Statecraft: Policies and Politics under Prime Minister Theresa May (Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership) 3031324714, 9783031324710

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Statecraft Policies and Politics under Prime Minister Theresa May Edited by Andrew S. Roe-Crines · David Jeffery

Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership

Series Editors Ludger Helms, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria Gillian Peele, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Bert A. Rockman, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership seeks to gather some of the best work on political leadership broadly defined, stretching from classical areas such as executive, legislative and party leadership to understudied manifestations of political leadership beyond the state. Edited by an international board of distinguished leadership scholars from the United States, Europe and Asia, the series publishes cutting-edge research that reaches out to a global readership. The editors are gratefully supported by an advisory board comprising of: Takashi Inoguchi (University of Tokyo, Japan), R.A.W Rhodes (University of Southampton, UK) and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (University of Luneburg, Germany). This series is indexed by Scopus.

Andrew S. Roe-Crines · David Jeffery Editors

Statecraft Policies and Politics under Prime Minister Theresa May

Editors Andrew S. Roe-Crines Department of Politics University of Liverpool Liverpool, UK

David Jeffery Department of Politics University of Liverpool Liverpool, UK

ISSN 2947-5821 ISSN 2947-583X (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership ISBN 978-3-031-32471-0 ISBN 978-3-031-32472-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: PA Images/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This volume is dedicated to Carl Bowler Whose fight against cancer is a daily one.

Acknowledgements

The editors and contributors would like to thank the Conservatives Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association (PSA) for financially supporting the academic symposium in September 2022 at the University of Liverpool that resulted in this edited collection. We should also like to thank the Department of Politics and Dr Hannes Baumann for the warm welcome they gave, and to the contributors for the excellent papers. Personal thanks also to those who assisted the contributors in providing their time for interviews. These include Kenneth Clarke, Matthew Scott PCC, Alice Park, and Patrick Diamond, and to those who wished to remain anonymous. Extra special thanks to Hope Virgo for discussing her struggles and wider campaign for awareness on eating disorders, which proved invaluable for Daniel Bowman’s chapter on Theresa May’s mental health policy. We would also like to express our gratitude to various archives, special collections, and repositories who make a wealth of invaluable material available for the purpose of original scholarship. These include (but are not limited to) the LSE Archives, The British Political Speech Archive, The UK Political Speech Archive on British Politics, and the Bodleian Library.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We should also like to thank the editorial teams at Palgrave and the series editors of the Palgrave Series in Political Leadership for their support and patience throughout, and also special thanks to the reviewers for their valuable comments and timely feedback. University of Liverpool, 2023

Andrew S. Roe-Crines David Jeffery

Praise for Statecraft

“Theresa May’s short-lived Premiership is a cautionary tale for politicians. These authoritative and compelling essays provide fascinating insights into why it unfolded and ended as it did, while also pinpointing May’s strengths and achievements as a political leader as well as her weaknesses and failures. It is an important addition to our understanding of this Prime Minister and the contemporary Conservative party.” —Andrew Gamble, Professor and Chair in Politics, University of Sheffield, UK. “We need to pay Theresa May’s troubled premiership far more attention than we have done so far, and this book provides the genuinely 360degree approach that enables us to do just that. Theoretically coherent, impressively comprehensive and engagingly written, it’s essential reading for anyone wanting to understand the Tories post-Brexit.” —Tim Bale, Professor of Politics, Queen Mary University of London, UK. “This book offers a comprehensive assessment of Theresa May’s premiership. It is essential reading not only for understanding the politics of her time in office, but also her legacy and place within the wider story of Conservative Party statecraft.” —Richard Hayton, Associate Professor of Politics, University of Leeds, UK. ix

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PRAISE FOR STATECRAFT

“We lack systematic critical assessment of Theresa May as prime minister and Conservative leader and this authoritative and comprehensive edited collection meets that need.” —Wyn Grant, Emeritus Professor of Politics, University of Warwick, UK. “This is the definitive account of Theresa May’s time as leader of the Conservative Party and UK Prime Minister. The collection contains extensively researched and original perspectives on the 2017 general election campaign, result and consequences. The book offers new insights into May’s Brexit strategy, appeals for support from the DUP, and wider foreign policy and economic outlook. The book uses interviews and archival sources to examine these and other issues, including policies on the environment, race and mental health. The book is essential reading for scholars of UK Prime Ministers and the Conservative Party.” —Jon Tonge, Professor of Politics, University of Liverpool, UK.

Contents

1

Introduction: The May Premiership Andrew S. Roe-Crines and David Jeffery

1

Part I Electoral Issues 13

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The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2016 Timothy Heppell and Oliver Booth

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‘I’m not Going to Call a Snap Election’—Theresa May and the 2017 General Election Andrew S. Roe-Crines and John-Paul Salter

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Attempting to Secure a Sympathetic Press: May and the Media William Coles

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Part II Policy Implementation 5

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Miscalculations and Constraints: Brexit and the Failed Statecraft of Theresa May Anthony Costello Foreign Policy Under Theresa May Kate Barry and Peter Kerr

69 93

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CONTENTS

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‘An Economy That Works for Everyone’? An Evaluation of the May Government’s Economic Policies and Statecraft Simon Lee

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Theresa May and Mental Health Policy: A Legacy Unfinished? Daniel Bowman

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Theresa May, Statecraft and the Environment Daniel Pitt

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Friends and Allies? Theresa May and the DUP Catherine McGlynn and Shaun McDaid

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Theresa May and Race Relations Policy Pete Woodcock

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Part III Political Debates 12

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Theresa May’s Mode of Conservatism; ‘Soft’ One Nation Toryism Peter Dorey From Workers on Company Boards to Representatives of ‘Workers Voices’: Explaining May’s Failed ‘One Nation’ Industrial Policy Eunice Goes

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Theresa May as a Political Leader Kevin Theakston

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Women Political Leaders Are All Feminists, Aren’t They? Theresa May and Feminism Rebecca J. Wray

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Theresa May and LGBT Equality Richard Johnson

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Theresa May and Religion: The Vicar’s Daughter in Downing Street Andrew Barclay

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239 263

289 309

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CONTENTS

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Theresa May and the Constitution: A Failure of Statecraft Philip Norton

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Theresa May and Britishness: Towards a Psychological Dimension of Statecraft Harry W. Fletcher

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Theresa May’s Team: Statecraft and the Cabinet Antony Mullen

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Conclusion: Statecraft, Policies, and Politics of Prime Minister Theresa May Andrew S. Roe-Crines and David Jeffery

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Andrew Barclay is a Research Associate at the University of Sheffield on political campaigns, voting, and religion. Kate Barry is a lawyer and a doctoral candidate at the University of Birmingham, researching the decriminalisation of abortion in Northern Ireland. She is a former chair of the Green Party Northern Ireland and is currently working for an NGO supporting strategic litigation on human rights and equality cases. Oliver Booth is a doctoral candidate in School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University of Leeds. Daniel Bowman is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics at the University of Liverpool (under supervision of the editors), and the Research and Communication Lead for the Conservative Mental Health Group. William Coles recently completed his doctorate at Royal Holloway, University of London. He is a classicist by training and a rhetorician at heart, with interests in both classical rhetoric and modern political communication. His latest publication is a review of a new translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric for the Oxford World’s Classics series (Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2023).

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Anthony Costello is a Lecturer of Politics and International Relations in Liverpool Hope University. His research specialism lies in European integration and governance, with a particular interest in intergovernmental decision-making procedures and emerging patterns of differentiated integration/disintegration beyond and within the Union. He has published work on the Fiscal Stability Treaty and Ireland, participatory democracy and the Future of Europe, the EU-Turkish relationship and EU foreign policy in North Africa. Peter Dorey is Professor of British Politics at Cardiff University. He has authored or co-authored fifteen books on post-war British politics, including British Conservatism: The politics and philosophy of inequality (I. B. Tauris, 2010); From Crisis to Coalition: The Conservative Party 1997– 2010 (Palgrave, 2011, with Mark Garnett and Andrew Denham); The British Coalition Government 2010–2015: A Marriage of Inconvenience (Palgrave, 2016, with Mark Garnett); and The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher (Palgrave, 2016, with Andrew Crines and Timothy Heppell). He has just published A Short History of Thatcherism (Agenda, 2023). Harry W. Fletcher is an Intelligence Analyst who writes and studies on political and social psychology. He has an MA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Edinburgh and an MSc in Public Health from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. Eunice Goes is Professor of Politics at Richmond: The American International University in London and is the author of The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband: Trying But Failing to Renew Social Democracy with Manchester University Press (2016). Timothy Heppell is an Associate Professor of British Politics at the University of Leeds. He is the author of The Tories from Winston Churchill to David Cameron (Bloomsbury, 2014), the co-author (with Andrew Crines and Peter Dorey) of The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher (Palgrave, 2016), and the author of Cameron: The Politics of Modernisation and Manipulation (Manchester University Press, 2019). David Jeffery is a Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Liverpool. He is the co-editor (with Antony Mullen and Stephen Farrall) of Thatcherism Today: The Social and Cultural Legacy of Thatcherism in the 21st Century (Palgrave, 2020).

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Richard Johnson is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Queen Mary, University of London. He is the author of The End of the Second Reconstruction (Polity, 2020) and US Foreign Policy: Domestic Roots and International Impact (Bristol University Press, 2021). He is the co-editor (with Yuan Yi Zhu) of Sceptical Perspectives on the Changing Constitution of the United Kingdom (Hart, 2023). Peter Kerr is an Associate Professor based in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. He specialises and teaches mainly in the area of British politics and his core research interest lies in looking at the impact of political projects on the development of British politics. In his recent work, he has also written on issues relating to depoliticisation, populism, and gender and sexuality. He is also co-founder of the Palgrave journal, British Politics, which he co-edited from 2005–2020. He is currently part of the journal’s senior editorial team. Simon Lee is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Hull. He is the author of Boom and Bust: The Politics and Legacy of Gordon Brown (Oneworld, 2009), co-editor of eight books, including (with Matt Beech) of Conservative Governments in the Age of Brexit (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023) and five other texts on UK politics, co-author (with Andrew Cox and Joe Sanderson) of The Political Economy of Modern Britain (Edward Elgar, 1997), and has contributed to 28 other books and encyclopaedia. Shaun McDaid is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at Leeds Trinity University. He is the author of Template for Peace: Northern Ireland, 1972–1975 (Manchester University Press, 2013), co-author of Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation in Higher Education (Emerald, 2018) and is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Catherine McGlynn works in a policy role in the civil service. Her publications include Abandoning Historical Conflict? Former Paramilitary Prisoners and Political Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (with Peter Shirlow, Jonathan Tonge and James W. McAuley) published by Manchester University Press, which was the Political Studies Association of Ireland Book of the year in 2011. She is co-author of Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation in Higher Education (Emerald, 2018). Antony Mullen is a Research Associate at the University of Bolton and the Director of the Thatcher Network. He is editor of Thatcherism Today:

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The Social and Cultural Legacy of Thatcherism in the 21st Century (2020, with David Jeffery and Stephen Farrall) and of the forthcoming Thatcher’s Ministers (with David Jeffery, Sam Blaxland, and Martin Farr). Lord Norton of Louth is Professor of Government and Director of the Centre for Legislative Studies at the University of Hull. He is the author, co-author, or editor of thirty-six books, amongst them Governing Britain (2020) and The 1922 Committee: Power Behind the Scenes (2023). He was elevated to the peerage in 1998 and he was the first Chairman of the House of Lords Constitution Committee. He has been described in The House Magazine—the journal of both Houses of Parliament—as ‘our greatest living expert on Parliament’. Daniel Pitt is a Teaching Associate at the University of Sheffield and a Research Fellow at Research Institute for Politics and Government at the University of Public Service. He is also a member of the Centre for British Politics at the University of Hull. His latest paper is called Future Conservative Electoral Prospects: Time for Tory Socialism? published in the French Journal of British Studies (The Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique). Andrew S. Roe-Crines is a Senior Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Liverpool. He is the co-author and editor of over ten books including Choosing the Party Leaders: Britain’s Conservatives and Labour Compared (with Peter Dorey and Andrew Denham); Policies and Politics under Prime Minister Edward Heath (with Timothy Heppell), and Corbynism in Perspective. He has also (co)-authored articles in leading international and national journals such as The Journal of Common Market Studies, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, and Parliamentary Affairs (amongst others). He also is the 2017 winner of the PSA Richard Rose Prize and co-editor (with David Jeffery) of the forthcoming History of the Conservative Party Handbook for Routledge. John-Paul Salter is Associate Professor of Politics at University College London (UCL). He has published on Brexit, financial accountability, and regulatory authority. Kevin Theakston is Professor of British Government at the University of Leeds. He has published fifteen books, including Winston Churchill and the British constitution (Politicos, 2004) and After Number 10:

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Former Prime Ministers in British Politics (Palgrave, 2010). He coauthored William Armstrong and British Policy Making (Palgrave, 2017, with Philip Connelly) and Disjunctive Prime Ministerial Leadership in British Politics: From Baldwin to Brexit (Palgrave, 2020, with Nick Randall and Christopher Byrne). Pete Woodcock is Associate Dean of Teaching Enhancement of the Global Banking School. He is the author of Political Theory: A Beginner’s Guide (Polity, 2019), and has written widely on teaching and learning issues. Rebecca J. Wray is an Associate Lecturer in the School of Health at Leeds Beckett University. She has published on fourth-wave feminism (with Katy Day) for Transform: A Journal of the Radical Left and the gendered nature of misogynistic backlash in science fiction fandom for Psychology of Women & Equalities Review.

List of Figures

Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2

Fig. 8.3

Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5

Fig. 8.6

Fig. 8.7 Fig. 16.1

Section 136 Detentions taken to police cells as place of safety (Source NHS Mental Health Dashboard) Total number of mental health related police incidents (English police forces: 2016–2019) (Source Parliament Street [2019, p. 10]—Fig. 1) Conservative party manifestos—Total amount of times ‘mental’ health/illness was mentioned (1964–2019) (Source Data Extracted from Conservative Party Manifestos ([1964–2019]) School mental health support teams (Source Data extracted from NHS England) % of CYP with eating disorders seen within 1 week (urgent) and 4 weeks (routine) (Source NHS Mental Health Dashboard) IAPT % of people receiving first treatment appointment within 6 weeks/18 weeks of referral (Source NHS Mental Health Dashboard) Number of detentions under the mental act (1983) (Source NHS Mental Health Dashboard) MP votes for the Civil Partnership Act 2004, by party (Source https://www.theyworkforyou.com/divisions/pw2004-10-12-256-commons/mp/10999)

146

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150 152

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155 156

317

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 19.1

Where duty and belief interact, an effect is generated that has power over a leader. If duty and belief are consistent the intersection is a zone of effective political action—positive emotions are generated and a leader feels confident in their decisions. If duty and belief are inconsistent (as shown), the intersection is a zone of cognitive dissonance generation. All Prime Ministers must operate at the intersection of duty and belief

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table Table Table Table

14.1 14.2 17.1 20.1

Table 20.2 Table 20.3 Table 20.4 Table 20.5 Table 20.6 Table 20.7

The Parliamentary Ballots Conservative Party members and the stark criteria (May-Leadsom-Gove) The league table of post-war prime ministers Impact of prime ministers on policy Religious Breakdown of the British Electorate First May Ministry (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Second May Ministry (a) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Second May Ministry (b) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Second May Ministry (c) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Second May Ministry (d) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Second May Ministry (e) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Second May Ministry (e) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status)

20 24 264 266 337 389 391 393 395 396 397 398

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The May Premiership Andrew S. Roe-Crines and David Jeffery

Critical Evaluation of Leadership and the Conservative Party The Conservative Party has enjoyed a reputation for governing longevity earned over the course of the post-war period. Of the four periods of Conservative government from 1951, three lasted for over a decade. These included 1951–1964 under the leadership of Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, and Alec Douglas-Home; 1979–1997 under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher and John Major; and the period since 2010 under David Cameron, Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, and Rishi Sunak. Only the period of leadership under Edward Heath was shorter (1970–1974). This demonstrates the capacity of the Conservative Party to project an image of electoral success and governing longevity, thereby producing a record against which current Conservative leaders may be evaluated.

A. S. Roe-Crines (B) · D. Jeffery Department of Politics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK e-mail: [email protected] D. Jeffery e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_1

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It is worth remembering, however, that in the most recent period of lengthy Conservative government (2010+), Conservative leaders have begun experiencing relatively shorter tenures of individual leaderships. These being Theresa May (2016–2019), Boris Johnson (2019–2022), and Liz Truss (2022). Each was removed from the leadership by their party rather than the voters. This suggests an increasingly fractious party with a taste for leadership removal over the more traditional approach of supporting the incumbent in favour of appearing united. This also suggests that the capacity of the Conservatives to unite behind their leader and demonstrate loyalty is less evident in the current Conservative Party than may historically have been the case. Moreover, at the time of writing, Rishi Sunak remains the leader of the Conservative Party, with polling data suggesting in the event he can navigate the travails that beset his immediate predecessors, his reward maybe leading the Conservatives into a difficult election. He is also in the invidious position of three of his four predecessors remaining politically active in a way that former prime ministers may ordinarily have avoided, thereby representing a new form of challenge to his authority. It is also worth reflecting on the circumstances in which the recent leaders of the party have found themselves. For example, the focus of this collection, Theresa May, inherited a party during a deeply divisive moment for the United Kingdom (UK), British Politics, and the Conservative Party more broadly. As is well documented, the vote for the UK to leave the European Union (EU) would represent a transformative moment for governing priorities for the coming years and test the conventions of the institutions of UK governance. It would also represent a difficult period of governing, in which crafting an effective model of statecraft would be problematic, thereby making May’s leadership an important and valuable case study of crisis management. It would be worth briefly summising aspects of these contexts to demonstrate their significance for the May administration. Upon securing the leadership, May found herself immediately needing to deliver some form of political and policy response to the result of the referendum. The following response would be the initiation of the Brexit processes, which evolved into an ongoing political ‘game’ of threedimensional chess between the party, Parliament, and the Civil Service. This placed May into a seemingly unnavigable position of needing to deliver satisfactory strategies to a set of promises made by the Leave campaigns during the referendum. For May, the problems of trying to

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deliver Brexit would be made more problematic by the uncertain nature of Brexit and how to quantify its core component parts. Put simply, various versions of Brexit emerged including a Hard Brexit, Soft Brexit, continued membership of the Single Market, or some other form of Brexit that would appease the factions whilst delivering on the referendum result. As is well documented, this was an impossible political task. A further contextualised problem would be the Parliamentary arithmetic that she inherited from Cameron. Although it was a majority, over the course of her first year as Prime Minister, it would provide only limited room for manoeuvre, thereby curtailing her capacity to confidently pass controversial legislation in her attempt to deliver a Brexit deal. Her political judgement was questioned in 2017 by the decision to strengthen her hand by calling the ill-fated 2017 general election. This decision was contextualised against favourable local election results earlier in the year; however, the subsequent general election campaign against the seasoned canvasser, Jeremy Corbyn, did not favour her style of campaigning. As is well documented, rather than improving her hand at the Brexit negotiating table, she instead removed the small majority she inherited, leaving her to strike a deal with the DUP. This made her position tenuous, reducing the confidence of the wider party that she could win an election, and left her increasingly unable to satisfy her divided party, the divided Commons, or manage the hostile press. It was within these circumstances that May sought to govern the UK. Whilst the Brexit situations dominated her time in Number 10, her leadership agenda went beyond Brexit to include a wide range of issues. Many of these wider issues such as mental health policy, environmental policy, race relations, foreign policy, amongst others, are discussed in this volume; however, these too represented significant problems as the volume demonstrates. As such, Theresa May’s time as Conservative leader and Prime Minister afforded her with little opportunity to craft a recognisable narrative of governing success. Despite this, there is scope to reconsider her leadership and the issues she faced using a methodologically robust typology.

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Conservative Leadership and Statecraft Any analysis of statecraft and the leadership of the Conservative Party necessitates a brief overview of its component parts and its conceptualisation by Jim Bulpitt.1 As argued by Marsh (2012), statecraft theory can be seen as a key approach towards better understanding British politics and governance. Furthermore, Hickson (2005) astutely suggested that ‘statecraft should be viewed as an examination of how the Conservative Party has sought when in power to insulate itself from social, economic and international pressures’ and ‘how it has sought to manipulate them in order to maintain some degree of governing competence’ (ibid.). As shown by Bulpitt’s seminal study of the Thatcher administration, using statecraft as a theoretical framework enabled him to evaluate the governing performance of her administration, whilst similarly presenting initial findings on whether issues of political ideology had overridden the long-standing reputation of the Conservatives for pragmatism and expediency in policy formulation and implementation. For Bulpitt’s important and vital analysis, he outlined the essential reward of demonstrating effective statecraft as ‘the art of winning elections’—this was because electoral performance is the ultimate measure of success for a major political party of governance as it enables them to transform the UK through governing. This is achieved by the implementation of policies related to economic and social changes along the lines put to voters through their manifesto. A political party that has occupied the corridors of power for a lengthy period of time may also enjoy the opportunity to demonstrate to voters their capacity to achieve ‘some necessary degree of governing competence in office’ (Bulpitt, 1986). This can be evidenced through prosperous economic management, healthy social policy designed to successfully reduce poverty, cohesive and smooth-running machinery of government, and friendly relations with allied foreign powers through institutions of global governance. At its heart, statecraft is driven by the need to demonstrate success in these areas and so reap the rewards of that success electorally. Thus, a leader capable of engineering a convincing statecraft strategy will likely gain electoral support for their party (Bulpitt, 1986; Stevens, 2002; Hickson, 2005; Taylor, 2005; Buller & James, 2012).

1 A wider discussion of statecraft can be found here: Stevens, 2002: 119–150; Buller, 1999: 691–712; and Buller, 2000: 319–27.

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To achieve these stated aims, Bulpitt’s typology of governing success was constructed around what he defined as statecraft using four component elements. As such, it is useful to briefly consider each element so that their intellectual significance can be evident. Moreover, given that each of the chapters for this volume draws upon these elements asymmetrically as a theoretical framework to evaluate Theresa May’s leadership style and levels of success, it would be worth covering how they can be useful in measuring Prime Ministerial success. In sum, the components of statecraft are party management; devising a winning electoral strategy; political argument hegemony; and a reputation for competence in government. For Bulpitt, evidence of success can be found in excellence across each of these components. Inversely, the absence of success in these suggests an ineffective model of statecraft, likely to result in governing degeneration and the loss of office (Roe-Crines, 2022). As Gamble noted, statecraft as used by Bulpitt necessitated ‘building support and negotiating power, winning the arguments at all levels of ideological discourse, and framing and implementing a viable economic strategy, are all involved in a successful political project that aims to establish and maintain hegemony’ (Gamble, 1988). By doing so, party leaders may present to voters the image of success, whilst internally they may enjoy the benefits of unity and party cohesion that competence affords. In addition, Gamble also reminds us of long-standing benefits of statecraft that the Conservatives have enjoyed, arguing that ‘statecraft involves identifying and then bringing about the conditions for hegemony, as conservatives have long understood’ (ibid.). This implies an essentially pragmatic element to statecraft that inherently benefitted the Conservatives when compared to the ideological factions and tendencies of the Labour Party, leading to the long-standing reputation for the Conservatives as the so-called natural party of government.2 The intellectual value of statecraft has also been demonstrated by its prior use as a theoretical framework to evaluate governing competence in other places. For example, Gamble employed the model in his evaluations of effective leadership, whereby he argued that ‘the object of Tory statecraft has always been to ensure that a durable hegemony is achieved and preserved through the institutions of state and civil society. 2 Richard Rose (1964) historically notes that the Conservative Party is a party of nonaligned tendencies of changing allegiances from the Parliamentary Party, which lacked the ideological cohesion of the Labour Party.

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Hegemony involves politics, ideology and economics, which is why the agents of hegemony, and the framers of political projects, are generally political parties’ (Gamble, 1988: 141). This enabled Gamble to evaluate the success (and deficiencies) of the Thatcher administration sufficiently to argue that whilst the perception may exist of Thatcher as an ideologically-driven political figure dominating commentary, in actuality ‘Thatcherism never did subordinate statecraft to ideology’ and that ‘it simply had a different view of statecraft’ (ibid.). This is to mean that Thatcher’s government was able to demonstrate effective statecraft through alternative demonstrations of competence relative to her predecessors or successors. Richard Hayton (2021) also used the statecraft model to examine the leadership of Boris Johnson with particular focus on the Union and the challenges posed by the SNP in retaining the UK as a cohesive union. He argues that the Union has ‘important implications for the Conservatives’ territorial statecraft, which traditionally had prioritised the defence of the Union above all else’ (Hayton, 2021). Thus, contrary to perception, the intellectual benefits of statecraft conceptually enable conclusions to be drawn that may subvert expectations or wider commentator narratives. This presents a valuable opportunity to test the framework in another contexts, namely in the case of this volume, the utilisation of statecraft as a theoretical framework that might enable authors to draw conclusions on topics that subvert the orthodox conclusions about Theresa May. Put simply, might there be more to the May leadership and might she still be considered a successful leader? Or might statecraft prove existing conclusions of governing degeneration through the presentation of new insights via the statecraft framework? Succinctly, these questions are put forward as the rationale for the volume, which each chapter will address using evidence drawn from a range of relevant sources.

Structure of the Volume The aim of this book is to make the case for examining the leadership of the May premiership from a transitional perspective. As discussed above, each chapter uses statecraft as a theoretical framework to evaluate May’s leadership over a range of relevant topics and concepts. To do this, we have split the book into three distinctive sections, each covering relevant aspects of the May leadership and the challenges she faced. Part one of the book—Electoral Issues —is concerned with how

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May secured an electoral mandate. In this section, Chapter 1 by Timothy Heppell and Oliver Booth asks how May was able to secure the mandate to lead the Conservative Party in 2016 following the resignation of her immediate predecessor, David Cameron. Chapter 2 by Andrew S. RoeCrines and John-Paul Salter follows this by discussing her wider electoral performance in the 2017 general election. Put simply, what seemed to be a likely victory for the Conservatives led to a reduction in the number of MPs because of her campaigning failures, thereby representing a defeat for her intentions. The section is then concluded by William Coles who writes about her fractious relationship between May and media for Chapter 3. The second section then goes beyond electoral performance to consider and analyse her record of Policy Implementation. Here, Anthony Costello opens the section with Chapter 4 on one of the most dominant features of her premiership, Brexit policy. Linked to this, but distinct in focus is the issue of foreign policy, which Peter Kerr and Kate Berry discuss in Chapter 5. Simon Lee then discusses the vital importance of economic policy and the approaches she and her wider government adopted for Chapter 6. Daniel Bowman then critically and astutely discusses her record on the important issue of mental health policy for Chapter 7. This is then followed by Daniel Pitt who then evaluates May and her attitudes towards environmental policy for Chapter 8. This is then followed by Catherine McGlynn and Shaun McDaid for Chapter 9 on the divisive issues in Northern Ireland and how May needed to work with parties to function in the post-2017 general election contexts. This is then followed with the concluding chapter for the section on the difficulties faced by May and race relations, written by Peter Woodcock. The third and final section then looks at Political Debates. These debates concern themselves mostly by ideology, theory, and conceptions of conservatism. For these discussions, Peter Dorey opens the section by looking at May’s political ideology for Chapter 11, which is then followed by Eunice Goes on the wider issues of how May continued the process of modernising conservatism for Chapter 12. Chapter 13 examines May’s leadership style by Kevin Theakston, which invokes the memory of Thatcher as an archetypal conservative leader. This is then followed by Rebecca Wray’s examination of May’s feminism for Chapter 14. Richard Johnson then continues the discussions with Chapter 15 scrutinising May and LGBTQ policy, which is then followed by Andrew Barclay who considers May and religion for Chapter 16. The Lord Norton then discusses the vital issue of May and the Constitution for Chapter 17. The

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section then discusses the psychology of identity politics and Theresa May with Harry Fletcher’s Chapter 18, ahead of concluding the volume with Antony Mullen’s reflective evaluation of May’s Cabinet and overall party management style for Chapter 19. By structuring the collection around the statecraft model, the collection is then able to reach certain conclusions about whether May’s leadership can be considered a success. The evidence presented in the chapters and the overall conclusions of the model will be considered by the editors, David Jeffery and Andrew S. Roe-Crines, who argue in the conclusion that there is evidence to suggest May’s premiership was a mixture of moments of success and moments of failure. It is those moments of failure that are frequently used when May’s record is invoked in political commentary; however, there are sufficient successes as identified through Bulpitt’s model to conclude she enjoyed moments of victory (although frequently drowned out by the media focus on Brexit). Therefore, we shall conclude that the volume presents a more complete and comprehensive evaluation of her time as Prime Minister compared to existing literature, and that as a model, statecraft has once again proven valuable as a theoretical framework.

References Buller, J., & James, T. (2012). Statecraft and the assessment of national political leaders: The case of new labour and Tony Blair. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 14(4), 534–555. Buller, J. (1999). A critical appraisal of the statecraft interpretation. Public Administration, 77 (4), 691–712. Buller, J. (2000). National statecraft and European integration: The conservative government and the European Union 1979–97 . Pinter. Bulpitt, J. (1986). The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s domestic statecraft. Political Studies, 34(1), 19–39. Gamble, A. (1988). The free economy and the strong state: The politics of thatcherism. Macmillan. Hayton, R. (2021). Conservative party statecraft and the Johnson government. Political Quarterly, 92(3), 412–419. Hickson, K. (2005). Inequality. In K. Hickson (ed.), The political thought of the conservative party since 1945. Palgrave. Marsh, D. (2012). British politics: A view from afar. British Politics, 7 (1), 43–54.

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Roe-Crines, A. (2022). The degenerative tendencies of long-serving governments… 1963… 1996… 2009… the conservatives in 2022? Political Quarterly, 93(2), 336–341. Rose, R. (1964). Parties, tendencies and factions. Political Studies, 12(1), 33–46. Taylor, A. (2005) Economic statecraft. In K. Hickson (ed.), The political thought of the conservative party since 1945. Palgrave. Stevens, C. (2002). Thatcherism, majorism and the collapse of Tory statecraft. Contemporary British History, 16(1), 119–150.

PART I

Electoral Issues

CHAPTER 2

The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2016 Timothy Heppell and Oliver Booth

Introduction Just before the General Election of 2015, David Cameron announced that, if elected, he would not seek a third term as Prime Minister (Cameron, 2019: 567–568). However, he was not making these plans from a secure position. The opinion polling evidence going into the campaigning period was inconclusive, and with the gap between the Conservatives and the Labour Party inside the margin for error, most political pundits were anticipating a hung Parliament (Cowley & Kavanagh, 2016: 16, 162). Cameron knew that there was a strong possibility that he would be leaving Downing Street and his memoirs reveal the preparations that were being made to deliver his resignation speech (Cameron, 2019: 575).

T. Heppell (B) · O. Booth School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_2

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Cameron did not need to deliver that resignation speech, as the Conservatives increased their vote from the General Election of 2010, going from 10,703,654 to 11,334,576 votes and increasing their parliamentary representation from 307 to 331 seats (Bale and Webb, 2015). Not only had Cameron secured the first parliamentary majority for the Conservatives since the General Election of 1992, but the gap between the Conservatives and the Labour Party had widened. The Conservatives had nearly 100 more seats, as the Labour Party saw their representation fall from 258 to 232 sears (Fielding, 2015). The gains that the Conservatives made were predominantly at the expense of the Liberal Democrats, who saw their representation collapse from 57 seats to just eight (Cutts & Russell, 2015). Many Conservatives felt that this freed Cameron from the shackles of coalition, providing the overall parliamentary majority that had been denied to them at the General Election of 2010 (Dorey, 2010; for Conservative views on the coalition, see Bale & Webb, 2016). Yet, being a majority administration, and one with a small majority of only twelve seats, actually created political problems for Cameron. When in coalition, he could imply that coalition necessitated compromise, as means to explain away decisions that he had made that upset some on the Conservative backbenchers (Bennister & Heffernan, 2015). As a majority administration that option was removed, placing him at the mercy of a phalanx of rebellious hard Eurosceptic backbenchers (on the 2010–2015 rebellions see Cowley et al., 2016). They formed part of the European conundrum that Cameron was struggling to resolve—i.e., how to construct an approach to European policy that was simultaneously popular with voters; unifying in terms of his own party; and credible as a governing approach (Lynch, 2015; Lynch & Whittaker, 2013a). The scale of Euroscepticism amongst his own parliamentary ranks would increase during his leadership tenure (Heppell et al., 2017: 764–768; see also Heppell, 2019: 121–2). This was in part caused by the fact that the Conservatives were facing increasing electoral competition in the shape of UKIP (Lynch & Whittaker, 2013b; Webb & Bale, 2014). UKIP exploited the issue of immigration as the means by which to fuel voter dissatisfaction about freedom of movement (they blamed EU immigrant workers as the cause of lower wages and increased unemployment) and the inability of the UK government—or specifically Cameron—to address this issue whilst inside the EU (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015).

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Cameron needed a way to nullify UKIP by resolving the debate about membership of the EU. By 2013, he rationalised that the road map out of this conundrum for him—not as Prime Minister in relation to a national problem, but as leader of the Conservative Party in what was a party problem—was to (a) renegotiate the terms of continued membership, but to do so after winning the next General Election; (b) win that General Election, with the promise of a referendum designed to disincentive voters from supporting UKIP; and (c) secure support for the renegotiated terms of membership in an in–out referendum. It was a strategy fraught with risks (Glencross, 2015). Winning the General Election of 2015 ensured that Cameron had to deliver upon his referendum commitment. His primary short-term difficulty was securing enough concessions from the EU when negotiating the new terms of membership. The concessions that he did secure were deemed to be insufficient in terms of altering the mindset of committed Eurosceptics1 (Curtice, 2017). Presenting those new terms for membership to the electorate in the referendum of June 2016 was then made more problematic by the following three factors. First, the scale of leave sentiment within his own parliamentary ranks and the willingness of high-profile Conservatives—e.g., the London Mayor, Boris Johnson, and Cabinet member, Michael Gove—to embrace the Brexit cause (Cameron having suspended collective Cabinet responsibility) (Heppell et al, 2017; Lynch & Whittaker, 2018). Second, the tone of print media coverage and the extent to which they displayed a bias in favour of leave (Moore & Ramsay, 2017). Third, the mistakes made by the cross-party ‘remain’ campaign. They continued to focus on the economic risks, assuming that these would trump the ‘leave’ campaign focus on immigration controls and the costs associated with continued membership. However, research would identify how the latter two issues proved to be the main motivators for those who voted leave (Hobolt, 2016: 1263). The subsequent decision by the electorate to vote to leave the EU, secured on the back of 17,410,742 votes (51.9%), to remain on 48.1

1 Cameron secured the following in terms of his renegotiations on the terms of future

membership. First, that should the decision to remain be confirmed then there would be an opt out from the commitment towards ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. Second, a four-year delay would be introduced before EU nationals working in the UK could qualify for in work benefits. Third, a move towards aligning the child benefit arrangements for EU nationals entering the UK (Ford & Goodwin, 2017).

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percent (on 16,141,241), was at odds with the expectations of the opinion pollsters (Clarke et al., 2017; Glencross, 2016). The decision for Cameron was clear and obvious: he would have to resign (Cameron, 2019: 679–680). It would be for his successor as Conservative Party leader and the new Prime Minister to negotiate exiting the EU. Such was his confidence that remain would win the referendum vote, his administration had engaged in only limited contingency planning for leave being the outcome (Hayton, 2018).

Explaining the Election Process: Rules, Candidates and Ballots This section of the chapter will consider the following three issues: first, the rules for selecting the leader of the Conservative Party; second, the candidates (and non-candidates) in the race to succeed Cameron; and finally, an overview of the eliminative parliamentary ballots. The rules used for the Conservative Party leadership election of 2016 were constructed in the aftermath of the General Election of 1997, as their newly elected leader, William Hague, hoped that the democratisation of leadership selection2 could be seen as part of a wider modernisation project (Hayton, 2012: 40–58; on how and why Hague was selected to replace Major see Alderman, 1998; Heppell & Hill, 2008). The new process had two stages. Stage one would involve parliamentary ballots, as long as more than two candidates put themselves forward, in which the parliamentarians would vote to determine the leading two candidates. If there were three candidates, this would involve one parliamentary ballot. If there were more than three candidates, it would involve multiple ballots. Stage two would be a one-member, one-vote (OMOV) ballot, in which the membership could select their preference from the two candidates presented to them by the parliamentarians (Alderman, 1999). This represented a form of partial rather than full democratisation. That is because the membership could only select from candidates that had been screened by the parliamentarians, and as such, it was possible for them to be denied the opportunity to select their preferred candidate if they were not popular enough with parliamentarians. It was also possible for the 2 On the rules, we need to acknowledge that the means by which the Conservative Party have selected their leaders have evolved and changed over time—for a discussion on the history of their leadership selections and rules, see Denham et al., 2020: 5–128.

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membership to be completely bypassed if only one candidate stood—as was the case with Michael Howard in late 2003 (Denham et al., 2020: 99). The new procedures also amended the means by which the party leader could be removed. Rather than retaining the challenger provision, the new rules introduced a confidence motion procedure (Quinn, 2012: 97– 130). This could occur at any time providing that fifteen percent of Conservative parliamentarians had confirmed that they wanted a ballot to determine whether the incumbent party leader continued to hold the confidence of the parliamentary party. This procedure again emphasised the limits to the role of the party members—they were permitted to select the party leader from a choice of two candidates decided by the parliamentarians, but the decision to remove the party leader would remain with the parliamentarians (Denham et al., 2020: 99). To demonstrate that confidence was retained the incumbent needed to secure an overall majority within the parliamentary party, and if this was secured, then no further confidence motions could be activated in the next twelve months. Should the incumbent fail to secure a majority that the party leadership became vacant and the defeated incumbent would be barred from seeking that vacancy. Since its inception, the confidence motion has been successfully used to remove Iain Duncan Smith from the party leadership in late 2003 (Hayton and Heppell, 2010). A confidence motion would be activated against May in December 2018, but she would defeat this attempt to remove her by 200 to 117 votes (Roe-Crines et al., 2021). Johnson would also survive a confidence motion against him in June 2022—by 211 to 148—although mass resignations from within his ministerial ranks (62 in total including his Chancellor, Rishi Sunak) would force him to step down weeks later (Booth et al., 2023). The confidence motion would have been a factor in the decision of Cameron to resign the party leadership in June 2016. He would have known that had he attempted to remain in post, and lead the negotiations for exiting the EU, then it was highly probable that an attempt to unseat him via the confidence motion procedure would have ensued. Having made his decision to step down in late June, the timetable for electing his successor was clear. Stage one would see the parliamentary ballots set for completion by early July. This would be followed by stage two, which was a two-month-long membership campaign, with the successor to Cameron announced in early September (Denham et al., 2020: 109).

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Having identified the rules for the succession contest, we can now turn our attention to the potential candidates. With the exception of Cameron, the most influential Conservative during their time in office was his Chancellor, George Osborne, a fellow moderniser. Although Osborne had leadership aspirations, his prospects were tied to those of Cameron. He had campaigned for remain, and as such, his road map to winning the party leadership was based on remaining in the EU, establishing himself as the heir apparent who could then succeed in the latter stages of the Parliament, when Cameron did step down. Having argued about the calamitous economic risks associated with leaving the EU, during the referendum campaign, it made the prospect of him replacing Cameron a complete non-starter (Seldon & Newell, 2019: 31–32). With Osborne eliminated as a viable candidate, the main focus was on May and Johnson (Quinn, 2019: 66). May, like Osborne, had been in office since the Conservatives had regained power in May 2010, serving throughout as Home Secretary (Seldon & Newell, 2019: 3–30). Given the breadth of issues that her office embraced—ranging from policing and prisons, immigration, national security and counter-terrorism—plus the fact that it constituted one of the three great offices of state, she had acquired a relatively high public profile over the preceding six years (Denham et al., 2020: 110). May had maintained, however, a deliberately low profile during the referendum campaign, officially aligning herself to the campaign to remain within the EU, but doing so with limited enthusiasm (Seldon & Newell, 2019: 27–30). She rationalised that she was the best option for the Conservatives as a). she was the candidate who could unify the party and the country, as her campaign team set about presenting her reluctant remain position as an advantage (Allen, 2018: 107), and b). she could offer a new post-Cameron agenda, based upon the classic ideological tradition of One Nation Conservatism, in which she would advance a programme of social reform to tackle what she described as ‘burning injustices’ (Atkins & Gaffney, 2020: 298; see also Hickson et al., 2020). If May was the insider candidate, who embraced remain (albeit it tentatively), then it was assumed that her main rival would be Johnson, the outsider candidate who had campaigned to leave. Johnson had no Cabinet experience and had only just returned to Parliament at the 2015 General Election, as the second term of his tenure as London Mayor (2018– 2016) drew to a close. In anticipation of this, the May campaign was placing a particular focus on securing the support of what were known

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as the ‘stop Boris’ parliamentarians (Seldon & Newell, 2019: 31; on the Johnson campaign, see Bower, 2020: 232–241; 279–293). What scuppered the Johnson campaign was to be the intervention of Gove, his fellow Brexiteer. They initially constructed a deal in which in return for his support Gove would be appointed as Chancellor of the Exchequer (Seldon & Newell, 2019: 33). However, in a fastmoving situation Gove moved from publicly backing Johnson to publicly condemning him. With Johnson unable to secure the endorsement of the Energy Minister, Andrea Leadsom, a fellow Brexiteer, Gove began to waiver (Seldon & Newell, 2019: 33). Gove now rationalised that not only did he have doubts about the temperament and character of his leave ally, Johnson, but he felt that the former London Mayor lacked unifying capability. Having abandoned Johnson, he decided, with only hours to go before the deadline for nominations, that he would stand for the vacant party leadership himself, prompting Johnson to abandon his campaign (Bower, 2020: 279–293). Advocates of Gove would seek to present his decision to abandon Johnson as an indication that he was courageous, but what he succeeded in doing was increase doubts about his loyalty: having abandoned Cameron on the issue of Brexit, he had now abandoned Johnson on the party leadership (Cameron, 2019: 687). With Osborne and Johnson sitting the leadership election out, the expectation became that the choice would eventually be May versus Gove, after the parliamentary ballots eliminated other fringe candidates. In the absence of Johnson, Gove was indeed the most high-profile leave advocate, having served as both Education Secretary (2010–2014) and Justice Secretary (2015–) with a short-term period as Chief Whip between these two roles. But two other candidates on the leave wing of the parliamentary party had decided to stand. Having been eliminated in the parliamentary ballot stages of the 2005 Conservative Party leadership election, Liam Fox decided to contest the leadership once more (Fox finished third on 51 votes, behind David Davis on 57 votes and Cameron on 90 votes and was thus eliminated, see Denham & Dorey, 2006). However, his reputation had been damaged by his breaching of the ministerial code, which required that he resign as Defence Secretary only one year into the coalition. Whilst Fox had been languishing on the backbenchers, the aforementioned Leadsom, first elected in 2010, had begun to climb the ministerial ladder, although it did smack of over-reach for her to seek the party leadership and the Prime Ministership, directly from Minister of State level, rather than from the Cabinet (Quinn, 2019:

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Table 2.1 The Parliamentary Ballots First Ballot (5 July 2016)

Second Ballot (7 July 2016)

Candidate

Votes

Percentage

Theresa May Andrea Leadsom Michael Gove Stephen Crabb Liam Fox

165 66 48 34 16 329

50.2 20.1 14.6 10.3 4.9

Votes 199 84 46 Withdrew Eliminated 329

Percentage 60.5 25.5 14.0

Source Quinn (2019: 68)

66). Alongside Fox and Leadsom, May and Gove would be joined by Stephen Crabb, who was a remainer. Although Crabb was a member of the Cabinet, he remained relatively low profile, and few expected that he had much chance of making an impact (Denham et al., 2020: 109) (Table 2.1). The first parliamentary ballot resulted in the automatic elimination of the lowest placed candidate, which was Fox with only 16 votes or 4.9% of all parliamentarians. Under the leadership election procedures, the fourth placed candidate, Crabb, was permitted to proceed to the next eliminative ballot. However, having secured only 34 votes, or 10.3%, Crabb withdrew and pledged his support for May. This meant that the second eliminative ballot would have only three candidates, making it the final eliminative ballot, as the leading two for this ballot would be the two who would proceed to the party membership stage (Quinn, 2019: 66– 69). Against expectations, Leadsom had performed better than Gove. She secured 66 votes (20.1%) to Gove on 48 votes (14.6%) but, even if both their votes were combined (114 or 34.7 percent), they were still a considerable distance behind May on 165 votes or 50.2%. The eliminated votes from the first parliamentary ballot (those who voted Crabb or Fox) were more likely to switch to May. If remain-leave sentiment was a significant influence of choice, then the elimination of Fox freed upon 16 votes for Leadsom and Gove to contest, whilst the freed up Crabb vote base of 34 was more likely to switch to May, than Leadsom or Gove (Denham et al, 2020: 109–111).

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In the second parliamentary ballot, May increased her vote from 165 to 199, and her increase of 34 votes coincided with the votes that had been cast for Crabb in the first parliamentary ballot. This meant that May had the support of 60.5 percent of her fellow parliamentarians as she proceeded to the membership ballot stage. Leadsom increased her vote by 18 votes as she moved from 66 to 84 supporters, an increase two greater than the number of freed up Fox supporters (16), leaving her on 25.5 percent of the parliamentary party. Gove, meanwhile, saw his support base contract from 48 to 46 supporters, and with only 14 percent of the parliamentary party supporting him, he finished last in a three-way eliminative ballot, meaning that Leadsom joined May in the membership ballot (Denham et al., 2020: 111). The gap that existed between May and Leadsom amongst parliamentarians was large—at 115 votes and 35.0 percent—but in a procedural sense it was not actually significant. Procedurally, the role of parliamentarians was to select the best two candidates, and then, the decision was placed in the hands of the membership. If they wanted to ignore the cue3 given to them to select May by their parliamentarians, that was in their power and the fact that the membership was disproportionately leave, whereas the parliamentary party titled towards remain (just), then this could have made Leadsom an attractive candidate to them (Jeffery et al., 2018: 264). However, Leadsom would withdraw her candidacy, leaving May as the only remaining candidate and thus invalidating the need to run a membership ballot. That decision embraced a political rather than a procedural calculation. Although procedurally Leadsom could win, many Conservatives were worried about whether politically this would be viable. That lack of enthusiasm for her candidacy from her colleagues stemmed from the fact that it could replicate Jeremy Corbyn’s ‘dysfunctional relationship’ (Crines et al., 2018: 362) with his own Labour parliamentarians, which had dominated media narratives and impeded effective opposition since his unexpected leadership contest victory in 2015 (see Dorey & 3 The scale of support that the leading two candidates could secure before presenting themselves to the party membership is deemed to be important, as it might influence the choice of those participating in the membership ballot. If a member was unsure on who to support as they are unsure about a candidate’s political competence or electoral appeal, then who endorses that candidate might matter—i.e., if someone a member trusts backs a candidate, then this can act as voting heuristic (for a discussion on endorsements, see Kousser et al, 2015).

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Denham, 2016). It would have also been clear to Leadsom that trailing so far behind May throughout the parliamentary ballots would, had she won the membership ballot and became leader, have left her with the unenviable challenge of uniting a fractious and volatile PCP that overwhelmingly supported another candidate (see also Jeffrey et al., 2018). Moreover, as the chapter will go onto to discuss the opinion polling evidence from the party members did not provide Leadsom with enough evidence to suggest that she was likely to win the membership ballot anyway (Denham et al., 2020: 109–111).

Explaining the Election Outcome: Acceptability, Electability and Competence To explain the election outcome in more detail, this section of the chapter will position the Conservative Party leadership election of 2016 within the context of the Stark model on leadership selection. Writing on the history of leadership selection in 1996, Stark argued that voters in leadership elections—be they parliamentarians or members—are motivated by the objective of securing governmental power on the basis on electoral success (Stark, 1996). As such, they are guided by the following strategic needs. First, they need their party to be unified—acceptability matters, so that means that from within the candidates available to them, they will reject divisive candidates. Second, they need their party to maximise its vote base—electability matters, so that means that they may be influenced by the short-term opinion polling data that emerges within a party leadership campaign on the electoral appeal of the candidates. Third, they need to select a candidate capable of being Prime Minister—competence matters, so they will be factoring in perceptions in relation to political skills, be they administrative skills (how effective are they at decisionmaking), negotiating skills (can they think tactically and strategically), and communication skills (do they excel at parliamentary debate and how effective are they as media performers?) (Stark, 1996: 125–126; see also Quinn, 2012: 159–164). To assess how the respective candidates for the Conservative Party leadership compare against the Stark criteria demands that we focus on the evidence from opinion polling data. Table two provides a general overview of the trends working in favour of May, relative to Leadsom and Gove.

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On acceptability, the issue of Brexit was assumed to be dominant. Following victory for the leave side in the European Union referendum, we might expect Conservative members (who were predominantly Eurosceptic) to support a candidate from the leave wing of the party (for a discussion on the views of Conservative party members, see Bale et al., 2019: 66–68). Leadsom, whilst not a particularly prominent figure for the leave side, ought to have been well placed in a fight against May (who supported remain) for the votes of the members. However, whether we focus on stage one—the parliamentarians, or stage two—the membership, the following factors clearly emerged. The appeal of May was stronger amongst remain parliamentarians and members, than it was amongst leave parliamentarians and members. The appeal of Leadsom went the opposite way. Critically, however, May was significantly more attractive to leave Conservatives than Leadsom was to remain Conservatives. To demonstrate this, we can note the following from the final parliamentary ballot. Jeffery et al. (2018) estimated that of those who voted leave, 48.0% voted for Leadsom; 34.7% backed May and 16.5 percent voted for Gove (with 0.8% unknown). Conversely, whilst May secured 91 percent of remain voters, Leadsom was only on 3.9 percent and Gove on 5.1 percent (Jeffery et al., 2018: 275). Amongst parliamentarians, May was clearly the more acceptable candidate. This sentiment was reinforced from the opinion polling of the membership. The importance of uniting the party was demonstrated by YouGov (2016a) polling (from 5 July 2016). This showed that 65 percent of party members believed that the winning candidate’s ability to unite the party was important, and only competence was seen as more important, at 74%. May did well to realise that her support for remain would place her at a disadvantage in a ballot of the members and so she sought to unite the party by neutralising the issue. She did this by declaring that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and promising to implement the result of the referendum (Cowburn, 2016; see also Allen, 2018). The success of this strategy came at Leadsom’s expense: 61 percent of members said that May would be best able to unite the Conservatives ahead of 17 percent who said Leadsom (as shown in Table 2.2). When we break this down into the leave/remain divide, we see 53 percent of leave-supporting members and 79 percent of remainsupporting members say that May was best placed to unite the party. Leadsom polled just 25 percent and 3 percent, respectively. Leadsom’s inability to unite the party can be seen in polling on a hypothetical run-off

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Table 2.2 Conservative Party members and the stark criteria (May-LeadsomGove) Candidate who would be…

May

Leadsom

Gove

Don’t know

…. …. …. …. ….

61 51 63 44 36

17 12 14 25 24

3 13 3 16 9

19 24 20 15 31

able to unite the party win the next General Election the strongest leader able to negotiate Brexit the best media performer (Competence)

Source: YouGov, 2016a

scenario between May and Leadsom, with 49 percent of leave-supporting members and 92 percent of remain-supporting members saying that they would vote for May, compared to 45 percent and 4 percent, respectively, for Leadsom (YouGov, 2016a). With May slightly leading Leadsom in what had been presumed to be the latter’s base of leave supporters, and leading strongly amongst remain supporters, Leadsom’s inferior crossparty appeal confirms her failure on Stark’s first criteria of unity amongst both Conservative parliamentarians and party members. In addition to being seen as the best candidate in terms of acceptability (or unifying ability), May was also viewed as being stronger than Leadsom in terms of her electability. As table two demonstrates when offered a three-way choice between May, Leadsom and Gove, members clearly viewed her as electorally more appealing—51 percent for May, 12 percent for Leadsom, 13 percent for Gove, with 24 percent selecting don’t know as their preference (YouGov, 2016a). This perception that May was the strongest candidate in terms of electioneering is, of course, intriguing given subsequent events and the criticism of her performance in the General Election of 20174 (Bale & Webb, 2018). On this, Quinn 4 This perception is held due to the loss of their parliamentary majority at the General Election of 2017 meaning that they only remained in office as a minority administration, propped up by a confidence and supply arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party. It is also held due to the erosion of the Conservatives’ very large lead in the opinion polls between the start and end of the General Election campaign of 2017—YouGov had them ahead by 24 percentage points (48 to 24 percent for Labour) at the beginning of the campaign in mid-to-late April, but their final poll left the Conservatives with a lead of only seven percent (42 to 25 percent for Labour). However, it is worth noting that despite their weaker than expected performance in parliamentary terms, the Conservatives

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suggests that the membership may have placed a reduced emphasis on electability as they did not see the Labour Party as an electoral threat. Their perception that Corbyn did not constitute a credible alternative Prime Minister, and the poor opinion polling ratings that he was in receipt of, may have meant that they were prioritising their governmental considerations—i.e., which of the candidates would make the best Prime Minister—over concerns about losing office (Heppell and McMeeking, 2021). On perceptions of competence, we can note the following from the opinion polling data—see table two. On anticipated skills at negotiating an exit from the EU, she was identified as the best of the three candidates—on 44 percent, she led over Leadsom on 25 percent and Gove on 16 percent (with 15 percent undecided), and she also had a lead in terms of being a media performer—on 36 percent, as comparted to Leadsom on 24 percent and Gove on 9 percent (with 31 percent undecided) (YouGov, 2016a). The weakness of Leadsom as a candidate had already been identified by earlier YouGov polling, before the parliamentary ballots were held, and perhaps the Conservative membership would have taken this as a cue had Leadsom proceeded to the membership ballot. The wider electorate was asked, from a full field of potential candidates, who they thought would make the best Prime Minister. May came out on top with 19 percent, Johnson came second with 18 percent and Leadsom polled just 1 percent. If we break this down into party allegiances, Leadsom fared marginally better amongst voters intending to vote for UKIP (3 percent said Leadsom was the best candidate) and for the Liberal Democrats (2 percent) than amongst those intending to vote for Labour and the Conservatives (1 percent each). Critically, amongst all genders, ages, social grades, and regions, Leadsom polled badly—between 1 and 2 percent of voters in each category said that she would make the best Prime Minister (YouGov, 2016b). Already suffering from weak opinion polling evidence, relative to May, Leadsom that undermined her prospects by two significant mistakes that she made during the campaigning period, and which raised doubts about her suitability. First, a former banking colleague of Leadsom publicly disputed her CV, saying in a Channel 4 interview that instead of the did see their vote increase by 2.3 million and 5.5 percent relative to the General Election of 2015, and their 13.6 million votes, on a 42.4 vote share, was their best performance in twenty-five years since the General Election of 1992 (Bale and Webb, 2018).

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senior investment management role she claimed to have held she was in fact a more junior administrative employee (Mickelthwaite, 2016). This was wounding to Leadsom, as she had relied heavily on her banking experience to lend her authority as a leadership figure, as in the case of her criticism of the interventions made by the remain-supporting Mark Carney (Governor of the Bank of England) in the EU referendum campaign (Arnold & Binham, 2016). Thereafter, Leadsom stuck to her guns, but the damage to her integrity was done, with newspapers creating a narrative that she was untrustworthy—see Nagesh, 2016, and Kenber and Wilson, 2016, as examples. Second, comments Leadsom made later that week in an interview with The Times further damaged her reputation, with her claim that she would make a better Prime Minister than the childless May because she ‘has children who will directly be a part of what happens next’ being heavily criticised5 (Coates & Sylvester, 2016). Senior Conservative MP, Alan Duncan, described her comments as ‘vile’ and former Scottish Conservative leader Ruth Davidson concluded that there was a ‘gulf’ in ‘class’ between Leadsom and May (BBC News, 2016). Seeing the triumph of May through the lens of the weaknesses of Leadsom is a helpful way of understanding the fight to succeed Cameron. In Leadsom, we see a candidate who fails on each the Stark criteria: the ballots of Conservative MPs show that she was unwanted in the parliamentary party and polling shows that she was unpopular amongst party members, whilst polling of the public suggested little electoral reward for the Conservatives if they were to choose her, and news reports emerged that cast doubt on her competence. Leadsom was probably rather astonished to find herself in the final two of the leadership election, after higher status candidates from the Brexit wing of the Conservative Party such as Johnson and Gove imploded, but after a cool reception and self-enforced errors, she dropped out of the leadership contest, leaving May to be coronated. Overall, we can argue that this result reaffirms the relevance of the Stark criteria to our understanding of leadership contests.

5 For wider analysis on the role of parenthood within leadership elections, see the work of Smith, 2018.

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Conclusion The Conservative Party leadership election of 2016 was only the fourth party leadership transition to be completed under the 1998 rules, but it was the first to be completed when in office. It also took place in the most tumultuous of circumstances, coming as it did in the immediate aftermath of the European referendum result. It produced a speedy outcome, as only part of the two-stage succession process was completed—i.e., the parliamentary ballot stage. When we consider the final eliminative parliamentary ballot—and the cue that it gave to the members (and indeed to Leadsom)—it is clear that May had secured a clear mandate from her parliamentary colleagues. Her return was larger than that secured by any other leader when winning the party leader for first time—i.e., if we discount the re-elections of Thatcher in 1989 and Major in 1995. As table six demonstrates, her 60.5 percent mandate bettered that of Heath (50.4 percent); Thatcher (52.9 percent); Major (49.7 percent); Hague (55.3 percent); Duncan Smith (32.5 percent); and Cameron (45.4 percent) (and it also bettered that secured by Johnson three years later on 51.3 percent). Of these first-time winners, she also had the largest gap between herself and the second placed candidate—at 35 percent—confirming the legitimacy that the parliamentarians had conferred upon her (Heath won with a gap of 5.8 percent; Thatcher 24.3 percent; Major 14.2 percent; Hague 11.1 percent; Cameron 16.7 percent; and Johnson 26.4 percent6 (Quinn, 2012: 189–94; Quinn, 2019: 68; Jeffery et al., 2022). However, impressive though her parliamentary mandate was, two important observations can be made in relation to this: (1). The scale of her victory made May seem like a stronger candidate than she actually was, or, to put it another way, the weakness of the opposition masked her limitations. Cameron had not led a Cabinet of Conservative ‘heavyweights’ – and she was fortunate that Osborne was so damaged by having led the economic arguments against Brexit that he saw no point in

6 The final parliamentary ballot of the Conservative Party leadership election of 2001

was virtually a three-way split as Clarke came first and Duncan-Smith came second and proceeded to the membership ballot, but the third placed candidate, Michael Portillo, was only one vote behind Duncan Smith (on 53 votes) and only six behind Clarke. For a discussion on how and why Duncan Smith won the 2001 Conservative Party leadership election, see Alderman and Carter, 2002; Heppell and Hill, 2010.

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standing. She was also fortunate the other credible remain candidates with Cabinet experience – for example, Jeremy Hunt – decided not to stand, and backed her. This meant that the majority remain faction within the parliamentary party had a choice of two – her or Crabb – whilst the leave wing was split between three options - Leadsom, Gove and Fox. Moreover, she benefitted from the ineptness with the leave faction. Johnson was the strongest of the leave candidates, so had the leave faction coalesced around him, and had Leadsom, Gove and Fox not stood, then it is conceivable that Johnson could have come have come a closer second to May then Leadsom did, thus making it easier to justify proceeding to the membership ballot. (2). It could be argued that proceeding to the membership ballot may have been beneficial to May. For example, a two-month campaign period would have provided May with more time to flesh out her post-Cameronite political agenda. Moreover, being exposed the pressure of two-month leadership campaign would have helped to hone her performative skills, be that in terms of set pieces speeches, interviews or engaging with voters (albeit campaigning to Conservative members in this case) (Atkins & Gaffney, 2020; see also Worthy and Bennister, 2021). Although these were lessons learnt by the Conservatives by the time of the Conservative Party leadership election of 2019 – when the membership stage was activated despite Johnson having a comfortable lead over Hunt – the primary lesson that Conservatives took was if the task in hand was to implement Brexit, then maybe it might be better to elect to the party leadership a Brexiteer.

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Denham, A., & Dorey, P. (2006). A tale of two speeches: The 2005 Conservative Leadership contest. Political Quarterly, 77 (1), 35–42. Denham, A., Dorey, P., & Roe-Crines, A. (2020). Choosing and removing British Party leaders. Manchester University Press. Dorey, P. (2010). Faltering before the finishing line: The Conservative Party’s performance in the 2010 General Election. British Politics, 5(4), 402–435. Dorey, P., & Denham, A. (2016). The longest suicide vote in history: The Labour Party leadership election of 2015. British Politics, 11(3), 259–282. Fielding, S. (2015). Hell no! Labour’s 2015 campaign. Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1), 54–69. Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2014). Revolt on the right. Explaining support for the radical right in Britain. Routledge. Ford, R., & Goodman, M. (2017). Britain after Brexit: A nation divided. Journal of Democracy, 28(1), 17–30. Glencross, A. (2015). Why a British referendum on EU membership will not solve the Europe question. International Affairs, 91(2), 303–317. Glencross, A. (2016) Why the UK voted for Brexit: David Cameron’s great miscalculation. Palgrave. Goodwin, M., & Milazzo, C. (2015). UKIP: Inside the campaign to redraw the map of British Politics. Oxford University Press. Hayton, R. (2012). Reconstructing conservatism? The Conservative Party in opposition 1997–2010. Manchester University Press. Hayton, R. (2018). British Conservatism and the vote for Brexit: The ideological legacy of David Cameron. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(1), 223–238. Hayton, R., & Heppell, T. (2010). The Quiet man of British politic: The rise, fall and significance of Iain Duncan Smith. Parliamentary Affairs, 63(2), 425– 445. Heppell, T. (2019). Cameron: The politics of modernisation and manipulation. Manchester University Press. Heppell, T., Crines, A., & Jeffrey, D. (2017). The United Kingdom referendum on European Union membership: The voting of Conservative parliamentarians. Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(4), 762–778. Heppell, T., & Hill, M. (2008). The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997: An analysis of the voting motivations of conservative parliamentarians. British Politics, 3(1), 63–91. Heppell, T., & Hill, M. (2010). The voting motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians in the Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2001. Politics, 30(1), 36–51. Heppell, T., & McMeeking, T. (2021). Corbyn and leadership satisfaction ratings. In A. Roe-Crines (Ed.), Corbynism in perspective: The labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. Newcastle.

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Hickson, K., Page, R., & Williams, B. (2020). Strangled at birth: The one nation ideology of Theresa May. Journal of Political Ideologies, 25(3), 334–350. Hobolt, S. (2016). The Brexit vote: A divided nation, a divided continent. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9), 1259–1277. Jeffery, D., Heppell, T., Hayton, R., & Crines, A. (2018). The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2016: An analysis of the voting motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians. Parliamentary Affairs, 71(2), 263–282. Jeffery, D., Heppell, T., & Roe-Crines, A. (2022). The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2019: An analysis of the voting motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians. Parliamentary Affairs, 75(1), 113–134. Kenber, B., & Wilson, H. (2016, July 6). Leadsom admits ‘misleading’ claims on CV for top job. The Times. Available online: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/art icle/leadsom-admits-misleading-claims-on-cv-for-top-job-n80lgc2rj [Accessed 20/05/2022] Kousser, T., Lucas, S., Masket, S., & McGhee, E. (2015). Kingmakers or cheerleaders? Party power and the causal effects of endorsements. Political Research Quarterly, 68(3), 443–456. Lynch, P. (2015). Conservative modernisation and European integration: From silence to salience and schism. British Politics, 10(2), 185–203. Lynch, P., & Whittaker, R. (2013a). Where this is discord can they bring harmony? Managing Intra-Party Dissent on European Integration in the Conservative Party. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15(3), 317–339. Lynch, P., & Whittaker, R. (2013b). Rivalry on the right: The Conservatives, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the EU issue. British Politics, 8(3), 285–312. Lynch, P., & Whittaker, R. (2018). All Brexiteers now? The Conservatives, Brexit and Party Change. British Politics, 13, 31–47. Mickelthwaite, J. (2016). Andrea Leadsom CV: Tory hopeful’s former colleague disputes claim MP was a banker. Evening Standard, 8 July, Available online: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/andrea-leadsom-cv-tory-hopeful-s-for mer-colleague-disputes-claim-mp-was-a-banker-a3291191.html. Accessed 13 June 2022. Moore, M., & Ramsay, G. (2017). UK media coverage of the 2016 EU Referendum Campaign. Centre for the Study of Media, Communication and Power. Nagesh, A. (2016, July 8). Andrea Leadsom was ‘part-time assistant, not banker’ says colleague. Metro. Available online: https://metro.co.uk/2016/07/08/ andrea-leadsom-was-part-time-assistant-not-banker-says-colleague-5994610/. Accessed 20 May 2022. Quinn, T. (2012) Electing and ejecting Party Leaders in Britain. Palgrave.

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Quinn, T. (2019). The Conservative Party’s Leadership Election of 2016: Choosing a leader in government. British Politics, 14(1), 63–85. Roe-Crines, A., Heppell, T., & Jeffery, D. (2021). Theresa May and the Conservative Party leadership confidence motion of 2018: Analysing the voting behaviour of Conservative Parliamentarians. British Politics, 16(3), 317–335. Seldon, A. and Newell, R. (2019) May at 10. Biteback. Smith, J. (2018). Politics and parenthood: An examination of UK Party Leadership Elections. Parliamentary Affairs, 71(1), 196–217. Stark, L. (1996). Choosing a leader: Party leadership contests in Britain from Macmillan to Blair. Macmillan. Webb, P., & Bale, T. (2014). Why do Tories defect to UKIP? Conservative Party members and the temptations of the populist radical right. Political Studies, 62(4), 961–970. Worthy, B., & Bennister, M. (2021). Dominance, defence and diminishing returns? Theresa May’s Leadership Capital July 2016–July 2018. British Politics YouGov. (2016a). Theresa May ahead of Leadsom in Conservative leadership race. Available online: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articlesreports/2016a/07/05/theresa-may-leads-conservative-leadership-race 5 July [Accessed 13/06/2022] YouGov. (2016b). Theresa May leads Boris Johnson amongst the general public. Available online: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/ 2016b/06/27/theresa-may-leads-boris-johnson-amongst-general-pu, 27 June [Accessed 13/06/2022]

CHAPTER 3

‘I’m not Going to Call a Snap Election’—Theresa May and the 2017 General Election Andrew S. Roe-Crines and John-Paul Salter

Introduction With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to argue that the 2017 general election was a strategic mistake, made even more startling because Theresa May herself had pledged not to go to the country during her campaign for the leadership of the Conservative Party. It was a mistake because—as May remarked—there was a need for stability after the 2016 Brexit referendum. It was this mistake which leads some to the conclusion that ‘the premiership of Theresa May was a failure’ (Marlow-Stevens & Hayton, 2021). Although it was not a mistake she alone made, it can be attributed to deficiencies in statecraft as well as wider problems of her strategic political judgement. Moreover, following the lengthy process of change of Prime Minister from David Cameron to May, an even more protracted period of political

A. S. Roe-Crines (B) · J.-P. Salter Department of Politics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_3

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uncertainty would be harmful to ‘UKplc’, the post-referendum responses, and the attempts to demonstrate to the troubled markets that the Conservatives had a grip on the vital levers of the economy. These were concerns that she shared, which she reflected on by commenting ‘I think we need that period of time, that stability, to be able to deal with the issues that the country is facing and have that election in 2020’ (May, 2016). To change course on such a clear and irrefutable position would call into question May’s consistency as a party leader and Prime Minister. Moreover, as is well noted in other places, there was no constitutional (or political) need for another election until May 2020 (Cowley & Kavanagh, 2018: 1–2). It was still relatively early in the Parliamentary term, with the majority holding and the clarity of the next vote secured by the Fixed Terms Parliament Act (FTPA). Indeed, given this Act, the decision to go to the country would not be hers alone. She could call for an election, but it was for Parliament to decide whether to permit it. As is well documented, the FTPA was designed to provide stability immediately after the 2010 general election, which produced a Coalition government between two major Westminster parties. Whilst after 2015 its role as a provider of stability was reduced given the majority, it still retained its power to compel the Prime Minister of the day to consult Parliament. Given David Cameron in 2015 had secured the first majority for the Conservatives to govern alone since 1992, the Conservatives were enjoying a period of much-needed confidence in office following the uncertainty of the Coalition years. As a consequence, there was no need to go back to the country to reaffirm an electoral verdict they had only recently delivered. In these circumstances, Theresa May was in a secure position with little prospect of being removed from office. Such a position raises the question ‘why did Theresa May make the mistake that she had campaigned to avoid in the run up to her succession as Conservative leader?’.

Why Did Theresa May Call for the 2017 General Election? In simple terms, the favourable political environment and increasing internal demands for another election compelled Theresa May to throw caution to the wind and risk the majority her predecessor secured only two years before. Pressures mounted from prominent internal sources, improving opinion polls suggesting an easy win against the Labour Party,

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convincing electoral performances (such as the 2017 local elections) that produced robust and confident results, and a general sense that Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party would be as easy to defeat for May in 2017 as Michael Foot’s Labour Party had been for Margaret Thatcher in 1983 (Heppell & McMeeking, 2021; Roe-Crines & Heppell, 2019). In combination, these represented favourable circumstances that appeared to benefit the Conservatives at a time when demonstration of electoral strength was vital in the negotiations with the European Union. In hindsight, we can characterise the decision to call the election a clear and avoidable mistake. However, on the surface, these positive factors came together to create what appeared to be an approaching opportunity to build on Cameron’s success in 2015 by increasing the Conservative majority. In the event of these results, she would be in a strong position in the House of Commons to ‘crush the saboteurs’ on the Labour, Liberal Democrat and SNP benches (Daily Mail, 2017), and have the benefit of pushing Labour even further away from power. The hope for the Conservatives was that a huge election defeat for Corbyn would intensify the civil war between the Labour leader and his own backbenchers. This aim was remarked upon by William (Lord) Hague, who noted that Labour had their ‘least credible leader ever’, thereby adding a strong voice and argument to the calls for an election (Hague, 2017). Hague’s argument joined other prominent voices adding increasingly unavoidable internal pressures. For example, David Davis and Philip Hammond each argued that May would need to seek her own mandate to strengthen her hand (Cowley & Kavanagh, 2018: 3). This would be a particularly significant issue given May became leader of the Conservative Party following a vote of MPs only, thereby avoiding the need to participate in a full campaign that included hustings. Put simply, voters had little idea who May was and why she was the most suitable person to lead the Conservatives. Finally, David Davis also noted that in the event the United Kingdom was ready to leave the European Union in 2019, then the Conservatives risked facing an immediate general election a few months later which would ‘clash awkwardly’ (ibid) with ongoing Brexit processes. With the increasing pressures on May to shift her position, the question of when the change of heart occurred is worth considering. This is because the circumstances around which her position shifted gives an indication of her motivations. However, as late as March 2017, May was still rejecting the idea of going to the country. Between then and 18 April, her position had changed to supporting a fresh general election. She

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announced her intention to call for an election on the steps of Number 10. For May, this would be a single issue, early election held under exceptional circumstances. It is worth remembering that ‘early elections and referendums are typically once-only options, taken in circumstances which need to be presented as exceptional’ (Bryan et al., 2021). This was also how the case for the election was to be sold to May. As mentioned, Hague was one of the loud voices in the crowd calling on May to seek her own mandate. In the run-up to the election being called, he argued that ‘we have a new Prime Minister and Cabinet facing the most complex challenges of modern times: Brexit negotiations, the Trump administration, the threat from Scottish nationalists’ and that ‘there is no doubt that they would be in a stronger position to take the country through these challenges successfully if they had a large and decisive majority in the Commons and a new full term ahead of them’ (Hague, 2017). This argument convinced many, with May’s resistance increasingly crumbling to the logic being put forward publicly. It was becoming increasingly difficult for May to ignore these arguments, especially as Hague was a respected voice in the Party. He had an impressive record in the Foreign Office between 2010 and 2014, overseeing British responses to the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, and the darker tone the protests subsequently took in Syria. Hague also stood in for the Prime Minister at PMQs when Cameron was unable to respond to questions from MPs, and he had himself acted as the former leader of the Party. Thus, Hague’s arguments carried credibility. Despite this, May remained defiant in her opposition to hold an election, which ultimately crumbled shortly after Hague’s interventions.

Making the Mistake In the event, May’s call for the election was publicly based on the hope of turning impressive and relatively consistent opinion polls into a stronger working Parliamentary majority so that she could pass any Brexit deal she may secure with the EU. Her justification for changing position and abandoning her opposition to an early poll was that an extensive opposition grouping in the Commons was allegedly working to jeopardise any attempt by the government to pass an eventual deal through the Commons, thereby threatening the Brexit process. Such strategies in the Commons needed to be overcome which could be done, she hoped, by going to the country.

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To explain this reversal of position, she argued that ‘the country is coming together but Westminster is not’ and that ‘in recent weeks Labour have threatened to vote against the final agreement we reach with the European Union, the Liberal Democrats have said they want to grind the business of government to a standstill, the SNP say they will vote against the legislation that formally repeals Britain’s membership of the European Union, and unelected members of the House of Lords have vowed to fight us every step of the way’ (May, 2017a). May’s characterisation of Parliament as a Remainer institution initiated a narrative that led prominent commentator and Leave campaigner, Darren Grimes, to later describe Westminster as simply a ‘Remainer Parliament’ (Grimes, 2019) alongside pressure groups arguing that a ‘corporate elite dominate Europe with little accountability’ (Traditional Britain Group, 2023). It was in this wider context of needing to change Parliament to enable Brexit that led May to shift her opposition to instead support an election. As mentioned earlier, however, the FTPA prevented May simply calling the election. Rather, she needed to pass a motion in Parliament which required the support of other parties. In the event, and with Labour’s support—Corbyn saying ‘Labour will be offering the country an effective alternative to a government that has failed to rebuild the economy, delivered falling living standards and damaging cuts to our schools and NHS’—the motion was passed by 522 votes (to 13 against), thereby clearing the way for the election May consistently has previously opposed to take place on 8 June 2017 (BBC, 2017). The precise moment when May made the decision to go to the country is unclear; however, Anthony Seldon (2019) suggests the ‘penny finally dropped’ with the passing of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, which has a ‘torturous time in both the Commons and the Lords’ ahead of gaining Royal Assent on 16 March (Seldon, 2019: 195–196). The difficulties May faced securing the passing of the Act with Cameron’s small majority convinced a Number 10 advisor that ‘it had become obvious that they would not be able to deliver their style of Brexit without a bigger majority’ (ibid.). Thus, the attempts to persuade May begun, putting the Conservatives onto the road to the election. The eventual results of the election tell their own story about whether it was the right strategic or political decision. Far from increasing the number of MPs Cameron won in 2015, the number of Conservative MPs went down by 13 (net) to 317, thereby costing May her slim majority. Meanwhile, Labour increased the number of MPs by 30 to 262, whilst

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the Remainer Liberal Democrats increased their number by 4 to 12 MPs (House of Commons Library, 2019). The election results also solidified Corbyn’s troubled position, who by increasing the number of Labour MPs subverted the expectation and attack-line that he would continue the backward slide Labour began in 2010. For May, the results locked her government into an impassable and locked Parliamentary arithmetic that made any attempt for May to pass a Brexit deal impossible. As noted by Allen (2018), ‘her failure to secure a majority in the 2017 general election gravely weakened her authority and the viability of her plans’ (Allen, 2018). With power now firmly resting with rebel groups and factions that cut across the Brexit spectrum of opinion, any permutation of a deal from ‘Hard’ to ‘Soft’ would be defeated by the Commons. On that measure, we can conclude that the decision to follow Hague’s advice and others taken in by a snapshot of favourable opinion was a mistake. The election not only failed to deliver an improved position for the Conservatives, but it also strengthened the hand and confidence of her opponents in Parliament, thereby condemning the remainder of her time in office to deadlock. This outcome raises a series of further questions, but chiefly, why did she and the Conservatives fail given their strong position at the start of the election campaign? To address this question, it is worth considering a selection of key issues raised during the campaign, including a discussion of how unexpected events such as two terrorist attacks affected the election, ahead of a concluding analysis of her performance using Bulpitt’s (1986) statecraft.

The Conservative Party Campaign A possible explanation for the Conservatives’ performance can be found in Theresa May’s plan to orientate the campaign around her personality. Given the election would be called on the singular issue of Brexit, the focus on May directly rather than on general policy sought to enable her to argue in Brussels that the result was her personal mandate. It was hoped by the Conservative campaign that this would enable her to claim to speak for Britain. The strategy of placing herself at the heart of the campaign did have a sense of campaigning logic, however. Put simply, her aim was to strengthen her hand in the Brexit negotiations and reduce the influence of Remainers in the House of Commons. Thus, she needed

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a personal mandate that was clear. At the start of the campaign, therefore, it was logical for her name and face to appear more prominently in campaign literature in individual constituencies as Parliamentary candidates sought the support of voters. In essence, ‘May had thrown off the ideological moorings of the One Nation narrative and would fight the election on the basis of her persona’ (Atkins & Gaffney, 2020). Yet this strategy increasingly backfired, as it became clear that May was not an effective campaigner. Indeed, her innate shyness prevented her from campaigning in the style required by the overall strategy the Party was attempting to pursue. This prevented her from developing a credible connection with voters, whilst simultaneously making her appear distant and uncertain. In an attempt to address this campaigning problem, the campaign would put together specially designed rallies which required tickets to gain entry. This ensured the crowds could be controlled, and responses anticipated. The consequence of this strategy was it lacked any sense of rhetorical connection with the audience. Indeed, absent from the strategy was authenticity, as such her rallies appeared to be excessively orchestrated and stage managed, which gave them an artificial feel to the oratory. The problems May faced seeking to connect with voters through conventional campaign hustings were magnified by her failure to connect through media engagement. Specifically, her absence from televised debates. Unlike the highly choreographed hustings organised by the campaign team, the televised debate audiences would be less controllable and more likely to embarrass May because they would be seen as more authentic. Moreover, her opponent, Jeremy Corbyn was more at home in such settings given his long-standing record of campaigning across his career. As such, May was very much on the back-foot of media campaign despite placing herself at the centre of the wider Conservative message. A key moment where May sought to capture the momentum occurred four weeks after she called for the general election. The launch of the manifesto took place in Halifax, West Yorkshire, to a carefully gathered audience of supporters. The manifesto was a promise of a ‘mainstream government that will deliver for mainstream Britain’ (May, 2017b). To do this, May argued as part of the launch that a strong economy and delivering Brexit would be the main priorities of the new administration. Yet the manifesto contained a series of policies that surprised commentators, such as the removal of the ban on new grammar schools, means-testing the winter fuel allowances, withdrawing the pension triple lock, removal

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of the commitment not to raise income tax or national insurance, and increased spending on public services (Conservative Party, 2017). More controversially, however was the commitment to raise the threshold for free social care from £23,250 to £100,000, inclusion of property in the calculation of wealth (Conservative Party, 2017). This policy attracted criticism from the media and opposition parties who characterised it as a ‘dementia-tax’, thereby giving the impression of being out of touch with the sensibilities of the people. Alongside these economic policies was the commitment on Brexit which included leaving the Single Market and Customs Union and also the repeal of the FTPA. As a campaign manifesto, the consequence of the policies was problematic for May. The problematic element was their capacity to distract voters from the objective of the election vis-à-vis to strengthen May and the governments negotiating position in the European Union, and also to reaffirm the voters’ commitment to the result of the Brexit referendum. This aim was partly lost in the controversies surrounding social care, fox hunting, and the apparent willingness to raise taxes. These controversies were latched onto by the Labour opposition, who were keen to talk about issues besides Brexit, thereby diluting the objective of the election and associating May with policies that the opposition characterised as out of touch. For the Conservatives, this was especially problematic because May was the face of the campaign across the country, and thus, as her deficiencies as a campaigner became increasingly apparent, the impact on Conservative candidates across the country began to be felt. Local Conservative candidates began to fear the image and performance of May could have a detrimental effect on their ability to attract votes. This links in with a wider problem of organisational strategy and brand management, and the impact the manifesto had on the image of the party. Put simply, the Conservatives appeared more willing to return to issues such as fox hunting and social care which threatened to become own goals in the attempt to appeal to voters. Put simply, the Conservatives risked appearing to be in retreat of the modernisations that Cameron credited the return to office in 2010 and the later majority administration (Heppell, 2013; McAnulla, 2010). Indeed, May’s wider reputation as a hard-nosed anti-immigration Home Secretary seemed to draw a line under this electorally palatable form of Conservativism which David Cameron had sought to govern within (Peele & Francis, 2016), and instead return the Conservatives to its more moralistic and paternalistic

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roots. Indeed, May benefitted from ‘a succession of shadow portfolios [that] had been followed by an unusually long six-year stint at the Home Office’ (Goodlad, 2017), thus gifting her a wide scope of knowledge of behind-the-scene Whitehall practices and priorities. As such, putting May front-and-centre of the campaign sent a technocratic message to voters, which risked not being electorally viable.

A Question of Rhetorical Character The strategy of using the party leader as the face of an election campaign can be rhetorically effective if executed to precision. Such a campaigning strategy is dependent on a strong sense of rhetorical character, credibility with the audience, and a clear set of arguments that can connect emotionally with a wide range of audiences. A rhetorical character is strengthened by their instantly recognisable persona, shared sense of values with audiences as demonstrated by prior victories, and a record of success in delivering for supporters. This would enable her to foster an emotional connection with voters in a way history’s most memorable orators have been able to achieve (Hayton & Crines, 2012). Unfortunately for May, she lacked these key criteria for a personality-led campaign. Her profile and wider persona were based on robust strength and authority. These characteristics tend to be valuable for a Home Secretary or a Chancellor given the need to rely on empirical evidence and logic. However, a Prime Minister needs to capture the imagination of voters through emotional arguments that construct positive visions of the future. Rhetorically, a campaign based on an individual need to sell their values as universally shared which link to idealised notions of national identity, prosperity, and affection. For May, this was rhetorically difficult. May’s key rhetorical character was characterised as essentially emotionless, which inspired John Crace to immortalise this as ‘the Maybot’ (Crace, 2017). A consequence of this style is where emotional warmth was required, and she would deliver cold, hard facts. Where compassion and understanding are needed, she would provide logic and strategy. These are skills and talents, but for a Prime Minister, these can be problematic during an election campaign, especially when the focus is on the party leader for a sustained period. A well-known example of why this is problematic can be seen in how she responded to a question put to her by a nurse during a BBC Question Time debate. A striking NHS nurse addressed May directly during an emotional part of the debate to argue

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that ‘all care workers, doctors, nurses… need to be able to lead reasonable lives without having to strike - so pay us please what we deserve’ (Daily Mirror, 2017). Rather than seeking to appeal to the circumstances put to her by the nurse, May instead replied sadly there ‘isn’t a magic money tree’. Whilst accurate, the response lacked the emotional depth required when responding to such questions during an election campaign. As the campaign continued, MPs and activists remained divided on whether the election was necessary, thus costing her important supporters from within the campaign machine. The demoralisation of activists reduces the footfall of campaigners on the ground, especially if the face of the campaign was becoming an electoral liability. Despite this, whilst activists pushed hard for a Conservative victory, the underlying doubts about the strategy intensified, thereby costing May a supportive narrative and sense of momentum within the campaign itself. Popularity polling also consistently showed May’s declining ratings (illustrated below), relative to Corbyn’s popularity figures.

(Source Mellon et al. [2018]) Moreover, as Bale and Webb (2017) noted, such advisors (and increasing detractors) included Lynton Crosby, Mark Textor, Jim Messina, and Stephen Gilbert. These prominent strategists questioned the direction of travel of the campaign, leading to a lack of focus of the message. Harmfully, their uncertainly over the strategy specifically

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extended to concerns about May’s capacity to win the election, despite the early favourable circumstances and optimism gifted by the polls. Furthermore, it is vital to remember that unexpected events are inevitable and can disrupt even the most carefully laid out election plans. These can be relatively minor or major disruptions that can produce pauses in the election. Two such events derailed the election campaign and caused trauma across the country—specifically, two terrorist attacks over the course of the campaign. Such events require leaders to demonstrate their skills at unifying the country whilst simultaneously responding to the attack. They can do this by emphasising security, taking threats of attacks seriously, and politicians responding to these in a way that inspire confidence amongst the voters that they have the cognitive skills to be Prime Minister.

Leadership and Responding to Terrorism During the 2017 general election campaign, two terrorist attacks derailed the campaign whilst uniting the parties and the electorate horror at the scale of the attacks. The first attack during the election was on 22 May when the suicide attacker, Salman Abedi, detonated a homemade explosive device at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, killing 22 people and injuring over 250 others (Counter Extremism Project, n.d). This was the largest terrorist attack on British soil since the London 7/7 bombings in 2005. The second terrorist attack took place on 3 June when three terrorists drove a van into pedestrians on London Bridge before vacating the vehicle and stabbing civilians in bars and restaurants, killing 8 people (BBC, 2019). These terrorist attacks shifted all focus from the election and onto the issue of security. By doing so, campaigning was suspended by all main parties. In response, May immediately released a statement saying ‘our thoughts are with those who are caught up in these dreadful events’, whilst Corbyn mirrored the statement, saying ‘my thoughts are with the families and friends of those who have died and the many who have been injured’. The derailing effect of the terrorist attacks on the general election was secondary to the losses felt by family and friends. To respond to these losses, election campaigns subsequently adapt to the new circumstances in which they are being conducted. In the case of the 2017 election, the attacks became a focus of May’s arguments for tighter security in response to the threats. Specifically, following the meeting of the G7 meeting in the

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weeks running up to polling day, May sought to highlight the perception that Corbyn’s relative softness on terrorism was a danger to the security of the country. For example, she argued that ‘I have been here with the G7, working with other international leaders to fight terrorism. At the same time, Jeremy Corbyn has said that terror attacks in Britain are our own fault and he has chosen to do that a few days after one of the worst terrorist atrocities we have experienced in the United Kingdom’ (May, 2017b). This represented a significant shift in the tone of the election as canvassing and campaigning resumed. Here, May’s suggestion that Corbyn’s attitudes towards terrorism suggested weakness represented a danger to the country and to the wider population. Moreover, she went on to argue that ‘I want to make something clear to Jeremy Corbyn and to you: there can never be an excuse for terrorism, there can be no excuse for what happened’ (May, 2017b). Here, May is implying that Corbyn defends those who attacked the United Kingdom, and that this made him an unsuitable candidate for the Premiership. Indeed, this is confirmed by her argument that the election has become ‘a choice between me working constantly to protect the national interest and to protect our security, and Jeremy Corbyn, who frankly isn’t up to the job’ (May, 2017b). Her arguments and perspectives were gifted rhetorical support by her the Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson who argued that it was ‘absolutely extraordinary and inexplicable in this week of all weeks that there should be any attempt to justify or to legitimate the actions of terrorists’ (Johnson, 2017). The tone of these messages seeks to demonstrate the relative strength of the Conservatives compared to Labour’s perceived weakness on national security and terrorism. May’s aim was to show the weakness of Corbyn and his record on an issue that left a devastating impact on the lives of the British people. These also speak to Corbyn’s wider background in foreign policy and his relationships with figures and regimes based in Iran, Syria, and the IRA (Garnett, 2021). As such, the shift in tone of the election towards security by these events enabled May to use her rhetorical strengths of logic and directness (even the Maybot), to appeal to voters that the people are safer with the Conservatives in power.

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Conclusion---Was the Election a Failure of Statecraft? When considering May’s decision to call the general election, we need to ask whether it can be considered a failure of statecraft. To do so, we need to draw on Bulpitt’s (1986) typology to demonstrate the failures of the decision. As mentioned at the start of the chapter, we argue May’s decision to call for the election ended up being a mistake. But was it hers alone? We can draw attention to the delicate relationship between May, her advisors, the wider party hierarchy, and the wider party membership in the construction and execution of this strategy. As mentioned above, May was under pressure from advisors and prominent figures in the Party to call the election which was against her initial judgement and position of her leadership election campaign. Favourable opinion polling data also gave the impression of a successful trajectory, yet these are snapshots which can change over short periods of time. Thus, it cannot be said that the electoral defeat—or rather, the failure to win from what was seen as a dominant position when the election was called—was entirely May’s fault. This should not lead us to the facile conclusion that May is somehow absolved given her own role in the events over the course of the election campaign, but equally the responsibility for the mistake and subsequent failure rests with others within May’s governing operation. For Bulpitt’s statecraft, ‘winning electoral strategy’ comprised of two key elements. Namely, it ‘involves the manufacturing of a policy package and image capable of being sold successfully to the electorate. But it also involves finding a programme which will unite the party and stimulate members’ belief that the party can not only win an election but also govern reasonably effectively’ thereafter (1986: 21). There are two key aspects of this which are significant for our evaluation of the May leadership. Firstly, there are a pair of audiences at play here, namely the electorate at large and the party membership, and whilst both must be won over, each has a slightly different importance for the party. To the former a policy package and an image must be sold, and the latter must be unified and convinced. This implies a careful constructing—manufacturing, to use Bulpitt’s term—of a set of policies and an overarching message, calibrated to both win over and to unify. On this measure, May would be unable to rely on an appealing image because of its essentially ‘cold’ nature. Second, we can see Bulpitt’s connection between a ‘winning electoral strategy’ and the other elements of his framework. For example,

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the party membership needs to be ‘unified’, to believe that the party can ‘govern reasonably effectively’, and the ‘policy package and image’ needs to be assembled which can appeal to the electorate. These align with, respectively, the concepts of party management, governing competence, and political argument hegemony. In unpacking the winning electoral strategy, we must consider May’s capacity to deliver a victory that related to competence and effective management. The evidence of the chapter and the eventual election result was a failure to create a winning electoral strategy. This is demonstrated by the loss of the Conservatives majority. Second, placing May front-andcentre of the campaign relies on her image to sell the policy package. The failure of this strategy—as demonstrated by the evidence of the chapter—highlights the problems with May’s image both rhetorically and visually. Indeed, ‘May’s rhetoric constrained her statecraft, undermining her capacity for governing competence’ and that her ‘statecraft was characterised by an inability to square the practical demands of negotiation and governing with the pressures of party management’ (Marlow-Stevens & Hayton, 2021). Because of these issues, May lost the capacity to maintain argument hegemony through her innate shyness and inability to communicate her arguments to her audiences. Uniting the party behind her argument, vision and hegemony would only be possible if she was able to communicate it convincingly to all quarters of the political audience. However, May avoided engaging with supportive audiences (as demonstrated by the highly controlled ticket-only conferences) and hesitated to demonstrate empathy to wider audiences because such emotions are not part of her rhetorical style. Thus, returning to the start of the chapter, our opening proposition has been demonstrated through the presentation of our discussion. With the benefit of hindsight, the 2017 general election was clearly a mistake. May knew it was a mistake, right up until the point she made it. It became a statecraft mistake that prevented her from being able to govern effectively for the remainder of her time in Number 10. But, as mentioned above, it was not a mistake that she alone made. The strategic error is owned by others, such as her advisors and established party grandees. Two years later, however, her successor—Boris Johnson—used the same tactic to shake up Parliament and won. What was the difference? Simply that Boris had a stronger persona and long-standing public image when compared to May’s weaker persona and less recognisable image.

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References Allen, N. (2018). Brexit means Brexit: Theresa May and post-referendum British Politics. British Politics, 13, 105–120. Atkins, J., & Gaffney, J. (2020). Narrative, persona, and performance: The case of Theresa May 2016–2017. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 22(2), 293–308. Bale, T., & Webb, P. (2017). We didn’t see it coming: The Conservatives. In J. Tonge, C. Leston-Bandeira, & S. Wilks-Heeg (Eds.), Britain votes 2017 . Oxford University Press. BBC. (2017). General election campaigning begins as MPs back June poll. BBC News. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39643804. Accessed 20 February 2023. BBC. (2019). London bridge attack: What happened. BBC News. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-40147164. Accessed 20 February 2023. Bryan, C., Randall, N., & Theakston, K. (2021). Theresa May’s disjunctive premiership: Choice and constraint in political time. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Bulpitt, J. (1986). The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s Domestic Statecraft. Political Studies, 34(1), 19–39. Conservative Party. (2017). Forward, together: Our plan for a stronger Britain and a prosperous future. Conservative and Unionist Party. Counter Extremism Project. (n.d.). Salman Abdei. Counter Terrorism Project. Available from: https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/sal man-abedi. Accessed 20 February 2023. Cowley, P. & Kavanagh, D. (2018) British general election of 2017 . Palgrave. Crace, J. (2017). I, Maybot: The rise and fall. Guardian Faber Publishing. Daily Mail. (2017, April 18). Crush the Saboteurs. Daily Mail. Daily Mirror. (2017). Applause as nurse on BBC Question Time says “pay us what we deserve” in heartfelt plea. Daily Mirror, available from: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/applause-nurse-bbc-que stion-time-28580025. Accessed 20 February 2023. Garnett, M., & Johnson, R. (2021). ‘Jeremy Corbyn’s foreign policy. In A. RoeCrines (Ed.), Corbynism in perspective. Agenda Publishers. Goodlad, G. (2017). Theresa May: A premiership in crisis. Political Insight, 8(3). Grimes, D. (2019). Darren Grimes on our Remain Parliament. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvkC5wRzpkc. Accessed 20 February 2023. Hague, W. (2017). Former Tory Leader William Hague urged Theresa May to call an early election. Insider. Available from: https://www.businessinsi der.com/william-hague-jeremy-corbyn-early-general-election-2017-3?r=US& IR=T. Accessed 20 February 2023. Hayton, R., & Crines, A. (2012). Conservative Orators from Baldwin to Cameron. Manchester University Press.

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Heppell, T. (2013). Cameron and liberal conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and conservative ministers. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2012.00546.x Heppell, T., & McMeeking, T. (2021). Corbyn and leadership satisfaction ratings. In A. Roe-Crines (Ed.), Corbynism in perspective. Agenda Publishers. House of Commons Library. (2019). General election 2017: Full results and analysis. House of Commons Library. Available from: https://commonslibrary. parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7979/. Accessed 20 February 2023. Johnson, B. (2017). Jeremy Corbyn: The war on terror is simply not working. The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 2017/may/26/jeremy-corbyn-the-war-on-terror-is-simply-not-working. Accessed 20 February 2023. Marlow-Stevens, S. & Hayton, R. (2021). A rhetorical analysis of Theresa May’s Statecraft on Brexit. Parliamentary Affairs, 74(4), 871–889. May, T. (2016). Theresa May rules out snap UK election after ‘shock’ of Brexit vote. The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/pol itics/2016/sep/03/theresa-may-election-pm-owen-smith-corbyn. Accessed 20 February 2023. May, T. (2017a). Theresa May calls for general election to secure Brexit mandate. The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/pol itics/2017a/apr/18/theresa-may-calls-for-general-election-in-bid-to-securebrexit-mandate. Accessed 20 February 2023. May, T. (2017b). May puts Manchester attack at heart of election with attack on Corbyn. The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/pol itics/2017b/may/26/may-puts-manchester-bombing-at-heart-of-electionwith-attack-on-corbyn. Accessed 20 February 2023. McAnulla, S. (2010). Heirs to Blair’s third way? David Cameron’s triangulating conservatism. British Politics, 53. https://link.springer.com/article/10. 1057/bp.2010.10 Mellon, J., Evans, G., Fieldhouse, E., & Green, J. (2018). Brexit or Corbyn? Campaign and inter-election voter switching in the 2017 general election. Parliamentary Affairs, 71(4), 719–737. Peele, G., & Francis, J. (2016). David Cameron and conservative renewal: The limits of modernisation. Manchester University Press. Roe-Crines, A. & Heppell, T. (2019). Legitimising Euroscepticism? The construction, delivery and significance of the Bruges speech. Contemporary British History, 34(2), 1–24. Seldon, A. (2019). May at 10. Biteback. Traditional Britain Group. (2023). About the group. Traditional Britain Group. Available from https://traditionalbritain.org/about/. Accessed 5 March 2023.

CHAPTER 4

Attempting to Secure a Sympathetic Press: May and the Media William Coles

Introduction Political communication underwent a revolution between the publication Bulpitt’s seminal paper on statecraft and Theresa May’s accession as leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister some thirty years later. Indeed, changes already became apparent in the years following Bulpitt’s paper. By the early 1990s, Foley had coined the phrase ‘the British presidency’ to describe the increasing importance of the image of the party leader in the media (Foley, 1993). Since then, the internet and social media have transformed the political and media landscape beyond recognition. The role of social media itself had already changed between 2010, when May entered government as Home Secretary, and 2016 when she became Prime Minister. May is notably the first Prime Minister to have joined Twitter before taking office, joining in June 2016 when she announced her leadership bid. Cameron by contrast joined the platform in October 2012 despite his prior criticisms of it, almost two and a half

W. Coles (B) Royal Holloway, University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_4

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years after he took office (Neild, 2012). Naturally, some have criticised the more prominent role that digital media plays in political communication. As early as 2006, Wolin attacked what he called the ‘technologization of politics’ (Wolin, 2006, p. 565), and more recently, Mark Thompson, the former director-general of the BBC and chief executive of the New York Times, bemoaned how political communication was becoming more akin to ‘a computational science’ in contrast to its more creative history within the tradition of the humanities (Thompson, 2016, p. 171). But other scholars, such as Jens Kjeldsen, have been more optimistic about recent trends by pointing out how digital media has resulted in a renaissance of speech writing on the grounds that the internet and social media platforms have provided a new rostrum from which political oratory can reach more people than it has ever done previously (Kjeldsen et al., 2019, pp. 8–10). Kjeldsen and his colleagues raise a valid point; at the time of writing BBC News’ coverage of May’s resignation speech has been viewed 1.3 million times on YouTube (BBC News, 2019). Social media has thus provided a more convenient means through which the public can access political content; no longer do voters need to watch live televised coverage, let alone be physically present to listen to orators on soapboxes and podiums. Yet more convenient access to political rhetoric has meant that parties and orators also have easier access to voters, which has attracted some fair criticisms. For instance, it is well known that algorithms can target tailored political messages to specific groups of voters in specific parts of the country, resulting in the criticism that political rhetoric conveyed via digital media is seldom addressed to the electorate as a whole (Goodman, 2022, pp. 2–10). However, it is worth remembering that targeted messages tailored to groups of voters is hardly a new phenomenon. While there has been an increase in the number of channels through which political parties can reach voters, the politicians—that is to say the rhetors themselves—have not necessarily become better communicators. On the contrary, the quality of our political orators has arguably become worse. Political scientists such as Theakston are especially pessimistic, who has argued that there have only been five Prime Ministers since Churchill whose public communication has been exceptional, namely Macmillan, Wilson, Thatcher, and Blair (Theakston, 2007, p. 230). But while criticisms of an individual’s oratorical skills and the quality of their rhetoric may seem purely aesthetic on the surface, public communication and

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the media image of the party leader are essential to successful statecraft, or perhaps more cynically, creating an illusion of statecraft. A party leader with a strong media image is key to demonstrating effective party management and showing unity; political rhetoric is the means by which election-winning policy programmes are sold to the electorate; hegemony in political argument is maintained by public debate and getting the correct message into the press; and a strong communications team at Number 10 is responsible for maintaining—and sometimes rescuing—a government’s perceived competence (Marlow-Stevens & Hayton, 2021). As Glover has argued, the quality of the party leader’s oratory and their general communication skills shapes their media image, and a media image can make or break political careers (Glover, 2011). It is perhaps no coincidence that YouGov puts Macmillan, Wilson, and Thatcher within the top seven most popular British Prime Ministers of all time (YouGov, 2022). It is probably an uncontroversial statement that May was not a natural communicator during her tenure as Prime Minister. This might have partly been due to her lack of a professional background in communications and public affairs, which would have allowed her to hone in her communication skills from early on in her career. Prior to her election to Parliament in 1997, she worked at the Bank of England and UK Payments Administration Limited. This stands in some contrast to David Cameron, who had worked at Conservative Central Office as a special advisor to Norman Lamont through Black Wednesday, and subsequently for Carlton Consulting as marketing consultant (Theakston, 2012, 196). Unlike Cameron, May’s media training was very much ‘on the job’ since she was promoted to the shadow cabinet by William Hague upon her election to Parliament, marking the beginning of a series of promotions. This period of May’s career naturally threw her into the media limelight with conference speeches and media interviews. Following her promotion to Chairman of the Conservative Party in July 2002, the first woman to hold that role, her speech to the party’s annual conference the following October attracted significant media attention. In this speech, May stunned her audience by speaking frankly about the Conservative Party’s image problems: Yes, we’ve made progress, but let’s not kid ourselves. There’s a way to go before we can return to government. There’s a lot we need to do in this party of ours. Our base is too narrow and so, occasionally, are our

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sympathies. You know what some people call us: the nasty party. (May, 2002)

May was the first person to use the term ‘nasty party’, a phrase which has since become associated with lingering elements of social conservatism and reactionary politics in the modern Conservative Party (Quinn, 2008, pp. 190–193). With this speech, May was able to grab the media headlines and give herself the image of a Tory moderniser. The speech itself also set the tone of the conference, despite other speakers making the same criticisms about the party’s image problems, notably Oliver Letwin (White & Perkins, 2002). Fourteen years later, May’s speechwriters alluded to this earlier remark in her first conference speech as Prime Minister, in which she attacked the Labour Party for its public infighting following the Vote Leave campaign’s win in referendum on EU membership and Jeremy Corbyn’s continuing weakness as party leader: You know what some people call them? The nasty party. And with Labour divided, divisive and out-of-touch, we have a responsibility to step up, represent and govern for the whole nation. (May, 2016b)

With this quip, May was evidently strengthening her position as party leader. She was attempting to demonstrate that she was still a moderniser, despite her prior conference speeches as Home Secretary which perceived as reactionary according to a recent rhetorical reception study (Browse, 2018, pp. 108–121; pp. 168–177). She was also highlighting the peripeteia the Conservatives had been through and how much the tables had turned since 2002; in 2002 the party was in a weak position in opposition, but in 2016 it stood in a strong position in government. Yet May’s strength in 2016, as reflected in strong media image, was probably the result of her opponents’ weaknesses rather than her own capabilities. As her time in office went on, and especially after the disaster of the 2017 general election, the cracks in her media image grew bigger (Atkins & Gaffney, 2020). The tables had arguably switched back by 2017 following the loss of her parliamentary majority. May’s downfall and the transformation of her media image in the process were arguably inevitable. The lack of a proper leadership election following Andrea Leadsom’s withdrawal meant that the Conservative Party’s membership did not get the opportunity to see May under media pressure, nor did they get to see

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her perform in a debate. By contrast, the Conservative Party membership’s exposure to Cameron’s political oratory played a crucial role in his victory in the 2005 Conservative leadership election (Bale, 2015, pp. 181–182; Denham & Dorey, 2006). Given the importance of party leadership contests for testing the ability of candidates to perform in the media, as well as offering an insight into their rhetorical capabilities, the lack of a leadership contest meant that May’s poor abilities as a media performer were not picked up earlier. While I am in no way suggesting that a leadership contest would have robbed May of the Conservative Party leadership, it would have exposed the public to her poor rhetorical skills at a much earlier stage, a phenomenon that we saw more recently with Liz Truss.

May as a Rhetorical Performer In Aristotle’s system of rhetoric, there are three genres in oratory; these are deliberative (symbouleutikos ), forensic (dikanikos ), and epideictic (epideiktikos ) (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1.3). In contemporary political oratory, these genres roughly align with speeches performed during parliamentary or televised debates, speeches delivered before a court or during the proceedings of an inquiry, and what we might call ‘set pieces’ such as a statement performed outside Downing Street. Naturally, the first and third of these genres are the most common. To use McMeeking’s words, there are ‘certain rituals, or occasions, on the political calendar’ where the Prime Minister is expected to deliver oratory and demonstrate their rhetorical skills (McMeeking, 2021, p. 68). On these occasions, the Prime Minister’s rhetoric serves the purposes of displaying competence, generating political thoughts and ideas, and to control the policy agenda, all of which enhance the Prime Minister’s own standing (Finlayson & Martin, 2008, pp. 447–453; Toye, 2011, p. 185). May at the Podium The first speech May gave as Prime Minister was outside 10 Downing Street upon her arrival from Buckingham Palace. The speech, which has since been branded the ‘burning injustices’ speech, was epideictic in nature since it its purpose was to allow the public to pass judgement on May’s ethos and the values that she projects in her oratory (Sullivan, 1993, pp. 118–27). From May’s perspective, the speech also gave her and her

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communications team the opportunity to forge the media image of the new government at the outset. While epideictic speeches are not explicitly argumentative, in contrast to speeches delivered in debates, they can be used to subtly advocate the continuation of certain values at the expense of others, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca emphasised in their landmark work The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 47–51). May opened the speech by praising David Cameron and his record on the economy, before moving on to the issue of social justice: If you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than if you’re white. If you’re a white, working-class boy, you’re less likely than anybody else in Britain to go to university. If you’re at a state school, you’re less likely to reach the top professions than if you’re educated privately. If you’re a woman, you will earn less than a man. If you suffer from mental health problems, there’s not enough help to hand. (May, 2016a)

This well-crafted speech, notable for its effective use of anaphora, served several functions. On the one hand, it allowed May to demonstrate that her government would continue in the spirit of Cameronism and the modernisation that took place under his leadership, therefore showing that she was still a moderniser despite her more reactionary rhetoric as Home Secretary (Browse, 2018, pp. 108–21; pp. 168–177). On the other hand, May was able to use the speech to set her own political agenda by focussing on issues of social justice and inequality, marking a change of focus but not a change in values, since political discourse since 2010 had often focussed on the economy and issues surrounding public spending. May also effectively used her ethos in this speech to create a degree of distance between herself and Cameron: I know you’re working around the clock, I know you’re doing your best, and I know that sometimes life can be a struggle. The government I lead will be driven not by the interests of the privileged few, but by yours . . . When we take the big calls, we’ll think not of the powerful, but you. (May, 2016a)

In emphasising that she as an individual could grasp the problems faced by ordinary voters, May was inadvertently distancing herself from her

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predecessors, notably David Cameron and George Osborne, whose more privileged upbringings had sparked accusations that they were out of touch during their time in office. May had also adopted this line of argument during the Conservative leadership campaign, where she stated that ‘not everybody in Westminster understands what it’s like to live like this. And some need to be told that what the government does isn’t a game’ (May, 2016c). As Atkins and Gaffney have emphasised, May’s early rhetoric as a leadership contender, as well as her decision to put both leave-supporting and remain-supporting MPs in her cabinet, served the purpose of representing herself as a healer and a unifier following Cameron’s referendum loss (Atkins & Gaffney, 2020, pp. 298–299). However, by the 2016 Autumn conference, May’s conciliatory tone had shifted. While conferences speeches are predominantly aimed at the party faithful (Toye, 2018, p. 92), the television coverage of the leaders’ speeches has encouraged party leaders to pitch their speech beyond their party’s membership and to the electorate as a whole, and YouTube as well as other online platforms have no doubt prolonged this trend. In this speech, May emphasised how ‘the lesson of Britain is that we are a country built on the bonds of family, community, citizenship. Of strong institutions and a strong society’ (May, 2016b). The values May projects her are more socially conservative and are probably aimed at the leave-supporting former Labour voters whom she aimed to win over (Marlow-Stevens & Hayton, 2021, p. 5). However, May’s remark that ‘if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere’ (May, 2016b) attracted much criticism as it was seen as a jibe at remain-supporting voters; however, as Atkins points out, the remark was aimed at business leaders who fail to contribute to British society (Atkins, 2022, p. 225). The ‘citizens of nowhere’ remark is just one example of how a speaker’s rhetorical intention (krisis ) can be transformed and manipulated when sections of the speech are segmented and posted digital platforms. Despite her short premiership, the relatively high number of terror attacks and other tragedies that took place during May’s time in Number 10 warranted her to perform several epideictic speeches in response to such events. Speeches following a terror attack are a balancing act; on the one hand, the speaker must correctly judge the mood of the audience within the eulogistic aspect of the speech, while at the same time enhance their own ethos in order to give reassure to the public and not to cause panic (Vatnoey, 2015). In 2017 alone, Britain witnessed the March 2017

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Westminster terror attack as well as further attacks at Manchester Arena and London Bridge. Following the March 2017 attack in Westminster, May’s statement to the Commons was an effective piece of epideictic rhetoric in which she affirmed that the values of free speech, liberty, human rights, and the rule of law will prevail, and then informed the Commons about what the police and security services had done thus far, what they were going to do, and the next steps the government would take (May, 2017a). May’s experience as Home Secretary certainly helped her rhetoric here since she came across as calm and in control. Similarly, May’s oratory following the Manchester Arena bombing also affirmed shared values, emphasising how the expressions of ‘solidarity and hope’ following the attack encapsulated ‘spirit of Manchester and the spirit of Britain’, and then she called on the public not to be ‘unduly alarmed’ (May, 2017b). However, May’s media response to the Grenfell Fire was less satisfactory. Her initial refusal to meet with survivors made her seem uncaring and lacking in empathy, and her statement to the Commons was not delivered until the week following the outbreak of the fire, which also suggested a lack of urgency on the part of May and the government. Yet writing in the Evening Standard a year later, May said that she regretted her delay in visiting North Kensington (May, 2018). May in the Commons Within the framework of rhetoric, exchanges within the House of Commons are deliberative in nature. Although the Commons was the arena in which May was probably most comfortable as an orator since she had faced five years of back-and-forth exchanges as Home Secretary, her performances were not especially memorable. As Shaw has argued, May’s rhetoric in the Commons was highly evasive and could sometimes be adversarial in style when challenged (Shaw, 2020, pp. 178–210). Naturally, this was mainly the case in her exchanges with Jeremy Corbyn and other MPs during Prime Minister’s Questions, a political ritual that has been compared to a spectator sport (Lovenduski, 2012, pp. 320– 322). Yet there were several instances during her leadership when May’s rhetoric in the Commons was memorable and attracted media attention. For instance, at her first exchange with Jeremy Corbyn on the topic of employment rights, May asserted her own authority in her response to Corbyn’s final question:

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I suspect that there are many members on the opposition benches who might be familiar with an unscrupulous boss. A boss who doesn’t listen to his workers? A boss who requires some of his workers to double their workload? And maybe even a boss who exploits the rules to further his own career? (Cockburn, 2016)

May then leant in towards the dispatch box, raised her voice, and said: Remind him of anybody? (ibid.)

May’s effective use of rhetoric here, especially tricolon, anaphora, and climax, as well as her delivery, was met with cheers and chants of ‘more’ from the Conservative benches. While May’s response did not engage with what scholars of Rhetoric such as Kock would call ‘good argumentation’, since it dodged Corbyn’s question with an ad hominem attack (Kock, 2011, pp. 14–20), it nonetheless enhanced her authority through an appeal to pathos —humour in this case. May was arguably in a fortunate position at the despatch box since her performances were enhanced not by her own oratory, but by the poor rhetorical skills of Jeremy Corbyn. Her position was arguably similar to that of Margaret Thatcher, whose political opponents also lacked the rhetorical skills needed to undermine her position, even during moments of weakness such as the Westland affair (Crines, Heppell, and Dorey, 2016, pp. 17–65). There were other instances during May’s premiership when she could effectively deploy humour to enhance her ethos as a performer in the Commons. May’s response to a question from Peter Bone about prisons on 19 October 2016 illustrates this. Bone, who was known to often frame his questions to the Prime Minister as coming from his then wife, having mentioned it was his birthday, asked the Prime Minister if she would consider reopening Wellingborough Prison in his constituency. May opened her response by wishing him a happy birthday, before saying that she hoped ‘Mrs Bone is going to treat the occasion in the appropriate manner’, which was met with such a barrage of laugher that the Speaker had to step in, saying ‘I want to hear what’s coming next’, to which May quipped ‘calm down Mr Speaker’ (Dor, 2016). May’s use of was humour not always successful though, and on occasions, her one-liners fell flat and were met with awkward responses. A notable instance of this was during a Prime Minister’s Questions exchange with Jeremy Corbyn in December 2018, in which she accused Labour of

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having an unclear and ever-changing policy on the European Union withdrawal agreement. She labelled Barry Gardiner, Labour’s shadow Trade Secretary, as a ‘henchman’ who is sent out by the Labour leadership to announce any changes to Labour policy, ending her response by calling him ‘the inconstant gardener’ (Evans, 2018). The quip was met with silence, before awkward laughter from May. On another occasion, also in response to a question about the European Union withdrawal agreement, May responded to Westminster SNP leader Ian Blackford with a formulaic and evasive response, stating that Blackford and his party ‘should vote for a deal — simples’ (Demianyk, 2019). While this attempt at humour was much less obscure than her ‘inconstant gardener’ remark, it nonetheless fell flat, probably on account of her rushed delivery and lack of comic timing. Labour MP Rupa Huq responded on Twitter by saying ‘Theresa Meerkat just stunned the Commons by Maybot malfunction in stating it’s her deal or no deal then concluding simples’ (Huq, 2019). This nickname, Maybot, was well known and reflected the perception that May’s rhetorical delivery was awkward and robotic (Crace, 2017). According to a report by the Daily Mail, the ‘simples’ remark was the result of a bet between May’s private secretary Seema Kennedy and Simon Hoare (Demianyk, 2019). Like John Major, what made performances in the Commons more difficult for May was the fact that a lot of the challenges came from her own back benches. Following the disastrous 2019 local elections, the worst result for the Conservative Party since 1995, Brexit-rebel Andrea Jenkyns openly asked May at Prime Minister’s Questions if she thought that she ‘should step aside and let someone new lead our party, our country and the negotiations?’ (McGuinness, 2019). On a similar occasion, Sir Bill Cash, who had also proven to be a headache for John Major over the Maastricht Treaty, was even more candid in a question to May on 11 April 2019. After listing his grievances with the withdrawal agreement, Cash closed his question with ‘will she resign?’ (Bartlett, 2019). While May would generally respond to these sorts of attacks with short dismissive replies, again encapsulating the evasive nature of her oratory in the Commons, there was one notable occasion when she made humour of her political difficulties. Following the re-election of John Bercow as Speaker after the 2017 general election, May congratulated Bercow by saying ‘at least someone got a landslide’ (Colliner, 2017).

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May the Media Performer Media interviews and appearances are another occasion when the Prime Minister can enhance their authority by using rhetoric to link the presentation of policy directions and government decisions with the substance behind them (Seymour-Ure, 1995, pp. 169–171). The increasingly personalised nature of political communication has meant that a much greater emphasis is now placed on the image of the party leader (Langer, 2011; Smith, 2009), and it is now incumbent on Prime Ministers to use their media appearances to show off their charisma and likeability, especially since these are increasingly important factors that influence voting behaviour (Denver, 2005; Smith & French, 2011). Given the importance of the charisma and likeability of the party leader as factors in influencing voting behaviour, media appearances are especially important during general election campaigns. In the case of May, these media appearances—or lack thereof—during the 2017 general election campaign certainly undermined her leadership and contributed to the failure of her statecraft. As Cushion and Beckett remarked in the case of 2017: ‘if this was an election where the campaign made a difference, then the media – and especially broadcasters – played a critical role’ (Cushion & Beckett, 2018, p. 323). The period from April to June 2017 represented a dramatic change in May’s media image; when May first called the election the Daily Mail famously framed her announcement as an attempt to ‘crush the saboteurs’, yet on June 9 the Mail headlined the election result with ‘Britain on a knife edge’. But just how did May’s poor public communication skills and weak media performances contribute to her tragic peripeteia? May’s media image during the 2017 general election campaign was arguably unsuccessful due to the basic contradiction that ran through it; May’s leadership was at the centre of the campaign yet she seemed to prefer staying out of the media limelight. In her statement outside Number 10 when she announced the election, she already emphasised how an election win for the Conservatives would be a win for her personally: Every vote for the Conservatives will make it harder for opposition politicians who want to stop me from getting the job done. Every vote for the Conservatives will make me stronger when I negotiate for Britain with … the European Union. (May, 2017c)

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As in her statement upon becoming Prime Minister, May’s rhetoric emphasised her own leadership rather than the collective capabilities of the wider Conservative Party and its policies. The Conservatives’ campaign slogan, ‘strong and stable’, also focussed on May’s leadership of the party and did not offer any insight into the vision that the Conservatives had for the country. But the May-focussed campaign clashed with her perceived discomfort with media scrutiny and debate, which are fundamental aspects of modern democracy and the performance of rhetorical citizenship (Hansen, 2012; Kock & Villadsen, 2012). For instance, May was absent from the ITV Leaders’ Debate on 19 May and from the BBC Election Debate, during which she was attacked five times for being absent, preferring instead to send Home Secretary Amber Rudd to stand in for her (Cushion & Beckett, 2018, pp. 332–335). During his closing statement, Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron even suggested to viewers that they change channel and watch The Great British Bake Off instead since May had not made time for them. May’s evasive rhetoric that characterised her responses to criticism within the deliberative setting of the House of Commons was seen to extend to media debate generally. But May was not totally absent from the media landscape during the election campaign; she appeared on Sky and Channel 4’s joint programme The Battle for Number 10; however, she was heckled on the issue of school funding cuts and struggled to defend her social care policy (Bienkov, 2017). May also appeared on the BBC Question Time Leaders’ Special; however, she came across as uncaring after responding to a question from a nurse about public sector pay with ‘there isn’t a magic money tree that we can shake that suddenly provides for everything that people want’ (Dearden, 2017). As Atkins and Gaffney have noted, May’s managerial responses during the general election campaign stood in contrast to her earlier rhetoric, especially her ‘burning injustices’ speech (Atkins & Gaffney, 2020, p. 304). There were some attempts to make May seem more sympathetic, especially during one-off media interviews, however her responses often seemed forced. During a light-hearted discussion on The One Show where May was joined by her husband Philip, she remarked that there were ‘boy jobs and girl jobs’ after Philip stated that he was the one who put the bins out in their household (Agerholm, 2017). Similarly, and arguably more damagingly, when asked by ITV’s Julie Etchingham what the naughtiest thing she had ever done is, May hesitated before answering with ‘running through fields of wheat’ as a child (McCann,

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2017). It was arguably May’s awkward demeanour and the uncomfortable tone in her voice that made her responses seem more forced and artificial, that is to say it was the delivery of her words (pronuntatio) that often made her oratory ineffective rather than the rhetoric itself (Crines, 2013, p. 81). May’s media performances stood her in contrast to Jeremy Corbyn, who came across much more naturally in media interviews. For instance, in response to a question from ITV’s Robert Peston about how he finds the energy to lead a general election campaign as a 68-yearold, Corbyn humorously quipped that he ‘has a bowl of porridge every morning’ and maintains a balanced diet (Gordon, 2017).

Conclusion May’s poor media performances, especially the awkward and forced delivery of her rhetoric, was certainly a contributing factor in the failure of her statecraft or at the very least it was a symptom of her failure. The lack of a formal leadership contest in 2016 meant that neither Conservative Party members nor the wider public got the chance to see May perform in the media as a potential leader or under pressure within a deliberative arena such as a televised debate. May’s poor rhetorical skills did not pose a problem for her statecraft until the 2017 general election, at which point the evasiveness that sometimes characterised her rhetoric in the House of Commons was seen to be directed to voters more generally. May was arguably fortunate at the beginning of her premiership since the Labour Party was distracted with its own infighting, and Jeremy Corbyn proved to be a poor Commons performer. Yet, the media coverage of the 2017 general election upset this status quo by exposing May as a poor rhetorical performer. May’s deliberative oratory stands in some contrast to her epideictic speeches, where she seemed much more comfortable and relaxed when performing the latter on the grounds that she would not be challenged, since they formed part of the rhetorical rituals that characterised governing rather than electioneering, the former of which was more interesting to May. The disaster of the 2017 general election only contributed to her failure at public communication, since the rebellious backbenchers she had hoped to drown out with a large Conservative majority became key opponents whose attacks she had to fend off in the Commons and in the media.

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Crines, A., Heppell, T., & Dorey, P. (2016). The political rhetoric and oratory of Margaret Thatcher. Palgrave-Macmillan. Cushion, S., & Beckett, C. (2018). Campaign coverage and editorial judgements: Broadcasting. In P. Cowley & R. Kavanagh (Eds.), The British general election of 2017 (pp. 323–346). Palgrave Macmillan. Dearden, L. (2017, June 3). Theresa May prompts anger after telling nurse who hasn’t had pay rise for eight years: ‘There’s no magic money tree’. The Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ politics/theresa-may-nurse-magic-money-tree-bbcqt-question-time-pay-riseeight-years-election-latest-a7770576.html (Accessed 30 December 2022). Demianyk, G. (2019, March 3). Theresa May said ‘simples’ in the house of commons ‘because of a bet. Huffington Post. Available at: https://www. huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/theresa-may-simples_uk_5c7c40c4e4b0614614d b99e7 (Accessed 30 December 2022). Denham, A., & Dorey, P. (2006). A tale of two speeches? The conservative leadership election of 2005. The Political Quarterly, 77 (1), 35–42. Denver, D. (2005). Valence politics: How Britain votes now. British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 7 (2), 292–299. Dor, L. (2016, October 19). Theresa May’s joke about treating an MP’s birthday in the ‘appropriate manner’ has raised a few eyebrows. Indy100. Available at: https://www.indy100.com/news/pmqs-latest-joke-theresa-maypeter-bone-wife-parliament-government-brexit-prison-wellingborough-736 9406. Accessed 30 December 2022. Evans, A. (2018, December 12). Theresa May mocked for bizarre pre-written ‘inconstant gardener’ jibe at Jeremy Corbyn during PMQs. iNews. Available at: https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/theresa-may-inconstant-gardenerjoke-jeremy-corbyn-pmqs-234434. Accessed 30 December 2022. Finlayson, A., & Martin, J. (2008). It ain’t what you say…: British Political Studies and the analysis of speech and rhetoric. British Politics, 3, 445–464. Foley, M. (1993). The rise of the British Presidency. Manchester University Press. Glover, D. (2011). The art of great speeches and why we remember them. Cambridge University Press. Goodman, R. (2022). Words on fire: Eloquence and its conditions. Cambridge University Press. Gordon, B. (2017, June 2). Vote Jeremy Corbyn... for him to become the nation’s lifestyle guru. Telegraph. Available at: https://www.telegraph. co.uk/women/politics/vote-jeremy-corbyn-become-nations-lifestyle-guru/ (Accessed 30 December 2022). Hansen, H. M. (2012). Deliberative democracy. In L. S. Villadsen & C. Kock (Eds.), Rhetorical citizenship and public deliberation (pp. 13–27). University Park.

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May, T. (2018, June 11). I made mistakes but one year on I’m going Green for Grenfell, writes Theresa May. Evening Standard. Available at: https:// www.standard.co.uk/comment/comment/i-made-mistakes-but-one-year-oni-m-going-green-for-grenfell-writes-theresa-may-a3860046.html. Accessed 29 December 2022. McCann, K. (2017, June 5). Theresa May admits ‘running through fields of wheat’ is the naughtiest thing she ever did. Telegraph. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2017/06/05/theresa-may-admitsrunning-fields-wheat-naughtiest-thing-ever/. Accessed 30 December 2022. McGuinness, A. (2019, May 9). Tory MP tells Theresa May she has ‘failed’ on Brexit and should quit. Sky News. Available at: https://news.sky.com/ story/tory-mp-tells-theresa-may-she-has-failed-on-brexit-and-should-quit11714552. Accessed 30 December 2022. McMeeking, T. (2021). The political leadership of Prime Minister John Major: A reassessment using the greenstein model. Palgrave-Macmillan. Neild, B. (2012, October 7). David Cameron joins Twitter. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/oct/07/davidcameron-joins-twitter. Accessed 21 November 2022. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation (Trans., J. Wilkinson & P. Weaver). University of Notre Dame Press. Quinn, T. (2008). The Conservative Party and the “centre ground” of British Politics. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 18(2), 179–199. Seymour-Ure, C. (1995). Prime Minister and the public: Managing media relations. In D. Shell & R. Hodder-Williams (Eds.), Churchill to Major: The British Prime Ministership since 1945. Hurst & Company. Shaw, S. (2020). Women, language and politics. Cambridge University Press. Smith, G. (2009). Conceptualizing and testing brand personality in British politics. Journal of Political Marketing, 8(3), 209–232. Smith, G., & French, A. (2011). Measuring the changes to leader Brand Associations during the 2010 election campaign. Journal of Marketing Management, 27 (7–8), 718–735. Sullivan, D. L. (1993). The ethos of epideictic encounter. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 26(2), 113–133. Theakston, K. (2007). What makes for an effective British Prime Minister? Quaderni Di Scienza Politica, 14(2), 227–249. Theakston, K. (2012). David Cameron as Prime Minister. In T. Heppell & D. Seawright (Eds.), Cameron and the conservatives: The transition to coalition government. Palgrave-Macmillan. Thompson, M. (2016). Enough said: What’s gone wrong with the language of politics. St. Martin’s.

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PART II

Policy Implementation

CHAPTER 5

Miscalculations and Constraints: Brexit and the Failed Statecraft of Theresa May Anthony Costello

Introduction The framework for analysis which binds the many contributions afforded to this edited volume is that of Jim Bulpitt’s criteria for ‘Statecraft’ (see Bulpitt, 1986). As a framework for examining effective governance over public policy, this chapter draws loosely upon Bulpitt’s criteria to examine Theresa May’s approach toward leading Britain’s departure from the European Union (EU). The chapter claims that May failed to wield effective Statecraft over Brexit. It suggests that her approach and leadership of Brexit were marked by a series of miscalculations and constraints which damaged her negotiating capacity. Despite initially commanding a degree of political argument hegemony (at least domestically), she soon failed in commanding key features associated with effective Statecraft, such as electability, party management, and the governing competence to fulfil a policy objective in such a way that the outcome of the Brexit negotiations was closest to British national preferences.

A. Costello (B) Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_5

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In supporting its claims, the chapter begins with a brief overview of Brexit and May’s accession to party leadership. It explores her political rhetoric and its impact on her initial Brexit position. It analyses the ill-fated 2017 general election and its influence on her inability to effectively negotiate Brexit in the face of increasingly apparent but initially ignored structural constraints (e.g., the Northern Irish border issue). It explores her ever softening position toward Brexit in the face of structural constraints and draws attention to her track record in U-turning on key promises. It concludes with an examination of the impacts of her softening position and U-turns on her ability to manage her cabinet. The supporting evidence collected and applied throughout the chapter demonstrates a failed approach toward Brexit Statecraft.

Brexit: An Overview The promise of a referendum on the United Kingdom’s (UK) membership of the European Union (EU) was initially part of Prime Minister (PM) David Cameron’s 2015 general election campaign bid (UK Parliament, 2016: 4). His promise to hold a referendum was a strategy intent on returning a Conservative majority to the Commons and ending the five-year-long coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Following electoral success, Cameron introduced the European Union Referendum Bill to parliament on the 28th of May 2015.1 The United Kingdom European Union Membership Referendum (hereafter referred to as the Brexit Referendum) was held on the 23rd of June 2016. With a total turnout of 77.2% of the electorate, 51.9% voted to cease economic and political marriage with the European Union (EU). Whilst electoral majorities in England and Wales voted to Leave, majorities in the devolved regions of Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to Remain, with 62 and 55.8% of regional votes, respectively (UK Parliament, 2016: 5). Cameron’s election campaign was successful (in part) due to his promise of a referendum. However, he subsequently ran the referendum campaign advocating for the UK to Remain a member of the EU. With a set of binary options printed on the ballot, the results unexpectedly countered Cameron’s official position. Prior to the referendum, there was little information of what departure legally or functionally meant for the UK (Hui et al., 2020). 1 The first reading of the bill took place in parliament a mere 21 days following Cameron’s successful electoral outcome.

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However, this was of little concern as a Leave outcome was far from anticipated. Failing to return a constitutionally significant result in line with his official position, and essentially losing his mandate to lead, he declared his resignation as PM on the 24th of June 2016 (The Guardian, 2016a). This subsequently paved the way for a snap party leadership contest made possible by the (presently dissolved) 2011 Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. Theresa May became PM on the 13th of July 2016. Upon assuming leadership of the Conservative Party, she became the second female leader in the party’s history and in the office of PM. A seasoned politician, she first ran for parliamentary elections in 1992. However, it was not until 1997 that she was elected to parliament as a Conservative MP for Maidenhead (Berkshire), winning nearly 50% of the vote in her constituency (Independent, 2018a). In 2010, following the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, she was appointed as Home Secretary; a position in which she retained until her ascension to her premiership.2 Her election as party leader was unexpected given that she traditionally supported (reluctantly) the UK’s membership of the EU. She was not known for being a popular or extroverted character within the party. Nevertheless, she assumed power with relative ease having won the first and second parliamentary ballots with 50.2 and 60.3%, respectively (Jeffrey et al., 2018: 263–264). Following a series of withdrawals and eliminations amongst key competitors, the path was paved for the relatively pro-EU May to take centre stage.3 In reference to the withdrawals of Boris Johnson and Andrea Leadsom (amongst others), a Conservative MP attributed May’s election to the party leadership to ‘literally being the last person standing when everyone else self-annihilated themselves ’ (Participant C, 2021c). However, Jeffrey et al. (2018) argue that the likely reason for May’s successful election was her inherent pro-EU background combined with her commitment to deliver Brexit under a pro-Brexit minister. Allen (2017: 107) makes a similar point in stating that her ‘qualified support for EU membership and her immediate acceptance of the referendum result enabled her to win over some pro-Brexit MPs ’. This suggests that for some observers, May represented a potential unifying force who could establish a via media in her negotiating of Brexit and 2 During her term as Home Secretary, Theresa May also held the position as Minister for Women and Equalities until September 2012. 3 Originally in the running prior to Michael Gove’s declaration of candidacy, Johnson was favoured to win the leadership contest had he remained in the running.

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reconcile the diverging preferences within her party. Data suggest that 91% of MPs who backed Remain in the referendum supported her for Prime Minister (Heppell et al., 2017; Jeffrey et al., 2018: 277). Overall, 185 Conservatives declared support for Remain compared to 138 Conservatives who supported Leave (BBC, 2016). However, despite her initial pro-EU sentiments, she wielded a relatively greater level of support from social Conservatives compared to her leading pro-Brexit opponents. Her election bid for party leader gained momentum amongst her peers due to her commitment to fulfilling Brexit alongside her commitment to unite a fragmented British society in the face of the constitutional crisis under a one-nation Conservative ethos. She employed unifying rhetoric which alluded to her willingness to defend the wishes of the whole country and not just a ‘privileged few’. She also won confidence from all corners of the party by claiming that Article 50 would not be activated until the British position on Brexit was carefully architected under a pro-Leave Brexit secretary (The Guardian, 2016b). Upon assuming office, May adopted a seemingly unyielding pro-Brexit position. Seeking to legitimise her premiership with the electorate and attempting to strengthen the pro-Leave arithmetic of parliament, she initiated a gravely miscalculated general election in June 2017. Returning a bare majority of Conservatives to parliament, her ill-chosen election established a series of constraints that eroded opportunities to wield governing competence over her Brexit policy. Relying on the controversial and contentious Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) for support in the face of a myriad of domestic and international constraints, she soon found her leadership and ability to deliver Brexit significantly foiled. The credibility of her leadership worsened due to a series of policy U-turns in the face of deepening parliamentary constraints and multiple rejections of her withdrawal bills. Although initially employing an authoritative political narrative that won her support amongst her party and with the electorate, her multiple miscalculations in the face of increasing constraints affected her ability to maintain support amongst her party, and eventually her ability to deliver alternatively proposed forms of Brexit; let alone the Brexit she originally promised. In short, May failed to wield and command Statecraft over her Brexit policy.

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Conceptualising Statecraft Statecraft is simply defined as the ability for a political party (or leadership candidate) to win elections and assume a degree of governing/ executive competence during a given term of office (Bulpitt, 1986: 21). In democracies (at least), for Statecraft to be realised, elections are necessary. However, elections are but only the means to achieve power. The true measure of Statecraft lies in a party or leaders’ ability to wield, assert, and maintain power in office and to assert political competence over the direction and achievement of desired policies and/or policy outcomes. Parties and leaders can win elections but not necessarily unlock Statecraft. As such, the two terms are not mutually inclusive. Measuring governing competence is not an easy endeavour. The degree of governing competence a party or leader wields is influenced by a multitude of factors from mere institutional constraints surrounding their office, to international political-economic constraints shaped by a state’s relationship to the national preferences of foreign states in the international system. ‘…governing competence will be primarily a function of policy implementation, and the relationship between external problems and forces and the domestic scene’ (Bulpitt, 1986: 22). At its very core, the path to Statecraft is dependent on favourable public (or party) opinion made possible by a winning electoral strategy, e.g., asserting persuasive political rhetoric and offering guarantees of publicly (or party) favourable policy-delivery. Following election, successful Statecraft becomes ever more dependent on the consistency and saliency of party management, political argument hegemony, and governing competences (Bulpitt, 1986: 21–22). The eventual success of Statecraft during a period in office measured against a party or a party leader is finally marked by the party or leaders’ ability to be re-elected. However, a word of caution follows this rather simplistic and phased account toward Statecraft; for the re-election of a party or even a leader is not necessarily an accurate measure of a previously successful assumption and/or assertion of Statecraft. The cases of Theresa May and subsequently the Conservative Party under Boris Johnson attest to this. Re-election can be made possible merely by a lack of viable (party/ candidate) alternatives during a difficult political situation or crises, or it can occur with substantial quantitative loss to party strength; neither of which necessarily reflect previously robust Statecraft. This adds weight to Griffith’s (2016: 741) argument that despite the many merits of Statecraft theory, analysts ought not to become too dependent on its narrow tenets

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as it can sometimes stifle ‘ontological, epistemological and methodological ’ dimension of analysis. Although May initially asserted a degree of political argument hegemony through her Brexitist language (Marlow-Stevens & Hayton, 2021: 878), over time she failed to offer her electorate realistic solutions to the promises she made to them regarding the UK’s full departure from the EU. Following an ill-timed election in 2017, she failed to return a parliamentary majority and had no option but to rely on a constraining minority regional party for support. She failed to manage/unify her party (and cabinet) and failed to govern with competence in the face of a series of structural constraints as evidenced by her multiple failures to see a Brexit deal passed through parliament (see Bulpitt, 1986; MarlowStevens & Hayton, 2020). As Bulpitt concludes, the ‘art of Statecraft’ is best captured by an elite’s ability to identify and work with the constraints or limitation on their path in a spirit of ‘damage control ’, rather than working against those constraints (Bulpitt, 1986: 39). By the time May chose to accept and work with the constraints in her path, the damage was beyond control.

Nascent Constraints: Populist Rhetoric and Premature Promises Although May initially demonstrated lukewarm support for the EU project prior to her premiership, she soon adopted a staunchly hard-Brexit approach. The 2016 referendum was not constitutionally binding, but it was binary in choice. Inheriting the leadership of a party which won a general election based on a Leave mandate meant she had no feasible option but to fulfil the demands of the British electorate to avert damage to the credibility of her party, and to herself. However, seeking to firmly establish a staunch hard-Brexit position was a folly move given that the 2016 referendum was not only initiated without a clear plan but she too failed to bring a clear plan to the table early on in her leadership. Marlow-Stevens and Hayton (2021: 873–880) suggest that the style of May’s appeals (via ethos and pathos ) for British public support impacted her opportunity to effectively negotiate Brexit. Her approach empowered the constraining preferences of Brexiteers. To wield influence in negotiations, leaders not only require opportunity structures that bolster bargaining leverage, but they ought to appear cooperative. Effective negotiations require compromise to succeed. As processes of

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preference bargaining, constructive negotiations are not meant to wield zero-sum outcomes but are ideally pareto-efficient when accounting for actors’ relative power or influence in the face of bargaining constraints. Pareto-efficiency maximises the (reasonable) achievement of preferences and provides opportunities for continued cooperation in good faith. Despite understanding the conventions of international negotiations, May’s fervent commitment to the extreme preferences of the British public suggested otherwise. Established with little or no consideration for the medium to long-term ramifications of her approach, a seemingly hard-Brexit soon became the UK’s official negotiating position which effectively left her with little room for strategic manoeuvre and concession seeking when negotiating constraints later became apparent (see Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019: 684). Political rhetoric can have profound impacts on the trajectory of policy-choices and policy-making outcomes (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019). Simply, rhetoric as a force of appeal can (negatively) bind a leader to a particular course of action and significantly influence the policy responses/reactions of decision-making counterparts (Roe-Crines, 2020; Thurner & Urban Pappi, 2009: 77). In her initial appeals to the public, May articulated an uncompromising approach to achieving Brexit. This was often expressed with a degree of arrogance which armoured the logos behind her withdrawal, an approach that may have impressed her supporters but significantly frustrated her counterparts in Brussels (Independent, 2018b). The Binding Force of Rhetoric May’s political rhetoric exuded populist pathos. This was particularly conveyed in her leadership launch Speech on the 11th of July 2016 in which she stated that ‘we must leave the European Union – and forge a new role for ourselves in the world. And we must make Britain a country that works not for a privileged few but for every single one of us ’ (UKPOL.CO.UK, 2017). Older, working-class voters were her target audience. Members of this class contributed heavily to the Leave referendum vote (Ipsos, 2016). Attempting to empathise with the inequalities experienced by this stratum of society, she sought to bolster support for Brexit by recalling the 2008 financial crash, austerity, employment insecurity, migration-induced wage reductions, and exploitation by the private and public elites; the latter whom were apparently preoccupied

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with challenging the Brexit result. During the October 2016 Conservative Party Conference speech in Birmingham, she referred to Brexit as Britain’s ‘quiet revolution’ and correlated the UK’s post-crisis economic hardship with the failures of liberalism and globalisation, suggesting that such failures were exacerbated by EU membership. In the same speech, she vowed to defend the British Union from divisive forces. She deemed Brexit as the collective will of the working people and staunchly defended their choice to leave the EU from the ad hominem attacks of elites who suggested that Brexiteers did not know what they were voting for. In defending her support base, she snubbed the experiences of the ‘well-off and comfortable’ who seemingly did not understand the concerns of the ordinary citizen (Independent, 2016a, 2016b). As per the preamble of the 2017 Conservative Party Manifesto, she spoke of ‘governing in the interests of the mainstream of the British public’ and being ‘guided by what matters to the ordinary, working families of this nation’, families who ‘have been ignored by politicians ’ (Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2017). It is clear throughout these early speeches that May perceived Brexit as the working class’ journey, and to be successful in her leadership, it was imperative that she satisfy those interests which ultimately fell in line with a hard-Brexit motivated by patriotic sentiments, immigration, and employment concerns, and (immigration related) crime control. During her Lancaster House speech on the 17th of January 2017, she spoke of the constitutional, political, and cultural differences between the UK and continental Europe. She assured Britain’s ongoing support and friendship with European ‘friends ’ by affirming that ‘we are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe….’ (GOV.UK, 2017a), but she also said that the UK’s departure will not be one that is partial in character. ‘We do not seek to adopt a model already enjoyed by other countries. We do not seek to hold on to bits of membership as we leave’ (GOV.UK, 2017a). Concrete Commitments Getting things done in Europe entails a strategic effort to produce timely, coherent and sensible national policies positions, and to build support for these at the European level. (Geuijen et al., 2008: 52)

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May’s early statements which constitute her attempts at winning political argument hegemony did not offer confidence to her negotiating counterparts in Brussels. Her statements appeared void of the reality of the constraints which lay before her administration. A pro-Brexit Conservative MP stated that ‘it would have been much more appropriate for May to express a more nuanced approach from the outset ’ for this may have facilitated her negotiating manoeuvre (Participant C, 2021c). In attempting to build political argument hegemony, it is clear her approach to building Statecraft over Brexit was centred on her fervent and unyielding commitment to a ‘hard’ Brexit; one being the whole of the UK remaining outside of the EU single market and customs union (Allen, 2017: 117). In attempting to bolster her support and credibility as the leader of Brexit, her uncompromising position firmly bound her to her promise, which the path of time has shown could not be delivered. Her position isolated, and emboldened the defensive reactions of her negotiating counterparts in Brussels which later impacted her ability to negotiate the constitutional, legal, and functional constraints that became more apparent as the Brexit process matured. In her Florence speech on the 22nd of September 2017, May alluded to the belief that the EU would be flexible in their future arrangements with the UK. Afterall, the EU had a long history of forging creative relationships with non-member countries (GOV.UK, 2017b). However, May overestimated the leverage her staunch Brexit position afforded her, believing that it would win her concessions to achieve a full departure and a free trade agreement without any functional ties and hindrances. As the constraints underpinning departure became more apparent, she employed secrecy and even silence to save face. She was dishonest with her supporters by downplaying and even actively avoiding publicly discussing the costs and trade-offs of Brexit for the UK (Bloomberg UK, 2019; Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019: 683). Consequentially, she deprived the public of important information about the potential impacts of Brexit. One interviewee stated that May’s ‘solution was to frame departure in term of regaining sovereignty, without being clear that we would depart but not without any major consequences ’ (Participant C, 2021c). It appeared that her initial concern was not with the technicalities of the negotiation process but rather with bolstering her support amongst the public; perhaps influenced by the manner through which she secured her mandate to govern, i.e., through a party leadership contest. There was a sense that she ‘… knowingly and explicitly set mutually exclusive and

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thus unachievable goals, creating far too many false hopes ’ (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019: 683). As time passed, she sold the withdrawal process as free from major obstacles; or at the very least, with obstacles that could be easily overcome through British determination, strength, and negotiating competence. She justified this by overplaying Britain’s global economic strength and political influence as a sovereign and independent entity. She presented the British negotiating position as authoritative and with sufficient leverage to achieve a complete departure from the EU whilst also gaining much desired free trade agreements that would foster a relationship of equality between the two unions. ‘We do not approach these negotiations expecting failure, but anticipating success ’ (GOV.UK, 2017a). For all intents and purposes, the British approach to Brexit from the beginning ‘is’ reminiscent of improvisation. It was clear that May and her team were ignorant (whether intentionally or unintentionally) toward the complex economic, legal, political, and constitutional consequences that the desire of departure would bring; consequences which would significantly limit the extent of the UK’s options and require the government to make difficult choices. However, at this point in her premiership, May’s public image as a leader ‘who’ would get Brexit done was far more important than facing the realities and detailing of ‘how’ Brexit would get done. This manifested itself in her unexpected call for a general election, not only as an attempt to strengthen her bargaining hand in a relatively strong pro-Remain parliament, but as an attempt to win legitimacy of leadership from the electorate.

The 2017 General Election and the DUP May initially demonstrated a very strong sense of direction…. to begin with she was very clear sighted but something happened around the time of the general election which changed things. (Participant B, 2021b)

Having won the Conservative Party leadership race in 2016, May inherited a party which commanded a majority in the Commons with 331 seats. However, it was fragile and divided majority with a mere 5 seats above the threshold. Three-quarters of MPs campaigned against leaving the EU prior to the Brexit referendum in 2016, and 56% of Conservatives were in fact Remainers (Allen, 2017: 106–107). Given that any

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Brexit withdrawal bill would have to be put before parliament, she was in a precarious position as the leader who fervently promised time again that ‘Brexit means Brexit ’. Constraining intra-party conditions prompted May to seek a stronger parliamentary majority that would enhance her governing competences. An unexpected general election on the 8th of June 2017 became the (intended) means to return a pro-Leave majority (BBC, 2017). Unexpected Election, Unexpected Outcome Prior to the 2017 general election, opinion poll data suggested a Tory victory with a Sevanta ComRes poll suggesting Tories would secure 50% share of the vote against 25% for Labour. However nearing election day, a Financial Times poll (2017a) suggested a 44% share of the vote, with Labour securing 36%. The outcome of the election resulted in a hung parliament with the Conservatives losing their majority by 13 seats, having only secured a mere 318 of the 650 available seats. Albeit remaining the largest party in parliament having secured 42.4% of the vote (an increase from 36.9% in 2015), the Labour party under the pro-Remain Jeremy Corbyn followed with 40% of the vote, adding even more difficulties to an already seemingly impossible situation (Financial Times, 2017b). May evidently overplayed her hand in holding the general election, relying too heavily on trends in public opinion polls (see YouGov, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c), as well as Conservative successes in the 2017 local elections which took place a mere two weeks following her call for the general election. In local elections, the Tories won 61% of available seats in England, nearly double the percentage won in the 2016 elections. In contrast, Labour secured a humble 18% (UK Parliament, 2017). The DUP: A Constraint on Departure The outcome of the ill-fated general election left May will little option but to form a precarious minority government bolstered by support from Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). This was not only constitutionally controversial but was a political gaffe which contributed to further demise in her governing competence.4 ‘Having to rely on the 4 The deal was considered constitutionally controversial as its undermined impartiality clauses within the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. Observers accused the Tory party of

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DUP came as a huge shock to her and it was palpable after that we had less confidence’ (Participant B, 2021b). Staunchly Unionist and long motivated by fears of any developments or structures that could make a United Ireland likely, the party naturally accepted the opportunity to prop up the British government. The opportunity provided the party with the means to leverage its regional and national interest; the latter which sat firmly with a UK-wide departure from the EU. For the DUP, an absolute departure from the EU was considered a long-term guarantee against the ever-creeping spectre of Irish unification. Tonge (2017: 413–414) suggested that the DUP’s new-found position in the corridors of power could have been an opportunity for the party to influence a softer Brexit given their desire to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland. In a strange twist of fate, this proved somewhat correct, because by initially rejecting May’s proposed polices of Special Status for Northern Ireland, the DUP constrained the rest of Great Britain’s departure options. In turn, they (unintentionally) influenced May to effectively concede to a soft-Brexit via the proposed backstop. However, due to rejections of the backstop, the DUP lost an opportunity to shape a Brexit outcome that could not only have been workable but could have significantly improved their regional, national, and international reputations.5 Short of a coalition, May’s relationship with the DUP came in the form of a Confidence and Supply Agreement. Published on the 26th of June 2017, the deal seemingly cemented the Tory minority government’s position through the DUP’s ‘guaranteed’ full support for the government’s Brexit position. The cost of the guarantee was financial concessions amounting to £1 billion (GOV.UK, 2020). Despite May perceiving the agreement as an opportunity to bolster her governing competence over Brexit, the language of the Confidence and Supply Agreement potentially challenged this opportunity from the start. On paper, the DUP committed to support the government in its Brexit policy, which as per May’s post-election speech was unequivocally in line with a full departure for the whole of the UK from the EU (see Independent, 2017b).

elevating the influence of the Unionists whilst stifling the voices and concerns of the nationalists in Northern Ireland. 5 An Ironic development because the backstop not only avoided a north-south border on the island of Ireland but was favourable to Remainers from both sides of the parliamentary house, as well as all major parties in Ireland. Such a ‘feat’ could have legitimised acclaim for the party.

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However, whilst the agreement states that ‘the DUP also agrees to support the government on legislation pertaining to the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union’, it follows by stating that ‘……support on other matters will be agreed on a case-by-case basis ’ (GOV.UK, 2020). In hindsight, the ambiguity of such wording gave licence to the DUP to U-turn on their support for May’s Brexit policy by rejecting her proposal for Special Status for Northern Ireland followed by rejections of her infamous Irish Backstop. The Conservatives did not initially expect the DUP to become a constraining force toward departure, as both the DUP and the Conservatives were like-minded on their policy of UK-wide departure from the EU, and their commitment to preserving the integrity of the UK. However, the agreement was a grave miscalculation on May’s part. Aside from not fully grasping the ambiguities and inherent contradictions of the DUP’s preferences, the Northern Irish Secretary would not be a member of the coordination committee through which the DUP would be consulted on the direction of government policy. This further cemented the DUP’s voice in the committee considering that governance in the devolved region of Northern Ireland had previously reverted to Westminster due to the breakdown of the power-sharing arrangement with Sinn Fein. In turn, the overwhelmingly Remain supporting nationalist community had neither representation in Stormont nor in Westminster, whilst the Pro-Brexit Unionist community was firmly seated in the anti-chamber of national power. In addition, the agreement was not even conditional on the restoration of power-sharing relations between Sinn Fein and the DUP (Tonge, 2017: 413). If it had been the case, one may speculate that nationalist representatives could have found a channel to assert their position and perhaps even influence an agreed backstop. Perhaps that is something May could have relied upon later on when negotiating constraints (associated with the Irish border) became ever more apparent.

Irish Border: Underestimation and Consequence Under May’s leadership, the UK’s broad objectives pertained to ending the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) jurisdiction over the UK, controlling immigration, and unifying the UK outside the EU. Deviating from these objectives, the UK’s national preferences came to entailing a full departure from the EU, as well as its single market for the whole

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of the UK, a rejection of any potential customs union arrangement and the creation of free trade agreement with the EU as an independent and sovereign third country (Maatelaer, 2017: 5–6). A UK-wide departure from the EU would require the erection of border on the island of Ireland. This would disrupt all-island trade relations, undermine the terms and institutional competences established by the Good Friday Agreement, and risk (already fragile) cross-communal relations. In addition, a border would be necessary to maintain the integrity of the EU single market, as Northern Ireland would be the only part of the UK sharing a landmass with an EU State and a land border with the EU. Overall, there was a considerable degree of ignorance toward the constraining features underlying the Irish border issue. ‘I think we assumed the structures [of the GFA] were strong enough to deal with the outcome and that they [Southern & Northern Irish] moved on from that ’ (Participant C, 2021c). Due to the constitutional, economic, and political consequences (and requirements) for an Irish border in the event of a UK-wide departure from the EU, European negotiators (bolstered by US support) used the border as an opportunity structure to gain negotiating leverage and constrain British negotiating manoeuvre. However, as one interviewee stated, ‘I don’t think we thought that it was fair or appropriate that some were using the potential re-emergence of cross-community violence [influenced by a border] as a case against Brexit ’ (Participant C, 2021c). To depart with a free trade agreement, the UK would have to ensure the avoidance of a border on the island of Ireland. This left May with a limited set of options; none of which were acceptable to the DUP and/ or members of her cabinet and wider party. These included: (1) A special arrangement for Northern Ireland to remain aligned with the EU’s single market/customs union with no North-South border on the island of Ireland. And a full departure for Great Britain with an EU trade deal and customs border in the Irish Sea. Or

(2) Continued UK-wide membership of the EU’s customs union/ single market ensuring avoidance of a North-South border on the island of Ireland, and avoidance of a border in the Irish Sea.

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Or

(3) Full departure for the whole of the UK without a trade deal with the EU, and the erection of a North-South border on the island of Ireland. There was not only significant underestimation regarding the impact that the Irish border (McNamara, 2020) issue would have on her preferences for departure, but May clearly did not foresee the impact that the DUP would have on her ability to navigate constraints and see a deal passed. The degree of ignorance toward the Northern Irish border issue, combined with the Confidence and Supply Agreement with a controversial regional political party who was incapable of managing its own ‘home affairs’, arguably became one of the greatest miscalculations and constraints on May’s governing competence (see McNamara, 2020). This miscalculation was born from a deep-rooted ignorance toward Irish political history (Open Democracy, 2017) which made the agreement with the DUP arguably one of the greatest decision-making failures of her premiership. In attempting to reconcile EU demands (avoidance of a Northern-South Irish border), and DUP objections toward Special Status for Northern Ireland (and an Irish sea border), followed by three parliamentary rejections of the 2018 Withdrawal Bill in the first quarter of 2019; May not only failed to deliver the Brexit she promised to her electorate, but she essentially could not deliver any form of Brexit. In stalemate, due to losing control over key forces such as the DUP and backbenchers, her governing competence was obsolete.

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The Lady ‘Was’ for Turning At the time, I assumed basic competences at the level of my superiors and that getting Brexit done was a slogan and the detailed work was getting done underneath it…...that competence wasn’t there. (Participant C, 2021c)

A key element of Margaret Thatcher’s Statecraft was her fervent ‘consistency and purpose of policy’ (Bulpitt, 1986: 20), best captured in her infamous declaration: ‘the Lady is not for turning ’. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for May. A series of U-turns on key promises and commitments significantly damaged the credibility of her political argument hegemony, her ability to secure governing competence, and manage her political party. As previously mentioned, many of May’s negotiating battles were domestic in nature, merely bolstered by self-defeating miscalculations, not least her premature and ill-fated 2017 general election (Washington Post, 2018). The choice to run that election marked the beginning of a series of U-turns. On inheriting the party leadership in 2016, she vowed repeatedly that a snap general election would not take place and that the country needed a period of stability which the 2015 general election made possible (see Independent, 2017; The New Statesman, 2017). Apart from attempting to strengthen her governing competence, one Conservative MP suggested that her U-turn and choice to hold the general election that paved her demise was sourced ‘partly in hubris ’ (Participant C, 2021c), meaning that her backtrack on a core promise was sourced in vanity and furthering her professional self-interest. Aside from backtracking on her election promise, May’s position on Brexit became ever more inconsistent. It diverged further away from the narrative that initially wielded political argument hegemony within her party and amongst the public. Despite the staunch ‘no deal is better than a bad deal ’ narrative which she asserted to strengthen her hand in the negotiations, it soon became clear that the economic and political costs of a no-deal Brexit would likely far outweigh the costs of remaining in the EU; and that deal was fundamentally dependent on solving the Irish border issue. In response to this constraint, none of her proposals essentially served the purpose of a full UK-wide Brexit. Special status for Northern Ireland essentially divided the UK and defiled one-nation conservativism.

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The subsequent unyielding Irish backstop proposal was perceived as a perpetual trap to keep the UK in the EU (McNamara, 2020). As negotiations entrenched, and more and more communiques were drafted, a no-deal scenario was simply declared a non-option. However, as a Conservative MP stated: ‘once you buy into the belief that a No Deal was not an option, you have lost your bargaining power’ (Participant A, 2021a), and this is exactly what happened. In accepting that a no-deal was not an option, May publicly surrendered to the array of constraints that made a true Brexit for the whole of the UK practically impossible. In turn, nullifying her national promise. Although her U-turn on a no-deal/hardBrexit was influenced by factors outside of her control, as Prime Minister she still clearly retreated from the promises and guarantees which she made to her supporters. As Prime Minister, full responsibility for such retreat lay upon her alone. Following the series of failed withdrawal bills in the first quarter of 2019, and soon approaching the departure deadline, it became clearer that May’s time in office was soon reaching an end. She had lost political argument hegemony, control over her party and wider parliament, and ultimately lost governing competence over Brexit. Under significant pressure to uphold the integrity of government, her own professional integrity, and her promise to deliver Brexit, she took the folly decision to seek support from pro-Leave Labour MPs. In doing so, she failed to uphold any of these endeavours. By offering to renegotiate key parts of the political declaration, as well as considering a second referendum (The New York Times , 2019) as a means to garner public support for her deal to wield leverage over a divided and belligerent parliament, her last-minute attempts to execute Statecraft over Brexit fundamentally imploded.

From U-Turn to Losing Control So however, frustrating some people find it, the government will not be pressured into saying more than I believe it is in our national interest to say. Because it is not my job to fill column inches with daily updates, but to get the right deal for Britain. And that is what I intend to do. (GOV.UK, 2017a)

The Brexit negotiation process obviously adopted an ‘us vs. them’ dynamic, with the EU presenting as a united force whose preferences were

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the complete antithesis of the UK’s (see Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019: 685). Arguably, May’s initial hard-Brexit approach was responsible for the materialisation of this dynamic. This was aided by her decision to populate her cabinet, and advisory team early on with political personalities that supported an unyielding hard-Brexit position. Her myopic descision appears more acute when one factors in the collective deficit in understanding the consequences of a hard-Brexit amongst those within the cabinet. One interviewee (of a pro-Brexit persuasion) criticised May’s aggregation of power away from wider parliament toward her tight-knit nucleus of power consisting of fervent hard-Brexit supporters. The interviewee subsequently remarked that there was much discussion around parliament regarding the extent to which May was ‘being moved by others [particularly hardliners] in the background’, particularly her chief advisor, Nick Timothy. Essentially, despite a multitude of constraints thwarting her governing competence, and the fulfilling of her promises to the electorate, she was being constantly pressured by a small set of ardent Brexiteers who hindered her ability to be fluid in the light of obvious negotiating constraints (Participant C, 2021c). However, another interviewee argued on the contrary by stating that it was in fact the loss of Nick Timothy (as a hardliner), as well as the growing influence of soft-Brexit Whitehall civil servants that put a full departure into peril (Participant A, 2021a). He argued that had May remained unyielding and fervent and not responded to constraints, she would have been far more successful in terms of wielding governing competence over Brexit. Regardless of semantics, the behaviour of centralising power into the hands of an elite few is often risqué (Bulpitt, 1986: 38), especially if such select few are unyielding in their positions despite harbouring little negotiating leverage. May isolated very capable backbenchers whom she deemed as anti-Brexit (Bloomberg UK, 2019), but whom she initially promised would have influence over the direction of Brexit. The irony is that these backbenchers, both outside cabinet, and if potentially added to her cabinet, could have provided her with significant leverage to reconstitute her narrative and secure a workable Brexit deal in the face of negotiating constraints. Despite placing much faith in her inner circle and remaining hostile to backbenchers, May later suffered fragmentations amongst her confidantes with cabinet members soon becoming hostile to her intra-cabinet secretive behaviour influenced by her gradual softening approach (U-turns) toward Brexit. Her lack of transparency, consultation, and consistency in

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approach led to several leaks from ministers which significantly undermined her leadership (Worthy & Heide, 2019: 585–589). The consequences of her emergent secrecy and lack of communication with her wider team is especially captured in the infamous resignations of her chief negotiators, David Davis, and later his successor, Dominic Raab, who both overtly attributed their resignations to her ever softening approach toward Brexit and her subsequent withdrawal bills that seemingly kept UK sovereignty locked in the hands of the EU whilst having no decision-making influence (see BBC, 2018; Institute for Government, 2020; The Guardian, 2018). May clearly lapsed in her staunch promise which initially enticed both representatives to undertake the role to negotiate a hard-Brexit. Overall, aside from an inability to control the DUP, the loss of key hard-Brexit cabinet ministers was indicative of losing further control within her party, and ultimately governing competence over Brexit.

Conclusion I have done everything I can to convince MPs to back that deal. Sadly, I have not been able to do so. I tried three times…. It will be for my successor to seek a way forward that honours the result of the referendum. To succeed, he or she will have to find consensus in parliament where I have not. Such a consensus can only be reached if those on all sides of the debate are willing to compromise. (GOV.UK, 2019)

The purpose of this chapter was to explore Theresa May’s approach to negotiate Brexit. The central claim was that May failed to wield effective Statecraft over her Brexit policy due to a series of self-induced miscalculations and constraints which thwarted negotiating capacity. In measuring May’s Brexit Statecraft against Bulpitt’s criteria, her selfdeclared failure is wholly captured in her resignation speech delivered on the 24th of May 2019 (see GOV.UK, 2019). To reiterate, Bulpitt’s criteria for effective Statecraft in government and over a given policy area entails asserting political argument hegemony, securing a winning electoral strategy, effective party management, and governing competences. Although May asserted political argument hegemony early on in her leadership, the nature of her rhetoric proved to hinder her negotiating

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capacity, as opposed to offering her leverage over the UK’s departure from the EU. It is also pertinent to note that May never secured a winning electoral strategy. She neither entered power following a publicwide electoral appeal in 2016, and she subsequently lost a governing majority in following the ill-chosen general election in 2017. Following this damning election and having to rely on the DUP for support amidst a divided Conservative Party, May found her withdrawal bills rejected time again. The impact of external and internal structural constraints on her manoeuvre shaped her ever softening position and subsequent U-turns toward Brexit which further hindered her command over her cabinet and her party. In sum, with an inability to get Brexit done, a loss of governing integrity, and an untimely resignation induced by defeat, it is unquestionable that May failed to wield governing competence over Brexit.

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Elite Interviews Participant A. (2021a). Interview conducted via Zoom. 30th August 2021. Participant B. (2021b). Interview conducted via Zoom. 31st August 2021. Participant C. (2021c). Interview conducted via Zoom. 13th September 2021.

CHAPTER 6

Foreign Policy Under Theresa May Kate Barry and Peter Kerr

Introduction Britain’s exit from the European Union inevitably triggered the need for a re-orientation of Britain’s foreign policy objectives, its relations with other states and its wider role within the world. However, tasked with managing that transition, Theresa May’s foreign policy can largely be characterised as ad hoc, reactive and confused. Her term in office was dominated by her attempts to negotiate the broad details of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU and carefully navigate a complex series of deep divisions within her own party, across Parliament and throughout the country as a whole. In the midst of these efforts, we can detect a general lack of strategic thinking or a coherent foreign policy plan. In some ways, this reflects the broader character of the ‘Leave’ campaign in the run-up to the referendum. Beyond a number of largely hollow soundbites, such as ‘taking back control’, there was little concrete attempt, prior to the referendum,

K. Barry (B) · P. Kerr University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK e-mail: [email protected] P. Kerr e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_6

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to detail how leaving the EU would impact foreign policy and how the UK government should respond to the new challenges it would face. In this chapter, we examine Theresa May’s attempts to navigate some of the complex sets of foreign policy challenges her government faced. In doing so, we show that the government struggled to respond coherently to the decision to leave the EU. Policy became driven by confused and often empty concepts such as the slogan ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and the ambitiously vague idea of ‘Global Britain’. This paralysing lack of strategic direction was further compounded by the political decision, by May, to try to placate some of the most ardent Leave supporters, by attempting to accelerate Britain’s withdrawal process. This represented a largely performative approach to policy-making driven often by party management decisions than by any substantive strategic direction. The result was that Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy direction remained in flux throughout May’s premiership and has continued to remain so under her three immediate predecessors.

Little Britain or Global Britain? One of the key concerns for those who opposed Britain’s decision to leave the EU was that Brexit would accelerate Britain’s longer-term decline as a global power and leave the UK relatively isolated on the world stage. Fuelled, to some extent, by a type of English nationalism (Henderson & Jones, 2021), and posing a potential threat to the longer-term integrity of the UK as a political union, some critics feared that Brexit was being driven by a type of ‘little Englander’ outlook. In the face of these types of criticism, much of the UK government’s foreign policy energy postBrexit has been directed towards trying to counter this perception, by reemphasising Britain’s focus as an outward-looking, global power. In such a context, from May’s Premiership onwards, Britain has sought to cast itself into a number of different and often contradictory roles, including that of: global trading state; great power; faithful ally to the USA; regional partner to the EU; and leader of the Commonwealth (Oppermann et al., 2020). For many Brexiteers, it is the ‘regionalist’ mentality of the EU which has worked to confine Britain’s wider ‘global’ reach, and therefore, Brexit provides a golden opportunity for the UK to regain some of its former autonomy, status and power on the global stage. Theresa May’s attempts to grapple with this mission became encapsulated in the phrase ‘Global

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Britain’, a term coined prior to the referendum but which took firm hold following May’s speech at her first Conservative Party Conference as leader in October 2016 (May, 2016a). Two key foreign policy goals were articulated in this early iteration of the idea of Global Britain: firstly, to continue a ‘mature, co-operative relationship’ with the EU and, secondly, to forge an ‘ambitious and optimistic new role’ for the UK in terms of world trade. Arguably, this ‘ambitious vision for Britain’, as May put it, largely spelled out what was already fairly obvious to most—namely that Britain would now need a new relationship with the EU and would also need to find new trading agreements. May’s newly appointed foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, was one of the leading exponents of the ‘Global Britain’ narrative. In his first official policy speech, Johnson stated his vision of ‘a global Britain running a truly global foreign policy’, as opposed to a nation ‘hauling up the drawbridge or slamming the door’ (Johnson, 2016b). Johnson stated that Britain would play a key role in contributing towards global peace, prosperity, stability and order (Johnson, 2016b). Describing Britain as a ‘flying buttress’ to the EU’s church, Johnson emphasised the importance of NATO and the need to maintain resolve against Russia. He also went on to discuss trade opportunities in Asia and development opportunities in Africa. Some commentators have noted that Johnson’s rhetoric around these types of themes was consistently underpinned by ‘British imperial and post-colonial discourses of ‘developing’ or ‘civilizing’ Africa and other parts of the globe’ (Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2017). Nevertheless, Johnson’s early foreign policy speeches provided no definitional clarity on what ‘Global Britain’ was to mean, or any substantive strategy on how to get there. As such, the term remained vague, lacking specificity beyond broadly undefined ambitions such as expressed in May’s Lancaster House speech, when she spoke of a ‘great, global trading nation that is respected around the world and strong, confident and united at home’ (May, 2017a). By the end of 2017, there was no indication that this vision had been transformed into any form of strategy or represented any meaningful change to the foreign policy pursued by previous administrations. In March 2018, the Foreign Affairs Committee published the first of a series of reports on ‘Global Britain’, highlighting a key concern around the lack of substance:

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If it is to be perceived as a superficial branding exercise, [Global Britain] risks undermining UK interests by damaging our reputation overseas and eroding support for a global outlook here at home. (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018a)

The Committee stated that ‘no minister during our inquiry was able to give the Committee a definitive explanation of ‘Global Britain’’. Pointedly, the Committee also noted that it took ‘repeated requests’ before the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) produced, some two months late, written evidence to the inquiry on its strategy. The House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations similarly pointed to the overall lack of definitional clarity: The Government’s Global Britain branding needs more definition if it is to be an effective tool in the promotion and re-positioning of the UK in a transformed international landscape. (House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, 2018)

Despite the government’s tardiness in responding to its requests, the Foreign Affairs Committee was able to identify some key foreign policy themes emerging from various government statements. These included: an international outlook; old friends and new allies; support for the international rules-based system; and a commitment to free trade. To some extent, these reflect the earliest attempts by the UK government to find new ‘roles’ for itself within the international system, post-Brexit (Oppermann et al., 2020). Underpinning these early themes were the two overarching concerns of trade and security. The former was an unavoidable focus for postEU foreign policy, with the UK looking to maintain at least the existing arrangements with the EU and third countries through the EU, while also demonstrating that it was capable of pursuing successful global trade outside the EU. Britain’s existing status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, its reputation as a diplomatic power and its existing defence expenditure, underpinned ambitions to remain a global leader on security and defence. Nevertheless, the only formal FCO statements on Global Britain during May’s administration were produced to the above-mentioned select committees, during February and March 2018. It would take until Spring 2021—nearly five years after the referendum in which, May

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(2017b) claimed, the electorate had chosen to ‘build a Global Britain’— before a more detailed policy paper was produced (FCO, 2021). The earlier FCO evidence to the select committees, during May’s Premiership, had claimed to set out a strategic vision of Global Britain. Yet, neither document was clear on how this vision represented a change to existing foreign policy or how the vision would enable the UK’s response to its changing role after leaving the EU. Perhaps more surprising given the circumstances, the FCO memorandum stated that ‘strategic foreign policy objectives have not changed’ (FCO, 2018b, paragraph 8) despite both papers acknowledging that a ‘new, deep and special relationship’ will be required with the EU (FCO, 2017). It seemed to some extent that the government’s position appeared generally out of touch with the reality of having left the EU and the potential implications of this for Britain’s international position. In November 2018, the Foreign Affairs Committee asked the government ‘again…to properly define Global Britain’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018b, p. 3). In response, the government continued to fail to provide any clarity on the concept, instead pointing to recent events such as the response to the Salisbury poisoning attack, hosting the Commonwealth Heads of States Meeting (hosted by Britain only after the original host, Vanuatu, suffered devastating hurricane damage) and hosting the Western Balkans summit (a commitment predating the referendum) as evidence of ‘Global Britain in action’ (HM Government, 2019b). None of these examples represented a meaningful change to existing policy. Notably, May made no reference to Global Britain in her address to the UN General Assembly in September 2018. According to Gifkins et al. (2019), from a UN diplomatic perspective, the concept was generally viewed by the government as a slogan used for domestic purposes, with little utility on the international stage. When Jeremy Hunt took over the role of Foreign Secretary in July 2018, in what was to become his first major role as a Conservative ‘fixer’, ‘Global Britain’ rhetoric had quietened. Hunt outlined a new ambition, for Britain to ‘become an invisible chain linking the world’s democracies’ (Hunt, 2018). This closely reflected Johnson’s ambition for Britain to be a ‘soft power superpower’ (Johnson, 2016a), promoting expansion of Britain’s diplomatic network together with existing security capacity, creating a ‘unique combination of soft and hard power’ (Hunt, 2018). However, in a notable shift in tone from his predecessor, Hunt suggested starting with a ‘realistic assessment of our global position’ (Hunt, 2019a).

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Emphasising Britain’s capacity to act as a global conduit for democratic values and the international order, Hunt was keen to highlight the UK’s role in establishing the existing international order: Britain’s hand in designing and defending the world order in the last century surely reveals our mission for the next; not a superpower but as a global power, binding together democracies who share our values and playing a decisive role in making the world safer, healthier and wealthier. (Hunt, 2019b)

Substantively, however, there was little development here on earlier iterations of the discourse around Global Britain, and ultimately, Hunt’s tenure was too short to see his ‘invisible chain’ developed beyond the level of aspiration. The failure to set a coherent overarching strategy meant that the main bulwarks of the UK’s foreign policy—trade and security— ultimately lacked any clear sense of direction.

Scrambling for Trade Trade was an unavoidable foreign policy priority for May’s government. At a minimum, leaving the EU required renegotiation of trading terms with the EU itself, as well as with the 53 third-party countries which had existing trade deals with the EU (Allen, 2018). The government faced the challenge of ensuring that the civil service had both the capacity and the expertise to negotiate these deals, with reports emerging of potential skills shortages within government (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018b; Wintour, 2018). As Glencross and McCourt (2018) note, because the EU retained competence for negotiating trade agreements, relevant experience was in short supply within the British civil service. In addition to dealing with the complexity of the implications of EU withdrawal, May also needed to demonstrate domestically that Britain would be able to act with greater agility in order to exploit new economic opportunities and also that Britain would be taken seriously by its international counterparts. In July 2016, May set up the Department for International Trade (DIT), appointing Liam Fox as Secretary of State. In his first ministerial statement, delivered in the USA, Fox declared that Britain is ‘open for business like never before’ (Fox, 2016). However, circumstances made it difficult for the government to deliver on this promise. Key international institutions such as the WTO and the IMF, as

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well as notable international leaders, including Barack Obama and Justin Trudeau, had already indicated that their relationships with the EU took priority over new deals with Britain, meaning that no such deals could be considered to be inevitable (Oppermann et al, 2020). Also obstructing progress was the fact that Britain had not left the EU at this point and therefore lacked the legal capacity to enter into any new deals until it did so (Sharma, 2016a). Notwithstanding questions over Britain’s capacity to enter into any new deals, the government worked quickly to start initial discussions on prospective trade deals outside of the EU. By the end of 2016, ministers, including the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had visited India, Argentina, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Hong Kong, South Africa and Bahrain, with a view to promoting future trading relationships with each. Marking the one-year anniversary of the establishment of the DIT, the government highlighted the creation of 10 working groups with 15 countries, including ‘Australia, China, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Israel, India, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, USA and South Korea’ (HM Government, 2017a). Later that year, the Secretary of State announced the creation of 9 HM Trade Commissioner roles responsible for nine geographical areas: Africa, Asia-Pacific, China, Eastern Europe and Central Asia Network, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, North America and South Asia (HM Government, 2017b). A tenth Commissioner role was created for Australasia in 2018 (HM Government, 2019a). As part of a developing strategy on Africa, ministerial visits across the continent placed trade, security and international development issues on the agenda (Baldwin, 2018). The overarching approach appears to have been to cover as much ground as possible, even in the knowledge that nothing substantive could or would be achieved until Britain left the EU and the terms of that departure were clear. However, the government did appear to prioritise certain relationships, including those with the USA, China and India. Early overtures were made to India, with the International Development Secretary making an initial visit in August 2016, followed by May’s first trade mission and first bilateral visit outside Europe in November 2016 (HM Government, 2016a, 2016b). While the Prime Minister lauded the progress made during the visit (May, 2016b), it was reported that she and Prime Minister Modi encountered significant differences over the key referendum issue of immigration (Allen, 2018; Asthana & Stewart,

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2016). This threw into light one of the fundamental conflicts within the Brexit agenda—on the one hand, the desire to demonstrate internationally that Britain is fully open for business, with few barriers to trade—while on the other, it’s domestic promise to keep a tight ‘control’ over its borders. This reflects some of the tensions within the stated ambitions for Global Britain. In the end, trade negotiations with India did not formally commence during May’s term of office, though this did not prevent May from citing this initial visit as an example of progress in her Lancaster House speech (May, 2017a). The ‘special relationship’ with the USA was also being tested by the decision to withdraw from the European Union. Prior to the referendum, President Obama had stated that leaving the EU would put the UK at the ‘back of the queue’ on trade talks, with talks between the USA and the EU being prioritised (Asthana and Mason, 2016). He stood by these comments during a joint press conference with May at the G20 talks in 2016 (Watts, 2016). Obama’s remarks that Angela Merkel was probably his ‘closest international partner’ indicated that the special relationship was perhaps less assured than the British government was asserting (BBC News, 2016). However, the relationship faced even tougher tests when Donald Trump was elected President in November 2016. In an early indication that the special relationship was still a priority for both countries, May was the first national leader to visit Trump at the White House. The day before meeting President Trump, May addressed the Republican Party convention and used this opportunity to highlight the importance of NATO as well as warning of the threat presented by Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin (May, 2017a). These statements appeared to be a response to Trump’s scepticism towards NATO and his relative warmth towards Russia, whose role in the presidential elections was already controversial. The moment which grabbed greatest attention, however, was Trump holding May’s hand as they walked through the White House colonnades (Beaumont, 2021). While this incident appeared to show that the two countries still shared a close bond, it also arguably worked to undermine May’s attempt to assert her authority on the global stage. Following the referendum, the British government was desperate to show that their closest ally would stand alongside them, particularly on the issue of trade. However, while May declared that President Trump was bringing Britain to the ‘front of the line’ (May, 2017a), this coincided with moves by the US administration towards a more protectionist

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‘America First’ foreign policy, led by a ‘capricious President’ (Farr, 2022, p. 402), who could not be relied upon to take a consistent stance on any given issue. Trump’s later suggestion that May’s so-called Chequers deal—which set out her vision for Britain’s future relationship with the EU and Northern Ireland—could undermine any future UK-US trade deal further highlighted that any such deal could not be taken for granted (Heron & Siles-Brugge, 2021). Evidence given to the House of Commons International Trade Committee warned of the potential complexities in any future negotiations, given Trump’s move towards protectionism and proposed US steel and aluminium sanctions (International Trade Committee, 2018, paragraph 8). As with India, formal negotiations did not ultimately commence until after May’s premiership. Trump’s hostility towards China meant that the UK’s trading relationship with China could further spark tensions between the USA and Britain (Crines & Dolowitz, 2018; Oliver, 2017). During the Premiership of David Cameron, the British-Chinese relationship was widely viewed as having entered a ‘golden era’ (Leoni, 2022). However, this changed during May’s term of office. Tensions emerged over Hong Kong and human rights abuses, in particular the persecution of Uighur Muslims in ‘re-education’ camps, along with concerns over Huawei’s involvement in Britain’s 5G infrastructure (Ibid.; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2019). Trade with China had featured highly in early governmental statements (Sharma, 2016a, 2016b; May, 2017a) and Theresa May made a state visit in February 2018. However, Britain did not sign the Memorandum of Understanding in support of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, their global trade infrastructure proposal (Jie & Wallace, 2021), a decision which was commended by the Foreign Affairs Committee (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2019, p. 53). Jeremy Hunt made his first ‘major international trip’ (HM Government, 2018b) to China in July 2018, again emphasising the goal of boosting trade and investment, but throughout May’s Premiership, the relationship with China became increasingly fragile. The government was criticised in 2019 for not being able to produce a strategy on China, with the Foreign Affairs Committee calling upon it to develop one (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2019, p. 60). The evidence produced by the FCO to the Foreign Affairs and International Relations Committees in 2018 suggests a continuation of existing policy in relation to China rather than any new approach to trade spurred on by Brexit or the broader ‘Global Britain’ vision (FCO, 2018a, 2018b). This lack of strategy, combined with

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growing concerns over security, left the ‘golden era’ looking somewhat lacklustre. As Chow et al. (2019) suggest, May’s government appeared to simply lack the capacity to maintain the momentum of the previous premiership. Britain’s lack of capacity more generally on the international stage thwarted any real progress on trade. While the future relationship with the EU remained unclear, it’s possible that no government could have expected to have achieved more than these types of initial discussions. However, May’s government was particularly constrained by its lack of any recognisable strategy or future policy vision.

Britain as a ‘Soft Power Superpower’? In contrast to trade, Britain arguably had greater autonomy on security issues, as it faced the prospect of being unbound by the terms of EU membership. Security and defence was stressed as one of the UK’s key strengths, with emphasis on Britain’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the second largest military budget in NATO, its global diplomatic network and its status as a nuclear power. Security was also a key element of the existing relationship with the EU. The FCO repeatedly stressed that Britain would seek to build a ‘new, deep and special partnership’ with the EU on security (FCO, 2017). Under the banner of ‘Global Britain’, the government cast the country as a defender of the international rules-based system: As a leading member of NATO, the foremost military power in Europe and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Britain has an enduring responsibility to help sustain the international rules-based order, and to defend the liberal values which underpin it. (May, 2017c)

This same sentiment underpinned Jeremy Hunt’s vision of Britain building an ‘invisible chain’ between those democracies which share British values in order to ‘defend the rules-based international order’ (Hunt, 2018). In scrutinising the FCO’s stated commitment to the rule of law, the Foreign Affairs Committee highlighted some potential tensions between the UK seeking to promote the rule of law in a human rights context and also appearing to ‘shield’ allies such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain with poor records on human rights (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018c; Holmes et al., 2018).

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The ‘great power’ element of Global Britain was symbolically signalled early into May’s administration when Boris Johnson declared that Britain was ‘back East of Suez’ (Johnson, 2016c). This policy, however, of the UK maintaining its presence in the Gulf region, predated the referendum, and it remains a point of contention as to whether Britain ever actually left East of Suez (James, 2021). Johnson’s declaration followed Theresa May’s announcement of a new package of joint measures with the Gulf Cooperation Council ‘to tackle terrorism and bolster our joint security’ (HM Government, 2016c). A new defence agreement with Japan followed shortly in January 2017, bolstered during the Prime Minister’s visit to Japan in August 2018 by the announcement that HMS Argyll would be deployed to the region in December 2018 (HM Government, 2017c, 2018b). This would bring British naval deployment in the region up to three ships, ostensibly to address North Korean aggression (HM Government, 2018d). In announcing a new ‘International Defence Engagement Strategy’ in February 2017, Johnson commented that ‘this is about sending a clear signal of the UK’s intent as a dynamic, agile, cutting-edge global power’ (HM Government, 2017d). Many of these moves can be seen in the context of attempts to form the narrative that Britain is a global power and remains a force to be reckoned with. However, the Foreign Affairs Committee cautioned the government over this approach in its report on China and the Rules-Based International System, raising concerns about a lack of any clear strategic narrative around naval deployments in the South China Sea (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2019). While supportive in principle of deployments to uphold freedom of navigation, the Committee warned that doing so ‘purely to demonstrate military power, or as a sign of Britain’s global presence, would be a mistake’ (ibid., p. 54). Missing from the ‘great power’ narrative was any substantive discussion of the UK’s relationship with the Commonwealth. The FCO’s select committee evidence provides only a short discussion on the benefits of the Commonwealth, effectively emphasising its role as an international network (FCO, 2018a, 2018b). The Foreign Affairs Committee queried whether the FCO regarded the Commonwealth as a ‘sufficiently high priority’ to justify any investment beyond the Heads of States summit hosted in 2018 and Britain’s tenure as Chair-in-Office between 2018 and 2020 (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018d, p. 14). These commitments predated May’s ‘Global Britain’ vision, and the lack of any clear future strategy appears to suggest that either the Commonwealth was simply

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being taken for granted or was not considered a key element of strategic foreign policy. Despite being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, concerns were raised that Britain’s influence at the UN was in decline, with the failure to have the sole British International Court of Justice appointment re-elected in 2017 described as a ‘failure of UK diplomacy’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018e). The Foreign Affairs Committee noted that Britain could not take re-election to the UN Human Rights Commission (HRC) for granted (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018c, pp. 6–7). However, the Committee did note that Britain remained engaged and influential, being closely involved in the HRC’s Universal Periodic Review process and as penholder in its Security Council role in Central Africa, Colombia, Cyprus, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, ‘Peacekeeping, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ and ‘Women’s Participation and Protection’ (ibid., p. 5). However, as Gifkins et al. (2019) note, this engagement has been criticised and Britain has been seen as absent on Yemen, possibly prioritising trade interests in Saudi Arabia. This is despite the fact that Jeremy Hunt had sought to make Yemen an example of British influence, visiting Yemen and taking part in peace talks, as well as announcing additional funding for the peace process (HM Government, 2018c). In many respects, many of the foreign policy activities of the May government represented continuity with previous policy. While leaving the EU might present potential challenges in terms of reduced diplomatic expertise and networks, Gifkins et al. (2019) suggest that withdrawal from the EU was more a symptom than a cause of decline. However, events in March 2018 presented the British government with an opportunity to challenge notions of declining influence. On 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, Sergei and Yulia Skripal were poisoned using Novichok, ‘a military-grade nerve agent of a type developed by Russia’ (May, 2018a). The use of the nerve agent was confirmed by an independent investigation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (OPCW, 2018). In her statement to the House of Commons, May confirmed that the government believed that, in the absence of a credible response from Russia, this was ‘an unlawful use of force by the Russian State against the United Kingdom’ (ibid.). The incident provided May with a unique opportunity to lead a united international front against Russia. On 26 March 2018, she announced that 18 countries, including 15 EU member states, the USA, Canada and

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Ukraine, had agreed to expel more than 100 Russian intelligence officers (May, 2018b). This process had not been straightforward and had tested Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the USA, as reports emerged that President Trump was reluctant to accept evidence of Russian involvement (Jaffe et al., 2018). However, it represented a real and substantive diplomatic victory for May, demonstrating Britain’s ability to coordinate on a global level and an ability to work in close partnership with the EU despite the ongoing tensions of withdrawal negotiations. While initial investigations into the Salisbury poisonings were ongoing, on 7 April 2018, Syrian military carried out a chemical weapons attack on the Syrian city of Douma. With Russia firmly in the frame for the Salisbury poisonings, Britain acted quickly to draw parallels between the two incidents, criticising Russian failure to ensure that its ally Syria abandoned the use of chemical weapons (HM Government, 2018d). On 14 April 2018, Britain, the USA and France carried out airstrikes in Syria, targeting sites understood to be storing chemical weapons (Pierce, 2018). These airstrikes were carried out without UN Security Council approval, with any proposed action likely to have been vetoed by Russia, which had previously prevented 12 other proposals for direct action in Syria (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018f). In addition, May had taken the political risk of not seeking parliamentary approval for military action, arguably disregarding the constitutional ‘war powers’ convention and risking domestic political backlash (Strong, 2022). The airstrikes shortly received unanimous support from the G7 leaders, with the G7 Foreign Ministers issuing a statement on the same day condemning the novichok attack in Salisbury and supporting Britain’s conclusions that the attack was carried out by Russia (European Council, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2018). Theresa May’s actions might appear politically opportunistic, but in the circumstances, she could reasonably claim that Britain had played an instrumental role in defending the rules-based international order against an aggressive Russia. These events show that May was prepared to take political risks at both the international and domestic levels, possibly weighing these against the opportunity of demonstrating Britain’s relevance as a major player in global security.

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The Fragility of New and Old Special Relationships Foreign policy was not limited only to matters of trade and security. Britain’s decision to withdraw from the EU had thrown open a range of questions about the UK’s broader relationship with key countries, most notably the 27 remaining members of the EU, the USA and Ireland. Besides tensions over trade, Britain’s special relationship with the USA was being tested more broadly. May’s visit to Washington in January 2017—during Trump’s first month in office—was seen as unusually early (Wilson, 2017) and was followed up by an invite to the President to make a state visit to the UK in return. However, this official state visit had to be postponed until June 2019, due to UK protests and media criticisms. Further tensions emerged over the USA’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA)—the so-called Iran nuclear deal. Britain expressed regret at this decision, placing the UK in line with European allies, a position maintained throughout May’s term of office (HM Government, 2019a). The relationship with the USA was further disrupted by Trump’s accusations that the British government was spying on him, the US administration’s leaking of the name of the Manchester bomber and Trump’s comments on ‘no-go areas’ in British cities (Farr, 2022). Despite May’s interventions, Trump imposed tariffs on Northern Ireland built Bombardier passenger jets and British opposition to steel and aluminium tariffs made little impact (Oppermann et al, 2020). In 2018, Trump gave an interview to The Sun and directly criticised May for not listening to him or taking his advice on EU withdrawal negotiations, also commenting that Johnson would be a ‘great’ Prime Minister (Dunn, 2018). It is perhaps the case that May might have been able to find ways to make better progress with the USA in more settled times, but in the midst of the negotiations over the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, May had to contend with managing other tensions in relationships closer to home. While other chapters in this volume deal more directly with the UK’s relationship with the EU and Northern Ireland, it is worth considering some of the foreign policy aspects of Britain’s relationship with both. The FCO expressed the wish to build comprehensive relationships with France, Germany and Ireland post-Brexit (FCO, 2018a). However, it became clear very quickly that Britain simply misunderstood the complexity of the situation in Ireland, had paid insufficient attention

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to the implications of EU withdrawal for the island of Ireland and had gravely underestimated Ireland’s determination and capacity to influence the EU’s position in the withdrawal negotiations. The British government also underestimated the potential for the negotiations to help unify the 27 member states. Taken together with the UK’s lack of clarity on, or preparedness for, its withdrawal, this laid the foundation for discordant talks. Britain’s decision to exit from the EU presented ‘unprecedented political, economic and diplomatic challenges for Ireland’ (Irish Government Publication, 2017), from its impact on energy supply, and future of its agriculture industry, to the implications for the peace process and beyond (Laffan, 2018; Murphy, 2019; O’Brennan, 2019). The Irish government, though shocked by the referendum result, wasted no time in preparing for withdrawal negotiations and did not take the support of the EU member states for granted, mounting a coordinated and intensive diplomatic effort to ensure that its interests were at the forefront of negotiations (Dooley, 2022; Laffan, 2018). Initial framework contingency documents were published within 24 hours of the referendum result, and by May 2017, the Irish Government published its detailed position on the negotiations and Ireland’s priorities (Irish Government Publication, 2017). Dooley (2022) observes the contrast between Ireland’s and Britain’s approaches to the prospective withdrawal negotiations as involving a contrast between deliberative and non-deliberative positions. Ireland took a deliberative approach to negotiating common positions with their member state counterparts, scaling up their diplomatic capacity, adopting a ‘whole-of-government’ response and pro-actively determining their key priorities (Dooley, 2022; Irish Government Publication, 2017; Laffan, 2018; Murphy, 2019). This contrasted sharply with the deep lack of consensus in the UK, even within the British government itself, on their own strategic priorities. Further, the British government, having paid little attention to the ‘Irish question’ during the referendum campaign, simply did not foresee the issues coming, demonstrating a substantive foreign policy short-sightedness (O’Brennan, 2019). Theresa May’s failure to secure a majority in the 2017 General Election further compounded the issues around the lack of consensus over the nature of the UK’s withdrawal. Her government was forced to enter a confidence and supply agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party (O’Brennan, 2019). The subsequent impact on negotiations, for example re-opening the so-called Irish ‘backstop’ issue following Commons

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defeats on her withdrawal proposals, damaged political trust with the Irish Government and frustrated EU negotiators (Gillespie, 2019). Frustrations also grew over the British government’s approach to the land border on the island of Ireland (Rankin, 2017). While the British government perceived the Irish issue as an attempt by the EU to frustrate withdrawal, commentators have argued that the EU did not need to use Ireland for leverage (Laffan, 2018; O’Brennan, 2019). Again, this arguably exposes significant misunderstandings on the part of the British government of the negotiating landscape. Ireland’s diplomatic efforts contributed towards the relative unity of the EU27 over the negotiations, but this sense of unity was also evident in other areas, such as security, where there was renewed momentum on forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Harrois (2018) suggests that Britain’s removal from the process, having previously been obstructive on the CFSP, had prompted this new momentum. As noted earlier, security and defence was a key issue in the withdrawal negotiations and a central element of the ‘new, deep and special partnership’ (FCO, 2017) with the EU. The FCO’s main statement on this new partnership focussed on Britain’s military capabilities and strengths, prompting Howarth (2017) to describe the UK’s proposals as being ‘devoid of all political, institutional, juridical or operational clarity’. This persistent lack of any detailed, agreed strategic approach to critical aspects of British foreign policy in the wake of its decision to withdraw from the EU makes the EU and Ireland’s approaches appear much more unified and considered.

A Failure of Statecraft? May possibly made matters more difficult for her government with some of her own political decisions, e.g., by creating two additional government departments and appointing a disruptive foreign secretary. Immediately after taking office, May set up the Department for International Trade (DIT) and the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU). Evidence given to the House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations suggested that coordinating foreign policy between the FCO, DIT, DExEU and the Department for International Development was more challenging than it needed to be (House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, 2018, pp.77–80). The Committee found that while work was being done to try to facilitate better coordination across

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departments, restructuring processes were undermining these efforts. For example, the creation of the nine Trade Commissioner roles undermined the work of the FCO (ibid.). These structural issues likely contributed to, or at least worked to compound, the overall lack of strategic thinking and the development of a coherent foreign policy response to EU withdrawal. Boris Johnson’s tenure as Foreign Secretary was a further disruptive element. Johnson’s ‘track record of misrepresenting and offending foreign peoples, leaders, and entire countries’ (Polonska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2017) made him an unexpected choice of Foreign Secretary, and having made an unsuccessful bid for leadership in 2016, his longer-term ambition to lead the country was well known. In failing to focus on developing a clear strategic direction on foreign policy, Johnson failed adequately to lead the FCO, leaving it up to junior ministers and the civil service to fill in the gaps. Critical errors of judgement, such as the mis-handling of the Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe case, as a result of his comments to a Select Committee, created international difficulties and led to serious questions over his competence (Wintour, 2022). By the time Johnson resigned in July 2018, ostensibly over May’s Chequers deal, some two years’ progress had been lost and his successor, Jeremy Hunt, had very little time to rectify some of the failings of his predecessor. Theresa May’s government might have been able to achieve some type of foreign policy coherence had it survived longer. It was arguably a victim of almost impossible circumstances and had too demanding a workload to develop a carefully worked out strategy. However, that would be to overlook the impact of May’s decisions and her government’s actions. The government did not have to invoke Article 50 when it did; time could have been spent preparing for withdrawal and developing considered policy stances on the various challenges it faced. Similarly, the government did not have to urgently scramble around for trade missions and could instead have prioritised its trade negotiations with the EU and developed longer-term trade and security policies. Instead, May bowed to domestic political pressures, at the expense of Britain’s international reputation, leaning too heavily on empty concepts rather than striving for policy substance.

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Conclusion Theresa May took on the role of PM at a time when Britain’s foreign policy was at a major crossroads. The decision to withdraw from the EU had opened up a series of critical questions and challenges relating to the UK’s future trade and security priorities, its wider relationships with other nations and its status and power on the global stage. In many ways, the decision to exit the European Union was itself a foreign policy decision, albeit one that had been delegated to the electorate through the mechanism of a referendum. But the dynamics that led to the decision to hold the referendum in the first place—as with many aspects of foreign policy— were prompted by a number of domestic considerations and calculations. Some critics have argued that Brexit was primarily driven by these shortterm party and electoral dynamics, rather than any longer-term strategic vision for Britain’s future role in the world. A close analysis of Theresa May’s foreign policy could lend some support to that view. The government had stumbled into its negotiations with the EU with no clear plan or consensus on where it wanted to be by the end of the withdrawal process. As a result, the decision to withdraw from the EU was not linked to any clear or substantive foreign policy vision. The attempts to construct such a vision—largely around projecting the UK as a major protagonist on the global stage—proved to be quite ad hoc, reactive and confused. These involved the generation of a number of relatively broad aspirations, ultimately lacking in policy detail. For May’s part, the PM did exhibit some degree of political skill and competent statecraft, most evident in the leadership she showed in coordinating an international response to Russia in the wake of the Salisbury poisonings and Syrian chemical weapons attacks. Yet, she also made some unnecessary political decisions—such as her decision to try to expedite the withdrawal process—which only worked to compound the difficulties she faced. The overall result was that foreign policy under May failed to exhibit the levels of innovation, agility and adaptation needed to meet the considerable new sets of challenges the country faced.

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May, T. (2016b). Speech to India-UK Tech Summit, Bangalore. https://www. gov.uk/government/speeches/bangalore-reception-for-the-india-uk-techsummit-prime-ministers-speech. Accessed 2 January 2023. May, T. (2017a). Speech to Republican Party Convention, Philadelphia. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-tothe-republican-party-conference-2017a. Accessed 2 January 2023. May, T. (2017b). Speech at Lancaster House, London. https://www.gov.uk/gov ernment/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-theeu-pm-speech. Accessed: 22 December 2022. May, T. (2017c). Speech to the World Economic Forum, Davos. https://www. gov.uk/government/speeches/davos-2017c-prime-ministers-speech-to-theworld-economic-forum. Accessed 1 January 2023. May, T. (2017d). Speech aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth, Portsmouth. https:/ /www.gov.uk/government/speeches/hms-queen-elizabeth-portsmouth-the resa-mays-speech. Accessed 2 January 2023. May, T. (2018a). Speech to the House of Commons. https://www.gov.uk/gov ernment/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-salisbury-incident-12-march2018a. Accessed 2 January 2023. May, T. (2018b). Speech to the House of Commons. https://www.gov.uk/govern ment/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-national-security-and-russia-26march-2018b. Accessed 2 January 2023. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2018). G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pc/page4e_000798.html. Accessed 2 January 2023. Murphy, M. (2019). The Brexit crisis, Ireland and British-Irish relations: Europeanisation and/or de-Europeanisation? Irish Political Studies, 34(4), 530–550. O’Brennan, J. (2019). Requiem for a shared interdependent past: Brexit and the deterioration in UK-Irish relations. Capital & Class, 43(1), 157–171. Oliver, T. (2017). Never mind the Brexit? Britain, Europe, the world and Brexit. International Politics, 54, 519–532. Oppermann, K., Beasley, R., & Kaarbo, J. (2020). British foreign policy after Brexit: Losing Europe and finding a role. International Relations, 34(2), 133– 156. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (2018, April 12). OPCW issues report on technical assistance requested by the United Kingdom. https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2018/04/ opcw-issues-report-technical-assistance-requested-united-kingdom. Accessed 2 January 2023. Pierce, K. (2018). Statement to the UN Security Council, New York. https:/ /www.gov.uk/government/speeches/our-action-will-degrade-the-syrian-reg imes-chemical-weapons-use. Accessed 2 January 2023.

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Polonska-Kimunguyi, E., & Kimunguyi, P. (2017). ‘Gunboats of soft power’: Boris on Africa and post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 30(4), 325–349. Rankin, J. (2017, August 25). UK accused of ‘magical thinking’ over Brexit plan for Irish border. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian. com/uk-news/2017/aug/25/uk-accused-of-magical-thinking-over-brexitplan-for-irish-border. Accessed 2 January 2023. Sharma, A. (2016a). Speech to Asia House conference, London. https://www.gov. uk/government/speeches/alok-sharma-the-future-of-uk-trade-after-brexit. Accessed 2 January 2023. Sharma, A. (2016b). Speech to British Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/alok-sharmas-speech-tobritish-chamber-of-commerce-hong-kong. Accessed 2 January 2023. Strong, J. (2022). Did Theresa May kill the war powers convention? Comparing parliamentary debates on UK intervention in Syria in 2013 and 2018. Parliamentary Affairs, 75, 400–419. Dunn, T. (2018, July 13). Trump’s Brexit Blast Donald Trump told Theresa May how to do Brexit ‘but she wrecked it’—And says the US trade deal is off . The Sun. https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6766531/trump-may-brexitus-deal-off/. Accessed 2 January 2023. Turner, O. (2019). Global Britain and the narrative of empire. The Political Quarterly, 90(4): 727–734. Watts, J. (2016). G20 Summit: Barack Obama warns US-UK trade relations could unravel after Brexit. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/pol itics/g20-barack-obama-theresa-may-brexit-backofthequeue-a7224781.html. Accessed 2 January 2023. Wilson, G. (2017). Brexit, Trump and the special relationship, The. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(3), 543–557. Wintour, P. (2018, November 28). Report reveals Foreign Office shortage of trained Brexit trade negotiators. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/politics/2018/nov/28/uk-only-30-expert-trade-negotiators-brexit-for eign-affairs-committee-report. Accessed 2 January 2023. Wintour, P. (2022, May 13). Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe tells PM she ‘lived in the shadow’ of his mistake. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.the guardian.com/news/2022/may/13/nazanin-zaghari-ratcliffe-tells-boris-joh nson-she-lived-in-the-shadow-of-his-mistake. Accessed 2 January 2023.

CHAPTER 7

‘An Economy That Works for Everyone’? An Evaluation of the May Government’s Economic Policies and Statecraft Simon Lee

Introduction: Statecraft and Economic Policy Jim Bulpitt has defined statecraft as ‘the art of winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence in office’ and ‘concerned primarily to resolve the electoral and governing problems facing a party at any particular time’ (Bulpitt, 1986: 21). In addition to governing competence and successful electoral strategy, Bulpitt has identified the two further dimensions of effective statecraft as party management and political argument hegemony (Bulpitt, 1986: 21–22). Statecraft, and in particular governing competence in the selection of economic policy choices and their successful implementation, is inextricably linked to national economic performance. This is because all national economies and markets are governed by a written constitution of laws, legislation, policies and regulation. And since that constitution is

S. Lee (B) University of Hull, Hull, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_7

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in turn shaped by the political ideology, interests and policy choices of the governing political party, the effectiveness of its statecraft, and especially its economic policy choices, will tend to have a major impact upon national economic performance (Keegan, 2019). The statecraft of UK economic policy also has two key and highly attentive audiences it must satisfy. On the one hand, policy must be sensitive to the domestic electorate, which is likely to punish at the ballot box any misdemeanours in economic management. On the other hand, economic policy must also be sensitive to financial markets and investors, especially since the City of London is host to highly volatile financial markets for foreign exchange and derivatives which daily trade around $6 trillion (Bank for International Settlements, 2019). In United Kingdom (UK) politics, economic policy has been critical for all four dimensions of party statecraft. At consecutive UK general elections, opinion polling has demonstrated that voters have identified the economy as one of the top three most important issues facing the country, and governing competence in management of the economy as one of the principal reasons for voting, or not voting, for a particular political party (Ipsos, 2022; YouGov, 2022). Furthermore, if a political party can, it will aim to set the terms of the political debate over economic policy not only for its tenure but also for successor governments formed by opposition political parties. At the same time, any prime minister and their Chancellor of the Exchequer are likely to find management of relations with both their parliamentary party and party membership problematic if their conduct of economic policy does not deliver financial stability and sustained prosperity. British political history since 1945 has demonstrated that if UK governments can deliver an effective statecraft in office, they have the capacity to set the terms of the debate in UK economic policy not only for the duration of their tenure, but for decades to come. For example, in May 1979, when the statecraft of the first Thatcher government sought to redefine the terms of the debate about UK economic policy, and to re-establish the hegemony of the Conservative Party’s arguments about British decline and how to reverse it, Sir Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State for Industry told the House of Commons: The new Government bring with them a different analysis and a different set of policies. The analysis takes into account the lessons that we have learn from the past during periods of Conservative Governments and, certainly,

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Labour Governments. A fresh set of policies will arise out of that analysis. (Joseph, 1979: c.706–707)

Careful preparations had been undertaken to make this statecraft viable. In Opposition, Joseph and Thatcher had in June 1974 set up their own think tank, the Centre for Policy Studies, ‘to seek to change the climate of opinion’ in British politics (Joseph, 1975: 3) and with the understanding that ‘the task of the next Tory government-national recovery-will be of a different order from that facing any other post-war government. Recovery requires a sea-change in Britain’s political economy’ (Centre for Policy Studies, 1977: S1). They had carefully crafted Conservative Party economic policy in a series of documents (Conservative Party, 1976, 1977), culminating in a 1979 General Election manifesto (Conservative Party, 1979) which had set out a clear vision and priorities for an incoming Conservative government to begin to reverse British national decline (Lee, 1997). The circumstances of Theresa May’s accession to the leadership of the Conservative Party and the office of Prime Minister were to be very different. No such preparation of economic policy statecraft had been possible because of the very short timeframe caused by David Cameron’s abrupt decision to resign. Nonetheless, in her inaugural statement as Prime Minister, May had chosen to articulate the same bold, transformational ambition as the Thatcher government in May 1979, namely a political vision of how she intended to bring about a sea-change in the political economy of the United Kingdom. May presented the 23 July 2016 European Union referendum (‘Brexit’) outcome as ‘an important moment in our country’s history which meant facing ‘a time of great national change’ (May, 2016a). Locating her own political vision firmly within what she termed the ‘precious’ British political union, May had argued that, precisely because that union was between all of its citizens, her government would fight against ‘the burning injustices that, if you’re born poor, you will die on average 9 years earlier than others’ (May, 2016a). The central mission of the May Government would therefore be nothing less than ‘to make Britain a country that works for everyone’. This would mean fighting ‘burning injustices’ whether they were manifested in terms of ethnicity, social class, gender, age. May promised her government would be one driven ‘not by the interests of the privileged few’, but by those who were just about managing (May, 2016a).

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There was, however, one critical difference between the statecraft of Theresa May, and that of Clement Attlee and Margaret Thatcher. The statecraft of Attlee and Thatcher had been borne of years of thoughtful preparation, with carefully crafted plans for a major reset of UK economic policy. In sharp contrast, May’s bold rhetorical vision for British national economic, social and political renewal was bereft of any such strategic thought or planning. In his withering evaluation of May’s premiership Anthony Seldon has argued that for all her ‘admirable qualities: a tireless work ethic, courage, frugality, physical and mental endurance, a hawkeye for detail, a profound sense of duty and an unselfconscious integrity’, May lacked the key leadership facets of ‘strategic clarity, charisma and intellectual confidence’ (Seldon, 2019: x–xi). The absence of these key leadership facets was never more evident than in the conduct of Theresa May’s economic policy statecraft.

The Economic Policy Statecraft of Theresa May: The Great Reset That Never Came If the May Government had used the outcome of chosen from July 2016 to comprehensively reset UK economy policy, it would have been perfectly justified in doing so given its inheritance from the Cameron governments. They had failed in both their central economic policy objectives, namely eliminating the deficit on day-to-day spending in the annual current budget, and re-balancing the UK economy away from its over-dependence upon financial services, debt-financed consumer spending, led by the ‘Southern Powerhouse’ economies of London and the South East towards manufacturing, private sector business investment and exports led by the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ economies of administrative regions in the English Midlands and North (Lee, 2011, 2015, 2017). In April 2009, David Cameron had claimed the ‘Age of Irresponsibility’ was over, and that it would be succeeded by a new fiscally responsible and economically unavoidable ‘Age of Austerity’ (Cameron, 2009). But, during Cameron’s six-year premiership neither the annual current budget was balanced nor the UK’s net public sector ‘national’ debt reduced as a percentage of national income. On the contrary, the current budget deficit was reduced only from £159.8 billion or 10.1% of GDP in 2009– 2010 to £85.2 billion or 4.1% of GDP in 2015–2016 (Office for National

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Statistics, 2022: Table PSA5A). Furthermore, during Cameron’s premiership, the UK’s national debt had risen by £583.8 billion (or an annual average of nearly £95 billion) to reach £1617.3 billion or 80.9% of GDP by the end of June 2016 (Office for National Statistics, 2022: Table PSA4). In February 2010, George Osborne, who would serve throughout the Cameron premiership as Chancellor of the Exchequer had promised to deliver a new British growth model to ‘re-balance’ the UK economy by unleashing a ‘march of the makers’ that would yield total UK exports of more than £1 trillion by 2020 (Osborne, 2011). This promised rebalancing never occurred. Osborne’s ‘march of the makers’ delivered total UK exports of £700.4 billion by the end of 2019 (Office for National Statistics, 2020: Table B), missing his target by fully 30%. Private business investment was deterred by the impact of fiscal austerity upon domestic demand and confidence, and by the continuing propensity of UK enterprises to distribute their profits as share dividends, rather than reinvesting them in new innovation and the expansion of output. As a result, the final full calendar of year of Cameron and Osborne’s respective tenures would be marked by a UK trade deficit of £38.57 billion or 2.1% of GDP, and a record £100.26 billion current account deficit, equivalent to 5.4% of GDP (Office for National Statistics, 2016: Table 1.2). May’s initial statement as Prime Minister appeared to offer the promise of a substantive departure from the statecraft and economic policy choices of David Cameron and George Osborne: The government I lead will be driven not by the interests of the privileged few, but by yours. We will do everything we can to give you more control over your lives. When we take the big calls, we’ll think not of the powerful, but you. When we pass new laws, we’ll listen not to the mighty but to you. When it comes to taxes, we’ll prioritise not the wealthy, but you. (May, 2016b)

However, her statecraft like that of both her immediate predecessor and successor as Prime Minister would be characterised by a consistent propensity for over-promising and under-delivery. This propensity was compounded by a series of strategic mistakes and tactical blunders in the conduct of economic policy. May’s first and greatest strategic mistake was her failure to immediately reset UK economic policy away from David Cameron’s ‘Age of Austerity’. This was an error which would never be

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corrected throughout her tenure. Both in June 2010 and June 2015, Cameron had begun each of his terms of office with an immediate budget statement and multi-year spending review to set out his government’s economic policy priorities for the forthcoming parliamentary term. May did neither. Indeed, no new multiyear Spending Review would be undertaken between the Cameron government’s 25 November 2015 Review and the Johnson Government’s resetting of fiscal policy in its 4 September 2019 Spending Round. When Theresa May had addressed the Conservative Party as party leader for the first time in October 2016, she had revisited the terminology, but not the substance of the technocratic statecraft set out in Edward Heath’s speech to the 1970 Conservative Party conference (Heath, 1970), May’s thesis was that the outcome of the 23 June 2016 EU referendum had amounted to a ‘quiet revolution’ and ‘a turning point for our country’ which had provided ‘A once-in-a-generation chance to change the direction of our nation for good. To step back and ask ourselves what kind of country we want to be’ (May, 2016b). May’s answer was to promise ‘a country that works for everyone’ (May, 2016b). Just as David Cameron had recognized that the Conservative Party had to change to win, a party statecraft vindicated by ‘The first majority Conservative Government in almost 25 years’, so now the Conservatives needed to change again and, above all to recognize the EU referendum outcome had represented ‘a vote not just to change Britain’s relationship with the European Union, but to call for a change in the way our country works – and the people for whom it works – forever’ (May, 2016b). This echoed Heath’s assertion in October 1970 that his party had been returned to office ‘to change the course of history of this nation-nothing less’ (Heath, 1970). Heath’s statecraft had offered a dual strategy of ‘a new era of British diplomacy’ abroad, including the commencement of negotiations to join the European Economic Community, and a ‘new style of government’ at home, founded upon a technocratic and wide-ranging ‘reconstruction of Whitehall departments’, a reorganisation of the functions of government, and an economic policy which would save and redirect government expenditure (Heath, 1970). By contrast, May’s speech laid out what she claimed to be ‘a bold plan to bring Britain together. To build a new united Britain, rooted in the centre ground’ (May, 2016b). By occupying this new centre ground, May claimed to have provided ‘An agenda for a new modern conservatism. That understands the good government can

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do. That will never hesitate to face down the powerful when they abuse their positions of privilege’ (May, 2016b). May promised her plan would mean government that challenged vested interests, took big decisions and invested in ‘the things that matter, the things with a long-term return’ like infrastructure (May, 2016b). For economic policy, ‘an economy that works for everyone’ would mean ‘making markets work for working people’ and everyone playing by the same rules’. For fiscal policy, it would mean continuing ‘to aim for a balanced budget’. For monetary policy, it meant acknowledging that ‘some bad side effects’ of ‘super-low interest rates and quantitative easing’, namely that ‘People with assets have got richer. People without them have suffered’ (May, 2016b). May acknowledged ‘The need to rebalance the economy across sectors and areas in order to spread wealth and prosperity around the country’ (May, 2016b). The power of government would be used to ‘set the market right’ by correcting the corporate exploitation of market failures and repairing ‘the dysfunctional housing market’. Government action would also deliver ‘a fairer economy’ by protecting workers’ rights and pursuing tax-dodgers (May, 2016b). Theresa May had offered a bold prospectus to her party and to the people of the United Kingdom. But in office, May’s economic policy statecraft reduced it to an equally hollow prospectus. The great reset of UK economic policy which would have been necessary to translate her transformational political narrative into substantive policy actions never materialised. As it happened, immediately prior to May’s becoming prime minister, George Osborne, the incumbent Chancellor of the Exchequer, possibly in the hope of saving his job, had partly reset his own commitment to fiscal austerity by asserting ‘we will continue to be tough on the deficit, but we must be realistic about achieving a surplus by the end of this decade’ (Osborne, 2016). In dispensing with Osborne’s services completely, May’s next strategic error was in her choice of Chancellor. Rather than selecting someone openly committed to her own political vision, or at least in possession of an open-minded, pragmatic approach to fiscal policy, May chose Philip Hammond, a well-known Thatcherite fiscal conservative, and the rival candidate she had defeated to become the Conservative candidate for the newly created Maidenhead constituency ahead of the May 1997 UK General Election. In serving as both the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary in the Cameron government immediately prior to his appointment to the Treasury, Hammond’s statecraft had exhibited not

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the slightest evidence of policy innovation, let alone a propensity for major resetting of governmental strategy. Confirmation that there would be no immediate resetting of UK economic policy came within the first two weeks of the May government. First, during her inaugural appearance at Prime Minister’s Questions, and in response to Leader of the Opposition’s Jeremy Corbyn’s challenge about her own commitment to fiscal austerity, May had affirmed: It is the long-term economic plan that has delivered the record level of employment that we see today. Perhaps I could put the right hon. Gentleman straight. We have not abandoned the intention to move to a surplus. What I have said is that we will not target that at the end of this Parliament. He uses the language of austerity; I call it living within our means…It is not about austerity; it is about ensuring that we have an economy that works for everyone. (May, 2016c)

Two days later, as he commenced a visit to China, Chancellor Hammond confirmed that any reset of UK fiscal policy would only occur ‘over the medium term’ and in the forthcoming Autumn Statement, and would itself depend upon ‘the data that will emerge over the coming months’ (BBC News, 2016). In the event, Hammond’s Autumn Statement 2016 kicked the proverbial fiscal can down the road by confirming the May government would not longer pursue Osborne’s long-term economic plan central fiscal objective of a budget surplus in 2019–2020 (Hammond, 2016). Instead, the first fiscal rule of Hammond’s new draft Charter for Budget Responsibility required merely that ‘the public finances should be returned to balance as early as possible in the next Parliament, and, in the interim, cyclically-adjusted borrowing should be below 2% by the end of this Parliament’ (Hammond, 2016). In subsequent fiscal statements, Hammond would make it clear that any resetting of policy would be contingent upon both the conclusion of a withdrawal agreement with the EU27, and ‘an orderly transition to a future economic partnership’ (Hammond, 2019). Then, and only then, would this ‘Deal Dividend’ raise the prospect of an actual future departure from fiscal austerity in ‘a full three-year Spending Review… to be concluded alongside an Autumn Budget’ (Hammond, 2019).

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The Political Economy of Theresa May Since May 1979, both in government and opposition, successive waves of Conservative politicians had adhered to a focus in economic policy upon fiscal and monetary stability, the quest for a smaller state, not least through privatization and outsourcing of public goods and services, market deregulation and liberalization, and tax cuts, especially for corporations and the wealthy. The dividend from this ‘developmental market’ agenda had been very different to that promised by Thatcher and Joseph’s vision of a sea-change in British political economy. Their shared vision had been of the restoration of an entrepreneur-led, enterprise culture to transform the productive, wealth-creating capacity of the national economy. However, Conservative statecraft in office, with the maintenance of extensive public subsidies and tax advantages for both financial services and investment in land, property and assets, rather than enterprises and new industries, had yielded a wealth-extracting, rentier-led ‘renterprise culture’, dominated by the ‘Southern Powerhouse’ economy of London and the South East of England (Lee, 2018). Prior to her sudden, unexpected and opportunistic accession to the premiership, there was little in Theresa May’s political biography to suggest that she might challenge, let alone reset, these central tenets of the modern Conservative Party’s particular British model of political economy. In many respects, Theresa May’s political career had been forged at the heart of the financial services and rent-seeking Southern Powerhouse ‘renterprise culture’. She was after all married to a City investment fund manager. Since 1997, May had represented Maidenhead, one of the safest and most affluent constituencies in England, located in the Thames Valley, and well served by key infrastructure, not least the existing Great Western mainline railway, future Crossrail line serving central London, and the M4 motorway corridor. May’s constituency was well insulated from the economic restructuring which had affected many other constituencies in the Midlands and North of England. Prior to becoming Prime Minister, although May had previously worked at both the Bank of England and the Association of Payment Clearing Services, in nineteen years as a Member of Parliament, she had not acquired any actual Shadow Cabinet let alone ministerial experience of serving either at the Treasury or one of the major Whitehall departments dealing with economic policy.

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However, it should not be thought that Theresa May had entered Number Ten Downing Street bereft of any analysis what might be ailing UK economic policy or performance. On the contrary, in her ‘three pillars of conservatism’ keynote speech, delivered at Westminster to a conference organised by the ConservativeHome website on the 10 March 2013, May had not only provided the clearest statement of her own vision for British conservatism, but also set out a comprehensive agenda for resetting the political economy of British capitalism via the creation of a British developmental state. In so doing, she had joined a long tradition of politicians from all major UK political parties who had identified this particular route as the remedy for redressing national relative decline (Lee, 1997, 2021, 2022). May had identified the three pillars of British conservatism as security, freedom and opportunity. For the political economy of the UK, the first pillar of security would mean ‘helping people to support their families, making communities stronger, and building up society so we don’t always need the state to pick up the pieces when things go wrong’ (May, 2013). The second pillar of conservatism, freedom, would mean freedom from vested interests, including those in the private sector, by using state power and corporate governance laws wherever big companies were acting against the interests of their customers, their shareholders or the public (May, 2013). May’s third pillar of conservatism, opportunity, would mean a willingness to act to reform capitalism to address ‘Britain’s over-reliance on financial services. Questions about our productivity and competitiveness. The crisis in our public finances. The inequality between London and the rest of the country. The cost of living. Stalling social mobility. The public’s anger about companies that evade taxes and excessive corporate pay’ and the fact, from May perspective, that ‘All too often, the system doesn’t seem to be working for the whole country’ (May, 2013). The key to the creation of a British economy that would work for all would be the institution of a British developmental state. May was adamant this would not mean a return to the ‘beer and sandwiches’ of ‘failed seventies-style corporatism’, but rather ‘a more strategic role for the state in our economy’ in fulfilling five roles. First, to ‘map out the established and developing industries that are of strategic value to our economy, so policy can be designed to promote those industries’ by improving the UK’s record in infrastructure, skills and training, and research and development. Second, to ‘identify the training and

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skills capabilities we need, and tailor its policies accordingly. It could encourage the establishment of more technical schools. It could work with schools’. Third, to ‘identify geographical clusters of industry – like biotech in Cambridge, the semiconductor industry in the South West of England, or the Formula One corridor in Oxford, Warwick and Birmingham – so we can help develop these clusters further’ (May, 2013). Fourth, to change the government’s approach to public procurement, ‘to strike a better balance between short-term value for the taxpayer and long-term benefits to the economy’. Fifth, to pursue a relentless campaign to support entrepreneurs and wealth creators, including freeing ‘world-beating British education and health providers who could use their expertise to win business in foreign markets’ (May, 2013). May insisted her industrial policy would not amount to picking winners. The model for her ‘strong, small and strategic state role’ was ‘pretty much every Asian country’, but also Germany’s support for its manufacturers, French intervention to support sectors like civil engineering, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, and the United States’ support for its defence sector. There was also a British developmental state precedent in the Thatcher government’s support for Canary Wharf and the London Docklands (Lee, 2010), the Nissan car factory at Sunderland, and the life sciences sector (May, 2013).

Theresa May’s Modern Industrial Strategy Upon becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May’s British developmental state model of political economy, which she had reiterated on the 11 July 2016 in Birmingham in a speech to launch her Conservative Party leadership campaign (May, 2016d), would take the form of a ‘modern industrial strategy’. However, it would turn out to be the clearest example of May’s statecraft in office failing to translate into effective policy the transformational character of her own ‘make the economy work for everyone’ political economy narrative. On becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May had immediately delivered a Cabinet reshuffle which saw the Ayn Rand-loving, and state intervention-sceptic, Sajid Javid, replaced by the more interventionist Greg Clark at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), a department newly created from the merger of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department of

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Energy and Climate Change, and charged with delivering ‘“a comprehensive industrial strategy”’ (BEIS, 2016). May appeared to have equipped her government with the department and the minister to deliver the strategic intervention she had prescribed as a curative to the ills of British capitalism and an economy she contended was not working in the interests of everyone. A golden opportunity then arose in the very first week of May’s premiership for her to reset United Kingdom economic policy in favour of her developmental state-led, comprehensive industrial strategy when a £24.3 billion takeover was announced of ARM Holdings by the SoftBank Group, a Japanese private equity fund. As the designer of 95% of the silicon chips used in smart mobile phones, ARM constituted the UK’s pre-eminent, globally significant technology company. Just one week earlier, in launching her Conservative Party leadership campaign, May had highlighted the foreign takeover of Cadbury’s ‘that great Birmingham company’ and the near sale of AstraZeneca to its US Pfizer. Indeed, she had asserted that ‘it is hard to think of an industry of greater strategic importance to Britain than its pharmaceutical industry, and AstraZeneca is one of the jewels in its crown’ (May, 2016d). Moreover, May reminded her audience that Pfizer was ‘the US company with a track record of asset stripping and whose self-confessed attraction to the deal was to avoid tax’ (May, 2016d). The conclusion therefore drawn by May for economic policy statecraft was that ‘A proper industrial strategy wouldn’t automatically stop the sale of British firms to foreign ones, but it should be capable of stepping in to defend a sector that is as important as pharmaceuticals is to Britain’ (May, 2016d). Given that May had identified the semiconductor industry as one of the clusters of British industry which could be further developed by her industrial strategy, and given ARM Holding’s status as the UK’s largest and sole globally significant technology company, her government appeared to have no other choice but to step in to block ARM’s sale. After all, May had committed herself only the week before to ‘cutting out all the political platitudes about “stakeholder societies”-and doing something radical’ to promote community, employee and the national interest in corporate governance (May, 2016d). In the event, however, instead of blocking the takeover, May was reported to have personally telephoned the chief executive of SoftBank, Masayoshi Son, to congratulate him on his deal (Sheffield, 2016). For his part, Chancellor Hammond was pictured in Downing Street shaking Son’s hand, and issued a statement proclaiming

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‘”Just three weeks after the referendum decision, it shows that Britain has lost none of its allure to international investors. Britain is open for business-and open to foreign investment”’ (Business Sale Report, 2016). Instead of a radical transformation of the political economy of the UK, May’s statecraft would deliver business as usual for the City of London and its short-termist takeover culture. This was confirmed In January 2017, when the May Government published its Green Paper Building Our Industrial Strategy (Her Majesty’s Government, 2017). Although May’s own Foreword to the Green Paper had claimed the industrial strategy was ‘underpinned by a new approach to government’ which would ‘build on Britain’s strategic strengths and tackle our underlying weaknesses, like low productivity’ (May, 2017: 3), her government’s own actions betrayed a quintessential ‘business-as-usual’ approach. Consequently, in August 2017 the May Government sold the state-owned UK Green Investment Bank (GIB) to a consortium led by Macquarie, an Australian banking group, for £1.6 billion. The GIB had been created as a public company by the Cameron government as recently as 2012 to help surmount ‘a lack of private investment in the green economy needed to meet the UK’s climate change obligations’ (Public Accounts Committee, 2018). In only five years, the GIB had committed £3.4 billion to fund or part fund 100 green investment projects, and had succeeded in attracting £8.6 billion of private capital alongside its own investments (Public Accounts Committee, 2018). A truly comprehensive industrial strategy, and one consistent with the transformational language of May’s own political rhetoric or the One Nation Conservative technocratic blueprint for industrial modernization published that year by Michael Heseltine (2012, 2017), would have reset UK industrial policy. The May Government could have used its same money creating powers, that had provided £445 billion of cheap funding to the banking sector, via quantitative easing purchases of UK government bonds, to invest strategically in the GIB and/or the creation of a network of development banks to fund the further development of the strategic industrial sectors May herself had earlier identified. Instead, May’s economic policy statecraft chose to accord primary to the same private financial interests in the City of London that had been favoured by her Conservative predecessors.

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How Did the UK Economy Perform Under Theresa May? Philip Hammond had made any potential resetting of UK economic policy away from fiscal austerity conditional upon the successful conclusion of the negotiation of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and an orderly transition to a new economic partnership. That ‘Deal Dividend’ never came and so there was no reset. Consequently, the performance of the UK economy during the tenure of the May government was as moribund and anaemic as it had been during David Cameron’s premiership. In July 2016, May and Hammond had inherited UK net public sector debt of £1606.7 billion, equivalent to 80.0% of GDP, and annual borrowing of £81 billion or 4.2% of GDP from the final year of the Cameron government in which they had both served (Brien, 2022: 25; Office for National Statistics, 2022: Table PS4). By the time, May and Hammond left office in July 2019, the UK’s annual current budget deficit had been reduced to £44.0 billion or 2.0% of GDP, but in the process UK net public sector debt had increased by a further £185.6 billion to £1792.3 billion, and had only declined by 0.1% as a share of UK national income during May’s tenure to 79.9% of GDP (Office for National Statistics, 2022: Table PS4). Not only had the May government’s persistence with fiscal austerity failed to balance the nation’s public finances. It had also suppressed economic growth to below the UK’s historic annual trend growth rate of 2.25–2.50%. The UK economy had grown by a paltry 2.3% in 2016, and 2.1% in 2017, followed by two consecutive years of 1.7% (Brien, 2022: 12). The New Economics Foundation think tank calculated that the cumulative year-on-year effects of pursuing fiscal austerity since 2010 had ‘suppressed the level of GDP by almost £100 billion in 2018/19 alone’, equivalent to £1500 per person and more than £3600 per household (Stirling, 2019). Every parliament since the May 1955 UK General Election had seen UK average annual real household income grow by 2.0%. However, the Resolution Foundation think tank would report that UK average real disposable income had increased by an annual average of only 0.3% between the May 2015 and June 2017 UK General Elections, and by an annual average of only 1.4% between the June 2017 and December 2019 General Elections, the worst period for the growth of household income in modern British history (Corlett, 2021). In December 2016, the then Governor of the Bank of England had depicted the decade since

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the 2007–2008 financial crisis as ‘the first lost decade since the 1860s’ because average earnings in the UK during this period had grown ‘at the slowest rate since the mid-19th Century’ (Carney, 2016). The economic policies chosen by Theresa May and Philip Hammond had done anything to reverse the miserable trends in UK economic performance characteristic of Carney’s ‘lost decade’. Nor had the government’s economic policy statecraft in office done anything to rebalance the UK economy. In every year of the May government, the long-term trend of parallel annual deficits in the UK’s trade and current account balances had continued. During the final year of the Cameron government, the UK’s trade deficit would reach £28.3 Billion (1.5% of GDP), and its current account deficit a record £96.4 billion (5.0% of GDP), but the first year of May’s tenure would see a further deterioration in both the UK’s trade deficit to £36.1 billion (1.8% of GDP) and its current account deficit to a new record £108.4 billion (5.4% of GDP). By the final full year of the May government, there would only be a marginal improvement to a UK trade deficit of £25.5 billion (1.2% of GDP) and a UK current account deficit of £78.9 billion (3.7% of GDP) (Office for National Statistics, 2020: Table B). For all her initial bold and transformational political rhetoric, May’s economic policy statecraft in office had yielded little tangible dividend in UK economic performance.

Conclusion: A Strategic Failure to Reset Economic Policy Jim Bulpitt’s conception of party statecraft has suggested that ‘government is not just about policies, it is also about competence-and that is related, amongst other things, to policy choice or selection’ (Bulpitt, 1986: 22). During her three years as Prime Minister, Theresa May consistently demonstrated deficiencies in her economic statecraft, especially in relation to her choice of policies. In her final speech as Prime Minister to the Conservative Party’s annual conference, May had acknowledged that ‘a decade after the financial crash, people need to know that the austerity it led is over’ (May, 2018). But in her own statecraft, she never delivered an actual end to austerity, let alone the strategic resetting of UK economic policy which should have come in July 2016 when she became Prime Minister. Only that course of action would have enabled May to have selected alternative economic policy choices to address the ‘burning

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injustices’ and to build the economy that worked for everyone which she had identified in her inaugural speech as Prime Minister. In practice, the May Government simply prolonged the ‘Age of Austerity’ which David Cameron had first prescribed for UK economic policy in April 2009. Under May, a further £185.6 billion was added to the United Kingdom’s net public sector debt over three years (Office for National Statistics, 2022: Table PSA4), and the balancing of the annual current budget to eliminate the ‘deficit’ was postponed until an unspecified date in the mid-2020s. At the same time, under May’s leadership there was continuity not only with the Cameron government but the economic policy statecraft of every UK government since the first Thatcher government in that there was no rebalancing of the UK economy away from an over-reliance upon household-debt fuelled consumer spending and imports towards private business investment, manufacturing and exports. The subsequent actions of the Johnson Government in moving away from austerity in September 2019 Spending Round, and interventions to fund (by June 2022) a £376 billion package to offset the impact of the coronavirus pandemic (National Audit Office, 2022) would make a mockery of the idea, to which the May Government steadfastly adhered, that fiscal consolidation was a necessary and unavoidable economic policy choice. What May’s statecraft, and that of her Conservative successors as Prime Minister had revealed, was that austerity all along had been a wholly political and ideological policy choice, and one which had condemned the UK economy to a lost decade of stagnating real average earnings and living standards.

Bibliography Bank for International Settlements. (2019). Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign exchange turnover in April 2019. Bank for International Settlements. BBC. (2016, July 22). Chancellor May “reset” economic policy in Autumn Statement. BBC News. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36864099. Accessed 27 November 2022. Brien, P. (2022). Economic indicators: September 2022. House of Commons https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbpLibrary. 9040/#:~:text=Headline%20Indicators%20summary,compared%20to%20the% 20previous%20year. Accessed 27 November 2022. Bulpitt, J. (1986). The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s domestic statecraft. Political Studies, 34, 19–39.

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Business Sale Report. (2016, July 18). iPhone microchip manufacturer ARM to be sold to SoftBank. Business Sale Report. https://www.business-sale.com/ news/business-sale/iphone-microchip-manufacturer-arm-to-be-sold-to-sof tbank-211239. Accessed 27 November 2022. Cameron, D. (2009, April 26). ‘The Age of Austerity’, Speech delivered at the Conservative Party Spring Forum, Cheltenham. Carney, M. (2016, December 5). The spectre of monetarism, Roscoe Lecture. Liverpool John Moores University. Centre for Policy Studies. (1977). Stepping stones. Centre for Policy Studies. Conservative Party. (1976). The right approach: A statement of conservative aims. Conservative Central Office. Conservative Party. (1977). The right approach to the economy: Outline of an economic strategy for the next conservative government. Conservative Central Office. Conservative Party. (1979). Conservative General Election Manifesto 1979. Conservative and Unionist Party. Corlett, A. (2021). Are you better off today? Real income growth under different governments since 1955. The Resolution Foundation. https://www.res olutionfoundation.org/publications/are-you-better-off-today/. Accessed 22 November 2022. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). (2016, July 14). Statement from Greg Clark, secretary of state for business, energy and industrial strategy. Press Release. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sta tement-from-greg-clark-secretary-of-state-for-business-energy-and-industrialstrategy. Accessed 13 July 2021. Hammond, P. (2016, November 23). Autumn Statement 2016: Philip Hammond’s speech. House of Commons. https://www.gov.uk/govern ment/speeches/autumn-statement-2016-philip-hammonds-speech. Accessed 27 November 2022. Hammond, P. (2019, March 13). Spring Statement to the House of Commons. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/spring-statement-2019-philiphammonds-speech. Accessed 4 October 2022. Heath, E. (1970). Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, Blackpool, 10 October. Her Majesty’s Government. (2017). Industrial strategy: Building a Britain fit for the future. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Ipsos. (2022, October). Best party on key issues: Managing the economy. https:/ /www.ipsos.com/en-uk/best-party-key-issues-managing-economy. Accessed 27 November 2022. Joseph, (Sir) K. (1975). ‘Foreword’ to centre for policy studies. In Why Britain needs a social market economy. Centre for Policy Studies.

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Joseph, (Sir) K. (1979). Industrial policy and employment, House of Commons Debate, Official Record, 21 May. cc.695–837. Keegan, W. (2019). Nine crises: Fifty years of covering the British economy from devaluation to Brexit. Biteback Publishing. Keep, M. (2022). The UK’s fiscal targets. Research Briefing Number 9329. House of Commons Library. Lee, S. (1997). Part B: Explaining Britain’s relative economic performance. In A. Cox, S. Lee & J. Sanderson (Eds.), The political economy of modern Britain (pp. 65–253) Edward Elgar. Lee, S. (2010). Necessity as the mother of intervention: The industrial policy debate in England. Local Economy, 25(8), 622–630. Lee, S. (2011). No Plan B: The coalition agenda for cutting the deficit and rebalancing the economy. In M. Beech & S. Lee (Ed.), The Cameron-Clegg government: Coalition politics in an age of Austerity (pp. 59–74). Palgrave Macmillan. Lee, S. (2015). Indebted and unbalanced: The political economy of the coalition. In M. Beech & S. Lee (Eds.), The Conservative-Liberal coalition: Examining the Cameron-Clegg coalition (pp. 16–35). Palgrave Macmillan. Lee, S. (2017). Expansionary fiscal consolidation and the ‘Smarter State’: An evaluation of the politics of Austerity in the United Kingdom, May 2010 to February 2016. In S. McBride & B. Evans (Eds.), The austerity state (pp. 123–143). University of Toronto Press. Lee, S. (2018). Law, legislation and rent-seeking: the role of the Treasury-led developmental state in the competitive advantage of the Southern Powerhouse. In C. Berry & A. Giovannini (Eds.), Developing England’s North: The political economy of the Northern Powerhouse (pp. 59–82). Palgrave Macmillan. Lee, S. (2021). The developmental state in England: The role of the Treasury. In C. Berry, J. Froud, & T. Barker (Eds.), The political economy of industrial strategy in The UK (pp. 39–47). Agenda Publishing. Lee, S. (2022). One nation socialism: Neil Kinnock and the Quest for a British developmental state. In K. Hickson (Ed.), Neil Kinnock: Saving The Labour Party? (pp. 42–52). Routledge. (Lord) Ashcroft Polls. (2017). The lost majority: The 2017 election, the Conservative Party, the voters and the future. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ hull/detail.action?docID=5058275. Accessed 1 October 2022. (Lord) Heseltine, M. (2012). No stone unturned in pursuit of growth. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. (Lord) Heseltine, M. (2017). Industrial strategy: A response to the Government’s Green Paper. www.IndustrialStrategy2017LordHeseltine.co.uk. Accessed 21 November 2021.

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May, T. (2013). We will win by being the party for all. Conservative Home ‘Victory 2015’ conference, Westminster, 10 March. https://www.conservat ivehome.com/platform/2016/07/full-text-of-theresa-mays-speech-we-willwin-by-being-the-party-for-all.html. Accessed 12 July 2022. May, T. (2016a, July 13). Statement from the new Prime Minister, Downing Street, London. May, T. (2016b). Speech to the Conservative Party Annual Conference, Birmingham, 5 October. May, T. (2016c). Prime Minister’s Questions, Official Record, July 20, c.818. May, T. (2016d, July 11). Speech to launch her leadership campaign, Birmingham. May, T. (2017). ‘Foreword from the Prime Minister’ to her majesty’s government. In Industrial strategy: Building a Britain fit for the future. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. May, T. (2018). Speech to the 2018 Conservative Party Annual Conference, Birmingham, 3 October. National Audit Office. (2022). Covid-19 cost tracker (as at June 2022 update). https://www.nao.org.uk/overviews/covid-19-cost-tracker/. Accessed 1 September 2022. Office for National Statistics. (2016). UK balance of payments, The Pink Book 2016. Office for National Statistics. Office for National Statistics. (2020). Balance of payments, UK: January to March 2020. Office for National Statistics. Office for National Statistics. (2022). Public sector finances, UK: October 2022. Office for National Statistics. https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmen tpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/bulletins/publicsectorfinances/oct ober2022. Accessed 28 November 2022. Osborne, G. (2011). Budget Statement, Official Record, 23 March, c.896. Osborne, G. (2016, July 1). Speech to Manchester Chamber of Commerce, Manchester. Public Accounts Committee. (2018). The sale of the Green Investment Bank. The Stationery Office. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/ cmselect/cmpubacc/468/46802.htm. Accessed 27 November 2022. Seldon, A. (with Newell, R.). (2019). May At 10. London: Biteback. Sheffield, H. (2016, July 18). Theresa May has been prime minister for five days-she has just performed an about-turn on a £24 billion takeover deal. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ softbank-arm-takeover-theresa-may-tory-policy-segars-hammond-a7142556. html. Accessed 26 November 2022.

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Stirling, A. (2019, February 21). Austerity is subduing UK economy by more than £3600 per household this year. New Economics Foundation Blog. https://neweconomics.org/2019/02/austerity-is-subduing-uk-eco nomy-by-more-than-3-600-per-household-this-year. Accessed 27 November 2022. YouGov. (2022, November 21). The most important issues facing the country. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/education/trackers/the-most-import ant-issues-facing-the-country. Accessed 27 November 2022.

CHAPTER 8

Theresa May and Mental Health Policy: A Legacy Unfinished? Daniel Bowman

Introduction to Conservative Mental Health Policy Institutionalisation, Lord Shaftesbury and Mental Health The saliency of mental health policy has increased amongst representative elites over the last two decades. An acknowledgement by parliamentarians of the high individual, social and economic costs associated with mental health has led to the construction of a range of policy proposals. The UK has a long history of mental health reform which can be broken down into three distinct paradigms: institutionalisation, de-institutionalisation and the holistic agenda that came to the fore under Theresa May. Importantly, before May would commence her mental health revolution, there was much work conducted by historic Conservative Party figures. The institutionalisation paradigm occurred in the 1800s through the emergence of the county asylum network (Jones, 1955). The work of

D. Bowman (B) Department of Politics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_8

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Conservative Party MP, Lord Shaftesbury endeavoured to construct a modern and compassionate system of public mental health provision for those unable to afford access to private institutions. He demonstrated great statecraft credentials with an ability to stimulate support within his own party for his mental health reform. Shaftsbury also created a strong coalition with the medical profession who he required to operationalise his grand vision on mental health. The professions support was gained through a promise that they would be central to the treatment of mentally ill people within the new public asylum system. Using both his loyal supporters within the Conservative Party and the medical profession, he was able to create a workable initiative that he took to Parliament in the late 1830s. His ability to build such a coalition was undoubtedly supported by his outstanding reputation as a social reformer (see Jones, 1955, p. 170). His perseverance on the issue and successful coalition building with stakeholders inside and outside of Westminster enabled him to secure his agenda: specifically, the Lunacy Acts 1845 which made it mandatory for asylums to be constructed across all localities in England and Wales, welcoming in a new era of reform. De-Institutionalisation: Enoch Powell and the Thatcher Administration The second epoch of reform occurred between the 1960s and 1980s through interventions from leading Conservative Party representatives. After the war, much debate occurred around the future of the mental health network. The old asylum buildings had become expensive to upkeep and concerns were raised around the humanitarian credentials of a system based on confinement. The alternative to institutionalisation was community-based care, which was perceived to be more affordable and (importantly) more humane. The case for reform was made by then Minister for Health, Enoch Powell in a speech to the National Association for Mental Health in 1961. Here, Powell used his rhetorical skills to capture the imagination of both representative elites and the wider population (Crines et al., 2016). He used harrowing terms and visual imagery to stimulate an emotional response from the population, pushing a modernising agenda by criticising the architectural characteristics of the asylums and the outdated cultures inside of them. Such was the effectiveness of the speech that he was able to determine more enlightened thought among the population, leading to calls for reform. Indeed, he

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argued that ‘where they stand, isolated, majestic, imperious, brooded over by the gigantic water tower and chimney combined, rising unmistakable and daunting out of the countryside’ (Powell, 1961). Powell demonstrated his abilities to use arguments that would penetrate strong feelings from his fellow party members and representative elites. By referencing both economic and moral lines within his argument, Powell was able to reach those that would not traditionally have considered mental health to be an important issue. The humanitarian and fiscal imperatives of transitioning from the old and tired institutions of the past towards the new and modern frameworks of community care set reform in motion. Another influential figure within Conservative Party politics would make a brief intervention on the matter in the same year. Though it is a little-known fact, Margaret Thatcher delivered a speech in support of mental health at the Friars Hospital in Barnet, where she demonstrated ideation around mental health that was not dissimilar to the rhetoric witnessed in the charitable campaigns of Mind and Rethink Mental Illness . She argued that ‘until the public comes into contact with a mental disorder, we of the general public tend to dismiss it as something that will never touch us’ (Thatcher, 1961). She proceeded to commend the important work of the medical profession in expanding the possibilities of care and leading the rest of Europe in their treatment solutions. Though Thatcher was not blatant in her support for the community care movement, it was under her premiership that the first asylum closed and the reintegration of those with mental health disorders would be operationalised. Unlike Powell, Thatcher had the power to facilitate a genuine reorganisation of mental health care when she rose to power in 1979. Throughout the following six years, discussions would be had around the future of these institutions. Though previous administrations (such as the Harold Wilson government) had reluctantly dismissed the stealthy closure of the asylums due to economic considerations, the Thatcher regime saw their demise as an economic opportunity. The Wilson government believed that until the country’s finances allowed for the construction of community-based facilities, the closure of the institutions would have to be delayed. The Better Services for the Mentally Ill report stated, ‘financial resource constraints alone, quite apart from the physical and manpower constraints, mean that it will inevitably be a very long time before a broadly modern service can be achieved’ (Better Services for the Mentally Ill, 1975: 84). An alternative view was held by the Thatcher administration who believed that the maintenance of the asylums was

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not cost-effective. Cummins (2010) suggests that the closures of the institutions was entirely motivated by economic considerations and not humanitarian concerns. However, Kenneth Clarke declared such views as unfounded, saying ‘that’s part of the left-wing mythology. Margaret Thatcher’s governments and chancellors did not attempt to cut money on public services including health. It’s a complete fictitious myth (interview with the author, Clarke, 2022). Powell’s rhetoric laid the foundations of the Conservative Party argument for deconstructing the asylums, whilst action from members of the Thatcher administration (such as the Kenneth Clarke) saw the establishment of community-based alternatives. Mental health reform has rarely been associated with the Conservative Party, however, these examples demonstrate the influential roles played by prominent Conservatives in the historical development of mental health care in the UK. Theresa May would follow in the footsteps of these individuals when she constructed her own mental health revolution over the course of her tenure. A Holistic Agenda The third epoch of reform developed out of transformations in public attitudes and beliefs around mental health. These transformations were influenced by emerging third-sector campaigns run by Mind and Rethink Mental Illness that aimed to reduce discrimination levels towards those with mental health disorders. The innovative Time to Change campaign founded in 2009 created an environment where it was okay to discuss mental health. Evans-Lacko et al. (2014) suggested that the campaign had a significant impact on reducing stigma and discrimination levels across the UK, alongside Henderson et al (2012) arguing that those with common mental health disorders felt less discriminated against by family, friends and employers a year into the campaign. In sync with the rise of anti-stigma campaigns was the economisation of mental health. Here, LSE Professor Richard Layard and his team reframed the argument for action on mental health from purely moral to economic. Their ‘New Deal for Depression’ report suggested that improving access to psychological therapies for common mental health disorders was essential to achieving higher rates of productivity, lower absenteeism, and reduced social security costs. This report acted as a catalyst for the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies initiative initiated in 2008. This scheme has been widely heralded for having beneficial effects on

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care and treatment outcomes but the scheme was also considered to based on neo-liberal principles. Pilgrim and Carey (2012, p. 123) argued that the scheme was reflective of neo-liberal values in its focus on economic outcomes, instead of the removal of human suffering. Nevertheless, the arguments made for its construction broadened levels of interest in mental health across the political spectrum, welcoming in a new era of parliamentary activity. Amid a social and economic crisis, the fiscal arguments for engaging with mental health enabled its maintenance on the minds of representative elites. In the third wave of reform, Theresa May would become a Conservative Party figurehead for the new holistic agenda on mental health. Her unmoving commitment to service would shine through when she turned her attention to the issue, however the environment in which she held the offices of Home Secretary and Prime Minister was thwart with obstacles that infringed her ability to achieve revolutionary change on mental health. Indeed her legacy on the issue may be unfinished.

Theresa May: A Modern Mental Health Revolution? As the historical overview has shown, mental health has not been an issue untouched by the Conservative Party. It was the valiant efforts of Lord Shaftesbury, the overpowering rhetoric of Powell and the reforming actions of Clarke that secured a conservative legacy on mental health. Theresa May would continue this legacy through her holistic reformation agenda. A previous financial consultant, May’s background offered limited clues as to where her enthusiasm for mental health came from. She had not spoken about any personal struggles with mental health or family experiences with psychological issues. Indeed, one can only assume that her enthusiasm for mental health was stimulated through a recognition of the individual, social and economic costs associated with the issue. Another reason could be the perceived de-politicised nature of mental health. The three main political parties in the UK Parliament had only referenced the issue collectively less than a dozen times in their manifesto literature prior to May becoming Home Secretary. The Conservative Party had only mentioned it twice within their 2010 manifesto compared to the Labour Party who referenced it five times. The lack of political division around mental health would have made it a desirable policy area for

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an up-and-coming cabinet member wanting to avoid unnecessary political feuds. As Prime Minister, she wanted to create a ‘country that worked for everyone’ and construct policies that met the needs of the so-called left behind. Mental health was, by any metric an issue that went to the heart of this agenda. It was an issue that caused children and young people drop out of education, adults to fall out of the workforce and families to slide into destitution. An awareness of these realities and the concentration of such outcomes in areas of destitution must have acted as a catalyst to May’s commitment to mental health. She did have an unwavering belief in doing the right thing, regardless of the personal or electoral cost. She created good argument hegemony around the issue of mental health, offering a holistic alternative to the increased spending solutions proposed by Labour. She constructed a workable strategy that aimed to both lower the fiscal burden of mental health whilst at the same time strengthen the availability of social and medical interventions. Though she failed to galvanise excitement amongst her own party and the general population around mental health, this may have been out of her control due to the emphasis placed on other domestic and supranational issues. A winning electoral strategy (or lack of it) was also informed by the broader issue of Brexit and not mental health. Overall, Theresa May did what she said she would do on mental health; however, the ghost of austerity and the onset of Brexit made it harder for her to build a strong narrative around her successes. Her early interventions on mental health as Home Secretary and her subsequent efforts to champion a holistic agenda as Prime Minister will now be considered.

Theresa May as Home Secretary (2010–2016)---Policing the Mental Health Crisis She would become Home Secretary shortly after the construction of the Coalition in 2010. Her no-nonsense approach to the role often created resistance from core stakeholders within the policing profession. She was harsh, unapologetically confrontational, and ruthlessly independent in her mission to reform the police force. Her mental health agenda during her time as Home Secretary would diverge from this path and was more collaborative and compassionate in nature. Four years into her role as Home Secretary, Theresa May made a speech at an event in partnership

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with Black Mental Health UK where she stated her deep determination to address what she described as one of the ‘toughest and most intransigent’ issues facing British law enforcement (gov.uk, 2014). She acknowledged that mental health services were overburdened and underresourced, causing many people in a crisis to come into contact with the police. Police officers were often poorly trained and ill-resourced to support individuals in acute distress. After all, this was not what they were trained to deal with as police officers, reducing their ability to offer meaningful interventions. The most common response by police officers was to take an individual to a place of safety. During this period, the use of police cells was common prior to a more appropriate setting being sourced. The use of Section 136 (Mental Health Act 1983) allowed a member of law enforcement to deal with a mental health crisis in this manner. Nevertheless, the small and poorly lit police cells were never the most appropriate environment for someone in a crisis, officers themselves often felt that their involvement in these incidents was unhelpful and unfair on the individual (Mclean & Marshall, 2010). Still, they offered as much support as they could under obvious constraints. Theresa May reflected their concerns around these practices when she passionately condemned them during a mental health summit in 2014. Imagine what it is like for the thousands of people with mental health problems, learning disabilities or other vulnerabilities who regularly encounter the police: people suffering from a breakdown or a psychotic episode; people acting in a way that is dangerous to themselves or others; people who are vulnerable and have been attacked or robbed; people who are confused, distressed and disorientated. And then imagine if that encounter also leads to physical restraint, or even being Tasered by the police. Imagine being transported to the hospital, not in an ambulance, but in the back of a police car. Or being detained in a police cell rather than a health-based place of safety or mental health ward. That encounter must be terrifying. (May, 2014)

Her words here demonstrated a genuine empathy for the ‘confused, distressed, disorientated’ individuals who found themselves within the punitive setting of a police cell. Her recognition at the end of the speech that such an ‘encounter must be terrifying’ further outlined her paternal instinct towards the mentally ill. This enabled her to show her softer side beyond the uncompromising image she had perfected, though one must not forget that she was part of an administration that had advocated direct

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cuts to mental health services, contributing to the enhanced role of the police in a crisis. Research released two years prior to her impassioned address at the policing and mental health event suggested that austerity measures facilitated by the Cameron administration had substantially reduced the number of people who could access appropriate mental health interventions (LSE Centre for Economic Performance’s Mental Health Policy Group, 2012: 3). This evidence was further supplemented by the Kings Fund (2015) which uncovered a 40% reduction in mental health trust budgets since 2010, whilst Curtis and Netten (2013) found that £260 million worth of cuts to local authorities removed access to care for almost 30,000 people with mental health disorders. Though May demonstrated empathy towards those in crisis, she was also a member of an administration that introduced cutbacks to traditional mental health interventions. The Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (2018) declared that they were ‘picking up the pieces’ of an underfunded and poorly staffed mental health service. Conservative Police and Crime Commissioner for Kent and former Lead for the APPG Portfolio Group on Mental Health & Custody, Matthew Scott agreed with the dire illustration of the ICFRS. The situation was not good if you suffered from a mental health problem. Between the reform of the healthcare system (Health and Social Care Act 2012), fragmented services and cuts to police officers the situation was certainly not positive. (interview with author, 2022).

Scott did acknowledge that May ‘did get’ mental health was an issue, but was concerned that the broader austerity agenda had reduced her capacity to do anything on a national level. Indeed, he stated that the fiscal constraints imposed by the central administration may have ‘tainted much of what she did on mental health’. To May’s credit, she continued to fight for the reduction in the use of police cells, something she and local police forces were very successful at. There is, however, the question as to what extent this was facilitated by the Home Office. Matthew Scott, whilst commending her intervention, suggested that most of the changes made were through collaborations between healthcare organisations, the police and other local stakeholders. He offered the example of the ‘Talk It Out’ Mental Health Hub set up in Kent to support those in crisis (Perkins, 2017) as evidence of such collaborations. Indeed, it may be far-fetched to suggest that Theresa May’s work was the catalyst for improvements in

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responses to mental health crises’s. A far more plausible explanation for such improvements is that local police forces found innovative ways of reducing its role in mental health call-outs without interference from the central government. This is something that Scott alluded to when asked about the role of the central administration in such innovations, though was also quick to suggest that May’s advocation acted as a supplementary measure to the hard work of local forces. There was a change in policing culture around the use of police cells. Although, this was voluntary and discretionary work by the police and health services that enabled such a transformation to take place. Not necessarily achieved through central government (interview with author, 2022)

Data collected by NHS England (2022) demonstrates the substantial reductions in the use of police cells as places of safety between 2016 and 2020. Around 900 detentions were recorded in 2016 compared to around 125 in 2019, whilst the total number of children and young people held in police cells fell from 20 in 2016 to 0 in 2019/2020. The Police and Crime Bill informed by local stakeholders and cemented into statute by the central administration supported these reductions. It was stated within the Bill that no child or adolescent should be held in a police cell as a place of safety and the use of them for adults should be heavily restricted (Fig. 8.1). The legal statute and the decision to abandon the use of police cells for children and young people in crisis did cause some issues. As already noted, mental health services had experienced immense cuts to their budgets throughout the coalition Government’s tenure. The austerity effects on mental health services increased the use of police time spent supporting those in crises because previously available health-based interventions had been cut. This time would be spent waiting in accident and emergency departments for a member of a local crisis team to come and assess a vulnerable individual in their care (Fig. 8.2). Doctoral researcher, Alice Park, who focuses on the issue of policing and mental health, stated that the reductions in the use of police cells as places of safety should have been partnered with increased investment in frontline services. She argued that ‘whilst there were good honest efforts on the ground to support people with mental health problems, the

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Fig. 8.1 Section 136 Detentions taken to police cells as place of safety (Source NHS Mental Health Dashboard)

Fig. 8.2 Total number of mental health related police incidents (English police forces: 2016–2019) (Source Parliament Street [2019, p. 10]—Fig. 1)

root cause of funding was not addressed’ (interview with author, 2022). The former Home Secretary’s record on mental health was undoubtedly spoiled by the continuing reductions in frontline service budgets, whilst the use of police cells fell, the number of mental health incidents dealt with by local police forces increased. Data collected by Parliament

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Street (2019) suggested that rates of mental health-related incidents dealt with by local police forces increased by 111% between 2016 and 2019. According to HMICFRS (2018, p. 40), officers have found themselves waiting up to 8 hours in accident and emergency departments for qualified mental health professionals to arrive. This reality will leave a clear stain on Theresa May’s efforts to address inequalities in mental health policy.

Theresa May at No.10: Mental Health on the National Agenda After the factious EU Referendum, the UK needed a Prime Minister that could heal the divisions of the past and put forward a comprehensive agenda for the future, particularly in areas such as mental health. One July morning, the second female Prime Minister set out her vision to renew the bonds of the British people. Her one-nation agenda aimed to deliver for those who had been left behind and renew a sense of trust in government. She would deliver a Beveridgian-style address on the steps of 10 Downing Street that outlined the ‘modern evils’ of British society. One such evil was mental health which she proclaimed did not receive the attention it deserved, stating that ‘if you suffer from mental health problems, there’s not enough help to hand’ (May, 2016). The issue of mental health was most prevalent in the regions Theresa May endeavoured to reach out to. The Northeast and Northwest which predominantly voted leave in the referendum had some of the highest rates of mental illness across the UK. Theresa May recognised the need to address this problem if she was to ‘build a country that worked for everyone’ and deliver for the so-called left behind. Addressing mental health had universal appeal both inside and outside of Westminster. It was not a contentious issue within her own party, neither was it an area that the Labour Party had a clear vision on. It was, however, an extremely poignant issue amongst the general population who saw action on mental health as something desperately needed. There was much to gain from addressing mental health without the risk of backlash from her own backbenchers. If May could construct an alternative agenda on mental health to the Labour Party’s increased spending promises, then she could achieve issue hegemony and encroach on traditional left-wing territory. She would endeavour to do this through the construction of a modern holistic agenda on mental health which focused on prevention over cure. Both, the types of care and

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treatment interventions and the environments in which they took place were to be modernised as part of her plan. This would include the introduction of mental health taskforces in schools and colleges, prevention and promotion activities in the workplace, and the reform of the Mental Health Act. This was a well-thought through strategy that would serve to reduce the individual, social and economic burdens of mental illness. Simultaneously, the strategy also aimed to unleash the potential of thousands of individuals with mental health disorders across the UK. Though her measures were extremely progressive, she could not ignore the underfunded and under-resourced traditional interventions in the NHS. In recognition of this, she pledged to increase the mental health workforce by 10,000 and reduce waiting times for psychological therapies. The proposals were comprehensive and ambitious, however, without corralling the necessary parliamentary support, her vision would not be realised. A level of distrust existed amongst Labour members who had not forgotten the austerity measures enforced onto mental health services throughout the Cameron administrations. The Community Care Journal (2015) suggested that mental health service budgets were cut by 8.25% whilst she was serving as Home Secretary. Further claims were made about the indirect mental health consequences of the former administrations austerity measures (Barr, 2015, pp. 455–456; Cummins 2018; Matthey’s, 2015, pp. 476–477). This directed many on the opposition benchers to call her new-found interest in mental health audacious. Hope Virgo, an award-winning mental health campaigner and Founder of the #DumpTheScales campaign, agrees with this sentiment, suggesting that May should have owned up to her former cabinet colleagues’ mistakes. From a wider funding perspective, she should have held her hands up and said we as a government haven’t invested in this area for a long time. Whilst May cannot be held accountable for what the Cameron administration did, she should have admitted that there had been a failure. (interview with the author, 2022)

Whilst Hope suggested that Theresa May could not be held responsible for the former administration’s errors, she did state that it was May’s duty to fix them as Prime Minister. She had an enormous task on her hands to reverse decades of underinvestment and inaction on mental health. Her preliminary measure was to enhance the importance of mental health on the Conservative Party’s agenda. She would be extremely successful in this endeavour.

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Mental Health Saliency Within Conservative Party Agendas Throughout the Conservative Party’s history, mental health policy has not been a salient issue within their election manifestos. Mental health was only referenced 11 times in the twentieth century, and whilst there were notable interventions made by Conservative members, these were not significant enough to maintain the party’s interest. Under the Cameron administration, references to mental health increased slightly with a total of 8 references in the 2010 election document. Even then, these references were framed around welfare-to-work initiatives and not direct care. The May premiership saw a divergence in this long-term trend on the saliency of mental health within the Conservative Party, increasing the interest of party members and fellow representatives threefold. The direct references made to mental health increased from 9 to 46 mentions between the 2015 and 2017 manifestos. This was an enormous achievement to be able to motivate such an increase in the saliency of mental health within a political party that was not traditionally interested in the issue. Nevertheless, after a disastrous election in 2017, May lost her majority and in turn, her ability to maintain the issue as a central part of the Conservative Party vision. Brexit became the dominant concern of backbenchers and the general population. Contention contaminated the political system and non-divisive issues such as mental health were ejected from the main discourses in Westminster (Fig. 8.3). This was evident in data collected on the prevalence of mental health within Conservative Party manifestos. The next leader of the Conservative Party, Boris Johnson chose to reduce references to mental health by around 93% from 46 to 3. The evidence suggests, at least in the short term, that May failed to cement the issue within her party’s priorities beyond her premiership. Though the data tells us something about the May legacy, it tells us nothing about how successful she was at achieving her pledges on mental health since 2017.

May’s Mental Health Pledges and Their Success The May programme on mental health moved beyond the previous focus on traditional interventions and aimed to create whole-society initiatives that transcended the NHS. A dynamic and innovative programme

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Fig. 8.3 Conservative party manifestos—Total amount of times ‘mental’ health/illness was mentioned (1964–2019) (Source Data Extracted from Conservative Party Manifestos ([1964–2019])

was developed that endeavoured to increase preventative and promotional measures in schools and workplaces, reduce waiting times for children and adolescent mental health services, and reform the Mental Health Act (1983). She argued that ‘I want us to employ the power of government as a force for good to transform the way we deal with mental health problems right across society’ (May, 2017). The selection of pledges was widely welcomed by individual and organisational interests who commended her focus on mental health. The Centre for Mental Health (2017) stated that with the right interventions in childhood, we can achieve lifelong benefits and better outcomes for children and young people. This intervention demonstrated her ability to build a strong issue hegemony around mental health among outside stakeholders, however, this was not the case inside of Westminster. The former Shadow Minister for Mental Health, Luciana Berger, directed attention to the extensive cutbacks made to mental health services. She questioned the trustworthiness of the May administration to deliver what was needed to support the mental health of the wider population. Berger was not wrong to point out that May was a cabinet member within an administration that contributed heavily to the issue she was not endeavouring to solve. She also faced difficulties with her own backbenchers who demonstrated little interest

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in mental health reform. The lack of motivation directed towards mental health reform meant that May had to rely on her own frontbench team to construct and deliver much of her programme.

Mental Health Support Teams (MHSTs) The Department of Health and Social Care and the Department of Education produced a green paper on Transforming Children and Young People’s Mental Health Provision in 2017. Based on evidence collected from a range of stakeholders, the paper outlined the governments’ strategy for improving interventions outside of the NHS. The main proposal made in the green paper was to create Mental Health Support Teams. These teams would see local stakeholders and school staff working closely together to support student mental health. The multi-disciplinary approach was considered to avoid the unnecessary medicalisation of students emotions and enable more holistic interventions to be undertaken. This innovative approach to children and young people’s mental health was to be achieved by 2030. Berger critiqued the long-term nature of the governments’ proposals which based on original predictions would only reach 20% of schools by 2023. Nevertheless, the extensive work carried out by the Department of Health and Social Care and the Department of Education enabled the timetable to be accelerated with the current administration on course to cover a quarter of schools by 2023. A further 8000 schools have applied for the program and Mental Health Lead training, suggesting that further gains may be made in the near future (Fig. 8.4). The successful implementation of the flagship school-based initiative bodes well for May’s governing competence and overall legacy on mental health. Even after critical appraisals from the Labour Party and disinterest from her own backbenchers, she delivered an extensive school-based initiative that moved mental health interventions away from the medical and into the social sphere. Though success was achieved on this proposal, other areas including waiting times and spending commitments the NHS were less well executed.

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Fig. 8.4 School mental health support teams (Source Data extracted from NHS England)

Investment and Waiting Times in Mental Health Services Theresa May and her government endeavoured to deliver a holistic programme of interventions for those experiencing mental health disorders. The move from the medical to the holistic was beneficial in broadening the scope of support available. Nevertheless, after decades of underinvestment, May could not ignore the need to address frontline mental health services. The Kings Fund (2015) outlined some of the core concerns around mental health care in the second half of the decade. Under the Coalition government, 7% of psychiatric beds had been cut with the use of out-of-area placements increasing by nearly a quarter in 2014/2015.1 The financial cuts to inpatient beds meant that patients were being sent away outside of their local jurisdictions and away from their family and friends. This was seen as having a devastating effect on the recovery process of patients, particularly children and adolescents. Community care was also struggling to maintain adequate standards of treatment due to understaffing and a lack of resources.

1 Out-of-area placements are when someone is referred for inpatient care outside of their local jurisdiction.

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Furthermore, waiting times for community-based treatments were inadequate with average delays of 4 months for routine assessments from CAMHS (See Centre for Mental Health, 2014). Many of the difficulties faced by services were down to budget cuts with some mental health trusts struggling to maintain a surplus. According to data extracted from NHS trust accounts, only 58% of them were maintaining a surplus whilst 42% were in deficit. An extra 9% of mental health trusts were in deficit in 2014/2015 compared to 2011/2012. The challenges facing the May administration were immense and would not be solved through short-term solutions. In an attempt to rectify the situation, Theresa May pledged an extra £1 billion in the 2017 manifesto for mental health services. This money was aimed at improving waiting times and training more staff to deliver services. Prior to this announcement, the opposition had criticised the government for not delivering on their spending promises. Though based on evidence from the NHS Mental Health Dashboard (2022), between 2016/2017 and 2020/2021 investment in mental health services increased by 1.7 billion. This demonstrates that the target was not only met, but exceeded by an extra investment of £700,000. Whilst investment increased, there was no guarantee that this would reduce waiting times. The highest waiting times experienced by children and adolescents was often for eating disorder services. This has been used as a core indicator of waiting-time outcomes within the NHS Mental Health Dashboard database. The indicators used measure how many urgent cases were seen within 1 week of referral and routine cases within 4 weeks of referral. The data collected by the NHS suggests that May’s administration did increase the percentage of urgent and routine cases being seen within the defined timeframes in the short term, however, the pandemic reduced the progress made with the percentage of referrals being seen within both timeframes falling below pre-May levels. This does not dent the enormous contribution Theresa May and her administration made in the short term to improving the timely nature of treatment (Fig. 8.5). In adult services, the indicator used to measure progress on waiting times is the percentage of people receiving first treatment appointments within 6 weeks of referral and the percentage of people receiving first treatment appointments within 18 weeks of referral. Both of these measures are based on outcomes for Improving Access to Psychological Therapies services. The evidence suggests that the percentage of adults receiving care within the defined timeframes has been mixed. The

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Fig. 8.5 % of CYP with eating disorders seen within 1 week (urgent) and 4 weeks (routine) (Source NHS Mental Health Dashboard)

percentage of adults meeting the 6-week referral target stood at 89.3% in 2017/2018 before fluctuating until its peak at 92.5% in 2020/2021. Due to the onset of the pandemic, the percentage fell back to 2017/2018 levels in 2021/2022. This signifies that improvements were made under the May tenure but due to the pandemic such work was dismantled. The 18 weeks standard fluctuated less, remaining consistently around 98.7% before falling to 98.4% during the pandemic. It is less obvious from these results that the May administration made much of a difference, however the IAPT scheme was well established prior to her government coming into office. Overall, the May administration succeeded in reducing waiting times in certain areas; however, the pandemic dismantled many of these accomplishments. Short-term gains were made but more work is required to improve waiting times post-pandemic (Fig. 8.6).

The Reform of the Mental Health Act (1983) The reform of the Mental Health Act (1983) was a core priority of the May administration who endeavoured to make it less punitive and more collaborative in its application. The evidence collected by the NHS

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Fig. 8.6 IAPT % of people receiving first treatment appointment within 6 weeks/18 weeks of referral (Source NHS Mental Health Dashboard)

suggested that the rates of detention under the Act were increasing exponentially between 2016/2017 and 2020/2021. The number of detentions grew by 16% in five years with a disproportionate number of individuals from the BAME community making up this total. The May administration commissioned Simon Wessely to produce a review of the Mental Health Act (1983) and respond with recommendations on how the statute could be improved. The final report was released in 2018 and found serious levels of risk aversion and discrimination within the application of the Act. The report found that fears among doctors, the media and the general public around the risk of violence from those with serious mental health disorders inflated the use of the Mental Health Act. Furthermore, Wessely reiterated concerns around the overrepresentation of individuals from the BAME community sectioned under the Act. The report called for a rights-based approach which was spearheaded first by the May administration and then consecutive governments thereafter. The rights-based approach aimed to promote choice, autonomy and individuality within the application of the Act. Within that, the use of the least restrictive method was to be become central to considerations around the application of the Act (Fig. 8.7).

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Fig. 8.7 Number of detentions under the mental act (1983) (Source NHS Mental Health Dashboard)

These considerations were eventually translated into a white paper which was released in 2021. A draft Mental Health Bill was organised in 2022 and will be put to Parliament in the coming years. Though the process was delayed due to the pandemic and other parliamentary business, it started with May’s commitment to making the Act fit for purpose. Once passed, it may add to Theresa May’s legacy on mental health.

Conclusion The legacy of Theresa May will be one thwart with discussions around Brexit and divisions within the Conservative Party, but these considerations fail to acknowledge the enormous contributions she made in other policy areas like mental health. Though her legacy remains unfinished, May will be remembered as one of the most influential Conservative Party reformers on mental health in history. She spearheaded a new holistic program that moved beyond treatment towards the prevention of mental health disorders. She restricted the use of police cells for vulnerable individuals and started the reform of the Mental Health Act (1983). From a statecraft perspective, she demonstrated strong issue hegemony and governing competence but failed to galvanise the interest of her own backbenchers in mental health. Needless to say, May was a leader of

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conviction and devoted herself to the cause of mental health. The results generated from her tenure were positively significant enough to secure her legacy as one of the great reformers of mental health within the UK Conservative Party.

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CHAPTER 9

Theresa May, Statecraft and the Environment Daniel Pitt

This chapter aims to analyse and measure the effectiveness of Theresa May’s statecraft. Bulpitt (1986, p. 19) stressed ‘the need to examine the activities of party leaders in terms of their statecraft’. In this case study, May’s statecraft will be analysed in terms of her environmental policies, plans, and campaigns as well as the ‘regularities and trajectories’ (James, 2016, p. 87) in her governance across her time as Prime Minister (13 July 2016–24 July 2019). Blowers (1987) identified three related functions in environmental policy, these were (1) development, (2) conservation and (3) ecological, and all three are distinguishable in the Conservatives administration during May’s leadership. According to James (2016, p. 85), ‘The study of political elites and leaders is one of the cornerstones of political science and of central importance to any society’. Relatedly, statecraft, at its core, covers a series of measures, and it utilises these measures as means to test political success. Consequently, the emphasis shall be on May as the main protagonists but some of May’s minister’s activities in relation to the Government’s environmental policy are also included, when this sheds light on May’s

D. Pitt (B) University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_9

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statecraft. Bulpitt (1986, p. 21) defined statecraft as ‘the art of winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence in office’. James (2016, p. 86) writes that ‘The statecraft approach is concerned with how political elites confront and respond to governing challenges’ and, in this case, the challenge is environmental policy, such as climate change but it is not limited to this. Nevertheless, according to Hayton (2014, p. 7), the ‘statecraft approach has significant value [but] it also contains an analytical bias against the role of political ideas’. Therefore, I attend to address this bias in my approach to statecraft in this chapter and will thus draw on Hayton’s work, and therefore locate May’s ‘statecraft within its broader ideological context’ (Hayton, 2014, p. 7). To be more specific, May’s statecraft will be located within the conservative environmentalist worldview, and hence, her environmental policy implementation will be analysed alongside her environmentalism in relation to conservative thought. On becoming the Conservative Party leader and also Prime Minister and ‘stepping into No. 10 Downing Street three weeks after the Brexit vote’ (Berthezène & Gottlieb, 2017, p. 1) meant that she had to work within a ‘structural context’ (Bulpitt 1988, p. 185) of the 2016 referendum result and then the outcome of the 2017 General Election. Both of which influenced her ability to achieve successful statecraft. Brexit dominated the policy-making process across Government during May’s leadership. This chapter, however, shall focus on the adjective rather than the noun in ‘Green Brexit’. I will argue that May’s strategic thinking on the environment was to try to strategically constrain her rival parties and make the environment a conservative issue. Yet, I argue that her tactics were insufficiently robust enough to gain political control over the general narrative about green issues as she failed to empathise sufficiently and repeatedly how her policies were embedded within conservative thought. Relatedly, I argue that ‘green’ thinking was seen, by some inside and outside the party, as being opposed to conservatism rather than being embedded within it. Thus, the strategy only partly achieved political hegemony on green issues, but this partial hegemony was bought at a cost as it further exacerbated intra-party divisions within the Conservative Party and consequently intensifying party management issues. Thus, if we take ‘What matters is winning, and winning again’ (James, 2016, p. 86) as the core criterion of statecraft, then it is difficult to argue anything but May’s statecraft ended in failure. I take this scope to be too narrow and I take a broader view of what matters in statecraft and therefore argue that May’s

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statecraft in relation to environmental policy was a partial success, but one that was purchased at a high price. Moreover, I will also argue that May saw environmental policy, especially what became her flagship policy; that is ‘Net Zero’ by 2050, as way of salvaging her image for governing competence but more importantly as a vehicle to leave a positive legacy beyond Brexit. The Conservative Party under May’s leadership had multiple policies and plans. The Conservative Party’s, 2017 manifesto noted that the five giant challenges that were facing the UK were: (1) the need for a strong economy; (2) Brexit and a changing world; (3) enduring social divisions; (4) an ageing society; and (5) fast-changing technology (Conservative Party’s Manifesto, 2017, pp. 6–7). There was a short section of the manifesto called Protecting the global environment in the Brexit and a changing world section. Thus, climate change and the environment were seen as a subsection of one of the giant challenges rather than a challenge per se. It was claimed in the manifesto that ‘We are at the forefront of action against global climate change’ (ibid., p. 37), and it also stated that ‘We will continue to lead international action against climate change, and the degradation of habitat and loss of species’ (ibid., p. 38). There was pledge about ‘protecting rare species, the polar regions and international waters’ (ibid., p. 40) and also a pledged to work with ‘Overseas Territory governments to create a Blue Belt of marine protection in their precious waters, establishing the largest marine sanctuaries anywhere in the world’ (ibid., p. 40). The manifesto stated that its primary aim in this in relation to energy policy was to focus on ‘outcomes rather than the means by which we reach our objectives’ as well as adding that energy policy should be ‘based not on the way energy is generated but on the ends we desire’ (ibid., p. 23). The manifesto stated that: The United Kingdom will lead the world in environmental protection. As Conservatives, we are committed to leaving the environment in better condition than we inherited it. That is why we will continue to take a lead in global action against climate change, as the government demonstrated by ratifying the Paris Agreement. We were the first country to introduce a Climate Change Act, which Conservatives helped to frame, and we are halfway towards meeting our 2050 goal of reducing emissions by eighty per cent from 1990 levels. (ibid., p. 40)

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The party strongly supported fracking in its 2017 manifesto. It pointed to the success in the United States stating that: The discovery and extraction of shale gas in the United States has been a revolution. Gas prices have fallen, driving growth in the American economy and pushing down prices for consumers. The US has become less reliant on imported foreign energy and is more secure as a result. And because shale is cleaner than coal, it can also help reduce carbon emissions. (ibid., p. 23)

It was also stated that the ‘potential’ was there to do the same in Britain and doing so ‘could play a crucial role in rebalancing our economy’ (ibid., p. 23). The plan was to ‘develop the shale industry’ whilst ‘maintain public confidence’ by ‘uphold our rigorous environmental protections’, and ensuring the ‘proceeds of the wealth generated by shale energy are shared with the communities affected’ (ibid., p. 23). This would mean legislation to ‘change planning law for shale applications’, and that ‘Non-fracking drilling will be treated as permitted development’ (ibid., p. 23). Moreover, a new Shale Environmental Regulator, new expert planning functions to support local councils, a new governance and accountability structure, a new National Planning Regime and a change to the Shale Wealth Fund were all proposed.

International Summits from the EU to the UN It has been argued that ‘The art of statecraft is to understand and work with the limitations placed on elite activity by the many changing structural constraints arising from within and without the polity’ (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 39). May seemed to understand the limits placed on her statecraft by the parliamentary arithmetic and consequently utilised set piece speeches outside of Parliament at home and at the transnational level to articulate her position on the environment and climate change. This approach to her statecraft also chimed with a manifesto commitment to ‘champion greater conservation co-operation within international bodies’ (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 40). May provided leadership through international summits, such as One Planet Summit, at the European Union, the United Nations General Assembly, the UN Climate Change Summit in Marrakech, and at the Global Climate Action Summit in San Francisco on 13 and 14 September 2018. May also utilised

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domestic summits, such as Zero Emissions Vehicle Summit which was held in Birmingham. May in June 2017, whilst in Brussels ‘welcomed’, the European Council reaffirmation that the EU and all its Member States were committed to fully implement the Paris Agreement (May, 2017a). At a G20 summit in July 2017, May said: Like other world leaders here, I am dismayed at the US decision to pull out of the Paris Agreement and I have urged President Trump to re-join it. The UK’s own commitment to the Paris Agreement and tackling global climate change is as strong as ever. Not only will this protect the environment for future generations, it will keep energy affordable and maintain a secure and reliable supply in order to protect the interests of businesses and consumers. We play a leading role internationally and we are delivering on our commitments to create a safer, more prosperous future for us all. (May, 2017b)

The then Business Secretary, Greg Clark, in a statement noted, which I believe is an exemplar sample of Naess’ (1973) shallow ecology, that ‘The Paris Agreement sends a clear signal that cutting emissions globally will not only help countries respond to the impact of climate change, but it is also compatible with economic growth’ (Clark, 2016). This belief was also echoed by Nick Hurd, the Minister of State for Climate Change and Industry at COP22 in Marrakesh. Moreover, at the One Planet Summit in Paris, May announce a raft of measures to tackle climate change, such as a £140 million fund. This fund, according to May, was for the world’s poorest communities to enable them to tackle the negative effects of climate change on them (May, 2017c), In November 2017, Thérèse Coffey, May’s Environment Minister, spoke at the UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn, Germany and stated the support the UK Government has been providing to developing countries, saying that: We recognise the particularly damaging effects of climate change on developing countries. That is why the UK has committed at least £5.8 billion of international climate finance between 2016 and 2020 to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change. (Coffey, 2017).

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, in January 2019 at the UN Security Council, argued that climate change is also a security risk and that ‘climate-related

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risks’ should be seen in ‘a holistic way’ (Ahmad, 2019).This shows that the Conservatives under May’s leadership were taking a multifaceted approach to climate change. Another key component of May’s statecraft and an interlinking one was to have partners globally. At a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in London on 16 to 18 April 2018, May announced her aims to unite countries around the Commonwealth, so they ‘turn the tide on plastic entering the marine environment’ (May, 2018a). There were also partnerships with Norway, New Zealand and Pacific Island countries; Canada; Ethiopia Colombia, Angola, Saudi Arabia and India to name a few, which is demonstrative of May’s approach. These covered co-operation on gas, ‘Clean Growth’, solar energy, protecting ecosystems and biodiversity.

Argument Hegemony and Electoral Strategy The Conservative Party traditionally bestows its leadership with a wide degree of autonomy in policy matters (McKenzie, 1955), and ‘Centre autonomy was always the principal rule of Conservative statecraft’ (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 28). May had limited options to choose her environmental strategies and these must be set within the ideational and historical context of the Conservative Party. At this point, it is important to note the role of conservatism and its relationship with environmentalism in shaping the contours of Conservative statecraft in office, for example, Margaret Thatcher’s speeches, in particular such as those in 1989 and 1990 at United Nations General Assembly on Global Environment (Thatcher, 1989) and her speech at the 2nd World Climate Conference (Thatcher, 1990). Furthermore, more recently, by May’s direct predecessor David Cameron (Carter & Clements, 2015). Bulpitt (1996, p. 1097) noted the important of ‘governing codes’ these are a ‘set of relatively coherent principles or rules underlying policies and policy related behaviour’. In a conference paper, called Oikophilia: Towards a Post-liberal Conservative View of the Environment , Pitt outlined what the ‘coherent principles’ could be. These are (1) Oikophilia; (2) trusteeship; (3) localism (that builds outwards and upward in concentric circles); (4) intergenerational obligations; (5) piety; (6) embeddedness; and (7) prudence (Pitt, 2022). Indeed, May did have a degree of ‘strategic reflexivity’ and was thus able to make ‘strategic choices’ (James, 2016, p. 96). May primarily built her arguments based upon the intergenerational obligations principle with

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a dash of prudence, but also pepped her speeches with a few nods to the aforementioned principles. However, the more holistic approach that draws on the multiplicity of principles was not utilised rigorously enough. May, drawing on the intergenerational obligations principle, said in Kenya that there was a ‘moral duty to leave this world in a better condition than what we inherited’ and that her objective was ‘to leave a greener, healthier environment for future generations’ but a core problem was ‘plastic in the sea’ and this problem is ‘set to treble’, so that ‘we need to do more to better protect our oceans and eliminate this harmful waste’ (Tapsfield, 2018). May’s strategic thinking was to box in the other political parties and the core of the Conservatives policy suite was announced in 2018 called 25 Year Environment Plan. May delivered the speech at the London Wetland Centre in Barnes, in which she addressed topics such as animal welfare, access to the countryside, plastic waste, climate change and air quality. At the start of her speech, she drawedon her go to principle—the intergenerational principle—saying ‘In our election manifesto last year we made an important pledge: to make ours the first generation to leave the natural environment in a better state than we found it’ (May, 2018b). She said that doing so was a ‘central priority’ for her Government. May also stated that ‘Making good on the promise that each new generation should be able to build a better future is a fundamental Conservative principle’ (ibid., 2018b). She added that she believed that ‘Conservatism and Conservation are natural allies’ and ‘whilst every political tradition has a stake in our natural environment, speaking as the Leader of the Conservative Party, I know I draw upon a proud heritage’ (ibid., 2018b). May drew on her party’s history and ideological traditions to legitimise her statecraft but also to legitimise her environmental platform. She said: The fundamental understanding which lies at the heart of our philosophical tradition is that we in the present are trustees charged with protecting and improving what we have inherited from those who went before us. And it is our responsibility to pass on that inheritance to the next generation… And it applies equally to our natural heritage. (ibid., 2018b)

Thus, drawing on the trusteeship principle, May, in her speech, cited works by Shakespeare (the Forest of Arden), Beatrix Potter, William Wordsworth, John Constable and Sir Stanley Spencer, she did this

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to enable her to make the case that protecting and enhancing the environment is part of British history and culture. Moreover, in May’s speech, there was an element of the embeddedness principle as she cited that we are reliant on the natural environment for our foodstuffs and water but also ‘getting closer to it is good for our physical and mental health and our emotional and spiritual wellbeing’ (ibid., 2018b). May also localise the environmental issue by providing reference to local parks and the seaside, hence evoking the localism principle. In the speech, May said she rejected two positions: (1) that a free market economy and economic growth are not compatible with protecting and enhancing our natural environment; and (2) that environment projections harm business and therefore is a brake on growth. She then argued that ‘innovation and invention’ will deliver new technology and a ‘enterprise economy’ will drive a ‘revolution in clean growth’ (ibid., 2018b). May then claimed that the ‘Industrial Strategy puts harnessing the economic potential of the clean growth revolution at its heart, as one of its four Grand Challenges’ (ibid., 2018b). Consequently, without utilising the term, she seemed to be making the case for prudence between the two positions she outlined. This was very similar to the reasoning in the 2017 manifesto, which stated that the focus should be on ‘reliable and affordable energy’ that seizes ‘the industrial opportunity that new technology presents and meeting our global commitments on climate change’ (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 23). May again tried to embed her environmental plan within the historical and ideological traditions of her party by citing Benjamin Disraeli’s River Pollution Prevention Act 1876, the Clean Air Act (during Anthony Eden leadership), she also said that Margaret Thatcher was the ‘first world leader to recognise the threat of global warming’ and May pointed to the David Cameron’s efforts in restoring environmentalism to a ‘central place in the Conservative agenda’ (May, 2018b). In the conclusion of her speech, May cites the eminent conservative philosopher, the late Sir Roger Scruton, saying: ‘the goal towards which serious environmentalism and serious conservatism both point – namely, home, the place where we are and that we share, the place that defines us, that we hold in trust for our descendants, and that we don’t want to spoil’ (ibid., 2018b). Consequently, May in her speech gave a nod to the Oikophilia principle. In this speech at the London Wetland Centre, May provided the most holistic argument to gain an hegemonic position on the subject and invoked six of the seven principles which were cited by Pitt (2022). Nevertheless, this was not repeated enough to gain

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that hegemonic position. The focus on intergenerational obligations and prudence only rather than on deepening and widening out the argument, therefore, not sufficiently robust to gain control over the narrative around the green agenda. A more holistic approach based on a wider range of principles and demonstrating that environmentalism is embedded within conservative thought (see Castellano, 2011; Scruton, 2013) rather than a compromise or capitulation to liberal or left-wing thought would have been a stronger position to gain full hegemony. Consequently, May only partially achieved the political argument hegemony central to a successful statecraft strategy. Moreover, in terms of devising a winning electoral strategy, there was partial success but a lack of successful implementation. There was a lack of the equivalence of the 20/20 strategy which then became the 40/40 strategy under Cameron and the 80/20 equivalent under May’s successors. Nevertheless, the share of the vote won by the Conservatives under May increase but most significantly the seats in the House of Commons went down. In terms of developing an election winning strategy, the environmental agenda was not a key strategic interest in relation to wining a general election her party. It was more important, especially ‘net zero’ policy, to May’s legacy, and I thus it did not secure her position in Number 10. Before the 25 Year Environment Plan, the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, on 12 October 2017, published The Clean Growth Strategy: Leading the Way to a Low Carbon Future (HM Government, 2017a, 2017b), and on 10 April 2017 the Government published a Litter Strategy for England (HM Government, 2017a, 2017b). Claire Perry’s speech launching the Clean Growth Strategy cited May saying: ‘Clean growth is not an option, but a duty we owe to the next generation’ but the speech did not embed the Clean Growth Strategy within conservatism or try to engage with the wider environmental arguments and debate, but it did state some policies. Perry did state that she thought that Britain lead ‘the G7 group of countries in cutting our emissions and growing our economy’ and ‘Proving as false the view that we couldn’t protect the planet and raise prosperity at the same time’. Thus, stating the argument that protecting the environment and economic growth via a market system are indeed compatible. In 2017, at UN General Assembly in New York, May again utilised the intergenerational obligations principle to make her argument saying, ‘I think of the climate change which is depleting and degrading the planet we leave to our children’ (May, 2017d). In July 2018, May said ‘Leaving

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the EU presents us with a unique opportunity to transform our food, farming and environmental policies so we can have a healthy and prosperous agricultural industry that is fit for the future, and helps us to leave the environment in a better place than we found it’ (May, 2018c), thus again using her go to principle. In June 2019, May said ‘Now is the time to go further and faster to safeguard the environment for our children’ (May, 2019), again utilising the obligations to the next generation principle. She also added that ‘This country led the world in innovation during the Industrial Revolution, and now we must lead the world to a cleaner, greener form of growth’ (Ibid., 2019). The use of intergenerational obligations mixed with prudence, for example that economic growth coupled with protection for the environment for our children, was May’s core strategy for winning the argument and becoming hegemonic in this policy area, which was only partially successful. Under May’s leadership the Government had multiple grants and schemes, for example, the Electric Vehicle Home charge and Plug-in Car Grant schemes, a £27 million scheme to improve the country’s waterways, a flood defence scheme in Hull worth £36.5 million and also a £21 million flood defence system in Lower Don Valley in Sheffield. This was completed on 25 January 2018. There was also the Countryside Stewardship Woodland Creation Grant, which was part of the Government’s aim to plant over 11 million trees, Air Quality Grant and a research fund (potentially up to £56 million) that focused on antimicrobial resistance, air pollution, climate change and global pandemics. Moreover, there was the £4 million Natural England peatland restoration scheme, plus the £10 million grant scheme to re-wet mosses and restore peatlands. The Government announced on 26 January 2017 a new fund worth £64 million announced for walking and cycling to work. It was announced on 30 August 2018 that the Government planned to, after a consultation, increase the plastic bag charge to 10p from 5p, which was originally introduced in 2015. There was a ban on the distribution and sale of plastic straws, drinks stirrers and cotton buds, which was also subject to a consultation (Defra, 2018). On 9 January 2018, there was also a ban on microbeads in personal care projects, such as in face scrubs. The selling of the Green Investment Bank, ‘green finance’, ‘net-zero’ heavy industry Hub, Northern Forest plus new rules for farmers in relation to water usage. The major policy, however, was announced Wednesday 12 June 2019. The statutory instrument to implement it was laid in Parliament, which amend the Climate Change Act 2008. Chris Skidmore remarked

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about the policy ‘We’re pioneering the way for other countries to follow in our footsteps driving prosperity by seizing the economic opportunities of becoming a greener economy’ (Skidmore, 2019a). On 24 June 2019, he said ‘This country has long been a leader in tackling climate change. Thirty years ago, Mrs Thatcher was the first global leader to acknowledge at the United Nations “what may be early signs… of man-induced climate change”’ (Skidmore, 2019b). Skidmore invoking and quoting Thatcher is a clear demonstration of him trying to tie the policy into an ideational and historical context within the Conservative Party’s praxis and thought, thus legitimating it. There were also campaigns such as Keep it, Bin it (an anti-littering campaign) with Keep Britain Tidy, the Powering Past Coal Alliance at COP23, and the Year of Green Action. The Year of Green Action was announced in a speech at ZSL London Zoo by Michael Gove. The Government also worked with the Scouts, British Youth Council, Innovate UK and Sky Ocean Ventures to name a few.

Governing and Managing the Conservatives and the DUP In terms of governing competence, it was the noun in ‘Green Brexit’ that undermined May’s Premiership. May was preeminent within the Conservative Party before the 2017 election, but was seen as lacking authority after the result due to mistakes made in the election campaign and also around the Brexit process itself which negatively impacted on her reputation for competent governing. Her green policies were a way of salvaging a reputation for governing competence and to leave a positive legacy beyond Brexit (Barwell, 2021). According to Rose (1964, p. 36) ‘the realignment of policy groups within and across party lines has been as significant, if not more significant, than shifts in government caused by general elections’. There were differing perspectives within the Conservative Party during May’s Premiership on the ‘green’ element of Green Brexit, especially around the ‘Net Zero’ policy, which impacted on party management. Party unity can be the consequence of shared attitudes, values and beliefs, in this case on the environment, which can consequently create cohesion within the party. Relatively, unity within parties can also be a consequence of incentives (promotions or the allocation of a prime office on the parliamentary estate) and sanctions (e.g. the removal of the whip or demotion) that

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the leadership of the party can utilise or threaten to utilise to influence the behaviour of members of the party to toe the party line (Sieberer, 2006, p. 151). The lack of unity or intra-party dissent can be demonstrated by Members of Parliament ‘through voice and vote’ (Norton, 2008, p. 240); that is, by voting against the party line in the houses of parliament (Owens, 2003) or through speaking against the party’s position (Kam, 2009, p. 39). Rose (1964, p. 37) stated that a tendency within a party was ‘a stable set of attitudes, not a stable set of politicians’. There is a well-established literature on the internal groups within the Conservative Party (see Beech, 2009; Bryson & Heppell, 2010; Norton & Aughey, 1981; Pitt, 2022, 2021). Everett (1994) utilities the Tory-Whig typology in relation to the landscape, which is useful for this case. Everett posts that the Tory view of the landscape is traditional, natural, Christian and organic. This is juxtaposed with the Whig view of the landscape which is one of privatisation, impersonal and improvement of the landscape based on utility. It can also be a useful tool for the party leader. For example, the leader could pick and choose the best solution from competing ideational traditions for the particular problem of the day (Aughey, 1996). During May’s tenure, there were intra-party disputes and disagreements, which threatened to derail the elite Conservative statecraft as well inter-party disputes with the DUP. Nevertheless, the tension can manifest itself in a negative form and May had to manage, control and diminish this tension in order to establish her statecraft. These were ‘attitudinal clusters’ (Webb, 1997) within the party, such as environmentalist vs green scepticism; that is, those Conservative MPs who embed environmentalism into their conservative beliefs and those who believe that environmentalism is alien to conservatism and that it is fundamentally opposed to it. It is illustrative of the salience of these ‘attitudinal clusters’ in that these have now formalised organisationally around two parliamentary caucuses. Of course, another way of demonstrating one’s dissatisfaction with policy or the ideological positioning of one’s party is to create a parliamentary group. These were formalised after May leadership, but they were nascent during her leadership and under her predecessor. These are, for example, Net Zero Support Group set up by Chris Skidmore. In January 2022, Skidmore (2022) tweeted ‘I have decided to set up the Net Zero Support Group - to demonstrate and maintain Conservative support for net zero carbon emissions and policies needed to deliver this. We need clean & secure energy sources for the future that aren’t reliant upon high cost imported fossil fuels’. The

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other parliamentary grouping is the Net Zero Scrutiny Group, which was set up in 2021 and chaired by Craig Mackinlay. Members of the Net Zero Scrutiny Group have called for the end of green levies and called for more fossil fuel extraction. Writing for the Conservative Home website, Mackinlay, wrote that he: was never Theresa May’s greatest fan politically, but I’ll conclude with a statement she made on January 11 2018: “In our election manifesto last year we made an important pledge: to make ours the first generation to leave the natural enviroment in a better state than we found it.” I agree wholeheartedly with that statement. There is much to be done in protecting habitats and our oceans and weaning the planet off of the scourge of plastic waste. These ambitions are achievable and rooted in common sense while this path to Net Zero is muddled, costly and impractical.

He also wrote that ‘The current UK output of global CO2 , no more than a rounding error in the scheme of things at a mere one per cent, will be reduced to ½ per cent as coal powered growth proliferates globally’. Note that MacKinlay did not argue against the aims of the policy but the way it is being pursued. Nevertheless, both intra- and interparty conflict impacted negatively on May’s statecraft and impacted on her party management and thus her governing competence.

Conclusion May’s strategic thinking on the environment was to try to strategically contain her rival parties but her tactics were insufficiently robust enough to gain political control over the green agenda as she failed to sufficiently embed her narrative in conservative thought. Thus, the strategy only partly achieved political hegemony on the issue, but this partial hegemony exacerbated intra-party divisions within the Conservative Party. Indeed, inning and winning again is an important creation in both politics and statecraft (James, 2016), and if this is taken as the core criterion of measurement of the effectiveness of one’s statecraft, it is difficult to argue that May’s statecraft was a success. Nevertheless, I conclude that May’s statecraft in relation to environmental policy was a partial success but bought at a high price.

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May, T. (2019). PM Theresa May: We will end UK contribution to climate change by 2050. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-theresa-maywe-will-end-uk-contribution-to-climate-change-by-2050. Accessed 27 January 2022. McKenzie’s, R. T. (1955). British political parties: The distribution of power within the labour and conservative parties. Heinemann. Naess, A. (1973). The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: A summary. Inquiry, 16(1–4), 95–100. Norton, P. (2008). Making sense of opposition. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 14(1–2), 236–250. Norton, P., & Aughey, A. (1981). Conservatives and conservatism. Temple Smith. Owens, J. E. (2003). Explaining party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures: Purposiveness and contexts. Journal of Legislative Studies, 9(4), 12–40. Pitt, D. (2021). Future conservative electoral prospects: Time for Tory socialism? Observatoire De La Société Britannique/French Journal of British Studies, 27 , 267–291. Pitt, D. (2022). Conservative welfare policies: Ideational oscillation in the age of Brexit. In M. Beech & S. Lee (Eds.), Conservative governments in the age of Brexit. Palgrave Macmillan. Rose, R. (1964). Parties, factions and tendencies in Britain. Political Studies, 12(1), 33–46. Scruton, R. (2013). Green philosophy: How to think seriously about the planet. Atlantic Books. Sieberer, U. (2006). Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis. Journal of Legislative Studies, 12(2), 150–178. Skidmore, C. (2019a, June 27). UK becomes first major economy to pass net zero emissions law. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-becomes-firstmajor-economy-to-pass-net-zero-emissions-law. Accessed 27 January 2022. Skidmore, C. (2019b, June 24). Law for net zero emissions begins passage through parliament. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ law-for-net-zero-emissions-begins-passage-through-parliament. Accessed 27 January 2022. Skidmore, C. (2022, January 7). I have decided to set up the Net Zero support group—To demonstrate and maintain Conservative support for net zero carbon emissions and policies needed to deliver this. We need clean & secure energy sources for the future that aren’t reliant upon high cost imported fossil fuels [Twitter]. https://twitter.com/cskidmoreuk/status/147956496896197 0176. Accessed 27 January 2022. Tapsfield, J. (2018, August 30). Plastic bags will double in price to ‘at least’ 10p in fresh crackdown on waste, Theresa May says. Daily

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Mail [Online]. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6113547/Mayconfirms-plastic-bag-charge-set-double-10p-least.html. Accessed 27 January 2022. Thatcher, M. (1989, November 8). Speech to United Nations general assembly (Global Environment). https://www.margaretthatcher.org/doc ument/107817. Accessed 27 January 2022. Thatcher, M. (1990, November 6). Speech at 2nd World Climate Conference. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108237. Accessed 27 January 2022. Webb, P. (1997). Attitudinal clustering within British parliamentary elites: Patterns of intra-party and cross-party alignment. West European Politics, 20, 89–110.

CHAPTER 10

Friends and Allies? Theresa May and the DUP Catherine McGlynn and Shaun McDaid

What the country needs more than ever is certainty and having secured the largest number of votes and the greatest number of seats in the General Election it is clear that only the Conservative and Unionist party has the legitimacy and ability to provide that certainty by commanding a majority in the House of Commons. As we do, we will continue to work with our friends and allies in the Democratic Unionist Party in particular. (Theresa May, 2017)

C. McGlynn (B) · S. McDaid University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK e-mail: [email protected] S. McDaid e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_10

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Introduction Theresa May’s speech confirming the formation of a government after securing support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) suggested a degree of continuity and direction that sat at variance from the self-inflicted crisis of governance resulting from the disastrous election campaign of 2017. In making the announcement of her new government, she also laid stress on the party’s innate connections to the UK as a union rather than unitary state while also promising that her mandate to govern would deliver a national imperative, “the will of the British people” (May, 2017). In the end, the DUP’s support for a “supply and confidence” deal rather than a coalition, proved to be another challenge to Theresa May and one that she could not manage. It has been suggested that the DUP were offered a formal coalition, but preferred the flexibility of a looser arrangement (Birrell & Heenan, 2020). While such flexibility might have seemed appealing to the DUP, it ultimately did not prevent the party from being held to account at the polls when the arrangement unravelled. We argue that while attempting to craft a withdrawal that dealt with Northern Ireland’s unique situation within the UK would have been difficult for any negotiating team, May was particularly limited in her ability to square the circle. Such agreements between minority governments and “support” parties have become increasingly common. Bale and Bergman (2006, p. 424) define arrangements where a government has a written contract with one or more parties that remain outside the cabinet as a form of “contract parliamentarism”. May’s arrangement with the DUP would seem to neatly fit this definition. The Tory Party’s alliance with the Northern Ireland unionists, who were neither full coalition partners nor party faction, played its own unique role in driving the dynamic that limited May’s room for manoeuvre until the point where there was nowhere for her to go with either her party or the EU. Adding to May’s difficulties was a faction of the Conservative Party, the European Research Group (ERG), which sought to push May towards accepting a maximalist conception of Brexit, with the UK out of both the single market and the customs union, without regard to the potential impact this might have on the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland.

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Often, the ERG’s answer to the question of the border was to trumpet “alternative arrangements” or solutions based on non-existent technology which were not technically feasible. Only a solution based on close alignment with the EU could soften the potential impact of Brexit for the Northern Ireland frontier, but the ERG could never accept this, since, in its view, this would constrain the UK’s ability to set its own regulations and represent a failure to embrace the potential benefits of Brexit. The ERG agenda, coupled with the DUP’s insistence that it could not countenance Northern Ireland leaving on different terms to the rest of the UK, created structural conditions which May was unable to recognise and to manage. While May’s failure to do this might be classified, following Bulpitt (1986), as a failure of statecraft, we argue that the impossibility of meeting the demands of both the ERG and the DUP would have been beyond the capacity of even the canniest of political managers or communicators, even May’s protean successor, Boris Johnson.

Statecraft and the DUP It would be significantly challenging to make use of the Statecraft prism to view the development and strategies of the DUP themselves. Buller suggested that despite willingness to make use of the thesis beyond the Conservative Party, Bulpitt’s work was organic to his primary interest in them (Buller, 1999). Beyond this, a set of criteria created to assess the given position at any time of a party that either is or seeks to be at the centre of the court would always be a mismatch with a party that has journeyed towards formal power while trying to retain support on the basis of its anti-political establishment roots. The DUP were founded in 1971, the year after their first and longest-serving leader the Reverend Ian Paisley Senior was elected to the parliament at Stormont as a direct challenge to established unionist politicians, against a backdrop of escalating disorder and protest in Northern Ireland. Paisley channelled the unionist insecurity and anger unleashed by campaigns by nationalists for equal civil rights. He successfully articulated the idea, as the violent counter-reaction to these campaigns turned to fullblown conflict, that any compromise and concession paved the way for the destruction of the union with Great Britain and a therefore the creation of a united Ireland. Although nationalists within Northern Ireland often bore the brunt of his ire, he reserved equal opprobrium for the Ulster

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Unionist Party (UUP), and in particular the UUP leadership, who he regarded as being too liberal for conceding basic democratic reforms to address the agenda of the civil rights movement. The original DUP chairman Desmond Boal’s oft-quoted promise that the party would be “right-wing in the sense of being strong on the constitution, but to the left on social policies” crystallised the DUP’s appeal. Paisley Senior was a preacher, and his Free Presbyterian congregation dominated the party hierarchy. The latter’s Protestant Telegraph newspaper gave expression to his unique and narrow form of antiestablishment sectarian populism. However, his primary focus on what he saw as the unionist elite’s journey to damnation via the path of ecumenism spoke to a community beyond rural evangelicals. He fused defence of the faith, with defence of the union and defence of those at the bottom of the pile in socio-economic terms (For more on the party’s origins, see Buckland, 1981; Bruce, 1986; Bruce, 2007; Tonge et al., 2014; Wichert, 1999). This brought success at all levels of electoral competition but the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), whose formal relationship with the Conservative Party disintegrated over the years of conflict in Northern Ireland, remained the most popular choice for unionist voters, even long after the disappointment in that community following the introduction of direct rule from London in 1972 (McDaid, 2013). While the DUP’s vertical grip on its power base and message remained its hallmark, the party also began to modernise in the 1980s with an influx of educated and urban politicians less in thrall to Paisley himself (Cochrane, 1997). Further new blood was infused into the party as it “picked off” (Tonge et al., 2014, p. 163) UUP personnel after the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 which the party decided to oppose after exiting from the peace process leading up to it. This acquisition included Arlene Foster who would be elected as DUP leader in 2015. The new guard augmented the party virtues of clarity and discipline in the new social media age, emphasising the sophistication and relevance of their message and combining what Gormley-Heenan and Mac Ginty (2008) noted were seemingly conflictual but actually harmonious impulses towards ethnic outbidding and party modernisation. The DUP assumed the form of an ethnic-tribune party (Mitchell et al., 2009), combining robust defence of their cause with an ability to maximise resources from the new power-sharing institutions. This allowed them to eclipse the UUP and take on the dual executive role in the

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Northern Ireland Assembly with Sinn Féin, after securing what they saw as the better deal for unionism in the shape of the St Andrews Agreement of 2007. One aspect of the DUP’s policy platform that has been slow to modernise, if at all, relates to the party’s stance on social issues, on which it is significantly less liberal than the bulk of the Conservative Party. It trenchantly opposes same-sex marriage and is against the liberalisation of abortion legislation in Northern Ireland (see Southern, 2005). On matters of social policy, the advantages of devolution as a means of pursuing different agendas within the UK are obvious. However, the DUP have always sought to resist any constitutional adjustments that would suggest that Northern Ireland was not integral to a sovereign British State. This meant that any future deal with the EU would need to be based on maximum alignment within the UK: with obvious implications for the form of Brexit that the party might be prepared to accept. It is not the DUP’s statecraft that is the focus of this chapter, then, given the nature of the party. The thesis is instead best suited to explaining how the supply and confidence agreement posed a short-term solution to Theresa May’s immediate post-election problems but long-term it added another obstruction to the prospects of her successfully packaging her role in Brexit negotiations as an example of party management and argument hegemony. Bulpitt extended party statecraft to cover coalitions in the event of a hung parliament (1986) and management of the coalition with the Liberal Democrats between 2010 and 2015 provided an opportunity to explore this (Gamble, 2015; Hayton, 2014). However, the DUP were not a coalition partner. And despite some similarities in political goals with ERG, they could not be considered as an extra-party part of that faction. So, while securing the support of an avowedly Eurosceptic party (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004) with 10 MPs resolved the electoral and governing problems facing May in 2017, they created further problems without a solution as Brexit negotiations proceeded.

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The Brexit Referendum and the General Election of 2017 The DUP had been the firmest and the most high-profile campaigners for Leave in Northern Ireland amongst the political parties. Most other parties backed Remain (although the UUP was less definitive, reflecting that the eventual majority vote for Remain in Northern Ireland EU stemmed in large part from very solid nationalist support). Following the result of the referendum, the UUP effectively sought a “soft” Brexit, with unfettered access to the EU single market, and no hard border on the island of Ireland (UUP, 2016, p. 3). If the UUP was “Eurorealist” (Hennessey et al., 2018, p. 81) rather than Eurosceptic, the reverse was true of the DUP. Opposition to the UK’s membership of a supra-national European organisation was always a central plank of the DUP’s worldview. Ian Paisley had opposed accession to the European Economic Community and the party maintained a hostile position throughout its history. As with so much of Paisley’s politics, his hostility to what would become the EU was shaped by an understanding of the institutions as so beyond the precepts of his faith as to be a front for the Devil himself (Murphy & Evershed, 2020a). A 1992 DUP pamphlet concerning the Maastricht Treaty reflected on the religious demographics of the European Community, noting that Catholics constituted the majority religious denomination in that polity. It was further observed that key figures in the movement for European integration, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand and Jacques Delors were “all faithful R[oman] C[atholic]s” (DUP, 1992). As the party modernised, however, objections to EU membership and, in particular, the “ever closer union” version supported by some of the political elites in France and Germany, “shifted from scripture to sovereignty” (Tonge, 2019). The recognition of the UK as a sovereign state was vital for the key goal of “preserving the existing cultural ethos in Northern Ireland” and any dilution of that sovereignty laid unionists bare to the machinations of Irish nationalists north and south of the border with the Republic of Ireland (Cochrane, 1997). European elections also gave the DUP a forum where they could outperform the UUP at the polling booth, with Paisley enjoying coming first in the vote across Northern Ireland as a single constituency. The party championed Paisley as “a free and unfettered voice in the European Parliament” who “unstintingly sought to ensure this province was kept

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to the fore in an ever-expanding Europe. What is more, he succeeded!” (DUP, 2004). This balancing act of opposing the UK’s relationship with Europe while maximising benefits for voters in Northern Ireland continued after Paisley had stepped down as MEP. After her re-election to the European Parliament in 2014, Diane Dodds affirmed that a longstanding commitment to a Eurosceptic position meant the DUP were not “Johnny-come-latelys to the cause” noting that the election “was really about who would go back to Europe to get the best deal for Northern Ireland, to work hard for Northern Ireland, to stand up for Northern Ireland and that’s what I will be doing, as well as continuing my campaign for a referendum to give the British people their democratic say on our relationship with Europe” (Belfast Telegraph, 27 May 2014). The DUP’s position as a regionalist party, albeit distinct from many others in the UK in terms of advocating for self-government as a possible path to full autonomy (Masetti, 2009), meant they were never destined to be in power directly at Westminster and the party often sought to underline that it would never have to sublimate any of its demands to the interests of a “state-wide” political party (McGlynn et al., 2014). However, in the uncertainty over government formation in the run-up to the 2010 and 2015 election, the DUP let it be known that it would be possible for political parties to consider calling upon it for support as long as this included financial recognition of Northern Ireland’s needs and excluded any alliance with the Scottish National Party (Sunday Times, 18 April 2010; Irish Times, 29 March 2015). Therefore, their openness to the confidence and supply deal that was offered in 2017 reflected their already established tactical view of general elections. The power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland had been suspended in the wake of the “Cash for Ash” scandal,1 and Schnapper argues that although the DUP did not deviate from their initial stated position within the Northern

1 “Cash for Ash” is the name given to the scandal that led to the collapse of the power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland. Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness had resigned at the start of 2017 because the First Minister Arlene Foster would not step aside from her post while an investigation was conducted into her and others’ role in administering a green heating scheme. The scheme, due to inadequate cost controls, meant some beneficiaries could be paid more than the cost of the renewable fuels they were burning, at great expense to the taxpayer. An official inquiry found no evidence of any corruption in the administration of the scheme. For more see (BBC, 2017; McBride, 2019).

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Ireland Executive that the region was unique and needed special consideration, they were now firmly behind the idea that it was the responsibility of the government at Westminster to pursue this (Schnapper, 2021). The supply and confidence agreement pledged commitment from the DUP on Brexit, the budget and national security with other policies to be decided on a case-by-case basis. It underlined that the Conservative Party “will never be neutral in expressing its support for the Union” but affirmed that the UK Government’s obligation was to respect the consent principle with regard to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK. Both parties committed themselves to finding a way to restore devolution, with a clear distinction between the Conservatives as the party of UK government and the DUP as a party entitled to form part of the executive in Northern Ireland. The agreement also incorporated a package of financial support amounting to £1 billion, expressed as recognition of the “unique circumstances of Northern Ireland’s history and the effect this has had on the economy” (Cabinet Office, 2017).

Negotiations and (Dis)Agreements May’s failure to get parliamentary backing for a deal with the European Union on withdrawal and subsequent UK-EU relations cannot be reduced to the difficulties caused by the DUP’s rejection of compromise and alternatives. Even if she had decided against the snap election that robbed the Conservatives of their slim majority, there would have been struggles within the party and within the House of Commons. And the existence of a land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would have presented significant challenges in terms of its implications for alignment with EU laws and policies. What the DUP’s presence within May’s circle of interests to please did was make every sore spot worse without providing any compensatory emollient. Reviewing the Confidence and Supply Agreement, Tonge (2017) noted that while the DUP could offer a disciplined cohort of votes, an obvious stumbling block was that the party wanted both a soft border and the UK out of the single market and customs union. This vision of Brexit would present May with an impossible to resolve Irish “trilemma” whereby she found herself trying to secure the full departure of the UK from the EU without creating any different circumstances for Northern Ireland or the introduction of a hard border with the Republic of Ireland (Menon & Wager, 2021). Separate to the economic issues of trade and

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regulatory alignment was the continuation of the Good Friday Agreement which had been signed at a point where “all Northern Irish futures had presupposed a European roof” and complexities around citizenship, movement and co-operation were eased by joint membership of the EU (O’Leary, 2018). Coming to the understanding that leaving without having to address and resolve substantial implications for Northern Ireland was a slow process. May had taken up the responsibility of negotiations with an ethos of red lines, and she only considered reaching out to others within Parliament, including the Labour Party when she had completely hit an impasse (Russell, 2021). Dooley notes that the non-deliberative approach was supplemented by a limited understanding of what issues the border might cause, something which was exacerbated by a tendency to engage in “magical thinking” whereby trade and custom hitches would be overcome by as-yet-unborn technological fixes (Dooley, 2022). May’s negotiating team eventually came to realise that an acceptance that any mitigation of a land border with the EU would require engagement and the possibility of compromise. In December 2017, this became visible in the form of leaked information about a joint report by the UK and EU’s negotiating teams which suggested that May had accepted divergence and differences in the way Northern Ireland would be treated after Brexit. The DUP’s reaction when the joint report was leaked was swift. Senior figures immediately made representations to Theresa May and Arlene Foster stated at Stormont that “Northern Ireland must leave the EU on the same terms as the rest of the United Kingdom. We will not accept any form of regulatory divergence which separates Northern Ireland economically or politically from the rest of the United Kingdom. The economic and constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom will not be compromised in any way” (The Guardian, 5 December 2017a). May’s hasty backtracking after the DUP’s fury led to the final report’s approach to Northern Ireland resting on what would become known as the backstop, an agreement that while the teams would continue to seek a way to develop an acceptable set of long-term economic and political arrangements for the UK and the Republic of Ireland, “In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement” (EU-UK Joint Report, 2017). This solution would meet implacable opposition from the

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DUP but also from within her own party to ensure that her version of the Withdrawal Agreement would founder in its three attempted journeys through Parliament. The utter hostility emanating from the DUP to the proposals May had initially agreed as the way forward cut down on her room for manoeuvre instead of giving her the security of ten votes. Murpy and Evershed (2020b, p. 464) note that this use of the DUP’s position to veto a negotiating stance “represented the extent of the DUP’s (new-found) power and influence, but also, arguably, its high-water mark” and point out that the way in which May had allowed them to find out what she was signing up to for Northern Ireland with little thought for their reaction underlined that she was much more focused on her own party’s reaction. From the point of the torpedoing of the joint report, the DUP became ever less “friends and allies”, demonstrated by a lack of support for the Withdrawal Agreement that May eventually secured. Observers warned the DUP that the party faced “Hobson’s choice” of accepting divergence or opening the door to power for the Labour Party under an extremely unsympathetic Jeremy Corbyn (Bevington & Wager, 2018). In the end the door would actually be opened, and the DUP shown out, by May’s replacement Boris Johnson once the impasse in parliament was broken by the 80-seat majority delivered in the 2019 general election. But the DUP were not the only fly in the ointment from May’s perspective: another faction of her own party, the ERG, was equally hostile to her attempts to leave the EU in what, from May’s perspective, was the least disruptive manner, and, from their perspective, a manner that did not give sufficient expression to the result of the referendum. The ERG’s Brexit positioning limited both May’s ability to find a resolution to the question of the Irish border, and the DUP’s room to accept a deal that took sufficient account of Northern Ireland’s unique circumstances.

The Third Wheel: Theresa May, the DUP and the European Research Group As mentioned, Theresa May had to balance the demands both of the DUP and her party colleagues, the ERG. Following Zariski, we define the ERG as a faction of the Conservative Party: that is, an “intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively – as a distinct bloc within the party – to achieve their goals” (Zariski, 1960). The current

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chairperson of the group is Mark Francois, the MP from Essex who is situated on the right of the Parliamentary Conservative Party. The group comprises Members of Parliament who pay a subscription and has a formal management structure, compared with some of the more informal ginger groups in Parliament. It has been estimated to have a membership of around 90 MPs (Roe-Crines et al., 2021, p. 324). A number of the most high-profile Conservative MPs are, or have been, identified as members of the group, including some of those most in favour of a hard Brexit such as Jacob Rees-Mogg, Suella Braverman, and the self-described “Brexit hardman” Steve Baker. None of this is to suggest that the challenge to May’s authority, and her inability to negotiate an exit deal of her preference, came exclusively as a result of the activities of the ERG. Clearly, there was a significant portion of the Conservative Party that would have opposed May’s attempts to negotiate a withdrawal agreement anyway, although a small portion of that opposition was on the basis that the relationship sought by May was too distant, not too close (Russell, 2019). Nevertheless, the ERG faction seemed to assume the role of guardians of a hard Brexit, with, it must be acknowledged, the support of many of their parliamentary colleagues, and had a media profile that allowed members to opine vocally and visibly on the question of what form the UK’s withdrawal from the EU should take. Initially, it appeared that there was considerable crossover in the interests of DUP and the ERG. Both were avowedly Eurosceptic, and both were clear that the result of the referendum should be implemented without undue delay. Such was the DUP’s commitment to Brexit, the party took out wraparound advertising in support of a Leave vote in the Metro newspaper, which is distributed throughout Great Britain, but not in Northern Ireland. The estimated cost of the advertisement was £300,000 (Guardian, 1 July 2017b). Throughout May’s tenure, as outlined above, the DUP and the ERG both had an impact on May’s inability to secure support for the Withdrawal Agreement. Even in March 2019, when May promised to step aside from the party leadership if parliament agreed to back her deal, a significant rump of the ERG, as well as the 10 DUP MPs, could not bring themselves to support it. Arlene Foster said that since the changes the DUP sought to the backstop had not been secured, that she, and her party, could not vote for May’s deal because it posed a threat to the integrity of the United Kingdom. While Foster and the DUP were staunch Brexiteers, they were

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stauncher unionists. And although leaving the EU was very important to Foster and her colleagues, it was not their core priority. As she put it, “the most important issue for me, for the Democratic Unionist Party, for our 10 MPs, is the preservation of the union” (Irish Times, 27 March 2019). Interestingly, one high-profile former opponent of May’s deal announced that he would vote for it, following her agreement to stand aside if it passed: Boris Johnson. The latter had, in 2018, been the star attraction at the DUP’s annual conference. During his keynote speech, which received rapturous applause from the DUP faithful, Johnson assured the audience that no British government could, or should, countenance any form of regulatory checks between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, known colloquially as “a border in the Irish sea”. Less than a year later, however, his own government did just that (Belfast Newsletter, 17 October 2019). The role of Johnson is significant here, as, not only had he seemed to undermine the authority of Theresa May throughout her attempts to navigate the withdrawal process, he appeared to cultivate the support of both the DUP and the ERG in order to further his own political ambitions and quasi-Churchillian vision of a post-Brexit UK with himself, not May, at the helm. Overall, however, despite the overlap in interests between the ERG and the DUP, both groups ultimately approached the question of Brexit from very different angles. This was most cruelly exposed, from a DUP perspective, after their former favourite Boris Johnson replaced May. Having secured a significant parliamentary majority on a “get Brexit done” ticket, Johnson negotiated a deal that dealt with the Irish border through the creation of the Northern Ireland Protocol. Johnson agreed a “barebones” Free Trade Agreement with the EU, outside of the Customs Union, which met almost all the objectives of the ERG, but struck at the heart of the DUP’s desire to maintain the closest constitutional alignment with Great Britain. Unlike the DUP, the ERG were apparently stauncher Brexiteers than they were unionists. The temporary alignment between the DUP and the ERG, however, was crucial in restricting May’s room for manoeuvre, which was ably exploited by her arch-rival, Boris Johnson—who cultivated the support of both groups. This would have challenged the abilities of the most skilful political managers, let alone Theresa May, who was beset both by bad luck, and a personal style that was ill-suited to intrigues of post-referendum politicking.

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A Failure of Statecraft? Bulpitt believed that “the art of statecraft is to understand and work with the limitations placed on elite activity by the many changing structural constraints arising from within and without the polity” (1986, p. 3). Negotiating an exit from the European Union without an overall party majority created an extreme and immediate challenge to Theresa May that she attempted to resolve by an alliance with the DUP. However, the alliance not only placed further constraints upon her, it exposed her lack of understanding of the other limitations on her position. The DUP’s obstructionist stance created significant problems for negotiations but May had initially entered negotiations with a non-deliberative and tonedeaf approach that was the first thing to limit her room for manoeuvre (Dooley, 2022). Because they were not actually responsible for negotiations, senior figures in the DUP could keep on insisting that there was a “third way, a different way, a better way” in response to every potential deal that the EU’s team might agree with the UK (Belfast Telegraph, 25 November 2018). However, even without direct pressure from unionist leaders, May and the team she assembled in the Department for Exiting the European Union would have persisted in committing themselves to technological fixes as a sugar-coating of the reality of a border on the other side of a customs union (Hayward, 2018). Crucially, the negotiations showed how unprepared the Conservatives were to address the implications of Brexit for their “double-think” that Northern Ireland was both an integral element of the UK and a place apart from it (Kenny & Sheldon, 2021). The DUP were able to utilise their position to push Theresa May into affirming the sovereignty and integrity of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, but ultimately changing electoral dynamics meant they could not do the same to Boris Johnson. For the DUP long-term the supply and confidence deal drove them to a state of crisis, exposing and intensifying a number of problems that they had faced. Assessments of the DUP’s Leave campaign strategies have noted the party’s surprise at victory and suggested that the prime advantage of the referendum had been viewed in terms of burnishing their Eurosceptic credentials and championing of sovereignty (see, e.g., Murphy & Evershed, 2020b; O’Leary, 2018). This is not to suggest any insincerity in their commitment to the Leave campaign, rather to underline that their expectation was that they would be able to extract a clear

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advantage out of being on the losing side within their own domain of power rather than they would have to address the realities of what divorce from the EU might entail. Anti-political establishment parties pay a particular cost of governing in coalition, due to perceptions that they have been taken into the fold (Van Spanje, 2011). Elections to the European Parliament had offered a chance to enter a political arena where such considerations were completely irrelevant. Going into coalition in Northern Ireland was a risk, but initially the dynamics of the consociational settlement had ideally suited their ethnic-tribune strategy of defence of their group within the system. The supply and confidence deal initially seemed to offer a similar opportunity of defence of, and benefits for, the DUP’s core constituency without the dangers of formal coalition. However, their insistence that the “trilemma” Northern Ireland presented could be solved without hardening of borders or differences within borders drove May towards a showdown with both elites and factions within her party. Since then, the DUP have struggled in terms of weakening electoral support and party in-fighting. The party, despite its best efforts, is “now seen as part of an ill-defined ‘establishment’” which fuels apathy amongst its supporters (Tonge et al., 2014). It is still trying to use the leverage of saying no to regulatory divergence (in the form of the Northern Ireland Protocol) through unwillingness to re-enter the executive of the Northern Ireland assembly, but with the success of Alliance presenting a fresh challenge of ethnic under-bidding within the consociational system (Coakley, 2008), the DUP need a new strategy if it actually wants to influence policy.

Conclusion As we have shown, the deal between the DUP and Theresa May’s government was a highly fractious one and did not deliver the stability that May perhaps felt that it would, at a time when both parliamentary arithmetic— and indeed some rogue elements within her own party—were working against her. This created a particularly challenging set of circumstances for May, which required considerable flexibility, an extremely thick skin and a talent for “creative ambiguity”. It is arguable that May was not possessed of any of these “qualities” in abundance. Indeed, her political style has been characterised by steadfastness, and sticking to a policy she believed to be right, rather than one which was more politically expedient or easy.

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The long-running saga of the attempts to deport the firebrand Islamist preacher Abu Qatada from the UK during May’s tenure as Home Secretary is a good example of this trenchant political style (see Prince, 2017, pp. 268–271). Overall, it is unlikely that history will judge the confidence and supply deal with the DUP kindly, from the point of view of its outcomes for the Conservative Party, or for May herself. The deal, such as it was, turned corrosive for May almost immediately as the DUP skewered May’s chances of a withdrawal agreement that addressed the issue of the Irish border with minimal checks on goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for example on agricultural products. The ERG was also opposed to May’s arrangement, since it kept the whole of the UK in a single customs territory with the EU, thereby supposedly scuppering the UK’s chances of securing trade deals with other places. However, the deal was also a toxic one from the DUP’s perspective, because what influence they appeared to enjoy over government policy was as temporary as it was illusory. The DUP, encouraged by the apparent crossover on interests with the ERG, but especially by the overtures of Boris Johnson, appeared to believe that it would continue to be at the forefront of shaping post-Brexit policy, even after May’s term of office had concluded. The brutal manner in which the DUP were cast aside by Johnson, and many in the ERG, after they had secured their objectives seriously damaged its credibility. The DUP, currently under the leadership of Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, might do well to reflect on the lessons of the May era in considering any future dalliances with the ERG, or indeed any other faction or figurehead within the Conservative Party. But was Theresa May’s confidence and supply arrangement with the DUP, ultimately, a failure of statecraft? Yes. But it would likely have been a failure for any Conservative leader. The impossibility of fulfilling the different visions of Brexit, all of which were to some degree based on illusion and self-deception, eluded even her more mercurial successor Boris Johnson. While May’s political style, which owed more to steadfastness than imagination, arguably did not help, even someone with the populist flexibility of Boris Johnson could not retain the confidence of the party in the face of the challenges which Brexit created, and the pandemic seriously accelerated. Thus, while the Conservative-DUP “pact” will ultimately be regarded as a failure, it was not entirely a failure of Theresa May’s making. Internal, and external, factors conspired against her, and the Irish border created

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an insoluble conundrum, which even the yet to be created technology of “alternative arrangements” could not seek to resolve. Despite these difficulties, however, it seems likely that history will look back at May’s term of office as a serene—even relatively stable—interlude at a time of national crisis. At least compared to that which followed.

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Schnapper, P. (2021). Theresa May, the Brexit negotiations and the two-level game, 2017–2019. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 29(3), 368– 379. Southern, N. (2005). Ian Paisley and evangelical Democratic Unionists: An analysis of the role of evangelical protestantism within the Democratic Unionist Party. Irish Political Studies, 20(2), 127–145. Sunday Times. (2010, April 18). DUP names block grant as price of its support, p. 1. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2004). Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 43(1), 1–27. The Guardian. (2017a, December 5). May’s weakness exposed as DUP derails Brexit progress. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017a/dec/04/jun cker-and-may-fail-to-reach-brexit-deal-amid-dup-doubts-over-irish-border. Accessed 20 October 2022. The Guardian. (2017b, July 1). Brexit minister linked to group that used loophole to channel £435,000 to DUP. https://www.theguardian.com/pol itics/2017b/jul/01/brexit-minister-linked-to-group-that-used-loophole-tochannel-435000-to-dup. Accessed 20 October 2022. Tonge, J. (2019). Faithful unionists: The Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland. Political Insight, 10(2), 26–29. Tonge, J. (2017). Supplying confidence or trouble: The deal between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Conservative Party. Political Quarterly, 88(3), 412–416. Tonge, J., Braniff, M., Hennessey, T., McAuley, J. W., & Whiting, S. (2014). The Democratic Unionist Party: From protest to power. Oxford University Press. UUP. (2016). A vision for Northern Ireland outside the EU. Available at: https://www.nicva.org/sites/default/files/d7content/attachmentsa rticles/a_vision_for_ni_outside_the_eu_2.pdf Van Spanje, J. (2011). Keeping the rascals in: Anti-political-establishment parties and their cost of governing in established democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 50(5), 609–635. Wichert, S. (1999). Northern Ireland since 1945. Longman Publishing Group. Zariski, R. (1960). Party factions and comparative politics: Some preliminary observations. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 4(1), 27–51.

CHAPTER 11

Theresa May and Race Relations Policy Pete Woodcock

Introduction There is no doubt that Theresa May took race relationsseriously. On 13 July 2016, in her first statement as Prime Minister, Theresa May posited herself as a unionist—but not only in the sense of supporting the Union of the constituent nations of the UK, but also, she used it as a shorthand for being a one nation conservative. A union exists, May said, ‘between all of our citizens, every one of us, whoever we are and wherever we’re from’ (May, 2016). She then went on to outline 6 ‘burning injustices’ that anyone interested in the union must abhor. The second of these ‘burning injustices’ directly pertained to race, stating: If you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than if you’re white. (May, 2016)

May promised to ensure that if you faced this, or any of the other ‘burning injustices’, that the ‘government I lead will be driven not by the interests of the privileged few, but by yours’ (May, 2016). So race relations was,

P. Woodcock (B) Global Banking School, Leeds, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_11

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upon the basis of this, one of the central elements of May’s premiership, and this chapter aims to look at her record on race relations to see if she did tackle this injustice or if, in fact, she exacerbated them. This chapter will argue that statecraft is an interesting lens to examine May’s record on race through, however it is complicated by the overlap of her policies and those of her predecessor David Cameron. It will show how the Conservative’s ongoing electoral pledge to reduce net migration to the UK to below 100,000 per year, a pledge made no doubt for electoral benefits, and a pledge continued by Theresa May when she was PM, can be seen as an act of statecraft. It was made when the Conservative Party were facing an electoral threat to the right from the UK Independence Party (UKIP). But there are interesting elements to this that complicate our analysis. Firstly, the net migration pledge was made by May’s predecessor David Cameron, but May, as Home Secretary, had a large part to play in the formulation of policy. Secondly, indirectly the pledge to reduce immigration led to the darkest moment in Theresa May’s record on race relations, namely the Windrush Scandal. The net migration pledge reduction pledge begat the Hostile Environment, which in turn begat the Immigration Act of 2014, which in turn led to many people of the Windrush Generation who were perfectly entitled to live and work in the UK losing their jobs and being deported. This chapter will begin with a discussion of statecraft and how helpful this is for us as a model to examine May’s record on race during her premiership, especially as there is so much of interest during her Home Office career which directly impacts on her record as PM. It will then go on to discuss May’s record as Home Secretary—beginning with the Conservative Party’s longstanding commitment to reduce immigration to under 100,000 per year, going on to discuss the Hostile Environment, a policy designed to make life difficult for illegal immigrants. Whereas this book is about May’s period of office as Prime Minister, discussing her work in the Home Office is not only worthwhile here for context, but also there is a direct link between policies carried out in the Home Office and the trouble May faced as PM on race relations. As we shall see later in this chapter, however, it was not only illegal immigrants that had their lives made difficult, but also the Windrush Generation who worked and lived entirely legally in the UK. Then we will move onto May’s tenure as Prime Minister, commencing with a discussion of how her government sought to use data and

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evidenced based policies to tackle ‘burning injustices’ including the experience of black people at the hands of the criminal justice system. The Hostile Environment will loom large again as we note how the Windrush Scandal, that led to the resignation of Amber Rudd as Home Secretary, had its genesis in the policies carried out by Theresa May when she was Home Secretary. We will also see how May’s distraction from the 2017 general election, and the lack of advice she received, led to a woeful response to the Grenfell Tower disaster that claimed the lives of so many BAME citizens. Theresa May’s premiership when looked at through the lens of race has two significant moments: the Grenfell Tower disaster and the Windrush scandal. If one was to examine Theresa May’s broader political career, however, the Hostile Environment policy also looms large, especially as that, coupled with the 2014 Immigration Act, impacted so negatively on the Windrush Generation.

Statecraft, May and Immigration Any discussion of race and Theresa May’s political record must start in the Home Office which she inhabited from 2010 until her ascension to the position of Prime Minister in 2016. There can be no doubt that May as Home Secretary had some agency in the Conservative Party’s attempt to reduce net migration to under 100,000 a year, and the Hostile Environment for illegal immigrants created then, yet what is also clear is that these were Conservative Party policies that she was implementing. Whether we can accurately describe Theresa May’s record and race as being informed by statecraft depends upon our answers to two (admittedly interrelated) questions. Firstly, does May have to be identified as the originator of a particular policy for us to think of it as being an act of statecraft, and secondly does it have to be successful—or can one think of a policy informed by statecraft that proved unsuccessful? Statecraft, as a way of examining politics, Bulpitt (1986) outlines, focuses less on ideology or policy success as other approaches might do, but instead ‘stresses the need to examine the activities of party leaders in terms of their statecraft – namely the art of winning elections and, above all, achieving a necessary degree of governing competence in office’ (19). Statecraft in this context, therefore, is a modernised version of Machiavelli’s notion of learning the art, the virtu of politics—the ability to successfully travail the rocky road of contemporary politics, and to come

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out of this journey in a politically successful manner. Elements of statecraft include achieving solid ‘party management’ techniques, developing a ‘policy package and image capable of being successfully to the electorate’, achieving an ‘easy predominance in the elite debate regarding political problems, policies and the general stance of government’, achieving a ‘governing competence’, all which should lead to ‘another winning electoral strategy’ (Bulpitt, 1986, 21–22). So statecraft can be reasonably summarised as a state of affairs whereby a party leader, via political skill, manages their party, produces policies that supports them winning an election, governs successfully and dominates political debates in such a way to ensure they are seen as governing successfully, and returns electoral success as a result of this. Our task in this chapter must be twofold: firstly to examine how helpful statecraft as a way of examining Theresa May’s approach to race issues, and secondly, doing this within the context of the fact that we realise that she was not successful in statecraft in the broader political sense. One would be hard pushed to characterise May’s 2017 election gamble, which although could technically be regarded as a electoral victory, returned fewer Conservative seats than they previously had, as being an example of a winning electoral strategy through the lens of statecraft. May’s policies and governance never achieved either successful party dominance, still less ‘predominance in the elite debate’ (Bulpitt, 1986, 21). May never achieved anything close to resembling a governing competence and resigned the leadership before she was able to develop a strategy of developing ‘another’ winning electoral strategy. But how important was her attitude to race relations, or perhaps more accurately put how important were her policies that had an impact on race relations to this failure in statecraft? Were these policies crucial to May’s downfall? My suspicion is that they were not central, and therefore that other factors were more important. The central narrative on May’s downfall will be that of Brexit and her failure to achieve consensus within her own party on how and when to leave the EU—so her time as PM will be seen within the broader implosion of governance leading up to and following the 2016 EU referendum. Other policy areas may have contributed to the broader picture or tell us interesting things about May’s character as PM, but we also have to recognise the dominance of Brexit in the political discussions surrounding May’s premiership. This does not mean to say that either (a) it is not worth examining May’s record on race, (b) that there were considerable debates

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surrounding them (especially those around the ‘predominance in the elite debate’ aspect of statecraft), or indeed that (c) statecraft does not give us an interesting angle on these issues. It is simply recognising that even had May achieved a resounding success in her policies in this area, this would not have prolonged her position in 10 Downing Street. Even if her policies here had a massive impact on immigrants, on the Windrush Generation, or the families and friends of those killed at Grenfell Tower, these take a backseat in the broader narrative of her premiership and the successes and failures therein. So, we must put notions of the success/failure of May’s term in office on the back burner when we use statecraft as a way to analyse her record on race relations. It becomes our position not to suggest whether this or that policy was successful via the lens of statecraft, but rather was an attempt at statecraft behind this or that policy, as opposed to ideology. How does an attempt to produce a set of policies that manages faction within the party, wins an election, dominates elite debate on the topic, achieves the image of electoral competence, leading on the further electoral success help us understand May’s position on race issues? And does this discussion give us any insight into May’s broader political problems? Bearing in mind that immigration policy, which I will portray as central to May’s position on race, was a policy position of some standing within the Conservative Party when May became PM, that was central to the Conservative Party’s electoral success, that May was linked heavily with the implementation of (if not necessarily the intellectual genesis of), it seems reasonable to analyse this from the perspective of statecraft. Statecraft might help us understand the place of this policy within the broader politics of the post-2010 coalition and Conservative government.

Conservative Party Policy Heritage on Immigration One of the central elements of Theresa May’s record of race certainly had its origin in an act of statecraft, in this instance a policy during an election campaign, but intriguingly it was an act of statecraft by her predecessor as Prime Minister, which she then attempted to implement as Home Secretary. The Conservative Party went into the general election campaign of 2010 with the pledge to reduce immigration to the UK. Earlier in the year when on the Andrew Marr Show when discussing immigration David Cameron had stated that they ‘would like to see net immigration in the

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tens of thousands rather than the hundreds of thousands’ (Guardian, 2010). This statement, possibly extemporised by accident, cemented a policy goal of the Conservative Party of reducing net immigration (immigration minus migration) of 100,000 per year—a reduction of 63,000 from 2008 figures. The target/goal/aspiration of reducing net migration to less than 100,000 per year became a leitmotif of Conservative Party policy during the 2010s. This goal became a 2010 election manifesto commitment, stating that ‘we will take steps to take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s – tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands’ (Conservative Party, 2010, 21). It was reiterated by Cameron in his speech in Ipswich in March 2013 stating that ‘my Party has set a clear aspiration to reduce net migration further to just tens of thousands over the coming years’ (Cameron, 2013). This was then repeated in the 2015 manifesto, where the promise was to ‘keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands’ (Conservative Party, 2015, 29). Indeed, the rhetoric was increased in the 2015 election, referring to the work of the coalition government: Since 2010, we have stripped more than 850 bogus colleges of their rights to sponsor foreign students; installed proper exit checks at our borders; cracked down on illegal working and sham marriages; made it harder for people to live in the UK illegally, by restricting their access to bank accounts, driving licences and private housing; and reduced the number of appeal routes to stop people clogging up our courts with spurious attempts to remain in the country. All of this has made a difference. Immigration from outside the EU has come down since 2010. (Conservative Party, 2015, 29)

This pledge would endure the post referendum collapse of Cameron’s leadership, as was adopted by May. Therefore, Theresa May’s manifesto of 2017 returns to the theme, saying it ‘is our objective to reduce immigration to sustainable levels, by which we mean annual net migration in the tens of thousands, rather than the hundreds of thousands we have seen over the last two decades’ (Conservative Party, 2017). It might be tempting, therefore, to see Theresa May’s position as Prime Minister on immigration, which impacts heavily on race issues, as being that of a reformer in Norton’s typology on Prime Ministers (Norton, 2019). Reformers seek power to achieve a future goal, but this is one

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previously formulated and agreed by their party, as opposed to innovators whose goal they themselves have largely devised (Norton, 2019). It is certainly clear that the goal of the reduction of net migration was a party goal, or if not, it is one from the previous incumbent David Cameron. What blurs this distinction, however, is Theresa May’s role in the home office to implement this. Whether or not the genesis of these policies was with Theresa May, her role in implementation is the lens through which we view her record on race matters.

Theresa May as Home Secretary May was promoted from her position of shadow Work and Pensions minister to Home Secretary following the 2010 general election and the following machinations in constructing a coalition cabinet. The elevation in government was allegedly driven by in coming Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne and was thought to be ‘not an obvious one’ (Prince, 2017, 202). But Cameron and Osborne were ‘acutely aware of the lack of a female presence at their top table’, and that both ‘had been won over by May’s work ethic, loyalty and ability’ believing her to be a ‘sensible, normal-sounding voice of Middle England’ (Prince, 2017, 202). Being the Home Secretary is a tough job. It deals with a lot of highly visible, but perhaps non-glamorous work in governance, and it necessarily involves the occupant making unpopular decisions. A former occupant of the Home Office, Ken Clark, describes it as ‘probably the most dangerous job in government’ (Clark, K. quoted in Cockerell, 2006). It fell to May to implement the Conservative Party commitment to reducing net migration to the tens of thousands, and she had to do this within the political context of a rise in support for UKIP, a rise that put Conservative electoral successes in significant jeopardy.

Hostile Environment Along with the now longstanding Conservative Party manifesto commitment to reduce net migration to the UK to under 100,00 per year was a number of policies devised to create a ‘hostile environment’ for illegal immigrants to make life hard. For May getting illegal immigrants to leave was about fairness. On the second reading of the Immigration Bill in parliament in October 2013, she summed up that those ‘who play by the rules and work hard do not want to see businesses gaining an

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unfair advantage through the exploitation of illegal labour. They don’t want to see our valuable public services - paid for by the taxpayer - used and abused by illegal migrants’ (May, 2013). Getting illegal immigrants to leave was as much a part of ‘fixing the immigration system’ as was reducing net migration (May, 2013). For critics, however, the ‘explicit intention [of the hostile environment is] to weaponise total destitution and rightlessness, so as to force migrants without the right to be in the country to deport themselves, at low or no cost to the UK’ (Webber, 2019, 77). The Hostile Environment was an attempt to ensure that illegal immigrants found it hard to live their lives in the UK. As Theresa May told The Telegraph in 2012 ‘we’re going to give illegal migrants a really hostile reception’ (Kirkup & Winnett, 2012). Under this policy (implemented by the 2014 Immigration Act) landlords were required to check potential renters’ immigration statuses, people without the proper documentation could also not open bank accounts nor driver’s licences. Notoriously vans with ‘Go Home’ written on the side were driven around 6 London boroughs, and posters put up in community centres encouraging those who were in the UK illegally to return to their country of origin voluntarily. Although May, as Home Secretary, took the lead on these projects, this was Cameron’s policy. Reportedly when Cameron outlined the policy to Cabinet, it was Communities and Local Government Minister Eric Pickles who led the arguments against it, arguments that led Cameron to storm out of the room: Pickles told Cameron that requiring landlords to conduct immigration checks on potential tenants was a bad idea, according to Laws. He warned that “anyone foreign-looking” would face challenges accessing private rented accommodation. It was a prescient observation. (Grierson, 2018)

Bale (2016) explains the introduction of these ‘ever more restrictive’ policies as pushed by the electoral challenge the Conservatives faced from UKIP. (393) Theresa May’s vans and posters policy was driven by ‘[a]nxiety about the electoral threat posed by Farage’s self-appointed ‘People’s army’, and the failure of the net migration figures to move… in the right direction’ (Bale, 2016, 393; Crines & Heppell, 2017). A policy that even Farage described as ‘over the top’ and backfired when ‘Immigration Minister Mark Harper felt obliged to resign following the discovery

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that his long-term cleaning lady was in the country without permission’ (Bale, 2016, 393). May, as Home Secretary, was responsible for much of the implementation of the Hostile Environment, but it would be a mistake to think of her as solely to blame for the policies excesses. Goodfellow (2020) highlights how the Hostile Environment, ‘draconian’ and ‘intensely aggressive’ though it was, was the end result of ‘decades of exclusionary politics that have made it acceptable to treat migrants this way’, it was not the coalition government that introduced ‘hostility into the immigration system’ (7): It’s not some preordained destiny that brought the UK to the point where people can’t get bank accounts or homes because of their immigration status, but it’s not a wild deviation from the norm either. (Goodfellow, 2020, 7)

Such is the nature of cabinet politics and policy-making that the precise agency of a minister within the cabinet is uncertain when it comes to policy formation. Indeed, only six Labour MPs voted against the Immigration Act of 2014 that confirmed into legislation some of the main elements of the Hostile Environment. Whatever one thinks of the Hostile Environment in terms of its treatment of illegal immigrants, one thing is for certain that this policy would have ripples into May’s period as PM as it was the need to prove one’s legal status that created such problems for the Windrush Generation. It was this policy that led to many unjust deportations against British citizens who had every right to be in the UK and would become the issue that May’s premiership would be remembered for on race relations.

Theresa May as PM Theresa May’s first speech as Prime Minister was to highlight a number of ‘burning injustices’ that existed in the UK, the remedying of which she aimed to make central to her time in office. One of these surrounded the fact that black people are treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than white people (May, 2016). So it is reasonable to assert that Theresa May made racial justice one of the key components of her policy priorities as Prime Minister. Theresa May’s premiership when looked at through the lens of race has two significant moments: the Grenfell Tower

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disaster and the Windrush scandal. If one was to examine Theresa May’s broader political career, however, the Hostile Environment policy also looms large, especially as that, coupled with the 2014 Immigration Act, impacted so negatively on the Windrush Generation. To the end of examining the ‘burning injustices’ surrounding race relations, May commissioned the Race Disparity Audit, intended to investigate where disadvantage existed in the system, because as stated by Damien Green in the forward to the audit, ‘it remains this Government’s abiding mission to tackle burning injustices’ (Cabinet Office, 2017, 1). The Audit noted considerable areas for action. It noted that ‘Asian and Black households and those in the Other ethnic group were more likely to be poor and were the most likely to be in persistent poverty’ (Cabinet Office, 2017, 9). That ‘Black men are also almost three and a half times more likely to be arrested than White men’, and that this led to lower confidence in the police amongst Black people (Cabinet Office, 2017, 11). That ‘people living in households headed by someone in the Asian, Black or Other ethnic groups were disproportionately likely to be on a low income (Cabinet Office, 2017, 27). And that ‘Black offenders had the highest rate of reoffending compared to other ethnic groups from 2006 to 2014, and in all regions of England and Wales except the North West and Yorkshire and the Humber’ (Cabinet Office, 2017, 45). The report made uncomfortable reading, but broadly May should probably be congratulated for laying the data out in such stark terms. What the Audit did not do, however, was make any suggestions on why there were such inequalities between ethnicities. Indeed, the report deliberately set out that it could not do this, and therefore that it is not ‘possible from the Audit data alone to determine the causes of any differences observed between ethnic groups’ (Cabinet Office, 2017, 6). The phrase ‘institutional racism’ is not used, neither is there any discussion of immigration or threats of deportation, which is prescient given the events that would follow in May’s premiership. Also, in 2017 the government published the Lammy review into BAME communities’ experiences with the criminal justice system. Although the findings were similar to the audit, the tone was far less dry. Lammy talks of ‘disproportionality’ throughout, and speaks to the financial and human cost of the overrepresentation of BAME citizens in the criminal justice system:

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These disproportionate numbers represent wasted lives, a source of anger and mistrust and a significant cost to the taxpayer. The economic cost of BAME overrepresentation in our courts, prisons and Probation Service is estimated to be £309 million a year. (Lammy, 2017, 3)

Not everyone within the Conservative Party agreed that examining race as a ‘burning injustice’ was the right thing to do, indeed May faced considerable criticism for publishing these reports. Boris Johnson’s advisor Munira Mirza (2017) wrote in The Spectator that May was engaged in a largely empty set of gestures to improve the Conservative Party’s standings with the BAME community. Instead, she warned that ‘[e]veryone, including ethnic minorities, should be worried about the way in which anti-racism is becoming weaponised across the political spectrum’ and that one should not ‘exaggerate the problem of racism. This shift in the way we think about racism has also had a wider cultural effect. A generation of young BAME people believe that they are disadvantaged because of their race, and they are angry. They are told repeatedly about how racist universities are (especially Oxbridge), how racist their schools are, how racist employers are, how racist the police are, and so on, ad infinitum. In pretty much all these areas, the statistics tell a more complex story about poverty, class, -cultural norms and expectations. In many areas, such as university entry or recruitment into the professions, a number of ethnic groups are actually doing better than white British people. (Mirza, 2017)

So not all conservatives shared May’s enthusiasm for identifying race as one of the potential ‘burning injustices’ that government should seek to remedy through policy initiatives. Indeed, not only that, but they also thought that publishing such reports exacerbated the situation as it created grievances amongst young people and made them more suspicious of authority. So, May started off her premiership committed to tackling a number of longstanding injustices faced by minority ethic groups in the UK. She did this by commissioning reports to view the data on this, and she did this despite much criticism from the conservative right. It would be the impact of her ‘hostile environment’ policy on the Windrush Generation that May’s premiership will be remembered for though.

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Windrush Perhaps the most noticeable moment of Theresa May’s premiership with regard to race issues was the Windrush Scandal of 2018—however despite the fact that it was the Home Secretary of 2018, Amber Rudd, who resigned in the wake of the policy disaster, the genesis of the problems faced by the Windrush Generation was in May’s term as Home Secretary, and the Hostile Environment policy outlined above. Not only was the Windrush Scandal morally wrong, but it was also a failure in governance— a failure to see how one policy would impact on a group of people, and demanding of them proof that they could not get. This means that we can see policy failure as a failure from the perspective of statecraft as well, as a central element of statecraft is that the party of government should govern effectively. The British Nationalities Act of 1948 provided the status of British Citizen to all subjects of the colonies and allowed for free movement within the UK of such citizens and allowed them to settle permanently in the UK. Famously also in 1948 HMT Empire Windrush stopped in the Caribbean whilst travelling from Australia to Tilbury and offered reasonably priced travel to migrants wishing to come to the UK in search of work. Thus, the travellers on this ship who settled permanently in the UK were known as the ‘Windrush Generation’ and represented an early phase in migration to the UK. Various changes, however, have been made to immigration laws since the 1948 British Nationalities Act, changes that make the legal status of the Windrush Generation legally complex. Wardle and Obermuller point out that repeated ‘changes in the law created arbitrary effects in the lives of Afro-Caribbean people involved and for their family networks. Family members born at one time, or who entered Britain at a certain moment, could find their legal status was fundamentally distinct to others who had moved or stayed under a different rubric’ (x). Consequently, when bank accounts, employment, driver’s licences and housing required certain proofs of legal status as was the case under the Hostile Environment and the 2014 Immigration Act, many members of the Windrush Generation struggled to provide the requisite paperwork and often faced deportation. For example, grandmother Paulette Wilson who emigrated to the UK when she was 10 and lived, worked and paid taxes in the UK for 50 years,

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working as a cook in the House of Commons, was threatened with deportation to Jamaica despite the fact that she had not been there in 50 years and had no living relatives. Wilson was sent to Yarl’s Wood immigration detention centre and was almost deported until legal challenges managed to stop the process (Gentleman, 2018). Hubert Howard arrived in the UK legally in 1960 at the age of 3 but struggled to prove this with documentation—in 2012 he was sacked by his employers as he could not prove his right to be in the country legally. He was granted citizenship 3 weeks before he died in poverty (Gentleman, 2019). The Windrush Scandal was full of such stories. People who arrived and settled legally in the UK, but through no fault of their own, did not have the paperwork deemed necessary under the regulations to prove their status. The thoughtlessness, cruelty and incompetence of it were breathtaking. As Goodfellow, 2020, points out: The problem was that the hostile environment demanded they prove they had the right to be here, and for those people who had come as citizens under the Empire, the government had no record of their status or arrival. Landing cards, the only proof of when they arrived in the UK, were destroyed by the Home Office in 2010. This made it near impossible for them to show they were in this country legally. (Goodfellow, 2020, 4)

Wardle and Obermuller (2019) argue that the impact of the Hostile Environment on the Windrush Generation ‘echoes but also re-invents, an intermittent history of anti-immigrant sentiment that dates back at least to the post-war period of decolonization’ and ‘violently disrupted’ what had previously been ‘settled facts’ about the status of the Afro-Caribbean community in the UK (Wardle & Obermuller, 2019, x). The inherent historical complexity of the legal status of many migrants with a Caribbean background meant that enforcement of ‘hostile environment’ policies from 2010 on inevitably caused chaos. A key feature of the ‘hostile environment’ was that the people targeted would be forced to prove a negative. Migrants must now demonstrate that they or their parents had been in the UK continually since January 1st 1973. However, for many, the Home Office’s failure to maintain the records of the people to whom it granted indefinite leave to remain in the 1970s have made this impossible to prove. Leaving the country for more than two years results in a loss of right to ‘continuous residency’. (Wardle & Obermuller, 2019, x)

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The Williams Report of 2020, although clearing the Home Office of institutional racism, suggested that ‘institutional ignorance and thoughtlessness towards the issue of race and the history of the Windrush generation’ within the Home Office, and that ‘a range of warning signs from inside and outside the Home Office were simply not heeded by officials and ministers’ (Williams, 2020, 7). The Home Office did not consider how policies such as the Hostile Environment would impact on the Windrush Generation, and even when it was clear how they did impact, they failed to do anything about it. The report minced few words, the second paragraph stating. Members of the Windrush generation and their children have been poorly served by this country. They had every right to be here and should never have been caught in the immigration net. The many stories of injustice and hardship are heartbreaking, with jobs lost, lives uprooted and untold damage done to so many individuals and families. (Williams, 2020, 7)

So, there was a sense of carelessness here—an inability to see how a policy would impact on a particular group of people—an obtuseness perhaps. Sadly, this was not the only time that May could be accused of an inability to see how her actions would impact on other people with regard to race relations during her premiership. Her cavalier response to the Grenfell Tower disaster that occurred in the days after the 2017 General Election could at worse be seen as callous, at best ill-judged and ill advised.

Grenfell Towers May’s, perhaps lack of political judgement was further illustrated by her response to the Grenfell Tower fire of June 2017, just over a week after the disastrous general election results were announced and the sacking of her chief advisors Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill. May was still in the process of securing a deal with the DUP to ensure a Conservative government was workable. 72 people died in the blaze that engulfed the 24-story block of flats, of which 85% were members of ethnic minorities (Townsend, 2020). May visited the site two days after the blaze and met with members of the emergency services on a private tour but did not meet with survivors and was booed on her arrival. This was in contrast to Jeremy Corbyn and HM the Queen who met and consoled survivors. Prince (2017) says this illustrated a double failure. Firstly, it was one of

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empathy, as ‘a human being, the lack of empathy she would show for the victims was widely condemned as downright unacceptable’ (Prince, 2017, 402). Secondly, as she had just lost her two advisors, it illustrated how friendless May was in Downing Street by now that no one thought to advise her to make sure she met with the residents’ (Prince, 2017, 402–403). Nobody thinks that May was an unfeeling woman, or that her failure to meet with Grenfell residents was because of their ethnicity, but her lack of judgement here exacerbated ill feeling towards her. After her visit she is said to have ‘wept… both for the Grenfell residents and herself’ (Prince, 2017, 402). If true, the comparison of the two situations shows a shocking lack of sympathy and self-awareness.

Conclusion Outstanding issues on race relations from the May were present in British politics several years after she had resigned as PM. The Williams Report (2020) contained 30 recommendations for the government to ensure that the Home Office was fit for purpose, all 30 of which were adopted by the government at the time. As recently as January 2023, however, the Home Secretary Suella Braverman decided not to implement 3 of the proposals, namely establishing a commissioner to speak up for the rights of migrants, giving new powers to the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, and holding a series of reconciliation events with people impacted by the scandal (BBC, 2023). Griffith (2023) describes the decision not to hold reconciliation events as ‘a huge, missed opportunity – for the government to show that it is truly sorry, and for us to come together and have our experiences acknowledged’. This equivocation over the Williams Report suggests that the government is no longer as committed to reforms as it once was. Braverman, however, spoke of the ongoing ‘commitment to the Windrush generation’ of the Home Office, pointing to the fact that ‘more than £64 million in compensation had been paid of offered by the Home Office to those affected by the Windrush scandal’, and that some ‘15,713 people have been helped to secure documentation confirming their right to be in the UK’ (Braverman, 2023). Famously Harold Macmillan was once asked what was the most challenging aspect of being Prime Minister, to which he replied, ‘events, dear boy, events’. Such is the case with Theresa May’s record on race relations. There is no doubt that May recognised that there were many ‘burning

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injustices’ that negatively affected minority populations, and her commissioning of reports to highlight these suggests that she intended to tackle these. However, her premiership will be judged on the Windrush Scandal and the Grenfell Towers Disaster, both of which occurred, if you will pardon the cliché, ‘on her watch’. These were events that highlighted a couple of problematic elements of May’s political career. On Windrush it seems ironic that May, who had gained the post of Home Secretary and then Prime Minister on the grounds of quite competence, could have been so cavalier in the pursuance of the Hostile Environment when its impact on a particular demographic of the population became clear. At Grenfell her inability to judge what was required by her government in response to the disaster, and/or her governing style that meant that she had no advisors to guide her through the process, was highly problematic. These were problems of governance and personality as well as policy, problems that lead one to think that around race relations, the burning injustices faced by minority groups in the UK were not tackled by the May regime—indeed they were probably exacerbated by it.

Bibliography Bale, T. (2016). The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron. Polity. BBC. (2023). Windrush report: Suella Braverman scraps three recommendations. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-64414451. Accessed 6 February 2023. Braverman, S. (2023). Home Secretary signals ongoing commitment to Windrush generation. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-signalsongoing-commitment-to-windrush-generation. Accessed 6 February 2023. Bulpitt, J. (1986). The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s domestic statecraft. Political Studies, 34(1), 19–39. Cabinet Office. (2017). Race disparity audit: Summary findings from the ethnicity facts and figures website. Cabinet Office. Cameron, D. (2013). Speech on immigration and welfare reform. https://www. gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-immigration-speech, accessed 31 January 2022. Cockerell, M. (2006). Home Secretary: Do you have what it takes to do Britain’s most demanding job? The Independent. https://www.independent. co.uk/news/uk/politics/home-secretary-do-you-have-what-it-takes-to-do-bri tain-s-most-demanding-job-479513.html. Accessed 3 February 2023. Conservative Party. (2010). Invitation to join the Government of Britain: The Conservative manifesto 2010. Conservative Party.

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Conservative Party. (2015). Strong leadership, a clear economic plan, a brighter, more secure future. The Conservative Party. Conservative Party. (2017). Forward, together: Our plan for a stronger Britain and a prosperous future. Conservative Party. Crines, A., & Heppell, T. (2017). Rhetorical style and issue emphasis within the conference speeches of UKIP’s Nigel Farage 2010–2014. British Politics, 12(2), 231–249. Gentleman, A. (2018). Woman nearly deported after 50 years in UK wins leave to remain. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ 2018/jan/11/paulette-wilson-threatened-with-deportation-after-50-years-inuk-leave-to-remain. Accessed 4 February 2023. Gentleman, A. (2019). Windrush victim dies without compensation or apology. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/nov/12/win drush-victim-dies-without-compensation-or-apology. Accessed 4 February 2023. Goodfellow, M. (2020). Hostile environment: How immigrants became scapegoats. Verso. Grierson, J. (2018). Hostile environment: Anatomy of a policy disaster. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/aug/27/hos tile-environment-anatomy-of-a-policy-disaster. Accessed 3 February 2023. Griffith, J. (2023). Where is the justice, Suella Braverman, for me and the others whose lives were ruined by the Windrush scandal? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jan/27/jus tice-suella-braverman-windrush-scandal-broken-pledges. Accessed 6 February 2023. Guardian. (2010). Tories would limit immigration to ‘tens of thousands’ a year, says Cameron. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jan/11/david-cam eron-limit-immigration. Accessed 31 January 2023. Kirkup, J., & Winnett, R. (2012). Theresa May interview. Telegraph, https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/theresa-may-interview-going-give-illegal-mig rants-really-hostile/. Accessed 3 February 2023. Lammy, D. (2017). The Lammy review: An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the Criminal Justice System. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643001/lammy-rev iew-final-report.pdf. Accessed 5 February 2023. May, T. (2013). Speech by Home Secretary on second reading of Immigration Bill. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-by-home-secret ary-on-second-reading-of-immigration-bill. Accessed 2 January 2022. May, T. (2016). Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May. https:// www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-ministertheresa-may. Accessed 5 February 2023.

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Mirza, M. (2017). Theresa May’s phoney race war is dangerous and divisive. The Spectator. https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/theresa-may-s-pho ney-race-war-is-dangerous-and-divisive/. Accessed 5 February 2023. Norton, P. (2019). Effective prime ministerial leadership. https://norton view.wordpress.com/2019/06/04/effective-prime-ministerial-leadership/, Accessed 12 February 2023. Prince, R. (2017). Theresa May: The enigmatic prime minister. Biteback. Townsend, M. (2020). Grenfell families want inquiry to look at role of ‘race and class’ in tragedy. Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ 2020/jul/26/grenfell-families-want-inquiry-to-look-at-role-of-race-and-classin-tragedy. Accessed 1 February 2022. Wardle, H., & Obermuller, L. J. (2019). ‘Windrush generation’ and ‘hostile environment’: Symbols and lived experiences in Caribbean migration to the UK. Migration and Society, 2, 81–89. Webber, F. (2019). On the creation of the UK’s ‘hostile environment.’ Race & Class, 60(4), 76–87. Williams, W. (2020). Windrush lessons learnt review: Independent review by Wendy Williams. HofC.

PART III

Political Debates

CHAPTER 12

Theresa May’s Mode of Conservatism; ‘Soft’ One Nation Toryism Peter Dorey

Introduction When Margaret Thatcher first became Conservative Prime Minister in May 1979, her speech outside 10. Downing Street seemingly alluded to the Party’s One Nation tradition, for she proclaimed ‘where there is discord, may we bring harmony’. Given how confrontational and divisive her governments subsequently proved, one of her Cabinet Ministers, James Prior, later described this declaration as ‘the most awful humbug’ (Prior, 1986: 113). Her eventual successor, John Major, also commenced his premiership waxing lyrical with warm words about ‘creating a country at ease with itself’ which was widely viewed at the time as a tacit repudiation of Thatcherism, especially as Major also alluded to Iain Macleod as a significant political inspiration (McMeeking et al., 2021). Yet Major’s Governments broadly continued to pursue a Thatcherite policy agenda, even if the rhetoric was sometimes less rebarbative.

P. Dorey (B) Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_12

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When David Cameron became Conservative leader in December 2005, he too initially distanced himself from Thatcherism by pledging to pursue a much more socially inclusive and less judgemental mode of Conservatism, which would also entail treating the public sector as valued partners in the delivery of education and health policies, rather than ideological adversaries to be denigrated and micromanaged (Crines, 2013). Yet Cameron’s 2010–2016 premiership evinced little of this supposedly more conciliatory and compassionate Conservatism, but instead reverted to Thatcherite denigration of the public sector, the poor and welfare recipients, in the context of austerity (following the 2008 global financial crash) and the professed need to cut public expenditure significantly and swiftly (Dorey, 2016; Dorey & Garnett, 2016). As such, when Cameron’s successor, Theresa May, similarly pledged her commitment to One Nation Conservatism, it was difficult to avoid a sense of ennui or cynicism, perhaps accompanied by the type of eyeroll beloved of many teenagers when asked to clean their bedrooms or stop texting for 20 seconds. However, her sundry proclamations about reviving One Nation Conservatism did seem rather more sincere, as evinced by some of the examples she cited of unacceptable or excessive inequalities and disparities of earnings, her avowed sympathy for specific sections of British society who she acknowledged were struggling materially due to the impact of austerity, neoliberalism and globalisation, and a few of the actual policies she promoted, even though austerity was broadly continued. However, part of the analytic problem of categorising contemporary Conservative leaders and Prime Ministers as One Nation Tories is that the wider economic, industrial, political and social context today is very different to that which prevailed in the 1950s and early 1960s, an era which constituted the apotheosis of this particular mode of Conservatism, dominated as it was by decent and humane senior Ministers such as Rab Butler, Iain Macleod and Harold Macmillan. Consequently, some of the specific policies associated with this post-war mode of ‘strong’ One Nation Conservatism are no longer feasible in the twenty-first century, such as maintenance of a mixed economy (entailing several nationalised industries alongside the private sector), a neo-corporatist partnership with the trade unions and incomes policies as a counter-inflationary strategy; what might be termed either liberal collectivism, or what Keith Middlemas (1979: passim) characterised as ‘corporate bias’.

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Besides, the Conservative Party has moved decisively to the Right since this era, especially on economic issues, with many of its current MPs and supporters still in thrall to Margaret Thatcher, their intellectual evolution having stalled during her (1979–1990) premiership. As such, many contemporary Conservatives and pro-Conservative newspapers remain utterly convinced that, economically at least, Britain needs more of the policies enacted during the 1980s, rather than their abandonment. Apparently, Thatcherism still needs either more time to become fully effective, or to be applied with more energy and enthusiasm: the solution to chronic job insecurity and short-term/zero-hours contracts, everincreasing inequality and poverty, unaffordable housing, underfunded, ‘marketised’ and over-managed public services, overpriced and/or inefficient privatised industries and the decimation of many local communities due to loss of jobs and/or shortage of homes (and young people moving away as a consequence), is deemed to be a doubling-down on the pursuit of the very ideology and concomitant policies which had caused or greatly exacerbated these problems in the first place. If some of the senior One Nation Conservatives from the 1950s and early 1960s were reincarnated in the Party today, they would probably be accused of being crypto-Marxists or ‘Woke’ and expelled accordingly. We will thus utilise the concept of ‘soft’ One Nation Conservatism, as delineated by Hickson et al. (2020), who acknowledge that May’s variant was less extensive or ‘strong’ than the post-war version cited above, but was certainly more substantive than the loose definition invoked by David Seawright, for whom it was primarily a ‘rhetorical device’ through which virtually all strands of Conservativism invoke themes such as national unity and patriotism, regardless of other ideological views, values and policy preferences (Seawright, 2010: passim). Hence, Hickson et al. argue that ‘soft’ One Nation Conservatism ‘includes also a policy dimension which identifies particular social problems and sees a larger role for the State than economic liberals within the Party would wish’, albeit still a rather less extensive role than many senior Conservatives accepted in the 1950s and early 1960s (Hickson et al., 2020: 338–39. See also Timothy [2020: chapter five]).

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Theresa May’s ‘Soft’ One Nation Philosophy Having publicly alluded to her non-Thatcherite perspective at the Conservatives’ 2002 conference, when she candidly informed delegates that many people viewed them as ‘the nasty Party’, Theresa May elaborated on her stance the following year, when she informed a ‘compassionate Conservatism’ conference that: ‘We are Conservatives because we believe in One Nation’, and that: ‘We never stopped being the Party of one nation, the party of the poor, or the party of the vulnerable’ (May, 2002, 2003). Sixteen years later, when she spoke outside 10. Downing Street immediately upon becoming Prime Minister in July 2016, following David Cameron’s resignation in the wake of the 2016 EU Referendum result, she claimed that he had ‘led a one-nation government, and it is in that spirit that I also plan to lead’ (2016a). Given that Cameron had presided over six years of austerity, demonisation of the poor, further assaults on the public sector, and ruthless welfare cuts (even the physically disabled became classified and treated as ‘undeserving’), the claim that he led a One Nation Government was bewildering, but it is nonetheless of crucial significance that May herself explicitly pledged to be leader of a one-nation government. In elaborating on this promise, May explained that ‘the Conservative and Unionist Party’ was not only fully committed to maintaining the ‘union’ of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but a union ‘between all of our citizens, every one of us, whoever we are and wherever we’re from’. This meant, ‘fighting against the burning injustice’ whereby: If you’re born poor, you will die on average 9 years earlier than others. If you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than if you’re white. If you’re a white, working-class boy, you’re less likely than anybody else in Britain to go to university. If you’re at a state school, you’re less likely to reach the top professions than if you’re educated privately. If you’re a woman, you will earn less than a man. If you suffer from mental health problems, there’s not enough help to hand. If you’re young, you’ll find it harder than ever before to own your own home.

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She added that: If you’re from an ordinary working-class family, life is much harder than many people in Westminster realise. You have a job but you don’t always have job security. You have your own home, but you worry about paying a mortgage. You can just about manage but you worry about the cost of living and getting your kids into a good school.

Three aspects of these passages are worth highlighting in terms of May’s ‘soft’ One Nation ethos. The first was the explicit acknowledgement of racism in the criminal justice system, barriers to working-class social mobility, and continued gender inequality. It was quite remarkable for a Conservative Prime Minister to openly acknowledge the existence and scale of racism, classism and sexism in British society; previous Conservative leaders would have either avoided such specificity in favour of platitudes about tackling discrimination and disadvantage in general (via promoting greater opportunities), or suggested that such discrimination was very much the exception, not the rule (‘a few bad apples’), but was greatly exaggerated by the ‘politically correct’ Left, ‘virtue-signalling’ liberals and those now contemptuously referred to as ‘the Woke’. The second notable aspect of May’s peroration was the explicit use of the term ‘working class’, because Conservatives had, in recent decades especially, usually avoided referring directly to the existence of social classes, and especially a specific class comprised of workers who shared common characteristics and, presumably, had shared material interests. Instead, Conservatives tended to deploy other terms or euphemisms, such as ‘ordinary working people’, ‘hard-working families’, ‘tax-payers’, ‘consumers’ and ‘communities’. There were rare exceptions, most notably the eulogising of John Major as a working-class boy from Brixton who became Conservative Prime Minister, but even this narrative was primarily intended to convey the impression that individuals could achieve social mobility and success if they were sufficiently ambitious, motivated and talented, and that as such, being working class should not be viewed as a barrier to self-improvement and social advancement: Major as a symbol of meritocracy. May’s speech (and sundry others) not only referred explicitly to a working class but acknowledged that ‘membership’ of it often entailed a life of material hardship, insecurity, limited opportunities and unfair treatment.

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The third notable aspect of May’s Downing Street speech, in terms of articulating a mode of ‘soft’ One Nation Conservatism, was the reference to those who were ‘just about managing’ (subsequently referred to by journalists as ‘the jams’). This was an explicit acknowledgement that millions of British people—working class and middle class alike—were struggling financially, due to the combined impact of austerity, the rising cost of living, exorbitant rents, ever-increasing train fares for commuters and lack of affordable housing (to buy), all of which were greatly exacerbated by almost a decade of stagnant wages and salaries following the 2008 global financial crash and ensuing austerity. Crucially, May also subsequently acknowledged that much of the support for Brexit derived from the experiences and anxieties of those living in ‘left behind’ communities, who ‘see others prospering while you are not’, and where: the divisions that we see around us—between a more prosperous older generation and a struggling younger generation; between the wealth of London and the rest of the country; between the rich, the successful and the powerful, and their fellow citizens—become entrenched.

May declared that ‘the central challenge of our times is to overcome division and bring our country together, by ensuring everyone has the chance to share in the wealth and opportunity on offer in Britain today’ (May, 2017a). The similarities with the ‘two nations’—the rich and the poor—identified (by Charles Egremont) in Benjamin Disraeli’s (1980/ 1845) novel Sybil is crystal clear. Having acknowledged these ‘left behind’ sections of British society, May pledged that: ‘The government I lead will be driven not by the interests of the privileged few, but by yours’ (May, 2016a). This message was reiterated in her closing speech to the Conservatives’ 2016 conference, when she declared her commitment to creating ‘a country that works, not for a privileged few, but for every single one of us’ (May, 2016b). Her vision of ‘soft’ One Nation Conservatism was to be achieved partly through the ‘shared society’, whereby individual rights and freedoms would co-exist with ‘the bonds of family, community, citizenship and strong institutions’, entailing a stronger emphasis ‘on the responsibilities we have to one another’. This was a clear refutation of Thatcher’s ‘no such thing as society’ claim, for it posited instead the vision of citizens who had mutual responsibilities, and whose rights were reciprocal and

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shared; individuals had obligations to each other and the wider community. Indeed, May complained that ‘responsibilities to the people around us … have been forgotten as the cult of individualism has taken hold’, because in an ‘individualistic world can sometimes loosen the ties that bind our society together’. May thus insisted that ‘the central tenet of my belief—the thing that shapes my approach—is that there is more to life than individualism and self-interest’ (May, 2017a). The repudiation of Thatcherism and three decades of neoliberal nihilism could not be starker or more striking.

Mayonomics: Acknowledging ‘Market Failure’ and Promoting an Active State This repudiation of Thatcherism and/or neoliberalism was clearly exemplified by May’s willingness to acknowledge that ‘the market’ could—and sometimes did—fail, or at least proved to be dysfunctional, and thus yielded undesirable consequences. She candidly conceded that three decades of neoliberalism had entrenched ‘an economic system that works well for a privileged few but failed to ensure that the prosperity generated by free markets and free trade is shared by everyone’. As such, May acknowledged that a growing number of people ‘are questioning whether the system of globalisation, free markets and free trade … is actually working for them’ or instead ‘is even working against them— serving not their interests or ambitions, but those of a privileged few’. She further recognised that ‘the jams’ and ‘left behind’ communities had ‘seen a small minority in the banking and business sectors appearing to game the system and play by their own rules’, whereupon ‘they come to a simple conclusion: that there is one rule for the rich and powerful and another for everyone else’ (May, 2017a). May thus proposed ‘a government rooted not in the laissez-faire liberalism that leaves people to get by on their own, but rather in a new philosophy that means government stepping up’ to respond to market failure and growing inequality. The millions of citizens who were ‘just about managing’ or ‘getting by’, May argued, ‘don’t need a government that will get out of the way, they need a government that will make the system work for them’ (May, 2017a). Not only were a more active role for government, and a fairer distribution of wealth, laudable objectives in themselves, May insisted, they were also ‘fundamental to retaining faith in capitalism and free markets’,

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lest those citizens and communities who had been left behind, or felt exploited, by decades of economic liberalism and globalisation, withdrew their consent from this system altogether. To prevent such a crisis of legitimacy in the context of increasing inequality, growing job insecurity and extensive socio-economic deprivation in many towns and cities, May insisted that ‘government cannot afford to take a hands-off approach’ (May, 2016c). On the contrary, although she was certainly not in favour of direct State control or public ownership of industries (as tolerated by many One Nation Conservatives in the 1950s and early 1960s), she did acknowledge the need for a much more active State in terms of promoting industrial, scientific and technological innovation, and providing strategic direction or support, and also ad hoc partnerships between government and particular sectors of industry, rather than simply assuming that ‘the market’ would automatically provide these (see, for example, May, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b). May was also much more concerned than her predecessors about the increasing gap between the highest and lowest paid, and the growing earnings gulf between corporate bosses and their workers. She claimed that ‘we need to act to address the economic inequalities that have emerged in recent years’, whereupon the 2018 Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations decreed that from 2020, companies with more than 250 employees would have a statutory obligation to disclose, annually, the ratio of their CEO’s pay vis-à-vis the median, lower quartile and upper quartile pay of their UK employees (on the principle of a ‘pay ratio’ to tackle inequality, see Dorey, 2021). May envisaged that the statutory publication of companies’ pay ratios would encourage public opinion or customers to exert pressure on companies and/or shareholders either to desist from paying their CEOs exorbitant salaries, or to increase the salaries of their staff—either response would then yield a reduction in their pay ratio (i.e. between highest and lowest paid). May also called for shareholders’ votes on executive pay to be binding, rather than merely advisory, in order to address ‘an unhealthy and growing gap between what these companies pay their workers and what they pay their bosses’ (Quoted in The Times 11 July 2016). May’s critical stance towards corporate governance was also evident in her professed concern about the lack of accountability and representativeness in Britain’s boardrooms, insisted that ‘Big business needs to

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change’, May pledged that ‘we’re going to have not just consumers represented on company boards but employees as well’ (Quoted in The Times 11 July 2016. See also Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016). This could be interpreted as extending the principles of ‘one nation’, consensus and partnership into the workplace, while also enhancing the status of ordinary workers, and thereby ameliorating ‘them and us’ divisions in the modern workplace.

Theresa May’s ‘Soft’ One Nation Social Policy Agenda Whereas Cameron had initially promoted the ‘Big Society’ as a nonThatcherite approach to tackling poverty and social exclusion, May’s professed commitment to a ‘soft’ One Nation social policy agenda was enshrined in her advocacy of ‘the shared society’, which was itself a pointed refutation of Thatcher’s ‘there is no such thing as society’ claim (May, 2017a). To this end, she pledged a bold programme of social reform, which would be overseen by a new Cabinet committee on social reform, inaugurated in September 2016, and chaired by the Prime Minister herself. However, May declared that social policy should not only assist ‘the most vulnerable’, but simultaneously aim to ‘make life easier for the majority of people in this country who just about manage’ (May, 2016d). This, of course, can be interpreted as part of May’s statecraft (discussed below) in terms of both bridging internal ideological divisions inside the Conservative Party, and building an electoral ‘coalition’ among otherwise divergent and variated voters. The relatively short duration of May’s premiership, and its overwhelming domination (and debilitation) by Brexit, meant that her professed commitment to a One Nation programme of social reform was limited both in terms of detailed development, and discernible achievements. One particular sphere of social policy to which May did give prominence was that of housing, where she candidly acknowledged the lack of affordable homes, particularly for young people, due to a toxic combination of rising house prices, high rents, the failure of earnings to keep pace with either of these phenomena and the overall demand for housing (due to demographic trends) exceeding supply. The combination of stagnant salaries and rising rents meant that many young people simply could not afford to save the 10% deposit usually required to obtain a mortgage to buy a property, whereupon they became effectively trapped

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in the private-rented sector of the housing market, and thus disenfranchised from the ‘property-owning democracy’ that senior Conservatives had venerated ever since Anthony Eden had invoked the term (and policy goal) back in 1946. This lack of affordable housing was also deemed to be a barrier to social mobility and labour market flexibility, because people were increasingly unable to accept a job offer or promotion when these would necessitate relocating from, say, Liverpool to London, or Bradford to Bristol. Britain’s chronic shortage of affordable housing was, May complained, ‘a crisis of almost literal social immobility’ (May, 2018c). May thus pledged that her government would promote wider home ownership via a significant increase in housebuilding, especially for those on modest incomes and ‘key workers’ in public services. This objective would be pursued via a closer partnership between central government, local authorities and construction companies, coupled with various funding streams and subsidies to provide incentives to build less expensive (and thus less profitable) properties. Financial support and more ‘rentto-buy’ schemes were also promised to those citizens who had hitherto been priced-out of the housing market due to the growing gulf between average earnings and escalating property prices (May, 2018c). Beyond increasing the supply of affordable housing for ordinary people, May noted that in the private rental market, the balance of power had been tilted too far in favour of landlords, thereby resulting in many tenants paying exorbitant rents (often for sub-standard, almost uninhabitable or unsafe, accommodation), and sometimes living in permanent fear of eviction at short notice. She thus pledged that tenants who paid their rent on time, and caused no damage to the property, should be entitled to longer tenancy agreements and more statutory security against arbitrary eviction. Meanwhile, local authorities would be granted more regulatory power to tackle ‘rogue landlords’ who failed to ensure that their properties were safe and fit for human habitation (May, 2018c; May & Brokenshire, 2019). Finally, May lamented that ‘social housing’ was often disregarded or derided, and those who lived in such accommodation often suffered from social stigma. She thus expressed a determination to tackle the notion that social housing was somehow inferior, and its tenants treated as second-class citizens. May declared that housing associations should be empowered to play a more active role in expanding the provision of social housing to those citizens whose incomes or circumstances meant that they

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would still be unable to buy a property. In accordance with her professed One Nation approach, May decreed that it was ‘imperative that government works with local councils and housing associations to address such issues and provide a new deal for social housing’ (May, 2018d, 2018e).

Theresa May’s Pursuit of ‘Soft’ One Nation Conservatism in a Cold Climate Although a ‘soft’ One Nation ethos was clearly evident in many of Theresa May’s public perorations and proposals, her success in implementing her professed policy agenda was severely limited by four obstacles, some intrinsic to the parliamentary Conservative Party itself, and others pertaining to the wider economic and political situation in which her premiership was conducted, although there was some overlap or interconnection between these endogenous and exogenous factors. The first (and absolutely crucial) obstacle which May faced in translating her ‘soft’ One Nation vision into reality was that there was only limited support for it among her parliamentary colleagues, among whom economic neoliberalism has become entrenched as the default stance. Indeed, on economic issues, the parliamentary Conservative Party is much more Thatcherite today than it was while Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister, as each general election since 1987 has yielded a new cohort of Thatcherite Conservative MPs, sometimes selected as candidates precisely because they were deemed, by constituency selection panels, to have ‘kept the faith’ or remained’one of us’ (Dorey & Garnett, 2015; Evans, 2013: 55, 149; Heppell, 2013, 2020). Moreover, Conservative neoliberals and Thatcherites are deeply sceptical of the notion of ‘social justice’ (as alluded to both by One Nation Conservatives and the Left), often sharing Hayek’s view that ‘social’ is a ‘weasel world’ deployed by those who wish to interfere with ‘the market’, usually in order to pursue the chimera of equality. Hayek was adamant that as unequal incomes and wealth were a natural and unavoidable consequence of spontaneous and impersonal market forces, inequality could not be attributed to human agency or intention, and it was therefore: ‘meaningless to call this … unjust … Only human actions can be just or unjust’ (Hayek, 1988: 52. See also Hayek [1976: 70]). Although some of these Conservative MPs might have been socially liberal in their attitude towards issues such as same-sex marriage, they often remained economically liberal too; in the social and the economic

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spheres, they wanted to shrink the State, and thus believed that governments should keep out of the bedroom and the boardroom. Supporting same-sex marriage does not a One Nation Conservative make! Therefore, May was seeking to promote a mode of One Nation Conservatism in a Party where only a minority of MPs still supported this philosophical strand or ethos; she was thus always swimming against the tide of opinion among most of her parliamentary colleagues, for whom Thatcher(ism) remains the lodestar. Following on from this, a second reason why May’s advocacy of a variant of One Nation Toryism failed to attract much support in the parliamentary Conservative Party was due to divergent attitudes towards Brexit. Whereas May couched her advocacy of ‘soft’ One Nation Conservatism in terms of a new political direction for Britain after leaving the EU, many Conservative MPs enthusiastically viewed Brexit as heralding the next phase of entrenching neoliberalism, and thus of consolidating, or even completing, the ‘Thatcher revolution’. Instead of welcoming Brexit as an opportunity to establish a more active State, enhance workers’ rights and industrial democracy, curb corporate ‘excesses’ and boardroom greed, and promote social justice and fairness, much of the Conservative Party adopted precisely the opposite perspective; leaving the EU would herald the next phase of cutting taxes, extending deregulation, pursuing more privatisation, reducing remaining employment protection, reforming public services via further ‘marketisation’ and ‘contractingout’, and further ‘hollowing-out’ the State. Britain was to become, in effect, Singapore-on-Thames. Indeed, Brexit constituted a third reason why May was unable to pursue her ‘soft’ One Nation agenda between 2016 and 2019, because the vast majority of her time and energy as Prime Minister was devoted to securing Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union. This both entailed complex negotiations with the EU and/or European leaders about the terms of Britain’s departure and future trading relationship (if any), and managing the intra-party divisions between those Conservative MPs who wanted a ‘soft’ Brexit (usually having supported ‘Remain’) whereby Britain retained relatively close economic links with the EU, and the parliamentary Party’s ‘hard’ Brexiters (especially the European Research Group, led during 2018–2019 by Jacob Rees-Mogg), who demanded a completely clean break with the EU, with few, if any, remaining links or ties; in effect, total autonomy and independence, possibly to be achieved by abruptly departing with ‘no deal’.

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The time and energy which May was compelled to expend on negotiating Britain’s departure from the EU, coupled with the associated insurmountable problems of Party management, meant that she was unable to devote more time to honing and pursuing her vision of One Nation Conservatism, and inter alia seeking to persuade Conservative MPs of its merits. Moreover, as already intimated, those who favoured a ‘hard’ Brexit were generally hostile towards any mode of One Nation Conservatism (unless it meant ‘one nation’ in nationalistic terms, rather than economic and social harmony and a ‘duty of care’ towards the poor by the rich), because they viewed Britain’s withdrawal from the EU as precisely the opportunity for re-energising and renewing the pursuit of Thatcherite neoliberalism, free from EU regulations and (alleged) restrictions. They were adamant that a further tranche of post-Brexit, neoliberal economic policies, would provide the entrepreneurship, growth and investment which the ‘left behind’ communities of northern England and South Wales would benefit from in terms of new jobs and prosperity. Notwithstanding, of course, the role of neoliberalism, during the previous three decades, in decimating extractive and manufacturing industries and pari passu the working-class communities immediately around them. In other words, having played a major role in destroying millions of jobs and livelihoods since the1980s, the very same neoliberalism was assiduously portrayed, by ‘hard’ Brexiters, as the source of economic regeneration and renewal which would rescue the ‘left behind’; having savaged their communities, it was now to become their source of salvation. The fourth reason why May struggled to enact her professed One Nation agenda was opposition from various vested interests outside the Conservative Party. This was most evident in response to the proposed reform of corporate governance, and especially the proposal that workers should be permitted to sit on company boards. Rather predictably, Britain’s over-indulged and over-paid corporate fat-cats were apoplectic at the idea that the workers who created their firm’s wealth should have any say in its governance, and consequently, even before the end of 2016, May’s proposal was being diluted and downgraded; firms would merely be encouraged to appoint a small number of employees to sit on their governing boards, but certainly not required to do so (McCulloch, 2019; The Times 8 November 2016).

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Theresa May’s Mode of One Nation Conservatism as a Form of ‘Statecraft’ The advocacy of ‘soft’ One Nation Conservatism by May can also be viewed as an attempt at fulfilling three criteria of statecraft, as delineated by Bulpitt (1986). She was clearly seeking to develop both a winning electoral strategy, and political argument hegemony, and while these two facets are invariably inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing, this was especially true in the context of Brexit. Of course, these two components were also intended to secure a third key element of statecraft, as defined by Bulpitt, namely party management. In explicitly acknowledging that the 2016 Leave vote had been strongly motivated by a backlash against neoliberalism and globalisation by those who had been ‘left behind’, May was evidently endeavouring to convince Brexit supporters that she fully understood their grievances, and would pursue policies which directly addressed their anxieties, alienation and anger. This would entail curbing socio-economic inequalities, actively addressing the lack of secure and/or well-paid jobs, and directly tackling the chronic shortage of affordable and/or ‘social’ housing. Pursuing such objectives would empower ordinary people and their communities, and thus enable them to ‘take back control’ of their lives and communities, just as Westminster had apparently done vis-à-vis Brussels. Moreover, May’s ‘soft’ One Nation Conservatism was clearly intended to render the pro-Brexit Conservative Party electorally attractive to many working-class voters in ‘left behind’ communities, and as such, significantly erode Labour’s traditional bed-rock (Red Wall) support in many northern towns and the South Wales Valleys. In acknowledging the extent to which globalisation and neoliberalism had actually caused many of the socio-economic problems which had decimated such communities (these then exacerbated by post-2008 austerity), May was explicitly seeking to portray the Conservatives as a party which now acknowledged that ‘the market’ could prove dysfunctional or even fail completely, and that some economic and social problems needed more State activity, not less. Of course, Labour would argue the same, but here, May’s Conservatives could promote a more active or interventionist State in a positive and pragmatic manner, a strategy which would be more effective because of the Conservatives’ perceived governmental competence, whereas Labour’s advocacy of State intervention in economic and social affairs would be depicted (by Conservatives) as ideologically motivated,

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fiscally reckless, centralising or top-down, and deriving from an innate hostility to business, private enterprise and profit-making. In effect, May’s Conservatives and (Corbyn’s) Labour could both advocate policies such as regularly publicising the disparity between corporate salaries and the wages of front-line staff and industrial democracy via worker-directors, but whereas the Conservatives promotion of such policies would be portrayed positively as commensurate with creating ‘one nation’ and social harmony, Labour’s advocacy of exactly the same policies would invariably be depicted negatively as promoting the ‘politics of envy’ and being anti-business or hostile towards wealth-creators. In advancing this potentially winning electoral strategy, May was also aiming to achieve political argument hegemony, especially vis-à-vis the Conservatives’ political opponents, primarily the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, both of whom had supported the Remain campaign (notwithstanding the ambivalence and evident lack of enthusiasm evinced by Labour’s the leader, Jeremy Corbyn) (Roe-Crines, 2021). Many MPs in these two pro-European were convinced that the Referendum result had been strongly motivated by scare-mongering and xenophobia fuelled by senior Leave campaigners. This perception, coupled with the narrow margin of victory for Leave (52–48), meant that some Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the Referendum result, the implication being that many Leave voters had been misled and manipulated, and therefore misunderstood what they were voting for; they seemingly suffered from chronic false consciousness. This enabled Theresa May to pursue statecraft via political argument hegemony, because while the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats struggled to accept the Referendum result, and were uncertain how to respond to it, May’s Conservatives could assert their full acceptance of the Leave vote, and pledge that they would fully honour it (notwithstanding the subsequent intra-party disagreements and schisms over the details and terms of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU). This imbued May’s pursuit of political argument hegemony with a populist dimension, for she could portray the Conservatives as being the Party which acknowledged and respected the ‘democratic will of the people’ (the term routinely invoked by Leave supporters in reference to the Referendum result), while Labour and the Liberal Democrats could be depicted as symbolic of an arrogant, out-of-touch, liberal elite which assumed that it knew what was in people’s best interests, regardless of what ‘the people’ themselves said they wanted.

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Of course, in pursuing the ‘winning electoral strategy’ and ‘political argument hegemony’ aspects of statecraft, as defined by Bulpitt, May was also seeking to manage the divisions in the Conservative Party over Brexit, between those MPs and Ministers who had voted Remain, and those who had voted Leave. May hoped that fully committing to securing Brexit—and thus honouring the Referendum result—while addressing the socio-economic grievances which underpinned much of the Leave vote, she could foster a semblance of Party unity around her domestic policy agenda, particularly if it looked likely to attract electoral support from erstwhile Labour voters who wanted both Brexit and more economic and/or social investment in their communities. However, May was unable to accomplish the intra-party management component of statecraft, due to the breadth and depth of Conservative divisions over Brexit (on the causes and intensification of these intra-party divisions since the 1980s, see Dorey, 2017). The pre-Referendum divisions between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party was superseded, under May’s leadership of the Party, by an implacable division between those who wanted a ‘soft’ Brexit and those who wanted a ‘hard Brexit’ (or ‘no deal’ at all), with the latter repeatedly rejected May’s ‘Withdrawal Agreement’ (on the distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptics, which then broadly characterised the different visions of Brexit after the Referendum, see Taggart & Szczerbiack, 2008). Although the ‘hard’ Eurosceptics/Brexiters were numerically a (large) minority in the parliamentary Conservative Party, they were well-organised and often highly vocal, which in turn enabled them to secure considerable publicity and prominence. May’s increasingly insurmountable problems in managing the parliamentary Conservative Party by ameliorating the divisions wrought by Brexit were both reflected and reinforced by the defection of three proEuropean and/or One Nation MPs early in 2019, when Heidi Allen, Anna Soubry and Sarah Wollaston joined a new Independent Group of MPs, due to their despair at the increasing prominence of the Party’s Right and ‘hard’ Brexiters. Ultimately, May’s professed commitment to One Nation Conservatism was not sufficient to overcome the intra-Party divisions over Brexit, and thus failed to fulfil Bulpitt’s (statecraft) criterion of successful party management. Meanwhile, the hard Brexiters viewed departure from the EU as a prerequisite of reinvigorating Thatcherism, and renewing the pursuit of a low tax, deregulated, minimal-welfare, neoliberal, economy, as

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envisaged in the Britannia Unchained ‘manifesto’ published in 2012 (Kwarteng et al., 2012). As such, they harboured a very different vision of Brexit to May’s advocacy of a more active State, curbing inequality, and pursuing social justice. In attempting to appeal to the two ‘wings’ of the parliamentary Conservative Party, May unwittingly alienated both of them. These insurmountable intra-party divisions naturally impacted negatively on May’s ability to achieve the two other components of Bulpitt’s model of statecraft, namely achieving governing competence, and securing an(other) winning electoral strategy. Her professed One Nation Conservative agenda was sidelined by, and subordinated to, the vexatious pursuit of Brexit and the associated intra-party divisions, which therefore militated against the pursuit of effective governance, and instead ensured that her premiership was beset by constant political crises. This, in turn, prevented May from crafting a winning electoral strategy, as evinced by the Conservatives’ loss of its narrow parliamentary majority in the 2017 general election, and May’s subsequent resignation long before the envisaged 2022 general election (actually called—and won emphatically—by her successor, Boris Johnson, in 2019) (Heppell et al., 2022; Heppell & McMeeking, 2021; Roe-Crines, 2019). May thus became the fourth consecutive Conservative Prime Minister whose premiership was destroyed due to intractable intra-party disagreements and divisions over Britain’s relationship with the EU, these compounded by deeper ideological schisms. The nature and causes of May’s resignation strongly suggested that the Conservative Party had fatally lost its former reputation for statecraft.

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CHAPTER 13

From Workers on Company Boards to Representatives of ‘Workers Voices’: Explaining May’s Failed ‘One Nation’ Industrial Policy Eunice Goes

Introduction Theresa May’s bid to the leadership of the Conservative Party was premised on the idea of ‘One Nation’ conservatism. In her first statement as Prime Minister, she announced her intention to lead ‘in the spirit’ of ‘one-nation’ (sic) and address the ‘burning injustices in society’ (May, 2016c). In a clear departure from the Thatcherite orthodoxy that had guided Conservatism since the 1980s, May argued that taxes were a sign of a civilised society and made the case for an active industrial policy which included plans to place workers in company boards and tackle corporate excesses as a way to address society’s ‘burning injustices’. But as noted by several observers (Atkins, 2022; Atkins and Gaffney, 2020; Byrne et al.,

E. Goes (B) Richmond: The American University, London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_13

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2021; Hickson et al., 2020), May’s intention to govern as a One Nation conservative failed. After three years as Prime Minister, Theresa May did not deliver on her promises to tackle society’s burning injustices. This chapter seeks to explain why May was unsuccessful at implementing an industrial policy, and crucially her promise to introduce workers to company boards and tackle excessive executive pay, which reflected One Nation values. Drawing on Bulpitt’s concept of statecraft (1986), on neo-statecraft theory (Buller & James, 2012; James, 2016, 2018) and on insights from discursive institutionalism and historical institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008; Hall, 1989, 1993), this chapter argues that Theresa May was unable to implement her One Nation industrial strategy because she lacked support from key institutional actors and was too distracted with the task of delivering Brexit. In particular, this chapter shows that May’s inability to impose a hegemony of political argument is largely explained by the absence of substantial institutional support for her ideas, by an unfavourable political context and by the shortcomings of her own leadership skills. The chapter will analyse set speeches by Theresa May, government documents such as the annual budget, green and white papers on industrial policy, speeches and media interventions delivered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond and by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Greg Clark, as well as the Conservative Party manifesto of 2017 to assess how May’s ideas evolved from ‘word to deed’ (Goes, 2021; Schmidt, 2008) and will use secondary sources such as media accounts and books by insiders to ascertain whether the absence of support by key political actors (Hall, 1989, 1993) and a challenging political context were the main factors that led to the failure of May’s One Nation transformative agenda. But first, the chapter will explain how Bulpitt’s concept of statecraft is used to explain May’s failure to adopt a One Nation agenda on industrial policy.

One Nation Statecraft In his influential article, Bulpitt defined statecraft as ‘the art of winning of elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence in office’ (1986: 21). As he explained, ‘The art of statecraft is to understand and work with the limitations placed on elite activity by the many changing structural constraints arising from within and without the polity’ (1986: 39). Thus, under this model, a party leader’s statecraft is

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deemed successful if he or she can manage party relations well and unite the party; develops a winning electoral formula which is popular with the electorate and achieves ‘argument hegemony’ (Bulpitt, 1986: 21–22). Bulpitt’s statecraft theory rightly assumes that successful statecraft depends largely on how leaders deal with institutional and political constraints, however in its operationalisation it tends to over-emphasise the role of prime-ministerial agency (Byrne et al., 2021: 700) and to downplay the role of ‘structural context’ (Buller & James, 2012: 539). More seriously, as was observed by several critics (Griffiths, 2014; Hayton, 2016; James, 2018; Marlow-Stevens & Hayton, 2021), Bulpitt downplays the role of ideas in political decision-making. Indeed, he accepts that ideas play a role, however, party leaders and prime ministers use them in an instrumental way. If those ideas are perceived to be detrimental to the goals of winning elections, maintaining party unity and achieving ‘argument hegemony’, they will be dropped. However, Bulpitt does not consider that there may be other reasons, namely the absence of key institutional support, why ideas are abandoned by political actors (Hall, 1989). But even if we accept the plausible proposition that ideas are used in an instrumental fashion by party leaders, there is one aspect of statecraft, namely the part that includes winning argument hegemony, that involves an ideational process. As Gamble presciently pointed out ‘hegemony involves politics, ideology and economics’ (1994: 141). This is so because, ‘building support and negotiating power, winning the arguments at all levels of ideological discourse, and framing and implementing a viable economic strategy, are all involved in a successful political project that aims to establish and maintain hegemony’ (Gamble, 1994: 141). Moreover, and as Griffiths (2014) forcefully argued, party leaders are also motivated by ideas and ideology and not merely by the goal of winning elections and remaining in power (Griffiths, 2014: 738, see also Hayton, 2012, 11; Goes, 2021; James, 2018). Indeed, empirical research by James (2018) suggests that party leaders are also motivated by ideas. Party leaders normally propose new ideas for a variety of reasons. They may want to address an urgent problem, or to win elections or to distinguish themselves from their predecessors. Political parties themselves can also be consumed by ideology. For instance, in the last two decades, the Europhobic obsession that took over the Conservative Party is an excellent example of that. At heart the project to leave the European Union (EU) is ideological: the extent to which Conservative MPs were ready to

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sacrifice economic prosperity, governing stability for the sake of leaving the EU, is a clear example of how ideological goals can drive political parties. Perhaps more importantly, ideas and interests are not necessarily disentangled from each other. As Gamble showed, Thatcherism offers a good example of how ideas and interests are mutually dependent. As he put it, Thatcherism in fact ‘rejected the idea that successful statecraft had to practise opportunism and be ready to surrender principles’ (Gamble, 1994: 151). Similarly, Gamble argued that the ‘austerity statecraft’ pursued by May’s predecessor, David Cameron, also combined ideological values and interests (2015: 43). Likewise, the tradition of One Nation conservatism which is being examined in this chapter, can be interpreted as a form of conservative statecraft. After all, One Nation conservatism is an ideational tradition that combines a principled concern with rising inequalities with an astute awareness of electoral opportunities and challenges by changed political and contextual circumstances. Historically, the tradition of One Nation conservatism was invoked at the times of electoral uncertainty (Seawright, 2010: 162; Walsha, 2003: 109). In those moments, the party needed to appeal beyond its ‘core natural vote’ and target working-class voters (Walsha, 2003: 69; see also Dorey & Garnett, 2015). Indeed, as Walsha argued, One Nation Tories saw themselves as ‘guardians of electability’ (2003: 109). Interestingly, May’s invocation of the One Nation Conservative tradition suggests a similar approach. On the one hand, May seemed to be genuinely concerned with what she termed the ‘burning injustices of society’ but she also defended this approach as a way of widening the Conservative Party’s electoral appeal (Shipman, 2018: 7). The fact that One Nation conservatism has been used in such an instrumental fashion by most conservative leaders may suggest that this tradition is more a mood music than an actual ideological tradition (Walsha, 2003: 108). However, it is a mistake to think that this highly malleable tradition has no distinctive ideological traits of its own. To start with, there are stark differences between One Nation conservatism and the still dominant orthodoxy of the Conservative Party, otherwise known as Thatcherism. The differences between the two are not just about policy, but also of attitude, values and of approach to politics. One Nation conservatism reflects a traditional conservative approach to politics which is sceptical of human nature and of the idea of progress but

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prioritises the maintenance of a balanced society where no social group dominates. To that end, One Nation conservatives propose an agenda where the state can be a ‘potential promoter of social harmony’ (Dorey & Garnett, 2015: 70). Thus, One Nation Conservatives have been ready to defend a strong role for the state in economic affairs with a view to promote a balanced relationship between the interests of workers and the interests of business (Gilmour, 1977: 236). In this capacity, the One Nation state can intervene in markets to prevent economic instability and the rise of socio-economic inequalities that endanger the stability of society. This being said, it is important to stress that One Nation Conservatives tended to be weary of too much state intervention in the economy (Seawright, 2010: 80). Indeed, they preferred to rely on the self-regulation of both business and labour interests than on increased state regulation (Middlemas, 1994: 457) and were equally committed to sound finance, efficiency and low taxes (Page, 2014: 20). Having established that One Nation conservatism can be seen as a form of statecraft where power and ideational goals cannot be disentangled from each other, it becomes easier to explain how the concept of statecraft will be used to explain and assess Theresa May’s failed One Nation agenda. The chapter uses Bulpitt’s criteria as benchmarks to assess the success of May’s statecraft, but it also pays attention to the role of ideas and structural context. In particular, it takes May’s ideational aims seriously. Moreover, the chapter shows that ideas can be abandoned by Prime Ministers not because of political expediency but because key actors failed to galvanise the support of key actors for their own agenda. This is particularly true when third-order change ideas, as it was the case, are involved (Hall, 1989). The following sections explain how and why May’s One Nation industrial strategy failed.

May’s One Nation Agenda Theresa May became leader of the Conservative Party and British Prime Minister in dramatic circumstances. Her predecessor David Cameron resigned following the results of the referendum on the membership of the EU held in June of 2016, triggering an immediate leadership election in the Conservative Party. May launched her bid to the leadership of the Conservative Party on the 30 of June 2016 and professed that she would pursue ‘a vision of a country that truly works for everyone’ (May, 2016a). The implication of May’s statement was that, despite six years of

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conservative rule, Britain was a country marked by injustice. As she put it: If you’re born poor, you will die on average nine years earlier than others. If you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than if you’re white. If you’re a white, working-class boy, you’re less likely than anybody else to go to university. If you’re at a state school, you’re less likely to reach the top professions than if you’re educated privately. If you’re a woman, you still earn less than a man. If you suffer from mental health problems, there’s too often not enough help to hand. If you’re young, you’ll find it harder than ever before to own your own home. These are all burning injustices, and—as I did with the misuse of stop and search and deaths in police custody and modern slavery—I am determined to fight against them. (May, 2016a). A few days after this speech, May explained that her agenda marked a departure from the party’s current orthodoxy. What she was proposing was ‘a different kind of conservatism’, one that marked ‘a break with the past’ (May, 2016b) and which sought to address the causes of the vote to leave the EU. But as she explained, her brand of conservatism was ‘completely consistent with Conservative principles because we don’t just believe in markets, but in communities. We don’t just believe in individualism, but in society. We don’t hate the state, we value the role that only the state can play. We believe everybody—not just the privileged few— has a right to take ownership of what matters in their lives. We believe that each generation—of politicians, of business leaders, of us all—are custodians with a responsibility to pass on something better to the next generation’ (May, 2016b). May said that this had always been her strand of conservatism. In truth, in a wide-ranging speech delivered in 2013 she claimed allegiance to a type of conservatism which proposed to reform capitalism to make sure ‘the market works in the public interest’ (May, 2013). But if May’s brand of conservatism was One Nation by conviction, it was also true that her team—namely her main political advisor Nick Timothy—viewed that agenda as a tool to broaden the Conservatives’ electoral appeal among working-class voters (Shipman, 2018: 7). May herself suggested the same when she said, ‘we have shown that when the Conservatives have an open, inclusive, One Nation agenda of social reform, we win elections—and we change the country for the better’ (May, 2016a).

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May eventually won the leadership of the Conservative Party and on her first day in Downing Street, she vowed to govern as a One Nation Conservative Prime Minister. In this speech, delivered on the doorstep of No. 10 Downing Street and written by her adviser Nick Timothy, she repeated almost verbatim the words of her burning injustices speech with which she launched her leadership bid. Thus, she promised to govern not in the interest of the ‘privileged few’ but in the interest of those voters who were just about managing, and whose lives had been scarred by the ‘burning injustices’ that defined modern Britain (May, 2016c). This speech was interpreted as the act of a Prime Minister with a clear and determined vision (Burton-Cartledge, 2022: 223). For example, the conservative commentator Matthew D’Ancona wrote that ‘if she means what she says, Brexit will be no more than the backdrop to something more turbulent, disruptive and welcome’ (D’Ancona, 2016). Similarly, in the pages of the Financial Times Sebastian Payne argued that Theresa May’s first hours in Downing Street confirmed she was ‘a breath a fresh air’ and signalled a ‘less austere, and more caring government’ (Payne, 2016). And in his assessment of May’s premiership Anthony Seldon argued that ‘no other Prime Minister had given such a confident assertion of the direction they were going to lead the country’ (Seldon, 2019: 5). A couple of months later, in her speech to the Conservative Party Conference in Birmingham May hinted at what this agenda might entail because, as she argued, a vision is worthless without ‘the determination to see it through’ (May, 2016d). In this speech the Prime Minister explained that her ‘burning injustices’ agenda would imply a different approach to the state and to the market. Indeed, she explained that the state could be a ‘force for good’ especially if its role was geared ‘to stand up for the weak and stand up to the strong’ (May, 2016d). From a defence of the state, May went on to defend taxation as ‘the price to pay to live in a civilised society’ (2016d) and to acknowledge that markets are not infallible. This admission set the ground for her defence of state intervention to correct dysfunctional markets and to attack what she perceived to be unscrupulous bosses. As she said, So, if you’re a boss who earns a fortune but doesn’t look after your staff… An international company that treats tax laws as an optional extra… A household name that refuses to work with the authorities even to fight terrorism…

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A director who takes out massive dividends while knowing that the company pension is about to go bust… I’m putting you on warning. This can’t go on anymore. (May, 2016d)

But despite the grandiloquence of her vision, there were few policy announcements in this speech. The clearest proposals centred around a new industrial strategy which focused on tackling excessive executive pay and placing workers on company boards. Indeed, she said that the government would introduce plans ‘to have not just consumers represented on company boards but workers as well’ (May, 2016d). This was presented as a necessary step given that, as she made clear in an earlier speech, appointing non-executive directors to company boards would not result in genuine workers’ representation because they were ‘drawn from the same narrow social and professional circles as the executive team’ (May, 2016b). Like One Nation conservatives in the past, May justified her new industrial policy as a strategy to help in improving the living conditions of workers (Bochel, 2010: 123; Gilmour, 1977: 232; Griffiths, 2014, 32; Seawright, 2005: 71); to promote the rebalancing of the relations between capital and labour (Hickson, 2009: 353; see also Gilmour, 1977: 19); to defend a degree of government intervention in industrial policy (Gilmour, 1977: 19; Middlemas, 1994: 494; Walsha, 2003: 69). As she indicated in her speech to the Conservative Party conference, a One Nation agenda had the potential to address the structural weaknesses in the British economy which partly explained the vote to leave the EU. This was not a new argument. In the past, proposals for active industrial policy had been made, by both Labour and Conservative politicians, economists and media commentators as one of the solutions to tackle Britain’s chronic low productivity. In the years immediately following the 2008 global financial governments, both the Labour government and the conservative-led coalition government that followed it in 2010 discussed such possibility (Silverwood & Woodward, 2018: 634). However, very little came out of these concerns with the United Kingdom’s declining manufacturing base and with the low productivity of the British economy. As Craig Berry noted, by 2014 it was clear that the Treasury ‘had shifted decisively away from the idea of an activist industrial policy’ (2016: 840). Arguably, the abandonment of an active industrial strategy offered May the opportunity to show that her premiership would represent a departing point from David Cameron and George Osborne’s agenda. But choosing

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industrial policy as her signature policy was surprising. Historically, this has been an extremely difficult area of public policy to change given that such agenda implies policies that are at odds with the British model of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2013: 29; Wood, 2013: 272). Indeed, liberal market capitalism is predicated on deregulated labour markets, weak trade unions and in a market relationship between employer and workers where companies have historically resisted any challenge to shareholder value. Thus, under this model of capitalism, companies ‘are under no obligation to establish representative bodies for employees’ (Hall & Soskice, 2013: 29). Secondly, an active industrial policy would imply a substantial shift, with all the transaction costs involved, from a services-based economy to a manufacturing-based economy. In addition, the relevant government departments and stakeholders do not, as Berry explained, ‘have the power, resources, expertise and even inclination to push for a more radical industrial policy agenda’ (2016: 842). In short, this resistance to an active industrial policy can be seen as a path-dependent process (Pierson, 2000). Resistance to change is determined not only by the assumption that the adoption of a new approach is far too costly but also because institutions are embedded in certain practices, cultures, traditions which render them resistant to change (Diamond, 2014: 276). Despite this challenging institutional and structural backdrop, May seemed determined to bring her One Nation agenda to fruition though she knew that her main task was to deliver Brexit (Seldon, 2019: 149). She was so committed to this agenda that, in the words of an adviser quoted by Anthony Seldon the speech was ‘framed and put up all around the building, including in the waiting room at No. 10’ (2019: 5; see also Cowley & Kavanagh, 2018: 51). Moreover, her team of advisers in the Policy Unit took that agenda seriously. They treated May’s speech as a guiding document to the policy proposals they would draft and they sought to translate her ideas on social justice, workers on company boards, corporate responsibility into concrete policy proposals (Seldon, 2019: 16). In the early stages of her term, May seemed to be able to deliver her vision. If she won the leadership of the party by default, she was also seen as a safe pair of hands by conservatives. At a time where the country was plunged in the uncertainty of Brexit, May’s apparent steady stewardship was welcomed by her party. Polling suggests that voters were equally reassured.

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Consequently, as noted by Nicholas Allen, May started her term as a powerful prime minister who explored her resources to the full (2017; see also Byrne et al., 2021). She centralised decision-making in Number 10 (Allen, 2018: 117) and on her arrival to Downing Street she demoted six former cabinet ministers and sacked seven others including the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne (Allen, 2017: 641). This ruthlessness did not suggest a timid or weak hold on power. In addition, she introduced significant institutional changes to the structure of government. She created two new departments, and she merged the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department for Energy and Climate Change into a brand-new Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Allen, 2017, 641), which signalled her intention to prioritise industrial policy. However, her centralising approach to government did not win May any friends in the cabinet. Her former chief adviser Nick Timothy agrees. As he put it: ‘the role of the prime minister is not to play every instrument in the orchestra, but to write the score and conduct the musicians. Too often, Theresa was trying to play the strings, woodwind, brass and percussion all at the same time’ (Timothy, 2020: 8). To make matters worse, the Chancellor Phillip Hammond did not like her, often briefed against her and resented the fact of being sidelined by May’s team (Shipman, 2018; see also Byrne et al., 2021: 709). Moreover, the divisions within the Conservative Party, the challenge of delivering Brexit, the fact that she did not rely on a personal electoral mandate to lead the government’s slender majority and her own limitations as a politician tested May’s resolve. The difficulties became visible as soon as she revealed her reformist agenda. The next section explains how May’s One Nation industrial strategy was derailed by her cabinet colleagues, by the negotiations to leave the EU and by her own shortcomings as prime minister.

The Politics of May’s Industrial Strategy May’s announcement at the 2016 Conservative Party Annual Conference of her plans to develop a new industrial strategy, to reform corporate governance and to bring workers into the boards of companies, took her government by surprise. The Chancellor Philip Hammond was more than surprised by the plans (Seldon, 2019: 151). He did not like them. In truth, as a ‘a bone-dry Thatcherite’ (Seldon, 2019: 646) Hammond did not share May’s economic philosophy (Shipman, 2018, 140), and

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believed that delivering Brexit was the government’s priority (Seldon, 2019: 173). May’s former adviser Nick Timothy recalls Hammond trying to dissuade May from pursuing her plans to reform corporate governance: ‘You don’t need to actually do any of this stuff. (…) you’re miles ahead in the polls just by talking about it’ (Hammond quoted by Timothy in 2020: 7). Several credible accounts showed that The Chancellor of the Exchequer was not ready to loosen the public purse’s strings to fund May’s ambitious agenda (Seldon, 2019: 169–173; Shipman, 2018: 140) or to see the dominance of the Treasury challenged by another department. In the 2016 Autumn Statement, the Chancellor announced some measures that supported the ‘Just About Managing’ families, but overall, they were modest in scope and did not reflect May’s ambitious vision. Above all, the Chancellor opposed the proposals to put workers on company boards and to regulate executive pay. A Hammond confidant said, ‘They clashed over the workers on boards and the rather bunkum way of doing industrial strategy with lots of silly interventions’ (Shipman, 2018: 141). Similarly, the Business Secretary Greg Clark, with whom May had a more constructive relationship, and who was responsible for delivering the industrial strategy, was not convinced of the need for May’s agenda (Cowley & Kavanagh, 2018: 55). In an interview with the Institute for Government, he admitted feeling surprised when May asked him to develop an industrial strategy. As he explained, industrial strategy ‘was not really associated with Conservative administrations’, especially the parts associated with corporate governance (Clark quoted by Durrant & Haddon, 2020). For similar reasons, ‘many cabinet ministers were opposed to her agenda from the start’ (Seldon, 2019: 188) and ‘within weeks were briefing against her’ (2020: 643). This account was corroborated by Barwell who claimed the May government was characterised by increasingly bitter infighting among ministers’ (Barwell, 2021: 47). In the backbenches there was little sympathy for May’s agenda (Byrne et al., 2021: 705). By then the parliamentary party was dominated by Thatcherites, who saw their positions emboldened following the referendum on the EU membership (Dorey and Garnett, 2015: 87; Hayton, 2018; Hickson, 2009). The fact that the party was unsympathetic to her agenda, as well as the absence of a personal electoral mandate implied that her One Nation project had very little chances to see the light of day.

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May’s problems also resulted from the vagueness of her new industrial strategy (Berry, 2016: 841). This made it easier for her opponents in the Cabinet to force concessions. Indeed, shortly after her triumphant party conference speech, May backtracked on her proposals to introduce workers into company boards. Following predictable negative reactions from the business community and from conservative think-tanks like the Adam Smith Institute and the Institute of Economic Affairs, the prime minister used her speech to the CBI in November 2016 to clarify that the scheme would be voluntary and was not suitable to all types of companies. As she explained, ‘While it is important that the voices of workers should be represented, I can categorically tell you that this is not about mandating works councils, or the direct appointment of workers or trade union representatives on boards’ (May, 2016f, see also May, 2016e). In a media interview, the Business Secretary echoed the Prime Minister’s words. He clarified that supporting greater ‘employee voice’ in company boards did not amount to incorporate them in company boards. ‘What we do want to do is to strengthen, to give a stronger voice to workers on boards’ (Clark quoted by Smith, 2016). Despite the opposition to her initial plans, the Prime Minister persevered with her agenda albeit in a much watered-down version. In the foreword to the government’s green paper on industrial strategy, May claimed her industrial strategy reflected ‘a new approach to government, not just stepping back and leaving business to get on with the job, but stepping up to a new, active role that backs business and ensures more people in all corners of the country share in the benefits of its success’ (HM Government, 2017a: 3). However, the plans, which involved the promise to invest more than £5bn in strategic sectors of the economy and in infrastructure, were not as ambitious as May had suggested. The Financial Times reported that they had received ‘faint praise’ from business leaders on the grounds that it was a ‘little more than a sprawling discussion paper’ (Pickard et al., 2017) which merely built-on David Cameron’s own industrial strategy (Silverwood & Woodward, 2018: 631). The green paper opened a process of consultation with business which gave May some breathing space to concentrate in the task of delivering Brexit. In January of 2017 May announced her Plan for Britain, which outlined her plan to trigger article 50 and withdraw from the EU, but it also included some vague commitments to her fairness agenda (May, 2017a). But while May focused on negotiating Brexit, the Chancellor blocked her industrial policy agenda. As Seldon revealed, ‘consultations

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with industrial leaders about spreading board representation to workers were discouraging. Messages came back that it would encourage trade unions and damage the quality of corporate leadership. The policy was amended to a milder form in which non-exec board members were responsible to be responsible for employees in their care’ (Seldon, 2019: 179). In short, under the government’s plans workers’ voices would be ‘represented’ by the appointment on non-executive directors or by setting up advisory panels to represent the interests of employees but crucially not through their incorporation into company boards. In other words, the government’s proposal was the limited response that May criticised when she run for the leadership of the party. Proposals to curb excessive corporate pay were equally watered down. Instead of curbs on pay, government proposals merely required companies to publish the pay ratios between bosses and staff and justify their differences within companies. Faced with resistance to her agenda but also with the signs that the party could increase its parliamentary majority, May decided to call an early election. By then, it was clear that the Prime Minister wanted a clear mandate to carry her One Nation agenda and her team seemed happy to oblige. For instance, Will Tanner, an adviser in May’s policy unit spoke of the enthusiasm of defining a new vision which tried ‘to reposition Conservatism back to a more historical tradition, more Burkean and less liberal, more unionist and less England, more classless and less establishment, and trying to get the Conservative Party into a more electable place’ (Seldon, 2019: 212). May’s chief political adviser Nick Timothy was equally committed to the cause. In fact, it was he who convinced May of the necessity of such approach. As a result, the 2017 Conservative Party manifesto entitled Forward, Together paid a brief though general homage to the One Nation tradition. In her foreword to the manifesto, the Prime Minister declared a commitment to fight the ‘burning injustices’ of society and promised a new ‘industrial strategy to spread opportunity across the United Kingdom’ (Conservative Party, 2017: 4). Similarly, the manifesto also promised that May’s government would protect workers’ rights and protection and enact an ‘ambitious industrial strategy, to get the economy working for everyone’ (Conservative Party, 2017: 7). But the hand of the Treasury was visible in the vague language used to outline the party’s proposals for industrial strategy and corporate governance (Seldon, 2019: 213). Regarding corporate excesses, the

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manifesto merely promised ‘to legislate to make executive pay packages subject to strict annual votes by shareholders and listed companies will have to publish the ratio of executive pay to broader UK workforce pay’. Regarding the representation of workers on company boards, the party promised to ‘change the law to ensure that listed companies will be required either to nominate a director from the workforce, create a formal employee advisory council or assign specific responsibility for employee representation to a designated non-executive director’ (Conservative Party, 2017: 15–17). These proposals represented a severe dilution to May’s agenda and the rest of the manifesto did very little to address the concerns of the ‘Just About Managing’ voters May had promised to devote her premiership to (Atkins & Gaffney, 2020, 303; Bale & Webb, 2018: 51). As John-Paul Salter explains in his contribution to this volume, public reaction to the manifesto and to a presidential electoral campaign that did not suit May’s style led to a disastrous result for the party. At this election, the Conservatives won only 42.2% share of the vote and elected 317 MPs. In short, the government lost its majority and as the chapter by Catherine McGlynn and Shaun McDaid shows, the Prime Minister was forced to seek the support of the DUP to govern. These disappointing electoral results had a severe impact on May’s agenda. She simply had no mandate and no parliamentary or cabinet support to deliver her fairness agenda. The Prime Minister was under pressure from some backbenchers and Cabinet colleagues to deliver a hard Brexit. She was also forced to sack her most trusted advisors Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill. The Prime Minister’s institutional weakness (Worthy & Bennister, 2020) were visible in May’s speech to the 2017 Conservative Party conference where May tried to reach out to the right of the party. A sign of that was the lavish praise for free markets, which had been absent in earlier speeches and the scant references to her One Nation agenda. On industrial policy, she mentioned new government investment in R&D and plans to invest in housing, a cap on energy bills, but there were no references to her plan to put workers on company boards and the language on fairness disappeared (May, 2017b). May’s institutional weakness was also detectable in the 2017 Queen’s Speech which had no transformational proposals. Likewise, the white paper on corporate governance published in August of 2017 amounted to a wish list of recommendations whereby companies would simply be ‘encouraged’ to incorporate ‘workers voices’ on company boards. The

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shift from workers’ representation to mere ‘workers voices’ signalled the dilution of May’s agenda. The publication of the government’s white paper on industrial strategy in November of 2017 signalled more backtracking from the Prime Minister. In its foreword, May claimed that the document epitomised her ‘belief in a strong and strategic state that intervenes decisively wherever it can make a difference’ (HM Government, 2017b: p. 4), however there was no articulated defence of a new and more comprehensive role for the state in the economy (HM Government, 2017b; see also BEIS, 2017b). Similarly, the government white paper on corporate governance reform (BEIS, 2017a) fell short of what May had proposed. May’s plans to tackle excessive corporate pay were watered down (BEIS, 2017a: 32– 34). Regarding workers on company boards, the proposals represented a new dilution of the initial proposals to introduce workers on company boards. The proposals to include ‘workers voices’ on company boards was reduced to a menu of voluntary options to ‘engage the workforce’ and give them voice. In concrete terms, this meant that, companies would be required to have a non-executive director on its board to represent employees or create an employee advisory council (BEIS, 2017a), but there were no guidelines about the criteria used to appoint these representatives. To make matters worse, in the week before the White paper was launched May threatened the EU with a race to the bottom in terms of tax and regulation (Silverwood & Woodward, 2018: 638), which questioned the Prime Minister’s commitment to workers’ rights. Predictably, the government’s proposals were attacked by the trade unions who accused her of going back on her promises. Similarly, the media reactions interpreted the dilution of the proposals as a sign of the government’s relenting to the pressure from the CBI (Elliott, 2018). The final iteration of May’s industrial strategy was the publication in December of 2018 of the document Forging Our Future: Industrial Strategy—The Story So Far, which summarised the progress of the government’s industrial strategy. In the foreword, the Prime Minister claimed the government’s approach was about ‘investing in science and innovation’, ‘nurturing the talent of tomorrow’ and ‘transforming the places where people live and work, by supporting businesses and building infrastructure’ (HM Government, 2018: 3). Tellingly, May did not present the policy as heralding a new approach to the state or the defence of workers’ rights. In his foreword, the Business Secretary Greg Clark was

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somewhat more detailed in his explanation and claimed that the government’s new industrial strategy was ‘a new way of working for government, working across departments to build long-term partnerships with business, academia, and local leaders—from mission-focused policy-making to our newly-established Industrial Strategy Council’, which in the meantime was disbanded in 2021. References to workers representatives were notoriously absent from this explanation while the aspirations were broad and vague. When she finally announced her resignation in March of 2019, following her failure to get her Brexit deal approved by Parliament, May decided to devote her last four months in office to some of her pet projects, however Philip Hammond was not keen to fund any of them (Seldon, 2019: 370). Consequently, the policy successes May announced at the end of her premiership were a far-cry from the ambitions she announced when she entered Downing Street.

Explaining May’s Failed One Nation Statecraft Political actors face institutional, structural and contextual constraints all the time. The test of leadership lies in navigating them with some control. But Theresa May was particularly unlucky as she faced considerable, if not extraordinary contextual and structural constraints (Byrne et al., 2021: 703) that partly explain her failure to deliver her One Nation agenda. She governed at an unparallel difficult period in British politics. The task of withdrawing from the EU absorbed all oxygen from Westminster and Whitehall (Burton-Cartledge, 2022: 224). The negotiations with her party and with the EU absorbed most of the administrative resources and attention of the government for at least a parliamentary term. As MarlowStevens and Hayton put it, her aspiration to address the burning injustices afflicting the nation ‘was completely overshadowed by the pursuit of Brexit’ (2021: 871; see also Byrne et al., 2021: 706). It did not help that adopting an active industrial strategy was a particularly difficult agenda to pursue. As explained earlier, this is an agenda that goes against the grain of the British model of capitalism since the post-war period. Neither Labour or Conservative governments have pursued active industrial strategies, nor have trade unions and least of all the business community supported such an approach. To deliver such a transformative agenda required a determination, focus and institutional strength that May did not possess.

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May’s inability to deliver on her One Nation agenda was further complicated by two variables, namely the absence of support from key actors and the limitations of her governing style. Historical institutionalism shows that the enaction of policy ideas, especially of transformative or third-order change ideas, is reliant on several factors namely the support that the idea attracts from ‘relevant’ institutional actors (Goes, 2021; Hall, 1989; Parsons, 2007). As it was shown in the previous paragraphs, Prime Minister May faced considerable institutional, structural and contextual constraints to her ability to enact her personal agenda. Though, she started her premiership from a position of strength, from the onset she faced considerable obstacles. As Ben Worthy explained, as a takeover prime minister May faced ‘greater obstacles and fewer advantages’ than elected Prime Ministers (2016: 515–516). She tried to overcome this shortcoming by calling an early election for June of 2017, but that decision proved to be disastrous. The Conservative Party lost its majority in the House of Commons and the government had to rely on the support of the DUP to get key legislative pieces approved. May’s difficulties were exacerbated by the reticence of her cabinet colleagues to support her agenda and by the dysfunctional relationships, she developed with key cabinet colleagues and namely with the Chancellor Philip Hammond (Garnett, 2021:122). As explained earlier in the chapter, Hammond did not support May’s attempt to introduce an industrial strategy along One Nation lines. Hammond was identified by a variety of observers and insiders as the biggest stumbling block to reform. For example, in his memoir, May’s former chief of staff Gavin Barwell wrote that Philip Hammond’s fixation on eliminating the deficit ‘made getting agreement for even relatively modest spending programmes a slow and painful process’ (2021: 44). According to Barwell, the Chancellor objected to the strengthening of the Department for Business and to the idea of delegating to this department the responsibility of leading the government’s industrial strategy. In fact, ‘it was “a struggle” to get him to even say the words “industrial strategy” (…) and he dismissed May’s fairness agenda on the grounds that there were no burning injustices in Britain today’ (Barwell, 2021: 137). Without the support of a Chancellor, it becomes nearly impossible for any Prime Minister to enact their agenda. The task was rendered even more difficult by the fact that May did not have many allies in government. As explained earlier, the Business Secretary Greg Clark, who was

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tasked with the responsibility of delivering May’s agenda, did not think an industrial strategy was compatible with conservatism. And the business community was vocally opposed to such agenda. In short, May never had the institutional backing she needed to enact her One Nation industrial strategy. But May was also a victim of her own shortcomings as leader. Firstly, she miscalculated the mood of her party. Secondly, her centralising governing style did not reflect her own institutional weaknesses as a takeover Prime Minister at a transformative moment in the country’s history. Thirdly, she did not possess the relational attributes required to lead a government; she was not collegial and did not invest in building relationships with her Cabinet colleagues or with backbench MPs (Seldon, 2019: 187). In truth, in the first two years of May’s term her two main advisors Fiona Hill and Nick Timothy antagonised several Cabinet ministers, especially the Chancellor (Barwell, 2021: 29). These shortcomings limited May’s ability to establish a political argument hegemony within the government, the Conservative Party or the country. Moreover, she lacked the drive to fight the resistance against her agenda. Within six months of her premiership, May’s advisors felt she ‘did not have the stomach for fiscal changes and radical reform’ (Seldon, 2019: 186). According to Nick Timothy, ‘when Hammond and others objected to her policies, she watered them down or gave up on them altogether’ (2020: 8). In short, she seemed to have prioritised party management over argument hegemony, in effect ceding the task of constructing the narrative of her premiership to her cabinet colleagues and to the Brexiteers sitting in the backbenches (Marlow-Stevens & Hayton, 2021, 871). May’s reluctance to persevere with her agenda was the final blow to her industrial strategy. Only a determined, ruthless and institutionally strong prime minister could overcome the historical legacy of institutional and structural resistance to an active industrial policy. In short, her premiership failed to meet all the criteria for successful statecraft. She did not manage party relations well and failed to unite her party. Crucially in 2017, she failed to develop a winning electoral formula. Failure in three aspects of statecraft had a knock-on effect on demonstrating competence and achieving argument hegemony. Her EU withdrawal agreement was defeated three times in the House of Commons and her industrial strategy was opposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other key cabinet ministers and resisted by the business community. May also lacked the zeal and determination to persevere with

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her agenda and lacked the relational skills that would have enabled her to persuade her government colleagues and party of the necessity—political and electoral—of her One Nation agenda. Consequently, the reforms she introduced were modest in scope and represented a continuity with the policies of her predecessor. In no way did her industrial strategy represent the heralding of a new vision of the role of the state as a promoter of opportunity and fairness or the beginning of a new relationship between workers and employers which would address society’s ‘burning injustices’. Acknowledgements I am grateful for the comments I received on earlier drafts of this chapter by Andrew Roe-Crines, Simon Lee and other participants at the ‘Symposium on Statecraft: The Leadership of Theresa May’ and which took place at the University of Liverpool, 16.09.2022. I am particularly indebted to the detailed, generous comments and suggestions by Patrick Diamond made on an earlier draft. All mistakes are my own.

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CHAPTER 14

Theresa May as a Political Leader Kevin Theakston

Introduction Theresa May will never be remembered as a brilliant prime minister but it is striking just how bad a one she is seen as when it comes to rating and ranking British prime ministers in terms of their success or failure in Number 10 Downing Street. She was rated as one of the worst two post-war prime ministers in a 2021 survey of UK university academics specialising in British politics and contemporary British history (Theakston & Gill, 2021). May was down at the bottom of the prime-ministerial ‘league table’ alongside Anthony Eden, whose short premiership was destroyed by the Suez crisis. Like his, her premiership seems destined to be remembered for just one word (‘Suez’/‘Brexit’), though the political crisis that engulfed her government, party and country over 2016–2019 eclipsed that of 1956 (Blitz, 2019). Even Alec Douglas-Home, prime minister for only a year before he was evicted from office in the 1964 general election, was given a higher rating than Mrs May. Assessing the ‘best’ and the ‘worst’ prime ministers is always a matter of judgement, raising difficult issues of criteria, comparison and context, and

K. Theakston (B) University of Leeds, Leeds, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_14

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sometimes dismissed as a just a parlour game (Theakston, 2013). It is true that there can be no completely objective or ‘scientific’ methodology for rating prime ministers and ranking their performance and achievements. Nevertheless, in the latest in a series of similar surveys going back to 2004 (Theakston, 2016; Theakston & Gill, 2006, 2011), academic respondents were asked to rate the performance of each prime minister during their tenure in Number 10 on a scale of 0–10, with 10 representing the top score of ‘highly successful’ and zero representing ‘highly unsuccessful’ (see Table 14.1). The ratings, covering prime ministers over a period of more than 70 years, gave a sharp perspective on Theresa May’s failure. As in the previous surveys, Labour’s Clement Attlee was rated as the most successful post-war prime minister, with a mean rating of 8.3. Margaret Thatcher, in second place, received a score of 7.8, just ahead of Tony Blair, who received 7.7. (It should be noted that Winston Churchill’s 5.1 rating, placing him mid-table, was based on an evaluation of his 1950s administration only. However, Churchill was given a 7.9 rating, and came out in second place overall, in the 2004 survey that covered the full sweep of twentieth-century prime ministers and therefore also included his wartime premiership.) Also replicating the previous run of survey Table 14.1 The league table of post-war prime ministers Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7= 7= 7= 10 11 12 13= 13=

Mean score 8.3 7.8 7.7 6.5 6.1 5.5 5.1 5.1 5.1 4.6 3.6 3.5 2.3 2.3

(Base: 93 academics, June 2021)

Prime Minister Clement Attlee (Labour: 1945–1951) Margaret Thatcher (Conservative: 1979–1990) Tony Blair (Labour: 1997–2007) Harold Wilson (Labour: 1964–1970 and 1974–1976) Harold Macmillan (Conservative: 1957–1963) Gordon Brown (Labour: 2007–2010) John Major (Conservative: 1990–1997) Winston Churchill (Conservative: 1951–1955) James Callaghan (Labour: 1976–1979) Edward Heath (Conservative: 1970–1974) David Cameron (Conservative: 2010–2016) Alec Douglas-Home (Conservative: 1963–1964) Anthony Eden (Conservative: 1955–1957) Theresa May (Conservative: 2016–2019)

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results, Anthony Eden at 2.3 and Alec Douglas-Home at 3.5 featured in the bottom rungs of the prime-ministerial league table—but were now joined by Theresa May with her dismal 2.3 rating. More than a third of academics (37%) rated May’s performance as either 0 or 1 out of 10; and only one academic in the survey was prepared to rate her premiership higher than 6 out of 10. Theresa May’s successor, Boris Johnson, was seen as doing better than her, being given a score of 3.5 by the academics, as a provisional rating based on his first two years in office (2019–2021). The results of the survey confirm the notion that ‘takeover’ prime ministers—those who first enter Number 10 following the resignation of their predecessor and an internal party leadership process, rather than by winning a general election victory and becoming PM after being leader of the opposition—have, on average, less time in office, less successful tenures, and are generally rated as worse-performing (Worthy, 2016). Of the group of 14 prime ministers up to and including Theresa May, eight were ‘takeover’ leaders, while six won general elections to become prime minister. The average rating for the first group was 4.37 compared to 5.25 for the second group. May’s relatively short tenure in Downing Street also virtually guaranteed a low rating. A record of multiple general election victories and a cumulative period of at least six years in office seems to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for having an impact, leaving a policy legacy, and being rated as a successful prime minister. Thus the top four ranked prime ministers, between them, won 12 of the 20 general elections held between 1945 and 2017 and clocked up 35 years in Number 10, while the bottom three in the league table managed only two general election victories between them (where Eden, who increased his parliamentary majority, in 1955 did better than May managed in 2017) and a total of only six years in office. Digging below the overall performance ratings, Theresa May also fared badly when survey respondents were asked to give their views on the impact each prime minister from Margaret Thatcher onwards had on British society, the economy, foreign policy, democracy and the constitution, and on their own party (see Table 14.2). Each leader was given a net score across these issues—the percentage of academics rating them positively minus those who rated them negatively. David Cameron and Theresa May are the only two of these prime ministers to be rated negatively, on balance, across all five areas. Mrs May scored particularly badly in terms of her perceived impact on Britain’s foreign policy and role in the

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world (−78), on her own party (−78) and on British democracy and the constitution (−72)—under all three of those headings getting the worst net scores of any prime minister in the last four decades. The other four prime ministers received more mixed ratings—sometimes seen as overall positive on one or more aspects of policy, but negative on others. Mrs Thatcher, for example, had the most negative rating of all six prime ministers for her impact on British society, but was rated most positively for her impact on Britain’s role in the world. It should be acknowledged that surveys like this one can reveal as much about the professors, as it were, as about the prime ministers. The sample was heavily Labour supporting. Fully 60% of those academics expressing a party preference said they would vote Labour in a general election, compared with 13% who would vote Conservative, 13% who would vote Liberal Democrat and 11% who would vote Green. This was also a cohort that was heavily Remain in the 2016 European Referendum: 86% said they voted Remain compared to only 14% voting Leave (among those answering). The extent to which these partisan factors, and particularly views on Brexit, influenced the ratings for David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson is open to debate, though equally this group of academics also rated Margaret Thatcher as one of the post-war greats. Table 14.2 Impact of prime ministers on policy Q) To what extent do you think each prime minister had a positive or negative impact on… Net score shown: positive impact minus negative impact

Margaret Thatcher John Major Tony Blair Gordon Brown David Cameron Theresa May

British society

British economy

Foreign policy/Britain’s role in the world

Their own British political democracy/ party constitution

−67

+6

+36

+26

−48

−17

−13

+14

−56

−17

+64 +27

+70 +51

−17 +29

+29 −27

+30 +9

−48

−55

−59

−43

−62

−38

−47

−78

−78

−72

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There seems to be little to no bias in ratings of prime ministers in terms of the gender of the academics, however, with little difference in how male and female survey respondents assessed both Thatcher and May. Thatcher’s average rating was marginally higher among men (0.2 points) and May’s slightly higher among women (1.1 points). But given the relatively limited number of female respondents to the survey (only 10%), it is difficult to ascribe much statistical significance to these small differences. To set against and help contextualise these academic ratings, it must be said that the general public also put Theresa May at the bottom of the prime-ministerial league table. In an Ipsos MORI poll of 1,124 adults in February 2021, asking whether prime ministers since 1945 had done a ‘good job’ or a ‘bad job’, David Cameron and Theresa May occupied the bottom two (13th and 14th place) slots in the league table with net scores (‘good’ minus ‘bad’ ratings) of −17 and −23 respectively, with Churchill (+55), Attlee (+16) and Wilson (+16) rated by the public as the top three prime ministers (Ipsos MORI, 2021). Labour voters in that poll put her unequivocally in last place in the league table, with a net score of −47, but even Conservative voters in the sample placed her no higher than joint 11th place with a net score of −8 (Conservatives rating both Blair and Brown as worse prime ministers than her). And in a separate exercise, the broadcaster Iain Dale asked the 55 authors (a mix of academics, journalists and politicians) of the essays in his book on all British prime ministers from Robert Walpole to Boris Johnson (Dale, 2020a) to give marks to the PMs they had written about, to feed into a historical league table covering all the PMs over the last 300 years. In line with the academic survey, Alec Douglas-Home was ranked in 48th place overall in Dale’s list (equivalent to 12th among the post-war prime ministers up to 2019), while Theresa May was in 50th place overall (13th among the post-war PMs) and Eden in 51st place (14th among the post-war PMs). Even such notorious historical ‘duds’ and prime-ministerial failures as Lord North and Neville Chamberlain got higher places than May in the Dale rankings (Dale, 2020b). Future academic historians and political scientists, as well as the general public, might come to a different verdict but opinion on rating Theresa May’s premiership is, for now, pretty damning. To understand why May is down at the bottom end of the prime-ministerial ‘league table’, the argument of this chapter is that we need to analyse the relationship between the circumstances in which she advanced to the leadership of her party and the government, what she was trying to achieve and the aims she was

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pursuing, her political skills and leadership style, and the context and situation she faced. Theresa May was herself ultimately not up to the job, but she was also dealt a near-impossible hand and, overwhelmed by events, there was much beyond her control.

Party Leadership Comparative political science research suggests that across a range of different countries, women are more likely to be selected as party leaders in conditions of political crisis, and when challenging circumstances make the post least attractive and successful tenure most uncertain (Beckwith, 2015). This is sometimes called the ‘glass cliff’ phenomenon. Margaret Thatcher’s emergence as Conservative opposition leader in 1975, after the failures of the Heath government and the loss of two general elections in a year (Roe-Crines & Heppell, 2021), fits that picture, as does Theresa May’s sudden and dramatic elevation to the Conservative leadership and the premiership in 2016, in the aftermath of David Cameron’s resignation following his defeat in the EU referendum. In terms of age (59), and service in parliament (19 years) and in the Cabinet (6 years), Theresa May also conformed to the pattern that new leaders selected by parties in government tend to be older, more senior and more experienced in office than those breaking-through in opposition. By way of contrast, David Cameron had become Conservative leader aged just 39 in 2005—at which age May was not yet even an MP—and he had become an ex-prime minister at the age of 49, at which age she was still only an opposition frontbencher who had never yet served in government. First elected in 1997, when she was one of only 13 female Conservative MPs, May’s route to Number 10 involved a long slog through a series of middle-ranking shadow Cabinet posts in opposition—including a stint as the first woman to be Conservative Party chairman, when her brutally frank remarks about the Tories being seen as ‘the nasty party’ identified her as a moderniser but did her no favours with her colleagues. Ambitious, competent, the proverbial ‘safe pair of hands’ and hardworking, she was never part of the Tory leadership inner circle under Michael Howard (2003–2005) or David Cameron (after 2005). But she got a lucky break in 2010 when—putting together the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition—it became important and necessary to have a woman in one of the top jobs, and May thus unexpectedly became Home Secretary. She held that post—one of the

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most difficult and toughest in government, and often a poisoned chalice for its holder’s career-hopes—for six years, showing a steely determination, taking a hard line on issues such as immigration, security and the need for police reforms, and often clashing bitterly with other ministers (in both the coalition parties). If not much liked, she earned grudging respect as ‘a bloody difficult woman’, to use Ken Clarke’s words—a label that helped rather than hindered her in the 2016 leadership election. May had more senior ministerial experience than Thatcher (with four years as Education Secretary) had when she became Conservative leader. Her long stint as Home Secretary helped her project an image of experience, competence and security that paid off in 2016. Later as prime minister she performed strongly on security issues, such as terrorism and handling the Salisbury poisoning attack by Russian agents. But she had survived at the Home Office by being ‘controlling, careful and uncollegiate’, and the strengths and qualities she developed there turned into a weakness—even a liability—later in Number 10 (Stern, 2019; Sylvester, 2020: 495). Moreover May’s apprenticeship was narrow in another sense (and a contrast to Thatcher’s in this respect). She was the first prime minister for half a century with no experience as either Leader of the Opposition or Chancellor of the Exchequer—roles requiring high-level performative skills and a grasp of the interconnections of policy and politics across the board. This background perhaps concealed her limitations and made the step up to the multifaceted leadership challenges of the top job even harder for her (Rawnsley, 2019; Seldon & Newell, 2020). The 2016 Conservative Party leadership contest has been described as ‘a chaotic bloodbath of recrimination, backbiting and betrayal’ (Prince, 2017: 331). One Tory MP said it was like ‘student politics’—‘I want a grown-up’ was how he explained his backing for May (Prince, 2017: 341). She benefitted from the bungling antics of, and the divisions and feuding among, her opponents, including Boris Johnson’s withdrawal from the race after being denounced by his erstwhile campaign manager Michael Gove, and the splitting of the ‘Leave’-supporting Brexiteers between socially liberal backers of Gove and socially conservative supporters of Andrea Leadsom. After two ballots of Conservative parliamentarians, May had the support of 60.5% of her party’s MPs—a stronger mandate than that won by any of her predecessors since the introduction of elections for the leadership in 1965, and a bigger parliamentarians’ vote than Johnson later got in 2019, with Leadsom trailing her in second place among MPs, with only 25.5%. Surveys of the wider rank-and-file party

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membership (two-thirds of whom were ardent Brexiteers) suggested May was favoured over Leadsom by 63 to 31%, but the latter’s withdrawal meant there was no grassroots ballot, and May was crowned leader as ‘the last woman standing’ (Jeffery et al., 2018; Quinn, 2019). May clearly trumped Leadsom on competence and ministerial experience by a huge margin; tellingly, over 80% of ministers were estimated to have voted for her, and most of the Tory whips’ office reportedly worked on her campaign. As one minister put it, her appeal was as ‘a serious woman for serious times’ (Duncan, 2021: 49). But also vital was the way in which she seemed best placed to unite the party. She had been a ‘Remainer’ but presented herself as an unenthusiastic and reluctant one, and played hardly any part in the EU referendum campaign. Her ‘Brexit means Brexit’ slogan signalled she accepted the result and could be trusted to deliver it. That helped win her significant support across the party her rivals lacked. While 56% of Tory MPs had supported ‘Remain’ in the referendum, 42% backed ‘Leave’—and May was backed by nine out of ten of the ‘Remainers’ and by over a third of ‘Leavers’. The truncated leadership election meant that the party and country were spared a two-month campaign season that may have prolonged the political instability after the shock of the referendum result. Although Johnson had been polling ahead of May among Conservative Party members in February 2016, he was behind her in June (Quinn, 2019)— but if there had been a full-blown leadership contest between the two to woo the rank-and-file over the summer of 2016, it is almost certain that he would in the end have won (Seldon & Newell, 2020: 649). But as things worked out May was not ‘road-tested’ out on the hustings as a campaigner and communicator—when her weaknesses in those respects would have been exposed—and was also not really required to spell out what she stood for, her political philosophy and policies or to elaborate in detail on what Brexit might mean in practice, and the problems, choices and trade-offs involved. She had not won an intellectual argument or a policy argument with the party and the mass membership that might have strengthened her authority in government and given her a clearer mandate to lead (Barwell, 2020; Ross & McTague, 2017: 53). She had no real time to work up a proper agenda and strategy for government. Her limitations and the drawbacks of this lack of policy definition and articulation were to become apparent only later.

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Ideology and Aims ‘There is no “Mayism”’, Theresa May herself once said (Prince, 2017: 390). She has in fact been described as a politician with strong views rather than a strong ideology, and as someone more driven by a moral compass than operating within an ideological framework (Spencer, 2017). ‘There’s no interest in ideas’, commented a Conservative who worked for her (Shipman, 2017: xxvi), but she is hardly unusual among the long run of British prime ministers—who have largely been pragmatists rather than strong ideologists—in that respect. May talked about the impact of her Christian upbringing and faith, and like a number of other recent prime ministers (Thatcher, Blair, Brown and to a lesser extent Cameron), her religious views—deep-rooted but understated and not flaunted—seem to have helped frame or inform her general thinking and approach, and underpin the very strong sense of public service and duty that was widely commented on (Crines et al., 2016; Crines & Theakston, 2015; Spencer, 2017). She believed strongly that politics is not a game, it is a serious business—a point she would make to emphasise the difference between her sort of politics and that of the likes of Cameron, Osborne and Johnson, which she considered unserious, shallow and gimmicky. But she was not well equipped to provide a strong sense of purpose or a new defining vision for her party and government. In trying to ‘place’ her within the Conservative Party, William Hague viewed her as coming from the moderate wing, not the anti-EU right, and believed she backed Ken Clarke in the 1997 leadership election (Prince, 2017: 83). She once said ‘there is more to life than individualism and self-interest’, distancing herself from Thatcherite ultras by suggesting that the Tories lost office to New Labour in the 1990s because people felt they were promoting the individual too much at the expense of the wider community or society as a whole (Prince, 2017: 374; Spencer, 2017: 312– 313). But although a so-called ‘moderniser’, May seemed to the right of Cameron not least because she was more of a social conservative than a metropolitan liberal on the social-cultural values and issues divide. Launching her leadership campaign, she spoke of a ‘different kind of Conservatism’, and a key influence on her here seems to have been her aide and adviser Nick Timothy, a devotee of the late nineteenth-/ early twentieth-century politician and social reformer Joseph Chamberlain. In this vein, May talked about ‘the good that government can do’, the need for the state to step in when markets were not functioning as

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they should, and the scope for ‘a new industrial strategy’, a substantial house-building programme and an end to corporate excess. The idea was to broaden the party’s appeal across class and geographical divides to ‘the just about managing’, tackling unfairness and injustices, making Britain a ‘country that works for everyone’, and putting the Conservatives back in touch with ‘ordinary working people’ rather than—in a swipe at the Cameroons—just the ‘rich and the privileged’ (Espiet-Kilty, 2018; Prince, 2017: xiii, 184, 238; Seldon & Newell, 2020: 45–46; Shipman, 2017: 17). All this meant that some described May’s approach as a combination of ‘reforming capitalism’ with a ‘populist agenda pitched on the side of working families’ (Worthy, 2017); others described it as ‘blue-collar Toryism’ designed to appeal to communities that felt left behind and might have once voted Labour but had recently been attracted by UKIP and had voted ‘leave’ (Hayton, 2017). Certainly, under May the Conservative Party produced in 2017 its most ‘left-wing’ general election manifesto since 1964 (Allen & Bara, 2019). In the context of an ongoing electoral and party realignment, driven by major economic, social, class and cultural changes (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020), May’s attempt to open up questions about the distributive effects of neoliberalism could be interpreted as an effort to build (or re-build) a Conservative electoral coalition that incorporated small ‘c’-conservative working-class voters (a strategy successfully carried further by Boris Johnson in 2019). However the danger was that the ‘burning injustices’ agenda could cede ground to Labour, who polls suggested were believed to be more convincing and trusted to ‘deliver’ on social problems and issues. In any case the follow-through in terms of practical policies and programmes seems to have been limited and stuttering, and actions did not live up to words—partly because of internal ministerial differences and resource constraints, partly because of the loss of May’s momentum and authority after the 2017 election, and partly because dealing with Brexit absorbed so much attention and energy, leaving little ‘bandwidth’ in government and the civil service for anything else. The promises of an ‘end to austerity’ (in May’s 2018 conference speech and the 2019 budget) marked a recognition that the Conservatives needed to have a positive strategy for a future general election and that the government was about more than delivering (and feuding about) Brexit. But there were obvious risks, after a decade of restraint and cuts, with pent-up expectations, and with the public finances and the state of the economy so dependent on what sort

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of Brexit deal could be reached, not to speak of the danger of always being out-promised by the left populism of the Corbynite Labour opposition. In the end, May ran out of road before she could make any progress with a broader agenda. It is likely that she will be historically defined and remembered primarily—perhaps even exclusively—in terms of Brexit rather than for other policy ideas and achievements or for ‘remaking’ Conservatism.

Political Style and Skills May was widely described as a third-rate communicator and a mediocre media performer. Steve Richards (2019: 352–353) says that more than a failure to communicate, May’s indifference to communication or the ‘teaching’ function of a political leader was a fatal flaw. Her job, as she saw it, was getting decisions right and making policy, not talking to the media and communicating what the government was doing (Barwell, 2021: 176–177). But her House of Commons performances were described by one Labour opponent, Yvette Cooper, as ‘steady and serious. She is authoritative in parliament—superficial attacks on her bounce off’ (Cooper, 2016). With the media and the public presentation side of politics, however, and in front of the television cameras or audiences of ordinary people, she was rightly called ‘unremarkable, wooden, frankly boring’ (Sparrow, 2018). Her style was defensive and remote: she was reluctant to give interviews, answer questions or open up, and was apparently not good at thinking on her feet. Her stilted, scripted, emotionless and robotic manner led to her being described as the ‘Maybot’. Putting her at the centre of an exceptionally personalised or presidential-style general election campaign in 2017 was clearly a huge and costly mistake by the Conservatives. And in national terms, the challenges of Brexit were not made any easier to deal with by the presence in Number 10 of someone so poorly equipped for, and shrinking from, the difficult job of engaging, educating, connecting with and persuading the public, and shaping a narrative about where Britain was headed—though admittedly these tasks would have been difficult enough for a leader with better communication skills. As an incoming prime minister in 2016, May acted decisively (even brutally) to reshape the government—more so than most of her predecessors among the post-war mid-term successor prime ministers (Allen, 2017). Her authority to put her own stamp on the Cabinet was probably stronger than Thatcher’s had been when she first entered office

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in 1979. Six of Cameron’s Cabinet ministers were demoted and seven sacked; there were eleven new faces round the Cabinet table. May paid-off some personal scores and grudges by immediately firing George Osborne and Michael Gove. Only a quarter of the new Cabinet were ‘Leavers’ but they occupied three key posts—Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary, David Davis at the newly created Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) and Liam Fox heading the new Department for International Trade. These changes underlined May’s commitment to Brexit and also tied-in Brexiteers who now had to ‘own’ the result they had fought for and take responsibility for implementing it (something they ran from in the event). They were perhaps more political gestures to the party and to the Brexiteers than sensible or well thought-out machinery of government changes, however, and the relationship between DExEU, Number 10, the Foreign Office and other departments did not work smoothly. Another political motive perhaps was that Johnson was mistrusted and seen as a threat, and so part of the plan was to appoint him to a role where he could to some extent be sidelined, reveal his shortcomings and discredit himself—as indeed he did, working to undermine her at every turn before resigning in 2018, along with Davis, after a split over the developing plans for a Brexit deal. She then soon lost her second Brexit minister, Dominic Raab, and in fact the May government saw an unprecedented and disruptive number of ministerial resignations on policy/political grounds, compared to other governments over the previous 40 years. Unlike, for instance, David Cameron with George Osborne and William Hague, May did not have very senior and heavy-weight lieutenants working closely with her, and supporting and sustaining her in government (Barwell, 2021: 419), though Damian Green and then David Liddington did useful behind-the-scenes coordinating work on domestic policy as de facto deputy PMs based in the Cabinet Office. Complicating and complicated by the need to balance and manage the Cabinet over Brexit was the difficult relationship between May and her Chancellor, Philip Hammond. Poor in personal terms and with differences over policy (Hammond was a cautious and economically dry Thatcherite), this was one of the most difficult and occasionally even counter-productive prime minister/chancellor relationships for decades. Sources close to the chancellor dismissed the prime minister as ‘economically innumerate’ (Duncan, 2021: 162), while there was speculation that May would sack

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him after her anticipated general election triumph—but instead he had to be kept on and his position was strengthened. With May’s personal political capital massively depleted after the 2017 general election, she had to bring back Michael Gove, then she botched a reshuffle in January 2018 when she could not move any of the ‘big beasts’ and some other ministers refused to switch jobs. Had the senior figures in the Cabinet all rallied around one candidate, they could have forced her out after the general election debacle. But there was no consensus about a successor, and tension and rivalries among possible opposing contenders (Gauke, 2020). In the event, there were many and growing signs in an increasingly deeply divided Cabinet after 2017, and in an endemically ‘leaky’ atmosphere, that government ministers were more able and willing to assert themselves over policy and decision-making, at many times showing open insubordination and ill-discipline, little loyalty to the PM, paying scant regard to the convention of collective Cabinet responsibility, and clearly manoeuvring for position in a future leadership race. Also among the victims of the general election were Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill, who had been the powerful joint-chiefs of staff in Number 10. They had worked closely with her in the Home Office, moulded her for and helped propel her to Number 10, and provided ideas and strategies that she often seemed unwilling or unable to provide herself. In Downing Street 2016–2017, they operated a highly centralised, domineering, dictatorial and top-down regime, marked by abrasive, aggressive, mistrustful and bullying attitudes and actions towards others (whether ministers, civil servants or other advisers) (Seldon & Newell, 2020; Shipman, 2017). It was a toxic and destructive environment, likened by some to a ‘reign of terror’ or a bunker mentality. The political and policy consequences were bad. Decision-making was slowed down, as everything had to go through the two ‘chiefs’. Other viewpoints—including unwelcome official advice—were shut out. Ministers became resentful. There was minimal consultation with her Cabinet over the development of Brexit policy in this period—the ‘red lines’, the ‘hard’ Brexit and the triggering of Article 50 were all decided in a secretive process by a small inner group around the prime minister. Timothy, a longstanding Eurosceptic, was a powerful voice on Brexit, and he masterminded the 2017 manifesto and dreamed up the controversial and electorally damaging social care policy plan (the so-called ‘dementia tax’) that was promptly abandoned in middle of the campaign.

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It was not surprising that Cabinet ministers demanded the immediate removal of the two ‘chiefs’ after the general election. Their replacement, Gavin Barwell (a former minister and MP), operated in a more conventional, low-key and lower-profile fashion, trying to set a different tone, and he worked more on a team basis with the civil servants and other figures at the centre, aiming also to improve Number 10’s relations with MPs (Barwell, 2019, 2020, 2021). Meanwhile, at an early stage the senior civil servant Oliver Robbins (a bogeyman figure for the ‘hard’ Brexiteers) was established as the key official adviser on Brexit, initially also heading the DExEU department, but then shifting across to be based in the Cabinet Office and working directly for the prime minister. The illness and early retirement of Cabinet Secretary Jeremy Heywood (who died in 2018) removed a powerful presence at the centre of a Whitehall machine under unprecedented strain, someone who had been a key adviser, fixer and solution-finder for Blair, Brown and Cameron (Heywood, 2021). His replacement—Mark Sedwill—was more in the mould of ‘securocrat’, with a background in foreign policy before working closely with May at the Home Office and then as National Security Adviser. At the centre of it all was the rather enigmatic figure of Theresa May herself. She was someone who in one sense appeared the sensible, normal, voice of ‘Middle England’: unflashy and cautious but also safe, serious, competent, dutiful and professional. She was once neatly described as a ‘first-rate second-rank politician’ (Barnett, 2017). She was supposedly on top of the details, a tough negotiator, systematic, tenacious and conscientious, with a remarkable resilience and the ability to just keep plodding on—the ‘do your homework’ rather than the ‘essay crisis’ prime minister, to make a comparison with Cameron (Runciman, 2019: 190). Quiet, shy, gauche and reserved, a very un-extrovert and private person, something of a loner—‘unclubbable’, as the saying goes—she had very few political friends outside her inner circle. She wanted to do the right thing and decide issues on their merits, it was said, rather than being a transactional deal-making sort of politician (Prince, 2017: 118). But this was also someone who was reportedly cold, secretive and untrusting, and hard to get to know properly. ‘You can’t talk to her like a normal person’, commented one of her Cabinet ministers, Amber Rudd (Swire, 2020: 322), while another minister said May’s ‘social skills’ were ‘sub-zero’ (Duncan, 2021: 181). She had a vengeful streak, too, alienating people and making enemies more easily than allies, which did not help her when her authority drained away. She was also described

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as lacking intellectual confidence and ideas of her own, as being narrowminded and unimaginative, poor at delegating and sharing with other people. One official commented that she did not like discussions in front of her where aides debated and disagreed with each other—she wanted ‘the advice’, one viewpoint put to her (Rogers, 2020). Another criticism was that she was slow to make decisions and then stubborn, rigid, inflexible and difficult to budge, and a micro-manager, once she had decided something, someone who tried to prevail by grinding people down and wearing them out. The exasperated leader of one EU country said she was ‘devoid of the basic human skills you need to be a political leader’ (Boffey, 2019). Although EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier admired what he saw as Theresa May’s courage and determination (Barnier, 2021), at no point in the Brexit process did she successfully privately engage with any of the main European leaders. She was on occasion capable of taking bold or willful decisions—but more often she took her time, played for time and didn’t. But as with other prime ministers, her personal strengths and weaknesses were coterminous, their political significance (for good or ill) depending on context and the wider play of political forces and events (Richards, 2019).

May, Thatcher and Gender in Political Leadership Gender has to be brought into consideration as a factor in understanding May’s premiership and views of her as a political leader, as it was in relation to the first female British prime minister, but it perhaps played out in some different ways compared to the situation with Thatcher. As a pioneering female British party leader and premier in the 1970s and 1980s, Margaret Thatcher believed she could do anything a man could do—only better—but scorned feminism and allowed no political space for other women. She liked to say it was more important that she was the first prime minister with a science degree than the first woman in that office. Nevertheless, her political colleagues and ministers were well aware of what Douglas Hurd (1993) called ‘the extraordinary combination of masculine and feminine qualities which gave [her] such a unique armoury’. Doubtless, much is explained by the fact that she had had to make her way, against the odds, in a very different era, in a maledominated profession and in a traditionally chauvinistic party, and shut out from the clubbable world of the Tory grandees who dismissed her as

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‘that woman’. If she failed, she recognised, ‘no chums would save her’ (Moore, 2019: 856). But what was once described as her adept ‘sexual style flexing’ allowed Thatcher to make calculated use of her gender as a political weapon, as circumstances demanded or suited (Genovese, 1993: 203–207; Young, 1990: 303–312). Thus, on one level Thatcher was often seen as the ‘honorary man’ (‘the best man among them’ it was sometimes said of her Cabinet) or even the tough, confrontational and aggressive ‘macho’ leader. One official noted how she came across in meetings as though she was ‘everyone’s mother in a bad temper’ (Moore, 2015: 4). Fitting the so-called ‘Queen Bee’ model, she had no time for the feminist movement and did little to advance other women (appointing only one other woman, for a brief period, to her Cabinet). Within her own party, and perhaps in international meetings too, she is said to have benefitted from the inability and/or unwillingness of male politicians of a certain age and class, at least at that time, to stand up to a powerful woman and argue back (that was certainly not May’s experience four decades later). They seemed equally vulnerable to what different ministers and advisers described as Thatcher’s use of ‘feminine wiles’ and ‘her feminine charm’ to get her way (Slocock, 2018). A very public relations-conscious leader, she and her advisers worked on her clothes, her hair and even her voice to mould her image and project her personality and power (Conway, 2016). From the time in Opposition onwards, they exploited a range of images of women—the housewife, the teacher/headmistress, the nanny—to carry her political message(s), revelling in the ‘Iron Lady’ gibe flung by the Soviets, and in government appealing to and exploiting British nationalism with Mrs Thatcher cast as ‘Britannia’, and being transformed into the ‘Warrior Queen’ after the Falklands War. Mrs Thatcher was undoubtedly a formidable and effective politician, not least for the remarkable way in which her gender was (or became) more of a political asset than a liability (Campbell, 2000: 408–410). In contrast to Thatcher, May had declared herself a feminist and had a record of hard work and achievement in championing women’s involvement in political life, being one of the leading figures in the ‘Women2Win’ organisation that helped women as candidates and produced a step-change in terms of Conservative female parliamentary representation after 2010. Also unlike Thatcher, May’s Cabinet included a significant proportion of women ministers—in July 2016, eight out of 27

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Cabinet ministers, including the PM herself (and nine out of 29 in 2019). Theresa May was, of course, a female prime minister in a rather different social and political context to Mrs Thatcher, with for instance 32% of all MPs being women after the 2017 election (compared to only 3% when Thatcher first entered Number 10), and with other parties also led by women, along with many more other women leaders around the world. On the negative side, there is evidence, however, that media coverage of her was more gendered than that of Thatcher, albeit in the context of a trend towards more personalised and celebritised media coverage of politics than in the 1980s (Williams, 2021). May’s Number 10 press office apparently had to field constant media questions about when she had cried (Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2020). Described initially in the press as ‘the new Iron Lady’ or ‘another Maggie’, May was always irritated by comparisons to Thatcher and insisted, ‘I do things my way’ (Wood, 2017). However, Tory critics were soon mocking her as ‘Old Ma May’ (Swire, 2020) or criticising her for not measuring up against their heroine: ‘Theresa May: You’re no Margaret Thatcher’ complained Norman Tebbit (2018) in his Daily Telegraph column. An alternative argument was that Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, was a better comparison as a non-ideological, managerial fixerleader (Parker & Warrell, 2014)—though, of course, she had powers of political survival and the ability to craft and sustain a political consensus that were beyond Theresa May. The real problem may be trying to understand one (female) leader through the prism of another. After Thatcher’s success as the first female prime minister, perhaps May can or should be categorised as simply a failed prime minister not a failed female pioneer (Maltby, 2019), and that view is reinforced by the argument that, fundamentally, her limitations and failures ‘had little to do with her sex and more with her outlook, experience and personality’ (Stern, 2019). Interviewed by former-Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, Theresa May herself seemed not to think she was treated differently in parliament because she was a woman, or that there was a strong gender dimension to her rise to power or her experience in Number 10 (Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2020). But the reference to May not having children and therefore being somehow less fit to hold office made by Andrea Leadsom in the Tory leadership race was a particularly overtly sexist judgement. And later, in 2019, when she apologised to aides for getting choked up on the steps of Number 10 while announcing her resignation, she said ‘the papers will use those pictures differently because I’m a woman’,

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suggesting that she had learned from sexist media reporting that showing emotion led to women being regarded differently to men and seen as weak (Barwell, 2021: 384). At one level the obsessive media interest in Mrs May’s shoes and clothes could be seen as rather trivialising, but in another sense it was perhaps a way in which she was able to safely display something of the personal or ‘human’ side she was otherwise uncomfortable about revealing. Equally, there was clearly something about gender and leadership going on when May could be labelled ‘an Ice Maiden’ for being no more cold, reserved and bloodless in personal style and manner than many men in political life over the years. Similarly, when she was mocked for dancing onto the stage to Abba music to give one of her party conference speeches, there were arguments she was being unfairly criticised because of her gender—a male politician parading their love of pop music would, it was claimed, be described as ‘authentic’ and cool. Gender analysts point to a sort of double bind or double standards affecting women at the top of politics. There are tensions between leadership roles and expectations and gender roles and expectations. Leadership is traditionally associated with masculinity but women who display ‘masculinist’ leadership qualities or styles are criticised as ‘unfeminine’. At the same time successful leadership is depicted as unemotional, but women are supposedly more emotional and empathetic and therefore vulnerable to being seen as either weak leaders or (if deficient in those respects) somehow flawed as a woman (Harmer & Southern, 2017: 238). However, this sort of analysis underplays the extent to which emotional intelligence and empathy are nowadays seen as vital ingredients of successful political leadership generally—something needed by men as well as by women leaders (Mattinson, 2010; Theakston, 2011). But the problem was that May ‘just cannot project empathy’, as one minister complained: ‘she is emotionally incompetent’ (Duncan, 2021: 188, 195). In that light, the criticisms of May as apparently lacking warmth and compassion (in contrast to Jeremy Corbyn) in her response to the Grenfell fire disaster in 2017 (with ‘show us you care’ headlines) arguably saw May being criticised for failings both as a leader and as a woman.

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Context Beyond the differences of personality and style that made Theresa May appear to be a much weaker leader than Margaret Thatcher, is the fact that they were prime ministers in very different contexts. No recent peacetime ‘takeover’ prime minister has faced a more challenging in-tray or a more intimidating set of circumstances and issues to handle than Theresa May. Also, few have suffered such a huge and dramatic change of fortune. Whatever the strengths and limitations of her character and approach, the changing wider political context and the constraints on her freedom of manoeuvre explain much about May’s premiership and what happened during it. Their tenures in Number 10 several decades apart, May was prime minister at a different point in ‘political time’ compared to Thatcher (Byrne et al., 2020, 2021). They faced different opportunities, challenges and constraints. Coming to power against the background of the crisis and breakdown of the post-war consensus ‘regime’ in the 1970s, Thatcher had the political space and opportunity to be a bold ‘reconstructive’ leader, opposing the old political and economic order, and constructing a new coalition around an alternative policy and governing framework. In contrast May, like Brown and Cameron before her, was an affiliate of a vulnerable and dysfunctional ‘regime’ facing many acute challenges, and as a ‘disjunctive’ leader was on the defensive and had severely limited options and room for manoeuvre. In truth, Thatcher’s success rested in part on numerous factors outside her control. North Sea oil came on tap just in time to provide a balance of payments cushion for the Thatcherite ‘economic experiment’. The bulk of the press was noisily supportive, and in a wider sense Thatcher and Thatcherism were helped also by the perception that they were going with the tide. Domestically and internationally, elite opinion moved to the right in the 1970s and 1980s, questioning the Keynesian welfare state consensus and supporting monetarism and free markets. At the partypolitical level, Labour’s civil war and lurch into unelectability, together with the Social Democratic Party breakaway and the splintering of the opposition, meant that in a first-past-the-post electoral system the Conservatives were rewarded with crushing parliamentary majorities (144 in 1983, 101 in 1987) on around 42% of the vote. All this added up to a favourable environment for a successful statecraft.

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Theresa May was in a much more difficult situation. Economically, she was more constrained than Thatcher, with the continuing effects of the prolonged period of austerity after the financial crisis, relatively low economic growth (averaging 1.5% a year 2016–2019, barely half of that achieved in the boom Thatcher years of 1981–1989), and the economic uncertainties triggered by Brexit. Politically, at first she had a narrow parliamentary majority of just 16, a position rendered more precarious still by the prospect of continuing fractious Tory divisions and dissent over Brexit. On the other hand, the collapse of the Liberal Democrats in 2015, internal Labour Party conflicts and infighting over Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, and the implosion of UKIP all eased the pressure on her. To that was added a surge in the Conservatives’ opinion poll ratings and the party’s lead over Labour, and in particular a massive personal lead for her over Corbyn in polls on who would be the best person as prime minister (and with May being more popular than her own party in the polls). Then in April 2017, she gambled everything by calling an early general election (having previously insisted she wouldn’t)—a fateful decision that almost bankrupted her in political terms. With a 20% lead in the polls, she had hoped and seemed on course for a greatly increased majority, which she wanted to bolster her position in parliament and her own party, and with the EU, as she negotiated Brexit. But the electorate refused to co-operate. Although the Conservatives’ vote increased in the June 2017 election by over 5% to 42.4% (May won a similar vote share to that achieved by Thatcher in the 1980s), they suffered a net loss of 13 seats, ending up with 317 MPs. Labour did better than expected, finishing up only 2.4% behind the Tories in vote terms (albeit still fully 55 seats behind). May was left clinging on by her fingernails in Number 10, heading a minority government, thanks to a Conservative revival in Scotland (gaining 12 more seats to add to the one already held there) and after putting together a ‘confidence and supply’ deal with the Northern Ireland MPs of the Democratic Unionist Party (allowing, in theory, a working majority of 13 on key issues). Calling an unnecessary early election turned out to have been a catastrophic misjudgement. The claims and promises of ‘strong and stable’ leadership now looked hollow, the prime minister becoming a lame duck overnight, labelled a ‘dead woman walking’ and ‘in office but not in power’. The 2017 election result inevitably set a limit on May’s premiership and on what she could achieve. It finished any hopes she might have had of redefining modern Conservatism, being a big social reforming prime

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minister leaving a domestic legacy, and repositioning her party. ‘I am the one who got us into this mess and I’m going to get us out of it’, she told her MPs: ‘I will serve as long as you want me’. But the idea of her fighting another general election campaign horrified her MPs. The ‘hard’ Brexit rebels failed to oust her in a formal vote of no confidence in her leadership in December 2018 (200 MPs voted to support her while 117 opposed her), and before the vote she was compelled to promise to stand down as leader before the next general election. The result was a pyrrhic victory, revealing the scale and depth of Conservative Party divisions but doing little to strengthen the fundamentals of her position. The diehard Brexiteers continued their opposition to the prime minister and their plotting and manoeuvring to overthrow her, with even her pledge to stand down and leave Number 10 before the next phase of the Brexit negotiations if they backed her failing to win over enough of them to get the March 2019 withdrawal deal she had negotiated with the EU through parliament. The Conservative Party became unleadable— fissiparous and bitterly faction-ridden, descending into ungovernability and seemingly intent on retoxifying itself. Tony Blair described her as ‘a pretty reasonable person surrounded by a lot of unreasonable people’ (Parker, 2018), and John Major said that the situation she faced with the Brexit fundamentalists (the hard Brexiteers of the European Research Group [ERG], acting as a party within a party) was worse than the one he endured with the Eurosceptic ‘bastards’ in the 1990s, when party infighting and disloyalty, together with governing incompetence, led to a landslide defeat and 13 years in opposition (Major, 2018). The realities of the parliamentary arithmetic also imposed their own constraints, seen starkly in the series of huge Commons votes against her planned deal in 2019, the government’s loss of control, the deadlock with no majority for any particular form of Brexit and the need to delay the UK’s date of departure from the EU. Economic realities always pointed to one sort of future arrangement, while internal Tory politics pushed in another direction. But by aligning herself with the 52% who backed ‘leave’ and taking early on a pretty ‘hard’ Brexit stance—for understandable reasons in terms of short-term internal Conservative Party politics and her perceived need to underline her own Brexit credentials—May, who was always a strongly tribalistic and dyed-in-the-wool Conservative, arguably missed an opportunity to set herself up as a unifying national leader, bringing the country together by reaching out at the start, when she was at her strongest, to the 48% that voted ‘remain’, constructing and selling

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a reasonable cross-party compromise and, as it were, trying to achieve as ‘moderate’ a Brexit as possible, based on a rational, open and honest discussion of the real trade-offs the country faced in terms of political control, trade and economic consequences, Ireland, freedom of movement, the position and interests of the EU 27 and so on (Brusenbach Meislova, 2019). When she did try to reach out to other parties in April 2019, it was too late and proved fatal for her. It was always difficult to see the talks with Jeremy Corbyn and Labour succeeding because there was by then too little trust or willingness to compromise, and Labour had little incentive to share responsibility or get the government and the Conservative Party out of a hole. There was also the problem of a probable huge Tory backlash and party split if she were to attempt to make concessions, work with Corbyn and force through an agreement with Opposition votes. In the end, with her authority shot to pieces, mounting party pressure on her and Cabinet support collapsing, she ran out of options and announced her decision to quit in late May, leaving office in July 2019.

Conclusion The central problem Theresa May always faced was the absence of a simple, easy or pain-free Brexit solution that could simultaneously be acceptable to the EU and command majority support in the Cabinet, in her party, in parliament and in the country. May’s approach often seemed to involve dithering, prevarication, obfuscation, appeasement and doubletalk—a lack of leadership. But in the circumstances she faced, it may have been a rational strategy to play for time, avoid being pinned down on specifics for as long as possible, to look for ‘transitional’ fudges and force last-minute choices. This could be defended as a sort of painful education in the reality that any deal was going to be sub-optimal—because there could be no deal that was demonstrably better than the deal Britain had as a full member of the EU—though the Brexit hardliners were uneducatable in those terms, and these methods did not alter the parliamentary arithmetic. May liked to insist that her approach was to just ‘get on with the job’ when the situation the country faced after 2016—in one of the critical moments of post-war British history—arguably demanded a leader with the ability to think more widely, imaginatively and creatively about how to use the job. But beyond the limitations of character and vision, the

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political context and pressures May faced were tremendously constraining, and the challenges huge and nationally divisive. When she left office commentators largely damned her achievements and legacy, and labelled her as one of the worst prime ministers in British history. It would be hard to dispute that May’s premiership was a failure, nor that her place at the bottom of the prime-ministerial ‘league table’ is appropriate. But it is arguable that the problems of May’s premiership may be too readily and easily written-off in terms of her personal weaknesses. As prime minister she certainly had serious shortcomings, and often made poor choices and made situations worse—but she was making decisions in conditions of unique constraint. Theresa May, to a degree not encountered by other recent prime ministers, confronted, with the challenges of Brexit and a party at war with itself, an almost impossible leadership situation in which division, disappointment, disillusionment and failure were probably inevitable.

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CHAPTER 15

Women Political Leaders Are All Feminists, Aren’t They? Theresa May and Feminism Rebecca J. Wray

Introduction There is a tendency among the media to automatically equate women leaders with gender issues and feminism, regardless of their political ideologies and policies. Upon winning the 2016 Conservative Leadership election, Theresa May became the latest woman in a position of power to have the feminist label uncritically applied to her. There is currently a lack of academic literature dissecting Theresa May’s politics specifically in relation to feminism. Instead, discourse regarding May’s relationship with feminism is dominated by journalists, activists, and campaigners. Indeed, feminist academia responses to the question of May’s feminism have been minimal, dismissive, and even derisive. For example, when Theresa May became the first British Prime Minister to self-identify as a feminist, even adorning the Fawcett Society’s ‘This is what a feminist looks like’ t-shirt in public in 2006, Bryson (2021) expressed dismay at how the media framed

R. J. Wray (B) School of Health teaching on Nutrition and Dietetics, Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_15

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May as a ‘feminist success story’, as well as anger at the appropriation of the feminist label by Theresa May, given how much harm her party’s policies have done to women. In response to the Daily Telegraph in 2016 asking “whether Theresa May was Britain’s most feminist Prime Minister ever”, Tirohl (2017a, p. 113, 2017b) expressed frustration with how May is solely compared with Margaret Thatcher and no other previous Prime Minister, completely overlooking the possibility that a male Prime Minister could be a feminist. Such anger and frustration is understandable. Indeed, it would be interesting to see in the future whether writers reflecting on former Prime Ministers such as Boris Johnson would raise the question as to whether he is a feminist or not. This chapter focuses on exploring not only Theresa May’s views and discourse on feminism, but also her voting record and policy, as well as highlighting examples of how the media portrays Theresa May.

Unequal Reporting on Women Leaders In discussing her feminism during interviews, May has stated that she never allowed being a woman to be an excuse or barrier to her success, and argues that her achievements are based on personal merit, rather than because of, or despite being a woman. May expresses frustration at the media’s fixation on her fashion choices (specifically shoes) and their insistence on defining her by her sex. May is also frustrated by the media’s negative focus in relation to reporting on women in politics, a focus on ‘lack’, rather than on success. May argues that if there was more focus on reporting success, it would encourage more women to start a career in politics (May, 2009, June 17). Perkins (2010) commented on the issue by suggesting that once the Conservatives came into power in 2010, the press would be condescending towards Theresa May, portraying her as ‘totty’ being set up to ‘fail’. This prediction was later echoed by classicist Mary Beard (2017) who contemplated that future reflections on May’s premiership would view her as “a woman who was put into—and kept in—power in order to fail” (pp. 81–82). Inevitably, May’s ascendency to Prime Minister in 2016 seemed to result in an increase (rather than decrease) in the press fixating their reports on what May is wearing rather than on her policies. For example, Kandola (2017, August 14) claims that the Daily Mail’s headline “Nevermind Brexit, who won Legs-it!” accompanied by a front page photograph of Theresa May and Nicola Sturgeon sat next to each other dressed in

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skirts is a case study in modern sexism. Critics of the Daily Mail’s headline argue that rather than focusing on what these women politicians did and said, instead the journalist chose to focus on the politicians’ bodies, clothing, and apparent ‘cat fight’ (Crockett, 2017; Kandola, 2017, August 14). Shaffi (2019) points out that such sexist media coverage serves to trivialise women politicians and similar reporting was not applied to David Cameron during his time as PM. Crockett (2017) argues that both May and Sturgeon deserve to be taken seriously as politicians, but instead are reduced down to body parts, thereby demonstrating that not even being in a position of power can protect women from sexism. Focusing on women politician’s appearance even if the attention is positive is arguably a form of silencing, as it is deflecting attention away from what politicians like May are saying (Walsh, 2015). Walsh also argues that concentrating on women politician’s appearance serves to create a ‘synthetic identity’ for these women, which in turn makes it more difficult for them to be taken seriously as politicians. Some media reactions to Theresa May’s ascendancy to Prime Minister were more positive. For example, Crosbie (2018, February 6) proposed that the UK being led by a female PM in the centenary year of women’s suffrage demonstrated how far UK society has progressed in regard to gender equality. In contrast, political scientist Victoria Honeyman (cited in Bond, 2016, July 17) contends that while the UK having a second woman PM is a step in the right direction, gender equality issues are not going to suddenly change because a woman is leading the country. This position is supported by political scientist Rosie Campbell (Tarabay, 2016, July 13) who argues that there are still gender constraints on political careers in the UK, with women in senior cabinet positions still being a rarity. Boyd (2016, July 5) was critical of claims of the rise of a ‘femocracy’ (a feminist revolution), contesting that a feminist identity cannot be claimed by someone who does not defend basic sexual and reproductive rights. Stamp (2016, July 25) describes how May was an early advocate for modernisation of the Conservative Party during their opposition years, but that despite May having liberal instincts in some areas, in others she can be more socially conservative. In an interview with Elliott (2012, January 24), May talked about how she felt pressure to prove women could succeed in senior positions in politics. When Theresa May became PM in 2016, not only did the media automatically apply the feminist label to May, but the media also tended to compare her with Margaret Thatcher for no good reason other than

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their shared gender, and as questioned by Tarabay (2016, July 13), why not compare May with a male former PM instead? Tarabay also pointed out that May herself has never compared herself to Thatcher. Historian Julie V. Gottleib (2016, July 19) describes how the media are portraying Theresa May as a direct heir to Margaret Thatcher and commonalities between the two are being drawn upon. One such commonality being drawn is references to Theresa May being “a difficult woman” (Tarabay, 2016, July 13). However, Gottleib (Bond, 2016, July 17) contends that just because both Theresa May and Margaret Thatcher are women, does not mean they are the same and that it is unhelpful to compare them. Gottleib argues this is because they are both products of their own time and place in history, and generational differences will arguably have shaped how the two women respond to feminism. Gottleib (2016, July 19) argues that attempting to trace May and Thatcher’s political ancestry on the mere basis of their common sex is misleading. Campbell (Tarabay, 2016, July 13) also contends that Theresa May is nothing like Margaret Thatcher. For example, May is a feminist and is progressive on some social issues, and unlike Thatcher, does not open up her private life to public scrutiny. Further, Honeyman (cited in Bond, 2016, July 17) expresses concern regarding the media comparing Theresa May with Margaret Thatcher, pointing out that such comparisons are not made with male politicians. Gottleib raises an interesting point that discussions around a particular woman’s political ambitions need to be separated from a discussion of their feminist ambitions and that the two should not be conflated (Bond, 2016, July 17).

From MP to Home Secretary As a new MP in 1997, Theresa May attended equality meetings, and according to Lagan (2018, February 6), women MPs from New Labour would act ‘snooty’ towards her, with May frequently being alone at these events. Theresa May was appointed Shadow Minister for Women and Equality in 1999 by William Hague, and occupied the role until 2001. May was re-appointed in the role from 2007 to 2010 by David Cameron. When the Conservatives came into power as a result of the 2010 General Election, David Cameron appointed Theresa May as Home Secretary and Minister for Women & Equalities, the latter of which May resigned from

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in 2012. May’s ministerial role for Women & Equalities was controversial at the time, with Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender [LGBT] groups criticising the appointment, and this controversy will be explored later in this chapter. During the period in which the Conservative Party were acting as the ‘opposition party’, May delivered a speech in 2005 asserting that the Conservatives will remain out of power, for as long as they are unwilling to embrace gender equality (Gill, 2019, July 15). By this point in time, New Labour had won its third General Election in a row. In response to this, growing numbers of Conservative women were arguing that the party’s neglect of gender issues, as well as its failure to select women candidates for winnable seats is not only wrong in and of itself, but also electorally disastrous for the party (Bryson, 2021; Bryson & Heppell, 2010). In delivering her ‘nasty party’ speech, May demonstrated herself to be a pragmatic politician, who was not beholden to Thatcherite ideology, but instead understood the need for the party to evolve and move away from previous party ideology and agendas (Williams, 2017). May lobbied then party leader Michael Howard to improve maternity leave in terms of pay and flexibility. May at the time fought both the ‘old guard’ of the Conservative Party and supposed party modernisers such as David Cameron to take gender issues seriously (Lagan, 2018, February 6; Gill, 2019, July 15). In 2001, May left the Carlton Club (a major Conservative donor) due to women only being allowed to join as associate members, and therefore unable to vote (Lagan, 2018, February 6). It was not until 2008 when the Carlton Club allowed women full membership, and May eventually accepted an honorary lifetime membership in 2016 (Hope, 2016, September 21). In 2000, May published a policy document called ‘Choices’ in which she set out her ideas for an initiative called ‘Women in Public Life’ which would be aimed at encouraging an increase in women being added to shortlists, as well as offering mentoring schemes. This document was later adapted by May, and in 2005 she co-founded the mentoring and pressure group Women2Win with Baroness Anne Jenkin (Bryson, 2021). Women2Win is credited with increasing the number of women Tory MPs in the early twenty-first century (Lagan, 2018, February 6). Many of the women involved with Women2Win were self-described feminists, and so Women2Win made links with feminist networks, organisations, and experts external to the Conservative Party. This enabled the group to develop ideas and an understanding of what women voters wanted,

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and the kind of changes the party could make to ensure more women were selected as candidates in winnable seats. Gill (2019, July 15) praised May for acting as a personal mentor to a generation of Conservative women, noting how May made personal efforts to meet women candidates, advising them, giving pep talks, and sending encouraging letters exhorting women to “keep going”. The philosophical foundation of Women2Win was that as women are a group that has been disadvantaged and discriminated against, women should therefore work together and support each other in order to bring about change. However, the group’s thinking was also underpinned by the notion that if women wanted to be seen as equals, then they must first be seen as individuals who compete based on merit, with no expectation for special treatment or consideration. It is this line of individualist thinking, which led May to oppose all-women shortlists being imposed in constituencies (Bryson, 2021). In 2007, May launched the ‘Women in the World Today’ report. The report found the equal pay gap was 17.1% and noted that there was still a long way to go in regard to equality in the UK. May believed the issue of continuing inequality was cultural, rather than legal, and stated that she wanted to inspire cultural change through the encouragement of girls’ career choices (May, 2009, June 17). In 2014 May co-hosted the first Girl Summit, speaking out against forced marriage and female genital mutilation [FGM]. This was followed by her appearance in a video called #Freedom2Choose in which she described forced marriage as a “fundamental breach of human rights” (Hope, 2016, September 21; Lagan, 2018, February 6). As Home Secretary, May acted on FGM, and introduced a law against coercive control. May also continued to raise equal pay as an issue, even setting up a Facebook group called ‘Theresa May for Equal Pay’ (Lagan, 2018, February 6). Criticism directed at May’s appointment as Women & Equalities Minister was based on her prior mixed voting record (1997–2004) in relation to LGBT rights (Pink News, 2010a, May 12). For example, May voted against equalising the age of consent in 1998; spoke in favour of Section 28 in 2001; spoke against greater adoption rights for gay people in 2002; was absent from the vote to repeal Section 28 in 2003; was absent from four votes for the Gender Recognition Act in 2004; voted for civil partnerships in 2004; voted against sexual orientation regulations in 2007; and in 2008 voted for a (defeated) bill that stated IVF treatment should require a male role model (ergo discriminating against lesbian couples) (Pink News, 2010a, May 12). May was also opposed

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to the Equality Act 2010 expressing fear that it would be too bureaucratic and expensive to implement (BBC News, 2010a, July 17). Gay and lesbian political group OutRage! claimed that based on this voting record, May was wholly unsuited to the role of Women & Equalities Minister, whereas Stonewall stated they were looking forward to working with May and the new Coalition government (Pink News, 2010a, May 12; 2010b, May 15). Pink News (2010b, May 15) reported on the development of a Facebook group called ‘Sack New Homophobic Equality Minister’, which at the time of reporting, had reached over 43,000 members calling for Cameron to withdraw May from the role of Equalities Minister. The Facebook group emphasised that it was not against the Conservative Party, or Theresa May, but rather they were only opposed to Theresa May being placed in the role of Women & Equalities Minister, arguing that she is not qualified for the position and that her appointment is symbolically counter-productive (Straw, 2010, May 14). On BBC’s Question Time (BBC News, 2010b, May 20), when May was challenged on her LGBT rights voting record she said she no longer opposed the Equality Act 2010 and was now supporting it. May also claimed she had changed her mind about gay couples adopting children, and stated she would vote differently if the same votes were held again. May explained her changed position on how she had been persuaded that it is better for a child to live in a stable and loving family environment (BBC News, 2010b, May 20). May pledged to look at considerations of asylum decisions taking sexual orientation into account (BBC News, 2010b, May 20), and also made a commitment in 2010, to giving headteachers support in identifying and dealing with homophobic bullying in schools (Pink News, 2010b, May 15). At the time, Theresa May made the assertion that equality is not a job for government and politicians alone, but that action also needs to be taken by business leaders, news editors, and figures in sport, arguing that cultural change is needed in order to overcome homophobia (Geen, 2010, June 18). In 2010, May launched a document setting out the Coalition government’s promises on LGBT rights, which included allowing religious civil partnerships, and removing historical convictions for consensual gay sex from criminal records (Geen, 2010, June 18). In 2012, May supported the introduction of same-sex marriage, and voted in favour of it in 2013. In 2012, May joined the Out4Marriage campaign, and filmed a video for this in which May explains how because

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she believes that marriage brings stability, it should therefore be available for everyone (Broch, 2012, May 24). Segalov (2017, July 27) was particularly scathing in their critique, citing an interview Theresa May gave to the University of Leeds’ student newspaper The Gryphon in 2001, in which May claimed that “Most parents want the comfort of knowing Section 28 is there”. Segalov contests Theresa May’s changing attitude towards LGBT rights and implies the change was only made out of cowardice, as well as due to the needs of political strategy, rather than a genuine change in perspective. Segalov also argues that the Conservative Party has no place in celebrating LGBT victories until they apologise for their past refusal to support basic principles of equality. Sarah Baker (cited in Prince, 2020, March 9), a former researcher working for Theresa May in the 1990s reflects back on how at the time, May was not particularly interested in women’s issues and gender equality. Baker states this changed upon May’s appointment as Women & Equalities Minister in 1999. After this, May rapidly became absorbed in the subject and began developing detailed policies on shared parental leave, tackling FGM, and concern regarding teenagers’ body image difficulties. Baker proposes that May was reclaiming gender policy from New Labour, while working to centralise the equality agenda and make it more palatable for Conservative Party members. Labour MP Harriet Harman contends that May’s efforts were part of a cynical bid to improve the Conservative Party’s standing among women voters, rather than being driven by anger against women’s subjugation as it is for Labour politicians. Further, some argue that May’s choice of battles betrays a lack of commitment to tackling the root causes of gender inequality (Prince, 2020, March 9).

May’s Premiership In July 2016, Theresa May won the Conservative Party leadership competition and replaced David Cameron as Prime Minister. During her premiership, May wanted the Conservative Party to become the voice of ‘ordinary working people’ (Wright, 2017, May 17), with a mission to ‘build a better Britain’ (BBC News, 2016, July 13, n.p.), and claimed hers would be a government which “must make Britain a country that works not for a privileged few but for every single one of us” (quoted in Goodlad, 2018, p. 14). May’s ‘shared society’ agenda launched in early 2017, and comprised: a reduced central state; greater social co-operation;

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increased mutual responsibilities; and social mobility for all. May advocated social mobility due to perceiving its aspirational potential as serving a wider demographic than social justice does which focuses on society’s most vulnerable (Williams, 2017). May’s 2017 Conservative manifesto was anti-Thatcherite in tone, highlighting injustices in modern Britain between socio-economic classes and condemning: “the cult of selfish individualism” (quoted in Goodlad, 2018, p. 14). Political activist and journalist Beatrix Campbell was particularly critical of May’s ‘one nation’ discourse here, arguing May’s rhetoric about a ‘better Britain’, a ‘Britain for all’ and ‘national unity’ really only applies to British people, and not immigrants or refugees. Campbell highlights how as Home Secretary Theresa May was hostile towards immigrants risking their lives crossing the Mediterranean and English Channel, and refused to engage in any kind of European re-settlement strategy (Gottleib & Campbell, 2019). In response to May’s appointment as Prime Minister, Sanghani (2016, July 13) was optimistic about her tenure, believing that it is in this role where May would show “her true colours” (n.p.). In contrast, Boyd (2016, July 5) raised concerns over May’s prior record in regard to women’s rights including: voting for welfare cuts; voting to reduce the abortion limit from 24 weeks to 20; trying to get abstinence lessons into secondary school’s sex education classes; and setting targets for deporting women and their children back into war zones. Speaking on the centenary of women’s suffrage, May continued to express interest in encouraging more women into politics, advising women to be themselves, believe in what they are doing, and avoid trying to mould themselves into a masculine stereotype, not feeling like they have to change who they are to meet society’s expectations (Lagan, 2018, February 6; Rigby, 2018, February 6). May asserted that “a woman’s place is in elected office” and called on women politicians around the world to work together (Crerar & Elgot, 2018, n. p). Rigby (2018) notes that May’s encouragement of women entering a career in politics is in stark contrast to Margaret Thatcher who did little to promote women under her leadership claiming none of them were good enough or experienced enough. May also promised to tackle women politicians’ experience of online abuse (Crosbie, 2018, February 6). While as PM, Theresa May might have continued with supporting women politicians (whether to stand for Parliament, or tackling online abuse towards them), May has arguably done little to help women’s rights and equalities in other aspects and criticisms have been made. For

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example, in 2017, May made a deal with the anti-abortion Democratic Union Party in order to form a minority government. Other examples include: little action being made towards parity in pay between the sexes (Gill, 2019, July 15); and speaking out against sexual abuse, while simultaneously restoring the whip to two MPs accused of sex offences (Levin, 2019, June 6). May’s government has also been criticised for continuing the legacy of Cameron’s ‘age of austerity’, with financial cuts still being made which had the greatest impact on poor and vulnerable women. Oppenheim (2019, May 24) suggests that it is a mistake to make the assumption that a woman in power is going to address gender equality and women’s rights. Vivienne Hayes, chief executive of Women’s Resource Centre (cited in Oppenheim, 2019, May 24), maintains that during her premiership, May did nothing to reverse sexist austerity policies and that any contribution May did make towards feminist causes is minimal. Hayes believes that in order to drive change towards gender equality, a woman politician is required who has a clear analysis of women’s discrimination and oppression as the centre of their worldview, and that feminism needs to be the central driving force for them standing for election in the first place. Dawn Butler, Labour MP and Shadow Women & Equalities Secretary (cited in Oppenheim, 2019, May 24) decried May’s contribution to feminist causes, dismissing her work as ‘tinkering around the edges’. Butler highlighted how May’s government cut the budget of the Women & Equalities department by over £1 million, with the associated secretarial role being diminished to four part-time positions. Further, that May failed women in Northern Ireland by staying silent on the abortion issue; and failed to address structural inequalities such as maternity discrimination, despite her earlier focus on improving maternity leave entitlements. Butler asserts that as PM, May has not been a very good, or particularly progressive feminist, with little bandwidth given over during her premiership to much of anything outside the Brexit process.

May’s Legacy After May resigned her post as PM in 2019, various news outlets reflected on her legacy. Historian Julie V. Gottleib (Bond, 2016, July 17) argues that politics was becoming more ‘feminised’, with the observation that more women are emerging in right-wing political parties, with women

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politicians ‘cleaning up’ men’s mess such as May handling the aftermath of the 2016 EU referendum when David Cameron resigned as PM. Gottleib also put forward that people should be questioning why it is the Conservative Party which has produced two female Prime Ministers (and by 2022, a third female PM), in contrast with the Labour Party which has produced none. Labour MP Jess Philips concurs with this position, asserting this fact shames Labour, and that having a woman in a position of power matters to girls in school (Phillips, 2019, July 15). One reflection on May’s legacy was that she transformed the Conservative Party’s image from the ‘nasty party’ and helped to bring about modernisation within the party (Lagan, 2019, May 24). Perhaps surprisingly, The Guardian praised May as a “true champion of women” (n.p.), pointing out that May never discussed promoting female advancement while also ‘pulling up the ladder’ (Gill, 2019, July 15). Rigby (2018, February 6) lamented that the legacy of May’s premiership would be almost entirely subsumed and perhaps even defined by the all-consuming task of Brexit. Catherine Mayer, co-founder of the Women’s Equality Party maintains that during her premiership Theresa May did little to promote gender equality, suggesting that this is a classic example of what is called ‘glass cliff syndrome’ whereby women are promoted during times of crises and maximum risk, and are ultimately set up to fail. Applying this theory to Theresa May’s premiership being subsumed by Brexit, Mayer suggests that it is difficult for a single woman to make any kind of significant change in such a scenario (CNBC, 2019, March 7). The notion that the Brexit process dominated May’s tenure as PM, is attested to by Baker (cited in Prince, 2020, March 9) who believes Brexit was the ‘death knell’ of May’s equality work. Even May’s critics such as Jess Phillips (2019, July 15) agreed that Brexit left May with no time or ‘bandwidth’ to lean in on any equality policies made. Shaffi (2019) argues that the media crowing over Theresa May’s resignation as PM acts as a reminder of how unfairly she was treated as PM, with a permeation of sexist news coverage focusing on May’s clothing and cooking, rather than on her political agenda. Shaffi argues that the media’s sexist treatment of Theresa May has served to obscure the ‘real’ criticisms which should be levelled at her and the impact of her work. Examples of criticisms Shaffi cited include: the long-term detention of women at Yarl’s Wood; the slashing of police budgets, and ‘go home’ anti-immigrant vans during May’s tenure as Home Secretary; as well as May’s refusal to stand up to Donald Trump’s Muslim ban; tackling Islamophobia in

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the Conservative Party; and dodging questions on abortion in Northern Ireland during her premiership. Levin (2019) similarly countered the more celebratory reflections by stressing that May’s sporadic history of small, delicate gestures towards women’s rights does not make her a champion of equality. Levin (2019, June 6) described May’s feminist policies as being too often additions and afterthoughts, rather than any kind of substantial policy. Jess Philips’ summation of Theresa May’s record on gender equality is more mixed. Philips notes that as Home Secretary May brought in key laws to help women, but as PM, May under-performed. In particular, she criticises May for failing to see how her government’s policies were impoverishing and trapping women on Universal Credit; as well as for removing legal aid; making cuts to Local Authorities; and providing a hostile environment to migrant women. Further, Philips argues that while May made many statements about ending sexual harassment, there was little action to back these words up. For example, recommendations made by the Women and Equalities Select Committee and women’s rights groups led to little more than reviews and consultations (Phillips, 2019, July 15). May also displayed an inconceivable lack of empathy in response to the 2017 Grenfell catastrophe, in which 72 (at least) of London’s poorest residents were killed in a tower block fire. It was only after negative publicity that May met with the survivors (Goodlad, 2017). Ironic, given May’s earlier claims that the Conservatives were the ‘worker’s party’ and party ‘for the poor’ (Williams, 2017). Spratt (2019, July 24) referred to Theresa May as an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms of her feminism. Spratt postulated that on paper, May was the most feminist PM the UK has had so far, but in real terms did not come close enough, arguing that if someone only cares about certain women, then they cannot claim to be a feminist.

Conservative Feminism? Oxymoron is perhaps an apt description for May’s brand of feminism. As Bryson and Heppell observe (2010), conservatism and feminism at first glance can appear to be at odds in terms of ideology. Traditionally, Conservative Party politicians were anti-feminist; the party was frequently criticised by activists; and feminists were unlikely to vote Conservative. Maguire (1998) describes how there is often a tendency to view right-wing political movements as reactionary and obfuscate any of their progressive tendencies. Since his election as party leader in 2005, David

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Cameron had a modernising agenda for the Conservatives, with ‘feminisation’ of the party being a core plank of this plan. However, despite attempts at creating a more ‘feminist-friendly’ guise, Bryson and Heppell argue that many of the party’s underlying assumptions means the Conservatives are unlikely to pursue key feminist goals (and even values) with consistent success. As Bryson and Heppell point out identifying Conservative ideology is notoriously difficult due to the party members claiming they are: (1) antiideological; (2) that conservatism is instinctive, not theoretical; and (3) a disposition, not a doctrine. Adding another layer of difficulty is that feminism is not a unified or cohesive field of thought. Feminism does not consist of a unitary set of shared values and goals. May has used the term ‘Conservative feminism’ to describe herself (Bryson & Heppell, 2010). Maguire (1998) describes Conservative feminism as being characterised by women who behave in a feminist way, while declaiming the feminist label, and maintaining their ties with traditional family values. This definition does seem to chime with May’s brand of feminism who places value on family, marriage, and has lobbied for better maternity leave. However, there is a lack of clarity and study done on whether Conservative feminism truly constitutes a meaningful strand of feminist thought (Bryson & Heppell, 2010). Lagan (2018, February 6) queries why Conservative feminists’ achievements are dismissed when they should be celebrated, while Gottleib (2016, July 19) questions why it is so difficult for people to comprehend the concept of Conservative feminism. Indeed, May’s supporters claim that while her feminism is different to Labour’s, it does not mean May was any less committed to gender equality (Prince, 2020, March 9). Levin (2019, June 6) raises the question as to why in the first place a woman Prime Minister is being held to standards rarely met by their male counterparts. Berthezène and Gottleib (2019) claim that Conservative women’s contributions to feminist campaigns such as women’s suffrage have not been sufficiently recognised, and argue this is because Conservative feminism looks different from feminist campaigning that has its roots in left-wing politics. Berthezène and Gottleib also suggest that feminist historians are reluctant to research Conservative feminism; though they speculate that the omission of Conservative women from feminist history is less a result of structural concealment than perceptions of Conservative women being mediated through layers of contradictory images (e.g.

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women in ancillary sandwich-making roles or Margaret Thatcher being made an ‘honorary—bullying—man’). Lagan (2018) claims that women (including Theresa May) with centreof-right politics often find themselves labelled as the ‘wrong’ type of feminist, or are told their political views are incompatible with the main principles of feminism. Similarly, Berthezène and Gottleib (2019) observe how Conservative feminists tend to be rendered as problematic, due to a general assumption that feminism is allied only to left-wing politics. Lagan (2018) contests this view, arguing that feminism is not a political party issue, nor that being a feminist and being a Conservative are mutually exclusive. Lagan emphasises that no one woman nor one party has the right to claim feminism for themselves, and even less authority to determine who is and is not a feminist. Maguire (1998) claims that Conservative feminism was wrongly removed from the feminist lexicon by feminist political theorists, leading to contributions by conservative women to be obscured; while Swift (2019) suggests the concept of Conservative feminism has not penetrated into the public consciousness, and many in politics would decry the term as an oxymoron. In contrast, critics of May’s brand of feminism dismiss it as reducing feminism down to a narrow, tame, and establishment-friendly version. Bryson (2021) contends that while this ‘establishment feminism’ may indeed endorse (much needed) campaigns against domestic violence, sexual harassment, and online misogyny, while working to promote greater workplace and political equality, it has a tendency to avoid making connections between these issues, and therefore fails to direct resources to their solutions. A particular weakness of establishment (or Conservative feminism) is that it tends to prioritise the needs of society’s most privileged women, at the expense of the most vulnerable. Conservative feminism is also over-simplistic in terms of how gender equality is conceptualised, with any broader context being overlooked. All of this means that Conservative feminism cannot act as a route to meaningful change (Bryson, 2021). Bryson and Heppell (2010) argue that it is difficult to see how Conservative feminism could ever deliver beyond the most limited of feminist goals, as despite the Conservative Party’s more recent swing towards compassion, it is still underpinned by ideas around competition, individual success, and meritocracy. These ideas render it difficult for Conservatives to not only develop collective solutions, but to even conceive of collective problems.

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“Theresa May is happy to admit that she is a feminist. But almost everybody qualifies for feminist credentials, under her definition” (quoted in Elliott, 2012, January 24, n.p.). May defined feminism as being about ensuring there is a ‘level playing field’ and equal opportunities for people. Elliot quipped that no one can disagree with this definition as it is a bland and cautious ‘catch-most’ statement. This image of May as a ‘safe pair of hands’, a leader the entire party can get behind, a reassuring figure with an unexciting sense of pragmatism has been described as what the UK needed during the Brexit transition due to it being a period of uncertainty (Goodlad, 2017). Dikwal-Bot and Mendes (2022) highlight how the co-optation of feminism by politicians is largely understudied in comparison to research on the co-optation of feminism by media, popular culture, and marketing. In his research on Conservative feminism, Swift (2019) observes how politicians such as Theresa May construct their identity through a ‘flat’, ‘abstract’ version of feminism, allowing to distance themselves from feminism when convenient or adopt it as necessary. Jess Phillips raises a key concern when summing up Theresa May’s feminist status, in that while women at the top end of society (such as middle-class women, women leaders, women in senior roles) may have fared more favourably as a result of May’s policies (e.g. improved representation on boards; and gender pay gap monitoring), there has been no time or opportunity to see how much these policies benefit women in the lower strata of society (such as working-class women or unemployed women) (Phillips, 2019, July 15). Phillips (2019, July 15) sums up Theresa May as a woman with a core set of beliefs and goals, but little in the way of ‘steel or teeth’ to deliver on them.

Conclusion It is perhaps more useful to reframe the question from ‘Is Theresa May a feminist?’ to ‘What kind of feminist is Theresa May?’ As this chapter highlights, May’s enthusiasm and interest in gender equality has shifted during her career in politics, moving from indifference and disinterest, to it being the driving force of May’s push towards modernising the Conservative Party. As critics of Theresa May have noted, May has had a mixed record in regard to equality issues, while encouraging and supporting more women to enter careers in politics, and showing concern for girls in regard to issues such as body image, forced marriage, and FGM on one hand; on the other hand May was initially anti-progressive in regard to LGBT issues

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showing support for Section 28, and voting against improving LGBT rights. May did change her position over time on LGBT issues such as adoption rights, but whether this change was due to a genuine change in perspective or a cynical political tactic it is difficult to say. May’s brand of feminism is fairly limited, as it only serves to help women who are already in a position of privilege (e.g. white, straight, middle-class), while more vulnerable women are overlooked. Upon her premiership May did little to allay the harm caused by her party’s austerity policies, nor alleviate the UK’s increasingly hostile environment to immigrants.

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CNBC. (2019, March 7). Catherine Mayer: Theresa May doesn’t put feminism high on her agenda. CNBC. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www. cnbc.com/video/2019/03/07/catherine-mayer-theresa-may-doesnt-put-fem inism-high-on-her-agenda.html Crerar, P., & Elgot, J. (2018, Nov. 7). ‘A woman’s place is in elected office’, Theresa May tells politicians. The Guardian. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/07/womans-placeis-in-elected-office-may-women-mps-of-the-world-conference Crockett, M. (2017). The Daily Mail’s front page is a stark reminder that no woman can escape objectification. Stylist. [Internet] Retrieved from: https:// www.stylist.co.uk/people/feminism/daily-mail-theresa-may-nicola-sturgeonlegs-legsit-brexit-controversy-sarah-vine-opinion-politics/10755 Crosbie, V. (2018, February 6). The number of female Tory MPs has almost quadrupled since 2005—And all we did was ask. The Independent. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/suffragettes-centen ary-women-vote-tories-theresa-may-women2win-female-mps-a8197551.html Dikwal-Bot, D., & Mendes, K. (2022). “Eight Tory leadership candidates declare themselves feminist”: Feminism and political campaigns. Feminist Media Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2022.2080751 Elliott, A. (2012, January 24). Theresa May: A feminist in kitten heels. Total Politics. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.totalpolitics.com/articles/ interview/theresa-may-feminist-kitten-heels Geen, J. (2010, June 18). Theresa May says sportsmen and newspaper editors must ‘take action’ against homophobia. Pink News. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.thepinknews.com/2010/06/18/theresa-may-says-sports men-and-newspaper-editors-must-take-action-against-homophobia/ Gill, M. (2019, July 15). Theresa May’s positive legacy? She’s a feminist champion. The Guardian. [Internet] Retrieved: https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2019/jul/15/theresa-may-legacy-feminist-champion-women Goodlad, G. (2017). Theresa May: A premiership in crisis. Political Insight, 8(3), 8–11. Goodlad, G. (2018). A tale of two Tories: Comparing Theresa May and Margaret Thatcher. Political Insight, 9(3), 12–14. Gottleib, J. V. (2016, July 19). This may be Tory feminism: The second woman PM is not Margaret Thatcher Mark II. Huffington Post. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/julie-v-gottlieb/theresamay-margaret-thatcher_b_11065884.html Gottleib, J. V., & Campbell, B. (2019). The Iron ladies revisited: Julie Gottlieb interview with journalist, writer and political activist Beatrix Campbell. Women’s History Review, 28(2), 337–349.

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Hope, C. (2016, September 21). Theresa May rejoins the historic Carlton Club 15 years after quitting over its women members’ policy. The Telegraph. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/ 09/21/theresa-may-rejoins-the-historic-carlton-club-15-years-after-qui/ Kandola, B. (2017, August 14). Theresa May: The perfect case study of modern sexism. We Are the City. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://wearethecity. com/theresa-may-perfect-case-study-modern-sexism/ Lagan, A. (2018, February 6) Theresa May is what a feminist looks like. The Spectator. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/ theresa-may-is-what-a-feminist-looks-like/ Lagan, A. (2019, May 24). Theresa May’s resigned, but the next female PM will owe her more than we realise. Huffington Post. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/theresa-may-res igns_uk_5ce7d0e6e4b010ec43ac95ac/ Levin, S. (2019, June 6). Now that she’s going, it’s time to set the record straight on Theresa May’s ‘feminist legacy’. The Independent. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/theresa-may-resign-leave-toryleader-feminist-brexit-female-prime-minister-a8947086.html Maguire, G. E. (1998). Conservative women: A history of women and the Conservative Party, 1874–1997 . Macmillan Press. May, T. (2009, June 17). Theresa May; My life as an MP. BBC News. [Internet] Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8033607.stm Oppenheim, M. (2019, May 24). Theresa May rolled back women’s rights as prime minister, say campaigners. The Independent. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/theresa-mayresign-womens-rights-austerity-benefits-conservative-leader-a8929141.html Perkins, A. (2010, May 12). Theresa May will be nobody’s stooge. The Guardian. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/com mentisfree/2010/may/12/theresa-may-nobodys-stooge Phillips, J. (2019, July 15). The second woman prime minister, and a feminist— But what difference did Theresa May actually make for women in the UK? The House. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.politicshome.com/the house/article/the-second-woman-prime-minister-and-a-feminist-but-what-dif ference-did-theresa-may-actually-make-for-women-in-the-uk Pink News. (2010a, May 12). Analysis: How pro-gay is the new home secretary and minister for equality Theresa May? Pink News. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.thepinknews.com/2010c/05/12/analysis-how-pro-gayis-the-new-home-secretary-and-minister-for-equality-theresa-may/ Pink News. (2010b, May 15). 43,000 people call for David Cameron to sack Theresa May over poor gay voting record. Pink News. [Internet] Retrieved from: https://www.thepinknews.com/2010d/05/15/40000-people-call-fordavid-cameron-to-sack-new-homophobic-equality-minister-theresa-may/

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CHAPTER 16

Theresa May and LGBT Equality Richard Johnson

Introduction On a mild, drizzly evening in November 2003, thirty men in dinner suits were milling about the RAF Club on Piccadilly with impatience. The mood had been somewhat discontented, but the atmosphere was becoming more relaxed with the aid of gin and tonics. Thirty starters of melon and ice cream were slowly melting in the kitchen. A mobile phone rang. ‘That’s probably Theresa’, announced a young man with questionable facial hair. ‘Please excuse me’.1 These men in black tie comprised the leadership of the Tory Campaign for Homosexual Equality (TorCHE), and the woman on the phone was Theresa May who, until the fortnight before, had been Chairman of

1 Katy Guest, ‘Tories Out!’, The Independent , 27 November 2003.

R. Johnson (B) School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_16

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the Conservative Party.2 She was late. Having dutifully switched on the Christmas lights in her constituency of Maidenhead, May was now stuck in traffic on the M4. Dinner would need to begin without her. The melons and ice cream could not wait forever. A loyal toast was offered, ‘To the Queen’. ‘Which one?’, someone quipped.3 The Tory Campaign for Homosexual Equality began its life as the Conservative Group for Homosexual Equality (CGHE) in 1977. At its formation, the organisation was not met with approval by the official Conservative Party. CGHE was forbidden from giving any suggestion of formal party affiliation. They were even banned from using the ‘Torch of Liberty’, adopted as the Conservative logo in 1982, on their literature. As a small act of rebellion, the group’s leader Dr David Starkey changed the name to TorCHE in 1990.4 The group would later become known as LGBTory and then, abandoning all effort at word play, LGBT+ Conservatives. The group’s chairman James Davenport complained that no one knew how to pronounce TorCHE. ‘I remember someone once referring to us as Torshhh’. The suggestion of Torché was dismissed as excessively camp.5 Theresa May had been appointed by Iain Duncan Smith as the first female party ‘chairman’ (the title was not changed to reflect this fact) in July 2002.6 Her conference debut that October ruffled more than a few feathers among Tory grandees. May lashed out at unnamed colleagues who ‘make political capital out of demonising minorities’. She put to the audience, ‘You know what people call us? The Nasty Party’.7 Many loyal 2 On 3 November 2003, Theresa May was appointed Shadow Transport Secretary by the new party leader Michael Howard. She was replaced by Liam Fox. The dinner in question took place on 21 November. 3 Katy Guest, ‘Tories Out!’, The Independent , 27 November 2003. 4 Conservative Group for Homosexual Equality, GB 97 HCA (LSE Archives). 5 Katy Guest, ‘Tories Out!’, The Independent , 27 November 2003. 6 When Theresa May became Chairman of the Conservative Party, the Guardian editor David Marsh instructed journalists that the house style would be Chairwoman. ‘Although the Conservatives describe her as the new “chairman”’, Marsh wrote in guidance to Guardian staff, ‘we have decided to call her the party chairwoman. She is, after all, a woman. If the Tories want to look daft and out of touch, that’s up to them’ (‘Diary’, Daily Telegraph, 26 July 2002). 7 May did not invent this moniker. The Shadow Education Secretary, Damian Green, was recorded using the term about his own party five months before Theresa May (‘The nasty party can’t become the nice party overnight’, Guardian, 8 May 2002).

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Conservatives in the audience recoiled at the implication. Afterwards, Norman Tebbit, party chairman under Margaret Thatcher, retorted that the Conservatives had been more popular when they were nasty.8 Various Conservative MPs, including May’s immediate predecessor David Davis, believed that she was doing Labour’s work for them.9 The following year, May used her conference speech to repeat similar themes. This time, she sounded a more optimistic note. ‘Rich or poor. Straight or gay. Black or white. Whoever you are, wherever you’re from, the Conservative Party is for you’. The Telegraph journalist Frank Johnson wryly observed that ‘few of her audience seemed to be any of those things’. Though, Johnson admitted, ‘One can never tell about the gays’.10 For ‘the gays’, their welcome came two months later when Theresa May formally recognised TorCHE as an affiliated group within the Conservative Party.11 The gathering at the RAF Club that drizzly November evening was, in many respects, a thank you to the party’s reforming erstwhile Chairman. Theresa May had dressed for the occasion, wearing rainbow-striped kitten heels and a fur trimmed sweater. By the time she finally arrived, the mood had shifted from the anxious to the slightly delirious. ‘Ladies and gentlemen, Theresa May!’, bellowed the host. ‘Ooh! May what?’, impishly inquired one guest. ‘I didn’t know we’d hired a drag queen’, another muttered. Observing her fury sweater, one of the assembled offered, ‘the shoes are one thing, but a feather boa?’.12 These heckles were met with hushes and tuts, and Theresa May valiantly bore them with good humour. Following much the same themes as her conference speeches, May outlined her vision of an inclusive and welcoming Conservative Party—one which was confident in its embrace of minority groups, including gay men and women. Not everyone agreed that the Conservative Party did have a problem appealing to gay Britons. Some argued that homosexuals were already 8 ‘We won as the nasty party, says Tebbit’, Daily Telegraph, 10 October 2002. 9 Colin Brown & Francis Elliott, ‘Who will have the last laugh?’, Sunday Telegraph, 23

February 2003. 10 Frank Johnson, ‘Retired major casts a shadow as the troops go on parade’, Daily Telegraph, 8 October 2003. 11 David Charter, ‘Gay Tories win right to be part of the party’, The Times, 9 December 2002. 12 Katy Guest, ‘Tories Out!’, The Independent , 27 November 2003.

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well represented in the Conservative ranks and had served in prominent leadership positions, possibly even the premiership itself (Bloch, 2015). At a fringe event during the 2003 Conservative conference, the journalist Charles Moore asked Norman Tebbit if the Conservative Party had been nasty to homosexuals. Tebbit replied that the charge was baseless, ‘Otherwise we wouldn’t have so many homosexual Members of Parliament. Don’t kid me that there’s only one or two’.13 Tebbit’s insouciance did not properly acknowledge the terror experienced by gay Conservative MPs during the 1990s. So few had voluntarily come ‘out’ because to do so still spelled political ruination. Gay Conservatives came under intense media scrutiny after John Major announced his ‘Back to Basics’ campaign in 1993. Michael Brown and Richard Spring, who were both unmarried, were forced to resign from the Major government after newspapers revealed they had been intimate with other men.14 In the case of Spring, he had the temerity to confess an attraction to the former Olympian Sebastian Coe.15 The Conservative MP David Ashby was deselected by his local party after the Sunday Times reported that he had left his wife for a male ‘friend’.16 At the age of 39, Alan Amos agreed to quit his safe Conservative seat of Hexham after he was arrested with another man and cautioned for indecency on Hampstead Heath, a famous gay cruising spot (Turner, 2013: 207). In nearly all of these cases, the Conservative MPs in question were unmarried and had engaged in consensual sexual activities. Yet, there was no effort from the party to defend them. The Conservative MP Richard Allason wrote at the time of Major’s pronouncement, ‘Mere infidelity could probably be survived, but the wholly legal act of homosexuality spelt catastrophe for the upwardly mobile’ (West, 1993). This was true for the former Defence Secretary Michael Portillo, whose leadership bid against Iain Duncan Smith in 2001 was fatally undermined by admissions from Portillo two years earlier that he had enjoyed gay romances at university.17 A businessman named Nigel 13 ‘Revealed’, Daily Telegraph, 9 October 2002. 14 ‘MoD man suspended during gay sex inquiry’, Birmingham Post, 10 May 1994. 15 ‘Roll-call of Tories who departed under a cloud’, The Independent , 10 April 1995. 16 Jo Knowsley, ‘I am not bitter, says humbled Tory MP’, Sunday Telegraph, 10 March 1996. 17 There was a certain irony, if the accusation of his former lover was true, that Portillo would not have been allowed to serve in the military at the time that he was Defence

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de Villiers Hart claimed Portillo’s homosexual interests were not a mere moment of teenage madness. The two had been in an eight-year relationship, and Hart, who was dying with AIDS, was furious that Portillo had voted against equalising the age of consent for homosexual sex in 1994 (Bloch, 2015: 284).18 On the matter of whether Portillo’s homosexuality was merely a thing of the past, Hart damningly posited, ‘Do leopards change their spots?’.19 When Conservative MPs voted on the final two leadership candidates to send to the party membership, Portillo failed to make it to the members’ ballot by one vote. Theresa May had supported Portillo from an early stage (Blackburn, 2016: 138). He was widely viewed as the members’ favourite, and it is likely that these gay rumours cost him at least a couple of MPs’ votes and, with them, the party leadership. It is in this rather toxic context that Theresa May’s 2002 and 2003 conference speeches, as well as her decision to recognise TorCHE in December 2002, should be understood. Her brief spell as Chairman of the Conservative Party, from July 2002 to November 2003, was marked by a serious effort at self-reflection and a desire for transformation on the matter of gay inclusion. While May presaged the modernising efforts of David Cameron, elected leader in 2005, her efforts were not always welcomed by the party’s old guard and more reactionary elements. Consequently, May sometimes cut a lonely figure in the Conservative Party of Iain Duncan Smith. At the 2003 party conference in Bournemouth, none of her Shadow Cabinet colleagues showed up at her Chairman’s drinks reception, an unmistakable snub. To make matters worse, wine ran out after 25 minutes. Only the noble (and expensive) intervention of a prospective parliamentary candidate, who put his card behind the bar, saved the day.20

Secretary: ‘a man who was officially regarded as unfit to be an army cook was in charge of the armed forces of the UK’ (Nigel Hart, ‘Michael is a hypocrite’, Guardian, 13 September 1999). 18 ‘Portillo’s former lover dies’, Irish Times , 18 December 1999. 19 Nigel Hart, ‘Michael is a hypocrite’, Guardian, 13 September 1999. 20 ‘Seaside Whispers’, Evening Standard, 6 October 2003.

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Opposition (1997–2010) Theresa May’s period as Chairman of the Conservative Party demonstrated her belief that gay people could and should be Conservatives. Yet, it took a little bit longer for the Conservatives to prove that they were a party welcoming of gay people. Until David Cameron became party leader, the Conservatives had voted against many of the New Labour government’s liberalising reforms on matters of gay equality, including against equalising the age of consent for gay intimacy and the right of same-sex couples to adopt. May followed the party line on these votes in the years immediately following her election to Parliament in 1997.21 During this period, May said relatively little on record about gay rights, with the exception of the controversy over the Labour government’s attempt to repeal Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988. In the 1980s, the tabloid press had fed a national hysteria over the idea that children were ‘being taught that they have an inalienable right to be gay’, as Margaret Thatcher put it, by left-wing teachers and council officials.22 There was at least one instance of a local education authority,23 controlled by Labour, which had purchased a Danish children’s book called Jenny Lives with Eric and Martin as a teaching resource.24 The book depicted a little girl nestled in bed (happily, eating breakfast) between her father and his male partner.25 The Thatcher government sought to stamp out these initiatives at inclusive education, instructing local authorities that they ‘shall not intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality’ or ‘promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship’.26 In 2000, the Labour government attempted to repeal Section 28, but the Conservatives, under their leader William Hague, were opposed. In spite of Labour enjoying an enormous majority in the House of Commons, the attempt to remove Section 28 was defeated in the House 21 https://www.theyworkforyou.com/mp/10426/theresa_may/maidenhead/divisions? policy=826. 22 http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106941. 23 The Inner London Education Authority. 24 ‘Gay sex book is vice lure’, Sunday Mirror, 26 October 1986. 25 ‘Baker urges ban on gay book’, Daily Telegraph, 17 September 1986. 26 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/9/contents.

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of Lords. Even after Labour’s purge of over six hundred, mostly Conservative hereditary peers a few months earlier, the government still lacked a majority in the upper chamber. Only five Conservative peers voted to scrap Section 28: the very ‘wet’ Ian Gilmour, Norman St John-Stevas (who was gay), the composer Andrew Lloyd Weber, Tristran Garel-Jones (another ‘wet’) and the academic Philip Norton.27 Theresa May was serving as Shadow Education Secretary at the time, having entered the Shadow Cabinet just two years after her election to Parliament. Her brief obviously put her at the forefront of the policy. She dutifully voted to keep Section 28. It is worth noting May did not defend Section 28 on its own terms but claimed that it was not enforced and, therefore, it caused no harm.28 She told a student newspaper, ‘No headteacher has commented to me that they are not able to deal with homophobic bullying or discuss homosexuality, where is appropriate, with young people’.29 When the Labour government’s effort to scrap Section 28 was defeated in the House of Lords, Theresa May told them to accept defeat. ‘The Government should stop wasting time and concentrate on delivering on the real issues that matter to people’, she lectured.30 It could be argued that Theresa May was simply following the doctrine of collective responsibility in her position as a member of the Shadow Cabinet. However, in the two years when she first served as a backbench MP, she did not show any willingness to rebel on gay rights concerns, either. In 1998, for example, she voted against equalising the age of consent for homosexual acts with heterosexual acts. Therefore, while it can be said that May was herself not one of the people ‘who make political capital out of demonising minorities’, she showed no willingness to sacrifice her political ambition for the cause of gay rights as a new MP. This set her apart from Conservatives like Shaun Woodward, the MP for Witney who crossed the aisle to Labour due to his fury over continuing Conservative support for Section 28,31 or John Bercow, who chose to

27 ‘Absentees and rebels caused defeat’, Daily Telegraph, 26 July 2000. 28 ‘Blair is wrong over Section 28 says Woodhead’, Sunday Telegraph, 30 January 2000. 29 ‘We found an old interview with Theresa May talking about promoting homosexu-

ality’, Vice, 27 July 2017. 30 ‘Labour faces new fight on age of gay consent’, Daily Telegraph, 26 July 2000. 31 ‘How Hague lost a rising star’, Guardian, 19 December 1999.

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resign as Shadow Work and Pensions Secretary in order to vote in favour of gay adoption (Bercow, 2020: 111–112).32 May came to disavow these votes, singling out her Section 28 vote as one of particular regret. As prime minister, May condemned Section 28: ‘by silencing supportive voices and emboldening bigots, the devastation it wrought on a generation was immeasurable’.33 At a Pride Reception in 10 Downing Street in 2017, Theresa May explained, ‘like millions of other people in this country, I have changed my own mind on a number of the policy issues which I was confronted with when I first became an MP twenty years ago’.34 She told ITV, ‘I hope people will see, yes, I have developed my view. I want to be seen as an ally of the LGBT [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender] community’.35 She wrote in Pink News, ‘I have come a long way. From my perspective, if those votes were today of course I would vote differently’.36 In 2004, Conservative leader Michael Howard offered a free vote on civil partnerships.37 Liberated from the constraints of the whip, May was able to vote according to her own personal convictions. With a minority of Conservative MPs (see Fig. 16.1), she voted in favour of the Civil Partnership Act. At the time, Theresa May was serving as Shadow Secretary of State for the Family. This was a position created by Michael Howard earlier that year. Although civil partnerships fell under the purview of the shadow ministry, Theresa May ceded the floor to Alan Duncan, who at the time was the only openly gay Conservative MP, to lead for the Conservatives in the civil partnership debate. The Evening Standard reported that this was done ‘to avoid a row’ with Duncan, who had been heavily involved in championing the issue and might have felt perturbed by playing only a supporting role at the final debate.38

32 ‘Bercow quits over Tory adoption policy’, Guardian, 4 November 2002. 33 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-the-pride-reception-3-

july-2018. 34 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pride-reception-2017-theresa-maysspeech. 35 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CNeaEosWxOk. 36 Theresa May, ‘Theresa May writes for PinkNews on the 50th anniversary of the

Sexual Offences Act’, Pink News, 19 July 2017. 37 ‘Tory MPs out to wreck gay partnership bill’, Guardian, 8 November 2004. 38 ‘Changing briefs’, Evening Standard, 11 November 2004.

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90% 79.1%

80% 70% 60% 50%

49.0% 43.0%

40.5%

36.2%

40% 30%

23.3%

20.4%

20% 8.0%

10%

0.5%

0% Conservative

Labour Yes

No

Others

Absent/Abstained

Fig. 16.1 MP votes for the Civil Partnership Act 2004, by party (Source https://www.theyworkforyou.com/divisions/pw-2004-10-12-256-com mons/mp/10999)

The role of Shadow Secretary of State for the Family was short-lived, and May was its only holder. There was no equivalent ministry in the Labour government, and David Cameron scrapped the post when he became leader in 2005. In spite of its fusty name, Theresa May used her position to promote a modernising agenda. She pledged to ‘change the definition’ of the family to include gay couples, saying that she would ‘stand up for them’ and would not judge them. She told Conservatives to ‘live in the real world’.39 In the years to follow, May continued to place herself on the proLGBT wing of the Conservative Party. While Michael Howard had laid the groundwork for the Conservative modernisation on social issues, this agenda was brought into high speed by his successor David Cameron. Cameron made it his mission as Leader of the Opposition that the Conservative Party ‘make its peace with the modern world’ and bring an end to the party’s ‘curtain-twitching moralism’ (Cameron, 2019: 93, 64). Cameron’s attitude echoed the vision May had laid out as party chairman 39 ‘Tory pledge to scrap fees and help teachers’, The Independent , 6 October 2004.

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in 2002 and 2003. No longer a lonely figure, whose greatest cheerleaders included eccentric gay men at a London club, May was now firmly on the same side of a modernising Conservative leadership.

Home Secretary (2010–2016) When the Conservatives entered office in 2010, many Conservative shadow ministers were demoted or lost out on a senior government position because the party had to make way for Liberal Democrat ministers, with whom they would be sharing power in coalition. Theresa May was an exception. Not only was she not demoted, but she enjoyed an impressive promotion after the election. May had been serving as David Cameron’s Shadow Transport Secretary, but when Cameron announced his Cabinet, she was promoted to one of the ‘Great Offices of State’: Home Secretary. The Conservatives’ Shadow Home Secretary had been Chris Grayling who ‘hadn’t made much of a mark’ (Blackburn, 2016: 189). May’s elevation was described as ‘the most eye-catching appointment’ of the entire Cabinet.40 LGBT rights featured high on Theresa May’s agenda as Home Secretary from the outset. Within weeks of her appointment, she made major interventions designed to improve the lives and dignity of LGBT people. At a Pride reception in the garden of 10 Downing Street in June 2010, co-hosted by David Cameron and Theresa May, the Home Secretary announced initiatives for tackling anti-gay bullying in schools, the opportunity to register gay relationships in religious settings, and the launch of an action plan on transgender rights. In addition to these wider governmental goals, May almost immediately set about making reforms within the Home Office itself. The first of these was to change asylum practices with respect to gay asylum seekers. Under the Labour government, 98% of asylum seekers who had claimed discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in their home country were, nonetheless, rejected and deported.41 The Home Office did not regard being gay as legitimate grounds for being placed

40 ‘Theresa May is surprise choice to be home secretary’, The Independent , 13 May 2010. 41 ‘Virtually all asylum-seekers sent back to persecution’, The Independent , 23 May 2010.

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at risk, even if the country to which the seeker was being returned criminalised homosexuality. Instead, the Home Office advised gay men and women simply to live discretely and ‘pass’ as straight to evade detection.42 The new Home Secretary vowed that she would not deport gay asylum seekers to countries where homosexuality was a crime. This position was confirmed two months later in a Supreme Court ruling in HJ and HT v Secretary of State for the Home Department, which related to an Iranian and a Cameroonian who both faced being deported under the previous government’s rules, in spite of being gay, to states where gay people faced imprisonment and death. In rather clunky, if well-intentioned, language, Lord Hope said his judgement would mean that gay men granted asylum in Britain would be just as free to go ‘to Kylie concerts, drinking exotically coloured cocktails, and talking about boys’ as straight men were to ‘enjoy themselves playing rugby, drinking beer, and talking about girls’. Theresa May celebrated the ruling, which she said vindicated her position. ‘I do not believe it is acceptable to send people home and expect them to hide their sexuality to avoid persecution’, she confirmed.43 However, May received criticism for the implementation of this policy. In order for asylum seekers to use fear of gay persecution as a legitimate grounds for their asylum application to be approved, they were required to prove that they were legitimately gay. This sometimes led to deeply personal and sometimes graphic Home Office interviews on topics relating to gay culture and physical intimacy. In response to complaints, May commissioned a review of the treatment of LGBT asylum seekers in 2014. May chastised Home Office officials for requiring evidence of ‘sexual behaviour’ rather than of ‘sexual orientation’. Another priority was to rectify the criminal records of gay men who had been prosecuted under Britain’s previous anti-gay legislation. One month into her role, May announced that men who had been convicted of ‘gross indecency’ for consensual sexual acts with another man over the age of 16 would see their criminal records expunged. Consensual sex between men over the age of 21 was not decriminalised in Britain until 1967. It was lowered to 18 in 1994 and again in 2000 to 16, finally equalising the age of consent for both homosexual and heterosexual intimacy. As has been

42 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10180564. 43 ‘Why the Supreme Court ruled against the deportation of gay asylum-seekers’, The

Independent , 8 July 2010.

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mentioned, May voted in 1998 against equalising the age of consent, but by the time she entered government, she had come to accept that she was wrong. May said, ‘It’s not fair that a man can be branded a criminal because 30 years ago he had consensual sex with another man’.44 Known as ‘Alan Turing’s Law’, the pardon was passed as part of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 when May was prime minister. Turing, the mathematician who helped to crack the Nazi code that gave Allied forces a crucial advantage during World War II, was convicted of ‘gross indecency’ in 1952 for his relationship with a 19-year-old man. Theresa May supported his personal pardon in 2013. In 2019, Turing was placed on the £50 note, with Theresa May celebrating, ‘It is only fitting that we remember his legacy and the brilliant contribution LGBT people have made to our country on the new £50 note’.45 The most controversial gay rights policy during the Cameron premiership was the decision to extend marriage rights to couples of the same sex. David Cameron said it was ‘one of the most contentious, hard-fought, and divisive issues during my time as prime minister’ (Cameron, 2019: 438). Civil partnerships, which May had supported, had been introduced in 2004 to extend all of the rights of marriage to same-sex couples. Many in the gay community, however, believed such a distinction was degrading and rendered same-sex relationships as if they were of a second order to opposite-sex relationships. A majority of Conservative Party members, however, were fiercely opposed to this effort, believing marriage to be an ancient institution unchanged in its essential form for centuries. The Cabinet were divided on the issue, and collective Cabinet responsibility was suspended. A free vote was given to Conservative MPs. Theresa May’s support was not in doubt. In the 2010 election, the Conservative manifesto had not made a pledge to introduce same-sex marriage. However, as Shadow Equalities Minister, Theresa May had authored a ‘Contract for Equalities’, to accompany the manifesto, which pledged that the government would consider the case for changing civil partnerships into civil marriages.46 In the early years of the coalition government, May argued that the government should support same-sex

44 ‘Convictions for gay sex to be erased’, Daily Telegraph, 17 June 2010. 45 https://twitter.com/theresa_may/status/1150759732061360129?ref_src=twsrc%

5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Enews%7Ctwgr%5Etweet. 46 https://issuu.com/conservatives/docs/equalities_manifesto.

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marriage (Cameron, 2019: 439). It was May who published the Equal Marriage White Paper and sponsored the legislation that introduced the right to marry for same-sex couples.

Prime Minister (2016–2019) In 2016, Theresa May became Conservative leader following the resignation of David Cameron after the referendum on membership in the European Union. May prevailed in the Conservative leadership contest after her opponent Andrea Leadsom withdrew. Leadsom told a journalist that Theresa May, who was childless, ‘possibly has nieces, nephews, lots of people, but I have children who are going to have children who will directly be part of what happens next’.47 Alan Duncan, the first Conservative MP to come out as openly gay, denounced Leadsom’s remarks as ‘vile’.48 Leadsom was also criticised by the Scottish Conservative leader Ruth Davidson, who is gay, for saying she didn’t like same sex-marriage.49 Davidson contrasted Leadsom with Theresa May, whom Davidson argued had impeccable credentials in government on LGBT equality. ‘I’m very happy that there are people here who have been proponents of equality like Theresa May…I’m very pleased that Theresa May was instrumental in bringing forward same-sex marriage’, Davidson enthused.50 Theresa May’s premiership, although highly disordered after losing her majority in the 2017 general election, made some important strides for LGBT equality. Theresa May’s Cabinet included David Mundell, the first openly gay man in a Conservative Cabinet, and Justine Greening, the first openly gay woman in any Cabinet. May’s interest in LGBT rights came with her publication of her LGBTQ Action Plan. Based on a survey of over 100,000 LGBTQ individuals, the largest in the world, the plan contained 75 concrete government responses aimed at improving the lives of LGBT people in Britain and around the world. May explained that she had been most emotionally affected by the survey’s finding 47 ‘Being a mother gives me an edge on May: Leadsom’, The Times, 9 July 2016. 48 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36760986. 49 ‘Andrea Leadsom gives right-wing Tories a chance to take their party back’, Telegraph, 8 July 2016. 50 ‘Ruth Davidson: I’d invite PM Angela Leadsom to My Gay Wedding’, Telegraph, 8 July 2016.

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that two-thirds of gay couples avoid holding hands with their same-sex partner in public out of fear of a negative reaction. ‘That really struck me’, May reflected, ‘Because, for heterosexual couples, holding hands is such a simple, normal gesture that we take it entirely for granted’.51 She budgeted £4.5 million for an LGBT Implementation Fund, and by the end of her premiership, many of the proposals had been implemented. The May government made several other strides in advance of LGBT equality. One was in the area of inclusive education, a repudiation of her party’s previous attitude to this topic during the days of Section 28. In 2018, the government issued new guidance for the teaching of Relationships and Sex Education (RSE). The guidance had last been updated in 2000. May’s government ensured that same-sex relationships and gender identity would become normal parts of the RSE curriculum. The updated guidance applied to primary schools, ensuring that primary age children would become aware that some families included parents of the same gender.52 Her government also introduced an anti-homophobic and anti-transphobic bullying programme in more than 1,800 schools. Once the new curriculum was implemented in 2019, protests erupted outside schools in Birmingham and Batley, where parents denounced the teaching that homosexual attraction was normal. Theresa May hit back, defending the move saying, ‘I know that policy in particular has been controversial in some areas, but teaching all children about respect for difference is a core British value’.53 May also promoted LGBT equality on the international stage. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit in London in 2018, Theresa May urged prime ministers in the 39 Commonwealth countries that still criminalised homosexuality to scrap their ‘outdated’ laws. She also accepted the legacy of the British Empire in these states: I am all too aware that these laws were often put in place by my own country. They were wrong then, and they are wrong now. As the UK’s

51 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-the-pride-reception-3july-2018. 52 Nick Duffy, ‘Schools to teach about same-sex relationships and gender identity’, Pink News, 19 July 2018. 53 ‘Theresa May Defends LGBT Education for Primary Children Despite Parent Protests’, PoliticsHome, 2 July 2019.

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prime minister, I deeply regret both the fact that such laws were introduced, and the legacy of discrimination, violence and even death that persists today.54

May also ensured that the summit hosted a Commonwealth Equality Network event, which was seen as an opportunity for LGBT rights campaigners to lobby ministers from governments, including those with restrictive laws. May’s initiatives received some backlash from Commonwealth leaders. Bishop Victor Gill in Trinidad told the BBC that May was guilty of ‘neo-colonialism…The gay agenda is being forced on us’, he complained.55 Theresa May was probably the most pro-trans prime minister in British history. Although unsuccessful, she made a more serious attempt than any prime minister to date to try to make it easier for trans people to be legally recognised in their declared gender. May also spoke out about trans rights more vocally than any other prime minister. She wrote in an article in PinkNews, ‘I am also concerned about the rise of transphobic aggression and the frequent misrepresentation of trans people in some sections of the media’.56 When the six living prime ministers in 2022 were invited to write contributions reflecting on 50 years or London Pride, only Theresa May mentioned trans people at all.57 In 2004, the Labour government passed the Gender Recognition Act. The legislation was provoked in part by a 2002 decision from the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v United Kingdom, which found that the inability of a transgender person to be fully recognised in their new legal identity was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.58 The legislation established a legal process for a person to achieve legal recognition of a gender different to the one they had a birth. In order to acquire a new gender status in law, known as a

54 ‘Theresa May says she deeply regrets Britain’s legacy of anti-gay laws’, Independent , 17 April 2018. 55 ‘Bishop calls for gay people to be jailed in interview on BBC’s Today programme’, Pink News, 17 April 2018. 56 ‘Theresa May’, PinkNews, 2 July 2019. 57 ‘Six prime ministers on LGBT progress on Pride 50th anniversary’, i, 1 July 2022. 58 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22ecli%22:%5B%22CE:ECHR:2002:0711JU

D002895795%22%5d%7D.

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Gender Recognition Certificate, a person was required to receive certification from two medical doctors that they suffer from gender dysphoria and to provide two years’ evidence of living in their ‘acquired gender’. Theresa May called the legislation ‘bureaucratic and invasive’. May argued that legal recognition of gender transition should no longer require medical confirmation. ‘Being trans is not an illness, and should not be treated as such’, May said.59 In 2018, her government launched a consultation on updating the Gender Recognition Act 2004. A majority of respondents supported ending the requirements of medical diagnosis. Yet, the proposals were beset by difficulties as the agenda of the May government was overwhelmed by her failed efforts to implement the Leave result of the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the European Union. May was unable to pass the legislation before she resigned as Conservative leader in 2019, telling a reception in July 2019, shortly before handing over the premiership to Boris Johnson, that reform of the legislation ‘must be completed so we can get a system that works for trans people and commands broad confidence’.60 The Johnson government scrapped the plans the following year.61 There were other areas where May set out strong commitments, but she was unable to see them fully implemented during her relatively brief premiership. In 2018, May announced her intention to end gay conversion therapy, which she described as ‘an abhorrent practice’62 and ‘disgusting’.63 Yet, her government did not draw up the necessary legislation to ban the practice. In spite of these setbacks, by the end of her premiership, May was obviously confident in her record as an LGBT ally. In 2018, she invited Peter Tatchell, the outspoken LGBT rights campaigner, to 10 Downing Street,

59 ‘Prime Minister Theresa May vows to support LGBT-inclusive sex ed at PinkNews Awards’, PinkNews, 18 October 2017. 60 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-the-pride-reception-2july-2019. 61 ‘Ministers ready to betray trans people’, 15 June 2020. 62 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CNeaEosWxOk. 63 https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=newssearch&cd=& ved=2ahUKEwjMsNfUtPD4AhUPRsAKHTjzBcI4ChDF9AEoAHoECBAQAQ& url=,https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fspeeches%2Fpms-speech-at-thepride-reception-3-july-2018&usg=AOvVaw3uwyyP7cQHokBA5xaKezat.

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the first prime minister to do so. Tatchell claimed he had been blacklisted by all of May’s predecessors, including the Labour prime ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. May said, ‘I know we probably don’t see eye-to-eye on everything, Peter, but I respect the lifetime of activism that you have committed in support of LGBT rights—and particularly most recently on the streets of Moscow’.64 On a personal level, Theresa May showed an interest in supporting LGBT performers and artists. In the middle of the traumatic defeats of her Brexit plan in 2019, May privately sent a letter of support, along with a signed photograph, to Ben Tye, known by the drag name Amber Dextris, who was competing in Miss Drag UK. The Prime Minister subsequently tweeted her support as well. Tye was so shocked when he saw the prime minister had tweeted about him that he threw his phone across the table. After recovering his senses, Tye expressed gratitude for May’s intervention: ‘I think it’s fantastic. She has a lot on her plate but she took the time to send something personal like that. It’s a positive thing’.65 Tye said he would sell the letter and photograph to raise money for Sands, a pregnancy and baby loss charity.

Conclusion: A Legacy Unravelled Theresa May deserves to be recognised as a genuine ally of the LGBT community. Although her early years as an MP included some votes that were detrimental to the cause of gay equality, she has repeatedly expressed remorse for the votes. Even at the time, there is no evidence that she particularly relished these votes or that she has ever publicly (or privately) stated revulsion or criticism of gay relationships. Indeed, once she became Conservative Party Chairman in 2002, May used her status to argue for a more inclusive and welcoming party and saw gay people as crucial to that end. In both opposition and in government, May was one of the most consistent Conservative voices for the advocacy of LGBT equality. She made forward strides on many such policy initiatives as Home Secretary and Prime Minister, including protecting gay asylum seekers, pardoning

64 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-the-pride-reception-3july-2018. 65 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-47409380.

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gay men convicted of gross indecency, reforming the school curriculum and spearheading the introduction of same-sex marriage. Her legacy, however, was incomplete. As prime minister, she failed to implement reforms to the Gender Recognition Act or ban gay conversion therapies, in spite of her expressed desire to do so. Partly because her premiership ended abruptly, after she failed to implement the 2016 vote to leave the European Union, these items were left on the desk for her successor Boris Johnson to pick up. Johnson, however, never did. Indeed, the Johnson government demonstrated some uneasiness about the extent of May’s planned reforms, formally dropping efforts to make gender recognition easier and failing to ban gay conversion therapy. The charity Stonewall was also deregistered by various government departments, over concerns that the charity had gone too far in pushing trans rights over women’s rights. One of the recommendations of May’s LGBTQ Action Plan had been the creation of an LGBT+ advisory panel which would ‘hold us to account’ on their implementation of the plan. In March 2021, three members resigned from the panel, citing the Johnson government’s ‘persistent and worsening hostility to our community’. Jayne Ozanne, a member of the committee who represented gay Christians, complained that there had been a ‘lack of engagement’ from the Johnson government, and various ministers had acted contrary to the panel’s advice.66 She singled out equalities ministers Liz Truss and Kemi Badenoch, with whom she had held meetings as a member of the panel. Ozanne was ‘astonished about how ignorant they are’.67 The two others who resigned were both transgender and blamed the government for engaging in a ‘trans culture war’.68 For all of the challenges of the May premiership, it can be said with some certainty that such language would not have been used about Theresa May.

66 ‘Why is the government facing a backlash from its LGBT+ advisory panel?’, The Independent , 14 March 2021. 67 ‘Three UK government LGBT advisers quit with rebuke of ignorant ministers’, Guardian, 11 March 2021. 68 ‘Three UK government LGBT advisers quit with rebuke of ignorant ministers’, Guardian, 11 March 2021.

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Bibliography Bercow, J. (2020). Unspeakable. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Blackburn, V. (2016). Theresa May: The downing street revolution. John Blake. Bloch, M. (2015). Closet queens. Abacus. Cameron, D. (2019). For the record. William Collins. Turner, A. (2013). A classless society: Britain in the 1990s. Aurum Press. West, N. (Rupert Allason). 1993. Murder in the Commons. Chivers.

CHAPTER 17

Theresa May and Religion: The Vicar’s Daughter in Downing Street Andrew Barclay

Introduction Upon her becoming Prime Minister in July 2016, many commentators were quick to draw parallels between Theresa May and until then Britain’s only other female Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Alongside the many discussions surrounding the style and policy positions of these two leaders, another notable similarity used to draw comparisons between them came in the form of their religious upbringing, in that both were the daughters of Christian preachers. In one sense, this may appear to be simply a coincidence (albeit a highly unlikely one) with little bearing on the role of faith within public life. And yet, it is also illustrative of a broader trend in British politics; that religious political leaders are becoming more common at a time where the British public is becoming more secular (Vickers, 2022). Gordon Brown was also the son of a Church of Scotland minister, and although Tony Blair was famously keen to avoid such

A. Barclay (B) University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_17

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discussions whilst in office,1 he has since said on many occasions that his faith has been instrumental in shaping his political outlook (Crines & Theakston, 2015; Griffiths, 2011). However, the fact that Britain’s leaders have tended to be more religious than their voters on average does not mean that they all approach their faith in public life in the same way. Firstly, there are obvious questions about the extent to which politicians opt to separate their public and private identities. Beyond this, there is the further question of the usefulness of a politician’s religious identity when it comes to advancing their political agenda. Returning to the theme of this volume, political leaders have been happy to use religion as a part of their statecraft (Bulpitt, 1986) when it has been productive in their attempts to win elections. However, they have tended to be more circumspect in situations where their strategic ends are not advanced by making religious appeals. This chapter shows that despite the personal importance of her faith, Theresa May tended to be very selective in making references to her religious convictions when pursuing political objectives. Whilst there is some evidence that this was in part an active choice of hers to view her religiosity and politics as a part of different spheres, it is also true that her Anglicanism was less infused with her political ideology, certainly compared to Margaret Thatcher whose political programme and religious convictions were closely linked. Moreover, it is also true that the Conservatives’ strategic aims did not fully lend themselves to being supported by religious appeals. The rapidly changing religious landscape of the British electorate in moving towards a more secular position as well as voters simultaneously adopting more socially liberal stances on a range of other issues means that there is less value and greater risks for parties using overtly religious appeals. As a result, even considering her strategy of pursuing more socially conservative voters in 2017, there was less of an incentive for Theresa May to convey either herself or her policy platform as grounded within her Christianity. The sparing use of religion in her public presentation came instead via more abstract notions of public service (Spencer, 2017c). Notwithstanding the other calamities of the 2017 campaign (Bale & Webb, 2017), this approach was likely 1 Blair was questioned about his faith by a journalist in 2003, but was interrupted by his then press secretary Alastair Campbell who reportedly said that “We don’t do God” (Seldon, 2004, p. 518), which has since become a byword for New Labour’s approach to religious matters.

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to be sensible given the way in which the Liberal Democrats’ campaign became dominated by questions of their leader, Tim Farron’s, Christianity (Strhan, 2017).

Personal Faith and Public Duty In one sense, Theresa May’s Anglican faith is extremely unremarkable for someone born in mid-1950s Britain. Nevertheless, it is clear that religion played a larger role in her life than was typical of the country as a whole, even during the more religiously observant period of the midtwentieth century. She taught Sunday school classes in her Father’s parish, and even attended meetings of the church council having already left to attend Oxford University (Spencer, 2017c). Speaking to the Christian publication High Profiles in 2003, May discussed how she “grew up in a Christian faith, in a family where Christian faith was very strong, and I suppose there was a positive process in accepting that” (High Profiles, 2003). Moreover, there can be little doubt that her religious upbringing continued to be of great importance to her as she entered political life. “It is part of me. It is part of who I am and therefore how I approach things”, she told the BBC’s Desert Island Discs programme in an uncharacteristically candid description of herself when still Home Secretary in 2014 (BBC, 2014). In a later interview with the Sunday Times after becoming Prime Minister, she described how her faith helped her navigate the challenges of her role. “I suppose there is something in terms of faith. I am a practising member of the Church of England and so forth. That lies behind what I do” (Sunday Times, 2017). Given this context, it isn’t surprising that upon her entering Downing Street, many commentators were quick to make comparisons between May and Margaret Thatcher. Links between the two were already inevitable given that they were at that stage the only women to inhabit the role, which is all the more notable given the general under-representation of women on the Conservative benches (Childs & Webb, 2011). Given that they were both also not only committed Christians on the right, but were even both the daughters of preacher fathers, comparisons between them became irresistible to many in the early days of the May premiership. It is perhaps slightly ironic then that it was their religious perspective (at least in terms of its interaction with political life) that divided the two leaders as much as almost any other issue. In particular, they divided over

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the extent to which they situated their political philosophies and policy offerings within religious language. Thatcher was unambiguous on this point in her memoirs, where she noted that whilst she was sceptical that Christians should necessarily be led to the political right, “I have never lost my conviction that there is a deep and providential harmony between the kind of political economy I favour and the insights of Christianity” (Thatcher, cited in Crines & Theakston, 2015). Neither was this perspective limited to her private reflections. The central Thatcherite contention that the role of the state should be to promote the role of the individual, wealth creation from the private sector and to reject the perceived inefficiencies of the collectivist welfare state, was regularly justified through the use of religious values and rhetoric (Crines & Theakston, 2015). She frequently made biblical references when discussing having the means to pursue ‘virtuous’ outcomes. “No one would remember the Good Samaritan if he’d only had good intentions… The important point was that “he had money as well” (Campbell, 2011). In a broader sense, Thatcher was also keen to describe the moral value of the governments that she led through religious appeals. She spoke at various times of Britain being a “Christian nation”, (Spencer, 2017a) and extended this notion in describing the country as formed on the basis of “Juedeo-Christian values” (Philpot, 2017). Through discussing a shared religious heritage alongside the moral principles espoused by her governments, she was able to both cast herself as a values driven politician as well as offer support for adopting more conservative stances towards moral positions: “These characteristics of our nation, the acknowledgement of the Almighty, a sense of tolerance, an acknowledgement of moral absolutes and a positive view of work, have sustained us in the past. Today they are being challenged … Each generation must renew its spiritual assets if the integrity of the nation is to survive.” (Thatcher, cited in Crines & Theakston, 2015)

By way of contrast, Theresa May has been much more reluctant to link her politics either to her own Anglican convictions, or more broadly to morally absolutist positions. Part of this appears to be a personal choice. Her appearance on Desert Island Discs may have served to signal how important her faith is to her, yet within the same interview she gave the view that “[I] think it’s right that we don’t sort of flaunt these things here in British politics” (BBC, 2014). This is insightful insofar it implies that

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explicitly using religion as a political device is somehow inappropriate, and that using scripture to rhetorically justify the moral correctness of a policy or politician is something that she would shy away from. Just as important to any personal uneasiness that May had in linking her politics and her religion was her conception of Christian values exercised in the public realm. Whereas Thatcher’s Christianity was operationalised ideologically, Theresa May’s faith was manifested through more inclusive principles of civic duty and service to the wider community. This divergence reflects the differences between their religious upbringings. The values that would have been communicated to a young Margaret Thatcher by her methodist lay preacher father were rooted within a religious tradition which placed “independence, hard work, probity, and economic prudence” at their heart (The New Statesman, 2017). May’s father on the other hand was an Anglo-Catholic, and this High Church tradition is more easily aligned with a communitarian approach to public life. Indeed, this is how Theresa May recalls how her values were influenced by her upbring, telling High Profiles : “I think that one of the key things – to link it in with the political life I then went on to get involved with – was the value of service to others, always wanting to help others to make a difference to their lives. It’s interesting, there are quite a few clergy sons and daughters in the House of Commons and I think they have that same public-service ethos.” (High Profiles, 2003)

The theme of public service motivated by her Christian convictions is a recurring one in Theresa May’s rhetoric, both in terms of her own political priorities and in her description of the influence of her father’s dealings with his parishioners. In the aforementioned Sunday Times interview, she spoke of how seeing her father at work meant that she saw people from “all walks of life, and particularly in villages you see people from all sorts of backgrounds… in all sorts of conditions, in terms of disadvantage and advantage,” before going to say that her upbringing gave her a “sense of service” (Sunday Times, 2017). This perspective appears to have endured in her approach to political life. When asked about her motivations for becoming an MP, she responded by saying: “The reason I wanted to be a Member of Parliament, it can be summed up very simply, I wanted to make a difference. I actually wanted to be

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doing a job where I was making decisions that actually helped to improve people’s quality of life. It’s about making life better for people, I think that’s fundamentally what drives me in politics.” (May, cited in Prince, 2017)

Upon hearing this, one might reasonably ask how such an ethic of public service would lead Theresa May to the political right. Indeed, one can detect strong similarities between the way that May describes her approach to public service, and the social democratic motivations of former Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown, himself the son of a Church of Scotland minister. Whilst still Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown told the 2006 Labour party conference that “we should use whatever talent we had to help people least able to help themselves” (Brown, cited in Crines & Theakston, 2015). May herself has recognised how “a Christian moral argument is often put for socialism” (High Profiles, 2003), but at the same time argues that her long-held Conservatism2 is also rooted within the Christian values that she developed during childhood. She describes this when rationalising her rejection of the political left, stating that: “Because [socialism] (and its extreme form, communism) denies the value of the individual, it actually isn’t based on what I would call ‘Christianity’. To me, conservatism is a set of values that recognises the value of the individual but also recognises their relationship with others in society and their need to contribute to a society, to be part of that greater thing.” (May, cited in High Profiles, 2003)

In one sense, there are obvious echoes with the Christianity and Conservatism of Margaret Thatcher in discussing the importance of the individual. Crucially though, there is added obligation to society that was not a driving feature of Thatcher’s political philosophy.3 Once again, she cites the formative influence of her father in instilling this approach. She recalled discussing her first forays into political life as an adolescent with her father, saying that “My father was very clear… that as far as he was 2 May was politically interested from a very young age and was reportedly a Conservative whilst still at school (Prince, 2017). 3 This is whilst acknowledging that there has been some mythologising surrounding her pronouncement that ‘there’s no such thing as society’, and that this is a slightly caricatured representation of Thatcher’s view.

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concerned, he was the vicar for the whole parish, and so I shouldn’t be on the streets, sort of parading my politics” (Prince, 2017). This point perhaps best summarises the interaction between May’s perceptions of her religious and public identities. Clearly, her religious upbringing has played a formative role on her political values, and in that sense she can be compared not just to Margaret Thatcher but also to most of Britain’s prime ministers over recent decades (Vickers, 2022). What makes her distinctive (certainly compared to Thatcher) is her inclusive conception of public service motivated by religion. It is hard to envisage her discussing the moral imperative for Britons to choose between ‘good and evil’, as Thatcher once did in a speech to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (Spencer, 2017a). This less divisive conception of the role of religious belief in public life is reflected in less overt religious justifications for specific policy positions. As articulated by Filby, “Margaret Thatcher set out a biblical justification for neoliberal economics. There’s no way May would do that. She’s not a preacher” (The Guardian, 2016).

Religion and Statecraft As important as a political leader’s faith can be in shaping their convictions and policy preferences, there are further ways in which it can have influence on political outcomes. Politicians can also make use of their religious beliefs and identity when pursuing electoral success. For example, politicians can seek to promote their personal appeal to voters by communicating their values in religious terms. Similarly, they can signal the moral correctness of aspects of their policy programme by grounding these positions within scripture. In other words—returning to the theme of this volume—it is possible to employ religion in the pursuit of statecraft (Bulpitt, 1986). As we have seen, key features of statecraft (itself loosely described as “the art of winning elections”) include devising a “winning electoral strategy” and establishing “political argument hegemony” (Bulpitt, 1986). The role that religion can play within these two related goals has both social and ecclesiastical bases. Social, in the sense that parties can use religion to establish a point of commonality between themselves and voters who share either a religious outlook, or at least share the values that would be associated with a certain religious perspective. Ecclesiastical in the sense that parties can use religion as a higher authority by which the moral value

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of certain policies can be made to appear self-evident (at least to religious voters). It is certainly easy to see how such appeals would be commonplace and electorally significant in highly religious countries. Indeed, many scholars have pointed to the continuing importance of politician’s use of religious language in their campaigns in the US (Albertson, 2015; Calfano & Djupe, 2009; Weber & Thornton, 2012). It is perhaps less obvious to see the utility in the case of a much more secular country like Britain, who even compared to other Western European democracies has generally been viewed as having a weak link between religion and politics. However, even in Britain there are significant differences between religious groups in terms of their voting patterns (Barclay et al., 2019; Clements, 2015; Martin, 2019; Tilley, 2015) and so this presents an apparent incentive to party leaders to use religious appeals in their communication with voters. Indeed, there are multiple examples of British prime ministers using their religion to such effect. The above section outlines how Margaret Thatcher couched her support for free-market economics within explicitly religious language throughout her premiership, but there are also examples of Britain’s other recent prime ministers doing similar, albeit usually to a lesser extent. Despite referring to himself as a fairly ‘wishy-washy’ Christian (Spencer, 2017b), David Cameron also steadfastly resisted the notion that Britain was in essence a secular country and argued for the importance of faith groups in delivering his vision for the “Big Society” during his 2014 Easter address: “People sometimes say … ‘You talk about the Big Society; don’t you realise this is what the Church has been doing for decades?’ And I say yes, absolutely. Jesus invented the Big Society 2000 years ago. I just want to see more of it and encourage as much of it as possible.” (Cameron, cited in Spencer, 2017b)

David Cameron claiming that his government’s policy is literally doing God’s work in this sense is a clear overture to religious voters about its values. However, Cameron’s time as prime minister (along with his immediate predecessors, Brown and Blair) also serves to highlight the electoral dilemma that leaders face when talking about religion in contemporary Britain. That is despite protestations from Cameron and others that Britain remains a Christian country, it is nevertheless true that the British electorate is far less Christian than it was, even compared to the

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Table 17.1 Religious Breakdown of the British Electorate Christian No Religion Religion not Stated Other

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2001 Census (%)

2011 Census (%)

2021 Census (%)

71.2 15.9 7.5 5.5

58.8 26.1 7.2 7.8

46.2 37.2 6.0 10.6

Source 2001, 2011 and 2021 Census

relatively recent elections of the New Labour years. For the most part, this is driven by a sharp increase over time in the number of non-religious Britons, as is shown in Table 17.1 although the proportion of nonChristian religious minorities has also grown over time. Christians are still the modal group according to the 2021 Census, but now less make up only a plurality (forty six percent) of British voters compared to more than seven in ten in 2001. Conversely, the percentage of non-religious voters has more than doubled in the same period. In terms of statecraft, this means that party leaders in modern Britain face a different balance of risks and incentives than would have been the case, for instance, during the Thatcher premiership. Not only is the ‘reach’ of an overtly religious appeal limited to a much smaller proportion of the electorate, there is also a growing risk of actively putting off non-Christian voters with a message too closely associated with a religious identity which isn’t their own. Navigating this has not always proved straightforward. Indeed, some have argued that Cameron’s forthright defence of Britain as a Christian nation was at least in part motivated by a need to placate many Christian voters who were unhappy with the Conservativeled coalition government’s legalisation of marriage for same-sex couples (Montgomerie, 2012). This decision in itself has been viewed through the lens of statecraft, in that it was a key aspect of an ongoing attempt to “detoxify” the Conservative brand and make them more appealing to socially liberal voters (Hayton, 2018). Other prime ministers instead have chosen to avoid engaging with overtly religious themes as much as possible. Tony Blair succinctly put the risks of engaging too overtly with religious themes in political life by saying that “people think you’re a nutter” (Crines & Theakston, 2015). Gordon Brown too, whilst not addressing this point explicitly, became increasingly circumspect about

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using religious appeals in his rhetoric as his career advanced (Bickley, 2017). What then of Theresa May? Generally speaking she shied away from using religious appeals as Prime Minister when in Office. One simplistic but nevertheless plausible reason why is simply that she lacked the space to do so effectively. Her tenure lasted a little over three years, in which time she contested a single General Election campaign and led a minority government dogged with difficulties in passing Brexit legislation (Russell, 2021). May therefore had significantly fewer opportunities to develop ‘Mayism’ in political or policy terms, than Thatcher or Blair did, for example. Beyond such practical considerations, we have already seen that May has said publicly that she is reluctant to “flaunt” her faith for political ends. However, a closer inspection of the context of her premiership and the strategic options open to her at the 2017 General Election helps show that whatever other mistakes that she made being selective and subtle in her religious appeals was not amongst them.

May in Office and the 2017 General Election Examples of Theresa May discussing faith (either hers or anyone else’s) as Prime Minister are rather thin on the ground. Indeed, this is an observation that can be extended to her whole political career since first being elected as an MP. Her entire tenure as an Opposition MP from 1997 to 2010 passed without her making a single reference to either her own religious convictions, or to Christianity and religiosity more broadly in the House of Commons. Whether this was a reflection of her desire for separation between the political and religious spheres is unclear, but it is certainly the case that she only really started giving a view on religious issues upon becoming a minister and later, prime minister. Moreover, even these rather sporadic interventions, often coinciding with Easter or Christmas, addressed religion in a way which was unlikely to attract particular controversy amongst the wider public, or indeed to cement her as a particularly values driven politician. For instance, she referred to religion most frequently at the dispatch box when speaking on the issue of persecution of Christians abroad (May, 2018a, 2018b) but even in such cases she did not emphasise her own faith to support her view. Perhaps the only example of her talking more forthrightly about the importance of faith in Britain was (ironically) a full throated defence of being able to discuss one’s faith freely in the workplace, adding that

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“we have a very strong tradition in this country of religious tolerance and freedom of speech, and our Christian heritage is something we can all be proud of. I am sure we would all want to ensure that people at work do feel able to speak about their faith, and also feel able to speak quite freely about Christmas” (May, 2016). Even here, discussing the “heritage” and “tradition” of Christianity, as well as situating its importance alongside more general values suggests that May was more concerned about safeguarding tradition than making a moral case for a society with values underpinned by Christianity, as Thatcher previously had done. Taking this approach allowed May to quietly convey her support and approval for Christian values in a way that was unlikely to concern voters who would not share her religious beliefs. The General Election of 2017, however, presented more clear incentives for May to go further in emphasising the importance of her faith to the wider electorate. The Conservatives’ strategy of building a significant Parliamentary majority by adding voters who supporting leaving the European Union in the 2016 referendum (especially former UKIP supporters) to their 2015 coalition (Ross & McTague, 2017) in particular meant that they were tasked with trying to persuade a group of voters who one would assume would be most receptive to religious cues in campaign messages. Scholars have shown that UKIP voters (Fisher, 2015) were disproportionately comprised of Anglican voters, and that support for Brexit and Euroscepticism more broadly is strongly associated with identifying as an Anglican (with other Christian groups also being more Eurosceptic than the non-religious, Kolpinskaya & Fox, 2019). Relatedly, Christians (and especially Anglicans) have a series of political attitudes which also align with pursuing a socially conservative strategy. They are, for example, substantially more in favour of curtailing immigration and opposing same-sex marriage than the non-religious are (Clements & Gries, 2017). Moreover, despite her own discomfort at the strategy, the decision was taken to run an almost presidential style campaign giving additional spotlight to May as the party leader given her relative popularity over both the Conservative party as a whole and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn (Cowley & Kavanagh, 2018). The importance of her personal convictions, religious or otherwise, was likely to become highlighted in such a context. In reality however, whilst Theresa May was happy to appeal to these voters’ communitarian and culturally conservative values, she tended to do so without making overtly religious appeals. A rare exception

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came in the lead up to the 2017 campaign via her Easter message, where she referred to the shared “values that I learned in my own childhood growing up in a vicarage” alongside discussing the country uniting around the opportunities presented by leaving the European Union (Guardian, 2017a). Even this fairly indirect reference to religious language attracted criticism from some quarters however. Tony Blair’s former Director of Communications Alistair Campbell in particular stated that, whilst she didn’t exactly imply that God would have voted for Brexit, “even vicars’ daughters should be a little wary of allying their politics to their faith,” (Guardian, 2017a). More broadly however, May attempted to court Leave and former UKIP voters through a harder Brexit policy which involved leaving the Customs Union (Allen 2017) and through secular appeals to communitarian values, most notably through the phrase “citizens of nowhere” (Atkins, 2022) when alluding to some opponents of Brexit upon first entering Downing Street. It is unclear as to the extent to which avoiding religious appeals to voters was an active choice on her part, but if it was, it was an astute one. The dangers of political values and scripture being too closely associated are demonstrated through the Liberal Democrats’ campaign in 2017. At first glance, the party appeared to be well placed to capitalise upon the fractured British electorate as the premier opponents of leaving the European Union (Curtice, 2017). Indeed, this was the central message that the Lib Dems attempted to put forward during the campaign through their manifesto commitment to a second referendum (Hobolt, 2018). However, their ability to concentrate on this policy during the campaign was substantially hampered by questions relating to the religious beliefs of their leader, Tim Farron. His evangelicalism in particular led (alongside his voting record)4 to him being scrutinised about his perceived opposition to abortion and for extending LGBT rights, argue Cutts & Russell (2018). He found questions pertaining to sexual morality especially difficult to address, and after several days of equivocating, he eventually told the BBC that he didn’t believe that gay sex was a sin (BBC, 2017a) but not before his Home Affairs spokesman Lord Paddick resigned over concerns about his leader’s views (The Guardian, 2017b).

4 Farron voted against the Equality Act in 2007.

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Whilst of course the Lib Dems’ underperformance in 2017 cannot be put squarely at the door of the controversies surrounding Farron’s religious beliefs, it is nevertheless true that they offer an illustrative example of how they can undermine effective statecraft. The stances of both main parties towards Brexit offered the Liberal Democrats a much needed opportunity to recover some of the ground that they lost (in England at least) during the Coalition years, and yet instead their ability to communicate their Remain credentials to socially liberal voters during the campaign was frequently blocked by needing to answer questions about Farron’s moral conservatism. Theresa May faced no such ongoing interrogation of her positions on personal morality, although one might initially wonder why following an inspection of her voting record, which in some respects is not particularly dissimilar to Farron’s. At various points as a parliamentarian, she has voted against equalising the age of consent, did not vote to repeal Section 28 and opposed adoption for same-sex couples in 1998 (The New Statesman, 2017).5 Part of the reason why this record would be less burdensome for May is of course reflective of the different coalitions of voters that the two parties were targeting; clearly being perceived as holding conservative moral stances is more likely to be harmful for the Liberal Democrats at a time when their entire electoral strategy is predicated on courting socially liberal voters (Cutts & Russell, 2018). However, it also seems as though May possessed a more nimble sense of how and when to discuss her religiosity in public. When asked on the Andrew Marr Show about her views on LGBT equality in the light controversies surrounding Tim Farron, and specifically whether she thought that an “aggressively judgemental mood” was being put towards Christians converting matters of conscience, she did not display any sympathy for her fellow party leader. Not only did she flatly reject the proposition that gay sex was sinful, she went further in saying that “I think that obviously, if anybody [is] a leader of a political party, who is putting themselves up for election, who is asking the public to trust them, is bound to get a whole range of questions, from a whole range of different groups” (BBC, 2017b). This may be taken at face value as her sincere stance on LGBT equality and the role of scrutiny of those in public life, but it also is illustrative of a deftness when discussing moral values in public life. Despite the myriad 5 It should be noted however that she supported the bill to introduce equal marriage for same-sex couples at all stages. She also expressed regret for voting against repealing Section 28, although this was in 2018 after the controversies surrounding Tim Farron (ITV, 2018).

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of failings with the 2017 Conservative campaign explored in this volume, and the role of May herself within those failings, the selective way in which she spoke of religion and religious language helped convey her values and priorities to voters in a way which would not risk alienating the growing number of voters who do not share May’s religious background.

Conclusion As noted at the outset of the chapter, a curious feature of British politics over recent decades is that leaders have been more likely to be religious at the same time that the country as a whole has been becoming much more secular. Of the six prime ministers who led the country between Margaret Thatcher and Theresa May, all but one either had an atypically religious upbringing, or developed a strong sense of religiosity in later life. Nevertheless, there are stark differences between them in how their religious beliefs are linked to their political outlook, and the degree to which they are comfortable talking about their religion when pursuing political goals. Theresa May’s approach was to be highly selective when discussing her religion in political terms. Certainly next to Margarat Thatcher—who she is most commonly compared to—she has been far more circumspect in couching her policy programme in religious language. On those occasions when she has evoked religious themes, she has tended to draw upon conceptions of public service, rather than more ideologically focused claims about the moral correctness of her conservatism. In part, this seems to be a consequence of her sincere preference to avoid discussing herself and to keep her life outside of politics private. Nevertheless, it is also reflective of a profoundly different religious and political landscape than has faced former leaders, particularly Thatcher. The growing secularism of the British public and the corresponding changes in social attitudes means that there are fewer electoral incentives for politicians to directly situate their politics within religious teaching, and that they should tread more carefully if they want to use their faith as an electoral benefit rather than a hindrance. Partially by evoking her religious values in a way which was understated, inclusive and (for the most part) detached from specific political ends, May presented herself as a values driven politician whilst avoiding the level of scrutiny which was faced by Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron which was instrumental in undermining their campaign.

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CHAPTER 18

Theresa May and the Constitution: A Failure of Statecraft Philip Norton

From a constitutional perspective, Theresa May’s premiership was unique, not because of her views on the constitution, which were unremarkable, but because of a combination of events that put her Government in a situation unprecedented in modern political history. She faced a constitutional crisis, in part of her own making, that was to bring her premiership to an end. The same could have been said of her predecessor, but whereas in David Cameron’s premiership it was the voters in a referendum that sealed his fate, in the case of Theresa May it was the House of Commons. The challenges during her premiership came principally, but not exclusively, from MPs in responding to her attempts to craft an acceptable withdrawal agreement with the European Union. She had to address problems posed by events in other parts of the United Kingdom as well as abroad. She fought to maintain the Union as well as having to balance the need for possible military action in the Middle East against the presumed constitutional convention that authority for any action required

P. Norton (B) University of Hull, Hull, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_18

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a vote of the House of Commons. Throughout her premiership, she was constrained. She inherited a position that meant she had limited capacity to exercise statecraft. Her attempts at statecraft notably failed.

Constitutional Principles Theresa May was a Conservative by instinct rather than as a result of a clear philosophical commitment. As Anthony Seldon observed, ‘she travelled ideologically and historically lightly’ (Seldon, 2020: 44). She did not think about the constitution as a constitution. She inherited major constitutional issues in the form of Brexit and a Union under pressure. She could not avoid either. On the former, she appeared ambivalent and ‘was the most pro-Brexit of all those in Cabinet who came out for Remain’ (Seldon, 2020: 29). This stance may have enabled her to accept the referendum result and work to achieve the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, but it did not enable her to be treated by committed Brexiteers as one of them. On the latter, she was an ardent Unionist and, as Prime Minister, was driven by the need to maintain the Union (Seldon, 2020: 13). A third issue also arose during her premiership in the field of foreign policy and that was in respect of Syria. Again, it was an issue she could not avoid and created a situation that posed a constitutional challenge. These unavoidable challenges aside, she was wary of changing established institutions and practices. This was reflected in the party’s 2017 election manifesto. Other than on Brexit, it adopted a constitutionally conservative approach. There was an embrace of existing practices, such as the first-past-the-post electoral system. There was a statement that the House of Lords should remain a scrutinizing body recognizing the supremacy of the House of Commons. There was no commitment to any concrete steps to reform the Lords, but rather the statement that the Conservative Government has enacted legislation to enable peers to retire and to remove those who committed a serious offence.1 Insofar as any constitutional changes were promised, they were limited and discrete, such as requiring photo identification when voting.

1 The claim was not strictly accurate. What the Government had done was support, and hence, facilitate the enactment of, a Private Member’s Bill, drafted by this writer, to achieve those goals.

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John Major was the last Conservative leader to think seriously about the constitution as a constitution (Norton, 2017: 73–89). Other leaders had addressed various constitutional issues, but as distinct issues, not part of a coherent Conservative view of constitutional change. The constitution tended to be viewed as something to be adapted to meet policy or political goals. Iain Duncan Smith made a unilateral decision to commit to a largely elected second chamber in order to avoid being outflanked by the Labour Party. David Cameron committed the party to an in/out referendum on membership of the EU as a means of holding the party together. And Boris Johnson, in order to deliver Brexit, adopted a cavalier approach to constitutional conventions and practices (Norton, 2020: 46– 8). Party manifestoes moved from mentioning the constitution in favour of references to democracy and rights (Pitt, 2021). Relative to her immediate predecessors and successor, May was arguably the most principled when it came to adopting a Conservative stance on the constitution. What was distinctive about her premiership was the absence of statecraft. She was not able to craft a winning election strategy, squandering a notable lead in the opinion polls, and led a parliamentary party that was not amenable to management by No. 10 and the whips.

Constitutional Clashes During her time in Cabinet, May clashed with both the courts and Parliament. Her time as Home Secretary was marked not so much for demonstrating what she was in favour of, but rather what she was against. This was notably so with immigration and overseas students and led to some adverse court judgements. In June 2012, as Home Secretary, she was held by a High Court judge to be in contempt of court for failing to abide by an undertaking to release a foreign national (As the individual was then released, no penalty was imposed). The following month, she also had to take emergency action when the Supreme Court declared unlawful recent changes to the UK Border Agency’s points-based system for skilled migration, visitors’ visas and family migration rules because they had not been directly approved by Parliament. As Home Secretary, the clashes with the courts were occasional and on policies she had set. As Prime Minister, she faced challenges with the courts, Parliament, devolved administrations (or in the case on Northern Ireland the lack of an administration) and the institutions of the European Union that were persistent, in part overlapping and in large measure

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inherited: she was essentially having to respond to issues on the agenda rather than being able to set it. In devising a response, she had difficulty in mobilizing support. On constitutional issues, there was no governing competence. Brexit May entered No. 10 committed to delivering on the decision of the electorate in the 2016 referendum to withdraw from membership of the EU. The challenge was to conclude a withdrawal agreement within two years, once formal notification of withdrawal was given under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, as well as reach agreement on the future relationship with the EU. Britain’s entry into the then European Communities in 1973 had caused some tension in adapting to the nation’s constitutional arrangements (Norton, 2020: 53–58). Withdrawing from the EU was to prove even more constitutionally fraught. In seeking to achieve withdrawal, May had to contend with three formal actors: the courts, the institutions of the European Union and Parliament, primarily the House of Commons. Within the UK, the courts and Parliament were normally deferential to the executive. That had begun to change in the 1960s and 1970s, but not to the extent of denying the outcomes sought by the executive. A Government, secure in a clear overall majority in the House of Commons, was usually able to get its way. As Andrew Gamble argued, Conservatives were especially adept at mobilizing support in order to exercise the politics of power (Gamble, 1974). Conservative leaders were the fount of party policy and drove through policies even though not always popular with their supporters. As long as the leader looked like delivering electoral success, the party proved loyal. Leadership and loyalty were two of the key elements in explaining Conservative success (Norton, 1998: 76–78). These features came under pressure towards the end of the century, not least on the issue of European integration, and reached unprecedented levels in the new century. This was notably so during the period of coalition Government from 2010 to 2015 (Norton, 2012: 181–193), but even more so after Theresa May became Prime Minister in 2016. Her attempt to alleviate the pressures—calling for and achieving a general election—served only to exacerbate them, creating a constitutional conflict unparalleled in modern British history.

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Brexit generated two major constitutional challenges: one was negotiating the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and other was maintaining the relationship between the executive and the legislature that is at the heart of the Westminster system of Government (Norton, 2022: 1–24). Each was novel. The capacity for a member state to leave the EU was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Prior to it taking effect, membership was in perpetuity. The Article was short and the UK was the first to make use of it. There was no precedent or authoritative guidance to draw on. The problem was compounded by the UK’s new Prime Minister being committed to Brexit, but without having any clear idea of what this entailed. When asked, she repeated the mantra ‘Brexit means Brexit’, without any clear adumbration of the different forms that it may take. When she later said ‘No deal is better than a bad deal’, this seemed to rule out the possibility of accommodation with the EU (Bower, 2020: 298). In conducting negotiations, she presided over both a divided Cabinet and parliamentary party. Such divisions are not unprecedented, but the sheer scale of dissent—and its consequences—was without parallel. Governments conduct treaty negotiations under prerogative powers. The onus for reaching agreement rests with HM Government. Once a treaty is negotiated, it is laid before Parliament. Before 2010, there was a convention (the Ponsonby Rule) that 21 sitting days were to elapse before ratification took place. If a request for a debate was made within that period, time was found. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 transferred this convention into statute, though no use was made of its provision. The key point is that the onus rested with Government and only once a treaty was concluded was it laid before Parliament and the two Houses could react. This fundamental principle was challenged during the Brexit negotiations. MPs sought to wrest control of treaty negotiation from Her Majesty’s ministers. The initial challenge was judicial rather than parliamentary. May sought to give notification of withdrawal under Article 50 through the use of prerogative powers. This was challenged in the courts on the grounds that prerogative powers could not be used to nullify rights that Parliament had created through primary legislation. The High Court, in Miller, upheld the challenge, as did the Supreme Court by an 8-3 decision. It held that the assent of Parliament was necessary to invoke Article 50. The decision was embarrassing for the Government, but did not create an insuperable

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problem. The Government introduced and achieved passage of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill. The real problem for the Government began once notification had been given. In tackling both negotiations with the EU and maintaining the support of MPs, Theresa May was limited politically and personally. She lacked any clear goal, other than getting Brexit done. ‘In truth, May herself had no idea of her final destination’ (Bower, 2020: 298). Her lack of clear goals was not compensated for by political and intellectual agility. She tended to consult a close group of trusted advisers (Heywood, 2021: 469) and avoided consulting beyond that. She was known for sticking to a script and not departing from it. One of her own ministers described her as ‘a carboard cut-out’ (Duncan, 2021: 199). She was not good at small talk and mixing socially. She appeared awkward in meetings with other heads of Government. By her own admission, she did not spend time in the tea room and dining rooms of the Palace of Westminster. This worked against her. Prime Ministers need to use the informal space of Westminster to rally support and keep Members on side (Norton, 2019a: 245–266). She failed to consult them. ‘The loss of her majority [in the 2017 election] could have prompted May to engage more actively with parliament—to establish the parameters of a deal that MPs would support. Instead, she doubled down on her strategy of excluding them’ (White, 2022: 38). She cut something of a lonely figure. This was by no means the cause of her constitutional problems, but it exacerbated them. It left her isolated when things went wrong and after she lost trusted advisers. The baronial model of Government (Norton, 2000: 101–24), senior ministers enjoying some degree of independence, appeared especially apposite under her premiership. As Prime Minister, Theresa May inherited a Tory majority in the Commons, but one that was not only small, but one that had been elected in the 2015 general election. It was not a parliamentary party necessarily committed wholeheartedly to implementing withdrawal from the European Union. Some MPs favoured a ‘soft’ Brexit or even no Brexit at all. Having set her face against seeking an early general election, May reversed her position and successfully sought one under Sect. 2 of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. The result—a plurality, but not a majority of seats— reflected a failure of statecraft and essentially tied the Prime Minister’s hands, making an exercise of statecraft virtually impossible in withdrawing from the EU. In the immediate wake of the election, May managed to hold on to her premiership—she had a difficult encounter with her MPs at

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a packed meeting of the 1922 Committee (Seldon, 2020: 285–7)—and to cobble together a ‘confidence and supply’ pact with the Democratic Unionist Party, but she lacked a majority to enact a withdrawal agreement. Attempts to produce a treaty that was acceptable to both the European Union and the House of Commons proved unsuccessful. A combination of opposition parties and dissident backbenchers, sceptical of Brexit and especially of a ‘no deal’ exit, tied the Government’s hands. The 2018 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill provided for a repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 on ‘exit day’, but with EU law remaining as a distinct legal category (EU retained law). The challenges faced by Government were apparent when it suffered defeats and accepted an amendment by Conservative MP Dominic Grieve that stipulated that, before a withdrawal agreement could be ratified, it had to be approved by the Commons and an act passed which contained provisions ‘for the implementation of the withdrawal agreement’. It also made provision for what the Government must do in the event of the motion not being agreed. This was essentially the point at which the Government ceased to be wholly in control of public policy. Although agreement was reached with the EU in November 2018 on a withdrawal agreement, the Government delayed bringing it before the House of Commons for fear of a defeat. Adding to its difficulties was the passing of a business motion, moved by Grieve, providing that if the agreement was rejected, and the Government produced an alternative, the motion providing for an alternative could be amended. The Government’s withdrawal agreement came before the House of Commons on 15 January 2019. The problem for the Government was that it united Brexiteers and Remainers in opposition; for the former, it wasn’t tough enough, for the latter it went too far. The Northern Ireland backstop was a particular sticking point for Brexiteers, who saw the agreement as ensuring that the UK remained effectively in the EU. The European Reform Group (ERG) of Brexiteers organized their own whipping operation in opposition to the agreement (Francois, 2021: 193– 9). The agreement went down to the biggest Government defeat in recorded history (432 votes to 202). No fewer than 118 Tory MPs joined with opposition parties to vote it down. The only significant vote won by the Government was when opposition Leader Jeremy Corbyn tabled a motion a no confidence in the Government. Debated the following day, it was rejected by 325 votes to 306.

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Thereafter, votes showed what MPs were against in respect of leaving the EU, but not what they were for. Two further attempts by Government to mobilize a majority for its withdrawal agreement failed. Amendments tabled to motions that the Government was obliged to table under the 2018 Act were usually voted down. Of seven amendments considered on 29 January, only two were passed, one calling for renegotiation of the Northern Ireland backstop and the other expressing a desire to avoid a ‘no deal’ Brexit. The following month, a motion tabled by the Government noting ongoing negotiations was defeated as were amendments that were moved to it. Two weeks later, two amendments were agreed, one calling for a UK-EU commitment to citizens’ rights and the other stipulating the timetable for a second vote on the agreement. Neither was seriously contested. Under the terms of the latter, the Government moved a motion rejecting a no deal Brexit; an amendment rejecting a no deal exit in any circumstance was carried; an amendment supporting a ‘managed no deal’ exit was rejected. The House then moved to a novel procedure that of voting on a range of indicative motions. A motion providing for such votes, moved by Sir Oliver Letwin, was carried. On 27 March, eight indicative votes—ranging from approving a no deal to revocation of notification under Article 50— were held (simultaneously and on paper); every one was defeated. The same fate befell four more indicative motions on 1 April. For the Government, the situation worsened when a business motion, moved by Letwin, to suspend standing orders so that Government business one day did not have precedence and that all stages of a Private Member’s Bill—providing for the Commons to decide the date of the extension sought under Article 50(3)—could be taken, was allowed by the Speaker (John Bercow) and passed by a majority of one (312 votes to 311). The Bill was then taken and achieved passage in both Houses. The Government faced a situation where the initiative had been wrested from it by MPs, losing control of the timetable and of policy. It also faced a situation where it lost control of its own ministerial ranks, with collective ministerial responsibility ceasing to function effectively. Some ministers resigned as a result of disagreeing with Government policy on Brexit—no fewer than 22 in the period between April 2018 and September 2019 (others resigned for other reasons) (Norton, 2020: 159). However, some, in clear breach of the doctrine, voted against their own Government in some of the votes on Brexit. Thirteen ministers, including four members of the Cabinet, abstained on the motion ruling out a no

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deal Brexit in all circumstances. Eight Cabinet ministers, including the Brexit Secretary, voted against the Government motion supporting an extension under Article 50. The situation was unprecedented. It represented a virtual existentialist threat to the executive-centric Westminster system of Government (see Norton, 2019b, 2022: 22–3). As Prime Minister, Theresa May was in office, but not in power. She faced a divided party. As one minister recalled, ‘If you were in government… you were stuck in the middle of a divide in which there was no appetite for consensus’ (Leadsom, 2022: 222). Attempts to negotiate with the opposition came to nothing. It was seen by Tory Brexiteers in the European Reform Group (ERG) as an attempt to ‘overmatch’ them and was badly received by Eurosceptic Cabinet ministers (Francois, 2021: 302–3). The Prime Minister then put forward proposals for changes to the agreement to try to bolster support, but they included a commitment to bring forward legislation to hold a second referendum if the House voted for it, a provision that enraged Brexiteers and prompted the resignation of the Leader of the House, Andrea Leadsom (Leadsom, 2022: 218–22). The parliamentary party was not only badly divided, but also started to fragment, as did the opposition. ‘Under the pressure of choosing between intolerable options… an unusually high number of MPs decided to become independents or to cross the floor, and new parties appeared’ (Tinline, 2022: 294). May faced a situation that appeared irresolvable while she occupied Downing Street. She had survived a vote of confidence by Tory MPs in December of the previous year, albeit only by 200 votes to 117, meaning most backbenchers had voted against her. Although under the rules for leadership contests, she could not be challenged for another year, by May 2019 she was under pressure to resign. On 16 May, she met the executive of the 1922 Committee in her office at the Commons. She was keen to have more time, but she was effectively told that her time was up. Eight days later, she stood in Downing Street announcing her resignation. The Brexit impasse was only resolved once her successor, Boris Johnson, was in place, had completed negotiations for a withdrawal agreement and got a Second Reading for the Bill to implement it, had achieved passage of a Bill providing for a general election in December 2019 and had won a large overall majority in that election to see the legislation through. With the outcome of the 2019 election, the Westminster system reverted to type.

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The Union Brexit was not the only constitutional challenge facing May in No. 10. The Union was also an issue. She clashed with the devolved administration in Scotland over the issue of both Brexit and Scottish independence and with the DUP in Northern Ireland over governance of the province. The Scottish Government was opposed to Brexit. Following the 2016 referendum and the negotiations to leave, the devolved administrations clashed with the Government over the distribution of powers that would revert to the UK when it left the EU. They were limited, though, in what they could do legally. The Supreme Court’s judgement in the Miller case in one respect favoured the UK Government in that it confirmed that the devolved legislatures had no legal power to veto the legislation. The principal issue during May’s premiership, though, was in respect of Northern Ireland. The border was a major sticking point in negotiations. In her Lancaster House speech, Theresa May made it a ‘red line’ issue, stipulating that there must be no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. In dealing with devolved administrations, she held the upper hand in constitutional terms. Ultimate power rested with the UK Parliament. However, the politics of the situation created fraught relations. The problems were compounded by a need to keep on board the Democratic Unionist Party in order to provide the Government with a majority at Westminster, while pursuing policies in Northern Ireland that were not embraced by the DUP in the province. May faced an SNP Government in Holyrood that posed a challenge in two respects: it did not support Brexit or how the UK Government was handling negotiations and it favoured a second referendum on Scottish independence. The Prime Minister variously met First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, both in Downing Street and at Bute House, the First Minister’s official residence, but there was no meeting of minds. Although the First Minister described their meeting in November 2017 as ‘constructive and cordial’, most of their encounters were, she said, ‘very frustrating’ (BBC News Online, 4 Nov. 2017). She complained that the Prime Minister always stuck to a script and was not capable of departing from it, even in small talk. As on Brexit, May was constrained by commitments made by her predecessor. The three main party leaders made a pledge during the 2014 referendum campaign to devolve more powers to Scotland should the

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voters support remaining within the Union. Survey evidence suggests that this was not a significant issue for those who voted to remain within the Union (Henderson, 2019: 46–7). However, having made the pledge, the Government was committed to giving effect to it. Following a report from a commission chaired by Lord Smith of Kelvin, more powers were devolved under the Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017. Far from stilling demands for more powers, and cementing the Union, the greater powers appeared to strengthen the devolved executives in calling for more. The Scottish Government also used Brexit—Scotland having voted to remain in the EU—as a basis for pressing for independence. Discussions over Brexit were strained. The Government favoured powers that on Brexit would be expected to revert to the devolved administrations to be retained at UK level until the Government decided what to do with them. Although some compromises were agreed between the Government and the Scottish and Welsh Governments and were embodied in the Withdrawal Agreement Bill 2018, the Bill was enacted without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. Subsequently, the Scottish Government went on a ‘Sewel strike’, refusing in most cases to seek consent motions for UK-wide Brexit legislation. Relations were not helped by the ‘grace and favour’ approach adopted by Whitehall to the devolved administrations and by the Government essentially being in a response mode to demands made by Scottish politicians for more powers and another independence referendum. There was no attempt to take a proactive stance in making the case for the Union. In Northern Ireland, within months of May becoming Prime Minister, the DUP-Sinn Fein executive collapsed following a scandal over a renewable heat incentive scheme. The province was then effectively administered by the Northern Ireland civil service, but it was a case of administration, not policymaking. May met leaders of Sinn Fein in November 2017 and those of the DUP early in 2018 to see what could be done to get the executive back again. With the Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadka she went to Stormont to meet both sets of leaders and met them again the following week. Little progress was made as neither side trusted the other. However much May sought to be a neutral figure in negotiations, she was hampered by perceptions that her reliance on DUP support at Westminster may influence her stance. The situation was not helped by the parties’ differing stances on Brexit. Although a majority in Northern Ireland had voted to remain in the EU, the DUP supported Brexit. Sinn Fein viewed the Prime Minister as being swayed by Brexiteers in her party.

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The Government took steps to keep the administration running in the province, including publishing a consultation paper on how to implement the Stormont House Agreement on establishing institutions to address the legacy of the province’s past and holding a meeting of the British Irish Inter-Governmental Conference. May continued to meet the party leaders, as well as talking to business leaders, in the province. Her talks impacted on the Brexit negotiations, given differing stances on the Northern Ireland backstop that formed part of the agreement with the EU. The parties were neither agreed on Brexit nor on how to restore the executive. However much May sought to find common ground, there was no obvious way of resolving the tensions. She left No. 10 with Northern Ireland remaining a major problem on the Government’s agenda. The absence of an executive did have one consequence in terms of public policy for the province. Westminster legislated for some change in social policy, primarily on abortion and same-sex marriage. Clause 9 of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc.) Bill provided if an executive was not formed by 21 October 2019 then the UK Government could introduce regulations to provide a new legal framework for abortion in the province. Once enacted, and no executive was in place on 21 October, regulations were introduced allowing access to abortion up to 12 weeks gestation. A motion opposing the new law was debated and carried, in the Northern Ireland Assembly, but had no legal effect. An amendment to the 2019 Bill, moved by a Labour backbencher, to provide for samesex marriage in the province was also accepted, bringing Northern Ireland law into line with the rest of the UK. The provision took effect in January 2020. Foreign Policy Foreign policy has been the prime policy sector falling within the remit of the executive. Parliament’s influence has been slight. ‘Above all, Parliament is in no sense a regular participant in the process, either by right or custom’ (Vital, 1968: 48). The Government operates through prerogative powers; there is rarely the need for legislation (Norton, 1981: 178–82). When armed forces have been committed to action abroad, the decision has been taken in the name of the Crown and reported to Parliament. The Government has been answerable for its decisions, but is answering for action taken. Prior to the twenty-first Century, other than at the time of the Korean war, no endorsement had been sought in advance from the

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House of Commons. This changed under the premiership of Tony Blair, when in 2003 he was persuaded by Jack Straw and Robin Cook to seek approval from the House of Commons for committing forces to invade Iraq (Straw, 2012: 375). On that occasion, approval was achieved, albeit with strong opposition from a large number of Labour, and some Conservative, MPs. When David Cameron was Prime Minister he followed the precedent set by Blair and in 2013 sought approval from the House to commit British forces to action in Syria. The Government motion was defeated, by 285 voted to 272. Cameron accepted the result (HC Deb. 29 August 2013, cols. 1555–6). The actions of Blair and Cameron were sufficient for some commentators to consider that it was now a convention that before committing forces to action abroad; the Government must achieve the endorsement of the House of Commons (see Strong, 2014: 19–34). However, its status as a convention was not fully conceded by Downing Street (Coates, 2014: 1; Constitution Committee, 2014; Norton, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c: 166) and, as with many conventions, its contours were imprecise (see Norton, 2020: 33, 39–40). The Leader of the House of Commons, Sir George Young, told the House in March 2011 that ‘A convention has developed in the House that before troops are committed, the House should have an opportunity to debate the matter. We propose to observe that convention except when there is an emergency and such action would not be appropriate’ (HC Deb. 10 March 2011, col. 1066). His statement was then embodied in the Cabinet Manual (Cabinet Office, 2011: 44). The qualifying provision was developed by Defence Secretary Michael Fallon in 2016, in a written statement, arguing the need to ensure that the security of military operations was not compromised: ‘if we were to attempt to clarify more precisely circumstances in which we would consult Parliament before taking military action, we would constrain the operational flexibility of the armed forces and prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of those involved’ (HC Deb., 18 April 2016: col. 10WS). This qualification was crucial when Theresa May came under pressure in 2018 to join the USA and France in carrying out air strikes in Syria. After holding discussions with colleagues, she authorized action. Her deputy, David Lidington, favoured a parliamentary vote, but the Cabinet supported action without seeking a recall of Parliament and parliamentary endorsement (Barwell, 2021: 239–40). Having authorized the strikes, May appeared before the Commons on two successive days,

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spending considerable time at the Despatch Box explaining her actions and answering questions. On the first day, she answered questions from 140 backbenchers. She told the House that seeking approval in advance ‘would have fundamentally undermined the effectiveness of their action and endangered the security of our American and French allies’ (HC Deb. 17 April 2018, col. 207). The following day, the Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, moved the motion ‘That this House has considered Parliament’s rights in relation to the approval of military action by British Forces overseas’. He argued that the convention should be transposed into law (HC Deb. 18 April 2018, col. 192). The proposal was not a novel one. It had been proposed, but not implemented, by Prime Minister Gordon Brown as part of his Governance of Britain programme (Norton, 2020: 40). May devoted her speech to justifying her decision to proceed without seeking parliamentary approval. She argued it on four grounds and made clear her opposition to introducing a War Powers Act: ‘Put simply, making it unlawful for Her Majesty’s Government to undertake any such military intervention without a vote would seriously compromise our national security, our national interests and the lives of British citizens at home and abroad—and for as long as I am Prime Minister, that will never be allowed to happen’ (HC Deb. 18 April 2018, col. 209). Some MPs argued that had she sought support of the House in advance, she may have built more of a consensus, a point developed by Liberal Democrat Sir Vince Cable (HC Deb. 18 April 1918, col. 220). The objection was thus to process as much as substance. In the event, May carried the House. Although Corbyn had moved the motion, the opposition voted against it and the Government supported it: it was carried by 317 votes to 256. May’s action served to delineate the limits of the convention, with approval of the Commons being sought where discussion in advance of action was possible, but with the decision being taken by the executive where secrecy was necessary to protect British forces and the military goal involved. The convention remained as a convention.

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Conclusion Statecraft entails having clear goals and being able to mobilize support to deliver them, showing that the party is a party of governance, in effect a safe pair of hands in dealing with the nation’s affairs. This has been central to Conservative success (see Norton, 1998: 76–9). It requires tactical as well as intellectual agility and a capacity to pursue clear goals, effectively a vision for the future. Margaret Thatcher was good at statecraft. Theresa May was not. The one area where she demonstrated it was in respect of foreign policy, but this covered a specific instance and did not feed through to reinforcing backbench support for her to stay in office. Her tenure in office was curtailed, as was her predecessor’s, by Brexit. She entered office in a weak position and, by her actions, made it worse. During her time in No. 10, she suffered 33 defeats in the House of Commons, the most important taking place on Brexit. She essentially lost control of the House.

Bibliography Barwell, G. (2021). Chief of staff . Atlantic Books. Bower, T. (2020). Boris Johnson: The gambler. W. H. Allen. Cabinet Office. (2011). The cabinet manual. The Cabinet Office. Coates, S. (2014). We can bomb jihadists without asking MPs, says Cameron. The Times, 2 September. Constitution Committee, House of Lords. (2014). Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed forces, 2nd Report, Session 2013–14, HL Paper 46. The Stationery Office. Duncan, A. (2021). In the thick of it. William Collins. Francois, M. (2021). Spartan victory. Kindle Direct Publishing. Gamble, A. (1974). The conservative nation. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Henderson, A. (2019), ‘Attitudes to Constitutional Change’, G. Hassan (ed), The Story of the Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Heywood, S. (2021). What does Jeremy think? William Collins. Leadsom, A. (2022). Snakes and ladders. Biteback. Norton, P. (1981). The Commons in Perspective. Martin Robertson. Norton, P. (1998). The Conservative Party: “In office but not in power”. In A. King (Ed.), New labour triumphs: Labour at the polls. Chatham House Publishers. Norton, P. (2000). Barons in a Shrinking Kingdom: Senior ministers in British Government. In R. A. W. Rhodes (Ed.), Transforming British Government, Vol. 2, Macmillan Press.

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Norton, P. (2012). Coalition Cohesion. In T. Heppell & D. Seawright (Eds.), Cameron and the Conservatives . Palgrave Macmillan. Norton, P. (2017). The constitution. In K. Hickson & B. Williams (eds), John Major: An Unsuccessful Prime Minister? Biteback. Norton, P. (2019a). Power behind the scenes: The importance of informal space in legislatures. Parliamentary Affairs, 72(2), 245–266. Norton, P. (2019b). Is the house of commons too powerful? The 2019 Bingham lecture in constitutional studies, University of Oxford. Parliamentary Affairs, 72(4), 996–1013. Norton, P. (2019c). Parliament: The best of times, the worst of times? In J. Jowell & C. O’Cinneide (Eds.), The changing constitution (9th edn.). Oxford University Press. Norton, P. (2020). Governing Britain. Manchester University Press. Norton, P. (2022). Is the Westminster system of government alive and well? The Journal of International and Comparative Law, 9(1), 1–24. Pitt, D. (2021). Structures of constitutional rhetoric: An analysis of conservative manifestos from Major to Johnson. Political Studies Association Annual International Conference, 31 March, Belfast. Seldon, A. (2020). May at No. 10: The Verdict. Biteback. Straw, J. (2012). Last man standing. Macmillan. Strong, J. (2014). Why parliament now decides on war: Tracing the growth of the parliamentary prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17 (4), 19–34. Tinline, P. (2022). The death of consensus. Hurst. Vital, D. (1968). The making of British Foreign Policy. Allen & Unwin. White, H. (2022). Held in contempt: What’s wrong with the house of commons? Manchester University Press.

CHAPTER 19

Theresa May and Britishness: Towards a Psychological Dimension of Statecraft Harry W. Fletcher

Introduction Statecraft is “the art of winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence… it is concerned primarily to resolve the electoral and governing problems facing a party at any particular time” (Bulpitt, 1986). This chapter takes a step back from Bulpitt’s theory to explore a meta-dimension of statecraft—one that precedes all others. It is a psychological dimension that is unique to the individual leader and proposes that a political leader’s duties in office, expected by the public that elected them and the party that elevated them, must be consistent with that leader’s own beliefs about the country they seek to govern— or at least not so inconsistent as to become intolerable. Whilst leaders might be able to operate without this consistency their premiership will be fundamentally unstable and ultimately short-lived. This chapter will concern itself with Britishness by examining a conflict within Theresa May’s psyche which ultimately proved unresolvable. The

H. W. Fletcher (B) Arden University, London, United Kingdom e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_19

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combatants were conceptions; contradictory visions of Britain and its place in the world, and most importantly its future. Britishness is a contradictory term. Stating it outright is to suggest that it is positivist and thus maintains a consistent definition—it is the feeling embedded in and arising from inter alia our physical institutions, cultural traditions, natural landscape, architecture and historical record—and yet, it has radically differing definitions depending on the thinker and the contents of their psychology. This leads to a confused constructivist conclusion—it is what we think of and feel about the nation. Theresa May’s key task as Prime Minister fundamentally challenged her vision of Britishness. Brexit did not sit comfortably with how she felt about the nation: it threatened the unity of the Home Nations and the Union was perhaps May’s most heartfelt priority. In the first instance, I will argue that Theresa May’s concept of ‘Britishness’ was stuck between a ‘unionist’ family of nations forged in her childhood and early career, and what she was duty-bound to deliver: a more outward-looking global Britain through Brexit—but one which might be structurally weakened through emboldened nationalist parties in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Throughout this chapter I will demonstrate how various oratological and symbolic moments of her tenure served to alleviate her cognitive dissonance (this conflict of which I speak) whilst simultaneously re-imagining Britain’s national identity to make it fit for its post-Brexit future. This is a significant contribution to contemporary thinking on statecraft as it proposes a precondition to the theory—a set of conditions within which statecraft can operate only if met, and without which statecraft cannot be expected to function in a stable manner.

Britishness and the Psychology of National Identity National identity is at once individual and collective. It is the sum total of a nation’s historical past, cultural mythology, public memory, oral and media history, politics and arts tradition to name just a few—and each individual’s conception of each of these facets in turn (László, 2013). David and Bar-Tal (2009) put forward a highly compelling argument of national identity in the context of populations experiencing a dilemma over how they see themselves. Key to their conceptual model is the theory that national identity constitutes a ‘micro’ and a ‘macro’ level. The former deals with the individual’s recognition of their country; the latter

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represents the “collective identity that denotes the shared awareness by constituents of a society of being members of a collective” (2009: 354). Britain is no exception to David and Bar-Tal’s argument. It is a country composed of people who have individual conceptions of the world around them and also act collectively through processes of categorisation and sorting. There is no one British identity: it is constantly changing and to treat it as stable is to “perpetuat[e] a myth” (Ashcroft & Bevir, 2022: 2). It has also most certainly been a population facing a dilemma over its identity following a 2014 secession referendum in Scotland and a 2016 EU membership referendum both of which created enduring identity fractures along voting lines. This micro/macro model is complemented by Tajfel and Turner’s (2004) social identity model in which people’s social group memberships determine their identities. Theresa May came to power in 2016 in the wake of those referendums that had forced the population through a narrow lens and into binary categories from which identities were being rapidly reformulated. Years later, we still hear of ‘leavers’ and ‘remainers’ and in Scotland a similar distinction exists between those who voted to leave the UK and those who chose to remain part of it. In the political world, these identities superseded all others ensuring that no one Prime Minister could govern for all. Although May would identify herself using terms including ‘British’, ‘unionist’ and ‘OneNation Conservative’, to the public, whose collective mindset was focused on the existential questions of the day, she was a ‘remainer’. Humans take cognitive short-cuts when conceptualising the national identity and allow symbols to do much of the leg-work. The Union Jack, for example, like all national flags, is the semiotic summary of the nation, but it is really polysemic, meaning what it represents depends on the person experiencing it (Reichl, 2004: 3). When one looks at the Union Jack the meaning attributed to it depends on that individual’s experience of British life and could invoke strong feelings of pride, disgust, hope, admiration or any other emotion that might arise from one’s interactions with Britain. Transcending this individual experience, the symbols of Britain have collective semiotic qualities. They create a sense of community amongst an otherwise disparate crowd. Perhaps the primary semiotic purpose of the flag is to differentiate Britain from other countries—with both the positive and negative connotations that this generates (Vincent & Hill, 2011). Guibernau (2007: 173) summarised that “identifying with our ancestors by celebrating their successes and remembering their tragedies is central to the construction of national

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identity”. May knew this well. She entered Number 10 proud to be British but recognising that historic inequalities existed in British society. She was determined to change that.

Cognitive Dissonance The psychological hypothesis at the heart of this chapter begins with the idea that Theresa May’s political and philosophical beliefs were not consistent with the duties she inherited at the start of her premiership. Specifically, May’s interpretation of British national identity as a strong union between four home nations fundamentally conflicted with her primary duty as Prime Minister—delivering The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. With majorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland opposed to this flagship policy (to the point at which calls for a second vote on secession for Scotland became loud and gathered temporary strength) and England and Wales in favour it was clear that the Union was divided. How could May deliver Brexit in the knowledge that it might weaken the UK Union? This fundamental contradiction between May’s conceptualisation of the UK and her obligation to deliver a policy bound to at least temporarily weaken, or call into question its structural integrity generated an intolerable cognitive dissonance. Unlike Johnson who succeeded her, she was unwilling to “[sacrifice] unity for sovereignty” (Biermann & Jagdhuber, 2021). Her downfall inevitably followed. My justification for its inevitability is discussed later. This chapter will employ a novel psychological dimension of statecraft that I argue is lacking in extant literature on the subject—possibly as the existential problems facing May during her premiership were unlike those of past leaders but perhaps because May’s individual psychology as a leader has simply yet to be examined in this way. The proposed element of statecraft, which I term ‘duty-belief consistency’ focuses on the individual leader’s initial beliefs about the country that they lead and their preferences for its management during their tenure, compared to the policy expectations of their Party and electorate. For a political leader to be able to govern their obligations (‘duties’) mandated by the electorate and derived from the perceived majority opinion of the country must broadly fit (or be consistent with) their personal beliefs regarding the political direction that the country should take. May’s jeopardy was compounded by not only polarisation within her Conservative party over the issue of Brexit, but polarity of opinion within each Home Nation, and

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between each Home Nation. May knew that she was bound by democratic mandate to deliver Brexit but as a staunch unionist she knew that the polarity of opinion present in the country could render that policy existentially damaging. Being pulled in both of these directions resulted in a cognitive stalemate in which each choice resulted in a weakening of authority. May was not a hardline Brexiteer, indeed she had supported the campaign to remain a member of the EU. She had no natural inclination to push on with Brexit regardless of the consequences to the UK Union. Her predicament was whether her belief in British Unionism should outweigh her political duty. The action she was expected to take might risk it all. The intense discomfort generated by one’s actions being at odds with one’s beliefs is cognitive dissonance. I argue that cognitive dissonance forces a leader into a situation where to avoid the intolerable continuation of their psychologically conflicting situation they must: (a) Preference shift: Change their preferences to fit the brief that they are charged with executing. (b) Persuade and align: Change the preferences of the electorate and political colleagues to more closely align to their authentic personal preferences. (c) Resign: Removing oneself from the situation thus collapsing the viscous dissonant cycle and eliminating the discomfort. Options ‘a’ and ‘b’ above allow for a continuation of governing, whilst option ‘c’ clearly does not. Resignation is the default position of a leader whose duty-belief inconsistency precludes them from governing. To operationalise ‘a’ or ‘b’ requires action over time, it carries the anticipation of an uphill struggle against prevailing opinion. To resign requires action itself, but its aim is to bring to an end the obligation for further action or decision-making so it is unique amongst the three. Leaders naturally seek the strongest possible justification for the policies and behaviours they pursue (Jervis, 1998). A leader without duty-belief consistency must consider the options available to them to correct their situation if they hope to successfully manage their party and present a coherent agenda for government. Where there are no options to rectify their dissonance, its intolerability must eventually determine resignation—that is unless their party removes the leader first. Resignation is the only exit strategy detailed

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in the present chapter as duty-belief consistency requires that agency must remain with the leader themselves: it is only they who know and feel the extent of the discomfort caused by their cognitive dissonance, and therefore, resignation is seen as their voluntary decision to alleviate the suffering caused by adopting multiple contradictory positions (although whether resignations are voluntary or not is case-specific).1

The Psychology of Discomfort Leon Festinger’s (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance has proved deeply influential in multiple fields of Psychology, but perhaps none more so than social psychology. The theory proposes that if a person holds two or more contradictory positions on a related issue; an intense psychological discomfort is generated (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2008). Festinger’s theory further proposes that this discomfort (dissonance) compels the individual to take steps to mitigate its effects. As individuals strive to regain cognitive consistency2 and thus eliminate the dissonance, they might shift their preferences to rationalise their thoughts (Metin & Camgoz, 2011) (For more on the logic of this, see Gawronski and Bannon [2019]).3 1 Secondary agency can be in the gift of others and still work within the rubric of cognitive dissonance as when a colleague or even a rival notes the leader’s outward discomfort and pressures them to resign. However, even in these circumstances the leader is the only one with the agency required to act on this decision. Such pressure merely adds to their discomfort. 2 Cognitive dissonance supposes the existence of cognitive consistency. This means that one’s beliefs, intentions or duties are each able to be achieved without compromising the ability to achieve another. Gawronski and Brannon (2019) make the point that cognitive dissonance and cognitive inconsistency should be examined as separate phenomena, with the latter being the state arising in which one’s own goals conflict, and the former being the emotional state that this generates. 3 A brief aside: when formulating my thoughts on the matter of one’s duties being consistent with one’s beliefs as a prerequisite for effective action, a dear friend challenged me: ‘what about the soldier who is duty-bound to kill when in her heart she is not a killer, and holds no special ill-will against the enemy?’ Mr. Duffy had a good point, but in response I argued that the non-conscripted (that is to say the professional) soldier who has chosen such a life made their decision knowing—well in advance—that theirs would be a task that would involve such killing. In the case of a political leader tasked with a duty that runs contrary to their beliefs, there is an element of ambiguity: that they may be able to prevent or craft what they see to be ill-conceived and change the political circumstances to prevent them having to carry out such an act. This is the difference.

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I argue that cognitive dissonance is a relevant lens through which to analyse Theresa May’s statecraft, and her attitude towards, and vision of Britishness during her tenure as Prime Minister as the decision-making expectations she inherited with the role conflicted with her values and beliefs (McGrath, 2017). Cognitive dissonance is underutilised in the context of political leadership in extant literature, moreover it has proved to be a useful innovation here. It is a concept that is often mentioned but rarely explained. It is taken for granted in news media and scholarship as a concept that readers will generally understand unassisted; a useful device to illustrate when a political actor is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Cognitive dissonance is heightened when applied to the political context as every decision is expected to be cast-iron, to the extent that deviation comes with significant political cost and very public accusations of a ‘u-turn’ or ‘flip-flop’. Such a decision to change course risks alienating those in the body politic who supported your original standpoint, and those within your party who make up your back bench support—if not your government. The ‘cognitive dissonance generation zone’ identified in Fig. 19.1 is therefore equally the space in which Theresa May was able to operate as a leader, in the middle of what was expected of her (duty) and what she hoped for (belief). This situation was inescapable: one cannot exist without beliefs—and the fact of leadership endows Prime Ministers with a solemn duty towards those they lead. As Fig. 19.1 very simply models, cognitive dissonance is an effect that is generated when two or more pieces of contradictory information attempt to occupy the same cognitive space. It is a displeasurable feeling that compels the sufferer to seek reduction behaviours. To reduce this discomfort individuals tend to focus only on informational sources that provide evidence in favour of their committed decision—or even seek out such information to quell a rising feeling of uncertainty that the path they have selected is indeed the correct one. Jonathan Haidt explains this behaviour in terms of the two basic mental processes ongoing in our minds all of the time: the automatic and the controlled (2012: 869). The automatic is similar to other animals in which our brains rapidly match patterns from our senses to make sense of the environment around us. The controlled dimension is unique to humans in that it is what allows us to attempt to steer our automatic processing—a far slower and less powerful process. If a politician lacks duty-belief consistency their automatic processing will consistently generate feedback that the behaviour being engaged in is

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Fig. 19.1 Where duty and belief interact, an effect is generated that has power over a leader. If duty and belief are consistent the intersection is a zone of effective political action—positive emotions are generated and a leader feels confident in their decisions. If duty and belief are inconsistent (as shown), the intersection is a zone of cognitive dissonance generation. All Prime Ministers must operate at the intersection of duty and belief

wrong or damaging (cognitive dissonance). The controlled dimension may seek to quell the rising dissonance with whatever satisfying arguments it can create and feed back to the individual but ultimately the discomfort felt is beyond our ability to internally argue away. Theresa May attempted to reduce the dissonance generated by this set of circumstances through various means. Firstly, by establishing the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) and appointing long-time Brexit advocates such as David Davis to run it, May distanced herself somewhat from the machinations of the policy. She created breathing space between herself and Brexit, ensuring that she felt to an extent that decisions on it would be taken out of her hands. It creates far more dissonance to implement the discordant policy yourself, rather than to be a bystander as another person implements it for you (Chang et al., 2016). Towards the end of her tenure May made another speech

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designed to produce a similar outcome. That is, to distance and shift blame away from herself and onto Parliament: May attempted to reduce the intolerable discomfort of cognitive dissonance by making a speech to the nation: You’re tired of the infighting, you’re tired of the political games and the arcane procedural rows, tired of MPs talking about nothing else but Brexit when you have real concerns about our children’s schools, our National Health Service, knife crime. You want this stage of the Brexit process to be over and done with. I agree. I am on your side. It is now time for MPs to decide. (May, 2019a)

This speech was a device of statecraft. It was first and foremost a reassurance to the public of her ability to govern and her wide-ranging prospectus of specific policy goals that would be achieved if only the Parliamentarians working against her would acquiesce. It was simultaneously a warning shot to rivals in Parliament that no amount of criticism would push her out of office. Finally this move to oratorically shift blame for the stalemate onto Parliament—thus reducing her own feeling of culpability in events can be thought of as a ratcheting up of political risk focused partly on dissonance reduction. As more options were exhausted May could be more confident that her ‘duty’ had been carried out. She had done her utmost to secure the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as had been tasked to her. She could start to feel as though its failure was Parliament’s fault, not her own.

Preference Shifting When Theresa May took power (and in the lead-up to this moment) she was faced with choices, some of which were binary: to support ‘leave’ or ‘remain’ in the referendum, to subsequently pursue a second referendum or not, to negotiate a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Brexit, to appoint a cabinet of her supporters, or from across the Brexit divide. Brehm (1956) suggested that when actors make choices they rationalise their decision by rejecting alternatives and shifting their preferences. Actors come to view alternatives as less desirable, whilst rapidly finding any and all evidence to view their chosen alternative as the most desirable. Actions, therefore, affect preferences—a feeling of acute discomfort can be overcome by collating

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arguments in support of the action you have taken and against the course of action you previously preferred (Acharya et al., 2018). In cognitive dissonance, theory preferences can by and large be discerned from behaviours and can themselves be changed by behaviours4 (Acharya et al., 2018). That is, if one performs a behaviour that causes them to experience dissonance they will seek to change their preferences to be consistent with the offending behaviour, as changing the behaviour is either impossible (it has already been performed) or a reversal of the behaviour carries some kind of high cost (such as being accused of weak leadership or a policy u-turn, both of which can undermine political support). Theresa May’s psychological imperative was to find evidence reinforcing her decision to pursue a ‘hard’ Brexit policy and thereby reduce the dissonance that she was experiencing by beginning to reframe the decision as one that was in the national interest, rather than a wicked problem that she had reluctantly inherited. Solely ‘finding’ agreeing evidence is powerful within itself, however avoiding discrepant information and selectively imbibing information that supports a leader’s chosen path of action—a phenomenon known as ‘selective exposure’ is a potent dissonance reduction technique (Jervis, 1998: 387). May’s ability to govern was contingent on correcting the cognitive inconsistency that had so far drastically weakened her leadership and its psychological toll. The conflict of alignment between her duties and her beliefs could be resolved by altering her preferences towards her policy (McGregor, 2013). Attitudes meaning the extent to which one favours a certain subject (McGregor, 2013; Zanna & Rempel, 2008) can be altered to reduce dissonance. Most commonly this means finding supporting arguments for the course of action chosen, and finding reasons to reject alternatives (Festinger, 1957). May had negotiated a policy which she had initially campaigned against ever requiring and was now fighting for her career against her own party who simultaneously believed her to be too ‘soft’ and too ‘hard’ on Brexit. May, therefore, increased her rating

4 This view is challenged by critics in academic psychology who assert that making a

choice reveals the pre-existing preferences of the actor (Sharot et al., 2010). This view is insufficient in the political context as a leader may need to make choices contrary to their opinions in order to ensure their career survival, or further policies that they authentically favour might be contingent upon that leader negotiating the obligatory passage point of a policy that they do not authentically favour.

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of Brexit as a policy and downgraded her perception not only of the EU, but of her own parliamentarians who seemed want to ‘kybosh’ her at every turn. This method is termed the ‘spreading of alternatives’, as it artificially increases the distance between two or more options so as to maximise the perceived advantages of the chosen course of action or the perceived disadvantages of the foregone option (Jervis, 1998: 383). Despite initially supporting the option to remain within the EU, once May had become embedded within her path towards delivering Brexit it was vital to regain her cognitive consistency so as to make her continued governing tolerable. She, therefore, downgraded her perceived rating of the EU and softer Brexit styles and upgraded her preference for a cleaner break with the bloc.

Towards a Meta-Dimension of Statecraft Bulpitt’s (1986) original explanation of statecraft detailed five core dimensions required for a leader to be successful in their pursuits. These are party management, a winning electoral strategy, political argument hegemony, a governing competence and another winning electoral strategy. Duty-belief consistency interacts with each dimension to a greater or lesser degree. I argue that this dimension’s confounding association on each of Bulpitt’s dimensions makes it a meta-dimension. The implication is that in order for a leader to act at all on any of the original dimensions; she must first have the ability to act. Duty-belief consistency is a mandatory prerequisite for action; other dimensions of statecraft are nested inside it. May’s decision to deliver Brexit was irreversible and contained a definite commitment (Jervis, 1998). It was also at odds with how May experienced Britishness and her conceptualisation of the nation. Her political need to maintain a governing competency—statecraft—could only be realised by correcting the warring factions of her own cognition. Theresa May and Britishness Writing about a leader’s conceptualisation of the national identity is an art, rather than a science, and requires an analyst’s skillset. Rarely do Conservative politicians go on record with a detailed summary of their ideological positions, rather “it is often left to scholars and commentators to piece together the precise elements of Conservative doctrine” (Page, 2018: 113). Theresa May’s enigmatic personality ensured that her true feelings about the country and the world were rarely on public show but an analysis of her psychobiography and utterances regarding

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the nature of the British state can yield robust results. This process is deductive and takes as its artefacts speeches, actions and accounts of Mrs May throughout her life and career. Theresa May’s relationship with the British national identity was forged in her childhood and early career (Page, 2018). In her parents, Theresa Brasier had two community-centric and dutiful mentors who taught her that the social world should be cooperative and grounded in faith (Prince, 2017). A pragmatic form of conservatism, she made it clear early in her political career that the Party should look to how conservative principles can be applied to the modern world, rather than making attempts to revive a nostalgic past (Ibid., p. 113). Deduced from this knowledge is May’s inclination towards building a modern British society that is in touch with the political principles that made it ‘great’ in the past, but without seeking to emulate that past. From this, we can deduce a degree of pragmatism typical of the One-Nation wing of the party. We can additionally acknowledge May’s apparent recognition that national identity is not fixed, but is also not endlessly changeable: it is “subject to both enduring continuity with the past and also change” (Vincent & Hill, 2011: 188). May’s first speech as leader stated: ‘Because not everybody knows this, but the full title of my party is the Conservative and Unionist Party, and that word ‘unionist’ is very important to me…’ (May, 2016a, b). From this statement it can be deduced that to May, British unionism is the obvious default for the British state. So uncontentious a concept—that the Conservatives govern for the Union—that not everybody knows it and it need not be said. That she chose therefore to mention it at all betrayed her deep concern that its political salience would become a key theme of her premiership: evident was her concern that her flagship policy— Brexit—that she was duty-bound to deliver would weaken the political structure so dear to her and central to her vision of Britishness. It is realistically possible that this came as a surprise even to her; a rude awakening from advisers closely monitoring opinion polls north of the border, expressing a need to signpost an all-of-UK approach to her Ministry. May’s emphasis on her unionist credentials in arguably one of the most important speeches of her career was a strategic calculation. This utterance was a warning shot: a signal that she was not about to make any concessions on future SNP referendums, nor put up with Nicola Sturgeon’s opportunistic rhetoric. Some in her party—particularly within the European Research Group (ERG) felt that for May, Brexit was an exercise in damage limitation rather than a policy platform (Hallam, 2019); that

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May felt it necessary to use her first speech as Prime Minister to shore up that which she perceived to be at risk lends evidence to their theory.

Epideictic and May’s First Speech as Leader Because not everybody knows this, but the full title of my party is the Conservative and Unionist Party, and that word ‘unionist’ is very important to me. It means we believe in the Union: the precious, precious bond between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. But it means something else that is just as important; it means we believe in a union not just between the nations of the United Kingdom but between all of our citizens, every one of us, whoever we are and wherever we’re from…we are living through an important moment in our country’s history. Following the referendum, we face a time of great national change. And I know because we’re Great Britain, that we will rise to the challenge. As we leave the European Union, we will forge a bold new positive role for ourselves in the world, and we will make Britain a country that works not for a privileged few, but for every one of us. That will be the mission of the government I lead, and together we will build a better Britain. (May, 2016a, b).

May used her first speech as Prime Minister—ceremoniously delivered in front of the door to remind the country that she governed for a union of nations and to reset the division of the referendum years by providing a communal definition of the UK. Her primary stated goal of leaving the European Union came at the end of the speech and was conspicuously absent during the main body. It was as though the speech was designed to prime the public for a premiership that would include, but not be dominated by Brexit. Her understanding of Britishness was codified: Britishness meant diversity, perseverance in times of turmoil, and above all it was the binding force holding four nations together in one family. May’s frontloading of unionist sentiment spoke not only of her pride in the historic alliance, but also of her fear of it being lost through her own policymaking. A key phrase adopted early on by May was ‘Brexit means Brexit’. It served two strategic purposes. In the first, it simplified the labyrinthine arguments surrounding the legalistic and competing interpretations of the policy into a simple sound-bite, whilst on the other hand it acted as a psychological device that aimed to create an epochal split in the British

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national identity. Brexit meant Brexit, and therefore, it meant whatever the listener needed or desired it to mean to serve their own purposes and fulfil their own visions of Britishness following the referendum. Seminal scholar Judi Atkins (2021) developed our understanding of May’s relationship with ‘Britishness’ in her defining arguments on the subject. Atkins analysed May’s oratory in relation to Britishness finding that the new leader “constructed her rhetoric around an imagined audience of Leave supporters, thereby excluding and, at times, antagonising pro-Europeans” (2021: 3). The truth to this statement is not obvious to me: May had become Prime Minister on account of David Cameron’s loss of the 2016 referendum and his subsequent resignation. It was Leave voters who facilitated her rise to the premiership—a majority of electors in fact. Her audience of Leave supporters was not imagined; it was tangible and emboldened in its democratic victory. Her success depended on ensuring that the Brexit she delivered was coherent with a plurality of Leave-voting views. Crafting her rhetoric to suit the voters who secured her victory should be viewed as a response to a given duty rather than some personal choice wrapped in the tedious national leave-remain identity split. In addition, I find May’s ‘antagonisation’ of pro-Europeans to be a rather problematic proposal. May’s deeply coded sense of duty, operationalised in the binary space into which she had entered left her little choice but to pursue the policy position that had been favoured by the majority. May had no obligation to appease those who had voted to remain inside the EU. Quite the opposite, in fact. Atkins was however correct to examine May’s relationship with Britishness through the lens of epideictic rhetoric (2021: 1). Epideictic refers to rhetoric designed to set out the state of society at that present moment in time (Vatnoey, 2020). It is a rhetorical theory of value triumphing over reason; the leader identifies and confirms the values of their society and promotes adherence to them (Sheard, 1996: 766). The mechanism through which this is achieved involves praise and blame, and to a secondary extent, display (Chase, 1961). That is, if the speech given consisted of praise or blame for an event, a place or a people it could be defined as epideictic (Condit, 1985). Praise and blame play the role of appraising the political climate in which the leader finds themself: the leader shows their hand and makes clear the issues that will define their prospectus. When Theresa May gave the infamous speech cited here in an earlier section—where she apportioned blame for the Government’s failure to deliver Brexit on time directly onto Parliament, distancing

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herself from it and claiming to be “on your side”, this too was epideictic. It set out the state of things as she saw them and attempted to re-centre May as the people’s champion in a Parliament that was trying its best to hold her back. Epideictic speeches tend to be ceremonial, for example, a speech made to mark a leader’s taking office for the first time (Sheard, 1996; Vatnoey, 2020). The leader delivering an epideictic speech hopes to “make the populace more amenable to later arguments” (ibid, p.286), and therefore, I tend to view epideictic as a context-situated speech act where the orator is performing in a ceremonial manner to set the public agenda going forward. It is performance with intention, but it has a hidden personal dimension too. This hidden personal dimension varies depending on the leader in question and their respective duty-belief consistency. For May epideictic was a dissonance reduction device. It was a way to demarcate one time period from another, to announce a fresh start to the public and put a hard ending on the ideological conflict between the all-consuming leave-remain dichotomy. However, it also served her psychologically by constructing a sense that the past and future could be cleanly separated: she no longer had to be concerned over the possibility that her policy direction and actions were not the correct ones to take: it marked a fresh start. What has happened is independent of what could happen next. It was psychological water under the bridge. This concept of a leader’s ability to demarcate—at will—the past from the future and arbitrarily create a new era for their country is deeply fascinating. For May, it was a dissonance reduction device. It allowed her reprieve from the arguments of the very recent past and the space to pursue a new agenda going forward.

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Conclusion: The Inevitable Downfall5 If a Prime Minister is a reflection of the public’s average political beliefs at a point in time, then Theresa May is the case in point. A polarised electorate each side of which believed passionately and sincerely in their vision of Britishness could not ever be averaged in one leader. Her failure at the polls in 2019 all but confirmed this. Statecraft is supposed to resolve electoral problems, but it depends on at least one pre-existing condition. May’s premiership developed fault lines over more than one dimension of statecraft ultimately causing its collapse and her resignation. May was not able to achieve a necessary degree of governing competence or keep her party on-side and united (not that she can be held responsible for this division). Her problems were compounded by the fact of her premiership being so focused on one issue: Brexit—an issue that she had never wanted to be responsible for delivering. Her duty did not align with her beliefs. She wanted to use her premiership to reignite the bonds between Westminster and the Home Nations. Her flagship policy was bound to weaken them. Under these conditions May’s political downfall was inevitable. No element of statecraft could function when the leader is experiencing such psychological turmoil. How could she achieve a degree of governing competence when she had not in her heart picked a side in the debate. How could she win an election when she knew her argument to the public would not be her sincere wish? Duty-belief consistency underpins statecraft and is usually an invisible dimension as the majority of leaders are bound to have it. It only becomes visible in contexts such as May’s in which a dominating policy issue threatens something that the leader holds dear. Had May’s beliefs about the direction she was taking the country aligned with the policy she was duty-bound to implement her Ministry may well have survived far longer. The argument I have made in this chapter requires a caveat: the importance of duty-belief consistency is foundational to any political leader’s success. However, it only becomes visible or salient, under specific circumstances: most leaders do not begin their tenure faced with a single highly 5 As an aside, it is worth considering whether the root cause of Theresa

May’s inconsistency was in fact a conflicting vision of the UK as a domestic place and as an international actor. My initial thought was that a strong leader had a consistent vision of the two. It might be the case that Theresa May’s vision of Britain as a nation—her internal vision of the country—was at odds with the Global Britain of which she was a key proponent.

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salient and polarising issue within which their own belief is weak. In addition, a leader’s beliefs are held to be relatively stable under this chapter’s hypothesis. If a political leader had relatively weak beliefs regarding the identity of their country (both domestically and internationally) and they were pressured to change those beliefs in order to survive politically, they could survive by doing so. Such an eventuality fits within the logic of duty-belief consistency since in order to make their political life tolerable they had to change as per option an associated with Fig. 19.1; unlike Theresa May they were willing and able to do so. This chapter has in no way been an attempt at criticism of Theresa May’s tenure as Prime Minister: in fact it is something of a defence. That she was not able to deliver on the objective set out in her first speech outside the door of 10 Downing Street—of delivering Brexit—was a reflection of her utterly immovable beliefs in, and strong psychological sense of what makes Britain unique and special in the world—a vision so strong that even the pressure of the Prime Ministerial brief could not challenge them. The closing words of her resignation speech outside of 10 Downing Street left no ambiguity on May’s stance on Britain and Britishness and revealed to us that in the end duty had won the psychological conflict. May came into politics because she deeply felt a sense of duty to help people and to serve. Despite the hardships of her tenure, she thus departed “with enormous and enduring gratitude to have had the opportunity to serve the country I love” (May, 2019b).

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Chang, T. Y., Solomon, D. H., & Westerfield, M. M. (2016). Looking for someone to blame: Delegation, cognitive dissonance, and the disposition effect. The Journal of Finance, 71(1), 267–302. Chase, J. R. (1961). The classical conception of epideictic. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 47 (3), 293–300. Condit, C. M. (1985). The functions of epideictic: The Boston Massacre orations as exemplar. Communication Quarterly, 33(4), 284–298. David, O., & Bar-Tal, D. (2009). A sociopsychological conception of collective identity: The case of national identity as an example. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13(4), 354–379. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance (Vol. 2). Stanford University Press. Gawronski, B., & Brannon, S. M. (2019). What is cognitive consistency, and why does it matter? Guibernau, M. (2007). The identity of nations. Polity. Haidt, J. (2012). Moral psychology and the law: How intuitions drive reasoning, judgment, and the search for evidence. Alabama Law Review, 64, 867. Hallam, M. (2019) Theresa may: Defined, destroyed by Brexit—DW—06/07/ 2019, dw.com. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/crowned-definedand-destroyed-by-brexit-uk-pm-theresa-may-resigns/a-49080718. Accessed November 27, 2022. Harmon-Jones, E., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2008). Cognitive dissonance theory. Handbook of motivation science, pp.71–83. Huddy, L. (2001). From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory. Political Psychology, 22(1), 127–156. Jervis, R. (1998). System effects: Complexity in political and social life. Princeton University Press. László, J. (2013). Historical tales and national identity: An introduction to narrative social psychology. Routledge. May, T., 2016a. Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May. Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street. London. [online]: https://www. gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-minister-theres a-may. Last accessed 13 February 2022. May, T., 2016b. Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May. [online] GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statementfrom-the-new-prime-minister-theresa-may. Accessed 21 May 2022. May, T. (2019a). London. May, T. (2019b). Prime minister’s statement in Downing Street: 24 May 2019, GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/primeministers-statement-in-downing-street-24-may-2019. Accessed 27 May 2023. McGrath, A. (2017). Dealing with dissonance: A review of cognitive dissonance reduction. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 11(12), e12362.

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McGregor, R. M. (2013). Cognitive dissonance and political attitudes: The case of Canada. The Social Science Journal, 50(2), 168–176. Metin, I., & Camgoz, S. M. (2011). The advances in the history of cognitive dissonance theory. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1(6), 131–136. Page, R. M. (2018). ‘Good solid Conservatism’: Theresa May’s ‘doctrine’ and her approach to the welfare state. Social Policy Review 30: Analysis and Debate in Social Policy, 2018, p. 111. Prince, R. (2017). Theresa May: The enigmatic prime minister. Biteback Publishing. Reichl, S. (2004). Flying the flag: The intricate semiotics of national identity. European Journal of English Studies, 8(2), 205–217. Sharot, T., Velasquez, C. M., & Dolan, R. J. (2010). Do decisions shape preference? Evidence from Blind Choice. Psychological Science, 21(9), 1231–1235. Sheard, C. M. (1996). The public value of epideictic rhetoric. College English, 58(7), 765–794. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (2004). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In Political psychology (pp. 276–293). Psychology Press. Vatnoey, E. (2020). Leaders’ response to terrorism: The role of epideictic rhetoric in deliberative democracies. Journal of Deliberative Democracy, 11(2). Vincent, J., & Hill, J. (2011). Flying the flag for the En-ger-land: The Sun’s (re) construction of English identity during the 2010 World Cup. Journal of Sport & Tourism, 16(3), 187–209. Zanna, M. P., & Rempel, J. K. (2008). Attitudes: A new look at an old concept.

CHAPTER 20

Theresa May’s Team: Statecraft and the Cabinet Antony Mullen

During the 2017 general election campaign, Theresa May’s popularity— which was far greater than that of the Conservatives at large—inspired an unlikely re-branding of her party. “Theresa May’s Team” was emblazoned on a campaign bus, stage backdrops and campaign banners in an effort to persuade voters to see the Conservatives through the prism of her strong personal polling figures (Smith, 2016). The re-branding attempted to persuade traditional (but wavering) Labour voters who had backed Brexit, were disillusioned by Jeremy Corbyn or, in May’s terms, “just about managing” to put their trust in her party on the basis that it too was just like her. But to what extent was Theresa May’s team truly hers? In what ways were its members ideologically aligned or personally loyal to her—and therefore willing to deliver her agenda? Here is it my intention to consider these questions in relation to her most senior ministerial team—her cabinet—and what the logic behind appointments to,

A. Mullen (B) University of Bolton, Bolton, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_20

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and the circumstances surrounding resignations from, the cabinet tell us about her leadership style. This chapter is not concerned to examine the effectiveness of individual ministers in the May government. Rather, it is about the logic behind the appointments, individuals’ characteristics and their ideological suitedness to deliver Mayism. In considering these points, I adopt two specific dimensions of the statecraft framework posited by Jim Bulpitt (1986), applied throughout this volume, to consider May’s governing competence: i. The appropriateness of the team she appointed to deliver her agenda and the extent to which her appointments enabled policy implementation. ii. From the perspective of party management, both in terms of how the cabinet she appointed was managed but also how it represented, and therefore brought together, the broad ideological spectrum of the parliamentary Conservative Party. Building upon this framework, I also suggest a third dimension which is necessary to consider in the specific context of discussing a Prime Minister’s relationship with the cabinet: iii. Leadership authority—and the extent to which appointments and resignations give a Prime Minister an air of being in control of the cabinet, rather than it being shaped by factors beyond their control (and therefore implying authority has been eroded or lost). To consider the extent to which a minister was suited or ideologically predisposed to delivering Mayism, it is first necessary to develop a working definition of what that might mean. This definition acts as a foundation for later analysis—namely the development of a new typology for understanding the composition of May’s cabinet and how this changed over time and, subsequently, the application of statecraft as a means of viewing May’s leadership in relation to the three tenets I have set out above.

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Mayism The political mission and change of policy direction that May indicated early on in her premiership—which I will refer to as ‘Mayism’—was eclipsed by two factors: the demands placed on government by Brexit delivery and the abortive 2017 general election which eroded May’s authority and saw much of her initial policy platform dropped. In defining Mayism, therefore, we face the challenge of attempting to make coherent the ideological project of a Prime Minister who was not particularly ideological and a government which did not get to govern on its own terms. Nonetheless, it is necessary to describe some elements of Mayism to comment upon the incongruousness of some of the ministers appointed to deliver it. The blueprint for Mayism was revealed to the public on the evening that May became Prime Minister. Her speech in front of Downing Street, in which she pledged to fight “burning injustice”, gave the impression of a more interventionist, communitarian Conservative. Perhaps most significant for this study was her positioning herself within the One Nation tradition, in stating that “David Cameron has led a one-nation government, and it is in that spirit that I also plan to lead” (May, 2016). In addition, she thanked Cameron for his “social justice” achievements (such as same-sex marriage); highlighted the importance of a sense of union between citizens; lamented gender, racial and class-based inequalities; and repeatedly poured scorn on the “privileged few” whom, it was said, would not drive her government’s agenda.1 This speech, though it celebrated Cameron, was followed by the clearest possible indicator that Mayism did not represent continuity and that—despite her warm words—it was a break with her predecessor: the well-publicised sacking of George Osborne as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Osborne himself has spoken openly about the fact May’s Downing Street team briefed the media to ensure it was known he had been sacked, rather than having resigned (Campbell, 2019). The dismissal of Cameron’s closest political ally and the architect of the political economy of his premiership made way for something new—though, as I note later,

1 For a discussion of how Theresa May was compared to Margaret Thatcher in the early days of her premiership, see “Introduction” in Thatcherism in the 21st Century: The Social and Cultural Legacy (Palgrave, 2020).

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Philip Hammond’s appointment as Osborne’s successor was a barrier to delivering economic policy which matched May’s rhetoric. Beyond these words at the opening of her premiership, May said little else about her political philosophy (to the extent that such a thing exists). We can, though, understand something more of Mayism by looking at May’s 2017 general election manifesto, which was co-authored by Nick Timothy, and the commentary surrounding it. The Guardian newspaper responded to the publication of the manifesto—Forward, Together—by hailing it a “break with Thatcherism” and a manifesto for “country and community” (Stewart & Mason, 2017). May’s foreword in the manifesto set out a sense of political leadership (seriousness, responsibility, hard work and being straight with voters) and a vision of the UK (unionism, meritocracy, community), but it was through the (unattributed) voice of Nick Timothy that May’s manifesto was most explicit in moving beyond Thatcherism: We do not believe in untrammelled free markets. We reject the cult of selfish individualism. We abhor social division, injustice, unfairness and inequality. We see rigid dogma and ideology not just as needless but dangerous. (Forward, Together, 2017)

This sense of Mayism representing a shift away from three decades of Conservative Party orthodoxy is shared by Eunice Goes (2017), who saw Mayism as a move from market fundamentalism and individualism towards a different type of conservatism. She states that May’s “particular brand of Conservatism is mostly One Nation, but is also inspired by Christian democratic thought and by the social democratic agenda of the former Labour leader Ed Miliband” (Goes, 2017). For Anne McEvoy, Mayism also represented the conservative politics of middle England rather than the metropolitanism of Cameronism (2017). Mayism, then, was tonally different to Thatcherism and Cameronism, as well as different in the policies it proposed. It was more comfortable with an active state and economic intervention, concerned with societal bonds and economic injustice and confident in talking about nationhood and community. It sought to speak to working-class, historically, Labour voters and aimed to articulate a more traditional sense of what it means to be a conservative as opposed to a libertarian (as Nick Timothy saw it). Whilst Mayism was not delivered in full, not least because May’s premiership was overwhelmed, then prematurely ended, by the challenges

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of Brexit, there is a clear enough sense of the direction of travel to pose the question: was May’s cabinet suited to delivering Mayism?

The First May Ministry (13 July 2016---11 June 2017) Theresa May began appointing her first cabinet on the evening she became Prime Minister, making clear that this was not a reshuffle but the formation of a new government. Despite this and excluding May herself, 12 of the 21 other full cabinet members had served as full members of David Cameron’s cabinet and seven more had been ministers (or a whip, in Baroness Evans’ case) under Cameron. Liam Fox had previously served as Defence Secretary during the Coalition but resigned. Only, Boris Johnson and David Davis had never held ministerial office under Cameron—though the former had been outside of the House of Commons for most of his tenure as Mayor of London and the latter was offered, but turned down, a role. All five of those ‘also attending’ May’s first cabinet had served in Cameron’s government, including the new Chief Whip, Gavin Williamson, who had been Cameron’s PPS. Apart from the Ministry of Defence (where Michael Fallon was retained as Secretary of State), the departments with a foreign affairs remit were headed by Brexit-supporting ministers: Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary, Liam Fox at International Trade, Priti Patel at International Development, and David Davis at the Department for Exiting the European Union. Andrea Leadsom, also a Brexit supporter, took over at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) which, whilst not a foreign policy brief, was a department with a substantial amount of EU legislation to repeal and one the new Secretary of State saw as being a Brexit brief (Haddon & Thimont Jack, 2020). As Brexiteers were handed foreign policy roles, Remain-supporting MPs, largely drawn from Cameron’s cabinet, were handed domestic policy briefs. Justine Greening in her ‘dream job’ at the Department for Education; Greg Clark at the new Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; Damien Green at the Department for Work and Pensions; Liz Truss at Justice; Sajid Javid at Communities; and Jeremy Hunt at Health. In seeking to provide a framework through which to understand the composition of May’s first cabinet beyond already well-documented characteristics like sex, educational background and age, I have developed a typology which places cabinet ministers into one of (initially) four

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categories, based on a combination of my own analysis/interviews and media reporting. These categories aim to identify the logic behind an individual’s appointment: . Personal friends—individuals who I have been able to identify, through interviews, news articles and ‘in conversation’ recordings as having a declared, pre-existing friendship with May. The most obvious among these is Damien Green, with whom Theresa May went to university. . Retained Cameroons—those who developed their career during David Cameron’s time as Prime Minister and demonstrated sufficient competence to be kept under a new Prime Minister. These are more economically comfortable with the Cameron/Osborne fiscal programme than Mayism. Their loyalty to David Cameron led them to support the Remain campaign during the EU referendum, putting aside their own Euroscepticism. A key example is Sajid Javid who said he remained a “Brussels basher”, despite supporting Remain (Mason, 2016). . Close fits—appointed on the basis of sharing May’s outlook, a record of competence and/or having strong prior experience in a relevant role. Anthony Seldon, for example, notes that David Lidington and David Gauke were “considered competent […] and respected by the party” (2019, p. 262). Some of these have said on the record that they had no personal relationship with May prior to their appointment. . Brexiteers—those who had leading roles within the 2016 Leave campaign and who were appointed to shore up May’s position as a Prime Minister serious about delivering Brexit. The appointment of Boris Johnson, who had been a figurehead of the Leave campaign, as Foreign Secretary is a principal example. Table 20.1 categorises full members of May’s first cabinet using this typology.2 May’s first cabinet, then, was largely comprised of people who had served in David Cameron’s government (and many at cabinet level). The 2 A minister’s inclusion within one of these four categories is a ‘best fit’ based on the most compelling or obvious reason for their appointment, not necessarily because they only meet the criteria for one.

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Table 20.1 First May Ministry (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status)

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Personal friends

Retained Cameroons

Close fits

Brexiteers

Damien Green

Jeremy Hunt

Chris Grayling

Sajid Javid

Justine Greening Baroness Evans Karen Bradley James Brokenshire Liam Fox

Philip Hammond Michael Fallon Liz Truss

Amber Rudd Boris Johnson Greg Clark David Davis David Priti Lidington Patel David Andrea Mundell Leadsom Alun Cairns

UK’s second female Prime Minister did not appoint substantially more women to her cabinet than had served in Cameron’s during his second ministry. Likewise, for a government with the mission of delivering the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the first May cabinet featured half as many Brexit-supporting members as Remain supporters—and only one in a Great Office of State. This typology also makes clear that May’s first cabinet contained a number of ministers appointed on the basis they were personal friends. Most obvious among these is Damien Green, but also former Home Office colleagues Brokenshire and Bradley and Justine Greening and Chris Grayling—the two MPs who signed her nomination papers to stand for the party leadership. The first of Theresa May’s governments—in so far as resignations are concerned—was strong and stable. Only four members of the government left their post during the first May ministry and all of these were in the House of Lords, attracting little to no attention. It was in the wake of the 2017 general election that changes to the cabinet occurred.

The Second May Ministry (11 June 2017---24 July 2019) Several ministers who had served in the first May ministry did not get the opportunity to resign from the second, as their constituents ended their ministerial careers at the 2017 general election. Among them was Garvin Barwell (Minister of State for Housing and Planning and later

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May’s Chief of Staff), Jane Ellison (Financial Secretary to the Treasury), Edward Timpson (Children’s minister) and James Wharton (DfID minister). Several other junior ministers also lost their seats, though only one cabinet minister did. Ben Gummer, who had attended cabinet as Paymaster General and Minister for the Cabinet Office, had co-authored the Conservatives’ 2017 general election manifesto. There was, in his defeat, a synecdochic— almost poetic—encapsulation of the night which saw the surprise loss of the government’s majority and a fatal blow to Mayism as a political project. The manifesto, and specifically the social care policy contained within it, is often cited as the reason for the Conservatives losing support during the campaign (Parker et al., 2017). More might have been made of Gummer’s loss had it not also been for the Scottish Conservatives defeating SNP Westminster Leader Angus Robertson and former Scotland First Minister Alex Salmond and former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg losing to Labour’s Jared O’Mara. Whilst no full cabinet members lost their seats, the general election result—and the need for May to re-assert her authority—did trigger a cabinet reshuffle.

First Reshuffle On 11 June 2017, May conducted a reshuffle which saw the promotion of Damien Green (to First Secretary of State and Minister for the Cabinet Office), David Lidington (to Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice) and David Gauke (to the Department for Work and Pensions). Andrea Leadsom was demoted (to Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the Council) as was Liz Truss (to Chief Secretary to the Treasury, where she reinvented herself as a freedom-loving Thatcherite): both had ‘attending cabinet’ status but ceased to be full members of it. Patrick McLaughlin, in contrast, remained Chairman of the Conservative Party and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster but became a full member of cabinet. Michael Gove returned to the cabinet from the backbenches to become Secretary of State at DEFRA and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) was renamed the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (still DCMS)—a change which reflected that half of the department’s remit related to the digital sector—but with Karen Bradley kept as Secretary of State.

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Table 20.2 Second May Ministry (a) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status)

391

Personal friends

Retained Cameroons

Close fits

Brexiteers

Damien Green Chris Grayling Justine Greening Baroness Evans Karen Bradley James Brokenshire Liam Fox

Jeremy Hunt

Amber Rudd

Sajid Javid

Greg Clark

Philip Hammond Michael Fallon

David Lidington David Mundell Alun Cairns David Gauke

Boris Johnson David Davis Priti Patel Michael Gove

Patrick McLaughlin

Table 20.2 shows the post-reshuffle cabinet composition, according to my typology. Following the June 2017 reshuffle, little changed with regard to the overall composition of May’s cabinet. The number of those appointed based on a personal friendship with May remained the same, David Gauke’s promotion represented an increase in those who were not personally close to May (at the time) but were perceived as competent and a good fit with the government’s mission, and Liz Truss’ demotion represented one fewer Cameroon in the cabinet.

First Cabinet Resignations A total of eight ministers resigned from the government between the 2017 general election and the reshuffle of January 2018. Five of these were junior ministers: Lord Bridges from the Department for Exiting the European Union, on the basis he disagreed with May’s Brexit approach; Andrew Percy as Northern Powerhouse minister, Lord Price as Trade minister and Baroness Aneley, who replaced Bridges as the DExEu minister in the Lords, all for personal reasons; and Christopher Pincher, Comptroller of the Household, following allegations of sexual assault. The first three cabinet resignations of May’s premiership came later, but in quick succession: the first on 1 November 2017 and the last of

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the three on 20 December 2017. Though later cabinet resignations principally occurred because of disagreement with the government’s Brexit policy, the cause of these initial examples was misconduct of various kinds. Michael Fallon resigned as Secretary of State for Defence following an allegation of sexual misconduct. Among the allegations made against Fallon was the suggestion (which Fallon denied) that he had made an inappropriate remark to Andrea Leadsom in cabinet about where she could put her hands “to warm up” (Stewart, 2017). Leadsom, as Leader of the House of Commons, subsequently became the most outspoken critic of mistreatment and abuse of women in Westminster. Fallon’s successor was Gavin Williamson, the Chief Whip, who some speculated may have “manoeuvred Fallon out” with a view to securing the role for himself (Seldon, 2019, p.361). Julian Smith, the Deputy Chief Whip, replaced Williamson and Smith was, in turn, replaced by Esther McVey, the former Cameron-era Employment Minister who had lost her seat at the 2015 general election and succeeded George Osborne in Tatton at the 2017 election. The resignation of Priti Patel, which came in the wake of allegations she had conducted unofficial meetings whilst in Israel, led to the appointment of Penny Mordaunt at DfID. Patel’s resignation was unlike any other during the May era for its sheer sense of theatre. Such was the speculation around Patel’s imminent sacking that journalists and social media users monitored the progress of her flight from Kenya to London in real time. Finally, Damien Green resigned as First Secretary of State following his admission that he had made misleading statements about the discovery of pornography on his Commons computer in 2008. Green was not replaced immediately, instead his resignation triggered the wider reshuffle of January 2018. Table 20.3 shows how these changes map on to my typology. Green’s resignation reduced the number of personal friends around the cabinet table, but the impact was more significant given he had been installed as her de facto deputy to bolster her authority. Mordaunt’s promotion following Patel’s resignation did not change the number of Brexiteers, which remained at four (with May thus far replacing like-for-like when it came to those in this category). The appointment of Gavin Williamson as Michael Fallon’s replacement gives cause for the creation of a new category within the typology: those rewarded for their loyalty to the Prime Minister. This category indicates

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Table 20.3 Second May Ministry (b) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Personal friends

Retained Cameroons

Close fits

Brexiteers

Rewarded for loyalty

Chris Grayling

Jeremy Hunt

Amber Rudd

Boris Johnson

Gavin Williamson

Justine Greening Baroness Evans

Sajid Javid Philip Hammond

Greg Clark David Lidington

David Davis Michael Gove

Karen Bradley

David Mundell

Penny Mordaunt

James Brokenshire Liam Fox

Alun Cairns David Gauke Patrick McLaughlin

that Williamson, whilst an ally of May’s, was not a personal friend, nor seen as particularly competent or a good fit for the post of Defence Secretary. Instead, his appointment followed a period of devout service to May, holding together her government (including being involved in keeping the DUP, with whom the government had a confidence and supply deal, on side). He was the first of several ministers who May had to promote in return for their loyalty to her, which spoke to her increasingly precarious position.

Second Reshuffle The reshuffle of January 2018 was intended to strengthen May’s authority after the departure of Green and others in the weeks before, though Justine Greening and Jeremy Hunt saw to it that this was not the case. Greening resigned as Education Secretary following an attempt to move her to the Department for Work and Pensions (a role eventually handed to Esther McVey, who had previously been a Minister of State at the DWP under David Cameron). Greening was replaced by Damian Hinds at the Department for Education (his shared commitment to social mobility with May was cited, but his friendship with new Chief of Staff Gavin Barwell was also a factor);

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Amber Rudd, the Home Secretary, took on the Women and Equalities brief that Greening had also held. More successful than Greening in avoiding a move was Jeremy Hunt, who resisted being transferred to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in a proposed job swap with Greg Clark. Not only did Hunt retain his role as Health Secretary, he emerged from Downing Street with an expanded brief. His title became Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and his department took charge of the social care green paper that Damien Green, as Minister for the Cabinet Office, previously had responsibility for. In a personal blow, May’s Home Office protégé James Brokenshire resigned on health grounds following a cancer diagnosis and was replaced at the Northern Ireland Office by Karen Bradley who, in turn, was succeeded as Culture Secretary by Matt Hancock. David Lidington was made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office, becoming her de facto deputy without the title Deputy Prime Minister. It was conventional to use First Secretary of State in this way, but the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had previously been a relatively low-ranking sinecure held by a junior cabinet minister. David Gauke replaced Lidington as Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. Notable at this reshuffle was the expansion of roles within the Conservative Party, as opposed to government, as a series of new Vice Chair roles were created. Patrick McLoughlin was replaced as Chairman of the Conservative Party by Brandon Lewis (who joined cabinet as Minister without Portfolio). His PPS during his time as Minister of State for Immigration, James Cleverley, became Deputy Chairman. Seldon notes that Lewis was perceived as competent, dynamic and able to “supercharge the moribund party organisation” (2019, p. 375). Table 20.4 shows the composition of May’s cabinet post-reshuffle. By this point in May’s premiership, the number of her personal friends in cabinet reduced further still, whilst she became increasingly dependent upon competent, managerial ‘close fit’ ministers. It indicated a greater degree of caution on May’s part—appointing those who are perceived as capable of delivering and relatively inoffensive to the wider parliamentary party.

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Table 20.4 Second May Ministry (c) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Personal friends

Retained Cameroons

Close fits

Brexiteers

Rewarded for loyalty

Chris Grayling

Jeremy Hunt

Amber Rudd

Boris Johnson

Gavin Williamson

Baroness Evans Karen Bradley

Sajid Javid Philip Hammond

Greg Clark David Davis David Michael Gove Lidington David Mundell Penny Mordaunt Alun Cairns David Gauke Matt Hancock Damien Hinds Brandon Lewis

Liam Fox

Second Cabinet Resignations In April 2018, Amber Rudd resigned from government after accidentally misleading the House of Commons’ Home Affairs Select Committee during questions about the Windrush scandal. Sajid Javid became the first minority ethnic holder of a Great Office of State when he replaced Rudd at the Home Office. Penny Mordaunt impressed members across the House as Rudd’s successor at the Government Equalities Office. The vacancy created at the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government by Javid’s promotion was filled by James Brokenshire, who had resigned at the January reshuffle. Three months later, DexEU Secretary David Davis and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson resigned in opposition to May’s Chequers Agreement and were replaced, respectively, by Dominic Raab and Jeremy Hunt. Hunt was replaced at Health and Social Care by Hancock who was, in turn, succeeded by Jeremy Wright (who had previously attended cabinet as Attorney General). Table 20.5 reflects these changes. Rudd’s resignation and Javid’s promotion allowed for the return of Brokenshire, a personal friend of May whose departure from the Northern Ireland Office was out of necessity rather than scandal or incompetence.

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Table 20.5 Second May Ministry (d) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Personal friends

Retained Cameroons

Close fits

Brexiteers

Rewarded for loyalty

Chris Grayling

Jeremy Hunt

Greg Clark

Michael Gove

Baroness Evans

Sajid Javid

Gavin Williamson Jeremy Wright

Karen Bradley Liam Fox James Brokenshire

David Lidington Philip Hammond David Mundell Alun Cairns David Gauke

Penny Mordaunt Esther McVey Dominic Raab

Matt Hancock Damien Hinds Brandon Lewis

This was largely viewed as the return of someone who deserved to be in the cabinet, but it also represented the first of two occasions upon which May brought back former members of her cabinet upon whom she knew she could rely and from whom she could expect loyalty. The appointment of Jeremy Wright is categorised as a reward for loyalty. It was such, but not for obvious reasons: rather than a promotion based on any expertise in the arts or digital economy, Wright was awarded a full cabinet position as a Secretary of State in return for vacating the office of Attorney General, which was awarded to Geoffrey Cox. The appointment of Cox as Attorney General stemmed from his loyalty to May (and, more significantly still, to her Brexit deal) in a meeting of the 1922 committee. Such was the importance of Cox’s rhetorical ability and intellectual defence of May’s deal to the Prime Minister that he was chosen to introduce her at Conservative Party Conference 2018 in Birmingham. The unlikely combination of the deep baritone of a middle-aged QC (as he was styled then) and ABBA’s ‘Dancing Queen’ set the scene for May’s final conference speech as Prime Minister.

Third Cabinet Resignations In November 2018, the publication of the EU withdrawal agreement sparked the resignation of Esther McVey from the DWP and Dominic Raab, the recently appointed Brexit Secretary. Both had held on to see

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the terms of May’s deal—but its contents were unpalatable to them as committed Brexiteers. They were replaced by Amber Rudd and Stephen Barclay, respectively. Table 20.6 shows the impact of their resignations within my typology. Following Raab and McVey’s resignations, May no longer sought to replace Brexiteer with Brexiteer as she had done previously. Instead, and perhaps having noted the risks of rebellion, she appointed the junior minister Stephen Barclay to the role of Brexit Secretary, but replaced McVey with Rudd. Barclay was a Brexit supporter but not as prominent during the referendum campaign as his predecessors. There is a case for categorising Barclay as ‘Rewarded for Loyalty’, given that Michael Gove reportedly turned down the role, simply because Barclay was willing to defend May’s deal (Schofield, 2018). Nonetheless, I have classed him as a Brexiteer because May committed to filling the Brexit Secretary with a Leave supporter—and that was therefore the principal criterion in selecting Barclay for the job. Rudd admits that she was not “particularly close” to May, but her return so soon after her controversial resignation indicated a degree of desperation of May’s part to return a trusted and reliable ally back to the cabinet table, as had been the case (though not as obviously or controversially) with Brokenshire (Durrant & Lilley, 2020). Table 20.6 Second May Ministry (e) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Personal friends

Retained Cameroons

Close fits

Brexiteers

Rewarded for loyalty

Chris Grayling

Jeremy Hunt

Greg Clark

Michael Gove

Baroness Evans

Sajid Javid

Gavin Williamson Jeremy Wright

Karen Bradley Liam Fox James Brokenshire

David Lidington Philip Hammond David Mundell Alun Cairns David Gauke Matt Hancock Damien Hinds Brandon Lewis Amber Rudd

Penny Mordaunt Stephen Barclay

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May 2019 On Wednesday 1st May 2019, on the eve of the local elections, news broke that May had dismissed Gavin Williamson from the role of Defence Secretary, after an inquiry into National Security Council leaks identified him as the culprit. Penny Mordaunt replaced him, becoming the UK’s first female Defence Secretary and she, in turn, was replaced by Rory Stewart. Table 20.7 reflects the impact of William’s sacking on the cabinet composition. May’s promotion of Mordaunt was astute. She had lost Brexiteers from the cabinet as a result of disagreements over her Brexit deal, but Mordaunt—a Naval reservist and former Armed Forces minister with a strong interest in the armed forces—was unlikely to resign from the top job at the MoD. Appointing her to this role made it less likely that she would join the list of prominent Vote Leave figures to resign over her deal. Rory Stewart had become a vocal defender of May’s Brexit deal and was more willing than most to advocate for it. He was subsequently awarded a post in cabinet as International Development Secretary which was a department in which he had previously been a minister, but also enabled him to mount a defence of May’s deal at the cabinet table. Table 20.7 Second May Ministry (e) (does not include those with ‘attends cabinet’ status) Personal Friends

Retained Cameroons

Close Fits

Brexiteers

Rewarded for Loyalty

Chris Grayling

Jeremy Hunt

Greg Clark

Michael Gove

Baroness Evans

Sajid Javid

Jeremy Wright Rory Stewart

Karen Bradley Liam Fox James Brokenshire

David Lidington Philip Hammond David Mundell Alun Cairns David Gauke Matt Hancock Damien Hinds Brandon Lewis Amber Rudd

Penny Mordaunt Stephen Barclay

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Loyalist Resignations The final substantial resignation is not captured in Table 20.7. Andrea Leadsom, whose status was downgraded to ‘attending cabinet’ upon becoming Leader of the House of Commons, may seem like an odd person to describe as a ‘loyalist’, but Leadsom has stated that she felt a particular responsibility to be loyal to May, and to help her deliver Brexit, because her withdrawal from the 2016 leadership contest had made May Prime Minister with little notice. However, May’s mention of the possibility of a second EU referendum at the dispatch box was a step too far and caused Leadsom to resign; she was replaced by Mel Stride. The second May ministry was not short of resignations from ministers who were no longer loyal to the government but, in its final days, after May had resigned as Party Leader and her successor chosen, the Prime Minister also accepted the resignations of those who wished to resign to demonstrate symbolic loyalty to her and opposition to Boris Johnson. Alan Duncan, who had been Boris Johnson’s deputy at the Foreign Office, was the first to resign in opposition to him becoming Party Leader. Anne Milton, the Skills minister, did so the following day. On the final day of May’s premiership, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, alongside Rory Stewart (DfID), David Gauke (Justice) and David Lidington (Cabinet Office) all resigned to signal their unwillingness to serve a Prime Minister who supported a ‘no deal’ Brexit. Over 60 ministers resigned from the May governments: more than had resigned during Margaret Thatcher’s entire 11 years in office as Prime Minister; this would remain unprecedented until July 2022, when over 50 of Boris Johnson’s ministers resigned over the course of just two days. The final resignation from the May government was her own, submitted to Her Majesty The Queen on 24th June 2019.

May and Statecraft At the opening of the chapter, I set out three tenets of statecraft which provided an appropriate framework for thinking about May’s leadership in relation to cabinet appointments: the appropriateness of the appointments vis a vis policy delivery; party management; and what appointments and resignations tell us about her authority. It is my intention now to consider how the typology I have developed enables us to apply this framework to examine May’s leadership style in the round.

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Appropriate Ministers to Deliver Mayism Broadly, May appointed a cabinet that was aligned with her on policy matters. The appointment of Greg Clark to the new BEIS department is a key example of her choosing someone with whom she had no previous relationship, but who was aligned to her economic vision and suited to develop her modern industrial strategy. Clark had not only been a minister in the Business Department, but had also been Shadow Energy Secretary under Cameron, which made him an ideal fit to create a new department that brought business and energy together (Durrant & Haddon, 2020). As Clark moved from Communities to Business, Sajid Javid moved from Business to Communities. May was adept in recognising Javid’s talents, but also placing him in a brief where his economic views, notably different to hers and on full display during his time as Business Secretary, were less of an issue. Similarly, Liam Fox, a Brexiteer who presents himself as a small-state Thatcherite, was comfortably aligned with May’s post-Brexit vision of the UK as ‘Global Britain’ and a trading nation that was outside of the EU’s single market and customs union. There were, however, some fatal mistakes in terms of appointing ministers to deliver significant, if not defining, parts of her vision. There was a widely held perception that May and Philip Hammond had been personal friends prior to his appointment, but Hammond has clarified in an Institute for Government interview that they only ever had a “working relationship” in government, not a friendship (Durrant and Tetlow, 2019). The logic behind his appointment, then, seems questionable. May had set out—at least rhetorically—a bold vision for change and made explicit that she did not represent continuity Cameron from the first day of her premiership. Yet, her decision to appoint Hammond immediately undermined this aim. Hammond had earned the sobriquet ‘Spreadsheet Phil’ because of a reputation for fiscal discipline. Having served as George Osborne’s deputy in opposition, Hammond was later credited with sorting the long-standing budgetary issues within the Ministry of Defence (Harding, 2012). More significant though is Hammond’s statement on his time as Chancellor: “I wouldn’t say it was a new direction, I would have said I was a continuity chancellor” (Durrant & Tetlow, 2019). May had clearly appointed to a role that influences all areas of policymaking somebody whose mission was continuity, not change—and certainly not Mayism.

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Justine Greening, May’s first Education Secretary, was appointed after a leadership campaign in which May had made explicit her commitment to lifting the ban on new grammar schools. Nick Timothy recalls that May’s commitment to meritocracy led to an announcement that the government would allow more selective schools to open, but that Greening ensured the policy was not delivered. According to Timothy, Greening did not express concern or disagreement to May, but ensured that the media was fully briefed against the government and intentionally leaked—by holding a memo towards a crowd of journalists that could be (and was) photographed—her own concerns about the policy. “The damage was done” Timothy explains: “the policy never got off the ground” (2020, pp. 4–5). Whilst Hammond’s appointment as Chancellor was explicitly incongruous with May’s rhetoric about tackling societal injustices and an active state, the appointment of Justine Greening as Education Secretary was inappropriate for Mayism in a more subtle way. Overall, then, May appointed a first cabinet broadly capable of delivering Mayism, and showing the ability to place some ministers into briefs where their thinking was congruent. Liam Fox and Sajid Javid are examples of ministers who were economically more Thatcherite, by their own definition, but were comfortably aligned with May in the areas to which she appointed them. However, a small number of ministerial appointments proved to be so out of sync with Mayism that—even aside from the challenge of delivering Brexit—it is questionable whether she would have succeeded in doing so. Party Management My typology indicates that May sought to balance the cabinet throughout her premiership, until the volume of resignations made her much more inclined towards loyalty. She initially appointed a number of those with whom she was personally close, as well as ‘rising stars’ of Cameron’s cabinet, leading Brexiteers (some of whom had supported Andrea Leadsom’s leadership bid), and a series of ministers who were respected across the party for their competence or suitedness to a role (e.g. Gauke, Lewis, Lidington). She was, admittedly, limited when it came to appointments for the Wales and Scotland Secretaries.

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May was initially successful in appointing ministers that strengthened her own position. Handing foreign policy briefs to leading Leavesupporting MPs indicated that she was serious about delivering Brexit. That Boris Johnson was in her cabinet and vocal Remain supporter Anna Soubry was only offered (but declined) a junior ministerial role added weight to the ‘Brexit means Brexit’ slogan she had developed during her leadership campaign and carried into her premiership (Timothy, 2020, p.4). However, this logic collided with the reality of her Brexit deal not being palatable to the token Brexiteers she appointed to these roles, leading her to abandon the strategy and appoint Remain-supporting Jeremy Hunt as Foreign Secretary. May required a lot of goodwill from the Brexiteers in the cabinet. Leadsom has described tolerating more than was acceptable to her, in terms of the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, because of a responsibility she felt to May. Others (Johnson, Raab, McVey) did not demonstrate this same goodwill. McVey’s resignation letter demonstrated a flaw with May’s approach to managing the Brexiteers. Having invented the phrase ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’, May gave the Brexiteers the impression that exiting the EU without a deal was an option she would consider when, in reality, it proved untrue. But as this became clearer, Brexiteers held this against May—with McVey stating in her resignation letter: “We have gone from no deal is better than a bad deal, to any deal is better than no deal. I cannot defend this, and I cannot vote for this deal” (Herbert, 2018). The wider consequence of this was that these leading Brexiteers were given a platform from which to resign, declaring that May was not serious about delivering Brexit, and thereby signalling to the wider parliamentary Conservative Party (some of whom, like Ben Bradley, had voted Remain but developed the zeal of the convert) that May’s deal was unworthy of their support. Leadership Authority Here, I am concerned to ask if ministerial appointments and resignations strengthened or weakened May’s authority. The sacking of George Osborne and Michael Gove, when appointing her first cabinet, allowed May to demonstrate serious authority when dismissing two ‘big beasts’ of the Cameron era. In appointing a cabinet that drew upon her close friends, those close to the Cameron project,

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people who had proven themselves competent ministers, and a selection of key Brexiteers, May assembled a cabinet that drew upon the full spectrum of the parliamentary party. Moreover, appointing Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary, despite his well-document personal ambition and selfserving nature, suggested May possessed a level of self-confidence in her leadership sufficient to include him in her top team. Then, throughout her premiership, several controversial circumstances enabled May to demonstrate strong leadership when dealing with ethical and moral issues: accepting the resignation of Michael Fallon, forcing the resignation of Priti Patel and actively sacking Gavin Williamson are the standout examples. But Timothy also notes that this occurred in private too: May did not re-appoint Stephen Crabb, formerly Work and Pensions Secretary, because he could not guarantee allegations about his sexual misconduct—of which there had already been an instance—would not continue (2020, p. 4). Beyond these examples though, other appointments and resignations gradually eroded May’s authority. Damien Green’s resignation was different to Fallon’s and Patel’s (which came at the same time) in so far as he was personally close to May and was resigning from a position to which he had been appointed to shore up her authority. That someone close to her, and in this position, resigned over an historic cover up created a greater sense of governing crisis. This was furthered by the resignation of Greening and Hunt’s unwillingness to move from Health: it signalled that she was not able to move ministers in her cabinet, nor able to retain even her own friends in government. May ended up appointing people to her cabinet who were not there for any reason other than they demonstrated loyalty to her—and, in needing to reward loyalty—it exposed her diminishing support within the parliamentary party. The appointment of Gavin Williamson was explicitly for this reason: his appropriateness for the role was questioned by even his own side and it was widely commented that his promotion was because May owed him. By the end of her premiership, the sheer volume of resignations from the government undermined May’s authority to the extent that it forced her resignation.

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Conclusion Theresa May appointed a cabinet that was high-risk, high-reward—but her gamble did not pay off. The appointments of Philip Hammond and Justine Greening represented a serious error of judgement. Both were experienced, competent ministers who were capable of leading major government departments and successfully delivering policy outcomes. Yet, neither of them were aligned with Mayism: Greening on the flagship grammar schools policy and Hammond, more broadly, on the theme of economic intervention and tackling burning injustices that was central to May’s premiership. As May tried to set out a different vision, Hammond—by his own admission—represented continuity in a department that had the ability to constrain all other government departments. Likewise, the appointment of leading Brexiteers was a mixed blessing. Priti Patel was removed for reasons relating to her conduct as a minister which allowed May to show some authority, but others who were appointed solely because they were Brexit supporters—David Davis, Boris Johnson, Dominic Raab, Esther McVey and others—undermined May’s credibility as someone committed to a ‘proper’ Brexit and, by extension, made impossible her ambition to gain the support of her own parliamentary party for her deal. She was able to retain those Brexit supporters who were personally loyal to her (Fox, Grayling, Evans), Mordaunt via a strategically sensible promotion to Defence Secretary and Gove, by acquiescing when he resisted a move to DExEu. But the figureheads of the Leave campaign, once they had resigned, were able to turn the parliamentary party’s Brexit supporters against her and ultimately use her lack of parliamentary majority against her.

References Bulpitt, J. (1986). The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s domestic statecraft. Political Studies, XXXIV , 19–39. Campbell, A. (2019). George Osborne: ‘I’ve sat down and had a drink with Theresa May since all of this’. [Online]. Accessed 10 December 2022. Available from: https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/george-osborne-theresamay-interview Durrant, T., & Haddon, C. (2020). Greg Clark [Online]. Accessed 2 March 2023. Available from: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/ministersreflect/greg-clark

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Durrant, T., & Lilley, A. (2020). Amber Rudd [Online]. Accessed 2 March 2023. Available from: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/ministersreflect/amber-rudd Durrant, T., & Tetlow, G. (2019). Philip Hammond [Online]. Accessed 2 March 2023. Available from: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/ministersreflect/philip-hammond Goes, E. (2017). Defining Mayism: One nation Conservatism with a hint of papal purple and a dash of Labour red [Online]. Accessed 9 December 2022. Available from: https://ukandeu.ac.uk/defining-mayism-one-nation-conservatismwith-a-hint-of-papal-purple-and-a-dash-of-labour-red/ Haddon, C., & Thimont Jack, M. (2020). Andrea Leadsom [Online]. Accessed 2 March 2023. Available from: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/ ministers-reflect/andrea-leadsom Harding, T. (2012). MoD balances books first time in four decades, Defence Secretary to announce [Online]. Accessed 1 March 2023. Available from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9086975/MoD-bal ances-books-first-time-in-four-decades-Defence-Secretary-to-announce.html Herbert, T. (2018). Esther McVey’s savage resignation letter in full: It’s obvious to everyone Brexit deal doesn’t honour referendum [Online]. Accessed 3 March 2023. Available from: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/esther-mcveybrexit-resignation-letter-in-full-a3990846.html Mason, R. (2016). Sajid Javid remains ‘Brussels basher’ despite being against Brexit [Online]. Accessed 10 December 2022. Available from: https://www. theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/03/sajid-javid-remains-brussels-basherdespite-being-against-brexit May, T. (2016, July 13). Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May. Downing Street. McAvoy, A. (2016). What is ‘Mayism’? The PM must move fast to explain her vision [Online]. Accessed 9 December 2022. Available from: https://www. theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/13/theresa-may-must-explainher-vision Parker, G. et al. (2017). Theresa May’s ‘dementia tax’ triggers Conservative backlash [Online]. Accessed 10 December 2022. Available from: https://www.ft. com/content/82ff3a76-3c98-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec Schofield, K. (2018). Michael Gove considering his future after turning down PM’s offer to become Brexit Secretary [Online]. Accessed 10 December 2022. Available from: https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/michael-gove-con sidering-his-future-after-turning-down-pms-offer-to-become-brexit-secretary Seldon, A. (2019). May at 10. Biteback Publishing. Smith, M. (2016). Theresa May is Britain’s most popular politician [Online]. Accessed 6 August 2022. Available from: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/ politics/articles-reports/2016/08/15/theresa-may-more-popular-jeremy-cor byn-among-tradi

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Stewart, H. (2017). Michael Fallon quit ‘over lewd comments made to Andrea Leadsom’ [Online]. Accessed 9 December 2022. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/02/michael-fallonresigned-defence-secretary-andrea-leadsom Stewart, H., & Mason, R. (2017). May signals break with Thatcherism in manifesto for ‘country and community’ [Online]. Accessed 9 December 2022. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/18/the resa-may-launches-conservative-manifesto-for-community-and-country Timothy, N. (2020). Remaking one nation: The future of conservatism. Polity. University of Lancaster. (2017). Forward, together [Online]. Accessed 1 December 2022. https://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ukmanifestos2017/loc alpdf/Conservatives.pdf

CHAPTER 21

Conclusion: Statecraft, Policies, and Politics of Prime Minister Theresa May Andrew S. Roe-Crines and David Jeffery

The objective of this book has been to critically evaluate Theresa May’s leadership of the Conservative Party across a range of defining issues related to her premiership, namely electoral issues, policy implementation, and political debates. They have been chosen because they represent important issues that enable a better understanding of her time as prime minister of the United Kingdom, her legacy (if any) for the Conservative Party, and her impact on British Politics more broadly. The spread of issues enabled us to explore whether May truly was able to foster an effective model of governing statecraft or left a lasting legacy. The contributor(s) for each chapter analysed May’s leadership by employing statecraft as an analytical window, thereby testing its utility as a theoretical framework for evaluating her leadership, her policy formulation, and her political engagement (Bulpitt, 1986). The focus on statecraft

A. S. Roe-Crines · D. Jeffery (B) Department of Politics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK e-mail: [email protected] A. S. Roe-Crines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7_21

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produces a consistent concept that binds the chapters together thematically, whilst simultaneously enabling a wider discussion of political and governing motivations across the issues that have been interrogated by contributors. Each chapter considers May’s role and contributions towards the respective themes, thereby enabling us to place her leadership at the centre of each analysis. As part of the summation of overall arguments, it would be prudent to say a few words on the utility of statecraft as an intellectual framework for evaluating leadership. For our study, we mean statecraft as an analytical framework that has enabled contributors to examine the topic of scholastic concern by using it to evaluate May’s leadership (James & Buller, 2015). Party management binds together the majority of the chapter themes, particularly in terms leadership and electoral performance. Specifically, however, the chapters that focused on party management noted her overall deficiencies as a party manager during the 2017 general election, and as a unifier over the course of the Brexit negotiations (Chapters 2–5, 14, and 20). Her capacity to demonstrate management skills are also deficient in areas of ideological renewal (Chapter 12) and constitutional reform (Chapter 18), however, where she demonstrated more success was in the articulation of her values in areas of internal party renewal on social issues (Chapters 8 and 13). It is also worth remembering that her management skills proved effective in her campaign for the party leadership (Chapter 2), thereby leading to the conclusion that her management may enjoy variable levels of success depending on her capacity to wield her authority and the broader political context. This also fed into another vital area of effective statecraft vis-à-vis winning the battles of ideas to create a state of argument hegemony. Here, May enjoyed more success in areas of LGBTQ rights, feminism, and in the areas of national identity (Chapters 15, 16, and 19). Her effectiveness here can be linked to an overarching belief that the battle of ideas in areas of the Union, economic policy, individual rights, issues of faith, and patriotism are aspects of a wider sense of national identity (Chapters 7, 17, and 19). By doing so, May would be able to convey a conception of conservatism that fitted with the modernisation ambitions of her predecessor, namely social conservatism, economic liberalism, and ‘Global Britain’ (Chapters 12 and 13; Heppell, 2019). These ideas were fundamental to her objectives as a Prime Minister, and so provided her with opportunities to engage in conservative renewal. More broadly, she

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would also seek to retain positive relations with the United States during the Presidency of Donald Trump despite saying she ‘never knew what to expect’ from the former President (Adkins, 2021), alongside seeking to demonstrate the wider importance of British foreign policy beyond the US (Chapter 6). As mentioned above, her capacity to develop an electorally winning strategy went into reverse following the local elections in 2017 (Chapter 3). Prior to this point, the general assumption of commentators and political pundits was that the Conservative Party would be highly likely to win a general election following Labour’s decision to choose Jeremy Corbyn as their leader (Helm, 2017) with the assumption being that Corbyn would prove highly divisive and so repeat the election disaster of 1983 (Denham et al., 2020: 203). However, it would not be until 2019 when this assumption played out, by which time May had stood down as Conservative leader. Rather, her electoral record would be the ill-fated 2017 general election, in which she found herself against Corbyn the confident and seasoned campaigner (Denham et al., 2020: 192). She, however, lacked the electioneering experience of Corbyn—for example, she remained behind the scenes during the Brexit referendum, and then faced a shortened Conservative leadership election when Andrea Leadsom withdrew (Jeffery et al., 2017). As such, May had not been afforded the opportunities to explain to sceptical audiences why she wanted to be Prime Minister, meaning her capacity to demonstrate electoral skills and a winning strategy were left undeveloped, thereby representing a significant deficiency in her capacity to demonstrate effective statecraft in this area. In terms of governing competence, May’s capacity to choose specific policies, manage implementation, foster an image of competence, whilst ensuring those policies were capable of being delivered were challenged by the wider circumstances that she faced. As Brexit continued to dominate, she would be unable to foster a wider political narrative on issues such as environmental policy, Northern Ireland, race relations, or mental health policy despite being active in each of these areas (Chapters 5 and 8–11). This disconnect meant that May would be unable to demonstrate a generalised sense of governing competence because of wider party issues such as rebellions and post-2017 Parliamentary arithmetic which made the daily operations of governance a spaghetti junction of problematic turns and pitfalls. As the chapters have demonstrated, however, efforts were made to pursue a complete programme of government, which were curtailed by wider circumstances.

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A legacy is largely defined by the capacity of successors to retain or continue a practice introduced by the predecessor. Needless to say, Brexit has and always will dominate such considerations because of the reach of its impact. Even where May and her government attempted to pursue policies unconnected to Brexit or the European Union, evidence of Brexit impact can be found. This singular issue textured her premiership and tainted attempts to retain a legacy. Despite this, May’s determination to govern in what she saw as the national interest motivated her time as Prime Minister, which is a conclusion that may be shadowed for as long as Brexit continues to dominate Conservative party politics. Because of this continuation, it is difficult to recognise an immediate legacy which those leaders that have followed May would be inclined to preserve. However, if an enduring legacy is to be found, it will likely be in an area of genuine passion such as mental health policy, environment policy, or social policy, as these are the areas where she could make a difference to improve the country she loved.

Bibliography Adkins, W. (2021, January 20). Theresa May on Trump. Politico. https://www. politico.eu/article/theresa-may-uk-lost-moral-leadership-when-it-cut-foreignaid-donald-trump-boris-johnson/. Accessed 12 February 2023. Bulpitt, J. (1986). The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s domestic statecraft. Political Studies, 34(1), 19–39. Denham, A., Roe-Crines, A., & Dorey, P. (2020). Choosing party leaders: Britain’s conservatives and labour compared. Manchester University Press. Helm, T. (2017, April 22). Conservatives on course for landslide victory in election, poll suggests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ politics/2017/apr/22/opinium-observer-poll-conservatives-way-ahead-oflabour. Accessed 12 February 2023. Heppell, T. (2019). Cameronism. Manchester University Press. James, T., & Buller, R. (2015). Statecraft: A framework for assessing conservative leaders. British Conservative Leaders. London: Biteback. Jeffery, D., Heppell, T., Hayton, R., & Crines, A. (2017). The Conservative Party leadership election of 2016: An analysis of voting motivations of conservative parliamentarians. Parliamentary Affairs, 71(2), 263–282.

Index

A Abortion, 183, 297, 298, 300, 340, 358 Adam Smith Institute, 250 Africa, 95, 99 Ahmad, Lord, 165, 166 Allen, Nicholas, 18, 23, 38, 71, 77, 78, 98, 99, 248, 272, 273, 340 Andrew Marr Show, The, 203, 341 Arab Spring, 36 Argentina, 99 Asia, 95 AstraZeneca, 128 A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 368 Atkins, Judi, 18, 28, 39, 52, 55, 60, 239, 252, 340, 376 Attlee, Clement, 120, 264 Australasia, 99 Australia, 99, 210 Autumn Statement, 124

2016, 124, 249

B Badenoch, Kemi, 326 Bale, Tim, 14, 23–25, 42, 53, 180, 206, 207, 252, 330 Bank of England, 26, 51, 125, 130 Carney, Mark, 26, 131 Barwell, Gavin, 171, 249, 255, 256, 270, 273, 274, 276, 280, 359, 389, 393 BBC News BBC Election Debate, 60 Question Time, 41, 295 Belfast Newsletter, 190 Belfast Telegraph, 185, 191 Bercow, John, 58, 315, 316, 354 ‘Big Society’, 227, 336

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. S. Roe-Crines and D. Jeffery (eds.), Statecraft, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32472-7

411

412

INDEX

Birmingham, 76, 127, 128, 165, 245, 322, 396 Black, Asian, Minority, Ethnic (BAME), 155, 201, 208, 209 Blair, Tony, 50, 264, 266, 267, 271, 276, 283, 315, 324, 329, 330, 336–338, 340, 359 Bone, Peter, 57 Bonn, Germany, 165 Britannia Unchained, 235 British Empire, 322 Overseas Territory, 163 British Irish Inter-Governmental Conference, 358 British Nationalities Act 1948, 210 Britishness, 363, 364, 369, 373–376, 378, 379 British politics, 2, 4, 119, 213, 254, 263, 329, 342, 407 Brown, Gordon, 264, 266, 267, 271, 276, 281, 324, 329, 334, 336, 337, 360 Bryson, Valerie, 172, 289, 293, 294, 300–302 Building Our Industrial Strategy, 129 ‘Burning injustices’, 18, 53, 60, 119, 132, 199, 201, 207–209, 214, 239, 245, 251, 254, 255, 257, 272, 404 Butler, Dawn, 298 Butler, Rab, 220

C Cameron, David, 1, 3, 7, 13–19, 26, 27, 33–37, 40, 49, 51, 54, 55, 70, 71, 101, 119–123, 129, 130, 132, 166, 168, 200, 203–206, 220, 222, 227, 242, 243, 246, 250, 264–268, 271, 274, 276, 281, 291–293, 295, 296, 299, 301, 313, 314, 317, 318, 320,

321, 336, 347, 349, 359, 376, 385, 387, 388, 393, 400, 401 Carlton Consulting, 51 Campbell, Alastair, 278, 330, 340, 385 “We don’t do God”, 330 Campbell, Rosie, 291 Canada, 104, 166 Capitalism, 126, 128, 244, 247, 254 Carlton Club, 293 Catholic, Roman, 184 Centre for Policy Studies, 119 Chamberlain, Neville, 267 Channel 4, 25, 60 Chequers, 101 Childs, Sarah, 331 China, 99, 101, 103, 124 Churchill, Winston, 1, 50, 264 Church of England, 331 Christian, 331 Good Samaritan, 332 Church of Scotland, 329, 334 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 335 City of London, 118, 129 Civil service, 2, 98, 109, 272, 357 Clarke, Kenneth, 140, 269, 271 Clark, Greg, 127, 165, 240, 249, 250, 253, 255, 387, 389, 391, 393–398, 400 Climate Change Act, 163, 170 Coe, Sebastian, 312 Coffey, Thérèse, 165 Cognitive dissonance, 364, 366–372 Commonwealth, 94, 103, 166 Commonwealth Heads of Government, 166, 322 ‘Conference of the Parties 23’ (COP23), 171 ConservativeHome, 126 Conservative Party 2005 leadership election, 19, 53

INDEX

2016 leadership election, 16, 22, 27, 269, 289 2019 leadership election, 28 Conservative Central Office, 51 One Nation Conservatism, 18, 220, 221, 224, 230–232, 234, 242, 243 Constable, John, 167 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, 351 Cooper, Yvette, 273 Corbyn, Jeremy, 3, 21, 25, 35, 37–39, 42–44, 52, 56, 57, 61, 79, 124, 188, 212, 233, 280, 282, 284, 339, 353, 360, 383, 409 Iran, 44 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 44 Corporate governance, 126, 128, 226, 231, 248, 249, 251–253 Cowley, Philip, 13, 14, 34, 35, 247, 249, 339 Crabb, Stephen, 20, 21, 28, 403 Crace, John, 41, 58 Crosby, Lynton, 42 Curtice, Sir John, 15, 340 Cutts, David, 14, 340, 341

D Daily Mail, 35, 59, 290, 291 Daily Mirror, 42 Dale, Iain, 267 Davidson, Ruth, 26, 321 Davis, David, 19, 35, 87, 274, 311, 370, 387, 389, 391, 393, 395, 404 Delors, Jacques, 184 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Boal, Desmond, 182 Donaldson, Jeffrey, 193 Foster, Arlene, 182, 187, 189, 190

413

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 127, 387, 394 Desert Island Discs , 331, 332 Disraeli, Benjamin, 168, 224 Dorey, Peter, 7, 14, 19, 21, 53, 57, 220, 226, 229, 234, 242, 243, 249 Douglas-Home, Alec, 1, 263, 265, 267 Duncan, Alan, 26, 316, 321 Duncan Smith, Iain, 17, 27, 310, 312, 313, 349 E Eden, Anthony, 1, 168, 228, 263, 265 England, 79, 125, 208, 251 English Channel, 297 Equality Act 2010, 295 Europe, 76, 99, 102, 139, 185 European Council, 105, 165 European Research Group (ERG), 180, 183, 230, 283, 374 European Union Brexit Article 50, 72, 109, 250, 275, 350, 351, 354, 355 Barnier, Michel, 277 Brexiteers, 74, 76, 86, 94, 190, 256, 269, 274, 276, 283, 348, 353, 357, 388 ‘Brexit Means Brexit’, 23, 79, 94, 270, 351, 375, 402 Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU), 108, 191, 274, 370, 387, 391 European Union Referendum Bill , 70 ‘Green Brexit’, 162, 171 Grimes, Darren, 37

414

INDEX

‘Hard Brexit’, 3, 234 Maastricht Treaty, 58, 184 Quiet Revolution, 76, 122 Remainers, 78, 270, 353, 365 ‘Soft Brexit’, 3 Withdrawal Agreement, 58, 234, 256, 347, 350, 353, 396 Evening Standard, 316 Executive pay, 226, 240, 246, 249 F Fallon, Michael, 359, 387, 389, 391, 392, 403 Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), 294 Festinger, Leon, 368, 372 Financial Times , 245, 250 Fixed Term Parliament Act (FTPA), 34, 37, 40 Foot, Michael, 35 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Foreign & Commonwealth Office Statements (FCO), 96, 97, 101–103, 106, 108 Foreign Affairs Committee, 95–98, 101–104 Forging Our Future: Industrial Strategy–The Story So Far, 253 Fox, Liam, 19, 98, 274, 387, 391, 393, 395–398, 400, 401 France, 105, 106, 359 #Freedom2Choose, 294 G Gaffney, John, 18, 28, 39, 52, 55, 60, 239, 252 Gamble, Andrew, 350 Gardiner, Barry, 58 Gender Recognition Act 2004, 324 Germany, 106, 127, 165, 184

Gilbert, Stephen, 42 Gilmour, Ian, 243, 246, 315 Girl Summit, 294 Global Climate Action Summit, 164 Globalisation, 76, 220, 225, 226, 232 Goes, Eunice, 7, 240, 241, 255, 386 Goodwin, Matthew, 14, 15 Gove, Michael, 15, 19, 20, 22–26, 28, 171, 269, 274, 275, 390, 397, 402, 404 Great Britain ‘Global Britain’, 94–97, 101–103, 400, 408 United Kingdom (UK), 189, 375 Great British Bake Off , 60 Grenfell Tower, 201, 203, 207, 212, 214 Guardian, The, 386 H Hague, William, 16, 35, 51, 271, 274, 292, 314 Halifax, West Yorkshire, 39 Hammond, Philip, 35, 123, 124, 128, 130, 131, 240, 248, 249, 254–256, 274, 386, 399–401, 404 Harman, Harriet, 296 Harper, Mark, 206 Hayek, Friedrich, 229 Hayton, Richard, 6, 16, 17, 33, 41, 46, 51, 55, 74, 162, 183, 241, 249, 256, 272, 337 Heath, Edward, 1, 122, 264 Heppell, Timothy, 7, 14, 17, 25, 35, 40, 57, 172, 206, 229, 268, 293, 300–302, 408 Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 399 Hickson, Kevin, 4, 18, 221, 240, 246, 249 High Court, The, 351 High Profiles , 331, 333

INDEX

415

Hill, Fiona, 212, 252, 256, 275 Home Office, 41, 200, 201 Honeyman, Victoria, 291, 292 Hong Kong, 99, 101 ‘Hostile environment’, 200, 201, 205–212, 214, 300, 304 Howard, Michael, 17, 268, 293 Hunt, Jeremy, 28, 97, 98, 101, 102, 104, 109, 387, 389, 391, 393–398, 402, 403 Huq, Rupa, 58 Hurd, Douglas, 277 Hurd, Nick, 165

181, 188, 190, 191, 193, 209, 235, 265–267, 269, 272, 274, 290, 324, 326, 349, 355, 387–389, 391, 393, 395, 402–404 Foreign Office, 36, 274, 399 Joseph, Sir Keith, 118, 119, 125 ‘Just about managing’, 119, 224, 225, 245, 249, 252, 272, 383

I Immigration Act 2014, 200, 201, 206–208, 210 Independent, The, 309–312, 317–319, 323, 326 India, 99–101, 166 Industrial policy, 127, 129, 239, 240, 246–248, 250, 252, 256 Industrial strategy, 127–129, 168, 240, 243, 246, 248–251, 253–257, 272, 400 Ireland, Republic of, 184, 186, 187 Irish Times , 313 Israel, 99, 392 ITV News ITV Leaders Debate, 60 Peston, Robert, 61

L Labour Party, 5, 13, 14, 25, 34, 35, 52, 61, 79, 141, 147, 151, 187, 188, 233, 282, 299, 334, 349 New Labour, 271, 292, 293, 296, 314, 330, 337 Lammy, David, 208, 209 Lamont, Norman Black Wednesday, 51 Lancaster House, 76, 95, 100, 356 Leadsom, Andrea, 19–28, 52, 71, 269, 270, 279, 321, 355, 387, 389, 390, 392, 399, 401, 402, 409 Leeds The Gryphon, 296 University of Leeds, 296 Lesbian Gay Bi-sexual Transgender (LGBT) Alan Turing’s Law, 320 Jenny Lives with Eric and Martin, 314 LGBTQ Action Plan, 321, 326 Outrage!, 295 Pink News, 294, 295 Pride, 318 Section 28, 294, 296, 304, 314–316, 322, 341

J Japan, 99, 103, 105 Javid, Sajid, 127, 387–389, 391, 393, 395–398, 400, 401 Jeffery, David, 8, 21, 23, 27, 270, 409 Jenkyns, Andrea, 58 Johnson, Boris, 1, 2, 6, 15, 44, 46, 71, 73, 95, 97, 103, 109, 149,

K Kohl, Helmut, 184

416

INDEX

Stonewall, 295, 326 Tory Campaign for Homosexual Equality, 309–311, 313 Letwin, Sir Oliver, 52, 354 Liberal Democrats, 14, 25, 35, 37, 38, 70, 71, 183, 233, 266, 268, 282, 318, 360 Farron, Tim, 60, 331, 340–342 Liberal Market Capitalism, 247 Liddington, David, 274 Local elections, 3, 35, 58, 79, 398, 409 London, 120, 125, 126, 166, 168, 182, 206, 224, 228, 300, 318, 322, 392 7/7 terrorist attacks, 43 London Bridge, 43, 56 London School of Economics (LSE), 140, 144 M Macleod, Iain, 219, 220 Macmillan, Harold, 1, 50, 51, 213, 220, 264 Maidenhead, 71, 123, 125, 310 Major, John, 1, 58, 219, 223, 264, 266, 283, 312, 349 ‘Back to Basics’, 312 Manchester, 106 Ariana Grande, 43 Manchester Terrorist Attack, 43 Marrakesh, 165 Marx(ist) (crypto) Marxists, 221 May, Theresa Home Secretary, 18, 40, 41, 49, 52, 54, 56, 60, 71, 141, 142, 148, 193, 200, 201, 205–207, 210, 268, 269, 292, 294, 297, 299, 300, 318, 319, 325, 331, 349 ‘Maybot’, 41, 44, 58, 273

‘Mayism’, 271, 338, 384–386, 388, 390, 400, 401, 404 McDaid, Shaun, 7, 182, 252 McGlynn, Catherine, 7, 185, 252 McGuinness, Martin, 185 McMeeking, Thomas, 25, 35, 53, 219, 235 Mediterranean, 297 Mental health Better Services for the Mentally Ill, 139 Black Mental Health UK , 143 Centre for Mental Health, 150, 153 Improving Access to Psychological Therapies , 140, 153 LSE Centre for Economic Performance’s Mental Health Policy Group, 144 Lunacy Act 1845, 138 Mental Health Act 1983, 143, 150, 154–156 Mental Health Bill 2022, 156 ‘Mind’, 139, 140 National Association for Mental Health, 138 New Deal for Depression, 140 NHS Mental Health Dashboard, 146, 153–156 Park, Alice, 145 Parliament Street, 146 ‘Rethink Mental Illness’, 139, 140 Scott, Matthew, 144, 145 Shaftesbury, Lord, 138, 141 Time to Change, 140 Transforming Children and Young People’s Mental Health Provision, 151 Virgo, Hope, 148 Merkel, Angela, 100, 279 Messina, Jim, 42 Metro Newspaper, 189 Miss Drag UK, 325

INDEX

Mitterrand, François, 184 Moore, Charles, 278, 312 N National Audit Office, 132 National Health Service (NHS), 37, 41, 148, 149, 151, 153–156, 371 NHS England, 145, 152 ‘Neoliberalism’, 220, 225, 229–232 Net Zero Scrutiny Group, 173 New Economics Foundation, The, 130 New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, The, 54 New Statesman, The, 84, 333, 341 New York, 169 New York Times, 50, 85 New Zealand, 99, 166 1922 Committee, 353, 355, 396 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 95, 100, 102 Northern Ireland The Alliance, 180, 192 border, 70, 82, 83, 180, 186, 190, 356 Good Friday Agreement, 82, 182, 187 Northern Ireland backstop, 353, 354, 358 Northern Ireland Protocol, 190, 192 Stormont, 81, 181, 187, 357 Stormont House Agreement, 358 United Ireland, 80, 181 Norway, 99, 127, 166 Number 10 Downing Street, 263 O Obama, Barack, 99, 100 Office for National Statistics, 121, 130–132

417

Oikophilia: Towards a Post-liberal Conservative View of the Environment , 166 One Nation Conservatism, 18, 220, 221, 224, 229, 231, 232, 242 One Nation Conservatives, 129, 199, 221, 226, 229, 230, 235, 240, 242, 243, 245, 246 One Planet Summit, 164, 165 Oratory deliberative, 53, 56, 60, 61 epideictic, 53–56, 61, 376, 377 forensic, 53 Osborne, George, 18, 19, 27, 55, 121, 123, 124, 205, 246, 248, 271, 274, 385, 386, 388, 392, 400, 402 Oxford, 127

P Paisley Snr, Reverend Ian, 181, 182, 184 Pakistan, 99 Paris Agreement, 163, 165 Payne, Sebastian, 245 Pfizer, 128 Pickles, Eric, 206 Plan For Britain, 250 Portillo, Michael, 27, 312, 313 Potter, Beatrix, 167 Powell, Enoch, 138–141 Powerhouse ‘Northern Powerhouse’, 120, 391 ‘Southern Powerhouse’, 120, 125 Preference Shifting, 371 Prime Ministers Questions (PMQs), 36, 56 Protestant Telegraph, 182

418

INDEX

R Raab, Dominic, 87, 235, 274, 395–397, 402, 404 Race Disparity Audit, 208 Rand, Ayn, 127 Rees-Mogg, Jacob, 189, 230 Rhetoric ethos , 53–55, 57, 72, 74, 333 logos , 75 pathos , 57, 74, 75 Roe-Crines, Andrew, 5, 7, 8, 17, 35, 189, 233, 235, 257, 268 Crines, Andrew, 21, 41, 57, 101, 138, 206, 220, 271 Rose, Richard, 171, 172 Rudd, Amber, 60, 201, 210, 276, 389, 391, 393–395, 397, 398 Russell, Andrew, 14, 340, 341 Russia Moscow, 325 Putin, Vladimir, 100 Salisbury poisonings, 97, 105, 110, 269

S Saudi Arabia, 102, 104, 166 Scotland, 70, 222, 282, 356, 357, 364–366, 375, 390, 401 Holyrood, 356 Scottish National Party (SNP), 6, 37, 185, 390 Blackford, Ian, 58 Sturgeon, Nicola, 290, 356, 374 Scruton, Roger Sir, 168, 169 Seldon, Anthony, 18, 19, 37, 120, 245, 247–251, 254, 256, 269, 270, 272, 275, 330, 348, 353, 388, 392, 394 Sevanta ComRes, 79 Shakespeare, William, 167 Forest of Arden, 167

Sinn Féin, 183 Social conservatism, 52, 408 Social Democratic Party, 281 Soubry, Anna, 234, 402 South Africa, 99 South Korea, 99 Spencer, Sir Stanley, 167 Starkey, David, 310 Stark, Leonard, 22, 24, 26 Statecraft, 2, 5, 6, 8, 33, 46, 51, 61, 70, 77, 118–123, 125, 127–129, 131, 132, 138, 156, 162, 166, 167, 169, 172, 173, 183, 200, 201, 203, 227, 233, 242, 256, 281, 341, 348, 361, 364, 366, 371, 378, 399, 408, 409 Bulpitt, Jim, 4, 5, 8, 38, 45, 49, 69, 73, 74, 84, 86, 87, 117, 131, 161, 162, 164, 166, 181, 183, 191, 201, 202, 232, 234, 235, 240, 241, 243, 330, 335, 363, 373, 384, 407 St John-Stevas, Norman, 315 Suez ‘East of Suez’, 103 Suez crisis, 263 Sunak, Rishi, 1, 2 Sunday Times, The, 312, 331, 333 Sun, The, 106 Supreme Court, The, 319, 349, 351, 356 Syria, 36, 44, 105, 348, 359 T Tanner, Will, 251 Tatchell, Peter, 324 Tebbit, Norman, 279, 311, 312 Telegraph, The, 206, 311, 321 Textor, Mark, 42 Thatcher, Margaret ‘Britannia’, 278 Falklands War, 278

INDEX

‘Iron Lady’, 278, 279 Thatcherism, 6, 219, 221, 225, 234, 242, 281, 386 ‘Warrior Queen’, 278 Theakston, Kevin, 7, 50, 51, 249, 263, 264, 271, 280, 281, 332, 334, 337 Times, The, 26, 226, 227, 231 Timothy, Nick, 86, 212, 244, 245, 248, 249, 251, 252, 256, 271, 275, 386, 401–403 Tonge, Jonathan, 80, 81, 182, 184, 186, 192 Toye, Richard, 53, 55 Traditional Britain Group, 37 Treasury, 123, 125, 246, 249, 251, 390 Truss, Liz, 1, 2, 53, 235, 326, 387, 389–391 Turkey, 99 25 Year Environment Plan, 167, 169 Twitter, 49, 58 U UK Border Agency, 349 Ukraine, 105 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), 182, 184 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 14, 15, 25, 200, 205, 206, 272, 282, 339, 340 Farage, Nigel, 206 United Nations UN Climate Change Summit, 164 UN General Assembly, 97, 164, 166, 169 UN Human Rights Commission, 104 UN Security Council, 96, 102, 104, 105, 165 United States of America (USA, US) ‘America First’, 101

419

‘special relationship’, 97, 100, 105, 106 Trump, Donald J., 36, 100, 101, 105, 106, 165, 299, 409 Washington DC, 106 White House, 100 V Varadka, Leo, 357 W Wales, 70, 138, 208, 222, 364, 366, 375, 401 Warwick, 127 Webb, Paul, 14, 24, 25, 42, 172, 252, 330, 331 Westminster House of Commons, 35, 38, 56, 60, 61, 104, 118, 147, 169, 186, 211, 255, 256, 273, 314, 333, 338, 347, 348, 350, 353, 359, 361, 387, 390, 392, 399 House of Commons International Trade Committee, 101 House of Lords, 37, 315, 348, 389 House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, 96, 108 Parliament, 34, 37, 38, 46, 138 Whitehall, 41, 86, 122, 125, 254, 276, 357 Williams Report 2020, 212, 213 Wilson, Harold, 26, 139, 264 Windrush, 200, 201, 203, 207–214, 395 1948 British Nationalities Act, 210 HMT Empire Windrush, 210 Wollaston, Sarah, 234 Women2Win, 278, 293, 294 Women and Equalities Select Committee, 300

420

INDEX

Woodward, Shaun, 315 Wordsworth, William, 167 ‘Workers voices’, 252, 253 World Climate Conference, 166 Worthy, Ben, 28, 87, 252, 255, 265, 272

Y YouGov, 23–25, 51, 79, 118

Z Zero Emissions Vehicle Summit, 165