Studying Islam in the Arab World (Routledge Studies in Islamic Philosophy) [1 ed.] 9781032564081, 9781032564098, 9781003435372, 1032564083

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“Typical of Dr. Hanafi’s earlier works, this project is designed around original empirical data, fortified by solid command of religious sciences. In this volume, we find detailed studies of the curricula, theses, sermons, and approaches to religious education across several Muslim-majority countries in different parts of the world. That alone would have been a pioneering accomplishment, but Dr. Hanafi enhances the originality of his contribution by exploring the fruitfulness of a dialogue between the religious sciences he observes and the secular social sciences of which he is a world-renowned expert. There is little in the available literature that rises to the level of this significant book in terms of global scope, depth of knowledge, and cross-breeding of genres of knowledge— all carried out over many years by a key player in global social sciences.” Mohammed Bamyeh, University of Pittsburgh, United States “In this book Sari Hanafi explores the state of the art of Islamic studies in different countries, comparing curricula and different learning goals and outcomes. Coming from a sociology background, he realizes the need to reform both social sciences and Islamic studies, and in this book addresses the rupture and its causes. Without necessarily using the notions of post-colonialism, this book is definitely about revisiting the map of sciences as we know it, with all its divisions and complexities. A  must read for social scientists and Islamic scholars alike.” Heba R. Ezzat, Assistant Professor of Civilization Studies, Ibn Haldun University, Turkey “Sari Hanafi shows how a seasoned social scientist with a personal history of acquaintance with Islamic traditional knowledge can interrogate this traditional knowledge’s current conditions, as represented by three of its globally recognized institutions of learning. Among scholars of Islam, the humanities, and the social sciences, there are instances of overlap, turf-protection, cooperation and competition. This text is an opportunity for all participants in these areas of scholarship to think through, question, and enrich their positions about their academic fields’ palpable and not-so-palpable affinities.” Ahmad Atif Ahmad, Professor of Religious Studies, The University of California, United States “Sari Hanafi’s book calls us convincingly to reconsider the existing false binary between Sharia sciences and social sciences. He demonstrates why it is urgently needed and how it can happen. It is a timely call to leave behind the existing pseudo-dichotomies and move forward for a rooted revival through an inclusive multiplex epistemology and methodology which brings together ethical and empirical levels of knowledge.” Recep Senturk, Dean of College of Islamic Studies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, and President of Usūl Academy, Qatar

Studying Islam in the Arab World

Addressing the rupture between religious and social sciences in Arab universities, this book provides a critical assessment of the curricula of Shariah and Islamic studies departments across the Arab world, arguing for increased interdisciplinary dialogue. Based on over 250 interviews with university students and teachers, this study is the sum of five years of field research observing the curricula and teaching styles of colleges in the Shariah sciences. The author provides critical insight into these curricula by focusing on case studies in Lebanon and Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait and Qatar, and Malaysia. In doing so, the book seeks to answer the following questions: • What is the purpose of religious education? • Does it aim to create people who specialize solely in religious affairs, or does it aim to form the student according to a comprehensive human framework? • What is the nature of the relationship between the social sciences and the Shariah sciences? The book concludes by examining three pioneering institutions that have introduced alternative curricula in teaching Shariah studies. The book has wide geographic and ideological coverage and will appeal to university students, academics and policy analysts working across a range of disciplines, including the philosophy of knowledge, Islamic law and education, and sociology. Sari Hanafi is Professor of Sociology, Director of the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies and Chair of the Islamic Studies program at the American University of Beirut. He is also the President of the International Sociological Association. He co-authored Knowledge Production in the Arab World: The Impossible Promise (2015).

Routledge Studies in Islamic Philosophy Series Editor: Oliver Leaman University of Kentucky

The Routledge Studies in Islamic Philosophy Series is devoted to the publication of scholarly books in all areas of Islamic philosophy. We regard the discipline as part of the general philosophical environment and seek to include books on a wide variety of different approaches to Islamic philosophy. Miskawayh’s Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq Happiness, Justice and Friendship Ufuk Topkara The Covenants of the Prophet Muḥammad From Shared Historical Memory to Peaceful Co-existence Ibrahim Mohamed Zain and Ahmed El-Wakil Vicegerency in Islamic Thought and Scripture Towards a Qur’anic Theory of Human Existential Function Chauki Lazhar From the Divine to the Human Contemporary Islamic Thinkers on Evil, Suffering, and the Global Pandemic Edited by Muhammad U. Faruque and Mohammed Rustom Ghazālī’s Epistemology A Critical Study of Doubt and Certainty Nabil Yasien Mohamed Studying Islam in the Arab World The Rupture Between Religion and the Social Sciences Sari Hanafi

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/middleeaststudies/ series/RSINIP

Studying Islam in the Arab World The Rupture Between Religion and the Social Sciences Sari Hanafi Translated by Thomas Parker

First published in English 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Sari Hanafi The right of Sari Hanafi to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Translated by Thomas Parker with the support of Nohoudh Center for Studies and Research. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. This book is an updated and shorter version of the original book, published in Arabic by Nohoudh Center for Studies and Research 2021 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ḥanafī, Sārī, author. Title: Studying Islam in the Arab world : the rupture between religion and the social sciences / Sari Hanafi ; translated by Thomas Parker. Other titles: ʻUlūm al-sharʻ wa-al-ʻulūm al-ijtimāʻīyah, naḥwa tajāwuz al-qaṭīʻah. English Description: First. | New York : Routledge, 2023. | Series: Routledge studies in Islamic philosophy | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Translated from Arabic. Identifiers: LCCN 2023038471 (print) | LCCN 2023038472 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032564081 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032564098 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003435372 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Islamic law—Study and teaching—Arab countries. | Islam—Study and teaching—Arab countries—History. | Islamic renewal. Classification: LCC KBP43.A73 H36 2023 (print) | LCC KBP43.A73 (ebook) | DDC 340.5/907121767—dc23/eng/20230926 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023038471 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023038472 ISBN: 978-1-032-56408-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-56409-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-43537-2 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To Alaa, Ola, Onsi, Yara and Joud

Contents

List of Figures xv List of Tables xvi Glossaryxviii Introduction The Story of This Book  3 The Research Concerns and Questions  7 The Book’s Content  8 PART I

1

Theoretical Approaches and Contexts

13

  1 Shariah Education: Its History, Crisis and Approaches From Mosque Complexes to University Colleges  15 al-Zaytouna 16 al-Qarawiyyin  18 al-Azhar 18 Western Islamic Training Institutes: The French Case  21 Three Leading Doctrines: Traditionalism, Salafism and the Maqasidi Approach  23 Traditional Inferential Jurisprudence  23 Literal Textual Jurisprudence and Strict Salafi Orientations 28 Deductive Fiqh and New Issues (Nawazil) Fiqh Under the Maqasid al-Shariah Approach  32 The Crisis and Way Out  33 Education in Religion Is Not a Religious Education  35 Teaching Religions With a Focus on Rituals as a Cultural Studies Course  36 Approaching the Study of Religious Being  37

15

x  Contents Teaching a Religious Subject: Including All the Functions of Religion 38 Convening With the Social Sciences: Epistemic Integration 40 An Ethical Approach to Social Phenomena 42 2 The Arab Religious Field Religiosity and the Political/Social 50 The Arab Path of Secularism 55 Various Reactions to Post-secularity 58 Some Concluding Thoughts 59 Three Schools of Fatwas 60 How Is Migration Perceived by Religious Authorities? 61 European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 66 Concluding Remarks 67 The Internal Islamic Reform: New Configurations 71 New Reflexive Islamic Knowledge Groups 71 Friday Sermons 74 Methodology 75 Preachers’ Profiles 77 Sources of Knowledge 81 Content Analysis of Friday Sermons 84 Reference to General Morality 90 The Non-Muslim Others 91 Concluding Remarks 92 3 The Islamization of Knowledge: Appraisal and Alternative Introduction 101 The Five Dimensions of the Social Sciences 101 The Genesis of the Islamization of Knowledge Project 102 Outcome of Islamization and Islamic Grounding of Knowledge 105 Social Philosophy Emphasis 105 Serious Attempts at Islamic Grounding 106 Shallow Attempts 109 IoK: Six Problems 111 Reductionism 112 Emphasis on Normative Approaches With Empirical Laziness 112 The Changing and the Unchanging 113 The Fiqh of Shariah Versus the Fiqh of Applying the Shariah 114 Epistemology Versus Working Conditions of Researchers 115 Internationalization of Knowledge 116

49

101

Contents  xi Conclusion and Alternative  117 The Alternative: “Separation, Connection and Pluralistic Praxis” 118 PART II

Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World   4 Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon: Dominance of the Traditionalist Tendency Introduction 129 The Islamic University of Beirut  130 Bachelor’s 132 Master’s  137 Doctoral Program  143 Master’s and Doctoral Theses  143 Conclusion 146 Narrow-Minded and Outdated Curricula  146 The Sharp Dichotomy Between Shariah Sciences and Social Sciences 149 Combining Between Religious and Sectarian Concepts  150   5 Shariah Education in Jordan: Traditionalism in a Complicated Religious Field Shariah Education and Curriculum  154 University of Jordan  154 The University of Al al-Bayt  156 Human Sciences in the Study Plans of Shariah Colleges  157 Syllabi and Course Content  158 “Islamic Culture” in the Faculty of Shariah in the University of Jordan  159 “Contemporary Intellectual Schools” in the Faculty of Shariah in the University of Jordan  159 “International Relations in Islam” in the Department of Fiqh and Its Usul in the University of Jordan  160 “The Rules and Art of Da’wa” in the Islamic Studies Department of Yarmouk University  160 “The Islamic Social Science” in the Department of Islamic Studies at Yarmouk University  160 “Religions and Sects” in the Department of Usul al-Din at Yarmouk University  161 “Hadiths of Tribulations and the Signs of the End of Times” in the Department of Usul al-Din at Yarmouk University  161

127 129

153

xii  Contents Theses and Academic Research 164 Conclusion 165 Hegemony of Religious Orthodoxy 166 Curricula’s Lack of Supporting Social and Academic Content 166 Weak Pluralistic Approach 168 Students’ Weak Capabilities Before Entering University 170 6 University Shariah Education in Kuwait: Dominance of the Salafi Approach Curricula of the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies Programs 174 Education System of the College 174 The Curricula 176 Knowledge Production and Graduate Theses 186 Master’s and PhD Theses 186 The Journal of Shariah and Islamic Studies 186 Conclusion 188 7 Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco: Maqasid al-Shariah Approach Curricula of Shariah and Islamic Studies Programs 192 Shariah Colleges 194 Islamic Studies 205 Knowledge Production and Graduate Theses 211 Master’s and Doctoral Theses 211 Journal of the College of Usul al-Din 214 Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya Institute: An Outstanding Model 215 History 215 Curricula 216 Conclusion 218 PART III

Alternative Models 8 Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences: The Case of the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University Introduction 227 Academic Programs 228 Applied Islamic Ethics 229 Islam and Global Affairs Program 231

174

192

225 227

Contents  xiii Contemporary Islamic Studies Program 232 Islamic Art, Architecture and Urbanism Program 233 Islamic Finance Program 234 Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics 236 Master’s Theses 238 Conclusion: Opportunities and Challenges 240 9 From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”: The Case of the International Islamic University of Malaysia Introduction 246 IIUM: The Laboratory of IoK 246 Challenging Working Conditions 249 (Limited) Internationalization 250 Curriculum: Conventional Versus Integrated 251 Economics: IIUM’s Success Story 254 Psychology: Integrating the Soul 257 Faculty Research and Theses: Generational Differences 258 Master’s and PhD Theses 259 Discussion 260 Professionally Trained Versus Islamically Oriented 260 Successful IoK Mainstreaming With Mitigated Outcome in Maqasidic Approach 261 IoK as a Paradigm Versus Pluralism 262 Conclusion 263 PART IV

246

Reality, Rupture and Alternative

269

10 Problems Shared by Shariah Colleges Oscillating Between Support and Refusal of Knowledge Integration 272 Methodological and Academic Integration 273 Different Referential System and Knowledge Incompatibility 274 Pedagogical Approach: Monotony and Blind Imitation 276 Contradicting Reason and Logic 278 Over-specialization 279 Poor Quality of Master’s and Doctorate Dissertations 279 Limited Abilities of Shariah Students 281 High Rates of Female Students 281 Conclusion 281

271

xiv

Contents Conclusion: Towards Methodological Alternatives in Connecting the Shariah Sciences to the Social Sciences Ecologizing Knowledge Through the “Separation, Connection and Pluralistic Praxis” Approach 287 The Maqasidi Paradigm 289 Approaching Religion as Ethics 291 Moral Inquiry, Public Reason and Emotion 292 Religion’s Relationship With Ethics 294 The Ethic of Conviction and the Ethic of Responsibility 295 In Conclusion 296 Index

285

300

Figures



2.1 2.2 2.3 9.1

Types and functions of religiosity. Four forms of secularism. Various reactions to post-secularity. Percentage of courses according to IoK categories in selected disciplines. 11.1 The sources of ethical judgement.

54 56 58 253 296

Tables



2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6

2.7

2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12

2.13 2.14 2.15

2.16 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.20 3.1

4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1

Distribution of Namaa Books to Different Fields Sunni Sample Distribution by Age Distribution of Sunni Sample by Region Type of School the Sunni Preachers Attended Highest Degree Obtained by Sunni Preachers Country in Which the Sunni Preachers Obtained Their Last Degree Distribution of Non-religious Degrees Obtained by Sunni Preachers, if Applicable Sunni Preachers’ Proficiency in Languages Other Than Arabic Salary Source for Sunni Preachers Sunni Preachers’ Other Professions Frequency of Internet Usage by Preacher Usage of TV, Internet, Radio and Other Media for Preaching Purposes Favorite Reading Topics Expressed by Sunni Preachers Declared Sources Used for Preparing Friday Sermons and the Frequency of Their Usage Declared Quotes Used in Friday Sermons and the Frequency of Their Usage Topics of the Sermons Sermon References to Specific Countries Invocation Reference to Specific Countries Speech Reference to Christianity and the Context of Reference Speech Reference to Jews and the Context of Reference Conferences and Events Related to the Topic of the Islamization of Knowledge University Institutions With Programs in Shariah or Islamic Studies Summary of the Analysis of Curricula in Shariah Colleges Established Curricula in the Shariah Institutes in Lebanon Distribution of Study Hours Between the Shariah Sciences and Social Sciences

73 77 78 78 78 79 79 79 81 81 82 82 83 83 84 85 86 86 91 92 104 131 147 150 158

Tables  xvii 6.1 Students’ Enrollment in Graduate Programs at the College of Sharia 7.1 Number of Universities That Present Shariah/Islamic Studies Programs 7.2 Percentage of Doctoral Theses in the Social and Human Sciences 8.1 Theses Defended From 2008 to 2018 9.1 Number of Courses According to IoK Categories in Selected Disciplines 10.1 Reason for the Crisis of the Shariah Studies

187 193 212 238 253 277

Glossary

Note on transliteration: I will use the simple form of transliteration. Arabic words will be in italic the first time they are used in each chapter. ‘illal  effective causes adhaan  call for the prayer al-wala’ and al-bara’  affinity and enmity for Allah’s sake asbab al-nuzul  causes/promptings of revelation bay’a  pledge of allegiance Da’i  Islamic advocate (pl. Do’aat) da’wah  Islamic advocacy; religious appeal and conviction fiqh al-ta’aruf  mutual knowledge of the other fiqh al-waqi’  jurisprudence that reflects the reality fiqh or (fiqhi rules)  human understanding of the divine Islamic law fitna  chaos and schism fitra  the natural disposition God instilled in mankind or man’s innate state ihsan  many significations: quality, doing something well, and continual beautification ijma’  consensus ijtihad  innovation or independent reasoning or original interpretation (pl. ijtihidat) Ilm al-Jarh wa al-Tadil  evaluating reliability of Hadith transmitters; criticism and praise in hadith sciences Istikhlaf  Allah’s Assigning the Human Being as His Deputy Jaafari madhhab  the predominant Shia jurisprudential school Jahaliyya  pre-Islam era Kafir  an apostate (pl. takfireyyeen) khulwah  a situation where a male and a female, who do not have a relationship that impedes their marriage, are alone in a private place mafasid  harms Maqasid al-Shariah (or Maqasid/Maqasidic methodology or Maqasidi/Maqasidic paradigm)  the higher purposes of the Shariah are evaluated by the social wellbeing function maslaha mu’amalat  social relationships mudarabah/musharakah  profit-sharing/equity participation

Glossary  xix mujtahid  innovator murshid  guide qard hasan  free loans qatiyyat or thawabit  religious unchangeable pillars and imperatives and fixed elements in Shariah qawa’id fiqhiyya  legal maxims qisas  retaliation sadaqat  charity sahaba  companions of the Prophet Mohamed Shariah colleges  colleges teaching Islamic religion shirk and bida’  illegal innovations in religious rituals shura  consultation (adj. shuratic) siyasa shariyya (or Shariah politics)  Shariah-legitimate governance: legal politics ta’sil  grounding Tahqiq  the critical editing tajdidi  reformist/revivalist takfir  denotes a Muslim who declares another Muslim to be apostate (i.e., not believing in the essential tenets of Islam) and therefore no longer a Muslim taklif (age of )  reach adulthood tariqa  school of Sufism Taskhir  God’s subjugation of the world to humanity Tawhid  monotheistic law that stems from the Quran and Sunnah tazkiya  purification of the self urf  customary practices Usul al-Fiqh  the sources of Islamic law and the discipline dedicated to elucidating them and their relationship to the substantive rulings of the law waqf  Islamic endowment of property to be held in trust and used for a charitable or religious purpose (pl. Awqaf) zakat  a levy on wealth

Introduction

One century ago, Mohamed Eltaher Ben Achour ([1907] 2006) wrote: Undoubtedly time has produced people after the eighth century who glorify, subject themselves to and unquestioningly follow others while not understanding them. This greatly aided in exacerbating blind imitation (taqlid) and distancing them from the truth and critique. They were deceived by the transmissions from master scholars they found in our predecessors’ works, thinking only this to be the sign of knowledge. Rather, if Sukaki transmitted from al-Zamakhsahri and Abd al-Qahir, he did so where he wanted to prove the correct meaning of something or point to an eloquent statement. Why then do we today only hear “he said, they said?” . . . to the point that it has turned into a belief among people that every written statement is true without need to challenge it. I open this book with this quotation from the work of Sheikh Mohamed Eltaher Ben Achour (1879–1973),1 the president of the Sheikhs of Zaytuna Mosque in 1945, titled Is the Dawn Not Near? He wrote this book in the year 1907 while he was still in his youth, and it has been republished numerous times since. The book discusses the issue of reforming Islamic education historically, methodologically and in terms of its content. This is one of the most important books to have discussed the dilemma of Muslims’ religious education. I find much in the spirit of Ben Achour that is relevant to our contemporary reality. What I found charming about the book was that even though it was written in the context of the confrontation between the colonized Islamic world and its Western colonizer, Ben Achour still focused on many of the foundational and methodological internal factors related to religious education, not only in the al-Zaytouna complex, but also in other centers of religious education. I therefore made the work’s title the subtitle of my own book in the Arabic version. Indeed, the essential problem is an internal one within our Islamic societies and is a problem ruled by intrinsic mechanisms that cannot be attributed to any sneaky external epistemological or ideological Trojan horse. Perhaps the other point I  share with Ben Achour’s book is that we are both armed with an idyllic and utopian dream. The morning is such a beautiful metaphor for the hope that the dawn of reform is near, and that the light of knowledge will DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-1

2  Introduction advance after the hegemony of fossilized knowledge. I believe that both of us tried to be faithful to this quality and present a constructive and optimistic critique. Ben Achour ended his book saying: This work has been accompanied by many suggestions and notes which this book included, and it turned out to be the first of the morning which I hoped was near, and I did not stop every time I found a gap to advance in education even if difficult, until I said “the morning follows its dawn,” and I saw many reformers who took our path and stayed on it accordingly. (Ben Achour 2006, 254) Ben Achour’s book is a brief yet difficult work, as he wrote it like a report. The Sheikh tried in his book to diagnose the ailment of traditional religious education and comprehensively describe its modern treatment. It included educational policies and programs, school curricula, teachers’ training, and discussion methods. His critique was simultaneously historical-civilizational, epistemological-educational, sociological-relational and political-ethical. This is despite Imam Muhammad Abduh previously being impressed with Zaytuna’s educational curriculum, of which he said, “The Muslims of Zaytuna have beaten us to reforming education to the point that what they are doing in Zaytuna Mosque is better than al-Azhar” (alManar 10/71). Sheikh Ben Achour discussed the absence of scientific communities and academic freedom, and the complete absence of the discipline of ethics from university education and not only Shariah education, problems which remain to this day. Before colonialism divided between religious education and general education, typically all education began in the madrasa (al-Zaytouna, al-Qarawiyyin and alAzhar). However, this division was of course not just a “colonial conspiracy” but also was due to the many problems in religious educational institutes. A researcher once mentioned to me that Taha Husayn—who was previously a student at al-Azhar—described student life in the Egyptian University (later renamed Cairo University), where he was the dean of the College of Arts at the time, by saying it was “where one can breathe fresh air and the self-fulfillment of knowledge without being disturbed by the control of al-Azhar professors.” While almost all Shariah and Islamic Studies colleges call to “moderation,”2 this moderation has been put at stake by political authorities who try to polarize these colleges and their curriculum (like they have polarized and contained religious institutions), as well as by a traditional conservatism which made moderation incongruent with the changing reality. The acceleration of different lifestyles calls for these colleges, scholars and muftis not only to interact with them as a matter of halal and haram, but also to think of how to accommodate this plurality of lifestyles in a single society. Furthermore, the crisis of Shariah disciplines can be partially demonstrated by the plenitude of academic conferences organized in Shariah colleges on the problems of religious education and used curricula.3 The September 11th attacks also cast a shadow over the issue of Islamic religious education, through the claim that this education was one of the most important

Introduction  3 reasons that lay behind terrorism and violence, according to the interpretation of neoconservatives in the United States and similar currents in Europe (al-Hafi 2016). The discussions around Islam are still greatly controlled by political considerations and adopting binaries such as modernity versus tradition, secularism versus religion (or religiosity), and reason versus revelation. The role of Shariah colleges and Islamic studies in education and curricula is also part of this discussion. This book hopes to overcome the ideological divides and aims to critically reframe concepts related to our ever-changing reality, such as national and religious identity, globalization, modernity and humanism. The issue is not one of Islamizing modernity or completely modernizing Islam (Aourid 2016). Rather, I will ask—along with Hmida Ennaifer (2011)—as to how we can achieve modernity while enabling the authenticity of tradition. This is not to simply repeat the old, like copying a transient photo, but rather to re-create tradition to where thought and action brings it to the level of being a living and creative copy. The Story of This Book The story of this book begins with my personal experience and my encounters with different knowledge systems, all of which enriched me personally. However, I felt the extent of the fractures of elite fighting, who at best ignore each other and do not speak to each other. I grew up in a religious and conservative family in the neighborhoods of Damascus and its Yarmouk camp. I am indebted to my two elder brothers, Muhammad and Thaer, and my two paternal uncles, Salah and Khalid, who allowed me to accompany them to their religious lessons in the seventies when I had barely left the cradle. I was curious and would even attend the lessons of sheikhs who belonged to contradicting intellectual and fiqhi schools, such as the two Sheikhs Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Bouti (1929–2013) and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–1999). The difference between both them and their followers reached the point of hatred and takfir at times. I remember al-Bouti calling al-Albani “the foreigner” (al-aja’mi), hinting at his Albanian origin and thus his inability to fully master the Arabic language. However, my awareness of Islamic thought began to develop with my reading of Malek Bennabi (1905–1973; with the pushing of my aunt Afaf), Jawdat Said (1931– 2022), Muhammad Emara (1931–2020), Muhammad Qutb (1919–2014), Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) and Said Hawa (1935–1989). Naturally, my political awareness against the dual tyranny of the Syrian Baathist project and the colonialism of the Israeli Zionist project led me to be involved organizationally and intellectually in political groups which could most closely be described as being leftist. There, I insatiably read Muhammad Abed al-Jabri, Hasan Hanafi and Muhammad Arkoun, and then Abdullah Laroui, Hichem Djaït, Munir Shafiq and Michel Foucault, among others. Nonetheless, I did not cut myself off from some Islamic personalities, as I, along with my dear friend Safwan al-Mushilli, played a role in promoting the ideas of some of the leftist intellectuals who were interested in the Arabic-Islamic heritage. This debate was particularly important in al-Salamiyyeh, a peripheral small town near Hama, where one would find different oppositional leftist currents such as the

4  Introduction Communist Party and the Communist Labor Association, as well as some of the more open-minded Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) and other Islamic intellectual currents. I would flee from Damascus and its noise to the refuge of this town, which was the home of my friend Safwan. I still remember our reading of the Communist Manifesto in Ramadan on the holy Night of Destiny (Laylat al-Qadr)!4 We coupled our studies of civil engineering with sociology—illegally, that is, as the university system prohibited combining two majors. At the time, we were searching not only to understand the world but to change it, as per Marx’s famous saying. I cannot forget the long hours that Safwan and I spent with Sheikh Jawdat Said in his village of Bi’r Ajam in the south of Syria, where we discussed the thought of al-Jabri, Arkoun, Hasan Hanafi and Foucault. Funnily enough, we would bring books to read in his village and return with honey, as Said was famous for producing delicious honey from the plains of Quneitra. The importance of Jawdat Said was in his inspiration from Gandhi’s theory of non-violence. Yet, paradoxically, his followers were involved in the Syrian revolution since 2011 in the countryside of Damascus, such as Daraya and al-Ghouta. I also founded a reading group in the Yarmouk camp for some of the youth who had grown up in a religious melting pot and were passionate about renewing Islamic thought. Our obsession was Shakib Arslan’s question, “Why did Muslims regress and non-Muslims progress?” In the early eighties, we would meet weekly to discuss many books. I remember we began by reading Hasan Hanafi’s Tradition and Modernity and impatiently waited for his From Tradition to Revolution, whose publication had been announced. We imagined that this reading of ours would set the stage for this revolution. This is how the good news came that the four-volume book was available in Lebanon. This was a period of excitement as the recent Iranian revolution (1997) had greatly motivated us at the time. I then quickly traveled to Beirut using some of my relations with a Palestinian faction to be able to enter Lebanon in that special manner called “the military way,” as Palestinians like me face great difficulties in entering Lebanon. It is no secret that we felt at the time that the book, despite its grand title, only produced something humble. This heartbreak perhaps continued until the Arab Spring began in 2010. We were always searching for a space for our divergent ideas to meet and crossfertilize, until we found a friend of ours who was truly influenced by Sheikh Jawdat and his school, the respected Syrian businessman and intellectual Mohamad Kheir al-Zarzour, who decided with Safwan’s help and mine to establish the Horizons and Selves (al-afaaq wa al-anfus) bookshop in the heart of downtown Damascus. This library was about the only place where one could obtain all of the tajdidi books of Islamic thought, in addition to leftist books by authors such as Mahdi Amel, Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, al-Tayyib Tizini, Ali Umailil and Husayn Marwa. The library transformed into a hub for discussions and debates between different intellectual orientations. My cousin Said Hajir was the director of this bookshop, where he would receive us with open arms and join our discussions with his usual enthusiasm, in addition to offering us tea and coffee. The bookshop perhaps became a gathering place, where I met many Syrian intellectuals, especially from the oppositional left

Introduction  5 (e.g., Adnan Makiyyeh, Ali Nur al-Din al-Atasi, Shukri al-Rayan and Dr. Nawar Atfa, Abdulmajid Arafah), before the regime permitted the oppositional leaders and their intellectuals (e.g., Riyadh Sayf, Jamal al-Atasi) to legally gather in what would be called diwaniyyat. In this context, I felt the importance of these little melting pots for intellectual cross-fertilization, but I also felt the deep gap between leftist elites (and most likely between the social sciences and humanities) on the one hand, and the religious elite on the other, who even applied labels to them such as kafir (disbeliever) or traitor. With the Arab Spring, these splits manifested in the real world, which made some leftists take refuge in the army to salvage them from the popular rise of Islamic movements, making it a bloody breakup, like in Egypt for instance. This is the opposite of many who attempt to blame the role of foreign powers for the political failure of the Arab Spring. As such, it appears that this gap between the two elites is present with the implicit approval of both sides. The sociological indicators of this separation manifested in some of my previous studies. For example, there are no discussions between religious and leftist intellectuals in daily journals, and any discussions we do see between them on television usually only feature heated spectacles and polemics, such as in the program al-Itjihah al-Mu’aqis (The Opposing Side) by Faisal al-Qasim on al-Jazeera. These polemics do not form a space for rational discourse but rather a sort of “Pavlovian” militarization against each other. These sharp polarizations become rich material for the public to deepen their takfiri thought in all its binary religious or secular forms: national-traitor, resistance-infiltration. This sociology of rupture also manifests in the restricted nature of the participants in 23 seminars or lectures held at the American University of Beirut between the years of 2011 and 2015. Between the dozens of participants, only two invitees were of an Islamic leaning, compared to dozens of leftist interlocutors. There were many papers on Islamic movements, but all with the same antagonistic shade that speaks of how these movements “stole the revolution,” the “insincerity of their demands for democracy,” and that “Sayyid Qutb remains their secret theoretical inspiration,” that they are “agents for America and Saudi Arabia,” and so on. We would have to wait until 2016 to listen to personalities such as Heba Raouf Ezzat and Abdelfattah Moro participate in the university’s conferences. The examples of this exclusion are repeated in several Arab countries. Religious people have become used to defining women’s religiosity by whether or not they wear the hijab, which they made the first and foremost symbol of chastity and purity, whereas for many non-religious people it represents women’s subjugation. This extreme polarization resulted in one side enforcing it with power in Iran and the other banning it in France (and Syria in the time of Rafat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez al-Assad). However, fortunately the Ennahda party in Tunisia would break this reductive division between hijab-wearing and non–hijab-wearing, as it appointed women who did not wear hijab as candidates for parliament and to head the Tunis Municipality, delivering the message that it is not only a party for hijab-wearing women only, but rather all women.

6  Introduction This exclusionary discourse would continue on social media, as in 2019 a social sciences professor in a Moroccan university wrote on Facebook: Sociology does not see poverty as being the Lord’s predestination like that of religions. Rather, it sees poverty as springing from the ill-distribution of wealth, as a human fault of the first degree. If you are a student or a teacher who believes that poverty is from Allah’s predestination, I  advise you to change your branch to that of Islamic studies. The Palestinian philosopher Fahmi Jada’an would aptly write on all these extremisms/literalisms (salafyyat) that because some people who live in our current Arab time live in a literalism in which the religious and the political accumulate, and because their opponents oppose them in that, and everything; their antagonism was aggravated especially in their discussions on the concept of enlightenment, which brought it to a place where it lost its innocence, significance and nobility. The concept became a victim of the two sides’ opposition, and this rational and self-negligence transformed it from its pure epistemological context to a “profane” ideological context. That is, it became a “heresy,” such as the hereticization of other grand concepts, striking in the same place from where Enlightenment came. (Jada’an 2018) Muhammad Hashimi (2016) also expressed how secularism turned into “another totalizing doctrine that behaves like it contains all human issues—even if negatively from indifference—which turns into a binding reference with orders and determinisms that could be described with the same self-comprehensiveness particular to religious doctrinal orders.” However, this self-confinement from other opinions is not limited only to secularist versus religious, as some strands of liberals or cultural left too are selfconfined in its concepts in liberty and pluralism. The Alwaleed Center for American Studies and Research (CASAR) in the American University of Beirut can also be critiqued, as for a long period of time the reductive picture of the United States it used to introduce to the Arab public was one closer to enforced demonization, and it rarely presented the debates between different orientations that sweep these states. Therefore, it was impossible for both the center itself and social scientist elites in the United States to predict President Donald Trump’s electoral victory. It was in this context of the weak spirit of liberalism in the region that I began to research the production of scientific knowledge in the Arab world, which culminated in my co-authored book (Hanafi and Arvanitis 2015) on knowledge production in the Arab world that the authoritarian political elite—not to mention some of the religious powers—were able to take advantage of the social sciences’ problematic situation (born in the shadow of the colonial period and its foreign funding) as a means to de-legitimize and marginalize it. It is rare to hear in the Arab world of

Introduction  7 a “white paper” written by academic researchers on the basis of a request from the public authorities to discuss it in the public sphere. Most likely, some religious authorities feel that they are threatened by social science researchers, as they compete to address society. For instance, I  pointed out in a study I  conducted on family planning in Syria to the heated television debates in 1994 between a sheikh and a female activist. The sheikh was Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Bouti, who views Islam as opposed to many forms of family planning. As for the activist, she was the head of the General Union for Syrian Women, whose one and only qualification was that she was a Baathist loyal to the authoritarian regime. Despite family planning lying directly within the realm of sociology and demography, she did not reference any social scientists during her general discussions. The Research Concerns and Questions The years passed until the time came for me to research this rupture. I occupied myself with working on this book in your hands now for more than five years, which required diligent and careful field research in several Arab countries and Malaysia. The grant from the Kuwaiti organization Nohoudh Center for Studies and Research, as well as the Carnegie Corporation of New York, was a major aid in enabling me to accomplish this careful work, which was followed by intensive meetings for dialogue. I try in this book to understand how religious actors delegitimized the social sciences. While the opposite is of course also true, it lies outside the interest of this book and will be the subject of my next research, especially how to link social sciences to moral philosophy. Hence, I will focus in this book on the content of the curricula of Shariah or Islamic studies departments in Arab universities through case studies in the Arab Mashriq (Lebanon and Jordan), the Arab Maghreb (Morocco), and the Gulf region (Kuwait and Qatar), in addition to Malaysia. This book starts from the premise that religion cannot be reduced to jurisprudence (fiqh), since fiqh requires socially grounded ethical arguments, and because applying fiqh to reality requires analytical tools that were developed and still lie in the field of the humanities in general and the social sciences in particular. One of the most important tasks of these sciences is to explore the connection between religious practice and affiliation and other social phenomena, and how these practices were established through religious social institutions (including Islamic movements and parties, mosques, fatwa institutions, religious virtual space, etc.). In light of these concerns, this book will attempt to answer the following questions: • What is the purpose of religious education? Does it aim to graduate people who specialize solely in religious affairs, or does it extend beyond that to the necessity of forming the believer in a comprehensive human framework? • What are the different schools of thought on Shariah education? • What is the nature of the relationship between the social sciences and the Shariah sciences? To what extent can Islamic studies benefit from the social sciences?

8  Introduction • What are the characteristics of Shariah curriculum and the quality of the dominant pedagogical system in Shariah departments? Does the curriculum produce graduates capable of participating in local or global socio-political debates? • What suggestions can we make to Shariah jurisprudents to develop their tools to understand the world, religion and society in light of an era characterized by pluralism? And how can social sciences be embedded in Shariah colleges? • What are the mainstream fiqh and Islamic intellectual trends present in the university space among students and teachers? • What are the characteristics of knowledge production in Shariah colleges represented in academic books, articles and university theses? The answers to these questions should help us better understand whether there is a crisis in Shariah education, and the extent to which such a crisis is related to their distance from social science perspectives. The Book’s Content The content of this book is the result of field research I conducted over five years (2015–2020) of studying some of the Shariah departments in the above-mentioned countries. I studied these colleges in terms of their curricula and teaching styles in the Shariah sciences and the relation of these sciences to other fields of empirical knowledge, namely the social and human sciences. With the help of a working team, I conducted 263 interviews with teachers and students in colleges of Shariah and the social and human sciences, some of whom were heads of departments, deans or even university presidents. We met some of them in their universities, and others through academic conferences and seminars. We also went through their academic production, including articles published in refereed journals, media writings and contributions to social media platforms. In each case, I sought to understand the context within which the teaching of Shariah sciences developed, the circumstances of field research, and the extent and access of our information. My extensive attendance of academic conferences, given my position as president of the International Sociological Association (ISA) and former vice president of the board of trustees of the Arab Council for Social Sciences (ACSS), aided me in gathering a large amount of data depicting the discourse of social and religious sciences scholars. I will discuss this methodologically in detail, as needed, in the introduction of the coming chapters of this book. In addition to this introduction and a conclusion, this book is composed of four parts and ten chapters as follows. Part I (Chapters 1–3) is devoted to the context and theoretical problems of teaching the Shariah sciences. Chapter 1 unfolds the evolution of Islamic madrasas in the West, with France as a model. I identify three main orientations in the Shariah sciences: classical (taqlidi, oriented to studying accumulating traditions and commentaries); literalists (Salafi, oriented to the founding period of Islam); and maqasidi (based on a paradigm of the higher aims of the Shariah). I then analyze what

Introduction  9 many actors have called the crisis of Shariah education and the different approaches of confronting this crisis. I center here on four approaches: an approach that separates the teaching of religion from religious teaching; an approach that focuses on rituals, supported by cultural courses on religion; an approach that highlights ontological questions; and finally an approach that teaches all functions of religion. I will suggest an approach close to the last approach as I propose connecting the teaching of Shariah sciences to the social sciences, which involves adopting an ethical approach to social phenomena. Chapter 2 discusses the characteristics of the Arabic religious fields with a focus on the relationship of religiosity to the social and political, including Arab experiments in partial secularization from below or from above, which makes it possible to understand the tools of fatwa-making in its three schools. This provides bases for the study of the Islamic renewal from inside the religious field while shedding light on some of its new actors. These include the Arab Network for Research and Publishing; Namaa Center for Research and Studies; and Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. Finally, I study Friday prayer sermons through a case study of Sunni and Shia sermons in Lebanon, centering on preachers’ characteristics and their relation to the state: supervision, financing, their sources of information, and sermon content (which points to social and political issues, ethics in the public sphere, or relationships with non-Muslims). Chapter 3 discusses the problems raised with approaches of Islamization of Knowledge (IoK) and ta’sil (grounding), pondering whether such projects are truly necessary or rather serve as a sort of identity politics. On the basis of this analysis, the chapter suggests a new approach that I call “separation, connection and pluralistic praxis” as an alternative to IoK and similar projects. Part II (Chapters  4–7) centers around Shariah higher education in the Arab world. Chapters 4–5 focus on the Mashriq, examining the cases of Lebanon and Jordan, which are highly influenced by the traditional approach, although I show how this traditionalism leads to results that go beyond the “traditional” framework. Chapter 6 examines the Kuwaiti example, including its Salafi orientation. Chapter  7 deals with Shariah education in the Arab Maghreb through examining the case of Morocco.5 In this part of the book I also touch upon religious madrasas and non-university institutes, when necessary, even though they are technically outside the scope of this book. Part III (Chapters 8–9) examines two pioneering institutions which have introduced alternative curricula in teaching Shariah and Islamic studies, in addition to Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyyah in Morocco, which I discuss in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 explores the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad bin Khalifa University in Qatar, which retrieved the ethical side in Shariah sciences. In Chapter 9 I explore the case of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), which was a laboratory in the project of Islamizing knowledge before moving from identity politics to integrating knowledge in a manner more akin to a model of what I call an interactive ecology of knowledge (Chapter 9). Finally, Part IV (Chapter 10) presents a general vision of the problematic characteristics shared between Shariah colleges. Here I discuss the problematic aspects

10  Introduction which these colleges must avoid, which are their oscillation between supporting and refusing knowledge integration; methodological and academic integration and interdisciplinarity; different referential systems and knowledge incompatibility; pedagogical approach of monotony and blind imitation; contradicting reason and logic; over-specialization; weak academic quality of master’s and doctorate dissertations; limited abilities of Shariah students; and finally, high female enrollment among the student body. This analysis is heavily based on how the critical voices among faculty in colleges of Shariah report about their colleges and their curricula. I decided to not discuss only the obstacles of Shariah sciences’ engagement with the social sciences, but to also point out three approaches that guarantee the quality of teaching the Shariah sciences and their bridging with the social sciences: cultivating knowledge according to the “separation, connection and pluralistic praxis”; the Maqasid methodology; and the ethical approach to religion. These approaches have been tested to a reasonable degree in three important institutions discussed in the book: the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad bin Khalifa, the International Islamic University of Malaysia, and Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya. In conclusion, I  must record my deepest appreciation and gratitude to all who participated in fieldwork or in deepening the ideas of this book. I especially thank the following respected scholars: Ali Fahd al-Zamei, Muhammad al-Shamiri, Nayla Tabbara, al-Tayyib Bouizza, Muhammad Eisa al-Sharifayn, Naser Jabi, Muhmmad bin Halima, Abdul Hamid Alyan, Imad al-Din Shahin, Ramah Gharib, Mu’taz al-Khatib, Ibrahim Zein, Muhammad al-Tahir al-Messawi, Iyad Eid, Dietrich Jung, Suleiman Bennouman, Abdel Moneim Shukeiri, Muhammad al-Nasiri, Hillary Weizner, Nehal Amer, Azzam Tomeh, Ali Harfouch, Khalid Bashir and Onsi Hanafi. I am especially grateful to Abdulrahman Helli, who reviewed the Arabiclanguage manuscript and filled it with valuable critical comments. Helli has an outstanding command of the Shariah sciences and has critical academic research works on the problems of religious education in the Arab world, with longstanding experience in different universities. He graduated from the Faculty of Shariah of the University of Damascus, obtained his doctorate in Quranic sciences from Zaytouna University in 2004, was an associate professor in Islamic studies at the University of Aleppo, and is currently a lecturer at the University of Frankfurt. I hope this work is beneficial to people and researchers in colleges and departments in Shariah, social and human sciences, and for it to be received well, with my apologies for any omission or slips. I  cannot but repeat Imam Shafi’s statement: “As time humbled me, it showed me my weak intellect. Any increase in my knowledge only increased me in my knowledge of my ignorance.” My aim from this critique outside of the Shariah sciences was only a keenness for its advance and interaction, to confirm its importance and critique reductive approaches towards it. Notes 1 All dates given in this book are Gregorian, unless otherwise marked as being hijri with the abbreviation AH. 2 For instance, among the aims mentioned for the Bachelor’s in Islamic Studies (Shariah and Religious Fundamentals) in the University of Bahrain are “Strengthening moderate

Introduction  11 Islamic thought, working to create roots and deepen it, and participate in the movement of reform and renewal” (College publication). 3 For instance, “The First International Conference: The Shariah Sciences: Challenges of Reality and Future Horizons,” Musqat, Oman, December 2018. 4 Muslims believe Laylat al-Qadr, or the Night of Power or Night of Destiny, to be the night on which the Quran was revealed and sins are forgiven, as revealed in the 97th and eponymously named chapter of the Qur’an. 5 For those interested in reading more about the Arab East and Maghreb cases, refer to the Arabic version of this book which contains extra chapters on Syria and Algeria.

References In Arabic al-Hafi, Amer. 2016. “Islamic Studies in Jordanian Universities.” In Islamic Studies Facing the Challenge of Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World, edited by Nayla Tabbara, 44–54. Beirut: al-Farabi/Institute for Citizenship and Diversity Management. Aourid, Hassan. 2016. Political Islam in the Balance: The Case of Morocco. Rabat: Tausna Publications. Ben Achour, Mohamed Eltaher. [1907] 2006. Is Not the Dawn Near? Arabic Islamic Education. Dar Sahnoun for Publishing and Distribution with Dar Al Salam. Ennaifer, Hmida. 2011. “The Arab Universities Crisis: Are We Globalizing Ourselves? (2/2).” Torus, 2011. www.turess.com/alfajrnews/20230. Hashimi, Muhammad. 2016. “Political Liberalism and Public Reason: Away from Secularism and Religion.” Mominoun Without Borders (blog). https://bit.ly/2Se1GJq. Jada’an, Fahmy. 2018. “What is Enlightenment .  .  . in the Arab World?” The New Arab, December 31, 2018. www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/2018/12/30/Ma-Tanweer-Arabia-1. In Other Languages Hanafi, Sari, and Rigas Arvanitis. 2015. Knowledge Production in the Arab World: The Impossible Promise. 1st ed. London and New York: Routledge.

Part I

Theoretical Approaches and Contexts

1 Shariah Education Its History, Crisis and Approaches

From Mosque Complexes to University Colleges This short chapter could in no way do justice to the history of religious education, which requires much more extensive study. However, it suffices for the purposes of our research questions to refer to only three of the oldest and most prestigious mosques worldwide whose educational systems evolved into universities: al-Zaytouna, al-Qarawiyyin and al-Azhar. Religious seminaries and colleges for Shariah education have become widespread across the Arab and Islamic world, in which the symbolic Islamic city could no longer be envisioned without its official educational institution. These institutions were frequently established by their local communities, since the scholars, most of whom were merchants and artisans themselves, allied themselves with an upper-middle merchant class which financed institutes, mosques, and charities. As Thomas Pierret (2013) notes, this partnership continued and expanded in the post-colonial era, at least in the Syrian case. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, religious education was taught in informal seminars before some mosques were converted into universities. These circles of learning are known by different names: “Katatib” in the East and “Khalwa” in Sudan due to Sufi influence (Ibrahim 1996). However, these informal designations did not affect the symbolic capital of many traditional scholars, who maintained considerable autonomy in the training of young clergy. Pierret’s analysis of Syrian religious education can then be extended to apply to the entirety of the Arab world. The institutionalization of specialized religious education in the twentieth century did not necessitate an end to the mechanisms of this social tradition. Rather, scholars were allowed—outside the formal traditional system—to designate their successors and favorites. Pierret cites three reasons for following informal education. First, a large proportion of the clergy has been trained in private institutes offering the advantages of modern education—that is, the effective and unprecedented ability to produce educated elites—while preserving the advantages of a teacherstudent relationship. Second, graduates of a state-run college for Shariah (or other colleges) tend to follow an informal training parallel to their formal education. Through their association with distinguished scholars, these students accumulate the symbolic DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-3

16  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts capital necessary for their admission into the religious elite. For example, I have noticed an important group of students at the American University of Beirut who would attend religious circles (halaqas) and Shiite seminaries (hawzas) outside their university hours. Third, while in Syria it may be possible to reach the uppermost tiers of religious elite through informal seminars only, in some Arab countries formal legal education has become necessary for an institutional religious role. To these three reasons one should add that the leaders of Islamic movements have often emerged from civil education, scientific, engineering and medical professions. Beyond the Arab and Muslim world, today Islamic and Shariah studies have spread to many Western universities and Islamic studies institutions. I will illustrate this in the French case. al-Zaytouna

Historians believe the Zaytouna Mosque in Tunisia to be the oldest existing Islamic mosque, which later offered religious education. Built between 79 and 114 AH by order of the governor of Tunisia Hassan bin al-Numan and completed by Obaidullah bin al-Habhab, Zaytouna has been teaching the religious sciences since the third hijri century (al-Ja’mati 2016, 22). The mosque became renowned for its excellence under the Hafsid dynasty, which ruled Tunisia after its conquest from 1228 to 1574. al-Zaytouna University is considered one of the most important university institutions in North Africa in terms of its early establishment and long-term operation. The university was solely dedicated to the Shariah sciences until 1951, when a modern branch was established, teaching a range of sciences, such as mathematics and natural sciences in Arabic in addition to modern languages such as French and English. al-Zaytouna University endured a turbulent period before and during the French protectorate between 1840 and 1958 that ended with its closure and replacement with a modern university education system in 1960. The old mosque retained a small location to host the Faculty of Shariah and Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, a faculty with limited prospects and few members. In 1987, al-Zaytouna University was restored and became an independent university, a political attempt by former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to gain clout with the scholars of al-Zaytouna upon his coup d’etat. However, in giving it a formal university status he also stripped it of its traditional orientation and scholars, giving its secular opponents control of its curricula. At the time, al-Zaytouna University had three colleges: a college for principles of jurisprudence, a second for civilization studies, and a third for Shariah studies (Ennaifer 2011). The authoritarian political system tamed and marginalized al-Zaytouna after it lost its financial independence, ending its esteemed civil status and links with public Islamic endowments, thereby severely restricting its educational and administrative body through uncooperative state employees.

Shariah Education  17 The interdisciplinary reform of the curricula at al-Zaytouna University included the merging of religious sciences, social sciences and humanities, and the appointment of professors from outside of al-Zaytouna. In some senses, this reform was the dream of some key figures of the historical Zaytouna, including Sheikh Mohamed Eltaher Ben Achour, Salem Bouhageb, and Tahar Haddad (al-Zaydi 2018). Despite the importance of this reform, some members of al-Zaytouna viewed it with mounting suspicion. By overtaking large segments of the program of specialized study and replacing them with courses in humanities, some considered the change confusing to students and potentially weakening the quality and robustness of the religious specializations. Moreover, the reform gave preference and superiority to the proponents of humanities and social sciences over the professors of religious sciences, considering how the changes took place in an atmosphere of politicization of scientific and religious education. Unfortunately, the predicament is not only external, but also internal. Ezzeddine Inaya (2011), a graduate of al-Zaytouna, draws attention to the 15th clause of a decision dated December 26, 1875, relating to the Education Law at Zaytouna Mosque, which clarifies: No one has the right to research the backgrounds of scholars received, then accept and reject them from one generation to the next, nor to interfere in the selection of the curricula. Excessive interference and skepticism is a sign of suspicion and confusion. This indicates that al-Zaytouna did not realize that social transformations should be matched by a parallel advance in knowledge. Rather, their dealing with religious issues in the sciences of the Quran, hadith, and the principles of jurisprudence did not depart from their classical confines. This stagnation narrowed the scopes of its members and limited their horizons, due to their lack of historical consciousness and sociological awareness (Inaya 2011). Despite this, the position of al-Zaytouna University today in comparison to other faculties of Shariah in the Arab world is relatively better off due to Tunisia’s unique societal context. There is a distinctive quality to Tunisia’s pre-university school education system. I was drawn to the strength of the Tunisian educational curriculum in its comprehensive, diverse and pluralistic approach to religion and religiosity. For example, in Islamic Thought, a textbook taught in the fourth year of high school (in the humanities track), in addition to passages from primary sources, including al-Muwatta by Malik, al-Risalah by al-Shafi’i, the Revival of Religious Sciences by al-Ghazali, and Bidayat al-Mujtahid by Ibn Rushd, also contains references to contemporary thinkers such as Malik bin Nabi, Muhammad Iqbal and Abdullah Laroui (al-Ghabri 2018). According to Abdelbasset al-Ghabri, Tunisia’s educational policy can be characterized by four components. The first of these is holding rationality as a principle of enlightenment that does not contradict the essence and higher aims of Islam. Yet, this rationality is largely abstract and technical and instrumentally employs reason

18  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts in dealing with given problems. This ends up by privileging an eclectic approach that aspires to accommodate modern and religious ideals while paying no attention to any potential paradoxes that may arise from it. In his opinion, it would have been more appropriate to adopt Taha Abdel Rahman’s approach for generating methodological mechanisms sourced from the Arab-Islamic communication sphere. The second characteristic is partial secularism, or rather secularism that does not explicitly clash with religion. The third characteristic is an educational and pedagogical centralization which has caused a lack of consideration for regional differences. Finally, there a relative impact of the Tunisian reformist school: despite the significance of religious and civic educational curricula reform during the two terms of Minister Mohamad Charfi (1989–1992) and the al-Ghad School project (2002–2007), curricula have not changed significantly, not even after the Tunisian uprising (al-Ghabri 2018). al-Qarawiyyin

The al-Qarawiyyin Complex in Fez was established as an educational institution for the Qarawiyyin Mosque, which was originally built by Fatima bint Muhammad al-Fihri al-Qayrawani in 245 AH/859 CE in Morocco’s city of Fez. al-Qarawiyyin University is not only one of the oldest universities in the world, but also the first scientific institution that established specialized scientific chairs and degrees worldwide. Western scholars graduated from it, and the university and its affiliate scientific institutions made it a center of intellectual, cultural and religious activity for nearly a thousand years. Its famous alumni include Sylvester II (Gerbert Dauriac of Aurillac), who served as pope between 999 and 1003, and who is said to have introduced Arabic numerals to Europe after his return. Maimonides, a Jewish physician and philosopher, also spent a few years at al-Qarawiyyin and taught at the university. The Faculty of Islamic Law in Fez represents a historical extension of the old University of al-Qarawiyyin and was established within the framework of the organization of this university in 1963. We will dedicate Chapter 7 to this university. Its transformation into a leading institution of thought and higher aims of Islam (maqasid) served as a beacon across the Islamic world. al-Azhar

al-Azhar Mosque is one of the oldest mosque complexes after the al-Qarawiyyin Complex. Originally built by Jawhar al-Siqilli in 969, the school was later attached to it to train Fatimid preachers. The Fatimid Caliph al-Mu’izz Li-Din Allah would pray in it, and it was an intended gathering place for the Ismaili Shiites, who represented the official doctrine on which the Fatimid state was founded. In this sense, al-Azhar was established as the center of the Islamic nation, rather than as a mere Egyptian institution. With the establishment of the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt during the fourteenth century, al-Azhar shifted its Shiite allegiances to the Sunni sect. Sultan Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi followed the example of the just king Nur ad-Din

Shariah Education  19 Zengi in the Levant by establishing schools in Damascus and Aleppo, as well as the Nasiriyah school next to the mosque of Amr bin al-Aas to teach Shafi’i jurisprudence, then the Qamiyah school near it to teach Maliki jurisprudence, where the great historian Ibn Khaldun came to teach. Sultan Salah al-Din then successively established many other schools in Egypt and Cairo under the patronages of sultans and princes, and their numbers multiplied in the seventh and eighth centuries. At alAzhar, an “al-Ahliyya” (lit.: competence, aptitude) certificate was awarded to those who spent eight years at the institution, and its holder had the right to occupy positions of imam and oratory in mosques. Another certificate called “al-Al’alamiyyah” (international) was designated for those who spent at least 12 years at the institution and gave those who obtained it the right to teach at al-Azhar itself. Taha Jaber al-Alwani recalls al-Azhar’s stages of transformation under attempts of the Nasser regime to “Egyptianize al-Azhar,” that is, to make it an Egyptian religious institution, thereby alienating scholars of non-Egyptian origins, including its dean of the Faculty of Shariah at the time, Sheikh Issa Mannoun (1887–1957), who was of Palestinian origin, as well as the Sheikh of al-Azhar himself, Muhammad al-Khidr Hussain (1875–1958), who was of Tunisian origin (Jouda 2016, 182). al-Azhar has historically played a major role both in Egypt and abroad through religious education characterized by moderation in intellectual and jurisprudence, and which leaned towards traditionalism over revivalism. One indication of this deep-set moderation was its recognition of the Jaafari school of thought in 1959. However, despite the historical importance of this institution, the crisis over its Shariah education has been ongoing for a long time. The Grand Mufti of Damascus, Muhammad Khalil al-Muradi (1759–1791), described the challenges of education in al-Azhar, among other things, including organizational and methodological challenges. Among its methodological flaws was a constraint in defined subjects and a narrow scope in teaching. The goal in education here was to receive some limited information. Going beyond this given information or simply questioning its validity would raise the scholars’ suspicion and resistance and could even amount to punishment and expulsion from the institute, loss of stipend, not to mention defamation. (al-Khatib 2017) al-Azhar has gone through several stages of stagnation, spurring leading reformers in Egypt, such as Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, Hassan al-Attar and al-Jabarti, to call for a review of its curricula and methods of performance. Perhaps the most important attempt was that of Imam Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), when he contributed to the issuance of the al-Azhar Law that stipulated: “The division of sciences into tools [i.e. the empirical] and the maqasid [i.e. conceptual], and the addition of religious ethics, arithmetic and algebra, three new sciences which were considered among required courses,” and “The greatest portion of lessons is devoted to the sciences of maqasid, and no amount of time allotted to studying the empirical can be equal to the time spent on maqasid.” Muhammed Abdo further explained that

20  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts “the greater portion of study time is still spent on grammar, an empirical science. However, little time is spent on the maqasid, such as interpretation of the Quran and hadith.” Despite this, the law stipulates that it is not permissible for a student to engage in one of the sciences of maqasid before he is able to derive from it the concrete means to understand it, as every student must acquire the foundations of his doctrine. (al-Khatib 2017) The law also emphasized a complete banning of reading footnotes and reports for four years in all given sciences. Muhammed Abdo, however, did contribute to the ​​establishment of a college independent of al-Azhar, a school of Islamic legal judiciary established after his death, likely due to his dissatisfaction with the rigidity of al-Azhar sheikhs. He failed to convince Sheikh al-Anbabi—the Sheikh of al-Azhar at the time—to allow the teaching of Ibn Khaldun’s Prolegomena (Abdelwahab 2018, 10). This experience resulted in his famous saying: “I  do not fear for this religion except from those who wear turbans.” His student Sheikh Mustafa al-Maraghi (1881–1945) carried on his legacy of reform. Today, al-Azhar has become an important beacon in interdisciplinary university legal education in conjunction with other human and social sciences. From an educational point of view, al-Azhar is more than a university, as it is affiliated with a large number of schools. However, its role goes beyond the educational, as it is a major religious institution in Egypt, with the Sheikh of al-Azhar now appointed by the political authorities. Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, the current Sheikh of al-Azhar, was a member of the Policies Committee of the ruling National Party during the days of President Hosni Mubarak. al-Azhar’s influence extends beyond Egypt, given how its religious colleges and universities have branches not only in different Egyptian cities, but also in many Arab countries. Important changes have occurred since the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. al-Azhar issued important advisory papers: the “Future of Egypt” document (June 2011), the “Arab Spring” document (October 2011), the “Freedoms, Art and Creativity” document (January 2012), and the renunciation document, titled “Violence” (January 2013). These statements represent important moderate guidelines for Islamic ethics (Abdelrahim 2016). Therefore, al-Azhar evidently carries a clear vision for adopting a democratic system and respecting pluralism and personal freedoms, but not without contradictions. This was shown in al-Azhar’s reaction to the Arab Spring revolutions, a contradictory approach and position characterized by a hesitancy towards events, which was negatively reflected in its delay in announcing support for the uprisings, and then showing a double standard in judging them (Abdelrahim 2016). al-Azhar participated in an Islamic conference held in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, a state within the Russian Federation, under the title “Who are the Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah?” which excluded Salafism from the definition of Ahl al-Sunnah, the mainstream followers of the Sunnah. In a statement on 8 June 2017, al-Azhar

Shariah Education  21 aligned itself with the Egyptian government, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates on the “Gulf crisis,” which indicates the direct connection it sometimes maintains with the Egyptian political authorities. Needless to say, there are other examples that show its resistance to the state’s interference in imposing unjustified jurisprudential innovations. Western Islamic Training Institutes: The French Case

Islamic religious education is no longer just a popular demand in Muslim-majority countries, but also in Western countries in which Muslim communities have established themselves, particularly since the beginning of the twentieth century. The development of Islamic studies in Western countries is not only related to the growing presence of Muslims, but also to the development of Area Studies, and especially the need to understand Islam and Muslims, sometimes for the purposes of subjugation and domination. The knowledge produced by Western universities is the result of interaction not only between Muslim scholars but also between Muslims and non-Muslims. This field was developed in order to understand the Muslim community there but also in the Muslim countries. It only takes looking at the plethora of translations provided by the Arab Network for Research and Publishing, which includes the works of Wael Hallaq, Michael Cook, Cecile Laborde and many others, to understand the significance of this interaction. Similarly, I agree with Heba Khodr (2018) that Islamic studies programs have become of more interest to Muslims than others, which may be problematic in the long run as its curricula have little content in classical religious texts. Yet, Islamic education programs have been limited by other challenges, such as in the case in France, where Islamic religious education is largely taught outside universities, which refuse to teach it in the name of a hard secularism. I briefly evoke the French case here because I  lived there and was closely acquainted with the situation of the community there. I will also rely on the valuable study of Nabil Ennasri (2019) in the following. There are currently about 2500 mosques and prayer halls in France, all of which require imams, as well as a growing renewal of religiosity among Muslim youth in France, a fact confirmed by many social scientists. Many young Muslim activists, as well as many second and third generation students born and educated in France, feel the need for a minimal qualification in Islamic law, Arabic, or even memorization of the Quran. Some of them have taken advantage of e-learning platforms such as the Islamic Institute for Distance Education (Institut Musulman des Etudes à Distance) or the Institute of Quranic Studies (formerly the Ibn Taymiyyah Institute). However, there are four important institutes for in-person education, the first being the European Institute of Human Sciences (L’Institut européen des sciences humaines), located in Château-Chinon in the Nièvre region. This center was opened in 1992 as an intensive continuing education program training for European imams in France and is attended by only 200 students annually. The second is the European Institute of Islamic Sciences in Paris, a branch of the former, established in 1999. It offers an intensive or intermediate program in the form of evening

22  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts lessons on the weekend, and its enrollment in recent years has surpassed a thousand students. The third is the Institute for the Fundamentals of Religion (Institut Oussoul el Dine), located in Saint-Denis. Established in the late nineties, this institute was frequented by many young activists of associations, particularly in its first ten years of operation. The institute offers lessons in Islamic education and in the Arabic language, for the particular benefit of young activists. The latest among these is the Shatibi Center in the Stains commune, which opened in 2014 and is attended by over 400 students annually. It is the most successful institute in the Paris region, combining the fundamentals of Islamic training and Arabic language to address the visible spiritual struggles, concerns and issues concerning youth in their Muslim community. In recent years, many of these institutes have sought to broaden the scope of their instruction besides their Islamic training to bring in non-Muslim lecturers from abroad. This development has been remarkable in recent years and can be explained by many evolving social factors. First is the need for youth education, for both men and women, to not be exclusively limited to Islamic sciences, but instead to encompass their understanding of their socio-political contexts in which Islam is threatened. Second, the high security period following terrorist attacks in both France and Europe forced some institutions to open their doors and educational programs in gradual assimilation of the principles of secularism, coexistence or French history. Finally, the growing need and interest in concepts and disciplines such as psychology, self-development, and even the environment, have concerned the officials of these institutes, who understand the need for greater interdisciplinarity between religious sciences and contemporary realities (Ennasri 2019). This flourishing of these religious institutions is threatened by the new wave of the state Islamophobia in France. In October  2020, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech to present his strategy for fighting separatism. He clearly targeted and stigmatized the Muslim community (including 52 mentions of the words Islam and Islamism) insofar as it has refused to be assimilated (to cultural majoritarianism). But this is a Muslim community which, as most social scientists admit, has engaged in an extraordinary process of integration, socially, economically, and to a certain extent politically, despite some of the cultural, urban and employment forms of discrimination against them. Once the “Islamic separatism” law was passed in parliament, Macron’s minister of interior, Gerald Darmanin, closed hundreds of mosques and banned some institutions related to the “Muslim Brotherhood” (MB) in France, and portrayed them as more dangerous than Salafism, which showed a degree of bigotry and ignorance of such actors’ importance in potentially Islamic reform.1 Anyone can consult fatwas and statements of the European Council for Fatwas and Research or the teaching of the European Institute for Human Sciences (both historically incorporate many members of the Muslim Brotherhood) to see the huge difference between these and the teachings of any Salafist or traditionalist Islamic movements either in Europe or in Islamic countries. The most flagrant case is the ban of the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, which has won many court cases during the last decade (Hanafi 2020). Needless to say, the deteriorating situation of Islamic institutions is not only

Shariah Education  23 related to French state intervention, but to Muslim leaders as well. I still remember in the early nineties how one of the mosques in the Parisian suburbs had an excellent knowledgeable and eloquent young imam who was replaced by the mosque’s administrative board with a mediocre one, just because the former was unmarried. Three Leading Doctrines: Traditionalism, Salafism and the Maqasidi Approach Through al-Qarawiyyin and al-Azhar Universities two independent schools of thought emerged, and alongside them of course, the Salafi school originating from Saudi Arabia. In the Arab world, there are indeed three major trends that affect all faculties of Shariah and Islamic studies, and these trends are fundamentally related to how to deal with jurisprudence: traditional inferential jurisprudence, literalist jurisprudence with strict Salafi orientations, and the inferential and nawazil (i.e., new legal cases) jurisprudence which centers around the maqasidi methodology. Traditional Inferential Jurisprudence

What is meant by traditionalism here is classicism, rather than an anti-modern quality of knowledge. Despite its inadequacy in keeping pace with some changes in our contemporary reality, traditionalism remains an important trend, and it is always important to have a good knowledge of classical texts in Islam. This trend, according to Radwan al-Sayyed (2019), was opposed by two parties: the reformist, which considered these texts old and decadent, and the revivalist, because he wanted to simultaneously escape the deception of history and the deception of the present for certainty of a system of his own making, believing that this is what was the Islamic system. Though al-Azhar established and championed this school of thought, both Egyptian and Syrian religious scholars and scholars who studied in Egypt played an important role in disseminating it. The most important among these figures are the Sheikhs Muhammad al-Mubarak, Mustafa al-Zarqa, Mohammed Said Ramadan al-Bouti, and Wahba al-Zuhayli. Given the importance of this trend, we will further dedicate two chapters to it on Shariah colleges in Lebanon, and to some extent in Jordan and Algeria. In the case of Syria and Lebanon, we find the latter greatly influenced by Syria, even though Shariah college experienced some difficulties with some traditional jurisprudential rulings which could not be omitted without providing alternatives (e.g., the omission of legal Islamic politics course from the Islamic University of Beirut). Though this traditional trend has always been characterized by referral to doctrinal texts and commentaries and simply commenting on them, such as with the case of al-Zuhaili, and pulling the rug from under the Maqasidi school, as with al-Bouti, traditionalism was rarely hostile to ijtihad (legal innovation). In fact, it has historically played an important role in the normalization and merging of Islamic Shariah and civil law, doing away with the adage “application of Islamic Sharia.” This can be in part credited to the presence of scholars and sheikhs (like in the case of

24  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Syria in 1950s) who practiced politics and were political representatives, and often graduated from colleges that did not separate Shariah from law (Faculty of Law), nor the Holy Quran from studying the Arabic language (Faculty of Arts). These scholars had an important role in spreading this trend in Lebanon, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab countries. To understand the significance of the Levantine presence in the Arab world, we will consider the paths of seven such personalities. Muhammad al-Mubarak (Damascus 1912—Medina 1981)

Of Algerian origin, Muhammad al-Mubarak obtained an education in linguistics and Shariah from his father, Sheikh Abdul Qader al-Mubarak, and from the modernist of the Levant, Sheikh Badr al-Din al-Hasani. His grandfather came to Damascus following the Algerian revolution led by Emir Abdelkader al-Jazairi. alMubarak joined the Faculty of Law at Damascus University and obtained a degree in 1935; he also obtained a certificate of higher literature in the same year. The Syrian Ministry of Education sent him to Sorbonne University, where he obtained a degree in Arabic literature, another in French literature, and a third in sociology, after which he returned to Damascus in 1938. Upon his return to Damascus, al-Mubarak worked as a professor of literature, then as an instructor of Arabic language and Islamic education, and then as a member of the Technical Committee at the ministry of education, where he participated in developing national curricula for the subjects of Arabic and religious studies. In 1947, he left his official job and ran for office, winning the city of Damascus. He remained its mayor for three consecutive terms until 1958, simultaneously working in the ministry between 1949 and 1958, where he was appointed on three occasions the minister of public works, then of transportation, and then of agriculture. At the same time, he was a lecturer at Damascus’ Faculty of Sharia, and at the Faculties of Arts, Philology and Quranic studies. In 1958, he was appointed dean to the College of Sharia. In 1966, he accepted a post at Omdurman Islamic University in Sudan. In 1969, he moved to the Umm Al Qura’s College of Shariah in Makkah and worked as a consultant to King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah. al-Mubarak continued to practice his work in teaching, lecturing, advocacy and university planning, and he continued to participate in seminars and conferences in Arab, Muslim and European countries until his death in 1981 in Medina. Politically, al-Mubarak was the co-founder of the Muslim Youth Association in Damascus, one of the leading Muslim Brotherhood institutions since its formation in Syria in 1945 (Brotherhood Wiki website). Mustafa al-Zarqa (Aleppo 1904—Saudi Arabia 1999)

The dean of Islamic Jurisprudence, Mustafa al-Zarqa moved to Damascus from Aleppo to teach at the Faculty of Law in 1944, and also taught at the Faculty of Shariah in Damascus after its establishment in 1954, after which he remained as a professor of civil rights and Shariah until his retirement at the end of 1966. The Muslim World League in Makkah chose him as a member of the Fiqh Council

Shariah Education  25 following its establishment in 1977, and he submitted numerous contemporary studies of jurisprudence to the Council. al-Zarqa also taught at the Institute of Arab Research and Studies in Cairo, then at the Faculty of Shariah at the University of Jordan from 1971 to 1989. A generation of scholars who came to hold the highest academic positions were brought up on his scientific method. In the sixties, the Islamic Jurisprudence Week was held in Damascus, and many jurists from different parts of the Islamic world attended, including Mustafa al-Zarqa, Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra, and Dr. Mustafa al-Sibai. In one of the contemporary jurisprudence issues, the debate on insurance, the two intellectual giants of al-Zarqa and Abu Zahra differed greatly, each strongly defending his opinion with evidence and proofs; they were unable to reach an agreement. In a private conference, al-Sibai upon being asked about the reasons for irreconcilable difference, and his opinion on it, stated: “Professor Abu Zahra is a jurisprudential library, and al-Zarqa is a jurisprudential prodigy,” meaning to say that there is a big difference between a library and a prodigy, since a library has tens of thousands of preserved references and recorded narrations, while mastery is the first tool of the mujtahid (jurisprudential innovator). Emerging from this debate, the sheikh decided that Shariah is not represented by a single school of jurisprudence (mazhab), but rather by the totality of schools of jurisprudence, and this approach is clearly reflected in a number of his fatwas. He also considered mazhab fanaticism to be a narrow prison in comparison to the paradise that is Shariah law. His approach—according to Adnan Saad al-Din—was based on the following principles: independence in understanding, distance from all doctrinal fanaticism, mitigation, facilitation, a distance from embarrassment, application of the principle of preventing the means to evil or harm (saad al-zarai’), adopting the jurisprudence of necessity, justification of jurisprudence, mentioning religious judgment next to judicial judgment, inference with the rules of jurisprudence and its principles, referring the questioner to a book that fulfills the subject, consultation of his fellow scholars, finding legal alternatives to forbidden situations, and restricting fatwas with regulation. It is worth noting that many of these principles are part of the Maqasid al-Shariah approach, though the traditionalist school rarely deals with it. Ultimately, the diligence of this approach in ijtihad was illuminating, selective and grounded in the pressures of reality.2 Muhammad Maarouf al-Dawalibi (Aleppo 1909—Riyadh 2004)

With a degree in law from the Syrian University in Damascus, Maarouf al-Dawalibi was sent to the Sorbonne in Paris, where he obtained a doctorate. His thesis, which he wrote in French, was titled “Ijtihad in Islamic Sharia.” On his return, he was appointed professor to the Faculty of Law at the Syrian University. Outside his academic career, al-Dawalibi joined the National Bloc and later the People’s Party. He was elected as representative of Aleppo in parliament in 1947, and was appointed minister of national economy in 1950, then speaker of parliament in 1951. He left Syria in 1963 and held a position as a political advisor to King Faisal until the latter’s death.3

26  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Ali al-Tantawi (Damascus 1909—Mecca 1999)

A Syrian jurist, writer and judge, Ali al-Tantawi obtained a degree in law from Damascus University in 1933. He moved to Iraq in 1936 and worked as a teacher at the Central Secondary School in Baghdad, then at the House of Shariah Sciences in Adhamiya, later to become the College of Shariah at the University of Baghdad. Moving to Beirut in 1937, al-Tantawi worked as a teacher at Beirut Islamic University’s Faculty of Sharia. Following this, he returned to Damascus and was appointed assistant professor in Anbar Office, a Damascus Civil Preparatory School, and the official secondary school during the time in the Levant. Tantawi eventually put aside his academic career education and entered the judiciary, to spend the next 25 years as a judge in al-Nabek, Douma, then back as a distinguished judge in Damascus. He then became advisor to the Court of Cassation in Syria, as well as that of Cairo, during the time of Syria’s unification with Egypt in the United Arab Republic. In 1963, al-Tantawi moved to Riyadh as a teacher in several faculties of Shariah and Arabic language in what later became the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, as well as the College of Education in Makkah. He was then assigned the implementation of a national Islamic awareness program, so he left the college and toured universities, institutes and schools across the kingdom to deliver lessons and lectures, devoting himself to answering people’s questions and fatwas in his campus council, or else in his home for hours of the day. He launched two programs: “Issues and Problems” on radio and “Noor and Hedaya” (Light and guidance) on television, which became the longest aired programs in the history of the kingdom’s radio and television, in addition to his famous program “At the Iftar Table” (Wikipedia/The Free Encyclopedia). In terms of his doctrine, he leaned towards Salafism in some of his fatwas. Muhammad Fawzi Faydallah (1925–2017)

A Hanafi jurist, linguist and scholar of the principles of fiqh, Muhammed Fawzi Faydallah was born in Aleppo and obtained a doctorate in jurisprudence from alAzhar University in 1963. Faydallah worked as a teacher at the Faculty of Shariah at Damascus University, heading to the Department of Jurisprudence and Foundations of Islamic Law where he taught for ten years. In 1970, a presidential decree expelled him from the university for his ideas and positions, and he was transferred to the ministry of health. He moved to Saudi Arabia, where he taught at Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, then at Imam al-Awzai University in Beirut. On moving to Kuwait, he taught at the Faculty of Shariah at Kuwait University, where he also headed the Department of Jurisprudence and Foundations of Islamic Law and was appointed as a member of Kuwait’s Board of Fatwah. Muhammad Fawzi Faydallah published several books and publications, most addressing jurisprudence. Among his most prominent books are Ijtihad in Islamic Sharia and The Theory of Guarantee in General Islamic Jurisprudence.4 ‘Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghuddah (1917–1996)

A modern jurist born in Aleppo, Abu Ghuddah obtained an international certificate from the Faculty of Shariah at al-Azhar Mosque in 1948. He was close to the

Shariah Education  27 Muslim Brotherhood movement and was imprisoned in 1966 for a year. He taught at the Faculty of Shariah at the University of Damascus before moving to Saudi Arabia and being appointed professor at Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, where he lectured at the Higher Judicial Institute and supervised many scholars. During this period (1965–1988), he participated in developing the plans and curricula of Imam Muhammad bin Saud University and was chosen as a member of its scientific council. Following this, the sheikh was appointed as a visiting professor to Omdurman Islamic University in Sudan and various Indian institutes and universities. He published over 70 books in his lifetime, most of them in the science of hadith (Wikipedia). Muhammad Farouk al-Nabhan (1940–)

Born in the city of Aleppo, Muhammed Farouk was raised by his grandfather, the famous Imam Muhammad al-Nabhan, whose Sufi order extended to Fallujah in Iraq. Muhammed Farouk graduated from Shaabaniya School in 1958, having studied among prominent sheikhs including Abu al-Khair Zain al-Abidin, Abdullah Siraj al-Din, Bakri Rajab, Abelwahab Sukkar, Abd al-Rahman Zain al-Abidin, Abdullah Khairallah, Abdullah Hammad, Najib Khayyat and Asaad Abji. He then joined the Faculty of Shariah at the University of Damascus and graduated in 1962. Among his most prominent professors were Mustafa al-Zarqa, Mustafa al-Sibai, Maarouf al-Dawalibi, Youssef al-Esh, Muhammad al-Mubarak and al-Muntasir al-Katani. He obtained a master’s degree from the Faculty of Arts at Cairo University in 1965, with a dissertation titled “Investment Loans and Islam’s Position on Them,” and then went on to obtain a doctorate degree from the Faculty of Dar Al Uloom at Cairo University in 1968 with a thesis titled “Collective Attitude in Islamic Economic Legislation.” He worked as a professor at Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh from 1966 to 1968, the College of Education at King Saud University from 1969 to 1970, and the College of Law at Kuwait University from 1970 to 1977. He was appointed a member of the Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco in 1984, where he continues to teach, and is also a member of the Jordanian Royal Academy of Islamic Thought in Amman, Jordan. He was formerly a member of the al-Qarawiyyin University Council in Fez, as well as a former member of the Higher National Committee for Moroccan Culture. Between 1977 and 2000, he was the director of Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniya (al-Zefzoufi, al-Khatib, and Ruqayya 2016). From the brief descriptions of these seven scholars, two observations must be highlighted. The first is that al-Nabhan extended his influence to Morocco and came to head there the Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya for 23 years, a prominent religious and educational institution (see Chapter 9). The second is that the first four mentioned personalities all ended up in Saudi Arabia, and though being intellectually affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, they played an important role in disseminating the thought of the traditionalist school (Ashari and Maturidi creed) before Salafism could dominate the country. The inclinations and connections of some to Sufism did not prevent them from influencing the Gulf countries,5 as was evident in the case of Qatar, where Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi was at the forefront of

28  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Islamic movement in mosques, Faculties of Shariah and the International Union of Muslim Scholars, whereas Salafism was prevalent in the Ministry of Endowments and select mosques, as well as in the Faculty of Shariah at Qatar University. Overall, we can observe the effect that the Gulf atmosphere had on these scholars, more so on their jurisprudence rather than creed, where there resulted a turn towards the literal readings of religious text and the decline of interpretation.6 The relationship between Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood is very complex and can only be studied empirically within a specified space-time framework. In general, there is a very conservative social Salafi aspect of influence, which focuses on rituals, rejecting modern social conventions, and emphasizes appearance for men and the niqab for women.7 However, the political dispute between the two remains intense. Sheikh Bin Baz viewed the Brotherhood as one “of the seventy-two misguided sects,” which “does not call for monotheism, does not warn against polytheism and heresy, and does not take care of the Sunnah.” Likewise, Sheikh Nasser al-Din al-Albani strongly criticized the Brotherhood’s partisanship and involvement in any political work within the nation state. Despite the evolution of Egyptian Salafist movements towards acceptance of political action, their hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood has not changed. Occasionally, however, there are political overlaps, such as with the ambiguous relationship between Sheikh al-Albani and Sheikh Muhammad Zuhair al-Shawish. Many of the Brotherhood’s thinkers and institutions systematically oppose the jihadist Salafist doctrine, especially central concepts such as al-wala’ and al-bara’ (affinity and enmity for Allah’s sake) or divine governance against the tyrant and the infidelity of Muslimmajority societies.8 Literal Textual Jurisprudence and Strict Salafi Orientations

The second school of thought to be discussed is that of literalist textual jurisprudence and its strict Salafi orientations. Salafism began as a reformist movement against what some considered “Sufi heresies,” but some of its branches expanded this reformism to a literal interpretation of the Holy Quran and Hadith. Because it was promoted at the Islamic University of Madinah, and to some extent Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, this trend came to dominate many Gulf universities, including the Faculty of Shariah at Kuwait University (see Chapter 6). More accurately, Saudi universities were not truly dominated by this movement, and had never been historically strict in their methodologies, but instead oscillated between traditionalism and reformism, especially given their Syrian roots.9 However, two events came to reshape the narrative: the Iranian revolution of 1979 and its perceived threat to Sunni Islam, as well as the rise of al-Qaeda following an incident at the Holy Mosque in Mecca the same year, when the political establishment gave wide berth to the religious establishment and the Salafist movement to face its opponents.10 This allowed an extremist Salafist current to entrench itself in the social fabric, religious practice and state function. The transformation of Wahhabi scholars into a clerical system to support the Saudi state, justify its policies and deepen faith in issues cut off the religious establishment from its current reality

Shariah Education  29 (Ibrahim 2017). This gave way to the Saudization of Shariah colleges, especially of their administrations and deanships, and the replacement of some academic professors with others well-known for their political loyalty to the regime. Moreover, the alliance between the religious and political establishments at that time not only served to counter the radical extremist ideology but also suppress the reformist ideology of the Sahwa (awakening), which demanded constitutional and political reform and was supported by leading clerics including Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Ouda, Nasser al-Omar, and Ayed al-Qarni. During this period, the president of the Islamic University of Madinah was replaced with a former Saudi intelligence officer.11 This university became a platform for spreading extremist Wahhabi Salafist ideology worldwide, a form of soft ideology-pushing diplomacy often repeated in history. Patrice Lumumba University, otherwise known as the Peoples’  Friendship University  of  Russia, was founded in 1960 by the decision of the Soviet Communist Party’s Politburo to prepare qualified national cadres in developing countries within a framework of the Soviet Union’s self-appointed international duty to help poor countries. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, the university hosted thousands of foreign students, who flocked from Asia, Africa and Latin America to pursue higher education with full scholarships at the expense of the Soviet state and under the supervision of the Soviet intelligence (KGB).12 With such soft diplomacy, vanguards of Salafism were formed everywhere. Those who studied sociology of religion in Africa, for example, will notice how the parameters of religiosity changed drastically in many cities since the mid-eighties following the return of graduates from the Saudi “Lumumba” University (Islamic University in Medina). Saudi humanitarian aid organizations also carried out this ideological agenda in the form of mosque building, monetary aid and relief programs, and other development projects. I do not claim, of course, that all graduates of Saudi Arabia at that time converted to this hard-line Salafism. For instance, Sheikh Khalil al-Sulh of Sidon, who studied there, always maintained a critical distance from Salafi militancy. In general, however, hard-line Salafism disturbed African Islam and its Sufi inclinations. The Sunni-Shiite conflicts emerged under the guise of the rivalry between Iranian Shiism, often political rather than religious, and Saudi Salafism. When the world woke up to the September 11th attacks, the extremist Salafist empire had already taken root, developing into a local phenomenon rather than an imported movement. This made it notoriously difficult to deal with due to the security solutions resorted to by authoritarian regimes, and even some Western democratic countries including France. In this regard, the Saudi religious establishment and political authority dealt firmly with any movement that it tactically or strategically considered hostile to Saudi policies and interests, be it Salafi-jihadi, Muslim Brotherhood or otherwise. For example, the Syrian Sheikh al-Hamwi Adnan al-Aroor in one of his Saudi broadcast television programs in 2012 detailed and refuted all the arguments made by the Nusra Front and ISIS, yet cursorily ended the program by praying for victory for his fellow Muslim fighters in Mali in their war against the French “Crusaders,” despite knowing, of course, that they are simply ISIS in North Africa. It is worth noting the role played by the Saudi

30  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts cultural centers affiliated with its embassies—including that of Damascus—in distributing free publications, such as the books of Muhammad bin Abdelwahhab and books promoting Salafism. Yet, the religious scene in Saudi Arabia, both in its social stratification and systemization, cannot be reduced to Wahhabi Salafism, especially after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman came to power. Saud al-Mawla (2016, 116) cites Saudi researcher Nawaf al-Qadimi in indicating a total of five different Islamist currents in Saudi Arabia: 1. The traditional Salafi currents, which include the official Salafi narrative sphere represented by the Council of Senior Scholars, which has limited scientific and public outreach. 2. Salafism with a takfiri and jihadist dimension, characterized by harsh strict measures taken against violators, and a strict and violent stance regarding political authority. 3. Salafism with a tendency for deferral, characterized by absolute obedience to authority, and which is relatively close to the teachings of Sheikh al-Albani. Its opponents call it Madkhalism. 4. The activist Salafi movement, represented by a dynamic activist current whose opponents call “al-Sururiyya” in relation to its founder. It is a theoretical, political and advocacy school whose curriculum is founded on the works of Ibn Abdelwahhab and Sayyid Qutb. 5. Finally, the dynamic current that is the Muslim Brotherhood, though not categorized procedurally within the framework of the Salafi movement. Disputes between traditional Salafis and the activist movement are intense, with activists describing some traditionalists as “menstrual scholars” because of their lack of interest in political issues and their indulgence in the details of daily religious practices (like menstruation). Hence, the combination of various currents can lead to different variations in traditional Salafism and Jihadism across the Arab region. I turn my focus here to the consequences of hard-line Salafism. Salafism as a reformist movement originated not only in Saudi Arabia at the hands of Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdelwahhab, but also in Egypt through Sheikh Muhammad Abduh. It started as a reformist movement because it faced a religious reality rooted in certain multitudes of extremity. Saud al-Mawla cites a popular saying by Sheikh Muhammad Abduh at the end of the nineteenth century: “When did Muslims become enamored with blasphemy and corruption?” He goes on to say: The fixed principles of Islam are distance from labelling others as heretics. Would you not refer to what is well-known among the Muslims and what they know of the rulings of their religion, a ruling that states: whenever a statement is issued by a person, and it bears one hundred aspects of disbelief, but bears one inkling of faith, then this person should be considered a believer, and it is not permissible to force on it disbelief! So have you then

Shariah Education  31 seen tolerance for the sayings of philosophers and sages greater than this? Is it appropriate for a wise man to be so foolish that he utters a statement that cannot carry with it faith in one out of a hundred ways?! (al-Mawla 2016, 53) The problem, then, becomes that of shifts in Islamic discourse over time and cannot be understood without referring to the political context of the contemporary nation-states. Abdelrahman al-Hajj (2014) believes there to be a set of features that characterize the Salafi discourse, including eclecticism. A portion of religion is overemphasized to make up for the rest, and the mystic and philosopher in Ibn Taymiyyah vanish, while only the “Salafi” Ibn Taymiyyah remains, who once declared nonSunni doctrines to be heretical, even though it was in a particular context. This shifting and unstable Salafi discourse has gone through three phases: 1. The stage of establishment, where political and social motives are mixed to motivate the founders of the Salafi discourse, and the Salafi discourse is born as a radical reformist protest discourse. 2. The stage of stability, where, after its founding, the Salafi discourse turns into an intellectual legacy with its symbols and “scientific” references, the most important of which is Sheikh Nasir al-Din al-Albani, as well as the development of more realistic convictions among the members of this discourse. 3. The stage of decontextualization, where the Salafi discourse gradually turns into a purely religious discourse that seeks to preserve the legitimacy of the groups that benefit from it and believe in it. In due course, it becomes a traditional, scholastic discourse (al-Hajj 2014). In brief, Salafism today is not a solid unified movement. Rather, there are fragmented waves that have resulted in much divergence: the traditional, historical, scientific, national reformist, renaissance, political activist, national jihadists, theoretical takfirism, armed takfirism and the international Salafi jihadi. The constant return to the ideas of Ibn Abdelwahhab and Ibn Taymiyyah to understand new intellectual details in the contemporary present blurs the dynamics of these branches more than it explains them. In order to fully comprehend the spread of Salafism to all parts of the world, the movement must be analyzed sociologically to understand it from within certain contexts, as Saud al-Mawla did in explaining the history and socio-economic situation of Tripoli, the cradle of the Lebanese Salafi movement. The study looked into the relationship between arbitrary arrests and systematic torture in overcrowded prison cellars, as detailed in the United Nations Committee Against Torture report (October 2014), and how that coupled with the work of Lebanese intelligence branches affected the rise of violent Salafism. alMawla followed in the footsteps of Hannah Arendt (1969) and her understanding of the phenomenon of violence, given that this violence is not motivated by logic or ideas, but rather by the social and political conditions that accompany it. Similarly, Nawaf al-Qadimi (2012) goes on to consider how praxis has been an incubator for

32  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts ideas within the Salafi context. In this sense, the Arab uprisings had had a decisive effect in accelerating not only the movements’ transfer from apolitical Salafism to activism, but also their acceptance of partisanship after decades of excommunicating them. It is perhaps the Egyptian Salafist experience which highlights this clearly, specifically the experience of the Nour Party, after which a Salafi party was established in Yemen and another in Tunisia (Abu Rumman 2013). We can determine that at least some Salafi currents moved away from exclusivity and educational practice towards political action (Hussan 2013). Deductive Fiqh and New Issues (Nawazil) Fiqh Under the Maqasid al-Shariah Approach

As for the final school of thought, it is a jurisprudence of deductive and contemporary issues as based on the Maqasid al-Shariah approach. Representatives of this methodological approach are Zaytouna University in Tunisia and various Moroccan universities. al-Zaytouna obstructed the Salafi phenomenon and the Wahhabi call and provided a scientific response to it based on Maliki jurisprudence. It is historically known that in the eighteenth century, a group of Zaytouna scholars received an invitation from Muhammad ibn Abdelwahhab, which he sent to Tunisia in the time of Bey Hammuda Pasha’s rule (1759–1814) as well as to the rest of the Maghreb and the East, calling on people to follow and show devotion to the Wahhabi doctrine. Otherwise, they will be considered heretics (kuffar). The Zaytuna Sheikh Omar al-Mahjoub eloquently replied to Ibn Abdelwahhab refuting his arguments. While we will explore in greater detail these North African universities as case studies in this trend, we can now highlight that what is shared among these universities is the teaching of Maqasid al-Shariah and ijtihad, both ancient and modern, in a manner which deals with diverse fiqh schools and theological doctrines from a pluralistic perspective. Moreover, these universities cover a wide range of subjects related to human sciences including philosophy, manmade religions, intellectual debates, logic, mysticism, ethics, contemporary Islamic thought, the science of comparative religion and the history of religions. This does not necessarily mean that applied fiqh in these countries resorts only to maqasid, but it is certain that the maqasid are taught hand in hand with the science of Usul al-fiqh (Fundamentals of jurisprudence). There are other educational institutions that take inspiration from this school in combination with the traditionalist approach. Therefore, it becomes worth studying three new models of Islamic education: Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya in Morocco (a section in Chapter 7), the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar (Chapter 8) and the International Islamic University in Malaysia (Chapter 9). We will study these models and evaluate them in a critical manner to evaluate what aspects can be benefited from in developing a new pedagogy for Shariah education. Another pioneering model, which is fairly new and still in need of a few more years to properly assess, is Turkey’s Ibn Khaldun University, which requires its students from over 70 countries to master three languages: Turkish, Arabic and English. According to the university’s founder and former president,

Shariah Education  33 Recep Şentürk, in an interview with Anadolu Agency, the university seeks to “revive open Islamic civilization with an innovative spirit, through research in the fields of humanities and social sciences.” The university was able to attract leading researchers, including Heba Raouf Ezzat and Wael Hallaq (as a semi-annual visiting professor). The Crisis and Way Out The crisis of religious education has raised the issue of ijtihad as a necessary tool for exiting the current impasse. But there is no ijtihad for the sake of ijtihad (i.e., a revolution against established heritage without justification). This is what Muhammad al-Hilali feared in his book Religious Education in Morocco: Diagnosis and Foresight (2017), where he begins by delineating previous attempts of what he calls the modernist tendency to “impose” reform from the outside and to call for an epistemological break with tradition, as seen in the approaches of Hassan Marwa, Hassan Hanafi, Muhamad Arkoun and Muhamad Abed Al Jabri. These approaches, for him, are characterized by exclusivity, highlighting schools of extremism in religious education, and wholly disregarding the contexts which contributed to the production of extremism. al-Hilali is in a different camp that starts from “civilizational and historical components of the Moroccan nation and its enlightened heritage, and from conscientious effort, innovation and openness to human wisdom” (al-Hilali 2017, 7) and calls for the reform of religious education while emphasizing the Islamic mission of spirituality and morality, yet abstaining of looking at the role of religion in public affairs or development and renaissance. al-Hilali prevails in steering this third trend towards what he calls the “participatory perspective,” which focuses on “the references for reform, its methodology, its direction, expected outcomes, and above all, an evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the educational system” (al-Hilali 2017, 13). I must concur with al-Hilali in this perspective, but I go beyond reforming curricula. I mean to consider a comprehensive role of religion not only in spirituality, but also in moralizing the social, economic and political spheres. In this perspective, it is worth mentioning the Rabat Declaration for the Reform of Religious Education issued in 2016 to strengthen the capabilities of understanding, assimilation and analysis, and to strengthen the faculties of communication, refutations and proofs, the capacity to criticize, carry dialogue, compare, synthesize and abstract, within a vision of teaching based on the principle of unity of knowledge and integration of sciences.13 While we understand the conundrums of the modernist reform movement, it cannot be denied that the pressure it has lent for external review has stimulated a lot of internal reform (i.e., from inside the religious field, as we will see in Chapter 2), and supported reform with necessary tools and methodology. For instance, while the Syrian reformist Sheikh Jawdat Saeed has a lot of admiration for al-Jabri and Arkoun, he distanced himself from some outcomes of their thoughts.

34  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts There are many indications of the crisis of religious education not only within the Arab world, but across the globe. Recent studies have brought to light some useful controversies, some of which I will address here. But before that, it must be noted that a great effort has been made by the International Institute of Islamic Thought with numerous conferences in this regard, as well as the compilation of huge volumes on knowledge integration (Okasha 2013) and also Believers Without Borders, which also held a symposium, the proceedings of which were published as a book (Jabron 2016).14 Two additional conferences have been held on this subject, the first at the American University of Beirut, which I organized with Radwan al-Sayyed and Bilal Orfali in 2018 with the title Towards the Reconstruction of Islamic Studies (al-Sayyed, Hanafi, and Orfali 2019). The second was organized by the Nohoudh Center for Studies and Research on “Research Priorities in Islamic Sciences” (2019). Besides these conferences, the deans of Shariah faculties in my acquaintance did not hesitate to describe the crisis bitterly, as was the case with Kamal Ladra’, dean of the Faculty of Shariah and Economics at Emir Abdulqader University of Islamic Sciences, who wrote: Noticeable is the predominance of the forms of classical teaching that prevailed in the olden days. Such a type of teaching cannot form a creative, innovative jurisprudential mindset that is able to link the present and the past, look to the future, and face challenges with an open scientific mind. (Ladra’ 2013, 124) There is a great deal of literature on this subject, given the pervasiveness of the global crisis that can be traced from the end of the nineteenth century, resulting from the separation of religion from “modern” education in many parts of the world. Perhaps the events of September 11th were a defining moment which brought back the importance of the study of religions to mind, as suggested by French philosopher Régis Debray in his 2002 report to the French government. Khaled al-Samadi and Abdulrahman Helli (2007, 17), two scholars in Shariah studies, eruditely analyzed this crisis not only in one country but all over the Islamic world and showing two camps. The first camp is the one of intellectuals such as Abd al-Majid al-Sharafi, Muhammad Sharif al-Ferjani and Milad Hanna, who called for the separation of religion from the educational system, claiming it difficult to reform religious education. The second camp includes Mohammed Emara, Ahmed al-Raysuni, Taha Jaber al-Alwani, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who foresaw the necessity of protecting cultural specificities through the development and renewal of religious education in this age of globalization. On a different take, Radwan al-Sayyed (2019) believes that 60 years after Muhammed Iqbal’s The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, the renewal has taken place but manifests in different directions without creating a new narrative of religion. This new narrative is based on three arguments: that the supreme value of Islam is mercy (over justice) in the form of God’s relationship with humans, that human relationships with one another are based on acquaintance and cooperation, and

Shariah Education  35 that the preservation of the five necessities and maxims as found in fiqh (Maqasid al-Shariah) are the basis of legislation. In summary, there are several approaches that address how religion should be taught and how it is taught and consider its teaching a fundamental component of the civic education of all students, both in schools and universities. These approaches do not only apply to university teaching, but also for school teachers. They do not only apply to the teaching at Arab Shariah colleges, but also for Islamic studies as a whole. In Islamic studies faculties, new disciplines more profound and important than that of traditional studies and heritage are being introduced. I put forth the claim that the difference between these two educational programs (Shariah vs. Islamic studies) should be in the degree, not in the pedagogies. Let’s look at these approaches before addressing my own. Education in Religion Is Not a Religious Education

Religion cannot be understood as mere worship, but rather it represents cultures in which all dimensions of human experience are embedded. Religions cannot be reduced to the non-rational, as they also bear rationality. Western modernity cannot be understood without its Jewish and Christian roots, and rationality cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality (William 2016, 175). Therefore, not every education in religion is necessarily religious education, and not every religious education is necessarily religious teaching per se. Rashid al-Radi (2016, 64) indicates that Ibn Khaldun enumerated the various economic activities (sanai’) known in the Islamic city, including the education industry. The term education was applied in Ibn Khaldun’s Prolegomena in a very broad manner: teaching the Quran, teaching science, teaching trades (ta’alim al-sana’i), teaching faculties, and teaching languages. Interestingly, however, he did not mention the teaching of religion. Rather, Ibn Khaldun clearly affirms that the relationship between religion and education from the outset of Islamic civilization was directly related to the concept of balagh, that is, a chain of transmission different from that of “industrial” education (ta’alim al-sana’i). Industrial education came about as a result of urban transformations that required deriving legal rulings from texts in part due to the plurality of facts. This required a law to protect it from error, so science became a necessary faculty and inherent part of industry and craft. In this Khaldunian sense, then, we can educate one in the Shariah sciences, but not give an education of religion. This is because religion, according to his perspective, is a general framework for human activity, both in its worldly and theological aspects. Therefore, it is not correct to distinguish between religious and nonreligious education (al-Radi 2016, 66). Teaching religion can also include teaching sciences that help us understand religion and law. Abdelwahid al-Alami (2016) writes on the current global crisis to posit religion as an important social phenomenon, showing us how debates on religious education have increased in European societies in a context characterized by acceleration of the process of secularization, the expansion of cultural pluralism, and the growing

36  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts tendency to search for meaning, both within and beyond traditional religious frameworks. He highlights different models of dealing with religious education, from the delicate secular models of Italy and Denmark to the pluralistic religious education systems in Germany and Britain, the parallelism in religious and secular education found in Belgium and Spain, and the ultra-secular French model. In the Italian experience, religious education was framed by two treaties (1929 and 1984) that stated as follows: The Italian Republic recognizes the value of religious culture, takes into account that the principles of Catholicism are an integral part of the historical heritage of the Italian people, and will continue to guarantee Catholic religious education in public schools until the university level. (al-Alami 2016, 91) Enzo Paco calls this a Catholic secularism that does not call into question the social representation of Catholicism, a cultural marker of national identity (al-Alami 2016, 92). In Denmark, students take “Christian Studies” at all levels of education. A law issued in 1993 defines the objectives of this compulsory religious teaching by creating awareness among students of the importance of the religious dimension in relation to the individual as well as in relation to others. The same law adds that “the starting point of education is Christianity as it appears in its historical and contemporary context.” However, this text was amended in 1999: “This teaching provides knowledge about Christianity and other religions, based on scholarly studies of religion, as the text refers to contemporary ethics and philosophy” (al-Alami 2016, 93). al-Alami concludes that the separation of the state from the church did obstruct the recognition of the public role of religions, which resulted in building cooperation between the state and churches. Teaching Religions With a Focus on Rituals as a Cultural Studies Course

The theory for separation came naturally from the militant tendencies of secularism, meaning that it not only separated religion from the state and politics, but also removed it from the public space and contained it to the private sphere. Therefore, the university today has become a platform for civic education, while Quranic and biblical seminaries and schools are a place for religious learning. Only a subject taught within the scope of culture, civilization, and the history of religions can transgress these boundaries. Here religious knowledge is transformed into knowledge that focuses on comparative description and rituals. But is a course titled “Introduction to the Study of Religions” sufficient to contribute to social harmony or respect for others? I agree with Mosaddegh al-Jalidi (2016) that this is not sufficient, and he has brought to light several delusions regarding this separation that can be summarized as follows: 1. Ontological fallacy: There is an ontological position that suggests religious discourse to be linked with the idea of ​​the transcendent absolute, that its essence

Shariah Education  37 was and will remain as such and will lead to one end. This fallacy did not take into account the real semantic capabilities of the founding religious text, which is the Quran, which contains within it the mechanisms to disrupt the ontological static through concepts such as the causes of revelation, the abrogating verses and abrogated ones, the status of error, the impossibility of final interpretation, and the rules of knowledge and cultural exchange between peoples and groups. The historical practice of hermeneutic readings of classical Islamic texts on a whole does nothing but support an ontological relativism of “religious” discourse, and carries no evidence in support of either its termination, nor its absolutism, as may appear from a more atomic approach to the science. 2. Epistemological delusion: Assuming the Islamic mind to be “a mind closed to only the text,” which directly contradicts the historical widespread translation and investigation movement which indicated a great openness among a significant number of Islamic thinkers and scholars towards various intellectual and philosophical positions. 3. Delusion of direct and pure universalism: By this we mean the perception of the individual as being able to possess universal values ​​in a direct and pure manner, without mediation or overlap by the local culture. However, the impossibility of direct access to the universal is a psycho-socio-cultural reality that calls for the social perceptions of individuals, and the existence of a cultural logical memory. Education opens loopholes in the system of individuals’ perceptions, allowing exchanges with their wider surroundings to correct this imbalance, as learning is nothing but “passing from one system of perceptions to another system of perceptions,” as Piaget says, by making self-adjustments to the first system, which will not be “too open, nor too closed.” Here, then, we are not dealing with a field of scientific concepts, which would require the epistemological ruptures with direct common sense, but rather with ideas, visions, perceptions, and phil­ osophies (al-Jalidi 2016, 291). Approaching the Study of Religious Being

Education of religion has been streamlined to adopt the phenomenological approach to religion and religious education, an approach developed by Ninian Smart (1971), who considered phenomenology to be the most appropriate approach in the curricula in order to grasp religious experience in the face of the official or missionary dogmatic religious approach. Any given particular religious viewpoint in his opinion is based on establishing a kind of “emotional identification with others” to understand the religion of individuals and groups, while “suspending” any negative or prejudiced judgment on the religious phenomenon studied. Some have criticized this approach for encouraging students’ curiosity at the expense of commitment. According to Edward Robinson, the spiritual dimension of religious experience, which is a single cosmic dimension, must be introduced. Robinson suggests the use

38  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts of applied art and thinking about examples from contemporary art, which he considers representative of the spiritual thirst of modern man. That is, a good religious education—according to Robinson—is what motivates the student to exercise his spiritual curiosity and develops in him an imaginative openness towards the infinite possibilities of life (al-Jalidi 2016, 105–106). John Paul William shows us how teacher handbooks in Britain declare the primary goal of religious education as being to ensure that students are able to interact with the religious aspects of their religious being. He carries on to state that the study of religions should be characterized by five characteristics: • Descriptive feature: The description and dynamic engagement of students with religious and non-religious positions in terms of historical and cultural facts. • Objective quality: The production of understanding, not the encouragement of some form of commitment. • Critical feature: Awareness of the existence of a multitude of perspectives. • Experimental feature: Linking education of religion to the students’ daily interests. • Moral quality: Prioritizing respect; Teaching any religious or non-religious position should not confuse those in the section who follow this position (William 2016, 171). According to William, secularism incapable of religious realism bears a priestly and dogmatic vision of the religious reality. It alienates religious people from schools and suggests that religion should be taught only in religious institutions (William 2016, 174). This has made it a thorny and troubling issue for many decision makers today if we think how some religious institutions’ teaching was out of any societal insight and instigated violence in this society. Teaching a Religious Subject: Including All the Functions of Religion

Here I  turn to the approach I  prefer, especially when combined with the ethical approach to social phenomena, as I  will explain later. Can religious existence be studied as a general subject? Many researchers see this as insufficient. Philip Burns criticizes British religious education and explains how it developed from being confessional (e.g., Protestant, Catholic, Anglican) to its evolution into a nonconfessional but all-inclusive religious subject bolstered by the idea of the unity of religions and Abrahamic religions (as developed by Montgomery Watt). In his experience, the current educational discourse did not prevent him from forming negative stereotypical judgments about other religions. While it is a compulsory educational component, this form of “religious literacy” is insufficient for several reasons. The first among these reasons is the fragility of liberal theology, or rather, the method of teaching students the idea of ​​religious unity, expecting them to come to know all religions and consider the possibility of truth in all of them. Stephen Prothero, chair of the Department of Religions at Boston University, criticizes this

Shariah Education  39 harshly in his book God Is Not One: The Eight Fighting Religions That Run the World. According to Prothero, religion is not just an individual preference but carries weight and influence on the world from social, economic, political and military perspectives. He finds it logically incorrect to assume that all world religions express different religious paths to the same God. In fact, we have no right to naively blur the sharp differences between religions. Instead, it is important to understand religious differences to bridge them towards cooperation rather than war. Even in South African debate, which scholars like David Chidester (2002) wish that the study of religions is a place to obliterate “us” and “them,” others such as Abdulkader Tayob (2018) sees this as unrealistic. This wishful thinking is motivated in part by the rejection of the exclusive Christian missionary view that only you and those who follow your religion will enter heaven. We can envisage teaching religions courses simply as a way to seek consolidating peaceful coexistence among the world’s religions in order to confront the problems humanity faces (e.g., global warming, social injustice, nuclear armament). Communication between religions, thanks to modern communication technology, has become more possible than ever before. Instead of holding on to the idea that religion is one, some believe that the values ​​common to religions could be emphasized instead. For example, the Dalai Lama stresses the value of compassion, which is a shared guiding principle among all religions. Because this value enables human beings to recognize other religions, it promotes true respect without compromising adherence to the core doctrinal religious teachings of any given religion. As for the second reason, the elimination of religion and exchange with notions of spirituality prevents students from entering into an emotional relationship and experience with religion. Faith is a source of morality, and belief is an essential part of religious experience. There is great value in allowing students to feel that they belong to the morality stemming from a particular religious and cultural heritage, and this goes hand in hand with concepts of human rights, helping others, solidarity and shared dialogue. Tolerance is only possible when a person does not feel threatened in their identity or religion. It is true that the study of faith brings with it a specified concept of truth and a certain exclusion of other religions, but this will not have a negative impact if the student is equipped with critical thinking skills. It is therefore necessary not only to study the ideal and positive in religion but also to delve into the negative aspects and explore how they have come about. This approach of teaching religion with a post-liberal approach is advocated by Philip Burns. So far, we have agreed that the main function of religious education is not to evangelize, since this is relative to the student’s understanding of the educational material as was presented to them in a critical manner. Here, I differ with al-Jalidi that the act of faith is its way of setting an example (qudwa) and its source is intuition. It is not amenable to teaching and learning since it can neither be parceled, fragmented, nor be taught in gradation. Instead, it is whole in its truth, and is therefore indisputable.

40  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts For al-Jalidi, this makes it unsuitable to be adapted for general educational discourse. For me, faith is conveyed and transmitted just as the sociologist who teaches Marxist theory can do in search for answers to economic exploitation. Both have some levels of ontology. The problem is not the transformation of knowledge into emotional, spiritual and faith feelings. We know the influence of instructors and curricula in pushing students to become Marxist, neoliberal, religiously committed, atheist and so on. The problem instead is in non-ethical pedagogical teaching that would involve indoctrination, emotional rhetoric and the dissemination of monolithic knowledge (instead of pluralistic views). The third reason is that the assimilation of universal values ​​will not be without a complex educational process that begins with the concept of anchoring, as conceptualized by Serge Moscovici (i.e., placing something new within a familiar frame of reference in order to access interpretation), and then evolve its understanding to levels of general scientific or philosophical comprehension. The final reason is related to communication skills. In observing the religious educational experience in South Africa, Abdulkader Tayob noticed that the manifestations of the public presence and experience of religion have changed themselves without affecting changes in religious education, both in schools and universities. Students must then be empowered to carry communication skills through a pluralistic and dispassionate study of religion and by being exposed to the manifestations of religions’ public presence in both its institutional and ritualistic aspects. Therefore, we must begin teaching the manifestations of public religion of each religious community, but not in a purely theological way. Convening With the Social Sciences: Epistemic Integration Is it possible to study Islam socially? In investigating the relationship of sacred texts with reality, the socio-historical method in the study of religion faces a problem in addressing the relationship between the transcendent, supernatural, or superhuman, or more specifically in the case of Islam, between the sacred texts of the Holy Quran and Sunnah, and the necessities and circumstances of ordinary life. al-Shahristani writes: “Texts are finite, reality is infinite, and the finite does not rule the infinite,” which indicates a possibility for reality to prevail over the text (Ali 2007). But such a statement must also confront the issue of saying that the texts are valid and relevant for every time and place. The task of any social study of religious phenomenon is in essence a search for the relationship between the sacred texts and reality, which then allows access to and facilitates the task by narrowing the gap between the absolute and the relative. However, if Islam appears within the texts of the Quran and Sunnah, its historical and social practices are numerous and different, and each relies on their own interpretation of the texts to support the legitimization of a position (Ali 2007). Those working in the Shariah sciences feel the necessity of connecting their field to the social sciences. Regarding the need for non-religious subjects in Shariah university education, one-third of the interviewed professors and students emphasized the need to include sociology and psychology (al-Samadi and Helli

Shariah Education  41 2007, 148). We find the International Institute of Islamic Thought giving awards to the best books in sociology and psychology. The King Faisal Prize in Islamic Studies honors social scientists for their contributions to interdisciplinary study. But the big question remains how to integrate these sciences. We have long had interactions between the Shariah sciences and humanities, including history, geography, culture, education, and to a lesser extent, philosophy, even when taught as part of Islamic curricula. Therefore, we find the names of interdisciplinary subjects titled “Islamic history,” “Prophetic biography,” “the geography of the Islamic world,” “Islamic philosophy,” “Islamic education,” “Islamic culture” and “the history of Islamic thought.” These books are often standalones, meaning they are not taught within the parent departments of these subjects such as the history or philosophy departments. It is rare to study the social sciences from a purely sociological, anthropological, economic, political, psychological or even media point of view, due to the suspicion these sciences evoke. A subject of media can be taught, but only in connection to the relevant “Islamic” elements of the subject (i.e., da’wah [Islamic advocacy]). Therefore, one of the major stakes is how much faculties of Shariah would be deeply invested in the normalization of the humanities and an introduction to the social sciences. There are three diverging camps on this debate. The first completely denies the necessity of any interaction with the social sciences, since “jurisprudential sciences contain within themselves what is necessary to understand reality,” a saying oftrepeated in my interviews in various Arab countries. The second camp advocates for an integration of social sciences, but after its appropriation into the fold of Islam. This camp claims that the social sciences are fundamentally Western and unsuitable for Islamic societies. Therefore, we see the titles of courses being taught such as “Islamic Sociology,” “Islamic Psychology,” “Islamic Finance” and “Islamic Economics.” In this camp, many researchers and professors in the fields of Islamic studies have reservations and opposition to the mainstream social sciences. These sentiments were put forward by Professor Abd al-Rahman al-Sanussi in an interview, who pointed out that none of the social sciences depended on revelation to be their primary source of knowledge, as is the case with Islamic studies. Highlighting this glaring contradiction, he says: Show me an original study of social science that relies on revelation as a source of knowledge, or relies on sacred texts to support its research. Rather, it endorses Western theories and research over revelation, some of whom have even shown a clear hostility to the source of revelation and various other Islamic sources. Are Max Weber, Durkheim, or even Karl Marx and their theories and theses truer than the Holy Quran? As for the third camp, it wants to engage with the social sciences through epistemic integration. There should be no problem for students of the Colleges of Shariah to be required to take courses taught in departments of the College of Arts including “Introduction to Sociology,” “Sociology of Religion,” “Introduction to Political Science” and so on. There are, of course, certain additional

42  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts conditions and characteristics of the proponents of this camp,15 which we will discuss later in greater detail. The difference between the previous camp and this one is like the difference between Imam al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd’s epistemic positions, even when they share their calls for epistemic integration. The former sees integration possible in the epistemic structure itself (i.e., social and Shariah sciences have the same episteme), while the second considers it a need for the sciences to complement each other (i.e., social and Shariah sciences have each their own episteme; Malkawi 2013). I think Ibn Rushd’s epistemic position makes more sense to me. As a sociologist and researcher, I am not inimical to the use of terms like Islamic, Arab, Lebanese or Algerian sociology, because this science draws some of its concepts from heritage and furnishes its theories with the lived realities of society. That said, it has become clear to me in my analyses of knowledge production yielded by this approach, and from interviews with advocates of Islamization and the Islamic reproduction of knowledge, that adding a geographical or religious label to sociology poses real problems. Instead, I present an ethical approach to the integration of knowledge into the investigation of social phenomena, or what I prefer to call the “interactive ecology of knowledge.” I will address this in further detail in Chapter 3 through the “separation, connection and pluralistic praxis.” An Ethical Approach to Social Phenomena

So far I have defended the idea that it is not sufficient to teach a general course on religions or a course specialized in a religion without bringing in the ontology of that religion and its spirituality and dealing with all its experiential functions. However, even this would not be possible without a minimal integration of knowledge in order to convey arguments and justifications from other disciplines. An ethical approach would need to synthesize certain grammatical rules to control the tensions resulting from an overlap, a synthesizing process necessary for normalizing religious knowledge as part of other knowledge systems in order to morally justify political and social convictions. Therefore, no teaching material and classroom discussion can solve this problem of separating religion from science until it is willing to discuss the limits of both sides and their positions on any given issue. This echoes the idea of Irish philosopher Maeve Cooke in distinguishing between authoritarian and non-authoritarian practical reasoning. The moral justification of political and social convictions can no longer be removed from religious (or non-religious) beliefs, and the significance of religion in building the moral system of the individual, group or society can no longer be ignored. Unfortunately, it is difficult to distinguish between the purely moral and religious decision and the sociological, psychological and pragmatic arguments adopted by an individual or even a political party. This is because we sit at the intersections of various intellectual traditions, and religions and their various institutional carriers have produced many forms of religiosity in our late modernity and contemporary society. The place of religion in democracy in general, and in the public sphere in particular, has changed. According to John Rawls, citizens cannot

Shariah Education  43 be asked to accept responsibility for justifying their political or social convictions apart from their religious beliefs. Habermas, on the other hand, acknowledges the place of religion in the public sphere, but he limits it to informal deliberations outside the framework of the state and excludes it from public institutionalization. He holds that religious groups must engage in hermeneutical deliberations in order to develop epistemological attitudes toward the claims of other religions and worldviews, which in turn allows the formation of secular knowledge which employs scientific expertise. But is it indeed possible to disentangle “religious” reasons from “secular” ones? Scholars such as Darren Walhof (2013), who studied the same-sex marriage debate in the United States, rightly posit that “theology, politics and the identity of a religious community are all tied up with each other, as religious leaders and citizens apply and reformulate their theologies in new political contexts.” (Walhof 2013, 229) Maeve Cooke (2006) states that the problem of religious positions is not that they appeal to a single non-shared framework, as Habermas would state, but that they tend to be authoritarian and dogmatic in their formulations. However, if nonauthoritarian arguments are formulated by religious actors, in which positions are not taken as absolutes but are subject to argumentation, then those arguments can be translated into the public sphere without jeopardizing the freedoms and democracies necessary for its existence. A  different measure for non-authoritarianism could be the attempt to integrate secular and religious knowledge into a single framework, in which both sets of knowledge are understood in light of one another. The attempt of religious individuals to reconcile their worldview with the findings of science, and/or justify them using science, is an example of this. This would allow religious people to maintain the certainty they find in faith, a subject that concerns ijtihad, and to engage in a public dialogue in which the both secular and religious languages are integrated into one worldview (Aduna 2015). Here we will use Cooke’s conception of authoritarian versus non-authoritarian practical reasoning and apply it to Tunisia’s public debate in 2018 on gender equality in inheritance. The debate transcended the familiar antagonistic dichotomies of religious parties siding against equality and liberals siding with it. This serves to show that such dualism no longer exists in a country like Tunisia given the selfawareness of its social actors and media actors, though such discourses still exist among some leaders of the leftist and Islamist elites (Hanafi and Tomeh 2019). Following her conception of authoritarian versus non-authoritarian practical reasoning, Cooke construes “context” and “history” to be what fundamentally distinguish authoritarian claims from non-authoritarian claims. She provides more specificity as to what composes authoritarian practical reasoning, highlighting two interrelated components on knowledge and justification: first, knowledge-access being restricted to a privileged group of people and its standpoint removed from history and context; and second, when the justification separates the validity of propositions and norms from the reasoning of the human subjects to whom those propositions and norms apply (Cooke 2007). While those two components are essential in de-totalizing an authoritarian argument, the assumptions which frame the public sphere should be there.

44  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Perhaps the ability of religious actors’ ability to conduct ijtihad and adopt the Maqasidi approach is sufficient to fulfill Cooke’s conditions for non-authoritarian thinking. Cécile Laborde takes a similar approach in her book Liberalism’s Religion (Laborde 2017). This opens the possibility to go beyond the binaries of religion versus secularism: the former associated with backwardness and irrationality, and the latter embodying a rationality and a liberated mind, especially when it comes to gender issues. Line Nyhagen (2017) argues that feminists who worked to reform religious traditions from within reject the idea that religions are by necessity patriarchal. Islamic feminists including Fatema Mernissi, Asmaa Lamrabet, Neila Selini and Amal Karami have all made significant contributions towards gender equality despite the challenges and obstacles (Abboud 2019). It is no longer possible to reduce Islamic thought to its opposition to liberalism. There is also Islam and liberalism, Islam within liberalism, and Islam post-liberalism. We must create common spaces of discourse for the sake of civil peace. It is important to have university requirements stipulating an introductory course of a study of religion, and for universities not to have qualms against teaching specialized subjects in Quranic studies, ethics, religion, jurisprudence and Islamic culture as optional subjects for interested students. Perhaps we can determine the root of this crisis to have been the separation of Shariah sciences from the rest of the sciences, after their establishment at major independent institutions like al-Azhar and al-Qarawiyyin. I strongly support here the opinion of Abd al-Wahed al-Faqihi that one of the biggest reasons for the spread of terrorism is not an incriminating religious culture but the absence of it besides the spiritual desertification of Muslim society, the decline in moral judgment, the ignorance of jurisprudential fundamentals and maqasidic rules, and a crude return to stripped forms of religious texts, understood with the most rudimentary levels of meaning. Therefore, one of the roles and aims of our education systems is to immunize young people from religious extremism and enable them to form a systematic and scientifically enlightened religious culture. This religious reform has already been initiated by distinguished scholars, including Salem Buhajeb, Muhammad al-Nakhli, Muhammad al-Najjar, al-Taher bin Ashour and al-Fadil bin Ashour. Abdulwahed al-Faqihi (2016) criticizes what he calls the rhetorical human model, inspired by Muhammad Abed al-Jabri’s structure of the Arab mind, which relies on memorization and control of the power of memory to deal with reality, heritage and language. Notes 1 This clearly indicates that Macron and his minister are simply banning those Islamic movements which (1) are politically highly organized, (2) refuse to call for assimilation to cultural majoritarianism, and (3) call, instead, not only for integration into French pluralistic society but for positive integration (i.e., being proactive actors as opposed to victimized agents). These actors, in line with similar ones in all religions, are extremely important in providing care, conviviality, love, hospitality and communal solidarity in our individualistic neoliberal world. 2 See Mustafa Ahmad al-Zarqa: The Jurist of the Age and Sheikh of Jurists (Arabic), published by Dar al-Qalam in Damascus.

Shariah Education  45 3 https://geiroon.net/archives/85721. 4 Biography of Dr. Muhammad Fawzi Faydallah on Syrian Scholars Association (Arabic). https://islamsyria.com/site/show_cvs/916 5 The influence largely manifests in traditional and doctrinal jurisprudence, as well as in contemporary Islamic political and social visions. Since they had no doctrinal (‘aqida) or Sufi associations, they were accepted in the Salafi community which needed their intellectual and cultural discourse. 6 “Ali al-Tantawi from the Ash’ari, Maturidi and Sufi creed to Salafism.” www.saaid.net/ feraq/el3aedoon/18.htm 7 See Aoun al-Qaddoumi’s critique of what he calls the Brotherhood’s missing link, Sufism, and the transformation of some of their ideas and behavior towards Salafism (al-Qaddoumi 2007); see Tammam (2010) on the Salafization of the Egyptian Brotherhood and the victories of the Salafi conservatives among them in the 2009 elections. 8 Response of the European Council for Fatwa and Research on some Salafi concepts in Mohamed Bin Ali (2015). 9 This reformist Salafi trend was led by Damascene Sheikh Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi (1866– 1914), who aimed to reform religious doctrines by rediscovering the new Hanbali order initiated by Ibn Taymiyyah. In contrast to the Ash’ari Maturidi school of thought, this trend supported Ibn Hanbal’s literal reading of the Quranic texts and hadiths, rejected the imitation of the four schools of jurisprudence, and criticized Sufism for being unIslamic, whether in some of its actual expressions or in its entirety. See Pierret (2013). 10 Juhayman al-Otaibi, a graduate of the Islamic University of Madinah, led an armed insurrection movement that took control of the Holy Mosque in Mecca. 11 Interview with an alumnus of this university. 12 Today, it is surprising to realize that the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and some teachers of the Qom seminary have graduated from this university. https://cutt.us/ iWNwl 13 http://cmerc.ma/index.php/activites/2016-07-18-07-45-02/325.html 14 There have been numerous conferences and papers presented which highlight this crisis, the most recent of which was held at Emir Abdelkader University of Islamic Sciences (Constantine) on “The Future of Islamic Sciences in Higher Education Institutions— Reality and Prospects,” on 23–24 April 2017, as well as the “First International Conference on Jurisprudential Studies: Reality, Challenges and Future Prospects,” held in December 2018. I will refer to some of the papers presented in the upcoming chapters. 15 For example, one professor in the Department of Sharia and Law at the University of Algiers believes that this integration can be achieved “provided that researchers in the social sciences adhere to the rules of Sharia. The fieldworks of sociologists in particular enrich scientific research, and researchers in Islamic sciences benefit greatly from this research, since there is no objection and nothing wrong for scholars of Islam to benefit from the conclusions made by social scientists.”

References In Arabic Abboud, Hosn. 2019. “How Islamic Feminism Can Be an Effective Part of Islamic Studies.” In Toward a Reconstruction of Islamic Studies, edited by R. Al Sayed, S. Hanafi, and B. Orfali, 223–52. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers. Abdelrahim, Ahmed. 2016. “Documents of the al-Azhar Institution since the January  25 Revolution: A Critical Analytical Study.” In al-Azhar’s Post-revolutionary Religious Reference Documents, edited by Ahmed Abd al-Salam and Muhammad Helmy Abdelwahhab. Cairo: Sigal House for Publishing and Distribution.

46  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Abdelwahab, Mohamed Helmy. 2018. Sufism in the Context of the Renaissance: From Muhammad Abdo to Said Nursi. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. Abu Rumman, Muhammad. 2013. Salafis and the Arab Spring: The Question of Religion and Democracy in Arab Politics. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. al-Alami, Abdelwahid. 2016. “Religious Education in European ‘Secular’ Contexts.” In Renewing Religious Education: A Question of Vision and Method, edited by Mohamad Jabron, 269–320. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. al-Faqihi, Abdulwahed. 2016. “The Graphic Human Model: Between Cultural Construction and Religious Education in the Arab-Islamic Context.” In Renewing Religious Education: A Question of Vision and Method, 203–339. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. al-Ghabri, Abdelbasset. 2018. “Religion and Religiosity in Formal Education Curricula.” In The Religious Situation in Tunisia 2011–2015. Part Two, edited by Mounir Saidani, 2015–260. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. al-Hajj, Abdelrahman. 2014. “Salafism and Salafists in Syria: From Reform to Revolution.” In The Salafi Phenomenon, Organizational Pluralism and Policies, edited by Bashir Musa Nafie, Izz al-Din Abd al-Mawla, and al-Hawas Taqiyya. Beirut: Al Jazeera Center for Studies & Arab Scientific Publishers. al-Hilali, Muhammad. 2017. “Introduction: Religious Education Between External Review Pressures and National Reform Necessities (Part One).” In Religious Education in Morocco: Diagnosis and Foresight—Part One, edited by al-Hasan Hama, 5–17. Rabat: Moroccan Center for Contemporary Studies and Research. Ali, Haider Ibrahim. 2007. “The Religious Phenomenon inArab-Islamic Society.” www.anfasse. org/index.php/2012-07-03-21-58-09/2010-12-30-15-59-50/829-2010-07-13-12-40-21. al-Ja’mati, Abdelsalam. 2016. “Religious Education from Mosque Circles to Institutionalization.” In Renewing Religious Education: A Question of Vision and Method, edited by Mohamad Jabron, 269–320. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. al-Jalidi, Mosadaq. 2016. “Didactic of Islamic Education and Thinking.” In Renewing Religious Education: A Question of Vision and Method, edited by Mohamed Jabron, 269–320. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. al-Khatib, Moataz. 2017. “Islamic Reform in Syria: In the Nineteenth Century and the First Half of the Twentieth Century.” The Scientist, March  24, 2017. http://alaalam.org/ar/ religion-ar/item/501-606240317. al-Mawla, Saoud. 2016. Salafism and New Salafists: From Afghanistan to Lebanon. Jdeidit al-Matin: Dar Sair al-Mashriq. al-Qadimi, Nawaf. 2012. Islamists and the Spring of Revolutions: The Productive Practice of Ideas. Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. al-Radi, Rashid. 2016. “On the Concept of Religious Education.” In Renewing Religious Education: A  Question of Vision and Method, edited by Mohamad Jabron, 269–320. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. al-Qaddoumi, Aoun. 2007. The Reformist Imam Hasan al-Banna and the Missing Link. Amman: Dar al-Razi. al-Samadi, Khaled, and Abdelrahman Helli. 2007. The Crisis of Religious Education in the Islamic World. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr. al-Sayyed, Radwan. 2019. Destination and Reference. Where Are Muslims Heading? Rabat: The Muhammadiyah League of Scholars. https://bit.ly/3nChO8L. al-Sayyed Radwan, Sari Hanafi, and Bilal Orfali, eds. 2019. Towards the Reconstruction of Islamic Studies. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers.

Shariah Education  47 al-Zaydi, Ali. 2018. “The Zaytuna Institution.” In The Religious Situation in Tunisia 2011– 2015. Part Two, edited by Mounir Saidani, 159–209. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. al-Zefzoufi, Bushti, al-Khatib, Aziz, and Ruqayya, Abdullah bin. 2016. al-Ithhafat al-Sunni with Translations from a Lesson in Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya (1436–1383 AH/1964– 2014 AD). Rabat: Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya Foundation. Ennaifer, Hmida. 2011. “The Arab Universities Crisis: Are We Globalizing Ourselves? (2/2).” Torus. https://www.turess.com/alfajrnews/20230. Hussan, Mohamed Fathy. 2013. The Political Thought of Salafist Currents. Cairo: Mohamed Fathy house. Ibrahim, Fouad. 2017. Jihadi Salafism in Saudi Arabia. Beirut: Dar al-Saqi. Ibrahim, Yahya Muhammad. 1996. History of Religious Education in Sudan. Beirut: House of Generation. Inaya, Ezzeddine. 2011. “So That the Olive Tree Does Not Remain an Idle Well.” Nucleus, July 7, 2011. https://nawaat.org/portal/2011/07/07/une-zitouna-active-tunisie/. Jabron, Mohamed, ed. 2016. Renewing Religious Education: A Question of Vision and Curriculum. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. Jouda, Mustafa. 2016. “Renewing Religious Education: Crisis and Possible Solutions: A Reading in the Book Religious Education Between Renewal and Freezing.” In Renewing Religious Education: A Question of Vision and Method, 179–201. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. Ladra’, Kamal. 2013. “The Experience of Prince Abdul Qadir University of Islamic Sciences in the Field of Cognitive Integration: A Critical Assessment.” In Knowledge Integration: Its Impact on University Education and Its Necessity, edited by Raed Jamil Okasha, 114–145. Amman: International Institute of Islamic Thought. Malkawi, Fathi. 2013. “Concepts of Cognitive Integration.” In Knowledge Integration: Its Impact on University Education and Its Necessity, edited by Raed Jamil Okasha, 19–45. Amman: International Institute of Islamic Thought. Okasha, Raed Jamil, ed. 2013. Knowledge Integration: Its Impact on University Education and Its Necessity. Amman: International Institute of Islamic Thought. Tammam, Hossam. 2010. The Salifization of the Muslim Brotherhood. Alexandria: Bibliotheca Alexandrina. William, John Paul. 2016. “Teaching Religious Realities According to European Perspectives.” In Renewing Religious Education: A  Question of Vision and Method, 149–78. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research.

In Other Languages Aduna, Danna Patricia S. 2015. “The Reconciliation of Religious and Secular Reasons as a Form of Epistemic Openness: Insights from Examples in the Philippines.” The Heythrop Journal 56 (3): 441–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12255. Arendt, Hannah. 1969. “Reflections on Violence.” The New York Review of Books (Supplement), February 27. Bin Ali, Mohamed. 2015. The Roots of Religious Extremism: Understanding the Salafi Doctrine of Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’. London: Imperial College Press. Chidester, David. 2002. Global Citizenship, Cultural Citizenship and World Religions in Religion Education. Cape Town: HSRC Publishers.

48  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Cooke, Maeve. 2006. “Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic Contents of Religion: The Limitations of Habermas’s Postmetaphysical Proposal.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 60 (1): 187–207. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-006-0006-5. ———. 2007. “A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical Political Theory and the Place of Religion.” Constellations 14 (2): 224–38. Ennasri, Nabil. 2019. “Islamic Training Institutions in France: Presence, Stakes, and Prospects.” In Towards the Reconstruction of Islamic Studies, edited by al-Sayyed Radwan, Sari Hanafi, and Bilal Orfali, 373–82. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers. Hanafi, Sari. 2020. “Macron’s Populism and Islam.” Open Democracy (blog), 2020. www. opendemocracy.net/en/openmovements/macrons-populism-and-islam/. Hanafi, Sari, and Azzam Tomeh. 2019. “Gender Equality in the Inheritance Debate in Tunisia and the Formation of the Non-Authoritarian Reasoning.” Journal of Islamic Ethics 3 (1): 207–32. Khodr, Hiba. 2018. “Policies and Politics Surrounding Islamic Studies Programs in Higher Education Institutions in the United States: The Perfect Storm in the War against Terrorism, Extremism, and Islamophobia.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 11 (3): 3–24. Laborde, Cécile. 2017. Liberalism’s Religion. Harvard University Press. Nyhagen, Line. 2017. “The Lived Religion Approach in the Sociology of Religion and Its Implications for Secular Feminist Analyses of Religion.” Social Compass 64 (4): 495–511. Pierret, Thomas. 2013. Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution. Cambridge University Press. Smart, Ninian. 1971. The Religious Experience of Mankind. London: Fontana. Tayob, Abdulkader. 2018. “The Representation of Religion in Religion Education: Notes from the South African Periphery.” Education Sciences 146 (8): 1–12. Walhof, Darren R. 2013. “Habermas, Same-Sex Marriage and the Problem of Religion in Public Life.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 3 (39): 225–42.

2

The Arab Religious Field

One cannot speak of Shariah education without describing the religious field in Arab countries. By religious field, I  mean—in the Bourdieuan sense—arenas of production, circulation and appropriation and exchange of goods, services, knowledge or status of religious actors, focusing specifically on their role, religiosity, their competition and conflicts through it, as religious institutions fulfill four essential roles: leading religious rites (or services), religious education, fatwa-making, and general guidance (Irshad). Using the concept of field entails the assumption of a certain autonomy vis-à-vis other fields (e.g., political field). Historically, financial autonomy was ensured by the institution of religious endowments (waqf). The waqf was the source of funding for a variety of social, educational and charitable activities and spaces for the class of faqihs (Hallaq 2012). It facilitated flexible and often inclusive Islamic understandings of the civil realm within a variety of instances of services and enterprises, like schools, fountains, hospitals, cemeteries and burial services, as well as various configurations of urban spaces, such as markets, large mosques and public squares. Contrary to the Weberian view of the waqf as impeding the emergence of capitalism, the waqf favored the formation of nodes within circulatory networks that had a crucial function in furthering long-distance trade, which was the sine qua non of all hemisphere-wide capital accumulation (Salvatore 2016, 121). The waqf still exists as an institution but on a smaller scale as the authoritarian political authorities in many Arab countries have confiscated waqf to be fully under the control of the state. Contrary to this Islamic history, the religious field currently does not always enjoy sufficient relative autonomy that would make this term meaningful due to the distortion which relations between the actors in this field suffer from. The strength of this relative autonomy from the field of political actors, for example, differs from one country to another. We cannot, for instance, understand what is happening in Saudi Arabia as considering the religious and political fields as having shared religious orientations and some divergences. Therefore, one can demonstrate how the curricula used in the kingdom’s universities and the fatwas issued by the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Fatwas push in two different directions, especially in social matters. Since the arrival of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the religious field has become fully controlled by the state, which DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-4

50  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts allows the state to issue some laws favoring opening Saudi society to entertainment, music, dance and other cultural activities. This chapter will discuss four issues. First, it will discuss religiosity and its relationship with the secular/civil state, as debates on separating/distinguishing religion from the state and from politics are circulating widely in the public sphere for the first time since the Arab Spring, compared to these issues previously only interesting the elitist left. This opens the path for potential Arab secularity(ies) without its historical authoritarian experience. Second, it will discuss the fatwas issued by religious institutions by distinguishing between three schools. Third, it will study the Islamic internal reform by focusing on some of its new actors (the Arab Network for Research and Publication, Nama Center for Research and Studies, Believers Without Borders, and the International Union of Muslim Scholars). Finally, the chapter will examine Friday sermons through a case study of Sunni and Shia sermons in Lebanon, while highlighting the speakers’ qualifications and relationship to the state: supervision and financing, their sources of knowledge, and a content analysis of Friday sermons, while pointing to social and political issues, public morality and non-Muslims. Religiosity and the Political/Social The role of religion has undergone many transformations in our society. There is a universal trend of a “return to religion” (Berger 1999). More than 80% of the world’s population affirms some degree of religious identity, which is growing, contrary to some of the prevailing academic and common ideas (Davie and Ammerman 2018). In a survey conducted in 2019 about the “Religion in Public Life” in four Arab countries—Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Tunisia—shows 79.5% of the interviewees are religious or very religious (61.1% and 18.4%, respectively; Hanafi, forthcoming). Similar trends can be found in Latin America, Africa and Southern Asia (al-Hermassi 2016). While atheism is increasing in some regions, such as European countries, it is declining in both China and Russia. Hence doubt and belief are occurring hand in hand. The Arab world, too, is part of this trend, even if it has a high level of religiosity. Sociologists observed the coexistence of the secular and the religious in an era of multiple modernities (Zemmin 2020) within the paradigm of pluralism (Berger 2014) or within a more realistic understanding of the process of separation of religion and state (Cipriani 2017), thus contesting the hypotheses put forward by many researchers on the decline of religion’s role in our modernity. These patterns cast doubt on the automatic linkage between the decline of religiosity with high indicators of education, industrialization, urbanization and women entering the workforce (Acquaviva and Pace 2011; Jarmouni 2016). These indicators are not related in a “linear” fashion and do not produce the same outputs. The spread of popular religion, for instance, would create multiple paths of religiosity. And yet, despite French anthropologist Marcel Gauchet’s reminder that the religious was always present in the political, a radical secularist ideology has swept many countries. It was until the beginning of the nineties that one could speak of the transition from

The Arab Religious Field  51 secular to post-secular society and the resurrection of the era of pluralism, which will be the focus of this chapter. The religious scene is home to religious expressions which have different forms of presence in the social space in a fragmented manner, due to its random development in light of the state’s weakness at times and its authoritarian power at other times. This led many individuals to flee the social space to an individual religiosity influenced by globalization, some visibly and others underground. These local social practices of cultural products show “the erasure of national borders, the hybridization of cultural distinctions, and the bricolage of various forms of sociocultural existence” (Saidani 2018). There are four patterns of religiosity in the Arab world that can be observed, and they come within specific ideological models: institutional/traditionalist, revivalist, post-Islamist and popular religiosity. Before laying out the differences, let me state that there are two basic functions that all patterns of religiosity share. The first is the spiritual function: despite the commoditization and instrumentalization of spirituality, prayer remains the most important ritual. Even if there is a significant decrease in attendance of religious rites in many regions, the practice of personal prayer has not shown a similar decrease. For instance Mari Johanna Parkkinen (2018) shows the importance of prayers for Palestinian Christians in the West Bank, and how prayer can enable people to adapt to difficult and painful life situations. The second shared function of religiosity is the principle of solidarity, where individual or religious institutions and movements have established associations that provide humanitarian aid and services for the poor to try to compensate for the state’s withdrawal from economic fields and from its responsibility in the domain of social justice, especially in the redistribution of wealth. These two basic functions demonstrate themselves in the four patterns of religiosity. The first pattern of these stems from the official institutional of Islam or traditional Islam, which is often a classical Islam with a scarcity of ijtihad. For example, al-Azhar University historically played a major role in Egypt and abroad in spreading moderate Islamic thought and jurisprudence (in its language wasatiyya), but at the same time its religiosity is tainted by the weakness of its ijtihad, political conservatism and limited autonomy vis-à-vis the state authority. The second pattern is the revivalist religiosity that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a protest against Westernization, colonialism and the Islamic tradition (taqlid) as preserved by traditional religious institutions. There are two prominent forms of revivalism: the Muslim Brotherhood’s revivalism, connecting religion to politics and constructing a political party with a strict hierarchy (giving bay’ah [a pledge of allegiance] to the murshid [guide]). For some, such as Radwan al-Sayyid (2014), this led to questioning the legitimacy of official religious institutions. There is also Salafist revivalism in general, and Wahhabism in particular, which was established in coordination with the political power of the Saudi state since King Abdul Aziz Al Saud (Abu Rumman 2013). Revivalists are very different from reformists. Rafa’a al-Tahtawi, Khair al-Din al-Tounisi, Muhammad Abdo and Ali Abdel Raziq viewed the Ottoman Tanzimat (mid-nineteenth-century reform movement) as legitimate procedures, including

52  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts the principle of citizenship, parliament and government, and restricting the ruler’s powers through the constitution. These reformists welcomed the Ottoman Judiciary Code and introduced nation-state juridical principles and branches within civil laws, while since the 1950s revivalists have established a clear distinction between Shariah (and jurisprudence based on it) and human-based statutory law. They also questioned some sciences as being opposed to faith and tried to Islamize them before dealing with them. Instead of cultural exchange with and benefiting from modernity, revivalists called for a comprehensive confrontation with modernity in order to preserve Islam and Muslim identity (al-Sayyid 2014). The third pattern of religiosity is that of neo-Islamic movements, or what Assef Bayat (2013) terms “post-Islamists.” These movements go beyond certain features of Islamist movements and call for replacing the Shariah with the nation as a basis for legitimacy. The difference between revivalism and post-Islamism is not organizational, as some moved from revivalism to post-Islamism (e.g., the Renaissance Movement or al-Nahda in Tunisia or the Justice and Development Party in Morocco). The difference lies in how social actors who believe in Islam as a moral system enter the political arena through participation as opposed to contestation (Brown 2012). It also lies in how post-Islamists conduct discussions and debates in the public sphere using arguments inspired by Islamic values and social sciences. An Islamic movement can be qualified as neo- or post-Islamist if it meets four conditions: • Belief that cultural, legal and religious pluralism is sufficient to guarantee the protection of minorities of all kinds. • The political/religious actor distinguishing between the sanctity of the religious message in which he believes, and the worldliness and profanity of political action, which mainly requires wisdom in policy-making, which should be done by separating da’wah (advocacy for religious matters) from political action. This is an important point. The preacher (and the jurist-faqih) will convince people of the prohibition of alcohol, but the politician/law maker might not forbid selling alcohol, as it is the right of Christians and the non-religious to consume it. • Adopting citizenship rights in the nation-state, and not just policies that benefit Muslims. It could even be argued that these rights should be viewed even beyond the citizen and as for the benefit of humanity as a whole.1 • Resolving current tensions between various cultural and social groups in their understanding of what is ethical and using innovation (ijtihad) to deal with the higher objectives of religion. This may occur only though dialogue and debate in the public sphere before choosing the legal means (resorting to majority vote, whether in the parliament or a referendum). If some revivalist movements turned to neo-Islamism, this is through practicing politics that has tamed their rigid ideology (Imad 2018), but this transformation is not automatic. Khalil Anani (2018) identified the intellectual and structural barriers that led to the crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the difficulties they faced in separating da’wah from politics.

The Arab Religious Field  53 In light of the above, the term political Islam is losing its meaning, as it does not recognize the foundational differences between revivalism and neo-Islamism. It is a stereotyping generalization which does not account for the heterogeneity of Islamic political thought, from the moderate to the extremist, carried out by individuals, from Islamic movements to official Islam. The term political Islam is often used to deride a movement and to suggest that all of their trajectories are the same and only composed of readers of Sayyid Qutb, and the term is employed to describe everyone from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda. It is worth noting that among those who employ such categorization are the “guardians” of official Islam who consider the Islam to which they adhere as essentially apolitical. It is due to their blindness to their own political nature that they judge Islamic opposition figures as being excessively political. To Gulf monarchs, for example, any opposition figure is viewed as being part of the Muslim Brotherhood (this is how Jamal Khashoggi’s murder was justified according to some political statements and popular tweets in Saudi Arabia) and, as such, considered a terrorist.2 The problem is that this kind of position does not take into consideration the emergence of some neo-Islamic political movements, especially in Tunisia and Morocco, where the neo-revivalist and the reformist movements intermingle. Karim Sadek (2012) has studied how one can understand Rachid al-Ghannouchi’s liberal policy, as an Islamic thinker and activist different from mainstream revivalists, by using Axel Honneth’s (1996) theory of recognition. What Ghannouchi is asking for is the recognition of Islamic identity in the public sphere and recognition of the importance of religious texts interpreted through ijtihad and the concept of maslaha (public interest). Among the most important reformists in the Arab world today are Sheikh Ahmad al-Raysuni and Dr. Saadeddine Othmani. The former was the head of the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR) but was pressed to resign because of his fierce criticism of the king’s credentials to produce fatwas due to his lack of knowledge in the religious sciences. He was also famous for his criticism of the 2011 Constitution, which states that the King of Morocco has a religious function (the Commander of the Believers). He is currently president of the World Union of Muslim Scholars, and his innovative influence transcends Morocco. He is distinguished by his jurisprudential views, based on his theory of approximation and preference3 (al-Raysuni 1997). Saadeddine Othmani was the prime minister of the Moroccan government from the beginning of 2017 to 2021. Othmani was the first to theorize clearly of the distinction between politics and religion without separating them (see Chapter 7). He constructed a theory differentiating between da’wah reasoning and political reasoning.4 As for the fourth type of religiosity, popular religiosity includes individual or Sufi religiosity most likely made up of small groups. To the contrary of the stereotype which views Sufism as immunizing individual or small groups from acts of protest or political or religious radicalism, this type of religiosity can become politicized. Therefore, we must reconsider our views of popular religiosity. In Latin America, for example, popular religiosity remains politicized and present in people’s conscience in their rites and so on, which manifests itself in carnivals. We must reconsider popular religiosity in our countries, though as a present

54  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts phenomenon, not in order to market it. For example, the phenomenon of awliya and zawiyas points to Sufi tariqas as not just personal rites, such as hadras, but also as producing specific kinds of knowledge. Ibn Arabi, for instance, connected philosophy to the Islamic sciences, and Jalal al-Din al-Rumi connected religious knowledge to a knowledge of adab. Sufism, in its three forms of popular tariqas, philosophized Sufism and elitist Sufism, was historically a very important phenomenon, and transformed into a form of popular religiosity which combines legends, the oppression of poverty and tyranny, and the introversion of the Arab self into any space in which spirituality protects it from a greedy, oppressive and tyrannical society. The Sufi phenomenon proliferates across different forms, some of which are rational (aqlani), some of which are closer to popular Islam, and some of which are closer to ritual folklore. The case study of religion in Tunisia, in this context, assigned an important section to Sufism, which stressed the social and palliative role of Sufism, especially for marginalized groups (Issa 2018). Tariqa Sufism was especially represented in the Ben Ali period, which he encouraged by transforming Zawiyas into annual events (mahrajanat), as support for opposing protest Islam. However, after the revolution the Sufi tariqas found themselves vulnerable to Salafi takfir and attacks on their zawiyas due to accusations of visiting graves, shirk and bida’ (unwarranted innovations in religious rituals). Lotfi Issa, however, noted Sufism and zawiyas’ miserable material and symbolic situation and the dominance of stereotypic representations of them. I will summarize in Figure 2.1 what seem to be the most important four characteristics of these patterns. First, while the institutional/traditional religiosity will favor the collective ritualistic function of religion, others will allow more flexibility in understanding religion and practicing it, and this include the possibility of protesting against authorities (whether religious or political). Second, while neo-Islamists/post-Islamists would preempt their followers to recourse to radicalism, this is not the case for the other patterns of religiosity. What

Figure 2.1  Types and functions of religiosity.

The Arab Religious Field  55 is interesting is how traditional religious institutions in Syria did not preempt many followers from joining opposition militia groups (e.g., al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, some factions in the Free Syrian Army). Jihadi Salafism, from Abdallah Azzam up to the rise of ISIS, is the product not only of Islamic movements but also of institutional/traditional religiosity (Saudi Arabian particularly). Third, some trends of individualistic religiosity are driven by popular Islam, new preachers or reformists. While historically reformism was not unable to transform itself into a mass movement, modern reformists (Adnan Ibrahim, Muhammad Shahrour, Hasan Farhan al-Maliki and others) are no longer a fringe phenomenon. These figures gained prominence after the Arab Spring and have spurred much debate in the public sphere. Adnan Ibrahim has become a mass phenomenon and has his own TV show in the Gulf, for example. Fourth, while the increase of the ritual dimension of religiosity in the Arab world is confirmed by data provided by Mohamed Cherkaoui (2020),5 yet the ritual level did not go into the privatization of the religious. Religious practice becomes indeed more and more community-based and ostentatious, to the point where the frantic construction of mosques is no longer sufficient to satisfy demand. In Morocco, for example, the number of mosques erected over the last twenty years has followed a strongly ascending curve, which is almost exponential. (Cherkaoui 2020, 97) Thus, there individual religiosity is never pure but always accompanied by a community-based religiosity. Finally, these different functions can only be understood through the dialectical relationship between religiosity and secularism. Religiosity influences social and political actions, including the distinction/separation between the religious and the political. The latter affects religiosity by enabling it to interact in the private and public spheres and to define religious pluralism within the same religion. Having said that, there are different forms of secularism as well, and this deserves some thought. The Arab Path of Secularism

Even if there is a general consensus on the need to distinguish/separate the political from the religious, which we see even in countries such as Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the devil is in the details, especially concerning the status of religion in the public sphere. Figure 2.2 shows four forms of secularism. The first is militant secularism, which sees religion as a purely individual expression and confines it to the private sphere, thus forming a civil religion that has its sanctity as much as other religions, preventing the prevalence of any other religion (a religion against other religions). This secularism has a negative attitude towards other religions, forcing non-Christian religions to take the form of Christianity (Asad 2003). We find this laïcité de combat (Policar 2017) as an exclusionary concept in France and Quebec (currently).

56  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts

Figure 2.2  Four forms of secularism.

Second, in contrast to the former rigid secularism, there is a soft secularism, which is more common than the first, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, in which religion is allowed to exist and provide input in the public sphere, with great autonomy for religious establishments separate from governments. This secularism plays a role in facilitating dialogue between religions and public authorities. It is worth mentioning that the secularization process that took place in Europe (except France) and in the Americas occurred often without the use of the term “secularism,” with legislators avoiding the ideological bearings of the term (Bishara 2015). François Gauthier (2017) summed up the societal and political debate in Europe on the aforementioned issues in two critiques: the republican critique of liberalism in the UK and the liberal critique of republicanism in France.

The Arab Religious Field  57 The third type is ersatz secularism, in which some countries pretend to separate religion from politics, while in fact making the official religious institution an institution that is largely subordinate to the tyrannical ruler who controls its stances. The ruler sets the following rule: the religious institution cannot hold politicians accountable, but politicians can utilize the religious institution to moralize the public sphere in any social matter. This type of fake secularism can take various forms of politicizing religion (e.g., Iran and Syria) or sacralizing politics (e.g., Saudi Arabia, but not under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman; see Abdurrahman 2018). This form of secularism allows for only official religion to be present in the public sphere. The last type of secularism is what some of the neo-Islamists or post-Islamists (and others) define as the civic state6 (as opposed to the religious state), or what Abdelwahab el-Messiri (2005) calls partial secularism or moral or humanistic secularism. Islamic history, as al-Hermassi (2012) and Aziz al-Azmeh (2021) points out, has always been characterized by de facto partial secularization out of necessity. In this type of secularism, there is a connection between the moral and the political, but a separation between da’wah and politics, allowing religion to exist in the public sphere, and creating new conditions within which faith and lack of faith can coexist, to use the words of Charles Taylor (2007). I see many countries in the Arab world as moving in the direction of this form of secularism. Important changes in the religious field and the transformation of some Islamic movements have prompted not only a movement driven in part or entirely by religious reform and secularization, but they have also mainly led to popular social movements demanding social justice and individual and collective liberties. There are some indicators of this. There are polls in the Arab world that show respondents do not find being religious as a condition for someone to be their political leader. Responding to a question on ranking the qualities of the political leader, only 5% of the Tunisians stated that being religious is necessary,7 indicating that the majority of those who voted for Ennahda did not do so because Ennahda’s candidates are religious. This percentage is higher in Jordan and Palestine but still less than a quarter of the respondents.8 Yet this is not the case in Gulf countries.9 Disenchantment is visible in people’s religious conception of politics and morality; mainly through two surveys: the first is the fourth Arab Barometer Report, which clearly shows that the vast majority of respondents do not consider there to be a contradiction between democracy and Islam. The second is the Arab Index, which raised the question about the criteria of being considered a religious person, in which 65% of the Arab respondents pointed out the importance of ethics and values ​​as a criterion. The majority also reject the notion that every person who is not religious is a bad person (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2018). Religious ethics may be expressed in different ways, which include adherence to general Islamic principles. In response to a question on the centrality of adherence to Islamic principles for the progress of the Arab world, 70.8% of Palestinian respondents answered that it is important or very important.10 In brief, the Arab world is, in varying degrees, going through a process of secularization, and the normalization of the religion in the public sphere is not

58  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts hindering such process. This is understood here as the distinction and partial separation between the religious sphere and the secular one, demonstrating how this is established not through the policies of the aforementioned four countries (from the top down) but rather through their citizens’ attitudes towards the matter. Therefore, there is a process of differentiation from below, or what I  call partial practical secularization from below. The word “practical” was added to emphasize that this process is related to people’s changing understanding of religion and life and not to fixed creedal concepts. In this sense we may talk about a sort of post-secularity. Various Reactions to Post-secularity

In light of the above, there have been various reactions to post-secularity since the occurrence of the Arab uprisings. These depend on the patterns of religiosity in relation to politics (especially secularism) in the public sphere and the private sphere, and their relation to pluralism and recognition versus conservatism. This will allow us to show complexity beyond banal questions such as whether Islam can adapt with democracy. This kind of question is still raised by many militant secularists. Inspired partially by Sabri Ciftci et al. (2018), Figure 2.3 shows these various reactions. As we see, post-Islamists are the closest to practicing democracy, since they believe in a pluralist discourse built on non-authoritarian practical reasoning in the public sphere. Yet, some forms of individual or popular religiosity believe in democracy but their religiosity is not mobilized to foster it. Revivalist

Figure 2.3  Various reactions to post-secularity.

The Arab Religious Field  59 religiosity, especially in its Salafi format, would use its voice in the public sphere to practice democracy as a procedure, but not as a philosophy. Popular religiosity can be liberal or conservative, depending on other social and political factors, but it tends to be liberal. Finally, the institutional/traditional religiosity can also be liberal or conservative, but it tends to be conservative. Some Concluding Thoughts

One of the great issues at stake of the modern era is not only to understand the metamorphoses in religiosity patterns but also how to narrate and critique modernity with a secularism not defined by its negation of religion; a secularism which does not privatize religion, but rather one which is a humanistic space that allows for the coexistence of multiple forms of faith. Such secularism would not kill religion but would preserve human drives through transforming them into spiritual values. The Islamic world has begun to pay attention to post-secularity and its humanistic space. For instance, the Iranian scholar Abdolkarim Soroush provides two epistemic foundations to deal with religious pluralism: first, the concept of straight paths (Soroush 2009) instead of a single straight path confined to one religion, and second to the separation between religion, which is sacred, and religious knowledge, which is human (Soroush 2002). His approach to comparing different religions and establishing a dialogue between them is based on connecting the religious and the sociological, using reason in order to analyze religion from other knowledge spheres. Yet, the process of revolution in the Arab world was accompanied by a counterrevolutionary process and debate over defining the nature of democratic forces. In many Arabic countries, attention is still rarely given to the practical reasoning of the elite, and the focus is primarily on secular forces. Those forces were viewed as though they were systematically immune to authoritarian practical reasoning, in contrast to Islamist political movements which are viewed as being inclined towards it. This section demonstrated that this is an ideological simplification which needs to be scrutinized, as authoritarian tendencies can be found in both elite formations. Here I reiterate with Muhammad Hashimi (2016) the same idea that hard and militant secularism “transformed into another universalist dogma, acting as though it addresses all human issues, negatively or with indifference, which transforms it into a binding reference, almost characterized by the same absolutism of religious dogmas.” The confluence of law, religion, politics and society is a reality we experience in our post-secularity, yet this has produced many tensions, especially in the context of the sharp antagonism between rival elites and the gap between the elite and the public. Two of the pathologies of this situation are sectarianism and racism. In conflict-prone areas, such as the Middle East, sectarianism is one of the main dynamics of conflict, as well as a mechanism for shaping local identity through what Azmi Bishara (2021) called “imagined sects.” Racism, Islamophobia and antiSemitism are present in Europe as well. As pointed out by Emmanuel Todd (2016), Islamophobia in France hides the social conservatism of Catholicism. France of

60  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts the periphery, such as West France or cities such as Lyon, have stayed true to the old Catholic bedrock, and while they may no longer be practicing Catholics, they are still infused with a Catholic ethos. By the same token, Israel recently passed a law declaring that Jews have a unique right to national self-determination, while apartheid policies continue within Israel and in the occupied Palestinian territories. Three Schools of Fatwas One of the most important duties of graduates of Shariah colleges is fatwa-making. Fatwa-making is not connected to knowledge of Shariah sources only but also to the mufti’s conditions and the extent of his being influenced by cultural, political and social and even economic factors, including as well his class affiliation. As a case study, I will take a complex social phenomenon such as migration/refuge and follow the fatwas issued which deal with the latter, especially when from a culture or religion contrary to the majority. The complexity of migration/refuge is manifested in militarization of nationalistic and racist sentiments and xenophobia, as this subject has become one of the most sensitive and important subjects during elections in the Western and Arab worlds. Naturally, this topic transcends the problem of racism, as its stakes have an economic dimension, as refugee labor forces have always been taken advantage of to lower wages in a manner that threatens the local workforce. Also, migration has cultural stakes related to how it will allow the host country to have policies of cultural pluralism and how migrants/refugees will accept positive integration and practice coexistence and mutual knowledge of the other in this society, as they preserve their culture and take from other cultures in a creative process which many migration researchers have written on, which they have named as hybridity and integration. This greatly differs from assimilation, which is for migrants to abandon their culture of origin most likely under the pressure of cultural majoritarianism in the host society. We will see in this section, through my discussion of fatwas and the role of fatwa-making, that the fiqh of migration or the fiqh of diaspora has a fiqh of minorities and ta’aruf (mutual knowledge of the other) and different schools which we will display here. Sami Abu-Sahlieh (1996) points to a historical framework of migration in early Islamic history by considering that Immigration marked the Muslim community since its beginning. Biographers of Muhammad reported how he sent some of his followers to Abyssinia to protect them from the persecutions of the inhabitants of Mecca. . . . Similarly, in an effort to escape persecutions, Muhammad, accompanied by some of his followers, left his native city Mecca in September 622 and went to Yathrib, the city of his mother, later named Medina. That marks the beginning of the Islamic era, the era of Hegira, era of migration. This tradition considered migration and the mobility of social actors as the rule—or to borrow Lisa Malkki’s term, the “national order of things”11—and not

The Arab Religious Field  61 fixation with the nation-state. This tradition continues after the time of the Prophet Mohamad, including the right to asylum. Louis Massignon wrote in 1952 comparing the importance of the right to asylum for Muslims compared to Christians. Gordon Oyer (2013, 89) commented on Massignon’s “The Respect for the Human Person in Islam and the Priority of the Right to Asylum over the Responsibility to Wage Justified Wars” (Opera Minora 545, trans.) as follows: [Massignon] describes the Islamic grounding of personhood within one’s personal testimony to a transcendent God, in contrast to Western notions of personhood that depend instead on social standing. He also emphasizes how through this standard Muslims grant personhood to Christians and Jews. . . . [T]his view of personhood to the Islamic concept of asylum . . . granted refuge to foreigners during war and to fugitives. Massignon felt this priority of asylum retained the vestige of a primitive sense of hospitality, which sees the “guest” or “stranger” as one sent by God. In contrast, Western hospitality has become at best a “commercial ploy.” The Christian West’s abuse of Islam’s primitive hospitality during their encounters reveals its own forgetfulness and contempt of the Bible. (p. 89) Written in 1952, the essay criticizes the post-war treatment of displaced Arab people. Massignon’s sensitivity apparently came from the fact that he found refuge with a Bedouin family in the Iraqi desert and felt hospitality despite merely being a foreigner. How Is Migration Perceived by Religious Authorities?

With the development of the internet and communication technologies, online fatwas have become a significant tool to ask questions related to various topics in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). What makes online fatwas special is that people can choose their preferred scholars no matter the distance separating them. I have sufficient evidence that these online fatwas are used beyond the context in which they are issued. They were used by different discussions I found on social media. I used 15 websites, in addition to Dar al-Iftaa al-Masriya (the official institution of fatwas in Egypt) of whose fatwas I  have an electronic archive reaching back to 1930. These are quite known and rather popular, as I  found many references to them in social media discussions as well as in the interviews I  conducted with many Muslims who are fatwa users, mainly in Lebanon (including Syrian refugees) and France. Some of these websites are official national fatwa institutions (e.g., Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) and others are transnational (e.g., European Council for Fatwa and Research, the Fiqh Council of North America, Islam House and Islam Way) or some famous and/or independent sheikhs (e.g., Islam Today, Assembly of Muslim Jurists in America, Path of Salaf, Muhamad Salih). This section analyzes 83 online fatwas provided by these sources that are related to migration to explore how Islamic scholars who respond to fatwas perceive the

62  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts issue and how they deal with it.12 Some are in Arabic or English, while others are in multiple languages. In spite of the fact that muftis refer to the same corpus (i.e., the Holy Quran and Hadith), they tremendously vary in their interpretation of social issues such as migration. The Koran mentions the term hijrah (migration) and its derivatives in 27 verses, mainly in the meaning of “to abandon” or “to leave an unjust situation or oppressive place”: “The believer must flee from the injustice” (74:5). So this term is used very often to designate the fact of fleeing from a country governed by disbelievers in order to join the Muslim community (Abu-Sahlieh 1996). Fatwas related to migration often evoke three Quranic verses: Verily, as for those whom the angels take (in death) while they are wronging themselves (as they stayed among the disbelievers even though emigration was obligatory for them), they (angels) say (to them): “In what (condition) were you?” They reply: “We were weak and oppressed on the earth.” They (angels) say: “Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to emigrate therein?” Such men will find their abode in Hell—what an evil destination!  Except the weak ones among men, women and children who cannot devise a plan, nor are they able to direct their way. These are they whom Allah is likely to forgive them, and Allah is Ever Oft-Pardoning, Oft-Forgiving. (al-Nisa’ 4:97–99) These three verses urge each Muslim living in a country in which a Muslim cannot exercise his religious duties to leave it and join the Muslim community, unless he is unable. Other verses express the same sense (4:100; 9:20). The purpose of this migration was to protect them from persecution and to strengthen the new community. Therefore the Holy Quran uses together the terms those who believe, and those who emigrate and strive in the way of Allah (2:218; 8:72, 74 and 75; 8:20; 16:110). Also there are many hadiths which fatwas are based on, among them the following: “I consider myself rid of any Muslim who sojourns among the polytheists” (authentic hadith from Bukhari and Ibn Hazm). Many fatwas refer to Quranic verses and hadith and distinguish three cases of a Muslim willing to migrate or already residing in the West, or what they call nonMuslim countries: 1. If s/he has a valuable reason to stay and can practice his/her religion openly and maintain his/her faith and religiosity, then he/she is allowed to stay wherever he/ she is, but it is commendable to migrate to a Muslim country. 2. If s/he is there in order to carry the message of Islam (do da’wah) and help the Muslim community, then it is not only permissible for him/her to stay, but it is also commendable. 3. If s/he cannot practice his/her religion and s/he fears affliction for his/her religion, then s/he should leave the country and migrate to a Muslim one, unless s/ he is not able to migrate for physical or financial reasons.

The Arab Religious Field  63 In the first case, a “valuable reason” has been described in most fatwas as migrating for work, seeking knowledge or getting medical treatment. As for “practic[ing] religion openly,” few fatwas specified what they meant by it. For example, Shaykh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal al-Shaykh, the Mufti of Saudi Arabia, explains that Practicing the religion openly does not only refer to praying and minor issues of religion and avoiding prohibited act such as usury (riba), adultery (zina) and so on. Rather, practicing the religion openly means proclaiming monotheism (Tawheed) and disavowing the ways of the polytheists (mushrikeen), such as associating others with Allah in worship and other kinds of disbelief (kufr) and misguidance. (Fatwa no. 1/77) One can notice the use of vocabulary such as mushrikeen and kufr. Moreover, some of these fatwas are concerned with family problems resulting from one member who wants to migrate to a non-Muslim country, while the mother/father or the wife/husband does not accept. Needless to say, many fatwas clearly discriminate between man and women and make it impossible for women to migrate or even travel alone.13 The migration issue is also related to the issue of citizenship. Fatwas on the permissibility of obtaining the nationality of a Western or non-Muslim country were found in the website of the Assembly of Muslims Jurists of America (AMJA) and in Islam Way. In both institutions, the response was that obtaining citizenship is only permissible under conditions of an exigent need as it could lead the Muslim to endorse sayings and acts that contradict the Islamic creed and to give allegiance to the disbelievers. For the Saudi official Fatwa institution (the Permanent Committee of fatwa), it is strictly prohibited to obtain nationality in non-Muslim countries.14 This way of framing geography in terms of Muslim versus non-Muslim lands has invited many believers to ask perverse questions to muftis. For instance, one of them asked Way of Islam: “I am currently in a Land of disbelief for the purpose of study . . . for a year, is it permissible to travel within this land with my wife for the purpose of entertainment and visit?”15 In addition to citizenship, an important notion that governs the rulings of migration in Islam is the status of the host states (whether those are where migrants currently reside or are willing to migrate to) and their relations with Muslims or the Islamic state. A fatwa in IslamWeb (Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs in Qatar) explains that The lands of Allah are of two types: Muslim lands (Dar al-Islam) and nonMuslim lands (Dar al-Kufr). In the latter, either there are some reasons for fighting between Muslims and non-Muslims, in which case it is called Land of War (Dar Harb), or that there are some reasons for peace, like reconciliation and covenant between Muslims and non-Muslims, in which case it is called Land of Peace (Dar al-Amaan). Therefore, it becomes clear that Dar al-Amaan is in reality a land of non-Muslims and it is not a separate third

64  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts category. In regard to what a Muslim can do in Dar al-Amaan, he should respect the laws of that country, which does not contradict Shariah rulings. Moreover, he should be a good example and he should portray the good traits of Islam through his dealings with the nationals of the country. However, if a Muslim fears affliction in his religion, he is obliged to migrate to a Muslim country where he would feel safe. (Translation by the source)16 Another fatwa from IslamWeb reads: In general, the conditions in the Land of Islam are incomparable to the conditions in the non-Muslim land (i.e. there is a great difference). The example that you have mentioned about your friends is nothing more than a single incident; the corruption and the temptations of desires in the non-Muslim countries on the other hand are prevalent and common, besides there being laws that provide absolute freedom. Even if you are spared, your children may not be so in the future, so you should be careful. Therefore, if a Muslim does not have a necessity or need to travel to those countries, then it is better for him to live among his family and relatives where he can be dutiful to his parents, if they are alive, have good relations with his relatives, be in a country where he can hear the adhaan (call for the prayer) five times a day, and observe the laws of his religion without trouble. (Translation by the source)17 Abu-Sahlieh (1996) sheds light in his article on a special case of Muslims whose territory became Land of War (Dar Harb). He explains: In the tenth century, the Christian reconquista and counterattack began, obliging (sometimes temporarily, sometimes definitively) the Muslims to withdraw from conquered former Christian territories. This was the case in Sicily and on the Iberian Peninsula. Maliki jurists faced the question whether Muslims could stay in these countries which became Dar Harb or whether they should emigrate to Muslim territories. This dilemma faced by the Muslim populations was resolved by their voluntary or forced departure. A fatwa in the website of Shaykh Bin Baz also deals with the same question. Bin Baz advised Muslims of this case to stay in the country in order to preserve the religion by spreading Islam and enjoying the good and forbidding the evil. However, if they cannot practice their religion and fear for themselves, they should leave if they are able to. As the Syrian refugee crisis is ongoing and is becoming a major problem worldwide, the Nassim al-Sham (pro-Syrian regime) issued a fatwa prohibiting Syrians to migrate to non-Muslim countries and naturalize there. The fatwa begins by stating the general rule for migration, as in other fatwas, and then deals with more detail the case of Syrian refugees. It lists a number of negative points regarding

The Arab Religious Field  65 migrating to the West: first, endangering the migrants, as illegal migration conditions are unsafe; second, generating a shortage in human resources in Syria; and finally, Syria as a nation needs its youth to build the country. This is why this fatwa leaned towards prohibiting migration unless absolutely necessary. Interestingly, another institution called the League of Syrian Ulama uses almost the exact same two arguments and adds to them the fact that migration will reduce the number of Sunnis in Syria, which will help the Syrian regime to realize its demographic plan. As for obtaining the nationality of non-Muslim countries, the Islamic Ulamaa of Sham fatwa has a negative position using the same aforementioned argument. In contrast to this fatwa, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi,18 a prominent Egyptian sheikh in Qatar and the former chairman of International Union for Muslim Scholars who passed away in 2022, provides a very innovative fatwa about “The Custody of Refugee Children in Europe” to the following question: Some Imams in Germany raised a question about the Islamic rule regarding Muslim families taking under their custody Syrian refugee children; boys and girls, who have or almost have reached the age of puberty, delivered by sea to Europe. They feel that there is a level of hardship as these children will live at home as family members and the prohibited khulwah [A situation where a male and a female, who do not have a relationship that impedes their marriage, are alone in a private place] is likely to occur. In addition, there are other situations, where people have religious concerns. Are there Islamic regulations for such a situation? His answer was as following: Self-evident is the fact that refugees are utterly released from blame for migrating from their land when they have no other option to protect their lives against almost a certain death caused by destructive missiles, devastating shells and explosive barrels. They are protecting themselves and their children against imminent danger. However, they should take the safest and most manageable roads otherwise they will face what they endeavored to flee from i.e. death. Since many Syrians and others migrated as refugees to non-Muslim lands, Muslims in Europe have a duty incumbent by virtues of brotherhood and sisterhood in humanity to take underage refugees in their custody, let them live with their children and take care of them as they take care of their children as an endeavor to protect their distinctiveness. It is not accepted to be slow when issuing this rule, let alone refraining from issuing a rule pertinent to the matter of concern due to the likelihood of khulwah or the uncovering of some of what is to be concealed. These partial rules are to be observed as much as possible in normal circumstances. In addition, they are not definitive but likely to happen and cannot be an obstacle in the way of fulfilling this serious duty (i.e., taking the underage refugees under one’s custody).

66  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts It is noteworthy that the Islamic rules are classified into various categories. One cannot neglect a rule of a higher category just to fulfill a rule of a lower category. Here we have two rules; one is of a lower category and is likely to happen, and the other is not only of a higher category but also is definitive that it is classified as a necessity. This is a good example of fiqh al-waqi’ (jurisprudence that reflects reality), a concept that was forged by al-Qaradawi. It is also worth noting the important contribution of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy19 to fiqh al-waqi’ concerning minority rights, stating that the non-Muslims are citizens that have the same rights and duties as the Muslims and they enjoy having special laws concerning their personal laws.20 Another fatwa that contrasts with classical fatwas comes from Egyptian Dar al-Ifataa, which has a close relationship with al-Azhar. In a fatwa by Sheikh Ali Jomah on migration, he stands strongly against Ibn Taymiyyah’s extremist interpretation on the status of the people of Mardin. Ibn Taymiyyah indeed requested for Muslims to migrate from areas whose governor is not Muslim (Ibn Taymiyyah fatwas, vol. 39, pp. 201–205). However, we will see with the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) that there is a paradigm shift with this council that deserves a throughout look. European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR)

A new model of fiqh was established by institutions such as the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA)21 and the ECFR. The former issued two important statements: on Being Faithful Muslims and Loyal Americans (adopted in its General Body Meeting on 24–25 September 2011) and on The Relationship Between Muslim and non-Muslim22 (elaborated by a member of the executive committee of this council, Dr. Jamal Badawi). These two statements reveal a new fiqh of minorities and give a new model of what it means to be a Muslim and citizen in non-Muslim societies. Of course there are other articulate statements from institutions in the region, such as the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities (January 2016), organized by the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies (Abu Dhabi). However, I  will focus on this section in the contribution of the ECFR. In its Final Statement of its 25th Ordinary Session (Istanbul, 6–10 October 2015) under the title “The Fiqh of Coexistence: the Text and Context,” ECFR addressed Muslims in Europe by stressing coexistence and positive integration and highlighting their duties towards their Syrian refugee brethren in terms of sponsoring their families and children. ECFR perceives that the requirements of coexistence are founded on ten principles that can be summarized as follows: 1. Acceptance of one human origin: Allah created all people from one origin. Acceptance of one human origin requires acceptance of equality of dignity and humanity.

The Arab Religious Field  67 2. Respect for human dignity and human rights: All people are equal in this regard. Hence, aggression against them, likewise depriving them of their rights and affronting their dignity, cannot be accepted, a principle confirmed by the Quran. The human right of dignity is guaranteed to all people alive as well as dead. 3. Abiding by justice, equity and morality, shunning oppression, and adhering to what leads to cohesiveness of the various communities of society. 4. Fulfilling treaties and conventions since it builds trust among all parties and contributes to stability and securing rights: it is a Quranic command. 5. Positive cooperation to achieve true citizenship, shielding society against dangers and protecting the environment, as they give clear indications of the eagerness of coexistence and application of the law of cause and effect. 6. Acceptance of pluralism and freedom of belief and worship, included in the scope of the right of disagreement, as it contributes to the safety and security of the various communities regarding their choices. 7. Adopting dialogue as the means of communication and reaching solutions, as it creates the ideal atmosphere for agreeing on truth. 8. Exerting efforts in every field leading to reconciliation, social harmony, good communication and reciprocal mercy, and shunning violence, since they help achieve good and social objectives. 9. Respecting holy values and refraining from mockery and other negative practices: the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, used to, even in war circumstances, command leaders of the Muslim army to show respect to holy values and places of worship. 10. Rejecting and criminalizing according to law everything that leads to violence, radicalism and terrorism expressed in words or actions. Allah forbids killing and oppression. ECFR continues: Muslims and non-Muslims deserve equal sympathy. One of the foundations of coexistence is equal expression of sympathy and support to Muslims and non-Muslims, when suffering natural afflictions, e.g. earthquakes and floods, donation of organs and blood and helping and rescuing refugees. Discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims in such circumstances contradicts fundamental Islamic values indicated in the Quran. As you see from the above ECFR promulgation, there is a new terminology being used in this statement and a new conception of the relationship between migrants and host societies that we will discuss in the conclusion. Concluding Remarks

From comparing these different examples of fatwas and promulgations, based on a subjective interpretation, I will establish three categories of fatwas.

68  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts The first category of fatwas are by what I call the textualists. These muftis frame geography within the dichotomy of Land of Islam and Land of Disbelief (Kufr) and argue that people’s mobility should be oriented toward land where they exercise their religious rights and duties. These fatwas often overlook the economic motivations behind migration and consider Muslims’ migration to Europe and America as an unwanted phenomenon that should be present only in case of dire need.23 These ulama advocate a very careful relationship with the majority population and sometimes against the basic concept of integration as defined by migration studies. This school is characterized by its ahistorical leaning and its disregard of the historical context of the time when ulama issued their fatwas. It may have provided evidence and inspired Bernard Lewis’ ahistoricism (2001). The second category of fatwas is issued by ulama that I will call the politically cautious realists. They are keen on establishing good conditions for migrants in host societies and especially in non-Muslim majority countries, but one feels that they also do not speak on many important issues. There are no fatwas about the sponsorship (Kafala) system or about the necessity of receiving Syrian refugees except for rare statements (al-Azhari ulamas [in the time of President Mursi], Salman al-Ouda and Yusuf al-Qaradawi). Some muftis such as Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Turayri (from Islam Today) distinguish between public policy and sacred law, arguing that much of the Saudi legislation (e.g., the ban on women from driving) has simply nothing to do with religion and the state only issues them to prevent the means to evil or harm (sadd al-dharâ’i’). However, he does not criticize the Saudi authorities for treating women as second-class citizens. One should note that most of the fatwas of these organizations are based on a collective effort and not the thought of one individual mufti. The third category of fatwas comes from organizations such as the ECFR, FCNA and sometimes from al-Azhar (in very eclectic way). I will call them the humanist ulama. With these councils, one can witness a paradigm shift, moving from the famous dichotomy of Land of Islam versus Land of Disbelief frame into the humanity frame, a frame that put emphasis on coexistence and acknowledges the complexity of living in states governed by the rule of law, while some of these laws enter into tension with some interpretations of Islamic fiqh. ECFR calls for the necessity of both parties to transcend their inflexible moral and religious ideologies and to extend hands to reach others: the majority should allow diversity and accommodate cultural differences, but the minority should also be creative in handling contradictions between national laws and religious beliefs. This reflection has been very well thought out since the early 2000s with the work of Abdel-Sattar AbuGhoda and Taha Jaber Ilwani, but above all the seminal work of Abdulla Juday (2008). By evoking the concept of positive integration, the ECFR and before them Tariq Ramadan (2005) insist on the necessity of converting Muslim ethnic capital (to borrow Bourdieu’s term) into social capital by setting a higher rate of ethnic capital in a way to ensure a structural foundation for the coexistence. Tariq Ramadan (2009) argues that what he calls “Western Muslims” should contribute positively in developing and making their society into a better one, instead of thinking of the duality of “us and them.” Hence, in this discourse, Muslims residing in the

The Arab Religious Field  69 West do not form a special case that should be fully changed but rather a reality that should be dealt with positively and proactively. In his chapter called “The Sense of Belonging and the ‘Post-Integration’ Approach,” Ramadan explains that it is important to develop positive, official policies focusing on contributions and sharing rather than on a so-called integration whose meaning has become unclear now that the vast majority of citizens speak the country’s language, respect laws, and, precisely, demand their rights to equal treatment. This kind of message can be found among many European scholars of Muslim origin who have developed thought on the positive contribution and coexistence of the Muslim minority in Europe (see, e.g., al-Khaznawi 2016). I was invited to participate in the ECFR’s Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session in Paris in July 2019. It was a special kind of participation, as it was not about participation in discussions and deliberations but an observation of discussions between jurisprudents and scholars in Islamic studies, combining discussions of a fiqhi, social, economic and political nature. I was impressed by the trading spaces between different fiqhi orientations, from Shafi’ and Hanafi to Maliki and so on. Most of the participants were graduates from al-Azhar, al-Zaytouna and other Western and Arab universities. The sessions began with a discussion of the papers presented, and the subject was “The Laws of Social Relations in Europe and Muslims’ Role in Strengthening Them.” The first paper was a brave one from al-Shaykh Ali Muhyi al-Din Qaradaghi on correcting and rooting some concepts, such as takfir, and not limiting them to a very narrow theological discourse. I was invited to present a paper on “The Foundations of Human Relations between Islam and Positivism”; my paper aimed to deliberately shuffle the deck, for a comprehensive treatment that would transcend the sterile and simplistic dichotomy of Islam versus scientific positivism, as there is no fiqh without the subjectivity of the faqih, and the objectivity of their tools, and standardization of his initial choices and final decisions. This is the case for the social researcher, too. With regard to standardization, the faqih uses what he calls the Maqasid al-Shariah (Higher Aims of Shariah), where he does not discuss a fiqhi ruling without confirming its consistency with protecting the five necessities which Imam Shatibi theorized and other mujtahid developed after him, creating discussion and constructive dialogue between an ethical framework and a maqasidi framework. From the discussions, it transpired that there are voices that are sensitive towards how to apply these laws in societies of European citizenship, where the law applies to all. But at the same time, they are demanding the right of cultural and religious difference, and what follows of idiosyncrasies related to daily practice of religious rites and social practices. I felt the self-confidence of the council’s members, all of whom are from Europe/Canada, with the exception of Shaikh Qaradaghi, as they do not want to placate any Western political side. They understood how to handle multiple identities: being both French/Irish/Swiss and also Muslim/Arab/ Amazighi.24 They are fully ready to work the tensions that this pluralism entails

70  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts and transcend the binary of us versus them, but requesting that their difference to be recognized, that is, a call for legal pluralism in the framework of citizenship and multiculturalism. This is the paradigm of “positive integration” (see above), which is not only represented in the demand for rights but also defining duties, the duties of interacting with Muslims and non-Muslims with justice, ihsan, and upright morals, far away from oppression, and a commitment to be convivial with different societal groups. All of that demands much wisdom and knowledge of the arts of ijtihad. On topics such as the means of notifying a wife of divorce, the minimum age of marriage, adopting children in case of specific circumstances analogizing this with orphans, and greeting non-Muslims on their holidays, some of the participants gave jurisprudential opinions from the wellspring of classical books, whereas others mentioned the laws applied in the country of the fatwa-seeker, and others encouraged harmonization between Shariah opinions and republican laws. And it is a group which takes many angles into consideration. All that was reflected in this session’s final statement. This statement begins in the onset of its recommendations by encouraging studying what the social sciences require of studying the characteristics of European societies, and the particular rules of this topic, to benefit from them while dealing with social problems, and participate in solving them or lessening their effects, which is through positive interaction with the social and human sciences, and pushing for their interaction with religious sciences, through manifesting the benefits and pay attention to what does not match the context, culture and religion of a particular society at a particular time. In light of the increasing power of the racist far right in Europe and many countries across the world, the council has many tasks and challenges, which requires it to be more interactive with the social sciences, its outcomes and elite, and more aware of the diverse intellectual and fiqhi currents in Europe, and different social groups, especially women and youth, “even if that leads to a future headache” (according to the worries of one person I met there). In the current climate of Islamophobia and European governments (particularly in France) interference in Islam, considered as a “foreign” religion, politicians have called for creating “a European Islam” and a call for training imams who please them, like the case of Hasan al-Shalghumi, the Imam of City mosque of Drancy in the suburbs of Paris. However, this push the intellectuals of the Muslim diaspora (The European Council for Fatwas and Research, and the like the Boudreaux’s imam Tareq Oubrou) to call for an Islam which has a fiqh for ta’aruf (conviviality and mutual knowledge of the other), not for a political placation as much as it is an interaction with the social reality in Europe. This is the great bet not only in Europe, but also in Arab authoritarian countries, in which official Islam distorts the dynamics of ijtihad and innovation stemming from intellectuals’ awareness of the necessity of jurisprudence of living open to humanity and the era of religious and

The Arab Religious Field  71 cultural pluralism. This analysis concurs with the findings of Osama al-Ghunamein (2018), who studied how ECFR fatwas form new paths of fiqhi reasoning. In brief, the statements of the ECFR show new terms (e.g., citizenship, equality, pluralism, freedom of conscience, human rights, communication, justice) and a new conceptualization of the relationship between migrants and host societies. The Internal Islamic Reform: New Configurations More than a decade after the outbreak of Arab uprisings, some structural and value changes have occurred in the Arab world that disenchant some of the Arab young population. Two forces enter into play. First, knowledge groups utilize the social sciences and philosophy as tools to reform the Islamic thought and to establish fiqh al-waqi’, making religious thought a catalyst for a new society and new values such as democracy, pluralism, tolerance and respect of human rights. Second, there are some political parties or groups (MB, Salafism and Sufism) that have new agendas and new debates. I will qualify them as reflexive to highlight their agenda, which presents a demonstrably new context for the Arab region. However, the Arab uprisings were an occasion that unleashed radical thoughts and praxis. The violence of the authoritarian state has fostered such radicalization. New Reflexive Islamic Knowledge Groups

Throughout the last half century, certain groups were influenced by intellectual scholars who claimed the necessity of reforming Islamic thought. Leaders who advocated for this intellectual trend include Mohamed Abed al-Jabiri (Moroccan), Mohamed Arkoun (Algerian-French), Hassan Hanafi (Egyptian), Nasr Hamed Abuzaid (Egyptian), Muhammad Shahrour (Syrian), and Mahmoud Mohammed Taha (Sudanese). Despite the importance of such scholars, the magnitude of this influence was limited to a thin stratum of an instructed youth who were influential in universities all over the Arab region. They were always criticized/perceived by the larger religious population as coming from outside the religious sphere and even as being atheists. For example, the sociologist Abdel Kareem Akbar (2014) rightly indicates this relative failure occurred primarily because of the popular Islamic movements which spread throughout the Islamic world, and partly because it borrowed heavily from other intellectual traditions but failed to influence the political culture. Moreover, its interpretation of the Quran failed to provide modern alternatives to traditional Islamic texts. The Islamic reform initiatives were indeed historically based on philosophical,25 logical and linguistics26 dialogue with the Shariah, but rarely with the social science, the very condition of establishing fiqh al-waqi’ (social and political jurisprudence changing according to the reality).

72  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts It was only after the launch of the Arab uprisings that a catalyst of new initiatives to reform Islamic thought emerged. In addition, the catalyst brought upon changes prospects to newer claims and newer values. In addition to the Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics, which be discussed in Chapter 8, three initiatives can be mentioned. Mominoun (Believers) Without Borders

This organization was founded in 2013 with a UAE fund and is headed by a Syrian scholar, Ahmad al-Ani. Its publications and conferences clearly present an objective of using the applied social sciences and philosophy to criticize the nuanced beliefs of political Islam and, even more so, some Islamist groups. However, their research presents an anti-clericalist (anti-religion) stance. Despite al-Ani’s declaration that he has no interest in politics, it nonetheless seems certain that such statements are referring/directed to groups such as MB. The Tabah Foundation, as well as Mominoun Without Borders, enjoys a close relationship with the UAE, which funds the Sufi network that links Abu Dhabi, Cairo and Rabat, presenting itself as the central actor of moderate Islam. Namaa Center

There are two interesting and relatively new Saudi research centers that are interested in connecting the Shariah (religious studies) to modernity: Namaa Center for Research and Studies and Taseel Center for Studies and Research. In its mission statement, Namaa declares the need for moderate Islamic discourse to be integrated with the intellectual discourse and its tools for the sake of “the conscious development” and connection to “knowledge and experience [sic] of the contemporary world.”27 A close scrutiny of the center’s activities (studies, lectures, book reviews) shows that this connection and integration has indeed been made, however, through philosophical and logical tools and not the social sciences. Scholars participating in this endeavor come from either religious studies, philosophy and history or are considered simply as intellectuals. The titles of the three studies mentioned on its website (www.nama-center.com) are revealing: “Freedom or Sharia?,” “Problems of values between culture and science,” and “Averroes’ school of thought and its connection to the European renaissance.” Positively invoking Averroes’ school of thought is something very new in a country dominated by Salafism and Wahhabism to begin with. Here one should highlight the amazing role of the three North African philosophers Mohamed Abdel al-Jaberi, Mohamed Arkoun and Abdullah Laroui. The first two are among the most prominent examples of contemporary Arab thinkers interpreting the classical Arab heritage (turath). The center has published 67 books in the last three years, distributed to different fields but 43% are about Islam and Fiqh (see Table 2.1). Of course, there are some exceptions—a sort of a light use of social science. One of the Saudi authors the center of Namaa promotes is Abdullal Sufiani. In 2014 Sufiani attained a PhD in education from Islamic University of Madinah (SA)

The Arab Religious Field  73 Table 2.1  Distribution of Namaa Books to Different Fieldss Subject

Number of Books

New approaches to fiqh Political essay Political science Fiqh applied to current issues Philosophy Islamism Sociology Economics/sociology Media studies Philosophy/political essay Total

26 10 10 6 5 3 3 2 2 2 69

with an endeavor to conduct a back-and-forth between education as a science and fiqh, as one can see from the title of his PhD thesis, “Regulations of Educational Critiques through Fatwas of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah and Their Application in the Field of Educational Research.” Sufiani gave a lecture titled “The Hidden Factors Influencing Faqihs” (jurisprudents, or religious lawyers of Islam) in which he challenged the sacrality of faqihs using psychology and sociology, referring to Freud and Ibn Khaldun.28 If we take the case of Bilal al-Tleidi’s book (2014) Islamists and American Research Centers: A Study of the Cognitive Crisis. This book, based on content analysis, is an excellent comparison between two American think tanks: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Taaseel Center

The Taaseel Center has almost the same mission statement, yet the trend of reforming mainstream Islamic dominant schools is less clear.29 Their interests to rethink the contemporary thinking are as important as the Namaa Center but always through a critical assessment of Western philosopher thinkers, such as Francis Fukuyama (al-Lahibi 2013).30 I tried in this section to present three examples of new trends that were born from within the religious sphere, but discussing these orientations does not mean there is a conceptual coherence of every orientation or from within every institution we mentioned. Some of them appear, for instance, politically conservative in some issues and reformist/revivalist (tajdidi) in other issues. However, these renewals are internal, because their proponents are from those who studied Shariah and memorized the Quran, and many of them have practiced da’wah as separate from political process. This does not mean that any solution must marginalize the role of renewal and its importance from outside the religious sphere, as we cannot separate between internal or external attempts at reform, because both complete each other and reach others.

74  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Nonetheless, history is replete with mutual negligence between those within the religious sphere and those outside of it, perhaps the greatest example of which is the book Reform of Islam by Abduh Filali-Ansary (2003), in which he presented the biographies of 16 Islamic reformers, only one of whom was from within the religious sphere (Ali Abdulrazzaq). Nonetheless, despite that, some of them benefited from individuals such as Muhammad Abdel al-Jabiri, Muhammad Arkoun, Muhammad Sharour and Wael Hallaq or were at the least motivated by discussing their thought of starting renewal. Likewise, the new thing in this orientation of renewal is connecting renewal to daily issues that touch people’s lives in their journey to economic, political and developmental reform, and not in worship and religious rites.31 According to the phrasing of Ali Fahd al-Zamia, the president of the Board of Nohoudh Center for Development Studies, the main problem with the reformist projects issued externally were that they were heavily elitist and separated from society and its reality.32 As we saw in the examples mentioned in this section, that is currently different. We are surprised in these days at the emergence of major personalities, who were part of the conservative official clergy in the Gulf with important reformist views, perhaps the most recent of which was the statement of the Sheikh Adil al-Kalbani, the former Imam of the Haram that “Daesh is a product of Salafism” or “Da’esh is Salafi, not Ikhwani, nor Sufi, nor Asha’ri, its thought must also be discussed, rather than only discussing its actions.”33 Undoubtedly, these attempts are important attempts for change in Saudi Arabia carried out by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to enforce a long-waited reformist agenda by many of the nascent generation of Saudi youth. It is in this context that the I’tidal institution in Riyadh publishes reformist thought more tolerant than extremist Wahhabi thought. Therefore, we are faced by many challenges in the Arab world caused by different actors with contrasting agendas; there is a sociological efficacy among some of the renewal efforts because of the great role played by the authoritarian Arab state (like what happened in other regions of the globe, especially the enforcing of the Kemalist project in Turkey). However, we cannot know its long-term consequences. The least that can be said of this is that reform of the political institution (from the top down) forms a case of false (wretched) consciousness, in the Nietzschean meaning, consciousness alienated from the self in its objective realization in this miserable, temporal world. History will one day write that this sociological “efficacy” had long-term effects, and perhaps history will also write that religious reform has never been abused when it is driven by political urgency. Friday Sermons There is considerable literature on Islamist groups and movements, their social actions and political violence (often reduced to the battles between political actors in their relationships with power). However, such literature rarely focuses on the knowledge they use and produce, not only within their own supporting groups but also within the larger public through Friday sermons, religious classes, fatwas, media interaction and social media. Other literature, often from Islamic authors

The Arab Religious Field  75 who are graduates from Shariah studies, decontextualize religious knowledge production by considering it as symbolic signs in a fixed format that “speak the truth for every place and every time” (quoting one of our preacher interviewees).34 There is no reason here to give a long narration on the importance of Friday sermon-givers in Arab societies. It is sufficient to point to a survey published by a Syrian journal in 2010 that ranked the best-selling authors the year before, of whom three of the five biggest authors were religious scholars and preachers (Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Bouti, Wahba al-Zuhayli and Muhammad Ratib al-Nablusi, who became famous through his radio programs which transmitted his sermons and through the al-Risala and Iqra’ channels). The commercial class (Pierret 2013, 126), in addition to Algerian novelist Ahlam al-Mustaghanimi, and the Lebanese star Maghi Farah, also participate in many Arab nations in allying with the ulema and sheikh class and supporting them with their financial abilities to spread their ideas, and Thomas Pierret (2013, 189) quotes a Syrian businessman as saying “The two foundational values in Damascene society: to have wealth, and to have a sheikh.” This study aims to investigate preachers and their Friday sermons in Lebanon, raising the following questions: What are the profiles of preachers in Lebanon and their academic qualifications? What are the topics evoked in their sermons? In instances where they diagnose and analyze the political and the social, what kind of arguments are used to persuade their audiences? What kind of contact do they have with the social sciences? According to statistics on religious sects/groups in Lebanon,35 the Shiite and Sunni Muslim population in Lebanon is estimated between 24%–30% and 27%– 35% of the total population, respectively. Contrary to Shia Islam, which has a formal hierarchy of authority and knowledge, the religious authority of Sunni Islam is composed of different institutions and independent preachers called sheikhs. Sheikhs are individuals who have often pursued higher studies (bachelor’s or equivalent) in religion studies. On the Shia side, many preachers are graduates from hawzas (i.e., Shia religious schools, equivalent to Quran schools for Sunnis), where they spend no less than seven years in religious training. Religious studies in Lebanon are essentially pursued at university-equivalent higher education institutions, with high levels of enrollment and active graduates (MA and PhD) students. However, these universities are often isolated from other higher education institutions, and some of them are part of the networks of Islamic preaching universities around the Arab and Muslim world. These universities, whose language of instruction is Arabic, are accredited by the Lebanese Ministry of Education.36 Methodology

This study is based on two research methods. It draws on 42 semi-structured interviews with preachers and content analysis of 210 preachers’ Friday sermons, all conducted between 2012 and 2015.37 Thirty-five Sunni preachers and seven Shia preachers were interviewed about their socio-economic status, educational

76  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts background and their process of acquiring knowledge in relation to the social sciences. By using the snowballing technique, stratified sampling was adopted, taking into account three criteria: ideological-political affiliation, geographical location and public influence. This study does not purport to contain a representative sample. However, the research does reflect the variety of preachers in terms of the above-assigned criteria. Given that the sample is small, there is no intention of producing any statistical inference. Sunni Sermons

For Friday sermons, 91 sermons were analyzed,38 selected so as to cover three major groups of the Sunni Muslim audience for the period April–June 2013. As preaching is largely an oral activity, the sermons were sourced from the three major Sunni radio stations in Lebanon, which broadcast these sermons. Thus, it can be argued that these sermons are effectively the sermons with the highest influence in Lebanon as they reach the widest audience. The sermons were sourced exhaustively from what were available in the period April–June 2013 on the following radio stations: al-Qura’n al-Karim Radio, which is the station affiliated with the central religious authority (Dar al-Fatwa) in Lebanon, and whose audience is generally Muslim Sunnis, especially in Beirut; al-Fajr Radio, which is the station affiliated with al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-affiliated Sunni group in Lebanon, and whose audience is from across the different Lebanese regions; and al-Qura’n al-Karim Bekaa Radio, which is the station affiliated with the relatively autonomous Sunni religious authority in the Bekaa area, a large rural district of Lebanon with a significant Sunni population. Thus said, the sermons cover three major ideological patterns of audiences and religious spheres, including the general urban Sunni audience, the general rural Sunni audience, and the MB-affiliated audience. In addition, eight more sermons from Salafi groups in Tripoli in 2015 were analyzed in a less systematic manner. Shia Sermons

Overall, the study includes 111 speeches. Half of the speeches were collected from the internet, 41% are transcripts, six of them are from books and one is a recording. Their locations are distributed, with 60% from Beirut, 25% from the South and 15% from the Bekaa area. In the Jaafari madhhab (the predominant Shia jurisprudential school), the Friday prayer (which is a two-rakat prayer that substitutes for Zuhr prayer and is accompanied by a two-section speech, one political and one religious) is an issue of disagreement among the Maraaji (the highest Shia religious authority). This is the reason why, for the whole Beirut/Dahye region, there can only be one Friday prayer held, and it is held by Sayyed Ali Fadlallah. Other mosques hold regular Zuhr prayer but present a sermon as well. That is the majority of what was analyzed. In the Bekaa, Sheikh Ali Taha and Sheikh Mohamad Yazbek hold Friday prayers. In the South, Sheikh Abdelkarim Obeid holds the Friday prayer.

The Arab Religious Field  77 Concerning the preachers’ affiliation, half of the speeches are given by preachers who are close to Hezbollah, while approximately a quarter are given by independent preachers and the remaining are close to late Sheikh Hossein Fadlallah and the Amal movement. It is interesting to note the fact that the Shia sermons are more monitored than the Sunni ones. al-Mihrab is an application founded by the Islamic Center for Daawa (close to Hezbollah) and the al-Maaref Cultural Association. This application falls under the attempts currently underway to regulate, manage and guide the religious discourse of Shia mosques in Lebanon. Before this became an application in early 2014, it was a sort of periodical issued and distributed to mosque imams. Recently, the printed periodical was stopped and the application was developed. Historically, mosques and similar institutions such as the Masjid, Husseiniyya (for Shia) have played an important role in Muslim society. In addition to being a place where Muslims pray and attend Friday sermons, the mosque was (and still is, to a certain extent) the hub of Islamic society. The mosque is thus a structure that accommodates many social and political activities. Nonetheless, some mosques attract more attendees than others for many reasons such as mosque location, size and accessibility, but the most important reason is the preacher’s popularity. Preachers’ Profiles General Background

The sample is well distributed among different age groups and skewed towards older age groups. I  expect that this characteristic somehow also represents the actual preachers’ population (Table  2.2). The sample is drawn from different regions. However, Beirut, the most populated city in Lebanon, has the lion’s share (Table 2.3). Concerning Shia preachers, their profile appears very similar to that of Sunni preachers, although slightly tilted to higher age groups. Most of the Sunni preachers interviewed live in urban settings, which is as expected because Lebanon is an urbanized country (29 in urban areas against only 5 in rural ones). Furthermore, mosque location and content of Friday sermon were evidently correlated. A quarter of a century ago, Richard Antoun (1989) compared the Friday sermons he analyzed in a village in Jordan to the results obtained by Borthwick, who analyzed Friday sermons given in urban mosques. Antoun tentatively infers that “the sermons delivered in the village mosque, in stark contrast to Table 2.2 Sunni Sample Distribution by Age Age

N

50 Total

9 13 13 35

78  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Table 2.3 Distribution of Sunni Sample by Region Region

N

Beirut South North Bekaa Total

15 10 7 3 35

Table 2.4 Type of School the Sunni Preachers Attended Type of School

N

Private religious (Islamic) Public Private non-religious Private religious (Christian) Total N/A

19 8 4 1 32 3

Table 2.5 Highest Degree Obtained by Sunni Preachers Highest Degree

N

BA/BS MA MD and PhD/PhD Diploma/BT BS Eng. Total

14 9 9 2 1 35

Borthwick’s urban sermons, had minimal political content.” Even though Antoun focused on one preacher and, therefore, his inference may not be valid for other village mosques or for the current age of increasing political mobilization in the Arab East, the suggestion that the content of the Friday sermon, which may not necessarily be limited to political content, is quite interesting and worth looking into further. Educational Background

There is no doubt that a preacher’s educational background has a direct effect on his preaching. Education helps cultivate certain skills; it plays a role in determining the sources of knowledge that, in turn, affect the content of Friday sermons and their appeal to audiences. The majority (20 preachers out of 35) come from religious Islamic schools (Table 2.4). Most preachers involved in this study have at least a bachelor’s degree that is often combined with religious training (three-quarters; Table  2.5). Twothirds of the Sunni sample obtained their highest religious training in Lebanon,

The Arab Religious Field  79 followed by 20% in Saudi Arabia (who often become Salafists among the preachers; Table 2.6). For those who have a non-religious degree in combination with a religious degree, it is interesting to note that roughly half of them have an Arabic literature degree, indicating the importance of rhetoric in preaching. Only two preachers have a degree in the social sciences, and nine have degrees in other disciplines (Table 2.7). Thus, the profiles of Sunni preachers may be divided into two: those who obtained a religious education ending with a Shariah degree and those (less common) who obtained a non-religious education. Meir Hatina (2010, 2–3) noticed that many engineers or doctors become preachers. Furthermore, preachers’ knowledge covers language, since more than half of the interviewed preachers reported having at least some proficiency in a second language (Table 2.8). Table 2.6 Country in Which the Sunni Preachers Obtained Their Last Degree Country

N

Lebanon Saudi Arabia Egypt Other Total

23 7 3 2 35

Table 2.7 Distribution of Non-religious Degrees Obtained by Sunni Preachers, if Applicable Field

N

Arab literature Social science Others Total

8 2 9 19

Table 2.8 Sunni Preachers’ Proficiency in Languages Other Than Arabic Number of Languages

N

None Some knowledge One language More than one Subtotal Missing Total

14 4 8 7 33 2 35

80  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Given that the sample is small for the Shia preachers, I will simply point out some general trends. Some graduated from Iraq or Qom and others from Lebanon in religious studies, and in some cases from law or basic sciences. Shia preachers are trained in hawzas, and the great majority have at least bachelor’s degrees. This is especially so, as hawzas in Lebanon have agreements with universities, such as the Islamic University, by which hawza students obtain a degree in Islamic studies (Kassem 2018). As previously pointed out, hawzas are very important institutions in producing preachers. Relationship to the State: Control and Income

The relationship between preachers and the state has a major impact on the relative autonomy of the field of religion and the messages delivered through Friday sermons. Although many Arab countries (Oman, UAE, Kuwait, Algeria and Morocco) impose unified Friday sermons on all preachers, the relationship with the state remains complex. Hatina (2010) argues that in some Arab countries most of the preachers have been and remain closely affiliated with the state in terms of posts, salaries and institutions, acting as teachers, mosque attendants, judges and administrators in the state religious system. In Algeria, Abderrahmane Moussaoui (2009), in his study on mosques, observed that by providing a salary to preachers, the state controlled them and their Friday sermons. States in the Middle East failed to create independent autonomous higher religious councils that can monitor and guide mosque institutions. There remains, however, some unaffiliated scholars who usually adopt a more critical and activist stance which often clashes with the mainstream current found within the state’s conventional religious spheres and the political authorities concerned with religious and sociopolitical issues (Hatina 2010, 2–3). In Egypt, long regarded as a foe of al-Azhar’s authority, following the coup d’état of General Sisi with al-Azhar in July  2013, the former Ministry of Religious Endowments worked to implement regulations to recruit preachers, bring mosques under the ministry’s jurisdiction and regulate the content of sermons and the issuing of fatwas. The minister of endowments, Mohamed Mokhtar Gomaa, declared that prayers would be allowed only in mosques controlled by the ministry and that only al-Azhar–qualified imams would be allowed to preach in mosques (Morsy and Brown 2013). However, this is not the case nowadays. The Algerian government seeks to find new regulatory measures to deal with imams who are beyond the control of the state and are thus free to choose the content of their speech. Nevertheless, it would be wise to avoid making a simple conclusion regarding the state employment of imams and the loss of their autonomy. A quarter of a century ago, Raymond Antoun (1989) in the eighties conceded the relative autonomy of the preacher who received a salary for writing his Friday sermons; the Jordanian Department of Religious Endowments used to send newsletters to preachers recommending topics for the sermons and would request that preachers keep a copy of them. Nonetheless, the preachers Antoun interviewed did not always use these recommended topics. As for Lebanon, it is interesting to note that almost half (16) of the Sunni preachers in the study sample do not earn money from their preaching (Table 2.9). In fact,

The Arab Religious Field  81 those who do earn money from Dar al-Fatwa or from religious associations (19 preachers), their salaries are not necessarily for preaching but for other tasks such as teaching and educational duties. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Lebanese families who built mosques continue to pay the preachers who assure the services in them (Table 2.10). With regard to the Shia, it can be said that they are completely autonomous from the state, thanks to the khums system that provides a direct income to the sheikhs. Hawzas are fully autonomous from the state but hold a strong relationship, including at the upper levels, primarily with the Maraaji’ of Iran (directly or through Hezbollah) and Iraq. Sheikhs obtain further funding from private teaching, writing and media appearances (Kassem 2018). It could be supposed that the relative decrease of state influence on preachers is linked to the insufficiency of state pay, associated also with preachers having to work in other professions to earn their living, in comparison (according to those interviewed) to earlier times when a job in the state’s religious sector was secure and relatively well paid with many social benefits. Sources of Knowledge

In attempting to trace the sources of knowledge of the preachers interviewed, it was observed that most of the Sunni preachers interviewed are connected to the internet, and slightly more than half of the preachers reported using the internet daily (Table 2.11). Interviewees declared multiple purposes for their internet use Table 2.9  Salary Source for Sunni Preachers Salary Source

N

Neither Dar al-Fatwa nor a religious authority Private religious authority (including mosque commissions) Dar al-Fatwa Private religious authority but for a different “religious” position Total

16 7 6 6 35

Table 2.10 Sunni Preachers’ Other Professions Profession

N

None School principal/teacher Judge Accountant Administrator Doctor Private business Total

9 19 3 1 1 1 1 35

82  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts but mainly for surfing religious sites and fewer than half for reading the news (Table 2.12). As for television consumption, the majority of the declared viewed programs are obviously political (three-quarters) or religious (more than half). Moreover, almost three-quarters of the preachers reported listening to religious channels or programs on the radio and two-thirds reported listening to other nonreligious channels or radio programs. With regard to reading material, a large majority reported reading scientific journals, magazines and newspapers (Table 2.12). All the Sunni preachers interviewed declared reading books. In fact, they identified several favorite readings; many conveyed political themes as a favorite topic, followed by literature and poetry and finally scientific topics. However, few in the sample declared books on social themes as a favorite (Table 2.13). The interest in reading Arabic literature and poetry (often classical) seems to coincide with the fact that half of the preachers with a non-religious degree hold a degree in Arabic literature. Thus, Sunni preachers in Lebanon seem to be very interested in politics, especially political news and updates, a genre that seems to be a very important source of knowledge for the interviewed preachers. When asked about the sources used by preachers in preparing Friday sermons, half of them claimed to always integrate political development in their speeches, and most of the others claimed to integrate it usually or sometimes. Once again, these numbers confirm the findings in the previous Table 2.11 Frequency of Internet Usage by Preacher Frequency

N

Daily Sometimes Not at all No Answer Total

17 13 3 2 35

Table 2.12 Usage of TV, Internet, Radio and Other Media for Preaching Purposes Media

Yes

No

Watching TV, religious channels Watching TV, political channels Watching TV, other Books Scientific journals Magazines Newspapers Internet, religious sites Internet, news Internet, search Internet, other Radio, religious Radio, other non-religious

20 27 13 35 20 24 25 26 14 13 15 26 21

15 8 22 0 15 10 10 9 21 22 20 9 14

The Arab Religious Field  83 Table 2.13 Favorite Reading Topics Expressed by Sunni Preachers Genre

N

Political/news Literary/poetry Scientific/documentary Historic Religious Social

25 18 15 12 8 6

Table 2.14 Declared Sources Used for Preparing Friday Sermons and the Frequency of Their Usage Source

Always

Usually or Sometimes

Rarely or Never

Islamic history General history Social events Arabic poetry Political development

13 3 15 5 16

17 25 12 19 14

2 4 5 8 2

section. With regard to using social events as a source of Friday sermon content, almost half the interviewees reported employing them in their sermons all the time, while only five preachers declared that they rarely or never use them as a source. This indicates that they engage with current issues emerging in their society. Fewer than half of preachers claimed to always use Islamic history as a source for sermons, while only two preachers claimed to rarely or never use it. Finally, most preachers claimed to usually or sometimes integrate general history and Arabic poetry (Table 2.14). As for the quotes used in Friday sermons, only three preachers of the sample claimed to always quote Muslim philosophers (e.g., Farabi, al-Kindi) and Arab social scientists (Ibn Khaldun), and 15 preachers claimed to use such quotes usually or sometimes (Table 2.15). These claims are not supported by the content analysis of the sermons, as displayed below. Nonetheless, while preachers seem to be well exposed to social events and seem to regard them as an important source for Friday sermons, this exposure to social events does not necessarily entail an exposure to the social sciences. In fact, the social genre that scored the lowest when compared to other favorite reading genres and sources of quotations derived were the social sciences. Nonetheless, politics, and possibly political science, scored the highest on the preachers’ favorite readings, seeming to be much more important and of greater exposure. The content analysis of Friday sermons carried out does not support the preacher’s declarations of using quotes from the social sciences. It could be concluded that preachers are open to various sources of knowledge, including mass media and social media (mainly Facebook and WhatsApp).

84  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Table 2.15 Declared Quotes Used in Friday Sermons and the Frequency of Their Usage Quotes Used

Always

Usually or Sometimes

Rarely or Never

Quotes from Arabs and Muslims Quotes from non-Arabs Quotes from scientists Quotes from religious figures Quotes from philosophers and social scientists Quotes from literary figures and poets

9 1 2 5 3

18 18 13 18 15

6 13 17 9 14

2

20

11

However, these knowledge patterns do not exhibit a specific pattern of religious or scientific scholarly dimension and are more similar to those of the general Middle Eastern/Lebanese population. This claim needs to be explored in greater depth, especially in relation to arguments about improper or insufficient qualifications of religious preachers and scholars. While a career in the religious sphere provides a notable sphere of social, cultural and knowledge-related influence on the general public, many Muslim individuals—especially among the youth and highly professional and educated sectors—complain of the irrelevant or outdated religious discourse, which they feel is becoming increasingly unappealing. This manifests itself predominantly in the content of Friday sermons, making its attendance often driven merely by the desire to fulfill a religious commitment rather than an interest in the sermon itself. Content Analysis of Friday Sermons

Friday sermons are the most important source of socialization for observant Muslims. According to Bunt (2000), “Their content can vary, from commentaries on the Quran to advice on common questions or issues.” Here focus will be on the topic addressed and the sources that affect the content of Friday sermons. Richard Antoun asked the preachers he interviewed to list the books they use for preparing Friday sermons. The books were the Quran, books of Hadith, books on preaching and commentaries on the Quran. Nevertheless, while being certain that Friday sermons included religious content, the focus of this research was on defining other non-religious sources, specifically in knowing how much the preacher went beyond the text to look at the context and to rely on non-authoritarian practical reasoning. Maeve Cooke (2007) construes “context” and “history” as what fundamentally distinguishes authoritarian claims from non-authoritarian claims. This also involves the capacity to anticipate and actively look for problems, to formulate and solve them, rather than taking them for granted without argument. The anthropologist Robin Horton (1982, 121) addresses the nature of these circumstances in writing about the change in Western Europe from a traditional, authoritarian, consensus-based mode of reasoning to a competitive style that places a premium on novelty and a proliferation of methods.

The Arab Religious Field  85 Generally speaking, exercise of such critical thinking in the Friday sermons observed was not found, nor was there encouragement from the audience to do so. The fact that preachers were not exposed to the social sciences seems somewhat problematic as their knowledge of context and history and understanding of social and political phenomena is thereby limited. As seen in the next section, this is especially so as most of the sermons present the religious perspective on social and political matters in Lebanon. Abdelhakim Murad suggests that the failure of Islamic movements, and perhaps the relative stagnation of the Muslim world, is due to the fact that Muslims “are endlessly fascinated by short-term political issues, but are largely ignorant of the larger tendencies of which these issues are simply the passing manifestations.” To be acquainted with these “larger tendencies,” preachers such as Islamic leaders should be “familiar with the ideas that underpin modernity” (Murad 2013). One way to solve this problem, Murad concludes, is to establish institutions capable of properly training young Muslims, not only in the Shariah sciences but also in the modern, intellectual and cultural disciplines. He gives an example of al-Ghazali’s Nizamiyya Madrasa in Baghdad that taught philosophy in addition to fiqh. Some religious authorities are aware of the problem of preaching. In his book, The Preacher’s Knowledge, al-Qaradawi (1978) gives guidelines to Muslim preachers on how to deal with Islamic and general knowledge. The following sections are based on the content analysis of the 88 sermons from Lebanese radio broadcasts that were read and analyzed in carrying out this study. Reference to Social and Political Issues

It is not easy to separate social and/or political issues from the religious sphere, as many preachers attribute all the catastrophes of the Muslim world to Muslims’ sinful behavior. Sunni Sermons

Political and social issues are highly represented in sermons (one-half and onethird of sermons, respectively; Table 2.16). This is normal, seeing that religion emphasizes morality in individuals and society. However, such references enter recurrently into diagnosing problems without using the tools or the modes of reasoning of the social sciences, as mentioned before. More than two-thirds of the sermons focused predominantly on Arab countries in contrast to a small minority on Muslim and/or other countries (Table 2.17). Table 2.16 Topics of the Sermons Topic

N

%

Political issues Social issues General morality

49 32 29

55.7 36.4 33.0

Note: Total number of sermons is 88. Sermons can have more than one theme.

86  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Table 2.17 Sermon References to Specific Countries Countries

N

%

Arab countries Other Muslim countries Other countries

65 16 15

73.9 18.2 17.0

Note: Total number of sermons is 88. Sermons can have more than one theme.

Table 2.18 Invocation Reference to Specific Countries Countries

N

%

Arab countries Other Muslim countries Other countries

38 24 7

43.2 27.3 8.0

Note: Total number of sermons is 88. Sermons can have more than one theme.

Reference was more often in terms of politics, mentioning, for example, the political situation in Syria and Palestine. This also confirms the extent to which preachers are exposed to political news. When the speech reaches da’wah (invocation), it is interesting to note that references to praying concerned not only Arabs and Muslims but sometimes also non-Arab and non-Muslim countries (Table 2.18). Historically and currently, the religious field in Islamic societies has experienced very little autonomy; there is a dependence vis-à-vis temporal authorities, in particular the political authorities. The case has been no different in Lebanon, where religious preaching has often been used to score political points. On political issues, it is clear that a theme such as repression is very present, because many Sunni prisoners have been arrested without legal judgment. Thus, the Lebanese legal system is also denounced in preachers’ speeches. Nonetheless, the concept of democracy is quasi absent among the 91 sermons. It was mentioned three times, once in a positive manner and twice in a negative manner or opposing it to the Islamic system. However, except for Bahrain, the most commented issue is the Arab uprisings and the consequent waves of refugees. One preacher started by comparing the Arab Spring to the Prophet’s biography (which aims to both spread happiness to the people and make the world a better place, and that the Prophet and the Arab uprisings first had many opponents and the “media” spoke badly about them by claiming that both caused harm to the world). Preachers often expressed support for freedom, dignity and people’s choice, and denounced the ruling Arab regimes, in many instances describing them as “tyrants,” “hypocrites,” “oppressors,” “corrupt” and “dictators.” This was especially evident in the context of referencing the Syrian uprising and the coup d’état against the former Egyptian President Morsi, as the selected period of sermons analyzed was mid-2013. Here two arguments were omnipresent; the first is that the entire world (sometimes Jews and/or Americans) was united in conspiring against Muslims, and the second was that some

The Arab Religious Field  87 Muslims (alluding implicitly or explicitly to Hezbollah, Iran or the Shia tout court) were contributing to supporting “the oppressor.” At times they used a political discourse of “Hezbollah and the Assad regime versus the Syrian people”; at other times emphasis was placed on sects, denouncing Shia involvement and support for the oppressor (the Syrian regime) and often calling for “Jihad against the Satans.” In these latter cases, a tilt towards a sectarian discourse was obvious. Yet, contrary to Shia sermons calling for the believers to go to fight in Syria against what they lump together as “takfireyyeen,”39 except for one there was no call from our sample of sermons for Sunni believers to go fight in Syria. This result was supported by Saoud al-Mawla’s (2016) work on Salafism in Lebanon. The majority of sectarian arguments conveyed in the analyzed sermons related to Shia, but there were almost none against Christians. Worth noting, however rare they were, is that some preachers were very careful not to make sectarian arguments. One preacher said, “The problem is not with the Shiites but with those who follow the oppressors and do harm to innocent people.” One preacher stressed that Islam was peaceful and that people were free to believe or disbelieve in any religion. Another insisted that jihad (the call for the fighting the enemy) should be an institutional call, not something that was up to an individual to initiate. The same preacher called for Christians and Muslims to stand together in Lebanon so as to avoid disagreement, chaos and schism (fitna). This term is of high contextual significance in Islam, especially in the Sunni-Shiite division and the historic crises between the two sects. Much emphasis is put on it in sermons, and it has become a buzzword to alert people to be vigilant against the danger of inciting “hostility to other sects,” which fuels the “global conspiracy against Islam.” In addition, further fieldwork was carried out to look at Salafi preachers in Tripoli. These sermons overtly support the Nusra Front and use very antagonizing language about the Syrian conflict. Some of them use Ibn Taymiyyah’s problematic categorization,40 such as Dar Islam (the land of Islam) and Dar Harb (the land of the infidels) as a principal of dealing with international relations. This frames their whole approach in respect to other religions. However, three sermons of Salafi preachers were selected from Tripoli close to the Syrian Nusra Front following the double suicide bombing in Jabal Mohsen (an Alawite area) committed by the organization. A striking feature of these preachers was the fact that all three denounced the attack. This indicates that even though they were supporting Nusra, they were not willing to adopt such action against other sects in Lebanon. It is interesting to note that some young people were aware that certain preachers were politicized to the point that they would avoid praying in their mosques, saying that “every mosque is owned by a faction and the ones praying in a particular mosque are automatically seen as members of that faction” (Samir Kassir Foundation 2016). The over-representation of politics correlates with the previously mentioned findings analyzing the knowledge sources of preachers who reported the use of mass media to stay updated with news and politics. It also coincides with preachers’ declared tendency to integrate current political developments in their speeches. The political deliberations of preachers have been constant over time. In 1965, Borthwick studied Friday sermons and concluded that preachers were promoting

88  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts “nationalism,” but that they were not furthering political modernization (Borthwick in Antoun 1989). According to Borthwick, the reason behind this is that the sermons provide the rhetoric and emotions necessary for promoting nationalism, but they do not provide the audience with the skills acquired through secular education, independent reading and experience (Antoun 1989). The Palestinian issue also figured highly; the arguments brought forward were often related to the land as a “holy land” and how Israelis were prohibiting Palestinians from praying in the al-Aqsa Mosque. Call for jihad against Israelis is very frequent. One preacher commemorated the death of a prominent Palestinian woman, Mariam Farhat or Umm Nidal, who was vocal in congratulating her three sons on martyrdom while fighting against the Israeli occupation. Concerning social issues, some sermons included references commending acts of social value, such as cleaning the neighborhood, working hard41 and respecting workers (on the occasion of Labor Day), driving safely and so on. There was an emphasis on many social problems related to young people, especially their sexuality and dress codes. Preachers often remind audiences that the weak practice of Islamic values had led to direct negative consequences on people’s everyday life, often citing acts such as extra-conjugal relationship (Zina) or homosexuality, and associated these acts with the increased spread of disease. It is clear that for many preachers, the youth was a category at risk. For instance, one preacher in Beirut said in his sermons, “Nowadays our youth is lost, immersed in sin, only seeking pleasure, spending nights dancing, forgetting their religious rituals.” The approach, often used by preachers, attempts to raise feelings of guilt in their congregations. From a Bekaa mosque, another preacher said, “We are plagued these days with the immorality of homosexuality. Homosexuality is increasing and spreading in Lebanon, like fire in hay.” This statement does not confine itself to preaching morality in society but also describes a social phenomenon. However, given that much research in Lebanon indicates that homosexuality is still very marginal, there is no justification for making such a statement. Another topic of interest and importance in some of the sermons analyzed was the issue of civil marriage. This was related to the fact that the date of these sermons coincided with a campaign led by secularist activists in Lebanon calling for civil marriage. A  closer look at the religious discourse on social issues is very relevant at this point. Two preachers criticized a Lebanese minister who signed an act for civil marriage, which they considered as a conspiracy by Christian and Shiite politicians against the Sunni sect. One preacher argued that civil marriage did not deal appropriately with important aspects of marriage such as inheritance and divorce from a religious perspective, and called his audience to observe how marriage in Turkey was “against Islamic doctrine.” Generally speaking, the eight sermons denounced it without really arguing the case, rather presenting it as simply a secularist plot against religion. Shia Sermons

In respect to the Shia sermons, subjects greatly varied. Current political, social, religious in the strict sense, historical (life of the Prophet, Imams Ali and Hussein)

The Arab Religious Field  89 were all covered. Forty percent of the speeches referred to social issues. Only two speeches referred to other than the Hadith and Quran when speaking about social issues. On political issues the sermons contained many references to sources other than the Hadith and the Quran. Three-quarters of speeches dealt with people’s everyday lives beyond religious rites. These included issues of law; fighting racism; democracy (one speech had a positive approach to the protection of democracy, and the other blamed democracy for terrorism); insistence upon freedom and liberty (mostly regarding Bahrain and the Saudi Shia area al-Qatif); much talk about political dialogue amongst the Lebanese; human rights (statements that human beings have rights simply by being human irrespective of other considerations); insistence on treating others; including Syrian refugees, like brothers and sisters; corruption; avoiding the collapse of the government; condemning the politicization of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; citizenship and patriotism; protecting the army; choosing one’s spouse; charity, and child education. There was emphasis on resistance, especially in its military meaning, citing resistance as the only effective way for nations to achieve their rights. This included praising the Lebanese army, such as greeting the national army on its day of commemoration, stating that the political leaders’ aim was not to develop their countries but to take over the government for their own purposes, and appealing to leaders to stop lying to their citizens and to serve them. Resistance, it was claimed, was antagonizing the “others” (referring to the United States as the “great Satan”). Another stated, “Resistance was important to face the Western plan to occupy Arab countries . . . America was a devil hiding behind democracy to achieve its main interests.” Resistance, it was stated, was also emphasized in the Iranian doctrine of resistance and there was frequent mention of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as its main theorist. There was much criticism of Arab regimes for reasons as varied as religious degradation and oppression. One example was the attack on their political position vis-à-vis Iran which stated, “The Arabs and the Gulf protest against Iran’s nuclear energy, but they remain silent on Israel’s dangerous actions.” To summarize, both Sunni and Shia sermons are over-politicized and show manipulations of its basic lexicon (e.g., terrorism, resistance, evil, good) with no social science modes of reasoning or social science methodology. The word “conspiracy” against Islam and the Muslim world was often mentioned in both Shia and Sunni sermons. Indeed, it is used like a national sport in the Arab world, including among the leftist groups. Political leaders battle over the electoral law proposal. There are external conspiracies against Muslims in the Arab region. Jihadists in Syria are part of the conspiracy and do not abide by true Islamic morality. Generally speaking, the difference between Shia and Sunni sermons is a difference in terms of chosen topics. With regard to the relation to the four modes of social scientific reasoning, the variance is thin. It is rare to find the first type of reasoning and measurement (experimental exploration and measurement of more complex observable relations); for instance, the scientific description of social or political phenomena before advancing normative statements about these phenomena is hard to come by. There is also a dearth in the second (hypothetical construction of analogical models). Also rare are sermons that encourage critical thinking

90  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts by showing that social reality requires interpretation and that there are different opinions in regards to any social or political issue. Instead of introducing hesitation as a mode of experimentation, preachers insist on one truth, upheld by one side. Concerning the third (ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy), sermons that bring comparison between different social and political contexts and different countries and different social systems are largely absent. Conversely, comparison with the prophet and the time of his companions is a method often used to stimulate guilt among listeners. Finally, in regard to the last mode of social scientific reasoning (statistical analysis of regularities of populations and the calculus of probabilities), use of such data in sermons is scarce. Moreover, sometimes even statistics were presented without any sort of referencing. Reference to General Morality

There was no real difference between Sunni and Shia sermons noted in regard to issues of general morality. Beyond encouraging people to follow Islamic law and fiqh, a third of the sermons emphasized general morality (see Table 2.16). General morality includes being merciful with young people, respecting neighbors and relatives, being loyal to one’s country (patriotism), working hard, preserving cleanliness, avoiding drug and alcohol abuse, valuing freedom, dignity and humanity, and so on. One preacher reminded people that in war there were ethics. Comparing the historical battle of Tabouk to the present, he deplored the lack of ethics at the present time. A recurrent theme was helping Syrian refugees. One preacher urged the Lebanese to treat Syrians like the al-Ansar (Muslim residents of Madina) who helped the Muhajirun (Muslim migrants from Mecca) in the early history of Islam. Another preacher discussed the help Lebanon offered to Armenian refugees and questioned the lack of will in helping the Syrians. Sometimes, communicating the good and bad behavior was delivered in harsh terms, especially when it came to women’s code of dress, or even to girls playing football in the Borg al-Shamali refugee camp near Saida.42 Similar harshness was found when discussing the failure to commit to certain religious rituals, such as prayer. Almost half of the sermons called for a return to the religious life of earlier times, such as the time of the Prophet and his companions, and more than half of the speeches stated, in one way or another, that religion was the sole way to prosper in life. Islamic history was often invoked to show how Muslims, having always faced problems (e.g., Crusaders, Mongols), managed to achieve victory through Allah because they held on to Islamic values and practices. The message was often conveyed by denouncing the current “deviant” behavior of Muslims and finding hope in following the word of God. Some sermons that coincided with the Prophet’s birthday (an official holiday in many Muslim countries) denounced considering this date as a holiday and celebrating it was “false festivity,” stating that instead it should be celebrated by “pursuing the prophet’s guidance and following it in our daily lives and decisions.” One form of the return to earlier religious life was the application of the early Islamic punishment system (al-hudud). Many

The Arab Religious Field  91 preachers seemed strict about implementing all kinds of hudud and believed that “doing so would stop people from further committing these sins and would purify people as well as society.” Many stressed that Muslim women should wear hijab and cover their bodies. The Non-Muslim Others Sunni Sermons

Overall, speeches tended not to talk about how Christians were perceived (a large majority did not refer to Christians or Christianity). However, when they were mentioned, the reference was sometimes positive and sometimes neutral. Rarely was Christianity mentioned in a negative context or in terms of competition43 (Table 2.19). However, there was a sweeping denunciation of the West. The West was sometimes viewed to embody Christianity and other times to embody imperialism and hegemony. For instance, a preacher reminded his audience that thinkers from the European Enlightenment attacked Islam (Voltaire and Renan). He added, “There is a law in the world that prohibits anti-Semitism. We are Semitic people. Don’t we deserve to be protected from attack? I call for international law that protects religion and prohibits attacking it.” A positive image of Western people was on occasion evoked by arguing that not all Western thinkers or ideas were bad or by pointing to the fact that some have reflected upon, inquired and embraced Islam. One mentioned Gustave Le Bon when he said that history never witnessed people who were more merciful than the Arabs. Sometimes preachers showed how some Western thinkers praise Islam but without a quote or source. Some ideas seemed untrue, such as one preacher’s statement that the Vatican praised the Islamic economy! It was also observed that the large majority of speeches analyzed did not refer to Jews. When there was a reference, however, it was mostly in a negative context. This is a slippery slope since, instead of using the terms Zionists or Israelis, the preachers used the word Jews (see Table 2.20). Sometimes there was reference to “the Jews in Palestine,” a euphemism for Israelis. Shia Sermon

Christianity was referred to in 17% of speeches, three-quarters of which were in a positive context (only five were negative). Other Islamic sects were referred to in Table 2.19 Speech Reference to Christianity and the Context of Reference Reference

N

%

Context of toleration Negative context Another context No reference Total

8 2 7 71 88

9.1 2.3 8.0 80.7 100.0

92  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Table 2.20 Speech Reference to Jews and the Context of Reference

Positive context Negative context Neutral No reference Total

N

%

2 20 4 62 88

2.3 22.7 4.5 70.5 100.0

15% of the analyzed speeches. Most were made in a context of tolerance. Some sermons emphasized Sunni-Shia dialogue and Islamic-Christian dialogue. Reference to Jews were made in 12% of the speeches, three-quarters of which were in a negative context. Reference to Arab countries, mainly Bahrain, Palestine and Iraq, were present in the sermons. There was also frequent positive reference made to Iran and negative reference to the United States and Israel. The majority of sermons carry no reference to any interaction of the preacher with a non-religious party or group. The majority also do not refer to Western civilization in a negative context. Concluding Remarks

There is no specific “model” or singular concept of “a preacher.” Significant variations exist between various Muslim groups, as preachers do not necessarily agree on some major concepts, particularly as they are becoming increasingly politicized. While the majority of the interviewees graduated from religious schools and universities, rarely do they use social scientific knowledge or tools in order to analyze and diagnose social and political phenomena. This further emphasizes the importance of studying the qualification and practices of preachers in religious institutions from a social science perspective, especially in light of the social influence they have in Muslim societies. Political and, to a lesser extent, social issues are omnipresent in the Friday sermons while the preachers’ main interaction with social research has been limited to public channels, such as newspapers and TV. There is significant awareness of the problem content of the sermons and style of preaching represents. Othman Mohammad (2013) eloquently calls this “Depressive Da’wah Style [Bitter-Pill Treatment].” For him this style has five characteristics: (1) belittling the listeners and destroying their self-esteem; (2) comparing our current state to the state of the sahaba (companions of the Prophet Mohamed), or the righteous predecessors, without clarifying the difference in context; (3) emphasis on how insignificant our deeds and efforts are in contrast to God’s blessings; (4) focusing on the torment of the grave and the punishment of the hereafter without mentioning the beautiful rewards God has prepared for His followers; and (5) attributing all the catastrophes in our Ummah (community) to the sinful behavior of Muslims and talk about sustained and perpetual guilt! (Mohammad 2013). This study demonstrates that discursive formations of sermons are in close relationship with power structures. Max Weber considers the sociology of religion as

The Arab Religious Field  93 a dimension of the sociology of power. Theorists have long sought to classify and understand the abstract processes inherent in the legitimization of power, or in more precise terms, “the particular rationale for attributing legitimacy for command and obedience” (Matheson 1987, 199). Weber (2008) identifies three “pure types” of legitimacy (traditional, charismatic and legal), which he maintains must emerge relationally in some variation or combination within a given community in order to ensure its sound functioning. This applies to preachers and muftis. It is how they are to set forth their authority, deploying one or more legitimization strategies. Patrick Gaffney (1994) modifies Weber’s typology to classify Egyptian preaching into three types: the saint, the scholar and the warrior. Here I alter Gaffney’s typology using different terms: the traditional, the scholar and the saint. The traditional is he who mainly utilizes arguments referring to the past, mainly to the early times of Islam. This is also what Mohamed Abed al-Jabri (1999) refers to as holy textual reasoning (al-‘akel al-bayani) that always uses excessive analogy with the past. The scholar relies not only on the tradition but also on scientific methods of inquiry in order to read reality and find solutions by using a complex set of interpretations of holy text and hadith. Finally, the saint (equivalent of Weber’s charismatic person) often relies on an extraordinary level of personal magnetism, rhetorical skills and emotions, without argumentation either from tradition or from the social sciences. So far the analysis of Friday sermons does not properly tackle the way preachers establish their authority and use legitimization strategies. However, it can be said that most of them represent both the saint and the traditional but rarely the scholar. This has an impact on how religious people are made to be easily influenced by traditional/saint preachers. Although it is the author’s belief that the individual constructs their own “bricolage” of beliefs, one that goes beyond what preachers want to dictate, such an approach can have dire consequences. Even Ammar Ben Hamouda (2016) already wonders cynically if the ritual of praying has any effect on Muslim moral behavior. In the context of oppression and the closeness of the political space, it does indeed seem that such discursive strategies of preaching facilitate, directly or indirectly, the easy shifting of some youth from, for example, being supporters of values such as global human justice, freedom, anti-oppression, equality and democracy, to supporting organization and groups that abuse Islamic values (e.g., ISIS/the Islamic State, sectarian jihadi Shia groups), as well as radical groups that exclude others as “infidels” and call for imposing the outdated laws of early Islamic rule. For motivation to become radical seems to require a long process of socialization in which preaching is one of its sources. When there is no way to address social, economic, political and identity claims, a sort of a continuum will be set between the construction of the “Other” in some preaching (frequent among the Salafi/Wahhabi preachers) and ISIS takfiri modes of thinking. As seen in the analysis of the preachers’ sermons, there are sometimes evident and guileful inclinations to these issues, such as consolidating sectarianism or calling for the restoration of the entire life pattern and laws of the historic Muslim reign, without reflecting on the distinction between the temporal and the religious. As

94  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Ali Harb (2014) clearly points out, this does not concern some trends only among Sunni Islam, but also among Shiism. The construction of the “Other” by preachers sometimes mirrors how the Western world constructs the “Other” (Imad 2013). Europe’s reaction to the expulsion of 8000 Christians by ISIS along with their lack of action against the ISIS expulsion of 423,000 people from Mosul in Iraq reveals how “invisible” the Muslim “Other” is in the conception of humanity among many Western politicians. As Francois Burgat (2014) put it, “the reaction of the West to the Syrian crisis is the reverse of the universal.” Notes 1 I agree here with Taha Abdurrahman (2018) in that the concept of citizenship should not also become an exclusive confessional concept, similar to religious confessionalist systems. 2 In 2020, Saudi Arabia’s Council of Senior Scholars (highest religious instance there) declares that “The Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization and does not represent Islam.” See https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2020/11/11/ Muslim-Brotherhood-is-a-terrorist-group-Saudi-Arabia-s-Council-of-Senior-Scholars 3 For example, his opinion against the execution of the apostate utilized two basic arguments: first, that the killing of apostates is against the maxim of the Quran: “no compulsion in religion” and second, everyone is now allowed to convert from one religion to another. Another view he had was that missionaries could be allowed to operate in Muslim-majority countries, as long as Christian-majority countries allowed Muslims to make their own da’wah there. 4 “Religion is present in politics as guiding principles, a driving spirit, and a force uniting the ummah, but political practice is independent from any authority in the name of religion or from religious authority” (Othmani 2009, 113) and the politician follows a logic that has to do with building alliances and creating the majority and relationship of Muslim-majority countries with the world order. Thus, the political gains a qualitative independence from da’wah. To use the words of researcher Salman Bou Naaman, Othmani made political action worldly by disengaging it from religious activities, replacing the slogan “Islam is the solution” with “Islam is a movement of truth and guidance,” focusing on ‘the establishment of Islam’ as a replacement for ‘the application of Sharia’, and moving from identitarian logic to the logic of social arrangement. 5 For instance, according to the time use survey in Morocco: between the two surveys, a period of 15 years in all, the time women devoted to religious practices almost doubled, from 27 to 48 minutes per day (Cherkaoui 2020). 6 Hajjaj Abujbar (2017) rightly states that the concept of “secularism” has been associated in the collective consciousness of the conservative Arab and Muslim world as being against religion and its moral values. 7 The Second Arab Barometer Report 2011. 8 For Jordan, according to the Second Arab Barometer Report in 2011, the percentage of those who voted for the Islamists because their candidates are religious amount for 25%. For Palestine, the percentage differs between surveys (varying from 8.8%, according to Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC), Survey Number 73.2011 (in Arabic), to 13% according to the Center for Arab World for Development and Research in Ramallah, Palestinian public opinion poll (entitled Arab revolutions, freedoms and democracy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, local elections and presidential elections, negotiation) 2011 (in Arabic), and 20% according to opinion poll of Palestinian university students in the West Bank (entitled participation in elections, priorities and needs of students, general political trends, and means of electoral persuasion), 2002 (in Arabic).

The Arab Religious Field  95 9 In Qatar, for example, the majority considers religiosity to be a majorly important characteristic of the leader (43.0% strongly agree and 39.0% somewhat agree). This was the answer to the statement “Agreeing on taking the opinion of religious ulama when it comes to political decisions.” Study of Social Harmony: Summary Report, September 2015 (in Arabic). 10 Palestinian public opinion poll on the repercussions of the decision to postpone the local elections and the evaluation of the Palestinian leadership, 2016 (in Arabic). 11 Malkki argues against the conception of nation-states that many scholars take it for granted: “that the world should be composed of sovereign, spatially discontinuous units is a sometimes implicit, sometimes stated premise in much of the literature on nations and nationalism” (Malkki 1992, 36). 12 I thank Onsi Hanafi who has contributed to the analysis of many fatwas included in this section. 13 http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=fatwaadvancedsearch&Word=%D3% DD%D1+%C7%E1%E3%D1%C3%C9&Option=All&R1 = 0&R2 = 0 14 http://fatawa.alukah.net/content/877. 15 On other sites, you can find questions on “the permissibility of congratulating Christians on Christmas.” See http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa& Option=FatwaId&Id=317107 and http://majles.alukah.net/ 16 IslamWeb claims that it “adopts balanced and moderate views, devoid of bias and extremism,” yet some fatwas are quite problematic, as is the one related to the Islamic position regarding statues: “According to the teachings of Islam, the statues should be destroyed and raised tombs should be leveled with the ground. If the sphinx or pyramids or any other statues contain tombs these are two reasons to destroy the same. First, because they are raised tombs and secondly because they are statues. Allah knows best” See http://fatwa.islamweb.net/emainpage/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option= FatwaId&Id=84193 17 See http://library.islamweb.com/emainpage/articles/88494/index.php?page=showfatw a&Option=FatwaId&Id=293716. Text was translated from Arabic by the website but I amended some confusing syntax. 18 http://iumsonline.org/ar/fatawy/h1003/ 19 This Academy is created in 1981 as an initiative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. It is an international body of Muslim experts on subjects of both religious and secular knowledge. See www.iifa-aifi.org/. 20 www.iifa-aifi.org/3986.html. 21 The Fiqh Council of North America traces its origins back to the Religious Affairs Committee of the then Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada in the early sixties. This Religious Affairs Committee evolved into the Fiqh Committee of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) after the founding of ISNA in 1980. As the needs of the Muslim community and the complexity of the issues they faced grew, the Fiqh Council was transformed into the Fiqh Council of North America in 1986. www.fiqhcouncil.org/ 22 www.fiqhcouncil.org/node/24. 23 Even this camp is very broad. Some articles in Dabiq (ISIS newsletters) pointed out that those who leave the Caliphate are traitors (ISIS). 24 Translator’s note: Amazigh/i is the name preferred by the people of North Africa (usually referred to in English as Berbers) and is now standard use in Arabic. 25 He adopted Spinoza’s method of studying the Torah in order to understand the Holy Quran and its sciences. 26 Shahrour, for instance, tried to interpret some Quranic verses arguing that they have different meanings than the prevailing ones. 27 See http://nama-center.com/Default.aspx. 28 See www.nama-center.com/WatchVideo.aspx?id=fEyX248JatY; see also his book (Sufiani 2014). 29 http://taseel.com

96  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts 30 See http://taaseel.com/display/pub/default.aspx?id=6251&ct=4&ax=3; reader can see that all references are in Arabic. 31 In this context, see the aim of the Nohoudh Waqf in Kuwait: “Nohoudh seeks to contribute to the development of intellectual and developmental discourse developmental by driving it to new prospects and spaces, in addition to focusing on the principle of dialogue and interaction between diverse intellectual discourses, no matter how varied and diverse in their implications, in addition to avoiding unilateralism in dealing with issues, in light of the evolution of life and the complexity of intellectual and cultural relations.” http://www.nohoudh.org/objectives 32 Ali Fahd al-Zami’a’s speech in the “Islamic Reform from Within: New Components” conference in the American University of Beirut, on Thursday, 13 October 2016. 33 See https://cutt.us/xiUvm 34 Interview with one of the sermon-givers in Beirut in 2014. 35 Estimations vary. See, e.g., www.state.gov/documents/organization/193107.pdf and International Religions Freedom Report 2012, published in May  2013, which includes the most recent available estimation of 27%. www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2012/ nea/208400.htm 36 These universities include the University of Tripoli, the Islamic Beirut University, the Islamic University of Lebanon, the al-Azhar University (Lebanon and Akkar), and the University of Imam al-Awza’i. 37 The fieldwork was conducted by the author, Meriam Itani, Nour al-Teneer, Ali Kassem and Nour Safieddine, to whom I am grateful. 38 Only 88 sermons were the subject of statistical analysis. 39 The plural of the Arabic word Takfir, which denotes a Muslim who declares another Muslim to be apostate (i.e., not believing in the essential tenets of Islam) and therefore no longer a Muslim. 40 Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, known as Ibn Taymiyyah for short, was a thirteenthcentury medieval Sunni Muslim theologian, jurisconsult, logician, and reformer. 41 One preacher from Beirut said, “Islam is the religion of work. It pushes us and motivates us to work hard.” 42 See http://assafir.com/Article/1/520672 43 For instance, one preacher denounced the fact that the weekend includes Sunday but not Friday in calling for strengthening Sunni religious institutions. Thus, it can be hypothesized that reference to other sects or religions remains associated with contextual developments and events.

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98  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts al-Jabri, Moḥamad Ābid. 1999. Arab-Islamic Philosophy. University of Texas Press. al-Khaznawi, Murshid. 2016. “Qoran Does Not Wage a War Against Europe But Protect it!” Kurdish Islamic Council in Norway, 2016. www.kurdic.no/?p=635. al-Mawla, Saoud. 2016. Salafism and New Salafists: From Afghanistan to Lebanon. Jdeidit al-Matin: Dar Sair al-Mashriq (in Arabic). al-Tleidi, Bilal. 2014. Islamists and American Research Centers: A Study of the Cognitive Crisis. Beirut: Namaa Center for Research and Studies. Anani, Khalil. 2018. “The Post-s: The Muslim Brotherhood as a Model.” In After PoliticalIslam: A New Stage or an Ideological Illusion, edited by Mohammad Abu Rumman, 91–106. Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Antoun, Richard T. 1989. Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. 2018. Arab Index 2017–2018 in Brief. Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. www.dohainstitute.org/ar/Lists/ ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab-Index-2017-2018-in-Brief.pdf (in Arabic). Asad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford University Press. Azmeh, Aziz al. 2021. Secularism in the Arab World: Contexts, Ideas and Consequences. Translated by David Bond. 1st ed. Edinburgh University Press. Bayat, Asef, ed. 2013. Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam. 1st ed. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Ben Hamouda, Amar. 2016. “Mosque and Modernity.” Believers without Borders (blog), 2016. www.mominoun.com/articles/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AC %D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB%D 8%A9-4220#_ftn5. Berger, Peter, ed. 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Eerdmans. ———. 2014. The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward a Paradigm for Religion in a Pluralist Age. Digital original edition. Boston: de Gruyter. Bishara, Azmi. 2015. Religion and Secularism in Historical Context. Vol. 2. Beirut: Arab Network for Research and Publishing (in Arabic). ———. 2021. Sectarianism Without Sects. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers. Brown, Nathan J. 2012. When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics. 1st ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bunt, Gary. 2000. Virtually Islamic. Llandybie: Dinefwr Press. Burgat, François. 2014. “La Crise Syrienne Au Prisme de La Variable Religieuse (2011– 2014) (1/4).” Tunivers (blog), 2014. www.tunivers.com/2014/09/12488/. Cherkaoui, Mohamed. 2020. Essay on Islamization: Changes in Religious Practice in Muslim Societies. Leiden: Brill. Ciftci, Sabri, F. Michael Wuthrich, and Ammar Shamaileh. 2018. “Islam, Religious Outlooks, and Support for Democracy.” Political Research Quarterly: 1–15. Cipriani, Roberto. 2017. Diffused Religion—Beyond Secularization. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Cooke, Maeve. 2007. “A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical Political Theory and the Place of Religion.” Constellations 14 (2): 224–38. Davie, Grace, and Nancy T. Ammerman. 2018. “Religions and Social Progress: Critical Assessments and Creative Partnerships.” In Rethinking Society for the 21st Century: Report of the International Panel on Social Progress. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

The Arab Religious Field  99 Filali-Ansary, Abdou. 2003. Réformer l’islam ? Une Introduction Aux Débats Contemporains. Paris: La Découverte. Gaffney, Patrick D. 1994. The Prophet’s Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt. United States of America: University of California Press. Gauthier, François. 2017. “Religieux, Religion, Religiosité.” Re vue MAUSS 49: 167–84. Hallaq, Wael. 2012. The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Hanafi, Sari. Forthcoming. “Introduction.” In Religion in Public Life in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Tunisia, edited by Zaid Eyadat. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hatina, Meir. 2010. “Ulama,” Politics, and the Public Sphere: An Egyptian Perspective. 1st ed. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. Honneth, Axel. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Translated by Joel Anderson. 1st ed. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Horton, Robin. 1982. “Tradition and Modernity Revisited.” In Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 201. MIT Press. Juday, Abd Allah ibn Yusuf. 2008. The Division of the Globe in Islamic Jurisprudence and Its Impact on Reality, a Study on Islamic Politics, Relations and History. Beirut: Muassasat al-Rayan. Kassem, Ali. 2018. “The Modernization of the Hawza? Lebanon as a Case Study.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 11 (4): 83–110. Lahibi, F. S. M. al. 2013. Position of the Islamic Though Concerning the Western Ideas. The Case of “The End of History.” Riyad: Taaseel Center. Lewis, Bernard. 2001. The Muslim Discovery of Europe. New York: W. W. Norton  & Company. Malkki, Liisa. 1992. “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees.” Cultural Anthropology 7 (1): 24–44. Matheson, C. 1987. “Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy.” The British Journal of Sociology 38 (2). Mohammad, Othman. 2013. “Depressive Da’wah Style—[The Bitter-Pill Treatment].” www.suhaibwebb.com/society/dawah/depressive-dawah-style-the-bitter-pill-treatment/. Morsy, Ahmed, and Nathan Brown. 2013. “Egypt’s al-Azhar Steps Forwards.” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs. www.anoypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails. aspx?aid=474. Moussaoui, Abderrahmane. 2009. “La Mosquée En Algérie. Figures Nouvelles et Pratiques Reconstituées.” Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée 125. http:// remmm.revues.org/6159. Murad, Abdal-Hakim. 2013. “Islam and the New Millennium.” http://masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ ahm/millen.htm. Othmani, Saadeddine. 2009. Religion and Politics: Distinction Not Separation. Rabat: Arab Cultural Center (in Arabic). Oyer, Gordon. 2013. “Louis Massignon and the Seeds of Thomas Merton’s ‘Monastic Protest.’ ” The Merton Annual 26: 84–96. Parkkinen, Mari Johanna. 2018. “Prayer Practices among Palestinian Christians in Occupied Palestinian Territory.” Approaching Religion 8 (2): 54–69. Pierret, Thomas. 2013. Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution. Cambridge University Press. Policar, Alain. 2017. “La Laïcité Dévoyée Ou l’identité Comme Principe d’exclusion : Un Point de Vue Cosmopolitique.” Revue MAUSS 49: 291–306.

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3 The Islamization of Knowledge Appraisal and Alternative

Introduction In recent decades, there has been much discussion on “Islamically grounding” the social sciences, which some researchers have described as being traditionally “Western” in nature. This debate was particularly prominent in Middle Eastern countries in the early nineties and took place in books, articles and doctoral theses. Nonetheless, while this project received a positive response from a small group of researchers, it attracted a largely negative response from many in the social science community. As a sociologist, I  have no qualms about using the terms “Islamic,” “Arab,” “Lebanese” or “Algerian” to describe where social science concepts and theories have been inspired by Islamic heritage and these societies. However, after undertaking a content analysis of 97 articles,1 32 books and 9 theses that have adopted this orientation, as well as conducting interviews with some of the proponents of the Islamization of Knowledge (IoK) or Islamic grounding (ta’sil) of knowledge, I  believe that adding a geographical or religious adjective to the social sciences creates real problems. This chapter describes the literature of the IoK, presents a synthesis of this literature, analyzes some of its problems and ponders whether this project is truly necessary or instead serves as a sort of identity politics. On the basis of my analysis, this chapter suggests a new approach that I refer to as “separation, connection and pluralistic praxis,” which acts as an alternative to IoK and similar projects. However, I will first show that the social sciences include several elements and dimensions which are not found in the Islamized social sciences. Furthermore, these sciences constitute a closed system in the face of the “Western” social sciences, only searching for an Islamic social philosophy, thereby ignoring other important elements and dimensions. The Five Dimensions of the Social Sciences The social sciences are made up of five dimensions—(1) a social philosophy and ontological concepts; (2) methodological tools; (3) “objective” analysis of social structures; (4) individual and group perceptions; and (5) economic/political/psychological and sociological public policy recommendations—in a manner that DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-5

102  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts takes into consideration the material possibilities and interests that make one social group dominate over others, individual and social consciousness, and the contradictions and paradoxes related to measuring benefits and harms and the lesser of two evils. These recommendations, therefore, do not depend on ultimate good and evil, or ultimate halal and haram, but are instead equations that are as complex as the complexity of social phenomena and their changes, and do not depend on the Weberian ethics of conviction only but also the ethics of responsibility, as I will soon explain. When discussing the social sciences, people tend to focus on the first and fifth elements outlined above, the two most normative elements compared to the others (which are more objective). They will, most likely, argue that there is a unified Islamic vision, in the manner of the electoral slogan “Islam is the solution,” which imbues it with an essence of being the antithesis of what they refer to as the Western (materialistic) vision. This generalization of the Western social sciences distracts us, rather than explaining the nature of knowledge production in Western countries. For instance, the Marxist school has an interest in social classes, which they see as the vehicle of social dynamics, whereas the functionalist school relies on various social systems that work harmoniously and discusses religion, for instance, as an important dimension in social cohesion. This is a chasm that simply cannot be reduced to saying “these two schools are Western.” At the same time, we also cannot say that “there is an Islamic social science” except in the strict sense of the word (sciences produced in an Islamic context or historical sciences produced in Islamic context). Perhaps there is an Islamic social philosophy that discusses the first dimension of social science but is meaningless with regard to the other dimensions. Therefore, the social sciences are construed as forming a closed system. The Genesis of the Islamization of Knowledge Project Social scientists, mostly non-Arab, were the driving force in early thinking about the Islamic perspective on the social sciences, such as the Pakistani Akbar Ahmed (1986), Iranians Ali Shariati (1979) and Shaykh Morteza Motahhari (1979), and the British Muslim scholar Merryl Wynn Davies (1988). Except for Mathari, all were intellectually raised in the West and developed their ideas in this context. For example, Akbar Ahmed called for an Islamic anthropology, describing it as a specialization that would be concerned with studies of Islamic groups by researchers committed to the universal values of Islam (humanism, knowledge and tolerance), which would connect studies, particularly on tribes and small villages, to Islam’s grand historical ideological frameworks. The concept of Islam here is not in its theological description but as a social science. Therefore, for Ahmad, the definition does not exclude non-Muslims (Ahmed 1986, 56). There were likewise Arab attempts in Islamizing knowledge, the most important of which was possibly by Shaykh Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, especially in his Thematic Exegesis of the Quran (al-Sadr 1989). The establishment of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists by the Muslim Students Association in the United States and Canada in 1972 was an important event

The Islamization of Knowledge  103 in understanding the connection between the social sciences and Islamic values. This association convened many conferences and meetings that culminated with the establishment of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in Washington in 1981, which officially launched the Islamization of Knowledge project.2 This project was led by the late Palestinian philosopher Ismail al-Faruqi in order to “recast knowledge in the mold of Islam in relation to the Islamic vision” by defining it as to redefine and re-order the data, to rethink the reasoning and relate the data, to reevaluate the conclusions, to re-project the goals and to do so in such a way as to make the disciplines enrich the vision and serve the cause of Islam. (IIIT 1984, 46) He outlined the aims of his work plan as (1) mastering the modern sciences; (2) mastering Islamic heritage; (3) establishing the proper relationship between Islamic concepts and every field of the modern sciences; (4) establishing a creative connection between Islamic heritage and modern knowledge; and (5) launching Islamic thought on the path that will lead to the realization of God’s laws on earth. A group of contemporary Islamic intellectuals/researchers—most of them university professors in the social and human sciences—adopted ideas inspired by this project. These intellectuals belonged to four groups. The first group was centered in the IIIT (e.g., Emad al-Din Khalil, Taha Jabir al-Alwani, al-Haj Hamed Abu alQasem). The second group was connected to the International Islamic University of Malaysia, which called for the Islamization of human knowledge and not every form of knowledge (e.g., Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas). The third group was connected to Saudi universities, especially al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, which was established in 1950. The fourth group was centered on the IIIT branch in Egypt (e.g., Muhammad Emara and Abdulwahab el-Messiri). From these beginnings, their intellectual efforts, which mostly took the form of nonresearch studies, spread all throughout the Arab world (e.g., Mahmoud Dhaouadi in Tunisia, Balqasim and Alyan Buzayan in Algeria). IIIT’s paradigm developed over many academic meetings convened to discuss the Islamization project in a general sense or related topics, organized by the institute among other bodies that shaped the project (see Table 3.1). The project’s outcomes branched out in several directions, generating positive and negative responses. Some outright rejected the social sciences, which they viewed as being founded on theories which could not be applied to any study or problem facing Islamic society. This response was championed by Ahmed Ibrahim Khudr, who demonstrated his opposition to the Islamization of knowledge project with eye-catching article titles like “Do Our Countries Need Social Scientists?” (Khader 2012), “Confessions of Social Scientists: The Futile Theory and Inadequate Method of the Social Sciences” (Khader 2010) and “The Quran Has Provided Solutions to All Human Problems.” This approach is particularly prominent among some imams in Lebanon. Another approach sought to focus on Islamic grounding (ta’sil) instead of the Islamization of knowledge, which took a more theological bent than the

104  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Table 3.1 Conferences and Events Related to the Topic of the Islamization of Knowledge Conference/Event

Organizer/Place

Convening Year

Establishment of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists The International Conference for Islamic Economics Islam and Psychology Symposium

Muslim Students Association in United States and Canada King Abdulaziz University

1972

College of Education at King Abdulaziz University in Riyadh In Makka (at the invitation of King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah) Lugano, Switzerland

1978

United States

1981

Islamabad, Pakistan

1982

Lahore, Pakistan

1983

Sétif, Algeria

1986

Research Center at al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (Riyadh) al-Azhar University of Egypt in coordination with the League of Islamic Universities Center of Epistemological Studies (Cairo) IIIT and the International Islamic Sciences University—Amman IIIT and the College of Shariah at the University of Jordan

1987

First International Conference on Islamic Education First International Symposium on Islamic Thought3 Establishment of International Institute of Islamic Thought Islamization of Knowledge Symposium Establishment of World Islamic Association of Mental Health (WIAMH) The Forum of Islamic Thought on Islam and the Social Sciences Symposium on the Islamic Grounding of the Social Sciences The Islamic Orientation towards the Sciences Social Sciences from an Islamic Perspective The Global Economic Crisis from an Islamic Perspective The Methodology of Knowledge Integration

1974

1977 1977

1993 2007 2010 2012

knowledge-based approach, though this approach caused much confusion (Abdelhalim 2014). The term ta’sil was formulated in several universities, especially Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University, in which representatives from the Association of Muslim Social Scientists and IIIT helped formulate the plan for its social sciences colleges at the university’s request. There were specific suggestions for the Islamic grounding of knowledge. For example, Bilqasim al-Ghali (1999) suggested the following steps: placing social issues in an Islamic framework, clarifying issues through reference to classical works, authoring Islamic works that have a social dimension, utilizing the works of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) and integrating the Islamic science with social sciences. As the editor of Idafat: the Arab Journal of Sociology, I notice at times that some researchers use Ibn Khaldun as if his sociological thought was applicable for every

The Islamization of Knowledge  105 place and time. They use the concept of asabiyya (blood relationship and tribal loyalties) for all Arab societies, even if social studies have proven that the tribe as a social structure has become weaker in a country like Algeria under the influence of French colonialism and with the emergence of the nation-state—both of which adopted the same approach to breaking up the tribe as a social unit and supplying society with new loyalties. Some researchers praise Ibn Khaldun as the founder of his methodology of history in his book al-Muqadimmah (The Prolegomena), even if his al-I’bar (to which al-Muqadimmah was the introduction) on the history of the Arabs and Berbers has not been very beneficial. I would argue that Ibn Khaldun’s work was used more as a form of identity politics than for connecting local history to sociology. Some researchers have also viewed Ibn Khaldun as rejecting the philosophy of his age, which is not true, as he was, indeed, influenced by it and engaged with it. History (the science of events) and sociology (the meaning of events) do not come from the observer’s direct experience, that is, pure observation, but rather the merging of the observer’s personal experience with philosophy and especially logic. The latter presents research tools and building materials for the theoretical architecture of history and society.4 Others, such as Fu’ad Abu Hatab, took up the term Islamic orientation (tawjeeh) of knowledge. The concept of destination (wijha) for him is synonymous with a paradigm, or Islamic interpretation of knowledge (al-Atiri 2013). Others are simply interested in Islamic perspectives on whatever science. There are other strands that are not necessarily influenced by IIIT but which aimed to connect science to Arabs or Muslims’ cultural particularities, such as Mahmood Amin al-Alim, Muhammad Jabir al-Ansari, and Mahmoud Dhaouadi. Sometimes taking an eclectic approach, they called for the establishment of a bridge between European modernity’s binaries and Arab or Islamic identity, or between the classical tradition and modernity, authenticity and contemporaneity, revelation and reason, or material and symbolic spiritualism. In this section, I will discuss some of the many attempts of Islamization and Islamic grounding of knowledge. These efforts are extensive in some fields— according to the Dar al-Mandumah database (research undertaken in 2020), there are 213 research papers and books on the Islamic grounding of psychology alone. I will discuss three types of these efforts at Islamization and Islamic grounding of knowledge. Outcome of Islamization and Islamic Grounding of Knowledge In this section, I will outline some examples of IoK or Islamic grounding and will organize them into three headings: (1) social philosophy emphasis, (2) serious attempts and (3) shallow attempts. Social Philosophy Emphasis

There has been much theorizing on the need for an Islamic social science, Islamic psychology or Islamic political science. Upon examining many of these attempts, one can find that in reality they do not transcend being an Islamic social,

106  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts psychological or political philosophy. Debates revolved around the importance of the group over the individual, and the necessity of replacing “instrumental rationality” with a normative rationalization that takes ethics into consideration. There are concepts proposed by Muslim intellectuals that must be reconsidered, such as Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya or Malik Bennabi’s “colonizability.” In general, many of these researchers have stressed the necessity of benefiting from classical Islamic literature or intellectuals in the social sciences (Haque 2004; Alatas 2013). There has also been an emphasis on the necessity of reforming the research methodology of the social sciences in addition to including revelation as a source of knowledge which completes and complements the senses and reason, which extreme positivist and empirical theories have evaded and exclusively relied on (Rajab 1996). Despite the importance of Islamic social philosophy, IoK scholars ignored the importance of understanding the Shariah through the geography and history of Muslim societies and hid behind ideals inspired by Quranic concepts, which they viewed as if they had a fixed understanding and application throughout the ages. For example, are the concepts of asabiyya or tolerance or humanism the same in tribal societies and modern societies built on urbanization and the nation-state? Serious Attempts at Islamic Grounding

There are new attempts, though rare, to study all the elements of the social sciences and ground (tawteen) them. I prefer to use the concept of an interactive ecology of knowledge, as it points not only to an Islamic cultural or value framework but also other factors, such as local and national culture. This is closer to the spirit of science as being (softly) universalist than describing it as Islamic. I consider a process of grounding to be serious if it possesses the following four dimensions: • Admission that a large part of the social sciences (and especially its objective side) has developed due to the global accumulation of knowledge. Therefore, we should no doubt benefit from research produced globally, whether in the West or elsewhere. • Because the social sciences are imprinted by local culture, including Islamic culture, the role of this culture should be taken into consideration while understanding the social actors of any social phenomena, as indicated by the social constructivist school of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967). That is, systems of knowledge are but mental constructions that are impacted by the dominant ideological and religious values in society, government policies, and the ethical system carried by knowledge producers. It is not enough to provide a simple chemical description of qat as a form of narcotic, but rather how many Yemenis understand qat as a part of convivial social rites for social cohesion in Yemen. • The whole life-cycle of research (i.e., including knowledge transfer and public or policy-oriented research activities) should be taken into account. Knowledge cannot be completed (when there is a local relevance) without interaction with the concerned community, and the societal debate resulting from its reception

The Islamization of Knowledge  107 by the community and how policy options can be received by society. From here, it is important for researchers to engage with their local colleagues to provide debates in the public sphere with scientific and moral arguments for specific policy options. That is, moral choices should be forged in the public sphere using Rawlsian public reason and where social sciences should play a crucial role in the process of overlapping consensus and finding reasonable accommodations. • It is necessary for the social sciences to communicate with moral philosophy and Shariah sciences (fiqh and Usul al-din), in order for empirical findings to be integrated with normative analysis, and for there to be a fiqh al-waqi’ (jurisprudence of reality) based on maqasid, which are two necessary paradigms for all Islamic reformist schools in our contemporary reality. As a result, social scientists need to understand the lexicon used by religious scholars and laypeople, while religious scholars should use the social sciences to think ethically before establishing jurisprudential rules. I  will now turn to discuss two examples of these serious attempts. The first example is in the field of Islamic economics. Bibliometric searches show an impressive amount of scientific research in this field. The research in this strand began by focusing on normative aspects, such as theorizing how to fulfill wellbeing, instead of mere instinctive desires, replacing usury with murabaha (an Islamic form of cost-plus financing), stressing sustainability instead of optimization and so on. From there, empirical studies to analyze economic behavior were carried out, even if they were few compared to the copious amounts of normative studies. The assessment I  am conducting here is with regard to the quantity of knowledge rather than its quality or ability to achieve a breakthrough. This literature mostly adopts a neoliberal paradigm influenced by the situation in the Arab Gulf and does not concern itself much with social justice or equitable distribution of wealth. However, in fairness, we must point to a serious and critical attempt whose source is more East Asian than Arab—particularly that of Mohammad Najatullah Siddiqi, who was chosen as the president of the International Association of Islamic Economics in 2001, and Masudul Alam Choudhury, both of whom studied economics before embarking on Shariah studies. Here I will mainly focus on Choudhury’s contributions. There is serious critical debate on Islamic economics and attempts to mainstream it. One of the most influential figures in this regard is Professor Masudul Alam Choudhury, whose books are part key readings at IIUM. Bridging the Islamic and Western fields in Islamic economics and finance, Choudhury’s scholarship has been recognized in both Western and Muslim academic circles, and as such, it plays an influential role in defining this Islamic discipline locally and internationally. After graduating from the University of Toronto, he occupied the Professorial Chair of Islamic Finance at the Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance at IIUM. As a way of validating his work by peers in the scientific community, he asked a prominent figure in economics from California State University, John C. O’Brien, to write the foreword to his book The Principles of Islamic Political Economy:

108  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts A Methodological Enquiry (Choudhury 1992). In addition, unlike many IoK scholars, he not only put emphasis on tawhid (monotheistic law that stems from the Quran and Sunnah) as an episteme, but he also provided three other resources. The first, which is called foundational epistemology, entails universal epistemes. The second is not an episteme per se but discourse channeled through a shuratic process (i.e., consultation which he considers as compulsory, making it closer to the notion of democracy). The third and final resource is the “formation of knowledge,” which is a discursively interactive, integrative, and evolutionary process (IIE-learning process). Choudhury’s methodology relies on epistemology while also remaining a process-oriented model, the combination of which is used to ensure innovation (ijtihad). These sources will establish the five Maqasid al-Shariah, organic unity of knowledge and the world system in its diversity, goodness (choice of the good things of life) and justice as balance. These five principles are used to guide four areas within economics: (1) in mudarabah/musharakah (profit-sharing/equity participation) as interactively participatory joint venture instruments; (2) avoidance of wastefulness (israf) in consumption, production, and resource utilization, and in interest-bearing transactions (riba); (3) in the institution of a wealth tax (zakat) to ensure justice and goodness is carried out through the act of wealth distribution; and (4) in the diversification and continuity of evolutionary learning possibilities. These instruments ensure a complementary relationship between the broader world system and Maqasid al-Shariah, allowing for its sustainability and continuity through circular causation, in turn feeding the sources of knowledge and supporting general well-being. It is clear that Choudhury’s methodology was developed with the aim of creating harmony between Islamic political economics, the broader social sciences, and contemporary economics. This approach is very different from how the IoK was initially conceived, as simply Tawhidi epistemology, where Western social sciences are altered to work in line with Islamic principles. This epistemology provides some epistemes that will complement or enter into tension with the universal foundational epistemology, and the other sources of knowledge will come to resolve tensions and contradictions. This is why, for Choudhury, it is not only applicable to the Muslim world but to humanity generally. In his article, using the example of Canada’s indigenous people, he demonstrates how his conception of Islamic political economy can be utilized to deal with the labor market problems this population faces. In line with this, Choudhury’s Heterodox Islamic Economics: The Emergence of an Ethico-economic Theory (Choudhury and Bhatti 2016) was an attempt to show that Islamic economics is an inherent part of heterodox and ethico-economics. By mainstreaming Islamic methodology in this interpretive way through combining it with international and reflexive epistemologies, he allows for the possibility for democracy and innovation (ijtihad) to handle tensions that could emerge from the competing stances. Beyond epistemology, details are important, and the more one examines issues of microeconomics, the more complications which require empirical work arise. In

The Islamization of Knowledge  109 this regard, Choudhury’s book (1992) does a thorough job of laying out the details of the principles of Islamic economics, as has the work of many IIUM faculty members. Looking at the titles within the publications of these researchers, the topics go beyond epistemological debates and Islamic banking, covering various areas of socio-economic life, including Islamic microfinance, the Shariah screening of stocks that promote responsible consumption and production and support climate action, zakat, sadaqat (charity), qard hasan (free loans), waqf (endowment), micro-takaful (mutual insurance), and poverty, hunger, well-being and the sustainability of communities in “underperforming” Islamic economics. Therefore, Islamic economics has begun to represent an important research and knowledge approach. Today we truly find researchers in several Arab universities, and more particularly Malaysia, who are distinguished by their serious work. The second example is Huda Muhammad Hasan Hilal’s pioneering work The Theory of Aptitude: An Analytical and Comparative Study of Fiqh and Psychology (2011). Hilal graduated from the International Islamic University of Malaysia and specialized in fiqh and usul, and she appears to have an insightful mastery of psychology. The importance of this book stems from it raising many thorny issues for research and discussion, such as women’s aptitude as judges, rulers and witnesses under Islamic law, and distinguishing between physiological maturity and rational wisdom, and the subject of mental or rational disorders invalidating one’s eligibility temporarily or permanently. This approach represents a change from blunt and categorical discrimination between men and women to one based on maturity, as men—like women—may enjoy eligibility or may lose it. She refutes the opinion of some scholars that a woman’s disqualification from some roles has any relationship to her menses, postpartum and other biological changes. She insists on the need for a sound contemporary theory of eligibility incorporating findings from between fiqh and psychology and contemporary sciences to find solutions to old and modern problems and differences.5 Shallow Attempts

While there have only been a few serious attempts at the Islamization of Knowledge and grounding knowledge in Islam, theoretically shallow works are unfortunately far more plentiful, as they are mostly built on reflections without implementing methodological tools to obtain positivist/empirical elements (structural or perceptual data about individuals and groups) which can understand reality. Some dress the social sciences in religious garb with some verses and Prophetic statements as decoration, while others impart the adjective Islamic to ethics that more closely resemble humanistic or Christian or Jewish ethics, for example in some of the literature related to the topic of the environment. It is understandable for intellectuals to be inspired by the dominant Islamic culture in order to encourage Muslims to respect the environment, but there is discussion on particularities that are not really particularly “Islamic.” For instance, it is all well and good for Auda al-Jayyousi (2013) to remind us that the principles of Islamic thought are represented in notions of justice, ihsan (in its many

110  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts significations: quality, doing something well, and continual beautification), treating one’s family well, and preventing corruption. He aimed to root this universally through studying sustainable development from an Islamic perspective. But to see these principles as contrary to Western principles is empirically incorrect, as these are general principles which cover all peoples. As for saying that they are the negative effects of a Western paradigm that aims “towards happiness through excessive consumption and luxurious distractions to necessities,” this is none other than a capitalist paradigm that can be found in both the West and the East, especially in the Gulf countries. Much of the literature around the environment and Islam (see, e.g., al-Khoshn 2011) is nothing but literature on general ethics that lacks a basic level of scientific research to identify a specific problem and present solutions that transcend wishful thinking. Despite the importance of Shariah-grounding to maintain an environmental balance (e.g., Saidi 2013), it is insufficient to reduce the topic of the environment to this element alone. Another example of these incomplete attempts is Jasser Auda’s study (2012) titled “Employing Maqasid al-Shariah to Guide Policies of the Knowledge Economy.” This study begins by presenting an amazing understanding of the concept of the knowledge economy promoted by the World Bank, and then presents afterward a critique of the indicators of a knowledge economy. Yet the study’s criticism was very general without reflection on specific indicators. He did not benefit from the substantial literature that has highlighted the problem of the knowledge economy indicators, such as percentage of mobile phone use. As Tremblay (2011) reminds us, Arab countries have rarely developed typical knowledge economy industries, such as production or assembly of electronic components, biotechnology or pharmaceutical industries. Ali Kadri (2014) talks even of policies of deindustrialization that have laid waste to the production of knowledge. As such, the indices used for post-industrial society do not fit the reality of many Arab countries. All of this was absent in Jasser Auda’s discussion. This reminds us once more of the importance of such topics being discussed in multidisciplinary settings, including the side-by-side presence of experts on Islamic jurisprudence and researchers. There are two interesting synthetic and bibliometric works that studied the knowledge produced on Islamic economics. The first is offered by the study of Ahmad Balwafi and Abdelrazzaq Bilabas (2010), which was built on a content analysis of 33 research papers published on the global financial and economic crisis from an Islamic economic perspective. The two researchers came up with alarming results on the content of most of these research papers, the majority of which they described as essays that merely make comments, embellish capitalism and have poor methodological bricolage. They also noted an absence of strategic dimensions and methodological planning to the point that they concluded that Islamic economics is unprepared to present alternatives to neoliberalism. The second is more bibliometric specifically on knowledge production in Jordan (219 master’s and PhD theses, 118 articles and 178 books) from 1974 to 2010. This study concludes that 60% of the materials focus on Islamic finance, meaning that other aspects of economics are missing. This study also highlights the chaos in the field and some problems related to the quality of research (al-‘Awran and Hattab 2016, 24).

The Islamization of Knowledge  111 IoK: Six Problems The late Egyptian sociologist Mona Abaza (2002), in her important book Debates on Islam and Knowledge in Egypt and Malaysia, conducted a study of IoK projects in which she focused on the political context (conflicts of intellectual and economic influence between Malaysia and Saudi Arabia) and the context of post-colonial policies and the African American discourse that influenced Ismail al-Faraqui. In addition to these identity politics contexts, there are local social contexts that called for the necessity of local adaptation of knowledge. For instance, the Iranian authorities were interested in this grounding after some conservatives viewed the Green revolution as a result of a “wrong understanding of the concept of liberty” resulting from the “Western” social sciences, and some extremists even called for social sciences colleges to be closed. al-Imam al-Sayyed Ali Khamenei responded to them in the manner represented in the following quote: The origin of the human sciences and its focus must be found in the Noble Quran. This should be an important field of Quranic research. Care must be taken of the fine points of Quran in different fields, and the foundation and concepts of the human sciences must be investigated and found in the Noble Quran. This is an essential and important job. If this takes place, intellectuals, researchers and opinion-makers in the different human sciences will be able to construct great knowledge on this basis (the Quran) and this focus. Of course in that case, they can benefit from the achievements of others of Westerners pioneers in the human sciences, but this foundation must be a Quranic foundation. By the human sciences, Imam Khamenei indeed meant the social sciences. Sara Shariati clarifies this point that the hawzas (Shia religious schools) of Qom maintained philosophy while erasing sociology, psychology and politics from their curriculum until 2013, when a new Islamic sociology branch was opened. The Egyptian authorities in 2014 viewed the “Tuesday class and discussion” based on Ibn Khaldun’s Muqadimmah conducted by Heba Raouf Ezzat, then professor of political science at Cairo University, in the al-Sultan Huseiyn mosque and madrasa as dangerous and banned the meeting, even though spreading social knowledge in mosques is one of the most important means to ground knowledge of the social sciences.6 Ezzat, at the time, was a researcher at IIIT’s Cairo branch, and she continued its mission when she went into exile in Istanbul, continuing to give weekly lectures in one of Istanbul’s historic mosques as a part of Ibn Khaldun University’s (where she now teaches) mission of integrating knowledge and spreading it outside of the university walls. As such, there are stakes that transcend the episteme proposed by the Islamization and grounding of knowledge project. I will focus here on six problems that emerged from the dominant concepts of IoK projects and their lack of serious application. Some of these problems are related to analyzing the content of the discourse, while others are related to the conditions of its socio-economic production.

112  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Reductionism

Some of those involved in IoK projects respond to Eurocentrism by using an Islamocentrism (Alatas 1987): Islamic knowledge would interpret phenomena in Muslim societies, and Western science for the West. There is a reduction of the West’s value framework to its Judeo-Christian inspiration. Most likely this reductionism is used to justify the necessity of an Islamic social science, with some highlighting the case of the Western financial crisis in 2007 (which began in the United States as a subprime mortgage crisis) as proof of the need for an alternative presented by Islamic economics. This religio-cultural reductionism conceals what is problematic in the West, namely capitalism and neoliberalism, which were the essential culprits of the financial crisis. Most likely, this reductionism only operates in one direction, meaning that the same people will not make the same assumption in reverse: “Our problem in the Muslim world is the presence of a religious culture.” This is a form of strawman fallacy that attributes the cause of Muslim countries’ backwardness solely to an imperialist conspiracy and neocolonial influence. This kind of reductionist discourse is shared alike by many Islamists and the (illiberal) left in many Arab countries. Syed Farid Alatas rightly called for the development of alternative discourses without these binaries. This is an essential demand in the process of popularizing the social sciences and protecting internationally recognized standards of scientific research. Introducing theories and concepts rooted in local practices and cultures must be counted as contributing to the universal social science—that is, they are not an alternative to it. Ibn Khaldun’s theory of the dynamics of tribal state formation could be applied to a myriad of other historical cases outside of his geographical area and periods of interest. Alatas, for instance, integrates the Marxist theory of forms of production with Ibn Khaldun’s theory of state formation and applies them to the case of the political economy of the Safavid empire (Alatas 1987). According to Alatas, the hypothesis that concepts and theories do not apply except to Asian phenomena holds the idea that Asians are so greatly different from non-Asians that both sides demand a separate special world of theories for us to understand them. He views this as an extreme reaction to the problem of Orientalism. This represents one of the aspects of the problem of focusing on nativism, as it makes the local perspective the one judging things to the point that it refuses Western bodies of knowledge, not on the basis of the extent of their benefit, power of proof and accuracy, but on the basis of their national or cultural roots. This reductionism takes on different forms, such as comparative reductionism that privileges one factor for the sake of comparative analysis, like reading Islamic behavior as only the result of the Quran without any influence of geography, history or society. Therefore, some believe in the unity of truth, and that they, naturally, are only ones who possess it. Emphasis on Normative Approaches With Empirical Laziness

There is an emphasis on normative approaches, which makes it easy for many proponents of the Islamization of knowledge or its grounding to focus only on presenting ethical prescriptions. For example, talking about how the Muslim family or the Muslim youth should be, without dealing with descriptive/positivist issues, that is,

The Islamization of Knowledge  113 empirical research which can present some sort of understanding of the nature of the family in the twenty-first century in a particular country. It is empirical research that clarifies how spiritual or religious rites influence individual or group behavior in society, the family or the market. While I acknowledge the importance of the Islamic worldview or lifeworlds and some ontological premises (e.g., the family as an overarching social structure for protection of the individual), the normative becomes meaningless by itself without the toil of empirical research. While Ibn Rushd promised that philosophy and the Shariah sciences would meet in the end, I would argue that there will be tensions, dilemmas and paradoxes between what some see as firm/fixed in the Shariah on the one hand and the results of the social sciences on the other. For instance, social research may conclude that polygamy or divorce has unpraiseworthy ramifications on children. Here concern would grow as to how this would be translated into normative provisions and public policy and awareness campaigns. Should that be done by temporal authorities or jurisprudents and mujtahids? Or both? This is what will be debated at the end of this chapter. The Changing and the Unchanging

There are those who view Islamic thought and fiqh as unchanging in their normativity and ethical values, and that the “positivistic” sciences must be subjugated to them. If we believe in the Maqasid al-Shariah methodology, this means that those literal textual laws—except the universals and foundations—can change with the changing nature of reality. Therefore, it is not only scientific knowledge that can change with the changing nature of reality. Eğri and Kizilkaya (2015) argue that ecclesiastical and customary religious meanings have been neglected, while relying on only contemporary lexical meanings, something which is against the Maqasid al-Shariah methodology. Generally, there has been a claim that fiqh al-waqi’ and fiqh al-tawaqi’ (jurisprudence of forecasting) and modernizing and updating old rules must refer to the social sciences, but we have noticed an absence of methodological tools, structural information, and perceptions capable of understanding reality in order to present solutions built on an understanding of the Quran, Sunnah and Shariah. For the jurisprudent to understand his reality, he must generate the key questions: What? Why? Where? When? How? Reality does not mean only the present, but also the past. Despite reality being globalized and transcending the local community (whether made up of a family, tribe or neighborhood), is the changing nature of reality what is needed before fiqh al-waqi’ can be grounded? In this case, who changes it? The ruler? The individual? The religious institution? These subjects were at the heart of the maqasidi fiqh which was neglected by the dominant jurisprudential trend. Alyan Buzyan (2014, 76) calls on researchers in Maqasid to move from comparative studies between Shariah and law for simply comparing with the intent to demonstrate the difference and stressing the height of the Shariah and its higher aims in obtaining human interests, to a stage of making them closer in a fruitful maqasidi approach.

114  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts The Fiqh of Shariah Versus the Fiqh of Applying the Shariah

Abdullah al-Maliki (who obtained a doctorate in the Shariah sciences and is an opinion-maker currently imprisoned in Saudi Arabia) championed an important intellectual development in The Ummah’s Sovereignty before the Shariah’s Application, by making an important distinction between the fiqh of Shariah and the fiqh of applying the Shariah. He transcends the philosophy of fiqh of waqi’ to differentiate between a fiqh of Shariah, which carries within its fold many fixed elements (thawabit), and between the possibility of application and its gradation: The Shariah is an expression of a revealed divine gift derived from revelation, and represented in undeniable and universal laws. As for application, it is a human and historical action, a struggle to understand (ijtihad) that divine gift. Application is not necessarily a religion, but rather could even oppose the religion, and corrupt the legislation’s aims and oppose its higher aims. (al-Maliki 2011) Kamal al-Haidari, a professor of Islamic philosophy in Qum’s hawza, discusses the complications of the experience of change in Iran, saying, “When Iran become an Islamic republic and we faced challenges that required answers, we found that the fiqh present at hand (I am not saying it cannot completely but) in many of its resources could not answer these problems” (Bou’oud 2006, 2). According to al-Maliki, there is a need for there to be sovereignty of the ummah (Muslim community) through its popular recognition, namely democratic acceptance of a ruler. This will move the principle of the Shariah’s obligatory status from the individual level to the group level by establishing laws and constitutions before applying the Shariah. al-Maliki gives a witty reply to those who say that sovereignty in Islam only belongs to the Shariah, and not the individual or the people: This saying has a problem in understanding the nature of the Shariah, as it does not look at the Shariah as an expression of a system of values, principles and laws. Rather, it views it as if it was close to a living being eating food, walking in the markets, sitting on its sofa and enforcing its views and will on people. This is how some conceptualize it! I do not only say that this is a caricature, rather some really make you feel that this is how the Shariah is in its conceptualization. As such, he always contrasts the Ummah’s Sovereignty and the Shariah’s sovereignty, and presents the Shariah’s sovereignty as above the Ummah’s, as if the Shariah’s values were living beings possessing a will and power. From here the importance of political and social sciences has an important role to play in studying this sovereignty, power and democracy, which are preliminary elements to applying the Shariah. Enabling these sciences becomes a condition for those interested in spreading the Shariah. It is apt for Islamic movements to raise

The Islamization of Knowledge  115 the slogan “The Ummah’s Sovereignty is the solution” instead of “Islam is the solution” (al-Maliki 2011). Epistemology Versus Working Conditions of Researchers

Eclectic attempts are most likely the result of the weak scientific training for Arab researchers. I see the weakness of social sciences (whether they claim to be from an Islamic perspective or not) as resulting from the social, political and economic conditions that researchers in the Global South face and which shape their intellectual formation, more than it is an epistemological problem resulting from the internationalization of the social sciences (i.e., incompatibility with Western concepts born in the limited contexts of European nation-states). Arab societies, for example, have been afflicted with fierce dictatorships which prevented any possibility of critical thought, in sciences as well as in theology. Some epistemology-based theories have led to eclecticism, as many writers in Islamization of knowledge or Islamic grounding of knowledge use flowery speech, beginning with some crisis of knowledge in the Western social sciences, and subsequently by Arabs, and finish by presenting purely epistemological solutions and suggest Islamic grounding as a means to exit this crisis (see, e.g., Abdelhalim 2014). Some researchers have rejected this over-emphasis on epistemology. In Ideology and the Social Sciences: The Dialectic of Their Connection and Separation (in Arabic), Algerian sociologist Wasila Khazar views the original relationship between the social sciences and ideology as one of separation. As she says: Epistemological, and therefore sociological theory emanate from the felt and observed reality and through empirical study. The social sciences try to frame concepts and connect them in the form of issues, and then test the validity of these issues to take the form of laws and theories. The beginning must then be from reality in the direction of building theory and not the opposite. Afterwards, then one relies on a theory to study other parts of reality, such as this study which was prepared as a basis to test the validity of a theory and the extent of its ability as a guide to understanding social phenomena. Therefore, when the Islamic perspective scholars argue that the Marxist and the structural functionalist schools include ideological premises which express purely human judgments and then suggest instead different ideological premises which originate in their basis from Islam, this suggestion for us is incompatible with science and objectivity. One’s starting-point for the basis of building a sociological theory must be from reality, and not from any ideological premises, no matter the essence of these premises, philosophical or religious, reason or revelation. (Khazar 2013, 269) In this vein, Jamal Atiyya also demonstrates that the science of Usul al-fiqh was formulated to provide a basis to determine duties and laws from texts, not to

116  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts interpret social phenomenon and their casual relationships, which is the subject of the social sciences (al-Bustani 2000). I end this paragraph with an elegant critique from Abdurahman Helli, a researcher with a mastery of different disciplines, of where this eclecticism leads: As for the last decades, dual specialties shrunk [that a researcher can have] and comparisons become done by researchers who studied a fiqh loaded with an obsession of fear with identity with an absolute confidence of faith and the fear of the threat of an equivalent knowledge moving on the ground. They resorted to comparison to dispel these obsessions with the superficial acquaintance with which they did this comparison rather than not studying it. There is another group of non-specialists in Shariah studies who had studied other disciplines who found it their Islamic duty is to make clear Islam’s precedence in their fields of knowledge, so they did comparative studies on fiqh with their scarce understanding of it. As such they exchanged titles and content, so the one who studies fiqh places his information under the lexicon of another discipline, and someone in economy or some other field places a contemporary economy under an Islamic lexicon, with both conferring Islam on their presentation without any harmonization. (Helli 2020, 3) Internationalization of Knowledge

To this day, a trend remains that argues there is an Islamic sociology for Muslims, a Buddhist sociology for Buddhists, and a Jewish sociology for Jews. This trend is incompatible with Muslims’ belief in Islam’s universalism and that it contains benefit for all people. Here, we must confirm that all sciences contain universalist dimensions as well as dimensions related to the culture of a population group and its needs. What is needed is a form of dialectical dialogue between the particular/ contextual versus the universal which can benefit from their different experiences and accumulation of knowledge. The governance and predominance of science in political debates (like climate change, genetically modified organisms, international property rights, and negotiations on drugs, biodiversity and the like) has changed. Scientific questions have become global. Scientists of the natural and social realms have become accustomed to thinking about issues at the global level. Of the two scientific fields, this phenomenon possibly occurs more with natural scientists. Objects are global; communities of specialists are global; training specialists has become a question of feeding an international distribution of competences, making every new PhD candidate a future emigrant. Caroline Wagner (2008), among many other authors, has defended the idea that international scientific networks are essentially made up of individuals who seek collaboration with peers having mutual interests and complementary skills around the world. In this globalized world, international collaboration functions as a global self-organizing system through collective action at the level of researchers themselves (Leydesdorff and Wagner 2008).

The Islamization of Knowledge  117 Conclusion and Alternative Far from the ossified reading of much of the literature of extreme secular social sciences and Shariah sciences researchers’ simplified reading of the social sciences, in this chapter I wanted to confirm that integration can be achieved between the Shariah sciences and social sciences, as well as other sciences, and bridge the gap between these sciences. This is an incredibly important subject if we are concerned with returning legitimacy to the social sciences for it to do its pioneering part in solving obtuse economic, political and social problems, and creating new conceptions and visions that open the horizon for many and deep ijtihidat (interpretations) that would enrich Islamic thought and knowledge in different fields. The process of integrating and grounding knowledge does not mean adopting a completely local theoretical context versus “Western materialist” theories (and like it, the slogan of “Islamization of modernity,” one of the branches of the IoK project). Rather, it means benefiting from global and local traditions at the same time and sifting through them to form a theoretical framework valid for studying the topic under consideration. For instance, if we were studying the independence of higher education and universities in Arab countries, the problem is related to the Arab dictatorial state’s hegemony over universities, whereas the problem in the West and Southeast Asia is connected to the commodification of knowledge and privatization. If we wanted to study poverty in Arab countries, the role of privatization is the decisive factor versus the problem of social cohesion in some Western countries. Therefore, the process of integrating and grounding knowledge does not mean adopting a principle of an opposition towards Western theoretical frameworks, which are qualified often as purely materialist or positivist and so on, and Islamic frameworks, which are often framed as embodying idealism, spirituality and the collectivity saliency. If the community is more important than the individual, then what part of this community, social class or category, is oppressed and need to be defended? In other words, it is easy to define an Islamic-grounding knowledge negatively (like that the Islamic economy is not neoliberal), but it more difficult to formulate positive determinants. The late Ismail al-Faruqi, who conceived the Islamization of knowledge, put together a work plan for his project in 1981, calling on everyone to adopt his approach. A third of a century later, we have found that this project did not produce much substantial research and knowledge. Perhaps, its secondary effect has been to scientize Islamic culture rather than Islamize the sciences. Yet I see some important reflexivity within IIIT, the institutional bearer of the al-Faruqi project, as it has abandoned this slogan, instead adopting “integrating knowledge” or “Islamic perspectives on knowledge.” What I tried to show here is that there are epistemological problems that grew out some concepts of IoK, with one of its results being that it was more a collective self-view (identity politics project) than a view of knowledge. There are good seeds, but in soil that is still poor and in need of care and pruning before it can bear fruit. I argue that good social knowledge is science that has the potential to enact change and perhaps even be subversive, which is to raise awkward questions on

118  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts economic and political interests and some pathologies of strong ideologies that affect all levels of society. It is that knowledge which clarifies how ideologies are built and how symbolic systems are utilized. Do the different aspects of Islamization of knowledge aim to live up to the adjective of good science? As I argued in this chapter, there is an excessive reductionism in many of these projects built for harmonization or Islamization, which tend to be purely epistemological methodologies. There is an exaggeration of the importance of values at the expense of interests and motivations. It appears in the twenty-first century that universal values have dissipated at the expense of politics, and that all of the statements legislators proclaimed at its onset dissipated in the end when they sank in the quicksand of politics. Khaled al-Hroub (2008) criticizes the current Arab and Islamic discourse on the issue of cultural particularity, as it becomes distant from the reality of these societies and their historical experience. He also views these obsessive delusions as transforming cultural particularism into a form of excusing Arab societies’ failures and hurting their chances of developing and catching up to scientific countries. It is necessary to criticize the Eurocentrism of the social sciences, but not to forget other local powers that push for self-censorship. The political crisis results in many researchers regressing themselves inside a methodology of theoretical poverty and excessive quoting of others. In other words, we should not fall for the myth of the idiosyncrasy of the Arab nation and its Arab-Islamic culture. From here I prefer approaches that take into account both epistemology and the social condition of knowledge production as a means to understand the crisis of the social sciences, such as that of Rushdi Rashid (2008), who used the concept of “localizing knowledge,” describing it as a way to establish science in contemporary Arab societies. According to Rashid, the localization of knowledge focuses on two essential foundations: the necessity of focusing on the correct knowledge of the relationship between classical Arab-Islamic knowledge and modern knowledge, and the necessity of revising its pioneering role in the latter’s coming to being. Second, is the necessity of both economic and political power in the process of harmonization, in order to achieve the necessary infrastructure for knowledge production. One of the main messages of my Knowledge Production in the Arab World: The Impossible Promise (Hanafi and Arvanitis 2015) was a clear call to improve the working conditions of knowledge production through enabling a national science system and the necessary political, economic and social conditions for its realization. The Alternative: “Separation, Connection and Pluralistic Praxis”

No knowledge exists today that has meaning without mutual enrichment and crosspollination between scientific disciplines and domains of knowledge. The social sciences have come to observe local, national and global forms of religiosity, their impact on political, economic and social spheres and how they are impacted in turn. Theology studies religion and religious rites from the perspective of their religious meaning, and in connection with their values to achieve salvation for

The Islamization of Knowledge  119 people. Yet theology, at least in many Western universities, is interested in practical theology; that is, how people perceive religion and how religion can help in human development through individual integrity and social cohesion and maximizing religious congruence. Thus, there is no subject that can be considered as a purely religious subject (Adhnali 2016). The Turkish reformer Ziya Gökalp (1875–1924) translated Emile Durkheim’s Social Consciousness to justify urf’s (customary practices) importance, given its description as a source of Islamic legislation, in Turkish national consciousness and how to benefit from it to build a good society (Özervarli 2017; Roussillon 2015). Returning to the Shariah sciences, what is needed is to teach them with two approaches: an approach of knowledge built on faith, and an approach built on the academic methodology of liberal arts, remembering that one will complement the other. This was adopted in the Master of Arts program in the Islamic Sciences (part of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities) in al-Akhawayn University in Morocco, with the aim of educating students in the human and social sciences necessary for research in religious studies. The Master’s of Islamic Studies has two tracks: a track for students who have an academic background outside of Islamic studies, and a track of “Religious Studies” for students who have a solid background in Islamic studies (Monette and Roy 2016). How can we understand and work towards the integration of knowledge or pedagogies between the natural and human and social sciences and the Shariah sciences? I will use an approach that I will call the separation, connection and pluralistic praxis approach (SeCoPP) that takes its premises from the Egyptian philosopher Samir Abuzaid’s (2009) bidimensional approach of separation and connection, and develop it further and add a third dimension (pluralistic praxis). In order to understand this concept, I will unpack these three dimensions. First, by separation, any problem can be divided into issues related to different fields: for instance, social distancing related to a pandemic should be the subject of medicine (how important it is to isolate the virus), the social sciences (psychological, social and economic ramifications of social distancing), and religion (what is the opinion of Islamic texts on holding the Friday prayer during a pandemic?). There is an acknowledgment that each knowledge field has its own methodology and some of the field’s aspects are objective and others subjective. One cannot reduce all sciences to one episteme. Even knowledge can share the same ontology but not the same epistemology. Second, connection is the art of providing a synthesis of the results of all fields about a problem in a way that ensures consistency. For Abuzaid, “consistency” is related to a “worldview.” For if every human has a view of the world, the essential characteristic which distinguishes this view is that it is consistent with itself and with the real world. This, in his view, was the secret of classical Arab-Islamic civilization’s success (Abuzaid 2013). However, here I tend to disagree with Abuzaid and others like him who strip pluralism from a worldview in a particular spacetime context, especially if we consider the Islamic worldview as fixed and unitary. Therefore, in my opinion, worldviews must be seen as lifeworlds, a phenomenological concept dear to Muhammad Bamyeh (2019) and rules of discussion and

120  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts dialog. When it comes to lifeworlds, this concept refers to the range of acts and practices through which old ideas continue to generate voluntarily accepted meaning, rather than enforced rules by an institution or state. The Islamic lifeworld thus is related to historical Muslims’ experience rather than the systems that result from economic and political techniques of standardization, which seek to obstruct individual agency. Thus the concept of lifeworlds enables the possibility of having a specific ontology (e.g., Islamic ontology) for a given issue (e.g., the centrality of the family as a social structure in our society; what are the master conceptions of family in Islamic thought and corpus) but not a specific epistemology, unless related to a specific science (e.g., how sociology determines the validity of sociological reasoning, or how hadith science determines the authenticity of hadith through a method that investigates the chain of transmission of a given hadith). Using the metaphor of Michael Walzer (2019) on “thick” and “thin” moral terms, ontology is thin as it has a few premises and cannot be thick enough to encompass details on how to moralize the human being. Concerning the rules of discussion and dialog, I  would like to use here the seminal methodology that the Lebanese philosopher Mouchir Basil Aoun (2023) proposes to help us in the phase of connection to deal with different levels (circles) of “truth” (the outcome of phase one, that is, separation) and what can be a matter of discussion or not. The first circle is about scientific truth. One can distinguish between the not-for-discussion outcome of the descriptive and conceptual epistemological imperatives of sciences and what comes from the paradigm that should be the subject of discussion. The second circle is the moral principles as a universal truth that become stable as anthropological truth framed by the values​​ of dignity, freedom, equality, justice, brotherhood and other ideals. However, this circle should be understood as a theoretical one and guidelines that are not for discussion but how they will be applied to each society is a matter of discussion. The third circle is the moral reasonings that apply the principles of the second circle and which deal as well with aesthetics. This can be fully discussed. The fourth and last circle is the truth of beliefs (or comprehensive doctrines in the language of John Rawls), including religious beliefs. This belief, in a form of theology, is difficult to be discussed without some unstable issues. As society has different communities that have different beliefs, one can only respect the belief of others as far as it does not contradict the second circle. Aoun, in the line of Paul Ricoeur, rightly thinks that beyond the outcome of the two descriptive and conceptual epistemological imperatives of science, the other truths are a sort of existential truth which is, in essence, rhetorical, metaphorical, and interpretive and should be taken as it is in order to facilitate innovation (ijtihad) and possibility of discussion and dialogue. The “separation and connection” is not a new method, but it was used by our ancestors. Abuzaid’s methodology of “separation and connection” relies on a model from our tradition, that is, the linguistic model of the Persian Sheikh Abdulqahir al-Jurjani, to guarantee the objectivity of a discipline, and at the same time a selfview of the world. This also ensures that the creedal and religious aspects do not dominate science, and that science (in its descriptive/positivist aspects) does not exceed its epistemological boundaries; that is, it leaves space for normative ethical

The Islamization of Knowledge  121 aspects drawing from religion and moral philosophy. This is not only related to Islam, but any religious or cultural context. Aljurjani’s treatment of the issue of the miraculous linguistic nature of the Noble Quran is an important example. He considered this to be both a scientific and religious topic. As such, he established the science of “al-Nazm” (literally, the arrangement of words) as a linguistic theory to study the Quran’s language akin to that of Ferdinand de Saussure’s school of structuralism, while also maintaining the Islamic perspective which believes in the miraculous nature of the Quran and confines it only in the meanings of the Quranic words. In this manner, Aljurjani did not conflate the field of religious knowledge with the field of human sciences. One of the means by which some philosophers and theologians have tried to solve the contradiction between science and religion has been to separate them on the basis that each has its own unique language. In the theory of linguistic analysis, interpretations are given to each—one for the language of religion and one for the language of science—with a complete contrast between them where one does not refer to the other, and with each having their own special role. In this regard, Wittgenstein uses the phrase “language games,” as he and his followers believe that both science and religions have their own specific language games. In light of this, both religion and science have special roles which differ from the role played by the other. As such, neither of them can be judged by the standards and criteria of the other. The language of science is a basis that benefits uncertainty and estimation and is distinguished in its pragmatic functional nature (Saidi 2013). Third, by pluralistic praxis, I mean that after connecting outcomes of different fields to deal with an issue, we need to consider different actions to different audiences taking into account the plurality of people in terms of culture, social classes, religions, ethnicity and so on. Let me explain the SeCoPP approach through the example of the issue of women’s share of the inheritance. For the faqih, there is a Quranic verse revealed on the distribution of inheritance. For others, there is a sort of contradiction between both the noble virtues of Islam (and other religions) and liberalism, such as equality and justice. In Tunisia, there was an important debate on this topic. However, those who supported maintaining the dominant interpretation of the Quranic text and their peers who supported gender equality in distributing inheritance ended up using pieces of evidence that had the same epistemological repertoires for their moral justifications (using textual, legal and sociological arguments).7 After both sides have used their different methodologies, they sought connection through using different justificatory repertoires of arguments and disseminating them in the public sphere, which is the third phase, that is, pluralistic praxis. Pluralistic praxis is that action which reflects the debate of ethical dilemma and research on reasonable accommodation (and not only rational, as it is also influenced by feelings) between virtue and a choice that take into account consequences. By pluralistic, I intend to emphasize that we always have different publics: at the very least, citizens and believers. This is because arguments and justifications which are presented to the citizen who comes from a different social, cultural and religious background will most likely differ from one the preacher presents to believers. In

122  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts the latter case, he can suffice with citing a holy text and its exegesis. Afterwards, action comes in, which is this peaceful debate in the public sphere which leads to a coming together of views through both sides accepting that no matter how much civil legislation may be preferable to a particular means of distributing inheritance, the other side may choose the other means. If there are democratic means to resolve the choice of the majority (most likely in the form of civil legislation), the preacher can always call believers to his religious choice and ratify it in the form of fiqh. One can go even further to adopting legal pluralism, found in many democratic countries around the world, whether Muslim majority or not. One example was when the Moroccan Minister of Endowments Ahmad Tawfiq was asked in parliament how he would treat homosexuals. Tawfiq answered that he would treat them with wisdom and good advice. He could have answered by issuing a fatwa against them, but he chose a different strategy, using rather the ethics of responsibility as a minister who wants to provide a statement for the whole Moroccan citizenry. Finally, needless to say, that the separation step is an analytical step. This means that the same actor can use different disciplines in order to come up with a position before the connection. I am thinking particularly of those who are interested in Maqasid al-Shariah. To resolve a problem related to different disciplines, they need to do this by outsourcing the research to those who are experts in each discipline. Justin Stearns (2021) wonderfully reminds us how our ancestors, like the seventeenthcentury Moroccan polymath al-Hasan al-Yusı (died 1691), considered “sciences and all beneficial knowledge in general was part of God’s Revelation, part of the religious and scientific inquiry into the workings of God’s Creation. They did not reside in the past to be venerated or preserved, but in the present, to be practiced” (66), while respecting the epistemology of each science. This is why the title of the Arabic version of this book is “Aloum al-Shari” (sciences related to religion) and not “Aloum Shari’yya” (sciences with which we established Shariah and jurisprudential rulings). Notes 1 I rely here on some of the specialized journals in this field, the most important of which is Islamization of Knowledge, published by IIIT (in Arabic), as well as JSTOR and the Arabic E-marefa and al-Manhal databases. 2 The institute has several branches and offices in Muslim and Arab capitals, and its work is supervised by a board of trustees, whose members include a president rotated cyclically. 3 This resulted in a call to establish the International Institute of Islamic Thought to lead the efforts of the Islamization of knowledge. 4 Ibn Khaldun’s “logic of proof” does not rely on Aristotelean logic, that is, deducting particulars from universals, but rather inducing universals from particulars, something rejected by Aristotle due to his belief that familiarity with all the particulars is practically impossible. In this respect, one can refer back to Ali al-Wardi’s Ibn Khaldun’s Logic. 5 For the importance of Islamic grounding for psychology, see Chapter 11. 6 These lessons and discussions continued for seven months, including small study groups to learn about and discuss the book and different topics based on Ibn Khaldun. This also

The Islamization of Knowledge  123 included discussions through a Facebook page, which reached 40,800 followers who took part in discussions and read Plato’s Republic. 7 For more on this topic, see Hanafi and Tomeh (2019).

References In Arabic Abdelhalim, Mahorbachat. 2014. The Islamic Grounding of Sociology, An Approach to the Islamism of Knowledge. Setif (Algeria): University of Setif 2. Abuzaid, Samir. 2009. Science and the Arabic Worldview—The Arabic Experience and the Scientific Founding of the Arabic Renaissance. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies. ———. 2013. “The History of the Philosophy of Science from an Islamic Perspective as a Basis for Achieving Cognitive Integration.” In Knowledge Integration: Its Impact on University Education and Its Necessity, edited by Raed Jamil Okasha, 109–54. Amman: International Institute of Islamic Thought. Adhnali, Ahmed Hadi. 2016. “Islamic Studies: A  Contemporary View from Turkey.” In Islamic Studies Facing the Challenge of Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World, edited by Nayla Tabbara, 78–107. Beirut: al-Farabi/Institute for Citizenship and Diversity Management. al-‘Awran, Ahmed Farras, and Kamal Tawfiq Hattab. 2016. Researchers’ Guide to the Islamic Economy and Islamic Banks in Jordan (1974–2010). Washington, DC: International Institute of Islamic Thought. al-Atiri, Ali Sultani. 2013. “Insights into Islamization and Grounding.” Contemporary Muslim Journal 149: 65–93. al-Bustani, Mahmoud. 2000. Islam and Psychology. Mashhad, Iran: Islamic Research Academy. al-Ghali, Belqasem. 1999. “Attempts at Grounding Sociology.” Journal of Social Affairs 63: 9–41. al-Hroub, Khaled. 2008. From Privacy to Historic Disability? Qantara website for dialogue with the Islamic world. https://ar.qantara.de/content/llm-lrby-lwlm-wjdl-lhwymn-lkhswsy-l-lq-ltrykhy. al-Jayyousi, Auda. 2013. “Environment and the Transition Towards Sustainability: An Islamic View.” Islamic Knowledge 72: 43–59. al-Khoshn, Hussein. 2011. Islam and the Environment . . . Steps Towards an Environmental Jurisprudence. Beirut: House of the Angel. al-Maliki, Abdullah. 2011. “The Sovereignty of the Umma Before the Implementation of Sharia.” www.almqaal.com/?p=922. al-Sadr, Mohammad Baqir. 1989. Objective Interpretation and Social Philosophy. Global Printing House. Aoun, Mouchir Basil. 2023. “Is It Permissible to Turn the Truth into a Topic of Discussion?” al-sharq al-Awst, April 10, 2023. https://bit.ly/3FodPm2. Auda, Jasser. 2012. “Using Maqasid al-Shariah in Rationalizing Knowledge Economy Policies.” Islamic Journal of Knowledge (70): 43–66. Balwafi, Ahmad, and Bilabas, Abdelrazzaq. 2010. Researchers in Islamic Economics’ Treatment of the Global Financial Crisis: An Analytical Study. https://bit.ly/415OfLB Bou’oud, Ahmed. 2006. The Jurisprudence of Reality: Origins and Limitations. Dar Al Salam for Printing and Publishing.

124  Theoretical Approaches and Contexts Buzyan, Alyan. 2014. “The Employment of Maqasid al-Shariah in the Islamization of Legal Knowledge.” Islamic Journal of Knowledge (78): 40–76. Helli, Abdulrahman. 2020. “Comparative Shariah Studies and Filling the Gaps.” Intellectual Forum for Creativity, September 17, 2020. www.almultaka.org/site.php?id=150. Hilal, Hoda Mohamed Hassan. 2011. The Theory of Eligibility: A Comparative Analytical Study between Jurisprudence and Psychology. Washington: International Institute of Islamic Thought. Khader, Ahmed Ibrahim. 2010. Confessions of Sociologists: The Futility of Theory and the Inadequacy of Method in Sociology. London: Islamic Forum. www.alukah.net/ culture/0/44114/. ———. 2012. “Does Our Country Need Sociologists?” www.Alukah.Net. www.alukah.net/ culture/0/44114/. Khazar, Wasila. 2013. Ideology and Sociology: The Dialectic of Connection and Separation. Beirut: Lebanese Knowledge Forum. Monette, Connell, and Roy, Emilie. 2016. “Master in Islamic Studies at Al Akhawayn University,” In Islamic Studies Facing the Challenge of Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World, edited by Nayla Tabbara, 17–30. Beirut: al-Farabi/Institute for Citizenship and Diversity Management. Motahhari, Morteza. 1979. Society and History. Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance. Rajab, Ibrahim Abdelrahman. 1996. “The Islamic Grounding of the Social Sciences: Milestones on the Road.” Islamic Journal of Knowledge (3). Rashid, Rushdi. 2008. “The Arab World and the Localization of Science.” Arab future (354). Saidi, Yahya. 2013. “The Legitimate Grounding for Maintaining Environmental Balance.” Islamic Studies, 16. In Other Languages Abaza, Mona. 2002. Debates on Islam and Knowledge in Malaysia and Egypt: Shifting Worlds. Routledge Curzon Press. Ahmed, Akbar. 1986. Toward Islamic Anthropology: Definition, Dogma and Directions. Ann Arbor, MI: New Era. Alatas, Syed Farid. 1987. “Reflections on the Idea of Islamic Social Science.” Comparative Civilisations Review (17). ———. 2013. Ibn Khaldun. Oxford: Oxford University Press India. al-‘Awran, Ahmed Farras, and Kamal Tawfiq Hattab. 2016. Researchers’ Guide to the Islamic Economy and Islamic Banks in Jordan (1974–2010). Washington, DC: International Institute of Islamic Thought. Bamyeh, Mohammed A. 2019. Lifeworlds of Islam: The Pragmatics of a Religion. Lifeworlds of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Anchor. Choudhury, Masudul Alam. 1992. Principles of Islamic Political Economy: A Methodological Enquiry. UK: St. Martin’s Press. Choudhury, Masudul Alam, and Ishaq Bhatti. 2016. Heterodox Islamic Economics: The Emergence of an Ethico-Economic Theory. 1st ed. London and New York: Routledge. Davies, Merryl Wyn. 1988. Knowing One Another: Shaping Islamic Anthropology. London: Mansell.

The Islamization of Knowledge  125 Eğri, Taha, and Necmettin Kizilkaya. 2015. Islamic Economics: Basic Concepts, New Thinking and Future Directions. UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Hanafi, Sari, and Rigas Arvanitis. 2015. Knowledge Production in the Arab World: The Impossible Promise. 1st ed. London and New York: Routledge. Hanafi, Sari, and Azzam Tomeh. 2019. “Gender Equality in the Inheritance Debate in Tunisia and the Formation of the Non-Authoritarian Reasoning.” Journal of Islamic Ethics 3 (1): 207–32. Haque, Amber. 2004. “Psychology from Islamic Perspective: Contributions of Early Muslim Scholars and Challenges to Contemporary Muslim Psychologists.” Journal of Religion and Health 43 (4): 357–77. IIIT. 1984. Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan. Washington, DC: IIIT. Kadri, Ali. 2014. Arab Development Denied: Dynamics of Accumulation by Wars of Encroachment. London and New York, NY: Anthem Press. Leydesdorff, Loet, and Caroline Wagner. 2008. “International Collaboration in Science and the Formation of a Core Group.” Journal of Informetrics 2 (4): 317–25. Özervarli, M. Sait. 2017. “Reading Durkheim through Ottoman Lenses: Interpretation of Customary Law, Religion, and Society by the School Gökalp.” Modern Intellectual History 14 (2): 393–419. Roussillon, Alain. 2015. “La Représentation de l’identité Par Les Discours Fondateurs de La Sociologie Turque et Égyptienne: Ziya Gökalp et ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Wahid Wafi.” In Modernisation et Nouvelles Formes de Mobilisation Sociale. Volume II: Égypte-Turquie, edited by CEDEJ, 30–68. www.amazon.com/Modernisation-nouvelles-formes-mobilisation-sociale-ebook/dp/ B010VB2K64. Shariati, Ali. 1979. On the Sociology of Islam. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press. Stearns, Justin K. 2021. Revealed Sciences: The Natural Sciences in Islam in Seventeenth-Century Morocco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107588523. Tremblay, André. 2011. Les Classements Internationaux Sont-Ils La Clef d’accès à l’économie de La Connaissance? Analyse Des Universités Du Liban et Dubaï . Liban: Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth. Wagner, Caroline. 2008. The New Invisible College: Science for Development. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press. Walzer, Michael. 2019. Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Part II

Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World

4 Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon Dominance of the Traditionalist Tendency

Introduction Religious education in Lebanon has long being organized, which made it an intellectual lighthouse not just for Lebanon, but also the whole Arab world. Perhaps the oldest of these are the Christian institutes, as Christian missionaries opened a large number of educational institutes, and every Lebanese religious sect has its own schools and university. The Maronite Church holds several institutes of higher education, such as the Holy Spirit University, the Dar al-Hekma College for teaching law affiliated with the Beirut Diocese, and the Maronite Notre-Dame University–Louaize, later added to by the Antonine University established by the Antonine order. As for the Orthodox church, most of its elementary schools are free and it owns 23 educational institutes, which are distributed as follows: 17 schools in the pre-university public education sector, three technical and arts schools, and three universities: the University of Balamand, Académie Libanaise des BeauxArts (ALBA) and Saint George University of Beirut. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Shia-majority Jabal Amel (South Lebanon) witnessed a scientific renaissance that included religious education through developing new teaching styles and ways of thinking. Fifteen schools were established just in Southern Lebanon. After finishing the primary educational stages, capable students could go to Iraq to continue their higher education in the hawzas of Najaf. There are many graduates of Najaf who became senior Lebanese scholars famous throughout the Arab and Islamic world. After the successful Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Islamic awakening led by Imam Musa al-Sadr in the sixties spread among Lebanon’s Shia community. From the mid-eighties, a new number of religious hawzas were established, the most prominent of which were the Hawza of al-Rasul al-Akram in the Harik neighborhood with Iranian sponsorship, and the Islamic Shariah Institute with the sponsorship of Muhammad Huseyn Fadallah. Graduates are able to complete their education in the city of Qom or join the al-Mustafa University in Iran.1 The eighties witnessed a wave of Sunni Shariah schools and institutes, the most important of which are the Dar al-Fatwa–affiliated Azhar Lebanon, the Shariah department in the Makassed Association schools, and the Dar of Religious

DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-7

130  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Education in Tripoli, all of which specialize in preparing students with religious education before sending them to al-Azhar (Imad 2012). This pluralism is not only inter-sectarian but also intra-sectarian, as every sect has many religious and political parties and movements. As Abdelghani Imad points out, these movements established schools, institutes and universities for Shariah education in the hundreds,2 and they compete for control over mosques and religious sites in light of the increasing weakness of the Dar al-Fatwa and the High Islamic Shia Council vis-à-vis the rising religious and political movements at the private education level. These schools do not adhere to the state’s formal curriculum like the rest of the private schools, but formulate their methodology according to the jurisprudential system they embrace, which has led to chaos .  .  . to the point that some of them have begun to teach controversial material propagating the difference between Sunni and Shia Muslims, which led the Ministers’ Council to intervene and close one of them in 2000. (Imad 2012) Nonetheless, Shariah colleges and universities in Lebanon are a pivotal center for Shariah knowledge production and spreading this production in Islamic circles, not only for Lebanese but for all Arabs. There is an investment in these institutions, as they used to attract hundreds of higher-education students from Syria, where Shariah was confined to quasi-governmental controlled institutions which were severely competed over, whereas in Lebanon any Syrian wealthy enough could find a place to study. These brokers even had agents in Syria to attract students. These colleges grant university degrees at all levels (see Table 4.1). As we will see, these institutions resemble each other in some areas and differ in other areas. It should be noted that the curricula of these colleges follow the Ashari school of theology. Some of the teachers also teach in mosques and associations. While these universities are primarily concerned with Shariah programs, some of them have also expanded to include other programs, such as the public management program in al-Awzai University. In this chapter, I will focus on the curricula of four important universities that teach Shariah: the Islamic University of Beirut, Kuliyyat al-Dawa al-Jamiyya, and the College of al-Imam al-Awzai, and the University of Tripoli, in addition to Irshad and Islah College which has educational programs, although it is not a university.4 However, I will examine in detail only the case of the Islamic University of Beirut. The Islamic University of Beirut Until the establishment of the Islamic University of Beirut, Lebanese Sunnis from Beirut who wanted to become sheikhs used to go generally to al-Azhar in Egypt or to Syria (Damascus in particular). The university was established during the era of Mufti Hasan Khalid, and its name then was College of Islamic Da’wa. It

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  131 Table 4.1 University Institutions With Programs in Shariah or Islamic Studies Institution Name

Place

Program

Date of Establishment

Degree

Jinan University

Tripoli

Islamic Studies Shariah and Islamic Studies Science of Quran Readings and Islamic Studies Intellectual Realities in the Quran and Sunnah Shariah

1999 1999

BA BA, master’s

1991

Shariah Islamic Studies Shariah Shariah Usul al-Fiqh Comparative Fiqh Islamic Studies Usul al-Fiqh

2003 2003 2009 1990 1998 1998 1998 1998

Comparative Fiqh

1998

Islamic Studies

2000 1980

University of Tripoli

Tripoli

al-Azhar University

Bekaa

al-Azhar University Islamic University of Beirut

Akar Beirut

1999 1999

University College of Da’wa

Beirut

College of al-Imam al-Awzai

Beirut

Shariah, Islamic Studies and Islamic Economy Islamic Studies

Makassed University Islamic Studies Program at American University of Beirut University of Tripoli

Beirut Beirut

Islamic Studies Islamic Studies

1982 –

Tripoli

Shariah

1991 2000

Islamic Studies

1991 2000

Sciences of Islamic Education Islamic Studies

2003

Global University3

Beirut

1986

Master’s, doctorate BA, master’s Master’s BA, master’s BA, master’s Master’s Master’s Master’s Master’s, doctorate Master’s, doctorate Master’s, doctorate Master’s, doctorate BA, master’s, doctorate BA, master’s Master’s BA Master’s, doctorate BA Master’s, doctorate Diploma BA, master’s and doctorate

132  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World established its headquarters in a small building close to Dar al-Fatwa. During the time of Mufti Muhammad Rashid al-Qabanni in 1990, an academic agreement was convened with al-Azhar University in Egypt, granting the College of Da’wa’s degree equivalency with al-Azhar’s degree for graduates from the College of Shariah and Law in Egypt. The name of the university changed at that time to College of Islamic Shariah, and a branch for women was established at the college in 1991. In 1996, the College of Shariah obtained accreditation from the Lebanese state as a university recognized by the ministry of education. At the time, the College of Islamic Shariah also merged with the High Institute for Shariah Judiciary, the College of Islamic Arts, the College of Applied Sciences and the University Institute for Technology to establish the Islamic University of Beirut. The College of Shariah in the Islamic University of Beirut is considered the educational institute formally affiliated with the Dar al-Fatwa. Therefore, many of the Friday preachers are graduates of this educational institution. Likewise, imams and preachers can only be qualified through the Dar al-Fatwa, which allows it to certify and monitor the content of Friday prayers. As such, Dar al-Fatwa in this case governs scholars’ production on the one hand through the College of Shariah, and on the other hand, their sermons through their control over mosques’ expenses. Ridwan al-Sayyed estimates the number of graduates in this university as 3000, with 2000 sheikhs currently giving sermons and guidance to people. Naturally, there are other preachers who graduated from other Shariah programs and are affiliated to different creedal schools and movements. Bachelor’s

In the first year, students study a number of traditional elementary texts, but with the growth of cooperation between the Islamic University of Beirut and the High Council of Islamic Thought, an additional class in contemporary Islamic thought was added in the second semester of the first year. As for compulsory classes, they include Quran, Arabic and English language, fiqh, the Hadith sciences, sirah (prophetic biography), Usul al-Fiqh, creed, the history of fiqh, Islamic literature, and an introduction to studying law. Many of the courses at this stage try to combine a traditional orientation with contemporary issues, such as Sheikh Muhammad alGhazali’s “Fiqh al-Sirah al-Nabawiyya” (The Fiqh of the Prophetic Biography) and Sheikh Abdulwahab Khalaf’s “The Science of Usul ul-Fiqh.” In the first year, students study the jurisprudence of the acts of worship (ibadat). This jurisprudence does not demand ijtihad and by consensus does not change with the changing of time and place. Therefore, the book Kifayat al-Akhyar by the Shafii jurisprudent Taqiyy al-Din al-Hisni is the book relied upon by both the traditionalist and reformist schools (but there is a difference with the Salafis in the issue of relying on one school). In the course on the fiqh of prophetic biography, students study Muhammad Ghazali’s eponymous work. The book tries to narrate the prophetic biography with the language of Ghazali’s period which he lived through in the twentieth century. Different from the classical books of sirah, he used a style closer to a

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  133 story or narration. He was interested in showing the Messenger (PBUH) in his daily life and material situations as someone who was poor and hard-working. He gave a glimpse of the clash of civilizations in his discussion on Islam and idolism and the genesis of Islamic civilization. The book also divides the prophetic biography into different periods: from birth to the sending of revelation, the period of da’wah (jihad al-dawa), the period of migration, the establishing of a new society, armed struggle (the period of wars in Madina), and the new phase (the settling of Islamic order). The modern political perspective can be noticed from this division of the prophetic biography, using contemporary terms to view history in an attempt to connect the prophetic biography to students’ lived reality. Even though the book is limited in its historical analysis, it is considered by many scholars I interviewed to be the best book of its kind in Shariah colleges because of how it smoothly connects history to the present, making it easy for students to apply it to reality. However, there is a potential problem in the book’s simplification of a complicated historical reality, thereby solidifying a unilinear theory of history. This is different from many Arab universities that still only teach Ibn Hisham’s (d. 218 AH) al-Sirah al-Nabawiyya, which is viewed as quasi-holy, preventing insightful critique of it.5 As for the elective course “Contemporary Islamic Thought” in the first semester, it uses The Crisis of the Muslim Mind by Abdulhamid Abu Suleiman, who was one of the pioneers of IIIT and the Islamization of Knowledge project. The book is important as it doubts the traditional approach to religion, which it considers one of the foundations of the crisis of the Muslim mind. Abu Suleiman begins the book by describing the intellectual crisis lived by Muslims, as he divides the current approaches to the sciences into three: traditional, westernization, and the original Islamic approach. He views the traditional and westernized approaches as approaches that are doomed to fail, whereas the third approach is more dynamic and connected to Islamic foundations. This makes it capable of interacting with an ever-changing reality through the trifecta of revelation, reason and being. According to Abu Suleiman, the aim of this trifecta is to draw out the higher aims of the laws and the values that motivate them in order to frame an intellectual approach toward the reality that Muslims live. The choice of this book is puzzling, as Abu Suleiman critiques the very traditionalist approach relied upon by the Islamic University of Beirut in creed, jurisprudence and jurisprudential theory. It is not clear how the designers of the university’s curriculum combined this text and the rest of the texts in the other courses. Abu Suleiman argues that it is necessary to review what are today considered the classical texts in order to purify them from the historical affiliations that afflicted them. Abu Suleiman uses many references from the social sciences, political science, education and technology, something which is congruent with and enriches his proposed methodology. After complicating the classical Islamic methodology and approach, Abu Suleiman calls for connecting the social sciences and Shariah sciences, and for the social sciences not to become merely statistics and numbers that work outside the circle of revelation without benefiting it. He then details the foundations of social

134  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World research and the Shariah, viewing the two as agreeing for the most part, such as determining reality and solving society’s problems, even if the two disagree in particularities, such as how knowledge is produced. In the fifth chapter, he deals with Islam, technology, education and the empirical sciences. Generally, this book is contrary to the Islamic University of Beirut’s general methodology. Therefore, it is a valuable addition that adds dimensions of knowledge to the established educational system, as it also explains many of the necessary concepts for students in the modern world. Nonetheless, the substantial problem with this book is the absence of any referencing of the sources he used to gather information (except Quranic verses). This makes it hard for students to research and confirm any more than the book’s content, thereby making it hard for them to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the approach Abu Suleiman is suggesting and use it to interact with the other courses. In the theology (creed) course, students study the commentary of Burhan alDin Ibrahim al-Bajuri (d. 1860), the sheikh of al-Azhar, on the famous Ashari text Jawharat al-Tawhid by Imam al-Laqani. The text deals with the divine aspects of creed, such as Allah’s names, attributes, prophetology, and revealed creed (sam’iyat),6 which includes faith in the afterlife. The text also adds additional details on the ranks of the companions and imams, and the five universals in Islamic jurisprudence, the foundations of moral philosophy with a little bit of Sufism and etiquette. However, this text is written in the language of the era of Caliphs and bay’a (oath of allegiance given to the Caliph), not the language of republics and elections. Therefore, it is par excellence a theoretical text that narrates the reality of the Caliphate in the age in which it was written more than it narrates the reality lived by the student and the one he will pass fatwas on after graduation. In the Islamic literature course (which also has elements of ethics),7 students study Risalat al-Murtarshidin by Harith bin Asad al-Muhasibi, a text on how to refine oneself according to Quranic verses, prophetic narrations and the stories of the companions and pious men (awliya). The book does not discuss the angle of contemporary psychology and does not teach a comprehensive reading of this text according to contemporary sciences. As such, the book creates romanticized images in the student’s mind without connecting it to his lived time. The course in Usul al-Fiqh uses Egyptian scholar Abdulwahab Khallaf’s The Science of Usul al-Fiqh, which tries to combine the reformist school established by Muhammad Abduh with the traditionalist school. Wael Hallaq views Khallaf as stuck between Muhammad Abduh and traditionalist scholars due to his being a Shariah judge and professor at the University of Cairo, and as such, forming a combination between the Western and Eastern legal schools (Hallaq 2001). Khallaf’s book is a short essay which focuses on maslaha and considered it one of the Shariah’s first principles. Khallaf divides maslaha according to the traditional division into three types: first the considered maslaha, which is the one prescribed by Quran and Sunnah, such as safeguarding religion and reason; second a simple maslaha, which is one that developed after the end of revelation without contradicting it; and finally to the rejected maslaha, which contradicts revelation.

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  135 Khallaf views safeguarding maslaha as necessary for the presence of ijtihad, and as such preceding the Quran and Sunnah, except that this connection between maslaha and ijtihad is only on the issues on which revelation was silent on. It is on this basis that the issue of proving a maslaha and working to reach it is an ambiguous issue in Khallaf’s book. Khallaf concludes by saying that the spirit of the text must be safeguarded more than its letter; however he does not dig into the means which can be employed to safeguard the spirit of the text. Wael Hallaq points out that Khallaf did not develop a view of the spirit of the text and how to embody it in reality, and how to interact with the particular laws (juz’iyya) in light of the comprehensive higher aims of the Quranic text (Hallaq 2001). As for the textbooks which are taught after Khallaf’s at the bachelor’s and master’s levels, they do not interact with the maqasid except as a part of Islamic jurisprudence, not as a theory to frame jurisprudential production. Generally, the first year is rich with methodological contradictions between the textbooks, between Khallaf and Abu Suleiman’s books on the one hand and the jurisprudential and creedal texts on the other hand, making it clear that there are two separate curricula which the students are interacting with. Despite Khallaf glorifying maslaha and considering it as an axial point of the Shariah, the teaching of the branches of fiqh in the curriculum does not rely on Khallaf’s approach. This lack of application of Khallaf’s methodology leads to a lack of understanding it, and hence forgetting it. Because Khallaf’s book in Usul al-Fiqh is simple and is considered an introduction to Usul and not a commentary on it, the course’s adherence to only this book does not facilitate the methodology’s spread among the students. This also applies to Abdulhamid Abu Suleiman’s book with regard to a critical reading of historical texts. Whereas Abu Suleiman views teaching the Ashari texts of creed as harmful, given that these texts were written in response to rival schools of thoughts, like the Mu’tizala and Ahl al-Ray, the course on creed teaches the “Essence of Tawheed” despite it representing the essence of what Abu Suleiman objects to. Whereas Abu Suleiman sheds light on the dangers of materiality, the Jawharat text deals with the dangers of Greek philosophy. All of the above displays the sharp divide present in the curriculum of the Islamic University of Beirut. This divide continues in the following years of education. In the second year of the bachelor’s program, students study the Quran, Arabic language, Hadith, logic, tafsir (Quranic exegesis) and Usul. In this year, students start to study mu’amalat (the jurisprudence of interactions) from Kifayat al-Akhyar. This division is distinguished by its relying on a textual analysis of the Quran and Sunnah, which students use to study the jurisprudence of sales, usury, renting contracts, and so on of economic affairs. Because the book was written in a past period, it is dominated by the nature of an agricultural society and does not dig into modern economic contracts and the jurisprudence they entail. So too is the concept of maslaha completely absent from al-Hisni’s work, even though maslaha for many (Khallaf and others) is one of the framing concepts of fiqh al-mu’amalat. An elective class is taught in personal status law according to the Hanafi school from Muhammad Zayad al-Abyani’s book Sharh Muktasar al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya,

136  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World which deals with the issues of engagement, marriage ceremony and its conditions, women-specific rulings, dowry, birth and expenses obligatory to spend on one’s wife. I believe the curriculum took personal law from the Hanafi school and not the Shafii school due to the former’s ability of a more tender jurisprudence able to deal with changes in a more secure manner, as the Hanafi school is based on jurisprudential opinion and not primarily on hadith. Furthermore, the Shafi’i fiqh of personal law has not yet been codified, whereas the Hanafi school has been codified as it was the school used in the Ottoman Empire and was codified under its aegis. The Sunni Shariah courts in Lebanon in fact still apply the Ottoman family law promulgated in 1917 before the Ottoman state’s collapse. In the third year of the bachelor’s program, students study Quran, Usul and research methodologies, balagha (rhetoric), tafsir and the jurisprudence of criminal law. The course on research methodology in Shariah colleges focuses on how to form theological research papers, meaning fundamentally the skills of writing a research dissertation and some other research skills. The course studies Yusuf al-Marashili’s Usul Kitabat al-Bahth al-Ilmi wa Tahqiq al-Makhtutat (The Fundamentals of Scientific Research and Manuscript Verification). It is worth pointing out that Marashili holds a bachelor’s and master’s degree in Arabic literature and a doctorate in Shariah, and as such his book focuses on textual analysis of research papers and how to deal with prophetic narrations, verses and classical books, without engaging with the methodologies of field research in the social sciences. As such, of the book’s 532 pages, Marashili only devoted 24 pages to studying a descriptive analytical and inductive approach, the observation method, the relational approach, and the empirical or semi-empirical approach, whereas nearly 500 pages focus on only analytical theological research topics and nothing more. In the Usul al-Fiqh course, Baydawi’s Minhaj al-Wusul ila Ilm al-Usul is used, and this book is considered a reference in dealing with urf in Shafii jurisprudential theory. The Usul lessons cover the jurisprudential standards in Ilm al-Usul and the texts from which statutes are drawn, the categorization of prophetic narrations as either sahih or daif, and the conditions for consensus (ijma) in fiqh. As for the fiqh lesson, they study Abdulfattah Kubarra’s Comparative Fiqh, which explains the jurisprudential and linguistic schools in Islamic civilization, and how differences arose between them and what the etiquette of differences entails. The book then aims to detail the important areas of differences, such as the Quran, Sunnah and Prophetic narrations in their rankings, and then Usul al-Fiqh. This book is considered the essential source for comparative fiqh between the four schools, renouncing fanaticism and a sincere commitment to Shariah evidence. The author then compares between Islamic jurisprudence and current positive law, and aims to forward some contemporary issues connected to real estate and renting to apply these comparisons. As such, this book stands out from other books in its jurisprudential dealing with contemporary issues in the Lebanese context lived by students without trying to transport them to historical times and subjects far from reality.

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  137 As for the second semester, students study Imam al-Nawawi’s Minhaj alTalibeen, which is done through teaching the following chapters: the chapter on qisas, rebels, the conditions of the Imamate, the chapter on apostasy, adultery, the penalty of accusing a chaste woman of adultery, and the penalty for robbers. The books conduct textual analysis derived from Shariah texts in a period in which Dar al-Islam was clearly manifested, and Nawawi in this book does not hesitate to state the ruling of the apostate’s execution, the stoning of the adulterer, and so on of types of hudud. In the fourth year of the bachelor’s program, students study tafsir, research methodologies, translation, hadith, inheritance law, sermon-giving, and comparative religion. In the comparative religion course, focus is given to Christian beliefs and studying the four gospels in addition to the history of Christianity and its synagogues and churches. It also engages with the Christian creed from both the Christian and Islamic points of view, specifically the issues of disagreement between Muslims and Christians, such as the crucifixion, the creed of the trinity, and how to view the Messiah in light of these issues. Undoubtedly, the class aims to confirm Islam’s validity and the falsity of any other religion, as shown in the book taught in the course and its reference list, which includes Shaykh Muhammad Abu Zahra’s Lectures on Christianity. The “research methodologies” course relies on Salih Ma’tuq’s Usul Kitabat al-Bahth al-Ilmi (Foundations of Scientific Research). Matuq divides scientific research into the phase of choosing a topic, the stage of planning, and the stage of execution (research tools and investigation), and the stage of framing the study, technical publishing (ikhraj) and discussing the research. The book does not mention any of the social sciences methodologies in research, and is confined to primary and secondary sources, glossaries and so on of purely textual research. It is worth mentioning that the university requested Ma’mun Tarbiyyah to teach a course in Islamic social sciences several years ago, which he taught for a period of four years. The university, however, did not ask him to continue. When I asked him about the difference between it and the social sciences course taught in the University of Lebanon, he answered that while it is similar to the latter, it took into consideration the sensitivity of some topics. In relation to the students’ interaction with this course, he mentioned that he found the interaction to be more conducive than among the sociology students in the University of Lebanon. Master’s

There are three master’s programs: Comparative Fiqh, Islamic Studies, and Usul al-Fiqh. Here we will only discuss the first two specializations. The university viewed its bachelor’s program as insufficient to fulfill the college’s aim, and therefore established the specialization phase for students to follow up with a more complex study of one of the Shariah’s specializations. The course of study in the specialization phase is one year, and students must obtain at least a grade of B in an academic thesis completed within one year minimum, and two years maximum with their supervisor’s request and approval.

138  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World It is worth mentioning that the conditions for acceptance to the master’s program do not only include holding a bachelor’s degree in Shariah, but also memorizing five juzs of the Noble Quran from the ten juzs which are required to be memorized in the higher education stage: from the beginning of the Quran to the end of Surat al-Tawbah, and for the student’s grade in the fourth year to be higher than 70%.8 As for those holding degrees in specializations other than law, they are accepted into the Islamic Studies program with the condition of taking a preparatory year in Islamic studies. As for degree holders in law, they are able to join the Comparative Fiqh branch after taking a preparatory year. The university describes the master’s program in Comparative Fiqh as preparing a conscious researcher and insightful scholar in the Shariah laws derived from detailed evidences from the Quran, Sunnah, consensus and qiyas (analogical reasoning), and different legal evidences: Istihsan, Istislah, an opinion of a companion, previous legal systems, the practice of the people of Madina, and Istishab. The researcher is required to have an overview of the jurisprudence of the four schools and others, which he compares between them and between the opinions of positive law scholars.9 The following courses are also taught: the Quran’s miraculous nature and prophetic rhetoric, Quranic jurisprudence, studying one of the four Imams, legal maxims (qawa’id fiqhiyya), Islamic economics and research methodologies, tafsir methodology, fiqh al-sunnah, manuscript verification, differences in the rules of jurisprudential theory, the higher aims of the Shariah, and applied studies in the books of fiqh and Usul. The fiqh course teaches selections from Qurtubi’s tafsir (d. 1273) al-Jami liAhkam al-Quran. The selections of text deal with Qurtubi’s jurisprudential inferences from some of the verses of Surat al-Baqarah. As for the course of studying one of the four imams, it looks at Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii’s methodology in Usul al-Fiqh, specifically (1) his biography and the dominant intellectual environment in his age; (2) his intellectual contributions and sources that he drew upon in his sciences; (3) his Usul in fiqh and the particular laws he built upon those foundations; and (4) the influences on Imam al-Shafii’s works. The book used to teach the imam’s methodology is al-Shaykh Muhammad Abu Zahra’s Shafi’i: His Life, Age, Views and His Fiqh. The book aims to give a traditional view of the Imam al-Shafi’i and focuses on explaining his view in Usul, not on how he developed in a spacetime context. As such, Abu Zahra is static in his approach to Shafii, and does not subject him to history or conditions. He displays him as if he was the sole scholar who faced the challenges of his time and tried to determine Islam’s nature according to what Allah and his Messenger wanted against the emerging groups at the time, such as the Mutazila. He also paints him as the figure who gave precedence to text over reason in his jurisprudential views. This can be explained by Abu Zahra’s tendency towards the traditional Azhari school. In the Usul al-Fiqh course, Ghazali’s al-Mustasfa is studied, and it is a book that is usually categorized as being a theologians’ (mutakallimin) book. In it, Ghazali tried to draw up the borders of reason, revelation and moral obligation, and as such

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  139 engages with the concept of al-Istihsan which aims to extend analogy, and which he does not consider as an independent source of law. Ghazali views maslaha as not used except in the case of making a preference between two jurisprudential views of equal evidence. He states that any saying which exits the borders drawn up in al-Mustasfa should be interpreted as delusions. Students are asked to read a specific section of this book, which is “The Fourth Pole: On the Ruling of the Mujtahid,” the concluding section of the book, which are practical projections of the book’s theories. The course in “Legal Maxims” (Qawa’id Fiqhiyya) uses Imam Suyuti’s alAshab wa al-Nadha’ir, which is the relied-upon text for the rulings of the Shafii school. Suyuti views Islamic legal maxims as resulting from induction from Shariah laws, and as not explicitly stated in the Quran and Sunnah, even if they were sometimes indicated. As for the applications of these maxims, they rely on the ‘illal (effective causes) of the laws: if laws share the same effective cause, then they share the same ruling, and if they differ in their effective cause, then the ruling also differs. As such, the maxims are not a source in themselves, but rather a part of a complex production of Shariah rulings. It deals with the traditional differences in jurisprudential issues, as it connects between texts and deduces laws from these texts. One example of these differences is the widespread difference between the real meaning of texts and the metaphorical meanings in interpreting ayat al-ahkam, Quranic verses which state a ruling. As usual, discussion is limited to jurisprudential issues to rulings without looking into the causes and higher aims upon which those laws were built. As for the course in Maqasid al-Shariah, students study the book Maqasidi Ijtihad: Its Evidences—Controlling Factors (dawabit)—Fields by the contemporary scholar Nur al-Din Bin Mukhtar al-Khadimi (1999). The book deals with defining the Maqasid al-Shariah, the relation between the higher aims and texts, and the topics (mawduat) of the higher aims. It also deals with more particular fiqh applications such as the relationship between the higher aims and Shariah proofs, rulings’ effective causes, the types of maqasid and their conditions and limitations, and the higher aims’ application in fiqh. al-Khadimi views the science of maqasid as a double-edged sword which could be used to safeguard the Shariah in the face of the space-time changes on the one hand, or could be used to empty the Shariah of its original meanings and laws on the other hand. However, he shows full conviction that it represents Islam’s moderation. The book presents discussions of classical scholars in maqasid in an easy and contemporary style for students in Shariah colleges. Even though alKhadimi does not conflict with what Ghazali and Shatibi and others have said, he also does not aim to widen the scope of the Maqasid al-Shariah’s use. When he looks at the maqasids’ use as the ‘illal of rulings, for example, he argues that maslaha could be the effective cause of a ruling if the Shariah stipulated that in the Quran, as such, clearly equating between the maqasid and effective causes of rulings. As for the course in Islamic economics, it uses Salih Hamid al-Ali’s Factors of Production in Islamic Economics and Contemporary Economic Systems: A Comparative Study (2000). The book argues that Islamic economics has three aims: achieving economic growth, achieving human happiness, and lessening the severity of disparity in wealth distribution through positive and negative

140  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World measures (zakat and paying for broken vows). The book begins by focusing on the normative aspects, such as theorizing how to fulfill needs to reach well-being, instead of answering instinctual desires, replacing riba with murabaha, emphasizing harmony rather than optimization and so on. As such, it presents empirical studies on the analysis of economic behavior, even if relatively little compared to the copious amounts of normative studies. The evaluation I did here is based on the size of knowledge production, and not whether it can achieve a knowledge breakthrough. This literature in general adopts a neoliberal paradigm, influenced by the situation in the Arab Gulf, and is not interested much in social justice and fair wealth (re)distribution. Salih al-Ali focused on fighting monopoly as much as fighting usury, though he does not mention anything on whether state monopolization of some interests to safeguard public interest would be contrary to Islamic teaching. In the introduction to this book, the author argues that the Islamic economy possesses six principles: Islamic economy is framed by universals and particulars; its framing is constant through place and time; it is universal for all humanity and not only Muslims; its initial source surpasses the capability of humans, as it is a revelation from Allah; the ijtihad it does contain is limited to issues and branches and not the foundations and universals; and its laws are precise, certain and comprehensive. One may notice a very positivistic language in the last principle, in addition to granting the myth of uniqueness: “Production in the Islamic economy differs from that of the other economic schools, as the means of producing and distributing the commodity, because the processes of production must be within the framework of the Islamic Shariah (al-Ali 2000, 101). It is worth pointing out that this book is full of jurisprudential and positivist references, all of which are old (from the seventies and eighties) and in Arabic. For the course on tafsir methodology, the colleges use Muhammad Huseyn alDhahabi’s al-Tafsir wa al-Mufasirun (Quranic Exegesis and Quranic Exegetes). The book presents the linguistic definition of tafsir, and then the history of tafsir beginning from the Prophet (PBUH), then the companions, and then the tab’ieen (students of the companions). It then presents the most important books of tafsir and their types in terms of tafsir through athar (historical texts) and al-ray (opinion). The book then presents the differences between Islamic sects in their tafsir methodology, responding fundamentally to the Mu’tazila. The author then devotes two chapters to detail the tafsir methodologies of al-Qadi Abdul-Jabbar and alZarmakhshy, two of the most famous Mu’tazila exegetes and the problems in their exegesis. As for the Master’s Program in Contemporary Islamic Thought, the university describes it as giving an opportunity to view Muslims’ efforts in different Islamic sciences, and follow contemporary Islamic thought. This program prepares the student to become a good researcher in the Islamic sciences, and able to confront difficult issues with insight as to what is beneficial for society.10

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  141 All of the preparatory content follows the traditional Ashari paradigm and is rooted in the classical Islamic heritage, with the exception of the “Introduction to the Social Sciences” class, which relies on Western academics. Students in the “Islamic Creed and Comparative Religions” course study the Ashari creed and its positions towards its opponents such as the Mu’tazila, in what could be considered as a summary of the text al-Aqeeda al-Tahawiyya. As for the “Legal Maxims” course, it focuses on the aforementioned al-Ashbah wa al-Nadha’ir book. As for the tafsir course, in which one would expect for it to deal with the meanings of verses, it is also limited to drawing out rulings from verses and does not teach tafsir methodologies. Tafsir in this class relies on ta’wil (metaphorical interpretation) and linguistic exegesis without looking at the social reality of the rulings derived from the Quranic text. It is noticeable that the Islamic heritage in these courses is presented as a frozen heritage of limited meanings and relies on jurisprudential issues as what frames this heritage. This view is the basis of relying on textual approaches to reality instead of sociological approaches that allow for an interpretation of reality. It is well-known that the validity of a fatwa is firmly connected with understanding the text on the one hand and fulfilling objectives on the other hand. Fulfilling objectives requires one to realize reality as it is, which is one of the conditions of ijtihad that is lacking in the curricula of Shariah colleges. The “Introduction to the Social Sciences” course uses Tawfiq al-Awji’s book Introduction to Studying the Social Sciences, in which he divides between Western systems, such as socialism and capitalism, and Islamic ones. He then says that economy is an attempt to solve the problem of limited resources. al-Awji criticizes socialism as not motivating individuals to work and as lacking the necessary management tools to distribute resources in a just manner. In another paragraph, al-Awji describes the problem of resources as a secular problem, pointing out: Despite their severe differences in most principles and foundations, the positivist schools completely agree on the issue of connecting the economy to the material and limiting it to that, and as such, separating economy from religion, ethics and human values. This made failure an inevitable result of the systems built on the foundations of those schools. It made oppression, poverty, misery and loss the destiny of the peoples who were afflicted with the application of any of them, and marked international relations with trials, wars, and plundering people’s wealth in a manner not seen before in history. (p. 56) Building on this, al-Awji views the problem as not only in the management of resources, but transcending that to Western epistemology and ethics, which are met by the Islamic system, which he defines as “a set of general economic principles which we derive from the Quran and Sunnah, and the economic foundations which we build on the basis of those principles according to every space and time.”

142  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World al-Awji also views the problem of Western thought as pivoting around the issue of power and distributing it in society, whereas Islamic thought pivots around the issue of truth and distributing it in society, a radical difference between the two philosophies. He describes this difference, arguing: Materialist thought and its principles on which the systems of colonialism and socialism were formed goes back to ancient Rome, Greece and Egypt, that is the “Pharaonic culture.” If we deeply study the history of human civilizations, we will see that the essential difference between civilizations which held the truth and the civilizations which held power, returns to the concept of truth they held: 1: those who considered truth as above power, i.e. the system of truth applies to all to apply and does not change with the changing of interests. 2: those who considered power above the truth, i.e. the system of truth is arbitrary decided by authority according to what it sees as appropriate to its interest and measures it according to that. The research methodologies course is built on the notes of Dr. Ali al-Tawil, and discusses the subjects of induction and deduction, documentation and means of proving, means of research and dealing with changing elements. He limits the course to how to write research papers, and does not give any information on the methodologies of understanding social phenomena. In the Master’s Program in Islamic Studies, the following courses are taught: “Islamic Economy,” “Studying One of the Imams,” “Tafsir Methodology,” “Legal Maxims,” “The Quran’s Linguistic Miraculousness and the Prophetic Eloquence,” “Research Methodologies,” “Jurisprudence of Companies,” “Arabic Language,” “History of the Sunnah,” “Maqasid al-Shariah,” “Manuscript Verification” and “alJarh wa al-Tadil” (Evaluating Reliability of Hadith Transmitters). The Islamic studies program is considered a general introduction to the Islamic sciences without any specialization in it, as it appears from the general nature of the courses taught. The program shares the same courses as the other programs except for al-Jarh wa al-Ta’dil, the history of Sunnah, and the jurisprudence of companies. The course on the history of the Sunnah relies on Shaykh Muhammad Abu Zahra’s al-Hadith wa al-Muhadithun, which studies the history of gathering hadith and developing the concept of Prophetic Sunnah. However, this book relies on a traditional approach in viewing the Prophetic Sunnah. The course deals with five periods of time including the period of the righteous Caliphs, the second hijri century, the fourth hijri century, and between the fourth century to the year 656 AH, and between 656 AH to the writing of the book. Abu Zahra relies in his book on a small number of scholars trusted by the Islamic traditionalist institute, and explains contemporary scholars’ ability to draw benefits from the texts of Sunnah without viewing the problems that many contemporary intellectuals propose in the issue of the historicity of the Sunnah and the accuracy of its transmission.

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  143 Doctoral Program

The Islamic University of Beirut argues that someone who produces society’s reform and strengthens its crooked points cannot suffice with a degree of specialization (master’s), because even if s/he gains experience and mastery in religion, s/he still remains in need of more research and studying. Therefore, he must continue his studies to obtain the doctorate level.11 There are not new courses that are given to doctoral students in the Islamic University of Beirut, except that the condition of admission to the program is finishing a master’s program in Comparative Fiqh, Islamic Studies, or Usul al-Fiqh. Graduates from the Contemporary Islamic Thought Program are not allowed to commence the doctorate until taking courses from one of the three other programs and finishing the doctorate in this same program. Students prepare their doctoral thesis within three years. Master’s and Doctoral Theses

The master’s and doctoral theses in the Islamic University of Beirut show a range of topics between those that are purely academic and related to interpreting texts or historical study, and those that aim to interact with social reality in its diverse topics (education, sociological, political, economic, etc.) Nonetheless, most theses are limited to the past, whether in terms of manuscript verification and comparing texts on the one hand, or whether in terms of covering history and past phenomena that have come and gone on the other hand.12 This type of study has utmost importance in the fields of historical and theoretical Islamic studies. Nonetheless, most of them manifest the quality of researchers that Shariah colleges produce, and the fields that need development, building on the courses of research methodology that we described above. Some examples of this are Sabri Ghariri’s thesis “Islamophobia in Western Media” (2016). The author relies on the works of Edward Said and others who wrote on Orientalism and covers Danish, British and American media. Despite being selective in the media he chose to deal with, the thesis does not produce any new knowledge and is confined to reading media through the lens of Orientalism, without making any contribution to the theory of Orientalism, nor any means to correct media production. Some other examples are Muhammad Abdulhadi Fa’our’s thesis “al-Maslaha al-Mursala,” which aims to critique the contemporary treatment of the concept of maslaha by covering the textual and jurisprudential sources of this concept. Fa’our doubts the contemporary treatment of maslaha. After this thesis, Fa’our wrote a book titled al-Maqasid inda al-Imam al-Shatibi (al-Imam al-Shatibi’s view of the Maqasid), in which he defended the classical conceptualization of maqasid and critiqued the reinterpretation which some researchers have proposed of Shatibi and Ghazali’s formulation. Fa’our’s presentation can be considered a new contribution

144  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World to the literature, although he dwells on a textual analysis of maqasid. However, there are important areas where the maqasidi paradigm is applied in his book alDawla al-Islamiyya bayn al-Thawabit wa al-Tagheer (The Islamic State between Change and Unchanging Elements) (2017), where he made it clear that the Quran and Sunnah did not define a particular system, but rather general frameworks and larger ethical rules like shura (consultation) and justice. Another example is Uthman Bakhash’s master’s thesis “The Concept of the Modern State from an Islamic Perspective,” where he overlooks most of the contemporary researchers on the modern state, such as Wael Hallaq, John Rawls and Charles Taylor, and instead focuses on Locke, Rousseau and Hobbes. This is a clear example of the problem of segmenting ideas from later developments. While Bakhash’s thesis earned the grade of A, he points out a difference between the professors during the discussion around the concept of Caliphate, as Dr. Bassam al-Sabbagh argued for the possibility of replacing the word “Caliphate State” with “the Caliphate Project” to indicate the continuation of this project to present times without limiting it to a past age. Most of the theses follow a textual research approach, using academic definitions to theoretically discuss social phenomena, such as suicide, the effects of television and so on without using field research, such as conducting surveys or indepth interviews with the groups being studied. As such, the studies lack empirical data which could confirm the theoretical discussion on the one hand, and lack data which would permit the development of a simple theory to match a complex reality. There is in fact reification of homo islamicus (i.e., a man living in an Islamic majority country or Islamic culture). As such, the analysis cannot possibly understand the impact of social class, urban setting or religiosity upon homo islamicus. For instance, in his thesis “Preparing Power to Confront the Ummah’s Enemies in Light of the Quran and Sunnah,” Muhsin Qowaider tries to build a military theory on the basis of the noble verse “Prepare against them what you can of power and cavalry, through which you deter Allah’s enemies and your enemies and other enemies unknown to you but known to Allah” (al-Anfal: 60). While the author works to support the theoretical side by examining the verse and its meanings, he does not submit this work to its consequences in the real world in light of the presence of nuclear weapons, humanitarian and military interventions, and preventative wars and so on (Qowaider 2015). Most of the master’s and doctoral theses lack any Western or non-Muslim sources, and as such the authors mostly see themselves as writing in a purely Islamic space, which leaves them open to many problems which include discussing topics which have been recently disproven, and reinventing the wheel, wasting spent effort on solutions already present. It also prevents students from gaining the required depth in understanding the research topic through not reading works previously written on the topic. This produces another problem, which is that the theoretical paradigm of much of the previous research itself depends on later research. As such, the presence of theoretical data not subjected to field research makes the problems worsen with time and makes the methodology even more separate from reality. Qowaider’s thesis also lacked any coverage of preparing for war from

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  145 Western sources as well, even though it establishes a universal theory which should be subjected to the context of other theories present in the field of military studies (Qowaider 2015). The research problems also include creating a sharp dichotomy between the Western paradigm and the Islamic paradigm from the onset. As such, it most likely pre-establishes a type of attack on the Western paradigm while theorizing the Islamic system’s precedence and superiority before actually conducting research. In addition, the method of confirming the hypothesis does not resort to statistics or field studies, but rather only brings discussion from Islamic sources. As such, one can find statements about how much Muslims are oppressed in international relations, for example, and Islam’s tolerance in comparison with the West’s brutality, and the Islamic intellectual precedence in human rights and international law and how the Church has oppressed science, and related judgments which aim more towards justificatory apologetics than sober knowledge production. This also gives Islamic knowledge an aura of sacredness which prevents dealing with it as scientific content. Hanan Burghli’s thesis “Islam between Universalism and Globalism” displays this problem, as it tries to compare Islam’s characteristic (universalism) and the characteristic of American hegemony (globalism), which Burghli attributes to the Zionist lobbies without providing any real proof. The thesis repeats Islamist metanarratives which completely reject globalism and consider it a great danger to Islam, all of which is done with any statistics or study of Lebanese Islamic reality. The absence of mentioning any Western sources that theorize the issue of globalization or its view of Islam is also noticeable, which harms the thesis’ methodology and objectivity (Burghali 2011). Here is the essential problem, the weak scientific quality of knowledge production in the case of most of the theses, as they try to repeat knowledge present in books in a manner that defends Islam or its reputation with an absence of original or creative thought. As such, instead of the thesis contributing to academic literature, it becomes a passage for graduation without actually producing a professional researcher who can enter the world of academic research smoothly or comfortably. In Sami Mazhar’s thesis “Human Rights in Light of the War on Terror,” the researcher presents international legal documents and some jurisprudential documents and how both conceptualize terrorism, while mentioning the difference between the application of human rights in the Western world and only mentioning Islamic theories to present Islam’s superiority and advantage over Western theories. This is naturally done without any mention of the Islamic history of applying these jurisprudential rules in a careful manner (Mazhar 2017). Finally, the general weak conclusions should be noted, as they are mostly focused summaries that rarely widen the results and extrapolate them to anything transcending the direct reading of these results of the research. The study can summarize some recommendations and advice that are practical and capable of execution, to benefit from them within the practical and abstract domains of knowledge. The recommendations could turn to proposing new studies and areas of research, which were shown to be in need throughout the course of research. Noticeably, the conclusions of the master’s theses rarely contained practical recommendations, and

146  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World as such, where the thesis criticizes reality and displays the problems, the author leaves the reader confused as how to deal with the phenomenon. One example of this is Khadija Abdullah Shihab’s thesis “The Islamic Educational Method of Building Scientific Personalities,” which criticizes the methodology of ulema formation, and the separation of theoretical education from practical reality. She argues that the worsening of this problem is due to the frozen Islamic educational institutes, and that new educational curricula must be produced. However, the problem is that the thesis stops here, and does not work to establish any recommendations through which the thesis could be converted into a plan to change curricula. It also lacks any mention of Western sources, even those which interacted with changing educational curricula, such as Paulo Freire (Shihab 2014). Conclusion After a detailed display of the program of the Islamic University of Beirut, I will in the following table (Table 4.2) give a general picture of the curricula of other Shariah colleges in addition to the Islamic University of Beirut. Narrow-Minded and Outdated Curricula

Like in many Arabic and Islamic countries, the curricula in Lebanon is combining Ashari/Azhari and Salafi curricula, with the first playing the larger role in orienting knowledge on the formal and informal levels. This intellectual orientation is affected by the nature of classical texts and how the beliefs and ideas they entail could lead to non-compatibility with contemporary realties. This situation encourages many to call for a fiqh that deals with this reality as a basis in its methodology (Brown 2004). This difference is manifested in the terms which the curricula depend on, as some depend on the concepts of citizenship and public interest, whereas others deal with the classical literature of Nawawi, Abi Shuja and their contemporaries. The greater problem in these paradigms is their dependence on self-referential concepts and terms, thereby producing closed knowledge and making their interaction with other paradigms difficult. This is not just limited to Ashari/Azhari and Salafi paradigms but is displayed in other paradigms as well, which increases the distance between these paradigms and makes doubting the traditional paradigms in the recognized education institutes more and more frequent. It is clear that most of the prescribed textbooks in these institutes are classical books. Rarely can one find a book authored in the nineties or afterward. Many who we met in Lebanon, such as Hussam Sbat and Muhammad Amin Farsukh, who were both deans of Shariah colleges and Islamic studies, complain of the dominance of taqlid (blind imitation). They both expressed the need for reform in curricula and methods of teaching. Hussam Sbat criticized the binaries of text and ijtihad, revelation and reason, describing them as concepts that are inseparable, not antithetical (Sbat 2019).

Table 4.2 Summary of the Analysis of Curricula in Shariah Colleges

Dominant approach Usul al-fiqh

Islamic College of Da’wa

Imam al-Awzai College

University of Tripoli

Guidance and Reform Association

Traditional

Traditional

Traditional

Traditional

Traditional

At the BA level: Ilm Usul al-Fiqh by Abdalwahab Khallaf (reformist)

At the BA level: Dawabit al-Maslaha by Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti (traditionalist)

At the master’s level: al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (traditionalist)

At the BA level: Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami by Wahba al-Zuhayli (traditionalist) Introduction to Studying the Islamic Shariah by Abdal Karim Zaydan

N/A

At the BA level: Sermon-Giving Civilization Studies Islamic Economy Orientalism Islamic History Media Studies Education and Psychology Ethics Social Sciences Comparative Religions

At the BA level: Islamic History Ethics The Islamic Library Principles of Research Comparative Political Systems Geography of the Islamic World Islamic History Islamic Civilization Economic Systems

At the BA level: Ethics Comparative Religions Methods of Teaching Research Methodologies Islamic Culture Islamic History Islamic Civilization Islamic Economy

N/A

In the Comparative Fiqh Master’s: Ilm al-Maqasid alShariah by Nur al-Din al-Khadimi (reformist) Related to social At the BA level: sciences or Introduction to Law History of Jurisprudence humanities Comparative Religions Research Methodologies

(Continued )

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  147

Islamic University of Beirut

Master’s in Comparative Fiqh: Islamic Economics Research Methodologies

Master’s in Islamic Thought: Introduction to the Social Sciences Research Methodologies

Islamic College of Da’wa

Imam al-Awzai College

At the master’s level: Islamic Library Islam and the West Economic Systems Media Theories Contemporary Islamic Thought Contemporary Islamic World Development Studies Secret Movements

University of Tripoli

Guidance and Reform Association

Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World

Islamic University of Beirut

148

Table 4.2 (Continued)

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  149 The Sharp Dichotomy Between Shariah Sciences and Social Sciences

We find some of the required non-Shariah courses to be closer to the humanities (history, geography, philosophy, language, ethics) than to the social sciences. The degree of teaching these courses changes: whereas the Islamic University of Beirut does not teach any course in the social sciences, the Imam al-Awzai College teaches 12 courses in the social sciences and humanities among the 40 required courses. In contrast, the College of Da’wa in its four years teaches nine courses in the social sciences among 65 courses. However, this does not mean at all that these sciences and social sciences are interacting with and supporting sufficient critical thought to develop a fiqh al-waqi’ which uses social science methodologies, theories, and research techniques. This is a conclusion also reached by the late Abdelghani Imad (2019). Upon comparison between the Shia religious hawzas and the Sunni universities, the former’s awareness of the importance of the social sciences is noticeable, as they require introductory books and methodologies of these sciences more than the latter. It is clear that the empirical field aspect changes from one university to the next, depending on the way of approaching reality in framing jurisprudential theorization in the university. The University of Tripoli is distinguished in a practical sense by a number of courses such as the fiqh of dawa, which aids students in understanding tangible reality, and with courses that interact with maqasid and fiqh al-waqi’, which produces a dynamic scholar who can interact with society’s changing aspects, whereas the educational curricula in the Islamic University of Beirut, al-Imam al-Awzai College and the College of Da’wa lack this practical information, and stick to theoretical interaction with texts far away from reality. This makes them less dynamic, even when interacting with real-world issues such as media, politics and economy. Students here rely on a purely Islamic theorization, without viewing the tangible reality of these systems, or in a manner that lacks the standards of the objective social sciences, through textual normativity. As such, the courses of social sciences in themselves lack the comprehensive human element of fieldwork. There is a chasm between the social courses that are taught and the social research methods used in the research problems of these master’s and PhD theses. This is manifested in the jurisprudential texts which are studied in these universities, which lack empirical approaches, and depend on a traditional approach which focuses on linguistic interpretation to interact with the issues of women, citizenship and violence. None of the educational curricula depends on studying social reality to answer religious questions. As such, even with the presence of courses in the social sciences, there is a sharp dichotomy between the Shariah sciences and the social sciences. Perhaps, the most prominent topic these differences manifest in is the science of siyasa shariyya (Shariah-legitimate governance). According to Abdelghani Imad’s study in his studied sample, the ratio of the types of religious sciences is clear from the curricula used in these institutes (and not universities except Azhar Lebanon), which include Majma Nur,13 Dar al-Tarbiyya wa al-Talim al-Islamiyya, Azhar Lebanon,14 al-Amin Institute, and Imam al-Bukhari madrasa, according to the following table (Table 4.3).

150  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Table 4.3 Established Curricula in the Shariah Institutes in Lebanon al-Imam al-Bukhari SchoolAkkar Quran memorization, Quranic exegesis, Quranic recitation Hadith, Sirah, Fiqh Creed and Usul Arabic language, syntax, and literature General culture, foreign language, sciences

Dar al-Fatwa- al-Amin Affiliated Institute in Azhar Akkar Tripoli

Majma Nur in Tripoli

Islamic College, Shariah Department

20.9

20.9

24

30.7

20.9

35.8 18.5 14.8

25.8 14.5 19.5

33.5 20 16.5

21 14.8 18.5

25.8 14.8 18.5

9.8

19.3

6

15

19.8

100

100

100

100

100

It can be noticed that these programs are derived from al-Azhar’s famous curriculum, where Quranic memorization and recitation, Quranic exegesis, hadith, Sirah, and Usul al-Fiqh occupy the majority of the syllabus. Combining Between Religious and Sectarian Concepts

It is clear that most of the proliferation of religious institutes and universities is an indicator of chaos more than an indicator of religious pluralism. We noticed that only in Maqasid University are there any teachers affiliated with Christianity or the Shia sect employed to teach their creed.15 Generally, there is a mix between religious and sectarian concepts that led to reducing religion to the doctrine of only one sect, as observed by the “Fourth Conference on Islamic Education” in 1996.16 Nayla Tabbara (2016) called indeed for introducing courses that present other religions according to their own sources, and strengthening a culture of religious diversity springing from schools and education on shared values and even at the university level. Notes 1 For more details, see Haytham Mazahim, “Shia Hawzahs in Lebanon oscillate between the traditional and academic methodologies,” (in Arabic): https://cutt.us/uUM1F; Kassem (2018). 2 https://almashareq.com/ar/articles/cnmi_am/features/2018/02/14/feature-02 3 Affiliated with “al-Ahbash” Islamic charitable organization. 4 This study is based on an analysis of the content of the curricula of the four mentioned universities, as well as on several interviews with professors and students involved in Shariah and Islamic studies programs. While this chapter (and those that follow) will document all references as is typical of academic writing, it will not do that

Curricula of Shariah Programs in Lebanon  151 systematically for textbooks. This is because most of them are unpublished or partially photocopied by the students and therefore difficult to document. 5 See the critique of Muhammad Hadi al-Yusufi al-Gharwi: Encyclopedia of Islamic History, Volume One: Prophetic Era—Meccan Era (Jeddah: Majma al-Fikr al-Islami, 1996), 31–43. 6 Translator’s note: Creed in Islam is divided into three. The first two divisions, the attributes of God and the attributes of Prophets, are believed to be able to be reached purely through the use of reason. The third division, (sam’iyat), are articles of belief, such as angels and the afterlife, not due to their being necessitated by reason, but revelation. 7 The word adab in Arabic indicates both literature and etiquette, connected by a notion of being “civilized” or “refined.” 8 Translator’s note: Juz’, literally a part, is equivalent to 1/30th of the Quran. 9 www.biu.edu.lb/pages/majors/masters/requirements.php 10 www.biu.edu.lb/ 11 Islamic University of Beirut—Doctoral Registration Requirements: www.biu.edu.lb/pages/majors/doctorat/requirements.php 12 Based on a detailed study of more than 16 dissertations, which include political, social and economic topics, in addition to historical textual topics. The theses were analyzed and evaluated based on the selected topic, and based on the methodology the researcher used in establishing and framing the main idea he wanted to deliver through the thesis. 13 Majma al-Nur was established in 1988 to include a number of educational institutes, such as: al-Qism al-Shari’, Nabhani Academy for Quranic Memorizers and Reciters, the al-Nur Professional Institute, and the Institute of the Noble Quran and Islamic Studies. Likewise, in 2018 it announced a department for university studies at al-Nur University with a large celebration, in which the minister of social affairs was awarded an honorary degree. All of Majma al-Nur’s services are free (e.g., books, transportation, dormitories for students from outside of Tripoli). Its degree is equivalent to the Islamic universities in Tripoli. Its graduates in 2017 reached approximately 246 students (125 males and 88 females), whereas the number of those still conducting their studies are 700 students between the Shariah department, vocational training department, and the Nabhani Academy for Quranic Memorization and Recitation. 14 One of the institutes affiliated with the Dar al-Fatwa. Its curriculum depends on that of al-Azhar’s, and its branches are spread over Beirut, Tripoli, Sayda and Bekaa. 15 For example, Naqula Ziyada, Father George Masuh, Michel Juha, Father Anton Daw, Jafar Shams al-Din. See Farshoukh (2016). 16 www.islahonline.org/display/arabic/conference/Conference.aspx?ConferenceID=7

References In Arabic al-Ali, Salih Hamid. 2000. Elements of Production in the Islamic Economy and Contemporary Economic Systems (a Comparative Study). Damascus: al-Yamamah House. al-Khadimi, Nur al-Din ben Mukhtar. 1999. Maqasidi Ijtihad: Its Evidences – Controlling Factors (Thawabit)-Fields. Umma Series no 65. Doha: Ministry of Waqf and Islamic Affairs. Burghali, Hanan. 2011. Islam between Cosmopolitanism and Globalization. Beirut: Islamic University of Beirut. Fa’our, Muhammad Abdulhadi. 2017. The Islamic State between Change and Unchanging Elements. Beirut: Dar alFiqer. Farshoukh, Amin. 2016. “al-Makassed University of Beirut, College of Islamic Studies.” In Islamic Studies Facing the Challenge of Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World, 31–43. Beirut: al-Farabi/Institute for Citizenship and Diversity Management.

152  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Imad, Abdelghani. 2012. “Religious Education in Lebanon: Problems and Limitations.” http://bit.ly/3TYb5lR. ———. 2019. Guardians of Religion in a Diverse Society: Religious Education and the Teaching of Shariah in Lebanon. Beirut: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Mazhar, Sami. 2017. “Human Rights in Light of the War on Terror.” Ph D. thesis. Islamic University of Lebanon. Qowaider, Mohsen. 2015. Preparing Force to Confront the Enemies of the Ummah in the Light of the Quran and Sunnah. Beirut: Beirut Islamic University. Sbat, Hussam Mohammed Saad. 2019. “Islamic Studies: The Imperative of Renewal.” In Towards a Reconstruction of Islamic Studies, edited by Radwan al-Sayyid, Sari Hanafi, and Bilal Orfali, 347–72. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers. (in Arabic) Shihab, Khadija. 2014. The Islamic Educational Approach in Building an Intellectual Personality. Beirut: Beirut Islamic University. Tabbara, Nayla. 2016. “Forward.” In Islamic Studies Facing the Challenge of Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World, edited by Nayla Tabbara, 9–14. Beirut: al-Farabi/ Institute for Citizenship and Diversity Management. In Other Languages Brown, Johnston. 2004. “A Turn in the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Twentieth Century Usūl al-Fiqh.” Islamic Law and Society (11): 233–82. Hallaq, Wael B. 2001. Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. Kassem, Ali. 2018. “The Modernization of the Hawza? Lebanon as a Case Study.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 11 (4): 83–110.

5 Shariah Education in Jordan Traditionalism in a Complicated Religious Field

The topic of religious education in Jordan is a heated subject. Not a month passes without there being an article in Jordanian newspapers on religious education. Dhoqan Ubaidat’s study, which analyzed the used curriculum and books and described them as being “Daeshi” (related to ISIS), is but one example in a long series.1 Like in the rest of the case analysis chapters, I relied on fieldwork and analysis I conducted with the assistance of Mohammad Eisa Alsheraifin, professor of Shariah in Al al-Bayt University, and the researcher Khalid Bashir.2 This chapter aims to analyze the content of the curricula of Shariah colleges and Islamic Studies in Jordan. First, I will introduce the curricula of Shariah and Islamic Studies programs, and focus on the presence or absence of the social sciences in these curricula in four government universities: the University of Jordan, Yarmouk University, the University of Islamic Sciences, and the University of Al al-Bayt. Second, I will discuss the knowledge production and master’s and doctoral dissertations produced in some of the Shariah departments in Jordanian universities. Even if I  focus here on universities, it should not be forgotten that there are numerous Shariah institutes connected to political and intellectual orientations. It is beneficial here to differentiate how Sufism has moved from the zawiya to outside it, as they have also established education institutes, the most important of which, according to Muhammad Abu Rumman (2020), is the Mahad al-Ma’rij lil-Ulum alShariyya, which was opened in 2007 and has since then established many branches and diverse institutes. This was followed by the establishment of institutes focusing on Shariah and jurisprudential education, which attract teachers from Shariah colleges, especially from the University of Islamic Sciences, such as Amjad Rashid, the dean of the Shafii Fiqh College, who established the Ma’had Madarik al-Ilm for Training and Consultations; Salah Abu al-Haj, the dean of the Hanafi Fiqh College, who established the Anwar al-Ulema’ Center; and the Dar al-Awabin Association established by Abdalqadir al-Harithi. The system in this institute is a two-year curriculum, as students must continue lessons for two complete years in gradation, which is named the “necessary sciences,” that is, those sciences in religion that must be known by every Muslim. DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-8

154  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Shariah Education and Curriculum As mentioned in the introduction, the study sample consists of four public universities: University of Jordan, Yarmouk University, University of Islamic Sciences, and the University of Al al-Bayt, and I will discuss the nature of teaching and social science elements in their curricula. University of Jordan

The history of the establishment of the College of Shariah in the University of Jordan goes back to 1964, when it was founded as an independent college outside of the university campus. At the time, it was the first college to specialize in teaching Shariah in Jordan. In 1971, the college moved inside the university campus, becoming the fourth college in the University of Jordan since its establishment in 1962. The college was established due to the increasing need to prepare qualified professionals, whether in the teaching sector to cover the rising need for teachers of Islamic education in schools, or qualified imams for the Ministry of Endowments (established in 1964). These aims are the same aims upon which the other, later Shariah colleges would be founded. As such, the colleges were connected to the available job market and fulfilling its needs, something which was necessarily reflected in their content and teaching. This was agreed upon by a number of students that we met who had studied in the college. Yet, they pointed out the absence of opportunities to devote time to conducting research. This explains the absence of specialized Islamic studies centers at the level of the whole country. Here, one can mention the Islamic Cultural Center in the University of Jordan,3 which is limited to preparing Quranic studies, such as courses in the rules of Quranic recitation. Shaykh Abdalaziz al-Khayyat was charged with establishing the college inside the university in 1971, and remained dean until 1976. al-Khayyat also held the position of minister of endowments from 1973 to 1976, before he took up the ministerial position a second time from 1986 to 1989. al-Shaykh al-Khayyat was interested in the area of da’wah and raising awareness, and established the Center for Training Preachers while he was the minister of endowments. Professor Ibrahim Zayd al-Kilani then assumed the position of dean of the College in 1976, and was at the time a member of the Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami (the Front for Islamic Work). He became famous for presenting religious programs on Jordanian radio and television through the period from 1959 until 1974. He is also one of the formulators of the curricula used in Islamic education in Jordan and the Sultanate of Oman, and a member of councils for fatwas, preachers, general guidance, and endowments and held the position of dean of the college until 1978. The orientations of these two deans and their interests in da’wah were reflected in the college since its establishment. If you view the college’s introduction today, you can find that it carries this nature: The primary higher aim of the Shariah college is to call to Allah the most High, and serve the Islamic religion according to an upright methodology to

Shariah Education in Jordan  155 build the ground, and achieve the aim for which Allah, the Most Glorious and Most High, created creation, that is, pure worship to the Almighty. The da’wah nature is also manifested at the level of the events held in the college, whether in the case of the events organized by the college, many of which lean in the direction of social issues, such as issues related to love, marriage, family and gender, with the aim being to encourage students to confine themselves to the religious rulings in these issues, or at the level of the events which the students groups themselves take the initiative of organizing, such as the event on the occasion of the international day for the Shariah College in 2016, titled “Atheism: A Fashion or Belief,” which aimed to respond to the growing trend within student and youth circles who holds “doubts” on the creedal foundations of Islam. Some examples of these events also are the event organized in 2014 demanding for students to dress modestly and distributing “Islamic” clothes to the female students. There are naturally many students who support this sort of daw’ah work, with many of them expecting their colleagues to become religious. The abundant results of the study pointed to most of the Shariah College students’ listing a group of students in the college who do not sufficiently adhere to the Shariah as one of the biggest problems they face (al-Jallad and al-Zubi 2004). In an interview with a professor in the social sciences in this university, he argued that the College of Sharia’s aims, in its da’wah and raising consciousness nature, conflict with academic requirements and the academic orientation of knowledge production and methodological research, the first aim of which is academic quality. That is despite the college announcing on its website that a part of its mission was to “provide an academic environment motivating learning, teaching, and academic research, and inspire thinking about issues related to the Islamic religion.” We asked a group of both current students and alumni of the college, and some mentioned how glad they were to get involved in the college and how much they had learned from the studied courses, whereas others confirmed the lack of providing an environment congruent to the college’s aims. These are some of the most important answers in the interviews can be summarized in seven points. • The teachers only transmit traditional knowledge and sciences: Students interpreted this as being due to the teachers’ fear of confronting society in the case of proposing something new, and “caution towards social acceptance and symbolic capital” as one of the female students saw it. This mentality is reflected in the climate and methods of teaching, which transmit knowledge without any motivation to research, differ and make independent judgments (ijtihad). • Promoting fear and warning against thinking: Another student mentioned that one of the teachers in the college would warn against attempts at thinking, and to avoid anything that has “philosophizing” in it. The students agreed that this was a general situation with only a few rare exceptions. • Dealing with opposing beliefs through takfir: This problem also manifests the da’wah nature distant from an academic style on another level, which is how to deal with other beliefs and religions. A number of students confirmed

156  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World

•

•

•

•

occurrences of quarrels between students and some of the teachers due to differences between them in creedal affiliation, especially in the case of one of them being Salafi and the other Ashari. One of the female students mentioned that one of the teachers in the Creed course was Salafi and would enforce on the students readings and sources that agreed with his creed, and would prohibit them from approaching any other sources. Slandering other religions: one of the students mentioned that the teacher of the “Sects and Religions” course would always curse and slander Christianity and Judaism, far from presenting any objective study or analysis of their beliefs. He gave the example of the teacher Amjad Qourshah who became famous for “making fun of other religions and beliefs,” as seen in a video clip that spread widely throughout Jordanian social media. There were court cases raised against him to try him for the charge of contempt of religions. Qourshah is a teacher in Comparative Religions in Faculty of Shariah in the University of Jordan, and his lectures witness a wide acceptance and attendance from students inside and outside the faculty, as they view him as a sheikh and da’i and not just a university professor. A mindset of “dispelling doubts” with every opposing proposal: In the students’ speech, the phrase “dispelling doubts” is repeatedly used while talking about the teachers’ styles, while being exposed to any contrary proposal. This latter is swiftly labeled as an orientalist or secularist proposal. One of the female students expressed that, saying it was “to the point that the phrase dispelling doubts becomes disgusting.” This phrase expresses the extent of distance from academic treatment of opposing theses, which it does not study or analyze, or research its formation and indicators, but immediately orients to responding to a “doubt,” like the style of the mutakallimin and theologians of old. Weak teaching of research methodologies courses: Some of the students mentioned the absence of their learning the principles of academic research in the faculty, which returns in the first place to the absence of a course with this name, as shown in the curriculum plans. Refusing attempts at reform: One of the students mentioned a model to one of the teachers of Shariah in which he leaned toward adopting reformist approaches and attempts, and tried to propose a comprehensive course on “ethics” combining philosophy and psychology with religious teaching. The reaction was restriction and conspiring against him to the point that he left the faculty entirely.

The University of Al al-Bayt

The College of Shariah in Al al-Bayt University was established at the same time as the university in 1994, which carried the name of “Al al-Bayt,” referring to the Jordanian royal family, sparked debate that continues due to its connotations that intersect with the regional political climate. The beginning of the university’s establishment goes back to 1992 when a royal decree was made to form “The Al al-Bayt Private Royal Committee” headed by Prince Hasan, the crown prince at the time.

Shariah Education in Jordan  157 The college was established with a high vision and ambition, and its name in the beginning was “College of Jurisprudential and Legal Studies.” The college’s vision stipulates the following: The College of Shariah in the University of Al al-Bayt was established with modern academic and intellectual goals that combine modernity and tradition, with the aim of achieving the standards of academic quality and accreditation in Shariah education, knowledge training, and academic research. The College looks forward to being a pioneer in the Islamic sciences on the local, Arab, regional and international levels, and a unique Shariah intellectual center with competitive global presence and a distinguished social participation, and a source to radiate Islamic civilization. As such, we find the focus here on “modernity” and “tradition” in addition to “globalism.” It clarifies the first aim intended by “modernity” as “preparing sharia qualifications of high intellectual and academic training, able to deal with the issues and challenges of this era with a solid intellectual paradigm based on moderation.” Here we find once more focus on the values of “moderation,” which are increasingly stressed in the context of the rise of extremism on the basis that Shariah colleges and universities are the tools to drive the process to confront and counter extremism. This is further clarified by the second aim: “Spreading Islam’s original culture, and tolerant teachings by installing the concepts of moderation and tolerance.” When it comes to the fifth aim, it points to a reformist trend through confirming “the understanding of Islam’s laws, maqasid and spirit a studied intellectual understanding and providing knowledge formation that prepares the instructor to uncover the civilization, thought and creed of Islam’s values.” These values are once more confirmed in the university’s aims, such as “Building a comprehensive Islamic personality conscious of the spirit of the age and nature of relationship between reason and action on the one hand, and faith and creed and values on the other hand.” This demonstrates a confirmation of a reformist trend and also manifests the principle of “faith and knowledge,” which the Church in the United States developed in the second half of the twentieth century, and once more confirms the confrontation with extremism, “Displaying the true image of Islam, springing from its being a way of life and model to be acted upon in light of moderation, far away from fanaticism and extremism.” Human Sciences in the Study Plans of Shariah Colleges The studied universities rely on a study plan for the bachelor’s level of 132 study hours. Table 5.1 makes it clear that there are no mandatory social science courses in the University of Jordan,4 whereas the University of Islamic Sciences5 and the University of Al al-Bayt6 do not exceed two courses, and Yarmouk University is concerned enough to give students five courses.7

158  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Table 5.1 Distribution of Study Hours Between the Shariah Sciences and Social Sciences University

Date of Establishment

Number of Study Number of Hours Number of Hours Hours of Mandatory of Electoral Social Sciences Social Sciences

University of Jordan Yarmouk University University of Islamic Sciences University of Al al-Bayt

1964

132

0

3

1990

132

15

15

2008

132

6

6

1994

132

6

6

Syllabi and Course Content Most of the courses taught in the Shariah colleges are fundamentally centered around the Prophetic Biography, Hadith, Quranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Creed and Comparative Religions. Some are introductions to these sciences and some are specialized and advanced courses. The science of hadith, for instance, can be found in the Usul al-Fiqh departments, with taught courses titled “Introduction to Hadith,” whereas others are advanced such as “Takhrij al-Hadith” (Verification of Hadith Chains), “Analytical Hadith,” and “Ilm al-Jarh wa al-Tadil” (Verification of Hadith Narrators). As for Creed, it is presented within the traditional framework and does not transcend presenting the beliefs of the classical sects and great religions (Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism). The course in Comparative Religion is dominated by a motivation to immunize students against the beliefs of other religions. The “Sects and Beliefs” course is dominated by an engagement with theological issues and debates which were dominant among sects classically, such as the issues of Allah’s names and attributes. Meanwhile, the course “Contemporary Intellectual Trends and Schools,” which follows the course in Creed, engages with modern intellectual orientations and schools (e.g., Marxism, Freudianism, nationalism) given their status as ideologies that have beliefs which must be responded to. As for the course in jurisprudence, it is limited to the usual issues and topics, such as that of the jurisprudence of purity, prayer, zakat and hajj, with an attempt to propose some chapters with the name “Contemporary Jurisprudential Issues” within a framework of dealing with “nawazil” (unprecedented issues) and new issues to which a Shariah rule must be placed and rooted. Here we find issues such as making ihram on an airplane or insurance. Rarely, do students study a methodology of Maqasid al-Shariah. As for Sirah, it is limited to the two topics of the Prophetic biography and the biography of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and is overwhelmed by a nature of repelling doubts and safeguarding a pristine narrative of the first Islamic era.

Shariah Education in Jordan  159 In what follows, we will take a glance at the descriptions of some of the courses according to the study plans used and available on the university’s websites. “Islamic Culture” in the Faculty of Shariah in the University of Jordan

Description: This course discusses the rooting of the concept of culture and problems of this term, the concept of Islamic culture and its place in global cultures, as it also discusses the sources of Islamic culture and its achievements and attributes. It also discusses the fields of Islamic culture: faith, worship, practical, behavioral, ethical, knowledge and da’wa, as well as the culture clash and cultural challenges and cultural invasion: its manifestations, means and confrontations, and the reality of Islamic culture in Muslims’ lives today, and the future of culture in light of contemporary globalization. We can note here the term “cultural invasion,” to which a part of the course is devoted, as it lists confronting it as one of its aims. As such, the logic of defense and confrontation dominates study and research. This course is not only taught to Shariah students but is also one of the university’s requirements for graduation for all students. Many of the students viewed it as a good course, according to a survey of students in Yarmouk University (al-Hiyari 1997). “Contemporary Intellectual Schools” in the Faculty of Shariah in the University of Jordan

Description: This course aims to introduce students to the most prominent contemporary intellectual trends which entered our countries and Islam’s position on these trends in order to immunize students and enable them to confront these incoming ideas. The most important of the course contents are: Studying the history, dangers and means of intellectual invasion, and then studying the most prominent of these intellectual orientations: the secular orientation (secular nationalist), materialist atheism (communism and Marxism), Chaotic/Relativism (existentialist and hippieism) and the pornographic trend (Freudianism and relativism), and materialist utilitarian (pragmatism), and globalism, and explaining the effect of these incoming trends on contemporary Islamic thought. [emphasis added] Here we can also notice the use of intellectual invasion, as well as describing materialism as atheistic, and Freudianism as “pornographic,” as well as being posed in Manichean terms.

160  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World “International Relations in Islam” in the Department of Fiqh and Its Usul in the University of Jordan

Description: This course is a mandatory course in the department, and discusses the image of political society from ancient times to the age of international organizations, the schools of understanding international relations, and motivations of conflict, and jurisprudential schools in dealing with the idea of nations’ sovereignty and the division of the world to Dar Islam and Dar al-Da’wa rather than Dar Islam and Dar Harb, who it is haram to fight, the ruling of civilians, the effect of wars, retreat and its conditions, domination, and covenants in Islam: its types and effects. Here the attempt at reform through replacing the concept of “Dar al-Harb” with “Dar al-Da’wa” is noticeable, with the motivation of avoiding suspicions of terrorism and violence. This is a halfway reform: while it is important, it admits the same framework of dividing the world into two camps on the basis of faith and belief. “The Rules and Art of Da’wa” in the Islamic Studies Department of Yarmouk University

Description: This course aims to introduce students to a comprehensive set of the rules and art of da’wa, which can enable them to practice da’wa in an effective manner, and present students successful models of Islamic da’wa work, explain its considerations for the rules and art of da’wa, and orient students to observe the rules of da’wa and its art in their da’wa lives. While this is a specialized course that prepares students to be future da’is, the course could have benefited from some fields of the social sciences, such as psychology and communications, for this important mission. “The Islamic Social Science” in the Department of Islamic Studies at Yarmouk University

Description: This course aims to introduce the fundamental concepts of the social sciences and the Islamic perspective of it, and the social patterns in the Quran and Sunnah, and study the concepts of social sciences in the Islamic heritage (education, politics, economics, etc.) and apply them to Ibn Khaldun’s Muqadimmah and other Muslim intellectuals. It also includes a study of the emergence and development of the modern social sciences, and a critical

Shariah Education in Jordan  161 study of positivistic social schools, and what should be done in order to establish an Islamic social science. While one can notice positively the comparative perspective of this course in how it deals with different sources of knowledge springing from text and context, the “Islamizing knowledge” framework can be problematic as we highlighted in Chapter 3. “Religions and Sects” in the Department of Usul al-Din at Yarmouk University

Description: This course aims to give students a glance at the older religions which preceded Islam: Judaism, Christianity, and other ancient idolatrous religions and discuss their beliefs, as it also aims to give students a glance at the emergence of sects in Islamic history, and explain the attribute of the saved sect. Here the acceptance and starting point of the creed of the “saved sect” should be noted, which springs from studying other sects as misguided groups which must be avoided and whose followers must be guided. “Hadiths of Tribulations and the Signs of the End of Times” in the Department of Usul al-Din at Yarmouk University

Description: This course aims to study the hadiths of tribulations and the signs of the end times through the intellectual value, importance and concept it has in the Ummah’s life, and to know the rules for understand them and their application to the real world in a manner that increases youth’s consciousness of the necessity of not blindly deviating to the destructive calls which encourage tribulations in the name of these hadith, and purify Jihad in the hearts in the name of terrorism and chaos. In one of the teaching publications in the course, it says “the students’ ability to benefit from the hadiths of tribulations in understanding reality, foreseeing the future, and avoiding inaction and despondency.” Here we can notice treating “the hadiths of tribulations” as having intellectual importance and value that can help one understand present reality and even foresee the future. This is clearly a course of legal politics (siyasa shariyya) without its foundations, but given a different name to prevent students from resorting to violence. A Reading of the Book Islam’s System

In what follows, we will present a reading of the book Islam’s System that is used for teaching in the College of Sharia, which is an electoral class taught to all of

162  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World the university’s students. We chose this class due to the multiple topics it treats, as every chapter in it is exposed to one of the sciences and presents an approach towards it from the Shariah perspective as the authors see. These are approaches which are repeated in other specialized works in each class. The first two units of this book were devoted to introducing the Islamic system and sources of the Islamic Shariah, and its overall proposal in these two chapters considers Islam and Shariah as “absolute truth.” Therefore, for the authors there is no need to use academic arguments and proofs in the presented theses, rather it is sufficient that these teachings and rulings are a part of the Shariah. That is sufficient evidence to indicate their validity and obligation. As such, the book’s approach is closer to that of “preaching” than an academic one based on interpretation and proof. The authors do not deal with religion as a relative system subject to changes and transformation with the passage of time, and amenable to interpretation and reinterpretation. Rather, they present it as an absolute and perfect system transcending all changes. This is reflected in their introduction of it as in the form, which it settled on since the era in which Islam was recorded, without spending or adopting any efforts or approaches that attempt to propose a legislative system that considers the emergent changes in the modern age. The authors do not present Islamic systems as interpretations and independent judgements, but rather as total orders and teachings from the heart of the Shariah and Islam which are sacred and unamenable to criticism, accountability and reinterpretation, which invalidates any attempt to approach it academically according to changing social paradigms and context. In the book, the authors show a complete negligence and lack of consideration of changing economic, social and political conditions and contexts. In general, the book does not transcend a preaching style, as it is dominated by the negative aspects of the logic of responding to the other and their theses through dispelling doubts. The book does not demonstrate that the authors have a specific theoretical perspective that they start from. Rather, they are concerned with presenting a comprehensive perspective that makes religion present in all walks of life without any consciousness of the importance of having input from other disciplines. Due to the lack of a theoretical perspective and framework, they in fact construct opposing perspectives, as the authors insist on making the Shariah and Islam present in every large and small detail like a comprehensive ideology. By doing so, they inflate religion in a manner it cannot bear and apply. Likewise, they end up adopting polarized perspectives established on complete separation between the worlds of Jahaliyya (literally the period of ignorance, used to refer to pre-Islamic era) and Islam, with Jahaliyya now referring to the “materialistic” civilizations and “secular” systems. The book does not deal with other theses such as the other perspectives and approaches that accept a give and take, but rather views every opposing thesis as a heresy and disbelief. As such, it is closer to a book of “Sects and Creeds” than an academic book that engages with other theses, debates with them, and critiques and builds on what it can reclaim from them. When the authors touch upon other systems, they deal with them with a complete and slanderous superficiality that is highly deficient in truly examining these

Shariah Education in Jordan  163 systems. For example, they summarize capitalism in the saying “Man is the slave of capital and the dollar,” and Marxism as “Man is a spoke in the wheel of history,” and Darwinism as “Man is an ape.” As a whole, the authors state grand theses, and reach conclusions without touching upon or indicating any number, statistics, or mentioning any tables and charts, which makes the book lose its academic nature, and takes it to the level of preaching. In the third, fourth and fifth units, the authors discuss the topics of the educational system, family, and worship, as in these units the authors present a preaching vision of society that societal happiness can only achieved by performing worship and applying the Shariah, in addition to achieving personal contentment and stability through connecting with Allah, and that society’s reform is done through “installing creed.” This is done without viewing any of the factors or means that lead to societies’ decline and deterioration of conditions, and how they decline, as there is no dependence on a political, economic, psychological, or social analysis. Instead, the authors use words that have no clear defined indication, and without theorizing them, such as virtue, virtuous values, tazkiya (purification of the self), and fitra (man’s innate state), as they depend on them as concepts not in need of defining or explanation. As for the book’s conceptualization of ethics, it does so from a perspective of “reward in the afterlife” based on the principle of “reward or torment,” with a poor conceptualization of “good” and “evil,” and no connection between them in social contexts, including in terms of individuals and society’s benefit and interests. The book likewise glaringly lacks any exposure to modern critique in the realm of ethics, in schools of moral philosophy and the related input of the social sciences (e.g., the school of moral and political sociology and the convivialist movement). Rather, the book transcends all these critiques as if they are not present, which places the book completely outside the context of the social sciences and debate with them. The great lack of social approaches can also be noticed in the book, through a note of how social phenomenon such as “family” and “marriage” are presented, as the authors deal with them with a type of sacredness, without presenting any critique or anthropological or sociological approaches. In the chapter on family, the presence of a logic of dispelling doubts can be noticed, for instance in the authors’ response to the doubt of polygamy, as the logic of “responding to orientalists” is still dominant, without consulting for instance the Saidian (Edward Said) paradigm, and orientating towards breaking up the starting points of the opposing discourse. The final three chapters of the book discuss the topics of economy, the political system, and international relations. Once more, the authors display a complete distance from the social sciences. While discussing the Islamic economic system, they show a great deficiency in understanding economy as a theory, as they do not present economic theories and principles at either the macro or micro levels. The authors further limit the concept of economy to the framework of interactions and sales, without presenting any independent theory based on clear foundations and starting points. As for the “political system,” the authors stop at the theoretical framework of Sultanism and do not transcend the concepts proposed by Ibn Taymiyyah and

164  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World al-Mawardi in the perspective of the mirror-for-princes perspective. This makes them end up proposing concepts that completely contradict the legal perspective of modern states, missing out key concepts, such as the people, constitution, citizenship, nationality, residence and borders. In contrast, the authors adopt the approaches of Ahl Dhimma, Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb and Ba’ya. They even go to the point of adopting concepts completely distant from the reality of state and its construct, such as saying that “the first task of the ‘Muslim’ state is to safeguard the Ummah’s creed and religion.” With regard to “international relations,” it does not appear that the authors have any idea of merely the definition of the term, as they limit it to the confines of the partial interactions between states at the diplomatic level, without presenting the bases of these relations from conflict or cooperation. To enquire the cause of this separation between the Shariah and social sciences in Shariah colleges in Jordanian universities, we study the work of Dr. Jamil Abu Sara, a mufti in the electronic website for Ifta’ and head of its administration, who studied his doctorate in the University of Jordan. His thesis was titled “The Effect of the Empirical Sciences on Discovering Critique of the Prophetic Narrations,” in which he tried to present a new approach, but faced obstacles and difficulties from the traditionalist approach in the university. He is currently studying a doctorate in philosophy and is interested in connecting between the Shariah sciences and the social sciences and humanities. Theses and Academic Research In a wonderful study titled Academic Research on Islamic Education in Jordan: An Analytical Bibliographic Study (2011), Majid Zaki al-Jallad clarifies that interest in the field of academic research in Islamic education in Jordan began in the seventies. However, this interest began growing exponentially in the eighties during which four refereed research papers, 27 university theses, and 31 books were written. The first decade of the twenty-first century (2000–2009) saw a tangible expansion in the number of doctoral theses which were written in Islamic education, after some doctoral programs in Islamic education were introduced in some Jordanian universities. The number of research papers reached 41, whereas the number of master’s theses reached 176 theses. Here, the doctoral dissertations were clearly prominent as their number reached 100 theses. As for the number of books, they exceeded the number in the past decade, reaching 56 books (al-Jallad 2011). The research topics related to the methodologies of Islamic education occupied a wide space of the research topics in Islamic education, as research was conducted in 259 different works. The means of teaching Islamic education occupied the largest part of these works, as 80 research papers, 43 master’s theses, 48 doctoral theses, and 34 books were written on the topic. Jallad clarifies the attributes of these studies, and stresses, rightly so, the researchers’ great interest in the theoretical background of their university dissertations, as these introductory materials occupied a large part that sometimes exceeded half

Shariah Education in Jordan  165 of the study. He further criticized, also rightly so, the dependence of methodology of collecting information and coordinating them rather than discussing them and benefiting from them to form a logical conceptual and methodological rule for the research problem, as well as the interest of some researchers in presenting previous studies without any clear aim from presenting them and building on them, especially in the empirical and descriptive studies (al-Jallad 2011, 28). From my looking over 15 theses, it became clear to me that critical approaches were rare unless they are addressed to Western writings. For instance, Amjad Ayish Abu Lihya discusses the educational aspect of Sayyed Qutb’s political thought in a master’s thesis defended in the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Yarmouk University in 2002. The thesis shows a complete absence of critical analysis of Sayyed Qutb’s thought, that is, presenting both the positive and negative aspects, but rather merely eulogizes him. Another example is Khoula Ahmad Jaradat’s master’s thesis on “Contemporary Works in Islamic Education (A Critical Study),” defended in the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Yarmouk University in 1996. The researcher is shocked by the extent of influence from Western social and psychological theories in the field of Islamic education. She notes The effect of Western translations on these works, whether in the field of theories or in the field of terms and orientations. It has become clear the emergence of an effect of some Western social and psychological theories in these works, and the spread of Western terms in them. So too, the effect of some Western orientations in these works has emerged. As if that in itself is a bad thing. The researcher did not take into consideration what Fathi Hasan Malkawi (2003) pointed out on the absence of Islamic contributions on the contemporary human experience in research, and an absence of the appropriate academic environment for research in Islamic countries. This sometimes makes non-Muslim researchers more capable of researching Islamic issues than Muslim researchers. There is also an obsession with the topic of grounding knowledge, the most preferred topic in the key terms of dissertations from 1976 until 2009, as found in 118 master’s theses and 12 doctoral theses (in addition to 22 books and 18 articles; al-Jallad 2011). Naturally, there are topics in which grounding knowledge is important, not merely an identity politics (“us” vs. “them”), such as Andalib Ahmad Abdullah’s master’s thesis on “The Effect of Listening to the Noble Quran on the level of Psychological Security,” which was presented to the College of Education and Arts at Yarmouk University in 1996. Conclusion Religious education is a complicated case due to the conflict and competition within the formal authorities who supervise religious education, and especially the role of Prince Ghazi (known for his Sufi orientation), and the security apparatuses which try to marginalize the power of the Islamic political opposition (mainly Muslim Brotherhood). This security agenda played an essential role in replacing

166  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World professors judged to be of this orientation with other professors who are available in abundance, that is the Salafi orientation. Nonetheless, this does not obstruct a relative independence of the religious field which it uses to push with all its power to safeguard religious orthodoxy and marginalize teachers who resist that and even fire them. These colleges succeeded in their aim in Islamic moral inculcation, but did not succeed sufficiently in religious teaching, as shown in many of the critical points among those we met, which can be summarized in four points: the hegemony of religious (traditionalist) orthodoxy, the educational curricula’s lack of supporting academic content, the weakness of a pluralistic approach, and the students’ weak capabilities before entering university. Hegemony of Religious Orthodoxy

To take some testimonials of some of the teachers who resist orthodoxy: There is a situation of tyranny of textual schools and methodologies, established on the centrality of the text, and that is by all the dominant classical schools, whether Salafi or Ashari. What I see is as the natural context is to believe in other sources around and beside the text that aid in understanding the text and studying it, such as reason, society, and the customs and values which people adopt. To the contrary of that, the lack of taking other sources is a case of literalism, which is limiting and confining readings to only the text, as dependence on using the science of indications (language) from within the text itself, as such the jurisprudent remains inside the text itself. Custom and maslaha mursalah can only be outside the system, but they are today atrophied, as the custom now is that they are the last thing a student of Shariah education can judge with. We can say that this was reflected in their view of the social sciences, as societies and social customs are the last thing that they can look at while legislating, but are instead limited to the jurisprudential rulings directly derived from transmitted texts. Perhaps, the system of dictation is one of the problems which do not motivate ijtihad: “The reality of Shariah colleges is a reluctant and irrelevant reality except for the style of dictation, and perhaps memorization, which all of the educational curriculum used are based on.” Discussion on this point has been discussed for a long time such as in some papers which were presented to the Conference of Shariah Sciences in Universities in 1994 (Malkawi and Abu Salem 1995), and furthermore in another conference organized by IIIT and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) in 2003 (International Institute of Islamic Thought 2003). Curricula’s Lack of Supporting Social and Academic Content

We also noticed from the tables of curricula in the previous chapter that the Shariah colleges rarely hold any supporting content. The most important of these contents

Shariah Education in Jordan  167 are introductions to the social sciences (e.g., principles of psychology, principles of social sciences) which train students to, as put by a Shariah professor, wisely deal with different classes of people, and grant them the ability to influence the recipient and inspire his rational needs. These kinds of content help in a da’wah framework further grant them the ability to manage their knowledge, invest their abilities in the most ideal manner, and build a bridge of confidence between them and their audience, that step which blocks most predicators (da’is) due to their lack of recognizing its importance. Or the science of logic or kalam, according to another Shariah professor, That science which prepares the Shariah students and trains him to practice theory, and motivates him to receive knowledge with a critical and insightful eye, and protect him from slipping, and strengthens, rather creates the mastery of thinking, and is an indispensable tool for creativity which produces scholars and intellectuals. In its absence, the Shariah student cannot transcend his being merely a receiver of a clumsy mind, superficial thinking, and a lack of creativity. The weak formation of social sciences by teachers and students is clear, according to a Shariah scholar in Jordan University, Those with Shariah sciences and specialization are completely uninformed of the social sciences. I suffered in my doctoral thesis titled “The Effect of Empirical Sciences in Discovering Critique of the Prophetic Hadith,” as I faced great difficulty in passing this title due to my using a new and unique methodology and style and sources outside the usual framework. This is on the level of empirical sciences which are very clear, so what then about using the social sciences, which are in their nature relative and normative? There is also another reason for the separation, and that is that the social sciences are accused by Shariah researchers of being of Western origin, which makes their interaction with the Shariah sciences more difficult. Abdelnasser Abu Basal (2003), the current minister of endowments, previously admitted, when he was a dean of a Shariah college, that the curricula in most Islamic universities are characterized by a focus on pure Shariah knowledge. As such they ignore other necessary branches of knowledge, as they at the same time solidified a bifurcation of education, and also are characterized by a sacralization of tradition and anything that appears traditional, which kills creative abilities, which are based on critical intuition. Those curricula are also clearly characterized by their distance from reality and discussing problems based on the past and worship of their importance.

168  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Weak Pluralistic Approach

Some that we met focused on the weak pluralistic approach of the Shariah sciences. One of them said, We will find the history of creeds to be the most severely closed, as the currently established schools are the Ashari and Salafi schools, and both hold the singularity of salvation, which differs in the case of fiqh, as there is a type of accepting the presence of other schools and judgements. In my opinion, if we want reform, then the beginning must always be in Usul al-Fiqh, as it is an essential science and one which builds the mindset of the legislator. If he was able to infer and merge the social sciences, students will be able to accept the like of these sciences. . . . But some cases of da’is who are usually described as the “new Do’aat,” I see that their reform is merely a superficial reform, as they transmit the same ideas, but in a contemporary manner. As such, I confirm what is salient is reform in the foundations of fiqh. Many of the teachers were cautious from immersing themselves in tajdid, in addition to the lack of intellectual flexibility which would push one towards ijtihad. One of those we met attributed that to legal thinking, which originates from asking the question: Which is that legally obligates you so you may be saved? “The logic of fatwa manifests from giving the rule: Halal, Haram, Mandub, etc. There is an absence of the logic of values based on beauty and ugly (tahsin, taqbih), which leaves its effect in the mindset of the student of Shariah sciences, as he is distant from any value perspective of religious texts. I think that there if there was a value framework present, there would be a great acceptance of developing a methodology and diversification of sources. Another teacher mentioned the opposition of some methodologies to reason and logic: Of this analytical type there is a saying of the dominance of revelation over reason, and that religion is based on following and not creativity, such as the Ummah’s consensus based on the proof that the Ummah does not agree on falsehood, and that modern narratives are evidence in themselves without any need for using reason, which prevents the same thing to be a piece of evidence and what is evidenced at the same time. Of those rambling rules: if reason conflicted with revelation and there is no space for combining them, then accuse your reason. These decrepit rules have been surrounded with an aura of sacredness walled off from any discussion. These rules took a path of compromising between what is sacred and what had its sacredness stripped from it by fanaticism for sectarian beliefs, jurisprudential opinions,

Shariah Education in Jordan  169 and political orientations. The sayings of exegetes came to rule over Allah’s book, and the sayings of commenters on hadith came to rule over the hadiths’ meanings and often contradicting them. There is also a weak use of the Maqasid al-Shariah and taking the principal messages of the Noble Quran into consideration. One person mentioned, We find a strictness and noticeable decline if we view the concepts endemic to the courses studied in Shariah colleges, as bright religious freedom that bursts from between the verses of the noble book finds itself blurred out of consideration by a text of the example of “who changed his religion, kill him,” and that the tolerance represented in the Noble Quran’s approach to dealing with the adherents of opposing religions finds itself fading away among the lines of educational content of Shariah colleges, and replaced by a decrepit text such as that of the saved sect. Another professor attributed that to the monopolarity that contradicts a strong academic paradigm and the spirit of scientific impartiality, As judgement is most likely conducted without discussion or the least bit of fairness, an orientation is adopted based on its being based on the true religion, then through this orientation or that school is used to judge the other orientations, the opposing schools are judged according to the rule of “the opponent is the judge,” and defense from one party, and trial proceedings are done by an impartial side, rather the height of prejudice and intolerance. This track is almost general even in what is called comparative studies, as it the course on creed, for instance, the prejudgment is that the Salafi creed is the truth and anything else is false, and the research topics and chapters revolved around the course of the semester on explaining the truth of this creed with the strongest proofs, and falsehood of opposing beliefs by submitting the weakest evidence of their adherents. If there was even a subsistence of fairness it would make it clear to the student its contrariness to the deceptions and elusions cast in his mind, but he is at the height of intolerance and sectarianism. Whereas the creedal difference between professors could be a positive factor for a pluralistic approach, one of the professors clarifies that it could lead to the opposite result in the corridors of Shariah colleges, which manifests most clearly in the dispute between Salafi thought and the rest of the intellectual orientations. Perhaps, it is credible at a point for us to admit that the Salafi orientation has reached the edge of victory over the others, not because it is convincing, rather because there is unlimited and unceasing support from multiple religious, political and perhaps regional actors. This does not mean that the fierce

170  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World conflict which the Salafi orientation wages is the most prominent conflict, as this does not mean there is not antagonism and rivalry between the other orientations between themselves. Even within the Salafi orientation itself, it could not be secure from internal rivalry between its different strands. This is a reality which no one could stave off or ignore its effect on the knowledge structure and da’wi track that bears Shariah knowledge, further sparking the embers of difference in society. It appears that there is a consciousness among some of the teachers of the importance of pluralism, as in a study by Farj Hamd Salim al-Zubaidi, an associate professor of Tafsir and Quranic Sciences in College of Arts (Department of Islamic Studies) at al-Husayn bin Talal University, he suggested reform in teaching the Shariah sciences in terms of the means and content in the course “Introduction to Studying Islamic Creed.” He suggested to add “Islamic Thought” to the title to allow new topics to be added to the course, such as, the concept of thought and how to think, how creed that influences and is influenced by thought, which participates in building creed by connecting the rational proofs contained in the Noble Quran that correspond to the truths of the cosmos and ourselves. Two chapters would be added to this course, the most important of which were the concept of religiosity and the origin of humanity, the concept of human’s organic instincts and needs and their relationship to religiosity, the difference between religiosity and religion, the concept of fitra and its relationship to religiosity, and the difference between the religious principle and the madhab’s principle, and the integrative linking between faith and praxis in the Muslim personality (al-Zubaidi 2018). Students’ Weak Capabilities Before Entering University

Perhaps, the factor of students’ capabilities is one of the non-essential factors for understanding the problem of religious education, but we must remember here that the baccalaureate grades needed for Shariah students is one of the lowest percentages, and that the majority of students in Shariah colleges did not desire this specialization, but entered this field by default, despite their lack of contentment especially in the beginning.8 For more explanation, we will display some models as follows. The universities that teach a Shariah major in its different departments are the University of Jordan, Yarmouk University, the University of Mu’ata, the University of Al al-Bayt University, al-Balqa’ Applied University—City of Ajloun branch, the last of which only teaches an applied Islamic studies major (Da’wah and Recitation). The Shariah colleges obtained the lowest rates of acceptance in Jordanian universities, as they reached the lowest degree of acceptance, 65%. The department with the lowest rate of acceptance (65%) was the department of Imam and Da’wah training, despite it being desperately needed. Of course, there are also students with high grades who are accepted to the Shariah major, but they are rare.

Shariah Education in Jordan  171 Students’ weak personality can also be added to their weak ability. According to one of the teachers of Shariah, that can be attributed to internal environment of Shariah colleges in both its students and teachers: The obvious in Shariah colleges would be a dependence on role model. This term has expanded until it reached all walks of personality. It even applies to the manner of dress, walking and eating, and students must imitate their teachers or the previous alumni of Shariah students, who (spout) a big beard, a large turban, and many other aspects of imitating appearance. A student just enters the gates of the Shariah College and finds himself confined. He can either orient himself to outside the College and become an outcast inside, or throw himself into the orientation of the college, which is what mostly happens. There is a schizophrenia between the Shariah college’s students and the rest of the university’s students sometimes for objective reasons, and other times for personal reasons. From the time this student throws himself into the environment of the Shariah college, he begins the journey of transformation from softness to hardness, from intellectual openness to enclosement. This returns naturally to the psychological effect practiced on him by his teachers and colleagues of a strict observance, as he transforms step by step into a part of this self-replicating system, and in turn takes up the duty of those before him. Notes 1 For this analytical study, see the following link: www.rasseen.com/art.php?id=7726f58f d4e6e9641f131188cdf752960f513495 —www.mominoun.com/articles/‫ذوقان‬-‫عبيدات‬-‫في‬-‫نقد‬-‫المناهج‬-‫التربوية‬-‫في‬-‫األردن‬-4034 2 In this chapter, I will partially rely on their fieldwork, but the concluding results of this chapter are solely my responsibility. 3 See the Center’s website: http://centers.ju.edu.jo/ar/icc 4 Distributed in the following manner: 27 hours are the university requirements, 30 hours are college requirements, and 75  hours are major requirements. As for the university requirements, there are 18 mandatory hours (6 courses), required for all students of the university, including the Sharia college. From these courses, there are only two in the human sciences: “Islamic Civilization” and “Introduction to Philosophy and Critical Thought.” As for the other nine hours, they are electoral requirements of the university, spread out over three areas, with the student choosing one course in each field.   The first field includes “Islam and Contemporary Issues,” “The Major Books,” “Arabic-Islamic Civilization,” “Jordan: History and Civilization,” and “Jerusalem.” The first course can be considered as having an orientation towards reform and contemporaneity, as for the others, they are close to the history courses which are often taught and discussed in a traditional style. The second field includes “Body Culture,” “Legal Culture,” “Environmental Culture,” and “Health Culture.” The second course could be considered from among the social sciences. The third field includes “Artistic Taste,” “Leadership and Innovation,” “E-trading,” and “Social Media.” The first, second and fourth are from among the social sciences. As for the rest of the 105 hours, they are all among Shariah courses inside the college. 5 The university’s required hours are 30 hours, divided into mandatory courses (21 hours) none of which are among the human sciences, 9 elective hours (3 courses), as the students chooses between 11 options, which include a course on “Scientific Miracles in the

172  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Quran and Sunnah,” with only two from among the human sciences, which are: “Contemporary Issues” and “The Art of Debate and Logic.” As for the college and major’s requirements, they are all within the college’s courses. 6 The hours required by the university reach 27 hours, divided into 18 mandatory hours, none of which belong to the human sciences, and 9 electoral hours (3 courses), with students choosing one course in every field of three fields: the field of the “human sciences,” which includes Shariah courses such as “Introduction to the Sciences of the Quran and Sunnah,” and most of the presented courses are in fact foreign language courses. The “Social and Economic Sciences” course, which also includes Shariah sciences courses such as “Introduction to the Science of Fiqh and its Usul,” “Introduction to Psychology,” and “Democracy and Human Rights.” It is worth pointing out the presence of courses within this field, especially in Al al-Bayt University, such as “Al al-Bayt and their Role in Islamic History,” and “The Higher Aims of the Amman Message.” As for the third field, which is “Science, Technology and Health,” and includes a course titled “Scientific Miraculousness in the Quran.” As for the required courses by the college and major, all of them are from the college’s courses. As such, the furthest extent of humanities and social sciences, a student can study 6 hours out of the 132 required hours. 7 For detail, the number of mandatory courses hours are 12 hours, which do not include any courses in the human sciences. Students study 15 hours of university mandates electoral courses (5 courses) from the 15 course choices. The number of humanities and social sciences from them are five courses, which are “Skills of Thinking,” “Human Rights,” “Introduction to Studying Human Culture,” “Media Culture,” and the “Art of Etiquette.” As for the college-mandated courses, they are 24 hours, and the major’s mandated courses are 81 hours, all of which are Shariah courses taught by the college. As such, the maximum extent a student can take is 15 hours of human sciences from among the 132 study hours. 8 In most Arab countries, students are only able to enter majors based on their grade point average in high school, as well if they had chosen the “arts” track or “science” track in high school. For university admission, students fill out an available majors form list, the first according to his desire. Usually, the most important specializations are in the beginning, then the student begins placing the majors not as important for him and which have low grades in order to secure a university seat, with the Shariah sciences usually at the very bottom of the list.

References In Arabic Abu Basal, Abdelnasser. 2003. “The Reality of Teaching Islamic Sciences in Universities: A  Critical Review of the Literature.” In Educational Research and its Applications in Islamic Sciences in University Education, edited by The International Institute of Islamic Thought. Amman: Publications of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO). al-Hiyari, Mahmoud. 1997. “Attitudes of Yarmouk University Students towards Islamic Culture and Its Relationship to Some Variables,” Yarmouk Research (3): 267–289. al-Jallad, Majed Zaki. 2011. Scientific Research in Islamic Education in Jordan: An Analytical Bibliographic Study. Virginia, USA: The International Institute of Islamic Thought. al-Jallad, Majid Zaki and Ibrahim Suleiman al-Zubi. 2004. “Problems of Students in Sharia Colleges in Public Jordanian Universities,” Studies in Educational Sciences, Volume 31, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 105–124. al-Zubaidi, Faraj Hamad Salem. 2018. “Innovation in the Teaching of Sharia Sciences in Terms of Method and Content: A Theoretical Proposal and an Applied Model on an Introduction Course to the Study of the Islamic Faith.” In The First International Conference

Shariah Education in Jordan  173 of Sharia Sciences: Reality Challenges and Future Prospects. Muscat: College of Sharia Sciences. International Institute of Islamic Thought. 2003. Educational Research and Its Applications in Islamic Sciences in Universities. Amman: Publications of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO). Malkawi, Fathi Hassan, and Abu Salem, Mohamed Abdel Karim, eds. 1995. Research Papers of the Conference on Sharia Sciences in Universities, Conference on Sharia Sciences in Universities – 1994. Amman: The International Institute of Islamic Thought/ Jordan Office. Malkawi, Fathi Hassan. 2003. “Educational Research and Its Applications in Islamic Sciences in Universities.” In Educational Research and Its Applications in Islamic Sciences in University Education, edited by the International Institute of Islamic Thought. Amman: Publications of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO).

6 University Shariah Education in Kuwait Dominance of the Salafi Approach

This chapter aims to analyze the content of the curricula of the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies in Kuwait. First, I will discuss the curricula of Shariah programs at Kuwait University. I will then address the knowledge production and doctoral and master theses issued by the Faculty of Sharia. Curricula of the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies Programs The College of Shariah and Islamic Studies at Kuwait University was established in 1981 as an independent college after it was previously the College of Shariah and Law. The number of students enrolled in it was 4569 students out of 36,704 students at Kuwait University in 2017–2018, constituting more than 12.4%.1 This large number demonstrates that the students who enroll in the College of Shariah are not only students who want to specialize in Shariah, but also students who want to obtain a law degree, since entry to the Faculty of Law is difficult. Thus, the Faculty of Shariah merges with the Faculty of Law. This led to some of the teachers we interviewed being discontent that most of the students were not religiously observant, as one third of the students study Usul al-Fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) and often work in legal professions. There was also a debate in the newspapers on law practitioners who protested the possibility of practicing law without proper training.2 In response, some argue that Kuwait implements the Shariah, and there is an Emiri Committee to apply the Shariah.3 In addition to legal jobs, graduates also work as prosecutors or lawyers. In the college, there is a “College of Shariah Society” whose council is elected by students, and it is active in the fields of da’wah, awareness and advocacy. Education System of the College

The stakes of this college for the Kuwaiti authorities are very important, as the college presents itself as “the safety valve in society, in preserving moderation and rejecting extremism and intolerance in religion.”4 This may explain the problems authorities face in appointing the dean of the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies. The deans of the colleges are usually appointed through DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-9

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  175 forming a selection committee and submitting three names to the director of Kuwait University. The university director then raises the matter to the Minister of Education, who in turn submits it to the Council of Ministers, to select one of the three names. Even if the opinion of the committee is “advisory,” the matter is first and foremost decided by the Council of Ministers, but these rules remain customary. The selection in the College of Shariah is not carried out according to this method.5 This is reflected in all levels of administration in the faculty, where department heads are appointed rather than elected. Some professors complained of the authoritarian approach of their dean (Mubarak Saif al-Hajri). This is due to the political quotas and a partisan logic that is superior to the logic of “the winner and the defeated,” according to Muhammad Faris al-Matairan and Tariq al-Tawari, the two professors at the college. They also point out that the dean selection committees are nominal committees.6 Despite the large student population, there are only 40 members of the faculty, with the rest only working part-time. In a study by Tariq al-Tawari titled “The Truth of Appointment: The College of Shariah Figures and Facts,” it is mentioned that there are 119 part-timers in the college, which is greater than the number of part-timers in all other colleges. He believes that their appointment is linked to their personal and clientelist relationship with the dean. Hence, this was reflected in the quality of teaching. In some classes, there are 170 students in one class. When I  attended two of these classes, I  found the students mostly silent and noticed the absence of discussion and debate in the class. There is also an evening shift due to the small number of teaching rooms. Concerning the bachelor’s degree, education in the college is conducted according to the curriculum system and students are granted a university degree (bachelor’s) upon fulfilling 132 credits according to the old system, and 142 credits according to the new system, which has been applied since 2005. The college has four majors in Shariah: Tafsir (exegesis of the Quran) and Hadith, Creed and Advocacy, Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh, and Comparative Fiqh and Shariah Politics. As for postgraduate studies, three master’s programs have been accredited: Hadith and its Sciences Program (1993), the Comparative Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh Program (1994), and the Tafsir and Quranic Sciences Program (1995). Students take 12 courses, equivalent to 36 credit hours, in addition to presenting a master’s thesis. Applicants for postgraduate studies are required to have a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent (specializing in Shariah or fundamentals of religion), whether from Kuwait or from other Arab countries with an average GPA of not less than 3 out of 4, in addition to memorizing the prescribed portion of the Holy Quran for students of Shariah (first six parts of the Quran in addition to the 29th and 30th parts), as well as passing the specialized personal interview exam. The doctoral program in Fiqh and Comparative Fiqh has also been accredited at the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies from 2005. Students take five courses, equivalent to 15 credit hours, in addition to a doctoral dissertation. The number of graduate students is currently about 85 students in the master’s program, and 15 students in the doctoral program.

176  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World The Curricula

Here we will review some courses that are closely or remotely related to the social sciences and humanities, and we will address some of their issues but will focus as a case study on the “Shariah Politics” and “Fiqh of Crime and Punishment” courses. “Shariah Politics” Course

The book prescribed in this course is a memorandum by Dr. Hamad Muhammad Jaber al-Hajri (2015). The author begins by revealing the meaning of politics in Shariah in its linguistic and terminological meanings by saying that it is a combination of politics and sharia resulting from the perfection of the Shariah and its comprehensiveness of all that a person needs in this world and the hereafter. . . . Whoever claims that there is a wisdom that contradicts what is in the Book of God then it is pure ignorance and vice and has no wisdom in it.7 Therefore, the author argues that Shariah politics—as a concept and a practice— connects politics, which is doing what is right in an issue, and legality, which is the application of the provisions of the law in what is stipulated in the text and then taking into account the absolute interest in those affairs that are not stipulated. As we can see, this definition gives the text total superiority, without mentioning which text is meant here: Is it the Noble Quran and the authentic hadiths only? Or is it more? Does the text always have one interpretation? However, the author later corrects this defect by defining the sources of Shariah politics as exceeding the Holy Quran, hadith and the Prophet’s biography, to include the consensus of the Ummah (especially the Companions and Caliphs) ijtihad (and its methods: qiyas (analogy), istishab (continuity), al-masalih al-mursalah (public interests), and sadd al-dharai’ (blocking the means of harm). The author’s biography demonstrates that he is an assistant professor in comparative Fiqh, holding all three degrees from the Islamic University of Madinah (Saudi Arabia). This perhaps explains why the book was written from a Salafi point of view, and expresses the prevailing thought of the Salafis of the Arab Gulf and the Arab world in general, more than it expresses prevailing Islamic thought. The book differs greatly in its tone and Fiqh rulings from similar books at al-Azhar University, although it is not very different from some curricula that deal with Shariah politics, for example, at Damascus University (in postgraduate studies), before 2011 at least. The author has an exaggerated tone of takfir and accuses everyone who opposes his ideas of complicity with the West (whether colonial or “Christian”). For instance, Ali Abdel Razek’s Islam and the Foundations of Political Power (2012 [1925]), in the opinion of al-Hajri, is a book that abolished the concept of the Islamic state. Therefore, Abdel Razek opposed “Islamic constants, and corresponded to the goals

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  177 of the English colonialism at the time. It suffices to know that the author’s father was a vice-president of the Umma Party, the stepson of English colonialism.” He also harshly criticizes the Egyptian Islamic thinker Khaled Muhammad Khaled (1920–1996), whose books revolve around the humanity of the Prophet Muhammad, Islam and freedom. The curriculum divides the world’s governance systems into three systems. First, Western systems of government or the democratic system, in which “absolute freedom is the most important component and many of those who are ignorant of the rules of the Islamic political system and its distinction from the earthly political systems have been deceived by it.” Second, the eastern system of government based on Marxist philosophy. And third, the dictatorial regimes prevalent in the third world countries. This negative characterization of these systems allows the author to decide on the singularity of the Islamic governance system as the only savior of humanity, despite the author’s acknowledgement that it is only valid for “Dar al-Islam” (territory of Islam). The curriculum also employs some contemporary Islamic literature, especially the writings of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdelwahhab and some of the Azharites. But all his citations come from old classical books such as the writings of Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi (450 AH), Abu Ya’la Muhammad bin al-Hussein alFara’ (380 AH), Abdul Malik bin Abdullah al-Juwayni (478 AH), Muhammad bin al-Walid al-Maliki known as Tartushi (520 AH), Ibn Taymiyyah (728 AH) and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (751 AH), Abu al-Qasim al-Malqi (784 AH), Ibn Khaldun (808 AH), Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Azraq al-Andalusi (896 AH) and Ibrahim bin Yahya Khalifa, famous as Dadah Efendi (973 AH). This is in addition to some old history books, such as Ibn Kathir’s al-Bidayah wan-Nihayah and Abu Abdullah al-Jahshiari’s Kitab al-Wizara’a wa al-Kuttab. al-Hajri’s book elaborates on what he considers the four pillars of the Islamic state. The first pillar is ruling by what God has revealed, and here the author judges the Muslim who does not rule by what God has revealed as a disbeliever, distinguishing between two cases. The first is “to judge by something other than what God has revealed, denouncing it, denying it, ridiculing or altering God’s ruling or believing that a ruling other than what God has revealed is equal to or better than the rule of God Almighty. This is major disbelief that expels one from the religion.” As for the second case, those who did it “out of leniency, ignorance, or error, or because of an order issued by the rulers, or following his whims, or for worldly affairs, or bribery. This is minor disbelief that does not exclude one from the religion.” The second pillar is ulu al-amr (“those in authority”), and the author relies on various sources to determine who is the “ulu al-amr,” defined as the jurists and scholars who teach people their religion, the rulers, Abu Bakr and Omar, and Muhajirun and Ansar. It appears that this generally applies to all rulers and religious scholars. The author elaborates here on the concept of the Caliphate and the imamate, and focuses on the bay’a (pledge of allegiance), which he describes in eight pages, as a method of taking over the Caliphate. He mentions the conditions of the imamate,

178  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World which are that he be free (i.e., not a slave), Muslim, male, fit for taklif (i.e., he is an adult) and of known integrity. Then he mentions the consensus of the scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jamaa’ah that in the event of choice, it is not permissible to have multiple imams in the same time and country, whether the area of ​​the Islamic state has expanded or not. There is also great detail and focus by the author on the issue of “obedience to the rulers and officials, not in certain conditions but always and forever, in hardship and ease, in contentment and discontent, in what is difficult on the nafs and so on.” Perhaps, this opinion is what explains—in my opinion—the speed in issuing fatwas from some muftis in the Arab Gulf states about the prohibition of demonstrations and rebellion against the Muslim ruler. The author describes the relationship between the ruler and the people as a relationship between a governor and the governed, which has its own nature that is governed by legal evidence. The imamate and obedience are a legal mandate for the Ummah, meaning that God commanded that it takes the form of a political entity in which one of the ummah is an obeyed ruler and the rest are obedient to him. The author states that there is a mischaracterization of some contemporaries in describing this relationship as a contract of agency or on behalf of the nation. He recalls, for example, that Muslim scholars have unanimously agreed that conquest and oppression are among the accepted methods of convening the imamate, even though it is one-sided and not a contract between two parties. The third pillar of the Islamic state is the subjects (the people), who are made up of Muslims, trustees (non-Muslims seeking safety), temporary residents and dhimmis (or the people of the covenant). A Dhimma contract in the Islamic legal terminology is “the imam’s obligation to acknowledge some infidels to reside permanently in the abode of Islam, provided that they pay the tax and adhere to the rulings of religion.” As for the fourth pillar, it is territory, where he distinguishes between the Territory of Islam and the Territory of Kufr (both the territory of war and the territory of the covenant), without mentioning how these classifications are to be applied in the era of nation states and citizenship. Especially given that the author lives in a country—which according to his classification is considered a part of Dar al-Islam—which scarcely accepted Syrian refugees during their terrible plight over the past years. After that, the author mainly discusses two rules of the political system in Islam: the first being shura (consultation). He elaborates on whether the outcome of shura is informative or binding, showing how scholars differed on this point. Despite his attempt in his book to minimize the discrepancies between jurists in many matters, he elaborated on this subject, a point of credit to the author given its importance. Although he does not express his opinion on the subject, he acknowledges the obligation of shura by “some advanced scholars, and the majority of researchers in the Islamic political system in the modern era,” citing A. E. al-Ansari’s (1998) Shura and its Impact on Democracy. For a moment, this last opinion may suggest

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  179 to us that the author thinks that the concept of shura is similar to the concept of democracy (which he refuted at the beginning of his book and will detail the justifications in the last chapter), but when he sets out the conditions for the people of shura, we see that the gap grows greatly between it and the concept of democracy. The conditions for the people of shura is that they be Muslims, and the people of shura are chosen from among those “who are well known among the people . . . or by the appointment of the ruler as members of the shura council.” The second rule is justice, and there are descriptions of concepts related to justice, especially the concept of freedom, as he distinguishes the areas of freedom, whether intellectual, political, economic or social. Among the issues he deals with is the issue of apostasy from Islam, which he sees as “similar to high treason, which states punish by execution.” However, we find ambiguous ideas by the author about the limits of intellectual freedom, as he also states that “Islam does not prevent its followers from intellectual freedom as long as it does not contradict the texts of Sharia.” In the chapter “Contemporary Concepts in Light of Islam,” the author launches a sharp attack on “concepts and terms that did not originate under the Islamic political system and in the Arab and Islamic environment, but rather appeared under the political systems that prevailed in the Christian West influenced by its old GrecoRoman heritage.” Here we can see how the narratives of some Islamists such as this author converge with the narratives of the post-colonial left in rejecting the Western in the social sciences (see Hanafi 2019). In this context, the author links the concept of secularism with atheism, the despotism of the church, the conflict between church and science and the French Revolution, with its “deceptive” slogans of “liberty, equality and fraternity.” He also points out that secularism is completely incompatible with Islam: In its atheistic and non-atheistic forms, and in its partial and comprehensive stages, it contradicts the religion of Islam in whole and in detail. It is not surprising, as it is a strange propagation that did not appear in the countries of Islam or among its people. While I am not in the position to defend or condemn secularism here, the reader should pay attention to the intensity and tension of this discourse and its takfir of those who may have found some aspects of secularism to be a means to escape the predicament of the authoritarian Arab or Islamic state. From a sociological perspective, such narratives have excessive generalizations. Turkey is governed by a secular system ran by an Islamic political party. The discourse of many Islamic political parties about the civil state is nothing but the adoption of some concepts and forms of separating/distinguishing religion from the state to build a state of citizenship for all its residents, Muslims and non-Muslims. Before violently attacking secularism, he also directs barbs at liberalism, which he defines as “absolute freedom in all economic, political, social and cultural life, subject to nothing but the rule of law.” There is a contradiction in this definition of his, that it is “absolute” freedom on the one hand, but limited to “the rule of law”

180  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World on the other. Of course, the author believes that all liberalism is secular and cannot accommodate religious ethical argumentations. The author continues to deem concepts such as democracy, the election of women (“because this position is one of the major governance positions”) and non-Muslims in the shura council as heretical. Also, talking about elections allows the author to continue his absolute judgments against what can be considered a “Western Christian” fad, such as the establishment of religious or political parties or partisan pluralism. Here the author also rejects the literature of Islamic thought and Fiqh councils that have adopted very different positions on this subject, to write categorically that political parties are “contrary to the law of God, which urges people to gather and unite on tawhid (oneness of God) and the Sunnah, and forbids difference and division.” This flat argument to the point of nihilism is based on the fatwas of the two sheikhs Abd al-Aziz bin Baz and Nasir al-Din al-Albani. Of course, it is impossible to destroy liberalism and Western social thought without discussing “Western” human rights of human origin compared to the Islamic human rights of divine origin, and the author’s consideration that there is a fundamental difference between them. Whereas, “the Muslim sees that human rights are a divine gift and a divine favor granted by God . . . in the Western concept . . . they are natural rights derived from the idea of ​​natural rights and the theory of the social contract.” The concepts of human rights—according to the author—are nothing more than slogans in the West. The author does not stop at this point, but continues his intellectual forays to culminate in an attack on Western concepts of women’s liberation in a blasphemous language. He ends his bombardment with severe criticism of the globalization that has spread Western culture. However, the author does not note, for example, that the most important features of globalization in the Arab region are the spread of Salafi thought throughout it via satellite channels more than the spread of Western thought itself. Therefore, we are facing a deep intellectual impasse in the curricula of some Shariah colleges, where there is no longer familiarity with human thought, or with the diverse and tolerant Islamic heritage of scholars and jurists such as al-Shatibi, al-Ghazali or Ibn Rushd or with contemporary Islamic literature on the fiqh of reality theorized by Sheikh al-Qaradawi. There is a real problem in the book Shariah Politics in that it builds on an epistemology that is in crisis against the other, instead of dealing with it as part of society and part of humanity. “Fiqh of Crime and Punishment” Course

In this course, the book used is Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra’s (1998) Crime and Punishment in Islamic Jurisprudence. Abu Zahra (1898–1974) was an Egyptian Azhari scholar, thinker and researcher, and a leading scholar of Islamic Shariah and law. Sheikh Abu Zahra, like Sheikh Wahba al-Zuhayli, has many books that represent a huge intellectual wealth in which he deals with various aspects of Islamic jurisprudence. Abu Zahra was one of the loudest voices calling for the application of Islamic law in life. He declared that the Quran enjoined the shura system and

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  181 therefore, the Muslim ruler must be freely chosen. No sultan assumes rule until he is chosen in a fair way, and choosing righteous rulers is the best way to protect the Shariah from the rulers’ tampering.8 He was famous for his opposition to birth control, which was a government project at the time, and challenged the civil personal status law. Abu Zahra was professor in the Faculty of Law in al-Azhar University, which was the most fruitful stage of his intellectual life, and he became the head of the Department of Shariah there. After the issuance of al-Azhar development law, Sheikh Abu Zahra was chosen as a member of the Islamic Research Academy in 1962, which was established in place of the Council of Senior Scholars. In addition to this, the honorable Sheikh was one of the founders of the Institute of Islamic Studies in Cairo, where he voluntarily presented his lectures on Islamic law. The institute was established for those who had missed out on studying in colleges dealing with Arabic and Shariah studies, and a large number of university graduates who wished to pursue such studies joined it.9 Abu Zahra’s Crime and Punishment in Islamic Jurisprudence is one of the classic books that deal with the topics of punishment, hadd punishments, ta’zir punishments and qisas (retaliation) in their general rulings without going into detail. As Abu Zahra explains in his introduction, the book is a summary of a series of lectures presented at the Institute of Crime Research in Cairo. This book was not only studied at the Faculty of Sharia, but was also studied at the Faculty of Law at Cairo University, as the equivalent of private law in Islamic jurisprudence. Abu Zahra adopted an analytical, historical and comparative approach. He built his perceptions of penalties in Islamic jurisprudence by analyzing many Quranic verses and Prophetic hadiths, which constituted—and still are—the main reference regarding the penal system in Islam. He also analyzed the most important statements of the four imams despite their different interpretations, readings and explanations (Anwar 2014). The book begins with the verse “And We have not sent you but as a mercy to the worlds” (al-Anbiya: 107), with the consideration that mercy is justice between people. As Hammadi Anwar demonstrates in his review of this book, punishment in Islam is divided into punishments in this life and in the afterlife. Islamic law prevents crime through three measures: first, psychological discipline through worship; second, by forming a virtuous public opinion in which evil does not appear, and in which good is clear and open, through enjoining good and forbidding evil, cooperating in righteousness and piety, repelling sin and aggression, and preventing crimes; and third, punishment for the crimes that occur, for the punishment deters the offender, rebukes others, and prevents the recurrence of crimes. Therefore, punishment was necessary to cleanse society of its germs (Anwar 2014). Since the purpose of punishment in Islamic jurisprudence—according to Abu Zahra—is to protect virtue and protect society from being controlled by vice, benefit or the public interest, he adopted Shatibi’s theory of the Maqasid al-Shariah without necessarily dealing with it seriously. According to him, there are five

182  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World interests which must be preserved in any human group, the violation of which must be punished. First is the protection of religion by honoring the human being, as religiosity pertains only to humans and not animals. Second is the protection of life by preserving the right to a decent life and protecting the body from violation. Third is the protection of the intellect by protecting it from any calamity that might make its owner a burden on society and a source of evil and harm in it. Fourth is the protection of lineage in order to ensure the continuity of the human race and to prevent violation of human life. Fifth is the protection of property by preventing it from being violated by theft or usurpation and by working to develop it and put it in the hands that protect it. In my opinion, one of the forms of neglecting the realization of these high objectives of Islam is Abu Zahra’s belief that the punishment for theft is not tied to the amount of the theft. He considers that penalty in Islamic jurisprudence varies according to the crime, and that these three aspects must be taken into account when deciding on the crime: the amount of harm inflicted on the victim, the amount of general intimidation and fright caused by the crime, and the extent of the violation of Islamic virtues in it. But when it comes to the penalty for theft—according to Abu Zahra—it is not according to the amount of the stolen money. This is due to the intimidation it causes, and therefore it is determined by the amount of panic, turmoil and chaos it causes, and by the extent of the thief’s habit, which explains that the punishment for a small theft is equal to the punishment for stealing a lot of money. In dealing with the hadd punishments in Islamic law, he first defines them as punishments that are fixed in a Quranic text or a prophetic hadith for crimes that were a transgression against the right of God Almighty, which are hadd punishment for adultery, slander, drinking, theft, brigandage and apostasy. Punishments for these crimes were called hadd/hudud, morphologically derived from the word for limits, “because they are fixed and determined by the decree of God Almighty and no one can increase or decrease them” (p. 85). It was established in society to separate between virtue and vice and righteousness and corruption, and was not left to the decision of a ruler or imam, but was directly decreed by the Shariah texts from the beginning. This is so that it would not be subject to times, conditions or customs. It is worth noting that Abu Zahra’s understanding differs from Tariq Ramadan’s understanding of the concept of the hudud in that it cannot be applied in societies with a non-Muslim majority. It also differs with Ahmed al-Raysuni, who considers that punishment for apostasy contradicts the spirit of Islam (there is no compulsion in religion). There are yet punishments for many crimes that the Quran and the Sunnah have not dealt with in detail and have been left to the authority (wali al-amr) to assess the penalties for them in proportion to the crime. This is called ta’zir, which is the second principle of punishment in Islam, which Abu Zahra develops in another book titled Crime in Islamic Jurisprudence. As for qisas (retaliation), the linguistic meaning of qisas, which is “equality,” is similar to its legal meaning, as qisas in Shariah means equality between crime

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  183 and punishment. It is a punishment established by the text of the Quran in the following verse: O believers! Retaliation is set for you in cases of murder—a free man for a free man, a slave for a slave, and a female for a female. But if the offender is pardoned by the victim’s guardian, then blood-money should be decided fairly and payment should be made courteously. This is a concession and a mercy from your Lord. But whoever transgresses after that will suffer a painful punishment. (al-Baqarah: 178) The Sheikh highlights—after this definition—that there is so much justice in retaliation that the mind cannot envisage a more optimal option and that it has many advantages that are not found in imprisonment or other similar punishments. It is a punishment according to the crime and given that the crime is a deliberate violation of life, so too is justice to be established through the same act (p. 336). Qisas also makes the offender aware that the penalty awaiting him is the same as the crime he will commit, and this will reduce the commission of crimes. Moreover, qisas cures the anger of the victim, by subjecting the offender to the same treatment as the victim (p. 337) (Anwar 2014). It is worth noting that Abu Zahra attributes the spread of crime to the absence of the Shariah’s application: a single look at the condition of a group that applies Shariah and the extent of security in its territory, and the state of one of the cities of Europe, which is teeming with people who do not feel safe with a law because it is man-made . . . shows us how faith affects the hearts. Imam Abu Zahra goes on to say that criminalism continues with civilization on a steady path. Wherever urbanization expands, the arts of crime increase, unlike groups that apply the law of God. The more civilization expands with faith, the more refined the hearts are, so criminality decreases alongside it. (p. 13) Perhaps he should have introduced other variables to understand the increase and decrease in crime. The Europe before the mid-eighteenth century, in which brutal torture of the guilty was widespread (Foucault 1975), is very different from the Europe of today, where many principles of citizenship and equality prevail. “Islamic Ethics” Course

The textbook that is used in the curriculum of this course is Dr. Ibrahim Ali alSayyid Issa’s (2006) Islamic Ethics in Light of the Quran and the Sunnah. Issa, an

184  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World associate professor of Hadith at the Faculty of Usul al-Din and Islamic Advocacy at al-Azhar University, defines Islamic ethics and their sources and shows their relationship to faith and worship, and presents their advantages and necessity to achieve individual and group happiness in this world and the hereafter and the importance of avoiding vices. Although he is traditional in linking ethics to some hadd punishments, such as executing the apostate, he emphasizes the need to use means of gentle uprearing to teach virtuous morals. The book deals with the most important areas of ethics10 and begins with a chapter titled “Non-Muslim Ethics and Its Failure to Paint the Ideal Picture of Human Behavior.” The chapter consists completely of negative value judgments about Jews, who are fossilized in their behavior in the time of the Prophet: “These abominations that the Holy Quran recorded about them are clearly visible throughout the ages and different places, and passing of time only increased these abominations in them” (Issa 2006, 9). The writer cites here the book of Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Banu Israil fi al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah (The Children of Israel in the Quran and the Sunnah). He goes on to Christianity, first showing the theoretical side of ethics, before moving on to practical ethics and the realistic behavior of the adherents of this religion, pointing to “the vast gap between theory and practice, and between principles and reality, not only in our present age, but throughout the ages” (Issa 2006, 9). He recalls the Crusades, the massacres in Jerusalem and Maarat al-Numan, the massacres of Muslims in Andalusia, and Christian colonialism in Indonesia, East Asia, Algeria and Morocco (ibid.). This chapter ends with an assessment of morality in Christianity as denying individual rights and suppressing feelings of revenge for the victim, citing the Gospel of Matthew: “If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also” (ibid.). “Islamic Sects” Course

This course consists of gathered material taught by Dr. Falah Ismail Muntadkar since 2015. The textbook begins on the fourth page by recalling that the first Islamic sects were the Kharijite and Shiite sects. The writer continues to talk about the Shiites and declares them as disbelievers: The Shiites continued their extremism, so they demonstrated their love of Ahl al-Bayt .  .  . and they began directing the arrows of their infidelity to this religion from this point of view, which attracted the affection of a large group of Muslims to it. . . . Their heresy and extremism have been damaging Islam and its people for more than fourteen centuries, using the most wicked of what humanity has known in its history of the arts of deception, plotting, forgery, distortion, and other types of conspiracy. (p. 4) “Psychology in Islam” Course

This is a course taught by Dr. Bassam al-Shatti and is full of standard vocabulary that psychology no longer uses, such as homosexual psychology, which he defines

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  185 as studying “the foundations of the behavior of homosexuals and deviants and the causes of this phenomenon of religious and mental weakness, personality disorders and mental illness.” Among the types of applied psychology is psychology from an Islamic perspective, which is defined as the oldest type in psychology, because it is related from the beginning to the existence of man on this universe. Its main feature is “its subjective approach,” that is, its focus on the inner dimension: where man contemplates abilities, capabilities and wonders that God Almighty deposited in the son of Adam, in accordance with the Almighty’s saying— “And in yourselves. Then will you not see?” And in order for him to be a witness upon himself, as the Almighty said: “Rather, man, against himself, will be a witness.”—and read his own deeds and sayings: “[It will be said], ‘Read your record. Sufficient is yourself against you this Day as accountant.’ ” (p. 6) The author argues that Islam considered the perfection and harmony of the human soul as manifested in its inclusion of the body, mind, spirit, balance and moderation. The text of the book has been designed in a clever way, with a focus on the role of ethics and moral education in psychotherapy, and is an introduction to religion’s influence in psychotherapy. Therefore, the text is full of citations of Quranic and Sunnah texts, including the texts of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. The book differentiates between the characteristics of Islamic and modern psychotherapies, as the first is characterized as a therapy of faith, morality, conformity (to values, principles and ideals), supportive (aid and assistance), persuasive, behavioral, comprehensive and realistic. In this way, it “outperforms modern treatment” (pp. 35–36). The author elaborates on self-healing through supplication and hope. The book ends with a detailed study of Islamic morals, drawing mainly from traditional and contemporary references in the Arabic language. “Family Education: Readings and Studies in Family Psychology” Course

This is a course taught by Dr. Atikah Ali al-Saeed, which is based mainly on Dr. Kamal Ibrahim Musa’s The Family: Definition, Functions and Forms. Like the previous course, it is a mixture of some psychological and sociological principles about the family, its structure and functions, but also with the normative applied aspect related to the Islamic jurisprudence of the family, and the centrality of the family in the Islamic society in preserving morals in society. The book draws on traditional and contemporary references in both Arabic and English. “Human Rights” Course

This course uses Mohamed Ahmad Aita’s (2005) Human Rights between the Guidance of the Most Gracious and Independent Human Reasoning. The compares between the concept of human rights in Islamic origins and modern Western thought. It deals with the rights shared between Islam and the United Nations Declaration, and hence the rights that characterize Islam (the right of the weak-minded to care, the

186  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World right of orphans, the right to pardon, the right to self-defense, and the right to inheritance). The book is written in a very prescriptive manner that promotes the Islamic system of rights and its precedence over the Universal Declaration, with a general approach that rarely goes into details. Thus, it does not deal seriously with the current understanding of Islamic jurisprudence in many issues, including the hadd punishment of apostasy. This problem was amply highlighted by many research papers of conferences, such as Islamic Studies in Universities: Reality and Ambition organized by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (1994). “Rhetoric” Course

The course consists of a group of texts selected according to topics, written by the Sheikhs Muhammad Abu Zahra and Abdul Rahman Hasan Habnaka al-Maidani and others, and compiled by Professor Nasser Khalifa al-Loghani. The course revolves around the jurisprudence of rhetoric, but there is a chapter by Sheikh al-Maidani about the levels of argumentation, which are in the following order: demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, and falsehood based on error or fallacy. It is worth noting his statement undermining moral philosophy that “most of the jurisprudential and judicial rulings and materialistic scientific theories are based on arguments that are no more than rhetorical arguments, that is, arguments that depend on considering the preferable conjecture” (p. 301). Knowledge Production and Graduate Theses In this section, we will look at master’s and doctoral dissertations before addressing the college’s journal, the Journal of Shariah and Islamic Studies. Master’s and PhD Theses

Looking at the titles of master’s theses since 1995 and doctoral theses since 2005, we found that about two-thirds of theses deal with historical topics, most of which are critical edition of classical books, including 7.4% of historical figures. The remaining section is on contemporary fiqh (23.4%) or comparative fiqh with secular law (13.6%). Here we note that there are topics in contemporary issues of great importance (see Table 6.1). The Journal of Shariah and Islamic Studies

The Journal of Shariah and Islamic Studies is a refereed journal issued periodically, the first issue of which was published in 1984. This journal aims to address contemporary problems and emerging issues from the point of view of Shariah. Its topics include most of the sciences of Shariah: tafsir, hadith, fiqh, economics, Islamic education, and other reports on conferences, reviews of contemporary legal books, legal fatwas and comments on scientific issues.11 It consists of a diversity of researchers, as faculty members in various Islamic universities and colleges

Table 6.1 Students’ Enrollment in Graduate Programs at the College of Sharia Degree

Gender

Comparative Fiqh Contemporary Fiqh

Comparative Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh

Master ’s

Male and female

52

99

PhD

Creed and Contemporary Schools of Thought Tafsir and Studies of the Quran Hadith and Its Studies

Master ’s

Male Female Female

9 10 0

Master ’s

Male and female

Master ’s PhD

Male and female Male and female

Total Total (%)

Historical Figures

History

Total

4

102

257

3 8 0

0 0 1

4 1 9

16 19 10

0

0

12

35

47

1 0 72 13.6

14 0 124 23.4

132 11 294 55.6

168 12 529 100.0

21 1 39 7.4

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  187

The Program

188  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World across the Arab and Islamic world publish in it. Its advisory board includes professors from Jordan and the Arab Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. This journal contains articles from several orientations, although articles with a hard-line Salafi trend make up the majority. This includes, for example, an article about the quality of the mandate of a member of the Kuwaiti National Assembly and the Shariah rulings it entails, by Dr. Ahmed Nabil Muhammad al-Huseinan, a teacher at the Department of Comparative Fiqh and Shariah Politics at Kuwait University. According to this article, since it is not permissible for a woman to assume any public mandate according to the preferable opinion, it is forbidden for a woman to enter the Kuwaiti National Assembly and obtain its membership, according to the preferred opinion (al-Husseinan 2017). Conclusion By looking at the curricula of the College of Shariah and Islamic Studies in Kuwait we can see that there are conflicting and competing trends within this college. On one hand, there is a system that allows interaction with other departments by allowing exchange of ideas and stimulating a critical approach. Because Kuwait University adopts the American system, there are courses required for the university but not for the major (12 elective subjects), which allows for interaction between Shariah students and other students, including taking courses from the social sciences departments. However, professors and students I  interviewed noted that most students choose courses from the College of Education because it is close to the College of Shariah in the Shuyukh area in Kuwait City. All students of Kuwait University have to take the course of Islamic Culture taught by a professor from the Faculty of Shariah and students of the Faculty of Law study the subject of Usul al-Fiqh. Some Shariah programs are open to the social sciences, such as the Islamic Finance (Diploma) program, which is a mixture of Shariah and management studies. This new specialization is a bilingual specialization in English and Arabic, and contains approximately 33 foreign language units, in addition to advanced courses in Shariah that keep pace with the global economy. In the Department of Creed and Advocacy, while they are interested in social sciences, such as the course on advocacy that deals with ways of dealing with people, there is no course for social research methods in the department. There is one seminar per month for each department attended by about 100 people, and the topics are sometimes purely religious (“The End of an Atheist” lecture by Dr. Muhammad al-Iwadi) or related to social aspects (“The Problems of Marriage in Kuwaiti Society”). On the other hand, the problem is the fluctuation between strict textual fiqh (often Salafi) and traditional fiqh, which lacks the implementation of the high objectives of Shariah and ijtihad (independent reasoning) in general. As we have shown in our analysis of some curricula, including the course on Shariah politics, there are major problems in adapting Fiqh theories to reality, including the reality of a conservative society such as that of Kuwait. Perhaps this has a methodological aspect, as teaching fiqh as comparative fiqh means not teaching a specific school

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  189 of thought and immersing some subjects in Wahhabi fiqh, which “does not educate a scholar or a jurist,” as one of the college professors put it. Although the College of Shariah considers itself a “safety valve in society, in maintaining moderation and rejecting extremism in religion,”12 some courses—such as Shariah politics— theorize, consciously or unconsciously, the same as what the radical jihadi trend proclaimed. And this is not related to a particular course in this university only, but to many courses that we can find in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Syria. Let me elaborate on this point. The thought and strategies of the two organizations, al-Qaeda and ISIS, were not only theorized for in the books The Absent Duty by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (book online, 1980) and Management of Savagery by Abu Bakr Naji, but rather dozens of books that are taught in Arab Shariah colleges. Here, we should not forget that the Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was trained “scientifically” at the University of Baghdad, where he obtained a doctorate in Shariah, before he was arrested and tortured by the American mandate at the time. Here he conveyed for us what he had learned: he was sworn allegiance to by ahl al-hall wa al-’aqd (those qualified to elect or depose a Caliph on behalf of the Muslim community) instead of being elected, to praise the state that does not believe in any pluralism and judges as infidels those who oppose it. It is a patriarchal state in which women have no place in the public sphere, despite being forced to wear the niqab. There is no role for the people of “dhimma” in the government and so on. In my opinion, the curriculum of the Shariah Politics course is nothing but an indoctrination of Gulf youth to memorize jurisprudential rulings that have found their application only in the “virtuous” cities (Mosul and Raqqa). These cities are fields for the application of a “repressive” anti-pluralistic ideology that has spread in the narratives of the Shariah politics of the extremist textual school and the narratives of the nationalist dictatorial thought discourse of the Iraqi and Syrian Ba’ath Party. The temporary marriage among these narratives in the atmosphere of the barrel bombs falling daily on the heads of civilians (especially in Syria) is what established the possibility for the existence of ISIS. Thus the logistical assistance of some of the intelligence services of regional countries that supported this organization are nothing but secondary factors to its spread, expansion and decline. Sorcery turned against the sorcerer, and ISIS is nothing but a harvest of ominous crops. We are the ones who sowed, and thus our hands reap and burn. There is awareness of the existence of a crisis in this college. Some deputies in the Kuwaiti National Assembly (Parliament) demanded that measures be taken against the professor of Shariah at Kuwait University, Dr. Shafi al-Ajmi, and prevent him from teaching, along with other professors, because of their positions in support of fighting in Syria. The United States had included the names of al-Ajami, Hamid al-Ali and Hakim al-Mutairi—all of whom are professors at the Faculty of Shariah at Kuwait University—on terrorist lists in early August 2015 on charges of supporting and financing extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. An academic study was prepared in 2009 at the College of Education titled Kuwait University, An Environment of Intolerance and Extremism. It revealed that the tribal intolerance of the teachers is the most severe in the College of Sharia, with a rate of 77.9%.13

190  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World The former dean of the College of Shariah defended his college as based on a tolerant Sharia, and a moderate approach, based on the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger, so whoever adheres to any specific thought outside the borders of the university the competent authorities of the state are concerned with them. But the College of Shariah took it upon itself to adopt the project and working program of the Kuwaiti government, which is the moderation of Islam, and fighting against extremist ideology, and it is the only college that was and will continue to fight this ideology, through conferences, competitions and activities at the level of Kuwait and not only at the university level.14 But I think that the college’s curricula are in urgent need of revisions if it is to play the role that the dean envisages for it. Notes

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14

https://alqabas.com/473906/ https://cutt.us/DTTzm www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ht3CIsJmwL8 www.shariakuniv.com/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A8 %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9 http://ajialq8.com/?p=35662. Interview with Dr. Tariq Al-Tawari and Dr. Muhammad Faris Al-Mutairan in Al-Youm channel about the concerns of the Faculty of Sharia, on June 15, 2014. www.youtube. com/watch?v=sy47IvZmIJ4 Text in this section either bounded by double quotation marks or as extracts indicate verbatim citations from the “Shari’ah Politics” handbook, the content of which we are analyzing. http://shamela.ws/index.php/author/1153 Ibid. Individual morals (sincerity, honesty, patience, humility, justice, loyalty, trust in Allah, chastity, modesty and benevolence), and social morals and ethics (benevolence to parents, raising children, maintaining ties of kinship, good neighborliness, cooperation in righteousness and piety, refraining from harm, forgiveness and the etiquette of visiting and entering homes), and ethics between the ruler and the ruled (from the ethics of the ruler: kindness, humility, justice, guarding religion, good worldly policy and consulting people of knowledge and experience). www.pubcouncil.kuniv.edu.kw/jsis/homear.aspx?id=1&root=yes# www.shariakuniv.com/ https://cutt.us/il9Gz. See also: MP Ashour demands the closure of the College of Sharia: www.aljarida.com/articles/1462430988183861600/ http://ajialq8.com/?p=9354

References In Arabic Abu Zahra, Muhammad. 1998. Crime and Punishment in Jurisprudence. Beirut: Arab Thought House. Aita, Mohamed Ahmad. 2005. Human Rights between the Guidance of the Most-Merciful and Human Diligence. Kuwait: Ibn Hazm House.

University Shariah Education in Kuwait  191 al-Ansari, Abdul Hamid Ismail. 1998. Shura and its Impact on Democracy: A Comparative Study. Saida: Modern Publisher. al-Hajri, Hamad Muhammad Jaber. 2015. Legal Politics. Kuwait: Kuwait University (unpublished). al-Husseinan, Ahmed Nabil Muhammad. 2017. “The Type of Sovereignty for a Member of the Kuwaiti National Assembly and the Legal Provisions That Follow.” Journal of Shariah and Islamic Studies (111). Anwar, Hammadi. 2014. “Crime and Punishment in Islamic Jurisprudence.” Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research (blog). 2014. https://bit.ly/3M6hJEQ. Issa, Ibrahim Ali. 2006. Islamic Ethics in Light of the Book and the Sunnah. Riyadh: alRushd Bookshop. In Other Languages Foucault, Michel. 1975. Surveiller et Punir. Paris: Gallimard. Hanafi, Sari. 2019. “Global Sociology Revisited: Toward New Directions.” Current Sociology 68 (1): 3–21. Razek, Ali Abdel. 2012. Islam and the Foundations of Political Power. 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

7 Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco Maqasid al-Shariah Approach

This chapter aims to analyze the curricula of Shariah colleges in Morocco. I will first introduce the curricula of Shariah colleges and Islamic Studies departments and focus on the presence or absence of social sciences elements in these curricula. I  will discuss the knowledge production and some of the master’s and doctoral dissertations produced in Shariah departments related to political or social issues. Finally, I will clarify Morocco’s success in a model formation of Islamic studies and Shariah scholars through the institution of the Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya. This chapter relies on fieldwork that collects the courses assigned in the selected colleges, and interviews with more than 65 of those involved with these topics (from Shariah professors and their students, and professors and researchers in the social sciences, to mosque preachers), in addition to looking over the literature and archives on the religious field, especially mosque sermons and Shariah education.1 Curricula of Shariah and Islamic Studies Programs Before a detailed discussion of university curricula in Morocco, I  should point out that the religious schools and institutes which are characterized as the “old schools” (madares al-atiqa) are spread all throughout the kingdom and particularly in villages, similar to other Islamic countries. The negative connotations of their name resulted from the discrimination during the period of Morocco’s colonization between the modern schools which were established by the French and Spanish colonial administrations and the other schools which were dubbed at the time as “old.” This name has continued to be used to this day. In an excellent study, the researcher Ilyas Tayyar (2017) clarifies that despite the ministry of endowments and Islamic affairs’ supervision (and even control) over these centers, there is an organic connection between this type of education and tribes and zawiyas. These schools have existed since the Almoravid period (1062–1150) and number over a hundred, most of them connected to mosques.2 These schools teach the Shariah sciences, Arabic language and some supplementary courses (science, mathematics and humanities). This type of education still leads to basic employment, that is, the formation and training of elites in the religious field (imams, jurisprudents, religious guides and employees in religious institutes). DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-10

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  193 In Morocco, there are 14 public universities, all of which present Shariah/ Islamic studies with the exception of Université Hassan 1er (in Settat). There are also seven private universities, but among them only the British University in Morocco (SIST) and al-Akhawayn University have Islamic studies programs. In summary, most universities in Morocco have Islamic-Shariah studies programs (see Table 7.1). These universities generally present all three levels of academic education: bachelor’s, master’s and doctorate, with a large number of students at all levels. This cannot be interpreted only through the factor of access to the labor market, but rather also through an increase in religiosity in Morocco, especially among the youth. This was demonstrated in a survey of youth values on everyday Islam in a representative sample of all of Morocco (Mohammed, Hassan, and Tozy 2007) and a sample in the governorate of Salé (Jarmouni 2016). What is noteworthy in both studies on everyday Islam is that some of the results cannot be interpreted as the return of religion that has been noticed since the beginning of the nineties in many regions around the globe (Berger 1999), but rather as a move from collective religiosity to individual one. That is to say, Moroccans are becoming more religious, but in different ways, where religiosity can be visible or invisible and with a different degree of religious congruence and impacts on their social actions. In this new pattern of religiosity, people yearn for knowing religion instead of merely practicing religious rites (Mohammed, Hassan, and Tozy 2007). This can help explain, even if partially, the intensive engagement with Islamic Studies and Shariah programs. In the year of 2015, the University of al-Qarawiyyin was reorganized and its affiliated institutes and institutions were re-distributed, with the University of al-Qarawiyyin-affiliated institutions instead attached to existing universities in other cities in the following manner: the College of Usul al-Din in Tétouan was attached to Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi Tétouan, the College of Shariah in Fez to Université Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah in Fez, the College of Arabic Language in Marrakesh to Université Cadi Ayyad in Marrakesh, and the College of Shariah in Aït Melloul and the College of Shariah Sciences in Smara were attached to Université Ibn Zohr in Agadir. Some that I  met criticized the restructuring of the University of al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco as a political maneuver of cutting off the connection of these old schools with the influential mother university (al-Qarawiyyin) (al-Ja’mati 2016, 50). However, others viewed this

Table 7.1 Number of Universities That Present Shariah/Islamic Studies Programs

Public universities Private universities

Number of Universities

Number of Islamic Studies and Shariah Programs

14 7

13 2

194  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World as an opportunity to connect these religious sciences to other sciences, including the social sciences. Shariah Colleges

We will focus in this section of our study on two colleges: the College of Usul ulDin at Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi Tétouan, and the College of Shariah in Fez.3 Due to its prominent role, the Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya has been singled out as one of the prominent models for reforming other universities in Morocco and the Arab world. The College of Usul al-Din at Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi Tétouan

The College of Usul al-Din was established in 1963 as a branch of al-Qarawiyyin University. The College of Usul al-Din specializes in anything related to higher education of the Shariah, Creed and Islamic thought. This college is one of the most important colleges that teaches Shariah in Morocco. Its number of students in 2022 is approximately 3,300, 42% of which are women. Study is divided into three levels, following the LMD system (licencemaster-doctorat): the first is the bachelor’s (licence) track (three years) and includes two tracks: the Usul al-Din and Quranic and Hadith Studies track, and Islamic Thought and Philosophy and Religious Sciences track. The second level of education is the master’s program, and the College provides three tracks for a master’s (two years) in the College: the Creed and Thought in the Islamic West track, the Usul al-Din and Shariah Studies in the Islamic Maghrib track, and the Thought and Civilization in Maghrib track. Finally, there is the doctorate track (three years minimum) with two paths: the Creedal and Intellectual Sciences in the Islamic West, and the Sufi, Usuli and Kalam Heritage in the Maghrib. We noticed the College offers jurisprudence at the bachelor’s level through three courses: the Maqasid al-Shariah course, whereas the best case scenario in the Eastern Arab world is for the essential principles of Maqasid al-Shariah to be devoted one section.4 The second course is “Ijtihad—Classical and Contemporary,” and the third course is the “Sects and Kalam Schools,” as this course teaches difference of opinion in Islamic thought and treats it as something which is healthy, and does not make takfir of groups outside the Sunni-Ashari consensus, something which accords with the college’s declaration of its effort to train students with a culture of moderation. The college offers as well humanities courses such as “Religions and Positivist Philosophies,” “Intellectual Debates,” “The Science of Logic, Sufism and Ethics,” “Contemporary Islamic Thought,” “The Discipline of Comparative Religions,” and “History of Religions.” As for the social sciences, there is only one course: “The Social Sciences and Religious Psychology,” a course studied by those who specialize in this field. In brief, the curriculum’s designers are conscious of the importance of enabling students with the tools of strengthening civilizational dialogue is also noticeable.

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  195 The master’s level meanwhile has more advanced studies with a focus on Maliki fiqh and Ashari creed. This level enables students to research the manner “Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari took in studying creedal issues and orienting intellectual conceptualizations and opinions,” according to the college’s description. The master’s also aims to build student’s ability to apply Shariah texts to the real world in a sound manner and to form a comprehensive Islamic personality. We notice there are introductory courses for enabling students to conduct academic research, through the course “Techniques of Research and Manuscript Verification,” and creedal and intellectual debates, and learning at least one foreign language. All of these enable students to verify texts and engage with them in a manner of discourse analysis, much more than to initiate them to the social sciences methods. It is noteworthy that the master’s level accepts students from Shariah institutes who obtained a degree from the “old” schools. As for the doctoral level, it focuses on the importance of participating in lifting “academic research in the field of Islamic studies, and working to reform it and develop it, according to a clear realistic academic vision that aids in sorting priorities, and avoiding the duplication of efforts,” as well as “participating in safeguarding the creedal heritage from loss, maintaining it and organizing it, and displaying it in the manner appropriate to it, and making prominent its bright spots.” As we will demonstrate in the section on university theses, they show a heavier focus on Islamic history than contemporary reality. The College of Usul al-Din has embraced many events which indicate its openness. In 2017, the first academic conference on “The Culture of Co-Existence and Human Shared Elements” was organized, followed by a series of conferences, the most important of which were the Moroccan philosopher Taha Abdurrahman lecture “The Divine Orders and Moral Philosophy” and the lecture by Dr. Fu’ad bin Ahmad, a professor at Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya, on “Ibn Rushd’s Thought in the Islamic Maghreb After the Sixth Hijri Century.” The College also discusses topics that have political dimensions, such as in the academic conference: “The Nation’s First Issue: Territorial Unity” (2016) (referring to Western Saharan issue), or have an environmental dimension such as the lecture “The Paris Environmental Conference” given by Zein al-Abidin al-Husayni. The College also convened agreements and memorandums of understanding (MoU) with the Russian Islamic University (The Russian Federal University in Kazan), and the Jisr Institute for Higher Islamic Studies in Antwerp, Belgium. al-Qarawiyyin University: College of Shariah in Fez

As mentioned in the introduction of this book, al-Qarawiyyin University in the city of Fez is one of the oldest universities in the world. The College of Shariah in Fez can be considered as the historical extension of the old al-Qarawiyyin complex, and was established in light of the university’s establishment in 1963. The College attracts large numbers of students. According to statistics from 2011,5 the number of students at the bachelor’s level reaches 2300, and there are 40 students in both the master’s and doctoral levels.

196  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World The College is interested in legal, tafsir, hadith and jurisprudential studies, and is made up of two branches: the Usul al-Fiqh, Hadith, and Tafsir branch, and the Jurisprudence and Legislation branch. There are two stages of study: the bachelor’s in Shariah and Law, and Higher Studies (Real Estate Laws in Maliki Fiqh and Moroccan Law, Laws of the Family in Jurisprudence and Law, and Maliki Fiqh and Its Terminology and Maxims). The following is an analysis of the content of the assigned courses in the college, which I will discuss as themes, with the knowledge that there is a demand from student representatives to rescind the printed textbooks from being mandatory, which made obtaining the assigned texts difficult. I will start from the undergraduate level of studies, before moving to graduate studies. UNDERGRADUATE CURRICULUM

The Shariah and Law track in the College of Shariah in Fez was modified in 2014 to offer the following courses: “Introduction to Studying the Quranic Sciences,” “Introduction to Studying Hadith,” “Introduction to the Science of Usul al-Fiqh,” “Introduction to Studying Creed,” “Verses of Rulings,” “Hadiths of Rulings,” “Jurisprudence of Acts of Worship,” “Jurisprudence of Compensations,” “Jurisprudence of Donations,” “Rulings of the Family,” “Rights in Rem,” “Maqasid al-Shariah,” “The Maxims of Deducing Rulings,” “Inheritance and Wills,” “Fiqh of the Prophetic Biography,” “Principles of Tafsir,” “Principles of Takhrij,” “Difference of Opinion in Jurisprudence,” “Foundations of Fatwa and Judging,” “Forensic Documentation,” “Documentation according to the 09/32 Law,” “Introduction to Studying Law,” “The Theory of Obligation,” “Named Contracts,” “Public Criminal Law,” “Constitutional Law,” “Social Law,” “Commercial Law,” “Administrative Law,” “Judicial Procedures” and “Capstone Project.” As can be noticed, this is one of the Arab colleges of Shariah which combines both Shariah and law like other universities in the Arab region currently and/or in the past, such as Kuwait, Damascus and al-Azhar. In an interview the researcher Mustafa al-Wadghiri conducted with the college’s dean, Hasan al-Zahir, al-Zahir makes this combination clear, saying, On the one hand, we safeguard our jurisprudential heritage . . . as for law, it cannot be beneficial except if it is harmonious with the real world and people’s culture and beliefs. As much as fiqh penetrates law, the degree to which we live the latter and thus its benefit, the more people’s rights are stable and the more their faith in these rights increase. al-Zahir views that his university has immunized Morocco from the “communist campaign which invaded the Islamic countries in the sixties.” Despite the awareness of the importance of a term paper in every specialized course, as they make up 30% of the degree of every course, al-Wadghiri makes clear that this rarely happens, because of the obstacles of a large number of students in the class (alWadghiri 2016, 78).

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  197 Courses Close to the Social Sciences

There are three courses close to the social sciences: the first course is the “Humanities” course taught by Dr. Abdulaziz Inmirat, which is replete with social and humanities theories, especially sociology, psychology and history, even though their presentation is reductive. The course is made up of only 50 pages, and written in a critical manner due to their being Western theories. The second course is the course on “Islamic Thought,” taught through Shakir Ahmad al-Sahmwadi’s (2010) Methodologies of Contemporary Arab Thought in Studying the Issues of Creed and Heritage. It is rich with the most important Arab intellectual schools, is written in an academic style, and has many Arab language sources. The author searches for the methodological issues which determined these ideas. The book is made up of four chapters. The first chapter is on the major debates which occupied contemporary Islamic and Arab thought, which he organized according to topic into three problems: the problem of divinity and human existence which took totalistic depictions: creedal and epistemological, the problem of reform and renaissance, and the problem of methodology and reading through texts and history. The second chapter discusses the answers with historical methodological frameworks in their three depictions which appeared successively: the documentary depiction, which began with a Western outlook and ended up defending the Islamic spirit and civilization; the dialectical materialistic depiction, which began with a Marxist outlook and was carried by a number of intellectuals afterwards; and the structuralist outlook, which emerged in light of the contemporary French thought. In the third chapter, the author discusses answers of a psychological literature, which are also in three successive dimensions: the inner dimension which began by defending the beliefs of faith and Islamic spirituality, but with a reference blending several orientations, such as rationalism, Sufism and Nasirist socialism. Then the analytical dimension, which takes Freudian psychology as its starting ground for its psychological interpretations of Islamic beliefs and cultural values; and then the materialist dimension, which supports a materialist critique of religion and heritage derived from materialist Enlightenment philosophy and the materialists of the nineteenth century. The fourth chapter is on the methodological crisis and rise of an integrative paradigm. Generally, the book is overly reductive by placing the adherents of all these paradigms in one basket dubbed “secularists” and continually trying to show their negative aspects. For instance, the author writes “The secularist orientation since its emergence under the aegis of Christian Arabs defined a contradictory framework between Allah and the human being” (p. 14) As can be noticed, he viewed this thought as one promoted by Christian Arabs. The author follows up: The Islamic leftist ideology driven by Hasan Hanafi, which considered all aspects of divinity as human aspects due to his influence from the Western Enlightenment, and especially Spinoza and Feuerbach and those within their scope, and who ended up by saying that European atheism was the true religion. (p. 15)

198  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World While the text implies that it is Hasan Hanafi who declared atheism to be the true religion, in reality it was Feuerbach. This is nothing but an attempt to attribute atheism to Hanafi. The author ends his critique of this orientation saying, the common denominator between all these theories is their connecting the development of the Islamic movement in Arab societies to a group of negative values, stances and situations. Naturally, in this case it does not view the spiritual and intellectual values included in the phenomenon of Islamic revival positively, and for the secularists this phenomenon does not represent a productive movement as much as it is a negative stance, the enemy of progress. (p. 69) The third course which is close to the social sciences is the “Course on History of Religions,” as the assigned unpublished textbook in this course discusses how intellectual and philosophical orientations have viewed religions throughout history. Here it also divides these orientations into ones that are Western and opposed to religion, and those which are not Western and support religion, while placing philosophy in competition to religion: “If religion is true and science is true, then the both must agree and support one another. However, if they disagree and dispute one another, then one of them must inevitably be false” (p. 18). Methodologies of Scientific Research Course

I will quickly present some of the chapters of the book assigned in the “Scientific Research Methodologies” course, which is Farid al-Ansari’s (2016) The Basics of Research in the Shariah Sciences: An Attempt at a Methodological Grounding, given the importance of the book and course. al-Ansari begins by focusing on the importance of methodology, because “learning is not collecting information and logging them as much as it is to research their methodologies to seize their secrets and realize how they are built and organized.” In the first chapter, titled “The Process of Research in the Shariah Sciences—Six Precepts for Academic Research,” he discusses: The First Precept is what he names the precept of worship. According to the author, this precept must not be neglected not only in the field of scientific research, but also in every activity of life in society: The ulema of this Ummah would usually initiate their scientific lessons and practice with the hadith “Verily, actions are by intentions, and every individual has what he intended,” thereby hoping to raise that act of theirs to the level of worship. The West would encourage scientific research in its society by generally creating a great aura around the men of knowledge and literature and naming them as “great men.” We Muslims have a better and more beneficial mean. Greatness is an image of the Western man’s perceptions, which are hasty materialist perceptions purely of this world.

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  199 As such, there is no trust in a person who shows off, is arrogant, or uses their knowledge to dominate or for a non-honorable purpose, destroying all of humanity as they do so. For the Muslim, the precept of worship is a safety valve which guarantees for them and others the sincerity of action for their self, their society and all of humanity. (p. 32) The Second Precept is the precept of the research problem: This is because scientific research is in itself a request for something that is absent and not defined in itself. Even if you know some of its features or effects, its reality cannot be excepted with a high probability. Otherwise, there would no need for it to be researched . . . then there must a revision of the academic problem by abstracting its impurities . . . I mean its epistemological obstacles that it consists of, and clarifying the false from the valid, until one confirms in the end that the problem is real and not illusionary. (p. 34) The Third Precept is comprehensiveness: This is because the researcher, if they are able to establish their problem, must frame it within a comprehensive vision of their intellectual school of study and research. By this precept, I mean for them to establish for themselves a project. This is the civilizational precept of scientific research, something more worthy of the researcher affiliated with Islamic civilization, which at the end of the matter is an expression of a divine project presented to all of humanity! Undoubtedly, any revival of this Ummah’s pioneering role is at the same time a revival of the multifaceted Islamic project, of which academic research is but one facet. It will become clear to anyone who views the reality of the Islamic sciences that there is an intellectual edifice which must be established, and grand projects which must be accomplished, so this Ummah can spring from both the methodological and intellectual fronts. (p. 38) The Fourth Precept is academic priorities, or the stages of the project of heritage: Islam organized Muslims’ lives, as it is truly a “way of life,” and any breaking of the ordering—I mean the principle of priorities—is a breaking of the whole paradigm. This is the basis of what must apply to the intellectual field. The translation of that in Islamic studies is that the researcher in any intellectual field faces a massive heritage, and must understand this heritage precisely before they can connect it to the proper channels, no matter how much the forms of that connection and aims differ. (p. 40)

200  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World As such, in the framework of ordering the priorities of research in Shariah sciences, al-Ansari discusses three stages: The investigative stage: that is, the one who returns to classical texts must first confirm its validity in its chain and text .  .  . the second stage is the stage of understanding, essentially related to the renewing sciences, which established their principles and maxims, and produced terms, becoming a field appropriate to demonstrate obstacles and problems, the like of the science of Kalam, Usul al-Fiqh, Fiqh and the sciences of hadith. There is no escaping the saying that any classical text in the Islamic sciences must—in order for to be used and invested in- pass through a phase built fundamentally on the interpretative sciences that intend to discover and analyze the aims of intellectual discourse in this field or that field. . . . Studying terms in our view is the essential structure which is valid to be the first tool of understanding, and upon which the rest of the classical texts are formed. The third and final stage is the stage of construction of the classical text. By composition here, I mean the composite use of a text, that the one who studies it in the interpretative framework studies it in his simplistic framework, then after defining his terms and aims it becomes valid for use in comparative and historical studies, critical and inductive which concern building theories and renewing knowledge and adding to it, which what we intend by composition .  .  . the composite student for instance must begin his work until he is certain that all of the investigative problems were smoothed out, and all the conceptual problems were solved, that is unless the subject is not an investigative or conceptual problem. This is the nature of most contemporary Islamic studies. As for the classical heritage, rarely was a field secure from the necessity of solving this mentioned trifecta: investigation, understanding and composition. (p. 44) As for the Fifth Precept, it is realism: that is the possibility of the research being accomplished in the most complete manner in a known time, which differs according to the level of the student, as it could be appropriate for a Masters student, and not a Bachelors student, and vice versa . . . if I want for instance to do a field study on the influence of social media on high school students, I  must ask myself: Do I really have the sufficient time to complete such a study in a manner that does not obstruct my studies? Do I really have the means and tools to do it? These are some of the obstacles to achieving its completion. The Final Precept is the methodological, as the nature of the problem is what defines the methodology followed in the research. If my research was a study of a certain phenomenon, I must choose

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  201 a methodology harmonious with it, like the descriptive empirical method, for instance. If the phenomenon was historical and related to evolution and development, I have to choose from among the historical methodologies . . . etc. It can be seen from this quick overview of the book The Basics of Research in the Shariah Sciences: An Attempt at Methodological Grounding that it is closer to being a guide for student on how to write research and the ethical conditions for writing this research (the precept of worship, for instance) than being techniques of academic research in the textual philological or the sociological sense. In addition to the many Arabic sources which the al-Ansari quotes, he also uses French sources on writing theses and organizing ideas.6 It is worth mention that this book is used in many Moroccan and even Arab universities, and the book has five editions in Egypt. CURRICULA OF GRADUATE STUDIES

Here we will analyze the curricula of some courses. Epistemology and Metaphysics Course The curriculum texts begin with a series of academic articles on the social sciences which encourage particular attention to the Eurocentric biases of the different methodologies of the social sciences as they are taught in contemporary institutions. In Abdulwahab el-Messiri’s article titled “The Importance of Epistemological Studies,” he argues that any definition of an episteme must take into consideration a worldview, that is, the ontological and metaphysical hypotheses this definition stems from, especially those related to divinity, humanity and nature. The first section of the article discusses the manifestations of inherent biases in Anglo-European and French studies on epistemology and explains at length the consequences of ignoring metaphysical hypotheses. This, according to el-Messiri, not only includes epistemology but also politics, sociology and economics. el-Messiri suggests as an alternative to define episteme in the Islamic world in a manner which realizes the bias in the social sciences in the West, which suppose themselves as “neutral” and not unintentionally containing the hegemony of Eurocentrism and positivism. He views colonialism and imperialism (and even Zionism) as a natural extension of this secular knowledge. In accordance with this approach, other texts—such as Jalal Abdullah Mu’awad’s article “American Materialism and Its Relationship to Economic Changes and Political Development”—study the means by which the epistemological and “materialist” view fundamentally constitute the capitalist economic model which appeared in the United States. Towards an Islamic Paradigm Course This course, a series of articles titled “The Problem of Bias: An Epistemological View and Call for Ijtihad,” collects the works of a number of Arab social scientists who agree on a shared argument: any project that aims to build a bridge between Islamists and the West must fail as

202  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World long as the metaphysical and epistemological hypotheses and prior judgements of these sciences are unclear, and the project will remain out of reach so long as the particularities of these sciences are undiscovered. In an article titled “Cases of Bias and Objectivity in Social Thought in the West and Ibn Khaldun,” Mahmoud Dhaouadi studies the principles of these biases, and the accompanying means to treat them through comparing Ibn Khaldun’s social thought with Western positive thought. He then argues that bias stems from four sources: (1) the human/knowledge factor, that is, our inherent deficiency to abstract free from our social context; (2) the influence of paradigms and inability to completely escape their a priori hypothesis; (3) the ideological nature of the social sciences, which is often latent; (4) our tendency to generalize our subjective results. In regard to the problems faced by Western social thought, Dhaouadi argues that it is tainted with materialism and reductionism as it mistakenly theorized on nonmaterialistic phenomena, such as religion and metaphysics. The author views the solution as dwelling in first deepening a more comprehensive approach and harmonization representing all the branches of knowledge, and realizing the difference between materialism and metaphysics. He argues that, second, Muslim social scientists must engage in a comprehensive process of social critique, which includes the needs to clarify those a priori judgments of concepts and axioms which were previously taken for granted. Third, he recommends merging the knowledge of other civilizations. Fourth, for him, it is important for Muslim social scientists to realize the historical conditions in which modern social theory was established. In the end, the author suggests Islamic social theory as a more congruous alternative to Western social theory. However, this conclusion raises questions as to how to do so, and if there is a single Islamic paradigm. How is the inclusion of progress and the other visions of other civilizations with this paradigm conducted? (For a critique of this orientation, see Chapter 3.) The second part of the series of articles is titled “Biases in Western Social Theory: the Concept of Development.” The Egyptian thinker Adel Hussein argues that the reductionist and materialist approach of Western sciences led to humanity’s commodification and removal from social spaces, or “in the end, led to negate societies’ dynamism, transforming them into a grand tool which can be controlled with tools as if they were buttons.” He views these emerging sciences as being mistakenly generalized. He also says these sciences were born from the West’s feeling of superiority over the rest of the world. To overcome these problems, Adel Hussein suggests two steps. The first is the necessity of no longer using concepts in their Western connotations so they may become Islamic terms, that is, the Muslim social scientist must remain aware of the epistemological biases behind any indications. Second, ijtihad must stem from its particular heritage, which is a “sum of materialistic and idealistic projects throughout history. (p. 13). Muhammad Amizyan’s article titled “Means of Social Research: Between Positivism and Normativity” discusses the theoretical foundations of an Islamic model or Islamic alternative. Amizyan views there as being many primary obstacles which face any project of this sort: (1) re-defining “objectivity” to realize the difference

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  203 between the social sciences and the natural sciences; (2) Integrating revelation in the knowledge sources from which the social sciences are derived; and (3) The necessity of any model of this sort being connected to the perspective of tawhid. There are number of other texts all of which depend on a similar approach, whether attempting to Islamize knowledge or adopt an Islamic modernity or humanism. For instance, the article by Luay Safi titled “The Theory of Islamic Knowledge: From Epistemological Principles to Procedural Methods” focuses on the procedural dimensions of the Islamization paradigm and clarifies some of the expected problems and differences surrounding this field. Safi determines the primary problems and type of self-critique of the model he wishes to defend, and then engages with those problems in a methodological manner, the most important of which is the question “Is it truly possible for us to achieve a “paradigm shift?” These texts until now were concerned with the Islamization of theoretical devices, and research means and paradigms, and so on. To the contrary (of that), Nasr Muhammad Arif’s article “Contemporary Political Development Theories” extends these theories to the issue of political development. In chapter 1, Arif critiques the prevalent methodologies of political development in the Arab world. In the final chapter, Arif says that Western theories on development in the Arab world were dominated by colonial and orientalist hypotheses that adopted the idea of development in the West. Research Methods Course  The mandatory readings in the “Research Methods” course are not as wide in scope and analysis as the above-mentioned readings. The assigned text begins by defining the essential terms, such as “knowledge” and “research,” followed by a list of methodological and objective characteristics of research methods. That is followed by a list of “characteristics the research must be described with” (p. 10), including, once more, objectivity and a lack of prior bias. Afterwards, the assigned text investigates several “Western” models of research methods, pointing to Fredric Lamson Whitney, and Arab intellectuals such as Muhammad Talat Eisa, Abdalrahman Bado, Abdulbasit Muhammad Hasan, and Rushdi Fakkar. The research methods which are studied are the descriptive method, the bibliographic method, dialogue and comparison, the analytical method, and what the author calls “alternative research methods,” including the Marxist dialectic and realist dialectic. Contrary to the other research methods manuals we found in textbooks in Shariah colleges in Kuwaiti and Lebanese universities, the assigned texts cover the stages of investigation, deduction/induction, and re-composition in depth. The plan is as follows: The first principles of research (defining knowledge, defining the research, research aims, characteristics of research, the researcher’s attributes and ethics), and types of research (the descriptive, comparative, analytical, and historical methods) and how to write a research paper (first steps, the introductory chapters of the paper, how to divide section, and paper’s conclusion).

204  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World There is a strong focus, throughout the assigned text, on the critical method. The remainder of the assigned text discusses other issues such as how to organize the thesis and so on. In summary, the assigned text is more comprehensive in its scope and depth from the texts in Lebanese universities which we covered in an earlier chapter. Nonetheless, it is not clear if this is taught before the readings we mentioned above or after. This is significant given that the text on research methods confirms the importance of objectivity and presents it as a fundamental condition of research, whereas the texts we researched in the section above on epistemes and paradigms viewed the concept of objectivity as problematic and not only impossible, but also necessary to manifest the conceptual hypotheses which frame those research papers. Nonetheless, this text presents a general view of different research methods in the West and Arab world. This leaves the reader with an impression that types of research, even those discussed in the text, do not necessarily have to be totalistic or orthodox. Shariah Studies (Fiqh and Law) Course  There are two classical texts used in the Fiqh curriculum: Shaykh al-Sadiq Abdulrahman al-Gharyani’s The Recording of Maliki Fiqh and Its Tools, and al-Mastara al-Madaniyya (Personal Status Law). The first book, especially the fourth volume, discusses testimonies and judicial procedures and argumentations in the framework of Maliki fiqh in all of their details and shapes and follows the classical Maliki fiqh texts. The second textbook, al-Mastara al-Madaniyya, deals more with conceptual and detailed issues which are latent behind judicial issues, that is, the issue of what is justice. The author begins by saying “Justice is not an abstract universal set of ethics, but must be understood within specific realities or defined cases.” This is a very interesting transformation compared to other curricula outside Morocco, which confirm the unitary and ahistorical nature of justice as a self-enclosed ethic. According to the book, secular law was not able to describe justice, whereas the Shariah did so “because it did not share those simplistic and secondary issues, but rather deal with those issues with a comprehensive depth” (p. 4). In addition to that, Muslims do not deal with law only because of their admission that they are divine principles, but also because a Muslim’s faith depends on his subjection to divine law. In other words, the relationship between law and faith, and therefore law and justice, is a fundamentally a-secular topic. The author mentions that while individuals must recognize the effectiveness of the modern legal system and the complex judicial procedures and their administrative and structural developments, the judicial system’s deep conceptual problems cannot be hidden either. In summary, the author draws a sharp contrast between the Shariah and positive law. Despite that, in the topic of the fiqh of marriage, the study begins with Moroccan law rather than beginning with the laws of Maliki fiqh, and discusses the extent of harmony between them, which makes the discussion updated and contemporary. This is completely different from how the fiqh of family is studied in universities in the Eastern Arab world, which makes these laws full of issues not at all relevant to current reality.

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  205 Islamic Studies

Perhaps, the context of the emergence of Islamic studies programs inside of the Faculties of Arts in itself is an indication of the rupture between different elite formations and how these programs find their muddy way in an atmosphere of suspicion from the other social sciences and humanities departments. I met 23 professors in philosophy and the social sciences, all of whom confirmed that these programs emerged in the context of an elite conflicting with emerging leftist elites at the time, whether students, professors or graduates, as well as in the context of departments of philosophy and sociology being closed at the beginning of the seventies. I heard from some of them acerbic critique of both the Shariah and Islamic Studies, such as that of the professors of sociology in the University of al-Quneitra in Morocco who said, “There is a calcification in the religious sciences: a language of violence and incitement; a dictionary of ideology and not a scientific dictionary.” As another professor said: “With regards to the topic of equality in inheritance: the Shariah Colleges have priests and guards; they are not researchers.” Perhaps, there is a political dimension to the establishment of these programs, which is what alHusni, Belbachir, the founder of the field of Islamic Studies in Morocco, confirmed when he admitted “The previous Interior Minister Idris al-Basri would defend Islamic Studies programs and encourage them as they spread moderate thought, which helps strengthen the country’s security.” (al-Husni 2014). But this is to be interpreted in his opinion that its benefit is delayed and not immediately present after its establishment. al-Husni, one of the leaders of the Istiqlal party and one of those loyal to Alal al-Fasi’s thought, narrates that the idea began in the beginning of the seventies when he was a director of higher education: I failed to pass any of the reforms I  wanted in al-Qarawiyyin University. I was wondering about the secret behind the university’s fragmentation particularly between three to four cities. I tried to convince the deans at that time to gather the university in any city they wanted, but they refused, and as such, the failure. I was once again responsible for the curriculum of the first year in the University of al-Qarawiyyin in the beginning of the seventies. At that time the curriculum was more important than gathering the branches of the university, as we were discussing the university’s very future in comparison to al-Azhar University in Cairo or al-Zaytuna. In agreement with the minister Muhammad al-Fasi, we wrote a number of notes to the king’s office to point us towards the direction we should take with regards to al-Qarawiyyin, should we follow al-Azhar in establishing colleges of medicine, commerce and agriculture in addition to the Shariah college, or do we follow Zaytuna, or what? We met with Altaher Ben Ashur, may Allah have mercy on him, who was the president of Zaytuna, who informed us that he had tried to create a college of Islamic thought and civilization, but the government refused. Given that I was responsible for the University of al-Qarawiyyin, I took the idea and tried to add a college of thought and civilization to the College of Usul al-Din and Shariah and suggested that it be in Tétouan, as it is close

206  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World to al-Andalus. Surprising, it was the College of Usul al-Din in Tétouan that refused the idea. Until now I still cannot interpret the refusal, but it was said at the time was that it was a conspiracy from the southern side of Morocco against the northern side, something completely unreasonable. Anyway, after the experience of the beginning of the seventies in the University of al-Qarawiyyin, and the experience of 1972, and after our comparing it with I believe of the comprehensiveness of Islamic thought, I was fortunately still a professor in the College of Arts, given my position as the first Moroccan dean in the College of Rabat, and I felt bad about the rejection. I considered replacing this deficiency by establishing an Islamic studies program to be added to the seven social sciences and humanities programs at the time. I discussed it with the Minister of High Education at the time, Dr. Abdullatif bin Abduljalil, who accepted the idea, and we began to think. Then the Minister Iz al-Din al-Iraqi, who was also convinced of it sent a note to the dean of the College of Arts asking him to open a program for Islamic Studies. However, the throes of the idea did not end here, as al-Husni goes on to say: When I opened the program at the minister’s order, I found an extreme resistance from the other departments, chief of which was the department of philosophy in the seventies, as the orientation of extreme leftist socialism among the professors and students which was established in 1968 after the students’ uprising was still present. It was a miracle that we were successful in creating the program. What helped our success was that 250 students signed up in the first year of the department’s establishment. Even in framing, we were not able to provide sufficient professors for the different courses, to the degree that I remember Dr. Mustafa bin Hamza, a great intellectual figure, would come from Oujda once every two weeks to teach the Prophetic Hadith course, which was a required course. From these struggles, we can conclude that there is a competitive view between these departments and the departments of sociology and philosophy. This manifested, for instance, in a conflict between the Islamic studies and philosophy departments on how to teach the “Islamic Thought” course. In the end, the former succeeded and started teaching this course to the philosophy branches. However, the opposite is not true, as the courses in sociology or psychology are not taught by those majoring in these branches, but by professors who are well-known for simultaneously familiar with both the social sciences and the Shariah sciences. In an interview with one of the sociology professors, he mentioned to me that the Department of Islamic Studies at Muhammad V University asked him to teach a sociology course, but he refused. He likewise refused to co-supervise with a professor in Islamic studies on a doctoral dissertation related to the debate over the family code, as he viewed the approach as being biased to a particular Islamic understanding and found it difficult to cooperate with such an approach (the thesis of Jamila al-Musali; see the section of doctoral theses in this chapter).

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  207 Despite that, there is much evidence that the Department of Islamic studies has benefited from being a part of the melting pot of the College of Arts. In an interview with an instructor of the “Social Sciences” course in this department in Muhammad V University, it became clear how his students train for empirical field research to understand people’s opinions and stances on some social challenges, and how this knowledge is used to sharpen the students’ ideas on how to apply jurisprudential rulings to a lived and changing reality. On the question if this Department of Islamic Studies benefited from the presence of figures who discuss contemporary readings of the Islamic heritage, such as Muhammad Abed al-Jabri or Abdullah Laroui, both of whom are professors in the department of philosophy at the same university, his answer was ambivalent. When I asked if at least some of al-Jabri’s book or articles were taught by them, the answer was that his ideas are discussed in the department, but not formally taught. The sole exception we found was the thought of Taha Abdurrahman, a professor of philosophy in this university, who became famous for his critique of trends of Western philosophy that separate between religion and ethics, and his development of the philosophy of Iti’man (trusteeship). But even Taha Abdurrahman is not taught seriously in Islamic studies in Morocco even though his office neighbors that of the Islamic studies offices, and his books are often taught in departments of philosophy and Islamic studies in other Arab and Islamic countries, such as Algeria, Qatar and Malaysia. If all of this indicates anything, it is the shy exchanges between departments that should interact under the umbrella of a single college, the “College of Arts.” I will term this as productive juxtaposition and not really an active interaction. Productive juxtaposition exists on the level of the individual more than being a clear policy of these departments. What deepens this lack of interaction is the feeling of professors in social sciences and philosophy that there is an incredible number of master’s and doctoral graduates in the Department of Islamic Studies, which casts doubt on the quality of knowledge production there, as one of the professors mentioned to me this quantity at the expense of quality. I conclude here by saying that the problem between these departments is political more than epistemological. Despite that, some of the professors of Islamic studies whom we met exhibited an awareness of the danger of their departments’ entrenchment, and considered their calls to moderation as something that necessitates an engagement with the contextual sciences (reality). Some of them mentioned that some departments of Islamic studies are more open than others, as for instance Beni Mellal University established a master’s in dialogue between religions and strongly linked this master’s to social science curricula and courses. Curricula of Islamic Studies (Muhammad V University)

Islamic studies can be described compared to Shariah sciences as focusing on the principles, or usul, of Fiqh more than its rulings, and adds the Maqasid al-Shariah courses as one of the pillars to reform the science of Usul al-Fiqh and ground fiqh’s application to reality. It is likewise interested in Sufism not as a philosophy

208  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World or gnostic thought, but rather as ethical thought, according to the expression of the Head of Islamic Studies in the University of Muhammad V (Rabat), Ahmad al-Bukili, that is transforming Sufism into behavioral ethics (salukiyat). This section will focus on the currently assigned curricula in the Islamic Studies department in Muhammad V University, making some notes on the assigned texts in the university. In the assigned text for Istikhlaf (Allah’s Assigning the Human Being as his Deputy) and Tawhid, it uses the book Epistemological Dimensions of the Concept of Istikhlaf by the Sudanese Sabri Muhammad Khalil, a professor in the philosophy of Islamic values at the University of Khartoum (Khalil 2006). The author discusses the philosophical dimension of the concept in an attempt to define the relationship between the entruster (Allah Almighty), the entrustee (the human being) and the thing that has been entrusted (the universe), by taking comprehensive Quranic values, like Tawhid, Istikhlaf and Taskhir (God’s subjugation of the world to humanity), as first principles, and then trying to induce philosophical results from these concepts. The author takes the ijtihadi efforts of Kalam scholars as a beginning point, and not an ending point. The substance of the concept of tawhid is the singularity of the Almighty’s divinity, and the substance of the tawhid of Lordship is that Allah Almighty is the sole absolute actor. The author makes it clear that the social sciences are a necessity for understanding how God has subjugated the world to humanity. As such, he explains the concept of istikhlaf as a deputyship, an application of the term’s metaphorical meaning, as the Quran depicts the existence of a kingdom, the king of which is the Almighty and the human being as his deputy on earth and this moral obligation as an honor to the human being. The author digresses to the concept of political istikhlaf. According to the author, its content is the chain of sovereignty (authority or absolute power) is to Allah alone, “Verily sovereignty is for Allah” (Yusuf: 40), and the Muslim community as the deputy who manifests the Almighty’s sovereignty by linking it to the divine order (Power limited by divine sovereignty), “(who) conduct their affairs by consultation” (al-Shura: 38), as for the ruler is he a deputy for the group with the right to appoint, observe and depose him. However, the author’s discussion on sovereignty is without any discussion of the issue of democracy whatsoever. The course in “Islamic Thought” defined this thought as “The result of a rational reflection produced from Islamic values and background, that is, that is conditioned to be thought from within the Islamic system” (from the notes of the lectures of Professor Sa’d Ka’b). If this is Islamic thought, then how can this system be criticized? As for “Tafsir Methodology,” we found it to have a significant openness and debate, as it admits the Zaidi, Imami and Twelver schools. The course distinguishes between the different types of Quranic exegesis, such as the jurisprudential exegesis which is the bases of deducing practical rulings from the Quran, and theoretical exegesis from the Quran, that is, exegesis concerned with explaining the universal and scientific verses in the Quran. The course also explains the scholars who opposed this orientation (al-Shatibi and Sayyid Qutb) and those who supported it (al-Fakhr al-Razi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohamed Eltaher Ben Achour).

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  209 In another course on the effect of secular thought in Islamic society by Muhammad Rashad Abdulaziz (1988), the author severely criticizes the bitter results of secularism’s spread to the Muslim world, from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to Ali Abel Razek, and then Taha Husayn in his The Future of Culture in Egypt. The textbook concludes by arguing the “collapse of secularism’s foundations.” As for the course in “Methods in Islamic Education” by Professor Uthman Muhammad al-Mania’, it focuses on types of moral advice through stories, dialogue, and parables. As for the assigned text in Usul al-Fatwa, it argues that the salient conditions of the mufti are: knowledge of contemporary sciences and fiqh al-waqi’, as well as knowledge of the means of deducing rulings (through knowledge of the Arabic language, resolving contradictions, and choosing between proofs of equal evidence). In this text, there is a clandestine critique of the religious establishment due to its lack of independence from the Moroccan king, and he compares these institutions to their state during the foreign occupation period. There is also a course on “Debate Between Religions,” with a section on bringing religions together through da’wah, referencing a study by Hasan al-Turabi. The approach of this course is different from many critical orientations which say, for example, that calling to closeness and dialogue between religions leads to tribulation (al-Jalil 2009). The course calls for coming closer without confirmation or compromise, that is, every religion holds on to its unique creedal and ritual particularities, while believing in the faith of others, respecting their beliefs and rites, and calling to getting to know them, making prominent the aspects of similarity or agreement, and lessening the differences, and avoiding research in the issues of creed, apologizing for the mistakes of the past, and cooperating to achieve shared values, and spreading religious love and kindness. One can found such a trend in the approach of the Second Vatican Council concerning dialogue between religions. There is another course on the political dimension of the Prophet’s life (PBUH) (Hamad 1982) that uses many contemporary references, including French ones. It is an excellent reading of an aspect of the Prophet’s biography, and has important implications for our current political reality (citizenship and nationality, p. 108). Yet sometimes, the author did not take into consideration the important work of some scholars who innovatively interpretated the historical corpus. This is why he justifies the use of the concept of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb as there is a conspiracy against Muslims. There is another assigned text on the civil state and religious state by Ibrahim Khalil Ali Alyan. Dr. Muhammad Hammam has another important text assigned, titled The Intersection of Shariah and Social Sciences: A Critical Epistemological Approach in the Islamization of Knowledge Project (IoK): The Debate between Ismail Raji alFaruqi and Muhammad Abi al-Qasim Haj Hamd” (Hammam 2014). He clarifies Abi al-Qasim Haj Hamd’s distinction between the theology of the unseen and the theology of nature and speaks of the duty of the natural and social sciences rather than their relativity. This is a different proposal than the one proposed by the IoK project (assigned in the master’s curricula in the Shariah College of the University of Fez) which points to the superiority of the revealed sciences compared to the other sciences, making them relative.

210  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World As for the course in “Research Methodologies,” it uses some of the chapters of the book Library and Research Methods. Like Farid al-Ansari’s book we analyzed above, the book revolves around research writing and reading literature, and not social science methodologies. Concerning the “Debate” course, it studies the book The Clear Book in Debating, with such general rules how to “respond to the Christians’ doubts.” The assigned text in the “Sociology of Family” is a theoretical introduction that enumerates theories beginning from Ibn Khaldun, and then another introduction to the crisis of the social sciences and calling to Islamizing and grounding knowledge. It then moves to the fiqh of family, once more listing multiple theories without manifesting any engagement or integration between these theories on the family. The course in “Social Psychology” taught by Dr. Farid Amar has many sections on the Islamic grounding of psychology (through the Quran and Sunnah), and discussion on Islamic thinkers who dealt with social psychology and focusing on the contribution of al-Junayd on education and good conduct, Ibn Khaldun on the social world and Imam Ghazali for ethics. As such, the author moves to discuss three fundamental references, distinguishing between socialism with its values on equality, and liberalism with its values on individual liberty, and the Islamic reference with its values of justice. As such, the author alerts the reader that “We Muslims share a number of values with the West, but in name only, with different content.” To conclude this section related to the Shariah and Islamic Studies programs, one can continue critically assessing the way their curriculum is an advanced model of reforming fiqh though Maqasid al-Shariah but with mixed effects of introducing some social sciences course. Yet while Shariah programs have a clear vision about the objective of learning for its students, there is undoubtedly an identity crisis with regard to Islamic studies. The students express many of these problems. Mustafa al-Wadghiri conducted an important survey with 457 students who graduated from Islamic Studies and Shariah departments in Morocco, as there is a general feeling that the university education programs do not treat contemporary issues in a sufficient manner. There is a small difference between graduates from Shariah colleges, as only 11% of them answered that they thought the university education programs treat contemporary issues, whereas half of them see it as doing so partially, and 40% do not agree, in comparison to 16%, 38%, and 46% of the Islamic studies graduates, that is, these studies treat daily issues relatively better than Shariah colleges. On the question: Do the university education programs cultivate future thought instead of memorization and automatic recall? A minority of Shariah college graduates (18%) answered positively, compared to 23% relatively so, and 59% negatively. These are approximately the same answer for graduates from Islamic Studies (16%, 29%, and 55%, respectively; al-Wadghiri 2016, 80–146). With regard to the teaching methods used by teachers in Shariah colleges, the majority of students (79%) answered that they were lecturing without interaction with students, compared to 5% dialogue, and 8% both methods, compared to 59%, 10% and 15% for teachers of Islamic Studies, that is, those teachers are relatively better at teaching methods. In

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  211 general, the methods used are based on dictation, as well as the learner’s negative role, which leads to a lack of development of the skills of self-education, even if the case is relatively better in Islamic Studies (al-Wadghiri 2016). This is contrary to Ibn Ashur’s expectations at the beginning of the previous century (as clarified in the testament in the beginning of the conclusion of this study below). Regardless of the analytical power of the al-Wadghiri’s survey, I can personally confirm through the two lectures I gave in Fez, one to teachers and students in Islamic studies and religious sociology, and another to teachers in Shariah colleges and their students, that the openness of the former compared to the latter was noticeable. Knowledge Production and Graduate Theses Many research centers in Morocco work to produce research and thought related to Shariah studies, through a significant amount of books and journals. There are three important journals: the Mir’at al-Turath (The Mirror of the Tradition),7 Da’wat al-Haq (Call for Truth),8 and Muqaribat (Approaches)9 journals. The Report on Islamic Academic Situation in Morocco presents in its third volume of 2015 (alMaqasid Center for Studies and Research 2016) a complete guide to this production through observing the trends in authorship, writing, lectures, seminars, conferences, academic debates and research. The report noted that these activities had a firm relationship of general interaction with the reality on the ground and reflect the sharp dichotomy that animates thought on the role of religion in everyday life between the spiritual and material, the religious and non-religious, the politicized and the non-politicized, the rational and the spiritual. It also noticed an increasing spread of Sufi thought, whereas authorship in the field of Islamic economics is weak given that Islamic banks in Morocco were only lately given licensing a couple of years ago. Whereas the number of books in the field can be counted on one hand, the seminars and conferences saw a large number of meetings and lectures about the participatory finance and banking system (i.e., Islamic banking system) in Moroccan universities and research institutions connected to them or independent (al-Maqasid Center for Studies and Research 2016). I will be concerned with what follows with universities’ production, and will primarily focus on master’s and doctoral dissertations on the one hand, and the university-published academic journals, on the other hand, taking the journal of the College of Usul al-Din in Tétouan as a model. Master’s and Doctoral Theses

The King Abdul-Aziz Al Saoud Foundation for Islamic Studies and Human Sciences in Casablanca prepared a database of the entirety of Moroccan university theses which were defended in colleges of arts and humanities from independence until 2008, reaching approximately 10,000 dissertations, 9.43% of which were in the field of Islamic studies (King Abdulaziz Al Saud Foundation 2010; see Table 7.2).

212  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Table 7.2 Percentage of Doctoral Theses in the Social and Human Sciences Academic Discipline

%

Arts Law Economic Sciences Islamic Sciences Linguistic Studies History Geography Other Fields Total

20.8 17.8 14.0 9.4 8.9 7.4 7.2 14.5 100.0

Source: King Abdulaziz Al Saud Foundation (2010). Compiled by the author.

The defended and recorded university theses from the College of Usul al-Din in Tétouan demonstrates that there has been a significant amount of knowledge produced in this college since the beginning of the nineties until 2014, which can be distributed in the following manner: 29 doctoral theses in creed and philosophy, 13 doctoral theses in tafsir and tafsir methodology. As for master’s theses, it reached 84 theses in creed and philosophy, 32 in creedal and ethical principles of takaful and transactions, and 144 theses in creed and thought in the Magreb (College of Usul al-Din- Tétouan 2014). Most of these dissertations were concerned with topics that discuss the biography or works of creedal and jurisprudential figures who helped enrich the Arab Islamic heritage. We also noticed a significant amount of effort in the critical editing (tahqiq) of manuscripts, as in 2014, most of the 30 defended master’s theses were in the critical editing of books of previous jurisprudents and historical topics, such as “Takfir of the Imams and Its Effect on the Backwardness and Decline of the Ummah in al-Andalus” and a critical editing of the manuscript of “al-Rawd alM’atar fi Ilm al-Nabi al-Mukhtar” by Abi al-Abass al-Banani, “Reformist Thought of Muhammad Yahya al-Walati,” and so on. Given that this college is open to non-Moroccan students, it attracts many foreign students, especially from Indonesia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Ghana and Mali. As such, there are important subjects specific to these countries. In general, there is little discussion of topics that touch on the current reality. There are some exceptions related to the clash with modern idealist thought, such as the doctoral thesis titled “The Thematic Exegesis of Muhammad Abid al-Jabri: A Critical Analytical Study of his Most Important Creedal and Intellectual premises,” or to the real world, such as “Christianization in the Arab West: Reality and its Dangers.” Both of these theses have critical approaches as shown in the title’s use of words such as “critique” or “dangers.” Currently, interest is growing in the topics of the Islamic economy, and especially the practical application of participatory banks and applying them in the real world, as shown in a report on The Islamic Academic Situation in Morocco (al-Maqasid Center for Studies and Research 2016).

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  213 All of these results do not differ from Abdelwahid Akmir’s description (1999) of Islamic studies theses, which he studied from the colleges of arts (where Islamic studies theses made up 18% of the total defended theses), that they focused on studying the biography or works of figures who helped enrich the Arab Islamic heritage, most of them from early Islamic history. According to Akmir, it is worth noting that some of the works on these figures were also conducted by researchers who defended their theses in philosophy. Here we believe it is important to devote space to comparing the contents of these university theses, given that they discussed the same subject from two different perspectives. He also noticed the concern of the Islamic studies department with manuscripts: “as the recorded theses on it formed 15%, and the significance of these studies lies in their having saved these manuscripts which Sufis and scholars authored in the previous centauries from being lost.” This researcher also noticed a concern with Islamic history, which formed 11% of the theses defended within Islamic studies, and that these theses covered the shortage in this field at the level of the history departments whose defended theses especially focused on Moroccan history” (Akmir 1999). The Islamic Academic Situation in Morocco Report (Volume III) also demonstrated the absence of coordination between universities at the level of research, which results in disastrous mistakes, such as researchers researching a topic which has been beaten to death in some universities while they think they are contributing something new to the literature. There are many examples of this, as Ahmed al-Rasyuni mentions that some researchers in manuscript critical editing think they are the first to edit a manuscript which had in fact already been edited (al-Maqasid Center for Studies and Research 2016). Despite that, some of these theses in Islamic studies have rich sociological content (even if they were written in a manner that mentions too many examples at expense of in-depth theoretical analysis). If we take for example the thesis of Jamila al-Musali (a leading member in the Justice and Development Party and the former minister of social solidarity and development and equality and family) titled “The Feminist Movement in Contemporary Morocco: Trends and Issues” (al-Musali 2011), which was turned into a book, it is a serious attempt to understand the Islamic feminist movement and view its approaches and activities and understand the differences between it and leftists in discussing women’s issues. According to al-Musali, the Islamic perspective is based on the concept of equality which calls for the invalidity of discrimination on the basis of gender, complementarity (takamuliyya) in relations between genders, and solidifying the center of the family in society, and depending on the tool of ijtihad in religion to put out a feminist model proud of its identity and authenticity. By complementarity, she means “a relationship of integration, synergy and cooperation between man and woman replacing [other approaches considering] the conflict, hatred and resentment between them” (al-Musali 2011, 285). The like of these studies were able to create a healthy debate within Moroccan society, even if the conflict of trends still continues (particularly at the elite level). For the leftist feminist activist Na’ima Benwakrim (2017), the discourse of the women’s rights movement is still based on ignoring the presence of this newcomer

214  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World at times, or dealing with it as an opposing side in the conflict at other times. She views organizations from an Islamic perspective as being able to find new interpretations of religious documents and texts in defending women rights and to connect their demands to a number of women’s issues that have a modern legal or universalist nature. More particularly, they demanded political rights for women against the stereotypes the world promotes with regard to women, and they fought violence against women despite the difference in difference and ideological choices. They also began to form an extension of the global feminist movement, and play an important role in pressing for international decisions related to women’s rights . . . Morocco today is in need of its conservativism and modernism to strengthen women’s rights in Morocco. (p. 20) In another interview with Benwakrim, she mentioned that the “Islamic feminist movement has the ability to change, because its demands are closer to the Moroccan mentality, which forms a bridge to present feminist thought and confront patriarchal thought.”10 Journal of the College of Usul al-Din

The Journal of the College of Usul al-Din is a refereed academic journal. Its latest volume was published in conjunction with a prominent historical event, the celebration of 50  years since the College of Usul al-Din’s establishment under the supervision of Dr. Muhammad al-Tamsamani, the dean of the college. This referred journal included a revival of a number of religious terms and concepts and their explanation, based on several creedal bases, and clarifying the foundations of religious consciousness. This journal thus declared its aims to be the safeguarding of the foundations of creed and revival of its foundations with original academic studies. We analyzed the content of the two bi-annual volumes (3–4) (480 pages), which clearly manifest the College’s reformist concern and concern with fiqh al-waqi’. There is a small article by al- Tayeb Buizza titled “On the Need of Arab Reality to Enable the Social Sciences” (Buizza 2015), which has a call to connect the social sciences to Shariah studies. As for al-Makki Aqlayna, a professor of Sunnah and its Sciences at Qatar University, he has an important paper on “Decision-Making in Light of the Prophetic Sunnah” (Aqlayna 2015), as he conducts a critical literature review of Western work on decision-making, what it requires in terms of thought and planning for successful execution, theorizing about the elements that could lead to the resolution’s failure, accounting the degree of risk it could present, preparing for all that to guarantee the highest degree of success, and avoiding the elements of failure as much as possible, and at the lowest cost if it does happen, which is expressed as calculating the risk ratio. While he criticizes its focus on the material aspect, he does not refuse it but presents some opinions of an ethical nature in light of the

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  215 Prophetic Sunnah to improve the conditions of decision-making. He justified that with the following: Undoubtedly Allah’s Messenger (PBUH) passed many of the conditions demanded for making appropriate decisions and preparing to take them, and he prepared for them by taking the necessary measures for their success. . . . All of that pushed me to follow the steps which the Messenger of the Islamic Ummah followed to walk with his guidance, and guarantee quality with Allah’s ability and power. (Aqlayna 2015) It is as if he believes that religion, as an effective factor in human life, can present a framework of spirituality and concepts which can aid in understanding social phenomena and presenting solutions for them. The writer does not present an alternative theory for the theories presented in the field, but adds some applied ethics to them. There is another significant study on “The Guarantee of Human Rights of Life and Protection from Torture: An Approach in the Framework of the Islamic Shariah and International Conventions concerned with Human Rights” (Ajuyllal 2015) This paper presents a significant harmonization between the two frameworks with regard to human rights of life and protection from torture, without having an obsession of proving Islamic superiority over the contradictory approach. Finally, there is an apologetic study of the Moroccan system, of which its title says much: “The Oath of Affiliation and Command of the Believers and Their Effects on National Unity” (Rahmouni 2015). Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya Institute: An Outstanding Model To conclude this chapter, I will devote a section to the Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya Institute to clearly demonstrate the importance of this “elite” institute of teaching Islamic Studies. History

Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya Institute is an institute for higher education and academic research, affiliated with University al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco under the responsibility of the ministry of endowments. It is entrusted with the mission of forming ulema and researchers in deep and specialized graduate Islamic studies, and developing academic research in the field of Islamic studies and Islamic thought, comparative religions and comparative fiqh.11 It was established in 1964 to revive modern Moroccan schools particularly in Hadith after the modern schools in the Eastern Arab world had become influenced by the Salafi and Wahhabi schools. Hasan II, the king at the time, charged the hadith and fiqh scholar Khalil al-Warzazi (1899–1986) to establish this institution and to study the noble hadith from the major hadith collections. The institute had an Arab dimension, as the Syrian

216  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Muhammad Fauq al-Nabhan (1940–) became the dean from 1977 to 2000, and some outstanding scholars taught in it as well (e.g., the Egyptian Aisha Abdulrahman [Bint al-Shati’]). The Academic Committee charged with formulating the curricula was headed by the Moroccan reformist Alal al-Fasi (al-Zefzoufi, al-Khatib, and Ruqayya 2016, 14). The institute was re-formulated in 2005 to mold scholars not only in the Islamic Studies, but also scholars in Shariah and researchers open to the rest of the social sciences and humanities, with the aim of enabling them to have a wide scope of what is happening around them in their environment, both close and far (al-Kalam 2013). Candidates must have obtained a baccalaureate degree in high school, whether in regular or the old (atiqa) schools, their academic grades must not be lower than 12 out of 20, and their grades in Arabic, French and English must not be less than 12 out of 20 as well. It has two tracks: The Track of Basic Specialized Formation consists of eight semesters divided over four years (two preparatory semesters), after which students are granted a Bachelors in the Religious Sciences from Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya. The Deep Higher Formation Track welcomes students holding a degree from al-Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya, or another college of law, economics or the social sciences, or their equivalent. This track consists of two stages: The Training Phase includes four semesters distributed over two years, and its teaching is based on a track system. Students at the end of this phase obtain a Masters degree of Qualification in Higher Islamic Studies. Doctorate Phase: Students engross themselves for at least three years to obtain a doctorate degree in Higher Islamic Studies. According to statistics from 2022, the institute holds 299 students, and in 2022, 85 students graduated (33 from the bachelor’s, 41 from the master’s and 11 from the doctoral program), all of whom obtained scholarships throughout the course of their study. Curricula

In the institute’s new phase it demonstrated diversity at the level of the assigned courses in the institute. In addition to Shariah courses, the teaching program was enriched with new courses, whether in the field of languages or in the humanities. The following courses were added: the French, English, Spanish and Arabic languages, logic, psychology, sociology, history, law, research methods, economics and media studies. Approximately half of the courses are in the Shariah sciences. It attracted my attention that most of the courses in the Shariah sciences at the master’s level discuss nawazil (unprecedented issues in fiqh), consequences and reality, making the Maqasidi approach the dominant one in all the sciences of Quranic exegesis, Hadith, creed and fiqh (“Introduction in Considering Outcomes,” “Foundation of Pragmatic Exegesis of the Quran,” “Principles Related to

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  217 Pragmatic Approach,” “Considering Outcomes in Fatwa and Nawazil,” “Creedal Judgement and their Outcomes in Thought and the Real World”). Quranic exegesis is concerned with studying models to understand the spirit of religion (“Studies in Systematic Exegesis of Quran”). It is also noteworthy that there is no course named “Islamic Economics” but rather only “Participatory Finance in Morocco.” The second half of the courses are distributed between languages, humanities and the social sciences. The institute attracts some Moroccan and Arab teachers to teach these sciences, such as the Egyptian Rushdi Fakkar (1928–2000), and Mokhtar El Harass (professor of sociology in Muhammad V University, College of Arts and Humanities in Rabat). Abdelmoneim al-Shaqiri, professor of sociology at the Institute,12 mentioned that the students interacted with his course like students in the social sciences, even if he teaches the course ”Introduction to Sociology” only slightly differently from how it is taught in the department of sociology to allow discussions between this field and religious fields. There are also interdisciplinary courses such as “Research Methods.” Looking over this course, for the first time I find it does not discuss interaction with only texts, but also techniques for conducting fieldwork on how to interpret reality like any research methods course in the social sciences. Some of them complained that the number of Shariah courses compared to other courses led to weak Shariah formation (al-Kalam 2013), but the ratio between these two types of courses are similar to any other university that adopts a liberal arts principle, that is, mandates students with courses beyond their major. From looking over and reading the titles of theses, 12 of them master’s and 8 doctoral theses, it became clear to me that: • There is no evidence of weak Shariah formation of graduates. • Most of the theses were written in an academic style in the humanities and social sciences in the Arab world in terms of outlines and argumentation structure. Therefore, it is clear that there is a benefit from these sciences methodologically and in what are the important contemporary issues that need to be discussed using lived fiqh (alfiqh almu’ash) or fiqh of reality. • They also used references in both Arabic and foreign sources, and the students’ understanding of the works they read was clear. Rarely is Western literature referred to as Orientalist. As for topics chosen, there is a focus on social and economic relationships (mu’amalat) (“Reforming Family Law in Nigerian Society: A Study in Light of Maliki Fiqh and Contemporary Fiqhi Ijtihadat,” and “Family-Regulation Laws: A Comparative Analytical Study”) or on economic issues (“Taxation System in Fiqhi Ijtihad: A Vision of Habilitation and Application,” “Effect of the Hadith on Prohibited Sales in Contemporary Financial Transactions: Commodity and Merchandise Exchange as Models,” and “A Theory of Harmonizing between Zakat and Taxes: A Fiqhi Grounding Study.”) This concurs with the director of al-Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya Ahmad al-Khamlishi’s statement that the essential field of ijtihad the institute aims to push for is in the field of social and economic interactions.

218  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World Methodologically, there is a clear interest in rationalizing rulings according to the paradigm of Maqasid al-Shariah: “Theory of Ta’lil in Usuli Thought: From Shafii (204 H.) to Ghazali (505 H.),” “Tahqiq al-Manat: The Need for It and Who Is Doing It in the Contemporary World,” and “Fiqhi Ta’lil of the Ruling on Apostasy: Conceptualization, Issues and Problems,” “Deducing Evidence in Ash’ari Kalam: A  Study in Logic’s Reception and Constructing Proofs,” and “Ta’lil of Fiqhi Rulings in Custody, Parenting Rights and Spending.” As well as connecting the text to the real world and especially law: “Legal Application of Spending on the Wife Stipulated in Article 199 of the Family Code,” “Managing the Legal Empty Space between the two Ijtihads of the Old Fiqh and Contemporary Moroccan Law,” “Comparative Religions: The Problem of Revelation in Jewish and Christian Religious Writings on Exegesis: Nadhm al-Durar fi Tanasub al-Ayat wa al-Suwar by Burhan al-Din al-Biqa’I (885 H.) as a Case Study,” and “Understanding of the Other in Jewish Thought.” The institute holds annual conferences on important subjects related to reform, such as for instance the conference “The Question of Ethics and Values in our Contemporary World” which was organized in cooperation with the Muhammadiyya Union of Ulema. The administration was also able to build links with foreign institutions, as students are required to spend at least one semester outside the institute. As such it has several cooperation agreements, the latest of which was with the Theology Department at the University of Marmara in Turkey, Rotterdam Islamic University affiliated with Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Free University of Amsterdam), and as such attracts international visiting students (through the Erasmus+ program). The institute also conducts domestic and foreign academic visits for professors and students. Conclusion The aim of education is to bring minds to the level of innovation. The meaning of innovation is to become ready to innovate in issues and expand data as innovated by those before them, advancing knowledge and its means. This is not done except by bringing about thought’s power of judgment that distinguishes between the truth and falsity of the information it receives. This requires the freedom of real critique at the highest degree and what approximates it. (Ben Achour [1907] 2006, 109) University education in Shariah studies and in Islamic studies in Morocco represent two important models that are generally open to the fiqh of reality and moderation. As such, they differ greatly from what we found in many Arab universities I studied. The state of these two models of education, which transcend the in-depth study of three cases (The College of Shariah in Tétouan and Fez, and Islamic Studies in Rabat) had a thriving awareness of the importance of openness to other cultures and civilizations, and the higher aims of the Shariah,

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  219 which they considered as the source that gives birth to ijtihad. This is indicated by the names of higher studies tracks: master’s in Religious Dialogue and Issues of Ijtihad and Reform in Islamic Culture (College of Arts and Humanities, Beni Mellal) In this master’s, students take courses like “The Shariah Text and the Fiqh of Reality,” “Comparative Applications With the Bible,” “Ijtihad and Reform,” “The Higher Aims and Ta’lil,” “Sources of Knowledge and Integrating Sciences,” “Philosophy of Religion and Religious Social Sciences,” Schools and Trend of Contemporary Arab and Islamic Thought,” “Religious and Civilizational Dialogue,” “Centers of Dialogue: Models from the Islamic World and Western World,” and “Theories of Change and Reform.” This master’s may be the only one in the Arab world in which the Shariah and social sciences clearly interact in its courses. Furthermore, the bachelor’s and higher studies in Shariah and law at Fez provide opportunities for graduates to learn not only in the religious field, but in the legal field as well. As shown on the Facebook page for students in this specialization (the Schoolyard of the College of Shariah and Law in Fez),13 these students are able to participate in the same competitions as their peers in the College of Law. The openness of Islamic studies in Morocco as an academic field to the social sciences and humanities did not prevent the presence of an identity crisis in this field: Is it a field of the Islamic Sciences or an application of Islam? Or a field on Islam? If it is a field on Islam, this means a comprehensive openness to the social and Shariah sciences and humanities. Alongside Pierre Vermeren (2007), I wonder if religious teaching can be reformed without a religious reform and its implications on the two issues of the Arabic language and Islamic Shariah, and whether we can distinguish between programs of Shariah programs and Islamic Studies programs and their placement in Colleges of Arts. Should we make them more general like Rashid Jarmouni’s suggestion to name the program as “Thought and Civilization”? All of this requires debate and stakes that transcend cognitive and pedagogical aspects. What concerns me in this chapter is the return to our first problem, that is, if Islamic and Shariah studies programs confirm the importance of fiqh al-waqi, which would require a necessity to use the social sciences. However, what we touched upon in our field research is that there are three obstacles to using the social sciences: The difficulty of Arab scholars in the social sciences’ engagement with some liberal elite which have a particular political orientation: Despite the Arab revolutions, this elite remains unopen to the new emerging elite. As we previously clarified, there is a competitive view between these departments and the departments of social sciences and philosophy, with only shy exchanges between these departments which should interact under the aegis of the same college, the College of Arts, which I named as juxtaposition (in contrast to interaction). This juxtaposition, however, takes different forms: an active juxtaposition at the individual level, a calm juxtaposition under the care of mutual respect, and juxtaposition while viewing each other suspiciously. As

220  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World such, these departments are neighbors more than they are interlocutors, and any engagement happens at the individual level more than these departments’ clear policy. The problem between these departments is more political than epistemological. The social scientists see their sciences as superior to Islamic sciences and this constitutes a salient cause for distrust. The latter are only weakly connected to the social sciences, as there is still a pathological fear that something could undermine religion and the revealed, and there is an attempt to “protect” it from slipping to “unknown terrain.” This is despite the awareness of the founder of the Islamic Studies field in Morocco, al-Bashir al-Husni, of the Islamic studies’ nature of “multiple integrated tracks, as they connect between Shariah, linguistic, philosophical, legal and economic sciences, etc. They also have a say in intellectual issues related to the track of all sciences and current issues of health, environment and development” (al-Husni 2004). At the second level is the nature of research produced by Islamic/Shariah Studies and Social Studies departments. The products of the Islamization of knowledge and integrating knowledge projects, the tendency among some social scientists to be anti-clericalists, manifested in most of them in an epistemological impairment and empirical laziness (See Chapter 3), failed to a large extent in extending both the Shariah Sciences and Social sciences to the necessary knowledge and research methodologies to interact between them. Perhaps, the Minister of Education’s obstructing students from moving from one specialization to another while moving to a higher degree lessened students’ mobility between the Shariah and social sciences. As such, it weakens the possibilities for interdisciplinary studies between them. Nonetheless, the openness of Islamic studies remains prominent compared to the Shariah colleges. Perhaps, the most important reformers today graduated from the former, as the former head of The International Union of Muslim Ulema Ahmed al-Raysuni is a graduate of Islamic Studies. Political oppression not as a secondary factor, but as a primary factor in the Moroccan context: This oppression, or what Salim Hmimnat terms “the constraints of authoritarian modernization,” played an important role in three aspects: that the majority of religious and social knowledge produced by academic research is functional and technical more than critical, the relative weakness of engagement with the wider public, the attempt of the political power to control the religious field and block the interaction between what is official political religious field and civil society’s religious field (or civic sphere in the sense of Jeffrey Alexander). I asked one of the teachers at the College of Usul al-Din about the two sheikhs, Abdulrahman al-Maghrawi and Ahmed al-Raysuni, the answer was that they do not represent Moroccan Islam.14 We also noticed a lack of cooperation between the European Council of Moroccan Ulema and the European Council for Fatwa and Research. If the Muhammad VI Center for Training Ulema in Rabat attracts students from

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  221 Morocco, sub-Saharan countries and France, as the spearhead of the religious soft diplomacy of the Moroccan monarch Muhammad VI to promote the values of “dialogue,” “coexistence,” and “moderation,” then political repression has affected the extent of this project’s success (Hmimnat 2020). Finally, the absence of teaching a course on Shariah Politics (Siyasa Shariyya) in Moroccan universities is one of the consequences of this repression. This could perhaps be a good thing as long as this course is not subjected to serious ijtihadi review, like that done by Abdullah Ibrahim Zaid al-Kilani (2015). Notes 1 I would like to profusely thank Salman Buna’man, Rashid Jarmuni and Abdelmoneim Shuqair for their help in field research for this study. 2 www.habous.gov.ma/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D 8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9.html 3 I viewed the curricula of more Moroccan universities than the two mentioned here (especially that of Mulai Ismail University in Meknas), and made many comparisons, which I will discuss at times broadly. 4 Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi Tétouan uses selection of Al-Shatibi’s Al-Muwafaqat and Ahmed Al-Raysuni’s Theories of Maqasid, whereas Mulay Ismail University in Meknas (Islamic Studies—Creed and Thought track) uses Nur Al-Din Ben Mukhtar Al-Khadimi (1999)’s Maqasidi Ijtihad: Its Evidences—Controlling factors (Dawabit)— Fields. This book is of little ijtihad. 5 www.chariaafes.com 6 L’art de la thèse: comment préparer et rédiger une thèse de doctorat, une mémoire de DEA ou de maîtrise ou tout autre travail universitaire by Michel Beaud. La prise de notes intelligente, by Renée et Jean Simonet. La méthode SPRI pour organiser ses idées et bien rédiger, by Louis Timbal-Duclaux. 7 www.arrabita.ma/Detail_Isdarat.aspx?C=101400 8 www.habous.gov.ma/daouat-alhaq/index.php?Itemid=120&option=com_ blankcomponent&view=default 9 http://moqarabat.com/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86.html 10 https://elaph.com/Web/News/2019/03/1241630.html 11 www.edhh.org 12 I would like to thank Abdelmoneim Al-Shaqiri for his insights about this institution. 13 https://cutt.us/AklM6 14 In the same vein, when there were a conflict in opinion between the dean of the Sharia College in Fez with the coordinator of the master’s “The Fiqh of Family” in 2013, the latter did not hesitate to request the mediation of the Moroccan king in front of the dean whom she accused of being biased to the Justice and Development Party. See www. youtube.com/watch?v=QnI7oiiWywg

References In Arabic Ajuyllal, Idris. 2015. “Guarantees of the Human Right to Life and Protection from Torture— an Approach within the Framework of Islamic Shariah and International Human Rights Instruments.” Journal of the Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion (3–4): 266–71. Akmir, Abdelwahid. 1999. “The Development of Scientific Research in Morocco through University Theses: Humanities as a Model.” Fiqr Wa Naked (28).

222  Curricula of Shariah Programs in the Arab World al-Ansari, Farid. 2016. The Basics of Research in the Shariah Sciences: An Attempt at a Methodological Grounding. Cairo: Dar Al Salam for Printing and Publishing. al-Husni, Belbachir. 2004. “Islamic Studies between the Present and Future Prospects.” Maghras. www.maghress.com/attajdid/17211. al-Husni, Belbachir. 2014. “Interview with Dr. Belbachir al-Husni: Obstacles in the Path of the Founder of the People of Islamic Studies in Morocco.” Nama Center for Research and Studies. http://www.nama-center.com/DialogueDatials.aspx?Id=37. al-Ja’mati, Abdelsalam. 2016. “Religious Education From Mosque Circles to Institutionalization,” In: Renewing Religious Education: The Question of Vision and Curriculum, edited by Muhammad Jabroun. Rabat: Believers Without Borders Foundation for Studies and Research, 45–78. al-Jalil, Abdulaziz. 2009. “The Fitna of Calling for Bridging and Interreligious Dialogue.” www.almoslim.net/node/94033. al-Kalam, Yousef. 2013. “The Project of Knowledge Integration between Shariah Sciences and the Humanities: An Analytical Evaluation Study of the Experience of Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya Foundation.” In Knowledge Integration: Its Impact on University Education and its Necessity, edited by Raed Jamil Okasha, 375–413. Amman: International Institute of Islamic Thought. al-Khadimi, Nur al-Din ben Mukhtar. 1999. Maqasidi Ijtihad: Its Evidences- Controlling Factors (thawabit)-Fields. Umma Series, no. 65. Doha: Ministry of Waqf and Islamic Affairs. al-Kilani, Abdullah Ibrahim Zaid. 2015. Shariah Politics: An Introduction to the Renewal of Islamic Discourse. Amman: The International Institute of Islamic Thought-Jordan Office. al-Maqasid Center for Studies and Research. 2016. Report of the Islamic Scientific Status in Morocco—Third Issue of 2015. al-Makassed Center for Studies and Research. al-Musali, Jamila. 2011. The Women’s Movement in Contemporary Morocco: Trends and Issues. Rabat: Moroccan Center for Contemporary Studies and Research. al-Sahmwadi, Shakir Ahmed. 2010. Curricula of Contemporary Arab Thought in Studying Issues of Faith and Heritage. Jeddah: Grounding Center for Studies and Research. al-Wadghiri, Mustafa. 2016. Teaching Shariah Sciences in Universities: Reality and Prospects. Martil: Higher School of Teachers in Martil. al-Zefzoufi, Bushti, Aziz al-Khatib, and Abdullah bin Ruqayya. 2016. al-Ithhafat al-Sunni with Translations from a Lesson in Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya (1436–1383 AH / 1964– 2014 AD). Rabat: Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya Foundation. Aqlayna, al-Makki. 2015. “Decision Making in the Light of the Sunnah.” Journal of the Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion (3–4): 266–71. Ben Achour, Mohamed Eltaher. [1907] 2006. Is Not the Dawn Near? Arabic Islamic Education. Dar Sahnoun for Publishing and Distribution with Dar Al Salam. Benwakrim, Na’ima. 2017. “The Moroccan Women’s Movement Experience: Advocacy, Research and Public Policy in the Field of Human Rights—A Case Study of Morocco.” www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/publications/research_reports/2016-2017/20170402_ morocco_arabic.pdf. Buizza, Tayeb. 2015. “The Arab reality Needs to Activate Social Sciences.” Journal of the Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion (3–4): 266–71. Hamad, Ahmed. 1982. The Political Aspect of the Life of the Prophet [PBUH]. Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam. Hammam, Muhammad. 2014. The Intersection of Shariah and Social Sciences: A Critical Epistemological Approach in the Islamization of Knowledge Project (IoK): The Debate

Curricula of Shariah Programs and Islamic Studies in Morocco  223 between Ismail Raji al-Faruqi and Muhammad Abi al-Qasim Haj Hamd. Believers Without Borders. Jarmouni, Rashid. 2016. “A Methodological Approach to the Study of the Religious Phenomenon: The Case of Moroccan Youth as a Model.” Idafat-The Arab Journal of Sociology (35): 24–47. Khalil, Sabri Mohamed. 2006. Cognitive Dimensions of the Concept of Stewardship. Khartoum: Knowledge Enlightenment Center. http://www.sudanile.com/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=69059:@c1@-C2&catid=252&Itemid=55. King Abdulaziz Al Saud Foundation. 2010. Moroccan Dissertations and Theses. Casablanca: King Abdulaziz Al Saud Foundation. Rahmouni, Abdelaziz. 2015. “Allegiance and the Emirate of the Believers and Their Impact on National Unity.” Journal of the Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion (3–4): 266–71. Tayyar, Ilyas. 2017. “The Case of Antique Schools in Morocco: A  Socio-Diagnostic Approach to the Situation of Antique Education—The Essaouira Province Model.” In Religious Education in Morocco: Diagnosis and Foresight—Part One, edited by alHasan Hama, 175–212. Rabat: Moroccan Center for Contemporary Studies and Research. In Other Languages Berger, Peter, ed. 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Hmimnat, Salim. 2020. “ ‘Spiritual Security’ as a (Meta-)Political Strategy to Compete over Regional Leadership: Formation of Morocco’s Transnational Religious Policy towards Africa.” The Journal of North African Studies 25 (2): 189–227. https://doi.org/10.1080/1 3629387.2018.1544073. Mohammed, El Ayadi, Rachik Hassan, and Mohamed Tozy. 2007. L’Islam au quotidien. Enquête sur les valeurs et les pratiques religieuses au Maroc. Casablanca: Prologues. Vermeren, Pierre. 2007. “Une si difficile réforme: La réforme de l’université Qarawiyyin de Fès sous le Protectorat français au Maroc, 1912–1956.” Cahiers de la Méditerranée (75): 119–32.

Part III

Alternative Models

8 Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences The Case of the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University

Introduction The College of Islamic Studies has been one of the important colleges affiliated with Hamad Bin Khalifa University since its establishment in 2007 as it carries out two essential roles: first providing higher education in contemporary Islamic studies; and second research, as it provides a distinguished platform to participate in intellectual debates on Islam and Muslims in a global context. Since its establishment, the college’s clear aim has been to graduate students who not only understand religion, but also contemporary reality. This objective was defined by the founding dean, Hatim al-Qarnshawi.1 Sheikha Moza played a pioneering role in formulating the general plans of the university and distinguishing it from the national university (University of Qatar) through its use of the English language and developing multi-disciplinary specializations to a high level. As such, this college uses both the English and Arabic languages to teach its programs to various degrees according to the program and its development. However, this also presents some problems, which we will discuss in the conclusion. The college passed through several phases of structuring and re-structuring, as many decisions in the Gulf are generally taken through trial and error. Some programs have recently been cancelled while other programs have been re-formulated. The current dean, Dr. Emad al-Din al-Shahin, a professor in international relations and a specialist in the Muslim world, has played a pioneering role in re-structuring the college. He viewed the college’s strength as lying in three areas: first, its methodology that combines Islamic values, solid academia, and contemporary social sciences (strengthening multi-disciplinary research programs, spurring new participations in contemporary and applied Islamic studies and sciences in their global context); second, innovative teaching platforms; and third, strengthening students’ skills (here meaning pushing innovation and connecting students to the labor market). For him, the aim of all of this is to build a pioneering generation of Islamic studies scholars, financial experts, social thinkers, pioneers, researchers and applied specialists, to pave the path towards furthering Islamic thought.2 Since its establishment, the college has graduated around 340 students from 74 nationalities. To study the college’s curricula and the extent of the Shariah sciences’ connection to the social sciences, this study analyzed the content of the college’s curricula, DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-12

228  Alternative Models the descriptions of the assigned texts we were able to obtain, and several interviews with teachers and students who participate in these programs. I analyzed the content of some of the knowledge production of professors and master’s dissertations produced in its program in a general manner by looking over the assigned texts in some of the colleges.3 Academic Programs The college contains five academic programs and four centers. The college’s strong point is in its mainstreaming of a new paradigm that connects religion, not as legislation but as ethics, to the social sciences. If the International Islamic University in Malaysia generalized “the Islamization of human knowledge,” with all its challenges of establishing universal sciences with pluralistic approaches, this college did not want to face this risk, as it worked to integrate the sciences in a manner open to the entire world, so a researcher in any social science could understand. Adding the ethical to sciences is a demand called for by many theorists in the West and East from the Frankfurt and Marxist schools, radical philosophers, convivialists and other social scientists opposed to utilitarianism. This subject, then, is not limited to Islamic particularities, as there are cultural particularities in every society, and as such, a pluralistic approach is very much a universal task. Faculty members in the college come from various intellectual and academic and even religious trends. This diversity has always been a part of the intellectual imagination of the first founders of the college’s project and its research wings (The Center of Islamic Legislation and Ethics) until today. Here it is worth pointing to the following example: in 2012, Ray Jureidini, a sociologist and outstanding scholar in migration issues, decided to attend a seminar by Tareq Ramadan on Islamic Ethics. When Ramadan was presenting some of the noble verses and prophetic narrations on contemporary issues, Jureidini presented some of the approaches with the ideas of some of the founding fathers of sociology (e.g., Emile Durkheim and Max Weber). After some time, Ramadan contacted Jureidini and asked if he would be interested in working with him as a researcher in the center, despite knowing that Jureidini did not know Arabic or have training in Islamic studies. Ramadan chose him due to his ability to interpret sociological phenomena, something scholars of Shariah and ethics require; and to apply the perspectives of human rights and ethics to migrant labor issues in Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council, something which had become an international concern. As such, the view from the onset was how to engage with experience to ethicize the sciences. Looking over the resumes of 20 of the current members of the faculty, almost every one of them has engaged with different disciplines in their teaching or professional career. Ibrahim Zain began by studying philosophy in his bachelor’s and master’s in Khartoum before specializing in religious studies from Temple University; Mutaz al-Khatib publishes in humanities and social sciences journals (such as Tabayyun) as much as he does in Shariah and Islamic Studies journals; and the work of Mohammed Ghaly, acting director of Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics, on bioethics

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  229 collaborates with medicine and the biological sciences. It is, therefore, a college with truly inter-disciplinary approaches and programs. In terms of the shared characteristics between the programs, there are three particular characteristics worth noting. First, adopting a maqasidi approach, even though it is not necessarily present as an independent course, but as a method at the core of different courses. For instance, the course “Applied Subjects in Usul al-Fiqh and Maqasid al-Sharia” taught by Abdulazeem Abozaid begins by teaching Ahmed al-Raysuni’s book on maqasid before moving to apply the idea to issues of financing and economy. Second, there is a strong concern with comparative studies to confirm faith-based philosophies not limited to Islam, such as in the course “Religious Experience and Comparative Mysticism” taught by Ibrahim Zain, which naturally discusses both the Abrahamic religions and Eastern religions in terms of their ontological structure. Third, the strength of its programs and graduates spring from its ability to attract a core of professorsresearchers who have prestigious research careers in both Arabic and English, which distinguishes this college from Arab Shariah colleges. This is clearly reflected from reviewing the descriptions of many of the assigned courses, which have sources in both Arabic and English, and have one foot firmly in the classical tradition and the other in the modern age. This also distinguishes it from the University of Qatar, for example. It is often updated annually as it becomes clear from comparing syllabi of the same courses. The college defines Islamic studies itself as a part of the humanities and social sciences like in the West, as its counts the College of Religions or Theology as a part of the humanities. Therefore, it teaches three specializations in the arts (Islam and international affairs, applied Islamic ethics, and Islamic studies), just as it teaches two specializations in science (Islamic art and architecture and Islamic finance), in addition to a doctorate recently established in Islamic Finance and Economics. Let us now look at these programs and centers in detail. Applied Islamic Ethics

The college is particularly distinguished by its program in Applied Islamic Ethics, which is the first of its kind in the world. It discusses how Islam, as a global religion which enjoys a rich ethico-religious tradition, participates in global ethical dialogue. This program combines two types of ethical knowledge rooted in the Islamic tradition: theoretical knowledge and its different fields of application. The repeated changes made to the college’s programs could be based on confirming their particularity and renewing the basis of our view of the field of “Islamic studies” as distinguished from traditional Shariah colleges. The college minimized the space of fiqh, first transforming it from an independent program to a sub-specialty within the program of Islamic Studies, and then to a special track under the name “Fiqh and Society.” Thus, an independent program for Islamic ethics was created. This is an emerging academic field whose absence Fazlur Rahman had previously complained about in contrast to the massive size of fiqh.

230  Alternative Models The program states that it increases participants’ research skills to continue their academic studies on the one hand, in addition to developing and applying ethics to their existing qualifications: “in a professional environment by regulating ethical guidelines and policies in government and private institutions active in a wide range of areas, including biomedical sciences, engineering, business, politics, family, migrant labor, and human rights—in Muslim and Western contexts.” Contrary to the previous program, here the Islamic context is compared to the Western which varies between hegemonic secular and religious (Christian or Jewish). However, those who run the program clarify that this is not to create a sharp dichotomy, but an academic and research specialization, nothing more. This affirms the program’s pluralistic approach, as some we met in the program highlighted the richness of the ethical tradition in its various forms. Pluralism is one of the aims of the program: “comparing and analyzing how to discuss different specialization and ethical issues from various viewpoints,” as “it enriches global dialogue on the ethical challenges and dilemmas.” As such, the program’s focus is not a normative confrontation of good and evil, but rather based on critical examinations of ethical dilemmas. The program’s overall framework was formulated to balance two primary aspects: “the academic aspect” of Islamic ethics, through a scholarly approach rooted in the Islamic scholarly tradition; and the “applied aspect” to improve students’ skills in addressing the vexing ethical dilemmas and questions that people face in contemporary times—adding critical value to professional qualifications. The program is made up of 36 assigned hours taught in English. It includes two foundation courses (“Islamic Ethics: Mapping the Field” and “Research Methods and Sources in the Field of Ethics”), two core courses on theoretical ethics (“Scriptural Ethics: Ethics in Quran” and “Sunnah, Theological and Philosophical Ethics”), and five elective courses in applied ethics from among ten options (“Islamic Bioethics,” “Ethical Reasoning and Decision-Making,” “Ethics of Migration and Human Rights,” Business Ethics,” “Peace, War and Politics of Ethics,” “Gender and Islamic Ethics,” “Ethical Issues in Psychology,” “Environmental Ethics,” “Art and Ethics,” “Comparative Religious Ethics,” “Ethics and Artificial Intelligence,” “Ethics of Pandemics” and “Ethics in Science and Technology”), in addition to a compulsory research thesis for graduation. The “Islamic Ethics: Mapping the Field” course is a general introduction to ethics and also serves as a general course that can be taken by students in all four college programs as well as the Applied Ethics Program. The course is taught by Mu’taz al-Khatib and Muhammad Ghaly. It is an introduction that covers the essential concepts and different principles and approaches to Islamic ethics in the different fields of Islamic knowledge. The instructors teach in a critical manner the development of the concept of ethics, and how these principles and their applications relate to contemporary issues in different fields, including the economy,

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  231 medicine, politics, society and culture, in addition to the two sciences of fiqh and kalam. This course was designed to develop students’ skills of ethical thinking to treat contemporary ethical dilemmas. It is made up of four parts: an introduction to “Islamic ethics” as a concept and field of study, theoretical ethics, applied ethics, and critical ethical thinking. Given the course’s unique plan and content, the Philosophy Department of the American University of Beirut invited Mu’taz al-Khatib to teach it within their courses in the winter of 2019. Another distinguishing factor of the program is the “Islamic Bioethics” course taught by Muhammad al-Ghali, which is concerned with the ethical questions raised by modern medical techniques (such as new reproductive techniques, genomes, life support and the beginning and end of life). This course overlaps with Western ethical discussions on the one hand, and the fatwas and decisions of fiqh councils in the Muslim world on the other. There are two courses which are taught for the first time in the field of Islamic studies: “Ethical Reasoning,” taught by Mu’taz al-Khatib, and “Scriptural Ethics,” which is co-taught by Samer Rashwani and Mu’taz al-Khatib, and they reflect another form of engagement with Western ethical discussions in their two intellectual and religious writings which developed a number of studies in these two fields. From here, the program tries to engage in these discussions with the diversity of the Islamic ethical tradition, which adds to the college’s strong point over traditional Shariah colleges. The program is also distinguished by the presence of other specialized topics, such as the “Ethics of Migration and Human Rights” taught by Ray Jureidini. Islam and Global Affairs Program

This program has two aims: “to analyze the place of Islam in the context of global affairs, and the interconnected challenges facing global Muslim communities from an interdisciplinary perspective.”4 As such, it encourages students, in addition to participating in research journals in their field, to “explore complex, interconnected global issues in collaboration with local and international organizations. Graduates of this program will possess the skills to become multidimensional ethical global leaders and change makers.” It is worth pointing out the focus of the program’s description on the human and universal element, as Students of the program analyze how Islam promotes a concern for human well-being and dignity on a global level. They develop a deeper understanding of how the values of Islamic teachings promote peace and cooperation across cultures, religions, and geographies. The program is a two-year program studied in English, made up of 36 hours which include the following: three foundational courses (“Introduction to Islam and Global Affairs,” “The Islamic Worldview,” “Research Methods”) and three essential courses (“Global Differences,” “Islam, Conflict Transformation and

232  Alternative Models Spreading Peace,” and “Globalization and Development Based on Faith”) and two elective courses from among the following courses: “Special Topics in Islam and Global Affairs,” “Islam and Global Governance,” “Humanitarian Work in the Islamic World,” in addition to what they term as a “laboratory” equivalent to one course (with applied research) and then the thesis. As can be seen from the course titles, the program focuses on the Muslim world more than theorizing the Islamic perspective. According to the former dean Dr. Emad al-Din al-Shahin, this program expanded thanks to the quality of faculty members. Here he particularly singled out Louay Safi for his prolific knowledge production, in addition to his important role in grounding the importance of democracy and generalizing it in the Islamic system and generally grounding the necessity of using reason (the title of his remarkable book) in understanding the classical tradition. Faculty member Mohamad Evren Tok is a good example of how to integrate Islamic values within global thinking instead of the exclusivist views which dominate how some Islamists view the social sciences, as shown through an article he co-authored titled “Islam, Entrepreneurship and Embeddedness” (Tok and Kaminski 2019), published in the Journal of Management Studies. The article begins by connecting between ethics and economy by referencing Karl Polyani and his concept of the embeddedness of the economic in the social, then discussing their own conceptualization of Islamic thought and the new ideas they present. So too, Ibrahim Zain’s research paper5 on human management and the Islamic perspective through the Toyota company which developed this field of management lies in the same context. This forms an essential difference from those who want to begin from zero in their critique of the late modernity we live in. Contemporary Islamic Studies Program

This program has various and exceptionally interconnected specializations to enable students to study “traditional Islamic knowledge, and place that knowledge in a context of challenges we face in modern society.” Despite the fact that Islamic studies is widely taught within universities throughout the globe, the harmonization and interconnection between these specializations, and the resulting theses presented in Hamad bin Khalifa University is something unique. The program consists of 36 hours over two years and includes three foundation courses: “Foundations of Islamic Thought,” “Contemporary Quranic and Hadith Studies,” and “Applied Research Methodologies in Islamic Studies.” Students in this program study two specialization courses. First, Fiqh and Society with three courses taught in Arabic (“Non-textual Legal Sources,” “Fatwa, Family and Society,” and “Politics and the State”). The second is Contemporary Islamic Thought with three courses taught in English (“Islam and Modernity,” “Islamic Thought and Postcolonial Studies,” and “Islamic Law and Society”). Students then choose three elective courses from the list of their specialization’s courses, and then write a dissertation.

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  233 As examples of the courses in this program whose descriptions I looked over: the course “Applied Research Methodologies in Islamic Studies” teaches students how to work with different sources and methodologies in producing research in Islamic studies. It especially focuses on how to produce research papers, and how to know the sources and tools they are based on, after placing Islamic studies in a wider context of academic research. Such presentation of foundational research skills and their application is rare in Arab Shariah colleges. The course also presents a general glance over the primary Islamic sources and methodologies, which gives students the ability to write good research proposals for the field of research of their choice. There is another excellent course, “Contemporary Quranic and Hadith Studies” which is an introduction to studying the foundational texts of the Quran and Hadith at three levels: first, the nature of every text, its history and reference point; second, the foundations and rules of interpreting texts and their rules, methodologies and schools of interpretation; and third, the relationship between these two textual sources, their problems, and the schools in understanding them. The course encourages direct connection to real-world issues and present discussions. As shown in the course description, it combines classical and modern Arabic and English sources of Muslim and non-Muslim writers. The cooperation between more than one professor in formulating the course and teaching it in English and Arabic can be noticed. There is another elective course “Quranic Civilizations,” taught by Muhammad Modassir Ali. I noticed that one of the outcomes of teaching for students was to establish how non-Muslims, especially Western publications, participate in expanding our understanding of the Quran, indicating openness to human knowledge, no matter its origin. Some of the teachers of this program include Gavin Picken, a specialist in Sufism; Ibrahim al-Zain, a specialist in comparative religions; Mohamed El-Gammal, a specialist in fiqh; and Joseph Lumbard, a specialist in Quranic studies. There are also some sociologists who studied Muslim minorities in the West before coming to the college, such as Frank Peter and Alexandre Caeiro, both of whom are specialized in the sociology of fatwas. Former faculty Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Shinqiti studies the history of religions and is interested in politics and the transformation of Arab regimes after the Arab Spring. al-Shinqiti has a large engagement with a wide public through his near-daily interventions on al-Jazeera. His engagement in addition to other professors in international affairs and current political and religious issues makes up one of the aspects of applied and intellectual which some of the college’s programs point to, that ethical theorization of Islamic studies is closely linked to everyday life’s political and social issues of Arab citizens. Ethical thinking is not necessarily idealistic or utopian. Islamic Art, Architecture and Urbanism Program

This program aims to equip the next generation of curators, historians, and designers with a critical and informed understanding of Islamic art and architecture. The

234  Alternative Models program focuses on concepts related to the “application of art history, architecture, and urbanism to international institutions in general, and more specifically to diverse Islamic societies.” The program includes three specializations: Islamic Arts: History and Cultural Display, Contemporary Mosque Architecture, and Sustainable Cities of Muslim Societies. The program is made up of 36 hours taught in the English language made up of one foundation course related to Islam, three core courses, and three specialization courses, as well as a thesis for graduation. Looking over the former faculty Remah Gharib’s “Sustainable Islamic Urbanism: Past and Present” course, it is a significant study of a contemporary understanding of the Islamic city, as it includes a critical analysis and discussion of issues related to Islamic Shariah, urban spatial infrastructure, and the material dimensions of urbanity, and the role of the legal system and cultural, social and environmental factors in the structure of Islamic cities. Remah Gharib and Tarek Swelim, who graduated from the American University of Cairo, are co-directors of this program and both played an important role in establishing the college and program especially in cooperation with the University of Oxford and opening up opportunities for students to obtain training there. Islamic Finance Program

This program presents two degrees, a master of science and PhD. With regard to the first, Islamic Finance is a specialized program that teaches qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis in both Islamic and conventional finance. The fields of specialization include financial transactions, risk management, corporate financing and fund management. The program’s philosophy is represented in enabling students to understand the global financial system and suggest alternatives that can be applied to current models through combining the orders of the Islamic Shariah with contemporary scientific knowledge and economic and financial techniques. It is noticeable that this is the first time the term “Islamic Shariah” comes up, as the focus in the above programs is on ethics, Muslim societies, Quran, religious studies, and Islamic art and architecture. This program is aimed primarily at those residing in Qatar, as Islamic finance in Qatar makes up approximately 25% of the local financial activity, making it an important branch of the financial market. The program focuses on practical aspects rather than the theory of Islamic finance and how students can be ready to better confront the global opportunities of commerce and finance. Like the other programs, it is made up of 36 hours, and includes two foundation courses: Islamic thought and Islamic ethics, three core courses (“Islamic Financial Contracts,” “Islamic Economics and Development: Between Theory and Practice,” and “Islamic Financial System and Financial Markets: Between Theory and Practice”) and a choice between two specializations (“Islamic Financial System and Risk Management” or “Islamic Financial Companies and Fund Management”), in addition to a thesis for graduation.

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  235 As an example of its inter-disciplinary nature, let us view the course “Islamic Economics and Development: Between Theory and Practice,” which is distinguished by teaching students how to use analytical tools developed in the dominant economy in nations that apply the Shariah. The course trains students on the theoretical critical study of the Islamic economy. This course increases student’s skills and knowledge in order to analyze current developments and economic policies within an Islamic framework. This is clearly shown in the course description, as after devoting three weeks to methodological issues in Islamic economics, the rest of the weeks discuss the prevalent issues of macro- and micro-economy, and return not only to the Islamic perspective, but also the international, such as the Millennium Development Qoals. There are other courses such as “Applied Quantitative Methods in Islamic Finance,” whose description makes clear that its theories are similar to those in economics colleges around the world. The same strategy can be noticed in many of the other courses. The “Islamic Corporate Financing” course uses three books in corporate financing that could be found in any economics college, with four additional articles on the Islamic perspective on corporate financing. I expected to find a course on waqfs, but could not. This is a big issue in all the Shariah colleges we have studied, but here they do not dedicate a course to this important topic, which can carry Islamic economics to wide horizons with the support of social justice perspectives.6 Meanwhile, the doctorate in Islamic finance and economy is an innovative multidisciplinary program that provides students with the required analytical and research skills to understand, analyze, and interpret the workings of the rapidly expanding Islamic financial services and market sectors, and to tackle their emerging challenges and opportunities. It is noticeable that the program lists universal ethical statements as its primary motivation, as it was framed “to develop unique and innovative approaches for the continuous transformation of economies to be more responsible, inclusive, and resilient,” and to serve “the reality of international institutions which increasingly recognize policies related to Islamic finance,” as well as a need “to understand and integrate concepts such as responsible finance, green finance, and circular economies.” The program focused on four main axes: quantitative foundations (approaches on how to investigate the relationship between economy, finance and Shariah and analyze them through quantitative and qualitative research methodologies); Shariah studies (covering the necessary abilities to apply the Shariah’s principles and values through economic and financial values and practices, and gaining skills in innovation and analysis); social projects (to strengthen innovative thought in the

236  Alternative Models field of free business, and gain mastery in applying Islamic economics and financial theories in Qatar, and within the context of the transformation from linear economies to circular economies). The use of the concept of circular economy is noticeable, as the college organized an international conference in 2020 devoted to it, as well as sustainability (a deep understanding of the central role businessmen play in developing business, and strengthening economic development and resources in a comprehensive and sustainable manner), which correlate with responsible economics and financing (to understand the principles of Islamic economy and finance and analyze them deeply, as students are prepared for effective participation in reforming practices related to models and theories of development, and to confront the environmental and social concerns risks as well as risks related to the government). The program is made up of 54 hours and is taught in English. Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics As mentioned previously, there are four centers affiliated to the college which vary in their degree of activity, but given that the Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE) is the most important and the biggest in production and attendance, I will focus on it. CILE was founded in 2012, with the aim of leading “the reform and renewal of contemporary Islamic legal and ethical thought and behavior by contributing a sustainable ethical framework for addressing contemporary global challenges.” It seems that Tariq Ramadan, the founding director of the center, aimed to transform it into a laboratory for the “radical reform” he had been calling for,7 that is, for a group of contemporary issues, specifically those related to applied Islamic ethics, to take into consideration the contemporary world—a realistic utopia that would also be more idealistic. In this regard, the center discusses the relationship between the legal Shariah framework and Islam’s ethical teachings in a manner that always treats ulema’s focus in their discussion on interpreting jurisprudential texts on rulings without paying attention to the moral significance of these texts. It is as if Islamic ethics are only related to the classical texts on good conduct without thinking about their meanings and aims. Here, the center plays a role in balancing the fiqhi Shariah framework and ethical horizons, trying to understand the necessary relationship between the two fields of study. On the path to achieving this aim, the center focuses on defined research fields: art, economy, education, environment, finance, food, social gender studies, media, medicine, bioethics, politics, and psychology. The center treated contemporary issues in every one of these fields by relying on textual scholars (from different classical specializations) and contextual scholars (from different backgrounds in the natural sciences and humanities). To achieve a “holistic synthesizing” curriculum that combines textual and contextual scholarship, the center employed researchers from all fields to exchange ideas from one knowledge field to another to produce a shared knowledge. Here we notice the curriculum’s description as “holistic synthesizing” instead of adding “Islamic” or “tawhidic” like the usual practice in the schools of the IoK project (see Chapter 3), as integration according to the center does not demand these adjectives. The

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  237 program aims to reconcile “between spirituality and science, legislation and ethics, and laws and objectives, while emphasizing their complementary relationship.” Looking over the Center’s Activities Report for its first three years (2012–2015) and its website, we can notice it not only organized closed specialized academic conferences which gathered researchers to study these issues and consult with them and focus on sensitive and specialized questions, but also developed a network of young Muslims interested in a creative vision of reform. As such, this network produces annual conferences with some of its activities viewed by half a million viewers, and the center’s Facebook page followed by 750,000 followers (Center’s Report, p. 27). These conferences gathered the most important Muslim ulema and social scientists from around the globe. Contrary to the center’s predominantly male environment8 in terms of its teaching body (as the efforts of hiring females was only in administration), these activities were full of female researchers and scholars, in addition to intensive female participation among the attendees. The center’s activities are conducted in three languages (English, Arabic and French) and previously had two branches, one in France and the other in the UK, which were closed in 2018. The center has also launched publications in three languages (Arabic, English and French), beginning with the series “Islam and Applied Ethics” in cooperation with Hamad bin Khalifa University Press, and the first refereed academic journal of its kind, the Journal of Islamic Ethics, and a series of specialized books, “Ethical Studies,” both of which were published in cooperation with Brill, the prestigious center and publishing house in Leiden, Netherlands. It is also worth mentioning that the journal and these books are available through open access for free on the internet. The charismatic and controversial personality of Tariq Ramadan helped spread the center’s influence, especially among Muslims in the Muslim world and outside. In some of his writings Ramadan is a deep academic researcher and in other works a public advocate for Islam. However, his charisma is simultaneously a source of power and weakness. This trait continued without achieving integration between the College of Islamic Studies and the center, as it transformed into a melting pot of research from which all can benefit, whether among the students or faculty. Therefore, the relationship between the college and center remained tense during the time of the previous dean, Hatem al-Qarnshawi, to the point that we could not find a link to enter the center’s website through the college’s website. The competition between Ramadan and Qarnshawi was vehement. So too, in the CILE website there is no deputy director. As some that we met confirmed, Tariq Ramadan, along with Jasser Auda (the center’s deputy director during its foundational period) as two giants in Maqasidi thought dually established the unmatched Islamic ethical school. Naturally, Ramadan’s position was frozen in 2018 due to the court case at the time in France. The administration of the center was taken up by Dean Emad alDin Shahin and currently Mohammed Ghaly as interim directors. Shahin’s combining the two positions (until 2022) in one person has consolidated greater integration between the center and college, which is a positive result. If Ramadan was fundamentally overwhelmed by his work as a polemicist and Islamic advocate, the presence of prestigious researchers in the center has aided in intensifying the center’s

238  Alternative Models academic and research activity, as can be clearly shown in the research workshops the center organized over the past years, as well its publications released through Brill (two books,9 three volumes of the academic journal, and two books awaiting publication, in addition to other works currently under editing and preparation for publication, whether the journal or the series of books, as some of the center’s researchers informed us). The center’s activity, which was previously dominated by the personality of Tariq Ramadan, has developed into academic activity. This was demonstrated when, separately from the summer school Ramadan would organize annually in Granada, the college established a winter school in cooperation with Leuven University in Belgium that presented an intensive model of the program of Applied Islamic Ethics. This was also demonstrated by the international conference, which the center usually organized in a manner closer to the general public and public relations. Nonetheless, the annual conference in 2020 carried the noticeable title “Central Ethical Sources in Islamic Civilization,” which strengthens the academic and research orientation the center is currently pursuing. Master’s Theses There were 290 theses defended throughout the past decade until 2018, that is, since the college’s establishment, at an average of 30 theses per year (see Table  8.1); the theses vary between Arabic (approximately 60%) and English. This is a large number compared to the number of teaching staff. The seriousness of this program can be touched upon by the quality of the theses generally presented, in terms of topics, methodologies and literature references and sources, to the point that we can call these dissertations the most serious in all the Arab world in Shariah and Islamic Studies departments, with no peer at this level except for the Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya in Rabat. One of the indications of their seriousness is that many students finish their doctorates in prestigious departments in the social sciences, religious studies or theology in Europe and North America. Table 8.1 Theses Defended From 2008 to 2018 Year

Number of Defended Theses

2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 Total

70 40 48 32 19 15 45 11 9 0 1 290

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  239 In terms of the topics, most of the theses revolve around contemporary issues of a legal, political, economic and social nature.10 Very few of them are related to issues of rituals, and rarely are topics related to a historical or jurisprudential nature. So too rarely do we find titles that indicate sharp binaries like “Islam and West,” “Grounding Knowledge” or “Between Fiqh and Positive Law.” The titles demonstrate a comfortable engagement between classical literature and the Islamic intellectual tradition, instead of titles like “Between the Quran and Positivist Thought.” Rather, there is a recognition of pluralistic exegesis and developing Islamic thought, such as “A  Conceptual History of the Quranic Term Umma in Tafsir and Islamic Political Thought” (2019). These theses could be defended in any college of social sciences or humanities around the world, especially in the sociology of religion. There is a focus on the sociology of fatwas in a manner that takes fatwas from merely being automatic qiyas (analogy) of classical Shariah rules to manifesting the influence of material factors (social or political) in preferring one rule over another: “The Problems of Fatwas on Zakat: Fatwas Released in the State of Kerala in India as a Case Study” (2018). There is also a focus on the issue of ethics: “Ethics of War in the Torah and Noble Quran and Public International Law: A  Comparative Study” (2017), and “Justice in Classical Islamic Thought: the Perspective of al-Mawardi, Ibn Misawayah and Ibn Taymiyya,” and “Ethical Ruling of Contemporary Art: An Islamic Approach.” As for the Islamic Architecture program, rarely is the word “Islamic” present in the titles. Being contained with tradition, the “Islamic” is there within it without any need of stating it (see “The Souk and Society in Qatar: Cohabitating Heritage” (2018). The former Comparative Religions Program focused on showing differences between religions more than Islam’s superiority or denigration of other religions: “Financial Rights of Wives in Islamic, Christian and Jewish Legislations: A Comparative Study” (2018), and on the concepts of religious pluralism: “Religious Pluralism in the Gulf: Paradoxes of Coexistence in a Modernizing State” (2018). The program also focused on tolerance and dialogue between religions even if in a manner critical of the effectiveness of some of the present trends in Qatar and other Islamic nations: “Role of the State of Qatar in Strengthening Coexistence and Dialogue: the Doha Center for Religious Dialogue as a Model” (2018) and “The Shared Human Element in Islamic-Christian Dialogue: An Analytical Study of the Documents of the Tripoli Conference of 1976” (2018), and “The Role of the Royal Institute for Religious Studies in Jordan in Religious Dialogue” (2018); Dialogue of the Abrahamic Religions: A Comparative Study Between The Perspectives of Ismail R. al-Faruqi (1921–1986) and Leonard J. Swindler (1929–2018). There are topics on lived ethics in “Preventive Medicine and its Applications on Marriage” (2013) and an interest in issues of human rights, especially issues of workers and migrants’ rights, in “Labour Rights in Islam” (2019) and “Religion and Politics in the Syrian Crisis: A Study of Islamic Discourses on Refugees (2011–2017)” (2018).

240  Alternative Models As for the Islamic Finance program, it has topics that touch upon the financial sector in specific countries, especially Gulf countries, and sometimes development and economy generally. Nonetheless, the issue of endowments was not discussed except in three theses: “The Service Endowment and its Contemporary Applications: A  Comparative Fiqhi Study” (2018), “Insurance Policy Based on Endowments and Its Role in Children’s Insurance” (2008), “Investing Endowment Money in Islamic Fiqh: The Indonesian Experience as a Model” (2016). As for the Master’s in Public Policy in Islam, there is a concern with important topics like democracy, not in terms of their harmonization with Islamic fiqh or not, but around their practical mechanisms like “The Democratic Transformation in Tunisia: The General Tunisian Union of Labor as an Example,” (2012), “The Crisis of Democratic Transition in Egypt after the January 25th Revolution” (2016), “The Philosophical Approach to Democracy in Contemporary Islamic Thought: Abdulwahab al-Messiri and Taha Abdurahman as Models” (2014), and “Coexistence of Islam and Democracy in Turkey Implications for Public Policy Making” (2012). There are other topics on security, including “The General Policy of Iranian National Security: A Case Study of the Nuclear Program (2017). As for Islamic thought, there are many theses on the trajectories of Islamic reformers and intellectuals, mostly critically but some prescriptive: “The Jewish Issue between Karl Marx and Malek Bennabi: A Comparative Study” (2018). There is an interest in some reformist thinkers like Malek Bennabi and Taha Abdurrahman: “The Role of Religion in Building Civilization by Malek Bennabi 1905–1973” (2015–2017); “The Authenticity of the Quranic Message through the Writings of Muhammad Abdullah Draz and Malek Bennabi” (2017); “Muslim Critiques of Modernity: The Case of Taha ‘Abd al-Rahman” (2016). There was a lack of studies on the critical editing of manuscripts, which makes the college truly different from Arab Shariah colleges. The research methods used in the theses vary between textual analysis and field research. In the latter, the level varies between medium to excellent in using social research methods, tools, and fields (see, e.g., “Labour Rights in Islam: Supervision and Health, Safety and Welfare of Migrant Labor in Qatar” [2019] and “Islam and Gender: Legitimizing Patriarchy in a Ghanaian Muslim Community” [2019]). In general, viewing the sources used in these theses, most of them are up to date with the most recent literature published in both English and Arabic (when the student is an Arabic speaker). Conclusion: Opportunities and Challenges It is difficult to reduce all of the faculty members in the College of Islamic Studies to a single intellectual and religious trend, but we can distinguish between four very different conceptions inside the college: 1. The Traditional Conception sees the primary mission of the college as to increase students’ essential Shariah knowledge which springs from the Islamic

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  241 tradition (e.g., Mohamed El-Gammal, the prominent Azhari jurisprudent specialized in mu’amalat). 2. A conception I will call as Post-Orientalist Islamic Studies: a serious approach towards Islamic reality by using the field of the social sciences (Alexandre Caeiro and Mohamed Evren Tok for example) or critical variations from within the Orientalist field (Gavin Picken and Joseph Lombard for instance); as such it is an episteme that combines internal and external (to religion) perspectives. 3. A conception that sees Islam as purely general and practical values: studies that stand on the ground of Western discussions and conceptions in the social sciences (we observed this in some of the courses in several of the master’s programs, such as the Islam and Global Affairs, the Arts program, and the Islamic Economy and Finance program). This is a minimalist trend, but important in and of itself, especially as it is comparable to its peers in Architecture and Politics colleges. 4. A conception which combines tradition and modernity conditioned on a multidisciplinary methodology: Perhaps the Applied Ethics program is the best example of this conception. Both the tradition and modern ethical philosophical discussions are strongly present in it in order to answer the contemporary problems in our world. This is reflected in the program’s philosophy and thesis topics. We found this same conception as well as in the Islam and Global Affairs program, but not in a systematic manner. Even if difficult, these conceptions engaged with one another, resulting in challenges, and sometimes a large obstruction against some conceptions, especially the last one. This is the result of the formation of some faculty who do not combine the traditional and modern formations. However, as I  mentioned previously in this chapter, the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad bin Khalifa University, in addition to the International Islamic University of Malaysia and Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya in Morocco, are the most important models of Shariah and Islamic studies in the Arab and Muslim world. This college’s pioneering experience represents the important example of combining tradition and modernity while employing a multi-disciplinary methodology, that was manifested in its reviving of the ethical side of the Shariah and science. I see this as perhaps a translation of Fazlur Rahman’s school (Berry 2003), with its pursuit of legislation’s comprehensive aims and values and Islam’s place in its ethical context, and reading the Quran in that light as well. As I mentioned in the introduction, the college was able to mainstream a new paradigm to connect religion, not as legislation but as an ethical paradigm, to the social sciences. If the International Islamic University of Malaysia generalized the “Islamization of human knowledge” in its new form of knowledge integration, including the challenges of establishing universal sciences with particularistic religious and cultural approaches, this college wanted to not face these risks. It decided to merge the sciences in a manner which could be open to universality in a manner which researchers in any field could understand. This established the pluralistic approach

242  Alternative Models necessary in an age in which individualization and the scattering of social identities are some of the most important processes of modernity. However, this college’s pioneering experience is tainted by some problems and challenges which must be faced for it to continue in its pioneering role. I will discuss six of them here: 1. Under the pressure of the university administration, since 2017, the College has moved towards focusing on visible bibliometric and innovation output. In his opening speech, former Dean Shahin focused on “securing a pioneering and exclusive status of innovation unique opportunities for the College of Islamic Studies to achieve hopes of the future, and define new aims, and form our students’ skills and experiences through innovative and pioneering teaching platforms, benefiting from the new and exciting tools like Pioneers’ Forum, Innovation Labs, and Innovative teaching tools.” This caused some discomfort among some professors and researchers who viewed these outputs as only being able to be measured in the “Scopus” and “Web of Science” platforms. The number of patents on these platforms could differ greatly from the aspirations of an Islamic studies institution that is concerned with creating a local debate in maqasidi topics in a social and cultural Gulf context that is closer to WahhabiSalafi conservatism. It is in need of focusing on direct engagement with a public most of whom speaks Arabic, and as such publishing in the Arabic language, and supporting engagement between Muslim youth. How can a bibliometric quantitative methodology measure the effect of Arabic books? For instance, Mu’taz al-Khatib’s book Permissible Violence: “Sharia” Confronting the Ummah and Dawlah (2016) or Luay Safi’s Shariah and Society (2017) had an effect in the general Arab field in their treatment of controversial topics, such as Islamic movements, something no bibliometric search engine can measure. There are also blogs; for instance, more than 368,500 people have read Muhammad alMukhtar al-Shinqiti’s 51 articles on al-Jazeera’s blog,11 and more than 143,600 people have read Mu’taz al-Khatib’s 40 articles on the same blog.12 All of these indicators cannot be measured with tools used by Hamad bin Khalifa University. With their commodification and obsession with global rankings and formal quality measures of a quantitative nature, universities are pushing their faculty members to publish in the English language in academic outlets (dubbed as international or high-impact journals) which we know statistically (through serious academic study) do not obtain more than nine readers on average. There are, of course, Arab universities that are excessively local, and produce researchers who only produce locally, and do not communicate with their peers in the same field around the world. Global publishing should not undermine local publishing and vice versa. 2. Tensions inside the teaching and research body (familiar in any university or college). Some of these tensions are related to working in the Gulf due to its employment policies, as there is a Gulf model of working with foreign employees in a manner that characterizes them as disposable labor and without proper labor rights. My fieldwork in this college and other universities in the Gulf demonstrated frustrated feelings of psychological and employment instability by

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  243 a large number of faculty who migrated to these countries. They experience a great deal of personal or temperamental discretion which can end their work contracts at a moment’s notice. As such, universities become without a memory, as everyone can be replaced without leaving any effect. This shows clearly in the content of the college’s website, which does not show the name of its founding dean Hatem al-Qarnshawi nor the dean after him, nor the founding director of the Center of Islamic Legislation and Ethics Tariq Ramadan and his deputy Jasser Auda. 3. The gender diversity of the teaching and research body: there are some clear imbalances in the policies of employment, as among 20 teachers and researchers, only three women have been recently appointed. This is unfortunate and unacceptable in a time in which there are many female researchers in the social and Shariah sciences and humanities around the world, and especially in the Arab world. 4. There is another primary tension related to language, which goes back to the difference in the targeted groups of the college’s programs. Is the targeted group those residing in Qatar, the majority of them Arab, who most likely have weak abilities in English, or is there a general competition open to the Muslim world and beyond? The administration chose the latter group, even if scholarships are limited (not exceeding three for every program), and the idea behind that is to make the college visible globally, whereas supporters of the first group propose that there must be an option that evaluates (and eventually ranks) the university using an “ecological” approach and not a global one. See for instance the ecological approach of the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies (Hanafi 2019). Naturally, there are costly solutions, for example for the program’s courses to be repeated in both languages, which is found in some programs but not all of them. 5. There is a tension between traditional studies (Quranic and Hadith Sciences, Usul al-Fiqh and Islamic Ethics) and the other sciences. The prevailing feeling is that there is a marginalization of the first to the benefit of the second, that is, an imbalance between those specialized in Shariah with their peers in the social sciences, and especially the Islamic Economy program. For example, there is only one specialist in the traditional sciences in the Islamic Finance program. According to some faculty of the Architecture and Policy programs, one course is sufficient for Maqasid al-Shariah. Some of them mentioned that it was possible to “ethicize” the sciences in every course, and there is no need for there to be many Shariah courses. Meanwhile, others viewed that there must be a balance in the college’s administration, if the dean is specialized in the social sciences, it would have been better for the deputy-dean to be specialized in the Shariah sciences, something which did not happen. 6. All of the interest in the Muslim world is with the two religions of Christianity and Judaism. Contrary to this, the strong point of this college is that it taught Eastern religions and successfully presented important theses on them. However, the cancellation of the Comparative Religions program will end this significant advantage of the college. As mentioned by Muhammad Modassir

244  Alternative Models Ali, anyone who views a map of world religions must feel the need for a deep scientific interest in Eastern religions, for five reasons: a. The wide spread of these religions, which cover incredible geographical spaces and important civilizational societies whose number of residents exceed more than three billion, in China, India, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Mongolia. Eighty-five percent of the residents of these countries believe in Eastern religions, whether that be Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism or Confucianism. b. The political importance of the countries which embrace these religions, especially China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, on the global political and economic stage. c. The historical relations exchanged between these religions and Islam which reached the point of cultural and civilizational interchange at times, such as in India. d. The spread of these religions in the contemporary world, especially Europe and America, as most of the contemporary religious movements which appear in the West and attract adherents see the principles and foundations of these religions as valid for building the new religious philosophy needed by contemporary Westerners. e. The necessity of dialogue which requires deep knowledge. I hope this chapter will give a pioneer example of how other Shariah faculties in the Arab and Muslim world can benefit from the experience of the College of Islamic Studies without falling into the same pitfalls as those identified within the trajectory of this college. Notes 1 A Dialogue with the Dean of the College of Islamic Studies in Qatar: https://cutt.us/ CzbTz 2 www.hbku.edu.qa/ar/cis/about 3 I would like to especially thank Dean Emad al-Din Shahin for facilitating my fieldwork in the college. 4 All of the testimonies in the section on programs are from the College’s promotional material or its website. 5 Abd Manaf, Noor Hazilah and Zein, Ibrahim Mohamed, “Lean Management and Islamic Perspective: Convergence in Diversity,”  in Spirituality in Management from Islamic Perspectives (Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press, 2011), 231–250. 6 To be more precise, they did before, but only when Monzer Kahf was there. 7 See Tareq Ramadan’s approach in al-Azhar (2017) and Ramadan (2008). 8 CIS paid attention to this and hired three women: Basma al-Dajjani to teach Arabic, Dalal Aassouli in the Islamic Finance program and Aisha Yousef al-Mannai as a Director of Muhammad Bin Hamad Al Thani Center for Muslim Contribution to Civilization. 9 One in the book series (Ray Jureidini and Said Hassan, eds., Migration and Islamic Ethics: Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship (Leiden and Boston: Brill Publications, 2020) was noted in 2022 as one of the top five of all Brill publications. 10 See for example: Establishing Evidence in Islamic Fiqh and Qatari Law: A Comparative Study (2018).

Reviving the Ethical in the Shariah Sciences  245 11 https://blogs.aljazeera.net/mshinqiti 12 https://blogs.aljazeera.net/2alkhateeb

References In Arabic al-Azhar, Shawky. 2017. Requirements to Renew the Principles of Jurisprudence in the Modern Era: Tariq Ramadan as a Model. Cairo: Dar al-Mashriq. al-Khatib, Mu’taz. 2016. Permissible Violence: “Sharia” Confronting the Ummah and Dawlah. Beirut: Dar Al-Sharq. Hanafi, Sari. 2019. “The Scientific Community at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. The Breakthrough and Challenges.” al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 15, 2019. https://bit. ly/30mH1Ei. Safi, Loay. 2017. Shariah and Society. Beirut: House of Contemporary Thought. In Other Languages Berry, Donald L. 2003. Islam and Modernity Through the Writings of Islamic Modernist Fazlur Rahman. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press Ltd. Ramadan, Tariq. 2008. Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation. 1st ed. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Tok, M. Evren, and Joseph Jon Kaminski. 2019. “Islam, Entrepreneurship, and Embeddedness.” Thunderbird International Business Review 61 (5): 697–705. https://doi. org/10.1002/tie.21970.

9 From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge” The Case of the International Islamic University of Malaysia

Introduction Founded in 1983 with an approach it calls “Islamization of Human Knowledge” (IoK), the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) was established according to the visions developed by prominent Islamic scholars Ismail al-Faruqi (co-founder of the International Institute of Islamic Thought in Virginia [IIIT]), Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman (current chairman of IIIT), and Syed Muhammad Naqib al-Attas (founder of the International Institute of Islamic Thought & Civilisation [ISTAC]), with the aim of linking what they call “revelation and heritage” with social and human sciences. Drawing on fieldwork1 carried out at the IIUM in May 2018, this chapter will explore how the 38-year-old university implements its foundational IoK approach, through scrutinizing the programs, curricula, and research produced by both faculty and students. This fieldwork research consists of interviews with 42 faculty members and 12 students; content analysis of the syllabi of several departments in Shariah Studies, and the social sciences and humanities; content analysis of 35 master’s and PhD theses produced within these departments; reviews on the publication and research conducted by the faculty of these departments; and personal attendance at four classes. Before examining its curriculum, faculty research, and master’s and PhD theses, this chapter will start by presenting relevant information regarding the university as a whole, since its inception. This process will allow for an unfolding of the passage from a generation of faculty who established the “Islamization of Human Knowledge” paradigm in order to streamline it, to a new generation that seeks to mainstream it. The aim is to show that this transition has been made possible due to the employment of Maqasid al-Shariah,2 and yet, despite this possibility, this shift is, and will continue to be, accompanied with some contradictions, tensions and shortages. IIUM: The Laboratory of IoK Since it opened in 1983, the IIUM has grown to include 91,000 male and female alumni. The majority of these graduates are local, with approximately 15% being international, and all are given an education that combines conventional and DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-13

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  247 Islamic knowledge.3 The university currently has 26,000 students enrolled (20,000 undergraduates and 6,000 graduates) from 117 countries, who are served by 2,000 faculty members, 14 faculties, three institutions, and two centers. One of IIUM’s main missions is the “Islamization of Human Knowledge” (IoHK or IoK), which the university defines as: an alternative paradigm for pursuing, constructing, developing, adapting, sifting, critiquing, organizing, disseminating, reconstructing, utilising and evaluating contemporary human knowledge—as distinct from Divinely revealed knowledge—in accordance with the worldview, fundamental principles, ethical values and norms of Islam. This alternative paradigm, based on the theology, ontology, epistemology, axiology and ethics of Tawhid, views critically the different branches of contemporary human knowledge, particularly as represented and constructed by the secular Western behavioral sciences, social sciences and humanities, including the philosophical foundations and ethical orientations of the natural.” (IIUM constitution cited by Hassan 2013, 17) Although there are other universities who belong to this approach,4 the “Islamization of Human Knowledge” is the unique, defining feature of IIUM, which is used to brand itself globally as the “The Premier Global Islamic University.” While other Western and non-Western universities have a sensitivity to religion or culture, they do not articulate it in the particular way IIUM does. One such example is Iowa State University (in the United States), which shares a statement calling for fostering “International and Multicultural awareness and sensitivity to diversity” (Hashim 2013, 52). IIUM follows the views of both al-Attas and al-Faruqi. al-Attas is more concerned with reforming the mind through properly establishing the Islamic worldview. As he explains, [n]either “grafting” nor “transplant” can produce the desired result when the body is already possessed by foreign elements and consumed in disease. The foreign elements will have first to be drawn out and neutralized before the body of knowledge can be remoulded in the crucible of Islam. (al-Attas 1978, 163) Placing Islamization of Human Knowledge and other Islamic fundamental coursework in the first semester is a clear indicator of this very stance. In contrast, alFaruqi is more interested in epistemological processes and the incorporation of Islamic values with the five unities that are used to form the first principals of Islamic methodology (these being the unities of Allah, of creation, of truth and knowledge, of life, and of humanity; Hashim 2013, 52). al-Faruqi was more influential not only because he had a strong, transnational institution behind him (IIIT)5 but because his nuanced and more dialogical approach is more conducive to reciprocity with what is traditionally perceived, or referred to, as Western knowledge.

248  Alternative Models This Islamic vision is clear across all faculties, departments, and programs. For instance, in the mission statement of the Bachelor of Human Sciences in Sociology and Anthropology, it was stated that this undergraduate program offers an integrated and balanced curriculum and at the same time, ensures solid foundations in sociological theory and empirical analyses of real-life issues in society. The courses offered in the program are substantially infused with Islamic concepts, principles, theories, methods and approaches. Offering courses that are infused with Islamic values can be said to be following the al-Faruqi method, without, as some faculty interviewed pointed out, becoming de-westernized as al-Attas had wished. For each program, the integrated curriculum is structured with required courses for a university core, others for a faculty, and other for departmental concentrations, all having supportive and elective courses; all of which are designed to meet the standards and requirements of higher Islamic education. For example, students in applied science have four required courses: “Islamic Worldview,” “Knowledge and Civilization in Islam,” “Ethics and Fiqh for Everyday Life,” “Creative Thinking and Problem Solving” and one related to Malaysia that was recently added, titled “The Malay World within Islamic Civilisation.” This paper will focus on an important faculty in IIUM, the Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences (KIRKHS), which aims to connect “Islamic sciences to other sciences.” This faculty has a Division of Islamic Revealed Knowledge (which includes the Departments of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh, Usul al-Din and Comparative Religion, Quranic and Sunnah Studies, and General Studies), and departments in social sciences and humanities (which include communication, history, political science, psychology, history, sociology, and English language and literature).6 Historically, students majoring in humanities and social sciences needed to have a minor in revealed knowledge, and vice versa. Many interviewees pointed out that this rounded education produced excellent alumni that benefited from this double formation. Also, faculty members in social sciences and humanities needed to complete a diploma in Revealed Knowledge. However, such rules for students and faculty are now optional. KIRKHS currently provides 38 major courses, 14 of which are in Arabic. It also provides a selection of optional service courses, and two compulsory courses for all concentrations—“Islamic Worldview” (theoretical ideals) and “Axiological Foundation”—both of which are based on the principals of God’s transcendence and the universality of ethics. Something interesting to note is that, rather than the name Faculty of Law, it is called the Faculty of Laws, as it includes not only what they refer to as “human law,” but “revealed law,” and master’s and PhD students are encouraged to study law on a comparative basis. IIUM is involved in training Shariah court judges to increase their knowledge regarding civil law, in training civil courts on Shariah law,7 and in harmonizing civil and Shariah laws.8

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  249 The university also has three institutes—the Institute of Halal Research and Training (INHART), the Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance (IIiBF) and the International Institute of Islamic Civilisation and Malay World (ISTAC)—and the Centre for Islamic Economics—that work independently and together to ensure an interdisciplinary education. So, for instance, students from the sciences can choose to minor in halal studies, which is a combination of Islamic legal studies in relation to food and management (a common choice by students due to the importance of the licensing business with regard to halal in Malaysia). Many faculty members complained, however, that this orientation was changed under the new administration in 1996, where the IoK approach was not made a priority. The motivation for the change was sparked by the local market, and by the demand by the Ministry of Higher Education for accreditation, which called for more credit requirements per major. It is also important to note that the majority of our interlocutors chose to use the concepts of Islamic “perspective” or “integration” of knowledge rather than IoK. This current conceptual discursive debate among faculty members at IIUM is studied by Wiebke Keim in an excellent article (Keim 2016), though I am more interested here in the current practices (teaching and research) than in the discourse. Already Abu-Baker Ibrahim noted 15 years ago that these concepts are used interchangeably.(A.-B. M. A. M. Ibrahim 2007) While the IIUM is open to all interested applicants, most students, at least in KIRKHS, are Muslim. There is a special course required only for Muslims who have no credit (Tilawah al-Quran) along with “Co-curricular Activities” (3 credits) in the form of halaqa9 or Tahfiz. For non-Muslim students, these are replaced with a course on dialogue. The IIUMs implementation of the concept of usrah10 (halaqa) involves circles of informal Islamic study education held in the university’s mosque, not only for students but, since 2016, for non-academic Muslim staff and students who live on campus (called “Mahallah” [at least in Gombak campus]). Nik Abdullah, Dollah, and Marusin (2018) evaluate the usrah culture, showing it to positively contribute to the sense of community among all IIUM students, faculty and staff. Before delving into the curricula used in IIUM, I  would like to bring some information about the working conditions of the faculty members as well about the extent to which this university is internationalized. These aspects are very important not only for the quality of teaching but also knowledge produced by faculty. Challenging Working Conditions

The working conditions in IIUM are similar to other universities in Malaysia, which includes a heavy teaching load, ranging between 12 and 15 credits per semester, with sometimes as many as 70 students in each course. The research grants given by the university are low, ranging annually between $1200 and $2400, which means it does not serve as a research university. Because the majority of the coursework is taught in English, the university had originally focused on recruiting faculty from

250  Alternative Models international academic markets (the majority of whom came from the Arab world, India, and Pakistan), but due to political reasons, the financial resources faded.11 Currently, most of the faculty members are Malaysian; for example, in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, only one faculty among ten (a Palestinian from Gaza) has been internationally recruited. Some foreign faculty reported there being discriminatory treatment in favor of local faculty members; the former do not receive sabbatical leave but publish much more than the local faculty. In addition, most of them only get short contracts with IIUM that have to be renewed in order to stay in the country, including those who have been living in Malaysia for 30 years. There is no category of permanent residence for themselves and their families. Despite these challenging working conditions, in 2020 IIUM received a fivestar (out of six) recognition from the Malaysia Research Assessment (MyRA, a state-ranking agency).12 It is worth noting that, combined, faculty members produce publications in English, Malay and sometimes Arabic. (Limited) Internationalization

In addition to IIUM’s current limited international faculty, and past reliance on international recruitment of faculty, the university was an observant member of the Union of American Universities in the eighties. In an effort to increase its internationalization, the IIUM accepts many international students, the majority of whom come from South Asia, Africa and the Gulf countries. At the entrance of KIRKHS, a big banner is displayed announcing that the QS World University Rankings in Subjects for 2018 ranked its faculty as a 31 in Theology. The IIUMs board of trustees is composed of Malaysian officers and scholars, and representatives from various Islamic countries and from Japan. IIUM cares to have good relations with the Arab countries, one of the major students sending countries to IIUM. These relations remote to the time of Malaysia independence from British colonialism where many Malay students went to al-Azhar University in Cairo and Damascus University to study mainly Shariah and Arab language. The current president of IIUM, Mohd Daud Bakar, received his bachelor’s of Shariah from Kuwait University, a “Shariah star” and “the ambassador of Malaysia’s Islamic financial market to the world” (Sloane-White 2017, 43), while some IIUM alumni are prominent officers or businessmen in Malaysia and abroad—for instance, the CEO of Bosnia Bank International, Amer Bukvic, graduated from KIRKHS in 1996. IIUM greatly benefited from being a hub for not only Malaysian scholars, but Arab, Indian, and Pakistani scholars who graduated from al-Azhar and other important universities in Europe and America. Now, however, it is much less internationalized. There are currently 13 existing refereed academic and intellectual journals published by different entities in IIUM, but only IIUM’s al-Shajarah, Journal of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, is indexed in the ISI (Web of Science), and it is the only ISI-indexed social science journal from the country. The Intellectual Discourse, the International Medical Journal Malaysia (IMJM) and Asiatic: IIUM Journal of English Language and Literature, are indexed

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  251 in many databases, particularly in SCOPUS (El-Mesawi 2013), while additional journals are indexed or abstracted in various databases, such as al-Mandhumah (Saudi Arabia). Curriculum: Conventional Versus Integrated In order to evaluate how the Islamic perspective was integrated into the courses, I collected the course outlines (syllabi) from several departments, with a systematic collection from Political Science, Psychology, and Media Studies. I also referenced the research Mohamed Aslam Haneef (2013) conducted regarding the department of economics. Four categories (which will be explored below) in order to take into account: the references (whether textbook or articles) listed in the syllabi, the terminology used in the course description, objectives, learning outcomes and items of the sessions. In regard to the learning outcomes, one can find either a sentence that compares or contrasts the Islamic perspective with the Western one or that mentions or highlights the Islamic perspective on its own. For instance, the description for “Political Thought II” explains that the course “also highlights the epistemological and ideological differences between western and Muslim political thought” with the objective to “acquaint students with the development of key Islamic political concepts and institutions and their significance in the contemporary context.” Worth noting is that one of the 10 program learning outcomes for IIUM and the IoK is what they call “Relevantization and Integration,” which means the ability to provide solution approaches to inter-religious issues pertaining to extremism, deviant teachings, human rights issues, and inter and intra religious conflicts. The ability to integrate Usul al-Din principles in the study of philosophy, Islamic thought, civilizations, ideologies, and other religions. The universities’ “Islamic” textbooks and references are often published by either IIIT or IIUM press, or other local publishing houses. The process of “Integration” works in two directions: by giving an Islamic perspective to humanities and social sciences, and by making Islamic fiqh and ethics more relevant to contemporary social, political, and economic reality (“Relevantization”). Former Dean of KIRKHS Ibrahim Zein (2014) made it clear that, as a method of integration, many courses are taught serving many different departments as either university electives or as part of their majors, and that, even if there is no required course in Maqasid al-Shariah, its conceptualization is embedded into the course readings. Interviewees bring many examples about Relevantization and Integration. One political science professor showed me how he teaches his students how to conceptualize some of Islamic heritage to fit the current international relations, bring the example of the concept of dar al-Islam that he does not understand today as a structure but as a norm. Another professor in economics emphasized waqf as an integral part of the Islamic micro-finance model. As we will see, IIUM does prove to be a laboratory for developing concepts such as Muhibah (which, loosely, refers

252  Alternative Models to the spirit of living together), and provides policies aimed at multicultural nationbuilding.13 Following are the four categories related to the Islamic perspective. First Category: Conventional courses. These are the courses not involved in the IoK. Constituting one-third of the overall number of courses, due to their technical nature, integration of IoK is not possible. An example of this can be seen in Media Studies, where the coursework is 60% conventional. As will see below, Psychology, with 13% conventional coursework, has an advanced integration of Islamic perspective, while Political Science sits in the middle, with 35%. There are also a few surprise instances, like a theory course that has no reference to Islamic perspectives. Second Category: Minor Integration. A course will be considered as such when the reference to Islamic perspective is recommended rather than required, and where it may be a learning outcome, but discussions on it do not spill out in the sessions. Almost one-third of courses in Psychology and Political Science are from this category, which constitute a significant contrast to the much smaller percentage in Media Studies and Economics. Third Category: Substantial Integration. These courses are considered as such when the reference to the Islamic perspective is required, and when this perspective is found in most of the sessions. The champion of this category is Psychology with 44% of the courses having substantial integration, followed in order by Economics,14 Political Science, and Media Studies. To offer an example of the nature of this integration, the description of the course of “Psychology of Learning” states: “[t]he relevance and applications of these perspectives within the context of Islam (e.g. learning and memorizing the Quran) are integrated throughout this course,” and it is common among the 39 courses in this category to reference “Islamic ethics” or “Islamic moral and manner.” Also found in many of these courses, are items at the end of each session description that evoke the Islamic perspective through one of two ways. First, the Islamic perspective can be presented by dichotomizing it with what is often described as “Western” philosophies, theories, methods, applications and history of a discipline; for example, in seeking to “examine Muslim responses to Western ideas and approaches.” In this case, the “Islamic perspective” is a sort of local example of the relevance of the knowledge in each session. Or, it is done without such binaries, using what I call a mainstreaming of this perspective. An example of this is in the course “Contemporary Islamic Political Thought,” which has the objective to “discuss the contributions of contemporary Muslim scholars and activists towards the development of Islamic Political Thought and compare the ideas of contemporary Muslim scholars and activists.” Fourth Category: Complete Islamic Content. A course will be considered as such when the reference to “Islamic” is in the course title, for example, the master’s course “Issues of Islamization in Sociology and Anthropology,” and the PhD course, “Islamic Sociology.” As we see from Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1 there are a few courses within this fourth category. In Political Science there are six (“Islamic Principles and Practices of Public Administration”; “Islam in Contemporary

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  253 Table 9.1  Number of Courses According to IoK Categories in Selected Disciplines15 Discipline

Political Science

Psychology

Media

Economics

Total

Conventional Minor integration Substantial integration Complete Islamic content Total

17 17 8 6

6 16 20 3

24 9 4 2

9 6 7 5

56 48 39 16

48

45

39

27

159

Source: Haneef and Amin (2013). Compiled by the author.

Figure 9.1  Percentage of courses according to IoK categories in selected disciplines. Source: Haneef and Amin (2013). Compiled by the author.

Southeast Asia”; “Islamic Theory of International Relations”; “Islah/Tajdid Movements in the Muslim World”; “Contemporary Islamic Political Thought”; and “Islamization of Political Science”). Half of the courses in Psychology fit this category (“Islam and Psychology”; “Undergraduate Seminar on Islamic Perspective of Psychology”; and “Psychology of Religion”), while in Media Studies there are only two (“Foundation of Communication in the Quran & Sunnah”; “Muslim Press”). In this fourth category, some courses encourage students to be pious. For instance, the description of “Islam and Psychology” explains, “[t]his course exposes students to the ‘scientific’ and Islamic study of human behaviours and mental processes without neglecting the role of the souls . . . The course will also train students to use psychology as a tool to increase their efficiency in fulfilling the roles as ‘abid and khalifah of Allah” [emphasis added].

254  Alternative Models To take a case study showing how students are exposed to such integration of knowledge, the Department of Economics posits itself as providing a bachelor’s in Islamic Economics, where, in addition to integrating Islamic perspectives, students receive 18 hours on fiqh and Usul al-fiqh, and 12 hours in other Islamic courses. The total hours that are Islamically focused therefore constitute 16% of the total hours required (20  hours out of 128) for this degree (Haneef 2013, 95). Haneef and Amin (2013) cite an external examiner of this bachelor’s program, who, after studying the quantity and depth of conventional courses (based on outlines and examination questions), assessed it as being sufficient and equally comparable with international standards. Generally speaking, the references used in the syllabi are relatively old; most of them that are before 2000 and rare are in the last five years. Also, some faculty members also pointed out that the anthologies on Islamic heritage are insufficient, a point that were more generally by Abu-Baker Ibrahim and Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman about the lacking of proper textbooks, despite the contentious efforts of IIIT and IIUM.16 To go more thoroughly, I will explore in-depth two case studies: the departments of Economics and Psychology. Economics: IIUM’s Success Story

The Department of Economics offers programs of study leading to a bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD degrees, where they teach both conventional and Islamic economics. While the master’s program clearly states that the department “provides graduate studies in Economics which combines both conventional and Islamic aspects,” the general mission statement of the department emphasizes that, in order to contribute to efforts to apply divine guidance to the understanding and direction of contemporary economics, that the teachings are grounded in Islam.17 Does this mean they want to mainstream what is “Islamic” in economics? One-third of the courses within this faculty are conventional ones, while the remaining either integrate conventional and Islamic economics or are explicitly Islamically focused, where the word “Islamic” is used in 20% of the course titles (e.g., “Islamic Political Economy”). Given the high degree of employability of its graduates compared to other departments, as shown by the tracer studies,18 this mix seems to fit well with the form and standards of Malaysian economics. Patricia Sloane-White talks about a Shariah generation who were employed by the growing Islamic bureaucracy and legal system (dual civil and Shariah) to which IIUM has heavily contributed (Sloane-White 2017, 38). Some faculty members interviewed demonstrated interest in being of use to the broader, multicultural Malaysian society, and this was something I found reflected within the functioning of broader Malaysian society (in Kuala Lumpur) as well, as illustrated in the following three examples. First, I found in three Islamic banks in Kuala Lumpur that I visited that they have clients who are not only from Muslim Malay ethnic origin, but who are

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  255 non-Muslim Chinese. Something that was confirmed by two experts. This may indicate a sort of good integration to the mainstream economics in their Islamic behavior, whether this is a good or a bad sign. For some of my interviewees in Arabic countries, they criticized IIUM for pushing the banking sector toward being Islamically minimalist (using for instance a tendency to rely on conventional, and thus anti-Islamic, derivatives). Second, after providing research to the ministry of tourism about criteria for a company to be a “Shariah compliance company,” they realized that this will alienate many businesses. They ended up creating a new label, “Shariah-friendly company.” In this latter case, a hotel, for instance, can have two restaurants, where one serves alcohol, and the other does not. Third, established in 1984, the Journal of Islamic Economics was published by this faculty until 1994, when it was decided to broaden its scope, becoming the International Journal of Economics, Management and Accounting (IJEMA), mixing conventional economics with Islamic ones, or mainstreaming Islamic ones. Based on my fieldwork there, there are three features of the Department of Economics in IIUM. First, Islamic Economics is part of a specialized Faculty of Economics and Management. In fact, while many departments of Islamic economics in the Muslim world are embedded in faculties of Shariah, there is sufficient evidence regarding the weak economic training for their graduates, including a lack of originality and innovation in their produced research. Baloufi and Bilaas19 carried out excellent bibliometric studies showing repetitions in many produced research. For instance, my bibliometric research in the Saudi universities using the al-Manduma database shows there to be a huge difference between serious research conducted in Um al-Qora University in Mecca where the program of Islamic economics is part of the Faculty of Economics and Management (like in the IIUM case) and other programs embedded in the faculties of Shariah there. Some interviewees from IIUM stated that the economic training is not entirely adequate at the university. Haneef and Amin (2013) argue that the majority of the lecturers teaching the courses of Islamic economics are trained in fiqh and Shariah rather than in Islamic economics specifically. They also argue that the curriculum gives the impression that Islamic banking and finance are the same as, or equivalent to, Islamic economics, while tending to associate Islamic economics with the legal aspects of fiqh (and even more so in the judgment outcomes of fiqh rather than in its axioms). Some of the interviewees said that the university needs to vary and expand the “Islamic” content to include thought and history so that it is able to provide a more “civilizational” outlook in the program. An interim report on the status of teachers in the field of Islamic economics reveals that the majority of them are from a Shariah background, and this imbalance between Western-educated and Shariah scholars can be counterproductive to achieving curriculum integration with contemporary disciplines (Mohammed 2013). Others argue that confining Shariah only to legal matters is a reductionist approach that may not function well when dealing with social sciences like economics, which focuses on decision making. This point was also raised by Mustafa Omar Mohammed, who points out that the Faculty of Economics at IIUM suffers from a dualism: where those who

256  Alternative Models graduated from the West lack the “knowledge of truth,” and those from a Shariah education lack the modern methodological tools necessary to derive concepts and principles from primary sources and to effectively undertake empirical research (wad’i; Mohammed 2013). Despite all these just criticisms, IIUM remains a conducive place for the double formation. Many faculty members at IIUM mentioned have, indeed, completed a minor in one of the programs of the Division of Revealed Knowledge. One of the interviewees from this division who was interested in providing his opinion about economic matters mentioned that he had audited some courses from the Department of Economics, which, he said, enabled him to produce sound religious opinions in these matters. He showed me a study he did on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, which was the first study conducted on how compliant these currencies are with Islamic thought. This fluidity between attending and mixing between Shariah and other departments and faculty is a unique feature of IIUM. Second, IIUM becomes a critical hub to bridge the gap between theory and practice of Islamic economics. Their Islamic Economics Database in the university’s library alone holds approximately 5000 publications on Islamic economics and finance from 1994 to 2005 (Mahyudi 2016), making it a critical productive resource. This translated into remarkable research on Islamic economics published by many faculty members, such as Muhammad Umer Chapra, Anas Zarka, Monzer Kahf, Muhammad Najtullah Siddiqi, Abbas Mirakhor, Muhammad Akram Khan, Mabid Ali al-Jarhi, in addition to Masudul Alam Choudhury, who was a visiting professor for just one year. Just to give an example of a serious research, Mohd Mahyudi Bin Mohd Yusop, a young faculty member also within the Department of Economics, insists on the importance of bringing Islamic economic science closer to how contemporary economics functions. For him, both homo economicus and homo Islamicus must be abandoned by all scholars of economics. Instead, he proposes a fresh alternative concept called the “Universal Man” (Mahyudi and Abdul Aziz 2018), explaining that “the fundamental problem is neither at the Islamic economics philosophical foundation nor its paradigm. Instead, it is at the basis of Islamic economics micro-foundation; that is, the conception of economic man” (Mahyudi 2016). This stance is indeed in line with mainstreaming Islamic economics. Third, beyond epistemology, details are important, and the more one examines issues of microeconomics the more complications arise, which require empirical work. In this regard, the work of many faculty members at IIUM, looking at the titles within the publication of these researchers, topics go beyond the epistemological debate and Islamic banking, covering various areas of socio-economic life, including Islamic microfinance, the Shariah screening of stocks that promotes responsible consumption and production and supports climate action, zakat (a levy on wealth), sadaqat (charity), qard hasan (free loans), waqf (endowment), microtakaful (mutual insurance), and poverty, hunger, well-being and the sustainability of communities in “underperforming” Islamic economics. Interviewees were proud to mention the influence of Volker Nienhaus, a prominent German economist who advocates for Islamic economics as being

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  257 an ethical economic science (while providing compelling criticism of many of its aspects as well; Nienhaus 2019). Some faculty members are taking the shortcoming in Islamic economics very seriously by providing compelling criticisms of Islamic financial sectors that have failed to develop in economic areas like agriculture and manufacturing, and to fill the gaps in welfare economics. Another important critique comes from Patricia Sloane-White who for long studies Islamic economics in Malaysia. While she praised first the zakat institution, she argues that by privileging the corporation itself as the solution to social and economic development, Islamic Corporate Social Responsibility moves influence over state social policy. This, for her, produces “a version of Islam that is increasingly conservative, financially and fiscally powerful, and committed to social control over Muslim public and private lives and over non-Muslims” (Sloane-White 2017, 192). Finally, IIUM is expected to excel in the domain of Islamic economics, is because the current president of the university is a prominent scholar in Islamic finance. His first book, Shariah Minds in Islamic Finance: An Inside Story of a Shariah Scholar, won the “Islamic Finance Book of the Year 2016” by the Global Islamic Finance Award (GIFA). Psychology: Integrating the Soul

While some argue that psychology teachings have a tendency to disregard the soul (ruh), rendering man as nothing more than his physical body, emotion, thought, and behavior, IIUM has continually taught its students to incorporate the soul and to acknowledge the role of religion and spirituality in clinical practice. This focus is in line with the growth of research over the last few decades generally, which indicates substantial increasing interest in the successful integration of spirituality and religion into clinical practice.20 One of the interviewees reminded us how Malek Bader, a Sudanese professor at KIRKHS, father of Islamic psychology, and current President of the International Association of Muslim Psychologists, set the agenda regarding the IoK in psychology: We don’t want to Islamize psychophysics or the physiology of sight and hearing and the anatomy of the eye and ear. Nor do we need to Islamize studies about the role of the brain neurotransmitter serotonin in our sleep behavior and in adjusting our body clock, the role of the hormone noradrenaline in setting our energy level not the influence of caffeine, alcohol or heroin on the human nervous system. We do not need to develop our own Islamic statistical psychology or to raise an ethical battle against neutral theories of learning. Such areas are “no man’s land” between psychology and other exact sciences. But [we do it] when we come to areas such as the theories of personality, abnormal psychology, the whole area of humanistic psychology and its reliance on existential philosophy, psychoanalysis, the most of the schools of psychotherapy and cultural psychology. (Badri 2009, 24)

258  Alternative Models Another interviewee mentioned the importance of Carl Jung in teaching at the expense of Freudian psychoanalysis, acknowledging Jung’s notion of collective conscientious that contains the whole spiritual heritage of mankind’s evolution born anew in the brain structure of the individual. One of the textbooks used is Psychology from an Islamic Perspective: A Guide to Teaching and Learning.21 Two faculty members, Mohamad Zaki Samsuddin and Alizi Alias, in their chapter “Motivation and Emotion,” provide examples regarding the impact of IoK and how they see it affecting psychology. For them, Freud’s argument that an individual’s personality is largely shaped by what they experience in the first five years of their life, is not in harmony with the perspective of Islam, which takes a more humanistic approach that sees consistency in the nature of man since birth (to the end of his life) to be optimistic and inclined toward goodness and continuous self-improvement (Samsuddin and Alias 2009, 102). However, this free will is not without boundaries, and a Muslim has to abide by the Shariah, which directs consciousness toward both his personality as an individual and collectively within family and community settings (Samsuddin and Alias 2009). Finally, the cognitive approach in psychology focuses on the individual differences in thought processes; and these processes include how people perceive and evaluate information, and how they use their interpretations and assessment of this information to solve problems and make decisions. The social-cognitive learning theory specifically is considered the most comprehensive theory of personality due to the balance between biological and environmental factors. However, according to Samsuddin and Alias, in Islam, one cannot begin to understand human nature without the installment of a belief (Iman) as a moderating variable, and the understanding of the existence of fitra as the underlying basic state of being. Yet, contrary to Western perspective, instinct is not inflexible, as Muslims believe that the soul and Iman moderate the relationship between instinct and behavior (Samsuddin and Alias 2009). Faculty Research and Theses: Generational Differences Research conducted by faculty, textbooks taught, and master’s and PhD theses defended in IIUM are very closely connected. Many researchers at IIUM that I  interviewed highlighted that revelation and reason strive toward the same goal: seeking truth, but that, in the case of conflict, preference will be given to revealed knowledge. Another argued that ijtihad can mediate between revelation and reason. When I asked how revelation is defined, the existence of ijtihad is raised, where revelation is reduced to only unchangeable pillars (thawabit), leaving plenty of room for innovation. Another issue raised is with regard to the commitment of the objective of scientific research to serve society. One example was brought up by Haslina Ibrahim, who has contributed to the conceptualization of Malaysia’s Muhibah value22 and how it should guide the religious communities in approaching diversity. Her contribution is to spell out seven distinctive principles of this concept: dialogue, kinship, harmony, sincerity, mutual trust, integrity and respect. Another topic, which goes beyond Malaysia,

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  259 is religious pluralism. I found two books published by the IIUM Press and others by the Islamic Strategic Studies Institute Malaysia (ISSI). The first is the work of Anies Malik Taha (Taha 2005), who carefully studied the emergence of the concept of religious pluralism. For him, while salient in its Western context historically, this is not that case now unless to admitting respect for differences between religions and for being more tolerant. The second one was published by Haslina Ibrahim (2016). While both scholars are faculty in the Department of Usul al-Din and Comparative Religion of KIRKHS, the work of Ibrahim is more molded in a strictly academic way and includes an extensive review of the literature within this topic from Western philosophy and religious studies, and in studies done in South Asia. Ibrahim is also much younger than Taha, which may confirm my hypothesis about the question of generation (see later), and its new focus in relation to IoK. Master’s and PhD Theses

Between 1991 and 2013, there were 3192 theses and dissertations produced by various kulliyyahs at IIUM, providing a picture of the steady development of the intellectual and academic achievements of the university’s graduates, from which 47% (1501 theses) are produced by KIRKHS. Approximately one-quarter of these theses in KIRKHS are submitted in Arabic, while the rest are in English (El-Mesawi 2013). Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi rightly notes that, while there is a large number of theses being produced overall, few have been published by either local or international publishers—most are frozen in the physical and electronic stores of the university. Analyzing 35 PhD theses submitted in IIUM, a convenient sample selected from KIRKHS and the department of education to take into account dates of defense and variations of treated topics, one can notice different approaches the new generation has for integrating knowledge. In the eighties and nineties many theses sought to set the foundation for the paradigm of IoK,23 but this trend is over, and more recent students are more interested in its application, examining reformoriented topics,24 and exploring practical topics.25 Others, particularly in the department of education, are establishing clear binaries between what is Islamic (  fitra) and what is Western.26 Most of these recent theses can be considered very important for mainstreaming the Islamic perspective. Some signs are there: literature reviews were carried out that took into account local and international knowledge production, while managing to avoid the employment of dichotomous theories. For instance, there is extensive use of Ibn Khaldun, although sometimes more decorative than necessary; and clearly, it is not easy to find much of theorization in the current research produced in the Arab and Islamic world that tends to be more empirical than theoretical. The other aspect is related to the serious account of religious phenomena, including dealing with what is ethical, spiritual and ritualistic as important factors in our understanding of human behavior and social relations. It does not deny the material analysis of history but adds new dimensions. It is interesting to note that comparing two theses submitted in IIUM and in France about the ethnography of women experiencing cancer in Malaysia and Tunisia, respectively, the first one   

260  Alternative Models depicts the importance of reciting the Quran in alleviating pain, while the other did not see such practice at all. In religious studies at IIUM one rarely finds editing of old works (tahqiq) to show more engagement with contemporary issues—which is the opposite trend that one finds compared to the Faculty of Shariah in many Arab countries. While challenges exist in the process of integrating Islamic knowledge and revelation with the social sciences, the tensions, dilemmas and paradoxes that arise from this practice are made more challenging when the IoK in areas like Islamic law and jurisprudence are not taking into account innovation according to the high objectives of Islam (ijtihad and Maqasid al-Shariah). Discussion In the light of allover description and analysis of IIUM as an institution, its curricula and knowledge production within it by faculty and students, I will discuss here all that by highlighting three points: the extent to which IIUM succeeded in producing professionally trained versus Islamically oriented graduates; the level of success IoK mainstreaming has had using the Maqasidic approach; and, finally, how the implementation of the IoK paradigm may be impeding pluralism. Professionally Trained Versus Islamically Oriented

The IIUM promises to produce professionally trained and Islamically oriented graduates. For the latter, this was very clear. The main campus of IIUM is dominated by the very beautiful Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah mosque, and you can see the circulation of students, faculty and staff harmoniously flow between classrooms and the mosque. It is not an anecdote that there is a close collaboration between the Friday sermon preachers and the action research conducted by some faculty. When Iyad Eid, a sociology professor at IIUM, requested to disseminate some information through a Friday sermon about his project on blood donation, the preacher asked him to give the Friday sermon, which Eid agreed to. The preacher did not ask him about his religious formation, nor require a beard from him, but he was generally sure that a faculty member in social sciences would be capable to deliver a sermon. When it comes to “professionally training,” IIUM needs to make more of an effort to reach a balance between the local relevance of their teaching and research, and their internationalization. Internationalization is not only required because of the nature of globalization but because IIUM advances epistemological reasoning that needs to be furnished by reality-check exercises, locally and globally. Entanglement of value and fact requires both local relevance and internationalization, and, while curricula at IIUM blur the demarcation line between positive and normative social scientific inquiry in some benign ways, there are also large gaps between the ideal Islamic society and current Muslim (or human) behavior. Haneef (2013) rightly puts it regarding Islamic economics that “Comparing ‘economic

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  261 teachings’ of the Quran, sunnah or even the writings of Muslim scholars of the 12–15th century with that of modern economists, is occasionally like comparing ‘general principles’ to specific detail operation manuals.” In other words, the greatest challenge for the research at IIUM is to transform the meta-religion principle from its philosophical outlook into a more feasible scheme for practical intellectual engagement. Wisdom is needed in this process. Successful IoK Mainstreaming With Mitigated Outcome in Maqasidic Approach

The founding fathers of IIUM were capable of making this university the laboratory for IoK and for streamlining this paradigm, while the new generation, through their use of Maqasid al-Shariah for ijtihad, succeeds in mainstreaming it. The Maqasid approach has two features: first, rather than being specific to a religion, it is postulated on the universality of ethics and the relationality of values to human beings (Zein 2014); and, second, it takes into account the complex structure of values, goals and means, and attempts to balance the way we look at human needs, rights and obligations (e.g., balancing moral agency and social responsibility; ElMesawi 2017). As beneficial as this approach may seem, however, it is not always well implemented. The university is sufficiently liberal to accommodate different Islamic trends inside, yet discussions of the social sciences and humanities with regard to Maqasid al-Shariah proves challenging when coming up against some classic Shariah rulings (in favor of understanding the spirit of Islam and its ethics, that is, relevantization). This challenge can be seen in gender issues, for instance, while IIUM is a laboratory of innovation pushing Malaysian society to be more respectful of universal human rights,27 they also sometimes fail to meet this goal.28 The need for a new Maqasidic approach to ijtihad is essentially based on creative synthesis between social sciences and revealed knowledge. Some interviewees argued that there is no proper training beyond the traditional application of qiyas (analogy), which can only be used when the phenomenon under study has similar ‘illah (cause or reason) in both old and new cases. An approach which is different from that of Imam Shatibi (1320/1388), who preferred to look at ‘illah from its macro original contexts that refer to the objectives, wisdom and meaning of Shariah. Yet, IIUM has done some efforts in encouraging multi-disciplinary studies and practices to facilitate the production of creative synthesis. For instance, students from science backgrounds are encouraged to opt for a multi-disciplinary program in halal management, combining courses in halal sciences (Institute of Halal Science) and management courses in the Faculty of Economics and Management. Others use the notion of culture to determine the best style of advocating religion (da’wah).29 While IIUM is frequently innovating its curriculum, it would benefit from addressing more courses in climate change or the uneven distribution of income and wealth, not only for the program of economics but for all of the majors in KIRKHS, particularly given that one of its main missions is IoK. And this focus on integration, which is very important for the Maqasidic approach,

262  Alternative Models should be seen more broadly—a shortcoming noticed by IIUM’s former dean of the Faculty of Education, Rosnani Hashim: Sometimes the curriculum is unbalanced and lacks integration between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge, this life and the afterlife, the sacred and the profane, and the perennial and the acquired. Students are unable to see how these sciences can be applied to other spheres of life. The classification of knowledge into ‘ilm naqliy and ‘ilm ‘aqliy, based upon its sources, has not helped this integration. Similarly, classifying knowledge according to priority and duty into fard ‘ayn and fard kifayah, albeit with good intention, also works against the unity of knowledge. . . . Unless our students fill in the gaps through their own initiative, they will have no aesthetic imagination and taste, no ability to undertake philosophical and scientific analysis, and no appreciation for culture. Many Muslim scholars and Sufis have articulated the relationship of art and aesthetics and the refinement of the human soul. For example, IIUM students have already encountered “Study of Quran I and II,” “Introduction to Fiqh,” “Introduction to Usul alFiqh,” “Sciences of Quran,” “Sciences of Hadith,” “Fiqh al-Sirah,” “Islamic ‘Aqidah,” “Islamic Ethics,” and “A Survey of Islamic History and Civilization.” Too much repetition dulls the mind and creates boredom, instead of motivating students to engage in further exploration. (Hashim 2017, 12) IoK as a Paradigm Versus Pluralism

IoK as a paradigm is seen as useful for combining or integrating value with fact, but this should be done very carefully. Some Islamic scholars, such as Tarek Ramadan, reject the label “Islamization of human knowledge” and the categorization of scientific fields as being “Islamic” or not. For him, what is “Islamic” “are the ethics, the norms, and the goals” (Ramadan 2008, 128) rather than the fields themselves. So, by removing the label of “Islamic” from the social sciences to Islamic ethically based social sciences, then, one may open the pathway for a new paradigm of pluralism. This new paradigm being the presenting, genuinely listening to, and engaging in different schools of thought, and the intellectual welcoming of different (and often opposing) views before taking one’s Islamic ethically based position. This approach may be effective at pushing IIUM into improving its internationalization, allowing it to become more relevant not only to Malaysia and the Islamic world (Ummah) but to humanity on a global scale. This beautiful tawhidi epistemology needs to establish a micro-foundation, which can only be achieved through the production of grounded research that allows Islamic culture to engage effectively with contemporary issues rather than just historical ones. Some of my student interviewees were eager to have a better micro-foundation. Jung Dietrich, who taught several seminars in the Political Science department for over 15 years, argues that his teaching was almost no different from other universities in the world. He added “some—but only a few—students asked me about how to put that social science now in an Islamic context. But these discussions went not very far

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  263 and my understanding of ‘western social science’ resonated much more amongst the students.” Pluralism provides a more conducive environment for collaboration. And why is collaboration important? As Nienhaus (2019, 93) explains: [i]f doubts emerge at some point of a normative argument about the acceptability of implications of a particular understanding of the divine guidance (e.g. due to contradictions with other moral rules), a reconsideration of the understanding and a new interpretation of the respective divine guidance may become necessary. Secular economists could contribute to the unfolding of the implications, but not to the (re)interpretation of religious texts. This falls into the competencies of Islamic economists and Shariah scholars. The macro-foundation about all human being all equal needs a micro-foundation on how to deal with income and wealth redistribution, social security and healthcare programs, and the ecological responsibility for future generations. IIUM would benefit from considering revelation and heritage knowledge as sources of inspiration for the development of new theories, which can then be tested by methods recognized by specialized peers through fruitful scientific discussions and engagement. Researchers and academics should put the consequences of the epistemological claim of a unique source of knowledge in a perspective that will not scare away potential dialogue partners. Malik Badri (1979) eloquently formulated that one needs to understand the origin of any field and the basic premises underlying its different perspectives so as not to be drawn into the “lizard’s hole.” Contradictions between curriculum in Islamic and Western visions exist, but by working simultaneously with both visions one will be better equipped to remove or work with those things that are contra to Islamic fundamentals (thawabit). The School of Frankfurt, Marxism, and radical philosophers, ecologists, convivialists and anti-utilitarian social scientists have many critical points authentic to those of the proponents of IoK. There is no alternative to the social, economic and political diseases of late modernity without mobilizing all alternative views, and establishing dialogue between them. As Islamic economist Ayman Reda states, I have tried to discover through Islamic scriptures, philosophers’ texts and jurisprudence the Islamic view of markets and I found out a lot of similarities with Christian views regarding how markets should work, how firms should behave in markets and how individuals should behave in markets. (Reda 2013) Conclusion IIUM has summarized its mission with four concepts: “Integration; Islamization; Internationalization; and Comprehensive Excellence.”30 Looking at theoretical models and practical applications of IIUM with “critical sympathy,” I  found, as we discussed in the previous section, that some of these dimensions were well advanced while others were more challenging.

264  Alternative Models Assessments of future progress by IIUM should include a focus on how it advances its liberal arts education, a vision dear to some scholars in IIUM itself.31 Definitions or gauges need to include the provision of well-rounded or holistically minded education that produce individuals who are able to think and write effectively; who have critical appreciation regarding the ways one gains knowledge and understands the universe, society, one another and ourselves; who are informed of other cultures and other times; who hold understanding and experience concerning moral and ethical problems; and who have attained some in-depth field of knowledge. Such endeavor also insists on being education conducted in a spirit of free inquiry undertaken without concern for topical relevance or vocational utility. Since its inception, the IIUM has advanced in some aspects, while less in others. This can be improved by not only expanding their confines of traditional epistemological terms, but by improving the working conditions of its faculty, and enhancing overall academic freedom (a major problem generally in many authoritarian Muslim states). Pluralism emerges in democratic systems with free media, which are important for creating healthy, engaging and mutually beneficial relationships between society and academia. Notes 1 An early version of this chapter was published by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in the American Journal of Islam and Society (AJIS) 38, no. 1–2 (2021): 101–135, https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v38i1-2.1086. I would like to thank Professors Ibrahim Zein from Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar and Mohamed El Tahir El Mesawi and Iyad Eid from the Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences (KIRKHS) of IIUM for all help providing to facilitate my fieldwork and commenting in early version of this chapter. Also I extend my gratitude to for all those who gave me time for interviewing them, also to Jung Dietrich, head of the Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark, who taught in IIUM for many years, for his comment in early version of this paper. 2 It is a school of thought that established ijtihad (innovation) while looking to the high objectives or purposes behind the Islamic rulings. 3 For full history of this university, see Zein and Noon (2013); Zain (2019). 4 For instance, the International Islamic University in Islamabad (1980) or Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (Riyadh-SA; 1974). Yet they don’t use the label IoK. 5 For a comprehensive analysis of 25 years of Farouqi, see Omar (2016). 6 For a comprehensive analysis of this Kuliyya, see Ibrahim (2007). 7 IIUM was the first to establish a formal, one-year training and certification program for Shariah court judges in 1986 (Moustafa 2018). 8 Beginning in 2003, the Ahmad Ibrahim School of Law at IIUM began to organize biennial conferences on the “Harmonization of Civil Law and Shariah” (Moustafa 2018). 9 Each semester comprises ten sessions of Halaqa conducted by facilitators appointed by IIUM, usually among postgraduate students (Nik Abdullah, Dollah, and Awang Marusin 2018). 10 Usrah means family and comes from Muslim Brotherhood (MB) culture, but in the case of IIUM it is not related to MB. 11 Zain (2019). For more critical assessment of the working conditions of IIUM, see Safi (2018, chap. 3). 12 www.iium.edu.my/news/iium-receives-5-star-recognition-of-malaysia-researchassessment-myra-2020 and https://the-european.eu/story-12028/empowering-islamicwith-knowledge.html

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  265 13 See for instance Hashim (2007). 14 In Haneef’s work, he used five categories for classifying courses rather than four. I collapsed moderate integration and comparative content between conventional and Islamic perspective into one category (substantial integration). 15 These are undergraduate courses, except for political science, where courses cited are graduate and undergraduate ones. 16 See Abu-Baker Mohamad Ahmad Mohamad Ibrahim, The Knowledge Integration and Its Applicability in the University Curricula (IIIT, 2007) and Abu Sulayman (2008). 17 “Seeks to develop in students an ability to think critically from a firm grounding in the sources of Islam in order to contribute to efforts to apply divine guidance to the understanding and direction of contemporary economics activities.” 18 IIUM alumni tracer study 2012. Alumni and Career Services Division. 19 Belwafi and Belabbas (2010) (in Arabic). 20 Haque et al. (2016). In fact, spirituality was mainstreamed in the psychological research. For instance, American Psychological Association has published two journals (Spirituality in Clinical Practice (since 2014) and Psychology of Religion and Spirituality). Other publishers put out other journals such as Journal of Muslim Mental Health. In social work, one can find a similar journal (Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Social Work). 21 Edited by Noraini M. Noor. Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press. 22 Ibrahim, Haslina and Dzulkifli, Mariam Adawiah and Rokis, Rohaiza and Wan Husin, Wan Nurhasniah, “Muhibah and Religious Pluralism: Maintaining Religious Harmony in Malaysia,” in Religion, Culture, Society: Readings in the Humanities and Revealed Knowledge (Kuala Lumpur: Silverfish Books, 2017), 112–138. 23 For instance, Hayatullah Laluddin, The concept of maslahah with special reference to Imam al-Ghazali: a study of its relevance to Islamization of knowledge (1998); Mron Rossidy, “An Analysis of al-attas’ and al-Faruqi’s Conceptions of Islamization of Knowledge: Implications for Muslim Education” (1998). 24 For instance, Nik Noriani bte Dato Nik Badli Shah, “Controversial Areas in the Law Relating Marriage and Divorce in Modern Times: Possible Reforms within Islamic Framework” (1997); Abdul Kabir Hussain Solihu, “Fazlur Rahman’s Methodology of Qur’anic Exegesis: A Comparative Analysis” (1998). 25 For instance, Abdul Khair Mohd Jalaluddin, “Savings Behaviour in Islamic Framework” (1992); Abdurrahman Raden Aji Haqqi, “al Qiyas (the Analogy) and Banking Interest: Special Study on the Suitability of Qiyas in Proving the Rule of Banking Interest in the Contemporary Juristic Discourse” (1992); Muhammad Naqib Numan, “Fundamental Rights in Shariah and Modern Law with Special Reference to Justice and Equality” (1992). 26 For instance, Taiwo Hanbal Abdulraheem, “The Nature of Man in Islam as a Basis for School Counselling” (1998); Saleh, Ali Moh’d Jubran, “Philosophy and Principles of Educational Administration: An Islamic Perspective” (1998). 27 See for instance Kamaruddin and Abdullah (2008). 28 See for instance Arif, Zakaria, and Diah (2017). 29 See for instance Yasin and Sharafaldine (2017). 30 www.iium.edu.my/page/vision-mission-1 31 See for instance, Hashim (2013, 52).

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266  Alternative Models Badri, Malik. 1979. The Dilemma of Muslim Psychologists. London: MWH London. ———. 2009. “The Islamisation of Psychology: Its ‘Why’, Its ‘What’, Its ‘How’ and Its ‘Who.’ ” In Psychology from an Islamic Perspective: A Guide to Teaching and Learning, edited by Notaini M. Noor. IIUM Press. Belwafi, Ahmed, and Abdel Razzaq Belabbas. 2010. Knowledge Production of Researchers in Islamic Economics of the Global Financial Crisis: An Analytical Study. Amman. El-Mesawi, Mohamed El-Tahir. 2013. “Promoting Islam through Research and Publications: Theses and Journals.” In IIUM: The Premier Global Islamic University, edited by Zaleha Kamaruddin and A. Rashid Moten, 1390152. Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press. ———. 2017. “Gender Issues in Islam: ‘Recovering the Measure’ and Restoring the Balance.” International Journal of Islamic Thoughts 6 (2): 31–52. Haneef, Mohamed Aslam. 2013. “Teaching of Economics at IIUM: The Challenges of Integration and Islamization.” In Islamic Economics Education in Southeast Asian Universities, edited by Mohd Nizam Barom, Mohd Mahyudi Mohd Yusop, Mohamed Aslam Haneef, and Mustafa Omar Mohammed, 90–107. Kuala Lumpur: IIIT & IIUM. Haneef, Mohamed Aslam, and Ruzita Mohd. Amin. 2013. “Islamic Economics Education in Malaysia: A Comparative Analysis of the Bachelor of Shari’ah (Shari’ah and Economics), University of Malay, and the Bachelor of Economics, International Islamic University of Malaysia.” In Islamic Economics Education in Southeast Asian Universities, edited by Mohd Nizam Barom, Mohd Mahyudi Mohd Yusop, Mohamed Aslam Haneef, and Mustafa Omar Mohammed, 109–48. Kuala Lumpur: IIIT & IIUM. Haque, Amber, Fahad Khan, Hooman Keshavarzi, and Abdallah E. Rothman. 2016. “Integrating Islamic Traditions in Modern Psychology: Research Trends in Last Ten Years.” Journal of Muslim Mental Health 10 (1). Hashim, Rosnani. 2007. “Intellectualism in Higher Islamic Traditional Studies: Implications for the Curriculum.” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 24 (3). ———. 2013. “Higher Education Curriculum Development for Islamization of Knowledge.” In Islamic Economics Education in Southeast Asian Universities, edited by Mohd Nizam Barom, Mohd Mahyudi Mohd Yusop, Mohamed Aslam Haneef, and Mustafa Omar Mohammed. Kuala Lumpur: IIIT & IIUM. ———. 2017. “The Curriculum of Islamic Studies and Islamic Studies Education Programmes in Meeting the Challenges of Globalization: A Case Study of Selected Malaysian Universities.” al-Shajarah—Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization: 1–32. Hassan, Mohd Kamal. 2013. “Islamization of Human Knowledge.” In Islamic Economics Education in Southeast Asian Universities, edited by Mohd Nizam Barom, Mohd Mahyudi Mohd Yusop, Mohamed Aslam Haneef, and Mustafa Omar Mohammed, 13–50. Kuala Lumpur: IIIT & IIUM. Ibrahim, Abu-Baker Mohamad Ahmad Mohamad. 2007. The Knowledge Integration and Its Applicability in the University Curricula. Virginia, USA: IIIT. Ibrahim, Haslina. 2016. Exploring Religious Pluralism: Christian and Muslim Responses. Islamic and Strategic Studies Institute (ISSI). Kamaruddin, Zaleha, and Raihanah Abdullah. 2008. “Protecting Muslim Women against Abuse of Polygamy in Malaysia: Legal Perspective.” Hawwa 6 (2): 176–201. Keim, Wiebke. 2016. “Islamization of Knowledge—Symptom of the Failed Internationalization of the Social Sciences?” Méthod(e)s: African Review of Social Sciences Methodology 2 (1–2): 127–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/23754745.2017.1354554. Mahyudi, Mohd. 2016. “Rethinking the Concept of Economic Man and Its Relevance to the Future of Islamic Economics.” Intellectual Discourse 24 (1): 111–32.

From Streamlining to Mainstreaming “Islamization of Knowledge”  267 Mahyudi, Mohd, and Enizahura Abdul Aziz. 2018. “Method and Substance of Islamic Economics Revisited.” Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics 31 (1): 33–50. Mohammed, Mustafa Omar. 2013. “Integrating al-Turath al-Islami to Modern University Curriculum: Issues and the Need for a Benchmark.” In Islamic Economics Education in Southeast Asian Universities, edited by Mohd Nizam Barom, Mohd Mahyudi Mohd Yusop, Mohamed Aslam Haneef, and Mustafa Omar Mohammed, 74–89. Kuala Lumpur: IIIT & IIUM. Moustafa, Tamir. 2018. Constituting Religion: Islam, Liberal Rights, and the Malaysian State. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nienhaus, Volker. 2019. “The Reform Agenda of Mainstream Economics: Importance, Relevance, and Obstacles for Islamic Economics.” Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics 2 (32): 89–97. Nik Abdullah, Nik Md Saiful Azizi, Hanafi Dollah, and Awang Abdul Muizz Awang Marusin. 2018. “The Implementation of Usrah in the International Islamic University Malaysia and Its Contributions to Holistic Student Development.” In 6th International Prophetic Heritage Conference (SWAN), 64–75. Nilai, NSN: Penerbit USIM, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM). Omar, al-Sayyed. 2016. Evaluating the Methodology of Islamization of Knowledge in a Quarter of a Century. Khartoum: Knowledge Rooting Administration—Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Ramadan, Tariq. 2008. Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation. 1st ed. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Reda, Ayman. 2013. “Islam and Markets.” Review of Social Economy 71 (1): 20–43. Safi, Louay. 2018. Options: My Journey Through the Whirlwinds of East and West. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr. Samsuddin, Mohamad Zaki, and Alizi Alias. 2009. “Motivation and Emotion.” In Psychology from an Islamic Perspective: A Guide to Teaching and Learning, edited by Notaini M. Noor, 127–43. Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press. Sloane-White, Patricia. 2017. Corporate Islam: Shariah and the Modern Workplace. New York: Cambridge University Press. Taha, Anis Malik. 2005. Religious Pluralism: An Islamic View. Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press. Yasin, K. A. M., and M. A. B. M Sharafaldine. 2017. “An Islamic Perspective of Culture: A  Preliminary View.” In Islamic Perspective of Sociology and Anthropology: Some Reflections, edited by Hazizan Noon, 123–45. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought. Zain, Ibrahim Muhammad. 2019. “Issues of Teaching Islam at the International Islamic University of Malaysia: Practical Reflections and Recommendations in Curriculum Reform for Islamic Sciences and Humanities.” In Towards the Reconstruction of Islamic Studies, edited by Radwan al-Sayed, Sari Hanafi, and Bilal Orfali, 315–74. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers. Zein, Ibrahim. 2014. “Teaching and Learning Islam in International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM): Some Aspects of Relevantization of Islamic Sciences.” Revelation and Science 4 (2): 19–30. Zein, Ibrahim, and Hazizan Noon. 2013. “Relevantisation and Islamisation: The Experience of the Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences.” In IIUM: The Premier Global Islamic University, 171–79. Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press.

Part IV

Reality, Rupture and Alternative

10 Problems Shared by Shariah Colleges

It was popularly known that Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) once said that he didn’t care if it is said Muhammad has done good deed or received many condolences, but that he wanted a religion to reform from the control of turbans. In the same vein, Radwan al-Sayyed (2017) wrote that Islam has suffered, and its studies have suffered over the past decades from a group of reductions, and partial and fragmented references. The deep-rooted Islamic tradition in Quranic exegesis, fiqh, kalam, Sufism, philosophy, history and literature, which are characterized by a richness and pluralism on the one hand, and regularity and consistency with specific context on the other, must now be read with the development of research and methodologies in languages, social sciences and humanities . . . to demonstrate its vitality and the inter-relationships of its operating systems. . . . The use of hermeneutics has led me to amazing results, always in the scope of conversation between the larger public, scholarly community and texts on history. In the previous chapters I  presented and analyzed educational curricula in the Shariah sciences through different examples. They showed important differences between how the Shariah sciences are taught in Arab Shariah colleges, and what appears to me how Islamic studies are taught differently in Morocco (a part of the College of Arts) and naturally in the pioneering models we highlighted, that is, the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad bin Khalifa University in Qatar, the International Islamic University of Malaysia, and Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya in Morocco. In this chapter, I want to focus solely on Arab Shariah colleges to clarify the many problematic characteristics they share. As we will see, the conclusions reached here are similar to what some previous professors, deans and students of Shariah studies have written. Here Ahmad Zaha al-Din Obeidat, a former student who graduated from the College of Shariah at the University of Jordan, writes on the problems of teaching the Shariah sciences as breaking off from cardinal principles, fighting against lively reform, digging trenches between different schools, sects, and specializations, closing their eyes to modernity, staying away from dialogue with others, forbidding DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-15

272  Reality, Rupture and Alternative theorizing unprecedented opinions, criminalizing acting with conviction, and the tears of the helpless over the ruins. (Obeidat 2018) Mohammad Alsheraifin, professor of Shariah at Al al-Bayt University in Jordan, calls for neutral specialists to re-conceptualize the content taught in Shariah colleges to purify it from myths and incited narratives, liberate it from the Salafi strand and contradictions, treat the defect caused by the selective manner of dealing with the tradition, and restore an intellectual balance to raise the ceiling of freedom and acceptance of others’ ideas. (Alsheraifin 2019) There are many problems that Arab Shariah colleges share, some related to the social and political context, such as the difficulty Shariah sciences graduates face while engaging with some social scientists who often belong to the Arab Left (being liberal or illiberal). This is also manifested in how political repression tries its utmost to control the religious field and obstruct engagement between the official political religion and the un-official political religion, which makes Shariah knowledge as a whole more about function and technicality than critique. This oppression not only led to the religious field’s subordination to political power after its previous sources of funding from endowments were nationalized, but also led to any attempt of engagement between the Shariah sciences and social sciences to be viewed with suspicion. This led the Islamization of knowledge and knowledge integration approaches in many Arab universities to yield some epistemological flaws and empirical laziness. In this chapter, I will focus on seven problematic characteristics shared by Arab Shariah Colleges: oscillating between support and refusal of knowledge integration; pedagogical approach of monotony and blind imitation; contradicting reason and logic; over-specialization; weak academic quality of master’s and doctorate dissertations; limited abilities of Shariah students; and high rates of female enrollment. As will be seen, I rely heavily on how the critical voices among faculty in colleges of Shariah report about their colleges and their curricula.1 Oscillating Between Support and Refusal of Knowledge Integration The perspectives in the religious field on the quality of the relationship between the Shariah sciences and social sciences differ, something demonstrated by my interviews with a group of professors of these colleges. This difference returns to the starting points and even intellectual and theoretical references used by these professors. Some professors see the relationship as firm, certain and inter-connected, while others see the relationship as not exceeding the nature of outputs imposed by the university administrations.

Problems Shared by Shariah Colleges  273 Methodological and Academic Integration

The relationship of interconnection between sciences has long been a controversial subject, especially between the Shariah sciences and other sciences, whether social or natural. On the other hand, many actors in these two fields, especially professors in the Islamic sciences, view the academic orientation built on experience and daily friction with lived reality as determining the consolidation of the relationship between these two fields. This relationship between the Islamic sciences and different social sciences cannot be described as firm, especially given the present extent of interdisciplinarity and multi-disciplinarity. The specialist in Shariah who attempts to approach reality and give fatwas on the issues of religion and the world needs these sciences for their fatwas and interpretations of religious texts based on evidence of how people really live. As such, the Shariah specialist is directed and gives fatwas based on this data, and there is much evidence of that in society.2 Additionally the relationship between the two is not a new issue, as many classical scholars, such as Ibn Khaldun and others, discussed it long ago. They see the Islamic sciences and the empirical, social and human sciences as integrating with one another without compromising the sources of knowledge in the Shariah sciences. The Islamic tradition had already interacted with Western sources after their sifting, dismantling and re-organizing in a format which liberates them from their positivist dimension to make them harmonious with the Islamic knowledge system.3 Some professors mentioned that ijtihad was the ideal framework in which the Islamic sciences would meet with the social sciences and different empirical sciences, because it continually works with contemporary data built on a precise academic view, such as social research based on fieldwork. However, these would not undermine the religious imperatives (qatiyyat) set by Islam, as knowledge in the Islamic sciences should not lead to doubt in them. Otherwise, one should collaborate between the most well-informed among religious scholars and scholars from the natural and social sciences. Others mentioned that when Islamic sciences specialists confront reality they need different social and human sciences in order to present an interpretation for society’s members’ queries on the conditions of their religion and world, and in order for a jurisprudent to pass a fatwa, he must at least have an overview of these sciences to know how to deal with the new issues in fiqh they bring. Fatwas cannot be passed without knowledge of economic, psychological and social data and how actors perceive social phenomena, as everything the ordinary citizen needs is connected at least partially to these sciences. For this reason, the Islamic or Shariah sciences need these sciences: “the Islamic sciences need sociology, psychology, philosophy and language, as if a faqih is not aware of a little of them, he will not be able to present the answers that society’s members need.” The integration of knowledge between sciences means the presence of a transient relationship between disciplines, which some term as inter-specialization or as a reciprocal relationship of mutual effect, as every science interconnects with the

274  Reality, Rupture and Alternative other sciences. For instance, in the Department of Arab Language and Civilization in the College of Islamic Studies (el-Kharrouba, Algeria), study of the Quranic text or religious texts is expressed in terms of levels of knowledge, and each one of these levels could be considered an as an established discipline in itself. This is the bet advocates of knowledge integration have made. We can take the works of Mahmud Shakir as an example or model. The relationship between the two fields is very firm, but there is a problem with the content and some concepts. For example: in the social sciences we say a social (including religious) phenomenon is an expression of reality known by society which the Shariah sciences refuse, as researchers and specialists in the Islamic sciences outright refuse this concept and refuse to make the religious a reality connected to the human. Rather, they view it as a high divine affair that came to organize human’s life and achieve his essential goal: worship and stewardship. Nonetheless, others view that there are conditions that must be met for this integration to be achieved; as there is “the condition that social science researchers are committed to the rules of the Shariah,” and focus on the comprehensiveness of religious knowledge: The religion of Islam was revealed to organize the human’s relationship with Allah, the human’s relationship to himself and to his human brother, and even the human’s relationship with the universe. Islam is a comprehensive system of human’s life in his relationship with all the components of the universe. The Shariah sciences too is an integrated and comprehensive system, in which sociologists find what they need, psychologists find highly scientifically accurate psychological indications, and even economists find economic perspectives, as Islam has a financial and economic system and perspectives on public spending. Different Referential System and Knowledge Incompatibility

The second faction of professors in Arab Shariah colleges see there being no relationship between these two fields. They hold that the relationship is “forced” on them as part of the university’s requirements and that it has no benefit for Shariah students. This group views the social sciences as benefiting more from the Islamic sciences, especially in its firm rules, as social developments benefit from these laws by returning back to the essential texts. The researcher in the Islamic or Shariah sciences does not think at all about ijtihad in what is firm or has clear and direct texts. Some Islamic studies professors and researchers have reservations or opposition towards social scientists’ perspectives. The dean of College of Islamic Studies at the University of Algeria, Abdulrahman Sanusi, clearly suggests this when he views the difference between the researchers in the two fields as being based on their different knowledge sources, as social sciences generally do not depend on

Problems Shared by Shariah Colleges  275 the essential source of knowledge for the Islamic sciences, revelation. He pointed out this incompatibility: Show me an original work of social sciences that relies on revelation as a source of knowledge, or refers to holy texts to support its claims. It commends Western theories and outputs over revelation. Indeed, some manifest clear enmity towards this source and different Islamic sources. Are the theories and hypotheses of Max Weber and Durkheim and even Karl Marx truer than the Noble Quran? In the view of professors who oppose the university’s requirement (introducing introductory courses in social sciences and humanities), they are wasted hours taking from both the students and teachers’ efforts that could be dedicated to courses which students would benefit from in his religion and worldly life, to prepare him for the optimum care of citizens’ religion in masjids and different religious institutions. This kind of courses are lost time which would have been better to add to the number of courses which the student needs for his religious formation in order to be able to confront the different social problems he faces in his life while presenting the true image of religion and his students and citizens. Some, whether students or teachers, went so far as to oppose all of the social sciences due to the atheistic nature of these sciences and the harmful nature of belonging or teaching them in university. In their opinion, teaching them is a sin one will be judged for on the Day of Judgement. In one of my field visits to a university in Jordan, a prominent professor mentioned in an interview that there are cooperative relationships with the social sciences and humanities departments. However, while we were heading to lunch, we passed by the sociology department, of which he sarcastically said about the department and its professors that “they are all disbelievers.” This trend views humans as being demanded to study the religious sciences which help them to know how to cultivate the earth and worship the creator with knowledge and clarity. This they base on the starting points of sciences and religious personalities like Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyyah who view the religious sciences as being the basis of all sciences. Neither of them considered to remind us of what Ibn Khaldun wrote: Know that teaching children the Quran is of the rites of religion which the people of Islam took and applied in all of their countries due to it granting the heart firm faith and belief in the Quran’s verses and some of the hadith texts. The Quran became the foundation for the education of skills they obtain later. The reason is that teaching children is more firm and is the basis of what comes after, because the first to enter the heart is like the foundation for the skills (that come afterwards). The foundation and its means determine the state of what is built on top of it.4

276  Reality, Rupture and Alternative Pedagogical Approach: Monotony and Blind Imitation Religious education presents several problems which have manifested throughout history. Some of these problems are particularly related to Shariah education, and some to higher education in general. In the classical period, the encyclopedic scholar Abdulrahman Ibn Khaldun criticized the dominant teaching paradigm in the Maghrib and that when education is not based on a solid curriculum, students merely tire themselves without any benefit: You find among them that the student of knowledge after spending years of his life in the circles of knowledge is silent. They neither speak, nor debate, and take more care in memorization than necessary, thereby not obtaining any useful mastery of sciences and education. Then after finishing what they view themselves as having obtained, you find his mastery of his knowledge limited if they debate, theorize or teach. (Ibn Khaldun [1406] 2004) Ghazali, likewise, has similar critiques in his “Ihya’ Ulum al-Din.” Many of the teachers and students we met complained that the teaching process is characterized by the dominant classical manner of dictation. Khalid al-Samadi (al-Samadi and Helli 2007) mentions that when he was a student in secondary education he studied the Risala of Abi Zayd al-Qirwani without the teacher making any effort to transform the book’s contents to a course that matches the student’s minds or age they lived in. Many of the Shariah sciences are characterized by what Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi and Rashid Rida called in the nineteenth century “al-hashwiyya,” that is, they freeze the expressions in the books of fiqh, dissolving their brains in it to understand it and deduce reason and concepts, wasting their time with what does not bring any mentionable benefit to the Ummah. If they had spent their time to understand the Quran and Sunnah they would have brought one wondrous thing after another, and moved the Ummah away from its frozen and backwards state. (Quoted in al-Khatib 2017) We noticed the dominance of the traditional style in many of the university books, which starts from studied concepts based on definitions understood literally while ignoring historical underpinnings and under problematizing them. For instance, the program of hadith sciences in the first year of many Shariah colleges stipulates the following topics: defining Sunnah linguistically and terminologically; Sunnah and the companions’ acts; Sunnah and bida’a (innovated act); the differences between Hadith, khabr and athar; hadith qudsi, matn and sanad linguistically and in Shariah; and legislative Sunnah and non-legislative Sunnah. As for the third-year programs of Usul al-Fiqh, they stipulate ijma’ (consensus) in language and terminology, the possibility of consensus and how to prove it, displaying evidence to those who deny it and discuss it, the types of consensus, the

Problems Shared by Shariah Colleges  277 definition of qiyas (analogy) linguistically and terminologically, and the evidence for qiyas (Ennaifer 2011). The style of monotony and blind imitation has become widespread, with the absence of the importance of fiqh al-waqi, keeping to the fiqh of texts, memorizing them and cutting off interconnection between the sciences. The binary division of sciences in the Islamic tradition between the rational sciences and the revealed sciences has had a great impact on Islamic thought, and still has reverberations on our educational curricula. What we need is to achieve reconciliation instead of separation (al-Hamdawi 2017). al-Raysuni diagnosed the problem of religious education as the tyranny of schooling and the rarity of practice, immersion in history and detachment from reality, drifting behind frozen mindsets and staying distant from application and practical matters (al-Raysuni 2001). In the words of al-Haj al-Hafdhawi (2017, 128): “Our crisis today is not one of substance as much as that of competence.” According to the survey Abdulrahman Helli conducted in 2005 of 46 Shariah college professors in Syria, Morocco, and Malaysia, and 77 higher education students in the same countries, he found that the respondents enumerate and ranked the reasons for the crisis of religious education in terms of importance (see Table 10.1). On the reason of curriculum content, Helli points to the absence of its connection with reality and lack of appropriateness with students’ needs and questions in the age we live in. Shariah students still study issues and terms and historical examples with no connection to the real world. The sciences of fiqh and kalam today have become a discussion on these sciences and not a continuation of their mission, and did not develop their vocabulary. Likewise, the dominance of mono-thinking, weak methodology, the dominance of fanaticism, and absence of dialogue and criticism, and the mixing between the holiness of the text and its interpretations also affect curriculum content (al-Samadi and Helli 2007, 135). Most of the teachers and students pointed to these curricula as not training graduates to perform the purpose of their education (2007, 136). Helli also pointed, referencing Ibn Khaldun, to the problem of the instrumental sciences5 transforming into sciences sought after for their own sake: “Like what the later generation did in syntax, logic and Usul alfiqh, because they expanded the circle of discussion in it and its inferences, taking it from being an instrument and making it into an aim in itself.” Table 10.1 Reason for the Crisis of the Shariah Studies Reason for Crisis

Number of Respondents

Weak pre-university education Political reasons Curriculum content Method of curriculum presentation Weakness of those teaching Dominance of memorization and absence of critical thinking Fanaticism and the absence of the etiquette of disagreement

65 64 60 60 58 58 37

Source: Study by al-Samadi and Helli (2007, 129). Compiled by the author.

278  Reality, Rupture and Alternative Contradicting Reason and Logic The Shariah college students’ weak abilities are reinforced by the educational content and attempts to create a form of reason ready to combine contradictions, which cannot be done without discouraging the rational skills, which are considered the most prominent characteristic of reason’s judgment and leads to reason losing its essential role. This is what is really happening to curriculum in the Shariah colleges. Perhaps, one manifestation of that is the multiple sacred corpuses among some of the faculty, as they equivocate between the holy text and ulema’s sayings on it. This disorder calls for a deceptive solution that replaces rational/reasonable judgment. Some examples of this deception are the sayings of “revelation’s dominance over reason,” that “religion is to be followed, not innovated,” “the agreement of the ummah with the proof that the Ummah does not agree on falsehood,” and that “hadith is evidence by itself no need to any interpretation and contextualization.” This of course is without the use of reason, which dictates that the same thing cannot be simultaneously cause and effect. Another one of these “silly” rules is that “if reason conflicts with revelation and there is no way to reconcile them, then accuse your reason.” These silly rules have been surrounded by an aura of holiness, and used to block conversation, and to confuse sectarian views, jurisprudential opinions and political orientations for the sacredness of the text. The opinions of Quranic exegetes rule over Allah’s book, and the opinions of hadith commentators rule over the meanings of hadiths, sometimes contradicting them, which has aided in forming a pattern of reasoning instead of the reason that Allah has gifted humanity with. Who dares to oppose this non-rational pattern of reasoning exposes himself to the guillotine that he is against Islam, opposes the Muslims’ consensus, and not to mention, is committing a sin that will take him to Hellfire. This framework of reasoning is not the most extreme of what appears in Shariah colleges, but rather almost a matter of consensus. Students graduate imbued with this thought, having raised their voice and lowered their reason, lost their ability to conduct dialogue, and their personality destroyed before it bore any fruits. People do not like when these graduates neither respect their minds nor their own, making them into objects of sarcasm and mockery. Many of the graduates of Shariah colleges are of this type, with no concern other than destroying reason, sanctifying revelation, and frustrating the people of knowledge and action. One person I met warned, saying, Fiqh and Shariah studies do not graduate faqihs, but camels who transmit, empty and dictate, and does not graduate intellectuals and mujtahids who train their mind and ability to think . . . they graduate those who are not able to transcend the examples given to them by the classical scholars, to apply rules to a new reality, or give birth to even just a contemporary example. Higher studies, which is supposed to be the level of conducting research, comparison and evaluation, in most of them not in the best state, as an

Problems Shared by Shariah Colleges  279 extension of a mindset of transmitting and negating knowledge, far from any innovation and critical thought. (Alsheraifin 2019) If one takes a look at one book, Safar al-Hawali’s al-Aqeeda al-Islamiyya, which is taught in some Shariah colleges, it pulls back the curtain on their shameful catastrophe of education. The author makes takfir of all the Islamic sects in all their orientations except for the Wahhabi Taymiyyan group, which he considers the solely saved sect. The Asharis, Maturidis, Kalabiyya, Mu’tazila and Twelver Shias are all disbelievers, whose destiny will be eternal Hellfire. This is but one example of an incredible amount of curricula used in Shariah colleges that destroys both reason and the Ummah. Over-specialization The over-specialization of Shariah teachers has had the effect of producing instructors who understand Quranic exegesis but not hadith and vice versa. We especially found this extreme enclosure behind one intellectual orientation in Kuwait and Jordan. This effect appears clearly according to specialization, as the practice of some specializations enforces a type of narrow-mindedness, limiting the scope of freedom, and criminalizing of mere discussion in what is considered taken for granted in the discipline. It is but a delusion for reasons that are subject to the nature of the knowledge structure of this or that discipline, which transformed mere opinions into sacred objects that prohibit re-theorization or re-valuation. The reason for this returns to these views is made a basis for their intellectual edifice, such as dissertations which enables one to obtain their academic rank around which his status and wealth revolve. As such, investigating what is considered threatening cannot be tolerated or accepted. It can be noticed that the most extreme professors in terms of closed-mindedness in this regard are hadith specialists. The well-grounded reason for this is clear. The science of hadith is distinguished from the other Shariah sciences in being the most problematic in terms of its methodological principles, as some of its aspects are set with contradictions and structural weaknesses. Other examples of this narrow specialization are specialization in only one jurisprudential madhhab and the absence of a course on comparative fiqh. Poor Quality of Master’s and Doctorate Dissertations There is an intensive knowledge production in the Shariah and Islamic sciences, which is relatively modern, and has many serious studies, some which were able to benefit from integrating the Shariah sciences and the social sciences and humanities. However, our research, as well as other studies on these theses, has demonstrated some negative aspects. According to Abdulrahman Helli (2005), one can easily notices repetition and similarities and regurgitation of the tradition, combining, competing, and re-producing, all while presenting itself as academic research.

280  Reality, Rupture and Alternative This is not to mention the rupture between current issues and old treatments of them. As for the results it reaches, most of them are more descriptive than analytical, making it research on the past and for the past. Muhammad Uthman Shabir wrote bitterly: Anyone who views many of the Masters and doctoral dissertations in Islamic Shariah universities generally a tremendous quantity and meager quality. These tons of papers did not produce any effect, and did not achieve a vision that changes the ummah’s reality, even if raised the material and sometimes social status of their authors, who went on to hold academic titles. This is if it does not become a means for its author to be continually denounced. It suffices to display many of the titles and content of these theses which reach tens of thousands to indicate the Ummah’s state and mindset. . . . If we are still unable of exceeding the examples (produced by classical fiqh), and do not hold the ability of jurisprudential and cultural solidification, then how can our institutions and curricula adopt jurisprudential skills. This of course does not mean the absence of innovations or bright spots and fatwas that paved a path for the Ummah and carries some hope. (Shabeer 1999, 5). We touch on this dilemma in two issues: the research problems (problematics) and research methods. In terms of research problematics, I noticed in many of the theses that the statement of research problem does not exceed two lines or less in some cases in a narrative style like “The problem of our study is represented in . . .” or end with asking questions instrumentally numbered only to directly move afterward to literature review on the understudied topic. This confirms that the research problem is not established on a theoretical (conceptual) framework, such as is the case in the social studies, making this a methodology to attempt to reproduce what has been socially and religiously passed down, especially well-known knowledge in the Shariah sciences. Regarding research methods, it often consists only of textual analysis. Perhaps, the most prominent example of that is what the student Fatih Rabi’i wrote: In order to successfully achieve and answer the central research problem and targeted aim, I will extrapolate Shariah texts in the particular topics, universal rules and ulema’s opinions, in order to gather the possible information, compare, analyze and sometimes compare. As such, the employed curricula to achieve this research range between the inductive, analytical and critical comparison.6 The student Muhammad bin Wali mentions the same thing, saying, I pursued in this study . . . the analytical inductive paradigm, as I inducted the research topic of mujtahids’ recourse to people of expertise, and follow the

Problems Shared by Shariah Colleges  281 sayings of jurisprudents in the issues that serve the topic, while combining the applied fiqhi issues, presenting them, analyzing and commenting on the fatwas of the people of ijtihad on them.7 Limited Abilities of Shariah Students In all of the Arab world, it can be noticed that the achieved grades of students in Shariah colleges in high school are of the lowest rates, and that not all the students of Shariah desired this major but rather entered the field by default; that is, because it was the only major that would accept them despite their lack of contentment, especially initially. Usually, the most important majors (medicine, engineering and sciences) are given priority, then students begin placing majors they consider as not important and have low grades, in order to guarantee a place at university. The Shariah sciences are most likely at the very bottom of the list. If they are accepted to this major, many of those accepted immediately try to change their major, and do not hesitate to do so if they find a means. This is the case at the University of Kuwait, where many of the students of Shariah colleges move to the College of Law in order to be able to practice as lawyers afterward. High Rates of Female Students There is a positive phenomenon in many Arab countries of a heavy female presence among Shariah College students. For instance, in al-Amir Abd al-Qadir Islamic University in Algeria, the statistics of the number of students for the academic year of 2016–2017 is 6550 students, 73% of whom are female (4756 students compared to 1794 male students). According to Nabil Ennasri, females make up the majority of Islamic religious education institutes in France, and the gender distribution of attendees ranges between 60% and 90% in every department. With their presence and participation, these women present new questions that often disquiet the classical approach to the Shariah and confirm their bravery and creativity. They rather represent a power of change that reaches to the point of energizing the entire ambiance of the educational center’s activities (e.g., field trips, conferences, seminars; Ennasri 2019). Nonetheless, we noticed that women hold very few of the administration and faculty posts in any of the Shariah colleges and education centers. Conclusion I tried to show in this chapter that there is a need to review the methods of teaching the Shariah sciences and their curricula by freeing knowledge from the power of memorization which threatens the very identity of ulema, which may have a function of easing the social re-production of big families of sheiks and intellectuals. It is not possible to continue viewing doubts as a problem that leads to misguidance and disbelief, instead of as motivators which push the researcher to the perfect answer. The conflation between Islam and Islamic studies made them closer to creedal decrees rather than fields of knowledge capable of being re-theorized and

282  Reality, Rupture and Alternative re-thought, and as characterized by defensive inclinations (e.g., Islam is in danger, Islam is being distorted), the prominence of a frozen discourse (e.g., there is no religion like Islam, Muslims preceded everyone else and are the first who . . .; alHafi 2016). The best way to close this chapter is to confirm the importance of the International Institute of Islamic Thought’s agenda on the subject of reforming religious education, as they are the pioneers who severely criticized the results of Shariah colleges. Abdulhamid Abu Suleiman criticized the methods of teaching which are concerned with particularities and individual issues, and closed themselves to the circle of semantic research topics, to the point that these sciences became a subject of abstract mental exercise which revolve around the particularities of texts, and clarifying definitions of definitions (al-Muttaqi 2016, 250). He also criticized the Salafi understanding of Islam which holds to the literal text. In the opinion of Taha Jabir al-Alwani, the literalist school of Islam has its equivalents in other religions, such as the Karaite Jews and the Orthodox Christians (al-Alwani 2009). Taha Jabir al-Alwani is amazed by the teaching of the initial Kalam groups (like the Mu’tazila) and Islamic countries that were teeming with secular orientations (like Marxism, nationalism and materialism). As such, he suggests the necessity of re-formulating religious teaching on several principles, the most important of which are: • Building a psychologically and intellectually balanced Islamic personality which exhibits positivity and effectiveness, and is aware that it possesses an aim and message, and was not created in vain. • Liberating the Muslim mind from sharp intellectual binaries, towards viewing the revealed religions as being one, whose aim is the reform of all of humanity, for humans entrusted in its totality and abilities, as well as peoples, towards achieving the aim of truth on earth. In this context, we did not neglect to point out the importance of opening Muslims’ knowledge structure towards the natural, human, psychological and social sciences, with their consciousness of the firm reference point of their aim and direction. • Connecting between science and higher values (tawhid, spiritual purification, and human civilization) against tyranny, corruption and special interests. • Taking the Shariah Islamic sciences out of static traditional thought to be connected to renewed and ever-changing life, taking it out of geographical and national circles to universal and global scopes, and establishing rules of dialogue between religions on high values based on the truth, justice and acceptance of the other, and therefore not enclosing oneself in local cultures (al-Alwani 2009, 187). Notes 1 All the quotes in this chapter are coming from faculty we interviewed, except if designated otherwise. 2 Interview with one professor of Usul Al-Fiqh in the College of Islamic Studies, University of Algeria.

Problems Shared by Shariah Colleges  283 3 Interview in a female professor who served for many years in the Department of Sharia and Law in the College of Islamic Studies in the University of Algeria. 4 Ibn Khaldun, Muqadimmah, ed. Abdullah Muhammad Al-Darwish, vol. 2 (Damascus: Dar Ya’rab, 2004), 353. 5 Instrumental sciences in the context of Islamic sciences refers to sciences which act as instruments helping one understand texts, such as the linguistic and rational sciences, such as logic. 6 Fatih Rabi’I, “Dawabit of Political Ijtihad in the Islamic Sharia: A Comparison to Modern Systems,” doctoral diss. in Usul Al-Fiqh, College of Islamic Sciences, University of Algeria, 2009–2010, p. 43. 7 Muhammad bin Wali, “Relying on Specialists in Ijtihad and its Contemporary Applications: An Usuli Fiqh Study,” Master’s in Usul Al-Fiqh, College of Islamic Studies, University of Algeria, 2012–2013, p. 26.

References In Arabic al-Alwani, Taha Jaber. 2009. Religious Education between Renewal and Freezing. Cairo: Dar Al Salam for Printing and Publishing. al-Hafdhawi, al-Hajj. 2017. “Religious Education in University Institutions: An Approach to Renewing the Epistemological Paradigm.” In Religious Education in Morocco: Diagnosis and Foresight—Part Two, edited by al-Hasan Hama, 117–44. Rabat: Moroccan Center for Contemporary Studies and Research. al-Hafi, Amer. 2016. “Islamic Studies in Jordanian Universities.” In Islamic Studies Facing the Challenge of Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World, edited by Nayla Tabbara, 44–54. Beirut: al-Farabi/Institute for Citizenship and Diversity Management. al-Hamdawi, Rabie. 2017. “Religious Education in University Institutions: An Approach to Renewing the Epistemological Paradigm.” In Religious Education in Morocco: Diagnosis and Foresight—Part Two, edited by al-Hasan Hama, 175–212. Rabat: Moroccan Center for Contemporary Studies and Research. al-Khatib, Moataz. 2017. “Islamic Reform in Syria: In the Nineteenth Century and the First Half of the Twentieth Century.” The Scientist, March  24, 2017. http://alaalam.org/ar/ religion-ar/item/501-606240317. (in Arabic) al-Muttaqi, Abdel’ali. 2016. “Reform of Religious Education in Contemporary Islamic Thought: An Approach to the Project of an Islamic School of Knowledge.” In Renewal of Religious Education: The Question of Vision and Curriculum. Rabat: Believers Without Borders Foundation for Studies and Research. al-Raysuni, Ahmed. 2001. “Shariah Sciences between Teaching and Practicing.” Islamic Journal of Knowledge (27). al-Samadi, Khaled, and Abdelrahman Helli. 2007. The Crisis of Religious Education in the Islamic World. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr. al-Sayyed, Radwan. 2017. “What Are Islamic Studies?” Beirut Center for Middle Eastern Studies (blog), April 10, 2017. www.beirutme.com/?p=24218. Alsheraifin, Muhammad Eisa. 2019. “Abrasions in the Phrases of the College of Sharia, a Life Experience.” Paper presented in a Conference “Religion and Society. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Beirut. Ennaifer, Hmida. 2011. “The Arab Universities Crisis: Are We Globalizing Ourselves? (2/2).” Torus, 2011. www.turess.com/alfajrnews/20230.

284  Reality, Rupture and Alternative Ennasri, Nabil. 2019. “Islamic Training Institutions in France: Presence, Stakes, and Prospects.” In Towards a Reconstruction of Islamic Studies, edited by Radwan al-Sayyid, Sari Hanafi, and Bilal Orfali, 373–82. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers. Helli, Abdulrahman. 2005. The Crisis of Scientific Research in Islamic Universities: Methodological Setback in Building Knowledge. Intellectual Forum for Creativity. http:// almultaka.org/site.php?id=302. Ibn Khaldun, Abdelrahman. [1406] 2004. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Obeidat, Ahmed Zaha el-Din. 2018. “How Can the Colleges of Shariah be Resurrected from Their Death?” Mominoun Without Borders (blog), 2018. www.mominoun.com/articles/ how-can-be-resurrect-faculties-of-Sharia-from-the-mawatha-6009. Shabeer, Muhammad Othman. 1999. Training Mastery of Fiqh. Doha: Presidency of Shariah Courts and Religious Affairs in the State of Qatar. http://waqfeya.com/book. php?bid=11575.

Conclusion Towards Methodological Alternatives in Connecting the Shariah Sciences to the Social Sciences

How can we understand Islam with the appropriate tools for understanding the real world? How can we insert the social sciences into Shariah colleges? And how can we enter the tradition and the sociology of religion into social sciences and humanities departments as well? The bet of this book is that the connecting of the social sciences to the Shariah sciences is not only possible but indispensable. University research in the religious sciences in the Arab world has not opened up to innovative methodological approaches and different knowledge fields. Meanwhile, in many nations religion has led to reflection in the modern social sciences and humanities. The phenomenon of religion has swept into many of the topics of these sciences and created specialized branches for itself (e.g., sociology of religion, psychology of religion, geography of religions, philosophy of religion, anthropology of religion). This inability to absorb modern knowledge that has occurred in religious studies has made studying religion in Arab and Islamic countries separate from the global human context. Therefore, religious studies have become stuck at the crossroads, attracted by different sciences (Bakhush 2020). The tumultuous relationship between the Shariah and social sciences was neither a lasting harmonious relationship nor one of perpetual conflict. Rather, it sometimes settled on a degree of absolute identification of Shariah with social sciences, and other times was fraught with tensions. The Shariah sciences in the face of the other sciences (or the contrary) stirred up conflict and controversy, and dialogue in the best-case scenario. Those who search for solutions from the social sciences must coexist with this controversy and disturb those who only look to the sky for solutions and recommendations. Anthropologically, this is how humans have been from prehistoric times and how they will remain. In our modern age, there have been revisions to many sharp traditional binaries, and a reconciliation of revelation and non-revelation, reason and desire, intelligence and emotion, and evidence and conscience. The historical tension in the relationship between reason and revelation cannot be explained by purely epistemological reasons, rather much of it returns to psychological and emotional motives (al-Toumi 2020). I viewed the output of these antagonistic dichotomies as none other than combining sciences to obtain dual education, even if at the least, between Shariah and social sciences education, to try to build dual modes of reasoning that have views open to the Islamic and social studies. DOI: 10.4324/9781003435372-16

286  Reality, Rupture and Alternative This book is an attempt to prevent knowledge from turning into a bright light that blinds humans to diagnosing what benefits them and distinguishing it from what harms them within an ethical framework. Emmanuel Kant truly viewed the ethical experience as a solid foundation for the divine and recognized reason’s inability in this field. Abu al-Fadl Sajidi (2008) wrote, and rightly so, that there are two things the more one reflects on them, the more their heart fills with amazement: the star-filled sky outside, and the ethical law inside. However, ethical practice demands there to be a type of consensus between virtue and good consequences (al-Kalbikani 2008). Here comes the role of the humanities and social and other sciences to study if the consequences of a certain action were good or not. The engagement and integration of these sciences among themselves do not mean that they melt into one another. What is happening today in the Western world among advocates of practical theology, which is a marriage of Catholic theology with the humanities and social sciences, is the result of decades and centuries of refusing the other, and at the same time, the melting of one discipline of knowledge in another. Since the nineteenth century, Jesuits in Latin America have used sociology without prejudice, and conducted surveys to understand people’s religiosity and understanding of reality. These advocates were divided between those who supported liberation theology and those who did not. If practical theology will present practical solutions for political, economic and social problems, there will still remain tensions between disciplines whose major methodology is based either in empirical methods or revelation, and reason and philosophy must attempt to solve the contradictions and dilemmas this presents for research. This book does not only call for the social sciences to enter the Shariah sciences, but also the opposite, through teaching sociology of religion (or its equivalent in other sciences) which we consider a tool for understanding lived religiosity. The sociology of religion has taken interest in the issue of religion in the public sphere through the process of late-modernity: secularization of religion; religionization of secularism; religious representations among social actors in the public sphere; the religious field; means of propagation; teaching religion in schools; practicing of religious rites; and the religious field in its relationship with politics. Sociology teaches us to respect the other, that is, pluralism. As such, I term sociology “the science of delaying value-judgment.” A  study on homosexuality does not begin by praising it or condemning it, for example, but rather attempts to understand the phenomenon, even if a value judgment may be necessary for the end result about ways of (non)accepting some of its manifestations. Religions play an essential role in giving meaning to our life and patterns of behavior. How can we interact with that and take into consideration other systems of human dimensions that transcend any particular religion? We should face the juxtaposition of these two systems through dialogue, as the basis of all speech is dialogue, (Boutayeb 2015), and not by sticking our heads in the sand, nor in the manner of secularization theory which separated between the civil public sphere and the private religious sphere. All contemporary theorists, like José Casanova (2007), Charles Taylor (2007) and others, have made a rupture with this theory by theorizing post-secularity, which calls for a soft secularism and engages with

Conclusion  287 religion as part of the public (and popular) culture, the elephant in the room in the public sphere. Therefore, I do not like the term “political Islam.” It is as if we are saying that Islamic movements cannot be political. They are political by definition. Like any ideology, I can criticize their political orientation, but I cannot say to them from the onset that Islam with its ethics is separate from politics. Compare this to the lack of pejorative concepts like political Christianity or political Hinduism. Rather, all religions play a role in politics. All of Israel’s politics, even with its important secular elite, are connected to a certain understanding of the Jewish people as God’s chosen people (Rouhana 2021). So too does the Pentecostal church play an important role today in the policies of many countries, the most important of which are the United States and Brazil. This role differs in terms of context, as this church itself which the leftist Lula da Silva supported, was later supported by the right-wing Jair Bolsonaro. If we believe as Abdolkarim Soroush (2002) believed in the relativity of knowledge, and not the relativity of truth, given that religious knowledge is characterized by transformation and relativity due to its connection with and influence by the shades of human knowledge, then from now on we should fear neither for nor from religion. However, I decided not to discuss the obstacles of engagement between the Shariah and social sciences in the conclusion, but rather to focus on three approaches that guarantee the elevation of Shariah science education and its bridging with the social sciences. As previously mentioned, these approaches have been seen as a decent amount of experimentation through three important experiences: the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad bin Khalifa University, the International Islamic University of Malaysia, and the Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya in Morocco. These approaches are acquiring knowledge according to the “connection, separation and pluralistic praxis” approach, the Maqasidi paradigm, and an ethical approach to religion, which we will now cover in turn. Ecologizing Knowledge Through the “Separation, Connection and Pluralistic Praxis” Approach As I mentioned in Chapter 3, even if sciences spring from universal principles and concepts, the application of these principles requires placing or putting them in their appropriate ecological context. That is, the local context and history, including both culture and religion, must be taken into consideration. Therefore, I prefer the concept of “ecologizing” knowledge to the concept of “knowledge integration,” as this latter has been used and abused by multiple actors and gives it a very different meaning. How can we understand ecology of knowledge in producing research and curricula connecting the empirical, human and social sciences with the Shariah sciences? As mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 3, I developed a “separation, connection and pluralistic praxis” approach (SeCoPP), that was inspired by Samir Abuzaid’s work based on a classical model of the Persian linguist al-Shaykh Abdulqadir al-Jurjani, in order to simultaneously guarantee disciplinary objectivity as well as authenticity to the Islamic worldview, so that creedal and religious aspects do not

288  Reality, Rupture and Alternative cover up the sciences, and the sciences do not cross their epistemological limits at the expense of the ethical normative aspects that are derived from religion and other sources. This SeCoPP approach is established on three essential steps: first, defining the scientific topic that is the subject of research in order to know several issues: if the topic is purely scientific it uses the scientific methodologies specific to its field. However, if the issue is a combined religious-scientific topic, it moves to the second step, which is to analyze the combined religious-scientific topic by breaking into a scientific issue and a religious issue each in their own field in a comprehensive manner. As for the third step, it is to establish a relationship connecting the two issues. As such, the sciences become harmonious with worldviews, regardless of how we describe them (e.g., French, Syrian, socialist, capitalist, Arab, Islamic). Therefore, Abuzaid, like Tareq Ramadan, does not categorize disciplines as being Islamic. To do so would be to make it an isolated case from the global scientific community, especially if the aim of Islamic thought is to benefit all of humanity. Science, in its nature, is a human activity in which all of humanity has participated in throughout history. For the Islamic sciences to isolate themselves would make them the first loser, as they will lose the positivist aspect shared between humanity, and lose the presence of a scientific community, which is a necessary condition for knowledge’s advance. The SeCoPP approach is necessary for any discipline and any society or culture, including that of the Shariah sciences. According to Abuzaid (2013), well-done integration, for which I prefer the term “ecologization,” becomes part of researchers’ sub-consciousness. For instance, our scientific position on the issue of “consciousness” in the neurosciences will not contradict with the issue of “freedom” in political philosophy for example, or the issue of “commanding the good and forbidding the evil” in Usul al-Fiqh, so long as neither contradicts with the worldview we describe as being Lebanese, Arab or Islamic. An absence of contradiction does not mean that we will solve the problems of tension between scientific and ethical fields, especially upon simplifications resulting from our conviction that our worldview is one within the Lebanese, Arab or Islamic spaces. Rather, there are multiple lifeworlds in the Islamic space that are ruled by pragmatics (Bamyeh 2019). The connection through lifeworlds makes using a particular concept such as Islamic epistemology analytically thin, a mere feeling of identity and sometimes a spearhead of identity politics. My stance here is similar to how I see the problematic concept of “epistemologies of the South” developed by the outstanding post-colonial theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014). I  am not in favor of any epistemology connected to an essentialist identity (that is connected to a race, nation or religion). Indeed, there are Lebanese, Arab, Islamic and southern perspectives, but they are not epistemologies. The SeCoPP approach will safeguard the objectivity of modern knowledge, and the search for consistency with the Arab/ Islamic perspective, to become a type of cultural pluralism in scientific research issues, especially in the social sciences. There may be some contradictions between Western and Islamic perspectives on some issues related to ontology, ethics, conscience or policy (take for instance how

Conclusion  289 central the family is as a social structure), but through working at the same time with both perspectives (what lessons we learned from research conducted in Europe, South Asia, Arab and Muslim world about the family, for instance), researchers will be better prepared to cautiously engage with research whose normativity can enter into conflict with essential Islamic ontology, ethics or conscience. The Frankfurt School, Marxism, radical philosophers, environmentalists, convivialists and social scientists opposed to utilitarianism have many shared points of critique with advocates of Islamic perspectives on knowledge. There is no alternative to engaging dialogue between all alternative perspectives in order to treat the political, economic and social ills of our late modern age. As mentioned in Chapter 9, the new generation of researchers and teachers at the International Islamic University of Malaysia has been able to acclimate their knowledge production and curricula by using more intensively local literature, taking religion into consideration, and dealing with sciences in a manner closer to the SeCoPP approach. Perhaps, the development of Islamic economics, which I would like to one day be named “economics from an Islamic perspective,” in this country and neighboring countries has resulted from researchers mostly practicing economics first, and Shariah sciences second, using the SeCoPP approach. Even the content and methods of teaching in IIUM is directed to the faith and knowledge aspect without transforming courses into a da’wah course. In any case, the entering of religious knowledge into universities is a subject that has its virtues, as I clarified in Chapters 2 and 9. However, this virtue is not only important for connecting our research to our societal (or Arabic/Islamic) communication sphere but also strategic, as no one today desires to make religious education outside the radar of formal educational institutions or those affiliated with recognized religious institutions. The Maqasidi Paradigm The ijtihadi stake is how to employ a maqasidi methodology in the process of ijtihad. This means re-theorizing the discipline of Usul al-Fiqh and seriously engaging with the maqasidi methodology, and not just in a few pages as is the case in many Shariah colleges in the Arab East and Gulf. Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahrah wrote in his book on Imam al-Shafi’i that “the Shafi’i scholars of Usul were not oriented towards clarifying the general aims of the Shariah . . . this was a clear deficiency in Usul al-fiqh, as these higher aims are the goals of fiqh” (Abu Zahrah 2013, 43). The Maqasid al-Shariah methodology begins with safeguarding the five necessities (religion, life, reason, honor and wealth), and Taha ibn Ashur added the sixth higher aim of liberty. Muhammad Najatullah Sadiqi (2016) (born in India in 1931) developed it not only as a defense against harm, but to also attract benefits as well. As such, he added to it fighting poverty and corruption and causing peace, all of which are higher aims for the sake of humans to live in security and peace, to work for their worldly life and afterlife. One of the most important Maqasid al-Shariah approaches is that of Jasser Auda, who suggests solving the apparent contradiction between prophetic narrations and understanding their indications through viewing the meanings and aims intended by their narrators. Auda criticizes

290  Reality, Rupture and Alternative the methodology that limits expressions to their apparent indications without considering the intended meaning as indicated by context. He likewise rejects the methodology that claims the historicity of the Quran and Sunnah, through a total separation between the signifier from the signified, as done by the deconstructionist school. Mu’taz al-Khatib (2013) clarifies the importance differentiating in some places between higher aims and means, as the “means” could be placed in a theory that could be termed “theory of means,” and the differentiation between solid maqasid and changing means can establish a valid methodology for fiqhi ijtihad, as it differentiates between the changing and unchanging means, thereby, not freezing texts with the motivation of the delusion that all of them are sacred (ta’budi). While reviewing the Arabic version of this book, Abdulrahman Helli pointed out, rightfully so, that there is still a difference of opinion among Moroccans themselves in how to invest in the Maqasid al-Shariah and the extent they can be directly relied upon. They even differ in how to understand Ibn Ashur’s position on this issue, meaning transcending analogy from partial matters and depending directly on universal principles, and the intensive and significant production of maqasidi studies have not always been translated into actual practice. This is what explains why Arab Shariah colleges in the Arab East neglect studying Maqasid al-Shariah and widening it, as they view it merely as a philosophy of legislation, and not as something that affects ijtihad. There is a (modern) use of Maqasid al-Shariah in some Arab authors in Islamic thought to make the Maqasid al-Shariah a step in transcending the Shariah itself. This has hurt the reputation of the Maqasid and made people in the Arab world cautious to use them to a degree. Let me here present, for instance, how the Maqasid al-Shariah paradigm can be applied to thorny topics like Islamic politics (siyasa shariyya), which obstructed some Shariah colleges from teaching it due to the difficulty of reforming it and applying as it is to the real world. In his book Siyasa Shariya: An Introduction to Reforming Islamic Discourse, Abdullah al-Kilani (2015), a specialist in the field of politics and siyasa shariyya, discussed it as a fiqh to apply rules on a basis of benefit, being aware of all of the intellectual tradition in its topic, in addition to its being a clear background to Western political thought and history of democratic institutions. As such, the book discusses the experiences and paradigms of siyasa shariyya jurisprudents, in order to place rules of siyassa shariyya’s application. He draws up a paradigm grounded in what Juwayni and Shatibi established in confronting new issues, pointing to universal principles and working on legislative unity represented in general moral or universal principles, clarifying their effect on understanding and applying to issues that have only partial texts or no text at all. The book also clarifies the importance of the relationship between social patterns and the Maqasid al-Shariah. This al-Kilani book was marked by its clarification of the fiqhi rules the researcher used to formulate and explain their classical and contemporary applications in the field of politics in all their diversity in the issues of personal status, administrative and constitutional systems and international law. Using this formula which absorbed both the classical and contemporary models of writing, the book built bridges between components of the Islamic spectrum, as it displayed the

Conclusion  291 political rules of the Islamic Ummah’s vast fiqhi tradition and did not confine it to one madhhab or orientation. By demonstrating the fiqhi rules in this realm, it was able to respond to most of the problems and questions which are brought up while confronting contemporary Islamic political thought. This al-Kilani book had the chance of being academically applied in university education at the doctorate stage for more than a decade in some Jordanian universities, as it was fortunate to have an academic discussion in a workshop with a group of experts and researchers in cooperation with IIIT and the Moroccan Center for Education Studies and Research in December 2015 in Rabat. One of the practical applications of the book which applies to current reality is that it viewed the Human Rights Charter that brought the fruits of the development of human thought as closer to the Islamic paradigm, and as such superior to nationstate laws. al-Kilani based this view using the thesis of the presence of different legal sources in our societies, some positive and some Shariah-based, and that the Shariah transcends the legal in its comprehensive vision of justice. This approach is quite different from the Islamic mainstream which cautiously views the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1 Having said, I  distinguish, as Mohamad Fadel (2022), Abdullah An-Na‛im (1994) and Mashood Baderin point out, between the Universality of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and cultural particularity of each system of human rights. Yet this cultural particularity, which is the basis of diversity, was taken often as an essence. It rather means the transformation of this particularity from barricades we hide behind to an inexhaustible specificity not limited to us, to become rather a dangling fruit ready to quench the thirst of anyone desiring this sweet resource. Neither the tradition nor cultural particularity is a domain that is neutrally valid; rather, both are loaded with ideology. I noticed the incredible accumulation of master’s and doctoral dissertations in Arab universities in the subject of maqasid in its different manifestations. This is not to mention the intensive production in usuli studies by a group of contemporary researchers, chief of which is Ahmed al-Raysuni, who has accumulated works in this realm of theory and practice. Yet the major issue at stake today within the different strands of the Maqasidi school is how to apply it when you have rules or instructions mentioned in a Quranic or hadith text, as Imam Najamuddin al-Tufi (1282–1321) has suggested. Approaching Religion as Ethics As I mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 8 on the experience of the College of Islamic Studies at Hamad bin Khalifa University, what we need is to revive the ethical side of the Shariah and science. This attempt to discover the goals and values hidden behind legislation and place Islam in its ethical context, and also read the Quran in that light, is a continuation of the school of Fazlur Rahman (2009). Other than the firm universal principles of religion in creed and acts of worship, what we need is to overturn our priorities in our understanding of religion by confirming ethics as the spirit of religion and pushing fiqh and legislation to be

292  Reality, Rupture and Alternative in harmony with ethics. That is, if we consider theft as being condemned ethically in every place and time (and this action does not gain its ethical adjective from the resulting harm and benefit, but from its nature as an attack on truth and justice, and humans desire justice as they desire pleasure (Nassar 2003), the ruling on the thief should be in accordance with its space-time context and the size of theft and its motivations. As such, what is needed is the mainstreaming of a new paradigm to connect religion, not as legislation/fiqh but as ethics to the social sciences, so the Shariah and social sciences can cooperate in legislation, inspired in their understanding by ethical sources (from religion and philosophy). Rather than considering the Shariah (fiqhi rulings) as the primary source of laws, whether personal status and Shariah or positive law, and there being antagonism over the boundaries separating them, which is what Shariah colleges usually teach, there will be a recognition that human relations are ruled by different interests, identities and solidarity principles stems from how they like their life to be and how connected to their Islamic lifeworlds (Islamic tradition not as institution but as experience). In this meaning, all sciences and Shariah will contribute to elaborating moral arguments in all domains and determining benign traditions and customs, personal status, as well as the political (e.g., citizenship, governance techniques, taxes). In other words, religion as ethics can have a say in conceptualizing what is the good life and ethical social relations, economic transactions and ethical politics. Ethics (derived from the integration of reflection in religious and philosophical thought) influences all three fields, that is, the hope of Shariah education is that religion remains the organizer of human relations but as an ethics, not as fiqh. I added moral philosophy as a source of ethics, as any interpretative reading (hermeneutical) of religious texts must take into consideration the reality which is influenced by the natures of tradition, globalization, historical contexts and present conditions. That is, interpretative readings of texts include moral philosophy. What is meant by moral philosophy is not only philosophical theorization but also anthropological theory, taking into consideration human’s cultural nature and sociological theory, which is interested in how to understand people in a particular space and time of a particular situation and the extent to which they answer the idea of (a soft) universalism or present local needs. As such, moral argumentations (which use different repertoires such as textual, sociological and legal) can reach moral judgments with the insurance of organic unity between customs and traditions and jurisprudential rulings and civil laws. Thus, one cannot separate moral philosophy from political philosophy: there is no moral validation without debate in the public sphere using public reason, as I will explain below. Moral Inquiry, Public Reason and Emotion

While ethics are necessary in every place and time, our current age (late modernity) also has some particular characteristics that make it more necessary compared to law (whether civil or Shariah), such as being characterized by the pluralism of perspectives on life, the importance of individualism, and the large role of emotions

Conclusion  293 in private and public life (and especially politics). In the current age of pluralistic and polarized societies and where local and national communities are weakened by global forces, there no longer exists a consensus on any version of the good life. All this makes moral inquiry so complex and subject to the engine of the rationalization of the norm that is “steeped in the logic of communicativity and its contingency, of how action engenders normativity via cognitive, cultural, and communicative means” (Salvatore 2016). This deliberation thus is a process smoothed by the possibility of reaching what John Rawls calls overlapping consensus despite the different comprehensive doctrines in society. Here, even in Islamic moral inquiry, the process is more important than the outcome. As Mohamad Fadel (2008, 7) put it, The centrality of rational inquiry in the quest for salvation and conceiving the basics of the ethical good life, Islamic theology and ethics placed relatively greater emphasis on the procedural integrity of inquiry rather than its substantive conclusions, and as a result Muslim ethical theory produced a system of normative pluralism that recognized the burdens of judgment. This is an invitation to look not only at text (in order to be understood according to Maqasid al-Shariah) but at the empirical context and provide moral justifications, which is why this argumentation can basically be part of Rawlsian public reason. To make our arguments more complex, many studies on moral reasonings social actors do demonstrate the importance of emotions in this public reason. Emotions like happiness, fear, surprise, sadness, anxiety, disgust, shame and pride all play an essential role in our ethical and legal justifications. Martin Heidegger once wrote (2008) that anguish is the characteristic most constitutive of human existence. Stoic philosophers noticed that concealed emotions destroy individuals’ ethical personality. Ethics and law must be a daily labor of restraining negative feelings. Disgust, for example, is a non-reasonable feeling that cannot be trusted as a basis for lawmaking (Nussbaum 2009), and ethical judgements can only lessen such feelings. All of this leads us to a dual process of ethical contradictions and dilemmas: on the one hand, there is an ethical sensitivity paralleled by moral enervation. For instance, let us take our relationship with the other that is a refugee or stranger. This fear of the internal enemy is paralleled by feelings of ethical responsibility towards strangers, which Luc Boltanski (1999) terms “distance suffering,” only so long as they remain far away. As globalization presses on space and time in a manner that brings distance suffering to our houses through screens and social media to a point that pictures of faraway suffering invades our feelings and re-enforces charity. But when the stranger ends at the borders of our nation-state, the end of distance increases the feelings of xenophobia and makes the stranger into an internal enemy, locking up ethical sensitivity. Sometimes, paradoxes emerge because of factors related to power structure, authoritarianism, populism, propaganda and ideology. All of that lets the element of fear corrupt the level of tolerance toward those with whom we disagree. It is no surprise that modern Islamic-Arab thought has begun to grow intensively interested in the subject of ethics. For instance, ethics forms the essential

294  Reality, Rupture and Alternative reference point of Taha Abdurrahman’s project where he elaborates a full-fledged Islamic ethical theory, connecting it to his philosophical, linguistic and sufi knowledge. Yet, despite the important humanist aspects in his project, there are also elements closer to identity politics. These emotions make up an important dimension in ethical or legal discussions in everyday life. In this context of the return of emotions and thinking about ethics, how can religious education interact with this type of ethical dilemmas? And what is religion’s relationship with ethics? Religion’s Relationship With Ethics

Spirituality, religion and theology should not be construed only as means of conflict (e.g., fear of religious difference) but as catalysts for social development because of religion’s role as one of the origins of ethics (e.g., mercy and forgiveness). The German philosopher Hermann Cohen (1842–1918) views religion (1990) as not necessarily enriching ethics, but that religion determines human action, because religion in ethics becomes a guardian of individual distinction. Religion does so by placing ethics in a tangible community (compared to pure humanism) by organizing ethics as well as rites, rituals, institutions and knowledge. If secular humanistic ethics lean towards ignoring the individual in the name of humanity, religion revives the subject of ethics by focusing on a specific experience, that is, recognizing human weakness and error as a key to realizing good amid its fragility. Our confirmation of our weakness is a preamble to an ethical life. The ethical humanistic vision sees humans as free and responsible but rarely does it control overconfidence or arrogance, whereas the religious vision can lead the self to recognize itself as a weak human that sins and makes mistakes. As such, religion pushes for the tangibility of the ethical subject and recognition of its weak points and limits. Ethics are not merely a conception of good for others, but an experience of meeting with others’ suffering. Cooperation then becomes multi-religious to treat poverty and help the victims of oppression and eliminate corruption, intersecting to accept pluralism. Transmitting these values, as well as accepting pluralism, is not seen as being primarily a cognitive understanding, but is developed through daily life and training through acts of worship (such as fasting as a reminder of the hungry poor’s pain, and zakat as a call to aid the poor), and the influence of the social institution and structure, that is the habitus in Bourdieu’s terminology. Virtue and institutions are two dimensions of ethics. Virtue is an element of stability because virtuous action comes from within the doer of the action (as a result of long and repeated practices) and whose role is represented in sharpening the feelings of responsibility, whereas institutions guarantee the stability of action/ work through enforcing external punishments on the doer or training the individual to have ethics. Sociologically, some empirical studies demonstrate that self-awareness of general standards which are considered as determining behavior can be influenced by religion, but not completely. About half of the respondents in Tunisia answered that the motivator of their actions was to follow halal and avoid haram, with a quarter answering their personal benefit, with the rest avoiding what is seen

Conclusion  295 as shameful in social convention and following their conscience (al-Hermassi 2018). From here, we can say that there is a division in Arab societies between those who view religion as the primary source of ethics, and others who view them as inspired by non-religious justifications of the criteria of utilitarianism and benefit, the logic of individualism, freedom of conscience and self-independence. In any case, whatever the sources of morality, for them to become economic, political, labor and social ethics, a balance must be established between great ethical values. This brings us to the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. The Ethic of Conviction and the Ethic of Responsibility

While facing a situation that needs an ethical ruling, we will be faced by the important distinction made by Max Weber (2008) between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. These are two principles that rule any ethically directed action, and could either be integrated or contradict one another. First, as a free agent, the individual should be able to choose autonomously not only the means for an action but also the end: “this concept of personality finds its ‘essence’ in the constancy of its inner relation to certain ultimate ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ of life” (Starr 1999, 410). The ethic of conviction thus drives value-rational action, which is defined by Weber as being “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects for success” (ibid.). While the ethic of conviction recognizes a given hierarchy of values as the context for a moral endeavor, the ethic of responsibility acknowledges value obligations, but assumes the absence of any given hierarchy of values and the inevitability of value conflict as the context for a moral endeavor. This means that the ethic of responsibility focuses on the possible consequences in the application of certain values. This is what Mu’taz al-Khatib did (2020) in his fiqhi/social study on suicide and homosexuality. Fatwas are no longer beneficial when it comes to social relationships (mu’amalat) that use the ethic of conviction, but rather must be combined with the ethics of responsibility. If one’s stance on the Syrian revolution and the bloody Syrian regime is based on the ethic of conviction connected to the essential principles of justice and freedom, then the ethic of responsibility must direct us on how to interact with this regime in light of a society divided between supporters and opponents. Perhaps, this responsibility demands viewing any interaction with this regime from the perspective of international humanitarian law and values of justice which could make this conflict continue without end, whereas the ethic of responsibility directs us to use a balance of justice and mercy, and between freedom and responsibility. As the Lebanese philosopher Nassif Nassar (2003) says: “Responsibility is the other side of liberty.” As another example, all the topics which fall within the application of Shariah rulings are connected to the results of application and necessity of using wisdom, especially in light of multi-religious, multi-racial and multi-cultural societies. Perhaps, this is what motivated Muqtedar Khan (2019) to build a philosophy of governance in Islam on the concept of Ihsan, prioritizing process over structure, actions over identity, love over law, and mercy and forgiveness over penalization.

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Figure 11.1  The sources of ethical judgement.

For a long time, I have taught a course on transitional justice (justice for societies which were exposed to protracted violations of human rights and have begun a transitional process), and at one point it was difficult to introduce to my students’ minds how concepts like forgiveness and general pardon (partial or comprehensive) could be effective tools (non-legal, but could result from ethical rulings) to move beyond protracted conflicts. Many of them debated against this notion, and I found the discussion to be more relevant to them (and some of them were religious) when I brought it closer to the inspiration of their culture and how we can marry the ethic of conviction and ethic of responsibility. A part of the discussion was related to how to marry religion between concepts of justice (rights) and mercy, and how our comprehensive understanding of the spirit of religion (like Maqasid al-Shariah, for example) is what aids us in ethical judgments and defining virtue. As such, virtue is not fixed, but is represented in its intersection with rights and mercy (see Figure 11.1). In Conclusion Let me conclude this book by saying that the great bet is to develop the education of liberal arts inside Shariah colleges and Islamic studies. This means working on curricula and educational courses through new means to compare their efficacy in providing integrated and comprehensive education; producing individuals capable of thinking and writing effectively; having a critical ability with regards to their sources of knowledge; understanding the universe and society through it; understanding themselves and others; being informed of other cultures and times; and having an understanding of and experience with ethical problems. This will not happen without religious educational institutes (and all the general university disciplines) obtaining independence from the formal political authorities, which will not happen without reconsidering the waqf system. These four approaches to connect the Shariah sciences to the social sciences became something transcending the relationship of the religious to the scientific, as the topic has a relationship to civil peace. The conflict is between two extreme elites: one that denies religion in the name of science and philosophy, and one that denies knowledge and philosophy in the name of religion. However, both of them

Conclusion  297 only speak in the name of the thing without its essence. As such, thought remains conceptualized in these fields in a manner that prohibits engagement with each other. As we mentioned in the introduction of the book, knowledge could lead us to authoritarian or non-authoritarian practical reasoning, and this is the great bet. The good news is that in a country like Tunisia, social and media actors participating in the public debate around gender equality in inheritance in 2018 were adroitly successful in carrying out a peaceful debate, armed with evidence derived from religious texts and the social sciences and using non-authoritarian practical reasoning (Hanafi and Tomeh 2019). Therefore, the hope of this book is that it is a brick in building civil peace in Arab societies whose presence is threatened by sharp polarizations. This book is concerned at the same time with the relationship between the Shariah sciences and the social sciences, addressing some thoughts to scholars in both fields and exerting them both to provide a ground for future interdisciplinary dialogue. Note 1 See, for instance, unpublished paper of Ali al-Jifri, “The Basic of the Reform in Human Rights” (2011).

References In Arabic Abu Zahrah, Muhammad. 2013. al-Shafi’i: His Life and Time—His Opinions and Jurisprudence. Beirut: Arab Thought House. Abuzaid, Samir. 2013. “The History of the Philosophy of Science from an Islamic Perspective as a Basis for Achieving Cognitive Integration.” In Knowledge Integration: Its Impact on University Education and its Necessity, edited by Raed Jamil Okasha, 109–54. Amman: International Institute of Islamic Thought. al-Hermassi, Abdellatif. 2018. “Introduction to Reading Questionnaire.” In The Religious Situation in Tunisia 2011–2015. Part IV, edited by Mounir Saidani, 23–36. Rabat: Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research. al-Kalbikani, Ali Rabbani. 2008. “The Science and Religion Controversy in Christian History.” In Problems of Contradiction and Mechanisms of Unification: Science and Religion from Conflict to Islamization, 13–52. Beirut: Civilization Center for the Development of Islamic Thought. al-Khatib, Moataz. 2013. “The Methodology of Objectives and Means in Fiqh Jurisprudence.” Contemporary Islamic Thought (formerly Islamism of Knowledge) 18 (71): 42–59. al-Khatib, Mu’taz 2020. “Suicide and homosexuality. between the morality of conviction and the morality of responsibility”. Aljazeera. https://bitly.ws/Z4Kr. al-Kilani, Abdullah Ibrahim Zaid. 2015. Shariah Politics: An Introduction to the Renewal of Islamic Discourse. Amman: The International Institute of Islamic Thought-Jordan Office. al-Toumi, Mohsen ben al-Hattab. 2020. Teaching Philosophical Thinking and the Arab Cultural Context: What Role for Cultural Predicaments? Introductions to Applied Modernities. Beirut and Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Bakhush, Abdelkader. 2020. “Priorities of Scientific Research in Religious Studies in Arab Universities.” In Research Priorities in the Humanities, Social and Legal Sciences in the

298  Reality, Rupture and Alternative Arab World, edited by Ibn Khaldun Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, 282–300. Doha: Ibn Khaldun Center for Humanities and Social Sciences. Boutayeb, Rasheed. 2015. A Letter to an Old Thinker: Readings in Modern Philosophy. Casablanca: Toubkal Publishing House. Nassar, Nassif. 2003. The Freedom Gate: The Emergence of Existence. Beirut: Dar al-Tali’a. Sadiqi, Muhammad Najatullah. 2016. The Purposes of Shariah and Contemporary Life. Damascus: Dar al-Qalam. Sajidi, Abul al-Fadl. 2008. “The Problem of Conflict between Science and Religion, a Critical Reading of the Proposed Solutions.” In Problems of Contradiction and Mechanisms of Unification: Science and Religion from Conflict to Islamization, 53–88. Beirut: Civilization Center for the Development of Islamic Thought. Soroush, Abdolkarim. 2002. Contraction and Expansion. Beirut: Dar al-Jadeed. In Other Languages An-Na‘im, Abdullahi Ahmed. 1994. “Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.” In Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, edited by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, 19–43. PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Bamyeh, Mohammed A. 2019. Lifeworlds of Islam: The Pragmatics of a Religion. Lifeworlds of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boltanski, Luc. 1999. Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics. Translated by Graham D. Burchell. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511489402. Casanova, José. 2007. “Rethinking Secularization: A  Global Comparative Perspective.” October: 101–20. https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004154070.i-608.39. Cohen, Hermann. 1990. La religion dans les limites de la philosophie. Paris: Cerf/La nuit surveillée. Fadel, Mohammad. 2008. “The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law.” Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 21 (1): 5–69. https://doi.org/10.1017/S084182090000432X. ———. 2022. “Muslim Modernism, Islamic Law, and the Universality of Human Rights.” Emory International Law 36 (4): 712–40. Fazlur Rahman. 2009. Major Themes of the Qur’an. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hanafi, Sari, and Azzam Tomeh. 2019. “Gender Equality in the Inheritance Debate in Tunisia and the Formation of the Non-Authoritarian Reasoning.” Journal of Islamic Ethics 3 (1): 207–32. Heidegger, Martin. 2008. Being and Time. Reprint edition. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. Khan, Muqtedar. 2019. Islam and Good Governance: A Political Philosophy of Ihsan. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54832-0. Nussbaum, Martha. 2009. Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rouhana, Nadim. 2021. “Zionism and the Dilemma of Legitimizing Settler Colonialism: Religious Discourse as a Response to the Palestinian Resistance.” Umran 10 (38): 45–80. Salvatore, Armando. 2016. The Sociology of Islam: Knowledge, Power and Civility. Wiley.

Conclusion  299 Sousa Santos, Boaventura de. 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. Starr, Bradley E. 1999. “The Structure of Max Weber’s Ethic of Responsibility.” Journal of Religious Ethics 27 (3): 407–34. Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Unabridged ed. Harvard University Press. Weber, Max. 2008. “Politics as Vocation.” In Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations, edited by J. Dreijmanis. New York: Algora Publishing.

Index

Abaza, Mona 111, 124 Abboud, Hosn 44, 45 Abdelhalim, Mahorbachat 115, 123 Abdelrahim, Ahmed 20, 45 Abdelwahab, Mohamed Helmy 20, 45 – 6 Abdurrahman, Taha 57, 94, 96 – 7, 195, 207, 240, 294 Abu Basal, Abdelnasser 167, 172 Abu Ghuddah, ‘Abd al-Fattah 26 Abujbar, Hajjaj 94, 97 Abu Rumman, Muhammad 32, 46, 51, 96 – 8, 153 Abu-Sahlieh, Sami Aldeeb 60, 62, 64, 97 Abu Sulayman, Abdul Hamid 246, 254, 265 Abu Suleiman, Abdulhamid 133 – 5, 282 Abu Zahra, Muhammad 25, 137 – 8, 142, 180 – 3, 186, 190, 289, 297 Abuzaid, Samir 119 – 20, 123, 288, 297 Acquaviva, Sabino 50, 97 Adhnali, Ahmed Hadi 119, 123 Aduna, Danna Patricia S 43, 47 Ahmed, Akbar 102, 124 Aita, Mohamed Ahmed 185, 190 Ajuyllal, Idris 215, 221 Akbar, Abdul Kareem 71, 97 Akmir, Abdelwahid 213, 221 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 208 al-Alami, Abdelwahid 35 – 6, 46 Al al-Bayt University xi, 153 – 4, 156 – 7, 170, 172, 272 al-Ali, Salih Hamid 139 – 40, 151, 189 al-Alwani, Taha Jaber 19, 34, 103, 282 – 3 al-Ansari, Abdul Hamid Ismail 178, 191 al-Ansari, Farid 198, 200 – 1, 210, 222 Alatas, Syed Farid 106, 112, 124 al-Atiri, Ali Sultani 105, 123 al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib 103, 246 – 8, 265 al-‘awran, Ahmed Farras 123 – 4

al-Awzai University 26, 130 – 1, 147 – 9 al-Azhar ix, 2, 15, 18 – 20, 23, 26, 44 – 5, 51, 66, 68 – 9, 80, 89, 96, 99, 104, 130 – 2, 134, 150 – 1, 176, 181, 184, 196, 205, 250 al-Azhar, Shawky 245 – 245 al-Bustani, Mahmoud 116, 123 al-Dawalibi, Muhammad Maarouf 25, 27 Aleppo 10, 19, 24 – 7 al-Faqihi, Abdulwahed 44, 46 al-Faruqi, Ismail 103, 111, 117, 246 al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji 209, 222, 239 al-Fasi, Alal 205, 216 Algeria 11, 23, 88, 103 – 5, 123, 184, 274, 281 – 3 al-Ghabri, Abdelbasset 17 – 18, 46 al-Ghali, Belqasem 104, 123 al-Gharwi, Muhammad Hadi al-Yusufi 151 al-Ghunamein, Osama 71, 96 al-Hafdhawi, al-Hajj 277, 283 al-Hafi, Amer 3, 11, 283 al-Hajj, Abdelrahman 31, 46 al-Hajri, Hamad Muhammad Jaber 176 – 7, 191 al-Hamdawi, Rabie 277, 283 al-Hawali, Safar 29, 279 al-Hermassi, Abdullatif 50, 57, 96 – 7, 295, 297 al-Hilali, Muhammad 33, 46 al-Hiyari, Mahmoud 159, 172 Al-Hiyari, Mahmoud 159, 172 al-Husni, Belbachir 205 – 6, 222 al-Husseinan, Ahmed Nabil Muhammad 188, 191 Ali, Haider Ibrahim 46 al-Jabri, Moḥamad Ābid 3 – 4, 33, 44, 93, 98, 207, 212 al-Jalidi, Mosadaq 36 – 40, 46 al-Jalil, Abdulaziz 209, 222

Index  301 al-Jallad, Majed Zaki 155, 164 – 5, 172 al-Ja’mati, Abdelsalam 16, 46, 193, 222 al-Jayyousi, Auda 109, 123 al-Kalam, Yousef 216 – 17, 222 al-Kalbikani, Ali Rabbani 286, 297 al-Khadimi, Nur al-Din ben Mukhtar 139, 147, 151, 221 – 2 al-Khatib, Moataz 10, 19 – 20, 46, 228, 230 – 1, 242, 245, 276, 283, 290, 295, 297 al-Khaznawi, Murshid 69, 98 al-Khoshn, Hussein 110, 123 al-Kilani, Abdullah Ibrahim Zaid 154, 221 – 2, 290 – 1, 297 al-Maliki, Abdullah 114 – 15, 123 al-Maqasid Center for Studies and Research 211 – 13, 222 al-Mawla, Saoud 30 – 1, 46, 87, 97 – 8 al-Messawi, Muhammad al-Tahir 10 al-Mubarak, Muhammad 23 – 4, 27 al-Musali, Jamila 206, 213, 222 al-Muttaqi, Abdel’ali 282 – 3 al-Nabhan, Muhammad Farouk 27, 216 al-Ouda, Salman 29, 68 al-Qaddoumi, Aoun 45 – 6 al-Qadimi, Nawaf 30 – 1, 46 al-Qaeda 28, 53, 189 al-Qaradawi, Yousef 27, 34, 65 – 6, 68, 85, 97, 180 al-Qarawiyyin ix, 2, 15, 18, 23, 27, 44, 193 – 5, 205 – 6, 215, 223 al-Radi, Rashid 35, 46 al-Raysuni, Ahmed 34, 53, 97, 182, 220 – 1, 229, 277, 283, 291 al-Sadr, Mohammad Baqir 102, 123 al-Sahmwadi, Shakir Ahmed 197, 222 al-Samadi, Khaled 34, 40, 46, 276 – 7, 283 al-Sayyed Radwan, 46, 48 al-Shahin, Emad al-Din 10, 227, 232, 237, 242, 244 al-Shamiri, Muhammad 10 al-Shatibi 22, 69, 139, 143, 180 – 1, 208, 221, 261, 290 Alsheraifin, Muhammad Eisa 10, 153, 283 al-Tantawi, Ali 26, 45 al-Tleidi, Bilal 73, 97 – 8 al-Toumi, Mohsen ben al-Hattab 285, 297 al-Wadghiri, Mustafa 196, 210 – 11, 222 al-Zamei, Ali Fahd, 10, 74, 96 al-Zarqa, Mustafa 23 – 5, 27, 44 al-Zaydi, Ali 17, 47 al-Zaytouna ix, 1, 2, 10, 15 – 17, 32, 69 al-Zefzoufi, Bushti 27, 47, 216, 222

al-Zubaidi, Faraj Hamad Salem 170, 172 Anani, Khalil 52, 98 Antoun, Richard T 77 – 8, 80, 84, 88, 98 Anwar, Hammadi 181, 183, 191 Aoun, Mouchir Basil 120, 123 Aourid, Hassan 3, 11 Applied Islamic Ethics 229, 236, 238 Aqlayna, al-Makki 214 – 15, 222 Arab Religious Field 49 – 100 Arendt, Hannah 31, 47 Arif, Arif Ali 265 Asad, Talal 55, 98 Ashari 27, 130, 134 – 5, 141, 146, 156, 166, 168, 194 – 5, 279 Auda, Jasser 110, 123, 237, 243, 289 Azmeh, Aziz al- 57, 98 Badri, Malik 257, 263, 266 Bahrain 10, 86, 92 Bakhush, Abdelkader 285, 297 Balwafi, Ahmad 110, 123 Bamyeh, Mohammed A i, 119, 124, 288, 298 Bayat, Asef 52, 98 Belwafi, Ahmed 265 – 6 Ben Achour, Mohamed Eltaher 1, 2, 11, 218, 222 Ben Hamouda, Amar 93, 98 Bennabi, Malik 3, 106, 240 Bennouman, Suleiman 10 Benwakrim, Na’ima 213 – 14, 222 Berger, Peter 50, 98, 106, 124, 193, 223 Bin Baz 28, 64, 180 Bishara, Azmi 56, 59, 98 Boltanski, Luc 293, 298 Bouizza, al-Tayyib 10 Bou’oud, Ahmed 114, 123 Boutayeb, Rasheed 286, 298 Brown, Nathan J 52, 80, 98 – 9 Buizza, Tayeb 214, 222 Bunt, Gary 84, 98 Burgat, François 94, 98 Burghali, Hanan 145, 151 Buzyan, Alyan 113, 124 Cairo University 2, 27, 111, 181 Casanova, José 286, 298 Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics xiii, 72, 228, 236, 243 Cherkaoui, Mohamed 55, 94, 98 Choudhury, Masudul Alam 107 – 9, 124, 256

302 Index Christianity xvi, 36, 55, 91, 98, 137, 150, 156, 158, 161, 184, 243, 287 Christian missionaries 129 Ciftci, Sabri 58, 98 Cipriani, Roberto 50, 98 Cohen, Hermann 294, 298 Cooke, Maeve 42 – 4, 48, 84, 98 course “Art and Ethics” 230 course “Business Ethics” 230 course “Comparative Religious Ethics” 230 course “Contemporary Islamic Thought”/ “Contemporary Intellectual Trends and Schools”/ “Contemporary Intellectual Schools” xi, 32, 132 – 3, 140, 143, 148, 158 – 9, 194, 232, 240, 283, 297 course “Debate Between Religions” 209 course “Environmental Ethics” 230 course “Epistemology and Metaphysics” 201 course “Ethical Issues in Psychology” 230 course “Ethics and Artificial Intelligence” 230 course “Ethics in Science and Technology” 230 course “Ethics of Pandemics” 230 course “Family Education” 185 course “Fiqh of Crime and Punishment” 176, 180 course “Gender and Islamic Ethics” 230 course “Hadiths of Tribulations and the Signs of the End of Times” xi, 161 course “History of Religions” 32, 36, 194, 198, 233 course “International Relations in Islam” 160 course “Islamic Culture” 41, 44, 106, 109, 117 – 18, 144, 147, 159, 172, 188, 219, 262 course “Islamic Ethics: Mapping the Field” 230 course “Islamic Sects” 91, 140, 184, 279 course “The Islamic Social Science” xi, 160 course “Methodologies of Scientific Research”/”Research Methods”/ “Research Methodologies” 75, 136 – 8, 142, 147 – 9, 156, 188, 198, 203 – 4, 210, 216 – 17, 220, 230 – 3, 235, 240, 280 course “Peace, War and Politics of Ethics” 230 course “Psychology in Islam” 184 course “Religions and Sects” xi, 161 course “Rhetoric” 40, 44, 79, 88, 93, 120, 136, 138, 186

course “The Rules and Art of Da’wa” xi, 160 course “Scriptural Ethics” 230 – 1 course “Sects and Kalam Schools” 194 course “Shariah Politics”/”Islamic legal politics” xix, 175 – 6, 180, 188 – 9, 221 – 2, 297 course “Social Psychology” 210 course “Sociology of Family” 210 course “Tafsir Methodology” 138, 140, 142, 208, 212 course “Towards an Islamic Paradigm” 201 Damascus 3, 4, 10, 19, 24 – 7, 30, 44, 130, 151, 176, 196, 250, 283, 298 Dar al-Hadith al-Hasaniyya Institute xii, 9 – 10, 27, 32, 47, 192, 194 – 5, 215 – 17, 222, 238, 241, 271, 287 Davie, Grace 50, 98 Davies, Merryl Wyn 102, 124 da’wah xvi, 41, 52 – 3, 56 – 7, 62, 73, 86, 92, 94, 99, 133, 154 – 6, 160, 167 – 8, 170, 174, 209, 261, 289; see also Da’i Department of Usul al-Din at Yarmouk University xi, 161 ecologizing knowledge xiv, 287 Eğri, Taha 113, 125 Egypt 5, 18 – 21, 23, 26 – 7, 30, 50 – 2, 61, 79 – 80, 86, 99, 103 – 4, 111, 124 – 5, 130, 132, 142, 189, 201, 209, 240 El-Mesawi, Mohamed El-Tahir 10, 251, 259, 264, 266 el-Messiri, Abdelwahab 57, 97, 103, 201 Ennahda Party 5 Ennaifer, Hmida 3, 11, 16, 47, 277, 283 Ennasri, Nabil 21 – 2, 48, 281, 284 epistemology i, iv, x, 108, 115, 118 – 20, 122, 141, 152, 180, 201, 247, 256, 262, 288 ethics; Approaching Religion as Ethics xiv, 291; Ethic of Conviction xiv, 295 – 6; Ethic of Responsibility xiv, 295 – 6, 299 European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) x, 45, 61, 66 – 9, 71, 96, 220 European Institute of Human Sciences 21

Index  303 Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion, Tetouan 193 – 4, 205 – 6, 211 – 12, 218, 221 – 3 Fadel, Mohammad 291, 293, 298 Fadlallah, Sayyed Ali 76 – 7 Farshoukh, Amin 151 fatwas x, 22, 25 – 6, 49 – 50, 53, 60 – 4, 66 – 8, 70 – 1, 73 – 4, 80, 95, 134, 154, 178, 180, 186, 231, 233, 239, 273, 280 – 1, 295 Faydallah, Muhammad Fawzi 26, 45 Fazlur Rahman 229, 241, 245, 265, 291, 298 fiqh ix, x, xi, xix, 24, 32, 61, 66, 71 – 3, 95, 100, 107, 109, 113 – 14, 131 – 2, 134 – 9, 143, 147 – 50, 152 – 3, 158, 160, 168, 172, 174 – 6, 180, 187 – 8, 196, 200, 204, 207, 209, 214, 217 – 19, 221, 229, 232, 239 – 40, 243 – 4, 248, 262, 276, 278, 282 – 4, 288 – 9, 297 Foucault, Michel 3, 4, 183, 191 France 5, 8, 21 – 2, 29, 48, 55 – 6, 59 – 61, 70, 221, 237, 259, 281, 284 Friday Sermons x, xvi, 9, 50, 74 – 8, 80, 82 – 5, 87, 92 – 3, 260 Gaffney, Patrick D 93, 99 Gauthier, François 56, 99 Germany 36, 65 Ghariri, Sabri 143 Gökalp, Ziya 119, 125 grounding x, xix, 9, 61, 101, 103 – 6, 109 – 12, 115, 117, 122 – 4, 165, 198, 201, 210, 217, 222, 232, 239, 265 Hallaq, Wael 21, 33, 49, 74, 99, 134 – 5, 144, 152 Hamad, Ahmed 209, 222 Hammam, Muhammad 209, 222 Hanafi, Sari i – vi, 11, 22, 34, 43, 45 – 6, 48, 99 – 100, 118, 123, 125, 152, 179, 191, 243, 245, 267, 284, 297 – 8 Hanafi school 50, 69, 135 – 6 Haneef, Mohamed Aslam 251, 253 – 5, 260, 265 – 7 Haque, Amber 106, 125, 265 – 6 Hashim, Rosnani 247, 262, 265 – 6 Hashimi, Muhammad 6, 11, 59, 97 Hassan, Mohd Kamal 247, 266 Hatim al-Qarnshawi 227, 237, 243 Hatina, Meir 79 – 80, 99

hawzas 16, 75, 80 – 1, 111, 129, 149 Helli, Abdulrahman 10, 34, 40, 46, 116, 124, 276 – 7, 279, 283 – 4, 290 Hilal, Hoda Mohamed Hassan 109, 124 Hmimnat, Salim 220 – 1, 223 Honneth, Axel 53, 99 Horton, Robin 84, 99 Human Rights 39, 67, 71, 89, 97, 145, 172, 180, 185, 190, 215, 221 – 2, 228, 230 – 1, 239, 251, 261, 291, 296 – 8 Human Sciences in the Study Plans of Shariah Colleges xi, 157 Hussan, Mohamed Fathy 32, 47 Husseiniyya 77 Ibn Hisham 133 Ibn Kathir 177 Ibn Khaldun, Abdulrahman 19, 20, 32, 35, 73, 83, 104 – 6, 111 – 12, 122, 124, 160, 177, 202, 210, 259, 273, 275 – 7, 283, 298 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 177 Ibn Taymiyyah 21, 31, 45, 66, 73, 87, 96, 163, 177, 275 Ibrahim, Fouad 29, 47 Ibrahim, Haslina 258 – 9, 265 – 6 Ibrahim, Yahya Muhammad 15, 47 ihsan xviii, 109, 295, 298 IIIT see International Institute for Islamic Thought ijma’ xviii, 276 ijtihad see mujtahid ‘illal/effective causes 139 Ilm al-Jarh wa al-Tadil xviii, 158 Imad, Abdelghani 52, 94, 97, 130, 149, 151 – 2 Imam Muhammad bin Saud University 26 – 7 Inaya, Ezzedine 17, 47 Indonesia 184, 212, 240 International Institute for Islamic Thought 103 – 5, 111, 117, 122, 125, 133, 151, 154, 166, 246 – 7, 251, 254, 264 – 7, 291 Iraq 26 – 7, 80 – 1, 92, 94, 129, 189 Irshad and Islah College 130 ISIS 29, 55, 93 – 5, 153, 189 Islam and Global Affairs Program xii, 231 – 2, 241

304 Index Islamic Art, Architecture and Urbanism Program xiii, 132, 229, 233 – 4 Islamic economy 25, 91, 107 – 8, 110, 112, 116 – 17, 123 – 4, 131, 140 – 2, 147, 149, 151, 163, 188, 212, 229 – 30, 232, 235 – 6, 240, 241, 243, 254, 267 Islamic Ethics 20, 48, 125, 183 – 4, 191, 228 – 31, 234, 236 – 8, 243 – 5, 252, 262, 267, 298 Islamic Finance Program xiii, 234, 240, 243 – 4 Islamic psychology 41, 105, 257 Islamic Reform x, 22, 46, 71, 74, 96, 107, 240, 283 Islamic Social Science xi, 102, 105, 112, 124, 137, 160 – 1, 266 Islamic sociology 41, 111, 116, 252 Islamic University of Beirut xi, 23, 130 – 5, 143, 146 – 9, 151 Islamism 22, 52 – 3, 73, 98, 123, 297 Islamization of Knowledge x, xiii, xvi, 9, 101 – 25 Islamophobia 22, 48, 59, 70, 143 Issa, Ibrahim Ali 183 – 4, 191 Issa, Lotfi 54, 97 Istikhlaf xvi, 208 Jaafari madhhab xvi, 76 Jabi, Naser 10 Jabron, Mohamed 34, 46 – 7, 222 Jada’an, Fahmy 6, 11 Jarmouni, Rashid 50, 97, 193, 219, 223 Jinan University 131 Jordan, xi, 7, 9, 23 – 5, 27, 50, 57, 77, 80, 94, 98 – 9, 104, 110, 123 – 4, 153 – 73, 188, 222, 239, 271, 272, 275, 279, 297 Jouda, Mustafa 19, 47 Journal of Shariah and Islamic Studies xii, 186, 191 Journal of the College of Usul al-Din xii, 211, 214 Judaism 156, 158, 161, 243 Juday, Abd Allah ibn Yusuf 68, 99 Jung, Dietrich 10, 262, 264 Kadri, Ali 110, 125 kafir xviii, 5 Kamaruddin, Zaleha 265 – 6 Kassem, Ali 80 – 1, 96, 99, 150, 152 Katatib 15 Keim, Wiebke 249, 266

Khader, Ahmed Ibrahim 103, 124 Khaled, Khaled Muhammad 177 Khalil, Sabri Mohamed 208, 223 Khallaf, Abdulwahab 134 – 5, 147 Khan, Muqtedar 295, 298 Khashoggi, Jamal 53 Khazar, Wasila 115, 124 Khodr, Hiba 21, 48 Kubarra, Abdulfattah 136 Kuwait: studying Islam in the Arab World xii, 7, 9, 26 – 82, 80, 96, 174 – 91, 196, 203, 212, 222, 250, 279, 281 Kuwait University 26 – 8, 174 – 5, 188 – 9, 191, 250 Ladra’, Kamal 34, 47 Lebanon xi, xvi, 4, 7, 9, 23 – 4, 46, 50, 61, 75 – 80, 82, 85 – 90, 96 – 9, 103, 129 – 31, 133, 135 – 7, 139 – 52 Lewis, Bernard 68, 99, 245 Macron, Emmanuel 22, 44, 48 Mahyudi, Mohd 256, 266 – 7 Makassed University 131, 151 Malaysia: studying Islam in the Arab World xiii, 7, 9 – 10, 32, 103, 109, 111, 124, 207, 228, 241, 246, 248 – 50, 254, 257 – 9, 261 – 2, 264 – 7, 271, 277, 287, 289 Malkawi, Fathi 42, 47, 165 – 6, 173 Maqasid al-Shariah ix, xii, xiv, xvi, 9, 10, 25, 32, 35, 108, 110, 113, 122 – 4, 139, 142, 144, 158, 169, 181, 192, 194, 196, 207, 210, 218, 243, 246, 251, 260 – 1, 265, 287, 289 – 90, 293, 296 Mazhar, Sami 145 Mecca 26, 28, 45, 60, 90, 151, 255 Mohammad, Othman 92, 99, 284 Mohammed, El Ayadi 223 Mohammed, Mustafa Omar 255 – 6, 266 – 7 Mominoun (Believers) Without Borders 11, 72, 97 – 8, 171, 284 Monette, Connell 119, 124 moral reasoning 120, 293 Morocco 192 – 284 Morsy, Ahmed 80, 99 Motahhari, Morteza 102, 124 Moussaoui, Abderrahmane 80, 99 Moustafa, Tamir 264, 267 mudarabah xvi, 108

Index  305 Muhammad VI Center for Training Ulema 220 mujtahid xvi, xix, 17, 23, 25 – 6, 32 – 3, 43 – 4, 51 – 3, 69 – 70, 108, 113 – 14, 120, 132, 135, 139 – 41, 146, 151, 155, 166, 168, 176, 188, 194, 201 – 2, 208, 213, 217 – 19, 221 – 2, 258, 260 – 1, 264, 273 – 4, 278, 280 – 1, 283, 289 – 90 Murad, Abdal-Hakim 85, 99 Mursi/Morsi, Muhamad 68, 86 Muslim Brotherhood 4, 22, 24, 27 – 30, 47, 51 – 3, 76, 94, 98, 165, 264 Namaa Center 9, 72 – 3, 97 – 8, 100 Nassar, Nassif 292, 295, 298 Nienhaus, Volker 256 – 7, 263, 267 Nik Abdullah, Nik Md Saiful Azizi 267 Non-Muslim Others x, 91 Nussbaum, Martha 293, 298 Nyhagen, Line 44, 48 Obeidat, Ahmed Zaha El-Din 271 – 2, 284 Okasha, Raed Jamil 34, 47, 123, 222, 297 Oman 11, 80, 154 Omar, al-Sayyed 264, 267 Omdurman Islamic University 24, 27 Ontology 40, 42, 119 – 20, 247, 288 – 9 Othmani, Saadeddine 53, 94, 99 Oyer, Gordon 61, 99 Özervarli, M 119, 125 Palestine 57, 86, 91 – 2, 94 Parkkinen, Mari Johanna 51, 99 Pierret, Thomas 16, 45, 48, 75, 99 Pluralism xiii, 6, 8, 20, 35, 46, 50 – 2, 55, 58 – 60, 67, 69 – 71, 119, 122, 130, 150, 170, 180, 189, 230, 239, 259 – 60, 262 – 7, 271, 286, 288, 292 – 4 Policar, Alain 55, 99 Political Sciences 41, 73, 83, 105, 111, 133, 248, 251 – 3, 262, 265 post-Islamism 52, 98 Psychology xiii, 22, 40 – 1, 73, 104 – 5, 109, 111, 122 – 5, 134, 147, 156, 160, 167, 172, 184 – 5, 194, 197, 206, 210, 230, 236, 248, 251 – 4, 257 – 8, 265 – 7, 273, 285, 2216 Public Reason xiv, 11, 97, 107, 292 – 3, 298 qatiyyat xix, 273 qisas xix, 137, 181 – 3

Qowaider, Mohsen 144 – 5, 152 Qutb, Sayyed 3, 5, 30, 53, 165, 208 Rahmouni, Abdelaziz 215, 223 Rajab, Ibrahim Abdelrahman 106, 124 Ramadan, Tariq 68 – 9, 100, 182, 228, 236 – 8, 243 – 5, 262, 267, 288 Rashid, Rushdi 118, 124 Rashwani, Samer 231 Reda, Ayman 263, 267 Religiosity x, xv, 3, 5, 9, 17, 21, 29, 42, 46, 49 – 55, 58 – 9, 62, 95, 118, 144, 170, 182, 193, 286 religious imperatives see qatiyyat Rouhana, Nadim 287, 298 Roussillon, Alain 119, 125 Sadek, Karim Sadek 53, 100 Sadiqi, Muhammad Najatullah 289, 298 Safi, Loay 203, 232, 242, 245, 264, 267 Saidani, Mounir 46 – 7, 51, 97, 297 Saidi, Yahya 110, 121, 124 Sajidi, Abul Fadl 286, 298 Salafism ix, 20, 22 – 3, 26 – 32, 45 – 7, 55, 71 – 2, 74, 87, 97 – 8 Salvatore, Armando 49, 100, 293, 299 Samsuddin, Mohamad Zaki 258, 267 Saudi Arabia 5, 21, 23 – 4, 26 – 7, 29 – 30, 47, 49, 53, 55, 57, 61, 63, 74, 79, 94, 111, 114, 176, 188 – 9, 251 Sbat, Hussam 146, 152 secularism 55; post-secularity x, xv, 3, 6, 11, 18, 21 – 2, 36, 38, 44, 55 – 9, 94, 97 – 8, 179, 209, 265, 286 separation, connection and pluralistic praxis approach 119 Shabeer, Muhammad Othman 280, 284 Shafi’i 10, 17, 19, 69, 132, 136, 138 – 9, 153, 218, 289, 297 Shariati, Ali 102, 125 Sheikha Moza 227 Shia Sermons 9, 50, 76 – 7, 87 – 90 Shihab, Khadija 146, 152 Shukeiri, Abdel Moneim 10 shura xix, 144, 178 – 80, 191, 208 siyasa shariyya xix, 149, 161, 175 – 6, 180, 188 – 9, 221 – 2, 290, 297 Sloane-White, Patricia 250, 254, 257, 267 Smart, Ninian 37, 48 social philosophy x, 101 – 2, 105 – 6, 123 sociology i, iii, 4 – 7, 24, 29, 40 – 2, 48, 73, 92 – 3, 97, 99 – 100, 104 – 5, 111, 116, 120, 123 – 5, 137, 163, 191,

306 Index 197, 201, 205 – 6, 210 – 11, 216 – 17, 223, 228, 233, 239, 248, 250, 252, 260, 267, 273, 275, 285 – 6, 299 Soroush, Abdolkarim 59, 100, 287, 298 Sousa Santos, Boaventura de 288, 299 Starr, Bradley E 295, 299 Sufiani, Abdullah 100 Sufism xix, 27, 45 – 6, 53 – 4, 71, 97, 134, 153, 194, 197, 207 – 8, 233, 271 Syria 4 – 5, 7, 11, 16, 23 – 7, 45 – 6, 48, 55, 57, 86 – 7, 89, 99, 130, 189, 277, 283 Taaseel Center 73, 99 Tabbara, Nayla 11, 123 – 4, 150, 152, 283 Taha, Anis Malik 259, 267 tahqiq xix, 136, 212, 218, 260 tajdidi xix, 4, 73 takfir xviii, xix, 3, 5, 30 – 1, 54, 69, 87, 93, 96, 155, 176, 179, 194, 212, 279 Tammam, Hossam 45, 47 tariqa see Sufism ta’sil see grounding ta’sil xix, 9, 101, 103 – 4 tawhid xix, 108, 134, 180, 203, 208, 236, 247, 282 Taylor, Charles 57, 100, 144, 286, 299 Tayob, Abdulkader 39 – 40, 48 Tayyar, Ilyas 192, 223 Todd, Emmanuel 59, 100 Tok, Mohamad Evren 232, 241, 245 Tomeh, Azzam 10, 48, 125, 298 Traditionalism ix, xi, 9, 19, 23, 28, 153 Tunisia 5, 16 – 19, 32, 43, 46 – 8, 50, 52 – 4, 57, 96 – 7, 99, 103, 121, 125, 240, 259, 294, 297 – 8 United Arab Emirates 21, 24, 212 United Kingdom 26, 36, 38, 49

United States i, 3, 6, 43, 48, 89, 92, 95, 99, 102, 104, 112, 157, 189, 201, 247, 287 Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi Tétouan 193 – 4, 221 Université Cadi Ayyad 193 Université Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah 193 University of Al al-Bayt xi, 153 – 4, 156 – 8, 170, 172, 272 University of Islamic Sciences 34, 45, 47, 153 – 4, 157 – 8 University of Jordan, xi, 25, 104, 153 – 4, 156 – 60, 164, 170, 271 University of Qatar 227, 229 University of Tripoli 96, 130 – 1, 147 – 9 urf xix, 119, 136 Usul al-Fiqh xix, 131 – 2, 134 – 8, 143, 147, 150, 152, 158, 168, 174 – 5, 187 – 8, 196, 200, 209, 229, 243, 248, 276, 282 – 3, 288 – 9 Wagner, Caroline 116, 125 Walhof, Darren R 43, 48 Walzer, Michael 120, 125 waqf xix, 49, 96, 109, 151, 222, 235, 251, 256, 296 Weber, Max 41, 49, 92 – 3, 99 – 100, 102, 228, 275, 295, 299 William, John Paul 35, 38, 47 Yarmouk University xi, 153 – 4, 157 – 61, 165, 170, 172 Yemen 32, 106 Zain al-Abidin bin Abdul Rahman 27 Zain, Ibrahim Muhammad iv, 228 – 9, 232 – 3, 264, 267 Zemmin, Florian 50, 100