Strategy and Ethnic Conflict : A Method, Theory and Case Study 9780313010941, 9780275976361

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Strategy and Ethnic

C O N F L I C T

Strategy and Ethnic

C O N F L I C T A Method, Theory, and Case Study

L a u r e

P a q u e t t e

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Paquette, Laure. Strategy and ethnic conflict : a method, theory, and case study / Laure Paquette. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–275–97636–X (alk. paper) 1. Strategy. 2. International relations. 3. Ethnic relations. 4. France— Military policy. I. Title. U162.P367 2002 355.4—dc21 2001054595 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2002 by Laure Paquette All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001054595 ISBN: 0–275–97636–X First published in 2002 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Fernand Fontaine, prince de l’esprit

Contents

Acknowledgments Chapter 1 Raising the Question

ix 1

Chapter 2 How and Why

23

Chapter 3 The Theory

37

Chapter 4 Using the Theory

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Chapter 5 French Strategic Decision Making, 1955–1970

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Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusion

87

Bibliography

107

Index

159

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following individuals: Joyce Agnew of the Department of National Defense of Canada; His Excellency Ambassador Tasheen Basheer of the Arab Republic of Egypt; Georges Buis of the Nouvel Observateur; Barry Buzan of the University of Warwick; Stephen Callary of Callary Associates of Canada; Jean-Paul Charnay of the University of Paris; Eliot Cohen of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies; James Finan of the Royal Military College of Kingston; Philippe Garigue of Glendon College of York University; Oded Granot of Ma’ariv (Tel Aviv); Yehoshafat Harkaby of the National Defense College of Israel; Zeev Maoz of Haifa University; Nabil Mekhael, formerly of the Nasser Academy of Cairo; Alex Morrison of the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies; Robert Powell of the University of California at Berkeley; Peter Schmidt of the Western European Union Institute; Gerald Steinberg of Bar-Ilan University; Lily Takla of the Ford Foundation (Cairo); Marcia Sweet, now of the National Art Gallery; Israel Tal of the Ministry of Defense of Israel; Maurice Torelli of the University of Nice; Nicole Woignier of Montpellier; at Cairo University, Wadouda Badran, Ali E. Hillel Dessouki, and Mohammed El-Saleh Selim; at Dalhousie University, David Black and Dennis Stairs; at the Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, His Excellency Ambassador Pierre Dabezies, Pres-

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ident, François Géré, Lucien Poirier and Maurice Prestat; at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Raymond Cohen, Yehezkel Dror and Yaacov Vertzberger; at the Institut français des relations internationales, Frédéric Bozo, Dominique David, Jean Klein and Jérôme Paolini; at the Japan Forum on International Relations, Ito Kenichi, Saito Horinori, and Yamamoto Tetsushi; at Queen’s University, Clement Adibe, Bonnie Beltrani, Edward R. Black, the late David Cox, Peggy Cunningham, David G. Haglund, Melanie Harris, Lorraine Helspy, Neil MacFarlane, W. Don Macnamara, Charles C. Pentland, Michelle Preston, Anthony Rusonik and Heather Woolnought; at Tel Aviv University, Joseph Alpher, Shai Feldman, Aharon Klieman, Ariel Levite and David Vital; at the University of Michigan, Chaim Kaufmann and Karl Mueller; at the Université Paul Valéry, M. Courtès, Alain Martel and Maurice Woignier; and at the University of Toronto, Janice Gross Stein and John Kirton. I would also like to thank the following institutions for their support: the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, the Center for Strategic Studies of Bar-Ilan University, the Centre for International Relations of Queen’s University, the Military and Strategic Studies Program of the Department of National Defense of Canada, the Office of Research of Lakehead University, and the Center for American Women and Politics and the Eagleton Institute of Politics of Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. My most sincere thanks go to the following libraries and their dedicated staff, without whom this research would not have been possible: the Library of Bar-Ilan University, the Library of Cairo University, the Chancellor Paterson Library of Lakehead University, the Library of the Department of National Defense of Canada, the Library of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade of Canada, the Douglas (now Stauffer) Library of Queen’s University, the Fort Frontenac Library, the Library of the Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, the Library of Haïfa University, the Library of the Institut français des relations internationales, the Library of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv), the Massey Library of the Royal Military College of Canada, the Library of Tel Aviv University, the Douglass College Library and the Alexander Library at Rutgers University, The New York City Public Library and the many libraries that lent their books for my use, or answered queries about their collections. I also offer my private thanks to the numerous individuals who declined to be acknowledged by name. x

C h a p t e r

1

Raising the Question

. . . vast though the public market should be for genuinely strategic reasoning—explaining why things are done—poverty in strategic thought is the norm. Colin Gray

It is a sad fact that the end of the Cold War has brought to the forefront many intractable conflicts, of which several are ethnic in nature: the death of Yugoslavia; the fire of war spilling over into southern Europe; and atrocities in the African Great Lakes. The questions these events raise are the same for policymakers, students of politics, or casual observers: what makes some conflicts so bitter? Why do these conflicts resist solutions that work elsewhere? Basic questions require basic research for answers, investigations into the most fundamental phenomena that motivate action, and into the nature of action itself.

BASIC RESEARCH This book proposes that kind of in-depth investigation, using the very building blocks of conflict. Through a habit of reading widely, I

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more or less stumbled onto the idea of strategy.1 Strategy, the unifying and guiding idea behind complex series of actions aiming to change the distribution of power, seemed to explain the unusual successes of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, elected president of the United States when he could scarcely walk, Emmeline Pankhurst, obtaining votes for women in Great Britain, Winston Churchill, savior of his country during World War II, and the election of Bill Clinton, once only a dark-horse candidate among presidential hopefuls. I enthusiastically pursued the idea, and soon found myself reading material sometimes 2,500 years old.2 I found myself in an uncrowded field—grand strategic theory—that proved powerful indeed in analyzing the more complex actions of human beings involved in complicated political systems. “Theory” began to seem like a misnomer: There was no general theory of strategy at a basic level. The only attempt at a general theory came from Jean-Paul Charnay at the Sorbonne. Couched in a terminology so complex it defeats even the native French speaker and hyper subtle, it is almost never cited. It comes as no surprise therefore that, while some of Charnay’s books are available in English, the theory itself has never been translated. I therefore set out to develop a new, general theory of strategy that could analyze a variety of situations that interested me, using values as the independent variable. By applying such basic components of human existence—values and action—I hoped to produce a theory that was more broadly applicable than conflict, although that was my first interest. In this book, I propose a general theory of strategy, taking as the independent variable the foundation of all human action—values. Talcott Parsons’s fundamental contribution to the social sciences in general, and to the action-values nexus in particular, and the rich vein of methodological research about the scientific method for social sciences guided this investigation of strategy. This proposal of basic theory comes after the development of a detailed methodology for theory-building and verification, and the completion of a large number of case studies taking the actor in strategy to be the state, the most commonly studied actor at the international level. (The theory posits that the actor can be an individual, group, state, or group of states.) There are five cas-types (or categories of cases) for the state as actor: strategy used in bilateral relations, strategy used by a single state in a multilateral setting, strategy used by several states in a multilateral setting, international organization 2

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dealing with states, both member and nonmember, and the case presented here of a single, stand-alone state making strategy.3 CAS-TYPES The time has come to examine a single-state step-by-step analysis and illustration, the case of France between 1955 and 1970, as completing the cycle of the five cas-types. In addition, it is time to consider the method that develops the theoretical foundations for these studies, as well as the theory itself. Within this investigation, identification of the various decisions proved to be the most challenging, requiring primary interviews as well as content analysis of documents. Documents are from official sources (research bureaus within the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, national defense colleges, and government research institutes), political sources (partisan thinkers or researchers, political parties’ policy wings, politicians), and academic sources. Interviewees are influential decision- and policymakers: In the past they have included public officials, members of the national legislature, aides to Cabinet ministers, and military and academic experts. Documents analyzed also include communiqués, media releases, treaties, memoranda of understanding, and minutes of debates on related issues. VALUES IN STRATEGIC THEORY The absence of controversy about the role of values in strategy was all the more striking until 1990, since it was vigorously launched nearly twenty-five years ago by Ken Booth’s Strategy and Ethnocentrism.4 Booth’s main argument was that values introduced a form of bias into strategy that analysts and thinkers alike could ignore only at their own peril. He followed similar debates about objectivity in political and social sciences. Although the book itself was well received, strategists have not taken its advice particularly seriously. From a theoretical standpoint, the most important recent efforts include Charnay’s Stratégie générative (1990), already mentioned, and Maoz’s National Choices and International Processes (1990). More recently, there have been edited collections like Keith Krause’s Culture and Security (1999). And there have been a few theoretical investigations like Snyder’s Contemporary Security and Strategy (1997) and Booth’s New Security Agenda (1998). But none of them proposes the fundamental research found here. 3

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There has not been much research into the influence of values in international relations theory, much of the research focusing on ethics. Ethics are fundamentally about what is right and what is wrong; using values, on the other hand, eliminates this normative aspect in favor of examining motivations outside of moral considerations. The contribution of normative theory lies in expanding the notion of value so that it can be applied to a state, not just an individual. On the other hand, Lodge and Vogel have conducted research into the competitive ideology of states, and their work touches on values.5 Although they use a slightly different vocabulary, this book can make use of their conception of values, “timeless, universal, noncontroversial notions that virtually every community everywhere has always cherished: survival, for example, or justice, economy, self-fulfilment or self-respect.”6 Values are held by communities of people like states, rather than by individuals.7 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC THEORY The discussion of the relationship between strategy and values falls within the realm of strategic theory because it is one of the pillars of a new, general theory of strategy. It is not strategic analysis: Strategic analysis, the more widely used concept, is generally understood to be the process of examining problems with the ultimate aim of solving them. To that end strategic analysts have developed a wide range of techniques, including trend extrapolation, simulation modeling, cross-impact matrix analysis, the Delphi technique, scenario building, expert judgment, and genius forecasting.8 The boom in strategic analysis dates from the 1960s. Strategic thought, on the other hand, is a field with more breadth and more depth. It is more abstract, and it encompasses quasi-philosophical research into the phenomenon of strategy.9 Unlike strategic analysis, however, there are no established methods of theory-building. Strategic theory (for the postwar period) last peaked in the 1950s and early 1960s, with a recent resurgence of interest since the end of the Cold War. What strategic analysis and strategic theory have in common is the idea of strategy, and this idea is at the heart of the debate that have moved both fields forward in the postwar period. The debate is about whether or not nuclear weapons make a qualitative difference in the history of warfare. On one side of the debate are military and civilian strategists, who believe that nuclear weapons are so powerful they are qualitatively different from other weapons, and that as a 4

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result nuclear strategy is a completely new form of strategy. Military strategists include Yehoshafat Harkaby, Lucien Poirier, and Pierre Gallois.10 Civilian strategists include Bernard Brodie, Lawrence Freedman, Arnold Wolfers, Albert Wohlstetter, and Colin Gray.11 On the other side of the debate are social scientists interested in strategy who see that “A continuum—intermittent and dialectical though it may be—runs from the strategies before 1945 to the strategies . . . since then.”12 They admit, of course, that there is a quantitative difference between prenuclear and postnuclear strategy, but maintain that the same argument could be made for the advent of the Iron Age, the invention of gunpowder, earthwork fortification, or the breech-loading rifle. Social scientists include Julian Lider, Knute Midgaard, and myself.13 At the heart of this debate is an uncertainty about the very nature of strategy; however, not all the consequences of this uncertainty have been bad for the field. In the case of strategic analysis, the uncertainty has given rise to exports of techniques into other fields, including business. In strategic theory, it has led to a split in the field, one group studying nuclear strategy and the other exploring nonnuclear strategy. In terms of nuclear strategy, the questions under study have included the role of nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace, how the equivalence of nuclear arsenals is determined, the credibility of NATO’s umbrella protection and its implications for deterrence theory, and the relative importance of first versus second strike. The seeds for the evolution of this strand of nuclear strategy, chronicled by Lawrence Freedman, can be found in a single book: Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age.14 Now that the Cold War is over, the debate focuses not on how much nuclear firepower is enough to deter the opponent, but on how little. The nonnuclear strand of strategic theory has been pursued by several independent schools of strategic thought (usually national schools like France’s or Israel’s), which are preoccupied by their own most pressing problems, as well as individual strategic thinkers interested in revolution (like Mao or Giap) or low-intensity warfare.15 DEFINITION OF STRATEGY In addition to taking Booth’s advice, we can take his thinking one step further. Before we can appreciate the substance of Booth’s argument and consider the overall importance of values to strategy, however, we need to know what those words mean. I have mentioned 5

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that strategy is studied by military strategists, civilian strategists, and social scientists. Within each of these groups, the definitions used are close enough for a few generic definitions to emerge. For military strategists, for example, strategy is the use of military power to achieve a particular goal. The most conservative military strategists argue that there can be no strategy without the use of military force. The problem with their position is that it does not work for nuclear strategy, where only threat, and not use, is involved. For civilian strategists and other military strategists, strategy is the means used by a state to win a contest with another state. Civilian strategists argue that there can be no strategy without a conflict between governments. The advantage of their position over the conservative military strategists’ is that it, at least, accounts for nuclear strategy. Finally, social scientists use “strategy” to label patterns of action to achieve goals. They argue that there need be no conflict, no threat and no government, only a challenge and a pattern of action in response to it. The problem with this position is that other scholars reject it as much too vague. The military, civilian, and social strategists have two ideas about strategy in common: First, strategy is a set of actions, which implies some sort of organized action on the part of the state; and second, strategy occurs in response to a conflict, which implies coercion or the use of force. This book tries to accommodate all three schools of thought by using the following definition: Strategy is an imaginative idea that orchestrates and/or inspires sets of actions (tactics, policies, programs or plans) in response to a given problem. This broader definition of strategy makes the strategic theory in this book more broadly applicable. The term “value,” meaning some principle that is desirable for its own sake, was introduced into social science by the Parsonian school of sociology.16 Like many other early concepts in social science, the idea of value was quickly expanded, once it became clear how static a concept it was.17 The discussion about strategy and values now points in two separate directions. First, Lodge and Vogel discuss value in terms of the state. Since strategy is an attribute of the state, the book needs to consider the relevant role and characteristics of a state. Second, values have traditionally been considered only one influence on national strategy. The other influence is the national interest. Although there has been more work on values than on interests in social science, there has been much more research on national interest than on na6

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tional values in political science. If this book is to address national values in a credible way, it needs to examine what place national interest leaves them.

THE NATURE OF THE STATE Most strategic thinkers are concerned about how states use strategy, but they do not theorize about states at any length. They tend to take the realist theory of the state, limited though it may be, as a given. The realist school of thought on the state is perhaps best exemplified by Peter Katzenstein, who analyzes international politics at the systemic level, studying the society of states rather than a single state at a time. He uses dynamic and organismic assumptions to explain the functioning of the state system. For instance, he shares the assumption that the state is a unitary actor, or a “billiard ball,” for example, that domestic or elite opinion in a state may be divided over some collective action, but that such divisions are not significant for the purpose of understanding state behavior in the international system.18 Other perspectives on the state have their own limitations. Pluralists, of which Peter Bachrach and Charles Lindblom are two, focus on the interest groups inside a state, because in their view, state behavior is a function of interest group competition.19 In those terms, the state is nothing more than an arena of competing interests. But the problem is that the liberal pluralist notion of power is fuzzy: It does not explain the permanent, systemic advantages or disadvantages of one group over another. Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband are two Marxist theorists with different perspectives on the state.20 In Marxism, the modern state’s function in a capitalist system is to defend the interests of the ruling (as opposed to the oppressed) class, which owns all the capital. The state works to conceal the fact that it is working to preserve the interests of the ruling class. Leninism argues that capitalist systems are imperialist, that is, they need to expand in order to survive. Therefore, the state becomes the defender of capitalist interests abroad.21 Rather than adopt any one conception of the state over all the others, this book will portray the state using the points shared by the theories above. The functions of the state would therefore be: 7

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1. to convince the population that the state apparatus is working in the population’s best interest, or exercise enough authority so that any opposition can be ignored. 2. to ensure the survival of the state apparatus; should the state change or disappear, the apparatus would survive.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST The second question concerns national interest. Before it even defines interest, the literature addresses the question of whether or not national interest is a useful concept. On the one hand, some scholars argue that “No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of, the national interest.”22 Their critics point out that the idea is fuzzy, indefinite, and ultimately useless.23 Obviously the concept of national interest has inherited all the problems of its parent concept, interest.24 Yet one of its most basic premises is incontrovertible, that “the nation-state is for its citizens the focus of orientation.”25 These definitions allow for an ordering of national interests, from most to least important. First and foremost is the protection of a state’s physical assets and patrimony. Second comes the promotion and protection of national values. Third, and less intense still, is the attainment of national goals. There are two problems with this perspective on national interest. First, the definitions conflict with the traditional view of national values as a distinct influence on strategy. Instead, national values are a component of national interest. Second, analysts tend to use “national interest,” as if its determination were a simple matter—obvious, measurable, and incontrovertible. Certainly there is a strong consensus about the content of national interest: Students of international politics have understood for generations . . . that countries have long-term interests in the defence of the homeland, economic well-being, a favourable world order, and the promotion of values; and that within these “broad enduring interests” there is a scale in the intensity of their stake from peripheral or minor interests to vital and survival interests.26 8

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What the literature lacks, even if its determination of national interests is correct, is a recognition that assessment of national interests is inherently subjective.27 Most decision makers would agree that the single greatest influence on strategy are the circumstances in which the state finds itself at the time. Like the influence of values on strategy, this is a striking gap in the literature: Strategic theory is silent on the subject, save for the occasional reference to national heritage. Strategic analysts have studied it in a little more detail. Lodge and Vogel, for instance, discuss relevant context, “the collection of phenomena, facts, events, insights, institutions, and forces that affect the community from within and from without: the surrounding reality, the actual environment.”28 Ascher and Overholt also discuss circumstances.29 THE URGENCY OF THEORETICAL RESEARCH This book seeks to contribute a better understanding of the relationship between values and strategy by developing a general theory of strategy. More theoretical research about strategy is urgent. For one thing, strategic theory has been developing cyclically for over 1,000 years: If it runs true to its long history, it is about to renew itself. Since Antiquity, strategic scholars have also been practitioners. For example, Sun Zi, the Chinese strategist defending the kingdom of Wei from the warring states (circa 600–400 B.C.E.), advocated diplomacy over confrontation. The nineteenth-century Prussian Clausewitz theorized about direct strategy in a geographically limited theater of military action. Chairman Mao bequeathed a wealth of strategies for revolutionary war. Since World War II, strategic thought has been concerned almost exclusively with the nuclear strategy of superpowers. Enter the East European revolution of 1989 and scholars called the relevance of nuclear deterrence into question:30 “Now the walls of our [Cold War] prison have suddenly collapsed and we emerge, bewildered, into a new and unfamiliar world.”31 Cold Warriors barely had time to drop their weapons before the Persian Gulf, Asian republics of the former USSR, and Yugoslavia erupted into war. These events confirmed private suspicions that, should the post-Wall world ever set aside superpower tensions, other simmering conflicts would boil over. New conflicts always spark fresh strategic problems: There is now a need to understand strategies for weaker states, strategies for endemic conflict, strategies for partly adversarial relations, strategies 9

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for nonaligned states, and strategies for regional powers, but most urgently for ethnic conflicts. Meanwhile, the map of middle and southern Europe is being redrawn and states caught in the crucible of ethnic conflict are forging national identities, often by relying on cultural characteristics, at the very moment we realize how little these are understood. Strategic theory can cope with these problems by renewing itself. It needs to do so by developing fresh, fundamental theory using the most rigorous methods and criteria. Now that deterrence and nuclear strategy are finally a little less important, it is time to make a bid for including new items on the research agenda.32 In addition to developing the method and the theory in detail, this book presents a method for amending the theory or developing portions of it further. It does so by providing a template, a complete network of detailed assumptions, constraints, and interwoven propositions for the researcher interested in specific aspects to conduct his or her own gedankenexperiment. NATIONAL VALUES AND NATIONAL STRATEGY National values influence national strategy. Prima facie, one might be tempted to argue that differences in material situations of nations explain their different fates. There is, after all, no denying that a state’s individual circumstances have a lot to do with the outcome. The only alternative would be to argue that intangible national characteristics somehow explain these events: The Israelis are possessed by some unusually strong national spirit; the Chinese have the skills that allow them to get the better of their conquerors over the long run; the Vietnamese knew when to press their advantage; and the United States’ war effort can be hamstrung by self-questioning of motives and approach, or lack of domestic support. Stereotyping aside, that is exactly the argument this book makes. In addition to being culturally distinct, each of these states had distinctive schools of strategic thought. Comparison of several traditions shows, for instance, that the Anglo-American school of strategic thought tends to resort to war more quickly than those of either the French or the Chinese school.33 Comparative studies of strategy point to culture and other nationwide characteristics playing a significant role in a state’s use of strategy.34 The relationship between culture and any aspect of society “is one of the central problems of all human experience and philosophical speculation,”35 one of the oldest problems in social science.36 In mili10

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tary science, references to it go back to Ardant du Picq in 1865.37 Yet “Critics of international security studies have often suggested that [such] questions are neglected by the field.”38 As we shall see, the single most important effort to study the role of values in strategic theory, nuclear ethics, suffers from a fatal flaw: The concept of ethics leaves little room for the culture-specific. A RELATED CONCEPT: NUCLEAR ETHICS The literature on nuclear ethics is amazingly well developed, considering that the postwar theoretical literature peaked in the 1960s.39 There are three differences between nuclear ethics and this book’s position. The first is merely a question of labels: Deterrence theory and this book deal with almost identical sociocultural phenomena, but deterrence theorists call them “ethics” and this book calls them “values.” Second, nuclear strategic theory treats “ethics” as a constant and an absolute, implying that only one set of ethics can exist. This book uses values as a state-specific variable.40 Third, nuclear strategic theory use ethics to judge two actions, the threat or use of nuclear weapons.41 This book uses values to explain, not judge, motivation. (See Table 1.1.) Table 1.1 Ethics and Values in Strategic Theory

Term Characteristics Function

Nuclear Strategy ethics constant monistic judge state action

Present Theory values variable state-specific motivate state action

The reasoning behind the claim that, in the final analysis, values guide strategy goes something like this: 1. This study tries to understand better the interactions between states. 2. No international relation is ever perfectly harmonious: No two states’ wills, goals and aspirations ever coincide perfectly—there are always some areas of contention. This very contention precipitates the need for strategy. 11

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3. However narrow its margin of action, it is always possible to imagine many possibilities of action for any given state in any given set of circumstances. 4. Since a state cannot actively consider a large number of these possibilities, it needs to reduce the number, eventually choosing only one. 5. Since the circumstances are exactly the same for all of the strategies possible (the same resources available, the same amount and quality of information about the adversary, the same area of contention, etc.), these alone cannot account for the decision. 6. Values somehow influence the final decision: But are values the key?42 This book only addresses the possibility that values influence the choice of strategy. There are two other phases to strategy: (1) conception and development, and (2) implementation. If values have a decisive influence on strategy as a whole, they influence its choice. Even if values do not influence the other stages of strategy at all, they can still have a decisive impact by influencing choice, which is the point where strategy takes its final shape, but the reverse is not necessarily true. It is also possible that values influence strategy in a trivial rather than a decisive way. The hypothesis may therefore refer to national strategy as a whole, even though the theory only addresses choice of strategy.

TESTING THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS Testing a general hypothesis at the choice stage may seem risky in an already risky enterprise, a périlleux échafaudage. In fact, several factors are usually thought to be significant influences, but which of them is the key does not become clear for some time. That is why the theory doubles as a template: Enough detail about the propositions and their structure is given so that it is easier to develop variations on the theory, taking other variables into account and generating hypotheses until a convincing explanation emerges. Starting the search for influences on strategy with national values happens to be supported by the scholarly literature. So far, there are two good reasons for embarking on this study: There is a big gap in strategic theory which makes any further prog12

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ress in strategic analysis difficult, if not impossible, and the time is ripe for it to be filled. There is also a third reason: the need to move beyond strategy in symmetrical relations, and ultimately beyond the military context. These are the foundation of my own motivation. In order to make that move, it is necessary to work at a theoretical level. In the postwar period, strategy has been overwhelmingly concerned with superpower nuclear strategy. While this dominance is perfectly understandable, given what the slightest threat of nuclear war means to the world, it has crowded many important issues off the research agenda. American and Soviet nuclear capabilities were noticeably asymmetrical until the mid-1960s, but after that time nuclear strategy focused on relations between roughly equal states, the United States and the former USSR, although it did address other cases, like the French force de frappe,43 Israel’s “undeclared” nuclear arsenal,44 and low-intensity conflict.45 Greater emphasis on asymmetrical relations can only make strategic theory and theory more relevant. And the importance of nonmilitary applications of strategy can only increase once its analytical and practical significance is better understood. Nonmilitary and/or asymmetrical strategy should interest anyone who is interested in social change. The classical literature (Clausewitz, Mahan, Douhet, Liddell Hart) does not directly address strategy’s potential for this kind of change, but the potential is clearly there. André Beaufre, in Introduction à la stratégie, hints at this potential with his classification of strategy, which relies on some basic distinctions.46 First, he distinguishes a strategy of action from a strategy of persuasion. Second, he distinguishes a direct strategy from an indirect one.47 By indirect strategy, Beaufre did not mean a roundabout strategy,48 but a strategy that reverses the existing ratio of power between the adversaries.49 In other words, it is a strategy whose aim is to have the underdog win, a perfect tool for activists or minorities. Unfortunately, even in the original French, Beaufre’s finer points are easily overlooked.50 THE METHOD This book builds on the foundation set by Beaufre and other strategic thinkers and theorists, and develops a network of statements that more or less closely describe the fundamental processes through which states choose their strategies. Interaction between basic statements and definitions provides a set of further statements 13

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and eventually generates hypotheses that are empirically tested. All of this is illustrated with a study of French national strategy between 1955 and 1970. In this case, the hypothesis is empirically verified, but even if it were not, the theory could generate a different set of interrelated propositions. This potential makes it possible to apply the theory to different actors and different types of relationship between the actors, or circumstances. Ultimately, it allows us to investigate different types of minorities. One caveat: Generally, the more tightly knit the theory, the more precise the predictions (or empirical hypotheses) it will generate. In the case of strategy, though, the theory produces only probabilistic hypotheses (i.e., hypotheses that read: “The state is likelier to . . .”) about the type of strategy. Strategy by nature is more suited to macroscopic analysis than microscopic analysis, because it looks at long-term patterns of action in states. The predictions and explanations its study produces are also general. This is strategy’s great and unavoidable limitation. As a result, the theory presented here inevitably appears somewhat crude, even if it were something more than a proposal. Certain methodological choices are responsible for this crudeness: The classifications are binary, for instance, and conditions set for the theory’s validity are deliberately and considerably simplifying, so the situation did not become intractable to analysis. It only claim a first attempt to bridge a very obvious gap in strategic theory. In any event, any theoretical contribution is always temporary: It only survives as long as it takes for someone else to come up with a better idea. Theoretical research, after all, thrives on controversy but dies of neglect.51 CLASSICAL AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY The questions that have given rise to the present theory, as well as the perspective that informs it, were cradled by classical strategy. Classical strategy gives a historical perspective to the role of technology, and shows much more clearly links between a variety of concepts related to values (worldview, ideology, value bias, ethnocentrism). Nuclear strategy’s contribution, dominated as it is by the Anglo-American school, is completely different. It revealed how problem-driven strategy is. More to the point, placing little emphasis on theory, it inadvertently created a vacuum into which a new theory could step.52 Robert Osgood, Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, and Albert Wohlstetter laid an exceptionally coherent theo14

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retical foundation, but concerns over policy dominated the agenda for decades.

STRUCTURE Each chapter of this book has its own distinct objectives. Chapter 2 on method answers three questions: (1) How is the network of statements developed? (2) How can other researchers weigh its contributions to knowledge? (3) What method is used to develop the theory in detail? Chapter 3 discusses each step of the strategic decision-making process and each of the three mechanisms through which national values influence national strategy. If national values are all-pervasive, it is only to be expected that they come into play at every step of decision making. Chapters 4 and 5 show two faces of the theory in action. Chapter 4 suggests how to investigate whether the hypothesis is correct, as well as how to adapt the theory to a different hypothesis or even a different situation, using the template. Chapter 5 shows the inner workings of France’s decision making, under the influence of national values, at some length: it is about twice the length of any other chapter in the book.53 Finally, Chapter 6 proposes the template and a method of developing the theory further and, since “to be right at the wrong time is the worst crime,” it anticipates some of the criticism that might be leveled at the theory.

NOTES 1. Roy Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 831 pages. 2. Sun Tzu’s Art of War is thought to have been written around 400 B.C.E. 3. NATO after 2000 (Huntington, NY: Novascience, 2001); Security for the Pacific Century (Huntington, NY: Novascience, forthcoming). 4. Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Holmes and Meier, 1979). 5. Other forays into the question of values are Michael Sullivan, Measuring Global Values (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979). 15

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6. George C. Lodge, “Introduction: Ideology and Country Analysis,” in George Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel, Ideology and National Competitiveness (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1987), 2–3. 7. George C. Lodge, op. cit., 2. 8. John H. Stewart II, “Methods for Developing Alternative Futures and Long-Range Planning,” in Creating Strategic Vision (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 61–88. 9. See the work of Philippe Garigue, Maurice Torelli, and Jean-Paul Charnay. 10. Harkaby Yehoshafat, Arab Strategies and Israel’s Response (New York: Free Press, 1977); Lucien Poirier, “Epistémologie de la stratégie,” Anthropologie et sociétés 7:1 (1983), 71–95; Pierre Gallois, Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1960). 11. Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as Science,” World Politics I:1 (1948), 467–488; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Colin S. Gray, “The Rise and Fall of Academic Strategy,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies Journal CXVI (1971), 54–77; “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,” International Security 6:2 (Fall 1981), 21–47; Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982); Michael Howard, Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare (Colorado Springs, CO: United States Air Force Academy, 1967); “The Classical Strategists,” in Problems of Modern Strategy, Alistair Buchan, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1970); Albert Wohlstetter, “Bishops, Statesmen and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents,” Commentary 75:6 (June 1983), 15–35; Arnold Wolfers, “Statesmanship and Moral Choice,” in Discord and Collaboration: Essay on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). 12. Peter Paret, “Introduction,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 7. 13. Julian Lider, “Towards a Modern Concept of Strategy,” Cooperation and Conflict 16:4 (1981), 217–235; Knute Midgaard, “Strategy and Ethics in International Politics,” Conflict and Cooperation 70 (1970), 224–240. 14. Lawrence Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981); Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959). 15. Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961); General Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army: The 16

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Viet Công Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Praeger, 1962). The low-intensity warfare thinkers are, for historical reasons, largely Hispano phone. Arlene Broadhurst, personal communication, May 1992, personal notes. 16. Clyde Kluckhohn, “Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action,” in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds. Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951); Guy Rocher, A General Introduction to Sociology: A Theoretical Perspective (Trans. Peta Sheriff. Toronto: Macmillan, 1972). 17. The problem of static concepts goes back to Bergson’s critique of the Kantian notion of time. The Bergsonian critiques have been widely misunderstood and ignored, by and large, by the scholarly community. See Laure Paquette, “A Comparison of Strategy and Time in Clausewitz’s On War and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” Comparative Strategy 10:1 (January 1991), 37–51. 18. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1949). 19. Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (London: University of London Press, 1969); with Morton S. Baratz, “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,” American Political Science Review 57:3 (September 1963), 632–642; Charles Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’ ” Public Administration Review (Spring 1959), 79–88 and “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through,” Public Administration Review (1979), 517–526. 20. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); Nicos Poulantzas, Crise de l’état (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1977). 21. Paul Marantz, “Gorbachev and East-West Relations: A Change in Style or Substance?,” AAASS Annual Meeting (November 1987), 2. 22. Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, “The American Idea of International Interest,” American Political Science Review XLVII (March 1953), 28. 23. Fred A. Sondermann, “The Concept of the National Interest,” Orbis 2:1 (Spring 1977), 121–138, especially pp. 123–124. 24. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 106. 25. Karl Von Vorys, American National Interest: Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1990), 19. 17

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26. Ken Booth, Book Review of Donald Nuechterlein’s America Overcommitted, International Affairs 62:1 (1986), 159–161, 160. 27. Idea also first expressed by Bernard Brodie in War and Politics (New York: MacMillan, 1973). See also Ken Booth, Book Review of Donald Nuechterlein’s America Overcommitted, International Affairs 62:1 (1986), 159–161, 160. 28. George C. Lodge, “Introduction: Ideology and Country Analysis,” in George Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel, Ideology and National Competitiveness (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1987), 2–3. 29. William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting: Political Risk and Economic Opportunity (New York: Wiley, 1983), chapter 1. 30. Survival has been the premier journal in strategic studies since its foundation in 1960. In 1989, it published a special issue on nonmilitary dimensions of strategy. See Volume XXXI:6 (NovemberDecember 1989). 31. Sir Michael Howard, “The Remaking of Europe,” Survival XXXII: 2, 95–106, 99. 32. All the pieces are laid out on the board, but unless one opponent knows what the other is thinking, it is impossible to make sense of all the individual little moves. Suppose for a moment the adversary is known well enough to identify some of his characteristics. Suppose it is possible to link some of those characteristics to the kind of strategy he is most likely to use. Then, the number of possibilities that need to be considered can be reduced by at least 75 percent. Once the opponent’s strategy is known, it becomes possible to anticipate individual, or tactical, moves. 33. See Laure Paquette, op. cit.; “Strategy and Peace Part I: Peace in Post-War Strategic Theory,” op. cit.; “Strategy and Peace Part II: Slanted in Favour of War?” Kingston: Canadian Political Science Association, June 1991, passim. 34. Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), passim. 35. Robert E. Osgood, op. cit., i. 36. Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist (New York: Penguin, 1982); Kenneth J. Arrow, “Values and Collective Decision-Making,” in Philosophy and Economic Theory, Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 110–111. 18

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37. Regarding Ardant du Picq’s Memoirs, see Richard F. Timmons, “The Moral Dimension: The Thoughts of Ardant du Picq,” Infantry USA 75:6 (November 1985), 10–11, 10. 38. Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field,” International Security 12:4 (Spring 1988), 5–27, 17. 39. Colin Gray, “The Rise and Fall of Academic Strategy,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies Journal CXVI (1971), 54–77. 40. The Judeo-Christian roots of ethics are easily exposed: It is essentially monist, i.e., that there is only one substantive morality possible, just as the concept of deity is essentially monist. The similarity between the two concepts may not be coincidental. 41. The layperson could start with any of the following surveys: Raphaël Draï and Thuan Cao-Thuy, Guerre, éthique et pensée stratégique à l’ère thermonucléaire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1988); Brian J. Hehir, “Ethics and Strategy: The View of Selected Strategists,” in Ethics in the Nuclear Age: Strategy, Religious Studies and the Churches, Todd Whitmore, ed. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1989), 13–34; Morton Kaplan, “Strategy and Morality,” in Strategic Thinking and Its Moral Implications, Morton Kaplan, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); Joseph Nye Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986); William O’Brien, ed., Nuclear Dilemma and the Just War Tradition (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986). The exception is Ken Booth, op. cit. 42. At this point, the question naturally arises whether states can have values. Values are attributes of groups of people and in that sense, states may have values. However, it is also true that values reside in individuals, just as decisions are actually made by states. See Chapter 3. 43. Many of the more familiar references from the French school can be found in the bibliography. Look for the works of Jean-Paul Charnay, Lucien Poirier, and Pierre Gallois in addition to André Beaufre. 44. The word “undeclared” is from Joseph Fitchett, International Herald Tribune (Paris edition), May 15, 1991, 1. For the scholar not fluent in Hebrew, only a very limited portion of the Israeli literature is accessible. 45. Mao Zedong, On Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961) and Giap Vo Nguyen, op. cit., are only two examples of this school. 19

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46. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Capt. Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1954); Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959). André Beaufre is a Golden Age theorist of the French school. His best known work is a trilogy on strategy: Introduction à la stratégie (Paris: Armand Colin, 1963); Stratégie de l’action (Paris: Armand Colin, 1963); Dissuasion et stratégie (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964). The French claim that Beaufre has done for strategy in the twentieth century what Clausewitz did for it in the nineteenth. Whatever the strength of that claim, Introduction à la stratégie is more than a textbook: It succeeds in introducing some semblance of order into the sometimes chaotic literature in strategic theory. 47. Thus, Beaufre’s taxonomy is not based on size or goal of strategy, but on the very nature of it. For a discussion of classification schemes for strategy, see Knute Midgaard, “Strategy and Ethics in International Politics,” Conflict and Cooperation 70 (1970), 224–240; and Julian Lider, “Towards a Modern Concept of Strategy,” Cooperation and Conflict 16:4 (1981), 217–235. 48. For details on the “strategy of the indirect approach” advocated so vigorously by Liddell Hart in the interwar period, see his Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1954). 49. Author’s translation of the following quotation: “l’idée centrale de cette conception est de renverser le rapport des forces opposées avant l’épreuve de la bataille par une manoeuvre et non par le combat.” From Introduction à la stratégie, op. cit., 96. 50. Consider, for example, Xavier Sallantin’s experience with this topic. In more than one instance, he misreads Beaufre, arguing as if Beaufre’s indirect strategy were identical to Liddell Hart’s. See Sallantin’s “Métastratégie,” Défense nationale (August-September 1976), 21–42; and Penser la défense, douze dialogues sur la défense (Paris: Ramsay, 1984). 51. Keith G. Banting, interview with author, Kingston, February 1990, personal notes. 52. “The volume and the quality of strategic thought published since the early 1960s is in marked contrast to that of the previous decade. There are two prime reasons for this; first, the main task of conceptual elaboration was performed (strategic conceptualisation, after all, is a task of only limited magnitude) by 1961–1962; second, the major theorists abandoned their prime commitment to 20

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scholarship in order to facilitate the implementation phase under congenial defence management.” From Colin Gray, op. cit., 56. 53. Author’s translation. The original reads: “avoir raison à contretemps est le crime suprême.” From Raymond Aron, Mémoires (Paris: Juilliard, 1983), 150.

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How and Why

The art of war, far from being a striking intuition, actually comes from profound study. . . . Strategic decisions are more certain when they rely on a body of rationally established doctrine—because, after all, genius is a rare occurrence, and the complete refusal to contemplate the use of force-related concepts, in the name of freedom, is often nothing more that the confession of intellectual inadequacy. Jean-Paul Charnay

A certain mystique clings to theorists in the popular imagination: They take the universe as their inspiration and, from their all-too-real flesh and blood, mysteriously alchemize ideas that move humanity forward . . . or so the legend goes. The myth accurately reflects the creativity and the intuition involved in theory-building. We listen to a lecture on one of the newer theories or we read about them—games and bargaining theory, simulation techniques, decision-making theory, communications and integration theory, conflict theory, systems theory, and so on—and we incorporate into our thinking whatever appeals to us, discarding the rest as irrelevant for our particular purposes.1

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On the other hand, the myth says nothing about the tedious, technical work that paves the way to rigorous, tightly argued theory: establishing definitions, producing a welter of possible statements and relationships between phenomena, setting assumptions and conditions, refining and clarifying the propositions, checking the theory for internal consistency, operationalizing it, and, finally, illustrating it. This chapter addresses that task. In addition, I make here the argument that not only does the theory meet criteria by which scholars judge theory qua theory, it exceeds them. The far greater challenge, in fact, lies in representing a nonlinear method of theory-building like this one with words and two-dimensional figures, a challenge rooted in the very nature of strategy. In strategic thinking . . . the most reliable means of dissecting a situation into its constituent parts and reassembling them in the desired pattern is not a step-by-step methodology such as systems analysis. Rather, it is that ultimate nonlinear thinking tool, the human brain. True strategic thinking thus contrasts sharply with the conventional mechanical systems approach based on linear thinking. But it also contrasts with the approach that stakes everything on intuition, reaching conclusions without any real breakdown or analysis.2 The process of theory-building moves forward in fits and starts, retracing its own steps as needed. The creativity required in theoretical development is so carefully channeled that the process sometimes seem rote. Because there has been little or no work on the influence of values on strategy per se, it sometimes seems as if the theory is being built in a vacuum. In fact, theory is probably the type of research that uses germane scholarship the most. When it comes to strategic theory-building, the literature is silent and the sources come from outside strategic theory, international relations, and even political science. DEVELOPING THEORY Generally speaking, the theory develops in seven stages: (1) definition of terms, (2) brainstorming, (3) distillation of statements, (4) ordering of statements, (5) testing for internal consistency, (6) operationalization, and (7) illustration. Table 2.1, Steps of the Method, summarizes those steps. 24

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Table 2.1 Steps of the Method 1. Definition

identify primary, secondary and methodological terms to be defined delineate and express the essence of the concept review on the basis of Aristotelian criteria 2. Brainstorm produce a flood of suggestions, statements, and relationships 3. Distillation break complex/compound statements down into simple ones differentiate statements according to type check for accuracy choose only central statements 4. Ordering create a set of statements by (i) ordering by type, eventually clustered around main concepts; (ii) establishing a genealogy 5. Backward test verify for consistency, i.e., completion and parsimony by moving from last-generation proposition to assumptions 6. Operationalization transform essentialist definitions of hypothesis into observable, measurable operation, then apply the theory to an actual country’s strategy 7. Illustration illustrate the theory and the empirical hypotheses to the particular case of a country’s strategy, in order to test the hypothesis and, indirectly, the theory

Step 1: Defining Terms Wittgenstein once said that common usage should be the basis of definitions. The consequences of defining terms, of which there are three types, ripple through the theory: (1) primary terms arise directly from the central hypothesis about strategic decision making, national values, and national strategy; (2) secondary definitions are 25

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essential but less central; and (3) methodological terms include assumptions, conditions, propositions, and hypotheses. The role of a definition is usually limited to expressing an idea, but in this theory it must also carefully distinguish an idea from other closely related ideas.3 Only essentialist definitions, that is, definitions that give the nature of the thing defined, can do that.4 Of the three major types of definitions (essentialism, descriptivism, and intentualism), essentialism works best for conceptual research and provides criteria according to which definitions can be improved. Those criteria include convenience, freedom from normative concerns, verifiability, and precision.5 Moreover, neither prescriptivist nor contextualist definitions suit strategy. Prescriptivism assimilates definitions to imperative rather than declarative sentences, and endows them with syntactic or semantic rules for prescribing linguistic operations. Prescriptivist definitions may be value-laden, introducing biases to which strategy is particularly sensitive. Pragmatic-contextual definitions identify meanings either with objects or with concepts denoted by words or linguistic usage. Because there are no agreed-upon usages for most terms used in this book, it is not possible to use this type of definition.6 Essentialism is not without its problems, however. For one thing, it tends to rely on metaphors. “Metaphors are apt or inapt, illuminating or misleading, according to two criteria: (1) the number and importance of the known points of resemblance between the things compared and (2) the number and importance of previously unnoted facts suggested by the metaphor.”7 Second, there is a greater risk of syllogism with essentialist definitions than with either prescriptivist or pragmatic-contextual definitions. “Too often, a single term has been used to symbolize different concepts, just as the same concept has been symbolized by different terms.”8 For instance, the theory uses values in the same way that “value systems” is used by the Parsonian school, or ideology is used in political culture.9 Syllogism can also be a problem for methodological terms: The theory uses “assumption” the way other scholars use “postulate” or “premise.”10 Finally, there are always problems with ordinary speech: In the first place, the terms of ordinary speech may be quite vague, in the sense that the class of things designated by a term is not sharply and clearly demarcated from (and may in fact overlap to a considerable extent with) the class of things not so 26

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designated. Accordingly, the range of presumed validity for statements employing such terms has no determinate limits. In the second place, the terms of ordinary speech may lack a relevant degree of specificity, in the sense that the broad distinction signified by the terms do not suffice to characterize more narrowly drawn but important differences between the things denoted by the terms.11 The book guards its definitions against essentialist problems in two ways. First, it submits the theory to stringent and detailed tests for internal consistency; and second, it develops the definitions by rigorously applying Sartori’s rules of definitions listed in Table 2.2.12 Step 2: Brainstorming A brainstorm is by definition unpredictable: It produces raw insights that need to be reworked to be any use. It can be done by a single scholar or by a team. It should happen at the start of the process, but can also occur at other times. The idea is to generate as many ideas as possible within a given time frame, without any critical remarks being made, and with freewheeling or improving on someone else’s ideas being welcomed. The percentage of useable ideas is usually low. Nevertheless, the more raw material, the better the theory will be. Step 3: Distillation Distillation is the reiterative process of adding, subtracting, classifying, revising, and clarifying statements. It is governed by a series of checks and balances (see Table 2.3). Distillation can be divided further, into a three-step process: (1) statements are differentiated by type; (2) individual statements are refined, usually by breaking them down into a simple standard format; and (3) statements are checked for accuracy.

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Table 2.2 Sartori’s Rules of Definition13 Rule 1 Rule 2a Rule 2b Rule 3a Rule 3b Rule 4 Rule 5 Rule 6 Rule 7 Rule 8 Rule 9

Rule 10

check for ambiguity and vagueness check whether key terms are defined, whether meaning is unambiguous, remains unchanged check whether key terms are used consistently do not use synonyms use synonyms unless there are different meanings to different words construct concept by collecting representative set of definitions, extracting characteristics, building set to extend concept, assess degree of boundlessness and denotative discrimination vis-à-vis membership remedy boundlessness of concept by increasing number of properties use connotation and denotation of concept in inverse relation terms designate concept controls set of related terms if term unsettles semantic field, ensure that selection must show that (i) no field meaning is lost (ii) ambiguity is not increased ensure definitions of concept are adequate and parsimonious

There are two distinctions to be made about statements; first between types of statements, and second, between types of propositions. Types of Statements The main test for internal consistency is what philosophical logic calls the backward test. The backward test ensures that every statement is in its proper place in the sequence of reasoning, relative to other statements. That place is determined by the role of each statement, which depends, in turn, on its type. There are five types of statements, each with its own characteristics: assumptions, conditions, hypotheses, propositions, and definitions. A summary of 28

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Table 2.3 Checks and Balances definition

1. Does the definition give the essence or nature of thing defined, rather than its incidental properties? It should. 2. Does the definition use synonyms? Metaphors? Negative terms? Correlative terms? It should not. for other statements clarity 1. Format: Does the statement include only one verb? Does that verb relate only two phenomena? 2. Differentiation: Is the statement deduced from other statements? If so, it is a proposition. If not, is the statement valid for phenomena other than, in this case, value-laden decision of strategy by states? If so, it is an assumption. If not, it is a condition. accuracy Can propositions be deduced from the set of statements that either (1) contradict each other, or (2) are obviously false? parsimony/ Backward test completeness elegance Melos and opsis (guides only) types and their characteristics may be found in Table 2.4, Statement Types and Characteristics. Assumptions are the most basic statements. They provide the foundation on which other statements build. While there is usually significant agreement among scholars on their truth or plausibility, they cannot be proven directly since they are philosophical in content. They must, however, meet three requirements: (1) assumptions must meet the formal requirements of logic; (2) assumptions must be consistent with prevailing conventions about knowledge; and (3) assumptions must be substantive.14 The easiest way to recognize an assumption is to look for its origin: If it is derived from any other statement, it cannot be an assumption. A condition’s role is to reduce the scope of a theory. It does so by specifying which events can be included in the study (including 29

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Table 2.4 Statement Types and Characteristics Type

Role

Taxonomy

Origin

Support

definition

delineate and express idea

main secondary methodological

strategic lit.

strategic lit.

assumption

basis for other statements

by main concepts

residual

rationale plausibility

condition

reduces cope of study

object of study

rationale

propositions

flesh out body of theory

1st genertion 2nd generation 3rd generation

assumption condition other

origins

hypotheses

operationalize central empirimost specific cal props

latter props

empirical investigation

strategic choices but excluding tactical ones), by singling out particular phenomena for study (decision-making processes, but not planning or programming), by setting spatial or temporal limits (studying only decisions made by France between 1955 and 1970), and, indirectly, by focusing on certain aspects of the research design. If assumptions are the infrastructure of the theory, then propositions are the superstructure. Propositions are deduced from earlier statements, usually other propositions. The following series of questions can identify the various types of statements: Is the statement deduced from other statements? If so, the statement is a derived proposition. If not, Is the statement valid for phenomena other than, in this case, value-laden choice of strategy by states? If so, the statement is an assumption. If not, the statement is a condition. Empirical hypotheses are propositions in operational language that can be investigated by empirical research.15 Hypotheses are, by their 30

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nature, impossible to confirm absolutely. Evidence supporting them can mount so much that they are generally regarded as being verified, but the possibility of encountering evidence that disproves them is always theoretically possible.16 Hypotheses, like assumptions, must meet several requirements.17 First, hypotheses must be deductive: they must be logically necessary derivations of propositions. That means that each hypothesis must be successful, that is, that it is possible to work through every statement from assumptions to hypotheses and back again, without finding a gap or skipping a statement. Second, hypotheses generated by this theory must be probabilistic: Even though assumptions come to formally imply the hypotheses, the assumptions are themselves probabilistic about individual events or single occurrences. Third, hypotheses are teleological, that is, they perform one or more functions in maintaining certain traits of a system. Several branches of derived propositions culminate with the generation of the hypothesis. Types of Propositions Propositions are divided into generations depending on the statements that inspired them: The first generation is deduced from assumptions and conditions, the second generation from at least one first-generation proposition, the third from at least one second-generation proposition, and so on. Successive generations mold the theory more and more closely to the original phenomenon, moving from the general to the specific, the theoretical to the empirical, and the abstract to the practical. Later-generation propositions can eventually be operationalized. For the theory to be tested for consistency, all statements must be of the same format. The basic format uses only one verb to link two phenomena, allowing for no complex propositions and no compound sentences. While statements are being broken down into the basic format, it is important to keep track of every statement’s origin to be able to complete the backward test and to develop a template for further theoretical development. The basic test for accuracy involves deriving propositions that contradict existing propositions or that are obviously false. Step 4: Ordering the Statements It is possible that portions of the theory have already been displayed in orderly successive generations. The rest also has to be displayed systematically for the theoretical work to proceed. Once this 31

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representation is complete, as it is in Chapter 6, it becomes possible to test the theory for internal consistency. Step 5: Backward Test First, a method of schematic representation, like cell diagrams, is chosen. Symbols are assigned to each type of statement, and the generations of propositions are determined: The theorist moves through the statements’ template from the late-generation through the first-generation propositions to conditions and assumptions, using the cell diagrams or other kinds of abstract representation. Step 6: Operationalization There are three possible outcomes of operationalizing the theory. It can produce feedback that leads either to confirmation of the empirical hypothesis, which is unlikely, or to adjustments of the theory. If the theory needs to be adjusted, that can mean one of two things. Either national values are not one of the key factors in determining national strategies, and the hypothesis is rejected, or only minor adjustments are necessary. Should the hypothesis be rejected completely, the theory can be changed to suit a new independent variable, using the method used to build the theory in the first place. Chapter 4 goes into the details of making these changes. The backward test provides all the necessary details about assumptions, conditions, and propositions needed to make those changes. JUDGING THEORY There are no criteria specific to strategy by which to judge theory, but there are criteria for the theory of international relations: clarity, accuracy, elegance, parsimony, and ability to predict and/or explain phenomena.18 As we will see, the method of theory-building outlined above meets the following interpretation of those five requirements. Solid definitions and consistent terminology are the key to clarity. It is easier to be consistent than it is to use rigorous definitions, because definitions rarely inspire any kind of consensus in social science. Beyond terminology, the meaning of each statement has to stand on its own merits, as well as in the context of other statements. Both distillation and the backward test (Steps 2 and 5) ensure clarity. 32

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Accuracy can be verified by asking the following questions: 1. Is it possible to deduce propositions that contradict each other, from an identical set of statements? 2. Is it possible to deduce propositions that are patently untrue (like reversing the law of gravity or the cycles of the moon)? For a theory to be accurate, it also has to be complete. It is judged to be complete if it can generate plausible empirical hypotheses from the statements included, and if every proposition is supported by other statements. That is a second use for the template of the theory. The template’s role is to represent the entire theory, making it obvious where the gaps are. The template makes any superfluous statements just as obvious, thereby ensuring parsimony. Ensuring clarity or accuracy may be technical, but it is easier than trying to make the theory elegant. Elegance is the least tangible of the five requirements. Few scholars will be interested in a theory unless it has elegance, not just intellectual tidiness. Some classics of strategy are models: André Beaufre’s work has a simplicity and a transparency that allow the reader an economy of effort. Elegance, I suggest, is a balance between the images created in the mind’s eye and the sound created in the mind’s ear. When image and sound strike some sort of balance, the effect is harmonious, and the theory can be understood with a minimum of effort. This balance of melos and opsis is what elegance is about.19 So much for the exposition of theory-building and a discussion of the criteria by which any theory in international relations can be judged. The structure of the remaining text reflects the method used. Chapter 3 reports the results of Steps 1 and 2. Chapter 4 reports on Steps 3, 4, and 5. Chapter 5 illustrates the empirical investigation necessary for Step 6 to occur. The attempt to build a theory will be made or broken on the work of the next chapter. NOTES The opening quotation for Chapter 2 is the author’s translation of the following: “l’art de la guerre, loin d’être fulgurante intuition, résulte d’une étude approfondie . . . les décisions stratégiques sont plus sûrement élaborées lorsqu’elles s’appuient sur un corps de doctrine rationnellement établi—car enfin, le génie est chose fort rare; et le refus de toute idée-force . . . au nom de la liberté, n’est 33

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souvent qu’aveu d’impuissance intellectuelle.” From Essai général de stratégie (Paris: Champ Libre, 1973), 291. 1. J.E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 38. 2. Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist (New York: Penguin, 1982), 13. 3. Raziel Abelson, “Definition,” in Paul Edwards, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1967), 317, 321. 4. Following Aristotle’s suit. See in particular Topica Ethica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), passim. 5. Philip E. Jacob and James F. Flink, “Values and Their Function in Decision-Making,” American Behavioral Scientist 5 (Supplement, May 1962), 5–38, 10. 6. For a discussion of the various types of definition, see Raziel Abelson, op. cit. About strategy and bias, see Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Holmes and Meier, 1979). 7. Raziel Abelson, op. cit., 315. 8. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), 74. 9. Talcott Parsons, R.F. Bales, and Edward Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953), passim. 10. Robert K. Merton, op. cit. Robert Gilpin’s use of “assumption” parallels the usage in this thesis, although the thesis places much greater emphasis on the differentiation of propositions than does Gilpin. See War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 106. 11. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), 8. 12. Aristotle proposed his own criteria in Topica Ethica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958). In question form: 1. Does the definition give the essence or nature of the thing defined, rather than its incidental properties? (It should.) 2. Does the definition use synonyms? Metaphors? Negative terms? Correlative terms? (It should not.) 13. Giovanni Sartori, “Guidelines for Concept Analysis,” in Giovanni Sartori, ed. Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 1984), 63–64. 14. Ernest Nagel, op. cit., 42–43. 34

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15. Karl Popper’s main thesis through several of his books. See “The Aim of Science,” “Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge,” and Appendix I of Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959); and Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1965). 16. This relates closely to the impermanence of theory, discussed in Chapter 1. 17. An extension of Ernest Nagel’s work, op. cit., on explanations. 18. There is a sixth requirement, that a theory take into account the forces of the international system. That criterion only applies to theories for the whole international system. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), especially pp. 69–72. 19. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 244.

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3

The Theory

The purpose of theory is to simplify reality by capturing its most important aspects. Zeev Maoz

Values are the heart of politics, the process by which “who gets what, when, and how” is decided.1 Because values are pervasive in the social system, they come into play over and over again in every aspect of politics, including strategic decision making. The theory proposed here identifies the influence of values at various points in the decision-making process for national strategy, specifically through three mechanisms: cognition, evaluation, and appreciation. From the outset, however, it is essential to understand what we mean by “national strategy” and “national values.” DEFINITIONS Caspar Weinberger once called strategy the accordion word, and if anything, the word values is even more of a rubber band.

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National Values Definitions of values by authoritative scholars are all variations on the same theme. There is consensus that values represent abstract constructs that provide coherence for political life, psychological unity for individuals, and integration for society.2 National values are the heritage and accepted standards of historical or ideological origin cherished by the population as a whole. National values are shared by the entire population of a state. Complete sets of national values are unlikely to recur because the number of possible combinations is very high. We may therefore safely assume that national values are state-specific.3 National values themselves are made up of standards, heritage, and, because standards and heritage interact, internal sanctions. There are three types of standards: cognitive, evaluative, and appreciative.4 Cognitive standards establish the validity and/or applicability of information, and serve to assess the information available to a state.5 Evaluative standards assess the effectiveness of any behavior. Finally, appreciative standards predict and explain the nonrational, nonutilitarian aspect of state actions. Heritage is the part of national values, both tangible and intangible, that can be passed on from generation to generation. Tangible components include natural resources and population; intangible components include beliefs and knowledge. Beliefs are existential statements considered to be facts arising from biologically determined or socially learned impulses, whereas knowledge is the perception of influence or control on the structure and operation of the world. Internalized sanctions only come into play once the national strategy is in place, and only apply to those who hold the national values. These sanctions are internal detriments or losses of reward that are meant to reinforce standards, particularly appreciative standards. Dissonance, the unease or discomfort experienced by decision makers when their behavior departs from the national strategy or what national standards deem acceptable, is only one example of internalized sanctions. Lodge and Vogel describe events leading up to dissonance in the following terms: [C]hanges in the real world induce complete institutions to behave differently. At that point, practice begins to depart from ideology. . . . There is a gap between institutional practice and ideology—a legitimacy gap. As it widens, . . . some of the com38

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munity seek to haul the institutions back into line with the traditional ideology. Others argue for a new ideology to justify the institutions’ actual practice . . . frequently an old ideology tends to linger on, uninspected, while institutions depart from it in many pragmatic ways.6 National Strategy When it comes to definitions, strategy is a Pandora’s box. The most famous example of a strategy is probably Churchill’s plan to “attack the underbelly of Europe” during World War II. I propose to use the following definition: an imaginative idea that orchestrates and/or inspires sets of actions (tactics, policies, programs or plans) in response to a given problem. Unlike most definitions, this uses neither conflict nor violence as its essential characteristic. Instead, it uses the core idea, which directs all the subsequent actions or tactics of the strategy when it is implemented. The core idea is usually expressed by a slogan or an image, as Churchill’s did. This characteristic holds true regardless of the context in which the strategy is applied, even across cultures.7 A strategy is national when it draws on the “political, economic, technological, military, and psychological or moral power of the state to gain maximum progress toward centrally adopted goals in peace and war.”8 There are three major components to strategy, in addition to the core idea: objectives, means, and approach. Objectives are goals, aims, or ends to which efforts are directed. They interact with cognitive standards. The means are resources, useful or helpful to a desired end. They interact with evaluative standards. Finally, the approach is the particular manner of taking steps for a particular purpose. They interact with appreciative standards. STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING The vein of research into decision making ranks among international relations’ richest, both in terms of theoretical development and depth of empirical investigations. With few exceptions, the paucity of research into strategic decision making is striking.9 The Peculiarities of Strategy Strategic decisions are different from other decisions and come with their own specific requirements (see Table 3.1, Requirements 39

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Table 3.1 Requirements for Strategic Decision Making 1. Distinguish between strategy and tactics 2. Take into account the strategy’s nature, i.e., half thought, half action 3. Accommodate the key idea component of strategy 4. Differentiate between strategy, on the one hand, and policies, plans or programs, on the other

for Strategic Decision Making). First, strategists must distinguish carefully between strategy and tactics. Most modern strategists have trouble with this, in part because Clausewitz’s influence has been great, and he barely distinguishes the two himself, but also because of the structure of Western thought. One way to tell strategy and tactics apart is to focus on times of change: Tactics are constantly adjusted: strategies are not. Second, strategy is an idea about means to an end: Atheory of strategic decision making has to allow analysts to move easily between the abstract and the practical. Third, although most applications of strategy have been military, strategy can be applied to any challenging situation—it need not even be adversarial. Finally, strategies are different from policies, plans, or programs. They are all ways of organizing actions. Strategy uses a single idea to organize all the state’s actions, usually by developing some slogan or symbol. Strategy allows the state more flexibility and much more creativity. Programs and plans organize action, but in a much more rigid way: If they provide for contingencies at all, the margin for maneuvering is much more narrow. A policy is a formulation of specific goals in a particular area, but those goals are very definite. Strategy’s goals are flexible, depending on changing circumstances.

Theories of Decision Making The full array of models and theories about decision making is impressive. Two attempts at integrating the entire theoretical literature have been published: (1) Snyder and Diesing’s Conflict Among Nations (1977) and (2) Zeev Maoz’s National Choices and International 40

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Processes (1990).10 Maoz concentrates on national processes of decision making and how they produce decisions of importance to the international community. He eventually develops a five-step process of individual choice, the individual being the single state. Snyder and Diesing focus on how decisions are reached in bargaining situations, which they assume describes the majority of decisions important to the international community. They develop a six-step process of bargaining, which includes two feedback loops.

Strategic Decision Making, Step by Step The process proposed here hinges on the interaction between national strategy and national values, as well as the interactions of their components. Step 1: Treatment of Information—Mechanism 1, Cognition One of the most challenging tasks decision makers face is the treatment of information that the entire state apparatus supports. Information Gathering. The circumstances in which states find themselves are increasingly complex. Government bureaucracies play a significant role in managing or overwhelming decision makers with information. They gather more information than the decision makers can realistically absorb, and often create a crisis atmosphere. Since the Cabinet is not always in a position to judge the validity, accuracy, or significance of that information, this state apparatus perceives itself and its environment through a mechanism called “cognition.” Through cognition, states gather raw information, that is, information untouched and unadulterated by any processing. At this point, national values already shape how a state perceives itself and its environment. The state analyses the information using the standards that are, as mentioned, a component of national values. This information can be of two types: either it is endogenous, that is, the result of a state’s internal operations; or it is exogenous, that is, gleaned from the outside world. Endogenous information includes expectations formulated in previous rounds of decision making, results of previous strategies or tactics, and conclusions drawn earlier. Exogenous information includes perceptions of outside threats or opportunities, actions of other states, and actions of nonstate actors in the international system. 41

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Perception. Generally speaking, the perceptions of human beings are socially constructed.11 That is even more true of collectively built perceptions, like a bureaucracy’s. State perceptions are formed through the government’s quick, acute, and intuitive awareness of its environment: however, understanding that information is not instant. Like a radio picking up sound waves within its range, it may be passed along without any analysis. Perceptions, like the state itself, are limited in several ways. States pick up information on military or economic activity, for instance, but only within certain parameters. These limitations are inevitable, and usually only become obvious when some previously unremarked phenomenon takes on an unexpected significance. Such limitations are due to finite amounts of time, money and energy on the part of the state or the decision makers. Within those limitations, however, the state is free. Its choices will reflect the priority that information gathering has among other tasks. The choice of areas in which to gather information also reflects values. For modern states and decision makers, these choices are difficult because the state is being forced to deal with more and more complicated situations. Step 1 is also the first opportunity for national standards to come into play. The state uses cognitive standards to judge whether a particular bit of information is accurate, relevant, or urgent. These standards increase in importance as available information proliferates. If national values shape a state’s perceptions, they also shape the institutions the state creates to reach goals and carry out its decisions. As the embodiment of cherished national values, those institutions are held in high regard—assets to be protected and promoted. Values, therefore, also provide a focus in the search for information on institutions, threats against them, and opportunities to promote them, that is, surveillance.12 Information Processing. Information processing starts as soon as information is available. The most important task is to identify threats to the state, the breadth of which depends on how much information is needed and how powerful the state is in the international system. Some information is bound to be more important or more accurate than the rest, but to know that, the state has to organize it into units that are easily analyzed. Once information is repackaged, it can go through a series of analytical steps: compared with the state’s expectations about its opponents’ behavior, matched with the various scenarios for the future of the international system, or contrasted with the responses from nonstate actors to its operations. Once that infor42

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mation has been put through the mill, it becomes possible to draw conclusions. The treatment of information may or may not lead to a decision. If the state makes a decision, it may be tactical, not strategic. If the national strategy is not changed, the information may be discarded, or it may be retained for future use. If the state does take action, it sets tangible objectives. Step 2: Diagnosis—Mechanism 2, Appreciation There are different kinds of threats and opportunities, just as there are different kinds of action. A threat is strategic when it puts the continued existence of the country or its values into doubt.13 An opportunity is strategic when there is a chance to promote national values. Appreciation, composed of preference and taste, shows how those threats and opportunities are assessed. Appreciation works to preclude action if the process of decision making respects a state’s preferences and tastes. If the process does not, the state may find it difficult to implement the decision. Preference. Students of decision making often remark on leaders letting their predilections guide their decisions: Preference expresses and formalizes some of those predilections. A preference is a state’s inclination or bias when it comes to a particular decision in a particular area. Therefore, by making repeated observations of state decisions, it is possible for an analyst to identify the set of priorities from which decision makers are working. If those priorities are ignored, the state’s decision makers may experience dissonance or disequilibrium. If so, “it [the state] will tend to change some aspects of its behaviour until this disequilibrium is reduced.”14 Preferences are particularly obvious in older states with documented decision-making histories. Eventually, preferences become part of the state’s heritage: Then they are called taste. Preferences are shaped by appreciative standards. The actual application of preferences is similar to the application of cognitive standards: The endogenous information gathered in Step 1 also included information on preferences. The information has to be organized, broken down, and analyzed. Some information triggers organizational memories, collective fears, or group inclinations: Decision makers, who feel this just as keenly as anybody else, include these reactions along with other endogenous information. It is eventually compared with the state’s expectations about its own reac43

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tions. The state then decides whether this information confirms its existing priorities, or signals the need for action. Taste. Scholars often make indirect reference to taste. Taste is a disposition, rooted in the political culture of a state, that expresses itself as an intense propensity. Taste makes a subtle but significant difference in decision making: It works to exclude from the agenda those options that offend a society before the better-known, more rational steps in decision making occur. It is often confused with national style, and there is always the risk of stereotyping some cultures. However, a national stereotype is a perception of a particular state by others; national values, standards, or tastes can only be inferred from historical observation. Taste can even influence the entire political culture, as with symbolism and the French.15 Step 3: Search for Options—Mechanism 3, Evaluation, Part I If it has not already done so, the state must set its objectives. It can consider various courses of actions to reach them. Generally, objectives reflect the desires of the population if there are no immediate or intense threats to the state, a state’s first aim being the protection of the national heritage. If it is not in jeopardy, the shorter-term objectives vary according to values and desires. Although objectives are not directly affected by national standards, options developed to meet them are. National standards are pivotal in the early rejection of unorthodox or “impossible” options: Such options are judged to be either too different from the state’s usual behavior, or too unlikely to be successful. These subdecisions in the process of considering options are made on the basis of appreciative standards. They are discounted so early that they never figure in the leader’s agenda, who can only consider a certain number of options at the same time. This early selection of options may eliminate from consideration some valid strategies.16 The next subdecision a state faces is whether or not it will use a strategy, as opposed to a plan, a policy, a program, or just “muddling through.”17 The decision not to use a strategy can be unconscious or inadvertent since states have varying degrees of skill in decision making. It is always in the state’s best interest to consider a broad range of options. After that first narrowing, decision makers search for strategic options.18 They consider the logical possibilities present in the actual situation; successful past strategies; individual ingenuity in office, 44

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biases, or preconceived notions officials advocate or endorse; or others. This search occurs regardless of whether the process of decision making is orderly. Step 4: Estimation of Expected Outcomes—Mechanism 3, Evaluation, Part II When people make decisions in the present, they usually rely on projections about the future, projections based on imperfect information and analysis. National values play a role in judging: (1) whether outcomes are acceptable; and (2) which outcomes are desirable. Acceptable outcomes depend on experience; desirable outcomes depend on learning. Experience. As the basis on which a state analyzes its experiences and builds on its learning, national standards develop early in the state’s history and then evolve slowly. Experience is the skill, wisdom, practice, or knowledge gained through direct observation or participation in events, particular activities or affairs generally. The state uses experience to draw conclusions from previous decisions that are incorporated into the decision-making process.19 Experience plays more or less the same role in evaluation as perception does in cognition. However, it uses information endogenous to the state rather than raw information. Endogenous information is analyzed as it becomes available, and only the information judged relevant is retained. Once it is organized, it is analyzed for patterns and relationships and compared to the expectations formulated earlier. Conclusions either confirm or reject the existing set of priorities implicit in national values. The state then either retains the information for future reference or makes a decision. Learning. Learning is a modification of a behavioral tendency based on experience.20 The phenomenon of learning has been observed in the international system. But there are also obstacles to learning, including a complex and constantly changing international environment, and the limitations of human beings as processors of information.21 More general problems with state learning include: 1. observers confusing learning with adaptation, competition, or the random ebb and flow of events; 2. observers falsely concluding that learning occurred because they underestimated what policy makers knew in the first place; 45

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3. observers allowing their own political biases to color their judgments.22 There are several distinct theories about state learning. Cognitive theorists suggest that learning entails increased differentiation and integration of mental structures (schemata). Political scientists usually adopt this approach, but make a distinction between what states come to know and what they come to believe. The theory proposed here suggests that learning contributes endogenous information to the decision-making process. This information is internally consistent only to the extent that the state’s population is itself consistent. It contributes to the creation of taste in the same way that processing information contributed to learning, that is, incrementally. Learning also builds reflex responses: The conclusions drawn from various individual experiences accumulate; some similarity of circumstances in the current situation triggers a link with the past; conclusions drawn then are retrieved. The relevance of the experience is determined, and that information is included in the ongoing decision-making process. State behavior may or may not be changed. If it is, learning is obvious. Previous conclusions may or may not be confirmed: Either way, that information could be retained. Step 5: Assessment of Strategic Options At this stage, the state looks at each option’s material and nonmaterial costs and benefits. The number of options a state can seriously consider is limited. Step 6: Choice of Strategy There have been subdecisions to be made all through this process. Now the state must decide either to adopt a new or revise the old one. The choice depends on the challenge facing the state. There are a number of possibilities: (1) intolerable situations; (2) deteriorating situations that eventually become intolerable; (3) intolerable situations that eventually improve; or (4) “a massive input of new information [that] breaks through the barrier of the image and makes a decision maker realize that his diagnosis and expectations were somehow radically wrong and must be corrected.”23 A state opting for revisions operates through trial and error. A state opting for a new strategy moves on to the next step. 46

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Step 7: Choice of Tactics When decision makers opt for strategy, their needs for information become much more specific (they are not necessarily met). Options about tactics are limited only by a state’s resources. Once tactics have been selected, the state coordinates them, allocates resources, plans for their implementation, and absorbs feedback. Step 8: Implementation of Strategy The decisions made are now acted on. Step 9: Confirmation, Change, or Adjustment of Tactics Information gathered and analyzed at this stage feeds back to Step 3. The state only reevaluates its position once it receives feedback. Both reevaluation and change require resources, which are always committed. There may also be some bureaucratic resistance to adjustments. Step 10: Confirmation, Change, or Adjustment of Strategy This last step feeds back to Step 6, Choice of Strategy. As the state considers the latest information, it either confirms, adjusts, or abandons the strategy. If it abandons the strategy, the state starts the decision-making process all over again. It is possible that it will reach the same conclusion again: States have been known to repeat unsuccessful strategies as much as successful ones. The theory eventually produces predictions about the type of national strategy selected, based on the type of national values. There are four types of national values: materialist/self-oriented, materialist/collective-oriented, nonmaterialist/self-oriented, and nonmaterialist/collective-oriented; and four types of national strategy: direct strategy of persuasion, direct strategy of action, indirect strategy of persuasion, and indirect strategy of action. The set of empirical hypotheses generated is listed in Table 3.2 Two more observations are in order. First, values have an overall conservative influence on strategy because they change slowly. A few societies go through periods of change so quickly that national values outgrow institutions, usually through great upheavals: Those cases are hard to miss. Second, uncertainty greatly magnifies the significance of values’ influence.24 Uncertainty is one of international relations’ great problems because it lacks credible theory and explanations for the sources of international institutions, state interests, and state behavior.25 As decision makers become more aware of 47

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Table 3.2 Empirical Hypotheses H1 a self-oriented, nonmaterialist state is more likely to choose a direct strategy of persuasion H2 a self-oriented, materialist state is more likely to choose a direct strategy of action H3 a collectivity-oriented, nonmaterialist state is more likely to choose an indirect strategy of persuasion H4 a collectivity-oriented, materialist state is more likely to choose an indirect strategy of action

the uncertainties involved, they tend to search even more thoroughly for options. Meanwhile, the decisions they must make become more difficult as uncertainty makes information appear contradictory. It quickly becomes impossible to set priorities in a environment with so many unknowns. The state reacts in a variety of ways: It may postpone the decision. It may vacillate between conflicting courses of action. It may make a decision inconsistent with its previous decisions or its current circumstances, if it is compelled to act. And even if it reaches a sound decision, it may devote only the bare minimum of attention and resources to implementing it, because it is not enthusiastic about it. NOTES 1. Harold Lasswell, World Politics and Personality Insecurity (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), 3. 2. Talcott Parsons, R.F. Bales, and Edward Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953), passim. 3. There are many closely related concepts. The ones closest in meaning can be lumped into two categories: components of national values (beliefs, attitudes, national character, national style) and alternative concepts (morals, morality, ethics). Beliefs are existential statements, expressing what human beings consider to be facts, or arise from biologically determined or socially learned impulses. In either case, there is little room for choice. (See Philip E. Jacob and James F. Flink, “Values and Their Function in Deci48

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sion-Making,” American Behavioral Scientist 5 [Supplement, May 1962], 5–38, 17–20.) Policy makers hold beliefs to be true, even if they cannot be verified (K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983, 321). Some beliefs are political in nature, like doctrine and ideologies (K.J. Holsti, op. cit.). Attitudes are general evaluative statements about some object, fact, or condition that determine whether they are more or less friendly, desirable, dangerous, or hostile (K.J. Holsti, op. cit., 321). National style, with its three basic components of unifying function of ideals, ambiguous “operator’s way” with ideas, and continuity and success of the ad hoc formula in dealing with situations, is another way of coping with the universal, inescapable dilemmas of life (W.W. Rostow, “The National Style,” in The American Style: Essays in Value and Performance, Elting E. Morison, ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958, 249–257). Even by the low standards of international relations, national style is an exceptionally fuzzy concept: It is supposed to explain why nations behave paradoxically when judged by arbitrary norms of consistency. The problem with national character, naively defined as certain psychological traits or features characteristic of the citizens of a given nation, but the “systems of attitudes, values and beliefs held in common by the members of a given society, or by large portions thereof” (H.C.J. Dujijker and N. H. Frijda, National Character and National Stereotypes: A Trend Report Prepared for the International Union of Scientific Psychology [Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1960], 20), or the enduring personality characteristics and unique lifestyles of a population, is that it reifies the state. (For a discussion of national character, see “National Character” by George De Vos, an article in Edward Sills’s Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968). The critique of reification was first suggested by Dennis Stairs (personal communication). National Stereotypes (R.F. Benedict, “The Study of Cultural Patterns in European Nations,” Transactions of the New York Academy of Science, 2:8 [1946], 274–279, passim) are relatively stable opinions of a generalizing and evaluative nature: all alike in a certain respect, nationwide. The expressions of it can be provoked or be spontaneous or elicited. The big problem here is that stereotypes, as might be expected, can easily be biased. Ethics, as we saw earlier, are monistic (K.J. Holsti, op. cit.). Monism is particularly clear in Joseph Nye’s Nuclear Ethics, for instance (Joseph Nye Jr., Nuclear Ethics, New York: Free Press, 1986, passim). Morality, whose scholarly meaning is closest to the popu49

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lar conception of ethics, at least, recognizes that, while there is in principle one single set of criteria by which to assess a course of action, there are various and often conflicting, moral points of view (Felix Oppenheim, “National Interest, Rationality, and Morality,” Political Theory 15:3 [August 1987], 369–389, 373). 4. Joseph Frankel, National Interest (New York: Praeger, 1970), passim. 5. Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 32, 47. 6. George Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel, Ideology and National Competitiveness (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1987), 7. 7. Viz. the opinions of Mujtaba Razvi, “Concepts of Policy, Strategy, and National Defense,” Pakistan Horizon 37:1 (1984), 62–73; Léo Hamon, La stratégie contre la guerre (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1966); Bradley Klein, “After Strategy: Search for a Post-Modern Politics of Peace,” Alternatives 13:3 (July 1988), 293–318; Philippe Garigue, “La métastratégie et la théorie du référentiel stratégiqué” (Toronto: Glendon College of York University, unpublished manuscript, 10 November 1989). “Core idea” also resembles Knut Midgaard’s “precept.” (See “Strategy and Ethics in International Politics,” Conflict and Cooperation 70 [1970], 224–240.) And “purely military definitions of strategy have virtually disappeared because they have failed to convey either the flavour or the scope of a subject that straddles the spectrum of war and peace and is as much concerned with statesmanship as with generalship” (From John Baylis et al., Contemporary Strategy, Volume I: Theories and Concept [London: Holmes and Meier, 1987], 4). 8. Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (Boulder: Westview, 1980), 2. Some authors use grand strategy and national strategy interchangeably, with grand strategy as “the art of employing all of the relevant assets of a country for the political purposes set by high policy” (Colin Gray, op. cit., 29). For our purposes, the distinction is useless, since the current definition of strategy is distinct from the traditional military context. 9. There are only two exceptions. First, Zeev Maoz, in his National Choices and International Processes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) mentions it as a distinct form of decision making, but he does not elaborate on it or try to integrate it into international processes, although he tries to include every other major kind of decision-making theory; second, David J. Hickson, 50

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Richard J. Butler, David Cray, Geoffrey R. Mallory, and David C. Wilson, “Decision and Organization—Processes of Strategic Decision-Making and Their Explanation,” Public Administration, 67:4 (Winter 1989), 373–490. 10. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Zeev Maoz, op. cit. 11. As numerous social and cultural theorists agree. Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), 21. 12. One of the conclusions possible, based on John Steinbruner’s paradigm, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 47–87. 13. Colin Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991). 14. Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978), 91. 15. Dorothy Pickles, “Political Imperatives and Dilemmas of French Defence Policies,” West European Politics 1:3 (October 1978), 115–143,121. 16. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, op. cit., 333–347. 17. Charles Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through,” Public Administration Review (Spring 1959), 79–88. 18. Zeev Maoz, op. cit., 32–40. 19. Experience is a factor in the drawing of conclusions, an operation carried out by the mechanism of evaluation. Although this theory presents each mechanism as coming into play at different steps of the decision-making process, in fact each of them comes into play repeatedly throughout the entire theory. The representation here is simplified. 20. Hadley Cantril’s research emphasizes the importance of understanding the frame of mind of the people with whom government must deal at home and abroad. Peter Haas infers learning from policy change: Policy evolves not just because circumstances do, but because states draw lessons and conclusions from their ex51

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periences. See the special issue of International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), Peter Haas, ed. 21. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, “Introduction,” in Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (San Francisco: Westview, 1991), 4. 22. Philip E. Tetlock, “Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept,” in Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds. (San Francisco: Westview, 1991), 44. 23. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, op. cit., 397. 24. See the literature on cognitive complexity, particularly Michael Brecher and James Rosenau, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods, R.B. Farrell, ed. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966). 25. Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” International Organization 46:1 (Winter 1992), 367–390, 385–386.

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4

Using the Theory

Theory without facts is empty, and facts without theory are blind. Kant

The theory proposed has generated empirical hypotheses, which we now can test. (Chapter 5 will test the causal propositions of the theory. Chapter 6 contains a systematic presentation of the propositions involved.) The first step is to identify the types of national values and national strategy. We start with the identification of national values in general, and go on to the identification of French values. Identifying strategies is more difficult, since they cannot be observed directly. Their indirect manifestations, however, are unmistakable. NATIONAL VALUES Identifying National Values Students of international relations are reluctant to work with values, because they find them too subjective.1 Nevertheless, the 1960s explosion of the field led to decision making becoming a major area of study in international relations, including a number of studies fo-

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cusing on intangible aspects of decisions: cognitive elements, operational codes, national character, modal personality, and, of course, values.2 J. David Singer, in reviewing this theoretical literature, identified “four basic routes to establishing” national values:3 1. Operationalize the revealed wisdom, handed down either by deities or the elite. 2. Conduct opinion surveys, asking people what they desire in life. 3. Try to identify the particular or universal needs of people. 4. Use the analyst’s judgment of what the universal needs of people are. Predictably, Singer has problems with all four options. Relying on elites or prophets is dangerous because their wisdom may be self-serving. Opinion surveys do not always make important distinctions between transitory and persistent components of values, or between superficial and fundamental components; they also tend to assume that what people want is desirable or that respondents give the issue serious thought. In any event, passing responses can be induced artificially. Identifying people’s needs is an attractive way to measure values, because it requires little or no elite intervention, but it does assume that needs can be determined, which amounts to excluding less tangible needs. It also assumes that needs are continuous over time and space, when they might in fact be fleeting or elusive. Finally, if the analyst assigns a set of needs and aspirations to the subjects, the whole study may be biased.4 The method of identifying values outlined below draws on each of those four paths, but combines them selectively to avoid their respective pitfalls. Political culture is a good way to measure national values because it bridges the gap between social values and political behavior by linking political beliefs to actions, and then to political structures and processes. It can also distinguish empirical (or “cognitive”) beliefs from the symbols that express them and from more fundamental social values. Symbols and beliefs ebb and flow with the prevailing political discourse, for instance, but values are much more stable. “Definitions of political culture are many and varied,” but by far the most influential and commonly used definition is Almond and Verba’s. Because the political cultures of older states have usually been studied, it is simply a matter of reviewing existing studies. Scholars 54

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investigate political culture in a number of ways: inferring from history; analyzing attitudes, behavior, or ideology; using psychological insights; studying institutional and ideological norms; and analyzing economic and social conditions.5 National values can also be identified through content analysis of rituals, literature, films, cultural thought systems, and through linguistic analysis.6 Historical analysis is the method of choice because it avoids the subjectivity of political culture. Instead, it identifies patterns of action in state behavior, and deflects traditional objections about political culture’s subjectivity.7 Cleavages like subcultures or fragmentation happen in societies from time to time, but they do not significantly affect the most basic social values. Further, subcultures can affect decision making because whole nations cannot participate, and the responsibility falls to a subset of the population. The most fundamental values exert a strong influence on everyone except for the most marginal individuals.8 Values broadly shared throughout the population show up among its leaders as well. In France, there were no significant cleavages between 1955 and 1970, although diversity is one of the roots of its conflictual individualism. In this period, there were no social upheavals except, perhaps, in May 1968, but even that did not come close to altering the basic fabric of society.9 If we accept the hegemony of culture, then elite-popular cleavages, even if they exist, are not important. Fragmentation of culture is uncommon in older states like France.10 France’s National Values France’s two most prominent national values are conflictual individualism and prestige. References to them are commonplace. France’s individualism has its roots in the wide-ranging diversity of that state and society. The search for prestige, on the other hand, springs from the central government’s history. Conflictual Individualism This book draws on Lodge and Vogel’s definition of individualism and communitarianism, rooted in the conceptions of the individual in the writings of John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. Individualism is intuitively difficult to grasp as a collective characteristic, because it is “an atomistic conception of society, one in which the individual is the ultimate source of value and mean55

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ing.”11 Individualism is so basic to the society that embraces it that it can even justify radical change.12 In communitarianism, by contrast, “The community as a whole has special and urgent needs that go beyond the needs of its individual members. . . . Individual fulfilment, therefore, depends on a place in a community, an identity with a whole, participation in an organic social process.”13 Diversity in ethnic, social, geographic, and economic terms is the cornerstone of France’s conflictual individualism, and references to French individualism have been commonplace for decades.14 It means competition for resources, equality of opportunity (not results), interest groups, and highly specified relations between individuals and the state. In French foreign policy, goals, symbols, and objectives are set for the country as a whole, because French individualism is linked to the tradition of a strong central government whose role it is to represent the common good. Yet, there is diversity at several levels: ethnicity, regionalism, religion, economic activity, and politics. Ethnicity, Regionalism, Politics The French population has equal parts of Latins, Alpines, and Nordics. The original types have mixed for generations, given the mobility of populations in this century, but it was still difficult to separate location and occupation from the effects of ethnic origin until the 1950s. That was true even later for immigrants. Students of political culture have been silent on French regionalism, largely mishandled by government. In religious terms, the anticlericalism of the early 1900s led to the expulsion of conservative Catholic priests, and the specter of anti-Semitism refuses to dissipate. Economic Activity At the end of the Fourth Republic, vertical and horizontal strata divided the work force. Horizontally, there were four major groups: (1) industrial workers, (2) agricultural workers, (3) workers in commerce and trade, and (4) public servants. Vertically, cleavages occurred between workers and bosses, owners and the propertyless, and rich and poor. There was also an opposition between the industrial north, the modern agricultural center, and the traditional agricultural south. Wealth had allowed farmers to be slow in introducing modern methods, and they began to lag behind. When standards of living fell, tensions rose: The rich were possessive and the poor were militant, with the state as the prize. The division be56

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tween rich and poor was also extremely important, and not just in electoral terms. The potential and need for alliance building and party formation were immense, whether groups acted autonomously or not. France therefore tended to resort to tug-of-war decision making more than other European countries. Politics and Geopolitics Until the Fourth Republic, two problems prevented consensus on foreign policy: Establishing common goals was difficult, and threats to French security were numerous. In French politics, political cohabitation between parties was almost impossible because of “conflictual individualism [as the] the moving force and the social basis of politics. . . .”15 Search for Prestige France fell from grace so quickly after World War II that de Gaulle’s greatest concern was her return to “the publicly recognized position of a great world power.”16 Until then, France was not only one of the most powerful nations in the world, it was also one of the richest. But France was slow to grasp the exhaustion of its resources after World War I.17 The consequences of the 1940 defeat were contradictory but very intense. On the one hand, the population suffered from an inferiority complex and despair; on the other, there was a deeply rooted move toward renewal.18 The solution France chose to cope with its domestic individualism was to look to a strong central government. Unfortunately, the people came to distrust it for several very good reasons. It got involved in wars that ended in defeat after defeat: Sedan (1870–1871), the Marne (World War I), and the Maginot line (1940). The memory of 1940 was vivid to Fourth Republic leaders.19 By the 1950s and 1960s, the central government had come to mean bloodshed in every generation. Moreover, French political thought encouraged “French[men] to free [themselves] of political and economic misgovernment,” and education did likewise.20 What is unique about France is not its set of historical or geographical circumstances. After all, Germany and Italy became united much later, Spain has a diversity of languages, and the former Yugoslav republics seceded once the authoritarian central government weakened. Rather, France dealt with its diversity in a unique way, by allowing it to flourish yet striving for prestige through the creation of strong symbols, of which nuclear weapons are the last of a long 57

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line. When the time came to determine a new strategy, de Gaulle was thoroughly convinced that above all else, France “remained a great nation.”21 Classifying National Values The theory is best served by a classification adapted from Talcott Parsons’s typology of social values, given that no classification of values in international relations respects the characteristics of strategy listed in Table 3.3.22 It is essentialist, but it can be subjective. Affectivity versus Neutrality If a state chooses affectivity, it allows both free expression of the feelings of its population and freedom to seek immediate gratification of impulses. Neutrality represents control of the population’s feelings, restriction or inhibition of their expression, or minimizing of their importance. It would be possible, for example, to argue that the Cambodian government made such a decision when it declared an amnesty for the Khmer Rouge, in spite of strong domestic feeling. Assigning either of these values is highly subjective, as is obvious in the case Yehezkhel Dror made about Libya under the leadership of Gaddafi.23 Universalism versus Particularism The universalist state judges situations or behavior using general criteria. The European Community’s denunciation of civil war in Yugoslavia, for instance, is probably based on universalism. The particularist state would put aside general criteria of judgment and use standards that apply only to a particular state or a unique situation. During the Persian Gulf War, Israel was the target of several Iraqi missiles, and had to decide whether or not to retaliate. If it chose not to retaliate because of some specific consideration, it acted as a particularist. Quality versus Performance Astate relating to other people and respecting them by taking into account who they are, independently of what they do, is a state choosing quality over performance. One such case was the negotiation and ratification of the Irish Treaty, piloted through Parliament by Winston Churchill in 1930 and adopted in Ireland by Michael Collins. This treaty showed a greater understanding of Ireland than 58

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usual for the English government at the time. A state judging other states in light of what they do and the results of their actions is an example of selecting performance over quality. Diffuseness versus Specificity Diffuseness may lead a state to consider and relate to states as a whole. When the United States negotiated to create an anti-Iraq coalition before the Gulf War, it treated each state as a whole. Specificity, on the other hand, leads a state to consider only one aspect of others: That was the case when Canada, the United States, and Mexico negotiated a free-trade treaty. Self-Orientation versus Collectivity-Orientation The self-oriented state may choose to act in accordance with its own goals, the collectivity-oriented state according to goals shared with other states. Only states that are not constantly struggling for their very existence against external threats can become collectivity-oriented. Materialism versus Nonmaterialism A materialist state is a state that considers tangible issues to be more significant than intangible ones. In diagnosing a threat, for instance, it will perceive a threat to material resources more easily than if cultural assets are threatened. For instance, if Canada were a materialist state, it would consider an issue such as acid rain, which threatens forests, to be more important than a cultural threat. A nonmaterialist state perceives threats or outcomes first according to nonmaterialist standards, and assesses outcomes according to nonmaterial aspects. One example of a nonmaterial value orientation is the significance of the Diaspora to Israel. While the Diaspora does contribute materially to Israeli society, it is regarded as a collection of individuals to be protected, and eventually repatriated. NATIONAL STRATEGY Identifying and Classifying National Strategy France’s postwar strategy is easy to identify: the strategy of grandeur. Identifying and classifying strategies is usually much more difficult. For example, there is always a chance that states are not using strategy. It is also possible that the analyst will fail to detect poorly conceived, poorly executed, or very secret strategies. In the later 59

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years of the Fourth Republic, France adopted a strategy of immobilism: The conflicts among the factions of the governing coalition were such that any decision would bring the government down. As a result, no decisions were made. It would be easy for an analyst to overlook the strategic decision in a situation like that. I identified strategy by answering three questions: 1. Is a particular state using strategy? It is critical to distinguish a strategy from a plan, policy, or program. Plans, policies, and programs organize means to an end as much as a strategy does. But strategy includes the core idea, which plans, policies, and programs lack. 2. Is the state using a national strategy? A strategy is national when it uses a broad spectrum of the means available to the state, and tries to achieve objectives important to the whole rather than to parts.24 In other words, the strategy must cut across several areas of state behavior: economic, political, cultural, military, and so on. 3. What strategy is the state using? It is not easy to pick out the exact strategy a state is using from the numerous possibilities. The best way to proceed is to start by reducing the number of possibilities one has to consider, that is, by identifying the type of strategy. Type of Strategy This book uses André Beaufre’s classification of strategy, because it classifies strategies according to their nature. There are four types of strategies: direct strategy of action, direct strategy of persuasion, indirect strategy of action, and indirect strategy of persuasion. The difference between action and persuasion is simple: The first involves physical engagement of the state’s material resources, while the second involves threats, discourse, and posturing—all means and actions that require nonmaterial resources. The difference between a direct strategy and an indirect one is not quite so obvious: A direct strategy is one that changes the opponent’s direction or momentum itself; an indirect strategy changes the opponent’s direction using an intermediary. Once the type of strategy has been identified, only the possibilities related to it need be considered. The next step is to identify the components of strategy. 60

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Components of Strategy The components of strategy are as follows: (1) objectives; (2) means or tactics; and (3) approach (sometimes called strategic culture).25 Each component has its own best source of information: direct observation for means, official statements for objectives, and secondary analysis for approach. (See Table 4.1.) Objectives can be identified using speeches, press releases, legislative debates, or minutes from executive meetings and other government documents widely distributed and readily available. They usually contain broad references to national objectives. It is important to consider a number of these documents in context, because they may be self-serving or even misleading. Means are observed directly. Anation’s approach to strategy is made up of recurring characteristics. Because observations about the approach occur only over the long term, historical sources are a must. These indirect sources are only as good as their authors, however, and often different authors use different words to describe the same approach. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a state’s approach to strategy. For instance, [F]or several centuries [French foreign policy] seems to have been dominated by certain factors which are found to be constant. Its chief characteristics were that it was opposed to all attempts at imperialist domination by all the other continental powers, namely Spain, the Hapsburg dynasty, Prussia and Germany of Kaiser or of Hitler. On the other hand, this policy also caused conflict with England when she went in for oscillating between two kinds of opposition; (1) hostility to the Hapsburg dynasty and Germany on the one hand and (2) opposition to naval supremacy of England on the other.26 Table 4.1 Identification of Strategic Components Source official statements direct observation secondary source

Strategic Component Objectives Means Approach X X X

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Empirical Hypotheses The theory presented in Chapter 3 produces empirical hypotheses, that is, predictions about national strategies based on known national values. A material state is more likely to use a strategy of action because it develops and applies material standards to the processes of cognition, evaluation, and appreciation. The state is more likely to perceive a concrete threat to assess outcomes according to tangible realities, and to prefer action to persuasion. In the same way, a nonmaterialist state prefers persuasion to action. The reasons why a self-oriented state chooses a direct strategy are a little less obvious. A state that sees itself as a single unit rather than part of a group is more likely to count on its own resources to solve a problem. It also sees other states as single units, discounting the significance of alliances. In a word, it generally applies self-oriented standards. Teaching strategy is difficult, and the above considerations tell us why.27 Every scholar seems to have a different answer: Colin Gray wants better definitions of strategy;28 Philippe Garigue wants more rigor;29 Yehoshaphat Harkaby thinks teachers of strategy should broaden the minds of their students;30 Lucien Poirier argues in favor of military history;31 and this author suggested elsewhere that Clausewitzian tendencies, deeply rooted in Anglo-American strategy, tend to confuse or be indifferent to the distinction between strategy and tactics.32 The one complaint these authors share is theoretical fuzziness, a complaint that much of the present method tries to remedy. NOTES 1. James Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 106. 2. Michael Brecher et al., “A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 13:1 (1969), 73–102, 75; Alexander L. George, “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and DecisionMaking,” International Studies Quarterly 13:2 (June 1969), 138–157; S.V. George De Vos, “National Character,” in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, David L. Sills, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, An Analytic Study: The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). 62

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3. J. David Singer, “Individual Values, National Interests, and Political Development in the International System,” in The Correlates of War, Vol. I: Research Origins and Rationale (New York: Free Press, 1979). Singer uses the Parsonian definition of a value system: “The value system of the society is, then, the set of normative judgments held by the members of the society who define, with specific reference to their own society, what to them is a good society.” See Talcott Parsons in Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1967), 8. 4. Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Holmes and Meier, 1973), passim. 5. For example, Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Macmillan, 1960); Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, op. cit. 6. R.F. Benedict, “The Study of Cultural Patterns in European Nations,” Transactions of the New York Academy of Science 2:8 (1946), 274–279. 7. Graham Crow, “The Use of the Concept of ‘Strategy’ in Recent Sociological Literature,” Sociology 23:1 (February 1989), 1–24, passim. 8. Murray Edelman, Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971) and Politics as Symbolic Action (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969), passim. 9. Raymond Aron, La Révolution introuvable (Paris: BergerLevrault, 1968), passim. 10. Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (New York: Praeger, 1975), 48. 11. George C. Lodge, “Introduction: Ideology and Country Analysis,” in George Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel, Ideology and National Competitiveness (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1987), 12. 12. George C. Lodge, op. cit., 13. 13. George C. Lodge, op. cit., 15–6. 14. As far back as 1955. See Herman Finer, Governments of Greater European Powers? A Comparative Study of the Governments and Political Culture of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956); J.B. Duroselle, “Crisis in French Foreign Policy,” Review of Politics 16:4 (October 1954), 412–437; Janice McCormick, “France: Ideological Divisions and the Global Reality,” in Ideology and National Competitiveness: An Analysis of Nine Countries, George C. Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel, eds. 63

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(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987), 57; George C. Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel, eds. Ideology and National Competitiveness: An Analysis of Nine Countries (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987), 11. See Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965) and Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), among others. 15. Eva Kolinsky and John Gaffney, “Introduction,” in Political Culture in France and Germany (London: Routledge, 1991), 1. 16. Elliot R. Goodman, “De Gaulle’s NATO Policy in Perspective,” Orbis 10:3 (Fall 1966), 690–723, 690; Wolf Mendl, “Background of French Nuclear Policy,” International Affairs 41:1 (January 1965), 22–36, 32–33. 17. J.B. Duroselle, “Crisis in French Foreign Policy,” Review of Politics 16:4 (October 1954), 412–437, 413. 18. J.B. Duroselle, op. cit., 416. 19. François Mitterrand, as president of the Republic, was quoted as late as 1983: “I have seen 1940. Enough said.” From Ici et Maintenant (Paris: Fayard, 1980), 232. 20. Aggravating “extremeness and practical governmental unsociality, and seems to abate little, certainly not enough, of the incivisme, or uncivic-mindedness,” Herman Finer, op. cit., 293. 21. J.B. Duroselle, “The Turning-Point in French Politics: 1947,” Review of Politics 13:3 (July 1951), 302–328, 323. 22. Talcott Parsons’s classification in R.F. Bales, Edward Shils, and Talcott Parsons, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953). 23. Crazy States? A Counterconventional Strategic Problem (Lexington, MA: Lexington Heath, 1971). 24. Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 2. 25. F.B. Ali, “The Principles of War,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institution for Defence Studies (May 1963), 159–165; André Beaufre, Lucien Poirier, and the Clausewitzians in general: Colin Gray and Edward Luttwak, among them. “The entirety of traditional practices and habits of thinking which, in a society, governs the organization and the use of the military forces in the pursuit of political objectives.” Author’s translation, as quoted by Bruno Colson, “La culture stratégique américaine,” Stratégique, 8 (1988), 15–82, 33. The original reads: “l’ensemble des pratiques traditionnelles et des 64

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habitudes de pensée qui, dans une société, gouvernent l’organisation et l’emploi de la force militaire au service d’objectifs politiques.” 26. Raymond Aron, “French Foreign Policy,” India Quarterly 6:2 (April/June 1960), 153–162, 153. 27. It is almost commonplace for professional strategists to decry the lack of strategic thinking and the lack of “true” strategy. 28. Colin Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), passim. 29. Philippe Garigue, interview with author, Toronto, March 1991, personal notes. 30. Interview with author, January 1992, Jerusalem, personal notes. 31. “Vous ne pouvez pas faire l’économie d’une étude approfondie de l’histoire militaire.” Interview with author, Paris, February 1992, personal notes. 32. Laure Paquette, “Strategy and Peace: Part I, Peace in Post-War Strategic Theory. Part II, Choosing an Approach to Strategy,” Canadian Political Science Association, Kingston and Charlottetown, 1991–1992, passim.

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French Strategic Decision Making, 1955–1970

The Gauls once took Rome. . . . But again, if you consider the history of our wars, you will see that none other but the war with the Gauls was as speedily concluded. Emperor Claudius’s Address to the Senate Tacitus, Annals XI: 24

Chapter 4 discussed how to use history to show that one of the hypotheses generated by the theory was verified in a single case. Two types of empirical evidence can support the theory even more. The first involves testing another of the hypotheses on a new case. The second involves examining the inner workings of the theory, rather than its predictions, to see whether there is empirical evidence to support it. Given the complexity of the theory, the second path is much more stringent, and exceeds the usual requirements of proof. Although there is an occasional lack of historical evidence to support the theory, the amount of verification is remarkable. In order to bridge the gaps in the historical evidence, I propose to use the foregoing theory’s hidden power to generate predictions, not about the end result of the relationship, but about France’s internal processes of decision making.

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It is ironic that France, one of the world’s great powers, sees itself as the underdog in so many international contests, and actively pursues a strategy of self-aggrandizement, of grandeur. Not only do French leaders command one of the largest armies in the world, they also have recourse to a nuclear arsenal, hold a permanent seat on the UN’s Security Council, are counted among the G-8 countries, and still possess the vestiges of a colonial empire. This theory explains this basic contradiction and many other actions on France’s part. For one thing, the Fourth Republic practiced a strategy of immobilism. When it became obvious that the strategy had to be changed, the options considered seriously became closely associated with rival politicians in France. De Gaulle eventually won the presidency, but the domestic consensus over his strategy, which lasted forty-odd years, has obscured the fact that the strategy of grandeur needed to be adjusted on occasion. It started with perfectly predictable means, but France’s circumstances were so adverse, relative to its own history, that it moved its strategy from a major power’s strategy to an underdog’s. The study of France offers a number of advantages: Its national strategy is well documented, in part because of its importance as a major power, in part because of its troubled relations with NATO. Generals and politicians wrote extensively about the issues and took an active part in intellectual debates, and more traditional memoirs are also revealing.1 Finally, France has adopted a single, recognizable national strategy and has pursued it for over forty years.2 A number of factors complicate the gathering of evidence: Much of what the theory suggests cannot be observed directly; official documents are suspect because they may be self-serving; participants’ memories are subjective and might be biased after the fact; and secondary sources usually argue their own point, and may not discount or downplay other information. It is therefore to be expected that evidence is only partial. Certain aspects of Steps 1 and 4 of the theory proved impossible to verify because of the confusion in state affairs late in the Fourth Republic. The governments were then short-lived, with an unusually high turnover of ministers and staff. Many people were involved in foreign policy: members of comités, conseils restreints, foreign, defense and atomic energy ministers playing musical chairs with the rest of the Cabinet, the premier, secretaries and secretariats of state for various portfolios (Secrétariat général, Secrétariat d’état à la Présidence du Conseil), senior public officials, to say nothing of individuals clandestinely involved and, after 1954 a group of military 68

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technicians who lobbied for nuclear weapons.3 Documents left behind by the important, the official, or the merely disgruntled have at times mystified even the most expert historians. THE PREVIOUS STRATEGY: IMMOBILIZATION The Fourth Republic only lasted twelve years, from the resignation of de Gaulle as leader of the provisional government in January 1946 to the “call of the nation” in May 1958. By the time the leaders of the Fourth Republic realized a new national strategy was needed, the government had been practicing immobilisme, that is, increasing paralysis.4 At the close of the Fourth Republic, the short-lived governments were made up of coalitions whose parties held contradictory positions. Any decision would be sure to displease at least one party, which would then withdraw its support and cause the government to fall. And public opinion was no guide, given contradictory and unstable attitudes. As a result, few if any decisions could be taken. Information Gathering The theory postulates that (1) France needed the mechanism of cognition; (2) there were unique French perceptions; and (3) the French state apparatus generally processes information in a way that reflects national values. The Need for Cognition French decision makers need a mechanism like cognition because they are overwhelmed by the amount of information available and need a way of dealing with it. Just like every other modern state, France has a complex state apparatus, which creates the flood of information in the first place. For instance, in foreign policy, there are eight articles in the constitution, a foreign affairs commission in the National Assembly, a foreign minister and a foreign ministry, a diplomatic corps, armed forces, an intelligence network, and so on.5 In 1955, France was dealing with many tasks: postwar reconstruction of both domestic economy and infrastructure, dismantling of the colonial empire, and a succession of international crises (Korean War, 1950; Suez crisis, 1956; revolution and civil war in Eastern Europe; Balkan crises; Cold War). Finally, French governments were chronically unstable and the civilian government was nearly overthrown in 1958.6 Studies of West-European bureaucracies in the 69

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1960s showed how clearly decision makers were overloaded, because they were increasingly hard pressed to meet the demands of the modern state.7 How much worse the situation must have been for unstable, cash-starved France. Perception The theory suggests that national values shape French perceptions, by shaping their limitations. There are two kinds of limits, in terms of range (what a state can perceive) and in terms of depth (how far afield the state gathers information). All limitations spring from lack of time or money. If anything, circumstances exacerbated these limitations: The troubled domestic and international situation of France meant there was even less time and money to spare. The more extreme the demands on a state, however, the more obvious the choices. In the case of France, it is striking that it maintained its interest and focus on every region where there were colonial links. As late as 1992, there were references to the importance of keeping the French flag flying in the Pacific, for example.8 As a result, France allowed its resources to be stretched thin, rather than abandoning the image of France as a world leader. Information Processing On this point, there is only partial evidence. France’s original strategy after 1945 was to promote and maintain her status as a great power, using, among other means, her overseas possessions. Since they play an important part in preserving that status, France considers incoming information in terms of how it affects those territories. It also means that the French intelligence network can cover information sources about those areas as a relative priority. If the theory is correct, therefore, the structure of the French intelligence network should reflect national values, according to threat perceptions: This information is not in the public domain. Therefore, it is not possible to verify this point, but it is possible to generate a prediction about it. If the theory is correct, structural changes in the foreign policy-making process should reflect the importance of the Départements Outre-Mer: Territoires Outre-Mer (DOM-TOM). One small example of this was the strengthening of presidential powers in the Fifth Republic, forced on the National Assembly through a plebiscite.9 It met with the population’s obvious approval: “To a general public still suffering from the effects of [a] post-war inferiority complex caused by France’s weakness during the immediate 70

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post-war years of struggle . . . the president’s tone and style continued to give satisfaction.”10 Foreign policy has been the president’s special purview since. Diagnosis By 1954, French foreign policy was in crisis. The government was confronted with more and more urgent problems, and French statesmen and generals were compelled to suggest solutions in spite of the political risks. If national values have any influence, the problems should be numerous and contradictory (given conflictual individualism), and they should touch on tangible as well as intangible assets (given the concern over prestige). There was no shortage of issues: Duroselle identified six main questions facing France at the time (see Table 5.1).11 It is possible to get an overall picture of France in the mid-1950s by considering various sources of information: debates in the National Assembly about the program law of 1956, memoirs of the magic circle surrounding de Gaulle (Aron, Gallois, Poirier, Leborgne, Ailleret, and Beaufre), popular opinion surveys, and secondary sources.12 This composite picture accords deeply with a self-oriented, prestige-oriented state in trouble. The state’s very existence had just been threatened by the putsch of the generals. France failed to take a position in the emerging Cold War, and neither trusted nor turned to either camp.13 It did not trust Germany for historical reasons, and the Suez crisis had not helped its confidence in Britain.14 Finally, French colonies were restless.15 By 1958, the cow was down and the knives were out. Table 5.1 Problems Confronting France in the Mid-1950s Status Europe Germany Tunis Morocco

How can France attempt to remain a great power? Should it unify? What should Franco relations be?

What should their status be? Indochina What should its status be? Cold War What type of defense should France have? 71

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France got itself a nuclear arsenal, but never named an adversary until 1982, never identified a specific target, and brooked no interference from allies for nearly thirty years. Could it have been more than a prudent and uncharacteristic silence on France’s part? Could this be a sign of a self-oriented state in action? If so, conflictual individualism was molding the perception and interpretation of information. To a self-oriented country, no country can be discounted as a threat, since threats can come from any direction, and other countries are also perceived as self-oriented. The Search for Options The theory predicts that strategic options would have been discarded early as impossible or undesirable, and that a small number of options would be given detailed consideration. The solutions proposed would have to be numerous, “In view of the individualism characterizing . . . the French in particular, the number of solutions proposed is perhaps greater than in any other country.”16 Because France was in a high-threat situation, the debate centers around security. Options Discarded Early Two strongly antinuclearist options surfaced early, but they were barely considered before they were dropped. The first was Communism, advocating among other things a strong alignment with Moscow. Stalin was dead by 1953, but Stalinism was not: The authoritarian side of the USSR disqualified it as an ally of individualist France. The proposal disappeared from the agenda when the French Communists were purged from the Commissariat in 1950 and 1951.17 The option of unilateral disarmament proposed by pacifists was also discarded early. Details are sketchy, but early proposals for nuclear-free zones in Western Europe specifically mention France.18 Generally speaking, antinuclearism was scathingly dismissed: “[Who] thought the Europeans would be naive enough or ignorant enough to believe in the validity of the first substitute offered in exchange for a denuclearization of continental Western Europe.”19 In hindsight, it is obvious that such a virulent stand came from the Bomb’s symbolic importance. An intangible international prestige accompanies membership in the most exclusive club in the world. Nuclear weapons were, then and now, the symbol of the super72

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power, the way a reconnaissance satellite is today. “A great State which does not possess them, while others have them, does not dispose of its own destiny.”20 The very lack of credibility as an independent deterrent reinforces the importance of its symbolic function. The debacle France was to experience in other areas also reinforced its importance. After the poverty of the postwar years, resources needed to develop a nuclear device must have seemed fantastical. The Bomb must have seemed as glamorous to the French as the steel mill the Russians gave to India, circa 1960, must have seemed to the Indians.21 Strategic Options Actively Considered Each option became closely associated with four prominent politicians, itself a consequence of the individualism of French political culture. These options were: 1. “French Presence Throughout the World.” Georges Bidault was premier and head of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire. He advocated an option relying on French greatness: The simple presence of France throughout the world would be enough to restore its prestige. He proposed to achieve this through maintaining American troops in Europe, a closer association of the United Kingdom in the European defense community, and a Franco-German agreement on giving the Saar special status as a European territory.22 2. “Peripheral Strategy.” René Pleven, a former defense minister, advocated withdrawal of American forces, and a defensive line through an alliance with Great Britain and Spain.23 3. “A Cure for a Single Illness.” Pierre Mendès-France, premier in 1954, believed that all problems arose from a weakness in economics. His single cure, outlined in the speech he gave at his investiture in June 1954, included a reduction in military expenditure, an increase in the industrial potential of France and the overseas territories, and economic modernization. He refused to rely on police methods either domestically and internationally, and proposed a combination of internal autonomy plus interdependence between the home country and the overseas territories. 4. “Politics of Grandeur.” Charles de Gaulle, leader of the interim government of 1946, founder of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français, and president of the Republic, believed in the greatness of France. He proposed to return France to its proper rank using a strengthened presidency, autonomy in French decision making, and a nu73

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clear deterrent. He favored two diplomatic tactics: the empty chair at the negotiating table and the strong attack on the weakest ally.24 Table 5.2, Strategic Options for France, 1955–1960, summarizes the options. Estimation and Revisions of Outcomes The theory suggests that France drew conclusions from its previous experiences, and learned, that is, changed its behavior in similar situations over time. The actual estimates are not available for study, given the state of French administration at the time because of a gap in documentation. Even if the thread of government had not broken, such estimates of outcomes involve senior levels of government, Table 5.2 Strategic Options for France, 1955–1960 advocate

strategy

means

Georges Bidault

French Presence Through the World

René Pleven

Peripheral Strategy

Pierre MendèsFrance

Single Cure for Single Illness

Charles de Gaulle

Politics of Grandeur

maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe; U.K. in EDC; Franco-German agreement on Saar withdrawal of U.S. troops; defensive line with U.K. and Spain reduction of military expenditures; increase in industrial potential; economic modernization; no police methods domestically and internationally; internal autonomy for DOM-TOM autonomy in decision making; strengthened presidency under new constitution; strong armed forces; nuclear arsenal

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whose documents are not in the public domain. The actual decision and its subsequent history are, however, available. Experience France’s dealing with the Suez crisis and its aftermath exemplifies the assimilation of experience in postwar France. Nasser, president of Egypt, nationalized the Anglo-French company that operated the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. Israel, France, and the United Kingdom chose to respond with a military operation that was well planned but poorly implemented, through lack of coordination and lack of understanding between the French and British. At the time, French leaders considered that, on the one hand, the British had failed and, on the other, the American and West European allies had isolated them. That experience served to reinforce the tendency toward individualism that France had inherited from previous generations, and made it even more certain to manifest itself. Learning If conflictual individualism affects France’s interpretation of an experience, at the start, it also affects conclusions drawn from it at the end. The theory posits that the state retains information, and that any previous experience can trigger retrieval. The Suez crisis was only one of several during the Fourth Republic and early Fifth Republic: the Madagascar crisis in 1947, the problems in Tunisia between 1947 and 1953, the war with Indochina, the Algerian war of independence, de Gaulle’s proposal for a triumvirate, the generals’ failed putsch, the coming to power of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the Berlin crisis, and so on. 1. War with Indochina, ending in 1955. Indochina’s national emancipation movement had developed during the Japanese occupation, and later rose against the French. The French campaign was marred by outdated military methods, little equipment and no understanding of guerilla warfare. The political consequences of the defeat outweighed the military ones, revealing the “inability of the French command structure to win a war, ending in a colossal error. It was also the confirmation of the French decline. American leadership, in particular, no longer believed the French could win any war.”25 De Gaulle also learned something about the importance of symbolism in leadership. By 1959, when he comes to power, “De Gaulle’s metaphors and catch phrases proliferate, giving free rein to the imagination and the broadest of interpretations.”26 75

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2. The Putsch of the Generals, 1958. In the night of April 21 to April 22, four retired generals, including two former commanders-in-chief of Algeria, seized power in Algiers. Public buildings elsewhere were also occupied. In Paris, police seized members of the army’s general staff who were responsible for the metropolitan plot. It was noted afterward that de Gaulle maintained an admirable calm throughout the crisis. While the insurrection lasted, however, conscripted soldiers, who were not ready for sedition, exerted pressure on their officers. De Gaulle therefore realized that, in spite of the revolt, the army was basically uncorrupted. In later years, it became a tool he put to good use. 3. Proposal for triumvirate in NATO, 1958. De Gaulle wanted to “create a tripartite organization to take joint decisions on global problems,” and revise the Atlantic Alliance to become worldwide in scope.27 At the time the proposal was made, France was extremely weak: It had just stepped back from the brink of civil war, and it was losing a tattered empire in Africa, after losing out completely in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. De Gaulle continued to press the issue in secret correspondence to President Eisenhower until March 1959. What de Gaulle learned here was the importance of foreign relations in maintaining or retrieving French status. 4. Cuban revolution, 1959; missile crisis, 1962. Soviet missiles were installed almost immediately after Castro’s victory. At the time of the missile crisis, de Gaulle staunchly supported Kennedy and a firm U.S. policy. De Gaulle emerged from the crisis sure in the belief that France should be able to act independently in the domain of nuclear strategy.28 A number of lessons learned from these crises have left their mark on the emerging strategy of the Fifth Republic. The options themselves predate the international crises, but their influence is apparent in the later strategic decisions. If de Gaulle had been less of an egotist, he might have estimated differently, consciously or not, the outcomes of the other three strategic options. Although Gaullists would be indefatigable in their pursuit of greatness, they would begin to talk about making a sanctuary of the French territory and using manifest strength, rather than making themselves more vulnerable through overseas possessions. Assess Options How French leaders weighed the various options is unknown, but it is possible to assess them in their own right, in terms of individualism and prestige. Bidault’s option, for example, ran counter to the 76

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notion that no allies would ever be reliable; that was learned during the Suez crisis. Pleven’s proposal predates the Suez crisis, but it probably would not be put forward after that, given lessons learned over allies. It makes France out to be something of an underdog, and that runs counter to the notion of French greatness. (In the Gaullist camp, the underdog idea was initially defeated.) Analysis of the Pleven option also shows a hierarchy in French national values. France had to decide whether to use allies to regain its prestige, or to act alone. Since it chose allies, prestige must have ranked higher than individualism. Mendès-France’s option combined the worst of those of both Pleven and Bidault: It left France very vulnerable without doing a thing for prestige. This brings us to a discussion of appreciation, of the intangible and irrational factors in any decision. Appreciation is made up of preference and taste. Preferences exist, although they are only actualized when decisions are made. Tastes are concrete manifestations of preferences. One of the strongest tastes in French political life, for example, is the use of symbolism. What evidence is there of appreciation? There is evidence that de Gaulle was aware of the importance of taste and preferences. De Gaulle was formerly a master at mobilizing the population. To him, “democratic practice . . . [and] popular rule demands it.”29 His usual solution to the problem of mobilization was to exercise personal charisma, but he also appealed to the historical pride of the French, ingrained “[f]rom elementary school through the university.”30 The fact that the two options dropped very early (the Communist and the pacifist) were both antinuclearist is also significant: The adoption of either would have robbed France of one of its most important symbols, the nuclear weapon. What the theory predicts is that, confronted with a new situation, and given a choice, a state will act in a characteristic way. Symbolism is one example, the “national habit” of verbalism another. It is possible to discern appreciation in such varied French positions as its stand against even a symbolic presence of U.S. troops in Europe, a strong pronuclear stance, and reliance on military might. Choice of Strategy The Core Idea De Gaulle announced an omnidirectional (tous azimuts) strategy in a speech to the Ecole militaire in November 1959:31 “today, more 77

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than at any time since the Liberation, is in fact approximating a policy to which she has long aspired: the politique du grand siècle.”32 Défense tous azimuts was to prove unbalanced as a concept: It generally overestimated the security provided by the simple possession of nuclear weapons, and underestimated the importance of public will and mobilization. France’s nuclear strategy was to be a tactic of the national strategy. The Strategy’s Components Objectives. The single greatest objective is to restore France to its rank as a great nation, the leitmotif of French foreign policy. “France is only herself when she is at the first rank . . . France would not be France without greatness.”33 The objective sprang not only from France’s fall from grace but also from its former position as one of the most important and richest countries in the world. But the loss of a colonial empire meant the loss of the protected markets that had slowed French modernization. Problems of national unity came to a head in the early 1950s after building for decades. Given all of this, one need not long wonder why the French felt their losses so keenly. Means. Because it was jealously guarding its independence, France refused to take sides early in the Cold War. Instead, she chose to enter the most exclusive club in the world, the small circle of nuclear powers.34 Approach. Symbolism was a key element in France’s approach: The symbolic value of nuclear weapons obviously outweighed their practical ones, since “On a strictly military basis, the force de dissuasion is inadequate and is likely to remain so even in the second generation.”35 On the other hand, nuclear weapons gave France leverage with greater powers. De Gaulle refused to relinquish the military and political advantages conferred by nuclear weapons in her relations with Germany. The French bomb also prevented superpower monopoly on atomic technology, an important card in the future European defense system.36 Further, nuclear weapons were a form of insurance against a possible U.S. withdrawal from Europe. Once France was a member of the circle of nuclear powers, the investment itself would prevent it from abdicating its position. Finally, the United Kingdom was the only other nuclear power in Europe, and it had not been a reliable ally. 78

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Choice of Tactics There were five main tactics: autonomy in decision making, a stronger presidency, the North Atlantic Alliance, French nuclear strategy, and the French colonial empire. Autonomy in Decision Making In 1964, France sent a memo to its NATO allies announcing that it was withdrawing from the integrated command structure, and requested that foreign soldiers withdraw from French soil, because de Gaulle thought France might lose some of its decision-making autonomy in the future, an essential attribute of every other great power. A country like France can make war only if it is her own war. The effort made must be her own effort. If such were not the case, if we allowed the defense of France to be entrusted over a long period of time to non-national agencies or to be fused or confused with something else, it would no longer be possible for us to maintain the idea of the State.37 The French were hostile to the European defense community for the same reasons. Stronger Presidency The Fifth Republic’s constitution strengthened presidential powers in the area of foreign policy. North Atlantic Alliance De Gaulle inherited the Atlantic organization and the Atlantic policy from the Fourth Republic and maintained them. French Colonial Empire At the close of World War II, there were 150,000,000 “Frenchmen” and 11 million km2 of territory overseas. The sheer weight and importance of the empire were expected to ensure the French of great-nation status. French Nuclear Strategy Nuclear strategy became, in the words of Maurice Mégret, “a tactic within a larger strategy, . . . itself now central.”38 De Gaulle used the “force de frappe as tool in pursuit of larger foreign policy objectives.”39 The nuclear strategy itself is one of deterrence of the strong by the weak. 79

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Implementation of Strategy There was trouble right from the start: France was unwilling to accept a back seat. Yet, in at least three areas of predominant concern to France—Germany, NATO, the colonial world—she was forced by circumstances and conditions beyond her control to retreat from her initial policy positions and to settle for considerably less than she had bargained for.40 Autonomy in Decision Making This tactic backfired, because in practice France irritated her allies, especially NATO. Stronger Presidential Powers De Gaulle earned the National Assembly’s enduring animosity by threatening to dissolve the legislature and form another plebiscite if it refused to pass the enormous appropriations necessary for the development of the force de frappe. The accumulating failures in foreign policy chronicled above also fell on the president’s shoulders. North Atlantic Alliance France felt both ousted from its rightful place and the victim of allied complacency. Confronted with British and American intransigence on his proposals to raise France’s profile, de Gaulle went on the offensive in a 1959 speech that outlined the French critique of NATO strategy.41 Colonial Setbacks The colonial setbacks in Tunisia, Algeria, Madagascar, Morocco, and Indochina were outlined above. Nuclear Strategy Because of these debacles, the only successful component of the national strategy grew in importance, eventually becoming the essential expression of the larger strategy.42 Once established, this relationship was maintained by successive French governments, who have felt “bound to stand by General de Gaulle’s ambitious vision of his country’s defense posture.”43 Confirmation, Adjustment, or Change of Tactics The theory posits that the results of the strategy be used as feedback. If the feedback occurs, there should be subsequent change in 80

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behavior. Changes can come at the tactical or the strategic level: France had both. Tactically, French relations with overseas territories changed, moving colonialism to cooperation with the newly independent states. In terms of nuclear strategy, there was a striking move away from tous azimuts to an underdog strategy. De Gaulle’s camp was made up of a clutch of generals, who shared perceptions of threats and challenges facing France. Two of the generals advocated different strategies, and would soon find themselves on opposite sides of a debate. For example, Pierre Gallois advocated an omnidirectional strategy, and he proved, at first, to be the more influential of the two.44 Lucien Poirier advocated a strategy of the strong by the weak, du faible au fort. Tous azimuts was based on the necessity of extending the development of nuclear weapons to intercontinental ballistic missiles, the conquest of space, and political affirmation of the French will to survive in an increasingly dangerous world. By the late 1950s, few Frenchmen still felt they could trust few allies, let alone discount threats from particular countries. France therefore should structure its foreign policy accordingly. Poirier theorized about France battling an adversary that would be much stronger.45 By relying in part on allies, Poirier argued that a “weak to strong” posture would allow France to fend off the first attack while either the European Defense Community (EDC), European allies, or the United States could spring to its defense.46 It is easy to see why the debate was settled in Gallois’s favor at the outset: A mosquito maneuver like Poirier’s would hardly have appealed to a population hungry for glory, even if the investments necessary were huge, and especially if France still had to depend on allies. Those harsh facts were glossed over for the sake of stature. Gallois’s strategy required a variety of tactics beyond the military sphere, while Poirier emphasized the importance of the nuclear arsenal right from the start.47 Gallois’s strategy accorded better with the search for prestige because Lucien Poirier’s option would admit a weakness. With the debacle of the national strategy, the nuclear posture had come full circle.48 The special relationship between national and nuclear strategy had solidified by the end of the 1960s. Confirmation, Adjustment, or Change of Strategy The theory posits that a strategy changes only when circumstances or values do. The verdict of historians and political scientists 81

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is that they have not changed; therefore, the strategy should not change either.49 In that case, French initiatives in foreign policy should fit with a strategy of grandeur. So it does. There has been no change in national strategy under Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand, or Chirac. Even the French proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing falls within this framework. The announcement was one of Pierre Bérégovoy’s first moves after assuming the office of the premier in 1992, “suspending its 32-year-old program of nuclear weapons testing in the south Pacific until the end of this year and suggested that it would extend the moratorium in 1993 if other nuclear powers followed suit.”50 Because it came soon after regional elections, the move was widely interpreted as a courtship of the two fast-growing environmental parties that had made significant gains in recent elections. Yet it is also obvious that France was using the nuclear arsenal in her search for leadership. Despite the end of the Cold War, France had not budged from its independent policy on arms control and the three conditions posed before the end of the Cold War for participating in nuclear arms control negotiations.51 Until this announcement, it remained hamstrung between a position outrun by circumstances and a strongly ingrained concern over its prestige. The moratorium is a striking departure from France’s previous position. Significantly, it is a move in the direction of world leadership, without France risking a thing. The independent nuclear deterrent remains the keystone of her defense policy. The proposal is moot if no other country follows, yet France overtakes the United States and the United Kingdom, neither of which proposed a ban. The evidence given in this chapter has its limits. It is partial with respect to cognition: It points to a need for the mechanism but does not prove its existence. Evidence will be long in coming because it requires specific empirical research; however, that research has now been undertaken. When it comes to the estimation of outcomes, evidence becomes available only once historians complete their assessment of available documents. In both cases, the theory generates predictions that can be assessed in the future. On the whole, however, the evidence supports the substance of the theory. Verifying the theory over the long term is a matter of repeatedly confirming or denying empirical hypotheses rather than filling the gaps in this particular study. 82

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NOTES 1. Pierre Gallois, L’adieu aux armées (Paris: Albin Michel, 1976); Charles Ailleret, L’aventure atomique française: Souvenirs et réflexions (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1968); and, of course, Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de guerre, Volume I: L’appel (Paris: Plon, 1954). Lucien Poirier was interviewed in the course of this research. The only exception of significance is André Beaufre, who died unexpectedly in 1972. Raymond Aron, one of France’s “princes de l’esprit,” was an active participant in the debates. Bertrand Goldschmidt wrote a history of the bomb: L’aventure atomique: Ses aspects politiques et techniques (Paris: Fayard, 1962). De Gaulle, Giscard d’Estaing, and Mitterrand have all published memoirs. 2. With few surprises still in store perhaps, but by no means entirely predictable, viz. the revelation of the American connection in the manufacture of the French nuclear device. See Richard Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy 75 (Summer 1989), 3–33. The significance of a discovery like that can take decades to assess. See Maurice Vaïsse and Jean Doise, Politique étrangère de la France: Diplomatie et outil militaire 1971–1991 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1992). 3. Wolf Mendl, “Background of French Nuclear Policy,” International Affairs 41:1 (January 1965), 22–36, 27; Bertrand Goldschmidt; L’Aventure atomique: Ses aspects politiques et techniques (Paris: Fayard, 1962), 289; the numerous articles written by Charles Ailleret, François Maurin, and G. Debau in Défense nationale in the June, July, October, November, and December 1954, and in the July 1955 issues. 4. See Chapters 4 and 5 of Edgar S. Furniss, France, Troubled Ally: De Gaulle’s Heritage and Prospects (New York: Praeger, 1960). 5. David Yost, “The French Defence Debate,” Survival XXIII:1 (January/February 1981), 19–28, 20; Herbert Tint, French Foreign Policy Since the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 238; Diego Ruiz de Palmer, “French Strategic Options in the 1990s,” Adelphi papers 260 (Summer 1991), 7–9. 6. Dorothy Pickles, The Fifth French Republic: Institutions and Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), 192. 7. Edward R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); and The Role of the Public Sector (OECD, 1959). 83

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8. Maurice Woigniez, interview with author, Montpellier, February 1992, personal notes. 9. Roy C. Macridis, “The New French Maginot Line: A Note on French Strategy,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 2:1 (Spring 1974), 105–112, 107. 10. Dorothy Pickles, op. cit., 187. 11. J.B. Duroselle, op. cit., passim. 12. André Siegfrid, Edouard Bonnefous, and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L’Année politique 1956 (Paris: Grand Siècle, 1957); the journal Sondages throughout this period, along with Documentation française, plus Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merrit, France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Scribner’s, 1967). 13. Alfred Grosser, La IVe République et sa politique extérieure (Paris: Armand Colin, 1961); Dorothy Pickles, op. cit., among others. 14. Frédéric Bozo, interview with author, Paris, February 1992, personal notes. 15. Also reported in a number of sources: Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); Alfred Grosser, op. cit.; Dorothy Pickles, op. cit.; Charles Ailleret, op. cit.; Pierre Gallois, “Raison d’ être of French Defense Policy,” International Affairs 39:4 (October 1963), 497–510; Raymond Aron, “French Foreign Policy,” India Quarterly 6:2 (April/June 1960), 153–162, 153. 16. J.B. Duroselle, op. cit., 412. 17. Albert Buchalet, press conference reported in Combat, March 19–20, 1960. 18. Bertel Heurlin, “Nuclear-Free Zones: An Attempt to Place Suggested and Established Nuclear-Free Zones with the Framework of International Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 1 (1966), 11–30, 19. 19. Pierre Gallois, op. cit., 505. 20. Charles de Gaulle, quoted by Wilfrid L. Kohl, “The French Nuclear Deterrent,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 29:2 (November 1968), 80–94, 85. 21. Though the French had to pay for the tinsel themselves. The steel mill analogy is even more apt than might be thought at first glance: The importance of the U.S. connection in surmounting technical difficulties in building the French bomb has started to come to 84

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light relatively recently. See, in particular, Richard H. Ullman, op. cit. 22. L’Année politique, André Siegfrid, Edouard Bonnefous, and J.B. Duroselle, eds. (Paris: Grand Siècle, 1954), 342–347. 23. René Pleven, “France in the Atlantic Community,” Foreign Affairs 38:1 (October 1959), 19–30, 21–23. 24. René Pleven, op. cit., 21–23; for the diplomatic tactics, see Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 30. 25. See Maurice Vaïsse and Jean Doise, op. cit., 553. 26. Maurice Vaïsse and Jean Doise, op. cit., 583. 27. President de Gaulle’s Third Press Conference, held September 5, 1960, reported in Official Speeches, Press Conferences and Communiques (New York: Ambassade de France, 1958), 11. 28. Hervé Alphand, ambassador to the United States at the time, said in an interview that de Gaulle had informed Kennedy that France supported the firm U.S. policy. Guy de Carmoy, op. cit. 2. 29. Edward A. Kolodziej, op. cit., 30. 30. Guy de Carmoy, op .cit., 187; Edward A. Kolodziej, op. cit., 30. 31. Reported in Documentation française (New York: Ambassade de France, 1959). See Maurice Mégret, “Questions et réflexions sur le programme français de force nucléaire,” Politique Etrangère 25:1 (1960), 15–32, passim. 32. Lawrence Scheinman, op. cit., xi. 33. Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de guerre, Volume I: L’appel (Paris: Plon, 1954), 5. 34. Bertrand Goldschmidt, L’aventure atomique: Ses aspects politiques et techniques (Paris: Fayard, 1962), passim. 35. Robert J. Lieber, op. cit., 424. 36. Wilfrid L. Kohl, “The French Nuclear Deterrent.” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 29:2 (November 1968), 80–94. 37. Speech of October 13, 1960, to the National Assembly, translated by the Information Service, French Embassy to the United States. 38. Maurice Mégret, op. cit., 32. 39. Wilfrid L. Kohl, op. cit., 3. 40. Lawrence Scheinman, op. cit., xx. 41. (1) The Alliance is under the influence of the United States; (2) the Alliance no longer fits the military and strategic realities of the times; (3) NATO is another means to perpetuate Yalta, i.e., the 85

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exclusion of France from great power status. See Wilfrid L. Kohl, op. cit., 83; Walter Schutze, “La France et l’OTAN,” Politique étrangère 31:2 (1966), 109–118, 111–113. 42. There are occasional exceptions to the rule of the politics of grandeur, such as Raymond Barre’s speech as prime minister to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale on September 11, 1980: “France, a middle power with limited resources cannot pretend to attain parity with the two superpowers.” Reproduced under the title of “La politique de défense de la France,” Défense Nationale, November 1980, 9–19, 14. 43. Diego Ruiz Palmer, op. cit., 15. 44. Pierre Gallois, Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire (Paris: CalmannLévy, 1960) and “Raison d’être of French Defense Policy,” op. cit.; interview with author, Paris, February 1992, personal notes, and L’Adieu aux armées (Paris: Albin Michel, 1976); Raymond Aron, Mémoires (Paris: Juilliard, 1983). 45. Lucien Poirier, Des stratégies nucléaires (Paris: Hachette, 1977). 46. Author’s translation of “manoeuvre du moineau hardi.” See Paul Létourneau’s “Allemagne-France: La coopération militaire et stratégique,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 18:4 (February 1984), 39–47. 47. Pierre Gallois, “Les conséquences stratégiques et politiques pour les relations franco-britanniques,” Politique étrangère 23:1 (1958), 167–180; Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1960); “Raison d’être of French Defense Policy,” op. cit.; Lucien Poirier, op. cit. 48. The circle was complete with the publication of Régis Debray, Tous azimuts: L’Europe stratégique (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1989). 49. L. Ruelh, “1982: la relance de la coopération francoallemande,” in Le couple franco-allemand et la défense de l’Europe, K. Kaiser and Pierre Lellouche, eds. (Paris: Economica, 1986), 33. 50. Alan Riding, “France Bans Atom Tests in Nod to Greens,” New International Herald Tribune, 9 April 1992, 1 and 2. 51. Outlined by President Mitterrand in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 28 September 1983 (New York: French Embassy to the United States, 1983): (1) reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities to levels comparable to those of other nuclear powers; (2) elimination of existing asymmetries in conventional forces in Europe, and outlawing of chemical and biological weapon manufacturing and storage; and (3) end to the unbridled arms race in ballistic missile defenses, antisubmarine warfare and antisatellite weapons. 86

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Discussion and Conclusion

A coherent body of interrelated propositions on military art as the basis of a logical and empirical analysis might be developed, which would serve as a full foundation for making correct decisions and acting on them. [But] as in other social disciplines, these would not form a body of eternal and immutable truths. Julian Lider

The theory is proposed and the empirical evidence for both hypothesis and causation is before the reader. As a final stringent theoretical proof of its validity, and as an option for the scholar critical of it, a template of propositions is provided. Using the method outlined in Chapter 2, it is possible for the accomplished layperson to expand the theory into areas of more personal interest, or to propose changes to solve any problems that may present themselves. The next section provides a summary of the findings of the study. The discussion then moves to consider its strengths and weaknesses. THE TEMPLATE In Chapter 3 the presentation of the theory of strategic choice moved from national values to national strategy. To test the theory,

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however, it is also necessary to move in reverse order from hypothesis to assumptions. The backward test displays the logic and rigor of the theory by identifying each connection through the various types of statements. It makes the theory both more complete and parsimonious by ensuring that every statement needed shows up, but no more. It ensures that no superfluous statement appears. It also reveals any problem until the theory is finally pared down to its essentials. This test was originally developed by philosophers for propositions in symbolic logic. Philosophical logicians are next-door neighbors to mathematicians, which is evident in the backward test they developed. The method requires the formulation of a set of statements in standardized format, as well as the grouping of statements by type. The single hypothesis is at the apex of the interrelated statements, and the conditions and assumptions are at the base. Between the bottom and the top come the propositions. The propositions are ordered by generation and grouped thematically, according to each step or mechanism of the theory. What follows is a textual rendering of the network of propositions, which can also be found in Tables 6.1 through 6.15 at the end of this section. Starting Point: The Hypothesis National values influence the development, choice, and implementation of national strategy. In this theory, the hypothesis is limited to the influence of values on the choice of a strategy (H). All states choose national strategy from time to time (P1). (A choice of nonstrategy is a possibility included in this proposition.) All states choose national strategy because the means required for the strategy are national, and because states make decisions (P2). In turn, states, like all actors on the international stage, make decisions because they are made up of people (P3), and people can make decisions (C2). All states have a more or less established process of choosing a national strategy (P4), since all states make decisions (P2) and because the situation does not change while the decision, that is, the choice of strategy, is being made (C3). The process of choosing a national strategy can be broken down into steps (P5), since choosing is a complex phenomenon (P6) (there are complex phenomena that can be broken down into components and simple ones that cannot), and all complex phenomena can be broken down into components (P7). In turn, 88

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all phenomena can be broken down into components because all phenomena are finite in terms of time, space, and quality (A3). Treatment of Information In order to consider a problem and consider various options, the state needs information. Information Gathering All states receive information (P8), because all states seek to obtain it by observing their own environments (P9), including other states. The state observes its own environment for two reasons. First, all states seek to survive (P10), because all states are composed of people (P3) and human beings are volitional (A8). Second, every actor competes with every other actor in order to survive in the international system (P11). States are only one type of actor on the international stage (P12); there are other, nonstate, actors in the system. All these actors compete because the international system, with its myriad actors and phenomena, is finite (P13, A1, A2). In order to survive, states must draw on the resources of their environment (P14). Those resources are finite because their environment, like every other reality, is finite (P15, P16, A3). Mechanism of Cognition: Perceptions The first step is for the state to gather raw, that is, yet-to-be-processed, information (P16). Values affect the gathering of information in the following way (P17): First, the amount of information available to states is limited (P18), simply because the availability of resources limits the gathering of information (P19). The environment is limited (P15ss). Second, states make decisions about allocating these resources (P20). Those decisions are made according to priorities that states set (P21). Those priorities in turn are based on a hierarchy of pressing circumstances and national values (P22). National values can also be hierarchized (P23) since they can be organized in a variety of ways (P24), and the relations that exist among them (P25) can be harmonious, conflictual or anywhere in between (A2), but also because human beings are volitional (A8). Mechanism of Cognition: Information Processing Information needs to be analyzed (P26) for several reasons. First, information floods all modern states (P27). States’ environments are 89

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complex (P28), if only because their environments are made up of a variety of actors and circumstances (P29). Each of those actors is made up of individual or groups of human beings (P30), and the actors themselves are proliferating (P31), nonstate actors like international organizations as well as states themselves. The nature of those human beings is complex (P32) because it is made up of rational, volitional, valuational, emotional, and creative/aesthetic components (A8). Second, only so much information can be integrated at any one time by states (P33), since processing information requires resources (P34), and those resources are limited (P15ss). So information is organized, focused, broken down into components, ordered again, and analyzed for patterns and relationships (P35). Criteria are used to analyze information (P36), based on cognitive standards consonant with national values (P37). National values are made up of three types of standards, cognitive, evaluative and appreciative (P38ss). Those criteria are important to ensure continuity and relevance, because only human beings make decisions (C2). Human beings hold values (A11), and they make decisions according to all sorts of rational, volitional, emotional, and other elements (A8), all of which accumulate (A9). Then conclusions about the information are drawn (P39). Those conclusions are based on standards set by national values (P38ss). The conclusions of the analysis are compared with expectations (P40). Those expectations are formulated on the basis of criteria, based on cognitive standards set by national values (P41). States first consider whether changes to the criteria used are in order (P42). Whether or not such changes occur, a decision based on criteria (P43), that information is accumulated (P44 and A9). States then decide if action is needed, based on the criteria (P38ss). Information about these operations is retained (P45). If action is required, states formulate tangible objectives (P46). If no action is required, states simply continue to observe their environment (P47). Diagnosis If the state perceives a change in the environment (P48), then it diagnoses either a threat or an opportunity (P49). The state may make such a diagnosis because it can differentiate between a threat and an opportunity (P50). States come to such a differentiation on the basis of criteria (P51). Those criteria are based on standards set by national values (P38ss). 90

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Search for Options In order to search for options (P52), the state decides whether or not to use a strategy (P53). A strategy is not the state’s only choice: A strategy requires a considerable amount of resources (P54), and resources, as we know, are limited (P15ss). The choice between a strategy and a plan, a policy, or a program may not be conscious or intended (P55). Only human beings make decisions (C4), and all experience, information, desires, and other elements of human beings’ minds that accumulate (A9) can play a role in decision making (A11). The state reviews many options (P56) and selects for further consideration only those options that are deemed likely to be realizable (P57). This decision about realistic and unrealistic options is made according to criteria (P58), themselves based on cognitive standards provided by national values (P38ss). Estimation of Expected Outcomes The state estimates or revises the expected outcomes for each of its options (P59). There are two considerations here: First the reasons why this estimation occurs, and how they occur. Second is the process of evaluation. The state makes initial estimations of each option’s results (P 60 ). These estimations are based on criteria, experience, and learning (P61). The criteria are based on evaluative standards set by national values (P38ss). Experience Experience are conclusions drawn from the state’s most recent decisions and actions (P62). The process is the same as for cognition, except that the source of information, instead of being exogenous to the state, is now endogenous to it. The state’s latest decision needs to be analyzed (P63), since information floods all modern states (P28ss). Only so much information can be integrated at any one time by states (P334ss). So information is organized, focused, broken down into components, ordered again, and analyzed for patterns and relationships (P36ss). Learning Decisions by a state are based on that state’s learning (P64). First something in the situation triggers learning (P65), and the earlier events are retrieved (P66); the relevance of it is assessed (P67) using criteria based on standards set by national values (P38ss). Conclu91

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sions are drawn (P40ss). The conclusions from the analysis are compared with expectations (P28ss). Conclusions are factored into the decision-making process (P68). The state behavior may be the same or it may be different from the past (P69), since strategies may be repeated, successful or not (P70). Learning may occur without being immediately manifested (P71), since the learning process is cumulative (P72ss). Assessment of Options The state assesses its options (P73) by making initial estimations based on criteria (P38ss), preference (P75), and taste (P87).

(P74)

Preference States have a preference (P75). Options are assessed according to the costs and benefits (P76). These costs and benefits can be material and nonmaterial (P77). This assessment is based on criteria (P28ss). Conclusions about preference are drawn (P78) on the basis of criteria (P28ss) and compared with expectations (P79), themselves formulated on the basis of criteria (P28ss). The state decides whether or not to change these criteria (P80). The decision may accord with national values or it may not (P81): It depends on the decision makers. Taste A state’s actions are guided by its taste (P82). A state’s taste is triggered by something in its circumstances (P83). The earlier preferences are retrieved (P84). The relevance of this preference is assessed (P85). This assessment is based on criteria (P86, P28ss). Then the conclusions are factored into the decision-making process as appropriate (P87). The resulting state behavior may be the same or it may be different from the past (P88), since past conclusions may or may not be confirmed (P89). Choice of Strategy The state chooses a strategy as a response (P90). The state’s choices are based on the information provided in the process outlined above (P91). Choice of Tactics The state chooses its tactics (P92). The state’s choices are based on information provided in the process outlined above (P93). 92

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Implementation of Strategy The state implements its strategy (P102). For the reasons given in Chapter 4, the process by which a strategy is implemented is not explored in any more detail than this. Confirmation, Change, or Adjustment of Tactics and Strategy The state confirms, changes, or adjusts its tactics (P95). The state confirms, changes, or adjusts its strategy (P96). Table 6.1 Hypotheses H

national values influence the development, choice, and implementation of national strategy

H1 a self-oriented, nonmaterialist state is more likely to choose a direct strategy of persuasion H2 a self-oriented, materialist state is more likely to choose a direct strategy of action H3 a collectivity-oriented, nonmaterialist state is more likely to choose an indirect strategy of persuasion H4 a collectivity-oriented, materialist state is more likely to choose an indirect strategy of action

Table 6.2 Conditions C1

the interaction occurs between two states only

C2

the two states are unequal in power

C3

the external environment does not change while the decision about strategy is being made

C4

only human beings make the decisions

C5

only factors relevant to the area of application of the strategy are taken into account 93

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Table 6.2 (continued) C6

a state’s value system is characterized by three predominant values only

C7

the classification of different types of values is built according to a series of value dichotomies affectivity universalism quality diffuseness self-orientation materialism

C8

neutrality particularism performance specificity collectivity-orientation nonmaterialism

the classification of various types of strategy is based on two dichotomies: (1) direct-indirect and (2) action-persuasion

Table 6.3 Assumptions A1

there are numerous phenomena and events in the universe

A2

relations between any one phenomenon or event and another phenomenon/event can be harmonious, conflictual or indifferent

A3

all phenomena are finite in time, space, and quality

A4

human beings are multidimensional: physical, emotional, rational, and spiritual beings

A5

human beings can differentiate between means and ends

A6

human beings are free to choose among alternatives

A7

human beings make decisions

A8

the human mind encompasses rational, volitional, emotional, and creative/aesthetic elements

A9

all experience, information, imagination, desires, and other elements of the human mind are cumulative to some degree

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A10 everything in human beings has the potential to play a role in choice A11 values are held by individuals or groups A12 human beings interact with all phenomena/events in their environments

Table 6.4 Starting Point H

national values influence the choice of national strategy

P1

states choose national strategies from time to time [P2 + P4]

P2

all states make decisions [P3 + C2]

P3

all actors on the international stage, including states, are made up of people [A12]

P4

all states have a more or less established process of choosing a national strategy [C3 + P5]

P5

the process of choosing a national strategy can be broken down into steps [P6]

P6

choosing is a complex phenomenon [P7]

P7

complex phenomena can be broken down into components [A3 + P 8]

Table 6.5 Treatment of Information P8

all states receive information [P9]

P9

all states observe their own environments [P10 + P11]

P10 all states seek to survive [P3 + A8] P11 every actor competes with every other actor in order to survive in the international system [P12]

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Table 6.5 (continued) P12 actors on the international stage include states and nonstate actors [P13] P13 the international stage is finite [A1 + A2] P14 to survive, actors must draw on resources of their environment [P15] P15 the environment is finite [A3]

Table 6.6 Cognition P16 the state gathers raw information [P17] P17 values direct the gathering of information [P18 + P21] P18 the state’s information is limited [P19] P19 availability of resources limits gathering of information [P15] P20 the state must make decisions about the resources it allocates [P21 + P26] P21 decisions are made according to priorities [P22] P22 priorities are based on a hierarchy of circumstances and national values [P23] P23 national values can be hierarchized [P24] P24 national values can be organized in a variety of ways [P25] P25 relations exist among national values [P26 + A2 + A8] P26 information needs to be analyzed [P27 + P33 + P35] P27 information floods all modern states [P28] P28 all states’ environments are complex [P29] P29 all states’ environments are made up of state actors, nonstate actors and circumstances [P30] P30 all actors on the international stage are made up of groups or individual human beings [P31] 96

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P31 actors on the international stage proliferate [P32 + P33] P32 human nature is complex [A8] P33 only so much information can be integrated at any one time [P34] P34 processing information requires resources [P15ss] P35 information is organized, focused, broken down into components, ordered again, and analyzed for patterns and relationships [P36 + P39] P36 criteria are used to analyze information [P37] P37 criteria are based on cognitive, evaluative, and appreciative standards set by national values [P38 + P41] P38 national values are made up of standards—cognitive, evaluative, and appreciative [C2 + A8 + A9 + A11] P39 conclusions about information are drawn [P40] P40 conclusions from analysis are compared with expectations [P41] P41 expectations are formulated on the basis of criteria [P42] P42 the state decides whether criteria used to analyze information needs to be changed [P38ss + P45] P43 the state makes decisions on the basis of criteria [P38ss + P44] P44 the state decides whether to take action [P45] P45 information about all of the above is retained [P46 + P47] P46 if action is required, tangible objectives are formulated [P48] P47 if action is not required, the state returns to observation [P8]

Table 6.7 Diagnosis P48 the state perceives a change in the environment [P49] P49 the state diagnoses either a threat or an opportunity [P50]

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Table 6.7 (continued) P50 the state differentiates between threat and opportunity [P51] P51 the state comes to a conclusion based on criteria [P38ss + P52]

Table 6.8 Search for Options P52 the state searches for options [P53] P53 the state “decides” whether or not to use a strategy [P54 + P55] P54 a strategy requires a considerable amount of resources [P15ss] P55 the choice between strategy and other possibilities (plans, policies, or programs) may not be conscious or intended [P56] P56 the state reviews many options [P57] P57 the state retains for serious consideration only those options deemed realistic [P58] P58 a judgment about realistic and unrealistic options is made according to criteria [P38ss + P59]

Table 6.9 Estimation of Expected Outcomes P59 the state estimates or revises the expected outcomes for each of its options [P60] P60 the state makes initial estimations [P61] P61 these estimations are based on criteria, on experience and on learning [P38ss + P62 + P64]

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Table 6.10 Experience P62 experience is conclusions drawn from a state’s most recent decisions [P63] P63 what happened to the state after its latest decision needs to be analyzed [P64 + P28ss + P34ss + P36ss]

Table 6.11 Learning P64 decisions of a state are based on that state’s learning [P65] P65 something in the situation triggers the state [P66] P66 the state retrieves the previous experience [P67] P67 relevance of experience is assessed [P28ss + P38ss + P40ss + P68] P68 conclusions are factored into the decision-making process [P69] P69 the state behavior may be the same or it may be different from the past [P70] P70 strategies may be repeated, successful or not [P71] P71 learning may occur without being immediately manifested [P72] P72 the learning process is cumulative [P73 + A9]

Table 6.12 Assessment of Options P73 the state assesses its options [P74] P74 the state makes initial estimations [P75 + P87 + P38ss]

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Table 6.13 Preference P75 the state has a preference [P76] P76 the state assesses options on the basis of costs and benefits [P77] P77 costs and benefits can be material or nonmaterial [P78 + P38ss] P78 the state draws conclusions [P79] P79 the conclusions are compared with expectations [P38ss + P80] P80 the decision may or may not be in accord with national interests [P81] P81 the decision may or may not be in accord with national values [P82]

Table 6.14 Taste P82 a state’s actions are guided by its taste [P83] P83 a state’s taste is triggered by something in its circumstances [P84] P84 the earlier preferences are retrieved [P85] P85 the relevance of this preference is assessed [P86] P86 this assessment is based on criteria [P38ss + P87] P87 conclusions are factored into the decision-making process as appropriate [P88] P88 the resulting state behavior may be the same or it may be different from the past [P89] P89 past conclusions may or may not be confirmed [P91]

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Table 6.15 Choice and Adjustments of Strategy and Tactics P90 the state chooses a strategy as a response [P91] P91 the state’s choices are based on the information provided in the process outlined above [P92] P92 the state chooses its tactics [P93] P93 the state’s choices are based on information provided in the process outlined above [P94] P94 the state implements its strategy [P95] P95 the state confirms, changes, or adjusts its expectations of the outcome [P96] P96 the state confirms, changes or adjusts its strategy

SUMMARY When we began, the influence of values on strategy was unknown. We accepted the importance of national interest, but moved beyond that discussion to sketch out the parameters of this study, a theoretical analysis of the influence of national values on national strategy, as a contribution to a general theory of strategy. The actual production of this contribution to theory, outlined in Chapter 2, was very technical: definitions, assumptions, and conditions were determined; raw material was produced and refined into a network of interrelated propositions; the theory was illustrated; and a method for adjustments to the theory was provided. Chapter 3 presented the theory shorn of its technical details, to be found in the template’s table series B. It consists of a ten-step decision-making process where national values influence national strategy via three mechanisms: cognition, appreciation, and evaluation. At the end, the theory generates a set of four hypotheses that can be tested empirically. Chapter 4 show how the empirical hypothesis can be applied. Chapter 5 illustrates that it is in fact verified: France’s national values are conflictual individualism and prestige, and its national strategy is one of grandeur, with a substrategy of nuclear deterrence of the strong by the weak. 101

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Table 6.16 Summary of Findings Step

Evidence

Gather Data (cognition)

complex/limited state apparatus complex tasks facing government decision-makers overloaded strengthening presidency of Fifth Republic

Diagnose

six foreign policy questions cow down and knives out enemy deliberately unnamed autonomous decision making

Search (appreciation)

2 options discarded early Bidault, Pleven, Mendès-France, de Gaulle options symbolic value of nuclear weapons

Estimate (evaluation)

partial evidence: move to sanctuarization difference in behavior before and after several international crises

Weigh Options

gap for historical reasons

Pick Strategy

la grandeur

Pick Tactics

autonomy in decision making stronger presidency North Atlantic Alliance French colonial empire nuclear arsenal

Implement

NATO withdrawal irritates allies bad relations between de Gaulle and National Assembly colonial setbacks

Adjust Tactics

move from tous azimuts to du faible au fort

Adjust Strategy

continuity with Giscard, Mitterrand, and Chirac

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Chapter 5 goes one step further by recounting the history of French national strategy from the 1950s and 1960s. There is evidence to support all but one of the ten steps: The gap springs from the lack of documentation during a difficult passage in the history of the French state. DISCUSSION National Values and National Interests Chapter 1 identified national values as the unknown half of the strategic equation. It argued in favor of the importance of national interest as an analytical concept, but it also declined to discuss the relationship between national values and national interests until more was known about national values. It does not answer all the questions: Only a full study of the relationship could do that. What this book does contribute is a focusing of those questions. Reconciling national interests and national values is “one of the central problems of all human experience and philosophical speculation.”1 The immediate problem is the tendency of the literature to confuse the two, for definitional reasons outlined in Chapter 1. Having studied values in relation to strategy, however, makes it clear that there is another source of trouble. Strategy is both an idea and an action, tangible and intangible; so are national values; so are national interests. The solution to this problem probably lies in a fuller understanding of circumstances in the phenomena of strategy, values, and interests. The traditional triangle of strategic theory, therefore, needs to be expanded. In essence, the theory is compatible with the existing scholarship about national interest. Although the existing literature provides the basis for understanding this four-way relationship, it needs to match the theory’s details and degrees of abstraction before any more questions can be answered. That is the other reason why I included the template: Given the network of propositions, any scholar can expand, refine, or change the theory as needed. Limitations of the Theory It is also possible that the theory will be found to be overly simplified by experts in areas I judged to be, if not peripheral, certainly less central. If values and strategy are at the heart of the theory, states, political will, national goals, and even national interests are less central. 103

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The empirical hypotheses are not exact predictions for several reasons. First, strategy is a tool for macro-analysis: It has the advantage of helping to analyze complex situations in the long term, but it has the disadvantage of not being worth the trouble in the short term, because it requires too much time and information. Until the theory is refined, it will be unsuccessful at predicting the outcome of a single decision. It cannot determine, explain, or predict tactics. It can help predict or explain why France would select an omnidirectional strategy, but it cannot predict what contribution to a European army France will make. That sort of factual prediction is still one step away. In addition, the theory begs a number of questions. Does the theory replace a simple and acceptable explanation, that is, that circumstances dictate a state’s strategy, with a complicated one? That is a common failing in theory. Everyone agrees that France used its nuclear weapons for political ends and French leaders were concerned over prestige. Why take the trouble of establishing a complex causal relationship? To do so implies that the relationship between national values and state behavior is important enough to warrant the exploration, a question of judgment on the scholar’s part. In that case, the more obvious the case study, the better: It can only serve its purpose as an illustration better. Is the state being personalized? This book is biased in favor of people being at the motor of history. Because each step of theory-building builds on the previous, implications from this assumption appear throughout the theory. These implications do not reach the state, however: Its functions and characteristics were specified from the start, and are distinct from society, population, and leaders. Is this theory policy-relevant? My decision to approach the problem theoretically was motivated by the desire to liberate strategy from its historical association not only with violence but also with conflict. It provides decision makers with the means to consider how one strategic option or another will sit with public opinion. The theory has to be readily accessible to decision makers, but decision makers have to be willing to invest the time and effort. They may also resist the theory because of its implications. Leaders may wish to believe something else than the list of assumptions and conditions about the world. They may not wish to acknowledge their 104

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values if they are different from what they profess publicly. Decision makers may not want to foresee the consequences of their actions quite so clearly. If decision makers are also elected leaders, they may find that insoluble problems are not popular with the electorate. Is this book a trickle of content in a canyon of notes? Perhaps. Many issues needed to be clarified, but theoretical support, as evidenced by Chapter 3 and the template, is substantial. A new method had to be developed in enough detail so other scholars could use it. All the methodological and theoretical problems also had to be solved up front and once and for all. So I argue that the theory is general enough and powerful enough to be applied to ethnic conflict and explains most of its most intractable features. The only requirement is that the actor always be capable of cognition, evaluation, and appreciation of information. To test this theory further, one could proceed empirically or theoretically. Empirical studies require generating predictions and investigating them. Theoretical studies require variations on conditions and assumptions, or using other propositions to contradict the findings of the current study. NOTES The opening quote for Chapter 6 is from “Towards a Modern Concept of Strategy,” Cooperation and Conflict 16:4 (1981), 217–235, 234. 1. Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations? The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), i.

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Index

Action, 1, 2, 60 Affectivity, 58 Ailleret, Charles, 71 Algeria, 75, 79 Analysis, 4–5 Appreciation, 43–44, 77 Approach, 61, 78 Aron, Raymond, 71 Assessment, 46, 76–77, 99 Assumptions, 88, 92, 93

Churchill, Sir Winston, 2, 58 Clausewitz, Carl von, 40 Cleavages, 55 Cognition, 41, 69–70, 89, 93 Collectivity-Orientation, 59 Collins, Michael, 58 Conditions, 93 Conflict, 1 Core idea, 77 Cuba, 76

Bidault, Georges, 58, 77 Brainstorming, 27

Decision making, 39, 40–41, 48, 54, 67, 73 De Gaulle, Charles, 68, 69, 73, 75–77, 79, 80 Definition, 24, 37 method, 25, 53–55 problems, 26 rules, 28 types, 25 Diagnosis, 43, 71, 90–91, 97

Canada, 59 Case studies, 3 Cas-type, 3 Castro, Fidel, 76 Charnay, Jean-Paul, 2, 23 Chirac, Jacques, 82 Choice, 46, 47, 87, 92–93

I n d e x

Learning, 45–46, 75–76, 91–92, 99 Locke, John, 55

Diffuseness, 59 Distillation, 27–31 Economics, 56–57 Egypt, 75 Estimation, 45, 74–75, 91–92, 98 Ethics, 11–12 Ethnicity, 56 European Community, 58, 72, 73, 74, 77 Evaluation, 44, 45 Experience, 75, 91, 99

Madagascar, 80 Materialism, 58 Mendès-France, Pierre, 73 Method, 25, 29 Mill, John Stuart, 55 Mitterand, Francois, 82 Morocco, 80 Neutrality, 58 Nonmaterialism, 59 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 68, 76, 79 Nuclear weapons, 72, 73, 77–78, 79, 82

France: decision making, 41–48, 67–83, 103 defense policy, 82 foreign policy, 69, 73–74, 75, 79 Fourth Republic, 69

Objectives, 61, 77 Options, 44, 46, 72–74, 91, 98

Gallois, Pierre, 71 Geopolitics, 57 Germany, 57, 71, 78 Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, 82 Grandeur, 68, 73, 82 Great Britain, 71, 75, 78, 82

Particularism, 58 Perception, 42, 69, 89 Performance, 58 Persuasion, 60 Pleven, René, 73, 77 Poirier, Lucien, 71 Policy: defense, 82 foreign, 69, 73–74, 75, 70 Political culture, 54–55 Pompidou, Claude, 82 Preference, 43, 77, 92, 100 Prestige, 57–58 Propositions, 31

Hypothesis, 12–13, 48, 62, 67, 82, 88–89, 93 judging, 30 Immobilism, 69 Implementation, 47, 80, 93 Individualism, 55–56, 57, 72 Indochina, 75, 80 Information, 41–42, 69–71, 89–90, 95 Interest, national, 8–9, 103 Israel, 58, 59, 75 Italy, 57

Quality, 58 Regionalism, 56 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 2 160

I n d e x

Self-orientation, 59 Smith, Adam, 55 Sources, 3 Spain, 73 Specificity, 59 Stalin, Joseph, 72 Standards, 43, 90 State, 7–8, 60, 62 Statements, 31–32 types, 28–31 Strategy, 2 change to, 92, 101 characteristics, 39–40 choice of, 46–47 components, 60–61, 78 definition, 5–7, 39 direct, 60 France’s, 59–60, 68, 69, 77 identification, 59–60 indirect, 60 influence on values, 10 national, 39, 59, 68, 87 nature, 5 nuclear, 14–15 theories of, 2, 10 types, 14–15, 60 Suez crisis, 75, 77 Summary, 101–102

Taste, 44, 92, 100 Template, 87–101 Theory: application of, 53, 67–83 basic, 2, 47 building, 2, 24 changes to, 87–101 illustration, 67–83 international relations, 46 judging, 29, 32–33 limitations, 103–105 method, 13–14, 24–32 strategic, 3–4, 87 summary, 11–12 urgency, 9–10 Tunisia, 75, 79 United States, 59, 73, 75, 77–78, 82 Universalism, 58 Values, 2, 3–4, 10, 103 definition, 38–39 France’s, 55–58 identification, 53–55 influence on strategy, 47–48 national, 53, 87 types, 58–59

Tactics, 61 changes to, 80, 101 choice of, 46–47 France, 78, 79

War, Persian Gulf, 58, 59 Yugoslavia, 1, 58

161

About the Author LAURE PAQUETTE is Associate Professor of Political Science at Lakehead University in Ontario, Canada, and Visiting Research Professor at the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey.