Studies of the Paris Manuscripts: The Turning Point of Marx 981329616X, 9789813296169

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Lixin Han

Studies of the Paris Manuscripts The Turning Point of Marx

Studies of the Paris Manuscripts

Lixin Han

Studies of the Paris Manuscripts The Turning Point of Marx

Lixin Han Department of Philosophy Tsinghua University Beijing, China Translated by Kaiyuan Hong Translation is financed by “Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences”.

ISBN 978-981-32-9616-9    ISBN 978-981-32-9618-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9618-3 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface The Paris Manuscripts: Turning Point of Marx’s Thought

This work is dedicated to the study of young Marx’s Paris Manuscripts. Yet it on no account aims to add another dispensable work to the multitude of secondary studies on the Paris Manuscripts but rather to advance a new explanation of early Marx, namely, that it is in the Paris Manuscripts – Notes on James Mill in particular – that Marx accomplishes a transition from his early to his mature period. The hallmark thereof is the transition of Marx’s framework from individual to society, so that the explanatory principle of society shifts from man’s intrinsic elements to extrinsic economic relations. This conversion eventually leads to the advent of historical materialism.

Three Explanatory Models of the “Karl Marx Problem” The subject matter of this work is the question of when Marx becomes Marx or, put another way, whether there is a so-called turning point in the evolution of his thought. At first glance, this question seems to merely address a demarcation of Marx’s thought, yet it is de facto determined by the judgment of the essence of Marx’s thought and is, in this regard, a project of fundamental significance for Marx studies. The question of when Marx becomes Marx is also known as the “Karl Marx problem,” put forward by a representative Japanese scholar on Adam Smith, Yoshihiko Uchida. As we know, the two major works of Smith are The Theory of Moral Sentiments and An Inquiry. In the former, Smith defines man as a moral being with sympathy, underlining the significance of altruist moral philosophy for the formation of society. In An Inquiry, however, he defines man as an egoistical economic being, emphasizing the reasonability of man’s selfish deeds. In regard to their value orientations and underlying explanatory principles of society, these two definitions present themselves as contradictory or inconsistent. The argument over their relation to one another is known in the West as the “Smith problem.” In the 1960s, Uchida posits that in analogy to the “Smith problem,” there is also a similar problem v

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in the development of Marx’s thought, insofar as Marx’s early thought is distinct from that of his late period. This is the so-called Karl Marx problem. In fact, this problem was not first propounded by Uchida but dates back to the year in which the Manuscripts were officially published. As we know, two versions of the Manuscripts were published in 1932, and these are included in MEGA① I-3 and Der historische Materialismus, respectively. Die Frühschriften was edited by Siegfried Landshut and Jacob P. Mayer1. Although dealing with basically the same text, the editors of these two versions reach opposite assessments of the Manuscripts. The editor of MEGA①, Vladimir V. Adoratsky, deems the Manuscripts to be merely immature writings of Marx, insofar as they are “frequently still in the guise of philosophical, Feuerbachian terminology.”2 On contrary, Landshut and Mayer speak highly of the Manuscripts, looking upon it as Marx’s most important work and something that has not been surpassed by his later works. This is the earliest recorded controversy over academic assessments of the Manuscripts. Surprisingly, this debate later developed into ideological opposition. During the 1940s and the 1950s, some Western Marxists put forward the idea that the kernel of the Manuscripts was the humanist theory of alienation, hence regarding Marx in the period of Manuscripts as the “humanist Marx” and the later Marx focusing on economics as the “scientific Marx.” Meanwhile, Soviet Marxists represented by Teodor I.  Oizerman vehemently criticize the standpoints of Landshut, Mayer, Erich Thier, Herbert Marcuse, etc. that they intentionally “counterpose young Marx and Marxism,” seeking to deny Marx’s historical materialism with the capitalist humanism3 and to “interpret the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 from a capitalist and revisionist standpoint”4. Hence, the initial debate over the value of Manuscripts unexpectedly ends up as conflict between Eastern and Western ideologies. As a result, Oizerman’s standpoint is established as the single legitimate point of view in the socialist world led by the Soviet Union, which saw the discussion on the “Karl Marx problem” reach a stalemate. It goes without saying that we can no longer follow this rigid ideological pattern today and need to relaunch this research in an academic manner. Regarding the “Karl Marx problem,” the most frequently cited evidence is Marx’s review of his own theoretical development in the preface to Zur Kritik der

 Karl Marx, Der historische Materialismus. Die Frühschriften, hrsg. von S. Landshut und J. P. Mayer, Bd. 1, Kröner Verlag, 1932. 2  Vladimir Adoratsky, Einleitung zum dritten Band der ersten Abteilung, in: MEGA① I-3, MarxEngels-Verlag, 1932, S. XIII (translated into English by K.H.) 3  See Editor’s Note in Studies of Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 in the Western, Fudan University Press, 1983. Not only does this compilation provide crucial materials to the Chinese studies of Manuscripts; the outline of the Western studies of Manuscripts in Editor’s Note is also of great academic value. 4  Teodor Oizerman, Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and its Explanation, translated by Pikun Liu, People’s Publishing House, 1981, p. 20f (translated into English by K.H). 1

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politischen Ökonomie. In spite of its length, the author shall quote it entirely in the following for the purpose of further exposition: In the year 1842–43, as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, I first found myself in the embarrassing position of having to discuss what is known as material interests. […] The first work which I undertook to dispel the doubts assailing me was a critical reexamination of the Hegelian philosophy of law; the introduction to this work being published in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher issued in Paris in 1844. My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term “civil society”; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy. The study of this, which I began in Paris, I continued in Brussels, where I moved owing to an expulsion order issued by M. Guizot. The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be summarised as follows. […] [I]n the spring of 1845 […] we [Marx and Engels] decided to set forth together our conception as opposed to the ideological one of German philosophy, in fact to settle accounts with our former philosophical conscience. The intention was carried out in the form of a critique of post-Hegelian philosophy. […] The salient points of our conception were first outlined in an academic, although polemical, form in my Poverty of Philosophy ..., this book which was aimed at Proudhon appeared in 18475.

According to this passage, the transition of Marx’s thought does take place in his early period, namely, from 1843 to 1847. This period can further be divided into three phases: (1) the period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts from spring 1843 to early 1844, (2) the Paris period in 1844, and (3) the Brussel period from spring 1845 to 1846. Correspondingly, there are three possible explanations of the theoretical transition of early Marx: Interpretation I: The transition dates back to the period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts and is marked by the manuscript of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts as well as Zur Judenfrage and Zur Kritik der Hegel’schen Rechts-Philosophie: Einleitung in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. Interpretation II: The transition occurs in the Paris period, and the hallmark thereof is the Manuscripts and Comments on James Mill. Interpretation III: It is in the Brussel period that the transition takes place, which is signaled by Thesen and Ideologie6. 5  Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One. Preface, in Karl Marx, Freidrich Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Marx: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 262–264. 6  Marx speaks highly of Das Elend der Philosophie (1847), claiming that it is in this work that “[t] he salient points of our [sc. Marx and Engels’] conception were first outlined in an academic, although polemical, form.” Yet this is likely due to the fact that his manuscripts  – e.g., the Manuscripts, Thesen, and Ideologie  – had not been published by then and Das Elend der Philosophie is thus the only text conveying the “salient points” of Marx and Engels’s conception that was known to the readers in the Brussel period. For this reason, despite Marx’s own remark, we can still consider the later published Thesen and Ideologie as signs of the third period.

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The most prominent exponent of interpretation I is Vladimir I. Lenin. In Karl Marx, he advances the notion that Marx began to shift “from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democracy to communism” in the period of Rheinische Zeitung from 1842 to 1843 and “this transition was finally made”7 in DeutschFranzösische Jahrbücher. This remains the most authoritative answer to the “Karl Marx problem” before the official publication of the Paris Manuscripts in MEGA①. Yet it actually contradicts with the fact in many places. To begin with, though Marx establishes the theory of democracy by presupposing the inversion of subject and object in Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, this theory is only a particular materialism, the materialism of Feuerbach that is still far away from Marx’s own historical materialism. Second, democracy is the capitalist democracy and therefore by no means communism. If the “communism” named by Lenin refers to the French socialist and communist thought at that time, then it is de facto the target of Marx’s critique before the Paris Manuscripts; if it designates the communism in Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, then it was still unborn in the period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts and Deutsch-­Französische Jahrbücher. In brief, Marx at that time was under no circumstance capable of accomplishing a transition “from revolutionary democracy to communism.” It is because of these evident inconsistences that interpretation I, even though advocated by Lenin, was not actually adopted by the Soviet textbook system8. The direct reference for interpretation II is Marx’s own exposition: through critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law, Marx realized in the Paris period that “the anatomy of this civil society […] has to be sought in political economy” and hence embarked upon a study thereof. After further inquiry in Brussel, he arrived at a historical materialist definition, which as “general conclusion” “became the guiding principle of my [sc. Marx’s] studies.” If we precede from taking Marx’s mature work as the criterion, his Paris period studies possess most of the characteristics of his mature period. Considered this way, the Paris period should have been construed as the key period of Marx’s transition, and interpretation II ought to receive extra  Vladimir Lenin, Karl Marx. A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism. Bibliography, in: Lenin: Collected Works, vol. 21: August 1914–December 1915, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 80. 8  Nevertheless, interpretation I is not short of supporters, such as Norimasa Watanabe. As he sees it, even though Lenin’s criterion for the transition “from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democracy to communism” is erroneous, the time in which he posits this transition, however, is accurate. First, pace Lenin, he advances that the essence of Marx’s transition in this period is from “democracy to the theory of human emancipation,” namely, that Marx discards his attempt to supersede the modern dualism through the theory of democracy in Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts and establishes the theory of human emancipation based on the opposition between “private property and propertyless” within civil society (Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher). Next, he argues that Marx’s “settl[ing] accounts with our [sc. Marx und Engels’s] former philosophical conscience” does not occur in Ideologie but in 1843 and 1844 when he, especially in the Manuscripts, supersedes the previous “composition of philosophical question,” i.e., the framework of the philosophy of self-consciousness that rests on Bauer’s self-consciousness of as well as Hegel and Feuerbach’s essence of man. See Norimasa Watanabe, Modern Critique and Marx, Aoki Shoten, 1989 (translated into English by K.H.). 7

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attention. Surprisingly, however, few scholars deem the Paris Manuscripts to be the turning point of Marx’s thought. As yet, there has not been an explanation of Marx’s transition based on interpretation II in the strict sense, whereby interpretation II can hardly be regarded as an independent explanatory model as interpretation I and III. Interpretation III is the hitherto most influential explanation. Not only as the orthodox standpoint espoused by the Soviet textbook system, it is also adopted by scholars outside this system such as Louis P. Althusser and Wataru Hiromatsu. The reason for its wide reception is, above all, Marx’s own review cited above, that he “settle[s] account” with his former philosophical conscience in the Brussels period. The second reason concerns Engels’s testimony in his later years. According to Engels’s description in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Marx rapturously welcomed Feuerbach’s Das Wesen des Christentums (1841) in the Brussels period: “One must have experienced the liberating effect of this book for oneself to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was universal: we were all Feuerbachians for a moment”9. It is in Thesen (spring 1845) – “the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world outlook”10 – that Marx frees himself from the influence of Feuerbach. Since Thesen is “the first document” of “the brilliant germ,” the period in which Marx becomes Marx can be no later than spring 1845. This testimony is the main underpinning of interpretation III. The principal problem facing this interpretation is the positioning of Manuscripts, which were not published in Marx and Engel’s lifetime, and its core concept, alienation. Oizerman points out that the alienation concept was employed by Hegel and Feuerbach. In spite of his critique of Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx was still confined within Feuerbachian humanism in the Manuscripts, and hence compelled to formulate his historical materialist and scientific socialist propositions with concepts such as alienation that do not match his mature thought: “Marx and Engels extensively employ the alienation concept before they – by theoretically summarizing the economic and political history of society – reach a concrete, historical conception of the history of capitalism, the relationship between capitalism and the proceeding gestalts of society as well as the function of productive forces and relations of production in the development of society”11. For this reason, the Manuscripts are still categorized as immature Marx. It is probably on account of this judgment that the editors of MEW, published in the Soviet Union, did not intend to include the Manuscripts in the first place and only added them later in supplement as a result of protest. As such, when did Marx abandon the alienation concept? In Oizerman’s opinion, it is not until the mid-1840s, i.e., in Ideologie. This is the basic viewpoint on the Manuscripts and the alienation concept within the Soviet model of interpretation III.

9  Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, vol. 26: Engels: 1882–1889, Progress Publishers, 1990, p. 364. 10  Ibid., p. 520. 11  Teodor Oizerman, The Problem of Alienation in Marx’s Early Writings, in Studies of Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, edited by the Central Compilation & Translation Bureau, Hunan People’s Publishing Press, 1983, p. 114 (translated into English by K.H.).

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As representatives of Western and Japanese Marxism, both Althusser and Hiromatsu posited the view, in the 1960s, that there was a “break” or “leap” in Ideologie. In Pour Marx (1965), Althusser indicates that Marx’s early and late writings had completely different themes, namely, humanism and historical ­materialism. The transition from the former to the latter is an “epistemological break” which “divides Marx’s thought into two long essential periods: the ‘ideological’ period before, and the scientific period after the break in 1845”12. According to this standpoint, writings including the Manuscripts and Thesen belong to “the ‘ideological’ period” and “rest on Feuerbach’s anthropological problematic”13. It is after Ideologie that Marx finally abandons the alienation concept, turning to criticize capitalism with the category of division of labor and thus unmasking the law of the development of human society. Yet, despite the novelty of his concepts and the impact of the wording, Althusser’s so-called epistemological break is – in terms of its content – virtually a repetition of Oizerman’s explanation14. Distinct from Althusser, Hiromatsu begins with the leap “from the logic of alienation theory to the logic of reification theory”: “In Die Deutsche Ideologie, the logic of self-­alienation is under criticism (self-critique). The proposition that Marx asserted in the Manuscripts is completely discarded, as the logic of the reification theory replaces the alienation theory”15. In accordance with this point of view, Marx’s thought can be divided into two phases by Ideologie: the phase of the alienation theory and that of the reification theory. The so-called alienation means that man’s creation turns against him and is estranged from him. Its underlying logical structure is the subject-object (Objekt) relation. The so-called reification denotes that the relation between persons presents itself as the relationship between Sachen, which rests on a complex structure of social relations that transcends the subject-­object (Objekt) relation. In the Paris Manuscripts, since Marx has not yet disengaged himself from Feuerbach’s humanism, his theoretical framework is still based on the alienation theory; in I. Feuerbach of Ideologie, however, he nearly discards the alienation concept altogether – with two exceptions wherein he simply employs it in with a sarcastic and negative tone16  – and turns to criticize capitalist society by way of the reification concept, transforming his framework into the reification theory.  Louis Althusser, For Marx, translated by B. Brewster, Penguin Press, 1969, p. 34.  Ibid., p. 35. 14  For instance, the following exposition of Althusser highly resembles Oizerman’s interpretation in his Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and its Explanation: “In particular, this reveals the extent to which Marx’s early works are impregnated with Feuerbach’s thought. Not only is Marx’s terminology from 1842 and 1845 Feuerbachian (alienation, species being, total being, ‘inversion’ of subject and predicate, etc.) but, what is probably more important, so is the basic philosophical problematic. […] To use his own expression, Marx did not really ‘settle accounts’ with this problematic until 1845. The German Ideology is the first work indicating a conscious and definitive rupture with Feuerbach’s philosophy and his influence” (ibid., p. 45). 15  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Horizon of Marxism, Keiso Shobo, 1969, p. 245 (translated into English by K.H.). 16  Marx, The German Ideology in: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 48, 88. 12 13

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It is perhaps due to the influence of the Soviet textbook system that Chinese scholars adopt a similar standpoint. In Studies of Marx’s Early Thought, Xianda Chen notes: “That Marx truly becomes ‘Marx’, becomes the founder of scientific communism is signified by the drafting of Die Deutsche Ideologie. Therefore, the division between young Marx and mature Marx is spring 1845, not August 1844 or earlier. The ‘transcendence’ over Feuerbach that Marx aims for in Die Heilige Familie is not accomplished until Die Deutsche Ideologie. From then on, he truly shifted from ‘admiration’ of Feuerbach to critique, from fragmentary articulation of historical materialism to the comprehensive establishment thereof”17. Even though Xianda Chen emphasizes that Marx’s transition is a process from quantitative accumulation to qualitative leap, in general, however, he still rests on the model of interpretation III, regarding Ideologie as the line of demarcation. In comparison, Bokui Sun and Yibing Zhang put forward “the double-turn theory of Marxist-Engels philosophy, in addition to describing the oscillation between two kinds of theoretical logic found in the 1844 Manuscripts.” To this, Yibing Zhang provides an explanation: “Professor Sun first proposed an additional and even more important theoretical advancement in the study of texts such as the 1844 Manuscripts. He argues that although in terms of politics Young Marx had already turned to support the proletariat position and in terms of philosophy, to a form of general, Feuerbachian materialism, nevertheless in the recesses of his theoretical application, there appeared two completely different forms of theoretical logic. The first is a humanist and latently idealist view of history, which begins from workers’ a priori species-essence (labor), and views social history (primarily modern industrial civilization) as the process of alienation and reversion of the essence of man. This was the guiding theoretical framework for the second stage of young Marx’s philosophy. The second form of theoretical logic appeared after Marx truly came into contact with the practical and economic historical facts of the proletariat class. Though this was a new unconscious theoretical logic which was rooted in objective historical reality […] it did not mean that Marxism’s new worldview had already been established; rather, it implied that as Marx’s understanding of reality grew ever more profound, he unconsciously deviated from the logic of humanist alienation. […] In the three months from the end of 1844 to the beginning of 1845, these two forms of theoretical logic were in a state of dynamic oscillation. Of course, in terms of the overall process of young Marx’s theoretical thinking during this time, an interpretation of history based on Feuerbachian humanist labor-alienation occupied the dominant position in Marx’s mind. In observing the deeper theoretical meaning, this humanist critique based on ethical values may have been a defense of the proletariat revolution, but it had not yet surpassed (Germany’s) bourgeois ideology. Not until April of 1845 when Marx wrote Theses on Feuerbach did his philosophical development finally experience a conscious philosophical revolution. Here the humanist discourse which had originally been apparent in the 1844 Manuscripts was completely deconstructed, and a new, practical, philosophical worldview began to rise  Xianda Chen and Huiming Jin, Studies of Marx’s Early Thought, in Collective Works of Xianda Chen, vol. 2, China Renmin University Press, 2006, p. 342 (translated into English by K.H.).

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to the forefront. This philosophical revolution was not completed until after an exposition and criticism of Feuerbach and Marx/Engel’s own pre-March 1845 viewpoint took place in The German Ideology”18. According to their viewpoint expounded in this passage, there are “two completely different forms of theoretical logic” in the Manuscripts: the Feuerbachian “logic of humanist alienation” and the brand-new economic, materialist logic. The latter substituted the former in 1845 and was developed into historical materialism. Despite its difference from the other positions addressed above in terms of perspective and content, this standpoint still belongs to the model of interpretation III, insofar as Bokui Sun and Yibing Zhang posit the transition of Marx’s thought in Thesen and Ideologie and argue that “an interpretation of history based on Feuerbachian humanist labor-alienation occupied the dominant position in Marx’s mind.” So far, we have briefly gone through the most representative viewpoints within interpretation III. Regardless of their differences, they all share the following features: in the Manuscripts, Marx was still confined to Feuerbach’s framework of alienation; it is not until Ideologie that he surpasses this framework and establishes historical materialism. Considered this way, the pivotal issue of interpretation III is when Marx surpassed Feuerbach, regarding which Keiichi Iwabuchi calls this explanatory model “the transcendence over alienation theory”19. For the proponents of interpretation III, despite some of them also acknowledging the value of the Manuscripts, this text can never gain a recognition that matches its depth and be truly valued, so long as it is defined as a text written before Marx truly becomes Marx.

 ew Paradigm in the Studies of Early Marx: The Paris N Manuscripts Disagreeing with the model of interpretation III, the author shall put forward in this work an explanation molded on interpretation II, namely, that the transition of Marx’s thought arises in the Paris Manuscripts, Notes on James Mill in particular, in the hope of reversing the academic convention that neglects the Paris Manuscripts and its alienation concept and elevating their position in Marx’s system. In addition to the fundamental fact that interpretation II better conforms with the development of Marx’s thought, the model of interpretation II is also buttressed by the philological studies of the Paris Manuscripts. In the 1960s, European and Japanese scholars found out that the so-called Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 not only encompassed the three well-known manuscripts but  Yibing Zhang, Back to Marx: Changes of Philosophical Discourse in the Context of Economics, translated by T. Mitchell, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2014, p. xxviif. 19  See Keiichi Iwabuchi, Japanese Studies of Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, translated by Lixin Han in Tsinghua Philosophical Almanac (2004), 2006 (translated into English by K.H.). 18

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should also include the Economics Notes written at approximately the same time. In a word, it is an entirety consisting of these two parts. In order to distinguish it from the conventionally defined Manuscripts, the author names this entirety the Paris Manuscripts. The emergence of the category of the Paris Manuscripts not only means the widening of the extension of the Manuscripts – to incorporate both the Manuscripts and the Notes – but also, more importantly, brings about a revolution of the ­methodology of Manuscripts study, namely, to integrate both parts into an entirety. In terms of content, the Manuscripts put an emphasis on philosophy, while the Notes concern more on economics, so that a combination of the two integrates philosophy and economics. This combination is a fundamental transformation of the previous paradigm of philosophical studies that severs the connection between philosophy and economics  – e.g., Erich S.  Fromm’s Marx’s Concept of Man (1961) – and of the paradigm of economics studies, e.g., David I. Rosenberg’s A Summary of the Development of Marx and Engels’s Economics Theories in the 1940s (1954). This shift might result in a breakthrough in studies of the Manuscripts, such as a change of attitude towards the alienation theory in the Manuscripts, for instance. The previous understanding of the alienation theory is normally confined to the concept of alienated labor, which is regarded as Marx’s immature theory due to the Feuerbachian humanist character it bears. Considered this way, the alienation theory has naturally become a target of critique and negation. The philological studies of the Paris Manuscripts, however, alter the extension of the alienation theory, incorporating the alienation of intercourse into itself, which paves the way for reestablishing the alienation theory and elevating its position through a combination of the alienation of intercourse and the alienation of labor. In addition, research also shows that contrary to the conventional viewpoint that the Economics Notes – Comments on James Mill in particular – were written before the Manuscripts, the actual writing sequence is far more complex, namely, the First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript. Moreover, Comments on James Mill distinguishes two stages in the development of Marx’s economics conception, insofar as it apparently stands on a higher plane than the First Manuscript. This philological conclusion will inevitably have a significant impact on the conventional conception of the Manuscripts in China. Take Yibing Zhang’s Back to Marx as an example. This work serves as a shining example of the attempt to interpret the Paris Manuscripts through a combination of economics and philosophy. Yet the author, on the one hand, adopts the traditional standpoint that places Comments on James Mill before the Manuscripts, following the writing sequence of Economics Notes (Comments on James Mill) → the First Manuscripts → the Second Manuscripts → the Third Manuscripts, positioning the alienation of intercourse theory in Comments on James Mill before the alienation of labor theory in the First Manuscript for, as he sees it, the former is not on the same level as the latter. On the other hand, he aims to develop a theory that asserts “two completely different forms of theoretical logic,” claiming that the “economics materialist logic” stands on a higher plane than the “humanist logic of alienation” centering on the alienation of labor. If the alienation of intercourse can represent Marx’s “economics materialist logic” – in

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fact, Comments on James Mill represents the pinnacle of Marx’s economics study in the Paris Manuscripts – then locating the alienation of intercourse behind the alienation of labor seems to better concur with Yibing Zhang’s presupposition that the “economics materialist logic” eventually overcomes the “humanist logic of alienation.” In this respect, the chronological ordering Back to Marx rests on  – i.e., Comments on James → the Manuscripts  – does not match the assertion of “two completely different forms of theoretical logic.” Such an inconsistency would have been resolved, and his standpoint of “two forms of theoretical logic” would have been more persuasive if he had adopted a writing sequence of the First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript. Compared with Back to Marx, this work adheres to the writing sequence of the First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript, meaning that alienation of labor precedes alienation of intercourse and that Comments on James Mill is more profound than the First Manuscript. Based on this, the author further brings forth a hypothesis on the demarcation of the theoretical development of early Marx: if there is indeed a turning point between early and late Marx, then it is between the First Manuscript and the Second Manuscript, namely, in Comments on James Mill. It goes without saying that whether this hypothesis holds true does not depend on the philological fact but is determined by logical justification in that philosophy is distinctive from the science of history  – to which philology to some extent also belongs – insofar as the conclusion of philosophy ought to be justified through conceptual deduction and reasoning. Except for Chapter IV, this work is intended as logical justification of my hypothesis. At the age of 26, Marx announces in the Manuscripts that “[i]t is hardly necessary to assure the reader conversant with political economy that my results have been attained by means of a wholly empirical analysis based on a conscientious critical study of political economy”20. Here, the author would like to borrow Marx’s words: It is hardly necessary to assure a reader conversant with the Paris Manuscripts that my results in this work have been attained by philosophical rather than philological means, namely, through conceptual deduction and reasoning.

 allmark of the Transition of Marx’s Thought: H The Emergence of the Vantage Point of Social Relations According to our analysis of interpretation III, this model takes Marx’s supersession of Feuerbach’s alienation theory as the criterion for a demarcation between early and late Marx. With regard to this division, this criterion proves to be rather effective. Yet, instead of this criterion, this work opts to divide early and late Marx by virtue of when his perspective turns from individual to society. 20  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 231.

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To be sure, this criterion is not completely different from that of interpretation III, since the model of interpretation II adopted by the author also construes Marx’s rupture from Feuerbach’s alienation theory as the hallmark of his transition. Yet interpretation III diverges from interpretation II with regard to the understanding of Marx’s transcendence over Feuerbach: the model of interpretation III sees the elementary drawback of Feuerbach’s alienation theory in its humanism, which leads to what Yibing Zhang’s names a “latently idealist view of history,” insofar as it explicates the essence of man and society with the abstract species-essence. Thus, transcendence over Feuerbach means transcendence over historical idealism. As far as the model of interpretation II is concerned, however, Feuerbach’s alienation is de facto the logic of the isolated individual’s self-alienation, which draws on the individual’s intrinsic essence, such as species-essence, freedom, reason, and practice, rather than extrinsic economic or social relations to elucidate the essence of man and society. Considered this way, transcendence over Feuerbach signifies the transition of Marx’s perspective from the subject-object (Objekt) relationship of the isolated individual to social relations between men. Certainly, to come to grips with man and society through extrinsic economic relations is the essence of historical materialism. Therefore, this shift of perspective is also the transcendence over historical idealism, in which sense, interpretation II does not contradict interpretation III. “From individual to society” is an outline of Marx’s theoretical transition in the Paris period, which further manifests itself in several concrete aspects. The most important ones are the transitions (1) from Feuerbach to Hegel, (2) from state to civil society, and (3) from alienation of labor to alienation of intercourse. If “from individual to society” characterizes the transition as a whole, then these three aspects can be considered as secondary attributes, insofar as they collectively compose the overall picture of this transition. Since “(1) from Feuerbach to Hegel” is connected with the “transcendence over Feuerbach’s alienation theory,” the author wants to go further into it. As regards “(2) from state to civil society” and “(3) from the alienation of labor to the alienation of intercourse,” we shall expound on them in the following chapters. As is well-known, young Marx was a theorist who once belonged to the Young Hegelians dedicated to the critique of Hegel. After the publication of Das Wesen des Christentums in 1841, Feuerbach in fact became the leader of the Young Hegelians. According to Engel’s comments cited above, Marx himself was a “Hegelian” too. In this respect, the shift from Feuerbach to Hegel is a betrayal of Marx’s theoretical origins with the Young Hegelians. Without this transition to Hegel, however, Marx would have never been able to disengage himself from the yoke of the Young Hegelians, not to mention establish historical materialism. Hence, how does Hegel assume such significance? This is determined by the advantage of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel is often considered the representative of objective idealism, the opposite of materialism. In fact, he is more profound than other philosophers of the time considering his conception of modern society, since his philosophy was established by way of an assimilation of political economics. As the “anatomy of civil society,” political economics unveils the economic relations between men through the study

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of commodity, money, capital, etc. and, though latently, embodies the dialectic of individual and society. Having realized its significance, Marx establishes historical materialism and his theory of surplus value through his critique of political economics. In his Frankfurt period (around 1800) and Jena period (1801–1807), Hegel was also attentive to the new principle of society contained in political economics. After conscientiously studying works such as James Steuart’s An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy and Smith’s An Inquiry, he transforms economic categories such as labor, property, division of labor, and exchange into philosophical categories, conceiving a dialectic that represents the reality of modern society, the dialectic of alienation. This achievement is documented in Jena manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes, Phänomenologie, and Grundlinien. Considered this way, Hegel had already undertaken the same approach before Marx. It is Lukács who first discovered the connection between Hegel’s dialectics and political economics, as he pointed out in Der Junge Hegel: “It is not only the case that he made the greatest and fairest German assessment of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period. In addition, he is the only German thinker to have made a serious attempt to come to grips with the industrial revolution in England. He is the only man to have forged a link between the problems of classical English economics and those of philosophy and dialectics”21. This is where Hegel surpasses his contemporaries including Feuerbach by a fair distance. His dialectic is therefore the most outstanding conception of society at that time. For Marx, as he and Engels later admit numerous times, the significance of Hegel’s philosophy is far greater that of Feuerbach’s, and Hegel’s dialectic is the methodology they draw upon when establishing historical materialism. Compared with other theorists, Hegel is the necessary mediator in Marx’s process of becoming Marx, the pivotal moment in the evolution of early Marx’s thought. Therefore, as earlier Marx turns to Hegel, the closer he comes to developing historical materialism. As such, when was Marx attentive to the significance of Hegel? Otherwise put, what prompted Marx to recognize the significance of Hegel? According to Engel in Ludwig Feuerbach, “[t]his further development of Feuerbach’s standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845  in The Holy Family”22, which leads to the adoption of Hegel’s “revolutionary side”23. Likewise, Althusser also holds that despite “Marx’s one and only resort to Hegel”24 in the Manuscripts at the last moment, his true conversion to Hegel took place in the period of “break” in 1845. As the author sees it, however, this transition does not occur in 1845 but in the Manuscripts, in “the text,” as Althusser puts it, “of the last hours of the night” which

 Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel. Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, translated by R. Livingstone, London, 1975, p. xxvi. 22  Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, vol. 26: Engels: 1882–1889, Progress Publishers, 1990, p. 381. 23  Ibid., p. 383. 24  Louis Althusser, For Marx, translated by B. Brewster, Penguin Press, 1969, p. 36. 21

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is, however, “the text the furthest removed from the day that is about to dawn”25. Through assimilation of political economics, Marx no longer rejects Hegel’s philosophy. As is aforementioned, Hegel’s dialectic is based on his transformation of political economics, whereby it shares the same root as economics. In the Paris period, Marx focused on the study of political ­economics and set his sights on a rather similar target as Hegel, insofar as both emphasize on the universality of private property as well as the significance of money and value for the transition from individual to totality. Having been conversant with political economic teachings, Marx turned back to Grundlinien and Phänomenologie  – both written during Hegel’s study of political economics  – and began to comprehend the profundity therein. As a result, he added the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt] to the Manuscripts at the last moment, showing the positive value he placed on Hegel’s thought. In brief, it is through the study of political economics that Marx, though indirectly, realized the significance of Hegel’s dialectic. To sum up, the reversal of Marx’s attitude towards Feuerbach and Hegel does not begin in 1845 but dates back to the Paris period, namely, Comments on James Mill and the Third Manuscript. In this regard, the author departs from Engels and Althusser.

Summary Academically considered, the main characteristics and standpoints of this work are: (1) Compared with the conventional approach in China that explains the essence of Marx’s thought with the concept of practice (subject-object relation), this work rests on the category of social relations as the new coordinate. Considered from this new vantage point, the First Manuscript is based on the subject-object relationship of the isolated individual, while the underlying structure of Comments on James Mill is the social relationship between private owners. For this reason, Comments on James Mill stands on a higher plane than the First Manuscript. (2) As opposed to interpretation III that deems Ideologie to be the turning point of Marx’s thought, the author moves this turning point forward to Comments on James Mill written between the First and the Second Manuscript, advancing that the essence of this transition is the shift in Marx’s framework from isolated individual to social relations, based on which the author establishes a model of interpretation II. (3) Drawing upon the philological achievements of the Paris Manuscripts since the 1960s, the interpretation of the Paris Manuscripts in this work follows the writing sequence of the First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript.

25

 Ibid.

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(4) This work critically assimilates the political economics-based dialectic of Hegel, applying it to the study of the Paris Manuscripts. In the light of this, it inaugurates a path to interpreting the Paris Manuscripts from the perspective of Hegel’s philosophy. (5) By revaluing Marx’s alienation theory, this work elevates the position of the Paris Manuscripts in the development of Marx’s thought for the purpose of changing the traditional paradigm of the studies of early Marx. Beijing, China

Lixin Han

Preface to the English Edition

The Paris Manuscripts (comprising the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and Comments on James Mill) are the most important surviving manuscripts pertaining to early Marx thought. They are nothing less than a milestone in the development of Marxism. This book offers a new understanding of early Marx thought, demonstrating that the transition from early to mature Marx thought occurred in the writing of the Paris Manuscripts. Specifically, this transition can be pinpointed to Comments on James Mill, in which Marx shifts from a framework of the isolated individual to one of social relations, establishing historical materialism that clarifies the human essence from the perspective of an external economic relationship. This is completely different from the position taken by European and Japanese scholars such as Oizerman, Althusser, and Hiromatsu, who believed this transition took place in Die Deutsche Ideologie. This study reopens the possibility of interpreting the Paris Manuscripts from the perspective of Hegel. According to the author, it was during the Paris Manuscripts period that Marx shifted his theoretical foundations from Feuerbach to Hegel. On the basis of Hegel’s alienation concept, Marx constructs a new form of alienation theory with “alienation of intercourse” at its core. The theoretical challenge tackled by this book is to restore the authority of alienation theory and strengthen the position of the Paris Manuscripts in the history of Marx thought, so as to rearrange the traditional landscape of research on early Marx thought. The context for this book is China’s developmental path in modern times. All of a sudden, after 1978, China entered civil society. The Paris Manuscripts are the theoretical crystallization of Marx’s first direct encounter with civil society and his confrontation with Smith and Hegel, originators of civil society theory. His critique of civil society is hugely valuable when explaining the evolution of civil society in contemporary China. Of course, his criticism also applies elsewhere in the world today, because world history has not yet surpassed the stage of capitalism. Therefore, the practical intent of this book is to get a grip on this era “from an elevated conceptual position” (begreifen), so as to be better able to forecast the future trajectory of China and the world.

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Preface to the English Edition

The Chinese version of the book, Studies of the Paris Manuscripts: The Turning Point of Marx (Beijing Normal University Press), was published in 2014. With the publication of the English edition, my research will be available to readers around the world. I never expected this when I first wrote the book. I would first like to thank doctoral candidate Kaiyuan Hong, my student and a fluent English and German speaker. He holds a Bachelor’s and a Master’s degree in Philosophy from Tsinghua University, where he specialized in the philosophy of Hegel and Marx. He is currently pursuing his doctorate at Ruhr-Universität Bochum in Germany, undertaking in-depth study of Hegel. During his years at Tsinghua University, he took part in numerous discussions with me about this book and gained a deep understanding of its content. It is hard for me to think of anyone better placed than Kaiyuan Hong to translate this book into English. I thank him for his painstaking diligence in carrying out the task. Thanks also to Ms. Heather Mowbray for entering the project in its final stages to proofread the translated text. She comes from the UK and works in Beijing as a translator and editor. Knowing she has carried out this task with the utmost professionalism, I am confident that the readers have before them the most intelligible and accurate account of my research possible. In addition, I would also like to thank Ms. Leana Li from Springer. As the responsible editor for this book, she has made huge efforts to bring the English publication into fruition. Last but not least, the translation and publication of this book have been generously supported by the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Science (No. 14WZX007), and to them I wish to express my sincere gratitude. I trust that the publication of this book will help the readers understand the state of play of Marx studies in China today and further their interest in deepening engagement with Chinese scholars on this topic. Beijing, China

Lixin Han 23 June 2019 This preface was translated by Heather Mowbray

Translator’s Note

1. On Citation (a) All italics and underlined parts are original. (b) Content added by the translator or editor of the quoted work, whether in brackets or square brackets, are remarked upon after a semicolon to explain their origin, e.g., “[…; trans.].” German originals provided by the author are placed in square brackets. Also, given in square brackets are remarks and modifications by the translator, e.g., in the case of “labor to earn a living” (see below). (c) All Chinese and Japanese and parts of the German text are translated into English by the translator of this book. 2. On the Translation of Terminology (a) 劳动者, 工人 (Arbeiter) The author distinguishes between two concepts within the term Arbeiter: man in division of labor and exchange relationship (劳动者) and wage worker employed by the capitalist (工人 or strictly 雇佣工人). Considering this, the translator renders the former as laborer in order to distinguish it from the latter. (b) 市民 (Bürger), 公民 (Staatsbürger) The distinction between these two concepts rests on the author’s differentiation between individual’s respective identity in civil society and state, i.e., Bürger as homo oeconomicus (市民) in the former and Staatsbürger as citoyen (公民) in the latter (see Chapter II). (c) 有产者 (Eigentümer), 私有者 (Privateigentümer) There are various renderings of these two terms in the edition of Progress Publishers: for Eigentümer “proprietor” and “property owner” and for Privateigentümer “owner of private property,” “private owner,” “private proprietor,” and “property owner.” For the purpose of consistency, the translator of this book adopts “property owner” and “private owner” (see Chapter IX).

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(d) 异化 (Entfremdung), 外化 (Entäußerung) Considering different renderings of Entfremdung, e.g., “estrangement” in the edition of Progress Publishers, the translator treats alienation and estrangement as synonyms but uses the former for consistency. Accordingly, in all cited passages from the edition of Progress Publishers, the term estrangement is preserved, while its rendering of Entäußerung as alienation is substituted by externalization so as to avoid confusion. (e) 营利劳动 (Erwerbstätigkeit) In most English or Chinese translations, Erwerbstätigkeit is translated as “labor to earn a living” and the like. Contrary to this reading, the author interprets it as labor directed towards profiting, i.e., gainful labor, which differs from “labor to earn a living,” insofar as the former presupposes “the relationship of exchange” (see Chapters V and IX). (f) 对象 (Gegenstand), 客体 (Objekt) Unlike in German and Chinese, these two concepts can hardly be distinguished in English as both correspond to the same word, “object.” Since the term Gegenstand, as a core concept of this work, appears far more frequently than the other in this book, the translator opts to add the original German word in square brackets thereafter every time the word object designates Objekt instead of Gegenstand. The same applies to all of its derivatives, such as objective and objectify. (g) 共同存在性, 共同本质 (Gemeinwesen) Gemeinwesen is rendered as “community” in the edition of Progress Publishers. As the author of this book sees it, however, Gemeinwesen in Marx’s context not only designates “gestalt and organization with the character of communal being,” but also, and more frequently, “the character of communal being” (see Chapter X as well as Chapters V and IX). Hence, he formulates it as 共同存在性, i.e., being in community, or 共同本质, i.e., communal essence. (h) 私人所有, 私有制 (Privateigentum) Chinese translators and scholars differentiate between two concepts within the term Privateigentum: taking 私人所有 to refer to property owned by a private individual and 私有制 as the constitution based on this ownership. Thus, they are, respectively, translated as “private property” and “private ownership” (see Chapter VI). 3. Abbreviations (a) Edition of Works GW TW MEGA① MEW MEGA②

Hegel: Gesammelte Werke (1968ff) Hegel: Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe  (1969–1971) Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (1927–1935, 1940) Marx Engels Werke (1956ff) Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (1975ff)

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(b) Individual Works The Fable of the Bees

 he Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, T Publick Benefits An Inquiry An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Differenz Differenz  des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie Über  die wissenschaftlichen Naturrecht Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften Phänomenologie Phänomenologie des Geistes Grundlinien Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts Einleitung Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung Manuscripts Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Notes Economic Notes Paris Manuscripts  Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and Economics Notes Thesen Thesen über Feuerbach Ideologie Die Deutsche Ideologie Grundrisse Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen  Ökonomie Grundrisse im weiteren Sinne  Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie im weiteren Sinne Ludwig Feuerbach Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy Karl Marx Karl Marx: A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism, Bibliography Bochum, Germany

Kaiyuan Hong April 2019

Contents

1 From State to Civil Society I.................................................................. 1 1.1 The Transition of Marx.................................................................. 2 1.2 The Economic Nature of the Civil Society Concept..................... 5 1.2.1 Three Principles of Civil Society..................................... 5 1.2.2 Hegel and Smith.............................................................. 9 1.2.3 Civil Society as Economic Society.................................. 17 1.3 Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law............................. 20 1.3.1 The Contradiction Within Hegel’s Notion of the State.... 22 1.3.2 Identity or Opposition...................................................... 26 1.3.3 The Significance of Heterogeneity.................................. 30 1.4 The Notion of Civil Society Within the Framework of the Philosophy of Law............................................................... 32 1.5 Summary........................................................................................ 34 2 From State to Civil Society II................................................................. 35 2.1 The Prelude to Marx’s Transition.................................................. 35 2.2 The Unexpected Function of the Theory of Human Emancipation................................................................................. 36 2.3 The Problem of the Disappearance of State.................................. 41 2.4 Summary........................................................................................ 46 3 Is “Return to Hess” Actually Essential?............................................... 49 3.1 Cornu’s “Return to Hess”.............................................................. 50 3.1.1 Characteristics of Hess’s Thought................................... 50 3.1.2 From Fichte to Feuerbach................................................ 52 3.1.3 Hess’s Influence on the Paris Manuscripts...................... 53 3.2 Hess Studies in Japan.................................................................... 55 3.2.1 Yamanaka and Hata’s Critique of Cornu......................... 55 3.2.2 Hiromatsu’s Theory of Hess’s Overwhelming Influence.......................................................................... 57 3.2.3 Rachi’s Synthesis of Previous Standpoints...................... 60 3.3 Hess Studies in China.................................................................... 63 xxv

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3.3.1 Cai Hou’s Pioneering Study............................................ 64 3.3.2 Yibing Zhang’s Hess-Centered Construction in Back to Marx............................................................... 66 3.4 Limitations of Hess’s Thought...................................................... 70 3.4.1 Lack of Hegel’s Dialectic................................................ 71 3.4.2 Superficial Understanding of Political Economy............ 73 3.5 Summary........................................................................................ 75

4 Philological Studies of the Paris Manuscripts and Their Significance............................................................................ 77 4.1 Definition of the Paris Manuscripts.............................................. 77 4.2 Philological Focus on the Paris Manuscripts................................ 79 4.2.1 Pioneering Studies of Japanese Scholars......................... 80 4.2.2 Lapin’s Division of Two Stages....................................... 82 4.2.3 The Problematic Ordering of MEGA②............................. 84 4.2.4 Rojahn’s Hypothesis........................................................ 86 4.3 The Credibility of Taubert’s Hypothesis....................................... 88 4.3.1 Philological Facts............................................................ 88 4.3.2 The Basis of Theoretical Deduction................................ 94 4.4 Summary........................................................................................ 98 5 The Fallacy in the Four Aspects of Alienated Labor........................... 101 5.1 The Distinction Between Hegel and Feuerbach’s Concepts of Alienation.................................................................. 101 5.1.1 Hegel: Alienation Leads to Man’s Socialization............. 102 5.1.2 Feuerbach: The Self-Alienation of Isolated Individual... 104 5.2 Inconsistency Between the First and the Second Aspect............... 107 5.2.1 The First Aspect: Alienation of Nature or Alienation of Product?....................................................................... 108 5.2.2 The Second Aspect: The “Other” in “Self-Alienation”... 111 5.2.3 Mochizuki’s Question...................................................... 112 5.3 The Third Aspect: The Particularity of the Alienation of Species-­Essence........................................................................ 116 5.4 The Fourth Aspect: The Conundrum of the “Alienation of Man from Man”......................................................................... 119 5.5 Summary........................................................................................ 123 6 Is Marx’s Alienated Labor Theory Circular Reasoning?.................... 125 6.1 Origin of the Aporia....................................................................... 125 6.2 The Semblance of Circular Reasoning.......................................... 129 6.2.1 Tadashi’s Question........................................................... 130 6.2.2 Hiromatsu’s Explanation................................................. 132 6.2.3 Yamanouchi’s Review..................................................... 133 6.3 Deciphering the Enigma of Circular Reasoning: The History of Private Property..................................................... 136

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6.3.1 Differentiation of Concepts............................................. 136 6.3.2 Historical Theory of Private Property.............................. 140 6.4 Definitive Solution to Marx’s Aporia: From Isolated Individual to Society.............................................. 145 6.5 Summary........................................................................................ 148

7 The Logic of the Transition from Individual to Society in Phänomenologie des Geistes............................................................... 151 7.1 Hegel’s Answer to the Aporia of Modernity.................................. 152 7.2 The Theory of Sache selbst in Chapter C. (AA) Reason................ 156 7.2.1 The Mediation of Sache selbst......................................... 157 7.2.2 The Inversion of the Relation Between Man and Sache.. 162 8 The Logic of the Transition from Individual to Society in the Jena Manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes............................... 169 8.1 From the “Tragedy of Ethical Life” to the Advent of Sprit in the Jena System............................................................ 169 8.1.1 System of Ethical Life in the Early Jena Period.............. 171 8.1.2 Philosophy of Spirit in the Late Jena Period................... 176 8.2 Summary........................................................................................ 182 9 The New Vantage Point on Comments on James Mill.......................... 187 9.1 Money and Alienation of Man....................................................... 188 9.1.1 The Independence of the Mediator: Money.................... 188 9.1.2 The Nature of Money: Alienation of Private Property.... 190 9.1.3 Alienation of Morals: Credit........................................... 192 9.2 The Opposition Between Man’s Essence and Private Property..... 194 9.2.1 Gemeinwesen as Man’s Essence...................................... 194 9.2.2 Private Property as the Externalized Essence.................. 198 9.3 From Gainful Labor to the True Production.................................. 202 9.3.1 Definition of Gainful Labor............................................. 203 9.3.2 The Triumph of Sache and True Production.................... 205 9.4 Hegel in Comments on James Mill................................................ 209 9.4.1 The Similarity Between Hegel and Marx........................ 209 9.4.2 The Difference Between Hegel and Marx....................... 212 9.5 Summary........................................................................................ 214 10 The Alienation of Intercourse in Comments on James Mill: The Turning Point of Marx.................................................................... 217 10.1 The Philological Starting Point for Studies of Comments on James Mill.......................................................... 217 10.2 The Flaw of the Alienated Labor Theory...................................... 219 10.2.1 The Structure of Alienated Labor.................................... 219 10.2.2 The Problem of the Forth Aspect of Alienated Labor..... 222 10.3 Alienation of Intercourse and Social Relation............................... 224 10.3.1 The Structure of Alienation of Intercourse...................... 225 10.3.2 The Vantage Point of Social Relations............................ 231

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10.4 Comments on James Mill and Hess............................................... 236 10.4.1 Comparison Between the First Manuscript and Comments on James Mill.......................................... 236 10.4.2 Comparison Between Hess and Marx............................. 238 10.5 Summary........................................................................................ 242

11 Alienation and Reification...................................................................... 245 11.1 Differentiation and Analysis of Concepts...................................... 246 11.1.1 Reification and Fetishism................................................ 246 11.1.2 Distinctions Between Alienation and Reification............ 249 11.1.3 The Hazy Thingification Concept.................................... 251 11.2 Opposition Between Mochizuki and Hiromatsu on the Problem of the Alienation Theory...................................... 256 11.2.1 Hiromatsu’s Negation of the Alienation Theory.............. 258 11.2.2 Mochizuki’s Critique of Hiromatsu................................. 260 11.3 Assessment of the “Debate over Early Marx”............................... 263 11.3.1 Is Alienation of Intercourse a New Form of Alienation?.................................................................. 263 11.3.2 The Reason of Hiromatsu’s Dismissal of Alienated Intercourse....................................................................... 265 11.3.3 Lack of Understanding of Hegel..................................... 268 11.4 Summary........................................................................................ 270 11.5 Appendix: Reflection on Casting Couch Incidents from the Perspective of Marx’s Reification Theory...................... 271 12 The Turning Point of Marx’s View on Communism............................ 275 12.1 Marx’s Conversion to Communism............................................... 275 12.2 Marx’s Critique of Early Communist Theories............................. 281 12.2.1 The History of Early Communism.................................. 281 12.2.2 Forms of Modern Communism....................................... 284 12.2.3 German “Philosophical Communism”............................ 287 12.3 The Concept of “Society” in the Paris Manuscripts..................... 289 12.3.1 The Positive Supersession of Private Property................ 289 12.3.2 The Resolution of the Contradiction Between Man and Nature, Between Individual and Species.................. 292 12.3.3 The Complete Restoration of Man’s Nature.................... 294 12.3.4 Communism as Movement.............................................. 296 12.4 Summary........................................................................................ 299 13 The Transition from Feuerbach to Hegel.............................................. 301 13.1 Objectivity: The Truth of Materialism........................................... 302 13.1.1 Feuerbach’s Contribution................................................ 302 13.1.2 Hegel’s “Double Error”................................................... 304 13.1.3 Non-identity of Subject and Object (Objekt)................... 310 13.2 The Naturalist Conception of Man................................................ 313 13.2.1 Man as “A Part of Nature”............................................... 313

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13.2.2 “Man’s Inorganic Body”.................................................. 314 13.2.3 Man’s Character of Species-Essence............................... 316 13.3 Assimilation of Hegel’s Dialectic.................................................. 318 13.3.1 From Negative Alienation to Positive Alienation............ 318 13.3.2 The Dialectic of Alienation and Communism................. 319 13.4 Summary........................................................................................ 321

14 Is Objectification Identical to Alienation?............................................ 323 14.1 Lukács’s Proposition..................................................................... 323 14.2 Fujino’s Explanation of Entgegenständlichung............................. 327 14.2.1 Kurella, Stiehler and Cornu............................................. 327 14.2.2 The Explanation Problem of Entgegenständlichung....... 330 14.3 Marx’s Concept of Alienation....................................................... 333 14.3.1 Hegel’s Objectification and Alienation............................ 333 14.3.2 Marx’s Twofold View of Alienation................................ 336 14.3.3 The Debate Over Lukács’s Proposition........................... 338 14.4 Summary........................................................................................ 339 Afterword: Our Time in the Text................................................................... 341 Bibliography..................................................................................................... 349

Chapter 1

From State to Civil Society I A Study of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts

The period leading up the publication in 18431 of The Paris Manuscripts, Karl Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law, has long been considered a key moment in the early development of Marx’s thought. Lenin defined the work as “Marx’s transition from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democracy to communism”,2 whereby Marx became a materialist and eventually a communist. To date, this interpretation has been adopted by most textbooks and scholars. As a summary of Marx’s work in the years around 1843 and his preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1859), however, Lenin’s remarks are somewhat off the mark. More accurately, Marx was undergoing a transition from conceptualizing the state to focusing on civil society. If one regards state and civil society as representatives of two disciplines of social science, then one could call this a transition from philosophy to economics. Starting from this perspective, this chapter will consider Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts3 as “the first work”4 written during this transition, and answer the following question: Why did Marx – who at that point was still enthusiastic about the philosophy of state  – shift his focus to civil society after writing Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, marking a transition that laid out the rudiments of his later

1  From March to December 1843, Marx finished Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts and the two articles for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, i.e. Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung and Zur Judenfrage. Since all these three manuscripts were written in critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law, this period can be considered the period of critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law. 2  Vladimir Lenin, Karl Marx. A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism. Bibliography, in: Lenin: Collected Works, vol. 21: August 1914–December 1915, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 80. 3  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975. 4  Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One. Preface, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Marx: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 262.

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 L. Han, Studies of the Paris Manuscripts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9618-3_1

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study of political economics in the Paris period and the formation of historical materialism in the Brussels period.

1.1  The Transition of Marx Along with other Young Hegelians, Marx had long shown great interest in Hegel’s philosophy of state, as he wrote in the letter to Arnold Ruge on 5th March 1842: “Another article which I also intended for the Deutsche Jahrbücher is a criticism of Hegelian natural law, insofar as it concerns the internal political system. The central point is the struggle against constitutional monarchy as a hybrid which from beginning to end contradicts and abolishes itself”.5 Based on this letter, Marx had already explicitly established that a critique of Hegel’s notion of the state would be his next main task. Yet it was not carried out until his stay in the Kreuznach countryside (from March to September 1843), when he, accompanied by his newly wed wife Jenny, was able to finish the manuscript of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts. The subject matter is Hegel’s philosophy of state. Despite Marx’s remarks in this manuscript that “this has to be demonstrated not here but in the critique of Hegel’s presentation of civil society”,6 “[t]his will be further considered in the section on ‘civil society’”,7 etc., there is no excerpt from the section on civil society in Grundlinien (§182–§256) nor analysis of Hegel’s civil society concept in the extant manuscripts. So what was it exactly that piqued Marx’s interest in Hegel’s philosophy of state? As the author sees it, there were three main triggers: To begin with, the Young Hegelians had already started to shift their focus from religion to politics by that time, as Marx notes in Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung: “The immediate task of philosophy, which is at the 5  Marx, To Arnold Ruge. March 5, 1842, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 1: Marx: 1835–1843, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 382f. This article on the critique of constitutional monarchy was not published in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher and its manuscript was later lost. Based on this letter and other materials, scholars like Ernst Lewalter, Siegfried Landshut and Jacob Peter Mayer assume that the writing of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts took place between 1841 and 1842. According to Eldar Ryazanov, the first editor and publisher of this manuscript, however, this manuscript should be dated before March 1843, since it was obviously under the sway of Feuerbach’s Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie (published in February 1843). Moreover, Marx himself also stated explicitly in the preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1859) that: “The first work which I undertook to dispel the doubts assailing me was a critical re-examination of the Hegelian philosophy of law” (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One. Preface, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Marx: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 262). Considering these facts, the author tends towards Ryazanov’s determination, which is also adopted by the editorial commissions of MEW and MEGA. 6  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 80. 7  Ibid. p. 81.

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service of history, once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms. Thus, the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics”.8 Considering Marx’s Young Hegelian political stance and his membership of a faction that critiqued the philosophy of law9 within the Young Hegelians, it was necessary for him to come to grips with the essence of philosophy of state and law in order to have more of a say in the area of political critique. Since “[t]he criticism of the German Philosophy of state and law […] attained its most consistent, richest and final formulation through Hegel”,10 a critique of Hegel’s philosophy of state was indubitably a task that the Young Hegelian Marx was impelled to undertake. Second, due to gaps in social development between the Kingdom of Prussia, Britain, and France, and especially considering the leading role of Britain and France in the field of political economy and communist theories, the philosophy of law and state was the only realm in which Germany could compete, or, in Marx’s words, “German philosophy of law and state is the only German history which is al pari with the official modern reality”.11 Having already extended his horizons from Germany to Britain and France, Marx has to shore up his philosophical foundations so as to better grasp the nature of modern society. Third, the experience acquired during his political involvement in the period of Rheinische Zeitung made Marx realize how different the actual Kingdom of Prussia was to the idea of the state recounted in Hegel’s philosophy. Confronted with the reality, he found that the universal idea of the state was little more than a fantasy. The supersession of his thinking led to a sort of political alienation that naturally became a conundrum for Marx, while also being a focus of critique of Hegel’s philosophy of state for Ruge among others. Hence, as he notes later in the preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, it was necessary to analyze Hegel’s philosophy of state in order to “dispel the doubts assailing me [sc. Marx]”. In the following two articles for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher published between October and December 1843, i.e. Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung and Zur Judenfrage, Marx’s thought underwent a drastic change, deviating from his original conception by turning from a critique of philosophy of state into an analysis of civil society as such. In concrete terms, in Zur Judenfrage, Marx takes civil society as his starting point, seeking to examine its  Ibid., p. 176.  This differentiation originates from Hiromatsu who notes in Critical Reconstruction of Early Marx’s Thought: “There are three currents within the Young Hegelians, namely the faction of religious critique by Strauss, Bauer and Feuerbach, the faction of critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history by Cieszkowski and Hess, and the faction of critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law” (Hess, Moses Hess: Selected Writings, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2010, p. 207 (translated into English by K.H.)). The interpretation is adopted by the author. 10  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 181. 11  Ibid., p. 180. 8 9

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inherent contradiction and resolve its problems of human political alienation and human emancipation. In Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, he lays bare the proletariat in civil society as the true force behind any possible realization of human emancipation. By the Paris period in 1844, Marx has almost completely shifted his focus to civil society and political economy, not only immersing himself in the study of economics, but also explicitly pointing out that “the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of private property – more precisely, in that of the economy”.12 Though, in the preface to the Paris Manuscripts, he restates the scheme advanced in Deutsch-­ Französische Jahrbücher – “the critique of the jurisprudence and political science in the form of a critique of the Hegelian philosophy”13 – and still considers the writing of the Manuscripts as a part of his critique of the philosophy of law and state, it is evident that, regarding the content of the Manuscripts, his work is by no means a critique of state, but thorough and thorough a critique of civil society or political economy, but that Marx, not being the beneficiary of hindsight, was not yet aware thereof. Hence, why did Marx make such a drastic transition from critiquing the notion of state to that of civil society? The traditional interpretation holds that it was Marx’s political involvement in the period of Rheinische Zeitung between 1842 and 1843 that led him to pay more attention to the problem of material interests. Apparently, since this problem was connected with civil society, it was necessary for him to make a study of civil society and political economy. Second, Engel’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie, which Marx received at the end of 1843 when editing Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher in collaboration with Ruge, exerted a huge impact on him, leading him to engage with political economy. Admittedly, both accounts are correct in that they are exactly what Marx himself notes in the preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. From the author’s point of view, however, these two explanations are too simplistic and superficial, insofar as they leave the intrinsic logic of Marx’s theoretical development concealed. Lacking adequate knowledge and intrinsic motivation to examine political economy, it is unlikely that Marx would set aside his interest in Hegel’s notion of state, even after reading Engel’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie, or when he found himself “in the embarrassing position of having to discuss what is known as material interests”. As the author sees it, the intrinsic factor behind Marx’s transition lies in the writing process of Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie where certain elements of Hegel’s philosophy of law influenced Marx imperceptibly, or, more exactly, Hegel’s philosophy of law motivated him to address issues of political economy and furnished him with the knowledge required for his inquiry into civil society. As such, what exactly were these elements? From the author’s point of view, they were Hegel’s civil society concept and its economic nature. In order to justify this interpretation, the author shall start by analyzing the civil society concept in Grundlinien alongside Marx’s Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. 12 13

 Ibid., p. 297.  Ibid., p. 231.

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1.2  The Economic Nature of the Civil Society Concept As it is widely known, civil society – as a concept of philosophy and social sciences in the modern sense – originates from Hegel. As an equivalent to the concept of state, it is likely that the civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) concept first appeared in Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft (1817/18) in the Heidelberg period. From the earlier System der Sittlichkeit and Jenaer Systementwürfe to the later Grundlinien, this concept has always been at the center of Hegel’s system of social sciences and political philosophy. In the following sections, an outline of Hegel’s civil society concept is developed in reference to the text of Grundlinien.

1.2.1  Three Principles of Civil Society In Grundlinien, Hegel divides the intrinsic conceptual differences into three elements: abstract right, morality, and ethical life (Sittlichkeit). As the unification of the first two, ethical life further consists of three stages, namely the family (Familie), civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) and the state (Staat). Hegel delineates the relations between these three stages as follows: “The concept of this Idea has being only as spirit, as self-knowledge and actuality, because it is the objectivization of itself, the movement through the form of its moments. It is therefore a) immediate or natural ethical spirit  – the family. This substantiality passes over into loss of unity, division, and the point of view of relativity, and is thus b) civil society, i.e. an association of members as self-sufficient individuals [Einzelner] in what is therefore a formal universality (formale Allgemeinheit), occasioned by their needs and by the legal constitution as a means of security for persons and property, and by an external order for their particular and common interests. This external state c) withdraws and comes to a focus in the end and actuality of the substantial universal and of the public life which is dedicated to this – i.e. in the constitution of the state”.14 In other words, the family as the “immediate or natural ethical spirit” constitutes the first stage of ethical life where subjectivity (Subjetktivität) and objectivity (Objektivität) as well as particularity (Besonderheit) and universality (Allgemeintheit) still remain in a substantial unity (substantielle Einheit), which begins to split in the second stage of ethical life, i.e. civil society, where the individual separates from this community, becoming an atomic, independent particularity. Since it is not self-­ sufficient to simply rely on the particularity, however, the individual has to unite with others so as to survive; hence, social life presents itself as the universality of mutual connection and dependency. Yet such a universality is still an association supported by the external legal constitution in which the individual is motivated purely by egoistic needs; it is therefore in essence still particularity or nothing more 14  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 197f.

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than “formal universality”. In order to actualize the return to a higher-level unity of ethical life, it is necessary to posit “the substantial universal”, i.e. the state, where the true unity of subjectivity and objectivity (Objektivität) and of particularity and universality can be achieved. Apparently, the connection between these three stages conforms to the triplicate characteristic of Hegel’s logic, namely immediacy-mediation-restoration or affirmation-­negation-negation. Thus, standing between the family and the state, civil society builds the foundation for the evolution of modern individuality and the state, playing an indispensable role in the development of ethical life. Compared with the state as the completed stage of ethical life, civil society is the unfurling stage that will eventually be superseded by it. This is Hegel’s principal positioning for civil society, which determines his weighing of the state over civil society as well as his solution to the contradiction of civil society, namely to supersede civil society by the state. From §182 onwards, Hegel fully elaborates on his civil society concept. The following passages will focus on his definition of civil society, namely its three principles. The concrete person who, as a particular person, as a totality of needs and a mixture of natural necessity and arbitrariness, is his own end, is one principle of civil society. But this particular person stands essentially in relation [Beziehung] to other similar particulars, and their relation is such that each asserts itself and gains satisfaction through the others, and thus at the same time through the exclusive mediation of the form of universality, which is the second principle.15

According to this definition, the first principle is the principle of particularity whereby “[t]he concrete person” “as a particular person […] is his own end” and, in his own interests, considers the others as a means to his ends. Yet individual needs can only be satisfied by the products of labor; as one’s needs grow, so the products of one’s labor appear increasingly simple and meager and one becomes increasingly dependent of the products of others’ labor. Thus, though the individual’s end is only to satisfy one’s own needs, “he cannot accomplish the full extent of his ends without reference to others”.16 In this sense, the concrete person can only survive through his relation to others, so that civil society once again resumes its former state of mutual dependence and complement. Hegel names this feature the “system of needs [System der Bedürfnissen]”,17 which is the second principle of civil society, i.e. the principle of the “form of universality”18 or principle of universality (Prinzip der Allgemeinheit) in short. It is defined as the “form of universality” in that this social relation is still grounded on egoistic ends instead of universal substance. In this regard, the true principle of universality is distinct from or even stands in opposition to the principle of particularity.

 Ibid., p. 220.  Ibid. 17  Ibid., p. 226. 18  Ibid., p. 220. 15 16

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Due to the division of these two principles, civil society needs a third principle, namely the principle of necessity (Notwendigkeit) and education (Bildung), as Hegel notes: “[B]ut in the very act of developing itself independently [für sich] to totality, the principle of particularity passes over into universality, and only in the latter does it have its truth and its right to positive actuality. This unity is not that of ethical identity, because at this level of division (cf. §184), the two principles are self-sufficient; and for the same reason, it is present not as freedom, but as the necessity whereby the particular must rise to the form of universality and seek and find its subsistence in this form”.19 This remark needs no further explanation. Since civil society is ethical life in its division, such a unity of particularity and universality “is present not as freedom, but as the necessity”,20 a necessary unity limited by the external necessity for the realization of particular end can only draw on means of formal universality. Yet, for the “Idea proves to be the fundament and necessary form of particularity as well as the controlling power of particularity and right of final end by granting universality”, the particularity needs this external controlling power so as to actualize its intrinsic elevation to universality. This is typical of Hegel’s dialectic: Due to the control of external necessity such as competition, an individual’s pursuit of his own particularity will necessarily elevate him to a higher level of universality where he achieves a unity of ethical life. As such, by what means can an individual move to the level of universality? Hegel provides his answer in the following passage: “Individuals, as citizens of this state, are private persons who have their own interest as their end. Since this end is mediated through the universal, which thus appears to the individuals as a means, they can attain their end only in so far as they themselves determine their knowledge, volition, and action in a universal way and make themselves links in the chain of this continuum [Zusammenhang]. In this situation, the interest of the Idea, which is not present in the consciousness of these members of civil society as such, is the process whereby their individuality [Einzelheit] and naturalness are raised, both by natural necessity and by their arbitrary needs, to formal freedom and formal universality of knowledge and volition, and subjectivity is educated in its particularity”.21 In other words, an individual needs education in order to reach a level of universality. Since the private end in civil society can only be actualized by means of formal universality such as economic laws and legal provisions, everyone ought to align their knowledge, will and actions with economic laws and legal provisions as much as possible, to avoid never being able to attain their end. At the same time, education by means of learning, labor, exchange and contractual obligations gives rise to consciousness of society and community whereby an individual mentally prepares themself to enter the highest community, i.e. the state, or, as Hegel puts it, “subjectivity is educated in its particularity”, which is the foundation for the

 Ibid., p. 223f.  Ibid., p. 224. 21  Ibid. 19 20

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a­ ctualization of the unity of ethical life. Therefore, education is the combination of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. These three principles of civil society are tied up with one another. The principle of particularity and universality constitutes two sides of the contradiction of civil society, whilst the principle of necessity and education is tailored to dissolve any opposition between particularity and universality and unify them. Considering Hegel’s definition of these three principles, his assessment of civil society that rests on the principle of particularity is hardly positive, for his main goal is to elevate particularity to universality. This attitude is also exemplifed in the three aspects of civil society: First, civil society is a “system of needs”, insofar as mutual needs are satisfied “through his [individual’s] work and through the work […] of all the others”; second, to guarantee the functioning of this system, an “administration of justice” (Rechtspflege) for protection of person and his property (Eigentum) is required; third, “police” (Polizei) and “corporation”22 (Korporation) are to be established in order to absorb egoistic individuals in the ethical life of the state. In comparison to the “system of needs” as a world of particularity, the administration of justice is more of a concept of universality, insofar as it protects ownership that transcends particular individuals; furthermore, Polizei has a far more extensive meaning than simply police, including public policy and the general good of communal association; corporation represents the common interests of a particular group, namely particular mutual interests, whereby citizens develop a spirit of corporation, preparing themselves to be citizens of the state. Through these three aspects, civil society gradually and automatically ascends to statehood. Nonetheless, Hegel’s attitude towards civil society is not absolutely negative. Hegal takes two contrary perspectives. On the one hand, he construes civil society as a world governed by the principle of particularity, insofar as the individual pursuits his private interests and the whole of civil society presents itself in the inhuman state of bellum omnium contra omnes and as a atomist system, or, in Hegel’s words, as ethical life in its division. This is clearly an observation from a negative perspective. On the positive side however, civil society is regarded as a world governed by the principle of universality whereby people are educated, their rights recognized, and based on division of labor and exchange, a social system of mutual complement and dependency is established. This lays the foundation for the evolution of community and the actualization of universality. The relation of these two perspectives can be summarized as follows: “The principle of particularity is the thesis, the principle of universality is the antithesis and the unification of both is the synthesis that lays out the rudiments of Hegel’s concept of civil society”.23 In all, Hegel’s conception of civil society is based on an opposition between particularity and universality as well as their unification. Deeply rooted in the historical dialectic,

 Ibid., p. 226.  Lixin Han, Turning Point of Marx’s Thoughts: The Alienation of Intercourse in Comments on James Mill, in: Modern Philosophy, no. 5, 2007 (translated into English by K.H.). See Chapter X, p. 355.

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his interpretation is without doubt the most outstanding notion of society and history in his time.

1.2.2  Hegel and Smith It is owning to the study and assimilation of the English political economy – Adam Smith’s economic thought in particular – that Hegel was able to form such a profound notion of society and history. His civil society concept is established on the basis of the political economy represented by Smith. As we know, Hegel developed great interest on the then ongoing industrial revolution in England early in the Frankfurt period (around 1800) and the Jena period (1801–1807) and thoroughly studied James Steuart’s An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (1767). According to Karl Rosenkranz, the author of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben, Hegel took notes from the German translation of this work in 1799: “All of Hegel’s thought on the essence of civil society, on need and labor, on division of labor and property of estates, poor assistance [Armenwesen] and administration of justice [Polizei], rents, etc., all of them are eventually concentrated in a comment on the German translation of Steuart’s economics. This comment was written from 19th February to 16th May 1799 and is still preserved in its complete form”. Unfortunately, this note by Hegel has not been preserved.24 The influence of Steuart led Hegel further to Smith’s An Inquiry (1776). According to the published Jena manuscripts, it is in Jenaer Systementwürfe I (1803–1804) where Hegel mentions Smith’s name for the first time and invokes his example of the pin factory.25 His interest in the political economy represented by Smith continued thereafter until he reread An Inquiry in his later years. Based on the study of Kunihiko Uemura, Smith’s name appears at least five times in the already published writings of Hegel, namely in Jenaer Systementwürfe I (1803/04), Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts (1819/20), Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts (1821/22) based on the transcript of an unknown student at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (1828–1830) and Grundlinien.26 In §189 of Grundlinien, Hegel addresses the “system of needs” in civil society and reminds readers to refer to “Smith, Say, and Ricardo”: Political economy [Staatsökonomie] is the science which begins with the above viewpoints but must go on to explain mass relationships and mass movements in their qualitative and  Cf. Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1844, S. 86 (translated into English by K.H.). 25  Cf. Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe I, in: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 6, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1975, S. 323. According to the editor’s scrutiny, it is unlikely that Hegel was then referring to the German translation of Christian Garve in 1796. 26  Kunihiko Uemura, What is Civil Society? Chapter 3. Smith and Hegel, Heibonsha Shinsho, 2010.

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1  From State to Civil Society I quantitative determinacy and complexity. – This is one of the sciences which have originated in the modern age as their element [Boden; trans.]. The development of science is of interest in showing how thought extracts from the endless multitude of details with which it is initially confronted the simple principles of the thing [Sache; trans.], the understanding which works within it and controls it (cf. Smith, Say, and Ricardo). […] a science which does credit to thought because it finds the laws underlying a mass of contingent occurrences.27

Considering this passage, Hegel speaks highly of political economy, which also confirms Smith’s sway on Hegel from another perspective. The relationship between Hegel’s thought and political economy – Smith’s theory in particular  – has already been a focus of many researchers, such as Georg Lukács who claims that “Hegel was decisively influenced by Smith’s conception of labour as the central category of political economy”.28 Hegel’s emphasis on the subjectivity of labor, account of concrete and abstract labor, discussion of machines, instruments and technological progress, and analysis of divisions of labor, can all be traced back to Smith. Moreover, Hegel further applies this notion of labor to the sphere of economics, society and philosophy; his account of modern society, value and money as well as expressions such as “cunning of reason” all derive from Smith’s logic. Thus, “[i]n economics Hegel was an adherent of Adam Smith”,29 “Hegel is the disciple of Adam Smith (and his teacher Ferguson) not only as an economist, but also as a critical humanist”.30 In regard to these remarks, Lukács basically portrays Hegel as a Smithian, an interpretation that holds sway over the general assessment of Hegel. In fact, Lukács also puts forward a truly revolutionary point of view: “It is not only the case that he made the greatest and fairest German assessment of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period. In addition, he is the only German thinker to have made a serious attempt to come to grips with the industrial revolution in England. He is the only man to have forged a link between the problems of classical English economics and those of philosophy and dialectics”.31 This conclusion is without doubt distinct from the common view of Hegel as an objective (objektiv) idealist or a conservative.  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 227f. 28  Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. by R. Livingstone, Merlin Press, 1975, p. 321. 29  Ibid., p. 323. 30  Ibid., p.  329. In regard to the detailed documentation of these problems, see II.5. Die ersten ökonomischen Studien, III.5. Die Ökonomie der Jenaer Periode, III.6. Die Arbeit und das Problem der Teleologie, III.7. Die Schranken der Hegelschen Ökonomie of Der Junge Hegel or I.2. Hegel’s Affirmation and Transcendence of Classical Economics of Yibing Zhang’s Back to Marx. Marx holds a similar standpoint to the relation between Smith and Ferguson: “which caused A. Ferguson, the master of Adam Smith, to exclaim: ‘We make a nation of Helots, and have no free citizens.’” (Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 359). 31  Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. by R. Livingstone, Merlin Press, 1975, p. XXVI. 27

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With the publication of the transcripts of the lectures on philosophy of law after the second world war (1973, 1974, and 1983), the relationship between Hegel and economics once again became the center of Hegelian studies, just as the impact brought about by the publication of Jenaer Realphilosophie was felt in the 1920s and 1930s. For example, Norbert Waszek carried out a comparative study of Hegel’s economic thought from the perspective of Scottish Enlightenment,32 characterizing it in the sense of modern political economy. Meanwhile, the new transcripts of Hegel’s lectures on philosophy of law were also translated into Japanese and gave rise to various in-depth studies, among them Philosophy of Freedom and Right: The Development of Hegel’s “Lecture on Law and Right”,33 in which Katsuo Fukuyoshi thoroughly analyzes the differences between the first three and the last two lectures, interpreting Hegel as a progressive modernist advocating freedom and right, in that the content of the transcripts is de facto far more radical than the officially published Grundlinien. In regard to the subject matter of this chapter, what is also worth mentioning is Briger P. Priddat’s Hegel als Ökonom,34 in which he advances that, according to the manuscripts in the Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin period, Hegel’s economics thought was not only indebted to the English political economy represented by Smith, but also rooted in the tradition of German Staatsökonomie. As the term indicates, economics developed by Johann H. G. Justi et al. differs from the political economy (Nationalökonomie) represented by Smith, insofar as it argues for the state’s interference and dominance in the economy instead of economic liberalism, regarding economics as cameralistic (Kameralistik), dominated by the state. Clearly, this theory is deeply beholden to Aristotle’s thought. Thus, as Priddat sees it, if the first element of civil society is attributed to Smith, then it is likely that the other two elements, namely administration of justice and corporation, can be traced back to Aristotle’s politics or have their root in German cameralism. Although its validity remains to be verified, this reading has in some measure weakened any emphasis on the dominant influence of English political economy since the time of Lukács. So far, we have briefly reviewed past studies on the relation between Smith and Hegel. In the following section, the author will analyze the influence of Smith’s economics on Hegel in concrete terms, namely, departing from the main theme of the chapter, to assess the influence that Smith’s notion of labor, his concept of the division of labor, and his notion of society have exerted on Hegel’s formulation of the civil society concept.

 Norbert Waszek, The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account of Civil Society, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. 33  Katsuo Fukuyoshi, Philosophy of Freedom and Right. The Development of Hegel’s “Lecture on Law and Right”, Sekai Shisousha, 2002. 34  Briger Priddat, Hegel als Ökonom, Duncker & Humblot, 1990. 32

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1.2.2.1  Smith’s Productive Labor and Hegel’s Labor Concepts As a need as well as an action taken to fulfil need, labor is not only the starting point of political economy, but also a fundamental and the constitutive principle of civil society. It is from the perspective of labor that Smith – as the founder of the modern notion of labor – establishes classical political economy and unveils the basic structure of civil society. First, Smith puts forward the concept of productive labor (produktive Arbeit) through his critique of contemporary mercantilism and monetarism. So-called productive labor is the activity through which man creates material wealth; its essence is that only man’s labor is productive, and in it resides the nature of wealth, or, in other words, labor is the true source of the growth of citizens’ wealth and the fundamental reason behind progress in civilization. It is due to Smith’s contribution in revealing that the essence of wealth lies in man’s labor as such that Marx acclaims him at the beginning of the Third Manuscript, regarding his thought in analogy to Luther’s Reformation as “enlightened political economy”.35 Hegel’s understanding of labor is consonant with Smith’s, insofar as he also attributes the essence of external wealth, money for instance, to human labor. This thought is chiefly present in the manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes in the Jena period, Phänomenologie, and Grundlinien (on which the author shall further elaborate in Chapter VII and VIII). In the manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes, Hegel fully develops his labor theory, in which he sees labor as the circulation of three elements, need-labor-enjoyment (Bedürfnis-Arbeit-Genuß), in which man not only integrates the external world into his world, turning it into objects for consumption, but also escapes from the barbarian state of nature through labor, affirming his essential power. Likewise, Hegel also emphasizes the significance of labor for the evolution of man and world in Chapter IV of Phänomenologie and deduces ownership, on which man’s personality is founded, from labor in Grundlinien. Hence, generally speaking, there is evident affinity between Hegel and Smith’s notion of labor. 1.2.2.2  Smith’s Division of Labor and Hegel’s “System of Needs” Smith construes labor to be a kind of divided labor, and the analysis of civil society from the perspective of the division of labor is the fundamental feature of Smith’s economics. An Inquiry starts with the principle of the division of labor. As Smith sees it, this originates from the tendency to exchange, purchase and sell, with the motivation that drives the modern homo oeconomicus to exchange labelled as “self-­ love”. The distribution leads to specialization of social labor, which, however, brings about immense progress in productive forces. Within the social division of labor, although people exclude one another as private individuals, they can only  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 290.

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fulfill their needs through exchange with others, or, in Smith’s words, “[h]e supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he has occasion for”.36 That is to say, division of labor builds a necessary connection of an individual’s labor with that of others, whereby an organic unity emerges. Based on Smith’s exposition, the division of labor is not only the modern principle of production, but also the modern principle of social organization. Division of labor (Teilung der Arbeit) originally refers to the specialization and individualization of labor, which normally implies an interpretation of society as an exclusive atomist system. Smith’s division of labor theory, however, puts emphasis on exchange and combination rather than segmentation, which enables him to consider modern society as a “commercial society”, as a social organism in which people are mutually connected. Then, what is Hegel’s definition of division of labor? As he sees it, “[t]he universal and objective aspect of work consists, however, in that [process of; trans.] abstraction which confers a specific character on means and needs and hence also on production, so giving rise to the division of labor. Through this division, the work of the individual [des Einzelnen; trans.] becomes simpler, so that his skill at his abstract work becomes greater, as does the volume of his output. At the same time, this abstraction of skill and means makes the dependence and reciprocity of human beings in the satisfaction of their other needs complete and entirely necessary”.37 Considering this passage, Hegel not only draws on Smith’s terminology to describe “labor”, “need”, “skill”, and “division of labor”, but also conceives of division of labor as the modern principle of production, insofar as he claims that “specific character […] on production” leads to a “division of labor” which further simplifies labor, improving the laborer’s skills and volume of output, and making “the dependence and reciprocity of human beings in the satisfaction of their other needs complete”. In addition, Hegel also interprets division of labor as the modern principle of social organization: “The mediation of need and the satisfaction of the individual [des Einzelnen; trans.] through his work and through the work and satisfaction of the needs of all the others – the system of needs”38; “[i]n this dependence and reciprocity of work and the satisfaction of needs, subjective selfishness turns into a contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. By a dialectical movement, the particular is mediated by the universal so that each individual, in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account [für sich; trans.], thereby earns and produces for the enjoyment of others!”39 Although Hegel does not employ 36  Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. I, Liberty Fund, 1981, p. 37. 37  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 232f. 38  Ibid., p. 226. 39  Ibid., p. 233.

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Smith’s terminology of “self-love” and the “invisible hand” directly, these two passages indicate an astonishing similarity between his underlying logic and these two concepts, the only difference being that “self-love” is replaced by “subjective selfishness” and the “invisible hand” by “a dialectical movement” whereby the individual achieves unity with all the others “in earning, producing, and enjoying”. That is to say, division of labor is not only not responsible for the segmentation of social connections, but it is, on the contrary, the bond that connects them; modern society is “a monstrous system of community and mutual interdependence”40 on the basis of a division of labor. This is, to some extent, the philosophication of Smith’s division of labor theory. 1.2.2.3  Smith’s “Invisible Hand” and Hegel’s Notion of Society Smith’s economics is the most outstanding anatomy of modern civil society. Similar to the works of other eighteenth-century theorists, his An Inquiry is not merely a work of economics, but a systematic conception of society which incorporates economics, politics and ethics, a characteristic also shared by Hegel’s Grundlinien. The kernel of understanding of modern civil society resides in the relation between the individual and the whole. In this respect, Hobbes and other natural law theorists tend to put more emphasis on the significance of individual independence and the individual’s priority to the whole; as such, society inevitably presents itself as a core system, as bellum omnium contra omnes where the organic connection between individuals is severed. In order to end such a state of nature, one can only resort to a social contract according to which people may establish a state and hence enter the state of society. Obviously, this thought of Hobbes presupposes that the individuals are inclined to turn against each other and that a reconciliation between individual and society in not inherently possible. It is on account of this negative presupposition that Talcott Parsons later puts forward the “Hobbes problem”: How is the formation of a universal social order possible when every individual simply acts in accordance with his own end? Within Hobbes’s framework, this problem is indeed an unsolvable aporia. As opposed to the presupposition of natural law theorists such as Hobbes, Smith holds that there is a natural organic connection among individuals as well as between individual and society. The modern individual, even as egoistic homo oeconomicus, will naturally end up in conformity with the whole, insofar as he participates in the economic system based on the division of labor and exchange. This notion is reflected in his famous metaphor of the “invisible hand”: “[H]e is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interests he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually

 Hegel, System of Ethical Life, trans. by H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press, 1979, p. 249.

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than when he really intends to promote it”.41 In other words, through the “invisible hand”, the individual achieves unity with others and with society. Apparently, Smith holds a far more positive viewpoint on the relation between individual and society than Hobbes. Smith’s notion of society significantly inspired Hegel (this is the subject matter of Chapter VIII). Likewise, Hegel – instead of proceeding from an atomist system – also stresses that the individual contingency will result in necessity on a social level. For instance, he remarks in Phänomenologie that “the individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work”,42 pointing out “what the individual does for himself also contributes to the general good; the more he has made provision for himself, not only is there a greater possibility of his being of service to others”.43 At the beginning of §189 of Grundlinien, he further notes: “The end of subjective need is the satisfaction of subjective particularity, but in the relation [Beziehung] between this and the needs and free arbitrary will of others, universality asserts itself”.44 This is almost a word-for-word repetition of Smith’s logic of the “invisible hand”. Philosophically considered, Hegel’s notion of society clearly distinguishes him from his contemporaries in German philosophy. Kant and Fichte tend to stress the decisive significance of an individual’s moral motivation and their ethics is the moral philosophy of the individual. As they see it, the individual good is the good of the whole and the perfection of an individual’s morality is the goal of reason. Yet, for Hegel, the moral motivation of individual activity is not what matters, or, in other words, reason’s ultimate goal is not simply the perfection of individual morality, but perfection of the whole. Considered this way, Hegel is more connected to his time, despite his thought having been touched by English political economy. 1.2.2.4  Differences Between Hegel and Smith Hegel holds almost the same viewpoint on labor, division of labor and society as Smith. In this sense, we can conclude that his civil society concept is derived from Smith. This does not mean however that Hegel remains on the level of Smith. There is still a profound distinction between their civil society concepts. Smith considers civil society to be an autonomous “system of natural liberty”, which, on one hand, neglects inequality among citizens in terms of their assets and skills, treating them all as homogeneous existences. Setting out from this presupposition, Smith, while attentive of wealth inequality in civil society, optimistically holds on to the belief that with an increase of state wealth and progress in education this problem would 41  Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. I, Liberty Fund, 1981, p. 456. 42  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 213. 43  Ibid., p. 392. 44  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 227.

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eventually be resolved before jeopardizing the root of social justice. Thus, he substantially rules out the interference of the state in the market, granting civil society his utmost trust, insofar as he leaves the problem of civil society to civil society itself. In the “system of natural liberty”, the individual not only enjoys economic freedom and political equality, but also promotes social welfare whilst pursuing private interests. Is it not the ideal of humankind? In comparison to Smith’s optimistic attitude towards civil society, however, Hegel’s understanding explicitly assumes a pessimistic character. Admittedly, civil society entails a positive aspect that allows for individual education and the progress of civilization, yet it remains, according to Hegel, a society ruled by egoism in the end. Considering inequality in individuals’ property as well as skills and the contingencies of individuals’ acquisition of equality and freedom, civil society will – with the application of machines and the concentration of wealth – inevitably be entangled in conflicts. “When the activity of civil society is unrestricted, it is occupied internally with expanding its population and industry. […] the accumulation of wealth increases; […] But on the other hand, the specialization [Vereinzelung; trans.] and limitation of particular work also increase, as do likewise the dependence and want of the class which is tied to such work; this in turn leads to an inability to feel and enjoy the wider freedoms, and particularly the spiritual advantages, of civil society”.45 That is to say, the development of industrialization will necessarily lead to the polarization of society and thereby gives birth to the rabble (Pöbel): “When a large mass of people sinks below the level of a certain standard of living – which automatically regulates itself at the level necessary for a member of the society in question – that feeling of right, integrity [Rechtlichkeit; trans.], and honour which comes from supporting oneself by one’s own activity and work is lost. This leads to the creation of a rabble, which in turn makes it much easier for disproportionate wealth to be concentrated in a few hands”.46 Though Hegel’s “rabble” is not to be identified with Marx’s “proletariat” – for Hegel, the rabble are those who are spiritually backward, whilst for Marx, the proletariat refers to a class exploited by property owners – Hegel at least points out that “despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy enough – i.e. its own distinct resources are not sufficient – to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble”.47 In other words, he regards the problem of poverty as a chronic disease that cannot be cured within civil society as such: “The important question of how poverty can be remedied is one which agitates and torments modern societies especially”.48 Now that these negative factors cannot be resolved within civil society as such, the solution to or prevention of this intrinsic contradiction and conflict can only draw on the universal factor from the sphere outside or above civil society, a factor that limits contingency and particularity. In the light of this, Hegel adds another two  Ibid., p. 266.  Ibid. 47  Ibid., p. 267. 48  Ibid. 45 46

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aspects, i.e. justice administration and cooperation, to the Smithian definition of civil society as a “system of needs”, in the hope of uniting individual private interests with universal organizations, preventing the emergence of a rabble and cultivating a spirit of cooperation. Yet the ultimate solution to these problems of civil society requires one to postulate that there is a transcendent, rational state above civil society that can eliminate blindness and anarchism in civil society and actualize universal welfare. Therefore, Hegel’s conception of civil society first and foremost fails to put trust in civil society, indicating that its intrinsic problems may only be solved in reference to powers that transcend civil society. It is perhaps for this reason that Hegel, in opposition to the romantism and idealistism of Smith et al.,49 deems civil society merely as a transitional stage in the development of human history. This understanding implies ideas that eventually lead to socialism and communism, and is later adopted by Marx.

1.2.3  Civil Society as Economic Society Considering the three aspects of Hegel’s definition of civil society as well as the relation between Hegel and Smith, Hegel’s civil society concept has two distinctive features: Above all, different from the city-state (polis) of classical antiquity, civil society in the modern era is separated from the state. In classical antiquity, the city-state refers to a political community constituted of free citizens and directly identified with the political state. The private sphere of each individual immediately becomes a political sphere; as with the state, civil society is also seen as a political category. In the modern era, especially with the establishment and development of capitalism in western Europe, the private sphere and civil society began to disengage from the political sphere and the state respectively. Second, the civil society concept is a category based on political economy. As we know, the modern civil society concept can be traced back to two different currents: The first one is represented by seventeenth-century theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, and Kant. Based on the theories of natural law and social contract, it underlines the political character of civil society, advocating the political significance of individual freedom. Its approach is to interpret civil society as a political society. In comparison, the other current stresses the economic aspect of civil society, presenting civil society as an economic society. Its representatives are eighteenth-century theorists  To be sure, Smith was also aware of the pitfalls of civil society, as he, for instance, is concerned to constrain the blindness of civil society and individual’s egoism in The Theory of Moral Sentiments by postulating citizen’s sympathy. From Hegel’s point of view, however, this is the unrealistic romanticism and idealism for civil society resting on egoism is incapable of this task, only the rational state can serve as the fundamental cure to the blindness and individual’s egoism in civil society.

49

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such as Smith. The basis of their theories lies in the economic reality of modern Europe and in political economic theory. With regard to the analysis above, Hegel’s civil society concept not only belongs to the second current, but is also its culmination. Compared with the former, the approach to interpreting civil society as economic society is essential to understanding the modern civil society concept. The establishment of the capitalist economic system and the rapid development of the industrial revolution conferred society in western Europe with an unprecedented economic character, insofar as man became a private individual with private property, economic labor replaced political practice as the main content of man’s activity, and private owners’ profit-oriented production and broad commodity exchange create a brand-new level of society, namely an economic society. With commodity exchange becoming the essential means of interaction, social life and the entire social structure started to go through a substantial transformation. Having grasped this fact, Smith deems civil society as a “commercial society” where “[e]very man […] becomes in some measure a merchant”.50 Resting on Smith’s theoretical framework, Hegel recognizes the on-going and profound transformation of modern society – from political to economic society – thus explicitly bringing forth a definition of civil society that, compared with the definition of classical antiquity, centers on economics so as to transform civil society from a political to an economic category. It is for this reason that Hegel is widely considered the theorist who established the modern civil society concept. In the late twentieth century, the new civil society theory represented by Jürgen Habermas and American scholars redefines civil society as a non-governmental, non-economic association, transforming the traditional bipolar structure of state-­ civil society into the tripolar structure of state-economic society-civil society or state-market-civil society. One of the main reasons behind such a division is discontent with the economic nature of civil society. Taking the development and functions of non-governmental, non-profiting organizations in contemporary developed countries into consideration, these scholars no longer put civil society in the dualistic structure of state-civil society, interpreting it instead as an independent public sphere that differs from both the state and the market: a political community somewhere between both. This post-modernist interpretation is apparently set against the traditional theory of civil society of Hegel and Marx, which also, from a different perspective, shows that Hegel and Marx’s civil society is by nature an economic society.51 50  Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. I, Liberty Fund, 1981, p. 37. 51  Interestingly, most of the civil society theories in China since the 1990s have been are under the sway of this new civil society theory. In particular, some political science scholars seek to politicalize Marx’s civil society concept, a current which can also be found in philosophy these days, as some interpret this concept to be political, turning Marx’s politics into a popular topic. Yet Marx’s civil society concept is in essence an economic category. An attempt to expound Marx’s political philosophy by departing from Hegel and Marx’s civil society concept seems to rest on false grounds.

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The emphasis on the economic nature of Hegel’s civil society concept is extremely important. This nature provides a vital answer to the postulated question of this chapter: Why did Marx, who was still enthusiastic about the philosophy of state, shift his focus to civil society after writing Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts? According to the analysis above, Hegel’s civil society concept is an economic category resting on political economy; if the civil society concept is to be considered as the kernel of Hegel’s philosophy of law, then philosophy of law should be taken as political economy in the context of German philosophy, or, in short, philosophy of law is Hegel’s political economy. If this interpretation holds true, then Marx’s study of philosophy of law is actually his first contact with political economy. It is likely that through the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law, Marx gradually grasps the economic implication of the civil society concept and its methodological significance for understanding the structure of modern society. For this reason, Marx, after receiving Engel’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie, discarded his critique of the philosophy of state and devoted himself to the study of political economy. In other words, even without Engel’s stimulation, Marx would have inevitably turned to a critique of civil society after his study of Hegel’s philosophy of law. In overview, it is Hegel’s philosophy of law that inspired Marx. As we shall see in the following part, Marx indistinctly sensed the economic implication of the civil society concept52 which led him to adopt a position apart from the Young Hegelian Admittedly, the endorsement of this new civil society theory is intended for the realization of democracy in China, which is a noble cause worthy of recognition. Considering the analysis above, however, it is completely erroneous to ascribe the political interpretation of civil society to Marx and Hegel. More importantly, to explicate the essence of current Chinese society according to a theory which construes civil society merely in a political sense is way ahead of the times in China, for it is still an economic society in essence. In this respect, Hegel and Marx’s civil society theories prove to be more essential for the interpretation of our time. Regarding the problem of civil society theories in China, see Lixin Han, Criticism of Theory of “Civil Society” of Chinese Scholars: Problems in the Establishment of Private Property and Difference of Wealth, in: International Journal of Decision Ethics, 8(3), p. 133–149. 52  In the period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, Marx had yet to advance his civil society concept. Considering his later definition of civil society, however, Marx also drew on Smith and Ferguson’s thought as Hegel did, in that his civil society concept is also an economic category. Take his summary of the civil society concept in Ideologie as an example: “Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the state and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its external relations as nationality and internally must organise itself as state. The term ‘civil society’ emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relations had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval community [Gemeinwesen]. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie [Bourgeoise]; the social organization [gesellschaftliche Organization] evolving directly out of production and intercourse, which in all ages forms the basis of the state and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name” (Marx, The German Ideology, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 89). According to this account, civil society came into being in the eighteenth century “when property relations had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval community” and developed with the bourgeoisie; as to its content, civil society embraces the “whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite

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in Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, that was in total opposition to Hegel’s simple supersession of civil society in the political state, to insist on a division between state and civil society. This standpoint is decisive for Marx’s shift from theorizing on the state to examining civil society.

1.3  Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law Although the civil society concept is key to the evolution of Marx’s thought, his focus in the period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts is on Hegel’s philosophy of state. Moreover, the manuscript of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts is de facto the result of Marx’s bitter struggle with Hegel’s philosophy of state. Marx’s critique of Hegel sets out from the following two perspectives: First, the liberalism of the Young Hegelians. As Hegel remarks in the preface to Grundlinien, “[w]hat is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational”.53 The first half of this remark underlines the actualization of the rational and thereby entails the critical spirit of rationalizing reality and transforming society, whilst the second half stresses the rationality of actual existence and implies a conservative attitude that affirms the actuality. The Young Hegelians take the first position as their starting point, namely to criticize reality according to the criterion of the Idea. Particularly, Arnold Ruge distinguishes the Idea of state from the actuality of state with regard to the matters of state and religion, severely criticizing the actual Kingdom of Prussia in accordance with the Idea of state. Marx’s letters to Ruge in the Spring and Summer of 1843 indicate that Marx was then under Ruge’s sway, also undertaking his critique of the actuality by drawing on Hegel’s Idea of freedom as well as democracy developed on the basis of this Idea. In this sense, Marx’s critique at that time assumed the character of liberalism and radical democracy shared by the Young Hegelians.

stage of the development of productive forces” and the “whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage” and is the “social organization evolving directly out of production and intercourse”. This clearly designates an economic society. Nevertheless, that Marx’s civil society concept is an economic category, does not imply that it only has economic connotation. In fact, civil society also incorporates political, philosophical and historical aspects, though, as Marx sees it, economics has a much more essential and fundamental significance than other spheres. Moreover, in comparison with other civil society theories, the emphasis on its economic implication is the most distinctive feature of Marx’s theory. What is also worth mentioning is that, despite Marx belonging to the same current as Hegel and Smith, his interpretation of civil society does not stay on the same level as Smith and Hegel’s, insofar as he is also attentive to bourgeois society (Bourgeoisgesellschaft) within civil society, laying bare the antagonism between capital and worker therein and thus undertaking a critique of civil society. Nonetheless, this belongs to the later development of Marx’s thought. For detailed discussion of Marx’s civil society concept, see Lixin Han, The Civil Society Concept in Die Deutsche Ideologie. Part I, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 4, 2006. 53  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 20.

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Second, Feuerbach’s materialism. According to his letter to Ruge in September 1843, Marx, compared to most Young Hegelians, acquired a new perspective, namely “from the forms peculiar to existing reality develop the true reality as its obligation and its final goal”.54 This perspective is designed to reach an Idea of the state by setting out from the actuality, a device bearing the hallmark of Feuerbachian methodology. Roughly considered, Feuerbach also belongs to the Young Hegelians, yet, unlike the others, he is known for his genuine humanism. In Das Wesen des Christenthums (1841), Feuerbach points out that god is the ultimate existence, whilst reason, will and love are all its predicates. Yet these essential attributes of god – reason, will, love, etc. – are de facto man’s species-essence; as such, god is nothing but the alienation of man’s species-essence. Therefore, the relation between man and god ought to be reversed so that god is construed as the alienation of man. This theory typifies the idea of praising man’s essence that has existed since the Enlightenment and can be regarded as true humanism. Cutting from this perspective, Feuerbach enters upon his critique of Hegel’s philosophy. As he sees it, for Hegel, “thought is being, thought the subject, being the predicate”55; the actual historical movement is merely conceived of as the movement of thinking, namely a process from thinking’s self-externalization, self-­ separation and self-alienation to the supersession of this separation and alienation, returning to the thinking. Just as the Christian relation between god and man, this is absolutely an “inversion of subject and predicate [Umkehrung von Subject und Prädikat]”. Yet “[t]he true relation of thinking and being is simply this. Being is subject and thinking a predicate”,56 thus “we need only invert speculative philosophy and then have the unmasked, pure, bare truth”.57This is clearly a materialistic position. Despite his dissatisfaction that “he [sc. Feuerbach] refers too much to nature and too little to politics”,58 Marx still draws on his method when addressing Hegel’s Grundlinien, criticizing Hegel’s philosophy of state from the perspective of the inversion of subject and predicate.

 Marx, Letters from Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 143. 55  Ludwig Feuerbach, Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy, in: The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, ed. by L. S. Stepelevich, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 166. 56  Ibid., p. 167. 57  Ibid., p. 157. 58  Marx, To Arnold Ruge. March 13, 1843, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 1: Marx: 1835–1843, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 400. 54

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Monarch

Upper House Estates Assembly

Government Lower House

Political State

Civil Society Landed Aristocrat

Corporation and

Bureaucrat

Peasant

Communal Association

Military

Substantial Estate

Reflecting Estate

Universal Estate

Fig. 1.1­  The relation between state and civil society Cited and modified from Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by M. Akasawa & W. Fujino, Chuo Koron Sha, 1995, p. 565

1.3.1  The Contradiction Within Hegel’s Notion of the State We begin with a sketch of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts. Focusing on Hegel’s notion of the state, Marx excerpts from Section 3: The State of Grundlinien (§261– §313)59 almost word-for-word and carries out a critique thereof. Hegel’s exposition of the internal constitution is divided into three aspects, i.e. the power of the sovereign (individual), the executive power (particular) and the legislature power (universal), which respectively corresponds with constitutional monarchy, bureaucracy, and state assembly. This forms the focus of Marx’s critique.  In the extant manuscript of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, the first page is missing and hence the numbering starts with Roman numeral II. It is likely that this page is the excerpt from and the comment on §257-§260 of Grundlinien.

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(1) Critique of the constitutional monarchy (§272–§286). Setting out from the universality and unity of sovereignty and state, Hegel argues that sovereignty should be a self-sufficient subjectivity and personality with self-determination; such subjectivity and personality can only fall on a concrete, corporeal person, namely the monarchy itself. Hence, the ideal constitution of state is monarchism. Thereby, from the “nature of the will”, Hegel somehow magically draws the conclusion that sovereignty lies in monarchy. As Marx sees it, however, this reasoning is mysticism, an absolute inversion of subject and predicate. The subject should be actual man, whereas sovereignty or the abstract state should only be the predicate of subject, as is noted: If Hegel had set out from real subjects as the bases of the state he would not have found it necessary to transform the state in a mystical fashion into a subject. ‘In its truth, however,’ says Hegel, ‘subjectivity exists only as subject, personality only as person.’ This too is a piece of mystification. Subjectivity is a characteristic of the subject, personality a characteristic of the person. Instead of conceiving them as predicates of their subjects, Hegel gives the predicates an independent existence and subsequently transforms them in a mystical fashion into their subjects.60

The reason for Hegel’s inversion of subject and predicate is that he wants to plead for monarchism and “is concerned to present the monarch as the true ‘God-­ man’ [Gottmensch], as the actual incarnation of the Idea”.61 Yet, according to Marx, sovereignty exists in people rather than the monarchy. The sovereignty embodied in the monarchy is nothing but the sovereignty of the people: “[I]t is not the constitution which creates the people but the people which creates the constitution”. Only the sovereignty of the people is substantial sovereignty. According to Marx’s critique of constitutional monarchy, he, on the one hand, maintains the political stance of the Young Hegelians whilst using Feuerbach’s materialistic approach, reversing Hegel’s inverted relation between people and monarchy. On the other hand, regarding Hegel’s attempt to unify opposition between the particular and the universal as well as content and form through monarchism, he explicitly advances the idea that “[o]nly democracy, therefore, is the true unity of the general and the particular”62 and can actualize the Idea of the universal state. This not only exhibits Marx’s difference from Hegel with respect of their political stance, but, more importantly, reflects their difference in regard to their understanding of the relation between state and civil society, as we shall see in the following. (2) Critique of the bureaucracy (§287–§297). Based on Hegel’s theory of the state, it is the duty of the executive power to implement and maintain decisions of the state; the executive power is nothing but the bureaucracy of the administrative body; the greatest function of the bureaucracy is to reconcile the conflict between state and civil society. In accordance with Hegel’s logic, though ­cooperation and  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 23. 61  Ibid., p. 24. 62  Ibid., p. 30. 60

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communal association (Gemeinde) respectively embody the common interests of trade and local community and therefore possess the universal power that transcends the individual, they still embody universality in civil society. Such a universality has two features: The first is that cooperation and communal association cultivate a communal spirit, which mediates the private individual’s journey to become a citizen of the state and civil society’s journey to statehood: “The spirit of the corporation, which arises when the particular spheres gain legal recognition, is now at the same time inwardly transformed into the spirit of the state”.63 The second is that, as universality is inherent in certain interests, it is inevitably constrained by the particular interests of certain trades or communities. This limitation can only be completely overcome by virtue of power outside civil society, namely bureaucracy that supervises and coordinates this internal conflict and conflict with the state. Preceding from this logic, Hegel justifies the necessity of having a bureaucracy and expounds in concrete terms the division of labor, the function of the administrative body and the appointment of officials in the business of government. Notwithstanding, this logic taken by Hegel is not only highly simplistic, but also appears to be an accurate account of the status quo of the Kingdom of Prussia, as Marx satirizes: “What Hegel says about the ‘executive’ does not deserve to be called a philosophical exposition. Most of the paragraphs could stand word for word in the Prussian Common Law”.64 What is most notable is Marx’s attitude towards Hegel’s attempt to unify state and civil society through bureaucracy, as he notes: “The corporations are the materialism of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy is the spiritualism of the corporations. The corporation is the bureaucracy of civil society; the bureaucracy is the corporation of the state. In actual fact, therefore, bureaucracy as the ‘civil society of the state’ confronts the ‘state of civil society’, the corporations”.65 As Marx sees it, cooperation representing civil society can never be unified with the bureaucracy representing the state due to their conflicting interests. In defining their relation however, though he points out the opposition of both, he emphasizes their identity, seeking to dissolve their separation by bureaucracy. In this respect, Marx pointedly remarks that for Hegel “[t]he identity which he has constructed between civil society and state is the identity of two hostile armies, where every soldier has the ‘opportunity’ to become, by ‘desertion’, a member of the ‘hostile’ army”.66 Considering the separation between civil society and state in the actual Kingdom of Prussia, what Hegel presents can only be an “imaginary identity” where “‘bureaucracy’ is the ‘state formalism’ [Staatsformalismus] of civil society”.67  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 329. 64  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 44. 65  Ibid., p. 45. 66  Ibid., p. 50f. 67  Ibid., p. 45. 63

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(3) Critique of the estate assembly (§298–§313). In Hegel’s philosophy of law, the third moment is the legislative power, and its institution is the assembly consisting of delegates from all estates (Stand). Since delegates stand respectively for the estate to which they belong rather than as private individuals, the private estate no longer represent individuals, but the political estate that assumes the universality of the estate they belong to. An assembly of these delegates is naturally not the representative constitution composed of representatives of all citizens, but an estate assembly. The estate assembly comprises an upper house representing the estate of landowners and a lower house representing the estate of tradesmen. The former is more important than the latter and culminates in a monarchy. For this reason, the state is based on constitutional monarchy. From Marx’ point of view, the private estate as an estate of civil society that can never be converted into a universal political estate in that it represents only private interests and is thereby counterposed to the political state. The essence of modernity lies in breaking down the medieval identity of civil and the political estate and the separation of civil society from the political state. It is also exactly because of this that Hegel seeks to cast light on the transition from private estate to political estate. Hegel suggests an estate assembly for the same reason he posits the idea of an estate bureaucracy, namely, instead of maintaining a separation of civil society from the political state, this opposition should be superseded or united by way of the political state. In regard to this, Marx remarks: 1) He has presupposed the separation of civil society and the political state (a modern condition), and expounded it as a necessary element of the idea, as absolute rational truth. […] He has counterposed the intrinsically and actually general aspect of the state to the particular interest and the need of civil society. In short, he presents everywhere the conflict between civil society and the state. 2) Civil society as civil estate is counterposed by Hegel to the political state. […] On the other hand: 1) Hegel does not want to allow civil society to appear in its self-constitution as a legislative element either as a mere, undifferentiated mass or as a multitude dissolved into its atoms. He wants no separation of civil and political life. […] Hegel is aware of the separation of civil society and the political state, but he wants the unity of the state to be expressed within the state, and this to be accomplished, in fact, by the estates of civil society, in their character as such estates, also forming the estates element of legislative society.68

This conception of Hegel, however, can only end up in self-contradiction. In regard to the estate assembly, Hegel employs the same method as in the exposition of constitutional monarchy and bureaucracy, which is still “this uncritical, mystical way of interpreting an old world-view in terms of a new one which turns it into nothing better than an unfortunate hybrid”.69 As Marx sees it, the private estate in civil society can essentially only be the estate of private individuals. One “must discard his estate, civil society, the civil estate”70 and become “sheer, blank  Ibid., p. 73f.  Ibid., p. 83. 70  Ibid., p. 78. 68 69

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individuality”71 in order to participate in the universal legislation for only as such is a man “citizen of the state [Staatsbürger]”, entitled to political significance and function and to participate in the universal legislation. This is the representative constitution rejected by Hegel, which, however, proves to be “a great advance”,72 since it is exactly the form that conforms to the modern state. This is Marx’s conception of democracy in the modern state. Since “[d]emocracy is the truth of monarchy; monarchy is not the truth of democracy”,73 Marx opposed constitutional monarchy and advocated true democracy. The reason that he deems true democracy to be the goal of state lies primarily in his political position of radical democracy. Setting out from this position, he holds that constitutional monarchy can never actualize people’s interests, as these can only be achieved by democracy. Second, he also points out that only true democracy can erase the separation of the social sphere from the political, and of members of civil society from citizens of the state. The conception of democracy reflects Marx’s depth of study by the Summer of 1843, a conception soon abandoned, as he started to write Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung and Zur Judenfrage in October 1843 for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.

1.3.2  Identity or Opposition Till now, we have analyzed Marx’s critical comments on §272–§313 of Grundlinien in accordance with the writing sequence of the manuscript of Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. As we can see, besides his political position of radical democracy, Marx’s critique embraces two main aspects: He absolutely recognizes Hegel’s grasp on the principal feature of modern society, i.e. the separation of civil society from the state, whilst severely criticizing Hegel for seeking to supersede the opposition between state and civil society. As aforementioned, Hegel’s conception of civil society stands out from that of his contemporaries, insofar as he not only ascertains the idea of the separation of civil society from the state, but also, more advanced than Hobbes, Locke, Kant et al., regards their separation as the separation of economics from politics, pointing out that the crux of modern society lies in the split between hommo and citoyen, between particular and universal interests. In this sense, Hegel’s philosophy of law is without doubt a reflection of the social reality of England and France at the time and is the most advanced understanding of society in that era. Fully aware of this, Marx emphasizes in his critique of bureaucracy and estate assembly that “Hegel, however, takes as his starting point the separation of ‘civil society’ and the ‘political  Ibid., p. 77  Ibid., p. 75. 73  Ibid., p. 29. 71 72

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state’ as two fixed opposites, two really different spheres”,74 exclaiming that “[i]t shows Hegel’s profundity”.75 In spite of that, Hegel consistently endeavors to dissolve such opposition and separation, which troubles Marx. In the latter’s opinion, civil society and the state are in essence two independent spheres counterposed to each other, and the former cannot be simply superseded in the latter. His critique of Hegel’s attempt to reconcile both consists of three aspects. To begin with, Hegel, according to Marx, “seeks to resolve” the “dualism of civil society and the political state” “by a harking-­ back”,76 namely to resolve the contradiction and conflict between civil society and the state in a medieval community. Admittedly, the material, economic life and the public, political life are unified in medieval community. Insofar as private estate equals political estate, civil society is simultaneously political society and the principle of civil society is also the principle of the state. Yet resorting to medieval community to resolve their separation is apparently a regression in that modernity resides precisely in the separation of material, economic life from public, political life whereby the former presents itself as civil society and the latter the state. This separation also underlies Hegel’s philosophy of law. The introduction of medieval community as resolution of separation, however, neither conforms to Hegel’s logic of double negation – according to which modern society is founded on the negation of the medieval – nor the fact that modernity represents progress from the medieval. Therefore, Marx criticizes Hegel for being “content with the appearance of this resolution and to pretend it is the substance”.77 Second, Hegel’s justification of the identity of both is merely formal, insofar as it simply combines two things of absolutely distinctive properties, which is nothing more than a “composite mixture [Mixtum Compositum]”, a “wooden iron [hölzernes Eisen]”.78 In accordance with his theory of mediation – that the two counterposed extremes will necessarily be unified in the mediator which is the coordinator of both – Hegel posits bureaucracy and estate assembly as the mediating institution that coordinates the conflict between state and civil society so as to prevent their opposition. For this logic, Marx makes a metaphor of a fight between “two who want to fight”, but are “too afraid of bruises to engage in a real fight”.79 As Marx sees it, “[r]eal [Wirkliche] extremes cannot be mediated precisely because they are real extremes. Nor do they require mediation, for they are opposed in essence”.80 In other words, simply based on the theory of mediation, the actual contradiction between state and civil society can never be resolved.

 Ibid., p. 72.  Ibid., p. 75. 76  Ibid., p. 82. 77  Ibid., p. 75. 78  Ibid., p. 84. 79  Ibid., p. 88. 80  Ibid. 74 75

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Again, though attention to the contradiction of actual society, Hegel construes it as something conceptual that can be resolved by way of the otherworldly idea of the state, namely in its conception, because, from Hegel’s point of view, the subject of historical movement is not the object of reality and its relations, such as civil society and state, but rather the “general idea”; only when these objects become particular aspects of the conception, namely as products or predicates thereof, can they assume reality. In such an inverted understanding, the real contradiction between state and civil society, both of which are predicates, will eventually be unified in the subject which is the conception. Extremely penetrating, however, is Marx’s remark that: “Hegel’s chief error is to conceive the contradiction of appearances as unity in essence, in the idea, while in fact it has something more profound for its essence, namely, an essential contradiction”.81 That is to say, the contradiction in reality is the subject of historical movement, thus the essential contradiction and so ought to be dealt with and resolved in an essential way instead of being dissolved by a conceptual operation characteristic of Wissenschaft der Logik. Based on the analysis above, Marx’s critique is not directed at Hegel’s dialectic as such, but his approach that treats the real contradiction in a conceptual fashion, superseding it on the surface. From this point onwards, Marx analyzes reasons of Hegel’s error, namely the mysticism and closedmindedness of his speculative philosophy. Above all, the mysticism of speculative philosophy is exhibited through the inversion of subject and predicate, as Marx notes: “In truth, Hegel has done nothing but dissolve the ‘political constitution’ into the general abstract idea of ‘organism’; but in appearance and in his own opinion he has evolved something determinate from the ‘general idea’. He has turned the subject of the idea into a product, a predicate, of the idea. He does not develop his thinking from the object, but expounds the object in accordance with a thinking that is cut and dried – already formed and fixed in the abstract sphere of logic. It is not a question of evolving the specific idea of the political constitution, but of establishing the relationship of the political constitution with the abstract idea, of placing it as a phase in the life-history of the idea, a manifest piece of mystification”.82 This exposition needs no further explanation. As Hegel sees it, the subject of historical movement is the “general idea”; real objects and relations such as family, civil society and the state are only illusion, since they are initially not in conformity with the concept; only when they have become aspects of the “general idea” – i.e. as product or predicate of the concept – can they assume reality and become rational beings. Considering Hegel’s argumentative method, the philosophy of law is no different from his Wissenschaft der Logik. From Marx’s viewpoint, however, this is nothing but a “logical, pantheistic mysticism”.83 Since the philosophy of law draws on the mystical approach of Wissenschaft der Logik, it goes without saying that Hegel’s exposition of family, civil society and the state, as well as their relations, is  Ibid., p. 91.  Ibid., p. 14. 83  Ibid., p. 7. 81 82

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based on the same inversion, insofar as “[t]he idea is made the subject and the actual relation of family and civil society to the state is conceived as its internal imaginary activity. Family and civil society are the premises of the state; they are the genuinely active elements, but in speculative philosophy things are inverted”.84 The reason for Hegel’s superficial supersession of the contradiction is that he construes the real movement of civil society and the state and their separation as merely conceptual. On the other hand, he inverts the relation of subject and predicate, insofar as civil society, the state and their real relations are considered predicates of the concept. In this inverted relation, the real contradiction of these predicates is not only a product of concept, but will also be eventually unified in the concept which is its subject. Second, Hegel’s speculative philosophical system is a closed circle: “Philosophy is a sequence which is not suspended in mid-air; it does not begin immediately, but is rounded off within itself”.85 The underlying logic of his philosophy is: The first, immediate thing alienates itself, splits within itself and becomes an objective thing. This objectivity is later superseded, so that the first thing is able to return to itself. As such, the starting point and the destination of this logical circle are, in terms of their form, united in being identical with each other; and the whole circle presents itself as a recursion from its outset. In the case of the philosophy of law, the family, as “immediate or natural ethical spirit”, is characterized as identity; civil society, however, is the ethical life in its division, the self-alienation of family, whereas the state restores identity on a higher-level through supersession of this separation. The starting point and destination of this circle are identical instead of full of separation and contradiction. Setting out from the closedness of the speculative system, Hegel is compelled to complete the supersession of civil society in the state. In all, Hegel holds that the state can eventually reconcile the conflict of materialistic interests in civil society and actualize the identity of civil society and the state. Considering this, he is a thorough compatibilist. Marx, however, conceives the separation of civil society from the state as an unavoidable, cruel reality, the opposition of both as an irresolvable antinomy and Hegel’s wish as a mere “illusion of state”86 that cannot be actualized. In this regard, Marx, who develops Hegel’s thought on the separation of civil society from state, is an uncompromising incompatibilist.87

 Ibid., p. 8.  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 26. 86  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 46. 87  In fact, some Chinese civil society theorists such as Zhenglai Deng and Keping Yu are also compatibilists like Hegel, arguing for the unity of state and civil society, since their theories – e.g. the theory of virtuous interaction of Zhenglai Deng et al. or Keping Yu’s proposition to interpret civil society as “society consisting of citizens of state” (公民社会) – are all geared to avoid the conflict between state and civil society, which, in some measure, coheres with their strategy of democratization in China as well as the current Chinese social reality. Academically considered, however, their approach actually deviates from Marx’s path. 84 85

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1.3.3  The Significance of Heterogeneity Why does Marx, as opposed to Hegel, opts for absolute opposition between civil society and state? Conventional interpretation attributes it to Marx’s political involvement in the period of Rheinische Zeitung. In this period, Marx has personally experienced the limitation of freedom of the press in the Kingdom of Prussia and the ruthlessness of bureaucrats in the case of the law on wood theft, which made Marx realize that the Kingdom of Prussia, conceived by Hegel as a rational state, is not only uncapable of resolving actual conflict in civil society, but even unqualified as a rational state.88 Therefore, civil society can by no means be simply superseded by the state and likewise the contradiction between actual civil society and the state cannot be simply covered up. Although this interpretation does explain the practical reason behind Marx’s objection to the identification of one with the other, it fails to clarify the logical reason. From the author’s point of view, Marx’s insistence on the separation of civil society from the state essentially is rooted in the nature of modern civil society or the economic nature of civil society. As has been noted, Hegel’s civil society is by nature an economic category centering on private interests, which is heterogeneous from a political state representing universal interests. Although Hegel, setting out from his objective (objektiv) idealist logic and his political stance of constitutional monarchy, posits multiple options – e.g. cultivation, administration of justice, corporation, communal association, estate assembly and bureaucracy – to unify civil society within the state, he, however hard he tries, fails to dissolve civil society into the state. The fundamental reason of his failure resides in the heterogeneity of civil society from the state: For the state, civil society is undissolvable in terms of either its content or its material. This is the reason for Marx’s insistence on their opposition. Admittedly, Marx does not give any explanation thereof in the manuscript of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, nor does he dedicate even a single chapter to civil society. Yet there are still instances which suggest that Marx adopts Hegel’s definition of civil society. To take an example, in Section 3: The State of Grundlinien, Hegel characterizes civil society as “the field of conflict in which the private interest of each individual comes up against that of everyone else, so do we here encounter the conflict between private interests and particular concerns of the community, and between both of these together and the higher viewpoints and ordinances of the state”.89 This is one of Hegel’s few accounts of the heterogeneity of civil society from the state in this section. What is at issue is that Marx takes care to excerpt and analyze this exposition

 Marx notes: “Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern state as it is, but for presenting that which is as the nature of the state. That the rational is actual is proved precisely in the contradiction of irrational actuality, which everywhere is the contrary of what it asserts, and asserts the contrary of what it is” (ibid., p. 63). 89  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 329. 88

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in the manuscript of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts90 and integrate it into his own definition of civil society, which later appeared in Zu Judenfrage: “Religion has become the spirit of civil society, of the sphere of egoism, of bellum omnium contra omnes”.91 Considering this, it is apparent that Marx’s adoption of Hegel’s civil society concept focuses on the heterogeneity (Verschiedenheit) of civil society from the state, which is also the main thrust of Marx’s critique. What exactly is the theoretical purpose behind Marx’s emphasis on this heterogeneity? Or, in brief, which conclusion does he intend to draw? Whoever delves into this problem needs to ask these questions. Unfortunately, Marx himself does not provide any explanation. As such, we can only make speculations based on the later development of his thought. After Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, Marx’s thought undergoes two major changes: Above all, Marx stresses that the opposition between civil society and the state resides in the difference between economics and politics, construing civil society to be a thorough aggregation of economic relations and confining the state to the political sphere, as the political state. This standpoint compels Marx to trace this difference back to its origin, to go into the “anatomy of civil society”, i.e. political economy. Second, he completely reverses the Hegelian relations between civil society and the state by regarding the former as more fundamental and essential than the latter: “He wants the ‘intrinsically and explicitly general’, the political state, not to be determined by civil society, but, on the contrary, to determine the latter.”92 That is to say, civil society is the subject, whereas the state is its predicate; civil society determines the state rather than the other way around. This standpoint is without doubt an absolute betrayal for a Young Hegelian who had always advocated the notion of the rational state. Yet, for a Marxist who wants to establish historical materialism, it constitutes the starting point of his theoretical construction. In fact, Marx asserts this stance even more explicitly in the ensuing Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. Moreover, this stance will eventually have him realize that the contradiction inherent in civil society can only be resolved by the materialistic power of civil society as such rather than by the political state as Hegel claims. This paves the way for Marx to abandon the framework of Hegel’s philosophy of law in the future. In conclusion, after the struggle with Hegel’s philosophy of law, Marx finally realized that the state is perhaps not the most important and that the focus of his inquiry ought to return to its original target, i.e. civil society. This is, based on the later development of Marx’s thought, the purpose as well as the result of Marx’s emphasis on the distinction between civil society and the state, only it seems he himself was not aware of it at the time.

90  Cf. Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 41f. 91  Ibid., p. 155. 92  Ibid., p. 90.

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1.4  T  he Notion of Civil Society Within the Framework of the Philosophy of Law As is aforementioned, in Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, Marx already discerned the significance of the civil society concept and even, though subconsciously, invoked this concept to criticize Hegel’s philosophy of law; yet his understanding, as a whole, was still under the sway of the framework of Hegel’s notion of the state and confined to the political stance of the Young Hegelians, i.e. a critique of state and religion. He was still oscillating between civil society and the state. As we have already expounded the positive and advanced aspect of Marx’s critique in the last section, the following section will briefly analyze the limitations of this critique, which consists of two aspects in concrete terms: (1) Although the subject matter of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts is a critique of Hegel’s notion of the state, the main theme and framework of Marx’s argument are still Hegelian. In the pre-modern era, man is, as Aristotle points out, naturally a political animal. When the universality of man is abstracted to the state in modern times, however, he becomes an economic animal in civil society, only left with particularity. This problem – later deemed by the Young Hegelians to be political alienation – is resolved by Hegel through his supersession of civil society in the state. Setting out from the same idea – that the state is superior to civil society – as Hegel, Marx also seeks to resolve the problem of man’s political alienation. From Hegel’s viewpoint, the so-called state is a constitutional monarchy which corresponds with the actual Kingdom of Prussia. As Marx sees it, however, the actual Kingdom of Prussia does not qualify as a state, for a true rational state can only be democratic. For this reason, the main difference between Marx and Hegel does not lie in the question of whether or not to abandon the state, but in the assessment of the Kingdom of Prussia as well as the question of whether or not the idea of the state can supersede civil society. In other words, Marx wants to accomplish the supersession of actual political alienation with a superior idea of the state. Considered this way, Marx has still to take the perspective of civil society as he does in the later published Zur Judenfrage where he resolves the problem of man’s alienation, putting forward a theory of human emancipation. This diagnosis also holds for the Historical-Political Notes (Kreuznacher Hefte) written since 1843. According to these notes, in addition to Hegel’s philosophy of law, Marx was then also interested in the political thought of Niccolò Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Jean-J. Rousseau et al., the history of revolutionary France and the parliamentary history of the French revolution.93 In its entirety, he was inclined to resolve man’s political alienation through reformation at a state level, including philosophical and political reformation. Had Marx stayed on this path, he could hardly have surpassed  In 1843, Marx studied Wilhelm Wachsmuth’s Geschichte Frankreichs im Revolutionszeitalter, whereby he was attentive of the 40-volume Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française edited by Philippe-J.-B. Buehez and Pierre-C. R.-Lavergne and became conversant with the history of the French civil society.

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Ruge who also carried out his critique of political alienation from the same perspective, not to mention Hegel. (2) There is still a major defect in Marx’s concrete understanding of civil society. The preceding sections have already analyzed the two main elements of Hegel’s perspective on civil society: One being the negative understanding of civil society as a world resting on the so-called principle of particularity; the other being the positive understanding of civil society as a world ruled by the principle of formal universality. In Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, however, Marx only draws on the negative aspect of civil society, passing over the positive one. This is probably because he is concerned to underline his distinction from Hegel. As Hegel sees it, the state, though separated from civil society, will eventually unify with the latter, whereas Marx stresses the particularity of civil society due to his focus on the distinction between civil society and state, regarding civil society merely as a realm of particularity where the individual pursues his private interests. This defect can also be found in his ensuing articles for Deutsch-­Französische Jahrbücher. As the author further demonstrates, Marx, even in Zur Judenfrage as his last work before the Paris Manuscripts, still determines the materialism of civil society and the spirit of civil society from the perspective of the principle of particularity. As a result, civil society is depicted as a world abounding with egoistic, greedy and scheming Jewish merchants. Hence, with respect to his conception of civil society, Marx has yet to reach Hegel’s depth in the entire period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts. The reason why Marx could not fully comprehend Hegel’s civil society concept is in fact that he has not yet drawn upon the political economy represented by Smith. Without knowledge of political economy, it is impossible to recognize the significance of the “system of needs” for the unity of individuals and between individual and society. This situation began to change at the end of 1843 when Marx received Engel’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie. From then on, Marx enthusiastically studied British and French economics, just like the young Hegel had done before him, searching for the key to the anatomy of civil society. After exploring the theories of Smith, Jean-B.  Say, Fryderyk F.  Skarbek, David Ricardo and James Mill – the concept of labor in political economy as well as the theory of division of labor and exchange in particular – he finally realizes the function of civil society as the unity of atomic individuals, pointing out in the Paris Manuscripts that “Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political economy”94 and thereby overcoming the limitation of his negative understanding of civil society. This also indicates from another perspective that Marx did not adopt political economy due to the influence of Hegel’s philosophy of law, or, in other words, his adoption of political economy was not mediated by Hegel. Instead, he completed this process alone in 1844. It not only enabled Marx to understand the significance of Smith and Hegel and combine economics and dialectic as the bases of his new world-outlook, but also enabled him to develop his own civil society concept, which eventually became his methodology.  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 333.

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1.5  Summary Let us end with an outline of this chapter. ( 1) Hegel’s civil society concept is an economic category. (2) The reason why Marx maintains a separation of civil society from the state far more firmly than Hegel did is that he has adopted Hegel’s economic account of civil society. (3) It is the civil society concept that made Marx set aside Hegel’s philosophy of the state and shift his focus to political economy. Yet Marx himself was not aware of this in the period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts. (4) Although Marx was not able to complete a transition from state to civil society at that time, he had already taken the first step. If the establishment of historical materialism is to be regarded as the symbol of the birth of Marx’s new world-­ outlook, then breaking the shackles of Hegel’s system, turning towards the actual civil society and shifting from a critique of the philosophy of law to that of political economy can be conceived of as the starting point of Marx’s mature period, a period that has been neglected in the previous Marx studies. In all, Marx started his study of Hegel’s philosophy of law as a critique of Hegel’s notion of the state, but ended up shifting his focus to civil society. Among other Young Hegelians at the time, he is the only one who went through such a theoretical transition.

Chapter 2

From State to Civil Society II A Study of the Two Articles for the Deutsch-­ Französische Jahrbücher

Considering Marx’s theoretical development, it is apparent that, till the writing of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, he had always been a firm adherent of Hegel’s philosophy of the state, adopting Hegel’s dualistic framework of state and civil society as a solution to the problem of man’s political alienation. In the ensuing two articles for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, however, Marx began to base his theory on the monistic structure of civil society instead of Hegel’s dualistic framework, leaving behind his early idea of the philosophy of state. What exactly led to Marx’ abandonment of his once favored philosophy of the state and to his structural transition from theorizing the state to investigating civil society?

2.1  The Prelude to Marx’s Transition As expounded in Chapter I, Marx embarked upon his study of Hegel’s philosophy of state when writing Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts in the summer of 1843. Yet, in his two articles for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, namely Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung and Zur Judenfrage (both published in February 1844), he departed from his original intention with a critical analysis of civil society and, in the ensuing Paris Manuscripts, shifted his interest entirely to political economy, which he referred to as the “anatomy of this civil society”.1 Why did Marx, after his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of state, change his focus to civil society? This is, according to my explanation, neither caused by Marx’ political involvement in Rheinische Zeitung between 1842 and 1843 nor due to the influence of Engel’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalkonomie, but rather was inspired by

1  Cf. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One. Preface, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 29: Marx: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 262.

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certain factors inherent in Hegel’s philosophy of law which Marx encountered during his critique, namely Hegel’s concept of civil society and its economic nature. Since Hegel’s civil society concept is essentially an economic category, it is heterogeneous (verschieden) with the political state that stands for universal interests. For the state, civil society is, both in content and form, undissolvable. Having realized this, Marx, even more firmly than Hegel, insists on the separation of state and civil society, opposing Hegel’s integration of the latter into the former and reversing Hegel’s definition of their relationship – namely the state as the subject and civil society as the predicate – all of which paves the way for a further interpretation of civil society as a more basic and essential entity compared to the state. Marx’s theoretical framework at the time, however, still rested on Hegel’s dualistic structure of state and civil society, with the state playing the dominant role. Setting out from the same idea of the state being a higher entity than civil society as Hegel, Marx sought to address human alienation in civil society by way of the state, only departing from Hegel with regard to the concept of the state. Hegel’s state is a constitutional monarchy, referring in reality to the Kingdom of Prussia, which, as Marx sees it, by no means deserves to be regarded as a rational state and should be replaced by a democratic state. In other words, the main difference between Marx and Hegel is not whether to keep the state in the system or not, but rather which idea of the state should supersede civil society. Considered this way, Marx at that time had yet to shift the theoretical basis of his solution to man’s political alienation from the concept of state to that of civil society. Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts is only a prelude to this coming transition. As such, how did Marx’s transition finally come about? It is a question that the preceding chapter leaves behind and which the author seeks to answer in this chapter (it is also the reason why Chapter II is entitled From State to Civil Society II). As the author sees it, it is in the following Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung and Zur Judenfrage that Marx set aside his previously dominating dualistic framework of state and civil society with his theory of human emancipation (menschliche Emanzipation), to construct a monistic structure of civil society.

2.2  T  he Unexpected Function of the Theory of Human Emancipation Zur Judenfrage is a critique of Bruno Bauer’s two essays on the Jewish question (Die Judenfrage) (In the following, the author shall refer to the first half of Marx’s critique of Die Judenfrage (1843) as Zur Judenfrage I, and the second concerning Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen, frei zu werden (1843) as Zur Judenfrage II). During the writing of this critique, however, Marx also systematically elaborated on his own theory of human emancipation for the first time; it is this concept of human emancipation that unexpectedly performs the role of resolving Hegel’s dualistic framework of state and civil society.

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The so-called Jewish question is a problem that emerged during the formation of modern European nation states (Nationalstaat). These newly-established nation states normally did not permit the existence of heterogeneous groups. Due to their insularity and firm religious conviction, Jews were not readily assimilated as citizens of Christian states and therefore remained in a heterogeneous existence. In order to resolve this conflict, Bauer puts forward “abolishing religion,”2 as according to him even the political state was servant to Christianity in the nineteenth-­ century Germany. Under these circumstances, even Christians could not become citizens of a state, not to mention Jews. Therefore, in order to grant the Jews of Germany citizenship, religion must firstly be abolished at state level, freeing politics from religion and allowing the nation state to transform into a truly political state. Second, all Germans, no matter Christian or Jewish, must renounce religious beliefs that put them in opposition to each other. Thus, the abolition of religion would not only eliminate such opposition but also allow for the realization of “civic, political emancipation”3 of the Jews. In this respect, Marx espouses Bauer’s approach to connect the Jewish question with political emancipation (politische Emanzipation), yet criticizes the superficiality of his solution. To begin with, the abolition of religion is not a necessary condition for human emancipation. By invoking the fact that in North America, where political emancipation had been realized, most citizens still remained religious, Marx pointed out that “the existence of religion is not in contradiction to the perfection of the state”.4 Second, even if the state had achieved emancipation and turned into a purely political state, its people would not necessarily become citizens of the state. There is no necessary relationship between the emancipation of citizens of state and the gestalt of state or individual belief. For this reason, the key to this problem is not whether to abolish religion, but rather whether human emancipation is even possible for human beings. From Marx’s point of view, political emancipation is only the first step to resolving the Jewish question; the final resolution of which still relies on a theoretical transition from political emancipation to human emancipation. As such, why can human emancipation not emerge from political emancipation? The answer resides in the intrinsic limitation of political emancipation. According to Marx, freeing the state from religion also infers freeing religion from the state. On the one hand, religion would be degraded from the level of state to that of civil society and end up as the secular spirit of civil society: “Religion is no longer the spirit of the state, […] Religion has become the spirit of civil society, of the sphere of egoism, of bellum omnium contra omnes”.5 On the other hand, the political spirit that permeates civil society is thereby abstracted and extracted to an exterior 2  Marx, On the Jewish Question, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 147. 3  Ibid., p. 146. 4  Ibid., p.151. Considering this, Marx is actually not in support of the abolition of religion, as he claims instead that “[t]he privilege of faith is a universal right of man” (ibid., p. 162). 5  Ibid., p. 155.

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p­ olitical community, i.e. the state, which signifies the shift of the noble political spirit from civil society to the state. As a result, political emancipation presents itself as a two-way transition: from the state to civil society and from civil society to the state. During this transition, religion and politics have both left their original vehicles and exchanged positions: religion enters civil society, whilst politics ascends to the level of the state. Furthermore, the closer the state comes to becoming a truly political community, the more civil society serves as a sphere of material interests, or, in Marx’s words, “the completion of the idealism of the state was at the same time the completion of the materialism of civil society. Throwing off the political yoke meant at the same time throwing off the bonds which restrained the egoistic spirit of civil society”.6 As political factors all ascend to the state level, civil society is also completely degraded to a sphere of pure private interests. Such an exchange of positions brings about an unexpected result for modern man who inevitably falls subject to the separation of political identity from private identity. In the pre-modern era, man, as a combination of both, simultaneously possessed characteristics of both communal being (Gemeinwesen) and homme, which have now been disassociated through political emancipation. Communal being ascends to the level of state, whereas homme remains on the level of civil society. Man exists separately as citoyen and bourgeois on the level of state and civil society respectively. Consequently, “man—not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life – leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the political community [politisches Gemeinwesen], in which he considers himself a communal being [Gemeinwesen], and life in civil society, in which he considers himself a private individual, regards other men as a means, degrades himself into means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers”.7 More seriously, these two identities are not equivalent in the reality of the modern era. On account of the decisive influence of the economy and the economic nature of civil society, civil society usurps the dominance of the state and rules over society, whereas the state is forced to become an appendage to civil society. By invoking the notion that “[t]he practical application of man’s right to liberty is man’s right to private property”8 and the Declaration of the rights of Man and of the Citizen, Marx lays bare the problem endemic in modern society, i.e. alienation of the state: “The fact becomes still more puzzling when we see that the political emancipators go so far as to reduce citizenship, and the political community, to a mere means for maintaining these so-called rights of man, that therefore the citoyen is declared to be the servant of egoistic homme, that the sphere in which man acts as a communal being [Gemeinwesen] is degraded to a level below the sphere in which he acts as a partial thing”.9 That is to say, the state representing man’s political rights and communal  Ibid., p. 166.  Ibid., p. 154. 8  Ibid., p. 163. 9  Ibid., p. 164. 6 7

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nature – the state as end – has been astonishingly degraded below civil society, serving only as means to protect private property: a total reversal of end and means! In terms of importance, man’s political identity and private identity are also inverted during the alienation of the state. The citoyen or political being was the original gestalt of man’s existence, whilst the homme or egoistic individual does not define the true man. Here, however, “not as citoyen, but man as bourgeois who is considered to be the essential and true man”,10 “whereas political man is only abstract, artificial man, man as an allegorical, juridical person [moralische Person]. The real man is recognized only in the shape of the egoistic individual, the true man is recognized only in the shape of the abstract citoyen”.11 In brief, the citoyen or political man becomes an “abstract man”, whilst the private individual, on the contrary, becomes a “real man”. This is exactly how man is alienated! When such an alienation becomes an accepted state of affairs, man begins to degrade into universal immortality. One only needs concern oneself with private interests, and should not, unless willingly, make self-sacrifices for the community. The spirit of Lei Feng (雷 锋) is worthy of our admiration. Being Shylock, however, is equally nothing shameful. Thus, at the very moment when the communal and political nature of modern man has been alienated from the state, man’s self-corruption is legitimized.

Religion + State

Transition from Religion to Civil Society

Judaism + Private Individual

Political Emancipation State

Citizen of State

Transition from Political Spirit to State

Return of Abstract Citizen of State (Political Spirit) to Man as such

Civil Society

Human Emancipation

Fig. 2.1  Political emancipation and human emancipation

In summary, political emancipation does not lead to human progress, but rather to its regression. The most serious problem of Bauer is his failure to realize this negative aspect of the theory that he himself considers the remedy of man’s political alienation. Marx, however, is aware that political emancipation does not resolve the problem and that the solution requires human emancipation. With regard to this human emancipation, he notes at the end of Zur Judenfrage I: “All emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself. Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical person [moralische Person]. Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in him10 11

 Ibid., p. 164.  Ibid., p. 167.

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self the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-­ being [Gattungswesen] in his everyday life, in this particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his ‘forces propres’ as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished”.12 Clearly, this program of human emancipation is established in full knowledge of the pitfalls of political emancipation. The key to this program resides in the reunification of citoyen and bourgeois which are separated due to political emancipation, so as to bring communal spirit and political spirit back to man, who thereby becomes species-being, taking up responsibility for the community and politics. Only in this way can man overcome his political alienation and make moral progress. Thus far, it seems that Marx has already surpassed Bauer by advancing a new solution. This marks the end of Zur Judenfrage I. Marx, however, had yet to finish as one might expect, but moved on to write Zur Judenfrage II and Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung. The reason for writing these two articles is perhaps the incomplete state of his new program. As has been noted, the aim of this so-called human emancipation is to reunify the previously separated private individual and citoyen in man. Yet the real problem is where this reunification can be actualized. As Marx sees it, it can only be achieved “in his everyday life, in this particular work, and in his particular situation”. Such circumstances, from the viewpoint of Hegel’s philosophy of law, belong to the sphere of civil society. That is to say, this reunification is not realized at state level, but in civil society, where the state citizen is demoted to a lower level and becomes a species-being. Previously, this approach was beyond the imagination. As is widely known, Hegel is also attentive to the separation of individuality and universality as well as that of the individual and the whole in modern society  – i.e. Marx’s problem of man’s political alienation – and offers his solutions to them in Phänomenologie and Grundlinien respectively. In the former, we see the individual self-consciousness ascending to the universal spirit via reason, whilst the individual in the later undergoes the transition from the level of civil society to that of the state. These are de facto the paths that Hegel paves for human emancipation. The fundamental characteristic of his approach is the supersession of individuality or the individual in the universal state so as to overcome man’s political alienation in civil society. In fact, in his slightly earlier work, i.e. Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, Marx also follows Hegel’s approach to overcoming civil society by virtue of the state. In Deutsch-­ Französische Jahrbücher, however, he veers off in the opposite direction, drawing on civil society instead of the state to resolve issues of man’s political alienation. Such a transition contradicts common understanding, since, according to Hegel’s differentiation, civil society is in essence a realm of particularity with the state serving as the realm of true universality. The unity of particularity and universality can only be achieved in the realm of universality, as it entails particularity and thereby exists on a higher level. The reason that both Hegel and Marx in the period of Kritik 12

 Ibid., p. 168.

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41

des Hegelschen Staatsrechts opt to permit the state to complete the unification of civil society is that only the state, from their point of view, is qualified to fulfill this task. In the aforementioned articles, however, Marx leaves this task to civil society, deemed to be the realm of particularity. Yet how can the unity of particularity and universality be possible on a level in which universality is absent? In order to justify the validity of his new approach, Marx needs to unravel the universality within civil society, the universality capable of unifying particularity in itself at the same time. Zur Judenfrage II and Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung can be seen as Marx’s first step in his search for this universality.

2.3  The Problem of the Disappearance of State As we know, Hegel addresses the problem of universality in Grundlinien. In one respect, he deems civil society a battlefield of private interests and a typical realm of particularity: the first principle of civil society. In another respect, as is showcased by money and values, civil society functions as a “system of needs” connecting all individuals and embodying formal universality, which constitutes the second principle of civil society.13 Although such universality differs from the universality of state, insofar as it only has its substantiality in particularity and is therefore still formal, it already entails the seeds of the universality that combines particularity. Considering the task Marx was confronted with at this point, perhaps he should have started his search for the universality of civil society with the rediscovery of this formal universality. As Zur Judenfrage II demonstrates, however, Marx opts for a completely different path. He construes the “[p]ractical need, egoism” as the “principle of civil society”,14 the “Judaism”15 (Judentum) as its fundamental spirit and defines civil society as a world which “sever[s] all the species-ties of man, put[s] egoism and selfish need in the place of these species-ties, and dissolve[s] the human world into a world of atomistic individuals who are inimically opposed one another”.16 Despite his discussion of money, Marx still fails to see its function in connecting isolated individuals as well as its universality derived from abstracting the individuality of private property, but views money from a rather negative perspective: “Money degrades all the gods of man – and turns them into commodities. […] Money is the estranged essence of man’s work and man’s existence, and this alien essence  Cf. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 220. 14  Marx, On the Jewish Question, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 172. 15  Ibid., p. 170. The German word “Jude” has two meanings: The Jews who believe in Judaism or the profit-seeking usurers. In Zur Judenfrage I, it designates the former, i.e. the Judaists who strive for the political emancipation and the emancipation of citizens, whilst in Zur Judenfrage II the latter, namely the economic man bent on money, or, in words of Zur Judenfrage I, bourgeois as member of civil society or egoistic homme. 16  Ibid., p. 173. 13

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dominates him, and he worships it”.17 Obviously, this standpoint is merely a critique of the alienation or fetishism of money. Considering this, Marx’s then understanding of civil society was grounded in the first aspect of Hegel’s civil society concept, namely to regard it as a realm ruled absolutely by the principle of particularity. Thus, it is hardly possible for him to lay bare the significance of the principle of formal universality, not to mention find its true universality. Nonetheless, in the ensuing Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung, Marx came across another kind of universality, namely the proletariat. As we know, the subject matter of this work is an answer to the question: Who is supposed to complete the task of human emancipation? Or, as Marx puts it, “­ [w] here, then, is the positive possibility of a German emancipation”? His answer is: “In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society”.18 From this perspective, the task of emancipation is given to the proletariat of civil society. The reason the proletariat is able to fulfill this task is that, though they are born in civil society, they have been deprived of their citizenship and thereby excluded from civil society on account of the loss of their private property. For this reason, it is most likely that the proletariat could be the force to accomplish the complete negation of civil society. Moreover, since they do not have private property, they are free from particular individual interests, thus possessing the absolute universality that the revolution requires. Without individual interests, the proletariat stands for universality and its discovery seemingly offers hope in Marx’s search for universality in civil society. Yet the universality of the proletariat is after all a particular universality, which differs from the universality that unifies particularity in itself. Above all, the proletariat is excluded from civil society due to a loss of private property. As such, they are no longer counted as citoyen nor citizens and cannot be classified by private and political identity. Hence, there is a great logical difficulty in realizing the unity of particularity and universality in a civil society to which the proletariat does not belong. Second, whilst the proletariat does possess universality because of their lack of private property, such universality is de facto an absolute universality that is not inclusive of particularity and thereby, strictly speaking, not suitable for the task of unifying particularity in itself, since the exclusion of particularity indicates the impossibility of such unification at the same time. In this sense, despite Marx’s discovery of the proletariat in civil society, there remains some distance from a completion of human emancipation. It is for this reason that Marx, without further elaboration, ends his discussion in Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung with the conclusion that “[t]he head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat”.  Ibid., p. 172.  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 186.

17 18

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In all, regarding the task of human emancipation, the proletariat does not prove to be an ideal conceptual device. Since the nature of both private identity and citizen lie in private property, one has to draw on the economic relations of civil society in order to find a path to elevate private identity and citizen onto a level of universality. From the Paris Manuscripts onwards, Marx resumed his search for the formal universality, which falls into neglect in Deutsche-Französische Jahrbücher. In the Paris Manuscripts, concepts that only have the meaning of particularity in Deutsche-­ Französische Jahrbücher – such as private property, labor, money, and division of labor – begin to assume a positive connotation of universality: Private property is defined on the premise of recognizing the private property of others; labor is no longer the objectification of isolated individuals, but gainful labor that presupposes the exchange relationship through which the labor of isolated individuals becomes universal; as the evil origin of man’s enslavement, money is also “the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, connecting me with nature and man”,19 “the abstraction from its specific, personal nature”20; value emerges as an abstract aggregation of uncountable private properties, reflecting human relations; the division of labor is the glue connecting independent producers to each other, the embodiment of the organic unity of human society. In overview, in the Paris Manuscripts, Marx started to interpret civil society based on Hegel’s second principle of civil society, i.e. the principle of formal universality, according to which civil society presents itself as a realm of universal connections. Since formal universality proceeds from particularity, an attempt to unify universality and particularity through formal universality accords not only with the nature of the problem to be tackled, but also with the approach of Marx’s later established historical materialism. For economic relations are the foundation on which historical materialism rests. Notwithstanding, the formal universality is after all the alienated gestalt of community or society – even though the negation of such an alienation is exactly what the evolution of the true universality presupposes – and differs from the political universality inherent in political identity and citoyen. Then, how can the formal universality turn into political universality? Or, in other words, is realizing the unity of private and political identity, and that of citoyen and citizen possible through formal universality? Though Marx already touches upon the problem of unifying individual and the species in the Third Manuscripts, heralding communism as “the true resolution of the strife […] between the individual and the species”,21 he had yet to provide a more concrete explanation of it in the entire Paris Manuscripts.

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 324. 20  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 213. 21  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 296. 19

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In Ideologie, Marx brings forth the concept of “freely combined individuals”22 as fully developed individuals in civil society who, through self-awareness and revolution, supersedes their private properties, realizing a brand-new union in the community. Later in Das Kapital, Marx further develops this idea as re-establishing “individual property [individuelles Eigentum] based on […] the possession in common [Gemeinbesitz] of the land and of the means of production”.23 All of these notions can be traced back to the idea of unifying private and political identity, citoyen and citizen. Rigidly adhering to the requirements of human emancipation put forward in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, however, the “species” in the Paris Manuscripts, the “union” in Ideologie and the “common ownership” in Das Kapital all fail to serve as the universality that incorporates particularity in itself. Without this universality, one can hardly consider the theory of human emancipation in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher as complete. This theoretical difficulty arises from the intrinsic limitation of the theory of human emancipation for Marx, in the period of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, as one still held within the confines of Hegel’s philosophy of law; no matter private identity and political identity or citoyen and bourgeois, they both still bear the hallmark of capitalist democracy. For Marx, who had already become a communist, this framework was no longer the right place to search for a conceptual device of universality. Considering the result, it is apparent that Marx did not finish justifying his theory of human emancipation in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. This, however, does not have the slightest influence on the significance this theory serves in the development of Marx’s thought. Marx’s earlier belief in Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie that only the state assumes universality is superseded. Now, civil society is also construed as a realm of universality for the first time. Thus, the division of civil society as particularity and state as universality losses its significance to Marx and is replaced by the monistic structure of civil society. From then on, the concept of the state that once held dominance in Marx’s thought gradually faded, disappearing from his theoretical scope. Considering Marx himself, the disappearance of the state signifies not only his transition to civil society thought, but also his deviation from Hegel’s system and the seeds of his independent world outlook. The abdication or disappearance of the state is significant for post-Hegelian German idealism (including the Young Hegelians) as well as Marx himself. Lastly, the author shall further invoke other works of Marx to briefly set forth the development of Marx’s view of the state. Strictly speaking, Marx’s transition started during  Marx, The German Ideology, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 83. See ibid., p. 78, p. 80 and p. 81. 23  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 35, Progress Publishers, 1996, p.751. Concerning the conception of reestablishing individual property, see Lixin Han, Problems Concerning the Explanation of “Individual Property”. A Comment on Huibin Li’s A New Interpretation of Marx’ “Private Ownership”, “Common Ownership” and “Individual Property”, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 2, 2009. 22

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his writing of Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, when he, after discovering the heterogeneity of civil society with the state and its dominance in modern society, realized that the state as such was a vacant abstraction. Before the modern era, man’s private life had been subsumed by his political life on account of the relationship between state and civil society. In this sense, the state is the substance, whereas private life as separated from political life is an abstraction without essential significance. In the modern era, however, civil society, as characterized by economic society and private life, begins to disengage itself gradually from the state, usurping the position of state, insofar as it becomes the substance, and the state is degraded to an abstraction. In brief, it is not civil society that becomes separate from the state, but the other way around. Marx notes: “The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times, because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product”.24 It is only because Marx was a proponent of Hegel’s philosophy of state at that time that he still sought to use democracy to save the state from being reduced to something unsubstantial. With his transition from state to civil society after Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx set aside his fantasy of remedying the state, instead adopting a critical attitude. By the Paris Manuscripts, his view of state had already become rather negative. The state basically appears as a representative of civil society, insofar as it collects land rent, profits by controlling capital and, as a commodity producer, buys low and sells high. What is worse, it even makes profit from issuing loans, which become value-added money backed by government credit. There is little difference between the functions of the state and that of homo oeconomicus in civil society. Marx points out in Comments on James Mill: “As regards government loans, the state occupies exactly the same place as the man does in the earlier example … In the game with government securities it is seen how the state has become the plaything of businessmen, etc.”.25 Unimaginable in antiquity, the state has degenerated into the homo oeconomicus in civil society and is, as such, no longer worthy of respect. In Ideologie, the state’s image is further tarnished, to be seen as merely an “illusory community”.26 This is because the state is not, as the ruling class claims, the realization of the interests of the whole, but merely representative of the interests of a particular group of people. “Since the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests”,27 then overthrowing or annihilating the state is indubitably a just cause. The formation of this notion of the state as a mere  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 32. 25  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 216. 26  Marx, The German Ideology, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 78. 27  Ibid., p. 90. 24

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representative of a certain class not only implies that the state is disqualified as a community, but also that it has become the object of critique and negation in respect to its inclined value and practice. The communist cause must be built on the ashes of the state. Following on from Ideologie, Marx continued his critique of the state in many other writings, which the author shall not further list here. Interestingly, during his late period, Marx still showed his intention to return to the topic of the state on several occasions. For instance, when Marx planned to reorganize Kritik der politischen Ökonomie into six volumes in 1858, one of these volumes was dedicated to the state,28 although it never came into fruition. Apart from the fact that the writing of the opening volume on capital already exhausted Marx, another reason for his failure to complete the volume on the state is perhaps that the restoration of an affirmative theory of the state does not conform to the logic of Marx’s transition from state to civil society in his early period, which, as is aforementioned, presupposes the eradication of the state.

2.4  Summary In Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx, who had yet to reach the level of Smith and Hegel, discarded Hegel’s state-based solution to the conflict of civil society as well as his dualistic framework of state and civil society, turning to resolve this conflict within civil society. Considering the outcome, it is undeniable that Marx was a bit impetuous and his theory hardly mature. Yet this attempt marks the completion of Marx’s transition from state to civil society. As Noboru Shirozuka notes, in the period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, Marx still “observed civil society principally in terms of its relationship with state, i.e. from the perspective of philosophy of law”, rather than “from the perspective of the economics”29; yet the true study of civil society takes the latter as its starting point. The lack of sufficient economic knowledge also led to Marx’ relatively negative understanding of civil society, so that his description of human emancipation still remains on the level of “[t]he head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart

28  Cf. Marx, Marx to Ferdinand Lassalle. February 22, 1858, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 40: Marx and Engels: 1856–1859, Progress Publishers, 1983, p. 268–271 and Marx, Marx to Engels. April 2, 1858, ibid., p. 296–304. 29  Noboru Shirozuka, Young Marx’s Thought, Keiso Shobo, 1975, p. 110 (translated into English by K.H.).

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is the proletariat”. There is still a considerable gap between this notion and Marx’s later standpoint that, as with his critique of Proudhon, the problem of civil society “could not be answered by invective, but only by an analysis of modern ‘political economy’”.30 Notwithstanding, after Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx eventually realized that “the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy”31 and set about studying civil society in its true sense. In autumn 1843, he left the kingdom of philosophy for France. From this period onwards, through drawing on the outcomes of political economy, Marx entered upon a critique of civil society, which lasted the rest of his life. Regarding the development of Marx’s thought in this period, Engels has drawn a fantastic outline in Karl Marx: Proceeding from the Hegelian philosophy of law, Marx came to the conclusion that it was not the state, which Hegel had described as the ‘top of the edifice’, but ‘civil society’, which Hegel had regarded with disdain, that was the sphere in which a key to the understanding of the process of the historical development of mankind should be looked for. However, the science of civil society is political economy, and this science could not be studied in Germany, it could only be studied thoroughly in England or France32

This comment, no matter from which perspective, can be considered as the best footnote on Marx’s transition to the study of civil society.

30  Marx, On Proudhon, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 20: Marx and Engels: 1864–1868, Progress Publishers, 1985, p. 29.f 31  Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One. Preface, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 29: Marx: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 262. 32  Engels, Karl Marx, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 21: Marx: 1867– 1870, Progress Publishers, 1985, p. 60f.

Chapter 3

Is “Return to Hess” Actually Essential? On the Relation Between Hess and Marx’s Paris Manuscripts

Since the 1950s, a new approach to the study of early Marx has been taken, one which traces the evolution of his thought back to his Young Hegelian background. Moreover, the influence of Moses Hess stands out compared with other Young Hegelians such as Bauer and Ruge. While previous interpretations may have deemed Hess a negative example,1 this new approach intentionally emphasizes his positive influence on Marx. This “return to Hess” or “renaissance of Hess” movement stretches from Europe all the way to China and Japan. Starting out by redefining the relationship between Hess and Marx from the perspective of history of philosophy, this movement overshoots its target in terms of both process and outcome, exerting a direct impact on Marx studies in Japan and China, which have struggled to disengage from orthodox Stalinism and reinterpret Marx’s theory. An ever-deepening Hess focus in Japan since the 1960s gave rise to a “debate over the Young Hegelians” and led to new interpretations such as Hiromatsu’s philosophy, whilst in China, the results of international Hess studies arrived in the 1990s with Cai Hou. Another Chinese scholar, Yibin Zhang, also incorporates Hess’s thought in his systematic work, Back to Marx. Considering these facts, Hess studies is distinct from regular studies of the history of philosophy in terms of its direct impact on the reconstruction of Marxist philosophy in Japan and China. For this reason, the “return to Hess” movement is not merely a current in Marx studies, but also entails a degree of theoretical risk. Therefore it needs to be put under close scrutiny, especially following the publication of a Chinese translation of Hess’s selected works.2 1  This circumstance is probably caused by Marx and Engels themselves, as they criticize Hess as the “true socialist” and “petty-bourgeois socialist” in Ideologie and Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, which gives rise to the later widely-adopted negative assessment of the relation between Hess and Marx. 2  Moses Hess, Moses Hess: Selected Works, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2010. As a selection of Hess’s most important works, this edition is based on the Japanese translation of Moses Hess. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837–1850 edited by Auguste Cornu und Wolfgang Mönke (Early Socialist Writings, trans. by T. Yamanaka & K. Hata, Miraisha, 1970).

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Focusing on Hess’ influence on Marx’ Paris Manuscripts, this chapter will first elucidate the relationship by reviewing current studies and then offer an objective assessment of Hess’s influence on Marx in order to redress any overcorrection in contemporary Hess studies.

3.1  Cornu’s “Return to Hess” The “return to Hess” movement has its origins in Europe. To the question of whether Hess once held sway over Marx, prominent European Marxist researchers Franz E.  Mehring, Lukács and Oizerman all concur in the negative. This mainstream standpoint was reversed by Auguste Cornu who not only held a positive view of Hess before the second world war, but went on to edit Moses Hess. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837–1850 (1961) in collaboration with Wolfgang Mönke.3 The long introduction to this edition written by Cornu marks the beginning of the “return to Hess” movement. In the following section, the author will analyze and comment on Cornu’s viewpoint in reference to this introduction.

3.1.1  Characteristics of Hess’s Thought Let us first draw an outline of Hess’s main contributions to philosophy and the features of his theory. To begin with, under the influence of Johann G.  Fichte and August von Cieszkowski,4 Hess adds elements of action and practice to Hegel’s philosophy of history in the hope of transforming it into a socialist theory, as we can see in Die Heilige Geschichte der Menschheit (1837), Die Europäische Triarchie (1841), and Die Philosophie der Tat (July 1843). Next, he integrates Fichte’s spiritual practice, Bauer’s self-consciousness and Feuerbach’s species-essence into a German socialist theory and combines it with French socialism, an attempt which earns him the title “father of German socialism”. These thoughts are chiefly embodied in Die Europäische Triarchie, Hess’s three articles in Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz, Frage und Antwort (1844), Die letzten Philosophen (May 1845). Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz is an anthology edited by Georg Herwegh in July 1843, in which Hess anonymously published three of his articles: Sozialismus und Kommunismus, Die Philosophie der Tat, and Die Eine und die Ganze Freiheit! Third, in Über das Geldwesen (written between October 1843 and February 1844), Hess also employs Feuerbach’s alienation theory in economic and social spheres,  Auguste Cornu und Wolfgang Mönke, Einleitung, in: Moses Hess. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837–1850, Akademie Verlag, 1961. 4  Polish philosopher Cieszkowski wrote Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (1838) under the sway of Hegel’s philosophy of history, Fichte’s philosophy of “I” and prioritization of practical reason. This work exerted profound impact on Hess. 3

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criticizing the reality of capitalism. Among these writings, Philosophie der Tat and Über das Geldwesen are two of Hess’s most representative works, which were not only written at approximately the same time as Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, but were also referred to directly by Marx in his manuscripts.5 As such, these two works serve as the chief texts of our examination. Hess is a philosopher full of aspiration and vision thanks to his background in both classical German philosophy and Young Hegelian thought. In particular, between 1841 and 1845 when Hess’s thought went through its most active period, Fichte’s philosophy of practice and Feuerbach’s theory of religious alienation both played a salient role in its development, and are thus deemed cornerstones of his system. As is widely known, Fichte is a philosopher who puts extra emphasis on the subject’s actions. His key concepts of I and practice, though strongly tinged with subjective idealism, are a direct source for the Young Hegelians, including Bauer, in their development of the concept of self-consciousness, and Hess in his philosophy of action. For Fichte, Not-I is nothing but a hypothesis of I; through practice, I breaks through the limitation set by Not-I to eventually realize self-creation. Such a logic implies a liberalist tendency that advocates individual freedom and opposes all external constraint, which coincides with a religious and political critique of the Young Hegelians. As for Feuerbach, he has a particularly special role for the Young Hegelians. His theory of religious alienation which posits god as the alienation of man, and his humanist thought that “man is god to himself” are closely linked with Ruge and Marx’s program of political and human emancipation. For instance, Marx advances a proposition similar to Feuerbach’s in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, remarking that “man is the highest being for man”.6 Whilst Fichte traces man’s essence back to individual freedom, Feuerbach deduces it from determining that, as a species, humankind bears the hallmark of community. This lays out the rudiments of Hess’s later critique of individualism and egoism and his species-centered socialist theory. In all, Fichte’s philosophy of practice and Feuerbach’s humanist consciousness have, reciprocally and in supplement, constituted the theoretical foundation of the Young Hegelians. Indubitably, Hess stands out from his contemporaries, as he seeks to establish a German socialist theory by combining Fichte and Feuerbach’s thought.

5  In the preface to the Manuscripts, Marx notes: “It goes without saying that besides the French and English socialists I have also used German socialist works. The only original German works of substance in this science, however—other than Weitling’s writings—are the essays by Hess published in Einundzwanzig Bogen and Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie by Engels in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher” (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 232.). 6  Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 182.

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3.1.2  From Fichte to Feuerbach In its entirety, Cornu’s demonstration of the development of Hess’s thought is in line with the two main threads of Fichte and Feuerbach mentioned above: “In Philosophie der Tat, he [sc. Hess] gave a thorough exposition of communism as a necessary result of historical development, namely based on Fichte as well as Feuerbach. He adopted motive of subjective-idealist notion of history, following on Feuerbach he calls for the supersession of alienation of human essence in religious as well as social field as basic condition for the emancipation of human”.7 According to this remark, Hess was under the sway of Fichte’s philosophy of action and Feuerbach’s humanism simultaneously during his writing of Philosophie der Tat, which resulted in his socialist theory being a combination of the two. In fact, unlike in his other works on Hess,8 Cornu emphasizes in this preface more on Fichte’s philosophy of practice than on Feuerbach’s thought. From Cornu’s perspective, in Philosophie der Tat, Hess bases his exposition of man’s essence – i.e. “absolutely free activity” and “free self-positing [Selbstbestimmung]”9 – on Fichte’s activity (Tätigkeit) as the principle of his philosophy of action. He also, centering on Fichte’s concept of freedom, conceives of capitalism as a “necessary negation of the free self-positing”10 and deduces “the historical necessity of communism”11 from his definition of man’s essence as comprising of free and independent activity. It is the background of Fichte’s philosophy that confers both individualism and anarchism on the communist thought in Philosophie der Tat. As for Feuerbach, who, according to Cornu, constitutes the mainstay of Hess’s philosophy of action alongside Fichte, his role therein is mainly to provide political objectives, such as the eradication of human alienation and the realization of communism, for the philosophy of action. Fichte’s theory, in contrast, serves as its underlying logic. In Über das Geldwesen, which was published less than half a year after Philosophie der Tat, however, Hess’s philosophical framework shifts from Fichtean to Feuerbachian, as Cornu notes: “If Hess’s thought at the time of his first major attempt of a ‘philosophical’ justification of socialism was started under the influence of both Fichte and Feuerbach, then in its further development the dependence on Fichte noticeably took a backseat to the influence of Feuerbachian thought”.12 This transition is principally due to a drawback inherent in Fichte’s philosophy, that its individualist and anarchic inclinations contradict the socialist idea of unifying the  Auguste Cornu and Wolfgang Mönke, Einleitung, in: Moses Hess. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837–1850, Akademie Verlag, 1961, S. XXXV (translated into English by K.H.). 8  These works include: Auguste Cornu, Moses Hess et la gauche hégélienne, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1934. Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels. Leben und Werk, Aufbau Verlag, Bd. I, 1954, Bd. II, 1962, Bd. III, 1968. Karl Marx und die Entwicklung des modernen Denkens, Dietz Verlag, 1950. 9  Auguste Cornu and Wolfgang Mönke, Einleitung, in: Moses Hess. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837–1850, Akademie Verlag, 1961, S. XXXV. 10  Ibid., S. XLV. 11  Ibid., S. XXXVII. 12  Ibid., S. XL.

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individual and the whole espoused by Hess. Overcoming this drawback requires Hess to conceive of human beings as communal being, prompting him to turn to Feuerbach and his species-being construct. Therefore, Über das Geldwesen no longer interprets man as an individual who “egoistically puts his interest through at the expense of the species” as in Philosophie der Tat, but rather as one who “in a harmonious species-life collaborate with others for the good of all”.13 Another reason is that Hess deems it necessary to criticize irrational social reality so that his philosophy of action can truly shift from theory to practice. Since Feuerbach’s method of religious critique happens to fulfill this requirement, Hess adopts his concept of alienation for his analysis of social-economic phenomenon. It is owning to this shift to Feuerbach that Über das Geldwesen exhibits “significant progress”14 compared with the three articles in Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz. Among his contemporaries, “Hess was the first one, who combines the Feuerbachian humanism with socialist ideas”.15 Considered that way, the development of Hess’s thought from Philosophy der Tat to Über das Geldwesen is a shift in influence from Fichte to Feuerbach starting with combination of the two. The role of Fichte gradually diminishes as Feuerbach assumes more importance. This is an explanatory framework extracted from Cornu and Mönke’s lengthy preface, which will also prove to be effective for the following examination of Japanese Hess studies.

3.1.3  Hess’s Influence on the Paris Manuscripts Based on the exposition above, it is Cornu’s point of view that Hess draws on Fichte’s philosophy of practice and Feuerbach’s humanism, applying their theories in social and economic spheres to unveil the problem of alienation in capitalist society, which lays the philosophical foundation for his communist theory. This development coincides with the direction of Marx’s efforts between 1843 and 1844. Herein lies the obvious question: Was Marx under the sway of Hess at that time? Cornu’s answer is that, from the writing of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts in 1843 to the completion of the Paris Manuscripts, Marx was indeed under the sway of Hess’s thought as expounded in his three articles in Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz and Über das Geldwesen. Yet, after the Manuscripts, it is Marx who held sway over Hess instead, and after that Hess never caught up. According to Cornu, Hess’s influence is principally found in the following two aspects: First, the concept of practice in Philosophie der Tat: “[T]hese works of Hess establish a first connection between German philosophical radicalism and French socialism and […] laid a certain groundwork for the development of the materialist concept of practice”. “[T]he still idealist-veiled core thought of the essay Philosophie der Tat, namely that activity builds the essence of humankind, was,  Ibid., S. XLV.  Ibid., S. XLV. 15  Ibid., S. XLII. 13 14

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however, clearly and explicitly enough expressed, that this quintessence of Hessian engagement with classical German philosophy made a great impression on Marx”.16 That is to say, Hess’s concept of practice – namely Fichte’s concept of practice as analyzed above  – or the notion that “activity builds the essence of humankind” exerts a dramatic impact on Marx. Second, the concept of alienation in Über das Geldwesen: “With the application of the Feuerbachian view of human externalization and alienation in social and economic fields, Hess exerted a certain influence on Marx at the end of 1843 and beginning of 1844 [in the period of Deutsch-­ Französische Jahrbücher]”; “Hess stimulated him [sc. Marx] to apply the theory of alienation also on the analysis of the social and economic relations of civil society [in the period of the Paris Manuscripts]”.17 In brief, as Cornu sees it, Hess’s concept of alienation, which is in fact modified from Feuerbach’s concept of alienation, influenced Marx. Nevertheless, Cornu’s emphasis on the consistency between Hess and Marx is not unconditional, instead he points out the insurmountable gap between them on account of the idealism of Hess’s notion of practice and the resulting utopian character of his theory of communism. These are Cornu’s two overarching conclusions. Like his outline of Hess’s thought, however, they lack the necessary justification, since (1) Cornu does not meticulously compare Hess and Marx’s concepts of practice; (2) he touches upon the influence of Hess’s alienation concept on Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher and the Paris manuscripts, yet his exposition is rather vague and opaque (this influence is unequivocally identified in another essay, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Life and Works18); (3) he even brings forth ideas in sheer opposition to aforementioned conclusions, e.g. that “with these articles [for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher], Marx and Engels reached a communist conclusion that is, aside from Hess, based on the results of extensive historical studies.19 Considering this remark, Cornu seemingly believes that Marx’s turn to communism, although synchronous to Hess’s, happened independently. Incidentally, this is exactly the standpoint that Cornu’s collaborator Mönke adopts in his Neue Quellen zur Hess-Forschung (1964),20 namely that Marx was not de facto substantially influenced by Hess.

 Ibid., S. XXXVIII.  Ibid., S. XLVI. 18  For instance, “under such [sc. Hess’s] influence, Marx not only examines the problem of alienation from the perspective of social politics, but also from that of social economics. Hess’s essay Über das Geldwesen prompted Marx to further elaborate on the function of money and to more extensively justify his viewpoints on the problems touched upon in Zur Judenfrage” (Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, vol. 1: 1818–1844, trans. by Pikun Liu et al., SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1980, pp. 629–630, (translated into English by K.H.)) and “Hess’s Über das Geldwesen might have influenced Marx in certain ways (which can be seen in Marx’s Zur Judenfrage)” (Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, vol. 2: 1844–1845, trans. by Pikun Liu et al., SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1980, p. 139 (translated into English by K.H.)). 19  Auguste Cornu and Wolfgang Mönke, Einleitung, in: Moses Hess. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837–1850, Akademie Verlag, 1961, S. XLIII. 20  Wolfgang Mönke, Neue Quellen zur Hess-Forschung, Akademie Verlag, 1964. 16 17

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Notwithstanding the drawbacks of Cornu’s study, his positive assessment of Hess set the tone for later Hess studies on the international scene. Practice and alienation, Fichte and Feuerbach, these pairs of keywords exacted from Cornu’s exposition also lay out the rudiments of later Hess studies in China and Japan.

3.2  Hess Studies in Japan This “return to Hess” movement caused a wide range of responses in Japan. As early as 1970, Hess’s selected works edited by Cornu and Mönke had been translated into Japanese. Chikara Rachi from Hitotsubashi University edited Materials of Early German Socialism. League of the Just and the Young Hegelians (1974) and completed the compilation and translation of the four-volume Collected Essays of the Young Hegelians (1986–2006) in collaboration with dozens of scholars including Hiromatsu. Hence, almost all of the important Hess studies have been translated into Japanese. Yet these scholars did not stop at introduction, further advancing their own standpoints and integrating Hess into their reconstruction of the “image of Marx”. Three of the most representative positions among them are to be addressed in the following section.

3.2.1  Yamanaka and Hata’s Critique of Cornu As the translators of Moses Hess. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837– 1850, Takaji Yamanaka and Kouichi Hata – rather than blindly following Cornu – carry out an examination of his dual conclusion by comparing Hess’s Philosophie der Tat and Über das Geldwesen to Marx’s Zur Judenfrage and the Paris Manuscripts. Regarding Cornu’s first conclusion, Yamanaka and Hatake compare it with the text in which Hess was mentioned in the Manuscripts – “On the category of ‘having’ [Haben], see Hess in the Einundzwanzig Bogen”21  – and acknowledge that Marx did indeed follow Hess’s idea that it is necessary to undertake a critique of private property for it turns man’s activity into a desire to simply ‘have’ an external object, resulting in man becoming unfree and one-sided. Based on this, Yamanaka further points out that “if we extend our horizon to Marx’s critique of crude egalitarian communism and his humanist notion of communism that the true communism is the supersession of the alienation of labor, is the realization of labor as the affirmation of man’s subjective creating activity, then the influence of Hess’s socialist thought in the period of Einundzwanzig Bogen on Marx’s Economic and Philosophic  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 300.

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Manuscripts is beyond imagination”.22 In other words, Hess’s socialist thought, based on the concept of practice, did influence Marx’s notion of communism in the Manuscripts. Despite that, both of them still hold that Hess’s practice, with respect to an understanding of the essence of labor (practice), is merely Fichtean practice with an idealist bent, whereas for Marx, practice is a materialist, sensuous activity of objectification. Hess and Marx’s notions of philosophy are essentially different, and this manifests itself in the concept of the alienation of labor. As Hatake sees it, setting out from materialism, Marx recognizes an object’s independent power in alienation and can thereby distinguish objectification and alienation, a differentiation that Hess is not capable of due to his idealist standpoint. Hess, however, adopts a position similar to voluntarism, claiming that man can overcome alienation and liquidate private property through his subjectivity alone, whilst Marx maintains that this task can only be realized by reforming social material conditions and social relations from which alienation and private property emerge. Since Hess conceives of an object’s objectivity (Objektivität) in the Fichtean fashion, “his concept of practice is weak when confronted with the actual problems, which is why his exposition of actual social practice is so important”. On account of these differences, they cannot concur with “Cornu’s interpretation of Hess’s ‘influence’ on Marx in that he makes ‘certain preparations for the [sc. Marx’s] establishment of the materialist concept of practice’”.23 Concerning Hess’s second conclusion, both Yamanaka and Hatake are of the opinion that, though both Hess and Marx apply Feuerbach’s alienation theory on their analysis of modern society and point to the problem of economic alienation, their differences are substantial. From Yamanaka’s perspective, Hess is only aware of “economic alienation” in the context of citizens’ “general private property”, connecting it to commodity fetishism; Marx, however, analyzes in the Manuscripts the alienation under certain circumstances, i.e. the “alienation of labor” that stems from the “separation of labor from capital” and the institution of “capitalist private property” as such.24 That is to say, Hess’s alienation only refers to man’s alienation in simple commodity production, whereas alienation in Marx’s Manuscripts is the alienation of wage workers in capitalist production. Since Hess fails to see the particularity of the relationship between capitalist and wage worker, his so-called economically alienated society is nothing more than a “world of small traders” (Krämerwelt) or civil society, whilst the economically alienated society that Marx refers to is capitalist society. This is the most fundamental difference between Marx and Hess and the decisive evidence that Hess did not actually hold sway over Marx.  Takaji Yamanaka, Hess and Marx. Focus on the Combination of Classical German Philosophy and French Socialism, in: The Establishment of Das Kapital, Iwanami Shoten, 1967, p. 175 (translated into English by K.H.). 23  Kouichi Hata, Interpretation: Hess and Marx, in: Early Socialist Writings, trans. by T. Yamanaka & K. Hata, Miraisha, 1970, pp. 197–199 (translated into English by K.H.). 24  Takaji Yamanaka, Hess and Marx. Focus on Economic Alienation. Part II, in: Economic Theory, no. 63, 1961, p. 36f (translated into English by K.H.). 22

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To sum up Yamanaka and Hatake’s standpoint, considering the criteria advanced by Cornu, i.e. practice and alienation, there is an essential difference between Marx and Hess. Therefore, if Hess ever had any sort of influence on Marx at all, it is most likely an influence on the preceding articles for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher which contain the same critique of commodity fetishism as Hess’s; but still, he did not substantially influence Marx’s Manuscripts. “Hence, it is necessary to take a negative position towards Cornu’s conclusion that Hess’s Über das Geldwesen held sway on Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts”.25

3.2.2  Hiromatsu’s Theory of Hess’s Overwhelming Influence In contrast to Yamanaka and Hatake who deem Cornu’s interpretation to be an overestimation of Hess’s influence on Marx, Hiromatsu pushes Cornu’s position to another extreme. In Critical Reconstruction of the Image of Early Marx (1967),26 Hiromatsu points out a methodology issue in the study of early Marx. Other than orthodox explanations of Marx’s early thought that proceed from the three sources of Marxism advanced by Lenin, it is necessary to trace the evolution of Marx’s early thought back to three currents within the Young Hegelians, namely the faction of religious critique (Strauss, Bauer, Feuerbach), the faction of critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history (Cieszkowski, Hess) and the faction of critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law (connected with Marx via Ruge).27 Among them, Hess is vital to the development of Marx’s thought. According to Hiromatsu, there is a theoretical gap between Marx’s Manuscripts and Ideologie. Previous Marx studies failed to elucidate how did Marx bridge this gap. The answer to this question, as Hiromatsu sees it, lies in the influence of Hess: “That the previous studies were unable to level up this gap is mostly because they ignored or underestimated the fact that Marx was then under the […] overwhelming influence of his ‘forerunner’, Moses Hess. The theses in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, normally considered as independent works of early Marx, are de facto following Hess’s footsteps not only in regard to their conceptions and perspectives, but even with respect to the wording. Starting from its famous first article, Thesen über Feuerbach, as the well-known ‘brilliant gem of the new world outlook’, is an imitation of one of Hess’s then published essays; its last article is nothing but a critique of Feuerbach from Hess’s standpoint. There are also traces of Hess as collaborator in the old layer of Die deutsche Ideologie”.28  Ibid., p. 39.  Wataru Hiromatsu, Critical Reconstruction of the Image of Early Marx, in: Collected Works of Wataru Hiromatsu, vol. 8, Iwanami Shoten, 1997 (translated into English by K.H.). This essay was firstly published in Thought (no. 10, 1967) and was later included in The Establishment of Marxism (Shiseito, 1968). 27  Ibid., p. 303. 28  Ibid., p. 299f. 25 26

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Hiromatsu’s argument proceeds as following: From Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts in 1843 to the Paris period in 1844 and to Ideologie in 1845, Marx’s thought moves from the faction that critiques Hegel’s philosophy of law to the faction that critiques his philosophy of history. The Manuscripts mark the beginning of Marx’s adoption of Hess’s philosophical paradigm, one that critiques Hegel’s philosophy of history. Such a transition manifests itself in the fact that Marx, though already drawing on Feuerbach’s idea of religious alienation, does not confine his understanding of man to Feuerbach’s species-essence and love (Liebe), but “reinterprets” it as a “social laboring subject”, and based on this, he analyzes problems in society, economics and revolution. These, however, are works already accomplished by Hess! By that time, Hess had not only conceived of man as self-activity (Selbstbetätigung) or the subject of practice – an implication of Fichte’s thought –, but also as a social being through the concept of collaboration (Zusammenwiken) – an implication of Feuerbach’s thought; such a concept of subject that combines Fichte and Feuerbach’s thought allows him to construe communism as the true actualization of freedom and equality and to articulate the actual and historical conditions as well as the social and economic mechanisms for the realization of true communism. In the period of the Manuscripts, Marx could be characterized as being still relatively “backward” in his thought, and not fully comprehending or able to apply Hess’s “progressive” theory. This “backwardness” could be put down to Marx’s distance from Hess’s thought regarding the “definition of the concept of subject”. Specifically speaking, though Marx, as does Hess, conceives of man as a “(1) social being, (2) self-acting, laboring subject”, he underlines simultaneously that “(3) man is an aspect of nature, which still entails the Feuerbachian idea of ‘nature as man’s inorganic body’” and the “(4) tendency to hypostasize [hypostasieren] the species-essence”. These two features, however, are missing in Hess’s theory. More importantly, Marx “(5) regards existent ‘man’ as a natural species of the highest value, which Hess ascribes to ‘freedom’”. In overview, points (3), (4) and (5) do not belong to Hess. Since Marx was so profoundly swayed by Feuerbach that he adopted these three points, his concept of the subject implies “the potential to be entangled in abstracter philosophical justification”29 and thereby falls behind Hess’s. As a result, Marx still kept Feuerbachian propositions such as “the unification of materialism and idealism” and “humanism = naturalism” in the Manuscripts. Considered this way, if Feuerbach is to be taken as the starting point of the transition of Marx’s thought, then Hess is its destination. Marx in the Manuscripts was still oscillating “between Feuerbach and Hess”,30 yet Hess was, by then, already dissociated from Feuerbach. It was not until Thesen that Marx finally caught up with Hess, as Hiromatsu notes: “The eleven-article Thesen is a declaration that Marx, no longer oscillating between Feuerbach and Hess, has almost completed his transition to Hess’s position”.31 By comparing Hess’s Über die sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland  Ibid., p. 330.  Ibid., p. 329. 31  Ibid., p. 336. 29 30

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(written in May 1844, published in the first half of 1845) with Marx’s Thesen, Hiromatsu points out that it is in Thesen that Marx eventually realized the conundrum entailed by Feuerbach’s concept of species-essence and his logic of self-­ alienation based on this concept, shifting his definition of man as a “natural being” in Manuscripts to an “ensemble of social relations”32 in Thesen. Hess has long put forward such an idea. With the change in understanding of the concept of the subject, Marx has finally “distanced himself from Feuerbach” and embarked on a transition from the “unification of idealism and materialism” to materialism. In Ideologie, he finally synthesized and superseded the three factions of the Young Hegelians, surpassing Hess to become Marx as we know him. Yet this conclusion contradicts our common understanding. Even if one could barely concur with Hiromatsu’s emphasis of Hess’s role in the Manuscripts, his thesis that Thesen or even Ideologie are also under Hess’s “overwhelming influence” is unacceptable. In spite of his own defence that he does not intend to deny “Marx’s originality”, his interpretation will inevitably leave the negative impression that, until the writing of Thesen, Marx’s thought is not original, but rather stems from Feuerbach or Hess. Even Hiromatsu himself has later realized that his opinion was bit too extreme so that he, in the new edition of The Establishment of Marxism (1984), “reflected” on his early standpoint, confessing that he had put too much stress on the connection between Marx and Hess, and too little on their differences, thereby, rather than bringing Marx and Engel’s “own theoretical development” to light, he had brought Marx and Engels down to the level of followers of Hess.33 In fact, there is a more profound reason behind Hiromatsu’s adoption of such an extreme point of view. As the title of his essay shows, his intention was to conduct a “critical reconstruction of the image of early Marx” by drawing on Hess and further constructing his own interpretation of Marx, i.e. Hiromatsu’s philosophy. As we know, his work advances two famous theories: Engel’s leading role and the leap from alienation theory to reification theory, both related to his interpretation of Hess. The former is Hiromatsu’s main viewpoint in Ideologie, namely that it is Engels rather than Marx who played a dominant role in the writing of Ideologie, regarded as the birthplace of historical materialism. One of the most important underpinnings of this interpretation is that Engel’s understanding of communism at that time was on a higher level than Marx’s, since Engels was persuaded by Hess’s communist teachings 2  years earlier than Marx. Besides, when constructing the theory of the division of labor, Engels also “adopted and developed” Hess’s thought regarding the “alienation of mutual activity” and productive forces.34 When even Engel’s ideas originate from Hess, it also sounds reasonable that Hess had been the one Marx endeavored to catch up with up until the writing of Ideologie. As for the  Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 4. 33  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Evolution of Marxism. Afterword to the Edition of Collected Works, in: Collected Works of Wataru Hiromatsu, vol. 8, Iwanami Shoten, 1997, p.  588 (translated into English by K.H.). 34  Wataru Hiromatsu, On Engels, Jokyo Shuban, 1994, p. 284 (translated into English by K.H.). 32

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theory of the leap from alienation theory to reification theory, its main thrust is to consider Ideologie as the turning point at which Marx became the Marx we know. In accordance with this standpoint, it is unlikely that Marx already appeared as an independent theorist before Ideologie. It is for this reason that Hiromatsu makes such an effort to highlight Hess’s influence on Marx. To sum up, Hiromatsu takes a radical position on the relationship between Hess and Marx in favor of his theories of Engel’s leading role and the leap from alienation theory to reification theory. From this vantage point, he stands out from other scholars of Hess, insofar as he seeks to incorporate Hess’s thought into his own systematic construction, an approach he shares with Yibing Zhang. Considered in this way, Hiromastu’s study of Hess is indeed distinguished. Nonetheless, he has gone too far in this direction. Shortly after the publication of his essay, Hiromatsu was critiqued by Rachi, the top Young Hegelian scholar in Japan.

3.2.3  Rachi’s Synthesis of Previous Standpoints In 1969, Rachi published his essay Can Hess be Regarded as Young Marx’s Coordinator? Comment on Wataru Hiromatsu’s Interpretation of Early Marx,35 in which he launches the criticism of Hiromatsu that he “might have been too carried away”,36 advancing the opposite interpretation that Hess could not possibly have been connected to the young Marx. To begin with, Rachi points out the problems in Hiromatsu’s understanding of Hess’s thought. For instance, when addressing the difference between Marx and Hess in respect to the “definition of the concept of subject”, Hiromatsu fails to deem the transition from Fichte to Feuerbach to be an advance, but regards Fichtean freedom as a concept at a higher level than Feuerbach’s concept of man. This contradicts the common understanding of the Young Hegelians and the development of Marx’s thought. Moreover, instead of seeing Hess’s theoretical progress from Philosophie der Tat to Über das Geldwesen, he simply sets forth Hess’s influence on Marx in a vague sense without distinguishing Über das Geldwesen from the three articles in Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz in terms of methodology: “To be short, the articles in Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz, especially Philosophie der Tat, represent an anarchist standpoint purified from the approach of Fichte = Bauer in Hess’s fashion, whereas Über das Geldwesen sets out from the school of Spinoza = Feuerbach to overcome the Fichtean subjectification”.37 The  Chikara Rachi, Can Hess be Regarded as Young Marx’s Coordinator? Comment on Wataru Hiromatsu’s Interpretation of Early Marx, Thought, no. 539, May 1969 (translated into English by K.H.). This essay was included under the title Hess and Early Marx in Chikara Rachi’s The Young Hegelians and Early Marx (Iwanami Shoten, 1987). 36  Chikara Rachi, The Young Hegelians and Early Marx, Iwanami Shoten, 1987, p. 297 (translated into English by K.H.). 37  Ibid., p. 300. 35

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core of Philosophie der Tat is a “philosophy of revolution, according to which the alienation and supersession of self-consciousness is the driving force of action”. In Über das Geldwesen, however, Hess “applies the alienation theory based on the real [real] humanism on the economic society”. From Philosophie der Tat to Über das Geldwesen, Hess has undergone a transition from Fichte (Bauer) to Feuerbach. In this respect, Rachi concurs with Cornu and stands in opposition to Hiromatsu. Without this vantage point on Hess’s transition, Hiromatsu comes to the absurd conclusion that Marx was still oscillating “between Feuerbach and Hess” in the period of the Manuscripts. According to the analysis above, the standpoint of Philosophie der Tat and Über das Geldwesen is respectively Fichtean (Bauer) and Feuerbachian and, during 1843 and early 1844, Hess himself was still at the stage of division, and incapable of combining both. In other words, his own thought was yet to mature, and in terms of influences, he was still in transition from Fichte to Feuerbach. In the Manuscripts, however, Marx, though also under Fichte and Feuerbach’s sway, “was oscillating between his so-called ‘discovery’ of Feuerbach and hidden ‘critique’ of Hegel, as the preface to the Manuscripts shows”.38 That is to say, Marx had already surpassed Fichte and Feuerbach’s framework at that time, advancing to Feuerbach and Hegel’s. Marx’s integration of Hegel in his system alone, not to mention his combination of Feuerbach and Hegel, already distinguished him from other Young Hegelians who remained devoted to their critique of Hegel. Hess, for instance, never truly came near to Hegel’s dialectic until death. Therefore, the viewpoint that Marx was still somewhere “between Feuerbach and Hess” was indeed an underestimation of Marx’s depth at the time. Second, Rachi also criticizes Hiromatsu’s standpoint that Marx did not fully adopt Hess’s thought until Thesen. Admittedly, the critique of Feuerbach in Hess’s Über die sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland coincides with Thesen in many places. However, Hiromatsu’s conclusion overlooks their fundamental distinctions: (1) Despite his claim that Marx turned to materialism in Thesen so as to catch up with Hess, Hess himself was never a materialist, although he drew on Feuerbach’s philosophy, he never adopted Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel’s inversion of subject and predicate. As such, how could Marx turn to materialism by following in Hess’s footsteps? (2) Considered this way, it was impossible for Hess to set out from sense-­ certainty and regard activity and practice “as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively”.39 On the contrary, he maintained the idealist notion of practice that thinking is man’s self-activity. This also corresponds with Yamanaka and Hatake’s critique of Hess. (3) Starting from the same concept of intuition as Feuerbach’s, Hess rejected Hegel’s category of mediation, thus “his so-called society as such is nothing but that which is abstracted from the historical process, doctrinized and utopianized by metaphysics”.40 Marx’s critique of Feuerbach in the sixth article of Thesen that “to abstract from the historical process and to define the religious  Ibid., p. 307.  Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 3. 40  Chikara Rachi, The Young Hegelians and Early Marx, Iwanami Shoten, 1987, p. 321. 38 39

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­sentiment [Gemüt; translator] by itself, and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual”41 also holds of Hess. (4) Owning to the drawback of Hess’s methodology, he could only “counterpose norms that transcended history” and “conceive of actual economic society in the immediate form of fetishism”, which is exactly what Marx firmly opposes in Thesen. To be short, the difference between Marx and Hess in Thesen is a difference between historical materialism and historical idealism. The assessment of this difference is key to understanding the relationship between Hess and Marx. In response to this critique, Hiromatsu later wrote On Chikara Rachi’s Critique,42 claiming on the one hand that it was not his intention to regard Hess as a “coordinate of young Marx”, insinuating that Rachi misunderstood him. On the other hand, he selectively responded to Rachi’s critique, yet basically rejected all of them. Rachi did not reply to this until the afterword of On Young Marx: “The reason that I did not respond this time is for one thing that time does not allow me to return to this theme, and for another that the discussion on this particular relation between Hess and Marx is, as I see it, no longer productive”.43 This is where the once influential “debate over young Marx” ended, as Hiromatsu and Rachi, the two most important Japanese scholars of the Young Hegelians, never came back to this topic, which is truly unfortunate for Japanese and international Marx studies in that such a discussion of Hess in the context of classical German philosophy and Marxian philosophy is rare to see even on the international scene. How does Rachi himself construe the relationship between Hess and Marx? The answer can be found in another essay, The Theory of Historical Construction in the Early German Socialism. By comparing Wilhelm Weitling and Hess’s communist thought, Rachi explicitly puts forward the notion that Hess’s humanist communism stands closer to Marx’s Manuscripts than Weitling’s egalitarian communism. Moreover, “one can find in Hess’s thought the prototype of the idealism in Marx’s Manuscripts”,44 insofar as Hess applies Feuerbach’s concept of alienation to social critique. Hess’s theory of activity and practice “contains the original version of the humanism in the Manuscripts and the sprout of an existentialist interpretation”.45 During his debate with Hiromatsu, Rachi also points out that, instead of Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz, it is Über das Geldwesen that evidently coincides with the Manuscripts. He even holds that, “as Wataru Hiromatsu demonstrates, considering the conception and wording alone  – such as the concept of  Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 4. 42  Wataru Hiromatsu, Afterword: On Chikara Rachi’s Critique, in: The Horizon of Marxism, Keiso Shobo, 1969 (translated into English by K.H.). 43  Chikara Rachi, On Early Marx. Review of Modern Marxism, Miraisha, 1971, p. 262 (translated into English by K.H.). 44  Chikara Rachi, The Theory of Historical Construction in the Early German Socialism. On Wilhelm Weitling and Moses Hess, in: The Young Hegelians and Early Marx, Iwanami Shoten, 1987, 153. 45  Ibid., 168. 41

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‘intercourse’ and ‘productive force’ –, it [sc. Über das Geldwesen] not only surpasses the Manuscripts in some places, but even approaches the level of Die deutsche Ideologie”.46 Therefore, Rachi does share Hiromatsu’s idea that Hess influenced Marx, although he does not concur with extending the radius of this influence to Thesen, not to mention place the development of early Marx’s thought completely under Hess’s shadow. When comparing Hess and Marx’s theoretical background, however, Rachi notices that in the Manuscripts, Marx’s starting point is Hess’s position regarding a split in Hegel’s dialectic. In Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics, Lukács characterizes Hess as a “thoroughly unsuccessful forerunner to Marx”47 due to his ignorance of dialectic, completely denying Hess’s influence on Marx, which is later criticized in the “return to Hess” movement as a counterexample that underestimates Hess. In opposition to adherents of this movement, however, Rachi not only translated this work of Lukács, but also adopted his critique of Hess, arguing that Hess’s work, since he completely follows Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, eventually comes down to ethical or religious communist utopianism. From my own point of view, Rachi grasps the Achilles heel of Hess or even, one might say, the Young Hegelians as a group. Regarding the Paris Manuscripts, this is the most essential difference between Marx, and Hess and his followers? From Yamanaka and Hatake’s negation of Hess’s influence to Hiromatsu’s overemphasis on this influence and to Rachi’s synthesis of the two, it seems that the Japanese assessment of Hess in the “return to Hess” movement has undergone the process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. This current culminated and drew to a close in the 1960s and 1970s. Considering its bright side, it promoted the study of the Young Hegelians in Japan and the reconstruction of a “historically original image” of Marx. As a result, the studies of Bauer, Ruge and Carl W. C. Schüz have all made great progress, as numerous relevant monographies have been published. On the other hand, owning to the leading role of Hiromatsu’s philosophy in Japan, Hiromatsu’s theory of Hess’s overwhelming influence also implies an underestimation of Marx’s originality and gave rise to the approach that relies on external factors to explain the evolution of early Marx’s thought.

3.3  Hess Studies in China Chinese Hess studies, although they cannot compete with European and Japanese studies in terms of the compilation of material or translation, cannot be considered academically backward. The works of Cai Hou and Yibing Zhang in particular surpasses European studies in certain aspects.

 Ibid., 305.  Georg Lukács, Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics, in: Tactics and Ethics: Political Writings, 1919–1929, trans. by M. McColgan, Verso, 2014, p. 184.

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3.3.1  Cai Hou’s Pioneering Study In 1994, Cai Hou published The Development of the Thought of the Young Hegelians and Early Marx,48 in which he devotes two chapters (Chapter III and IV) to an examination of the relationship between Marx and Hess’s socialism with respect of their notions of philosophy and socialism. Resting on the German literature of Hess, this work is not confined to limited Chinese translations of Hess’s works; what is more notable is, as an academic work strictly based on textual evidence, it sets Chinese study of the Young Hegelians in motion. In comparison to Hess studies in Europe and Japan, this work has two features: Above all, Cai Hou sets out by considering Feuerbach’s influence on Hess. “In some sense, Hess’s ‘true’ socialism is a reproduction of the philosophy of history or sociology based on Feuerbach’s teachings on ‘species’. The theoretical relation between Hess and Feuerbach has undergone a trilogy of transition, adoption and critique”.49 According to this trilogy, Hess’s transition to Feuerbach’s camp took place in the second half of 1841. Before that he was still under Marx’s sway, confined to the framework of Bauer’s philosophy of self-consciousness. From 1842 onwards, Hess began to adopt Feuerbach’s teachings, based on which he sought to justify socialism from philosophical (1842–1843) and economic (early 1844) perspectives respectively. Resting on the conception of man’s essence as a relationship of social and material exchange, the philosophical justification combines Feuerbach’s idea of species with the essence of socialism, i.e. freedom and equality. The economic justification focuses on introducing Feuerbach’s theory of alienation into the sphere of economics and actual life, laying bare the nature of the alienation of money and actual life. Among them, Über das Geldwesen stands on the “pinnacle”50 of his “adoption and promotion” of Feuerbach’s philosophy. In less than half a year, from the middle of 1844, Hess turned from a “worship” of Feuerbach to a “critique” of him, for “Feuerbach does not truly solve the problem of man’s essence”, failing to either reduce man’s essence to social essence, such as mutual activity, and from humanist teachings to socialism. In its entirety, Cai Hou’s exposition of Hess’s theoretical contribution and limitation is grounded in Hess’s connection to Feuerbach. This approach evidently differs from that of Cornu and other Japanese scholars in that, as they see it, the background of Philosophie der Tat and Über das Geldwesen are respectively Fichte and Feuerbach’s philosophy, and the process of transition from the former to the latter is  Cai Hou, The Development of the Thought of the Young Hegelians and Early Marx, China Social Sciences Press, 1994 (translated into English by K.H.). 49  Ibid., p. 124. 50  Ibid., p. 128. 48

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that of a shift from Fichte to Feuerbach’s framework. Deciding not to concur with this interpretation, however, Cai Hou deems Hess’s adoption of Fichte’s philosophy to be a regression.51 Second, by reviewing the discussion of Cornu, Mönke, David Mclellen, etc. on the relation between Über das Geldwesen and Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Cai Hou explicitly advances a proposal that it is Comments on James Mill and the Manuscripts rather than Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher that were most influenced by Über das Geldwesen, thereby shifting the focus of discussion to the Paris Manuscripts: “In respect of the subject matter, main thread and standpoints, they [sc. Über das Geldwesen and Paris Manuscripts] share certain consistencies and similarities. For this reason, one can conclude that Marx’s Excerpts [sc. Comments on James Mill], especially the Manuscripts, was, in some measure, inspired and influenced by Über das Geldwesen”.52 This explicit identification of the influence of Über das Geldwesen on Comments on James Mill is rather uncommon as far as the author is aware. What is notable is that, whilst stressing the consistency of each, Cai Hou also draws distinctions between them: (1) “Though both conceive labor as man’s essence, Marx, as opposed to Hess who underlines the relationship of men in labor such as ‘exchange’, ‘collaboration and ‘intercourse’, stresses more the general labor”. That is to say, “Marx is not confined to simply highlighting and emphasizing the sociality of the definition of man, namely the sociality of labor”, but also “grasps the key category, namely the alienation of labor”, comprehensively unveiling “the status and function of labor or material production in our social life and historical development and thereby laying the foundation of his edifice of historical materialism”.53 (2) Regardless of consistency between Marx and Hess in terms of their viewpoints on money’s essence and function as well as the relation between money and religion and even the structure of their writings, there is a “major difference” between them on the problem of the genesis of money, since Hess attributes the emergence of money to man’s isolated and disunited state, whereas Marx “construes money as a result of abstract, general private property”, which originates from alienated labor; “hence, in Marx’s point of view, money, along with exchange and private ownership, becomes categories subsumed under and  For instance, in his remark to the sentence “Hess’s understanding of self-consciousness now assumes more of the Feuerbachian character than the Bauerian”, Cai Hou notes: “W.  Mönke’s opinion that Hess turns from Feuerbach’s philosophy to Fichte and his ‘philosophy of self-consciousness’ is problematic” (ibid., p. 135). Moreover, as Cai Hou sees it, it is due to young Marx’s sway in 1841 – Marx was then a Bauerian and Bauer’s philosophy of self-consciousness is a variant of Fichte’s philosophy of practice – that Hess failed to come under Feuerbach’s influence in time (ibid., p. 127). These two examples illustrate Cai Hou’s negative view of Fichte’s (Bauer’s) influence on Hess. 52  Ibid., p. 177. 53  Ibid., p. 164. 51

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determined by labor or production”.54 Thus grounded, it is Cai Hou’s opinion that, compared with Hess’s reduction of man’s essence to sociality, Marx prefers to focus on labor as the subjective basis of man’s essence. In comparison with Hess who puts more emphasis on exchange and money, Marx pays more attention to the labor behind it. This is a salient distinction between Hess and Marx’s perspectives. According to the discussion on Comments on James Mill in the later chapters of this book, however, Cai Hou’s point of view is untenable. For Cai Hou, that Comments on James Mill was under the sway of Über das Geldwesen is only a conclusion of his argument. This conclusion, however, implies a far-reaching potential, namely a consideration of Marx’s Comments on James Mill as a work on the same level as Über das Geldwesen, something that also perhaps also goes beyond Cai Hou’s intention. Yet the following studies conducted in China have endeavored to turn this possibility into reality.

3.3.2  Y  ibing Zhang’s Hess-Centered Construction in Back to Marx Yibing Zhang’s work on Hess firstly appeared in his study, Back to Marx, in which Hess, though regarded as an important “auxiliary economic background”, plays an integral role. Later, in his preface to Moses Hess: Selected Works, Yibing Zhang further elaborates on the standpoint he takes in Back to Marx regarding an ongoing discussion on Comments on James Mill and the aforementioned essay of Hiromatsu. Above all, he “basically concurs with Cornu”, “recognizing Hess’s academic influence on Marx”, opposing the underestimation of Hess’s function as Lukács does, as well as Hiromatsu’s exaggeration of his influence.55 So which of Hess’s works and thoughts did most influence Marx? From his point of view, the answer is Über das Geldwesen and the idea of economic alienation. The idea of economic alienation here mainly designates the following: As opposed to the previous definitions of man’s essence from the perspective of man’s free activity, Hess “expounds the social-realization of man’s species-nature from the perspective of social relationships, coining the term intercourse [Verkehr] to describe the concept”, construing the “collaboration of this exchange and intercourse … [as] the real essence [wirkliches Wesen] of individuals” and the “collaboration” in intercourse as a productive force. From this point alone, Yibing Zhang holds the same position as Cai Hou in principle, yet differs from the latter insofar as he thinks it is English political economy rather than Feuerbach that lies behind Hess’s standpoint: “[T]he real essence of man is a relationship of material intercourse; in this point, we can see Hess’ economics research beginning to surpass Feuerbach’s philosophy. Chinese

 Ibid., p. 170.  Yibing Zhang, Preface: Hess. An Important Forerunner and Companion of Marx and Engels, in: Moses Hess. Selected Works, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2010, pp. 21–22.

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scholar Hou Cai does not comprehend Hess’s deeper economics background. He mistakenly defines Hess’ theories here within Feuerbach’s philosophical context”.56 After highlighting political economy instead of Feuerbach as the background of Über das Geldwesen, Yibing Zhang further brings forth a problem appertaining to the subject matter of the author’s own work, i.e. the relationship between Über das Geldwesen and Comments on James Mill. Closely following the paragraph quoted above, he notes: “While this is an important advancement with regards to Feuerbach, Hess nevertheless commits two fatal mistakes. First, he places intercourse (which is actually modern exchange in a commodity economy) above production, not realizing that this ‘intercourse’ is really the result of production. This determinism of exchange is a step back from the social materialism of the second stratum of classical economics. The author believes we can see the direct influence of Hess’ intercourse determinism on young Marx in Marx’s Comments on Mill. Second, Hess did not understand that his material exchange is only able to occur under specific historical conditions of material production; it is the specific historical result of the production of commodities in bourgeois society. Hess’s elevation of economics using Feuerbach’s species-philosophy necessarily began from the same abstracted intercourse (exchange). In this sense, Hess was closer to the mercantilists than he was to Smith and Ricardo. Of course, the latent logic of the essence of Hess’ views (including the rules of creative force, collaborative intercourse, etc.) is unscientific. Nevertheless, the author believes that the ideas of the young Marx had not yet come close to attaining the level of depth of Hess’ philosophy at this time”.57 In this paragraph, Yibing Zhang presents two viewpoints: To begin with, Über das Geldwesen represents in essence a “determinism of exchange”, under whose influence Marx’s Comments on James Mill comes to being. Second, if “at this time” the quotation above refers to the stage of Comments on James Mill in the Paris Manuscripts, then Comments on James Mill is to be considered of a lower level than Über das Geldwesen, which, however, does not match some of his own assessment of Comments on James Mill in Back to Marx, for instance: “[I]n this philosophical criticism of economics – the area he believed to be most important – he agreed with Hess’s views. What is more, Marx easily surpasses Hess in Comments on James Mill”.58 This problem, however, should not concern us here. The reason behind Yibing Zhang’s claim that “determinism of exchange is a step back from the social materialism of the second stratum of classical economics” is that such a “determinism of exchange” “places intercourse (which is actually modern exchange in a commodity economy) above production, not realizing that ‘this intercourse’ is really the result of production”. In other words, production, as he sees it, stands on a higher plane than intercourse, and only by setting out from production  Ibid., p. 13. The underlined part originally appears as a footnote in the Chinese edition of Back to Marx. As a matter of fact, however, Cai Hou does undertake an economic analysis on Hess and points out that Hess’s advance to Feuerbach’s philosophy is bridged through his study of economics (Cai Hou, The Development of the Thought of the Young Hegelians and Early Marx, China Social Sciences Press, 1994, pp. 136–142). 57  Ibid., p. 13. The underlined part is originally omitted in the Chinese edition of Back to Marx. 58  Yibing Zhang, Back to Marx. Changes of Philosophical Discourse in the Context of Economics, trans. by T. Mitchell, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2014, p. 140f. 56

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can one come close to Marx’s mature thought. At that time, Marx elaborated in the First Manuscript on the alienation of labor or production, whereas Comments on James Mill, as a result of the influence of Hess’s “intercourse determinism” in Über das Geldwesen, focuses on the alienation of intercourse. Considering this, he draws the conclusion that the First Manuscript stands on a higher level than Comments on James Mill, and therefore that Comments on James Mill could only have been be written before the First Manuscript. Proceeding from this standpoint, Yibing Zhang will by no means agree with Hiromatsu’s claim that even Thesen was still under Hess’s influence. In fact, he turns right away to the critique of Hiromatsu: “Hess’s species-being tends more towards man’s exchange relationship and collaboration. Considering this, Hess’s influence on young Marx is rather exemplified in the money-centered ‘economic alienation’ in Comments on James Mill (alienation of intercourse) rather than the alienated labor in the 1844 Manuscripts. In the latter, Marx surpasses Hess both in respect of his critique of the multiple alienation of labor relation within capitalist economic structure as well as his critique of objective [objektiv] logic based on industrial manufacture (personal property or movable property)”.59 Correspondingly, in the preface to the Chinese translation of Hiromatsu’s The Original Image of Historical Materialism, he notes: “Hess’s intercourse is merely an appearance, a concept attained through narrowing the logic scope down to the simple commodity circulation of small commodity producers where the ‘circulation’ is obviously the focus. ‘In this model of a society of simply commodity circulation, such a form of intercourse is almost the form of the existence of social division of labor  =  collaboration’. Actually, that young Marx in 1844 Manuscripts develops alienation of intercourse, which Hess derives from the sphere of circulation, further to alienation of labor on the sphere of production exactly manifests his consciousness of this limitation. Some scholars, however, have completely reversed this progress of theoretical logic in that they cannot look through it from the process of Marx’s economics study”.60 These two quotations not only point out Hess and Hiromatsu’s mistakes, but also, in a more profound sense, make a plea for the viewpoint that Comments on James Mill is written before the First Manuscripts. For those familiar with studies on the Paris Manuscripts in China, it is exactly in regard to this problem that the author stands in opposition to Yibing Zhang. In the author’s opinion, no matter from a philological or logical perspective, Comments on James Mill was written before the First Manuscript, since the alienation of intercourse in the former is on a higher plane to the alienation of labor in the latter.61 It is perhaps due to this dispute that he wrote similar passages in both prefaces; the “some scholars” that he criticizes must have also included this author.  Ibid., 2010, p. 23.  Yibing Zhang, Preface: Wataru Hiromatsu. Reification and Historical Materialism, in: Wataru Hiromatsu, The Original Image of Historical Materialism, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2009, p. 22. 61  See Lixin Han, On the Japanese “Debate over Early Marx”. A Comment on the Significance of Comments on James Mill for the Reconstruction of Marx’s Alienation Theory, in: Philosophical Researches, no. 9, 2010, The Turning Point of Marx’s Thoughts. The Alienation of Intercourse in Comments on James Mill, in: Modern Philosophy, no. 5, 2007. 59 60

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Considering the main thrust of this chapter, the author shall confine his argument here to two points: First, the labor referred to in its alienation in the First Manuscript is under no circumstance identical with Marx’s later concept of production; equating this labor with production in the introduction to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1857) is rather far-fetched. Second, the theory of alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill can by no means be replaced by Hess’s concept of intercourse or be summarized as Yibing Zhang’s “intercourse determinism”. It is actually a methodological category Marx attained through his conscientious study of the division of labor and exchange theory of political economy and his combination of them with Hegel’s dialectic. If labor can be construed as a subject-object relationship, then intercourse is an intersubjective relationship that implies a connection between Sachen; the essence of this intersubjective relation is Marx’s later employed category of economic or social relations, a level of depth to which Hess has never come close. Thus, the concept of intercourse here belongs to Marx’s basic conception of modern civil society and is in fact equivalent to Smith’s “commercial society” or Hegel’s “system of needs”. Third, on no account can the concept of intercourse from Comments on James Mill be equated with the moment of exchange or circulation in the entire process of production, consumption, distribution and exchange (circulation) in the introduction of Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. That production is placed before exchange in the introduction does not mean to narrow intercourse in Comments on James Mill down to an element of the production process or conclude that the alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill is below the level of the alienation of labor in the First Manuscript. The reason that alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill stands the same high plane as alienation of labor in the First Manuscript will be expounded at great length in later chapters. Yibing Zhang’s definition of the relationship between Comments on James Mill and the First Manuscript is tied up with his division of early Marx’s thought as well as his systematic construction in Back to Marx. As is widely known, he advances in Back to Marx “two completely different forms of theoretical logic”, namely the “humanist logic of alienation” and the “economics materialist logic”. Based on their correlation, he dates the establishment of “general historical materialism” to between 1845 and 1846, i.e. in the period of Thesen and Ideologie, for at that time an “economic materialist logic” prevailed over the “humanist logic of alienation” and Marx’s economic thought finally reached its maturity. According to the extant manuscripts of Marx, however, the only text that can represent the pinnacle of Marx’s economic study during 1844 and 1846 is Comments on James Mill; yet Yibing Zhang deliberately neglects it, insisting that Ideologie instead is the peak of the “economic materialist logic”. This standpoint certainly coheres with his assessment of Comments on James Mill as a work on Hess’s level. In other words, this evaluation directly influences his theory of “two completely different forms of theoretical logic”. Hence, Hess plays an integral role in Yibing Zhang’s construction in Back to Marx, as the author notes at the beginning of this subchapter. In all, for Yibing Zhang, his study of Hess is by no means simply concerned with an assessment of Hess’s thought, but also his systematic construction in Back to Marx.

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From Cai Hou to Yibing Zhang, Chinese Hess studies in China have trodden a unique path. Cai Hou emphasizes the Feuerbachian element in Hess’s thought to the utmost, associating Über das Geldwesen with Marx’s Comments on James Mill. Resting on this, Yibing Zhang further considers Comments on James Mill as a work equivalent to Über das Geldwesen, concluding that Comments on James Mill stands on a lower level than Manuscripts. Though unexpected, this path is distinctive on the international scene. Yet the author disagrees with this approach, as we shall see in later chapters. Thus far, we have reviewed Cornu’s studies and the “return to Hess” movement in both China and Japan. In the following, let us conduct a brief assessment of this movement. Different from western Europe, both China and Japan were once under the yoke of a Soviet dogmatic system; in order to put forward an original idea of Marxism, one has to cross this dogmatic divide and return to Marx’s initial context, thereby reconstructing a theoretical framework as the basis of understanding Marx. When many Japanese scholars took on this task in the 1960s, the reconstruction of the “image of Marx” and the “original image of history” became catchphrases. In this process, the studies of the Young Hegelians, the “return to Hess” movement in particular, have become key moments or approaches for their reconstruction of Marx, as the “debate over the Young Hegelians” between Hiromatsu and Rachi demonstrates. Considered this way, it is also necessary to promote the study of the Young Hegelians in China. Cai Hou and Yibing Zhang’s studies can be deemed pioneering efforts in this direction. The “return to Hess” entails, however, certain theoretical risks, especially when we integrate Hess’s element into a reconstruction of Marx’s philosophy. According to the analysis above, it is evident that, due to discontent with previous underestimations of Hess, this movement tends to overemphasize Hess’s influence on Marx. Such an inclination does in fact bring with it the risk of reliance on extrinsic factors to explain intrinsic reasons for Marx’s theoretical development, even denying the originality of Marx’s thought, and resulting in an assessment of the philosophical revolution accomplished by Marx as merely a composite of his contemporaries’ standpoints. Thus, an objective assessment of Hess’s theoretical status and his influence on Marx is not only a key to avoid unnecessary theoretical risks, but also a guarantee of the success of reconstructing Marx by virtue of the Young Hegelians.

3.4  Limitations of Hess’s Thought Hence, what exactly is the difference between Marx and Hess’s thought at that time? Considering Hess’s Philosophie der Tat, Über das Geldwesen and Marx’s Comments on James Mill, their difference encompasses multiple aspects. For instance, setting out from the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history, Hess stresses the function of subjective activity, namely will and subjective practice, and is a radical idealist in terms of his notion of philosophy, whereas Marx was then drawing on Feuerbach’s natural materialism and the “economic materialist logic” of political

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economy, seeking to combine both with Hegel’s dialectic and converting his notion of philosophy to dialectic materialism and historical materialism. Regarding their understanding of man, Hess tends to conceive of man in terms of activity or spiritual essence in Fichte’s sense; for Marx, however, man exists within an actual private ownership relationship. With regard to the notion of communism, Hess attempts to construct an ethical communism through the combination of French socialism and German philosophical socialism, whilst the path Marx opts for is to establish a scientific socialism by combining English political economy, French socialism and classical German philosophy. Regarding the subject matter of this book, the author should point out two reasons behind these differences: In comparison with Marx in the period of the Paris Manuscripts, (1) Hess overlooked Hegel’s dialectic; (2) though he did study political economy, he failed to substantially integrate the outcome of political economy in this theory. It is due to these two limitations that Hess, though he took the socialist or communist path earlier than Marx, was not capable of disecting the “anatomy of this civil society”, which left a critique of political economy as well as the task of establishing historical materialism, up to Marx.

3.4.1  Lack of Hegel’s Dialectic In 1926, right after the publication of History and Class Consciousness, Lukács wrote an essay on Hess, claiming that “Hess himself appears as a thoroughly unsuccessful forerunner to Marx”.62 This conclusion is drawn from the fact that, at the last stage of their theoretical evolution, Marx and Hess were both in the process of converting to communism, and adopting thoroughly opposite attitudes towards Hegel’s philosophy: Hess completely rejected Hegel’s dialectic, turning back to Fichte and Feuerbach, whereas Marx critically inherited Hegel’s dialectic, seeking to combine it with political economy. Hence, as we know, Marx become the founder of historical materialism, whilst Hess remained the spokesman of a form of true socialism, that was to become a target of Marx and Engel’s critique. As Lukács sees it, Hess also set out from Hegel’s philosophy of history in the first place, but later, under Cieszkowski’s influence, sought to establish a new philosophy based on subjective activity and practice, namely the philosophy of action, by introducing Fichte’s concept of practice due to his discontent with the rigidity, objectivity and staticity of Hegel’s philosophy of history. As a result, it turned out to be “an attempt to overcome the contemplative character of Hegelian philosophy and make the dialectic practical […] bound of necessity to lead back to Fichte”.63 As Lukács himself comments in the Preface to the new edition (1967) with Marx’s own words, “such thinkers [sc. the Young Hegelians including Hess] believed subjectively that  Georg Lukács, Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics, in: Tactics and Ethics: Political Writings, 1919–1929, trans. by M. McColgan, Verso, 2014, p. 184. 63  Ibid., p. 185. 62

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they were making an advance on Hegel, while objectively they simply represented a revival of Fichte’s subjective idealism. […] this [sc. Fichte’s] ­radicalism is purely imaginary and that, as far as knowledge of the real movement of history is concerned, Hegel’s philosophy moves on an objectively higher plane than Fichte’s. This is because the dynamics of Hegel’s system of the social and historical mediating factors that produce the present is more real and less of an abstract intellectual construct than Fichte’s manner of pointing toward the future”.64 Hegel’s dialectic is indeed an objective conception that stands closer to the reality of modern society, or, in Lukács’s words, it contains “dynamics […] of the social and historical mediating factors”. The Young Hegelians such as Hess, however, conceive of this realism or positivism as the conservative element of Hegel’s philosophy, abandoning Hegel’s historical dialectic because of its inclination to reconcile with reality, resorting to idealism that points towards the future. This “always leave [Hess] trailing behind Hegel”65 and has him end up in utopianism and utopian socialism. On the contrary, Marx, by drawing on Hegel’s realism and historical dialectic, unmasks within the social structure the irrationality of capitalism and looks into the future. The approach of the Young Hegelians, as Marx and Engels later criticized in Ideologie, is rather historical idealism. Moreover, as Hess turned back to Fichte, he also comprehensively adopted Feuerbach’s philosophy. To be sure, Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel’s idealism from the materialist standpoint, particularly his identification of Hegel’s inversion of subject and predicate, proves to be tenable. Yet he dismisses the progressive aspect of Hegel’s philosophy especially the rationality of mediation, seeking to replace it with intuition, sense and immediacy and thereby completely setting aside the abundance and historicality of Hegel’s dialectic. As Lukács comments, through the “uncritical adoption of Feuerbach’s basically wrong attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and in particular this theory of the relationship between immediacy and mediation”,66 Hess proceeds from immediate knowledge of Feuerbach, rejecting Hegel’s concept of mediation. With regard to the notion of philosophy, Hess “succumbs to the very weakest, most idealistic aspect of Feuerbach’s work: his ethic of love”,67 and is eventually entangled in ethical communism in the religious sense, and in philosophical communism. It is exactly for this reason that, as Rachi points out, Marx’s critique of Feuerbach in the sixth article of Thesen also hold true of Hess. Then, which level exactly does Marx’s thought in the Paris Manuscripts attain? In fact, he was already standing on the same plane as Hegel. If Marx still lacked a political economy background when he was critiquing Hegel’s philosophy of law and was therefore unable to come to grips with Hegel’s dialectic, then, after studying the teachings of Smith, Say, Mill and Ricardo, etc., he acquired the needed ability to  Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, 1971, p. XXXIV. 65  Georg Lukács, Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics, in: Tactics and Ethics: Political Writings, 1919–1929, trans. by M. McColgan, Verso, 2014, p. 185. 66  Ibid., p. 202. 67  Ibid., p. 201. 64

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critically inherit Hegel’s dialectic. Take the concept of alienation in the Paris Manuscripts for instance, as opposed to the concept of alienation in the First Manuscript that still bears Feuerbach and Hess’s hallmark, the alienation concept in Comments on James Mill already surpasses the framework of Feuerbach’s alienation theory, reaching the level of Hegel’s alienation theory in Phänomenologie. Not attentive to the superiority of Hegel’s alienation theory over Feuerbach’s, Hess, on the contrary, applies Feuerbach’s alienation concept to the social and economic sphere, which is in fact a regression. It was not until the writing of Comments on James Mill that Marx realized this, turning unreservedly from Feuerbach to Hegel and applying Hegel’s alienation concept to the social and economic sphere. Among Young Hegelians, he was the only one who accomplished such a transition. In all, as Lukács comments, “Marx takes up the thread where Hegel left off”.68 Considering this, Engels later explicitly points out in Ludwig Feuerbach that “he [sc. Feuerbach] himself, compared with the encyclopaedic wealth of the Hegelian system, achieved nothing positive beyond a bombastic religion of love and a meagre, impotent morality”.69 In the maturity of his thought, Marx also “openly avowed [himself] the pupil of that mighty thinker [sc. Hegel]”.70 These all suggest that, comparing with Feuerbach and Fichte, Hegel is the key to Marx’s establishment of historical materialism. In this sense, Lukács’s critique of Hess is accurate and successfully brings the difference between Marx and Hess to light. The fundamental flaw of the “return to Hess” movement is forgetting Lukács’s remark, regarding Fichte or Feuerbach as the link to measure the development of Marx’s thought.

3.4.2  Superficial Understanding of Political Economy To be sure, Hess already exhibits his economic knowledge in Über das Geldwesen, insofar as he employs various categories that later feature in the historical materialist system such as money, property, private property, exchange (intercourse), productive force, society and capital. The appearance of these categories, however, does not necessarily mean that they are employed in the same sense as in Marx’s context. The correct application of these categories requires adequate knowledge of political economy. In this regard, Hess’s understanding of political economy is still shallow compared with Marx’s in the Paris Manuscript, in that it lacked a survey of the teachings of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, et al. It is for this reason that these two works, though written almost at the same time, differ from each other in terms of their critique of capitalism: In Über das Geldwesen, Hess resorts to intrinsic factors of

 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, 1971, p. XXXV. 69  Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 26: Engels: 1882–1889, Progress Publishers, 1990, p. 382. 70  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 19. 68

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humanity such as morality and love to launch a moral critique of capitalism, whilst Marx’s critically employs concepts of political economy –private property, division of labor, exchange and capital – to undertake a scientific critique of capitalism and its theoretical reflection, i.e. political economy. For those familiar with Das Kapital and Althusser’s “epistemological break”, the implications of this scientific critique go without saying. This limitation of Hess is exemplified in his negative understanding of civil society (see Chapter X. The Alienation of Intercourse in Comments on James Mill. The Turning Point of Marx). Hess considers civil society as an inhuman world of bellum omnium contra omnes where individual losses his social connection and names it the “world of small traders”.71 This definition indicates that Hess’s conception of civil society only rests on Hegel’s principle of particularity, yet lacks the advancement and universality of civil society. According to the analysis in the last chapter, this understanding of civil society is very close to Marx’s in Zur Judenfrage; considering this similarity alone, Über das Geldwesen is actually on the same level as Zur Judenfrage. Whilst Hess still held onto his old position, Marx took a significant step in 1844. After finishing Zur Judenfrage, Marx devoted himself to the study of political economy. By summer 1844, he has, through the study of the theories of Smith, Say, Skarbek, Ricardo, Mill, etc., surpassed Hess by distance, both in respect of the understanding of political economy as well as the application of the knowledge of political economy. The analysis of the three sources of income and the genesis of private of property in the First Manuscript along with the definition of the essence of money and the examination of the commodity world within private property in Comments on James Mill all bear a strong hallmark of economics; in the light of the understanding of civil society, Marx is no longer confined to the negative vantage point, but construes civil society as a positive, organic system from the perspective of formal universality. Not only are these notions far beyond the league of Marx’s contemporaries such as Hess, the Paris Manuscripts, even when judged according to the criterion of Marx’s mature political economy, can be regarded as the rudiment of Grundrisse and Das Kapital, or even be named as the preliminary Das Kapital. It is considering the level of depth he attains that Marx announces in the preface to Manuscripts with full confidence that “[i]t is hardly necessary to assure the reader conversant with political economy that my results have been attained by means of a wholly empirical analysis based on a conscientious critical study of political economy”.72 In conclusion, in 1844, Hess was still concerned to apply Fichte’s philosophy of practice to the construction of his socialist theory and Feuerbach’s alienation concept to his critique of society and economics. In its entirety, his background consists mainly of Fichte and Feuerbach’s teachings, or is at most based on the combination  Cf. Moses Hess, Über das Geldwesen, in: Moses Hess. Selected Works, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2010, p. 151. 72  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 231. 71

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of both. Marx, however, incorporates not only Feuerbach, but also, and more importantly, Hegel, political economy and even their combination in his framework. This leads to the principal difference between Marx and Hess. Those acquainted with Marx’s mature thought would have known what such difference implies.

3.5  Summary At last, let us make a summary of the relation between Hess and the Paris Manuscripts. From my point of view, Hess’s influence on Marx in the Paris period of 1844 is rather limited. It is not thanks to Hess’s guidance, but owning to Marx’s own endeavor that Marx manages to conduct a Marxian critique of political economy and the phenomenon of alienation in modern society in the Paris Manuscripts. At that time, he had surpassed Hess by some distance with regard to his critical adoption of political economy and interpretation of Hegel’s Phänomenologie. These two aspects are exactly the premise for establishing historical materialism. Therefore, in its entirety, Marx stands on a much higher plane than Hess in the Paris Manuscripts, especially in the texts from Comments on James Mill onwards. It is unfair for Marx when the entire Manuscripts are put under Feuerbach or Hess’s shadow simply because Marx still employs concepts such as species, man’s essence and alienation in the Manuscripts. As Marx once recalls in Ideologie, “[t] his path was already indicated in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher  – in the Einleitung zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie and Zur Judenfrage. But since at that time this was done in philosophical phraseology, the traditionally occurring philosophical expressions such as ‘human essence’, ‘species’, etc., gave the German theoreticians the desired reason for misunderstanding the real trend of thought and believing that here again it was a question merely of giving a new turn to their worn-out theoretical garment”.73 This paragraph is to remind us that, though he has long established a new philosophy, the German theorists still mistakenly assume that he is still confined to the old Feuerbachian paradigm simply because of his terminology such as “human essence” and “species”. When even Zur Judenfrage and Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung do not belong to the old paradigm, the Manuscripts can by no means be demoted onto the plane of Hess at all. In this sense, Cornu, Hiromatsu and Yibing Zhang have all overestimated Hess, whilst underrating the Paris Manuscript at same time.  Marx, The German Ideology, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 236.

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Chapter 4

Philological Studies of the Paris Manuscripts and Their Significance

Along with Ideologie and Grundrisse im weiteren Sinne (Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58), the Paris Manuscripts are regarded as one of the three most important sets of manuscripts in Marx’s oeuvre. As the most significant work in the evolution of Marx’s early thought, the Paris Manuscripts have been the center of attention as well as dispute ever since their publication. From the 1930s to the 1960s, discussions on the Paris Manuscripts were mainly centered on an assessment of alienation in labor theory, which internationally gave rise to the so-called “two Marx debate”. At the end of the 1960s, however, a startling new research frontier opened up, based on substantial headway made by European and Japanese scholars in surveying the writing sequence of the Paris Manuscripts. With regard to debate on the theory of labor alienation and the “two Marx debate” as the first wave of studies on the manuscripts, this new frontier can be considered a second wave. This chapter will begin with a brief introduction and assessment of previous studies of the Paris Manuscripts and thereby respond to Taubert’s hypothesis.

4.1  Definition of the Paris Manuscripts In October 1843, Marx moved from Germany to France. His stay in Paris until February 1845 is known as the Paris period, and played a crucial role in the formation of Marx’s thought. Exactly as Marx put it himself in the preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1859), it was in this period that he entered into study of political economy for “the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy”.1 Through this research, Marx finally freed himself from the yoke of the Young Hegelians, setting off on a journey to establish a new world outlook. This thought transition is documented in the manuscripts written during the 1  Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One. Preface, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Marx: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 262.

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Paris period, which can be divided into two parts: Excerpts from and comments on works of economics, commonly known as the Economics Notes, and what appears to be the manuscript of a work in progress, i.e. the so-called Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 or the Manuscripts in short. Together, the Economic Notes and the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 comprise the Paris Manuscripts, not to be mistaken for the Manuscripts. The earliest publication of the Paris Manuscripts dates back to MEGA① in 1932, which includes both parts of the manuscripts in volume 3 of section I (I-3). Yet the editors of the subsequent Russian and German versions of MEW did not intend to include the Manuscripts in the first place, and only added them later in the complementary volume, 42, due to the protestations of Western scholars. The Notes, however, failed to be included in their entirety, except for the excerpts from Friedrich Engels’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie and James Mill: Élémens d’économie politique, namely Comments on James Mill. The new version of MEGA first published in 1975 changed the approach of MEW by including the entire Paris Manuscripts as MEGA① had done. Nevertheless, the Manuscripts and Notes were respectively incorporated in MEGA② IV-2 (autumn 1981)2 and MEGA② I-2 (1982),3 according to editing guidelines for separate inclusion. We begin with a brief introduction to the Notes. Since his time as a student, Marx had developed the habit of taking excerpts from and annotating works of interest before writing about them at length. During the Paris period, he wrote extensive notes on the works of famous English and French theorists, leaving us nine notebooks in total. The editors of MEGA① number these notes in accordance with their date of writing.4 Modifications occurred in the new version of MEGA, for example parts of the Notes are subsumed under the Brussel Notes, but the categorization and numbering of its predecessor, also adopted in this chapter, remain the international norm for all discussions on the Notes. Further information about these notebooks is given in Table 4.1. The left column gives the ordering of the Notes in accordance with the numbering of MEGA①, whilst the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 on the right-hand side is arranged based on the writing sequence set down by MEGA②. These nine notebooks were written in two periods: The first five notebooks date back to the period between October 1843 and August 1844, and the rest were written between December 1844 and the beginning of 1845. Since the Manuscripts are also dated between April and August 1844, coinciding with the time in which the first five notebooks were written, the five are usually deemed to be the foundation for Marx’s Manuscripts. Especially given that a considerable part of the Manuscripts has been lost, these five notebooks have become an invaluable archive for us to build a complete picture of the Paris Manuscripts.

 Marx, Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Exzerpte und Notizen 1843 bis Januar 1845, In: MEGA② IV-2, Dietz Verlag, 1981. 3  Marx, Ökonomisch-Philosophische Manuskripte, In: MEGA② I-2, Dietz Verlag, 1982. 4  Marx and Engels, Die Heilige Familie und Schriften von Marx von Anfang 1844 bis Anfang 1845, in: MEGA① I-3, Marx-Engels-Verlag, 1932, S. 411f. 2

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Table 4.1  Comparison between the two major parts of Paris Manuscripts Economics Notes (according to the numbering of MEGA①) The First Notebook: Say and Skarbek The Second Notebook: Smith The Third Notebook: René Levasseurs and Smith The Fourth Notebook: Xenophon, Ricardo and Mill The Fifth Notebook: John R. McCulloch, Pierre Prévost, Antoine D. de Tracy, Mill and Engels The Sixth Notebook: James Lauderdale The Seventh Notebook: Schüz, Friedrich List, Heinrich F. Oslander The Eighth Notebook: Pierre de Boisguillebert and John Law The Ninth Notebook: Antoine-E. Buret

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (according to the writing sequence set down by MEGA②) The First Manuscript:  Wages of Labor, Profit of Capital, Rent of Land  [Alienated Labor and Private Property] The Second Manuscript:  [Antithesis of Capital and Labor. Landed Property and Capital] The Third Manuscript:  [Re. p. XXXVI]  [Re. p. XXXIX]  [Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole]  [Human Requirements and Division of Labor under the Rule of Private Property and under Socialism. Division of Labor in Bourgeois Society]  Preface  [The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society]

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 is the title of the Manuscripts given by the editors of MEGA①. The Manuscripts comprise three relatively complete sections, along with a preface, excerpts from Hegel’s Phänomenologie and some independent fragments. The editors of MEGA① named the three sections the First Manuscript (Erstes Manuskript), the Second Manuscripts (Zweites Manuskript), and the Third Manuscript (Drittes Manuskript) respectively according to the date of writing of each manuscript and hints left by Marx. This categorization was adopted by MEGA②, with the titles changed to Notebook I (Heft I), Notebook II (Heft II) and Notebook III (Heft III). The author follows the titles used in MEGA①, as they remain the international standard for discussions of the Manuscripts.

4.2  Philological Focus on the Paris Manuscripts Philological studies of the Paris manuscripts began at the end of the 1960s, turning upon the relationship between the writing of the Manuscripts and that of the Notes. Before the 1960s, the prevailing explanation for the writing sequence of the Paris Manuscripts was that the Notes were written prior to the Manuscripts. This theory was first brought forth by Adoratskij, the editor of MEGA① I-3, who argues that the Notes including excerpts from and notes about Say, Smith, Ricardo, and Mill’s works must have been written before the Manuscripts, for they were clearly Marx’s

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preparatory notes for writing the Manuscripts.5 Concurring with Adoratskij’s theory, the Soviet economist David I. Rozenberg applies it to his interpretation of the Paris Manuscripts in A Summary of the Development of Marx’s and Engels’s Economics Theories in the 1940s,6 insofar as his explication of Marx’s early economics theory basically follows a sequence from the first five notebooks to the Manuscripts. Likewise, this sequence was also adopted by another Soviet philosopher Oizerman in The Evolution of Marxist Philosophy and by the editors of the Russian and German version of MEW. As the editor notes in a remark to Comments on James Mill in the Chinese translation of MEW: “Different from many other similar materials in Marx’s manuscripts, notes and excerpts for instance, this document [sc. Comments on James Mill] consists mainly of Marx’s comments that are related to Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 in terms of their content, and written prior to these manuscripts”.7 Owing to the authority of MEW, Adoratskij’s theory exerted a profound influence on Marx studies worldwide.

4.2.1  Pioneering Studies of Japanese Scholars At the end of the 1960s, however, this theory was vigorously challenged by Japanese Marxist economists. Before the publication of Lapin’s essay, they were the first to address the writing sequence of the Manuscripts and the Notes and compare their level of depth in an academic manner. This discussion was sparked off by the differentiation of perspectives on the alienation of labor theory in the First Manuscript and Comments on James Mill. It is normally considered that the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscripts is in principle concerned with the connection between capital and wage labor, while the Comments on James Mill sees Marx discuss alienated forms of social intercourse – such as money, exchange, and division of labor – within an commodity economy. Although both fragments focus on private property (Privateigentum) and alienation, the meanings of these two concepts vary considerably from fragment to fragment: In the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] and Comments on James Mill, private property designates private property under capitalism and the private property of common commodity producers or citizens respectively. Likewise, alienation in the former denotes the alienation of labor in the immediate process of capitalist production and in the latter, the alienation of ­intercourse during commodity exchange. In brief, with regard to vantage point and depth, these two fragments are significantly different. Herein lie the questions:   Vladimir Adoratsky, Einleitung zum dritten Band der ersten Abteilung, in: MEGA① I-3, S. XII-XIII. 6  David I. Rozenberg, A Summary of the Development of Marx and Engels’ Economics Theories in the 1940s, trans. by Fang Gang et. al., SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1958. 7  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Collected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 42, People’s Publishing House, 1979 (translated into English by K.H.). 5

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Which text was written first, and which stands on a higher plane? These were the major problems puzzling Japanese scholars in the 1960s. Koichi Shigeta was one of the first to notice the sequence and complexity issue. He argues that Marx had already applied a set of economics categories such as private properties-value-money in Comments on James Mill to his analysis of the alienated form of species-life. This approach differs from the alienation of labor theory in the First Manuscript, yet roughly corresponds to the structure of reification Marx employs in Das Kapital to survey relations of production, i.e. commodities-­ money-­value.8 Without drawing a distinction between these two manuscripts, however, he vaguely suggests that they cohere with each other, yet are reciprocally supplementing, insofar as the economics concepts that are lacking in the Manuscripts – such as exchange, value, and money – are supplemented in Comments on James Mill. In comparison, Suguei Hosomi makes the difference and contradiction between these two the center of his discussion and holds that this difference exemplifies young Marx’s change of perspective: After his unsuccessful attempt to deduce the opposition of the three original classes (First Manuscripts) from the commodity exchange relationship (Comments on James Mill), Marx returns to the opposition of the three original classes and deduces from his analysis that such opposition is rooted in the alienation of labor. Hence, young Marx’s thought appears to have been taking shape during the transition from Comments on James Mill to the First Manuscript. Based on this, Hosomi suggests that Comments on James Mill was written prior to the First Manuscript. In contrast to Hosomi, Kyoshi Oshima writes in The Path to Das Kapital (1968) that Marx reduces all labor processes to the coercive exploitation of workers by capital due to a neglect of the commodity exchange relationship in the First Manuscript. In Comments on James Mill, however, he had a more concrete and well-rounded understanding of social relations and self-alienation, stemming from a study of money, value and commodity exchange.9 Therefore, the theoretical standing of Comments on James Mill is higher than that of the First Manuscript. Almost at the same time, Hiroshi Nakagawa points out that Marx had already availed himself of two vantage points in his two articles for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher: Zur Judenfrage presupposes the relationship of commodities to money, whilst the underlying structure of Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung is the relationship of capital. By the Paris period, these two perspectives that should have been unified are still independent of each other: The relationship of commodities to money in Comments on James Mill serves as a supplement to that of capital in the Manuscripts. After this differentiation of perspectives, Nakagawa launches criticism at the standpoint of Hosomi et al., pointing out emphatically that the fragment [Die ent8  Koichi Shigeta, A Comment on Young Marx’s Economic Notebooks of 1844, in: The Economic Review of Kansai University, vol. 8, no. 6, 1959. 9  Cf. Kyoshi Oshima, Chapter II. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and Economics Notes, in: The Path to Das Kapital, Todai Shubankai, 1986.

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fremdete Arbeit] was written before Comments on James Mill. Notably, in justifying his point of view, Nakagawa takes an approach which is very similar to Lapin’s philological examination that will be considered later. Specifically, he discovers in the index at the end of Grundrisse that Comments on James Mill was written in the summer of 1848, which obviously contradicts the conclusion of MEGA① I-3 that the First Manuscripts was written between April and May 1844. If the index of Grundrisse is correct, then Comments on James Mill must have been written at a later time point than the First Manuscript. Furthermore, the examination of the text also indicates that Mill’s name and the citation of his work did not appear until the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript. For this reason, “as opposed to Suguei Hosomi’s opinion, the writing sequence is as follows: The First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript. If this sequence proves to be correct, then one of the premises of Suguei Hosomi’s argument has collapsed”.10 This is very likely the earliest theory to place Comments on James Mill chronologically after the First Manuscript. In this way, 1960s Japanese academia set up a sharp opposition on the sequencing of Comments on James Mill and the First Manuscript. It was not until the publication of Lapin’s essay that this contention was finally put to rest.

4.2.2  Lapin’s Division of Two Stages In February 1969, Nikolai I.  Lapin from the then USSR published his essay Vergleichende Analyse der drei Quellen des Einkommens in den “Ökonomisch-­ Philosophischen Manuskripten” von Marx11 in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, in which he undertakes a comparative analysis of the three income sources discussed in the First Manuscripts, i.e. labor wages, capital profit and land rent. Unexpectedly, however, the first part of this essay – 1. Etappen der ökonomischen Studien von Marx in Jahr 1844. Beginn der ersten Etappe – took center stage, generating interest in the philological study of the Paris Manuscripts worldwide. By comparing copies of the Paris Manuscripts, Lapin surveys the chronological relationship between the Manuscripts and the Notes. As we know, Marx was accustomed to exploring a new subject matter by excerpting from and commenting on works in the relevant field. Based on this habit of Marx, Lapin establishes a methodological principle: Ascertaining when the content of the Notes first appears in the Manuscripts to deduce the writing sequence of the Paris Manuscripts. As he discovers, the contents of the fourth and fifth notebooks on Ricardo and Mill, although 10  Hiroshi Nakagawa, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and Comments on James Mill: An Examination Centered on Alienated of Labor, Shogaku Ronshu of Fukushima University, vol. 37, no. 2, October 1968, p. 18 (translated into English by K.H.). 11  Nikolai Lapin, Vergleichende Analyse der drei Quellen des Einkommens in den „ÖkonomischPhilosophischen Manuskripten“von Marx, In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 17(2).

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they did not appear in the First Manuscripts, were extensively cited in the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript. The only quotation of Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in the First Manuscript is actually a secondary citation from Buret’s La misère des classes laborieuses en Angleterre et en France. Likewise, the study of commodities exchange and money in the Comments on James Mill from the fourth and fifth notebooks, which did not appear in the First Manuscript either, also appear in the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript. More importantly, the study of economics in the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript had reached a substantially higher level compared with the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscripts. Resting on these facts, Lapin concludes “two main stages of his economics studies from the end of 1843 to August 1844: 1. from his first acquaintance with the works of economics to the writing down of the first manuscript inclusively; 2. from excerpts from the works of Ricardo, Mill and others (fourth and fifth notebooks of excerpts) to the third manuscript inclusively”.12 Hence, from Lapin’s study of the five notebooks of the Notes and the three parts of Manuscripts, we can deduce the writing sequence of the Paris Manuscripts. As shown in Table 4.2, the First Manuscript including the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] belongs to the first stage, and the fourth and fifth notebooks of Notes including Comments on James Mill along with the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript compose the second phase. The writing sequence of the Paris Manuscripts presents itself roughly as following: The First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript. The publication of Lapin’s essay had a huge impact on Japanese academia for, as has been noted, the chronological ordering of Comments on James Mill and the Manuscripts had long been the center of their dispute. His essay provides a cogent resolution to the perplexing problem of writing sequence, insofar as it draws a distinction between perspectives on the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] and Comments on James Mill and bolsters a hypothesis that places the First Manuscript chronologically before Comments on James Mill. In the preface to his Japanese Table 4.2  The writing sequence of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts The First Phase

The Second Phase

1.First contact with the economics works of Engels, Proudhon, etc. 2.Excerpts from Say, Skarbek and Smith’s works (the first, second and third notebooks) 3.The First Manuscript (the first half of Notebook I): analysis of the three sources of income, i.e. [Labor Wages], [Capital Profit] and [Land Rent] 4.The First Manuscripts (the second half of Notebook I): [Alienated Labor and Private Property] 1.Excerpts from and comments on Ricardo, Mill and McCulloch’s works and excerpts from Engel’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie (the fourth and fifth notebooks) 2.The Second Manuscripts (Notebook II) 3.The Third Manuscripts (Notebook III)

 Ibid., p. 197 (translated into English by K.H.).

12

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translation of Lapin’s essay, Suguei Hosomi avows: “I hereby take back my previous sequencing of Comments on James Mill and Manuscripts and endorse Lapin’s viewpoint instead”.13 As a result, since the 1970s, Lapin’s essay has been widely recognized in Japan, which meant that Inge Taubert’s essay did not draw enormous attention when it was published there in 1978.14

4.2.3  The Problematic Ordering of MEGA② MEGA② I-2 and IV-2 are currently the most authoritative versions of the Notes and the Manuscripts. According to the editing guidelines of MEGA②, these two volumes are unavoidably concerned with the issue of the relationship between the Manuscripts and the Notes. In regard to their writing sequence, however, these two volumes not only do not cohere with Lapin’s internationally accepted conclusion, but also contradict with each other in some respects. Let us begin with MEGA② I-2. The editor of this volume is Inge Taubert who is also responsible for the editing of the Probeband and Vorabpublikation of Ideologie in MEGA②. Before the publication of MEGA② I-2, she wrote an essay entitled Probleme und Fragen zur Datierung der “Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte” von Karl Marx”15 and then brought forth a distinctive viewpoint on the dating of the Manuscripts and the Notes, the notebooks on Ricardo and Mill in particular, in the preface to MEGA② I-2 as well as in its Apparat. As opposed to Lapin’s widely accepted conclusion, she argues that Marx did not start to take down excerpts from the French version of Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and Taxation and Mill’s Elements of Political Economy until he had finished writing the Third Manuscript and, as such, the entire compilation of Manuscripts.16 Since these two notebooks also include Marx’s exposition of his own standpoint, some of which are concerned with problems that he only partly addresses or completely omits in the Manuscripts, they serve as “supplement as well as con Suguei Hosomi, Translator’s Preface, in: Shiso, March 1971, p. 101 (translated into English by K.H.). 14  Fumio Hattori’s student, Shibuya, criticized Taubert’s new hypothesis based on the verified conclusion from the philological studies in Japan. Cf. Tadashi Shibuya, The Significance of Taubert’s Essay in the Studies of Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in: Gendai to Shiso, no. 38, 1979; On the Problem of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and the Paris Notes, in: Keizai, August 1983; On the New Phase of the Studies of Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and Paris Notes, in: Keizai, June 1984; The Writing Sequence of the Paris Notes, in: Economics of Kagoshima University, no. 35, 1991. 15  Inge Taubert, Probleme und Fragen zur Datierung der „Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte“von Karl Marx, in: Beiträge zur Marx-Engels-Forschung, 3 (1978). Also see Inge Taubert, Zur Interpretation der Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte, in: Marxistische Studien. Jahrbuch des IMES. Sonderband I (1982) along with her explanations to each part of the Manuscripts in the introduction to Apparat of MEGA② I-2. 16  Cf. MEGA② I-2, Apparat, S. 696f. and MEGA②, I-2, Einleitung, S. 36. 13

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tinuation to the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844”. Apparently, her interpretation is founded on a different chronological ordering: The Second Manuscripts and the Third Manuscript → Notes on Ricardo and Mill. This reading has made a new impact on the philological studies of the Paris Manuscripts: If her hypothesis were to be valid, then the approach of using Comments on James Mill to divide the First Manuscript from the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript would be severely challenged. How does MEGA② IV-2 that includes the Notes deal with this matter? In this volume, the fourth and fifth notebooks are organized according to the following chronological ordering: Ricardo → Prevost → Engels → Tracy → McCulloch,17 which basically corresponds with the arrangement of MEGA① and Lapin, except that Comments on James Mill is now considered the latest text in these two notebooks. What is at issue is, however, the sequencing of the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript, to which the editors of MEGA② IV-2 provide a self-contradictory explanation: On the one hand, the fourth notebook on Ricardo and Mill is dated between Summer and Autumn 1844, and the fifth notebook on Mill, McCulloch, Tracy, Prevost and Engels is dated Summer 1844. Therefore, since the Manuscripts were supposed to have been finished in August 1844, at least part of the fourth notebook must have been written after the Manuscripts. In fact, we can also find record in Apparat of MEGA② IV-2 that the writing of the notes on Ricardo and Mill preceded that of the Manuscripts.18 On the other hand, however, the editors also claim that the fourth notebook on Mill, McCulloch, Tracy, Prevost and Engels was written before Kritische Randglossen auf dem Artikel: Der König von Preussen und die Soziale Reform: Von einem Preussen, namely before 31st July 1844 according to Marx’s own dating, since he writes of these authors or cites their work in this article. Based on the previous deduction of the writing sequence of the fourth and fifth notebooks, the notes on Ricardo were at least finished prior to the notes on McCulloch, Tracy, Prevost and Engels, and thus cannot have been written in August 1844. Furthermore, it is also maintained by the editors of MEGA② IV-2 that Comments on James Mill was written at the same time as the notes on Ricardo. This judgement suggests yet another writing sequence, i.e. the notes on Ricardo and Mill → the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript, which obviously contradicts the previously accepted chronology. This inconsistency was discerned by Tadashi Shibuya who further argues that, if the editors of MEGA② IV-2 insist on the this new sequence, it also contradicts the chronological ordering adopted by MEGA② I-2,19 giving rise to a contradiction between these two volumes. Unfortunately, the editors of MEGA② have not provided any explanation of such an issue.

 Cf. MEGA② IV-2, Apparat, S. 717f.  Cf. MEGA② IV-2, Apparat, S. 715. 19  Cf. Tadashi Shibuya, On the Problem of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and the Paris Notes, in: Keisai, August 1983 (translated into English by K.H.). 17 18

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4.2.4  Rojahn’s Hypothesis Jürgen Rojahn is a philologist outside the former USSR and Eastern Europe. In 1983, he wrote a long essay named Der Fall der sogenannten “Ökonomisch-­ Philosophischen Manuskripte aus dem Jahr 1844 “20 for the ITH-Sonderkonferenz on the subject of “Marx und Geschichtswissenschaft” in Linz, Austria. As a researcher at IISG, he thoroughly examined the preserved originals of the Paris Manuscripts in IISG, employing a methodology of historical science to examine studies of the Manuscripts at that time, including Lapin and Taubert’s essays as well as the two volumes of MEGA② then due for publication. Based on properties of the Paris Manuscripts such as sheet-type and pagination, he advances the notion that the Second Manuscript is a continuation of the fourth notebook on Ricardo and Mill, namely the last part of the fourth notebook,21 giving the following justification: To begin with, the fourth notebook on Ricardo and Mill bares considerable resemblance to the Second Manuscript. The fourth notebook is numbered by IISG as B23. The B23 manuscript consists of nine sheets or 18 pages. Each of them is divided into two by a straight line down the middle, making 36 pages in total. The first two pages are not numbered, whilst the remaining 34 pages are all numbered with Roman numerals. Since Marx numbered page XXV twice, the last page became page XXXIII. The first 17 numbered pages were notes on Ricardo. Page XVIII to page XXXIII belong to the first part of Comments on James Mill.22 According to Rojahn’s explanation, the Manuscripts and the fourth notebook are the only two exceptions in the entire Paris Manuscripts that are numbered with Roman numerals. In terms of material features, the shape of sheets for instance, the fourth notebook is also identical with the Second Manuscript. Moreover, since Marx’s numbering of page I left ink blots on the other side of the sheet, it is likely that this numbering was done after note taking was completed, rather than page by page. In addition, the first two pages of the fourth notebook, pages I and II, were also written in the same way as the First Manuscript, in three columns. All these facts indicate a particular relationship between Comments on James Mill and the Manuscripts.23 Aside from this, since Marx took care to preserve all of his manuscripts, including the First Manuscript and the Third Manuscript, which serve as a supplement to the Second Manuscript, why it is that the Second Manuscript is partly missing? As such, the claim that Marx lost his Second Manuscript is hardly tenable. Besides, there are only a limited number of direct citations of Comments on James Mill in the  Jürgen Rojahn, Der Fall der sogenannten „Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844“, in: International Review of Social History, 28(1). 21  Ibid., S. 39f. 22  MEGA② IV-2, S. 428–466. 23  Cf. Jürgen Rojahn, Der Fall der sogenannten „Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844“, in: International Review of Social History, 28(1), p. 38. 20

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Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript, which reinforces the hypothesis that Comments on James Mill might have been the Second Manuscript itself, so that there is naturally no need for Marx to cite from Comments on James Mill in the Second Manuscript. Resting on these reasons, Rojahn made a bold hypothesis: “the four pages from A 8 [sc. the Second Manuscript] that outwardly bear striking resemblance to the last pages of B 23 c [sc. the First Comments on James Mill] present the conclusion of Marx’s text in B 23 c”.24 He also provided further justification for his hypothesis from the vantage point of the content: It seems that Marx did not intend to finish his writing at the end of Comments on James Mill, but rather returned to a discussion of labor that presupposes private property, which also corresponds with the main theme of the few remaining pages of the Second Manuscript. In the Third Manuscript, the supplement to page XXXVI and XXXIX concerns the private property relationship and the opposition between the propertyless and the property owner respectively. Hence, the Third Manuscript can also be regarded as a continuation of Comments on James Mill. If this hypothesis stands up to scrutiny, then the loss of the Second Manuscript is not as serious as was previously presumed. Considering the thirty-three pages from the fourth notebook on Ricardo and Mill plus the existing four pages from the Second Manuscript, there are in fact only six pages from the Second Manuscript, pages 34–39, missing. Rojahn’s distinguished hypothesis was espoused by Yamanaka, who published a new edition of the Paris Manuscripts based on his own examination, in which Comments on James Mill is subsumed under the Second Manuscript in accordance with Rojahn’s conclusion.25 Distinct from the MEGA② version, this is the first edition that rests on Rojahn’s philological study. Its significance is actually nothing less than that of Hiromatsu’s edition of Ideologie in 1974. Here our introduction and summary of the philological studies of the Paris Manuscripts which turn upon the writing sequence of the Notes and the Manuscripts reach their end. The hitherto most reasonable chronological ordering, i.e. the First Manuscripts → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript, is widely adopted by most philologists including Nakagawa, Lapin, Yamanaka, Fumio Hattori, Rojahn, except for Taubert.

 Ibid., S. 39 (translated into English by K.H.).  Takaji Yamanaka, Marx’s Paris Manuscripts. Economics, Philosophy and Socialism, Ochanomizu Shobo, 2005. Unfortunately, the editor of Yamanaka’s translation of Paris Manuscripts, Takayuki Shibata, does not seem to understand the significance of its publication, as he notes in the Editor’s Introduction to Yamanaka’s translation that, as translator, Yamanaka “only gives instructions on the chronological ordering of the manuscripts, yet fails to explain why such an arrangement is the most reasonable” (ibid., p. 264 (translated into English by K.H.)).

24 25

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4.3  The Credibility of Taubert’s Hypothesis We now turn to the validity of Taubert’s hypothesis that places Comments on James Mill after the Second Manuscripts and the Third Manuscript. According to the editorial principles (Editionsrichtlinien) of MEGA②, editors should follow the principle of historical examination to arrange manuscripts in accordance with their writing sequence. In reality, however, it is extremely difficult to sequence the undated manuscripts chronologically. Under such circumstances, the editors of MEGA② normally base their determination of chronological ordering on two principles: The first is to trace back the time of writing using the physical properties of the text (sheet type, numbering, etc.) and historical materials (correspondence, records and author’s accounts, etc.). Take the Paris Manuscripts as an example. By identifying the physical properties of the text, such as the sheet type, writing habit and numbering, Rojahn deduced that Comments on James Mill were de facto the Second Manuscript. Taubert’s hypothesis that the Third Manuscript was written in August or even early September 1844 is also underpinned by evidence such as Marx and Ruge’s correspondence with others as well as the dates of their publications in Vorwärts. Likewise, Lapin, Yamanaka, Hattori, Rojahn and Taubert’s hypotheses on the relation between the five notebook and the three parts of the Manuscripts all rest on the order in which the names of Smith, Say, Ricardo and Mill and their citations appear. This last method in particular has been generally deemed to be the main criterion for the chronological sequencing of the Paris Manuscripts. Hence, despite their differences, they all followed the same principle. As regards the second principle, this is to determine the chronological order by comparing each notebook and each part of the manuscripts on a theoretical level, as is typified by the pioneering studies of Japanese scholars and the survey of Lapin who determined the writing sequence by comparing the level of Marx’s understanding of economics in the First Manuscript with that of the Comments on James Mill. In all, the determination of the writing sequence of the Paris Manuscripts can only rely on the two criteria above, namely the principle of philological deduction and the principle of theoretical deduction respectively. Instead of using these two principles, the author seeks to verify the credibility of Taubert’s hypothesis.

4.3.1  Philological Facts In Probleme und Fragen zur Datierung der “Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte” von Karl Marx, Tauber sets forth her objection to Lapin’s hypothesis based on philological evidence: “If Marx had already excerpted from Ricardo and Mill’s writings before writing the second notebook, there is still no direct nor indirect connection to these excerpts at all on the pages handed down. The remaining hypothesis is that the concrete evaluation [Auswertung] mainly occurs on the missing pages. Yet this contradicts with that the excerpts from Ricardo’s book ‘Des

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principes de l’économie politique et de l’impôt’ (MEGA② IV/2, S. 392–427) and from Mill’s writing ‘Élémens d’économie politique’ (MEGA② IV/2, S. 428–470) are not directly nor indirectly used or evaluated [ausgewertet] in the completely extant notebook III either”.26 That is to say, as she sees it, there is no trace of the fourth notebook on Ricardo and Mill at all in the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript. This judgment will be analyzed based on the content of the Manuscripts. In the Manuscripts, Mill’s name appears eight times in total (see the following Table 4.3), twice in the Second Manuscript (MEGA② I-2, S. 376, 381) and six times in the Third Manuscript (MEGA② I-2, S. 384, 423, 424, 431, 432 and 433), yet not even once in the First Manuscript. From this, most philologists, e.g. Lapin, Yamanaka and Rojahn, deduced that Comments on James Mill should be placed between the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript. Aside from this, Marx also quotes a passage from Ricardo’s work in the First Manuscript. Since the excerpts from Ricardo’s work and Comments on James Mill appear in the fourth notebook at the same time, a further clarification is needed here. That “Ricardo in his book (rent of land): […]”27 is a secondary citation from Buret’s La misère des classes laborieuses en Angleterre et en France. Considering this, it seems that Marx did not even write down the title of Ricardo’s work correctly, but mistook rent of land for its title. From this point, Lapin, Rojahn and even Taubert all deduced that Marx did not actually read Ricardo’s work until he finished the First Manuscript. Therefore, the pivotal issue is now the question: Do the eight excerpts from the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript listed above have direct or indirect connection with Comments on James Mill? The author shall verify them one by one as follows: Excerpts (1) and (3) are Marx’s critique of the so-called “modern political economy [modern Nationalökonomie]” or “[t]he Ricardo school”. He satirically calls it the “Great advance of Ricardo, Mill, etc., on Smith and Say”, “a relative growth in the cynicism of political economy from Smith through Say to Ricardo, Mill, etc.”, insofar as they manifestly or even shamelessly delineate the anti-human implications of this theory. As is illustrated in the table above, this comment also appears in the fourth notebook. Compared with the reference to cynicism in the fourth notebook, the remark in the Second Manuscript is more like a summary. Moreover, similar expressions can also be found in Marx’s published article Kritische Randglossen auf dem Artikel: Der König von Preussen und die Soziale Reform: Von einem Preussen: “The most definite expression of the English view of pauperism  – we are speaking always of the view of the English bourgeoisie and government – is English political economy, i.e., the scientific reflection of English economic conditions. One of the best and most famous English economists, McCulloch – a pupil of the cynical Ricardo – who is familiar with present-day conditions and ought to have a comprehensive view of the movement of bourgeois

26 27

 MEGA② I-2, Apparat, S. 696 (translated into English by K.H.).  MEGA② I-2, S. 348 (translated into English by K.H.).

Relevant expositions in the Second Manuscript and the Sequence Third Manuscript (1) “Great advance of Ricardo, Mill, etc., on Smith and Say, to declare the existence of the human being – the greater or lesser human productivity of the commodity – to be indifferent and even harmful. Not how many workers are maintained by a given capital, but rather how much interest it brings in, the sum-total of the annual savings, is said to be the true purpose of production. It was likewise a great and consistent advance of modern ||XLI| English political economy, that, […]” (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, 284, see MEGA② I-2, S. 376) (2) “[Movable property claims that] without capital landed property is dead, worthless matter; that its civilized victory has discovered and made human labor the source of wealth in place of the dead thing. (See Paul Louis Courier, Saint-Simon, Ganilh, Ricardo, Mill, McCulloch and Destutt de Tracy and Michel Chevalier.)” (ibid., p. 288, see MEGA② I-2, S. 381.)

Relevant expositions in the fourth notebook on Ricardo and Mill „Dadurch, daß die Nationalökonomie alle Bedeutung dem revenu brut, d. h. der Quantität der Production und Consumtion, abgesehn vom Ueberschuß abspricht, also dem Leben selbst alle Bedeutung abspricht, hat ihre Abstraktion den Gipfel der Infamie erreicht. Es tritt hierin heraus 1) daß es sich bei ihr gar nicht um das nationale Interesse, um den Menschen handelt, [...] 2) daß das Leben eines Menschen an sich nichts werth ist, [...] Weiter nichts, als daß die Menschlichkeit ausser der Nationalökonomie und die Unmenschlichkeit in ihr liegt” (MEGA② IV-2, S. 421)

Table 4.3  References to Mill in the Second Manuscript, the Third Manuscript and Comments on James Mill

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“the political economist postulates the original unity of capital and labor as the unity of the capitalist and the worker; this is the original state of paradise. The way in which these two aspects, ||XIX| as two persons, confront each other is for the political economist an accidental event, and hence only to be explained by reference to external factors. (See Mill.)” (ibid., p. 312, see MEGA② I-2, S. 424.)

(5)

(4)

“Hence it must throw aside this hypocrisy in the course of its further development and come out in its complete cynicism […] by proving the implications of this theory to be anti-human in character, in contrast to the other, original approach […] (The Ricardo school.) There is not merely a relative growth in the cynicism of political economy from Smith through Say to Ricardo, Mill, etc., inasmuch as the implications of industry appear more developed and more contradictory in the eyes of the last-named; these later economists also advance in a positive sense constantly and consciously further than their predecessors in their estrangement from man. They do so, however, only because their science develops more consistently and truthfully.” (ibid., p. 291, see MEGA② I-2, S. 384.) “Mill suggests public acclaim for those who prove themselves continent in their sexual relations, and public rebuke for those who sin against such barrenness of marriage.... Is this not ethics, the teaching of asceticism?” (ibid., p. 311, see MEGA② I-2, S. 423.)

(3)

(continued)

“Die Hauptmittel wodurch es die Gesetzgebungen in ihrer Gewalt haben, den Lauf der menschlichen Handlungen zu verändern, sind Strafen und Belohnungen, beide wenig geeignet die Tendenz der Menschenart zum Wachsthum und zur Vermehrung aufzuhalten, p. 57[−58.] [...] » [...] Es würde vielleicht hinreichen, daß der öffentliche blâme (Tadel) mit all seiner Kraft auf die Menschen fiele, die durch ihre Unvorsichtigkeit und durch Erschaffung einer zahlreichen Familie in Armuth und Abhängigkeit verfallen sind, und daß die öffentliche Approbation die Belohnung derer wird, die durch eine weise Zurückhaltung sich vor dem Elend und der Degradation garantirt haben.« p. 59” (MEGA② IV-2, S. 435.) “»Die Production ist das Resultat der Arbeit; aber die Arbeit empfängt vom Capital die Rohstoffe, welche sie façonnirt und die Maschinen, wodurch sie in dieser Operation unterstüzt wird oder vielmehr diese Artikel sind das Capital selbst.« p. 32. In der civilisirten Gesellschaft sind der Arbeiter und der Capitalist zwei verschiedene Personen, p. 32, 33. (MEGA② IV-2, S. 432.)

“Dadurch, daß die Nationalökonomie alle Bedeutung dem revenu brut, d. h. der Quantität der Production und Consumtion, abgesehn vom Ueberschuß abspricht, also dem Leben selbst alle Bedeutung abspricht, hat ihre Abstraktion den Gipfel der Infamie erreicht. Es tritt hierin heraus 1) daß es sich bei ihr gar nicht um das nationale Interesse, um den Menschen handelt, [...] 2) daß das Leben eines Menschen an sich nichts werth ist, […] Wenn aber Say und Sismondi […] den Ricardo bekämpfen, so bekämpfen sie nur den cynischen Ausdruck einer nationalökonomischen Wahrheit. [...] Wir haben schon mehrmals Gelegenheit gehabt, den Nationalökonomischen, von allen menschlichen Illusionen freien Cynismus Ricardos zu bewundern” (MEGA② IV-2, S. 421–423)

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(8)

(6), (7)

“Mill presents developed exchange – trade – as a consequence of the division of labor.  ‘The agency of man can be traced to very simple elements […] As men in general cannot perform many different operations with the same quickness and dexterity with which they can by practice learn to perform a few, it is always an advantage to limit as much as possible the number of operations imposed upon each. For dividing labor, and distributing the powers of men and machinery, to the greatest advantage, it is in most cases necessary to operate upon a large scale; in other words, to produce the commodities in greater masses. It is this advantage which gives existence to the great manufactories; a few of which, placed in the most convenient situations, frequently supply not one country, but many countries, with as much as they desire of the commodity produced.’ Thus Mill.” (ibid., p. 319, see MEGA② I-2, S. 431, 432.) “Mill presents trade as the consequence of the division of labor. With him human activity is reduced to mechanical motion. Division of labor and use of machinery promote wealth of production. Each person must be entrusted with as small a sphere of operations as possible. Division of labor and use of machinery, in their turn, imply large-scale production of wealth, and hence of products. This is the reason for large manufactories.” (ibid., p. 321, see MEGA② I-2, S. 433.)

Table 4.3 (continued)

“»As men in general cannot perform many different operations with the same quickness and dexterity with which they can by practice learn to perform a few, it is always an advantage to limit as much as possible the number of operations imposed upon each.« p. 11. »For dividing labor, and distributing the powers of men and machinery, to the greatest advantage, it is in most cases necessary to operate upon a large scale; in other words, to produce the commodities in greater masses. It is this advantage which gives existence to the great manufactories.« I.e.” (MEGA② IV-2, S. 428.)

“»As men in general cannot perform many different operations with the same quickness and dexterity with which they can by practice learn to perform a few, it is always an advantage to limit as much as possible the number of operations imposed upon each.« p. 11. »For dividing labor, and distributing the powers of men and machinery, to the greatest advantage, it is in most cases necessary to operate upon a large scale; in other words, to produce the commodities in greater masses. It is this advantage which gives existence to the great manufactories.« I.e.” (MEGA② IV-2, S. 428.)

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society”.28 Since it was dated by Marx himself on 31st July 1844, this article has been regarded as decisive evidence for the determination of the chronological ordering, from which Taubert deduced that the Third Manuscript was written after 31st July. Yet can we not deduce from this hypothesis that the notebook on Ricardo, including Comments on James Mill, was written before 31st July, hence before the Third Manuscript? Excerpt (2) is a summary of Paul Louis Courier, Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Ganilh, Ricardo, Mill, McCulloch, Tracy and Michel Chevalier’s opinions, not specifically referring to Ricardo and Mill. Yet being able to make such a summary at least indicates that Marx had a certain level of knowledge of Ricardo and Mill’s works. The passage in excerpt (4) “Mill suggests public acclaim for those who prove themselves continent in their sexual relations, and public rebuke for those who sin against such barrenness of marriage....” is obviously an indirect quotation from Comments on James Mill or a summary of the corresponding content in Comments on James Mill. Since it is a summary of the material in Comments on James Mill, does it not show that Comments on James Mill was written before the Third Manuscript? It seems that the editors of MEGA② also notice this problem, so that they add a remark in reference to this fact. At the end of excerpt (5), Marx wrote, “See Mill”, referring the reader directly to Mill’s work. In regard to this, the editor of the Chinese translation of Comments on James Mill specifically adds, “See page 151”,29 which indicates that they are also attentive to the direct connection between this exposition in the Third Manuscript and the passage in Comments on James Mill, or even consider the latter a summary of the former. Excerpts (6) and (7) are the core underpinnings of Taubert’s hypothesis. The passage “[t]he agency of man can be traced to very simple elements. […] As men in general cannot perform many different operations with the same quickness and dexterity with which they can by practice learn to perform a few, […] It is this advantage which gives existence to the great manufactories. […] supply not one country, but many countries, with as much as they desire of the commodity produced” is the only direct quotation from Mill’s work in the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript, at the end of which Marx even adds, “Thus Mill” to emphasize the origin of this passage. In Comments on James Mill, however, only the underlined part of this quotation appears, which suggests that the quotation in Comments on James Mill might have been directly excerpted from Mill’s Elements of Political Economy. Yet Taubert deduces from this very fact that Marx did not write Comments on James Mill until he finished the Third Manuscript.

 Marx, Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian”, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843– 1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 192f. 29  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, People’s Publishing House, 2000, p. 127.

28

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Is Taubert’s deduction valid? In response to this, Rojahn notes: “That […] does not mean much; in A7 [sc. the First Manuscript], Marx had also – apart from B 20 [sc. the first notebook on Smith] – drawn on Smith’s book itself”.30 Even if the evidence he produces does not match the fact, it is still impossible to draw Taubert’s conclusion from the evidence on which she rests, since, even having already taken excerpts and notes, one can still cite the original text during writing for the sake of accuracy. Has Taubert herself not had the same kind of experience? It is rash to determinate chronological order simply based on the fact that the quotation in the Third Manuscript is relatively longer than that in Comments on James Mill. Excerpt (8) is a summary not only of excerpt (7), but also of all the excerpts from Elements of Political Economy that appear in Comments on James Mill. Considering its content, it would be impossible for Marx to have made this summary, had he not already studied the theory of division of labor and intercourse in the notebook on Ricardo and Mill. Does this not suffice to prove the direct connection between Comments on James Mill and the Third Manuscript and that Comments on James Mill was written prior to the Third Manuscript? It is also worth noting en passant that excerpts (6), (7) and (8) all belong to the fragment [Teilung der Arbeit] of the Third Manuscript, which is Marx’s summary of the labor concepts employed by all the political economists in the Notes. Since Taubert also acknowledges that this fragment is a summary of excerpts from Smith, Say and Skarbek’s works, why can she not see that it also includes a summary of the content of Comment on James Mill and thereby deduce that Comments on James Mill was written before the fragment [Teilung der Arbeit] of the Third Manuscript? In overview, as aforementioned, Marx not only lists Ricardo and Mill’s names in the Second Manuscript and the Third Manuscript, asking the reader to refer to them, but also cites standpoints and quotations from the notebook on Ricardo and Comments on James Mill. In the light of this, Taubert’s hypothesis that Marx does not directly nor indirectly use the notebook on Ricardo and Comments on James Mill does not match the facts. Unlike theoretical deduction, a philological survey of the Paris Manuscripts is grounded on factual material. As such, its results can be verified by other scholars by repeating the same process according to the provided data and facts, as in natural sciences. Only conclusions that stands up to this level of scrutiny can be recognized, which is also why Taubert’s hypothesis has not drawn much attention.

4.3.2  The Basis of Theoretical Deduction Thus far, we have applied the principle of philological deduction to the verification of Taubert’s hypothesis. The following examination will proceed from the principle of theoretical deduction.  Jürgen Rojahn, Der Fall der sogenannten „Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844“, in: International Review of Social History, 28(1), p. 30 (translated into English by K.H.).

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Taubert’s justification from the theoretical perspective is relatively simple, as she notes in Problems und Fragen zur Datierung der „Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte” von Karl Marx: “[(1)] Based on Mill, Marx treats money as mediator of exchange and explicates why private property must develop into monetary system [Geldwesen]. Although also speaking about the role of money in the Third Manuscript, Marx shows no sign of employing the more comprehensive and precise remarks from Comments on James Mill. [(2)] Marx portrays in Comments on James Mill the exchange of man’s activities and products as species-activity and species-­ enjoyment, and argues with “political economy” that grasps man’s community only under the form of exchange and commerce. [(3)] In this connection, Marx remarks, that in the exchange relation labor becomes gainful labor and mutual complementing and exchange of activities become division of labor. Thus, the assessment in the Third Manuscript that ‘[t]he division of labor is the economic expression of the social character of labor within the estrangement’ does stand on the level of the generalization that Marx carries out in Comments on James Mill. In the Third Manuscript, Marx also deals with differences of viewpoint on the division of labor within political economy, and therefore goes further in this case as in Comments on James Mill. On the other side, however, the expositions in Comments on James Mill are far more thorough and problematically [problemreich] laid out [angelegt] than those in the Third Manuscript”.31 This is almost the entirety of the evidence provided in her essay. Considering this evidence, her point of view is self-contradictory. On the one hand, she deems the money theory in Comments on James Mill to be “more comprehensive and precise”, so that Comments on James Mill “can be evaluated as a continuation of the exposition of this theme broken off in the third notebook”.32 On the other hand, she points out that Marx’s evaluation of division of labor in the Third Manuscript “does stand on the level of the generalization that Marx carries out in Comments on James Mill” – this so-called “generalization” probably refers to excerpts (2) and (3) – and that “also deals with differences of viewpoints on division of labor within political economy”. For this reason, it “do[es] not annul the first hypothesis”33 that Marx “goes further in this case [sc. the Third Manuscript] as in Comments on James Mill” and the latter precedes the former. Setting the ambiguity of her stance aside, let us focus on her standpoint that the theory of money in Comments on James Mill is “more comprehensive and accurate” than that in the Third Manuscript. Having set out to do so, however, we find Taubert’s justification to be rather limited, going little beyond her remark that “[(1)] Marx treats money as mediator of exchange and explicates, and why private property must develop into a monetary system”. In other words, as she sees it, it is on account of these two aspects that  Inge Taubert, Problems und Fragen zur Datierung der „Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte“von Karl Marx, trans. by T. Shibuya, in: Gendai to Shiso, no. 12, 1979, p. 244 (translated into English by K.H.). 32  MEGA② I-2, Apparat, S. 701. 33  Inge Taubert, Problems und Fragen zur Datierung der „Ökonomisch-Philosophischen Manuskripte“von Karl Marx, trans. by T. Shibuya, in: Gendai to Shiso, no. 12, 1979, p. 244. 31

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Comments on James Mill stand on a higher plan than the Third Manuscript. In fact, however, the fragment [Geld] of the Third Manuscript also contains a conception of money as the medium of exchange, only without explaining “why private property must develop into a monetary system”. Yet the absence of this explanation does not necessarily lead to Taubert’s conclusion for it is probably because Marx adopts a new vantage point to address money in the Third Manuscript, or simply because there was no need to repeat something that has already been thoroughly developed in Comments on James Mill. In the MEGA Symposium in 2002, Rojahn submitted an essay entitled The Emergence of a Theory: The Importance of Marx’s Notebooks Exemplified by those from 1844. Most of its contents on philological studies had already appeared in his previous essay in 1982, except for one of his footnotes: “As for the exzerpte from Ricardo’s and Mill’s books, there is no clear evidence of when exactly they were made. According to the Moscow editors of MEGA2 IV/2, Marx made these exzerpte before writing the Second Manuscript; according to the Berlin editors of MEGA2 I/2, he made them after writing the Third Manuscript. My previous criticism of the arguments of the latter (Rojahn 1983, 30) remains, I think, valid. On the other hand, considering the content and style of Marx’s comments, the Berlin editors seem to be right, at least as regards the exzerpte from Mill’s Elements. It is however beyond doubt that Marx read Mill’s book before writing the Third Manuscript (cf. MEGA2 I/2, 283, 286, 311 f.)”.34 The editor from Berlin referred to is Taubert. This footnote shows that Rojahn now partly concurs with Taubert’s conclusion that Comments on James Mill is a continuation of The Third Manuscripts, whilst maintaining his original standpoint at the same time. The reason for Rojahn’s wavering, considering that he also explicitly reaffirms the validity of his critique of Taubert, does not lie in the credibility of Taubert’s evidence, but in that, with respect to theoretical level, Comments on James Mill might well have been written after the Third Manuscript. To this end, Rojahn made an even more explicit remark when interviewed by the editor of A Quarterly Report of the Materialists Group,35 Minoru Tabata: It could be possible that Marx realized his lack of economic knowledge of money after writing the fragment [Geld] and thus turned back to his study of political economy, excerpting from the chapter on money in Mill’s Elements of Political Economy. Or, according to the preface written before the fragment [Geld], this fragment is possibly only the beginning of Marx’s long-conceived critique of political economy, whilst Comments on James Mill serves as a continuation of this fragment. These possibilities cannot be excluded because Marx’s understanding of money in Comments on James Mill is far more sophisticated than in the fragment [Geld]. Expressions like “Mill very well expresses the essence of the matter in the form of a concept by characterising money as the medium of exchange. The essence of money is not, in the first place, that property  Jürgen Rojahn, The Emergence of a Theory: The Importance of Marx’s Notebooks Exemplified by those from 1844, in: Rethinking Marxism, 14(4), p. 38. 35  Minoru Tabata, Dialogue: On the Editing of Marx’s Manuscripts and Notes, in: A Quarterly Report of Materialists Group, no. 110, November 2009, p. 140. 34

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is alienated in it, but that the mediating activity or movement, the human, social act by which man’s products mutually complement one another, is estranged from man and becomes the attribute of money, a material thing outside man”36 are far beyond the scope of the fragment [Geld] in the Third Manuscript.37 Therefore, the key to the problem has been reduced to a comparison between notions of money in the fragment [Geld] and Comments on James Mill, an assessment that can hardly be completely objective. As other interpreters see it, Comments on James Mill is more profound than the Third Manuscript, insofar as certain aspects of the conception of money in Comments on James Mill stand on a higher plane. In my opinion, though some perspectives in Comments on James Mill do surpass the scope of the Third Manuscript, the latter is a summary of the former, since the fragment [Geld] includes not only a critique of the fetishism and mysticism of money within political economy, but also an affirmation of the positive function of money as a universal medium to connect the division of labor to society, for instance: “If money is the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, connecting me with nature and man, is not money the bond of all bonds? Can it not dissolve and bind all ties? Is it not, therefore, also the universal agent of separation? It is the coin that really separates as well as the real binding agent – the [...] chemical power of society”.38 Such manifest recognition of money’s positive function as the glue of society is clearly an advance on Comments on James Mill. In reality, to compare the Third Manuscript and Comments on James Mill merely in terms of the conception of money is insufficient, because Comments on James Mill touches upon various themes other than money, such as division of labor, exchange and alienation. Considering the idea of the division of labor for instance, even Taubert herself would have agreed that the conception of division of labor in the fragment [Teilung der Arbeit] stands on a higher level than that in Comments on James Mill and is a summary of “the generalization that Marx carries out in Comments on James Mil”. Thus, it is unfair to make a judgement simply by virtue of the conception of money. Actually, if one examines the connection between the Third Manuscript and Comments on James Mill from a more holistic standpoint – the perspective of a theoretical framework for instance – instead of being confined to certain concept, then it becomes much more evident that the Third Manuscript has greater profundity than Comments on James Mill. To sum up, even based on the principle of theoretical deduction, Taubert’s hypothesis that Comments on James Mill was written after the Third Manuscript is still not convincing.

 Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 212. 37  Cf. Jürgen Rojahn, The Emergence of a Theory: The Importance of Marx’s Notebooks Exemplified by those from 1844, Rethinking Marxism, 14(4). 38  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 324. 36

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4.4  Summary As is demonstrated, the inherent limitation of philological studies manifests itself in two aspects: Above all, though philological studies can deduce chronological ordering by way of examination of data and facts, it does not provide us with the criteria for determining order on a theoretical level. Take the relationship between Comments on James Mill and the Third Manuscript as an example. It is still disputable whether Comments on James Mill should be placed before the First Manuscript or between the First Manuscript and the Second Manuscript or even after the Third Manuscript. Considering the outcome of philological examination, the author tends to concur with the second hypothesis. Yet this philological conclusion does not suffice to justify Comments on James Mill standing on a higher plane than the First Manuscript, since this comparison essentially depends on content. The fundamental reason Yibing Zhang insists on placing Comments on James Mill before the First Manuscript is, as demonstrated in Chapter III, is his reading that Comments on James Mill remains under the sway of Hess’s “intercourse determinism” and hence falls behind the alienation of labor theory.39 Likewise, the justification of the author’s standpoint that Comments on James Mill stands on a higher plane than the First Manuscript cannot solely rest on the outcome of philological studies – this can only serve as backup evidence at most – but mainly on justifying that the alienation of intercourse discussed in Comments on James Mill is more advanced than the alienation of labor written of in the First Manuscript, which is exactly the task of this work. The determination of order on a theoretical level, however, can be used to reinforce philological conclusions. Yibing Zhang’s interpretation suggest that Comments on James Mill was written prior to the First Manuscript, just as the justification of the author’s standpoint bolsters the second hypothesis that places Comments on James Mill between the First Manuscript and the Second Manuscript. In this sense, Taubert and her adherents still need to back up their hypothesis with further justification from a philosophical perspective in order to make their conclusion more persuasive. Second, philological studies cannot substitute theoretical justification and philosophical study. Thanks to their possession of the originals, philologists, especially those from the former USSR and Eastern Europe, have long monopolized ­interpretations of Marx and Engels’ manuscripts. For this reason, however, one must stay wary of their conclusions, such as the aforementioned hypothesis of Taubert, rather than blindly adopting them as the absolute truth. Meanwhile, we have to be even more cautious of scholars who exaggerate the significance of philological studies, jumping directly from philological fact to philosophical conclusion  Cf. Yibing Zhang, Back to Marx. Changes of Philosophical Discourse in the Context of Economics, trans. by T. Mitchell, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2014.

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without theoretical justification. Though the philological approach can assist us in ascertaining textual facts, it can never replace theoretical deduction, just as the discovery of the terracotta warriors, though substantially enriching our understanding of the history of Qin Dynasty, cannot actually tell us whether the Qin Dynasty was grounded on slavery or feudalism. In light of this, philological researchers and their proponents ought to be attentive to limitations on their authority.

Chapter 5

The Fallacy in the Four Aspects of Alienated Labor A Study of the Fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. Part I

This chapter is dedicated to [Die entfremdete Arbeit], a fragment which has high standing in studies of the Manuscripts on account of its elaboration of the contentious theory of the alienation of labor theory (entfremdete Arbeit). While previous discussions of this theory have tended to focus on the question of whether or not it can be confined within Feuerbach’s humanism, this study takes another perspective, focusing instead on the inherent fallacy of this theory, namely the deficiencies in Marx’s conceptual framework of alienation concept as well as logical inconsistencies among the four aspects of alienated labor. The aim of this analysis, however, is not to deny the significance of early Marx’s thought, but to lay bare the necessity of his shift from isolated individual to society.

5.1  T  he Distinction Between Hegel and Feuerbach’s Concepts of Alienation Alienated labor, in its four aspects, is closely connected to the concept of alienation woven through the history of philosophy. Before going into these aspects, let us first draw an outline of the concept of alienation and Marx’s understanding of it at the time. Etymologically considered, both Entfremdung and Entäußerung are derived from the Greek word áλλοτρíωσξ and the Latin word alienatio which refer to a subject becoming an other (Anderes), or distanced, from the subject. Both the Chinese translation “异化” and Japanese translation “疎外” accurately embody the meaning of Entfremdung. In the First Manuscript, Marx did not distinguish between alienation (Entfremdung) and externalization (Entäußerung), employing them as synonyms. But this has already been pointed out by the English translator of the Manuscripts Martin Milligan and by Lukács (see Chapter XIV) and is not our

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c­ oncern here. In this chapter, these two concepts will also be used without differentiation except in certain contexts. To be sure, the alienation concept can be applied to both the relationship between men and the relationship between man and object, assuming different meanings in each context. In the former case, it has the original meaning of the English word to “alienate”, namely to transfer a commodity or right; in the later, however, it denotes the subject’s externalization of its essence in the object, or, in Hegel’s words, the act of “making oneself into a thing [sich zum Dinge machen; translator]”.1 As we shall see in the following, this differentiation is of vital significance. In the history of philosophy, it is Hegel’s contribution that transforms this word from a daily expression into a philosophical category. In the Jena period, Hegel determined the basic definition of this concept, which was later to be critically modified by Feuerbach and applied to his critique of religion and Hegel’s philosophy. Also drawing on Feuerbach’s alienation concept, Hess applied it to his economic and social critique of modern civil society. Marx’s alienation concept in the Paris Manuscripts is tied up with all three predecessors, especially with the Hegelian and Feuerbachian notions. Furthermore, due to the distinction between Hegel and Feuerbach’s concepts of alienation and the fact that Marx adopted them at slightly different times, Marx’s version in the Paris Manuscripts manifests itself as a development from the Feuerbachian to the Hegelian framework. The author shall only draw a minimum outline of this distinction between Hegel and Feuerbach’s alienation concepts here, for it will be further expounded in Chapter XIII.

5.1.1  Hegel: Alienation Leads to Man’s Socialization Unlike in the period of the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law, the work that exerted the greatest influence on Marx in the Paris period is, in regard to the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt] in the Third Manuscript, Hegel’s Phänomenologie. For this reason, alienation in Phänomenologie can be seen as the direct source of Marx’s concept. The concepts of alienation and externalization are extensively employed in Phänomenologie, especially in B. Self-­ alienated Spirit. Culture of C. (BB.) Spirit, which is probably where these two concepts make the most appearances, for instance: [Self-consciousness] divests itself of its personality, thereby creating its world. This world it looks on as something alien, a world, therefore, of which it must now take possession. But the renunciation of its being-for-self is itself the product of the actual world, and by this renunciation, therefore, self-consciousness directly takes possession of this world. Or we may say that self-consciousness is merely a ‘something’, it has actuality only in so far as it

1  Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L.  Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 103.

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alienates itself from itself; by so doing, it gives itself the character of a universal, and this its universality is its authentication and actuality.2

Seen in this passage, Hegel’s alienation concept has a double meaning or two characteristics: Above all, it refers to the subject’s self-alienation and return to itself, which can be further divided into three phrases: (1) The self-consciousness or spirit turns itself into an object or another, which is alienation in a narrow sense; (2) it then supersedes its alienation and returns to itself from the object; (3) through this process, self-consciousness or spirit ascends from the abstract to reality. Considered this way, Hegel’s alienation is not identical with alienation in a narrow sense, namely that a subject turns into another, but rather it incorporates phase (2) and (3). In this general understanding of alienation, the subject not only does not lose itself in the process of alienation, but de facto develops itself. Therefore, alienation is of positive significance for the subject. As Hegel remarks at the beginning of (DD.) Absolute Knowing of Phänomenologie, “it is the externalization of self-­consciousness that posits thinghood [of the object; translator] [Dingheit] and that this externalization has not merely a negative but a positive meaning”.3 The “positive meaning” of alienation is one of Hegel’s unique insights. Second, Hegel’s alienation concept designates the process by which the individual (Individuum) externalizes their individuality into the external world and elevates themself from the external world to universality through cultivation. Figuratively speaking, if alienation in its first meaning is based on a vertical, subject-­ object (Objekt) relation, then the second meaning of alienation refers principally to a horizontal, intersubjective relation or the relation between the individual and the society. Proceeding from the second meaning, alienation is the socialization of the individual, namely the process whereby the individual alienates (transfer) his object to another or to society and thereby attains social attributes. This feature of alienation can be called socialization through alienation. In fact, when addressing social problems in the Jena manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes as well as in Phänomenologie and the later Grundlinien, Hegel himself leans more on the alienation concept in the second sense.4 Socialization through alienation is clearly an aspect conceived of under the consideration of the reality of modern civil society, e.g. the transfer and surrender of commodities or relinquishment of natural right. In concrete terms, (1) the external world is established through infinite individuals’ externalization of their essential power, just as the economic laws and juridical system of civil society are the result of a citizen’s alienation (Entäußerung) of their right and property. In Hegel’s words, “[i]t obtains its existence through self-consciousness’s own externalization [Entäußerung] and separation of itself from its essence”.5 (2) Once this external  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 297.  Ibid., p. 479. 4  In Phänomenologie, there three chapters that mainly concerns alienation: IV. The Truth of Selfcertainty, V.  B. The actualization of rational self-consciousness through its own activity, V.  C. Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself and VI. B. Self-alienated Spirit. Culture. 5  Ibid., p. 294. 2 3

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world is established, however, it stands in opposition to its creator, the individual. For instance, the economic laws and juridical system of civil society will pose limitations on the individual’s willfulness, this “world has the character of being something external, the negative of self-consciousness”.6 (3) Nevertheless, the individual is still compelled to alienate himself for only the alienated can acquire substantiality,7 be recognized by other members of civil society and thus elevate his individuality to sociality. It is because Hegel’s alienation concept encompasses this aspect of man’s socialization that Lukács acclaims him for concretizing Aristotle’s proposition that “man is a political animal”.8 In overview, the alienation is, on the one hand, the negation of the subject which, however, enables the subject to reclaim his essence; on the other hand, though the alienated subject is the individual, his alienation results in a social relationship whereby the individual assumes a social character. As such, Hegel’s alienation concept has a positive meaning in both aspects.

5.1.2  Feuerbach: The Self-Alienation of Isolated Individual In Das Wesen des Christentums (1841), Vorläufigen Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie (1843) and Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft (1843), Feuerbach develops his well-known alienation theory,9 which, however, differs distinctively from Hegel’s alienation concept. To begin with, Feuerbach applies the alienation concept to his critique of religion and to Hegel’s philosophy. As opposed to the Christian theological interpretation of man’s essence, namely that man is created by god as his alienation, Feuerbach argues that Christianity reverses the real relation between man and god, since it is man who creates god by alienating his essence. Hegel interprets the relationship between the absolute spirit and man as in Christianity, construing man (as well as family, civil society and state) as the alienation of the absolute spirit. Feuerbach reverses the subject-object relation inversed by Christianity and Hegel, positing  Ibid.  Hegel remarks: “[F]or the self that has an absolute significance in its immediate existence, i.e. without having alienated itself from itself, is without substance, and is the plaything of those raging elements. Its substance, therefore, is its externalization, and the externalization is the substance, i.e. the spiritual powers ordering themselves” (ibid., p. 295). 8  Ibid. Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel. Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. by R. Livingstone, London, 1975, p. 469. 9  Considering the Paris Manuscripts, Marx had mainly the last two works in scope, as he explicitly refers to them in the deleted part of the preface to the Manuscript: “[A]gainst whose Philosophie der Zukunft and Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie in the Anekdota, despite the tacit use that is made of them, the petty envy of some and the veritable wrath of others seem to have instigated a regular conspiracy of silence” (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 232). 6 7

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man as the alienating subject, and god or the absolute spirit as the object of alienation. Through this reversal, Feuerbach establishes a new explanatory model of the relationship between man and god. Owning to its emphasis on man, this model implies the humanist notion that human nature is the highest nature to man. This is particularly significant for the critique of the oppression of man from the external world, including religion, and for advocacy of man’s freedom and emancipation. Second, Feuerbach’s alienation concept is only of negative significance for man. As is aforementioned, Hegel’s alienation concept, as the process of man’s self-­ alienation and return to the subject, is positive; instead of resisting alienation, man should strive to participate in it. From Feuerbach’s viewpoint, however, alienation is merely a one-way process without any moment of the return to the subject. In other words, alienation implies man’s loss of himself, and is therefore the negation of man. Notwithstanding, such a negative interpretation of alienation can lead to the a radical revolutionary logic, making it reasonable to criticize, to negate the external world or even to foment revolution against it, since the external world, including religion, is merely the man’s alienated state of man. It is exactly due to this revolutionary factor implied in Feuerbach’s alienation concept that the representatives of the Young Hegelians, such as Bauer, Hess and Ruge, all recognize Feuerbach’s notion, applying his concept to their political, economic and social critique of modern society. Naturally, Marx also noticed this, as he was under the sway of this humanist thought not only in the period of Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts, but also during the writing of the First Manuscript when he even deemed Feuerbach to be a socialist or communist. For instance, he notes in his letter to Feuerbach on 11th August 1844: “In these writings you have provided – I don’t know whether intentionally – a philosophical basis for socialism and the Communists have immediately understood them in this way. The unity of man with man, which is based on the real differences between men, the concept of the human species brought down from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this but the concept of society!”10 Setting Marx’s politeness aside, Feuerbach’s philosophy does imply a revolutionary factor worthy of Marx’s compliment. Third, Feuerbach’s notion of alienation can only refer to the alienation of the isolated individual. Since Feuerbach’s alienation designates the individual’s alienation from his essence, this concept has yet to surpass the scope of a single human: The subject of alienation is man, its result is the loss of himself and the supersession of alienation is the supersession of his state of self-loss. Thus, Feuerbach’s alienation is only concerned with the subject’s self-relation, moulded on the structure of self-alienation or, as Marx puts it in Thesen, the alienation of the “isolated – human individual”. This differs from Hegel’s concept of alienation, which, although the alienating subject is still man, brings about the socialization of the object as follows: The relation between the individual and his object is no longer the narrow relationship between him and his object, but that between him and everything. Correspondingly, the subject-object relationship between isolated individuals  Marx, To Ludwig Feuerbach. August 11, 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 354.

10

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becomes the social relationship between men. Having surpassed the scope of the self, this can no longer be considered self-alienation, but rather becomes a model for mutual alienation. That Feuerbach’s alienation is the alienation of the isolated individual is closely tied up with his conception of man. Unsatisfied with the Young Hegelian conception of man as “I” or self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein), and the interpretation of man as a egoistic, selfish individual by Hobbes and other modern natural law theorists, Feuerbach construes man’s essence to be that of the species (Gattung), seeking to integrate man once again into communal relations as he notes in Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft: “The single man for himself possesses the essence of man neither in himself as a moral being nor in himself as a thinking being. The essence of man is contained only in the community and unity of man with man; it is a unity, however, which rests only on the reality of the distinction between I and thou”.11 He even claims that “[t]he highest and last principle of philosophy is, therefore, the unity of man with man”.12 Based on these remarks alone, Feuerbach seems to have already conceived of man from the perspective of social relations, misleading even Marx at that time, who praises Feuerbach in the Third Manuscript for “making the social relationship of ‘man to man’ the basic principle”.13 Marx soon realized his mistake and, within half a year, launched a criticism at Feuerbach in Thesen, with one of its focuses being the lack of social relations perspective in Feuerbach’s notion of man’s essence. To interpret man’s essence from the perspective of the species and the I-you relation does not necessarily elevate man to a social being, for this actually depends on the principle that underlies the species, connecting “I” with “you”. It is exactly in this respect that Feuerbach, aware that man has been falling into the state of isolated individual given the collapse of the community of antiquity, endeavors to connect these individuals with their intrinsic, sensory human abilities, i.e. love (Liebe), instead of drawing on extrinsic economic factors such as the transferral of property and exchange like Hegel and Marx. The species simply connected by love, however, can only be the abstract commonality originated from the naturally-formed family. In this sense, the species-life articulated by Feuerbach is a description of family more than social life; correspondingly, the I-you relation built on love is neither the relationship of one to another nor the relationship between two private owners, but simply the relationship between family members. Therefore, I-you for Feuerbach is by no means a social relationship. Based on Das Wesen des Christentums, Yasishi Yamanouchi seeks to plead for Feuerbach that he has already discussed man and his relation with society in the sense of sociality. He further criticizes the mainstream interpretation of Feuerbach in Japan, making an example of Shirozuka’s opinion that Feuerbach lacks a notion of society and history, “Noboru Shirozuka is not  Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. by M. H. Vogel, Indianapolis/ Cambridge, 1986, p. 71. 12  Ibid., p. 72. 13  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 327.

11

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attentive to the fact that Marx’s immanent understanding of the English political economy is likely mediated by Feuerbach’s empiricist conception of society”.14 As the author sees it, however, this is an over-interpretation of Feuerbach’s philosophy and an exaggeration of its significance. Later in the sixth article of Thesen, Marx lays bare the falsity of Feuerbach’s concept of society: “Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is an ensemble of social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is hence obliged: 1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment [Gemüt; translator] by itself, and to presuppose an abstract-isolated-human individual. 2. Essence, therefore, can be regarded only as ‘species’, as an inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals in a natural way”.15 That is to say, notwithstanding the expressions “species” and “I and you”, man can never become an “ensemble of the social relations”, but is nothing more than an “abstraction inherent in each single individual”, insofar as the constitutive principle of species and the I-you relation remains unchanged. In all, Feuerbach’s alienation is that of an abstract, isolated individual, based on which the individual would rather remain in the community of antiquity founded on love than enter modern civil society. Considering the reality of modern society, however, such a nostalgic, romantic fantasy is virtually utopian. For this reason, Shirozuka holds that Feuerbach lacks a “historical consciousness and dialectic thinking”.16 Indeed, with respect to the concept of modern society, Feuerbach does fall far behind Hegel, which is also explicitly pointed out by Marx later: “Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is certainly poor”.17

5.2  Inconsistency Between the First and the Second Aspect In the previous subchapter, we addressed the alienation concept and the distinction between Hegel and Feuerbach in this regard. Moving on from this, we proceed with a discussion of Marx’s understanding of alienation. In its entirety, alienation in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscript does not designate any general alienation, but rather a particular 14  Yasishi Yamanouchi, The Gaze of the Sufferers: The Renaissance of Early Marx, trans. by Xi Peng & Liying Wang, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2011, p. 290 (translated into English by K.H.). Also noteworthy are Chapter II. 3A. Feuerbach’s Empiricism and Naturalism and Chapter III. 3. Supplement: On the Current Critique of Feuerbach. 15  Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 4. 16  Noboru Shirozuka, Young Marx’s Thought: The Establishment of Socialist Thought, trans. by Jingjing Shang et al., Qiushi Publishing House, 1988, p. 166 (translated into English by K.H.). 17  Marx, On Proudhon, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 20: Marx and Engels: 1864–1868, Progress Publishers, 1985, p. 26.

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a­ lienation, i.e. alienated labor (entfremdete Arbeit). According to Marx’s exposition in this fragment, this embraces four aspects: (1) The alienation of labor product (the alienation of Sache) (2) The alienation of labor activity (self-alienation) (3) The alienation of species-essence (Entfremdung des Gattungswesens) (4) The alienation of man from man (Entfremdung des Menschen von dem Menschen) Considering the complexity of these aspects as well as the current discussion on them, the first two aspects of alienation can also be named as alienation of Sache and self-alienation. According to Marx’s definition of these aspects, we can differentiate two phases within his exposition of the alienated labor: The first and second aspects can be construed as alienated labor in its literal meaning, since they are immediately related to man’s labor. Yet the third and fourth, strictly speaking, do not refer to alienated labor, but to the alienation of man during the labor process. Hence, it is not accurate to regard them all as aspects of alienated labor, though this is not our concern here. These four aspects present themselves as a development: From labor product to labor activity as such, to man as species and finally to the relationship between men, namely in an increasingly complex progress from thing to man, and from a single man to multiple men. This indicates that Marx was seeking to establish a comprehensive conceptual system of alienated labor. When examined closely, however, this seemingly integral system entails a number of conundrums that need further clarification. In the following, the author shall analyze these problems from different perspectives. Yet it is on no account meant to deny the significance of Marx’s alienated labor concept, but to explicate the necessity of Marx’s transition to the alienation of intercourse.

5.2.1  T  he First Aspect: Alienation of Nature or Alienation of Product? Before going into the first aspect, we shall briefly consider Marx’s intention behind his alienated labor concept. According to Marx himself, the reason for advancing this concept is to elucidate the genesis and essence of private property. Based on the political economy principle, labor object and product, both in terms of their origin and essence, should belong to the laborer himself, since his physical and mental energy are impregnated in the object and product of his labor, in which sense labor is the premise of property, and private property is the accumulation of the private individual’s labor. Contrary to this principle, however, the “actual economic fact” is: “The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in

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direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things”.18 On the other hand, however, non-laborers accumulate huge amount of capital, taking control of labor. This is a fact that contradicts the assumption of political economy and to which political economy fails to provide any explanation. For this reason, Marx wrote the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] for the purpose of bringing this unmistakable contradiction to light through the alienated labor concept. We now turn to the survey of the first aspect of alienated labor, which Marx defines as following: [T]he object which labour produces – labour’s product – confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has become material [sachlich]: it is the objectification [Vergegenständlichung] of labour. Labour’s realisation is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realisation of labour appears as loss of realisation for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation [Aneignung] as estrangement, as alienation.19

This first aspect can also be briefly summarized as that “the worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object”.20 When examined thoroughly, however, this sentence actually expounds two conditions: The first one corresponds to the first half of the above quoted passage: “The object which labour produces  – labour’s product – confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer”. This process is named by Marx as objectification (Vergegenständlichung), an alienation that permeates human society, for it is the necessary result of man’s labor. The other one is the alienation occurring “[u]nder these economic conditions”, corresponding to the second half of this passage. The second condition is not only a portrayal of the object alienating from the laborer and becoming an independent existence, but also of the following state: Despite his labor, the worker cannot appropriate (aneignen) his own labor product, which is taken from him rather than compensated for his labor, and therefore falls into the state of “estrangement”, “alienation” and means he “loses realization to the point of starvation”. The more products he creates through his labor, “the more he falls under the sway of his product, capital”.21 This is clearly the state of the wage worker’s existence under capitalism. After drawing a distinction between these two kinds of alienated labor, Marx goes on to examine them individually. At the beginning of page XXIII, he notes: “Let us now look more closely at the objectification, at the production of the worker; and in it at the estrangement, the loss of the object, of his product”.22 His explanation of this alienation starts out from analyzing the inversion of man and nature’s positions in labor: First, “[t]he worker can create nothing without nature, without 18  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 271 f. 19  Ibid., p. 272. 20  Ibid. 21  Ibid. 22  Ibid., p. 273.

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the sensuous external world”, since the laborer’s existence and his object are all dependent of nature as such; second, “the more the worker by his labour appropriates [aneignen] the external world, sensuous nature, the more he deprives himself of means of life in two respects”; Finally, “[i]n both respects, therefore, the worker becomes a servant of his object, first, in that he receives an object of labour, i.e., in that he receives work; and secondly, in that he receives the means of subsistence”.23 That is to say, man is the only being in the natural world endowed with self-­ consciousness and hence held as a supernatural being with dominance over the natural world. His existence, however, depends on the grace of nature, which makes him simultaneously nature’s servant. More ridiculously, the stronger his laboring ability grows, the more dependent on nature he becomes. Therefore, nature is alienated from man, and this alienation of nature from man is a term that appears in Marx’s later summary of the first three aspects of alienated labor: “In estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his life activity, estranged labour estranges the species from man. It changes for him the life of the species into a means of individual life”.24 Here, nature’s “estranging from man” is alienation of nature, which obviously unfolds itself on the sphere of the relation between man and nature and does not concern social institutions. After addressing this objectification, Marx embarks upon a survey of alienation “[a]ccording to the economic laws”.25 This alienation differs from alienation as objectification, insofar as the former results in polarization, an extremely unfair state which Marx depicts with a tone of repulsion: Labor produces “privation”, “hovels”, “deformity” and “stupidity, cretinism” for laborers, whilst those who do not labor are given “wonderful things”, moving in “palaces” and becoming the “rich”.26 As Marx sees it, since the worker should have appropriated his product, he stands in a “direct relationship” with his product, a relationship that is, however, broken by the property owner who deprives the worker of his product, turning it into an “indirect relationship” between the worker and his product. Unfortunately, the political economist “conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labour by not considering the direct relationship between the worker (labour) and production”,27 staying ignorant of this bare fact. What Marx sets out to do is to unmask the fact that the wealth of the property owner is in essence robbery of the laborer, since “[t]he relationship of the man of means to the objects of production and to production itself is only a consequence of this first relationship”.28 To sum up, Marx explicitly differentiates two kinds of alienation within the first aspect of alienated labor: the sense of objectification or alienation of nature (Entfremdung der Natur) and the alienation of product from worker (Entfremdung des Produktes), both later subsumed under the alienation of Sache: “The relation of  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 276. 25  Ibid., p. 273 26  Ibid. 27  Ibid. 28  Ibid., p. 274. 23 24

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the worker to the product of labour as an alien object exercising power over him. This relation is at the same time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of nature, as an alien world inimically opposed to him. […] the estrangement of the thing”.29 Considering the first aspect of alienated labor, this distinction is of vital importance for it is the premise of our further discussion of the contradiction inherent in Marx’s alienation theory. The next question is what exactly is the relation between the alienation of nature and the alienation of product? Why does Marx set forth two completely different senses of alienation? According to his own account at the outset of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit], he is concerned to elucidate the origin and essence of the capitalist’s private property (capital). In this regard, alienation of product certainly matches the subject matter of this fragment, whereas alienation of nature seems to be rather irrelevant. One may wonder, therefore, whether mixing up these two kinds of alienation will cause theoretical unclarity? Does it not give rise to the misunderstanding that alienation of nature is also a reason for the capitalist’s private property? Unfortunately, Marx does not provide any explanation of these perplexing problems.

5.2.2  The Second Aspect: The “Other” in “Self-Alienation” Let us move on to the second aspect. According to Marx’s definition, “labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. […] His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. […] Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague”.30 “This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him”.31 In comparison to the laborer’s relation to this labor object and product in the first aspect, the second aspect is concerned with the alienation of labor activity as such from the laborer himself. Since labor activity constitutes man’s essence, the alienation of man from his own labor activity can also be regarded as “self-estrangement [Selbstentfremdung]”.32 According to Marx’s own account, the second aspect is deduced from the first because, once labor product is alienated, the labor as such that produces this product will be alienated as well. Likewise, however, this seemingly self-evident second aspect also causes confusion.

 Ibid., p. 275.  Ibid., 274. 31  Ibid., 275. 32  Ibid. 29 30

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To begin with, the labor addressed here is “external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his [laborer’s] intrinsic nature”. It is not “voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour”, “labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification” so that “as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague”. This, however, is merely the empirical phenomenon of the labor that “does not belong to his intrinsic nature”, but not a definition of the self-alienation concept in that it has yet to explicate the reason why labor does not belong to laborer himself. Apparently, Marx is aware of that and provides his explanation right after this account of external labor: “Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another”.33 This is the kernel of the second aspect, namely that the laborer’s work belongs to “another”. The existence of this other is pivotal as it explains the externality of labor and why the laborer “does not feel content but unhappy” during his labor. Where, however, does this other come from? Why can he appropriate the labor of another and why does the other laborer permit the former’s appropriation of his own labor? According to the common understanding, this is indubitably a fact only under certain relations of production such as capitalist relations of production or, in Marx’s later economics formulations, that under capitalism, the capitalist appropriates the wage worker’s labor. Yet, since this premise is not given in this context, the appearance of the other is somewhat abrupt. Second, we will be confronted with an even more serious problem when connecting the second aspect with the first. If the first aspect is to be construed as the alienation of nature, then the relation between laborer and his object in this alienation of nature is a onefold subject-object (Objekt) relation that does not allow for the other. In this case, it is impossible to deduce the second aspect from the first. The deduction of the other is only possible when the first aspect is to be construed as an alienation of the wage worker’s product, which necessarily presupposes the capitalist’s relationship to private property. Marx, however, seems reluctant to take the second option, for it does not cohere with his presupposition at the outset of this fragment, namely to deduce private property from alienated labor.

5.2.3  Mochizuki’s Question Only a few scholars of the Manuscripts focus on this logical conundrum entailed by the first two aspects of alienated labor. Seiji Mochizuki is one of them. In A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, he undertakes a thorough examination of the distinction between alienation of nature and alienation of product as well as their theoretical conundrum. It begins with a critique of the interpretation of Oyi Tadashi, Katsuko Umemoto, Hiromatsu, Ernest Mandel, et  al., who all consider the laborer in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] as a wage worker under capitalism, thereby 33

 Ibid., 274.

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identifying the first aspect with alienation of the wage worker’s product, overlooking alienation of nature in the first aspect. As he sees it, this approach not only contradicts the fact that Marx actually construes the alienation of nature as the first aspect, but also leads to an interpretation of the “alienation of product of ‘wage labor under capitalism’ […] as the alienation of the sensory, external world=natural object=nature that permeates the entire history”.34 In order to avoid this contradictory conclusion, Mochizuki brings fourth an idea that the first aspect ought to be defined as the alienation of nature: “Thus, the first aspect is nothing but alienation of labor process, which entails the ‘first aspect’ that conforms to the literal meaning of alienated labor”.35 It goes without saying that this alienated labor is the process of men’s objectification activity that permeates the entire history of human society. Considered this way, however, the transition from the first aspect to the second becomes impossible, since the second aspect is apparently the product under certain relations of production, something that is lacked in alienation of nature: “This ‘conception’ of alienation=externalization from the perspective of ‘coercive labor that belongs to another’ cannot be logically deduced from ‘alienation of nature’”.36 Yet, Marx seems to overlook this “inconsistency”37 between the first two aspects, insofar as he “mistakenly takes alienation of labor process or ‘alienation of nature=thing (Sache)’ as the starting point and portrays the second aspect of alienated labor, i.e. ‘externalization of labor’, through alienation of labor, namely the suffering under capitalism”.38 This indicates that Mochizuki is also attentive to the missing transitional moment between the first and the second aspect, a moment that allows the other to appear. “Hence, where exactly shall we be looking for this missing moment?”39 Nowhere but in Comments on James Mill, as Mochizuki answers himself. His argument proceeds as following: Since the problem resides in the fact that the subject in the first aspect is an isolated individual devoid of the quality of social relations, we can set out from the individual in an economic society consisting of multiple individuals where he assumes the characteristics of the private property relationship and then have him return to the world of the second aspect. As such, Mochizuki first needs to constitute a world of multiple individuals. As he sees it, the species in the third aspect of alienated labor is the closest to this presupposed world, for the word species literally means an entirety formed by individuals. As the following analysis will show, however, the species in the third aspect is not a community consisting of individuals, not to mention a society of private owners. Then, is there a society consisting of private owners in the Paris Manuscripts? Yes, in Comments on James Mill, where Marx “elevates ‘species’ to the concept of ‘society’ equivalent to the  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 58 (translated into English by K.H.). 35  Ibid., p. 60. 36  Ibid., p. 69 37  Ibid., p. 76. 38  Ibid., p. 79. 39  Ibid. 34

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‘civil society’ concept of political economy and further regards ‘species’ as the ‘alienated’, ‘mutually complementing activity of men=society’”.40 That is to say, Comments on James Mill provides us with a world that allows for the division of labor and exchange between private owners, a world where the individual embued with the private property relationship can be found. As such, Mochizuki comes to the bold conclusion: “As is repeatedly mentioned, the First Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts is basically a theory of the ‘alienation of nature=thing’ from isolated individual, a theory that lacks the vantage point of ‘collaboration’, even though it unmasks the alienation of labor process. As a result, Marx is entangled in the aporia how can that isolated individual disengage himself from the ‘species’ and become an ‘individual’. It is through his study in Comments in James Mill that Marx is capable of construing ‘species’ as (1) a universal common being as well as (2) a history-determined community equivalent to ‘civil society’”.41 To sum up: The individual first takes a direct leap from alienation of nature to the third aspect, where he disengages himself from the species, jumping to the context of Comments on James Mill; through the cultivation of civil society, he is alienated from his species, becoming an independent individual, hence returning to the world of the second aspect. The individual has to go through this entire process, i.e. the first aspect → the third aspect → Comments on James Mill → the second aspect”, so as to accomplish a transformation from isolated individual to private individual in civil society. The complexity and breadth of this process is astonishing. There are, however, several problems to be clarified in his exposition. To begin with, it is inappropriate to narrow the first aspect down completely to the alienation of nature. Admittedly, it is absurd to jump to the conclusion that the alienation of Sache leads to capital’s dominance over the worker without explicit differentiation between the alienation of nature and that of product. In this respect, Mochizuki’s critique is apparently correct. Yet, whilst pointing out the mistake of Tadashi, Umemoto, Hiromatsu, Mandel, et al., Mochizuki has himself fallen into the trap of another extreme, ignoring the aspect of alienation of product,42 which clearly contradicts with Marx’s account in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. As has been noted, in addition to the alienation of nature, Marx also incorporate the alienation of labor product in the first aspect. Considering this, Mochizuki’s interpretation overshoots its mark. Second, Mochizuki’s attempt to solve the transitional conundrum from the first to the second aspect by introducing the concept of species in the third aspect is  Ibid., p. 88.  Ibid., p. 99. 42  Regarding Chinese scholar’s critique of Mochizuki’s interpretation, see Zongbi Liu, An Analysis of Seiji Mochizuki’s Viewpoint on the “Alienation of Nature”, in: Philosophical Trends, no. 9, 2011. Zongbi Liu’s critique is chiefly setting out from the concern that Mochizuki’s understanding will weaken Marx’s critique of the alienation under capitalism, which is identical with the standpoint of the orthodox Marxists in Japan. As the Chinese translator of A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, the author also concurs with this critique. In this chapter, however, the author wants to launch an immanent critique of Mochizuki’s interpretation to expose the logical fallacy within his argument. 40 41

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rather far-fetched. Above all, considering the text ordering, the second aspect is deduced from the first and followed by the third. It is, therefore, difficult to confer the individual in the first aspect with the character of species. Even regardless of the text ordering, Mochizuki’s presupposition of the species in the third aspect as a community or society consisting of multiple individuals is also groundless for, as we are about to see, such a community does not conform to Marx’s own definition of species in the third aspect. Species does not imply community or society and the so-called species-essence is nothing more than man’s “free, conscious” nature. In this regard, it is futile to import the private property relationship in civil society into the species in the third aspect. To be sure, this critique of Mochizuki is under no circumstances a denial of his salient contribution to pinpointing a problem inherent in the aspects of alienated labor and to pointing out that the solution to this problem requires importing the private property relationship after the first aspect. He originally intends to perfect the exposition of alienated labor in the hope of providing a consistent interpretation of early Marx’s thought. The approach he adopts, however, is not necessarily effective. As the author sees it, the most effective solution to the transitional problem is to presuppose a theoretical moment between the first and the second aspect, in which the private property relationship holds dominance: By virtue of his own labor, the laborer attains his private property, based on which, he joins his division of labor and exchange of goods with another. During this process, a divergence among private owners arises: some lose their means of production, whilst others accumulate free money (in exchange for free labor) whereby the division of labor and exchange relation of common private owners begins to turn into the capitalist relations of production with labor becoming wage labor and workers beginning to produce in property owners’ factories. The insertion of this moment makes it possible to elucidate the alienation of product in the first aspect, and understand why labor is taken from the worker and given to “another” in the second aspect. This is the transitional bridge between the first and second aspect. In the ensuing summary of the four aspects of alienated labor, Marx shows himself to be attentive to this transitional problem. The reasons that he fails to postulate such a transitional moment before the account of the second aspect are: First, it is possible that, bound by his announcement at the beginning of fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] that, instead of treading the failed path of political economy to deduce alienated labor from private property, he deduces the latter from the former, deliberately avoiding a presupposition of the private property relationship so as to distinguish it from the political economy approach. Actually, his concern is hardly necessary. As we shall see in the following chapter, there are two kinds of private property under review here, namely private property “founded on the labor of the proprietor” (private property I) and capitalist private property (private property II), as well as two kinds of alienated labor, namely alienated labor as objectification (alienated labor I) and alienated labor that belongs to “another” (alienated labor II). What Marx intends to explicate here is that the wage worker’s labor (alienated labor II) leads to capital (private property II), whereas what political economy deals with is that one acquires wealth (private property I) through his private labor (alienated

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labor I) and then participates in the production activity bent on value (profit-­oriented alienated labor II) in civil society (the world of private property I). This is exactly what Marx calls political economy’s deduction of alienated labor from private property, which can by no means unveil the essence of capitalist private property (private property II) namely that “capital is the accumulation of other men’s labor”. Therefore, these are two essentially distinct problems, which, when clarified in the first place, would have not led to such misunderstanding. Considered this way, Marx should have distinguished private property I right before his deduction of private property II from alienated labor II. It is also possible that Marx was unable to provide a scientific explanation for the transition from alienated labor I to alienated labor II as well as from private property I to private property II owning to his lack of economics knowledge when writing the First Manuscript, which results in the logical gap between the first and the second aspect. Concerning a detailed exposition of this complex, see Chapter VI. The second reason is probably the conclusion postulated by Marx. In fact, Marx does not introduce the relationship between the laborer and “another” until he finishes setting forth all four aspects of alienated labor: If one’s own labor product and labor activity do not belong to oneself, to whom exactly do they belong? Since they do not belong to god, they can only be owned by “man”, yet any man other than the laborer himself, “other man than the worker”.43 Thus, if this “other man” already appears in the second aspect, that would mean to presuppose the conclusion as the premise of argument. Third, it might be related to Marx’s explanatory framework at the time. As the author shall expound, Marx was basically resting on Feuerbach’s framework of the alienation concept with Hegel’s framework of alienation still out of reach.

5.3  T  he Third Aspect: The Particularity of the Alienation of Species-Essence From the first two aspects of alienated labor, Marx deduces a third: “In estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his life activity, estranged labour estranges the species from man. It changes for him the life of the species [Gattungsleben] into a means of individual life [individuelles Leben]. First it estranges the life of the species and individual life, and secondly it makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form”.44 According to this definition, the third aspect is directly deduced from the first two aspects. This aspect seems to be rather simple, yet still causes some confusion on the grounds of the particularity of Marx’s conception of species-essence.  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 278. 44  Ibid., p. 276. 43

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Regarding the Paris Manuscripts in their entirety, Marx’s concept of species-­ essence embraces three meanings in principle: (1) Depending on external nature, man is a universal natural being, “a part of nature”.45 (2) Man can consciously perform “free, conscious activity”; with the consciousness of the object and his self-­ consciousness, he can undertake production activity that reshapes the world. (3) Man is a kind of communal or social being, what Marx later defines as an “ensemble of the social relations”. Therefore, the pivotal issue is to clarify to what exactly species-essence in the First Manuscript refers. From the author’s viewpoint, the concept of species-essence in the First Manuscript only encompasses the first two meanings, whilst the third meaning first appears in Comments on James Mill. To begin with, let us examine Marx’s account of the first meaning of species-essence in reference to the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt]. In this fragment, Marx explicitly construes man’s species-essence as universal nature for the purpose of criticizing Hegel’s idealism. For instance, he notes: “Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers – he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities—as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering [leidend], conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants”.46 As a “living natural being”, man is compelled to depend on external nature for survival. Regardless of the level of evolution man has reached, he still needs earth, water, air, food, etc. as necessary conditions for his survival, maintaining his living activity in a metabolism with external nature. This is the natural limitation that no “living natural being” can escape, the truth of life. In this regard, man is a “suffering” being. Yet, furnished with living powers such as quality, ability, impulsion, passion, etc., he is also able to transform the external world, which makes him a proactive, “active natural being”. Marx presents a brilliant account of this dialectic relation: “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being – and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power [Wesenskraft] of man energetically bent on its object”.47 In brief, it is exactly because of his “suffering” that man necessarily becomes “passionate”; man’s capability to act stems from his suffering. Being “passionate” is the beginning of man’s intentional utilization of nature. Once it starts, man will conceive of external nature as “objects that he needs  – essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers”.48 With this consciousness of the object, man is capable of distinguishing himself from his object and therefore considering his own activity as externalization. As such, man gradually becomes self-aware, with an “objective [gegenständlich] existence”, “a human natural being. That is to say, he is a being for himself.  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 336. 47  Ibid., p. 337. 48  Ibid., p. 336. 45 46

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Therefore he is a species-being”.49 This is the aforementioned second meaning of species-essence, namely that man can perform “free, conscious activity”. Concerning this second meaning, Marx notes at the outset of the third aspect of alienated labor: “Man is a species-being [Gattungswesen], not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but – and this is only another way of expressing it [Sache] – also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being”.50 In addition to this essential exposition, Marx also avails himself of the following articulations to demonstrate a further point that “free, conscious activity is man’s species-character”51: “Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness”, “man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty” and “It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being”. In alienated labor, however, this noble “independent, free activity” degenerates into mere means to maintain a corporal existence, as Marx remarks: “Estranged labour turns thus: (3) Man’s species-being [Gattungswesen], both nature and his spiritual species-property, into a being alien to him, into a means for his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect”.52 This is the basic meaning of the alienation of species-essence in the third aspect. It is in Comments on James Mill that the concept of species-essence escapes the yoke of the isolated individual’s self-realization and freedom and assumes its third meaning, social-being. In Comments on James Mill, Marx not only identifies man explicitly as the “true [communal essence] of men”, “social entity”,53 “total being [totales Wesen]”,54 etc., but also construes “species-activity” and “species[enjoyment]” as “social activity [gesellschaftliche Tätigkeit]” and “social enjoyment [gesellschaftlicher Genuß]”.55 In other words, it is in Comments on James Mill that Marx’s conception of man reached the level of the later Thesen. In general, since the species-essence in the third aspect only refers to the “free, conscious” character of man’s activity, it still remains as the species-essence of the isolated individual, devoid of the literal meaning of species, namely a community or society comprising of multiple individuals. This conclusion drawn from our analysis not only favors those who interpret the third aspect as an alienation of social

 Ibid., p. 337.  Ibid., p. 275. 51  Ibid., p. 276 f. 52  Ibid., p. 277. 53  Ibid., p. 217. 54  Ibid., p. 218. 55  Ibid., p. 217. 49 50

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relations. It is presumptuous to claim that Marx already has the notion of an “ensemble of social relations” simply based on the appearance of the term “­ species-­essence”. Yet, aside from Mochizuki, many Chinese scholars find themselves in such a position. As the species-essence in the third aspect does not imply communal essence or an “ensemble of social relations”, Marx will be confronted with even greater difficulty when articulating the fourth aspect.

5.4  T  he Fourth Aspect: The Conundrum of the “Alienation of Man from Man” The fourth aspect, i.e. the alienation “of man from man”, is the most uncanny aspect compared with the previous ones. Let us first take a look at Marx’s exposition: “An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity and from his species-being, is the estrangement of man from man [die Entfremdung des Menschen von dem Menschen]. When man confronts himself, he confronts the other man. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to the other man’s labour and object of labour”.56 As the only exposition of the fourth aspect, this passage is, compared with Marx’s account of the first three aspects, rather simple in content. In terms of its form, it seems to be deduced from the first three aspects, the third in particular: Since man is alienated from the product of his own labor, living activity and species-­ essence, he is alienated from anothers. Moreover, considering Marx’s expression that “the proposition that man’s species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature”,57 the fourth aspect appears to be a component of the third aspect. Thus, some scholars do not recognize the fourth aspect as an independent aspect of alienated labor. For instance, Umemoto puts forward a combination of the third and fourth aspects, construing Marx’s conception of alienated labor in a threefold structure58; Hiromatsu also tends to interpret the fourth aspect within the framework of the third aspect and thereby regards Marx’s alienated labor as triple alienation, namely alienation of man from object, from himself and from species (which is in essence alienation of man from man).59 Disagreeing with this, the author still holds

 Ibid., p. 277.  Ibid. 58  Katsuko Umemoto, Historical Materialism and Economics, Genndai no Rironsha, 1971, p. 49 (translated into English by K.H.). 59  Wataru Hiromatsu, On Young Marx, Heibonsha, 1971, p. 251ff (translated into English by K.H.). 56 57

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the forth aspect to be an independent aspect for, in accordance with our analysis above, the species-essence in the third aspect does not imply community or social relation, but only refers to man’s nature of being “free and conscious”. Since the fourth aspect addresses the relationship between men, it cannot be subsumed under the third aspect. Nevertheless, this reading of the fourth aspect as an independent aspect of alienated labor also faces multiple theoretical difficulties, e.g. how is the conclusion “he confronts the other man” deduced from the premise “[w]hen man confronts himself” and how can we justify Marx’s claim that “[w]hat applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man’s relationship to the other man, and to the other man’s labour and object of labour”? Marx fails to provide answers to these questions. In his own account, the proposition that “[w]hen man confronts himself, he confronts the other man” seems to be the key of the fourth aspect. Based on this, alienation of man from man” is supposed to be the opposition or conflict between two men. The question is, however, to whom do these two confronting men refer? What exactly is the reason for their conflict? In the first three aspects, “man” certainly means laborer and, for example in the capitalist’s factory, wage worker. Hence, can these two men be considered two wage workers? The answer is no for, above all, there is no indication from Marx in this text to support this interpretation, and second the reciprocal alienation of wage workers does not make sense: Since the subject matter of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] is to unravel the notion that “capital is the accumulation of other men’s labor”, it is supposed to come down to a conclusion that a worker’s labor is appropriated by “another”. Hence, the interpretation of alienation of man from man as the reciprocal alienation between wage workers is meaningless. Considered that way, the most reasonable interpretation of alienation of man from man is seemingly the alienation between wage worker and capitalist. Marx’s exposition also appears to bolster this reading. After all the four aspects of alienated labor, Marx starts a new page, i.e. page XXV, to summarize his exposition of the alienated labor concept. Beginning with the question “[i]f the product of labour is alien to me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does it belong?”, Marx goes through several subjects to whom the product of labor might have belonged such as God and nature. Yet neither God nor nature can possibly own another’s labor for “only man himself can be this alien power over man”. As alien power, this man is definitely not the laborer himself, but “other man than the worker”, namely the capitalist: “[t]hrough estranged, alienated labour, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labour of a man alien to labour and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labour creates the relation to it of the capitalist (or whatever one chooses to call the master of labour)”.60 Therefore, it seems reasonable to construe the alienation of man from man as the reciprocal alienation between wage worker and capitalist. In fact, it is the consensus shared by  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 279.

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most of the scholars of the Manuscripts including Rosenberg, Cornu, Umemoto, Shiro Sugihara and Yibing Zhang. Yet, this interpretation cannot stand up to scrutiny. First, the alienation of man from man appears to be the reciprocal alienation between two men, namely the alienation of wage worker’s product and labor to the capitalist as well as the alienation of capitalist’s product and labor to the wage worker. The second scenario, however, clearly contradicts with the essence of Marx’s alienated labor theory in that, based on Marx’s presupposition at the beginning of this fragment, it is the capitalist that does not labor, yet unilaterally appropriates wage worker’s labor product. Only in this way can the proposition that “capital is the accumulation of other men’s labor” be justified. Hence, the interpretation of the fourth aspect as the reciprocal alienation between wage worker and capitalist is untenable.61 Second, since capitalist cannot be alienated, the alienation of man from man cannot be understood as reciprocal alienation, but as unilateral alienation between two unequal subjects, i.e. as wage worker’s alienation of himself to the capitalist. Nevertheless, if wage worker alienates himself to the capitalist, does it not mean that worker alienates his labor product and labor activity to the capitalist? Is this not exactly the content of the first and the second aspect? When the fourth aspect is identical with the first two aspects, however, is it still necessary for Marx to present the fourth aspect individually? Based on Marx’s exposition, the four aspects of alienated labor collectively constitute a development, in which sense the fourth aspect should be by no means a simple repetition of the first two aspects. Moreover, according to the analysis above, the relation between wage worker and capitalist is the final conclusion drawn from the entire exposition of alienated labor. Thus, to consider the alienation of man from man as reciprocal alienation between wage worker and capitalist is to identify the fourth aspect with the conclusion of Marx’s exposition of alienated labor, and this does not logically make sense either. Hence, how exactly is the fourth aspect to be interpreted? The author proposed a bold hypothesis in 2007 that alienation of man from man in the First Manuscript does not refer to the alienation between two unequal subjects such as capitalist and wage worker, but the alienation between two producers in civil society, or the alienation between two private owners to be exact. The reason is that only private owners can regard himself as well as another as means and, when alienating himself, alienates another from himself at the same time. More importantly, the private owner also meets the requirement of reciprocal alienation in the fourth aspect, by both transferring his product and labor to another and building an equal relationship of  One might raise objection with regard to the following passage from the Third Manuscript: “Estrangement is manifested not only in the fact that my means of life belong to someone else, that which I desire is the inaccessible possession of another, but also in the fact that everything is itself something different from itself – that my activity is something else and that, finally (and this applies also to the capitalist), all is under [the sway] of inhuman power” (ibid., p. 314). Apparently, the alienation here presents itself in two forms: First that my means of living and labor belong to another and second that an inhuman power rules over everything. The alienation of both wage worker and capitalist can only occur in the second sense. The position where the parenthesis “and this applies also to the capitalist” is inserted also reinforces this reading.

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reciprocal alienation. Reading through the Paris Manuscripts, we can find such a scenario in Comments on James Mill. For instance: 1) each of us actually behaves in the way he is regarded by the other. You have actually made yourself the means, the instrument, the producer of your own object in order to gain possession of mine; 2) your own object is for you only the sensuously perceptible covering, the hidden shape, of my object; for its production signifies and seeks to express the acquisition of my object. In fact, therefore, you have become for yourself a means, an instrument of your object, of which your desire is the servant, and you have performed menial services in order that the object shall never again do a favour to your desire.62

This passage explicitly shows that under the conditions of private property, men reciprocally regards the other as a means and instrumentalizes them: alienation of man from man.63 As we shall further demonstrate, Marx surveys the essence of the alienation of man from man through the concept of the alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill and thereby unveils the relation between this alienation and private property. In the light of this, the author advances the notion that “it is in Comments on James Mill that Marx completed his exposition of the fourth aspect of alienated labor. Even without Marx’s own acknowledgment, the alienation of intercourse concept is de facto the supplement to the fourth aspect in the First Manuscript”.64 It is probably because Marx intended to solve this problem in Comments on James Mill that he rashly puts an end to the exposition of the fourth aspect in the First Manuscript. To be sure, it is also likely that this difficulty results from the underlying Feuerbachian framework of alienation. As is aforementioned, Feuerbachian alienation is based on the structure of the isolated individual’s self-alienation, the simplest subject-object relation. Preceding from this structure, one can easily explain the first three aspects of alienated labor except for the last one, since it is impossible for a true “another” to appear in this structure of the isolated individual’s self-­  Ibid., p. 227.  It goes without saying that Marx’s most classic expression of reciprocal alienation appears in Grundrisse, e.g. “Individual A satisfies individual B’s need by means of the commodity A only to the extent that and because individual B satisfies individual A’s need by means of commodity b, and vice versa. Each serves the other in order to serve himself; and makes reciprocal use of the other as his means. Each individual is now conscious that (1) each attains his end only in so far as he serves the other as means; (2) each becomes a means for the other (being for another) only as end for himself (being for himself); (3) this reciprocity whereby each is at once means and end, and moreover attains his end only in so far as he becomes means, […] that this reciprocity is a necessary FACT, presupposed as a natural condition of exchange, but that it is as such a matter of indifference for each of the two subjects of exchange, and is of interest to each of them only in so far as it satisfies his own interest as excluding that of the other, without relation to it” (Marx, Outlines of Critique of Political Economy, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Marx: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 175 f.). That being said, this account of reciprocal alienation is, with respect of its content, not much different from that in Comments on James Mill, only the pronouns “your” and “my” are replaced by “A” and “B”. 64  Lixin Han, The Turning Point of Marx’s Thought: The Alienation of Intercourse in Comments on James Mill, in: Modern Philosophy, no. 5, 2007 (translated into English by K.H.). 62 63

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alienation. It is perhaps on account of this drawback of the explanatory framework that Marx was unable to further unfold the content of alienation of man from man.65

5.5  Summary In overview, based on the analysis above, Marx’s concept of alienated labor holds logical inconsistencies that show his thought had not yet reached maturity at the time of writing the Fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. Aside from Marx’s inadequate economics knowledge, the main reason is his constriction by Feuerbach’s self-alienation framework. Admittedly, without considering the moment of the subject’s return to himself in Feuerbach’s alienation concept, alienation results in a loss of self. By applying this to the analysis of the capitalist relations of production, as Marx demonstrates with his alienated labor concept, one can well explain why the more a worker labors the poorer he becomes, and extrapolate from this the irrationality and inhumanity of capitalism. Considered this way, we can even conclude that the alienated labor concept is the result of Marx’s ingenious application of Feuerbach’s concept of alienation. When one employs this concept to solve problems that entail social relations including an “other” or those between men, however, its limitation is completely exposed, as are the issues Marx encounters in explaining the transition from the first to the second aspect and the alienation of man from man. All these problems force Marx to reflect on his approach and realize that Feuerbach’s concept of alienation is not suitable for an analysis of relations in modern civil society, private property in particular. Hegel’s alienation concept, long criticized by Marx, implies the possibility of penetrating the profound essence of modern civil society and unravelling the enigma of private property. In the following Comments on James Mill and the Third Manuscript, Marx embarks on a transition from the Feuerbachian to the Hegelian framework. As a result, he establishes his own model of alienation theory through the critical assimilation of Hegel’s alienation concept: Resting on the externality of man’s communal essence as the principle, he posits this externality as the necessary moment of the individual’s elevation to sociality so as to complete the methodological transition, i.e. to explain man’s intrinsic essence based on the extrinsic world.  As Zhengdong Tang sees it, the alienated labor in the First Manuscript is only seemingly founded on the structure of isolated individual in that, if Marx’s critique of political economy was indeed setting off from this structure, the following question will be unsolvable: “When even Feuerbach is capable of conceiving species-essence from the perspective of relationship and thereby construes ‘species-being’ as ‘species-relation’, is it possible that Marx, who was under Feuerbach’s sway when writing the Paris Manuscripts, would turn to the logic of isolated individual and hence fall behind Feuerbach?” (Zhengdong Tang, From Smith to Marx: A Historical Interpretation of the Economic-Philosophical Method, Jiangsu People’s Publishing, 2009, p.  281 (translated into English by K.H.)). Yet the Feuerbach’s “relationship” is not a relation built on economic basis, but merely a relation held by love and sensuousness and is therefore not the true “relationship”.

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Chapter 6

Is Marx’s Alienated Labor Theory Circular Reasoning? A Study of the Fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. Part II

The Greek word aporia denotes an unsolvable logical conundrum in the process of deduction which undermines the whole argument. It is due to the aporia inherent in Marx’s argument that his alienated labor theory in the Paris Manuscripts has long been underestimated and even considered circular reasoning among early Marx scholars. Furthermore, this is believed to be the reason why Marx, although unwillingly, was to later give up his alienation theory, and turn to a new theoretical framework. As such, to which extent does this interpretation hold true? What difficulty is Marx’s alienated labor theory confronted with exactly? Is a solution to this conundrum possible? Through a new interpretation of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscript, this chapter is dedicated to answering these questions.

6.1  Origin of the Aporia As is widely known, Marx set out in the First Manuscript to unveil the genesis and nature of private property. He began the column [Profit des Kapitals] with the question: “What is the basis of capital, that is, of private property in the products of other men’s labour?”1 In order to answer this question, one has to first define capital. For Marx it is, “[c]apital is stored-up labour”2 or, to be exact, “the accumulation of other men’s labor”. Marx prefaces the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] by reviewing his exposition of the three sources of income in the fragment [Arbeitslohn, Profit des Kapitals, Grundrente], and then pointing out the “fact of political economy”, namely that capital, the capitalist’s private property, constantly increases, whereas labor, the 1  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 246. 2  Ibid., p. 247.

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laborer’s private property, is lost. Society as a whole presents itself as an opposition between the accumulation of capital and the accumulation of poverty and hence “fall[s] apart into the two classes  – the property owners and the propertyless workers”.3 This grim social fact has underpinned capitalism since the beginning of the modern era! Strangely, political economists who set off to explicate the essence of modern society fail to provide any explanation of this fact, but rather take it as the starting point to develop the political economy system.4 As Marx sees it, political economy does not qualify as science, for it does not or cannot account for this fact: It only seeks to provide an explanation grounded in superficial economic “laws” or “the way the movement is connected”, but in fact “go[es] back to a fictitious primordial condition”, just as it bases the necessity of “competition” on the “external and apparently accidental circumstances”, or, as “the theologian explains the origin of evil”, “assumes as a fact, in historical form, what has to be explained”.5 The twenty-six year old Marx believed himself to be competent to tackle what political economy had thus failed to accomplish, despite the fact that he had a PhD in philosophy and had only begun studying English economics barely half a year ago. He adopts a philosophical approach to grasping the concept of private property (begreifen): to elucidate the origin and essence of private property on a conceptual level and then demonstrate that “capital is the accumulation of other men’s labor” as well as the necessity of the opposition between “the property owners and the propertyless workers”. To accomplish this task, Marx begins by reexamining the “actual economic fact” (nationalökonomisches, gegenwärtiges Faktum): “The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things. Labour produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a commodity – and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general”.6 Obviously, the fact in Marx’s eyes is distinct from that viewed by political economists who take it for granted and see no need to justify its self-evidence. For Marx, however, it is a fact that has to be analyzed and judged, as he goes on to say: “This fact expresses merely that the object which labour produces – labour’s product – confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an  Ibid., p. 270.  In Excerpts from Jean-Baptiste Say’s Traité d’économie politique, Marx made the following remark on Say’s exposition of the nature of wealth and the principle of circulation: “Private property is a fact, the explanation of which does not concern the political economy; yet this fact builds its foundation. There is no wealth without private property and the political economy is in essence the science of enrichment. Therefore, there is no political economy without private property. The entire political economy is founded on a fact without necessity” (MEGA② IV-2, S. 316, 318 (translated into English by K.H.)). 5  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 271. 6  Ibid., p. 271f. 3 4

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object, which has become material [sachlich gemacht hat]: it is the objectification of labour. Labour’s realization is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realisation [Verwirklichung] of labour appears as loss of realisation [Entwirklichung] for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation [Aneignung] as estrangement, as alienation”.7 Considering this passage, it is clear that Marx does not take this fact for granted, but considers it an irrational and even ludicrous fact that contradicts the original or normative state. This is Marx’s fundamental difference from those political economists whose names are mentioned at the outset of his discussion, and shows that he stands in direct opposition to them. What follows is a survey of alienated labor, a conceptual device used to unravel all the mysteries of private property. At the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit], Marx returns to the question of what is private property with the conclusion: “Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labour, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself. Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labour, i.e., of alienated man, of estranged labour, of estranged life, of estranged man. True, it is as a result of the movement of private property that we have obtained the concept of alienated labour (of alienated life) in political economy. But analysis of this concept shows that though private property appears to be the reason or the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence, just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual confusion. Later this relationship becomes reciprocal”.8 Here, Marx eventually fulfills a promise made at the beginning of this fragment: to bring the genesis and essence of private property to light. The alienation of labor is the reason of private property; “[p]rivate property is the result of alienated labor”! From this, he further deduced the proposition: “Through estranged, alienated labour, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labour of a man alien to labour and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labour creates the relation to it of the capitalist (or whatever one chooses to call the master of labour)”.9 Although Marx had yet to establish concepts such as wage labor and surplus value, he ingeniously comes to the conclusion that “capital is the accumulation of other men’s labor” and that the “worker creates the relation to it of the capitalist”, which already stand on the same plane as his propositions in Das Kapital.10 Undoubtably felt to be a triumph of reasoning, it is little wonder Marx cannot help but express his satisfaction in the preface to the Paris Manuscripts: “It is hardly necessary to assure  Ibid., p. 272.  Ibid., p. 279f. 9  Ibid., p. 279. 10  For instance: “Capitalist production, therefore, under its aspect of a continuous connected process, of a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus value, but it also produces and reproduces the capitalist relation; on the one side the capitalist, on the other the wage labourer” (Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 277). 7 8

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the reader conversant with political economy that my results have been attained by means of a wholly empirical analysis based on a conscientious critical study of political economy”.11 In other words, on grounds of the proposition he just deduced, he claims himself to have already surpassed political economics. Although Marx was delighted to fulfill his promise with this accomplishment, however, it was accompanied by a sudden change of tone. To begin with, in contrast with the political economic approach, Marx sets off to deduce private property from alienated labor. Yet, after the conclusion of his deduction, he shows sign of weakening, as we see at the end of the previously quoted paragraph: “Later this relationship becomes reciprocal”. It seems to indicate that the causal relation between alienated labor and private property is transformed into a reciprocal relation. The following exposition is even more evident: “Only at the culmination of the development of private property does this, its secret, appear again, namely, that on the one hand it is the product of alienated labour, and that on the other it is the means [Mittel] by which labour alienates itself, the realisation of this alienation”.12 That “it [sc. private property] is the product of alienated labour” conforms to Marx’s hitherto standpoint. Yet the ensuing sentence that “it [sc. private property] is the means by which labour alienates itself” is perplexing since, as “the means by which labour alienates itself”, private property is logically prior to alienated labor and as such the cause of alienated labor, which, however, contradicts Marx’s presupposition. Marx further argues: “we can develop every category of political economy with the help of these two factors; and we shall find again in each category, e.g., trade, competition, capital, money, only a particular and developed expression of these first elements”.13 Attention! The “two factors” or “first elements” by which Marx seeks to “develop every category of political economy” not only refer to alienated labor, but also private property. Hence, does it not also mean that private property is the presupposition from which other categories such as capital are deduced? Is this not contradictory to Marx’s original intention to deduce capital from alienated labor? Second, before going into the elaboration of “trade, competition, capital, money”, Marx abruptly advances two tasks for himself: “(1) To define the general nature of private property, as it has arisen as a result of estranged labour, in its relation to truly human and social property [das wahrhafte menschliche und soziale Eigentum]. (2) We have accepted the estrangement of labour, its alienation, as a fact, and we have analysed this fact. How, we now ask, does man come to alienate, to estrange, his labour? How is this estrangement rooted in the nature of human development? We have already gone a long way to the solution of this problem by transforming the question of the origin of private property into the question of the relation of alienated labour to the course of humanity’s development. For when one speaks of private property, one thinks of dealing with something external to man. When one speaks of labour, one is directly dealing with man himself. This new formulation of the question already contains its solution”.14  Ibid., p. 231.  Ibid., p. 280. 13  Ibid., p. 281. 14  Ibid. 11 12

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In regard to the former, Marx seeks to explain the “general nature of private property” from the vantage point of “its [sc. private property’s] relation to truly human and social property”. Concerning the latter, Marx’s aim is “transforming the question of the origin of private property into the question of the relation of alienated labour to the course of humanity’s development”, namely to clarify the historical origin of alienated labor before addressing the genesis of private property. As such, how exactly does alienated labor come into being in human history? That Marx fails to provide a direct answer to this question is not our concern here; what is noteworthy is that the purpose of Marx’s search after the origin of alienated labor is still to explicate the origin of private property. To sum up, these two tasks, though from different perspectives, are still directed towards ascertaining the “general nature of private property” and the “origin of private property”. This is still the task he takes upon himself at the outset of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. Yet, does Marx not just claim that he has surpassed political economy by explaining the origin and nature of private property through the alienated labor concept? Why does he end up returning to the problem if it is already solved? If the problem is indeed solved, it is absurd to propose it again; a possible explanation is therefore that at this point he suddenly realizes that he is de facto far from solving the problem. If this is the case, then the approach taken so far, namely the deduction of private property from alienated labor, is problematic. As we seek to find the answer in Marx’s exposition, however, the First Manuscript hastily comes to an end.

6.2  The Semblance of Circular Reasoning Is Marx confronted with an aporia here? This is an enigma left by the First Manuscript. In fact, ever since the publication of the Paris Manuscripts in 1932, this problem has been the focus of Marx studies on the international scene. Strictly speaking, it is the Japanese scholars who first provide a direct solution to this problem. For instance, Rosenberg makes the following remark on this aporia: “Private ownership is the cause and alienated labor is the result; in its development, the former brings about the latter. This is the main thread permeating Engels’s Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie and some of Marx’s early manuscripts (in his comments on the excerpts from economists’ works). In the here examined fragment [sc. fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]], however, the profound and extensive analysis of alienated labor indicates that, as with elsewhere, the cause becomes the result and the result becomes the cause on account of the dialectical development. That is to say, private ownership causes alienated labor and alienated labor in turn ­reproduces private ownership”.15 The first half of this remark that Marx deduces 15  David Rosenberg, A Summary of the Development of Marx and Engels’s Economics Theories in the 1940s, trans. by Fang Gang et al., SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1958, p. 123 (translated into English by K.H.).

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alienated labor from private property contradicts with the text of this fragment. In the second half, Rosenberg is attentive of this contradiction, but, instead of explaining it, he draws on “the dialectical development” whereby “the cause as such becomes the result and the result becomes the cause”, as if everything could simply be explained by the dialectic. Yet exactly this reading becomes the mainstream standpoint of the soviet textbook system and exerts far-reaching impact on Chinese Marxist studies, insofar as most textbooks directly adopt Rosenberg’s explanation without actually going into details about this aporia. In comparison, early in 1957, Masanori Shimizu has already pointed to the “aporia in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts” in his The Development of the Self-­ Alienation Theory.16 Later on, the contributions of numerous Japanese scholars such as Tadashi, Umemoto, Hiromatsu, Hattori, Mochizuki and Yamanouchi have constantly brought this discussion to a higher level. In this chapter, the author shall concentrate on the most representative viewpoints from Tadashi, Hiromatsu and Yamanouchi, and thereby pinpoint the crux of the aporia.

6.2.1  Tadashi’s Question Tadashi’s demonstration that the alienated labor theory is circular reasoning mainly set out from the philosophical perspective. In the preface to The Evolution of the Historical Materialism, he points out that “the alienation and the alienated labor in the Manuscripts serve the purpose of explaining the origin of private property”, which is “exceedingly characteristic”17 of the Manuscripts, a point, however, barely noticed by the Japanese scholars. As he sees it, although “to clarify the genesis of private property through alienated labor” is Marx’s “greatest contribution” and one that distinguishes him from political economics, his argument is severely defective. Above all, Marx is already fallen into circular reasoning at the outset of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. Where does alienated labor come from? Regarding this question, Marx turns to the “fact of political economy”, which, according to Marx, is the “fact of private property”. That is to say, alienated labor results from the movement of private property. In the discussion on the aspects of alienated labor, however, he does not provide further explanation thereof, but instead claims at the end of this fragment that “it [sc. private property] is the product of alienated labour”. As such, there is a “unsolvable circular relation (reciprocal effect)”18 between the beginning and the end of this fragment.

 Masanori Shimizu, The Development of the Self-Alienation Theory, in: Kobe University Bungakukai Kenkyu, 1957 (translated into English by K.H.). 17  Oyi Tadashi, The Evolution of the Historical Materialism, Miraisha, 1968, p. I (translated into English by K.H.). 18  Ibid., p. 274. 16

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Second, Marx advances a question in the First Manuscript: “If the product of labour is alien to me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does it belong? If my own activity does not belong to me, if it is an alien, a coerced activity, to whom, then, does it belong? To a being other than myself”.19 Considering this question, the alienation here is mainly conceived of as the unpaid possession of product by another. Furthermore, the question “to whom, then, does it belong” also presupposes a certain private property relationship. “That is to say, in order to analyze the emergence of ‘private property’, Marx takes the ‘alienated labor’ which is deduced from ‘private property’, i.e. the alienated labor in the second sense of ‘alienation’, as the starting point. The conclusion is postulated as the premise”.20 For this reason, he is in fact “seeking to deduce ‘private property’ again from the ‘alienated labor’ that already entails ‘private property’ in itself”.21 Third, as Marx notes, “[t]he estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man [stands; trans.] to himself, is realized and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men”.22 This passage indicates that alienated labor always presupposes the “relationship in which a man stands to other man”, which certainly includes the private property relationship. Therefore, as Tadashi sees it, Marx’s alienated labor theory is in essence entangled in circular reasoning, which can only be avoided by the scientific explanation of the genesis of private property. The standard Marxist explanation is Engel’s standpoint in Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats that private property is deduced from the social division of labor, surplus product and commerce. Among Marx’s early writings, only Ideologie provides an explanation that matches this standard. In this work, however, Marx rests on the division of labor theory rather than the alienated labor theory to account for the origin of private property. Thus, as Tadashi sees it, it is in Ideologie that Marx finally resolves this problem. To be sure, Tadashi’s diagnosis is currently the mainstream interpretation, adopted by many Japanese Marxist economists including Hattori23 as well as Marxist theorists in China such as Xianda Chen. In his Study of Early Marx’s Thought (1983), Xianda Chen also addresses the logical conundrum inherent in the alienated labor theory that the genesis of alienated labor cannot be clarified without private property. With regard to the solution to this problem, he points out that “considering Marx’s and Engel’s later works, the original forms of the alienated labor that results in private ownership are division of labor, exchange, etc. The increase of productive forces leads to the development of division of labor and exchange and further brings about private property. Both Marx and Engels articulate this thought

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 278. 20  Oyi Tadashi, The Evolution of the Historical Materialism, Miraisha, 1968, p. 278. 21  Ibid., p. 279. 22  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 277. 23  Cf. Fumio Hattori, The Evolution of Marxism, Aoki Shoten, 1984, p. 160. 19

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in Ideologie, indicating that division of labor is a form of alienated labor in that it has each individual’s entire activity become an uncontainable alien power”.24 According to this passage, Xianda Chen also concurs with the explanation in Ideologie that division of labor results in private property. Yet he registers simultaneously that “division of labor is a form of alienated labor” and hence maintains the approach in the Manuscripts, namely to deduce private property from alienated labor, which distinguishes him from other critics. In all, Tadashi’s solution to the problem of circular reasoning is built on Marx’s transition to the explanatory framework of Ideologie, i.e. the transition from the alienated labor theory to the division of labor theory. This approach however means giving up solving the problem within the Paris Manuscripts, a solution that not all scholars are content with, e.g. Hiromatsu.

6.2.2  Hiromatsu’s Explanation Hiromatsu advances the most meticulous elaboration of this problem, addressing it in different measures in all of his most important early works: On Engels, The Original Image of Historical Materialism and On Young Marx.25 His solution to this problem also becomes a vital part of Hiromatsu’s Philosophy. First, Hiromatsu argues that Marx was not aware of the decisive inadequacy of his argument until the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] and hence did not provide any explanation of the cause of alienation. According to Marx’s exposition that “[t]hrough estranged, alienated labour, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labour of a man alien to labour and standing outside it”,26 alienated labor can only be labor within certain private property relationships. Yet, since Marx fails to presuppose the private property relationship, we can only conclude that “alienation is inevitable, so long as man labors, or even as he exists”.27 In order to avoid this ludicrous conclusion, one has to presuppose private property as the premise of alienated labor, which, however, means deducing alienated labor from private property and thereby contradicts with Marx’s approach in this fragment. In fact, it is because Marx presupposes the private property relationship in Comments on James Mill that he falls into even worse circular reasoning therein. Even if the new approach in Comments on James Mill is valid, “the evolution of ‘private property’ postulated as a premise is yet to be explained”.28 Why was Marx unable to explain the origin of private property at that time? As Hiromatsu sees it, it  Xianda Chen & Huiming Jin, A Study of Marx’s Early Thought, in: Selected Works of Xianda Chen, vol. 2, China Renmin University Press, 2006, p. 214 (translated into English by K.H.). 25  Wataru Hiromatsu, On Engels, Morita Shubansha, 1968; The Original Image of Historical Materialism, San-Ichi Shobo, 1971; On Young Marx, Heibonsha, 1971. 26  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 279. 27  Wataru Hiromatsu, On Young Marx, Heibonsha, 1971, p. 255 (translated into English by K.H.). 28  Ibid., 258. 24

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is because Marx adopted Feuerbach’s explanation of god as the alienation of man, seeking to elucidate private property (god on earth) through alienated labor (man). Following Feuerbach’s logic, however, to explain alienated labor through private property will mean that man is god’s alienation, which in fact presupposes private property a priori (god). This is exactly the political economy approach that Marx can on no account accept. It seems that Hiromatsu simply uses an analogy with Feuerbach to belie Marx’s presupposition. Yet this viewpoint is de facto in conformity with Hiromatsu’s interpretation of young Marx’s theoretical development. In his opinion, Marx’s alienated labor theory at that time was still confined to Feuerbach’s framework moulded on the structure of the isolated individual’s self-alienation and return to itself. Regarding this subject-object (Objekt) relation, it is a bipolar structure, since the object is nothing but a product of the subject’s self-alienation; the concept of private property, however, entails in addition to this subject-object (Objekt) relationship the relationship with another and is therefore a tripolar structure that incorporates another subject. For this reason, “it is apparently untenable to explain private property through alienated labor”29 for it means to account for a tripolar structure with a bipolar framework. As such, in order to bring private property to light, it is necessary to escape the framework of self-alienation, construing man as a social being. It is in Thesen and Ideologie that Marx eventually conceives of man as an “ensemble of the social relations”, which he was incapable of in the Paris period. This argument indicates that Hiromatsu’s answer to this problem is closely tied up with his famous theory of “leap from alienation theory to reification theory”. In overview, as Hiromatsu sees it, (1) the reason that the alienated labor theory falls into aporia is that Marx cannot clarify the emergence of private property; (2) Comments on James Mill not only does not solve this problem, but results in even worse circular reasoning; (3) the key to the solution is to disengage from Feuerbach’s framework of self-alienation, which Marx fails to accomplish until Thesen and Ideologie.

6.2.3  Yamanouchi’s Review The Japanese studies of the aporia in the alienated labor theory culminated at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Yamanouchi wrote thereafter a review of the studies of the Paris Manuscripts and its aporia. In the seventeen-times serialized long essay On Early Marx’s Civil Society Concept,30 he takes Lapin’s  Ibid., 258f. Also see Wataru Hiromatsu, Marxism and the Self-Alienation Theory, in: The Original Image of Historical Materialism, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2009 (translated into English by K.H.). 30  Yasishi Yamanouchi, On Early Marx’s Civil Society Concept, in: Modern Thought, 1976.8– 1978.1. It is later included in The Gaze of the Sufferer: The Renaissance of Early Marx (Seidosha, 2004). Also see Yasishi Yamanouchi, The Gaze of the Sufferer: The Renaissance of Early Marx, trans. by Xi Peng & Liying Wang, Beijing Normal University Publishing House, 2011. 29

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essay Vergleichende Analyse der drei Quellen des Einkommens in den „Ökonomisch-­ philosophischen Manuskripten“ von Marx31 as the starting point to look back at Japanese studies of this problem. As we know, the most salient contribution of Lapin’s essay is to distinguish two stages of Marx’s economics study in the Paris Manuscripts from the philological perspective: (1) the First Manuscript, (2) Comments on James Mill as well as the Second and the Third Manuscript. From Yamanouchi’s point of view, this differentiation is tied up with the then on-going discussion on the aporia in the alienated labor theory, insofar as it suggests that, at the end of the First Manuscript, Marx was attentive to the conundrum in his theory and hence moved to the second stage, an interpretation that coincides with the standpoint of most Japanese scholars. In the following, Yamanouchi concentrates his examination on Mochizuki and Hiromatsu’s analysis and solution, for, according to him, both are on the right path, though their survey of the subject of alienation still needs improvement. He starts out from criticizing Mochizuki’s interpretation of the alienation of nature from man. As is analyzed in Chapter V, Mochizuki construes the first aspect of alienated labor as alienation of nature from man. Since this alienation of the labor process does not concern social institution, its subject can only be an individual isolated from social relations. From Yamanouchi’s point of view, however, to interpret the first aspect merely from the relation between man and nature is too narrow: The fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] actually presupposes a society with a commodity economy, in which the laborer as the subject of alienation can only be being within the commodity economy relationship rather than be an individual isolated from social relations. Although Marx does undertake his analysis of the first aspect on the sphere of the relations between man and nature, he “has by no means thereby abstracted the commodity economy, which is civil society’s constitutive character that integrates every man in the market into social relations”.32 In brief, Yamanouchi does not conceive of the premise of alienated labor as that of a capitalist world grounded in the relationship between capital and wage worker, but rather as a world of a commodity economy resting on the division of labor and exchange. Yamanouchi moves on to examine Hiromatsu’s interpretation. As is aforementioned, though pointing out that the structure of alienated labor is the “immediate, bipolar relation” between subject and object, Hiromatsu does not come to the same conclusion as Mochizuki because, in his opinion, Marx’s framework at that time was Feuerbach’s self-alienation theory, according to which the object (Objekt) is not a being unrelated to subject, but in essence merely the product of the subject’s self-­ alienation. Thus, the relation between subject and object is not man’s relation to external nature, but that between him and the product of his own self-alienation. In this sense, it is still alienation of the isolated individual.

 Nikolai Lapin, Vergleichende Analyse der drei Quellen des Einkommens in den „Ökonomischphilosophischen Manuskripten“ von Marx, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 17(2). 32  Yasishi Yamanouchi, The Gaze of the Sufferer: The Renaissance of the Early Marx, Seidosha, 2004, 324 (translated into English by K.H.). 31

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As we can see, though both Mochizuki and Hiromatsu reduce the subject of alienation to an isolated individual, they arrive at distinct conclusions. Yamanouchi tends towards Hiromatsu’s reading, yet refuses to impute the idea of an isolated individual completely to Feuerbach, since, as he sees it, Feuerbach not only considers man as an “atomistic, isolated, exclusive individual of self-awareness”, but also incorporates aspects of species or community in his conception of man. Unfortunately, Marx at that time only drew on the first aspect, passing over the second: “The limitation of the First Manuscript is not that Marx did not comprehend the reason of alienation, but that he fell into the same one-sidedness as Feuerbach”.33 Thus, for Yamanouchi, neither Hiromatsu nor Marx fully comprehended Feuerbach, as neither saw the aspect of man’s species in his conception. Whether or not Yamanouchi’s understanding of Feuerbach is accurate, however, is not our concern here. If the subject of alienated labor is neither the laborer in the relation to nature, nor man in relation to the self, then to whom exactly does it refer? Yamanouchi’s answer is: “Marx opts for temporarily setting aside social relations, reducing behavior that can only come into being in the society of the commodity economy to isolated individual ‘action’ and ‘relational behavior’ [Verhalten] and then bringing the commodity economy relationship back via the relationship with the self of isolated individual”.34 That is to say, the subject of alienated labor should have been man within the commodity economy, yet he forgets his identity at a certain point of labor, ending up as a thoroughly isolated individual. Notwithstanding its originality, this explanation is rather far-fetched, for Marx does not presuppose the society of the commodity economy before developing his alienated labor theory in the First Manuscript as Yamanouchi argues. In fact, his exposition of the society of the commodity economy first appears in the ensuing Comments on James Mill. Yamanouchi does not insist on this viewpoint either. In the following elaboration of the aporia in the alienated labor theory, he ascribes its reason to the fact that Marx “was then cutting from the self-relation of isolated individual”35 and points out that the solution to this aporia requires “shifting perspective from self-alienation to social relations”.36 Considering these standpoints, it is clear that, in spite of Yamanouchi’s critique of Hiromatsu and Mochizuki, he is not much different from them both with regard to the aporia. This also implies a negation of Yamanouchi’s hypothesis that Marx presupposes the society of the commodity economy in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. In summary, all these Japanese scholars agree that Marx encountered an aporia in the alienated labor theory and, instead of bypassing this problem as the Europeans do, seek to solve it within the Paris Manuscripts. As a group, this has resulted in two important conclusions:

 Ibid., p. 541, footnote 3.  Ibid., p. 365. 35  Ibid., p. 368. 36  Ibid., p. 373. 33 34

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First, the aporia of the alienated labor theory is circular reasoning: At the outset of the fragment, Marx intends to deduce alienated labor from private property, but by the end of the First Manuscript he is forced to deduce the latter from the former, thus committing the fallacy of circular reasoning. Second, the reason behind this aporia is the structural flaw in the alienated labor concept as such, insofar as this concept rests on the subject-object (Objekt) structure of the isolated individual and can by no means bring about social relations such as private property. Marx fails to provide any solution to this problem in the First Manuscript for it is only possible through changing his framework from isolated individual to social relations or, in Yamanouchi’s words, by “shifting the vantage point from self-alienation to social relations”. In the following, the author shall respond to these conclusions, thereby advancing a solution to the aporia.

6.3  D  eciphering the Enigma of Circular Reasoning: The History of Private Property As for the first conclusion, in order to determine whether Marx’s alienated labor theory is circular reasoning, one has to first ascertain whether or not the concepts of alienated labor and private property are consistent. In other words, does private property denote the same thing when respectively conceived as cause and result of alienated labor? Does alienated labor as the cause of private property and alienated labor as the result of private property share a meaning? If these are consistent, then the alienated labor theory is indeed entangled in circular reasoning; if not, then it is an entirely different story. According to my analysis, Marx avails himself of de facto two concepts of alienated labor and two concepts of private property in the First Manuscript. Therefore, as none can function as cause and result at the same time, the alienated labor theory is free from the accusation of circular reasoning. Moreover, what Marx puts forward at the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] is actually a remarkable historical theory of the origin of private property, which is equivalent to the theory of primitive accumulation of capital in his mature period.

6.3.1  Differentiation of Concepts In Marx’s economics, private property can normally be divided into two categories: (1) Private property “founded on the labor of the proprietor”, namely that the laborer owns his means of labor and product, ensuring his ownership of the property both in consciousness and in civil law. This is the realized identity of labor and property in the sphere of the private individual. (2) Capitalist private property. According to

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the definition in Das Kapital, this type of private property rests on the deprivation of private property “founded on the labor of the proprietor”37 and it is capital as such that presupposes the separation of labor and property. In the following, the author shall name the former private property I and the latter private property II. As for alienated labor, this also has two meanings: alienated labor as objectification and alienated labor that belongs to another. The former, which the author calls alienated labor I, refers to the process by which man embues the natural object with his energy and intelligence, turning it into a consumable product. As the externalization of one’s essential power, which is also the original meaning of the term “alienation”, this activity is called alienated labor. Since this alienated labor is necessary for subsistence, it is also identified with positively-connoted objectification; in fact, this is exactly how Marx calls it in the First Manuscript. The latter, alienated labor that belongs to another, means the labor and product of labor that belongs to someone other than the laborer. This is also one of the original meanings of the term, “alienation”, namely the transferal of commodity or relinquishment of natural right. It has two typical forms: One is labor within a common commodity economy for the purpose of generating exchange value; the other is wage labor under capitalism that belongs to the capitalist. Both are called alienated labor II in the following exposition. Evidently, the fundamental distinction between them is that alienated labor I denotes alienation of the subject-object (Objekt) relation, and its beneficiary, if there is any, is the external object as such, whereas alienated labor II refers to alienation in the relationship between men, and its beneficiary is others rather than the laborer himself. It should be noted that these two pairs of concepts are not differentiated solely in respect to Marx’s later economics theory, because Marx already intended to differentiate them, though not so explicitly, in the First Manuscript. Let us cast our eyes back to the proceeding fragment [Arbeitslohn, Profit des Kapitals, Grundrente] which focuses on the process by which property is taken from the worker and accumulated in the hands of the capitalist. In this context, property accumulated in the hands of the capitalist is private property II. Accordingly, labor that causes the loss of property can only be alienated labor II. Therefore, it is evident that these two concepts already appear in the First Manuscript. What is at issue is whether private property I and alienated labor I already appear in the First Manuscript? Considering the first aspect of alienated labor, Marx does elaborate on a logic of alienation between subject (man) and object (Objekt) (nature), which gives rise to readings such as Mochizuki’s alienation of nature from man and Hiromatsu’s self-alienation. Likewise, it is also because the first aspect is built on the subject-object (Objekt) relation that the transition from the first to the second aspect is called into question. For this reason, there shall be no objection to the fact that alienated labor I is present in the First Manuscript.  Cf. Chapter XXXII. Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation, Volume I, Das Kapital: “This [sc. Capitalist private property] is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor” (Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 751.).

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Hence, the remaining question concerns whether or not private property I, i.e. private property “founded on the labor of the proprietor”, also exists in the First Manuscript. Admittedly, we can barely find it therein,38 probably because it is unrelated to the subject matter of this text and therefore left out by Marx: The main theme of the First Manuscript is capitalist private property and the conflict between capital and labor, whereas private property I refers to the property of small producers within a common commodity economy or the property of citizens in civil society. A further, oven more fundamental reason is that Marx was probably not aware of the necessity of addressing it at that time or, even though attentive thereof, was incapable of going into it. One way or another, it is in Comments on James Mill that private property I finally comes to light. After briefly defining these two pairs of concepts and identifying them in the text, we now turn to the following questions: In which relation do they stand to one another? What are the consequences of this order? These questions are key to determining whether the alienated labor theory consists of circular reasoning or not. To begin with, let us turn back to the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]: “We have accepted the estrangement of labour, its alienation, as a fact, and we have analysed this fact. How, we now ask, does man come to alienate, to estrange, his labour? How is this estrangement rooted in the nature of human development?”.39 As has been noted, alienated labor I is an objectification activity, which is in fact the labor process as such. Hence, the question “[h]ow […] does man come to alienate, to estrange, his labour?” is identical to the question how does alienated labor I become alienated labor II? The reason behind such transformation is “rooted in the nature of human development”. Following Marx’s line of argument, the so-called “nature of human development” is in fact a particular social relation, namely private property. Yet this private property can by no means be private property II, for private property II is deduced from alienated labor II and thus should be placed thereafter. This means that the social relations situated between alienated labor I and alienated labor II that bring about the transformation from the former to the latter can only be the remaining private property I. Considered in this way, the order that Marx has in mind at the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] is: alienated labor I → private property I → alienated labor II → private property II. Hence, we can interpret the entire process as follows: First, man’s common labor produces private property “founded on the labor of the proprietor”, which in turn leads to alienated labor that belongs to another; the latter eventually results in capitalist private property. As regards the form of the definition of these concepts, each of these four concepts has its own meaning and role; 38  To be sure, private property I is not completely absent in the First Manuscript, namely in the column [Grundrente] prior to the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. For instance: “[L]anded property, the root of private property, be dragged completely into the movement of private property and […] become a commodity” (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 267). Yet the usage of private property I here is rather special, mainly as the transformation of “landed property” to industrial private property. 39  Ibid., p. 281.

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together, they constitute a process in ascending order, which is Marx’s justification for the necessary emergence of private property II at the same time. Since none of them is simultaneously cause and result, this justification is under no circumstances circular reasoning. The reason many scholars accuse Marx’s alienated labor theory of consisting of circular reasoning is that they fail to distinguish between these two pairs of concepts that Marx uses without differentiation, nor do they see the order in which these concepts are used. Considering the meanings of these concepts, this exposition is clearly a historical demonstration of the emergence of capital. At the outset of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit], Marx sets off to undertake a logical analysis of the “fact of political economy” whereby he concludes at the end of the forth aspect of alienated labor that private property is deduced from alienated labor. At the end of this fragment, however, he suddenly decides to trace the genesis of capitalist private property from a historical perspective. This is a perspective that Marx did not have until now. By analogy with Marx’s fully-developed economic theory, this historical vantage point coincides with the development of the theory of primitive accumulation of capital, whilst the logical analysis in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] roughly corresponds to the theory of surplus value. Assuming this hypothesis is correct, then the reason that Marx resumes his examination of the problem of private property’s origin at the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] is not to repeat the task he took upon himself at the outset, but to survey this problem from another perspective. It is probably because this change takes place so dramatically that the reader can hardly catch up with it, not to mention because Marx avails himself of the same terms for two distinct concepts without differentiation and gives rise to these accusations of circular reasoning, to which he has to take at least half the responsibility. Xianda Chen also seeks to resolve the problem of circular reasoning by differentiating two kinds of alienated labor, as he already points out in A Study of Marx’s Early Thought (1983): “Bound up with private ownership, the alienated labor  – namely that laborer’s product and activity is taken by another – is naturally dependent on private ownership, coexisting and developing with it, reciprocally affecting each other, whilst the alienated labor as the cause of private ownership precedes the latter”.40 Here, he explicitly differentiates two kinds of alienated labor, i.e. the alienated labor “bound up with private ownership” and “the alienated labor as the cause of private ownership”, pointing out that the second alienated labor is prior to private ownership. This is the earliest comment on the alienated labor problem in China. Proceeding from distinguishing two pairs of concepts, i.e. externalized labor (entäußerte Arbeit) and alienated labor (entfremdete Arbeit), as well as private property and private ownership, Xiaoping Wei also attempts to refute the accusation of circular reasoning. She further argues that “the kernel of this problem clearly resides in two further questions: First, how does externalized labor result in private ownership? Second, how does private ownership lead to alienated labor? These are two

 Xianda Chen and Huiming Jin, A Study of Marx’s Early Thought, in: Collective Works of Xianda Chen, vol. 2, China Renmin University Press, 2006, p. 214.

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main threads implied in Marx’s approach”.41 The author distinguishes between these two questions and identifies with this crux of the problem, yet disagrees with her differentiation and definition of those two pairs of concepts. As is aforementioned, Marx employs Entäußerung and Entfremdung without differentiation in the First Manuscript, plus there is no substantial distinction between these two words as such, as both are German translations of the same Latin word alienatio. It is, therefore, somewhat far-fetched to use them to distinguish two kinds of alienated labor. As to the second pair of concepts, the differentiation between private property and private ownership is also inappropriate. In addition to the fact that both are Chinese translations of the same German word Privateigentum, i.e. “private property” (私人所有) and “private ownership” (私有制), her differentiation can hardly find support in Marx’s economics. Take her remark that “when addressing the relationship between alienated labor and private property, Marx uses the concept of private property in the sense of property rather than social institution”42 for instance: Setting aside whether this reading can find textual support in the Paris Manuscripts or not, it is perplexing to consider what she means by “in the sense of property rather than social institution”, since the private property concept as such already implies certain relations of production and already embodies a certain economic institution. In this respect, it is more accurate to divide Marx’s private property concept into the private property “founded on the labor of the proprietor” and capitalist private property for this differentiation is not only underpinned by textual evidence, but also conforms to the essence of Marx’s economics.

6.3.2  Historical Theory of Private Property We now come back to our subject matter. As has been noted, what Marx advances at the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] is not a negation of the question proposed at the beginning, but an account of a new historical concept: Alienated labor I → private property I → alienated labor II → private property II. As such, to what degree has Marx solidified this concept in the Paris Manuscripts?

41  Xiaoping Wei, Pursuing Marx, People’s Publishing House, 2010, p. 237 (translated into English by K.H.). 42  Ibid., p.  236. In Searching for Marx (People’s Publishing House, 2005), Xiaoping Wei also touches upon the problem of alienated labor’s origin, putting forward that the “differentiation of the possession of private property” or the “social differentiation of private property” is responsible for the emergence of alienation. The so-called “social differentiation of private property” means that “property is concentrated in the hands of few, whilst the most people lose the basic means of production” (ibid., p. 14 (translated into English by K.H.)). This is the “separation of laborer from his means of production, which arises with the emergence of private property” (ibid., p. 18). What is at issue is, however, whence does such “social differentiation of private property” come? Is it not, according to Marx, the result of alienated labor? Considered this way, Xiaoping Wei’s argument as such is open to circular reasoning.

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In the following, the author shall first divide this historical process into three stages, i.e. alienated labor I ① → private property I ② → alienated labor II ③ → private property II, examining each in reference to Comments on James Mill and the Third Manuscript, and eventually reassembling them so as to gain a relatively complete picture of this concept. Since the first stage is already demonstrated in the First Manuscript, the following will mainly focus on the last two stages. First, alienated labor I → private property I: According to the examination above, that Marx passes over private labor I in the First Manuscript leaves the impression that private property II is directly deduced from alienated labor I, as if capital is deduced from the alienation of nature from man. In order to dispose of this impression, Marx has to shed light on the process of alienated labor I → private property I. Having realized this, he makes an attempt to clarify this process after advancing the question, “[h]ow, we now ask, does man come to alienate, to estrange, his labour”: “[W]hen one speaks of private property, one thinks of dealing with something [Sache] external to man. When one speaks of labour, one is directly dealing with man himself”.43 The “private property” and “labor” mentioned in this passage should refer to private property I and alienated labor I respectively. This exposition indicates that Marx already realizes that the genesis of private property is closely bound up with man’s labor: Private property can only originate from man as such. Since labor constitutes man, labor (alienated labor I) gives birth to private property (private property I). Much hope rests on this new approach, as Marx confidently claims: “This new formulation of the question already contains its solution”.44 As a matter of fact, the task of clarifying the process of alienated labor I → private property I had already been accomplished by modern theorists, especially political economists. According to Locke’s delineation, man takes possession of natural objects through labor, and this property originates from the proprietor’s labor. Political economists represented by Smith even regard this deduction as the principle of political economy. In Part One of Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Marx also admits that: “That is why all modern economists have proclaimed, in a more economic or more juridical manner, one’s own labour to be the original title to property, and property in the result of one’s own labour, the basic premiss of the bourgeois society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft). (Cherbuliez: see above. See also A. Smith.a)”.45 Generally speaking, this deduction of private property from labor is correct, only it is not clear which private property does “private property” here designate? It is in this respect that the political economists adopt a quite ambiguous attitude, intentionally or unintentionally confusing private property I with private property II, and drawing the conclusion that capital (private property II) is also deduced from capi43  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 281. 44  Ibid. 45  Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Economic Works: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 463.

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talist’s own labor (alienated labor I), i.e. “capital is the accumulation of one’ own labor”. This is what Marx cannot accept and what he strives to belie in the Paris Manuscripts. For this reason, he exposes the hypocrisy of political economy by virtue of his critique of Proudhon: “Political economy starts from labour as the real soul of production; yet to labour it gives nothing, and to private property everything. Confronting this contradiction, Proudhon has decided in favour of labour against private property. We understand, however, that this apparent contradiction is the contradiction of estranged labour with itself, and that political economy has merely formulated the laws of estranged labour”.46 In the ensuing paragraph, he puts forward that simply raising wages does not solve all the problems, for wages are nothing but the result of the alienation of worker’s own labor. How ridiculous it is that, when paying the worker wages, the capitalist is actually paying the worker with the latter’s own labor product! Setting aside political economists’ defense of the capitalist, however, their deduction of private property from labor is not absolutely unacceptable for Marx. In fact, in the opening fragment [Privateigentum und Arbeit] of the Third Manuscript, Marx speaks highly of the thought of Smith et al. that man’s labor is the “subjective essence of private property”  – a reformulation of the process of alienated labor I → private property I. As he sees it, it is “enlightened political economy”, a significant progress compared with monetarism and mercantilism, and Smith is the “Luther of Political Economy”.47 Considering this evaluation, Marx does agree with the idea of alienated labor I → to private property I and must have expatiated on it. Unfortunately, we can find no exposition appertaining to this process. What is left of the fragment [Privateigentum und Arbeit] is only a supplement to page XXXVI of Notebook II, whilst the original page XXXVI is missing. According to the

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 280. 47  Ibid., p. 290. Before Marx, Engels also calls Smith the “economic Luther” in Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie, but without direct explanation. It seems that Engels is set out from the perspective of the humanity of commerce: “Smith proved that humanity, too, was rooted in the nature of commerce; that commerce must become ‘among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship’ instead of being ‘the most fertile source of discord and animosity’” (Engels, Outlines of A Critique of Political Economy, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p.  422f). In comparison, Marx provides an explanation thereof: “Just as Luther recognised religion – faith – as the substance of the external world and in consequence stood opposed to Catholic paganism – just as he superseded external religiosity by making religiosity the inner substance of man […] with private property being incorporated in man himself and with man himself being recognised as its essence. But as a result man is brought within the orbit of private property” (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 290f). This explanation evidently differs from Engel’s, insofar as it emphasizes that the essence of private property resides in man’s labor. On the distinction between Marx and Engels in this regard, Yamanouchi holds a different viewpoint as the author (See Yasishi Yamanouchi, The Gaze of the Sufferer: The Renaissance of Early Marx, trans. by Xi Peng & Liying Wang, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2011, p. 317f). 46

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author’s speculation, this missing part must have contained an elaboration of this process. Second, private property II → alienated labor II: As Mochizuki already points out, “Marx’s development of the second and the third aspect of alienated labor can only be construed as a shift from private property to alienated labor”.48 In fact, this is also the standpoint of Rosenberg, Tadashi, Hiromatsu and Yamanouchi. That alienated labor II is not possible without private property I is their consensus, which even Marx himself would not deny. According to historical materialism, alienated labor II is by no means a priori, but the product of the material and social relations of production, but Marx fails to further develop this logic in the First Manuscript. One possible explanation is that he wants to avoid being mixed up with political economy, for the latter also elucidates alienated labor through private property; another reason rests in Marx’s incapability to establish his own theory of private property I → alienated labor II at that time. This transition later constitutes the most difficult part of Marx’s economic theory, namely the first two chapters of Das Kapital including Chapter I  – Commodities. As known to those conversant in Marxist economics, these are the two chapters to which Marx devotes most effort. This, however, does not imply that Marx makes no attempt in this direction throughout the entire Paris Manuscripts. In fact, in the ensuing Comments on James Mill, Marx enters right away into a study of the law of movement of private property I, analyzing the qualitative change that the exchange of private property I brings to labor, i.e. that it turns the original labor (alienated labor I) into alienated labor II: “The relationship of exchange being presupposed, labour becomes directly [gainful labor]49 [Das Verhältnis des Tauschens vorausgesetzt, wird die Arbeit zur unmittelbaren Erwerbsarbeit]”.50 This is Marx’s first articulation of the process of shifting from private property I → to alienated labor II. What, then, is gainful labor (Erwerbsarbeit)? In accordance with Marx’s definition, (1) “[gainful labor] and the product of the worker have no direct relation to his need or his function as worker”; (2) “The product is produced as value, as exchange-­ value, as an equivalent, and no longer because of its direct, personal relation to the producer”.51 This labor clearly distinguishes it from the common labor of man, insofar as it is aimed to profit and acquire exchange value through exchange rather than fulfilling one’s own needs and attain use value. For this reason, “it becomes quite accidental and inessential (Es ganz zufällig und unwesentlich wird)”52 and, in this sense, alienated labor.  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 78 (translated into English by K.H.). 49  Disagreeing with the English translation of Erwerbsarbeit as “labour to earn a living” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, the author renders it as “gainful labor” and shall give the reason of this translation in the following. 50  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 219. 51  Ibid., p. 219f. 52  Ibid., p. 220. 48

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Since gainful labor presupposes exchange, the producer conducting this labor must exchange his labor product, that is to transfer (entäußern) his property to another. According to the definition above, the transfer of one’s own property to another is alienated labor II. In the world of simple commodity exchange or private property I, however, the only reason that a private owner transfers his property to another is that he can acquire the equivalent from another at the same time: This is the so-called exchange justice. Based on exchange justice, the foundation of private property I, i.e. the identity of labor and property, is maintained in a mediate manner. Yet, under such circumstances, it is impossible for capital to arise as “the accumulation of other men’s labor” for both sides are governed by the principle of equivalent exchange. In other words, this alienated labor II can on no account lead to private property II. As such, under which circumstances exactly, or, to put it differently, given what form of alienated labor II, is private property II born? This is the crux of the problem. In Comments on James Mill, though having already provided a relatively complete explanation for the process of private property I → alienated labor II (gainful labor), Marx is still unable to answer this key question. This lasts until the later Grundrisse im weiteren Sinne (Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58) in which he provides the standard answer that alienated labor II can only bring about private property II when the latent capitalist purchases another’s labor rather than common commodity with the free money in his hand, or, in the economic language of Grundrisse, when “capital is exchanged with labor”. This alienated labor II is not the gainful labor within a common commodity economy, but the wage labor under capitalism whereby the laborer no longer owns his labor and the capitalist can appropriate another’s labor. The principle of modern society used to be the identity of labor and property (private property I), namely an appropriation of one’s own labor product through labor or the gain of another’s product through an equivalent exchange. Under capitalism, however, this condition undergoes a fundamental transformation so that “one’s labour will create someone else’s property and property will command someone else’s labour”.53 This is the state in which, in sheer opposition to the modern civil law, labor is separated from property (private property II). In Grundrisse and Das Kapital, Marx calls it the “inversion of the first [sc. law of appropriation]”54 [Umschlag des Gesetzes der Appropriation oder Aneignung]. This theory, as the author sees it, is the most complete articulation of Marx’s conception of the process of shifting from private property I → alienated labor II as well as that of shifting from alienated labor II → private property II. In the First Manuscript, although Marx fails to elaborate on the process of private property I  →  alienated labor II or clarify the duality of alienated labor II, namely as gainful labor and wage labor, as well as the transition from the former to the latter, he does provide a relatively complete account of the process of transition  Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857–58) [First Instalment], in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 170. 54  Ibid., p. 397. 53

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from alienated labor II  →  private property II.  For instance, as he remarks in the second aspect of alienated labor, “it [sc. labor] is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another”.55 What this passage portrays is clearly how the laborer losses ownership over his labor in the immediate process of capitalist production in which there is an “inversion of the law of appropriation”. Considered this way, the later “inversion of the law of appropriation” is a reproduction of the second aspect of alienated labor in Marx’s early period. In overview, as illustrated in the analysis above, Marx does not stop with the historical schema advanced at the end of the First Manuscript, but strives to solidify it in the following Comments on James Mill and the Third Manuscript. Due to limitations to his economics knowledge at the time, however, he was not capable of bringing certain theoretical aspects of his theory to light. Notwithstanding, he ingeniously foresees the theory of primitive accumulation of capital in Grundrisse and justifies the salient proposition that “capital is the accumulation of other men’s labor”. What an accomplishment it must have been for him to reach this level of depth at such a young age. In the light of this, the Paris Manuscripts are the preliminary version of Grundrisse, or, vice versa, Grundrisse is the fully-developed version of the Paris Manuscripts.

6.4  D  efinitive Solution to Marx’s Aporia: From Isolated Individual to Society Thus far, we have freed the alienated labor theory from the accusation of circular reasoning. This, however, is not an ultimate solution to the problem of the aporia, for the second issue advanced by the Japanese scholars remains: How is a transition from the alienated labor of isolated individual to private property possible? The solution of the Japanese scholars, namely to transform the framework from subject-­ object (Objekt) relations of the isolated individual to social relations, has indeed struck at the root the problem. In spite of that, they neglect Marx’s indication of this transition at the end of the First Manuscript and thus bypass the First Manuscript. For instance, Hiromatsu leaves the entire Paris Manuscripts aside after unearthing the conundrum of the self-alienation theory; Mochizuki, unlike Hiromatsu, turns to Comments on James Mill, looking for traces of Marx’s transition. Their abandonment of the First Manuscript, however, is all too rash in that Marx not only realizes this drawback of the alienated labor theory at the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit], but also consciously conducts this transition of perspective. It is until the forth aspect of alienated labor that Marx realizes the difficulty of transitioning from alienated labor to private property: “The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man [stands; translator] to himself, is realised  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 275.

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and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men”.56 Around page XXV, after drawing a conclusion that the product belongs “[t]o a being other than myself”, he abruptly reminds the reader: “We must bear in mind the previous proposition that man’s relation to himself only becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to the other man”.57 As the author sees it, this hitherto unseen logic marks the beginning of Marx’s remediation. The first step he takes is to deduce man’s “relation to the other man” from his “relation to himself”: “Every self-estrangement of man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation in which he places himself and nature to men other than and differentiated from himself. […] [②] In the real practical world self-­ estrangement can only become manifest through the real practical relationship to other men. [①] The medium through which estrangement takes place is itself practical. [③] Thus through estranged labour man not only creates his relationship to the object and to the act of production as to powers that are alien and hostile to him; he also creates the relationship in which other men stand to his production and to his product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men”.58 This argument is obviously a syllogism: ① Alienation can only be actualized through practice; ② Since self-alienation inevitably presents itself as a “relation to the other man” in practice, ③ Alienated labor will also inevitably create a “relation to the other man”. With regard to its content, this is a textbook deduction. Though logically valid, this syllogism still remains an abstract deduction in a purely philosophical sense. Considering that labor does not bring about the modern private property relationship in the community of antiquity, this abstract deduction is devoid of practical significance. As will be illustrated in Chapter IX, only profit-­ oriented modern labor can give birth to the social relation between private individuals. In addition, a frequently raised objection is that, since labor or practice is definitely social labor, it inevitably produces social relations between men, hence the author’s proposition that labor of isolated individuals does not entail social relations is on no account valid. This critique, however, fails to grasp the concept of social relations, which in fact denote the relationship between private individuals, mediated by private property and commodity. Such a social relation can only result from exchange-directed gainful labor or, in Hegel’s words, “surplus labor” with regard to the laborer’s own needs. For this reason, the author construes exchange rather than labor (production) as the feature of modern civil society for it presuppose the individual’s private property, which is the fundamental character that distinguishes modern civil society from the preceding gestalts of society. In all, the deduction that practice leads to social relations does not suffice to deduce modern private property. Having realized this, Marx takes on a new assignment: “(1): To define the general nature of private property, as it has arisen as a result of estranged labour, in its relation to truly human and social property”.59 This is de facto the second step of Marx’s remediation.  Ibid., 277.  Ibid., p. 278. 58  Ibid., p. 279. 59  Ibid., p. 281. 56 57

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To be fair, this passage is exceedingly obscure. Fortunately, Marx provides a supplement to it in the second following paragraph: “Alienated labour has resolved itself for us into two components which depend on one another, or which are but different expressions of one and the same relationship. Appropriation [Aneignung] [(A)] appears as estrangement [(A)], as alienation [(A)]; and alienation [(B)] appears as appropriation [(B)], estrangement [(C)] as truly becoming a citizen [Einbürgerung]”.60 With respect of its content, this passage is very likely Marx’s answer to his new assignment. This preparatory answer is quite peculiar as well, insofar as it is not related to any other part of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] than the assignment it supplements. It is probably for this reason that it has not drawn much attention as yet. Hence, what does it mean exactly? As far as the author knows, only Mochizuki has provided an explanation thereof: “Man’s self-realization activity that treats object as thing for him (appropriation A) brings about alienation of nature and thing (alienation A and externalization A). The completion of objectification and product (externalization B) is on the one hand, as product, the return to the producer → appropriation → enjoyment (appropriation B); on the other hand, it is transferred as the property of man = society; at the cost of the disengagement of the product from its producer (alienation C), the producer is permitted to enter the ‘society of man’ (becoming a citizen) (appropriation C)”.61 The author completely agrees with this explanation. The last part, showing how the producer becomes a citizen through externalization  =  transferal of his labor product to another is, in regard to the theme of this chapter, of vital significance. The subject of appropriation, alienation and externalization is clearly not about the wage worker any more, let alone the capitalist, for he, in addition to satisfying his needs through labor, also turns his property into a social product that satisfies the needs of another through exchange, and thereby becomes a citizen. This subject can only be a private owner within a common commodity economy or a citizen of civil society; the economic relationship composed by these subjects can only be comprised of commodity exchange or civil society. This scenario has never been enacted in the First Manuscript. Distinct from the theme of the First Manuscript, i.e. the ­immediate process of capitalist production, it is clear that Marx is ready to shift his focus to the social relations between private owners in civil society. To be noted, though striving to escape the logic of self-alienation, Marx does not simply adopt Feuerbach and Hess’s approach here. Considering the isolation of modern man, Feuerbach argues for the individual’s transition to species-essence, whilst Hess further suggests elevating the individual to a community (Gemeinwesen) or having him participate in collaboration (Zusammenwirken). Marx, however, is convinced that, no matter how much they underline attributes such as “real” and “concrete”, these theorists remain abstract, unable to form true social relations, so long as the conception of man remains within the philosophical realm. For this rea Ibid.  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 105.

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son, he needs to provide a solution from an economic perspective, namely to have these men enter civil society built on private property I in a relationship between members of civil society as a real relationship between people. They are real, insofar as they have private property. That “the general nature of private property, as it has arisen as a result of estranged labour” is to be defined “in its relation to truly human and social property” is not only out of logical necessity, but also probably because Marx wants to distinguish himself from Feuerbach and Hess. In fact, it is Hegel who provides the most successful explanation of the transition from isolated individual to social relations at that time. After realizing Feuerbach and Hess’s limitation, Marx turns back to Hegel’s Phänomenologie, a transition that is exemplified in Comments on James Mill and the Third Manuscript. In general, at the end of the First Manuscript, Marx is finally aware of the necessity of disengaging himself from the structure of the isolated individual’s alienated labor and explicitly indicates a shift in focus to private property relations. As such, he put the writing of the First Manuscript aside and began a second stage of economics study, drafting the famous Comments on James Mill. In Comments on James Mill, in addition to thoroughly studying the division of labor and exchange among private owners, he also elevates the alienation of intercourse concept to the center of the Paris Manuscripts, thus successfully solving the aporia in the transition from isolated individual’s alienated labor to private property.

6.5  Summary Lastly, the author would like to briefly address the theoretical significance of the circular reasoning problem. As we known, Marx’s main efforts in the Paris Manuscripts are directed towards working out the essence of private property and laying bare the idea that capitalist private property is private property II (capital) instead of private property I, particularly in respect of political economy’s intentional or unintentional confusion of private property II with private property I. As Marx strives to demonstrate, private property II is by no means the result of the capitalist’s labor (alienated labor I), but can only come from the accumulation of alienated labor II. This is where Marx truly surpasses political economy. Considered that way, it is also impossible. Marx is unlikely to employ an unanalyzed and undifferentiated private property concept that serves as cause and result at the same time, since, if so, the circular argumentative process of private property → alienated labor → private property would mean that capital stems from the accumulation of one’s own labor, which is exactly the political economist’s logic. What Marx seeks to demonstrate, however, is rather the process of private property I → alienated labor II → private property II. Here, private property as the starting point is distinct from private property as the conclusion. Moreover, as Marx set out to unveil the idea that “capital is the accumulation of other men’s labor”, it is unlikely that he would let his argument fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning.

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In all, the main task of the First Manuscript is to justify the notion that “capital is the accumulation of other men’s labor”. Due to limitations in the framework of Feuerbach’s self-alienation and his lack of economics knowledge, however, Marx unexpectedly encounters an aporia when attempting to deduce this proposition from the alienated labor concept. Yet, instead of giving up, he courageously faced up to this theoretical conundrum, taking two new assignments upon himself at the end of the First Manuscript: to unmask (1) the essence of private property from the perspective of the social relations between private owners and (2) the origin of alienated labor and private property from a historical perspective. As a result, Marx, in the horizontal direction, positions the alienated labor theory in the sphere of commodity economic relations, hence opening up the field for the alienation of intercourse theory. Meanwhile, by leading the survey of the genesis of private property into a vertical, historical realm, he now enters a theoretical level similar to his later theory of primitive accumulation of capital. Through his endeavors in these two directions, Marx lays a firm foundation for his main conclusion to the historical enigma of capital in Grundrisse.

Chapter 7

The Logic of the Transition from Individual to Society in Phänomenologie des Geistes

In the preceding chapter on the aporia in the alienated labor theory, the author points to the drawback of the First Manuscript, namely its underlying subject-object (Objekt) relationship between the isolated individual and their lack of social relations. Hence, when and how did Marx complete his transition from isolated individual’s alienated labor to humankind’s social relations? As the author postulates in the preceeding chapter, it is highly possible that this took place while he wrote Comments on James Mill. Despite the maturity of Marx’s account of social relations grounded in private property in Comments on James Mill, reading it may lead one to wonder: How does this social relationship evolve from an individual’s isolated labor? Or, in other words, how do individuals become a society? Surprisingly, instead of explaining this at length, Marx apparently choses to omit this step, starting his argument directly from the exchange relationship between two private owners, that is, alienated intercourse (Verkehr). In other words, his exposition starts from the vantage point of social relations, and thus clearly lacks adequate elaboration of the transition from the isolated individual to the social being. To the best of the author’s awareness, there is still no cogent explanation for this phenomenon. Although both Hiromatsu and Mochizuki speculate that Marx must have undergone a change of perspective after the First Manuscripts, they fail to provide an answer grounded in the Paris Manuscripts themselves. As Hiromatsu sees it, Marx was constrained to the logical framework of the isolated individual’s subject-object (Objekt) relations throughout the Paris Manuscripts period, and it was not until Thesen and Ideologie that his reification theory came to light. In comparison, Mochizuki identifies a perspective on social relations in Comments on James Mill, i.e. alienation of intercourse, yet takes the alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill as his direct starting point, without offering a plausible explication for the transition of perspective from the isolated individual to social relations. This is a shame, as both had already realized the importance of considering social relations.

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How do we account for this transition? As is aforementioned, Marx’s change of perspective must have happened straight after the First Manuscripts were completed, or it would have contradicted the intrinsic logic of his theoretical development in the Paris Manuscripts. If Comments on James Mill was indeed the text that followed the First Manuscripts, then we should first turn to Comments on James Mill in search of the missing part of Marx’s transition. Following this line of thought, we surprisingly encounter a trace of Hegel, namely elements of philosophy of spirit in the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes and Phänomenologie: Marx’s logic of labor, money and value share many similarities with Hegel’s philosophy of spirit. Although it is impossible for Marx to have read the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes at that time, he was definitely conversant with Phänomenologie. Based on this, the author advances a bold hypothesis: The logic of Marx’s transition from individual to social relations stems from Hegel. The critical adoption of Hegel’s logic behind the transition from individual to society in Phänomenologie enables Marx to complete his own transition to the social relations perspective as seen in Comments on James Mill. In order to justify this hypothesis, the author starts from Phänomenologie and the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes, analyzing the logic of Hegel’s transition from individual to society and drawing comparisons with the logic of Marx’s transition from individual to society. As such, this chapter consists of two parts: (1) The logic of the transition from individual to society in Phänomenologie (2) The logic of the transition from individual to the whole in the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes

7.1  Hegel’s Answer to the Aporia of Modernity In 1714, Bernard Mandeville anonymously published the soon to become notorious work The Fable of the Bees, in which he presents an antinomy endemic of modern society, i.e. “private vices as public benefits”, pointing out how the individual’s pursuit of private interests brings public benefits. The reaction to its publication was polarized: Whilst many called for it to be outlawed on grounds of its advocacy of the reasonableness of private vices, it drew the attention of a great many modern philosophers, including Mill, Rousseau, Kant, Marx1 and especially Smith. 1  When addressing division of labor in Economic Manuscript of 1861–63, Marx notes that “[t]he whole of this passage [from Smith] as well as this way of viewing the matter [sc. division of labor] is copied from de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees” (Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861–63, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 30: Economic Works: 1861–1863, Progress Publishers, 1988, p. 297). Moreover, he even quotes from Mandeville directly, claiming that Mandeville points to the positive significance of “private vices” to modern society: “In his The Fable of the Bees (1705) Mandeville had already shown that every possible kind of occupation is productive, and had given expression to the tendency of this whole line of argument: ‘That what we call Evil in this World, Moral as well as Natural, is the grand Principle that makes us Sociable Creatures, the solid Basis, the Life and Support of all Trades and Employments without exception;

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The reason why The Fable of the Bees received such attention is that it unveiled a grim fact of modern society, namely an inconsistency between the individual and the whole. The individual is generally considered to be consonant with the whole, insofar as individual good results in the good of the whole and individual contingency leads to chaos for the whole. This consistency had been validated by life in the community of antiquity. Separated from the community, however, the modern individual sees his private interests as a code of behavior. Therefore, owning to the loss of community as the common goal, a society consisting of individuals bent on private interests would inevitably deteriorate into a state of bellum omnium contra omnes, as modern theorists once predicted. Surprisingly, instead of this disordered state of nature, modern society presents itself as an unprecedentedly organized state of society, in which the interests of the whole are realized as never before. As such, how did individual disorder lead to order of the whole? Why does such an opposition that should have appeared as predicted result in unity? Evidently, this is a theoretical conundrum that modern theorists must confront. In a manner of speaking, modern natural law theorists, such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Fichte and Kant, were all dedicated to resolving this problem. Hobbes seeks to explicate the creation of society through the concept of a social contract among individuals. Such a society, however, is merely an atomist system rather than an organic unity.2 It is for this reason that Hobbes’s logic of the transition from individual to society has long been criticized and still remains an unsolved aporia in sociology, i.e. the “Hobbes problem”. German philosophers tread another path: For Kant, the individual is a person who is capable of “the legislation for nature”, whilst Fichte construes the individual as an I that posits a not-I. With this universal self-­ consciousness, the individual per se can be regarded as a universal being. Thus, one there we must look for the true origin of all Arts and Sciences; and the moment Evil ceases, the Society must be spoiled if not totally destroyed.’ Only Mandeville was of course infinitely bolder and more honest than the philistine apologists of bourgeois society” (ibid., p. 310). In Chapter XIV. Division of Labour and Manufacture of Volume I of Das Kapital, we can also find the following remark: “The celebrated passage in the same chapter that begins with the words, ‘Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or day labourer in a civilised and thriving country,’ &c., and then proceeds to depict what an enormous number and variety of industries contribute to the satisfaction of the wants of an ordinary labourer, is copied almost word for word from B. de Mandeville’s Remarks to his The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Publick Benefits (First ed., without the remarks, 1705; with the remarks, 1714)” (Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 360). These passages suggest that Marx is not only conversant with Mandeville’s work, but also fully aware of his influence on Smith. 2  Hegel’s explication of the origin of state differs from that of the modern natural law theorists, as he notes: “If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is equated with the security and protection of property and personal, the interest of individuals [der Einzelnen; translator] as such becomes the ultimate end for which they are united; it also follows from this that membership of the state is an optional matter” (Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 276). That is to say, as opposed to the modern natural law theorists, according to whom the state is built on signing the social contract in the hope of protecting private property, Hegel thinks that the ultimate end of state is to unite the individuals, is the higher-level return to the organic community of antiquity.

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only need magnify such a perfect individual in order to unify it with the whole, which is exactly the approach adopted by both Kant and Fichte. Such an approach can indeed unify both individual and the whole, yet their presupposition of the individual’s nature does not match modern reality. Both of their solutions bear a strong utopian hallmark. It is Smith who, proceeding from the reality of modern society, made the first attempt to elucidate this inconsistency between the individual and the whole. In An Inquiry, he notes: “[H]e is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interests, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it”.3 In other words, even when individuals are not motivated by public benefits, economic activities in pursuit of private interests will eventually be aligned with social benefit via the “invisible hand”. The term “invisible hand” is very similar to Mandeville’s “private vices, public benefits”, only the former rests on the empirical validation of political economy: In the examination object of political economy, that is the modern market economy system, the individual is solely concerned with his own products and interests, which in turn not only bring about universally accepted products, an objective (objektiv) law of value and a fully-developed system of division of labor and exchange, but also promote the realization of public benefits in an ultimate sense. Philosophically considered, Smith’s political economics account has two new features: Above all, though the result is still of social benefit on the whole, its presupposition is no longer the perfect individual postulated by Kant and Fichte, but rather a defective, empirical and imperfect private individual. That is to say, in contrast to ancient philosophical traditions, the alignment of the individual with the whole is no longer a given. Second, as opposed to Kant’s formal ethics, it sets out from a separation of end and means: The motivation no longer matters, so long as the result is desired. These two points clearly pose a great challenge to the traditional relationship between the individual and the whole. Hegel was one of few modern philosophers who faced up to this challenge. In the Frankfurt period and the early Jena period (around 1800), Hegel explicitly directed his efforts towards relations between the individual and the universal. In order to find a path from the individual to the universal, he studied the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau and Fichte, but, instead of tending towards Kant and Fichte’s approach, he opted for Smith’s path, proceeding from the empirical and egoistic individual to establish the transition from the individual to the universal. The difficulty of this approach resides in an inconsistency between the individual and the whole in the modern era. If one takes the empirical and egoistic individual as one’s starting point, then to elevate the individual to the universal means achieving unity of two opposites. If Kant and Fichte’s magnification of the ideal individual  Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. I, Liberty Fund, 1981, p. 456.

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can be articulated as the deduction of A from A, then what Hegel is about to accomplish is to deduce ¬A from A. In this respect, Hegel has to find, instead of Kant’s ethics, a new explanatory framework that allows him to deduce a conclusion that stands in opposition to his starting point, the political economic approach for instance. Hegel eventually arrived at his goal. In the Jena period, he extensively studied the political economic theories of James Steuart, Smith, et  al. Based on these, he established his dialectic, or, as Lukács’ puts it, he combined “dialectics and economics”,4 thus completing the theoretical task of deducing ¬A from A. In his writing, how exactly does Hegel solve this conundrum of modernity? At the early stages of his construction of a system, Hegel presents a rather lucid outline of his argument and concrete steps: (1) The starting point ought to be the concept of the individual based on an actual person in modern society. Different from the individual of ancient times, this individual not only lacks communal essence or the god-like “pure – i.e. inwardly universal  – personality [Persönlichkeit]”,5 but also possesses negativity and individuality (Individualität) and is hence in essence exclusive. As such, this individual is not a priori, but rather a citizen of modern civil society, namely homo oeconomicus. (2) Likewise, as the final destination, the whole or the universality can neither be the mechanical mass (Menge) of individuals nor the direct magnification of the perfect individual. Instead, it should be the polar opposite of the modern individual: an orderly and organic society as an integral unit. The transition from (1) to (2) is an aporia, for it is exactly the process by which the former turns into its opposite. (3) This transition cannot be bridged by the recognition theory of modern natural law theorists such as Hobbes and Fichte; it is only possible through the mediation of an objective world outside the individual. (4) Moreover, this process must imply a structure of alienation in between. As Hegel’s critique points out, for the traditional theology including philosophy, “[i]n itself [life of God; translator], that life is indeed one of untroubled equality and unity with itself, for which otherness and alienation, and overcoming of alienation, are not serious matters”.6 As opposed to them, he is going to take the problem of “otherness and alienation” seriously. In fact, it is precisely because of Hegel that alienation ascends to the fundamental principle of comprehending modern society. (5) As the ultimate goal, universality is not formal universality, but true universality, which only exists in the substance of ethical life and spirit, or, according to the philosophy of law, only in state. From this point of view, the current civil 4  The earliest systematical study of this problem dates back to Lukács’s Der Junge Hegel of. “Über die Beziehung von Dialektik und Ökonomie” was once the subtitle of this book when it was first published in 1948. 5  Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, trans. by T. F. Geraets et al., Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, p. 111. 6  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 10.

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society has yet to become the ideal of mankind, but rather is ethical life in a state of “division [Entzweiung]”.7 In comparison to community of antiquity, modern civil society is indeed an improvement, but it will still be superseded by a more evolved community. Hegel’s tackling of this conundrum of modernity began in the Jena Period (1800–1807). If one regards the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes as his coming to grips with the problem, then Phänomenologie (1807) can be construed as his conclusion. In the preface to Phänomenologie, Hegel draws an outline of his task: “The task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge had to be seen in its universal sense, just as it was the universal individual, self-­ conscious Spirit, whose formative education had to be studied. […] Science sets forth this formative process in all its detail and necessity, exposing the mature configuration of everything which has already been reduced to a moment and property [Eigentum] of Spirit. The goal is Spirit’s insight into what knowing is. […] But the length of this path has to be endured, because, for one thing, each moment is necessary; and further, each moment has to be lingered over, because each is itself a complete individual shape”.8 Whilst reminding the reader to “endure” “the length of this path”, Hegel further divides this process of the individual’s elevation to the whole into three stages: self-­ consciousness, reason and spirit. In the following, the author shall examine the Sache selbst concept in chapter C (AA.) Reason with regard to the problem of the unification of the individual with the whole.

7.2  The Theory of Sache selbst in Chapter C. (AA) Reason In discussions on the problems of social and political philosophy in Phänomenologie, B Self-consciousness has always been the center of focus. Yet Hegel’s most crucial exposition of the relationship between the individual and the whole lies de facto in the following chapter: C (AA) Reason.9 Considering this relationship, Hegel’s account in chapter B. Self-consciousness is rather the individual’s transition to the whole through “life-and-death struggle” (Kampf auf Leben und Tod) with another individual. This transition is accomplished without mediation, but as a result of a face to face contest between two individuals. This condition, however, changes fundamentally in chapter C (AA) Reason. Although this chapter is also devoted to the relationship between individuals in civil society and the relationship between the 7  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 62. 8  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 17–19. 9  Most of the Western scholars of Hegel’s social philosophy, Alexandre Kojève for instance, overemphasize the significance of chapter B. Self-consciousness. In fact, in regard to the subject matter of this chapter, chapter C. (AA.) Reason proves to have greater significance, in which sense, Kojève et al. have underestimated the importance of this chapter.

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individual and the whole, Hegel adds therein a mediation between individuals. This mediation is on the objective world, i.e. Sache selbst, by which Hegel is able to demonstrate the ascension from individuality to universality. Herein lies the uniqueness of Hegel’s philosophy.

7.2.1  The Mediation of Sache selbst 7.2.1.1  An Outline of Sache selbst The concept of Sache selbst is introduced for the purpose of resolving the contradiction between individuality and universality inherent in the modern individual. Regarding this contradiction, Hegel remarks in the subchapter B The actualization of rational self-consciousness through its own activity: “The individual […] His deed, qua actuality, belongs to the universal; but its content is his own individuality which, as this particular individuality, wants to preserve itself in opposition to the universal”.10 That is to say, the content of an individual’s deed is individual, yet its outcome is universal. This is a serious contradiction the modern individual has to confront. Hence, how can one solve this contradiction? Or how can one combine individuality with universality? Diverging from the typical individualist approach, Hegel provides a solution with a tinge of holism: “By his act he places himself in, or rather posits himself as, the universal element of existent reality, and his act is supposed to have, even according to his own interpretation, the value of a universal ordinance. But he has thereby freed himself from himself; he goes on growing qua universality, on his own account and purges himself of his particularity”.11 As we can see, instead of pushing universality towards individuality, Hegel merges individuality into universality, or, as he puts it, the individual must “posit” himself in “the universal element of existent reality”, “free himself from himself” and “purge individuality”. To modern individuals who have gone through the Enlightenment, such a solution is quite horrifying for, if not implemented properly, individuality could be wiped out in the process. Furthermore, even if individuals in modern society were willing to sacrifice themselves, they still might not necessarily attain universality, since simply relying on individual virtue would inevitably fail, like the “knights of virtue” (tugenhafte Ritter) before the “way of the world”12 (Weltlauf), becoming the laughing stock of history. For this reason, in order to complete the process from individuality to universality, Hegel needs a solution that pays the utmost respect to the modern principle of individuality, whilst also considers the realization of community as its ultimate goal, or, in language of the contemporary political philosophy, realizes the true unity of individualism and communitarianism. At the same  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 224.  Ibid., p. 223. 12  Cf. Ibid., p. 228ff. 10 11

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time, Hegel is obliged to make a promise to the individual: Instead of paying a heavy price, the individual will, on the contrary, have a greater opportunity for self-­ realization during the acquisition of universality. Without such a promise, modern individuals might refuse an elevation to universality on the grounds of their egoistic nature, since acceptance would entail a foolish self-sacrifice. The Sache selbst concept is crafted to fulfill these conditions. As for this concept itself, different standpoints lead to different interpretations. For example, from a Marxist perspective, Lukács conceives of this concept as “the capitalist commodity-­ relation”13 in Der Junge Hegel, whilst Tomonaga Tairako interprets it as “the social relations of individuals that exist as a system of Sache”14; from the perspective of the contemporary political philosophy, it is viewed by Yoshihiro Katayama as the “the commonality of citizens” and “the principle of universality”15; moreover, in the Japanese translation of Phänomenologie, Sache is directly rendered as a “thing of value” (価値あるもの)16 by Hiroshi Hasegawa. It is the fact that Hegel has conferred this concept with various connotations that give rise to so many interpretations.17 For the sake of clarity, the author shall determine the Sache selbst concept in the context of the subchapter C. Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself, for it is the most focused treatment of the Sache selbst concept in Phänomenologie. Here, we can find Hegel’s own definition thereof: “The ‘heart of the matter’ [Sache selbst] is only opposed to these moments [Moment] in so far as they are supposed to be isolated, but as an interfusion of the reality and the individuality it is essentially their unity […] it is a reality which is explicitly present for consciousness”.18 “Moments” in the cited passage refer to the deed that produces work (Werk). Thus, the heart of this definition is the distinction between work and Sache, work being the result of the individual’s objectification of his essential power. As an embodiment of the identity of subject and object, it represents his individuality and distinction from others. Once produced, however, work will come into existence as Sache due to the reciprocal effect of countless individuals. Sache transcends individuality, containing the universality that can be accepted by others. It has two features. To begin with, it is the joint product of countless individuals’ work. Second, it is a world of objects that is external to the individual. Since Sache refers to both an individual’s product as well as an actuality standing in opposition to i­ ndividuality,  Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel. Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. by R. Livingstone, Merlin Press, 1975, p. 483. 14  Tomonaga Tairako, The Alienation Theory and the Reification Theory, in: The 100th Anniversary of Marx’s Death. The Contemporary Significance of Das Kapital, Aoki Syoten, 1984, p. 177 (translated into English by K.H.). 15  Yoshihiro Katayama, The Development of Self. The Method and Experience of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, Soufusha, 2002, pp. 111, 116 (translated into English by K.H.). 16  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by H. Hasegawa, Sakuhinsha, 1998, 266. 17   According to Seiichi Yamaguchi’s calculation, the Sache concept appears 154 times in Phänomenologie, including 67 times as Sache selbst (See Seiichi Yamaguchi, The Origin of Hegel’s Philosophy, Housei University Press, 1989). 18  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 246. 13

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Hegel names it as “the interfusion of individuality and objectivity”.19 In the following, we shall see the importance of these two characteristics for the transition from the individual to the universal. 7.2.1.2  Justification of Universality in the Object of the Individual As such, what exactly is the function of the Sache selbst concept from Hegel’s viewpoint? Via this concept, Hegel aims to illustrate how the individuality of the object of the individual can ascend to universality, or, in his own words, “how in its existence individuality will preserve its universality”.20 This justification is composed of the following three steps: (1) The work is individual. As the embodiment of its creator’s essential power, of his ability and personality,21 it thus exemplifies individuality. The original form of this relation between work and individual is the relationship between labor and property in modern civil society. Only labor leads to property; the individual’s ownership of object resides in the fact that the object is the concentration of his labor. Through his work, the individual “does not go outside itself”,22 nor does the individual have the capacity to do so. (2) For others, however, this work still belongs to an “alien reality”.23 In this sense, it is still not true work. Thus, in order to share it with others, certain intersubjectivity must be infused into the work, which eo ipso becomes Sache, i.e. the intersubjectivity-infused work. In reality, commodity is epitomized by commodity, as its use value and value clearly transcend the object itself. (3) The aggregation of countless Sachen is Sache selbst. In Sache selbst, the relationship between work and individual miraculously vanishes so that individual can no longer find himself: “[T]his its existence is the work of self-­consciousness, but it is also an alien reality already present and given, a reality which has a being of its own and in which it does not recognize itself”.24 The disappearance of the identity between individual and work shows that the Sache selbst “belongs to no one”,25 freed from the particular ownership. Such a thing “that belongs to no one” is naturally substance, species and essence (Wesen). In this respect, the

 Ibid.  Ibid., p. 243. 21  Hegel notes: “It [sc. Self-consciousness] can therefore compare one work with another, and by so doing grasp individualities themselves as different; it can regard an individual whose work is more wide-ranging a possessing greater energy of will or a richer nature, i.e. a nature whose naïve quality is less limited; and another, on the other hand, as a weaker and poorer nature” (ibid., p. 241). 22  Ibid. 23  Ibid., p. 243. 24  Ibid., p. 294. 25  Ibid., p. 258. 19 20

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transition from work to Sache selbst also implies the transition from object to “a universal [Allgemein]”.26 Through the process of 1) work → 2) Sache → 3) Sache selbst, Hegel demonstrates the elevation of the object of the individual to universality. This is the unity of the individual as an object with the whole! In the language of social philosophy, it is the individual’s unity with society that he achieves in the external world of objects. Setting out to address humankind’s unity in the world, Hegel surprisingly bypasses his subject matter, beginning with the unity in the world of things. It was fortunate that Hegel comes up with such an approach, as it coincides with the intrinsic character of modern society in that things in modernity are no longer the product of individual labor, but exactly what Sache is, namely a concentration of man’ universal labor, e.g. commodity, money and capital. More importantly, these Sachen have unavoidably become key constituents of human society, capable of even substituting man in his social relation with the others. Hegel is likely the only one at that time to have acquired such a profound insight. 7.2.1.3  Justification of Sociality in the Individual’s Deed As a demonstration of universality in the object of the individual, the process of 1) work → 2) Sache → 3) Sache selbst has not yet proved universality of the individual as such. Since man’s universality mainly refers to his sociality, the process of man’s attaining universality is equivalent to the process of transitioning from isolated individual to social human being. Since Hegel does not specifically elaborate on this in chapter C. (AA.) Reason, the author shall reproduce his argument in the following, particularly in reference to subchapter B.  The actualization of rational self-­ consciousness through its own activity: (1) As substance, species and essence, Sache selbst is necessarily a spiritual essence. At the end of section a. The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or the “Matter in Hand” itself, Hegel concludes: “Rather is its nature such that its being is the action of the single individual and of all individuals and whose action is immediately for others, or is a ‘matter in hand’ [Sache] and is such only as the action of each and everyone: the essence which is the essence of all beings [Wesen aller Wesen], viz. spiritual essence [geistiges Wesen]”.27 In other words, Sache selbst is the totality that encompasses every man’s deed or, in Marx’s words, the “ensemble of the social relations”. Therefore, in Sache selbst, the individual will “experience [erfahren]” that there must be countless individual beings like himself and countless deeds of others outside him. (2) Now that Sache severs the individual’s connection with his work, it must entail the element of otherness: “A consciousness that opens up a subject-matter soon learns that others hurry along like flies to freshly poured-out milk, and want to 26 27

 Ibid., p. 247.  Ibid., p. 251 f.

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busy themselves with it; and they learn about that individual that he, too, is concerned with the subject-matter [Sache], not as an object, but as his own affair […] and instead of a mere ‘doing’, or separate action, peculiar to the individual who opened up the subject-matter, something has been opened up that is for others as well, or is a subject-matter on its own account”.28 That is to say, the particular Sache, seemingly crafted by a certain individual alone, is actually co-produced with other individuals like “flies to freshly poured-out milk”. Likewise, from the perspective of others, that so-called Sache of someone else is de facto intricately related to themselves from the outset; they have all unavoidably participated in its production. As such, Sache is not onefold, but implies intersubjectivity. (3) That intersubjectivity is already entailed in Sache indicates that its original form, i.e. work as such, is probably not purely for his creator, as the individual subjectively conceives, but actually also for others: “The labor of the individual for his own needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own, and the satisfaction of his own needs he obtains only through the labor of others. As the individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work”.29 Indeed, if the labor product implies universal element that fulfills the needs of others, then the labor that produces such a product is no longer individual labor, but universal labor. This deduction is somewhat similar to how Marx deduces alienation of labor activity (the second aspect of alienated labor) from alienation of labor product (the first aspect of alienated labor) when defining alienated labor. Through this effective approach, individual deed has now assumed universality from the very outset. The process above, i.e. 1) Sache selbst → 2) Sache → 3) work, is a typical abductive reasoning: Since Sache selbst is a social being, the Sache that constitutes Sache selbst also has sociality, so does the work from which Sache stems as well as the individual deed by which this work is forged. Hence, proceeding from Sache selbst, Hegel completes his justification of the sociality of the individual deed. This process – i.e. 1) Sache selbst → 2) Sache → 3) work – stands in sharp contrast to the previous process of 1) work → 2) Sache → 3) Sache selbst. If one considers the latter as the journey in which the individual, as a thing, acquires universality in the world of things, then the former could be regarded as the process by which the individual gradually discovers his sociality in Sache selbst. Together, they form a circle: isolated individual → work → Sache → Sache selbst → Sache → work → social individual. In this circle, Sache selbst stands in the center as the mediation, enabling the individual to develop from individuality to universality or, in language of social philosophy, from isolated individual to social human.

 Ibid., p. 251.  Ibid., p. 213.

28 29

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7.2.2  The Inversion of the Relation Between Man and Sache By entering Sache selbst as thing, the individual can indeed obtain sociality, which is the positive significance of Sache selbst. Yet the individual’s acquisition of sociality is not what he originally intends, but stems from the separation between end and outcome or the alienation of the individual. Moreover, that social relation between men now manifests itself as the relation between Sachen further brings about the problem of reification. In the following section, we shall move on to Hegel’s Sache selbst theory from the perspective of alienation and reification. 7.2.2.1  The Separation Between End and Outcome The core of the principle of subjectivity lies in the unity of subject and object (Objekt), namely that the object belongs to the subject himself, or, in Marx’s terminology, the identity of labor and property. In this respect, work is without doubt the ideal state towards which the modern individual strives, for in work the unity of subject and object (Objekt) is maintained. In reality, however, work can only exist in the form of Sache selbst, which, according to the analysis above, presupposes the dissolution of any opposition between subject and object (Objekt) and is thereby the negation of their unity. If examining the opposition between work and Sache selbst from the perspective of the relationship between end and outcome, it is clear, that though end and outcome are still unified in work, they diverge from each other in Sache selbst. The individual’s deed is individual and oriented towards his private interests, yet his outcome is a universal totality! As Hegel exclaims: “Consciousness, therefore, through its experience in which it should have found its truth, has really become a riddle [Rätsel] to itself, the consequences of its deeds are for it not the deeds themselves”.30 Through this process, the individual “comprehends itself as this particular individual who exists for himself, but the realization of this End is itself the setting-aside of the latter”.31 One can only realize his end by “setting aside” this end. No matter how absurd it sounds, this is the only way for the individual to achieve its end in civil society. Consequently, as the individual devotes himself to Sache selbst, both two pairs of underlying concepts of modern philosophy – subject and object (Objekt) as well as end and outcome – present themselves in the state of division. This is Hegel’s discovery, the outcome of his scrutinized observation of modern civil society. As has been noted, Hegel criticizes his predecessors for not taking the problem of “otherness and alienation” seriously. It is likely that he was referring to their dismissal of this inconsistency and their idealist presupposition of identity and consistency, as is typified by Kant who insists on hollow moral laws that are not only abstracted from 30 31

 Ibid., p. 220.  Ibid., p. 218.

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the reality of modern society, but also lack feasibility.32 Hegel’s presupposition stands more closely to the reality of civil society, insofar as it takes the egoistic individual as the starting point, affirming the reasonableness of his pursuit of private interests. It goes without saying that this postulate rests on an inconsistency between the individual and the whole, otherwise it would never come down to the benefit of the whole. Considered this way, instead of the individual’s subjective end, Hegel focuses more on the outcome, namely the perfection of the ethical order of the whole. In this sense, Hegel is one of few German philosophers who ascribes such great importance to the secular world, an approach that bears the hallmark of English utilitarianism33: He is the son of modernity. 7.2.2.2  The Structure of Reification Inconsistency between subject and object (Objekt) or end and outcome will necessarily lead to alienation. In its original sense, alienation means that one’s creation no longer belongs to oneself. From the perspective of those two pairs of concepts, this alienation is the object’s (Objekt) betrayal of the subject, the dissociation of end and outcome. In chapter C. (AA.) Reason, Hegel comments on alienation as follows: “It does not know that this realization as what affirmatively is, is in truth rather the implicit universal in which the individuality of consciousness, which entrusts itself to it in order to be this particular immediate individuality, really perishes; instead of acquiring a being of its own, it therefore attains to being the alienation of itself”.34 In other words, instead of realizing himself, the individual who “entrusts itself to” the reality ends up “perished” therein. Hegel’s exposition of alienation and its supersession is mainly concentrated in the following chapter C. (BB.) Spirit, which we will not go further into here. Next, our focus will turn to the problem of reification. Reification is a concept characteristic of Marx’s theory (here we shall only draw an outline of this concept, which will be discussed at greater length in Chapter XI). In Das Kapital, Marx notes: “To the latter, therefore, the relations [Beziehung] connecting the labor of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations [Verhältnis] between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons [sachliche Verhältnisse der Personen] and social

 In the section B.c. Virtue and the way of the world, Hegel insinuatingly criticizes Kant’s ethics: “Ideal entities and purposes of this kind are empty, ineffectual words which lift up the heart but leave reason unsatisfied, which edify, but raise no edifice; declamations which specifically declare merely this: that the individual who professes to act for such noble ends and who deals in such fine phrases is in his own eyes an excellent creature – a puffing-up which inflates him with a sense of importance in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, whereas he is, in fact, inflated with his own conceit” (ibid., p. 234). 33  Hegel once remarks: “[T]he entirety of these inner moments […] i.e. the action of the individual, is again in an accidental relationship to reality in general; fortune decides as well in favor of an ill-disposed purpose and an ill-chosen means, as against them” (ibid., p. 244f). 34  Ibid., p. 224. 32

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r­ elations [gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse] between things [Sachen]”.35 Based on this definition, reification means that relations between individuals present themselves as relations between Sachen. By virtue of this concept, Marx seeks to unveil the inverted nature of man’s relation to Sache in modern civil society. The Sache that was once man’s creation not only grows independent of man, but also usurps man’s leading role and assumes dominance over him. As such, how does Hegel’s concept of Sache selbst relate to Marx’s concept of reification? According to Tairako, though there is no sign of either the reification or the thingification concept in his text, Hegel does employ formulations like “making oneself a Thing [das sich zum Dinge machen]”,36 which suggests that he also has the idea of “making oneself a Sache [das sich zur Sache machen]”,37 an idea very similar to reification. There is indeed a remarkable similarity between Hegel’s concept that man as Sache takes part the process of Sache selbst and Marx’s reification concept, or, conversely, Marx’s reification concept is the refinement of Hegel’s Sache selbst theory. This viewpoint is reinforced by the following three aspects: To begin with, Sache selbst is the joint creation of individuals, that, once created, belong to no one, becoming of independent substance, as Hegel notes on many occasions: “[sc. The ‘heart of the matter’] completely holds its own and is experienced as that which endures, independently of what is merely the contingent result of an individual action, the result of contingent circumstances, means, and reality”.38 Second, according to the analysis above, Sache selbst is the joint product of countless individuals, in which social relations between individuals are concentrated. Lastly, once Sache selbst has taken shape, it is possible for it to convert from predicate into subject, resulting in a reversal of the status of man and Sache, as Hegel notes in the following two passages: A. “[T]hey all have this ‘matter in hand’ as their essence but only in such a way that it, being their abstract universal, can be found in each of these various moments, and can be a predicate of them. The ‘matter in hand’ is not yet a subject; but those moments count as subject because they fall on the side of individuality in general, whereas the ‘matter in hand’ is at first only the simple universal. It is the genus which is found in all these moments as species of itself, and is equally free and independent of them”.39 B. “Consciousness learns that on one of these moments is subject, but rather gets dissolved in the universal ‘matter in hand’; the moments of the individuality which this unthinking consciousness regarded as subject, one after the other, […] Thus, the ‘matter in hand’ no longer has the character of a predicate, and 35  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 84. 36  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 213. 37  Tomonaga Tairako, The Alienation Theory and the Reification Theory, in: The 100th Anniversary of Marx’s Death. The Contemporary Significance of Das Kapital, Aoki Syoten, 1984, p. 179. 38  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 246. 39  Ibid., p. 247.

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loses the characteristic of lifeless abstract universality. It is rather substance permeated by individuality, subject”.40 These two passages stand in sheer contrast to each other. In the former, Hegel points out that Sache selbst is the joint creation of individuals, and as such can only be the predicate of the individual. In the second passage, however, Sache selbst develops into a substantial being like “ethical substance”41 and becomes the subject, whilst the individual becomes the predicate. The conversion of Sache selbst from predicate into subject is de facto the process by which Sache becomes the master. In overview, Hegel’s Sache selbst concept is identical to Marx’s reification concept, except that Marx’s exposition of the reification phenomenon is set out from a more critical perspective. 7.2.2.3  Formal Universality The individual, as work, merges into Sache selbst, which is still not the elevation of man as such to universality. In this respect, the universality attained by the individual in Sache selbst is not true universality, but merely formal.42 The first reason is not explicitly pointed out by Hegel, namely that the unity the individual achieves in Sache selbst with another or the whole is in essence the unity of the individual’s objects with the objects of another. This unity differs from that of the two forms of self-consciousness in chapter B. Consciousness because the former achieves unity in the world of objects with Sache being the subject of this unification, whilst the latter is unified in man’s world with self-consciousness being the subject of this unification. Thus, the unity attained in Sache selbst is at most a reflection of the relationship between persons as between Sachen, which, according to the analysis above, is nothing more than reification that ought to be superseded. The second reason, made plain by Hegel, lies in the deceptive nature of this universality. Based on the literal meaning of universality, the individual’s deed is not supposed to merely serve itself, but also another as well as the whole. Nonetheless, as has been noted, the outcome of Sache selbst is de facto completely contrary to the end of the egoistic individual. As such, those who use Sache selbst to puff up their noble deeds are simply engaged in “a play of individualities with one another”, in which “each and all find themselves both deceiving and deceived”.43

 Ibid., p. 252.  Hegel does comment on the inversion of subject and predicate of “ethical substance” in reference to Sache selbst: “The ethical substance has sunk to the level of a predicate devoid of self, whose living subjects are individuals who themselves have to provide the filling for their universality and to fulfil their essential nature through their own efforts” (ibid., p. 215). That is to say, in the phase of Sache selbst as the alienation of “ethical substance”, the subject is the individual, which, however, is the predicate in the “ethical substance”. 42  Ibid., p. 247. 43  Ibid., p. 250. 40 41

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Then, why do “each and all find themselves both deceiving and deceived”? This stems from the fact that, when the individual, as work, takes part in Sache selbst (in this case public affairs), he is simply trying to fulfill private desires. Thus, those who claim that they started out to serve the public good are apparently engaging in deception. Likewise, others whose “eagerness to come and help was itself nothing else but a desire to see and exhibit their own action, not the matter in hand itself; that is, they wanted to deceive the others in just the same way that they complain of having been deceived”.44 In brief, the assistance and involvement of another is not out of any noble cause, but simply motivated by egoism. Therefore, “[i]t is, then, equally a deception of oneself and of others if it is pretended that what one is concerned with is the ‘matter in hand’ alone”.45 Considered this way, what every individual desires is to “exclude the glare of publicity and participation by all and sundry”,46 thus their deeds only assume the form of universality, yet lack its content . In conclusion, the individual’s acquisition of universality in Sache selbst is not a willfully obtained outcome, but purely one that has happened by accident. As a contingent result, this universality can only be formal. It is probably for this reason that Hegel chose the interesting title The spiritual animal kingdom and deceit, or the ‘matter in hand’ [Sache selbst] itself47 for this section: Since Sache selbst only possesses the form of universality and allows of the reciprocal deception of individuals, it can only be “the spiritual animal kingdom” rather than the spiritual kingdom. This standpoint is later more clearly articulated in Grundlinien where civil society presents itself as the “system of needs”48 grounded on universal connections, but the main driving force is still the principle of particularity, according to which the relation of men is only “an association … in what is … a formal universality [formelle Allgemeinheit]”.49 In comparison to the true universality, this “formal universality”based civil society can only remain as ethical life in the state of its “division”.50 Notwithstanding, from Hegel’s point of view, this reciprocal deception is still of positive significance for it can result in “a display of what is one’s own in the element of universality whereby it becomes, and should become, the affair of everyone”.51 This experience is exceedingly vital, since, having realized that the universality he attained is only formal, the individual will then turn in search of true universality, at which point his attitude towards the whole would have changed entirely. Considering this, Hegel is full of anticipation: “[T]he whole becomes, as a whole, his own work, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in so doing

 Ibid.  Ibid., p. 251. 46  Ibid. 47  Ibid., p. 237. 48  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 226 49  Ibid., p. 198. 50  Ibid., p. 62. 51  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 251. 44 45

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receives back from it his own self”.52 To be sure, this individual is, strictly speaking, no longer the individual in chapter C. (AA.) Reason, but the self-conscious being in chapter C. (BB.) Spirit. To sum up, with regard to the Sache selbst theory in chapter C. (AA) Reason, Hegel’s conception of the relationship between the individual and society has the three following features: (1) The individual’s elevation to universality or man’s transition from individuality to sociality cannot be achieved without the structure of alienation. That is to say, the individual’s socialization coincides with his alienation. First, the individual acquires sociality by converting himself into Sache. Second, this transformation entails the transferal of his essence into an external thing, which is inevitably accompanied by the risk of alienation: Not only will he disappear in a world of Sachen, but even his role as subject will be usurped by Sache. Yet alienation cannot be rejected, as otherwise the path to universality would be denied. In the end, even though the universality attained at the cost of alienation is still merely formal and gives rise to reciprocal deception, one cannot, like Don Quijote, decline to play this game of deception in the name of morality, for he would be hence isolated from the mass and ultimately abandoned by history. For this reason, Hegel, more than anyone else, encourages people to embrace alienation, which is exceedingly rare among his contemporaries. (2) Although alienation results in the acquisition of sociality, the price paid seems too high for an individual already accustomed to life in a community. Therefore, in order to convince the individual to alienate himself, his concerns must first be taken care of. The greatest advantage of Hegel’s logic of Sache selbst is that it does not require self-sacrifice during the ascension from the individual to the universal: On the one hand, he introduces the model of Smith’s “invisible hand”, affirming the reasonableness of private interests whereby he prevents the “tragedy of ethical life” that the individual is sacrificed for the sake of the whole.53 On the other hand, instead of the modern natural law theorists’ scaremonger notion of the state of nature, he draws on the presupposition of political economists, transforming a state of bellum omnium contra omnes into a state of mutual dependency and complementary citizenship, providing theoretical underpinning for the individual to enter the state of society at minimum cost. As is aforementioned, in order to have the individual sacrifice himself, one has to advance a perfect scheme to describe the unity of the individual and the whole. It is evident that by now Hegel has managed to do this. Upon arriving here, one could imagine Hegel calling upon us: Individuals! Be brave, go forth and alienate yourselves in society!

 Ibid., p. 213.  Before 1804, that is in System der Sittlichkeit and the Jena System I, Hegel did seek to resolve the contradiction between individual and the whole through the individual’s demise, for which he has been later considered as the representative of totalitarianism and even fascism. 52 53

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(3) The deduction of man’s sociality from Sache selbst is equivalent to Marx’s explication of the nature of man and society through external economic relations. For those familiar with Marx, this is the most important proposition of historical materialism. In fact, during the time of the Paris Manuscripts when Marx was establishing historical materialism, Marx’s theoretical framework – in spite of their distinct value orientations – displays considerable resemblance to Hegel’s. For instance, Hegel’s concepts such as the separation of end and outcome and “making oneself a Sache” can be translated in the language of the Paris Manuscripts as the alienation of labor and the alienation of intercourse; “formal universality” and “spiritual animal kingdom” would respectively coincide with the “false system”54 and “caricature of his real community [wirkliches Gemeinwesen], of his true species-life”.55 If one reconsiders the essential content of the Paris Manuscripts with respect to alienation and reification, then it is apparent that Marx’s line of thought does not transcend Hegel’s logic of Sache selbst. In this sense, Hegel is indeed Marx’s forerunner.

 Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–44, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 215. 55  Ibid., p. 217. 54

Chapter 8

The Logic of the Transition from Individual to Society in the Jena Manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes

Based on chapter C. (AA) Reason, the author examines in the last chapter Hegel’s explication of the transition from individual to society through the mediation of Sache selbst. It still remains to be answered, however, how the Sache selbst concept came about? How did it become a key principle for explaining the evolution of society? In Phänomenologie, owning to the multiplicity of themes and the abundance of leads – not to mention the abstruseness of the wording – answers to these questions are hard to find. In the Jena manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes, however, Hegel had already concretely and systematically elaborated on these issues. Thus, the author shall trace back from Phänomenologie to Hegel’s exposition in the Jena manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes so as to further unravel the formation and significance of Hegel’s logic regarding the transition from individual to society.

8.1  F  rom the “Tragedy of Ethical Life” to the Advent of Sprit in the Jena System The Jena period (1801–1807) has been widely considered a key evolutionary period in Hegel’s thought. During this period, Hegel set about constructing his own philosophical system, stepping onto the historical stage as an independent philosopher. One of the symbolic achievements of this period is that Hegel – through critiquing modern natural law theories and assimilating political economics – established his own social and political philosophy, i.e. the philosophy of spirit, which, though set against the background of modern society at that time, still thrives in the contemporary context. Before the publication of Phänomenologie (1807) as the culmination

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of Hegel’s efforts in the Jena period, Hegel had drafted three manuscripts appertaining to his philosophy of spirit: (1) System der Sittlichkeit in the early Jena period, an unpublished manuscript written by Hegel between 1802 and 1803 and named by Rosenkranz. First edited and published by Georg Mollat,1 it then appears twice in Hegels sämtliche Werke edited by Lasson.2 Currently in greatest circulation are Lasson’s second edition in Hegels sämtliche Werke (1923) and the GW edition (1998).3 (2) Philosophie des Geistes I in Jena System Draft I, namely the section on the philosophy of spirit in Das System der spekulativen Philosophie (1803/1804).4 Comprising of essay fragments, this manuscript was revised by Hegel himself. Given its content, it assumes the manifest character of the transition from System der Sittlichkeit to Philosophie des Geistes II. (3) Philosophie des Geistes II in Jena System Draft III, namely the section on the philosophy of spirit in Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes (1805/1806).5 As a revision of Philosophie des Geistes I, this manuscript is the most complete early draft of Philosophy des Geistes in the Jena period. On the international scene, systematical studies of the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes began in the 1930s, shortly after the publication of Jenenser Realphilosophie,6 and have included well-known works such as Lukács’s Der Junge Hegel. The publication of GW fueled another wave of studies of Jena System Draft worldwide. In comparison to earlier editions, GW rests on similar editorial principles as MEGA, incorporating comprehensive philological information such as Hegel’s revision of the manuscripts. Studies of the manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes plays a salient role in Western academia. In addition to Lukács, numerous scholars including Habermas and Axel Honneth have also risen to fame through their contributions to this field. As for Hegel’s thought in the Jena period, scholars have sought to divide its evolution from different perspectives: Some divide it into two stages,7 whilst others  Hegel, System der Sittlichkeit, hrsg. von G. Mollat, A. W. Zickfeldt, 1893.  Hegel, System der Sittlichkeit, hrsg. von J. Hoffmeister, in: Hegels sämtliche Werke, Bd. 7, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1913, 1923. 3  Hegel, System der Sittlichkeit. Reinschriftentwurf (1802/1803), in: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 5, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1998. 4  The latest version is included in Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe I, in: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 6, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1975. 5  The latest version is included in Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe III, In: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 8, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1976. 6  Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie I. Die Vorlesungen von 1803–1804, hrsg. von J. Hoffmeister, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1932; Jenenser Realphilosophie II, hrsg. von J. Hoffmeister, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1931. Its latest version is: Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie. Vorlesungenmanuskripte zur Philosophie der Natur und des Geistes von 1805–1806, hrsg. von J.  Hoffmeister, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1969. 7  For instance: According to Heinz Kimmerle, Hegel has shifted his focus from nature (Schelling) to self-consciousness and labor (Fichte) since Jena Sysem Draft I (1803/1804). (See Heinz 1 2

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three.8 With respect to the theme of this chapter, the author opts for the former, namely to take Philosophie des Geistes I (1803/1804) as the line of demarcation, classifying Naturrecht9 and System der Sittlichkeit as the main works of the early Jena period and Philosophie des Geistes II (1805/1806) as the main work of the late Jena period. This division is grounded in methodological difference in Hegel’s treatment of the relationship between the individual and the whole: In the early Jena period, Hegel mainly rested on Aristotelian holism and a modified recognition theory of natural law tradition, later turning to the logic of Sache selbst as a combination of dialectic and economics.

8.1.1  System of Ethical Life in the Early Jena Period 8.1.1.1  “Tragedy of Ethical Life” System der Sittlichkeit is Hegel’s first systematical work written to solve the problem of the transition from individual to society. Before this, he wrote Naturrecht (1892), which is commonly seen as a preface to System der Sittlichkeit. In this essay, he not only criticizes the empirical natural law theories represented by Hobbes, but also sets his sight on the formal natural law theories represented by Kant and Fichte. Also, for the first time, he suggests combining these two theories of natural law so as to establish a system of ethical life that allows for the freedom of the individual and the community (Gemeinschaft) of the people. Ethical life corresponds in reality to the people (Volk): “[T]he intuition [individualization; translator] of this Idea of ethical life, the form in which it appears in its particular aspect, is the people […] people is not a disconnected [beziehungslose] mass [Menge], nor a mere plurality”.10 This definition of people embodies Hegel’s basic conception of society: In contrast to both Hobbes and Fichte’s atomist conception of society as the “mass” of “a mere plurality”, the true society, however, should be an organic entirety, as Aristotle remarks in Politics: “The state [Volk; translator] is more in accord with nature than is the individual [Einzelne]; for if the individual, in isolation, is not self-sufficient, he must – like all [other; translator] parts – constiKimmerle, Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens, in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 8, 2. erweiterte Auflage, Bouvier Verlag, 1982. 8  Such as Takashi Shimazaki who divides the Jena period into three stages: (1) the early stage (1801–1804): before Jena System Draft I (1803/1804); (2) the middle phase (1804–1805): Jena System Draft II (1804/1805); (3) the late stage (1805–1807): Jena System Draft III (1805/1806) and Phänomenologie (1807). See Takashi Shimazaki, Hegel’s Dialectic and Conception of Modernity, Miraisha, 1993, p. 140. 9  Hegel, Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften, in: TW 2, Suhrkamp, 1970. 10  Hegel, System of Ethical Life and the First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. by H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press, 1979, p. 144.

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tute a single unit with the whole”.11 In other words, society should consist of an organic unity of individual and the whole, which presupposes the existence of the whole. This definition enables us to realize the “highest community”, whilst maintaining the freedom of the modern individual. It should be said that this was a rather rational conception put forward in an epoch in which individualism was all pervading. The realization of this objective, however, is not easy, for it requires a theory to bridge the two extremes, i.e. the freedom of the individual and the community of the people, or a mediating principle to unify both.12 Since the premise of unity is the existence of the whole, the success or otherwise of its realization can be judged according to the following criteria: With the stability of the community presupposed, the more freedom and the higher status an individual can reach therein, the closer the unity is to perfection; on the contrary, the less freedom and the lower status the individual has, the less successful that unity is. Naturally, the negation or disappearance of the individual in the community can only imply a failure of unity. If one examines Hegel’s notions according to the criteria above, it is apparent that, in the early Jena period, he remained far from this goal, insofar as he failed to grant the individual his true status in the whole. For example, Hegel points out in Naturrecht: “[I]ndividuality as such is nothing and completely at one with absolute ethical majesty”13; in System der Sittlichkeit, he further considers “elder [Alter]” as the most qualified ruler of the community, since, as the nearest to death, they are most likely to give up their “individuality [Einzelheit]”14 and hence stand closest to universality. These ideas are clearly resting on the premise that the less individuality, the better. Such neglect of the individual conversely manifests itself as worship of the whole: In Differenz (1801), Hegel exclaims the slogan “[h]ighest community is highest freedom [Die höchste Gemeinschaft ist die höchste Freiheit]”15; in System der Sittlichkeit, he seemingly exhausts his words of praise in rhapsodizing about the whole: “[sc. absolute ethical life] is the absolute truth”, “absolute process of formation [Bildung]”, “absolute Unselfishness [Uneigennützichkeit]”, “supreme freedom and beauty” and “serene and without suffering”.16  Hegel, Hegel Political Writings, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University, 1999, pp. 159 f.  Karl Löwith is attentive of the importance of this problem and points out: “The means whereby he accomplishes the harmonization is the dialectic mediation between the individualistic principle of bourgeois society and the totalitarian principle of the of the state, between individual particularity and political totality” (Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenthcentury Thought, trans. by D.  E. Green, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, p.  241). Yet the “mediation” here is merely the theoretical objective that Hegel starts out to achieve, not the required mediating principle. 13  Hegel, Hegel Political Writings, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University, 1999, p. 114. 14  Hegel, System of Ethical Life and the First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. by H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press, 1979, p. 158. 15  Hegel, The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, trans. by H. S. Harris & W. Cerf, State University of New York Press, 1977, p. 145. 16  Hegel, System of Ethical Life and the First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. by H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press, 1979, p. 147. 11 12

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This preference for the whole over the individual results in Hegel leaning toward holistic solutions when dealing with the relationship between the individual and the whole. He prefers to sacrifice the individual for the sake of unity of the individual and the whole, as epitomized in the well-known metaphor of the “tragedy of ethical life” (Trägodie im Sittlichen): “This is nothing other than the enactment, in the ethical realm, of the tragedy which the absolute eternally plays out within itself – by eternally giving birth to itself into objectivity, thereby surrendering itself in this shape to suffering and death, and rising up to glory from its ashes”.17 That is to say, when the conflict between individuality and universality cannot be reconciled, the individual ought to unconditionally give up his individuality or even his life; those who manage to do this willingly – e.g. Jesus and Socrates – are the finest among us, insofar as they make their individuality accord with universality through self-­ sacrifice. Yet this elevation of individuality to universality through self-sacrifice of the former is, in every possible way, the “tragedy of ethical life”. Consequently, only the whole is absolute, and the significance of the individual resides only in self-negation for the sake of the whole, in devoting himself to “an absolute totality” and “an absolute people”.18 In the language of contemporary political philosophy, this idea means that the individual must unconditionally commit himself to the interests of the community. This absolute totalitarian principle is the reason Hegel is constantly reproached and even blamed for the emergence of the German fascism. Setting this reactionary aspect of Hegel’s concept aside, the true unity of individual and the whole cannot be built on the negation of individuality either for, logically considered, the individual to be united with is not to be found in this unity. 8.1.1.2  Self-Contradiction in the Model of the Recognition Theory It goes without saying that this totalitarian principle which sacrifices individuality is not a successful solution. From the perspective of the history of philosophy, it is evidently a return to pre-modern times, to ancient, absolute communitarianism. As such, why does Hegel adopt this vintage solution? Possible explanations are for instance that it is an overreaction to modern atomist natural law theory, that the methodology of System der Sittlichkeit, i.e. the identity of intuition and concept, is insufficient, that the approach to clarifying modern society with the concept of nature or natural ethical life is not tenable, that Hegel’s civil society concept has not yet taken shape, etc. Yet the author wants to press here that Hegel adopts this one-­ sided solution mainly because his attempt to interpret society modelled on the recognition theory does not turn out well. In the modern sense, the recognition concept means that each man recognizes and respects the will, right and value of others, that is, mutual recognition (gegen Hegel, Hegel Political Writings, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University, 1999, p. 151.  Hegel, System of Ethical Life and the First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. by H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press, 1979, p. 101.

17 18

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seitige Anerkennung) instead of unilateral recognition. Paradoxically, what the modern individual pursues is nothing but unilateral recognition, i.e. the recognition of himself by others, which inevitably leads to conflict between individuals that in turn brings about mutual recognition between them. Most modern natural law theorists follow this approach to explain why man will make the transition from the state of nature to the state of society. As is aforementioned, in the early Jena period, Hegel criticized Hobbes and Fichte for their atomist interpretations of society; on the other hand, however, he was also profoundly influenced by both of them, seeking to establish a recognition theory to account for the relationship between the individual and the whole. In System der Sittlichkeit, Hegel adopts Hobbes’s notion of “war of every one against every one”. According to Hobbes, the individual in the state of nature will, on account of his egoistic, exclusive nature, fight to the death against others for survival; yet the fear of death compels both sides to relinquish their rights to the state by signing a social contract and to end the state of bellum omnium contra omnes through their obedience to the state. In chapter II. Das Negative, oder die Freyheit, oder das Verbrechen of System der Sittlichkeit, Hegel also expatiates on the “battle of one whole person against another whole person”,19 namely that since property and right are directly tied up with the honor of the family, the individual will risk his life without hesitation when they are “injured” or even go beyond the law to “duel [Zweikampf]”, since “[c]oncerning my honor and life there can be no contract”.20 The usage of the term “duel” with its ancient and medieval character suggests that Hegel was still constrained by the pre-modern context. It goes without saying that such a “battle” for honor is very similar to Hobbes’s account of the state of nature.21 In Philosophie des Geistes I, Hegel develops this “battle” for honor into a “struggle for recognition” (Kampf um Anerkennung), a notion he derived from combining Hobbes’s state of nature with Fichte’s recognition concept and his intensification of Fichte’s theory. According to Fichte, though struggling for recognition, the individual as rational being will still, for the sake of the freedom of others, restrain himself in pursuit of his own freedom in order to resolve conflicts between subjects. Yet Hegel substitutes Fichte’s free subject with the individual in Hobbes’s state of nature: “Each must have from the other cognizance of whether he is an absolute consciousness: a) each must put himself into such an opposed connection with the other as will bring this to light, he must injure him; and each can only know of the other whether he is [a; translator] totality [Totalität] in as much as he drives him to the point of death, and each proves himself as totality for himself likewise only in

 Ibid., p. 137.  Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 128. 21  Concerning the similarities between Hegel’s recognition theory and Hobbes’ concept of state of nature, see e.g. Ludwig Siep, Der Kampf um Anerkennung. Zu Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes in den Jenaer Schriften, in: Hegel-Studien, Bd. 9, 1974. 19 20

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that he goes to the point of death with himself”.22 Now that this individual will even use the death of the other to justify himself as “a totality”, his existence obviously poses a threat to the others who, for his own survival, will fight with the former to the death. The result of such a “life-and-death struggle” can only be the individual’s death and the complete negation of individuality. Hence, even though Hegel strives to erase traces of Hobbes and Fichte, his recognition theory is clearly built on Fichte’s concept of recognition and Hobbes’s notion of “war of every one against every one”. Considered this way, one can hardly dissociate them from Hegel completely. As such, the individual is now deeply entangled in contradiction: It is for his self-­ preservation that the individual negates the other, fighting against him to the death, which, on the contrary, ends up risking his own life. It is a contradiction that should not have been manifested! Hegel is aware of this: “I perpetrate the contradiction of wanting to affirm the singularity of my being and my property; and this affirmation passes over into its contrary, that I offer up everything I possess, and the very possibility of all possession and enjoyment, my life itself; in that I posit myself as totality of singularity I suspend myself as totality of singularity”.23 More seriously, since the individual can only gain complete recognition by the demise of the other or himself, the result of this “struggle for recognition” is not mutual recognition between individuals anticipated by modern natural law theorists, but the negation of another equivalent subject instead. The negation of the other, however, means the cancellation of the premise of recognition, which is an “absolute internal contradiction” for the individual bent on recognition: “This recognition of the singular [consciousness; translator] is thus [an; translator] absolute internal contradiction; the recognition is just the being of consciousness as a totality in another consciousness, but as far as it is actually achieved, it cancels the other consciousness, and thereby the recognition is suspended too”24 – a essential conundrum that Hegel’s recognition theory has to face. Considered this way, an attempt to solve the contradiction between the individual and the whole by way of the recognition theory model is thwarted. It was probably owning to this setback that Hegel turned to the vintage, totalitarian program at end of the early Jena period. Yet this is exactly, as Hegel puts it, the “tragedy of ethical life”, an expression that shows Hegel’s discontent with this scheme. Since the true “realm of ethical life”25 can under no circumstances be founded on a tragedy, Hegel needs to find a new approach to resolve the contradiction between the individual and the whole.

 Hegel, System of Ethical Life and the First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. by H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press, 1979, p. 240. 23  Ibid., p. 239. 24  Ibid., p. 240. 25  Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 159. 22

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8.1.2  Philosophy of Spirit in the Late Jena Period Hegel’s endeavor to find a new solution begins with Philosophie des Geistes I (1803/1804), in which he employs the logic of Sache selbst extracted from political economics. 8.1.2.1  The Application of Economic Principles Let us draw a comparison of Hegel’s programs in the early Jena period: The totalitarian program – advanced in contrast to the modern nature law theories – presupposes the individual’s self-sacrifice; likewise, as a modification of modern natural law theories, Hegel’s recognition theory also calls for the negation of another individual. Although distinct with respect to the victim sacrificed, both programs opt for the negation of individuality for the sake of universality. It seems impossible to ascend to universality without the sacrifice of individuality, which, in turn dissolves universality. Here, Hegel is trapped in an antimony. In order to escape this dilemma, Hegel must find a way for the individual to unite with the whole without self-sacrifice! No philosopher before Hegel had managed to achieve this. Yet this unity had already arisen in the reality of Europe and the theoretical account of this reality, that is political economics. As Smith puts it in An Inquiry: Economic activity directed towards private interests will, qua the “invisible hand”, promote the benefits of the whole. In other words, despite the individual end (private interests) being opposite to the inclination of the whole (public benefits), the economic activity of the individual will lead to the unity of individual and the whole; More importantly, there is no individual sacrifice at all in this process of unification. Emerging political economics implies such a vital clue! This must have been an unexpected discovery for Hegel, as there is hardly a place for expressions of such a utilitarianist bent – e.g. “invisible hand” – in the tradition of German moral philosophy founded by Kant. Under the sway of this tradition, Hegel was also unable to discover the logic of the “invisible hand” until the end of the Frankfurt period,26 at which point he indistinctively sensed the theoretical value of political economics and entered upon a study thereof, drafting the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes, just as the Paris Manuscripts are Marx’s outcome of his study of political  According to Rosenkranz, Hegel took notes from the German translation of Steuart’s An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy in 1799: “All of Hegel’s thought on the essence of civil society, on need and labor, on division of labor and property of estates, poor assistance [Armenwesen] and administration of justice [Polizei], rents, etc., all of them are eventually concentrated in a comment on the German translation of Steuart’s economics. This comment was written from 19th February to 16th May 1799 and is still preserved in its complete form” (Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969, S. 86 (translated into English by K.H.)). Unfortunately, this note of Hegel is not preserved till today (also see Chapter I).

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economics. Considering these manuscripts, it is not clear whether or not Hegel had read An Inquiry before 1803. Yet it is apparent that, after Philosophie des Geistes I, Hegel learned to appreciate the philosophical significance of the “invisible hand”, converting it into the logic of Sache selbst in Philosophie des Geistes II (1805/1806), which, in replacement of his model of the recognition theory, serves as the new guiding principle for solving conflict between the individual and the whole. In the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes in the late Jena period, Hegel, much like in System der Sittlichkeit, sets forth the evolution of society according to the following sequence: need → labor → possession and property → struggle → recognition → contract → law → state”. As opposed to previous interpretations, however, this account clearly assumes an economic character. To begin with, the process sets out from the private individual engaged in modern labor, i.e. the citizen living in civil society. The end of his labor is nothing noble, simply there to fulfill his private interests, and as such his deed is individual and exclusive. At the same time, however, “[t]he labor that is concerned with the need of a single [agent; translator] [Einzelne] becomes in [public life; translator] α) the labor of a single [agent; translator], but β) even [though it; translator] is only motivated by his need it is a universal”.27 How does individual labor become universal? To address this obvious logical gap, Hegel gives a final explanation: The judgment [Urteil] which analyzed them [sc. these diverse, abstract, processed needs], placed them against itself as determinate abstractions. Their universality to which this judgment rises is [that of; translator] the equality [Gleichheit] of these needs, or value. In this they are the same. This value itself, as a thing, is money […] Each one gives his own possession, negating its existence [Dasein] [as his; translator] and in such a way that that existence is recognized therein; the other receives it with the consent of the first. Both parties are recognized; each receives from the other the possession of the other […] and this equality in the thing, as its inner aspect, constitutes its value, in regard to which I concur entirely with the opinion of the other – [concurrence of; translator] that which is positively mine and likewise his, the unity of my will and his.28

This passage illustrates the transition from individual to universal labor: First, Hegel clarifies the universality that exists among “processed needs” and transcends all their particular gestalts, i.e. “equality” or “value”. In Grundlinien, Hegel defines value as: “This universality, whose simply determinacy arises out of the thing’s particularity [Partikularität; translator] in such way that it is at the same time abstracted from this specific quality, is the thing’s value”.29 Value is the most crucial factor in the transition from individual to universal labor because it enables the products of individual labor to be exchanged. This indicates the individual’s transferal of his property, a terrifying act of alienation that is unimaginable without the guarantee of the value of Sache, for this value ensures  Hegel, System of Ethical Life and the First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. by H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press, 1979, p. 246. 28  Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 121 f. 29  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 92. 27

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“equality” between exchanged goods. Moreover, in order to successfully see the exchange through, both sides should commit to “contract [Vertrag]”,30 also grounded in the value of Sache. In conclusion, by exchange and contract, “[e]ach satisfies the needs of many, and the satisfaction of one’s own many particular needs is the labor of many others”,31 whereby the entire world develops into a universal system of mutual dependency, and individual labor eventually becomes universal. As we can see, value and money are pivotal constituents of Hegel’s argument, insofar as they actually play the same role as the Sache selbst concept in chapter C. (AA.) Reason of Phänomenologie. At the end of Philosophie des Geistes II, Hegel explicitly builds a connection between money and Sache selbst: “The essence of the thing is the thing itself [das Wesen der Sache ist die Sache selbst]. Value is hard cash […] The formal principle of reason is there. (But this money, which signifies all needs, is itself merely an immediate thing [Ding].) It is the abstraction from all individuality, character, skills of the individual, etc.”32 With “all individuality, character, skills” of the individual abstracted, money is an ensemble of individuals’ labor, an entirety of universal connection. It must have been an unexpected result for Hegel who had been striving to find a way to unify the individual and the whole, when he found himself exclaiming that money was “a great invention”.33 This new principle brings the recognition theory out of its early Jena period quagmire. According to the recognition theory, the individual is in the state of fighting to the death. Now, however, “[e]ach one gives his own possession, negating its existence [as his; translator] and in such a way that that existence is recognized therein; the other receives it with the consent of the first. Both parties are recognized”. Hence, both sides obtain reciprocal recognition through the transferal of their “possession”. Naturally, the realization of this recognition relies upon the value of their possessions, or, as Hegel puts is, “this equality in the thing, as its inner aspect, constitutes its value”.34 Mediated by value and money, this reciprocal recognition is a relationship of indirect recognition, distinct from that of direct recognition between persons in the previous recognition theory. Compared with unilateral recognition, this recognition theory allows individuals to maintain a mutually beneficial relation without self-­ sacrifice. Exactly as Herbert Marcuse notes, “[t]he exchange relations of the market provide the necessary integration without which isolated individuals would perish in the competitive conflict. The terrible struggles within the commodity-producing society are ‘better’ than those between wholly unrestricted individuals and groups – ‘better’, because they take place on a higher level of historical development and  The “contract” is essentially to guarantee the exchange, and thus named by Hegel as “an ideal exchange” (Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p.124) and “an exchange of declarations [Erklären]” (ibid., p. 125.). 31  Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 121. 32  Ibid., p. 166. 33  Ibid. 34  Ibid., p. 122. 30

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imply a ‘mutual recognition’ of individual rights”.35 Although Marcuse’s remark is not made in the context of this chapter, it still perfectly manifests the advantages of the logic of Sache selbst over the model of the previous recognition theory. In all, having discovered the concept of value and money (Sache selbst), Hegel eventually discards this approach in his early Jena period, using the modified natural law theory to underpin the transition from individual to the whole. By way of value and money, man can develop from the state of nature to the state of society without fighting to the death for recognition. In this way, Hegel maintains the possibility of elevating the status of individuality. As a matter of fact, in the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes, the term “Selbst” that represents Individualität and Einzelheit appears in much greater frequency and individuality leaps into its role as a constitutive principle of society, remarked on by Hegel in this way: This is the higher principle of the modern era, a principle unknown to Plato and the ancients. In ancient times, the common morality consisted of the beautiful public life – beauty [as the; translator] immediate unity of the universal and the individual [unmittelbare Einheit des Allgemeinen und Einzelnen], [the polis as; translator] a work of art wherein no part separates itself from the whole, but is rather the genial unity of the self-knowing Self and its [outer; translator] presentation. Yet individuality’s knowledge of itself as absolute – this absolute being-within-itself  – was not there. The Platonic Republic is, like Sparta [Lacedämonisch], [characterized by; translator] this disappearance of the self-knowing individuality.36

This passage perfectly illustrates the transition of Hegel’s thought. In the early Jena period, the Hegel that drew on Plato and Aristotle’s communitarianism would rather accept the “tragedy of ethical life” than recognize modern individualism. Yet he is now in turn unsatisfied with communitarianism, as it results in the “disappearance of the self-knowing individuality”. In a marginal remark on this passage, he specifically points out that “this state [of Plato’s time] has perished” in that it lacks the “principle of absolute individuality [Prinzip der absoluten Einzelnen]”.37 Naturally, this does not mean that Hegel abandons the underlying principle established in the early Jena period, i.e. to unify individual and the whole on the presupposition of the latter. That he now puts so much emphasis on the “absolute principle of the individuality” is simply because he has uncovered a mediating principle that enables the co-existence of holism and the principle of individuality, namely the logic of Sache selbst. As has been noted, the criterion for determining whether Hegel has resolved the conflict between individual and the whole is whether the individual is affirmed despite his conflict with the whole or whether the individual has been given the utmost freedom within the whole. Hence, based on the exposition above, we can say that Hegel has indeed solved this conundrum.

 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960, p. 81. 36  Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 160. 37  Ibid. 35

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8.1.2.2  From Cultivation to Knowledge Although Hegel has acquired a new explanatory model through his study of economics, the universality attained is still the formal universality of civil society rather than the true universality of the state as the highest level of ethical life. Therefore, in order to perfect the logic of the transition from individual to society, Hegel has to set forth how the individual develops from the universality of Sache selbst to the universality of the state. In the last chapter of Philosophie des Geistes II, i.e. III. Constitution, he takes on this task: It [sc. the universal will] has first to constitute itself as a universal will, out of the will between individuals, so that this appears [scheinen] as the principle and element. Yet on the other hand the universal will is primary and the essence – and individuals have to make themselves into the universal will through the negation of their own will, [in; translator] externalization and cultivation [Bildung]. The universal will is prior to them, it is absolutely there for them – they [the two wills; translator] are in no way immediately the same.38

This passage can be regarded as an outline of Hegel’s standpoint: (1) The whole (the “universal will”) comprises individuals (the “will between individuals”), the individual is the constitutive “principle and element” of the whole; (2) However, the whole is still prior to the individual. Exactly as the marginal remark to this passage indicates, this aspect originates from Aristotle’s notion that “the whole is, according to nature, prior to the parts”39; (3) the individual and the universal will are “in no way immediately the same”, thus the former can only become universal by mediating moments such as “the negation of their own will, [in; translator] externalization and cultivation”. Here, we shall leave out the first two aspects that have already been addressed above and concentrate on the last one. “[T]he negation of their own will” is Hegel’s answer to how the individual acquires true universality. Yet it is no longer the self-­ sacrifice of the early Jena period, but rather “externalization and cultivation”. “Externalization” is the individual’s transferal of his individuality, whilst “cultivation” designates “[individual’s] own process of becoming the universal”.40 Ultimately, through labor, exchange and contract, the individual comes to appreciate universal laws and proactively elevates himself to universality. Compared with Sache selbst by which the individual arrives at universality unintentionally, the crux of the matter here is whether the individual can grasp the necessity of his movement towards universality and consciously complies with this necessity, or, in Hegel’s terminology, “knowing [wissen]” and “knowledge [Wissen]”41: Owning to this “knowledge”, the individual’s ascension to universality “is not a process of blind [i.e., unknowing; translator] necessity, however, but is rather one that is mediated through knowing [Wissen]. Thus each one is thereby his own end, i.e., the end is

 Ibid., p. 154.  Ibid. 40  Ibid., p. 133. 41  Ibid., p. 152. 38 39

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already the source of movement”.42 This identity between the individual’s end and the will of the whole is termed as conscience (Gewissen) in Phänomenologie, which is the final moment in the process of the self-consciousness’s becoming the spirit.43 Only in this state is the individual’s universality acknowledged as true universality. Through moments such as “externalization and cultivation” and “knowledge”, Hegel eventually has the individual arrive at universality on the level of state. At this point, as the individual self-consciousness, the individual finally reaches his destination, or, in Hegel’s language, the “spirit of a nation [Geist eines Volkes]”. The so-called spirit is “universality in the complete freedom and independence of the individual [Allgemeinheit in der vollkommenen Freiheit und Selbständigkeit der Einzelnen]”.44 Differing from the ethical life built on community of antiquity, it is a higher-level unity of individuality and universality realized by way of the negation of community and the affirmation of the “absolute principle of individuality”. Once the spirit concept was established, the system of ethical life, dominant in the early Jena period, was due be replaced by the philosophy of spirit. The advent of the philosophy of spirit marks the completion of Hegel’s justification of the transition from individual to society, which is exemplified in Phänomenologie. It serves as Hegel’s fundamental viewpoint on society and history, which remains consistent until his later work Grundlinien. Considered in its entirety, the transition from individual to society in the late Jena period is already very similar to the elevation of self-consciousness to spirit via reason in Phänomenologie. Such a similarity is fully understandable if one takes the fact into consideration that, though Phänomenologie was published in 1807, printing began in February 1806. In other words, Phänomenologie was written before Spring 1806 at least, coinciding with the writing of Philosophie des Geistes II. As such, it is no wonder that Philosophie des Geistes stands on the same plane as Phänomenologie. To sum up, it is the Sache selbst concept that enables Hegel to explicate the transition from the individual to the whole in C. (AA.) Reason. According to the analysis above, this concept is closely tied to political economics, in particular to its core concepts including need, labor, division of labor, value and money. These political economic concepts embody not only individuality as private owner, but also universality of private labor. Hence, they demonstrate the individuality and universality, “in which the interfusion of individuality and objectivity has itself become objective”.45 In this respect, the concepts of money and value in the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes are a preliminary version of the Sache selbst concept in C. (AA.) Reason. With this concept, Hegel not only solves the conundrum of ­recognition  Ibid.  The emphasis on cultivation and knowledge is one of the major differences between Hobbes and Hegel’s explication of the evolution of society: The former deduces society from human nature, whilst the latter construes society as the result of the cultivation and knowledge of individual, i.e. the individual’s self-reflection. 44  Ibid., p. 151. 45  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 246. 42 43

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theory, but also presents a brand-new interpretation of the universality of modern society. For this reason, it is reasonable to conceive of the evolution of the Sache selbst concept as the development of Hegel’s concept of the unity of individual and the whole.

8.2  Summary After our examination of Phänomenologie and the manuscripts of Philosophie des Geistes, we can finally answer the question set out at the start of this chapter: How exactly does Hegel complete his justification of the transition from individual to society? His exposition includes at least five core principles: 1. The principle of labor Labor originally refers to the subject’s deed that externalizes his essential power in an object and thereby forms a subject-object (Objekt) relationship between himself and the object. In the modern era, however, the end of labor is no longer the fulfillment of one’s own needs (use value), but directed towards profiting from the product thereof and thus gaining value. Since value is intersubjective, this labor necessarily transcends itself, generating social relations between subjects. One of the most evident characteristics of Hegel’s principle of labor is the simultaneous evolution of objectification and intersubjectivity in labor. 2. The principle of exchange Exchange is the transferal of property between private owners. Due to the profit-­ oriented nature of modern labor, the product of individual labor alone cannot immediately satisfy one’s own needs, as these can only be fulfilled by the product of other producers. Considering the private nature of the producer, the individual must exchange products of equal value to the property he transfers. Thus, money and value are the mediators of exchange whereby reciprocal complementation between individuals is realized. The crux of the principle of exchange is that it allows the individual to surpass his boundaries and establish external social relations with another. 3. The principle of alienation (the negative principle) Equivalent to externalization, alienation embraces two meanings: Above all, the subject turns himself into a thing, i.e. externalization in the sense of objectification, or, as Hegel puts it, “making oneself an object” (sich zum Gegenstande machen); second, he transfers his own object to another, i.e. externalization in the sense of exchange. On this twofold meaning, Hegel remarks: “I have willed in the exchange, have posited my thing as a value […] just as [is; translator] labor, sunk in being – the same externalization. (α) In laboring, I make myself immediately into the thing, a

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form which is Being. (β) At the same time I externalize this existence of mine, making it something alien to myself, and preserve myself therein”.46 4. The principle of cultivation Cultivation is the process whereby the individual align himself with external universality as much as possible. It is the process by which the individual seeks to escape from alienation and ascend to universality by acquiring the universality of the external world. For the individual, alienation means surrendering himself to Sache selbst, yet it is in Sache selbst that individual is toughened and attains the ability to pursue universality. 5. The principle of conscience (the principle of knowledge) Conscience means that the individual realizes his unity with the whole and consciously behaves in conformity with it: It stands on a higher level than cultivation. Cultivation can also refer to a situation in which the individual is at odds with the whole, yet coerced to succumb to external necessity, whilst conscience is the moment when the individual “knows” the nature of the whole and, setting out from this “knowledge” of his unity with the whole, consciously elevates himself to universality. Within conscience, the individual substantially actualizes his unity with the whole. In brief, it is through these five moments that unity of the freedom of the individual and the community of the people is eventually achieved.

Exchange Externalization

Private vices

Labor

Sache Selbst

(Value, Money)

Cultivation

Conscience

The Good of the Whole (State,Spirit)

Externalization Alienation

Fig. 8.1  The logic of Sache selbst

As is illustrated, starting out with private vices, the individual undergoes five phases, i.e. labor, exchange, alienation, cultivation and conscience, and reaches the good of the whole (state, spirit). In this process, Sache selbst (value, money) stands at the center. Labor participates in Sache selbst as Sache; since as Sache selbst does not belong to the individual, but rather is alien to him, participation in Sache selbst  Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 123.

46

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means an individual’s alienation. Exchange is also conducted in Sache selbst, which (as money and value) serves as the mediator of the connection between individuals. If alienation means that the individual gives himself up to Sache selbst, then cultivation refers to the process of the individual’s disengaging himself from Sache selbst. Consequently, Sache selbst develops to become a core moment in the transition from private vices to the good of the whole. It is exactly for this reason that the author entitles the diagram above the logic of Sache selbst. More importantly, the logic of Sache selbst pioneers an approach to explicating the principles of modern society from an economic perspective. If Hegel followed a traditional path in the early Jena period, drawing on moral or psychological elements – e.g. Aristotle’s morals, Hobbes’s fear of the death and Fichte’s subjective freedom – so as to account for the formation of society (universality), then in the late Jena period he clearly shifted to a model based on Smith’s “invisible hand” as his explanatory principle. This means to explicate man, society and history from a new vantage point, that is the perspective of the objective world beyond our ­subjective world, of external, objective (objektiv) economic relations. This overarching change of perspective is, for those conversant in Marxism, the crux of historical materialism. Though this perspective of Hegel’s is not as mature as Marx’s, it is still an incredible achievement to elucidate the evolution of human society by way of this approach before the time of Marx. In this regard, Hegel’s greatest breakthrough in the Jena period is without doubt his use of the logic of economics, such as with the Sache selbst, to expound on a constitutive principle of modern society. This can very well be conceived as the Copernican revolution in the interpretation of society and history. Thus far, the author has abstracted an explanatory framework of the transition from individual to society from Hegel’s text. Such a framework not only serves to reconstruct Hegel’s thought in the Jena period, but also, more importantly, provides the following viewpoints on the logic of Marx’s transition from individual to society. 1. Alienation and the problem of sociality The original meaning of alienation is the individual’s loss of himself in an object: his becoming another. This loss easily lends the alienation concept a negative connotation. As we can see in the diagram above, however, alienation is a necessary moment that the individual cannot bypass, since he can never elevate himself to the whole without Sache selbst. For the individual, though turning himself into a thing or transferring (externalizing) his property is extremely painful, such agony is prerequisite for entering into Sache selbst. In this sense, alienation is the precondition for the individual’s acquisition of sociality (universality) and therefore of positive significance. It is because of a guarantee of the principle of cultivation that Hegel encourages people to alienate themselves. Alienation does result in an individual’s loss of self, yet at the cost of which he is also able to pass the trials of cultivation leading to a reacquisition of self on a higher level. The principle of alienation and the principle of cultivation are just like a journey along the two sides of the letter V. Whilst alienation

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pushes the individual to the bottom, cultivation is the inverse process by which the individual climbs up and reclaims himself. Both alienation and cultivation promote the movement from individuality to universality, as Hegel notes: “[I]ndividuals have to make themselves into the universal […] [in; translator] externalization and cultivation”. This entire movement takes the shape of a Möbius strip. As such, alienation and the individual’s acquisition of sociality (universality) come hand in hand. As such, man’s universality (sociality) is under no condition a priori, but results from the alienation of countless individuals’ labor (Sache selbst); likewise, man’s sociality (universality) does not exist in the isolated individual’s subjective world, but in the alienated objects outside the individual, in Sache selbst or the relations of countless individuals’ Sachen, on which Hegel comments: “This legal person, however, has its substance and fulfilment outside of the world”.47 This understanding not only differs from that of Fichte and Kant, but also from that of Feuerbach. As universality, Feuerbach’s species-being is inside the individual and a priori. Considering the other manuscripts of the Paris period written after Comments on James Mill, Marx was clearly following Hegel’s path, insofar as he rests on the external economic relation between subjects to define man’s social nature instead of ascribing it to the subject himself. In this sense, it is clear that Hegel’s alienation theory profoundly inspired Marx. 2. Labor and the problem of intersubjectivity More importantly, Hegel’s labor is simultaneously intersubjective labor. Generally speaking, the isolated individual’s objectification is normally considered a onefold subject-object (Objekt) relationship, which does not imply an intersubjective relation. The most manifest feature of Hegel’s definition of labor, however, is that the intersubjective relationship is also deduced from labor moulded on the subject-­object (Objekt) relationship. This definition is bound up with the laboring subject and the nature of labor. In Philosophie des Geistes I and II, Hegel explicitly posits laboring subject or individuality as a private individual, whose labor is exclusive, private labor or, in Hegel’s terminology, “surplus labor”. Since this labor is geared towards profit, its product must have use value that is realizable to another as well as value that enables exchange with another. Both use value and exchange value are intersubjective; and the value contained by labor product underlies the transition from individual labor to universal labor. Therefore, on the surface, modern private labor takes the shape of an exclusive subject-object (Objekt) relationship, but in essence it implies a social characteristic that transcends all previous forms of labor. In Chapter VII, we have surveyed the process of isolated individual → work → Sache → Sache selbst → Sache → work → social individual, according to which the individual labor and the isolated individual will inevitably turn into social labor and the social individual respectively, once the individual and his labor are drawn into the world of Sache selbst. As the diagram of the logic of Sache selbst above shows, an individual’s labor cannot enter the world of Sache selbst without alienation and exchange. It is in the 47

 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 364.

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world of Sache selbst that the individual completes the transformation from one to many or, in other words, from individuality to universality. Both alienation and exchange belong to externalization, in which sense externalization mediates the transition from individuality to universality. In brief, if the individual wants to confer intersubjectivity on his labor, he cannot do so without externalization or Sache selbst. Hegel’s identification of labor with intersubjectivity is of crucial importance, the crux of which lies in the private nature of the laboring subject and the profit-oriented nature of his labor. Marx develops this notion in Comments on James Mill, propounding on the concept of gainful labor as well as the principle of alienation of intercourse, both of which feature prominently in Marx’s perspective shift from isolated individual’s alienated labor to social relations. 3. The problem of the dialectic Lastly, when analyzed closely, then the process from private vices to the good of the whole can be deemed as a process from vice to good, from one to many. Logically considered, it is a deduction from A to ¬A, which, according to traditional formal logic and formal ethics, is extremely difficult or even impossible. Nonetheless, this is the reality of modern society that manifests itself as an aporia: Disengaged from the community of antiquity, these individuals bent on “private vices” are bound to form a good entirety for the survival of human society. Taking on the task to resolve this aporia, in the Jena period, Hegel opts for dialectical logic. In this respect, his dialectic is the product of the modernity, corresponding to a sphere of human society and, according to a classification of Hegel’s philosophical system that should be subsumed under the philosophy of spirit. To be sure, it is the times in which Hegel lived that enabled him to establish this dialectic. By then, capitalism had been established in Western Europe, and political economy, as a theoretical reflection of it, had reached maturity. In contrast to Kant and Fichte, Hegel had the opportunity to draw on the most recent development of human history from both the perspective of reality and that of theory. The deduction of ¬A from A inevitably entails a reversal and its restoration. In the diagram of the logic of Sache selbst above, alienation is the reversal, and cultivation the restoration. This process has only only seen good become vice, but also brought about an additional consequence, namely the elevation of individual to the whole, the conversion from “private vices” to “public benefits”. The so-called dialectic of Hegel is in essence this historical or social dialectic. Since the crux of this process lies in the reversal, Marx names it the dialectic of negativity, whereas the author would rather call it the dialectic of alienation. Evidently, it is exactly this dialectic of alienation that Marx adopts critically in the Paris Manuscripts.

Chapter 9

The New Vantage Point on Comments on James Mill An Interpretation of Comments on James Mill. Part I

As is presumed at the end of Chapter VI, it is in Comments on James Mill that Marx concludes his perspective transition from isolated individual to social relations. In order to better illustrate this transition, we have traced it back to Hegel’s transition from individual to society over the last two chapters. Now, with these preparations, we can resume our task of clarifying how Marx accomplishes this transition in Comments on James Mill. Beginning at the outset of Chapter VII, the author puts forward a bold hypothesis regarding the origins of Marx’s transition in Hegel and that there is considerable similarity between the thought expressed in Comments on James Mill and that of Hegel. This is a relationship that has long attracted academic attention. In addition to Lukács who undertakes a comparative study of early Hegel and Marx in Young Hegel, Marcuse points to the similarity between Hegel’s thought in the Jena period and Marx’s economic critique in Reason and Revolution: “In his further remarks on the concept of labor, Hegel actually describes the mode of labor characteristic of modern commodity production. Indeed, he comes close to the Marxian doctrine of abstract and universal labor”.1 This point of view is also shared by Karl Löwith, according to whom, “[i]f Marx had been able to see the critical expositions of the Jena lectures and the commentary on Stewart’s Political Economy, he would have been able to develop his statement of the problem, out of Hegel’s, much more directly than he was able to on the basis of his study of the Phänomenologie”.2 These opinions share an emphasis on the similarity between Hegel’s manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes and Marx’s Paris Manuscripts. Since Marx could not have read the Jena manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes, this similarity can only result from Marx’s examination of Phänomenologie. Through his study of Phänomenologie and political economics, Marx ingeniously grasped the kernel of 1  Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960, p. 77. 2  Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-century Thought, trans. by D. E. Green, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, p. 270.

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 L. Han, Studies of the Paris Manuscripts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9618-3_9

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Hegel’s thought in the Jena manuscript, critically transforming Hegel’s dialectic and applying it to his anatomy of civil society.

9.1  Money and Alienation of Man The condition and structure of the text of Comments on James Mill is rather complex. As introduced in Chapter IV, it consists of two parts: The first part or the First Comments on James Mill comes from the forth notebook on Xenophon, Ricardo and Mill in the Paris Manuscripts, and the second part or the Second Comments on James Mill comes from the fifth notebook on McCulloch, Prevost, Tracy, Engels and Mill. As the main part of the comments as a whole, the First Comments on James Mill includes page XVIII to XXXIII of the forth notebook, whereas the Second Comments on James Mill is very short, consisting only of pages 13–18 of the fifth notebook. The editors of both two editions of MEGA integrate the parts on Mill from these two notebooks into an independent text called Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique.3 Before tackling the comparison of Marx and Hegel, let us first analyze Comments on James Mill by following Marx’s line of argument: money → private property (man’s essence) → gainful labor (production).

9.1.1  The Independence of the Mediator: Money The First Comments on James Mill begins with a discussion on money, as Marx abruptly starts an analysis of money when excerpting from Chapter III. Interchange of Mill’s Elements of political economy. Considering its form, this part appears to be a development of Mill’s theory of money, yet its content reveals a comprehensive critique of the political economic theory of money from Marx’s own perspective. After excerpting from and summarizing Mill’s work, Marx prefaces his exposition with the following remark: “The essence of money is not, in the first place, that property is alienated in it, but that the mediating activity or movement, the human, social act [der menschlicher, gesellschaftlicher Akt] by which man’s products mutually complement one another, is estranged from man and becomes the attribute of money, a material thing [materielles Ding] outside man”.4 As we can see, instead of interpreting money as a means of circulation, Marx sets out from the question of why man’s social deeds alienate and turn into money, a perspective distinct from that of political economics.  Cf. MEGA① I-3, S. 520-550 (the First Comments on James Mill: 520-547, the Second Comments on James Mill: S. 547-550); MEGA② IV-2, S. 428-470 (the First Comments on James Mill: 428466, the Second Comments on James Mill: S. 466-470). 4  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 212. 3

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From Marx’s viewpoint, man is in essence a being of mutual complement and dependency. In this original form of intercourse, the reciprocally exchanged labor product is man himself. Since the labor product as such stems from the objectification of man’s physical and mental energy, it embodies his essential power as a person. For this reason, mutual exchange and complementation of labor products means the same between persons. Had it been a mediator in this exchange relationship, it could only be a person as such, or, conversely, if this exchange were only mediated by a person, it would be de facto an immediate relationship without a mediator. Such a “mediating activity or movement” is the ideal state of human intercourse, which Marx names the “human, social act”. Once certain objects such as gold or silver become mediators of this mutually complementing activity, however, the relationship between man and object changes, namely “the relation itself between things [Sache], man’s operation with them, becomes the operation of an entity outside man and above man”.5 In other words, the “relation itself between things” assumes dominance over the relation between men, which in turns is degraded to an appendage of the former. This is definitely a reversal of the relationship between man and thing. With man becoming its slave, the mediator (money) becomes the “true god”, which leads to the fetishism of mediator or money. The reason for such reversal is that “[o]bjects separated from this mediator [Mittler] have lost their value. Hence the objects only have value insofar as they represent the mediator, whereas originally it seemed that the mediator had value only insofar as it represented them”.6 That is to say, the object representing person now relies on the mediator, and the relationship between man and mediator is reversed; more dreadfully, after the emergence of money, “[t]his reversal of the original relationship is inevitable”.7 By analogy with the change in Christ’s role of interlocator positioned between man and god, Marx vividly exposes the logical process of how money is elevated from individual to universal and ultimately seizes absolute power: “Christ represents originally: 1) men before God; 2) God for men; 3) men to man. Similarly, money represents originally, in accordance with the idea of money: 1) private ­property for private property; 2) society for private property; 3) private property for society”.8 This analogy can be presented in the following Table 9.1. Table 9.1  The elevation of mediator to absoluteness Mediator Individuality Christ Men before god Money Private property for private property

 Ibid.  Ibid. 7  Ibid. 8  Ibid. 5 6

Universality God for man Society for private property

Absoluteness Men to man Private property for society

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At first, Christ is “1) men before God”, whereas for man he is “2) God for men”: He is therefore “alienated God and alienated man”; for both man and God, he is merely a secondary mediator. Yet, since “God has value only insofar as he represents Christ, and man has value only insofar as he represents Christ”, Christ as mediator surprisingly becomes “3) men to man”. The “men” here by no means refers to ordinary man, but to man as a benchmark for every other man: For anyone who wants to be a man, he has to become Christ first. Hence, Christ as meditator between man and God no longer depends on substance such as man or God, but is himself the substance, possessing the absoluteness to determine man and God. What applies to Christ also has a bearing on money. For the individual private owner, money used to be a certain form of private property, i.e. “1) private property for private property”. Having become a universal equivalent, however, it assumes universality, turning into “2) society for private property”; when the universal equivalent is further fixed as mediator such as gold or silver, the entire condition will undergo a complete transformation, insofar as the mediator becomes “3) private property for society” as if it no longer depends on any certain private property and in turns every private property can only be actualized through it. The mediator therefore seizes absolute power, assuming dominance over all private owners. In brief, the introduction of the mediator leads to the mediator’s dominance over man, an unfortunate consequence in contradiction to man’s original intention. As such, why do we not cease to use the mediator? Or, why does man allow private property to turn into money? This is the question Marx is about to answer.

9.1.2  The Nature of Money: Alienation of Private Property “Why must private property develop into the money system [Geldwesen]?”9 “Because man as a social being must proceed to exchange [Austausch] and because exchange – private property being presupposed – must evolve value. The mediating process between men engaged in exchange is not a social or human process, not human relationship; it is the abstract relationship of private property to private property, and the expression of this abstract relationship is value, whose actual existence as value constitutes money. Since men engaged in exchange do not relate to each other as men, things [Sache] lose the significance of human, personal property [persönliches Eigentum]. The social relationship of private property to private property is already a relationship in which private property is estranged from itself. The form of existence for itself of this relationship, money, is therefore the alienation of private property, the abstraction from its specific, personal nature”.10 As we can see, Marx adopts the Smithian answer: Man ought to exchange as he is a “social being”. Despite the exclusive nature of private property, this cannot be realized outside of exchange. As both objects being exchanged are private property,  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 212 f.

9

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private owners have to abide by the principle of equivalent exchange and hence call for a value commensurate with all kinds of objects; since value is an abstract relation between private properties and hence cannot serve as the mediator of exchange, money arises as an equivalent in replacement of value. Therefore, money demonstrates the “actual existence” of value. With regard to this deduction of money from the nature and movement of private property, Marx takes a similar standpoint to Hegel, who expounds on the process of how “processed needs” are turned into money in the Jena manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes in a similar fashion. Moreover, Marx moves on to lay bare the essence of money as “the alienation of private property, the abstraction from its specific, personal nature”. The relationship between private property and object is originally immediate, yet, as money appears, the thing (Sache) as private property loses its “significance of human, personal property” and thereby its correspondence with man. If private property is to be conceived of as the alienation of man, then money is the further alienation of private property. Moving from man to money now presents itself as a two-stage process of alienation: man → private property as the alienation of man’s essence → money as the alienation of private property”. In other words, money is the twofold alienation of man’s essence, by which money as mediator ascends from individuality to universality and eventually to absoluteness. As Marx summarizes: “This mediator is therefore the lost, estranged essence of private property, private property which has become alienated, external to itself, just as it is the alienated species-activity of man, the externalised mediation [Vermittlung] between man’s production and man’s production”.11 In all, money is private property externalized. As Marx’s first definition of money, it is his most profound and best embodies the standpoint that Marx takes in his maturity. As Marx further unveils, on the presupposition of money, the subject of exchange is no longer the person, but private property or things (Sachen) such as money, and exchange activity is “not a social or human process, not human relationship”,12 but the “social relationship of private property to private property”. In exchange, the human relationship becomes a social relationship between things. This condition is later called reification, as Marx notes in Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: “Money is not a symbol, just as the existence of a use value in the form of a commodity is no symbol. A social relation of production appears as something existing apart from individual human beings, and the distinctive relations into which they enter in the course of production in society appear as the specific properties of a thing – it is this perverted appearance, this prosaically real, and by no means imaginary, mystification that is characteristic of all social forms of labour positing exchange value. This perverted appearance manifests itself merely in a more s­ triking manner in money than it does in commodities”.13 The reason that money such as  Ibid., p. 212.  Ibid., p. 213. 13  Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Economic Works: 1857-1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 289. 11 12

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gold or silver seizes “true power” over the world is not because money per se possesses certain magic, but rather that man transfers “[a]ll the qualities, which arise in the course of this activity are, […] to this mediator”.14 That is to say, the power of the mediator (money) is conferred by man, which is indeed a “social power”.15 From this, it can be seen that in Comments on James Mill, Marx has already gained a conception of money equivalent to that of his mature period.

9.1.3  Alienation of Morals: Credit Through analysis of the opposition between modern political economics and monetarism, Marx further criticizes the grave alienation of man in the world of money under the conditions of political economics: “The opposition of modern economists [Moderne Nationalökonomie] to the monetary system [Geldsystem] is merely that they have conceived the essence of money in its abstract universality and are therefore enlightened about the sensuous superstition which believes in the exclusive existence of this essence in precious metal” and thereby regard paper money and other “paper representatives of money (such as bills of exchange, mandates, promissory notes, etc.)”16 as the consummate gestalt of money which conforms to its essence. To be sure, considering that modern political economics “conceived the essence of money in its abstract universality”, it is clearly superior to monetarism. Yet the political economist’s conception of money does not change the essence of money, but simply “substitute[s] refined superstition for crude superstition”.17 More importantly, as money advances from the “sensuous form” of precious metals such as gold and silver to the abstract form of paper money, its inhuman essence is even more manifest. Through a “credit system” as the ultimate form of money, Marx goes on to unravel the extremely inhuman essence of money and the simple error committed by Saint-Simonism: [I]n the credit system, of which banking is the perfect expression, it appears as if the power of the alien, material force were broken, the relationship of self-estrangement abolished and man had once more human relations to man. The Saint-Simonists, deceived by this appearance, regarded the development of money, bills of exchange, paper money, paper representatives of money, credit, banking, as a gradual abolition of the separation of man from 14  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 212. 15  Marx remarks in Grundrisse: “Money is ‘impersonal’ property. I can carry it around with me in my pocket as the universal social power and the universal social nexus, the social substance. Money puts social power as a thing into the hands of the private person, who as such uses this power” (Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857-58) [Second Instalment], in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Economic Works: 1857-1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 431). 16  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 213 f. 17  Ibid.

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things, of capital from labour, of private property from money and of money from man, and of the separation of man from man. An organized banking system is therefore their ideal.18

At first glance, no paper money, not to mention precious metals such as gold and silver, are used in the modern credit system. It seems that the relationship between men no longer depends on money as its mediator, but returns to its original form, namely as a relationship of trust. Deluded by this appearance, the Saint-Simonists even construe the credit and banking system as the ideal institution of human society, as a hope to free man from alienation, despite this being exceedingly absurd in Marx’s eyes. As he sees it, the credit and banking system is even more vile, a “more infamous and extreme” “self-estrangement [and] dehumanization”19 for the following reason: To begin with, the advancement to the credit system does not alter the essence of money since the relationship between man and credit is still that of man and money, only with man’s credibility as guarantor. That the creditor lends to the debtor is simply guaranteed by the debtor’s ability to pay. Furthermore, that money does not appear in the credit is due to the fact that “man himself, instead of metal or paper, has become the mediator of exchange, not however as a man, but as the mode of existence of capital and interest”.20 For this reason, “credit becomes merely a medium facilitating exchange, that is to say, money itself is raised to a completely ideal form”.21 Second, embodied in the credit relationship, the alienation relationship between man and mediator not only remains unchanged, but also manifests itself in a state of alienation far deeper and serious than previous forms of money: “Within the credit relationship, it is not the case that money is transcended in man, but that man himself is turned into money, or money is incorporated in him. Human individuality [menschliche Individualität], human morality [Moral] itself, has become both an object of commerce and the material in which money exists. Instead of money, or paper, it is my own personal existence [persönliches Dasein], my flesh and blood, my social virtue and importance, which constitutes the material, corporeal form of the spirit of money. Credit no longer resolves the value of money into money but into human flesh and the human heart”.22 That is to say, not only is it the case that “man himself has been put outside himself and has himself assumed a material form”,23 what is even more intolerable is that it is no longer outside man, but now traded and exchanged as something closely tied up with man’s spiritual character such as individuality and morality. Obviously, compared with the trade of things outside man, trading man as such is far viler. The most infamous result is that, though driven by the egoistic motive that regards another as means to profit, such filthy deeds present themselves under the

 Ibid., p. 214.  Ibid. 20  Ibid., p. 215. 21  Ibid. 22  Ibid., p. 215. 23  Ibid. 18 19

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noble guise of trust and honesty, which causes Marx to lash out: “One ought to consider how vile it is to estimate the value of a man in money, as happens in the credit relationship”,24 “under the appearance of man’s trust in man it is the height of distrust and complete estrangement”,25 “he [sc. man] has to make himself into counterfeit coin, obtain credit by stealth, by lying, etc., and this credit relationship – both on the part of the man who trusts and of the man who needs trust – becomes an object of commerce, an object of mutual deception and misuse”, “the secret contained in the lie of moral recognition, the immoral vileness of this morality”.26 With every single word at his disposal, Marx unveils the sanctimoniousness of credit and its abuse of man’s morality, claiming trading morality to be an unprecedented “extreme retrogression and the extreme consequence of vileness”.27 In addition, before ending his critique of the credit system, Marx also surveys the relationship between the banking system and the modern state. As he sees it, both conspire with each other, as the banking system achieves “political dominance”, whilst the state sells “trust in [it]”, a critique that is not outdated even today.

9.2  T  he Opposition Between Man’s Essence and Private Property Having finished the analysis of alienation in money and the credit system, Marx finally sets about defining man’s essence and private property. If private property is the alienation of man’s essence or money is the externalization of private property, then it might have made sense for Marx to have defined private property or man’s essence first, before his analysis of money. That this task is actually placed after the analysis of money is perhaps because Marx’s excerpt from Mill’s Elements of Political Economy started with a discussion of money. This, however, is not our concern here.

9.2.1  Gemeinwesen as Man’s Essence Let us first take a look at Marx’s exposition of man’s essence where he advances a brand-new proposition on man’s essence: “Exchange, both of human activity within production itself and of human products against one another, is equivalent to species-­activity and species-[enjoyment] [Gattungsgenuß], the real, conscious and true mode of existence of which is social activity and social enjoyment [der  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 214. 26  Ibid., p. 216. 27  Ibid., p. 215. 24 25

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gesellschaftliche Genuß]. Since human nature is the true [communal essence] [wahres Gemeinwesen] of men, by manifesting their nature men create, produce, the human [communal essence] [Gemeinwesen], the social entity [gesellschaftliches Wesen], which is no abstract universal power opposed to the single individual, but is the essential nature of each individual, his own activity, his own life, his own [enjoyment], his own wealth”.28 Man’s core nature is being in community or having a “communal essence [Gemeinwesen]”. This proposition has at its heart a clear understanding of the term “Gemeinwesen”. In the Chinese translation of Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (2000), it is rendered as “social connection” (社会联系). In terms of its meaning, this translation is not inaccurate except for its overemphasis on society compared with the original. Gemeinwesen originally means communal essence or communal being, encompassing the features of two gestalts of community life, i.e. community (Gemeinschaft) and society (Gesellschaft). As regards the distinction among Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft and Gemeinwesen,29 Gemeinschaft refers to a community in which human intercourse needs no meditator, whereas Gesellschaft is a society wherein intercourse between men is mediated. Gemeinwesen, however, stands between them, embracing the meaning of both community and society. For this reason, the author translates Gemeinwesen as “being in community” (共同存在性) or “communal essence” (共同本质). Marx’s definition of man’s essence as “being in community” is a breakthrough. First, according to the analysis in Chapter V, Marx had construed species as man’s essence in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscript. Yet this species refers merely to the individual’s characteristic of being capable of “free, conscious activity”, a definition built on the relationship between man and the external world, or the subject-object (Objekt) relationship. In Comments on James Mill, although Marx avails himself of concepts like “species-activity” or “species-­ enjoyment” to frame man’s essence, these terms are used here to designate “[e]xchange, both of human activity within production itself and of human products against one another”, clearly defined from the perspective of intersubjectivity. As such, man’s essence can only refer to his communal character, cohering with the literal meaning of “species”. Such a definition is nowhere to be found in the First Manuscript. In addition, Marx further defines Gemeinwesen as a “social entity”. What does this mean? As aforementioned, the distinction between society and community is principally one of whether the association of individuals therein is mediated or not. The existence of mediation such as private property means the emergence of the individual and his separation from another due to the exclusive nature of private  Ibid., p. 216 f.  This distinction is addressed at greater length in: Lixin Han, Translator’s Introduction: Marx’s Historical Theory of Civil Society, in: Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009 as well as Norimasa Watanabe, The Theory of Community and Communal Society, in: A New Study of Die Deutsche Ideologie, ed. by Lixin Han, China Renmin University Press, 2008.

28 29

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property, whilst, without mediation, there is no independent individual. Civil society exemplifies a Gemeinwesen composed by exclusive individuals,30 whilst undistinguished individuals compose another typical gestalt of Gemeinwesen, namely community of antiquity or family. For this reason, Marx remarks: “the social entity, which is no abstract universal power opposed to the single individual, but is the essential nature of each individual”, namely society constituted by individuals. Furthermore, the “true [communal essence] [Gemeinwesen] does not come into being through reflection, but appears owing to the need and egoism of individuals, i.e., it is produced directly by their life activity itself”31; the individual can only be a “real, living, particular individual”32 when pursuing his own interests. These propositions are clearly tied up with private property and civil society. Having become a private owner, man qualifies as a “real individual”, and his relations with other private individuals become social. In these articulations, we can see the embryo of Marx’s later historical materialist proposition that the essence of man and society resides in their economic relations. In overview, Marx not only defines society from the perspective of civil society, but also deals with the essence of man from the same angle. This vantage point, however, does not originate with Marx, but emerges in political economics, despite Marx being unaware of it. After studying the theories of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, et al. for some time, he finally comes to terms with this and brings himself to make a complimentary comment about political economics: “The [communal essence] of men, or the manifestation of the nature of men, their mutual complementing the result of which is species-life, truly human life – this community is conceived by political economics in the form of exchange and trade. Society, says Destutt de Tracy, is a series of mutual exchanges, and precisely this process of mutual integration. Society, says Adam Smith, is a commercial society. Each of its members is a merchant”.33 To be short, by virtue of exchange and trade, political economy has precisely grasped that the mutual complementing is the “[communal essence] of men”. As such, it is exactly political economics that “defines the estranged form of social intercourse as the essential and original form corresponding to man’s nature”.34 This is quite a compliment from Marx for whom political economics tends to attract the full weight of critique. It goes without saying that the “[communal essence] of man” within political economics is still not the communal essence Marx has in mind, nor can the civil society of political economics be considered true society, as Marx notes: “Exchange  In the Manuscripts, Marx has used the concept of “civil society” four times in total (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, 241, 287, 317, 340), which does not agree with the “disappearance of the civil society concept” in the Paris Manuscripts pointed out by Seiji Mochizuki in A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory. 31  Ibid., p. 217. 32  Ibid. 33  Ibid. 34  Ibid. 30

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or barter is therefore the social act, the species-act, the community, the social intercourse [gesellschaftlicher Verkehr] and integration of men within private ownership, and therefore the external, alienated species-act. It is just for this reason that it appears as barter. For this reason, likewise, it is the opposite [Gegenteil] of the social relationship”.35 Whilst recognizing the advance of political economics in defining man’s essence, Marx also launches criticism of political economy: “[A]s long as man does not recognize himself as man, and therefore has not organised the world in a human way, this [communal essence] appears in the form of estrangement, because its subject, man, is a being estranged from himself”.36 In other words, within private property or political economy, communal essence and society exist in the form of alienation. On this alienated communal essence and society, Marx comments: To say that man is estranged from himself, therefore, is the same thing as saying that the society of this estranged man is a caricature of his real community [communal essence], of his true species-life, that his activity therefore appears to him as a torment, his own creation as an alien power, his wealth as poverty, the essential bond linking him with other men as an unessential bond, and separation from his fellow men, on the other hand, as his true mode of existence, his life as a sacrifice of his life, the realisation of his nature as making his life unreal, his production as the production of his nullity, his power over an object as the power of the object over him, and he himself, the lord of his creation, as the servant of this creation.37

“[R]ealisation of his nature” is “making his life unreal”. Formulations such as “production” as “production of his nullity”, “power over an object” as “power of object over him”, and “lord” as “servant”, suffice to remind the reader of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscript. When examined closely, however, the subject matter of this “caricature” is de facto no longer the alienation of the wage worker under capitalism, wherein the worker alienates the product of his labor and his labor to the capitalist, occasioning an opposition between the property owner and the non-property owner, and between the worker and the capitalist. It is instead the alienation of the private owner in civil society. It is a caricature that depicts man’s alienation within the commodity-money relationship. As Marx sees it, true communal essence should be a social essence that supersedes alienation or a social essence that has rid itself of attributes such as “private property” or “citizen”. To sum up, in Comments on James Mill, Marx scrupulously differentiates and employs concepts such as “species”, “community” and “society” to define man’s essence in “free, conscious activity” and community.

 Ibid., p. 219.  Ibid., p. 217. 37  Ibid., p. 217. 35 36

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9.2.2  Private Property as the Externalized Essence Following the definition of man’s essence, Marx enters upon an analysis of private property. In the entire Comments on James Mill, this is only the second time Marx addresses private property. Distinct from his survey of the private property relationship in the last section, this examination is not geared to elucidate the genesis and essence of money, but to shed light on the essence of private property by means of its relation to community. Since communal essence is the opposite of private property, this explanation also pertains to private property. “Political economy – like the real process – starts out from the relation of man to man as that of property owner to property owner. If man is presupposed as property owner, i.e., therefore as an exclusive owner [exclusiver Besitzer], who proves his personality [Persönlichkeit] and both distinguishes himself from, and enters into relations with, other men through this exclusive ownership – private property is his personal, distinctive, and therefore essential mode of existence [Dasein] – then the loss [Verlust] or surrender [Aufgeben] of private property is an alienation of man, as it is of private property itself”.38 In this paragraph, Marx answers a few questions about private property through his analysis of political economy: (1) How to define the private owner? As “an exclusive owner, who proves his personality and both distinguishes himself from, and enters into relations with, other men through this exclusive ownership”. That is to say, his essence resides in his exclusive ownership of the product of his labor, further serving as proof of his personality. (2) How to define private property? “[P]rivate property is his personal, distinctive, and therefore essential mode of existence”. That is to say, private property is not merely man’s object, but also the embodiment of his personality and value. For this reason, the externalization and loss of private property is not only the externalization and loss of property, but, more seriously, the externalization and loss of its owner’s personality. As private property contains man’s personality and dignity, why would its owner, except under certain circumstances, externalize (transfer) and surrender it? Yet in reality, private owners without fail take this awful transfer of private property for granted. (3) Why does man have to transfer (externalize) his own private property? On the one hand, out of “necessity [Not], need [Bedürfnis]”, because one’s product may not satisfy a need which may be met by the product of another. To rephrase it, “the substance of their private property”, “the specific kind of object [spezifische Natur des Gegenstandes]“is “a necessity for the completion of my existence and the realisation of my nature”.39 In the language of Marx’s later economics, “(1) the natural particularity of the commodities exchanged; (2) the particular natural need of the exchangers. Or, combining both aspects, the dif38 39

 Ibid., p. 217 f.  Ibid., p. 218.

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ferent use value of the commodities to be exchanged”.40 On the other hand, private property is meant for another. Its owner has to, either in consciousness or reality, transfer (externalize) it so as to prove his ownership. “[O]nly if, while ceasing to be my private property, it [thing, Sache] on that account does not cease to be private property as such, that is to say, […] if it becomes the private property of another man”,41 can it be recognized as private property. Originally, it is because of its exclusive nature that private property is private property, yet, as “[externalized] private property”, the true private property necessarily contradicts with its original meaning. As such, the concept of private property per se entails this profound contradiction.42 In the following, Marx presents a detailed account of the meaning of “[externalized] private property” as well as the necessity of the resulting equivalent: “Through the reciprocal [externalization] or estrangement of private property, private property itself falls into the category of [externalized] private property. For, in the first place, it has ceased to be the product of the labour of its owner, his exclusive, distinctive personality. For he has [externalized] it, it has moved away from the owner whose product it was and has acquired a personal significance for someone whose product it is not. It has lost its personal significance for the owner. Secondly, it has been brought into relation with another private property, and placed on a par with the latter. Its place has been taken by a private property of a different kind, just as it itself takes the place of a private property of a different kind. On both sides, therefore, private property appears as the representative of a different kind of private property, as the equivalent of a different natural product, and both sides are related to each other in such a way that each represents the mode of existence of the other, and both relate to each other as substitutes for themselves and the other”.43 (4) Yet, without another person willing to accept one’s private property, its externalization may never be actualized. What prompts another to appropriate one’s private property? “The desire for these two objects, i.e., the need for them, shows each of the property owners, and makes him conscious of it, that he has  Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857-58) [First Instalment], in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857-1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 174. 41  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 218. 42  Hegel has already discovered the contradiction inherent in modern private property: “[P]roperty is just as much an all-round contradiction as non-property; each contains within it these two opposed, self-contradictory moments of individuality and universality” (Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 259). Yet he does not go further to undertake a fundamental critique of private property, which, as is well-known, is accomplished by Marx. Concerning Marx’s critique of Hegel in this respect, see Marx’s assessment of Hegel’s exposition of land property in Grundlinien (Marx, Capital. Volume III, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 37: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1998, p. 609f). 43  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 219. 40

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yet another essential relation to objects besides that of private ownership, that he is not the particular being that he considers himself to be, but a total being [totales Wesen] whose needs stand in the relationship of inner ownership [Eigentum] to all products, including those of another’s labour. For the need of a thing [Sache] is the most evident, irrefutable proof that the thing [Sache] belongs to my essence, that its being is for me, that its property [Eigentum] is the property, the peculiarity, of my essence. Thus both property owners are impelled to give up their private property, but to do so in such a way that at the same time they confirm private ownership [Privateigentum], or to give up the private property within the relationship of private ownership. Each therefore alienates a part of his private property to the other”.44 In other words, on one hand, the private owner is aware of the necessary mutual complementary relationship between him and another, i.e. the “relationship of inner ownership”. On the other hand, as compensation for appropriating another’s private property, he has to externalize (transfer) his private property to him, and exchange with him. “The social connection [Beziehung] or social relationship [Verhältnis] between the two property owners is therefore that of reciprocity in [externalization], positing the relationship of alienation on both sides, or [externalization] as the relationship of both property owners”.45 (5) Now that two private owners exchange their private property with each other, both have to abide by the principle of exchange justice, namely that the exchanged goods must be equivalent. To achieve that, it is necessary to find an “equivalent” from the infinitely multiple Sachen, and further, to find the “value” and “exchange-value” of that “equivalent”. With this “equivalent”, the exchange between two private owners can accord with the principle of equivalent exchange, though “[h]ow this value is more precisely determined must be described elsewhere, as also how it becomes price”. Hence, in spite of its immaturity, Marx develops an exposition following the process of equivalent → value → exchange value → price, which roughly coincides with the labor theory of value in Das Kapital, or an exposition that, by every means, reminds the reader of the labor theory of value. Concerning the question of whether or not there is a labor theory of value in Paris Manuscripts, Rosenberg’s standpoint remains the most widely-accepted ­viewpoint. According to him, deeply swayed by Engels’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie, Marx was inclined to deny the labor theory of value at that time, as he notes: “Marx agrees with Engels from the outset that private ownership makes it impossible for price to be determined by labor, meaning that only price that fluctuates due to competition is real. Later on, in the critique of Mill, […] he shifts from absolute denial of labor value to analyzing its manifestation in general

44 45

 Ibid., p. 218.  Ibid., p. 218 f.

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movement”.46 Yet this conclusion of Rosenberg is questionable when we consider Marx’s elaboration here, plus his assessment of modern political economy that it “conceived the essence of money in its abstract universality” as well as his concept of gainful labor and discussion on the subjective essence of private property at the beginning of the Third Manuscripts. Despite the fact that Marx has not yet explicitly advanced the proposition that the substance of value is “abstract human labor”, he has already ceased to address value from the vantage point of production cost, efficiency and competition, surveying the essence of value from the perspective of relations between men, labor and labor, private property and private property, from the perspective of the equivalent among different private properties, of the universality embodied in them. In this respect, Marx had already attained the labor theory of value. It is of vital importance to correct Rosenberg’s mistake and to acknowledge that Marx had already come to this notion, since this means he has already conceived of man’s labor from the perspective of social relations and found a way to draw isolated individuals into society. After defining private property, Marx turns back to the problem of man’s essence. He propounds here a definition of man as “total being”: “The desire for these two objects, i.e., the need for them, shows each of the property owners, and makes him conscious of it, that he has yet another essential relation to objects besides that of private ownership, that he is not the particular being that he considers himself to be, but a total being [totales Wesen]”.47 Probably owning to the influence of the Western Marxism, many Chinese scholars tend to interpret “total being” from the vantage point of the consummate development of man. They note, for example, that man is an active, practical and historical being. Although not erroneous, it appears these explanations are an over-interpretation with regard to the text here. According to Marx, the so-called “total being” designates that, due to “necessity”, man has to be complemented by another, and further, that man is a social being of mutual dependency and complement. For Marx, man is in essence a “total being”, insofar as “[his] needs stand in the relationship of inner ownership to all products, including those of another’s labour”. That one has ownership over another’s private property sounds somewhat perplexing. This reminds us of Hegel’s metaphor of flies “hurry[ing] along to freshly poured out milk” mentioned in Chapter VII. The Sache which seems to be exclusively owned by another is de facto closely connected from the outset. Similar to Sache, private property is not only owned by the private individual, for it entails intersubjectivity in itself. Therefore, man needs the supplement of another due to “necessity [Not]” and, because of this “need [Bedürfnis], he is a “total being”. This dialectic from “necessity” to “total being” resembles Hegel’s “system of needs” and the  David Rosenberg, A Summary of the Development of Marx’s and Engels’s Economics Theories in the 1940s, trans. by Fang Gang et al., SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1958, p. 85f (translated into English by K.H.). 47  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 218. 46

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relation between principle of particularity and principle of universality in Grundlinien. In addition, Marx’s formulation that “he is not the particular being that he considers himself to be, but a total being” also shows what he has inherited from Hegel. In all, on account of its exclusive nature, private property has to be independent of another or the community, and is thereby the negation of man’s communal essence. In modern civil society in which private property is made absolute, however, the private owner has to externalize his property, hence becoming a “total being”, a social being, and vice versa: The individual is a social being, insofar as he has private property and is thereby an isolated, individual being. In a word, private property and man’s communal essence exclude and oppose each other, whilst reciprocally depending on and complementing each other. Later in Grundrisse im weiteren Sinne (Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58), Marx presents an in-depth summary of this simultaneously opposing and unifying relation: “The further back we go in history, the more does the individual, and accordingly also the producing individual, appear to be dependent and belonging to a larger whole. At first, he is still in a quite natural manner part of the family, and of the family expanded into the tribe; later he is part of a community, of one of the different forms of community which arise from the conflict and the merging of tribes. It is not until the 18th century, in “bourgeois society”, that the various forms of the social nexus [gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhang] confront the individual as merely a means towards his private ends, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual [vereinzelne Einzelne], is precisely the epoch of the hitherto most highly developed social (according to this standpoint, general) relations. Man is a [political animal] in the most literal sense: he is not only a social animal [geselliges Tier], but an animal that can isolate itself only within society”.48 This “isolated individual” is the most developed part of this social relationship. The account of the relationship between private property and the “total being” is probably Marx’s earliest articulation of this classical proposition. This proposition also signifies the formation of Marx’s scientific thought on how the individual and society are related.

9.3  From Gainful Labor to the True Production Having finished analyzing the essence of man and of private property, Marx proceed to the examination of labor. As we known, alienated labor addressed in the First Manuscript designates wage labor in the immediate process of capitalist production, whereas the theme of Comments on James Mill is labor within the common private property relationship, which Marx names “gainful labor [Erwerbsarbeit]”.  Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857-58) [First Instalment], in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857-1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 18.

48

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This kind of labor is in essence distinct from the alienated labor of the First Manuscript.

9.3.1  Definition of Gainful Labor So what exactly does gainful labor entail? Linguistically, it is comprised of Erwerb and Arbeit. Erwerb embraces three meanings: (1) make money, profit, (2) acquire, purchase, (3) make a living. The rendering “labor to earn a living” (谋生劳动) from the People’s Publishing House represents the third meaning. At first glance, this translation appears to be accurate, considering that Marx does counterpose it with “free, conscious activity” in the First Manuscript, criticizing the fact that capitalism has turns the worker’s original “free, conscious activity” into a means to survive. According to the definition in Comments on James Mill, however, this translation is somewhat inappropriate, for Marx intends to use it to demonstrate that, in a society in which private property and exchange are presupposed, the purpose of labor is no longer to earn a living, but rather to profit. For this reason, the author takes the first meaning of Erwerb, i.e. to make money, and translates it as “gainful labor”49 in order to distinguish it from the Erwerbsarbeit referred to the First Manuscript. To begin with, Marx makes plain under which conditions gainful labor comes into being: “The relationship of exchange being presupposed, labour becomes directly [gainful labor] [Das Verhältnis des Tausches vorausgesetzt, wird die Arbeit zur unmittelbaren Erwerbsarbeit]”.50 This is not labor that directly fulfil one’s own need, labor that exists since the birth of mankind, permeating all historical stadiums, but the labor arising under certain historical circumstances, namely after the emergence of exchange mediated by money or private property. Compared with the former, gainful labor is an alienated labor for “1) on one side [gainful labor] and the product of the worker have no direct relation to his need or his function as worker” and “2) he who buys the product is not himself a producer, but gives in exchange what someone else has produced”.51 To rephrase it, labor used to be the living activ In Marx’s summary of the column [Arbeitslohn], we can also find similar articulation: “In political economy labour occurs only in the form of [gainful labor] [Erwerbstätigkeit]” (ibid., p. 241). Yet, as Marx was fully engaged in tackling with capital’s exploitation of wage labor and the opposition between the two original classes, he did not further develop the concept of gainful labor until the writing of Comments on James Mill. 50  Ibid., p.  219. Concerning the translation of “Erwerbsarbeit”, the author has discussed with Shunliang Yao from Nanjing University and Xuegong Yang from Beijing University in private. Xuegong Yang does not agree to translate it as “gainful labor”, but insists on the original rendering “labor to earn a living” (谋生劳动) for even on presupposition of exchange labor is still aimed for subsistence instead of making profit. As the author sees it, his understanding does not match Marx’s thought in this context. If the original meaning of labor is already to earn a living, then the expression “labour becomes directly [gainful labor]” becomes meaningless. The reason that Marx adds the condition “[t]he relationship of exchange being presupposed” is to emphasis that labor is no longer aimed for subsistence, but turns into the inessential labor directed towards profiting. 51  Ibid., p. 219 f. 49

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ity used to acquire the means of subsistence so as to directly fulfil one’s own need. Gainful labor, however, is not related to the direct need of the laborer himself, and not used to produce a use value for himself, but to acquire value and exchange value from another. For those conversant with Marx’s economics, these are clearly two essentially distinct forms of labor, the first necessary and essential, and the latter “quite accidental and inessential [ganz zufällig und unwesentlich]”.52 As alienated labor, gainful labor manifests itself in four aspects: (1) the alienation of the laboring subject; (2) the alienation of the labor object; (3) that the laborer’s labor is not determined by his own needs but by social needs to which he is subject; (4) that his activity becomes a means of subsistence.53 On the surface, these four aspects seemingly resemble the four aspects of alienated labor in the First Manuscript about which Mochizuki remarked “owing to the lack of a perspective of collaboration and distribution of labor inside community, the alienation=externalization aspects of ‘gainful labor’ […] again falls back to the standpoint of isolated individual in the [First] Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts”.54 When examined closely, however, manifestations of alienation in gainful labor is distinct from that of alienated labor in the First Manuscript: The subject in the latter is the wage worker under capitalism, whereas the subject in the former is the independent commodity producer or citizen; alienated labor exemplifies the relationship between capital and employment, whereas gainful labor is the reflection grounded in the commodity-money relationship. Particularly, aspect 3) namely, the individual enslaved by social needs, is the unique manifestation of the alienation in gainful labor. Considered in this way, Mochizuki’s view that this is Marx’s way of falling back on the position of the isolated individual in the First Manuscript cannot stand up to scrutiny. Whether or not the gainful laborer can make a profit depends on the objective (objektiv) need of the external world, “the greater and the more developed the social power appears to be within the private property relationship, the more egoistic, asocial and estranged from his own nature does man become”.55 This inevitably gives rise to alienation in the social division of labor, for gainful labor implies that “he who buys the product is not himself a producer, but gives in exchange what someone else has produced” and “[e]ach, therefore, exchanges with the other only the surplus of his production”.56 This is only possible, when the social division of labor is presupposed. In this sense, alienation in gainful labor leads to the alienation of the social division of labor and intercourse. Gainful labor will further deepen the alienation of the mediator, i.e. money. “Within the presupposition of division of labour, the product, the material of private  Ibid., p. 220.  Cf. ibid. 54  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 105 (translated into English by K.H.). 55  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 220. 56  Ibid., p. 219 f. 52 53

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property, acquires for the individual more and more the significance of an equivalent, and as he no longer exchanges only his surplus, and the object of his production can be simply a matter [Gegenstand] of indifference to him, so too he no longer exchanges his product for something directly needed by him. The equivalent comes into existence as an equivalent in money, which is now the immediate result of labour to gain a living and the medium of exchange (see above)”.57 In short, gainful labor not only promotes a division of labor, but also fosters exchange, and eventually the emergence of money. Prior to this paragraph, Marx’s commentary considered money, showing how it is the alienation of man’s mediating activity and social intercourse. At the end of this paragraph, Marx reminds the reader to “see above”, which indicates the close connection between this paragraph and the preceding discussion on money. This is in fact also a return to the beginning of Comments on James Mill. To sum up, after successively addressing money, private property and gainful labor, Marx resumes his task of unraveling the essence of money: “Just as the concept of the equivalent, the value, already implied the alienation of private property, so money is the sensuous, even objective existence [gegenständliches Dasein] of this alienation”.58 Furthermore, the relationship between the person and Sache is inverted in money, insofar as man’s creation, that is money, now becomes a god to man. Next, Marx launches criticism of this inversion through analysis of production and exchange in private ownership.

9.3.2  The Triumph of Sache and True Production Prior to the survey and critique of production and exchange in private ownership, Marx again excerpts from Chapter IV. Consumption of Mill’s Elements of Political Economy. When coming to the passage “Two things are necessary to constitute a demand. These are – A Wish for the commodity, and An Equivalent to give for it. A demand means, the will to purchase, and the means of purchasing. […] An equivalent is the necessary foundation of all demand. It is in vain that a man wishes for commodities, if he has nothing to give for them”,59 Marx is suddenly moved to record a long comment beginning with the sentence “With his customary cynical acumen and clarity, Mill here analyses exchange on the basis of private property”.60 The original purpose of man’s production activity is to “have [Haben]” the labor product so as to fulfil his own need. In history, however, production further falls into two categories: For one, “the amount of his production is determined by the extent of his immediate need” and “man produces no more than he immediately requires”, namely to “have” what he produces; the another is to “have” by exchanging his  Ibid., p. 221.  Ibid. 59  Ibid., p. 224. 60  Ibid. 57 58

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product with another, to meet his own need in an indirect manner, which only occurs on the presupposition of surplus production. Compared with the former, the latter is the result of an advance in productive forces. Within private ownership, however, the latter will undergo qualitative change, insofar as “[p]roduction has become [a means to gain profit] [Erwerbsquelle], [gainful labor]”. As has been noted, gainful labor is also alienated labor. That labor becomes a means to gain profit. Gainful activity also signifies the alienation of production, which ceases to be “man’s production for man as a man [Production des Menschen für den Menschen als Menschen], i.e., it is not social production”.61 Marx moves on to set forth the transformation process from human to inhuman production in the following steps: To begin with, “it is not man’s nature that forms the link between the products we make for one another”,62 as we produce only in our own interest. Hence, “[e]ach of us sees in his product only the objectification of his own selfish need, and therefore in the product of the other the objectification of a different selfish need, independent of him and alien to him”.63 Under such conditions, you stand in certain necessary intrinsic relation to the product of me, − in which sense, production has to be human production – it cannot be directly owned, and can only be owned via a mediator, that is in exchange for your private property. The relation between you and my object is thus indirect and extrinsic. Hence, the goal of production is about to be alienated, insofar as it is not meant to meet your needs as man, but to acquire with it the object you produce, namely to exchange. Moreover, right at the outset of production, it is “an exchange which in my mind I have already completed. The social relation [gesellschaftliche Beziehung] in which I stand to you, my labour for your need, is therefore also a mere semblance [Schein], and our complementing each other is likewise a mere semblance, the basis of which is mutual plunder. The intention of plundering, of deception, is necessarily present in the background, for since our exchange is a selfish one, on your side as on mine, and since the selfishness of each seeks to get the better of that of the other, we necessarily seek to deceive one another. It is true though, that the power which I attribute to my object over yours requires your recognition in order to become a real power. Our mutual recognition of the respective powers of our objects, however, is a struggle, […] For the totality of the relationship, it is a matter of chance who ­overreaches whom. The ideal, intended overreaching takes place on both sides, i.e., each in his own judgment has overreached the other”.64 This reminds us of chapter C. (AA) Reason of Phänomenologie, as Hegel remarks: “[T]hus enters a play of individualities with one another in which each and all find themselves both deceiving and deceived”,65 a passage quoted in Chapter VII. Naturally, private owner produces in order to make profit, yet he strives to glorify it with a noble cause, claiming that his production is directed towards the need of  Ibid., p. 225.  Ibid. 63  Ibid. 64  Ibid., p. 226. 65  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 250. 61 62

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another. With respect of such sanctimoniousness, Marx also avails himself of terms such as “semblance” and “deception” like Hegel. He further points out, as did Hegel, that recognition between private owners is merely a façade, for what they recognize is nothing but the other’s object rather than his person. Second, man and thing constitute the two major elements of production: As a performer of productive behavior, man is the master of production, whilst the thing, unable to become a labor product by itself, is a passive object. Since the time of Aristotle, the relationship between man and thing has been construed in the same way with man as the formal cause and object as the material cause. This condition, however, has now undergone an unexpected change. In exchange, since what you need is not the person, but the thing in his hand, then “[w]hat gives your need of my article [Sache] its value, worth and effect for me is solely your object [Gegenstand], the equivalent of my object”.66 The person as such, is dispensable. In this regard, the thing as “the means, the mediator, the instrument” becomes the “acknowledged power”,67 so that a gruesome phenomenon arises: “[O]ur own product has risen up against us; it seemed to be our property [Eigentum], but in fact we are its property. We ourselves are excluded from true property because our property excludes other men”.68 Thus, as the result of human struggle, man is completely cast out of the stage of history, whilst the thing becomes the master of production, the protagonist of history. The relationship between man and thing has been completely inverted. This dreadful condition is ongoing. With his dependency on the thing, man’s alienation deepens. As Marx portrays it in the First Manuscript, the increase in value is directly proportional to the devaluation of man: “Our mutual value is for us the value of our mutual objects. Hence for us man himself is mutually of no value”.69 Hence, “[t]he only intelligible language in which we converse with one another consists of our objects in their relation to each other. We would not understand a human language and it would remain without effect. […] We are to such an extent estranged from man’s essential nature that the direct language of this essential nature seems to us a violation of human dignity, whereas the estranged language of material values seems to be the well-justified assertion of human dignity that is ­self-­confident and conscious of itself”.70 Man has now completely descended into an inhuman state. To sum up, the alienation of man and the dependency of the Sache are two sides of the same coin. Man’s deception and struggle against each other result in the triumph of the Sache. The third-party benefits from the tussle, only here it is Sache instead of man. For man, this is without doubt an exceedingly ironic scenario, a “caricature” as Marx calls it. That the Sache begins to wield human power in the world is an unprecedented phenomenon in history; the reification of human society  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 226. 67  Ibid. 68  Ibid., p. 226 f. 69  Ibid., p. 227. 70  Ibid. 66

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or the era of fetishism. Later in Grundrisse, Marx divides the development of human society into three stadiums: (1) the “relationships of personal dependence”, (2) of “dependence mediated by things” and (3) of “[f]ree individuality”.71 The relationship of “dependence mediated by things” therein is exactly this era of reification where, as Das Kapital illustrates, Sache such as commodity, money, capital and interests takes the leading role, whilst man, e.g. the capitalist, merely acts as a personification of Sache (capital). In this sense, what Das Kapital presents is a world without man. It is also the reason that some Western scholars criticize Marx for ignoring the human in his late period. Yet, according to our analysis, such criticism is a complete misunderstanding of Marx for he does not forget people, but in fact in this manner registers his protest against the hidden nature of reification and the oppression of man. To put it in another way, that there is no man in Das Kapital is a consequence towards which Marx’s theoretical logic has necessarily led. In a word, Marx’s unearthing of the logic of Sache’s triumph over man has sought to shed light on the irrationality of modernity and to furthermore supersede it. In the following, Marx looks forward to the ideal gestalt of society in the future: “Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person. 1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality [Individualität], its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality [Persönlichkeit] to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man’s essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man’s essential nature. 3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species, and therefore would become recognised and felt by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love. 4) In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realised my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature [Gemeinwesen]”.72 In future production, human labor is “a free manifestation of life, hence an enjoyment of life”, rather than the “[externalization] of life” as depicted in the inhuman production of today; “[l]abour therefore would be true, active property” instead of “torment” and “semblence”; labor is not “an external fortuitous need”, but “an inner, essential one”; my labor presents itself in the object as it is, rather than

 Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857-58) [First Instalment], in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857-1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 95. 72  Marx, Comments on James Mill, ÉlÉmens d’Économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 227 f. 71

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“appear[s] as something which by its nature it is not”.73 This is Marx’s account of the first aspect of human production. Considering this, he evidently refers to the alienated labor theory in the First Manuscript. Since Comments on James Mill comes to its end here, we cannot find Marx’s further elaborations of the other three aspects. Based on the Marx’s arguments hitherto, these three aspects are clearly related to the theme of Comments on James Mill: If the first aspect points at the alienation of man’s labor in the subject-object (Objekt) relationship, then the following three aspects without doubt aim for the alienation of man’s intercourse, i.e. the alienation of man’s social relation, emphasizing that future production should restore man’s mutual complementing, species-activity, species-enjoyment and communal nature. In fact, before addressing man’s production, that is before excerpting from Chapter IV. Consumption of Mill’s Elements of Political Economy, Marx notes: “[F] inally the separation of labour from wages, of capital from profit, and profit from interest, and, last of all, of landed property from land rent, demonstrate self-­ estrangement both in the form of selfestrangement [Selbstentfremdung] and in that of mutual [wechselseitig] estrangement”.74 This “self-estrangement” and “mutual estrangement” coincides with the notion of alienated labor in the First Manuscript and the alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill. It seems that Marx has finally decided to combine these two critical vantage points at the end of the First Comments on James Mill and provide a unifying explanation. Unfortunately, there is no sign of further development of this scheme in the Second Comments on James Mill.

9.4  Hegel in Comments on James Mill Thus far, we have gone through the basic content of Comments on James Mill by following its line of argument. Let us now resume the task postulated at the outset of this chapter, namely to compare Hegel and Marx’s transitional logic from individual to society.

9.4.1  The Similarity Between Hegel and Marx In their entirety, the subject matter and method of Comments on James Mill considerably resembles that of Hegel in the Jena period. In Comments on James Mill, Marx also sets out to analyze the connection between individual and society in modern times and, in terms of his method, seeks to bridge a transition from individual to society by importing political economic categories such as need, labor, 73 74

 Ibid., p. 228.  Ibid., p. 221 f.

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division of labor, exchange, value and money. Owing to this similarity of theme and method, Comments on James Mill are not only, terminologically considered, under Hegel’s sway, applying concepts characteristic of Hegel like “mutual deception”, “recognition”, “lord and servant”, but also bare resemblance to Hegel’s thought regarding the categories Marx’s employs and their constellation: e.g. “producer”, “private individual” in Comments in James Mill and “self-consciousness”, “individual” in Phänomenologie; “private property”, “money” and “Sache”, “Sache selbst”; “exchange”, “alienation of intercourse” and “mutual deception”, “formal universality”; “caricature of species-life” and “spiritual animal kingdom”; “suppose that man had carried out production as human being” and “ethical substance”, “spirit”. Next, the author shall draw a comparison of their transitional logic. (1) As Hegel before him, Marx defines value and money from the perspective of the relationship between individuality and universality, in turn applying this notion of value and money to his explanation of the evolution of society. For Hegel, the exchange between individuals can only be performed by virtue of value or money entailed by Sache, i.e. by means of Sache selbst. Value or money functions as a mediator for “[i]t is the abstraction from all individuality, character, skills of the individual, etc.”75 In Comments on James Mill, Marx also construes money as the “[externalization] of private property, the abstraction from its specific, personal nature”. Therefore, the private owner’s “things [Sache] lose the significance of human, personal property”. “Money, as purely abstract wealth – in which every specific use value is extinguished, and hence also every individual relation between possessor and commodity”76  – becomes a universal being. The individual as such thereby transcends his limitation, turning into a universal, social being. In brief, the money in Comments on James Mill serves the same function as Hegel’s Sache selbst.77 (2) The product of Hegel’s “surplus labor [überflüssige Arbeit]” is Sache, which is distinct from the individual work (Werk) in that it implies intersubjectivity. Marx’s definition of private property is identical to Hegel’s concept of Sache. So-called private property is externalized, that is, it presupposes the existence of another. It intrinsically implies intersubjectivity and can therefore only actualize itself when externalized. In System of Ethical Life, Hegel breaks the closed circle of the need-labor-enjoyment trinity by way of the concept of “surplus  Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 166. 76  Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857-58) [Second Instalment], in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Economic Works: 1857-1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 451. 77  Yibing Zhang has also gone into Hegel’s economics thought, advancing that “Hegel’s judgement of the nature of money represents the highest point of political economy before Marx” (Yibing Zhang, Back to Marx. Changes of Philosophical Discourse in the Context of Economics, trans. by T.  Mitchell, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2014, p.  36). Notwithstanding, he also argues that “Marx’s correct understanding of these theories of Hegel took place after 1845, especially after 1857-1858 economics research” (ibid., p. 49). Considering the analysis in this chapter, however, this judgment of him underestimates Marx’s level of depth in 1844. 75

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labor”: By exchanging surplus products, one is able to enjoy another’s products, whilst one’s product provides enjoyment for others. This lays the groundwork for the transition from individual to universal labor. Similar to this “surplus labor”, gainful labor in Comments on James Mill also aims to have exchange-­ value, and will hence necessarily break the closed circle of need-labor-­ enjoyment, in transferring one’s labor product to others. In Chapter VIII, we have construed Hegel’s labor concept as a conception that allows for objectivity and intersubjectivity at the same time. Likewise, the subject-object (Objekt) relationship and their intersubjectivity also coexist in gainful labor. (3) Hegel’s demonstration of the transition from individual to society proceeds as following: isolated individual → work → Sache → Sache selbst → Sache → work →individual of sociality. The heart of this process is the shift from Sache to Sache selbst. Compared with this, Marx’s exposition in Comments on James Mill – i.e. money → private property → gainful labor – appears to lack the transition from work → Sache → Sache selbst. When examined closely, however, Marx does explicitly unfolds a logic of gainful labor → private property → money in his exposition of money’s genesis and essence. Therefore, by analogy with Hegel’s pattern, Marx’s transition from individual to society can be demonstrated as following: the private owner’s labor (gainful labor) → private property → money (value)  →  private property → total being. The most pivotal moment in this elevation of private owner to total being is the process of transition from private property to money. (4) Hegel’s alienation offers an opportunity for individual socialization, i.e. the individual ought to alienate himself to Sache and thereby assume a social character. The alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill is rather similar to this structure of socialization through alienation. Alienation of intercourse originally means that the relation between persons has to be mediated by Sache so that the intercourse between persons degenerates into an exchange of Sachen. Conversely, only through this mediator can the individual establish a substantial relationship with another and acquire the latter’s level of recognition and sociality. (5) Hegel inaugurates the methodology to cast light on the essence of human society through the external Sache selbst, which Marx goes on to develop as far as possible. In Comments on James Mill, Marx no longer reduce man to a “free, conscious” being, but to a real man with communal essence; a social being. The thus-named real man designates a man who owns Sache such as private p­ roperty, whilst the basis of communal essence and social being is the relationship built on private property, commodity and money. The common ground for these aspects is that their definition of another does not draw on man’s intrinsic character, i.e. being “free, conscious”, but is deduced from the extrinsic relation between Sachen such as private property, commodity and money. Hence, as for Hegel in chapter C. (AA) Reason of Phänomenologie, but even more thoroughly, Marx shifts the explanatory principle of man and society from inside to outside, and eventually establishes a historical materialist principle that explicates society and history grounded on relations of production.

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In overview, though Marx never mentions Hegel’s name in Comments on James Mill, his theoretical deduction and the constellation of his categories are very similar to Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, especially the logic of Sache selbst. It is in this regard that the author advances the transitional logic that takes Marx from isolated individual to social relations with their origins in Hegel. Marx resorts to Hegel’s thought to bridge the transition from individual to society.

9.4.2  The Difference Between Hegel and Marx Nevertheless, Comments on James Mill is also where Marx diverges from Hegel. Whilst drawing on Hegel’s logic of Sache selbst, he substantially pushes Hegel’s idea of modern society forward, presented in the following two aspects: (1) Marx places his emphasis on the negative significance of alienation and reification in the course of man’s socialization. For Hegel, man’s alienation results in the acquisition of sociality, and the struggle between self-consciousnesses leads to mutual recognition. As such, despite alienation, division and conflict, mankind will eventually enter a world of spirit, a kingdom of ethical life under the guidance of the logic of Sache selbst. As Marx sees it, however, man’s alienation also implies an increasingly strengthened alien external world of Sache with man degraded to servant. The consequence of the human struggle sees every man eventually defeated by Sache that in turn becomes the master of the world. For him, alienation and reification have grave consequences. Marx’s negative conception of alienation and reification is exemplified in his line of argument in Comments on James Mill. For instance, the order in which his exposition of money unfolds, i.e. individual private property → precious metal as money → paper money → credit, is not only the increasing abstractness of money, but also the ever deepening alienation of man at the same time. Regarding Marx’s critique of money, he apparently underlines more the calamitous consequences of money for man, seeing money as the opposite of social relations, and as an alien power that oppresses man. Hegel’s conception of money is far more positive. In the Jena manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes, he construes money as the opportunity for the individual to ascend from individuality to universality. This distinction determines that Marx’s standpoint is critical of the political economics in which Hegel, according to him, remains steeped. (2) Marx realizes that the individual’s socialization is simultaneous to the segmentation and division of society, conceiving of modern capitalistic society based on this division and opposition. Although Hegel also shows himself attentive to the existence of the rabble and, to some extent, the widening gap between rich and poor, he fails to clarify reasons for the polarization of civil society and the appearance of the wage worker and the capitalist, not to mention construe modern civil society within a framework of class antagonism.

9.4  Hegel in Comments on James Mill

Exchange

Individual

Gainful Labor

Civil Society

(Value, Money)

213

Capitalist

Alienated Labor(Wage Labor)

Alienation

Capitalist Society

(Capital, Exploitation)

Supersession of

Society

Alienation (Revolution)

Proletariat

Fig. 9.1  The transition from individual to society

In all, Hegel does not regard civil society’s inherent conflict between men and between man and society as irreconcilable. Hence, when dealing with these problems, he always opts for the conciliatory solution. As opposed to Hegel, Marx seeks out the element in civil society that undermines it. Therefore, he has to uncover an irreconcilable conflict in civil society so as to justify the necessary downfall of capitalism. This is the greatest distinction between Marx and Hegel’s transitional logic underpinning the shift from individual to society. Marx’s thought can be illustrated as following (Fig. 9.1): When compared with the diagram of Hegel’s logic of Sache selbst in Chapter VIII, it is clear that: (1) Marx differentiates between two forms of alienated labor: that which Marx later names wage labor, and gainful labor, which is the private individual’s labor within common private ownership – a distinction missing in Hegel’s theory. The existence of alienated labor splits the once equal citizenry, with part becoming capitalists and the other half wage workers. Correspondingly, civil society is transformed into bourgeois society78 founded on capital and exploitation, which is marked by the middle part of the diagram above, namely from alienated labor (wage labor) to bourgeois society. Although Marx’s notion of capitalism in the period of the Paris Manuscripts was still immature and still lacking the concept of capital and the law of surplus value in a strict sense, he already shows himself attentive of the heterogeneity between bourgeois society and civil society. Hegel, however, never comes near to such a differentiation, since, as he sees it, everything belongs to civil society. (2) For Marx, the logic behind the transition from individual to society is far more radical than for Hegel. In the first half of the diagram above, from gainful labor to civil society, Marx basically stays on the same course as Hegel. In the second half, however, significant differences open up between them: In addition to adding the process from alienated labor to bourgeois society, Marx resort to iron economic law and upholds vehement revolution and struggle (supersession of  Concerning the distinction between civil society and bourgeois society, see Lixin Han, The Civil Society Concept in Die Deutsche Ideologie. Part I, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 4, 2006.

78

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alienation) in the transition from bourgeois society to society, rather than elements such as cultivation and conscience. In fact, due to the immoral nature of capitalistic society, moral elements such as conscience are far too weak to serve as the driving power of social transformation or have already been dissolved under capitalism. It is reasonable that Marx discards moral cultivation as means to achieve the shift from individual to society and hence rejects moral socialism and ethical socialism. This aspect distinguishes him not only from Hegel, but also from his contemporaries such as Feuerbach, Hess and other utopian socialists and even from some contemporary thinkers, e.g. Honneth, and analytical Marxists.79

9.5  Summary As this completes our interpretation of the First Manuscript and Comments on James Mill, the author draws an outline of these two manuscripts. (1) Apparently, Comments on James Mill makes up for the drawbacks of the First Manuscript – namely that Marx omits to analyze “private property founded on the labour of the proprietor” (private property I) – and thereby further concretizes and perfects ideas arising at the end of the First Manuscript, i.e. alienated labor I  →  private property I  →  alienated labor II  →  private property II. Nonetheless, whether Marx accomplishes this in the Paris Manuscripts or not is another issue. Looking at the entire Paris Manuscripts, Marx mainly addresses the relationship between private properties in modern society, which can further be divided into two categories: One is the commodity-money relationship between citizens or that between common private property owners; the other is the relationship between capital and labor, between the property owner and the propertyless, or, in Marx’s words, “[t]he relations of private property contain latent within them the relation of private property as labour, the relation of private property as capital, and the mutual relation [Beziehung] of these two to one another”.80 The examination object of Comments on James Mill is the former, namely the relation between equal citizens or private owners in civil society, whereas the Second Manuscript, according to the extant pages of this manuscript, focuses on the latter, i.e. the relationship between the wage worker and the capitalist under capitalism: “The character of private property is expressed

 As regards analytical Marxists, Gerald A. Cohen in particular, they, as the author sees it, also bear the hallmark of moral socialism and ethical socialism. In his exposition of socialism and communism, however, Marx does not opt for the approach of moral revolution, as his critique of Bauer and the “true socialism” in Ideologie demonstrates. 80  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843-1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 285. 79

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by labour, capital, and the relations [Beziehung] between these two”.81 Normally, after differentiating between these two kinds of private property relationships, Marx would elucidate how an equal relation of commodity exchange ends up as the antagonistic relationship between capital and labor. Unfortunately, such a “synthesis” is nowhere be found in the entire Paris Manuscripts. One explanation is that the pertinent exposition is in the missing pages of the Second Manuscript. It is also possible that Marx was not yet capable of tackling this problem for it concerns the transition from money to capital or the inversion of the law of appropriation, which is the most difficult part of Marx’s economics and finds its complete articulation first in Grundrisse (1857/58). As the author sees it, the second explanation is more likely. (2) Both private property I and private property II lead to the alienation of man’s essence. The subject matter of the First Manuscript is the alienation of the individual laborer in immediate capitalist production. As the supersession of this alienation, man’s essence is defined as the intrinsic essence of the individual’s living activity, namely “free, conscious activity”. What Comments on James Mill deals with, however, is the alienation of intercourse in the commodity production and exchange of common private owners. As the supersession of this alienation, man’s essence is construed as that of a communal being or social essence. From “free, conscious activity” to communal being or social essence, Marx makes great advances with his conception of man. “Free, conscious activity” reflects the self-relation of the isolated individual, whereas the communal being is an embodiment of the social relations of individuals. If the former is to be considered as a bipolar subject-object (Objekt) relation, then the latter is a tripolar structure that includes the intersubjective relation besides the subject-­ object (Objekt) relation. The development from the bipolar to the tripolar structure signifies Marx’s change of perspective from isolated individual to social relation. For this reason, Comments on James Mill also indicates the point at which Marx makes a transition from early thought to maturity. (3) This transition is clearly related to Marx’s shift to the Hegelian framework. According to the distinction between Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s concept of alienation drawn at the outset of Chapter V, Hegel’s alienation causes the alienation of man’s intercourse, whilst Feuerbach’s alienation is nothing but the self-­ alienation of the isolated individual. In other words, we can deduce man’s social relations from Hegel’s concept of alienation, whilst Feuerbach’s concept of alienation only implies the isolated individual’s essence as a conscious being, that is his natural essence. Considering Comments of James Mill, Marx is obviously already conversant with the framework of Hegel’s alienation. Owning to the previously prevailing reading that the Manuscripts are under Feuerbach’s sway, we used to pass over Hegel’s influence in the Manuscripts entirely or simply confine it to Hegel’s labor concept that Marx adopts. In fact, Hegel’s influence on Marx not only includes this concept, but also his entire dialectic. Approximately 30  years later, Marx admited in the afterword to the second 81

 Ibid., p. 289.

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German edition of Volume I of Das Kapital: “I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker [Hegel], and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him”.82 With respect to the identity of the theory of value in Das Kapital and the main thrust of Comments on James Mill, this confession is not made entirely out of humbleness. It becomes necessary to reexamine Marx’s theoretical background during the writing of the Paris Manuscripts. We used to reduce Marx’s theoretical background at that time to Feuerbach’s humanism or Hess’s thought. For instance, as Yibing Zhang argues in Back to Marx, the thought in Comments on James Mill is basically “a projection of the humanist logic of Hess and Feuerbach”, “a humanist discourse after the style of Feuerbach and Hess”.83 Yet this assessment is obviously far too conservative, as it underestimates Comments on James Mill. Yibing Zhang further advances that “Marx is just Marx. When he first stepped into the context of economics research in 1844, he had only just identified Feuerbach’s natural materialism in historical research, and under the influence of humanist subjective philosophy, he was in the process of distancing himself from the social materialism of political economy and Hegel’s historical dialectic”.84 Based on the analysis above, however, this judgement is disputable. When entering the context of economics study in 1844, Marx has actually disengaged himself from Feuerbach and Hess’s framework and come closer to political economics and Hegel’s dialectic. If Marx did have any sort of “subsidiary awareness” at that time, as Yibing Zhang puts it, it must have been Hegel – since political economics and Hegel’s dialectic share the same origin – unlike Feuerbach.

 Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 19. 83  Yibing Zhang, Back to Marx. Changes of Philosophical Discourse in the Context of Economics, trans. by T. Mitchell, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2014, p. 131 and p. 134. 84  Ibid., p. 91. 82

Chapter 10

The Alienation of Intercourse in Comments on James Mill: The Turning Point of Marx An Interpretation of Comments on James Mill. Part II

10.1  T  he Philological Starting Point for Studies of Comments on James Mill One of Marx’s most salient acomplishments during his big year of economics in 1844, Comments on James Mill did not receive the attention it deserved for a long time. For most scholars of the Paris Manuscripts, Comments on James Mill is either seen as an irrelevance or a mere “appendix”. Considering its theoretical and documentary value, however, Comments on James Mill fully qualifies on the level of the Manuscripts and occupies an exceedingly vital position in studies of the Paris Manuscripts and the development of Marxism1 as a whole. Any underestimation of Comments on James Mill probably owes itself to inadequate knowledge of the philological aspects of the Paris Manuscripts. In early 2007, the author published an essay entitled, The Philological Studies of the Paris Manuscripts and its Significance2 to introduce international philological research to studies of the Paris Manuscripts. Regarding the subject matter of this chapter, the conclusions of the essay are enumerated as follows: (1) The so-called Paris Manuscripts comprise de facto two inseparable parts, namely the Notes (Comments on James Mill in particular) and the Manuscripts. (2) The writing of the Paris Manuscripts was carried out in the following sequence: the First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript. (3) In the period of writing the Paris Manuscripts, Marx’s economics study can be divided into two stages, with Comments on James Mill inaugurating stage two. (4) If 1  Except few scholars like Yibing Zhang, most have hardly paid attention to Comments on James Mill in this sense and undertaken systematic study thereof. Though the author cannot agree with Yibing Zhang’s determination of the writing sequence of the Paris Manuscripts, his Back to Marx is beyond all doubt one of the most salient studies of Comments on James Mill in China, providing the author with crucial inspiration and motivation. 2  Lixin Han, The Philological Studies of the Paris Manuscripts and its Significance, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 1, 2007. The main part of this essay is incorporated in Chap. IV.

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 L. Han, Studies of the Paris Manuscripts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9618-3_10

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s­ peculation in the preface to the Russian translation of Comments on James Mill proves to be true, then Comments on James Mill is the first draft of the mostly missing Second Manuscript, and hence the core of the entire Paris Manuscripts. According to Rojahn’s speculation, the extant four pages of the Second Manuscript are merely the concluding part of Comments on James Mill, or, in other words, Comments on James Mill as such comprises the bulk of the Second Manuscript. Proceeding from these philological conclusions, the author puts forward two bold propositions: Above all, it is unreasonable to dismiss Comments on James Mill in studies of the Manuscripts. In this respect, from Marcuse to Fromm and Althusser, most Western Marxists’ analysis of the Paris Manuscripts is defective, insofar as they are not aware of the significance of including the Notes in studies of the Manuscripts. There is no trace of Comments on James Mill in the classical works on the Manuscripts, e.g. Neue Quellen zur grundlegung des historischen Materialismus (Marcuse), Marx’s Concept of Man (Fromm), Pour Marx (Althusser). As a result, they can only interpret the Manuscripts from the vantage point of alienated labor or construe the entire Paris Manuscripts as a work that turns simply on alienated labor. This has set off a trend of interpreting Marx’s early thought in a humanist sense. Discontent with this interpretation, Soviet and Eastern European Marxists put more stress on the scientific spirit found in the later Das Kapital, reducing the entire Manuscripts to the role of immature thought, in contrast to Western Marxism. Hence, a dual opposition arises: humanist Marx versus scientific Marx, and early Marx versus late Marx. This opposition is later turned into an ideological confrontation, severely holding back studies of the Paris Manuscripts. Considered from our perspective, however, it probably stems from the fact that both sides failed to thoroughly survey and assimilate Comments on James Mill, or focus on the essential difference between the alienation of intercourse therein and the alienated labor theory in the First Manuscript, let alone combine them and consider them as an integral concept. Had they been aware of the significance of the alienation of intercourse, they may well have offered the Paris Manuscripts a more appropriate assessment. Second, it is untenable to interpret the Paris Manuscripts without considering the actual writing sequence, i.e. the First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript. Though attentive to Comments on James Mill and seeking to combine it with the Manuscripts, the conventional approach remains ignorant of this philological conclusion, resting on the order employed in volume 42 of the Russian version of MEW, insofar as it construes Comments on James Mill as a work that precedes the Manuscripts and, theoretically considered, falls far behind the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. As a result, Comments on James Mill is degraded to the level of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher and interpreted in nexus with Marx’s Zur Judenfrage, Hess’s Über das Geldwesen and Die Philosophie der Tat as well as Engel’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie. By doing so, we cannot clarify the concept of society in the Third Manuscript nor how Marx’s conception of man develops from one capable of “free, conscious activity” in the First Manuscript to an “ensemble of the social relations” in the sixth article of Thesen, let alone to elucidate Marx’s “comprehending

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[…] civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history” in Ideologie. Consequently, this logic will, on the one hand, devalue Comments on James Mill and, on the other hand, sever the connection between the Paris Manuscripts and Ideologie, insofar as Ideologie is considered to be where the “epistemological break” (Althusser) or the “leap from alienation theory to reification theory” (Hiromatsu) occurs. This will further lead to an underestimation of Comments on James Mill as merely Marx’s pre-“break” writing. It may be that they omit to see the qualitative change Marx’s thought undergoes in Comments on James Mill and, most importantly, that alienation of intercourse is alienation of social relations and hence reification. If there is a turning point in Marx’s early thought, alienation of intercourse is it. Against this background, Chap. X is an experimental study of the key concept in Comments on James Mill: alienation of intercourse. In the same time, it also puts the principle advocated by the author into practice, grounding studies of the Manuscripts on philological conclusions.

10.2  The Flaw of the Alienated Labor Theory 10.2.1  The Structure of Alienated Labor As regards Paris Manuscripts, alienation tends to be accepted as its overarching idea. This viewpoint as such is not wrong. Yet what is at issue is whether alienation, as is widely-accepted, merely designates the alienated labor concept of the First Manuscript? Or, conversely, does alienated labor already exhaust the content of Marx’s alienation theory? Before we answer these questions, we should examine the logical structure of the alienation concept. The two German words, Entfremdung and Entäußerung, share a Latin origin, alienatio, which means become another. Both Chinese and Japanese translations emphasize becoming alien or an estranged other. In the history of philosophy, no matter whether we consider Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, in which absolute “I” posits not-I through externalization, or Hegel’s theological logic, according to which the absolute spirit externalizes itself and returns to itself, or Feuerbach’s critique of religion as man’s self-alienation, they all employ the concepts of alienation and externalization in the sense of becoming another. As we can see in the following, Marx also avails himself of the alienated labor concept in this sense. Hence, what exactly is the logical structure of the alienation concept? Above all, it is based on the subject-object (Objekt) structure characteristic of modern philosophy. Alienation is the act of the subject becoming an estranged object (Objekt) that in turn stands in opposition to the subject, and its supersession of this object (Objekt) in a return to itself. Its underlying structure is clearly the division of subject and object (Objekt) inherent in the thought of modern philosophers from Descartes to Hegel, and those in their dialectical movement. Similar to Hegel, Hiromatsu also

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characterizes the logical structure of alienation as self-alienation and a return to itself (self-alienation in short). This logical structure is typified by the relationship between god and man. Both Christian theology and Hegel’s philosophy rest on the logic of god’s externalization as man. When Feuerbach reverses Hegel’s relationship between subject and predicate, however, the subject of self-alienation is no longer god, but man whose essence is alienated as god. The thought of Young Hegelians such as the Bauer brothers, Hess and Max Stirner basically proceed from the same structure as Feuerbach’s religious critique, further applying Feuerbach’s logic of man’s self-alienation to political, economic and social spheres. As a political entity, the state possesses god-­ like transcendental power, yet this turns out to be the externalization of man’s power. As god on earth, economic power such as money and capital also result from the idolization of man’s intrinsic power (fetishism); law and society as such are also externalizations of man’s essential power, which then becomes independent of man. If we push this logic to the extreme as Stirner does, even man and his species-­ essence will become alienated gestalts of the individual (Einziger), even though they are originally the two revolutionary concepts the Young Hegelians establish to escape from the framework of Hegel’s theology. Considering these theories, “self-­ alienation as such is inseparably bound up with certain concepts of subject”.3 For Hegel, the subject of self-alienation is god or absolute spirit whose predicate is man. The Young Hegelians, however, substitute the subject with human (Strauss), self-­ consciousness (the Bauer brothers) as well as man and species-essence (Feuerbach, Hess) and the predicate with god, state, politics, law, money, etc. Though the Young Hegelians stand in opposition to Hegel with regard to their theoretical orientation, the underlying logical structures of their alienation concepts are identical. Actually, according to the aforementioned definition of alienation as a subject’s act of becoming alien, in estrangement to another, alienation as such is necessarily self-alienation. In spite of the subject positing himself as an estranged another who stands in a bipolar relation to the subject, this is still the self-movement of one subject (externalization, objectification, alienation). In other words, given a particular subject, the alienation logic will be self-sufficient, independent of additional external elements. For this reason, self-alienation is in essence built on the logical structure of a single subject. Since the Young Hegelians focus on solving the problem of man’s alienation, the subject of self-alienation is obviously man or, to be exact, a single man. As such, alienation is, to borrow Marx’s formulation in the sixth article of Thesen, the logical structure of an “abstract – isolated – human individual”4 or the logical structure of the isolated individual in brief. The division between subject and object (Objekt), self-alienation and isolated individual are the three essential features of the logical structure of alienation, with its heart residing in self-alienation. The next question at issue is: Has Marx adopted 3  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Evolution of Marxism, in: Collected Works of Wataru Hiromatsu, vol. 8, Iwanami Shoten, 1997, p. 588 (translated into English by K.H.). 4  Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 4.

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this logical structure of self-alienation already in the Manuscripts? As we known, Marx’s elaboration of alienation is concentrated in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscript. In this fragment, instead of addressing the externalization of absolute spirit as Hegel, or the alienation of species-essence in the sense of religious alienation as Feuerbach, Marx confines his argument to man’s labor activity, applying the alienation logic to analysis of the actual “fact of political economy”, namely the condition of the laborer within capitalist relations of production. Considering the four aspects of alienated labor, Marx is apparently drawing on the logical structure of self-alienation. In concrete terms, these four aspects are: (1) alienation of Sache (Entfremdung der Sache), (2) self-alienation, (3) alienation of species-essence and (4) alienation of man from man. At least the first three aspects are based on the self-relation of a particular subject, that is the laborer (Arbeiter). In this fragment, though having already changed Hegel and the Young Hegelians’ concept of the subject and, in particular, conceived of Feuerbach’s man as a laborer within certain relations of production, he has yet to disengage from the framework of self-alienation. According to Marx’s account of man in the third aspect of alienated labor, namely that laborer is (1) a natural being that (2) is capable of “free, conscious activity” and (3) has species-essence, man’s essence is still the essence of the isolated individual in his self-relation. The so-called alienation is nothing but alienation from the laborer himself, from his own labor product or his nature and Sache, of his own labor process and labor activity, of his species-essence. This is still embued with the logic of self-alienation, insofar as it still rests on a division between subject and object (Objekt). Marx defines “the estrangement, the [externalization], in the activity of labour itself” directly as “self-estrangement [Selbstentfremdung]”5 and his several references to self-alienation reinforce this reading as well. The inherent nature of the alienation of labor as self-alienation entails the double flaw of Marx’s alienation theory. First, it presents itself as a priori humanist logic in terms of its conception of man. Since its publication in 1932, the Paris Manuscripts have been under intense criticism by philosophers in socialist states as well as Western Marxists such as Althusser and the Japanese scholar Hiromatsu, as they all presuppose the alienated labor theory to be a value-laden postulate of man’s essence and point to the historical idealist character of its account of man and history that proceeds from species-essence. In fact, this defect is intrinsic to the logic of self-­ alienation, for it presupposes a subject a priori, an initial state yet to be alienated, otherwise there is no such thing as alienation. This is the presupposition that all alienation theories, including Marx’s, cannot avoid. Feuerbach’s alienation theory, for instance, construes god as the result of man’s self-alienation, which necessarily presupposes man’s species-essence to be an unalienated, original state. Likewise, in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit], Marx is obliged to take original labor, i.e. man’s species-essence or “free, conscious activity”, as the logical starting point in order to demonstrate the alienation of labor under capitalism.

5  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 274 f.

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Second, the alienation theory is confronted with methodological problems with regard to the interpretation of civil society. As aforementioned, the alienation concept is grounded on the logical structure of “abstract – isolated – human individual”, as is alienated labor, which is in essence the logic of the isolated individual as well. Marx’s survey of alienated labor starts out from “an actual economical fact”: “The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things”.6 Yet this “fact” concerns the exploited and oppressed wage worker and the scenario he sets his sights on is basically the immediate process of labor in the capitalist factory. In such a scenario, a depiction of the isolated laborer will suffice for Marx’s argument. This is exactly the reason why there is no trace of the division of labor, exchange or analysis of civil society in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. Conversely, though the alienated labor theory can shed light on the existence condition of wage laborer, it can hardly explicate civil society founded on division of labor and exchange or mass living therein. Without having a scientific explanation of civil society, one can hardly unravel the development of society and history, let alone to establish historical materialism. In this sense, the alienated labor theory comes with a major methodological flaw.

10.2.2  The Problem of the Forth Aspect of Alienated Labor As the direct consequence of this methodological drawback, it is impossible for Max to explicate the forth aspect of alienated labor. As the reader might have noticed, the discussion on alienated labor has only hitherto concerned the first three aspects, as the forth aspect is heterogeneous to its predecessors. On the forth aspect of alienated labor, Marx remarks: “An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species-­ being is the estrangement of man from man”.7 That “man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species-being” obviously refers to the first three aspects of alienated labor, the result of which is the “estrangement of man from man”. Yet how does Marx come to this conclusion? What exactly does this “man” designate? Is he a wage worker, capitalist or common citizen? Does the “estrangement of man from man” mean relations between wage workers, between wage worker and capitalist, between capitalists or between citizens? Marx does not provide any explicit answer to these questions, except for repeating his deduction: “When man confronts himself, he confronts the other man. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labour and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to  Ibid., p. 271 f.  Ibid., p. 277.

6 7

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the other man’s labour and object of labour”.8 Admittedly, this hardly qualifies as a strict definition of the forth aspect. Compared with the first three aspects, the forth aspect is far too simplistic. Why does Marx address the forth aspect in this fashion? As has been noted, this stems from the methodological flaw of the alienated labor theory. Though the logic of self-alienation may well justify man’s “estrange[ment] from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species-being”, it evidently cannot be applied to the “estrangement of man from man”, since this aspect surpasses the scope of the isolated individual: It takes at least two equal, independent individuals, otherwise there is no such thing as relations between men, let alone the so-called “estrangement of man from man”. Compared with the logic of the isolated individual as the simple subject-object (Objekt), the “estrangement of man from man” rests on a more sophisticated logic between subjects as well as between subject and object (Objekt). An explanation for the latter can only be found in a system based on production and exchange of commodities, namely civil society. Therefore, as the author sees it, a reason that Marx leaves out further exposition of the forth aspect is that he is not capable of it,9 as he is still constrained to the logic of self-alienation of the First Manuscript. By the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit], Marx finally realizes the fault in the alienated labor theory and seeks to import relations with another into his argument: “Every self-estrangement of man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation in which he places himself and nature to men other than and differentiated from himself. […] In the real practical world self-estrangement can only become manifest through the real practical relationship to other men”.10 Considering the text before and after this passage, it seems that Marx is about to interpret “man’s relation to the other men” as the relationship between the isolated wage worker and the capitalist that has not yet appeared in the text. Yet the relationship between the wage worker and the capitalist is unequal and subordinating and, logically considered, cannot be applied to the “estrangement of man from man”. Only a relationship between independent, equal subjects such as citizens or private owners can contain an “estrangement of man from man”. Probably for this reason, Marx proposes at the end of this fragment a survey of political economic categories such as “trade, competition, capital, money”, presupposing a relationship between independent, equal subjects, and fulfilling two tasks before examining the evolution of these categories: “(1) To define the general nature of private property, as it has arisen as a result of estranged labour, in its relation to truly human and social property”.11 This is a very  Ibid.  Zhengdong Tang also holds that Marx “actually cannot go further” at the end of the First Manuscript (Zhengdong Tang, From Smith to Marx. A Historical Interpretation of the Economicphilosophical Method, Jiangsu People’s Publishing, 2009, p.  279 (translated into English by K.H.)). Yet the reason this brings him to this conclusion is not exactly the same as given here, insofar as he imputes it to the fact that Marx had not read the works of Ricardo et al. by then. 10  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 279. 11  Ibid. p. 281. 8 9

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obscure sentence that cannot be truly understood by itself. Fortunately, Marx supplements it with a further explanation: As to (1): The general nature of private property and its relation to truly human property. […] Appropriation appears as estrangement [A], as alienation [externalization A]; and alienation [externalization B] appears as appropriation [B], estrangement [C] as truly becoming [appropriation C] a citizen.12

About this passage, Mochizuki remarks: “[M]an’s self-realization activity involves treating an object as a thing (appropriation A) which results in the alienation of both nature and the thing (alienation A and externalization A). The completion of objectification and production (externalization B) is on the one hand, a product, returned to the producer → appropriation → enjoyment (appropriation B). On the other hand, it is transferred as the property of man=society. At the cost of the alienation of his product, the producer is permitted to enter ‘human society’ (become a citizen) (appropriation C)”.13 The author concurs with this reading in principle. Regarding the topic of this book, the last part of this interpretation, namely that producers externalize = transfer his own labor product to another and thereby attain citizenship, becoming members of society, is of crucial importance. That is to say, by transferring his property, the private owner confers his private property with universal essence so that it becomes the property of man and society. Considering this preparatory answer that Marx provides for the first task he takes on, he has already set his mind to breaking the yoke of the alienated labor concept, seeking to extend the alienation logic to the sphere of the relationship between men. This also foreshadows that Marx will expound the forth aspect of alienated labor in the sphere of the relationship between private owners. To sum up, at the end of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit], Marx finally realized the necessity to shift his focus from self-alienation to mutual alienation, from an analysis of alienated labor to one of the alienation of the relationship between men.

10.3  Alienation of Intercourse and Social Relation After making a study of the alienated labor theory, Marx sets about surveying human relationships in civil society. This examination is carried out by critically drawing on political economic works, with the outcome apparent throughout Comments on James Mill and some fragments of the Third Manuscript. One of the key concepts that Marx obtains through this study is “the estranged form of social intercourse” or the alienation of intercourse (Entfremdung des Verkehrs) in short.

 Ibid.  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 75 (translated into English by K.H.).

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10.3.1  The Structure of Alienation of Intercourse What is alienation of intercourse? To begin with, we shall first clarify the meaning and basic structure of this concept. Linguistically considered, Verkehr encompasses multiple meanings such as traffic and exchange. Marx’s understanding of Verkehr in Comments on James Mill finds its most concentrated articulation in the following passage: Exchange, both of human activity within production itself and of human products against one another, is equivalent to species-activity and species-[enjoyment] [Gattungsgenuß], the real, conscious and true mode of existence of which is social activity and social enjoyment. Since human nature is the true [communal essence] [Gemeinwesen] of men, by manifesting their nature men create, produce, the human [communal essence] [Gemeinwesen], the social entity.14

According to Marx, intercourse is “species-activity and species-[enjoyment]”, “social activity and social enjoyment” or “the true [communal essence] of men” and “the human [communal essence]”. Man is bound to live among fellow members of his species, community or society for, as a single individual, he is not self-sufficient, depending on the labor product of another for his survival. In this sense, intercourse or, as Marx puts it, “mutual complementing [wechselseitige Ergänzung]” is embedded in man’s nature and is his original gestalt. Marx speaks highly of Mill’s work that “very well expresses the essence of the matter in the form of a concept by characterising money as the medium of exchange”15 and acknowledges that “[t]he [communal essence] of men, or the manifestation of the nature of men, their mutual complementing the result of which is species-life, truly human life – this community is conceived by political economy in the form of exchange and trade”,16 because they, while still in the political economic fashion, see the significance of mutual complementing for realizing “species life” and “true human life”. Since mutual complementing is taken as species-essence and the essence of society, human intercourse ought to entail relations between persons. In Comments on James Mill, Marx indicates that this is self-evident without providing sufficient explanation. Following Marx’s argument, the author will supplement this proposition. The reason why intercourse entails the relationship between persons is that: First, each labor product is an object that embodies the laborer’s essential power including his physical and mental energy and the objectification of his person. To rephrase it, as each labor product is infused with the laborer’s personality, it represents or even is the person as such. Therefore, the exchange of labor products is in fact intercourse between persons. Second, mutual complementation of labor products is not realized by means of a certain mediator, such as private property, money, or commodities, but is an immediate mutual complementary relationship. Due to  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 216 f. 15  Ibid., p. 212. 16  Ibid., p. 217. 14

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the absence of a mediator, each person is confronted by another in intercourse, hence intercourse is naturally the intercourse between persons. The presence or absence of a mediator such as private property, money, or a commodity is key to determining the essence of the intercourse relationship. Third, mutual complementation consequently connects man’s needs with the labor product of another, thereby improving the personality of both. Through intercourse, man not only actualizes his personality, but also the personality of another, or, in Marx’s words, “[e]ach of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person”.17 For this reason, intercourse embodies mutual recognition between persons.18 In actual civil society, however, intercourse manifests itself in a form inappropriate to relations between persons, i.e. the “estranged form of social intercourse”.19 As for the alienation of intercourse concept, the author developed a brief definition in his earlier essay, The Concept of Civil Society in Die Deutsche Ideologie. Part I,20 pointing out its threefold meaning: (1) the externalization of private property, (2) money as such and (3) exchange as such. Due to editorial reasons, however, these aspects were merely enumerated without further exposition. The author shall make a few supplementary comments here. (1) The externalization of private property is the alienation of intercourse. This definition concerns conditions under which the alienation of intercourse occurs. As Marx notes, “as long as man does not recognize himself as man, and therefore has not organised the world in a human way, this community appears in the form of estrangement”. That is to say, alienation of intercourse presupposes “man” who “does not recognize himself as man, and therefore has not organised the world in a human way”. Hence, what does this “man” designate? In the preceding sentence, Marx mentions Smith’s “need and egoism of individuals”, which suggests that this “man” is definitely a human oriented towards his own “need and egoism”. Following the quoted passage, Marx further points out that this “man” does not exist as an “abstraction, but as real, living, particular individuals”. To whom does this refer? He is a private owner for, as we shall see in the following, only private owners qualify as “real, living, particular individuals”. In addition, in most cases, the subject of alienation in Comments on James Mill designates a private owner who produces or a citizen of civil society rather than a proletarian or capitalist. Though Marx occasionally addresses capital and alienated labor within the wage labor relationship, the  Ibid., p. 227.  Particularly enlightening are Dun Zhang’s essays on the relation between the recognition theory in Hegel’s Phänomenologie and the alienation of intercourse theory. See Dun Zhang, The Problem of “Recognition” from the Vantage Point of the Marxian Practical Philosophy (Marxism & Reality, no. 1, 2007), Alienation of Intercourse. The Problem of “Recognition” in Marx’s Comments on James Mill (Modern Philosophy, no. 5, 2007). 19  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 217. 20  Lixin Han, The Civil Society Concept in Die Deutsche Ideologie. Part I, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 4, 2006. 17 18

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main theme of Comments on James Mill is indubitably the alienation of intercourse between private owners. The private owner is an “exclusive owner [exklusiver Besitzer], who proves his personality [Persönlichkeit] and both distinguishes himself from, and enters into relations with, other men through this exclusive ownership”.21 Once man becomes a private owner, his relationship with the other becomes a relation between two private owners. Thus, the form of intercourse is alienated for now the purpose of exchanging man’s products is no longer to directly take what one needs, but to “trade [Schacher]”. Within private ownership or in the world of “need and egoism of individuals”, to acquire the labor product of another presupposes the transfer (externalization) of one’s own private property to him, except by virtue of external coercion. In other words, the exchange with another is mediated by one’s private property for he is also a private owner who would never transfer his private property if not obtaining the equivalent at the same time. This is the so-called exchange justice. In all, the exchange mediated by private property is alienation of intercourse. Alienation of intercourse originates from private ownership and the exchange mediated by private property. (2) Money as such is the alienation of intercourse. True intercourse needs no mediator. Now that private property has arisen and man has become a private owner, intercourse needs to abide by the principle of exchange justice. Meanwhile, money gradually replaces other forms of private property, becoming the mediator of exchange. The emergence of this mediator is of vital significance in human history for, not only does man no longer act as a mediator for man, intercourse between persons becomes that between private property, which in turn dominates the intercourse between persons. For this reason, money epitomizes alienated intercourse. According to Marx’s classical definition of money, it “is […] the alienation of private property, the abstraction from its specific, personal nature”.22 The essence of money resides in private property; money is the creation of the private individual’s labor, but also the exclusion of private property’s particular gestalt, and the result of private property’s externalization. Therefore, money ought to belong to man, as it stems from the externalization of the “human, social act”. Unfortunately, once created, money turns “outside man and above man”.23 Before money, man’s wishes, activity and relations became powers estranged from himself, and man ended up losing himself in a regard for money as his end. The subject-object (Objekt) relationship between man and Sache is inverted, insofar as man is enslaved by money when it seizes “real power” over him, becoming a “real god”. As Marx remarks, money is the “alien mediator”.24

 Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 218. 22  Ibid., p. 213. 23  Ibid., p. 212. 24  Ibid. 21

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Through a survey of the credit system, Marx further unveils the essence of alienated intercourse. In a credit system, exchange mediated by money is seemingly superseded, as transactions are conducted by credit, and man returns to relations between persons. Deceived by this illusion, the Saint-Simonianists mistakenly consider credit an ideal of human society. For Marx, however, this is an alienation far graver than common barter for “[i]n credit, the man himself, instead of metal or paper, has become the mediator of exchange”. As has been noted, in civil society, man can only acquire the private property of another by transferring his property to this another and, in completing this exchange, must resort to certain thing outside man such as money and labor product. Yet, within the credit relationship, the exchanger no longer draws on thing outside man like money and labor product, but rather draws immediately on the person or, as Marx puts it, “[h]uman individuality [menschliche Individualität]”, “human morality [menschliche Moral]”, “personal existence [persönliches Dasein]”. To be noted, this “person” is distinct from the person in the personal relation above for it serves as an economic guarantee of the transaction, as a “mode of existence of capital and interest”.25 In trenchant and startling language, Marx unmarks the role of personality in credit: Within the credit relationship, it is not the case that money is transcended in man, but that man himself is turned into money, or money is incorporated in him. Human individuality, human morality itself, has become both an object of commerce and the material in which money exists. Instead of money, or paper, it is my own personal existence [persönliches Dasein], my flesh and blood, my social virtue and importance, which constitutes the material, corporeal form of the spirit of money. Credit no longer resolves the value of money into money but into human flesh and the human heart.26

In brief, the thing exchanged in credit is the person themself. As we know, by encouraging bartering, civilized society has strictly forbidden the trade in persons directly since the abolishment of slavery and feudalism. In Metaphyik der Sitten, Kant divides things into two categories: person and Sache. The person is the end and hence untransferrable, whereas Sache as a means may be transferred. As the fundamental notion of the person in modern philosophy, this is also the underlying idea behind the Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of Independence. The prohibition of organ trading, abortion and the contempt for corruption and the sex trade are all deduced from this axiom of dignity of the person. Conversant with this tradition, Marx cannot even put up with the trade of things outside man, let alone the trade of the person in the credit system. Therefore, compared with the exchange of things outside man, the trade of thing inherent in man is “self-estrangement, the dehumanisation, [which] is all the more infamous and extreme”.27 Although the credit and banking systems may be taken as advances in the means of exchange, “all progress and all inconsistencies within a false system are extreme retrogression and the extreme consequence of vileness”.28  Ibid., p. 215.  Ibid., p. 215. 27  Ibid., p. 214. 28  Ibid., p. 215. 25 26

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(3) Exchange as such is the alienation of intercourse, one that is used to designate various material and spiritual intercourse between persons. In civil society, however, intercourse is simplified to a trading relationship, to the exchange of commodities mediated by things (Tausch oder Austausch). The transition from intercourse to exchange is tied up in the alienation of intercourse. As intercourse becomes exchange, substantial changes are put into effect regarding labor, turning it into “gainful labor”. What is gainful labor? According to Marx’s definition, it has first of all “[…] no direct relation to his need or his function as worker”. Second, “[t]hrough exchange his labour has become partly a source of income. Its purpose differs now from its mode of existence. The product is produced as value, as exchange-value, as an equivalent, and no longer because of its direct, personal relation to the producer”.29 Considered this way, this is evidently not the original form of labor, but rather the ultimate alienated form. Yet, as another kind of alienated labor, gainful labor is also distinct from the alienated labor in the First Manuscript. The alienated form labor referred to in the First Manuscript is the self-­ alienated wage labor of the capitalist factory, whilst gainful labor denotes the commodity producer’s profit-oriented labor that presupposes exchange. In gainful labor, the end of labor is shifted from the direct relationship that affirms individual existence to the indirect relationship bent on exchange-value. In this regard, the Chinese rendering of this pivotal concept as “labor to earn a living” (谋生劳动) is inappropriate in that the essence of this labor lies in making profit, whilst the essence of labor to earn a living is, on the contrary, to survive: There is an essential distinction between the two. Second, that intercourse has turned into exchange will fundamentally reverse relations between man and thing. Based on private ownership, so-called production for the need of another is nothing more than a semblance, as its true goal is to “have”. Likewise, so-called mutual complementation is also merely a semblance, with the aim to plunder. Within the exchange relationship, the private owner only cares about the thing in another’s hand rather than his personal needs. One’s thing is a means to satisfy one’s need, as “the means, the mediator, the instrument” that enables you to exert power over another, and the “acknowledged power” that guarantees the success of exchange. “[T]herefore we mutually regard our products as the power of each of us over the other and over himself. That is to say, our own product has risen up against us; it seemed to be our property, but in fact we are its property. We ourselves are excluded from true property because our property excludes other men”.30 Extremely penetrating is Marx’s remark on this inverted relationship between man and thing: “The only intelligible language in which we converse with one another consists of our objects in their relation to each other. We would not understand a human language and it would remain without effect. [..] We are to such an extent estranged from man’s essential nature that the direct language of this essential nature seems to us a violation of human dignity, whereas the estranged

29 30

 Ibid., p. 220.  Ibid., p. 226 f.

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language of material values seems to be the well-justified assertion of human dignity that is self-confident and conscious of itself”.31 Lastly, that intercourse has turned into exchange will cause alienation of the relationship between men. After exposing the alienation of man’s labor and of the relation between man and labor product within exchange relationship, Marx finally enters upon a third level and the heart of the concept of alienation of intercourse, namely the alienation of man from man. 1) [E]ach of us actually behaves in the way he is regarded by the other. You have actually made yourself the means, the instrument, the producer of your own object in order to gain possession of mine; 2) your own object is for you only the sensuously perceptible covering, the hidden shape, of my object; for its production signifies and seeks to express the acquisition of my object. In fact, therefore, you have become for yourself a means, an instrument of your object, of which your desire is the servant, and you have performed menial services in order that the object shall never again do a favour to your desire.32

This lucid passage vividly depicts the actual state of man in exchange: Man is devalued to the level of his product. The value of man to another is the value of the Sache he possesses. Therefore, man per se is worthless to another man. Mediated by things, man is enslaved by others: In exchange, he is not only negated by things, but also by others. The relation between Sachen assumes dominance over social relation, whilst the relationship between men is merely an appendage to it. How similar is this account to the reification theory in the later Grundrisse! Despite the absence of the term “reification” in Comments on James Mill, its meaning has already found comprehensive articulation here. What is noteworthy is, though conceiving exchange as the alienated gestalt of the intercourse between men, Marx does not opt for complete or absolute rejection of exchange, but deems it to be a necessary stage in the development of intercourse for, when one removes the garment of alienation of intercourse, exchange is still the embodiment of “human, social” intercourse: “Exchange or barter is therefore the social act, the species-act, the community, the social intercourse and integration of men within private ownership, and therefore the external, alienated species-act”.33 It is because of private ownership that exchange becomes an “external, alienated species-act”. If presupposed private ownership is liquidated, then exchange will reflect the essence of intercourse, namely “the social act, the species-act, the community, the social intercourse and integration of men”. At the end of Comments on James Mill, Marx looks forward to production in future society in a passage that begins, “Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings”. The four aspects encompassed in this prospect constitute the true state of man’s production and intercourse on the premise of the liquidation of private ownership.34 By following Marx’s line of reasoning in Comments on James Mill, we have so far addressed the threefold meaning of the alienation of intercourse and thereby  Ibid., p. 227.  Ibid. 33  Ibid., p. 219. 34  Cf. ibid., p. 227 f. 31 32

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ascertained that, if the core concept of the First Manuscript is alienated labor, then that of Comments on James Mill is the alienation of intercourse. Both forms of alienation, they have different components. Based on the subject-object (Objekt) logic or the logic of the isolated individual, alienated labor refers to the self-­ alienation of the laborer. Alienation of intercourse, however, refers to alienation between at least two private owners and, though it also concerns the alienation of labor product and activity from the laborer, it presupposes the exchange relationship. In this sense, previous studies that arbitrarily subsume the entire alienation theory of the Paris Manuscripts under the category of alienated labor are untenable, since alienated labor neither represents the entirety of Marx’s alienation theory, nor, on grounds of its inherent flaw, falls behind the alienation of intercourse with regard to theoretical maturity, as we shall see in the following section. This is the answer to the question propounded at the outset of the first subchapter: Can alienated labor represent the entirety of Marx’s alienation theory? In addition, at the end of the last subchapter, the author mentions that Marx barely unfolds the forth aspect of alienated labor in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. The analysis of alienation of intercourse above, however, suggests that the “alienation of man from man” denotes an alienation of intercourse between citizens of civil society and hence that it is in Comments on James Mill that Marx completes his explication of the forth aspect of alienated labor. Although Marx does not acknowledge this himself in Comments on James Mill, the alienation of intercourse concept can well enough elucidate the forth aspect of alienated labor in the First Manuscript. The theory of alienation of intercourse not only resolves the theoretical conundrum in the First Manuscript, but also lays out the rudiments of Marx’s later scientific account of the concept of society.

10.3.2  The Vantage Point of Social Relations Comments on James Mill starts out with a discussion of money. As a mediator of intercourse, money is distinct from alienated labor in that it is the common course of multiple private owners and a reflection of complex social relations rather than isolated private owners’ individual deeds. The other core categories that Marx elaborates on in the following, e.g. bank and credit, intercourse (exchange), division of labor, gainful labor, all bear the same character, as they presuppose the social relation of at least two private owners. In accordance with this change of object of examination, the vantage point of Comments on James Mill shifts from self-­ alienation in the First Manuscript to alienation of intercourse or reciprocal alienation, the essence of which is alienation of social relation. It is reasonable to say that Marx first adopts the vantage point of social relations in Comments on James Mill. The advent of this perspective is without question exceedingly significant for the development of Marx’s thought as it brings about tremendous change to his theoretical framework. It frees Marx from the abstract, subject-object (Objekt) logic of humanism, while allowing him to overcome the limitations of a labor-based

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interpretation of man’s essence and unmask man’s essence from a different social perspective. It also enables Marx to conceive of society and history from the vantage point of social relations and establish his own concept of society. As we see in the preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, to interpret human history from the perspective of social relations is the premise of historical materialism. To begin with, Marx’s notion of man’s essence is different. In the First Manuscript, Marx’s object of analysis is the alienated labor of isolated individuals, as he bases his definition of man’s essence chiefly in the context of the relationship between man and nature or that between wage worker and capitalist. For his classical definitions of man’s essence such as “free activity”, “free, conscious activity” and “free manifestation of life”, the pivotal issue is how to escape the limitation of natural necessity and the capitalist relations of production. In Comments on James Mill, however, Marx tends to define man’s essence from the perspective of social relations between men, as his concern turned into an anatomy of civil society. This is exemplifed in two brand-new propositions on man’s essence that Marx propounds: (1) “[H]uman nature is the true [communal essence] of men”; (2) “total being”. (1) “[H]uman nature is the true [communal essence] of men”.35 The crux of this proposition is an understanding of Gemeinwesen. In the Chinese translation, this is rendered as “social relations” (社会联系). Yet, according to the survey of Mochizuki, Gemeinwesen has three meanings: 1) “the character of communal being”, which equals species-essence in the Paris Manuscripts; 2) “gestalt and organization with the character of communal being” such as community (Gemeinschaft) and society; 3) “particular community” such as the village community and the Roman community.36 Throughout the Paris Manuscripts, this term is chiefly used in the first two meanings. As regards “Gemeinwesen” in the cited passage above, it is, as the author sees it, a summary of the nature of “gestalt and organization with the character of communal being”, i.e. of the nature of community and society. As such, what exactly is community and society? The former normally refers to organization in which the individual is yet to be independent and alienation of intercourse has not come into being, primitive community without private ownership for instance. Society, however, is an alienated community which, contrary to the former, brings with it individual independency and mediated intercourse as in actual civil society. Therefore, Gemeinwesen is a summary of the mutual essence of community and society, i.e. man’s nature of mutual dependency and activity. In light of this, the Chinese rendering of Gemeinwesen as “social relations” (社会联系) is inaccurate, for Gemeinwesen not only concerns social connections, but also the communal essence of community.

 Ibid., p. 217.  Cf. Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 87 f.

35 36

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(2) “[T]otal being”. This is a frequently cited proposition. Marx expatiates on this proposition as follows: “[T]he need for them, shows each of the property owners, and makes him conscious of it, that he has yet another essential relation to objects besides that of private ownership, that he is not the particular being that he considers himself to be, but a total being”.37 The key to understanding this proposition is the dialectic between the particular and the universal (the whole). The reason why man is a “total being” is, most of all, because he is a particular, non-self-sufficient and flawed being. Because of his particularity, he is in need of the whole and thus has “another essential relation” besides his ownership of natural objects, i.e. the social relationship is his dependence on being complemented by another. In this sense, that man is a “total being” actually implies that man is a particular, flawed being who counts on his intercourse with another to survive. What stands behind the proposition of the “total being” is Hegel’s theory of civil society. Despite the lack of absolute philological evidence, the formulation that “he is not the particular being that he considers himself to be, but a total being” easily reminds us of the “system of needs” in Hegel’s Grundlinien. Therein, the private individual is an egoistic, exclusive being, following a principle of particularity directed towards himself. Without the relationship with another, however, he cannot achieve all of his ends. As such, the private individual is obliged to “become a being [Sein; translator] for others”,38 namely, whilst producing and enjoying, to produce for the enjoyment of another. This means that the private individual is also a universal being, following the principle of universality. The so-called private individual is exactly the unity of these two principles. Marx’s “total being” is to be understood in the context of Hegel’s notion of particularity and universality, having “become separated in civil society, […but] nevertheless bound up with and conditioned by each other”.39 When one removes the fabric of man’s alienation in civil society, one can refer to the “total being” as an independent individual as well as a social being with communal essence. Second, Marx propounds his own concept of society. In the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscript, he principally focuses on alienated labor and, since its logical starting point is the isolated laborer, there is no need for society to appear. In Comments on James Mill, however, his focus is shifted to alienation of intercourse, thus it is logically necessary to posit a civil society of multiple subjects. Marx’s understanding of civil society in Comments on James Mill can be traced back to Hegel and Smith in principle. From Marx’s definition of man’s essence, we already have an indication of Hegel’s influence, as Marx construes civil society as a “system of needs” as well. As for Smith, Marx not only directly quotes his famous

 Ibid., p. 218.  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 229. 39  Ibid., p. 221. 37 38

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proposition that “society is a commercial society”,40 but also conceives of civil society as a system of division of labor and exchange. At the outset of the fragment [Arbeitsteilung] of the Third Manuscript, Marx notes: “[S]ociety, as it appears to the political economist, is civil society in which every individual is a totality of needs and only exists for the other person, as the other exists for him, insofar as each becomes a means for the other”.41 This idea is almost a hybrid of Hegel and Smith’s theory. To be noted, Marx’s notion of civil society here has made a giant advance compared with that in the period of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, insomuch as he can now objectively (objektiv) consider the significance of civil society for human history. To understand this is exceedingly important, since this understanding of civil society is the prototype of Marx’s concept of society. As we known, Marx’s concept of society appears out of nowhere in the Third Manuscript where he expatiates on society in the fragment [Privateigentum und Kommunismus]. For instance: Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal enjoyment – i.e., activity and enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in actual direct association with other men—will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of the enjoyment.42

This passage shows that, instead of defining society in concrete terms, Marx posits society as the ideal gestalt for mankind from a functional perspective, as he does in most of his exposition of society in the Third Manuscript. Why does he choose not to define this overarching concept? It is likely because he has already given a definition before producing the Third Manuscript and hence omits it here. When following this line of thought to reexamine the above quoted passage, we will see that the expression “[s]ocial activity and social enjoyment” has already appeared in Comments on James Mill, only that it was then expounded in the context of money and exchange. That these “exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment” is exactly a conclusion drawn from Marx’s survey of civil society in Comments on James Mill: “Social activity and social enjoyment” can only be realized through a mediator (private property such as money) in civil society and are therefore not “directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment”. Considered this way, civil society is the alienated gestalt of society. The conception of society in the Third Manuscript presupposes the underlying framework of the civil society concept in Comments on James Mill and is based on the supersession of civil society. Only by virtue of this  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 217. 41  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 317. 42  Ibid., p. 298. 40

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aspect can we distinguish Marx’s concept of society from Feuerbach’s notion of species and Hess’s of community, though both Feuerbach and Hess also write at length on species, community and society from a humanist perspective and even posit them as an ideal of mankind. If there are still traces of the Young Hegelians, Feuerbach and Hess in particular, in Marx’s previous thought on society, then, after an examination of the civil society concept in Comments on James Mill, we can see that Marx has come close to establishing his own framework of thought. Putting forward a concept of society is a milestone in the development of Marx’s thought. The First Manuscript turns upon alienated labor and, as critique thereof, necessarily conceives man’s essence as “free, conscious activity”, whereas Comments on James Mill focuses on civil society (the system of alienated intercourse) and, as the critique of alienation of intercourse, necessarily interprets man’s essence as “true communal essence” and “total being”. In the Third Manuscript, Marx takes on the task of superseding alienated labor and civil society, eliminating the two attributes of “alienated” and “civil” and achieving a synthesis of labor and society. The essence of man at this stage is definitely the unity of “free, conscious activity” and “social being”. This argumentation of Marx bears considerable resemblance to Hegel’s syllogism and, when presented with a diagram, can be framed as follows: the First Manuscript (labor – “free, conscious activity”) → Comments on James Mill (civil society – “total being”) → the Third Manuscript (the combination of labor and society – “free, conscious activity” and “social being”).43 Having gone through this process, Marx is infinitely closer to his thought in the first article (“practice”) and the sixth article (“ensemble of the social relations”) of Thesen as well as his view of history in Ideologie. If Thesen and Ideologie are where the origins of historical materialism are to be found, then the proximity to these concepts indicates that Marx is not far away from establishing historical materialism or has already made an extraordinary step. In summary, Comments on James Mill is giant leap in the development of Marx’s thought, not only in regard to Marx’s rupture from the humanist logic of alienated labor and adoption of the vantage point of alienation of intercourse to explicate the true structure of society and history, but also because he begins to shift his underlying perspective from that of the isolated individual to man’s social relations. It is exactly in this regard that the author deems the alienation of intercourse theory in Comments on James Mill to be the turning point of Marx’s thought.

43  Considering the Paris Manuscripts in its entirety, Marx does undergo the process of alienated labor → civil society → labor and society. This, on the one hand, shows that Marx was gradually approaching the historical materialist standpoint, and, on the other hand, bolsters the philological speculation of Lapin, Rojahn and other Japanese scholars over the writing sequence of the Paris Manuscripts, namely the First Manuscript → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscript → the Third Manuscript.

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10.4  Comments on James Mill and Hess Thoughtful readers might have noticed that, through the exposition above, the author has already made clear and justified an essential standpoint that the alienation of intercourse stands on a higher plane to alienated labor and that Comments on James Mill is theoretically more mature than the First Manuscript. This, however, is not a widely-accepted conclusion in Chinese academia or even a heterodoxy, since the leading interpretation deems the First Manuscript more mature and alienated labor more profound. According to the philological conclusion introduced at the outset of this chapter, however, this reading simply cannot stand up to scrutiny. Yet what the author aims for is not to simply refute this viewpoint based on philological facts, but to shed light on the problem of the assessment of Comments on James Mill and Hess’s theory from the perspective of theoretical logic and the development of thought, as in the last two subchapters.

10.4.1  Comparison Between the First Manuscript and Comments on James Mill Let us start with the basics of Marxist economics. In Marx’ mature work, Das Kapital, the logical starting point of Marx’s scientific exposition is not the relation of capital to wage labor or capital in short, but to commodity. Setting out from his survey of commodity relations, Marx deduces money, value, fetishism of commodity and money, embarking upon an analysis of capital in the labor process and in the production process of surplus value. In brief, his survey proceeds from civil society and moves on to capitalist society. Comparing this with the Paris Manuscripts, we can see that, in Das Kapital, Marx does not follow the same writing sequence as that of the Paris Manuscripts, namely from alienated labor (the relationship between capital and wage labor) in the First Manuscript to alienation of intercourse (an analysis of commodity and money) in Comments on James Mill. Rather, his writing sequence is to the contrary. If the writing of Das Kapital follows a scientific logical sequence, then when did Marx come to realize that the underlying significance of an analysis of commodity and money was a vital indicator of the maturity of his thought. Although incomparable with Das Kapital regarding its economic maturity, Comments on James Mill covers subject matters including commodity, money, distribution of labor and exchange and is de facto equivalent to Chap. 1. Commodities of Das Kapital. Furthermore, if the maturity of Marx’s thought is marked by the diminution of the humanist character, then Comments on James Mill clearly contains less of a humanist element than the First Manuscript. One can justify this standpoint from various perspectives, yet, due to limited space, the author shall only compare two passages in the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] and Comments on James Mill

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respectively to show where they differ. In the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit], Marx makes the following remark when defining the first aspect of alienated labor: [L]abour produces wonderful things for the rich – but for the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces – but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty– but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labour by machines, but it throws one section of the workers back to a barbarous type of labour, and it turns the other section into a machine. It produces intelligence – but for the worker, stupidity, cretinism.44

This is a typical humanist critique of alienated labor. The inhuman conditions of the wage worker depicted in this passage can well arouse outrage in the reader. Comment on James Mill, however, apparently lacks such a humanist character. Take a passage quoted earlier as an example: “Exchange, both of human activity within production itself and of human products against one another, is equivalent to species-­activity and species-[enjoyment], the real, conscious and true mode of existence of which is social activity and social enjoyment. Since human nature is the true [communal essence] of men, by manifesting their nature men create, produce, the human [communal essence], the social entity”. Aside from admiring the profundity and uniqueness of Marx’s analysis, one can hardly feel the resonance of Marx’s humanitarian concern and burst into outrage as when reading the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit]. It is true that the author has singled out two extreme examples here. Since alienated labor and the alienation of intercourse are both forms of alienation, they necessarily entail a humanist aspect, albeit in different measures. What is at issue here is their distinction with respect to the object of analysis and research method: Alienated labor concerns the exploited conditions of the wage worker and Marx’s critique of alienated labor draws on Feuerbach’s humanist logic of religious critique. Comments on James Mill, however, turns on the condition of multiple private owners in civil society and, though also containing critique and exposure of alienated intercourse, comprises mainly a scientific survey of civil society, a method very similar to that in II.  Chapter on Money of Grundrisse im weiteren Sinne (Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58) and Chap. 1. Commodities of Das Kapital. The author wants to further press that the intensity of the critique of inhuman conditions under capitalism is not proportional to the maturity of Marx’s thought. The critique of capitalism in Marx’s early writings such as Zur Judenfrage, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung and the First Manuscript is extremely radical and vehement, yet scientific logic cannot be spun directly from the outrage of proletarian and cynical idealism, but should be established on the basis of an anatomy of civil society enriched by political economic knowledge. For this reason, the shift from alienated labor of the isolated individual to the alienation of intercourse in social relations is a theoretical advancement, or, in Hiromatsu’s words, a conversion “from alienation theory to reification theory” is cause for this theoretical leap. In China, however, Comments on James Mill is commonly positioned with the First Manuscript, swayed perhaps by the order of volume 42 of the Russian version 44  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 273.

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of MEW or Rosenberg’s interpretation in A Summary of the Development of Marx and Engels’s Economics Theories in the 1840s which places the Notes before the Manuscripts.45 These mere speculations, however, cannot fully explain this arrangement. The actual reason for this order is very likely an overestimatation Hess’s influence on Marx running through Chinese academia. Though it might seem somewhat abrupt and unexpected, the author wants to point out that an objective (objektiv) assessment of the relationship between Marx and Hess is key to solving the problem. Most proponents of the mainstream chorological order construe Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, Comments on James Mill in particular, as works influenced by Hess’s Über das Geldwesen. Since Über das Geldwesen stands on the same plane as the two articles for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, degrading Comments on James Mill to the level of Über das Geldwesen means that Comments on James Mill also belongs to the period of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher and is thus prior to the Manuscripts as a text. Hence, one can easily draw the conclusion that the First Manuscripts is more mature than Comments on James Mill and that the alienation of intercourse theory still falls behind the alienated labor theory. The question is, however, whether Über das Geldwesen actually lies on the same level as Comments on James Mill?

10.4.2  Comparison Between Hess and Marx As we known, Hess had been a like-minded companion to Marx until mid-1840s. This relationship, however, has long been disputed in the studies of early Marx’s thought, which mainly concerns two aspects: First, who applied Feuerbach’s theory of religious alienation first to the economic sphere? In other words, did Hess’s Über das Geldwesen influence Marx’s Zur Judenfrage, or vice versa? Between 1843 and 1844, Hess anonymously published three articles in Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz – i.e. Sozialismus und Kommunismus, Die Philosophie der Tat, Die eine und ganze Freiheit  – and wrote Über das Geldwesen for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. Among them, Über das Geldwesen not only resembles Marx’s Zur Judenfrage in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher in terms of content, but was also finished almost at the same time. In Über das Geldwesen, Hess advances the idea that, just as man externalizes his species-essence to god, the producer externalizes his species-essence to money that does not belong to him and makes money the true god of civil society. Likewise, Marx also puts forward the idea that “[m]oney is the estranged essence of man’s work and man’s existence”46 in Zur Judenfrage and unfolds a similar theory of money’s alienation. In fact, Zur Judenfrage was finished  David Rosenberg, A Summary of the Development of Marx and Engels’s Economics Theories in the 1840s, trans. by Fang Gang et al., SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1958. 46  Marx, On the Jewish Question, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 172. 45

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no later than December 1843, whilst Über das Geldwesen missed the February issue of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher in 1844 as planned, because it was submitted too late. David Mclellan holds that, in Zur Judenfrage, Marx “copied”47 Hess’s thought in Über das Geldwesen. Yet, chronologically considered, this viewpoint is untenable for it would have been impossible for Marx to have read the manuscript of Hess’s Über das Geldwesen when writing Zur Judenfrage. According to Cai Hou, the reason for such remarkable similarity probably lay in the fact that “Marx and Hess extensively discussed and exchanged views on pertinent topics before writing”.48 The author basically concurs with Cai Hou’s point of view. It is at least certain that both works were finished at the same time, which means one can hardly determine whether one or the other holds dominance. Second, does Über das Geldwesen actually exert an influence on Marx’s later Paris Manuscripts? To his question, most scholars of Marxist philosophy, such as Cornu and Hiromatsu, have answered in the affirmative. Hiromatsu even puts forward the idea that Marx was under Hess’s “overwhelming influence”49 in the period from the Manuscripts, Thesen to Ideologie. Though holding the same opinion, Cai Hou points out that “this enlightenment and influence cannot be overestimated either. […] Compared with Hess, Marx develops Hess’s exposition in certain aspects, corrects Hess’s one-sidedness on some issues and even draws the absolutely opposite conclusion as Hess on certain problems”.50 The author agrees with Cai Hou that Über das Geldwesen is not to be overrated and the fundamental difference between the Paris Manuscripts and Über das Geldwesen should not be overseen. There are various differences between these two writings. Concerning the subject matter of this book, the most fundamental difference between Hess and Marx, as the author sees it, lies in the notion of civil society.  David Mclellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969, p. 155.  Cai Hou, The Development of the Thought of the Young Hegelians and Early Marx, China Social Sciences Press, Beijing, 1994, p. 152, 157 (translated into English by K.H.). The third and fourth chapter of this book, i.e. Marx and Hess’s Socialism. Part 1 and Part 2, expound at length the relation between Hess and Feuerbach and between Hess and Marx. Both are salient texts for the studies of the relation between Hess and Marx in China. 49  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Evolution of Marxism, in: Collected Works of Wataru Hiromatsu, vol. 6, San-Ichi Shobo, 1997, p. 299 (translated into English by K.H.). In this famous work of his early period, Hiromatsu dedicates an article to Hess’s significance for the formation of early Marx’s thought and even interprets Marx’s Manuscripts with Hess’s thought, degrading the Manuscripts to the plane of Hess’s Über das Geldwesen and Philosophie der Tat. This reading would be more understandable if we consider Hiromatsu’s underlying framework, namely the “leap from alienation theory to reification theory”: That Marx has already surpassed the level of Hess and himself in the period of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher is not a favorable conclusion for him who construes Ideologie as the turning point where Marx’s “leap” occurs. Therefore, he must put the Manuscripts under Hess’s shadow. In his late period, however, Hiromatsu reflected on his early standpoint, admitting to having overrated Hess back then (Wataru Hiromatsu, The Evolution of Marxism. Postscript to the Edition of Collected Works, in: Collected Works of Wataru Hiromatsu, vol. 6, San-Ichi Shobo, 1997, p. 588) 50  Cai Hou, The Development of the Thought of the Young Hegelians and Early Marx, China Social Sciences Press, 1994, p. 177. 47 48

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For Hess, civil society is embedded with a decisive flaw, namely as per Feuerbach’s humanism, that it is an atomic, egoistic inhuman world. Hess conceives of civil society in an entirely negative sense. This defective notion enables him to undertake a critique of capitalism earlier as Marx, yet also obstructs him to free himself from the yoke of abstract humanism and cynical idealism rooted in the Young Hegelians and to turn a critique of civil society and capitalist society into science as does Marx. Regarding Hess’s entirely negative viewpoint on civil society, the following passage provides the best demonstration. The world of small traders is the practical world of illusion and lies. – Under the appearance of absolute independence [there is] the absolute neediness; under the appearance of the most living intercourse [there is] the most deadly barricading of every man from all his fellow men; under the appearance of inviolable property guaranteed to all individuals all their property [Vermögen] is actually taken from them; under the appearance of the most universal freedom [there is] the most universal servitude.51

“World of small traders” is an evidently discriminatory expression, from which one can well sense Hess’s contempt for civil society. For him, individuals in civil society are isolated from social connection, ones who have “sanctioned practical egoism”52; a society consists of these individuals is an inhuman world, “the most universal servitude”, “the social animal world”, the state of “war of all against all”53 where “Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe”. For this reason, the actual “world of small traders” is worse than antiquity and the middle ages, as, “[c]ompared with our social relations, not only Antiquity, also the Middle Ages are still human”.54 Likewise, Engels also advances a similar idea of civil society in his Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie. To this, Yamanouchi offers a wonderful summary: “In regard to the conception of civil society, Hess and Engels share the same drawback, insofar as they both consider it as a filthy world composed by isolated and egoistic individuals. In this atomist world, one treats another solely as means to fulfill his own desire and end. They regard commerce as deception and money as symbol of the inhumanity of society. In reality, civil society is a morally decadent, inhuman world, therefore it is necessary to establish a humanity-based moral world of socialism and communism”.55 So how does Marx conceive of civil society? As has been noted, Marx’s Zur Judenfrage is equivalent to Hess’s Über das Geldwesen, partly due to Marx’s similar understanding of civil society. In Zur Judenfrage, Marx portrays civil society as a world full of egoistic, greedy and scheming Jewish merchants, that “sever[s] all the species-ties of man, put[s] egoism and selfish need in the place of these  Moses Hess, Über das Geldwesen, in: Moses Hess. Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften 1837–1850, Akademie Verlag, 1961, S. 344 (translated into English by K.H.). 52  Ibid., S. 339. 53  Ibid., S. 345. 54  Ibid., S. 342 f. 55  Yasishi Yamanouchi, The Gaze of the Sufferer, Seidosha, 2004, p. 260 (translated into English by K.H.). 51

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s­ pecies-­ties, and dissolve[s] the human world into a world of atomistic individuals who are inimically opposed to one another”.56 From this, he concludes the liquidation of private ownership and the emancipation of man. In this respect, despite their particularities, Marx’s Zur Judenfrage, Hess’s Über das Geldwesen as well as Engel’s Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie all stand on the same level in principle, since their mutual defect is the lack of objective (objektiv) and dialectic conception of civil society and recognition of the significance of civil society for historical development. The absence of this conception is because they have not yet truly comprehended and assimilated Smith and Hegel’s theories of civil society. As we know, ever since the publication of Lukács’s Der Junge Hegel, the connection between Hegel and Smith as well as that between Marx and Hegel has been a central issue of scholarship on early Marx’s thought. Closely tied to Marx’s understanding of Hegel’s civil society concept is Hegel assimilation of Smith’s theory of civil society. Particularly, changes in Marx’s view of Hegel’s civil society concept are key to determining the development of Marx’s civil society thought. In the Frankfurt and Jena period, Hegel meticulously studied Steuart’s An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy and Smith’s An Inquiry, and integrated the outcomes of his study in his philosophical system. One of Smith’s fundamental notions of civil society is to think of it as a “commercial society” or civil society based on division of labor and exchange. Hegel’s exposition of civil society in Grundlinien is apparently under Smith’s sway, insofar as he views civil society from two perspectives: first as a world permeated by the principle of particularity, as a atomist system where “Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe”, and second as a world permeated by the principle of universality where man actualizes mutual complementation through intercourse, thus forming a “system of needs”. If the principles of particularity and universality are to be thought of as thesis and antithesis, then their unification is synthesis, which is the underlying structure of Hegel’s civil society concept. In the period of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx still looks upon Hegel’s civil society as an atomist system in which “Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe”, and has yet to notice the principle of universality. By the summer of 1844, however, Marx has studied and critically integrated Smith, Say, Skarbek, Ricardo and Mill’s theories of division of labor and exchange and unearthed the significance of the principle of universality. Particularly in the fragment of [Arbeitsteilung] of the Second and the Third Manuscripts, Marx begins to break free from the constraints of the Young Hegelians, insofar as he in some measure grants civil society his approval and adopts the standpoint of synthesis or negation of negation. Considering this, one can say that it is through Smith that Marx truly comprehends Hegel’s civil society concept. Actually, the recognition of the double significance of the civil society concept (synthesis) is what essentially distinguishes young Marx from Hess and Engels. In 1844, when everyone else was vehemently criticizing Hegel and siding with Feuerbach, Marx crept back to Hegel. Whilst speaking highly of Feuerbach  Marx, On the Jewish Question, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 173.

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in the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt], Marx also adopts Hegel’s dialectic without hesitation. To sum up, the fundamental difference between Marx in the period of the Paris Manuscripts and Hess as well as himself in the period of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher is his synthetical, dialectic understanding of civil society. By way of this understanding, Marx not only realizes the negative nature of the transition from civil society to capitalist society, but also draws the necessary law of historical development from civil society. Though Hess has discussed concepts such as practice, activity, private property, money, intercourse, communal essence, society prior to or almost at the same time as Marx, he has been throughout under the shadow of Feuerbach’s humanism, as has failed to come to grips with the outcomes of Hegel and political economy. That he proposes to “unite ourselves in love” at the end of Über das Geldwesen reinforces this reading. When addressing these concepts in Comments on James Mill, however, Marx no longer simply applies Feuerbach’s alienation theory to the economic sphere, but also reconstructs his own alienation of intercourse theory and civil society concept based on Hegel’s dialectic and concepts of political economy. In conclusion, the similarity between Marx and Hess is a mere semblance, since Comments on James Mill has clearly surpassed Über das Geldwesen.

10.5  Summary The author concludes this chapter by reemphasizing the significance of the alienation of intercourse theory. (1) The alienation of intercourse theory offers a new vantage point for interpreting the Paris Manuscripts. Alienation of intercourse is a perspective overlooked in previous studies of the Manuscripts. Not only differing in terms of the alienated labor perspective, it is also more developed, insomuch as it resolves the theoretical aporia of the First Manuscript and further brings up Marx’s horizon to an unprecedented level. The application of this new vantage point will greatly deepen and enrich our studies of the Paris Manuscripts. (2) The alienation of intercourse theory lays the groundwork for establishing Marx’s concept of society. Why does Marx move on to constitute the alienation of intercourse theory after surveying the alienated labor concept? The fundamental reason is that complex social relations cannot be fully explicated through alienated labor alone. It is by constituting the alienation of intercourse theory that Marx enters upon an in-depth anatomy of civil society, paving the way for his later attainment of the concept of society and establishment of historical materialism.

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(3) The alienation of intercourse theory is the turning point of Marx’s thought. Hiromatsu puts forward in his famous proposition that the shift “from alienation theory to reification theory” is a giant leap in the development of Marx’s thought and it occurs in Ideologie. Yet, since the reification theory is in essence an account of the inversion of social relations between men, which is exactly what alienation of intercourse is about, we can say that the reification theory already exists in Comments on James Mill. Assuming that the proposition of a transition “from alienation theory to reification theory” is correct, then the so-­ called “leap” (Hiromatsu) or “epistemological break” (Althusser) should have taken place during the writing of the Paris Manuscripts or, more specifically, in Comments of James Mill.

Chapter 11

Alienation and Reification With Comments on the “Debate over Early Marx” in Japan

From the exposition of the proceeding chapters, it is evident that the concepts of alienation and reification are vitally important for elucidating points of transition of early Marx’s thought. Whilst the alienation concept has already been addressed in Chapter V and Chapter X, the reification concept and its relation to alienation remain untouched. A distinction between these two concepts presupposes knowledge of Hegel’s concept of Sache selbst as well as the economic terms exchange and money. Having explored Hegel’s thought from the Jena period and Marx’s Comments on James Mill, it is now time to survey their differences. To be sure, distinguishing between these two concepts not only aims to ascertain intentions and extensions, but, more importantly, to link them to a shift in perspective that occurred for Marx after the writing of Comments on James Mill, namely the transition from individual to society. As seen in Lukács’s works, this differentiation between alienation and reification is not of central concern in Western academia. Drawing it mainly answers Hiromatsu’s proposition of a leap “from the logic of alienation theory to the logic of reification theory”,1 for this not only strictly distinguishes alienation from reification, but also makes this distinction the criterion on which to base a division between early and late Marx. With the expanding influence of Hiromatsu’s philosophy in China, unwrapping how alienation and reification differ has become something of an urgent task in Chinese academia. Considering the direct impact of this question on Japanese Marxism, the author shall briefly introduce and evaluate the “debate on early Marx” that has taken place between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki in Japan so as to shed additional light on the meaning of these concepts.

1  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Original Image of Historical Materialism, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2009, p. 35 (translated into English by K.H.).

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11.1  Differentiation and Analysis of Concepts In order to make a distinction between alienation and reification, we have to not only define them and draw a comparison, but also account for concepts closely tied to them, such as objectification, fetishism and versachlichen.

11.1.1  Reification and Fetishism Although Hegel never uses the term “versachlichen”, the notion conveyed by it can certainly be traced back to him, especially to his concept of Sache selbst in chapter C. (AA.) Reason of Phänomenologie. As shown in Chapter VII and VIII, Sache selbst as an objective (gegenständlich) world disengaged from man that does not belong to any one individual, despite having arisen as a joint product of countless individuals. Furthermore, since social relations between individuals can only occur through Sache selbst, it in turn assumes power over the individual. This coincides with the meaning of Marx’s reification concept. Marx is the first to advance the concept of reification. The most famous example is derived from Chapter III. Money, or the Circulation of Commodities of Volume I of Das Kapital: “[T]he personification of objects and the representation of persons by things [Versachlichung]”.2 Yet the conventional definition of the term “reification” rests on Marx’s exposition in Section 4. The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof of Chapter I. Commodities: “To the latter [sc. the producers], therefore, the relations [Beziehung] connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations [Verhältnis] between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons [sachliche Verhältnisse der Personen] and social relations [gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse] between things”.3 In addition, similar expositions in Grundrisse im weiteren Sinne (Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58) and Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1859) are also used to define reification: “[T]he social relationship of persons is transformed into a social attitude of things; personal capacity into a capacity [Vermögen] of things”4 (Grundrisse im weiteren Sinne); “Lastly, it is a characteristic 2  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p.  123. According to Tabata’s calculation, Marx only uses the term “Versachlichung” for a few times: “Versachlichung”, including “sich versachlichen” and “versachlicht”, appears twice in Ideologie, six times in Grundrisse im weiteren Sinne (Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58), four times in Theories of Surplus Value (a part of Economic Manuscript of 1861–63), once in Results of the Direct Production Process (a part of Economic Manuscript of 1861–63), once in Volume I of Das Kapital and three times in Volume III of Das Kaipital (see Minoru Tabata, Marx and Philosophy, Shinsensha, 2004, p. 410). 3  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 84. 4  Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857–58) [First Instalment], in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 94.

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feature of labour which posits exchange value that it causes the social relations of individuals [die gesellschaftliche Beziehung der Personen] to appear in the perverted form of a social relation between things [das gesellschaftliche Verhältnis der Sachen]”5 (Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie). Based on these definitions, reification means that: (1) the social relation between persons presents itself as a simple relationship between Sachen, and (2) the subject-object (Objekt) relationship between persons and Sache is inverted with Sache becoming the subject and the person the object (Objekt). Directly linked to reification is the concept of fetishism. In Section 4. The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof, Marx notes: “A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective [gegenständlich] character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things [Ding] whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses [ein sinnlich übersinnliches Ding]. […] There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism [Fetischismus] which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities”.6 According to this passage, fetishism denotes that the god-like power something possesses is at base conferred by the social relations between men and the social character of labor; yet man mistakenly attributes this power to the thing itself and ends up worshipping it. Hence, founded on the concept of reification, the definition of fetishism refers to the inverted relationship between man and thing. Exactly for this reason, proponents of the reification theory such as Hiromatsu equate fetishism with reification. When examined closely, however, there remain subtle distinctions between them. (1) Fetishism underlines the reason why a thing becomes a fetish (fetisch). That a thing and its relationship with other things has such power, turning into something “perceptible and imperceptible by the senses”, something with “mystical character”, “a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and ­theological niceties”7 is simply because of “definite social relation between men”, because social relations “assume, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a 5  Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Economic Works: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 275. 6  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 82 f. 7  Ibid., p. 81–83.

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relationship between things”.8 Without these ties, paper money for instance would be nothing more than a pile of worthless paper. (2) Fetishism emphasizes the mere semblance (Schein) of something that has become a fetish, which is mistaken (quid pro que) by common consciousness as being the essence of the thing due to man’s illusion. Nevertheless, the occurrence of such a mistake is no accident, stemming as it does from the structure of reification itself. As Hiromatsu remarks, “that the relationship of men manifests itself in forms distinct in appearance, material relation, character and gestalt is, academically considered, indeed a misunderstanding, yet by no means a contingent, arbitrary delusional illusion. It is appropriate to deem it as a misunderstanding arising under certain circumstances, a misunderstanding in which common consciousness ‘necessarily’ falls”.9 Therefore, the emergence of fetishism happens because not only are social relations between men concealed by the relation between Sachen, but because our common consciousness is unable to see through their semblance. These characteristics of fetishism, however, are deduced from the basic meaning of reification in that relations between men present themselves as relations between things. Thus, we can subsume fetishism and reification under the same category. Their structure and relation are illustrated in Fig. 11.1.

Sache in

Man regards Person

Person

the power of Sache to be the power of

turn Sache

Reification Quid pro que

Sache

assumes dominance

Fetishism

Fig. 11.1  The structure of reification and fetishism

 Ibid., p. 83.  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Contour of the Versachlichung Theory, trans. by Xi Peng & Qian Zhuang, Nanjing University Press, 2009, p.  68 (translated into English by K.H.). Following this path, Hiromatsu later puts forward an extended interpretation of Marx’s reification concept: “The ‘reification’ in Marx’s late period is no longer the objectification phenomenon that directly emerges between subject and thing, but the phenomenon of common subject mediated by man’s intersubjectivity” (Wataru Hiromatsu, The Horizon of Marxism and the Reification Theory, see Wataru Hiromatsu, The Original Image of Historical Materialism, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2009, p. 238). Based on this “structure of common subject”, he further widens reification to other spheres like nature and even combines it with phenomenology, establishing Hiromatsu’s philosophy. This certainly has nothing to do with Marx’s thought. 8 9

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The significance of the reification concept is normally underlined from the perspective of a critique of political economics. The concepts of reification and fetishism help us unveil the illusory essence of commodity, money and capital, the inverted relationship between man and thing in civil society as well as the unreasonableness and inhumanity of capitalist society.10 Yet the author wants to assert here that the reification concept also has a significance for Marx’s methodology in establishing historical materialism. On account of reification, the direct relation between men is converted into an indirect relationship between things. Conversely speaking, however, this indicates that definitions of man and society can no longer be accounted for through man as such, but rather through an external mediator, that is Sache outside man and relations between Sachen. Before Hegel and Marx, the explication of man and society usually resorts to man’s intrinsic, spiritual elements, e.g. reason, freedom, intuition, emotion, mentality, free will and practice. Correspondingly, it gives rise to propositions such as “man is a free being”, “man is a practical animal”, “reciprocal recognition is rooted in man’s rational ability to restrain himself”, “man’s choice of a social contract is due to his fear of death”, etc. The author calls this explanation of man and society by way of immediate, intrinsic elements the approach of the intrinsic principle. Hegel and Marx, however, completely reverse this approach, insofar as they turn to a sphere outside man, drawing on Sache and the relationship between Sachen, as illustrated in the diagram above. For instance, so-called “real man” is de facto one who possesses Sache and relations between Sachen. When Sache is still simply a labor product, man probably comes from an ancient, primitive society or a future communist society; when Sache becomes capital, man is probably a capitalist, and society is a capitalist society. By analogy, the author names this explanation of man and society from the perspective of external Sache the approach of the extrinsic principle. The emergence of the reification structure signifies a transition of explanatory principle for man and society in German idealism, namely from intrinsic to extrinsic principle or from ideological to material principle. In the history of philosophy, this is beyond all doubt a Copernican revolution.

11.1.2  Distinctions Between Alienation and Reification Alienation designates a state in which (1) the subject is distanced from himself, becoming an object, another (Anderes), and (2) this object even estranges itself from the subject and turns around to confront him. The relation between alienation and objectification is relatively complex. Objectification (Vergegenständlichung) originally means that a subject infuses his essence into the object. According to the definition of alienation above, objectification is evidently similar to alienation, namely that the subject is distanced from himself, becoming an object, an “other”. Though some take the second meaning as the criterion for distinguishing objectification and 10

 Concerning this, see the appendix to this chapter.

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alienation, this criterion is seen by the author to be insufficient to differentiating them, as one can also deduce the second meaning of alienation from the definition of objectification above. Thus, it is necessary to find a new criterion. This new criterion is whether the subject can reclaim this other, or, in Marx’s words, whether the subject can appropriate (aneignen) his external object, or whether he is capable of Entgegenständlichung. Herein lies two possibilities: (1) either the subject can appropriate his object, and the object is able to return to the subject so that both may achieve their reunification, (2) or the subject fails to reappropriate his object, the object is still estranged from the subject and both remain eternally separated from the other. The author names the former objectification and the latter alienation. As has been noted in Chapter V, however, this is de facto merely a differentiation made in Feuerbach’s context. Feuerbach construes alienation as a process by which the object cannot return to the subject. The more man alienates himself to god, the less is left in him; the more is alienated from him, the poorer he becomes. Therefore, the logic follows that alienation is evil. For Hegel, however, alienation also includes the object’s return to the subject. In this respect, alienation is in essence objectification: The more is alienated from man, the more powerful he turns out to be when reclaiming his object. Alienation is as such good. In other words, Hegel equates alienation with objectification. According to Lukács, this is where Marx diverges from Hegel, insofar as he distinguishes alienation from objectification in the Manuscripts, whilst such distinction is nowhere to be found in Hegel works. The ensuing Chapter XIV will specifically go into this problem. Here, the author concludes in advance that Lukács’s standpoint is half-correct for it only bears on the First Manuscript, while not on the Third Manuscript where Marx, like Hegel, also thinks of alienation as a process that allows the object’s return to the subject. When illustrated with a diagram, alienation and objectification present themselves as in Fig. 11.2. As such, what exactly is the distinction between alienation and reification? Compared with the two diagrams above, their distinction is clear. The logic of ­alienation is the process of double negation: initial state → alienated state → return to initial state. It proceeds from the presupposition of an initial state, as Marx points out in the fragment [Privateigentum und Arbeit] of the Manuscripts when he writes of man’s species-essence as the theoretical starting point. Yet reification does not have such a presupposition; instead, it directly starts out from the person in possession of Sache (private property or commodity) or Sache selbst, just as Marx dedi-

Objectification Subject

Object Appropriation, Entgegenständlichung

Objectification = Alienation

Fig. 11.2  The structure of alienation and externalization

Alienation ≠ Objectification

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cates the first chapter of Das Kapital to commodity. For those conversant in studies of the Manuscripts, this distinction is crucial. It is exactly because of this value-­ laden postulate of species-essence in the alienated labor theory that some hold the Manuscripts to contain Marx’s immature writing. Another difference between alienation and reification is that alienation is the subject-object (Objekt) relation or the movement between a subject and his object. Thus, one subject already suffices for alienation built on the basis of a bipolar subject-­object (Objekt) structure. Regarding Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, this pattern of alienation has a bearing on the alienated labor concept in the First Manuscript. Reification, however, is grounded on the social relations of two subjects mediated by Sache and thereby calls for at least two subjects and a Sache. For this reason, the reification structure is at least tripolar. This pattern applies to the alienation of intercourse concept in principle. Conversely, one could say that the alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill is the embryo of Marx’s reification concept. If its appearance indicates, as aforementioned, the establishment of historical materialist methodology, then Comments on James Mill is where it all starts. The analysis hitherto suggests that the structure of reification is obviously more developed than that of alienation. It is probably owning to this that Hiromatsu concretizes the transition from early to late Marx as the conversion “from alienation theory to reification theory”. Admittedly, this paradigm proves to be effective in illustrating the shift in Marx’s thought. Nevertheless, the author has a distinct interpretation and will point out some principal differences. Above all, Hiromatsu dates the emergence of reification to Ideologie, whereas this author to Comments on James Mill. Second, instead of blurring the distinction between Hegel and Feuerbach, the author conceives of this transition as Marx’s conversion from Feuerbach’s to Hegel’s framework, as expounded in the proceeding chapters. Third, as we shall see in the next subchapter, Hiromatsu holds a quite narrow view of the alienation in the Paris Manuscripts, as he only really considers the self-alienation in the First Manuscript and passes over the mutual alienation in Comments on James Mill. Fourth, he omits to see that the significance of this transition is that Marx’s account of man and society shifts from being led by the intrinsic principle to being led by the extrinsic principle.

11.1.3  The Hazy Thingification Concept Likewise, Marx avails himself of the thingfication concept. What then is the distinction between reification and thingification? To bring this to light, we have first to determine the difference between Sache and Ding. Hegel distinguishes Sache from Ding, a differentiation that features in Phänomenologie, Wissenschaft der Logik and Grundlinien. First, in Phänomenologie: “[A]n object born of self-consciousness as its own, without ceasing to be a free object in the proper sense. The Thing [Ding] of sense-­ certainty and perception now acquires its significance through self-consciousness

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and through it alone; on this rests the distinction between a Thing [Ding] and a cause or a ‘matter in hand’ [Sache]”.11 Based on this passage, thing is the object of “sense-certainty and perception”, a pure thing that has not yet entered self-­ consciousness or the world of man. Second, in Grundlinien: “What is immediately different from the free spirit is, for the latter and in itself, the external in general  – a thing [Sache], something unfree, impersonal, and without rights”.12 Apparently, Hegel here also construes Sache as thing rather than person, just as Kant does. Notwithstanding, though having “no Subjectivity”13 compared with person, Sache, in comparison to Ding, stands in certain social relations to person, such as property relations. Thus, from Hegel’s viewpoint, Sache stands in self-consciousness or property relations, whilst Ding remains outside. Marx adopts Hegel’s differentiation between Sache and Ding, writing for instance: “Yet the first and the most universal account of Sache as a social thing [Ding] is the conversion of labor product into commodity”14; “A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing [Ding] that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another”15; “However, capital is not a thing [Ding], but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing [Ding] and lends this thing [Ding] a specific social character”.16 Considering these examples, Marx conceives of Sache as an object processed by man’s practice, thereby conferred with a certain social character, or an object that man possesses, appropriates, utilizes, disposes of and puts up for exchange. As the embodiment of certain social relations, it is exemplified in commodity, money, capital, etc. A thing, however, belongs to that which constitutes the material substratum of commodity, namely the material character of the thing itself. Only when conferred with the character of certain social relations can a thing become Sache.17 With this distinction, we can now proceed to account for thingification. What is thingification? Hegel himself never uses the term “Verdinglichung”, except for formulations such as “making oneself a Thing”,18 “making oneself into a thing [sich  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 246.  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 73. 13  Ibid., p. 74. 14  Marx, Das Kapital. Band I, Hamburg, 1867, S. 39 (translated into English by K.H.). 15  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 45. 16  Marx, Capital. Volume III, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 37: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1998, p. 801. 17  Senlin Liu and Gang Luo also write at great length on this from the terminological perspective, arguing for distinguishing Sache and Ding, a differentiation similar to that drawn in this chapter (see Senlin Liu, Reexamination of Verdinglichung. Proceeding from its Distinction from Versachlichung; Gang Luo, The Unconsciousness and Inactivity of Social Relations. Lukács’s Differentiation of Verdinglichung and Versachlichung, in: Philosophical Trends, no. 12, 2012). 18  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 213. 11 12

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zum Dinge machen; translator]”,19 “self-objectification [sich zum Gegenstande machen; translator]”,20 “This processing [Verarbeiten; translator] of things is itself many-sided, however; it is consciousness making itself into a thing”.21 These articulations suggest that, had Hegel ever developed a concept of thingfication, it could only refer to the process by which man converts himself to a thing (Ding). In other words, for Hegel, thingification is identical with objectification or alienation.22 Marx only uses the term “Verdinglichung” a few times and, to the author’s knowledge, twice in Das Kapital, once being in Volume III: “In capital-profit, or still better capital-interest, land-rent, labour-wages, in this economic trinity represented as the connection between the component parts of value and wealth in general and its sources, we have the complete mystification of the capitalist mode of production, the conversion of social relations into things [Verdinglichung], the direct coalescence of the material production relations with their historical and social determination. It is an enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy world”.23 Based on this passage alone, thingification designates social relations that become purely thinglike in character, such as gold and silver. This definition per se needs no further explanation. Yet the application of this term by scholars like Lukács, Hiromatsu, and Tairako has attached more content to this concept, complicating our definition of the term. Let us start with Hiromatsu’s concept of thingification. To establish his reification theory, Hiromatsu differentiates reification from thingification. In The Original Image of Historical Materialism, he enumerates three manifestations of thingification: (1) “Man as such is thingified”, e.g. when he is traded as slave or simply treated as an appendage to a machine. In these conditions, man is degraded to a thing-like being. (2) “Man’s way of behavior is thingified”, insofar as he, for instance, loses control of his action amid streams of people in a train station or in an overcrowded tram. Such an involuntary way of being is identical to that of thing. (3) “Man’s subjective ability is thingified”, insofar as he e.g. externalizes his subjective ability to an object, converting it into a piece of art such as sculpture or painting. In this sense, “man’s subjective ability becomes the existence of the thing”.24 According to these articulations, Hiromatsu’s thingification refers to the conversion from subject to object (Objekt), from man to thing, whilst “reification is not the idea that the subjective suddenly becomes a thing-like being, but the phenomenon that the social relation between men is mistaken as the relation between things as well as the char-

 Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit, trans. by L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, 1983, p. 103. 20  Ibid. 21  Ibid., p. 120. 22  Bokui Sun also distinguishes two conditions within thingification, i.e. objectification and alienation; only the latter, as he sees it, includes alienation of social relation (see Bokui Sun, Lukács and Marx, Nanjing University Press, 1999, p. 1). 23  Marx, Capital. Volume III, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 37: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1998, p. 817. 24  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Original Image of Historical Materialism, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2009, p. 35 f. 19

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acter of thing”.25 Thingification belongs to early Marx’s immature framework, whereas reification is a scientific category which late Marx avails himself of. The transition from the early to the late period can be thought of as the transition “from thingification theory to reification theory”.26 As such, Hiromatsu actually deems thingification to be the counterexample of the reification concept. Unlike Hiromatsu’s negative treatment of the thingification concept, Tairako not only redefines thingification, but also recognizes the standing of thingification in Marx’s economic system27: “The thingification is the process in which various reificated moments of social relations manifest themselves as the natural characteristics of the thing [Ding] as such. Thingification refers to the disappearance of the social relationship sphere and its conversion to the sphere of immanent relations of thing or properties [Eigenschaft]. A particular object is defined as a thing when the various relations it conveys are all imagined as properties of the object”.28 To rephrase it, if reification denotes the manifestation of social relations as the relationship between Sachen, then thingification means that the relation between Sachen further presents itself as a purely thinglike quality (dingliche Qualität) or property of thing (dingliche Eigenschaft). This differentiation is in fact founded on a differentiation between Person, Sache and Ding. Sache is the thing that enters relations between persons, and Ding is the pure and simple thing itself. Considering the distance to social relation, they can be arranged in the sequence “person → Sache → thing”, in which Sache stands in closer proximity to social relations than the thing. Reification is when the person becomes Sache and thingification is when Sache become a thing. As he sees it, reification and thingification are not independent of each other. In the process from reification to thingification, the social relations between men goes through two reversals: (1) the reversal from man to Sache (the first reversal) and (2) from Sache to thing. Through this double reversal, the social relations between men further adheres to the thing and are, “as a property of the object of the thing as such, embedded in the thing”.29 In this regard, thingification is a more profound concealment and mystification of social relations than reification. This differentiation of Tairako resembles Marx’s differentiation between commodity and money. According to Marx, commodity is already an abstraction from man’s social labor, and money is

25  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Original Image of Historical Materialism, San-Ichi Shobo, 1974, p. 63f (translated into English by K.H.). 26  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Original Image of Historical Materialism, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2009, p. 36. 27  Besides the essays cited in this chapter, also see The Method and Dialectic in Marx’s Critique of Economics (in: Yuibutsuron, no. 8, 1977) and The Underlying Characters of Das Kapital. “The Inverted Logic” (in: Dialectic and Modernity, ed. by C.  Iwasaki, Horitsu Bunkaisha, 1987). In respect of these two essays, Hirotaro Yamamoto launches criticism at Tairako in his Difference and Marx: Alienation, Reification and Fetish (Aoki Shoten, 1985). 28  Tomonaga Tairako, Socialism and Modern World, Aoki Shoten, 1991, p.  192 (translated into English by K.H.). 29  Tomonaga Tairako, The Method of Marx’s Critique of Economics and the Dialectic as Formal Determination, in: Scientific Method and Conception of Society, ed. by C. Iwasaki, Chobunsha, 1979, p. 118 (translated into English by K.H.). In this regard, Tairako’s viewpoint is exactly opposite to that of Senlin Liu and Gang Luo. See Senlin Liu and Gang Luo’s essays.

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a further abstraction from commodity, an abstraction of an abstraction. In this sense, money is a more profound concealment of social relations than commodity.30 Lastly, we turn to Lukács’s concept of thingification. As is well-known, it is thanks to Lukács that the thingification concept has come under the spotlight; yet it is also because of him that the meaning of this concept remains opaque. As early as 1923, Lukács propounded a concept of thingification in his Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein31 and, centering on this concept, made an interpretation of Marx’s thought, especially his notion of fetishism of commodity in Das Kapital. As such, his thingification concept should have been closer to reification or fetishism. Lukács even quotes the above mentioned passage in Section 4. The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof to underpin his definition of thingification, supplementing it with an explanation of what happens when commodity becomes a universal social category, “[o]bjectively a world of objects [Ding] and relations between things springs into being (the world of commodities and their movements on the market). The laws governing these objects are indeed gradually discovered by man, but even so they confront him as invisible forces that generate their own power. […] Subjectively – where the market economy has been fully developed – a man’s activity becomes estranged from himself, it turns into a commodity which, subject to the non-human objectivity of the natural laws of society, must go its own way independently of man just like any consumer article”.32 Considering this, Lukács’s thingification concept seems to conform with the author’s account of reification. In the essay Die Verdinglichung und das Bewußtsein des Proletariats, however, Lukács advances a perplexing definition of thingification: “[A] man’s own activity, his own labour becomes something objective and independent of him, something that controls him by virtue of an autonomy alien to man”.33 Considering this, thingification is rather similar to the above defined alienation, and there are indeed many expositions of the alienation of man throughout Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. As one of the Chinese translators of Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, Zhangzhi Du also notices this, commenting in the Translator’s Preface that “thingification is also an overarching concept permeating the entire Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. It denotes that man’s activity, his own labor becomes something objective and opposite to him. […] Lukács deduces this concept directly from Marx’s survey of fetishism of commodity in Das Kapital. It was impossible for him to have read Marx’s manuscripts of 1844 at that time, yet his exposition of thingification exceedingly resembles what Marx has said about ‘alien-

 Cf. Tomonaga Tairako, The Connection of Thingification and Reification with Hegel’s Dialectic, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 4, 2012. In this article, Tairako divides thingification into two phases, i.e. (1) fetishism of commodity and (2) fetishism of money, conceiving the conversion from commodity to money as deepening of thingification, which veers away from his early thought. 31  Lukács also avails himself of the reification concept. Concerning this problem, see Gang Luo, The Unconsciousness and Inactivity of Social Relations. Lukács’s Differentiation of Verdinglichung and Versachlichung, in: Philosophical Trends, no. 12, 2012. 32  Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, 1971, p. 87. 33  Ibid. 30

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ation’ in those manuscripts”.34 In the Preface to the new edition (1967), Lukács himself also admits that “the phenomenon of reification is closely related to that of alienation but is neither socially nor conceptually identical with it; here the two words were used synonymously”.35 Furthermore, Lukács does not even distinguish objectification from alienation. In the Preface to the new edition (1967), he reflects on this problem: “History and Class Consciousness follows Hegel in that it too equates alienation with objectification [Vergegenständlichung; trans.] (to use the term employed by Marx in the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts)”.36 Setting aside an element of humbleness, there is indeed no sign of differentiation of these concepts in Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. To the author’s knowledge, it is in the autumn of 1937 when he finished Der Junge Hegel that Lukács drew a distinction between objectification and alienation for the first time. When exactly he decided to differentiate between reification and alienation, however, is hitherto unknown. In overview, instead of distinguishing thingification, alienation, reification and objectification, Lukács employs them all in the sense of reification. For this reason, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein actually complicates our understanding of reification and other relevant concepts. To sum up, Lukács, Hiromatsu and Tairako all have distinctive ideas of reification. The author has yet to come to an explicit definition of reification, but tends towards Tairako’s viewpoint in that he at least explicitly distinguishes reification from alienation and objectification. However, because of the particularity of Tairako’s reading, it will take a while before it is widely accepted. Lastly, the author wants to emphasize that, due to Lukács’s position and influence in Chinese Marx studies, the distinction of reification, alienation and reification had fallen into neglect China. With the introduction of achievements of Japanese Marxism as well as the deepening of discussion on this problem, Chinese scholars are now confronted with the decision: Whether to stick to Lukács’s approach or to differentiate between these concepts?

11.2  O  pposition Between Mochizuki and Hiromatsu on the Problem of the Alienation Theory In the 1960s and the 1970s, there was a “debate over early Marx”37 in Japan, carried out between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki. This debate not only concerned a series of thorny issues including assessments of Comments on James Mill and the 34  Zhangzhi Du, Translator’s Preface, in: G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by Zhangzhi Du et al., The Commercial Press, 2004, p. 7 (translated into English by K.H.). 35  Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, 1971, p. xxivf. 36  Ibid., p. xxiv. 37  This expression first appeared in Comprehensive Index of Modern Debates (ed. by K. Matsumoto,

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reconstruction of Marx’s alienation theory, barely covered hitherto by Chinese scholars, but also prompted Japanese Marx scholars to break through the conventional explanatory framework of alienation theory and accomplish an emancipation of thought in their study of early Marx. The background of this “debate over early Marx” between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki is philological advancements in the study of the Paris Manuscripts at that time, the two pivotal conclusions being: First, that the Paris Manuscripts encompass two inseparable parts, i.e. the Notes (Comments on James Mill in particular) and the Manuscripts; Second, the writing of the Paris Manuscripts follows the process “First Manuscripts → Comments on James Mill → the Second Manuscripts → the Third Manuscripts”. Considering these two conclusions, it is necessary to integrate the Notes or at least Comments on James Mill in studies of the Manuscripts. Furthermore, since Comments on James Mill is Marx’s earliest work of economics and the alienation concept in the Manuscripts is normally regarded as a philosophical study, the combination of the Manuscripts and Comments on James Mill aim to fuse economics with philosophy. These two requirements have later become a prerequisite of studies of the Manuscripts in Japan, as Kiriro Morita remarks: “It is unreasonable to study the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts without reference to Comments on James Mill; particularly, any approach that severs [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts from other parts will lead to misinterpretation and distortion of Marx’s alienation theory”.38 On account of this paradigmatic shift, the documentary value of the previously neglected Comments on James Mill has grown more prominent than ever, whereby Japanese studies of the Manuscripts undergo a revolutionary change, creating a new environment for the studies of the Manuscripts studies distinct from elsewhere. The advent of this new condition inevitably brings about new readings of the Manuscripts such as Mochizuki’s civil society theory, which necessarily comes into conflict with the then existing studies of early Marx, especially Hiromatsu’s alienation theory as the most representative among them. Centering on the evaluation problem of the Paris Manuscripts, the author shall introduce and outline the disagreement between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki.

Ruitsu Shuban, 1980). In Japan, only few have studied this debate, probably because Mochizuki specializes in history of economics and is normally associated with his challenge to Hisao Otsuka’s school of historical science. In fact, Mochizuki also presents an extensive critique of Hiromatsu in his major work A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory. Besides, unlike Otsuka as well as the disciples of his school who never respond to Mochizuki’s critique, Hiromatsu specifically wrote an anti-critique in response to Mochizuki, in which sense there has been actual debate between him and Mochizuki, not to mention their direct confrontation at the economics conference of Meiji Gakuin University. 38  Kiriro Morita, Comments on James Mill. The Evolution of the Economics Notion as a Critique of Civil Society. Part I, in: Gendai no Riron, no. 5, 1971, p. 9f (translated into English by K.H.).

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11.2.1  Hiromatsu’s Negation of the Alienation Theory The greatest achievement of Hiromatsu, Japan’s leading Marxist in the 1960s and 1970s, is his distinctive interpretation of the development of Marx’s thought, namely that between the Manuscripts and Ideologie there is a giant leap “from the logic of alienation theory to the logic of reification theory”. This proposition differs from Althusser’s “epistemological break”, insofar as its essense lies in construing the reification theory as the mark of Marx becoming the Marx we now know and the alienation theory as a notion discarded by Marx after Ideologie. Why does Hiromatsu conceive of the alienation theory as part of Marx’s immature thought? He provides a reason unlike that seen in the Soviet textbook system and Althusser: The alienation theory was abandoned because it was in nature self-­ alienation. As we know, alienation tends to refer to a state in which the subject’s creation is in opposition to him and estranged from him. This has been the typical logic of the subject-object (Objekt) relation since Descartes, a logic that belongs to modern philosophical categories. When addressing this concept, however, Hiromatsu reduces its essence to the negatively perceived concept of self-alienation. What is self-alienation? According to Hiromatsu, it is the process by which the subject externalizes and then reclaims himself through supersession. This is characterized by the action of the isolated subject, as is typified by Hegel’s concept of the spirit and the Young Hegelians’ theory of self-consciousness. As is known, the Young Hegelians dissolve Hegel’s spirit into self-­consciousness, species-essence, man (Mensch), etc., invoking this logic of self-consciousness to launch criticism of religion, state and politics in Germany at the time, and giving birth to progressive German ideologies. As Marx criticizes in Die Heilige Familie and Ideologie, however, self-consciousness will inevitably fall into the pitfall of idealism or abstract humanism for it necessarily presupposes a subject a priori. Moreover, since it suffices with only one subject, it cannot serve as the explanatory principle of a civil society built on division of labor and exchange of multiple private owners. Hence, the crux of the problem lies in whether or not Marx, in the period of the Paris Manuscripts, is confined to the framework of self-alienation? For Hiromatsu the answer is affirmative. For him, in the period of the Manuscripts, Marx has already, through a critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law and his initial study of political economics, substituted the Young Hegelians’ concept of subject, i.e. spirit or self-consciousness and even Feuerbach’s man, with the laborer under certain relations of production, and thought of labor within the political economy as alienated labor. Yet, with respect to the theoretical structure of alienated labor, its first three aspects of alienated labor in particular, and his definition of labor as self-­ alienation, Marx’s alienation concept is in essence still a concept of self-alienation. Moreover, if the evolution of Marxism is to be seen as having been influenced by German classical philosophy, English political economy and French socialism, then it is chiefly by virtue of the self-alienation logic that Marx managed to accomplish the synthesis. In brief, his critique of political economics and of communist theory both rest on the logic of self-alienation. Thus, the Manuscripts in their entirety are

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a writing on self-alienation, and Marx at that time has not yet escaped from the Young Hegelians’ framework of thought.39 In Hiromatsu’s opinion, it is in the 2 years after having written Ideologie that Marx bids farewell to the concept of self-alienation, a transition signified by the reification concept: “In Die Deutsche Ideologie, the self-alienation logic as such undergoes a critique (self-critique), the proposition Marx asserted in the Manuscripts is completely set aside and replaced by the logic of reification theory”.40 Reification designates “phenomena such as that the intersubjective relation between men is mistakenly conceived as ‘property of thing’ (e.g. that money possesses the ‘property’ of purchasing power), and that the intersubjective social relations between men are mistakenly thought of as ‘relations between things’ (e.g. the value relation of commodities as well as the price-determined relationship between ‘demand’ and ‘supply’)”.41 Based on this exposition, reification differs from alienation, insofar as it no longer rests on the structure of simple subject-object (Objekt) relations, but is a structure of complex social relations consisting of multiple subjects (mainly the division of labor and exchange relation of private owners); its subject is not abstract man anymore, but private owners mediated by commodity and money. Moreover, reification stands on a higher theoretical plane to alienation: If the alienation theory corresponds to humanism for the Young Hegelians, then the reification theory is equivalent to historical materialism. One could say that the advent of the reification theory marks the establishment of Marxism. Hiromatsu’s conclusion that the Manuscripts are about self-alienation is underpinned by the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscript. Then, what is his attitude towards Comments on James Mill that assumes more importance in the philological studies? In general, he adopts a negative stance: To begin with, in his works published before Lapin’s essay, i.e. The Establishment of Marxism, The World of Marxism and On Engels, there is no place for Comments on James Mill and pertinent discussions in Japanese academia about Marxist economics. After the publication of Lapin’s essay, it is mainly in On Young Marx (1971) that he takes philological conclusions into consideration. Though unfolding his exposition in this book in the order of “the First Manuscripts – Comments on James Mill – the Second Manuscript – the Third Manuscript”, Hiromatsu shows no intention of comparing the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] and the alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill, and his examination of Comments of James Mill is mainly geared to determining whether or not the problem of the origin of private property has been solved. According to the conclusion he draws, not only does the problem remain unsolved, but the presupposition of private property also contradicts the logic of the First Manuscript, namely to deduce private property from alienated labor. That is to 39  Cf. Wataru Hiromatsu, Marxism and the Self-alienation Theory, in: The Original Image of Historical Materialism, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2009, p. 215–217. 40  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Horizon of Marxism, Keiso Shobo, 1969, p. 245 (translated into English by K.H.). 41  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Contour of the Versachlichung Theory, trans. by Xi Peng & Yi Zhuang, Nanjing University Press, 2002, p. 70 (translated into English by K.H.).

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say, instead of resolving the problem left by the First Manuscript, Comments on James Mill further gives rise to a problem of circular reasoning between alienated labor and private property. Second, he does not hold the achievements of Marx’s study of economics in Comments on James Mill in high regard, especially the alienation of intercourse concept. From his point of view, the level of economics in the Notes including comments on Mill and Ricardo has, both qualitatively and quantitatively, taken a giant stride forward compared with that in the First Manuscripts. Yet, “from the perspective of the third party, it still remains on a plane about which even the late Marx himself would pull a wry face”.42 Besides, considering the concept of an “estranged form of social intercourse”, Marx merely “adopts the standpoint that man should first of all be posited in his original way of being, namely the species-being as such [Gemeinwesen als solches], which, in Hegel’s terms, is the perspective of ethical substance [sittliche Substanz]”.43 That is to say, for Hiromatsu, the economics of Comments on James Mill is equal to or on a slightly higher level than that of Hegel’s Grundlinien. Considering that Marx continues to use the self-alienation logic of the First Manuscript, the entire Notes, including Comments on James Mill, are on the same level as the First Manuscript and there is no qualitative leap from the First Manuscript to Comments on James Mill. This is Hiromatsu’s actual attitude towards Comments on James Mill.44

11.2.2  Mochizuki’s Critique of Hiromatsu Shortly after its appearance, Hiromatsu’s interpretation of the concept of alienation was subjected to critique by the civil society school of Marxism. A Japanese movement from the 1960s, it strictly distinguishes civil society from bourgeois society, insomuch as the former is a society of the commodity economy, grounded on the division of labor and exchange of private owners, and the latter is a class society resting on the theory of surplus value and exploitation. As opposed to the Soviet textbook system which normally directly enters any critique of bourgeois society without analyzing the structure of civil society, this school stresses the significance of civil society for grasping the essence of bourgeois society. Second, this methodology requires them to pay more attention to the intercourse and exchange relations between private owners and even elevates the concept of intercourse and exchange to the underlying principle for anatomy and critique of civil society. For instance, Kiyoaki Hirata, one of the founders of this school, defines civil society directly as a 42  Wataru Hiromatsu, On Young Marx. IV. Early Economics, Heibonsha, 1971, p. 237 (translated into English by K.H.). 43  Ibid., p. 240. 44  “Through Feuerbach’s logic, he [Marx] accounts for the establishment and supersession of private property; the framework of man’s self-alienation and return to himself does not fall apart instantly. […] The adoption of this framework also occurs in Economics Notes” (ibid., p. 259).

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“society of intercourse”.45 Setting out from this, their readings of the Paris Manuscripts naturally put more emphasis on the alienation of intercourse concept in Comments on James Mill and thus come into conflict with Hiromatsu’s viewpoint on the Manuscripts. Members of this school such as Mochizuki, Morita, Hata have all criticized Hiromatsu and the most representative critique is Mochizuki’s. To begin with, Mochizuki deems it necessary to base studies of the Paris Manuscripts on philological conclusions and thereby overcome the original explanatory framework that reduces alienation to a philosophical category, construing it as an economics category. As such, what exactly are philosophical and economic categories? When addressing Marx’s critical transformation of Hess’s thought, Mochizuki provides an explanation thereof: Marx “adopts a twofold method: On the one hand, he returns to Hegel’s ‘system of needs’ and, from a higher level, distill the alienation theory into the theory of division of labor=intercourse (Comments on James Mill); on the other hand, he goes directly into the foundation of equivalent exchange, i.e. social production=labor (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts). This double approach grants him great confidence for he acquires a distinctive, immanent understanding of the alienation theory”.46 Considering this passage, the philosophical category is de facto the above-mentioned alienated labor concept moulded on self-alienation and the economics category designates the alienation of intercourse concept that Marx attains through examining political economics and supplements with content such as the division of labor and the exchange between private owners. They respectively correspond to the First Manuscript and Comments on James Mill. Yet Marx’s complete alienation theory ought to be a united ­philosophical and economics category, of alienated labor and alienation of intercourse. As Mochizuki sees it, in order to understand Marx’s alienation theory, we can by no means sever Comments on James Mill and the First Manuscript from each other, but have to look upon them as a “reciprocally supplementing and completing”47 entirety instead. This can be considered the new principle for interpretation of Marx’s alienation theory. Cutting from this new principle, Mochizuki reproaches Hiromatsu from two perspectives: First, Hiromatsu only construes alienation from the philosophical perspective, equating Marx’s alienation theory with the Young Hegelians’ self-alienation theory. As a result, not only can his notion of the alienation theory hardly differ from that traditional “understanding of alienation in the sense of absolute privation”, which puts alienation solely in the context of the immediate process of capitalist production and narrows it down to absolute privation that alienation brings on laborer, the philosophical perspective also leaves him no choice but to negate Marx’s alienation theory. Second, he fails to tell the difference between the alienation of intercourse concept in Comments on James Mill and the alienated labor theory in  Kiyoaki Hirata, Civil Society and Socialism, Iwanami Shoten, 1969, p. 56 (translated into English by K.H.). 46  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 39 (translated into English by K.H.). 47  Ibid., p. 54. 45

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the First Manuscript, and hence underrates alienation of intercourse. It seems that he directly jumps to Ideology after merely studying the alienated labor in the First Manuscript, “without examining the immanent development of Marx’s thought”.48 Resting on this conclusion, Mochizuki moves on to raise his objection in three aspects: (1) Before Ideologie. Owning to the economic content added to the alienation concept in the Paris Manuscripts, this concept is already different from the self-alienation of the Young Hegelians. Therefore, the alienation theory is no longer the object to be “settle[d] accounts with” in Ideologie, but instead counts as mature thought of Marx instead. (2) In the period of Ideologie. By invoking the examples of “the philosophers”49 and “Herr Grün”,50 Hiromatsu determines that “Marx undertakes a self-critique of the alienation concept” in Ideologie. In Mochizuki’s opinion, however, Hiromatsu misunderstands these two examples in that what Marx actually criticizes is the approach that “construes the entire history as historical image of the development and self-alienation of this abstract ‘man’ rather than the alienation category as such”.51 (3) After Ideologie. Based on the fact that Marx also avails himself of the alienation concept in Grundrisse and Das Kapital in the positive sense, Mochizuki points out that, “after the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and Comments on James Mill”, Marx in his maturity still maintains “the alienation theorylike conception of society”,52 and Hiromatsu’s reading that Marx has surpassed the alienation theory after Ideology does not conform to the fact. Mochizuki’s objection shares many similarities with Keiichi’s and others’ critique of Hiromatsu standpoint.53 This is one of the reasons that the transition “from the logic of alienation theory to the logic of reification theory” asserted by Hiromatsu suffers much criticism. To Mochizuki’s incisive critique, Hiromatsu responded in Shin Jidai54 (1975) and the Collected Works edition of The Evolution of Marxism (1984). These responses, however, completely bypasses the pivotal issues concerning Comments on James Mill and alienation of intercourse, targeting at Mochizuki’s explanation of the collaboration problem in Ideologie, arguing that Mochizuki’s distinguishing Marx and Engel’s notions of division of labor and reducing them respectively to “theory about the development of division of labor” and “theory about development of gestalts of property” do not make sense.55 Hence, in Hiromatsu’s response, we  Ibid., p. 63.  Marx, The German Ideology, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 48. 50  Ibid. p. 486. 51  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 160. 52  Ibid., p. 334. 53  Among Keiichi’s numerous critiques of it, see e.g. The Japanese Studies of Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 1844 (trans. by Lixin Han, in: Tsinghua Philosophical Almanac (2004), Hebei University Press, 2006). 54  Wataru Hiromatsu & Seiji Mochizuki: On the Collaboration Problem in Ideologie, in: Shin Jidai, no. 3, 1975. 55  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Evolution of Marxism, in: Collected Works of Wataru Hiromatsu, vol. 8, Iwanami Shoten, 1997, p. 540 (translated into English by K.H.). 48 49

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can find not no sign of change of attitude towards Comments of James Mill nor traces suggesting his acceptance of Mochizuki’s critique. These objections suggest that Mochizuki holds an affirmative viewpoint on Marx’s alienation theory, only this theory is no longer that simple philosophical category (alienated labor), but a reconstructed alienation theory incorporating the content of an economics category (alienation of intercourse). It is through this reconstruction that Mochizuki, when establishing Marx’s historical theory, confidently claims that “the survey of the formation of Marx’s historical theory does not have to follow common understanding, e.g. that historical materialism starts from Ideologie, but ought to proceed from Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and Economics Notes, or even sets out from the immanent study of the ‘alienation’ logic”.56 This is a distinctive standpoint rarely found in international Marx studies.

11.3  Assessment of the “Debate over Early Marx” The analysis thus far illustrates the point that any disagreement between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki is concentrated on Comments on James Mill and their different interpretations of alienation theory: Hiromatsu holds Comments on James Mill to be insignificant, while, from Mochizuki’s perspective, it actually plays a decisive role. As regards Marx’s alienation theory, Hiromatsu negates it due to its underlying self-­ alienation structure, whereas Mochizuki recognizes its value with regard to the alienation of intercourse aspect it entails. This is the essence of the confrontation between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki in the “debate over early Marx”.

11.3.1  Is Alienation of Intercourse a New Form of Alienation? This leaves us to determine how we should evaluate this “debate over early Marx”? The key is in the question of whether alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill is distinct from alienated labor, or rather a logic apart. The answer to this question will determine our assessment of Hiromatsu and Mochizuki. The alienation of intercourse concept has been expounded on at great length in Chapter X. Here, the author shall only supplement this from the perspective of its difference from alienated labor. In Comments on James Mill, intercourse designates the unmediated, direct relationship between persons, which is “the true [communal essence] of men”.57 In civil society, however, the intercourse between persons can only be bridged by virtue of a mediator such as private property and money, because  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 8. 57  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 217. 56

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of which relations between persons manifests themselves as an exchange relation between Sachen. This is evidently not the true intercourse, but rather an inverted state of intercourse or an inhuman condition whereby man is enslaved by Sache. As this inverted and inhuman state matches the account of alienation, Marx names it the “estranged form of social intercourse”58 or, briefly, alienation of intercourse. When examined closely, it is apparent that alienation of intercourse is distinct from alienated labor. First, in alienated intercourse, the character and quantity of the subject are fundamentally different. The subject coming on stage in alienated labor is an isolated laborer, who is originally man with his species-essence, tinged with humanism; alienation refers to the alienation of this man. Alienation of intercourse, however, concerns at least two equal private owners (Privateigentümer) or “real men”, and takes the “relation of man to man as that of property owner to property owner”59 as its logical starting point. Second, the change of alienated subject shifts the focus of alienation theory. Figuratively speaking, if alienated labor refers to the vertical relationship between man and object or man and nature, then alienation of intercourse concerns the horizontal, “social connection or social relationship between the two property owners [die gesellschaftliche Beziehung oder das gesellschaftliche Verhältniß der beiden Privateigenthümer]”.60 The former can be called the perspective of labor or of production founded on the subject-object (Objekt) relationship and the latter the perspective of social relations. One might raise an objection that Marx also touches upon labor and the like in Comments on James Mill. Yet this labor is no longer the alienated labor of the First Manuscript, but rather the gainful labor of the private owner, bent on making profit through exchange. For this reason, this labor presupposes the exchange relationship between two private owners. Lastly, the advent of the vantage point of social relations brings about an essential change to the theoretical scenario of the Paris Manuscripts. Here, the stage in the spotlight is no longer the one exemplified in alienated labor, or the immediate process of capitalist production that rests on an opposition between labor and capital, but the world of alienated intercourse, centering on a division of labor and exchange and consisting of multiple private owners. If alienated labor is Marx’s first abstraction of the essence of capitalist society, then alienation of intercourse is his exposure of the realities of civil society. By analogy with the relevant discussions in Japanese economic studies mentioned in Chapter IV, the former is the logic of capital relations and the latter the logic of commodity = money relations. To be noted, it is relatively easier for young Marx to discover the logic of capital relation than to realize the significance of the logic of commodity = money relation: The logic of capital relation belongs to the level of the First Manuscript and can be deduced from Marx’s theoretical background, that is the Young Hegelians’ philosophy of self-consciousness. Understanding and recognizing the logic of commodity = money relations, however, requires Marx to completely transcend his original theoretical framework and enter a brand-new realm, i.e. critique of political eco Ibid.  Ibid., p. 217. 60  Ibid., p. 218. 58 59

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nomics. This marks the conversion from philosophical idealism to serious economic science, a fully-qualified quantum leap. As such, alienation of intercourse stands on a higher plane than alienated labor, and is the turning point on Marx’s path to historical materialism. In conclusion, in Comments on James Mill, Marx does adopt a new vantage point distinct from self-alienation, that is alienation of intercourse, or, as Marx puts it, self-alienation is demonstrated “both in the form of self-estrangement and in that of mutual estrangement”.61 The emergence of “mutual estrangement” not only adds a new dimension to Marx’s alienation theory, but also deepens his conception of the structure of capitalist society. This is the author’s basic conclusion regarding the problem of alienated intercourse in Comments on James Mill. Assuming this conclusion is correct, we can now make a judgment on the debate between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki. Alienation as conceived by Hiromatsu comprises solely of alienated labor without alienation of intercourse, which is one-sided and narrow. Mochizuki’s notion of alienation embraces both alienated labor and alienation of intercourse and is therefore integral and profound.

11.3.2  T  he Reason of Hiromatsu’s Dismissal of Alienated Intercourse Then what leads to such significant difference between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki with respect to an understanding of Marx’s alienation theory? As leading figures of Japan’s new-generation of Marxism, freed from the clutches of Stalinism,62 both Hiromatsu and Mochizuki oppose the so-called orthodox school or dogmatic system, seeking to interpret Marx from scratch, and deduce the essence of his thought and world outlook by proceeding from the logic of social relations of multiple subjects (society) instead of the logic of onefold subject-object (Objekt) relations (labor). For Hiromatsu, it comes down to the reification theory (or “fundamental nature of relations”, “social ontology”, “structure of the common subject”, etc.). For Mochizuki, on the other hand, it is exemplified by civil society theory (or social intercourse, social connections, and a history of dependency relations, etc.). Hiromatsu’s main work on the reification theory is The Original Image of Historical Materialism, Contours of the Versachlichung Theory and The Philosophy of Das Kapital. The Original Image of Historical Materialism unmasks early Marx’s theoretical developments from abstract man to economic relation-centered reification; Contour of the Versachlichung Theory and The Philosophy of Das Kapital focuses on commodities exchange and fetishism, namely the problem of the exchange relationship of private owners’ commodities. These three works present themselves  Ibid., p. 222.  For this reason, Yibing Zhang names them “new Marxism in Japan”. See Yibing Zhang & Lixin Han, “Japanese Marxism” or “New Japanese Marxism”? Discourse on the Academic Positioning of the Japanese Marxism, in: Chinese Social Science Today, March 25, 2010.

61 62

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as a process from abstract to concrete, from philosophical reification to an economic view on reification. As for Mochizuki’s civil society theory, its core concept is civil society, the meaning of which is also a system of labor division and exchange of private owners. The reason he does not identify this system with society (society in the context of the Third Manuscript) is that civil society can only count as a prehistorical or alienated gestalt of society. As such, his employment of the term “civil society” is geared towards unveiling the relations of persons behind Sachen. Considering this, Hiromatsu’s reification theory and Mochizuki’s civil society theory shares structural similarity, insofar as both rest on Marx’s economic theory, particularly his survey and critique of the exchange relationship between private owners.63 With such a structural similarity, why does Hiromatsu not include alienation of intercourse in the category of alienation, reaffirming alienation in the same way as Mochizuki? As the author sees it, in addition to the reason that he only conceives of alienation as self-alienation, it is mainly determined by his proposition of the leap “from the logic of alienation theory to the logic of reification theory”. As is well-known, Marx’s most classic and mature articulation of the exchange relationship of private owners’ commodities as well as the reversal of this relationship is in Chapter I. Commodities. Section 3. The Form of Value or Exchange Value of Das Kapital, from which Hiromatsu’s reification theory originates. When seeking to divide the development of Marx’s thought, Hiromatsu set up this “form of value” theory as his criterion, tracing it back to writings prior to Das Kapital. This search stops when he unearths the reification theory in Ideologie.64 Yet, if this reification theory can indeed be reduced to the later “form of value” theory, then Hiromatsu’s determination of Ideologie as the line of demarcation does not match the actual development of early Marx’s thought: As analyzed above, compared with the division of labor theory in Ideology, the alienation of intercourse theory in Comments on James Mill stands much closer to the reification concept and can even be thought of as the prototype of reification. The author will further expatiate on this point. As has been noted, reification principally denotes that the relationship between persons manifests itself as a relationship between Sachen and that the relationship between persons is dominated by the relationship between Sachen. Based on this definition, Hiromatsu pinpoints the following two paragraphs in I.  Feuerbach of Ideologie as Marx’s earliest articulation of reification: “[A]s long as man remains in naturally evolved society, […] as long, therefore, as activity [Tätigkeit] is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to

 To be sure, similarity does not mean identity: Hiromatsu further seeks to surpass the sphere of exchange relation between property owners, widening the reification concept to nature and the entire ontological realm, an attempt that is however not unproblematic. Nanshi Wang, for instance, calls Hiromatsu’s extension of reification to natural world into question (see Nanshi Wang, Wataru Hiromatsu’s Reification-based Interpretation of Marx’s Theory and its Extension, in: Academic Research, no. 6, 2007). Mochizuki broadens the theory of exchange relation between property owners to historical area, establishing a civil society-centered historical theory, known as Mochizuki’s school of historical science in Japan. 64  Cf. Wataru Hiromatsu, The Original Image of Historical Materialism, trans. by Xiyi Deng, Nanjing University Press, 2009, p. 39–44. 63

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him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him”65; “This fixation [Sichfestsetzen] of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into a material [sachlich] power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now. The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is caused by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them”.66 The general meaning of these two paragraphs is that, as long as man still remains in “naturally evolved society”, a division of labor as well as a naturally formed “co-­ operation” can be converted into “material [sachlich] power” above man as such. In this respect, it is reasonable for Hiromatsu to regard these two paragraphs as ­evidence of the existence of reification theory in Ideologie. What is at issue is, however, that we can find far more direct expositions of reification in Comments on James Mill. For instance, “[t]he complete domination of the estranged thing [Sache] over man has become evident in money, which is completely indifferent [Gleichgültigkeit] both to the nature of the material, i.e., to the specific nature of the private property, and to the personality of the property owner. What was the domination of person over person is now the general domination of the thing over the person”.67 In spite of the absence of the term “reification”, this passage is, in terms of its content, virtually a repetition of the definition of reification in Chapter I. Commodities of Das Kapital. Furthermore, in this passage, Marx construes money directly as the exemplification of reification, which is identical to his definition of reification in Chapter I.  Commodities of Das Kapital. For this reason, if the author is about to modify Hiromatsu’s reification theory, then he should definitely interpret the alienation of intercourse in Comments on James Mill as Marx’s earliest reification theory and date the emergence of the reification theory back to Comments on James Mill. In conclusion, Hiromatsu should have read as far back as Comments on James Mill rather than stop at Ideologie. Why did he miss out on Comments on James Mill? One possible explanation is that he was subject to the proposition of a leap “from the logic of alienation theory to the logic of reification theory”. This proposition not only strictly distinguishes alienation and reification, but also, based on this differentiation, establishes Ideologie as the dividing line between Marx’s early and late period. Therefore, even having later noticed a similarity between alienation and reification, Hiromatsu was forced to “turn a blind eye” in order to maintain consistency. It is typical of Hiromatsu’s stubbornness that he never takes back what has been said, even when pointed out to be a definite mistake, just as he insists on his position that Engels led the writing of Ideologie. 65  Marx, The German Ideology, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 47. 66  Ibid., p. 47 f. 67  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 221.

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Yet, when encountering the self-alienation aporia of the alienated labor concept, Mochizuki does not opt to discard the alienation theory and replace it with the reification theory like Hiromatsu, but rather construes reification as a “subordinate concept”.68 That he does not counterpose reification and alienation from the outset opens up the possibility of reconstructing the alienation theory in a positive sense. Meanwhile, setting out from the alienation concept, he establishes his civil society theory by following the order “the social intercourse concept in Comments on James Mill → the development of division of labor in Ideologie → the social connection concept in the letter to Annenkov and Das Elend der Philosophie → the history of dependency relation in Grundrisse”. In accordance with this reconstruction, the division of labor theory in Ideologie can only serve as a continuation of the alienation theory in the Paris Manuscripts rather than as marker of the “break” between Marx’s early and late period. As the most mature gestalt of the civil society theory, the history of dependency relations are developed from alienation of intercourse. Therefore, from Mochizuki’s viewpoint, the alienation theory and the civil society theory are on no account mutually exclusive, but share the same structure by nature. It is probably for this reason that he discusses a program on the “alienation theory and civil society”69 for the purpose reinterpreting Marx’s historical theory by extending the range of application of the alienation theory from capitalist society to civil society as a whole.

11.3.3  Lack of Understanding of Hegel That Hiromatsu overlooks alienation of intercourse also stems from his lack of awareness of the significance of Hegel and political economics. At the outset of Chapter V, the author draws a comparison between the alienation concepts employed by Feuerbach and Hegel, pointing out that, in a strict sense, the logic of the isolated individual’s subject-object (Objekt) relation, i.e. the self-alienation logic that Hiromatsu points to, originates from Feuerbach instead of Hegel. The latter’s alienation concept, however, is the logic of both subject-object (Objekt) relations and social relations. As set forth in the last subchapter, Hegel’s alienation concept entails intersubjectivity, from which the reification concept can be deduced. Hiromatsu clearly omits to notice this distinction between the alienation concepts of the two, as he mistakenly attributes the logic of isolated individual’s self-alienation to Hegel, arguing that it is due to his adoption of this self-alienation logic that Marx in the Paris Manuscripts cannot step out of the dilemma of isolated individual. In fact, according to our survey in Chapter III, the essence of Young Hegelians’ thought does not come from Hegel, as its name suggests, but from Fichte and Feuerbach. Their drawback is exactly due to the fact that they fail to draw on Hegel’s  Seiji Mochizuki, A Study of Marx’s Historical Theory, trans. by Lixin Han, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group, 2009, p. 384. 69  Ibid., p. 10. 68

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dialectic and its origin, namely political economics. When starting out from the Young Hegelians to reconstruct early Marx’s thought, Hiromatsu mistakenly deems Feuerbach and even Hess to be equivalent to Hegel and thereby puts the entire Paris Manuscripts on the plane of Feuerbach and Hess. Hence, he cannot discern the revolutionary significance of the alienation of intercourse concept rooted in Hegel and political economy. Consequently, when introducing the reification concept to explicate the transition of early Marx’s thought, he is compelled to start directly from Das Kapital and apply the “form of value” theory rigidly on Ideologie instead of searching for the immanent necessity of the emergence of reification theory in writings prior to Ideologie. This is also the reason why the proposition of “leap from alienation theory to reification theory” always seems somewhat abrupt and why he can only depict the development of Marx’s thought as a “break”. In addition, as Hiromatsu’s rival, Mochizuki was also not aware of Hegel’s significance to the alienation of intercourse concept in Comments on James Mill. That he rediscovers the alienation of intercourse concept is not mediated by Hegel, but thanks to the tradition of the civil society school of Marxism to which he belongs, that is to rest on the theoretical framework of Smith’s civil society concept and to think of civil society as a system of division of labor grounded in exchange. Setting aside from this tradition, Marx necessarily comes to realize the theoretical significance of the alienation of intercourse concept in Comments on James Mill. In addition, that Mochizuki advances to supplement alienated labor with alienation of intercourse and thereby to reconstruct Marx’s alienation theory is in essence also because he adopts a similar approach as Hiromatsu, namely to apply Marx’s mature economic theory to interpret the Paris Manuscripts. Considered this way, Mochizuki also fails to unmask the necessity of the emergence of alienated intercourse within Marx’s Paris Manuscripts. It is due to his ignorance of Hegel’s influence on Marx that Mochizuki points out that the disappearance of the civil society concept from the Paris Manuscripts “is principally occasioned by Marx’s discovery of the Smithian=English ‘civil society’ and his conversion form the Hegelian=Prussian ‘civil society’ to the Smithian=English ‘civil society’ […] After entering this new discipline, i.e. the economics, Marx was determined to make a bold attempt, namely to depart from Hegel”.70 This exposition apparently does not conform to the development of Marx’s thought. Considering the Paris Manuscripts, Marx not only does not depart from Hegel after learning political economics, but moreover begins to lean ever closer to Hegel, applying his dialectic to the systematical construction of economic theory. Concerning this, the passage dedicated to Hegel in the afterword of the second German edition of Das Kapital serves as the best evidence. In all, both Hiromatsu and Mochizuki pass over Hegel. Yet, as the author sees it, it is because of an assimilation of Hegel’s dialectic that Marx is able to accomplish his transition from the First Manuscript to Comments on James Mill or from the alienation theory to the reification theory.

70

 Ibid., p. 42.

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11.4  Summary Finally, the author shall make a summary of this chapter in reference to the current studies of the Manuscripts in China. Despite the unsettling disagreement between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki as well as traces of the Soviet philosophical system or Althusser’s framework in Hiromatsu’s works, their discourse has ultimately extended the alienation theory to a much broader sphere including alienation of intercourse, reification and civil society. Particularly, Mochizuki successfully brings alienation of intercourse into the alienation theory, breaking through limitations on the alienated labor theory and philosophy, and laying the groundwork for a reevaluation and reconstruction of the alienation theory. Through this “debate over early Marx”, Japanese studies of the Manuscripts have trod the path of combining philosophy with economics as well as economics with history and have reached the forefront of Manuscripts studies on the international scene. In this sense, the “debate over early Marx” between Hiromatsu and Mochizuki qualifies as an enlightenment in the 1960s when international Marx studies was still under the “bleak” dominance of the USSR. In China, however, the studies of the Manuscripts have not yet overcome the framework that interprets the manuscript from the perspective of alienated labor and humanism, and hence remains in its entirety on the level of the Soviet philosophical system or Althusser’s framework, underestimating Marx’s alienation theory. In addition to the aftereffects of the old ideology, the main reason is the lack of philological study of the Paris Manuscripts and Comments on James Mill. It goes without saying that different viewpoints will lead to different evaluations of the same fact. As the author sees it, Chinese Marxist academia has not yet truly drawn on the achievements of philological studies of the Paris Manuscripts or established a proper understanding of them. Most studies of the Manuscripts are confined to the three manuscripts, while only a few combine the Manuscripts with the Notes, let alone to interpret the Paris Manuscripts in the order verified by philological examination. As for methodology, we are still incapable of combining economics with philosophy so as to put extra emphasis on the alienation of intercourse concept in Comments on James Mill: Despite the discussion on alienation of intercourse, this concept has not been elevated to the level of paradigmatic conversion, but on the contrary has been lowered to the level of Hess’s Über das Geldwesen. Despite certain scholars’ “thorough” critique of the alienation theory, they can barely account for a new theoretical gestalt of the alienation theory (the reification theory or the civil society theory), simply reducing them to “science” or “historical materialism” like Althusser or the Soviet philosophical system, let alone reconstructing the alienation theory to provide a new explanation of Marx’s thought. Considered in this way, for China to satisfactorily advance in the study of the Manuscripts, a thorough enlightenment in academic circles will be required.

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11.5  A  ppendix: Reflection on Casting Couch Incidents from the Perspective of Marx’s Reification Theory In Das Kapital, Marx elaborates in-depth on the reification phenomenon in capitalist society: “To the latter [sc. the producers], therefore, the relations [Beziehung] connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations [Verhältnis] between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons [sachliche Verhältnisse der Personen] and social relations [gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse] between things”. To rephrase it, relations between people that should have a social quality turn out to be relations between Sachen, e.g. between commodities. From Marx’s point of view, this is a distorted, inverted phenomenon that ought to be criticized and negated. Actress Zhang’s casting couch case presents a textbook example of the reification concept in practice. For opportunities to star in movies and television series, Zhang exchanged sex with the director and was later compelled to release evidence including videos, recordings and written commitments online when the director refused to keep his word, instead blocking her career. Originally, the director and the actress differed only in regard to their respective roles in motion picture production, which relied on their collaboration. The relationship between this particular director and this actress was between two individuals. Yet with the cast-couching incident that was revealed by Zhang, their collaboration was seen to have been complicated by the exchange of sex: The actress traded her body for the director’s power to assign roles. In this case, therefore, the director and the actress no longer presented themselves as simply individuals, but as a body appropriated and power traded. By analogy with the above cited passage in Das Kapital, their relation “appears not as direct social relation between director and actress at work, but sex-exchange relation between director and actress and social relation between body and power”. Body and power, in Kant’s language, are simply things or Sachen. For this reason, not only do their persons directly become Sachen, but their social intercourse degenerates to the level of an exchange between Sachen. As Lukács puts it, due to thingification, “his qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are things which he can ‘own’ or ‘dispose of’ like the various objects of the external world. And there is no natural form in which human relations can be cast, no way in which man can bring his physical and psychic ‘qualities’ into play without their being subjected increasingly to this reifying process”.71 What this passage exposes is de facto the inhumanity inherent in this sex exchange. In the cast-couch incident, what actress and director use to exchange is not an ordinary commodity like shoes or a ring, but things that directly belong to the person as such: the body and power. There tends to be an injunction against this kind of trade. The trade in the body is not only immoral, but also illegal in many countries. The trade in power is corruption and, as such, a crime. As a commodity, something  Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, 1971, p. 100.

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like shoes or rings are after all in existence outside man. Though Marx does not recognize substituting social intercourse between persons with the exchange of commodities such as shoes or rings either, the exchange of power and the body is more infamous than any common exchange of commodities, insofar as it presents man’s reification or inhuman state in an “unambiguous, decisive, plain and undisguised”72 manner, at which Marx lashes out: “In the approach to woman as the spoil and handmaid of communal lust is expressed the infinite degradation in which man exists for himself, […] From this relationship one can therefore judge man’s whole level of development”.73 Therefore, to exchange power for a thing inherent in man such as the body poses a challenge to civilized society. It must be for this reason that civilized society restricts such exchange both morally and juristically. Which then is worse: The exchange of sex between an actress and a director and the sex trade between a prostitute and a client? Obviously the former. A prostitute’s body is their commodity; to consume this commodity, a client has to pay with money. The exchange between them follows the principle of equivalent exchange. A client cannot coerce a prostitute with any sort of external compulsion such as political power, weapons and intimidation. Likewise, a prostitute also has to abide by professional ethics, providing a client with a corresponding service. In a manner of speaking, this relationship is fundementally voluntary and equivalent and thereby able to be protected by law in certain countries. The sex exchange between actress and director, however, is a totally different case, since it presupposes that one party has power and assumes a clearly coercive character. With a director holding the upper hand over an actress, their relationship is not equivalent, but an example of the compulsion of free will, bullying of the weak and ultimately violation of the spirit of freedom and equality advocated in Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and Declaration of Independence, a spirit that underlies civilized society. Moreover, in the exchange of sex between an actress and a director, which is the more shameless? As Marx remarks in Manuscripts, “[p]rostitution is only a specific expression of the general prostitution of the labourer, and since it is a relationship in which falls not the prostitute alone, but also the one who prostitutes – and the latter’s abomination is still greater – the capitalist, etc., also comes under this head”.74 By analogy with prostitution, Marx intends to demonstrate the unreasonableness of worker’s coercive production and lay bare the vices of capitalist. This analogy, however, bears on the sex exchange between an actress and a director as well: The director falls into a relationship of prostitution from a position of more infamy than the actress that he coerces her to yield through his power, exactly as a capitalist coerces a worker to sell labor because of his capital. As such, the “director’s abomination is still greater”. That the actress Zhang, regardless of her dignity, released videos of the sex exchange with her director means she thinks his deed is the more shameless. She believes the condemnation of society will be harsher towards him than towards her.  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 295. 73  Ibid., p. 295 f. 74  Ibid., p. 295. This passage was written at bottom right of page V of the Third Manuscript, see MEGA② I-2, Text, S. 265; MEGA② I-2, Apparat, S. 800. 72

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To be noted, the power of the director is granted by society. Owning to the economic benefits and social influence of blockbuster films, directors achieve fame through their Sachen (motion pictures), becoming public figures with certain social influence and public power or even representatives of Sache, spokespeople of certain products or branch of industry. In fact, this is also a miserable condition of reification of which the director may not be aware. Now that the director possesses public power, civilized society imposes a higher set of standards, requiring the director to not only comply with the law, but also abide by certain moral codes which, compared with ordinary people, pose a greater impact on society if broken. Moreover, granted more rights, they are obliged to take up more moral responsibility. On account of the reciprocity of right and obligation, civilized society naturally expects greater self-discipline. The relation between Sachen is after all different from that between persons. As rational being, man is by nature unsatisfied with this inhuman condition, because of which Marx calls upon mankind to end this inhuman condition and achieve human emancipation. Likewise, as the creator and conveyor of spiritual wealth, both actress and director are certainly unwilling to remain on this level of reification, but hope to free themselves from the scandal and reclaim their identity as actress and director. In order to accomplish this self-redemption, however, they have to elevate themselves from Sache to person for only by this is it possible for them to regain the respect of society. The above cast-couching incident provides an actual example of Marx’s reification concept, which in turn proves to be an efficient theoretical weapon for the analysis and critique of these phenomena.

Chapter 12

The Turning Point of Marx’s View on Communism An Interpretation of Communist Thought in the Third Manuscript

The main theme of the Third Manuscript is communism, and its exposition is the most difficult part of the Paris Manuscripts for the following reasons. For one thing, since the Third Manuscript is a supplement to the Second Manuscript, Marx’s elaboration of communism therein is rather scattered and entails multiple perspectives and leads, which makes it difficult to sift for a particular line of reasoning. For another, Marx had only just converted to communism and he had yet to land on a mature notion of communism and socialism. This makes his position and articulation seem rather vague and contradictory in places, which has the knock-on effect of complicating our interpretation. According to Marx’s own numbering, the exposition of communism in the Third Manuscript encompasses seven aspects in three parts: The first part is the fragment [Privateigentum und Communismus] which includes the first five points. This fragment further comprises three parts, i.e. the beginning, a section on society and one on sensuality. The second part is the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt], which makes up the sixth aspect. The third part embraces the fragment [Privateigentum und Bedürfnisse] as well as the ensuing fragment [Zusätze], which correspond to the seventh aspect. Critiquing these three parts, this chapter will explore Marx’s conversion to communism in the Paris Manuscripts as well as his definitions of communism and socialism.

12.1  Marx’s Conversion to Communism As the founder of scientific socialism, Marx did not hold a particularly positive, perhaps even a predominantly negative, view on communism and socialism1 before the Paris Manuscripts. If this is the case, when did he begin to change his 1  The concepts of socialism and communism were first introduced to Germany by Lorenz von Stein in his Der Sozialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreich (1842). By 1845, however,

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perspective? What is the theoretical underpinning of this conversion? To these questions, Lenin gives us the classic answers. First, we should consider the period of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. According to Lenin, there were already signs of Marx’s “transition from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democracy to communism” in the period of Rheinische Zeitung (1842–1843) and, by the time Marx wrote two articles for Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, “this transition was finally made”.2 In other words, Marx’s adoption of communism and socialism took place no later than the writing of Zur Judenfrage and Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung, which dates it to before October 1843. Second, the influence of French Communism: In Karl Marx, Lenin names three sources of Marx’s thought: “Marx was the genius who continued and consummated the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, as represented by the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism combined with French revolutionary doctrines in general”.3 Additionally, in Frederick Engels, he also notes that “[i]n Paris, under the influence of the French socialists and French life, Marx had also become a socialist”.4 Considering these formulations, Lenin holds French communist and socialist theory to be the theoretical source of Marx’s communist thought or the direct reason for his conversion to communism. Owning to Lenin’s leading role in the international communist movement, these two explanations of him were widely accepted. Most textbooks in China also adopt his point of view, e.g. The History of Marxist Philosophy5 edited by Nansen Huang. When scrupulously examining the Paris Manuscripts and the development of Marx’s thought before it, we find both explanations dubious: To begin with, Marx’s conversion to communism did not take place in the period of Deutsch-Französische Hess and Engels are the only two German who differentiate these two concepts. In Grundsätze des Kommunismus (1847), Engels answers the question “In what way do Communists differ from socialists?” (Engels, Principles of Communism, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 6: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, pp. 341–357). In the preface to the English edition of Manifest der kommunistischen Partei (1888), he notes: “Socialism was, in 1847, a middle-class movement, Communism a working class movement” (Engels, Preface to the 1888 English Edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 26: Engels: 1882–1889, Progress Publishers, 1990, p. 516). Yet early Marx was not consistent in his usage. In The State and Revolution, Lenin defines socialism as “the first phase of communism”, which becomes the hitherto mainstream standpoint. In fact, however, this differentiation cannot find textual support in Marx’s early writings; if there is ever a differentiation, then it is that Marx deemed socialism to be more developed than communism. 2  Vladimir Lenin, Karl Marx. A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism. Bibliography, in: Lenin: Collected Works, vol. 21: August 1914–December 1915, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 80. 3  Ibid., p. 50. 4  Vladimir Lenin, Frederick Engels, in: Lenin: Collected Works, vol. 2: 1895–1897, Progress Publishers, 1972, p. 23. 5  History of the Marxist Philosophy, ed. by Nansen Huang et al., Beijing Publishing House, 1996.

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Jahrbücher, but in summer of 1844, namely during his writing of the Second and the Third Manuscript. Second, the key factor that brings about this transition is not French socialism and communism, but Marx’s critical assimilation of political economics and his critical approach to German philosophy. In a word, Marx’s advance to socialism and communism is independent of the influence of French communism. Next, the author shall invoke several texts written at the time that review these changes in young Marx’s attitude to communism. (1) Communism and the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung issued on October 15th 1842 on Rheinische Zeitung. In this, his first article after becoming editor of Rheinische Zeitung, Marx counters chief editor of Allgemeine Zeitung Gustav E.  Kolb’s reproach of Rheinische Zeitung. During September and early October 1842, the attention of German journalist circles was drawn to communism and socialism due to reports of the tenth scholarly congress of France, at which French communist and socialist theories were heavily discussed, and the publication of Lorenz von Stein’s Der Sozialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreich (September 1842). On October 11th 1842, Kolb published an article Die Kommunistenlehre in issue no. 284 of Allgemeine Zeitung accusing Rheinische Zeitung of sympathy with communism as it had printed two articles on communism. Kolb claimed that Rheinische Zeitung had brought the “confusion in neighboring countries”6 to Germany. Marx replies with a refute: “The Rheinische Zeitung, which does not admit that communist ideas in their present form possess even theoretical reality, and therefore can still less desire their practical realisation, or even consider it possible, will subject these ideas to thoroughgoing criticism. But if the lady of Augsburg demanded more, and was capable of more, than smooth-sounding phrases, it would be obvious to her that such writings as those of Leroux, Considérant, and above all the sharp-witted work by Proudhon, cannot be criticised on the basis of superficial flashes of thought, but only after long and profound study”.7 On account of the polemical character of this article, Marx is concerned to clarify that the political stance of him and Rheinische Zeitung does not add up to communism. Marx held that his lack of support for communism was because it lacked theoretical reality and belonged to an unrealistic form of utopianism. As to his thought at this time, Marx makes the following explanation in the preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1859): “On the other hand, at that time when good intentions ‘to push forward’ often took the place of factual knowledge, an echo of French socialism and communism, slightly tinged by philosophy, was noticeable in the Rheinische Zeitung. I objected to this dilettantism, but at the same time frankly admitted in a controversy with the Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung that my previous studies did

 MEGA② I-1, Apparat, S. 1032.  Marx, Communism and the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 1: Marx: 1835–1843, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 220.

6 7

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not allow me to express any opinion on the content of the French theories”.8 Considering this self-reflection, Marx, on the one hand, did not have adequate knowledge of French socialism and communism; on the other hand, aside from works of Fourierists and Proudhon, among others, French socialist and communist theories are indeed taken as “dilettantism”. (2) Marx’s letter to Ruge in September 1843. In this letter, Marx again addresses the problem of communism with regard to the editorial principles of Deutsch-­ Französische Jahrbücher: “Therefore I am not in favour of raising any dogmatic banner. On the contrary, we must try to help the dogmatists to clarify their propositions for themselves. Thus, communism, in particular, is a dogmatic abstraction; in which connection, however, I am not thinking of some imaginary and possible communism, but actually existing communism as taught by Cabet, Dézamy, Weitling, etc. This communism is itself only a special expression of the humanistic principle, an expression which is still infected by its antithesis – the private system. Hence the abolition of private property and communism are by no means identical, and it is not accidental but inevitable that communism has seen other socialist Doctrines – such as those of Fourier, Proudhon, etc. – arising to confront it because it is itself only a special, one-sided realization of the socialist principle. And the whole socialist principle in its turn is only one aspect that concerns the reality of the true human being. But we have to pay just as much attention to the other aspect, to the theoretical existence of man, and therefore to make religion, science, etc., the object of our criticism”.9 According to this passage, Marx had already distinguished communism and socialism by this stage, and had made it plain that he did not accept the popular communism in France of the time for it, “in particular, is a dogmatic abstraction”. The communism of Étienne Cabet, Alexandre T. Dézamy, Weitling et al. is merely “a special expression of the humanistic principle, an expression which is still infected by its antithesis – the private system”, “a special, one-sided realization of the socialist principle”. Though “other socialist Doctrines – such as those of Fourier, Proudhon, etc.” are theoretically more advanced than this communism, their “socialist principle” is “only one aspect that concerns the reality of the true human being” without attention “to the other aspect, to the theoretical existence of man”. Therefore, Marx advised Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher not to publish this dilettantism. (3) The two articles issued in February 1844 on Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, i.e. Zur Judenfrage and Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung. In Zur Judenfrage, Marx indeed criticizes Bauer’s political emancipation, pointing out that political emancipation cannot replace human emancipation, the realization of which requires reformation of civil society. In Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung, Marx discovers the proletariat and writes on its historical mission. This is also the reason why Lenin looks upon  Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One. Preface, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 29: Marx: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 262. 9  Marx, Letters from Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. M. to R., in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 142f. 8

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Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher as the mark of Marx’s conversion to communism. In these two articles, however, Marx omits to express his attitude towards communism or socialism, nor does he even mention French socialism and communism. Furthermore, the proletariat concept conveys different meanings in Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung and Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei: Unlike in Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei where the proletariat designates the wage worker, this meaning is absent in Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung. It is nothing short of arbitrary to assert that Marx had already converted to communism at this time simply based on the presence of the term “proletariat” in Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung. (4) Critical Marginal Notes on the Article, “The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian,” written on July 31st 1844. This is an open critique of Ruge. On July 27th 1844, Ruge published the article The King of Prussia and Social Reform on Vorwärts, underscoring the significance of the bourgeoisie in the struggle against feudalism, to which Marx responses with a critique including an assessment of communism and socialism. In this article, Marx changes the critical attitude to Weitling expressed in his letter to Ruge half a year earlier, claiming that Weitling was not inferior to Proudhon and overwhelming him with praise: “As for the educational level or capacity for education of the German workers in general, I call to mind Weitling’s brilliant writings, which as regards theory are often superior even to those of Proudhon, however much they are inferior to the latter in their execution. Where among the bourgeoisie – including its philosophers and learned writers – is to be found a book about the emancipation of the bourgeoisie  – political emancipation  – similar to Weitling’s work: Garantien der Harmonie und Freiheit?”.10 Moreover, he publicly acclaims socialism, linking it with the proletariat: “[T]he German proletariat is the theoretician of the European proletariat, just as the English proletariat is its economist, and the French proletariat its politician”; “A philosophical people can find its corresponding practice only in socialism, hence it is only in the proletariat that it can find the dynamic element of its emancipation”.11 These suggest that Marx at this time already differed from himself in the period of Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, insofar as he now favored German communist and socialist theory. Yet what socialism here refers to remains unknown. (5) Marx’s Letter to Ludwig Feuerbach on August 11th 1844. This letter also contains Marx’s assessment of communism: “Your Philosophie der Zukunft, and your Wesen des Glaubens, in spite of their small size, are certainly of greater weight than the whole of contemporary German literature put together. In these writings you have provided – I don’t know whether intentionally – a philosophical basis for socialism and the Communists have immediately understood them 10  Marx, Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian”, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843– 1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 201. 11  Ibid., p. 202.

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in this way. The unity of man with man, which is based on the real differences between men, the concept of the human species brought down from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this but the concept of society!”12 According to this letter, Marx’s attitude to socialism and communism had undergone fundamental changes by then and it is his opinion that Feuerbach’s humanism can serves as the theoretical underpinning of communism and socialism. Certainly, this compliment can, in some measure, be taken as a gesture of humbleness. As we shall see, the true society concept is not derived from Feuerbach, but belongs to Marx himself. (6) The preface to the Manuscripts written in summer 1844. In this preface, Marx admits that “[i]t goes without saying that besides the French and English socialists I have also used German socialist works. The only original German works of substance in this science, however – other than Weitling’s writings – are the essays by Hess published in Einundzwanzig Bogen and Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie by Engels in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher”.13 To this confession, the editors of the Chinese Selected Works of Marx and Engels appends a remark: “By then, Marx had already mastered French and had become conversant in French literature. He studied the works of Victor P. Considérant, Pierre Leroux, Pierre-J.  Proudhon, Etienne Cabet, Alexandre T.  Dézamy, Philippe Buonarroti, François M. C. Fourier, Richard Lahautière, François Villegardelle et al. and often excerpted from them”.14 If Marx’s confession and the editor’s remark were true, then Marx was then quite conversant with French socialists and has come to grips with the writings of German communists and socialists including Weitling’s main work, Garantien der Harmonie und Freiheit (1842) and his articles published in Die junge Generation during the time between 1841 and 1843, Hess’s anonymously published articles in Einundzwanzig Bogen, namely, Sozialismus und Communismus, Die Philosophie der Tat, Die Eine und ganze Freiheit, and Engels’ Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie. Marx had only by changed his viewpoint on communist and socialist thought, but also showed his intention to conscientiously study communism and draw on English, French and German socialist works in order to establish his own notion of communism and socialism. Until now, we have gone through the process of Marx’s change of attitude towards communism and socialism up to the period of the Paris Manuscripts in chronological sequence. As this development shows, Marx’s conception of communism and socialism went from a thorough denial to a gradual affirmation. The signs of this transition begin to appear in September 1843 and by the summer of 1844, Marx explicitly expresses his favor of communism. This coincides with his writing of the Third Manuscript and the preface to the Manuscripts, and manifests  Marx, To Ludwig Feuerbach. August 11, 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 354. 13  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 232. 14  Selected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 1, 2009, p. 780 (translated into English by K.H.). 12

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a conversion to communism that takes place in the Paris Manuscripts rather than Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher period.

12.2  Marx’s Critique of Early Communist Theories As such, can French communism and socialism serve as the source of Marx’s own view of communism? Based on the review of Marx’s thought above, he does not think highly of French socialism and communism. According to the editors of MEGA②, in the Paris period, Marx has read much of the work of French communists and socialists, including Proudhon’s Qu’est ce que la propriété? (1841), Louis Blanc’s Organisation du travail (1839), Cabet’s Voyage en Icarie (1840), etc., and has made contacts with Blanc and Proudhon among others. Yet, unlike his engagement with the political economists Smith and Mill, and the German theorists Hegel, Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians, traces of Marx’s confrontation with French socialists except for Proudhon are rare in his remaining Paris period texts. This leads Hiromatsu to claim that Marx’s knowledge of French communism and socialism is not directly drawn from French socialist theories, but largely mediated by Stein’s Der Sozialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreich (1842).15 The author agrees with Hiromatsu in principle and shall make a few supplements to this conclusion in reference to Marx’s own assessment of communism and socialism in the Third Manuscript.

12.2.1  The History of Early Communism At the outset of the fragment [Privateigentum und Kommunismus], Marx summarizes the development of early communism in a few words: “The transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same course as self-estrangement”.16 Scholars have yet to reach a consensus on the exact meaning of this sentence. In the author’s opinion, clarification of this sentence ought to take the previous fragment [Privateigentum und Arbeit] into consideration, which turns on the development of political economics. As Marx points out, by analogy with the history of modern capitalism, the development of political economics has also gone through three stages: (1) mercantilism and monetarism; (2) physiocracy; (3) contemporary political economy. In the phase of (1) mercantilism and monetarism, the essence of wealth is reduced to external existence such as money. For (2) physiocracy, on the one hand, “[a]ll wealth is resolved into land and cultivation (agriculture)”; on the  Wataru Hiromatsu, The Fundamental Idea of Socialism. I. 5. Early Marx and Engels’s Adoption of Stein, in: Selected Works of Wataru Hiromatsu, vol. 2, Jyoukyou Shiubann, 1995. 16  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 294. 15

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other hand, agriculture is thought of as “the only productive labour”.17 (3) Contemporary political economy construes the essence of wealth as labor, i.e. the subject himself, and thereby establishes the principle of the “subjective essence of wealth”18 or “subjective essence of industry”.19 Smith is situated between phase (2) and (3), whilst Ricardo and Mill represent the cynicism in (3) contemporary political economics – undisguised, shameless inhumanity. With industrial advancement, this cynicism has thrived.20 Here, “self-estrangement” designates the movement of private property as well as the development of its theoretical embodiment, i.e. political economy, and “transcendence of self-estrangement” is the critique and supersession of private property, namely socialist and communist thought and movement in England and France. Hence, the sentence “The transcendence of self-­estrangement follows the same course as self-estrangement” must mean that communist theory is developed from its opposition to and confrontation with political economics and has, by analogy with the development of political economics, also undergone three stages. “Private property is first considered only in its objective aspect – but nevertheless with labour as its essence. Its form of existence [Daseinsform] is therefore capital, which is to be annulled ‘as such’ (Proudhon). Or a particular form of labour – labour levelled down, fragmented, and therefore unfree – is conceived as the source of private property’s perniciousness and of its existence in estrangement from men. For instance, Fourier, who, like the Physiocrats, also conceives agricultural labour to be at least the exemplary type, whereas Saint-Simon declares in contrast that industrial labour as such is the essence, and accordingly aspires to the exclusive rule of the industrialists and the improvement of the workers’ condition. Finally, communism is the positive expression of annulled private property – at first as universal private property”.21 Here, Marx enumerates three kinds of communist theory: (1) The communist theory whereby “[p]rivate property is first considered only in its objective aspect”. In accordance with the classification in the fragment [Privateigentum und Arbeit], political economics that conceives of private property “in its objective aspect” is the earliest gestalt, i.e. the phase of mercantilism and monetarism. As such, the corresponding form of communism is the preliminary phase of communism, which is, according to Marx, typified by Proudhon’s theory. Yet, based on the principle that property is deduced from labor, Proudhon actually points out that the “iniquity” of capitalism is “robbery”, the gaining of something for nothing.22 In other words, he holds labor to be the “subjective essence of wealth”. In this respect, Marx’s assessment seemingly does not match  Ibid., p. 292.  Ibid., p. 290. 19  Ibid., p. 293. 20  Ibid., p. 291. 21  Ibid., p. 294. 22  Pierre-J. Proudhon, What is Property?, trans. by B. R. Tucker, Dover Publications, 1970. 17 18

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Proudhon’s own thought. Moreover, Proudhon can by no means be reduced to the preliminary phase of French communism; on the contrary, he embodies the pinnacle of French communism of the time. This also seems to diverge from Marx’s approach that draws an analogy between the developmental stages of political economics and that of communism in ascending order. These inconsistences give rise to Hiromatsu’s speculation that the appearance of the name “Proudhon” here might be a slip of the pen, as Marx actually means to refer to Robert Owen.23 The author basically concurs with this speculation. (2) The communism wherein “unfree [labor] – is conceived as the source of private property’s perniciousness and of its existence in estrangement from men”. This communism is further divided into two categories: Fourier’s communism that looks upon agricultural labor as the “exemplary type” and Saint-Simon’s communism that conceives of industrial labor as the essence. Based on the categorization in the fragment [Privateigentum und Arbeit], political economics that highlights the significance of agricultural labor belongs to the phase of physiocracy. Thus, Fourier’s communism is only a onefold inversion of physiocracy. Existing on the same plane, Saint-Simon’s notion of communism is also a simple reversal of Smith’s theory: Though construing industrial labor as such as the essence, Saint-Simon still bears the hallmark of physiocracy, insofar as he fails to define labor exclusively from the perspective of the “subjective essence of industry” as expoused by Ricardo and Mill (Table 12.1). (3) The communism that “considers the private property relation from the universality of the private property”. If (1) and (2) are to be thought of as earlier forms of communism and named as classical communism, then (3) refers to the then popular form of communist thought or modern communism. This communism coincides with political economics after Smith, mainly Ricardo and Mill’s modern political economics, since it already unifies the “subjective essence of landed property”24 with the “subjective essence of industry” and reduces them to labor. For this reason, modern political economics is capable of the “scientific analysis Table 12.1  Comparison between the development of communist theories and of political economy Various forms of communism Proudhon’s communism (Owen’s communism?) Fourierism Saint-Simonism Modern communism

Different stages of political economy Monetarism, etc. Physiocracy Political economy (Smith) Modern political economy (Ricardo, Mill)

 Wataru Hiromatsu, The Fundamental Idea of Socialism, in: Selected Works of Wataru Hiromatsu, vol. 2, Jyoukyou Shiubann, 1995, p. 86. 24  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 293. 23

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of the subjective essence of private property”.25 Correspondingly, the communism in this phase again inverts this universal private property so that “communism is the positive expression of annulled private property”. In all, Marx’s summary of the development of early communism is entirely in accordance with that of political economics and the extent to which the “subjective essence of private property” is brought to light serves as the criterion for his division of early communism. From Proudhon’s communism (Owen’s communism?) to Fourierism, Saint-Simonism and modern communism, the theories become increasingly abstract and universalized (see the table above). Whether this view holds true is not our concern here. What the author wants to assert here is that how to deal with the concept of private property in political economics is one of Marx’s basic criteria for categorizing communist and socialist thought. Thus, after summarizing the development of communist thought, Marx notes: “It is easy to see that the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of private property – more precisely, in that of the economy”.26

12.2.2  Forms of Modern Communism Next, Marx moves on to survey modern communism. The common ground of the numerous representatives of modern communism, such as François N.  Babeuf, Cabet, Dézamy, Jules Gay, Proudhon and Weitling from Germany, is to impute the iniquity and inequality of mankind to private property and therefore argue that communism must abolish private property and realize common property and equal distribution. This communism can be divided into the following three forms: (1) “[C]rude communism [roher Kommunismus]”. This expression is probably borrowed from Stein’s Der Sozialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreich as well as Hess’s Sozialismus und Communismus and Die Philosophie der Tat. For Hess, “crude communism”, “crude, abstract communism” and “crude communism” all refer to the position of Babeuf and his followers, i.e. the new Babouvists. This is adopted by Marx, as he also claims in Die Heilige Familie that “[t]he Babouvists were crude, uncivilised materialists”.27 The adherents of “crude communism” advocate “universal private property” – as opposed to private property that brings about a gap between rich and poor – and absolute egalitarianism. Though opposing capitalist private ownership, they do not opt for fundamentally annulling private property, but instead set the “generalisation and consummation” of private property as their primary goal. This, however, implies  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 297. 27  Marx, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Company, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 4: Marx and Engels: 1844–1845, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 131. 25 26

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a “community of women” in that, if women are to be counted as private property as well, then to achieve absolute egalitarianism requires implementing “community of women”, as Marx ironically comments: “Finally, this movement of opposing universal private property to private property finds expression in the brutish form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive private property) the community of women [Weibergemeinschaft], in which a woman becomes a piece of communal and common property. It may be said that this idea of the community of women gives away the secret of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism”.28 That “community of women” is “crude and thoughtless” is because this institution annuls the “personality” (Persönlichkeit) of marriage. As Feuerbach notes in Das Wesen des Christentums, true marriage should be a love-based combination of two persons, a personal behavior exemplifying species-essence. Following this viewpoint of Feuerbach, Marx holds that the relation between man and woman, though as “direct and natural species-relationship”,29 is necessarily a concomitant of respect for person. Now that monogamy has been established as the civilized form of marriage in modern civilized society, the endorsement of “community of women” is “[i]n the approach to woman as the spoil and handmaid of communal lust” which expresses “the infinite degradation in which man exists for himself”.30 This communism is in this regard “merely a manifestation of the vileness of private property”.31 In Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, Marx and Engels specifically discuss the “community of women” when refuting the bourgeois’s smear against the communist party: “The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women. He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production”.32 In their opinion, the idea of “community of women” is rooted in the notion of women as “instrument of production”. Since capitalism exactly typifies the institution that degrades man to a mere “instrument of production” for the purpose of increasing value, Marx and Engels return the accusation of “community of women” back to the bourgeois: “Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common”.33 In order to annihilate this “hypocritically concealed, […] openly legalised community of women”, one has to annihilate the capitalist relations of production in the first place.

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 294. 29  Ibid., p. 295. 30  Ibid. 31  Ibid., p. 296. 32  Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 6: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 502. 33  Ibid. 28

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(2) “[P]olitical communism”, which further presents itself in two forms: “(α) still political in nature – democratic or despotic; (β) with the abolition of the state, yet still incomplete, and being still affected by private property, i.e., by the estrangement of man”.34 The distinction between these two forms is the achievement of communism by virtue of the state. Form (α) puts forward the realization of communism through the state. Communists represented by Cabet resort to a democratic state, whereas the Babouvists, Blancists and Weitlingists pin their hope on a despotic state. Form (β), however, argues for establishing communism through the abolition of the state. It chiefly concerns French communism with an anarchical background, including the theories of Dézamy, Gay, Proudhon et al., who seek to combine the supersession of the state with the thought of common property. Compared with “crude communism”, Marx omits to elaborate on “political communism” – thus, the correspondence between names and thoughts listed in the last paragraph is mere the speculation of the author – only it explicitly points out the theoretical drawback: “[S]ince it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property, and just as little the human nature of need, it remains captive to it and infected by it. It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence”.35 Considering this critique, “political communism” is no different from “crude communism”, insofar as it is a onefold annulment of private property without adequate understanding of the law of private property’s movement. As Marx sees it, what is for communism at issue is not whether to abolish state, but to lay bare the historical necessity and significance of private property and ascertain the law that governs capitalism’s fall. To be short, these two forms of communism have yet to break free from the framework of private property, insomuch as they both take a critique of inequality of wealth as their starting point, which is closely connected to the French revolution. As we know, the French revolution establishes the idea of equality that becomes the substratum of French communism. In the face of polarization between non-property owners and property owners in modern capitalist society, the French communists take this ideal of equality as their starting point to call for the abolishment of private property and equal distribution. Considered this way, it is no coincidence that these two communist currents arise in France. Yet, for Marx who had already studied Hegel’s philosophy of law and political economy, these two forms of communism seem too shallow and to miss the central issue, insofar as they fail to criticize capitalist private ownership as such. Hence, when ascertaining that their reformist remedy is solely set out from the perspective of equality, Marx stops going further into it, which is probably the true reason why his introduction of “political communism” is so condensed. (3) Communism as the “real appropriation of the human essence”, of which Marx makes an exceedingly polished account: “Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation [Aneignung] of the human essence by and for man; communism  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 296. 35  Ibid. 34

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therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth [Reichtum] of previous development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism [Naturalismus], equals humanism [Humanismus], and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence [Existenz] and essence, between objectification and self-­ confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution”.36 This is a new kind of communism distinct from the first two forms, insofar as it no longer draws on the idea of equality to criticize inequality of wealth, but rather on German philosophical traditions, that is Hegel’s dialectic of double negation, Feuerbach’s humanism and the Young Hegelians’ philosophy of self-consciousness. As notions characteristic of German philosophy, these aspects are missing from French communism. Since the leading Young Hegelians at the time combine all of these notions, this communism can be considered a “philosophical communism [philosophischer Kommunismus]” derived from the Young Hegelians.

12.2.3  German “Philosophical Communism” The term “philosophical communism” originates from Engels.37 During October and November 1843, Engels’ article Progress of Social Reform on the Continent was twice serialized in New Moral World, for the purpose of introducing continental communist thought to an English-speaking readership. In this article, Engels summarizes the communist currents in England, France and Germany: “[T]he three great and civilised countries of Europe – England, France, and Germany, have all come to the conclusion, that a thorough revolution of social arrangements, based on community of property, has now become an urgent and unavoidable necessity. This result is the more striking, as it was arrived at by each of the above nations independently of the others; […] The English came to the conclusion practically, by the rapid increase of misery, demoralisation, and pauperism in their own country: the French politically, by first asking for political liberty and equality; and, finding this insufficient, joining social liberty, and social equality to their political claims: the Germans became Communists philosophically, by reasoning upon first principles”.38 According to this introduction, the core categories of English, French and German communism are respectively practice, politics (equality) and philosophy. Distinct from Weitling’s “worker communism” and “Christian communism”, German “philosophical communism” rests on Young Hegelians’ philosophy as its underlying  Ibid., p. 296f.  Cf. Engels, Progress of Social Reform on the Continent, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 392. 38  Ibid., p. 392f. 36 37

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principle. Besides Hess, the founder of this school, its other important members are Ruge, Marx, Georg Herwegh and, of course, Engels. It is true that Marx not only set about engaging with French and German communist and socialist currents much later than Hess and Engels, but also that he falls behind them in terms of understanding their significance. According to the extant texts, it is in Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian” (July 31st 1844) that Marx publicly addressed “philosophical communism” for the first time, as he notes therein: “It has to be admitted that the German proletariat is the theoretician of the European proletariat, just as the English proletariat is its economist, and the French proletariat its politician”.39 Similar summaries can also be found in the Manuscripts: “Equality is nothing but a translation of the German “Ich = Ich” into the French, i.e., political, form. Equality as the basis of communism is its political justification, and it is the same as when the German justifies it by conceiving man as universal self-consciousness. Naturally, the transcendence of the estrangement always proceeds from that form of the estrangement which is the dominant power: in Germany, self-consciousness; in France, equality, because it is politics; in England, real, material, practical need taking only itself as its standard”.40 These articulations suggest that Marx’s conception of communism in the Manuscripts is, in a considerable degree, swayed by Engels’ Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie, just as the critique of political economics therein is also under the influence of Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie. Like Engels, Marx is also discontent with French communism on account of its lack of theoretical support from philosophy. The philosophy that Marx has in mind here mainly refers to the Young Hegelians’ self-consciousness logic and Feuerbach’s humanism. The self-consciousness logic underlines man’s subjectivity and freedom, opposing every external constraint and can thus provide the theoretical weapon for criticizing the dehumanization and alienation phenomenon in modern society. As a matter of fact, in Die Philosophie der Tat and Sozialismus und Communismus, Hess has converted this selfconsciousness logic into communist thought. Likewise, oweing to his opposition to the religious oppression of man, Feuerbach holds god to be the self-alienation of man’s essence, pointing out that “human nature is the highest nature to man”, a philosophy with strong humanist bent. In the period of ­Deutsch-­Französische Jahrbücher, Ruge, Hess, Marx, Engels and others have all applied this to their critique of state, politics and economics. Proceeding from this humanism, they naturally tread the path of criticism of private ownership and capitalism. It is likely to be for this reason that Marx notes in his letter to Feuerbach on August 11th 1844 that Feuerbach’s works provides “a philosophical basis for socialism”.

 Marx, Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian”, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843– 1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 202. 40  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 312f.

39

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In overview, from the viewpoint of the German “philosophical communists”, French communists, although they have propounded ideas such as the liquidation of private ownership, still lack the ability to theorize and philosophize about their communist thought, as Engels remarks: “There is a greater chance in Germany for the establishment of a Communist party among the educated classes of society, than anywhere else. The Germans are a very disinterested nation; if in Germany principle comes into collision with interest, principle will almost always silence the claims of interest. The same love of abstract principle, the same disregard of reality and self-­ interest, which have brought the Germans to a state of political nonentity, these very same qualities guarantee the success of philosophical Communism in that country. […] The French Communists could assist us in the first stages only of our development, and we soon found that we knew more than our teachers”.41 This passage represents the standpoint of the “philosophical communists”. Therefore, if Marx is ever to adopt communism and socialism, it seems likely he will choose German “philosophical communism”.

12.3  The Concept of “Society” in the Paris Manuscripts The above-mentioned German “philosophical communism” does not belong to Marx alone, but is de facto shared by Hess, Engels, etc. Did Marx develop his own definition or distinctive understanding of communism at that time? Regarding the Paris Manuscripts, the answer is positive. Marx not only adds the dialectic of double negation (see Chapter XIII) and the concept of proletariat (see Chapter II) – which is left out in Hess’ notion of communism – to his definition of communism, but, more importantly, defines communism through the concept of “society”42 in the Third Manuscript – which distinguishes Marx’s view of communism from that of the others.

12.3.1  The Positive Supersession of Private Property As aforementioned, for Marx, “[c]ommunism [is] as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement”, “as the complete return of man to himself as a social [gesellschaftlich] (i.e., human [menschlich]) being”. “Society” here is obviously construed by Marx as the ideal condition after the supersession of man’s alienation or private property, i.e. the state of communism whereby man appropriates his essence. In this respect, the definition of “society” is simultaneously taken as the definition of communism itself.

 Engels, Progress of Social Reform on the Continent, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 407. 42  The author shall henceforth use quotation marks to distinguish this specific concept of society. 41

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This “society” does not arise out of nowhere, but stems from the positive supersession of private property. Early French and German communists point to the inequality of private ownership and set the absolute liquidation of private ownership as the essential goal of communism. This approach is not per se incorrect. Yet, whilst denouncing private ownership, both show a tendency to belittle private ownership, neglecting its significance in the establishment of communism. As such, their communist theories have certain utopian bent and are later assailed by Marx as utopian socialism. On the contrary, in his critique of the inhumanity of private property, Marx looks upon its movement as the premise of the advent of communism or as part of the communist movement: “Its [sc. private property’s] movement – production and consumption – is the perceptible revelation of the movement of all production until now, i.e., the realization or the reality of man”.43 Communism is indeed the liquidation of private property, but also dialectic negation that presupposes the historical necessity of private property or, as Marx puts it, “[t]he positive transcendence of private property, as the appropriation of human life, is therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement”.44 Such an attitude towards private property bears a resemblance to the notion of “capital’s civilizing function” in Grundrisse, namely that communism is prospecting into the future, grounded on a recognition of the positive function of capital. As the ideal of the future, “society” must rest on the foundation of movement of private property. This notion of “society” is also related to the civil society concept that Marx acquires in Comments on James Mill. As is known, the main task undertaken by Comments on James Mill is to analyze the kind of civil society that presupposes private property. Unlike community, civil society is an organic entirety that can only take shape through a mediation of private property. In such a civil society, the satisfaction of man’s needs and enjoyment can only be actualized by virtue of others or society. As such, man’s labor and enjoyment become indirectly related, insomuch as his own labor product serves to satisfy the needs of others or society rather than his own enjoyment and his needs are in turn satisfied by the labor of others or society as a whole. At the same time, since the satisfaction of needs can only rely on mediation and indirect relations, man has to unite with other to form social relations of mutually complementation and exchange. Therefore, the essence of civil society is “[t]he social connection or social relationship between the two property owners”.45  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 297. 44  Ibid. 45  Marx, Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 218. 43

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Future “society” cannot be considered society founded on private ownership or civil society, but rather derives from supersession of private property and its civil nature. “Society” is under no circumstances a return to the community of antiquity, “not a returning in poverty to unnatural, primitive simplicity”,46 nor is it a leap to an unrealistic utopia, but a transcendence based on the preservation of the positive outcomes of modern civil society. Hence, “[s]ocial activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal enjoyment – i.e., activity and enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in actual direct association with other men [unmittelbar in wirklicher Gesellschaft mit anderen Menschen] – will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of the enjoyment”.47 To rephrase it, although features such as the “private individual” and “citizens” are removed from the “society” of the future, private property and individual independency, which is cultivated by civil society, as well as the social relations thereby established are preserved, Thus, “society” can only be an association of independent or free individuals. Marx depicts future “society” as follows: “We have seen how on the assumption of positively annulled private property man produces man – himself and the other man: how the object, being the direct manifestation of his individuality, is simultaneously his own existence [Dasein] for the other man, the existence of the other man, and that existence for him. […] Thus the social character is the general character of the whole movement: just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him. Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social enjoyment”.48 This passage reminds us of Hegel’s concept of spirit.49 In Phänomenologie, the essence of spirit is defined as “‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’”50 and the future “kingdom of the ethical life” ought to be the direct unity of individual and the whole, of individuality and universality. Marx’s concept of “society” is the unity of individual and the whole as well, yet on the presupposition of individual independency.

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 342. 47  Ibid., p. 298. 48  Ibid., p. 297. 49  Concerning the similarity between Hegel’s concept of spirit and Marx’s concept of society, see Ying Xia, On the Construction of Concept of Sprit: From the Perspective of Young Marx, in: Journal of Tsinghua University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), no. 4, 2013. 50  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 110. 46

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12.3.2  T  he Resolution of the Contradiction Between Man and Nature, Between Individual and Species “Society” is not only the positive supersession of private property and civil society, but also the final resolution of the underlying conflict of human society. Since humankind began, man has been entangled in conflict with nature, between men or between individual and species. In modern civil society, with private property assuming dominance over man, these conflicts between man and nature and between men (individual and species) have intensified so that both relations slide into grave alienation. With communism taken as the supersession of alienation, “society” necessarily becomes the ultimate resolution of conflict between man and nature and between men. How is this “society” capable of resolving conflict between man and nature? Above all, “society” is established on industrial foundations. According to the modern conception of nature, it can only be understood when it becomes the object of man’s cognition and practice. With industrial advancement, nature is comprehensively integrated into the realm of man’s cognition and practice, that is, merged into society to become humanized nature. This humanization entails the complete unity of nature and man. Second, “society” frees man from his narrow exploitive relations to nature and serves to create fully-developed man with abundant senses, insofar as he no longer treats nature as merely a means of making money, but builds up a broader, more comprehensive relationship with nature. “Need or enjoyment has consequently lost its egotistical nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use”.51 Now that man restores “human sense, the human nature of the senses”,52 the modern antagonism between man and nature is reconciled with both reaching an unprecedented level of harmony. The next and more complex question is why “society” can serve the true resolution of conflict between men? The answer to this question means first determining the means of unity of men or of individual and species. As we know, Feuerbach also deals with this unification, arguing that the individual can only actualize his essence in and through his species. Yet the accomplishment of his unification will eventually depend on love between both sexes or friends. In this entirety bound by natural emotion such as love, the individual is dependent, just as in the community of antiquity and family. In Über das Geldwesen, Hess is attentive to Feuerbach’s limitation and seeks to accomplish this unification by importing ideas of intercourse and collaboration. Due to his somewhat negative notion of civil society, however, he in turn construes money merely as the source of man’s depravity and the regression of human history, hence passing over its function as a bond between men. In spite of the exclusiveness inherent in money, it does bind isolated individuals together. This is the contradiction endemic of modern society. In this sense, Hess omits to discern  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 300. 52  Ibid., p. 302. 51

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that division of labor and exchange (money) is de facto a more advanced form of the unity of individual and species and as such a form of progression of mankind. As opposed to Feuerbach and Hess, Hegel thinks of civil society as a sphere permeated by the principles of particularity and universality simultaneously and hence looks upon individuals in civil society as particular individual as well as universal beings. Civil society is by nature the stage wherein the unity of individual and the whole arises: Here, the individual is not merged into the whole. Instead, it is exactly because of his independency that the individual becomes a true social being. For this reason, Hegel’s unification of individual and species presupposes the individual’s independency: This is the dialectic of the relationship between individual and the whole. These are the two representative viewpoints on the unification of individual and species prior to Marx. Then, how does Marx himself conceive of the relationship between individual and species (the whole)? “Above all”, so Marx, “we must avoid postulating ‘society’ again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual”, nor is the individual to be thought of as atomistic being indifferent to each other, but as “social being”.53 “Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real individual [individuell] social being), is just as much the totality [Totalität] – the ideal totality – the subjective existence [Dasein] of imagined and experienced society for itself”.54 These articulations manifest the strong Hegelian character of Marx’s view of society. Actually, after the writing of Comments on James Mill – the study of political economic theories of division of labor and exchange in particular –, Marx’s notion of the unification of individual and species can only be Hegelian for this conception of Hegel not only coincides with political economics, but also conforms with modern societal realities. The resolution of conflict between man and nature is closely tied with that of conflict between individual and species. In “society”, the former will lead to the latter because man can now appropriate his object which is his essence, putting an end to the state of division between him and his object, between him and his essence and actualizing the unity of man and nature (object). This unification also demonstrates the unity of individual and species: Since the separation between man and nature (object) is engendered by unreasonable social relation, i.e. the division between man and species, the unification of man and nature (object) in turn indicates the realization of the true unity of individual and the whole, between individual and species. As Marx notes: Thus the social character is the general character of the whole movement: just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him. Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social enjoyment. The human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does nature exist for him as a bond with man – as his existence for the other and the other’s existence [Dasein] for him – and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the foun53 54

 Ibid., p. 299.  Ibid.

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dation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become his human existence, and nature become man for him. Thus society is the complete unity of man with nature – the true resurrection of nature – the accomplished naturalism of man and the accomplished humanism of nature.55

12.3.3  The Complete Restoration of Man’s Nature The greatest evil of private property is the alienation of “the essence of man [das menschliche Wesen]”. The essence of man embraces two spheres: The first refers to the objectified essential power of man, i.e. material wealth inpregnated in the object, which can be considered man’s essence in that it reflects man’s characters such as his physical and mental energy as well as emotion. The second is the “richness of subjective human sensibility”,56 namely the richness of man’s inner world, full of sense and emotion. The alienation that private property brings to man manifests itself on these two spheres: on the former as man’s loss of himself in his object or as the transferal of his object to another; on the latter as the loss of man’s senses except for the one-sided desire for things. Therefore, as supersession of alienation of man, “society” not only returns objective wealth back to man and the product of labor back to laborer, but also sees man again “appropriate his comprehensive essence”, reshaping the “one-sided” man corrupted by private property as “a whole man”.57 Man’s senses stem from his objectification activities (human labor, production, practice), or, as Marx puts it, “the senses of the social man differ from those of the non-social man”,58 “[t]he forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present”.59 Exactly for this reason, man’s inner senses are far richer than those of the animal, insofar as he has emotion, aesthetic judgment and love and embodies a unity of cognition, emotion and will. Within private ownership, however, man’s senses descend to the level of animal insomuch as “[i]n the place of all physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of all these senses, the sense of having [Haben]”.60 As a result, man only feels  Ibid., p. 298.  Ibid., p. 301. 57  Ibid., p. 299. 58  Ibid., p. 301. 59  Ibid., p. 302. 60  Ibid., p. 300. The term “Haben” here refers to the state in which man is only bent on material benefits, only concerns whether in possession of material wealth. As such, it can also occasionally be rendered as “possessiveness” (占有欲). In the Paris Manuscripts, Marx also avails himself of several other terms similar to “Haben”, e.g. “Eigentum” (property), “Besitz” (possession), “Aneignung” (appropriation). The distinction between Besitz and Aneignung has been dealt with in the previous chapter; here, the author only wants to add an explanation of the concept of property: According to Marx’s account in the subsection [Forms preceding Capitalist Production], property designates: (1) “the relation [Verhalten]” to the “natural conditions of production”; (2) the mutual 55 56

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he is human when he gains certain objects and satisfies his most basic material need. As what is left in him is solely “the sense of having”, man has, regarding the richness of senses that he should have possessed, fallen into “absolute poverty”.61 Corresponding to “the sheer estrangement of all these senses”, man’s “needs” are also alienated and show a tendency to become extremely “one-sided”. In the fragments [Privateigentum und Bedürfnisse] and [Zusätze], Marx expatiates extensively on the alienated state of man’s needs within capitalist private ownership: e.g. “The need for money is therefore the true need produced by the economic system, and it is the only need which the latter produces”.62 In order to fulfill a desire to make money, the rich are impelled to reduce their additional needs. That money and wealth are merely external things means that the more man needs them, the less he asks from inside and the more he loses his richness. Marx’s empirical account of daily life illustrates in-depth the alienated state of the rich: “The less you eat, drink and buy books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorise, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save – the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor rust will devour – your capital. The less you are, the less you express your own life, the more you have, i.e., the greater is your alienated life, the greater is the store of your estranged being. Everything which the political economist takes from you in life and in humanity, he replaces for you in money and in wealth; and all the things which you cannot do, your money can do. It can eat and drink, go to the dance hall and the theatre; it can travel, it can appropriate art, learning, the treasures of the past, political power – all this it can appropriate for you – it can buy all this: it is true endowment. […] All passions and all activity must therefore be submerged in avarice”.63 Besides the alienation of the needs of the rich, alienation is also brought on the need of the poor by absolute property, insomuch as “[i]t is not only that man has no human needs – even his animal needs cease to exist”.64 Fresh air, comfortable habitation and safe food used to be man’s basic needs, but are no longer regarded as needs within absolute property: “Even the need for fresh air ceases to be a need for the worker. Man returns to a cave dwelling, which is now, however, contaminated with the pestilential breath of civilisation, and which he continues to occupy only precariously, it being for him an alien habitation which can be withdrawn from him any day – a place from which, if he does not pay, he can be thrown out any day”.65 relation [Verhalten] evolved in production; (3) the consciousness that distinguishes himself from another (Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857–58) [First Instalment], in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, pp. 415–420). In short, the meaning of property is that man possesses external object through labor, and ensures his ownership of this object in his relation to one another as well as in his consciousness. 61  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 300. 62  Ibid., p. 307. 63  Ibid., p. 309. 64  Ibid., p. 308. 65  Ibid., p. 307.

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As an alienated state more profound than the alienation of the rich, it is names by Marx as “bestial barbarisation, a complete, crude, abstract simplicity of need”.66 In a word, no matter for the rich or the poor, “[p]rivate property has made us so stupid and one-sided”.67 Without supersession of private ownership, man’s senses and needs will be entangled in a one-sided and stupid condition for eternity. The supersession of private property is “the complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities”.68 As such, the advent of “society” signifies the restoration of man’s senses: “It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich [reich] human being and the rich human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need [Totalität] of a totality of human manifestations of life – the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as need”.69 “[E]stablished society produces man in this entire richness of his being – produces the rich man profoundly endowed with all the senses  – as its enduring reality”.70 In fact, early in Zur Judenfrage, Marx already engaged with the problem of restoring man’s richness or human emancipation. In civil society, “it is not man as citoyen [sc. citizen of state], but man as bourgeois [sc. member of civil society or citizen] who is considered to be the essential and true man”.71 “Man as bourgeois” designates private owner or, to put it in the language of the Third Manuscript, man who only has the sense of “having”, whilst the political character of man as such, e.g. species-essence, ceases to be the definition of man. In this regard, man is alienated, and the supersession of this alienation is human emancipation. Human emancipation is to reclaim man’s political character, man’s “species-essence”, or, as Marx puts it in the Third Manuscript, to restore man’s richness and actualize the unity of individual and species. To sum up, only in “society” can man attain “all the senses” that “the rich man [is] profoundly endowed with”, overcome his one-sidedness and return to being a “whole man”.

12.3.4  Communism as Movement Aside from employing the concept of “society” to define communism, Marx also defines communism as a movement, as he notes in the fragment [Zusätze]: “since with him therefore the real estrangement of the life of man remains, and remains all the more, the more one is conscious of it as such, hence it [sc. the negation of this  Ibid.  Ibid., p. 300. 68  Ibid. 69  Ibid., p. 304. 70  Ibid., p. 302. 71  Marx, On the Jewish Question, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 164. 66 67

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estrangement] can be accomplished solely by bringing about communism. In order to abolish the idea of private property, the idea of communism is quite sufficient. It takes actual communist action to abolish actual private property. History will lead to it; and this movement, which in theory we already know to be a self-transcending movement, will constitute in actual fact a very rough and protracted process”.72 Considering this passage, Marx, pace other communists who posits communism as the other-worldly ideal, not only think of communism as a future goal or an “idea of communism”, but also explicitly defines it as “actual communist action” which unfolds in pursuit of this goal. In Ideologie, Marx and Engels make it plain that “[c] ommunism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will; trans.] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise”.73 In this respect, Marx obviously differs from the German-ideology style communism of the time and even further from French communism and socialism. According to the conclusion drawn in Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung, this historical mission falls on the proletariat. Distinct from Young Hegelians such as Hess, Marx already shows the explicit subjective consciousness to realize communism. During his stay in Paris, he not only associated with the German and French working class, comparing the proletariat of these two countries, but also showed great concern for the uprising of the Silesian weavers, writing an article, Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian” specifically about it. On the distinction between the German and French working class, he remarks: “When communist artisans associate with one another, theory, propaganda, etc., is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of this association, they acquire a new need – the need for society – and what appears as a means becomes an end. In this practical process the most splendid results are to be observed whenever French socialist workers are seen together. Such things as smoking, drinking, eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or means that bring them together. Association, society and conversation, which again has association as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies”.74 The “communist artisans” here refers to the German proletariat. In German, the term was still immature and their “need for society” was only just established, compared with the French proletariat which has been accustomed to “society” and in whose “society” and “contact” “the nobility of man shines upon us”. As regards this distinction between the two, the author invokes Marx’s letter to Feuerbach on  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 313. 73  Marx, The German Ideology, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 49. 74  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 313. 72

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August 11th 1844: “You would have to attend one of the meetings of the French workers to appreciate the pure freshness, the nobility which burst forth from these toil-worn men. The English proletarian is also advancing with giant strides but he lacks the cultural background of the French. But I must not forget to emphasise the theoretical merits of the German artisans in Switzerland, London and Paris. The German artisan is still however too much of an artisan. […] For me the difference between the French character and our German character was never demonstrated so sharply and convincingly”.75 Interestingly, contrary to his relatively negative view of French communist theories, Marx gives great credit to the French proletariat. At the end of the fragment [Privateigentum und Kommunismus], Marx no longer avoids the differentiation between socialism and communism as he has in the past, abruptly bringing it into discussion: “[B]ut socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds from the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as the essence. Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion, just as real life is man’s positive reality, no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through communism. Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society”.76 This passage seems somewhat perplexing. “Communism” here designates the third gestalt of the above mentioned “modern communism”, i.e. German “philosophical communism”, for, as the “position as the negation of the negation”, it is grounded in the logic of self-consciousness. This is also the notion of communism that Marx favored at the time. Yet, quite unexpectedly, Marx goes on to argue that “communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society”. Considering this, it is also Marx’s opinion that communism is not the ultimate gestalt of human society and that socialism stands above communism. This clearly differs from the conception of communism in his maturity, for instance Kritik des Gothaer Programms, in which socialism is seen as a lower stage of communism. That Marx comes to such an opposite point of view in the Paris Manuscripts is probably because, according to him, German “philosophical communism” of the time lacked the content of the “society” and hence only “society”-centered socialism qualified as the ultimate gestalt of human society. This standpoint of Marx also appears in the tenth article of Thesen (1845): “The standpoint of the old materialism is ‘civil’ society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or associated humanity”.77  Marx, To Ludwig Feuerbach. August 11, 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 355. 76  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 306. 77  Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 5. 75

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12.4  Summary Based on the Third Manuscript, we have thus far surveyed Marx’s view of communism in the Paris Manuscripts, which can be summaried as the following three aspects: (1) The communism Marx has in mind is German “philosophical communism”. (2) Communism is “society”. This sense of “society” is the positive supersession of private property, the ultimate resolution of conflict between man and nature and between individual and species and the comprehensive restoration of human nature; (3) Communism is a movement directed towards its realization. In its entirety, despite Marx having already come into contact with French communist theories and noted the importance of the problems they point to, he does not draw on their theoretical achievements, but instead expresses his discontent with them. In this sense, French communism is not the source of Marx’s communist thought as Lenin claims. It is by following the footsteps of the Young Hegelians that Marx comes to communism, though he also modifies their approach by way of Hegel’s philosophy and political economics.

Chapter 13

The Transition from Feuerbach to Hegel An Interpretation of the Fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt]. Part I

The last fragment of the Manuscripts [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt] is special in that its main focus is on classical German philosophy, Hegel’s dialectic and Feuerbach’s critique of it to be precise. For this reason, it does not appear to match the main thread of the Manuscripts hitherto, being a critique of political economics and an analysis of communism. In this regard, the final fragment is one of a kind in the Manuscripts. As for his intention in writing this fragment, Marx offers an explicit statement in the preface to the Manuscripts: “In contrast to the critical theologian of our day, I have deemed the concluding chapter of this work – a critical discussion of Hegelian dialectic and philosophy as a whole – to be absolutely necessary, a task not yet performed. This lack of thoroughness is not accidental, since even the critical theologian remains a theologian”.1 At the outset of the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt], he also makes it plain that “[t]his is perhaps the place at which, by way of explanation and justification, we might offer some considerations in regard to the Hegelian dialectic generally and especially its exposition in the Phänomenologie and Logik and also, lastly, the relation [to it; trans.] of the modern critical movement”.2 Based on these expositions, Marx’s critique of Hegel is, above all, motivated by his discontent with the “critical theologian of our day”, namely the Young Hegelians. Including Strauss and Bauer, their representatives all vehemently criticized Hegel’s philosophy, yet “so completely was its development entangled with the subject-­ matter – that there prevailed a completely uncritical attitude to the method of criticizing […] Such expressions do not even show any verbal divergence from the Hegelian approach, but on the contrary repeat it word for word”.3 In a word, they completely miss the crux of the problem, as Marx later comments in Die Heilige Familie: 1  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 232. 2  Ibid., p. 326. 3  Ibid., p. 326 f.

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“In Hegel there are three elements, Spinoza’s Substance, Fichte’s Self-­ Consciousness and Hegel’s necessarily antagonistic unity of the two, the Absolute Spirit. The first element is metaphysically disguised nature separated from man; the second is metaphysically disguised spirit separated from nature; the third is the metaphysically disguised unity of both, real man and the real human species. Within the domain of theology, Strauss expounds Hegel from Spinoza’s point of view, and Bauer does so from Fichte’s point of view, both quite consistently. They both criticised Hegel insofar as with him each of the two elements was falsified by the other, whereas they carried each of these elements to its one-sided and hence consistent development. – Both of them therefore go beyond Hegel in their criticism, but both also remain within his speculation and each represents only one side of his system”.4 Naturally, this critique is hardly persuasive. In order to step out of this quagmire, the Young Hegelians had to first undertake “a critical settling of accounts with the mother of Young Hegelianism  – the Hegelian dialectic”,5 striking at the root of Hegel’s philosophy so as to truly fulfill the historical task of political and social critique they had taken upon themselves. As a Young Hegelian, Marx had already leveled critique at Hegel twice before the Paris Manuscripts: the first time, in Kreuznach, at Hegel’s notion of state and the second time in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher at the compatibilism in Hegel’s philosophy of law. Through these two critiques, Marx settles his account with Hegel’s dualist framework of state and civil society, shifting his focus from state to civil society, but goes no deeper into Hegel’s dialectic and his philosophy as a whole. After study and critique of political economics, however, he finally realizes this theoretical limitations and those of all Young Hegelians and points out “the apparently formal, but really vital question: how do we now stand as regards the Hegelian dialectic?”6 Therefore, it is indispensable to meticulously examine and reflect on his relationship to Hegel’s philosophy and, as much as possible, apply its positive elements to our understanding of his own theory.

13.1  Objectivity: The Truth of Materialism 13.1.1  Feuerbach’s Contribution Marx’s critique of Hegel is provoked by Feuerbach, as he states in the Manuscripts: “Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true 4  Marx, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Company, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 4: Marx and Engels: 1844–1845, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 139. 5  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 328. 6  Ibid., p. 327.

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conqueror of the old philosophy”.7 As regards the advanced nature and subversiveness of Feuerbach’s critique, he makes a summary in the later published Die Heilige Familie: “Feuerbach, who completed and criticised Hegel from Hegel’s point of view by resolving the metaphysical Absolute Spirit into ‘real man on the basis of nature’, was the first to complete the criticism of religion by sketching in a grand and masterly manner the basic features of the criticism of Hegel’s speculation and hence of all metaphysics”.8 Considering these articulations, Marx had already realized at that time that, in order to carry out a “critique of the Hegelian dialectic and philosophy as a whole”, Feuerbach’s theory is the sole resource on which he can rely. As this is the case, what exactly does he borrow from Feuerbach’s philosophy? Regarding Feuerbach’s contributions, Marx makes a remark at the outset of the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt]: Feuerbach’s great achievement is: (1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned; (2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of ‘man to man’ the basic principle of the theory; (3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.9

In the Manuscripts, Marx elaborates extensively on point (1), according to which Feuerbach identifies Hegel’s philosophy with religion. As Feuerbach sees it, Hegel’s philosophy is merely “theological philosophy”; a subject that according to Hegel can give birth to all beings and movements, i.e. spirit and self-consciousness are de facto produced by the thinking of sensuous, actual and natural man. Actual man and nature are instead the subject, whereas spirit and self-consciousness are nothing but products of man’s self-externalization and as such the predicate. The future philosophy ought to again reverse the “mystical subject-object” that “are related to each other in absolute reversal”10 and base it on a firm materialist foundation. Marx shares the same viewpoint as Feuerbach on this issue, as he had basically r­ ecognized and adopted this critique of the inversion of subject and predicate from his previous period of critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law. In comparison, Marx does not provide any account of point (2), probably because it is in fact an overvaluation of Feuerbach. As a matter of fact, there is hardly any content in Feuerbach’s theory that conforms to the second half of this assessment. Quite the contrary, it is Marx himself who elaborates on the “social relationship of ‘man to man’” in the previous Comments on James Mill and the fragment [Privateigentum und Kommunismus] of the Third Manuscript. These expositions embrace not only the  Ibid., p. 328.  Marx, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Company, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 4: Marx and Engels: 1844–1845, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 139. 9  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 328. 10  Ibid., p. 342. 7 8

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anatomy of the structure of civil society from an economic perspective, but also an extensive account of concepts such as communism and the “society” and, both in terms of theoretical level and horizon, surpass Feuerbach by a great distance. Compared with Marx, Feuerbach on no account deserves such an evaluation. Marx’s exposition of point (3) is relatively thorough. In his opinion, the opposition between Feuerbach and Hegel resides, above all, in their understanding of the “positive” and the “absolute positive”. In the self-movement of spirit, if the spirit in itself is the positive, then the “actual, sensuous, real, finite and particular”11 is its negation. According to Hegel’s science of logic, in order to consummate itself, the spirit must undergo a further stage as the negation of the previous negation, namely as a return to the stage of “the abstraction, the infinite”.12 This final negation of the negation is considered the “true positive” or the “absolute positive”. For Hegel, only the “absolute positive” has reality and truthfulness. From Feuerbach’s point of view, however, the “actual, sensuous, real, finite and particular” is the truth per se, and is “the position of sense-certainty based on itself”. Instead of running through the circle of negation of a negation, philosophy should be “starting out from the positive facts which we know by the senses”.13 In Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, he points out: “All is mediated, says the Hegelian philosophy. But something is true only when it is no longer mediated”.14 For Hegel, mediator or mediacy is the basic principle of his philosophy and notion of the spirit as the subject cannot achieve its truthfulness without mediation. Therefore, according to this principle of mediator or mediacy, the “actual, sensuous, real, finite and particular” in the stage of negation can only be the mediating moment of the spirit’s self-externalization and return to itself, and is therefore bound to be negated. If the “actual, sensuous, real, finite and particular” serves as the foundation of a materialist world outlook, then the sole function of Hegel’s “absolute positive” is to eradicate this foundation, something that Feuerbach cannot tolerate under any circumstance.

13.1.2  Hegel’s “Double Error” After outlining Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, Marx goes on to set forth his basic view of Hegel’s thought. Preceding from Phänomenologie as “the true point of origin and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy”, Marx first transcribes its table of contents, summarizes Hegel’s Enzyklopädie and surveys the idealist character of Hegel’s system of philosophy, starting out from and returning to thinking.

 Ibid., p. 329.  Ibid. 13  Ibid. 14  Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. by M. H. Vogel, The BobbsMerrill Company, 1966, p. 55. 11 12

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“Logic – mind’s coin of the realm, the speculative or mental value of man and nature […] is alienated thinking, and therefore thinking which abstracts from nature and from real man: abstract thinking”.15 This is quite an interesting analogy drawn using categories of economics. After his study of political economics, it is clear to Marx that money and value are not properties of any one simple thing, but abstractions of the universality of countless individual things, of the universal essence of the countless acts of individual labor. Money and value have their root in individual private property, yet, independent of any individual private property, they form a unity of individuality and universality. Hegel’s science of logic is, in a manner of speaking, also an abstraction from the philosophy of the spirit and the philosophy of nature, from the natural and social objects addressed therein, yet simultaneously independent of any concrete natural or social objects. It is through an analogy with money and value that Marx lays bare the essential character of Hegel’s science of logic or of the spirit: It is an abstraction that stands outside individual thinking, but objectively (objektiv) exists at the same time. This analogy also indicates Marx’s familiarity with political economics, otherwise he would not be capable of such an analogy, had he not thoroughly studied money and value in Comments on James Mill. This also provides another angle to support a chorological order that places Comments on James Mill before the Third Manuscript. Following his identification of the character of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx further points out the “double error” committed by Hegel in his philosophy: First “[w]hen, for instance, wealth, state power, etc., are understood by Hegel as entities estranged from the human being, this only happens in their form as thoughts …. They are thought-entities, and therefore merely an estrangement of pure, i.e., abstract, philosophical thinking”.16 In reality, these alienations are actually “the opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought itself”; likewise, the supersession of these alienations as well as the reclamation of these objects are “in the first place only an appropriation [Aneignung] occurring in consciousness, in pure thought, i.e., in abstraction”.17 Second, “the vindication of the objective world for man […] that religion, wealth, etc., are but the estranged world of human objectification, of man’s essential powers put to work and that they are therefore but the path to the true human world – this appropriation or the insight into this process appears in Hegel therefore in this form, that sense, religion, state power, etc., are spiritual entities; for only mind is the true essence of man, and the true form of mind is thinking mind, the logical, speculative mind. […] Just as entities, objects, appear as thought entities, so the subject is always consciousness or self-consciousness; or rather the object appears only as abstract consciousness, man only as self-consciousness”.18

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 330. 16  Ibid., p. 331. 17  Ibid. 18  Ibid., p. 331. 15

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Marx articulation of Hegel’s “double error” is rather perplexing and gives rise to different readings. For instance, Hosomi argues that, “for Hegel, both alienation and supersession of alienation is ‘movement of thought’ that ‘only happens in their form as thoughts’,”.19 To rephrase it, the “double error” can be attributed to Hegel construing both, alienation as such and the supersession of alienation as movement of thinking. According to Yibing Zhang, “the first of these [sc. double errors] is that […] Hegel has not discovered that estrangement in reality is actually the estrangement of the human essence, not the estrangement of the ideal that reflects this estrangement of reality. […] The second error is that Hegel does not realize that the true essence of the refraction of the estrangement of the Idea is the ‘return of the objective world to man’”.20 As such, Yibing Zhang reduces Hegel’s error to his failure to perceive alienation as the alienation of man in the objective (objektiv) world and the supersession of alienation as the vindication of the external objective world for man. To sum up, despite their differences, both Hosomi and Yibing Zhang deem the “double error” to be Hegel’s conception of real movement as movement of thinking. In the author’s opinion, Hegel’s first error is that he looks upon actual alienation and conflict as merely alienation and conflict of thinking and supersession of this alienation as merely movement of abstract thinking, the “dialectic of pure thought”, hence blurring the borderline between the world of thinking and the real world as object. Alienation initially refers to “the opposition of in itself and for itself, of consciousness and self-consciousness, of object and subject”,21 to the substantial difference and opposition between thinking and objects outside thinking. Hegel, however, holds that an external object can only be understood by thinking and thereby construes the opposition above as “the opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought itself”.22 Second, as analyzed in Chapter VII, Hegel already posits sense, wealth and state as the inevitable path individual self-consciousness takes to ascend to universal self-consciousness and thinks of these elements as objective (objektiv) objects existing in the real world (world of cultivation, Sache selbst), as objective (objektiv) beings different from thinking. Unfortunately, in accordance with Hegel’s science of logic, they are still all destined to be superseded by and incorporated into the spirit, becoming beings in thought. The “double error” functions as the coordinate for Marx’s critique of Hegel or as the prelude to his critique. Next, Marx directs his critique at the dialectic of thinking in Phänomenologie: “For Hegel the human being – man – equals self-­consciousness. All estrangement of the human being is therefore nothing but estrangement of self-­ consciousness. The estrangement of self-consciousness is not regarded as an expression – reflected in the realm of knowledge and thought – of the real estrangement of  Suguei Hosomi, On the Fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt] of the Third Manuscript. Question to Mr. Fujino, in: An Interpretation of Marx. II, Gendai no Rironsha, 1975, p. 118 (tarnslated into English by K.H.). 20  Yibing Zhang, Back to Marx. Changes of Philosophical Discourse in the Context of Economics, trans. by T. Mitchell, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2014, p. 194 f. 21  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 331. 22  Ibid. 19

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the human being. Instead, the actual estrangement – that which appears real [Die wirkliches, als real erscheinende Entfremdung] – is according to its innermost, hidden nature (which is only brought to light by philosophy) nothing but the manifestation of the estrangement of the real human essence, of self-consciousness. The science which comprehends this is therefore called phenomenology. All reappropriation [Wiederaneignung] of the estranged objective essence appears, therefore, as incorporation [Einverleibung] into self-consciousness: The man who takes hold of his essential being is merely the self-consciousness which takes hold of objective essences. Return of the object into the self is therefore the reappropriation of the object”.23 This passage constitutes the heart of Marx’s critique, based on which we can divide Hegel’s dialectic into four moments: ① As subject, “the human being – man – equals self-consciousness” ② “All [externalization] of the human being is therefore nothing but estrangement of self-consciousness” ③ The actual alienation of that which, as object, presents itself as reality is merely the “manifestation of the estrangement of […] self-consciousness” ④ The supersession and “reappropriation of the […] objective essence appear […] as incorporation into self-consciousness” These four moments make up the entirety of Hegel’s dialectic of thinking. The sequence numbers ①, ②, ③ and ④ correspond to those in the diagram of objectification and Entgegenständlichung in Chapter XIV. Based on this diagram, Hegel conceives all four moments, i.e. man as subject, man’s externalization, externalized object as such and object’s return to man, as movement of self-consciousness; that is to say, they are all confined to the realm of thought. For Marx, however, the subject of this movement is not abstract self-consciousness, but a “real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature”24; the externalization of such a “natural being [Naturwesen]” cannot simply be attributed to thought, but is the externalization process of concrete physical and mental energy; nor is the thereby posited or produced object a ­“thought-­entity”, but a “real, objective […] overwhelming world”25 that has objectivity and thinghood; lastly, this return of object to man is not supersession of itself in thinking either, but an actual, natural and sensuous return to man. In all, pace Hegel, Marx holds all four moments of the subject’s self-movement to be actual movement outside thought. Considering this critique, the main difference between Marx and Hegel is their understanding of objectivity. From Marx’s point of view, objectivity designates the concrete objective nature of the object per se, a “thinghood [Dingheit]” disengaged from self-consciousness “because at bottom he is nature”.26 In Hegel’s philosophy, however, “Objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] as such is regarded as an estranged  Ibid., p. 334.  Ibid., p. 336. 25  Ibid., p. 335. 26  Ibid., p. 336. 23 24

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human relationship which does not correspond to the essence of man, to self-­ consciousness. The reappropriation [Aneignung] of the objective essence [gegenständliches Wesen] of man, produced within the orbit of estrangement as something alien, therefore denotes not only the annulment of estrangement, but of objectivity as well. Man, that is to say, is regarded as a non-objective [nicht-gegenständliches], spiritual being [spriritualistisches Wesen]”.27 That is to say, as a result of the externalization of self-consciousness or a stage in the process of self-consciousness’s return to itself, the object is a necessary moment for Hegel. Furthermore, once it has arisen, this object has to stand in opposition to self-consciousness as the subject, otherwise it cannot be thought of as negation of self-consciousness or its alienation. If self-consciousness is to be considered a form of thinking, then the opposite object is material outside thinking or concrete matter, namely objectivity or thinghood apart from thinking. According to Hegel, however, this opposite object will eventually be superseded. Such a supersession indicates the return of the object to self-consciousness. More importantly, objectivity and thinghood must be eliminated, otherwise the object with objectivity and thinghood “is offensive [Anstössige] and constitutes estrangement for self-consciousness”28 and cannot be reappropriated by the subject. For Hegel, the subject is pure, abstract thinking and form, which cannot contain qualitatively different material. Thus, owning to the supersession of the object, material is destined to be negated so that “thought is thing hood, or thing hood is thought”.29 Considered in this way, though independent of self-consciousness or different from thinking with respect of its form, objectivity or thinghood is still an entity in thought, never surpassing its realm. In this sense, an object or thing is never objectivity or thinghood in its true sense. Hence, Marx satirizes Hegel in that he has the consciousness to “pretend to be directly the other of itself – to be the world of sense, the real world, life”, an attempt to surpass thinking with an object that turns out to be “thought surpassing itself in thought”.30 To be sure, it is Feuerbach rather than Marx who first identifies the idealist logic contained in Hegel’s dialectic. Even objectivity, this overarching concept, originates from Feuerbach as well, to which Marx specifically points in his notes written in the second half of 1844:  Ibid., p. 333 f.  Ibid., p. 338. 29  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 352. 30  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 339. This thought is attributed to Feuerbach. In Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, Feuerbach notes: “Hegel is a thinker who surpasses himself in thought. His aim is to capture the thing itself, but only in the thought of the thing; he wants to be outside of thought, but still remaining within thought – hence the difficulty in grasping the concrete concept” (Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. by M. H. Vogel, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1986, p. 49). 27 28

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Hegelian Construction of the Phenomenology. 1) Self-consciousness instead of men. Subject. Object [Objekt]. 2) The Differences. The things [Sachen] important, because the substance as self-differentiation or because the self-differentiation, the differences, the activity of understanding are grasped as essential, Hence, Hegel gave inside the speculation real distinctions that grasp the things [Sachen]. 3) Supersession of the alienation identified with supersession of the objectivity. (an aspect, namely developed from Feuerbach.) 4) That is why supersession of the represented [vorgestellt] object, of the object as object of the consciousness identified with the real objective supersession of the sensuous action, practice, und real activity that are different from the thinking (to develop seriously).31

Marx explicitly points out that “3) Supersession of the alienation identified with supersession of the objectivity” is “developed from Feuerbach” and what he does is only a further development of a path inaugurated by Feuerbach. It is true that Marx’s view of objectivity is related to Feuerbach. In The Decline of Metaphysics: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Relation Between Marx and Feuerbach, Xiaoming Wu specifically addresses Feuerbach’s concept of objectivity as well as its relationship to Marx and, based on this concept, expounds on how the metaphysics tradition ranging from Plato to Hegel ends with Feuerbach. He equates objectivity with sensuousness and hold that the fundamental task of Feuerbach’s principle of sensuousness-objectivity is to dispel Hegel’s mode of thinking that bases the explanation of the external on the “supersensible world” inside thinking and “eliminate the inwardness of consciousness and the entire metaphysical dualism resting on it”.32 Setting out from this perspective, he argues that Feuerbach’s objectivity is not a being that can only be conceived of in its relation to the subject (thinking), but an immediate being disengaged from this relation to the subject (thinking), namely a thing outside the subject. This explanation of Xiaoming Wu is correct. In the Manuscripts, Marx adopts Feuerbach’s concept of objectivity and further demonstrates that, even the object is – in accordance with Hegel’s logic of the subject’s self-alienation and return to itself – deemed to be posited by or alienated from the subject. It can no longer be completely incorporated into the subject after ­assuming its independence for it already possesses objectivity and becomes an objective being that is heterogeneous to the subject. In other words, objectivity will sever the connection between object and subject. As Hegel sees it, however, objectivity can never break free from its relationship to the subject, insofar as it is not only posited by self-consciousness, but will also necessarily return to the subject. In this sense, it is a being that remains for all eternity in reciprocity with the subject. Hegel’s negation of objectivity inevitably brings about the negation of the actual world and leads directly to a passing over of the severity and intensity of real existing conflicts. In Phänomenologie and Grundlinien, despite his extensive elaboration of  MEGA② I-2, S. 407 (translated into English by K.H.).  See Chapter IV. 1. Sensuousness and Supersensible World in Xiaoming Wu’s The Decline of Metaphysics. A Contemporary Interpretation of the Relation Between Marx and Feuerbach (People’s Publishing House, 2006).

31 32

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beings in reality, e.g. private property, family, civil society, state, moral and religion, as well as their underlying laws, Hegel eventually only interprets them as manifestations of the self-movement of thinking and his supersession thereof is merely supersession in thought as well. As such, both alienation and supersession are movements that do not actually touch the actual world as such. Conversely considered, all existing conflicts and oppositions in reality are insignificant, insofar as they will eventually be unified in spirit. As Löwith points out, “‘hostile alienation’ is degraded to a ‘irrelevant estrangedness’”.33 Herein lies the root of Marx’s dissatisfaction with Hegel: Regardless of the positivist and critical content he unfolds, Hegel still attribute it to the movement of thought, for which reason Marx names it “false positivism” and “apparent criticism”.34

13.1.3  Non-identity of Subject and Object (Objekt) As is known, Hegel’s philosophy is a philosophy of the spirit. One of the characters of the spirit concept is a subjectification of the object. Subjectification of the object means that self-consciousness or spirit, as subject, reappropriates the external object through self-alienation and return to itself. In order to be understood and grasped, the external world per se also needs to be incorporated into the subjective world. As analyzed above, this spirit concept is the reason why Hegel annuls the object’s thinghood or objectivity. That is to say, the framework of the spirit’s self-movement implies eo ipso a tendency to overlook the being of external things. Should our cognition of nature rest on this framework, the significance of nature as origin before mankind even existed, alongside the ontological significance of nature, will be weakened, even if the subject of movement, i.e. spirit or self-consciousness, is substituted by actual man. This is the drawback intrinsic to this framework. Later on, with the assimilation of Hegel’s dialectic, Marx embarks upon a critique of Feuerbach’s intuition and immediacy in the second half of the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt] as well as in Thesen, Ideologie and his mature economics works, arguing to construe the “thing, reality, sensuousness”, etc. as “human sensuous activity, practice”.35 This means interpreting the “thing, reality, sensuousness” and “subjectively”,36 an approach identical to Hegel’s in that it integrates the object into its relationship to the subject. It goes without saying that Marx’s definition of both subject and object, namely as actual man and objective (objecktiv) as well as its movement, is distinct from that of Hegel. It is for this reason that Lukács, Alfred Schmidt, et al. all hold Marx’s concept of nature to be a social and historical concept, according to which nature can only be cognized and assessed when incorporated into man’s objective activity, and into the  Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-century Thought, trans. by D. E. Green, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, p. 34  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 339. 35  Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 4. 36  Ibid. 33

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realm of labor practice. Similar standpoints also come about in the debate over practical materialism, practical philosophy and the subjectivity problem in China during the 1980s and 1990s, as many Chinese scholars deem nature to be a social and historical category. This is indeed an aspect of Marx’s view of nature or even its heart. Yet the author wants to press that, even with an emphasis on man’s subjectivity and the function of practice, Marx does not abandon the above addressed conception of objectivity either, nor does he simply ascribe the object to the subject. Take Marx’s mature economics works as an example. As is well-known, in Grundrisse (1857–1858), Marx has completely shifted his focus to the study of economics. Considering the nature of economics – namely to look upon external nature as labor object and use value –, Marx should have put more emphasis on man’s subjectivity and the creation function of labor. Surprisingly, however, he develops a labor theory that underlines the priority and independency of nature. Based on Aristotle’s distinction between form and matter (Stoff), for Marx, form is active, whereas matter is passive. All things are combinations of formal and material cause. When we apply this distinction to our account of labor process, then man and nature are respectively form and material. Labor is the formalization process, the process by which man’s form is conferred to the natural object. In this process, man is the subject of labor with an end like will and plan, whilst, as material, the natural object per se does not have an end, can only serve as an object and means of labor, and as the means to realize man’s end and to affirm man’s essential power. Starting out from this, nature can only be subordinate to man in labor, in which sense our study interprets this as humanized nature. As Marx sees it, however, though labor is the “living, form-giving fire”37 and bears the hallmark of its Aristotelian form, this form remains temporary and contingent on natural material. Natural material will not be dissolved by form, but will maintain its independence from it. In other words, form and material are external to and independent of each other. Marx invokes the example of production of a table38: In the process by which wood is made into a table through labor, though the form of wood is altered, its matter, namely wood, remains the same, only it has been turned into a table. As a combination of man’s labor (form) and wood (matter), the table, when not used, “falls a prey to the destructive influence of natural” and, as “[i]ron rusts and wood rots”39 with time, eventually returns to nature through the erosion of natural power. Yet, as the form of table vanishes, the matter remains itself. Considering this process, labor can only alter the form of nature but not its matter. Therefore, “[t]he latter [sc. man] can work only as Nature does, that is by changing the form of matter. Nay more, in this work of changing the form he is constantly helped by natural forces”.40 “Out of merely objectified labour time, in whose physi-

 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 286. 38  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 81 f. 39  Ibid., p. 193. 40  Ibid., p. 53. 37

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cal being labour exists only as vanished, external form [äußerliche Form] of its natural substance, a form exterior to this substance itself (e.g. to wood the form of the table, or to iron the form of the cylinder), as merely existing in the external form of the physical matter [stofflich]”.41 To sum up, as the embodiment of man’s subjective power, labor does not determine the destiny of matter that represents the material power of nature. As an object (Objekt), natural matter still maintains its independency from man’s labor practice, its stubbornness that the labor subject cannot take hold of, a stubbornness which Marx names “indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] of physical matter to its form”.42 Similar to the objectivity or thinghood in the Manuscripts, this “indifference” is the logic according to which the external object cannot be folded into man’s subjectivity or man’s subjective world. It is interesting that Schmidt, author of Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx, is also attentive to Marx’s conception of Nature, holding the “indifference” of nature to be the “non-identity of subject and object [Nichtidentität von Subjekt und Objekt]”.43 Based on this theory, though integrated into the social and historical process though labor, nature can neither be created nor dissolved by society, but must tenaciously follow the circle of nature-society-nature in accordance with its inherent law. This nature is evidently no longer the social and historical concept that only stands in relation to man’s labor, but now assumes ontological significance. Despite Schmidt’s start by interpreting Marx’s nature as a social and historical concept, the emergence of this ontological reading means that he comes to an opposite conclusion. In the face of this conundrum, Schmidt, whilst imputing this problem to Marx himself44 on the one hand, is forced, on the other hand, to alter his earlier reading of the social and historical concept and to acknowledge that Marx’s concept of nature also assumes ontological significance, only this nature in the ontological sense does not have a positive significance, but is merely Marx’s “negative ontology [negative Ontologie]” or “hidden speculation of nature [geheime Naturspekulation]”.45 Considering the conundrum confronting Schmidt, Marx’s theory gives rise to two distinct notions of nature and the original gestalt thereof arises exactly in the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt]: On the one hand, Marx and Feuerbach’s conceptions of nature share remarkable resemblance; particularly, Marx’s concept of objectivity and thinghood are identical to his later “indifference of physical matter to its form”; on the other hand, as we shall see in the next chapter, Marx adopts Hegel’s dialectic of alienation and bases his understanding of nature on the framework of spirit’s self-movement, underlining the  Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 285. 42  Ibid., p. 285. 43  Alfred Schmidt, Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1971, S. 72 (translated into English by K.H.). 44  Cf. ibid., S. 209. 45  Ibid., S. 77. 41

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function of man’s practice and subjectivity. The former rejects incorporating nature into the subject, whereas the latter construes nature in its relation to the subject. These two notions of nature are inherent in Marx’s thought and employed according to context: When criticizing Hegel’s idealism, he clearly takes the absolute materialist position, adopting the former; when leveling critique at Feuerbach’s intuition, he naturally assumes the stance of dialectic materialism, resting on the latter. Schmidt is perplexed with the inconsistence embedded in Marx’s notion of nature, which, however, can be easily explained in Marx’s own words: “There is nothing incomprehensible or mysterious in this”.46

13.2  The Naturalist Conception of Man Through critique of Hegel, Marx establishes his own materialist world outlook. Proceeding from this standpoint, Marx shows a tendency similar to Feuerbach in his naturalism with regard to the understanding of man. Meanwhile, he surpasses Feuerbach by integrating an active Hegelian dialectic.

13.2.1  Man as “A Part of Nature” In the Third Manuscript, contrary to Hegel who construes man as self-­consciousness – “Man, that is to say, is regarded as a non-objective, spiritual being”47 –, Marx sets out from Feuerbach’s naturalism, looking upon man as a corporeal, living being, i.e. “a part of nature”48: “Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers – he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities—as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering [leidend], conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants”.49 According to this passage, that “Man is directly a natural being” embraces at least two meanings: To begin with, nature is the natural historical or biological premise of the existence of mankind. If we consider man’s genesis as the evolution process “cosmos → geology → life → human”, then man is apparently born from nature, as the product of natural evolution. Second, man is “a living natural being”. So long as man is living or corporeal, he is impelled to depend on external nature to survive; no matter which stage of evolution man has achieved, he still needs necessary conditions for existence such as earth, water, air, food, etc. and to sustain his

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 335. 47  Ibid., p. 334. 48  Ibid., p. 276. 49  Ibid., p. 336. 46

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life activity through exchange of matter with external nature. This is a limitation that every “living natural being” cannot break free from, the truth of life. In this regard, man is still secondary to nature; for man, nature is a being in an ontological sense. Unlike inorganism, however, man is an “active natural being” that possesses natural and living force in disposition, ability, impulsion and passion, and proactively performs life activities to fulfill his desires, e.g. to eat when hungry and to take shelter when cold. Whilst passively adapting to nature, man also proactively and actively reshapes external nature to suit his existence. Marx offers a wonderful account of this conversion: “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being – and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power [Wesenkraft] of man energetically bent on its object”.50 To rephrase it, it is “suffering” that makes man “passionate”; man’s activeness stems from his “suffering”: This is the dialectic of life. Being “passionate” marks the beginning of man’s deliberate utilization of nature. Correspondingly, man now thinks of external nature as “objects that he needs  – essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers”.51 With this consciousness of the object, man can discern himself from the object, construing himself as objectification activity and gradually becoming a conscious objective being: “[H]e is a human natural being. That is to say, he is a being for himself. Therefore he is a species-being”.52 In short, it is by owning up to his “suffering” that man becomes “passionate”. This is the dialectic that Marx repeatedly employs here. This dialectic not only unveils the necessary link between “passiveness” and “activeness”, but also bases man’s activeness on naturalness and thereby lays the materialist groundwork for his definition of man. It is exceedingly important for us to understand Marx’s concept of nature, man and labor as well as his relationship with environmental thought.

13.2.2  “Man’s Inorganic Body” As “living natural being”, man will necessarily distinguish himself from external object. With the appearance of human labor, man inevitably steps into relationship to nature and environment. Originally, the advent of this relation presupposes the differentiation between man and nature. Marx, however, names this relation surprisingly the relation of nature to itself: “Man lives on nature – means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature”.53

 Ibid., p. 337.  Ibid., p. 336. 52  Ibid., p. 337. 53  Ibid., p. 276. 50 51

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It is true that, when nature is to be divided into man’s nature (intrinsic nature) and nature outside man (extrinsic nature), both remain part of nature and their relationship can naturally be thought of as the relation of nature to itself. Considered this way, the relationship between man and nature is not extrinsic, but immanent, namely an organic, living relation. In Ideologie, Marx and Engels posit the living individual being as the first premise of human history, construing “the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature”54 as a fact to be recognized in the first place – the relationship between the “physical organisation” and the “rest of nature” here is a continuation and development of the relationship of nature to itself in the Manuscripts. In the period of Das Kapital and its manuscripts, Marx further defines man’s labor process as an “exchange of matter [Stoffwechsel]”55 between man and nature. The concept of exchange of matter precisely displays the immanent relationship between man and nature as well as their unity. Yet Marx’s view of the relationship between man and nature does not stay on the level of the relationship of nature to itself. Next, Marx invokes a biological metaphor: Compared with man’s organic body, “Nature is man’s inorganic body – nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself human body”.56 That is to say, the relation of nature to itself is furthermore a relationship between the “inorganic body” and the “organic body”. This step is of vital significance, as it exemplifies Marx’s dialectic notion of man’s activity. Above all, man’s activity is a “life activity” (生命活动). Aside from “man’s inorganic body”, Marx also employs the term “inorganic nature [unorganische Natur]” in the Paris Manuscripts. These formulations are clearly swayed by biology, the prominent discipline in natural sciences at the time. In spite of its rhetorical function, biologically considered, man is compelled to rely on metabolism with external nature, i.e. assimilation and alienation, to maintain his existence. As Marx remarks, “nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die”. For man, nature is of ontological significance. Second, man’s activity is also a living activity (生活活动). In this activity, the metaphor of “man’s inorganic body” entails the meaning that man treats external nature as an object of need and utilizes it as a means: “The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body – both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body – nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself human body”.57 According to this passage, man can regard nature as the means of affirmation of his essential power and the realization of his universality.

 Marx, The German Ideology, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 31. 55  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 194. 56  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 276. 57  Ibid., p. 275 f. 54

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Considered that way, the metaphor “man’s inorganic body” has a twofold meaning, i.e. “life activity” and “living activity”, and is also the unity of both. As with the above addressed dialectic of “suffering” and “passion”, this unifying logic shows that it is oweing to a dependency on external nature (life activity) that man set about proactively utilizing nature (living activity). Despite the author’s differentiation between this life activity and living activity, both correspond to the same German word “Lebenstätigkeit”, which bears out the logically necessary connection of these two concepts. Corresponding to this differentiation, the expression “man’s inorganic body” also manifests Marx’s double conception of nature: On the one hand, nature is the object of man’s need and as such has use value; on the other hand, as the basis of man’s life, it has ontological significance. In all, Marx’s notion of nature is twofold. Whilst highlighting that “man is a part of nature”, he also puts emphasis on the principal difference between man and animal, which constitutes another aspect of his view of nature.

13.2.3  Man’s Character of Species-Essence As a “living natural being”, man has to come into contact with external nature in order to pursue an existence. Yet this alone does not distinguish man from other organisms such as animals. In the First Manuscript, Marx specifically highlights the fundamental difference between human and animal labor so as to criticize alienated labor for its distortion of human essence: “Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-­sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard [das inherent Maß] to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty”.58 In this passage, Marx enumerates differences between the human and the animal, to which Chinese practical materialists have paid extra attention during the 1980s for they hold it to be evidence of Marx’s advocacy of practical materialism. For instance, one of their representatives, Deshun Li notes: “Marx propounds two ‘standards [Maß]’ for man’s labor in this exposition, namely the standard of object and the standard of man”.59 It is thanks to the distinction of these two standards that we  Ibid., p. 276 f.  Deshun Li, Theory of Value, China Renmin University Press, 1988, p. 98 (translated into English by K.H.).

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can absolutely distinguish man’s activity from that of animal. Yongchang Wang also provides an explanation for this difference of standards: The “standard […] of the species to which it belongs” is the nature and law of objective things, whereas the “inherent standard” designates the standard of man as subject. Labor is the process by which man, based on a cognition of the objective (objektiv) thing (the standard of object), confers his “inherent standard” (man’s standard), such as end, wish, emotion, will, to the external object.60 As we can see, it is evident for Chinese practical materialists that this “inherent standard” denotes a human standard. In Japan, however, it is still disputed whether the “inherent standard” refers to human or object. The most accepted Japanese translation of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 das inherent Maß is rendered as “its [object’s; trans.] inherent standard”61 (その[対象]固有の規準). In respect of this rendering, the translator obviously attributes the “inherent standard” to the object as such. Certainly, there are other Japanese scholars who deem it otherwise, such as Chikazuku Iwasaki who, like the Chinese practical materialists, construes the “inherent standard” to be the “inherent standard”62 of man. Aside from the syntactic complexity of the sentence in which “das inherent Maß” appears, it is more in conformity with Marx’s thought to conceive of it as the “inherent standard” of man. A tree cannot become a table by itself; only man, with sufficient knowledge of tree’s law and nature, can confer man’s standard of table to it and bring table into being. It is due to man’s “inherent standard” that he “freely confronts his product” and produces “in accordance with the laws of beauty”.63 Therefore, considering the context, it is more reasonable to think of the “inherent standard” here as the standard of man. The principal difference between man and animal is still that man is a being with consciousness, as Marx notes: “The animal is immediately at one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. […] Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity”.64 Not only can man treat the external world as his object, but he is also able to take his life activity as an object of his consciousness. If the former is to be called the consciousness of the object, then the latter is self-consciousness. It is on account of these two kinds of consciousness that man may distinguish himself from animals and perform the above-mentioned free activity. It is also precisely for this reason that man becomes a species-being (Gattungswesen). As for species-being, the author has provided an explanation in Chapter V. Marx’s definition of species-being here is in principle identical with that of the First  Yongchang Wang, Theory of Practical Activity, China Renmin University Press, 1992, p. 186.  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, trans. by N. Shirozuka & Y. Tanaka, Iwanami Shoten, 1986, p. 97 translated into English by K.H.). 62  Chikazuku Iwasaki (ed.), The Modern Theories of Culture, Ethics and Value, Osaka Economic Law University, 1998, p. 43f (translated into English by K.H.). 63  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 277. 64  Ibid., p. 276. 60 61

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Manuscript: First, man is a universal, natural being, relying on external nature for his existence. Second, with consciousness, man “in practice and in theory […] adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object”.65 In brief, man has consciousness of object and himself. Third, man can perform objectification activity to reshape the world, namely consciously and freely produce, and “[i]n creating a world of objects by his practical activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being”.66 The third aspect makes up the essential hallmark of species-being.

13.3  Assimilation of Hegel’s Dialectic According to the analysis in the first subchapter, the fundamental flaw of Hegel resides in his negation of the objectivity of the material world. This negation coheres with his logic of the spirit that subjectifies the object or his dialectic of the negation of the negation. Cutting from the materialist standpoint, Feuerbach imputes this drawback to Hegel’s dialectic as such and thereby discards his dialectic entirely. Marx, however, departs from Feuerbach, insomuch as he distills the dialectic of the double negation from Hegel’s idealism, and that he criticizes and acknowledges its positive significance.

13.3.1  From Negative Alienation to Positive Alienation As has been noted in Chapter V, Feuerbach and Hegel hold different views on the alienation concept. Both conceive of it as a state of the subject’s self-loss. Yet, aside from this, Hegel also looks upon alienation as a necessary part of the process by which the subject returns to itself through the supersession of alienation and affirms his essential power. That is to say, alienation is, for him, a process of the negation of the negation. Hence, though negative in its form, alienation serves de facto as a positive factor that brings the whole process forward. Feuerbach, however, thinks of alienation as the state in which man losses his self eternally: “To enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing”.67 He opposes the negation of the negation which Hegel posits, since for him objectivity or thinghood that is intrinsic to matter is abandoned along with the supersession of alienation. As such, he holds a completely negative attitude towards alienation. Shirozuka offers a magnificent summary of the differences between Hegel and Feuerbach’s notion of alienation: “For Hegel, self-alienation and return to itself are inevitable moments for the self-unfolding of spirit (history). Self-alienation is a historical process. Yet, from Feuerbach’s viewpoint, self-alienation is an illusion, a  Ibid., p. 275.  Ibid., p. 276. 67  Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. by M. Evans, London, 1881, p. 25. 65 66

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mistake of consciousness; that is to say, the alienation concept is converted from a factual concept to a value-laden concept. The alienation concept that Hegel holds to be the embodiment of the factual process of the objective historical movement turns out to be the reflection of the state of the subjective, negative value”.68 According to this, alienation is, in Hegel’s opinion, a neutral, factual concept or even a positive, good category, whilst Feuerbach deems it to be a value-laden concept: a negative, evil category. The author agrees with such a summary. As is well-known, alienation is at the very heart of Marx’s Manuscripts. The Paris Manuscripts in their entirely can be summarized as manuscripts pertaining to alienation. In these manuscripts, however, Marx’s view of alienation has gone through a transition. In the First Manuscript, his notion of alienation is basically Feuerbachian, as he for instance condemns alienation as follows: “[T]he worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. For on this premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself – his inner world – becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself”.69 Despite the absence of the alienation concept, this account is definitely targeted at the phenomenon of alienated labor. Man externalizes his essential power to the object, yet cannot reappropriate his labor product. As a result, the more he externalizes to the object, the hollower he becomes; the more he labors, the more he is devalued. This significantly resembles Feuerbach’s concept of alienation, even the articulation, “The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself” is itself a modified Feuerbachian proposition. Hence, in respect of the fragment [Die entfremdete Arbeit] of the First Manuscript, Marx also deems alienation evil like Feuerbach. By the Third Manuscript, however, Marx starts to recognize the positive significance of alienation, a notion that clearly stems from Hegel. As to Marx’s change of attitude towards alienation and assimilation of Hegel’s concept of alienation, we shall expound on it at greater length in reference to Lukács’s proposition in the ensuing chapter. Here, the author only wants to invoke Marx’s exposition of communism to demonstrate how he avails himself of Hegel’s logic of the double negation.

13.3.2  The Dialectic of Alienation and Communism According to Marx’s definition of communism in the fragment [Privateigentum und Kommunismus], “[c]ommunism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement”. Private property, along with its appendages as well as money, politics, state, etc., is the alienation of man’s essence. Communism may  Noboru Shirozuka, Young Marx’s Thought, Keiso Shobo, 1975, p. 307 (translated into English by K.H.). 69  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 272. 68

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supersede private property, return the alienated essence back to man and achieve the “complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being”.70 Logically considered, this definition of communism necessarily presupposes a moment as supersession of alienation and return to man, that is the moment of the negation of the negation. In accordance with our analysis above, this moment cannot be deduced from Feuerbach’s logic of alienation, but is exactly that which Hegel’s logic of alienation entails. In other words, Hegel’s negation of the negation is indispensable in justifying the historical necessity of communism. From Hegel’s viewpoint, although man’s self-alienation is a negative state of man, it is exactly because of this negative mediator that man disengages himself from the abstract and hollow primitive state, immersing himself in the inhuman world abounding with competition and alienation where he goes about cultivating and hardening himself; when reclaiming his alienated essence, man becomes richer and more powerful. Likewise, private property is, according to Marx’s definition of communism, the alienated state and negation of man, yet it is oweing to this moment that man can comprehensively stimulate his potential so as to eventually reappropriate the essence of man through the supersession of private property, thereby reaching communism. It is because he discerns “the positive essence of private property [das positive Wesen des Privateigentums]”71 as well as “the meaning of private property [der Sinn des Privateigentums]”72 that Marx does not adopt an absolutely negative attitude towards private property and capitalism like most of the communists of the time such as Weitling, Hess and the young Engels. Instead, he construes private property as the “necessary premise”73 of the realization of communism and “self-estrangement”, “[externalization] of man’s essence”, “man’s loss of objectivity” and “his loss of realness”74 as the necessary moments in the realization of communism. Herein lies the reason why Marx can eventually surpass utopian socialism and establish scientific socialism. Naturally, such a view of alienation and communism would be unimaginable without Hegel’s dialectic. After setting forth the significance of private property, Marx notes: “But atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the objective world created by man – of man’s essential powers born to the realm of objectivity; they are not a returning in poverty to unnatural, primitive simplicity. On the contrary, they are but the first real emergence, the actual realisation for man of man’s essence and of his essence as something real”.75 Indeed! Communism is on no account merely a means by which (1) man alienates his essence to an object and vanishes due to the exploitation of said object; on the contrary, man must overcome alienation and reappropriate the objects and wealth that should have belonged to him. Nor is communism by any means (2) the fear-driven return to primitive community either; instead it is the  Ibid., p. 296.  Ibid. 72  Ibid., p. 323. 73  Ibid., p. 341 f. 74  Cf. ibid., p. 342. 75  Ibid. 70 71

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reconstruction of a new-style society that emerges through the purgatory of alienation. If (1) refers to political economics, then (2) corresponds to “crude communism”, the methodology of which can only be Feuerbachian. In conclusion, methodologically considered, Feuerbach is positive about immediacy, resorting to sensuous intuition and holding a negative view of alienation, whilst Hegel highlights mediation, resting on the negation of the negation and acknowledging alienation. On account of this distinction, Marx turns from Feuerbach to Hegel when expatiating on communism. As a result, from the First to the Third Manuscript, Marx’s notion of alienation presents itself as a transition from total negation to an affirmation. Furthermore, the alienation concept in the Third Manuscript is more developed than that in the First Manuscript for, though the latter exposes the exploitative essence of capitalism and denounces the inhumanity of capitalism, it cannot dialectically deal with the historical necessity of private property, division of labor, exchange and civil society, and is hence entangled with cynical humanism. The alienation concept in the Third Manuscript, however, embraces both positive and negative aspects, based on which Marx lays out the rudiments of his communist theory. All in all, the alienation concept in the Third Manuscript manifests as a giant step forward in the development of Marx’s thought.

13.4  Summary In the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt], Marx sets out from praising Feuerbach for his critique of Hegel, yet ends up discovering the great significance of Hegel’s dialectic. This result surprises not only the reader, but perhaps also Marx himself. He starts out to criticize Hegel and praise Feuerbach, but unearths during his exposition the significance of the dialectic of labor, and man’s self-evolution and alienation in Hegel’s philosophy. Though Marx does not openly reproach Feuerbach, the Third Manuscript does already comprise elements of Thesen written in 1845. In fact, one can detect Marx’s discontent with Feuerbach and approval of Hegel between the lines of this fragment, for instance: “We shall explain both the abstract form of this process and the difference between this process as it is in Hegel in contrast to modern criticism, in contrast to the same process in Feuerbach’s Wesen des Christentums, or rather the critical form of this in Hegel still uncritical process”.76 Moreover, in point 4) of the above cited notes taken around the second half of 1844, Marx already points to Feuerbach’s lack of understanding of “the sensuous action, practice, und real activity”. Thus, the opinion that the Paris Manuscripts do not contain the thought of Thesen does not match the fact, as it underestimates the level of depth Marx attained in the Paris Manuscripts. Marx’s conversion to communism is commonly believed to have been bridged by Feuerbach’s materialism or his humanism centered on the alienation theory. Feuerbach is regarded as the mediation by which Marx turns to communism. This 76

 Ibid., p. 329.

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point of view is not wrong. However, given the main thread of the development of Marx’s thought, the role of Hegel’s philosophy, especially his alienation-centered dialectic, is at least equally as large as Feuerbach’s. In particular for the communist theory in the Manuscripts, Hegel’s logic of the negation of the negation is rather more essential. In this regard, it is reasonable to say that, in the transition of young Marx’s thought, Hegel’s dialectic proves to be a more salient mediation than Feuerbach’s philosophy. Lukács is one of the first to realize the significance of Hegel’s dialectic in Marx’s work. In the preface to the new edition of Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, he notes: “For anyone wishing to return to the revolutionary traditions of Marxism the revival of the Hegelian traditions was obligatory. History and Class Consciousness represents what was perhaps the most radical attempt to restore the revolutionary nature of Marx’s theories by renovating and extending Hegel’s dialectics and method. […] Plekhanov and others had vastly overestimated Feuerbach’s role as an intermediary between Hegel and Marx, […] This is the question of alienation, which, for the first time since Marx, is treated as central to the revolutionary critique of capitalism and which has its theoretical and methodological roots in the Hegelian dialectic”.77 In spite of his recognition of the significance of Hegel’s dialectic in early Marx’s conversion, he omits to determine a distinction between the alienation concepts in the First and the Third Manuscript, as we shall see in the next chapter, and therefore cannot provide a fair assessment of Hegel’s dialectic of alienation.

 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, 1971, p. XXIf.

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Chapter 14

Is Objectification Identical to Alienation? An Interpretation of the Fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt]. Part II

As is well-known, Lukács put forward a salient proposition on the connection between early Marx and Hegel. The latter identifies objectification with alienation, whereas Marx strictly differentiates between the two. Hegel affirms alienation, whereas Marx negates it. Due to Lukacs’ particular standing, this proposition exerts a profound impact on Marx studies worldwide, especially in China where it is regarded as the guiding principle for surveying the relationship between the two great philosophers. As the author sees it, however, this proposition is not precise enough to be considered accurate. By way of a review of Lukacs and Fujino’s disagreement on the relationship between objectification and alienation, this chapter analyzes the distinction between Hegel and Marx on the concept of alienation and objectification and eventually performs an assessment of Lukács’s proposition in order to dispel its negative influence and reposition early Marx’s thought in relation to Hegel’s dialectic.

14.1  Lukács’s Proposition As an expert on early Marx, Lukács specifically addresses the connection between young Marx and Hegel in Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, Der Junge Hegel and Der Junge Marx (Zur philosophischen Entwicklung des jungen Marx (1840–1844)). It is in these three works and the preface to an updated edition of Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein that Lukács’s proposition came into being and took shape. In Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (written in 1919 and 1921, published in 1922), Lukács distills a concept of thingification from fetishism theory in Das Kapital. Although he cannot have read the Manuscripts by then, or even have been aware of their existence, this thingification concept bears many similarities to the alienation concept in the Manuscripts. Furthermore, he ingeniously employs this concept to carry out an in-depth anatomy and critique of capitalist social relations, reevaluating concepts such as Hegel’s dialectic. Therefore, when the Manuscripts © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 L. Han, Studies of the Paris Manuscripts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9618-3_14

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were published in 1932, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein gained great fame in the West for its similarity with the Manuscripts. Yet, unlike Marx, Lukács does not deal with the relationship between objectification and thingification (alienation) in Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. Der Junge Hegel (written in 1938, published in 1948) was published after the Manuscripts. According to Lukács’s memory, when working at the Marx-Engels-­ Lenin Institute in Moscow in 1930, he had already read the unpublished Manuscripts, which had, in particular Marx’s exposition of the relationship between objectification and alienation, an “overwhelming effect”1 on him. Hence, in Part IV. 4. “Entäusserung” (“externalization”) as the central philosophical concept of The Phenomenology of Mind of Der Junge Hegel, Lukács elaborates on his viewpoint. He starts by pointing out that both terms, “externalization” and “alienation”, are translations of the same German word “alienation”. In English economics, the term “alienation” denotes the transferal and relinquishment of goods; in contractualist political thought, it designates that men surrender pre-contractual freedom to a society which they form by signing a contract. He further divides the externalization concept into three stages: (1) “It refers firstly to the complex subject-object relation inseparably bound up with all work and all human activity of an economic or social kind”; (2) “there is the specifically capitalist form of ‘externalization’, i.e. what Marx would later call ‘fetishism’”; (3) “there is a broad philosophical extension of the concept ‘externalization’ which then comes to be synonymous with ‘thinghood’ or objectivity. This is the form in which the history of objectivity is portrayed: objectivity as a dialectical moment in the journey of the identical subject-object on its way back to itself via ‘externalization’”.2 Lukács’s definition of Hegel’s concept of externalization is also his notion of alienation, as he deems alienation and externalization to be identical. In the Manuscripts, Marx avails himself of these two terms in the same way. Second, he differentiates between three spheres within alienation as well: (1) The externalization of the first sphere refers to the alienation in subject-object (Objekt) relation, namely that the subject becomes another or alienation in the most general sense. (2) It then designates the alienation under capitalist relations of production, namely that the externalized another in turn holds dominance over man, enslaving man, which coincides with the alienation in the fragment [Entfremdete Arbeit und Privateigentum] of the Manuscripts. The last alienation is comparatively sophisticated, insomuch as it is thinghood or objectivity of the object on the one hand and the spirit’s self-­ movement as such on the other hand, i.e. the subject’s alienation (externalization), supersession of alienation and return to the subject. Despite this differentiation, however, Lukács de facto takes alienation in the second sense, namely as capitalist alienation, for the purpose of strictly differentiating between alienation and objectification. 1  Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, 1971, p. xxxvi. 2  Cf. Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel. Studies in the Relations Between Dialectics and Economics, trans. by R. Livingstone, London, 1975, p. 539–541.

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Next, he points out: “For alienation is sharply distinguished from objective reality, from objectification in the act of labour. The latter is a characteristic of work in general and of the relation of human praxis to the objects of the external world; the former is a consequence of the social division of labour under capitalism, of the emergence of the so-called free worker who has to work with the means of production belonging to another and for whom, therefore, these means of production as well as his own product exist as an independent, alien power”.3 In other words, Marx, as he sees it, already explicitly distinguishes between labor as objectification and labor as alienation. The former is the general character of labor that permeates the entire history of humanity, whilst the latter designates the phenomenon endemic in capitalism. By contrast, on account of his uncritical idealism, Hegel confines alienation to merely the realm of the spirit, whereby, “[o]n the subjective side, there is the mistaken identification of man and self-consciousness demonstrated and criticized by Marx; on the objective side, there is the equation of alienation and objectification [Gegenständlichkeit] in general”.4 In Der Junge Marx (written in 1942, published in 1954), Lukács’s critique of Hegel’s concept of alienation gradually escalates, ascending to an ideological level. From his point of view, “the fatal mistake of Hegel, the fundamental falseness of his principle” resides in: “[f]irst, Hegel mistakes the inhuman alienation in capitalism for the general objectivity and want to supersede the latter in idealist way rather than the former”.5 By contrast, “starting from the facts of real life, “he [sc. Marx] has drawn a distinct boundary between objectification in labor as such and human self-­ alienation in the specific, capitalist form of labor. It is therefore the socialist critique of capitalist economy with the perspective of the supersession of capitalist alienation that enables Marx to overcome the false, idealist way of putting the question and solution in the Hegelian treatment of the problem of alienation”.6 Hegel’s second error is “that Hegel means to supersede the alienation in the negation of negation, but in reality confirms it”.7 In a word, Hegel is positive on alienation, about which Lukács comments: “The Hegelian philosophy is therefore as such, out of its essence, its principle, a part of the self-alienation, it contains – as civil [bürgerlich] ideology – the justification and fixation of the alienation. It can thus not be the philosophy of man’s emancipation, of the overcoming of his self-alienation”.8 Considered this way, the affirmation of alienation is “civil ideology”, is Hegel’s apology for the bourgeois, whereas its negation embodies the “socialist standpoint” and Marx’s critique of capitalism. In the preface to the new edition (written in 1967), Lukács reflects on the earlier edition of Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein and undertakes a self-critique, pointing out that this work commits a “fundamental  Ibid., p. 549.  Ibid., p. 551. 5  Georg Lukács, Zur philosophischen Entwicklung des jungen Marx (1840–1844), in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2(2), p. 336 (translated into English by K.H.). 6  Ibid., p. 337. 7  Ibid., p. 339. 8  Ibid. 3 4

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and crude error”, insofar as it “follows Hegel in that it too equates alienation with objectification [Vergegenständlichung] (to use the term employed by Marx in the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts)”.9 Based on the summary above, Lukács’s proposition mainly comprises the following three aspects: (1) Objectification is a pervasive concept in human history for, wherever human labor exists, there is objectification, regardless of the gestalt of society. Alienation, however, is a phenomenon endemic to capitalist society, and bound to be eradicated in communist society. That is to say, “objectification is a natural means by which masters the world and as such it can be either a positive or a negative fact. By contrast alienation is a special variant of that activity that becomes operative in definite social conditions”.10 Objectification is a neutral or positive category, whereas alienation is an absolutely negative category. Second, Hegel does not distinguish between objectification and alienation, but equates them, whilst Marx strictly differentiate one from the other and criticizes Hegel’s erroneous identification of both. Third, Hegel is positive about alienation, whereas Marx negates it. The third aspect constitutes the kernel of Lukács’s proposition. Hence, can this proposition stand up to scrutiny? It is apparent that, from Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (1922) to the preface to the new edition (1967), Lukács’s attitude towards Hegel is gradually intensified. In Der Junge Hegel, Lukács can still objectively (objektiv) assess the connection between Hegel’s dialectic and his economics and acknowledge the positive elements of Hegel’s dialectic. In Der Junge Marx, however, Lukács gives increasingly fewer positive comments on Hegel, who is now deemed to be the spokesman of bourgeois ideology and a counterexample to Marx. Later, Lukács even criticizes himself in the preface to the new edition of Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (1967), warning the others not to commit the same foolish error. Generally speaking, Lukács focuses more on continuality between Marx and Hegel’s dialectic in his early period, later turning to their incontinuity. It remains unknown whether this is oweing to political pressure on Lukács after the publication of Der Junge Hegel and particularly during the writing of the preface to the new edition of Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. Considering the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt] alone, Lukács fails to do justice to Hegel’s dialectic and the relationship between Marx and Hegel and shows signs of oversimplification and an ideological bent. It is for this reason that his standpoint has invited extensive criticism. For instance, one of the critics of Lukács, the French translator of Phänomenologie Jean Hyppolite specifically engages with Lukács’s proposition in his Études sur Marx et Hegel. Though also agreeing with this proposition, he raises objections to the conclusion Lukács draws, namely that Marx stands on a higher level than Hegel: “Consequently, the strict Marxian account of Hegel’s confusion of objectification, as the glory and final end of man in a rediscovered nature, with self-alienation, as  Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by R. Livingstone, The MIT Press, 1971, p. xxiv. 10  Ibid., p. xxxvi. 9

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merely a development within a particular phase of history, in our opinion fails to do justice to Hegel’s philosophical analysis and interpretation of these notions”.11 According to Hyppolite, the way of man’s being per se has the character of alienation, “objectification and alienation are inseparable”,12 the progress of human history is exactly based on alienation. In this sense, Hegel’s identification of objectification with alienation is exactly the part in which he is more profound than Marx. This reading evidently stands in blank opposition to that of Lukács.

14.2  Fujino’s Explanation of Entgegenständlichung As the Japanese translator of the Kokumin Bunko edition of the Manuscripts and Grundlinien, Fujino is also conversant with both Marx and Hegel’s thought. Before unfolding his critique of Lukács, he first invokes pertinent discussion of Alfred Kurella, Gottfried Stiehler and Cornu to elucidate how objectification, externalization and alienation are related.

14.2.1  Kurella, Stiehler and Cornu In Der Mensch als Schöpfer seiner selbst, Kurella points out two facts that contradict Lukács’s standpoint: To begin with, based on a passage of the fragment [Privateigentum und Kommunismus] – “We have before us the objectified essential powers of man in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, in the form of estrangement, displayed in ordinary material industry”13 –, Kurella argues that “man’s objectification of his own essential power through labor can also be considered as externalization [Entäußerung] and alienation [Entfremdung] in that the labor product, once disengaged from the laborer, stands in opposition to the laborer himself or the others in an external, estranged fashion”.14 This passage suggests that Kurella first equates externalization with alienation and then objectification with “externalization and alienation”, which can be illustrated using the equation: (alienation  =  externalization)  =  objectification. Next, he points out that Marx has used alienation in the neutral (“indifferent”) sense: “In Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx often regards externalization and alienation as synonyms, employing them in parallel to each other with a comma. At these spots, he obviously avails himself of the alienation concept in an indifferent sense, namely in the neutral  Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, trans. by J. O’Neill, Basic Books, Inc., 1969, p. 89.  Ibid., p. 88. 13  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 302f. 14  Alfred Kurella, Der Mensch als Schöpfer seiner selbst, Aufbau Verlag, 1958, S. 93 (translated into English by K.H.). 11 12

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sense of externalization of something intrinsic that is externalized [Hinausschaffen]. For this reason, he also follows the usage inherited from Hegel and Feuerbach”.15 With regard to this articulation, Kurella identification of externalization with alienation is conditioned, insomuch as only neutral alienation equals externalization. Hence, his standpoint can also be formulated as “negative alienation ≠ (neutral alienation = externalization) = objectification”. Despite the instringency of and the confusion engendered by his exposition,16 the two facts he points to are fully revealing. Contrary to Kurella’s standpoints, Stiehler advances a different point of view: “For the Marxist analysis, it is very important to maintain the difference of both concepts [sc. externalization and alienation]. Unfortunately, in the work of Alfred Kurella, Der Mensch als Schöpfer seiner selbst (Berlin 1958), this is not done sufficiently. In numerous places of this writing, the concepts objectification, externalization and alienation are rather used as synonym. […] Fact is that objectification and externalization are inherent in the general human activity, whilst the alienation arises essentially on the foundation of opposition of capital and labor. When Kurella seeks to underline the positive significance of alienation, it is in the true sense the positive role of externalization that he has in view. Marx defines the alienation as relation in which the labor produces the condition for its own existence as estranged powers that rules over it”.17 Likewise, Cornu also asserts that, “due to his conservative inclination, Hegel attempts to eliminate the contradiction of capitalist relations that causes alienation of man by virtue of a conceptual coordination mediated by spiritualization of man and nature. As such, the process of creating man assumes for Hegel the positive characteristic of externalization rather than the negative characteristic of alienation. […] Pace Feuerbach, Marx conceives alienation from a communist perspective as alienation of labor that oppresses man”.18 To sum up, both Cornu and Stiehler hold the opinion that Marx explicitly differentiates between externalization and alienation, insofar as the former is considered positive and the latter negative. Therefore, as to the problem of the relationship between alienation and objectification, externalization is deemed objectification’s equal, whilst alienation is seen as completely different from objectification, being alienated labor under capitalism and therefore exploitation built on the opposition of capital and labor. The principal distinction between Marx and Hegel is that Marx distinguishes externalization and alienation. In essence, this standpoint coincides with Lukács’s strict distinction between objectification and alienation except, for Lukács, externalization is barely different from alienation in Hegel and Marx’s 15  Alfred Kurella, Man as Creator of himself, trans. by W. Fujino, Aoki Shoten, 1972, p. 62 (translated into English by K.H.). 16  For instance, the last sentence of the cited passage, “he also follows the usage inherited from Hegel and Feuerbach”, is problematic, since Hegel and Feuerbach’s notion of alienation are essentially different: Hegel’s alienation is neutral, whilst Feuerbach’s is negative. 17  Gottfried Stiehler, Die Dialektik in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, Akademie Verlag, 1964, S. 280 (translated into English by K.H.). 18  Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, vol. 2: 1844–1845, trans. by Pikun Liu et al., SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1980, p. 146 (translated into English by K.H.).

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Table 14.1  Comparison between Lukács, Kurella, Stiehler and Fujino’s Standpoints Name Lukács Kurella Stiehler Fujino

Standpoint (alienation = externalization) ≠ objectification (1) (alienation = externalization) = objectification (2) negative alienation ≠ (neutral alienation = externalization) = objectification alienation ≠ (externalization = objectification) (alienation = externalization) = objectification

context. In brief, Lukács’s viewpoint is “(alienation = externalization) ≠ objectification”, whereas Cornu and Stiehler’s is “alienation ≠ (externalization = objectification)” (Table 14.1). In Fujino’s opinion, the standpoint of Stiehler and Cornu, though seeming reasonable, fails to match up with the facts. Considering the Manuscripts, Marx does not explicitly differentiate between externalization and alienation as they claim, but often employs them side by side, like “alienated, externalized labor”, or in one place “alienated labor” and in another “externalized labor”, with both words conveying the same meaning. As such, externalization and alienation are in principle synonyms in the Manuscripts. In other words, regarding the relation between the two, Fujino agrees with Lukács, and opposes Stiehler and Cornu. Concerning the relationship between objectification and alienation, however, he sides with Kurella against Lukács, insofar as he sees the common identity of objectification and alienation despite their differences. In the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt], Marx is, like Hegel, also attentive to the positive aspect of alienation and externalization rather than simply looking for negatives: “Marx’s critique is by no means targeted at Hegel’s identification of objectification and alienation, as Lukács argues”; instead, “it is only focused on Hegel’s idea that the objectified, alienated subject and his essence are nothing more than abstract thinking, self-consciousness and philosophical spirit, namely Hegelian idealism”.19 Therefore, that Lukács draws a “distinctive line” between objectification and alienation is an erroneous “schematism and undialectical viewpoint”.20 Interestingly, Fujino intentionally syncretizes the standpoints of Lukács, Cornu and Stiehler that he objects to. Using Cornu and Stiehler’s mistaken distinction between externalization and alienation as well as his identification of externalization and objectification as counterevidence, Fujino argues that, “if, for Marx, there is no fundamental difference between externalization and alienation, then, granted the identical aspect between alienation and objectification, we have to admit that externalization and objectification also have an identical aspect (admittedly, to recognize that externalization, alienation and objectification have identical aspects does not mean to equate them [sc. externalization/alienation and objectification])”.21

 Wataru Fujino, Historical Materialism and Ethics, Shin Nibon Shubansha, 1972, p. 285f (translated into English by K.H.). 20  Ibid., p. 272. 21  Ibid., p. 271. 19

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From this, Fujino deduces that alienation can indeed be equated with objectification.

14.2.2  The Explanation Problem of Entgegenständlichung After clarifying the relationship between objectification, externalization and alienation, Fujino extensively expatiates on how to translate the term “Entgegenständlichung” invented by Marx. In fact, this term appears twice in the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt]: In one of these two places, Marx notes: “The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phänomenologie and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object [Entgegenständlichung], as [externalization] and as transcendence of this [externalization]”.22 The term “Entgegenständlichung” here is rendered differently in all three Japanese translations, i.e. the edition of Aoki Bunko, Iwanami Bunko and Kokumin Bunko. In the Aoki Bunko edition, Kazuo Miura conceives of Entgegenständlichung as deviation, estrangement of the subject’s object from the subject and hence renders it as a “deviation of object”.23 This deviation of object is de facto equivalent to the alienation of the object (Entfremdung des Gegenstandes). In the most influential translation of Iwanami Bunko, Shirozuka offers a thorough explanation on the translation issue of Entgegenständlichung. On account of its significance, the author quotes it in its entirety: This term consists of two parts: ent- and Gegenständlichung. Different notions of the prefix ent-, however, will lead to distinct readings of this term. Common meanings of the prefix ent- are, for instance, confrontation, objection, negation, separation, emergence, movement to a certain state and degeneration. Since Gegenständlichung means becoming an ‘object’, then Entgegenständlichung correspondingly refers to dis-objectification, separate objects, being something separated as an object and turning an object into the opposite of itself, etc. As to the English translation, both Martin Milligan and Thomas B. Bottomore render it as ‘loss of the object’. On page 87 of this translation (the part of alienated labor), Marx notes that the ‘objectification’ of labor presents itself as ‘loss of the object and bondage to it [Verlust und Knechtschaft des Gegenstandes]’. For this reason, we can also reasonably translate it as ‘loss of the object’, but this is ‘loss of the object’ for man (laborer) or subject (Hegel’s spirit, consciousness) rather than disappearance of the object itself. It signifies a separation and independency of object from subject, the detachment of object from subject. Moreover, the relationship between Vergegenständlichung and Entgegenständlichung is analogous with the that between Verwirklichung and Entwirklichung. Regarding consistency in translation, I will translate Entgegenständlichung as ‘detachment of object’.24

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 332f. 23  Marx, Economic = Philosophic Manuscripts, trans. by K. Miura, Aoki Bunko, 1974, p. 239, 267 (translated into English by K.H.). 24  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, trans. by N. Shirozuka & Y. Tanaka, Iwanami Bunko, 1986, p. 288f (translated into English by K.H.). 22

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Based on Shirozuka’s account, he thinks of Entgegenständlichung as the “separation and independency of object from subject”, “detachment of object from subject” and thereby renders it as the “detachment of object”. This in fact coincides with Miura’s “deviation of object”, since both refer to that object becoming another, i.e. alienation of object. Furthermore, considering Shirozuka’s introduction of Milligan and Bottomore’s English translation, they all understand this word in principle as alienation of object, which can therefore basically be regarded as the common understanding of Entgegenständlichung. In the light of this, it is somewhat unconventional that Entgegenständlichung is rendered in the Chinese translation of People’s Publishing House as “dis-objectification” (非对象化), the meaning of which is unclear. As Fujino sees it, however, Entgegenständlichung designates the state in which “the subject strips the object of its objectivity”25 and hence translates it as a “stripping-­off of objectivity”, providing a detailed explanation. To begin with, he invokes Marx’s approval of political economics in the fragment [Privateigentum und Arbeit] of the Third Manuscript, namely that monetarism and mercantilism look upon private property “as something outside man and independent of him”, whilst political economics supersedes “this external, mindless objectivity”,26 unearthing the subjective essence of wealth, that is, construing external wealth as man’s labor product. Viewed from this political economy standpoint, Hegel also interprets the external object as the objectified essence of the subject. Hence, preceding from Marx’s analogy between political economics and Hegel, Fujino points out that “the so-called ‘stripping-off of objectivity’ designates the overcoming of the thoughtlessness that conceives the object as an external being, independent of man, and the conception of the object as ‘objectification’ of man’s subjective essence”.27 Next, he draws on the first article of Thesen: “The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things [Gegenstand; trans.], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively”.28 From this, Fujino deduces that the “shedding of objectivity” does not mean thinking of the object solely as an object (Objekt), or understanding the object by way of intuition, but, quite the opposite, viewing it from the perspective of subjectivity, i.e. as a result of man’s practice. “Shedding of objectivity” is distinct from the alienation of the object. Whilst alienation of the object refers to the disengagement of object from subject, the “shedding of objectivity” means that “the subject strips the object of its objectivity”.  Wataru Fujino, Historical Materialism and Ethics, Shin Nibon Shubansha, 1972, p. 275.  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 291. 27  Wataru Fujino, Historical Materialism and Ethics, Shin Nibon Shubansha, 1972, p. 280. 28  Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5: Marx and Engels: 1845–1847, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 25 26

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The former addresses the separation of object from subject, whereas the latter the separation of objectivity from the object. According to this, the meaning of “shedding of objectivity” is closer to the supersession of the object. Since the supersession of the object and alienation of the object point in opposite directions, the “shedding of objectivity” ought to be perceived of as a reintegration of object into subject, namely the process by which the objectified subject returns to itself. Unfortunately, Fujino’s exposition suggests he seems to be only concerned with interpreting the “shedding of objectivity” as a “conception of the object as the ‘objectification’ of man’s subjective essence”, insofar as his entire argument is aimed to stress the cognitive integration of object into subject. This, however, does not solve the problem! After “shedding” objectivity, in which direction should the object move next? Is it supposed to return to the subject? It is with this key question that Fujino stops, which is quite unbelievable for someone who translates Entgegenständlichung as the “shedding of objectivity”. From the author’s viewpoint, Fujino’s translation is correct, yet his definition of “shedding of objectivity” is insufficiently thorough. In the following, the author sets forth in detail his argument that the “shedding of objectivity” refers to the “object’s return to the subject” or the “subject’s reappropriation of the object” or, as Hegel’s concept of “spirit” reveals, the “subjectification of the object”. Only though this understanding can these two opposite concepts, i.e. objectification and the “shedding of objectivity”, constitute a circulation of self-alienation and a return to itself, can Marx’s conception of “objectification as loss of the object [Entgegenständlichung], as [externalization] and as transcendence of this [externalization]” be reasonably accounted for29 and can this translation be completely differentiated from that of Miura, Shirozuka et al. and conform to Fujino’s intention to criticize Lukács’s proposition. In a word, only this notion of Entgegenständlichung deserves such an outstanding translation as the “shedding of objectivity”.

 Actually, what exactly does this remark of Marx mean has been a puzzling mystery. Syntactically considered, this sentence comprises two parts: “conceives objectification as loss of the object [Entgegenständlichung]” and “as [externalization] and as transcendence of this [externalization]”. According to the diagram below, “stripping-off of objectivity” means to supersede externalized object, to return to itself, which corresponds to the process “③ → ④ → ①”. Since the first part, i.e. “conceives objectification as loss of the object [Entgegenständlichung]”, also coincides with the process “③ → ④ → ①”, it conveys as such the same meaning as the second part, that is “as [externalization] and as transcendence of this [externalization]”. If objectification can be illustrated with the process “① → ② → ③” in the diagram below, then this proposition of Marx actually means that Hegels construes “① → ② → ③” simultaneously as “③ → ④ → ①”. To rephrase it, these two movements are to be thought of as an entirety “① → ② → ③ → ④ → ①”, which includes objectification, externalization = alienation, supersession of alienation and reappropriation of itself. This is what we define as dialectic of alienation. 29

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14.3  Marx’s Concept of Alienation As yet, we have reviewed the opposition between Lukács and Fujino on the relation between objectification and alienation. Then, what exactly is Marx’s attitude towards Hegel’s alienation and objectification? This question is apparently the key to resolve this opposition.

14.3.1  Hegel’s Objectification and Alienation To begin with, it is necessary to survey the concrete meaning of Hegel’s objectification, externalization and alienation, in particular the concepts of objectification and alienation in Phänomenologie, since it is the work Marx has in his sights in the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt]. There are two words corresponding to externalization: Äußerung and Entäußerung. Äußerung originally means that the intrinsic overflows and presents itself to the outside, placing itself in certain external objects, which is what we understand by the Chinese translation of externalization “外化”. As such, it is indeed similar to objectification, in which sense Stiehler and Cornu’s equation of “externalization = objectification” does have a point, a reading that can at least be easily accepted by Chinese readers. If the intrinsic denotes thought within the mind, then Äußerung correspondingly denotes expression, publication and manifestation of oneself, which are the basic meanings of this word in daily life. Entäußerung, however, is the negative form of Äußerung and not only means to present itself to the outside and place itself in certain external object, but also designates the state in which this object becomes another estranged and opposite to itself. Perhaps due to the additional connotation of being estranged and opposite to itself, we used to hold Entäußerung as identical to Entfremdung and different from Vergegenständlichung when dealing with Hegel and Marx’s concept of alienation. In this regard, Lukács’s calling for a strict distinction between externalization and objectification to some extent makes sense as well. As such, though both are translated as “外化”, Äußerung and Entäußerung are indeed different. If the former is to be equated with objectification, then the latter can only be perceived as alienation, which is also why Hegel and Marx often employ Entäußerung and Entfremdung in the same sense. Closely tied to Hegel’s alienation concept is his theory regarding the spirit’s self-­ movement. Therefore, his alienation concept has a much wider spectrum of meaning than the above addressed Entäußerung. In the preface to Phänomenologie, Hegel makes an account of the spirit’s self-movement: “But Spirit becomes object because it is just this movement of becoming an other to itself, i.e. becoming an object to itself, and of suspending this otherness. And experience is the name we give to just this movement, in which the immediate, the unexperienced, i.e. the abstract, whether it be of sensuous [but still unsensed; trans.] being, or only thought

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of as simple, becomes alienated from itself and then returns to itself from this ­alienation, and is only then revealed for the first time in its actuality and truth, just as it then has become a property of consciousness also”.30 In spite of the idealist character of the spirit concept, let us first examine the notion of the spirit’s self-movement. As the subject of movement, the spirit, according to Hegel, ought to first externalize itself and turn itself from being in itself to being for itself so as to change its undetermined hollowness, abstractness and immediacy and acquire reality and truthfulness. For the subject, this process implies relinquishing itself and transfering itself to another – the meaning of entäußern, a verbal form of Entäußerung, means to relinquish and abandon; for the object, this means accepting that what is externalized from the subject and becomes another, different from the subject. It goes without saying that what the spirit originally intends is by no means to have itself disappear completely, but to transfer itself in this manner to the object for the purpose of affirming its essential power. This is objectification or externalization in the sense of Äußerung. Since the spirit’s objectification or externalization aims to affirm itself in an object different from itself, the more it objectifies or externalizes itself, the closer it nears this goal. Conversely, the resistance and negative power of the object is the necessary premise of the spirit’s affirmation of itself; the more powerful this resistance, the mightier the spirit as such proves to be, as Hegel’s dictum in Phänomenologie goes: “The power of Spirit is only as great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose itself in its exposition [Die Kraft des Geistes ist nur so groß als ihre Äußerung, seine Tiefe nur so tief, als er in seiner Auslegung sich auszubreiten und sich zu verlieren getraut]”.31 This remark profoundly lays out the spirit’s dialectic relation to externalization and alienation. From the perspective of the spirit, the resistance of the object stems from its objectification. Once arisen, however, this power confronts the spirit as if it were the object’s own power, becoming another estranged and alien to the spirit, giving birth to alienation or externalization in the sense of Entäußerung. Thus, for a spirit that devotes everything to the externalization (äußern) of itself, alienation (Entäußerung) is clearly a tragedy. Spirit, however, will on no account allow itself to fall in such a tragedy, but rather endeavor to reclaim the lost self from the alienated object. This means to reconsider the power of object as its own power and another as thing for itself in order to supersede the objectivity of object and return to itself, which is “appropriation” of object or, as has been noted, “shedding of objectivity”. Only through this self-return can the spirit accomplish the circular movement of self-negation and self-evolution and obtain reality and truthfulness. This process can be illustrated as follows: ① subject → ② object, externalization = alienation → ③ object → ④ supersession of object, supersession of objectivity, appropriation → return to ① subject”. Based on this diagram, ② object, externalization = alienation is heading in exactly the opposite direction to ④ super30 31

 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 21.  Ibid., p. 6.

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2 Objectification, Externalization = Alienation ƻ

1 Subject ƻ

3 Object ƻ

4 Appropriation, Engegenständlichung, Supersession of Object ƻ

Fig. 14.1  The structure of objectification and Entgegenständlichung

session of the object, supersession of objectivity, and appropriation, with both respectively representing negation and the negation of the negation in the dialectic of double negation (Fig. 14.1). According to Hegel’s depiction of the spirit’s self-movement, alienation (externalization) is indubitably the crux of this movement. Objectification of the spirit results in alienation, and the spirit’s affirmation of itself also requires alienation. The reason why the spirit ought to return to itself is still alienation, without which it can under no circumstances accomplish self-movement. Thus, alienation, with regard to its form, belongs to the moment of negation in the syllogism of the negation of the negation, and functions in essence as the bond linking the entire process of objectification, externalization (alienation), supersession of alienation and appropriation of the object, thereby taking on a positive significance. This is determined by the nature of the dialectic of double negation. As such, this alienation can be called the dialectic of alienation or the dialectic of negativity. This has been pointed out by the Chinese translators of Phänomenologie, Lin He and Jiuxing Wang, in their translator’s preface: “The so-called ‘dialectic of negativity’ pervades the concept of ‘alienation’ or ‘alienation of self-consciousness’ in the ‘phenomenology of spirit’”,32 a notable remark during the cultural revolution. The analysis above helps us differentiate between two kinds of alienation: First, alienation in the narrow sense, namely the state in which the subject externalizes or objectifies itself to the object, which turns against and estranges itself from the subject. According to the diagram above, this corresponds to the movement “① → ② → ③”. Second, alienation in the broad sense, that refers to the entire process of objectification, alienation (externalization), supersession of alienation and appropriation, i.e. the movement “① → ② → ③ → ④ → ①”. This is the dialectic of alienation mentioned earlier. Since alienation in the narrow sense does not include the supersession process “③ → ④ → ①”, it can only remain within the stage of negation. For the subject, this alienation is evil and equals Feuerbachian alienation as addressed in the last chapter, insofar as it is nothing but self-sacrifice without return. Alienation in the broad sense, however, is to be construed as good alienation in that it incorporates the supersession of alienation in the narrow sense and thereby compensates for the subject’s sacrifice. Although we can filter out alienation in the narrow sense from  Lin He & Jiuxing Wang, Translator’s Preface: On Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, in: Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by Lin He & Jiuxing Wang, The Commercial Press, 1962, p. 27 (translated into English by K.H.).

32

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Hegel’s dialectic, alienation can only be, in accordance with the nature of Hegel’s dialectic, good alienation that eventually comes back to the subject, namely as the dialectic of alienation.

14.3.2  Marx’s Twofold View of Alienation Hence, what exactly is Marx’s attitude towards Hegel’s alienation, especially in the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt]? In its entirety, he has undergone a process from critique to understanding to assimilation to employment. As noted in the last chapter, Marx draws on Feuerbach’s materialist standpoint, slaming Hegel for erroneously canceling the objectivity inherent in the object through the dialectic of alienation. Yet, as Engels notes in Ludwig Feuerbach, “a philosophy is not disposed of by the mere assertion that it is false”.33 To surmount a philosophy, one has to go into its core and reveal the positive significance therein. It is this aspect that Marx deviates from Feuerbach. After pointing to Hegel’s “double error” on page XVIII, Marx abruptly changes his tone, expressing a wish to learn from Hegel: “inasmuch as it [sc. Phänomenologie] depicts man’s estrangement, even though man appears only as mind, there lie concealed in it all the elements of criticism, already prepared and elaborated in a manner often rising far above the Hegelian standpoint”.34 In other words, Marx notices that Hegel’s philosophy, his critique of the object, entails positive elements which can be drawn on, namely alienation. He intends to unearth this concept of alienation, turning it to his own theoretical weapon. Hence, he continues: “It is now time to formulate the positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic within the realm of estrangement. (a) Supersession as an objective [gegenständlich] movement of retracting the [externalization] into self. This is the insight [Einsicht], expressed within the estrangement, concerning the appropriation [Aneignung] of the objective essence through the supersession of its estrangement; it is the estranged insight into the real objectification of man, into the real appropriation [Aneignung] of his objective essence through the annihilation of the estranged character of the objective world, through the supersession of the objective world in its estranged mode of being [Dasein]”.35 This passage unequivocally demonstrates that Marx construes alienation as “positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic”. Compared with the above cited passage of Phänomenologie, it is evident that Marx’s formulations, e.g. “objectification”, “estrangement”, “supersession”, “retracting the [externalization] into self” and “real appropriation of his objective essence”, are an almost verbatim repetition of Hegel’s dialectic of  Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 26: Engels: 1882–1889, Progress Publishers, 1990, p. 365. 34  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 332. 35  Ibid., p. 341. 33

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a­ lienation. As Marx puts it in the afterword to the second German edition of Das Kapital, what he does is merely add actual “critical and revolutionary”36 content to the dialectic of alienation. On page XXII, the outset of the second fragment of the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt], Marx makes the famous remark: “The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phänomenologie and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object [Entgegenständlichung], as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man – true, because real man – as the outcome of man’s own labour. […] and this, to begin with, is again only possible in the form of estrangement”.37 Based on this passage, Marx already realizes that Hegel’s dialectic of alienation can expose the underlying structure of labor process as well the evolution of man and therefore gives great credit to this dialectic. In all three passages cited above, Marx speaks in the affirmative about alienation, asserting that “there lie concealed in it all the elements of criticism”, it is the “positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic”, the outstanding achievement of Phänomenologie and the dialectic of negativity “is again only possible in the form of estrangement”. Thereafter, as is expounded in the last chapter, Marx justifies communism by virtue of this dialectic of alienation. This attitude of Marx towards alienation, however, is perplexing. As is well-­ known, as the greatest critic of alienation, Marx lashes out at alienation in the First Manuscript, whereas here he adopts an absolutely opposite stance. How exactly can this be explained? According to the author, there are two notions of alienation throughout the Manuscripts, namely alienated labor in the First Manuscript and the dialectic of alienation in the Third Manuscript. This reading, however, is not subject to conjecture by the author, but underpinned by a remark made by Marx himself in the Third Manuscript: “[T]he appropriation [Aneignung] of what is estranged and objective, or the annulling of objectivity in the form of estrangement (which has to advance from indifferent strangeness [die gleichgültige Fremdheit] to real, antagonistic estrangement [die wirkliches feindselige Entfremdung]), means likewise or even primarily for Hegel that it is objectivity which is to be annulled”.38 Although aimed at unveiling the idealist essence of Hegel’s dialectic – i.e. the negation of reality, the thinghood of the object through supersession of alienation –, this passage explicitly indicates that Marx differentiates two forms of alienation: “indifferent strangeness” and “real, antagonistic estrangement”. Though the term “indifferent” also means being apathetic – because of which it is rendered as “apathetic” (漠不关 心的) in the Chinese translation of the People’s Publishing House –, its meaning here is neutral. This neither positive nor negative alienation is de facto a dialectic of  Marx, Capital. Volume I, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 35: Marx, Progress Publishers, 1996, p. 20. 37  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 332f. 38  Ibid., p. 338. 36

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alienation or alienation in the broad sense: the above-mentioned good alienation. The compliment of Hegel suggests that Marx’s view of alienation in the Third Manuscript is more set out from this perspective. The latter, “real, antagonistic estrangement”, is obviously not neutral, but contains a negative value-laden assessment; it should refer to alienated labor in the First Manuscript or alienation in the narrow sense, i.e. evil alienation. This distinction not only distinguishes Marx from Feuerbach, but also sees Marx’s alienation conception exhibit incomparable superiority over Hegel’s. Although the logic of alienation in the broad sense can account for the self-­evolution of the modern subject and manifest man’s subjectivity and the significance of labor, it cannot explain alienated labor of the wage worker or alienation under capitalism. It is with regard to this aspect that Hegel’s alienation theory exposes its inherent one-sidedness and limitations, insofar as it fails to see that the laborer cannot appropriate his labor product under capitalism and always conceives of man’s self-­ alienation as a circular movement which allows for self-return; nor does he realize that, under different concrete social institutions, this perfect circulation might been interrupted during the stage of alienation in the narrow sense whereby man forever remains captive to the hollow state of self-loss without replenishment. According to Marx’s analysis, the reason for Hegel’s mistake is that he only knows of abstract, spiritual labor, neglecting the actual opposition between capital and labor or, if there is any, unifying it within the logic of the spirit. This is Marx’s constant critical stance towards Hegel since Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. The superiority of Marx’s alienation concept resides in his ability to go beyond actual alienation, to explicitly differentiate between two kinds of alienation, based on which he could constitute an alienation in the narrow sense and a theory of alienated labor that would serve as a critique of actual capitalism, and alienation in the broad sense that would justify communism. Hegel had yet to attain this level of depth.

14.3.3  The Debate Over Lukács’s Proposition At last, let us review the problem of the identity of objectification and alienation, upon which this chapter turns. Above all, based on the analysis above, Lukács’s proposition is half right and half wrong: If objectification includes its narrow sense – i.e. stage ② in which the subject externalizes his physical and mental power to the object –, externalization = alienation, supersession of alienation, return to itself through the “shedding of objectivity”, then it is identical to alienation in the broad sense. In this regard, it is true that Hegel equates objectification with alienation and approves of alienation. That Marx distinguishes objectification from alienation and negates alienation, however, requires further examination. For Marx, objectification is indeed different from alienation in the narrow sense or alienation in the sense of alienated labor. With respect of this, Lukács’s reading does hold true. Yet, as analyzed in this ­chapter, Marx is positive about alienation in the broad sense in the Third Manuscript and,

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like Hegel, tends to identify alienation in the broad sense with objectification. Therefore, it is erroneous to claim that Marx distinguishes objectification from alienation and negates alienation. Lukács’s mistake is mainly because he is not attentive of Marx’s differentiation within the alienation concept and overlooks the distinction between the alienation concept in the First and the Third Manuscript. Second, though Fujino accurately determines that Marx does not simply negate alienation in the Third Manuscript and criticizes Lukács’s “schematism and undialectical viewpoint” on alienation, he fails to reduce the “shedding of objectivity” to the supersession of alienation or the supersession of objectivity. Yet, as Marx puts it, “supersession as an objective movement of retracting the [externalization] into self” can complete circular movement and move forward. Unfortunately, Fujino’s logic of alienation lacks the moment of self-return, which suggests that he has yet to truly consider the dialectic of alienation to be the entirety of self-alienation and self-return. Lastly, Lukács’s proposition will directly lead to dismissal of the theoretical significance of Hegel’s alienation concept. As such, it wields negative influence on the understanding of the relationship between Marx and Hegel, particularly in China where most Chinese scholars uncritically adopt Lukács’s proposition, to the extent that they not only completely reject Hegel’s alienation concept, but also underestimate the significance of Hegel’s dialectic for the transition of Marx’s thought. The assessment of Lukács’s proposition will assist us in reverting this status quo.

14.4  Summary In reference to the content in the last and this chapter, the author wants to summarize Marx’s relation to Feuerbach and Hegel in 1844. In Pour Marx, Louis Althusser brings forward a proposition that young Marx goes through a conversion from the “Feuerbach’s anthropological problematic” to the “Hegelian problematic”, a shift significant for Marx’s establishment of historical materialism. Moreover, it is in the period of the break, i.e. in 1845 when Thesen and Ideologie was written, rather than in the Manuscripts, that this transition comes to light. Despite “Marx’s one and only resort to Hegel in his youth, on the eve of his rupture with his ‘erstwhile philosophical conscience’” and at the end of the Manuscripts, that is in the fragment [Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt], despite his attempt to shift to the “Hegelian problematic”, “the theoretical principles on which this critique of Hegel was based are merely a reprise, a commentary or a development and extension of the admirable critique of Hegel repeatedly formulated by Feuerbach”, since Marx at that time was still under the sway of Feuerbach’s humanism. Consequently, the Manuscripts, “the text of the last hours of the night is […] the text the furthest removed from the day that is about to dawn”.39

39

 Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. by B. Brewster, The Penguin Press, 1969, p. 36f.

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Admittedly, it is remarkable for Althusser to have discerned this inversion of Marx’s attitude towards Hegel and Feuerbach – Marx depends more on Feuerbach before the writing of the Manuscripts – early in the 1960s and grasp it on the level of a paradigmatic transition. Unfortunately, the shift took place earlier than 1845, beginning with the Paris Manuscripts, specifically Comments on James Mill and the Third Manuscript. In terms of content, this conversion cannot be simply reduced to an abandonment of Feuerbach’s humanism. As this work reveals, it embodies in essence the process by which Marx thoroughly assimilates Hegel’s dialectic of alienation and thereby establishes communism, accomplishing the logical demonstration of the transition from individual to society. As a matter of fact, Marx’s open critique of Feuerbach first appeared in Thesen in 1845. In the Manuscripts, he still speaks highly of Feuerbach, claiming that “Feuerbach’s writings [is] the only writings since Hegels Phänomenologie and Logik to contain a real theoretical revolution”.40 This, however, does not mean that Marx was then merely a “Feuerbachianist”, remaining within the “Feuerbachian problematic”. As noted in Chapter IX, Marx comprehensively adopts Hegel’s logic of Sache selbst in Comments on James Mill and thereby bases his explanatory framework of society on the extrinsic principle. Moreover, considering his notion of the alienation problem, Marx has already evidently shifted from Feuerbach to Hegel by the time he writes the Third Manuscript. All these facts manifest that Marx has already departed from Feuerbach and comprehensively adopted Hegel’s dialectic, the critical reconstruction of which signifies the formation of historical materialist methodology.

 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3: Marx and Engels: 1843–1844, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 232.

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“Child of His Time” “[E]very true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its time”.1 This dictum of Marx is true in every sense! It was after the French Revolution that young Hegel, in whom culminates modern philosophy, made his historical debut. When Napoléon Bonaparte, as the “World-Spirit”, swept the continent, civil society arose in Western Europe, bringing with it a wave of capitalism. As Hegel notes in the preface to Phänomenologie, “ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era”.2 In this period, the “[s] pirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation”.3 Since “this new world is no more a complete actuality than is a new-born child”,4 Hegel takes upon himself the task of interpreting his time, even transcending it by unveiling that “complete actuality”. At the time, he was probably the only person who aspired to and was capable of this task, because of which his philosophy also came to be known as the “child of his time”.5 By the time young Marx stepped on the stage of history, the industrial revolution had engulfed Western Europe, with civil society reaching its maturity in the form of capitalist society, and political economy (private property) establishing dominance. The accumulation of capital, however, brought with it an aggravation of property. Western European society entered a capitalist era characterized by man’s compre1  Marx, The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 1: Marx: 1835–1843, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 195. 2  Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 6. 3  Ibid. 4  Ibid., p. 7. 5  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 21.

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hensive alienation, the era of political economy. Set against this background, Marx was determined to criticize capitalism, eventually establishing a new philosophy that surpassed Hegel’s and political economy. On account of its nature as a critique of capitalism, Marx’s doctrine is destined to maintain its unsurmountable theoretical standing, as long as capitalism exists. As a representative of Asian communities and an ancient Asian state occupied with establishing socialism, China had no experience of civil society until 1978, abruptly entering the historical course of civil society thereafter in a unique fashion, by going through a process that had taken centuries in Western Europe within 30 years. Hence, our philosophy has been confronted with an urgency of transformation. Yet, faced with this sudden change, Chinese scholars of this generation have not been able to catch up quickly enough, for two reasons: First, with regard to knowledge composition, our understanding of Marxism has been mainly rooted in the Soviet textbook system, the greatest problem of which is the severance of the connection between Smith, Hegel and Marx. As founders of modern civil society theory, Smith and Hegel are objects of Marx’s critique as well as the theoretical basis on which he rests. Considered this way, one can hardly understand Marx without knowledge of Smith and Hegel, nor can we come to grips with the type of civil society criticized by Marx. Yet what scholars of this generation lack is precisely the knowledge framework that encompasses Smith, Hegel and Marx. The second reason is a congenital deficiency in the understanding of reality. It was after 1978 that civil society came into being in China. For domestic scholars, it has taken time to personally grasp the meaning and laws of civil society, just as it has taken time, for instance, to understand that not spitting in the street and following traffic rules embody the principles of civil society, i.e. not hindering or harming others, property rights (private property) protected by property law that are de facto constitutional principles of civil society. This personal experience of reality is by all means necessary for academic studies; were Hegel not in Jena or Marx in Paris and London, they could never have finished Phänomenologie, the Paris Manuscripts and Das Kapital. In such a period of transformation, the historical moment at which China enters civil society, to begreifen our time and look into the future of our motherland and world as those two great German thinkers did is not only the inescapable historical mission of contemporary scholars, but also a golden opportunity for them, for after all this transformation takes place in China. This work is an interpretation of the Paris Manuscripts against this backdrop.

Why the Paris Manuscripts? The Paris Manuscripts are Marx’s critical engagement with private property or civil society. Different from earlier studies, they are his first attempt to combine political economy, classical German philosophy and communist theory. The survey of this spectacular scene of modern civil society is also the first time Marx displays his

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attitude towards this “caricature” from a Marxist perspective. This is of significant value for a China that imports civil society, whilst insisting on Marxism. To break free from traditional community and arise as an independent citizen onto the historical stage requires sufficient knowledge and psychological preparation. The principal characteristic of the modern citizen is that of the “economic man”, by nature not only an “isolated individual” bent on his interests, but also a “social man” in division of labor and exchange relationships. In this sense, he is a being that realizes his universality through antagonism towards the other. This contradicts with our conception of man and society in the traditional community or, as Marx puts it, “the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is precisely the epoch of the hitherto most highly developed social (according to this standpoint, general) relations”.6 Moreover, civil society is where polarization as well as poverty and suffering inevitably occur. The most fundamental difference between Marx and Smith as well as Hegel is that he holds a negative attitude towards civil society and private property and hence shifts earlier viewpoint on civil society from affirmation to negation and further to communism. The Paris Manuscripts exemplify the most trenchant insight into this double nature of civil society. It is my view that the existence of these manuscripts is the great fortune of my fellow countrymen and the world. My engagement with the Paris Manuscripts did not set out from such a profound background, but rather unintentionally. I began to read the Paris Manuscripts when doing doctoral studies at Hitotsubashi University in 1995. At the age of almost 30, however, I was still a layman with regard to this text, striving to dispel the stonehard, textbook framework derived from my study at Renmin University of China. It was after my return to China in 2002 that I truly embarked upon studying the Paris Manuscripts. Yet, since my first essay on it in7 2007, I did not produce any work of interpretation of the Paris Manuscripts. Apart from laziness, the main reason was that I was still in search of an explanatory framework of the text, without which there could be no new reading, but merely a rearrangement of texts or a reformulation of Marx’s words. This, however, is not what I intended, as I would rather go to the extreme than simply follow in someone others’ footsteps, let alone to repeat what had already been said. As regards the interpretation of the Paris Manuscripts, previous studies have each rested on different explanatory frameworks: For Lukács, it is the distinction between objectification and alienation; for Althusser, the “break” between ideology and science; for Hiromatsu, the “leap from alienation theory to reification theory”; for Mochizuki, civil society and alienation of intercourse; for Bokui Sun and Yibing Zhang, “two forms of theoretical logic”. Considering this, it is not an easy task to put forward a new reading, since there is little room left for more studies. Yet, no

6  Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 28: Economic Works: 1857–1861, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 18. 7  Lixin Han, Philological Studies of the Paris Manuscripts and its Significance, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 1, 2007.

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matter how many times I have read the Paris Manuscripts, my focus has been fixed on the problem of the explanatory framework. As a result, I lay out multiple paradigms in this work, including “from individual to society”, “from state to civil society”, “from Feuerbach to Hegel”, “from alienated labor to alienation of intercourse”, “logic of Sache selbst” and “from subjective, intrinsic principle to objective (objektiv), extrinsic principle”. Although some of them might, to a certain degree, overlap with existing standpoints, I strive to present distinctive content, which, I hope, resonates with readers. This work was finished in a hurry to be included in the National Achievements Library of Philosophy and Social Sciences and has to be submitted before the due date. Therefore, I omitted to elaborate on the fragment [Arbeitslohn, Gewinn des Kapitals, Grundrente] of the First Manuscript, nor do I go into the fragments [Privateigentum und Bedürfnisse] and [Teilung der Arbeit] of the Third Manuscript, which was supposed to be Chap. XV. In addition, Marx’s mature thought in Grundrisse and Das Kapital is not systematically integrated in this work either. It is partly owning to the subject matter of this work, partly related to my research program in the long term, as I leave thorough survey of Ideologie, Grundrisse and Das Kapital until the next phase. Yet even I am not certain whether this task can be accomplished in my life. After all, man proposes, god disposes.

Why Hegel? One of the overarching perspectives of this work comes from Hegel. Actually, both my Ph.D. supervisors are scholars of Hegel: Professor Shimazaki and Shigeru Iwasa are respectively experts on Wissenschaft der Logik and Phänomenologie and both engage with Marx at the same time, which is typical of Japanese Marxist scholars, just as many who study Marxist economics are also experts on Smith. The reading materials of their seminars are mainly Hegel’s writings. It is a pity that I was too ignorant at the time to fully comprehend the significance of these texts. Nevertheless, the knowledge of Hegel was still stored in my brain like a hard drive, locked until my recent examination of the Paris Manuscripts. It is likely that everyone stores a couple of hard drives during reading; whether they can be opened when needed depends not only on one’s circumstance (e.g. philosophical awareness), but also on the quality of these hard drives (whether their content derives from classics). For this reason, I recommend students to devote themselves to reading classics and stock up as many high-quality hard drives as possible in their youth for later use. The middle part of this book, i.e. Chap. VII, VIII and IX, is dedicated to Hegel with Chap. VIII focusing on Hegel’s Philosophie des Geistes in the Jena period. As an unknown thinker once said, “our thinking can never grow profound without studying Hegel”. In fact, most of the first-rank scholars with a Marxist bent, e.g. Lukács, Marcuse, Habermas, Honneth, all draw upon Hegel’s philosophy. Moreover, since the 1930s and 1940s, there has been a “Hegel-renaissance” on different scales in the western world. One of the leading figures of this movement is Lukács, whose

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Der Junge Hegel inaugurated the approach of studying Marx from the Hegelian perspective. Almost at the same time, Marcuse and Löwith published Vernunft und Revolution (1941) and Von Hegel zu Nietzsche (1941) respectively, while Kojève and Hyppolite sparked a revival of interest in Hegel’s philosophy in France. Unfortunately, such a current did not reach Chinese academia. Quite the contrary, with respect to his relations to Marx, Hegel has been given much less attention than Kant, and even Lukács was reproached for his favor of Hegel. In the translator’s preface to the Chinese translation of Phänomenologie, Lin He and Jiuxing Wang specifically criticized Lukács in that “he mistakenly acclaims Hegel in Marxist terms, construing historical materialism and materialist dialectic as direct adoption and development of Hegel’s historical standpoint and idealist dialectic”.8 This severe critique is not only attributed to the confines of the time, but also typifies mainstream Hegel and Marx studies in China. In spite of signs of change since the end of the twentieth century – e.g. in Back to Marx, Yibing Zhang thinks of “Hegel’s affirmation and transcendence of classical economics” as the “hidden clue” in the previous studies, advocating to conscientiously go into the relationship between Hegel and the classical economy –, the condition of Hegel studies in China has not been truly ameliorated in its entirety. Despite not completely comprehending Hegel due to a shortage of time and my own incompetence, I am determined to break this status quo. The interpretation of Hegel in this work might seem unorthodox for some Chinese experts on Hegel, as it does not proceed in the epistemological and ontological sphere they are conversant with, but in the realm of economics and social philosophy instead. Furthermore, due to this distinctive Hegelian perspective, the interpretation of Marx in this work may likely be accused of bearing a Hegelian hallmark. If so, then I am fully willing to accept it and take it rather as an excessive compliment of me. As far as I am concerned, even though it is necessary to sever the connection between Marx and Hegel in order to retain the originality of Marx’s thought, unscrutinized, crude division, on contrary, will lower the level of discussion on Marx’s thought. To be sure, my goal has never been to interpret Marx as Hegel, but to interpret him on his actual level, a level founded on Hegel’s philosophy. In the preface to Grundlinien, Hegel remarks on “contempt” for philosophy: “The worst kind of contempt it has met with is, as already mentioned, that everyone, whatever his condition, is convinced that he knows all about philosophy in general and can pass judgement upon it. No other art or science is treated with this ultimate degree of contempt, namely the assumption that one can take possession of it outright”.9 To not be classified as one of those against whom Hegel’s critique is leveled, without the slightest “contempt”, I would be content that I had done my utmost

8  Lin He & Jiuxing Wang, Translator’s Preface: On Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, in: Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by Lin He & Jiuxing Wang, The Commercial Press, p. 44 (translated into English by K.H.). 9  Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 15.

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to comprehend Marx’s philosophy, though still uncertain as to whether or not this goal had been achieved.

Acknowledgments I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Tsinghua University for admitting me when I came back to China and granting me the opportunity to lecture. The support and trust of vice chancellor Weihe Xie for the course I have been dedicated to will never be forgotten. In 2012, Tsinghua University established the Center for Marx-Engels Literature Research (CMELR), appointing myself as director. I want to take this opportunity to thank Deputy Party Secretary Wei Deng for the help he gave me during the establishment of the center. This work is also part of the outcomes of the independent research project of Tsinghua University “MEGA②-based study of Marx’s and Engel’s manuscripts” (No. 20101081800) undertaken by CMELR. Compared with my contemporaries, I am undoubtedly behind in terms of publishing, insofar as I have not written a book in 10 years, not even a monography in the field of Marxist philosophy, for which I am often teased by my colleagues, friends and even students. Nevertheless, upon sending this book to press, I still feel nervous: Does this work come out too soon? Hereby, I would like to thank my doctoral, master’s and bachelor’s students at Tsinghua University. The writing of this book has been carried out through discourse and communication with them, as their viewpoints have provided me with valuable inspiration. From them, I see the future of Chinese Marx studies. My gratitude also goes to my wife, Associate Professor Ronghua Liu, who is the first reader of my work, my student Kaiyuan Hong who assisted me in setting up a table of contents and index, my student Qingchun Ling and others who attended my seminar on Marx’s writings and thoroughly proofread my manuscript and, lastly, Beijing Normal University Publishing Group and editor Chuanhua Qi, without whose tolerance, patience and overtime, this book could never have been published on time. In the following, I enumerate all my published essays that have been included in this work: 1. Philological Studies of the Paris Manuscripts and its Significance, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 1, 2007. 2. The Turning Point of Marx’s Thoughts: The Alienation of Intercourse in Comments on James Mill, in: Modern Philosophy, no. 5, 2007. 3. “Rule over Nature” und “Exchange of Matter”. An Interpretation of Marx’s Double Logic of “Labor Process” from the Biological Perspective, in: A Quarterly Report of Materialists Group, no. 105, August 2008. 4. From State to Civil Society. Crucial Transition of Marx’s Thought, in: Hebei Academic Journal, no.12009. 5. Criticism of Theory of “Civil Society” of Chinese Scholars, in: Hitotsubashi Bulletin of Social Sciences, no. 6 March 2009.

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6. Focus. New Phase in the Studies of the Paris Manuscripts, in: Chinese Philosophical Almanac (2009), Philosophical Researches, 2009. 7. Seiji Mochizuki’s Studies of Marx’s Historical Theory of Civil Society, in: Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences), no. 4, 2009. 8. New Interpretation of Marx’s Historical Theory, in: Modern Philosophy, no. 4, 2009. 9. “Japanese Marxism”. A New Academic Category, in: Academic Monthly, September 2009. 10. From Feuerbach’s Alienation to Hegel’s Alienation. The Transition of Marx’s Thought, in: Thinking, no. 6, 2009. 11. Reflection on Casting Couch Incidents from the Perspective of Marx’s Reification Theory, in: Chinese Social Science Today, January 14, 2010. 12. Is Objectification Identical with Alienation? in: Jilin University Journal (Social Sciences Edition), no. 1, 2010. 13. “Japanese Marxism” or “New Japanese Marxism”? Discourse on the Academic Positioning of the Japanese Marxism, in: Chinese Social Science Today, March 25, 2010. 14. Marxism and Ecology: Marx’s Theory of Labour Process Revisited, in: Ecosocialism as Politics: Rebuilding the Basis of our Modern Civilisation, ed. by Q. Huan, Springer, 2010. 15. Return to Hegel. On the Publication of “Selected Works of Foreign Marxism”, in: Academic Journal of Jinyang, no. 5, 2010. 16. “Alienated Labor” and “Alienation of Intercourse”, in: Marx’s Faculty of Construction. The World of the Alienation Theory, ed. by S. Iwasa, Shakai Hyoronsha, 2010. 17. On the Japanese “Debate over Early Marx”. Comment on the Significance of Comments on James Mill for the Reconstruction of Marx’s Alienation Theory, in: Philosophical Researches, no. 9, 2010. 18. Criticism of Theory of “Civil Society” of Chinese Scholars: Problems in the Establishment of Private Property and Difference of Wealth, in: International Journal of Decision Ethics, 8(3), p. 133–149. 19. Is “Return to Hess” Actually Necessary? Review of Studies of the Relation between Hess and Marx, in: Philosophical Trends, no. 3, 2011. 20. Is Marx’s Alienated Labor Theory Circular Reasoning?, in: Academic Monthly, no. 3, 2012. 21. The Logic of Transition from Individual to Society. With Focus on the Sache Selbst Concept in Phänomenologie des Geistes, in: Philosophical Trends, no. 10, 2012. 22. From “Tragedy of Ethical Life” to the Advent of Spirit. The Logic of Transition from Individual to Society in the Jena Manuscript of Philosophie des Geistes, in: Philosophical Trends, no. 11, 2013. 23. Alienation, Reification, Fetishism and Thingification, in: Marxism & Reality, no. 2, 2014.

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All these papers have been substantially reworked and revised beyond recognition when included in this book, except for The Turning Point of Marx’s Thoughts: The Alienation of Intercourse in Comments on James Mill, as it lays the groundwork for this work and has historical value so that the reader can still discern the embryo of this book from it. Besides, since this essay has been criticized by many scholars, it is all the better to be stoned with when in its original form. Xinzhai, Tsinghua University

Lixin Han January 2014

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