Strategic Perspectives on Crime and Policing in South Africa 9780627026898, 9780627029073

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Strategic perspectives on crime and policing in South Africa Johan Burger

Van Schaik PUBLISHERS

Published by Van Schaik Publishers 1064 Arcadia Street, Hatfield, Pretoria All rights reserved Copyright © 2007 Tshwane University of Technology No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the publisher. First edition 2007 Second impression 2011 Print ISBN 978 0 627 02689 8 WebPDF ISBN 978 0 627 02907 3

Commissioning editor Lydia Reid Production coordinator Werner von Gruenewaldt Editorial coordinator Leandri van der Elst Copy editor Estelle Coetzee Proofreader Liezl Potgieter Cover design by Fresh Ideas Cover image Digital Source Image Library Typeset in 9.75 on 13 pt Palatino by Pace-Setting & Graphics, Pretoria

Website addresses were correct when the publication was finalised.

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DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to the men and women of the South African Police Service.

Man ... is uneliminated ape as well as undeveloped angel ... if the development of the angelic element in him demands freedom and opportunity ... the eradication of the bestial element calls for the exercise of authority and for the stern enforcement of the law. (HEARNSHAW AS CITED BY MERKL, 1972: 132)

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TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iixi Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Chapter 1: General orientation 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exposition of the problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Identified problem areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Research rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Purpose and objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organisation of the book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 2 5 5 6 7 8

Chapter 2: Conceptualisation 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crime combating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crime control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crime prevention and crime deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Crime prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Crime deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Law enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Strategy, levels of strategy and national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1 Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1.1 Defining strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1.2 Direct and indirect strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2 Levels of strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2.1 Total strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2.2 Overall strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2.3 Operational strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.3 National security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.1 Conceptual clarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.2 Direct and indirect strategy and policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.3 National security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 9 10 12 12 14 15 15 16 16 17 18 18 19 19 19 22 22 23 23

Chapter 3: Conceptual dilemmas in modern policing 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.2 Origins of the police and of policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

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3.2.1 Defining police and policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Origins of the police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Origins of police functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Inherent dilemmas of and inquiries into the police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 The position in the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1.1 Crime rates and police numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1.2 Inquiries into the police and policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 The position in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2.1 Crime rates and police numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2.2 Inquiries into the police and policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Historical development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 The “impossible mandate” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Public perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26 28 28 31 32 32 34 37 37 39 41 41 42 43

Chapter 4: Interpreting relevant research in the United States and the United Kingdom 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Definition and causes of crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Defining crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Causes of crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Police impact on the prevention of crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Community focused policing and crime focused policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Community focused policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 Crime focused policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2.1 The “broken windows” theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2.2 The “zero tolerance” approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Direct and indirect policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Police force versus police service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 The role of a crime prevention agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.1 Crime prevention and the risk factors of crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.2 A national coordinating structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.3 Police reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.4 Direct and indirect policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44 45 45 46 49 51 52 54 54 56 58 60 62 64 64 65 65 66

Chapter 5: Policy development for the police and policing in South Africa 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 A brief history of constitutional change in South Africa: 1990–1994 . . . . . . . . 5.3 The development of policy relating to the police, policing and the combating of crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 The pre-election phase: 1991–1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68 69 69 70

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5.3.1.1 The National Peace Accord and Ready to Govern document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5.3.1.2 The interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 The post-election period: 1994–1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 5.3.2.1 The 1994 Draft Policy Document on Change (“Green Paper”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 5.3.2.2 Establishment and functions of the South African Police Service (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.3.2.3 The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

5.3.3

The White Paper on Safety and Security: 1999–2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 5.3.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 5.3.3.2 Policing (or law enforcement) and crime prevention . . . . . . . . 81 5.3.3.3 The National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre (NCPSC) . . 5.3.3.4 A critical assessment of the White Paper and prevailing crime prevention approaches in South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

5.4 Crime as a national security threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 A central or national coordinating structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

84

89 5.6 The cluster approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 5.7.1 5.7.2 5.7.3

The variance between statute and policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Idealistic versus realistic view of the police role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 National security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Chapter 6: The South African Police Service’s approaches to crime combating (1994–2004) 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 6.2 The community policing phase (1994–1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6.2.1 Legislative and policy framework for community policing . . . . . . . . . 97 6.2.2

6.2.3

Motives for the introduction of community policing in South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 6.2.2.1 Community policing as a new corporate strategy of the South African Police Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 6.2.2.2 Community policing as an instrument of change . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6.2.2.3 Community policing and crime prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 The Community Safety Plan (CSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

6.3 The PPO phase (Policing Priorities and Objectives): 1996–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 6.3.1 The Annual Plan of the South African Police Service 1996/1997 . . . . 104 6.3.2 The Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) 1997/1998 . . . . . . . . . . . 106 6.3.3

The Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) 1998/1999 . . . . . . . . . . . 107 6.3.3.1 Detracting from community policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

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6.3.3.2 The new strategic framework of the South African Police Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3.3 Programme Johannesburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 The Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) 1999/2000 . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4.1 The PPOs and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4.2 Crime prevention and policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The strategic focus phase: 2000–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 A national security policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 The National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.3 Operational results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.4 Official crime rates and the impact of crime combating operations . The strategic plan phase: 2003–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.1 The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service–2002–2005 . 6.5.2 The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service–2004–2007 . 6.5.3 The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service–2005–2010 . The South African Police Service and crime prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.1 Conceptual and terminological confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.2 Social crime prevention and sector policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.2.1 Social crime prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6.2.2 Sector policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7.1 The community policing phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7.2 The Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7.3 The strategic focus and strategic plan phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

108 109 110 110 111 114 114 116 118 122 125 125 127 128 128 128 130 130 133 135 135 136 137

Chapter 7: Summary and recommendations 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 Crime combating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 Crime prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3 Social crime prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.4 Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.5 Community policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.6 Sector policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.7 Direct and indirect policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.8 Crime and national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.9 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.10 Police functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.11 The police’s operations approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.12 The police’s impact on crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.13 The police subculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

139 139 139 140 141 141 142 143 143 143 144 144 145 145 146

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7.2.14 Coordinating structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Crime combating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Crime prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.3 Social crime prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.4 Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.5 Community policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.6 Sector policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.7 Direct and indirect policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.8 Crime and national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.9 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.10 Police functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.11 The police’s operations approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.12 The police subculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.13 A national crime combating centre (or agency) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

146 147 147 147 148 148 149 149 149 149 150 150 150 151 151

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

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PREFACE

This book is based largely on a doctoral thesis in policing, which, in turn, was motivated by the realisation that the solution to South Africa’s crime problems is more complicated than simply equating it with policing. This situation is also not unique to South Africa. In the United Kingdom, for example, the former British Home Secretary, Mr Kenneth Baker, in his memoirs had the following to say about the police: [t]here was impatience, if not anger [within government], that although we had spent 87 per cent more in real terms since 1979 and had increased police numbers by 27 000, there had still been a substantial rise in crime (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 2–3). In fact, between 1981 and 1995 the crime rate in Britain rose by more than 70 per cent (Dennis, 1997: 11). Political and police leaders in South Africa, and probably many other leaders too, share the view that the solution to increases in crime is a matching increase in police numbers. According to the annual reports of the South African Police Service for 2001/2002 and 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2002b: 6; 2005a: 23), police personnel are being increased annually from 123 000 in 2001 to 165 850 in 2008. Similarly the police’s budget almost doubled from just over R17 billion in 2001 to more than R31 billion in 2006 (South Africa, 2005b: 57). Yet crime remains at extremely high levels. This is particularly true in the case of serious and violent crimes such as murder, rape and robbery. Many commentators, including the police themselves, seem to be quite complacent about the fact that there has been a year on year decrease in the murder figure from 66,9 per 100 000 of the population in 1994/1995 to 40,3 in 2004/2005 (see Table 6.2). The shocking reality is that the latter ratio, in real terms, still represent almost 19 000 murders (currently) per year in this country. In Great Britain, with its much larger population, less than a 1000 murders were committed during the same period, while the international average statistic for murder is 5,5 per 100 000. This means that South Africa has a murder rate nineteen times higher than that of Great Britain and almost eight times higher than the international norm. In the case of robbery the situation is even worse, keeping in mind that “house robbery” and “hijackings” both are forms of robbery and that these are probably the main contributors to an increasing psychosis of fear among South Africans. Robbery with aggravating circumstances (armed robbery) increased between 1994/1995 and 2004/2005 from 218,5 per 100 000 of the population to 272,2. In real terms this figure relates to almost 127 000 incidents of armed robbery during the 2004/2005 financial year. In 2003/2004 the ratio was 288,1. The classification “other robbery” is also a form of theft with an element of violence and is recorded separately from robbery with aggravating circumstances. This type of robbery more

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than doubled since 1994/1995 when 84,2 robberies per 100 000 of the population were recorded to 195,0 during 2004/2005. In 2003/2004 this figure was as high as 223,4 (see Table 6.2). It is especially the cruelty and unnecessary violence associated with many of these crimes that contribute to the fear of crime and a feeling of vulnerability. It is obvious that the increased spending on the police and their consequent expansion (as was also the case in Great Britain), are not delivering the sort of result government was hoping for. At the same time there is mounting public pressure on government to do more about crime. This is the key. Few people realise that “to do more” means much more than policing. Put bluntly, “fixing” the police will certainly help, but it will not “fix” the crime problem in this country. This book therefore aims to show that it is not only unfair to blame only or even primarily the police for the high levels of crime in our country, but that it is crucial to have an overarching national policy and a national strategy to combat (fight) crime effectively. Such a national policy and strategy should provide direction for the development of departmental strategies, compelling each government department to focus on the issues identified by the national policy and strategy and to perform in terms of what they are realistically capable of doing. This approach should free the police from the “problem solving” idealism, where they are expected to help communities solve problems which are mostly socioeconomic in nature. At the same time it should direct government departments who do have a role in this regard, to start meeting their responsibilities and, when necessary, to start sharing the blame for high levels of crime. Equally important, of course, is the creation of an authoritative coordinating structure, chaired by someone with the authority to direct Cabinet ministers, to manage (drive) the national strategy and to hold each government department accountable for their performance in terms of the national and departmental strategies. In conclusion, this book also challenges the doctrine developed by Sir Robert Peel in England almost two centuries ago, which stated that the police must prevent crime, as obsolete and an impossible mandate to fulfil. Crime can be prevented and the police certainly have a contribution to make, but crime prevention and policing are two sides of the same coin (crime combating), and this book sets out to clarify this relationship and how it should be managed in the fight against crime.

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FOREWORD

In Strategic perspectives on crime and policing in South Africa Johan Burger has a word to say about policing (especially crime prevention) today, yesterday and, from a strategic perspective, also for tomorrow. This book is relevant and makes a contribution in understanding the, sometimes unfair, expectations of what the police is capable of. Although constitutionally mandated to do so, the pivotal point is that crime prevention is not the sole (or primary) responsibility of the South African Police Service. Other governmental agencies, private organisations and the community at large should jointly carry this responsibility. The author not only shows himself to be a researcher of high quality but also a seasoned practitioner who knows how to apply and evaluate theoretical knowledge against the backdrop of practical police reality. His conclusions are well thoughtout and presented in a lucid manner. These conclusions are tied up neatly and logically with general findings and recommendations. A significant contribution to the science of policing is made by introducing strategically based evaluative structures into the thought processes of police policymakers. Linear thinking has to be replaced by a more contextual viewpoint on policing. However, in doing so the concomitant problem of police managers’ “mandate-blurring” might become a reality. Holden’s assertion that law enforcement agencies’ tendency to accumulate new and varied responsibilities tarries neatly with Johnston’s cynical view that (police) bureaucrats have the innate urge to expand empires (greater personal prestige and power). In short, thinking about and reacting on crime is solely dependent upon the mood (swings) of politicians and bureaucrats. Some of the problems relating to a general understanding of and agreement on the policing functions can be attributed to the diverse origins of policing information. Knowledge of policing comes from numerous sources. The academic disciplines of Law, Psychology, Sociology, Criminology, Management Sciences and Political Sciences have made contributions to the better understanding of the policing discipline. This textbook is a practical illustration of the sympodial relationships between sciences at work. “Mandate-blurring” leads invariably to misconceptions. The author’s clarification of key functional concepts is of particular importance and value to the science of policing. By clarifying the underlying principles of crime prevention and crime combating there should never again be any doubt among police managers as to how to go about devising programmes for combating crime. In this process, the myths surrounding community policing, the broken window-syndrome and the zero toleranceideology are exploded. This book is a valuable source of information for learners and functionaries in

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the Criminal Justice system. Hopefully it will not only make a contribution to our understanding of crime prevention, but will also provide a basis for developing and evaluating strategies to cope with the high levels of crime (especially crimes of violence), and by so doing contributes to strengthening democratic stability in South Africa. Prof. Ben Smit Emeritus Professor and Research Fellow, University of South Africa Consulting Professor, Research Methodology, Tshwane University of Technology

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1

General orientation

1.1 Introduction In South Africa, as in a number of other countries, notably the United States of America (United States) and the United Kingdom, high levels of crime and the role of the police continue to be the focus of debate and controversy. For example, at a conference on crime prevention (December 2003) Scharf (2003: 1), a criminologist from the University of Cape Town, expressed the view that whatever South Africa is doing about crime, it is not enough. According to Scharf (2003: 1): [d]espite what we all are doing, and despite all the work and innovation going into the fight against crime, it is not reducing the general trend. According to Liela Magnus (2003: 7) in Beeld at a seminar held by the Institute for Security Studies, Professor David Bayley, an internationally renowned author and an expert on criminal justice systems, called the police’s promise to reduce the incidence of crime, a lie. Bayley (Magnus, 2003: 7) argued that the police could not make such a promise because 80 per cent of all crime has socioeconomic roots over which the police have no control. Beeld, (2001: 10) in its editorial of 13 June 2001, under the heading “Tyd om te loop” (“Time to go”), accused the Minister of Safety and Security of failing in his duty. Beeld (2001: 10) subsequently called on the Minister to make room for someone else. The editorial of The Star of

A false public perception about the ability of the police creates conflict whe these expectations are not met. (HALE, 1994: 12)

Learning outcomes After studying this chapter, you should be able to ~ explain why crime prevention and the role of the police in this regard are problematic ~ identify the problem areas and critical questions faced by the police in relation to public perceptions about their role ~ justify why continued research into the role of the police is important and necessary.

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11 February 1997, under the heading “SAPS: farce and tragedy”, proclaimed that: ... if the SAPS was a private company and the results were this bad, the management would be out ... the fact is inescapable: the SAPS is wildly inefficient. Matthews (2000: 185), in a paper entitled Government responses in South Africa, which he read in September 2000 at a conference on “Crime and policing in transitional societies”, explained the dilemma of the police: This poor public image, coupled with increasingly poor service, has resulted in a situation in which it became increasingly acceptable to blame crime and violence on the police, rather than adopting a broader understanding of the whole problem. (Author’s emphasis) The continuing accusations against the police of inefficiency and ineffectiveness can only lead to desperation, despair and poor morale among police officials. The problem is exacerbated when it is realised that the police themselves largely fail to fully appreciate or recognise the complexities of the crime phenomenon and that, despite their best efforts, due to the socioeconomic roots of crime, there is little they can do to change the situation. Criticism against and blaming of the police is frequently based on public perceptions of what the police can and should be doing. However, the public are often ignorant of the complexities of crime as a phenomenon and the real capabilities of the police. Political commentary and the typical reaction of the police to this type of criticism and blame, demonstrate two possible explanations: either they share this non-understanding of a complex societal problem, or, for undisclosed reasons, prefer not to speak out on this issue. Nevertheless, they need to be seen to be doing something about the growing crime problem and the high levels of crime. The police however, are faced with a dilemma. Crime levels in this country remain high in spite of positive indications that it is on the decrease (South Africa, 2005a: 56–57). When the South African Police Service announced their annual crime figures in September 2005, the media’s reaction was that these positive signs were not matched by public perceptions about their safety (Rapport, 2005a: 22). According to a national victims of crime survey, conducted during 2003 by the Institute for Security Studies, it was found that although there was proof that crime was on the decrease, South Africans still did not feel any safer (Du Plessis & Louw, 2005: 1). Against this background it becomes clear that the role of the police vis-à-vis crime is in urgent need of clarification. Therefore, the aim of this book is to determine that role and to make appropriate recommendations.

1.2 Exposition of the problem 2

As indicated in the introduction, the police themselves seldom question or dispute the fairness of public demands and criticism. While politicians repeatedly declare war on crime (Rauch, 2002: 21–22), the police will almost invariably react by establishing additional specialised units, reorganising themselves and/or introducing

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new strategies and plans (Nqakula, 2003a). Many of the “new” approaches to crime combating and policing in South Africa during the last decade, such as community policing, partnership policing, problem-orientated policing and sector policing, bear testimony to police attempts to adapt their approach to law enforcement in an attempt to be seen to be doing something (Dixon, 2000: 75, 77). The feasibility and usefulness of these attempts are an important focus of this book. The crime situation in South Africa was, and still is, exacerbated by a multitude of sociopolitical changes in the wake of the transition to democracy in 1994. The police were, for example, directly affected by changes such as the amalgamation of the eleven police agencies (the South African Police and the police agencies of the ten so-called homelands). This resulted in the formation of a single national police organisation, the South African Police Service (SAPS), in terms of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995). According to Mr George Fivaz, former National Commissioner of the South African Police (Van Blerk, 1995; South Africa, 1996a), members of the “new” Police Service had to adapt to a completely new constitutional and sociopolitical environment during the process of amalgamation and change. This included a number of structural and policy changes, for example changes to facilitate the process of demilitarisation and the adoption of a new style of policing. The South African Police Service also had to deal with other transformation issues, such as affirmative action and representivity. In addition, SAPS personnel needed to be trained and retrained in order to effect and facilitate these changes. The magnitude of this process and its many challenges becomes obvious when viewed against the background of a work force of approximately 122 000 persons in 2001, of whom roughly 100 000 were functional personnel (Schönteich, 2002: 6). During 2005 these figures increased to a total of 148 970 of whom 115 959 were functional members (South Africa, 2005a: 10). There can be no doubt that the crime situation in South Africa is serious. According to Hough (2003: 202) the high levels of especially violent crime, are indeed so serious that it has to be considered as one of the main threats to national and individual security in South Africa. In an article by Charlene Smith in the Mail & Guardian (June 22–28, 2001) under the heading “SA’s dead speak: How we died”, a spokesperson for a combined team from the Medical Research Council and the University of South Africa, which did a surveillance study at 37 mortuaries in six South African provinces, stated that a South African is twelve times more likely to be murdered than the international norm of 5,5 per 100 000 of the population. This equation was based on the 1996 murder rate of 61 per 100 000. According to the Annual Report of the South African Police Service, 2000/1 (South Africa, 2001: 23) the murder rate in 1996 was actually slightly higher at 63,9 per 100 000. However, it is worth noting that the murder rate has decreased on a year-to-year basis from 66,9 in 1994/5 to 40,3 in 2004/5 (South Africa, 2005a: 56). Sekhonyane and Louw (2002: 11), in their analysis of the official SAPS crime figures, found that levels of recorded crime began to increase in the mid-1980s and have escalated since the early 1990s. The twenty most serious crimes increased by 24 per cent between 1994 and 2000, with residential burglary increasing by 33 per

1

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1

cent and violent crime by 34 per cent over the same period. By 2002/3 only murder and car theft decreased. However, according to the SAPS’s Annual Report for 2004/5 (South Africa, 2005a: 56–57), more crimes began to show decreases. For example, between 2003/4 and 2004/5 murder decreased by 5,6 per cent; attempted murder by 18,8 per cent; serious assault by 4,5 per cent; common assault by 5,1 per cent; serious robbery by 5,5 per cent; and common robbery by 5,3 per cent. Only rape and indecent assault increased during the same period with 4 per cent and 8 per cent respectively. Although the above decreases certainly are promising, it needs to be pointed out that these are for crimes which are at exceptionally high levels. The real figure for murder, for example, in 2004/5 is 18 793 (South Africa, 2005a: 56). This represents a ratio of 40,3 per 100 000 of the population, which far exceeds the international norm of 5,5 per 100 000. In comparison, the murder rate (real figure) in the United Kingdom – which has a much larger population than South Africa – for 2003/4 was 850 (La Grange et al., 2004: 1). The Mail & Guardian (19–25 September, 1997) carried a report by Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), wherein he disputed police claims at that stage that serious crime was on the decrease and added that “the major reason is simply that the police are not doing their job” (Thiel, 1997: 4). This report also appeared in the Sunday Afrikaans newspaper Rapport (21 September 1997). In a follow-up letter to the editor of the Mail & Guardian (19 September 1997) Cilliers explained why he did not accept the police’s crime figures. His argument was that a victimisation survey, carried out jointly between the ISS and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, indicated that certain categories of crime were under-reported by up to 70 per cent (Cilliers, 1997). According to a report by Anesca Smith (2006: 14) in the daily newspaper Die Burger, Mr Pieter Groenewald – spokesperson for the Freedom Front Plus – in his reaction on 6 April 2006 to a report on the high levels of crime, accused the South African Police Service of neglecting their constitutional duty. In Groenewald’s opinion the large number of security guards in South Africa (almost triple the number of police officials), proved that the police were not able to protect the citizens of this country and their property (Smith, 2006: 14). In contrast, the former National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (Mr Fivaz) in his foreword to the 1999/2000 Policing Priorities and Objectives, while accepting a number of shortcomings in the police, made the following statement about the high levels of crime in South Africa: Many of the socioeconomic causes of crime, the reasons for political violence and other negative factors continue to exist. Our current unacceptable levels of crime and violence are, therefore, the visible symptoms of what President Mandela referred to as our sick society and the need for the ‘reconstruction and development of the soul’ in his opening address to Parliament on 5 February 1999 (South Africa, 1999a: 9).

4

These sentiments are echoed in the Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service 2005/2010 (South Africa, 2005b: 37), where it is stated that:

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[t]he implementation of the National Crime Combating Strategy is impacted on negatively by the prevailing, unfavourable socioeconomic conditions in the country. These socioeconomic conditions, such as wide-scale poverty, lack of access to basic services, et cetera, may contribute to the root causes of crime, thereby increasing the likelihood for the perpetration of crime.

1

From a report by the Institute for Security Studies in 2002, it is evident that the National Commissioner’s call in 1999 for a broader approach and a concerted effort to combat crime went unheeded. In this report, which followed an intensive investigation into the state of community policing in the South African Police Service’s priority areas, Pelser et al. (2002: 83) drew, among others, the following conclusion: Public safety, security and policing ... therefore remain a long way from being seen as a common responsibility, or everybody’s business. They remain in the perception of the general public, still very much ‘police business’.

1.3 Identified problem areas Flowing from the introduction and the above discussion the following problem areas were identified as particularly important for the purpose of this book: ♦ The police carry most of the blame for high levels of crime, which, inter alia, lead to a poor public image of the police and poor morale. ♦ The police seem to accept the blame and react to it by constantly reorganising themselves, and by continuously introducing new policing approaches and novel policing concepts. ♦ A number of criminologists, scientists in policing and practitioners have openly rejected the notion that the police should be blamed (at least alone) for the high levels of crime, and attribute this phenomenon to socioeconomic and other conditions over which the police have no control. ♦ Crime prevention, which is generally seen as the primary responsibility of the police, is precisely the one area of responsibility where the police are least likely to succeed. ♦ There is a clear and expressed need for a much broader (than only policing) and concerted effort to combat (including preventing) crime.

1.4 Research rationale This book is the result of critical questions about the reasons for the perceived incompetence of the police to prevent crime. This incompetence, if it is true, poses the following five critical questions: ♦ What is it that the police are not doing, and which they should be doing? ♦ What are the police doing wrong? ♦ What are the deficiencies within the police that cause their real or perceived incompetence?

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♦ Is it justifiable to blame the police for high levels of crime and, if so, is it fair to blame only the police? ♦ What are the solutions? Therefore this book and the research it represents, is necessary for the following reasons: ♦ A continuation of the current approach, where the police are the only government agency legally (and perceptually) incumbent to prevent crime, will not solve the crime problem. ♦ In order to be effective against crime, it is necessary to determine the relevant roles of all government agencies, including (but not exclusively) that of the police, in a concerted effort against crime and to coordinate that effort authoritatively. It will also be valuable, in the process, to assess the relevant roles of provincial and local governments and nongovernmental organisations. ♦ If the role of the police is correctly defined, in terms of what a (any) police agency is realistically capable of, it will enable the police to focus their efforts and resources in a manner suited to their capabilities. ♦ It will motivate police officials and enhance morale if they are tasked in accordance with that which they are able to do and for which they have been trained. ♦ Tasking in terms of the capabilities and realistic expectations of the police will allow for a more fair and credible evaluation of the effectiveness of the police.

1.5 Methodology

6

The research approach for this book is qualitative and the research method consists mainly of a literature study. Primary sources in this regard are the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995), various White Papers, policy documents and strategies. In addition, as secondary sources, a wide range of textbooks on policing, criminology and strategy were consulted, as well as a number of publications from the Internet. Extensive use was made of relevant conference papers, nationally and internationally, other academic and research publications and survey results. The literature study was augmented by unstructured interviews and discussions with senior police officials. Limited use was made of media reports and articles, but especially so where no other public or primary sources were available. The overall research objective for this book is comparative, interpretive and applicatory. It is based on a critical analysis of related studies and the questions, answers, suppositions, conclusions and findings of these studies. The book also takes a critical look at the South African Police Service in terms of how they understand their role, their strategies and plans, and how they attempt to meet their constitutional obligations. The book endeavours to propose a completely new approach to crime combating and especially crime prevention, and the police’s role in this regard.

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The value and advantage of adopting a literature study as a method of research lies therein that much work has already been done and the results are available. Accordingly this book will attempt to build on the existing work and to expand on it through logical argument. In Chapters 3 and 4, for the purpose of creating a suitable background for a textbook on policing and crime combating in South Africa, attention is given to policing challenges in the United Kingdom and the United States. The reason for this approach is to show that so-called developed countries face similar challenges and dilemmas. It is instructive to note that in these countries the reasons for increased crime levels are also blamed on the police and perceived police incompetence (Chapter 3). By investigating these challenges and dilemmas in at least two other countries, it is possible to show that South Africa is not unique in this regard. It has the additional advantage of putting the South African experience into perspective by creating a deeper understanding of the complexities of crime, crime combating and policing.

1

1.6 Purpose and objectives The purpose of this book is to explore the role of the South African Police Service in the combating of crime, from a strategic perspective. Particular attention is given to crime prevention and how it relates to crime combating, as well as to the significance of the relationship between crime prevention and crime combating for the police. This will be done by means of a qualitative analysis. The author is convinced that the only way to approach this problem is to provide clarity with regard to the police’s role in the combating of crime. To do this it is necessary to approach the problem from a strategic perspective, that is, to consider the role of the police within the broader context of crime, its causes and its implications for national security. Lastly, the author believes that clarifying the role of the police in the combating of crime, will also shed light on crime combating in general. This will enable the police to focus their attention and resources on those activities that they are capable of carrying out effectively. At the same time other role-players, for example in the social and economic services environment, and local authorities, will be made aware of their responsibilities to address the root causes of crime and other conditions which are conducive to crime. Role clarification should furthermore improve service delivery in general and, consequently, have a positive impact on the morale of police and other officials, and a concomitant impact on reducing the prevalence of crime. In addition to its purpose, this book also has the following specific objectives: ♦ Explain the pressures and conceptual dilemmas experienced by the police due to unrealistic statutory obligations and public expectations. ♦ Rationalise the conclusions from research that the police have very limited impact on crime prevention.

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♦ Explain, from a national strategic perspective, the development of policing in South Africa since the African National Congress in 1991 officially began to prepare for the take-over of government in South Africa. ♦ Explain the strategic and operational approaches of the South African Police Service towards the combating of crime. ♦ Propose an alternative strategic approach to crime, which includes the establishment of a national government agency or structure to coordinate crime combating, including crime prevention.

1.7 Organisation of the book Based on the above exposition of the problem and the critical questions identified, the rest of the book is organised in the following chapters: ♦ Chapter 2 provides the conceptual framework for this book. ♦ Chapter 3 explains some of the conceptual dilemmas of modern police agencies, with specific reference to the United States of America (United States) and the United Kingdom. It also considers some of the implications of these dilemmas. ♦ Chapter 4 deals with research findings in the United States and the United Kingdom, relating to the impact of the police on crime. ♦ Chapter 5 describes from a national strategic perspective the development of policy for the police and for policing in South Africa since 1991. ♦ Chapter 6 investigates the strategic and operational approaches of the South African Police Service in relation to the combating of crime between 1994 and 2005. ♦ Chapter 7 provides a summary and recommendations on the future of policing and crime combating in South Africa.

SELF EVALUATING QUESTIONS ~ Name the critical questions resulting from/pertaining to public perceptions of police incompetence. ~ Provide reasons to justify ongoing research into policing. ~ Why is the police’s role vis-à-vis crime prevention problematic?

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2

Conceptualisation

2.1 Introduction The discussion and definition of key concepts in this chapter are important for two reasons: firstly, to provide clarity as far as the use of these concepts are concerned, and, secondly, to provide an early indication of the direction of the arguments in this book. In the literature and other sources, including official publications and personal interviews, divergent definitions and interpretations of important concepts were found. For some concepts, such as crime combating, no definition could be found. Thus it is necessary, especially for a correct understanding of this study, to define and discuss the key concepts. These are the following: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

crime combating crime control crime prevention and deterrence law enforcement strategy and levels of strategy national security.

2.2 Crime combating Although the term crime combating is used frequently, no definition for the term could be found. It is apparent that in many cases the term is inconsistently applied, and users are often confused about its correct meaning. For example, the term is sometimes used

... if the people lack sufficien ‘virtue’ – the trained motivation to act ‘well’ and ‘efficiently’ i relation to their fellows – no despotism, no policing, by itself, can come anywhere close to maintaining the systems of a productive and safe society. (PARSONS, 1952)

Learning outcomes After studying this chapter, you should be able to ~ define and explain key concepts such as crime combating, crime prevention, crime control, crime deterrence, law enforcement, strategy and national security ~ explain the levels of strategy, as well as direct and indirect strategy ~ discuss crime and the risk factors of crime (including its socioeconomic root causes) as a threat to the national security of South Africa.

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when crime prevention is intended, or vice versa. However, it is obvious that combating is much more than prevention alone. The term should be construed as inclusive of both crime prevention and policing (proactive and reactive police measures). This would mean that crime combating could be regarded as an overarching term for all kinds of legal activities aimed at fighting crime, whether it is to prevent, reduce, control, deter or to solve crime, and may also include policing activities such as law enforcement, the maintenance of public order and visible policing. The term crime fighting itself is sometimes used in a restrictive way. For example, Morgan and Newburn (1997: 81), quoting from a report by the Audit Commission in Britain in 1993, use “law enforcement” and “crime-fighting” as interchangeable terms. Incidentally, the title of the Audit Commission’s report refers to “tackling” crime. Therefore, for the purpose of this book the terms crime combating and crime fighting will be regarded as interchangeable, and phrases such as tackling crime, as having an analogous meaning. A study of official documents of the South African Police Service, reveals that a degree of terminological confusion exists. For example, the terms crime combating and crime prevention are used either as interchangeable, or as completely separate concepts. In his foreword to the 2000/1 Annual Report of the South African Police Service, the National Commissioner of the Service uses the words prevent and combat separately, but gives no indication of whether or not they are conceptually different (South Africa, 2001). Stevens and Cloete (1996: 42, 47) also through their use of “prevention” and “combating”, illustrate the basic error of using these terms interchangeably. Unfortunately they too do not define the term crime combating, but as argued in this book, crime prevention is always part of the broader concept of crime combating, while crime combating, on the other hand, can never be part of crime prevention. Based on the aforegoing arguments, the following definition for the concept crime combating is adopted: Crime combating entails any lawful activity aimed at reducing crime, whether it refers to measures aimed at the prevention of crime, or whether it is an activity associated with proactive or reactive policing.

2.3 Crime control The term crime control is another example of terminological confusion. It is widely used to refer to the business of policing, but it is unclear as to what specific types of activity are referred to. For example, Moore et al. (1996: 3) make the following statement: The core business of the police is to control crime. No one disputes this. Indeed, professional crime fighting enjoys wide public support as the basic strategy of policing ...

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To these writers there are three basic tactics predominant in professional crime fighting (crime control):

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♦ motorised patrol ♦ rapid response to calls for service ♦ retrospective investigation of crime.

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Moore et al. (1996: 3–4) admit that these tactics justify criticism of the police as being too reactive. They argue that the addition of more proactive tactics, such as diagnosing and managing community problems that produce crime as well as fostering closer relations with the community in order to facilitate the solving of crime, will greatly enhance the crime-control capability of the police. From this it seems that the authors see crime control as a much broader concept than that which is denoted from the first three tactics. It may also explain their equation of crime control with crime fighting and, in terms of the arguments in this book, also with crime combating. It is, however, uncertain whether indeed Moore et al. (1996), see crime control as similar to crime combating, or whether crime control, in their view, includes crime prevention. In the South African National Crime Prevention Strategy (South Africa, 1996c: 5), which was developed by an inter-departmental strategy team, a clear distinction is made between crime control and crime prevention. According to this document crime control refers to largely reactive measures, while crime prevention “... involves a deeper process ... longer term and ... focuses on preventing crime at an early stage”. According to Hale (1994: 25–26) the concept of crime control includes the detection of crime, the suppression of crime, and the prevention of crime. He believes that crime is not just a police problem, but much rather a community problem. As its causes and cures are beyond the control of the police, crime control cannot be the core function of the police. It should be a shared responsibility. Used in this sense, however, the term crime control, once again, seems to be understood to mean much the same as crime combating. Strong criticism against the way in which the term crime control is applied comes from Lab (1992: 10). According to Lab: ... crime control alludes to the maintenance of a given or existing level and the management of that amount of behaviour. To this Lab (1992: 10–11) adds the following: ... the admission of the functional necessity of crime and the goal of crime ‘control’ helps engender a mindset doomed not to achieve crime ‘prevention’. Lab’s arguments are very convincing. Crime control can only mean that a given or existing level of crime is accepted as tolerable and, at least psychologically, provides no incentive or room for initiative to reduce those levels. In that sense the term is negative and psychologically restrictive. In contrast, the term crime combating is much stronger and more positive. Crime control, therefore, can be defined as a form of policing intent on preventing increases in crime. This is how the term is understood for the purpose of this

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book, keeping in mind that it is not necessarily the meaning attached to it by all the authorities on the subject of crime and criminology.

2.4 Crime prevention and crime deterrence 2.4.1 Crime prevention Crime prevention, as a concept and subsequently also its definition, is probably one of the most problematic areas of policing. Some of the reasons for this statement have already been alluded to, and will receive further attention later in this book. The problematic nature of crime prevention stems from the fact that most criminologists, scientists in policing and police professionals agree that there is very little, given the nature and the causes of crime, that the police can do to prevent crime. On the other hand, looking at the history and development of policing – especially since the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829 and the historic emphasis on the crime prevention responsibilities of the police – the general public and government expect the police to prevent, and to be able to prevent, crime. Against this background, defining crime prevention will always be difficult. The situation becomes even more complicated where the definition lends itself to the allocation of responsibilities. The examples that follow are only a few of the many, and mostly valid, definitions available. Lab (1992: 10) makes it clear that crime prevention is very different from crime control. He defines crime prevention as: ... any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived level of fear of crime. Building on the work of other writers, Lab (1992: 11–14) distinguishes three approaches to crime prevention: ♦ Primary crime prevention. This form occurs in the realm of criminal justice and identifies conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for, or precipitate, criminal acts. Typical examples are environmental design, neighbourhood watch, general deterrence, private security and education about crime and crime prevention. ♦ Secondary crime prevention is a form that engages in early identification of potential offenders and seeks to intervene. An example is the identification of high crime areas and areas predisposed to fostering criminal activity. ♦ Tertiary crime prevention is a form that deals with actual offenders and involves intervention in such a fashion that they will not commit further offences. This approach applies mainly to the activities within the criminal justice system after arrest.

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During 2000 the National Crime Prevention Centre, within the Department of Safety and Security, published a manual for community based crime prevention, enti-

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tled Making South Africa safe . According to the manual (South Africa, 2000a: 4) the term crime prevention means different things to different people. It goes on to state that “[i]n effect, crime prevention is about stopping crime from happening rather than waiting to respond once offences have been committed”. The explanation of crime prevention offered by the manual, rather than its definition (South Africa, 2000a: 5), is in line with the thinking of Stevens and Cloete (1996: 42, 51):

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Crime prevention in general means the removal of causes, and not merely the treatment of symptoms. and also: ... the term ‘crime prevention’ refers to any activity designed to reduce the future incidence of criminal behaviour ... According to the National Crime Prevention Strategy (South Africa, 1996c: 5) crime prevention involves a deeper process than crime control, is longer term and focuses on the prevention of crime at an early stage. In terms of tackling crime it seeks to address two types of factors: ♦ Those that create a risk of offending ♦ Those that create a risk of victimisation A workable definition of crime prevention is contained in the White Paper on safety and security: 1999–2004, which was published in September 1998. In the White Paper (South Africa, 1998a: 14) crime prevention is defined as: All activities which reduce, deter or prevent the occurrence of specific crimes firstly, by altering the environment in which they occur, secondly by changing the conditions which are thought to cause them, and thirdly by providing a strong deterrent in the form of an effective Justice System. However, the crime prevention role of the police (including crime deterrence) should also be considered against the background of the so-called precipitating and predisposing factors of crime. Precipitating factors have to do with the belief that an opportunity to commit crime exists, while predisposing factors refer to the inclination to perpetrate crime (Van Heerden, 1992: 157). Both precipitating (opportunity) and predisposing (inclination or need) factors must exist simultaneously for a crime to take place. In view of the fact that the role of the police vis-à-vis the prevention of crime is part of the main theme of this book, it is also necessary at this stage, to list the functions (“objects”) of the South African Police Service as contained in section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.

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2.4.2 Crime deterrence Crime deterrence should be seen as a form of crime prevention, but should not be confused with it. According to Van Heerden (1992: 158) deterrence describes those activities, which are aimed at discouraging criminals from the perpetration of crime by the placement of obstacles. Van Heerden (1992: 159) also distinguishes between two types of deterrence, namely general deterrence and direct deterrence: ♦ General deterrence. General deterrence is achieved through the existence of certainty or a belief that the commission of crime will be followed by detection and arrest, and by prosecution and punishment; through effective law enforcement; and by the nature of the punishment, which should be sufficient to deter. ♦ Direct deterrence. Direct deterrence has to do with the blocking of potential opportunities. This can be achieved through police visibility, security guards, security systems and electronic equipment, et cetera. This, at least, is the theory. It is an ongoing debate whether or not the presence and activities of the police really deter crime or only displace crime. There is a totally unrealistic perception of the contribution of the police towards the prevention of crime and of the impact the police make, or are capable of making, with regard to crime deterrence. Conklin (1995: 454), to some extent, touches on this perception with the following statement: The police, legislators, politicians and the public commonly assume that the police deter crime through arrest or the threat of arrest, even though the rate at which the police solve crime is quite low.

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The situation is even worse considering that many crimes are not reported to the police. Conklin (1995: 456–457) also points to the debate about the displacement of crime and notes that the case for and against displacement is continuing. According to Conklin (1995: 453) the relationship between crime rates and the risk of apprehension remains unresolved, while general disagreement also exists regarding the subject of deterrence and police numbers. In this regard, Conklin (1995: 454) refers to research which found an inverse relationship between clearance rates and crime rates. This would mean that increases in solving rates lead to fewer crimes, at least of the sort solved. But another study, using data from 1964 to 1970 for 98 American cities, could find no support for such a conclusion. From this brief discussion it is obvious that the concepts crime prevention and crime deterrence are interrelated but not synonymous. Prevention is the overarching concept, with deterrence one of its subdivisions, very much like crime prevention is a subdivision of crime combating. Crime prevention, in essence, means to stop a crime from happening in the first place. But there are various ways of preventing crime, for example, by addressing its causative conditions; by implementing physical measures; and by creating psychological barriers. In view of the aforementioned discussion and the definitions of concepts, the wording of section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 cre-

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ates terminological confusion. For example, the use of the word “combat”, in addition to “prevent”, in section 205(3), implies a difference in the meaning of these two concepts, but neither of them are explained. This leads to speculation and various interpretations. Another difficulty is the interchangeable use of concepts, which do not seem to logically fit together. For example, to prevent crime can obviously be an aim or objective of the police, resulting from the performing of their functions (law enforcement, crime investigation, public order maintenance and visible policing), but it cannot be a function (or responsibility) in itself. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how functions can become objects (aims and objectives). In view of this exposition and although it still does not fully resolve all the terminological confusion inherent in the wording of section 205(3), it would make more sense to clearly separate functions and objects in the tasking of the police. Accordingly, a rephrased section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, could read as follows:

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The crime combating functions (or responsibilities) of the police are to uphold and enforce the law, to investigate crime, to maintain public order and to perform visible police services, with the object to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property.

2.5 Law enforcement According to Purpura (1997: 134) law enforcement is the “[a]pplying [of] legal sanctions to behaviour that violates a legal standard”. To Hale (1994: 34), law enforcement is a basic responsibility of the police. In the White Paper on Safety and Security: 1999–2004 (South Africa, 1998a: 6) law enforcement is equated with policing and set apart from crime prevention. The White Paper views law enforcement (or policing) and crime prevention – particularly social crime prevention – as a “twin approach” to crime. Police officials are often described as law enforcement officials and police agencies as law enforcement agencies. This practice strengthens the general view that policing and law enforcement is one and the same thing. But Van Heerden (1992: 16) warns against the tendency to define policing in terms of functions only. He argues that function and method are inseparably linked in the sense that function can determine method, whereas method cannot determine function. Function is described as a specific duty or obligation and method as the proficiency – the skills or the rules which accompany the execution or performing of the duty. However, for the purpose of this book the above-mentioned definition of law enforcement, provided by Purpura (1997: 134), is regarded as adequate.

2.6 Strategy, levels of strategy and national security The concepts of strategy, national strategy and national security are so intertwined, that it is necessary to discuss them together. Although the discussion will be rela-

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tively brief, it will include reference to some existing definitions. At the end of the discussion for each of these concepts, a definition will be tendered which will be regarded as both a working definition and in line with modern thinking on the subject. An alignment and understanding of these concepts, for the purpose of this book, is essential for the following reasons: ♦ Crime and policing is viewed from a national strategic perspective. In other words, the book is based on research into the development of the philosophy behind the current understanding, and subsequent judicial regulation of policing in South Africa since 1991. ♦ A discussion of the national crime prevention and crime combating strategies at political and departmental level is fundamental to the arguments in this book. ♦ It will be argued that crime in South Africa is a threat to national security and that the combating of this threat should be approached from a national strategic perspective. ♦ National security policy and national security strategy – which must be all-inclusive and away from the current over-reliance on the police and policing – must be developed, implemented and authoritatively managed if crime is to be combated effectively.

2.6.1 Strategy 2.6.1.1 Defining strategy The word strategy, according to Beaufre (1965: 19), is one of those words that are used often enough, but seldom properly understood. It is also commonly used by the police to describe a number of policing activities. These activities are grouped together for the purpose of achieving specified objectives within prescribed time frames, but the word or term strategy as a concept in terms of policing, is not defined or explained anywhere. Therefore it is necessary to briefly discuss the origin of the word and how it evolved to its current broader and more modern meaning. Lastly, and based on this discussion, a definition of strategy – which is applicable to the police and policing – will be proposed. Strategy, as a concept, was originally developed to describe the conduct of war and military operations. It developed from the Greek word strategos, which is translated as “general” (Snyder, 1999: 13–14). In 1832 a Prussian General, Carl von Clausewitz, defined strategy as: ... the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the war (Rapoport, 1983: 241).

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Liddell Hart (1967: 333), also a soldier, described the Clausewitz definition as too restrictive and limited to the utilisation of the battle only. Liddell Hart (1967: 335–340) argues that strategy should have a broader explanation and should,

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for example, be so effective that a positive result can be obtained without having to resort to actual fighting. To Liddell Hart (1967: 335) strategy is:

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... the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy. It is clear that Liddell Hart, although he successfully broadens the scope of strategy, still limits its application to the military. André Beaufre, a French general, also defines strategy as a purely military concept. According to Beaufre strategy is: ... the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute (Beaufre, 1965: 22). But Earle (1966: viii) took a step forward in the development of the concept when he stated that strategy could no longer merely be a concept of wartime, but should be seen as an inherent element of statecraft. He clearly builds on Liddell Hart’s definition (earlier editions) while, at the same time, ridding it of its restrictions to war and the military. Earle (1966: viii) defines strategy as: ... the art of controlling and utilising the resources of a nation – including its armed forces. Rejai (1977: 29–31) largely agrees with Earle’s views on strategy, but maintains violence (and probably also the threat of violence) as an important element in his definition. According to Rejai (1977: 29): Strategy refers to all actions, policies, instruments and apparatus necessary to achieve the political goal. It has four main components: leadership, ideology, organisation and the use of violence. (Author’s emphasis) Snyder (1999: 14) was able to unequivocally state that the term strategy was no longer the “sole province” of the military, and even civil institutions such as businesses, corporations, non-military government departments and universities, have started to use the term to describe their planning and plans. Considering all of these definitions and the development and modernisation of the concept, Liddell Hart’s definition – with only a few changes – seems the most appropriate for policing. This adapted definition will accommodate all that is necessary to plan for and conduct policing operations and to combat crime in general. Accordingly, for the purpose of this book strategy is defined as: ... the art of distributing and applying all available resources, human and material, to fulfil the ends of policy.

2.6.1.2 Direct and indirect strategy In addition to defining the concept, it is important to note that strategy can be subdivided into direct and indirect strategy (Beaufre, 1965: 107–110). Apart from a few

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minor differences, Beaufre’s classification of direct and indirect strategy corresponds with Liddell Hart’s (1967: 15–19) direct and indirect approach. A direct approach or strategy refers to a direct confrontation, whereas an indirect approach or strategy denotes a subtler or less obvious way of doing things. Beaufre (1965: 134) compares the two approaches with music when he says that strategy can be played in two keys. The major key is direct strategy, where force is the main factor. The minor key is indirect strategy, where force is replaced by psychology and intelligent planning as the main instrument to achieving success. The direct approach and direct strategy are similar in meaning, but, according to Beaufre (1965: 108) there is a difference between the indirect approach and indirect strategy. Although these concepts will be used in this book in an adapted form to, inter alia, introduce direct and indirect policing, it is instructive to note how Beaufre perceives the difference between indirect strategy and indirect approach. According to Beaufre (1965: 108), who explains the difference in war and military terms, the object of the indirect approach remains victory through military means and it is only the preparatory manoeuvring which is direct. In a sense it thus remains part of direct strategy. For Beaufre the essential feature of indirect strategy is that “it seeks to obtain a result by methods other than military victory”. The essence of both the indirect approach and indirect strategy was captured as early as 500 years before Christ by Sun Tzu, in The art of war (Liddell Hart, 1967: 11), when he said the following: In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

2.6.2 Levels of strategy In view of later arguments it is important to note here that strategy can also be subdivided into different levels or categories. Beaufre (1965: 30–32), for example, categorises strategy into total strategy, overall strategy and operational strategy.

2.6.2.1 Total strategy

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The term total strategy is more or less equivalent to the terms grand strategy and national strategy (Beaufre, 1965: 30). Although Beaufre (1965: 30–31) explains total strategy in a military context, there is no reason – as explained earlier – why it cannot be applied within a wider non-military context. According to Beaufre (1965: 30) total strategy is at the top of the pyramid and under the direct control of the government. Total strategy must provide the overarching and integrating framework for all related fields or categories of government, such as the political, economic, diplomatic and military, and also determine the object for the overall strategies (sub-strategies) for each of these fields or categories. Liddell Hart (1967: 362) supports the arguments for levels of strategy and explains the difference between strategy and total strategy (grand strategy) as follows:

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Whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem of winning military victory, grand strategy must take the longer view – for its problem is the winning of the peace.

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Lider (1983: 200) equates national strategy with political strategy and state strategy and regards the latter two terms as interchangeable. However, it seems logical, if political strategy is often called national strategy as mentioned by Lider (1983: 200), then national strategy is also part of this interchangeable grouping of concepts with political and state strategy. Lider also places state or political strategy – and by implication national strategy – at the level of government.

2.6.2.2 Overall strategy Beaufre (1965: 31) identifies another level of strategy below that of total strategy, which he refers to as overall strategy. The term overall strategy is used to allot tasks and to coordinate activities within each of the fields of conflict (military, political, economic or diplomatic). Burke as cited by Lider (1983: 252–253) adds social, moral, spiritual and psychological objectives to these “fields of conflict”.

2.6.2.3 Operational strategy Operational strategy is the lowest level of strategy, the level at which conception and execution meet (Beaufre, 1965: 31). Because each main field or category may have various branches of activity, each branch of activity will also have its own distinct strategy or category of strategy. This type of strategy is referred to as operational strategy.

2.6.3 National security It is fundamental for the purpose of this book to recognise that crime in South Africa is a major threat to national security. This view is supported by Hough (2002: 5) in a paper delivered in February 2002 at a conference on the future of safety and security in South Africa. The recognition of crime as a national security threat implies an understanding that crime and its risk factors are multidimensional, and that the state’s efforts to combat it requires much more than a police or even a criminal justice approach. As with strategy, the concept national security developed from an initial and purely military application. In this regard Hough (2002: 1) provides two examples of traditional definitions: ... the ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruptions from outside; and to control its borders. and:

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... the condition of freedom from external physical threat which a nation state enjoys. Buzan as cited by Snyder (1999: 79) challenges the traditional understanding of security and argues that the security of human collectivities is affected, in addition to the military factor, by four other major factors, namely political, economical, societal and environmental. In other words, external military threat is seen as just one of five forms of threat a state could face. Buzan (Snyder, 1999: 80–81) also challenges the traditional notion of state as the only “referent object” of security, even when the security of people was included. Some writers, however, argue that because the state is the only entity capable of providing people with security, the referent object must be the state and therefore the focus on state security. Buzan, again cited by Snyder (1999: 80), rejects this argument as an oversimplification of the relationship between states and their citizens. He adds that the individual can be threatened by and through the state itself in a number of ways. Buzan (Snyder, 1999: 80) also draws a distinction between strong and weak states. According to his view a good part of the security problem of weak states is to protect the state against internal threat. Snyder (1999: 83) argues in favour of “people” as the referent object of security. He is supported by Booth as quoted by Snyder (1999: 83) to whom emancipation is the freeing of people, both as individuals or groups, from physical human constraints, such as poverty, poor education, political oppression and war. Snyder (1999: 84–89) also discusses societies and the environment as possible referent objects of security. He (Snyder, 1999: 97) concludes with the following statement: The state derives tremendous power from its claim to be the guardian of national security ... Challenging the traditional understanding of security as state security ... is therefore to pose a political challenge to the power of the state ... Hough (2002: 1) adds a further complicating factor to the debate about whether or not national security should include domestic security, when he points out that some analysts are concerned that such a broadening of the term may legitimise domestic violence and lead to a confusion between regime security and state security. According to Hough (2002: 1) recent studies on Third World security have started to emphasise the importance of the internal dimension of security. He cites Imobighe, as an example, who wrote that the most serious security challenges faced by sub-Saharan African countries, are those related to the undermining of national cohesion, as well as internal socioeconomic and political stability and progress (Hough, 2002: 1). Job as quoted by Hough (2002: 2) emphasises the insecurity dilemma of Third World countries and lists four major differences with developed countries:

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♦ The lack of a single nation with communal groups in competition for their own security ♦ The government often represents a particular social or ethnic sector, with a resultant absence of perceived legitimacy to security interests

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♦ The lack of effective institutional capacity to provide peace, order and progress ♦ Perceived threats are internal, to and from the regime, rather than externally motivated threats to the nation

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The South African White Paper on Intelligence (South Africa, 1994a) supports the broader view of national security. The White Paper, for example, states that in recent years, the focus in terms of security moved from a narrow and exclusively military-strategic approach to a much broader application. Accordingly the White Paper describes the current national security threat to South Africa as follows: The main threats to the wellbeing of individuals and the interests of nations across the world do not primarily come from a neighbouring army, but from other internal and external challenges such as economic collapse, overpopulation, mass-migration, ethnic rivalry, political oppression, terrorism, crime and disease ... (South Africa, 1994a: 7). The South African White Paper on Defence (South Africa, 1996d: 3) takes the view that national security is no longer a predominantly military and police problem. The concept has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental issues. The White Paper, therefore, also makes it clear that it perceives the greatest threat to the South African people as: ... socioeconomic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services, as well as the high level of crime and violence (South Africa, 1996d: 3). On 23 June 2002, in an unprecedented full-page advertisement in the Sunday Times and other Sunday newspapers, the South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) published its mandate and how it viewed national security. Reminiscent of both Snyder and Booth, the NIA made it clear that “the determinants of national security today ... is (sic) therefore the private citizenry that should be the foremost stakeholder in this equation”. Elsewhere in the advertisement it is stated that “[i]t is the overall safety and quality of life that constitutes our view of national security” (Mavimbela, 2002). According to the advertisement the NIA mandate covers the following three key areas of national security: ♦ The economic health of the country which predetermines the pursuit of national security both in its internal and external dimensions ♦ That part of the South African national interest which relates to the attainment and maintenance of a stable, peaceful, democratic and prosperous continent and the world ♦ The need to ensure good, clean governance and the maintenance and protection of the integrity of the state (Mavimbela, 2002)

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The broadening of the concept of national security to include the political, economical, social, cultural and personal dimensions in addition to the military dimension, was again confirmed by the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions which was tabled in the South African Parliament in February 1999 (South Africa, 1999c: 5). Against this background it is clear that the concept of national security is no longer limited to external threats, and specifically, military threats. Therefore, national security will be defined – at least for the purpose of this study – as a condition of freedom from either or both external and internal (domestic) threats, which may manifest in any of the following ways: ♦ Threats against the state, the people, or the individual ♦ In addition to military threats, also political, economical, societal and environmental threats (including problems such as poverty, unemployment, poor education and training, a lack of housing and inadequate social services) ♦ Crime and violence, and the threat of anarchy

2.7 Conclusion The conceptualisation in this chapter focuses on two types of concepts relevant to the arguments in this book, namely those normally associated with the police and with policing, and those, which have to do with strategy and with national security. This approach is necessary because it is intended, with this book, to determine not only the role of the police in the combating of crime, but also how crime is to be combated within the national strategic environment.

2.7.1 Conceptual clarity

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This chapter attempts to provide clarity on some of the key concepts relating to policing and crime prevention. It shows how terminological confusion and diverse interpretations relating to important concepts can lead to uncertainty, especially for the police in terms of what is expected of them. Uncertainty creates room for excuses by government departments (and other role-players) to either evade their responsibilities or to remain passive in the fight against crime. It was also pointed out that there is some doubt as to the terminological correctness of section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 . Section 205(3) prescribes the responsibilities (“objects”) of the South African Police Service. The absence of terminological and conceptual clarity in the Constitution, which is the starting point for the determining of the police’s role in the combating of crime, clearly exacerbates the existing confusion. No other South African legislation provides any further guidance on this matter. In addition to terminological and conceptual confusion about the role of the police, there is a similar confusion about crime combating terminology and concepts in general. This adds to difficulties and uncertainty about the overall location of responsibilities, especially with regard to government departments. It is for this

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purpose that a discussion of terms and concepts relating to strategy and national security becomes relevant. Strategy is simultaneously complicated and simple. It is simple in the sense that it decides the “how”. The “what” is determined by policy. Policy provides the direction, the aims, goals and objectives. Strategy decides the effective use of resources to achieve those objectives. To paraphrase: whereas policy decides the destination, strategy controls the journey. It is thus clear that the effectiveness of a strategy will largely depend on the clarity of the relevant policy. The South African Constitution, as the highest form of policy, followed by legislation and governmental policy documents, therefore needs to provide such clarity and direction. The need for clarity and direction is also a need for greater focus, and optimal use of resources. A thorough understanding of the relationship between policy and strategy, and consequently the conscientious application of this insight in the development of both these concepts at all levels of government and government agencies, are therefore necessary if success is to be achieved.

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2.7.2 Direct and indirect strategy and policing The value of the concepts of direct and indirect strategy for policing, accordingly, lies in the opportunity to focus according to those areas where the police have a direct impact and those where they have an indirect impact. Consequently policing can also be categorised into direct and indirect policing. The term direct policing will be applicable to those functions and activities where the police directly confront unlawful conduct and offenders. The term indirect policing will be applicable to those activities which have to do with the interaction between the police, other government agencies, local authorities, nongovernment agencies, communities and community-based organisations (see paragraph 4.4.3 for a more detailed discussion of these concepts). A national strategy should acknowledge the concept of direct and indirect policing and should task the police accordingly. Once there is this clear understanding of the police’s role, the police should be able to prioritise and focus much more effectively in relation to how they apply their resources.

2.7.3 National security Lastly, it is important to note that the South African government acknowledges crime (and the socioeconomic conditions which are thought to cause it) as a national security threat. What is clearly needed is a national policy and strategy to combat this threat. Such a national policy and subsequent strategy must obviously be as comprehensive as the threat itself. Consequently it cannot be restricted to only addressing the problems and deficiencies of the criminal justice system, and in particular that of the police, but must also deal with the risk factors of crime. It must, accordingly, define the responsibilities of the various role-players, including those of the police.

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SELF EVALUATING QUESTIONS ~ Explain the difference between crime combating, crime prevention and crime deterrence. ~ Explain the difference between law enforcement and crime control. ~ Define strategy and explain its three levels. ~ Distinguish between direct and indirect strategy. ~ What is the relevance of direct and indirect strategy for policing?

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Conceptual dilemmas in modern policing

3.1 Introduction This chapter focuses on the dilemmas faced by the police in their attempt to execute their prescribed functions, with specific reference to the United States and the United Kingdom. As was indicated in Chapter 1 these two countries were selected for providing a suitable background and perspective for the arguments in this book, regarding crime and policing in South Africa. It is necessary to show that South Africa, as a developing country has – in many respects – a very different policing experience, yet faces many of the same policing dilemmas of developed countries. This chapter will show how increases in crime levels in the United States and the United Kingdom, as in South Africa, led to criticism of the police and of policing. It will also be shown how, in the United States and especially in the United Kingdom, formal inquiries were conducted to determine what was wrong with the police, instead of determining what was wrong with society . This is also the South African experience. Throughout this discussion it is essential to remember that the golden thread which runs through this book, is crime prevention, as part of crime combating, and the question as to whether it should continue as a function of the police. This chapter will also attempt to show how political, social and economic developments in the previous

The police did not create and cannot resolve the social conditions that stimulate crime. They did not start and cannot stop the convulsive social change that is taking place in America. (PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 1967: 92)

Learning outcomes After studying this chapter, you should be able to ~ define and explain the concepts police and policing ~ discuss the origins and development of police functions ~ explain the inherent dilemmas facing the police ~ explain the relationship between crime rates and police numbers ~ explain the influence of political and public perceptions on policing.

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century impacted on crime and, in turn, how these sometimes dramatic increases in crime affected the police and policing. The literature, where the phenomenon of the police vis-à-vis crime prevention is discussed, abounds with terms such as “fiction”, “myth”, “assumption”, “unrealistic”, “misconception” and “impossible mandate”. In one instance, where conflict within the police in relation to its control versus its care role is discussed, it is described as “institutional schizophrenia” (Walker, 1994: 33). In general, the dilemmas faced by the police are summarised well by Bayley (1994: 3): The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best-kept secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that they are society’s best defence against crime and continually argue that if they are given more resources, especially personnel, they will be able to protect communities against crime. This is a myth. In essence this means that the police are expected to perform a function – crime prevention – for which they are least qualified. The causation of crime resides mainly in social and economic factors and in this regard the police clearly have a very limited role. Some of the questions and dilemmas thus posed, become clear: ♦ If the police do not prevent crime, who does, and what is it then that the police do or should be doing? ♦ If the police know they cannot prevent crime, why do they continue to pretend that they can? Does it have anything to do with prestige and power? ♦ Is it simply a question of sentiment and/or foolhardiness not to admit that the police cannot prevent crime, or is it ignorance? ♦ If the police continue to claim responsibility for crime prevention, the public and the political establishment will continue to hold them accountable and will continue to blame them for increases in crime and violence. Why would the police allow that and how will it affect them in the long run? To set the stage for a discussion on some of these questions and dilemmas, this chapter will consider the origins of modern police agencies and of their functions and responsibilities, especially their responsibility regarding crime prevention.

3.2 Origins of the police and of policing For the purpose of clarity and before discovering the origins of the police and of policing, a brief discussion and definition of the concepts police and policing is necessary.

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3.2.1 Defining police and policin In the Extract from Instruction Book of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London (2002: 1), the term police is defined as:

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... generally, the arrangements made in all civilised countries to ensure that the inhabitants keep the peace and obey the law.

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The above definition clearly defines “police” as a verb. According to the Instruction Book, the word police, used as a noun also denotes the force of peace officers employed for this purpose. The Collins Concise Dictionary (2001: 1159) defines police and policing as follows: ♦ police (noun): the organised civil force of a state, concerned with maintenance of law and order. ♦ police (verb): to regulate, control, or keep in order by means of a police or similar force. ♦ policing (noun): the policies, techniques, and practice of a police force in keeping order, preventing crime et cetera. According to Johnston (1992: 4) the concepts of police and policing have been conflated over time, with historians and sociologists assuming that the two things meant the same. However, Reiner as cited by Francis et al. (1997: 5), clearly distinguishes between the two concepts: “Police” refers to a particular kind of social institution, while “policing” implies a set of processes with specific social functions. “Police” are not found in every society, and police organisations and personnel can have a variety of shifting forms. “Policing”, however, is arguably a universal requirement of any social order, and may be carried out by a number of different processes and institutional arrangements. According to Francis et al. (1997: 5) the term police is also relatively new, whereas “policing” has a much longer historical pedigree. Reiner, again quoted by Francis et al. (1997: 6), further describes “police” as “... a specialised body of people who are responsible for the use of legitimate force to safeguard security”. Drawing upon the work of Reiner, Francis et al. (1997: 5–6) suggests a formulation inclusive of both “police” and “policing” which they believe will contribute to a better understanding of the two concepts: ... policing involves both “the creation of systems of surveillance” and “the threat of sanctions for discovered deviance” ... and may be carried out through a number of processes, of which the modern system of public police is but one example. It is increasingly evident that there is general agreement that the concept police, used as a noun, refers to the public police or “the organised civil force of a state concerned with maintenance of law and order” (Collins Concise Dictionary, 2001: 36). It is, however, the concept of policing that is becoming a contentious issue. Johnston (1992: 4–6, 183–203), after discussing the history of policing, draws the conclusion that it entails more than what the public police do. According to Johnston

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(1992: 190) “... policing consists of a complex of connections between formal and substantive powers, and between private and public activities ...” Johnston’s views are obviously supported by Francis et al., as shown by the above-mentioned quotes. More support comes from Bayley and Shearing (2001: 1) who define policing as “... meaning the activity of making societies safe ...” According to them policing is no longer carried out exclusively by governments. It is their view (Bayley & Shearing, 2001: 1) that policing is being transformed and restructured in the modern world, and that it involves much more than reforming the institution regarded as the police. Bayley and Shearing (2001: 5–11) clearly favour the idea that policing refers to any legitimate activity aimed at the provision of security, whether it is provided by the state police or by a private security institution. The arguments in favour of a broader meaning of the concept policing are not convincing. It is, for example, debatable why the function of safety and security, when provided by private security companies, needs to be referred to as policing. It only adds to existing confusion regarding the concepts of police and policing. This book is in support of a more conservative or traditional interpretation of policing, to mean those functions performed by the police. In this sense it is proposed that policing be defined as: ... all those lawful activities, whether proactive or reactive, performed by the police in the process of providing their prescribed services such as reassuring the public; creating a visible deterrence; and executing their law enforcement, crime investigation and public order maintenance functions.

3.2.2 Origins of the police According to the Extract from Instruction Book of the MPS (2002: 1), the British police originate from early tribal history. It was based on customs relating to the securing of order, by means of appointed representatives. During the eighteenth century the Industrial Revolution created a mass movement of people from rural to urban areas, and its accompanying social and economic changes and conditions (Hale, 1994: 3). At the time it became increasingly clear that the system of policing was totally inadequate in those new and changing conditions. Crime and disorder became more prevalent and a new and more organised approach was needed (Hale, 1994: 3; MPS, 2002: 1). In 1829 the British Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel, introduced an Act for Improving the Police in and near the Metropolis in parliament (Hale, 1994: 3–4). This Act was regarded as the birth of the London Metropolitan Police (Service), which in turn served as model for the development of police agencies elsewhere, including in the United States (Hale, 1994: 4), and in South Africa.

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3.2.3 Origins of police functions Based on the discussions in the previous paragraph it is safe to say that – before the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 – the responsibility for crime pre-

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vention was not among the functions of the earlier police organisations. The functions of the police prior to 1829 that can be identified from the literature are:

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♦ order maintenance ♦ law enforcement ♦ street patrols ♦ guard duties. It can, however, be argued that all of the above-mentioned functions, when performed well, have a deterrent effect and therefore indirectly prevent crime. This is to some extent true, but it should also be borne in mind that there are various counter-arguments. For example, deterrence in one place may prevent the crime from being committed at that place, but does not necessarily mean that the crime will not be displaced and committed elsewhere (see Chapter 2). With the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, the prevention of crime was for the first time specifically mentioned as a police responsibility, when Sir Robert Peel published his nine principles of policing (New Westminster Police, 2004: 1–2). These principles, which guided modern policing to this day, are: ♦ The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder. ♦ The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions. ♦ Police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public. ♦ The degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force. ♦ Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law. ♦ Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient. ♦ Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give fulltime attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence. ♦ Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary. ♦ The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it. In the same year Sir Richard Mayne, one of the two joint Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, echoed Sir Robert’s views when he wrote the following about the functions of the police:

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The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime: the next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. To these ends all the efforts of the police must be directed. The protection of life and property, the preservation of public tranquillity, and the absence of crime, will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful and whether the objects for which the police were appointed, have been attained (MPS, 2002: 1). The first Instruction Book of the Metropolitan Police clearly reflects these views, especially with regard to the prominence of the prevention of crime, and goes on to explain it further: The security of person and property, the preservation of public tranquillity, and all other objects of a police establishment will thus be better effected than by the detection and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in committing the crime ... officers and police constables should endeavour to distinguish themselves by such vigilance and activity as may render it impossible for any one to commit a crime within that portion of the town under their charge (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 75–76). The establishment of the Metropolitan Police thus added two new police functions: ♦ The prevention of crime (as the primary function) ♦ The investigation of crime (“detection and punishment of the offender”)

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It is obvious that some of the goals the Metropolitan Police set for themselves were very idealistic. For example, to “render it impossible for anyone to commit a crime”, is not realistically achievable. This is a clear indication of the thinking around crime prevention at that time. There is no mention of prevention by addressing the root causes of crime, or of other types of prevention (for example, primary, secondary and tertiary prevention). To illustrate the impossibility of the task to “render it impossible for anyone to commit a crime”, one only needs to look at the police to public ratio in London during 1829. According to statistics in About the Metropolitan Police (MPS, 2002: 1) the personnel figure of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 was 1000 officers, while the population of London was less than two million. In other words, the ratio was one police officer for every 2000 citizens (1:2000). The ratio in modern-day London is 1:281, but even this relatively more favourable ratio will not enable the police to “render it impossible for anyone to commit a crime”. It can only be concluded that at the time (the early years of the Metropolitan Police) there was very little understanding of the complex criminological relationship between the causes, the perpetrator and the perpetration of crime. It is also difficult to understand why, more than 170 years later and in spite of all the knowledge and understanding gained since then, there is still so much reluctance and even resistance to re-evaluate Sir Robert Peel’s dictum and to change it. The 1829 dictum about the police and policing is still being preached in modern-

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day London and followed by many police agencies all over the world. In its Statement of Common Purpose and Values , for example, the Metropolitan Police Service in 1992 defined its purpose as follows:

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... to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen’s Peace; to protect and reassure the community ... (Comben & Strachan, 1992: 2). The influence of Sir Robert Peel and the Metropolitan Police is evident in the Constitutional tasking of the South African Police Service. Section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, determines that: The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.

3.3 Inherent dilemmas of and inquiries into the police In the following sections attention will be given to how the responsibility (function) for crime prevention has created fundamental dilemmas for the police in the United Kingdom and the United States. (The position in South Africa will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.) This discussion is necessary for the purpose of creating a better understanding of how sociopolitical developments over the last 30–40 years have impacted on the police and policing. It will also provide the necessary background and insight for the later discussions on the sociopolitical developments in South Africa, and how these influenced the police and policing in this country. It is widely accepted that the exceptionally high crime levels in the United Kingdom and the United States over the last few decades, resulted from major sociopolitical changes. As these changes increased, crime levels increased, and as crime levels increased, criticism of the police increased (Dennis, 1997: 12–27; Penna, 1996: 1–12). It remains a striking feature of times characterised by high or increasing crime rates that the police are the first to be blamed. Inevitably this results in official inquiries or reviews to determine what is wrong with the police or what is wrong with how policing is conducted. Then follows recommendations on how to “fix” (reform) the police and how to improve policing. Consequently the police themselves experience feelings of despondency because their best efforts seem fruitless and ineffective. They lose confidence and are prepared to accept all the changes (reforms) forced upon them, believing that others (non-police) know best. Dennis (1997: 15–16) points out in his discussion how certain social changes effectively undermined the authority of the police: ... it sapped the confidence of police personnel themselves in the legitimacy and effectiveness of their police function. Unfortunately many police executives are almost submissive in their acceptance of the criticism. Because many among them are well aware that traditional police

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practices will not be effective, at least not in themselves, they are prepared to reach beyond the traditional scope of policing. Their attempts are aimed at a more proactive approach and have already resulted in novel concepts, such as community policing, problem oriented policing, partnership policing, sector policing, et cetera. Most police executives probably know that crime prevention is only possible when the root causes of crime and other conditions, which are conducive to crime, are addressed. Because they are not in a position to address these causes and conditions, and because nobody else seems prepared or willing to take on that responsibility, the police have taken the initiative to enter into partnerships with communities and various other role-players in an effort to jointly address these causes and conditions. The question, however, remains whether this is really the correct way to address such a hugely complicated sociopolitical problem, and whether the police should continue to accept the blame and to search for police and policing solutions? In the words of Reiner (1994: 29), quoting from Raymond Chandler in The Long Goodbye: …using the cops to control crime and other complex social problems is like taking aspirin to cure a brain tumour, but “[n]o way has yet been invented to say goodbye to them”. Recent studies have shown increasing support for a re-evaluation of the police’s role, especially in terms of crime prevention. Morgan and Newburn (1997: 10), for example, have articulated this need well: ... it is also very clear that we cannot go on as we have been doing ... We must establish what the fundamental role and functions of the police are to be.

3.3.1 The position in the United Kingdom The United Kingdom comprises Great Britain – consisting of England, Wales and Scotland – and Northern Ireland, as well as a number of small islands. England and Wales have forty-three police services and Scotland has eight. Northern Ireland has its Royal Ulster Constabulary, and the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsy have their island police services (Comben & Strachan, 1992: 6). In paragraph 3.3.1.1 the growth of crime in the United Kingdom, especially since the 1960s, and the pressures this created for the police, are discussed. This is followed, in paragraph 3.3.1.2, by a discussion of the attempts by successive governments to “fix” the problem by “fixing” the police.

3.3.1.1 Crime rates and police numbers

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According to Dennis (1997: 7–27), a British sociologist, there is very little appreciation for the enormous social changes in Britain since the 1930s, and their escalating impact on crime. He illustrates the seriousness of the situation by quoting the following crime figures: ♦ Between 1931 and 1996 robbery increased from 208 to 72 000.

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♦ The crime rate in Britain increased from less than a 1000 per 100 000 of the population in 1955 to 7300 per 100 000 in 1985.

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♦ Between 1981 and 1995 the crime rate in Britain increased by 91 per cent from 11 million to 19 million. ♦ In 1954 almost 20 000 youths under the age of 14 were found guilty on various criminal charges. In 1994, while the crime rate was 11 times higher than in 1954, the number of youths found guilty of offences was 6 times lower. During the late 1970s the rising crime rate became a major factor in British politics, but it was clear that the police were still seen as the government’s main weapon against crime. In 1979 the new Conservative Party government immediately and significantly increased police salaries and complements (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 2). The new British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, promised to “spend more on the police whilst economising elsewhere”. Her government saw this as an investment which would deliver, firstly, a supportive police service and, secondly, a reduction in crime levels (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 2). In 1985, at the Conservative Party annual conference, Mrs Thatcher reaffirmed her belief that the solution to the crime problem rests with the police. She promised that her government would continue “steadfastly to back the police”, and “[i]f they need more men, more equipment, they shall have them” (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 2). That the police are pre-occupied with numbers, in terms of personnel and resources, vis-à-vis crime, is a clear indication that many police executives believe that a growth in the crime rate has to be followed by a corresponding growth in police numbers and resources. To illustrate this point, Sir John Smith, Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, cited the following statistics at an International Police and Law Enforcement Conference in London in 1994: Over the past ten years or so, the total number of police officers in England and Wales rose by some 6 per cent (with additional civilian staff this amounts to approximately 12 per cent). At the same time there has been an 82 per cent increase in reported crime, a 70 per cent increase in emergency calls and ... [a] twelve-fold rise in reported domestic violence in London (Smith, 1994: 23). However, within Conservative Party circles, disillusionment with the performance of the police soon started to show. In his memoirs, Mr Kenneth Baker, Home Secretary in 1990, sums up the situation as follows: ... while several of my ministerial colleagues and Tory MPs supported the police in public, they were highly critical of them in private. There was impatience, if not anger, that although we had spent 87 per cent more in real terms since 1979 and had increased police numbers by 27 000, there had still been a substantial rise in crime (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 2–3). The British government made the classic mistake of thinking that the crime problem could be solved by increased spending only on the criminal justice system, and

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especially the police. Of course it will help, but it is not the solution. The government clearly failed to understand the complex relationship between crime, its causes and the accommodating conditions. Therefore they had no appreciation of the impossibility of what they expected from the police and the fact that the police, no matter how hard they tried, were never going to be able to live up to the high political expectations. The disillusionment and disappointment of the politicians, given their naivety in matters of crime and policing, is understandable. Between 1979 and 1984 the expenditure on the police more than doubled from 1664 to 3358 million pounds (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 46). In the same period, recorded crime continued to increase by 37 per cent from 2,5 million cases in 1979 to 3,5 million in 1984. In contrast, the official clear-up rate for notifiable offences declined from 41 per cent in 1979 to 35 per cent in 1984. By 1987 recorded crime increased by a further 6 per cent to 3,7 million cases, while the clear-up rate dropped to 33 per cent (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 46). Strangely the crime rate began decreasing in the mid-1990s, although not as drastic as was the case with the increases in the preceding years. According to the British Crime Survey (BCS) of 1998 – based on a survey of victims of crime and to be distinguished from police crime reports which measure recorded crime – the long-term trend shows that the gradual rise in BCS reported crime during the 1980s and the steep rise during the early 1990s, has been reversed. But, in spite of these decreases, the overall number of crimes counted by the BCS has increased by 49 per cent since 1981 (Mirlees-Black et al., 1998: i). According to Simmons (2002: i) crime has further decreased significantly between 1997 and 2001/2; violent crime has decreased by 22 per cent; domestic burglary by 39 per cent; and vehicle crime by 26 per cent. The reasons for the apparent fall in the crime rate since the mid-1990s are not clear. It is also unknown whether the police or the criminal justice system as a whole, are accredited in any way. It is, however, doubtful whether these decreases can be sustained without drastic and fundamental political interventions also in the socioeconomic dimensions of life in the United Kingdom. This view is supported by the fact that some crimes have recently again shown increases. For example, between 2000/1 and 2001/2, homicide increased by 4 per cent and robbery by 28 per cent (Simmons, 2002: 53). According to the crime figures announced by the Home Office in early January 2003, violent crime in England and Wales rose by 19 per cent during 2002, while there was an increase of 35 per cent in the use of firearms (Van der Walt, 2003: 3). Robbery increased by a further 18,2 per cent; housebreaking by 7,9 per cent; other break-ins by 6 per cent; thefts out of vehicles by 3,5 per cent; other thefts by 12,6 per cent; and drug-related crime by 12,3 per cent (Van der Walt, 2003: 3).

3.3.1.2 Inquiries into the police and policing

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According to Morgan and Newburn (1997: 2) there existed in Britain, until the mid1970s, a large measure of agreement between the two main political parties about the police and policing. Brewer et al. (1988: 42) ascribe this state of agreement to the

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fact that public expectations of the police rested on the principle of consent and, very importantly, “the presumption that the body of the people were pacific and law-abiding”. The only notable interest in the police during this time is to be found in a public survey conducted during 1960 for the Royal Commission on the Police in 1962 (Reiner, 1994: 12). The survey showed an “overwhelming vote of confidence” in the police. The recommendations of the Royal Commission led to the promulgation of the Police Act of 1964 (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 44). By the late 1970s things were set to change. In 1979 the Conservative Party government focused the bulk of their law and order attention on the police. Six years later, in 1985, the government was still promising “more men and more equipment” (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 2). But, as pointed out above, the British government soon became disillusioned. Despite the increases in police personnel and other resources, recorded crime continued to rise and clear-up rates went down (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 2–3). From approximately 1982 onward, the government vigorously implemented its Financial Management Initiative (FMI), whereby it endeavoured to introduce private sector management practices to the public sector (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 3). Government also considered options such as privatisation, civilianisation and voluntarisation. All of these developments created consternation and even resentment among police representative organisations (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 3–4). The public disorders of the early 1980s, especially the Brixton riots of 1981, led to the well-known Scarman Inquiry, chaired by Lord Scarman (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 50). The Scarman Report: The Brixton Disorders, 10 –12 April 1981 , which was published in 1982, was highly critical of the police and contained wide-ranging recommendations regarding the police and policing (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 50–51). Importantly, however, it also reconfirmed the basic functions of the police formulated 150 years earlier by Sir Robert Peel. Of these basic functions, crime prevention was again mentioned as the primary function of the police (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 51). In 1984 the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) followed, and soon after that, in 1986, the Public Order Act (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 50). The latter Act introduced significant changes to public order law, but PACE was shrouded in controversy. Although PACE provided far-reaching procedural safeguards to suspects, it also extended a number of police powers. The police supported PACE, but it was severely criticised by liberal and left-wing commentators (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 51). From the debates about the police and policing and from the direct and indirect political interference in the affairs of the police since the 1980s, it is clear that policing increasingly became politicised. Whereas the 1980s saw a Conservative Party government intent on strengthening and resourcing the police, the 1990s was characterised by a Labour Party government intent on scrutinising and reforming (“fixing”) the police. Within six months after the general elections in 1992 the new (Labour Party) government instituted two major reviews of policing. The first review led to the

3

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1993 White Paper on Police Reform: A Police Service for the Twenty First Century (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 4). During May 1992, and before the completion of the White Paper, the second review, chaired by Sir Patrick Sheehy, was announced (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 5). A report by the Sheehy Inquiry in 1993, entitled Report of the Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards , was highly unpopular with the police. Its publication only two days after the publication of the White Paper aggravated the situation of uncertainty and confusion then prevalent among police members (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 5–6). Whereas the White Paper prescribed the main job of the police as the “catching of criminals”, the Sheehy Report once again focused on “crime prevention”. In addition to crime prevention, the latter report repeated the already familiar police responsibilities of crime investigation, order maintenance and the helping, protection and reassurance of the public (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 5–6). The White Paper eventually resulted in the Police and Magistrates Courts Act of 1994 (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 6). This Act contained a number of significant reforms, but essentially it aimed at establishing more control over the police and making them more efficient and effective. In 1994 yet another review of the police was announced, the Review of Core and Ancillary Tasks. Its terms of reference were: To examine the services provided by the police, to make recommendations about the most cost-effective way of delivering core police services and to assess the scope for relinquishing ancillary tasks (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 7).

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The police successfully resisted most of the critical recommendations following this review. These included, inter alia, the privatisation of certain police functions. However, for the police the message was clear. They were perceived as spending too much time and effort on their secondary tasks and, consequently, neglecting their primary functions. In addition, in 1993 and 1996, there were two reports by the Audit Commission, entitled Helping with Inquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively (1993) and Streetwise: Effective Police Patrol (1996) (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 8). The recommendations by the Audit Commission, especially its proposed model for policing, were relatively more acceptable to the police. In summary, it entailed that policing should become more proactive and less reactive. Prevention and investigation should be prioritised and greater emphasis should be placed on information technology and the management of information, and known repeat offenders should be targeted (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 8). Morgan and Newburn (1997: 9–10) question the views of the Audit Commission. Their concerns are that there seems to be confusion or disagreement among policymakers about the fundamental role of the police (Chapter 4). Lastly, it is important to briefly refer to the Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Role and Responsibilities of the Police, which was set up in 1993 by the Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute, to do introspection by the police themselves. According to Morgan and Newburn (1997: 10) the Independent Inquiry

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was conducted out of concern that changes in policing policy might be instituted without adequate reflection on the role of the police. Introspection by the police probably resulted from both the conviction that the police were failing in their task and the concern that if they did not do something about the problem, it would be done for them. In the latter case the results may be totally unacceptable. In this respect the police and the Independent Committee of Inquiry shared the same motivation. Accordingly, in 1990, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), published its influential Strategic Policy Document (Bennett, 1994: 107). With this document, ACPO aimed at broadening the policing paradigm from a narrow conception of “police enforcement” to “police service”, and emphasised improvement of the quality of service. The Strategic Policy Document was based largely on the Operational Policing Review which was published in 1990 by the Joint Consultative Committee, representative of the three police staff associations (Bennett, 1994: 109). The main proposition in the Operational Policing Review was that drives for greater efficiency, measured in terms of quantifiable aspects of policing, led to an erosion of traditional “service-style policing”. This proposition, along with other pressures on the police to reform and to change their style of policing, lies at the heart of the arguments in this book and will be critically examined in the next chapter.

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3.3.2 The position in the United States According to Hale (1994: 4) policing in the former American colonies followed the example of the model developed in England. In most towns and villages, constables and sheriffs were responsible for law enforcement and the maintenance of peace and order. Larger cities, such as Boston, New York and Philadelphia eventually developed a nightwatch system, but the first regular police force was established in New York City in 1844. Conklin (1995: 401), however, credits Boston with the first modern police force in the United States. It was established as early as 1837, along the lines of Sir Robert Peel’s Metropolitan Police in London. Other American cities soon followed these examples (Hale, 1994: 4). The United States comprises 50 states and one district (the District of Columbia), and its police or law enforcement agencies are organised at four levels, namely: county sheriffs departments, municipal police departments, state police departments, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Conklin, 1995: 402; World Factbook, 2002: 530). As with the discussion on the United Kingdom, the following two sections (paragraphs 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2 respectively) deal with the crime situation in the United States over the last 30–40 years, the pressures it created for the police and policing, and the inevitable criticism of and inquiries into the police.

3.3.2.1 Crime rates and police numbers The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), are the official reports on crime statistics in the United States. They present only the number of criminal offences known to

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the police, and reflect only serious offences, known as Part 1 crimes (violent crimes such as murder, robbery, rape and assault; and property crimes such as burglary, larceny, auto theft and arson) (Lab, 1992: 2). According to the UCR, crime in the United States rose substantially in the 1960s and 1970s, levelled of in the early 1980s and towards the 1990s it again started to increase (Lab, 1992: 3). In 1960 there were 1887 offences per 100 000 of the population; in 1976 it was 5287 and in 1988 it rose to 5664. The National Crime Survey (NCS), which measures the level of criminal victimisation, also reveals increased levels of crime during the 1970s (Lab, 1992: 4). The NCS crime figures are regarded by many as more accurate than the crime figures provided by the UCR, because it is not encumbered by the problems associated with official records and is able to uncover crimes that are not known to the police. According to the NCS there were 35 646 755 criminal offences during 1973, increasing to 41 267 496 in 1981 and decreasing to 35 795 840 in 1988. As in the United Kingdom, the crime rates indicated by the NCS, compared to those of the official report (UCR), present a consistent pattern of under-reporting of crime to the police (Lab, 1992: 4–5). The NCS figures show twice as much crime as that indicated by the UCR. The 1988 UCR figures were even worse, reflecting only 36,4 per cent or roughly one-third of the NCS reported crime (Lab, 1992: 5). Divergent views on the possible relationship between crime and police numbers also exist in the United States. According to Bayley (1994: 4) there is no connection between the two. For example, between 1970 and 1990 the number of sworn officers in the United States rose by 70,7 per cent, but serious crime rose by 78,8 per cent and violent crime by 147 per cent. When these figures are adjusted to provide for population growth, the figures change as follows: police numbers (sworn officers) increased by 70,6 per cent, serious crime by 46 per cent and violent crime by 101 per cent. Bayley is supported by Conklin (1995: 453) who observes that there is very little evidence that increases in police numbers will significantly alter crime rates. Conklin (1995: 453) cites the findings of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, that for cities with populations over 500 000 there was no apparent correlation between the crime rates and the number of police officers per 100 000 of the population. According to Bayley (1994: 4–5) it is probably true that the addition of large numbers of police may have an impact on crime such as, for example, placing a police officer on every street corner or doorstep. Nevertheless, there are critical thresholds beyond which changing the number of police officers would not affect crime. The problem is that nobody knows what these thresholds are. In addition, the question of whether to increase or decrease police numbers is decided by the political establishment and determined by normal political and budgetary pressures. Accordingly, the sort of changes in police numbers, which will be possible within any practical range, will have no effect on crime. Sherman (1998a: 239) argues that while social scientists claim that the police make only minimal contributions to crime prevention, citizens and public officials often espouse the view that the more police there are, the less crime there will be. It

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appears that the truth lies somewhere in-between. However, it can also be argued, at least as far as the public is concerned, that their opinion is not so much an informed one, but based more on perception and the reassuring effect that the presence of the police has on society.

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3.3.2.2 Inquiries into the police and policing It would appear, from the literature, that the police in the United States were not as fiercely inquired into or reviewed as their counterparts in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, they have been as fiercely criticised and blamed for the huge increases in crime and violence since the 1960s. According to Williams and Wagoner (1996: 516), many have argued – especially in the 1970s and 1980s – that because of the changing nature of society, as well as the changing nature of and increases in crime, changing the police has now become both desirable and/or imminent. Sherman (1996: 27) contends that for two centuries Anglo-American police work has entailed little more than patrol and investigations as the cures for all kinds of crime. This situation continued until about 1970 when, as a result of federal and foundation funding, the police and policing were exposed to scientific diagnosis, theory-building and experimentation. One such study, for example, was carried out in 1975 by the Rand Corporation at the request of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Chaiken et al., 1996: 161). The focus of this nationwide study was the criminal investigation process. Hale (1994: 5) describes the 1960s as the beginning of the reform era of American policing. It was during the 1960s that the police came under scrutiny, not only for the rising crime rates, but also for their role in urban riots, campus demonstrations and civil rights protests. This led to the appointment of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice by President Johnson in 1965, to “deepen our understanding of the causes of crime and how society should respond to the challenge of the present levels of crime” (Conklin, 1995: 528). The Commission published its report entitled A Challenge of Crime in a free Society, in 1967, and also issued a series of reports for each of the different branches of the criminal justice system, including the police (Hale, 1994: 5). The Commission’s report contained one of the most comprehensive and detailed analyses of American policing ever conducted, and included a series of recommendations for improvements and reforms (Hale, 1994: 5; Conklin, 1995: 528). It is instructive to note, as pointed out by Conklin (1995: 528), that the Commission adopted a conservative approach to the reduction of crime. The first sentence of the summary chapter in the final report stated “America can control crime”. But, in the view of Conklin (1995: 528), the report did give passing attention to the liberal approach when it stated the following: [c]rime flourishes where the conditions of life are worst, and ... therefore the foundation of a national strategy against crime is an unremitting national effort for social justice. Reducing poverty, discrimination, ignorance, disease and urban blight, and to the anger, cynicism or despair those conditions can inspire, is one great step towards reducing crime.

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The work of the Commission led to the promulgation of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968, which established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) (Conklin, 1995: 529). Initially, most of the funds of the LEAA were spent on the police, but this gradually changed and funds were increasingly used for correctional purposes. When, in 1971, President Nixon declared war on crime, he raised the LEAA’s funding and consequently raised expectations that the LEAA would be able to reduce crime. But when crime continued to escalate during the 1970s the LEAA was considered ineffective and disbanded in 1981. The President’s Commission was followed a few years later by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (Hale, 1994: 5). The latter Commission, in 1973, also issued a series of reports with very specific recommendations for each of the branches of the criminal justice system. One of these recommendations was for the development of a national agenda for the improvement of the police. However, Conklin (1995: 531) correctly points out that both commissions emphasised criminal justice reforms as the way to reduce crime. It was never considered that the problem of crime should be approached by identifying and addressing its underlying causes. In both cases it was assumed that once the problems with the criminal justice system were sorted out, the crime problem would be solved. Soon after the Commission published its reports, another commission – the Commission for Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (COLEA) – was established jointly by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriff’s Association and the National Organisation of Black Law Enforcement Executives (Hale, 1994: 6). This was an initiative by the police themselves and its primary intention was to establish reasonable standards against which the police could be evaluated. Secondly, COLEA would develop a programme of national accrediting. In 1981 the Attorney General’s Task Force On Violent Crime, in its report, also focused on the criminal justice system as a solution to the crime problem (Conklin, 1995: 531). However, President Reagan, in a speech later that year before the International Association of Chiefs of Police, did comment on the causes of crime. His speech reflected a conservative, law-and-order approach in which he referred to crime as “ultimately a moral dilemma rather than just a question of more funds for the criminal justice system”. He also called for “an attitude of mind and a change of heart” in America. However, notwithstanding his clear understanding of the complexities of crime as a phenomenon, and instead of placing more emphasis on treating the causes and conditions he identified, Reagan continued to focus his attention on the criminal justice system. It was once again the criminal justice system which had to be “fixed” in order to solve complex socioeconomic and political problems by meeting out penalties based on the ideas of deterrence, incapacitation and just deserts (Conklin, 1995: 531). In 1984 President Reagan signed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (Conklin, 1995: 531). Because this Act applied only to federal cases, which affected only about five per cent of defendants being tried, it had almost no impact on the crime prob-

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lem. This Act was followed by the President’s Commission on Organised Crime, which published its report in 1986, and in the same year the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. None of these had any meaningful impact on crime (Conklin, 1995: 532). Lastly, in 1996 Congress requested the Attorney General to submit a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the Department of Justice grants which were meant to assist State and local law enforcement agencies and communities to prevent crime. This task was undertaken by Lawrence W. Sherman and five colleagues in collaboration with members of the Graduate Programme from the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, on behalf of the National Institute of Justice. Their 400-page report was published in July 1998. It is entitled Preventing crime: what works, what doesn’t, what’s promising and contains extensive evaluations of, inter alia, the police and policing (Sherman et al., 1998: 1) (Chapter 4).

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3.4 Conclusion This chapter, in essence, demonstrates that there are a number of basic flaws in the way that governments and police agencies respond to abnormally high crime levels, and especially to how they view and approach the prevention of crime.

3.4.1 Historical development The problem (basic flaws), alluded to above, is rooted in history and it is an open question as to how much research, experience and thought went into the original decision – more than 170 years ago – that responsibility for the prevention of crime must rest with the police. In view of the available evidence and other information, it seems clear that prevention of crime by the police was no more than an ideal, almost a vision or a dream of a future society, free of crime. There is also some suspicion that during those early years of professional police organisations, crime prevention was seen as synonymous with crime deterrence. Furthermore, because there is much the police can do to deter crime, it was generally accepted that in that manner the police were actually preventing crime. This, obviously, is an oversimplification of a very complex problem (Chapters 2 and 4). If, on the other hand, the authorities truly believed that the police would be able to “prevent” crime, it can only be surmised that they were totally ignorant as to the complexities of crime as a phenomenon and the realistic impact the police could be expected to make. Such a position is possible when viewed against the background of those early times when the structure and social fabric of society inhibited the perpetration of crime. There is also convincing support for the view that the earlier criminal justice system, rooted in conservative norms and values, acted as a strong deterrent. In more recent times, especially since the Second World War, enormous socioeconomic and political developments dramatically changed people’s thinking. Old ideas became old-fashioned and societies became more liberal in terms of their norms and values. This, in turn, affected the laws, the administration of justice and

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the criminal justice system as a whole. Generally, it resulted in greater tolerance of deviant behaviour and more rights and freedoms for offenders. Eventually, and especially since the 1960s, these developments and the permissive society they created, went hand-in-hand with high increases in crime.

3.4.2 The “impossible mandate” As crime began reaching alarming levels, the “inability” of the police to act as preventers of crime, became exposed. Many thinking people started to realise that it was not so much an inability of the police as an impossibility for them to prevent crime. Extensive research on crime and policing over the last decades, has shown the fallacy of the belief that the police can prevent crime. Nevertheless, in spite of this knowledge and in spite of the fact that many people, including police executives, realise this, nobody seems prepared to revisit the 1829 dictum and to re-determine the role of the police, especially its crime prevention role. The effect of this “impossible mandate” on the police has not yet been sufficiently and scientifically researched, but the available evidence suggests that in many instances it creates a feeling of despondency. It is based on feelings of inadequacy, such as being incapable of performing prescribed duties and a failure to live up to public expectations, et cetera. The results are a loss of self-confidence and a decline in morale. Feelings of despondency will probably increase when more personnel and resources are added, without a quid pro quo impact on crime. Very few police officials, apart from perhaps some executives, understand that they are literally victims of a functional impossibility which they inherited, and a crime situation which has very little to do with police incompetence, but has everything to do with a changing society and a political leadership which has failed to understand the dynamics of crime and policing. On closer examination, it appears that almost everybody misses the point, even those who acknowledge the fact that the police cannot really prevent crime. Once this fact is established, what is to be done about it? For example: ♦ It is crucial that the concept of crime prevention is properly and scientifically dissected and its relevant parts relocated between the appropriate government departments and other role-players. ♦ Once such a dissection has taken place it is essential to do function purification. This will necessarily include the police and rid them of those functions which they are not equipped to deal with and allow them to focus their attention on those functions for which they are.

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♦ It is equally essential, once a relocation of functions has taken place, that an authoritative coordinating mechanism be established. Such a mechanism must involve all those entities responsible for crime prevention, including – but not primarily – the police, for purposes of sharing and authoritatively coordinating their efforts and contributions.

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3.4.3 Public perceptions

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Lastly, there is the problem of public perceptions about the role of the police. For as long as the myth of the police as being able to prevent crime is kept alive by the authorities and the media, the public will hold the police responsible for every failure to prevent crime. Everybody grew up with the belief that the police are there to prevent crime and, therefore, blaming the police is almost a natural or conditioned reaction. Since the dictum – that crime prevention is the primary function of the police – was laid down almost two centuries ago, it became ingrained in statutes, in textbooks, in the mind of every police official, and in the public mind. Now, because of this conditioning, few people are prepared to look elsewhere for a solution or for alternative approaches to and responsibilities for crime prevention. It is hoped that this book will contribute to the debate and set in motion a process of rethinking and redefining the police’s role and, eventually, to fundamental changes to the outdated dictum about the responsibilities of the police vis-à-vis crime prevention.

SELF EVALUATING QUESTIONS ~ Distinguish between the police and policing. ~ What are the difficulties created by Sir Robert Peel’s 1829 dictum? ~ Explain the “impossible mandate” in policing terms. ~ Briefly explain the fundamental dilemmas of modern police agencies/services. ~ Discuss the impact that public perceptions about policing in the period 1994–2005 had on the police.

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C H A P T E R

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Interpreting relevant research in the United States and the United Kingdom

Learning outcomes

There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root.

After studying this chapter, you should be able to ~ define and discuss crime and its risk factors ~ discuss the impact of the police on the prevention of crime ~ explain concepts such as community policing and crime focused policing (including the “broken windows” theory and the “zero tolerance” approach) ~ explain direct and indirect policing ~ explain the difference between “police force” and “police service” ~ discuss the role of a national crime combating structure ~ explain the impact of police “reforms” on the police.

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(HENRY D. THOREAU 1817–1862, AS CITED BY BOUZA, 1993: 35)

4.1 Introduction In the previous chapter the focus was largely on the three main areas of policing development: firstly, the history of the police as an institution, the development of policing as a practice, and the development of police functions; secondly, the inherent dilemmas of the police which developed over time as a result of the tension created within the critical triangular relationship between the police, policing and police functions; and thirdly, actions by governments to determine “what is wrong with the police” and how to reform (“fix”) the police. This chapter will focus much more on research, observations and arguments to refute the general belief that crime is only, or even primarily, a police problem. The general perception seems to be that police failures or incidents of police incompetence are some sort of conditio sine quo non for crime. In other words, if the police were competent there would not be crime. Attention will also be given to the definition and causes of crime, as well as to some of the more recent and novel policing concepts, which seem to have developed in an attempt to become more effective. These attempts at making a greater impact on crime are almost ironic

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when viewed against the background of what some researchers describe as the “impossible mandate” of the police. As with the previous chapter, the discussion in this chapter is necessary for reasons of both background and perspective. The discussion is again limited to research about the police and policing in the United States and the United Kingdom. The background and perspective is essential in order to better explain and understand the development of the police and policing in South Africa in the next two chapters.

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4.2 Definition and causes of crime 4.2.1 Defining crim If the fight against crime is to have any meaning, it is essential that crime be thoroughly understood. Crime is a complex phenomenon with a number of factors interacting at any given time. These factors are sometimes referred to as risk factors and include the so-called “root causes” of crime, which explains why they are simply and generally referred to as “the causes” of crime. Without attempting to provide an in-depth analysis of crime, it should be clear that it is not enough to think of crime only in terms of manifestation, that is, the “where” and “how” of crime when it happens. The risk factors or “causes” of crime are crucial and need to be properly identified and effectively addressed if the combating of crime is to make any real sense. In this context (causes and manifestation) it can justifiably be argued that the risk factors which produce crime and not the perpetrators of crime, should be the primary focus of crime combating efforts. Radical as this may sound, it can be argued that it is not so much the success of the police against criminal offenders, but much rather the success achieved with the elimination of risk factors which will determine the levels of crime. In the study of the police’s role in the combating of crime, it is surprising to find how little attention is paid to the defining and understanding of crime, especially as far as its risk factors and appropriate interventions are concerned. Perhaps it is because even criminologists – and there are various schools of thought – find it difficult, if not impossible, to agree on a mutually or generally acceptable definition of crime. McCabe (1983: 49), for example, describes this problem as follows: There is no word in the whole lexicon of legal and criminological terms which is so elusive of definition as the word “crime”. Some of the earlier attempts to define crime resulted in highly legalistic definitions. Tappan (1947: 100), for instance, describes crime as: “... an intentional act in violation of the criminal law ... commit without defence or excuse, and penalised by the state ...”. Tappan’s view has been modified over time and was followed by a normative approach in the 1960s, and later in the 1970s, by the so-called “new criminologists” (Brown et al., 1996: 17–23). Although the new criminologists expound a very social-

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istic view of crime, they did, for the first time, touch on the causative side of crime. According to Brown et al. (1996: 19), the new criminologists believe that criminal theory “... [h]as developed without adequate attention to the key role that political and economic forces play in generating crime and deviance”. To complicate matters further Brown et al. (1996: 23–26) refer to the existence of five major paradigms or “schools of thought” as far as crime is concerned, namely: free will, positivism, interactionism, critical perspective, and the integrative approach. Although these schools of thought will not be discussed here, it is instructive to note that Brown et al. (1996: 21–22) are of the opinion that the examination of crime from a causative perspective “... requires that it be defined in behavioral rather than in legal terms”. In criminal law, and even in lexical terms, the legalistic definition of crime is still the accepted understanding of the concept. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Pearsall, 2001: 337) defines crime as: An action which constitutes a serious offence against an individual or the state and is punishable by law. Criminal law in South Africa views crime as an unlawful, guilty act, which can be either a commission or an omission, and which is punishable by the authorities (Snyman, 1986: 2). According to Snyman (1986: 2–3) the purpose of punishment is retribution and the prevention or deterrence of crime, or the reform of the perpetrator. Bartol (1995: 1), a contemporary criminologist, argues that because crime is a complex phenomenon, the answers to crime will also have to be complicated. It is indeed the complexity of crime, and consequently the lack of understanding crime, which provides part of the reason for the inability to prevent crime (Bartol, 1995: 1). In conclusion and without attempting to tread upon the field of criminology, or to solve the definitional problems of criminologists, it is necessary to arrive at some form of definition of crime which will indicate that crime, in all its complexity, is much more than just a punishable act. It has another side to it. It has an origin, a history and roots, and should be explainable. Accordingly, and purely for purposes of policing the following definition of crime is proposed: Crime is an unlawful act of commission or omission which results from a number of risk factors, including but not limited to socioeconomic, environmental and political factors, and which is punishable by law.

4.2.2 Causes of crime

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In view of the central position of crime and its causes in the arguments put forward in this book, it is necessary to expand on the definitional discussion and to explain the risk factors of crime in more detail. According to Henry and Milovanovic (1996: 124) scientific criminology promised to search for and deliver the causes of crime, but, they admit, this is a much more complicated task than was originally thought. The same authors (1996: 124–125) go on to make the following cynical statement:

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Causation in criminology, rather than being the result of a steady accumulation of knowledge, has instead been a litany of false starts and abandoned idols, raising more questions about causality than confirmation of its efficacy.

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Bartol (1995: 2) makes it clear that there is no all-encompassing psychological explanation for crime, any more than there is a sociological, anthropological, psychiatric, economic, or historic explanation. Therefore, if an attempt is to be made to explain and control criminal behaviour, it is crucial to find a way to integrate the data, theory and general viewpoints of each of the relevant disciplines. Bouza (1993: 29), a retired police chief, agrees that there are no simple answers about the causes of crime. Street crime, for example, is rooted in poverty, but not all poor people are criminals. Bouza (1993: 29–34) provides a brief discussion on, inter alia, the following possible causes (risk factors) of crime: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Racism and class struggle Economic conditions Social conditions Cultural conditions Demographics History Biological and/or psychiatric factors

It is, of course, important to keep in mind Bartol’s argument that crime is caused by a combination of factors and that the explanation does not lie in a search for one single cause or factor. Bouza (1993: 33) is also of the opinion that, in the United States, crime is probably and primarily influenced by social problems, such as racism and poverty. He (1993: 31) argues further that crime can also be the result of a social struggle: Stability, social controls, strong family ties, an influential church, a sound educational plant, and all of the invisible social glue binding a community into a coherent neighborhood result in a safe area. Transition, mobility, rapid social change, and a transient population result in an unsafe area. There is other research evidence that race and class are important factors influencing crime. Sherman (1998b: 40), after considering some of the research in this regard, finds that serious crime in the United States is predominantly a matter of one kind of community, that finds itself increasingly isolated and shunned by the rest of society. In this context Sherman (1998b: 41) refers to so-called “segregated ghetto’s” and to “hypersegregation”, the latter of which he describes as: ... historically unprecedented levels of geographic segregation by race and class, magnifying the effects of poverty and racial isolation. Sherman (1998c: 2) highlights poverty as a crime risk factor when he states that substantial reductions in crime can only be achieved by prevention in areas of concen-

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trated poverty, where the majority of homicides occur and where homicide rates are much higher than the national average. In addition, theoretical and empirical research have provided strong support for the crime prevention value of employment (Sherman, 1998d: 27–28). Sherman (1998d: 28) makes it clear that the staggeringly high unemployment rates in the highest-crime communities (in the United States) are beyond dispute. Research has also shown that police crackdowns in areas of high unemployment have given large numbers of young men criminal records for minor offences, limiting their chances of employment and increasing their likelihood of entering into further and more serious criminality. In their discussion of four major theoretical explanations for the link between employment and crime, Bushway and Reuter (1998: 158–159) refer to, inter alia, the following claim by Wilson (who made an analysis of inner-city problems in Chicago in 1996): ... many of today’s problems in the inner-city ghetto neighborhoods – crime, family dissolution, welfare, low levels of social organisation and so on – are fundamentally a consequence of a disappearance of work. Bushway and Reuter (1998: 159) also found that employment is undoubtedly the primary factor in the development of healthy social bonds and institutions in a community and, conversely, that unemployment usually results in crime and disorder. In the conclusion to their discussion on the link between employment and crime, Bushway and Reuter (1998: 181) mention two other relevant findings namely: ♦ The isolation of areas of high poverty from the legitimate job market may be a critical reason for the lack of motivation among the youth in those areas. ♦ Drug markets in impoverished areas provide substantial alternative employment to legal markets. Waller (1999: 20) claims that currently there is strong international consensus on the common factors (risk factors) associated with delinquency, violence and insecurity. He lists these factors as follows: ♦ Poverty and unemployment deriving from social exclusion, especially for youth ♦ Dysfunctional families with uncaring and inconsistent parental attitudes, violence or parental conflicts ♦ Social valuation of a culture of violence ♦ Presence of facilitators (such as firearms and drugs) ♦ Discrimination and exclusion deriving from sexist, racist or other forms of oppression

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♦ Degradation of urban environments and social bonds ♦ Inadequate surveillance of places and the availability of goods that are easy to transport and sell

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What Waller refers to as “facilitators”, in relation to crime, Sherman (1998b: 44, 61) categorises as “criminogenic factors”. The term “criminogenic” is normally used to describe conditions, substances or commodities that would increase the likelihood of crime being committed. For example, criminogenic factors such as guns, alcohol and drugs, under the right circumstances, can provide either sufficient or additional cause for a crime to happen. Studies have shown that alcohol and drug abuse correlate with violent crime, while the use of guns in crime causes a greater risk of homicide (Sherman, 1998b: 44). According to Bayley (1994: 10) crime experts generally accept that factors such as employment status, income, education levels, gender, age, ethnic mix, and family composition, are the best predictors of crime. Citing a number of sources on the subject, he estimates that as much as 90 per cent of the difference in crime rates among communities can be explained by differences in these factors.

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4.3 Police impact on the prevention of crime In his conclusion to a chapter entitled Communities and crime prevention , Sherman (1998b: 62) finds that there is a substantial disconnection between what is known about the causes of serious crime and what is being done about those causes. There is strong scientific evidence that serious crime is concentrated in a very small number of communities, but the link between these facts and the design of prevention programmes is very tenuous. About the police’s role, Sherman (1998b: 67) argues that substantial increases in police patrols in areas of concentrated crime could greatly reduce the crime rate “in the short run ”. This is, of course, due to the minimising of precipitating factors. After considering a wide array of research and experiments, Sherman (1998a: 239) concludes that there is a powerful connection between policing and risk factors. He divides his conclusion on this subject into four main points: ♦ Hiring more police to provide rapid response, unfocused random patrol, and reactive arrests, does not prevent crime. ♦ Community policing without a clear focus on crime risk factors generally has no effect on crime. ♦ Directed patrols, proactive arrests and problem-solving in high crime areas (“hot spots”) have shown substantial evidence of crime prevention. ♦ The police can prevent robbery, disorder, gun violence, drunk driving and domestic violence, but only by using certain methods under certain conditions. As is indicated later, some aspects of Sherman’s views and conclusions – about the role and impact of the police in the prevention of crime – are challenged by other researchers. In some places his use of terms such as prevention and deterrence, becomes very confusing. It should, at this stage, be pointed out that although deterrence certainly has preventative qualities it does not have the same impact as prevention. Deterrence – in those areas where deterrence can be effected – removes only the precipitating factors (opportunity) of crime, whereas prevention is (or

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should be) aimed at removing the predisposing factors (inclination). Limiting the precipitating factors by, inter alia, police patrols – whether random or directed – will have little effect on the predisposing factors and may only lead to the displacement of crime. It may, however, also remove or minimise the capacity of the wouldbe offender. According to Lab (1992: 116) deterrence does not enjoy strong support as a crime prevention tool. The certainty of apprehension and punishment should increase the risk for offenders, but failure to increase the risk does not necessarily mean that crime levels will rise. In other words, it rather indicates that the sanctioning power of the criminal justice system alone is not enough to keep motivated persons from committing crime (Lab, 1992: 116). Sherman (1998d: 29) observes that the massive increases in police presence in high crime areas could have a major effect on crime prevention. This observation is debatable. In view of the variance between precipitating and predisposing factors, and between prevention and deterrence, it is more likely that increased police presence may have a major effect on crime through deterrence. He is correct in his further observation that a concentration of police presence in high crime areas can possibly create a threshold (meaning an acceptable or minimum number of police officials) level of public order and safety. Once such a threshold is achieved, the effective functioning of family, community, schools and labour force (employment) may substantially increase. Sherman (1998d: 29) acknowledges the reality that the strength of the police’s impact on crime is generally moderate rather than substantial. In fact, the threshold he refers to creates opportunities for developing and implementing measures other than those provided by the police and the rest of the criminal justice system. It is primarily in these “other” measures that the prevention of crime should be sought. In the words of Dennis (1997: 6): When the police have done their job, then, as compassionate private citizens, compassionate clergy, compassionate pressure groups and compassionate charities, we can do ours.

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According to Lab (1992: 248) the major role of the criminal justice system in primary crime prevention lies in the support of and participation in relevant interventions. The police, for example, are an important source of information about crime and are in the position to identify the problems, and, in consultation with a community, to initiate programmes for the combating of crime. Lab’s argument is sound as far as crime combating initiatives in general are concerned, but when applied to crime prevention interventions, his notion becomes problematic. The idea of the police feeding in information and helping to identify problems is correct, but why should the police initiate programmes if these programmes are about socioeconomic and other crime risk factors beyond the scope of policing? Is it because there is no one else, or is it because there is a total lack of coordination of the state’s crime combating capability? What is needed is a structure or mechanism to coordinate the efforts of all the disciplines involved in these

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crime combating interventions (including preventative interventions). Programmes should be initiated through this structure/mechanism, and within it decisions should be taken on who leads which initiative and who supports which (par. 4.6). According to Morgan and Newburn (1997: 156, 180) the police cannot conceivably be regarded as being responsible for primary crime prevention. The police are simply not responsible for the range of public services relevant to community safety (crime prevention) such as roads, street lighting and road safety, housing and refuse collection, education, youth and community facilities, recreational facilities, health services, employment, regional development, et cetera. Walker (1994: 59) is even more explicit in his statement that the police have been given an impossible mandate. This mandate requires the police to deal with difficult social problems using only the limited means allowed them by law. To Walker (1994: 59), therefore, the future of the police will be determined by whether or not the role of the police can be demystified, and whether or not the police will eventually settle on a “lower pedestal” with a “more modest but attainable mandate”. According to Bayley (1994: 10), it is generally understood that crime levels are determined by social conditions beyond the control of the police and the criminal justice system as a whole. Police officials, who are aware of this, often complain that they are nothing but a “band-aid on cancer”. Hale (1994: 11) shares these sentiments and believes that simply too much is expected of the police, and that too few police officials are willing to admit publicly that, despite their best efforts, there is little the police can do to prevent crime. The myth about the impact of the police on crime, especially on crime prevention, was acknowledged by a former commissioner of the New York Police Department in an almost sarcastic manner, when he stated that:

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... police executives can rest assured that whatever they do is not going to make the situation worse (Bayley, 1994: 9).

4.4 Community focused policing and crime focused policing In this section a brief discussion is provided on what can be described as the two main conceptual approaches to policing; that is, broadly speaking, the community focused and crime focused approaches. Although these approaches cannot be totally separated into watertight compartments, there are sufficient differences to categorise them separately. Community focused policing normally refers to concepts such as community policing, community orientated policing and problem orientated policing. These three aspects are discussed under the heading “Community focused policing”. On the other hand, the term crime focused policing provides an appropriate category for concepts such as the “broken windows” theory and the “zero tolerance” approach. An attempt will also be made to describe what appears to be an emerging strategic distinction in policing, which will be referred to as “direct” and “indirect” policing. In essence this distinction recategorises the community and crime focused approaches to policing and shows that various elements of both approaches can coexist.

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4.4.1 Community focused policing It would probably be fair to say that the concept of community policing is the most talked about, written about and most tried out attempt at improving policing over the last two or three decades. At the same time it needs to be said that there are various conceptional variations of and definitional difficulties relating to the concept. Probably one of the better definitions of community policing is provided by Cox and Wade (1998: 104–105), borrowing from Eck and Rosenbaum: ... it refers to a philosophy of policing that emphasises a cooperative approach between the police and other citizens focusing on solving community problems and improving the quality of life in the community.

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Community policing is different from traditional policing in the sense that, unlike the traditional approach, which addresses the symptoms of crime and disorder by responding to calls or incidents, it attempts to identify and address the underlying problems (Cox & Wade, 1998: 105). According to Morgan and Newburn (1997: 59) the concept of community policing in the United Kingdom originates from the writings of John Alderson, a former Chief Constable, during the late 1970s. Alderson referred to the development of a “new social contract” for the police based on “community policing principles”. Alderson believed that police performance, especially in terms of crime prevention, could be improved by bringing the police and communities closer together and by creating new partnerships between the police and the public (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 59). The community orientated approach to policing clearly gained momentum after the publication of the so-called Scarman Report in 1982, following the riots in Brixton and a number of other cities in England. Hale (1994: 148) shares the view that community and problem orientated policing grew out of an awareness of the inadequacies of traditional styles of policing. His other arguments, however, that this new style of policing enables the police – in cooperation with communities – to identify and solve local community problems, are highly debatable. Of course the police can and should make available all relevant information that is necessary to identify crime problems, crime areas, known offenders, risk factors, et cetera, but they should not be expected to solve all of these and other community problems, or even to lead the process. There is no doubt that the community should be consulted to determine what it perceives as its crime problems and what it proposes should be done about these. The police should also consult the community to find out what it expects from the police and how it expects to be policed. There may be shortcomings in terms of policing that can be corrected and there may certainly be community problems which the police feel they are capable of dealing with, removing or solving, but, again, this role is limited. However, if the thinking behind community policing is that this approach should enable the police, with the assistance of the community, to solve all kinds of community problems – such as the risk factors (root causes and other factors and conditions conducive to crime) discussed in paragraph 4.2.2 – the approach is clear-

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ly flawed and even naive. Of course the police must participate in all relevant fora where they can interact with communities, local authorities, other government agencies, et cetera, in order to share their knowledge, expertise, information and capabilities. In this capacity they can advise and support, and even be tasked. But, when the police are tasked, it should only be in terms of that which they are realistically capable of doing and not according to expectations based on popular belief (myth) about what the police can or should do. The police’s adoption of the concept community policing is probably based on a belief that this new approach will enable them to live up to the high, and even impossible, public and political expectations. If, by working closer with communities, this new concept allows them to become more effective in the fight against crime – even if this means moving outside the defined parameters of policing – the police may feel that it was worth the effort. The question remains, however, whether community policing, after more than twenty years, has lived up to this expectation and whether it has achieved its objectives. Sherman (1998a: 259), upon evaluating the results of tests pertaining to the community policing hypothesis that increased police-citizen contact reduces crime, comes to the conclusion that the most promising results were not in reduced crime levels, but in increased police legitimacy. Many police practitioners are openly critical and sceptical about community policing as a concept. During a police and law enforcement conference held in London from 18–20 October 1994, senior British police officers expressed concern over and even disillusionment with the concept and its implementation in the United Kingdom. According to O’Connor (1994: 27), Deputy Chief Constable of Kent County Constabulary, community policing “has been dented by being over-sold and by difficulties of implementation”. In 1991 a survey of chief officers in the United Kingdom found that 55 per cent expressed some support for the concept, while 45 per cent believed it to be a meaningless expression (O’Connor, 1994: 17). Phillips (1994: 14), the Chief Constable of Kent County Constabulary, was even more critical of community policing and pronounced it a failure:

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Community policing may have been the goal but either it has not been achieved or it has utterly failed as a strategy. The irony is that the new liberalism of the criminal justice system has had a great deal to do with the failure of community policing. According to Phillips (1994: 14) crime in the United Kingdom escalated as never before during the 1980s when community policing was implemented. He also questions the inference that communities are somehow essentially good and that they share a “harmony of interest”. This inference and the calls for community policing are the result of liberal influence and the real call from communities is almost always for law enforcement. Phillips (1994: 15–16) does not consider community policing as an alternative to the law enforcement approach. He believes that it is more accurate to say that all policing, if it is to be strategically effective, must be tailor-made for the circum-

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stances and conditions in which it is conducted. For this purpose the development of intelligence is crucial and the analysis should be such that a holistic response can be developed. Instead of searching for alternative models of policing, the police should practice what Phillips (1994: 15) prefers to call “sensible policing”, along the lines explained above. Finally, Phillips (1994: 15) sums up his resentment of community policing as a concept as follows: If the expression means the policing of a particular piece of territory, it means nothing. If it means a strategy to police without law enforcement, it will fail. If it means that policing should set out to work in cooperation with all those willing to assist in the enforcement of the law and always to mediate the exercise of enforcement with discretion, then it means no more than policing has always meant and represents an alternative to nothing at all!

4.4.2 Crime focused policing 4.4.2.1 The “broken windows” theory In March 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling published an article entitled The police and neighborhood safety (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 262). This article became popular as the so-called “broken windows” theory and directly addressed the significance of order maintenance by the police (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 19). The theory is based on the analogy of a broken window to describe the relationship between disorder and crime. If a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, the rest of the windows will soon be broken (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 19). According to the “broken windows” theory, disorderly behaviour which is left unchecked and unregulated, sends out a signal to citizens that the area is unsafe. As citizens withdraw from social interaction or move out of the area, the social controls they helped to maintain are largely lost. The result is a gradual undermining of the social fabric of the community, leaving them vulnerable to an influx of more disorderly behaviour and eventually more serious crime (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 20). The theory is further explained by Wilson and Kelling (1982: 34) themselves: ... serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behaviour goes unchecked. The panhandler [beggar] is, in effect, the first broken window. Muggers and robbers ... believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If a neighbourhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passers-by, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.

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Basing their arguments on the results of the 1981 Newark Foot Patrol Experiment and other research, Wilson and Kelling were able to prove the causal relationship between disorder and fear, as an empirical fact. However, the relationship between

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disorder and serious crime, and disorder and decay, had to be formulated as an hypothesis for further empirical testing (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 20). Empirical proof for this hypothesis was provided eight years later by Professor Wesly Skogan in a publication in 1990 entitled Disorder and decline: crime and the spiral of decay in American neighbourhoods (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 24–25). Further proof was provided by Sherman (1998a: 259) when he found consistent support for the “broken windows” and “zero tolerance” hypotheses, and that a police focus on street activity can help to reduce serious crime. Disorder is defined in its broadest sense as “incivility, boorish [rough and badmannered] and threatening behaviour that disturb life, especially urban life” (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 14). Disorder refers to behaviour such as aggressive begging, street prostitution, drunkenness and public drinking, menacing behaviour, harassment, obstruction of streets and public spaces, vandalism and graffiti, public urination and defecation, unlicensed vending and peddling, unsolicited car-window washing (“squeegeeing”), et cetera (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 15). According to Kelling and Coles (1997: 5) the crime problem does not begin with serious crime, and conceiving of it and addressing it as such “leads to bad public policy, poor legal thinking and practice, and distorted criminal justice priorities and practices”. The authors believe that there is a general policy bias in favour of serious crime. They also believe that, apart from the obvious dangers associated with and inherent in serious crime, there are two additional factors that perpetuate the “single-minded fixation” on such crimes. These factors are

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♦ firstly, a broad societal ideology according to which certain individual rights are absolute and almost completely without responsibility and obligation. According to this ideology all forms of non-violent deviance should be tolerated in the interest of liberty; and ♦ secondly, current criminal justice thinking (and strategy), which is consistent with this “libertarian” ideology, regards the criminal justice system as the primary means for crime control (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 5–6). Kelling and Coles (1997: 6) close their argument with the observation that the high levels of serious crime over the last three decades provide clear proof that the criminal justice system approach has failed, and that its failure is due to the fact that this approach does not acknowledge the links between disorder, fear, serious crime, and urban decay. According to Kelling and Coles (1997: 37) “broken windows” can be repaired, but the methods required to get this concept accepted and implemented, are quite radical. Among others, political leaders, criminologists and the police will have to incorporate fear and disorder into their crime fighting (crime combating) strategies and programmes. A fundamental reordering of political and professional priorities, is also required/implied, and lastly, this concept challenges the established criminal justice approach. The “broken windows” theory advocates a close collaborative approach between the police and citizens to “fix” the “broken windows” (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 23).

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The theory is not about so-called “streetsweeping” (law enforcement) tactics by the police, but rather about the joint development of neighbourhood standards and rules, and about order rather than disorder. Accordingly it is preferred that these rules are enforced through non-arrest action such as education, persuasion, counselling, ordering, et cetera, and that arrest only takes place as a last resort. Kelling and Coles (1997: 23) are of the opinion that part of the problem of getting this concept fully accepted and correctly implemented, is the fact that the police often find it difficult to distinguish between “order maintenance” and “streetsweeping” or law enforcement. The problem is understandable to some extent. For example, according to Hale (1994: 39) there is only a “thin line between law enforcement and order maintenance”. Hale (1994: 39) argues that the idea of public or social order is based in law and the police use the law as authority (or threat) to ensure compliance. When this approach fails, the role of the police changes from that of order maintenance to that of law enforcement.

4.4.2.2 The “zero tolerance” approach “Zero tolerance” became a new catch phrase in policing in the early 1990s and still enjoys a large measure of support. The term itself denotes a no-nonsense attitude and sends a clear message that all laws will be enforced at all times, particularly those laws aimed at preventing disorder and other less serious crime. According to Dennis (1997: 3), “zero tolerance” policing is based on the following three ideas: ♦ “To nip things in the bud”. This means that anti-social elements must be prevented from believing that they are in control, and that a broken-down environment of neglect and decay must be prevented from becoming a breeding ground for crime and disorder. ♦ The police can use the tactics of “low intensity, humane and good natured” (or tolerant) control for the policing of less serious offences. ♦ A combination of the first two ideas in terms of direct and indirect results. Direct results are achieved by reducing petty crime, vandalism, graffiti and low-level crime, and indirect results by creating an environment less hospitable to more serious criminals. At first glance the similarities between “broken windows” and “zero tolerance” seem obvious. However, the “zero tolerance” approach is often criticised for relying too much on aggressive and uncompromising law enforcement (Pollard, 1997: 46). Although the “zero tolerance” concept developed from the “broken windows” theory and therefore clearly resembles the latter, Pollard (1997: 45–47) is of the opinion that the following distinct and fundamental differences exist between the two concepts:

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♦ Whereas the “broken windows” theory is essentially concerned with the identification and description of complex societal problems, and broad ideas about how to solve them, “zero tolerance” is concerned purely with solutions.

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♦ Whereas the “broken windows” theory envisages a solution which may include law enforcement, and even arrest and prosecution where necessary, the “zero tolerance” approach – although it is also aimed at low-level crime and disorder – confronts the problem in a very direct, aggressive and uncompromising manner

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♦ Whereas the “broken windows” theory emphasises the involvement of other social agencies in the search for solutions which will be enduring, and applies the theory in conjunction with a variety of other police tactics, “zero tolerance” has only a short-term effect. ♦ Whereas the “broken windows” theory results in relatively few arrests and incarcerations, the application of the “zero tolerance” approach is problematic in areas where prisons are already overcrowded or full. Sherman (1998a: 259) also raises concerns about the long-term effect on people arrested for minor offences. He argues that a “zero tolerance” approach and consequent arrests may have a negative impact on police legitimacy, and that the criminogenic effect of arrest may make arrestees more defiant. Bratton (1997: 35–36, 40), who became Commissioner of Police in New York in January 1994, and who received most of the credit for the implementation of the “zero tolerance” approach, obviously disagrees with his critics. When he first arrived in New York in 1990, his impression was that this was a city that had “lost control” and had “stopped caring” about itself. Everywhere he went he saw neglect and decay typical of the “broken windows” theory: graffiti, aggressive begging, shanty towns in public spaces, street car washers (which he refers to as the “squeegee pest”), unlicensed street peddlers and “shakedown artists” who vandalised turnstyles and demanded that paying passengers hand over their tokens. The result was a climate of fear and a decline in the quality of life as a whole (Bratton, 1997: 33–34). Bratton believes himself to be fortunate in the sense that the newly elected Mayor of New York in 1994, Rudolph Guiliani, had campaigned on the issue of crime and disorder. The new mayor immediately authorised the police and their newly appointed commissioner to deal with the identified problems, while he himself coordinated the efforts of other agencies in support of the crime control strategies (Bratton, 1997: 36). According to Bratton (1997: 36), he guided the New York Police Department (NYPD) in the development and implementation of eight specific crime control strategies aimed at drugs, guns, youth crime, vehicle theft, corruption, traffic, domestic violence and so-called quality-of-life crimes. He also claims to have implemented a form of community policing, which he describes as “better, smarter and more assertive policing in partnership with the criminal justice system and the community we serve” (Bratton, 1997: 40). Bratton (1997: 40–41) concludes his presentation on his New York experience by stating that, in spite of the critics and the sceptics, crime levels continue to decrease and New Yorkers are feeling safer. Residential and real estate markets are booming, the economy has stabilised, tourism has skyrocketed, and, in general, New York City has started to revitalise itself.

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Bratton’s claims are supported by Kelling and Coles (1997: 151) who describe the New York of 1997 as a city in which order and quality of life have been restored, and in which a “renewed sense of pleasure” is being experienced. New York experienced not only an improvement as far as quality of life was concerned, but also a reduction in low-level crime, incidents of disorder and even serious crimes. For example, in 1994, murder decreased by 17 per cent while the national figure decreased by only 5 per cent; robberies declined to their lowest rate since 1973; burglary decreased by 10,9 per cent; larceny decreased by 10,8 per cent; and vehicle theft by 15,2 per cent (Kelling & Coles, 1997: 153–154).

4.4.3 Direct and indirect policing

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There is absolutely no doubt that, as with the concepts of direct and indirect strategy (Chapter 2), there are two distinct approaches to the combating of crime. The first is the direct approach which is aimed at targeting the perpetrators of crime, while the second approach is seen as indirect because it is aimed at addressing the socioeconomic and other risk factors of crime. Crime itself is only a result (or product) and cannot be combated without resorting to both of the above-mentioned approaches simultaneously. This section will indicate that policing, like strategy, should also be direct and indirect. Although the police cannot really prevent crime, they can affect crime, both directly and indirectly. However, there is so much confusion and obscurity about the role of the police that few practitioners and academics seem to be considering such a distinction. The literature abounds with criticism and arguments for and against particular policing models or styles, of which some examples were discussed above. Both sides have convincing arguments, and logically the answer may lie in finding a balance between all of these models or approaches. The direct and indirect approaches to policing are an attempt to find such a balance and to clarify the role of the police in the process. O’Connor (1994: 23) attempted to find clarity regarding the police’s role amidst the confusion and uncertainty which resulted from the widespread disorder and escalating crime in the United Kingdom during the early 1980s, by distinguishing between – what he termed – the strategic offensive and strategic defensive postures to policing. After the publication of the Scarman Report – following the 1981 riots in Brixton and elsewhere in England – and especially in view of its emphasis on the primacy of public order over law enforcement, the British police moved from the strategic offensive (law enforcement) approach to the strategic defensive (community policing) approach (O’Connor, 1994: 22–23). However, by the end of the 1980s and contrary to expectations, community policing tactics had failed to make any impact on crime and accordingly crime still dominated the public agenda. The only real benefit derived from the community policing effort, seems to have been the improved legitimacy of the police (O’Connor, 1994: 15). According to O’Connor (1994: 24–25), the early 1990s saw a move back to the strategic offensive approach in an attempt to regain the initiative. This shift was

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further supported by the resonance of the crime fighting aspects of policing in the 1993 White Paper on Police Reform and the report by the Audit Commission, Helping with inquiries, published soon afterwards. In essence, this meant a strategic shift in focus away from the community orientated approach and community policing, in favour of what is termed crime focused policing (O’Connor, 1994: 25–26). O’Connor also clearly senses the need to find some balance between the two strategic extremes in terms of policing. He expresses his concern with the new ascendancy of the crime focused approach and proposes that the apparent contradictions between the need to make an impact on crime and the need to retain a sound relationship with communities, should be reconciled (O’Connor, 1994: 26). O’Connor’s proposal touches the heart of the problem. Why should one approach be adopted to the exclusion of another? There is a place in policing for both a focus on crime and a constructive and sound relationship between the police and communities. There is, in other words, room for elements of both the strategic offensive posture and the strategic defensive posture. It is proposed that the problem of finding this balance or reconciliation can be resolved by implementing the concepts of direct and indirect policing. Gaines (1996: 119) touches on the matter when he espouses the view that the police can have both a direct and indirect effect on crime. Although he does not go as far as the arguments put forward in this book, Gaines formulates his point as follows:

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To maximise their effectiveness in crime reduction, the police should adopt aggressive patrolling techniques as well as community building and problem solving. Sherman (1996: 29) also alludes to direct and indirect policing when he raises an alternative and more sensible approach to the policing of violent crime than only patrol and investigation. He bases his alternative on four broad actions: ♦ Mapping out the nature of the violent crime problems and classifying them ♦ Identifying the possible causes of each of the categories and subcategories of violent crime, and separating those the police can affect from those they cannot ♦ Listing all the possible police tactics or strategies that could impact on the causes of each specific violent crime problem and developing an overall strategy to focus on the most potent causes, but at the same time on those that are easiest to deal with ♦ Conducting field experiments to test the impact on the specific violent crime problems Sherman’s ideas are sound as long as it is understood that his alternative will only fully succeed if his proposed actions are undertaken in cooperation with other interest groups and in the manner proposed in paragraph 4.6. The emphasis should not be on what is perceived to be the best policing model(s) or approach(es), but rather a distinction should be made between those

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crime combating activities where the police have a direct responsibility and can make a direct impact on crime, and those activities where the police, through their interaction with others and by sharing information and their expertise, can make an indirect impact on crime. In conclusion, direct and indirect policing can be distinguished in more or less the following way: ♦ Direct policing is a form of policing which refers to the following crime combating activities for which the police are primary and directly responsible: – law enforcement – conducting criminal investigations – maintaining public order – providing visible policing (patrols, attending to complaints, reacting to incidents requiring police presence, et cetera) – gathering, interpretating, evaluating and utilising of crime intelligence – crime deterrence (which should be the result of the effective performing of all or any of the other activities listed above). ♦ Indirect policing is a form of policing which should be regarded as all those activities or practices relating to the combating of crime (including activities or practices to prevent crime) where the police do not have a primary or direct responsibility. In these instances the police’s role is to assist, inter alia, by identifying problems, crime risk factors, tendencies, trends, et cetera, and to share this information with those agencies and interest groups who are principally responsible for acting on such information. In this sense, indirect policing would include many of those aspects normally associated with community and problem orientated policing.

4.5 Police force versus police service

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The name change of the police in the United Kingdom from a force to a service, is closely linked to the development of community policing. The change also has an obvious link with the perceived strategic move from an offensive to a defensive posture as far as policing is concerned. In addition, the change from force to service seems to be part of the desperation of the police to make themselves more presentable in view of all the criticism against them, also in terms of their image and the perceived message that the name of the police organisation was projecting. According to Bennett (1994: 107) the “revolution” in British policing in the early 1990s was due – in part – to a policy by chief police officers “to realign operational policing to contemporary needs”. This policy change was contained in the Strategic Policy Document which was published by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 1990, and included a conceptual change of name from a “force” to a “service” (Bennett, 1994: 107–109). The Strategic Policy Document, in turn, was based largely on the 1990 Operational Policing Review (Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.1.2). According to Reiner (1994: 14) and Bennett (1994: 109), it was the poor public rating of the British police in terms of their traditional service-style of policing, in the

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Operational Policing Review, which prompted the name change from “police force” to “police service”. ACPO subsequently launched their Quality of Service initiative with its Statement of Common Purpose and Values wherein the mission of the police was clearly defined in “service” terms (Reiner, 1994: 14). It is obvious that the police chiefs believed that by marketing the police as a service rather than a force, they would regain public support. Police organisations in the United Kingdom reacted by substituting the term force in all references to their institutions with the term service and as a consequence, the term force is no longer considered “politically correct” (Reiner, 1994: 14). Morgan and Newburn (1997: 59) are of the opinion that – based on the findings and the recommendations of the Scarman Report in 1982, namely that the police had become too distant from the communities they were supposed to serve – police organisations in Britain generally started to emphasise the service theme ahead of the term force long before the name change became official in the 1990s. To Morgan and Newburn (1997: 74) the name change is superficial and of limited use, but it did demonstrate that among ACPO members there was agreement that it was important for the police to have a community orientated service function. The debate on the force versus service ethos of the police is also aligned with the debate on the control versus caring functions of the police. Control is clearly seen as part of the force element in policing, whereas care is obviously in line with the service element. As far as Becker and Stephens (1994: 1) are concerned, a rehabilitation of the care/control debate is at the heart of the matter and is a determinant of the future of British policing. It is important, at this stage, to briefly consider two pertinent characteristics of police organisations, namely their military character and the so-called police subculture. Police organisations have traditionally been organised along military lines. This includes uniforms, a visible rank structure and a code of discipline very similar to the military code of discipline (Walker, 1994: 34). Among the more obvious reasons for this practice, is the apparent functional analogy between the police and the military. For example, like the military, the police are in certain circumstances required to use coercive force (Walker, 1994: 34). The police are accordingly and appropriately armed and legally authorised to use deadly force under prescribed conditions. It is apparent that, over the years, decision makers believed that the exercising of their formidable powers and the use of their weapons – by members – often isolated and in unpredictable situations required the type of strict discipline and training that characterises the military. However, it is important to keep in mind that police organisations and the military are also different in many ways:

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♦ The functions of the police are obviously very different from those of the military. ♦ Unlike the military the police are only lightly armed. ♦ Police training, although often including basic military drill exercises, is focused on the preparing of recruits to perform police – and not military – functions.

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♦ There are important differences between police and military doctrines. For example, the police act according to the doctrine of minimum force while the military doctrine is maximum force, and whereas the police doctrine is to search and arrest, the military doctrine is to search and destroy. ♦ Police members are normally trained to act alone, while soldiers train to act in unison. The police subculture is closely linked to its military character. Hale (1994: 78) describes this subculture as unique within society, based on a highly regulated and intense selection process, and dominated by certain personality types, value systems and behaviour. According to Hale (1994: 78), secrecy and a very specific code of conduct ensure loyalty to the organisation and, consequently, an us versus them attitude. Police officials also tend to withdraw behind what is referred to as the “blue curtain” whenever they are criticised. Bennett (1994: 124), referring to a publication by Goldstein in 1990, views the police subculture as the product of a wide range of factors. These factors are associated with the nature of the police’s job which includes the threat of physical danger, hostility of the public, unreasonable public demands and conflicting expectations, and daily pressures to perform. To Hale (1994: 78), an integral part of the subculture is the fact that police officials view the police organisation as a home and even as an extended family. It provides a refuge from an unfriendly outside world and a sanctuary where their colleagues appreciate and understand them. The current dilemma of the police, finding themselves torn between the ethos of law enforcement (control) and the ethos of community oriented (care) policing, is best described by Walker (1994: 33, 61) as a form of “institutional schizophrenia”. Keeping in mind the rationale for both the military character of the police – including the fundamental differences between it and the military – and the unique police subculture, it is doubtful whether the police’s character and image can change very much. Considering that the changes to, or reforms of, the police are largely due to the mistaken search for a policing solution to an essentially socioeconomic problem, the question is whether this change in image is in fact not doing more harm than good. Bennett (1994: 126), referring to the theory and practice of community policing, also adds a word of caution to those responsible for policing policy, before they attempt more radical changes to the police and policing: In particular, attention should be given to the appropriateness and the consequences of broadening the police role ... whether such a move will either add to enforcement or undermine enforcement by eroding the organisational structure and police culture that support it.

4.6 The role of a crime prevention agency 62

Most of the research thus far referred to, supports the averment that the police cannot prevent crime, at least not in a direct or primary capacity. Williams and Wag-

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oner (1996: 521) even go as far as stating that “there is sufficient evidence to support the assertion that any reduction of crime must come from outside the police” and that methods should be found “of stripping proactive pretence” from the police. (It is suggested here that with the term “proactive” the authors were referring to crime prevention activities.) The logical question then, also raised earlier, is if the police do not prevent crime, who does? The obvious answer is that no single organisation or institution can prevent crime on its own. The risk factors of crime (causes, conditions and other contributing factors) are simply too varied for a one-dimensional approach to succeed. The answer lies in a multidimensional and multi-agency approach, involving all stakeholders, from national (government) to local government level, and including nongovernmental interest groups. The obvious challenge is to find a way or mechanism to effectively coordinate and authoritatively guide the efforts of all these role players. Williams and Wagoner (1996: 521) suggest that if there is a need for a “proactive force to control and prevent crime”, it would be much better to create an agency specifically for that purpose. Such an agency would have to engage in the improvement of education, health, recreation, community renovation, and measures to address all the other identified risk factors of crime. Since the 1980s there has been some experimentation with the concept of a national crime prevention agency, especially in the so-called developed and industrialised countries. Waller (1999: 73–82) provides useful information on the establishment and development of such (or similar) agencies in Australia, Belgium, Canada, England, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States. In most of these countries, crime prevention agencies were only established during the latter half of the 1990s, and in many of the countries where such agencies already existed, they were significantly modified during the same period. In the United Kingdom, the government created a Ministerial Group on Crime Prevention, representing twelve departments, in 1995 (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 60). This group is advised by a newly established National Crime Prevention Agency, consisting of representatives from the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Crime Concern, local and police authorities, the business community, et cetera. With these developments, the focus has now shifted from crime targets and crime events, to the social environment within which crime flourishes (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 60). The police themselves, unsurprisingly, in view of tradition and the diffuseness of the subject, are completely in favour of continuing with the responsibility for crime prevention, and even leading and coordinating the process. This is an intriguing point because all the evidence disproves the conception that the police can prevent crime. Perhaps this is also the reason why there is an alternative view that primary crime prevention will never enjoy high priority with the police (Morgan & Newburn, 1997: 144). Irrespective of the police’s position on the issue of crime prevention, it is clear that there is not much the police can do in any direct or primary sense to prevent crime and certainly they should not lead any coordinated effort aimed at prevent-

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ing crime. In this regard both Morgan and Newburn (1997: 144, 156, 180) and Waller (1999: 57, 77) emphasise the point that the role of the government in a crime prevention agency (or whatever it is called) is critical – from national to local level. According to Waller (1999: 4), the period since the 1980s saw crime overtaking other national issues as a priority concern. It is precisely because crime has now become a national priority, that national government – albeit through a central or crime prevention agency – must be involved, to provide a national policy and resultant national strategies for the prevention of crime (Waller, 1999: 77). Unfortunately, it seems that the locus of responsibility for a central or crime prevention agency is exactly the reason why some of these agencies are not yet as effective as they should be. For example, these agencies are correctly placed, that is, under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister, in only two of the nine countries already mentioned, namely France and New Zealand (Waller, 1999: 78). Waller correctly points out that it is doubtful whether any government department will accept the authority of a crime prevention agency if such an agency is situated within another government department. In other words, if a crime prevention agency is to be effective, it must be independently placed and answerable directly to government. Furthermore, it must be invested with the necessary political authority to enable it to authoritatively guide departments through the development of government approved policies and strategies to prevent crime. The role of the police in a crime prevention agency is to provide information and expert knowledge about known criminals and the manifestation of crime, as well as what they perceive to be risk factors of crime in any specific area or locality. Waller (1999: 84) explains, for example that a crime prevention agency should be able to pool information coming from various sources, including the police, and other sectors such as education, health, employment, et cetera.

4.7 Conclusion 4.7.1 Crime prevention and the risk factors of crime

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Crime can be prevented, but not by the police, at least not directly or primarily. There certainly are instances in which police action can prevent a crime from actually happening, but these are the exception rather than the rule (see the discussion on proactive policing in par. 6.3.4.2). Even then, the police act primarily in terms of their law enforcement and not their crime prevention function. In general, the police’s contribution towards crime prevention is through the deterrent effect achieved in executing their primary functions of law enforcement, order maintenance, crime investigation, crime intelligence and visible policing (random and targeted patrols). It could be argued that crime prevention is a limited by-product of the performance of the primary functions of the police and should therefore, not be regarded as a primary product or function in itself. It has become manifestly clear that there is a marked disconnection between crime, its causes (risk factors), and the programmes developed and actions taken to combat it, and especially to prevent it. As was also pointed out earlier, crime has

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undoubtedly become a national threat and a national concern in many countries. The responsible action by a government in this situation is to develop a comprehensive national policy to counter (combat) this threat. Such a national policy (national security policy or national safety and security policy) should, inter alia, not only ensure that the counterefforts are integrated, but also that there is a logical connection between the crime problem and its identified causes and the measures aimed at combating it.

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4.7.2 A national coordinating structure Precisely because an integrated approach will be necessary to implement a national security policy, a national coordinating structure such as a central or national crime prevention agency (or, as will be recommended in paragraph 5.5, a national crime combating centre), is essential. Crime and the risk factors of crime are so complex and varied that no single government department, including the police, should be given the responsibility for implementing such a policy (or for crime prevention per se) or even for coordinating its implementation. This responsibility should be given to an agency or centre, such as proposed above, established specifically for that purpose. Government departments are notoriously unwilling to accept “instructions” from each other, and the location of such a broad coordinating responsibility in one department will be fatal for the effective implementation of a national security policy. Therefore, not only is the establishment of a national coordinating structure essential, but it must also be invested with the political authority to manage the implementation of the policy, as well as its subsequent targeted strategies to combat both crime and the causes of crime. One of the preferred ways of ensuring political authority, apart from legislation, is to link the proposed structure directly to the head of government or to his or her deputy. The role of the national coordinating structure (agency or centre) in terms of directing the various capacities, capabilities and expertise of the relevant departments towards achieving the policy objectives, can be compared to the role of a conductor directing the ensemble in a philharmonic orchestra, with their variety of instruments and talent, to combine their individual contributions into one harmonious musical performance.

4.7.3 Police reforms As far as the obsession of and with the police is concerned, the police should rather stop, and be allowed to stop, pretending that they can prevent crime. It is a fundamental error of reasoning to expect a policing solution to an essentially socioeconomic problem. Seeking to find reasons within the police and weaknesses for the ever-increasing levels of crime, and consequently attempting to “reform” the police, is doing more harm than good. In addition, novel policing concepts, such as community policing, are continuously being developed. However, because these concepts are not based on a clear understanding that crime is not so much a polic-

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ing problem as it is a socioeconomic problem, these new concepts seldom have any impact on crime. Over the last decade there were a number of initiatives aimed at addressing crime by focusing on police reforms. A case in point is the name change from a force to a service, which has had limited practical value. There are also ongoing attempts at demilitarising the police and changing and aligning the unique police subculture to fit the new service and community oriented image of the police. The irony is, however, that the rationale for the existence of a military character in the police and the development of a police subculture due to dangerous working conditions and the legal authority to use force, et cetera, is not about to change. Therefore it can be argued that, contrary to the good intentions to improve the police and to improve policing, most of these changes and novelties have had a negative impact on the police and on policing, due to the impossibility of the police’s mandate. The following are considered to be pertinent examples of the negative results of some of these reforms: ♦ The creation of what is termed “institutionalised schizophrenia” within the police is descriptive of the confusion and uncertainty among police personnel about what they can do and what they are expected to do. ♦ Instead of rationalising the police’s mandate with regard to the prevention of crime, expectations are raised and the “impossible mandate” in fact broadened, exposing the police to more criticism and increasing their chances of failure. ♦ As crime rates rise and communities’ feeling of safety deteriorates, more police reforms, more experimentation with novel policing concepts and more crime combating and crime prevention plans and strategies are certain to follow, creating an almost vicious cycle of pressure and result, without solving the problem (compare with the analogy of a band-aid on cancer). ♦ The focus of the police is increasingly moved away from what they can do to what they cannot do or to where their impact is at best limited, for example with community policing where the public arguably “like” the police more, but the police’s impact on crime is limited. ♦ Police resistance to change is experienced because of the aim of turning them into something they are not, and cannot be, and directing them into doing things that they are least capable of doing. Although this resistance is often ascribed to the military character and the subculture of the police, they in fact experience these changes as obscure and even as unnecessary tampering with their character which has evolved in a particular manner due to the realities of policing. In addition, such change often leads to a decline in self-confidence, results in poor morale and negatively impacts on the police’s esprit de corps.

4.7.4 Direct and indirect policing

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Finally, the police’s role in the combating of crime needs to be clarified, and a logical way of doing this is to divide this role into direct and indirect policing. Direct policing should include all the primary functions of the police, but should exclude

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crime prevention. Indirect policing, on the other hand, should include all those activities of the police, which can support efforts to prevent crime. For example, the police will be able to provide fora – such as a national coordinating structure and local community safety forums – with valuable information and expert advice regarding the manifestation of crime, crime hot spots, crime trends and tendencies, the profiles of known criminals, et cetera, and – more importantly – with guidance on what they see or perceive as the risk factors (causes, et cetera) of crime. Indirect policing will obviously include ongoing contact and consultation with communities to determine their concerns about crime and other safety issues, and their policing expectations. This type of information, apart from eliciting an appropriate response in terms of direct policing, should form part of the information that the police will be feeding in at the fora where they participate in inter-agency crime combating (and crime prevention) planning.

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SELF EVALUATING QUESTIONS ~ Define crime and name at least ten of its risk factors. ~ Distinguish between community focused policing and crime focused policing. ~ Discuss the “broken windows” theory and the “zero tolerance” approach. ~ Explain the concepts “direct policing” and “indirect policing”. ~ Distinguish between “police force” and “police service”.

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C H A P T E R

5

Policy development for the police and policing in South Africa

Learning outcomes After studying this chapter, you should be able to ~ discuss the development of policy for the police and for policing in South Africa (immediately before and after 1994) ~ discuss the importance of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996) and the reasons for its failure ~ discuss the impact of the White Paper on Safety and Security: 1999–2004 on policing ~ explain the relevance of the proposed (in the White Paper) National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre for the national crime combating structure or agency proposed in this book ~ explain how crime and its risk factors can be regarded as a threat to South Africa’s national security.

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With fear of crime at all-time high levels, our national political leaders propose dramatic solutions to the “crime problem”. They focus on ... incarceration policies, construction of more prisons, tighter gun control, and increasing the number of police on the streets. (KELLING & COLES, 1997: 1)

5.1 Introduction In Chapters 3 and 4 the discussions and analyses focused on the development of the police and policing in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It is also useful, for purposes of background and perspective on the development of police and policing policy in South Africa, to look at relatively similar developments in other countries. In addition, it was possible to point out the misconceptions and unrealistic expectations that exist about the role of the police vis-à-vis the combating of crime, and more specifically, the prevention of crime. It was also shown that these perceptions have created a number of dilemmas for the police and that subsequent reforms of the police have contributed very little to the prevention of crime. In this chapter the development of policy and thinking about the police and policing in South Africa (since 1991) will be analysed and considered. It will be argued that the perceptions (misconceptions and

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unrealistic expectations) about the police, and the role of the police in this country, do not differ greatly from those described in the previous two chapters. The reason for limiting the discussion to the period after 1991 lies in the political and constitutional transition that took place in South Africa during the early 1990s when the African National Congress (ANC) began preparing for eventual political take-over and its future role as government. Since the constitutional dispensation changed dramatically after 1994 – when the ANC came into power – it is important to establish how the ANC thought about the police and crime before and after they took over government, and how that influenced policy. Some of the more important policy developments, such as the often-quoted National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security, will be considered against this background. While Chapter 5 focuses more on policy development, Chapter 6 looks at the operational approach of the police and its impact on crime. In addition, attention is given to the development and implementation of more “modern” concepts such as community policing and sector policing in Chapter 6.

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5.2 A brief history of constitutional change in South Africa: 1990–1994 South Africa became a republic in 1961 and, until 1994, was ruled by a white minority government. The black majority were not allowed to vote or participate in any other way in formal political life, apart from the so-called homeland system. As a consequence, after 1961, the ANC – as the main liberation movement – embarked upon (what became known as) an armed liberation struggle. In 1990, after almost three decades of violent conflict in South and Southern Africa, the main adversaries – the South African government and the ANC – agreed to a negotiated political settlement (Hough & Du Plessis, 1994: 1, 51–55). This agreement was followed by a long and difficult negotiation process which culminated in the transitional or interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993), which was assented to on 25 January 1994. The interim Constitution heralded in a new era of multiparty non-racial democracy in South Africa. It also meant a radical change in government when the ANC won the elections on 27 April 1994 and established a government of National Unity (Hough & Du Plessis, 1994: 27). In 1996 the interim Constitution was replaced by the current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.

5.3 The development of policy relating to the police, policing and the combating of crime The thinking of the ANC, and later the ANC-led government of National Unity, about the role of the police and policing in general, as well as about the combating of crime and the consequent development of related policy, will be discussed in three phases. Phase one will cover the pre-election period from 1991–1994; phase two the post-election period from 1994–1998; and phase three the period beyond 1998.

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5.3.1 The pre-election phase: 1991–1994 5.3.1.1 The National Peace Accord and Ready to Govern document The first indications of how the ANC viewed the police and policing in South Africa, are found in the introduction to the National Peace Accord of 14 September 1991. This accord, which resulted from an agreement between the South African government, Inkatha and the ANC, was subsequently signed by 23 political organisations (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000: 2). As the ANC was clearly the dominant party, it can be accepted that the tone and contents of the Peace Accord reflected the views of the organisation, or, at least, that it was not in conflict with these. A good indication of the thinking of the ANC during these early stages of its involvement in the police policy development is found in the Peace Accord, in observations about the relationship between the police and communities. For example, according to the Peace Accord the past role of the police engendered suspicion and distrust between the police and some communities and: [i]n recognition of the need to promote more effective policing, a commitment to sound policing practices and a cooperative relationship between the police and the communities is necessary (Hough & Du Plessis, 1994: 59). Chapter 3 of the Peace Accord contained a number of general and specific principles for the police and for policing. The following are examples of the more pertinent principles (Hough & Du Plessis, 1994: 66–67): ♦ The police shall endeavour to protect the people of South Africa from all criminal acts ... ♦ The police shall endeavour to prevent crime and shall attempt to arrest and investigate all those reasonably suspected of committing crimes ... ♦ The police ... are accountable to society ... ♦ The police shall endeavour to obtain the cooperation of the public whose partnership in the task of crime control and prevention is essential. ♦ The police, as law enforcement officers, shall expect a higher standard of conduct from its members ... than they expect from others ... ♦ The police shall exercise restraint ... and shall use the minimum force.

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The words “endeavour” and “attempt” in the phrasing of these principles were an obvious recognition of the practical impossibility for the police to protect everybody, to prevent all crime, or to arrest every offender. The intention clearly was to indicate to the police that they are expected to function as efficiently and effectively as possible, and by doing so, to provide as much protection as possible, prevent as many crimes and arrest as many criminals as possible. In view of the standard and stereotyped terminology normally used to describe police functions, this intention will become very relevant when, later, the functions of the South African Police Service are discussed. On 31 May 1992, a mere eight months after the signing of the National Peace Accord, the ANC approved a policy document entitled Ready to Govern (Hough &

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Du Plessis, 2000: 16). In a section about policing they declared that the primary function of the police would be the prevention of crime . In addition, the police are now expected to guarantee the personal security of citizens and the “free and peaceful exercise of their constitutional rights” (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000: 19). The policy change from the more realistic “endeavour” in the National Peace Accord to the more idealistic “guarantee” in Ready to Govern is rather conspicuous. It is clearly also an impossible expectation. Another obvious policy change is the elevation of “crime prevention” to the “primary function of the police”. Against the background of the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4, these policy statements constitute a step backwards.

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5.3.1.2 The interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 Prior to the first democratic elections in South Africa, on 27 April 1994, the negotiating parties agreed to the so-called transitional or interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993). In Chapter 14, sections 214–223, the interim constitution provided for the establishment of the South African Police Service, its functions and its functioning. The powers and functions of the Police Service are described in section 215 as: (a) the prevention of crime (b) the investigation of any offence or alleged offence (c) the maintenance of law and order (d) the preservation of the internal security of the Republic. The contents and wording of section 215 is similar to that of section 5 of the former Police Act, 1958 (Act No. 7 of 1958), which was repealed in 1995 by Proclamation No. 5 of 1995: Rationalisation of the South African Police Service . There are only two differences: firstly, section 5 was part of an ordinary act of parliament while section 215 formed part of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa ; and secondly, in section 215 the order of the functions, ostensibly taken over from section 5 of the 1958 Act, was reversed. Consequently, in section 215, crime prevention – which was the last mentioned function in section 5 – now moved to the first mentioned, seemingly primary position in section 215, and internal security from the first to the last position. The implications of the changes mentioned above, are twofold: ♦ Firstly, the fact that the functions of the police are elevated from being set out in an ordinary Act to being set out in the Constitution signifies the importance attached to policing, and also demonstrates the intention to ensure that the police are not abused for political or any other purposes. ♦ Secondly, the elevation of crime prevention from last to first position in the list of four main functions – when read in the context of the stated position of the ANC in Ready to Govern (par. 5.3.1.1) – seems to signify that crime prevention is seen as the primary function of the police. That would imply that the other three func-

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tions, including the preservation of internal security, are regarded as lesser functions. It is also important, at this stage, to refer to section 221 of the interim Constitution. Section 221 introduced two new developments in policing in South Africa, namely municipal or metropolitan police services and community-police forums. Section 221(3)(b) reaffirmed the importance attached to crime prevention as a police function and described the functions of the municipal or metropolitan police as follows: ... the powers of such a police service shall be limited to crime prevention and the enforcement of municipal or metropolitan by-laws ... A critical shortcoming, however, is the absence of a definition or explanation of crime prevention as a concept. This is in spite of an obvious preoccupation with crime prevention as a police function. The lack of definition or explanation can only result in speculative deductions and an imagined role for the police. If it is not clear precisely what the term “crime prevention” means, how is it possible to decide on the role of the police? It is this kind of speculative deduction that has created, for the police, the so-called “impossible mandate” discussed in Chapter 4. In paragraph 5.3.2 the attempts made, in policy and strategy documents, to define and explain both the concept of crime prevention and the role of the police in this regard, will be discussed.

5.3.2 The post-election period: 1994–1998 5.3.2.1 The 1994 Draft Policy Document on Change (“Green Paper”)

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On 25 May 1994, soon after the April elections and his appointment as Minister of Safety and Security in the new democratic South Africa, Sydney Mufamadi introduced his first draft policy document on policing and change, at a press conference in Cape Town. The policy document is also referred to as a Green Paper (South Africa, 1994b: 41; Mufamadi, 1994a). According to his media statement, Minister Mufamadi saw the publication of the Green Paper as an opportunity to provide a policing vision with a focus on a “process of fundamental change”. This included a “re-evaluation of policing principles and practices by both the community and the South African Police Service” (Mufamadi, 1994a: 2). In his media statement the Minister also referred to the need for a national crime prevention strategy to “reduce levels of crime and violence and to improve community safety” (Mufamadi, 1994a: 3). The Green Paper, apart from a short historical perspective and an introduction to the new political environment, focused on thirteen major policy issues. It also provided a vision, principles and steps to realign all the policy issues relating to policing, with the Constitution and especially with the chapter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. A number of statements that are relevant to the arguments in this book, are made in a section of the Green Paper entitled “The New Environment” (South

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Africa, 1994b: 6–7). Among others, it is stated that in spite of political changes, the South African society is still marked by a culture of interpersonal violence which creates an enormous demand for police services (South Africa, 1994b: 7). The Green Paper also recognises the important link between socioeconomic conditions and the high levels of crime. In this regard, reference is made to the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which aimed to address these issues (South Africa, 1994b: 7). In the discussion on major policy issues, the fourth policy issue is entitled “Police Service and Community Development” (South Africa 1994b: 13–15). This policy issue is of particular relevance because it clearly indicates “[t]he specific role of the police ... to solve community problems of crime and disorder ...” (South Africa, 1994b: 13). The important and reciprocal relationship between community safety and the RDP is also singled out because of the belief that the success of the one is dependent on the success of the other (South Africa, 1994b: 14). The discussion under “Police Service and Community Development” also refers to two pertinent aspects of the overall policy on how to fight crime: firstly, by stating that the police will play a role in local development forums (which clearly has to do with the RDP and socioeconomic development, as well as addressing poor environmental and infrastructural conditions); and, secondly, by acknowledging the central role of local government “in managing the relationships around security” (South Africa, 1994b: 14). In essence, the following valuable and relevant assertions in the Green Paper can be highlighted:

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♦ The existence of complex socioeconomic conditions, including interpersonal violence, which is at the root of the high levels of crime in South Africa ♦ The realisation that policing alone will not solve the crime problem, and the consequent need for a reconstruction and development programme ♦ The idea that the police should play a role in local development forums aimed at socioeconomic development ♦ The notion of a problem-solving role for the police in terms of community problems relating to crime and disorder ♦ The acceptance of the central role of local government in addressing the issues and conditions (at that level) which are conducive to crime and violence

5.3.2.2 Establishment and functions of the South African Police Service (1995) The South African Police Service was formally established during 1995 in terms of section 5 of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995). The only reference in the Act to the powers, duties and functions of the members of the police, is found in section 13(1) of the Act: Subject to the Constitution ... a member may exercise such powers and shall perform such duties and functions as are by law conferred on or assigned to a police official.

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The provisions made for the establishment of community police forums and boards, and for municipal and metropolitan police services in section 221 of the interim Constitution, were complied with when the South African Police Service Act of 1995 was promulgated. Sections 18–23 of the Act prescribe the establishment and functioning of community police forums and boards. Section 64 of the same Act, as amended by the South African Police Service Amendment Act, 1998 (Act No. 83 of 1998), prescribes the framework for the establishment, functions and control of municipal or metropolitan police services. According to section 64E of the abovementioned Amendment Act, the functions of a municipal (or metropolitan) police service shall be as follows: (a) traffic policing, subject to any legislation relating to road traffic (b) the policing of municipal by-laws and regulations which are the responsibility of the municipality in question (c) the prevention of crime (author’s emphasis). Again, the emphasis on the prevention of crime is apparent, as is the absence of a definition or explanation of the concept. It can only be concluded that those who wrote the Act were themselves ignorant about the meaning of the concept, or they assumed that everybody involved in policing would know how to interpret the phrase. In the end, little clarity on this issue exists. A first indication of how the South African Police Service can be assisted to perform their functions, is provided by section 18 of the South African Police Service Act of 1995. Section 18(1)(f), for example, refers to “joint problem identification and problem solving by the service and the community”. The strong sentiment towards, or belief in, the concept of community policing and its influence on the thinking about policing is again illustrated in this quote. It is obvious that the thinking – at least at that stage – was that community policing would be the approach that would enable the police to both reduce and prevent crime. In 1996, the interim Constitution was replaced by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 205(3) of the new Constitution completely changed the formulation of the functions of the police, or the “objects” of the police as they were now called. According to section 205(3), the objects of the “National Police Service” are: ... to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law. The formulation of the objects of the police in section 205(3) differs from previous functional stipulations (in law) in two particularly important respects:

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♦ Firstly, the functions of the police are described as objects. According to Pearsall in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (2001: 981), “object” means either a goal or a purpose (author’s emphasis). This creates the impression that the new formulation is aimed at achieving a desired result in almost idealistic and normative terms. The

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new formulation is also reminiscent of the idealistic terms used in the description of the functions of the police in the ANC’s policy document Ready to Govern, where the police were expected to guarantee personal safety, et cetera (paragraph 5.3.1.1).

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♦ Secondly, the term “combat” is used for the first time. It is neither defined nor explained, which immediately raises questions as to its meaning. In practice, “combat” is often confused with “prevent”, or the two terms are used interchangeably. However, the mere fact that it is added to the more traditional functions, implies a difference in meaning.

5.3.2.3 The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) • ESSENCE OF THE STRATEGY

The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), which was launched in May 1996, was developed by an inter-departmental strategy team in direct response to concerns expressed by the South African government about the high levels of crime in the country (South Africa, 1996c: 4; Rauch, 2002: 9–10). These concerns were addressed in two ways: firstly, through the NCPS as the longer term strategy aimed at addressing the social and developmental factors thought to facilitate crime; and secondly, as shorter term, high profile and visible policing measures intended to reassure the public (Rauch, 2002: 10). In describing its aims, the NCPS clearly states that its primary objective is to reduce crime levels in South Africa. It goes on to list ten supporting objectives that are deemed necessary to achieve the primary objective (South Africa, 1996c: 5–6). The following two supporting objectives are particularly relevant: ♦ Establishing a comprehensive policy framework which addresses all policy areas that impact on crime, as part of the greater initiative to improve economic growth and development ♦ Generating a shared understanding among South Africans of what crime prevention involves (South Africa, 1996c: 5) In explaining the second of the two supporting objectives, it is acknowledged that the criminal justice system largely deals with crimes already committed. Therefore, it is also acknowledged that the criminal justice system is largely reactive and that its efforts must accordingly be regarded as “crime control” and not “crime prevention”. While an effective criminal justice process can act as an effective crime deterrent, crime prevention is seen to involve “... a deeper process which is by definition, longer term and which focuses on preventing crime at an early stage” (South Africa, 1996c: 5). Elsewhere in the NCPS it is stated that South Africa needs a new way of looking at crime. This includes a shift away from crime control, which is an essentially reactive concept, to crime prevention, which is regarded as essentially proactive. It also includes a shift away from emphasising crime as a security issue, to viewing crime as a social issue (South Africa, 1996c: 6).

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In a short discussion on the history of crime prevention in South Africa (South Africa, 1996c: 7), the NCPS describes the situation as follows: No organised or systematic approach to the prevention of crime has existed in South Africa. No single agency or level of government has had responsibility for crime in its broadest sense, and there is currently no special structure to plan, manage and coordinate crime prevention policy and activities. Previous crime prevention initiatives were developed without adequate analysis of the root causes of high crime rates and have been narrowly focused on only one or a few aspects of the crime problem. The focus of existing crime prevention efforts have been on “stemming the tide”, and have relied on reactive strategies, primarily through the application of more policing capacity to selected problems. The aspects referred to in this quote are reminiscent of the criticism levelled against existing crime prevention approaches in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. In support of research relating to crime prevention in the abovementioned countries, the NCPS clearly identifies the following crucial needs for an effective and successful approach to the prevention of crime: ♦ An organised or systematic approach to crime prevention ♦ A single or special national agency or structure to coordinate the planning and implementation of crime prevention policies and activities (elsewhere in the NCPS it is stated that this coordinating structure should be duplicated at provincial and local level) ♦ A proper and adequate analysis of the root causes of crime before deciding on a suitable crime prevention approach ♦ “Stemming the tide” is not a particularly effective crime prevention approach (“stemming the tide” corresponds closely with a popular phrase in the South African policing environment, namely the “stabilising of crime”) ♦ The need to look beyond more policing capacity for a solution to South Africa’s crime problems The NCPS takes a strong stand against the view that more police – and in particular more visible police – will solve the crime problem. It continues as follows: ... it is only necessary to consider the magnitude of the problems of rape and domestic violence, child abuse, et cetera, to recognise that whilst this approach may provide solutions for some kinds of crime, it will not deal with other serious criminal activities, such as those which takes place within the private realm (South Africa, 1996c: 45).

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The NCPS goes on to explain that there is no single cause of crime and violence and that mono-causal explanations will only lead to simplistic solutions. Accordingly,

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effective crime prevention will only be possible if the overlapping social, economic, political and psychological causes of crime are properly analysed and understood (South Africa, 1996c: 9). In addition to pointing out the complexity of the multiple causes of crime, the NCPS also emphasises the importance of making a conceptual distinction between the root causes and the enabling factors of crime (South Africa, 1996c: 11). According to the NCPS, enabling factors are those circumstances which facilitate or make it easier for criminals to commit crimes and get away with it. An inefficient criminal justice system would be an example of an enabling factor. Root causes, on the other hand, are those factors which create the initial motivation to commit an offence (South Africa, 1996c: 11). One of the more salient and often quoted features of the NCPS, is its so-called four pillar approach to crime prevention. The “four pillars” are derived from the identification of the “four most crucial areas for intervention in addressing crime”:

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♦ the criminal justice system ♦ community values and education ♦ environmental design ♦ transnational crime (South Africa, 1996c: 50–80). As indicated earlier, the NCPS, in turn, represents one component of the safety and security pillar of the National Growth and Development Strategy (GDS), with its six pillars. According to the NCPS, it does not represent all government activities that may contribute to crime prevention, but rather serves to emphasise areas of crime prevention not covered by other components of the GDS. Examples of these areas of crime prevention which may eventually also impact on the prevention of crime, are listed as job creation, welfare safety nets and meeting basic needs (South Africa, 1996c: 49). • IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY

The NCPS makes it clear that crime prevention cannot be tackled by government alone, or by one sector of government alone. What is needed is an “integrated, multi-agency approach” (South Africa, 1996c: 80). Responsibility for the successful implementation of the NCPS was, according to the strategy itself, allocated to the Ministry of Safety and Security (South Africa, 1996c: 81). The strategy created or utilised the following structures for its implementation and for the further management of its processes: ♦ NCPS Inter-Ministerial Committee. This Committee was chaired by the Minister of Safety and Security, and was to provide policy direction, allocate programmes to departments and monitor progress. ♦ NCPS Directors-General Committee (DG’s Committee). This committee was also to become a subcommittee of the GDS (National Growth and Development Strategy) Directors-General Committee. It was supposed to have been invested with

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sufficient authority to rise above departmental concerns when implementing the NCPS (see paragraph 5.3.2.3(3)). The NCPS DG’s Committee was chaired by the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service. ♦ Joint Security Staff (JSS). Although not created by the NCPS, the Joint Security Staff (JSS) were often tasked by the NCPS DG’s Committee to implement particular programmes. The JSS consisted of representatives from the following government departments: – South African Police Service – South African National Defence Force – Justice – Correctional Services – Welfare The National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), which was established in 1994 in terms of section 4 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994), provided the JSS with the necessary intelligence. ♦ NCPS Coordinating Mechanism. During March 1996, Cabinet approved a coordinating mechanism for the NCPS. It was accountable, and acted as a secretariat, to the NCPS DG’s Committee. In the following year (1997) a new security operational structure developed as an extension of the NCPS coordinating mechanism. The new security operational structure, which replaced the JSS, was called the Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (JOINTS). The JOINTS comprised representatives from the same government departments which formed the JSS, but also included a representative from NICOC. All JOINTS representatives were senior officials at the level of Deputy Director-General. The JOINTS also had a mandate, depending on the nature of a specific responsibility at any given time, to co-opt a senior representative from any other government department or nongovernmental organisation onto the structure. Soon after the establishment of the JOINTS, the National Operational Coordinating Committee (NOCOC) was created, which was responsible for the joint planning and execution of all NCPS initiated crime prevention and security operations under the guidance and supervision of the JOINTS. The NOCOC was subsequently duplicated at provincial, as well as police area and station (precinct) level. ♦ NCPS Programme Teams. The NPCS Programme Teams formed part of the NCPS Coordinating Mechanism. They also consisted of representatives from various relevant governments departments and sectors in civil society. They were given the responsibility to implement specific NCPS initiated programmes and projects (South Africa, 1996c: 81–86; Knight, 2004). • CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGY

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It should be made clear from the outset that the NCPS, when viewed against the background of the crime combating arguments espoused in this thesis, was an excellent strategy. The NCPS recognised that the police could only contribute short-

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term visible policing measures, while much more was needed to address crime in the longer term. In this regard, it placed a specific focus on those issues that are associated with the social and developmental factors thought to cause or facilitate crime (Rauch, 2002: 9). However, eight years after its launch few people will argue that the NCPS has lived up to expectations. On the contrary, at this stage the NCPS can only be regarded as a good strategy, but one that has failed. The primary reasons for its failure are

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♦ a lack of understanding of and insight into the intricate relationship between crime and its underlying causes (socioeconomic and other risk factors) by political leaders and other principals ♦ as a result, a lack of conviction, commitment and support to implement the NCPS. It is obvious that, unlike the individuals who developed the NCPS, the political leaders and other principals failed to grasp not only the undeniable relationship between crime and its causes and the necessity to think and act accordingly, but also the strategic importance of their failure. From a strategic perspective, that failure cost South Africa dearly in terms of an escalation in crime, rising costs to combat crime, a negative impact on development and a decrease in investment. In the end, ironically, most of the blame for the persistent high levels of crime in South Africa continues to be directed towards the police. Janine Rauch, a senior consultant on criminal justice issues and formerly a member of the Secretariat for Safety and Security, has identified the following reasons for the failure of the NCPS (Rauch, 2002: 12–18): ♦ The launch of the NCPS in 1996 followed too soon after the launch of the 1996/7 Annual Police Plan. This was a public relations blunder, to which the public reaction was that the NCPS was “just another plan”. For government it resulted in a conceptual confusion between the police’s short-term plan and the longterm goals and objectives of the NCPS. According to Rauch (2002: 12) it: ... created a conceptual gulf between immediate short-term policing responses to rising crime rates, and the need for a developmental approach aimed at the causes of crime – a gulf that still exists today. ♦ The NCPS itself contained very little detail on how the programmes it proposed, were to be developed and implemented. ♦ It was a mistake to assume that cooperation between government departments would arise naturally and spontaneously. This was crucial considering that the [s]uccessful implementation of the NCPS was predicated on the assumption that inter-departmental cooperation was achievable, and that government departments and other role-players would be able (and willing) to agree on joint priorities and share information.

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♦ The NCPS did not fully conceptualise or explain the relationship between the four pillars or categories of crime prevention and the seven national priority crimes it identified. The result was an implementation approach with a strong focus on the pillars and, consequently, the establishment of structures and processes which had little in common with the content of the crimes they were supposed to address. ♦ No government funding was dedicated to the implementation of the NCPS. Instead, government departments were encouraged to rationalise their existing resources to also accommodate the NCPS. Obviously this did not take place. ♦ In the absence of detailed guidance and dedicated funding, the Secretariat for Safety and Security approached Business Against Crime (BAC) for support. BAC identified the first pillar of the NCPS, namely the re-engineering of the criminal justice system, as its immediate focus area. The result was, once again, that the first real implementation activity – as far as the NCPS is concerned – neglected the real aim of the NCPS, namely its situational or social approach to crime prevention. ♦ The 1997 review of the NCPS, which became necessary when it was realised that the implementation of the strategy was not successful, resulted in an even greater focus on short-term criminal justice issues rather than the longer term prevention approach. However, Rauch (2002: 18) argues that on the positive side, the review did succeed in making a conceptual link between law enforcement and crime prevention, and between short-term actions and long-term approaches.

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Rauch (2002: 13, 15, 18) refers to another important factor in terms of the implementation of the NCPS, namely that the implementation of the strategy rested with the Secretariat for Safety and Security. Placing the responsibility for the implementation – and coordination for the purposes of implementation – of a strategy with a focus on the longer term socioeconomic causes of crime, with the Department of Safety and Security, demonstrates an inability to think of crime prevention in strategic terms. Strategically, it would make much more sense to place primary responsibility for a strategy with a focus on longer term socioeconomic and environmental development, with government departments that are primarily responsible for these matters in the first place. In this instance, the police should play only a secondary or supporting role. It would, of course, make even more sense – as is argued throughout this book – to establish a separate structure to guide the implementation of such a national strategy. All of the role players, including government departments, can then be tasked with and held accountable for their respective line functions as far as these are covered by the (national) strategy. This would require that such a structure be given an overarching authority to direct government departments and other roleplayers to perform as dictated by the strategy. Lastly, to illustrate government’s failure to recognise the NCPS as primarily a

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long-term prevention strategy, it is necessary to quote from a speech made by the late Minister of Safety and Security in 1999. At a parliamentary media briefing in Cape Town on 28 June 1999, the late Minister Tshwete said, inter alia, the following about the NCPS:

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‘The criminals have obviously declared war against the South African public. In response our government formulated the National Crime Prevention Strategy ... It is not that government did not have a plan aimed at ridding our society of this particular scourge. What is required now is a ruthless implementation of that plan (Rauch, 2002: 23).

5.3.3 The White Paper on Safety and Security: 1999–2004 5.3.3.1 Introduction The White Paper on Safety and Security: 1999 –2004 (South Africa, 1998a) can be described as the most pertinent and clear direction indicator, as far as police policy is concerned, to be produced since the beginning of the new constitutional order in South Africa (in April 1994). The White Paper is entitled “In Service of Safety” and was published in September 1998. Since it is a fairly comprehensive document, only those aspects relevant to this book will be discussed. Accordingly, the discussion in this section will focus on the distinction between law enforcement (or policing, as it is also referred to in the White Paper) and crime prevention; the National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre; and a critical assessment of the White Paper and prevailing crime prevention approaches in South Africa.

5.3.3.2 Policing (or law enforcement) and crime prevention In his foreword to the White Paper, Mr F.S. Mufamadi, the then Minister of Safety and Security, sets the tone for the policy direction that follows. The Minister makes it clear that the White Paper ♦ is “[i]n keeping with the approach outlined in the National Crime Prevention Strategy ...” ♦ advocates a dual approach to safety and security through “... effective and efficient law enforcement and the provision of crime prevention programmes ...” (South Africa, 1998a: ii). In the mission statement of the White Paper it is similarly stated that: [r]eal reductions in crime will be attained through, firstly, more effective and efficient policing as part of an effective justice system and, secondly, through a greater ability to prevent crime (South Africa, 1998a: iv). In the White Paper the terms “policing” and “law enforcement” are used interchangeably (South Africa, 1998a: 6). The distinction made between policing and law enforcement, as mainly a reactive activity, throughout the White Paper, is apparent.

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In section II of the White Paper law enforcement (and by implication policing) is subdivided into three focus areas, namely ♦ criminal investigations ♦ active visible policing ♦ service to victims of crime (South Africa, 1998a: 15). In addition to these three focus areas, the White Paper emphasises the crucial role of effective crime intelligence in enhancing both criminal investigations and active visible policing (South Africa, 1998a: 16–18). According to the White Paper, the contribution of policing (law enforcement) to safety and security is twofold: firstly, the arrest and prosecution of suspects remove them from the opportunity to continue with criminal activity; and, secondly, effective investigation, arrest and successful prosecution act as a strong deterrent to potential offenders (South Africa, 1998a: 15). It is important, at this stage, to point out that the police’s contribution to safety and security includes a contribution to crime prevention through deterrence. Deterrence is achieved by performing well in terms of what the police can do, namely law enforcement. Crime prevention itself is defined by the White Paper in the following terms (South Africa, 1998a: 14): All activities which reduce, deter or prevent the occurrence of specific crimes firstly, by altering the environment in which they occur, secondly by changing the conditions which are thought to cause them, and thirdly by providing a strong deterrent in the form of an effective justice system. The fact that the police contribute to the prevention of crime through the deterring effect of their actions, and the fact that “to deter” is now part of the definition of crime prevention in the White Paper, cannot conceivably justify the inclusion of crime prevention as a function of the police – and a primary function at that. There are three important reasons for excluding crime prevention, as it is defined in the White Paper, from the functions of the police: ♦ The definition is vague and inclusive of all types of activity which are the responsibility of a diverse group of governmental and nongovernmental roleplayers. The police are only one of these role-players and it would not make sense to assign this responsibility (crime prevention) solely – and moreover, primarily – to the police. Crime prevention in this (wide) sense is clearly a shared responsibility and cannot be carried by one role-player (government department) alone.

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♦ Of the three types of activities mentioned in the definition, the police only participate in the third, namely the justice system. In addition, this responsibility is shared with other government departments, including Justice and Correctional Services. The police have very little or nothing to do with the first two activities, that is the altering of the environment and changing the conditions which cause crime. The only contribution the police can make towards these activities is to

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bring relevant information to the attention of those institutions, which do have a responsibility to address them.

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♦ The deterring effect of the police is the result (by-product) of the performance of the police in relation to law enforcement (criminal investigations, arrests and visible policing). Therefore it constitutes circular reasoning to argue that because the result or by-product of law enforcement, namely deterrence, contributes to the prevention of crime, crime prevention should be a (primary) function of the police. The White Paper builds on its definition of crime prevention to further distinguish between crime prevention through effective criminal justice, and social crime prevention (South Africa, 1998a: 14). According to the White Paper effective criminal justice contributes to crime prevention because it reduces the opportunity for crime by making it more difficult to commit crime, more risky or less rewarding. Effective law enforcement (policing), as an integral part of criminal justice, creates a strong deterrent against crime. Social crime prevention, on the other hand, is aimed at reducing the socioeconomic and environmental factors that induce people to commit crimes (South Africa, 1998a: 14). The White Paper also recognises that crime prevention – and more specifically social crime prevention – requires a “multidepartmental or multisectoral” approach and the institutionalised management of the various planning and implementation efforts relating to crime prevention (South Africa, 1998a: 20–21).

5.3.3.3 The National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre (NCPSC) Eventually and logically, following on its prior reasoning, the White Paper concludes (and recommends) the establishment of a National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre (NCPSC) to “... initiate, coordinate and facilitate crime prevention programmes” (South Africa, 1998a: 21). According to the White Paper, the NCPSC was to be situated within the Department of Safety and Security, and was to be responsible for both social crime prevention and the criminal justice system. The White Paper proposed the following functions for the NCPSC (South Africa, 1998a: 22): ♦ Establishing a national vision and identifying priorities ♦ Mobilising other government departments that can contribute to crime prevention initiatives ♦ Assisting provincial and local government in preventing crime by, inter alia, providing research, technical guidance, training and the sharing of best practices ♦ Providing seed funding for certain social crime prevention programmes ♦ Providing continuous improvements to the criminal justice system ♦ Assisting in the coordination and management of initiatives to prevent certain priority crimes

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Within the Department, the NCPSC was placed with the Secretariat for Safety and Security (Rauch, 2002: 19; Pelser & Louw, 2002: 141). This was, to some extent, a positive development, as the NCPSC could have been placed with the police (which are also part of the Department of Safety and Security) – precisely where it does not belong. However, if the distinction between policing and crime prevention (especially social crime prevention) were further developed and better explained in the White Paper, and perhaps better understood by the decision makers, the placement of the NCPSC may have been approached differently. If policy and decision makers had had a better understanding of the concept of crime prevention, they would certainly have realised that it was a mistake to allocate primary responsibility for crime prevention, and a structure (the NCPSC) to lead the process, within the Department of Safety and Security, whose role in this regard is only contributory and indirect. It is even more difficult to understand why, during 1999 and after the appointment of a new Minister of Safety and Security, the function of social crime prevention was shifted from the NCPSC and the Secretariat for Safety and Security, to the South African Police Service (Rauch, 2002: 23; Pelser & Louw, 2002: 139). The transfer of social crime prevention to the police was precisely what should not have happened. Given the arguments in this book for the creation of a separate and independent coordinating structure, accountable only to government (and of course to parliament), to manage crime prevention policies and strategies at national level, the transfer should be viewed as a huge step backwards. Placing responsibility for actions directed at social, economic and environmental development within the police, makes no sense. The transfer of social crime prevention to the police, also meant the end of the NCPSC. And so one of the most positive recommendations of the White Paper – namely a national coordinating structure to manage the process of crime prevention – came to naught. According to Pelser and Louw (2002: 139) the result of this development is that it now often appears as if the small social crime prevention unit within the police “drives” most government crime prevention efforts. This is in direct contrast with the recommendations by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) in Montreal, Canada (Pelser & Louw, 2002: 139). The ICPC, after conducting a study in this regard, recommended that sustainable crime prevention required a “responsibility centre” in order to ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

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provide leadership located at the highest level of government develop an implementation strategy ensure that the policies of other departments contribute to the strategy stimulate partnerships (often through the provision of seed funding) so that key actors work together (Pelser & Louw, 2002: 139).

5.3.3.4 A critical assessment of the White Paper and prevailing crime prevention approaches in South Africa As is the case with the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security is a remarkable document in many ways. It provides

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policy direction, which is enlightening and far ahead of current practice. A clear example is the distinction it makes between policing (or law enforcement) and crime prevention. This distinction is, to a large degree, also the position supported in this book. However, there are aspects of the White Paper that are open for debate, and these aspects will be discussed in the remainder of this section. According to the White Paper (South Africa, 1998a: 15–21), law enforcement refers to policing activities such as crime investigation, targeted visible policing and service delivery (to victims of crime). Crime prevention, on the other hand, which is not the result of the deterrence affected by the criminal justice system, is referred to as “social crime prevention”. The latter term is used to describe all those activities aimed at reducing the socioeconomic and environmental factors that motivate people to commit crimes. However, the statement in section III of the White Paper (South Africa, 1998a: 20) that “... law enforcement alone cannot reduce the social and economic factors which contribute to crime”, is either a mistake or it is nonsensical (author’s emphasis). It should be obvious that law enforcement can have very little, if any, impact on social and economic factors. This unfortunate statement obscures an otherwise clear and logical distinction – between law enforcement and crime prevention – and can only contribute to the confusion that already exists. To make sense, the word “alone” should be scrapped. It is also a pity that the White Paper failed to develop further the concept of crime prevention, in terms of the specific role of the police. It appears as if the drafters of the White Paper did not have the necessary understanding of and insight into the functioning of the police and crime prevention, to clarify the role of the police in this regard. The White Paper should, in one way or another, have made the further distinction between the direct and indirect roles of the police. As was pointed out in paragraph 4.4.3, the police have a direct responsibility for and an impact on crime as far as their policing or law enforcement role is concerned. The efficiency and effectiveness with which they perform this task, will also determine the degree of deterrence achieved. It can also be argued that the police have a direct responsibility to deter crime, and to perform their law enforcement function in such a way that maximum deterrence is achieved. The potential benefits for crime prevention are obvious. The indirect role of the police, as far as social crime prevention is concerned and based on their daily contact with crime, lies in their responsibility to inform others (other governmental and nongovernmental role-players) about the incidence of crime, identified problem areas (or “hot spots”), the real or perceived causes of crime, and the environmental and other contributing factors which lie at the root of the crime problem. Pelser and Louw (2002: 140), in their critique on crime prevention approaches in South Africa, point out that it is still unclear what crime prevention means for the police. Although the police do attempt to involve themselves in crime prevention, through community-oriented methods such as community policing and sector policing, “... practical crime prevention for the police still largely amounts to road blocks and high density search and seizure operations” (Pelser & Louw, 2002: 140).

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In the conclusion of their critique, Pelser and Louw (2002: 140–141) list the following findings, which are broadly in line with the arguments in this book: ♦ The ability of the police to prevent crime is limited. (Author’s emphasis) ♦ Crime prevention is unclear in operational terms. ♦ Since policing goals tend to be short-term, it raises the question of whether crime prevention policy and programmes should be led by the police. (Author’s emphasis) ♦ Allocating responsibility for crime prevention to the police, not only adds to the burden of the police, but it also allows other departments – such as those responsible for social welfare, health and education – to evade their responsibilities. ♦ Allocating crime prevention to the police also means that the concept of “safety and security”, which implies an active role for players other than the police, is largely being disregarded. (For example: prevention projects aimed at the youth in areas with high levels of delinquency, youth diversion, after-school care for children at risk, and home visits to new mothers, are the responsibility of the departments of social development and education, and not of the police.) ♦ The core problem is that despite the progressive policy directions in both the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security, public safety is still commonly viewed as a security issue and therefore the responsibility of the criminal justice system, and specifically that of the polic . Accordingly, the implementation of the NCPS focuses mainly on improvements to the criminal justice system, to the neglect of its other provisions. (Author’s emphasis) It is apparent, also from the above critique that the White Paper should have been bolder and should have taken a much stronger stand as far as its policy recommendations are concerned. The consequences of not approaching crime combating in the manner prescribed by the White Paper, should have been made clear. As matters stand, the conceptualisation and policy directions of the White Paper have been largely ignored. The question that remains is: quo vadis? Pelser and Louw (2002: 141) make five specific recommendations to address the shortcomings in crime prevention policy and implementation. These recommendations either correspond with the arguments put forward in this book, or are regarded as similarly sound and constructive. The recommendations, which are listed later, are also considered as criticism on the White Paper for not being bold enough and for its inability to achieve a breakthrough in the existing crime prevention paradigm paralysis. The inevitable result is a crime-combating impasse. The five recommendations by Pelser and Louw (2002: 139–143) are as follows: ♦ To reduce the pressure for “quick fixes”, the lead responsibility for crime prevention should not lie with the police.

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♦ The responsibility for crime prevention should preferably rest with the departments of the social cluster (for example, the departments of Social Development, Health and Education).

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♦ The concepts of “safety” and “crime prevention” need to be reconceptualised as social health issues. Such a reconceptualisation would allow for the sharing of the crime prevention burden by various role-players in both government and civil society. It would also contribute or facilitate a wider understanding of crime as a social health issue, rather than a security issue.

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♦ The establishment of a National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) in South Africa is strongly argued for. Such a centre should manage the process of crime prevention by providing, inter alia, national policy direction, guidance, technical assistance, financial support, training, research, evaluation, et cetera. It is also essential that such a crime prevention centre command the necessary authority, if it is to direct and guide government crime prevention initiatives.

5.4 Crime as a national security threat In Chapter 2 it was argued that crime and violence, their social and economic causes and the environmental conditions conducive to crime and violence, can pose a threat to national security if not addressed effectively. These conditions could, for example, lead to a state of anarchy where government and its law enforcement agencies are no longer able to maintain law and order. Bayley and Shearing (2001: 39) argue that the “[f]ailure to provide public safety fairly and equitably can affect the stability of government itself”. The above argument is supported by section 37(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 which provides, inter alia, as follows: A state of emergency may be declared ... when – (a) the life of the nation is threatened by ... disorder ... or other public emergency ... Serious crime levels and/or high levels of, for example, unemployment and poverty, especially if these are allowed to escalate to a state of anarchy, or mass discontent, certainly poses a threat to “the life of the nation”. Hough (2003: 202), following an overview of the impact and implications of crime in South Africa, comes to the conclusion that “crime is undoubtedly one of the main threats to national and individual security in South Africa ...” According to Hough (2003: 203): ... it is clear that especially violent crime, organised crime and economic crime, have definite implications for national security, and additionally so if national security is used in its broader context, and not limited to state security. The policy directions discussed so far, in relation to crime and the prevention of crime, have avoided the need and the challenge to recognise crime as a national security issue, and subsequently to confront it as such. To the contrary, the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), although acknowledging the “impact which burgeoning crime rates have in depressing popular confidence in the very

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process of democratisation in South Africa,” cautions that to view crime as a fundamental threat to state security, is to risk overstating the problem (South Africa, 1996c: 8). Unfortunately the NCPS clearly limits its definition of national security to the old and narrow meaning of state security. However, the NCPS goes on to admit that the ongoing crime problem and the widespread insecurity it causes, as well as the sheer magnitude of the victimisation it causes, may create popular contempt for human rights and for the constitutional dispensation, which guarantees these (South Africa, 1996c: 8). The cautious approach of the NCPS and the complete silence of the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security with regard to the subject of national security is strange considering the position taken in the 1994 White Paper on Intelligence, the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. The relevant aspects of the latter White Papers were referred to in Chapter 2 and it is clear that in both cases a broader approach to national security is followed. In both of these White Papers it is stated that, among others, crime and violence, and socioeconomic problems, are seen as the greatest threat to the South African people (South Africa, 1994a: 5–8; South Africa, 1996d: 3). This position was confirmed in 2002 when the South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) published their mandate in the Sunday Times of 23 June 2002 (Mavimbela, 2002). Once a government is clear on what its country faces in terms of a real or potential national security threat, it needs to develop a national security policy and a concomitant national security strategy to counter (combat) that threat. In view of the broader definition of national security, it is obvious that a national security policy will have to be equally broad and comprehensive to confront the threat in all its dimensions, including the manifestation of crime, its root causes and other risk factors. The national security strategy, which should flow from the national security policy, will have to determine objectives, allocate responsibilities (to government departments), and distribute resources in such a way that government is enabled to achieve the aims of its national security policy. Based on the national security policy and national security strategy, government departments should develop their own (department specific) strategies in line with their prescribed functions. Such a national policy, and to some extent, the national and departmental strategies, can also act as a guideline for nongovernmental and private institutions to align themselves with government initiatives. The NCPS, in its own admission, does not view crime and its causes as a threat to national security, and subsequently does not meet the requirements for the kind of national security strategy called for in this book. There is also some doubt as to what extent the NCPS can be regarded as a strategy and whether it is not more policy than strategy. According to Hough (2003: 202), the NCPS cannot be regarded as being equivalent to a comprehensive national security policy or strategy, “... although, as a comprehensive programme to prevent and combat crime, it forms a building block in the formulation of – primarily domestic – national security policy and strategy”.

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5.5 A central or national coordinating structure

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The need for a national security policy and a national security strategy is matched by the need for a central or national coordinating structure to manage the development and implementation of such a policy and strategy, and resulting departmental strategies. In the instance where crime and its associated conditions are regarded as a national security threat, it would seem appropriate to refer to such a national coordinating structure as a national crime prevention centre or agency. However, as will be argued in the next chapter (paragraph 6.3.4.2) crime prevention is only one element of the broader concept of crime combating, the other being policing, and consequently it would make more sense to create a national crime combating agency or centre. Alternatively, the mandate, structure and functioning of the National Security Council (NSC), could be adapted to enable it to perform the functions of a national crime prevention (or combating) centre. Such a change would be particularly appropriate if crime and its associated risk factors are recognised as a national security threat in South Africa. Consequently, the NSC should be given the responsibility to develop, and generally to manage, the implementation of a national security policy and a national security strategy. The NSC should also oversee the implementation of departmental and interdepartmental (cluster) strategies that derive from the national policy and strategy. No matter what the name and nature of the central coordinating structure may be, it is essential that it perform, inter alia, the following functions: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Continuously assess the crime situation Identify the risk factors underlying the crime problem Identify measures to address each of these risk factors, proactively and reactively Allocate responsibilities to the various government departments and other roleplayers ♦ Manage the process of implementing its decisions and taskings In practical terms it is expected that a central coordinating structure would perform its duties by gradually developing an overarching national crime combating policy and drawing up a national crime combating strategy to strive towards and achieve the aims and objectives of the policy. The strategy should contain the taskings, responsibilities, objectives, timeframes, estimated costs, and distribution of resources needed to successfully carry out the taskings, et cetera. Lastly, if the central coordinating structure, as proposed, is established, it is essential that it be given the authority necessary to have its directives and decisions carried out. Government departments therefore – in terms of the implementation of a national policy and strategy aimed at combating (including preventing) the national threat, such as the endemic crime and its risk factors – need to be accountable to a central coordinating structure operating with overriding authority. Without authority there cannot be accountability. One way of ensuring authority for such a central coordinating structure is to appoint either the President or the Deputy President as its chairperson. Another

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possibility is to promulgate legislation that provides for this. However, experience has shown that the way not to do it is to make a single government department or a single minister responsible for this task.

5.6 The cluster approach During 1999–2000, the South African government, in recognition of the need for improved coordination and cooperation between government departments – and probably also out of frustration with the dormancy of the NCPS coordinating structures at Cabinet and Director-General level – established a system of “cluster” (or sector) committees (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000: 54–57; Knight, 2004). The following six clusters were established at both Cabinet and Director-General level (Hough & Du Plessis, 2000: 56): ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

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Social Sector Economic Sector Investment and Employment Sector Governance and Administration Sector International Relations, Peace and Security Sector (IRPS) Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Sector (JCPS)

The purpose with the cluster or sector approach is relatively obvious and clearly demonstrates a move in the right direction, that is, to bring government departments closer together – in terms of their interrelated roles and responsibilities. Some departments belong to more than one cluster. The cluster directly relating to policing or law enforcement, the JCPS cluster, comprises fourteen departments. Among these are the departments of the criminal justice system, the South African National Defence Force and members of the Intelligence community (Knight, 2004). According to Knight (2004), some of the clusters also have periodic intercluster meetings to consider shared interests and responsibilities. However, in view of the arguments in this book that firstly, crime and the risk factors of crime constitute a real or potential threat to the national security of this country and, secondly, the prevention of crime requires action in both socioeconomic and environmental dimensions, as well as in policing, it is argued that a system of independently functioning departments or clusters of departments, will still fail to adequately address the need for effective coordination and cooperation. Considering the expressed need for a national security policy and a national security strategy to counter or combat national security threats, it is illogical to expect a diverse group of government departments (or clusters) to execute such a national policy and strategy in a coordinated manner unless the process is facilitated by a structure or mechanism established specifically for this purpose. This is true even if crime and its risk factors are not regarded as a national security threat. Consequently, and due to the variance between crime and its causes, especially as far as countermeasures are concerned, various government departments, that would normally not have much reason to work together, should be forged into a relationship

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where they have a joint responsibility for the combating of crime. The term “crime combating”, as used in this book should be regarded an overarching term for both crime prevention and policing measures. Whether or not crime is seen as a national security issue, it is serious enough to justify unity in effort to counter or combat it. Such a unity in effort can only be achieved through the establishment of a central coordinating structure, which functions with the necessary authority to enable it to achieve its objectives. In the cluster approach the divide between relevant departments, as far as a possible overarching and integrating national security policy/strategy or a national crime combating policy/strategy is concerned, remains. This situation is compounded by the fact that the Ministers and Directors-General of the so-called “lead departments” in the various clusters, are appointed as chairpersons of the Cabinet and Director-General committees (clusters) respectively (Knight, 2004). As was pointed out earlier, Ministers do not take instructions from each other and neither do Directors-General. This deficiency has already led to failure of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), and it will continue to derail the efforts of the current cluster system to combat crime. According to Knight (2004), the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS) is occasionally chaired by the President. However, although this cluster may, on such occasions, command the necessary authority, its focus is still too limited. Its primary focus remains the criminal justice system and it cannot act as a coordinating structure for other clusters or for government departments that are not part of this cluster.

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5.7 Conclusion 5.7.1 The variance between statute and policy The development of policy for the police and for policing in South Africa since the early 1990s is, on the whole, obscured by the huge discrepancy between theory and practice, and between statute and policy. The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security are good examples of excellent policy statements, which, in practice, are largely ignored. Both the NCPS and the White Paper recognise the variance between crime and its causes, and that the police can do very little about these causes. In both documents it is pointed out that the role of the police lies in short-term activities, such as law enforcement, while crime prevention relates to longer term socioeconomic and environmental developments. Longer term development issues are the responsibility of other (non-police) role-players. Another positive policy development is the clear distinction in the White Paper between policing (or law enforcement) and crime prevention. Policing and law enforcement are used as interchangeable terms and refer to criminal investigations, targeted visible policing and the delivery of service to victims of crime. The White Paper also refers to the importance of crime intelligence to enhance the effectiveness of policing. These are the things the police can do. Crime prevention, on the

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other hand – except for the relatively small contribution of deterrence – refers to those longer term activities aimed at addressing the socioeconomic and environmental conditions, which are thought to cause crime and/or to create an environment conducive to crime. In the White Paper this is referred to as social crime prevention. Unfortunately the White Paper does not further explore the specific role of the police in terms of its contribution to crime prevention. The main argument in this book is precisely that the role of the police in relation to crime prevention is complementary and consists of the following: ♦ Effective policing (or law enforcement) which can act as a strong deterrent ♦ The provision of information (for example, the incidence of crime, trends and tendencies, “hot spots”, prevailing conditions and perceived causes, et cetera) to those institutions that have a primary responsibility for crime prevention As will be argued in this section, statutory reflection on the development of police and policing policy is also in direct conflict with other policy developments in this regard. For example, whereas both the NCPS and the White Paper acknowledge the fact that the police cannot prevent crime, legislation – after 1993 – projects a preoccupation with crime prevention as a primary police responsibility. Improbable as it may seem, government obviously approves of both (conflicting) positions, since it is government who either makes these laws and/or policy statements, or approves them. This may indicate a high level of ignorance on the part of political leaders as to the complexities inherent to the concepts of crime and policing. It may also explain why good policies are not properly implemented. In the months leading up to the promulgation of the interim Constitution in 1993, the African National Congress (ANC) – which dominated the multiparty constitutional negotiations in the early 1990s and became the governing party in 1994 – made an important policy change regarding the role of the police. In the 1991 National Peace Accord they supported the more realistic approach that the police should “endeavour” and “attempt” to prevent crime and to protect people from criminal acts, et cetera. Eight months later, in the 1992 publication Ready to Govern, they completely changed their position to a more idealistic approach and declared crime prevention as the primary function of the police. The police were also now expected to “guarantee” personal security and other constitutional rights of citizens.

5.7.2 Idealistic versus realistic view of the police role

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The policy change from a relatively realistic to a relatively idealistic view of the role of the police in relation to crime prevention, is another clear example of the “impossible mandate” of the police, which is referred to in Chapter 4 and elsewhere in this book. In the interim Constitution, the prevention of crime was listed as the first of four police functions. Against the background of the views expressed in Ready to Govern,

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it can only be concluded that the prevention of crime, as the first function of the police, was intended to also mean the primary function of the police. The interim Constitution also provided for the prevention of crime as a function of the metropolitan or municipal police services. This position was confirmed by the South African Police Service Amendment Act of 1998. In 1996 the new and current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa not only confirmed crime prevention as a function of the police, but added crime combating as a new function. None of the Acts cited above, provides an explanation or definition for any of these terms. This obviously results in speculation and a divergent use of these terms. The first official attempt at defining “crime prevention” is found in the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security. However, apart from political approval of the White Paper and consequently of the definition of crime prevention, there is no subsequent indication by Government that they agree with and actually apply this definition. Certainly, to agree with the definition would imply an acceptance that the primary role of the police cannot be crime prevention. Tied in closely with the notion that the primary responsibility of the police is to prevent crime, is the belief in community policing as a solution to policing problems, and especially to the perceived ability of the police to prevent crime. Community policing is based largely on the premise that the police, by working closely with communities, will be able to solve their problems. This ideal was already expressed in the 1991 National Peace Accord, and concretised through its inclusion in the 1993 interim Constitution. In 1995, “joint problem identification and problem solving by the Service and the community” also became a prominent feature of the South African Police Service Act. It is obvious that, contrary to other government approved policy developments, the legal position (as set out in the statute) is that crime prevention remains the primary responsibility of the police. According to the same legal position, community policing is regarded as an essential policing concept that can assist the police in their attempts to prevent and reduce crime. The legal position, as discussed here, is not supported by other policy statements of Government in this regard. As was argued in Chapter 4, research has shown that concepts such as community policing – although having the potential to enhance the legitimacy of the police – very seldom have any impact on crime. This again underlines the argument that crime is not so much a police problem, but rather a social and economic problem in need of other (non-police) interventions.

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5.7.3 National security Lastly, there remains the question of whether or not crime and its associated risk factors (socioeconomic causes, as well as environmental and other enabling factors), are to be recognised as a national security threat in South Africa. In the 1994 White Paper on Intelligence, the 1996 White Paper on Defence, and the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, crime and its associated risk factors are indeed identified as a national security threat. This position

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was confirmed by the National Intelligence Agency in 2002 when it published its mandate in the media. It is, therefore, argued in this chapter that a national security policy and a subsequent national security strategy are urgently required to combat or counter this threat. Such a policy/strategy will have to address this threat in all its dimensions, that is, social, economical, environmental, political, cultural, security, et cetera. To ensure the effective and efficient management (development and implementation) of such a policy/strategy, a single national or central coordinating structure, invested with the necessary authority, is crucial. Even if crime and violence are not regarded as a national security threat, the situation is still serious enough and the responsibility for managing these matters diverse enough, to justify the establishment of a central coordinating structure. The next chapter will focus on what the police can do, but mainly on crime combating operations and other operational approaches. In addition, reference will be made to the so-called modern concepts of community and sector policing. An analysis of reported crime will also be provided to determine the impact of all these efforts on the prevalence of crime.

SELF EVALUATING QUESTIONS ~ Explain some of the difficulties in the way police functions in South Africa are formulated. ~ What are the essential focus areas of the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy? ~ What are the essential focus areas of the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security? ~ Define crime prevention in terms of the White Paper on Safety and Security. ~ Explain the advantages of a national coordinating structure for crime combating.

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The South African Police Service’s approaches to crime combating (1994–2004)

6.1 Introduction The previous chapter provided an overview and analysis of policy development in South Africa as far as the police, policing and crime prevention is concerned. This chapter will consider the strategic and operational approaches of the South African Police Service, in implementing these policies, and also in terms of their impact on crime. This discussion will cover the ten years between 1994 – when the present constitutional dispensation came into effect – and 2004, which saw the commemoration of the first ten years of democracy in South Africa. Where possible and necessary relevant information after 2004 will be included. The South African Police Service was established in terms of section 214(1) of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993), the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995) and the South African Police Service Rationalisation Proclamation, 1995 (Proclamation No. 5, 1995). The result of the above legislation was the amalgamation of the following eleven police organisations to form a single South African Police Service (Annexure A of the Rationalisation Proclamation): ♦ South African Police ♦ Bophuthatswana Police ♦ Transkei Police

No police strategy in itself, no matter how effective, can return crime to the levels of forty years ago. (DENNIS, 1997: 4)

Learning outcomes After studying this chapter, you should be able to ~ explain the development and implementation of community policing in South Africa ~ explain the impact of community policing on the prevention of crime ~ discuss the various operational plans of the police and their implementation since 1995 ~ explain the relationship between crime combating, crime prevention and policing ~ discuss the impact of crime combating operations on crime ~ explain social crime prevention and sector policing.

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♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Gazankulu Police Qwaqwa Police KwaZulu Police Ciskei Police Venda Police Lebowa Police KwaNdebele Police KaNgwane Police

According to section 15 of the Rationalisation Proclamation, the South African Police Service was formally established on 1 April 1995. On 25 May 1994 the first Minister of Safety and Security in the new dispensation, Mr Sydney Mufamadi, published his Draft Policy Document on Change (South Africa, 1994b). The purpose of this policy document was to provide guidelines for the rationalisation and transformation of the newly established police service according to democratic principles. Although it is not the intention of this chapter to discuss transformation issues per se, they are so interwoven with aspects relating to the crime-combating role of the police during this period, that reference to transformation issues is unavoidable in places. It is also important, for purposes of perspective, to point out that during the mentioned decade of democracy, the police were faced with the double challenge of combating the crime explosion and simultaneously undergoing transition and transformation. On police reform, Shaw (1995: 49) argues that “[t]ransition impedes the capacity of the police to combat crime, while crime places pressure on police transition”. The “crime explosion” seemed to correspond with the advent of democracy in 1994, while transition and transformation were necessitated by the inevitabilities of political change. Shaw (1995: 9) further explains the situation as follows: Political liberalisation brought a crime explosion, so apparently following the pattern of other societies undergoing sustained periods of democratic transition: as social controls are loosened, spaces open which allow growth in criminal activity.

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Both the strategic thinking of the police and the manner in which they were performing their duties, were clearly influenced by the dramatic political, social and structural changes – over which they had no control – that were taking place around them. Unfortunately, in the process, the attention given to all of these changes obscured many of the good things the police were doing. It is, therefore, quite difficult to provide an in-depth discussion of all the changes affecting the police and policing. It will be equally difficult to provide an account of all the strategies, operations and other police (crime combating) actions over the past ten years. Consequently, and in line with the general theme of this book, the

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focus will be on primary strategies and policing plans, as well as major crime combating operations that illustrate the strategic thinking and the operational approaches of the South African Police Service during this period. In order to enable a more structured and logical analysis of the relevant police strategies, plans and operations for the period 1994–2004, it is divided into four phases:

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♦ The community policing phase (1994–1996) ♦ The Policing Priorities and Objectives phase (1996–2000) ♦ The strategic focus phase (2000–2002) ♦ The strategic plan phase (2002–ongoing) At this stage it has to be pointed out that the above phases are not intended to correspond with the three phases identified in Chapter 5, although they may overlap at times.

6.2 The community policing phase (1994–1996) Although the development and implementation of community policing was certainly not limited to the period 1994–1996, this was the time during which the concept was introduced in South Africa and during which policing in general was dominated by the principles and terminology of community policing. This phase will be analysed on the basis of the legislative and policy framework of community policing, the motivation for or purpose of its introduction to South Africa, and the Community Safety Plan, in the following paragraphs.

6.2.1 Legislative and policy framework for community policing Community policing was discussed in Chapter 4, and in Chapter 5 the manner in which the concept first became part of official policing policy in South Africa, was explained. In this regard, the National Peace Accord of 14 September 1991 referred to the need for a commitment to establish a cooperative relationship between the police and communities (Hough & Du Plessis, 1994: 59). In Chapter 3 of the National Peace Accord, it is further stated that the police are “accountable” to society and “... shall endeavour to obtain the cooperation of the public whose partnership in the task of crime control and prevention is essential” (Hough & Du Plessis, 1994: 66–67). (Author’s emphasis) Section 221 of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, took the concept further by providing for the establishment and functioning of community police forums (CPFs) at all police stations. Their functions included the following: ♦ Promoting police accountability to local communities ♦ Promoting cooperation between communities and the police ♦ Monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the police ♦ Advising the police on local policing priorities

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Unfortunately, the interim Constitution was silent on the essential elements of community policing and it was left to academics and practitioners to develop a mutually acceptable understanding of the concept. In his draft Policy Document on Change (South Africa, 1994b), the Minister of Safety and Security attempted to provide more clarity on the envisaged relationship between the police and the public, as embodied in community policing. According to the Minister (South Africa, 1994b: 22): The philosophy of community policing must inform and pervade the entire organisation. Among the broader issues in the policy document, aimed at enhancing this philosophy and the changes in the police organisation, the Minister explained his views on aspects such as: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Democratic control over and accountability of the police Community consultation and involvement The police and community development The style of the police (South Africa, 1994b: 8–18)

In the following year, with the promulgation of the South African Police Service Act, 1995, effect was given (in sections 18–23) to the provisions of the interim Constitution (section 221) with the establishment of community police forums (CPFs) and community police boards. The above Act also provided for the objects, functions and procedural matters pertaining to CPFs and community police boards. Unfortunately, the Act focused so heavily on the establishment and functioning of community policing structures, that it completely missed another important provision of the interim Constitution (section 219 (1)(b)), namely the allocation of the responsibility for “community policing services” to Provincial Commissioners of the South African Police Service. As a result, relatively little attention was given to the development of the philosophy itself, particularly during this phase. In this regard, Pelser (1999: 11) remarked as follows: ... community policing has been generally viewed as the “responsibility” of particular functions within the SAPS and ... this responsibility is interpreted ... primarily in terms of the establishment and maintenance of CPFs. Pelser (1999: 11) further observed that: ... a trend has developed, within and outside the SAPS, in which community policing is seen as synonymous with the functions of the CPFs.

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As both the philosophy (or concept) of and structures for community policing are prescribed by law, it remains a part of the training of the police and of the job descriptions of certain categories of police officials, inter alia, station commissioners. However, in practice, community policing in South Africa has shown disappointing progress. In a study conducted in 2002 by Pelser et al. (2002: 26–27, 64), it was found that

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♦ community policing and community police forums seems to be downgraded by government as far as policies, regulations and funding is concerned

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♦ the public attitude also seems to suggest that they regard public safety and policing as “very much police business”. Part of the reason for the seeming inability of (at least) the police to successfully operationalise (implement) community policing, may be found in some of the original political motives behind the introduction of the concept in South Africa. As a result it is necessary to briefly consider some of these motives, in the following subsection.

6.2.2 Motives for the introduction of community policing in South Africa During the introductory phase of community policing, very few of the books, articles, papers, et cetera, which dealt with the subject, did not sing its praises. Expectations were high and it appeared that many saw community policing as a panacea for the deficiencies associated with the police and policing. In terms of the latter, it was clearly anticipated that community policing would greatly enhance the crime prevention capabilities of the police. Protagonists of community policing in South Africa – during this phase – seemed completely ignorant of the difficulties being experienced with the concept in countries such as the United Kingdom. As shown in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.4.1, the only real achievement with community policing in both the United Kingdom and the United States of America, related to an improvement in the legitimacy of the police, but it had little, or no, impact on crime in these countries. There is no doubt that some of the reasons for the introduction of community policing in South Africa were sound and well meant. However, it is obvious that there were reasons or motives that are questionable in terms of their stated intentions to promote effective policing or crime combating. Accordingly, and for practical purposes, a number of the obvious and less obvious reasons or motives are clustered into the following three categories for a brief discussion: ♦ Community policing as a new corporate strategy of the police ♦ Community policing as an instrument of change ♦ Community policing as a method of proactive or preventative policing (which should not be confused with crime prevention)

6.2.2.1 Community policing as a new corporate strategy of the South African Police Service In the early 1990s South Africa faced some fundamental and radical changes in an immediate post-revolutionary climate. An important objective of the change policy was to provide the South African Police Service with a completely new corporate strategy and image. Clearly, community policing was seen as one such strategy. However, the conditions under which community policing was implemented in the developed countries – inter alia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium

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and Canada – were very different from that which existed in post-revolutionary South Africa. According to Marais (1995: vt7), who was at that time a member of the Interim Advisory Team of the Minister of Safety and Security and the Convener of the Change Management Team of the police, the context in which these changes were taking place can only be described as a total renewal of the South African society. Echoing this sentiment, the South African Police Service, in the preamble to their Annual Plan for 1996/1997, stated that “[p]olicing in South Africa is undergoing a rebirth” (South Africa, 1996d: 1). (Author’s emphasis) The language of many of the policy documents that saw the light during the early 1990s – including the police’s Annual Plan 1996/1997, and a number of academic publications – projected a climate of almost euphoric and jubilant expectations of changes that were to come. Even the new policing terminology became a reflection of a type of revolutionary change rhetoric. As shown in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.1, community policing in South Africa did not live up to the high expectations initially placed on it. To some extent, this can be ascribed to the high expectations that it would yield good results. In this regard, the Minister of Safety and Security, in his draft policy document on change in 1994, admitted that “[t]he policy objectives should rightfully be idealistic in their vision” (South Africa, 1994b: 5). It is within this context of idealistic thinking that the South African Police Service declared, in its 1996/1997 Annual Police Plan (South Africa, 1996e: 4), that “the institutionalisation of community policing” has now become its new corporate strategy. Accordingly, the police undertook to realise their vision “[t]o create a safe and secure environment for all people in South Africa,” (South Africa, 1996e: 4) by implementing this new corporate strategy. The strategic role envisaged for community policing was further explained in the preamble of the 1996/97 Annual Police Plan (South Africa, 1996e: 1): Community policing, based on the acceptance that safety and security can only be effectively pursued through partnership and by sharing responsibility, will create the preconditions for improved public safety.

6.2.2.2 Community policing as an instrument of change

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It is evident that the purpose of community policing in South Africa – at least initially – related more to changing the police than to changing policing. In fact, there was a strong sentiment at the time that anyone who disagreed with any part of the change process – including community policing – was being resistant to change. Since change was taking place in an immediate post-revolutionary climate, there were obvious political reasons for supporting community policing. As will be shown, there was a firm belief that in order to change or transform the police, urgent attention needed to be given to specifically the following four aspects: ♦ Changing the unique culture of the police

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♦ Demilitarising the police ♦ Enhancing trust between the police and communities ♦ Promoting police legitimacy

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It was further believed that community policing would be instrumental in effecting these changes. In 1994, for example, the Minister of Safety and Security (Mufamadi) made it clear in his draft policy on change that: If [community] consultation is effective, it will result in significant changes to the police organisation, and improvements to the quality of police service, and also in greater public legitimacy and acceptance of the Police Service (South Africa, 1994b: 12). Elsewhere in his policy document, the Minister indicated that: Changing the police culture is perhaps one of the most significant challenges facing the new government (South Africa, 1994b: 16). The Minister also referred to the “new style” of the police, emphasising the need for a “demilitarised approach” (South Africa, 1994b: 17–18). According to the Minister “[t]he system of discipline should be informed by professional, rather than military values,” and further “[a] militarised system is not conducive to the development of professional discretion and accountability” (South Africa, 1994b: 18). It is a moot point whether the Minister’s argument that “professional discretion and accountability” justifies demilitarisation, is valid. Such a justification would, by implication, mean that the military, unlike the police, act in terms of military doctrine for which they do not need “professional discretion” and for which they should not be held “accountable”! It is obvious that the 1996/97 Annual Police Plan was guided by the above policy direction provided by the Minister. For example, in the preamble to the Annual Police Plan (South Africa, 1996e: 1) it is stated that “... the nature and style of the police service need to be transformed” and further: [it] is for this reason that many of the priorities and objectives identified in this document relate to the transformation of the South African Police Service. Transformation, in this context, is qualified as follows in the Annual Police Plan (South Africa, 1996e: 1): The strategies, structures and activities of the South African Police Service are in the process of being transformed in line with the principles and objectives of community policing. According to Shaw (1995: 7, 51), a former employee at the National Secretariat for Safety and Security, the South African Police Service began to focus on community policing because it was seen as an alternative to traditional strategies of service. The expected benefits were obvious:

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♦ Breaking with the past and moving closer to communities could go some distance in improving legitimacy. ♦ It could relieve much of the pressure on the police to change. ♦ At least among some members of the police, there must have been the hope that this new approach to policing would contribute to a reduction in crime. Shaw (1995: 53) argues that the [political] aim of community policing was not solely to reduce crime, and that: Primarily, it [was] an attempt to rebuild relations with citizens after confrontational periods ... to transform the apartheid-oriented police force into one which enjoys some community acceptance. In a paper entitled The challenges of community policing in South Africa , Pelser (1999: 2), a former member of the National Secretariat for Safety and Security, points out that the political popularity of community policing is to be found in the “flexibility or definitional vagueness” of the concept. This results in a situation where persons or groups across the political spectrum are able to use or promote that interpretation which suits them best. According to Pelser (1999: 4), the African National Congress (ANC) saw community policing as a way in which the South African Police Service could “... be democratised and legitimised by enhancing oversight and accountability ...” This approach is understandable in view of ANC concerns over the politics of the police during the period of transition. Pelser (1999: 4) also avers that the primary concern of the ANC was to find a way to neutralise the potential of the police to destabilise the new democracy. When read in this context, it is obvious that – from a political perspective – the role of community policing, and specifically that of community police forums (CPFs), was much more focused on the monitoring of the police than on solving community problems.

6.2.2.3 Community policing and crime prevention

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According to Shaw (1995: 50), community policing is the result of police agencies searching for an alternative to the standard patrol practice, which failed to reduce crime. Reiner, as cited by Shaw (1995: 50), believes that the process of finding an alternative was facilitated by a new international group of technocratic police experts who were also responsible for the diffusion of such “fashions” (styles) of policing. It can therefore be argued that the development of community policing was based on the belief that the police are primarily responsible for the reduction of crime and, consequently, for the prevention of crime. When existing police methods and practices failed to deliver on this belief, the police technocrats developed alternative policing models, such as community policing, in the belief (again) that they will eventually find a policing model that will enable them to prevent, and subsequently reduce, crime.

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It is clear from these arguments, that the so-called technocrats made no attempt to disaggregate the socioeconomic causes of and conditions conducive to crime, from the policing role (law enforcement, crime investigation, visible policing and order maintenance). As was argued earlier, crime should primarily be prevented at its roots, that is by addressing the socioeconomic and other risk factors which are thought to cause crime or which create conditions conducive to crime. The police are simply not capable of performing this task. In view of the police’s training, skills, qualifications, resources, organisation and, in general, their overall policing role (excluding crime prevention), it must be obvious that there are other state agencies much better qualified to address the socioeconomic problems referred to above. Unfortunately, concepts such as community policing and its implementation structures (community police forums) increase public (and political) expectations that this new approach will enable the police to finally “win the war” against crime. This creates further pressure on the police to do what they cannot, that is, to prevent crime. The danger of such pressure lies in the real risk of overstretching the police and deviating their attention and resources away from their policing (law enforcement) responsibilities, in other words, drawing them away from what they can do. According to the Minister of Safety and Security, in his Draft Policy on Change (South Africa, 1994b: 13):

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[t]he specific role of the police is to solve community problems of crime and disorder ... In this regard, the Minister expects the police to interact with other state agencies to solve community problems (South Africa, 1994b: 13). Based on the Minister’s understanding of the police role, it is evident that the police are regarded as the lead or facilitating agency regarding the interaction with and coordination of other state agencies. In his policy statement, the Minister (South Africa, 1994b: 15) added that the police “... must be proactive and actively seek solutions to problems and must prioritise the prevention of crime ” (author’s emphasis). It is noticeable that the Minister omitted any reference to the policing or law enforcement role of the police in his draft policy document, apart from cautioning against the use of unnecessary force (South Africa, 1994b: 27–28).

6.2.3 The Community Safety Plan (CSP) The Community Safety Plan (CSP) was implemented by the South African Police Service during March 1995 as a national police strategy to combat the high levels of crime and violence (South Africa, 1996e: 7). The CSP was also aimed at addressing national crime priorities and crime tendencies, such as political violence, taxi violence, bank robberies and vehicle hijackings (South Africa, 1996e: 7, 9–10). The CSP comprised both short and longer term objectives (South Africa, 1996e: 7–8; Moorcroft, 2004). ♦ The short-term objectives were divided into three phases:

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– Phase 1 (March–April 1995) consisted of a number of small scale high-density operations by the police, supported by elements of the South African National Defence Force. The aim of these operations was to stabilise the four priority provinces (Gauteng, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal). – Phase 2 (May–June 1995) consisted of an extension of these small scale operations to priority areas in the non-priority provinces. – Phase 3 (July–April 1996) saw a number of bigger stabilisation operations being conducted in the four priority provinces, and a continuation of the smaller crime combating operations in the other five provinces. During this phase the concepts of “intelligence-driven operations” and “joint task forces” were firmly established as part of the overall operational approach of the South African Police Service. ♦ The longer term objectives of the CSP were to be integrated into the Annual Police Plan 1996/1997. It was also envisaged that the longer term objectives of the CSP would eventually form part of a future Strategic Plan of the South African Police Service. A conspicuous feature of the Community Safety Plan was the effort to mask hard core policing (crime combating and stabilisation operations) under the cloak of community policing. This is further borne out by the name given to the plan, namely “Community Safety Plan”. In addition, the discussion of the CSP in the Annual Police Plan 1996/97 (South Africa, 1996e: 8), which was in itself a community policing oriented document, concluded that: ... in order to make these gains [of the Community Safety Plan] sustainable, greater effort needs to be put into community policing initiatives based on shared responsibility between the police and the community. The Minister of Safety and Security, in an address to Parliament on 20 September 1994, provided further proof of the pretence of community policing when, in fact, the emphasis was already being placed on aggressive police operations. In his address, the Minister (Mufamadi, 1994b: 5) referred to an announcement he had made earlier, on 22 August 1994, that a “comprehensive crime combating and crime prevention plan” would be launched soon. This was a clear reference to the Community Safety Plan. According to the Minister (Mufamadi, 1994b: 5) this plan consisted of two main components, namely an operational plan to improve the effectiveness of policing as a deterrent, and a public campaign to mobilise community participation.

6.3 The PPO phase (Policing Priorities and Objectives): 1996–2000 6.3.1 The Annual Plan of the South African Police Service 1996/1997 104

According to section 11(2)(a) of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995), the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service has a duty to:

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[d]evelop a plan before the end of each financial year, setting out the priorities and objectives of policing for the following financial year ...

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The first of these plans was the Annual Plan of the South African Police Service 1996/1997, which was referred to in Chapter 2, paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. This first annual (police) plan was more intent on establishing the new South African Police Service and community policing, than it was on combating crime. Although crime and other policing priorities were mentioned, there was no clear indication as to how these priorities were to be addressed. It soon became clear that the police plan contained too many objectives, that these objectives were clumsy in their formulation and that their achievability was questionable (South Africa, 1998c: 8). It is obvious that police management was aware of the potential weaknesses in the plan before its launch in June 1996. In an apparent attempt to counter any impression that the police were “soft” on crime, the implementation of the plan was linked to a major crime combating operation. Accordingly, on 13 June 1996, George Fivaz, the (then) National Commissioner of the South African Police Service, publicly announced the 1996/1997 Annual Plan (or police plan, as it was popularly referred to) and described it as: ... a no-nonsense “back-to-basics” policing plan aimed at crushing crime, specifically criminals, wherever it is encountered (Fivaz, 1996: 1). The announcement of the police plan was accompanied by further strong statements, but essentially it centred on how the plan was to be operationalised. In this regard, Fivaz (1996: 1) made the following additional announcement: Operationally, the heart of the Police Plan is a “Sword and Shield” approach where SAPS takes the offensive by hunting down criminals everywhere, whilst preventing crime by systematically reclaiming streets and rural areas from criminals. According to Fivaz (1996: 2), the “sword” referred to the mobile striking force of the police, which would deal mainly with the crimes that had been prioritised in the police plan. The mobile striking force would “... relentlessly hunt [down] identified criminals, [by] day and [by] night.” The “shield”, on the other hand, was aimed at the protection of communities by: ... aggressively taking back and dominating the streets and rural areas and also by deflecting cross-border and international crime (Fivaz, 1996: 2). Matthews (2000: 189) questions the sense of police operations such as those associated with the “sword and shield”. According to him, more than 300 000 suspects were arrested during that operation, but this only compounded existing problems of case-backlogs and the overcrowding of prisons. In 2000, for example, the average occupation rate of South African prisons was 163 per cent, with the Westville prison reaching an occupation rate as high as 211 per cent (Matthews, 2000: 189).

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Matthews (2000: 189) argues convincingly that it is debatable whether large scale police operations can have a long-term impact on crime. He also makes the following observation: Policing based on short-term, large scale operations that draw members away from their stations and can displace crime to other areas, also ignores the needs of ordinary people who want an accessible local police station that provides a competent and effective service, with members who can, and want to, do their jobs. In support of Matthews’ comments, it can be added that the competency and effectiveness of the police should be measured in terms of policing, in other words, in terms of what they can do. The police should not be pressurised into embarking on forceful-sounding operations to create the impression that they are doing something about the crime problem. As was argued before in this book, if crime is addressed as it should be – on a multi-agency basis and with effective coordination – the police should be able to concentrate on the delivery of a competent and effective service.

6.3.2 The Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) 1997/1998 Between 1997 and 2000 three more police plans were produced, but these were now referred to as the Policing Priorities and Objectives, popularly known by their acronym PPOs. According to Moorcroft (2004), one of the primary reasons for the renaming of the police plans was the confusion created by the seemingly “many” plans. In this regard, the media appeared to contribute largely to the confusion by referring to all crime combating policies, strategies, operations and plans, as “plans”. This created the impression of many plans but few results. In an attempt to counter this confusion, the introduction to the 1997/1998 PPOs stated that: The policing priorities and objectives of the Service ... should not be regarded as a plan in itself ... it merely provides a list of priorities, focus areas and objectives to set the stage and provide a framework for the development and implementation of various operational and organisational plans and strategies (South Africa, 1997a: 4). In the second paragraph of the 1997/1998 document, the PPOs are linked to the National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996). The relevant paragraph reads as follows: These identified priorities and objectives are based on the strong foundation provided by the crime prevention framework of the National Crime Prevention Strategy ... (South Africa, 1997a: 4).

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Another difference between the PPOs and the annual (police) plan was the perceptible downscaling of community policing in the 1997/1998 PPOs. However, com-

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munity policing retained some credibility in the sense that it was still mentioned in the two broad strategic aims of the PPOs and specifically in the discussions on crime prevention (South Africa, 1997a: 5, 15–16). A new development in the 1997/1998 PPOs was the introduction of sector policing (South Africa, 1997a: 16). However, apart from introducing (mentioning) the concept and stating the intention to implement it, the first practical steps in this regard were only taken during the 1998/1999 financial year with a pilot project under the auspices of Programme Johannesburg (Programme Johannesburg, 1998: 14–15) (see paragraphs 6.3.3.3 and 6.6.2).

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6.3.3 The Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) 1998/1999 The PPOs of 1998/1999 was a remarkable document in many ways and reflected important developments in police’s strategic thinking subsequent to the previous two police plans. For purposes of this book the discussion of these developments will be limited to the following three issues: ♦ The detraction from community policing ♦ The new strategic framework ♦ Programme Johannesburg

6.3.3.1 Detracting from community policing Compared to the Annual Plan of the South African Police Service 1996/1997 and even the Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) of 1997/1998, the absence of any reference to community policing in the 1998/1999 PPOs is apparent. If one considers these three documents in isolation, a progressive move away from the initial and almost overworked use of the term “community policing” becomes apparent. A possible explanation for the absence of “community policing” in the 1998/1999 PPOs, may be found in the fact that the official policy document on community policing was published in April 1997. The policy document, entitled A manual for the South African Police Service (South Africa, 1997b), can be described as a set of guidelines on community policing. It included a definition of the concept, its philosophy and principles, as well as information on how to implement the concept and how to establish community police forums (CPFs). It could therefore be argued that any further reference to this concept in the PPOs would have been superfluous. Such an argument is difficult to accept, however, given the original thinking about the concept and that it should “permeate” everything the police do. It is argued in this book that by 1997/1998, for a number of reasons relating mainly to the motivation for its introduction in South Africa, community policing had largely lost its public appeal (Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2). As will be shown later in this chapter, the feasibility of community policing, its implementation by the South African Police Service, and poor community involvement, were increasingly being criticised by researchers, among them, for example, Pelser (1999: 10–12). There are also indications that by 1997/1998 the concept was beginning to show signs of failure and, in view of the initial high expectations, it was gradually losing

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its popular appeal. To some extent it can be said that community policing, at this stage, was being kept alive only because it was prescribed by law and included in policies.

6.3.3.2 The new strategic framework of the South African Police Service In contrast with its predecessors, the 1998/1999 PPOs contained a well formulated “Strategic Framework” with a clear and concise “Strategic Approach” (South Africa, 1998c: 9–13). In this discussion, only the relevant aspects of the strategic framework and the strategic approach will be analysed. Apart from linking the policing priorities and objectives to government policies and strategies, the PPOs also called for a proper analysis of crime and “... a sound understanding of the South African Police Service’s role in the combating of crime ” (author’s emphasis) (South Africa, 1998c: 9). Subsequently, and in what can probably be described as a watershed, the 1998/1999 PPOs make the following statement: For the Service it has been a source of continuous concern that it carries the blame for the crime wave in this country, while it is a matter of course that there is very little, if anything, that the Service can do in terms of dealing with the socioeconomic causes of crime (South Africa, 1998c: 9). George Fivaz, the (then) National Commissioner of the South African Police Service, in his foreword to the 1998/1999 PPOs, cautioned against unrealistic public expectations of what the police can do (South Africa, 1998c: 7). Fivaz added an additional perspective: We have to recognise the fact that combating crime is as much a fight against adverse socioeconomic conditions as it is a fight against organised crime. It is as much a campaign against social and moral decay as it is against lawlessness and disorder (South Africa, 1998c: 7). Fivaz also pledged the support of the police “in any way it can” to those institutions better suited to dealing with the causes and conditions which he highlighted (South Africa, 1998c: 7). In the new strategic framework, the police attributed the untenable situation they found themselves in, to the lack of understanding in many quarters of the relationship between crime and its causes, and consequently of the role of the police in this regard (South Africa, 1998c: 9). Accordingly, the police expressed their appreciation for the position taken by the (then) draft White Paper on Safety and Security where it was argued:

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... that law enforcement (including visible policing and criminal investigations) should be separated from social crime prevention issues. It is within this framework that the role and responsibility of the Police should be defined (South Africa, 1998a: 9).

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It may be argued that this new strategic framework was only an excuse for the seeming inability of the police to deal effectively with crime. However, it is obvious that the police were taking criticism against them seriously and were trying to determine what they were doing wrong. In general, the police’s arguments were supported by the newly developed White Paper on Safety and Security (1998). The new strategic thinking of the police was also in line with what researchers and some individual police thinkers had been arguing for some time.

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6.3.3.3 Programme Johannesburg A pertinent goal of the new strategic approach was the development of so-called “pockets of excellence” as “building blocks” in the search for a new policing model. For this purpose, the Johannesburg Police Area with its twenty police stations was selected as a pilot project (South Africa, 1998c: 10–11). This pilot project soon became known as “Programme Johannesburg” and focused on the following eight priorities (Programme Johannesburg, 1998: 14–15): ♦ Implementing a Service Delivery Improvement Programme (SDIP) – The SDIP was developed specifically for organisational restructuring at police stations to enable them to function more effectively and to improve their service delivery. ♦ Crime investigation – In this priority, steps were taken to improve the effectiveness of detectives at police stations, inter alia, by reducing case-loads. ♦ Crime prevention strategies and operations (including sector policing) – To address this priority, attention was given primarily to the development of sector policing and to its implementation at the twenty police stations in the Johannesburg Police Area. ♦ Crime information/intelligence – At each of the twenty police stations steps were taken to establish structures and centres to ensure useful crime information and crime intelligence. ♦ The operationalisation of resources – This priority was aimed at redirecting resources to key service delivery points, such as moving functional police officials from administrative to operational duties. ♦ Communication – The development of new internal (police) and external (police–public) communication strategies and initiatives were an integrated part of the programme. ♦ Professional conduct – Attention to professional conduct was aimed at discouraging absenteeism, improving discipline, training, education and reducing discriminatory practices.

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♦ Standards – This priority dealt with the setting of standards, such as the implementation of proper fleet and telephone management and the use of a petrol card system. Programme Johannesburg was launched during April 1998 and by the end of that year, according to the police, they had already moved 321 functional police officials from administrative to operational duties (Programme Johannesburg, 1998: 14–15). The following additional successes were claimed by the police: ♦ Absenteeism decreased by 4,1 per cent. ♦ Arrests by detectives and cases brought to court increased by 57 per cent and 99 per cent respectively. ♦ The number of criminal cases handled by the police decreased by 5,8 per cent. However, in their evaluation of Programme Johannesburg at the end of its term (April 1999), the Secretariat for Safety and Security was much more critical about its success (Dixon & Rauch, 2004: 23). Amongst others, the Secretariat found that the lack of resources was a major stumbling block and that the roles and responsibilities of sector managers, in particular, were not properly clarified. Still, despite the lack of resources and the termination of the programme, sector policing continued in the Johannesburg Area and gradually also expanded to other police stations countrywide (Dixon & Rauch, 2004: 24).

6.3.4 The Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) 1999/2000 6.3.4.1 The PPOs and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) The PPOs for the 1999/2000 financial year, which was also the last of this type of police plan, was largely a continuation of the PPOs of the previous year. In his foreword, the (then) National Commissioner of the South African Police Service, George Fivaz, again reiterated that law enforcement and police action alone would not be sufficient to reduce the high levels of crime and violence (South Africa, 1999a: 9). Fivaz again called for a wider approach to address the root causes of crime: It is imperative that unemployment be addressed, educational levels be improved and that the country be mobilised into engendering a respect for law and order and the rights of others. A value system that recognises the above is the only long-term guarantee for a safe and secure environment in our country (South Africa, 1999a: 9).

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As far as the role of the police was concerned, Fivaz (South Africa, 1999a: 9) made it clear that the police realised the need to be “more visible, efficient and effective,” especially as far as the detection and apprehension of criminals was concerned, and also promised stricter law enforcement. The strategic framework of the 1999/2000 PPOs linked them directly to the

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White Paper on Safety and Security (1998). As the White Paper was only a draft when the 1998/1999 PPOs were developed, linkages would have been inappropriate at that stage. However, since the White Paper had been approved by government in September 1998, its policy guidelines and general principles were largely integrated into the 1999/2000 PPOs. The police particularly welcomed the White Paper’s conceptual distinction between policing (or law enforcement) on the one hand and crime prevention, specifically social crime prevention, on the other (South Africa, 1999a: 11). As a result of the progression in the strategic thinking of the police, and supported by the conceptual distinction made between policing and crime prevention in the White Paper, the 1999/2000 PPOs adopted the following three goals:

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♦ Increase the effectiveness and efficiency of criminal investigations. ♦ Target visible policing to address specific crimes and the fear of crime. ♦ Improve the quality of service to victims of crime (South Africa, 1999a: 11). (Author’s emphasis)

6.3.4.2 Crime prevention and policing Based on the direction provided by the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998), the PPOs, in its strategic framework, took a firm stand on the role of the police in relation to crime prevention, in particular social crime prevention. In this regard the PPOs made it clear that: Although effective policing or law enforcement will always contribute to the prevention of crime, the White Paper now recognises the fact that the burden of responsibility for the prevention of crime does not rest with the SAPS (South Africa, 1999a: 11). According to the strategic framework, the “inherent nature” of police work allows for police intervention mainly after a crime has either been planned, attempted or committed. Therefore, in order to really be effective in the prevention of crime, intervention is necessary before a crime is even planned (South Africa, 1999a: 12). The reasoning of the police is obvious: once a crime has reached the planning stage it means that the potential offender is already predisposed (inclined) to the commission of a crime and believes that an opportunity exists (precipitation) to commit the crime and to get away with it. In this instance, prevention should have been achieved by actions aimed at removing the need (predisposing factors) to commit the crime. Removing the predisposing factors should therefore be the primary focus of crime prevention interventions. The degree of success in terms of addressing the need (predisposing factors) should have a corresponding degree of inhibiting influence in relation to opportunity (precipitating factors). The only contribution the police can make towards the prevention of crime, is in terms of the deterrent effect of its policing activities (law enforcement, crime investigation, order maintenance and visible policing). Deterrence affects the precipitating factors of crime and should therefore be regarded as a secondary form of prevention.

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Crime Combating

Crime Prevention (Long-term activities)

Policing (Short-term activities)

Proactive Policing

Reactive Policing

• Crime prevention through environmental design

• Visible Policing

• Crime investigation

• Law enforcement

• Law enforcement

• Order maintenance

• Order maintenance

• Deterrence through effective Criminal Justice System

Information

• Socioeconomic interventions (Social crime prevention)

Deterrence Arrest

FIGURE 6.1 Crime combating, crime prevention and policing

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Crime prevention and proactive policing should not be confused with each other. Whereas crime prevention refers to all activities by all role-players – including the criminal justice system and therefore also the police – policing (both pro- and reactive) refers only to the activities of the police. In this regard, proactive policing should be understood to refer to all those police activities which either prevent a crime from actually taking place (interventions), or which act as a deterrent to crime. The relationship between crime combating, crime prevention and policing (both pro- and reactive), is illustrated in Figure 6.1. This relationship rests largely on the exposition provided in the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998a: 6, 12, 14–21), and is also in line with the views postulated in this book. In Figure 6.1 the division of crime combating into the interrelated, yet separate, concepts of crime prevention and policing is clearly shown. The list of activities under crime prevention is certainly not exhaustive, but indicates the types of activity that constitute crime prevention. The diagram (Figure 6.1) indicates how the activities of the police can contribute to crime prevention in the form of deterrence. However, it is important to understand that some police functions have both a proactive and a reactive value. For example, law enforcement would normally take place after a crime has been com-

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mitted, which makes it reactive. On the other hand, law enforcement for minor transgressions may prevent other or more serious offences. This is precisely the reasoning behind the “broken windows” theory and the “zero tolerance” approach. Crime investigation, although primarily a reactive function, can also act as a deterrent if carried out successfully. Visible policing, which is predominantly a proactive (deterrent) function, may also lead to the arrest of offenders if performed effectively. In addition to the examples already mentioned, proactive policing can lead to the arrest of a potential offender under the following circumstances:

6

♦ Good and timely intelligence or information from the public enables the police to arrest a potential offender before the actual commission of the crime. ♦ Positive observation by alert police officials leads to the arrest of a potential offender before the crime is carried out. In support of the White Paper’s exposition of the role of the police in the combating of crime, the 1999/2000 PPOs explained the effect of policing as follows: Effective policing or law enforcement reduces the opportunity to commit crime. It makes crime more risky and less rewarding and, accordingly, creates a strong deterrent to crime (South Africa, 1999a: 12). According to the PPOs, the police were now intent on utilising their crime intelligence capability more effectively and planned to target identified criminals and crime “hot spots” more directly (South Africa, 1999a: 12). As far as their more indirect role was concerned, the police – according to the PPOs – regarded their involvement in the National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre (NCPSC), envisaged in the White Paper, as supportive. Accordingly the police saw their role vis-à-vis the NCPSC, as that of pointing out areas in need of economic interventions. The responsibility for mobilising all relevant role-players and resources for this purpose was, however, that of the NCPSC. The gradual change in the police’s conceptual understanding of their role in relation to crime combating and especially to the prevention of crime, is also illustrated by the change in terminology from “crime prevention” in the 1998/1999 PPOs to “active visible policing” in the 1999/2000 PPOs (South Africa, 1998c: 23–26; South Africa, 1999a: 18–19). The term “active visible policing” is explained in the glossary of the 1999/2000 PPOs as including preventative patrol, directed patrol, sector policing and high density policing (South Africa, 1999a: 18–19). In the 1999/2000 PPOs, reference to crime prevention operations which characterised previous police plans or PPOs, was absent. In the discussion that follows it will be shown how the police, who were seemingly beginning to understand their role more clearly, still found it difficult to extricate themselves from what was earlier described as a schizophrenic situation. In this phase (2000–2003), the police were faced with the dilemma that legislation, government (in public statements) and public opinion expected them to prevent crime, but that national policy (also approved by government), as well as their own

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strategic thinking and operational planning, dictated that they focus on policing (see Figure 6.1).

6.4 The strategic focus phase: 2000–2003 The strategic focus phase is distinctly different from earlier phases in three main respects: ♦ The absence of a written police plan ♦ The all-out focus on crime combating through targeted police operations ♦ The first direct reference to a national security policy In the absence of a written police plan for this phase and due to the extent of developments during this time, the discussion of this phase will be limited to a national security policy and the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS), as well as Operation Crackdown.

6.4.1 A national security policy In Chapter 5, paragraphs 5.4 and 5.7, it was argued that the effective combating of crime (including both crime prevention measures and policing) requires an overarching national security policy and a national security strategy. This argument is based on two observations: firstly, government indicated (for example, in the White Papers on Defence and Intelligence) that it regards crime and its socioeconomic causes as the biggest threat to South Africa’s national security; and, secondly, because the combating of crime requires the integrated and coordinated involvement of all government departments (also on provincial and local level) a national policy and strategy to focus and guide all government efforts are crucial. Essentially, policy will dictate “what” needs to be done and strategy, “how” it is to be done. Various departmental and/or interdepartmental (cluster) strategies can be developed once a national strategy is in place. Subdepartmental strategies are possible for departments with subdepartments, such as the Department of Safety and Security which comprises the South African Police Service, the Secretariat for Safety and Security and the Independent Complaints Directorate. At this stage it seems certain that there is no such overarching national security policy or national security strategy, at least not in the form of a single document under that title (Hough & Du Plessis, 2003: 5). At a media briefing held on 5 August 2003 after a Cabinet meeting (“Lekgotla”), the Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, explained the work of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster by stating, inter alia, that:

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An urgent need to develop a cogent integrated [national] security strategy from its several elements that currently reside with the cluster departments was recognised. Related to this is the need to improve the functioning of the national security management system (Hough & Du Plessis, 2003: 92–93).

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According to Hough and Du Plessis (2003: 5) the JCPS Cluster had apparently been tasked to develop a national security policy and a national security strategy, but in 2003 this process still needed to develop. During 2004 there were still no indications of any progress in this regard. However, a national coordinating structure at Cabinet committee level, had been established during 2000/2001, in the form of the National Security Council (NSC). It was likely that this structure would be responsible for the implementation of such a policy and strategy (Hough & Du Plessis, 2003: 5). See paragraph 5.5 on the role and functions of the NSC. Hough and Du Plessis (2003: 5–8) argue convincingly that the development of a national security policy and a national security strategy should be the responsibility of the NSC and not that of the JCPS Cluster, as the latter is limited in terms of departmental participation and in terms of its criminal justice focus. In the Strategic plan for the South African Police Service 2002 –2005 (South Africa, 2002a: 15), it is stated that police planning since 2000 was based on a “National Security Policy” which was developed “... in order for the SAPS to fulfil its mandate as described.” According to the Strategic Plan (South Africa, 2002a: 15) the “National Security Policy” is coordinated by the JCPS Cluster. As indicated earlier, reference to a “National Security Policy” is problematic. Indications are that such a policy does not (yet) exist in the form of a single policy document. At this stage it can be accepted that the “National Security Policy” is nothing more than a strategic framework that has developed since 2000 and which is based on various government policy statements (reports) about safety and security matters. To illustrate this point the Strategic plan for the South African Police Service 2002–2005 (South Africa, 2002a: 9) makes it clear that the “Strategic Focus” of the police for the period 2000–2003, is the result of an “extensive strategic planning process” by the Department of Safety and Security, which started in January 2000. During this planning process “[s]trategic priorities were reviewed against crime information and crime analyses, and adjusted in line with government policy” (South Africa, 2002a: 9). According to the Annual Report of the South African Police Service 2000/2001 (South Africa, 2001: 2) the strategic planning process lasted three months and was conducted by the top management of the South African Police Service. In summary, the strategic planning process was based on the following information: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

An analysis of past experiences Relevant government policies and strategies The President’s speech of 25 June 1999 A declaration by the Heads of State of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Reports by the JCPS Cluster Initiatives of other clusters Client needs Organisational analysis Scenarios The National Intelligence Estimate

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In conclusion, it appears that there is confusion about the existence, or at least the nature and format, of a national security policy and about who should be involved in its development and implementation. This is an issue that needs urgent attention. In the process of developing a national security policy (and subsequently also a national security strategy) it should be clear that neither the police, nor the Department of Safety and Security or even the JCPS Cluster can develop, implement or manage such a comprehensive policy and strategy. The police, the department and the cluster can only contribute to the development of such a policy and strategy, and to its implementation, in as far as their line functions and expertise allow them. Crime and its risk factors, however, are simply too wide-ranging and complex to be addressed by individual government departments or even clusters. What is needed is a national security policy or, alternatively, a national crime combating policy, which covers the total spectrum of the threat. In this instance crime and its risk factors (which include the socioeconomic root causes of crime) should be seen as a national security threat, harmful or potentially harmful to the total fabric of South African society. Consequently, the development, implementation and overall management of such a policy and its strategy, is much too important to be left to a single government department or even a cluster of departments with a limited focus. There can be no doubt that such a responsibility should rest with a national coordinating body like the national Security Council or, alternatively, a National Crime Combating Council or Agency.

6.4.2 The National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS)

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It should be pointed out from the outset that the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS), which is the subject of this discussion, is not the type of multi-agency strategy – based on an overall national policy – called for in paragraph 6.4.1 above. Although the initial intention may have been to include other government agencies, the NCCS was never more than just another police plan, occasionally supported by other departments, such as the South African National Defence Force, during crime combating operations. As was indicated earlier (paragraph 6.4, the South African Police Service had no written police plan after the 1999/2000 Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs), at least not until the approval of the Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service 2002–2005, during 2002. However, during 2000 the police published a special edition of the SAPS Bulletin (South Africa, 2000b) with an article entitled The new strategic focus of the SA Police Service for 2000 –2003. As an internal communication instrument the special SAPS Bulletin was clearly intended, in the absence of a written plan, to keep police members informed of the latest police plans. The “strategic focus” of the police resulted in what was initially known as the SAPS Crime Combating Strategy, but was subsequently renamed the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) (South Africa, 2000b: 4; South Africa, 2002b: 24). The NCCS was designed to focus on four operational and two organisational priorities. These priorities were described as follows (Figure 6.2):

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♦ Operational priorities – Organised crime – Serious and violent crime – Combating crimes against women and children – Improving basic service delivery to all communities

6

♦ Organisational priorities – Budget and resource management – Human resource management (South Africa, 2000b: 1) The following time frame was set for the implementation of the NCCS (no doubt with the initial ideal of multi-agency cooperation): ♦ A short-term stabilisation phase (2000–2003) ♦ A medium-term normalisation phase (2000–2005) ♦ A long-term socioeconomic development phase (2000–2020) (South Africa, 2000b: 2–3; South Africa, 2002a: 15). The first two phases were regarded as the primary responsibility of the police in cooperation with other role-players, and the third phase as the primary responsibilFocus areas and operational approaches Organisational priorities • Improved resource management (personnel, budgeting and physical resources)

Organisational priorities • Organised crime • Serious and violent crimes • Crimes against women and children • Service delivery Focus is to decrease crime in order to • move from reactive to proactive policing • speed up socioeconomic development and other programmes to address the causes of crime • enhance community safety.

Operation Crackdown (2 approaches) CTA OCTA Geographical approach (Serious and violent crimes)

Organised crime approach

• Crime combating zones • Police stations = 145 • Crime combating task groups (Multi-dimensional)

• Organised crime combating task groups

117 FIGURE 6.2 The National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS)

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ity of the government departments in the Social Cluster (South Africa, 2002a: 15). The aim of the NCCS was that the police, in the first two phases, should reduce crime, the fear of crime and create a climate conducive to socioeconomic development (South Africa, 2000b: 3). According to the SAPS Bulletin (South Africa, 2000b: 2), the prevailing incidence of crime and violence required close scrutiny and analysis in order to determine those areas in the country with the highest crime rate, as well as the type of actions necessary to stabilise these. As indicated in the diagram (Figure 6.2), a so-called “geographic approach” and an “organised crime approach” were subsequently developed under the operational code name of “Crackdown”, to address serious and violent crimes, as well as organised crime (South Africa, 2000b: 2). The two approaches of Operation Crackdown – as shown in the diagram (Figure 6.2) – was informed by a CTA (Crime Threat Analysis) and an OCTA (Organised Crime Threat Analysis) respectively. A total of 145 police station areas (precincts) out of almost 1200 nationally, were identified for Operation Crackdown on the basis that they were responsible for 50 per cent or more of all serious, violent and organised crime in the country. Once identified, these station areas were clustered into 32 “crime combating zones” or geographical areas. A “crime combating task group” – comprising police officials from various operational branches, as well as members from the Metropolitan (Municipal) Police Services and the South African National Defence Force – was deployed for each zone (South Africa, 2000b: 2). Similarly, as part of the organised crime approach, a number of “organised crime task teams” were appointed (South Africa, 2000b: 2). Unlike the crime combating task teams, however, the organised crime task teams were not allocated or restricted to specific geographical areas because of the nature of this type of crime. According to the SAPS Bulletin (2000b: 3) the police also set in motion a joint cooperative venture with other government departments including Justice, Correctional Services, Health and Water Affairs, and departments in the Social Cluster, inter alia, to address social instabilities in the identified high crime areas. However, it remains a critical question whether (and why) the police should act as initiator and facilitator for those government departments whose responsibility it is to address social instabilities. Operation Crackdown was officially launched on 1 April 2000, and two pilot runs of the operation were conducted in Hillbrow and Sunnyside from 13–20 March and 22–27 March respectively (Pelser, 2000: 7–8). Operation Crackdown was a high-density operation that focused primarily on policing techniques such as cordon-and-search, search-and-seizure, roadblocks, et cetera (Pelser, 2000: 7–8). Although this is not as often reported on, the actions of the Organised Crime Task Teams against local and international crime syndicates strengthened the reach and impact of the operation (Potgieter, 2000).

6.4.3 Operational results From both media and official reports it is evident that the police regard the high number of operational results (or successes, as they are sometimes referred to) of

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their high-density operations and operations (projects) against organised criminal groups, as proof of their ability to combat crime. This fixation with operational results has its benefits for the police who believe that they are now able to show tangible proof that they are performing their duties. Phrased differently, the police believe that the facts are showing that they are, indeed, doing something about crime. Unfortunately there is a huge difference between results and impact. In the next section some aspects relating to the police’s impact on crime – with particular reference to crime statistics – will be discussed. To a large extent, the media contributed to the optimism regarding the police’s operational successes. Some newspapers were almost euphoric in their coverage of these “successes” and created high expectations of how the police would crack down on crime and criminals. The following examples of media reports on Operation Crackdown, clearly indicate this: Misdadigers gaan swaar kry in volgende Crackdown (Potgieter, 2000), Cops hail success of turning heat on crime: ‘Fight fire with fir drive pays off in high-crime areas in Cape (Phahlane, 2001: 3), and Cops zap 33 936 in Operation Monozite (Helfrich, 1999: 5). Operation Monozite was a national crime combating operation similar to Operation Crackdown. Operation Monozite was conducted during 1999 and directly preceded Operation Crackdown. According to Deputy National Commissioner André Pruis (Helfrich, 1999: 5), Operation Monozite focused on police station areas where 50 per cent or more of the crime in a province occurred. This operation employed high-density tactics on the “flood-and-flush” principle and focused specifically on roadblocks, cordon-and-search actions, and air-supported operations. It can therefore be accepted that, in many ways, Operation Monozite was used to test the operational concept, which seemed to work so well in terms of operational results or “successes”. During the first month of Operation Monozite (July 1999), the following successes were announced by the police (only some examples are listed here):

6

♦ 33 936 suspects were arrested, 14 045 of whom were facing charges in connection with serious crimes such as murder, rape and armed robbery ♦ 1423 stolen vehicles were recovered ♦ 1383 illegal firearms were confiscated (Helfrich, 1999: 5) To achieve these results, a combined force of more than 9000 police officials and soldiers were deployed on a daily basis in the so-called “hot spot” areas. They performed the following tasks: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Conducted searches of more than 183 000 vehicles and 21 644 premises Held 2375 roadblocks Conducted 1971 cordon-and-search operations Carried out a further 5446 other high-density tasks (Helfrich, 1999: 5)

According to Helfrich (1999: 5), Deputy National Commissioner Pruis was so impressed with these results that he was “fairly confident” that the police would be able to bring the crime rate down by as much as 200 per cent in the targeted areas.

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On 30 May 2001, just more than a year after the launch of Operation Crackdown, Commissioner Pruis briefed the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security in Cape Town, on the successes of the operation. In his briefing, Pruis claimed that the operation had clearly had an impact on crime. According to Pruis the police were able to reduce crime in 80 per cent of the targeted high crime areas, achieving a decrease of 20 per cent in some cases. In other areas crime rates stabilised and in a few cases there were also some increases (Phahlane, 2001: 3). At the same briefing to the Portfolio Committee, Pruis also gave a summary of the operational results of Operation Crackdown (only some examples are listed here): ♦ 198 034 suspects in serious crimes and 339 714 suspects in less serious crimes were arrested ♦ 16 643 vehicles were recovered ♦ 22 501 firearms were confiscated (Phahlane, 2001: 3) Lastly, in the Annual Reports of the South African Police Service 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 (South Africa, 2003a: 18; South Africa, 2004b: 11–12) the police included tables with information entitled “Results of crime prevention operations”. It is unclear whether these results are attributed to Operation Crackdown, which was a crime combating operation, or whether they were something else. According to the 2002/2003 Annual Report the successes were to be ascribed to a “[c]rime prevention operation ... aimed at addressing specific trends in priority crimes in high crime areas ...” (author’s emphasis) (South Africa. 2003a: 18). Some of these results, for both financial years, is repeated further on in a comparative table (Table 6.1). In their 2003/2004 Annual Report the police (again) seemed to realise that focusing on operations only will not solve the crime problem. According to the Annual Report: Crime prevention is a complex issue given the nature of the concept of prevention ... Internationally, there is a move from reactive policing towards a more proactive policing approach to crime by increasing involvement of communities and other government agencies in a partnership relationship ... (Author’s emphasis) and: [t]aking this trend into consideration, the SAPS no longer focus solely on practical crime prevention through roadblocks and high-density search and seizure operations ... [but now] suggest initiatives to combat serious and violent crime, which involve proactive measures such as partnerships and sector policing (South Africa, 2004b: 11).

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In Table 6.1 a comparative summary is given of some of the results (actions and successes) of police crime prevention operations during 2002/2003 and 2003/2004. The figures cited in Table 6.1 are certainly impressive, keeping in mind that they are only examples of the many crime combating and crime prevention operations

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conducted by the police over the past few years. They also go a long way in showing that the police are serious about fighting crime and that they are indeed doing something to combat it. It is logical then – if police action is regarded as the (primary) solution to the crime problem – to expect, in the face of these impressive results of police action that crime levels overall should show a comparative decrease. However, apart from the reasoning (in this book) about the socioeconomic root causes of crime, which should see a shift of responsibility for crime prevention away from the police, there are other complicating factors within the criminal justice system. The sheer volume of arrests as a result of these focused high-density operations creates obvious problems for the courts and prisons, such as blockages, backlogs (courts) and overcrowding (prisons). At a parliamentary media briefing on 13 February 2004, Dr Penuell Maduna (2004: 10), Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, stated that South Africa’s prison population stood at 185 632 at that stage, while the prison capacity was only 110 874. This translated to an over-

6

TABLE 6.1 Comparative results of police crime prevention operations from 2002/2003 to 2004/2005 Type of actions

Roadblocks Cordon-and-search operations Vehicles searched Premises searched Persons searched Stop-and-search operations Air supported operations Vehicle patrols Foot patrols

National total 2002/2003

2003/2004

2004/2005

61 213 63 465 3 581 684 355 833 7 570 187 156 885 2 205 491 025 645 766

72 443 76 233 3 598 990 608 483 8 906 239 166 278 1 644 676 329 320 112

61 084 81 342 4 105 761 617 460 9 938 366 276 538 1 922 826 493 385 201

Successes (Results) Arrests (serious and violent crimes) Arrests (less serious crimes) Number of firearms recovered/confiscat (22 120 firearms were reported lost/stolen i 2002/2003, 20 164 in 2003/2004 and 15 837 in 2004/2005) Number of vehicles recovered (111 528 vehicles were reported stolen/robbed in 2002/2003, 104 720 in 2003/2004 and 93 518 in 2004/2005)

2002/2003

2003/2004

2004/2005

444 738 647 951 21 027

445 779 564 022 35 248

449 352 681 128 23 813

45 152

34 055

43 041

Source: These figures are based on information taken from the Annual Reports of the South African Police Service fro 2002/2003 to 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2003a: 18; South Africa, 2004b: 11–12; South Africa, 2005a: 35–36)

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population of 74 758 or 65 per cent. According to the official statistics of the Department of Correctional Services the situation improved during 2006 to an overpopulation of 37,11 per cent. In real figures there are bed capacity in South Africa’s prisons for 114 796 and an inmate population of 157 402 (South Africa, 2006: 1). In the next section the official crime figures will be considered in an effort to determine whether it is possible to find a correlation between the operational results and crime rates.

6.4.4 Official crime rates and the impact of crime combating operation The South African Police Service is the custodian of South Africa’s official crime statistics, bearing in mind that these only reflect crimes reported to the police or which come to their attention officially. Murder, for example, can come to the attention of the police officially when there is a dead body, although there may not be a complaint or somebody who reports this crime to the police. Table 6.2 reflects the official crime rates (ratios calculated on the basis of the number of crimes per 100 000 of the population) for seven violent and ten propertyrelated crimes in South Africa from the financial years 1994/1995 to 2004/2005. Table 6.2 was compiled from information taken from the Annual Reports of the South African Police Service 2003/2004 (South Africa, 2004b: 19) and 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2005a: 56–57). It is obvious from the figures in Table 6.2 that South Africa is plagued by high levels of serious and violent crime. Claims by the police and political leaders about the successes of police crime combating operations are also publicly challenged. The following newspaper reports published over the past few years, serve as an example of some of the public criticism of and doubts about crime statistics: ♦ Pretoria News, 9 February 2001: “Mbeki’s claim on ‘falling’ crime queried”. ♦ Sunday Times, 29 September 2002: “Statement in the fight against crime: Longawaited statistics released this week do little to allay the fears of crime-weary citizens”. ♦ Beeld, 28 July 2004: “Misdaad neem toe, glo meeste SA mense: Duisende meld oortredings nie aan ‘oor polisie nie help’” (Smith, 2004). ♦ Beeld, 21 September 2004: “Twyfel oor ‘rooskleurige’ misdaadsyfers” (La Grange et al., 2004: 1). ♦ Rapport, 25 September 2005: “SA voel nie veiliger, al daal syfers”.

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At a conference on strategic challenges for South Africa, held at the University of Pretoria on 12 August 2003, Mr Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, pronounced the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) a success and claimed that it had “stabilised” crime “particularly in the 145 police stations accounting for 50 per cent of all crime in South Africa” (2003b: 7). However, Nqakula expressed disappointment with the implementation of the social crime prevention elements of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). According to Nqakula (2003b: 7),

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due to the failures of the NCPS, government was now faced with the “twin challenges” of sustaining the NCCS and “vigorously” implementing social crime prevention initiatives. A few months later, during a parliamentary briefing on 13 February 2004, Dr Penuell Maduna (2004: 5), Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, only highlighted those crimes which showed a decrease, and remained silent about those crimes which had increased. In fact, government officials seem reluctant, in their claims about reduction in crime levels, to mention the very high levels of some of these crimes. They also seem reluctant to point out that the decreases they claim are generally too small to make any meaningful impact on the overall levels of crime and, accordingly, to increase a feeling of safety and security among the public. In this regard, and in spite of all the successes of police crime combating operations since 1994, violent crime in 2004/2005 was still 12 per cent higher than in 1994/1995 and property crime 21 per cent (Altbeker, 2005a: 1). There are also doubts about the reasons for some of the decreases and, as indicated in one of the media reports quoted above, this may point to an even more disturbing possibility, namely that victims are losing faith in the police and are less inclined to report crimes. A comparison between South Africa’s crime rate and that of the other 109 countries reporting to Interpol, confirms the seriousness of especially violent crime in this country. In this comparison, South Africa had the highest murder rate (in 2002), the highest per capita rate for rape, the second highest rate for robbery and violent theft, and the fourth highest for serious assault and sexual offences (Sekonyane & Louw, 2002: 12). However, a more recent analysis by the Institute for Security Studies (Altbeker, 2005b: 1–7) raises some doubts about the comparability and accuracy of crime statistics between countries due to definitional and other problems. The police themselves believe that South Africa is not generally more crime-ridden than countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, but they acknowledge that the problem in this country is the “abnormal violence associated with our crime” (South Africa, 2003a: 26). The police ascribe this phenomenon to a lack of socioeconomic development – covering a range of problems such as alcohol and drug abuse, domestic conflict (resulting from economic hardship), unemployment and rapid urbanisation, and moral decay (South Africa, 2003a: 24, 34; South Africa, 2005a: 59–60). The police argue that they have done what they could in terms of “focused conventional policing” and that this, together with “other government initiatives, were the main reasons for the significant decreases in the crime rate (especially murder) between 1994/1995 and 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2003a: 34; South Africa, 2005a: 58). Between 2002/2003 the murder rate decreased by 9,9 per cent and between 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 with a further 5,6 per cent (South Africa, 2004b: 21; South Africa, 2005a: 56). However, although the police do not elaborate on what they call “other government initiatives”, they do make it clear that further significant decreases in violent crime will only be possible if – in addition to “proper policing” and government initiatives to improve socioeconomic conditions – there is more community cooperation and a change in community lifestyles (South Africa, 2003a: 34; South Africa, 2004b: 21; South Africa, 2005a: 59–60).

6

123

596,2 225,7 272,8 472,5 121,9 995,5 162,5 170,9

Housebreaking – residential

Housebreaking – non-residential

Theft – motor vehicles

Theft – out of/from vehicles

Stock theft

Other types of theft

Commercial crime

Shoplifting

160,0

154,0

979,4

109,7

484,7

249,3

220,8

628,9

327,7

24,3

115,4

195,0

520,5

152,2

153,2

924,5

103,5

430,4

239,8

214,7

602,9

319,8

24,9

124,9

163,0

500,3

570,4

70,4

126,7

62,8

1996/ 1997

154,3

153,7

969,3

101,0

435,3

249,2

219,3

611,1

307,4

24,0

Property crimes

133,34

177,5

489,0

570,4

68,4

126,2

59,9

Violent crimes

1997/ 1998

153,8

150,9

1051,4

98,8

452,5

255,9

224,5

652,7

307,6

23,9

154,7

220,6

485,0

566,3

70,4

118,3

59,8

1998/ 1999

153,4

157,7

1152,8

96,2

453,9

239,3

216,2

673,4

312,0

22,3

173,5

229,5

538,9

608,1

65,4

122,8

52,5

1999/ 2000

154,9

152,4

1281,1

95,1

459,0

229,0

209,3

694,0

319,2

20,5

206,5

260,3

569,7

630,2

64,4

121,0

49,8

2000/ 2001

152,6

130,4

1286,7

92,9

444,6

216,1

194,4

675,3

324,5

19,5

201,3

260,5

584,3

589,1

69,8

121,1

47,8

2001/ 2002

151,8

123,7

1364,6

102,7

431,0

204,9

162,8

704,0

345,6

20,2

223,4

279,2

621,6

585,9

78,9

115,3

47,4

2002/ 2003

155,0

120,4

1307,4

89,0

370,8

190,0

139,3

645,2

341,2

19,0

206,0

288,1

605,7

560,7

64,8

113,7

42,7

2003/ 2004

Source: Compiled from figures taken from the Annual Reports of the South African Police Service 2003/2004 (South Africa, 2004b: 19) and 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2005a: 56–57)

317,8

Malicious damage to property

28,2

Arson

218,5

Robbery with aggravating circumstances 84,2

516,0

Common assault

563,7

67,9

125,9

67,9

1995/ 1996

142,8

115,8

1151,1

70,1

318,8

180,0

120,3

592,8

323,7

17,6

195,0

272,2

575,0

535,3

52,6

118,3

40,3

2004/ 2005

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Other robbery

555,8

69,1

115,3

66,9

1994/ 1995

Assault GBH (serious)

Attempted murder

Rape

Murder

Crime categories

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TABLE 6.2 Crime ratios (number of crimes per 100 000 of the population) in South Africa for the financial years 1994/1995–2004/2005

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6.5 The strategic plan phase: 2003–2010

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The strategic plan phase is nothing but a continuation of the written police plan in another form and for longer periods. Accordingly, in the discussion that follows, the strategic plans of the South African Police Service for 2002–2005, 2004–2007 and 2005–2010 will be analysed briefly in terms of their strategic direction and their implications for policing.

6.5.1 The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service – 2002–2005 During 2002, the South African Police Service finally produced another written police plan in the form of the Strategic Plan for 2002–2005 (South Africa, 2002a). This plan did not involve a major change in the strategic thinking of the police and, in fact, can be regarded as a written extension of the police’s strategic focus which has guided the operational activities of the police since 2000 (South Africa, 2002a: 4, 8). In the introduction to the Strategic Plan it is stated that the strategic focus, together with the guidelines provided by Treasury Regulations, issued in terms of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999), formed the basis of the Strategic Plan. The Strategic Plan was implemented on 1 April 2002 and provided a broad framework for policing for the next three years (South Africa, 2003c: 8). However, managers at all levels were required to compile operational plans that would enable them to implement those aspects of the Strategic Plan applicable to their respective fields of responsibility. According to the Strategic Plan (South Africa, 2002a: 20, 30–36) the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) – with its geographical and organised crime approaches – would continue to be the primary operational framework through which to address safety and security priorities. The Strategic Plan also identified five departmental or financial programmes, as indicators of how the police planned to utilise their budget in pursuit of their key objectives (South Africa, 2003c: 21). The five departmental programmes are as follows: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Programme 1: Programme 2: Programme 3: Programme 4: Programme 5:

Administration Crime Prevention Operational Response Services Detective Service and Crime Intelligence Protection Services

(South Africa, 2002a: 12–14).

Programme 2 deals with crime prevention and has as its key objective the intention “[t]o provide a safe and secure environment to the inhabitants of SA” (South Africa, 2002a: 13). The functions necessary to achieve this objective are listed as follows: 2.1 To control the movement of people, articles and goods 2.2 To regulate occupations, trade and the manufacturing of articles and substances

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2.3 To discourage the commission of crimes against the state, citizens and their property (author’s emphasis) 2.4 To respond to emergencies 2.5 To serve and execute court processes 2.6 To provide a Community Service Centre

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From the above functions it is obvious that only functions 2.1–2.3 have any real relevance to the prevention of crime. It is also debatable to what extent functions 2.1 and 2.2 are crime prevention functions and not, for example, law enforcement functions. The argument in this book is that functions 2.1 and 2.2 are primarily law enforcement functions, with the result (or by-product) that crimes that may otherwise have been committed are subsequently prevented either through deterrence or arrest. It is clearly a strange way of reasoning then, that the police will act in terms of their crime prevention function (the result or by-product), and not in terms of their law enforcement function. Similarly, function 2.3 is the result of the police’s effective and efficient execution of their non-crime prevention functions (or objects) such as law enforcement, crime investigation, visible policing and order maintenance. The result, in this instance, is deterrence or discouragement to commit a crime. Crime prevention is therefore a result and not a function. It should also be understood that if crime prevention, which is included with the above functions as the “objects” of the police in section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 , is interpreted in terms of the eiusdem-generis rule (words of the same kind), its meaning becomes confusing and problematic for the police. This statement is best explained by pointing out that the police can achieve the “objects” of law enforcement, crime investigation, visible policing and order maintenance, by taking direct action. As far as crime prevention is concerned, police action is primarily indirect, as explained above, in that it creates deterrence (to discourage). The only direct action by the police in this regard, is to arrest potential offenders before a crime is committed, and such arrests can only be effected in terms of the law, in which case law enforcement is the function (or action), and crime prevention the result. In a booklet entitled Planning information for the South African Police Service 2003/2004 (South Africa, 2003c: 25), Programme 2: Crime Prevention is explained further. According to the booklet, the police can prevent crimes such as robbery, housebreaking, theft of/out of motor vehicles and stock theft. These crimes are referred to as “more policeable” because they can “to a certain extent be deterred and thus be prevented by an increase in conventional policing” (author’s emphasis). According to the booklet, examples of conventional policing are [targeted] visible patrols, deployment of plain clothed police officers, roadblocks, police warnings to the public, stop-and-search actions, cordon-and-search operations, et cetera. In view of the abovementioned interpretation and the complex nature of crime prevention – especially with regard to its risk factors and the need for multi-agency

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and long-term countermeasures – it is also argued in this book that the term should be regarded as sui generis (of its own or unique kind). Consequently, it is further argued that the term crime prevention should not form part of the genus of objects created by section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 . (See the discussion on deterrence in Chapter 2, par. 2.4.2.)

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6.5.2 The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service–2004–2007 In 2004 the police published their Strategic Plan for the period 2004–2007. This plan was largely a continuation of the previous plan and only constituted a “process of fine tuning and improving upon the existing strategy on an annual basis” (South Africa, 2004a: viii). However, two important aspects regarding the new plan need to be pointed out, as these may prove to be fundamental for policing in the future. These two aspects are the following: ♦ In the new Strategic Plan, “Key Departmental Programme 2: Crime Prevention” has been changed to read “Visible Policing” (South Africa, 2004a: 2, 19). Crime Prevention is reduced to a subprogramme of visible policing. This subtle change seems to suggest that the police are gradually adapting their strategic thinking (and consequently their strategic planning) to the realisation that, as far as crime prevention is concerned, they can only play a secondary role. ♦ The JCPS (Justice, Crime Prevention and Security) Cluster and its integrated priorities are increasingly determining the priorities of the police. The impact of the JCPS priorities on those of the police, are clearly reflected on pages 4–13 of the Strategic Plan. In this regard the Strategic Plan also makes it clear that “[a]ll strategies and priorities of the South African Police Service ... are aligned to the goals of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster ...” (South Africa, 2004a: 4). The significance (especially the growth in importance) of the JCPS Cluster should not be overlooked. As was pointed out in paragraph 5.6 earlier, the cluster approach is a move in the right direction, and the fact that it succeeds in providing direction to government departments in the criminal justice system, is encouraging. However, as was also pointed out in paragraph 5.6, the focus and the mandate of the JCPS Cluster is understandably limited to primarily criminal justice issues. This means that it would be extremely difficult, and perhaps even impossible, for the JCPS Cluster to reach beyond criminal justice issues into the realm of the socioeconomic causes of crime. It also means that the JCPS Cluster will reach a stage where it realises that its limitations are inhibiting the fight against crime. The obvious next step should be the establishing of a coordinating body or structure, which would overcome this limitation by bringing together all the government departments (or even the various clusters) that have a responsibility in terms of the risk factors of crime.

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6.5.3 The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service – 2005–2010 During 2005 and obviously before the expiry of the 2004–2007 Strategic Plan, the police published a Strategic Plan for 2005–2010 (South Africa, 2005b). It is not clear why this was necessary because the latest was clearly a continuation of the previous plan. The only reason provided by the Strategic Plan itself, is in the Introduction (South Africa, 2005b: 14) where it is stated that this Strategic Plan is the first five-year plan developed by the police in accordance with the revised Treasury Regulations.

6.6 The South African Police Service and crime prevention Throughout Chapters 5 and 6 the position of the South African Police Service vis-àvis the prevention of crime was discussed against the background of legislation, policies, strategies and police operations. In this section, attention will be given to how the police themselves interpret and view their role in the prevention of crime.

6.6.1 Conceptual and terminological confusion

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It is not surprising that the police, in spite of their apparent understanding of their role in crime prevention, continue to make confusing reference to the concept, both in terms of terminology and in practice. In many ways, this is the result of the legacy of an 1829 statement, made during the establishing of the London Metropolitan Police, that “[t]he primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime ...” (Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.3). This view on the responsibilities of the police became enshrined in South African legislation regulating the police, and was finally confirmed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 205(3). The situation is exacerbated by the expectations of the general public who could not care less about the complexities of crime, and the unsuitability of the police to deal with risk factors such as root causes, et cetera. In the public mind, and perhaps due to conditioning over time, references to crime automatically raise expectations of a response from the police. Public expectations are that government has a special responsibility to ensure their safety and security, and the police are seen as the government agency that exists to execute that responsibility. Unfortunately, many police officials, for much the same reasons, share this very simplistic and seemingly logical understanding of the role of the police. The efforts of the police (in their plans and strategies) to appear to be doing what is expected of them (the prevention of crime), while in practice continuing to do what they are in fact equipped for and able to do (for example, law enforcement), could be referred to as conceptual and terminological juggling. To illustrate this confusion and the difficulties that result from it, a few brief examples will be discussed. The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service 2002 –2005, “Programme 2: Crime Prevention” has as its “Key Departmental Objective” “[t]o provide a safe and secure environment to the inhabitants of SA” (South Africa, 2002a: 13). To achieve this objective, the police intend, among others, to “discourage the commis-

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sion of crimes against the State, citizens and their property,” and the expected outcome is “[r]educed opportunities to commit crime”. “Reduced opportunities” clearly refer to the so-called “precipitating factors” of crime. It could be argued, that the police are in fact preventing crime as they are (to some extent) able to reduce opportunities for committing crime. However, in reality, the actions of the police that are aimed at discouraging and deterring crime, are the result of their other statutory functions (objects) such as law enforcement, visible policing, order maintenance and the investigation of crime. In other words, discouragement (deterrence) and consequently crime prevention are the results of police action (or policing) and cannot conceivably be a function of the police. Elsewhere in the Strategic Plan (South Africa, 2002a: 24–25), the police argue that the following crimes can be policed: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

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Robbery with aggravating circumstances and other types of robbery Burglary (residential and business premises) Stock theft Theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles Theft out of/from motor vehicles

The term “policed”, as it is used here, is explained in a note in the Strategic Plan (South Africa, 2002a: 24) as being “proactive police action” that can “deter the potential perpetrator from committing a particular crime at a specific place and time.” In this sense, the police believe that the crimes listed above can be regarded as “directly preventable”. In the same note it is stated that crimes such as murder, attempted murder and rape are “less susceptible” to policing. The danger of this reasoning, although not wholly incorrect, is that it borders on equating proactive policing with crime prevention. It also creates a mistaken belief that proactive policing (in the form of law enforcement, order maintenance and visible police presence) will be less effective with regard to certain crimes (such as murder, attempted murder and rape) than with regard to other types of crime. This argument might have been valid, had proactive policing and crime prevention indeed been interchangeable concepts. In the Annual Report of the South African Police Service 2001/2002 (South Africa, 2002b: 35–36), a contentious distinction is also made between “more policeable” and “less policeable” crimes. “More policeable” crimes are the same crimes listed above as “directly preventable” by police action. According to the police (South Africa, 2002b: 35) these crimes are labelled as more policeable: ... because they can, to a certain extent, be deterred and, thus, prevented by an increase in conventional policing (e.g. visible patrols at the right time and place; the deployment of plain-clothed police officials; roadblocks; police warnings to the public; stop-and-search actions; cordon-and-search operations). (Author’s emphasis) According to the Annual Report (South Africa, 2002b: 36), “less policeable” crimes are the following:

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♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Murder and attempted murder Rape Serious and common assault Shoplifting Theft (not listed under “more policeable crimes”) Commercial crime

“Less policeable”, in this instance, “implies that conventional policing ... on its own may not be sufficient to lower the incidence of these crimes”. According to the Annual Report, these crimes are considered as mainly social or domestic and therefore their causes should be addressed “by means of strong partnerships between the community, community-based organisations, government departments ... and the SAPS” (South Africa, 2002b: 36). It is a strange logic to argue that some crimes are to be prevented by addressing their root causes, while other crimes are to be prevented by police actions intended to deter or discourage. Apparently the police themselves eventually abandoned this type of reasoning. In the Annual Reports of the South African Police Service for 2002/2003, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2003a: 26–43; South Africa, 2004b: 18–22; South Africa, 2005: 55–62) as well as in the Strategic Plans for the South African Police Service 2004–2007 and 2005–2010 (South Africa, 2004a: 48–49; South Africa, 2005b: 3), the concepts of more or less policeable crimes were recategorised into “contact crimes” (crimes against the person) and “property related and commercial crime”.

6.6.2 Social crime prevention and sector policing The following discussion will indicate how the South African Police Service, in its ongoing search for its role in crime prevention, is now focusing their attention (and hope?) on two relatively new concepts, namely “social crime prevention” and “sector policing”.

6.6.2.1 Social crime prevention Social crime prevention was already referred to in Chapter 5, paragraphs 5.3.3.2 and 5.3.3.3. In paragraph 5.3.3.3, the decision to transfer the responsibility for social crime prevention from the Secretariat for Safety and Security to the police was criticised and labelled as a step backwards. However, once given that responsibility, and because of their long-standing recognition of the need to address the socioeconomic causes of and conditions conducive to crime, the police embarked on a number of initiatives in this regard. At this stage it must be emphasised that, although social crime prevention is important, the following aspects should be considered:

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♦ The term “social crime prevention” itself is restrictive and moulds a wider socioeconomic responsibility into a narrow function, which only appears to fit the profile of the police.

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♦ The role of the police in this regard should only be to identify the socioeconomic and other risk factors in crime-prone areas and to provide that information to the coordinating structures created for this purpose (as proposed in Chapter 5). Alternatively the police should be able to relay such information to government departments or local authorities better suited to addressing those particular problems.

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In this regard, a statement by the Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, during his budget vote in parliament on 13 June 2002, is encouraging, provided that he shares the view that the police should only play a limited role in the combating of crime. The Minister said the following: An important element of our stabilisation programme in the 145 police areas will be the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrence of social crime. I have already asked the police to do a proper analysis of the crimes that happen in those police areas to determine which of them can be addressed by way of social crime prevention and socioeconomic development programmes. This matter will be taken forward in meetings that I intend to have in the next three months with all the provinces and local authorities (Nqakula, 2002: 6). Based on an announcement by Minister Nqakula, at a parliamentary media briefing on 15 February 2005, it is clear that some progress in this regard was made. At the media briefing the Minister announced the appointment of an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate government efforts aimed at social crime prevention (Nqakula, 2005: 1). This development resulted from an earlier Cabinet meeting “Lekgotla” (during January 2005) where it was decided that the Social and Economic Clusters will work more closely with the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster on projects relating to crime prevention and combating. It is instructive to note that the Minister of Provincial and Local Government and not the Minister of Safety and Security was appointed to head the inter-ministerial committee. Some examples of the initiatives which the police regard as social crime prevention, are provided in the Annual Reports of the South African Police Service 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2004b: 14–15; South Africa, 2005a: 40–46): ♦ Implementation of the Anti-Rape Strategy. This includes initiatives to reduce rape and to improve the investigation of rape cases, and the improvement of services to victims of rape. ♦ Implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act No. 116 of 1998). This mainly involves training of police officials to improve services rendered in terms of this Act, and a communications and awareness campaign among police officials and the public. ♦ Victim Empowerment Programme (VEP). The VEP also focuses on the training of police officials to equip them with the necessary skills to assist victims of crime.

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As part of the VEP, so-called “victim-friendly” facilities were established at a number of high crime police stations. ♦ Youth Programme. This programme also involves the training of police officials to enable them to recognise and assist young people at risk of turning to or becoming victims of crime. The youth programme includes a schools-based crime prevention programme and a homeless children’s programme. ♦ Prevention of Violence Programme. This programme refers to interdepartmental programmes and processes where the police are involved. It includes programmes such as the Moral Regeneration Programme (coordinated by the office of the Deputy President); the development of an implementation strategy for the Sexual Offences Bill (coordinated by the Department of Justice); the Child Labour Action Programme Steering Committee (coordinated by the Department of Labour); the development of an Inter-departmental Victim Empowerment Policy (coordinated by the Departmental of Social Development); and the development of a Victim Charter (coordinated by the Department of Justice). ♦ Local Crime Prevention Development Programme. This programme is aimed at mobilising “action and participation in strategic crime prevention interventions at community level”. Interventions are multisectoral and “services are brought in line with root causes of crime and violence” (author’s emphasis). Examples of such interventions are the Urban Renewal Programme (URP) and the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP). ♦ Social Crime Prevention Programme (in support of crime reduction in priority areas). This programme is directly linked to the terms of reference of the inter-ministerial committee referred to above. It is the result of a decision taken by the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster during 2004, giving the South African Police Service the responsibility to lead the process of identifying and profiling 63 police station areas with significant levels of crime. The resulting profiles had to include the identification of the causes of and contributing factors to crime (including social, economic and environmental factors).

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The examples provided above are proof of the limited ability of the police to provide social crime prevention, apart from identifying the causes of crime and to channel that information to structures established to deal with it or to other agencies whose responsibility it is. Four of the initiatives are aimed at training police officials in terms of performing their services more effectively and efficiently. The other initiatives are the primary responsibility of other government agencies and the role of the police is secondary (participative and supportive). This situation is further proof that, in spite of excellent work undertaken by the Social Crime Prevention Unit of the South African Police Service, social crime prevention is an integrated responsibility that primarily falls outside the functional range of police capabilities. Social crime prevention therefore needs to be integrated into an overall crime combating strategy which should be coordinated by a central government coordinating structure.

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6.6.2.2 Sector policing Sector policing was introduced in Johannesburg in April 1998 as part of the comprehensive “Programme Johannesburg” (paragraph 6.3.3.3), and subsequently rolled out to other parts of the country. According to the Annual Report of the South African Police Service 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2005a: 49–51), sector policing, apart from being rolled out to other parts of the country, has been given high priority in the so-called presidential stations (14) and priority stations (47). In the 14 presidential stations, 103 of the 128 sectors (80,4 per cent) are fully activated, and in the 47 priority stations, 236 of the 366 sectors (64,4 per cent) have been fully activated. Sector Policing is defined in the Draft National Instruction of the South African Police Service 2003 (South Africa, 2003d: 2) as:

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... a method of policing used in a smaller, manageable geographical sector in a police station area; the appointment of a police official as a sector commander who, by acting as a crime prevention official will involve all role-players in identifying the particular policing needs in each sector and addressing the root causes of crime, as well as the enabling and contributing factors, in order to bring about effective crime prevention. (Author’s emphasis) Crime prevention, in the context of sector policing, is to be achieved “through the launching of informed, intelligence-driven ... projects in collaboration with the local community” (South Africa, 2003d: 2). This is based on the principle that all roleplayers in a sector are involved in identifying the safety and security needs of the sector, and carry a collective responsibility to address the root causes of crime, as well as its enabling and contributing factors (South Africa, 2002c: 13). It is obvious that the police still find it necessary to throw a “lifeline” to the almost forgotten concept of community policing, by formally linking it to sector policing. In the Draft National Instruction, for example, sector policing is described as “a practical manifestation of community policing,” and also: [a] need has ... been identified to institutionalise these [community policing] values and pillars into practical policing methodologies and techniques to meet the needs of a democratic, constitutional society (South Africa, 2003d: 1). The linking of sector policing and crime prevention to community policing is supported in the Strategic Plan of the South African Police Service 2004 –2007 (South Africa, 2004a: 10), where it is stated that “South African crime prevention is based on principles of community policing, that is communities in partnership with the [police]”. The partnership referred to here is between police officials appointed as sector managers and sector community representatives. To add to this, the police regard sector policing as “the main focus area of the SAPS’ approach to the normalising of crime ...” (South Africa, 2004a: 11). The above position is continued in the Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service 2005–2010 (South Africa, 2005b: 35–36) but, although community policing terminology such as “problem solving” is still used, it focuses more on practical guidelines for the implementation and management of sector policing.

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According to the Strategic Plan, sector policing is based on the following four pillars: ♦ The geographical demarcation of a police station area into manageable sectors, taking into account Crime Administration Blocks, the geographical size of areas, topographical features, community resources, crime types and patterns ♦ The appointment of permanent SAPS members as Sector Commanders and the forming of Sector Policing Teams ♦ Active participation by communities by means of reservists, partnerships and support groups ♦ The implementation of strategies and projects by the SAPS and communities to address specific crime problems in each sector (South Africa, 2005b: 36)

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The responsibilities of each sector are also indicated. Each sector will be responsible for the provision of visible policing, crime deterrence, quick response to crimes, partnerships and problem-solving projects (South Africa, 2005b: 36). Although there is still reference to the addressing of specific crime problems and to problemsolving projects, attention has clearly moved from what can be called “idealistic policing” (i.e. what the police cannot do, like solving socioeconomic problems) to “realistic policing” (i.e. the things the police can do, like visible policing, deterrence, quick response, et cetera). The Strategic Plan also addresses the personnel and other resource requirements of sector policing. It is stated that police personnel will further increase to 158 000 in the 2007/08 financial year and to 165 850 by the end of March 2008. In addition there will be a simultaneous expansion of the department’s vehicle fleet, equipment supplies and information technology infrastructure (South Africa, 2005b: 27). Building on the 2005–2010 Strategic Plan, the police issued a new draft Policy Document (4 of 2005) on Sector Policing (South Africa, 2005c), which replaces the 2003 Final Draft National Instruction on Sector Policing. The Policy Document on Sector Policing is essentially a good document. It is more comprehensive and realistic than anything before and, more importantly, it subtly changes the focus of sector policing from community policing to community safety. Although the Policy Document still implies that addressing the root causes of crime is a police function, and although it continues to link Sector Crime Forums to Community Police Forums, it is evident that the primary objectives of sector policing are the “individual and unique” safety and security needs of each sector (South Africa, 2005c: 2). However, as with Community Police Forums (CPFs), it remains an impractical requirement for sectors to involve a variety of role-players (e.g. traditional leaders, government departments, local governments, private and civil sector, et cetera) in each sector forum. It can be imagined how difficult it would be if a station area is divided into, for example, five sectors and each of these attempt to involve members from the above structures. The level at which sectors function is also relatively low (junior ranks) and is unsuited for inter-departmental liaison.

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Still, sector policing seems to be moving in the right direction, and it is only necessary to finally rid it of all precepts that this concept will enable the police to address the root causes of crime. What needs to be done in sectors is for the police to concentrate on the policing they can do. When they do identify crime causes (root causes), which they cannot functionally solve, they must be provided with a practical mechanism through which these can be channelled to the responsible institutions or structures. Sector policing is understandably personnel intensive (and obviously also resource intensive). To further boost its implementation, a completely new category (category D) for “Rural and Urban Sector Police Reservists” was created during 2002. This new category of reservists was created by National Instruction 1/2002 on the South African Reserve Police Service, published in May 2002 (South Africa, 2002d).

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6.7 Conclusion This chapter investigated the strategic and operational approaches of the South African Police Service from 1994/1995 to 2004/2005. The aim was to determine how the police interpreted the legislative and policy prescripts that directed them. To enable a logical discussion of this very complex period, the information was divided into four interrelated (and sometimes overlapping) phases, each with its own distinct features and developments.

6.7.1 The community policing phase During the first phase, which saw the beginning of a new constitutional order in the Republic of South Africa in 1994, the police were immediately faced with the double challenge of exceptionally high levels of crime, as well as transformation and transition. At the outset, there were high hopes that the relatively new concept of “community policing”, which initially dominated both the change process and the way in which crime was thought to be reduced, would enable the police to overcome these challenges. However, it appears that the police, after the first three to four years, were losing interest in community policing and consequently its progress was disappointing. There are many possible reasons why community policing has failed to meet police (and public) expectations, but for purposes of this book the following three possibilities are put forward as the primary reasons:

♦ The motivation for the “South Africanisation” of community policing was more concerned with political than with policing issues. ♦ The concept of community policing was developed by so-called policing technocrats in Europe, where conditions were very different from those in postapartheid South Africa. ♦ Community policing was originally intended as an alternative policing model which would enable the police to do what they cannot, namely to prevent crime.

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With the launch of the Community Safety Plan in 1995 the police, amidst some pretence of a community-oriented approach, already demonstrated their intention to revert to more traditional policing methods to combat crime.

6.7.2 The Policing Priorities and Objectives (PPOs) phase

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The community policing phase was followed by the PPOs-phase (Policing Priorities and Objectives), which covers the period between 1996 and 2000. During this period the police published their first annual police plan in April 1996, for the 1996/1997 financial year. Subsequently, three more police plans – which now were popularly referred to as PPOs – were published, with the last of these expiring at the end of March 2000. As indicated by its acronym, the PPOs or police plans stipulated the priorities and objectives of the police for each financial year. These plans were generally wellformulated and created the impression that the police had developed a thorough understanding of their crime combating role, including their role in relation to the prevention of crime. The police plans were also clearly linked to major policy documents such as the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security. However, the police continued to face a fundamental dilemma in the posturing of their role. On the one hand the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 compels the police to prevent crime, among a number of other “objects”. It seems that this position is shared by the general public. This situation is largely the result of the 1829 legacy when, with the establishment of the London Metropolitan Police, the “prevention of crime” was specifically stated as the “primary object” of the police. On the other hand, and based on a wide range of research and police practice, government policies such as the NCPS and the White Paper on Safety and Security make a clear distinction between policing (what the police do) and crime prevention (an inter-agency responsibility aimed at addressing the socioeconomic root causes and other risk factors of crime). Both these policy documents contain convincing arguments why crime prevention cannot be the responsibility of a single government department and why – especially according to the White Paper – there is a need for a central or national coordinating structure to manage the relevant efforts of the participating government agencies. The police, apparently and according to their PPOs, support the views expressed in the above policy documents. This discrepancy – between the provisions of the Constitution and government policies – not only creates a dilemma for the police, but forces the police into the use of terminology that obviously attempts to satisfy both. In the end, the police’s plans or PPOs appeared to be strong on words but weak on implementation. The police’s approach to this dilemma, apart from attempting to resolve the discrepancy with more appropriate terminology, was to continue with what can only be described as an “operations approach”. This approach was a continuation of the Community Safety Plan concept of 1995 and was “sold” to the public as the operationalisation of the 1996/1997 police plan. However, it is apparent that – unlike the

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Community Safety Plan and the police plan itself – all pretence of community policing was abandoned. The operationalisation of the 1996/1997 police plan with Operation Sword and Shield, as it was called, was launched as a “no-nonsense, back-to-basics plan” and was a clear indication of the intentions of the police to focus on the more traditional methods of policing. These methods (and activities) consisted of visible and targeted patrols (vehicle, foot and equestrian), high-density (“flooding”) operations, roadblocks, cordon-and-search operations, stop-and-search operations, and airsupported operations in so-called “priority areas” or crime “hot spots”. The results of these hard core police operations in terms of arrests, confiscations and seizures were impressive, but created new problems for the rest of the criminal justice system. The courts were not capable of processing the sudden increase of cases, and the problem of overcrowding in South Africa’s prisons became worse.

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6.7.3 The strategic focus and strategic plan phases During the third or strategic focus phase, from 2000–2003, the police not only abandoned the idea of a written police plan (or PPO document), but concentrated even more on operations. Operation Crackdown, which was launched in April 2000 as part of the operationalisation of the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS), was more focused and sophisticated than earlier operations. It obviously resulted in more blockages at courts and overcrowding of prisons. The large scale utilisation of the operations approach by the police continued into the strategic plan phase. The strategic plan phase originated during 2002 with the publication of the first Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service 2002–2005. This phase is mainly characterised by the fact that the police now, again, had a written plan – albeit a three-year strategic plan. The Strategic Plan presented the framework on which annual operational plans had to be developed and implemented. Another salient feature of the Strategic Plan 2002–2005 and its replacement, the Strategic Plan 2005–2010, is the obvious and growing importance of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster, where the police – at least at Director-General level – are the lead agency. The JCPS Cluster is playing an increasingly important role in determining priorities for member departments. This development must be seen as positive, but is still far from the overarching national coordinating structure envisaged in this book. Unlike the JCPS Cluster, which can only focus on matters relating to the criminal justice system, the abovementioned national coordinating structure should be able to involve and direct the overall capability of government (and its social partners) to address both the causes and the manifestation of crime. At this stage, the police have reached the point where they realise that they have achieved what they can by applying police methods. What is needed now is for the other role-players, in especially the social and economic environment, to meet the efforts of the police in terms of their contribution. Unfortunately, in this regard, the police are being handicapped by the fact that, during 1999, responsibility for “social crime prevention” was moved from the Secretariat for Safety and Security to the

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police. This seemingly political decision further complicated matters for the police, especially as far as the clarification and purification of their policing role is concerned. This decision was also a step backward, because, instead of elevating social crime prevention to a higher level (a central or national coordinating government structure), it was relegated to a lower level by moving it to the police. In the process of finding and creating clarity, understanding and acceptance of the role of the police, the police themselves have become involved in what can be described as terminological “juggling”. They often use terms such as “crime prevention” and “proactive policing” interchangeably, whilst they actually refer to different concepts. The police also experimented with concepts such as “more” or “less” policeable crimes, but have recently replaced this terminology with references to crimes that are “directly preventable” through policing and crimes that are “less susceptible” to policing. Police documents increasingly use concepts or terms such as “proper policing”, “conventional policing”, “traditional policing”, et cetera, without proper explanation. However, a positive development in the Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service 2005–2010, is the increasing emphasis on “visible policing” and a concomitant loss in prominence of “crime prevention” as a police function. Finally, police claims about operational successes and a resultant positive impact on crime, should also be considered with circumspection. The operational successes or results of the police may have contributed to decreases in some crime categories, as claimed by the police, but crime levels in South Africa remain extraordinary high. It is also debatable whether an increase in police operations can further contribute to the reduction of crime. It must be kept in mind that the outcome of the fight against crime will eventually be determined less by what the police do and more by what is done to address the root causes and other risk factors of crime. It is, therefore, a fundamental error in reasoning to claim that the police are capable of reducing crime, when the factors that causes crime are beyond the control of the police. The next and final chapter contains a summary and recommendations.

SELF EVALUATING QUESTIONS ~ Define community policing in South African terms. ~ Explain the impact of community policing on crime prevention. ~ Explain the relationship between crime combating, crime prevention and policing. ~ What are the essential focus areas of the 2000 National Crime Combating Strategy?

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~ How does social crime prevention and sector policing contribute to crime combating?

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Summary and recommendations

7.1 Introduction The purpose of this book was to determine the role of the police in combating crime, viewed from a strategic perspective. It was motivated by the endless stream of criticism against the police for their seeming inability to combat, and especially to prevent crime. In this final chapter attention will be given to a brief summary of the main arguments and conclusions in this book, as well as to specific recommendations relating to the improvement of crime combating (crime prevention and policing) in South Africa.

... few police officials ar ready to admit publicly that, despite their best efforts ... there is very little that the police can actually do to prevent crime. (HALE, 1994: 11)

7.2 Summary The summary below is aimed at highlighting the key concepts and arguments in this book and to lay the foundation for the recommendations, which follow.

7.2.1 Crime combating • CRIME COMBATING AS AN OVERARCHING CONCEPT

The development of a definition for crime combating and a model (Figure 6.1), depicting the place of both crime prevention and policing within the broader framework of crime combating, is considered an important contribution to police science. In terms of the proposed model and definition that crime prevention forms part of crime combating – but lies outside the realm of policing – although policing plays a complementary role. Similarly policing is part and

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parcel of crime combating, on an equal footing with, but separate from crime prevention. In the proposed model crime prevention refers, among others, to socioeconomic interventions (including so-called social crime prevention interventions), crime prevention through environmental design and deterrence through an effective criminal justice system. Policing, on the other hand, refers to what the police do (i.e. what they are realistically capable of doing), both proactive and reactive. It includes the responsibility for law enforcement, crime investigation, visible policing and order maintenance, but excludes responsibility for crime prevention. In view of the above exposition it is obvious that the three terms (concepts) clearly have completely different meanings and therefore cannot be used interchangeably, as is often the case. • CRIME COMBATING AND THE “ZERO TOLERANCE” APPROACH

The absence of a “zero tolerance” approach in official South African policy and the operational approaches of the South African Police Service is conspicuous. Contrary to expectations, after its acclaim for the dramatic crime decreases in New York, the concept was never officially implemented by the South African Police Service. Although “zero tolerance” is considered an “uncompromising” law enforcement approach, it is based on the “broken windows” theory with its focus on the complexity of societal problems and how to solve them. Therefore, if correctly applied, “zero tolerance” represents both crime prevention and policing practices, which should elevate it to the level of crime combating. However, if the “broken windows” (or crime prevention) element is ignored, “zero tolerance” becomes nothing more than a policing approach – at best a criminal justice approach. For much the same reason, the crime combating operations of the South African Police Service should much rather be referred to as policing operations. The lack of interest (in South Africa) in the “zero tolerance” approach can be ascribed mainly to two possible factors: ♦ It was considered to be in conflict with the official community policing policy of government and of the South African Police Service. ♦ The South African criminal justice system (especially the courts and prisons) do not have the capacity to deal with the large number of cases and arrests that accompany such a strategy.

7.2.2 Crime prevention

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There is no doubt that Sir Robert Peel deserves credit for the development of the modern concept of police organisations. However, his pronouncement in 1829 that the primary function of the police is crime prevention – although understandable for the time – created a number of dilemmas for the police. Although Sir Robert’s contribution to policing is acknowledged, it is this pronouncement (or dictum) of 175 years ago that is challenged in this book. Extensive research has shown that the police do not prevent crime. The body of

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knowledge now available in relation to criminology and policing proves that the 1829 dictum can no longer stand. But, precisely because this dictum is so ingrained in the public mind, is contained in legislation, and is supported by the police themselves, it will be a difficult task to change it. Nevertheless, this belief – that crime prevention is a police function – needs to be changed, especially for the following reasons:

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♦ Unless the dictum is changed, crime combating will never be correctly understood and effectively applied. ♦ The dictum needs to be changed so that the police can focus their attention and resources on policing, and leave the prevention of crime to the structures and capacity created for this purpose (7.3.13). ♦ Changing the dictum is the only way the police will be able to escape the pressures of unfair blaming, and the consequent “impossible mandate” with its inevitable and resultant search for “more effective” (novel) policing models. Crime prevention and proactive policing are also very often confused, and used as interchangeable terms. In terms of the model proposed in Figure 6.1, the two concepts are clearly separated and this separation should facilitate a better understanding and application of both concepts. Whereas “crime prevention” refers to all crime preventative activities by all relevant role-players, including the criminal justice system and therefore also the police (as far as their contributory role is concerned), “policing” (both pro- and reactive) refers only to the activities of the police. More specifically, proactive policing refers to all those police activities which prevent a crime from actually being committed, either through arrest or through deterrence.

7.2.3 Social crime prevention The transfer of responsibility for social crime prevention from the Secretariat for Safety and Security to the South African Police Service was a huge setback for crime prevention. It is a setback, not because the police are not trying, but because the police should not be responsible for crime prevention, least of all by having to address the social causes of crime. Social crime prevention should not even have been situated in the Department of Safety and Security. It is argued in this book, that in view of the socioeconomic causes and other risk factors of crime, no single government department should be tasked with the responsibility for crime prevention. Therefore crime prevention – including social crime prevention – should be regarded as a shared responsibility, which should be coordinated at all levels of government, from national to local government level.

7.2.4 Policing Policing, as a concept, has now become a contentious issue. There are some writers who propose to broaden its meaning to include any legitimate activity aimed at the

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provision of security, whether by the state police or by private security companies. This development is not supported in this book. There are no convincing arguments as to why safety and security services, for example, when provided by private security companies, need to be referred to as policing. Such a situation will only add to the existing confusion relating to the police and policing. This book is in favour of a more restrictive meaning of the term (or concept) policing. In fact, as illustrated by the crime combating model in Figure 6.1 and the proposed definitions of crime combating and policing, in Chapters 2 and 3 under 2.2 and 3.2.1 respectively, this book proposes a definition of policing which is descriptive of what the (state) police should realistically be doing. Accordingly, the proposed definition of policing also excludes crime prevention.

7.2.5 Community policing Community policing (either as a concept or a strategy) has failed. It failed in the United States, in the United Kingdom and in South Africa. It is considered a failed strategy because it had little or no positive (reductive) impact on crime. The only positive contribution of this strategy was in its real or potential ability to improve the legitimacy of the police. In the United Kingdom crime levels continued to rise, despite the implementation of community policing during the early 1980s. According to some British officials this was the result of the police “losing the initiative” in the fight against crime. Consequently, community policing represents what is termed the “strategic defensive” posture of policing in the United Kingdom, as opposed to law enforcement which signifies a “strategic offensive” posture. To regain the initiative against crime, the 1990s saw a return to the strategic offensive and to “crime focused policing”. In South Africa, in the early years of its democracy (the mid 1990s), there were initial and idealistic expectations that community policing would be the solution to its serious crime problems. It was also believed that community policing would facilitate the transformation process in the South African Police Service. However, research has shown that within three to four years the police lost their initial interest in the concept and like their counterparts in the United Kingdom – and to a large extent also in the United States where “zero tolerance” gained wide support – increasingly reverted to more traditional methods of policing. It is concluded that there are three primary reasons why community policing has failed in South Africa: ♦ The motivation for the “South Africanisation” of community policing was more concerned with political than with policing issues.

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♦ The concept was developed by so-called policing technocrats in Europe, where conditions were (and still are) very different from that in post-revolutionary South Africa. ♦ Community policing was originally intended as an alternative policing model which was to enable the police to do what they cannot, namely to prevent crime.

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7.2.6 Sector policing

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Sector policing is a relatively new concept in South Africa and although it was introduced during 1998, it is still not fully implemented throughout the country. The concept is regarded as a practical manifestation of community policing and as with the latter approach, it is intended to promote crime prevention by working with communities in smaller geographical areas (sectors). It is too early to judge the success of the new concept, but it is clear that it has replaced community policing as the latest fashion in policing. To its credit and because sector policing is personnel intensive, government approved an increase in police personnel (numbers) from approximately 119 000 in 2002 to 152 000 in 2006. In addition, the South African Police Service broadened its policy on police reservists to include a new category for rural and urban police reservists.

7.2.7 Direct and indirect policing In addition to the model for crime combating (which includes reference to pro- and reactive policing), which was developed as part of the process of writing this book, the concepts of direct and indirect policing were also developed. As was shown with direct and indirect strategy, policing (as defined in this book) can also be direct and indirect. Direct policing refers to those crime combating responsibilities where the police have a direct and primary responsibility, whether proactive or reactive. Examples of direct policing are law enforcement, crime investigation, visible policing and public order maintenance. Indirect policing has to do with all those activities undertaken by the police in support of crime combating but that are not the direct or primary responsibilities of the police. This would largely refer to crime prevention practices, which are, as pointed out before, considered a joint, or shared responsibility. The provision of relevant crime information to government departments or coordinating structures is an example of indirect policing. Community policing and sector policing, because they aim to prevent crime on the basis of partnerships between the police and communities and attempt to address socioeconomic conditions over which the police have little or no control, are also considered examples of indirect policing.

7.2.8 Crime and national security In a number of countries crime is now recognised as a threat to national security and regarded as a national concern. The South African government also regards crime and its socioeconomic roots as the primary threat to South Africa’s national security. However, despite the government’s stated position on this issue (e.g. in White Papers), South Africa does not have a national security policy and/or a national security strategy to combat this threat. Alternatively, South Africa should develop an overarching national crime combating policy and a national crime combating strategy which should cover all the dimensions of the state such as the political, economic, diplomatic, military, social, environmental, spiritual/religious and psychological dimensions. If properly coordinated, all the relevant role-players

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(including the police) can be tasked to perform their responsibilities as they arise from such a policy and strategy, but within the realistic mandate and capability of each role-player.

7.2.9 Terminology This book provides a number of examples of the terminological (and conceptual) confusion that exists as far as safety and security issues are concerned, especially in South Africa. This is, among others, the result of unclear legislation and conflict between legislation and policy. For example, the terms crime prevention and crime combating are not defined in legislation, which leaves them open for interpretation and results in all kinds of speculation and divergent use. The confusion is exacerbated by the introduction of unexplained terms and concepts, especially by the police, and the use of terms or concepts by political leaders and the media whilst lacking a proper understanding thereof. To add to the conceptual confusion, there exists a glaring discrepancy between the statutory obligations of the police (section 205(3) of the Constitution, 1996) and the obligations contained in policy documents such as the National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996) and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998). For example, whereas section 205(3) prescribes crime prevention as an “object” of the police, both policy documents recognise that the police have a limited role as far as crime prevention is concerned. The police are also faced with the dilemma that although politicians and officials often rhetorically refer to these policy documents, it is largely ignored in terms of implementation. The police, in their attempts to appear to perform according to both statute and policy, have now increasingly become entangled in what can only be described as terminological “juggling”. The terminological and conceptual confusion obviously creates uncertainty and, subsequently, leads to difficulties as far as role clarification is concerned. It clearly also causes uncertainty and confusion in the public mind and is considered, in this book, as a major reason for the unrealistic expectations of what the police are capable of, or what they should be doing.

7.2.10 Police functions

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This book also questions the conceptual correctness of section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The use of the term “objects” to prescribe the responsibilities of the police is problematic. Responsibilities such as law enforcement and crime investigation can very well be described as “functions”, because they are concrete things the police can do and are not part of a future or ideal situation. Crime prevention, on the other hand, may be an “object” or aim (a future or ideal situation) towards which the police can certainly contribute, but it is not a function. Accordingly, it is concluded that crime prevention is so dissimilar (sui generis) from the rest of the grouping (genus) of police responsibilities, that it is terminologically and conceptually illogical to maintain the current formulation of section 205(3). Functions and “objects” (goals) should not be confused in the formulation of

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responsibilities, and in the case of the police it is evident that the functions (responsibilities/obligations) of the police need to be reformulated.

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7.2.11 The police’s operations approach It is obvious that despite their declared commitment to community policing the South African Police Service soon realised that the surest way to make an immediate and visible impact on crime, was to revert to more traditional policing methods such as high-density police operations. Initially there was some pretence of a dual approach (community policing and high-density operations), but gradually all pretence disappeared and the operations approach can now be considered as the new corporate strategy of the South African Police Service. However, and in spite of impressive operational results, the police were once again faced with a number of dilemmas: ♦ The large number of arrests over extended periods of time created additional pressures on an already overburdened criminal justice system, especially the courts (case backlogs) and prisons (overcrowding). ♦ High-density operations are personnel intensive and it is doubtful whether this approach is sustainable over the longer term. ♦ The police may already have reached a saturation point as far as their impact with the operations approach is concerned (this conclusion is borne out by increasing calls from the police for more to be done in terms of socioeconomic interventions to complement police efforts). ♦ The unfortunate political decision in 1999 to move responsibility for “social crime prevention” to the police enhances the perception that the police are responsible for crime prevention and for solving the social problems associated with crime.

7.2.12 The police’s impact on crime It should be said at the outset that it is extremely difficult to determine to what extent the high-density operations and other police activities impacted on crime levels in South Africa. From the impressive operational successes shown in Table 6.1 it is logical to expect a correlation (comparative decreases) as far as crime figures are concerned, but according to official crime rates (Table 6.2) South Africa is still faced with an abnormal crime problem. For example, six of the 17 crimes listed in Table 6.2 (in 2005) are now at higher levels than in 1994. There are also doubts about the reasons for some of the decreases and there is a real possibility that some decreases can be attributed to non-reporting of crimes by victims who have lost faith in the police. The police point out that murder decreased from 66,9 per 100 000 of the population in 1994/1995 to 40,3 in 2004/2005, but compared to international standards this is still abnormally high. For example, the South African murder figure in 2003/2004 (financial year) was almost 20 000, compared to 850 in the United Kingdom which has a much larger population.

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It is obvious that the large scale high-density and targeted police operations, given their results as far as arrests, the confiscation of firearms and other operational successes are concerned, must have had a positive impact on crime. However, it is equally obvious – given the continued high levels of most crimes and the increases in certain crimes – that the police have reached (or soon will reach) a saturation point in terms of their impact. This is to be expected, because the police do not control the factors that cause crime, and unless these factors are addressed on a massive and well-coordinated scale, the continued efforts of the police will continue to deliver – what seems to be – a disproportionate low impact on crime.

7.2.13 The police subculture This book questions the usefulness of the almost cosmetic changes to the police organisation, such as changing from a force to a service. In South Africa these changes are aligned with the implementation of community policing and the remodelling of the police to reflect the new democratic order. They also include aspects such as the demilitarisation of the police which directly affects the so-called police subculture. It is ironic that community policing, which became the new corporate strategy of the South African Police Service during 1994/1995, and which required a non-military (defensive) image for the police, is now considered a failed strategy. However, the new corporate strategy of the police, the operations approach (high-density crime combating operations), requires a more offensive and authoritative posture. It is also ironic that the new, more forceful, strategy is carried out by a police organisation with a non-forceful corporate image. It is also clear that the rationale for a military character of the police is not about to change. Like the military, the police is a lawful coercive force, authorised to use physical force, including deadly force, against citizens, when required. And, like the military, they are expected to work under dangerous conditions. In Chapter 4, under 4.5 it is considered, that apart from political reasons, these changes to the police organisation were motivated by the mistaken belief that the solution to the crime problem lies in changes to, or reforms of, the police. There seems to be an obsession with determining what is wrong with the police, rather than finding out what might be wrong with the society it serves. In the process of change, the unique subculture of the police is destroyed and the results are often counterproductive. These changes, because they are based on a mistaken belief, undermine the authority of the police, their confidence and their morale. They also lead to experimentation by the police with “novel” police concepts such as community policing, in response to the mostly unfair criticism, and in an effort to become more “effective” in the fight against crime.

7.2.14 Coordinating structures

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The growing importance of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster is a positive development. The JCPS (as it is popularly referred to) acts as a coor-

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dinating structure for member departments at both Cabinet and Director-General level. However, due to its limited criminal justice focus it does not fit the mould of the overarching crime combating or crime prevention centre called for in this book. Research has shown that there is a marked disconnection between crime and its risk factors, and programmes or actions to combat these. Crime and its risk factors are too complex and varied to be the responsibility of a single government department or even a cluster of departments with a limited focus, such as the JCPS Cluster. Prior to the establishment of the JCPS Cluster, the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) recommended a National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre (NCPSC) to initiate, coordinate and facilitate crime prevention programmes. The NCPSC was originally situated within the Secretariat for Safety and Security, but in 1999 – after the social crime prevention responsibility was shifted to the police – it became dysfunctional. The NCPSC was, in any case, not the answer to the identified need for a central coordinating structure to manage a national security or crime combating policy and strategy. The current reality is that South Africa does not have an overarching crime combating (or crime prevention) structure to authoritatively coordinate a national security policy or a national security strategy (aimed at the combating of crime and its risk factors). The only existing structure that could possibly be considered at this stage, is the National Security Council (NSC), but its current mandate, structure and functioning is not adequate in terms of what is required (Chapters 4 and 5 under 4.6 and 5.5).

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7.3 Recommendations Based on the research and arguments contained in this book, and in the belief that it will contribute to more effective crime combating (crime prevention and policing) in South Africa, the following recommendations were formulated.

7.3.1 Crime combating It is recommended that crime combating be accepted as an overarching term or concept, inclusive of both crime prevention and policing, as illustrated by the model (diagram) in Figure 6.1. It is further recommended that the definition of crime combating, which is proposed in Chapter 2 under 2.2, be accepted. Both the definition and the crime combating model (diagram) should be promoted as much as possible.

7.3.2 Crime prevention It is recommended that the dictum by Sir Robert Peel in 1829, that crime prevention is the primary responsibility (“basic mission”) of the police, be regarded as outdated.

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It is further recommended that crime prevention be recognised as a shared responsibility between government agencies at all levels, and the police’s role in this regard as a secondary responsibility. The secondary (contributory or supportive) role of the police with regard to crime prevention entails the following: ♦ The effective and efficient performing of policing functions (law enforcement, crime investigation, order maintenance and visible policing, e.g. random and targeted patrols) should act as a deterrent to crime. ♦ Through proactive policing (7.3.4) the police can effect arrests which may prevent the perpetration of other or more serious crimes. ♦ The police should work with and provide information about crime (e.g. crime statistics, crime analysis, crime trends and tendencies, the identification of crime “hot spots”, causes of and conditions conducive to crime identified by the police, et cetera) to those government departments/agencies or joint fora created for the overall purpose of crime combating. It is recommended that the prevention of crime should not be allocated as a primary responsibility of any one government department, but that an overarching central or national coordinating structure – representative of all relevant role-players (as determined by the complexities of crime and its risk factors) be created for the purpose of primary responsibility.

7.3.3 Social crime prevention It is recommended that the responsibility for social crime prevention be moved from the police to the proposed central or national coordinating structure (7.3.13).

7.3.4 Policing

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It is recommended that the term policing be used in a restrictive form and that it be interpreted to refer to the lawful activities of the police (and that the concept crime prevention, as a police responsibility, be scrapped from laws such as the South African Constitution, 1996). It is further recommended that the definition of policing, as proposed in Chapter 3, under 3.2.1, be adopted. The concepts of proactive and reactive policing, as described in this book, should be adopted, especially by the police. It is important for the police to realise that there is a distinct difference between “crime prevention”, as depicted in Figure 6.1, and “proactive policing” (which has crime prevention characteristics). Proactive policing refers to all those lawful activities performed by the police which either prevent a crime from being committed (direct intervention), or which act as a deterrent to crime (indirect intervention), or activities that are regarded as necessary to maintain public order or to protect the public and their property. Reactive policing refers to all those lawful activities performed by the police to find and to arrest offenders after a crime has been committed, to restore public order, and to protect the public and their property.

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7.3.5 Community policing It is recommended that community policing as a concept, a philosophy, a style, a practice or a strategy be phased out, and that it be replaced with a doctrine (principle) of sensible policing. Such a doctrine should guide the police in terms of acting responsibly and fairly, consulting the public and working in cooperation with all individuals, groups and institutions that have a shared and lawful interest in the combating of crime.

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7.3.6 Sector policing It is recommended that sector policing be supported, but that its focus be changed from community policing to community safety. Such a change in focus should entail the following: ♦ Organising the community and community structures in a sector (e.g. neighbourhood and business watches, block and street watches, domestic worker watches) to play a more structured role in their own safety and security. ♦ Establishing an effective mechanism to provide for the policing needs of each sector. ♦ Keeping the community informed as far as issues affecting them are concerned. ♦ Tapping in to the community to gather information relating to crime, the risk factors of crime and known or potential criminals. ♦ Establishing a mechanism to channel information regarding the socioeconomic causes of and conditions conducive to crime (as well as other risk factors), and over which the police have no control, to those government agencies or coordinating structures that are in a position to address these causes and conditions.

7.3.7 Direct and indirect policing It is recommended that direct and indirect policing be accepted as new concepts, based on the concepts of direct and indirect strategy. Direct policing refers to those crime combating responsibilities for which the police have a direct and primary responsibility, whether proactive or reactive (e.g. law enforcement, crime investigation, visible policing and public order maintenance). Indirect policing refers to the secondary or supportive role of the police and includes activities to combat crime (including the prevention of crime) indirectly, for example through providing crime information (7.3.2) to enable other government agencies or coordinating structures to perform their functions more effectively.

7.3.8 Crime and national security It is recommended that – since crime and its socioeconomic roots are acknowledged by the South African government as a threat to South Africa’s national security – a national security policy and consequently a national security strategy should be

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developed to combat this threat. Alternatively, a national crime combating policy and a national crime combating strategy should be developed. However, unlike the limited criminal justice and safety and security focus of existing strategies, the recommended policy and strategy should cover all the dimensions of the state, inclusive of the political, economic, diplomatic, military, social, environmental, spiritual/religious and psychological dimensions. It is further recommended that the implementation (operationalisation) of the above policy and strategy be coordinated by a national or central coordinating structure (7.3.13). All government departments/agencies with either direct or indirect responsibilities should be represented in such a structure. It should be the responsibility of participating departments, in cooperation with the coordinating structure, to develop departmental strategies and even sub-departmental strategies. The aim of these strategies will be to direct departments, in terms of their department-specific capabilities and actions, to achieve the aims and objectives of the overall national policy and strategy.

7.3.9 Terminology It is recommended that the terminology in the safety and security environment be standardised. For this purpose, government should consider the appointment of a working group representative of the relevant government departments and academic institutions. It is also recommended that once such a standardised list of terms is approved, government should approach parliament for purposes of defining these terms in the relevant Acts.

7.3.10 Police functions It is recommended that section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 be amended. The amended section should clearly distinguish between functions and objects. The working group proposed in 7.3.9 can also be tasked with the responsibility of reformulating section 205(3) (see Chapter 2, under 2.4.2 for a proposal in this regard). Although it is more a question of structure than of function, it is also recommended that the South African Police Service abandons the pretence of crime prevention in terms of its structures and units, and renames them in terms of what they really (realistically) do. By implication, this would specifically refer to so-called crime prevention units and the crime prevention division, et cetera.

7.3.11 The police’s operations approach

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It is recommended that the police continue with their operations approach. At this stage, and in spite of the possibility that they may have reached a saturation point, they have few other choices. What is needed now is a coordinated effort by all relevant government agencies as recommended in 7.3.2, guided and directed by the

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proposed national coordinating structure and the recommended national security or crime combating policy, and subsequent strategies.

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7.3.12 The police subculture It is recommended that recognition be given to the unavoidability of a unique subculture in the police. In essence this refers to a culture of military discipline. The police are a unique organisation, with unique powers and responsibilities that work under unique conditions. They face personal dangers as an occupational hazard, but also possess the authority to use coercive and even deadly force. They face crime and criminals on a regular basis, and often have to deal with disturbing crime scenes and the victims of crime. None of the factors mentioned here is about to change, because this is what the police do. However, in their uniqueness they share certain characteristics with the military, such as the authority to use coercive force. Therefore, like the military, they need to be organised, trained, supervised and disciplined in a way that will enable them to perform their unique role effectively. Although they share some of the characteristics of the military, they are also different in many ways, and to destroy their subculture, simply because they share certain commonalities with the military, is ill-considered and counterproductive. It is therefore recommended that, based on the above arguments, the police be allowed to retain their semi-military character. In a democracy there are in any case, adequate mechanisms to prevent the police from developing into an alternative military organisation. However, the police, for purposes of conducting highdensity crime combating operations and other dangerous policing tasks, need to be organised and structured much like the military. If the police are further “demilitarised” and their subculture further eroded, it will not only undermine their morale, but also their effectiveness, and may even endanger their lives.

7.3.13 A national crime combating centre (or agency) It is recommended that a central or national crime combating centre or agency be established to manage (coordinate, direct, guide, monitor and evaluate) the implementation of a national policy and a national strategy against crime and its risk factors (including the socioeconomic causes of crime). Experience has shown that government departments do not take instructions from each other and also work independently from each other without sharing a common goal. It is for this reason that a coordinating national structure, representative of all relevant role-players and empowered by an overriding authority, needs to be established. The overriding authority can be achieved by having the President or Deputy President chair this structure. It is essential that such a national structure or centre develops and implements a national security or national crime combating policy and subsequent thereto a national security or national crime combating strategy along the lines recommended in 7.3.8. Because of its limited criminal justice focus, the Justice, Crime Preven-

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tion and Security (JCPS) Cluster is not the answer. It is also important that the Department of Safety and Security and the police, contrary to their position in the JCPS Cluster, do not perform the lead role in the national coordinating structure. The national coordinating structure will, in particular, have to perform the following functions: ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Continuously assess the crime situation Identify risk factors underlying the crime problem Identify measures to address each risk factor (proactively and reactively) Allocate responsibilities to the various government departments and other roleplayers ♦ Manage the process of implementing its decisions and taskings Alternatively, it is recommended that the mandate, structure and functioning of the National Security Council (NSC) be adapted to fulfil the role of the national coordinating structure.

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Van Blerk, C. 1995. A new police force for the new SA. Pretoria News, 5 May. Van der Walt, S. 2003. Britte se vertroue in regering daal terwyl misdaadsyfers styg. Beeld, 14 Januarie: 11. Van Heerden, T.J. 1992. Inleiding tot die polisiekunde. Pretoria: Unisa. Walker, N. 1994. Care and control in the police organisation. In Stephens, M. & Becker, S. (Eds), Police force – police service: care and control in Britain. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 33–65.

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Wilson, J.Q. & Kelling, G.L. 1982. The police and neighborhood safety. In The Atlantic, 29–38. In Kelling, G.L. & Coles, C.M. 1997. Fixing broken windows: restoring order and reducing crime in our communities. New York: Touchstone (Simon & Schuster), 34. World Factbook. 2002. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s.

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A African National Congress (ANC) 69 Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 60

B Business Against Crime (BAC) 80

C central coordinating structure functions 89 national crime combating centre 89 national crime prevention centre 89 National Security Council (NSC) 89 cluster approach Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (JOINTS) 78 Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster (JCPS) 90 National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) 78 six clusters 90 community focused policing community orientated policing 51 community policing 51 problem orientated policing 51 community police forums 72, 74, 97 establishment of 74 functioning of 74 community policing 52, 98 definition 52 new social contract 52 partnerships 52 South African Police Service manual 107 technocratic police experts 102 conditio sine quo non 44 constitutional change armed liberation struggle 69 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 69 interim Constitution of the Republic of

South Africa, 1993 69 liberation movement 69 National Peace Accord 70 negotiated political settlement 69 crime 45, 130 commercial 130 contact 130 property related 130 crime combating 9, 112 active visible policing 113 conventional policing 126, 129 crime prevention 112 idealistic policing 134 less policeable crimes 129 more policeable 126, 129 national security policy 114 national security stategy 114 policing 112 proactive police action 12 proactive policing 112 reactive policing 112 realistic policing 134 visible policing 113, 127 crime control 10 crime deterrence 12, 14 direct 14 general 14 police numbers 14 crime figures analysis 3 crime focused policing 51, 54 broken windows theory 51, 54 climate of fear 57 crime 54 direct results 56 disorder 54 indirect results 56 no-nonsense attitude 56 shakedown artists 57 social controls 54 social fabric 54 squeegee pest 57

159

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zero tolerance approach 51, 56 crime, national security threat anarchy 87 departmental strategies 88 individual security 87 national security 87 national security policy 88 national security strategy 88 crime prevention 12 definition 13 National Crime Prevention Centre 12 National Crime Prevention Strategy 13 precipitating factors (opportunity) 13, 49, 111 predisposing factors (inclination) 13, 50, 111 primary 12 secondary 12 tertiary 12 crime prevention agency 62 multi-agency approach 63 multidimensional 63 national security policy 65 crime, risk factors of 45 criminogenic factors 49 facilitators 49 root causes 45

D deterrence 49 direct strategy 17 Draft Policy Document on Change (Green Paper), 1994 72 Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 72 new political environment 72 Police Service and Community Development 73

E eiusdem-generis rule 126

L law enforcement 15

M military character 61 municipal/metropolitan police services 72 establishment 74 functions 72, 72 South African Police Service Amendment Act, 1998 74

N national coordinating structure functions 89 national crime combating centre 89 national crime prevention centre 89 National Security Council (NSC) 89 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), 1996 69, 75, 83 four pillars 77 functions 83 structures 77 NCPS coordinating mechanism 78 National Growth and Development Strategy (GDS) 77 national security 19, 23 domestic security 20 internal dimension of security 20 military application 19 national policy 23, 65, 88, 114 national strategy 23, 65, 88, 114 referent object 20 regime security 20 state security 20 strategy 23 New York Bratton, W.J. 57 Guiliani, R. 57 New York Police Department (NYPD) 57

I

160

impossible mandate 42, 51 indirect strategy 17 institutional schizophrenia 62 International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) 84

O Operation Crackdown crime combating task group 118 crime combating zones 118 Crime Threat Analysis (CTA) 118

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organised crime task teams 118 Organised Crime Threat Analysis (OCTA) 118 Operation Monozite flood-and-flush principle 119 hot spot areas 119 operational strategy 19 overall strategy fields of conflict 19

P police 26 legitimacy of 58 police enforcement conference 53 police force 60 police functions 28 dictum 30 principles of policing 29 Sir Robert Peel 28 police, inquires into 34 Brixton riots 35 police enforcement 37 police service 37 Scarman Inquiry 35 police reforms 65 negative results 66 police service 60 police, specific principles for 70 police subculture 61, 62 military doctrine 62 police doctrine 62 policing 26 policing, inquiries into 34 Brixton riots 35 police enforcement 37 police service 37 Scarman Inquiry 35 policing, specific principles for 70 Programme Johannesburg 109 pockets of excellence 109

R Ready to Govern 70 primary function of police 71 research rationale 5

S Secretariat for Safety and Security 84 sector policing 107, 133 sensible policing 54 Service Delivery Improvement Programme (SDIP) 109 social crime prevention 83, 130 South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) 21 South African Police Service Act, 1995 duties 73 funtions 73 powers 73 South African Police Service, functions of 13 South African White Paper on Defence 21 South African White Paper on Intelligence 21 Statement of Common Purpose and Values mission of police 61 strategic defensive 58 strategic offensive 58 strategy 16 definition 17 sui generis 127 Sword and Shield 105

T total strategy grand strategy 18 national strategy 18 political strategy 19 traditional policing 52 community policing hypothesis 53 harmony of interest 53 liberal influence 53

W White Paper on Safety and Security, 1998 69 White Paper on Safety and Security, 19992004 81 contribution of policing 82 crime prevention, defined 82 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Mission 22

161

Crime categories

1995/ 1996

1996/ 1997

1997/ 1998

1998/ 1999

1999/ 2000

2000/ 2001

2001/ 2002

2002/ 2003

2003/ 2004

2004/ 2005

Violent crimes Murder

62,8

59,9

59,8

52,5

49,8

47,8

47,4

42,7

40,3

126,7

126,2

118,3

122,8

121,0

121,1

115,3

113,7

118,3

69,1

67,9

70,4

68,4

70,4

65,4

64,4

69,8

78,9

64,8

52,6

Assault GBH (serious)

555,8

563,7

570,4

570,4

566,3

608,1

630,2

589,1

585,9

560,7

535,3

Common assault

516,0

520,5

500,3

489,0

485,0

538,9

569,7

584,3

621,6

605,7

575,0

Robbery with aggravating circumstances

218,5

195,0

163,0

177,5

220,6

229,5

260,3

260,5

279,2

288,1

272,2

84,2

115,4

124,9

133,34

154,7

173,5

206,5

201,3

223,4

206,0

195,0

Attempted murder

Other robbery

Property crimes Arson

28,2

24,3

24,9

24,0

23,9

22,3

20,5

19,5

20,2

19,0

17,6

Malicious damage to property

317,8

327,7

319,8

307,4

307,6

312,0

319,2

324,5

345,6

341,2

323,7

Housebreaking – residential

596,2

628,9

602,9

611,1

652,7

673,4

694,0

675,3

704,0

645,2

592,8

Housebreaking – non-residential

225,7

220,8

214,7

219,3

224,5

216,2

209,3

194,4

162,8

139,3

120,3

Theft – motor vehicles

272,8

249,3

239,8

249,2

255,9

239,3

229,0

216,1

204,9

190,0

180,0

Theft – out of/from vehicles

472,5

484,7

430,4

435,3

452,5

453,9

459,0

444,6

431,0

370,8

318,8

Stock theft

121,9

109,7

103,5

101,0

98,8

96,2

95,1

92,9

102,7

89,0

70,1

Other types of theft

995,5

979,4

924,5

969,3

1051,4

1152,8

1281,1

1286,7

1364,6

1307,4

1151,1

Commercial crime

162,5

154,0

153,2

153,7

150,9

157,7

152,4

130,4

123,7

120,4

115,8

Shoplifting

170,9

160,0

152,2

154,3

153,8

153,4

154,9

152,6

151,8

155,0

142,8

Source: Compiled from figures taken from the Annual Reports of the South African Police Service 2003/2004 (South Africa, 2004b: 19) and 2004/2005 (South Africa, 2005a: 56–57)

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1994/ 1995

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TABLE 6.2 Crime ratios (number of crimes per 100 000 of the population) in South Africa for the financial years 1994/1995–2004/2005