Studies on Copular Sentences, Clefts and Pseudo-Clefts [Reprint 2010 ed.] 9783110869330, 9783110132861

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STUDIES ON COPULAR SENTENCES, CLEFTS AND PSEUDO-CLEFTS

Symbolae Facultatis Litterarum et Philosophiae Lovaniensis

SERIES C LINGUISTICA VOL.5

SYMBOLAE, series C LINGUISTICA, a collection of studies edited by the department of Linguistics of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at the 'Katholieke Universiteit Leuven' (Louvain, Belgium).

STUDIES ON COPULAR SENTENCES, CLEFTS AND PSEUDO-CLEFTS Renaat DECLERCK

Leuven University Press Foris Publications Holland/USA

CIP KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK ALBERT I, BRÜSSEL No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without written

permission from the publisher. D/1988/1869/24 © 1988 by Leuven University Press/Presses Universitaires de Louvain/ Universitaire Pers Leuven Krakenstraat 3, B-3000 Leuven-Louvain (Belgium) ISBN 90 6186 289 2 (Leuven University Press) ISBN 90 6765 124 9 (Foris Publications Holland/USA)

PREFACE This is a book on copular sentences in which ample attention is devoted to so-called cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences. (I myself will speak of ω-clefts and WH-clefts and use the label cleft as a cover-term for both.) It is not a book that is written within a theoretical framework, or which is meant to adduce evidence either for or against one of the current linguistic theories. In this respect the book is atheoretical. What it does aim to do is go into the (primarily semantic and pragmatic) characteristics of copular sentences, derive some generalizations from them, point out a number of restrictions and propose an explanation for them. If the book succeeds in achieving this aim, it presents a great number of linguistic data which will have to be accommodated by any linguistic theory that aims to achieve explanatory adequacy. The book is divided into six chapters. The first (which takes up nearly half the volume of the work) deals with the different semantic types of copular sentences that appear to exist in English, viz. specificational sentences, predicational ones, what I will call 'descriptionalry-identifying sentences', identity statements, definitions, etc. In this chapter I deal with the typical characteristics of each of these sentence types, thus laying the foundations for trie other chapters, in which a couple of phenomena are investigated that are closely connected with the different properties of the various sentence types. Chapter 2 deals with a very concrete point of English grammar, viz. the use of// is... versus that of He/she is... in sentences like It is the postman, He is my neighbour, It is John, She is my friend, etc. Chapter 3 investigates the possibility that there might be exceptions to the widespread belief that //-clefts are by definition specificational (identifying). Chapter 4 examines a number of restrictions on the use of //-clefts (e.g. the restriction on highlighting predicate nominals which entails that a sentence like ??It is a teacher that John is is of very questionable acceptability). Chapter 5 investigates the use of//-clefts and WH-clefts in discourse. Here a number of semantico-pragmatic subtypes of clefts are identified, and the factors are examined which may induce a speaker to prefer a particular type of cleft to another in particular contexts. Chapter 6, finally, examines the role played by word order in the semantic interpretation of copular sentences, more specifically the way in which word order may determine the possibility of interpreting the sentence in a specificational way. Chapters 2 to 5 are based on work which has already been published. They are revised versions of the following articles: - 'It is Mr Y' or 'He is Mr Y'?. Lingua 59 (1983), 209-246.

- Predicational clefts. Lingua 61 (1983), 9-45. - Some restrictions on clefts that highlight predicate nominale. Journal of Linguistics 20 (1984), 131-154. - The pragmatics of ii-clefts and WH-clefts. Lingua 64 (1984), 251-289. The above mentioned journals retain the copyright on these articles. 29 September 1986

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1. TYPES OF COPULAR SENTENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Introduction Specificational sentences Predicational sentences Further differences between specificational and predicational sentences Descriptionally-identifying sentences Identity statements Definitions Other types

v v 1 1 5 55 75 95 110 114 117

CHAPTER 2. ΊΤ IS MR Y'OR ΉΕ IS MR Y'?

119

CHAPTERS. PREDICATIONAL IT-CLEFTS CHAPTER 4. SOME RESTRICTIONS ON IT-CLEFTS THAT HIGHLIGHT PREDICATE NOMINALS

148

1. Introduction 2. Restrictions 3. Conclusion CHAPTER 5. THE USE OF IT-CLEFTS AND WH-CLEFTS IN DISCOURSE 1. Introduction 2. Pragmatic subtypes of (specificational) WH-clefts and /f-clefts 3. The use of clefts in discourse 4. Special types 5. Conclusion

CHAPTER 6. SPECIFICATIONAL INTERPRETATION AND WORD ORDER REFERENCES

182 182 183 207 208 208 209 224 239 241

242 251

Vll

CHAPTER 1. TYPES OF COPULAR SENTENCES

i. INTRODUCTION It is well-known that sentences with be can express a variety of meanings, depending on the particular kind of be that is being used. In this study I will disregard the use of be as a lexical verb (as in God is or Undoubtedly there is a God, where be is said to have an 'existential' meaning) and as an auxiliary of voice (e.g. The problem is being solved), aspect (e.g. They are walking) or modality (e.g. He was to leave at once). What I will be concerned with is the copula be, and even then I will restrict myself to the core of its uses, for I will not consider sentences like It is 5 o'clock, The meeting is in the adjacent room or The explosion was at 8: 00p.m., though all of these would seem to be examples of be as a copula in the wide sense of the term (et Kahn 1973: 22). The type of construction that I wish to investigate is basically that of the form 'NP be NP', although I will also consider other constructions (e.g. 'NP be adjective', cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences, and even noncopular structures) as long as these can have the same semantic or pragmatic meaning as one of the types of structure of the form 'NP be NP'. Many linguists hold that sentences of the form 'NP be NP' fall apart into two semantic types, which are often referred to as 'predicationaT and 'specificational'.1 Others hold that other types should be distinguished besides these. In this book I will defend the latter position, but the bulk of the book will be concerned with the distinction between specificational and predicational sentences.2 The terms specificational and predicational appear to have been launched by Akmajian in his 1970 Ph.D. dissertation (which was published as late as 1979).

1. An example of this position is Blom & Daalder (1977:65), who claim explicitly that every copular sentence is either specificational or predicational, though they allow for the fact that these categories may be further subdivided. 2. .Among the copular ('predicative') uses of to be logicians usually distinguish: (a) the identification of one entity with another (a = b) (e.g. The murderer is that man over there); (b) class-membership (e.g. Sill is a teacher (= Bill is a member of the class of people characterized as teachers)); and (c) class-inclusion (e.g. Whales are mammals (= The members of the class of beings characterized as whales are included among the members of the class of beings characterized as mammals)). As noted by Lyons (1968: 389), "though logically important, this distinction between classmembership and class-inclusion does not appear to be of any syntactic significance in most languages." The notions of class-membership and class-inclusion may therefore be collapsed into one linguistic category, viz. the one we will call predicational, while the notion of identification of one entity with another seems to correspond to our notion of specificational.

There are other terms for the same concepts (see below), but the terms speciflcational and predicational are (in my opinion) the most suitable, because they are quite in keeping with the definitions of the concepts in question. A specificational sentence is one whose semantic function is to specify a value for a variable. Thus, the sentence The one who stole the money is Fred is specificational because it specifies a value (Fred) for the variable the X who stole the money'. A predicational sentence, in contrast, does not specify a value for a variable. Rather, it just predicates a property of the subject NP. For example, the sentence Bill is a good student (when used without contrastive accent on any of the constituents) just predicates of Bill the characteristic of being a good student. There is no sense that a value is being specified for a variable. As noted above, the linguistic literature contains a variety of terms to denote this contrast. Specificational sentences have sometimes been called identifying (see e.g. Dik 1980a, Gundel 1977b) or identificational (e.g. Kuno & Wongkhomthong 1981, Quirk et al. 1985). These terms are in keeping with the fact that specificational sentences like It is John who is the murderer indeed identify a person or entity, but they are inaccurate because (as we will see) not all identifying sentences are specificational. (For example, in (1) Mike? Who's Mike? - He's our neighbours' son. the reply sentence is identifying but not specificational - cf. below). In some cases the choice of the term identifying or identificational seems to be motivated, not by the fact that specificational sentences reveal the identity of someone or something, but by the observation that they represent two entities as being identical. Thus, Dik (1980a: 32) defines an 'identifying' sentence as one "in which a relation of identity is established between two entities", i.e. "in which it is expressed that the referents of two definite terms do, in fact, coincide in the same entity." The same view also underlies the use of the terms equative (e.g. Halliday 1970b, Huddleston 1971, Kahn 1973) and equational (e.g. Harries-Delisle 1978, Bolinger 1972a): a specificational sentence is held to have "two functions, resembling the two terms of an equation, where the one serves to identify the other, as in = 2" (Halliday 1970b: 155). However, I do not think that specificational sentences express "the identification of one term by another" (Huddleston 1971: 134) or the idea that "what is referred to as NPj is the same as what has been referred to as NP2" (Kuno 1970: 351). Sentences that express this kind of relation are identity statements (e.g. The Morning Star is the Evening Star, Dr. Jekyü is Mr. Hyde), and, as we will see below, identity statements differ in many respects from specificational sentences. Although the claim that specificational sentences (for example, clefts or pseudoclefts) express "a relationship of identity, a kind of 'equals' sign" (Halliday 1982: 68) is widespread in the linguistic literature (see also Van Dijk 1977: 121, Harries-Delisle 1978:422, Atlas & Levinson 1981:53, Kuno & Wongkhomthong 1981: 76, etc.), and although there is a long philosophical tradition of treating

specificational sentences like The number of planets is nine as the expression of some kind of identity, specificational sentences cannot actually be analysed in this way. They are identifying in the sense that they reveal the identity of some entity but not in the sense that they state a relation of identity between two entities. Only a couple of linguists (e.g. Higgins 1976: 11, 133, Ball 1977: 67) have stressed this difference between specificational sentences and identity statements. For example, Ball (1977:67) states explictly that, if we use the notation 'x = y' for specificational sentences, "this is read 'assign the value y to x' and not 'x equals y'. In the former, the variable x is treated in effect as non-referential, in the latter it is not." In sum, terms such as identifying, identificational equative and equationd are either imprecise or misleading when applied to specificational sentences. In contrast, the term specificational expresses precisely what such sentences do, viz. specify a value for a variable. For the sake of completeness I should also mention the term extensive, which is used by Halliday (1967, 1968). Halliday's distinction between 'intensive' and 'extensive' be appears to concur with our distinction between predicational and specificational sentences. However, these terms have not become widespread in the linguistic literature and I will not make use of them in this work. The array of terms that have been used for what we call predicational is even larger. The fact that predicational sentences predicate some property (characteristic, attribute, quality) of the referent of the subject NP has engendered the use of such terms as attributive (Gundel 1977b, Lyons 1968: 389, Halliday 1970a), propertyassigning (Dik 1980a), qualifying (Mathesius 1975), characterizational (Kuno & Wongkhomthong 1981, Quirk et al. 1985) and ascriptive (Kahn 1973: 469-473). Erades (1949) speaks of classifying sentences, because assigning a property to an entity boils down to saying that the entity belongs to the class of entities sharing that property. Hanies-Delisle (1978) uses the term non-equational, to set off such sentences from 'equationaP (specificational) ones. And, as noted above, Halliday (1967, 1968) introduces the term intensive. Although most of these terms would seem to be fairly satisfactory, I still prefer the term predicational because this is the term that is normally contrasted with the term specificational. And, indeed, the most important characteristic of a predicational sentence is not that it assigns a property, but that it does so in a non-specificational way. As we will see, a pseudo-cleft like What John is is tall is specificational in spite of the fact that it ascribes a property to the referent of the subject NR A predicational sentence is thus one which merely predicates a property of the referent of the subject, i.e. one which does not specify the property in question as the value of some variable. The term predicational seems to be better-suited than the other terms to capture this meaning. Before we start investigating the different sentence types, two further remarks should be made. First, it should be noted that the distinction between specificational and predicational sentences is relevant not only to copular sentences but also to other structures expressing a relationship that is basically the same as that expressed

between the subject and the subject complement of be. I am referring here to structures with as (e.g. I consider John as my role model lam speaking to you as a friend) and structures with an object complement (e.g. / made John my assistant, They called Edna a good student). Noun phrases that are used as object complement or which follow as are also to be analysed as either specificational or predicational. The second remark we have to make concerns our use of the terms 'specificational sentence', 'predicational sentence', etc. This use is somewhat misleading, in that it suggests that we are dealing with sentence types that have quite different syntactic and semantic characteristics. Although this is true to a certain extent, the distinction we will make is essentially of a semantic nature and is not necessarily reflected in the syntactic properties of the sentences in question. That is, although there are some syntactic characteristics that are typical of predicational or specificational sentences only, it is possible for one and the same sentence to yield both a predicational and a specificational interpretation. As we will see below, pseudo-clefts are often ambiguous between a predicational and a specificational reading. (For example, the sentence What happened was a catastrophe can be interpreted both as 'What happened was disastrous' and as 'The following happened: a catastrophe'.) A term like 'predicational sentence' is therefore a somewhat inaccurate abbreviation of'sentence that yields a predicational interpretation'. Let us now have a closer look at the different sentence types. Since a predicational sentence is to a large extent defined on the basis of the negative property of not being a specificational sentence, it seems logical that we should examine the specificational type first.

2. SPECIFICATIONAL SENTENCES Consider the following sentences:

(1 )(a) The bank robber is John Thomas, (b) The only people that can help you are the Prime Minister and the Queen herself. These sentences clearly come up to the definition of specificational sentences: (l,a) specifies the value 'John Thomas' for the variable 'the X who is the bank robber', and (l,b) similarly specifies the two values ('the Prime Minister' and 'the Queen herself) that satisfy the variable 'the only X-es that can help you'. Specificational sentences like these have the following characteristics: 2.1. As pointed out by Higgins (1976), specifying values for a variable is very similar to enumerating the items on a list. Thus, we could say that (l,b) enumerates the two items that figure on the list whose heading is 'people that can help you'. The same is true of (l,a), but the list in question here has only one item on it. 2.2. It follows that (1 ,b) can be paraphrased as 'The list of people that can help you contains only two people: the Prime Minister and the Queen herself. More generally, any specificational sentence expresses something like "The following values satisfy the variable: valueb value2, etc.'. A paraphrase of this form is therefore always available, and, moreover, every specificational sentence can be read with a 'colon intonation' (i.e. with a slight pause after be) as long as the constituent indicating the variable precedes the one denoting the value. Thus, (l,a) can be paraphrased as 'The following person is the bank robber: John Thomas', and the sentence can be pronounced with the colon intonation: 'The bank robber is: John Thomas'. Apart from the fact that specificational sentences can be paraphrased in terms of the structure 'x be: y', it should be noted that this structure may be used as a syntactic device for explicitly creating a specificational interpretation. A very clear example of this is to be found in Dutch, where the constituent to be interpreted specificationally can be moved towards the end, where it is typically preceded by a slight pause creating a colon interpretation. The following examples are from Blom &Daalder(1977: 106):

(3)(a) Beide ineens aan: de pianostemmer. 'Suddenly rang: the piano tuner' (b) Hi] zal altijd blijven: trouw aan zijn principes. 'He will always remain: loyal to his principles'

Although this kind of 'postpositioning' does not seem to be a recognized transformation in English, similar examples can be found, provided the specificational constituent is relatively long or complex: (4)(a) Dead were Mrs. Claudia Ann Plumley, 24 years old, of Gobies, Mich.; her children, Virginia, 4, Melissa, 2, Howard, 1 112 and Sarah Jane Saye, 5, also of Gobies. (Rensky 1981: 138) (b) Needed will be an adjustment of academic calendars and schedules, effective combination of classroom requirements with independent study, and liberal recognition of the mature students' practical experience, (ibid.) Examples like these would seem to be instances of Complex NP Shift. Yet they violate the rule that Complex NP Shift does not operate on subject NPs (c£ Postal 1974: 83). Whether the shift in question is Complex NP Shift or not, the result at any rate is that the sentence can only be interpreted specificationally, whereas the source sentences ('x, y and z were dead', 'x, y and z will be needed') can also be interpreted as predicational. Apart from examples like (4,a-b), English also uses the colon intonation in sentences of the type which Ross (1969) has called instances of 'equative deletion': (5) Bill is what you think him to be: a bore. 2.3. Specifying a value (or values) for a variable (or enumerating the items on a list) is very similar to providing an answer to a question. The reason is that in a question that has narrow scope the WH-word functions as a variable for which a value must be specified. It follows that specificational sentences will often be used in answer to explicit WH-questions, or, if this is not the case, imply such a question. Thus, the sentence The bank robber is John Thomas is naturally felt to provide an answer to the question Who is the bank robber?. A consequence of this is that specificational sentences have exactly the same presuppositions as question-answer pairs: (6)(a) What did you get? - A book. (b) It was a book that I got. (c) What I got was a book. Not only the question in (6,a) but also the specificational sentences (6,b) and (6,c) presuppose that there was something that I got. (That is, all three of them carry a presupposition of existence.) Because of this, some people (e.g. Grimes 1975: 341, Farad 1971) have argued that the WH-clause of a WH-cleft (which is a typical

specificational structure)3 should be analysed as a dependent question clause rather than as a free relative. Conversely, others (e.g. Harries-Delisle 1978: 479, Takizala 1972) have claimed that WH-questions and their answers are in fact underlying cleft sentences. (As we will see, cleft sentences are the most typical instances of specificational sentences). Although I doubt that the mere fact that //-clefts and WH-clefts share the same presuppositions as question-answer pairs is a sufficient basis for making such claims, the great similarity of the three structures is certainly worth emphasizing. It also needs stressing that there is no such similarity where predicational sentences are concerned. I disagree with Lyons (1977: 598) where he writes that "every statement can be seen as providing an answer to either an explicit or implicit question". Although it is true that a suitable question could be thought of for any statement, predicational statements are not felt to be answers to implicit questions. The predicational sentence John is walking in the garden becomes specificational if it is felt to answer the question What is John doing?. In that case what represents a variable and walking in the garden is the value that is assigned to it. Similarly, John is a good student, which is normally felt to be predicational, is used specificationally if it answers the (explicit or implicit) question What is John ?. The semantic similarity between specificational sentences and question-answer pairs is also reflected in syntactic facts. One example of how the two pattern alike is their behaviour in connection with referring pronouns. Compare:

(7)(a) (b) (8)(a) (b) (9)(a) (b)

What did Johrij sell? - HiSj house. *What did he( sell? - John's, house. What Johrij sold was his, house. *What he, sold was John'Sj house. It was hiSj house that John, sold. *lt was John'Sj house that hej sold.

Not surprisingly, lists behave in the same way (cf. Higgins 1976: 218-219):

(10)(a) Johnj sold the following: his; house, (b) *Hej sold the following: John'Sj house. The fact that specificational sentences are felt to be answers to WH-questions accounts for the fact that, syntactically, they can be of two different types. The first type requires that the specificational sentence should be used in answer to an overt WH-question. In that case the specificational sentence may be a repetition of the question, but then in the form of a statement and with a specificational constituent (representing a value) in the place of the variable (WH-word) of the question:

3. From now on I will be using the term Yf-cleft' for what is traditionally called a 'cleft sentence' and 'WH-cleft' for what is often referred to as a 'pseudo-cleft'. The term 'cleft' will be used as a cover-term for both of these.

(11) (Who opened the door?) - John opened the door. Variants of this type are (a) the construction in which the Old' material (opened the door) is replaced by a pro-form (John did), and (b) the construction in which the old information is deleted altogether (leaving only John as answer). The three variants have in common that the specificational sentence specifies a value for a variable without containing a formulation of the variable itself The second type is that in which the value and the variable are both expressed and linked to each other by means of be. Typical examples of this are //-clefts and WH-clefts: (12)(a) It was John who opened the door. (b) The one who opened the door was John. Noncleft sentences can also be of this type, but then only if the subject NP is of the appropriate kind. Compare: (13)(a) The reason why they have failed is that they haven't worked hard enough. (b) The problem is how to collect all that money. (c) The murderer is Jack Smith. (d) "John's ability is to swim. (e) *My anger was that Bill had lied. Higgins (1976: 92-93) points out that the predicate complement in such a specificational sentence "in some way gives the content or constitution of what is referred to by the subject NP". This is not the case in (13,d) and (13,e): "Swimming does not constitute John's inability - John may have an inability with respect to swimming, but swimming in no sense makes up his inability." Similarly, "the fact that Bill had lied does not constitute my anger, but is rather the stimulus or target of my anger. Inability and anger refer to characteristics that simply are not constituted by some other thing." Another way of formulating this restriction is to say that the subject NP must be paraphrasable as 'the X that is...' in the way suggested by Bach (1968). Thus, the murderer is equivalent to 'the X who is the murderer' (or: 'the one who committed the murder'); the problem in (13,b) is equivalent to the X that is the problem' (or: 'what is problematic'), etc. There are no such paraphrases for nouns like ability or anger. Nominalizations that are based on this type of copular paraphrase are possible for the murderer, the problem, etc. but not for John's ability or my anger: (14)(a) (b) (c) (d)

8

(The one) who is the murderer (is insane). (I'll tell you) what is the problem. "(I'll tell you) what is John's ability. "(I'll tell you) what is my anger.

And of course it is related to this that we ask questions like (15,a-b), but not such questions as (15,c-d): (15)(a) (b) (c) (c)

Who is the murderer? What is the problem? *What is John's ability? *What is your anger?

All this makes clear that in specificational sentences like (13,a-c) (i.e. specificational sentences of the 'second type' that are no clefts) the subject NP must contain the variable for which a value is specified. In sum, specificational sentences may be of two types. In the first type, the specificational sentence is used in answer to an overt question and contains only the material necessary for specifying a value for the variable in the question. In the second type, the sentence consists of two constituents, one representing the variable, the other the value, and the copula be is used to connect them to each other. The fact that the variable is mentioned explicitly means that we no longer need the preceding discourse to interpret such sentences. Because of this, specificational sentences of this second type (including /V-clefts and WH-clefts) can in principle be used out of context (i.e. out of the blue, or discourse-initially) (cf. chapter 5). This possibility is restricted, though, since it appears to be a natural fact that we do not start telling someone the answer to a question unless we assume that he is actually thinking of that question. This means that the use of any specificational sentence normally requires that the variable be in the hearer's consciousness. Still, there may be exceptions to this rule, in which case the specificational sentence conveys information that is entirely new. This special use of specificational sentences will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. There is a final remark to be made about these two types of specificational sentences. Higgins (1976) argues that the subject of a specificational sentence is not referential but 'superscriptional', i.e. it resembles the heading of a list. We are now in a position to remark that this is not true of all specificational sentences. In order to be 'superscriptional' the subject NP must represent the variable. In many specificational sentences the subject NP does not do this, for several reasons. One is that, as we will see below, specificational sentences are 'reversible', so that the variable NP can turn up as subject as well as as predicate nominal. In the latter case the subject is not superscriptional: (16)(a) The murderer is JOHN, (b) JOHN is the murderer. A second reason is that in most specificational sentences of the first type the variable is represented not by an NP but by another constituent. Whereas in (17,a) the content of the variable is still described by an NP (the murderer), it is described by the VP (committed the murder) in (17,b) (where John is the value specified for

'the X who committed the murder'). There is therefore no superscriptional subject NP (in fact no superscriptional NP at all) in (17,b): (17)(a) (Who's the murderer? -) The murderer is JOHN. (b) (Who committed the murder? -) JOHN committed the murder.

2.4. We have already noted that //-clefts are typically specificational. In fact, the claim that they are so by definition has often been made in the linguistic literature (see e.g. Akmajian 1979: 163, Clark & Haviland 1977: 11, Gundel 1976: 4, 1977b: 547, Hajicova & Sgall 1975: 5, Halliday 1967:236, Harries-Delisle 1978: 422, Huddleston 1971: 246ff, Kuno 1976: 443, Van Dijk 1977:121, Visser 1970: 40). Although I will point out in chapter 3 that there are exceptions to this rule,41 think that the claim is basically correct. There is no doubt that the vast majority of //-cleft sentences are specificational. Moreover, the opposite claim is even more true: if a sentence is specificational, it can always yield an //-cleft paraphrase (unless the //-cleft formation is blocked for a particular structural reason - see chapter 4). This provides us with an excellent tool for establishing whether a sentence has a specificational meaning or not: if it has one, //-clefting should be capable of bringing it to the fore. The same is true of WH-cleft sentences. Although not all sentences that have the form of a WH-cleft are specificational (cf. section 3.7. below), it must in principle be possible for any specificational sentence to be paraphrased by a WH-cleft. (The only exceptions are the cases in which no WH-cleft can be formed for lack of an appropriate relative construction to describe the contents of the variable. Thus, we can say // was reluctantly that he did //, but there is no suitable expression to lexicalize the variable X in the WH-cleft The X that he did it was reluctantly'. Phrases like the way in which he did it or how he did it are not quite what we need here.) 2.5. Specificational sentences provide identifying information. (This does not mean, however, that identifying sentences are necessarily specificational - see below). The purpose of a specificational sentence is to make it possible for the speaker to pick out the referent(s) from a set. For example:

4. In chapter 3 I will point out some exceptional types of //-clefts that are partly, or even wholly, predicational. For example, (i,a-b) have a predicational meaning which is paraphrasable as (u,a-b): (i)(a) Was it an INTERESTING meeting that you went to last night?

(b) It was certainly no IDIOT who wrote this. (ii)(a) Was the meeting that you went to last night interesting ? (b) The one who wrote this was certainly no idiot.

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(18)A. Who broke the window? B. It was Tom who did it. Speaker A knows that there is someone who broke the window (i.e. the presupposition of existence is satisfied) but he does not know who it is, i.e. he cannot identify the window-breaker, he cannot pick him out from the set of people that he is acquainted with. The information provided by speaker B is meant to make this identification possible. Speaker B specifies a value for the variable, using a description (in this case a proper name) which should enable speaker A to pick out the person in question from a set. Of course, speaker B may be wrong in assuming that the description that he uses will have this effect. In that case speaker A will ask a further question: Who's Tom?, and speaker B will have to look for another description (viz. a description that really means something to A), and only then will A be able to identify the person who broke the window. Another case in which a specificational sentence fails to provide really identifying information is when the value specified for the variable has the form of an indefinite NP (e.g. It was a boy who broke (he window). The answer provided by such a cleft is a 'reticent' or 'evasive' answer, reflecting that the speaker does not really have the full identifying information himself, or that he does not wish to reveal all of it. This does not alter the fact, though, that a specificational sentence is basically meant to give identifying information. This is a point to which we will return below. 2.6. In WH-question - answer pairs the contents of the variable for which the answer specifies a value must be described in the question. Thus, a question like Who committed the murder? asks for a specification of a value for the variable 'the X who committed the murder'. Here the contents of the variable ('(who) committed the murder') is described in the question itself It follows that, when the question is answered by a sentence like JOHN committed the crime only the constituent representing the value is new information. The remainder (committed the crime) is information that is Old' or 'known', or 'shared by the speaker and hearer'.5 Since the specificational act is always similar to giving an answer to a WH-question, the same is true whenever a specificational sentence is used.6 In any

5. According to Dyhr (1978: 157), it is already the case in the WH-question itself that every constituent except the question word is old information. This claim seems to be generally correct for example, I am not likely to ask you Who's the murderer? if I do not assume that a murder was committed - but there may well be exceptions to it. For example, rhetorical questions (e.g. Who shall say that he is wrong?) do not seem to contain old information. Another kind of exception will be pointed out in chapter 5. (We will observe there that cleft questions can more easily be used discourse-initially than cleft statements. When a sentence is used discourse-initially, everything is new information.) 6. This is actually an overstatement. See below.

11

specificational sentence the value part represents 'new' information while the variable part expresses Old' information. In the terminology of Chomsky (1971): the value part is the 'focus' and the variable part is the 'presupposition' of the sentence. Thus, in The bank robber is JOHN THOMAS, John Thomas is the focus and the bank robber is the presupposition. It follows that the nuclear accent of the sentence falls on John Thomas. The possibility of deleting elements from a specificational sentence confirms this organization: because it is old information, the variable part may be deleted under the identity condition (as in (Who's the bank robber?) - (It's) John), but the value part, which is new, can never be omitted. There are a couple of things that should be noted here. First, when we say that the value (focus) is new, this does not mean that it must be newly introduced in the discourse. The constituent in question may well be old in the sense that it has been mentioned in the preceding context, but it is new in the sense that it is new information that it is this constituent that is the value satisfying the variable.7 Second, when we have a copular structure it seems natural to think of ascribing the labels value and variable^ focus and presupposition to those parts of the sentence that follow and precede be, respectively. However, examples may be found in which the variable or presupposition is defined by constituents both to the right and to the left of be. Consider, for example: (19)(a) It was the student in the green hat that came in first, (b) The person who came in first was the student in the green hat. These sentences may be used in answer to different questions: (20)(a) Who came in first? (b) Which student came in first? (c) The student in which hat came in first? When we use (19,a-b) in answer to (20,a), the focus (value) is the student in the green hot; when we use them to answer (20,b), the focus is in the green hat; when we use them to answer (20,c), the focus is green. (See Chomsky (1971: 202) and Jackendoff (1972: 233) for similar examples.) It follows that it is not always correct to use the term focus or focal constituent to refer to the constituent preceding the WH-clause of an //-cleft or to refer to that part of a WH-cleft that is not the WH-clause. In many cases the focus (value, new information) is only part of this constituent. Although the term focus is often used to

7. This point has often been made in the linguistic literature. For example, Hutchins (1975: 115) notes that the focal element can be said to be 'new' only in the sense that its exact relationship to other elements was previously unknown to the hearer. Harries-Delisle (1978: 422) defines new information as "textually and situationally nonderivable information" rather than "factually new information".

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refer to the relevant constituent as a whole (see e.g. Akmajian 1979, Higgins 1976: 8), it seems better to use another term in this sense. The term that will be used in this book is defied constituent.91 The term focus or focal element will be reserved for what is actually the new information, i.e. the value specified for the variable in the specificational sentence. To refer to that part of an rt-cleft or WH-cleft that is not the clefted constituent I will use the term WH-clause. Again, this is technically more correct than speaking of the presupposition or out-of-focus constituent (Schachter 1973). Now that we have defined the relevant terminology precisely we can examine further what it means to say that a specificational sentence typically consists of a focus (new information), which is the value part, and a presupposition (old information), which is the variable part. The following remarks can be made: A. It follows from the above observations that in a cleft construction the focus must either be the clefted constituent or be contained in it. This, at least, is the case in clefts of the canonical type (e.g. It was John who did it or The one who did it was John), which is the only type of clefts taken into account in nearly every treatment of clefts in the linguistic literature. However, I will point out in chapter 5 that there are exceptions to the general rule. One special type is that in which the whole cleft is focus, i.e. in which the information given in the WH-clause is also new. The existence of such clefts was first signalled by Erades (1962), and later on by Prince (1978). They are discussed in detail in chapter 5. Another exceptional type is that in which two specificational acts are performed simultaneously. In that case there are two value parts (foci), and since only one of them can occupy the position of the clefted constituent, the other has to appear in the WH-clause. The following sentence is an example of this: (21) (Why did you hit Mary ? - I beg your pardon!) It was SHE who hit ME!

There are still other types of special clefts, but it would be premature to deal with them here. They will be discussed in due course in chapter 5. B. As has often been noted,9 what is the focus of a specificational sentence in the sense that it expresses the new information (value) is also intonationally the focus, since it receives the nuclear accent of the specificational sentence (or at least of the information unit (tone unit) in which it occurs, for a sentence may consist of more

8. This is in keeping with Jackendoff (1972: 233), who speaks of the 'clefted phrase'. Rochemont (1986:129) also adopts this convention. 9. See e.g. Chomsky 1971, Elffers 1979: 103, Postal 1971: 234, Bolinger 1972c: 633, SchermerVermeer 1979: 193, Davison 1984.

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than one information unit, as is usually the case e.g. when the sentence is a WH-cleft.) In other words, the 'focus of information' (i.e. the position of the nuclear accent) "indicates where the new information lies. The rule is that in any unit marked as new, the nucleus assumes (subject to stress rules) final position" (Quirk et al. 1972: 940).10 Thus, in It was the student in the red hat who came in first the nuclear accent will fall on hat if the new information (focus, value) is either the student in the red hat or in the red hat. If the new information is just red, it is this item that receives the nuclear accent.11 C. The variable part of a specificational sentence is the 'presupposition', not only in the sense that it represents old information, but also in the sense that it refers to something that is logically presupposed.12 The sentence It was John who committed the murder logically presupposes that someone committed the murder. Even if the specificational sentence does not contain a formulation of the variable (as in (Who committed the murder?) - It was John) the presupposition remains present. And of course, as can be expected of logical presuppositions, it remains intact when the specificational sentence is put in the negative (// was not John who committed the murder). The presupposition in question is normally referred to as a presupposition of existence because it can be expressed in the form of an existential sentence. What is

10. This rule has often been formulated. See e.g. Halliday (1967: 82), Chomsky & Halle (1968:90) (the well-known "Nuclear Stress Rule"), Huddleston (1971: 136), Bolinger (1972c: 644), Crystal (1975: 23), Buysschaert (1982: 125-126). Rochemont (1986) examines how the rule should be precisely formulated. He argues against Chomsky & Halle's Nuclear Stress Rule (which says that nuclear stress must be assigned to the rightmost lexical category in S) and against Jackendoffs (1972) reformulation (according to which the nuclear accent is assigned to the rightmost lexical category in a [+ focus] constituent in S). He argues that "accenting is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for interpretation as focus" (p.25) and therefore proposes the following rule: "If a constituent is specified [+ focus] in S-structure, then an accent is assigned rightmost in the [+ focus] constituent. If there is no overtly marked [+ focus] constituent, then an accent is assigned rightmost in S." 11. The fact that the focus of a specificational sentence must be internationally prominent concurs with the fact that, when an item has both a stressed and an unstressed form, only the stressed form can occur in the focus. Thus, the pronoun it, which is known to be the "stress-reduced" anaphoric form of that (Kuroda 1968: 250-251), cannot be substituted for that in It is that that I don't understand. In languages like Dutch, German or Danish, where the third person reflexive pronoun has a stressed and an unstressed variant, only the stressed variant can occur in focus position. The following example is from Dutch: (i) Met is zichzelf ("zieh dat hij gekwetst heeft. 'It is himself that he has injured' 12. The relation between the notion of old information and that of logical or pragmatic presupposition has been recognized for some time. What is presupposed is considered to be part of the speaker's and hearer's 'shared knowledge'. (See e.g. Karttunen 1973, Kempson 1975, Stalnaker 1977, 1978, Gazdar 1979a,b, Wilson & Sperber 1979.)

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presupposed in // was John who committed the murder is that 'there is some X who committed the murder'. However, Seuren (1985: 295) objects to the term 'presupposition of existence'. He points out that in

(22)(a) It is the Abominable Snowman that Mrs Prendergast is trying to shoot. (b) What Mrs Prendergast is trying to shoot is the Abominable Snowman. "what is presupposed is not the existence of what Mrs Prendergast is trying to shoot, but that there is something that Mrs Prendergast is trying to shoot, or, in other words, that it is true that Mrs Prendergast has gone out with the idea of shooting something. This, of course, may be true even if what she intends to shoot does not actually exist." Correct as this remark may be, I do not think that it must lead us to conclude that presupposition of existence is an infelicitous term. Since the essence of a specificational sentence is that it specifies a value for a variable, what is presupposed is the existence of the variable (in this case 'the X that Mrs. Prendergast is trying to shoot') in some world, which is not necessarily the actual one. The fact that what Mrs. Prendergast is trying to shoot does not actually exist in the real world does not alter the fact that the variable 'what Mrs. Prendergast is trying to shoot' is present (i.e. exists) in the minds of the speaker and the hearer. If we take presupposition of existence to mean no more than this, the term presents no problem at all. The above observations hold good not only for statements but also for questions. The sentence Is John the murderer? presupposes that, at least in the mind of the person asking the question, there is someone who is the murderer. This observation runs counter to Donnellan's (1966: 284) claim that in the sentence Is de Gaulle the king of France? "there seems to be no presupposition or implication that someone is the king of France". I claim that, if the sentence is interpreted specificationally (i.e. with the nuclear accent on de Gaulle), the speaker asking the question does presuppose that there is someone who is the king of France. If this were not the case, the variable 'the X who is the king of France' would not exist and the sentence could not be specificational at all. The way in which we have defined the existential presupposition that is attached to specificational sentences differs from the way in which it is defined by various linguists. Chomsky (1972: 100) writes: // was John who was here expresses the presupposition that someone was here in the sense that truth of the presupposition is a prerequisite for the utterance to have a truth value. According to our definition, the claim that the sentence It was John who was here carries the presupposition 'someone was here' means no more than that the variable 'the X who was here' is present in the minds of the speaker and the hearer. This does not mean the same thing as saying that the proposition Someone was here must be

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true for the it-cleft to have a truth value. Examples can be found of specificational sentences which are perfectly felicitous in spite of the fact that they occur in a context which explicitly questions or denies the truth of the presupposition. This point is also made by Gundel (1985:101). It can be illustrated with examples like the following: (23)(a) I'm still not convinced that anyone called, but I know it wasn't my mother (who called). (Here the speaker obviously does not believe in the truth of the proposition Someone called.) (example from Gundel 1985:101) (b) You say that someone in this room loves Mary. Well maybe so. But it certainly isn't Fred (who loves Mary), and it clearly isn't John. And... Therefore, no one in this room loves Mary, (example from Keenan 1971: 52) It should also be noted that the presupposition of existence attached to the variable of a specificational sentence differs from the presupposition of existence that is attached to definite NPs, in that it cannot be cancelled by the use of not for 'radical negation' in the sentence.13 For example, the sentence It was JOHN JONES who murdered Smith involves at least two presuppositions: the presupposition that John Jones exists and the presupposition that someone murdered Smith. The former can be cancelled by radical negation, since we can say (24) It was not John Jones who murdered Smith: John Jones doesn't exist. But we cannot use not in the specificational sentence to reject the second presupposition of existence. Instead of (25,a) we will normally use (25,b): (25)(a) !lt was not John who murdered Smith: Smith was not murdered at all. (b) John did NOT murder Smith: Smith was not murdered at all. The first sentence of (25,b) is predicational, whereas that of (25,a) is specificational. In fact, it appears that negative specificational sentences of whatever type are never suitable for cancelling the presupposition of existence that is attached to the variable. The following are no better than (25,a) :14 13. Seuren (1985: 238) distinguishes between 'minimal negation', which is the normal negation under which presuppositions are preserved, and 'radical negation', which serves precisely to cancel a presupposition. For example, the sequence Father Christmas did not speak to you, for Father Christmas does not exist is acceptable only if not is interpreted as a radical negator rejecting the presupposition of existence that is normally attached to the definite description Father Christmas. 14. Seuren (1985: 296) notes that what he calls the 'cleft presupposition' cannot be eliminated by (radical) negation, whereas other presuppositions can. However, the phenomenon holds not only for rt-cleft sentences but for any type of specificational sentence.

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(26)(a) 'JOHN did not murder Smith: Smith was not murdered at all. (b) 'The one who murdered Smith was not John: Smith was not murdered at all. The fact that the presupposition of existence attached to the variable of a specificational sentence cannot be eliminated by making the sentence negative follows automatically from the nature of the presupposition. We have defined the presupposition in question as meaning that a specificational sentence requires the variable to be explicitly or implicitly present in the preceding discourse or in the sentence itself. Clearly, if there is no variable, no act of specification can take place. In consequence it is logically impossible that a (negative) specificational sentence could serve to cancel the presupposition that the variable exists. A specificational sentence by its very nature requires that the variable must exist. It should be noted, finally, that the claim that (27) (as well as its negative and interrogative counterparts) logically presupposes 'John ate something' is explicitly rejected by Delahunty (1981: 389ff). According to Delahunty, the sentence (27) It was an apple that John ate. entails 'John ate something' but does not logically presuppose it. The evidence adduced in support of this claim hinges on the following sentence: (28) If it wasn't an apple that John ate, then John ate nothing. According to Delahunty, (28) is an impeccable sentence, although it would have to be an impossible implication if the cleft logically presupposed 'John ate something'. My answer to this is simply that (28) is not an acceptable sentence if the cleft is interpreted specificationally. As we will see in chapter 5, //-clefts have developed a secondary use in which a constituent is clefted for emphasis rather than because it is the value specified for a variable. Such //-clefts (which are exceptional) are no longer truly specificational. I maintain that sentence (28) could only be judged acceptable if the //-cleft is interpreted this way. If we substitute a (truly specificational) WH-cleft for the //-cleft in (28), the result is obviously unacceptable: (29) !lf what John ate was not an apple, then John ate nothing. Delahunty (1981:391) also makes the same claim (that specificational sentences do not carry a presupposition of existence) in connection with noncleft sentences. He argues that John ate an APPLE does not logically presuppose 'John ate something', since the following is not inconsistent:15 15. Delahunty actually gives the sentence If JOHN did not eat an apple then nobody did, but this is obviously a mistake, for this sentence could only be used as evidence in connection with the presupposition 'Someone ate an apple'.

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(30) If John did not eat an APPLE, then he ate nothing. However, it appears again to be the case that the conditional clause is not interpreted specificationally. This is clear from the fact that an apple is not interpreted contrastively, which it would have to be if it were the focus of a specificational sentence (cf. section 2.8. below). D. A natural consequence of the fact that the variable part of a specificational sentence is presupposed is that specificational sentences cannot normally be used Out of the blue' or discourse-initially. A sentence like // was John who murdered Smith can only be appropriately used if the hearer can be assumed to be acquainted with the fact that someone murdered Smith. This means that the existence of the variable 'the X who murdered Smith' must belong to the information shared by the speaker and the hearer: it must be old (known) information. In fact, the requirement is even stronger than this: for a felicitous use of the sentence this information must not only be 'known' but also 'given', i.e. it must be information which "the cooperative speaker can assume to be appropriately in the hearer's consciousness at the time of hearing the utterance" (Prince 1978: 888).16 The reason for this is obvious: if we tell someone the answer to a question without introducing or repeating the question first, this means we assume the question to be part of the listener's short memory storage. If we know that the question links up with information that is shared by the hearer, but which is not part of what he is currently concerned with, then we will first activate this information so that it is brought back into the hearer's consciousness. In that case we will not tell the hearer without further ado It was John who murdered Smith but we will first reintroduce the topic of Smith's murder, as in (31) Hello, Tom. Do you remember that chap that was killed in the park last year? Smith his name was. Well, I'll tell you something. It was John who murdered Smith. In sum, the fact that specificational sentences specify a value for a presupposed variable entails that they naturally require that the variable should not only be

16. The term 'given' is sometimes used in this sense (e.g. Chafe 1974, 1976; Halliday 1967), but sometimes in the sense of Old', 'known' (i.e. information that is assumed to be in the hearer's general knowledge-store but not necessarily in his current consciousness (e.g. Haviland & Clark 1974, Clark & Haviland 1977). 18

known information but should actually be in the hearer's consciousness at the time of utterance. This conclusion is an important one and will be further examined in chapter 5. The possible exceptions to the rule will also be gone into there. E. The above conclusion does not mean that the presupposition of a specificational sentence must occur verbatim in the preceding context. Though this may be the case, it more often happens that the presupposition is old information only in the sense that it links up with what has already been said. Sometimes the hearer must even build one or more inferential 'bridges' (see Haviland & Clark 1974, Clark & Haviland 1977) to understand how the presupposition is connected with the 'given' information. Consider, for example, the following: (32)A. John seems to be moody? B. Yes. I think it's his stomach again.

This scrap of discourse is perfectly coherent, yet one has to build a bridge in order to understand it. The step skipped over by speaker B is: 'If John is moody, there must be something the matter with him.' This proposition ('There is something the matter with John') then serves as the presupposition for B's specificational sentence. F. If the presupposition of a specificational sentence is expressed in the form of an NR this NP is usually definite (c£ Clark & Haviland 1977:13). This follows from the fact that the presupposition represents old (even given) information: it is well-known that indefinite NPs are used to introduce new information, whereas definite NPs refer to what is old (i.e. already mentioned or inferrable from the context). Still, examples may be found of specificational sentences whose variable NP is indefinite: (33)(a) (Most wars in history have had economic causes.) An example of this is World War II. (b) A question which has apparently never been asked is what is the use of it all. (c) One thing that I don't understand is why this suggestion has not been made earlier. (d) (Some parents don't like their children to go out.) - Someone who certainly doesn't like that is my father.

The use of indefinite NPs in specificational sentences such as these can be explained from three observations. One is that the indefinite NPs invariably involve modifiers expressing old information (as in (33,a) and (33,d)) or at least expressing information that is linked up with the preceding context. Sentences like (33,a-d) require a context; they will not be used out of the blue. They therefore satisfy the general condition that the variable should link up with what is in the mind of the hearer. The second observation is that the subject NPs of (33,a-d) cannot be made definite without a drastic change of meaning: 19

(34)(a) The example of this is World War II. (b) The question which has apparently never been asked is what is the use of it all. (c) The thing that I don't understand is why this suggestion has not been made earlier. (d) The one who certainly doesn't like that is my father. Since definite NPs implicate 'inclusiveness' (i.e. the idea that all the items in the set satisfying the referring description are being referred to),17 a singular definite NP suggests that there is only one referent satisfying the referring description (cf. Hawkins 1978). If the speaker does not want to convey this aspect of meaning, he cannot but use an indefinite NP instead. This is clearly the case, for example in (33,a), where it is obvious that there exists more than one 'example of this'. The use of the indefinite variable NPs in (33,a-d) is therefore motivated by the semantic difference between these NPs and the corresponding definites. The third observation that helps to explain the acceptability of sentences such as (33,a-d) is that the variable NP is special in that it is not wholly old (or inferrable) information. In fact, the noun head itself is not given in or inferrable from the context. For example, in (33,a), where the variable NP is an example of this, it is only this that links up with the preceding context. The noun head itself is new information. Similarly, in (33,d) the context creates the idea of parents who do not like their children to go out, but the idea of someone in particular is not suggested. This observation is important, for it is precisely because of this that the opposition between an indefinite noun head and a definite one becomes possible. If the noun head itself were part of the presupposed (old) information, it would have to be definite. Thus, if the context creates the idea of a particular 'someone', the specificational sentence specifying the identity of the person in question cannot itself involve someone as head of the variable NP: (35)A. Someone doesn't like you to go out. B. I know. 'Someone who doesn't like me to go out is my father.

In this sequence there is semantic contradiction between A (which refers to one person) and B, where the use of someone suggests that there are other people satisfying the description given in the rest of the variable NE The possibility of using an indefinite NP thus crucially requires that the noun head of the NP should not be part of what is presupposed (old) information. 17. Hawkins (1978) claims that inclusiveness is an inherent part of the meaning of the definite article. Declerck (1987b), on the other hand, argues that inclusiveness is no more than an implicature, i.e. that the idea of 'reference to all' is only suggested as long as there is no indication to the contrary. Thus, the wickets will be interpreted as 'all the wickets' in (i), but not so in (ii), where the context excludes this interpretation: (i) It was John who brought in the wickets after the game. (ii) The one who brought in the wickets after the game left one on the pitch.

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The above observations account for the fact that the specificational sentences (33,a-d) cannot be replaced by their //-cleft counterparts: (36)(a) (Most wars in history have had economic causes.) *lt is World War II that is an example of this. (b) *lt is what is the use of it all that is a question that has apparently never been asked. (c) *lt is why this suggestion hasn't been made earlier that is one thing that I don't understand. (d) (Some parents don't like their children to go out.) - *lt is my father who is someone who certainly doesn't like that. Whereas the noun heads of the variable NPs are not part of the old information in (33,a-d), they are represented as such in (36,a-d). Sentence (36,a) presupposes that there is 'an example of this' and identifies the example in question. This means that (36,a) specifies a value for the variable 'the X that is an example of this'. However, there is nothing in the preceding context creating a variable of this kind. The sentence preceding the //-cleft in (33,a) may create the idea of possible examples, but it does not establish a particular example, nor does it allow any inference that there exists only one example. (In fact, it does just the opposite: the use of most asserts that there exist several examples.) The //-cleft in (36,a) (which presupposes the definite variable 'the X that is an example') therefore does not link up with the preceding sentence. The scrap of discourse in (36,a) (and the other examples of (36)) is discontinuous (incoherent), and therefore unacceptable. (As a matter of fact, //-clefts like (36,a) are unacceptable even in isolation because there is contradiction between the use of the indefinite NP (an example, a question, etc.) in the WH-clause and the fact that they specify only one value for the variable. The fact that only one value is mentioned means that only one value satisfies the variable, but, if so, the relevant NP in the variable should be definite, not indefinite (since indefinite NPs suggest 'exclusiveness').18 Thus, the use of an example in (36,a) suggests that other examples exist, but the //-cleft actually specifies only one. The result is that the sentence is very odd even when used in isolation.) The above observations reveal an interesting difference between clefts and noncleft specificational sentences. In a cleft the WH-clause always represents the variable as definite. In a noncleft the variable may be indefinite. It may sometimes even be indefinite when it represents old information, as in (37)A. Can you give me an example of what we call a superpower? B. An example of a superpower is the Soviet Union. 18. By exclusiveness is meant the idea that there are other entities satisfying the referring description besides the one actually referred to. For example, the use of on inhabitant of (hat house in a sentence like An inhabitant of that house came to see me yesterday suggests that the house in question is inhabited by more than one person (otherwise we would have to use the inhabitant of that house). According to Hawkins (1878), exclusiveness is an inherent part of the meaning of indefinite reference. However, Declerck (1987a) shows that it is no more than an implicature.

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Here an example from A cannot become the example in B because the expresses inclusiveness (and hence, in the singular, uniqueness), whereas a does not (cf. above): the shift to the would in fact be a correction of the idea (conveyed by a superpower) that there are several superpowers. Because of this, (37,B) cannot be defied, since the variable part of a cleft is definite, not indefinite:19 (38) B. !lt is the Soviet Union that is an example of a superpower. (Note that this sentence is odd even in isolation because the inclusiveness understanding that follows from the definiteness of the WH-clause clashes with the sense of exclusiveness (i.e. the idea that there are other entities satisfying the referring description) suggested by the indefiniteness of an example.) In sum, the variable NP of a specificational sentence is normally definite, but exceptions remain possible. In fact, we have pointed out two types of exceptions: sentences like (33,a-d), in which the head noun of the variable NP is not part of the old information, and sentences like (37,B). In both cases an indefinite NP is used in order to convey an 'exclusive' interpretation. Such an interpretation is the opposite of the 'inclusive' interpretation conveyed by definite NPs. 2.7. In section 2.3. we spoke about specificational sentences Of the first type', in which the variable part is not expressed in the sentence again. Sentences like these (e.g. JOHN committed the murder) are mostly noncopular. What we have observed in section 2.6. concerning 'focus' and 'presupposition' is, of course, also in keeping with the conclusion that specificational sentences need not be copular. Noncopular sentences may also involve a focus and a presupposition of the kind we have defined for specificational sentences. Thus, the noncopular sentences in (39,b) have exactly the same specificational meaning as the copular ones in (39,a): (39)(a) Who's the one who robbed the bank? - The one who robbed the bank is John Thomas, (b) Who robbed the bank? - John Thomas did. Whether or not a noncopular sentence (e.g. John THOMAS robbed the bank) will be interpreted specificationally depends on two factors, viz. the context and the intonation pattern of the sentence. The context can make clear that specificational information is requested; the intonation pattern reveals which part of the sentence is new information. If the sentence John Thomas robbed the bank is pronounced with the nuclear accent on John Thomas, we will infer that it is presupposed that

19. That the WH-clause of an «/-cleft functions like a definite NP is also pointed out by Dik (1980a: 36), Brömser (1984:329), Gundel (1985:97) and Wirth (1978). (Wirth even argues that the it of an -cleft is derived from the: in her opinion, // is "the syntactic variant of the" (p.70).)

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someone robbed the bank and that this someone is now identified as being John Thomas. If the sentence is pronounced with the nuclear accent on the bank, only this constituent can be interpreted as a specificational focus (i.e. as the value specified for the variable 'the X that John Thomas robbed'). The two factors inviting a specificational interpretation (viz. the context and the intonation pattern) may often suffice on their own, but in some cases they must co-operate. The nuclear accent entails a specificational focus interpretation of the relevant constituent only if the constituent in question will not receive the nuclear accent under neutral sentence intonation. As noted above, the neutral position of the nuclear accent is, generally speaking, on the last open-class item or proper name in the clause. This means that, when the nuclear accent falls on the final NP of the sentence, as in John gave Mary a BOOK, it is not clear whether or not that NP is to be interpreted as the focus of a specificational sentence. In that case only the context can guide us to the correct interpretation.20 There is generally no problem when the nuclear accent falls on the subject NP (as in JOHN committed the murder), although even then a predicational reading is not always excluded. Thus, the sentence Your MOTHER is coming can be used in answer to both (40,a) and (40,b). In the former case the sentence is predicational, in the second it is specificational.21 (40)(a) What's all this fuss about? (b) Who's conning? So, in many cases contextual and intonational factors will have to co-operate in order to bring out a specificational reading. The fact that copular specificational sentences like clefts have "non-cleft congeners" with which they are "truth-conditionally identical" (Delahunty 1981: 384)22,23 h^ 1^ ^ the interesting use of a blended construction in colloquial English: 20. Chomsky (1972: 89, footnote 21) notes that in such a case the element "that would serve as intonation center under normal intonation" may receive "an extra heavy stress and extra dominant pitch". But he remarks that even then the interpretation of such sentences is "obscured", i.e. that it is hard to interpret them if they are isolated sentences. 21. In the sequence What's all this fuss about? - Your MOTHER is coming the nuclear accent on mother in the second sentence runs counter to the general rule that the nuclear accent falls on the last open-class item in the information unit conveying new information. (In this case the whole sentence conveys new information and forms a single tone unit.) Sentences like these are discussed by Bolinger (1985: 121). Equally exceptional are sentences like I ran into JOHN this morning, which can be used discourse-initially (i.e. as scenesetters). They exemplify what Rochemont (1986: 52-56) calls 'presentational focus' (as opposed to'contrastive focus'). 22. This claim is rejected by Seuren (1985: 300): «The cleft presupposition makes for certain truth-conditional differences with respect to 'straight' sentences. For example, if in a situation where nobody laughed (88a) is uttered it will simply be (minimally) false and its negation (89a) will be true, but if (88b) is uttered it will be (radically) false and its negation will still fail to be true: ./..

23

(41)(a) What Bill wants is Bill wants a BIKE. (b) What I'm trying to do is I'm trying to HELP you.

Seuren (1985: 297) notes that this construction is "extremely common in spoken English of all sociolinguistic levels". 2.8. Affirmative specificational sentences always convey a contrastive meaning.24 This follows from the act of specification itself The fact that a particular value is assigned to the variable automatically creates a contrast with all the other potential values that have not been selected. This implication of contrast will become stronger according as the set of potential candidates is smaller and strongest when this set contains only two members. Thus, when only Fred and Tom are possible candidates for being elected chairman, the sentence FRED ha? been elected will automatically be strongly contrastive (i.e. imply 'not Tom'). In negative specificational sentences the strength of the implication of contrast depends on whether or not the negation belongs to the presupposition. If it does (e.g. if we interpret JOHN didn't do it as 'It was John who didn't do it'), contrastiveness again clearly arises because a candidate is selected. However, if not has wide scope (e.g. if we interpret JOHN didn't do it as 'It was not John who did 22. ../..

(88ja

Harry laughed b. The one who laughed was Harry. (89)a. Harry didn't laugh. b. The one who laughed was not Harry. This shows that it is mistaken to say that whatever difference there is between (pseudo)cleft and 'straight' sentences is merely pragmatic and not truth-conditional.» In my opinion, this conclusion is unwarranted because the only possible interpretation of Harry laughed m the situation outlined here is predicational. There are two possible ways in which this sentence may be used. One is that the statement Nobody laughed has actually been made by someone. In that case Harry laughed (with the nuclear accent on Harry, for that is the only new information) is meant to contradict this statement. Since the context contains no presupposition that someone laughed, the sentence is not specificational. (Rather than presupposing that someone laughed the sentence actually makes an assertion to this effect.) The second possibility is that the point of someone laughing or not laughing has not been verbally made in the context. In that case the whole sentence Harry laughed conveys new information (so that the nuclear accent is on laughed), and this sentence is obviously not specificational either. So, the observation that Harry laughed and The one who laughed was Harry are truth-conditionally different in the illustrative context is quite correct, only it does not warrant the conclusion that clefts do not have the same truth conditions as the corresponding 'straight' specificational sentences, for Harry laughed is not used specificationally in the example.

23. This identity of truth conditions has even led Lakoff (1965) and Postal (1971) to argue that noncleft specificational sentences like JOHN bought a chair are derived from their corresponding cleft counterparts. 24. This point has often been made in the linguistic literature. It is made in connection with clefts by e.g. Gundel (1977b: 550), Harries-Delisle (1978), Laeven (1983: 140), Lipka (1982: 164). It is made in connection with both cleft and noncleft specificational sentences by Chafe (1976: 33-37), Kuno( 1972: 269).

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it'),25 no such clear contrastive implication need be present, because no selection is made: instead of assigning a value to the variable, the cleft rejects a candidate as the correct value for the variable. Since no selection is made from a set of candidates, the only contrast that is implied is that between John and 'someone else'. If this 'someone else' is not thought of as being one of a restricted set of candidates (as in We don't know who is the murderer, but it certainly isn't TOM) the sense of contrast is not very strong. It is much stronger when the set is restricted (as in We don't know which of them is the murderer, but it certainly isn't TOM). So, contrastiveness is automatically implied whenever the act of specification takes place. This is the case in affirmative specificational statements and in negative ones in which not belongs to the presupposition. If not has wide scope (i.e. if a value is not assigned to the variable but rejected), contrastiveness is still present in the (weaker) sense that it is understood that, if this value does not satisfy the variable, there must be some other value that does. However, in interrogative specificational sentences (e.g. Who (is it who) is the murderer?) the situation is different. Here the question of which value satisfies the variable is asked but not answered. That is, no act of specification takes place. Consequently, no value is selected from a set of possible candidates, hence no sense of contrastiveness is created.26 The fact that (declarative) specificational sentences are inherently contrastive means that there is normally a kind of 'exclusiveness understanding' attached to them. The sentence It is JOHN who loves Mary presupposes not only that there is someone who loves Mary but also that there is at least one person who does not love Mary. Whereas the presence of the presupposition of existence has been pointed out by innumerable linguists, the point about the exclusiveness understanding has not so often been made. (Notable exceptions are Dyhr (1978: 150ff), Moreau (1976:25-26).) Still, exclusiveness is clearly present: like contrastiveness, it is an automatic consequence of the act of specification. (That this is so is clear from the fact that exclusiveness is as absent as contrastiveness in interrogative specificational sentences.) Contrastiveness is one of the differences that distinguish between specificational sentences and predicational ones. A sentence like John opened THE DOOR can be interpreted specificationally or predicationally. (The nuclear accent does not enforce

25. These two interpretations are connected with two different intonation patterns. See Akmajian (1979: 239ff), who speaks of a 'conclusive' and a 'contradict!ve' intonation pattern, respectively. 26. Because no act of specification takes place in questions, one could object to our speaking of 'interrogative specificational sentences'. However, I think this term can be maintained to refer to sentences that ask for specificational information. This is a slight extension of the meaning of 'specificational' but it seems warranted by the fact that questions like these share most of the characteristics of (truly) specificational statements. (For example, they can be clefted: Who (was it who) closed the door?).

25

a specificational interpretation here because it falls on the last open-class item in the sentence.) I claim that the specificational interpretation is inextricably connected with a contrastive reading of the door. This does not mean that, on the predicational reading, the door is not contrastive at all. Bolinger (1965a: 106) notes: In a broad sense every semantic peak is contrastive. Clearly in Let's have a picnic, coming as a suggestion out of the blue, there is no specific contrast with dinner party, but there is a contrast between picnicking and anything else the group might do. As the alternatives are narrowed down, we get closer to what we think of as contrastive accent.

I would say that, though contrast is always present - anything we say contrasts with anything else we could have said - contrastiveness is not actually in the speaker's mind when he uses a predicational sentence. The speaker uttering Let's have a picnic as a predicational sentence is not actually thinking of the contrast between a picnic and something else, i.e. he is not suggesting the picnic as one of several alternatives. The fact that contrastiveness is automatically present when a sentence is specificational is already clear from the fact that the sentence has an existential presupposition. The presupposition 'There is an X that John opened' which the sentence John opened the DOOR has on the specificational interpretation already suggests contrastiveness, for it implies that, in order to identify X, one value will have to be selected from the set of possible candidates. This brings us back to the conclusion arrived at before, viz. that the most important factor determining whether a noncleft sentence is to be interpreted specificationally or predicationally is the absence or presence of the existential presupposition in the context. The sense of contrast is already activated by this presupposition. The place of the nuclear accent is then no more than an ancillary factor which is not always conclusive by itself If we combine the observation that the focus of a specificational sentence is contrastive with the observation that the focus necessarily conveys new information and therefore carries the nuclear accent of the tone unit, we come to the conclusion that the focus of a specificational sentence always bears 'contrastive accent'.27 In fact it is tempting to hypothesize that contrastive accent is nothing more than the phenomenon that the nuclear accent is placed on an item that is semantically contrastive. This would mean that it is not correct to say that contrastive accent 27. Some people speak of 'contrastive stress', but I will follow Bolinger (1965a, 1972c) in making a distinction between 'stress' and 'accent'. Bolinger uses the term stress exclusively in the sense of 'word stress': "the stressed syllable of a word is the one where the accent falls if there is an accent, which is to say that it is the syllable with the potential for accent" (Bolinger 1965a: 107). He speaks of contrastive stress if there is "a shift in stress" (pp.116-117), that is, if the word stress does not fall on the part of the word where it usually falls if the word receives the nuclear accent. This is e.g. the case in These goods are not EXported but IMported. Stress is thus to be distinguished from accent, which is a question not only of stress but also of pitch. "Stress belongs to the lexicon. Accent belongs to the utterance." (Bolinger 1972c: 644 ).

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entails a contrastive interpretation. Rather, what happens is that a semantically contrastive item attracts the nuclear accent of the information unit. Moreover, we might go one step further and assume that an item can be semantically contrastive only if it is the focus of a specificational interpretation. The conclusion would then be that contrastive accent can be defined simply as nuclear accent on the focus of a specificational sentence. Although I have not studied contrastive accent in great detail, I do believe that this hypothesis is correct. As far as I can see, placing the nuclear accent on a constituent which would not receive that accent under neutral sentence intonation28 does not create a contrastive interpretation if that constituent is not the focus of a specificational sentence. This seems clear from examples like the following (which are all predicational): (42) (a) NEVER will I do it! (b) That WAS a serious mistake. (c) That was REALLY a serious mistake. (d) SOMEBODY must be responsible. (43) Why are you so sulky? - Your MOTHER is coming. (44) (That man is mad. - I don't agree.) He is NOT mad.

In (42,a-d) the nuclear accent is placed on an item other than the final one in order to put special 'emotive emphasis' on this constituent. As noted by Quirk et al. (1972:969), this kind of emphasis does not result in a contrastive interpretation of the item in question. In (43) the nuclear accent is again not placed on the focal item. This is apparently because the speaker considers your mother to be the semantic peak of the sentence (cf. Bolinger 1985:121). Again, this marked choice of nuclear accent does not lead to a contrastive interpretation. In sentence (44) the nuclear accent is on not. Now, not is often considered to have a great potential for expressing contrast, so that some people (e.g. Higgins 1976) distinguish between a 'straight' negation and a 'contrastive' negation. However, it apears again to be the case that not suggests a contrast ('not A but B') only when it bears on the focus of a specificational sentence (e.g. What I need is NOT a new car). This is not the case in (44) and there is consequently no idea of contrast. (Compare (44) with / wouldn't know what John is, but he is NOT mad, which is specificational and where not mad does imply a contrast with what John really is.) The claim that the accent is not contrastive in sentences like (42)-(44) is perhaps not quite accurate. In (44), which is used to contradict the previous sentence, there is, of course, an implication of yes/no contrast. The same thing is possible in sentences with emotive emphasis:

28. The concept 'neutral sentence intonation' may not be as straightforward as is suggested here (and nearly everywhere in the linguistic literature). See Schmerling (1974) for a discussion.

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(45)(a) Why haven't you called the police? - I HAVE called them. (b) Why didn't you lock the door? - But I DID lock it! (c) Look for your keys. - I AM looking for them. In sentences like these, where the nuclear accent is on the operator, some sort of contrast is implied, but it is only a contrast between positive and negative meaning. There is no 'selective contrast', as with specificational sentences, but only a 'yes/no contrast'. The function of putting a strong accent on the operator is to emphasize the truth of the statement. This typically happens when the opposite claim has been made, as in (45,a-c), or when the speaker assumes that the hearer is implicitly making this claim, as in (46) I'm selling my old Volkswagen to buy a Mercedes. I CAN afford to buy a Mercedes, you know. In order to maintain our hypothesis we must therefore eliminate yes/no contrast from the formulation. The claim is then that a constituent that receives strong accent expresses selective contrast only if it is interpreted as the focus of a specificational sentence. This means that placing the nuclear accent on a constituent that should not normally receive it is a sign that the constituent in question is to be interpreted specificationally - an interpretation which is then automatically contrastive and exclusive, because the specificational act is by definition an act of selecting (and hence excluding).

2.9. Specificational sentences have an 'exhaustiveness' understanding:29 they imply that the focus represents an exhaustive list of the values satisfying the variable. For example, when the speaker utters (47,a) or (47,b), the hearer has a right to conclude that only two people insulted Mary. If more (or fewer) people actually did so, the speaker would be deceiving him :30 (47)(a) JOHN and BILL insulted Mary. (b) It was JOHN and BILL who insulted Mary. It is not difficult to show that this exhaustiveness understanding is not a logical presupposition (like the presupposition of existence). Since an answer to a question is only appropriate if the two share the same presuppositions (cf. Chomsky 1971: 202), the exhaustiveness understanding would have to be shared by the question if exhaustiveness were a logical presupposition. However, this is obviously not the 29. I will point out below that this is actually true of affirmative specificational sentences only. 30. It goes without saying that the exhaustiveness understanding must be understood with respect to a restricted universe of discourse (cf. Halvorsen 1978: 15). The sentences (47,a-b) do not say that apart from John and Bill nobody ever insulted Mary.

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case, since the question Who (was it who) left the room? can be felicitously answered by any one of the following sentences: (48)(a) (It was) John. (b) (It was) John and Mary. (c) (It was) John, Mary and Betty. Each of these sentences has an exhaustiveness understanding. They suggest, respectively, that one, two and three persons left the room. Evidently, none of these understandings can be shared by the question, otherwise only one of these answers would be an appropriate reply. The conclusion must be that exhaustiveness is not logically presupposed by specificational sentences. On the other hand, exhaustiveness is not an entailment either.31 As pointed out by Delahunty (1981: 409), if the entailed sentence is false, then the entailing sentence must (by definition) also be false. Hence, if exhaustiveness were entailed, the following syllogism ought to succeed, whereas in fact it does not:32 Premise 1. If it was John who left the room, then only one person left the room. Premise 2. Mary also left the room. Conclusion. It was not John who left the room. Another argument proving that (49) It was JOHN who left the room, does not logically entail (50) Only one person left the room. is the following. If (50) were a logical entailment of (49), then (49) could not be true if (50) were false. That is, if (50) were false, then the negation of (49), viz. (51) It was not John who left the room. would have to be true. Now, if it turns out to be the case that (50) is false (because several people actually left the room), it does not automatically follow that (51) must be true. There is no reason to rule out the possibility that John was among the people who left the room. In a situation like this we cannot really say that (49) is

31. This runs counter to Atlas & Levinson's (1981: 29-30) claim that"// was John that Mary kissed (...) entails Mary kissed (exactly) one person". 32. Still, I will point out below that there are exceptional cases in which exhaustiveness is entailed, viz. those cases in which the variable is overtly expressed in the form of a singular definite NF

29

false. Rather we will be inclined to say that (49), although technically true, is deceiving because it suggests (without asserting) that (50) is true. That is, (49) is not as informative as it should be, and therefore violates one of Grice's (1975) principles of conversation. The above arguments, which show that exhaustiveness is neither presupposed, asserted nor entailed by (49), thus naturally lead us to the conclusion that the exhaustiveness understanding observed in (49) is an implicature. And, indeed, it is not hard to see how exhaustiveness follows from the very act of specification if the speaker is taken to abide by the conversational Maxims described by Grice (1975). The Maxim of Quality prescribes that the speaker should specify the correct value(s) for the variable; the Maxim of Quantity ('Make your contribution as informative as required') prescribes that the speaker should give the complete (exhaustive) list of the values that satisfy the variable. If the speaker is taken to be co-operative (i.e. abiding by the Maxims) the listener has a right to conclude that there are no values satisfying the variable apart from those listed in the focus of the specificational sentence. This is why a sentence like The one who went out was John implicates the truth of the statement Only one person went out. It is clear, then, that exhaustiveness follows directly from the act of specification itself. Exhaustiveness is nothing else than 'exhaustive listing'.33 It follows that there is no such implicature in predicational sentences. Compare: (52)(a) (Who called you up a minute ago? -) BETTY called me up. (b) (Did anything interesting happen while I was out? -} BETTY called me up. (She said that...)

In spite of the identical intonation pattern, (52,a) is specificational, whereas (52,b) is not. While (52,a) implicates that nobody else called up the speaker, (52,b) does not. (Perhaps the speaker received several phone calls, but Betty's is the only one she finds worth mentioning.) Halliday (1967: 225) notes that "the London brewer's slogan We want Watney's, which envisaged the possibility that we might want other things as well, was very early replaced by the identifying form What we want is Watney's." This is not surprising: the WH-cleft is specificational and hence implicates 'we do not want anything else', while We want Watney's can be interpreted predicationally.34 33. 'Exhaustive listing' is actually the term used by Kuno (1972). (It should be noted, however, that Kuno considers the exhaustive listing interpretation as a reading different from the contrastive one: on p.269 he states that John kissed Mary but Bill did not and John (and only John) kissed Mary are different interpretations of the sentence John kissed Mary. It is clear that in our theory these are not different interpretations: they just represent different aspects of the specificational meaning of the sentence.) 34. Although there is no implicature of exhaustiveness in the sense of 'exhaustive listing' in predicational sentences, predicational sentences may often implicate something very similar, for a different reason. Atlas & Levinson (1981:46) note that when a speaker asserts (i,a) he implicates

30

The conclusion that specificational sentences have an exhaustiveness implicature calls for several interesting remarks: A. It is clear from the mechanism engendering the implicature that the implicature can only arise if the variable is uniquely defined. Now, this is usually the case since the variable part of a specificational sentence is usually a definite NP (c£ above) and, as is well-known, a definite NP always "conveys the speaker's understanding that there is some referent that is to be identified uniquely in the contextual knowledge shared by speaker and hearer" (Leech 1983: 90). As we have seen (section 2.6), the WH-clause of a WH-cleft or //-cleft always functions like a definite nominal, and in noncleft specificational sentences the variable part is usually also definite, but occasional examples can be found in which it is not: (53)(a) An example of this kind of war is World War II. (b) Typical instances of this are Julius Caesar and Napoleon. (c) Something that I don't understand is how the thief managed

to get in. When the variable NP is indefinite, there is no uniqueness understanding. Sentences (53,a-c) leave open the possibility (and even suggest) that there are other examples, and other things that I do not understand. (We have spoken of an 'exclusive' meaning: indefinite reference implicates that the reference is to only a subset of the set of items satisfying the referring description, i.e. that at least one item is exluded from the reference.) (When the indefinite NP involves another or other as determiner the existence of other objects satisfying the description is even asserted.) It follows that (53,a-c) do not implicate the truth of (54,a-c): (54)(a) World War II is the only example of this kind of war. (b) Julius Caesar and Napoleon are the only typical instances of this. (c) The only thing that I don't understand is how the thief managed to get in. 34. ../.. (i)(a) Russell wrote Principia Mathematica. (b) Only Russell wrote Principia Mathematica. Sentence (i,a) can be interpreted specificationally (with contrastive accent on e.g. Russell) or predicationally. It is true that even on the latter interpretation (i,a) seems to implicate (i,b). This can again be traced back to the Maxim of Quantity. When we say that X wrote a book, we implicate that X wrote the book completely. Otherwise (because of the Maxim of Quantity) we would say something like X helped to write the book or X wrote part of the book. Of course, if it is understood that X wroteCl the book completely, it follows that X must be the only writer of the book. In (i,a) the implicature (i,b) thus arises from the mere formulation of the VP However, in most predicational sentences the VP does not trigger such an implicature. For example, Socrates was mortal does not implicate Only Socrates was mortal because be mortal is not a VP that implicates 'completeness' the way write a book does.

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As noted in 2.6,, the meaning of (53,a-c) changes when they are clefted, because the corresponding //-clefts do implicate the truth of (54,a-c): (55)(a) ??lt is World War II that is a typical instance of this kind of war. (b) The ones that are typical instances of this are Julius Caesar and Napoleon. (c) ?? lt is how the thief managed to get in that is something that I don't understand. These sentences do implicate (54,a-c) because their WH-clauses are definite. (The fact that such sentences are rather unacceptable has already been pointed out and explained in section 2.6.). B. In some cases the variable is expressed in the form of a singular definite NP: (56)(a) The one who murdered Smith is JOHN, (b) The murderer is JOHN. In that case the exhaustiveness understanding (There is only one person who is the murderer') is of course not only implicated: it is entailed by the singularity and the definiteness of the variable NP It follows that it does not make sense to add only to the focus. Compare (57)(a) The one who murdered Smith is my neighbour, (b) The one who murdered Smith is only my neighbour. The first sentence can be read specificationally (with my neighbour as focus) or predicationally. The former interpretation implicates Only my neighbour', so that the addition of only would be quite redundant on this reading. It follows that (57,b) will be interpreted differently (i.e. predicationally): it will be understood as meaning that Smith's murderer is not someone with whom I have close relations. That is, (57,b) stresses that the murderer is not my son, or my brother, etc. but only my neighbour. C. Since the exhaustiveness understanding arises from the fact that a co-operative speaker using a specificational sentence must give the full list of values satisfying the variable, there will be no exhaustiveness implied (or rather implicated) in negative specificational sentences, unless the negation forms part of the presupposition. Thus, there is no exhaustiveness in (58,a), nor in in (58,b) if it is interpreted as (58,a), because no real act of specification takes place: (58)(a) It was not John who kissed Mary, (b) JOHN did not kiss Mary. What is expressed in (58,a) is merely that John is not the value (or one of the values) satisfying the variable. (That is, John does not figure on the list of people 32

who kissed Mary.) The sentence does not specify which value (or set of values) actually does satisfy the variable, hence there is no sense of exhaustive listing, since there is no listing at all. D. It is not easy to say whether exhaustiveness is a conventional implicature or just a conversational one. As is well-known, conversational implicatures are cancelable, whereas conventional ones are not because they are part of the meaning of the expression. Now, as far as the exhaustiveness implicature is concerned we note that the use of a specificational sentence in a context which cancels the implicature is sometimes acceptable, but sometimes not. That is, the implicature appears to be cancellable by some contexts but not by others. The following paragraphs provide some examples. A clear illustration of how the implicature can be cancelled is provided by sentences like the following, in which the focus is preceded by an adverb that is a 'particularizer', i.e. one of the focusing adjuncts that "restrict the application of the communication particularly or mainly to the part focused" (Quirk et al. 1972: 431): (59)(a) It was not only JOHN who kissed Mary. BILL and FRED did so too. (b) It is mainly TOURISTS that come here. (c) It was especially the CHILDREN that were afraid of her.

(d) It is primarily the WORKERS that are dissatisfied with the government's policy. In (59,a) the implicature (Only one person kissed Mary') is explicitly denied by the use of not only. In (59,b-d) the particularizers (mainly especially primarily) cancel the implicature because each of them implies that it picks out only a subset of the set of entities referred to by the NP that follows it. On the other hand, focusing adjuncts that are 'additives' do not cancel the implicature. The sentences (60)(a) It was also JOHN who ran away. (b) The one who ran away was also JOHN.

cannot be interpreted as saying that John was not the only one who ran away. If the sentences are not unacceptable it is because another interpretation is available, viz. the reading on which John is taken to be the value not only of this variable but also of another one (or other ones). That is, (60,a-b) are interpreted something like (61,a) (which is equivalent to (61,b)):

33

(61 )(a) It was not only John who did X (and Y) but it was also John

who ran away. (b) John was not only the 35one who did X (and Y) but he was also the one who ran away. With an additive like even there is no specificational interpretation besides the one cancelling the implicature, and because this does not appear to be permissible the sentence is unacceptable: (62) *lt was even John who ran away. As pointed out by Dillon (1977: 9), Even John ran away "presumes someone else ran away". This presumption runs counter to the implicature Only one person ran away' but is not capable of cancelling it. The sentence is therefore unacceptable.36 (The fact that the noncleft Even John ran away is not out is because this sentence, unlike the cleft, can be interpreted predicationally. On that reading there is no exhaustiveness implicature, hence no semantic contradiction leading to unacceptability.) Sentences in which the specificational statement is followed by an addition cancelling the exhaustiveness implicature do not appear to be acceptable: (63)(a) *They were the ones who ran away, like us. (b) *lt was they who ran away, among others. (c) ?*lt was Bill who ran away, but not just him. John and Mary also ran away. Atlas & Levinson (1981: 25) point out that sequences like the following are all right: (64) It wasn't John that Mary kissed - it was Mart and Rick. However, this cannot be taken as an example of implicature cancelling, since (as we have seen sub C.) there is no listing and hence no exhaustiveness implicature in negative clefts like // wasn't John that Mary kissed. The following sentences do not teach us anything either about the possibility of cancelling the exhaustiveness implicature: (65)(a) Was it Bill and Fred who kissed Mary? - No, it was only Bill, (b) Was it Bill who ran away? - No, it was John and Mary.

35. Higgins (1976:206) overlooks the possibility of interpreting (60,a-b) as (61,a-b) when he makes the claim that WH-clefts cannot be interpreted specificationally if also is added to the copula. 36. The unacceptability of sentences like (62) is also noted by Gundel (1977a: 127). Surprisingly, the sentence It was even John who protested figures as an example that is not starred (i.e. judged acceptable) in Quirk eiaL (1972: 438) and Quirk etaL (1985: 611). 34

in (65,a-b) the exhaustiveness understanding implicated by what is said by speaker A is denied by what is said by speaker B.37 However, this kind of 'correction' is always possible, even with presuppositions (which are by definition not cancelable): (66) It was John who closed the door. - No, he didn't. The door was closed all the time. The only kind of cancelling that is relevant to the present discussion is that in which one and the same speaker first implicates something and then rejects it. This is not possible with presuppositions (witness (67,a)) but is generally possible with conversational implicatures (cf. (67,b), where the implicature 'John is no longer a member of the club' is cancelled by and he still is) :38 (67)(a) !|t was John who locked the door, though the door was never opened, (b) John used to be a member of the club, and he still is. The exhaustiveness implicature cannot be cancelled in this way: (68) *lt was Betty who came in last, although it was Mary too. In fact, the only way in which the implicature can be cancelled appears to be by the use of not only or chiefly, mainly, primarily, etc. (as in (59,b-d)). This suggests that the implicature, although it arises from conversational principles, must be conventionalized to a (fairly high) degree.

37. Halvorsen (1978: 16) claims that questioned ö-clefts do not implicate exhaustive listing: «Questioned clefts also have a focus constituent. It is John in the question Was it John that Mary kissed?. But this question does not conventionally implicate that the list containing the single name John is an exhaustive listing of the persons Mary kissed. If it had been so, the question would have been pointless.» I think this statement is not correct. What is implicated by the question is that (in the opinion of the speaker) there is only one person who kissed Mary. The point of the question is whether it is correct to say that this person is John. There is no way in which the implicature makes the question pointless. (The problem noted by Halvorsen arises only when the implicature is taken to be Only John kissed Mary rather than Only one person kissed Mary. The element John is of course the point of the question. However, it is clear from what we have argued that the implicature in the sentence under consideration is Only one person kissed Mary.) 38. That used to conversationally implicates that the habit referred to is a 'discontinued' one is pointed out by Comrie (1976, 1985).

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E. The claim that (apart from the exceptions pointed out above) specificational sentences have an exhaustiveness understanding expressable in terms of only might lead one to wonder why only is often used overtly before the focus of a specificational sentence: (69)(a) It was John that kissed Mary, (b) It was only John that kissed Mary. We may wonder if the use of only in (69,b) is not redundant. Could we simply substitute (69,a) for (69,b), or is there a semantic difference between them? The answer is that there is indeed a difference. Sentence (69,a) presupposes that some X (singular or plural) kissed Mary, asserts that X is John and implicates that only John is X (i.e. that no one else kissed Mary). Sentence (69,b), on the other hand, presupposes that John kissed Mary and asserts that no one else did (cf. Seuren 1985: 304). This means that (69,a) and (69,b) have different presuppositions and make different assertions. They are therefore likely to be used in different contexts. In answer to Who kissed Mary? we will normally use (69,a), not (69,b). Sentence (69,b), but not (69,a), will be appropriately used in answer to a question like Who else kissed Mary?. The two sentences thus have different semantic properties, which accounts for the fact that they occur side by side. Only is not used redundantly in (69,b).

2.10. As noted above, a specificational statement provides an answer to an (either overt or implied) WH-question. Questions introduced by a WH-word (which, how why, etc.) always ask for specificational information, and may therefore always be clefted themselves. For example, both the question and the answer in (70,a)) are specificational, so that they are semantically equivalent to the cleft sentences in (70,b): (70)(a) Where did he go? - He went to Paris. (b) Where is it that he went? - It is to Paris that he went. There are, however, a couple of exceptions to the rule that WH-questions always ask for specificational information. The first concerns sentences that answer questions with who. These may, but need not, be specificational. Consider:

(71) Who's the chairman? - That man over there. - Who is he? He's the mayor of this town. The question Who's the chairman? asks for specificational information. It may therefore be replaced by Who is it who is the chairman ?. The question Who is he?, on the other hand, is not equivalent to * Who is it who is he?. This sentence does not

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ask for specificational information, but for what we will call 'descriptionallyidentifying' information (cf. section 5). That is, Who is he? is interpreted something like 'Can you tell me something more about him?'. This means that a question of the type 'Who is NP?' may be either a request to specify a value for the variable represented by who or an invitation to furnish further information about the referent of the NR A suitable answer will be specificational in the former case and 'descriptionally-identifying' in the latter (cf. section 5). In the former case, but not in the latter, who is similar in use to which (one) in that it implies that someone has to be picked out from a set. In fact, the difference between Which (one) is the chairman? and Who's the chairman? (on the specificational interpretation) is that which (one) implies that the value to be assigned to the variable is to be found in a restricted set of entities known to the speaker and the hearer, whereas who does not imply this. (This is why we can say Which of them is the chairman ? but not * Who of them is the chairman ?). A second exception to the generalization that WH-questions ask for specificational information concerns questions introduced by what. Apart from asking the hearer to specify a value for the variable (as in (72,a)), a w/wtf-question may also ask for a definition (as in (72,b)): (72)(a) What was the cause of the accident? (b) What isaouijaboard?

Although both questions could be answered by a copular sentence with deictic that as subject, it is clear that there are fundamental differences between them. Providing a definition is not the same as specifying a value for a variable. To give a couple of illustrations only (for 'definitional' sentences will be dealt with more extensively in section 7): (72,a) can be //-clefted, whereas (72,b) cannot: (73)(a) What was it that was the cause of the accident? (b) *What is it that is a ouija board ?

In (72,a) which will be substituted for what if it is understood that the value is to be selected from a restricted set of candidates that is known to the speaker and hearer: (74) Which (of these factors) was the cause of the accident?

There is no similar use of which in (72,b). That is, the sentence Which is a ouija board? is perfectly grammatical, but it asks for specificational information and not for a definition. These and other pieces of evidence (seesection 7) make clear that what-questions asking for definitions must be considered as constituting an exception to the rule that WH-questions ask for specificational information. 37

The same conclusion might seem to hold for M>Aa/-questions that ask for predicational information:

(75)(a) What is he? - He is a teacher, (b) What is he like? - He's a nice fellow. However, the issue is not as simple as it may look. It is certainly true that, if we are confronted with a predicational sentence and we are asked to reconstruct the question to which this sentence could be an appropriate reply, we will come up with a question of the type' What is NP?' or What is NP like??9 However, this is not the same thing as saying that we use a predicational sentence when we answer one of these questions. A predicational NP (i.e. an NP denoting a property, profession, function, role, capacity, etc.) can be focalized just like any other NP (although there are restrictions on this, which we will discuss in chapter 4). In that case it is obvious that the predicational NP is the focus of a specificational construction:

(76)(a) He is a BAKER, not a BUTCHER! (b) It is a BAKER that he is, not a BUTCHER! (c) I'll tell you what I think he is. He's a THIEF. Since a predicational NP can thus be the focus of a specificational sentence there is no a priori reason why we should not look upon the answers of What is X? and What is X like? as specificational. And, indeed, we notice that an answer like He is a TEACHER can be paraphrased as 'He is the following: a teacher'. However, we have seen that the speaker uttering a sentence of the type Ά is the following: B' must make sure that B is an exhaustive list of all the values satisfying the variable 'the X that A is'. And here a problem does arise. Most predicational ideas are not such that a statement of the kind A isX implicates 'hence, X is not Y, Z, etc.'. Whereas in the specificational sentence The murderer is John the focus is interpreted as contrastive and exhaustive (because the murderer can only be one person to the exclusion of all others), the sentence John is a good student does not exclude that John may have other properties as well. The property 'good student' does not exclude (and hence does not contrast with) other properties, such as those indicated by expressions like small, ugly, with brown hair, young, etc. For this reason, a good student does not represent an exhaustive listing of the properties that John has. This means that, even when used in answer to What is John like?, the sentence John is a good student would seem to lack some of the salient characteristics of specificational sentences, viz. exhaustive listing and contrastiveness.

39. What is he? is usually interpreted as inquiring about such things as someone's profession, or his function, or class-membership. What is he like? is the usual question if the speaker expects the hearer to assign a property or characteristic to the referent of the subject NP 38

On the other hand, these characteristics need not be totally absent. A good student still contrasts with a bad student, and when the sentence is used in a situation in which students are being evaluated, John is a good student does indicate exhaustively how John is to be characterized in terms of'studenthood'. The context can thus narrow down the (otherwise almost infinite) set of properties from which one is selected as the value for the variable. This narrowing down can even be maximal, as in (77) If there is one thing that he is not, it is intelligent. Here the first clause states explicitly that only one property is in question. When the predicational NP denotes a profession, function or role rather than a property, the sentence also more easily suggests a contrast. Since most people have only one profession, the sentence John is a teacher readily suggests 'That's the (only) thing that he is'. In a context in which it is being discussed which member of the board has which function, the sentence John is the treasurer automatically suggests 'not the president, nor the vice-president, etc.'. The conclusion, I think, must be that when a sentence like John is a teacher or John is silly is used in answer to the question What is John ? or What is John like ?, it is a specificational sentence with a predicational focus. Because of the special characteristics of predicational elements some of the typical characteristics of specificational sentences (viz. contrast and exhaustiveness) may be more or less obscured, and this in its turn may render it difficult to cleft the sentence (since clefts represent a more emphatic kind of specificational construction). However, this is no reason for abandoning the conclusion that such sentences specify a value for the (predicational) variable in the question and are therefore basically specificational. Returning now to the basic claim of this section, we can conclude that WH-questions generally ask for specificational information in the sense that they ask the hearer to specify a value for the variable represented by the question-word, i.e. ask him to use a specificational sentence as reply. (The only exceptions are that questions with who may, in some contexts, be answered by means of a 'descriptionally-identifying' sentence and that questions with what may ask for a definition.)40 This conclusion is in keeping with Rochemont's (1986: 19) observation that "wh phrases function naturally as foci" (cf. also Danes' 1967, Horvath 1981) and that a "κΆ phrase may be informally viewed as a kind of vacuous operator, binding an open position in a proposition for which the speaker intends the audience to provide an appropriate value - the focus, or new information" (ibid.).

40. The use of who asking for descriptionally-identifying information will be discussed in section 5 of this chapter. The use of what in questions asking for a definition will be treated in section 6. The problems in connection with specificational sentences with a predicational focus will be examined in more detail in chapter 3.

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2.11. Specificational sentences of the form 'N?! be NP2' are 'reversible'. That is, the two NPs may be permuted (so as to yield 'NP2 be N?!*) without any semantic effect. This means that either the variable NP or the focus can occur as superficial subject.41 For example: (78)(a) (Who is it who is the bank robber? -) The bank robber is John Thomas, (b) (Who is it who is the bank robber? -} John Thomas is the bank robber. (79)(a) What we need is love, (b) Love is what we need. In WH-clefts, this reversibility leads to clear ambiguity:

(80)(a) What I told him was what she wanted to know, (b) What she wanted to know was what I told him. Both these sentences (which come from Huddleston (1971: 135)) allow the two interpretations paraphrasable as 'It was what she wanted to know that I told him' and 'It was what I told him that she wanted to know'. That is, both the precopular constituent and the postcopular one can be interpreted as either the variable part or the value of the Specificational structure. (At least, this double possibility exists when the sentences are written. In speech, the intonation pattern will make clear which of the constituents is to be interpreted as the focus (value).) The possibility of permuting the two NPs is of course related to the fact that Specificational sentences "have as their most characteristic function that of identifying an entity referred to by means of one expression with an entity referred to by another expression" (Kahn 1973: 473). Since the referents of the two expressions are identified with each other, it does not really matter which expression is placed first. On the other hand, there may be independent reasons for putting or not putting one of the expressions in a particular position, and it is therefore natural that we should have to mention a number of exceptions to the reversibility rule. First, Specificational sentences of the form 'It is + NP' (e.g. It is John) are not reversible ("John is if). This is because (as we will see below) such sentences are

41. In discussing the rule of reversibility I will concentrate on Specificational structures of the type 'NP be NP' because there are too many factors disturbing reversibility when one of the constituents does not have the form of an NR For example, when the value is a prepositional phrase, it will not normally take the subject position for the simple reason that the subject of a sentence must normally have the form of an NP: (i)(a) The usual method of solving this problem is by firing the coach, (b) ??By firing the coach is the usual method of solving this problem. (That sentences like In the woods is where I found it seem all right is due to the fact (pointed out below) that WH-clauses with where, when, how, why and who are not normally processed as superficial subject of a Specificational sentence.)

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reduced //-clefts, and //-clefts do not allow the permutation in question. Secondly, when the subject NP is deictic that (with reference to a person), the permutation is not allowed either. Thus, we can use (81,a-c), but not (81,d) in answer to the question Who's the chairman?: (81 )(a) (b) (c) (d)

The chairman is THAT MAN OVER THERE. THAT MAN OVER THERE is the chairman. THAT'S the chairman. *The chairman is THAT.

Thirdly, anaphoric demonstratives cannot be processed as subject complements (predicate nominals): (82)(a) She said that I was a creep and THIS/THAT was what made me sad. (b) *She said that I was a creep and what made me sad was THIS/THAT. (83)(a) (A couple of strangers were there too.) I think THOSE/

THESE were the murderers. (b) (A couple of strangers were there too.) Ί think the murderers were THOSE/THESE.

Cases like these will be discussed in chapter 5 (section 3.3.2). An explanation of the restriction will be proposed there. A fourth exception concerns WH-clefts. As noted by Quirk et al. (1972: 955), WH-clauses that are introduced by who, where or when will not normally occur as the superficial subject of a WH-cleft: (84)(a) (b) (85)(a) (b) (86)(a) (b)

The police chief was who I meant. ??Who I meant was the police chief. Here is where the accident took place. ?? Where the accident took place is here. (In) Autumn is when the countryside is most beautiful. ??When the countryside is most beautiful is in Autumn.

In fact, the restriction also holds for how and why: (87)(a) Lack of money is why he did it. (b) ??Why he did it is lack of money. (88)(a) With a gentle touch is how it should be done. (b) ??How it should be done is with a gentle touch.

The fifth exception concerns specificational sentences in which the variable NP is indefinite, while the presupposed variable as a whole is definite: (89) (One of your men is a traitor. - Who (is it who) is a traitor? -) BILL is a traitor.

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In the last sentence of (89) a traitor is an indefinite NP representing the variable, but the presupposed variable as a whole is definite ('the one who is a traitor'), as it also is in the corresponding #-cleft or WH-cleft. This sentence is not reversible: (90) *A traitor is BILL

There is no reversibility either if the definite article is dropped from a definite variable NP (as is sometimes possible, cf section 3.5). Compare: (91 )(a) (b) (c) (d)

BILL is the captain of the team. The captain of the team is BILL BILL is captain of the team. "Captain of the team is BILL.

This is a restriction that is hard to account for. There is no a priori reason why it should be impossible for an indefinite variable NP to become the subject of a specificational sentence, as the following is grammatical: (92) An example of this was Hitler's attitude towards the Jews.

The only difference between (92) on the one hand and (90) and (91,d) on the other is that the presupposed variable is definite in the latter (viz. 'the X who is a traitor' and 'the X who is captain of the team') but not in (92): here the variable is 'an X which is an example of this'). The restriction thus appears to be that a definite variable cannot be represented by a nondefinite subject NP, though it can be represented by a nondefinite predicate nominal. I have no explanation of this, apart from the suggestion that the restriction might be connected with the fact that the subject NP expresses the theme (topic) of the sentence (in the sense of: what the sentence is about) and that a nondefinite NP is not a suitable means of informing the hearer that the sentence is going to be about a definite variable. A sixth exception follows simply from the well-known rule that English prefers sentences with a short subject NP and a relatively long VP to sentences in which the VP is much shorter than the subject. Thus, although both (93,a) and (93,b) are fine, (94,b) is much less acceptable than (94,a) because the nominal that is now the subject is much longer than the subject complement NP: (93)(a) (b) (94)(a) (b)

Our strategy is: DENIAL. DENIAL is our strategy. Our strategy is to deny every charge that is made against us. ?To deny every charge that is made against us is our strategy.

A final set of exceptions follow from the rule of'topic continuity' (Givon 1983). If, in a particular discourse, we have the choice between two variants of a sentence,

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we will preferably select the one whose topic (theme)42 is the same as in the preceding discourse. Thus, (95,a) is more coherent (and thus 'better') as a stretch of discourse than (95,b):

(95)(a) What's the problem ? - The problem is that I have no influential friends. (b) What's the problem? - That I have no influential friends is the problem. The principle of topic continuity (which will be more extensively dealt with in chapter 5) accounts for the fact (observed by Hetzron (1970: 908)) that (97,a) is a "natural sequel" to (96,a), but not to (96,b), whereas one would expect (97,b) to follow (96,b) rather than (96,a):

(96)(a) The institute has a director appointed by the board of trustees. (b) The council elects one of its members as president. (97)(a) The director of the institute is the president of the council. (b) The president of the council is the director of the institute. The sentence topic of (97,a) (the director of the institute) is already mentioned in (96,a), but not in (96,b). Hence there is topic continuity if (97,a) follows (96,a), not if it follows (96,b). Conversely, topic continuity will be preserved if (96,b) is followed by (97,b). The topic of the latter sentence (the president of the council) does not link up with anything in (96,a), but it does link up with (96,b). Hetzron (1970: 908) concludes from these facts that (97,a) "is not the same as" (97,b). I think this conclusion is not warranted. The facts observed do not point to a difference in the semantic contents of the two sentences. They just show that the principle of topic continuity helps to determine the pragmatic use of such sentences. Putting (97,a) after (96,b) or (97,b) after (96,a) does not result in semantic contradiction or in some other violation of semantic restrictions. It just makes for stretches of discourse that are not optimal in that they are not as coherent as they could have been. In sum, there are at least seven types of exceptions to the rule that specificational copular sentences (involving NPs as subject and as subject complement) are reversible. (The last of these is less stringent, as it is a question of pragmatic felicity rather than of grammaticality or semantic acceptability.) The fact that, apart from these exceptions, specificational sentences of this type are reversible may make it difficult to establish which of the two NPs is the underlying subject and which is the predicate nominal.43 Still, there are some indications that it is the focus (value) NP 42. I'm using 'topic' or 'theme' here in the sense of 'what the sentence is about' (not in the sense of Old information'). As is well-known, the topic is very often the subject. 43. Blom & Daalder (1977) devote a lot of attention to this problem, yet the conclusions they come up with seem to me to be patently wrong.

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that is the underlying subject of the sentence: A. Consider the following question-answer pairs: (98)(a) Who's the thief? - BILL is the thief, (b) Who's the thief? - The thief is BILL. If we assume that it is the sentence BILL is the thief that reflects the (underlying) order 'subject + verb + predicate nominal', we must assume that Who is the thief? reflects the same order (i.e. that who is the subject): if is the thief is the predicate in the answer, it must also be the predicate in the question. One might object to this, saying that the word order Who's the thief? is the result of applying WH-fronting to The thief is who ?. If this is correct, who is the predicate nominal in the question and Bill is consequently the predicate nominal in the answer. However, this objection appears untenable when we consider sentences like the following: (99) A. One of them is a thief. B. Which one is a/the thief? A. Bill is a/the thief. B. The/*a thief is Bill. In the question Which one is α thief? the order of the constituents must be subject + verb + predicate nominal: no WH-fronting can have applied, since we cannot accept a question of the form *A thief is which one?. This situation remains unchanged when we substitute the thief for α thief. (This substitution is possible because the preceding context has established that one (and only one) particular person from a group is a thief; we can therefore refer to that person as the thief.) In Which one is the thief? the NP which one is therefore the subject, and in the corresponding answer BILL is the thief the subject is Bill. This is confirmed by the fact that BILL is the thief alternates with BILL is α thief, in which α thief cannot possibly be the subject. B. Higgins (1976: 140ff) points out a couple of tests that can help to make clear what is the underlying constituent order of the copular sentences. One of them is based on the observation that subject-auxiliary inversion does not take place in indirect questions. Because of this, indirect questions of the form 'WH-word + NP + be'can be traced back to (direct) questions of the form 'WH-word + be + NP'. Thus, from the order of the constituents in (100,a-b) we learn that the corresponding

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direct question has the (underlying) order of (101,a) and not of (ΙΟΙ,ο):44

(100)(a) I asked him which one was the/a thief. (b) Ί asked him which one the/a thief was. (101 )(a) Which one is a/the thief? (b) The/a thief is which one?

C. Another test that we can use consists in inserting a modal auxiliary in the question. If in the question Which one (is it who) is a thief? the NP which one is the subject (as we are arguing), insertion of an auxiliary like can will yield (102)(a) Which one can be a thief? (b) Which one can it be who is a thief?

If the underlying subject were a thief, the resulting sentences would have to be (103)(a) 'Which one can a thief be? (b) *Which one can it be who a thief is? Since (103,a-b) are plainly ungrammatical, we can conclude that a thief is not the subject. D. Similar results are obtained when we embed the question under a verb of prepositional attitude: (104)(a) Which one do you think is a thief? (b) *Which one do you think a thief is ?

44. One might wonder whether the fact that subject-auxiliary inversion does operate on direct questions could provide us with another test. However, this does not appear to be the case, because subject-auxiliary inversion applies to superficial rather than to underlying subjects (c£ the grammaticality of 7s John hard to please ? where John is superficial subject and underlying direct object). This means that, since both NPs can in principle become superficial subject, both should be capable of participating in subject-auxiliary inversion. This does appear to be the case, although (for various pragmatic reasons) one alternative generally seems to be better than the other. Compare: (i)(a) Who is the murderer?-John. (b) Is JOHN the murderer? (c) ?ls the murderer JOHN ? (ii)(a) What he gave me was a BOOK. (b) ?Was a BOOK what he gave you ? (c) Was what he gave you a BOOK ? 45

In sum, there appears to be ample evidence that in specificational sentences it is the NP representing the focus that is the (underlying) subject.45-46 This means that the unmarked word order in the surface structure must be taken to be the one in which the focus NP fills the subject position. Specificational sentences in which it is the variable NP that fills the position of the superficial subject are 'inverted' specificational sentences. This conclusion is particularly relevant to the treatment of WH-clefts, since the term 'inverted pseudo-cleft' has actually been used with two different meanings in the linguistic literature. For Prince (1978) an inverted pseudo-cleft is one in which the WH-clause does not occur as subject; for Quirk et al. (1972:954) it is just the other way round: the WH-cleft is called 'inverted' when the WH-clause is processed as the subject of the sentence. If the terminology is based on the question of which constituent is subject in the underlying structure, the definition of 'inverted WH-cleft' must be as in Quirk et al.47 This conclusion is confirmed by the restrictions on reversibility that we have noted above. Most of these restrictions concern the impossibility for an NP which (in our theory) is subject complement in underlying structure to occur as superficial subject. That is, the restriction is always that what we consider to be the noninverted structure is possible, whereas the inverted one is not. There are no cases where the restriction works the other way round. This is strong evidence in favour of Quirk et al.'s (1972) definition of inverted specificational sentences. (As regards WH-clefts we will therefore consider as inverted that version in which the WH-clause occupies the subject position in the surface structure.) I would like to note, finally, that the question of which element of a specificational copular sentence is the underlying subject and which is the

45. This conclusion is in keeping with Givon's (1973: 119) claim that it is a universal restriction on predicate nominals that they must be less general than their subjects. As we will argue in section 2.12., the variable NP of a specificational sentence is 'attributive' (in the sense of Donnellan (1966)), whereas the value NP may be referential or attributive. Since "the referential is less general than the attributive" (Givon 1973: 118), the restriction concurs with the claim that it is the value NP that is the underlying subject. 46. Rensky (1981: 140) reaches the same conclusion, but on a rather dubious basis. Concerning the sentence (i) Man's most obvious sign of age is the dry, wrinkled, flaccid skin that marks his late years. (Huddleston 1971:133-134) he notes that while (i) "is contextually freely reversible, a substitution of represent for be confirms the obvious assumption that the more specific skin is the subject and the more general sign (...) the complement". However, the conclusion would be just the other way round if we substituted consist in for be. This shows that no conclusions are to be drawn from this kind of paraphrasing. 47. Huddleston (1971: 136) takes another criterion, viz. the accentuation pattern: "Since the normal position for the nuclear stress in clauses in general is (other things being equal) at the end of the clause" and since the nuclear accent of a specificational sentence falls on the focus (value), he assumes that the variable-as-subject version is "basic" and the focus-as-subject type "marked".

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underlying subject complement is not just a theoretical issue without practical implications. The answer to this question is directly relevant to the interpretation of any specificational sentence. For example, we have already noted the ambiguity of sentences like What I told him was what she wanted to know and What she wanted to know was what I told him. Concerning this, Huddleston (1971:136) notes: "This ambiguity can be accounted for by postulating two different functions or cases, an 'identifier' and an 'identified', such that in the first interpretation what I told him is the identifier, what she wanted to know the identified and vice versa for the second interpretation. (We would expect identifier and identified to be special instances of more general deep structure cases, but I shall not consider this question here.)" In my opinion, the functions 'identifier' and 'identified' correlate directly with the functions 'subject' and 'subject complement' in the underlying structure of the specificational copular sentence. In other words, the identified is the constituent involving the variable, the identifier is the value, and (in a specificational copular sentence) these functions correspond with the functions of underlying subject complement and subject, respectively.

2.12. The NP representing the variable of a specificational sentence is a 'referring' NP only in a weak sense of the term. Although the description given in the NP (e.g. the bank robber has a particular referent, it does not by itself enable the hearer to identify this referent (i.e. to pick him out from a set). Thus, in (105)A. Who is the bank robber? B. The bank robber is JOHN THOMAS. speaker A uses the description the bank robber to refer to someone who is not identifiable for him from the mere use of the description. In fact, the purpose of his sentence is precisely to inquire into the identity of the person in question. It is clear that the description the bank robber in (105,A) satisfies the requirements of what Donnellan (1966) has called the 'attributive' use of a definite NP: the bank robber is a definite description whose referent is not known to the speaker (so that the speaker cannot 'identify' him in the sense of 'pick him out') and which is essential to the speaker (rather than just being one of various descriptions that could be used) because it is the only description that he can produce to refer to the person in question. These requirements would not seem to be satisfied in (105,B), as speaker B obviously knows the identity of the referent and can produce alternative descriptions. However, the use of the bank robber in (105,B) is just an echo of its use in (105,A) - we must keep in mind that the variable of a specificational sentence is always presupposed - and it therefore seems reasonable to say that the bank robber is also used attributively by speaker B. The purpose of a specificational sentence with a definite NP as variable is precisely to identify the referent of an NP whose use has remained attributive for the hearer.

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The claim that the variable NP of a specificational sentence is attributive is not new. It has been made by e.g. Fodor (1976:203) and Elffers (1979:109).48 On the other hand, it is explicitly rejected by Higgins (1976) (who calls the relevant NP 'superscriptionaP because it resembles the heading of a list.): Clearly the Superscriptional and the attributive noun phrases differ in semantic function. The attributive reading of a noun phrase is often used precisely when one is unable to state in any more exact way who or what fits a certain description. One is, as it were, a symptom of ignorance, the other of knowledge.

True as this comment may be, I do not think it is an argument against the view that superscriptional NPs are used attributively, for we can argue (as I have done in connection with (105,B)) that the attributive NP in the specificational sentence is an echo of the preceding context. In a specificational sentence the speaker identifies the referent of an NP which up to that point has been attributive for the hearer. Higgins (1976:170-171) also offers two more specific objections to the view that superscriptional NPs are used attributively. The first is that there exist NPs which can only be used superscriptionally, that is, which cannot be used attributively in any other context. An example of this is what he wants to marry in (106,a), which, as appears from the ungrammatically of (106,b), cannot be used as subject of a predicational sentence: (106)(a) What he wants to marry is an actress. (b) *What he wants to marry is blonde and wealthy. However, why should the fact that phrases like what he wants to marry can only be used as the variable part of a specificational sentence enforce the conclusion that such an NP is not attributive? In my opinion, the only conclusion that we can draw from the ungrammaticality of (106,b) is that an NP like what he wants to marry is heavily restricted in its use. (This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the NP cannot even occur in specificational sentences that are interrogative: *Who is what he wants to marry?). Higgins' second argument is that "if one collapses the superscriptional and the attributive readings", one cannot account for all the possible interpretations of sentences like the following: 48. Elffers (1979: 109) even claims that the attributive character of the superficial subject NP is a sufficient condition for the sentence to be specificational. However, this is plainly incorrect, since predicational sentences and identity statements with an attributive NP as subject are impeccable: (i)(a) Smith's murderer must be insane, (on the reading: 'Whoever it is that murdered

Smith must be insane') (b) The leader of the party always IS the Prime Minister, (is = 'is the same person as') (Moreover, the attributive NP in the specificational sentence need not be the superficial subject NP, since specificational sentences are reversible.)

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(107) The winner of the election might have been the loser. Among the many readings of this sentence we note the following two: (108)(a) The winner of the election might have been the following: the loser. (= specificational) (b) The winner of the election might have been the same person as the loser. (= identity statement) Higgins points out that the winner of the election is superscriptional in (108,a) and may be attributive in (108,b). His argument now is that the two readings could no longer be distinguished if we collapsed the superscriptional and the attributive readings. However, it should be pointed out here that what we argue is no more than that superscriptional NPs are used attributively. We do not 'collapse' the two meanings, i.e. we do not identify them with one another. We just say that one of the uses of attributive NPs is as superscriptional NPs in specificational sentences. Besides, one of the premisses of Higgins' argument is that the ambiguity of (107) depends on an ambiguity in the subject NP: it is assumed that (107) is read specificationally if and only if the subject NP is read superscriptionally. However, there is no evidence that the interpretation of the sentence works like this rather than the other way round (i.e. there is no reason why we should not adopt the view that the subject NP is interpreted as superscriptional because the sentence is read specificationally). In this connection we can point out that the readings (108,a) and (108,b) can be brought out by the intonation of the sentence, without the subject NP playing any decisive part in this: reading (108,a) is produced when we put contrastive accent on loser and have a slight pause ('colon intonation') before this NP; reading (108,b) is produced when we put the nuclear accent on been. The claim that the two readings can no longer be distinguished if we assume that the subject NP is attributive on both interpretations is thus clearly not warranted. In sum, it can be argued that attributive NPs can be used both in specificational sentences (in which case the NP can be called the 'superscriptional NP' or 'variable NP') and in other types of sentences (e.g. predicational sentences, identity statements, etc.). I hasten to add that this does not mean that a superscriptional NP has to be definite (although it usually is). As noted above, examples like the following are specificational: (109} An example of this is the decline of civilization in the western world. There are two avenues open to us here. We can simply assume that superscriptional NPs are attributive only if they are definite - since Donellan has made the distinction only for definite NPs - or we may assume that indefinite NPs can also be used in two different ways, resembling the referential/attributive contrast. The latter assumption is in fact not uncommon in the linguistic literature. Many linguists

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have argued for some kind of referential/attributive distinction in connection with indefinite NPs. For example, quite a few have claimed that the well-known specific/nonspecific contrast is no other than Donnellan's distinction applied to indefinite NPs (see e.g. Heringer 1969: 94, Palacas 1977: 202, Taglicht 1972: 12, Klein 1980:153, Rivero 1975:39). The fact that specificational sentences with an indefinite variable NP such as (109) are grammatical (though rare - c£ Higgins 1976:196, Quirk et al 1985:742) therefore presents no real problem for the claim that superscriptional NPs are attributive. The conclusion that the variable NP of a specificational sentence is attributive automatically explains why 'strongly referring' NPs like anaphoric pronouns, proper names and demonstrative pronouns (or NPs with a demonstrative determiner) cannot be used superscriptionally.49 Sentences like the following are not specificational (but, as we will see in section 5, descriptionally-identifying): (110)(a) Who's that man ? - That man is the Prime Minister. (b) (There's a man smoking a pipe in the corner.) Who is he? He's the Prime Minister. (c) (You say you gave it to John.) Who's John ? - He's a son of my neighbours'. It may be noted, finally, that, as far as the focus (value) NP is concerned, Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction is not criterial at all. In the example (111 )(a) Who are you looking for? - I'm looking for the man drinking a martini. (b) Who is itthat you are looking for? - It's the man drinking a martini that I'm looking for. the focus NP the man drinking a martini may be both referential and attributive. (That is, the speaker may know who it is that is drinking a martini and use the description the man drinking a martini as one of various possible means to refer to that person; or he may not know which person fits the description and use the latter in the sense of 'whoever it is that is drinking a martini'.)

49. However, exceptions are possible where proper names are concerned. There are some cases in which proper names are not used in a strongly referring way, i.e. are not sufficient to pick out the referent from a group. For example, even if I know who John is (so that the mere use of the name John is normally sufficient to identify the referent), there may be circumstances in which the name John does not suffice to pick out John from a set, e.g. when John belongs to a group of people that are masked. In that case we can ask the question Which one is John ? and receive the (specificational) reply John is the one with the red mask (or It is the one with the red mask that is John). For further examples and discussion, see Chapter 2.

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2.13. Specificational sentences are the only type of copular sentences that show 'connectedness'. This means that elements from both the focus and the presupposition participate in the application of certain rules. An example of such a rule is reflexivization, which may involve elements from both constituents, even if these belong to different superficial clauses.50 For example:51 (112)(a) What Johrij did was wash himselfi/*himj/*herselfj. (b) What Johrij wants Mary to do is wash himj/*himselfj/herselfj. (c) John'Sj greatest treasure is a book about himselfj/*himj. The fact that there is connectedness in Specificational sentences but not in other copular sentences accounts for the difference between (113,a) (which is Specificational) and (113,b) (which is predicational): (113)(a) The job Fred has accepted is to write a book about himself, (b) The job Fred has accepted is a source of agony for him. Apart from reflexivization, the following examples of connectedness offer themselves: A. What is perhaps the most basic kind of connectedness is that, because it specifies a value for a variable, the focal item must be of the appropriate semantic class, i.e. the class represented by the variable (cf. Akmajian 1979: 19).52 This explains observations like the following: (114)(a) What he wrote was a BOOK, (b) *What he wrote was an APPLE.53

B. A negative or near-negative element in the variable part of a Specificational sentence can trigger the use of a 'negative polarity item' (nonassertive word or phrase) in the focus:

50. Because reflexivization is claimed to be a clause-internal rule, the fact that the two clauses of e.g. a WH-cleft are involved in the operation has often been considered as evidence for deriving such Specificational structures from an underlying simple sentence (see e.g. Akmajian 1979). 51. The facts about reflexivization referred to here have often been noted in the linguistic literature. 52. To put it in words that have to do with the list analogy: "a well-formed list contains items that conform to the heading at the top of the list, and therefore a well-formed list will only consist of semantic predicates if the heading states that such are being listed" (Higgins 1976:95). 53. These selectional restrictions are obviously the same as in noncleft sentences. In the older literature this was often taken as evidence that clefts are transformationally derived from simple sentences (see e.g. Lees 1963).

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(115)(a) (b) (c) (d)

What I have never noticed is any signs of dissatisfaction. It is rarely that we need do that. It is seldom that we receive any help. What John hasn't done is leave yet/'already. (Halvorsen 1978:6) (e) What John doesn't want is ever to be left alone, (ibid.) (f) What he omitted doing was telling anybody that he would leave.

There is no such connectedness in predicational sentences:

(116)(a) What he omitted doing was as interesting to some of us as what he did do. (b) What you never noticed was noticed by some of us. (c) What John hasn't done is already a subject of controversy. C. A reciprocal pronoun in the focus can refer to NPs occurring in the variable part. Compare the specificational sentence (117,a) with the predicational (117,b):

(117)(a) What the two of them did was kiss each other, (b) *What they did was surprising to each other. D. Quantifier shift can move a quantifier from the variable part into the focus: (118) What the little bastards did was all get in the tub at the same time. (Hankamer 1974:223) There is no such possibility in predicational sentences: (119)(a) What all the little bastards did was sursprising to us. (b) *What the little bastards did was all surprising to us. E. When the presupposition part of the specificational structure is a finite clause and the focus is a nonfinite clause, both clauses have to share the same (progressive or nonprogressive) aspect:54

(120)(a) (b) (c) (d)

What he did was work in the garden. What he was doing was working in the garden. 'What he did was working in the garden. 'What he was doing was work in the garden.

54. The present participle working in (120,b) and (120,c) is an obligatory reduction of be working and therefore has progressive meaning (cf. Declerck 1981b).

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Predicational sentences again do not share this form of connectedness. The following predicational examples are grammatical although one clause is progressive whereas the other is not:55 (121 )(a) What John does for a living has been causing some bitterness lately. (b) What John has been doing has caused a great deal of bitterness. F. This matching of the two verb forms in specificational sentences is also possible where perfect aspect is concerned:56 (122) What he's done is spoilt the whole thing. (Quirk et al. 1972: 955)

However, the perfect aspect of the focal clause is more often neutralized: (123) What he's done is spoil the whole thing. G. When the focus of an //-cleft is an NP functioning as the object of a preposition, the preposition may occur either in the clefted constituent or in the variable part (WH-clause): (124)(a) It is to John that I was talking, (b) It is John that I was talking to. H. If the verb of a WH-clause of a cleft is an intensional verb, the focus is included in its scope, even when the focus precedes the WH-clause: (125)(a) It is a Swedish girl that I want to marry, (b) What I want to marry is a Swedish girl. In these sentences the possibility of interpreting a Swedish girl as a nonspecific NP (which has no referent in the world of discourse) is created by the presence of want in the WH-clause. Sentences like these should be compared with (126) The one I want to marry is a nice person.

55. Notice that this is not due to some restriction on the formation of progressive verb forms, since both do and cause readily yield progressive forms. 56. Once again we may note the similarity between specificational sentences and question-answer pairs: (i) What has he done ? - Spoiled the whole thing.

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On the predicational interpretation, a nice person is a property NP (predicational NP), not a nonspecific one.57 This means that the predicational NP is not within the scope of the intensional verb in the subject clause. In sum, examples of various kinds show that there is connectedness between the two parts of a specificational sentence, whereas there is none between the comparable parts of predicational sentences.

57. The claim that a property NP is a nonspecific NP is false, though it has occasionally been made in the linguistic literature. A nonspecific NP is 'weakly referring', much in the same way as an 'attributive' definite NP (cf. section 2.12). A property NP, in contrast, is not referring at all. The difference between the two is stressed e.g. by Kuno (1970). 54

3. PREDICATIONAL SENTENCES Section 2 was concerned with the definition of specificational sentences and an examination of their salient characteristics. In this section I will concentrate on the second major group of copular sentences, which, following Higgins (1976), Akmajian (1979) and many others, I will call 'predicational'. Predicational sentences derive their name from the fact that instead of specifying a value for a variable (i.e. identifying a referent) they merely predicate something of the referent of the subject NP In most cases this 'something' is a characteristic, a role, a function, or an indication of class membership. For example: (1 )(a) John is a teacher. (= John teaches) (b) Mary is a pretty girl. (c) John is the cleverest student of them all. Because many predicational sentences ascribe a characteristic to the referent of the subject NP - perhaps even all predicational sentences can be said to have this function if the term 'characteristic' is used in a very broad sense -58 some linguists refer to them as 'characterizationaP sentences (e.g. Kuno & Wongkhomthong 1981, Quirk et al. 1985). I myself will sometimes use the term 'property NP' (next to 'predicational NP') to refer to the predicate nominal of such sentences. Predicational sentences have the following characteristics: 3.1. A predicational sentence is not felt to answer a question asking for specificational (identifying) information. This statement should not be misunderstood. It does not mean (as has sometimes been said) that a predicational sentence answers a question for predicational (characterizational) information. Rather it means that a predicational sentence is not felt to answer a question at all. As we have seen in section 2.10, if a sentence is felt to be an answer to a WH-question, this means that it specifies a value for the variable represented by the WH-word. In other words, a WH-question always asks for a specificational reply, even if the variable and the value in question are predicational in the sense that they denote a property. Consider, for example, the following: (2) John is a good student.

58. Even locative expressions are sometimes analysed as characteristics. For example, Dik (1980b) treats (is) in the garden in John is in the garden as a property. Ball (1977: 60) states that all predicational sentences mean that a property is added to the list of properties that hold of the referent of the subject NR

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This sentence, which ascribes a property to John, is predicational when used out of context. But when it serves as a reply to a question specifically asking for a specificational answer (e.g. What is John (like)? or What is it that John is?) it is used specificationally. In that case a good student is the value specified for the variable 'what John is' and the sentence is interpreted as 'John is the following: a good student'. The fact that both the variable and the value denote a property does not alter this. In other words, a question like What is John (like)? asks for predicational information, but this predicational information is to be given in the form of a specificational reply.

3.2. As has often been noted (see e.g. Kuno 1970), an NP denoting a property has no referent in the universe of discourse. Not only does it fail to be 'strongly referring' (like e.g. anaphoric pronouns), but it is not even 'weakly referring' (like e.g. attributive definite NPs, or nonspecific indefinites, or generic NPs) and therefore fails to establish what Karttunen (1968) calls a 'discourse referent'. Even when an NP is only weakly referring, it can nonetheless trigger the use of a referring expression in the following discourse:

(3)(a) I need a doctor. He must be no older than sixty. (b) Smith's murderer (whoever he may be) must be insane. He has literally torn Smith to pieces. (c) The whale is a mammal. It does not lay eggs. Property NPs, by contrast, do not refer at all. For that reason they cannot even establish discourse referents. That is, in a sentence like (4,a) the NP a good man just denotes a property; it does not refer to anybody having this property. If we add to (4,a) or (4,b) a sentence starting with he, we refer to John, not to a good man or the acme of courtesy. This is clear from examples like (4,c), where the property is not ascribed to a particular referent and the use of a referring expression such as he in the context that follows is consequently impossible :59 59. Cf. Vendler (1971: 131), who notes that sequences like the following are "discontinuous": (i)(a) He is a teacher. The teacher is lazy, (b) Joe became a salesman. The salesman is well paid. Kuno (1970: 356-357) discusses a similar example:

(ii) My brother is a doctor. I cannot trust him/'the doctor/that doctor. Kuno points out that the doctor is unacceptable in the second clause because a doctor in the first clause "does not establish, linguistically, the presence of a doctor in the present universe of discourse"; him is acceptable, but is anaphoric, not with the preceding a doctor, but with my brother, which is a referential NP; that that doctor is acceptable is explained from the fact that NPs with that (e.g. that bastard, that man, etc.) can function like pronouns. (In my opinion, the reason for this is that the anaphoric power of these NPs resides entirely in that. The added noun does not participate in the referring function of the NP; its function is rather to predicate an additional property of the referent. Thus, that bastard is equivalent to 'he, who is a bastard,' - cf. Declerck 1979.)

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(4)(a) John is a good man. (b) John is the acme of courtesy. (c) Being a good man is the highest of human destinies. (*He has therefore been rewarded.) McCawley (1981: 124) points out that in (5) Carter is a politician. I'm glad I'm not him. him can only have the subject, not the predicate NP, as antecedent. If we want to use a pronoun that does have the predicate NP as antecedent we use that (or the weaker form //). In that case the pronoun refers to the denotation of the antecedent NP (i.e. to the property itself), not to any individual having the property in question: (6)(a) Carter is a politician. I'm glad I'm not that, (b) He is a rich man, though he does not look it. It follows that the question-word who cannot be used in a WH-question asking for a property-ascribing reply. A question with who always asks for information that should enable the hearer to identify a referent. If we are interested, not in someone's identity, but in his relevant properties we ask a question with what, whatJike, or how:60 (7)(a) (b) (c) (d)

What is John ? - He is a doctor. What is John like? - He is a very nice young fellow. How are you ? - I'm fine, thank you. WhatrWho did she become?61

The nonreferentiality of property NPs is also apparent from the use of relative pronouns. In a nonrestrictive relative clause the relative pronoun who cannot be used as subject complement (i.e. as predicational NP). Which is used instead (cf. Kuno 1970):

(8)(a) He is a good student, which you are not. (b) At that time he still was the chairman, which he now isn't any longer.

60. Questions with which ask for identifying information. That is, the speaker asks for information which should enable him to pick out an entity from a set. This entity is usually a person or object, but it may also be a property. The following sentences illustrate these two possibilities: (i)(a) Which of those people is the murderer? (b) Some of the psychiatrists say the murderer is insane, the others that he is quite responsible. Which is he then?

61. Higgins (1976: 154) notes that a sentence with become is necessarily property-ascribing. See also section 4.7.

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As appears from these examples, the antecedent of predicational which may be a (definite or indefinite) property NE It may also be a nonspecific indefinite NP: (9) I need a psychiatrist, which you are not. A predicational nonrestrictive relative clause cannot depend on an antecedent that is referential, attributive (in Donnellan's sense) or specific indefinite: (10)(a) Ί saw the murderer, which you are not. (b) *l saw a (certain) murderer, which you are not. Higgins (1976: 158) also notes that we use what, not who, to introduce a free relative denoting a property: (11 )(a) John wants to become what his father was. (b) John is what his father wanted to become. It automatically follows that a WH-cleft highlighting a property cannot involve (the one) who in the WH-clause. We use what instead: (12) What I'd like to be is chairman of the club. (Note that a WH-cleft with what cannot be used to specify the identity of the person referred to in the WH-clause:

(13)(a) *What is the murderer is JOHN. (b) The one who is the murderer is JOHN.)62 Who can be used in restrictive relative clauses that form part of the property NP: (14) John is a student who works a lot. But if the relative pronoun itself functions as a property NP, we have to use that instead of who:63 62. What is possible is sentences like

(i)(a) What I'd like to marry is a Swedish girl, (b) What I need is a doctor. but these are clearly of a different type, since their WH-clauses are not copular. Note that such sentences always require the focus to be a nonspecific indefinite: (ii)(a) What I need is a friend, (b) *What I need is your friend. 63. Vendler (1971: 131) and Emonds (1976: 141) note that sentences like the following are ungrammatical: (i)(a) Ί spoke to the teacher that he is. (b) 'There is a salesman that Joe became. The reason that these are ungrammatical is that it is not possible for a relative pronoun denoting a property (i.e. a nonreferential relative pronoun) to follow a referential antecedent.

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(15) I am not the man that I used to be. (The use of who would imply that I have changed my identity - cf. Higgins 1976: 160). Thai also has to be used instead of who in exclamations like the following: (16) Fool that I was! The fact that property NPs are nonreferential of course means that strongly referring NPs (e.g. personal pronouns, demonstratives, anaphoric NPs, proper names) cannot be used as property NPs.64.65 As noted by Quirk et al (1985: 742), "noun phrases used as characterization attributes are normally indefinite." Still, definite NPs are not altogether excluded. Various writers (e.g. Halliday 1967: 68-71, Kuno 1970:349-350,358-359, Fodor 1976:202-215, Higgins 1976:155ff) have stressed that definite NPs may sometimes be used predicationally. The following sentences (which are to be read with neutral sentence intonation) illustrate this:66 (17)(a) Is John Mary's husband ? (b) I dreamt that I became the king of France. (c) I am not the king of France. Examples like these provide further proof that property NPs do not refer. As is well-known, definite referring NPs (whether referential or attributive) carry a

64. There are a couple of exceptions to this. As noted above, thai and it can refer back to a property expression. In examples like (i,a-b) the proper name (typically preceded by the indefinite article) is also used predicationally: (i)(a) I doubt if this painting is a Picasso, (b) The boy is every inch a Ewing, just like his father. 65. Nominal clauses cannot function as property NPs. A copular sentence cannot be predicational if the postcopular NP is a gerund clause, an infinitive clause, a thai-clause or a dependent question. The following sentences are all specificational: (i)(a) What I hate doing is writing reports. (b) What I like to do is (to) walk on my own. (c) Our advice is that he should leave. (d) The question is whether the others will be there too. (e) What I don't understand is how the burglar got in. Nominal relative clauses (headless relatives) form the only exception: they can sometimes be used predicationally: (iij This theatre is no longer what it was when we first went to it. 66. It hardly needs saying that the above statement that definite property NPs are not referential does not mean that they are attributive in the sense of Donnellan (1966). Blom & Daalder (1977: 101-102) therefore make a mistake when they reject Akmajian's (1979: 178) claim that the postcopular NP in a predicational sentence is nonreferential on the basis of the observation that the sentence The leader of the party is the Prime Minister may be specificational in spite of the fact that the Prime Minister can be interpreted attributively. (As we have observed in section 2.12, attributive NPs are 'weakly referring', while property NPs do not refer at all.)

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presupposition of existence,67 but the predicate NPs in (17,a-c) do not. It follows that the question of whether a sentence like (18) The one who got killed was not my sister. is true on a predicational or specificational reading partly depends on whether or not I have a sister. If I have one, the sentence may be true irrespective of whether it is interpreted predicationally or specificationally; if I have no sister, (18) can only be true on the predicational interpretation (see also Gundel (1977: 544)). It is perhaps worth noting that definite property NPs normally require that the subject NP should refer to the whole set of entities characterized by the property in question (cf. Declerck 1986). Thus, John and Mary are the culprits implies that there are no more (and no fewer) than two culprits. The difference between The chairman is a linguist and The chairman is the linguist is that, unlike the former, the latter represents the property in question as typical of the chairman only. (Since anybody knows that there exist plenty of linguists, this is of course only possible if the property in question has been restrictively defined in the context, i.e. if the linguist stands for 'the linguist who...'. In that case the restrictive information is more likely to occur overtly, as in (19) The chairman is the linguist who founded case grammar.) However, there are exceptions to this rule. In John is my friend the (formally definite) NP my friend does not imply that the property of being my friend is typical of John only: my friend can be read as 'a friend of mine'. (This is an interesting case of an NP that is definite in form but indefinite in meaning - see Declerck (1986) for a discussion.) 3.3. Since a property NP is quite nonreferential, whereas a predicational sentence does predicate something of a referent, the subject NP of a predicational sentence must be at least weakly referring: it must be capable of referring to an entity independently of what is predicated of that entity in the rest of the sentence. In fact, we ascertain that the subject NP of a predicational sentence may be either referential or attributive (in the sense of Donnellan). Donnellan's own example

67. Gundel (1985: 100-102) rejects this claim on the basis of examples like (i) If I pull this handle, the explosion is inhibited. However, although it is true that there exists no referent for the explosion in the actual world, I think there does exist one in the mind of the speaker. (Moreover, if one remarks that the explosion does not take place, this means that the possibility of an explosion has been discussed or is otherwise present in the memory of the speaker and/or hearer.) The claim that definite NPs presuppose existence does not mean that their referents must exist in the actual world (ct also our use of the Abominable Snowman, the Loch Ness Monster, etc.) 60

Smith's murderer is insane, in which the subject NP may be referential or attributive, can be interpreted as predicational on both readings.68 For some reason, the subject of a predicational copular sentence is not normally indefinite, unless it is interpreted generically (which is another instance of 'weak' reference): (20) A horse is a rather slow means of conveyance. Sentences like (21), in which a generic interpretation is excluded, are odd, even in a suitable context: (21) (Nobody is eight feet tall.) - ??A man I met last year was eight feet tall. A sentence like this will normally be reworded as / met a man last year who was eight feet tall or something of the kind.69 The fact that a predicational sentence is unlikely to have an indefinite subject (unless it is generic) can be explained from the following observations: a. When the subject NP represents old information (as is usually the case in a predicational sentence, since it is usually the property that is the new information), the subject must be definite. (Indefinite NPs imply that the referent is not identifiable in the linguistic or situational context and therefore typically represent new information - c£ Chafe 1970: 214, Leech 1983: 90-93). b. If the subject does refer to an entity that has not been referred to yet (in the preceding discourse) or is not identifiable from the situation or context, the speaker normally introduces that entity linguistically before ascribing a property to it. A typical example of this is the use of an existential ('presentational') sentence. Compare: (22)(a) (I went to London.) ?A man I met there looked exactly like me. (b) I went to London and met a man there who looked exactly like me. (c) I went to London. There was a man there who looked exactly like me. 68. I thoroughly disagree with Elffers (1979: 109-111) where she claims that a copular sentence is automatically specificational if the first NP is attributive and predicational if that NP is referential. (A very clear example of a predicational sentence with an attributive subject NP is I've been informed that the man drinking the martini has important news for me. So I must find out who he is. Similarly: Whoever it is that killed Smith must be insane.) Higgins (1976: 166) also claims that the subject of a predicational sentence is always "referential", but he uses the term as a synonym of 'referring' and not in the sense of Donnellan (1966). An attributive phrase like whoever killed Smith is 'referential' in his terminology. 69. Closs Traugott (1972: 41) makes a comparable statement: "For reasons not yet entirely clear, certain adjectival verbs like be tall, be loyal must have definite subjects. I cannot say *A man is tall *A man is loyal in the same sense as I can say Λ man came in." 61

Sentences (22,b) and (22,c), in which the referent is first introduced, are much better than the clumsy (22,a), in which this is not the case. 3.4. Because the subject of a predicational sentence is a referring NP, whereas the predicate nominal is not, predicational sentences are not reversible: (23)(a) John is a teacher, (b) *A teacher is John. Compare also: (24)(a) jb) (25)(a) (b)

What I'm doing is amusing myself. Amusing myself is what I'm doing. What I'm doing is amusing me. *Amusing me is what I'm doing.

As is clear from the fact that they show connectedness (the use of myself), (24,a-b) are specificational (c£ section 2.13), while (25,a), which shows no connectedness, is predicational. A couple of things are worth noting here: A. What we call reversibility means that the order 'NP, be NP2' is changed into 'NP2 be ΝΡΛ This phenomenon should not be confused with 'preposing' (as in topicalization, focus-movement or Yiddish-movement).70 Preposing moves an element (which is not the subject) into initial position, but does not affect the subject, which consequently remains before the verb. In contrast, when a copular sentence is reversed, both the subject and the predicate nominal are moved, so that be remains between the two NPs. So, (26,a-b) provide an example of reversing, whereas (27,a-b) illustrate preposing: (26)(a) (b) (27)(a) (b)

TOM is the murderer, (specificational) The murderer is TOM. He is a teacher, (predicational) A teacher he is.

(27,a) does not allow the NPs to change places: (28) *A teacher is he.

70. These three types of preposing operations are distinguished by Prince (1981, 1985); Examples are: (i)(a) Mary John saw yesterday, (topicalization) (b) They bought a dog. FIDO they named it. (focus-movement) (c) They bought a dog. A GOAT they should buy, their house is so dirty. (Yiddishmovement) 62

On the other hand, (26,a-b) do not allow proposing of the predicate nominal: (29)(a) *The murderer TOM is. (b) *TOM the murderer is. The difference between proposing and reversing is particularly clear when the copular sentence is embedded under a raising verb. In that case reversing is still possible, whereas proposing can no longer take place: (30)(a) (b) (31 )(a) (b)

I believe the murderer to be TOM. I believe TOM to be the murderer, (reversing) I believe him to be a teacher. Ί believe a teacher him to be. (preposing)

B. In a couple of cases preposing of a predicational element is accompanied by subject-verb inversion, so that the result is the same as when reversing has applied. One such case is when the proposed element is an obligatory place adverbial: (32)(a) The knife is on the table. (b) *On the table the knife is. (c) On the table is the knife. That we do not have reversing here but rather preposing plus inversion is clear from the fact that what we observe in (32,a-c) is in no way different from what we observe in connection with the noncopular (33,a-c): (33)(a) A man stood on the hill. (b) *On the hill a man stood. (c) On the hill stood a man. The difference between reversing and preposing with inversion is also revealed in the interrogative. Compare:

(34)(a) (b) (c) (d) (35)(a) (b) (c) (d)

The murderer is JOHN. JOHN is the murderer. Is JOHN the murderer? 71 ?ls the murderer JOHN ? The knife is on the table. On the table is the knife. *ls on the table the knife? Is the knife on the table ?

71. The acceptability of this sentence is doubtful (which is in keeping with our claim (made in section 2.11) that the (underlying) subject in (34,a-b) is John, not the murderer.) On the other hand, the following is not too bad:

(i) Is the one who murdered Fred that man over there? (In so far as this sentence is acceptable, it would seem to indicate that subject-verb inversion can also operate on a superficial subject which is not a subject in underlying structure.)

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Moreover, (35,a) and (35,b) do not have quite the same meaning, as appears from the fact that they imply different questions: whereas (35,a) can answer the question Where is the knife?, (35,b) is only a suitable reply to What is there on the table? (cf. Bolinger 1972a: 100). A second case where proposing of a predicational element triggers subject-verb inversion is when the property expression implies comparison :72 (36)(a) More interesting is the second illustration. (b) Just as surprising was the defeat of the Dodgers. (c) Equally important is looking after the animals. Once again we can show that what is happening here is proposing with inversion rather than reversing: (37)(a) (b) (38)(a) (b)

We believe the second illustration to be more interesting. *We believe more interesting to be the second illustration. Is the second illustration more interesting? *ls more interesting the second illustration?

In sum, predicational copular sentences may allow the property expression to be proposed, but they do not normally allow the subject and the predicate nominal to be permuted.73 The reason is that, unlike proposing, reversing produces the effect that the NP that is moved into subject position is actually interpreted as the (superficial) subject of the sentence. (This follows from the fact that the other NP is moved into a position where it can be interpreted as predicate nominal. This is not the case when an element is proposed, because the subject NP of the sentence is then left in subject position). Now, the subject of a copular sentence is also usually the

72. The reason why predicational elements implying comparison can easily be proposed is obvious: such elements are explicitly linked up with the preceding discourse and are therefore eminently suited to become the topic of their sentence, (cf. Butters 1977: 68) 73. I still add the mitigating term normally because a couple of linguists claim that reversed predicational sentences can be found in a particular style of English. Kahn (1973:472) writes that "Intelligent is John is of course acceptable; but it is stylistically restricted, and it is associated with a very particular intonation pattern." Rensky (1981: 140) points out that sentences like A remarkable bird is the pelican can be found in poetry. In everyday English, however, sentences like these will surely be judged unacceptable. It should also be noted that in some cases reversing a predicational sentence yields a result that is perfectly grammatical and acceptable, but which does not have the same meaning. For example: (i)(a) Someone who has a bad conscience is someone who does not sleep well, (b) Someone who does not sleep well is someone who has a bad conscience.

In this case too we can uphold the claim that predicational sentences are not reversible, for we have seen that reversing a specificational sentence has no semantic impact.

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topic of the sentence (in the sense of the 'theme', 'what the sentence is about'), and, as noted by Gueron (1984: 153), a topic NP "must be referential, that is interpretable as denoting an individual whose existence in the world of the discourse is independent of the truth value of the sentential predicate." Using the terminology introduced above, this means that the subject must be a 'referring' expression. This requirement presents no problem for reversing a specificational sentence, since the variable NP is 'weakly referring' (attributive), whereas the focus is either strongly or weakly referring (c£ section 2.12). Property NPs, by contrast, are not referring at all. This explains why they cannot be processed as subjects.

3.5. Because predicational NPs do not refer but rather denote a property, they behave as adjectivals rather than as nominals. That is, they have at least the following typically adjectival characteristics: A. Predicational NPs may indicate a property that is gradable and therefore enter into grading constructions where referring NPs are totally excluded: (39)(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)

John is a better teacher than you. He is more of a hero than Kelly. What intelligent children they are! What a disgrace it was! Why are you such a snob? He is such a baby. He is diplomat enough to settle such quarrels, That was quite a success. The performance was rather a disappointment.

B. Predicational NPs are the only NPs that can be preposed by certain stylistic rules that only apply to adjectivals: (40)(a) King of the country as he is, he should tell us what to do. (b) Good student that I am, I never get drunk on Mondays. (Delahunty 1981:50) (c) Genius though she was, she was quite unassuming. (Quirk et al. 1985:1097) It is worth noting that such preposed predicational NPs are used without the definite or indefinite article. The reason is presumably that the absence of the article is a signal that the NP in question is predicational rather than referring and must therefore not be interpreted as the subject (topic) of the sentence. C. Even when they are not preposed, predicational NPs can sometimes be used without the definite article:

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(41 )(a) Bill is now cook. (Gruber 1976:142)

(b) Tom is captain of the cricket team. (Fodor 1976:118) (c) That woman is Mayor of Cambridge. (Higgins 1976:149) (42)(a) They elected him President of the U.S. (b) He hopes to be crowned king.

The omission of the definite article is obligatory in sentences like (42,a-b). Otherwise it is only possible when the predicational NP expresses a role, function or profession. Thus, the sentence Bill is ugliest man on campus is "only appropriate if there was a competition resulting in the selection of Bill as the ugliest man on campus, that is, if the NP describes a position or status" (Fodor 1976: 208). Moreover, Gruber (1976: 142) notes that "the the which may be omitted singles out the individual as unique in the identified class". This probably explains what is noted by Bald (1972:99), viz. that we can say He was leader/king but not *He was businessman/philosopher. Unlike the definite article, the indefinite article is not normally deleted from a (nonpreposed) predicational NP in English. (However, deletion is very common in other languages. Compare English He is a baker with Dutch Hij is bakker or French Π est boulanger.) We can therefore subscribe to Kahn's (1973:472) claim that the occurrence of the indefinite article in the English sentence John is a writer "is a purely automatic consequence of the fact that the subject-NP is singular and writer is a countable noun. The complement in the ascriptive sentence is not, therefore, the NP-expression a writer but the N-expression writer" D. As we have seen, predicational NPs have their own question words (e.g. what (...like), but not who) and relative pronouns (e.g. which, not who, in nonrestrictive clauses). Moreover, they also have special anaphoric pronouns (e.g. that, it). In fact, the pronouns that can refer to a predicational NP are exactly the same as are used to refer back to adjectival ideas. Compare: (43)(a) (b) (44)(a) (b) (45)(a)

Nick is tall, and I'll never be that. (Thompson 1971: 93) They all say Bill is a fool, and that he is. Bill is Intelligent, although he doesn't look it. Mary is a fool, although she doesn't look it. Petrol was expensive in Europe before it became so in the U.S. (b) Neither of these places is an island, but that they were once so appears from geological evidence. (Scheurweghs 1959: 137)

E. Only predicational NPs can be preceded by no (cf. Kruisinga 1920: 112): (46) He is no hero. (See also section 4.2.B.) 66

F. Predicational NPs and adjectives may often alternate: (47)(a) He is rich/a rich man. (b) Most of the tourists were Swedish/Swedes. (c) He is (an) American. Kruisinga (1920: 112) also mentions examples like the following: (48)(a) All these roses are dwarf. (b) His talk was and remained only church. In some cases the predicational NP can also be conjoined with an adjective: (49) In 1961 she was still young and an innocent child. (Kirkpatrick & Uszkoreit 1982:128) (As is well-known, constituents can only be conjoined with each other if they belong to the same syntactic or semantic category.) G. The property expressed by a predicational NP is often actually a bundle of properties. For example, Bill is a tyrant suggests that Bill has various properties typical of a tyrant (i.e. he is undemocratic, cruel, volatile, ruthless, etc.). In a certain sense, a property can be seen as a bundle of semantic features, one of which very often is the feature 'self-controllable' (cf. Kuno 1970: 352-353). Predicational NPs which have this feature in their property set can be used in copular sentences that are in the imperative or progressive form, and in examples like (52,a-b): (50)(a) (b) (c) (51 )(a) (b) (52)(a) (b)

Be a good girl. Be a hero. Don't be a fool. He's being a fool. She's being a good girl. I warned him not to be a fool. She asked me not to be a hypocrite.

Similar examples are ungrammatical when the NP in question is a referring one:74

74. Examples similar to (53,a-e) may sometimes be acceptable if be is interpreted as 'play the part of, 'pretend to be': (i) Today my son is being Napoleon. However, this sentence is predicational rather than specificational. (This appears e.g. from the fact that it cannot be reversed: Today Napoleon is being my uncle does not mean the same thing as

(0). 67

(53)(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

*BeTom. *Be that man over there. *l'm being Tom. *She's being her mother. *l warned him not to be that man over there.

3.6. When we speak of a predicational NP we usually refer to an NP that is used as subject complement (predicate nominal). However, predicational NPs can also occur in noncopular structures. The most obvious examples are NPs that function as object complements or follow the 'prepositional copula' or:75 (54)(a) I consider John (as) my friend. (b) I thought Bill a good linguist. (c) As chairman of the society he should be able to help us. (In examples like these the relevant NP cannot be specificational: (55) Ί thought Peter John.) A predicational relation is also expressed when we use an O/-PP after words like function, capacity etc.: (56) In his function of chairman he knows a lot of influential people. 'Absolute1 clauses introduced by with can also be predicational (not specificational): (57)(a) With her husband an invalid, it must be difficult for her to make ends meet, (b) With John (as) our leader, nothing can happen to us. In all the above examples the constructions involving the predicational NP are not copular, but they are still clearly related to copular sentences. However, there are numerous predicational sentences which neither contain nor imply the presence of be. For example, the noncopular sentences in (58,a) convey exactly the same predicational information as the copular ones in (58,b): (58)(a) What does he do? - He teaches at the local girls' school, (b) What is he? - He is a teacher at the local girls' school.

75. I borrow the term 'prepositional copula' from Emonds (1982).

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As noted above, it depends on the context and on the intonation pattern whether a noncopular sentence will be interpreted as specificational or as predicational. The context can make clear that specificational information is requested; in that case the intonation pattern of the sentence will reveal which constituent is to be interpreted as focus. If the context does not create the idea of a variable that is to be specified and if the sentence has a neutral intonation pattern (rather than an intonation with contrastive accent on a particular constituent), the sentence will be interpreted as predicational. Thus, a sentence like John robbed a bank can be interpreted in two ways. It will be interpreted as specificational if, for example, the nuclear accent is on John and the context somehow makes mention of or implies the idea of someone robbing a bank. It will be interpreted as predicational if the intonation pattern is neutral (i.e. with the nuclear accent on bank) and there is no variable like 'the X who robbed a bank', 'the X that John did to a bank' or 'the X that John robbed' suggested by the context. (This is the case, for example, in (59) (Do you know why John is so rich ? Well, I will tell you.) John robbed a bank.)

3.7. Whereas η-clefts are always specificational,76 WH-clefts may be specificational or predicational. Compare: (60)(a) What I gave her for her birthday was not expensive, (predicational) (b) What I gave her for her birthday was a ring, (specificational) (c) What I gave her for her birthday was an expensive piece of jewelry, (predicational or specificational) A similar example of an ambiguous WH-cleft is sentence (61) (which I borrow from Clifton (1969)): (61) What I don't eat is food for the dog.

This sentence yields the specificational reading 'The following I don't eat: food for the dog'. In this sense it is equivalent to the li-cleft (62,a), and may be reversed so as to become (62,b): (62)(a) It is food for the dog that I don't eat. (b) Food for the dog is what I don't eat.

However, (61) also yields a predicational reading: 'Whatever I do not eat is used as food for the dog'. On this reading the sentence does not identify the referent of the

76. As noted before, there are actually a couple of exceptions to this rule. See chapter 3.

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subject NP but merely says something more about it. Neither the ώ-cleft (62,a) nor the (62,b) version of the WH-cleft can have this interpretation. There are a couple of remarks that should be made in connection with this ambiguity: A. The fact that WH-constructions like (61) are ambiguous has created some confusion as to the use of the term 'pseudo-cleft' (WH-cleft). Since /f-clefts do not show this ambiguity and since it has often been claimed that there is some transformational relationship between //-clefts and WH-clefts, most linguists dealing with WH-clefts have claimed that a sentence like (61) is a WH-cleft only on the specificational reading. They uphold the view that zV-clefts and WH-clefts are both instances of specificational constructions. At least one linguist (Higgins 1976) does not share this view. For Higgins, a WH-cleft need not be specificational by definition, and Higgins consequently speaks of 'specificational WH-clefts' and 'predicational WH-clefts'. In my opinion, this position has at least the advantage that there is a complete terminology. Those who hold that WH-clefts must be specificational do not appear to have a suitable term for the predicational type of WH-construction. (As a matter of fact, the latter is mostly disregarded.) The issue is further complicated by the fact (apparently overlooked in the linguistic literature) that WH-sentences similar to either (62,b) or its reversed version (61) may still have other meanings besides a specificational and/or predicational one. In section 2.10 we pointed out that >f/wz/-questions may ask for a definition. The definition in question can be given in the form of a WHconstruction similar to (62,b): (63) What is a pyramid? - A pyramid is what the Egyptians built to bury their pharaos in. If we extend Higgins' terminology, we can speak here of a 'definitional WH-cleft'. And we still have another meaning in (64)(a) What I did WAS what you told me to do. (b) The one who is drinking the martini IS Mr. Brown. Sentences like these are interpreted as identity statements. They express that the referents of the two NPs are the same (is = 'is the same as', 'is identical with').77 As we will show in section 6, identity statements are neither specificational, predicational nor definitional. We may therefore refer to (64,a-b) as 'identity WH-clefts'. 77. This interpretation of course requires a suitable context. For example: (i)A. We must try and find the man drinking the martini as soon as possible. B. No, we must first try and find the man who calls himself Mr. Brown. A. But that's the same thing. The one who is drinking the martini IS (the one who calls himself) Mr. Brown.

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Since sentences of the form of (61) can have all these meanings, it seems best to use the term 'WH-cleft' as a mere indication of the outward form of such sentences.78 To indicate the meaning of a particular WH-cleft we can then add one of the modifiers 'specificational', 'predicational', 'definitional' or 'identity'. I propose to adhere to this convention in the present book. However, since the vast majority of WH-clefts are specificational, and since I will not often be concerned with one of the other three semantic types, I will often use the term 'WH-cleft' where I really mean 'specificational WH-cleft'. This will only happen in contexts where no confusion can arise. B. For some speakers the WH-clause of a predicational WH-cleft can undergo extraposition: (65)(a) What Henry sells is expensive, (b) It is expensive what Henry sells.

Such a construction is formally very similar to an Λ-cleft.79 However, it is not specificational. (Seuren (1985), who claims that sentences like these are grammatical, stresses this point.) C. There is at least one case in which the form of the postcopular item (i.e. the focus or predicational element, according as the WH-cleft is specificational or predicational) makes clear whether the interpretation must be specificational or predicational. Consider the following: (66) How did he speak to you? - Flatteringly. Corresponding to this question-answer pair we have the WH-cleft80 (67) The way he spoke to me was flatteringly.

78. The term 'WH-cleft' will not, however, cover WH-sentences whose WH-clause is an indirect question rather than a free relative (e.g. What happened afterwards is a complete mystery). 79. The similarity is the greater because certain dialects of English, notably Irish and Scottish dialects, allow the use of what instead of that in rt-clefts. The following examples are from Delahunty (1981:270): (i)(a) It was a falling tree what him him. (b) It was the accident what upset him. 80. Some people might object to my calling (67) a WH-cleft because its 'WH-clause' does not begin with a true WH-word. However, I consider it an accidental gap in the potentialities of how that the WH-cleft How he spoke to me was flatteringly is unacceptable. The fact that we normally use the way instead of how is no reason for claiming that the structure is not a WH-cleft. (There is a similar problem in connection with who, which must normally be replaced by the one who in a WH-cleft.) 71

This WH-cleft can only be specificational. (This is of course in keeping with the fact that there is connectedness between the adverbial WH-element and the adverbial focus.) The corresponding predicational WH-cleft makes use of flattering instead of flatteringly: (68) The way he spoke to me was flattering. Bolinger (1972a: 98-100) gives various examples illustrating this difference: (69)(a) The way he played the music was hopelessly, (specificational) (b) The way he played the music was hopeless, (predicational) (70)(a) The way he behaved towards her was offensively, (specificational) (b) The way he behaved towards her was offensive, (predicational) These examples can be compared with (71) The way she looks is frightful. where the two meanings are no longer signalled by words from different parts of speech because look is a copula and we therefore have to use an adjective, not an adverb of manner, on the specificational reading too. D. The specificational reading of a WH-cleft is no longer available if we substitute whatever for what, or whoever for the one who, etc.: (72)(a) The one who did that was a stranger, (b) Whoever did that was a stranger. Whereas (72,a) is ambiguous between a specificational and a predicational reading, (72,b) can only be predicational. The reason is that the use of whoever implies that the speaker does not know the identity of the person in question. Using whoever in a specificational sentence in which that identity is revealed therefore makes for semantic contradiction. (I will not go into the question of whether what is violated here is a presupposition, an entailment or an implicature.) The same kind of explanation accounts for the following: (73) (a) What he told them was a secret, (specificational or predicational) (b) Whatever he told them was a secret, (predicational only) (74) 'Whoever did it was John. (In (74) whoever enforces a predicational reading, but John cannot be used as a predicational NP)

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E. As noted by Kaisse (1979: 708-709), auxiliary reduction is not possible in specificational WH-clefts, although it is possible in predicational constructions: (75)(a) (b) (c) (d)

What I eat's important to me. (predicational) What he said's not significant, (predicational) *What I want's an avacado. (specificational) *What I wonder's whether we'll find a solution to this problem, (specificational)

Sentences like (72,a) or (73,a) are disambiguated by the possibility of applying auxiliary reduction: (76)(a) What she is telling him is a military secret, (ambiguous) (b) What she's telling him's a military secret, (predicational only) F. It is possible to combine a predicational WH-cleft and a specificational cleft in one complex sentence: (77) Whatever it was that he got from her was expensive. This sentence combines the predicational WH-cleft What he got from her was expensive with the idea that the identity of the object in question is unknown (as expressed in What (ever) was it that he got from her?) Such sentences always require the use of whatever (rather than what): (78) *What it was that he got from her was expensive. (I cannot say whether the obligatory use of whatever is due to the fact that this construction needs stressing that the identity of the referent is unknown or to the fact that the construction must be distinguished from a similar type of construction, in which whatnot whatever) is used, but then as a question word (introducing a dependent question), not as a free relative: (79) What it was that he got from her is still a mystery.) Another type of complex sentence involving both predicational be and specificational be is the following: (80) Mary is what I will never be: attractive. Here part of the sentence corresponds to a specificational WH-cleft identifying a property: (81) What I will never be is: attractive. The (predicational) head clause then ascribes this property to Mary.

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G. A final note in connection with the observation that WH-clefts may have different meanings is that the number of ambiguous WH-clefts is actually not very high in everyday language. The reason is that selectional restrictions usually rule out all but one of the theoretically possible interpretations. Thus, (82,a) and (82,b) can only be read as specificational and predicational, respectively: (82)(a) What John is is angry with his father, (b) What John is is lucrative. The possible interpretations are determined by the selectional restrictions. One can say of someone that he is angry with someone, not that he is lucrative. Conversely, one can say of something (e.g. what John is, i.e. the profession he exercises) that it is lucrative, not that it is angry.

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4. FURTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SPECIFICATIONAL AND PREDICATIONAL SENTENCES. 4.1. Specificational and predicational sentences behave differently in various types of conjoined structures: A. When the predicate nominal consists of two predicational elements conjoined by and, the sentence will express that both descriptions are simultaneously applicable to the referent of the subject NP: (1 )(a) Lisa is a clever girl and a hard worker, (b) What Lisa is is a clever girl and a hard worker. If the two conjoined elements are specificational, the interpretation will be quite different. Since specification is tantamount to listing, the sentence will be understood as asserting that two values satisfy the variable. Thus, the specificational reading of (2) What I need is a car and a boat. is that I need two things, viz. a car and a boat. On the predicational interpretation the sentence means that I need an object that is simultaneously a car and a boat, i.e. a kind of amphibian.81-82 B. It follows that a predicational NP cannot be conjoined with a specificational NP, except zeugmatically (Halliday 1967: 71):83 (3)(a) *The murderer is Bill and very clever, (b) *Mary is the blonde one and also rather small.

81. The noncleft / need a car and a boat does not yield this reading. Its only possible interpretation is specificational. 82. Higgins (1976:7) notes that, on the predicational reading, the sentence What we saw in the park was a man and a woman means that the entity referred to by the WH-clause is a hermaphrodite (i.e. has the property of being both a man and a woman). 83. As noted above, specificational NPs can be conjoined with other specificational NPs, and predicational NPs can be conjoined with other predicational NPs. In the former case the only requirement is that no selectional restrictions should be violated (e.g. ^-1 drank tea and an apple); in the latter case the predicational elements must not belong to quite different semantic classes (e.g. 'Bill is disappointed and rather small for his age) (cf. Bald 1972: 40). 75

C. Because a specificational sentence gives an exhaustive list of the elements satisfying the variable, the copula be cannot be repeated before each of the elements listed in the focus. Thus, we can use (4,a), but not (4,b), as a specificational sentence: (4)(a) What I saw was a man and a horse, (b) What I saw was a man and was a horse. Sentence (4,b) is, however, perfectly grammatical on the predicational reading (asserting that what I saw was at the same time a man and a horse). Halvorsen (1978: 11) observes the same thing in connection with VPs: (5)(a) 'What John is doing is buying tickets and is selling cars. (b) What John is doing is buying tickets and selling cars. (c) What John is doing is dangerous and is damaging to his health. The repetition of is entails that (5,a) and (5,c) cannot be interpreted specificationally. Sentence (5,c) is interpreted predicationally, but (5,a), which yields no meaningful predicational interpretation either, is unacceptable. Sentence (5,b), in which is is not repeated, is impeccable as a specificational sentence. D. We have already noted that WH-clefts may be either specificational or predicational. Now, when two such sentences are co-ordinated, they must both be either specificational or predicational: (6)(a) What John is is dissatisfied/angry with Bill, (specificational) (b) What Fred is is rewarding/worth while, (predicational) (c) What John is is angry and what Fred is is dissatisfied, (specificational + specificational) (d) What John is is rewarding and what Fred is is worth while, (predicational + predicational) (e) *What John is is dissatisfied and what Fred is is worth while, (specificational + predicational) E. Gapping can occur in (6,d), but not in (6,c): (7)(a) What John is is rewarding and what Fred is worth while. (predicational + predicational) (b) *What John is is angry and what Fred is dissatisfied, (specificational + specificational) This means that, unlike predicational be, specificational be cannot be deleted.

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4.2. Specificational and predicational sentences differ with respect to negation: A. When not is added to a specificational sentence, it always expresses that the element in focus position is not the correct value (i.e. the value satisfying the variable): (8) It is not John who is the bank robber. In (8) the negation merely denies that John is 'the X who is the bank robber'; the existence of the variable itself is not denied.84 This means that the interpretation of (8) is something like Ί believe that (there is) someone (who) robbed the bank, but that person is not John'. Since it follows from this that someone else must be the bank robber, not is automatically taken to express contrastive negation: it is not John who... automatically suggests: but... Another consequence of this is that, in specificational sentences, no difference is felt to exist between sentence negation (wide scope) and focus negation (narrow scope). Since (9) It is not true that it is John who is the bank robber, entails (10) Hence it must be someone else who is the bank robber, there is no semantic difference between (9) and (11): (11) It is [not John] who is the bank robber (but someone else). The negation of a specificational sentence is therefore naturally felt to be constituent negation of the focus. B. In predicational sentences, not is not felt to be contrastive. Under neutral sentence intonation, the sentence John is not angry is an example of "ordinary neutral sentence-negation" (Pinkham & Hankamer 1975: 436), which is not possible in specificational sentences.85

84. This is, of course, because the variable is presupposed. 85. In Dutch, the negator niet ('not') normally precedes the focus of a specificational sentence but usually follows the property NP in a predicational sentence. Hence the English sentence The one who did it is not my friend (which can be read predicationally or specificationally) is likely to be disambiguated by the position of niet: (i)(a) Degene die het gedaan heeft is niet mijn vriendin. The one who did it is not my friend' (b) Degene die het gedaan heeft is mijn vriendin niet. The one who did it is my friend not' The normal readings of (i,a) and (i,b) are specificational and predicational, respectively.

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It is related to this that negators other than not (e.g. no, or incorporated negators like un-, im-, etc.) can occur in predicational sentences, but not in specificational ones: (12)(a) (b) (c) (d)

He is no hero. The idea is impossible to realize. Bill is dissatisfied. The suggestion is quite unfounded.

Negators of this kind cannot be substituted for not in specificational sentences, because they cannot be used for contrastive negation:86 (13)(a) What we need is not a HERO, (b) *What we need is no HERO. The difference between the contrastive negation of a specificational sentence and the 'straight' or 'neutral' negation of a predicational sentence is also apparent from the fact that the latter, but not the former, triggers the use of nonassertive items ('negative polarity items') in its scope. Compare: (14)(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

I think John has already finished. I don't think John has finished yet I think JOHN has already finished, not TOM. Ί don't think JOHN has finished yet, but TOM. I don't think JOHN has already finished, but TOM.

In the predicational sentence (14,b) the addition of not to the subclause entails the use of the nonassertive item yet.67 If we similarly add not to the subclause of (14,c), this does not result in the use of yet: as shown by the ungrammaticality of (14,d) and the grammaticality of (14,e), we must continue to use already. The reason is that in (14,c) (and hence also in (14,d) and (14,e)) already belongs to the presupposition ('the X who has already finished'), and that the presupposition is not affected by the contrastive negation in (14,d-e). What is negated in (14,d-e) is the assertion that the X who has already finished is John. This negation therefore cannot trigger the use of yet in the presupposition. (For the use of yet to be possible the presupposition itself would have to be negative (independently of the contrastive sentence negation), as

86. These negators can be used for contradicting a statement (e.g. He is a hero! -1 disagree. He is NO hero!) but this is not the same thing as contrastive negation (as in He is not a HERO but a COWARD). 87. Although not occurs in the head clause, its scope is the subclause, not the head clause. This is because not has been raised ('transferred') from the subclause into the head clause.

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in I (don't) think that JOHN has finished yet, where the presupposition is 'someone has not finished yet'.)88 4.3. The scope differences observed in connection with negation also appear in interrogative sentences. In a specificational question the point of the question is always whether the value expressed by the focal item is the correct value satisfying the variable: (15) Is JOHN the murderer?

This kind of questioning is again felt to be contrastive (= 'Is it John or someone else?') and therefore to have narrow scope. In predicational interrogative sentences the question is felt to have wide scope: Is John a murderer? is equivalent to 'Is it the case that John is a murderer?'. 4.4. There are a couple of observations to be made in connection with concord (subject-verb agreement). In specificational sentences the number of the copula can apparently be determined by that of either the superficial subject NP or the variable NP If the two coincide there is of course no problem: (16)(a) The aim of our policy is/*are improved relations with the Soviet Union. (b) What the book does not offer is/*are any solutions to the problems that are noted.

When the subject NP expresses the value and is plural in form (whereas the variable NP is singular in form), both a singular and a plural copula may often be found, but the singular is normally preferred: (17) Improved relations with the Soviet Union is/?are the aim of our policy.

When the subject NP does coincide with the variable NP but is a WH-clause (which does not signal number by itself), we still usually find is, but are is not quite impossible:89 88. In a simple sentence, where there is only one 'locus' for the negation, there cannot simultaneously be a negation in the presupposition and a contrastive negation. For that reason the sentence JOHN hasn't finished yet can only be understood as 'The one who hasn't finished yet is John'. The idea 'The one who hasn't finished yet is not John' cannot be expressed by a simple sentence. 89. Gundel (1977b: 547) adduces examples similar to (18,a-b) but notes that these sentences "are not equally acceptable for all speakers. In most cases, agreement with the left-hand NP is preferred."

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(18)(a) What we can't have here is/?are theft and robbery, (b) What I need is/ ?? are more books. When the variable NP occurs as predicate nominal, the number of the verb can more easily depend on that of the value NP: (19)(a) Theft and robbery is/are what I despise most, (b) More books is/?are what I need. In predicational sentences the situation is different. Here the number of the copula normally depends on that of the subject: (20) Good books are/*is a rarity these days. However, it is the predicate nominal that dictates the concord in sentences like (21) What you have bought are fake jewels. (Using is would enforce a specificational interpretation.) The reason why we use are is that WH-clauses like what you have bought may have singular or plural reference. Since the predicate nominal (which is singular or plural according to the reference) is the only other NP in the sentence, it is this NP that distinguishes between singular and plural. Thus, we have to use are and a plural predicate nominal if there is plural reference (as in (21)) and is and a singular predicate nominal if there is singular reference (as in (22)): (22) What you have bought is a fake jewel. When the predicational element is not an NP, the sentence cannot make clear whether the reference is singular or plural, and in that case is is used irrespective of the number of referents: (23) What you have bought is fake. The above observations account for the fact that the number of the copula may reveal whether a WH-cleft is to be interpreted specificationally or predicationally: (24)(a) (b) (25)(a) (b)

What you have bought is fake jewels, (specificational) What you have bought are fake jewels, (predicational) What she wants is expensive things, (specificational) What she wants are expensive things, (predicational)

4.5. No less complicated than the question of number is the question of the tense of the copula. In predicational sentences the copula may be in any tense, depending on the time that the property is (or was, will be, etc.) an attribute of the referent of the

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subject NR Thus, John is my friend expresses a present property of John, whereas John was my friend expresses a past one. This simple system is slightly complicated by the fact that some properties may be considered as permanent. Thus, it would seem that attributes like being a thief or being a murderer are commonly considered as permanent (as is clear from the saying Once a knave, always a knave) and that sentences like John was a murderer therefore make sense only if the referent of the subject NP is no longer alive. Still, sentences like the following seem all right: (26) Good books are/*is a rarity these days The reason why such sentences are possible is that the use of the tenses may be determined not only by the 'deictic centre' of the speaker making the utterance (i.e. the present hie et nunc of the speaker) but also by some other deictic centre chosen by the speaker. In (26) the speaker is thinking of the time when he didn't trust John and he takes this time as point of reference (deictic centre) for the tenses in his sentence (i.e. he uses the past tense to represent the situations referred to as simultaneous with that past point of reference.) (For more details about the possibility of selecting a 'secondary' deictic centre see Declerck 1987c.) In sum, in predicational sentences the tense of the copula depends on the relationship between the time at which the property is true of the referent and the chosen deictic centre (which is usually the moment of speech). In specificational sentences the tense of the copula may be determined by two different and independent systems: A. The first system is similar to that observed in connection with predicational sentences. That is, the tense depends on the relation between the chosen deictic centre and the time implied by the variable NR This system is clearest when the variable is expressed in the form of a clause, since the time implied by the variable then appears from the tense of the WH-clause: (27)(a) The one who murdered Smith was John. (b) It had been John who had been the first to leave. (c) The one who will win will be one of us. In each of these sentences the tense of the WH-clause representing the variable is determined by the usual rules governing the use of the tenses. The tense in question is then also selected for the copula. The WH-clause and the copula thus show the same tense. This is logical, since the function of the copular clause is merely to fill in the contents of the variable NR This means that the WH-clause and the copular clause cannot refer to different times. Two things should be noted here. First, the system is exactly the same when the variable NP contains no WH-clause. In that case the variable NP still implies a particular time reference and is still paraphrasable in terms of a WH-clause. The 81

tense of be again depends on this time reference (which is reflected in the tense of the paraphrase). For example, in the pattern Smith's murderer +be + John, be will become was, will be, etc. according as Smith's murderer is read as 'the one who murdered Smith', or 'the one who will murder Smith', etc. The second remark is that, when the variable is expressed in the form of a WH-clause, the rule that the tense of the copula must agree with that of the WH-clause is often obscured by the fact that 'tense simplification' is then often possible and sometimes even more or less obligatory.90 Compare: (28)(a) The one who had murdered Smith was/??had been John. (b) John had been the one who murdered/ had murdered Smith. (c) John was/?had been the??one who had murdered Smith. (29)(a) The one who will win is/ will be Fred. (b) Fred will be the one who wins/ ? will win. (30)(a) ??lt will be Fred who will win. (b) It is Fred who will win. (c) It will be Fred who wins. Even when the variable is not a WH-clause, tense simplification may occur in the copula if the relevant tense is already present in the preceding discourse: (31) Smith had been killed, and the murderer was/?had been John. In sum, in this first system the tense of the copula can in principle be any of the tenses that can be accounted for in terms of reference points and temporal relations, but because of the rule of tense simplification the copula is in most cases either is/are or was/were.91 (Perhaps it is worth stressing that tense simplification does not take place in predicational sentences, for the obvious reason that it would change the time when the property is said to hold of the referent. There is a clear difference of meaning between the following (a) and (b) sentences: (32)(a) (b) (33)(a) (b)

The one The one The one The one

who will win will be happy. who will win is happy. who had won had been happy. who had won was happy.)

B. The second tense system which the speaker using a specificational sentence can choose is that in which the tense of the copula is neutralized. In this system, the copula is always in the present tense: 90. This is basically the same kind of tense simplification as is observed in conditional clauses and adverbial time clauses. (See Comrie 1985.) 91. Higgins' (1976:199) claim that the tense of the copula in a (specificational) WH-cleft can only be a present or past tense is therefore an overstatement.

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(34)(a) (b) (c) (d)

It is John who killed Smith. The culprit is you. The reason he did it is that he is a coward. What he would not say is when it will happen.

The reason that 'tense neutralization' is possible in specificational sentences (but not in predicational ones) is that the specificational relationship is by nature timeless (cf. Bolinger 1972a: 101, Givon 1973: 117, Bhat 1975: 39). That is, if X is the correct value for a variable Υ at a particular time, it remains so for ever, unless the variable changes. If John is the man who murdered Smith in 1982, he will be Smith's murderer for ever. But if Bill is the winner of the Grand National in 1982, he is not necessarily the winner of the Grand National in any other year. That is, the variable 'the winner of the Grand National' is a variable that is satisfied by different values at different times. It follows that, although (35,a) expresses a timeless relation, (35,b) does not: (35)(a) X is the winner of the Grand National in year Υ (b) X is the winner of the Grand National Hence, tense neutralization can take place in sentences of the type (35,a), but not in those of the type (35,b): (36)(a) Bill was/is the winner of the Grand National of 1982. (b) Bill was the winner of the Grand National. If tense neutralization does take place in (36,b), the reference will automatically be taken to be to the latest Grand National. The above observations explain why tense neutralization can take place only if there is 'present relevance', i.e. if the past act of specification is still felt to be relevant. The following sentences further illustrate this: (37)(a) It was/is?? John who murdered Smith. (b) It was/ is John that I needed/feared most. As explained above, the one who murdered Smith continues to be thought of as 'the one who is the murderer of Smith'. But what I needed most or feared most at some time in the past is unlikely to be that relevant to the present. Hence the implausibility of tense neutralization in (37,b). Similar examples are: (38)(a) That (= what I have just explained) was/ ?? is why she was angry. (b) That (= what you see over there) is/??was what they were looking for. In (38,b), where that indicates what the speaker is pointing at, the sense of present relevance is so great that the use of the neutralized present becomes almost

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obligatory.

Apart from the above restriction, there are some other factors that may help to determine whether or not the use of a neutralized present is acceptable. For example, when not only the variable but also the value is a clause in a non-present tense, the copula linking the two clauses cannot be in the present tense: (39)(a) What he said was/?*is that he was ill. (b) What she asked was/*is whether there would be any time for questions. (It should be noted that the tense of the postcopular form is determined by that of the Wh-clause (by the 'sequence of tenses' rule). The occurrence of is between the two clauses is apparently felt to disturb this system.) When only one of the NPs is a clause, tense neutralization is easier when the clause follows be than when it precedes the copula: (40)(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

It is/was Tom who killed Fred. Tom is/was the one who killed? Fred. The one who killed Fred was/ is Tom. Tom was/is Smith's murderer. Smith's murderer was/?is Tom.

In some cases there are elements in the context that entail that is is interpreted, not as a neutralized tense, but as referring to present time: (41 )(a) It was, in my opinion, John who murdered Smith, (b) It is, in my opinion, John who murdered Smith. The addition of in my opinion entails that (41,a-b) may be interpreted in different ways. While (41,b) suggests that the speaker now thinks that John murdered Smith, (41,a) may be used to suggest that the speaker thought so at the time but has now changed his opinion. On this interpretation the act of specification is explicitly connected with the past (rather than being interpreted as timeless), so that tense neutralization is impossible. Another factor that can more or less rule out the use of a neutralized present has to do with whether or not there is a referent that is no longer alive. If there is, the past tense will normally be used: (42) The man who founded this church was/?*is Henry VIII. But this factor may be overruled by that of present relevance:

(43) SHAKESPEARE is the author of Hamlet. Another restriction is to be observed in specificational WH-clefts whose focus is a predicational element. Compare:

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(44)(a) (b) (45)(a) (b)

What John was was/*is happy.92 It was/is happy that John was. What he wanted to become was/*is a teacher. It was/is a teacher that he wanted to become.

I have no explanation for the unacceptability of is in the WH-clefts. (That is is not ruled out in the (b) sentences must again have to do with the fact that it precedes the WH-clause.) To sum up this section: in predicational sentences the tense is determined by the time when the property is felt to hold of the referent of the subject NP; in specificational sentences it either depends on the tense (or time) of the variable NP (though tense simplification may blur this tense harmony) or it is neutralized. In the wake of this discussion of tense we can say something about the auxiliary used to. Higgins (1976:151) claims that used to be can replace was in predicational sentences, but not in specificational ones. This appears to be correct for sentences like (46) The murderer of Tom was/*used to be John, but not for examples like the following:

(47)(a) The colour that she preferred used to be blue, (b) The one who did most of the work used to be John. Sentences like these show that used to be can occur in specificational sentences if the variable NP is such that different values can be assigned to it at different times, as in (47,a-b), nut not if only one value can be assigned to it at any time, (as in (46)). In other words, the reason that used to be is out in (46) is that the meaning of used to (which is 'discontinued habit' - cf. Comrie 1976) is incompatible with the timeless nature of the specificational relation. However, (47,a-b) show that not all specificational sentences express such a timeless relation, so that the (im)possibih'ty of using used to be is not a reliable test for establishing whether a sentence is predicational or specificational. 4.6. Indefinite pronouns and determiners can occur freely in predicational sentences, but some of them are excluded from the focus position of specificational sentences. This is a restriction which has been noted for ft-clefts,93 but actually holds for all types of specificational sentences. We can distinguish the following cases:

92. This type of sentence has a low degree of acceptability, for reasons that have nothing to do with the choice of tense. See chapter 4 for a full discussion. 93. Gundel (1977a: 127) notes this for many and few; Lees (1963: 2) notes it for no, every and neither; Schachter (1973:28-29) mentions the restriction in connection with somebody, anybody, everyone and nothing; Seuren (1985: 297) notes it in connection with many, few and most. 85

A. The focus cannot be one of the negative pronouns nothing, nobody no one (nor not + anything/anybody/anyone): (48)(a) (b) (c) (d)

*What happened was NOTHING. *lt was NO ONE who came in. (I know the ring was found.) *lt was found by NOBODY. *lt was NOT ANYTHING that he told me.

(Note that (48,a) and, to a minor extent, (48,c) are acceptable on a predicational reading.) The reason why (48,a-d) are unacceptable as specificational sentences is rather obvious: they make an assertion that is incompatible with the presupposition of the variable. For example, (48,b) presupposes that someone came in and asserts that no one came in. This semantic contradiction of course renders the sentence unacceptable. What is possible, though, is that a sentence with nothing, etc. is used to contradict the presupposition: (49)(a) What happened? - NOTHING happened, (b) Who was it who called up? - NO ONE called up. As noted before, clefts cannot be used in this way: (50)(a) What happened? - "What happened was NOTHING. (b) Who was it who called up? - *lt was NO ONE who called up. B. Universal determiners (every, any, all, etc.) and universal pronouns (everybody, anything, all, etc.) do not normally occur in focus position: (51 )(a) (b) (c) (d)

*lt was every/any mistake that we corrected. *What we saw was everything/anything. *lt was anything that we got from them. *What I want is all.

Sentences like these are unacceptable because the universal quantifiers are what Collinson (1937: 25) calls 'exhaustive indicaters'. That is, they refer to a set in its totality, without excluding any item or subset of it. This is incompatible with the requirement that the focus of a specificational sentence should be exclusive and contrastive, i.e. that there should be a contrast between the candidate(s) selected as value and the other candidates) in the set satisfying the referring description. It is in keeping with this that the use of a universal determiner does not produce unacceptability when it does not rule out a contrastive interpretation: (52)(a) What we want to save is all the buildings that were built between 1800 and 1850. (b) What John stepped on was every bee in the hive. (Halvorsen 1978:82)

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In (52,a) the buildings that were built between 1800 and 1850 contrasts with all the buildings that were built at some other time; in (52,b) every bee in the hive can contrast with all the bees outside the hive. Specificational sentences with every, etc. in the focus can also be used to contradict an assertion, presupposition, or implication. (We have noted the same thing in connection with nothing, nobody, etc.) (53) Which of them was here? - EVERY ONE of them was here! Again, cleft sentences cannot be used in this way: (54) Which of them was here? - *lt was EVERY ONE of them that was here!

C. Although indefinite determiners like some, several, a few, a couple of can occur in the focus of a Specificational sentence, it has been claimed that indefinite determiners like much, few, many, most are excluded there. Thus, Gundel (1977a: 127) notes that (55,a-b) are ungrammatical: (55)(a) *lt was few people that voted for George, (b) *lt was many blackbirds that were in the pie. Seuren (1985: 297) gives the following example: (56) What Henry sold was a postcard/a few postcards/'few postcards/*many postcards/*most postcards. He also notes that the use of the indefinites in (56) is exactly the same as in the question-answer pair (57,a) and as in (57,b): (57)(a) What did Henry sell ? - A postcard/a few postcards/*few postcards/*many postcards/*most postcards, (b) Henry sold a POSTCARD/a few POSTCARDS/*few POSTCARDS/*many POSTCARDS/*most POSTCARDS.

The possibility of using a focus NP with a, some, a few, a couple of, a little can be explained from the fact that the answer to a WH-question may be 'evasive' or 'reticent', i.e. it may be information which is not fully identifying but which at least lifts a tip of the veil. The same is possible in Specificational sentences. Sentences like (58)(a) What Henry sold was a POSTCARD/some POSTCARDS. (b) The one who did it was a MAN.

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specify a value which is perhaps not as identifying as it could have been - this is especially clear in (58,b) - but which is nonetheless offered as if it were identifying. It should be noted that in such sentences the nuclear accent is entirely on the noun head. The determiner (a, some, etc.) is not heavily accented at all. In my opinion, determiners like a few many, much can be used similarly, but it is very difficult to find contexts in which they seem good, because they have a semantic import that determiners like a, a few some, several, etc. do not have. In sentences such as (58,a-b) the latter determiners have no clear lexical meaning. A is just the indefinite article which for syntactic reasons is required before a singular count noun, a little and some can be used in an article-like function before mass nouns, and the other determiners (a couple of, a few several) (and also some) are used as the plural counterparts of a. None of these determiners has a particular semantic import, and this is in keeping with the fact that they are very weakly accented. By contrast, the determiners few many, much and most do add an aspect of meaning since they not only refer to an indefinite quantity but also specify that this quantity is a small or large one. As a result the use of such a determiner in the focus NP of a specificational sentence will require that the determiner participates in the contrast!ve meaning of this focus. That is, if the focus is e.g. few postcards (as in (56)-(57)), there must not only be a contrast between postcards and something (or anything) else but also between the idea of 'few' and its opposite. This is not the case in the examples (56)-(57), where the use of few many and most is consequently unacceptable, but the requirement is satisfied in the following examples: (59)(a) Henry didn't sell much. - That's not true. He sold few postcards, but he sold plenty of pencils. (b) The children have eaten a lot. - Not really. They have eaten many apples but they haven't eaten much bread. (c) Let's buy a lot of cheap instruments. - No. I think that what we should buy is not a lot of cheap instruments, but a couple of really good ones. In some cases, however, viz. when the specificational sentence serves to explicitly reject a particular value, the quantifier need not be contrastive: (60) We need a lot of money to do all this. - Well, I think it is a lot of courage and a lot of enthusiasm, rather than a lot of money, that we need to realize this project. If everybody will co-operate and do his utmost, we will not necessarily need a lot of money. In cases like this the determiner is again unaccented, whereas it is not in (59,a-c). The above observations make clear that determiners \\ktfew, many, etc. are not necessarily unacceptable in the focus of a specificational sentence. Under particular conditions they may be perfectly all right.

D. When (a) few (a) little, much, etc. are used as pronouns rather than as determiners, they are not acceptable in the focus of a cleft: (61 )(a) *What I need is much/a little/a lot. (b) *lt is many/a few/few that know that. Noncleft sentences like (62)(a) They spend LITTLE, (b) They eat A LOT. are grammatical, but I do not think they are specificational. They do not tell us what is spent or eaten, but rather how much. And for some reason the variable of a specificational sentence cannot merely indicate quantity: (63)(a) *How much we need is SIXTEEN. (b) *lt is SIXTEEN that we need. (c) *We need SIXTEEN. These can be compared with (64)(a) What we need is SIXTEEN POUNDS. (b) It is SIXTEEN POUNDS that we need. (c) We need SIXTEEN POUNDS. Sentences like these show that the focus of a specificational sentence can be an NP with a quantifier as determiner, but it cannot be an unmodified quantifier pronoun.94 This means that it is not possible for the focus to indicate no more than quantity. That is, the value specified for a variable like 'the X that I need' must necessarily indicate what it is that I need, and may in addition say how much ofthat is necessary. But indicating quantity without indicating the substance that it applies to is not possible. E. The final set of indefinite words that we must consider consists of the pronouns some, somebody, something and someone. None of these can occur as the focal item of a specificational sentence: (65)(a) *lt was SOMEBODY/SOMEONE that came in. (b) *We bought SOME. (c) 'What I need is SOMETHING.

94. A sentence like What we need is THOSE THREE is all right because it is also acceptable when three is deleted. Equally acceptable are sentences in which the quantifier is accompanied by a restrictive relative clause or prepositional phrase: What I need is the three (that are) in the cupboard, not the three (that are) in the drawer; What I need is three of these pencils.

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The reason for the unacceptability of such sentences is obvious: the focal item is totally uninformative. What is asserted is exactly the same thing as is already presupposed. Thus, (65,a) both presupposes and asserts that someone came in. It goes without saying that such sentences violate Grice's Maxim of Quantity and are therefore pragmatically unacceptable. 4.7. When the linking verb of a copular sentence is not be, the postcopular element is always predicational. This has often been noted in connection with become (see e.g. Geach 1968: 35, Fodor 1976: 119-120, 209, Higgins 1976: 150-151) but is actually true of virtually any verb that can occur in copular function. (Turn into is the only exception that I am aware of - see below (esp. footnote 95).) Thus, every one of the following sentences has a predicational NP after the copula: (66)(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

At first he had no job but later he became a teacher. Atoms for peace could turn killer. (Bald 1972:95) The man proved a coward. We want to keep friends. She seems a courageous woman.

It follows that elements that cannot be used predicationally cannot follow these copulas: (67)(a) 'After the kiss the frog became Prince Edward.95 (b) The shadow proved Bill. According to Higgins (who deals with WH-clefts only) a WH-cleft also automatically becomes predicational if we add to it a verb or adjective that produces raising (e.g. tend to, begin to, seem to, sure to, unlikely to\ a modal verb, or a sentential adverb (Higgins 1976:195,204-205,226). The following examples are adduced to illustrate this: (68)(a) Betsy believes that what Bill is is tall, (specificational) (b) 'What Bill is is believed by Betsy to be tall, (nonsensical predicational reading only) (69)(a) What John is tends to be boring, (predicational only) (b) What he is pointing at seems to be a kangaroo, (id.) (70)(a) 'What John is may be rich, (nonsensical predicational reading only) (b) *What he doesn't know is possibly that anyone tried to bribe them. On the other hand, Halvorsen (1978: 34) argues that the following WH-clefts (in which raising has applied) are fine on a specificational reading: 95. This sentence is all right if we use turned into instead of became: (i) After the kiss the frog turned into Prince Edward.

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(71 )(a) What John wants seems to be never to be left alone, (b) We believe what John wants to be never to be left alone. However this may be, noncleft specificational sentences certainly do not become predicational when we add a sentential adverb or modal verb: (72)(a) The murderer could be JOHN. (b) What they need is perhaps a HAMMER. These sentences are specificational, and they would not seem to be unacceptable. The acceptability is, however, more doubtful when raising has applied: (73)(a) ?The murderer is unlikely to be JOHN, (b) ?The murderer seems to be JOHN. On the whole, sentences in which be combines with some other verb or adverb are harder to judge than sentences in which another copula is used. In the latter case the postcopular NP is clearly predicational; in the former type of sentence this may or may not be the case, and judgements are often hard to make. 4.8. According to several linguists a predicational sentence typically denotes class-inclusion, i.e. "expresses the relation of class membership" (Halliday 1970: 154). Thus, Jespersen (1962: 176) claims that "He is a rascal means 'he is one of the class of rascals'" (see also Jespersen 1961: 390). Gundel (1977a: 130) argues that She was my friend means that "the NP she is asserted to have been included among a set of friends"; and according to Halliday (1970:154) Marguerite is a poet can be paraphrased as 'Marguerite belongs to the class of poets'. According to this claim the subject and the predicate nominal show a different degree of specificity: the predicate nominal is more general than the subject NP In the opinion of Blom & Daalder (1977), this claim even represents the essence of the definition of 'predicational sentence': a sentence is predicational if it classifies the referent of the subject NP in a larger category, indicated by the predicate nominal. That is, in a predicational sentence the subject is a 'hyponym' of what is denoted by the predicate nominal (which is the 'hyperonym' or'superordinate').96 Thus, in His mistake was understandable, the NP his mistake is the hyponym and understandable is the superordinate. This means that his mistake represents a more specific concept, whose meaning is included in the meaning of the larger concept '(what is) understandable'. 96. The terms 'hyponym' and 'superordinate' were introduced by Lyons (1963: 68-71; 1968: 453-460; 1977: 291-301). According to Lyons, a word is a 'hyponym' of another if the concept denoted by the former is included in the concept denoted by the latter (the 'superordinate'). For example, tulip is a hyponym of flower. Blom & Daalder (1977) extend these definitions a little: they apply the terms not only to words but to linguistic expressions in general (p.70).

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In my opinion, this theory raises insurmountable problems. I agree that predicational sentences with an indefinite NP as subject complement often express class-inclusion (e.g. John is an American), but there are subtypes of predicational sentences where no idea of class-inclusion (or class-membership) appears to be present: a. We have already noted that definite NPs can sometimes be used predicationally (cf. section 3.2.). In that case the predicational sentence does not express class-inclusion: (74)(a) Bill is the acme of courtesy. (b) Reagan is (the) President of the U.S.A. (c) John is the best musician in town. b. Even when the subject complement is an indefinite NP, it does not always denote a larger class in which the referent of the subject is included: (75) Bill is someone who is wise enough to know that his marriage to Mary would be in danger if he went about with another girl. The (rather complex) subject complement here does not imply (or implicate) 'exclusiveness', i.e. does not suggest that the description (someone who is wise enough to...) is applicable to other people besides Bill.97 There are similar problems in connection with another claim made by Blom & Daalder (1977), viz. that the essence of a specificational sentence is just the reverse of what is (claimed to be) expressed in a predicational sentence. According to Blom & Daalder, a specificational sentence by definition has a subject acting as 'superordinate' (more general concept or class), whereas the subject complement functions as 'hyponym'. Thus, they claim that in (76) His mistake was that he let himself be easily intimidated. his mistake is the superordinate and the thai-clause is the hyponym. However, this theory again raises serious questions. It is not clear to me in what sense his mistake in (76) is more general than the /Aa/-clause specified as value. As stressed by Higgins (1976), the essence of the specificational relation expressed in a sentence like (76) is that the contents of a concept (in this case his mistake) are specified. But this naturally means that the NP denoting the concept and the NP specifying its contents

97. As noted before, Hawkins (1978) claims that exclusiveness is an inherent part of the meaning of the indefinite article, but Declerck (1987a) argues that exclusiveness is no more than conversationally implicated by the use ofa(n), and can therefore be cancelled by the context or by the meaning of the rest of the sentence.

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cannot differ in generality or specificity.98 Moreover, the claim that, in a specificational sentence, the subject is the superordinate and the subject complement the hyponym, whereas it is the other way round in a predicational sentence, leads to the conclusion that a specificational sentence must automatically become predicational when it is reversed (i.e. when the subject becomes subject complement and vice versa). This runs counter to everything we have argued in section 2.11. In sum, it does not appear to be possible to define predicational and specificational sentences on the basis of a hyponymy relation or in terms of greater or smaller specificity or generality of the NPs. The only claims that seem warranted are the following: a. Predicational copular sentences with an indefinite subject complement mostly express class membership (in which case the concept denoted by the subject complement is more general than that denoted by the subject). b. Specificational sentences do not express a hyponymy relation. There is no difference in generality between the variable NP and the value NR99 4.9. In section 3.2. we saw that a predicational NP is always non-referring, irrespective of whether it is definite or indefinite. However, I may draw attention to an exceptional type of NP, which is at the same time referring and predicational. Consider: (77)(a) Let's ask John for advice. - By God, no! I won't have that idiot meddling in my affairs, (b) Have you heard of Bill ? The idiot has divorced his wife.

98. Halliday (1967, 1968) argues that the two NPs of a specificational copular sentence have the same degree of specificity, and that this is precisely the reason why such sentences are reversible. Blom & Daalder's theory is also incompatible with Givon's (1973: 119) claim that it is a universal restriction that "a predicate may never be less general than its subject". 99. It is worth noting, though, that the variable NP may include an expression that is a superordinate with respect to the value NP, but not vice versa: (i)(a) The flowers they gave me were TULIPS, (b) 'The tulips they gave me were FLOWERS. Sentence (i,b) is unacceptable because it fails to give any identifying information: sinee flower is a superordinate of tulip, what is specified as value is information which is already present in the variable the tulips they gave me'. (That is, we here encounter the same problem as we met in connection with *It was somebody who came in, which is also unacceptable because what is asserted is already presupposed.)

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In these examples the NP that/the idiot is used both to refer to someone and to predicate a property of him.100 The NP is therefore paraphrasable as 'He (or: that one), who is an idiot'. However, the fact that the NP thus contains predicational information does not mean that it can be used as a predicational NP This is prevented by the fact that the NP is also referring. Thus, the following are interpreted specificationally, not predicationally: (78)(a) The one who did it is the/that idiot, (b) The murderer is the/that idiot.

100. Declerck (1979) points out that in some cases the property is not simply assigned to the referent but also functions as an evaluation of the assertion that is made in connection with that referent. Thus, the idiot in (77,b) says not only that Bill is an idiot, but also (and perhaps even primarily) that it was idiotic of him to divorce his wife. (This double claim is the same as is made in Bill is an idiot to divorce his wife. See Declerck (1979) for an analysis of such sentences.) 94

5. DESCRIPTIONALLY-IDENTIFYING SENTENCES Although the vast majority of copular sentences are either specificational or predicational, there are some minor sentence types which do not fit in either of these categories. One such sentence type is that which Higgins (1976) calls 'identificational'. It is exemplified by sentences like the following:

(1 )(a) Who's that man? - That man is John's brother, (b) Mike? Who's Mike? - Mike is my brother. Higgins calls such sentences 'identificationaP because they clearly ask for, or provide, identifying information. However, we have observed that specificational sentences (like Who's the bank robber? - It's John Thomas) are also concerned with identifying information and I therefore think that using the term 'identificationaP for nonspecificational sentences such as (l,a-b) is somewhat misleading. Because of that, I will use a different term, viz. 'descriptionallyidentifying', which corresponds exactly with the function that such sentences have. The following paragraphs should make this clear. Unlike specificational sentences, sentences like (l,a-b) are not meant to specify a value for a variable. Rather, the specification seems to have happened in advance, so that the subject NPs are now fully referential: descriptions like that man and Mike are normally sufficient to pick out a person from a group. In other words, identification has already happened in the sense that a value has been specified for a variable. However, identification may require more than this. The assignment of a value to the variable will result in full identification only if the description (which is specified as value) can be associated by the hearer with a particular entity, i.e. if the description belongs to the "backing of descriptions"101 that the hearer has of the entity referred to. Thus, descriptions like that man or Mike will not lead to full identification if the hearer knows no further descriptions of the person referred to, i.e. if he does not recognize the description in question as typical of a particular person he knows. Thus, on being told The murderer is that man over there, the hearer can pick out the person in question from a group that is being shown to him 101. The term 'backing of descriptions' is borrowed from Strawson (1959:20), who claims that "it is no good using a name for a particular unless one knows who or what is referred to by the use of the name. A name is worthless without a backing of descriptions which can be produced on demand to explain the application". (The resulting theory, viz. that the reference of a name is necessarily determined by some cluster of descriptions is criticized by Kripke (1972) and Donnellan (1972). This criticism, however, is immaterial to the use I will be making of the term 'backing of descriptions'.)

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but he may unable to recognize the person as somebody he knows, i.e. of whom he has a 'backing of descriptions'. In that case the specificational sentence fails to create full identification and the hearer is likely to ask Who is that man ?, thus asking for a 'descriptionally-identifying' sentence like That man is John's brother. In this sentence the speaker does not specify a value for a variable but adds a description (John's brother) as further identifying information. If this description belongs to the backing of descriptions which the hearer has of a particular person, fuller identification will have been achieved. The above observations lead to the following generalizations: A. There is 'full' identification only if two requirements are simultaneously satisfied: (a) the relevant entity can be 'indicated' (in the sense of 'picked out from a set') by a deictic expression like that one, the girl over there, the man in the middle, etc.; and (b) we can give the name of the entity in question or a description which distinguishes it from all other entities. B. This means that identifying information is either a deictic expression (what Collinson (1937) calls an 'indicated) or a name or what I will call a 'description'.102 A description is an expression describing a property and is therefore the only one of these three types of NP that can also be used predicationally.103 C. All three types of identifying NPs can occur as the value of a specificational sentence: (2)(a) Who did that? - It was that man over there. (b) Who did that?-It was John. (c) Who did that? - It was a friend of mine. D. Since full identification means that the referent can be both 'indicated' and named or described, the use of any one of these three expressions does not necessarily lead to full identification. When the identifying expression used is an indicater, the hearer is enabled to pick out the referent from a set, but it is possible

102. I am not using the term 'description' here in the way the term 'referring description' is used in the philosophical literature. Deictic expressions and proper names are normally also treated as referring expressions there. 103, A proper name is not a description in this sense. As pointed out by Christophersen (1939: 59), "proper names differ from appellatives in having no conceptual content. They merely indicate an object without implying a description of it. (...) Proper names are like the numbers assigned to convicts; no matter how much alike are two convicts, they are never given the same number. The number only identifies, but does not describe the person to whom it belongs, and the function of a proper name is exactly similar."

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that the entity in question does not mean anything to him (i.e. he does not 'know' the referent, he can provide neither his name nor any description applying to him). Conversely, when the identifying expression is a 'non-indicater' (i.e. a name or description), the hearer may still be unable to 'indicate' the referent. In both cases the hearer will have to ask for the missing identifying information. For example:

(3)A. B. A. B.

Who won the first prize ? John did. Who's John? John is that man over there.

In this example speaker A first provides a non-indicater (John) as identifying information. When this appears not to be sufficiently identifying for B, A has to add an indicater (that man over there). In the following example the two pieces of identifying information are given in the reverse order:

(4)A. B. A. B.

Who won the first prize ? That man over there. Who is he? He is the son of Judge Harris.

E. Whichever type of expression is provided first, the first answer to a question asking for identifying information is normally specificational. This is clearly the case in the above two examples, where the first answer of B can each time be replaced by an it-cleft sentence (viz. // is that man over there (who won the first prize) and It is John (who won the first prize)). F. The nature of the second answer of B (i.e. the sentence giving the supplementary identifying information) depends on which information is being provided. In (3), B's second answer can again be interpreted specificationally (and can therefore be replaced by the i'/-cleft It is that man over there who is (called) John. In (4), on the other hand, B's second answer is not specificational but descriptionally-identifying. For that reason it cannot be replaced by an it-cleft ("It is the son of Judge Harris that is that man over there). The reason for this difference between (3) and (4) is that a sentence can only be descriptionally-identifying if the identifying NP is a description, not if it is an indicater or a proper name. B's second sentence is therefore descriptionally-identifying in (4), but not in (3), and neither in (5):

(5)A. B. A. B. A. B.

Who won the first prize ? That man over there. Who's that man ? Why, don't you recognize him? It's John! John? Who's John? Don't tell me you don't know who John is. He is the fellow who sat beside you at the annual dinner party of the club. 97

B's first and second replies are specificational; the third is descriptionallyidentifying. G. Examples like these show clearly that, if the hearer has neither of the two elements of full identification, we can use a specificational sentence, but not a descriptionally-identifying one, to give him one of these elements. A descriptionally-identifying sentence can only be used to provide the second element (with the additional condition that the element in question must be a description, not a name or indicater). In a sense, a descriptionally-identifying sentence is thus a secondary type of identifying sentence. It will be recurred to only if the specification of a value for the variable has failed to be fully identifying. This does not mean that the act of specification must have been overtly expressed in the form of a specificational sentence preceding the descriptionally-identifying one. The mere use of an indicater pr proper name in the preceding context is sufficient, because these imply that the variable has been assigned a value. For example: (6)A. John may be coming tonight. B. John? Who's John?

A's sentence need not be specificational (i.e. it need not be pronounced with the nuclear accent on John}. But even if it is predicational, it asserts that someone may be coming tonight and identifies that someone as John. Although the sentence (on this predicational interpretation) does not serve to specify a value for a presupposed variable,104 it is clear that this specification is implicitly made. B's question asking for further identifying information can therefore be answered by a descriptionallyidentifying sentence (e.g. John is my uncle). H. The three kinds of identifying expressions (viz. indicaters (deictic expressions), names and descriptions) correspond with three levels of identification. When someone is said to know the identity of some entity, this means that he can refer to that entity by using an indicater, a name or/and a description. The entity in question is then 'identifiable by indication', 'identifiable by naming' or/and 'identifiable by describing'. Although any of these three possibilities can be realized on its own (without either of the others being realized), there does appear to be some kind of gradation. If one can provide (or understand, i.e. recognize) descriptions applying to the entity, then one usually also knows its name. And if one knows its name, one is usually also able to 'indicate' it, i.e. pick it out from a set. If one can only indicate the entity (without knowing its name or any description applying to it), the knowledge that one has of the entity's identity is still very 'elementary'. That knowledge is

104. This is precisely the difference between the predicational use and the specificational one: the former asserts, whereas the latter presupposes, that someone may be coming tonight.

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richer if it also includes the name, but is maximal only if one is also familiar with the descriptions (at least the most relevant ones) applying to the entity. What has just been referred to as 'knowledge of the identity of an entity' is called 'acquaintance' by Higgins (1976). The way in which this term is defined is quite in keeping with our above remark in connection with 'degrees of knowledge': we say that a person is 'acquainted' with some entity if he is at least capable of using an indicater (deictic expression) to refer to that entity, i.e. to pick it out from a set: The use of a Deictic phrase implies that the user has the object referred to before him in some very direct sense. I will say that if one is in a position to say this χ or thai x, then one is Acquainted with the x, or that one has Acquaintance with it. This (...) notion of Acquaintance (...) does not presuppose any knowledge about the object but merely a hie et nunc confrontation (...). I shall say that a proper name is used with Acquaintance if one knows who or what bears the name to an extent that would allow one to use the name as an alternative to a Deictic phrase accompanied by a pointing gesture if the bearer of the name was present and one was in a position to recognize him, her, or it. (Higgins 1976: 137)

The preceding pages have given a definition of descriptionally-identifying sentences and have made clear what is the relationship of such sentences to specificational sentences, which are also identifying. (In what follows I will sometimes use the term specificationally-identifying instead of specificational when the sentences in question are compared with descriptionally-identifying sentences.) We are now in a position to go somewhat more fully into the characteristics of descriptionally-identifying sentences. Especially the way in which they differ from specificationally-identifying sentences is worth examining.

5.1. Descriptionally-identifying sentences lack the most salient characteristics of specificational sentences. This is immediately clear when we consider a simple example like the following: (7)A. Who's that fellow? B. He's a friend of mine. Sentence (7,B) lacks the following properties that are typical of specificational sentences: a. It is not paraphrasable as The following person is that fellow: a friend of mine. b. It cannot be replaced by an //-cleft (witness the ungrammaticality of *// is a friend of mine who is that fellow).

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c. It cannot be used in answer to an interrogative cleft. The question Who is it who is that man ? (which is not a very acceptable sentence) will not be answered by a descriptionally-identifying sentence like He is a friend of mine but rather by a specificationally-identifying one like // is a friend of mine. (See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the difference between It is a friend of mine and He is a friend of mine.) d. Sentence (7,B) is not felt to specify a value for a presupposed variable. The typical aspects of meaning following from the act of specification (viz. contrastiveness and exhaustiveness) are therefore absent. The description a friend of mine is not felt to contrast with all the other possible descriptions, and does not exclude any one of these. Rather, the description is just one of the descriptions that are applicable to the person in question, and it is perfectly possible to add others: (8) (Who's that man?) - He is a relative of John's and a friend of mine. As we have seen, similar sentences are unacceptable if they are specificational: (9) (Who is Smith's murderer?) - *ltis a relative of John's and a friend of mine. e. Sentence (7,B) is not reversible: (10) (Who's that man ?) - *A friend of mine is he/him/that man. Although it is true that next to (1 l,a) there is the possibility of saying (1 l,b), we cannot conclude that (1 l,a) is reversible. (11 )(a) (Who's Bill Smith ?) - Bill Smith is a friend of mine, (b) (Who's Bill Smith?) - A FRIEND OF MINE is Bill Smith. Whereas (11,a) is descriptionally-identifying, (ll,b) is specificational. That is, the question Who's Bill Smith? in (ll,b) is interpreted as 'Who is it that is (called) Bill Smith?', and (ll,b) (or its inverted equivalent Bill smith is a FRIEND OF MINE} is a (rather reticent) specificational answer to this question. In (1 l,a), on the other hand, the question is interpreted as Tell me something more about that fellow called Bill Smith', and the answer is descriptionallyidentifying. The difference between these two answers is brought out further by the fact that, if we use a pronoun instead of repeating the name Bill Smith, we will substitute He is a friend of mine for (1 l,a) and It is a friend of mine for (1 l,b), but not vice versa. (See also Chapter 2.)

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5.2. Descriptionally-identifying sentences do not normally answer questions that use which or which one instead of who. The reason is that which (one) is typically used for picking out an entity from a set and is therefore normally used in questions asking for specificationally-identifying information.105 5.3. Both specificationally-identifying sentences and descriptionally-identifying ones can answer questions of the (superficial) form ' Who is NP?'. Apart from the fact that clefting is only possible in the former case, the two sentence types differ in that the underlying order of the constituents in the question is different. Whe have seen that in a specificational question of the type 'Who is NP?' the NP is the predicate nominal and who the underlying subject. In descriptionally-identifying sentences it is the other way round: who is the predicate nominal and the NP is the underlying subject. This is clear from various observations (see also Higgins 1976): A. As pointed out in section 2.11, indirect questions of the form 'Wh + NP + be" correspond to direct questions of the underlying form 'NP + be + wh\ whereas indirect questions of the form 'Wh + be + NP' correspond to direct questions of the underlying form' Wh + be + NP'. Consider now what happens when we use (12) in indirect speech, as in (13): (12)A. B. A. B. (13)(a) (b) (c) (d)

Who's the new president? That man over there (is the new president), (specificational) Who is he/that man? He is the son of the former president, (descriptionallyidentifying) The girl asked us who was the new president. We told her that it was the man standing in the corner of the room. She then asked us who he/that man was. We replied that he was the son of the former president.

The indirect questions (13,a) and (13,c) reveal the different underlying order of the constituents in the specificational question and in the descriptionally-identifying one. (It should be noted that (13,c) could not be reworded as *She then asked us who was he/that man.106 As for (13,a), if we change it into The girl asked us who the new president was, the result is not ungrammatical, but it is not the correct indirect 105. I know of only two exceptions to this rule. One is pointed out by Higgins (1976: 163), who notes that the following is grammatical and must be 'identificational' (= descriptionallyidentifying) because of the use of that as subject:

(i) (Do you know which member that is ?) - Yes. That's the member for the Chiltem Hundreds. The second exception will be pointed out in section 3 of Chapter 2. 106. A similar example is I'd like to know who thai is, for which we cannot substitute *I'd like ίο know who is thai.

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version of the first question in (12): the new sentence reports a descriptionallyidentifying question and cannot be appropriately answered by the first reply of (12) (which is specificationally-identifying). What is revealed by the word order in indirect questions is in fact already clear from the word order in direct questions: (14)(a) Who's that man ? Is he/that man a friend of yours ? (b) Who's that man ? *ls a friend of yours he/him/that man ? (As pointed out in footnote 44, this test is unreliable in connection with specificational sentences because subject-verb inversion applies to superficial subject NPs, and in specificational sentences (which are reversible) both NPs can occur in subject position. This problem does not arise in connection with descriptionally-identifying sentences. Since these are not reversible, the NP that is subject in the surface structure is also the underlying subject.) B. The claim that the underlying word order is 'Wh be NP' if the question is specificational and 'NP be wK if it is descriptionally-identifying is confirmed by the position of the NP if we insert a modal auxiliary into the question. Compare: (15)(a) (b) (c) (16)(a) (b) (c) (17)(a) (b) (c)

Which one is the thief? (specificational) Which one could be the thief? (id.) *Which one could the thief be? (id.) Which one is it who is the thief? (id.) Which one could it be who is the thief? (id.) *Which one could it be who the thief is? (id.) Mike ? Who's Mike ? (descriptionally-identifying) Mike? Who could Mike be? (id.) *Mike? Who could be Mike? (id.)

The above examples are direct questions. The following involve indirect questions with the modal auxiliary added to be: (18)(a) I am at a loss to know which of them may be the thief. (specificational) (b) *l am at a loss to know which of them the thief may be. (id.) (19)(a) I am at a loss to know what this may be. (descriptionallyidentifying) (b) Ί am at a loss to know what may be this, (id.) (20) ...a lady whose face seemed familiar to me, but who she could be I had not the slightest idea. (Kruisinga & Erades 1953:449) C. The same results are obtained when the question is embbeded under a verb of prepositional attitude:

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(21 )(a) Which one do you think is the thief? (specificational) (b) *Which one do you think the thief is? (id.) (22)(a) A. Mike? Who's Mike? (descriptionally-identifying) B. Well, who do you think he is? (id.) (b) A. Mike? Who's Mike? (id.) B. *Well, who do you think is he/him? (id.) (23)(a) Who do you think you are? (descriptionally-identifying) (b) *Whodoyou think is you? (id.) D. A sentence like Who are you? can only be descriptionally-identifying: it is a clear example of a sentence that does not ask for specification of a variable but rather for an identifying description. The fact that we say Who are you? and not *Who is you? confirms our claim that it is you, not who, that is the underlying subject. The same is clear from the fact that someone coming to after a period of unconsciousness can say Who am I?, but not Who is me ?. In this case the speaker is clearly asking for an identifying description. He is not asking the hearer who (i.e. which person) it is that is using the pronoun / to refer to himself. In the above example (viz. the use of Who am I? rather than * Who is me?) there are two indications that it is / and not who that is the subject: the verb agrees with /, and we use / rather than me (which is the usual form of the pronoun in subject complement position). The latter phenomenon can also be observed in (24)(a) Mike? Who's he/*him? (b) Beaumont and Fletcher? Who are they/*them? Since a pronoun used as predicate nominal usually appears in the object form (e.g. It's him, Thai's her, etc.), the obligatory use of the subject form confirms that the personal pronoun is the subject. 5.4. The subject of a descriptionally-identifying sentence is either a deictic NP referring to an entity in the immediate situation (as in (25,a)) or what we have called a 'non-indicater' (i.e. a proper name or description) which is referential for the speaker but attributive for the hearer (cf. (25,b)). (25)(a) Who's that (man) ? - That (man) is John Thomas. (b) Who's John Thomas? - John Thomas is a friend of mine. 5.5. Higgins (1976: 147) notes that a typical kind of 'identificational' (descriptionally-identifying) sentence is that introduced by a deictic pronoun: (26) This/that is Michael York. This use of this/that with human reference (which Higgins (1976: 147) calls 'common gender use') is possible only in identifying sentences. In the following example, which is predicational, that cannot have human reference:

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(27) That is tall. Common gender that can be found in both specificationally-identifying and descriptionally-identifying sentences: (28)(a) Who's the murderer? - THAT'S the murderer, (b) Who's that? - That's MICHAEL YORK. The difference between specificationally-identifying sentences like (28)(a) and descriptionally-identifying ones like (28,b) is clear from several indications. In (28,a) that is contrastive and heavily accented, while the murderer is old information. We here have the typical features of a specificational sentence. In (28,b) that is weakly accented and conveys old information. The new information is the name, which therefore receives the nuclear accent, but which is not contrastive. The sentence has the typical meaning of a descriptionally-identifying statement. However, it is not always that easy to judge whether a sentence with common gender that as subject is specificationally-identifying or descriptionally-identifying. Consider: (29)(a) Look! Isn't that John who's walking over there? (b) Is that a gun that he is pointing at us? Sentences like these have very seldom been considered in the linguistic literature. Those who have pointed out their existence (Bolinger 1972a: 107, Jenkins 1975, Ball 1977) have treated them as representing a special type of η-cleft, i.e. as specificational sentences. This analysis seems correct, for the most essential characteristics of ti-clefts are realized: the sentences fill in a value for a variable, and the focal items (John and a gun) are strongly accented and contrastive. On the other hand, sentences such as (29,a-b) differ from //-clefts (and from specificational sentences in general) in that the variable (WH-clause) need not be presupposed (old) information. A sentence like (29,a) can easily be used out of the blue. The reason for this is to be found in the use of deictic that, which creates for the sentence an anchoring-point in the immediate situation. What is interesting about (29,a-b) is that they also have the most essential characteristics of descriptionally-identifying sentences. If we leave out the WHclauses they are definitely descriptionally-identifying: (30)(a) Look! Isn't that John? (b) Is that a gun? The reason is that the use of deictic that means that what we have called 'elementary identification' is automatically realized: the person or object in question is identified in the sense that he, she or it can be picked out. What the sentence does is provide a description (gun) or proper name (John) as further identifying information.

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However, the use of this/that does not always mean that elementary identification has taken place. In some cases the use of a demonstrative (rather than it) appears to have some other origin: (31 )(a) I hope you're feeling better today? - How's that? - I heard you were sick. - Oh, that was last week that I was sick. (b) What difference does a little dispute make now and then? O.K. but this was with his boss that he was having the argument.

In these two examples (which I borrow from Bolinger (1972a: 107)) the demonstrative pronoun does not refer to an entity in the immediate situation. Rather, its use seems to be the result of adding to it the temporal deixis that is realized in the WH-clause. That is, it is replaced by that in (31,a) to create the idea of temporal distance, while this was in (31,b) is equivalent to this time it was. In sum, it appears to be warranted to analyse sentences like (29,a-b) and (31,a-b) as ir-clefts of a special type, but the use of this/thai in some cases entails that the construction also has the basic properties of descriptionally-identifying sentences. 5.6. If we disregard the this/that-deus referred to in the preceding section, the over-all conclusion from section 5 must be that there are numerous differences between specificational (specificationally-identifying) sentences and descriptionally-identifying ones. This means that the question Who is X? is ambiguous between the readings 'Who is it who is X?' and Tell me something more about X'. Since the difference has to do with a different function (subject or predicate nominal) of the nominal constituents, I even think it is warranted to speak of syntactic homonymy. It follows that (if we disregard the minor sentence types still to be discussed) copular sentences fall apart into two major classes: those that give identifying information and those that do not. The latter, which just predicate a characteristic of the referent of the subject Νζ are predicational. The former are either specificationally-identifying or descriptionally-identifying. The sentence is specificational if the speaker specifies a value for a variable. This means that, prior to the use of the identifying sentence, the hearer knows that a particular description (e.g. 'the X who did V applies to a particular individual or set but does not know which individual or set it is. The specificational sentence is meant to furnish him this information. Conversely, if the relevant individual or set is identifiable to the hearer in the sense that he can pick it out (i.e. there is hie et nunc acquaintance with it), a descriptionally-identifying sentence may be required for the hearer to link up the referent in question with an individual or set that he knows in the sense that he has a 'backing of descriptions' of it. 5.7. In the preceding sections we have concentrated on the differences between descriptionally-identifying sentences and specificational ones and have disregarded 105

predicational sentences altogether. However, it may be interesting to draw the latter into the picture as well, for we may wonder whether the three major classes (specificational, predicational, descriptionaUy-identifying) are not related in another way. Instead of first distinguishing between identifying sentences and predicational ones and then further subclassifying the former, we could perhaps argue that the primary distinction is that between specificational and predicational sentences, and that the latter fall apart into identifying predicational sentences (i.e. the descriptionaUy-identifying ones) and nonidentifying predicational sentences. Such a classification would imply that descriptionaUy-identifying sentences share the basic characteristics of (nonidentifying) predicational sentences. Actually, there is something to be said for this point of view. If the differences between specificational sentences and descriptionaUy-identifying ones are numerous, both semantically and syntactically, those between descriptionaUy-identifying sentences and (nonidentifying) predicational ones are more restricted. The two sentence types have at least the foUowing characteristics in common: a. Neither of them is reversible. This clearly distinguishes them from specificational sentences. b. DescriptionaUy-identifying sentences answer questions of the underlying form 'NP is whoT, and (nonidentifying) predicational sentences answer questions of the underlying form 'NP is whalT. Specificational sentences, on the other hand, answer questions of a different underlying order: 'Who/'what is NP?'. c. The questions 'NP is whoT and 'NP is whatT are both questions asking for descriptive information. The question 'Who/what is NP?', by contrast, is a request to fill in a referring expression. d. DescriptionaUy-identifying sentences and (nonidentifying) predicational sentences have the same intonation pattern. If there is no material following the predicate nominal, neutral sentence intonation puts the nuclear accent on the predicate nominal (i.e. on the descriptive information). Thus, the sentence John is my friend (with the nuclear accent on friend) is either predicational or (when used in a suitable context, e.g. in answer to John ? Who's John 7) descriptionaUyidentifying. The same sentence can also be used specificationally (i.e. in answer to Who is it who is your friend?), but then the intonation pattern is entirely different (viz. with the nuclear accent on John). e. As we have seen, the NP that represents old information in (nonidentifying) predicational sentences and in descriptionaUy-identifying ones (i.e. the NP that is subject in the question 'NP is who/what?1) may be either attributive or referential in Donnellan's sense. However, in specificational sentences the relevant NP cannot be referential: we have seen that it can only be a weakly referring NP (i.e. 106

an attributive definite NP, a generic definite NP or an indefinite one). £ Unlike specificational sentences and like (nonidentifying) predicational ones, descriptionally-identifying sentences carry no exhaustiveness implicature. In (32) John? Who's John? - He's my friend. there is no sense that the NP my friend is the only description that could be used in the slot after He's. This description is just one of the several that could be used. As we have seen, it is only in specificational sentences that an exhaustiveness understanding arises. In sum, descriptionally-identifying sentences have a lot of characteristics in common with (nonidentifying) predicational sentences, so that it might seem justified to claim that both belong to the same class of predicational sentences. However, this claim is dubious, because the differences still outweigh the similarities: a. In connection with persons, descriptionally-identifying sentences are felt to answer the question 'Who is NP?', whereas (nonidentifying) predicational sentences answer the question 'What is NP?' or 'What is NP like?. (This difference is not devastating to the claim, though, since it just shows that the former sentences are identifying and that the latter are not.) b. Although the description given in the predicate nominal of a descriptionallyidentifying sentence (e.g. my friend) can mostly also be used as the predicate nominal of a predicational sentence, there are occasional instances where this is not the case. For example: (33) Bill ? Who's Bill ? - He's that man over there. The description that man over there is a strongly referring expression, which therefore cannot occur as the postcopular NP of a (nonidentifying) predicational sentence. (As we have seen, a predicational NP (property NP) is always nonreferring.) The fact that the postcopular NP of a descriptionally-identifying sentence may be strongly referring follows precisely from the fact that it is identifying information that is given. On the other hand, an identifying description need not be referring. It can also be a property NP, as in (34) Mary? Who's Mary? - Oh, she's a friend of mine. In this case the speaker dodges giving precise identifying information. The answer is rather evasive.

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c. Whereas the property of a predicational sentence can beturned into the focus of a specificational construction (e.g. by clefting the sentence), this is not possible where the predicate nominal of a descriptionally-identifying sentence is concerned: (35)(a) (b) (c) (36)(a)

John is a teacher, (predicational) ?lt is a TEACHER that John is.107 What John is is a TEACHER. John ? Who's John ? - He is a teacher at our school, (descriptionally-identifying)

(b) John ? Who's John ? - *lt is a teacher at our school that he is. (c) John ? Who's John ? - 'What/who he is is a teacher at our school.

The reason why the answers in (36,b-c) are unacceptable is simply that descriptionally-identifying sentences presuppose that specification of the referent has already happened. As we have seen, descriptionally-identifying sentences are used precisely in cases where specification of the referent has taken place but has failed to have the expected result of making the referent identifiable for the hearer. d. We have observed (cf. section 3.5) that the definite article may sometimes be deleted in definite property NPs that refer to a rank, function or position: (37) That man is (the) president of the club.

This omission of the article appears to be impossible in descriptionallyidentifying sentences: (38) Who's that? - That's president of the club.

This means that the deletion of the is possible only in (true) predicational sentences, not in sentences where the property NP is meant to be identifying information. e. In section 4.1 we saw that the conjunction of postcopular NFS entails multiple reference in specificational sentences, but not in predicational ones. For example, on the predicational reading the sentence What we saw was a car and a boat implies that we saw one object that was simultaneously a car and a boat (i.e. an amphibian); on the specificational reading it asserts that we saw two different objects. (For that reason a sentence like The thing that I saw was a car and a boat

107. As noted before, there is a restriction on the use of ώ-clefts that highlight a property NI» so that the acceptability of sentences like (3S,b) is rather low. See chapter 4.

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(where the singularity of the thing implies that I saw only one object) is unacceptable on a specificational reading.) Similarly, in the predicational sentence John is a good boy and an excellent student the two conjoined NPs refer to different properties of the same subject. When we apply this test to descriptionally-identifying sentences we ascertain that they behave rather like predicational sentences: (39) Who's that? - That's my neighbour and best friend John. The conjunction of two postcopular NPs in (39) does not entail multiple reference. On the other hand, the following is out: (40) (Who's that?) - That's my friend and a good man. The reason why the conjunction produces unacceptability here is that, unlike my friend, the NP a good man does not provide identifying information. For that reason it can only occur in predicational sentences, not in descriptionallyidentifying ones. The above observations lead to the conclusion that the set of NPs that can be subject complement in predicational sentences overlaps only partly with the set of NPs that can be subject complement in descriptionally-identifying sentences. The overlap concerns such NPs as my friend, which can be used either as mere property NPs or as identifying descriptions. Demonstrative NPs and proper names can only have the latter function and cannot, therefore, be used in predicational sentences. NPs like a good man can be used as property NPs but not as identifying ones and are therefore excluded from descriptionally-identifying sentences. It follows that, in spite of the fact that there are various similarities between descriptionally-identifying sentences and predicational ones, it would be incorrect to treat descriptionally-identifying sentences as a subclass of the larger class of predicational sentences. Descriptionally-identifying sentences with a deictic NP or proper name as predicate nominal are not predicational: such NPs cannot be used as property NPs. We will therefore have to go on distinguishing between descriptionally-identifying sentences and predicational sentences. If we wish to make a generalization over two of the three classes, we must take together the identifying ones (specificationally-identifying and descriptionally-identifying) and set them off from the class of predicational sentences, which are not identifying.

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6. IDENTITY STATEMENTS Apart from the three major types referred to above, there are a couple of minor types of the form 'NP be NP'. Sentences like the following illustrate such a type: (1 )(a) The Morning Star is the Evening Star. (b) Dr. JekyN's Mr. Hyde. (c) The man who killed Smith is the man who robbed the bank. Sentences like these yield a reading which can be paraphrased as 'NPj is the same (person/object) as NP2'. Following Higgins (1976) and many others, I will refer to them as 'identity statements'. In treatments of copular sentences identity statements are not often considered to form a class of their own. In many cases they are conflated with specificational sentences. This is in keeping with the fact that specificational sentences are often claimed (especially in the philosophical literature)108 to express sameness or identity. A sentence like // is John who is the thief is then held to express that the person referred to by John is 'the same as' (or: is 'identical with') the person referred to by the thief.109 However, although this is logically entailed by the sentence, it is not a correct characterization of the specificational act that is performed in such a sentence.110 In my opinion, sentences like (l,a-c) are ambiguous between a specificational reading and an identity reading. Thus, sentence (l,c) can be interpreted either as (2,a-b) or as (2,c):m 108. Of course, even in the philosophical literature exceptions can be found. For example, Linsky (1963: 80) writes: Some of the statements which have been counted as identities cannot be interpreted as such. Suppose I explain to my confused son, "Charles de Gaulle is NOT the king of France". That this statement is not an identity can be shown as follows. From a = b, it follows that b = a, but from "Charles de Gaulle is NOT the king of France" it does not follow that "The king of France is NOT Charles de Gaulle". The first of these statements is true while the second is neither true nor false. 109. This opinion is widespread among linguists too. See e.g. Kuno 1970:351, Van Dijk 1977:121, Harries-Delisle 1978: 422, Atlas & Levinson 1981:, Kuno & Wongkhomthong 1981: 76, Halliday 1982: 68. Someone making the erroneous claim in the other direction (i.e. treating identity statements as specificational sentences) is Elffers (1979: 102). According to her, The Morning Star is the Evening Star is an "identifying" sentence. 110. Higgins (1976: 133) stresses that "the Specificational reading of a copular sentence is not the expression of some kind of identity". He rightly points out that the much discussed example The number of planets is nine is not an identity statement but a specificational sentence. 111. The specificational reading pointed out here is the one on which the man who robbed the bank is the focus NE However, since specificational sentences are reversible, there is also the specificational reading on which the man who killed Smith is the focus. Let us disregard this interpretation in the discussion.

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(2)(a) The following person killed Smith: the man who robbed the bank. (b) It is the man who robbed the bank who (is the man who) killed Smith. (c) The man who killed Smith is the same person as the man who robbed the bank. There is a clear semantic difference between the specificational reading paraphrased in (2,a-b) and the identity reading paraphrased in (2,c). This semantic difference is reflected in the intonation pattern that (l,c) receives: on the specificational reading the nuclear accent is contained in the focus (the man who robbed the bank); on the identity interpretation it is on the copula. In my opinion, the difference between the two readings is so obvious that it is unnecessary to adduce further evidence for the distinction. Like Higgins (1976), I will henceforth treat identity statements as a type of copular sentence that should not be confused with the specificational type. An attempt at eliminating identity statements in another way is to be found in Blom & Daalder (1977). Blom & Daalder claim that all copular sentences are either specificational or predicational. Seeing that identity statements are clearly not specificational, they therefore claim that they are predicational. Thus, the sentence The Morning Star IS the Evening Star is treated as a predicational sentence in which a characteristic is predicated of the Morning Star, viz. the characteristic of 'being the Evening Star'. The fact that we can also say The Evening Star IS the Morning Star (since identity statements are evidently reversible: a = b can also be expressed as b = a) is not felt to be a problem for their theory. This sentence, they claim, is also a predicational sentence, which ascribes to the Evening Star the property of 'being the Morning Star'. In my opinion, such an analysis is quite counterintuitive. I discern no difference of meaning between The Morning Star IS the Evening Star and The Evening Star IS the Morning Star. Moreover, there is plenty of evidence that this type of sentence is different from predicational sentences. To sum up the most important arguments only: (a) in identity statements the postcopular NP is always a referring NP,112 whereas the property NP of a predicational sentence is by definition nonreferring; (b) in an identity statement the nuclear accent is typically on the copula, whereas predicational sentences show the neutral intonation pattern (with the nuclear accent on the last open class constituent); (c) in an identity statement the copula can be paraphrased as is the same as or is identical with. Such a paraphrase would lead to nonsensical results in most predicational sentences (e.g. She is a beauty); (d) unlike predicational sentences, identity statements obviously do not evoke questions of the type 'what is NP?' or 'what is NP likeT. No doubt many other differences could be pointed out,

112. Wiggins (1965: 42) defines an identity statement as follows: For a sentence to express an identity 'is' or '=' must stand between two noun-phrases which, if they are distinct, are serving independently of one another to make genuine references.

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but I think the point is too obvious to devote further attention and space to. In fact, I will not go further into identity statements at all because they are not really relevant to the rest of the book. Still, it is worth noting that sentences of the superficial form of WH-clefts are sometimes identity statements rather than specificational structures: (3) What we call the Morning Star IS what they call the Evening Star. Since we do not treat WH-clefts as being by definition specificational (cf. section 3.7 above), we can refer to such sentences as 'identity WH-clefts' (as distinct from specificational WH-clefts, predicational WH-clefts, etc.).

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7. DEFINITIONS To the four sentence types discussed so far, a fifth should perhaps be added. It is the type of copular sentence that is used to give definitions: (1 )(a) A motor car is a vehicle that has four wheels and is propelled by an internal combustion engine, (b) A pyramid is what the Egyptians built to bury their pharaos in. This type of sentence seems to have escaped the notice of nearly everyone dealing with the specificational/predicational distinction in the linguistic literature. Yet sentences like these again do not fit into the predicational/specificational dichotomy. To begin with, it is clear that they are not specificational: a. They do not have the intonation pattern typical of specificational sentences (i.e. with contrastive accent on the constituent that is to be interpreted as focus). b. They are not reversible. (That is to say, switching the places of the subject NP and the predicate nominal in (l,a) or (l,b) results in a sentence that is not ungrammatical, but which no longer counts as an example of a definition.) c. Although a paraphrase in terms of 'NPt is the following: NP2' seems possible, no value is specified for a variable. The structure (2) A motor car is the following: a four-wheeled vehicle with an internal combustion engine. does not give an exhaustive enumeration of the items on the list whose heading is 'the X that is a motor car'. d. /f-clefting is not possible. The sentence (3) ?lt is a four-wheeled vehicle with an internal combustion engine that is a motor car. can only be interpreted specificationally. (This reading would only make sense if the speaker were presented a number of alternative definitions of the term motor car and had to select the correct one, i.e. the correct value for the variable 'what motor car means'. In that case the 'definitional' NP would be turned into the focus of a specificational construction in the same way as a predicational NP can be. However, it is doubtful whether this type of sentence is quite acceptable.) Could we say that a definitional copular sentence is predicational? Such an 113

interpretation would be in keeping with the intonation pattern of the sentence, with the fact that the structure is not reversible, and with the fact that definitions answer the question 'What is NP?'. On the other hand, definitional sentences differ from predicational ones in that the information given by the predicate nominal is meant to make the hearer understand the contents of a concept or the use of a term. This may happen by relating the term in question to another one, which is expected to be better known (e.g. An oculist is an eye-doctor) or by summing up the characteristics that are considered to be the most typical (essential) properties of the prototype. In a 'normal' predicational sentence the predicate nominal is not felt to have this function. Even when a number of characteristics are summed up, as in John is a stupid, haughty and disagreeable person, there is no idea that a definition is being given. In fact, for a copular sentence to be interpretable as a definition it is necessary that the subject NP should not be interpreted as referring. This means that it cannot be a proper name. If it is a definite description (e.g. the Abominable Snowman), this description is not used as a referring NR Hence the difference between Who is the Abominable Snowman ? (which uses the description as a referring NP and asks for identifying information) and What is the Abominable Snowman ? (where the NP is not referring and it is the denotation of the term, not its reference, that is in question). Only the latter question, which asks for the meaning of the term, can be answered by some kind of definition. As appears from (l,b), a definitional sentence may be a WH-cleft, but then necessarily one with the WH-clause in postcopular position. This is unlike what we have observed in connection with predicational WH-clefts, whose WH-clause necessarily precedes the copula. Compare: (4)(a) A racket is what you use to play tennis, (definitional) (b) What I use to play tennis is rather expensive, (predicational) The conclusion would seem to be that definitional sentences like (l,a-b) do not fit into any of the categories of copular sentences discussed in the previous sections. The issue is furthermore complicated by the fact that sentences such as these do not represent the only possible type of sentence giving a definition. A request for a definition can also be satisfied by ostensive exemplification: (5)(a) (What is a pyramid ?) - What you see over there is a pyramid. (b) (What does to bug someone mean ?) - Bugging someone is what you're doing to me just now! Sentences such as these are no definitions in the technical sense of the word, but they do count as valid answers to questions asking for definitions. The canonical type of definitions (exemplified by (l,a-b)) consists of the name of the object to be defined followed by be and a list of the most salient characteristics of the prototypical object (cf. Lander 1977). Sentences like (5,a-b), in contrast, give no

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more than an example of the object in question. Apparently the speaker assumes that the example in question is identifiable to the hearer in the sense that he has a backing of descriptions of it and that the hearer will be able to distinguish the relevant descriptions (viz. those that are typical of the prototype) from the contingent ones. It is not easy to establish which type(s) of copular sentences (5,a-b) belong to. As far as I can see, (5,a) can be considered as predicational: it states that what is observed has the property of being a pyramid. Sentence (5,b), on the other hand, is very similar to (l,a-b). However, it differs from these in that it does not really give a definition. Although there is no doubt a lot more to be said about definitions, I will not examine the subject any further here. Definitional sentences will not be dealt with in the rest of this book, so for our present purposes we need no more than note that they exist and point out that they can hardly be fitted into the three major types of copular sentences dealt with in sections 2 to 5.

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8. OTHER TYPES? There are still a couple of copular sentence types left that cannot be simply analysed as specificational, predicational, descriptionally-identifying, identity statements or definitional. A first such type is illustrated by the following examples: (1 )(a) To see her is to love her. (Kahn 1973:27) (b) To be a member of the Space Club is to be one of the most privileged citizens of the world. (Esser 1984:116) (c) To be human is to err. (Quirk et al. 1985:1063) (d) To look back to the past is surely to. look away from your responsibility for the future. (Bald 1972:66) (e) To remain in a favourable state is in general to be inactive. (Huddleston 1971:139) (f) (If cleft sentences can be generated by the base rules of a transformational grammar, then they must be so generated.) To generate them otherwise is to render the grammar redundant. (2)(a) Virtue is happiness, (b) Democracy is chaos. The sentences (l,a-f), whose two NPs are each time infinitive clauses, can all be paraphrased in terms of (3): (3) If clause 1 is true, then clause 2 is true. Sentence (2,a) can be paraphrased similarly if we look upon its NPs as nominalizations of infinitive clauses. (That is, if (2,a) is considered equivalent to To be virtuous is to be happy.) Sentence (2,b) yields a paraphrase very similar to (3), viz. 'If there is democracy, there is chaos'. At first sight these sentences look very similar to identity statements. However, they do not really express an identity. For example, if democracy and chaos were identical, i.e. denoted the same concept, it would be possible to substitute one for the other in most contexts. However, this is clearly not possible. It is in keeping with this that these sentences are not reversible. They would be if they were identity statements. Can we look upon them as predicational? Clearly not. Although we might find Democracy is chaotic a reasonable paraphrase of (2,b), (2,a) certainly does not mean the same thing as Virtue is happy. The infinitive clauses in (1) do not function as property NPs either. In fact, we pointed out in section 3.2 (more specifically, in footnote 5) that nominal clauses cannot be used as predicational NPs. The question whether (l,a-f) and (2,a-b) could be specificational or descriptionally-identifying need hardly be asked: it is clear that none of these sentences identifies some unknown (or insufficiently known) entity. And interpret-

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ing them as definitions does not make any sense either. We are, thus, faced with a special type of copular sentence. Since the meaning of such sentences is paraphrasable in terms of'i£..then...', we might refer to this type as the 'inferential' type. There is another type that is worth mentioning, although it is less of a maverick and can probably even be treated as specificational: (4)(a) It was not that he was not hungry. It was merely that he didn't dare to ask for food. (b) It's not that I don't like him. (On the contrary, I like him very much.) Delahunty (1981: 180) considers such sentences as //-clefts that have no overt WH-clause (representing the variable). This analysis is presumably correct.113 The deleted WH-clauses are easily recoverable and mostly indicate the reason or cause of something that is clear from the context. A nice example of this is (5): (5) It may have been that the porter at York railway station was irritated by Sunday duty, or it may have been that the outward signs of wealth in his client were not conspicuous; whatever the cause, he spoke rudely to her. (Kruisinga 1932a: 503) The following example (and the comment in brackets) is from Curme (193la: 187): (6) The queer part of it was that Miss Waters didn't seem to be really mean. It (= the cause of her trouble-making) was just that she couldn't mind her own business.

113. Λ-clefts with a that-dausR as focus and an overt WH-clause are not very acceptable. Still, Delahunty (1981: 82) notes the following example from a novel by Somerville & Ross: (i) I wonder if it was that they hadn't room enough for them up in the house that they put them out here in the woods?

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CHAPTER 2. ΊΤ IS MR Υ' OR 'HEISMR Υ'? 1. The problem I will attempt to solve in this chapter is that of finding the mechanism that underlies the selection of it versus he/she/they as the subject of sentences like (l,a-d): (1 )(a) There's a policeman at the door. - Who is it/he ? (b) Last night a man was arrested by the London police and charged with the murder of Annie Jones. It was/He is Mr James Smith, ofSweetham Street, Bexton. (c) I know the man in the photograph. lt/*he is John! (d) Who is Mr Aronov? - He/*it is a Russian. The problem considered here is by no means an unfamiliar one. It has been treated by quite a number of grammatical handbooks and there is at least one article that is entirely devoted to it, viz. Erades (1949). Yet the solutions that have been proposed do not appear to be fully satisfactory. They usually involve one of the following claims, which (as I hope to show) are either fallacious or insufficient to solve the n//ze-problem. 1.1. According to some grammars (e.g. Sack 1954: 111, de Vocht 1947: 149, Close 1975: 6), it is used instead of he/she/they if the gender and number of the subject cannot be gathered from the preceding context. This explanation may seem all right for sentences like (2) Who's at the door? - It's the postman. but is clearly inadequate in other cases: a. It does not explain the possibility of using it in (l,a-c), where the preceding context does specify the gender and number of the referent (a man/ policeman). b. It fails to account for the difference between (3,a) and (3,b), where the gender and number of the referents are not specified: (3)(a) There's someone at the door. - lt/*he is a policeman, (b) There's someone at the door. - He/*it wants to see you. c. The rule cannot be extended to cases where the preceding context does not create a personal referent (i.e. where it does not appear to refer to a person at all), as in

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(4) What's that noise? - Never mind. It's only the children. 1.2. Some grammars (e.g. Deutschbein 1959: 208) state that it is used when the reference is to an "unknown or unmentioned person". In doing so they avoid problem (a), but do not escape the problems (b) and (c). 1.3. According to Curme (193 la: 7), it is "used as subject to point to a person or thing that is first presented in only dim outlines by the situation, but is often later identified by a predicate noun: 'It's John'... (uttered by someone upon hearing approaching footsteps)". This explanation may cover the cases of problem (c) but certainly does not solve problem (b). It also meets with the problem that examples like (5,a-b) show that one and the same noun phrase (that man) can be used both as 'identifier' (as in (5,a)) and as 'identified' (as in (5,b)). How is it possible for the same NP to present a person "in dim outlines" in one context and to "identify" him in another? (5)(a) Someone shouted something. I think it was that man over there. (b) Who's that man over there? - Why, don't you recognize him ?

1.4. Some other grammars (e.g. Zandvoort 1964: 166) state that when it is used, "both pronoun and verb refer to an image seen, a sound heard, a smell perceived, in short some sensory perception". This rule avoids the above three problems (a)-(c), but fails to explain the use of // in cases like (l,b) or (6), where no sensory perception appears to be involved: (6) (talking of an engagement) But who is it? Is it the young man that she used to go out with last summer? 1.5. According to Jespersen (1958: 149), sentences with it is are reduced //-clefts and he/she/they are used only "when there is no cleft sentence (i.e. when no continuation with a relative clause could be thought of)", as in (7) Who are those girls ? - They are my sister's friends. A similar view is defended by Poutsma (1916: 732), who states that "it may be understood as the representative of a substantive clause (...), which, although not actually expressed, is more or less distinctly implied in the context". However, although many //-sentences may indeed be considered reduced //-clefts (cf. below), there are other cases which do not yield to such an analysis. Thus, (8) resembles (7) in that "no continuation with a relative clause could be thought of, but we all the same have to use it: (8) Who's that (girl)? - It's Mary. 120

Conversely, there are cases in which the continuation with a relative clause is possible but where he can be used next to (although not always interchangeably with) it: (9) Who's the girl that is walking there ? - It/she is my sister.

The rule thus wrongly predicts that it and he/she/they are mutually exclusive and is therefore incapable of explaining the difference between the use of it and that of he/she/they in sentences like (9). 1.6. Scheurweghs (1959: 182) claims that rt-sentences are used "when there is no reference at all to a particular word mentioned before: they express who it is that does something, that is heard or seen, that is talked about". For example: (10) I have to go to a funeral in Golders Green. - "te it a friend?", Sylvia asked.

It is clear, however, that this rule covers only part of the cases, since sentences with it often do refer to a person that has been mentioned before (cf. examples like (8) and (9))1.7. According to Kruisinga (1932a: 99-101), it is used in sentences that serve to identify a person mentioned before and he/she in sentences that serve to describe the referent. In other words, // answers the question 'Who is it?', and he/she answers the question 'What is he/she?'. This rule is inadequate in at least two respects. First, it does not account for the use of it in sentences that do not refer to a "person spoken of before" (as in (4), (6), (10)). Secondly, next to the questions 'Who is it?' and 'What is he/she?' we can also ask the question 'Who is he/she?' and the corresponding answer will make use of he/she, in spite of the fact that it appears to provide identifying information. The possibility of using he/she in identifying sentences is stressed by Erades (1949), who gives numerous examples like the following: (11) An unusual feature of the investiture was the appearance of a lady to receive the VC. She was Mrs Green, widow of Captain John Leslie Green, to whom the award of the VC. was notified on August 5.

Kruisinga's own comment on this sentence is that "we should expect if (p. 102) and that the use of she is "a trick of refinement" (p. 103) often used by journalists. 1.8. What seems to me to be the best and fullest treatment of the it/he-problem is to be found in Erades (1949) and in Kruisinga & Erades (1953: 59-61, 444-445, 452-454). In these works a distinction is made between three types of sentences: 121

a. "Identifying sentences" answer the question 'Who is it?' and therefore have it as subject. They serve to identify a person (or persons) either as "the source, cause or origin of some sensory perception" (K & E 1953: 59) or as "the subject or object of an activity, or as the cause of some occurrence, mentioned before" (K & E 1953: 453). Sentences such as (4) and (10) are good examples of these two possibilities. b. "Specifying sentences" answer the question 'Who is he/she?' or 'Who are they?' and therefore begin with he/she/they. Their function is to specify a person mentioned before by giving his name, "either in the shape of a class-noun or of a personal proper name" (K & E 1953: 60). Sentence (11) can serve as an illustration. c. "Classifying sentences" answer the question 'What is he/she?' or 'What are they?'. They begin with he/she/they and have the function of "attributing some quality (rank, age, occupation, degree of relationship, nationality, religious or political persuasion, etc.) to persons mentioned before (K & E 1953: 61). The following is an example: (12) Fortunately, Dr. Seaton arrived promptly. He was a bluff, hearty middle-aged man. Although this threefold distinction is no doubt more illuminating than any other I have reviewed, it still has a number of weak points: A. The definition of 'specifying sentences' appears unsatisfactory. For one thing, sentences giving the name of a person will use it much more often than he/she/they (it is even virtually obligatory when the proper name is just somebody's first name (e.g. John)). For another, the "class-noun" can hardly be said to function as a name in sentences like (13) Robert? Who's Robert? - He is a Frenchman, for all I know

Moreover, α Frenchman indicates a nationality and should therefore be 'classifying'. Still, the sentence here answers the question Who is Robert?, not What is Robert?. B. There are some problems in connection with 'identifying sentences' too: a. The statement that //-sentences can identify a person as "the cause of some occurrence, mentioned before" is inaccurate in that the occurrence of which the person is identified as the cause need certainly not have been mentioned before. For example, on coming home and finding my wife in tears I may ask What's the matter? and then make a guess: Is it the children? Has something happened to them ?

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b. Both in Erades (1949) and Kruisinga & Erades (1953) the it of identifying sentences is claimed to be an anaphoric pronoun referring to the sensory perception that is identified: They (i.e. identifying sentences) attribute a sensory perception to some source, cause, origin, or Object' (in the philosophical sense of the term). This explains why the referring pronoun should invariably be neuter and the verb singular: both refer to a neuter and hence singular idea, viz. something seen, heard, felt, etc. (K & E 1953: 451)

However, this claim raises several problems. To begin with, it overlooks such //-sentences as (6) and (10) in which there is no reference to a sensory perception at all. Secondly, the claim runs counter to the observation that we have to use whoever rather than whatever in sentences like (14). If it were a neuter pronoun, whatever should be possible. (14) Who's at the door? - Whoever /'whatever it is, it is not John. Thirdly, there are cases in which plural they has to be used in spite of the fact that the reference is to a sensory perception. For example, on seeing one person enter the room you can ask your hearer Who is it?, but on seeing several persons coming in you can only ask him Who are they?. Yet, in both cases there is a sensory perception of exactly the same kind. c. There are sentences that are clearly 'identifying' but where he can or should be used: (15) Who's the murderer? - Do you see that man over there? He is the murderer.

d. The distinction between identifying, classifying and specifying sentences does not enable us to explain the selection of it or he in cases like the following: (16) (a) Who's that man ? - It/he is my brother. (b) Who's that? - lt/*he is John. (c) Who's that man ? - Itfhe is John.

(d) Who are those people? - They are ("It is) the Johnsons. (17) The new general, he/it is a friend of the President. (18) That fat old humbug we met last week has just been elected chairman of the club. - Is he/*it the one with the funny moustache ?

In sum, none of the treatments of the it/he-problem appears to provide a fully satisfactory solution.

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2. The direction in which we should look for a solution to the problem is indicated by two things that are particularly clear when we have a look at the examples. The first is that the use of it in statements about persons is restricted in that it can exclusively be found as subject of be: (19) There's a man in the kitchen. - Who is it? What does he/*it want? How did he/*it get in ? The second observation is that the //-sentence invariably contains a noun phrase (possibly a pronoun) as predicate nominal. Apparently, // cannot be used when the postcopular elements is an adjective, adverb or prepositional phrase: (20) There's someone at the door. -Who is it? What is he/*it like? Howtallishe/*it? Where is he/*it now? These two observations make clear that only sentences of the form 'NP be NP' are relevant to the discussion of the it/he-problem. And since //-sentences appear to be semantically different from Ae-sentences, it seems reasonable to assume that at least part of the solution to the problem is to be found in the distinction between different types of 'NP be NP' sentences which we have made in chapter 1. As a matter of fact, I will argue that, apart from a number of special cases (to be discussed below), the use of it versus he/she/they can be accounted for by the following two hypotheses: (a) //-sentences are specificational, whereas he/she/they-sentences are either descriptionally-identifying or predicational; (b) Such //-sentences are reduced //-clefts. These two hypotheses are not unrelated: as pointed out in chapter 1, //-clefts are the most typical instances of specificational sentences. Even when the noncleft counterpart of the //-cleft is a predicational sentence, the cleft specifies a value for the variable: (21) It is John who is a teacher. In this example the is in the relative clause is predicational, but the head clause (and therefore the sentence as a whole) is specificational. It is because //-clefts are specificational that they always imply that one candidate (or group of candidates) is picked out from a set. Thus, what distinguishes (21) from the simplex John is a teacher is that only the //-cleft presupposes the existence of a set of candidates (i.e. a set of people who might be teachers) from which John is picked out as the one who is a teacher and which must therefore contain at least one other person besides

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John. As we have seen, this 'picking out' function is precisely what distinguishes specificational sentences from the other copular sentence types. A natural consequence of the observation that //-clefts are always specificational1 is that the first hypothesis in fact follows from the second: if //-sentences are reduced //-clefts, they will naturally be specificational. As a first approximation to proving these hypotheses, let us consider the following examples: (22)(a) (Who is your friend?) - It is the son of the Prime Minister, (b) (Who is your friend?) - He is the son of the Prime Minister. There is a clear difference of meaning between (22,a) and (22,b). In (22,a) the question Who is your friend? is interpreted as a request to reveal the identity of a person who has apparently been referred to as my friend. The reply is meant to enable the hearer to pick out the person in question from a number of people that are known to him. In other words, the //-sentence specifies a value (the son of the Prime Minister) for a variable ('the one who is my friend') and is therefore specificational (specificationally-identifying). Sentence (22,b), on the other hand, requires a different setting. It suggests that some identification of the friend in question has already taken place (e.g. the friend is in the same room as the hearer and has been pointed out to him), but that the hearer does not recognize the person in question as someone he knows. The question Who is your friend? is then equivalent, not to Tell me who is your friend', but to Tell me something more about your friend'. It is a request for a further description or further descriptions which must enable the hearer to relate the friend to someone of whom he has a fuller 'backing of descriptions'2 or at least to build up a backing of descriptions in connection with the friend himself so that fuller identification becomes possible (rather than being restricted to the hie et nunc possibility of picking out the friend from the set of people in the room). In other words, (22,b) is a descriptionallyidentifying sentence. There are various differences between (22,a) and (22,b) that confirm these conclusions: a. In (22,b) the NPs your friend and he are 'strongly referring' (cf. chapter 1, sections 2.12 and 5): the use of your friend implies that the person asking the question has been able to pick out the person from the group of bystanders. Even

1. As pointed out in chapter 1 (section 2.4), there are a couple of exceptional types of tf-clefts that should be considered as predicational. I will discuss them in detail in chapter 3. None of them, however, is relevant to the it/he-pmblem that we are dealing with here. 2. I am using the term 'backing of descriptions' here as explained in chapter 1, section 5 (see especially footnote 101).

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if the question receives no answer, there will have been some 'elementary' identification in the sense that the description your friend has been related to a particular person. In (22,a) this is not the case. The N? your friend \s here only 'weakly referring' (i.e. there is a referent but his identity is unknown) and only if the question is answered with an appropriate specificationally-identifying sentence will it be possible to connect the description your friend with a specific person. b. Only in (22,a) is it possible to substitute Which (one) is your friend? for Who is your friend?. This is consistent with the claim that only (22,a) is a specificationally-identifying sentence, since we have seen that questions of the form 'Which (one) is NP?' typically ask for a specificational answer. c. The string underlying the question Who is your friend? has the underlying word order 'who is your friend?' in (22,a) and 'your friend is who?' in (22,b). This becomes clear when we replace the question with an expression involving an indirect question, as in (23)(a) I am asking you who is your friend, (b) I am asking you who your friend is. The //-sentence of (22,a) can only be used as a reply to (23,a),3 whereas the Ae-sentence of (22,b) can only be used as a reply to (23,b). This is consistent with the hypothesis that the former is specificationally-identifying whereas the latter is descriptionally-identifying (cf. chapter 1, sections 2.11 and 5). d. For some reason the addition of a superlative to an NP renders it hard for the NP to be interpreted as strongly referring. Thus, in Who is your best friend? the NP your best friend will not normally be taken to be strongly referring and the sentence will therefore invite a specificationally-identifying answer rather than a descriptionally-identifying one. It is therefore consistent with our hypothesis that the Ae-sentence of (22,b) is not a plausible answer to this question, whereas the //-sentence of (22,a) is. e. The claim that //-sentences like (22,a) are specificational is further corroborated by the fact that they may show connectedness: (24) Who's your best friend ? - My best friend is not a person. It is a book about myself/"me. 3. It appears that for some speakers (23,b) can also be used as an alternative to (23,a). In that case (23,b) is ambiguous between a specificationally-identifying reading and a descriptionallyidentifying one. In the former case only the if-sentence of (22,a) is a suitable reply. In the latter case only the Ae-sentence of (22,b) is appropriate.

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As noted in chapter 1 (section 2.13), connectedness is typical of specificational sentences. The connectedness shown in (24) is the same as found in the specificationally-identifying sentence (25) My best friend is a book about myself/*me. f. It has already been noted that //-clefts are always specificational (see, however, footnote 1). A similar claim can be made in connection with //-cleft questions: questions of the form Who is it who... ? always ask for a specificationallyidentifying answer. It is therefore in keeping with our hypothesis that Who is it who is your friend? can be substituted for Who is your friend? if an //-sentence follows, as in (22,a), but not if a Ae-sentence follows, as in (22,b). Our second hypothesis, viz. that the relevant //-sentences are reduced //-clefts, also becomes plausible now: since // is the son of the Prime Minister is an appropriate answer to Who is your friend? only if the latter is interpreted as Who is it who is your friend?, it seems natural to look upon the //-reply in (22,a) as a reduction of// is the son of the Prime Minister who is my friend.

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3. The above observations make clear, I think, that ^-sentences like (22,a) are specificationally-identifying, while Ae-sentences like (22,b) are descriptionallyidentifying. Before adducing further evidence I will consider one more illustration, which will also be useful in setting the stage for the notes on sentences involving proper names that will be given below. Consider the following sentence: (26) Who is Jack Smith? Sentence (26) can be a question asking for either specificational or descriptionallyidentifying information. In the latter case it means that the value 'Jack Smith' has been specified for a variable, but that the speaker of (26) has no backing of descriptions for this name (i.e. the name Jack Smith does not mean anything to him). In that case sentence (26) asks, not for specificationally-identifying information (so that the speaker can pick out Jack Smith from a set of people), but for descriptionally-identifying information, i.e. for a description or set of descriptions applying to Jack Smith. Any description concerning Jack Smith, e.g. (27,a) or (27,b), will be a suitable answer to this question. (27)(a) He is a neighbour of mine, (b) He lives next door to me. Sentence (26) can also be used as a question asking for specificationallyidentifying information. In that case a suitable paraphrase is (28,a), not (28,b): (28)(a) I am asking you who (it is that) is Jack Smith, (b) I am asking you who (*it is that) Jack Smith is. and if the speaker seeks to pick out Jack Smith from a specific set of people, which (one) will normally be used instead of who: (29) Which (one) is Jack Smith? A sentence like this can be used in a variety of situations. It is possible that the speaker has just heard the name Jack Smith and, having no backing of descriptions for it, does not know which person is to be associated with this name. Or the speaker does have a backing of descriptions for the name (i.e. he knows who Jack Smith is) but, owing to circumstances (e.g. all the people present are masked, or the speaker has left his spectacles at home), he is unable to pick out Jack Smith from a group. The third possibility is that the speaker has a backing of descriptions for the person who is called Jack Smith (i.e. he knows the person) but the name Jack Smith is not part of them (i.e. he does not know that the person he knows is called

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Jack Smith). On hearing the name Jack Smith he is therefore incapable of associating the name with a particular person. These three possibilities have in common that the speaker who asks (29) seeks to relate the name Jack Smith to a particular person. That is, he is asking for specificationally-identifying information, and an appropriate answer will be something like (30), not (27,a) or (27,b): (30) It is that man over there. However, there is still another situation in which the sentence Which is Jack Smith ? can be used. Suppose Jack Smith is an actor who belongs to a company that is playing Hamlet. In that case it is possible that, thinking of the characters in the play, I ask the question Which is Jack Smith ?, meaning 'Which of the characters is played by Jack Smith?'. An appropriate answer to this question may be something like (31,a) or (31,b), but not (31,c): (31 )(a) Jack Smith is Guildenstern. (b) He is Guildenstern. (c) It is Guildenstern. The reason why (31,c) is not a suitable reply is that my question here does not ask for specificationally-identifying information: the reply should not enable me to pick out Jack Smith from the group of actors - obviously, this is something I am already capable of doing - but it should add a description ('the one who acts the part of X') to the backing of descriptions I have of Jack Smith. Since the description in question is to come from a restricted set (viz. the set of descriptions of the type 'the one who acts the part of X', where X can only have as many values as there are characters in the play), my question can involve which instead of who - a possibility which, as we have seen, is otherwise restricted to questions inviting a specificationally-identifying answer. But (31,a) is clearly not specificational here. This is also obvious from the fact that (31,a) is not reversible: in answer to the question Which (character) is (played by) Jack Smith? we can say (31,a), but not (32) Guildenstern is Jack Smith. The latter sentence would be used in a different context. For example, when I see the actors acting and cannot recognize Jack Smith (though I know he is one of them) I can ask Which (one) is Jack Smith ?, meaning 'Which of these people is Jack Smith?'. In this case I wish to pick out Jack Smith from the group, and the answer will be the (now specificationally-identifying) sentence (32), or its reverse (31,a), or the equally specificational (31,c). The difference between this use of sentences like (31,a) and the descriptionally-identifying use outlined above is especially clear when we have a question with you instead of a proper name. In the first context, when I wish to know which part you are acting, the question will be

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(33,a), where the use of are makes clear thai you is the underlying subject; in the second context, when I wish to pick you out from a group of actors (e.g. in a photograph), the question will be (33,b), where the use of is makes clear that which is the underlying subject: (33)(a) Which are you? (b) Which is you?

In the former case the reply will be descriptionally-identifying (e.g. lam Hamlet); in the latter it will be specificationally-identifying (e.g. Hamlet is me, which is reversible to / am Hamlet).4 Examples like these make clear that, contrary to what is often assumed, proper names need not always be strongly referring (like anaphoric or demonstrative pronouns): in sentences like (31,a) they may also be used as a description attributed to a strongly referring subject in a descriptionally-identifying sentence. Cases like the one outlined above, in which a proper name is equivalent to the description 'the person who acts the part of X' are not the only ones in which proper names are used in this way. Another case is provided by examples like the following (which I borrow from Kruisinga (1932a: 103)): (34)(a) I met today a strange, battered figure of a man - the first newspaper man so far as I am aware to be wounded in the war. He was Mr. Donald C. Thompson, one of the 'camera men'ofthe 'New York World'. (b) An unusual feature of the investiture was the appearance of a lady to receive the VC. She was Mrs. Green, widow of Captain John Leslie Green, to whom the award of the VC. was notified on August 5. In sentences like these the proper names are not strongly referring: they do not suffice to pick out a person from a set. Rather, it is clear that the proper names do not mean anything to the speaker (i.e. they are not automatically associated by the speaker with a specific person) but are presented as descriptions (equivalent to 'someone called X' or 'a certain Mr/Mrs/Miss X') which are added to the backing of descriptions that the speaker and hearer have of the person in question. This backing is still very limited, but as a result of the information given in the first part of (34,a) and (34,b) it contains at least one definite description ('the first man to be wounded in the war', 'the lady who received the VC.'), so that it is possible for the speaker to refer to that person by means of a strongly referring NP like he or she. In

4. The reversed version lam Hamlet will generally be preferred to Hamlet is me because the pronoun referring to the speaker is a 'preferred theme', i.e. it is more likely to be processed as the theme of the sentence (which in this case is the subject) than an NP referring to some other entity, (cf. Kuno 1976)

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other words: a proper name can be used as an additional description given in the predicate complement of a descriptionally-identifying sentence, provided it does not presuppose what Fodor (1976) calls 'acquaintance', i.e. provided the speaker and hearer do not know in advance of a particular person that he has that name.5 In that case the name can be added as a description to the backing of descriptions which the speaker and hearer already have of a certain person, i.e. after 'elementary' identification (specification of a value (e.g. 'the first man to be wounded...') for the variable) has already taken place.6 In sum, the distinction between It is Mr Υ and He is Mr Υ is basically that the former is specificationally-identifying (i.e. answers the question 'Who (is it who) is NP?'), whereas the latter is descriptionally-identifying (i.e. answers the question 'NP is whoT).

5. According to Fodor (1976:105), a proper name like John is used with 'acquaintance' if the speaker can answer the question Who is John ? correctly with a sentence of the form 'John is + definite NP. 6. A fine example of this is to be found in the following passage from Anthony Powell's novel At Lady Molly's. (The setting is as follows. A new guest arrives at Lady Molly's and she does not know who he is. The narrator, however, recognizes him as a former school mate of his, and says:)

(a) I know him. (b) Who is he? (c) He is called Kenneth Widmerpool. I was at school with him as a matter of fact. He is in the City. (d) I know his name of course. And that he is in the City. But what is he like ? As is clear from the use of he and him, elementary identification has taken place right from the beginning: everybody knows which guest is being referred to. But Lady Molly wants to have fuller identification. So she utters (b) to ask for a description (or descriptions) which can enhance her 'acquaintance' with the guest. The narrator then gives three descriptions, one of which consists of the name of the person. However, two of these descriptions already belong to the backing of descriptions that Lady Molly has of the person in question, and anyhow they are not the kind of descriptions that she is interested in. They do not enable her to place the guest socially and morally in her world. So she asks for more (and other) descriptions, using the question What is he like?, which is basically equivalent to Who is he?.

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4. Apart from the evidence advanced in the previous sections, there are quite a number of observations that support the hypotheses that have been put forward. In this section I propose to go into some of them. 4.1. The claim that if-sentences are reduced ίί-clefts is borne out by the fact that they share the same restrictions. For example: (35)(a) Who's the bank robber? - *lt is even Smith, (b) *lt is even Smith who is the bank robber. Certain indefinite nonspecific NPs are equally unacceptable in both constructions (cf. chapter 1, section 4.6): (36)(a) Who were the first guests to arrive ? - It was our/*many/ *few/*no neighbours. (b) It was our/*many/*few/*no neighbours that were the first guests to arrive. 4.2. The conclusion that sentences of the type He is Mr 7 are not specificationallyidentifying is supported by the fact that they do not allow the predicate nominal to become the focus of an it-cleft construction: (37) Who's that man ? - He is Mr Green. *lt is Mr Green that is that man.7 In general, predicate nominals of descriptionally-identifying sentences cannot be highlighted in an //-cleft: (38) Jack? Who's Jack? - He is a friend of mine. *lt is a friend of mine that he is. The same test confirms another conclusion we have arrived at, viz. that the sentence Jack Smith is Guildenstern is descriptionally-identifying when meaning 'Jack Smith acts the part of Guildenstern' and specificationally-identifying when it means "The following person is Jack Smith: the one acting the part of Guildenstern'. Only on the latter interpretation is it possible to substitute // is Guildenstern that is Jack Smith for Jack Smith is Guildenstern.

7. In spite of the ungrammatically of this ώ-cleft sentence, It's Mr Green is an acceptable answer. This does not contradict the theory argued here, for it will be pointed out below (section 5.2) that in cases like this the //-sentence is not a reduced η-cleft. Rather, it is the stress-reduced form of that and echoes the demonstrative determiner in the question.

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4.3. As pointed out by Halliday (1967:237), it is characteristic of Α-cleft sentences that an auxiliary from the source sentence can sometimes be put in the head clause as well as in the WH-clause: (39)(a) (b) (40)(a) (b)

It was going to have been John who was given the prize. It was John who was going to have been given the prize. It will be John who comes in first. It is John who will come in first.

The same vacillation seems to be possible in //-sentences: (41) (Who's going to be the next chairman ?) - It is (going to be) John Robinson. This possibility supports the hypothesis that (41) is a reduced it-deft. 4.4. There is a clear semantic difference between (specificational) //-sentences and the corresponding (descriptionally-identifying) Ae-sentences. Consider the following examples: (42)(a) (You know that someone was arrested last night?) Well, it's John! (b) (Yesterday a man was arrested and charged with several serious crimes.) He is Mr John Roberts, of High Street, London. Sentence (42,b) assigns to the referent of the subject NP a description which is not temporally or spatially restricted, i.e. which is applicable to that person at any time and at any place. Sentence (42,a), in contrast, does not reveal the (permanent) identity of a person. Rather it reveals the identity of a participant in a particular (non-permanent) situation. Whereas (42,b) assigns an 'inalienable' (permanent) description (viz. a proper name) to a person, (42,a) assigns an 'accidental' (i.e. temporally and spatially restricted) description (viz. 'who was arrested last night') to a person who is already known by name. In this respect (42,a) is exactly like the (full) //-cleft (43), and this of course supports the hypothesis that (42,a) is actually a reduced version of (43): (43) It is John who was arrested last night. 4.5. As pointed out by Poutsma (1916: 733-734), we will not normally use (descriptionally-identifying) Ae-sentences in which he refers back to an indefinite pronoun, //-sentences will normally be used instead: (44) He caught sight of somebody on the pavement (...). For the moment Mrs Altham could not see who it/*he was.

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It should be noted that this is not due to some absolute prohibition for he to refer to someone, since we can have (45) There was someone at the door. I wondered what he wanted. However, the restriction observed by Poutsma is in keeping with the hypotheses I have been arguing, as the copular sentence in (44) cannot be descriptionallyidentifying: a description like somebody is not sufficient to pick out a person from a set (i.e. it does not really specify a value for a variable),8 so that no 'elementary' identification is achieved in the first half of (44). In other words, an indefinite pronoun can hardly be used as a strongly referring NI^ so that it cannot furnish the subject of a descriptionally-identifying sentence. Rather, because somebody gives no identifying information whatever, the copular sentence that follows it must necessarily be specificationally-identifying. 4.6. The theory argued here also accounts for the fact that some proper names will only be found in ^-sentences, while others can also occur in Ae-sentences: (46)(a) (The police have arrested a suspect.) - I know. lt/*he is Smith/John. (b) (The police have arrested a suspect.) He is Mr W. Smith, aged 46, of Walbey Street, Harrow. As we have seen, proper names can occur in the predicate complement of descriptionally-identifying sentences if they just specify the name of someone who has already been identified in an 'elementary' way. This is the case in (46,a). (The reason why, in spite of the proper name being used as a mere label, it is not excluded in (46,b) is that it is possible to use the form of a specificationally-identifying sentence to give information which pretends to be specificational but is not really so (cf. chapter 1, section 2.5). Thus, to the question Who's the murderer?one may give what Higgins (1976: 153) calls "a somewhat reticent answer (of a kind dear to small children)" such as (47) The murderer is (a) Mr W. Smith, of Walbey Street, Harrow.

This reply is reticent in so far as it pretends to be specificationally-identifying, whereas in actual fact it is not likely to help the hearer to pick out the murderer from a given set of people.) Consider now (46,a). The proper names here cannot be used as mere labels (as in (46,b)) because they presuppose 'acquaintance' in the sense of Fodor (1976) (cf.

8. In chapter 1 (section 4.6.F) we noted that tf-clefts whose focus is a pronoun like some/somebody/ someone/something are unacceptable (e.g. *It was somebody who was on the pavement).

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footnote 5). That is, the very use of proper names like John and Smith implies that the speaker has a particular person in mind: there are specific persons who are known to him as 'John' and 'Smith' and who are fully identifiable by the mere use of these names. In consequence, such names are not likely to be used in the predicate complement of a descriptionally-identifying sentence but will naturally be taken to represent specificational information.9»10 The same is true of personal pronouns like me, him, her, etc. These too cannot be used as mere labels that are stuck to a person who has already been identified. Rather, they can only be interpreted as specifying a value for a variable. For example: (48) (Who's that boy in the photograph?) - Why don't you recognize him? lt/*he is me/John! Even though the use of that boy implies that the variable has already been given a value, it is possible to add further specificationally-identifying information in the form of me/John because these represent more strongly identifying information. Whereas the use of that boy merely enables the hearer to pick out the person referred to from a particular set (hence at a particular place and time), the use of me or John enables him to pick him out from any set, immediately and unconditionally (i.e. at any place and time). It should be noted that still other NPs can sometimes be used in a similar way, provided they also unequivocally refer to a specific and known person. For example: (49)(a) (Who's that boy?) - Why, don't you recognize him? It/he is my son! (b) (Who's that man?) - It/he is the Prime Minister. 9. This concurs with Searle's (1971: 215-217) statement that proper names are not "used to describe or specify characteristics of objects": "Unlike definite descriptions they do not in general specify any characteristics at all of the objects to which they refer. 'Scott' refers to the same object as does 'the author of Waverley" but 'Scott' specifies none of its characteristics, whereas 'the author of Waverley" refers only in virtue of the fact that it does specify a characteristic". However, Searle wrongly treats all proper names alike. As we have seen, some proper names (viz. those that are used without 'acquaintance') may specify a 'characteristic' (i.e. a description), as in (46,b). 10. The observation that proper names in Ae-sentences do not imply acquaintance, whereas those in Λ-sentences do, explains the use of he and it in the following example from Kruisinga (1932a: 103):

(i) Suddenly there came the man. Some say he was Mr E V Lucas, an author whom we trust it is no discourtesy to call celebrated. Others say it was Mr Grant Richards, the well-known publisher. As is clear from the different nature of the appositions (the definite the well-known publisher versus the indefinite an author whom...) and from the fact that only Mr Lucas's name is preceded by initials, the speaker expects the reader to be familiar with Mr Grant Richards, but he does not expect him to be acquainted with Mr Lucas.

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Sentences like these show that NPs like my son and the Prime Minister can be used as additional descriptions in descriptionally-identifying Ae-sentences, but can also convey spedficationally-identifying information in the same way as personal pronouns and proper names. It should be pointed out, finally, that, although proper names that presuppose acquaintance in Fodor's (1976) sense are normally used in specificationallyidentifying sentences only, there may be exceptional cases in which they are used differently. The following sentence (which is used for a different purpose by Fodor (1976: 143)) is a case in point: (50) Charley believes that Tom is not Tom. Silly old Charley. Of course he is Tom. In this sentence the speaker states that the name Tom, which in his opinion is a description that applies to a particular person X, is wrongly rejected by Charley as a description for X : according to Charley the man referred to as Tom by the speaker is not called Tom. Sentence (50) is therefore paraphrasable as either (51,a) or (51 )(a) Charley believes that the man that I call Tom is not called Tom. Silly old Charley. Of course he is called Tom. (b) Charley believes that the man I call Tom is not the man who is called Tom. Silly old Charley. Of course he is the man who is called Tom. In both these paraphrases he refers to the man that I call Tom. The sentence Of course he is Tom is therefore equivalent to either (52,a) or (52,b): (52)(a) Of course the man I call Tom is called Tom. (b) Of course the man I call Tom is the man who is called Tom. These paraphrases make clear that the sentence is not specificationally-identifying : it does not specify a value (Tom) for a variable. Rather, this specification has already taken place: the speaker has no doubt that the person in question is the unique person that is generally referred to as Tom (i.e. represents the unique variable that has the value Tom'). On the interpretation (52,a), He is Tom is a predicational sentence; on the interpretation (52,b) it is an identity statement (i.e. the speaker asserts that the man he calls Tom is the same person as the man who is generally known under the name of Tom). As we will see below (section 6.3), identity statements whose NPs have a human referent can also make use of he, but not of it. 4.7. There is a restriction on the use of it in specificationally-identifying sentences which apparently has to do with the number of the NP in the presupposed WH-clause:

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(53)(a) (Who's the murderer?) - It's a friend of mine, (b) (Who are the murderers?) - *lt is friends of mine. They are friends of mine. This restriction is in keeping with my analyses, since I have argued that //-sentences are reduced //-clefts and that the questions of the form 'Who is NP?' that they answer must therefore be interchangeable with 'Who is it who is NP?'. We now notice that this kind of reformulation is possible only in (53,a):

(54)(a) Who is it who is the murderer? (b) *Who is it who are the murderers? The ungrammaticality of (54,b) is due to a conflict between two requirements: on the one hand, there is the requirement that // should combine with a singular verb (/'/ are is always ungrammatical); on the other hand, a question beginning with who will require a plural verb if who is assumed to refer to more than one person (e.g. we cannot say Who has done this? if we assume that it has been done by several people). In other words, the use of a plural NP like the murderers requires that who should be followed by a plural verb, whereas the use of it makes this impossible. The impossibility of substituting (54,b) for the question in (53,b) excludes any reply in the form of a reduced //-cleft. Instead, we have to use a descriptionallyidentifying sentence with they. This requirement will, however, lead to another conflict when the predicate nominal in the reply is an expression like them or John and Mary which cannot be used as predicate nominal in a descriptionallyidentifying sentence but requires the use of an //-sentence. In that case the latter requirement prevails and // is used, even though a question of the type Who is it who... ? is excluded:

(55) (Who (*is it who) are the leaders here? - It is/*they are them/John and Mary. 4.8. The hypothesis that //-sentences are reduced //-clefts is further corroborated by sentences like the following:

(56) A whisper went round: "The Queen!" and Queen Mary herself it was. (Scheurweghs 1959:116) It was pointed out in chapter 1 (section 3.4) that proposing the predicate nominal is normally possible in predicational sentences, but not in specificational or

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descriptionally-identifying ones:11 (57)(a) (You must not speak ill of John.) A true gentleman he is, I am sure, (predicational) (b) (Who's the murderer?) - *That gentleman over there the murderer is. (specificational) (c) (Who's that man?) - *A friend of mine that man is. (descriptionally-identifying) The possibility of proposing Queen Mary herself in (56) (which is specificational) would therefore seem inexplicable, if it were not for the fact that we treat such //-sentences as reduced //-clefts. In //-clefts the postcopular NP can, indeed, easily be proposed: (58) Queen Mary herself it was who came to welcome us. 4.9. In section 2.7 of chapter 1 we noted that //-cleft sentences are semantically equivalent to simplex sentences that are specificational. Thus, there is no semantic difference between (59,a) and (59,b): (59)(a) It is Smith who is the murderer, (b) SMITH is the murderer. Some linguists have even argued that (59,a) is actually derived from (59,b) by a clefting operation which extracts the focus from the simplex sentence and turns the presupposition into a WH-clause. (Although this operation is now usually rejected because it appears to be syntactically unmotivated, I will continue to speak of (59,a) as the 'clefted version' of (59,b). In doing so I do not make any claim concerning the transformational derivation of //-clefts.) If it is correct that //-clefts are somehow derived by a transformation moving (extracting) the clefted constituent, then what happens in //-clefts is very similar to what happens in dislocated structures like the following: (60)(a) It's Jack Smith, the (one who is the) murderer, (b) The (one who is the) murderer, it's Jack Smith.

11. In chapter 1 (section 3.4.A) I stressed that preposing the predicate nominal is not the same thing as reversing the copular sentence. Preposing moves an element (other than the subject) into initial position (e.g. for topicalization), but does not affect the subject NP, which consequently remains before the verb. In contrast, when a sentence is reversed, both the subject and the predicate nominal are moved, so that be remains between the two NPs. Specificational sentences do not allow the predicate nominal to be proposed, but they are reversible. Predicational sentences, in contrast, are not reversible, but they permit preposing of the postcopular NP

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(As a matter of fact, some people have argued that (59,a) is derived from (60,a) rather than from (59,b) - see e.g. Gundel 1977b, Harries-Delisle 1978:422, Givon 1979:246.) It follows that, if independent if-sentences are reduced zi-clefts, as I have argued, we should expect the use of it versus he in independent clauses to be the same as the use of it versus he in dislocated structures. This expectation is actually borne out, as appears from the following examples: (61 )(a) (b) (62)(a) (b) (63)(a)

(Who's the murderer?) - lt/*he is John/me. The murderer, it/*he is John/me. (Who's Jack Smith ?) - He/*it is a friend of mine. Jack Smith, he/*it is a friend of mine. lt/*she was Alice, the one who just had the baby. (Gundel 1977b:555)

(b) Who was it Nixon chose? - It was Agnew, the one Nixon chose. (Bolinger 1972a: 112) We should also notice the difference between (64,a) and (64,b): (64)(a) The murderer, who is it? (b) The murderer, who is he? Whereas (64,a) clearly asks for specificationally-identifying information (which should enable the hearer to pick out the murderer from a set), (64,b) requires a descriptionally-identifying reply: it implies that some elementary identification has already taken place and asks for further descriptions (i.e. the speaker would like to know more about the murderer).

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5. The theory I have developed thus far still raises a couple of questions, but I think they can be given a satisfactory answer: 5.1. A first problem concerns sentences of the following type: (65)(a) (Who's that?) - lt/*he is the son of the Prime Minister, (b) (Who can this be?) - lt/*he is Colonel Brandon. (Poutsma 1916:734)

These sentences are clearly descriptionally-identifying: the use of that and this in the questions implies that elementary identification has already taken place (i.e. the person has been picked out from a group), so that the subject NPs of (65,a-b) are strongly referring and the sentences serve to give an additional description which must render full identification possible (since the man referred to by this or that appears to be otherwise unknown to the person asking Who's that? or Who can this be?). That (65,a-b) are not specificationally-identifying is furthermore clear from the fact that completion with WH-clauses is impossible (which means that (65,a-b) are no reduced /i-clefts): (66)(a) *lt is the son of the Prime Minister who is that, (b) *lt is Colonel Brandon who can be this.

However, in spite of the fact that (65,a-b) are descriptionally-identifying, we have to use it instead of he. (Poutsma (1916:4) also notes this explicitly in connection with (65,b): "When a person is indicated by a demonstrative pronoun, he/she/they cannot be used.") The solution to this problem appears to be that deictic that and this, if used with reference to persons, can only be referred to by another nonpersonal deictic form, i.e. by that/this itself (which could, indeed, be substituted for it in (65,a-b)) or by it, which is known to be the "stress-reduced" (Kuroda 1968: 250-251) anaphoric form of the pronouns that and this (cf. sentences like (67)(a) That man is the son of the Prime Minister, isn't he/*it? (b) That/this is the son of the Prime Minister, isn't it/*he/*that/ *this?

See also Higgins 1976:179-180.) This is in keeping with the fact that he is actually only ungrammatical in (65,a-b) if it is an anaphoric pronoun (referring back to that/this), not if it is used deictically (i.e. in a nonanaphoric, demonstrative way).12 12. Pollock (1983: 105) also notes that, although we normally have to say That's Paul rather than *He is Paul, there is nothing wrong with HE is Paul (in which the pronoun is pronounced with contrastive accent).

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The it of (65,a-b) is thus not the it of a (reduced) it-cleft and does not present any real problem for our analysis. It should be noted that the possibility of using // as a weak form of thai/this in descriptionally-identifyirig sentences may be taken to be the origin of quite a number of d-sentences. For example: (68) The clatter of Penny Pitches' heavy shoes came echoing down the passage. "Is it your son?' broke in Mr. Geard, but the priest shook his head. (Kruisinga & Erades 1953:453) Compare also the following sentences: (69)(a) (Here is the girl that asked for you.) She seems to be a friend of yours, (b) (Here is the girl that asked for you.) Why! It's a friend of mine! In (9,a) she is merely anaphoric; in (69,b) // is deictic (i.e. a weak demonstrative). 5.2. Whereas descriptionally-identifying sentences need to have that/this or it as subject if the referent is the pronoun that or this, they may use both an anaphoric subject (he/she) or a deictic one (that/this/it) if the referent is an NP involving that or this as a determiner: (70) Who is that boy? - He/that/it is a cousin of mine. The claim that this it not that of a reduced //-cleft is borne out by several observations. First, the full if-cleft is ungrammatical: (71) *lt is a cousin of mine who is that boy. Secondly, the claim that it is a stress-reduced thai is confirmed by the observation that // is excluded whenever that is excluded, e.g. when the antecedent involves the plural determiner those: (72) Who are those people? - They are friends of mine. *That is/are friends of mine. *lt is/are friends of mine. The possibility of using it also accords with that of using that in sentences like the following: (73)(a) (Do you see that boy?) That/it/he is the murderer, (b) (Do you see that boy?) He/*that/*it is said to be the murderer.

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5.3. An interesting problem for the reduced it-cleft hypothesis is raised by sentences like the following: (74)(a) (Who was at the door this morning?) - Nobody. (b) (Who was at the door this morning ?) - Oh, it was nobody. There is a difference of meaning between (74,a) and (74,b): the former denies that anybody was at the door, the latter presupposes that somebody was at the door but asserts that the call was unimportant. In our analysis, (74,b) should be a reduced i'f-cleft, but the full cleft appears to be unacceptable: (75) "It was nobody that was at the door this morning. As explained in chapter 1 (section 4.6.A), the unacceptability of //-clefts like (75) results from semantic contradiction: on the one hand, a cleft of the form 'It was X that was at the door' necessarily carries the presupposition that someone was at the door; on the other hand, filling in nobody for X entails the assertion that nobody was at the door. Still, there are a couple of indications that (74,b) must be a reduced //-cleft. First, unlike (74,a), (74,b) carries the presupposition that someone came to the door. Treating (74,b) as a reduced rt-cleft accounts for this. Secondly, (74,b) provides a description which is not generally applicable to the person referred to, but which applies to him only in so far as he is a participant in the event. Thus, unlike a sentence like (76) That man is (a mere) nobody. (74,b) does not assert that the man who was at the door is somebody unimportant: it merely asserts that the man in question was a participant in an unimportant event. In section 4.4 we have observed that restrictions like this are typical of (reduced and full) //-clefts. I will therefore assume that (74,b) is a reduced //-cleft and that nobody is a reduction of something like 'nobody of importance'. This is in keeping with the fact that the full //-cleft which on this hypothesis is the putative source of (74,b) is no longer unacceptable: (77) It was nobody of importance that was at the door this morning.

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6. There are a couple of remarks that still need to be made in order to avoid misunderstandings in connection with the previous sections. 6.1. The statement that he cannot be used in specificationally-identifying sentences should be interpreted as meaning that it is not possible to substitute he for it in sentences like (78) (Who's the murderer?) - lt/*he is that old man that lives near the river. In sentences such as this it is the predicate nominal, not the subject, that is the 'identifier' NP However, if it is the subject NP that is the identifier, he can be used (with demonstrative force), whereas it cannot: (79) (Who's the murderer?) - HE/*it is the murderer! Sentence (79) is equivalent to (80,a) and reversible to (80,b): (80)(a) It is HIM (that is the murderer), (b) The murderer is HIM. 6.2. It should also be pointed out that for the use of a reduced it-cleft it is not necessary that the deleted WH-clause should be recoverable from the linguistic context (i.e. should be identical with a phrase or clause that has been used before). In many cases it is the extralinguistic context or situation that makes clear how the reduced #-cleft should be completed. For example: (81 )(a) Felix passed them, and turned to look. Yes, it was they (that were walking there; or: that he had passed, etc.). (Kruisinga &Erades1953:59) (b) (talking about an engagement:} Who is it (that she got engaged to) ? (c) (on seeing people coming in:} Why, it's you (who are coming to see me)! What good news have you got to tell me? 6.3. Up to now identity statements have not been dealt with in this chapter. It should be clear, however, that only Ae-sentences can be interpreted as identity statements (if there is a human referent). For example: (82) It is Mr Hyde who has committed those murders. But one could also say it is Dr Jekyll, for he/*it IS Mr Hyde.

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7. Summarizing the previous sections, we can say that the following principles have been established so far: (a) he can be used as the subject of sentences that are either descriptionally-identifying, predicational,13 or identity statements, and as the identifier NP in specificationally-identifying sentences; (b) //-sentences are either specificationally-identifying sentences answering the question 'Who (is it who) is NP?' or descriptionally-identifying sentences in which // is the stress-reduced form of that/this. There is, however, one more type of //-sentence to be considered. It is illustrated by sentences like the following: (83)(a) (What's that noise?) - Oh, it's only the children. (b) (We heard a sound of footsteps in the hall.) It was John and Mary. Sentences like these should be linked up with sentences like the following, in which the postcopular NP is followed by a relative or participial clause: (84)(a) (What's that noise?) - Oh, it's only the children playing at Red Indians. (b) (We heard a sound of footsteps in the hall.) It was John and Mary coming home. (c) (What's the problem?) - It's that damned neighbour of yours who refuses to accept my offer! I have pointed out elsewhere (Declerck 198la) that sentences like these are peculiar in that the relative or participial clauses do not really modify their NP heads, i.e. they are neither restrictive nor nonrestrictive in the traditional sense of the word. I have adduced ample evidence that clauses like these (which I have called 'pseudo-modifiers') differ from normal restrictive and nonrestrictive relative clauses, both semantically and syntactically. I have also shown that the sentences containing them are no //-clefts. (Ten arguments have been adduced to this effect. Among them are the observations that, unlike //-clefts, //-sentences like (84,a-c) do not alternate with WH-clefts, do not allow tense neutralization, cannot involve that (instead of who) after a proper name, cannot be conjoined without omission of it is, allow

13. The latter possibility has been somewhat neglected in the previous sections (which have been mainly concerned with Ae/o-sentences answering the question 'Who is NP?'), but it is clear that predicational sentences (answering the question' What is NP?') cannot make use of it if there is a human referent. The following sentences illustrate this: (i) What is John ? - He/'it is a teacher. (ii) John Roberts is always eating candy. He/*it is the fattest boy I know

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passivization without semantic impact, and do not allow deletion of the relative pronoun that.) It follows that, if the //-sentences of (83,a-b) can be considered reduced sentences of the type (84,a-c), they are certainly not reduced //-clefts. On the other hand, they are not instances of descriptionally-identifying sentences using a deictic it either, since sentences like (84,a-c) are clearly specificationallyidentifying. They fully satisfy the definition of specificational sentences (viz. sentences in which "the predicate complement says what constitutes or makes up the object referred to by the subject noun phrase" (Higgins 1976: 93)) and allow the kind of paraphrase that is typical of specificational sentences: (85)(a) The noise you hear is the following : the children are playing at Red Indians. (b) The sound of footsteps that we heard was (caused by) the following: John and Mary were coming home. (c) The problem is the following: that damned neighbour of yours refuses to accept my offer. As is suggested by these paraphrases, a sentence like (84,a) appears to have as underlying structure something like (86,a), although its superficial structure is of the formof(86,b): (86)(a) Np[Np[tne noise]NP s[you hear]s]NP be s[the children be playing at Red lndians]s (b) Np[Np[the noiseJNp s [you hear] S]NP is NP[Np[the children] NP s[(who are) playing at Red IndiansJsJNP In Declerck (198 la) I have provided further evidence for structures like these and argued for a movement transformation ('pseudo-modifier creation') deriving (86,b) from (86,a). However this may be, it is clear that //-sentences like (84,a-c) are different from the types that we have discussed in the previous sections. Their relevant features are that they are specificational and that their subject it is not the dummy // of an //-cleft. Rather, // mostly refers (anaphorically or deictically) to a (noun phrase referring to a) sensory perception (e.g. a noise) or to an Operator' noun (Plötz 1972: 37) \ikeproblem, thing, reason, cause, question, etc. Sentences such as (83,a-b) can be regarded as reduced versions of such pseudo-modifier constructions. Thus, (83,a) expresses that the noise that is heard is caused by the children doing something, but what that something is is not expressed: the VP (which would normally appear as a pseudo-modifier) is left unexpressed. There are at least three good arguments that support this reduction theory : a. If we do not assume there to be a VP in the underlying structure of (83,a), this sentence must be the pronominalized version of (87) *That noise is only the children.

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However, (87) is unacceptable because it violates the requirement that "the noun phrases in a specificational statement (...) must be non-distinct with respect to all those semantic features which play a role in selectional restrictions" (Akmajian 1979: 35). (That is, the unacceptability of (87) is of the same nature as that of (88) *The man over there is the woman I know.) If (87) does not seem totally unacceptable in informal English, it is because the same sentence could be used as a reduced pseudo-modifier construction.

b. Perhaps the strongest evidence that the children is not a normal predicate nominal in (83,a) is that the sentence (although specificational) is not reversible: (89) The children are/is only it/that noise. If (83,a) were a simplex specificational sentence it would have to be reversible to (89) (cf. chapter 1, section 2.11). But if the sentence is a reduced pseudomodifier construction (i.e. if the children is what remains of the NP after deletion of the pseudo-modifier), the ungrammatically of (89) becomes explicable, since there appear to be severe restrictions on the reversibility of sentences whose predicate nominal involves a pseudo-modifier. Compare: (90)(a) That noise is the children playing at Red Indians, (b) The children playing at Red Indians is/are that noise. c. Another piece of evidence is provided by sentences like (91) (What's that noise ?) - Never mind. What you hear is only the children. As pointed out by Halliday (1967:234) and Kuno (1970:50), it is not normally possible to use what as subject of a specificational WH-cleft whose focus is a human NP with specific reference: (92)(a) What she needs is a daughter/*her. (Halliday 1967: 234) (b) *What I love is that girl. (c) *What I heard singing yesterday was the children. The grammaticality of (91) is therefore only explicable on a reduced pseudomodifier construction analysis (according to which the referent of what is a clause in underlying structure).

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8. CONCLUSION Copular sentences involving a predicate nominal with a human referent can have a pronominal subject which is either // or a regular personal pronoun (agreeing with the predicate nominal in gender and number) such as he/she/they. In this chapter I have argued that the following principles govern the selection of it versus he/she/they: a. He/she/they must be used in predicational sentences. b. He/she/they are the normal forms in descriptionally-identifying sentences, but it can be used there as the stress-reduced form of this/that c. Deictic he/she/they can be used in specificationally-identifying sentences only if they represent the identifier NP (as in (79)). d. Otherwise it has to be used in specificationally-identifying sentences, //-sentences like these can be of two types: those that answer the question Who is it who... ? are reduced //-clefts; those in which /'/ refers anaphorically or deictically to a sensory perception or to a noun like problem are reduced pseudo-modifier constructions. e. Only he/she/they-sentences can be interpreted as identity statements.

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CHAPTER 3. PREDICATIONAL IT-CLEFTS 1. In chapter 1 (section 3.7) we noted that a WH-cleft like (1) What the jewel thief did not steal was worthless jewelry is ambiguous between a specificational and a predicational interpretation. On the specificational reading the sentence is equivalent to (2,a), on the predicational reading it can be paraphrased by (2,b): (2)(a) It was worthless jewelry that the jewel thief did not steal, (b) Such jewelry as was not taken away by the jewel thief was worthless. //-clefts, by contrast, cannot normally be interpreted predicationally: they are inherently specificational.1 Thus, sentence (3), which is the //-cleft corresponding to (1), cannot possibly have the predicational reading that (1) can have: (3) The jewel thief did not steal the following: worthless jewelry. Similarly, the specificational WH-cleft (4,a) has an it-deft counterpart (4,b), but there are no //-cleft sentences corresponding to the predicational (5,a) and (6,a): (4)(a) (b) (5)(a) (b) (6)(a) (b)

What I read was a book. It was a book that I read. What I read was interesting. *lt was interesting that I read. What is happening is a blow to every one of us. *lt is a blow to every one of us that is happening.

In chapter 1 it was also stressed that the statement that //-clefts are always specificational should not be misunderstood as meaning that they cannot involve any predicational information whatever. As is clear from a sentence like (7) What John is is ambitious.

The observation that it-clefts are always specificational has been made by a large number of linguists. See e.g. Akmajian 1979: 163, Clark & Haviland 1977: 11, Dik 1980a: 41, Gundel 1977b: 547, Hajicova & Sgall 1975: 5, Halliday 1967: 68, 236, Harries-Delisle 1978: 422, Huddleston 1971:246, Jacobsson 1971:322, Kuno 1976:443, Van Dijk 1977:121, Visser 1970: 40, Delahunty 1981: 74.

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both the variable of the WH-cleft (what John is) and the value assigned to it (ambitious) may be predicational, but even then the structure as a whole is specificational, precisely because it specifies a value for a variable. The same is true of //-clefts like the following:2 (8)(a) It is ambitious that John is, not haughty, (b) I can find no trace of his having exercised any profession before 1980.1 wonder what it was that he used to be then. Again these sentences are specificational, although both the variable and the value assigned to it are predicational. So, what seems to be impossible in //-clefts is not that the variable and the value are predicational, but that the structure as a whole is predicational. As illustrated by (5,b) and (6,b), it is impossible to interpret the head clause (i.e. it is + the focal item) as giving predicational information about some referent (identified by the WH-clause). //-clefts can apparently only be interpreted as specifying a value for a variable. However, in this chapter I aim to show that this rule is not as strict as it is widely assumed to be (cf. footnote 1), and that there do appear to be types of //-clefts that are in a certain sense predicational. After having considered what is ostensibly such an exception in section 2, I will draw attention to some types of //-clefts that are partly, and sometimes even purely, predicational.

2. Examples of it-clefts with a predicational variable and value are more difficult to come by because there are severe restrictions on the occurrence of predicate nominals in the focal (value) position of it-clefts. See chapter 4 for a detailed treatment.

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2. What, at first sight, would seem to be the clearest case of predicational Λ-clefts is to be observed in proverbial sentences like the following. (The examples come from Jespersen (1961: 89), who includes them in his discussion of //-clefts): (9)(a) (b) (c) (d)

It is a poor heart that never rejoices. It is an ill bird that fouls its own nest. It is a long lane that has no turning. It is a wise child that knows his own father.

Other, somewhat less proverbial, examples are: (10)(a) It is a good divine that followes his owne instructions. (Jespersen 1961:89) (b) It would be a brave man who tried to stand up against Mr Davidson, (ibid.) (c) It'll be a lucky man who marries her, won't it? (Kruisinga & Erades 1953:145) (d) It would be an inhuman boy who kept a diary without confiding to it some disparaging references to the masters. (Kruisinga 1932b:504) (e) It would be a bold minister who would embark on such fundamental changes. It needs little arguing that sentences like these are predicational: (9,a) is clearly equivalent to (11) A heart that never rejoices is a poor heart. and does not specify a value for a variable.3

3. Delahunty (1981: 32) and Ball (1977: 58) propose (i) as a paraphrase for (9,a):

(i) The heart that never rejoices is a poor heart. Since both the heart in (i) and a heart in (11) are to be interpreted generically, there hardly seems to be any difference between these two paraphrases. However, I will point out below that (9,a) can also be paraphrased in terms of a conditional sentence ('If a heart never rejoices, it is a poor heart') and this kind of paraphrase is also applicable to (11), but not to (i). Jespersen himself proposes the following paraphrase: (ii) The heart that never rejoices is poor. Delahunty (1981: 32-33) remarks that (ii) is "minimally but critically distinct" from (i), as "there seems to be an ambiguity about this paraphrase that is not available in the original" (= our (11)), "nor in the paraphrase structure given in" (i). Another problem for (ii) is that, like (i) and unlike (11), it does not allow the conditional paraphrase referred to above.

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How can this type of "proverbial //-cleft" (Prince 1978: 905) be accounted for? As far as I can see, there is some evidence that such sentences are not //-clefts at all but belong to a different type of sentence: A. A first piece of evidence is that, unlike true //-clefts, sentences like (9,a-d) and (10,a-e) cannot be "uncleft" (Ball 1977: 58). Compare: (12)(a) (b) (13)(a) (b) (14)(a) (b)

It was JOHN who did it. JOHN did it. It's a POOR HEART that never rejoices. A POOR HEART never rejoices. It's a LONG LANE that has no turning. A LONG LANE has no turning.

Whereas (12,b) is equivalent to (12,a) (cf. chapter 1, section 2.7), the (b) sentences of (13)-(14) do not have the same meaning as their (a) counterparts. B. It is well-known that the WH-clause of an //-cleft does not behave like a genuine restrictive relative clause in several respects.4 However, there is plenty of evidence that the WH-clauses of sentences like (9)-(10) are true relative clauses: a. As is well-known, restrictive relative clauses yield a conditional interpretation if the antecedent NP does not have a specific referent. For example, (15,a) can be interpreted as (15,b): (15)(a) A man who has no money may feel obliged to steal, (b) If a man has no money he may feel obliged to steal. 4. For example: (a) The WH-clause of an //-cleft can follow a uniquely referring 'antecedent' such as a personal pronoun (/, me) or a proper name not preceded by an article, whereas a restrictive relative clause cannot. (b) The WH-clause of an //-cleft may sometimes be deleted in subject position (e.g. // was John saw it first), whereas a subject relative pronoun can otherwise never be omitted (except in //zere-constructions). (c) Relative clause reduction is impossible in //-clefts. Compare JOHN was the man working in the garden with *// was JOHN working in the garden. (d) As pointed out by Kuno (1970), a relative clause depending on a predicational human antecedent has to be introduced by which, not that or who (e.g. Bill is the president of the club, which/*that/*who John has in fact always wanted to be). However, a predicational human 'antecedent' can be followed by that in an //-cleft (e.g. // is the president of the club that he has always wanted to be). (e) True relative clauses can often alternate with infinitival clauses (e.g. He was the third man who was arrested/to be arrested). In the corresponding //-cleft an infinitival clause cannot be substituted for the WH-clause: // is the third man that fired the shots/*to fire the shots. (f) A relative clause depending on an antecedent containing such must be introduced by as (e.g. This is such a doll as/*that I'd like to have). The corresponding //-cleft cannot involve as: It is such a doll that/*as I'd like to have.

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It goes without saying that the WH-clause of a specificational cleft cannot be given a similar conditional interpretation, but the sentences of the type under consideration can: (16,a) is interpretable as (16,b) and hence as (16,c). The WH-clause of (16,a) is therefore a genuine relative clause.

(16)(a) It is a happy mother who has such children. (b) A mother who has such children is a happy mother. (c) If a mother has such children, she is a happy mother. b. In hypothetical constructions, true relative clauses follow the system of verb forms used in conditional clauses, whereas the WH-clauses of i/-clefts normally follow the system of verb forms used in head clauses:

(17)(a) If a man5 didn't/*wouldn't have any friends, he wouldn't be happy. (b) A man who didn't/*wouldn't have any friends wouldn't be happy. (c) If John were the one to decide, it wouldn't be a book that would be/?was given to Mary. (d) If I were the one to decide, it would be a more interesting subject that we would be/*were discussing tonight. By this test, the WH-clauses of hypothetical sentences of the type (16,a) qualify as genuine relative clauses, and not as WH-clauses of //-clefts:

(18)(a) If those stones were real??diamonds, it would be a happy mother who possessed/ would possess them. (b) It would be a happy mother who had/ ?? would have such children as you have just described. (c) It would be a bold prophet who predicted/??would predict the future of this company. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that the auxiliary should, which can be used to express improbability in conditional clauses (c£( 19,a)) and conditional relative clauses (cf. (19,b)), can also be found in the WH-clauses of sentences like (16*):

(19)(a) If someone should come, tell him I'm away. (b) A person who should say that would be a rash person. (c) It would be a rash person who should say that a hard voice is universally characteristic of the North or West. (Kirchner 1970:295)

5. The would form in the //-clause is to be interpreted here as a conditional form (with hypothetical meaning). No volitional interpretation is intended.

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c. As pointed out by Kuno (1970) and Higgins (1976: 160), the relative pronoun who cannot be used predicationally in a relative structure with a full lexical antecedent. Instead we use that in restrictive relative clauses and which in nonrestrictive ones: (20)(a) He is not the man that/*who he used to be. (b) He is a reliable man, which/*who you are not. The same restriction applies to it-clefts: (21) It is a teacher that/*who I want to become, not a baker! It-clefts moreover show a similar restriction if the WH-word is not used predicationally itself but has as 'antecedent' a clefted constituent with a predicational focus: in that case that is preferred to who: (22)(a) I thought it was a RELIABLE man that/(who) had been given the job. (b) It is only a DEVOTED wife that/(who) makes her husband happy. (c) It is only RELIABLE people that/(who) should be hired for this job. These sentences are of a type that will be discussed in section 3. They are basically specificational //-clefts, but they turn out to give only predicational information because the adjective in the clefted constituent is the only 'new' element (i.e. the head noun belongs to the information that is 'given' or 'known' - cf. chapter 1, section 2.6). In that case most speakers feel there to be a preference for that (while who is preferred if the predicational adjectives are dropped). Consider now sentences of the type (16,a). Here too the structure is felt to be predicational because it is the adjective (e.g. happy in It is a happy mother who has such children) that conveys the new information in the focal NP Nevertheless, there is no preference for using thai rather than who, although (22,a-c) make clear that //-clefts do show such a preference if the WH-clause depends on a clefted constituent in which the new information is entirely predicational. This confirms that sentences like (16,a) are distinct from //-clefts. (It also suggests that a happy mother is not actually the antecedent of who has such children, which is in keeping with the possible analyses that will be pointed out below.) The above pieces of evidence make clear that predicational sentences like (16,a) are not really //-clefts but represent a type of sentence that is homophonous with //-clefts. They differ from the latter in that they cannot be 'uncleft' and in that they involve a true restrictive relative clause. As far as I can see, there are three possible analyses that can account for these facts, and all three of them have actually been proposed in the linguistic literature. The first, which is asserted but not argued in

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Kirchner (1970: 295), treats the it of such sentences as a 'determinative pronoun' followed by a restrictive relative clause that has undergone so-called extrapositionfrom-NR6 Additional evidence for this analysis is to be found in the fact that in sentences of this type that are less proverbial than (9,a-d) or (16,a) the pronoun it can be replaced with the more regular determinative pronouns he/she: (23)(a) ...and the best that we find in these travels is an honest friend. He is a fortunate voyager who finds many. (Kruisinga 1932b:505) (b) It/he would be a rash prophet who should attempt to fore-tell the future fate of shall and will in American speech. (Galinsky 1952:277) The second analysis that is in keeping with the observation that sentences of this type involve true restrictive relative clauses is advocated by Poutsma (1928: 992) and Jacobsson (1971: 321). According to them, (24,a) is derived from (24,b): (24)(a) It is a happy mother who has such children. (b) *lt is a happy mother, a mother who has such children. This analysis also concurs with the observation that he/she can often be substituted for it, as he/she are in fact the regular pronouns in cases of right dislocation such as (22,b). It follows, however, that the analysis does not account for the possibility of using it - a weakness that it shares with the first analysis, which does not explain this possibility either, since the normal determinative pronouns with human reference are he, she or they. The third analysis, which is proposed by Ball (1977: 11), derives (24,a) from (25,a) via (25,b) (which is the result of applying extraposition-from-NP to (25,a)): (25)(a) The mother who has such children is a happy mother, (b) The mother is a happy mother who has such children. This analysis again has the advantage of treating the WH-clause as a true relative clause. However, Ball herself admits that it encounters the problem that it violates the well-known constraints on backward anaphora. Another problem is that, like the other two analyses, it fails to account for the possibility of using /'/: pronominalization of the mother should result in the use of she, not it.7 6. A determinative pronoun is a pronoun that is restrictively modified by a relative clause, participial clause, prepositional phrase or adverbial adjunct (see e.g. Scheurweghs 1959: 133). Thus, the subject pronoun is used determinatively in Those who are here know about this or They laugh best who laugh last. 7. Ball herself fails to recognize this problem because she illustrates her analysis with the example It is a poor heart that never rejoices. (Of course it is the expected pronoun here since the heart is neuter.)

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I will not attempt to argue in favour of one of these three analyses, but I would like to add some comment on the fact that none of them can apparently account for the use of it. In present-day English it cannot normally have a human referent if it is used as a determinative pronoun, as the pronoun left behind in a dislocated structure, or as a cataphoric pronoun. However, we should keep in mind that the type of sentence under consideration is essentially proverbial and, like most proverbs, reminiscent of an older stage of the English language. A closer look at that older stage reveals the following facts: a. As noted by Poutsma (1928: 730), we do "find instances of // used as a kind of determinative" in the writings of Shakespeare: (26)(a) For that's it that always makes a good voyage of nothing, (b) It holds current that I told you of. Note that in (26,b) the relative clause has undergone extraposition-from-NE b. Visser (1970: 41) notes that "it was formerly also used as formal subject of classifying to be, where nowadays he, she, that would be preferred" (Visser's term classifying concurs with our predicational.): (27)(a) Hit is an biscop. (b) T is a good boy', said his master. c. Visser (1970: 50) and Curme (1931b: 188) also point out that in former times the it of specificational /i-clefts could be replaced with a pronoun agreeing with the gender and number of the focal NR Thus, "in the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19ty centuries 'they are my brothers who...' was occasionally used by the side of'// is or it were my brothers who...'" (Visser 1070: 50): (28)(a) They are our own self-chosen employments (...) which hinder prayer. (b) ...she was a stranger with whom you were talking. (Visser 1970:41) (dated 1875) Taking these elements together, we see that (a) in older English it could be used as a determinative pronoun functioning as the head of an NP from which the relative clause could be extraposed; (b) it could replace he/she in predicational sentences; and (c) it is and he/she is were apparently interchangeable anyhow, not only in predicational sentences but even in specificational ιί-clefts.8 It follows that the fact that it can be used in sentences like (9)-(10), where contemporary English should

8. For the rules governing the use of it is versus he/she is in contemporary English, see chapter 2.

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normally require he/she, is no real counterevidence to the possible analyses pointed out above, as long as we keep in mind that this type of sentence is essentially proverbial, and therefore reminiscent of an older stage of the language.9 The general conclusion from this section, then, is that sentences like (9)-(10) represent a type of their own, different from genuine //-clefts, and therefore provide no exception to the rule that //-clefts are essentially specificational.

9. What is not so easy to accept is that the first two of the analyses in question also figure among those that have been argued to hold for genuine ω-clefts. The analysis in terms of a determinative pronoun and extraposition-from-NP is claimed by Halliday (1968) and Huddleston (1971:325) to hold for zf-clefts in general, but no real evidence is adduced to support this claim. Bolinger (1972b: 31) makes much the same claim when asserting that the WH-clause of any ίϊ-cleft is an "adjective clause", i.e. "one that modifies // regardless of its function". The same analysis is also argued in Wirth (1978). The second analysis (viz. the one involving a right-dislocated structure as underlying form) is applied to (true) /Y-clefts by Gundel (1977b), Harries-Delisle (1978:422) and Givon (1979:246). However, given the fact that there are fundamental differences between //-clefts and sentences like (9H10), is is rather unlikely that the same analysis should be applicable to both of them.

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3. If we discard such sentences as (9)-(10) we still have not produced any evidence that there exist ίί-cleft sentences that could be called predicational. However, such //-clefts do appear to exist, and the following sentences provide some illustrations: (29)(a) Was it an interesting meeting you went to last night? (b) Is it a very devoted, rather simple-minded young woman who is writing: of that there is no doubt at all. (Kruisinga 1932b: 504) (c) An excellent chapter in Vol. V is Mr Tod's on the economic background. It was a luminous choice which put him in charge of this section, for he has the first two qualifications for the task... (Kruisinga 1932b: 505) (d) Assuredly it was a daring thing which she meant to do. (Poutsma1916:990) (e) What a glorious bonfire it was you made! (Quirk et al. 1972: 954) Sentences like these should be distinguished from sentences like What John is is ambitious, in which, as we have seen, a predicational value is specified for a predicational variable. In (29,a-e) the variable is not predicational, yet the value (i.e. the focal NP) is. In fact, the speaker does not seem to be specifying a value for a variable at all: the variable NP (which is in large part represented by the WH-clause) seems to be referential rather than 'superscriptional' (i.e. resembling the heading of a list - cf. chapter 1, section 2.1). Thus, the correct paraphrases of (29,a-e) would seem to be, not (30,a-e), but (31,a-e): (30)(a) Did you go to the following last night: an interesting meeting? (b) The following person is writing: a very devoted, rather simple-minded young woman. (c) The following put him in charge of this section: a luminous choice. (d) She meant to do the following: a daring thing. (e) You made the following: (what) a glorious bonfire! (31 )(a) Was the meeting that you went to last night interesting ? (b) The young woman who is writing is very devoted and rather simple-minded. (c) The choice that put him in charge of this section was a luminous one. (d) What she meant to do was (a) daring (thing). (e) How glorious the bonfire was that you made!

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Sentences like (31,a-e) are predicational without doubt, yet they represent the correct meanings of (29,a-e),10 which are it-cleft sentences and should therefore be specificational. When we examine the syntactic behaviour of the latter sentences we notice that they show characteristics of both predicational and specificational sentences. In the remainder of this section I will point out some twenty characteristics that they share with predicational sentences. In section 4 I will subsequently go into the characteristics that they share with purely specificational sentences. 3.1. Perhaps the simplest proof that sentences like (29,a-e) are (to a certain extent) predicational is that they can be used in answer to a question that is explicitly asking for a predicational answer: (32)A. The car you saw in front of the house, was it a red one or a green one? B. It was a GREEN car that I saw in front of the house. Notice that in (32,B) all the information except green is old. The new information is entirely predicational. Similarly: (33)A. You're a lucky man. You're rich, you have a good job and an amiable wife... B. It's certainly not a GOOD job that I have! (or: It's certainly not an AMIABLE wife that I have!) In (33,B) (which is a cleft of the 'correcting' type - see chapter 1 (section 2.6. A) and chapter 5 (section 4)), it is not the entire clefted constituent but only the predicational element in it (viz. the adjective good/amiable) that is negated, i.e. that, together with not, constitutes the new information.

10. The observation that the sentence type illustrated by (29,a-e) conveys predicational information is also made by Kruisinga (1932b: 504). Kruisinga uses (29,b-c) as illustrations and comments that these sentences represent "what may be called the descriptive type. What is formally the main clause might be a nominal predicate in the usual sentence type". Since publishing the article that serves as the basis for this chapter (viz. Predicational clefts in Lingua 61 (1983): 9-45) I have found that the point I am making in connection with (29,a-e) is also made by Ball (1977). Ball also notes that although "it has been claimed that all //-clefts are specificational", sentences like (i,a-c) "are predicational //-clefts: the subjects are referential, and the focus is read as predicated of the subject in each". Thus, (i,a) "cannot be read as specifying what you're wearing, but instead is interpreted as a comment on a particular property of the dress that you're wearing."

(i)(a) Gee, it's a nice dress you're wearing. (b) It sure is a fast car you drive. (c) It's a subtle distinction you're making.

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3.2. In chapter 1 (section 4.2.B) we saw that the negator no cannot be used to negate the focus of a specificational sentence. Thus, we cannot substitute no for not a in the following: (34)(a) What we need is not a teacher, (b) It is not a teacher that we need. On the other hand, no can occur in some predicational NPs, viz. in those that express a property in the strict sense of the term. Thus, we can use John is no teacher to express that John does not have the qualities of a teacher, or we can say Mary is no hero, etc. Consider now the following sentences, which are acceptable if the negation is interpreted as bearing on the adjective in the clefted constituent: (35)(a) It was no MEAN gathering of souls that Mrs Brockett's dingy gas illuminated. (Kruisinga 1932b: 504) (b) It's no RELIABLE man that you have hired, but a crook! (c) It was no INTERESTING meeting that I went to. The possibility of using no in such sentences confirms that the information given is really predicational. On the other hand, the choice of no seems less natural to many people than the use of not a, and in some sentences it yields a somewhat questionable result: (36)

?

lt certainly was no BEAUTIFUL girl who asked me to marry

her. This is in keeping with what will become clear throughout sections 3 and 4, viz. that sentences like (29,a-e) are really border-line cases: although the information they convey is predicational, they are formally //-cleft sentences, and ^-clefts are essentially specificational in nature. Because of this we will see that sentences like (29,a-e) share characteristics and restrictions of both specificational and predicational sentences at the same time. 3.3. In section 3.5.A. of chapter 1 it was pointed out that predicational NPs may indicate a property that is gradable and may therefore enter into grading constructions such as (37)(a) (b) (c) (d)

He is more of a hero than Kelly. What a disgrace it was! He is such a baby. How intelligent is he?

Grading constructions of this kind are incompatible with a specificational interpretation. As pointed out by Akmajian (1979:164), "predication is a semantic relation which admits comparison and modification of degree, while specification is

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a semantic relation which in some sense implies uniqueness, and there can be no modification of degree. Thus, one can say that someone is very fat, or somewhat tall, or that someone is taller than someone else. However, one cannot say that Jones is somewhat the man who robbed the bank, or that he is more the man who robbed the bank than he is the man who lives on the corner. Jones either is or is not the man who robbed the bank, and there can be no sense of modification of degree." This difference between predicational and specificational sentences provides us with a strong argument for saying that sentences like (29,a-e) are predicational, for the predicate nominal allows comparison and modification of degree: (29)(e) What a glorious bonfire it was you made! (38)(a) It was such an important meeting that he went to last night that he is extremely happy now that he did not miss it. (b) How interesting a subject is it that they are discussing ? (c) (The subject matter of the latest debates was not particularly interesting.) It is a rather more interesting topic, however, that we are going to discuss tonight. (d) Are you really saying that it is a BETTER player than Kevin that you are looking for? 3.4. The difference that we assume there to be between 'predicational //-clefts' like (29,a-e) and specificational //-clefts is borne out by the fact that a cleft from either class can be conjoined with a cleft from the same class, but not with one from the other class: (39)(a) It was a BOOK that John gave me and a BIKE that Mary gave me. (spec. + spec.) (b) It is an IMPORTANT meeting that I'm going to and an INTERESTING subject that they're discussing, (pred. + pred.) (c) ??lt is an IMPORTANT meeting that I'm going to and JOHN who is presiding at it. (pred. + spec.) (d) ??lt is JOHN who is going to lead the debate and an INTERESTING subject that is going to be discussed, (spec. + pred.) As pointed out in section 4.1.B of chapter 1, predicational and specificational elements cannot be coordinated, except zeugmatically (see also Halliday (1967: 71): (40)(a) *John is the tall one and also fat. (b) *John is both the bank robber and very charming. 3.5. Higgins (1976: 194) notes that (41,a) is ambiguous between a specificational and a predicational reading, but that (41,b) yields only the predicational interpretation:

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(41 )(a) Where John is going to is a nice place, (b) Where John is going is a nice place. Both sentences can be reformulated as //-clefts:

(42)(a) It is a nice place where/that John is going to. (b) It is a nice place where John is going. Sentence (42,a) is again ambiguous, while (42,b) yields only the predicational interpretation. As a matter of fact, (42,b) is a sentence of the type (29,a-e) and therefore confirms the existence of predicational //-clefts. 3.6. In a copular sentence in which to be is preceded by seem, the copula can never be deleted on a specificational reading:

(43)(a) (b) (44)(a) (b)

The murderer seems to be Jack Jones. The murderer seems Jack Jones. It seems to be a book that is missing. *lt seems a book that is missing.

There appear to be some restrictions on deleting to be from predicational sentences as well,11 but there are no exceptions to the rule that only a predicational reading is possible if to be is actually deleted. Thus, WH-clefts like (45,a-b) are not ambiguous between a predicational and a specificational reading but can only be interpreted predicationally:

(45)(a) What you are working on seems an interesting subject, (b) What he suggested seemed a difficult thing to do. The above observations provide a further argument for the claim that //-clefts may be predicational, since //-clefts such as the following appear to be acceptable: (46)(a) It seemed an interesting subject that he was working on. (b) It seemed a difficult thing to do that they required of him. 3.7. In section 4.7. of chapter 1 we saw that the verb become cannot be used as the copula of a specificational sentence because it "behaves rather like an inchoative to the verb be in its Predicational meaning" (Higgins 1976:150-151). Thus, sentences like (47,a-b) are ungrammatical, and the same is true of specificational //-clefts involving become, such as (47,c):

11. For example, to be appears to be more easily dispensable in (i,a-b) than in (ii,a-b): (i)(a) That seems (to be) a difficult thing to do.

(b) She always seems (to be) sad. (ii)(a) He seems (to be) an important man. (b) Bill seems (to be) a close friend of John's.

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(47)(a) 'John's friend became that girl. (b) *The man who robbed the bank became you. (c) *lt has become John who is our worst enemy. However, it does appear to be possible to find become in sentences like (29,a-e): (48)(a) A couple of weeks ago it seemed clear which candidate deserved voting for, but now many people think that it has become a difficult choice they have to make. (b) After the recent troubles it has become an extremely important issue that the ministers will discuss next week. (c) In the meantime it has become something different that the children would like to have. This is another piece of evidence that sentences like (29,a-e) are predicational //-clefts. 3.8. Another argument, similar to the previous one, concerns the possibility of adding adverbials like no longer or not... any more to the copula. In specificational sentences this can be done only if the variable is such that different values can be assigned to it at different times, as in (49,a-b). Otherwise the result is unacceptable: (49)(a) (b) (50)(a) (b) (c)

The president is no longer John. It is no longer John who is the president. The murderer of Smith is no longer John. *lt is no longer John who (is the man who) murdered Smith. *lt is no longer an ice cream that I have given to Mary. It has melted.

In predicational sentences the adverbial will be possible as long as the property referred to is temporary:

(51)(a) John is no longer ill. (b) 'This circle is no longer round. Consider now:

(52)(a) It is no longer an INTERESTING subject that they are discussing, (b) It is not a HAPPY woman any more that is speaking here. If the adverbials do not cause the sentences to be unacceptable here it is not because the variables are such that different values can be assigned to them. The sentences must therefore be predicational.

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3.9. As noted in chapter 1 (section 4.5.), the tense of the copula in a specificational sentence may either depend on the variable part or be a neutralized present tense:12 (53)(a) The one who murdered Smith was/is John, (b) It was/is John who murdered Smith. In predicational sentences, however, the tense can never be neutralized. Thus in (54) The man who murdered Smith was cruel. is cannot be substituted for was without semantic import. The reason is that in predicational sentences the tense of the copula expresses the time at which the property is applicable to the referent of the subject NP (see also section 3.10). Consider now: (55)(a) It is/would be a book that John would give to me if he had his way. (b) It would be/*is a more interesting subject that we would be discussing if John had his way. In (55,a) neutralization of the tense is possible because the /'/-cleft is specificational. In (55,b), on the other hand, is cannot be used, which is another indication that (at least in certain respects) this type of //-cleft is not specificational but predicational.13 3.10. If tense neutralization does not occur in predicational sentences, we noted in chapter 1 (section 4.5) that there is another type of variation that is possible there. Consider the following: (56)(a) (b) (c) (d)

The man who told you that is dangerous. The man who told you that was dangerous. The man who told you that has always been dangerous. The man who told you that will be dangerous (if you betray him).

The variation observed here has nothing to do with the phenomenon of tense neutralization: (56,a) is not equivalent to either (56,b), (56,c) or (56,d). Rather, the

12. This does not mean that both tenses are always equally appropriate. See chapter 1 (section 4.5) for some discussion. 13. As could be expected, predicational sentences of the type It is a happy mother who has such children behave like (55,b): (i) It would be/*is a bold prophet who predicted the future of shall and will in American English.

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variation is a natural consequence of the predicational nature of these sentences: the property assigned to the referent of the subject NP may be a property which the person in qurestion has (now), had (at some time in the past), has had (for some time) or will have (at some time in the future). Specificational sentences can show this kind of variation only if the variable is such that different values can be specified for it at different times (cf. section 3.8): (57) JOHN is/was/has been/will be the chairman of the committee. Otherwise only a present tense form of the copula is possible. Thus, sentences like (58,a-b) are ungrammatical, while (58,c) cannot mean that the person who murdered Smith is 'that man over there' now but possibly was not him at some time in the past. (That is, is is a neutralized tense form in (58,c).) (58)(a) The one who murdered Smith has always been that man over there. (b) The one who murdered Smith will be that man over there. (c) The one who murdered Smith is that man over there. As could be expected, specificational //-clefts behave in exactly the same way: (59) It is/*has always been/*will be that man over there who murdered Smith. On the other hand, if we examine predicational //-clefts like (29,a-e), we notice that a variation of the kind observed in (56,a-d) is possible: (60)(a) It was/is an INTERESTING subject that they were discussing. (b) It was/is a WISE man who said that. (c) It is/was/will (prove to) be/has already proved to be a FAR-REACHING decision that was made yesterday. The tense variation here is not of the type observed in (57): it is not the case that different values are assigned to one and the same variable. Rather, the variation is as in (56,a-d). The fact that such a variation is possible (at least to a certain degree)14 confirms that the focal item of such sentences is predicational. On the other hand, the fact that the possibility of variation may well be more restricted here than it is in nonclefts like (56,a-d) (cf. footnote 14) confirms that //-clefts are not a natural means of conveying predicational information.

14. In some cases the result is not so acceptable: (i) It was/ ?is/ ?will prove to be an IMPORTANT person that you threw out just now.

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3.11. As pointed out by Higgins (1976: 207), "the copula in a Specificational pseudo-cleft sentence cannot have a 'straight' negation of the predicate, but at best only some kind of contradiction negation". Thus a sentence like (61) What you need is not a doctor. is acceptable only if some continuation with but is explicitly or implicitly present. As we noted in chapter 1 (section 4.2), the same is true of specificational //-clefts, and in fact of any kind of specificational sentence: (62)(a) It is not John who murdered Smith, (b) Smith's murderer is not John. Adding not to a specificational sentence inevitably means that a particular element is rejected as value for the variable and hence that some other value must be chosen. Predicational sentences do not imply this kind of contrast and can therefore have a 'straight' (or 'neutral') negation: (63) The meeting was not interesting. When we examine the negation in sentences like (29,a-e) we find that it is a straight negation, and hence that the /'/-clefts in question must be predicational: (64)(a) It was not an IMPORTANT decision that was made yesterday. (b) It wasn't an INTERESTING subject that they were discussing. 3.12. The predicational nature of such sentences is also apparent from the fact that they lack the exhaustiveness implicature which is typical of specificational //-clefts, and in fact of specificational sentences in general (cf. chapter 1, section 2.9). Unlike (65,a), (65,b) does not suggest that the adressee went to only one place last night. And there is no sense of exhaustiveness attached to the adjective either: if the meeting was interesting there is nothing to suggest that it could not have had other characteristics (e.g. pleasant, long, etc.) as well. (65)(a) Was it a meeting that you went to last night? (b) Was it an INTERESTING meeting that you went to last night? 3.13. The observation that no exhaustiveness implicature follows from the use of predicational //-clefts is in keeping with the fact that, unlike specificational //-clefts (such as (66,a-b)), predicational //-clefts (like (67,a-b)) can have a nonspecific indefinite plural NP as clefted constituent:

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(66)(a) (b) (67)(a) (b)

*lt wasn't things that he told me. *lt wasn't people that told me that. It wasn't INTERESTING things that he told me. It wasn't IMPORTANT people that told me that.

Specificational it-clefts like (66,a-b) are unacceptable because NPs like things and people are too vague to specify a variable or to carry an exhaustiveness implicature. On the other hand, //-clefts like (67,a-b) are fine because they are primarily predicational (i.e. the focal item is not the entire clefted constituent but only the adjective in it). 3.14. Specificational sentences not only have an exhaustiveness implicature but also imply contrastiveness (cf. chapter 1, section 2.8). This naturally follows from the act of specification itself, since specifying a value for a variable necessarily means that other potential values are rejected. The value that is chosen is automatically felt to contrast with the values that are rejected, and this sense of contrastiveness will become stronger according as the set of potential values is more restricted. Thus, if only three people (say John, Bill and Ted) could have killed Smith, the sentence It's John who killed Smith automatically implies 'not Bill or Ted'. In predicational sentences there is no such implication of contrastiveness. In

(68) What he said was interesting. interesting may be contrasted with 'not interesting', in the sense that any term implies the negation of its antonym, but there is no contrast with other adjectives that might have been chosen. When we consider predicational //-clefts like

(69) It was an INTERESTING thing that he told us. we find that they are just like (68) in that they lack the explicit sense of contrastiveness that is attached to Specificational sentences. This is another way, then, in which such //-clefts as (29,a-e) and (69) behave like predicational structures. 3.15. It is well known that the it of an //-cleft can never be followed by a plural form of be. On the other hand, plural predicate nominals in predicational sentences appear to require a plural copula (cf chapter 1, section 4.4). Thus, a sentence like

(70) What he wanted to give me was interesting books. will normally be interpreted specificationally only. For a predicational interpreta-

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tion a sentence like (71) will be required:15 (71) The books that he wanted to give me were interesting (books). It follows that iV-clefts should normally be harder to interpret as predicational if their predicate nominal is in the plural - an expectation which is actually borne out by the fact that a sentence such as (72,b) is much less acceptable on a predicational reading than (72,a). Instead, speakers will normally recur to a construction in which were is possible, such as (72,c):16 (72)(a) It was an INTERESTING meeting that John organized. (b) ?lt was always INTERESTING meetings that John organized. (c) They were always INTERESTING meetings that John organized. It is also interesting to notice that it is becomes much more acceptable if the plural predicate nominal is such that a specificational reading is excluded (e.g. if it contains no (cf. section 3.2)): (73) It was no INTERESTING meetings that John organized. 3.16. In chapter 1 (section 4.5) we noted that copular sentences involving used to be are usually predicational. Sentence (74,a) is an example. Used to be can occur in specificational sentences if the variable is such that different values can be assigned to it at different times, as in (74,b-c), but not if only one value can be assigned to it at any time, as in (74,d): (74)(a) (b) (c) (d)

John used to be a good football player when he was young. The colour that she preferred used to be blue. The one who did most of the work used to be John. The murderer of Tom was/*used to be John.

15. In Dutch there are two alternatives for a sentence like (70). The first, which is the exact equivalent of (70) and yields only the specificational interpretation is (i) Wat hij mij wilde geven was: interessante BOEKEN. 'What he wanted to give me was: interesting books' The second, which can only be interpreted predicationally, is (ii) Wat hij mij wilde geven waren INTERESSANTE boeken. 'What he wanted to give me were interesting books'

16. The observation that clefts of the form 'it is + plural NP + WH-clause' are normally only interpreted specificationally and that we normally use they are instead of it is to render the predicational reading is also made by Ball (1977: 62). Her examples are: (i)(a) They are/?lt is SERIOUS charges you're making. (b) They are/?lt is ROYAL horses you are catching. Let them go. (c) They were/ ?lt was ENGLISH hands that dragged him up to the tree of shame.

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Consider now: (75)(a) It used to be a RELIABLE man that worked for John, (b) It used to be a really GOOD painter who painted their portraits. Sentences like these are grammatical, even if it is assumed that only one value should be assigned to the variable (i.e. if only one man has ever worked for John and if the portraits referred to were all painted by one and the same painter). It follows that (75,a-b) must be taken to be predicational sentences - a conclusion that is confirmed by the fact that they are paraphrasable by (76,a) and (76,b), respectively. (76)(a) The man that worked for them used to be reliable. (b) The one who painted their portraits used to be a really good painter. 3.17. It goes without saying that a question of the type' What kind o/NP is NP ?' is predicational (i.e. asks for predicational information) and cannot, therefore, be suitably answered by a specificational sentence: (77)(a) (What kind of person is John ?) - I think he is a thief. (predicational) (b) (What kind of person is John?) - Ί think the thief is him. (specificational) It follows that both //-clefts in the question-answer pair (78) are predicational: (78) What kind of person is it that you're looking for? - It is a FAT man that we're looking for. 3.18. In chapter 1 (section 4.1) the following clear difference between specificational and predicational sentences was pointed out: if the predicate nominal consists of two conjoined NPs, it will be specificational if there are two referents and predicational if there is only one. For example: (79)(a) What I need is a car and a driver, (specificational: two referents) (b) That man is a thief and a murderer, (predicational: one referent) (c) What we need is a fast player and a good defender, (either specificational (two referents) or predicational (one referent)) Consider now //-clefts such as the following:

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(80)(a) It is a fast player and a good defender that the club needs. (b) It was a good worker, and a fast one, that did this job. (c) It is a thief, and a murderer too, that is being chased by the police. (d) It was an interesting meeting, and a very pleasant one, that I went to last night. In each of these sentences the predicate nominal can easily be interpreted as having a single referent. On this interpretation the //-clefts are therefore predicational, not specificational. 3.19. In a specificational //-cleft like (81) It is an escaped convict who committed this murder. the indefinite focal NP has specific reference. For that reason an can be replaced by some or (though somewhat clumsily) by a certain or a particular (cf. Heringer 1969). In a predicational //-cleft the situation is different. Although the cleft as a whole still implies a specific referent, the focal NP itself no longer functions as a specific NP That is, the predicational //-cleft (82) Was it an INTERESTING meeting that you went to last night? which yields the predicational interpretation 'Was the meeting you went to last night interesting?', will no longer yield this reading if the focal NP is explicitly marked as specific, e.g. through the substitution of some or a particular for an: (83) Was it some/a particular interesting meeting that you went to last night? Sentence (83) only yields the specificational interpretation (and is therefore awkward if strong accent is put on interesting). Whereas a natural reply to (82) would be a predicational sentence such as Yes, the meeting was interesting, only specificational sentences like (84,a-b) are suitable answers to (83): (84)(a) No, it was a party that I went to last night. (b) Yes, it was a meeting that I went to, but I did not find it interesting. The fact that the focal NP in (82) does not behave like a specific NP is in keeping with its predicational nature: as pointed out by Kuno (1970), an NP cannot be used as a 'specific' NP and as a 'qualitative' (predicational) NP at the same time. 3.20. Infinitival clauses that involve a copula and depend on a verb like consider will behave differently according as they are predicational or specificational. If they

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are.predicational, to be can easily be deleted. If they are specificational, to be can be deleted only if the value NP precedes the variable NP:

(85)(a) I consider John (to be) his best friend, (either predicational or specificational with John as focus) (b) I consider his best friend to be JOHN, (specificational) (c) Ί consider his best friend JOHN, (id.) If the infinitive clause is //-clefted, only the specificational reading is retained, but to be cannot be deleted at all:

(86)(a) I consider it to be JOHN who is his best friend, (b) Ί consider it JOHN who is his best friend. The same is true in the passive:

(87)(a) It is considered to be JOHN who is his best friend, (b) *lt is considered JOHN who is his best friend. However, predicational Λ-clefts like (82) allow deletion of to be:

(88)(a) I consider it (to be) an INTERESTING subject that they are discussing tonight. (b) It is considered (to be) an INTERESTING subject that they are discussing tonight. This is another piece of evidence for the claim that //-clefts like (82) are predicational. (On the other hand, the essentially specificational nature of //-clefts reveals itself in the fact that sentences similar to (88,a-b) are not always equally acceptable:

(89)(a) ??l consider it an IMPORTANT man that is speaking tonight, (b) lt is considered an IMPORTANT man that is speaking tonight.)

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4. In the previous section I have pointed out twenty characteristics that sentences like (29,a-e) or (82) share with predicational sentences. Some of these characteristics apply without apparent restrictions, others apply as it were only reluctantly. In this section I will point out a couple of characteristics of predicational sentences that are not shared by sentences like (29,a-e). In these respects (and in others - cf. below) such sentences behave like specificational structures. 4.1. With few exceptions (to be dealt with below), predicational //-clefts require that the predicational element be a modifier rather than the noun head of the NP that is the clefted constituent. Thus, in (82) interesting is the only predicational element. The reason why such a cleft is felt to be predicational is that only the predicational element represents new information: all the rest is presupposed. Thus, (82) implies that the speaker knows that the hearer went to a meeting last night and merely wants to know whether that meeting was interesting. If the noun head meeting were not presupposed (i.e. if the speaker knew no more than that the hearer went somewhere last night) (82) would be pronounced with contrastive accent on meeting and would be unambiguously specificational. It follows that //-clefts like (82) in fact require a specificational noun head representing old information. If we leave out the predicational modifier, what remains must be a good specificational //-cleft (except when the noun head is a vague or indefinite plural like things or people - ct section 3.13). Thus, if we leave out interesting from (82) we get an impeccable specificational //-cleft: (90) Was it a MEETING that you went to last night?

4.2. There is other evidence that in //-clefts such as (26,a-e) or (82) it is not the clefted constituent as a whole that is predicational. As we saw in chapter 1 (section 2.13), specificational sentences can show 'connectedness' whereas predicational sentences cannot. That is, only in specificational sentences is it possible for certain clause-internal rules (e.g. reflexivization) to hold between the subject NP of the matrix and a constituent of the postcopular clause or phrase. For example, there is connectedness in (91,a-b), which are specificational, but not in (92,a-b), which are predicational: (91 )(a) (b) (92)(a) (b)

Consider now:

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The job Fredj has accepted is to write a book about himselfj. What Johnj wrote was an excellent description of himselfj. The job Fred, has accepted is a source of agony for him,. What John; wrote was an excellent description of hirrij.

(93)(a) It was a description of himselfj/*himj that John, wrote. (b) It was an EXCELLENT description of himselfi/*hinij that Johnj wrote.

Sentence (93,a) illustrates that the //-cleft is a basically specificational structure. Even in (93,b), where excellent is the only piece of new information and the //-cleft is therefore predicational in the sense defined above, there has to be connectedness between the noun head of the clefted constituent and the WH-clause.17 This is in keeping with the observation we have made, viz. that in predicational //-clefts like these only the adjective is predicational, while the clefted NP as a whole stands in a specificational relationship to the WH-clause. 4.3. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that an //-cleft of the type // was an interesting meeting that I went to last night is ungrammatical if the entire clefted NP is predicational, as in (94), where the clefted NP as a whole functions as the predicate nominal of the predicational WH-clause: (94) *Was it an interesting meeting that the meeting that you went to last night was?

Notice that the corresponding noncleft predicational sentence is fine: (95) Was the meeting that you went to last night an interesting meeting ?

4.4. In section 3.16 we observed that used to be can occur freely in predicational sentences, but is possible in specificational sentences only if the variable NP is such that different values can be assigned to it at different times: (96)(a) John used to be reliable, (predicational) (b) *The murderer used to be John, (specificational) (c) The JACKSONS used to be the ones who were given the best jobs, (specificational)

The same situation appears to hold with regard to verbs like begin, continue and cease. These too can be used freely in predicational sentences (as is illustrated by (97,a-c)) but can only occur in specificational sentences if different values can be assigned to the variable (cf. (98,a-c)):

17. One of my informants found both himself and him acceptable in (93,b). If him should, indeed, be acceptable to a relevant number of speakers it would provide us with another argument for the (partly) predicational nature of such //-clefts.

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(97)(a) (b) (c) (98)(a) (b) (c)

John has begun to be harder to convince lately. He still continues to be a reliable servant. Mary has ceased to be an attractive woman. The colour that she prefers has ceased to be blue. The one who does most of the work continues to be John. *The murderer of Tom continues to be John.

In connection with used to we noticed that this auxiliary can be found in predicational #-clefts: (99) It used to be a RELIABLE man that worked for John. However, verbs like begin, cease and continue are much more reluctant to be used in this way: (100)(a) ?lt continues to be an UNRELIABLE servant that works for John. (b) ?lt hasn't yet ceased to be an ATTRACTIVE woman that I'm married to. Sentences like these are better than purely specificational Α-clefts like (101,a-b) but they are much worse than the (fully grammatical) corresponding predicational nonclefts(102,a-b): (101 )(a) *lt continues to be John who is the murderer of Fred. (b) *lt hasn't yet ceased to be Mary that I'm married to. (102)(a) The servant that works for John continues to be (an) unreliable (servant). (b) The woman I'm married to hasn't yet ceased to be (an) attractive (woman). The relative unacceptability of (100,a-b) is therefore evidence for the fact that these sentences are partly specificational in nature. 4.5. As is well-known, the sentence / want to marry a doctor yields an interpretation on which a doctor is a nonspecific NI* i.e. does not have a referent in the universe of discourse of the speaker. On this reading the sentence can be followed by (103,a) but not by (103,b), because in the latter, but not in the former, the use of he presupposes the existence of a specific doctor:

(103)(a) He must be gentle and good-looking, (b) He is gentle and good-looking. A similar restriction can be observed when the nonspecific NP is used as predicate nominal in a predicational sentence. For example, although (104,a) is grammatical on a specificational reading, the predicational reading requires must be:

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(104)(a) What I'd like to read is a really interesting novel, (specificational) (b) What18 I'd like to read must be/*is (a) really interesting (novel). (predicational) A nonspecific NP in a predicational sentence thus requires must be (or some similar modal phrase) instead of is. However, when we consider predicational /'/-clefts with a nonspecific NP as defied constituent, we find not only that is is possible, but also that must be cannot even be used: (105) It is/*must be a really INTERESTING novel that I would like to read. Even though (105) can be paraphrased as (106) (in which must be has to be used instead of is on the nonspecific interpretation), is· will be the normal form in (105). This is another way, then, in which predicational /'/-clefts like (105) qualify as specificational structures. (106) The novel that I would like to read must be/*is really interesting. 4.6. Another piece of evidence confirming that even predicational //-clefts are essentially specificational is that the WH-clause of a predicational //-cleft can hardly be omitted.19 Compare: (107)A. I am meeting a man tonight. B. (a) Is it John that you are meeting tonight? (b) Is it John? (c) Is it a YOUNG man that you are meeting tonight? (d) ??lsitaYOUNGman? Sentence (107,B,c) shows that a full it-deft can be used to convey predicational information (the idea 'Is the man a young one?'), but (107,B,d) makes clear that reducing such an //-cleft leads to a hardly acceptable result. The reason is that it is difficult to interpret a copular sentence that conveys predicational information as (part of) an /'/-cleft if there is no overt WH-clause to enforce this interpretation, //-clefts are, indeed, essentially specificational. For this reason the speaker who embarks on a predicational sentence in the form of an //-cleft will find it necessary to add the WH-clause as an explicit indication that the sentence he is constructing is really an /'/-cleft. Otherwise he will prefer an unambiguously predicational construction such as Is he young?. 18. Of course, is is acceptable if there is reference to a specific novel, but here we are considering nonspecific NPs only. 19. There are some restrictions on the possibility of reducing //-clefts (cf. chapter 4), but these do not affect the particular examples given here.

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4.7. The dual nature of predicational //-clefts also reveals itself when the word also is added to the copula of the matrix. In chapter 1 (section 2.9.D) we saw that if this is done in a (purely) specificational //-cleft, the implication is that the value should be assigned not only to some variable not expressed in the sentence but also to the variable that is expressed there. Thus, (108) It is also a meeting that I am going to.

is to be interpreted as 'Not only variable X (e.g. 'What you are going to') is a meeting; what I am going to is also a meeting'.20 By contrast, if also is added to a predicational sentence there are two possibilities, according as also is related to the predicational element or to the subject NP In the former case the implication is that not only some property not referred to in the sentence but also the property referred to there is predicated of the subject NP Thus, (109) The meeting that I'm going to is also important.

can be interpreted as 'The meeting that I'm going to is not only X (e.g. pleasant) but also important'. The alternative interpretation is that the property is predicated not only of some entity not referred to in the sentence but also of the referent of the subject NP of the sentence. On this reading (109) means 'Not only X (e.g. the meeting that you're going to) but also the meeting that I'm going to is important'. The predicational //-cleft (110) It is also an important meeting that I am going to.

yields only the latter interpretation (and will therefore normally be pronounced with stress on /, which is the contrastive element in the description of the referent). This means that also cannot bear on the predicational element (important), whereas in a predicational sentence like (109) it can. On the other hand, (110) also differs from the specificational it-cleft (108), since the noun head (meeting) of the clefted NP is not specified as value for a variable but is part of the NP ('the meeting that I'm going to') of whose referent the property important is predicated. However, (108) and (110) do resemble each other in another respect: in both cases also bears on what is the subject NP in the semantic representation (viz. 'what I am going to' and 'the meeting I am going to'). The conclusion, then, is that, although (110) is predicational in meaning, it has the form of a specificational structure and this

20. Compare:

(i) I admit that it's John who drinks most of the whisky, but it is also John who pays for it! where the interpretation is something like: Ί admit that John is the value of the variable "the X who drinks most of the whisky", but he is also the value of the variable "the X who pays for

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results in certain restrictions which are shared, not with predicational sentences, but with specificational ones.21 4.8. A final piece of evidence confirming the fundamentally specificational nature of predicational //-clefts concerns their behaviour in connection with pronominalization. In predicational sentences pronominalization appears to be possible irrespective of whether the coreferential NP precedes or follows the pronoun: (111 )(a) (b) (112)(a) (b)

John's, son is his, best friend. HiSj son is John's, best friend. What Johnj knew was a source of agony for hirrij. What he, knew was a source of agony for Johnj.

In specificational sentences, by contrast, there are several restrictions. One of them is that, if the value NP precedes the variable NP, the latter can contain a pronoun that is coreferential with (part of) the value NP only if that pronoun is not (part of) the subject of the WH-clause: (113)(a) (b) (114)(a) (b) (115)(a) (b)

*lt was John'Sj dog that hej beat. It was John'Sj dog that worried hirrij. 'John's, dog was what he, beat. John'Sj dog was what worried hirrij. *lt was Johnj whom hiSj dog bit. It was Johnj who beat hiSj dog.

When we examine predicational //-clefts we find that, unlike predicational sentences such as (lll,a-b) and (112,a-b), they show certain restrictions on pronominalization. More specifically, they are subject to exactly the same restriction as is illustrated in (113)-(115): (116)(a) (b) (c) (117)(a) (b)

*lt was something useful for Johnj that he( bought. It was something useful for Johnj that I gave him,. It was something useful for John, that I bought for hirrij. It was something important for John'Sj future that I told hirrij. *lt was something important for John'Sj future that he, was told by her.

21. The conclusion that even predicational //-clefts are essentially specificational suggests that grammatical structures continue to impose their essential characteristics even when they contain lexical material that is normally incompatible with them. As a matter of fact this phenomenon (sometimes called 'shifting') has been noted in connection with other grammatical structures. It is described in detail in Talmy (1978) and Talmy (1985).

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5. In the previous two sections we have examined the characteristics of such //-clefts as (29,a-e). This examination has led to the following conclusions. 5.1. In sentences such as (29,a-e) the new information is entirely predicational. To convey predicational information can therefore be considered to be the sole function of this sentence type. 5.2. Not any predicational sentence can be reformulated in the form of such a sentence. The reason is that in an it-cleft like (29,a-e) the clefted NP is specificational as a whole, although it contains predicational information about the noun head, /f-clefts in which the entire clefted NP is predicational will not normally be found. (See, however, below.) 5.3. As a result of combining a predicational meaning with a specificational structure, //-clefts like (29,a-e) have some characteristics in common with both predicational sentences and specificational //-clefts, but also differ from both of these in several ways. 5.4. The predicational meaning of such //-clefts follows (more or less accidentally) from the fact that the NP specified as value for the variable represents old information except for the adjective modifying the noun head.22 We could therefore maintain that such predicational //-clefts are still specificational in structure, if it were not for the fact that the construction has given rise to a couple of types where the specificational nature can no longer be upheld. An example of this is the type mentioned above in which be is replaced by become (cf. section 3.7.):

(48)(b) After the recent troubles it has become an extremely IMPORTANT issue that the ministers will discuss next week. As in (29,a-e), the noun head (issue) is not part of the predicational new information. In other words, the logical subject of become (i.e. that which has come into being) is signalled exclusively by the adjective: it is not the case that something has become an issue now but rather that the issue (which is old information) has

22. The reason why this construction is used is probably that "English prefers qualification realized by a combination of a noun with an adjective to qualification expressed by an adjective alone" (Mathesius 1975: 114). Thus, "in English we can (...) say His career was short, but a more idiomatic manner of expression would be His career was a short one" (ib.). Similarly, Mrs. Smith was a clever woman is "more idiomatic English" (ib.) than Mrs. Smith was clever.

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become important now. However, the fact that become is used instead of be makes it impossible to maintain that the defied NP as a whole is specificational (cf. section 3.7). Here we are confronted with an example of how the predicational meaning of the sentence has overruled the essentially specificational nature of the /i-cleft construction: what should be considered as the value part of a specificational structure is at the same time marked as a predicational NP by the use of become.

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6. There are other cases of ώ-clefts that can hardly be recognized as specificational any more. Up to now we have only considered cases in which the predicational element is the modifier in the clefted NP and we have observed that the noun head itself cannot normally be predicational.23 Thus, as we have pointed out, the sentence (2)(a) It was worthless jewelry that the jewel thief did not steal. can only be interpreted specificationally, although the corresponding WH-cleft can be predicational as well. There are, however, exceptional cases of predicational i/-clefts in which the head noun of the focal NP is itself predicational. The following sentence is an example: (118) It is such an idiot who says that that you should not pay any attention to him. As pointed out in section 3.3, the fact that the focal NP involves a degree modifier marks it unambiguously as a predicational NR What is important, however, is that the predicational element here is no longer a modifier but the noun head itself. The whole clefted NP is exclusively predicational, which means that we have a type of //-cleft here that is no longer specificational at all. The same conclusion should be drawn in connection with #-clefts like the following: (119)(a) It certainly was no idiot who planned this. (b) It was no fool who wrote this. (c) It certainly was no beauty who asked me to marry her. In each of these sentences the clefted NP consists of only a noun and the modifier no. The fact that no is used marks the noun unequivocally as a predicational element (cf. section 3.2). Moreover, the figurative sense in which beauty has to be interpreted in (119,c) renders a specificational reading impossible. The following is still another type of iV-cleft that appears to be purely predicational, albeit for a different reason. As noted in chapter 1 (section 2.6), the variable part of a specificational cleft is presupposed and cannot, therefore, be negated. That is, it is not possible to use an NP with zero reference (e.g. nobody

23. Remember that we are not dealing with /'/-clefts like It is a good teacher that I want to be, which is a purely specificational //-cleft in which a predicational value is assigned to a predicational variable. In such //-clefts the focus NP as a whole can of course be predicational.

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nothing, etc.) as the NP representing the value that is assigned to the variable. For example, the //-clefts (120)(a) *lt was nobody who came in. (b) The one who came in was nobody. are unacceptable because of the semantic clash between what is presupposed (viz. that someone came in) and what is asserted (viz. that nobody came in). The following //-clefts are unacceptable for the same reason: (121 )(a) *lt was not anything that he told me. (b) *lt was nothing that he told me. On the other hand, we have seen that sentences like (122) are also unacceptable as //-clefts, because they assert the same thing as is already presupposed: (122) *lt was something that he told me. Consider now: (123)(a) It was nobody of importance that came in. (b) It was nothing new that he told me. (c) It was something new that he told me. In //-clefts like these it is exclusively the predicational element (of importance, new) that renders the sentence acceptable. The meaning of the cleft as a whole is also purely predicational: (124)(a) The person who came in was not anybody of importance. (b) What he told me was not (anything) new. (c) What he told me was (something) new. The definition of specificational sentences is no longer applicable to (123,a-c). These //-clefts do not specify a value for a variable, but predicate something of that variable, while the variable itself is left unspecified. In other words, the clefted NPs in (123,a-c) do not contain any specificational information whatever. They are purely predicational. The same is true of sentences like the following: (125)(a) It's really SOMETHING that he has discovered! (b) It was really SOMEONE who made that speech! Here something and someone mean something like 'something/someone of importance' and contain exclusively predicational information. The fact that they do not specify a value for a variable is clear from the fact that the sentences become

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unacceptable as //-clefts if the predicational idea Of real importance' is no longer expressed: (126)(a) *lt is something that he has discovered, (b) *lt is someone who made that speech. We may conclude, then, that apart from purely specificational //-clefts and //-clefts that are specificational and predicational at the same time, it is possible to find //-clefts that are exclusively predicational. A condition for the use of these //-clefts, and also for the use of //-clefts of the mixed type, appears to be that the //-cleft (or the context in which it is used) makes clear that a predicational interpretation is the only possible one. The reason is that the unmarked interpretation of an //-cleft is naturally the specificational reading. Predicational //-clefts of the mixed type (e.g. // was an interesting meeting that I went to) require that the clefted NP contain an adjective and that this is the only new information given in the sentence. Purely predicational //-clefts like (48,b), (118)-(119), (123,a-c) and (125,a-b) are possible only because a specificational interpretation is explicitly excluded by the lexical material of the head clause, viz. by the use of become instead of be, or by the presence of such (a) or no in the clefted NP, or by the use of a figurative noun head like beauty in (119,c), or by the use of an indefinite noun head like nothing or something which cannot otherwise be the focus of an α-cleft.24

24. We may add to this the remark that in some cases there seems to be no semantic difference between the predicational reading and the specificational one. For example, an rt-cleft like

(i) It is the truth that Mary is telling you. can be given both a specificational paraphrase and a predicational one: (ii)(a) What Mary is telling you is (the following): the truth. (b) What Mary is telling you is true. but it is questionable whether there is any real semantic difference between these two readings, since even on the specificational interpretation no precise value is specified for the variable: on neither of the readings do we know exactly what Mary is telling the hearer. For this reason it seems impossible to tell whether the meaning of (i) is predicational or specificational, or both.

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CHAPTER 4. SOME RESTRICTIONS ON /r-CLEFTS THAT HIGHLIGHT PREDICATE NOMINALS.

i. INTRODUCTION It is well-known that an it-deft whose clefted constituent functions as subject complement (predicate nominal) in the WH-clause is often unacceptable, or at least questionable: (1 }(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

*lt's a genius that he is. (Leech & Svartvik 1975:181) "It's a conductor that John is. (Stockwell et al. 1977:107) "It's the football coach that John is. (Emonds 1976:140) "It's easy to please that John is. (Gundel 1977b: 554) *lt is quite happy that Bill is. (Mieszek 1979:121) *lt is tall that John is. (Akmajian 1979:166) ? lt is clever that John is. (Delahunty 1981:162) *lt was nice that she seemed. (Bolinger 1972b: 28)1

In this chapter I will investigate different types of //-clefts highlighting predicate nominals. I will point out five different restrictions that may lead to partial or complete unacceptability and develop a theory that can account for them. In this theory the notions 'predicational' and 'specificational' will again play an important role, because the //-cleft construction is essentially a specificational type of sentence. (The exceptional cases of predicational and semi-predicational //-clefts discussed in chapter 3 will not prove relevant to the restrictions that are now going to be discussed.)

1. Dyhr (1978: 115) and Gross (1977: 42) make the same observation in connection with German and French, respectively.

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2. RESTRICTIONS 2.1. Any specificational sentence specifies a value for a variable. Using Halliday's (1967) terminology, we can say that the value is the 'identifier' and the variable the 'identified'. In the information structure the identified represents known information and the identifier represents information that is new. It follows that in an //-cleft sentence, where the focus presents new information and the WH-clause information that is known (presupposed) (or represented as such - see chapter 5),2 only the identifier can fill the focus position. This is a restriction that was already pointed out by Halliday (1967: 238-239). For example: (2)(a) Who's the murderer? - JOHN is the murderer. It's JOHN who is the murderer. *lt's the MURDERER who is John, (b) Who's John ? - The MURDERER is John. It's the MURDERER who is John. *lt is JOHN who is the murderer. 2.2. There are some rather intricate restrictions on //-clefts whose clefted constituent conveys only predicational information.3 It should be noted that these restrictions need not follow from the specificational nature of //-clefts per se, as it is clear from specificational WH-clefts like (3,a-b) that there is nothing to prevent the value of a specificational sentence from being predicational, as long as the variable is predicational as well:4

2. Of course, the focus of an rt-cleft need not be 'new' in the sense of 'not mentioned' before, but it is always new in the sense that the fact that the focal item is the value to be assigned to the variable is presented as new information (cf. chapter 1, section 2.6). 3. Some people, e.g. Lees (1963: 280) and Emonds (1976: 140), simply assert that "predicative nominatives and predicative adjectives do not appear in focus position in the cleft construction" (Emonds 1976: 140). However, we will see that the situation is much more complicated than this. 4. It is quite impossible for a predicational element to become the value of a specificational sentence if the variable is not predicational as well. Compare: (i)(a) What hit John was heavy, (b) 'It was heavy that hit John. Sentence (i,b) is ungrammatical because the variable ('the X that hit John') contains no predicational constituent. If we add such a constituent the result is much better (though it still needs a suitable context to be judged quite acceptable - cf. below): (ii) It was heavy that what hit John was. (Here the variable is 'the X that what hit John was', in which X is predicational.)

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(3)(a) What John is is proud, (b) What John has always been is a respectable citizen. Still, the ή-clefts corresponding to (3,a-b) are hardly acceptable:5-6 (4)(a) ????lt is proud that John is. (b) lt is a respectable citizen that John has always been. As far as I can see, the following are the principles determining the possibility of using //-clefts that specify a predicational value for a variable: A. As pointed out in chapter 1 (section 2.1), the variable of a specificational sentence is always 'superscriptional', i.e. it functions like the heading of a list. Now the heading of a list is necessarily a nominal. For example, as the heading of a list enumerating entities that are green we can imagine phrases like Objects that are green' or 'what is green', but not simply 'green'. A superscriptional element must always take the form of an NI^ even if the value specified for it is an adjectival. In WH-clefts this requirement presents no problem, as the variable is always formulated in the form of a "nominal relative clause" (Quirk et al 1972: 732), as shown by (3,a-b). In //-clefts, however, the situation is different. Here the WH-clause is not a nominal clause, and therefore does not express the variable NP completely. Rather, the variable can be formulated in the form of a noun head followed by a relative clause (i.e. 'the/an X who/which/that...'), in which X is a noun like person, thing, time,place, etc. In the //-cleft itself only part of this variable (viz. the WH-clause) is explicitly expressed, but the variable as a whole is presupposed. Thus, the speaker using the //-cleft // is John who killed Bill presupposes that someone killed Bill, and it is the variable 'the person who killed Bill' that is actually given a value. So, the requirement that the superscriptional element should be a nominal is fulfilled in //-clefts, not through the presence of a nominal in the sentence itself, but through the presupposition of a nominal as variable.7 5. /f-clefts like these are hardly acceptable when used in isolation, but we will see below that they may be quite acceptable when used in a suitable context. 6. The restrictions in question do not appear to hold for Irish English. Jespersen (1958: 149) notes that "the Irish make an excessive use of cleft sentences" and gives several examples (by Irish authors) of sentences similar to (4,a-b), e.g. It is angry that he was, It's proud and pleased I am to see you home again, It's an angel you are to forgive me. 7. This accords with the following remark by Bolinger (1972a: 112): What is special about cleft sentences is not their deep structure - which is simply that of adjective clause embeddings - but the nominalizations that they represent. The adverbial nouns are particularizations for place, time, manner, etc. The adverbial pronouns, which include this and that as well as it, are generalized nominalizations of anything that can be restrictively focused on; they cover the same ground as the adverbial nouns and much more.

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There is a second requirement that a superscriptional element must satisfy. Not only does it need to be a nominal, it needs to be a nominal with a specific referent. As pointed out in chapter 1 (section 2.6.F), the superscriptional NP of a specificational sentence is usually definite. Although exceptions of the type (5,a) can be found (see the relevant section in chapter 1 for some discussion), //-clefts with an indefinite superscriptional NP are usually unacceptable, as appears from (5,b): (5)(a) An example of this is world war II. (b) *A man I met yesterday was Jack Jones.8 It follows from this that the value assigned to the variable will always be felt to be 'exclusive' (cf. section 2.8 of chapter 1): if the variable has a specific entity or set as referent, only one entity or set can be assigned to it as value. All other potential candidates are then automatically excluded. (Hence the exhaustiveness implicature which we have discussed in chapter 1, section 2.9.)9 The above two requirements, viz. that in a specificational sentence the variable must be a nominal and have a specific referent,10 entail that //-clefts with a predicational element as clefted constituent will be acceptable on certain conditions only. Since predicational elements are basically adjectival (cf. chapter 1, section 3.5), they do not by themselves suggest any nominal idea with a specific referent. In fact, predicational elements are not felt to be exclusive at all: in Mary is pretty the use of pretty does not exclude that other characteristics could be predicated of Mary

8. It was pointed out to me that (5,b) becomes much better if was is replaced with turned out to be: (i) ?A man I met yesterday turned out to be Jack Jones.

I have no explanation for this. (It is also remarkable that (ii) is again unacceptable, except if a murderer is read as One of the murderers': (ii) Ά murderer turned out to be Jack Jones.)

9. The claim that the variable NP of an //-cleft must have specific reference is inherent in some of the analyses that have been proposed for //-clefts, e.g. in the analysis (argued by, amongst others, Bolinger (1972b)) that treats the WH-clause of an //-cleft as an adjective clause modifying it, and which therefore considers it a true pronoun with specific reference. 10. Our claim that specificational sentences are subject to these two requirements accords with what Clark & Haviland (1977: 4) write about what they call the 'antecedent', i.e. the piece of given information: "Formally, it consists of a node in the listener's memory structure characterized as a nominal that has associated with it one or more propositions in which the nominal serves as an argument." For example, in It was Percival who piqued the professor, "the antecedent is the node in the listener's memory corresponding to 'the one who piqued the professor'".

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as well.11 For a predicational element to have an exclusive meaning it is necessary that this exclusive sense is brought about by the context. For example, in a discussion about what is Mary's most typical characteristic I can say Mary is PRETTY, implying that this and no other characteristic is most typical of Mary. It follows that for an adequate use of an Α-cleft with a predicational clefted constituent it will be necessary that the nominal idea with the specific referent which is needed as variable be brought up by the context. Thus, in the context of the discussion just referred to, an Λ-cleft will be possible: (6) It's pretty that Mary is, more than anything else. Similarly, although (7,a) is unacceptable (if used out of context), (7,b) is fine because the nominal idea ('the thing that he is not') is created by the context preceding the //-cleft: (7)(a) It is intelligent/a good citizen that he is not. (b) If there is one thing that he is not, it is intelligent/a good citizen. Another example is provided by (8,b), which is much better than (8,a) because the addition of want to implies that the speaker is thinking of something in particular: (8){a) ?? lt is a teacher that I am. (b) It is a teacher that I want to be. In (8,b) the variable can easily be conceived as 'that which I want to be' but it is more difficult to conceive (or contextualize) the variable 'that which I am' which is required for (8,a).12 This is clear from sentences like the following, in which the use of these two variables as specific nominals is tested:

11. This concurs with Bolinger's (1972b: 28) claim that the elements that can be focalized in an //-cleft are those of which it is true that "their presence in the sentence particularizes the event". Bolinger also points out that such elements can be identified through the fact that they produce a 'separate event' when used in a conjoined structure. Thus, (i,a) can be if-clefted because two different events are referred to, whereas (i,b) cannot be /f-clefted because the two adverbs refer to the same act of speaking: (i)(a) He worked yesterday. Today too. (b) He spoke happily. Feelingly too. (ii)(a) It was yesterday that he worked. (b) "It was happily that he spoke. 12. This observation accords with the following statement by Akmajian (1979: 159): "I leave as an open question whether adjectives can appear in focus position. While (i) seems unacceptable, (ii) seems to be better: (i) It's tall that John is. (ii) It's idiotic that John always manages to be."

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(9)(a) Is there something that you want to be? - Yes. I want to be a teacher, (b) Is there something that you want to be? - Yes. It is a teacher that I want to be. (10)(a) *ls there something that you are? - Yes. I am a teacher, (b) *ls there something that you are ? - Yes. *lt is a teacher that I am. (11 )(a) I'd like to talk to you about something that I want to be. (b) Td like to talk to you about something that I am. (12)(a) There is something that I want to be. It/that something is: a teacher. (b) There is something that I am. It/that something is: a teacher. So, one of the conditions for the use of if-clefts with predicational defied constituents appears to be that a variable should be available in the form of a nominal like 'the thing that...'. Whether such a superscriptional NP is possible can be tested, not only by means of existential sentences such as (9)-(10) and (12,a-b), but also by examining the possibilities of pronominalization: if a predicational sentence suggests a specific nominal like 'something' or One thing' (which can become the variable 'the thing that...' of an #-cleft), the predicational element can be referred to by the pro-form that; otherwise, we will have to use so (which is the usual pronoun substituting for adjectivals) or, if the predicational element is an NI* one. Thus, (13, A) does not by itself suggest 'There is something that she is', and the pronoun in (13,B) is therefore so rather than that: (13)A. She is beautiful. B. Yes. She has always been so/*?that. Similarly, (14, A) does not automatically suggest 'There is something that she is', and that is again unacceptable as a pro-form: (14)A. She is a teacher. B. Yes. She has been one/*?that for 25 years. On the other hand, (15,A) (through the use of want to) does suggest "There is something that she wants to become', and consequently that can be used in (153):

12 In my opinion, (i) is less acceptable than (ii) because the presupposition that John is something requires a very specific type of context, whereas the presupposition in (ii) (namely, that there is something that John always manages to be) does not. And this is itself the result of the fact that in 'John always manages to be X' the predicational element X has an exclusive (specific) meaning, whereas it lacks such a meaning in 'John is X'. The same explanation also accounts for (iii)(a) ??lt was never truly ambitious that he was.

(b) It was never truly ambitious that I expected him to be. (Bolinger 1972a: 113)

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(15)A. She wants to become a teacher. B. Yes. She has always wanted to be that. Another possible test consists in building specificational sentences like the following:

(16)(a) *The (only) thing that she is is an American. ? (b) * The (only) thing that she is is a teacher. (c) The (only) thing that she wants to be is a teacher. Sentences like these make clear that this restriction on li-clefts specifying a predicational value is in fact part of a more general restriction on specificational sentences involving a predicational value: such specificational sentences will only be acceptable if the nominal idea that is to become the superscriptional NP is suggested by the context, because the predicational element will not normally do so by itself As a further illustration of this, consider the following sentences:

(17)(a) ??/f was not happy that she was when she heard the news, (b) I don't know what she was when she heard the news, but I can assure you that it was not happy. The i/-cleft of (17,a), which is hardly acceptable in isolation, becomes fully acceptable in (17,b) because the preceding context now provides the nominal ('what she was') which is needed as the variable to which the predicational value is assigned. Similarly:

(18)(a) ??lt is not a teacher/idiot that John is. (b) I don't know for certain what John is, but it is certainly not a teacher/idiot. Consider also (19)-(21). Whereas the (a) sentences are unacceptable in isolation, the (b) sentences are much better because they all presuppose a specific variable. Thus, (19,b) presupposes the idea 'there is something that he is', since the sentence explicitly identifies this 'something' as the property 'important', while asking a question about the degree to which the statement 'he is important' is true. (19)(a) (b) (20)(a) (b) (21 )(a) (b)

??

ls it an important man that he is? How important a man is it that he is ? ? ?ls it pretty that she looks ? How pretty is it that she looks ? ?? ls it well that he plays? How well is it that he plays?

The observation that the superscriptional element (variable) of a specificational sentence should be a nominal can also account for other restrictions on //-clefts and on specificational sentences in general. For example, the specificational sentences (22,a) and (23,a) are ungrammatical for lack of an appropriate nominal as variable 189

(as appears from the corresponding (b) sentences), whereas similar sentences such as (24,a) and (25,a) are all right because there is a nominal idea available as variable: (22)(a) *lt was whereas John was a Londoner that she was a Parisian, (b) The ? that she was a Parisian was whereas John was a Londoner. (23)(a) *lt was although it was raining that he went out. (b) The ? that he went out was although it was raining. (24)(a) ?It was in spite of the rain that he went out. (b) The thing in spite of which he went out was the rain. (25)(a) ?It was because he came that I was angry. (b) The thing because of which I was angry was that he came. The reason that I was angry was that he came. The same principle accounts for the fact that, although predicational sentences like She looked nice or They painted the fence black can be ft-clefted (that is, It was nice that she looked and // was black that they painted the fence may be acceptable in an appropriate context), other predicational sentences appear unable to yield an //-cleft (with the predicational element as clefted constituent) at all: (26)(a) (b) (27)(a) (b) (28)(a) (b)

He drove us all insane. "It was insane that he drove us all. He scorched himself black. *lt was black that he scorched himself. He dug himself deep. *lt was deep that he dug himself.

While it is possible to conceive of variables like 'how she looked' or 'the colour that they painted the fence', there is no possibility of deriving an appropriate variable from the (a) sentences of (26)-(27):

(29) The ? that he drove us all was *What scorched himself *How dug himself

insane. black deep

Similarly, predicational sentences whose predicational information is not the expression of a role, of class membership, or of a property like good, silly, etc. will always resist //-clefting because they fail to suggest an appropriate variable. Thus, (30,b) and (31,b) are quite unacceptable because (30,a) and (31,a) do not imply There is something that your question/this problem is'. That is, it appears simply impossible to conceive of a variable like 'What your question is' and to assign to it the value One that I cannot solve'.

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(30)(a) (b) (31)(a) (b)

Your question is one that I cannot solve. *lt is one that I cannot solve that your question is. This problem is something that I don't understand. *lt is something that I don't understand that this problem is.

Closing off this section, we can conclude that //-clefts (and other specificational structures) that specify a predicational value for a predicational variable require that the variable should be given or presupposed in the form of a nominal with a specific referent. Since a predicational focus does not normally suggest a specific nominal by itself, //-clefts of this type will be hardly acceptable when used in isolation but are all right in a context where the specific nominal is presupposed.13 There are two further pieces of evidence confirming this conclusion. The first is that //-clefts whose predicational focus is a question word like which or what are always fully acceptable: (32)(a) Some tell me that John is generous, some that he is stingy. Which is it that he is, then ? (b) Nobody will tell me which it is that John is: a teacher, a physician or an engineer. (c) I can find no trace of his having exercised any profession before 1980.1 wonder what it was that he used to be then. In sentences like these, which and what are predicational. That such sentences are acceptable is predicted by our theory, since a question of the form What/which is it that he is? (in which what/which are predicational) necessarily presupposes 'There is something that he is'. (In fact, the noncleft What/which is he? already presupposes this.)14 The other additional piece of evidence for our theory is that //-clefts (involving a

13. For the sake of completeness it should be noted that these claims do not hold for /f-clefts such as the following: (i) It was as chairman of the board that John had to deal with such problems. As we have seen, as is a 'prepositional copula', and the clefted NP chairman of the board is predicational. However, this type of it-cleft differs from the one we have been discussing in that the clefted NP does not specify a value for a variable expressed in the WH-clause. That is, there is no variable 'what John was' expressed by the WH-clause and specified by the clefted constituent. (The relevant predicational copula (as) is not part of the WH-clause but rather of the clefted constituent.) Examples like (i) are therefore not subject to the restriction that we have noted (which has to do with the probability of variables of the kind 'what John is'). 14. It is interesting to note that the question What is X like?, which also asks for predicational information, does not imply that there is one specific quality to be assigned to X (i.e. does not presuppose 'There is something that X is') but inquires into X's qualities in a very general way. That is, the adjectival whal..like lacks the exclusive sense that the nominale what and which appear to have. It is therefore in keeping with our theory that the //-cleft What is it thatXis like? is acceptable only in a suitable context, i.e. in a context implying the presupposition 'There is something that X is like'.

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predicational clefted constituent) that are hardly acceptable in isolation become much better if the predicational focal item is given extra contrastive emphasis (e.g. in contradicting statements): (33)(a) *?lt is a teacher that he is. (b) It is a TEACHER that he is, not a BUTCHER!

The reason is that this extra contrastive emphasis assigns a strong exclusive meaning to the element in question. For example, the predicational element pretty in Mary is pretty does not have an exclusive sense, and therefore does not imply 'There is something that Mary is', unless pretty receives contrastive emphasis. In the latter case the meaning of the sentence is something like 'It is X (viz. pretty) that Mary is, not Y', which automatically implies There is something that Mary is'. Similarly, (33,b) is of the form 'It is X that he is, not Y', which presupposes There is something that he is'. The same effect can also be achieved by the presence of an emphatic (contradicting) negation in the focus: (34) It is NOT courageous that he is.

Sentence (34) presupposes 'There is something that he is' and states that this something is not 'courageous' but something else. If this 'something else' is explicitly mentioned, not need not even be stressed: (35)(a) It is not really foolish that he looks. Rather, it is helpless, (b) It's not haughty that she is, it's just proud.

The observation that a predicational sentence implies the idea There is something that X is' more easily if the predicational element is felt to be contrastive is also confirmed by the fact that it is virtually impossible for a sentence such as (36,a) to be//-clefted: (36)(a) Mathematics is a subject. (b) *lt is a subject that mathematics is.

Since there seems to be no predicational element that clearly contrasts with a subject, (36,a) will not be felt to presuppose There is something that mathematics is', nor is it easy to conceive of a context suggesting this idea. This means that even within the set of predicational elements, some will more easily be highlighted in an //-cleft than others. Those that will most readily appear in focal position are those that can most easily be interpreted as having an exclusive (contrastive) sense, 192

namely those that indicate class membership (e.g. He is a teacher)15 and those that have a polar opposite (e.g. He is happy/unhappy). B. As has been pointed out by many linguists,16 the defied constituent of an it-deft is generally also the 'theme' of the sentence (i.e. what the sentence is about).17 It follows that predicational elements are not very suitable to become the clefted constituent of an //-cleft, for two reasons. First, predicational elements, even if they are NP$, do not have referents (cf. chapter 1, section 3.2), whereas it is natural for a theme to have a referent,18 since the function of the theme is to indicate what the sentence is about (see e.g. Gundel 1977a: 97-98, Gueron 1984: 153, Davison

15. The strongest exclusive sense appears to be attached to predicational elements that specify a role or function. If there is no indication to the contrary, a sentence like John is a teacher will normally be felt to have an exclusive meaning, i.e. we will not assume that John exercises other professions as well. It is for this reason that the sentence What is John? will normally be interpreted as inquiring into John's profession (role, function) rather than into other properties that he may have. (In the latter case What is John like? will be the normal question.) This follows from the fact that what implies something specific (exclusive) while whaL..like does not. It is also in keeping with the fact that the VP be something can actually be used in the sense of 'belong to a profession', as in (i,B): (i)A. I don't believe he has any diploma. B. I think he does. I'm sure I've heard that he is something. Isn't it a civil engineer that he is? 16. See e.g. Allerton 1978: 164, Chomsky 1965: 221, Dekeyser etaL 1979: 11, Givon 1979: 217, Grimes 1975: 341, Gross 1977: 40, Halliday 1967: 236-238, 1970a: 357, 1982: 62ff, Hutchins 1975: 115, Kuno 1976, Leech & Svartvik 1975: 180, Poutsma 1928: 140, Quirk etaL 1972: 951. 17. This view is not shared by those linguists who simply equate 'theme' with Old/given' information, because in an rt-cleft it is normally the WH-clause that presents known information (see, however, chapter 5). However, I agree with Halliday (1970b, 1982) that a distinction should be made between the thematic structure of a sentence and its 'information structure' and that, even if the focal item presents new information, it can be thematic. This distinction runs parallel to the distinction (made for example by Barry (1975:1), Bates (1976:171), Keenan & Schieffelin (1976: 381), Van Dijk (1977), Levy (1982), Davison (1984)) between the 'discourse topic' or 'context-dependent topic' and the 'topic of the sentence'. Consider, for example, the following illustration from Keenan & Schieffelin (1976: 381):

(i)A. What's the matter? B. My father, he's bugging me again. K & S comment: "Here the left-dislocated NP is part of the new information provided about the discourse topic proposition 'something is the matter'. The NP 'my father' is the 'center of attention' (...) of the sentence in which it is couched. It is not the 'center of attention' of the discourse in which the sentence is couched." (their emphasis) 18. This is true at least for a 'cognitive' (Halliday 1967) or 'topical' (Halliday 1982:86) theme, i.e. for a theme (or for that part of a theme) that functions as subject, complement or circumstantial adjunct.

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1984: 803-804).19 Using an //-cleft with a predicational focus is therefore a marked choice. Secondly, because the clefted item of an it-cleft is normally thematic and therefore referring, a clefted item will not be given a predicational interpretation unless a referring interpretation is ruled out. Thus, on hearing the beginning of an //-cleft like It is a teacher that., the hearer will automatically interpret a teacher as referring (i.e. as a specific or nonspecific NP),20 not as predicational (i.e. not as a property NP). If the full //-cleft then turns out to be such that only a predicational interpretation is possible (e.g. ??// is a teacher that he is), the hearer has to correct his initial interpretation. Because of this, a 'co-operative' speaker21 will not normally use such an //-cleft with a predicational focus, unless it is clear from the preceding context or from the focal element itself (cf. below) that the predicational interpretation is intended. Thus, in a discussion about whether John is a teacher, a plumber or a veterinary surgeon, we can easily say // is a teacher that he is because it is then clear from the context that it is a predicational value that should be assigned to the variable.22 There are various pieces of evidence that corroborate the above principles: a. The claim that the clefted constituent of an //-cleft is normally thematic accords with the principle (argued by e.g. Halliday (1967,1982) and Kuno (1975)) that the (cognitive) theme of a statement is the first NP of the sentence or the initial 'scene-setting' adverbial. The claim that predicational elements will not be thematic is in keeping with Halliday's (1970a: 357) statement that "the function of theme can be regarded (...) as the deictic element in the structure of the clause, in that it defines the speaker's angle on the content": since predicational elements represent adjectival ideas, and therefore have no referents, they certainly have no deictic force.

19. Davison (1984) examines a number of marked constructions in which an NP is interpreted as topic because it is placed in a salient position. She concludes that there is "a scale of NP types ranging from those which make 'good topics', in the way that they point to a referent, to those whose referential properties make them very poor topics". The NPs that are highest on the scale are those that we have called 'strongly referring' (i.e. proper names, definite descriptions that are used referentially, specific indefinites). Lower on the scale are 'weakly referring' NPs such as nonspecific indefinites, attributive definite descriptions and generic NPs. NPs that are hardly referential at all (e.g. idiom chunks, any-generic NPs and 'end of scale' superlatives like the slightest noise, the smallest vibration) are lowest on the scale (i.e. make very poor topics). 20. To be quite correct, the interpretation that will automatically suggest itself will be either referential or generic. The point, however, is that it will not be predicational. 21. See Grice (1975) for a definition of the concept 'co-operative speaker'. 22. It follows that //-clefts like these require that the presupposed part (variable) should represent information that is not only 'known' but also 'given' (i.e. actually in the hearer's consciousness at the moment of speaking). This runs counter to Prince's (1978) claim that the information in the presupposed part of an //-cleft always has to be known (or represented as such) but need not be given. (See chapter 5 for a more general discussion of this claim.)

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The validity of the above two claims appears to be confirmed by the fact that, unlike specificational sentences, predicational sentences are not reversible (cf. chapter 1, section 3.4): (37)(a) *A philosopher is John, (b) *Silly is John. In (37,a-b) the predicational element (which is not fit to be processed as theme) is put in initial position and should therefore be interpreted as theme. It follows that there is a striking parallelism between it-clefts and simplex sentences. Because in both types of sentences the first NP position is thematic, the nominal elements that cannot be highlighted in /i-clefts (unless they are exceptionally stressed) will be the same as cannot occur in thematic position in the corresponding noncleft. Compare: (38)(a) It was JOHN who did it. (b) JOHN did it. (39)(a) It was JOHN'S hat that we found in the room. It was JOHN whose hat we found in the room. (b) JOHN'S hat we found in the room. (40)(a) *lt is a GOOD MAN that he is. (b) *A GOOD MAN he is. (41 )(a) *lt is a TEACHER that I am. (b) *A TEACHER I am.23 b. It accords with the above observations that predicational information that does involve a deictic (referring) element (which is rather exceptional) can more easily be thematic and hence become the clefted constituent of an /deleft: (42)(a) It's like this that he has always been. (b) It's like your father that you should try to be. (c) I've always been an HONEST politician and it is that that I want to remain. c. The full grammatically of sentences like (42,c) also confirms the principle that an it-cleft with a predicational NP as focus requires that a nonpredicational interpretation of the NP should be excluded by the context. In (42,c) there are at least two indications that that must be predicational. First, that refers back to the predicational NP an honest politician. Second, although that can refer to a

23. (41,a-b) are unacceptable in isolation but not if the preceding context has brought up the idea 'There is something that I am'. In that case a teacher can more easily be thematic because it pursues the thematic line of the preceding context. It should also be noted that (40,b) and (41,b) are more acceptable if they are intended to be the result of a 'proposing' operation (cf. section 3.4.A of chapter 1).

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person when used in subject position, it cannot do so when used as the focus of an if-cleft. (Compare That's my friend with *It's that who's my friend.} A nonpredicational interpretation is therefore excluded. Another example illustrating this point is: (43) A. Why won't you pay attention to what I say? You simply don't want to become a good businessman. B. No. It's only the kind of busisnessman that you want me to be that I refuse to become. I want to be an HONEST businessman. The #-cleft in (43,B) is unproblematic because the focus is unambiguously predicational. This is because the relative clause here helps to specify the property referred to in the entire predicational NP and because the antecedent of the relative clause must be predicational if the relative pronoun is predicational. (That the antecedent and the relative pronoun must belong to the same semantic class is a general requirement of relative clauses, as has been observed by (amongst others) Emonds (1976: 141) and Higgins (1976: 159).) In the zi-cleft of (43,B) a nonpredicational interpretation of the focus is thus excluded, not only by the context, but also by an indication in the NP itself The latter possibility may also observed in (44,b), which should be contrasted with (44,a). The latter sentence shows that predicational NPs may or may not involve the definite article. However, in the corresponding it-deft the use of the definite article is questionable,24 which is in keeping with our observation that a predicational interpretation of the focal item will be diffucult as long as a referential reading is possible as well. (44)(a) He wants to be (the) president of the club. (b) It is (?the) president of the club that he wants to be. Another example of this tendency for the predicational NP to be formally recognizable as exclusively predicational when used in thematic position is to be found in sentences like the following:

24. In Dutch the situation is even clearer, as the definite article is quite unacceptable in cases like (44,b): (44)(a') Hij wil (de) voorzitter van de club zijn. (b') Het is (*de) voorzitter van de club dat hij wil zijn.

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(45)(a) You are an idiot. *You are idiot, (b) Look what you've done! Idiot that you are! *An idiot that you are! (46)(a) Michael is a fool. *Michael is fool. (b) Michael, fool as/that he was, completely ruined the dinner. (Quirk et al. 1972:750) Notice that an idiot/a fool will again be substituted for idiot/fool if the thematic NP to which it belongs is otherwise marked as predicational, e.g. through the presence of what, as in What an idiot you are!. d. The claim that a predicational clefted NP is acceptable if it cannot be misinterpreted as referring is in keeping with the fact that WH-clefts with predicational foci present no problem: unlike its //-cleft counterpart, a sentence like What John is is a teacher is quite acceptable. The reason is that the focal item (the value) will not be interpreted otherwise than predicationally because the variable is expressed first, and this variable is unambiguously predicational. (Not only is the question word predicational in function in the nominal relative clause, it is also formally marked as such through the choice of what rather than who.) Concluding this section, we can say (a) that /Y-clefts with a predicational clefted constituent will always be a marked choice because predicational elements are reluctant to be used in thematic position, and (b) that such η-clefts will be even more problematic if the clefted NP is such that it can be mistaken for a referring (and therefore nonpredicational) NR C. In addition to the restrictions noted above we should also point out that, for some reason, a predicational element can more easily be focalized in an it-deft if the copula in the WH-clause is a verb other than be. Thus, although the following sentences may all be more or less acceptable in an appropriate context, the (b) sentences seem a little less good than their (a) counterparts: (47)(a) (b) (48)(a) (b) (49)(a) (b)

How happy it is that she looks! How happy it is that she is! How good a player is it that you find him ? How good a player is it that he is ? It was white that the wall had been painted. It was white that the wall was.

I would hazard the following explanation for this slight difference in acceptability. As we have seen, every one of these (b) sentences implies the idea 'There is something that X is/was'. If the 'something' in question is to be predicational (i.e. a

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property), this very idea is somewhat unnatural, because properties are not mutually exclusive: if X has property A, there is no reason why it should not have other properties as well. For this reason, //-clefts implying this idea will need a suitable context, i.e. a context that makes clear that only one property is presently in question. When other linking verbs are used, the idea 'There is something that...' is not so unnatural. Unlike be, linking verbs like look, find, grow, etc. express a predicational relation that is more readily linked up with specific circumstances or with a specific time. The property that is assigned to the referent of the subject NP is therefore more easily felt to be exclusive: it is the particular property that the referent has or had in specific circumstances. It follows that the variables that are presupposed in the (a) sentences of (47)-(49) (namely 'how she looks, 'how you find him' and 'the colour that the wall had been painted') are more naturally conceivable than the variables that are presupposed in the (b) sentences ('what she is', 'what he is' and 'the colour that the wall was'). In other words, the (a) sentences are slightly more acceptable than the (b) sentences because they more easily suggest a specific setting and hence a specific variable. The above explanation is corroborated by the fact that the (b) sentences become more acceptable if be is accompanied by an adverbial that creates a specific setting or otherwise particularizes the event:25 (50)(a) How happy it was that she was in those days! (b) How happy it is that she looks in that lovely hat and pink dress! (c) How good a player is it that he is now? (d) It was white that the wall had been in the good old days. D. In conclusion, //-clefts with predicational clefted constituents will be subject to at least the following restrictions: a. The variable must be formulated, or be capable of being formulated, as a nominal that has a specific referent. b. If the clefted constituent is an NP, it must be clear from the NP itself or from the context that this NP should be interpreted as predicational and not as referential.

25. Bolinger (1972b: 28) claims that elements can be focalized in an tf-cleft only if "their presence in the sentence particularizes the event". I would agree that sentences referring to a particular event can more easily be /Y-clefted (because the specific variable is more easily conceived of) but I do not think that it is the focal element itself that must particularize the event. For example, (i,b) is much more acceptable than (i,a) because of the particularizing information, but a teacher is not particularizing itself:

(i)(a) ??lt was a teacher that I was. (b) It was a teacher that I wanted to become in those days.

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c. Since the focus of an //-cleft is normally thematic, and since a predicational element is not normally capable of being thematic, //-clefts with a predicational clefted constituent will always be marked anyhow. d. //-clefts with a predicational clefted constituent will be somewhat less acceptable if their Wh-clause involves an unmodified form of be than when it involves a modified form or another linking verb.

2.3. There is a third restriction on //-clefts hightlighting predicate nominals, which is apparently linked up with the specificational nature of //-clefts, since it is to be observed in specificational sentences in general. In informal terms, the restriction is that the copula of a specificational sentence must always occur between the subject NP and the predicate nominal, except in cases of inversion. For example, though (51,a) is reversible to (51,b), no related construction in which be does not appear between the two NPs will be grammatical: (51 )(a) (b) (c) (d)

The murderer is your brother. Your brother is the murderer. *Your brother the murderer is. *The murderer your brother is.

The restriction can also be observed in specificational relative clauses: although (52,a) is reversible to (52,b), and although both NPs can become the head of a relative clause, only those relative clauses will be grammatical in which be occurs between the relative pronoun and the other NP:26 (52)(a) The murderer has turned out to be John. He was arrested last night. (b) John has turned out to be the murderer. He was arrested last night. (c) The murderer, who has turned out to be John, was arrested last night. (d) *The murderer, who John has turned out to be, was arrested last night. (e) John, who has turned out to be the murderer, was arrested last night. (f) *John, who the murderer has turned out to be, was arrested last night. 26. Notice, incidentally, that this restriction explains the ungrammaticality of Kuno's (1970: 351) example (i), which I do not think is accounted for by the principles that he argues himself:

(i) 'Mr Jones, who my piano teacher happens to be, has been arrested by police for drunken driving. If the relative clause is to be interpreted specificationally, our constraint requires that happens to be should occur between the NPs who and my piano teacher. This word order is also obligatory if the relative clause is to be predicational, because in that case who must be the subject NP and my piano teacher the predicational NP (since who refers to Mr. Jones, which cannot normally be predicational).

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As could be expected, the same restriction will also be observed when specificational sentences are //-clefted:27 (53)A. Who is the ban k robber? B. John is the bank robber. It is John who is the bank robber. The bank robber is John. *lt is John who the bank robber is. (54)A. Which one is John? B. The bank robber is John. It is the bank robber who is John. John is the bank robber. *lt is the bank robber who John is. How can this restriction be accounted for? It is doubtful that there should be any independently motivated rule prohibiting the copula of a specificational sentence to occur in any position other than in between two NPs. Such a rule seems questionable (a) because of its ad hoc character (e.g. it does not hold for predicational copular sentences - cf. footnote 27), (b) because it fails to explain why be can precede the two NPs in case of inversion (e.g. Is John the murderer?), and (c) because it is a language-specific rule: though it reflects the facts of English, the rule is not applicable e.g. to Dutch. In Dutch, the copula is found between the two NPs in simple specificational sentences, but necessarily follows the two NPs in specificational subclauses (e.g. relative clauses or the WH-clauses of //-clefts): (55)(a) De leider is Jan. 1 The leader is John (b) Jan is de leider. 'John is the leader' (c) *Jan de leider is. 'John the leader is' (d) *De leider Jan is. The leader John is' (56)(a) Jan, die de leider is, is mijn vriend. 'John, who the leader is, is my friend' (b) *Jan, die is de leider, is mijn vriend. 'John, who is the leader, is my friend' (57)(a) Met is Jan die de leider is. 'It is John who the leader is' (b) *Het is Jan die is de leider. 'It is John who is the leader' 27. Lees (1963: 380) had already noted examples like (53H54), but his conclusion was that "the predicate noun in a copula sentence is not amenable to the cleft-sentence operation". However, it is clear that this conclusion is false, since the restriction observed holds only for specificational sentences. When predicational sentences are clefted (which, as we have seen, is possible, although there are a number of restrictions), the predicate nominal can become the focal item and be need not occur between the two NPs (e.g. What is it that you want to become? -It is a teacher that I want to become).

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All this suggests that the restriction observed is not an independent one but follows from another, more fundamental principle. As far as I can see, this is the principle (argued in section 2.1.B) that the initial NP of a specificational copular sentence is always interpreted as the theme and therefore as the syntactic subject of the clause.28 Since specificational copular sentences are reversible, this means that whichever NP comes first in such a sentence is interpreted as both theme and syntactic subject (irrespective of whether it is the variable NP or the value NP)29 and that the other NP will automatically be interpreted as predicate nominal and fill the position after be. In other words, the reason why *The leader John is is ungrammatical is that it is impossible to interpret the leader as predicate nominal and John as subject if the leader is put in initial (i.e. subject) position. If the leader fills this position, it must be interpreted as subject, and then John has to be interpreted as predicate nominal and follow be, as in The leader is John. As far as I can see, the above explanation naturally accounts for the different facts that we have noticed, as well as for others: A. It explains why specificational be is not found between the two NPs in cases of inversion (e.g. Is John the leader?). Since the point of the explanation is that in specificational copular sentences the first NP will be interpreted as subject and the second as predicate nominal, it is natural that the first NP should follow be in those cases in which a subject NP normally follows the copula, i.e. in cases of inversion. B. Our explanation accounts for the fact that the restriction observed (namely the obligatory occurrence of be between the two NPs) does not hold for predicational sentences. Since predicational NPs are nonreferring by nature, they are not suitable to be interpreted as theme and subject of the sentence. (As we have seen, this is the reason why predicational sentences are not reversible.) It follows that, even if the predicational NP is used in initial position (as in such formal sentences as A thief he is, and a murderer), it is the other (i.e. the referring) NP that is interpreted as subject. The latter NP will therefore also precede the copula.

28. As pointed out by Halliday (1982:72), Quirk et al. (1972:945) and many others, it is the subject that is the unmarked theme in a declarative sentence. 29. This is especially clear in an example like the following:

(i)A. (pointing at a photograph:) Which is you ? B. This one is me. I am this one. The use of is rather than are in (i, A) makes clear that which is the subject and you the predicate nominal. Accordingly, in This one is me, the phrase this one is the subject and me is the predicate nominal. But when the sentence is reversed, / becomes the syntactic subject. This is clear both from the use of/(rather than me) and from the use of am (rather than is).

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C. The explanation holds not only for simple sentences but also for relative clauses and the WH-clauses of //-clefts. If clauses of this type are copular and specificational, the first NP (i.e. the relative pronoun or the NP containing the relative determiner) will always be interpreted as the subject NP, while the other NP will be interpreted as (and take the position of) the predicate nominal (e.g. It is John who is the leader or John, who is the leader, is a friend of mine). Although the specificational sentence John is the leader alternates with The leader is John (in which the leader is subject), there is no //-cleft *// is John who the leader is (in which the leader would still be the subject and who would have to be interpreted as predicate nominal). Rather, who, which is the first NP in the specificational WH-clause, can only function as subject, so that the only possible //-cleft is // is John who is the leader.30 On the other hand, if the WH-clause is predicational, only the referential NP can become subject. This accounts for the fact that we can say You need a doctor, which I am not, but not *You need a doctor, which is not me, and for examples like // is a teacher that I want to be or / am not the man that I used to be. D. Our theory predicts that the restriction on the position of be will apply only to such //-clefts as have an NP as focus: if the clefted constituent is an adjective or adverbial, the WH-word must also function as an adjectival or adverbial and cannot, therefore, be interpreted as the subject of the Wh-clause. This prediction is quite correct, as appears from the following examples: (58)(a) (b) (59)(a) (b)

It is happy that she is, not unhappy! *lt is happy that is she/her, not unhappy! It was in the kitchen that he was. *lt was in the kitchen that was he.

E. Our theory is in keeping with the fact that, in Dutch, the restriction on the position of the copula in specificational copular sentences holds only for independent clauses and not for relative clauses or the WH-clauses of //-clefts (cf. (55)-(57)). The reason is that, unlike English, Dutch has a rule that requires a different word order irThead clauses and subclauses. If we assume, with Koster (1975), that Dutch is an SOV language, the rule can be formulated as follows (cf. Declerck 1982: 170):

30. This point is especially clear from examples like the following, in which the verb form and the form of the pronouns reveal which element functions as subject: (i)A. (pointing at a photograph:) Which one is you ? B. The tall one is me. I am the tall one. It's the tall one who is me. "It's the tall one who I am.

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(60) In clauses that do not begin with an overt complementizer, the operator (i.e. the verb form that is marked for tense, number and person) must be moved to the position following the subject. This rule (which in this formulation is called 'Verb Second')31 shifts the verb to the position after the subject in (55,a-b), but does not does not have this effect in (56)-(57), because relative clauses and the WH-clauses of ώ-clefts involve an overt complementizer (viz. the WH-word). The fact that Verb Second has applied in the derivation of both De leider is Jan and Jan is de leider confirms that in both cases it is the initial NP (i.e. the NP after which is is put) that is felt to be the syntactic subject, as is claimed in the theory that we have argued. F. Our theory also accounts for the difference in acceptability between (61 ,a-b) and (62,a-b): (61 )(a) (b) (62)(a) (b)

What John has always been is tall for his age. What Mary wants to be is a teacher. ? * What his aim is is to enrich himself at your expense. *?What his car's worst defect is is its steering.

Higgins (1976: 162) notes that, unlike (61,a-b), (62,a-b) are "relatively bad", whatever the context in which they are used. In my opinion this unacceptability can be traced back to the constraint that we are discussing: (62,a-b) are unacceptable because the copula does not occur between the superscriptional NP and the value NR If we put it in that position, the sentences become quite acceptable: (63)(a) What is his aim is to enrich himself at our expense, (b) What is his car's worst defect is its steering. The fact that (61,a-b) are not unacceptable (although the copula again fails to occur between what and the second NP) is automatically explained from the fact that the constraint holds only for specificational clauses. In (61,a-b) the WH-clauses are not specificational but predicational (witness the use of what instead of (the one) who.} G. Our theory also accords with the observation that the restriction does not hold for descriptionally-identifying clauses:32

31. The rule exists independently of the SOV hypothesis, but must be formulated differently if this hypothesis is rejected. In an SVO framework it is known as 'Verb Final'. 32. The term 'descriptionally-identifying' is introduced in chapter 1 (section 5). See also chapter 2.

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(64)(a) Mike? I wonder who that can be. (b) *Mike? I wonder who can be that As we have seen, descriptionally-identifying clauses are not reversible. This means that only one constituent can act as syntactic subject, and that constituent is that, not who. Thai must therefore occur in subject position, i.e. before the copula, whereas the subject complement who ends up at the beginning of the clause as a result of WH-movement. In sum, the restriction noted and explained in section 2.3 is that specificational sentences (at least in English) require the copula to occur between the subject NP and the predicate nominal, the reason being that the interpretation of the NPs as subject or predicate nominal depends entirely on their position with respect to the copula.33 2.4. Another restriction on //-clefts focalizing predicate nominals is that the corresponding noncleft must not be descriptionally-identifying: (65)(a) Who is that (man)? - He/That man is my brother. (b) *Who is it who is that (man)? - *lt is my brother who is that (man). (*...who that (man) is) (66)(a) Mike? Who's Mike? - He/Mike is my neighbour. (b) *Mike? Who is it who is Mike? - *lt is my neighbour who is Mike. It should be noted that Who is it who is Mike? is acceptable as a specificational sentence (meaning 'Which person is Mike?') but not as a descriptionally-identifying one (i.e. as a question asking for a description of Mike). Similarly, // is my neighbour who is Mike is impeccable as a specificational reply but unacceptable as a descriptionally-identifying one (see also chapter 2). The reason why descriptionally-identifying sentences cannot be //-clefted is to be found in the specificational nature of //-clefts. Whereas an ή-cleft specifies a value for a variable, a descriptionally-identifying sentence assigns a description to an (already partly identified) referent. These are two entirely different functions. Moreover, because an //-cleft serves to identify a variable, the NP representing the latter must not be identifying (specifying) itself and must not have a referent that has already been identified, //-clefts such as those in (65)-(66) violate this requirement, since the NPs that should function as variables imply that some sort of identification has already taken place. For the same reasons the corresponding specificational 33. As far as I know, this constraint has not been formulated before in the linguistic literature. Yet, the data relating to it have sometimes been noted. For example, Higgins (1976: 163) notes that the sentence

(i) ?Please tell me which man the Speaker of the House is. is "strange on its Specificational reading" and that "it would be more normal to say": (ii) Please tell me which man is the Speaker of the House.

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WH-clefts are also ungrammatical:34 (67)(a) 'Who/what/the one who that is is my brother, 35 (b) 'Who/what/the one who Mike is is my neighbour.

2.5. There is one more restriction that I would like to draw attention to, although it has a wider scope than the previous ones, since it holds not only for #-clefts highlighting predicate nominals but for if-clefts in general. However, the principles that can account for it are the same as have been established in the previous sections, and I therefore deem it useful to include it in this chapter. The restriction in question concerns the possibility of deleting the WH-clause of the if-cleft. In some cases deletion appears to present no problem at all, in other cases it yields an unacceptable result: (68)A. B. (69)A. B. (70)A. B.

Someone fell off the roof of the school. Was it a pupil (who fell off the roof) ? One of the pupils ran away. Was it a friend of yours (who ran away) ? I'd like an ice cream, please. Is it a big one that you'd like ? *ls it a big one? (71 )A. I need three people to help me. B. Is it adults that you need? *ls it adults? The rationale of this appears to be the following. As pointed out above, an ft-cleft always presupposes a variable in the form of a nominal with specific reference.36 This nominal has the form of a noun head (which is not overtly expressed in the it-cleft) followed by a restrictive relative clause ('the X who/that...'). Deletion of this WH-clause from the //-cleft is possible only if the specificity of the variable NP 34. Bolinger (1972a: 102) accepts examples like the following: (i) (What's that?) - Well, what that is is a cap. This would seem to be a counterexample to the claim that descriptionally-identifying sentences cannot yield a WH-cleft. However, it seems to me that the (relative) acceptability of this Wh-cleft is entirely due to the question-answer situation, which facilitates the use of what that is as subject NP: this NP is clearly a reiteration of the question. Note that the corresponding ώ-cleft (in which there is no what and hence no possibility of reiteration) is quite unacceptable:

(ii) (What's that?) - 'Well, it's a cap that that is. 35. The sentence The one who is Mike is my neighbour is more acceptable than (67,b), but only on an interpretation on which neither the variable nor the value is descriptionally-identifying. The sentence could be used, for example, to express that the actor who plays the part of Mike in a play is my neighbour. In this sense it is a specificational sentence, which is therefore reversible to My neighbour is the one who is Mike (in which is means 'plays the part of) (see chapter 2). 36. Except, as will now become clear, when it is used in an opaque context (see below).

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is established by the context; if the relative clause is the only indication that the variable is specific, it cannot be deleted. Thus, the relative clauses can be deleted in (68,B) and (69,B) because the specificity of the variable is established by the specific NPs someone and one of the pupils in the preceding context, but (70,B) and (71,B) cannot be reduced because here the noun head of the variable is established by a nonspecific NP (an ice cream, three people). In other words, a reduced //-cleft like Is it a big one ? in (70,B) is unacceptable in this particular stretch of discourse because it presupposes a specific variable (i.e. it presupposes the existence of some specific ice cream) while there is no indication in the discourse of what the referent of this NP could be. It should be noted that the problem does not arise when not only the question (A) but also the reply (B) is embedded in an opaque context: (72)A. I'd like an ice cream, please. B. Must it be a big one ? In an opaque context the variable NP is no longer specific and does not, therefore, require a specifying relative clause or the presence of a specific NP in the preceding context. (Because of its specifying meaning, a WH-clause cannot even be added any more.) The following example further illustrates these principles: (73)A. I'm looking for someone who can help me. B. Is it a pupil (that you are looking for)? Must it be a pupil (*that you are looking for) ? Sentence (73,A) is ambiguous between a specific and a nonspecific reading of the NP someone who can help me. On the former interpretation the speaker has someone specific in mind and says that he is looking for him (or her). In this case only Is it a pupil (that you are looking for)? is an appropriate reply. On the nonspecific interpretation (73,A) means that the speaker is looking for someone who can help him without having any particular person in mind. In this case only Must it be a pupil? is acceptable as a reply. In sum, reduced //-clefts whose focal item is a specific NP (i.e. an NP that presupposes a referent in the world of discourse) require that there should be a specific NP introducing that referent in the preceding context. Unreduced //-clefts do not require this because specification then happens through the presence of the WH-clause. Reduced //-clefts with a nonspecific focal NP do not require this either. It is worth noting that the above theory confirms one of the conclusions that we have already arrived at. In section 2.2.B we observed that the clefted NP of an //-cleft will always be interpreted as referring (and thematic) if no predicational interpretation is enforced by the context. This is in keeping with the conclusion we have just reached, namely that the variable NP of an //-cleft (and hence also the NP representing the value, i.e. the clefted NP) will be interpreted as specific (hence

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referring) unless a nonspecific interpretation is enforced by the context. This leads to the conclusion that there is a certain hierarchy in the way focal NPs are interpreted: if a specific interpretation is possible, the focal item will not normally be interpreted as nonspecific or predicational; if a specific interpretation is excluded, the nonspecific interpretation (on which the NP is only referring within the world created by the opaque context) will be preferred; a predicational interpretation (on which the NP is not referring at all) will be selected only if the other two are explicitly excluded. (It goes without saying that this accords with what we observed in chapter 1, viz. that nonspecific NPs are only 'weakly referring' and that predicational NPs are not referring at all.)

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3. CONCLUSION In this chapter I have pointed out and attempted to explain the following restrictions on //-clefts with a predicate nominal as clefted constituent: 3.1. The clefted NP must be the 'identifier' and cannot be the 'identified'. 3.2. //-clefts with predicational foci are subject to the following restrictions:

a. The variable must be (or must be capable of being) formulated as a nominal with a specific referent. b. It must be clear from the context or from the clefted NP itself that the latter should be interpreted as predicational. c. Even those //-clefts that come up to these requirements will be marked because a predicational NP cannot normally be thematic. d. An it-deft with a predicational focus will be less acceptable if the VP of its WH-clause consists of just a form of be than if the VP involves other elements as well, or consists of a different verb form. 3.3. In an //-cleft (and in fact in any specificational type of sentence) the copula must always be put between the subject NP and the predicate nominal, except in cases of inversion. 3.4. The predicate nominal of a descriptionally-identifying sentence cannot be processed as the focus of an //-cleft. 3.5. The WH-clause of an //-cleft can be deleted only if the specificity of the variable NP is established by the context.

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CHAPTER 5. THE USE OF /T-CLEFTS AND WH-CLEFTS IN DISCOURSE

i. INTRODUCTION In this chapter I will be concerned with the principles that govern the use of /'/-clefts and WH-clefts in discourse, i.e. with what we could call the 'pragmatics' of clefts. In doing so I will start from a discussion of Prince (1978), which is the most detailed treatment of the subject in the recent linguistic literature. I will adopt some of the principles argued there but reject others and build on this criticism to make alternative proposals. The conclusion will be that both //-clefts and WH-clefts fall apart into three major subtypes and that, although //-clefts and WH-clefts basically have the same meaning and function, there are numerous pragmatic factors that may induce the speaker to prefer one type of cleft to another in a particular context.1 It should be noted that this conclusion in fact holds only for specificational clefts. Since we will be concerned with a comparison of //-clefts and WH-clefts in discourse and since //-clefts are essentially specificational - the (semi)predicational types discussed in chapter 3 are exceptional and will be disregarded here - we will not be concerned with WH-clefts that are not specificational (i.e. the types of WH-clefts that we have called predicational, definitional or identity statements - cf. chapter 1, section 3.7). Prince (1978), which serves as our starting-point, also deals with specificational clefts only. On the other hand, Prince considers only WH-clefts whose WH-clause precedes the copula. (As noted in chapter 1 (section 2.11), Prince calls such WH-clefts 'noninverted' but we actually consider them to be the 'inverted' type. In order to avoid any misunderstanding I will use the label 'WH-clause-initial WH-clefts' in this chapter.) However, since both WH-clauseinitial and WH-clause-final WH-clefts can be used specificationally, I will include both in the discussion.

1. This conclusion exposes the simplicity of a claim which is not unfamiliar in the linguistic literature, viz. the claim that /'/-clefts and WH-clefts "are synonymous, share the same presuppositions, answer the same questions, and in general they can be used interchangeably" (Akmajian 1979: 149). (For Akmajian this putative interchangeability is even sufficient ground for claiming that rt-clefts are transformationally derived from WH-clefts by some sort of extraposition rule.)

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2. PRAGMATIC SUBTYPES OF (SPECIFICATIONAL) WH-CLEFTS AND IT-CLEFTS In the linguistic literature clefts2 are traditionally treated as a unitary class of constructions. They are considered to be structures consisting of a 'focus' which represents new information and is heavily accented and contrastive, and a WH-clause which represents 'presupposed' or Old' information. (In our terminology, the focus represents the value and the WH-clause the variable to which it is assigned.) The sentences of (1,B) are typical examples of such clefts:

(1 )A. Who broke the window? B. (a) It was John who did it. (b) The one who did it was John. (c) John was the one who did it. As far as I know, only two people have challenged this unitary treatment of clefts. In one of his 'Points of Modern English Syntax' in English Studies, Erades (1962) draws attention to the sentence

(2) It was in 1886 that (...) Lewin published the first systematic study of the cactus. Erades points out that (2) differs from ώ-clefts like (l,B,a) in that the focus is not contrastive, the /Aa/-clause does not convey old information, and thai is not deletable (as it is in 'normal' //-clefts: // was John (that) saw it first). Erades therefore concludes that (2) is not really an //-cleft but "a different type of sentence" (p.138). More recently, examples like (2) have been discussed by Prince (1978). Prince adduces a number of similar examples (drawn from a corpus) and concludes that //-clefts (but not WH-clefts) should be divided into two subclasses: next to 'stressed-focus //-clefts' like (2,B,a) she also distinguishes 'informativepresupposition //-clefts'. The latter are //-clefts such as (2) whose focus is not contrastively accented and whose WH-clause represents information which is not presupposed but entirely new. The following sentences further illustrate the type:

2. As above, I will be using 'cleft' as a cover-term for ή-clefts and WH-clefts. 210

(3)(a) It is with great pride that I accept this nomination. (b) It was also during these centuries that a vast internal migration (...) from the south northwards took place... (Prince 1978:

898) (c) The leaders of the militant homophile movement in America generally have been young people. It was they who fought back during a violent police raid on a Greenwich Village bar in 1969... (Prince 1978: 898) Prince points out that //-clefts like these differ from 'normal' (i.e. 'stressed-focus') //-clefts in several respects: (a) the focal item is not as heavily accented; (b) the WH-clause conveys information which is not presupposed (known) to the hearer, but which is represented as if it were known; (c) for that reason, the WH-clause is normally (vs. weakly) accented; (d) the focal item is generally short and anaphoric, and is usually an NP or a "thematic scene-setting adverbial"; (e) the WH-word is not deletable. It goes without saying that splitting up the class of //-clefts into two subclasses with characteristics of their own is a major step forward. The question then is whether this distinction can also be made for WH-clefts. Prince (1978) answers this question negatively. According to her, WH-clefts show a characteristic which is incompatible with the idea of an 'informative presupposition', viz. the characteristic that (for an adequate use of a WH-cleft in discourse) the WH-clause must represent 'given' information, i.e. information which "the coperative speaker can assume to be appropriately in the hearer's consciousness at the time of hearing the utterance" (p.888). If this claim is correct, there cannot be any 'informative-presupposition WH-clefts', since an 'informative presupposition' by definition represents information that is quite new. However, is the claim made by Prince really correct? Is it true that WH-clefts must always involve a WH-clause that represents 'given' information? When we examine Prince's evidence we ascertain that her claim is based on two observations : A. Prince's first piece of evidence is that, unlike //-clefts, WH-clefts cannot function as discourse openers. Thus, she points out that none of the following is acceptable when used out of the blue: (4)(a) tttt *Hi! What my name is is Ellen. (b) tttt *Hi! What I've heard about is your work. (c) 8tt *Hi! What you used to do was go to school with my brother. According to Prince, the reason for this unacceptability is that, although the material in the WH-clause can still be considered as 'known' in the sense that it can

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be inferred via 'bridges',3 it is not 'given', i.e. it cannot be assumed to be in the hearer's consciousness. Thus, in (4,a), "the hearer, seeing that I am a person, could infer that I have a name" but "it would be highly presumptuous (though possibly correct) for me, the speaker, to assume that my hearer is actually thinking that I have a name" (p.888). //-clefts, on the other hand, can be found as discourse openers. Prince's examples include the following, in which the it-cleft is the first sentence of a piece of written discourse: (5)(a) tttt It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us the week-end. On September 25,1926, (...) he decided to establish a 40-hour week... (b) tttt It is through the writings of Basil Bernstein that many social scientists have become aware of the scientific potential of sociolinguistics... Such examples show that "the information represented in it-cleft thai-clauses does not have to be assumed to be in the hearer's mind" (p.894). This conclusion is further illustrated with examples like the following (p.894): (6)(a) If I see a train crossing, I keep going. It's a game you're playing. (...) (b) I've been bit once by a German shepherd. It was really scary. It was an outside meter the woman had. I read the gas meter and was walking back out... In (6,a) the speaker (who is describing his job) clearly does not presume that the hearer is thinking that one is playing something; nor does the speaker relating the dogbite incident in (6,b) assume that the hearer is thinking that a particular woman existed and that she had something. If he used WH-clefts instead of ή-clefts, the speaker would make these assumptions. However, I do not think that the above argument is a valid one. In my opinion, it fails in two ways: a. Examples like (5)-(6) lead Prince to conclude that "//-clefts make no assumptions about the hearer's thoughts" (p.895). However, this generalization is clearly inadequate. To see this, it suffices to substitute η-clefts for the WH-clefts in (4,a-c): (7)(a) tt *Hi! It's Ellen that my name is. (b) 88 *Hi! It's your work that I've heard about. (c) 88 *Hi! It's go to school with your brother that you used to do.

3. The term '(inferential) bridge' is due to Clark & Haviland (1977: 6).

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Obviously, these //-clefts are no more acceptable as discourse openers than the WH-clefts of (4,a-c), the reason apparently being the same, viz. that the clefts cannot be used out of the blue because they require the presupposed part to be in the hearer's consciousness. b. It is not correct that WH-clefts can never be used as discourse openers. This is clear from examples like (8,a-b), where a WH-cleft is used as the opening sentence of a speech :4 (8)(a) What I have often asked myself is how other linguists manage to keep abreast with the rapid developments in the different fields of linguistics while still finding time to go on writing articles themselves. One colleague who has proved to be able to do this and who I have the honour to introduce to you tonight is Mr... (b) My dear friends, what we have always wanted to know, but what the government has never wanted to tell us, is what exactly happens at secret conferences like the one you have been reading about in the papers this week. There is one man, however, who has been present at such conferences himself and who is willing to break silence. His name is Robert Fox, and he is the man that we have invited as guest speaker for tonight. It would seem, then, that we are faced with a rather odd situation: both //-clefts and WH-clefts are sometimes acceptable as discourse openers but sometimes unacceptable. However, there is a very simple explanation for this: the //-clefts that are used discourse-initially (as in (5,a-b) are of the 'informative-presupposition' type, while those that are unacceptable as discourse openers (as in (7,a-c)) are 'stressed-focus' //-clefts. And exactly the same thing is true of WH-clefts: as shown in (4,a-c), stressed-focus WH-clefts cannot be used discourse-initially, but there are also WH-clefts that can be found as discourse openers (as in (8,a-b)), and these are

4. Prince recognizes that WH-clefts can occur discourse-initially, but she claims that this is possible only if the information given in the WH-clause is 'given', i.e. "coperatively assumable" as being in the hearer's consciousness. However, I do not think that one can claim that this is the fact in (8,a-b) without stretching the meaning of'given' to a point that the term is virtually empty of meaning (and is certainly no longer distinguishable from 'known').

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clearly of the informative-presupposition type.5 B. The second piece of evidence adduced by Prince in support of the claim that there are //-clefts but no WH-clefts that have an informative presupposition concerns the following examples: (9)(a) It's sort of an arbitrary line that you're drawing. (b) *What you're drawing is sort of an arbitrary line. (10)(a) It's obvious that I'm a woman and enjoy being a woman. I'm not overly provocative either. It's the thin, good-nigger line that I have to toe. (b) *What I have to toe is the thin, good-nigger line. According to Prince, cases like these, in which the focus NP is extracted from an idiom, confirm that "//-clefts make no assumptions about the hearer's thoughts"

5. This conclusion refutes not only Prince (1978) but also Gundel (1985:98), who makes the exactly opposite claim, viz. that WH-clefts, but not //-clefts can be used discourse-initially. Gundel adduces the following examples as evidence for her claim: (i)(a) Can I help you ? - Yes, what I'm looking for is a printer. (b) Can I help you? - ?Yes, if's a printer that I'm looking for. (ii) (at the beginning of a lecture:) (a) What I would like to talk about today is conversational implicature. (b) ilt's conversational implicature that I would like to talk about today. (iii)(a) At first meeting, people are always telling Judy Goldsmith that she doesn't look the type. What they seem to expect from the president of the National Organization for Women is someone slick, sophisticated, perhaps a bit strident. (b) (...) ?lt's someone slick, sophisticated, perhaps a bit strident that they seem to expect from the president of the National Organization for Women.

In section 3.3.1 will show that there are various pragmatic principles which may entail that one type of cleft is more felicitous than another in particular contexts. The relative unacceptability of the //-clefts in the above examples is due to such principles, and therefore cannot sustain the claim that //-clefts cannot be used discourse-initially. The principle that is at work in (i) and (ii) is that a constituent that is a 'continuous topic' (i.e. a topic which links up with the preceding context) will preferably be placed at the beginning of the sentence (cf. section 3.3.1.). In (i) it is clearly what I'm looking for that links up best with the preceding sentence Can I help you ? (which is a question that is typically asked when someone seems to be looking for something). For this reason the WH-clause-initial WH-cleft (i,a) is a better choice than the //-cleft (i,b) or the WH-clause-final WH-cleft A printer is what I'm looking for. In (ii) there is no context in the sense of preceding discourse, but there is a situational context: the speaker is just starting his lecture and is announcing its topic. It goes without saying that the constituent that links up best with this is the WH-clause what/that I would like to talk about today, not the constituent conversational implicature. It is therefore predictable that the only suitable type of cleft in this situation is the one in which the WH-clause is processed first (i.e. not an //-cleft or WH-clause-final WH-cleft). In example (iii), finally, the relative unacceptability of the //-cleft is due to the fact that the defied constituent someone slick, sophisticated, perhaps a bit strident is not a referring NP but a predicational one. (This also appears from the use of what rather than the one who in the WH-clause.) As we saw in chapter 4, //-clefts with predicational foci are relatively unacceptable, except if the variable is established by the preceding context. This is not the case in (iii,b).

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(p.895), whereas WH-clefts do. In my opinion, however, the ungrammatically of the WH-clefts in (9)-(10) can simply be traced to the fact that there are severe restrictions on operations that break up idioms. As noted by Schachter (1973: 31-32), idioms may allow extraction of an NP for relativization, but other operations that break up the idiom are not normally possible: (11 )(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

She's keeping careful track of her expenses. The careful track she's keeping of her expenses pleases me. *The careful track pleases me. *Careful track is being kept of her expenses. *What she's keeping is careful track of her expenses.

We can conclude, then, that neither of Prince's arguments against the existence of informative-presupposition WH-clefts is valid. On the contrary, the discussion of the first argument has made clear that the existence of such WH-clefts must be recognized: it has been shown that WH-clefts may sometimes be found as discourse openers, as in (8,a-b). It goes without saying that the WH-clause of a cleft (of any type) that is used discourse-initially cannot present 'given' information (i.e. information that the hearer is assumed to be thinking about) and must therefore be informative. There are other pieces of evidence that confirm this conclusion: A. When we examine Prince's examples of informative-presupposition //-clefts, we notice that many of them can easily be replaced by WH-clefts: (12)(a) But why is the topic so important? Apparently, it is the topic that enables the listener to compute the intended antecedents of each sentence in the paragraph, (p.902) (b) But why is the topic so important? Apparently, the topic is what enables the listener to compute the intended antecedents of each sentence in the paragraph. (13)(a) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting independent evidence for this rule and it is to that evidence that we must now turn, (p.902) (b) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting independent evidence for this rule and that evidence is what we must now turn to. (14)(a) It is for this reason that Halle's argument against autonomous phonemics is of such importance, (p.900) (b) This is why Halle's argument against autonomous phonemics is of such importance. In these examples both the //-clefts and the (WH-clause-final) WH-clefts that we have added as possible alternatives are of the informative-presupposition type. Examples with WH-clause-initial WH-clefts are also easily found:

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(14) A. Those apples are good, aren't they? B. So they are! What keeps me from eating all of them is that mother will be furious if I don't leave any for the others. (15) A. I hear you've got a job at Johnson's. A nice place that is. I suppose you're happy now? B. Well, I don't know. What I'd really like to do is run a business of my own. But I can't do that because I've no money to start one. B. That informative-presupposition WH-clefts are not at all exceptional is furthermore clear from the fact that they are sometimes more natural than their //-cleft counterparts: (16) A. I'm afraid we'll have to give up the plan. B. (a) That's what I thought too. (b) ?lt is that that I thought too. (17) A. The machine appears to be badly damaged. B. (a) That's what I was afraid of, yes. (b) ?lt's that that I was afraid of, yes. C. The conclusions arrived at in this section so far are further borne out by the fact that the basic properties which Prince ascribes to WH-clefts and //-clefts respectively are in fact properties of the larger class of structures to which both belong, viz. specificational structures. Thus, the requirement that the presupposed part of a (stressed-focus) WH-cleft should represent material that is given (i.e. that may be assumed to be in the hearer's consciousness at the time of speaking) is in fact typical, not of WH-clefts only, but of specificational sentences in general. Since specificational sentences specify a value for a variable, the normal (unmarked) use of any specificational sentence will require that the variable be given when the value is specified. Thus, the sentences (17,a-e) will all be equally acceptable or unacceptable as discourse openers according as the speaker can or cannot assume that the variable ('the X who murdered Smith') is in the hearer's consciousness: (17)(a) Hi! The one who murdered Smith is JOHN. (b) Hi! JOHN is the one who murdered Smith. (c) Hi! It is JOHN who murdered Smith. (d) Hi! The murderer of Smith is JOHN. (e) Hi! JOHN is Smith's murderer.

These sentences are all specificational, and they all require the variable to be 'given' in exactly the same way.6 The same is true of the property which in Prince's theory is typical of 6. It should be pointed out that this conclusion actually holds for declarative specificational sentences only. Interrogative stressed-focus clefts (which form a category that is disregarded by Prince (1978)) do not require the WH-clause to represent 'given' information. Thus, whereas (i,a-b) are very odd as discourse openers, the corresponding questions (ii,a-b) seem all right: ./..

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informative-presupposition rt-clefts, viz. that the part corresponding to the variable represents new information as if it were known. In my opinion, any kind of specificational sentence will evince this property if the variable to which the value is assigned is unknown to the hearer at the time of the utterance. For example:

(18)A. But why is everybody so interested in uranium? B. (a) Because uranium is what you need to produce atomic power. (b) Because it is uranium that you need to produce atomic power. (c) Because uranium is the fissionable material used in producing atomic power.

6. ../.. (i)(a) (b) (ii)(a) (b)

'Hi! It was about JOHN that your brother spoke to Mary. 'Hi! JOHN was the one that your brother spoke to Mary about. Hi! Was it about JOHN that your brother spoke to Mary? Hi! Was JOHN the one that your brother spoke to Mary about ?

Similarly, there seems to be nothing wrong with examples like (iii,a-b):

(iii)(a) Good morning! Was it your radio that played so loudly last night ? It kept me from sleeping until after midnight, (b) Good morning, sir. Is this what your son ordered by telephone last night ? My wife was not quite sure she had understood him correctly. It is clear that in examples like these the speaker need not assume that the contents of the WH-clause are in the hearer's consciousness at the time of utterance. In (iii,a) the speaker may realize the hearer was probably never conscious of his being too noisy, and (iii,b) can easily be said if the speaker suspects that the hearer does not know that his son ordered something by telephone. In that case the speaker consciously informs the hearer of this fact (possibly to spite the hearer's son), which means that the contents of the WH-clause are actually new (rather than known) information and are therefore certainly not given. The reason why interrogative clefts do not require the presupposed part to be given, whereas declarative clefts of the stressed-focus type do, appears to be the following. Like other specificational sentences, clefts specify a value for a variable. As we saw in chapter 1 (section 2.3), this is a process that is similar to providing an answer to a question. For this reason a (stressed-focus) cleft like (i,a) could easily be paraphrased as: 'You want to know about whom your brother spoke to Mary? Well, the answer is: John'. Now, it is a natural fact in the use of questions and answers that we will not start a stretch of discourse by telling someone the answer to a question that we assume he is not thinking about. If the speaker tells someone the answer to a question in this way (for example, by telling him which value is to be assigned to a particular variable), it means that the speaker presupposes that the question (variable) is at that moment 'given' in the mind of the hearer. In interrogative clefts the situation is different. Here the speaker asks the hearer which answer (value) is to be given to a question (variable), and this, of course, is something that he can easily do without assuming that the hearer is actually thinking of that question.

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In each of these specificational sentences,7 the part corresponding to the variable contains information which cannot be taken to be what the hearer is thinking about at the time of the utterance, since it provides the answer to a question that the hearer has just asked. This part of the sentence is thus entirely new, but because the speaker chooses to use a specificational sentence, it is represented as if it were a variable to which a value has to be assigned. And since in the unmarked use of specificational sentences the variable is not new but known to the hearer, this has as a result that information that is unknown to the hearer is actually represented as if it were known. The reason why Prince wrongly concludes that representing new information as known is characteristic of (informative-presupposition) //-clefts only is that she contrasts her examples of /'/-clefts exclusively with nonspecificational sentences. Thus, in connection with (19,a) she noted: "Were the first sentence not clefted, i.e. Fifty years ago, H.F. gave..., it would seem as though the newspaper had just discovered (or were pretending to have discovered) the information in the /Äö/-clause; the //-cleft, in contrast, serves to mark it as a known fact, unknown only to the readership" (p.898). She adds that "the same is true of other informativepresupposition //-clefts, such as (19,b).

(19)(a) It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us the week-end. (...) (b) The leaders of the homophile movement in America generally have been young people. It was they who fought back during a violent police raid on a Greenwich Village bar in 1969, (...) Example (19,a) is deceiving in that only a nonspecificational structure can be substituted for the /'/-cleft in a natural way. However, in (19,b) we can try out more alternatives:

(20)(a) It was they who fought back... (b) They were the ones who fought back... (c) They fought back... Like the /'/-cleft in (19,a), the WH-cleft in (19,b) (at least on the specificational reading) also appears to represent the fight as if it were old information. In contrast,

7. Sentence (18,B,c) is ambiguous between a specificational and a predicational reading. To get an unambiguously specificational interpretation we would have to reverse the order of the subject NP and the predicate nominal, but this is somewhat difficult to do because it runs counter to the 'principle of theme continuity' that we will discuss in section 3.3.1. It can be done, however, if the speaker uses a special intonation pattern which puts surprised emphasis on the final NP: (i) Because the fissionable material used in producing atomic power is ... uranium!

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(20,c), which is not specificational, definitely does not have this effect.8 The reason is that this effect follows from phrasing the new information in the form of a variable, i.e. from the use of a specificational sentence. The observation that the variable part of such a sentence is always (represented as) known concurs with the fact (noted in chapter 1, section 2.6.F) that, with very few exceptions, the NP expressing the variable in a specificational structure (e.g. the variable 'the ones who fought back' in (20,a-c)) is always definite. It is well-known that the the use of a definite NP implies that the speaker assumes the hearer to be able to identify who or what he is talking of. The use of a specificational sentence with a definite NP as variable (presupposition) therefore naturally entails that the latter part is represented as known to the hearer.9 In sum, the following things have become clear now: a. It is not only WH-clefts that involve a 'given' variable. The presence of a 'given' variable is typical of the unmarked use of any specificational sentence.10 b. It is not only //-clefts that may have an informative presupposition. The presence of a variable representing new information as if it were known is typical of a marked use of specificational sentences in general.11 c. It follows that the distinction between 'stressed-focus' clefts and 'informativepresupposition' clefts can be made for WH-clefts as well as for /i-clefts. However, this still is not the end of the story. When we scrutinize the examples of 'informative-presupposition' clefts given here and in Prince (1978) we notice that they actually fall apart in two groups. The following examples (which are repeated here for convenience) should make this clear: (21 )(a) However, it turns out that there is interesting independent evidence for this rule and it is to that evidence that we must now turn.

8. Sentence (20,c) can be interpreted as specificational, though, provided there is contrastive accent on they. In that case (20,c) also represents the fight as information that is known to the hearer. 9. As a matter of fact this explanation also accounts for the fact that clefts can be used with an informative presupposition, for (as has often been observed) "the relative clause in the //-cleft is also a definite referring expression" (Gundel 1985: 97). 10. This conclusion accords with Rochemont's (1986: 132) claim that a phrase can receive contrastive focus only if the rest of the sentence is 'directly c-construable', i.e. if either it "has a discourse antecedent" or "the attention of the participants has been directed towards the intended referent (...) in the physical environment of the discourse". 11. Noncleft specificational sentences of the type The problem is that., or The question is whether... are particularly apt to have an informative variable part. For example: (i) We certainly hope to have the bridge finished before next week. The problem is that the weather forecast is none too good.

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(b) However, it turns out that there is interesting independent evidence for this rule and that evidence is what we must now turn to. (22)(a) But why is everybody so interested in uranium ? - Because it is uranium that you need to produce atomic power. (b) But why is everybody so interested in uranium ? - Because uranium is what you need to produce atomic power. (23)(a) My dear friends, what we have always wanted to know, but what the government has never wanted to tell us, is what exactly happens at secret conferences like the one you have been reading about in the papers this week. There is one man, however,... (b) It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us the week-end. (...) (24)(a) Those apples are good, aren't they? - So they are! What keeps me from eating all of them is that mother would be furious if I left none for the others. (b) It is through the writings of Basil Bernstein that many social scientists have become aware of the scientific potential of sociolinguistics. (...) There is a clear difference between the examples in (21)-(22) and those in (23)-(24). The former clearly satisfy all the requirements imposed on 'informativepresupposition' clefts by Prince (1978), but the latter satisfy only some of them. More specifically, the former involve a focus NP that is unaccented and "short and anaphoric" (Prince 1978: 899), but the latter do not. In (23)-(24) the focus is relatively accented and long, and it does not link up with the preceding discourse in any way. A further difference, which is related to this, is that (23)-(24) can easily be used discourse-initially, whereas this does not seem to be possible for (21)-(22). This means that, rather than distinguish two types of η-clefts and WH-clefts (viz. 'stressed-focus' ones and 'informative-presupposition' ones), we should actually distinguish three. And in doing so we will have to coin new terms, since examples like (23)-(24) appear to involve both a (relatively) accented focus and an informative presupposition. I therefore suggest the following subclassification. A. Contrastive clefts

These are the clefts that we have so far labelled 'stressed-focus clefts' and which are exemplified by (l,B,a-c). They have the following characteristics: a. The WH-clause gives information that is not new but 'given' (in the above defined sense of 'co-operatively assumable to be in the hearer's consciousness at the time of utterance'). (In the terminology of Givon (1983): the WH-clause pursues the thematic line of the stretch of discourse in which it is couched; the variable is therefore a 'continuous topic'.) b. The focus NP may or may not occur in the preceding context. In other words, it may be a 'continuous topic' (as in (25,a)) or a 'discontinuous' one (as in (25,b)):

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(25)(a) I asked her what was the matter with John and she answered that it was he who had been the victim of the robbery. (b) Nobody knows who killed the old man. The police seem to believe that it was a tramp who did it. Irrespective of whether the focus NP is a continuous or discontinuous topic, it represents 'new' information in the sense that the NP has not yet been specified as value for the variable in the preceding context. (That is, it is new information that the NP is identified as an argument NP of the predicate of the WH-clause.) c. The focus NP is heavily accented, whereas the WH-clause is weakly accented. d. Because it is heavily accented, the focus NP is strongly contrastive. (As we saw in chapter 1 (section 2.8), specificational sentences naturally invite a contrastive interpretation of the value NP, and this is especially the case if the NP in question is strongly accented and if the variable part is given.) e. Because it is heavily accented, the focus NP is likely to be an 'important topic', i.e. "a rather persistent topic in terms of the succeeding discourse context" (Givon 1983: 9). Thus, in (25,a), John may easily continue to be a topic in the succeeding sentences. (For example, the next sentence could easily begin with He...) f. Because at least one of its constituents (the WH-clause) is a continuous topic, a contrastive cleft will not be found at the beginning of a stretch of discourse (cf. our above discussion of (4,a-c) and (7,a-c)). g. If the contrastive cleft is a WH-cleft, it may be a noninverted one or an inverted one: (26)(a) Who broke that window? - John was the one who did it. (b) What do you need ? - What I need is a sheet of paper and a pencil. (This does not mean, of course, that the two constructions are always equally appropriate. As we will see below, pragmatic factors (having to do with e.g. the length of the clefted constituent or the choice of the sentence topic) may render one of them preferable to the other. B. Unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts These are clefts like (21)-(22) which exhibit the following characteristics:

a. The WH-clause represents information which is new (but represented as if it were old). It is therefore a discontinuous topic. b. The focus NP is anaphoric and therefore by definition a continuous topic (in terms of the preceding context).

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c. The focus NP is not heavily accented.12 This is in keeping not only with the fact that this NP is anaphoric but also with the observation that this type of cleft does not invite a contrastive interpretation. The WH-clause is normally (vs. weakly) accented. d. The focus NP is not likely to be a persistent topic. For example, in (27) the topic these centuries is a "fast-decaying" topic (Givon 1983:25) which is not repeated in the clauses following the cleft: (27) It was also during these centuries that a vast internal migration (...) from the south northwards took place, a process no less momentous than the Amhara expansion southwards during the last part of the 19th century. (...) (Prince 1978: 898) The reason why the focus NP is not likely to be a persistent topic is that it is weakly accented and gives old information, whereas the WH-clause that follows is more heavily accented and represents new information. (As pointed out below, in WH-clefts of this type the WH-clause normally follows the copula in order to conform to this pattern.) Naturally, it is the new and more emphatic topic expressed in the second constituent that has the greater potential for being continued in the succeeding discourse. e. Because the focus is anaphoric and thus continuous, this type of cleft cannot be used as a discourse opener. It needs a preceding context containing the antecedent of the anaphor. £ If the cleft is a WH-cleft, the WH-clause normally follows the copula. (As we will see in section 3.3.2., a short and anaphoric focus will normally be processed before the WH-clause.) For example: (28)A. Why do you like Paris so much? B. (a) Because that's where I met my future wife. (b)*Because where I met my future wife is that. C. Discontinuous clefts

These are clefts of the type exemplified by (23)-(24), which have the following characteristics: a. The WH-clause represents information which is new, but which is no longer clearly represented as if it were known. The latter fact can be explained as follows. We have seen that, in the unmarked use of specificational sentences, the

12. This is the only type of cleft in which it can be found as the destressed form of that: (i)(a) (Do you like it?) - It's what I have always wanted, (b) It's what he said, son.

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b. c. d. e.

value part represents old information. It follows that, if a specificational sentence is used with a value part that is new, the effect is that the new information is represented as if it were known. This marked use of a specificational sentence is what we actually observe in unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts. However, (and now I am anticipating section 3.3.3) discontinuous clefts are often used to emphasize rather than identify, in which case there is hardly anything left of their specificational meaning. In such cases the implication of representing new information as if it were old is naturally as weakly present as the specificational meaning on which it depends. The focus NP also represents information that is new in every sense of the word. Not only the variable but also the value is thus a discontinuous topic. Because of this both constituents are at least normally accented . Another consequence of the fact that both the focus and the WH-clause give new information is that this type of cleft can easily be used as a discourse opener. As we have seen, specificational WH-clefts may generally be either noninverted or inverted. Unaccented-anaphoric-focus WH-clefts represent an exception, as their WH-clause must normally follow the copula. The reason for this is that in an English cleft it is natural to process a short and anaphoric focus before the WH-clause (cf. section 3.3.2). In discontinuous clefts, the focus is not anaphoric, and the shorter constituent may be either the WH-clause or the focal element. In discontinuous clefts the WH-clause can therefore either follow the copula (as in (29)) or precede it (as in (23,a)) (although, as we will see, pragmatic factors can entail that one of the alternatives is preferable or even obligatory in a particular context). (29) Good morning, sir. Is this what your son ordered by telephone last night? My wife was not sure she had understood him correctly.

f. Because both constituents of a discontinuous cleft give new information and may be processed as first or second constituent, both may easily continue to be the primary topic of the following discourse.13 Discontinuous clefts therefore differ from unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts in that the focus NP has a greater potential for being a persistent topic. This is the case, e.g. in (23,b), where the topic 50years ago is pursued in the following sentence:

13. Our conclusions in connection with the likelihood of the focus being a persistent topic in our three types of clefts are quite in keeping with the general conclusions which Engelkamp & Zimmer (1983) reach on the basis of experiments. Their findings are that information following an ff-cleft is better processed when it relates to the new information than when it relates to the old, and that it is consequently the new rather than the old information of the cleft that is likely to become the subject of the following sentence.

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(23)(b) It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us the weekend. On September 25,1926, (...) he decided to establish a 40-hour week, giving his employees two days off instead of one. (Prince 1978: 898) In sum, the main conclusion from section 2 (which has been concerned with the different types of clefts and their characteristics) is that both zf-clefts and WH-clefts fall apart into three major subtypes: 'contrastive clefts', 'unaccented-anaphoricfocus clefts' and 'discontinuous clefts'. The main difference between the three types, whose characteristics are summarized in table 1, is that contrastive clefts involve an Old' variable part and a (possibly continuous) focus representing new information, whereas unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts involve a 'new' variable part and a weakly accented continuous focus, and discontinuous clefts involve a variable and a focus which are both discontinuous. What the three types have in common is that they are all specificational and because of this put emphasis on the value constituent (which can therefore rightly be called the 'focus' of the cleft). As we will argue in section 3.2.1, emphasis is one of the natural consequences of using a specificational construction (which use may therefore be triggered by the need for emphasis). In section 3.3.3 we will show that in discontinuous clefts the specificational meaning may be weaker, but the emphasizing function remains.

Table 1 contrastive clefts

unaccented-anaphoricfocus clefts

discontinuous clefts

The focus is new; the clause is old information Focus heavily accented; WH-clause weakly accented Focus strongly contrastive

The focus is old; the WH-clause is new but represented as old

Both the focus and the WH-clause are new

Focus weakly accented; WH-clause normally accented

Focus and WH-clause at least normally accented

Focus not strongly contrastive Focus not likely to be a persistent topic Cannot be used as a discourse opener

Focus not strongly contrastive Either the focus or the WH-clause can be a persistent topic Can be used as a discourse opener

WH-clefts are always WH-clause-final

WH-clefts can have initial or final WH-clause

Focus likely to be a persistent topic Cannot be used as a discourse opener WH-clefts can have initial of final WHclause

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3. THE USE OF CLEFTS IN DISCOURSE This section will be concerned with the question of whether there is a difference of meaning and/or use between the different types of sentences that the speaker has at his disposal when he wants to code specificational information (these different types being a noncleft sentence, an //-cleft, a WH-clause-initial WH-cleft, or a WH-clause-final WH-cleft). 3.1. Prince (1978) makes some specific claims about the use of clefts in discourse (i.e. about what we might call the 'pragmatics' of //-clefts and WH-clefts). According to her, //-clefts and WH-clefts are not interchangeable but rather "do different kinds of work and mean different things, at least some of the time" (p.883). This claim is based on the assumption that WH-clefts always require that the material inside the WH-clause should be 'given', whereas //-clefts may also have an 'informative presupposition'. However, we have shown that this assumption is false: WH-clefts may also be 'informative-presupposition' clefts. There is therefore no basis left for claiming that the two constructions have a different meaning or function. Still, it is clear that WH-clefts and //-clefts are not always interchangeable and that there may be contexts in which one of the constructions seems preferable to the other (cf. the examples in (16) above). The factors determining this preference are probably numerous and poorly understood, but I will make some suggestions below, pointing out what I think to be the most important of them. 3.2. Let us first of all tackle the question of why the speaker/writer may prefer to use a cleft rather than a noncleft sentence. 3.2.1. A first factor evidently is that it makes a difference whether information is or is not presented in the form of a specificational sentence. Consider, for example, the following sentences:

(30)(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

John has murdered Fred. John is the murderer of Fred. John is the one who murdered Fred. The murderer of Fred is John. The one who murdered Fred is John, It is John who murdered Fred.

The last three of these sentences can only be interpreted specificationally, i.e. as answering the question Who has murdered Fred?. The first three sentences, in contrast, can be interpreted either specifieationally or predicationally. (In the latter case they can be used e.g. in answer to the question Why has John been arrested?.)

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If these three sentences are not used in a disambiguating context, only the accentuation pattern can make clear which interpretation is meant. Thus, since in a specificational sentence the value normally presents new information, and since the subject of a sentence is usually the primary topic (cf. Givon 1983) and hence expresses old (continuous) information, special emphasis on the subject will be needed to mark it as new information and, by doing so, make the specificational reading predominant. It follows that when no accentuation is available (e.g. in a written text) and when the context does not exclusively call for a specificational reading, only (30,d-f) will be used if the specificational reading is intended. It is then sufficient that a nominalization like the murderer is not available for the speaker/writer to be obliged to use an fr-cleft or a WH-clause-initial WH-cleft: (31 )(a) It was Fred who was seen stealing the apples. (b) The one who was seen stealing the apples was Fred. (c) The seen stealing the apples (one) was Fred. So, the use of a (particular type of) cleft can be induced by the speaker/writer's wish to produce an unambiguously specificational sentence. In written texts such clefts fulfil the function that is mostly fulfilled by accentuation in spoken language. This explains why clefts are much more frequent in written language than in speech. The above observations naturally lead us to the question why a speaker may prefer to use a specificational sentence rather than a predicational one. The answer to this question is that using the former type of structure enables the speaker to convey additional information along with the message. Consider, for example, (30,a). On the predicational reading this sentence conveys a single piece of information (viz. that it is a 'property' of John that he is Fred's murderer). However, on the specificational reading (i.e. with the nuclear accent on John) the information conveyed is more complex: it may be represented as involving two pieces of information, viz. 'X has murdered Fred' and 'X is John' (cf. Akmajian 1979). As noted in chapter 1, we automatically get the following aspects of meaning along with this: a. an implication of contrast: The fact that a particular value is assigned to the variable automatically creates a contrast with all the other potential values that have not been selected. This implication of contrast is stronger according as the set of potential candidates is smaller (and is thus strongest when there are no more than two candidates). It has sometimes been claimed (see e.g. Brame 1978: 51, Harries-Delisle 1978:421) that it is the function of clefts to express contrast, but this is true only if taken in a nonexclusive sense: in any specificational structure the value selected implies a contrast with the possible alternatives that have not been

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chosen.14 b. emphasis: Along with contrastiveness, the particular choice of value also entails a certain emphasis on the value constituent. This is a natural consequence of the specificational meaning and, like contrastiveness, is not typical of clefts only. c. an implicature of exhaustiveness: It is inherent in the use of a specificational sentence that the (co-operative) speaker will specify the variable correctly. This means, among other things, that the value assigned will be a set that contains all the elements satisfying the variable. For example, when the speaker says JOHN and Bill ran away or It was John and Bill who ran away, the hearer has a right to conclude that only two people ran away. If more (or fewer) people actually ran away, the speaker would be deceiving him. (For more details concerning the exhaustiveness implicature see chapter 1, section 2.9.) It is these connotations of contrastiveness, emphasis and exhaustiveness that will often induce a speaker to use a specificational (e.g. cleft) sentence rather than a nonspecificational one. For example, in (32) I've been bit once already by a German shepherd. It was really scary. It was an outside meter the woman had. I read the gas meter and was walking back out... (Prince 1978:894) it would have been possible for the speaker to use the simple nonspecificational sentence The woman had an outside meter instead of the cleft, but by using the cleft the speaker puts contrastive emphasis on an outside meter, thereby stressing a relevant point in the situation described: if the meter had been inside, the owner of the dog would have been aware of his visit and would have kept the dog from biting him. 3.2.2. A minor factor that may determine the choice of a cleft (rather than a noncleft sentence) is that a cleft consists of two clauses, so that seemingly incompatible adverbials can be related to different verb phrases. This is the case in (33,a), where the corresponding simplex (noncleft) (33,b) is of questionable acceptability: (33)(a) ?? Today it is five years ago that John died, (b) Today John died five years ago.

14. It concurs with this observation that there is actually no implication of contrast in those specificational sentences that do not assign a value to the variable but reject a candidate as the correct value for the variable: (i) I don't know who damaged the car but I'm sure that (a) JOHN didn't do it. (b) it wasn t JOHN who did it. (c) the one who did it wasn't JOHN.

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Similarly, a sentence like It might have been Betty who would have been the next victim shows how the use of a cleft makes it possible to combine two different modal auxiliaries, which is impossible in the corresponding noncleft *Betty might would have been the next victim.15 3.2.3. Another reason why the speaker may choose to use a cleft rather than a simple sentence is that the former suggests a higher degree of involvement of the hearer with what is being said. The reason is that in a cleft sentence the variable part is mostly introduced by a WH-word that can also be used as an interrogative pronoun. Because of this, even those clefts that are not used in answer to an explicit question seem to imply such a question: they suggest than an answer is being given to a question that is implicitly present in the mind of the hearer. This is clear when we compare the noncleft (34,a) with (34,b-c): (34)(a) Jack is Smith's murderer. (b) (The one) who murdered Smith is Jack. (c) It is Jack who murdered Smith. The explicit presence of a WH-clause entails that (34,b-c) more easily suggests the interpretation 'You would like to know who murdered Smith? Well, the answer is: Jack'. These sentences therefore more easily suggest interest and involvement on the part of the hearer than the noncleft (34,a). 3.2.4. The speaker may prefer to use an (unaccented-anaphoric-focus or discontinuous) cleft rather than a simple sentence if he wishes to create suspense, i.e. if he wishes to suggest that what he is saying will turn out to be important for the future development of his story. Consider e.g.: (35) During the next two weeks Ann and I went out together several times. It was during one of those evenings out that she suddenly began coughing. The use of the it-cleft here suggests that the fact that Ann began coughing is very important, perhaps even a turning-point in the story. It creates the impression of impending misfortune, in a way that the corresponding noncleft would be unable to do. The passage would easily fit in a story in which the heroine eventually becomes ill and dies of pneumonia, but it would be very unnatural if the writer did not pursue the topic of coughing in the rest of his story. The reason why unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts and discontinuous clefts can create this impression is that they represent new information as if it were known. Thus, the ii-cleft of (35) suggests that everybody knows about the fact that Ann began coughing, hence that this fact was of special consequence. 15. Delahunty (1981: 43) notes that this observation presents a serious problem to those who hold that clefts are derived from noncleft sentences.

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3.3. In section 3.2 we have considered a couple of factors which may induce the speaker to prefer a cleft to a noncleft sentence. In this section we will investigate why the use of a particular type of cleft (viz. an //-cleft, WH-clause-initial WH-cleft or WH-clause-final WH-cleft) may often be preferred to the use of another. Here again the factors are probably numerous, but the following appear to be the most important. 3.3.1. The principal factor playing a role in the choice of a particular type of cleft probably has to do with the thematic organization of the sentence and the discourse of which it forms part. It is well-known that when a number of sentences follow each other "the same theme tends to be held constant" (Bates 1976:169). A stretch of discourse does not normally consist of unrelated sentences, but of sentences that form what Givon (1983) calls a 'thematic paragraph', i.e. "a string of clauses whose main/primary topic remains the same" (p.9). Now an important observation (which we will attempt to interpret and explain below) is that the choice of a particular type of cleft often appears to be determined by the tendency to process a continuous topic as first element of the sentence (i.e. as focus of an //-cleft or as the subject clause of a (WH-clause-initial or WH-clause-final) WH-cleft. Consider, for instance, the following sentence involving an unaccented-anaphoric-focus //-cleft: (36) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting independent evidence for this rule, and it is to that evidence that we must now turn. (Prince 1978: 902)

This is a fluent complex sentence, apparently because the primary topic of the clause preceding the //-cleft is also processed as the first NP constituent of the cleft. Sentences like (37,a-c) show that the same fluency is achieved (for the same reason) whenever that evidence is the first element of the second clause, e.g. when it is the subject of a WH-clause-final (unaccented-anaphoric-focus) WH-cleft, the topicalized element in a clause that has undergone Y-movement or the subject of a passive: (37) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting independent evidence for this rule,

(a) and that evidence is what we must now turn to. (b) and that evidence we must now turn to. (c) and that evidence must now be turned to. However, the sequence will become much less natural if the //-cleft is replaced by a structure in which thai evidence is no longer the first NP element in the clause, e.g. a WH-clause-initial WH-cleft or a noncleft clause with a different subject:

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(38) However, it turns out that there is rather interesting independent evidence for this rule, (a) and what we must now turn to is that evidence. (b) and we must now turn to that evidence. So, one of the principles determining the choice of possible constructions appears to be that an NP will preferably be put at the beginning of a clause if it continues the primary topic of the preceding clause. The following is another, though slightly different illustration of this principle: (39)(a) Have you found everything you need? - Well, I have found the handbooks that I need, but / have not found the dictionary. (b) Have you found everything you need ? - Well, I have found the handbooks that I need, but what I have not found is the dictionary. In (39,a) the reply is an impeccable sentence because its two clauses open with the same subject. The reply in (39,b) is also fine because the subject of the WH-cleft (what I have not found) links up with the theme of the preceding discourse, viz. whether I have found everything I need and what exactly I have found. Using an if-cleft or a WH-clause-final WH-cleft, however, yields a much less natural sequence, because the thematic line is then broken up completely: (40)(a) Have you found everything you need? - Well, I have found the handbooks but it's the dictionary that I haven't found. (b) Have you found everything you need? - Well, I've found the handbooks but the dictionary is what I haven't found. If the speaker uses (40,a-b) rather than (39,a-b) he violates the principle of theme continuity and the hearer will infer that he does so deliberately. For this reason the replies in (39,a-b) and (40,a-b) will suggest slightly different interpretations. The fact that the variable part (that/what I haven't found) in (40,a-b) is not put in initial position will be interpreted as meaning that it does not link up with the theme of the previous discourse. Whereas the variable part of the WH-cleft in (39,b) is 'known' in so far as it can be inferred from the preceding context (via 'bridge-building'), the variable part of the clefts in (40,a-b) will be taken to be purely and simply known. For this reason (40,a-b) suggests that the fact that the speaker has been unable to find something must have been known to the hearer before the sentences were uttered, rather than being deducible from the clauses preceding the clefts. The examples in (39)-(40) involve what we have labbelled 'contrastive clefts'. The principle of theme continuity observed in connection with unaccentedanaphoric-focus clefts is thus also applicable to contrastive clefts: if the variable part is to be represented as knowable (via bridges) from the preceding context, it will normally be put in initial position (i.e. a WH-clause-initial WH-cleft will be preferred to an it-deft or a WH-clause-final WH-cleft). 230

The principle of theme continuity also plays a role in the use of discontinuous clefts. Consider, for example, the following sentences: (41 )(a) The boat was rolling heavily and it was with the greatest difficulty that we managed to keep our foothold. (b) I know that the nomination is a great honour. It is with great pride that I accept it. (c) The fire brigade was quickly on the spot, but it was with the greatest difficulty that they managed to put out the fire. In sentences like these the choice of a cleft involving a particular focal item seems to be determined by the speaker's desire to construct a stretch of discourse in which the sentences logically link up with the preceding ones. Sentences (41,a-c) reflect the following trains of thought: (42)(a) rolling heavily - and (therefore) - difficult to keep one's foothold (b) a great honour - (hence) - great pride (c) quickly on the spot - but - difficult to put out the fire The most important element in the third link is the idea 'with difficulty/pride'. It is this element that links up with the previous links in the logical line. For this reason the speaker will preferably process it as the first element of the second part of his sentence, and the use of an //-cleft offers him the possibility of doing this.16 The above examples (36)-(41) suggest a double conclusion. First, in a chain of clauses there is a tendency to keep the primary topic continuous. Second, there is a tendency to put such a continuous topic earlier in the sentence, and the choice of a particular type of cleft is dependent on this. The following sentences provide a further illustration of these two tendencies: (43)A. But why are you so interested in Paris? B. (a) Paris is the place where I met my wife. (b) ??The place where I met my wife is Paris. (c) Paris is where I met my wife. (d) ??Where I met my wife is Paris. (e) It is in Paris that I met my wife. The clear difference in acceptability (in this context) between the sentences of (43,B) confirms that one of the factors determining the speaker's choice of a

16. This concurs with the following remarks which Halliday (1982: 81) makes in connection with so-called 'conjunctive adjuncts': "if the speaker includes some element expressing the relationship to what has gone before (...) it is natural for him to make this his point of departure (...) The Theme of the message then becomes an indication of its significance at that point in the discourse."

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particular cleft or noncleft construction consists in a tendency to continue the thematic line of a stretch of discourse by processing the most continuous topic at the beginning of the sentence. Although there can be no doubt about the observations, there may be some discussion as to the interpretation and eventual explanation of the facts. Everything depends upon the particular theory of theme/topic that one wishes to accept as the correct one. Different theories are, indeed, available and they will interpret the observations in a different way. I will briefly consider what seem to be the two most important alternatives. A. Halliday (1967, 1970b, 1982) makes a distinction between the 'thematic structure' of a sentence and its 'information structure'. The information structure is determined by what is new or known (old) information; the thematic structure is a question of whether a particular part of the sentence is processed as 'theme' or as 'rheme'. The 'theme' is the "communicative point of departure" of the clause and is therefore put in initial position. This means that in noncleft sentences the theme will normally be the subject NP or a 'setting adverbial'. In a WH-cleft the theme is whichever NP (i.e. the focus NP or the WH-clause) is put first (cf. Halliday 1967: 226, 1982: 68-69). Thus, in a WH-clause-initial WH-cleft the theme is the WH-clause; in a WH-clause-final WH-cleft it is the NP functioning as value (focus). In //-clefts it is the clefted constituent that functions as theme. There is often a relation between the thematic structure of a sentence and its information structure, in the sense that old information is more likely to be processed as theme than new information. However, this relation is by no means absolute: in //-clefts, for example, it is the clefted constituent that is the theme, although the WH-clause contains the old information (at least in contrastive clefts). Hallidays's distinction between information structure and thematic structure is related to the distinction (made e.g. in Barry (1975), Bates (1976), Keenan & Schieffelin (1976), Van Dijk (1977), Levy (1982), Davison (1984)) between the 'discourse topic' and the 'sentence topic' (or 'clause topic'). The discourse topic is the theme that persists through a number of sentences and which is the topic that the stretch of discourse is about. However, each of the sentences in this discourse has its own sentence topic, which, even if the sentence continues the discourse topic, may be different from the latter. For example: (44)A. What's the matter with Mary? B. John has been nagging her again. In (44) the 'discourse topic proposition' is 'something is the matter with Mary'. The pro-form her in (44,B) represents old information and continues this discourse topic. The sentence topic of (44,B), however, is John. This NP, which represents new information, is the theme in Halliday's sense because it is the 'communicative point of departure' of the clause.

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It goes without saying that the observations we have made in connection with the speaker's preference for using a particular type (or particular types) of (non)cleft sentences fits in perfectly with the above theory. We have observed that elements that continue the thematic line of the preceding discourse are preferably placed in initial position in a cleft or specificational noncleft. In Halliday's terms this simply means that an element that is already thematic in the preceding context will preferably also be the theme of the following specificational sentence. This is completely in keeping with the observation that in a stretch of discourse "the same theme tends to be held constant" (Bates 1976: 169).

B. Another theory of theme/topic, advocated e.g. by Givon (1983), holds that the topic is not an "atomic, discrete entity" (p. 5), i.e. a single constituent of a clause. This means that a clause may have several topics. These topics are 'participants' in the sense that they are semantic arguments of the verb and may be grammatically marked for the semantic role that they express. For example, in a normal English sentence the subject is the "primary grammaticalized topic" (Givon 1983: 6) and the semantic role expressed by it is most frequently that of agent. A topic that also occurs in the preceding context is a 'continuous topic'; a topic that is entirely new is a 'discontinuous' one. In between the two extremes there is a whole range of 'degrees of continuousness'. Zero anaphors and unaccented/bound pronouns are by definition the most continuous topics; referential indefinite NPs are the most discontinuous ones. A number of clauses that are about the same theme constitute a "thematic paragraph" (p.8). The observations that we have made can be fitted in this theory (only the essentials of which have been summarized here) if we assume that in English the 'primary topic' tends to be put in initial position and, conversely, that an NP in front position tends to be interpreted as the 'primary topic'. These assumptions are consistent with the following observations: a. The subject N£ which is most often the 'primary grammaticalized topic', is usually found in initial position: English is an SVO language (at least, this is the order of the constituents on the surface). b. In contrastive structures, where the contrastive element is the primary topic (cf. Givon 1979:217), this primary topic will usually be put at the beginning. This is the case in //-clefts, left-dislocated structures and sentences that have undergone Y-movement (contrastive topicalization). c. If our assumptions are correct, the first NP element of a WH-cleft will be considered to be the primary topic. This is in keeping with the fact that this element (whether it is the focus NP or the WH-clause) is also the grammatical (syntactic) subject of the WH-cleft. d. It is pointed out by Prince (1978: 899) that in all her examples of 'informative-presupposition' /'/-clefts that have an NP (rather than an adverbial) as focus, the NP invariably functions as subject of the WH-clause. This lends

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support to the hypothesis that an NP in front position (which in this case is the clefted constituent of the Λ-cleft) is normally interpreted as the primary topic. In the above theory, according to which the primary topic tends to be put in initial position, the observations we have made in connection with (36)-(43) lead to the conclusion that, when processing the material for his sentence, the speaker will preferably assign the role and position of primary topic to an element that was already a topic in the preceding sentence(s). Whether this is a tendency that shows up in specificational (especially cleft) sentences only, is a question that falls outside the scope of this work.17 It should be noted, finally, that whichever theory of topic is advocated, the facts of (36)-(43), which clearly reveal a tendency to put known information earlier in the sentence, lead to the conclusion that WH-clause-final WH-clefts are closer to //-clefts in usage than to WH-clause-initial WH-clefts. 3.3.2. It follows from the above principle of theme continuity that a focus NP that is anaphoric will normally be processed before the WH-clause. Next to this tendency (but possibly related to it) there also appears to be a preference for putting the shorter of the two elements first (irrespective of whether it is the clefted NP or the WH-clause), even when it is not anaphoric. That is, in the structures (45)(a) /f/sX +WH-clause (/f-cleft) (b) X/s WH-clause (WH-clause-final WH-cleft) (c) WH-clause isX (WH-clause-final WH-cleft) X tends to be short in (45,a) and (45,b) but long in (45,c). Conversely, the WH-clause tends to be long in (45,a) and (45,b), but short in (45,c). The following sentences illustrate these tendencies: (46)(a) John should be punished because it is he who broke the vase. (b) John should be punished because he is the one who broke the vase. (c) ?? John should be punished because the one who broke the vase is he/him. (47)(a) Who broke that vase ? - It was John who did it.

(b) Who broke that vase? - John was the one who did it. (c) Who broke that vase ? - The one who did it was John. In (46) the pronoun he virtually has to be processed first because it is both short and anaphoric. In (47) there is a strong tendency to put John in the first NP position in

17. Right-dislocated structures, in which the dislocated element is also mostly a continuous topic, appear to be an exception to this principle (see Givon 1983).

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the cleft: (47,a-b) are definitely more natural than (47,c). Yet, it is not John but the WH-clause that is a continuous topic. The tendency to put a very short element at the beginning of a cleft has thus proved stronger here than the tendency to process continuous information first. The following sentences further illustrate the point: (48)(a) Good morning, sir. Is this what your son ordered by telephone last night? My wife was not sure she had understood him correctly. (b) *Good morning, sir. Is what your son ordered by telephone last night this ? My wife was not sure... (49)(a) It is football that most men (but very few women) would like to see on television every night. (b) Football is what most men (but very few women) would like to see on television every night. (c) What most men (but very few women) would like to see on television every night is football. In (48) the very short focal NP this has to be put first, even though it is not anaphoric.18 In (49) the WH-clause may be a continuous topic (e.g. if the sentences are used in answer to What would most men like to see on television every nighll), but (49,c) is nevertheless somewhat awkward, while (49,a-b) are fine. Here again the very short focus NP tends to precede the comparatively long WH-clause. 3.3.3. There are still other factors that can determine the choice of a particular type of cleft. A well-known factor in the choice between an //-cleft and a WH-cleft is that the range of WH-words is too narrow for every //-cleft to be matched by a WH-cleft (see e.g. Gundel 1977b: 551, Mackenzie & Hannay 1982: 49). This is the case in (50), where no WH-word appears to be available: (50)(a) It's with great honour and pleasure that I announce our next speaker. (b) The ? that I announce our next speaker is with great honour and pleasure.

18. Cataphoric this is, however, a possible exception. Since it announces the following sentence, it can also be placed in final position (i.e. just before its referent). Compare (i,a-b) (with cataphoric this) with (ii,a-b) (where anaphoric that is used): (i)(a) This is what they say we should do: we should sell this place and move to London, (b) What they say we should do is this: we should sell this place and move to London. (ii)(a) (Their car has broken down.) - That is what I have been telling you would happen all along. (b) (Their car has broken down.) - "What I have been telling you would happen all along is that.

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There is a similar restriction on //-clefts: if the value takes the form of a thai-clause or whether-clause, only a WH-cleft is quite acceptable: (51 )(a) What I told him was that I was ill. (b) ??lt was that I was ill that I told him. On the whole, however, the cases in which an it-cleft is ruled out while a WH-cleft is possible are less numerous than the cases in which it is the other way round. The reason is that the variable part of a WH-cleft opens with a WH-word (e.g. what, which, who, whose) which has specific syntactic and semantic properties, while the that-clause of an //-cleft is compatible with nearly any kind of value, irrespective of whether it is a (human or nonhuman) N£ a prepositional phrase or an adverbial. The fact that in 'informative-presupposition' //-clefts involving a that-clause there is no WH-word such as what, who, etc. also entails that the specificational meaning of such clefts is often less strongly marked. Thus, the //-cleft in (32) I've been bit once already by a German shepherd. It was really scary. It was an outside meter the woman had. I read the gas meter and was walking back out... (Prince 1978: 894) is hardly felt to specify a value for a variable since there is no 'known' variable (the alleged variable part in fact contains new information) and there is no WH-word explicitly introducing a variable either. The function of this cleft is therefore not the (normally primary) function of identification (i.e. of specifying a value for a variable) but the (normally derived) function of marking emphasis.19 For this reason the it-cleft can hardly be replaced by a WH-cleft (What the woman had was an outside meter) because the presence of the WH-word what inevitably means that there is a variable to be identified. This, then, is also an important pragmatic difference between otherwise interchangeable //-clefts and WH-clefts: when used as unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts or discontinuous clefts (i.e. when there is no Old' variable), the WH-clefts will explicitly establish a variable, while the //-clefts will not do so. Therefore only an it-cleft will be appropriate if the speaker is looking for a means of marking emphasis (often for contrast) rather than for a construction in which a value is specified for a variable. The above observation, that unaccented-anaphoric-focus and (especially) discontinuous //-clefts may be just emphasizing rather than identifying (specificational), is corroborated by the following facts: 19. The view that "English uses the construction with it is in two functions: to emphasize and to identify" (Kruisinga & Erades 1953: 144) was already familiar in traditional grammar. The emphasizing function has also been revealed by the experiments made by Engelkamp & Zimmer, which have led them to conclude that placing a concept in clefted position has the effect of "focussing the listener's attention on this concept" (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1983: 119).

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a. In section 2 we noted that discontinuous WH-clefts and //-clefts can be used as discourse openers. However, //-clefts appear to be much more frequent in this use than WH-clefts. (For example, Prince (1978) appears to have found no examples of discourse-initial WH-clefts in her corpus, although there are quite a few examples of discourse-initial //-clefts.) The reason is that, because of the explicit WH-word in WH-clefts, these clefts remain clearly specificational, whereas this is not true of //-clefts. The latter need not always presuppose a variable involving old information and can therefore more easily be used at the beginning of a stretch of discourse. b. As noted in chapter 1 (section 4.6.B), the focal item of a cleft cannot normally be a universal pronoun like everybody: (52) A. Who helped you? B. (a) *lt was (not) everybody who helped me. (b) *The one(s) who helped me was/were (not) everybody. (53) *What a nice piece of work! The one(s) who can do this is/are not everybody.

However, such a universal pronoun can sometimes be found as the focal item of a discontinuous //-cleft: (54)(a) What a nice piece of work! It is not every one who can do this. (Kruisinga & Erades 1953:144) (b) It is not everybody that cares for early Staffordshire pottery. (Kruisinga 1932a:386)

The reason why everybody cannot be used in (52,B) and (53) is that these clefts are clearly specificational, i.e. identifying. As we saw in section 4.6.B of chapter 1, identifying sentences serve to pick out a member (or members) from a set of candidates and will therefore never involve a value part that refers to the set of candidates as a whole (i.e. a value part with a universal meaning). In discontinuous //-clefts, however, this identifying function is absent or at least subordinate to the function of emphasizing a constituent, so that items like (not) everybody can more easily appear in focal position.20 c. The observation that, in many discontinuous //-clefts, the copula be is no longer felt to be specificational concurs with the fact that be is often felt to have the meaning of happen or of some other dynamic verb (cf. Poutsma 1928: 141, Kruisinga 1932a: 503, Visser 1970: 50). Thus, be is more or less equivalent to happen in 20. The examples that I have found are all negative. Perhaps the construction is impossible without not. I have no explanation for this restriction.

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(55)(a) It is not often that we have snow here in September. (b) It is nearly twenty years ago that a human being set foot on the moon for the first time. In (56) it was not for a week that., can be paraphrased as 'a week lasted before...': (56) It was not for a week that she woke from all this furniture and those books and clothes. (Kruisinga & Erades 1953:144) d. As noted before, all specificational sentences, including clefts, have the implicature of exhaustiveness. This means that the hearer has a right to conclude that the value that is assigned to the variable is not only correct but also exhaustive (i.e. that no other elements can also satisfy the variable). For this reason, restricters like only of just cannot normally be added to the focal item of a (truly specificational) cleft (except in the negative -cf. chapter 1, section 2.9): (57) Who broke that bottle? - It was (*only/*just) John who broke it. There is one exception to this rule. If the speaker knows or thinks that the hearer overestimates the number of elements in the value, he can use a restricter in the clefted constituent to correct this false assumption. For example: (58) At least thirty people were killed. - Oh no! It was only the pilot who died. All the others escaped with their lives. Now, if it is correct that unaccented-anaphoric-focus ιϊ-clefts and discontinuous //-clefts may be emphasizing rather than specificational, we may expect that such clefts do not (or hardly) have the exhaustiveness implicature any more and that restricters can therefore be found in the clefted constituent. This expectation is actually borne out, as appears from the examples (59,a-c), in which the restricter can even hardly be omitted: (59)(a) It is only of late that I have found out how hard it is to forgive him. (Poutsma 1928:141) (b) The reading of ambiguous sentences like (22) in which the speaker is responsible for the description is called the transparent reading; that in which the subject is responsible is called the opaque reading. It is only in the opaque reading that substitutivity and existential generalization are ruled out. (Heringer 1969: 91) (c) It is only women who live alone that can know what it is to yearn to have a man's strong hand. e. It goes without saying that in a truly specificational cleft the clefted constituent 238

must be a single phrase, or a sequence consisting of conjoined elements, but not a sequence of two or more discrete elements. That is, we can use either (60,a) or (60,b) but not (60,c), because it is not possible for the clefted constiuent to specify more than one variable at a time: (60)(a) It was JOHN who arrived yesterday. (b) It was YESTERDAY that John arrived. (c) *lt was JOHN YESTERDAY that arrived.

However, Delahunty (1981: 187) draws attention to examples like the following: (61 )(a) It was at Knock a century ago that the Virgin appeared to local peasants. (b) It was during a heated discussion at the Berlin Olympics in 1936 that Hitler decided on his "Anschluss" policy.

I would account for these "apparent counterexamples to the claim that only a single phrase may be focussed" (Delahunty 1981:187) as follows. The examples in question are clearly of our 'discontinuous cleft' type. As I have been arguing, this type of cleft may easily be used to emphasize rather than identify (specify). If it is used in this way, the restriction that only one variable can be specified at a time becomes irrelevant. If the cleft just serves to emphasize a sequence, there is no reason why the sequence in question should not consist of two different constituents (as long as these are not too dissimilar in categorial status, i.e. they may be two setting adverbials, but not e.g. an adverbial and an NP).

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4. SPECIAL TYPES I will conclude this chapter by pointing out a couple of special uses of clefts. First of all, it is possible that a special accentuation pattern has the effect of changing the normal function of a particular subtype of cleft. For example, in (62,B,b) and (62,B,d) unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts are used to specify a value for a known (and given) variable and therefore have the same function as the contrastive clefts (62,B,a) and (62,B,c), respectively: (62)A. I hear you met someone in Paris? B. (a) Yes. It was JOHN that I met there, (contrastive /i-cleft) (b) Yes. It was there that I met JOHN, (unaccentedanaphoric-focus /i-cleft) (c) Yes. The one I met there was JOHN, (contrastive WH-cleft) (d) Yes. That's where I met JOHN, (unaccented-anaphoricfocus WH-cleft)

The reason is that the strong emphasis on John entails a specificational interpretation in which John is the value assigned to the variable 'the one I met in Paris', so that John is as contrastive in the unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts (where it is not the focus) as in the contrastive clefts (where it is the focus). A similar use of emphasis is to be observed in 'correcting' clefts: (63)A. Why did you hit her? B. (a) I beg your pardon! It was SHE who hit ME! (b) I beg your pardon! SHE was the one who hit ME!

The fact that two constituents are strongly accented entails that two specificational acts take place (viz. 'the one who hit was: she' and 'the one who was hit was: me'). These two acts of specification are necessary for the correcting effect: two presuppositions of (63,A) have to be corrected (viz. 'you were the one who hit' and 'she was the one who was hit'). In (63,B) only one of the two value NPs can take the position of the clefted constituent. The other value NP must therefore occur in the WH-clause, where contrastive emphasis marks it as the value NP of a specificational act. It is not only in correcting clefts that this double act of specification is to be observed. The same thing happens when the cleft is used in answer to a question that contains two question words: (64)A. About that fight, I want to know definitely who started hitting whom. B. It was BILL who started hitting RONALD.

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Another type of cleft that seems somewhat special is the following:

(65)A. Was it John who complained? B. Of course. It is ALWAYS John who complains. This cleft is of a kind that is emphasizing rather than specificational. Because the cleft It is John who complains is a reiteration of the preceding question, the point of the sentence is no longer the specification of John as value for the variable. Rather it is to emphasize the idea of always, which is therefore inserted in the clefted constituent. (Inserting it in the WH-clause would lead to an unnatural result because always would not receive the necessary emphasis.) Always thus appears in the clefted part, not because it is the value assigned to a variable, but just for emphasis. Apart from the special use of emphasis observed in (62)-(65), we may draw attention to a type of cleft that really seems to be exceptional:

(66)(a) Here's good news for you. You're not under arrest any more. It's the inspector who's made a mistake. The real culprit has been found now. (b) Don't worry. There's nothing wrong with the car. It's the driver who's a little tipsy. (c) That story really makes me feel sick. I never did any of the things referred to in that article. It's the reporter who has invented everything. In clefts like these both the focus and the 'presupposition' are entirely new, yet the clefts as a whole are clearly discourse-conditioned, i.e. they require that some relevant information has been given. It would therefore be impossible to use them as discourse openers. What is especially striking about them is that they hardly look specificational: they do not seem to assign a value to a variable. For that reason the focus is not really contrastive (although it is heavily accented): in (66,a-c) there is no implication that anyone else might have made a mistake, might have been tipsy, or might have invented the story. For the same reason these sentences do not involve a presupposed variable either. Unlike other clefts, they do not appear to provide an answer to a question involving the same presupposition. It is possible that sentences like these should not be treated as clefts at all but should be analysed as structures involving 'pseudo-modifiers'.21 However, I do not as yet understand such sentences sufficiently to go further into them here. 21. 'Pseudo-modifiers' is the term used by Declerck (198la) to refer to relative clauses, participial clauses and prepositional phrases that seemingly modify a noun head but are neither restrictive nor nonrestrictive in the usual sense. For example:

(i) What you hear is John (who is) working upstairs. See Declerck (198 la) for a full discussion of such constructions. (A brief summary has been given in chapter 2, section 7.).

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5. CONCLUSION 5.1. It has been argued that both //-clefts and WH-clefts may be subdivided into three major subclasses, viz. contrastive clefts, unaccented-anaphoric-focus clefts and discontinuous clefts. This taxonomy goes far beyond that suggested by Prince (1978), since Prince treats WH-clefts as a unitary class and distinguishes only two subclasses of //-clefts. 5.2. The fact that both //-clefts and WH-clefts can belong to each of the three subtypes means that they basically have the same meaning and will be used in essentially the same way. Still, there are a number of pragmatic factors that may cause the speaker to prefer or rule out one of the alternative constructions in certain contexts. The most important of these pragmatic factors has to do with the possible or preferred selection of a particular element as (primary) topic of the sentence. We have observed that the (primary) topic of a specificational sentence is normally put at the beginning and preferably links up with the primary topic of the previous sentence(s). This has a bearing on the use of clefts because the element that is interpreted as the primary topic of the cleft is the focus part in an it-deft or WH-clause-final WH-cleft and the WH-clause in a WH-clause-initial WH-cleft. Other pragmatic factors have been identified. For example, a short focus or WH-clause will preferably take the initial position in any type of cleft. Another factor is that, unlike 'informative-presupposition' WH-clefts, unaccentedanaphoric-focus //-clefts and discontinuous //-clefts do not explicitly establish a variable, and may therefore easily be emphasizing rather than identifying (specificational). This resulted in a frequent use of //-clefts where WH-clefts would not be appropriate. 5.3. Various factors have been pointed out that can induce a speaker to prefer a cleft to a noncleft sentence: the use of a specificational structure allows the speaker to express connotations such as contrast, emphasis and exhaustiveness; using a cleft may be a means of creating suspense or of suggesting a higher degree of involvement of the hearer with what is being said; or a cleft may be preferred simply because it offers the syntactic advantage of involving two clauses. 5.4. I have stressed, finally, that the principles suggested here are possibly only the tip of the iceberg, and have drawn attention to a couple of exceptional types of clefts that deviate from regular clefts in various ways.

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CHAPTER 6. SPECIFICATIONAL INTERPRETATION AND WORD ORDER. When we use a sentence that we intend to be interpreted specificationally, we can make use of several devices to make sure that the addressee hits upon the correct specificational reading. In spoken English the usual way of conveying a specificational reading is the use of contrastive accent (cf. chapter 1, section 2.8). In written English, where accentuation is not available, we can recur to the use of a typically specificational structure such as an ίί-cleft. However, whether we are writing or speaking, there is still another device at our disposal, viz. the manipulation of the word order of our sentence. As a first example illustrating the potential impact of word order, let us compare the following sentences: (1 )(a) To express so-called 'escapable obligation', the auxiliary should is used. (b) The auxiliary should is used to express so-called 'escapable obligation'. When these sentences are pronounced with the neutral intonation pattern (i.e. when there is no contrastive accent on a nonfmal open class constituent) or when no accentuation is available (because the sentences are part of a written text or are produced in the monotonous way typical of a talking robot), we feel there to be a difference of meaning between them : the two sentences seem to provide an answer to different questions, i.e. (l,a) is an answer to (2,b), whereas (l,b) is an answer to (2)(a) Which auxiliary is used to express so-called 'escapable obligation'? (b) What meaning is expressed by the auxiliary should? As we saw in chapter 1 (section 2.3), sentences that provide an answer to a w/z-question are by definition specificational: they specify a value for the variable represented by the question- word. The semantic difference between (l,a) and (l,b) is therefore a difference between two specificational readings: the sentences are interpreted as (3,a) and (3,b), respectively : (3)(a) To express so-called 'escapable obligation' the following auxiliary is used : should. (b) The auxiliary should is used for the following purpose: to express so-called 'escapable obligation'.

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(It should be borne in mind that I am now considering (l,a-b) as if they were used in isolation and without accentuation. It is, of course, true that (l,b) will be interpreted as (3,a) if there is contrastive accent on the subject NP (the auxiliary should) or if it is explicitly used in answer to (2,a). I am now disregarding such external factors and concentrating purely on the different word order of the sentences.) There is a similar difference of meaning between the following sentences:

(4)(a) When a person is against war or violence, he is a pacifist, (b) A person is a pacifist when he is against war or violence. Sentence (4,a) just predicates of a particular kind of person that he has the characteristic of being a pacifist. The normal interpretation of (4,b), in contrast, is that a person is a pacifist if (and only if) he is against war or violence. That is, (4,b) can serve as a definition of what a pacifist is, whereas (4,a) will not normally be used for the purpose of such a definition. (If (4,a) were used in answer to the question What is a pacifist? it would be a somewhat evasive answer. It would seem to refer to one of the cases in which one can speak of a pacifist rather than provide us with a straightforward definition of the concept itself) This distinction between (4,a) and (4,b) is a distinction between a predicational and a specificational reading: whereas (4,a) conveys the predicational meaning paraphrased by (5,a), (4,b) suggests the specificational interpretation paraphrased by(5,b):

(5)(a) When a person is against war or violence he has the characteristic of being a pacifist. (b) A person is a pacifist in the following case: if he is against war or violence. In sum, the sentences of pairs like (l,a-b) and (4,a-b) suggest different interpretations simply because they have a different word order. The ensuing generalization would seem to be that for a specificational interpretation to be possible, the part representing the value must not precede the part representing the variable. To avoid any misunderstanding, I repeat that this is not by any means an absolute principle. There are several cases in which the speaker or writer need not observe it because there are other factors that guide the listener or reader towards a specificational interpretation. For example, the value does precede the variable in ζϊ-clefts, but this does not obscure the intended specificational reading because (a) //-clefts are typically specificational and (b) the division into a clefted constituent and a WH-clause leaves no doubt as to what is the value and what is the variable. Another case is that of copular specificational sentences such as The murderer of Kennedy was Lee Oswald or What I need is a new coat. As noted before, such sentences are in principle reversible. However, we saw in chapter 5 that there are

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various pragmatic factors (having to do, amongst other things, with the thematic organisation of the stretch of discourse) which can make the inverted version preferable to the noninverted one or vice versa. If all these factors (and others, such as context and accentuation) are eliminated, copular sentences probably also observe the general principle. However, I will not go into this question here. To avoid any problems, I will henceforth concentrate exclusively on specificational sentences that are not of the copular type. As noted above, another case in which the general principle is overruled is when the sentence involves contrastive accent, i.e. when the nuclear accent falls on a constituent which would not receive it under neutral sentence accentuation. In that case the constituent in question is interpreted as the value of a specificational construction, irrespective of whether it precedes or follows the variable part. (Thus, although (l,b) will not be interpreted as (3,a) under neutral sentence accentuation, it does acquire this interpretation when the NP the auxiliary should receives the nuclear accent of the sentence. A further case in which the general principle is overruled is when the sentence is used in a context which clearly invites a specificational interpretation. Thus, in answer to the question What meaning does used to express? sentence (6,a) might serve as a suitable specificational answer, even though it would clearly be preferable to change the word order so as to get (6,b). (It should be noted, however, that (6,a) cannot receive the neutral intonation pattern here, so that we can only speak of a separate type of exception when the sentence is used without accentuation (as e.g. in writing).

(6)(a) The idea of 'habit in the past' is expressed by used to. (b) Used to expresses the idea of 'habit in the past1. Contrastive accent and embedding in a suitable context do not always allow the general principle to be violated. Violation seems to be better possible when the part that is to be interpreted as the value is an NP than when it is an adverbial. Compare:

(7)A. Which term do you use to express this idea? B. (a) To express this idea we use the term radiation. (b) We use the term radiation to express this idea. (8)A. Which idea is expressed by the term radiation? B. (a) !We use the term radiation to express the idea of... (b) To express the idea of... we use the term radiation. In both (7) and (8) the A sentences ask for specificational information. The (a) sentences of the answers provide this information in accordance with the rule that the variable should precede the value. The (b) sentences in both cases violate this rule, but the result is much worse in (8) than in (7). This shows that the general principle may sometimes continue to hold, even when a specificational interpretation is enforced by the context and by the use of contrastive accent. The following 245

question-answer pair is a further illustration of this: (9)A. When did he leave? B. (a) He left yesterday. (b) 'Yesterday he left. (c) ??YESTERDAY he left. Since the principle that we are investigating is overruled in marked sentence structures like if-clefts and may be overruled when the sentence is a copular one, when there is contrastive accent, or when the sentence is embedded in a particular context, I will henceforth restrict the discussion to sentences that have an unmarked structure, involve no copula or contrastive accent, and are used out of context. In such sentences a specificational reading appears to suggest itself only when the value part follows the variable part. The following sentences can serve as a further example: (10)(a) This type of vegetable is grown in Egypt, (b) In Egypt this kind of vegetable is grown. Sentence (10,a) is ambiguous between a predicational reading ('This type of vegetable is not unfamiliar in Egypt (and probably in other countries as well') and a specificational reading ('It is in Egypt (and only there) that this type of vegetable is grown'). This specificational reading (on which in Egypt is the value part) is no longer available in (10,b).' How can the principle observed be accounted for? An answer that immediately suggests itself is that this principle follows from the rules that govern the thematic

1. In this context we can also note Chomsky's well-known examples (i) Beavers build dams. (ii) Dams are built by beavers.

Chomsky (1975: 97) observes that (i) "states that beavers have a certain property, namely, that they are dam builders", while (ii) "states that it is a property of dams that they are built by beavers. Under this interpretation, the sentence is false, since some dams are not built by beavers". In my opinion, (ii) is felt to be false because by beavers, as a result of its end position, is felt to be the focus of a specificational reading and is therefore interpreted as Only by beavers' (because of the exhaustiveness implicature attached to specificational sentences, cf. chapter 1, section 2.9). If by beavers is moved away from its end-position (as is possible e.g. in Dutch, where a sentence like By beavers dams are built is fully grammatical), the specificational reading gets lost and by beavers is therefore no longer interpreted as Only by beavers'. (That is, this sentence is assigned the same predicational interpretation as (i).) (It should also be noted that (ii) remains unacceptable if it is interpreted predicationally rather than specificationally, because this interpretation too entails that the sentence makes a false statement: the predicational reading is something like 'Dams have the characteristic of being built by beavers', which is of course a false generalization.)

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organisation of sentences. Though there are several different theories of how sentences are structured in terms of theme and rheme or topic and comment (compare the Functional Sentence Perspective theory of the Prague school with Halliday (1967, 1970a, 1970b, 1982) and Givon (1983)), all theories agree that there is a strong tendency to process old (known, shared) information before information that is new.2 Since in a specificational sentence the variable part is normally old information whereas the value part is always new,3 the principle observed is quite in keeping with this general rule of thematic organization. However, this observation does not account precisely for those sentences that we are now considering, viz. the sentences that are used out of context (e.g. discourse-initially). Such sentences do not contain any information that is old: everything is new information. Yet we have seen that it is precisely this type of sentence that provides the best illustrations of the principle. Another theory that looks like a plausible candidate for accounting for our principle is Bolinger's (1965b) theory of 'linear modification'. Bolinger also observes that alternations in word order may often have a semantic import. According to him, the reason is that "elements as they are added one by one to form a sentence progressively limit the semantic range of all that has preceded. This causes beginning elements to have a wider semantic range than elements toward the end." (p.279). Thus, "before the speaker begins, the possibilities of what he will communicate are practically infinite. (...) When the first word appears, the possibilities are vastly reduced, but that first word has, in communicative value for the hearer, its fullest possible semantic range. The second word follows, narrowing the range, the third comes to narrow it still further, and finally the end is reached, at which point the sentence presumably focuses on an event - usually aided by a gesture, a physical context in which only one of several possibilities can be elected, or what not." (p.281) According to Bolinger, this theory predicts that constituents that are to imply 'selective contrast' will be put as far back in the sentence as possible, for the idea of contrast is heightened as semantic narrowing proceeds. For example, we will use (11,a) rather than (ll,b) if we wish to establish a contrast between open and 'closed'. But if we wish to see the door contrasting with other objects, we will prefer

2. See, for example, Lyons (1977: 507), who notes that "there is a very high correlation, not only in English, but in all languages, between occupying initial position in the utterance and being thematic, rather than rhematic". (This claim amounts to the same thing as saying that old information is preferably expressed before new information, since "the theme is commonly defined as the expression which refers to what is given and the rheme as that part of the utterance which contains new information" (ibid.)) 3. As noted in chapter 1 (section 2.6), the value part need not be new in the sense of 'not mentioned before', but it is always new in the sense that the assertion that it is this value that satisfies the variable is presented as new information.

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(11 )(a) I pushed the door open. (b) I pushed open the door, (p.291) Similarly, when we compare (12,a) with (12,b), we notice that only the latter "lends itself to the implication 'but not before' - selective contrast" (p.289):

(12)(a) When you come I'll help you. (b) I'll help you when you come. Bolinger adduces a great many other illustrations, all of which he claims substantiate his principle of linear modification. It is interesting to see that some of these examples are also good illustrations of the 'variable-before-value' principle that we have observed. For example:

(13)(a) If you come I'll help you. (b) I'll help you if you come. Bolinger notes that of these two sentences "the first envisages more affirmatively the possibility of the person's coming - has, that is to say, a meaning that goes a little beyond mere condition and may amount almost to an invitation; the second lends itself more readily to the implication 'I'll help you ONLY if you come' - selective contrast. When the //-clause is placed first, it serves as a frame for all that follows." (p.289) Bolinger's observation that only (13,b) readily suggests Only if you come' concurs with our claim that (when used out of context and without contrastive accent) only (13,b) yields the specificational interpretation 'I'll help you in the following case: if you come'. The idea of 'selective contrast' then automatically follows from this reading (since a specificational reading is always contrastive - cf. chapter 1, section 2.8), and the same thing is true of the idea Only if, which follows from the exhaustiveness implicature that is typical of specificational sentences (cf. chapter 1, section 2.9).4 It would seem, then, that the principle of word order that we have observed in specificational sentences can be explained from Bolinger's more general principle of linear modification: since (according to the latter principle) selective contrast is

4. Although Bolinger himself was unaware of the fact when he published his paper, the principle of linear modification (semantic narrowing) accords perfectly with the Functional Sentence Perspective theory of the Prague school, at least with the version that is expounded by Firbas (1964). According to Firbas, whether an expression is thematic or rhematic depends on its degree of 'communicative dynamism' (= CD): thematic elements show a low degree of CD, whereas a high degree of CD is typical of rhematic elements. "It is obvious that elements conveying new, unknown information show higher degrees of CD than elements conveying known information." (Firbas 1964: 270) One of the factors determining the degree of CD is "the capability of the sentence positions of gradually raising the degrees of CD, in the direction from the beginning towards the end of the sentence." (ibid.)

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most likely to be associated with a sentence-final constituent, the value part of a specificational sentence, which by definition implies selective contrast, will normally be put in that position. Constituents that occur before the variable part will not normally be taken to convey selective contrast (unless, of course, they receive the nuclear accent) and will therefore not be interpreted as the value part of a specificational reading.

Still, Bolinger's theory does not appear to explain everything. Although Bolinger considers examples in which selective contrast is involved as major evidence for his theory, it seems doubtful whether the principle of linear modification (according to which there is semantic narrowing as the sentence proceeds) offers a full explanation of the observation that selective contrast is preferably associated with sentence-final position. Let us consider again the sentences of (1 l,a-b): (11 )(a) I pushed open the door, (b) I pushed the door open. In (1 l,a) the selective contrast (unless otherwise marked by contrastive accent on / or pushed) is on the door; in (II ,b) it is on open. Yet, it does not seem to be the case that the door narrows the semantic range of what precedes (by identifying what I pushed) more drastically in (11 ,a) than in (11 ,b). In both sentences the door follows pushed, so that the semantic narrowing is the same in both cases. Similarly, the narrowing down from the idea of pushing to the idea of pushing open happens as clearly in (1 l,a) as in (1 l,b): in both cases open folio ws pushed. Bolinger's principle therefore does not really predict the different location of selective contrast in (1 l,a) and(ll,b). The same remark can be made in connection with examples like the following: (14)(a) Try to force back this bolt, (b) Try to force this bolt back. Bolinger correctly observes that it is natural for the adverbial particle back to be put in post-position if it is to express selective contrast (p.290). However, this is not really predicted by his theory, since back narrows down the idea expressed by force the moment it is placed after this verb, irrespective of whether it precedes or follows the direct object. It would seem, then, that the principle of linear modification, even though it is right in stating that selective contrast increases with semantic narrowing, fails to offer a full explanation of the fact that contrastive elements (such as the values of specificational sentences) favour end-position. In my opinion, the principle that does account for this is the principle of intonational end-prominence (rather than Bolinger's principle of semantic end-prominence, though the two are of course

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closely related). As noted in chapter 1 (section 2.6),5 the constituent which, under neutral sentence intonation, receives the nuclear (primary) accent of the clause is the last open-class constituent of the sentence, i.e. the noun, verb, adverb or adjective that occurs most to the right in the sentence. (Prepositions may sometimes also receive the nuclear accent, but pronouns never do.) In accordance with this rule, the nuclear accent is on this bolt in (14,a) and on back in (14,b), and this is in keeping with the fact that it is these constituents that imply selective contrast in the respective sentences. If we add to the sentences an adverbial that takes end position, neither this bolt nor back implies selective contrast any longer: (15)(a) Try to force back this bolt with a screwdriver, (b) Try to force this bolt back with a screwdriver.

Under neutral sentence intonation the nuclear accent is now on screwdriver, and this constituent is therefore the only one that can imply selective contrast. The relation between the neutral position of the nuclear accent and the neutral position of the constituent implying selective contrast is also clear from the following examples: (16)(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

He threw the oranges back. He threw back the oranges. He threw the oranges back to her. He threw back the oranges to her. He threw the oranges back to the shopkeeper, He threw back the oranges to the shopkeeper.

In (16,a) and (16,c) back is the constituent that receives the nuclear accent and which expresses selective contrast. In (16,b) and (16,d) that constituent is oranges. In (16,e-f), on the other hand, the NP in final position is no longer a pronoun and it is therefore this NP that receives the primary accent and the information focus of the sentence. It follows that back and oranges no longer clearly express selective contrast. When used out of context and without special contrastive accent, both (16,e) and (16,f) have their nuclear accent on the shopkeeper, so that it is this constituent that implies selective contrast. Let us consider one more example: (17)(a) Have you already seen him ? (b) Have you seen him already?

The adverb already receives greater emphasis in (17,b) than in (17,a). (17,b) is therefore the better means to suggest that the speaker is surprised that something has already happened. (That is, it is (17,b) that implies contrast between what has

5. See also Quirk et al 1972: 943, Hajicova & Sgall 1975: 31, Dekeyser et aL 1979: 4, etc.

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happened and what had been expected to happen.) This contrastiveness follows from the emphatic end-position of already, and is not really predicted by Bolinger's principle of semantic narrowing.6 The conclusions that we have arrived at can be summarized as follows. When the value part of a specificational sentence cannot be identified from the context, from the use of special contrastive emphasis or from the use of a marked sentence structure, it is the word order of the sentence that determines which constituent can be interpreted as the value part of a specificational reading. The principle appears to be that the constituent in question normally fills the position at the end of the sentence, thus following the part that is to be interpreted as the variable. This principle is in keeping with the well-known rule that new information is preferably processed after old information and with Bolinger's theory of linear modification (semantic narrowing). These two theories, however, do not completely account for the principle in question. My suggestion is that the preference for the value part of a specificational sentence to go in end-position is linked up with the fact that it is in that position that a constituent receives the primary accent and information focus of the sentence. Since the value part of a specificational sentence is by definition contrastive, it is only natural that, other things being equal, the constituent expressing the value should favour the position where the idea of selective contrast is most naturally evoked. Let us note, finally, that this conclusion is perfectly in keeping with Halliday's well-known distinction between thematic structure and information structure. Although he agrees that the theme is very often something that is known rather than something that is new, Halliday holds that it is actually information-structure that is determined by whether something is given or new. He also points out that, at least in English, information-structure is primarily a matter of stress (or rather accent) and intonation: constituents that convey new information are generally accented, and constituents that convey information that is represented as known or recoverable from the context are de-accented. It goes without saying that this theory accords perfectly with what I have argued. When a particular constituent is presented as the value of a specificational reading (and is therefore to be interpreted contrastively), this automatically means that the constituent in question is new (in the sense defined in footnote 3). It follows that it will normally occupy the position that receives the heaviest accent in the sentence, viz. the position of the last open-class item.

6. In a later publication (viz. The phrasal verb in English) Bolinger (1971: 45-60) recognizes the connection between the position of the nuclear accent and the identification of the constituent that is the "semantic peak" of the sentence.

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