State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition: Empirical Analysis of Energy Programs Acceptance 9819926823, 9789819926824

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Dinita Setyawati

State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition Empirical Analysis of Energy Programs Acceptance

State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition

Dinita Setyawati

State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition Empirical Analysis of Energy Programs Acceptance

Dinita Setyawati Just Transition Network Jakarta, Indonesia

ISBN 978-981-99-2682-4 ISBN 978-981-99-2683-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

When this book was just an idea scribbled on a few documents on my computer, the intention was to write a volume that would, perhaps rather ambitiously, span a number of programs and projects. The first was the divide between global scholarship on energy social science—the work of social science researcher versus the area study specialist—and the wider conceptual literature in the field of development studies, perception and behavioural studies, justice and human geography. The second was between “global” versus “local” scholarship and views, and what might be termed differently in regard of aspect influencing social acceptance and justice. The third key divide which I wanted to explore was that which separates the grand view of justice theory and local realities and implications of projection of justice in the real world as it is. This book was intended to be a local-level study that synthesises local perspectives to global studies and an on-the-ground view of global work. But perhaps more than anything my intention was to bridge the inequality between the North and South divide in scholarships. Every time I browse through journals and books, I found mostly European, the US and northern countries’ case studies rather than the Global South. My reality as someone with lived experiences of energy poverty is written clearly in the words of this book. They are greatly influenced by the work of others. I envisage readers to have a closer look at the case studies presented and for them to understand more about the realities facing energy transition challenges. Jakarta, Indonesia

Dinita Setyawati

v

Acknowledgements

My deepest gratitude goes to my family, Ganesanda Tikuallo who have been supportive and patient, and my children Caeli and Kei who have been cheerfully, enduringly, bravely, accompanied me in this great adventure. I thank also Professor Makoto Usami, who has been consistently helpful, encouraging and guiding me throughout my Ph.D. adventure. Thank you to professors at Kyoto University, Yumiko Takemae, Hirohide Kobayashi, Akihisa Mori and Gregory Trencher whose counsel have nurtured my doctoral project throughout the years. Lively discussions with fellow students during seminars, lunch breaks and classes motivated my research. In particular, I would like to thank Shahar Lilia Griffin, Bahareh Ghafouri, Tshering Ongmu Tsherpa, Sara Nishida, Phuong Lan Nguyen, Layna Droz-dit-Buset, Yang Yang, Masako Ichihara, Kumie Hattori, Undrakh Batkhuyag, Janiel Latoya Hazle, Kanan Kintani, Fan Yujia, Daigo Nishizaki and Zhang Ruixing. I am also profoundly thankful to Toyota Foundation, who have kindly supported part of my project. Financial supports from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Monbukagakusho (MEXT )) scholarship, the Toyota Foundation and Sawtooth Software Academic Grant are gratefully acknowledged. Friends from Just Transition Network who have supported my research through lively discussions on issues surrounding energy transition in the Global South. Thank you. My deepest gratitude to my parents who unfailingly help nurture my children in their early years in life. My brothers for their adventure stories. My cousin for her kind support of baby supplies. My late grandmother for always believing in me.

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Summary of the Book

State-of-Art-Indonesia Energy Transition presents a story about the citizen’s acceptance of various energy programs in Indonesia through a social science lens. It examines the justice aspects manifested in citizens’ acceptance of energy programs in Indonesia and applies them to social science research by utilising social acceptance and energy justice theories. Social acceptance and energy justice are two intertwined terminologies that capture the social acceptance of energy technologies in the energy system that fairly disseminates the costs and benefits of energy service and has impartial decision-making mechanisms. They aim to cover some new light on factors influencing community acceptance by highlighting the relative importance of three justice dimensions: distributional justice (fair allocation of cost and benefits), procedural justice (fair decision-making process) and justice as recognition. Their moral responsibility shapes justice as an ethical concern of individuals and their environment. The research presented in this book offers a situated, particularistic analysis of energy programs in Indonesia between 2014 and 2021. The case studies include five energy programs of low-carbon energy sources that the Government of Indonesia has prioritised, including solar panel policy, electricity charging stations, nuclear power, green electricity and extractive industries (geothermal and coal). Each study case has a separate set of target respondents based on their relevance to the energy programs, proximity to energy facilities and knowledge about the energy sector. Using qualitative and quantitative methodologies, the findings identify the principles of distributional and recognition justice that influence social acceptance, such as affordability, accessibility, environmental impacts and recognition. It also reveals that distributional and procedural justice conceptions alone are insufficient to ensure social acceptance without considering justice as recognition. The novelty of this book is that it presents how the target respondents within each study case weigh the three justice dimensions and identifies the conditions under which social acceptance increases or decreases, associated with renewable or

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non-renewable energy sources. Overall, this book offers useful policy and strategic recommendations for how energy decision-making can mitigate the environmental impacts of energy production and use and do so in a sustainable and socially just way.

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Emerging Justice and Social Acceptance Issues in Energy Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Organisation of This Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1

2

Social Acceptance in the Context of Energy Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Social Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Social Acceptance: Case Study Application . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Debunking NIMBY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 The Influence of Self Efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Energy Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Multifaceted Definitions of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Justice in the Energy System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Fostering Social Acceptance Through Energy Justice . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 13 14 15 16 17 18 18 19 21 22 23 24

3

A Centralised Energy System of Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Energy System in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Fossil Fuel Hegemony and Power Bloc Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Indonesia’s Energy Regulatory Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 The State Control over Energy Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Energy Policy Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Energy Subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Hegemonic Conflict in Energy Stakeholder Prioritisation . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Barriers to Creating Energy Citizen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Limited Participation of Local Government . . . . . . . . . . .

29 29 32 33 33 34 36 37 37 38

2 5 7 9

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3.4.3 Growing Private Sector Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Implications to Renewable Energy Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

5

Analysis of Perceptions Towards the Rooftop Photovoltaic Solar System Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Context: Solar Energy in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Awareness and Knowledge on Solar Technology . . . . . . 4.4.2 Awareness of Ministerial Regulation No. 49/2018 (Rooftop PV Policy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.4 Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.5 Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.6 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.7 Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.8 Comments and Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.9 Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.10 Challenges Facing Indonesia in Achieving its Renewable Energy Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.11 Key Barriers in Policy Related to Rooftop PV and Solar use in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.12 Overcoming Challenges From the Government Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electricity Charging Stations and the Energy Survival of the Urban Informal Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Urban Informal Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Energy Justice and Energy Poverty Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1 Economic Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2 Socio-Political Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3 Electricity Charging Stations can Potentially Solve Energy Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39 42 42 43 47 47 49 52 53 53 56 58 58 58 59 59 60 60 61 62 62 63 64 66 69 69 71 72 74 76 76 77 79 81 83 84

Contents

6

7

8

9

Emerging Justice Issues in the Citizen Acceptance of Nuclear Power Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Background: Acceptance of Nuclear, Lobbying and Development in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 Parliamentary Discourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Academics’ Preferences for Green Electricity Attributes . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Analysing Consumer Preference with a Discrete Choice Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Conjoint-Based Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Survey Model and Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.1 Survey Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.2 Choice-Based Conjoint Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Injustice and Environmental Harm in Extractive Industries . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Energy Justice from a Southern Green Criminology Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 The Distribution of Power and Inequality in the Indonesian Energy System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Findings and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.1 The Political Dimension, Environmental Harms and Social Implications of Coal Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.2 The Marginalisation of Local Communities and Green Crimes in Geothermal Operations . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Renewable Energy Procurement in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Challenges and Opportunities in Transitioning to a Low-Carbon Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.1 Social Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.2 Energy Dynamics in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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87 87 88 90 91 92 95 96 97 99 99 100 101 102 103 103 106 108 109 111 111 113 114 116 117 117 118 120 121 125 125 126 126 127

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9.3

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.1 Selection of Case Studies Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.2 Expert Interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 Comparison Between Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam . . . . . . . . 9.4.1 Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.2 Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.3 Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 The Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

128 129 129 131 133 134 135 135 136 137

10 Determinants of Social Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Reflecting on Justice Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2.1 Distributional Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2.2 Procedural Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2.3 Justice as Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 Emergent Themes in Case Study Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 Implications to Energy Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

139 139 140 141 144 145 147 150 151 153

11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Social Acceptance and the Critical Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 Gaining Acceptance of Renewables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 The Need for a Systemic Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5 Closing Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

157 157 158 161 162 163 164

Appendix 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. 7.4 Fig. 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 8.1

Fig. 8.2

Fig. 10.1

Conceptual framework (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . Social acceptance framework. Adapted from (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondents’ reason of interest in solar technology . . . . . . . . . . Respondents’ interest to install solar panel under Rooftop PV Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respondents’ perception on the implementation of Rooftop PV Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theoretical framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perception of risk and benefits from nationwide survey . . . . . . . Perception of benefits from provincial survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preferences for public participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preferences for environmental impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preferences for the renewable energy mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preferences for additional tariff (US cents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preferences for service from State-owned Electricity Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Average importance score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Map of geothermal power plants at various stages in Indonesia. Source Geothermal map from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, with mapping of conflict from Jatam (2021), Yolanda et al. (2021), Cipto (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Map of forest cover in Indonesia in 2019. Source Ministry of Environment and Forestry Regulation No. P.41/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/7/2019 on National Forestry Plan year 2011–2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Social acceptance framework integrating elements of energy justice, modified from Sovacool et al. (2017) and Delina and Sovacool (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 15 56 57 57 74 93 94 105 105 105 106 106 108

119

119

153

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Photo 5.1 Photo 5.2

List of Figures

Electricity charging station in Barito Market and Dakota park, Jakarta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . User of electricity charging station. Source Author . . . . . . . . . . .

80 81

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1

Table 3.2 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7 Table 4.8

Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 10.1 Table 10.2

Energy justice principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Division of authority between central and local governments for energy and mineral resources management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public–private partnership policies and regulatory framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Demographics characteristics of the respondents (n = 987) . . . Knowledge on Rooftop PV Solar Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Knowledge on rooftop PV Solar technology based on gender and age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perception of solar panel installation under Rooftop PV Policy across Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perception of rooftop Solar PV Installation under Rooftop PV Policy across Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perception of rooftop Solar PV Installation under Rooftop PV Policy across Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perception of rooftop Solar PV Installation under Rooftop PV Policy across Educational Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pearson chi-squared test of respondents’ interest to install solar panel under Rooftop PV Policy according to gender, age, income, educational background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coding grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Acceptance of nuclear power plants from national survey using logistic regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of survey variables (n = 164) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Choice-based conjoint result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preferred products based on Discrete Choice Experiment . . . . . List of papers for in-depth analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main policy settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case study findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perceptions of distributional justice across five case studies . . .

20

35 41 54 55 55 58 58 59 59

60 91 94 104 107 108 130 132 141 142 xvii

xviii

Table 10.3 Table 10.4 Table 10.5

List of Tables

Perceptions of procedural justice across five case studies . . . . . Perceptions of justice as recognition across five case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Social acceptance criteria of energy program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

145 146 151

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter introduces the country and scientific context in which the book is situated. It discusses the energy transition in Indonesia and defines the terms “social acceptance” and “energy justice” while exploring the purpose and structure of the book. The book’s central aim is the consolidation and development of debates surrounding the social acceptance of energy programs, by exploring the political and behavioural drivers and implications of the condition.

1.1 Introduction The development of energy transition can be viewed in various ways. It is possible to take a largely technological position where the focus is squarely on rates of technological growth, structural changes in the infrastructure, and technological price and availability, for instance, and where the viewpoint is economic science. Alternatively, it is possible to take a social science perspective and broaden the scope of analysis to include such issues as social acceptance and perception, justice implications, theory of planned behaviour, sociotechnical transition, energy democracy, and energy poverty and the differential implications on family relations, social norms and gender. The term “energy transition” refers to the process of alternating to new energy sources. Historically, the first energy transition occurred during the industrialisation phase in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries when coal replaced wood because the price of wood had gone up. Fast forward centuries later, after the Paris Agreement, the term “energy transition” emerged as a process to transform the current energy system based on fossil fuels into a model based on renewable energy sources. The concept is also closely linked to terms, such as “sustainable transition”, “low-carbon transition” or “renewable energy”, but it has come into common usage for wanting anything more sustainable. I shall use the common definition of the energy transition as a state, a process in which fossil-based fuels are being gradually replaced by renewable energy sources.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_1

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1 Introduction

For many scholars, international organisations, economists and development experts, energy transition still leave endless questions. How can countries transition into low-carbon development? How can we ensure the transition is fair and just? How can the countries of the North and the South work together to achieve this common goal? Today virtually all the governments of the world have been working together through various intergovernmental forums, working groups and funding mechanisms to achieve the energy transition. European countries emerged as leaders in the politics of sustainable energy transition. Meanwhile, several Asian, African and other developing countries were designated as the followers of the global energy transition simply because they are considered to be lagging behind in the transition process and technological development, despite the fact that there are differences in material indicators, such as population size, per capita income and to some extent fiscal dependence on revenues from fossil fuel production. How then can we find feasible solutions for energy transition in the developing world? Before I move on to the discussion about the literature response to the energy transition, I need to emphasise that the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly the “great lockdown”, has a significant impact on energy demand, carbon emissions and the speed of transition. Before the pandemic, scholars indicated positive trends in the politics of sustainable energy transition, for example, the Paris Agreement was instituted in Nationally Determined Contributions, the cost of renewable energy technology was falling rapidly, and sustainable transitions were placed on the agenda of various levels of government (Kuzemko et al., 2020). After the pandemic, the central part of sustainable transition’s focus is for the state to invest in a post-pandemic economic recovery that considers an opportunity for green growth.

1.2 Emerging Justice and Social Acceptance Issues in Energy Transition The literature on energy transition recognised the sustainability challenges that reshape the established patterns of energy supply, distribution and consumption (Geels et al., 2017; Sovacool et al., 2021). Amidst these challenges, the energy transition has emerged to conceptualise a sustainable energy system that provides both the security of supply and universal access to energy (Bridge et al., 2013). The transition of the energy system can be either incremental or radical and is dependent on the situated policy, politics and governance (Bulkeley et al., 2010). Some countries, such as Poland (Brauers & Oei, 2020), Bangladesh (Kotikalapudi, 2016) and Indonesia (Sambodo & Novandra, 2019), are heavily invested in fossil fuels and resist the reduction of consumption in fossil fuel production, concerning political instability, resulted from rising energy prices and energy security. Furthermore, the low-carbon transition inevitably comes with dimensions of inequality that deserve to be studied in a systematic and organised way. The concrete, physical inequality in fossil fuel resource distribution is visible and, naturally, of

1.2 Emerging Justice and Social Acceptance Issues in Energy Transition

3

interest to everyone. Policymakers, politicians and activists: each have their vantage point regarding the relations of power and domination that exist between the social groups that control natural resources. This physical inequality has also been studied by a wide range of scholars and emerges in theories of climate justice, environmental justice and energy justice (McCauley & Heffron, 2018; Schlosberg, 2013; Schlosberg, & Collins, 2014; Sovacool et al., 2016). The common perspectives of the theories are that concepts of justice and ethics provide an important junction to thinking about the world’s climate, environmental and energy problems. Justice issues in the energy system relate to equity, vulnerability and fairness, and are framed as distributive justice, recognition justice and procedural justice (Jenkins et al., 2018; McCauley & Heffron, 2018; Sovacool et al., 2016). Distributive justice entails as to where the key impacts are located, fluctuations of impact and the risk to future generations. Recognition justice is an identification of who is impacted. Procedural justice is the right to fair processes and inclusion in decision-making. In order to apply it into practice, Sovacool et al. (2017a) proposed ten principles of energy justice, including availability, affordability, due process, transparency and accountability, sustainability, intragenerational equity, intergenerational equity, responsibility, resistance and intersectionality. The concept of just transition has also begun to be featured in global discussions, including the 2019 Group of Twenty (G20) Ministerial Meeting for Sustainable Growth, the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) and the recent G20 Bali Leaders Declarations. Another strand of scholarship, social acceptance has been a prominent topic of research by energy social scientists (Aas et al., 2017; Devine-Wright et al., 2017; Sovacool & Lakshmi Ratan, 2012; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). Social acceptance literature (Batel, 2020; Gaskell et al., 2015; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) explains how some form of consent and voluntary acceptance to a new idea or energy technology. It is also important to note that the discussions about public and social acceptance towards new energy technology were taken place in frames of the Not-In-MyBack-Yard (NIMBY) sentiment and Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) models. In general, NIMBY is often understood as the opposition of local communities to the government’s plan to build new energy infrastructure in their neighbourhood. While some scholars tend to interpret the resistance to technology implementation by the “NIMBY” concept (Consulting, 2008; Wilton, 2000), others are calling for a more nuanced understanding of the real reasons for local opposition (Batel, 2020; Komendantova & Battaglini, 2016; Petrova, 2013; Wolsink, 2000, 2006). Evidence also shows that the DAD model often leads to social conflicts because it only incorporates views from educated experts, project developers or the government in the decision-making process (Komendantova & Battaglini, 2016; Wolsink, 2010). Nowadays, the prominent discussion includes not only NIMBY, or DAD, but also a prime indicator of social acceptance based on perceptions, beliefs and values that can be organised as a function of the three classical fields of justice perceptions: distributional, procedural and recognition (Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017a; VelascoHerrejon & Bauwens, 2020). Distributional justice refers to perceived justice and injustice in the distribution of costs and benefits among stakeholders of the global energy system (Sovacool et al., 2017b). Procedural justice refers to the participation

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of local stakeholders in energy decision-making (McCauley & Heffron, 2018). Justice as recognition acknowledges marginalisation and social inequalities among local and global energy stakeholders (Lacey-Barnacle et al., 2020). One of the early avenues of study for social acceptance was proposed by Gross (2007) who used justice theory as an analytical tool to understand how different sections of a community are influenced by outcome fairness. Later studies have focused on the justice aspects of people’s responses to new technologies, particularly in relation to social conflicts (Jenkins et al., 2017; Batel, 2020), distributive/procedural elements (Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017b) and climate change urgency (Sovacool & Blyth, 2015; Sovacool & Lakshmi Ratan, 2012). In these models, the social acceptance of energy technologies is directly affected by the perceived risks and benefits, as well as the preference for fair processes (procedural justice) and equal outcomes (distributional justice). Social conflicts related to energy utilisation and technologies can be complicated and challenging to unravel since they may break relationships and involve losses in livelihood. Therefore, the fundamental question is, are there more complex factors relating to society’s acceptance of technologies, for example, ones that relate to social/personal norms and values of justice? To mention a few, the integration of justice perceptions into social acceptance framework has been studied in Switzerland (Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017a), in Australia (Gross, 2007) and in Great Britain (Evensen et al., 2018; Roddis et al., 2018). Simultaneously, scholars have stated energy justice studies as being dominated by case studies took place in the Global North and biased in their human-centred approach (Castán Broto et al., 2018; Velasco-Herrejon & Bauwens, 2020). Energy justice in the context of developing countries needs to consider a different set of historical and political factors such as postcolonial legacies, authoritarianism and decentralisation (Lacey-Barnacle et al., 2020). This study responds to the limitation in research studies by applying the social acceptance and energy justice frameworks to Indonesia as a case study from a developing country.1 Social acceptance and justice theories are primarily utilised to achieve the objectives of this study. Since the idea of justice is contested, this study does not engage in a detailed analytical examination of competing philosophical positions on justice. Instead, it uses an empirical approach by utilising a perspective on justice to investigate fairness and equity issues that could potentially influence acceptance. The conceptual framework developed for this present study seeks to identify aspects of justice in citizens’ acceptance of energy technologies. The fundamental theoretical argument is derived from a thorough literature review on energy justice, social acceptance, behavioural science, governance and the preference elicitation method. Figure 1.1 synthesises the social acceptance framework that results from the discussion in the literature review section. The three dimensions model that 1

With a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of $4050 in 2019, Indonesia is classified as an “upper middle-income economy” according to the World Bank. However, following this classification, President Joko Widodo in his 2020 Annual Speech stated that Indonesia was still in the developing country group and therefore must strive to escape the “middle income country trap”. Therefore, this study classifies Indonesia as part of the developing country group.

1.3 State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition

Acceptance by local communities influenced by distributional, procedural and recognition justice

Community acceptance

Socio-political acceptance

5 Focus upon policies, government and politics at various levels; current regulatory framework and energy regime

Market

acceptance

Acceptance by consumers and market, including commonization of energy sources and current market practices

Fig. 1.1 Conceptual framework (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007)

encompasses socio-political acceptance, community acceptance and market acceptance is represented in the middle. All three, sometimes interdependent categories of social acceptance are studied in this research. Socio-political acceptance is social acceptance at the most general level. At the general level of socio-political acceptance, this also concerns the acceptance of policy actors and key stakeholders of effective policies (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). Community acceptance refers to the sitting decisions and new energy infrastructure projects by local stakeholders, particularly local communities and authorities. This is the debate of NIMBY (Not-In-My-BackYard) concerns, where some argue that people support energy facilities as long as it is not in their own backyard, while others argue that this is an oversimplification of people’s opposition (Bell et al., 2005). Finally, at the market level, social acceptance focuses on the market dynamics of new energy innovation. The focus is not just on consumers but also on investors and large energy firms (Maruyama et al., 2007).

1.3 State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition The search for similar titles, such as Energy Transition, Energy Justice or something similar, is overwhelmingly dominated by discussions of the European energy transition, and of an European perspective, in general, is inclined to support marketbased instruments to accelerate the transition, such as the carbon tax or the European Green Deal. These instruments are quite challenging to implement in developing or underdeveloped countries or regions whose purpose is to achieve their sustainable development goals. Enormous financial support and political commitments are needed to be able to successfully implement energy transition in the developing world. With this notion in mind, this book takes a local perspective and broadens the scope of analysis to include Southern viewpoints while adding environmental and cultural perspective to contribute to the growing bodies of scholarships in Indonesia regarding how the transition should be implemented.

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1 Introduction

State-of-Art-Indonesia Energy Transition is a study of the social acceptance of energy programs in Indonesia. It examines the justice aspect of the ideas behind five energy programs in Indonesia, the solar photovoltaic system, electricity charging stations, nuclear power, green electricity and extractive industries (geothermal and coal). Indonesia has been selected as the study case for the following reasons. First, the country is the largest energy consumer among ASEAN member states, the world’s fourth biggest producer of coal and the largest producer of biofuels worldwide (IEA, 2019). Second, Indonesia has traditionally been viewed as a de facto leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) due to the sheer size of its territory and population (Emmers & Le Thu, 2021). Thus, supposedly, it has the capability of steering the direction of Southeast Asia’s energy policy. Third, it is experiencing rapid deforestation that contributes to global emissions (Setyowati, 2020) though this contribution is substantially surpassed by the energy sector (Wijaya et al., 2017). The electricity sector, in particular, is the largest carbon emitter since electricity generation is mainly derived from fossil fuels (IRENA, 2020). The Indonesian government’s ambitious targets require new strategies to ensure energy demand is being met sustainably. To the extent possible, I explore the dynamics of social acceptance of these new energy sources within the country from 2017 to 2021, the period after the Paris accord. It is, in some respects, a suitable place to observe the transition away from fossil fuels. It poses a credible risk for increasing global energy demand (due to its 270 million people) and continued reliance on carbon-based energy for domestic use. The conceptual basis for this study of energy transition development in Indonesia is that the social system of a community is an integral part of the very much wider energy, economic and technological system of that transition. Moreover, changes in the internal needs and values of the community require changes in the energy system; these will normally include changes in consumption patterns or in the form of economic activity as well as the other components of the total social system. I also need to emphasise that this project is situated in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis with devastating implications for many citizens as experts and politicians are encouraging, and in some cases mandating, that people stay at home to contain the virus. Indeed, when I started this project in 2019, I did not foresee the pandemic and its impacts on the global economy, energy, politics and our ways of living. However, as the pandemic is unfolding, we have witnessed that COVID-19 will do much to shape the energy behaviour of residents. This study is written at a time when the pandemic is still unfolding and post-recovery is underway. Although some of the case studies data in my research were from the pre-COVID-19 era, most of the data were obtained between 2020 and 2021, at the height of the pandemic. This has impacted the data collection and changed the way we were used to face-to-face meetings. Some data for the survey and interviews have to be collected online. Nevertheless, my purpose here is driven by the need to better understand the social dynamics of the energy transition. This purpose is particularly pertinent now, as governments, companies and the wider public consider a sustainable and resilient recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic.

1.4 The Organisation of This Book

7

1.4 The Organisation of This Book This book comprises a series of connected chapters, designed to provide various case studies, dealing with various energy programs in the Indonesian context. Many of the key problems that arise in this discussion lie well inside the social science discipline and also deal with matters in other scholarships, including behavioural psychology, technology and economics. This book also relies on heavy empirical data in its analysis. My objective is to propose a social acceptance framework that integrates justice perceptions and can be applied in various settings to a wide range of different technologies and populations. In more details, this book examines five case studies, selected using the following criteria: 1. The case study should be prioritised by the government in the National Energy Plan, enacted as Presidential Regulation No. 22/2017, sets out the energy management plan which constitutes application and implementation of energy policy across sectors to achieve the targets of national energy policy. 2. The case study was discussed in detail by the government respondents in the preliminary interviews in January and March 2019. I conducted six interviews with representatives from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the National Energy Board during the two months. 3. The case study should be energy policies or programs considered as critical energy infrastructure projects in Indonesia’s jurisdiction. For example, according to the International Energy Agency, many countries are considering the introduction of nuclear power to boost reliable and clean energy production. 4. Lastly, the case study should represent both the salience of energy policy in national politics and the role of justice dimensions in attempting to remedy historic injustice with respect to marginalised and under-represented communities. Considering the above criteria, this research examines the following energy programs: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Solar panel policy; Electricity charging stations; Nuclear power; Green electricity; Extractive industries (geothermal and coal).

Before entering into the discussion of case studies, I need to set the scene for the reasoning. I first sketch the global situations that compose the current state of the energy system. In Chap. 2, I begin by looking at the question of what we mean by social acceptance and energy justice, and its various definition and forms. I also presented social acceptance and energy justice theories and discussed the limitations of the current literature. In this chapter, I argued that we are facing energy crises together and that the social acceptability of new energy technologies is an important

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1 Introduction

aspect to achieve the energy transition. In Chap. 3, I argued that the coal oligarch’s hegemony over energy decision-making makes the political commitment to energy transition difficult. Chapter 4 examined the newly introduced rooftop photovoltaic solar system policy. The research questions framing this research are: What are the perceptions of the public, government, private sector, and energy experts towards the rooftop solar system policy? How do these perceptions influence customers’ decisions to install solar systems under this specific policy setting? To answer the questions, I examined a nationwide survey and conducted interviews with energy experts. Findings show that the perception of both the society and government is generally positive regarding the development of solar technology and Rooftop PV Policy implementation. In addition, several issues such as solar panel subsidy, institutional strengthening and the lack of information from the government were raised from the research data. In Chapter 5, I investigated how the street vendors perceived the electricity charging stations as their mode of energy survival. I conducted interviews with street vendors and observed their energy consumption behaviour. From this research, my analysis revealed that introducing new energy facilities create a bounty of desirable opportunities as well as complex risks that need to be managed effectively. Chapter 6 examined community acceptance of nuclear power plants in the West Kalimantan province. The result showed that both public and the parliament members have a strong acceptance towards nuclear development, which holds significant implications for the future trend of nuclear energy adoption in Indonesia. Chapter 7 explored the academics’ preference for green electricity. For this research, I distributed an online survey to academic networks. The research questions for this research are: What attributes influence the academics’ preferences for green electricity? Why do these attributes were preferred? In conclusion, consumers in the sample exhibit preferences for green electricity sourced from renewable energy sources with the lowest environmental impacts and lowest electricity prices. In Chap. 8, I investigated the perpetual injustices experienced by the local communities around coal and geothermal mining facilities. In conclusion, this research demonstrated how the marginalisation of rural communities and the production of environmental harm had been perpetuated by influential figures, reinforced since colonialism and escalated by the demands of the Global North. In Chap. 9, I compared renewable energy schemes in Indonesia to those in Malaysia and Vietnam. In this chapter, I concluded that factors such as access to financing, incentives, financial subsidies and cheaper green electricity tariffs might increase the acceptance of renewable energy procurement. From Chap. 10 onwards, I consolidated the results from the previous chapters and drew parallels with the wider literature presented in Chap. 2. In doing so, it showed the relative influence of justice perspectives on social acceptance and put them into perspective as to how they are valued in a country with a limited participatory culture. The final chapter evaluated the conclusion, as well as offered suggestions for future research in the light of the evidence presented.

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Wolsink, M. (2000). Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: Institutional capacity and the limited significance of public support. Renewable Energy, 21(1), 49–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/S09601481(99)00130-5 Wolsink, M. (2006). Invalid theory impedes our understanding: A critique on the persistence of the language of NIMBY. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 31(1), 85–91. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2006.00191.x Wolsink, M. (2010). Contested environmental policy infrastructure: Socio-political acceptance of renewable energy, water, and waste facilities. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 30(5), 302–311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2010.01.001 Wüstenhagen, R., Wolsink, M., & Bürer, M. J. (2007). Social acceptance of renewable energy innovation: An introduction to the concept. Energy Policy, 35(5), 2683–2691. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.enpol.2006.12.001

Chapter 2

Social Acceptance in the Context of Energy Justice

Abstract Social acceptance is one of the key determinants in implementing successful regulatory frameworks and policies. The past debate of social acceptance is centred around NIMBY (Not in My Own Backyard) which is closely correlated with the case of wind energy. More recent literature introduces three dimensions of social acceptance, namely socio-political, community and market acceptance. Justice factors are increasingly recognised as being important for understanding why social rejection produces the outcomes. In this chapter, this study examines the current literature on social acceptance and energy justice and extends the discussion about how much of the literature on social acceptance and energy justice had been derived from the Western conception of justice that promotes freedom, equality and participation.

2.1 Introduction Social acceptance has become a barrier to the government’s efforts to increase renewable energy deployment (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). In Colombia and Mexico, the local media reported that local indigenous groups had repeatedly blocked wind projects through lawsuits, protests and sabotage. In Indonesia, geothermal power plant developments in tourist locations also faced vivid debates at both local and national levels. These phenomena illustrated that social acceptance is an issue that needs to be addressed to gain public and stakeholders’ support at varying scale levels. More than the NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) phenomenon, broader issues of justice, recognition and participation form the basis on which people accept new energy technologies (Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017b; Wolsink, 2019). This chapter offers a discussion about social acceptance and energy justice theories. It extends the debate on the definition and application of these theories. The critique of the literature developed for social acceptance theory seeks to explain the consumer choices in the energy sectors by highlighting relevant justice factors which influence the decisions.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_2

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2.2 Social Acceptance In the transition from non-renewable to renewable energy sources, scholars have proven interests in the fields of social acceptance (Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017b). In energy social science, scholars have defined the term “acceptance” from various perspectives. Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) termed a generalised idea of social acceptance as “one factor that can potentially be a powerful barrier to the achievement of renewable energy targets”. Integrating a political science approach to develop the conceptualisation of social acceptance and responses towards renewable energy technology, Dermont et al. (2017) refer to social acceptance as various actors’ responses towards renewable energy technologies. Others took a more specific approach to define social acceptance by emphasising on justice concerns. For example, Gross (2007) analysed how a lack of perceived procedural justice can lead to opposition in communities towards a wind farm. The definition of acceptance by specific actors may be more relevant for the context in which the contextual differences between consumers are understood. There are prominent discussions in social acceptance studies regarding the conditions in which positive attitudes of energy technologies do not translate into adoption behaviour, often termed as “value action gap”. Value action gap refers to behaviour that deviates from an individual’s attitudes (Batel & Devine-Wright, 2015; Gross, 2007). This difference between willingness to pay and the actual adoption has been widely researched (Form et al., 2014; Kowalska-Pyzalska, 2015; Lane & Potter, 2007). These studies concluded that observed respondents’ behaviour deviates from their attitudes which are influenced by their personal and contextual conditions. For example, Hai et al. (2017) conducted a qualitative study assessing individual opinions of solar energy technology and disclosed that people might have positive attitudes and intentions, but this does not necessarily and always lead to adoption. Moreover, Barr (2006) investigated the attitudes held by individual citizens towards their use of natural resources and indicated that fundamentally different factors predict a willingness to minimise waste instead of actual behaviour. These studies demonstrated that the willingness to pay for new energy technologies is a result of more than positive perceptions. In fact, other factors have influenced the acceptance of consumers. For example, in Germany, consumers consider the physical quality of electricity to be important in determining their willingness to pay (Sagebiel, 2017). Similarly, in India, consumers are concerned about the physical aspects of electricity quality, such as the absence of power outages (Hanisch et al., 2010). In addition, people with different sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender, education and social status may have different preferences for energy products (Setyawati, 2020). Therefore, questions regarding the socio-economic, cultural and physical quality of energy production also become essential. In analysing the socio-economic and cultural variables, scholars categorised social acceptance into three dimensions: socio-political, community and market acceptance

2.2 Social Acceptance Fig. 2.1 Social acceptance framework. Adapted from (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007)

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Socio-political acceptance

Community acceptance

Market acceptance

(Devine-Wright et al., 2017; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) (see Fig. 2.1). The sociopolitical acceptance concerns the acceptance of technologies and policies by the public, key stakeholders and policymakers. Market acceptance refers to the connection between national and local, involving potential consumers and investors of the technology (Chen et al., 2020). This dimension of acceptance also includes the commodification of energy sources and current market practices. Community acceptance refers to the specific acceptance of communities and local authorities in association with the infrastructure development of renewable energy projects (Sovacool & Lakshmi Ratan, 2012). Acceptance by local communities is also influenced by procedural and distributional justice perceptions (Gross, 2007; Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017a). However, only a few studies have encompassed more than one of three aspects in their respective analytical frames (Devine-Wright et al., 2017). The interconnectedness between various levels across different geographical scales also lacks emphasis (Batel & Devine-Wright, 2015). This particular weakness can be addressed by integrating social representations by key actors working at different scales into the social acceptance analysis (Devine-Wright et al., 2017).

2.2.1 Social Acceptance: Case Study Application The case study utilising social acceptance theory can be classified into two categories. The first research direction addresses the cost and benefits of specific energy technology in the developed country and its associated impacts on the local environment (Ewing & Sarigöllü, 2000; Gowan et al., 2006; Gross, 2007; Tanaka et al., 2014; Sommerfeld et al., 2017; Mulyono, 2018). These studies concluded that environmental impacts from energy technology could be validated through monetary compensation to various degrees. Moreover, the environmental valuation of novel energy technologies provided analysis of a typical green energy consumer who is educated, affluent and comes from the middle class and above (Stigka et al., 2014), for example, in Texas (Zarnikau, 2003) and in England (Longo et al., 2008). The second stream of studies is concerned with study cases of developing countries (Höffken, 2014; Sagebiel & Rommel, 2014; Sovacool et al., 2011, 2021; Siyaranamual et al., 2020). The literature provided an insightful analysis of the trade-offs

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among electricity service attributes, the consumers’ role and their willingness to pay to improve electricity supply quality. For example, Siyaranamual et al. (2020) found that consumers’ preferences for improved electricity service attributes resulted in the willingness to pay for improvements. Deutschmann et al. (2021) concluded that households and firms in Senegal are willing to pay a significant premium over current tariffs for high-quality electricity service without outages. In a similar vein, Abdullah and Mariel (2010) found individuals in Kenya valued electricity service reliability, which can help decision-makers in utility companies design new products and services, thus enabling them to target their products to consumers’ preferences in an informed way. Contrarily, Sagebiel and Rommel (2014) found that about 90% of the population surveyed in Indonesia are not interested in the topic of improved electricity supply quality or not willing to pay for improvements in quality. The study shows further that most consumers are not interested in the privatisation of the power sector and prefer the current system with government-owned distribution companies. In this vein, the trust of the electricity service provider likely influences the willingness-topay decision. In Kenya and Senegal, there have been a series of protests against the government and power service providers. In Indonesia, the State-owned Electricity Company has been broadly accepted by society as the leading provider of electricity services, including the management of household solar panels (Setyawati, 2020). The studies show that varied opinions were found among respondents from different countries.

2.2.2 Debunking NIMBY For energy systems with large-scale energy infrastructures, which are prominent in developing countries, the most common explanation to gain social acceptance, proposed by developers, politicians, media and academics, has been identified as Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) syndrome (Dorshimer, 1996; Uji et al., 2021). NIMBY has been the symbol of local resistance against large hazardous facilities. It is referred to as the basis of the environmental justice movement in the US during the 1980s (Lake, 1996). It symbolised the local resistance to controversial land uses and demand for environmental equity. The literature that followed discussed the relationship between less advantaged communities and environmental justice. For example, Canan (1986) concluded that the conflicts surrounding geothermal energy development in Hawaii could be avoided if the opportunity for community-scaled policy were pursued. In this project, the government-industry cooperation has put aside the local interest while the geothermal development poses a threat to the natural environment of the island community. Over the years, environmental policy scholars have begun to rethink the NIMBY syndrome, arguing that its meaning has changed, both in how it is academically defined and in how it is practically implemented (Abreu et al., 2019; C.R. Warren, 2013; Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017b). Specifically, academics in energy social science

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have presented NIMBY, the place-attachment factor to social opposition, as an “oversimplification” (Devine-Wright, 2013; Petrova, 2013; Wolsink, 2000; Willett Kempton et al., 2005). According to Wolsink (2000: 50), with a focus on local projects, it has been “one of the most common mistakes in facility siting to take general support for granted and expect people to welcome developments they claim to support”. Current literature looks at NIMBY as a materialisation of people’s relations with the place they live and of people’s concerns with their health and livelihoods (Batel, 2020; Devine-Wright, 2013). The fact that policymakers and developers have explained local opposition as NIMBY proved that they are trying to portray a negative representation of the local setting of technologies and hazardous facilities. More specifically, Van der Horst (2007) and other scholars argued that the elements provoking resistance towards a project are not the technology itself (e.g., related uncertainty, or lacking experience) or distance, but rather how the project and process are designed, such as fairness and environmental impact, and how people value the land used for siting and the information on the specific project people receive to form their attitudes (Batel & Devine-Wright, 2015; Gross, 2007). These findings have empirically verified that assumptions about spatial proximity are too simplistic an explanation of opposition, considering that community acceptance of energy technologies is shaped by a broader set of social, political, socio-demographic, cultural and geographical factors (Batel & Devine-Wright, 2015; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007).

2.2.3 The Influence of Self Efficacy While NIMBY will guide researchers on their research approach, other scholars emphasised the need for characterising the distributional and procedural justice in the energy programs that influence the community’s responses to energy infrastructure (Wolsink, 2019). The perception of procedural fairness, or the involvement of society in the decision-making process, to perceive energy programs as fair has cascaded into research on community engagement (Gross, 2007). To explain these perceived risks/benefits, I borrow a theory of “self-efficacy” from psychology (Bandura, 2012): Self-efficacy beliefs affect the quality of human functioning through cognitive, motivational, affective, and decisional processes. Specifically, people’s beliefs in their efficacy influence whether they think pessimistically or optimistically in self enabling or self-debilitating ways. Self-efficacy beliefs influence how well people motivate themselves and persevere in the face of difficulties through the goals they set for themselves, their outcome expectations, and causal attributions for their successes and failures.

The implication to social acceptance is that people’s self-efficacy may encourage pro-environmental behaviour. Indeed, scholars have documented some associations between personal efficacy and concern about global warming and climate change (Hostager et al., 1998; Milfont, 2012). Knowing more about the risks of global warming and climate change, this increased concern leads to greater perceived efficacy and responsibility to help solve them (Hostager et al., 1998). More recent research by Fritsche and Masson (2021)

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concludes that when individuals are identifying with existing collectives, such as one’s own nation or an environmental movement, it is a powerful source of both personal and collective efficacy, which turn these individuals into collective climate actors. I now turn the discussion to another key idea in energy social science, which is energy justice.

2.3 Energy Justice 2.3.1 Multifaceted Definitions of Justice In looking at the energy justice conceptual framework, one begins with looking at the core tenets of energy justice to see if they are present before broadening their scope to see where the issue fits within the energy system. Theorists of justice have emerged since the time of ancient Greece to recent times. For Plato, justice is the condition in which a person can act for psychological elements of reason, aspiration and appetite without one interfering with another. Justice is to rule with wisdom in a society (Cooper, 1977). Since then, many scholars, from political theorists to philosophers, have proposed their theories of justice in their terms. Among them was John Rawls, who wrote a book on “A Theory of Justice”. In his book, Rawls (1971) refers to liberalism, which is related to the “basic freedom” of the citizen to exercise a sense of justice and “basic reasoning” when they are free to pursue their conception of the good with substantial involvement from the government. This formed the foundation for the energy justice concept. The debate on justice has been centred on individual rights versus collective rights. The word comes from the Latin jus, meaning right or law. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the “just” person as one who typically “does what is morally right” and relates the word to “social justice” as the quality of being fair or reasonable. Rawls (2020: 20–25) proposed justice as liberalism pertaining to the “basic freedom” of the citizen to exercise the sense of justice and “basic reasoning” when they are free to pursue their conception of the good with substantial involvement from the government. The successor of liberalism thoughts includes Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, who went beyond the distribution of goods and claimed how those goods could flourish a particular individual. Sen (1990) argued that justice is about human development, the extent of choice to function in society, and freedom in access and opportunities to the good they need. Nussbaum (2002) stated that a person must obtain specific capabilities to realise functioning and proper behaviour, including life, health, body integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, relationship, play and political control. This is to say that justice relates to individual and societal dimensions, between freedom versus limitation, equity versus partiality. While the Western definition of justice centres on individual rights and freedom, justice is understood somewhat differently in the Eastern context. Influence from colonial rulers, religion and political leaders forms the basis on which the justice

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concept is articulated. The Eastern tradition emphasised social connections, mutual obligations and moralism (Sovacool et al., 2017b). Confucius viewed justice as an individual must have a deep and particular concern for the well-being of other members (Cline, 2013). Meanwhile, postcolonial theory painted a controversial picture of justice in the colonised countries. The suggestion is that colonialism reverberates in the postcolonial moment, long after the empire has been dismantled (Kapur, 2013). Applying justice theory in the developing country context is much needed to enrich the discussions about how different meanings of justice apply in real-world settings. Meanwhile, in the past decade, scholars’ attention has been focused on justice issues in environmental scholarships, including in the energy system, which focused on the fair allocations of costs and benefits of energy decisions to society.

2.3.2 Justice in the Energy System Energy justice has commonly been defined within the tenets of distributive, recognition and procedural dimensions (Heffron & McCauley, 2017; McCauley et al., 2016). The distributional justice element in the energy system covers equal access to the energy system and addresses the injustices implicated by the system. The recognition element identifies the vulnerable or misrepresented society that is being ignored in the energy system. Procedural justice refers to the fair processes in policy decisionmaking and inclusive representation in energy-related activities. More specifically, Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) define energy justice as: A global energy system that fairly disseminates both the benefits and costs of energy services and one that has representative and impartial decision making.

The definition is elaborated further by demanding focus on crucial elements, such as cost, benefits and procedures, which bring together cosmopolitan (the idea that human beings are part of the greater community) views (Sovacool et al., 2016). Energy justice demands that one calculates how energy is distributed to present and future generations; provide meaningful involvement and access to the decisionmaking process; and represent minorities in decision-making at all stages of the energy process (Sovacool et al., 2017a, 2017b). In this regard, Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) proposed ways in which justice principles can be applied to the energy system, which covers the aspects detailed in Table 2.1. Moreover, Jenkins et al. (2016) stated the nexus in which energy justice can provide the opportunity to explore where injustices occur, recognise new sections of society and develop new processes of avoidance and remediation. The study further characterised injustices in Energiewende cases in Germany and wind power developments in the isle of Lewis. Energy justice, therefore, serves as a network to understand the energy system from multiple impacts: social, economic, political and environmental. Ideally, one system should achieve all the justice principles in the energy system, but in reality, they might erode each other. Examining the energy transition in

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Table 2.1 Energy justice principles No

Principles

Description

1

Availability

People deserve sufficient energy resources of high quality (suitable to meet their end uses)

2

Affordability

All people, including the poor, should pay no more than 10% of their income for energy services

3

Due process

Countries should respect due process and human rights in their production and use of energy

4

Transparency and accountability

All people should have access to high-quality information about energy and the environment and fair, transparent and accountable forms of energy decision-making

5

Sustainability

Energy resources should be depleted with consideration for savings, community development and precaution

6

Intra-generational equity

All people have a right to reasonably access energy services

7

Inter-generational equity

Future generations have a right to enjoy a good life undisturbed by the damage our energy systems inflict on the world today

8

Responsibility

All actors have a responsibility to protect the natural environment and minimise energy-related environmental threats

9

Resistance

Energy injustices must be actively, deliberately opposed

10

Intersectionality

Expanding the idea of recognitional justice to acknowledging how the realisation of energy justice is linked to other justice dimensions

Source Sovacool et al. (2017a, 2017b)

Mozambique, Broto et al. (2018) found that attempts to introduce more environmentally sound renewable energy innovations contrast with the persistence of injustices embedded in the expansion and functioning of Mozambique’s electricity grid. McCauley et al. (2016) explored the justice in infrastructural development in the Arctic and found that the energy system was developed at the expense of customary people who are subject to distributional injustices, from due process and proximity perspective as energy infrastructure that benefits all and burdens some. The study concludes that energy justice aims to provide all individuals across all areas with safe, affordable and sustainable energy, but it must also be wary that injustice, like poverty, is actually relative, not absolute. Energy justice is a tool to develop a just policy and address the injustices imposed by the policy. The concept has been used in law, historical politics, social and case studies in relation to community development and innovations (Allen et al., 2019; Maher & Stefan, 2019; Forman, 2017; Sovacool et al., 2019). These previous studies

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explored how energy justice was used as a measurement to achieve justice in different cases. Most of the literature studies have been done in a Western tradition of thoughts rendered from the Greek concept of justice as freedom, just order and modern notions of right and wrong (Nederman & Shogimen, 2008). This was confirmed by Sovacool et al., (2017a, 2017b), who stated that the philosophical underpinnings of “global energy justice” have been relied almost exclusively on Western philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and Robert Nozick who defined justice as freedom and equality. On the contrary, countries with significant deficits in energy access and postcolonial and hegemonic dominance of the West have shaped the energy system and transition towards renewable (Broto et al., 2018). Indeed, activists and academics have discussed the meaning of energy justice for almost a decade. However, the definition may be lacking in domesticating this global perception in national policy literature, while the postcolonial definition remains underexplored. Limited study has recognised this shortcoming and explains energy justice from the perspective of non-Western and non-human-centred theories of ethics and justice. Sovacool et al., (2017a, 2017b) looked into several non-Western and nonhuman philosophers such as Hinduism, Taoism and animal centrism to make the case of involvement of these theories. In summary, the study recognised two added principles of energy justice; one of resistance, standing up to injustice, and one of intersectionality, recognising how issues of energy justice are intertwined with other elements such as race, class, or power and the treatment of non-humans (Sovacool et al., 2017a, 2017b). According to Forman (2017), energy systems at local scales can foster greater energy justice. Examining community energy projects in Wales, Forman (2017) justified that context is crucial, and it is important to use a sensitive methodology to the local context. Sovacool et al. (2019) analyse energy justice in European low carbon transitions found that the principles of affordability and sustainability erode equity and respect. The study highlights the complications in which innovations can create new vulnerabilities if unaddressed carefully. Both studies suggest that contestation of energy justice under the politics—for whom, when and how—is essential to be explored further, and universal definition might not be suitable for all cases.

2.4 Fostering Social Acceptance Through Energy Justice As mentioned in Sect. 2.2, the community that perceived energy decision-making as fair will be benefitted in fostering acceptance. As discussed in the previous section, justice can be equated to the concepts of fairness and righteousness. In social acceptance research, it is common to further break justice into two crucial aspects, distributive justice and procedural justice. Distributive justice focuses on the individual perceptions of fairness regarding outcome allocations or distributions (Walker et al., 2014). Procedural justice concerns with regard to community perception of fairness in the processes of decision-making (Gross, 2007). More specifically, procedural justice

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is closely related to the degree of participation of different actors in the decisionmaking processes. Both distributive justice and procedural justice (as defined by energy justice terminology) have been shown to have important associations with community attitudes towards local energy infrastructure developments. The provision of community benefits might enhance local support of energy infrastructure instead of self-interest as the sole basis of NIMBY. Some studies have attempted to demonstrate the impact of procedural justice in social acceptance. According to Roddis et al. (2018), local stakeholders are willing to accept new energy infrastructure (wind turbines) in their vicinity if they can participate in the decision-making, if the community owns the turbines and if the electricity is consumed in the region and not exported. Goedkoop and Devine-Wright (2016) found that there are positive prospects for shared ownership of energy between developers and communities that pave the way for acceptance. While community ownership is often lauded as a panacea for maximising turbine acceptance, a new study suggests that decision-making involvement—procedural fairness—matters most (Baxter, 2017). The other justice aspect of social acceptance, distributive justice tied closely with procedural justice. The considerations of equity in the distribution of costs and benefits are important in renewable energy projects (Goedkoop & Devine-Wright, 2016). The equity principle suggests that outcomes should be proportional to inputs provided by different project stakeholders (Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017a). This concept not only concerns the distribution of benefits between the private sector and communities but also between communities to mitigate conflicts (Aitken, 2010). The distribution of costs and benefits is often materialised as the energy project operators’ disruption of community livelihood. As different stakeholders of the project might have different views of the cost and benefits, developers and policymakers need to consult the communities to conduct effective planning: positive benefit-sharing and greater participation.

2.5 Discussion In the light of its significant potential for contributing to the energy transition, social acceptance research in Indonesia is surprisingly scarce. From all the articles published between 2015 and 2021 that included the keywords “social acceptance” and “Indonesia” in the several prominent energy journals that address the issue (Energy Policy, Renewable, and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Energy Research & Social Sciences, Nature Energy and Applied energy), solar energy is currently the most frequently addressed source of energy, followed by nuclear power, gas (LPG gas stove) and decentralised renewable energy system. A comprehensive analysis of current priorities energy programs (solar panel, geothermal, nuclear, coal and green electricity) and the interconnected roles of different actors at different levels arguably will provide rich empirical context for studying social acceptance.

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Secondly, even though social acceptance and energy justice objectives are closely interlinked, there is limited research on the links between the social acceptance of energy technology and energy justice. While it is common sense that a certain degree of distributive justice and procedural justice is a desirable objective, for energy infrastructure developers, implementing these principles requires addressing those most in need. The other tenet of energy justice, recognition justice, can be applied to social acceptance theory to inform social acceptance of energy technology in emerging economies and to engage in how marginalised, indigenous and impoverished communities interpret energy production-related issues (Velasco-Herrejon & Bauwens, 2020). Meanwhile, both social acceptance and energy justice theories are mainly derived from the Western conception of justice. Justice in the Western system is primarily concerned with the concepts of “freedom”, “equality” and “participation” (Rawls, 1971)—almost absent in the postcolonial world of the Global South. Here, the energy system is mostly centralised (Broto et al., 2018) and inequality is high. Therefore, justice discussions in the Global South should also focus on the justice as recognition aspect rather than only procedural and distribution dimensions. Applying to the case study, the Indonesian State-owned Electricity Company controls the production, transmission and distribution of electricity, limiting community participation in the energy system. This is one of the legacies of Dutch colonialism “domein verklaring” (controlling rights of the State) to justify Dutch East Indies’ control of the land. The application of justice theory to the developing country context with a postcolonial history will result in interesting findings.

2.6 Conclusion The discussions of the various literatures on social acceptance and energy justice have been presented in this chapter. The application of social acceptance theory often encompasses only one of the three acceptance dimensions identified by scholars (socio-political, market and community). The literature also shows that social acceptance of energy projects is closely interlinked with the two main dimensions of justice, distributive and distributional justice, and commonly grouped recognition justice with procedural justice. Furthermore, it has been brought to the attention that linking social acceptance and energy justice theories is helpful to understand factors affecting social acceptance of energy technologies. In this case, attention to distributive, procedural, as well as recognition justice is needed. It was also noted that much of the literature on social acceptance and energy justice had been derived from the Western conception of justice that promotes freedom, equality and participation.

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Milfont, T. L. (2012). The interplay between knowledge, perceived efficacy, and concern about global warming and climate change: A one-year longitudinal study. Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 32(6), 1003–1020. Mulyono, B. (2018). Kebijakan Pembelian Listrik PLTSa oleh PT PLN (Persero ) (Divisi Energi Baru dan Terbarukan Direktorat Pengadaan Strategis 1 PT. PLN (Persero)), p. 87. Nederman, C. J., & Shogimen, T. (Eds.). (2008). Western political thought in dialogue with Asia. Lexington Books. Nussbaum, M. (2002). Capabilities and social justice. International Studies Review, 4(2). Petrova, M. A. (2013). NIMBYism revisited: Public acceptance of wind energy in the United States. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 4(6), 575–601. https://doi.org/10. 1002/wcc.250 Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Belknap Press. Rawls, J. (2020). A theory of justice: Revised edition, 20–25. Harvard University Press. Roddis, P., et al. (2018, May). The role of community acceptance in planning outcomes for onshore wind and solar farms: An energy justice analysis. Applied Energy, 226, 353–364. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.05.087 Sagebiel, J. (2017). Valuing improvements in electricity supply using discrete choice experiments: Preferences of private households in India and Germany (1). Sagebiel, J., & Rommel, K. (2014). Preferences for electricity supply attributes in emerging megacities—Policy implications from a discrete choice experiment of private households in Hyderabad, India. Energy for Sustainable Development, 21, 89–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2014. 06.002 Sen, A. J. (1990). Justice: Means versus freedoms. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 111–121. Setyawati, D. (2020). Analysis of perceptions towards the rooftop photovoltaic solar system policy in Indonesia. Energy Policy, 144(August 2019), 111569. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020. 111569 Siyaranamual, M., et al. (2020). Consumers’ willingness to pay for electricity service attributes: A discrete choice experiment in urban Indonesia. Energy Reports, 6, 562–571. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.egyr.2020.02.018 Sommerfeld, J., Buys, L., & Vine, D. (2017). Residential consumers’ experiences in the adoption and use of solar PV. Energy Policy, 105(December 2016), 10–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol. 2017.02.021 Sovacool, B. K., et al. (2016). Energy decisions reframed as justice and ethical concerns. Nature Energy, 1. https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.24 Sovacool, B. K., & Dworkin, M. H. (2014). Global energy justice: Problems, principles, and practices. Global Energy Justice: Problems, Principles, and Practices. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO 9781107323605 Sovacool, B. K., & Lakshmi Ratan, P. (2012). Conceptualizing the acceptance of wind and solar electricity. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 16(7), 5268–5279. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.rser.2012.04.048 Sovacool, B. K., et al. (2017a). New frontiers and conceptual frameworks for energy justice. Energy Policy, 105(November 2016), 677–691. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.005 Sovacool, B. K., et al. (2017b). New frontiers and conceptual frameworks for energy justice. Energy Policy, 105(March), 677–691. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.005. Sovacool, B. K., D’Agostino, A. L., & Jain Bambawale, M. (2011). The socio-technical barriers to Solar Home Systems (SHS) in Papua New Guinea: “Choosing pigs, prostitutes, and poker chips over panels”. Energy Policy, 39(3), 1532–1542. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.027 Sovacool, B. K., Hess, D. J., & Cantoni, R. (2021). Energy transitions from the cradle to the grave: A meta-theoretical framework integrating responsible innovation, social practices, and energy justice. Energy Research and Social Science, 75(February). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021. 102027

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Sovacool, B. K., Martiskainen, M., Hook, A., & Baker, L. (2019). Decarbonization and its discontents: A critical energy justice perspective on four low-carbon transitions. Climatic Change, 155, 581–619. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02521-7 Stigka, E. K., Paravantis, J. A., & Mihalakakou, G. K. (2014). Social acceptance of renewable energy sources: A review of contingent valuation applications. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 32, 100–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2013.12.026 Tabi, A., & Wüstenhagen, R. (2017a). Keep it local and fish-friendly: Social acceptance of hydropower projects in Switzerland. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 68(July 2016), 763–773. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.10.006 Tabi, A., & Wüstenhagen, R. (2017b). Keep it local and fish-friendly: Social acceptance of hydropower projects in Switzerland. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 68(August 2015), 763–773. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.10.006 Tanaka, M., et al. (2014). Consumers’ willingness to pay for alternative fuel vehicles: A comparative discrete choice analysis between the US and Japan. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 70, 194–209. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2014.10.019 Uji, A., Prakash, A., & Song, J. (2021). Does the “NIMBY syndrome” undermine public support for nuclear power in Japan? Energy Policy, 148, 111944. Van der Horst, D. (2007). NIMBY or not? Exploring the relevance of location and the politics of voiced opinions in renewable energy siting controversies. Energy Policy, 35(5), 2705–2714. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2006.12.012 Velasco-Herrejon, P., & Bauwens, T. (2020, February). Energy justice from the bottom up: A capability approach to community acceptance of wind energy in Mexico. Energy Research and Social Science, 70, 101711. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101711 Walker, B. J. A., Wiersma, B., & Bailey, E. (2014). Community benefits, framing and the social acceptance of offshore wind farms: An experimental study in England. Energy Research and Social Science, 3(C), 46–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.07.003 Warren, C. R., & McFadyen, M. (2013). Does community ownership affect public attitudes to wind energy? A case study from South-West Scotland. Geography Compass, 7(12), 853–866. Wolsink, M. (2000). Wind power and the NIMBY-myth: Institutional capacity and the limited significance of public support. Renewable Energy, 21(1), 49–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/S09601481(99)00130-5 Wolsink, M. (2019). Social acceptance, lost objects, and obsession with the “public”—The pressing need for enhanced conceptual and methodological rigor. Energy Research and Social Science, 48(December 2018), 269–276. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.12.006 Wüstenhagen, R., Wolsink, M., & Bürer, M.J. (2007). Social acceptance of renewable energy innovation: An introduction to the concept. Energy Policy, 35(5), 2683–2691. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.enpol.2006.12.001 Zarnikau, J. (2003). Consumer demand for “green power” and energy efficiency. Energy Policy, 31(15), 1661–1672. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4215(02)00232-X

Chapter 3

A Centralised Energy System of Indonesia

Abstract For Indonesia, meeting energy demand implies substantial changes in the traditional energy system that relies heavily on fossil fuels. The state-owned companies and the fossil fuel industry maintain hegemony over the energy system through policies and regulations that support dependency on fossil fuel. Yet, declining fossil fuel reserves call for immediate interventions to increase the utilisation of renewable energy. A number of regulatory reforms have allowed a greater role of the private sector and civil society in the energy system, for example, the introduction of a net metering scheme and reimbursement costs for geothermal investors. However, local government participation is still limited. This chapter reviews the existing energy regulatory regime and analyses the role of stakeholders by whom policies were created. The result shows that breaking the control of the state and fossil fuel hegemony is inconceivable. Instead, a successful energy transition includes new groundbreaking energy policies and legally binding decarbonisation targets that recognise its urgent needs and necessary implementation.

3.1 The Energy System in Indonesia Indonesia has a population of over 270 million people and has been named as the largest economy in Southeast Asia (The World Bank, 2019). It is a member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and the G20 (Group of Twenty). The population growth rate is around 1% every year and GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increases by around 5% per year since 2015 (The World Bank, 2019). This strong rate of growth causes mounting demand for energy. In order to secure the energy supply, society has predominantly relied on fossil fuels. In 2017, the total electricity produced from coal accounted for around 60% of the national energy mix (IEA, 2019). In addition, the coal boom during the decade of 2000 has provided ample opportunity for oligarchic dominance of coal extraction, supplies and exports (Marquardt, 2016). To succeed at transitioning to

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_3

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3 A Centralised Energy System of Indonesia

a low-carbon energy system, the utilisation of energy resources must differ from historical precedent.1 Indonesia is fortunate in many ways. It is blessed with abundant natural resources, geothermal and coal reserves, and it has been successful in fuelling the industrial phase through natural resource extraction after the colonial era. The country has also charted continuous economic growth since overcoming the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. Being the world’s fourth most populous nation and 10th largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity, it is ranked as a lower-middle economy by the World Bank between 2022 and 2023. The year 2022 also marks importance as Indonesia assumed the G20 Presidency, encouraging all countries to work together to achieve a stronger and more sustainable recovery from the pandemic. The issue of sustainability was also discussed, and Indonesia has affirmed commitments to support reaching the net zero emissions goal by 2060. It is a fact that reaching the climate goal needs radical changes to the current energy system that is mainly powered by coal. The Indonesian energy system is highly regulated and centralised into a national distribution network. This is, in part, a legacy of colonialism, which still impacts current patterns of power and wealth inequality (Booth, 1998). According to the Constitution, the state has the right to manage natural resources, a law that has its origin in the Dutch colonial-era principle of “domein” (Robertson-Snape, 1999). The domein principle asserts the right of the colonial power to rule, own and manage land and restrict community access to land. Specifically, article 33, point 3 of the Constitution states, “the land, the waters and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the State and used to the greatest prosperity of the people”. This is to say that the state (and leaders of the state) holds responsibility for protecting the common good from others who seek to undermine it—consequently excusing and delegitimising opposition (Robertson-Snape, 1999). As a consequence of the centralised system, the generation, distribution, and transmission of electricity are controlled by the State-owned Electricity Company PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara). PLN owns most of the assets for generation, the whole national grid transmission system and the end sale of electricity. Under Law No. 30/2009 on electricity, private entities can participate in electricity generation and sell electricity to entities other than PLN, provided that the power generators have been allocated a specific business area. However, in practice, a license to distribute electricity is difficult to obtain. Therefore, most private entities have a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) contract to sell electricity to PLN. The private entities that operate in power generation businesses are called Independent Power Producers (IPPs). The central government determines the value of each PPA based on the essential cost of electricity generation (Biaya Pokok Pembangkitan—BPP). As a whole, the system of energy infrastructure in Indonesia is quite well developed, considering its geographical setting. Geographically, Indonesia has several 1

This chapter has been published as a paper: Dinita Setyawati (2021) Contested Hegemony of Indonesia Energy Regulatory Regime: Challenges and Prospects for the Deployment of Renewable Energy. OGEL 1. www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=3952

3.1 The Energy System in Indonesia

31

more or less distinct parts that are important for political, cultural, social or economic reasons. The importance of these distinctions is made greater by some aspects of the distribution of resources and population. The most obvious was the distinction between the island where urbanisation, development, economy and political activities are centred in the Java Island. This distinction is also evident in the fragmentation of the power system. The Java-Bali power system is the largest in the country with more than 60% of Indonesia’s installed capacity. The transmission infrastructure is also available in other large islands in East and West Indonesia. Regarding the energy demand and consumption, Indonesia has been grouped among the “Asian giants” and often compared with China in terms of its large population size (Burke et al., 2019). However, while China has successfully grown its renewable energy capacity, Indonesia is still lagging behind. Renewable energy only contributed to around 9–12% of the total energy supply in 2019, far below the target of 23% by 2025, as declared in the Paris Agreement. With a population of over 260 million people, electrifying the whole population has been the government’s primary aim in line with Sustainable Development Goal No. 7 (universal access to energy). Subsequently, in 2019, the government enacted the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL), which included the development of electricity generators with a capacity of 35,000 megawatts (MW) in total, of which more than 50% will be supplied by coal. The main aim of the plan is to ensure that the whole population has a reliable and secure electrical connection. It seems that the current government administration still favours the use of coal resources for generating electricity as it is lower in cost than renewable energy. Various national policies have been aimed at increasing energy production as well as fulfilling the rising demand for energy. Although many of these policies support investment in renewable energy, the largest share of electricity generation still comes from coal. Therefore, the main challenge in Indonesia is to meet increasing electricity demand, including in rural areas, while simultaneously deploying renewable energy sources and reducing carbon emissions (Setyowati, 2020). With the recent situation in Russia and Ukraine, the demand for Indonesian coal has been rising. According to an interview with a government representative, the coal producer in Indonesia now preferred to supply the global market as the price of coal is higher as foreign demand rose, especially when Russian coal was banned. Indonesia was determined to increase output to help meet demand from countries that have lost coal supplies from Russia. When it comes to fossil fuel dominance, this research shows that the industry maintains a form of hegemony legitimised by the way energy markets are structured and regulated. According to Britannica encyclopaedia, hegemony is “the dominance of one group over another, often supported by legitimising norms and ideas”. The electricity distribution, transmission (via a national grid) and a large quantity of power generation are controlled by the state-owned company PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara, hereafter “State Electricity Company”). Each year, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources determines the tariff regime for coal and renewables sold to the State Electricity Company by independent power producers (IPPs). In 2020, the State Electricity Company purchased coal for US$5–6 cents/kilowatt hour

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(kWh) and renewables for US$9–14 cents/kWh. For the oil and gas sectors supply, refinery and distribution of fuel are controlled by state-owned company Pertamina. Both companies are legally mandated to control the energy system and maintain affordable energy for its citizen.2 As a consequence, this means both companies have the power to influence and enforce policies that are likely to favour cheaper fossil fuel sources instead of more expensive renewables. In spite of the urgent need for renewable energy deployment, there is still an evident grip of fossil fuels on society (LeQuesne, 2019). Through a case study, this chapter presents an analysis of how the energy regulatory regime in Indonesia supports the fossil fuel industries’ control over the energy system. Moreover, this research analyses how fossil fuel industries’ hegemony impedes the deployment of renewables and creates a power bloc coalition consisting of populist politicians and mining oligarch. The author interviewed government officials from the State Electricity Company, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) and the National Energy Board, as well as private sector representatives in the energy sector and civil society organisations for the data. The objective is to reveal how political power plays out in the case of energy. This chapter concluded that a greater civil society and local government engagement are needed for a successful energy transition, as well as greener policy reform (the inclusiveness of environmentallyfriendly strategy in the energy policy and programs).

3.2 Fossil Fuel Hegemony and Power Bloc Coalition Scholars have applied Antonio Gramsci’s theoretical concept of hegemony to explain the control of the state and fossil fuel industries over the economy and society (LeQuesne, 2019). Hegemony refers to the domination of a privileged “bloc”\ over others through the manufacturing of consent and reinforcing through coercion (Gramsci, 1971). The hegemonic bloc is able to acquire the consent of a certain agenda from the majority of civil society. Often, as in the case of the Trans Mountain pipeline in Canada, the agenda is legitimised by policy decisions and regulations (Kraushaar-Friesen & Busch, 2020). In a similar vein, the hegemonic power of fossil fuel industries is preventing necessary action on climate change and blocking a just energy transition in Canada (Carroll, 2020). In practice, fossil fuels hegemony had come to dominate economies and society since the beginning of the industrial revolution when they were used as sources of energy. To some extent, the energy landscape is changing as some countries are moving away from fossil fuels. However, history has tended to side with the fossil fuel industries. As the population grows, the demand for energy is also increasing. In this era, the “capitalist pressure to extract” has overcome the economic barrier of the high cost associated with oil sources (Pineault, 2018). The pressure from this capitalist 2

Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for Cirebon coal-fired power plant and PPA for hydro power generator Rajamandala.

3.3 Indonesia’s Energy Regulatory Regime

33

group has, therefore, forestalled the ecological imperative of transition and keeps us in the carbon era. Indeed, not only the capitalist group that is dependent on the extraction sector, other power bloc constituents, including the state, workers and communities, live in a close-quarter to the site. There is no doubt that the mining sector has the potential to contribute to a country’s wealth and economic growth. To some degree, local communities also benefited from the mining industry, in the form of job opportunities and corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. The CSR encompasses dimensions of economy, education and environmentally beneficial products undertaken by mining companies to improve the living conditions of local communities and reduce the environmental impacts of mining projects (Pineault, 2018). In developing countries, the extractive industries are mostly nationalised, but foreign players are closely involved in a context disguised by aid, trade and investment (Pineault, 2018). This fact influences the favourable conditions for a new hegemony of global capitalism, characterised by extraction intensity in the Global South countries driven by demand from industrialised countries. These views help us to understand how the power bloc interests are aligned in support of favourable energy regulatory regime and thus, form an influential coalition that challenges the deployment of renewable energy.

3.3 Indonesia’s Energy Regulatory Regime 3.3.1 The State Control over Energy Matters The energy sector in Indonesia is heavily regulated by the state. The Republic of Indonesia Constitution 1945, article 33 stipulates that: Production sectors that are vital to the state and that affect the livelihood of most of the population are to be controlled by the state.

In other words, the Constitution has provided the Indonesian government with broad power to control key economic sectors, including the land, water and natural resources. The country applies a Trias Political governance system in which the functions of administration, legislature and judiciary are implemented by different state actors. Trias political is the separation of power between the executive, judiciary and legislative functions (Iswandi & Prasetyoningsih, 2020). Law and regulations are enacted by the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ DPR). The executive branch (consists of the President, the Vice President and the Cabinet, which holds administration function) can propose laws for consideration by the DPR. Bids to liberalise the energy market were brought into the Constitutional Court and resulted in dismissal. Between 2003 and 2011, there have been several attempts to restrict the state control rights on state-run sectors by various community organisations to the Constitutional Court (Arizona, 2011). The most notable case was

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3 A Centralised Energy System of Indonesia

the constitutional review on Electricity Law No. 20/2002. The petitioners asked for a review of articles on the law that stipulates electricity unbundling. Within the electricity sector, unbundling is a type of structural reform that involves the separation of core functions performed by power companies. Because the State Electricity Company’s role is only for transmission and distribution, the unbundling system will provide greater privatisation of the electricity market. Ultimately, the Constitutional Court declared that electricity is an important state product and therefore must be managed by the government through the State Electricity Company (Arizona, 2011). The results of the 2003 decision led to the issuance of the 2009 Electricity Law which introduced a greater role of the State Electricity Company in electricity generation, including the State Electricity Company’s authority to refuse the involvement of private companies in supplying and distributing electricity (Pricewaterhousecoopers/PWC, 2017). Apart from the State Electricity Company, the parliament also plays a vital role in enacting energy policies. It is also important to emphasise that the parliament members are close to political elites or party leaders and usually comprise individuals from elite families, ex-ministers and former members of the military (Adiputri, 2018). Allegedly, some members of parliament are also somehow linked to the coal business (Jong, 2020). For instance, when the parliament passed the controversial law, Omnibus Law, in October 2020, it was responded to by a series of protests across the country. In addition, a coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) accused that the politicians involved in the drafting and passing of the law were linked to coal or energy companies (Indonesia, n.d.). The Omnibus Law sets to ease restrictions and gives monetary incentives for coal operation, including exemption from royalties for coal miners that invest in downstream activities/ power plants. Despite decentralisation that took place in the aftermath of the 1998 Asian financial crisis, the local government’s engagement is still limited to issuing business licenses for small-scale energy projects (e.g., Biofuel). Law No. 32/2004 on Local Government strengthened the democratic process at the local level. However, the law still stipulates the control of the central government in public affairs, including financial policy, foreign matters and judiciary. Against this backdrop, changes to Law No. 32/2004 are stipulated in Law No.23/2014, in which the local government retains greater control of energy resources and is allowed to give issuance of permits for infrastructure projects (see Table 3.1). Yet, the newly enacted Law No.11/2020 on Job Creation / Omnibus Law (as of October 2020) contradicts decentralisation efforts by changing geothermal licensing authority from local to the central government.

3.3.2 Energy Policy Overview After the Constitution, the next sources of law in Indonesia are as follows: laws proposed by the President and enacted by the parliament, governmental regulations, presidential decrees and local government regulations. The main energy laws are provided by Law No. 30/2007 on Energy, Law No. 30/2009 on Electricity and the

3.3 Indonesia’s Energy Regulatory Regime

35

Table 3.1 Division of authority between central and local governments for energy and mineral resources management National Government

Provincial Government

Management of energy and issuance of a permit for energy projects with the following characteristics: – Oil and gas operation – >12 miles and/or interprovincial (metal and non-metal mineral, coal, rocks, electricity installation) – Involvement of foreign investment – Bordering with other countries – For business holders of Production Operation Specific Mining Business License (Izin Usaha Pertambangan Khusus) – Biofuel > 10,000 tonne – Geothermal concession tender and issuance of Geothermal license

Management of energy and issuance of a permit for energy projects with the following characteristics: – 50–100 million

62

6

>100 million

20

2

Educational background Elementary school

2

0.2

Junior high school

4

0.4

High school

158

16

Diploma

33

3.4

Bachelor

553

56

Postgraduate

237

24

Job type Informal labour/farmer/fisherman

7

1

Private Sector

352

36

Professional consultants

53

5

Retired

74

7 (continued)

4.4 Results

55

Table 4.1 (continued) Characteristics

Number of respondents

Percentage (%)

Entrepreneur

174

18

Military/police/public servants

199

20

Other occupation

111

11

Table 4.2 Knowledge on Rooftop PV Solar Technology

Number of respondents Expert High

Percentage (%)

26

2.6

104

10.5

1

0.1

Medium

418

42.4

Low

287

29.1

None

151

15.3

Moderate

Table 4.3 Knowledge on rooftop PV Solar technology based on gender and age Gender

Age (year)

Male

30–40

5

13

0

86

47

23

174

>40–50

9

32

0

92

62

24

219

>50–60

3

21

1

85

49

27

186

>60

0

11

0

30

9

9

59

30–40

2

3

0

24

29

16

74

>40–50

0

0

0

29

42

19

90

>50–60

0

2

0

13

22

16

53

>60

0

3

0

3

14

7

13

26

104

1

418

287

151

987

(92 respondents), male age 30 to 40 years old (86 respondents) and male age 50 to 60 years old (85 respondents). The highest number of female counterparts (42 respondents) answers to have a low level of knowledge of rooftop technology in the age group 40 to 50 years old. The motivation of respondents who have installed solar PV systems was explored. The majority of respondents choose “saving electricity bill”, and the second most popular answer was “supporting clean energy and environment”, followed by “contributing to PLN electricity supply”, “research”, “lifestyle” “and following regulation” (see Fig. 4.1). This raises the notion on public awareness of environmental issue and the government’s dissemination of information on potential contribution of solar PV to environmental quality, energy savings and emission reductions.

56

4 Analysis of Perceptions Towards the Rooftop Photovoltaic Solar System …

Question: Why are you interested in installing solar panel? 120

109 101

Number of Respondents

100 80 60 40 20 2

6

6

1

0

Saving electricity bill

Lifestyle

Contributing Supporting to PLN clean energy electricity & supply environment

Research

Following regulation (RUEN)

Reason to install Solar Panel

Fig. 4.1 Respondents’ reason of interest in solar technology

4.4.2 Awareness of Ministerial Regulation No. 49/2018 (Rooftop PV Policy) Respondents were asked whether they have knowledge about Ministerial Regulation No. 49/2018 in which the State Electricity Company customers can export excess electricity produced from the solar PV systems to the national grid. The survey showed that 41% of survey respondents are aware of this scheme, while the majority of respondents, about 59%, are unaware. It seems that the policy is not well informed to the public and the government needs to make more efforts in disseminating the new policy. Respondents were also asked about their interest to install solar panel (see Fig. 4.2). Figure 4.2 shows that most of the respondents expressed interest in installing Rooftop PV Policy under better scheme (701 respondents, 71%), followed by interested to install under current scheme (23%) and not interested (6%). This indicates that the perception of solar technology is generally positive and acceptable; however, it also indicates that better scheme is preferred. Factoring the capital cost of installation, government supports or financial institutions’ assistance was absent. Therefore, installer of solar technology must pay for solar investment privately. Considering the bulk level of income of respondents ranges from 3 to 20 million, the technological cost may be considered to be too high. The majority of respondents (52%) answer to positive response for their perception about the implementation of the policy (see Fig. 4.3). The remaining respondents answered to doubting the policy will be a success (32%), and a small percentage of

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Question: Are you interested in installing solar panel under Rooftop PV policy? 800

701

No of respondents

700 600 500 400 300

225

200 61

100 0 Interested to install

Interested but waiting for better scheme

Not interested / do not care

Response

Fig. 4.2 Respondents’ interest to install solar panel under Rooftop PV Policy

the respondents (5%) think the policy implementation will be a failure. This signifies a generally positive perception of the new policy although it does not seem that a positive perception of the policy will influence the people’s decision to adopt solar panel systems.

Question: What do you think about the implementation of this policy?

No of Respondents

600

520

500 400

314

300 200 105 100

48

0 Fail

I doubt it

I do not know

Yes, I am sure it will be successful

Response

Fig. 4.3 Respondents’ perception on the implementation of Rooftop PV Policy

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Table 4.4 Perception of solar panel installation under Rooftop PV Policy across Gender

Options

Gender Women

Interested in installing PV systems Interested but waiting for better scheme Not interested/do not care Total

Male

39

186

212

489

23

38

274

713

Table 4.5 Perception of rooftop Solar PV Installation under Rooftop PV Policy across Age Options

Age (years old) 60

Interested in installing PV systems

19

59

64

72

11

Interested but waiting for better scheme

88

176

233

152

52

Not interested/Do not care Total

12

13

12

15

9

119

248

309

239

72

4.4.3 Gender Comparing responses from different gender, 77% of women respondents stated that they are waiting for a better scheme for installing solar panel, while 68% of male respondents reported similar perception. This illustrates that the available solar PV packages are less cost attractive for both women and male (see Table 4.4).

4.4.4 Age Table 4.5 indicates that respondents at the age group 50–60 are most interested in installing solar PV systems than other age groups. The majority, 233 and 152, of respondents from age group 40–50 to 50–60 years old prefer to wait for better scheme before installing solar panel.

4.4.5 Income As shown in Table 4.6, the interest to install solar panel under Rooftop PV Policy shows more than half of the respondents across all income category prefer to wait for better scheme before installing rooftop solar panel. The data also show that all respondents from income category 50 million and above have an interest in installing solar panel systems. It seems that income plays a role in the installation perception of Rooftop PV under the new policy.

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Table 4.6 Perception of rooftop Solar PV Installation under Rooftop PV Policy across Income Income Range (million Rupiah) Currency in Indonesian Rupiah (1 rupiah = 0.000070 US $) 100

4.4.6 Education About 56% of respondents have obtained Bachelor degree and 24% hold Bachelor degree. However, there seems to be no association between interest to install and educational background as respondents with higher degree also answer to the question not interested/do not care (see Table 4.7). Table 4.7 Perception of rooftop Solar PV Installation under Rooftop PV Policy across Educational Background Educational Background Elementary school

Junior high school

High school

Diploma

Bachelor

Postgraduate

Interested in installing PV systems

0

1

36

5

121

62

Interested but waiting for better scheme

1

3

111

27

398

161

Not interested/do not care

1

0

11

1

34

14

2

4

158

33

553

237

4.4.7 Statistics Pearson chi-squared test was conducted to determine the correlation between socioeconomic demographic factors versus interest in solar PV systems installation. The result shows that there is a significant correlation between the perception of rooftop solar PV installation and such factors as gender (p = 0.000169), age (p = 0.002310) and income (p = 0.00086). Results from Pearson’s chi-squared test reveal that there is no association between interest to install and educational background (p value = 0.36) (Table 4.8).

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Table 4.8 Pearson chi-squared test of respondents’ interest to install solar panel under Rooftop PV Policy according to gender, age, income, educational background

Item

p-Value

Gender

0.000169

Age

0.002310

Income

0.00086

Educational background

0.36

4.4.8 Comments and Input Survey respondents were asked for their comments and input towards the adoption of solar technology at home under the Rooftop PV Policy. This section is designed to illustrate the perception of this policy using the respondents’ own words. The result shows that the response of respondents raised the following concerns: • Lack of information and campaigning to the general public. Some respondents recommended that the government should include saving electricity bills as a key point in their public campaign. • High cost of solar technology. Costly imported materials are hampering the installation of solar technology in residential areas. Most respondents commented on the lack of government support or subsidies to support the expansion of the domestic solar panel industry. • Subsidy for solar technology. The government has yet to offer a subsidy system for private-use solar installation. Respondents noted that the lack of subsidy means that only people with high incomes can afford the technology. • Low-interest loan for solar PV systems. The government has yet to officially announce cooperation with banks or other financial institutions for a low-interest loan for solar PB systems, despite the growing interest from the State of Electricity Customers in installing a rooftop solar panel. The available crediting scheme varies from one provider to another and the customers are expected to choose themselves the ones that best serve their interest. • Lack of complete service package. Under Rooftop PV Policy, PLN is authorised to give a “certificate of operation” for solar panels device which the consumer buys from private entities. A number of respondents noted that it would be more convenient if PLN can provide a complete package, including solar panel installation and maintenance.

4.4.9 Interviews In addition to the online questionnaire survey, the primary data for this study come from interviews. The key questions of the semi-structured interviews were: (a) challenges facing Indonesia in achieving its renewable energy target, (b) key barriers in

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policy related to rooftop PV and solar use in general and (c) ways to overcome those challenges from the government perspective.

4.4.10 Challenges Facing Indonesia in Achieving its Renewable Energy Target Renewable energy target set in the Nationally Determined Contribution and the National Energy Plan 2017 was said to be difficult to achieve. In order to achieve the target, renewable energy mix needs to be increased by more than 10% by 2025. This achievement can only be done through massive renewable energy power plants which require large investment, capital and economic commitment. The interview data suggest that building plants sourced from renewable energy may met with social challenges, especially from communities that are being affected. For example, geothermal project which was developed in West Sumatra has attracted complaints from the community regarding land compensation and disruption of village agriculture. In addition, other source of renewables such as solar power plant contributes to smaller portion of renewable energy mix target. Another challenge is the uncompetitive financing system in power generation. One respondent said that BOO (Build-Own-Operate) project financing where a private entity receives a concession from PLN to finance, own and operate power generation facility makes investor reluctant to invest on renewable energy power plant. This scheme was designed for private sector to make large sum of initial investment before able to gain profit from selling the generated electricity. In addition, there is an issue of cost maintenance and repair or the power plants before the transfer electricity is made. Unfavourable policy, frequent reshuffling of government officials and lack of consultation between ministries and between national-local governments serve as barriers in promoting renewable energy. The policy on renewable energy has put investors reluctant to invest in renewable energy power plant development. Regulations No. 12/2017 and No. 50/2017 regulate PLN’s power purchase prices at 85% of local average generation cost (BPP). The high-cost venture is making renewable electricity a non-competitive investment compared with coal generation, making investors unable to make timely profits. Furthermore, frequent changes in government officials are contributing to frequent policy and program changes. The stability in the regulatory framework is needed to ensure effective working mechanism. The reshuffling of senior government officials may occur in two to five years. Lastly, the lack of intra-ministerial/ national-local coordination made renewable energy calculation more complex. For example, other ministries may have independent poverty alleviation programs which generate renewable energy in remote areas of Indonesia without consultation with the MEMR. Similarly, local government does not have obligations to report renewable energy projects to the MEMR. Respondents stated

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that this lack of coordination poses problems in calculating the total use of renewable energy in Indonesia.

4.4.11 Key Barriers in Policy Related to Rooftop PV and Solar use in General MEMR has projects in the use of solar energy which are small-scaled and may be lacking significant public impact. From the year 2017, solar energy projects are concentrated into solar lamp distribution to remote areas and solar lamp use for public (roads) lightning. Interview participants have noted that the local communities who are given solar lamp for free sometimes resell the equipment to get economic incentives. This act of “free giveaway” is hampering the independence of the communities and undervaluing the core importance of solar energy. Furthermore, road lightning incurred problems such as stolen batteries and high-cost maintenance. A number of private sector led large-scaled solar parks are being developed in Indonesia, including a ground-mounted SP Medco East Bali Solar PV Park, Quantum Power Riau Solar PV Park, Masdar Tuas Power EDF IP Indonesia Solar PV Park, Combol Solar PV Park, Citlim Solar PV Park and Duriangkang Floating Solar PV Park. Under the planned renewable energy bill, there will be incentives provided by the Government of Indonesia in the form of tax reduction, land/ infrastructure facilitation and financing guarantee from Central Government. However, there is uncertainty about the incentive mechanisms. In larger cities such as Jakarta, Surabaya and Balikpapan, the electricity consumption pattern reaches its peak at night time when sunlight is absent. Therefore, users of solar technology either have to invest in a battery system, or connect to National Grid of PLN. If connecting to the national grid, the generated electricity will be valued lower (at 65% per kW/h) of what they pay to the PLN. In addition, problems of solar power plants lie in the technological issue or the intermittent nature of the solar energy.

4.4.12 Overcoming Challenges From the Government Perspective The participants recognised the need for institutional strengthening and increased coordination between government agencies. In order to achieve renewable energy target and increase the use of solar panel systems, there needs to be coordination between government agencies to achieve collaborative policy. In some cases, the regional government have their own renewable energy projects which not yet coordinated with MEMR. Interview data suggest that renewable energy project needs to be communicated and coordinated thoroughly.

4.5 Discussion

63

While some political hurdles are difficult to overcome, the respondents are generally positive about the implementation of Rooftop PV Policy and the development of solar technology. MEMR training centre records high interest for classes on solar technology. In addition, the new policy brought new light to PLN’s increasing attention on renewable energy. The increase of renewable energy share, mainly geothermal, wind and solar, is also included in Presidential Regulation No. 22/2017 on National Energy Plan. In addition, Indonesia’s Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement shows good faith in climate change commitment.

4.5 Discussion This study offers insight on the potential of solar PV system installations within existing regulatory framework. The first research question sought to determine the perception of community and government towards Rooftop PV Policy. The findings suggest that the majority of community and government perception is positive and confident about solar energy development. For Rooftop PV Policy, majority of respondents answer to positive response. For the government’s response, the interview suggests that they are positive about the implementation of Rooftop PV Policy. The study findings are relevant for the development of solar technology in Indonesia as stated by Sommerfeld et al. (2017), identifying the perception of community as defining factor in the acceptance of renewable energy technology. The second research question sought to determine to what extent the perceptions influence decision to install solar panel. There was a consistency between result of the questionnaire survey and government interview in relation to existing academic literatures. Taken across all data, the most common commonalities are economic, socio-demographic and institutional factors. The economic factors, namely price, were mentioned in the comments section a number of times. Both government and the community considered solar panel to be costly for average citizen. The high cost of solar technology was also mentioned in previous study which discouraged respondents for installing solar PV systems (Yuan et al., 2011). In addition, the concern of increasing electricity prices named to be the most significant motivator to install solar PV (Sommerfeld et al., 2017). Correspondently, in the questionnaire survey, community that have installed solar PV mentioned their main concern was to save electricity bill. The responses from the respondents indicate that economic and social factors were more important than environmental factors in their motivation to install solar PV. Indeed, policy should be aligned with values, norms and attitudes of the end users targeting in order to reveal conscious and unconscious drivers (van den Broek & Walker, 2019). Result of the questionnaire survey suggests that gender, age and income factors contribute to the perception of rooftop PV installation; however, there is a similar pattern that respondents across those factors prefer to wait for better scheme before installing solar panel. The 65% price cap for solar-generated electricity seems to contribute to the view that the finances scheme within Rooftop

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PV Policy is unattractive. Also, there is a lack of information on cooperation with private financial institutions that can make solar panel installation more affordable. In addition, subsidy has historically subsisted in the Indonesian economy since reformation, mainly in fuel and electricity for the poor. In the comments section, a number of respondents mentioned that the government should be giving subsidy to finance solar panel. They also noted that PLN should have a more comprehensive packaging for solar technology, for example providing solar panel hardware, installation and maintenance. Although this should be covered by the private sector, the respondent’s comments suggest that there is consideration to entrust pricing and technological-related matter to the PLN. There is a need to strengthen the government’s institutional factor in order to achieve successful policy implementation. In the comments section, a number of respondents mentioned the lack of public campaigning from the government on Rooftop PV Policy. Minimal knowledge contributes to the lack of motivation to pay for high cost of solar panel. Furthermore, knowledge on the technology may frame positive perception for public acceptance. Other aspects that appear from the interview are unfavourable policy towards renewable energy, frequent reshuffling of government officials and uncoordinated ministries and national-local governments. The responses indicate that there is a need of political stability, institutional strengthening for policymaking, as well as regulatory capability and practices. The previous study acknowledged government engagement and favourable regulatory framework as key factors in ensuring positive image for solar power (Alsabbagh, 2019; Sovacool & Lakshmi Ratan, 2012; Yuan et al., 2011). Research data indicate that the perception of solar technology is generally positive and acceptable; however, it also reveals that better scheme is preferred. Research limitations were identified. Firstly, the respondents are limited to a specific group of people within a similar network with similar characteristics that are technology savvy because the questionnaire was distributed online. In addition, there is a limitation for the researcher to clarify the survey result with respondent without face-to-face interaction. Thirdly, this survey is unable to reach a challenging population located in remote areas without internet access. This questionnaire survey does not intend to represent the views of the whole Indonesian population, but it is an attempt to explain problems associated with the newly enacted regulation on Rooftop PV and intention to install the technology in residential areas. Note that the questionnaire survey does not represent the general views of Indonesians and the result might have been different if the survey is conducted differently, for example only targeting communities in the rural areas.

4.6 Conclusion Renewable energy target of the Indonesian government might be technically challenging to attain; however, the positive note is that acceptance of related policy may help to achieve the goal. Similar studies of social acceptance of solar energy

4.6 Conclusion

65

and perception have been conducted before. However, there is a limited study on Indonesia’s solar energy perception after Rooftop PV Policy is enacted. This research aims to fill in the gap. The findings of this study revealed several important points useful for policy recommendations. The first highlight is that the perception of the Rooftop PV Policy is generally positive; however, it does not translate into motivation to install solar panel systems. Research data suggest that the majority prefers to wait for a better scheme before installing solar technology. Cost seems to be the main influential aspect for respondents of this study. Solar panel in Indonesia is still considered costly. In the comments section, the issue of subsidy is raised a number of times. Similarly, the government expressed a positive note on the promulgation of the Rooftop PV Policy despite the acknowledgement that solar panel price is expensive. This suggests that the economic factor outranks the environmental factor in the adoption of solar panels. The survey became a paradox in which a positive perception of policy does not always influence people’s decision-making process. A feasible solution is to work on a green financing policy to make solar panel more affordable. This requires the government to work together with the private sector and financial institutions to provide financing for solar technology, especially in providing initial solar panel equipment. The approach might be banks offering 0% credit loans for solar panel systems in a longer timeline (5 years and above) in order for customers to afford upfront solar system PV costs. It should be noted that a 65% price cap from PLN is unavoidable considering PLN needs to survive financially. The response generated from the survey indicates that PLN could take the role of supplier and maintainer in solar PV. This plan could usefully be explored to achieve a comprehensive and collaborative approach to addressing economic matters. This research produced preliminary useful findings in the study on solar technology development in Indonesia. As mentioned earlier, the findings are limited by the scope and nature of online questionnaire survey process, it would be useful to do further in-depth interviews or surveys grounded in communities with different socioeconomic background or in rural areas. Inputs from these communities can contribute to further understanding of public perception of solar technology in Indonesia. Lastly, the incorporation of the community into electricity generation will alter the traditional way of the top-down governance of the power market. If attractive solar panel financing is introduced and well communicated, more residents may adopt solar panel. Favourable policy is potential for increasing the use of solar panel. If more communities can generate own electricity from solar panels, the task of electrifying Indonesia would be less of a burden and renewable energy target is not impossible to achieve. Increasing the use of solar technology may reduce traditional fossil fuel use or in the more extreme case, replace it for good.

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References Alsabbagh, M. (2019). Public perception toward residential solar panels in Bahrain. Energy Reports, 5, 253–261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2019.02.002 Dang, M. -Q. (2017). Solar energy potential in Indonesia. Devine-Wright, P., et al. (2017, April). A conceptual framework for understanding the social acceptance of energy infrastructure: Insights from energy storage. Energy Policy, 107, 27–31. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.04.020 Fathoni, A. M., Utama, N. A., & Kristianto, M. A. (2014). A technical and economic potential of solar energy application with feed-in tariff policy in Indonesia. Procedia Environmental Sciences, 20, 89–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proenv.2014.03.013 Graham, J. B., Stephenson, J. R., & Smith, I. J. (2009). Public perceptions of wind energy developments: Case studies from New Zealand. Energy Policy, 37(9), 3348–3357. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.enpol.2008.12.035 Labay, D. G., & Kinnear, T. C. (1981). Exploring the consumer decision process in the adoption of solar energy systems. Journal of Consumer Research, 8(3), 271. https://doi.org/10.1086/208865 Maulidia, M., et al. (2019, February). Rethinking renewable energy targets and electricity sector reform in Indonesia: A private sector perspective. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 101, 231–247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.11.005 Mujiyanto, S., & Tiess, G. (2013). Secure energy supply in 2025: Indonesia’s need for an energy policy strategy. Energy Policy, 61(5), 31–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.119 Outhred, H., & Retnanestri, M. (2015). Insights from the experience with solar photovoltaic systems in Australia and Indonesia. Energy Procedia, 65, 121–130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro. 2015.01.044. Rycroft, R. W. (2006). Time and technological innovation: Implications for public policy. Technology in Society, 28(3), 281–301. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2006.06.001 Sambodo, M. T., & Novandra, R. (2019). The state of energy poverty in Indonesia and its impact on welfare. Energy Policy, 132(October 2018), 113–121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019. 05.029 Sommerfeld, J., Buys, L., & Vine, D. (2017). Residential consumers’ experiences in the adoption and use of solar PV. Energy Policy, 105(December 2016), 10–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol. 2017.02.021 Sovacool, B. K. (2018, June). Success and failure in the political economy of solar electrification: Lessons from World Bank Solar Home System (SHS) projects in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Energy Policy, 123, 482–493. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.09.024Kawamura (2019) Sovacool, B. K., & Hess, D. J. (2017). Ordering theories: Typologies and conceptual frameworks for sociotechnical change. Social Studies of Science, 47(5), 703–750. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0306312717709363 Sovacool, B. K., & Lakshmi Ratan, P. (2012). Conceptualizing the acceptance of wind and solar electricity. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 16(7), 5268–5279. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.rser.2012.04.048 Sovacool, B. K., D’Agostino, A. L., & Jain Bambawale, M. (2011). The socio-technical barriers to Solar Home Systems (SHS) in Papua New Guinea: “Choosing pigs, prostitutes, and poker chips over panels”. Energy Policy, 39(3), 1532–1542. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.12.027 van den Broek, K. L., & Walker, I. (2019, March). Exploring the perceptions of drivers of energy behaviour. Energy Policy, 129, 1297–1305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.03.033 Wolsink, M. (2010). Contested environmental policy infrastructure: Socio-political acceptance of renewable energy, water, and waste facilities. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 30(5), 302–311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2010.01.001

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Chapter 5

Electricity Charging Stations and the Energy Survival of the Urban Informal Sector

Abstract This chapter presents a study on energy poverty that manifests in various dimensions: access, equity and quality. In Indonesia, electricity deprivation results from low access to safe and reliable electricity connection. For street vendor communities, electricity deprivation constitutes vulnerability in two aspects: economic vulnerability and socio-political vulnerability. This chapter starts from the multiple definitional controversies surrounding energy poverty and energy justice and then discusses the different ways they affect the vulnerability of communities being studied. In this study, marginalised urban communities are defined as the informal sector workers operating businesses on the street or the street vendor communities. This chapter concludes that this challenge calls for specific actions, from government initiatives to community-based efforts and innovation.

5.1 Introduction Energy is defined as a social issue in the Indonesian regulatory framework, stating that fuel and electricity prices are reflections of social justice. For the government, maintaining energy price stability means protecting the poor and vulnerable. However, this concept covers electricity usage for the residential, commercial and business sector without taking into account the informal sector which comprises almost 60% of the Indonesian economy. The informal sector, here defined as street vendors whose income fluctuate, gets electricity service from informal, sometimes illegal ways through diesel or power generator. Thus, the principles of energy poverty: availability, security and sustainability, are questioned. Within this context, this chapter seeks to address the social issue of energy justice for the urban informal sector in Indonesia. The definition of energy justice and energy poverty allows for a situated approach to the phenomenon. Energy poverty is a distinct form of poverty characterised by the lack or absent of access to electricity in their homes and the use of traditional energy sources in unstainable, unsafe and inefficient ways (Birol, 2007). Meanwhile, energy poverty is also defined as a question of freedom and capabilities (Sen, 2000). In developed countries, it is primarily an affordability matter resulting from the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_5

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5 Electricity Charging Stations and the Energy Survival of the Urban …

combination of living in energy inefficient buildings, low income and high expenditure on energy (Awaworyi Churchill & Smyth, 2022). In developing countries, the nexus vary from affordability, accessibility to availability of energy services resulting from existing infrastructure, low income, inefficient buildings and living in off-grid electricity areas. In the Indonesian context, energy poverty has traditionally been described as a situation in which a household does not have access to electricity, gas and all fuel used in everyday activities, such as for cooking and lightning for reading. This definition is especially significant since it provides a contrast of energy poverty defined in the European context in which energy poverty has been defined as the inability to heat its homes to an acceptable level, with the standards recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO)—18 °C for bedrooms and 20–22 °C for living rooms (Boardman, 2010). The same definition echoed fuel poverty interpretation in the UK where this condition is principally seen as the inability to purchase affordable warmth (Bouzarovski, 2017). The conditions and manifestations of energy poverty and energy (in) justice vary according to the geographical, socio-cultural and economic conditions. The rural areas that share characteristics of Indonesia have similar geographical settings in which some areas are still disconnected from the national grid and rely on and currently channelled through different sets of programs: (i) grid extension executed by the State Electricity Company, (ii) off-grid programs executed by line ministries and (iii) off-grid programs executed by the local government. The data presented by the Government of Indonesia show that electrification ratios are lowest in eastern Indonesia; however, the absolute number of households without electricity is greater by far in western Indonesia. Approximately 46% of the estimated 10.4 million households without electricity are in Java, whereas only 23% are in eastern Indonesia; the province of West Java, for example, has nearly as many unelectrified households— some 2.4 million—as all of eastern Indonesia combined (Asian Development Bank, 2016). This study is based on a research project titled: Energy Survival of the Marginalised: Case Study of Electric Charging Station for Urban Informal Sector in Jakarta and Bogor. This research addresses the social issue of renewable energy as a new value for the urban informal sector community in Indonesia through the examination of a new energy facility, electricity charging station (ECS) or stasiun pengisian listrik umum (SPLU). In 2016, the government launched ECS which has the potential to be powered by solar panels. The facilities were initially designed as charging stations for electric vehicles. However, the uptake and development of electric vehicles have been slow. As a result, the government redirected the use of these facilities to the public, particularly the street vendors. Previously, the vendors were dependent on illegal electricity connections that pose constant fire hazards. With a prime emphasis on fieldwork, the main purpose of this research is to analyse how and why ECS overcome injustices inflicted on the urban informal sector community in regard to electricity distribution. The question framing this research is: How and why does ECS overcome injustices caused by disproportionate electricity distribution? The secondary objective of this research is to reveal the community’s

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71

perspective on the values of renewable energy. The project included an informative session on ECS’s use of solar energy to increase understanding of the importance of using a cleaner energy source. The research compares evidence of selected ECS from two urban areas: Jakarta and Bogor. The methodology is interviews, direct observation, participant observation and documentation.

5.2 Urban Informal Sector There is no consensus on how to define the phenomenon of informal economy in the developing country context. The choice of definition is influenced by the availability of data for a researcher. In a policy research paper by World Bank, informality is defined “according to employment contract status, according to social security protection and in a manner which is often adopted in previous research, according the nature of the employment and the characteristics of the employer” (Henley et al., 2006). This definition indicated that there is a closer link between the absence of having a registered employment contract and not contributing to social security scheme. The issue of poverty has been prominent in the study of urban informal sector in Indonesia particularly in the subject of urban poverty and unemployment (Suharto, 2002). Such research often employed economic measures which stressed wage-based employment in the informal economy, for example for street vendors in Java (Brata, 2010) and Jakarta (Fathy & Rachmawan, 2020). There are interesting findings of these studies, including the varying degree of vulnerability among vendors that are influenced by the location of vending (Brata, 2010) and the inclusion of technology as a mode of survival in economic competition and technological changes (Fathy & Rachmawan, 2020). Studies have shown that the informal sector and informal employment continue to be a growing component of the economies of developing countries (Asian Development Bank & BPS-Statistic, 2011), including Indonesia that has a large informal sector. Informal sector in Indonesia absorbs 77.9% of non-agricultural employment compared to 51.4 per cent in Thailand (Blunch et al., 2001). After the economic crisis in 1997, the informal becomes the main alternative for people who were unable to find employment in the formal sector. Like agriculture-driven economies, it is typical to see people in Indonesian cities working in rice fields, growing sugarcanes, tending their sheep or breeding chickens. Traditionally, these activities are associated with households but transforming the agricultural products into different commodities. However, in recent decade, Indonesia is undergoing a historic transformation from a rural to an urban economy. The country’s cities are growing faster than in other Asian countries at a rate of 4.1% per year; by 2025, Indonesia can expect to have 68% of its population living in cities (The World Bank, 2016). Insufficient investments in infrastructure leave many communities vulnerable to poverty in the urban areas. Urbanisation and mass movement of people to cities grew rapidly and high population density put more pressure on existing infrastructure.

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The capital Jakarta has a population density of around 13,000 people per km square (Martinez & Masron, 2020). As the capital city, Jakarta is home to the largest street vendor community in the country. This city is an attractive place for rural–urban migration since it is home to eleven million people and has the most developed infrastructure among other cities in Indonesia, creating the façade of good career prospects and attractive employment. In reality, the rural people without good academic qualifications often find themselves working many odd jobs or working as street vendors to support their livelihood. Most of the populations working in the information sector have no insurance coverage or pensions. The informal sector, in particular street vending, has played a major role in the job creation and the market for goods and services in Indonesia, predominantly represented by the urban poor. However, the ability of these informal workers to profit from and grow their business is severally constrained by lacking infrastructure. Working in the informal sector, many street vendors have no access to basic infrastructure, particularly electricity. In some locations, the vendors connect an illegal electricity connection to neighbouring homes that present fire hazards. Recognising this issue, the government established electricity charging stations, a stand-alone electricity station in which the public may connect to the stations and purchase electricity. The first electricity charging station in South Jakarta was launched in 2018 by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Initially, the stations were developed to provide electricity for charging electric vehicles. Over time, the stations were commonly used by street vendors operating in proximity. The government observed the situation and considered establishing more electricity charging stations in designated public places to relocate some of the street vendors who operated on the main streets in the city. This program was an attempt to try to renew and upgrade their city planning by the city administrators in collaboration with the State Electricity Company.

5.3 Energy Justice and Energy Poverty Dimensions Energy justice exists in both individual and societal dimensions, between freedom versus limitation, equity versus partiality. It has recently been defined within social justice literature, as combination of distributive, recognition and procedural dimensions (Sovacool et al., 2016). The concept of justice was based on Rawls’ liberalism, which related to the “basic freedom” of citizen to exercise sense of justice and “basic reasoning”; they are free to pursue their conception of goods (Rawls, 1971).It has also been influenced by scholar Amartya Sen who stated that beyond primary goods, a person has options to function well in society and capability to exercising their reasoning (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014). The arguments also about human development and freedom in access and opportunities to the good they need. Each dimension of energy justice has a specific definition. The distributive justice in the energy system recognises both the physically unequal allocation of environmental benefits and ills and the uneven distribution of their associated responsibilities (Heffron & McCauley, 2017). The recognition justice identifies the vulnerable or

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misrepresented society that is being ignored in the energy system, while procedural justice refers to the fair processes in policy decision-making and inclusive representation in energy-related activities (McCauley et al., 2016). To attain a just and sustainable energy system, the government should focus on strengthening energy vulnerability of disadvantaged individuals and thus address intergenerational justice problem. Ideally, one system should encompass all justice variables, but in reality, they might erode each other. Energy availability might erode affordability because the transfer cost of energy to remote areas will be high for a large archipelagic country such as Indonesia. Moreover, a centralised energy system may accentuate economic growth and development, in which infrastructure is developed in the expense of indigenous communities without taking into account their participation and contribution in the decision-making process. The recognition tenet of energy justice is often recognised as overlapping with distributional and procedural justice (Lee & Byrne, 2019). However, in order to apply the concept of energy justice to concrete situations of injustice, it requires us to explore the conceptual connections between the three dimensions while keeping these dimensions analytically distinct (Hurlbert & Rayner, 2018). Nancy Fraser argues that recognition justice dimension is equally important particularly in an argument in a bivalent theory of justice (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). For Fraser (2018: 36), to achieve justice, at least two conditions must be satisfied. First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants’ independence and “voice”. She named this the objective condition of participatory parity. It precludes forms and levels of economic dependence and inequality that impede parity of participation. Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements that institutionalise deprivation, exploitation and gross disparities in wealth, income and leisure time, thereby denying some people the means and opportunities to interact with others. The second condition requires that institutionalised patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. Energy poverty is a concept closely intertwined with energy justice, in which perspectives on energy poverty in the Global South have been closely defined in relation to the interdisciplinary field of development studies, in addition to encompassing the dimensions of access, equity and investment in sociotechnical system (Bouzarovski, 2017). Energy poverty can also be defined as a household’s inability to achieve certain levels of energy services, also known as energy deprivation (Bouzarovski & Petrova, 2015). In particular, observing the deprivation from access and equity concepts allows us to distinguish the vulnerability in several aspects: economic vulnerability and socio-political vulnerability. This approach makes it possible to link the dimensions to the theories (Fig. 5.1).

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Energy justice

Distributive Dimension

Recognition Dimension

Procedural Dimension

The recognition of both the physically unequal allocation of environmental benefits and ills and the uneven distribution of their associated responsibilities

The identification of vulnerable or misrepresented society that are being ignored in the energy system

The fair processes in policy decision making and inclusive representation in energy related activities

Access and equity The access to resources and equal distribution

Economic vulnerability

Socio-political vulnerability

Fig. 5.1 Theoretical framework

5.4 Methodology Case study analysis is able to provide an answer through analysis of situation (participant observation), determine what problems exist (in-depth interview to reveal the communities’ perception of justice or injustices with regard to the facilities) and proposal of best possible policy to achieve justice in the energy system (interviews with government stakeholders). The research participants in this study comprise of street vendors located in Bogor Jakarta with mobile carts or shelter and representative of government in energy issues. The case study protocol has several stages. The first stage is development of case study questions and propositions. In this study, the questions asked are: What are the perceptions of street vendors in relations to the values of justice, freedom and responsibility for electricity? What are the injustices inflicted? What are the recommendations to address the injustices? Hypothesis is that Electric Charging Stations can address the injustices inflicted to street vendor community. The theoretical framework is procedural, distributional and recognition tenets of energy justice as proposed by Sovacool and Dworkin (2014). This research studied several ECS in Jakarta province and Bogor city. Comparison between two urban areas will bring the case study from initial level of exploratory to a more advanced level of replication theoretical models and invariances. Jakarta and Bogor are selected because both have unique characteristic of urban areas. The first

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being the capital of government and business, but home to largest informal sector in Indonesia. Bogor is a satellite city close to Jakarta with strong environmental commitments administered by the Mayor. Both cities are located in Java, the most populated island of the nation. The case study will retrieve data from interviews with street vendors, participant observation and video documentation. The first ECS was launched in Jakarta. As the capital city, Jakarta is home to the largest street vendor community in Indonesia. The city is an attractive place for rural– urban migrants since it is home to eleven million people and has the most developed infrastructure in Indonesia, creating the façade of good career prospects and attractive employment. In reality, rural people without good academic qualifications often find themselves working various odd jobs or supporting themselves by working as street vendors. Street vendors in Indonesia are categorised as part of the informal economy and thus have no national insurance or pension cover. ECS is one of the government programs aimed at assisting street vendors to conduct business activities in designated public places (such as markets or parks). I used stratified sampling to obtain a representative sample of the target population to prevent sampling bias (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). In this case, the target population was street vendors, the intended user base for ECS. I began by identifying the locations of the charging stations in Jakarta. Following this, I conducted a field visit to determine the average number of street vendors using the stations daily. I selected Jakarta as the location for my case study as it is home to the largest street vendor communities in Indonesia and where ECS was first established. The capacity of the ECS is around 5 kilowatt-hours, and each one can be used by a maximum of four persons simultaneously. Twenty-eight interviews were conducted after participant observation in the predetermined locations. Participant observation as a technique of fieldwork has been largely used in anthropological research. The participant observation conducted in this research relied on the recording of chronologically oriented, descriptive field notes, which also include the incorporation of the observers’ thoughts and reaction (Musante & DeWalt, 2010). To avoid bias, in each location, the observers comprise of three research assistants to cross-check the data. Participant observation is useful to achieve an understanding of the most fundamental processes and patterns of social life, in this respect, energy consumption and purchases. All interviews were transcribed, and the transcripts were subjected to the stages of critical discourse analysis proposed by Fairclough (2001: 96). This analysis focuses on “the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination of some groups of people over others”. The names of interviewees remain anonymous to ensure confidentiality.

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5.5 Results The economic constraints in purchasing electricity determine the economic vulnerability of the vendors. Energy deprivation results from the inability to adequately achieve the level of energy services required for vending activities. Another factor that determines energy poverty and injustices is socio-political vulnerability, or the inability to participate in the socio-political dynamics that hold control over resources, networks and access to technical knowledge about different electricity technologies.

5.5.1 Economic Vulnerability The economic constraints that influence energy deprivation appear as limitations on both the ability to purchase electricity at an affordable price and the ability to access electricity-saving technology to improve vending activities. Although structural access is included as a technological limitation, however, geographical locations can also be considered a central issue in determining the economic dimension of energy poverty. Given the differences in pricing systems, some utility customers in urban areas in Indonesia have higher electricity bills than rural customers. To examine the economic vulnerability of street vendors in relation to energy deprivation, we need to look into the economic parameters which are specific to the energy use of this community and aspects of consumption relating to cultural and behavioural attributes. In most cases, it seems that the vendors do not have the financial resources and capital to cope with economic necessity. For the respondents, electricity, after all, was a “luxury which we (street vendors) cannot afford” (interview #14). The electricity utilisation is mostly for vending purposes, including for lightning, and powering electrical appliances, such as blenders or electric stoves. There is an apparent case in the inability to invest in cooling systems to make the temperature more comfortable for the vendors and the customers. The investment required to cover cooling systems and expenses is far beyond the financial capacity of vendors whose income is nearly enough to cover energy costs. A typical day for a street vendor looks like this. The seller wakes up in the early morning to prepare food or beverages to sell for the day. They then commute to the vending locations by dragging their carts across the city. Small children often accompany their parents to vending locations and stay until the parents close the stall at night. According to the respondents, electricity is used for lighting from afternoon to night, around 5–6 h, a blender is used for around 4–5 h per day for juice sellers and an electric stove is generally used for 3–4 h. In some cases, an electric stove is sometimes used as an alternative or in conjunction with portable gas stoves. Their nomadic business nature and inability in finding safe and affordable housing exacerbated their vulnerability. In most cases, the sellers live in slum areas located at

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least 10 km from the city centre. The slum areas are located close to railway tracks or riversides where they are prone to flooding and susceptible to train accidents. In parts of Southeast Asia, these trends hold true as well, for example in Bangkok or Hanoi where the urban poor supported themselves by street vending and living in slums. Street vendors can roughly be divided into three types: those who constantly move around on a bicycle or on foot, those who have a stable stand on the street and those who rent a fixed place in front of a shophouse—all without planning permission or unauthorised, despite being provided with basic amenities in the form of water and electricity for the latter. The respondents represent a variety of these types. With regard to the improvement of their economic conditions, there are several constraining factors. First, there are often cases and histories where children of street vendors dropped out from secondary or tertiary education programs to continue their parents’ business (interview#6). This is a troubling element because it means that younger generations would not be likely to enter the job market and escape extreme and recurring poverty and vulnerability. In this sense, the notions of coping are in the form of paying electricity bills rather than education and health. Second, both parents and children are at increased risk of respiratory illness due to prolonged exposure to traffic-related air pollution, as well as other forms of illness, based on the evidence in other cases (Amegah & Jaakkola, 2014; Noomnual & Shendell, 2017). The street vendors are also restrained in terms of access to electricity-saving technology to improve vending activities, such as solar light bulbs that last longer, and require less energy or solar technology to generate electricity. It should be acknowledged that street vendors use electricity mostly at night for lightning purposes. This means solar lamps without battery storage may not be a feasible alternative to reduce their electricity bill.

5.5.2 Socio-Political Vulnerability Beyond access and expenditure, socio-political vulnerability relates to how social relationships, norms and behaviours shape how people adapt to energy consumption patterns. These vulnerabilities impact socio-economic inequality resulting from the social exclusion of this group and the marginalisation of this group from social protection policy. Metropolitan spaces have become a privileged spatial and social scenario of the structural contractions characterised by residential and ethnic segregation (Benassi et al., 2020; Iglesias-Pascual et al., 2023). Urbanisation has contributed to the creation of the social condition of poverty. Cities are creating poverty by the presence of the delusions of opportunities, divisions of classes and discourses of wealth. In reality, people that are not best equipped (financially and in terms of their educational background) to enter the job market usually find themselves losing to the competition and resort to street vending. Instead of getting a better quality of life, without sufficient education, they are facing health, safety risks and risk literacy. Some studies have taken the focus on examining the health estimates of this particular group, where

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they are constantly exposed to air pollution and at risk of getting non-communicable diseases (Amegah & Jaakkola, 2014; Esayas & Mulugeta, 2020). There is a yearly trend where at the end of the Ramadan fasting month, Eid al-Fitr, the whole population of Jakarta and other large cities leave to go to their hometowns and return with relatives. Successful stories made during a visit back home encourage other families to send their children to these cities. In reality, they survive selling street food and hawking goods on the street. Even the pandemic did not stop the exodus of informal workers from the capital Jakarta and back, forcing the Ministry of Transportation to ban the Eid al-Fitr movement. The socio-political vulnerabilities of street vendors are often overlooked because measures of inequality are usually based on statistics collected at the regional level. Regional development has a tendency to regard regions as uniformly disadvantaged, and as a result, the practice often brings additional benefits to individuals living in rural regions who were not disadvantaged to start with (Rigg, 1997). Rigg (1997) asserted that intra-regional inequalities are often more pronounced than inter-regional ones—it is people who suffer from poverty and low level of consumption that should be the basis of measuring poverty. The emphasis on procedural justice and justice as recognition can serve to address social inequality issues. The problem is that the vendors are largely “invisible” when it comes to the urban planning circles. Despite their different business activities and vending locations, street vendors generally have similar broad-based participation and engagement mechanism in decision-making processes. Almost all members of the groups rely on the local neighbourhood associations to communicate their aspirations to the city authorities. It is unclear whether these neighbourhood associations have the power to influence city planning decisions. Some of the street vendors also seemed to have no desire to be consulted on proposed developments or new arrangements, stating that their voices “will not be heard” (Interview #7 in Bogor). This low perception of self-esteem is dominant among street vendors, termed by Richard Wilkinson in his TED Talk in 201, “How economic inequality harms societies” as a “psychosocial effect” of inequality. This is to do with feeling devalued, worry about being seen and judged, as inferior and status insecurity that makes this particular group more vulnerable to mental illness. Changes to social status are quite difficult to achieve because society is highly stratified and there are social borders between different income groups. The interactions between income groups are limited, and if they are, these will be in the form of consumers and sellers. The street vendors are grouped in the lowest income group because some of their incomes are less than the minimum wage determined by the provincial government. The lack of priority for education means that the children of the vendors will remain in the same social class. An interviewee said, “I do not prioritise my children’s education because I am in survival mode. I spend my income on food, electricity, transportation and other basic needs” (interview #11 in Jakarta). It was observed that although men dominate vending activities, it was women who have the lowest income. The data show that most female respondents are included in the USD$30–USD$60 (n = 1) and USD$60–USD$300 income groups (n = 8) than male respondents in the USD$300–USD$600 (n = 15). It should be noted that the

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number of male and female respondents in this study is not equal. Nevertheless, it shows that more male respondents belong to the higher income group. From the interview, the women work as street vendors because they are lacking other options for finding sources of income. One respondent said she is working as a street vendor because it is better than “working as a domestic worker” (interview #11 in Jakarta). Another respondent said that she is “helping out the family economy because the husbands were not making enough money from motorcycle ride-hailing phone service” (interview#19 in Jakarta). These differences in earnings widen the gap of gender inequality. It is an interesting observation that apart from street vending, online motorcycle taxi has become a popular field of work for people who are looking for flexible working arrangements. As a result, there is a trend of rising female employment in the informal economy.

5.5.3 Electricity Charging Stations can Potentially Solve Energy Poverty From observation, it seems that ECS has the potential to address energy insecurity and energy injustice problems where it may address both issues. A government representative said: The State Electricity Company and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources purposely build ECS in public places, such as parks and markets, to make this electricity service available to street vendors doing business in those places without an electricity line from the state. (interview #1, Jakarta)

An interviewee stated, After these stations were established, I felt safe knowing that I would not get forcibly evicted by doing business here. (Interview #15 in Taman Bakti park, Jakarta)

Moreover, the facilities have made electricity affordable, responding to the affordability principle of the distributional justice element (note that this is only the case when they pay collectively). For example, in Taman Bakti, Jakarta, vendors bought ECS electricity tokens collectively, so that the poorest can access electricity on equal terms as other vendors. We paid collectively about Rp. 200,000 (United States Dollar/ USD18) per month. Before this facility was established, we used electricity from nearby houses and paid more. (Interview #16 in Cililitan market, Jakarta)

ECS that uses solar panels has the potential to educate street vendors about the importance of using cleaner energy sources. Solar panel power stations can potentially lessen the burden on the national electricity grid and subsequently can reduce emissions. Street vendors who operate on public streets, alleys and public roads

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previously use diesel generators or steal electricity to electrify their stalls causing additional pollution to already polluted cities. Electricity charging stations using solar panels can reduce emissions by using clean, renewable energy sun. This shift away from traditional diesel helps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and air and air pollution. According to the interview with the Association of Street Vendors in Jakarta, 10% of street vendors depend on kerosene lanterns, 3% on the electric stove, 5% on diesel generators, 2% on LED lamps and about 60% on the central grid which is powered by fossil fuels. Replacing these energy sources with clean energy would reduce emissions and improve air quality in the vending areas. Education to the vendors is important because it seems that a limited number of the respondents know about renewable energy. I do not know about renewable energy. I just use it (ECS facilities) and I only know about my everyday livelihood. (Interview #5 in Dakota park, Jakarta)

Another respondent (Interview#21, Jakarta) added, “I do not know anything about renewable energy”. Observation on the field regarding the use of elefigctricity charging stations reflects the need to educate the communities. Some members of community groups seemed to encounter technical difficulties when using the stations. To be able to connect to the stations, users are required to purchase electricity points at nearby convenience stores or via mobile banking. Some of the participants do not own bank accounts or smartphones for mobile banking. Therefore, they need to go to nearby stores to purchase electricity. On most occasions, the stores were already closed before the street vendors closed their stalls. The purchase mechanisms of electricity need to be made simpler, which will provide vendors with greater business security (Photos 5.1 and 5.2).

Photo 5.1 Electricity charging station in Barito Market and Dakota park, Jakarta

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Photo 5.2 User of electricity charging station. Source Author

5.6 Discussion The setting of electricity charging stations in this research poses contributions for the livelihoods of communities and evenly addresses domestic energy distribution, by providing the space to access electricity, which was previously more prevalent in some places than others. Concerning spatial variations within countries, studies have found that rates of energy poverty are impacted by geographic conditions and deeper socio-material inequalities (Bouzarovski & Simcock, 2017; Bouzarovski & Tirado Herrero, 2017). The studies also stated that the environmental features of a place are crucial in shaping vulnerability to energy poverty, including climatic conditions and material characteristics of residential locations and neighbourhoods. Some places are thus more likely to face elevated risks. Considering the risks of flood, pollution and health risks in the urban area, it is safe to say that urban space contains vulnerabilities and the population in these areas is exposed to a spatially embedded form of energy poverty (Barnes et al., 2004). In reflection on the justice dimensions, distributional justice in the energy system is inheritably understood as a spatial concept with notions of place at its centre (McCauley et al., 2016). However, for social scientists, place and space have different distinct materiality, where the former is understood as concepts which regulate social relations (Hall, 2013). The implications of energy justice, therefore, focus on both the desirability of technologies and the proximity of a locality to any given energy infrastructural development. The spatiality of injustice becomes even more evident in a setting where the physical spaces of communities receiving energy services are compartmentalised.

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Concerning the desirability of this technology, the findings reflect the distributional and recognition of justice’s element of access as perceived by the respondents. Before these stations were established, the vendors were dependent on illegal connections, retrieving electricity from unauthorised extensions from the power lines of nearby houses (interview #2). These vendors also operated illegally on pavements intended for pedestrians. The development of ECS in designated parks and markets aimed to encourage the vendors to move to these designated places, and provide them with a safe electricity connection. In 2013, the administrative office of Jakarta province enacted bylaws on spatial zoning that require commercial areas and developers to set aside 5 per cent of the premises for street vendors. In other cities and municipalities, the bylaws contain the spatial arrangement of street vendors into several spaces based on zones. In other words, the government has accommodated street vending activities into the legal framework. However in reality, conflicts frequently occurred, mainly associated with the provisions of the arrangement of the street vendors, decided single handily the government. The implementation of this program illustrated that the authorities use the stations to incentivise the street vendors to relocate to the designated premises. Part of distributional justice demands that we evolve new business models and regulatory paradigms that promote fairness in the distribution of costs and benefits of the energy system (Sovacool et al., 2016). Regarding procedural justice and its implementation emerge from the empirical findings. Procedural justice in the energy system must be an imperative to the inclusion of local communities within the decision-making for business processes. Indeed, the authorities fulfil the requirement of giving information regarding the establishment and the utilisation of the stations. Such provision of information was sufficient to reach all members of street vendor communities because they arranged it through the local neighbourhood associations. Information reached most members of the communities, who were able to make use of it. This strategy amounts to adequately inform and the minimum mechanism for engagement of minority groups. It serves as an example for preliminary inclusion in the energy system. Unlike in other case study where community participation in energy project is as yet not completely recognised, and where political decisions tend to be taken solely by policymakers (Yenneti & Day, 2016), the procedural justice in the case study confirms the protection of public interest through some degree of public participation. It is important to note that active public participation corresponds to the principles of democratic participation in Indonesia which are often weakly implemented due to a centralised energy system and its associated power structures. Even though the present form of procedural justice does not allow for consensual decisions on matters impacting the environment and energy for the street vendors community for achieving recognition justice (Schlosberg, 2004), the decision-making mechanism found in this research is an important step to allow participation in decision-making and ensure their contributions are taken seriously by receiving full information disclosure. It also seemed that the street vendors were not concerned (or even aware) about renewable energy. Although some of the ECS use solar panels to generate electricity, the respondents participating in this study did not have an understanding of solar

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energy or its environmental benefits in comparison with fossil-based energy sources, indicating low awareness of environmental matters in this targeted group. Unfortunately, the use of solar panels for the ECS is still limited, and they are not ready to be deployed at the scale we need for decarbonising our electricity system. The price of fossil fuel does not reflect the environmental implications of using those fuels in the grid system. As a result, using solar panels to replace electricity from the national grid would be quite expensive. Another important issue is that, when the solar panels used in ECS have reached their end of lifetime, these photovoltaic panels will be either thrown away to an open landfill, or recycled. A government representative stated that they have yet to regulate the disposal of solar panels. Ultimately, landfill disposal will create injustice to communities living in nearby areas of the junkyard.

5.7 Conclusion This investigation of justice dimensions in the implementation of the electricity charging stations highlights an important new arena for research on justice in energy policy and suggests new areas of energy justice research for investigation in different geographical contexts. The empirical research found that distributional justice principles-affordability, accessibility, procedural justice principles— providing detailed information, valuing local knowledge and ensuring the dissemination of information to all affected communities with the representation of underrepresented groups—and recognition justice—recognising marginalised groups in the program implementation—in electricity charging stations implementation are important not only for ensuring the acceptance of community but also for mitigating any socio-environmental impacts of the project. Failure of distributional, procedural and recognition justice in the implementation of energy projects in developing economies is problematic because it can perpetuate and widen inequalities, weaken governance arrangements and impact the social acceptance of low-carbon energy projects (Tabi et al., 2014; Yenneti & Day, 2016). The implementation of electricity charging stations project targeting street vendors’ communities has also proven to deliver positive co-benefits. Evidently, the stations have given a portion of society the chance to become engaged with the energy system, albeit as consumers. They contribute to the improvement of the environment in terms of cleaner and safer electricity products. They also protected the neighbourhoods from electrical fire hazards by creating electricity connections that are safer than the illegal ones used previously. They also gave access to poorer individuals to retrieve electricity through a collection process. In this way, the lowcarbon innovation examined can enhance some aspects of energy justice, including distributional justice and justice as recognition. However, the establishment of electricity charging stations also comes with justice tensions and collection of risks. These risks especially concerned the potential for environmental pollution from waste solar panels from these facilities. Those who

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live in close proximity to landfill will be exposed to environmental hazards from the release of toxic contaminants from the photovoltaic waste. Conceptually, these findings remind us, too, that qualitative injustices may occur alongside any type of innovation. As a policy recommendation, this research suggests that the government needs to formulate policies to address the safe disposal of solar panels that have reached their end of life. Nevertheless, the stations generated a new sense of values that are solidarity, sustainability and tolerance within communities. The facilities play a vital role in the social life of communities, such as it provided much-needed electricity for business activities. The social values of the program lie in the contribution it makes to people’s attachment to their locality and communal presence. Since the facilities use solar panels, they have the potential to educate the members of the community about the importance of renewable energy for a sustainable future. It also has the potential to educate the issues of carbon emission and climate change. Electricity charging stations have supported the urban informal communities in the transition to a more sustainable society. Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Toyota Foundation Research Grant Program 2019, Grant Reference Number D19-R-0042.

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Bouzarovski, S., & Simcock, N. (2017). Spatializing energy justice. Energy Policy, 107, 640–648. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.064 Bouzarovski, S., & Tirado Herrero, S. (2017). Geographies of injustice: The socio-spatial determinants of energy poverty in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Post-Communist Economies, 29(1), 27–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2016.1242257 Brata, A. G. (2010). Vulnerability of urban informal sector: Street vendors in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management, 5(5), 47–58. Esayas, E., & Mulugeta, S. (2020). Theoretical and empirical researches in urban management vulnerability of street vendors: Case study for Dire Dawa City. Eastern Ethiopia, 15(2), 49–65. Fathy, R., & Rachmawan, D. (2020). The paradox of informal economy in urban area Indonesia: A case study street vendors in Jalan Salemba Raya, Jakarta, and Jalan Raya Sawangan, Depok. MASYARAKAT: Jurnal Sosiologi, 25(1), 83–106. https://doi.org/10.7454/mjs.v25i1.10871 Fraser, N., & Honneth, A. (2003) Redistribution or recognition?: A political-philosophical exchange translated by Joel Golb, James Ingram, Christiane Wilke. Verso. Hall, S. M. (2013). Energy justice and ethical consumption: Comparison, synthesis and lesson drawing. Local Environment, 18(4), 422–437. Heffron, R. J., & McCauley, D. (2017, March). The concept of energy justice across the disciplines. Energy Policy, 105, 658–667. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.018 Henley, A., Arabsheibani, R., & Carneiro, F. (2006). On defining and measuring the informal sector. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper [Preprint], (3866). Hurlbert, M., & Rayner, J. (2018, July). Reconciling power, relations, and processes: The role of recognition in the achievement of energy justice for Aboriginal people. Applied Energy, 228, 1320–1327. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.06.054 Iglesias-Pascual, R., Benassi, F., & Hurtado-Rodríguez, C. (2023). Social infrastructures and socioeconomic vulnerability: A socio-territorial integration study in Spanish urban contexts.Cities, 132. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2022.104109 Lee, J., & Byrne, J. (2019, September). Expanding the conceptual and analytical basis of energy justice: Beyond the three-tenet framework. Frontiers in Energy Research, 7, 1–10. https://doi. org/10.3389/fenrg.2019.00099 Martinez, R., & Masron, I. N. (2020). Jakarta: A city of cities. Cities. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cit ies.2020.102868 McCauley, D., et al. (2016). Energy justice in the Arctic: Implications for energy infrastructural development in the Arctic. Energy Research and Social Science, 16, 141–146. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.erss.2016.03.019. Musante, K., & DeWalt, B. R. (2010). Participant observation: A guide for fieldworkers. Altamira Press. Noomnual, S., & Shendell, D. G. (2017). Young adult street vendors and adverse respiratory health outcomes in Bangkok, Thailand. Safety and Health at Work, 8(4), 407–409. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.shaw.2017.02.002 Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Collins, K. M. (2007). A typology of mixed methods sampling designs in social science research. Qualitative Report, 12(2), 281. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbi.2003. 12.001 Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Belknap Press. Rigg, J. (1997). Southeast Asia the human landscape of modernization and development. Routledge. Schlosberg, D. (2004). Reconceiving environmental justice: Global movements and political theories. Environmental Politics, 13(3), 517–540. https://doi.org/10.1080/096440104200022 9025 Sen, A. (2000). Development as freedom. Development Practice, Oxford(10), p. 258. Sovacool, B. K., & Dworkin, M. H. (2014). Global energy justice: Problems, principles, and practices. Global Energy Justice: Problems, Principles, and Practices. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO 9781107323605 Sovacool, B. K. et al. (2016). Energy decisions reframed as justice and ethical concerns. Nature Energy, 1. https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.24.

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Suharto, E. (2002). Human development and the urban informal sector in Bandung, Indonesia: The poverty issue. New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 4(2), 115–133. Tabi, A., Hille, S. L., & Wüstenhagen, R. (2014). What makes people seal the green power deal?— Customer segmentation based on choice experiment in Germany. Ecological Economics, 107, 206–215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.09.004 The World Bank. (2016). Indonesia’s Urban Story. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/ 2016/06/14/indonesia-urban-story. Accessed: 3 January 2021. Yenneti, K., & Day, R. (2016). Distributional justice in solar energy implementation in India: The case of Charanka solar park. Journal of Rural Studies, 46(2015), 35–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.jrurstud.2016.05.009

Chapter 6

Emerging Justice Issues in the Citizen Acceptance of Nuclear Power Deployment

Abstract This chapter analyses the citizen acceptance of nuclear power plant development in Indonesia by analysing minute of meetings of the parliamentary member responsible for energy issues, a nationwide and a provincial-based survey. The results suggest that both the public and the members of parliaments accept and agree the government’s plan to develop nuclear power plants. More than 50% of respondents support the development of the nuclear power plants. This suggests that perceived benefits such as cheaper cost of electricity and no power outage outrank the perceived risks.

6.1 Introduction The mounting demand for energy has led to increasingly urgent calls for new and renewable energy resources. Many countries, once a resource-rich country, are now facing imminent depletion of fossil fuels and risking the emergence of energy poverty. Correspondingly, there has been a growing interest to nuclear energy as a potential energy source. Particularly by those countries who have yet developed nuclear energy, they consider nuclear as a promising energy source, cleaner and more sustainable than fossil-based resources. Indonesia included. However, there is a concern about the impact of nuclear energy power plants to the health of the society and environment. Justice concern in the energy sector has been termed as “energy justice”. Energy justice is defined as a global energy system that fairly disseminates both the benefits and costs of energy services, and one that contributes to more representative and impartial energy decision-making (Sovacool et al., 2016). Past research on nuclear issue sought to assess public acceptance, stakeholders’ perspectives and the role of nuclear in canvassing sociotechnical change ˇ et al., 2020; Okubo et al., 2020). (Jenkins et al., 2017; Cábelková This research aims to contribute to existing literature by analysing general public, local community and members of parliament (MPs) acceptance of nuclear power plants’ development. The novelty of this research is an analysis of the MPs’ debates surrounding nuclear issue. The objective of this research is to gain understanding of the public and MPs’ acceptance of nuclear power and their response to its deployment © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_6

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along with policy implications. In specific, the research question are: How do the public perceive the government’s plan to develop nuclear power plants? While many countries are moving towards the cessation of nuclear generation, Indonesia appears to be moving towards the opposite direction. Nuclear has had a long history in Indonesia; however, its utilisation still limited for research. Even in the face of Fukushima nuclear accident, this research suggests that the majority of the public are supporting the development of nuclear technology to secure energy supply. In the MPs’ discourses in the meeting with the government, it also appeared that they support the development of nuclear power plants. Acceptance is a key factor in which policy will be successfully implemented. Civil society and MPs’ acceptance of nuclear technology will determine the future direction of Indonesia’s energy policy.

6.2 Background: Acceptance of Nuclear, Lobbying and Development in Indonesia Much of the research conducted on acceptance of new technology found a number of dominant factors shaping public views, including place and process (Graham, Stephenson & Smith, 2009), technology and people (Ram Mohan & Namboodhiry, 2020) and socio-institutional factors such as trust and fairness (Ali et al., 2013). Some studies conclude that more information can get people to accept new technology and thus is able to shape greater familiarity and knowledge of it in particular if coming from trustworthy source (Sagebiel et al., 2014). However, this view is contested by scholar who claims that more information does not necessarily change opinions or built a consensus to move forward; yet positive or negative perceptions are most likely influenced by personal experiences and values as well as their social networks (Chapman et al., 2018). Personal experiences and values are largely shaped by demographics background. Indeed, scholarly studies on nuclear energy acceptance indicate that gender influences acceptance; in particular, women are more prone to resistance than men (Jenkins et al., 2017). In addition, it is also commonly found that much resistance to NPP from the public has been found due to concern for safety, distrust to the government and environment (Uji et al., 2021). In particular, the conventional view of Not-InMy-Back-Yard (NIMBY) predominantly influences public acceptance. One research investigating the public acceptance of nuclear power in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear accident concludes that people who live far away from a nuclear power station are more likely to accommodate the technology, while proximity leads to negative public acceptance (Okubo et al., 2020). However, not all nuclear acceptance research can be explained with NIMBY theory. A research investigating community acceptance of NPP in Serpong, Indonesia (location of centre for nuclear research), stated that of 99 respondents being interviewed, 75% declared agreement to NPP development quoting cheaper electricity

6.2 Background: Acceptance of Nuclear, Lobbying and Development …

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price, establishment of job market and less pollution as reasons for acceptance (Sugiawan & Managi, 2019). In addition, the acceptance of NPPs is also determined by the degree of trust in the local stakeholders and relevant authorities. Indeed, trust relations are correlated with the ability of the government to attenuate the benefits of nuclear and influencing in how people make judgements about it. As mentioned, research investigating nuclear acceptance in Indonesia found greater acceptance from the public that influenced by demographic factor and trust to the local government. In addition, past research on nuclear energy development in Indonesia was mostly focusing on the technology, policy processes and contribution to the environment (Jenkins et al., 2017). I aim to make contribution to the social acceptance studies by examining the parliamentary discourses on nuclear and analysing nationwide, as well as provincial survey. Indonesia has spent the last few decades anticipating to incorporate nuclear energy into the national energy mix. Nuclear is considered as a cleaner and more sustainable energy than coal and renewables. Indonesia also has an estimate of 70,000 tonne uranium reserves in West Kalimantan, Papua, Bangka Belitung and West Sulawesi. A number of governmental institutions focusing on nuclear issues have been established, including BATAN (Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional/ National Nuclear Agency) and BAPETEN (Badan Pengawas Tenaga Nuklir/ Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency) with the focus to research, develop and utilise nuclear energy, and implement surveillance of the use of nuclear energy through licensing and inspection. The country has also operated a number of experimental nuclear research reactors to date—in Serpong (30 MW), Bandung (2 MW) and Yogyakarta (100 KW) which also hosts the Nuclear Technology College (STTN). Recent news update announced that Danish companies Topsoe, Alfa Laval, Copenhagen Atomics, and Aalborg have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Pertamina New and Renewable Energy to build a nuclear power plant and generate the nuclear energy for ultra-low emissions ammonia produced by Pupuk Kaltim, both are owned by Indonesia. The proposed plant is expected to begin operation in 2028 and will be capable of producing 1 gigawatt of energy, along with using 25 small modular reactors. Several laws and regulation governed nuclear energy development in Indonesia. The basic law for the utilisation of nuclear energy is stipulated in the Nuclear Energy Act No. 10/1997. The Act stipulates that BATAN is the main government body to develop nuclear energy in Indonesia and BAPETEN as regulatory body in nuclear licensing and policy. In addition, the Act ensures the safety of workers and environmental protection consistent with continued productivity. In the President Regulation No.22 of 2017 on the General Planning for National Energy (Rencana Umum Energi Nasional/ RUEN), nuclear is being considered as a feasible alternative to achieving energy security, however only as the last option after other new and renewable energy sources (i.e., biofuel, solar, wind, hydro, natural gas). In the proposed New and Renewable Energy Bill, the development, operation and decomissioning of the plant will be under the jurisdiction of state-owned electricity company. Over the past decades, Indonesia has signed a number of international agreements, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation for nuclear power development. The

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type of agreement includes feasibility studies to establish nuclear reactor with Korea and assistance for developing NPP with Japan in 2007. Moreover, the latest ambitious plans are a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that BATAN signed with Rosatom (Russia’s State Nuclear Energy Corporation) to design a multipurpose experimental high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTR) of 10 MWt and cooperation with USbased nuclear company ThorCon International Pte Ltd to build a 500-megawatt floating nuclear power plant in the country by 2027. The development of nuclear energy in Indonesia made more complex due to the Trias Politica decentralised governance system. Trias Politica is stipulated in the 1945 Constitution that provides for a separation of executive, legislative and judicial power. This is to say that in order to establish a nuclear power plant, one must manage multilevel authorities, including parliamentary members, central government, provincial and district government. Moreover, in a democratic country such as Indonesia, public opinion features prominently in policy processes.

6.3 Methodology This chapter examined the public and MPs’ acceptance of nuclear technology in Indonesia. In order to obtain the results, this chapter examined two surveys organised by BATAN distributed in 2016 and 2018. The first survey is Public Opinion of Nuclear Technology in 2016 (hereafter, “national survey”). The aim of the survey was to measure the public’s responses and knowledge on nuclear technology and its utilisation. The survey was distributed house-to-house in 34 provinces both urban and rural areas. A total of 50 researchers and 450 enumerators were involved in this nationwide survey. To ensure balance, the research-maintained equality between male (51%) and female (49%) respondents. In total, the survey gained 4000 responses. The second survey is Public Opinion of Nuclear Technology in West Kalimantan province involving 600 respondents, 300 male and 300 females organised in 2018 (hereafter, “provincial survey”). West Kalimantan is selected as one of the provinces considered potential for NPP development. This region is characterised by considerable amount of coal reserves for the mining sector. The distribution of survey was stratified random sampling in 12 districts and 2 cities. Both surveys began with questions of demographics, including gender, house location, marital status, education and monthly income and expenses. Then, the second part explores the respondents’ knowledge on nuclear technology in category 0 (none) to 16 (expert). The third part explores the respondents’ risks/benefits perception on nuclear facilities. Respondents’ responses were marked in a 5-point scale (1 = do not have risks at all and 5 = do not have benefits at all). The last part explores respondents’ agreement for NPP development and reasons for agreeing/disagreeing. The respondents required to answer one of the reasons to agreeing/disagreeing (see Table 6.1). I employ logistic regression as predictive analysis to investigate factors impacting agreement to NPP development (dependent variable) for the national survey. The

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Table 6.1 Coding grid Code

Variables

Stakeholders

MPs

Perceived benefits (Survey: why do you agree on development of NPPs?)

No power outage, cheaper electricity, create work, technological advances, no pollution, Indonesia’s capability and government’s program

Perceived risks (Survey: why do you disagree on development of NPPs?)

Worry of nuclear accident/ spill, radioactive pollution, radioactive waste, unpreparedness of Indonesia’s human resources, nuclear weapon development and other power plants are sufficient

margin of error used was 0.05. The independent variables were gender, age, education, income, knowledge and risks/benefits perception of nuclear energy. The second survey was analysed using Pearson correlation coefficient to analyse linear relationship between variables. The variables are equivalent with the first survey. To gain a deeper understanding of political discourses at the parliamentary level, this chapter examined transcriptions of National Parliament debates. In particular, debates from meetings of Commission VII with government counterparts that oversee energy matters, including with BATAN, State Electricity Company PLN, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and Ministry of Research and Technology. The Commission comprises of 51 members from a total 575 members of parliament. The meeting documents between 2015 and 2019 were retrieved from the House of Parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ DPR) website: www.dpr.go.id. The total number of documents retrieved was 23 documents. In order to allow comparison with the survey, the documented data underwent thematic content analysis proposed by Braun and Clarke (2013). The thematic content analysis underwent 6 phase process for coding and theme development. The process began with data familiarisation, systematic data coding, generating initial themes, developing and reviewing themes, refining themes and writing the result (Braun & Clarke, 2013). To generate coding for content analysis, I used deductive approach by generating codes from previous research and from the survey generated to ensure consistency of results. In the meeting report, the sentence was determined as unit of analysis. The coding contents include the following: perceived benefits and perceived risks (see Table 6.1).

6.4 Results and Discussion In this section, detailed results from the surveys are presented first. A summary of demographic variables, perceived risk/benefits and statistical analysis results then

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follows. Subsequently, results from content analysis of parliamentary meetings are discussed.

6.4.1 Survey Both surveys revealed positive perceptions of nuclear technology and acceptance of NPP development. The 2016 national survey revealed that 78% of respondents support the development of NPP in Indonesia, while 22% declared their opposition. In addition, the 2018 West Kalimantan provincial survey showed that 87% of respondents accept development of NPP.

6.4.1.1

Demographics

The first part of the surveys explores demographic characteristics of the respondents. Both surveys obtained a balance between male and female respondents. In addition, both rural and urban participants were explored. The national survey revealed responses from both urban (1920/48% respondents) and rural areas (2080 respondents/ 52%). For provincial survey, the rural participants were 420 respondents (70%) and urban participants were 180 respondents (30%). Other demographic variables that were included in the survey were age, expenditure and educational background. These factors determine how the respondents access information on nuclear and whether they might have learnt about Fukushima nuclear accident. For national survey, the respondents were categorised into five years grouping starting at 15 years and ended at 65 years or more. The largest number of respondents were at 20–25 years age group (n = 1006 or 83%). In the provincial survey, the first age group begin at 17–20 years and the last age group end at 61 years above. Similarly, the largest number of respondents was found at 21–25 years age group (121 respondents or 20%). The mean of age respondents from both surveys is 26–30 years, revealing the participation of working age population. The two surveys measured household economy using household monthly expenditure. The national survey used monthly expenditure ranges from Indonesian rupiah Rp. 500,000 to more than Rp. 10,000,000. The provincial survey utilised expenditure groups ranging from Rp 1,500,000 to Rp 10,000,000. For this survey, largest number of respondents were in the “less than 1,500,000 group” with the total of 199 respondents (33%). Moreover, level of education was also included in the demographics data survey. The education groups were divided as follows: unschooled, elementary school, middle school, highs school, Diploma, Bachelor, Master degree, Doctoral degree. Interestingly, the provincial survey included the largest age group of high school education (49% or 299 respondents) possibly due to the inclusion of younger age group (starting from 15 years) in the survey.

6.4 Results and Discussion

6.4.1.2

93

Knowledge and Perceived Risks/Benefits

With regard to nuclear knowledge, the respondents were asked to rate their own understanding about the technology. The national survey utilised 0 to 16 rating with 0 meaning none knowledge and 16 knowledgeable. The mean dimensions of the knowledge from national survey were 8–9, indicating sufficient but not at expert level. Both surveyed revealed low to sufficient knowledge on nuclear technology. The data also suggest that a younger and more educated respondents have better knowledge of nuclear technology. The national survey also investigates the respondents’ risks perception of nuclear energy. The question used 5-scale ranking, from 1 (zero risks) to 5 (zero benefits) and 1 option for not responding. From the survey, it was revealed that the largest number of respondents answered to “benefits are equal with risks” indicating that risk perception is equivalent with benefit perception. Both surveys explore further the perceived benefits and risks of nuclear technology. Respondents participated in the national survey were allowed to choose more than 1 answer from seven options. The most popular answers were: no power outage, cheaper electricity and create work. The least popular answer was Indonesia’s capability and government programs. As for perceived benefits, similar with result from the provincial survey, concerns about nuclear accident/spill and radioactive waste were two of the most popular answers from 7 options. From the chart, it can be seen that the largest number of respondents considers no power outage as one of the benefits of NPP indicating high demand of electricity at all time (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2).

What is your perception of the risks/benefits of nuclear power plants development? (n=4000) Do not know Zero benefits Risks are greater than benefits Benefits are equal with risks Benefits are greater than risks Zero risks 0

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 No. of respondents

Fig. 6.1 Perception of risk and benefits from nationwide survey

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Perceived benefits of NPP (n=600) Others create work government’s program Indonesia’s capability no pollution technological advances, cheaper electricity no power outage 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Fig. 6.2 Perception of benefits from provincial survey

Table 6.2 Acceptance of nuclear power plants from national survey using logistic regression

6.4.1.3

NPP Acceptance Variables

Significance level (P)

Gender

0.019

Age

0.587

Education

0.433

Household expenditure

0.000

Knowledge

0.695

Risks/benefits perception

0.000

Statistical Analysis

Data results from the national survey show that factors that influence acceptance are risks/benefits perception, gender and household expenditure (see Table 6.2). The most influential of these were found to be the economic factors influencing the acceptance of nuclear. In particular, male respondent with low household expenses prefers the development of NPPs to fossil fuel power plants. Furthermore, female participants have greater anxiety about nuclear power accident that affected their preference of energy generation. Similar with the national survey, gender and household expenditure influences the acceptance of NPP development from the provincial survey with Pearson R value 0.20 and 0.361, respectively. Female respondents with higher household expenditure tend to be disagree to NPP development. Moreover, Pearson correlation revealed that there was no significant correlation between education or age and acceptance of NPP development. It is likely that the education and age of respondents from the survey were not evenly distributed (50% and more respondents are concentrated in one education and age group) and therefore influence results of the test. The results from both national and provincial surveys show that the influential factors for NPP acceptance are gender, household expenditure and perceptions of

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nuclear technology. In the surveys, the results also show that the majority of study participants agreed that the procedures by which the nuclear power plants’ locations were determined were fair. They also agreed that active public consultations in the process are important to determine public acceptance.

6.4.2 Parliamentary Discourses As elaborated in methodology section, I begin the analysis by familiarising with the data. In this regard, the reports from 23 meetings were conducted between 2015 and 2019. Then, I developed the coding theme by drawing variables from the national and provincial survey resulted in perceived benefits/risks elaborated in the discussion below.

6.4.2.1

Perceived Benefits

Over time, the MPs paid attention to the development of nuclear energy and discussed about possible nuclear energy deployment. Based on my study, the parliament seems to hold regular meetings with BATAN to discuss NPP progress. Moreover, discussion about NPP development occurred frequently in meetings with Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and PLN. The content analysis of minutes of meeting showed that nuclear energy was mainly represented as beneficial to the country, in particular to address energy security, energy sustainability and use clean energy. In addition, the MPs expressed their support to BATAN in developing nuclear technology. MP#1(National Democrat Party), 15/01/208 “…electricity sourced from nuclear can generate clean energy with large capacity…” MP#4(National Democrat Party), 15/01/2018 “If Indonesia has nuclear energy, then perhaps the outer area in the border (to Papua New Guinea, to Malaysia) can enjoy electricity….it is about time that I utilise nuclear energy…” MP#2(Golkar Party), 15/01/2018 “My purpose is to give political support (to BATAN). I repeat, to give political support so I can develop nuclear immediately”.

In specific, the MPs mentioned the perceived benefits of nuclear energy (n = 9), as technological advances for Indonesia (n = 5) and government program (n = 4). It differs with survey results that revealed no power outage and cheaper electricity as main reasons to support nuclear technology development. The MPs’ focuses were on the technological advances of nuclear and how Indonesia should possess such technology. In addition, the MPs also revealed that nuclear should be incorporated in the government’s program or the National Energy Plan. In the meeting documents, the MPs mentioned less about the perceived benefits of nuclear technology being no power outage, no pollution and Indonesia’s capability

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of managing nuclear energy, indicating the lack of trust in Indonesia’s ability to maintain nuclear technology. Similar to the survey results, there are a small number of respondents choosing “Indonesia’s capability” as perceived benefits of nuclear.

6.4.2.2

Perceived Risks

In the content analysis data from the MPs’ meeting reports, similar to the survey results, the MPs viewed nuclear accident/spill as the main risk in developing nuclear technology. In a discussion about safety, worry of nuclear accident/spill was mentioned in 2 sentences. In addition, the MPs also proposed that other power plants are sufficient, indicating the support for coal as a cheaper option and renewable energy as part of fulfilling renewable energy target in the Paris Agreement 2015 (n = 1). The members of parliament also agreed that the mechanisms in place to support public engagement in nuclear power plant development are sufficient. In addition, they also discussed about the procedures to support greater public engagement. In the House of Representatives (parliament), party politics is strong. For example, the MPs were given instruction by political party leaders to support or discard government programs. However, even though PAN party is included in the government coalition (supporter of the President for the period 2014–2019), the MPs from PAN expressed disagreement towards development of NPP by government agency BATAN. This shows that in this case, party coalition does not determine an MP’s agreement towards nuclear development in Indonesia.

6.5 Discussion and Conclusion This chapter explored the public and members of parliament acceptance of nuclear power plant development through statistical analysis of two public surveys (a nationwide and a provincial), as well as content analysis of minutes of meetings of the parliamentary members. The results suggest that both the public and MPs accept and agree the government’s plan to develop nuclear power plants (NPP). In both surveys, the agreement to develop NPP was found to be high. The 2016 national survey revealed that 78% of respondents support the development of NPP. Meanwhile, the 2018 West Kalimantan provincial survey showed that 87% of respondents accept development of NPP. The findings have different results with previous research investigating community acceptance of nuclear technology that found opposition of the plants from local community (Okubo et al., 2020). This suggests that perceived benefits such as cheaper cost of electricity and no power outage outrank the perceived risks. In contrast to previous studies that assert higher knowledge can fuel acceptance (Jenkins et al., 2017), the results demonstrate that this variable is not a determinant factor that influences public acceptance. In this research, the study participants were general population without specific target to nuclear experts and scholars.

References

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Moreover, consistent with findings from previous study, gender and economic factors influence the acceptance of nuclear energy (Harris et al., 2018). The survey data show that respondents with greater household expenditure tend to oppose the establishment of NPP, suggesting that these particular groups of respondents are more concern on the safety issues of nuclear. Moreover, gender entities (being women or men) would signify different perspectives of nuclear technology. The content analysis of the MPs meeting records shows that perceived benefits were mentioned more frequently than the risks. In particular, the MPs stressed that nuclear would be the turning point for Indonesia in terms of technological advances. They fostered the belief that Indonesia is capable of handling the technology, while promoting the development of NPP to secure energy supply for Indonesia. Since MPs are exercising a legislative function in the government, their opinion greatly matters in policymaking. Considering the path for future research investigating nuclear acceptance in Indonesia, I suggest several directions. Future research should consider an evaluation of the government stakeholders’ perspective in the adoption of nuclear technology via in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. To further enhance our scholarly understanding of nuclear technology acceptance, future work should examine the extent to which the relationship between MPs campaign of nuclear technology in their constituency is influencing voters’ acceptance, specifically in areas explored for NPP development. It is likely that continuous public campaign on the benefits of nuclear technology may influence how the public view nuclear energy.

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Ram Mohan, M. P., & Namboodhiry, S. K. (2020). An exploration of public risk perception and governmental engagement of nuclear energy in India.Journal of Public Affairs, 20(3). https:// doi.org/10.1002/pa.2086 Sagebiel, J., Müller, J. R., & Rommel, J. (2014). Are consumers willing to pay more for electricity from cooperatives? Results from an online Choice Experiment in Germany. Energy Research and Social Science, 2, 90–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.04.003 Sovacool, B. K., et al. (2016). Energy decisions reframed as justice and ethical concerns. Nature Energy, 1. https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.24. Sugiawan, Y., & Managi, S. (2019). Public acceptance of nuclear power plants in Indonesia: Portraying the role of a multilevel governance system. Energy Strategy Reviews, 26(November 2016), 100427. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100427 Uji, A., Prakash, A., & Song, J. (2021). Does the “NIMBY syndrome” undermine public support for nuclear power in Japan? Energy Policy, 148, 111944.

Chapter 7

Academics’ Preferences for Green Electricity Attributes

Abstract This chapter investigated the preferences for green electricity attributes by using a discrete choice experiment survey. The survey was distributed to academics community in Indonesia. It identifies the drivers for green electricity adoption and preference, as well as the barriers to academics’ acceptance of green electricity. Also discussed are the key demographics that influence the preference for green electricity. Findings show that price, environmental impact, mode of information dissemination and renewable energy percentage in the electricity mix influence respondents’ preference for green electricity product.

7.1 Introduction Indonesia is the largest consumer of energy in Southeast Asia with a rapidly increasing energy demand led by its large population of over 260 million people. The continuous energy supply, therefore, is an important prerequisite for livelihoods and development. In reality, however, the government has been struggling to provide electricity to all citizen. Indonesia is an archipelagic country and building infrastructure in remote areas is not economically feasible, even for the national electricity company, PLN, that is subsidised by the government (Maulidia et al., 2019). In order to overcome the supply gap by the traditional power grid network, policymakers consider developing renewable energy infrastructures to improve the condition. While data on renewable energy technologies and policies are widely available, there is a limited understanding on how this technology is perceived by the consumer. This information is of importance for the government to consider policy and tariff options. Generating energy from renewable sources is fundamentally important to achieve a sustainable and a secure energy system (Madlener & Stagl, 2005). In this respect, consumers have the power to express their desire for a more sustainable future through purchasing renewable energy products, for example, by subscribing to a green electricity tariff or other means (Tabi et al., 2014). However, in a highly regulated energy system, the general consumers have little influence to the energy decision-makings. Despite this fact, a selected few, academics and scientists are often invited to the parliamentary meetings and commissioned by the government to write policy briefs © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_7

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and reports. Therefore, the preference of academics and scientists may influence policymaking processes. This research examines the preference of academics and energy scientists for green electricity tariff. The research questions framing this research are: What are the attributes influencing the preference for green electricity? Why do these attributes prefer? To answer, a questionnaire was distributed to the university mailing lists, academic network groups and energy scientist’s forum. For analysis, this research applies a discrete choice experiment (DCE) model which identifies the preference ranking within a given sample. The goal of this research is to identify potential preferences for green electricity’s attributes. The findings show that the respondents preferred green electricity with the lowest additional cost and non-environmental impacts. These results should help policymakers in providing to the consumers’ needs by introducing products with selling points more than price. In addition, this research will provide the profiles of popular green electricity products by investigating the most preferred attributes.

7.2 Analysing Consumer Preference with a Discrete Choice Model Analysing consumer preferences has been applied in the field of psychology by measuring social and physiological factors which influence the acceptability of energy programs as well as its physical characteristics (Poortinga et al., 2003). One of the methodologies to analyse consumer preferences is a choice experiment (or stated preferences method) that is subject to hypothetical bias (Murphy et al., 2005). Hypothetical bias is an unrealistic report from the respondents of a study that impact the result. In other words, if hypothetical bias is high, the study result cannot be applied in real-world situation. According to Schläpfer and Fischhoff (2012), preferences study should be conducted only when the good and the context can be made familiar and meaningful to respondents. In this light, the choice in the study should include fixed options of expected preferences within the context of private goods (goods that are matter to respondents, such as market price, as opposed to goods that are matter to the public such as political debate) (Schläpfer & Fischhoff, 2012). In practice, however, the respondents are forced to choose the best option from the choices of the study thus eliminating their rationality (Sagebiel et al., 2014). In the light of the discussion above, one of the methods for eliciting consumer preferences is discrete choice experiment (DCE). DCE is widely used in marketing research and characterised by multinominal experiment to examining preferences for hypothetical products (Ewing & Sarigöllü, 2000). It should be noted that DCE may not mirror real-life situation or poses as an accurate predictor of future market development, but it is useful for empirical policy input. In detail, this method provides a simulation of real buying situation where the customers can design the “attributes”

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of the product that they most preferred. Attributes in DCE are understood as characteristic of a product (e.g., price), made up of various levels (at least two for each attribute) (Orme, 2002). Buyers can determine a value of each of those attributes and the result will show which attributes are most preferred. Therefore, defining the appropriate attributes and level is most critical. Scholars have been considering DCE as a method for determining consumer’s preferences for environmental products (Botelho et al., 2018; Ewing & Sarigöllü, 2000; Sagebiel, 2017; Siyaranamual et al., 2020; Tabi et al., 2014). For example, Tabi et al., (2014) explored the characteristics that distinguish subscribers of green electricity with potential adopters and found that environmentally sustainable behaviour and educational background play an important role to influence the adoption of green electricity. A study by Huh et al. (2015) investigating electricity service attributes found that electricity mix and characteristics of the utility company are important in determining the customers’ preferences for green electricity. In addition, Sagebiel and Rommel (2014) revealed that respondents from higher social categories tend to care more about their power quality.

7.3 Conjoint-Based Model A variety of discrete choice experiment class is choice-based conjoint (CBC) model that measures partly of orthogonal arrays of attributes and levels that maximise the information obtainable from the survey. The CBC can be implemented as follows: imagining this research conducted a CBC experiment with a 95% confidence interval for our experiment. The individual participates and chooses certain levels (dependent variable) of attributes (independent variable) repeatedly in the survey according to their preferences. To derive the most preferred levels and attributes, this research calculated the utility (benefit or value) from such levels and attributes. Utilities are developed for each level so the formulae produce “maximum likelihood fit” the respondents’ choices. In this survey, Sawtooth’s Choice-Based Conjoint with Hierarchical Bayes statistical program was used to estimate coefficients for the individual utilities. The algorithm adds utility ranking questions prior the CBC tasks based on the respondents’ rating and ranking of the attributes’ levels. Consider a number of product alternatives (1, 2, 3, …) in a choice set:  P1 = exp (U1 )/ exp(U1 ) + exp (U2 ) + exp (U3 ) + exp (U . . .)] were, P1 = The probability of choosing product alternative 1. Exp means “exponentiate” or raising e to the power of total utility. U1 = Total utility for alternative 1, etc. In the formula, the P1 represents the total utility for the chosen concept; the U1 , U2 , U3 are the total utilities for each concept including the chosen one. A utility is a

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number representing the preferences of each attribute in a conjoint study. This algorithm estimates how different the respondent’s utilities are from the other respondents in the study. The algorithm will then reflect the optimal preferences of the individual attributes and the sample averages. The above formula is the simplified model of choice experiment based on Sawtooth Software technical documents. This research rigorously selected the attributes and levels to ensure validity of the test result. The attributes were determined based on previous literature and preliminary interview with energy experts in the government. The attributes were selected based on an initial interview with government representatives and a review of past studies (Sagebiel, 2017; Sagebiel et al., 2014; Siyaranamual et al., 2020; Tabi et al., 2014; Vuichard, et al., 2021a). Public participation attribute represents some degree of democratic decision-makings for customers in this electricity market setting. The negative impacts of renewable energy generation aim to consider respondents’ concern for the environment. The other attributes: share of renewable energy, price and additional service from the State Electricity Company complete the attribute list. The share of renewable energy is presented as extreme levels, from zero to hundred per cent. Meanwhile, in the survey, price is presented in Indonesian Rupiah per kWh—the form Indonesian consumers are familiar with. However, in the results and discussion section, the price is presented in US dollar.

7.4 Survey Model and Distribution This research excluded power quality since previous study showed that these attributes weakly influence the willingness to pay (Sagebiel & Rommel, 2014). The questionnaire was implemented using Sawtooth Software an online environment for survey research. Respondents were recruited through academic networks and mailing lists of universities, covering professors, employees and students. A link was sent to potential participants requesting that they take part in an approximately 25-minlong online survey. The research at hand makes use of the data of 164 respondents with 649 incompletes. The software records all attempts at registering the answers; therefore, the incomplete number is high. For example, one attempt to fill in part of the survey without completion is registered as incompletes. To avoid bias in the results produced by this sampling process, I do not statistically generalised the data I am aware that the research sample is strongly bias towards highly environmentally aware, educated people, and thus bears the advantage that they will be more prominent in policy discussions featuring renewable energy.

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7.5 Results and Discussion 7.5.1 Survey Results The 164 respondents participated in the survey formed the sample for analysis. The characteristics of the respondents are shown Table 7.1. The sample was demographically heterogeneous in terms of gender, age and household size. Based on the survey, 94% of respondents are aware that coal produces the highest emission compared with solar energy, geothermal and nuclear. This confirms the assumption that academics possess both contextual and experiential knowledge about energy and thus, relevant to perspective from wider practitioner and policymakers with respect to renewable energy. Eliciting preferences from these actors will be important to inform the practitioners to influence further decision-making processes (Trutnevyte & Stauffacher, 2012). The results of the surveyed respondents’ preferences towards public participation received a mean value of 2.04 (information brochure), 2.41 (public meetings), 2.49 (expert consultation) and 2.59 (education), indicating that most respondents have a high concern for participation. This is in line with other studies that investigating potential consumers’ desire to participate contributes to some degree of willingness to pay (Sagebiel et al., 2014). Figure 7.1 illustrates the preferences for public participation for the sample (n = 164): Education is the most preferred method to participate in the decision-makings. Similar studies find that environmental concern acts as an important predictor of the social acceptance of green electricity (Georgarakis et al., 2021; Vuichard et al., 2021b) (see Fig. 7.2). The survey revealed that the majority of respondents agree that power plants should have either medium or small impacts to the environment. Coincidentally, the data estimates of electricity mix indicate that respondents generally prefer lower content of renewable energy in electricity generation, contrary to findings from Siyaranamual et al. (2020). It is likely that identifying the type of renewable energy makes the respondents hesitate in choosing a higher level of renewable energy. For example, respondents might consider nuclear energy as renewable since the energy that is produced by nuclear power is renewable (the survey did not distinguish nuclear energy/nuclear power plant) (Fig. 7.3). As expected, Fig. 7.4 presents the results of the surveyed respondents’ preference for lowest cost of green electricity service. This is consistent with the other study findings that lower tariffs are preferred over high (Sagebiel et al., 2014; Tabi et al., 2014). In addition, I found that the electricity bill, or the price of the green premium, is the most important attribute of electricity service. In the question about service from the State Electricity Company, the respondents generally consider all the presented options are preferable. This finding is in line with conclusions from other studies that found there is a demand for electricity service reliability (Ozbafli & Jenkins, 2016) (Fig. 7.5).

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Table 7.1 Summary of survey variables (n = 164) Name

Description

Count

Min Max Mean

Gender

Female Male

86 (52%) 78 (48%)

1

2

1.48

Age (years)

18 18–24 25–34 35–49 50–64 65+

1 (1%) 6 (4% 68 (41%) 71 (43%) 14 (9%) 4 (2%)

1

6

3.63

Household size

1–2 3–4 5+

47 (29%) 78 (48%) 39 (24%)

1

3

1.95

Monthly income (USD equivalent)

0–400 401–1000 1001–2000 2001–5000 5000+

16 (10%) 61 (37%) 48 (29%) 26 (16%) 13 (18%)

1

5

2.75

Energy knowledge

If respondents are aware of an Right 94% 164 energy source with highest Wrong 9% emission

1

4

Public participation *4-point Likert scale ranking (1 = disagree, 2 = agree, 3 = highly agree, 4 = no opinion)

Information brochure Public meetings Expert consultation Education

164

1 1 1 1

4 4 4 4

2.04 2.41 2.49 2.59

Environmental impact *

Almost none Small Medium Large

164

1 1 1 1

4 4 4 4

2.01 2.21 2.09 1.75

Renewable energy percentage 0–10% in green electricity mix 11–20% * 21–30% 31–50% 51–100%

164

1 1 1 1 1

4 4 4 4 4

2.12 2.01 2.08 2.21 2.32

Additional cost from regular tariff (USD cents) *

164

1 1 1 1 1

4 4 4 4 4

1.76 1.76 2.02 2.32

164

1 1 1 1

4 4 4 4

2.45 2.34 2.37 2.52

+0.92/kWh +0.72/kWh +0.35/kWh +0.21/kWh

Service from State Electricity Stable electricity connection Company Renewable energy certificate * Direct communication with manager Tariff reduction

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Education Expert consultation Public meetings Information brochure 0% Disagree

20%

40%

Agree

60%

Highly agree

80%

100%

No opinion

Fig. 7.1 Preferences for public participation

Large Medium Small None 0%

20% Disagree

40% Agree

60% Highly agree

80%

100%

No opinion

Fig. 7.2 Preferences for environmental impact

51-100% 31-50% 21-30% 11-20% 0-10% 0%

20%

Disagree

40% Agree

60%

Highly agree

Fig. 7.3 Preferences for the renewable energy mix

80% No opinion

100%

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7 Academics’ Preferences for Green Electricity Attributes

+0.21/kwh +0.35/kwh +0.72/kwh +0.92/kwh 0%

20% Disagree

40% Agree

60%

Highly agree

80%

100%

No opinion

Fig. 7.4 Preferences for additional tariff (US cents)

Tariff reduction Direct communication with manager Renewable energy certificate Stable electricity connection 0% Disagree

Agree

20%

40%

Highly agree

60%

80%

100%

No opinion

Fig. 7.5 Preferences for service from State-owned Electricity Company

7.5.2 Choice-Based Conjoint Results Results of the choice experiment were analysed in Sawtooth using the choice-based conjoint (CBC) formula, showing the part-worth utilities with standard deviations of the attribute levels and confidence interval (Table 7.2). Within the attribute public participation, the level “renewable energy education to the society” has the highest utility and is, therefore, preferred, and the level “distribution of information brochure” has the lowest utility. For the attribute negative impacts of renewable energy generation, “almost none” impact has the highest utility, and “large impacts” has the lowest utility. As for the renewable electricity mix attribute, the level “51–100%” received superior utility score, while “0–10%” received the lowest utility. For price, respondents preferred the lowest price “USD 0.21 cents/kWh” while the highest price “USD 0.92 cents/kWh” received the lowest utility. Having the choice of “additional service” from the State Electricity Company, on average respondents preferred “stable electricity connection” and “tariff discount when electrical connection is lost”; both levels received higher utility score, compared to “renewable energy certificate” or “direct service with manager”.

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Table 7.2 Choice-based conjoint result No

1

Attribute

Public participation

Attribute levels Average utility Information brochure Public meetings Expert consultation

2

Negative impacts of renewable energy generation Renewable energy percentage in green electricity mix

5

Price (Additional USD cents)

Additional service

Upper 95% CI

−20.05

2.61

−25.17

−14.93

−3.60

2.61

−8.73

1.52

4.80

2.35

0.19

9.40

Education

18.86

2.79

13.39

24.33

31.87

3.46

25.07

38.67

Small impacts

31.18

3.16

24.98

37.38

Medium impacts

−5.74

3.22

−12.06

0.59

−57.32

4.02

−65.22

−49.42

−8.34

3.45

−15.12

−1.55

11–20%

0.60

2.69

−4.68

5.87

21–30%

3.77

2.64

−1.40

8.95

31–50%

−0.81

2.71

−6.13

4.50

4.78

3.56

−2.20

11.76

0.92/ kWh

−34.80

4.29

−43.22

−26.37

0.72/kWh

−28.32

3.09

−34.39

−22.25

0.35/kWh

17.40

3.07

11.37

23.42

0.21/kWh

45.72

4.82

36.25

55.19

Stable electricity connection

17.78

2.73

12.41

23.15

Renewable energy certificate

−12.34

2.77

−17.78

−6.91

Direct service with the manager

−17.88

3.18

−24.14

−11.63

12.45

2.40

7.73

17.16

0–10%

51–100% 4

Confidence Interval Lower 95% CI

Almost none

Large impacts 3

Standard error

Tariff discount when electrical connection is lost *Confidence level interval 95%

The CBC model also calculates the attributes’ importance score, which indicates the preference of negative impacts of renewable energy generation and price relative to other options (Fig. 7.6). The results show that the average respondent’s choices are

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7 Academics’ Preferences for Green Electricity Attributes 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

Public participation

Negative impacts Renewable energy Price (Additional USD cents) percentage in green of renewable electricity mix energy generation

Additional service

Fig. 7.6 Average importance score

Table 7.3 Preferred products based on Discrete Choice Experiment Product

Public Participation

Negative impacts of renewable energy generation

Product 1 Share of preference 82%

Information brochure

Product 2 Share of preference 18%

Information brochure

Renewable energy percentage in green electricity mix

Price (Additional USD cents)

Additional service

Almost none 11–20%

0.21/kWh

Stable electricity connection

Large impacts

0.21/kWh

Stable electricity connection

11–20%

mostly influenced by environmental impact and price, while the other four attributes influence the preference to a lesser extent. This implies that the respondents would make trade-offs, for example limiting their participation to ensure that their electricity has the lowest price. This is in line with previous studies that showed that economic attribute is the dimension most valued by the potential customers (Hahnel et al., 2020). In the CBC analysis, I identified two most popular products based on respondents’ preference, as shown in Table 7.3.

7.6 Conclusion This research investigates the academics’ preferences for green electricity attributes. I applied a discrete choice experiment to investigate the most preferred attributes and products of green electricity. From a theoretical perspective, I argue that these attributes can make recommendations to current energy sector challenges. To add

References

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empirical evidences, I conducted an online choice experiment survey with a sample of 164 respondents. The results show that respondents prefer a green electricity product with information brochure as a mode of public participation, almost none negative impacts to the environment, 11–20% renewable energy percentage in the green electricity mix, the lowest additional price and a stable electricity connection. This preference varies substantially with gender, age, income and household size. In general, I propose policymakers in Indonesia to incorporate consumer research findings into upcoming policy decisions. Research such as this can help to design popular renewable energy products. Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge software support from Sawtooth Software Academic Grant Program for this chapter.

References Botelho, A., et al. (2018) Discrete-choice experiments valuing local environmental impacts of renewables: Two approaches to a case study in Portugal. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 20(s1), 145–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-018-0169-0 Ewing, G., & Sarigöllü, E. (2000). Assessing consumer preferences for clean-fuel vehicles: A discrete choice experiment. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 19(1), 106–118, https:// doi.org/10.1509/jppm.19.1.106.16946 Georgarakis, E., et al. (2021). Keep it green, simple and socially fair: A choice experiment on prosumers’ preferences for peer-to-peer electricity trading in the Netherlands. Energy Policy, 159, 112615. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112615 Hahnel, U. J. J., et al. (2020). Becoming prosumer: Revealing trading preferences and decisionmaking strategies in peer-to-peer energy communities. Energy Policy, 137(November 2019), 111098, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111098 Huh, S. Y., Woo, J., Lim, S., Lee, Y. G., & Kim, C. S. (2015). What do customers want from improved residential electricity services? Evidence from a choice experiment. Energy Policy, 85, 410–420. Madlener, R., & Stagl, S. (2005). Sustainability-guided promotion of renewable electricity generation. Ecological Economics, 53(2), 147–167. Maulidia, M., et al. (2019, February). Rethinking renewable energy targets and electricity sector reform in Indonesia: A private sector perspective. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 101, 231–247, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.11.005 Murphy, J. J., et al. (2005) A meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in stated preference valuation. Environmental and Resource Economics, 30(3), 313–325, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-0043332-z Orme, B. K. (2002). Formulating attributes and levels in conjoint analysis. Sawtooth Software Research Paper Series, 98382(360), 1–4. Ozbafli, A., & Jenkins, G. P. (2016). Estimating the willingness to pay for reliable electricity supply: A choice experiment study. Energy Economics, 56, 443–452. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco. 2016.03.025 Poortinga, W., et al. (2003). Household preferences for energy-saving measures: A conjoint analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(1), 49–64, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(02)001 54-X Sagebiel, J. (2017). Valuing improvements in electricity supply using discrete choice experiments: Preferences of private households in India and Germany (1).

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Chapter 8

Injustice and Environmental Harm in Extractive Industries

Abstract The rapid development of Indonesia’s economy in the recent decades has accelerated the exploitation of natural resources by the extractive industries and increased carbon emissions through higher energy consumption. Additionally, the persistent enthusiasm for coal energy and the ambitious deployment of renewable energy may have led to injustices in the energy system, short-sighted corrupt practices and environmental harm. This chapter examines the challenges and risks of energy source utilisation and technological developments linked to coal, geothermal and solar energy. More specifically, I focused on the following issues: domestic market obligation for coal, geothermal exploration, solar lamp distribution, rooftop photovoltaic policy and electricity charging stations (ECS). Investigating these issues from an energy justice and a green criminology perspective allowed us to evaluate them concerning instances where injustices (to humans and the environment) have emerged and how they should be addressed. In conclusion, the chapter demonstrates how the marginalisation of rural communities and production of environmental harm has been perpetuated by powerful figures, reinforced since colonialism and escalated by the demands of the Global North.

8.1 Introduction The rapid development of Indonesia’s economy in the recent decades has accelerated the growth of extractive industries by exploiting natural resources and increasing carbon emissions due to higher energy consumption rates.1 The formation of these extractive industries began in the colonial period. It intensified after World War II, particularly since the late 1960s when state corporations seized resource extraction activities to boost the Indonesian economy. Extractive industries—particularly coal and geothermal—generate considerable employment and a share of significant

1

The chapter was originally published in the International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy Setyawati, D. (2022). Injustice and Environmental Harm in Extractive Industries and Solar Energy Policies in Indonesia. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 11(1), 14-27. https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.1975.

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revenue for the government and corporations. However, they come with high environmental and social costs. The coal industry’s environmental harm and social impacts are widely known and documented by scholars, journalists, activists, intellectuals and concerned citizens. More recently and highly publicised, a petition against coal construction in Indonesia was endorsed by 8,221 individuals from 114 countries and 112 organisations from 34 countries to the Japanese government. It demanded them to stop financing the construction of the Indramayu coal-fired power plant. It stated that the project would produce considerable environmental pollution and destroy the livelihoods of thousands of local farmers and fishermen (Indonesia-Japan non-governmental organisations [NGOs] coalition, 2020). Meanwhile, the overexploitation of coal has made coal reserves decline at a fast rate and prompted the government to seek other energy sources. Based on Indonesia’s coal production in 2019 of about 400 million tons, it is estimated that the coal reserves will last about 20 years, particularly for domestic use (Bappenas/National Development Planning Agency, 2019). The government prioritised coal and geothermal in the National Energy Plan 2017–2050 to mitigate this issue. However, geothermal exploration operations also entail environmental damage. Therefore, significant questions remain about the environmental and social consequences of the government’s energy policies concerning coal and geothermal energy. This chapter jointly explores the following interrelated issues: coal and geothermal mining. This chapter aims to explore the issues of injustice and harm in energy generation and distribution through the lenses of energy justice and southern green criminology. The research question is: How do injustice and harm associated with energy development being perpetuated? It focused on the actions of powerful figures who facilitate the production of environmental harm and legitimise the marginalisation of human groups and the Global South’s natural world (Goyes, 2016; Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014). In summary, the rapid development of Indonesia’s economy in the recent decades has accelerated the exploitation of natural resources by the extractive industries and increased carbon emissions through higher energy consumption. Additionally, the persistent enthusiasm for coal energy and the ambitious deployment of renewable energy may have led to injustices in the energy system, short-sighted corrupt practices and environmental harm. This research examines the challenges and risks of energy source utilisation and technological developments linked to coal, and geothermal energy. More specifically, this research focused on the following issues: domestic market obligation for coal and geothermal exploration. Investigating these issues from an energy justice and a green criminology perspective allowed us to evaluate them concerning instances where injustices (to humans and the environment) have emerged and how they should be addressed. In conclusion, the research demonstrates how the marginalisation of rural communities and production of environmental harm have been perpetuated by powerful political figures, reinforced since colonialism and escalated by the demands of the Global North.

8.2 Energy Justice from a Southern Green Criminology Perspective

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8.2 Energy Justice from a Southern Green Criminology Perspective Energy justice focuses on the fair dissemination of the benefits and costs of energy services among communities and the impacts of energy decisions on marginalised populations and future generations within a holistic global system (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014). This concept stemmed from both environmental and social justice philosophies. It is concerned with the potential ramifications of actions directly related to ecological well-being, human health and the distributive impact of exploitative activities on people’s livelihoods and well-being (Davies, 2014; Sovacool & Hess, 2017; White, 2013). Energy justice research also has subfields in the procedural, distributional and recognition dimensions of justice. So far, these subfields have been applied to the community energy sector in Wales (Forman, 2017), and the oil and gas development in the Arctic (McCauley et al., 2016). Scholars using this approach have demonstrated that people low in the political economy suffer the most from legally sanctioned procedures for extractive industries (Colchester et al., 2006; Ruggiero & South, 2013; Schlosberg & Carruthers, 2010). Correspondently, Ruggiero and South (2013) asserted that the public policies for solving environmental and economic problems could be criminogenic, giving rise to corruption and illegal markets. Therefore, energy justice requires highlighting issues of environmental justice and social justice, which can be achieved using the perspective of green criminology. Admittedly, although giving priority to the “fairness” in the energy system, purely human-centred approaches (e.g., the original version of energy justice) tend to ignore the ecological context, where human and non-human species are marginalised and victimised. Discussions on crimes committed against ecosystems, human beings and nonhuman beings are included within the green criminology conceptual framework (Brisman, 2014). Green criminology also exposes the uneven nature of power and wealth distribution between the North and South. This North-South imbalance is at play in the overconsumption of environmental products in the North at the expense of environmental destruction in southern countries (Goyes, 2019). It forms a rationale for defining southern green criminology as “the science that is attentive to the dynamics and context of the Global South and grows out of the epistemological power of the marginalized, impoverished and oppressed” (Goyes, 2019: 11). In other studies, southern green criminology was characterised as paying attention to the uneven distribution of political and economic power (Franko, 2019), the colonisation and exploitation of the South (Carrington et al., 2019; Rodríguez Goyes, 2021) and the power imbalances that have privileged the Global North over the Global South (Carrington et al., 2019). Therefore, Goyes (2019: 55–56) stated that “a Southern green criminology can further decolonial aims and thus aid the science that challenges ecological discrimination”. Conceiving southern green criminology this way draws attention to the ways historical structures and consumer culture give political superiority to powerful groups. This phenomenon is evidenced in various regulatory processes that have systematically produced environmental harms when serving the

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interests of the powerful (Heydon, 2018; White, 2013). Importantly, southern green criminology has identified the harmful actions against marginalised communities as instances of (neo)colonialism (Rodríguez Goyes, 2021; Weis, 2019) and capitalism (Ruggiero & South, 2013). Energy justice and southern green criminology perspectives complement each other in various ways concerning their central concerns regarding the disclosure of injustices and harms in public policies and the marginalisation of some people by the dominant group (Goyes, 2019; Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014). Both southern green criminology and energy justice have recognised the problem of inequalities and injustice by focusing on the extractive sector. Scholars applying both theoretical frameworks also denounce the lack of representation of southern voices into debates of environmental and energy injustice (Carrington et al., 2019; LaceyBarnacle et al., 2020). This research applies energy justice and southern green criminology by investigating and clarifying the injustices and environmental harms found in the case studies, the systemic nature of these harms and the concrete ways they operate. The discussion now turns to the structure of the energy system to demonstrate the application of these frameworks to this research’s subject. The structure disproportionately benefits national politicians and large corporations in Indonesia while limiting community well-being and threatening rural people’s access to natural resource-based activities.

8.3 The Distribution of Power and Inequality in the Indonesian Energy System The Indonesian energy system is highly regulated and centralised into a national distribution network. This is, in part, a legacy of colonialism, impacting current patterns of power and wealth inequality in the postcolonial Indonesian state (Booth, 1998). According to the Constitution, the state has the right to manage natural resources—this privilege originated in the Dutch colonial-era principle of “domein” (Robertson-Snape, 1999). The domein principle asserts the right of the colonial power to rule, own, and manage land and restrict community access to land. Specifically, article 33, point 3 of the Constitution states, “the land, the waters and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the state and used to the greatest prosperity of the people”. This point refers to the state (through its representatives), who hold the responsibility to protect the common good from others who seek to undermine it. In Indonesia, this mandate has been exploited to legitimise an authoritarian style of government that rejects opposition (Robertson-Snape, 1999). Accordingly, the energy system’s centralisation has incepted and sustained an oligarchy lead by political elites and is manipulated by economic groups with vested interests. The European colonisation also introduced the first urban–rural divide in the archipelago. The Dutch introduced economic centralisation on the island of Java, while the rest of the archipelago remained relatively “undeveloped” (Booth, 1998).

8.3 The Distribution of Power and Inequality in the Indonesian Energy System

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According to the National Statistics Agency in 2021, Java is home to the capital city of Jakarta and remains the most populated island, home to 150 million people or more than half of the country’s population. Consequently, the rural and urban divisions increase the inequality both within and between provinces. A study asserts there are no large inequalities in income, education and healthcare access between regions in Indonesia (Suryadarma et al., 2012). However, these inequalities are present within urban and rural areas. In terms of electricity access, the rural areas have the least developed electricity infrastructure, evidenced by a lower electrification ratio than urban areas. There are focused government efforts to address energy security concerns in rural areas by implementing community-based renewable energy projects (Fathoni et al., 2014). While such circumstances have supported the efforts to address inequality, challenges remain in providing reliable electricity access for the rural population. Several regulatory reforms have allowed a greater role of the private sector and civil society in the energy system to promote renewable energy (i.e., solar panel policy). However, breaking the control of the state and fossil fuel hegemony is inconceivable (Setyawati, 2021). Several barriers hinder democratic participation in developing energy policies and the establishment of less environmentally detrimental energy production practices. First, despite the democratic reformation2 in 1998, free speech in Indonesia is subject to restrictions (ADB, 2020). Defamation provisions in the Criminal Code for slander invoke higher penalties if the person is a public official. Further, journalists who breach the code law face up to six years of imprisonment and a fine of up to IDR 1 billion (around USD 100,000). Human Rights Watch states that elite groups and individuals can use this law to silence criticism or allegations of corruption, fraud or misconduct made against the government or individuals with political power (Gallagher & Pearson, 2010). Defamation cases against journalists frequently appear in the news since the Criminal Code was enacted. Regarding energy production alternatives, there is currently a prohibition against the PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara/State Electricity Company) purchasing renewable power at prices higher than conventional coal power. This prohibition is regulated by the domestic market’s obligation to cap coal prices sold by the power producers to PLN (ADB, 2020). This policy interferes with the competitiveness of renewable energy investments, making the power sector dependent on coal. Third, the renewable energy development priorities laid out in the National Energy Plan are on geothermal and solar energy. However, the development of these energy sources affects rural livelihoods concerning environmental degradation due to geothermal operations in forest areas.

2

The reformation was a period when authoritarian President Suharto resigned, and the country underwent a time of transition to democracy.

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8.4 Methods The case studies discussed below provide an examination of the benefits and justice outcomes produced by energy-related activities sanctioned by existing laws and regulations. The case studies each fall under one of the following energy source classifications: a. Coal (one of the main fossil fuels used in Indonesia) b. Geothermal (a renewable energy source). There are several reasons these energy sources have been chosen for analysis. Both coal and geothermal are extractive industries located in forest areas and largely investigated as drivers of deforestation (ADB, 2020). Coal-based power is considered a cheap option, although it has high environmental costs. One viable alternative is geothermal. However, environmental and financial costs are associated with geothermal development, primarily impacting local communities in project areas. This research uses a qualitative methodology, combining 16 interviews with elites. Snowball sampling was used to identify appropriate participants for the elite interviews due to the sensitivity of the issues and complexity of the government’s decisionmaking process (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). Most interviews took place while I was conducting three months of fieldwork at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources from January to March 2019. Notably, this type of interview can pose problems concerning the validity of the data. Further, there are ethical considerations, such as identity protection (Arksey & Knight, 1999). We attempted to minimise these problems by using a data triangulation technique (Arksey & Knight, 1999). In this research, we triangulated three sample groups and supplemented the data with government reports, news and research. The elite interviewees were separated into three groups: government (the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, State Electricity Company PLN and National Energy Board), private sector and academia (the PLN Foundation School of Engineering). Eight elite interviews were conducted over two years between March 2019 and March 2021. Five interviews were conducted in person, while three were conducted via an online chat video/audio platform. Government participants were drawn from various divisions of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. The data on coal and geothermal developments were collected from the government and academia groups and the available literature. All interviews were transcribed, and the transcripts were subjected to the stages of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2013). This analysis focuses on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination of some groups of people over others. The names and positions of interviewees remain anonymous to ensure confidentiality.

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8.5 Findings and Analysis 8.5.1 The Political Dimension, Environmental Harms and Social Implications of Coal Mining Coal operations are important to national and regional economies. According to the National Statistics Data in 2017, coal mining accounted for around 1.8% of Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It also provides development and employment opportunities for regional economies. Based on Law No. 33/2004 and Government Regulation No. 55/2005, regional governments receive 80% of the revenue derived from natural resources. The coal industry is inextricably linked to Indonesian politics, especially concerning the role those financial contributions play in election campaigns. Released four days before the presidential election, the documentary Sexy Killers exposed the coal industry’s influence on the campaigns of both presidential candidates (Sasono, 2020). Even though the documentary does not contain direct allegations of political corruption during the election, it certainly shows how deeply interconnected the coal industry is with Indonesian political elites. A study also reported, it is “common knowledge” that politicians own or financially benefit from coal mining operations, making them prone to corruption (Atteridge et al., 2018). In 2016, the Governor of Southeast Sulawesi was arrested for indiscretions relating to issuing mining licenses (Jakarta Post, 2017). Later, in 2019, the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) announced that the former Cirebon Regent was suspected of money laundering and bribery related to the coal-fired power project. The expansion of coal mining operations in Indonesia has had significant implications for physical and social environments. Between 2010 and 2016, deforestation in the coal mining areas of East Kalimantan occurred at a rate of 223,830 hectares per year. This deforestation contributed to carbon emissions, increasing air pollution, with significant health consequences for local habitats and human residents. The environmental degradation accompanying coal mining is also a matter of growing concern the communities surrounding the mines (Kartikasari et al., 2018). For example, a study suggested that the rise of respiratory illness among residents of the Muara Enim District of South Sumatra is linked to regular incidences of toxic dust from the neighbouring large open-cut coal mine (Juniah et al., 2012). Meanwhile, another study estimated that air pollutants from coal power plants are linked to 7,480 premature deaths annually (Koplitz et al., 2017). There is also a lack of regulatory oversight regarding disused mining pits, leading to numerous accidental deaths, mainly of children (Gokkon, 2017). Coal mining operations also paid less attention to the land ownership and management by the local communities, leading to various social conflicts. For example, a news outlet reported persistent conflicts between Long Lanuk Village residents and the coal mining company regarding land boundaries and procedural fairness (Siswanto et al., 2022). Current energy policies support coal utilisation above other cleaner energy sources. For PLN, it is cheaper to buy electricity from coal than from renewable

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energy sources due to the domestic market obligation policy. This policy caps the sale price of coal to PLN and limits any price increases that may occur (regulated in the Ministry of Energy Decree No. 78K/30/MEM/2019). Moreover, Omnibus Law No. 11/2020 asserts automatic mining permit extensions, avoiding the need for companies to undergo complex bureaucratic processes to obtain renewal permits. As one interviewee stated: Coal is more often used than renewables because it is deemed more cost-effective and reliable than renewables. The take-off price of renewables by PLN is higher than that of coal (staff of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources).

8.5.2 The Marginalisation of Local Communities and Green Crimes in Geothermal Operations Part of the efforts to secure energy supplies and move away from fossil-based fuels is geothermal exploration, often entailing a marginalisation of local communities and significant biodiversity loss. Recently, five people (all farmers and children from Sibanggor Julu village) died from exposure to toxic gases caused by nearby geothermal drilling by Sorik Merapi Geothermal Power (Karokaro & Syahni, 2021). Despite the suspension of geothermal operations, the gas pollutants continue to put people’s health at risk, primarily children living in places such as Sibanggor Julu. Another study documented the pollution caused by the geothermal industry in the Tompaso district, where pollutants found in the air and nearby wells caused the productivity of rice and agricultural crops to decline (Tulungen et al., 2021). Additionally, land-use changes have caused a reduction in water resources around the site and a loss of reservoir water. This took place in Gunung Slamet, where the water has become murky, disrupting the livelihoods of local communities from tofu production and fisheries (Zufar & Azami, 2021). Protests by local communities against geothermal power plant development have occurred in various parts of the country. Some have been met with repression. Between 2017 and 2020, protests have taken place in the communities of Solok (West Sumatra province), Wae Sono (East Nusa Tenggara province), Gunung Slamet (Central Java province), Pangalengan (West Java province) and Sibanggor Julu (North Sumatra) (indicated by squares in Fig. 8.1). An eyewitness of a protest in Solok said that the authorities used violence to quash the demonstration (Yolanda et al., 2021). The protesters in Gunung Slamet also had a violent confrontation with the authorities (Cipto, 2017). In their various regions, these protesters demanded an end to geothermal operations in their area, citing the loss of forest cover and livelihoods due to the development of geothermal facilities. Figure 8.2 illustrates the locations of forests in Indonesia based on 2018 data (indicated by shades of green). It can be observed when comparing Fig. 8.1 with Fig. 8.2 that geothermal facilities are mostly located in the forested areas of Indonesia. As noted by a government representative:

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Environmental issues relating to renewable energy infrastructure are mostly concerned with geothermal power plant development located in the forest conservation areas.

A representative from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources confirmed that communities living in protected forest areas often protested geothermal power plant development: We (the government) met resistance from local communities that feel their livelihoods are obstructed by geothermal power plant development. For example, a geothermal facility is planned to be built on Sumatra Island. This social protest is not easy to contain.

However, these large-scale geothermal developments in Indonesia cannot be said to affect particular rural populations as a whole. In actuality, the poor and marginalised communities in these rural areas bear the highest social and environmental costs of the developments. This is especially evident when considering

Fig. 8.1 Map of geothermal power plants at various stages in Indonesia. Source Geothermal map from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, with mapping of conflict from Jatam (2021), Yolanda et al. (2021), Cipto (2017)

Fig. 8.2 Map of forest cover in Indonesia in 2019. Source Ministry of Environment and Forestry Regulation No. P.41/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/7/2019 on National Forestry Plan year 2011– 2030

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the victims of these environmental crimes: the farmers in Sibangor Julu and fishermen of the Gunung Slamet. As their livelihoods are deeply interconnected with nature, they have sought to defend their land and resist endeavours likely to contaminate their sources of income. Despite these concerns, the government continues to promote geothermal energy development. An interviewee from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources revealed that fiscal incentives (e.g., tax deductions and funding for geothermal investments) were introduced to attract private investments. Further expansion of geothermal power plants can cause problems that may disproportionately affect local communities.

8.6 Discussion and Conclusion One definition of injustice within green criminology is the “mistreatment of one of the beings by the hand of the other or the existence of inappropriate guiding principles that lead to systematic unequal treatment” (Goyes, 2019: 24). The cases analysed can be categorised as an injustice to the communities surrounded by coal and geothermal facilities, applying this terminology. First, there is an uneven distribution of energy and environmental goods among Indonesian communities (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014). Such inequality can be connected to the structures left by colonial times (Goyes, 2019) and the demands of global capitalism (Ruggiero & South, 2013). Southern scholars posit that colonial legacies are key factors shaping the economic and political dynamics of current social and environmental harms (Rodríguez Goyes, 2021). This idea aligns with the dynamics of marginalisation, accompanied by equally systemic injustice, impacting nearly every facet of life for some rural communities in Indonesia. Northern influences were evident in the practice of resource exploitation that occurred throughout the colonial period. From the outset, infrastructure development was concentrated in certain parts of the country, excluding the rural population from the early stages of Indonesia’s development. Acknowledging the needs of the rural population has recently become more prominent in renewable energy policies. However, marginalisation continues, as some significantly poorer and less advantaged citizens are exposed to higher air, water and soil pollution close to coal mining and geothermal exploration sites. Curbs on freedom of speech have constrained the rights of non-state actors to voice their environmental concerns. The foreign financing of various coal projects in Indonesia demonstrates, from a green criminological perspective, or victimisation “within the context of the global capitalist treadmill of production” (Lynch et al., 2018). This argument also reflects Sovacool and Dworkin’s (2014) recognition of uneven developments in capitalist societies within countries on a global scale. The natural resource exploitation demanded by capitalist economies is informed by neocolonial logic from the North to the South (Rodríguez Goyes, 2021). In this case, the drive for development in the west has created a global capitalist system in which exploitative industries are rampant in countries in the Global South.

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In response to the scarcity of cases that apply theories of energy justice and southern green criminology in the Global South (Carrington et al., 2019; LaceyBarnacle et al., 2020), this research demonstrates how injustice and the marginalisation of rural communities have been reinforced since colonialism and escalated by the demands of the Global North. This research also adds a more nuanced understanding of the context and shape of environmental crimes and justice in the Global South by applying these perspectives to some extractive industries in the energy sector. This research demonstrates how the main concerns of energy justice and southern green criminology—marginalisation and victimisation—affect one another in various ways. These include the uneven opportunities for energy access and the disproportionate distribution of environmental risks, economic benefits and social impacts associated with some aspects of the energy sector, as illustrated by the case studies.

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Chapter 9

Renewable Energy Procurement in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities

Abstract This chapter examines the availability of renewable energy procurement schemes in Southeast Asia. It traces the electricity market development in Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. This chapter starts from the multiple controversies surrounding energy transition in Southeast Asia, to then discuss the state of energy transition in each country. This chapter concludes that Vietnam and Malaysia are leading the race to Net Zero compared to Indonesia due to the availability of renewable energy financing and incentives for project developers.

9.1 Introduction Southeast Asia is home to some of the largest population in the world. By 2040, International Energy Agency (IEA) predicted that Southeast Asia’s energy demand will represent one-tenth of the rise in global demand. This scenario represents the impact of existing policy as well as population and industrial growth. Southeast Asia’s economy is supported by large manufacturing industries with large labour force. This region’s importance as a global manufacturing hub has attracted major foreign investors, including RE100 companies and other companies looking to source renewables into their electricity. RE100 is a global initiative that grouped business committed to 100% renewable electricity. Renewable energy has gained importance and is changing the way companies conduct manufacturing activities. Southeast Asia provides opportunities for these companies, since the region is endowed with abundant renewable energy sources and attractive incentives for foreign direct investment. That said, the region is appealing to companies looking to enter the Asian market and expand their supply chains. In fact, global brands are reaching their renewable energy targets through several schemes in Southeast Asia, including rooftop solar Photovoltaic (PV) generation, renewable energy certificates and power sourcing from utility provider. Despite the rising demand for renewable energy, its deployment is going slowly. Renewable energy only accounts to 15% of the total energy generation. Notwithstanding the diminishing reserve of fossil fuels, regulatory framework maintains favourable conditions for fossil fuel generators. Thereby, the energy transition is © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_9

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threatened by corruption due to the lack of proper accountability that leads to rentseeking practices mainly in the mining sector. As a consequence, the switch of power generation from coal to renewables is a highly political process. Energy systems are dominated by fossil fuels, incentives for renewables are rare and scepticism towards modern renewables are high. There is also a trend of centralised energy system in which electricity transmission and distribution are controlled by the state. In this research, the procurement of renewable energy is explored in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. In all the three countries, the electricity market is highly regulated by the government. Southeast Asia’s biggest consumer of energy, Indonesia’s electricity is operated by State Electricity Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara/PLN). PLN also owns most of Indonesia’s coal power plants. As a result, there is preference to use coal as main energy source. The government of Malaysia has introduced a number of renewable electricity generation schemes to meet energy demand. They have also pledged to achieve 20% renewable energy deployment by 2025. However, the total amount of renewable energy in the electricity generation is approximately only 2% in 2019 (Lau et al., 2016). Moreover, Vietnam is on the progressive track developing clean energy by having 41% renewable energy in the electricity generation mix (Urban et al., 2018). However, a large-scale renewable energy development has been limited and the share was almost exclusively accounted for hydropower, constituting barrier to the development of other energy sources. An analysis of current renewable energy procurement schemes is vital to forecast how the region will fare in the future where energy demands are stronger. The research question asks: What renewable energy procurement available in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam and what particular conditions of such procurement promote acceptance by the public? The results show that renewable energy procurement schemes in Indonesia are less attractive than in Vietnam and Malaysia, indicated by the unattractive solar feed-in-tariff and absence of green electricity product.

9.2 Challenges and Opportunities in Transitioning to a Low-Carbon Society 9.2.1 Social Acceptance Past research found that the government’s efforts to increase renewable energy deployment are partly constrained by social acceptance (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). Previous studies found that economic, political and social factors are the main concern influencing people’s decision to adopt and accept a certain renewable energy technology (Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017). The argument is that good governance and socio-economic factors can release bottlenecks that impede or slow down a transition towards renewables. Each renewable technology is unique with its own dynamics; a recognition of the economic, social and political benefits of renewable technology can foster acceptance.

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Social acceptance hinges upon three dimensions: socio-political, community and market (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). Aspect of the specific character of socio-political acceptance, was that, it concerns with the acceptance of technologies and policies by the public, key stakeholders and policymakers. Community acceptance refers to specific acceptance of communities and local authorities in association with infrastructure development of renewable energy projects. Market acceptance refers to the connection between national and local, involving potential consumers and investors of the technology. Based on existing literature, perceived benefits increase the likelihood of public acceptance of renewable energy technology. The benefits are associated with economic, environmental and social factors, including sustainability values, less environmental impact and quality of government institutions (Papadis & Tsatsaronis, 2020). Most of those studies concern with the acceptance of renewable energy schemes in a specific energy project, such as electric vehicle or wind power in Europe or Northern America (Sovacool, 2016). The literature on renewable energy in Southeast Asia has mostly focused on the economic, technological and institutional restraints surrounding the procurement of renewable energy by potential consumers. These studies found that cost, governance and subsidies influence the consumers’ decision to adopt renewable energy. One could argue that there was lack of motivation on deploying renewable energy initiatives on the part of the government. The absence of legal binding on Paris Agreement and similar initiatives contributes to the lack of motivation to move renewable initiatives forward. This research then offers an analysis of renewable energy procurement’s acceptance in Southeast Asia.

9.2.2 Energy Dynamics in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia is a fast-developing region with high dependency on fossil fuels. Economic growth is mainly driven by fossil fuels, leading to environmental degradation, social conflicts and mining oligarchy. The mining operation is controlled by a small number of people linked with political elite (Setyawati, 2021). Energy consumption in Southeast Asia nearly doubled between 1995 and 2015, growing at an average pace of 3.4% annually, with industry as the largest consumer. More than half of the region’s energy supply is propagated by fossil fuels, and the fastest growth has been registered by coal. This chapter examines Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam that accounted for most of the region’s total final energy consumption. Indonesia is the world’s fourth-largest producer of coal and the main producer of biofuels worldwide. With a population of over 260 million people, electrifying the whole population has been the Government of Indonesia’s aim along with their energy justice campaign. As of December 2019, the electrification ratio is 98,86%, the total installed generator capacity is 66,46 Giga Watt and the electricity consumption is 1.077 kWh/Capita (Widyaningsih, 2017). In the 2019–2020 Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL), coal is the main source of energy generation and the current renewable energy mix is around 13% in 2019. However, the government made a

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commitment to increase the renewable energy mix by 23% by 2025 in Paris Agreement 2015. A number of policies have been enacted and planned in order to achieve the target, including on-grid solar PV systems and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs). Under this scheme, customers of the State Electricity Company PLN have the option to self-generate electricity through on-grid rooftop PV systems. This scheme is stipulated in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 49/2018 on Rooftop PV. As stipulated in the regulation, customers of PLN can sell the excess electricity generated from solar panels at the rate of 65% of the average tariff rate; however, the government do not include a financing or subsidy system for potential adopters. The government of Malaysia aimed to increasing renewable energy use in the power mix to 20% by 2025. As per 2019, the current renewables are at 6% of total power sources (Petinrin & Shaaban, 2015). In Malaysia, the power sector is highly regulated. The electricity industry is managed by state-owned companies in all states and federal territories. Tenaga National Berhad for Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah Electricity Sdn Bhd for Sabah and SESCO for state of Sarawak. The government of Malaysia introduced several renewable energy schemes for customers, including green tariff Net Energy Metering (NEM) and Peer2Peer (P2P) trading. Net Energy metering allows the customers to export excess solar PV-generated electricity to the national grid on “one-on-one” offset basis. Customers can purchase solar panels individually or apply to solar leasing to private companies with monthly fixed price. P2P trading scheme allows energy generators to sell excess power to another consumer with grid fee payable to State Electricity Company (Tenaga National Berhad/TNB). Vietnam energy consumption is dominated by industrial sector, which accounts to almost 40% of the total consumption (Tang et al., 2016). The power sector is operated by Vietnam Electricity (EVN) which owned large-scale hydropower and coal power plants as well as holding monopoly over electricity transmission and distribution. The government of Vietnam has several key policies for sustainable energy development and shaping the future energy growth, including Renewable Energy Development Strategy (REDS) that supports schemes for renewable energy development; they are Feed-in-Tariff (FiT), Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and net metering (Nguyen et al., 2019).

9.3 Methodology This research focuses on empirical studies that investigate renewable energy barriers in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam in English language through a longitudinal study. To identify peer-reviewed papers related to the research, the researcher uses sources, including Web of Science and Scopus. For data that are not included in the studies, this author conducted supplementary experts’ interview from selected energy experts and household representatives.

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9.3.1 Selection of Case Studies Process The first exploration of academic literature on renewable energy in the three countries, produced a total amount of 1,131 papers. I used keywords such as “renewable energy and Indonesia, “renewable energy and Malaysia”, “renewable energy and Vietnam” or “renewable energy and Southeast Asia” to identify relevant topic from 2015 onwards. The author then limits the data corpus by conducting five phase selection process. First, the research had to involve the supply of energy services to the public; therefore, studies that analyse technological aspects of renewables are excluded. This selection produced a total of 495 papers. Then, the research has to be conducted in the past five years to ensure relevancy of data. This reduced the number of papers to be 105. Third, I limited the research that investigated centralised energy systems, this means that off-grid renewable energy projects are excluded since those projects are detached from the national grid. The papers were then 65. Fourth, the research selected was from academic papers published in peer-reviewed journal. This reduced the papers to be 35. Lastly, the research has to analyse renewable energy schemes, policies and the public’s perspective. This refined the case studies into 24 papers summarised in Table 9.1. Several reports published from international development agencies were included to provide background on renewable energy policies.

9.3.2 Expert Interview Expert interview was conducted to present data for analysing the challenges and opportunities of renewable energy procurement. The interviews were conducted in a time span of 4 years. A total of 15 interviews were conducted during October– December 2018 and January–June 2020. In order to provide comprehensive data, I included a variety of stakeholders in the energy system, including from academic institutions (School for Engineering of PLN’s foundation (STT PLN), Hue University Vietnam), government agencies (PLN Indonesia, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Indonesia (MEMR)) and companies and institutions (Indonesian Solar Panel Module Association (APAMSI), manufacturing sector representatives with factories in Indonesia and Malaysia, SUN Energy Indonesia). During the meeting, the author relied on semi structure interview, combining open ended questions that include main queries such as, “What renewable energy procurement schemes are available in the country?”; “When was these procurement schemes introduced?”; “How have the public responded to these schemes?”; “What are the main barriers in implementing these schemes and what can be improved?”; and “What are the most popular schemes and how have the policies supporting such

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Table 9.1 List of papers for in-depth analysis No

Region/Country

Studies

Authors

1

Southeast Asia

Renewable energy policies recommendations

Erdiwansyah et al. (2019)

2

Southeast Asia

Drivers of renewable energy development

Khuong et al. (2019)

3

Southeast Asia

Rural electrification

Holstenkamp (2019)

4

China, Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia

Energy consumption trends

Sharvini et al. (2018)

5

Vietnam

Scenario for achieving emission targets

Tran and Chen (2016)

6

Vietnam

Policy analysis of low-carbon transition

Shem et al. (2019)

7

Vietnam

Drivers of climate policy

Zimmer et al. (2015)

8

Vietnam

Energy efficiency

Urban et al. (2018)

9

Vietnam

Residential rooftop PV systems

Nguyen et al. (2019)

10

Vietnam

Energy consumption and economic growth

Tang et al. (2016)

11

Malaysia

Summary of renewable energy policies

Bujang et al. (2016)

12

Malaysia

Solar panels and electric vehicles’ acceptance by the public

Kardooni et al. (2018)

13

Malaysia

FiTs

Oh et al. (2018)

14

Malaysia

Biomass and solar energy deployment

Petinrin and Shaaban (2015)

15

Malaysia

Hydropower and solar energy Foo (2015)

16

Malaysia

Energy savings

Kaffashi and Shamsudin (2019)

17

Malaysia

Hydroelectricity

Lau et al. (2016)

18

Malaysia

Renewable energy technology

Abdullah et al. (2019)

19

Indonesia

Private sector participation

Maulidia et al. (2019)

20

Indonesia and India

Solar energy deployment

Burke et al. (2019)

21

Indonesia

Solar energy deployment

Outhred and Retnanestri (2015)

22

Indonesia

Policies in energy sector

Dutu (2016)

23

Indonesia

Energy poverty

Sambodo and Novandra (2019)

24

Indonesia

Energy poverty

Setyowati (2020)

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schemes driven the acceptance of renewable energy procurement?”. All the interviews were transcribed, however to ensure confidentiality, the names of interviewees remain anonymous.

9.4 Comparison Between Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam With regards to the transition towards low-carbon society, many countries espouse the political will for such a transition, with varied renewable energy targets between 20 and 25%. Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam are all member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional intergovernmental organisation comprised of ten countries in Southeast Asia, which promotes cooperation and facilitates economic development. ASEAN designated ASEAN Centre for Energy which tasked to provide information and expertise to harmonise energy policies of each country are in line with the environmental sustainability of the region. However, ASEAN is emphasising on state sovereignty, non-interference and non-intervention. Therefore, the transition towards a low-carbon society may be entirely depend on the political will of each country. Table 9.2 shows the supporting policy in place to support examined energy technology. Based on the results, there are differences in how each country approaches energy sources. For example, Indonesia implements fuel subsidies and the domestic market obligation to stabilise the price of coal sold in the domestic market. In contrast, Malaysia and Vietnam pledged to phase-out/reduce their coal consumption in specific targets. For nuclear energy, both Malaysia and Vietnam cancelled activities in nuclear power plant investments. Meanwhile, Indonesia still lists nuclear as alternative energy in the coal phase-out. For geothermal, Indonesia and Malaysia are currently tapping into their geothermal potential by prioritising geothermal as one of their primary renewable energy sources. From all three countries, Vietnam has succesfully underwent a solar energy boom. From only 134 MW in 2018, Vietnam’s cumulative installed solar PV capacity will hit 4.4 gigawatts (GW) in 2019 (ASEAN, 2022). For Malaysia, the deployment of renewables is supported by a regulatory framework consistently stipulated by the authorities, including SEDA, state utility companies and Energy Commission. More specifically, the primary data and research interviews collected for this paper suggest that the moderate growth of renewable energy demand in Indonesia and Vietnam was caused by the unfavourable regulatory framework, i.e., the low export value of net metering for rooftop PV in Indonesia. Unlike in Malaysia, there is an absence of green electricity tariff in Indonesia and Vietnam for regular customers of utility companies. This existing framework makes it difficult for RE100 companies to achieve their renewable energy goals in Indonesia and Malaysia. The traditional electricity grid systems in both countries make the purchase of renewable electricity almost impossible. Adequately responding to renewable energy issues is an important indicator of a country’s fast track towards low-carbon society. Many countries have declared commitment to

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Table 9.2 Main policy settings Energy source

Countries in comparison Indonesia

Malaysia

Vietnam

Coal

1. Fuel subsidies for electricity 2. Domestic market obligation, capped coal prices sold at the domestic market

Gradual coal phase-out by not building new coal power plants after 7000 MW of coal power plants’ Power Purchase Agreement will expire by 2033

Gradual coal will decrease by 30% by 2030 in power generation

Nuclear

1. The National Energy General Plan stipulates the road map for nuclear power integration in the national energy development plan 2. The members of parliament supported the development of nuclear power plants in meeting with the government (2015–2019)

Prime Minister in 2020 declared that Malaysia will not build nuclear power plants

National Assembly of Vietnam passed Law on Atomic Energy in 2008 that stipulates activities in the field of nuclear energy, including power plants The investment policy on nuclear was cancelled in 2016

Geothermal

The National Energy General Plan the capacity of national geothermal power plant will reach 8 Giga Watt/GW by 2030 (currently around 2 GW)

The feed-in-tariff (FiT) mechanism allows electricity produced from an indigenous renewable energy source to be sold to authorised power utility companies at a fixed premium price for a specific duration

The National Energy Development Strategy limits the use of geothermal energy as a possible option for power generation

Solar photovoltaic 1. FiT for solar panel systems stipulates that electricity sold to the State Electricity company is valued at 65% of tariff rate 2. Ministry of Industry regulation stipulates the domestic content level of solar panel should be at 40%

1. Feed-in-tariff for rooftop solar panel systems stipulates energy generated back to the grid on a “one-on-one” offset basis; every 1 kilowatt-hour (kWh) exported to the grid will be offset against 1 kWh consumed from the grid (ratio 1:1) 2. Green electricity option

Solar power projects commissioned before mid-2019 can sell their electricity to the state-owned Vietnam Electricity and its subsidiaries at FiT tariff of $93.50 per Megawatt-hour for a 20 year contract

9.4 Comparison Between Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam

133

renewable energy deployment; however, there is limited public’s access to such energy. As high cost of investments is needed to use renewable energy; low-cost alternative for the consumers is important. Studies showed that economic factor is one of the key components in shaping the decision-making process in adopting renewable energy scheme (Sommerfeld et al., 2017). Moreover, access to financing, incentives and financial subsidies for solar panels equipment and cheaper green electricity tariff may increase the acceptance of renewable energy schemes. The absence of subsidies for household electricity users is a common finding in all three countries. Moreover, the public needs a transparent information and processes of renewables. Thus, potential consumers who understand the benefits of renewable energy technology are assumed to be interested in purchasing if there is a certain benefit of compensation in using those technology.

9.4.1 Indonesia Indonesia is the largest manufacturing market in Southeast Asia. The manufacturing industry employs about 14 million people and contributed 20% to GDP. The government has undertaken a number of reforms and introduced incentives to boost manufacturing. The introduction of industrial zones, simplifying bureaucracy and lower energy cost is recent steps to upgrade investment climate. Historically, the main energy source for electrification has been coal. However, a decline in coal reserve forces the transition to a greener energy regime. The government is targeting 23% of renewable energy target by 2025 through the introduction of several procurement schemes, including net metering, green tariff, RECs PLN and biodiesel. Analysis of these schemes is listed below. – The net metering scheme is considered to be uncompetitive with an absence to green financing. Customers of State Electricity Company PLN have the option to self-generate electricity through on-grid rooftop PV systems. This scheme is stipulated in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 49/2018 on Rooftop PV. Under this scheme, customers of PLN can sell the excess electricity generated from solar panels at the rate of 65% of normal tariff rate; however, the government do not include financing or subsidy system for potential adopters. According to one of respondents: The cost of solar panels is too expensive, and the return of investment period is more than 10 years. (Participant 9, 04/2020)

– The access to on-grid net metering is limited for non-PLN customers. This energy system becomes a barrier for those who reside in remote areas without PLN connection and wish to install on-grid rooftop solar PV systems. Moreover, the electricity export rate is considered to be the main barrier in attracting prospective users.

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– The green tariff and RECs are limited for commercial and industrial customers in which the tariff is negotiated directly with PLN.

9.4.2 Malaysia Under the 11th Malaysian Plan (2016–2020), improving wellbeing and enhancing inclusiveness towards an equitable society is seen as a way to utilise energy as a tool to solve socio-economic problems. Despite the success of electrifying the whole nation from 2018, the Malaysian government faced challenges to deliver reliable and affordable electricity supply to consumers. These include dependence on fossil fuels (mainly coal), high consumption growth rate, high fuel price and slow growth in renewable energy. To introduce renewable energy to the market, the government introduced NEM, green tariff, RECs and P2P trading scheme for customers who wish to purchase renewable energy. Analysis of the schemes and response of the market is elaborated below. – Net metering scheme has high potential of adoption due to 1:1 value. Net metering scheme in Malaysia is regulated under Electricity Supply Act 1990 which stipulates the permission of private electricity generation. Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA) Malaysia introduced net metering that allocate excess solar PV generated energy back to the grid on a “one-on-one” offset basis, in early 2019. Every 1 kWh exported to the grid will be offset against 1 kWh consumed from the grid (ratio 1:1). In 2019, the government secured 139 solar rooftop contracts with a total capacity of 25.3 MW. SEDA also introduced solar leasing scheme, allowing consumers to lease and install solar panels at no upfront cost. In addition, interview data suggest that adoption of solar panels, highly depends on income. For me (solar panels) is more on hobby and also better for environment. However, I understand that not everyone can afford it. (Participant 16, 22/6/2020)

– Malaysia encouraged green investors to enter the market by introducing RECs and P2P trading scheme. The Malaysian government launched a marketplace for the trade of RECs, each carrying the value of 1 MWh of renewable energy. The RECs scheme was introduced through the Malaysia Green Attribute Tracking System (mGATS), a platform for retailers and customers to trade energy from renewable sources. In 2019, TNB issued 700,000 RECs that allows customers to choose the renewable sources (wind, solar or hydropower) certifying the purchaser. The REC is sold on international market and has been receive positive response from the buyer market, mostly Fortune 500 and RE100 companies that use RECs as tracking mechanisms for their energy consumptions (Participant 14, 05/2020).

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9.4.3 Vietnam Vietnam attracts foreign investors due to availability of young labour market and multiple free trade agreements, including with the European Union and US. The manufacturing sector employs about 16 million people and global brands such as H & M, Nike and Samsung has invested in the country. – Access to financing and incentives for renewable energy producers is one of the most competitive in Southeast Asia. Foreign investors are able to own 100% of Vietnamese companies including in the energy sector. In addition, renewable energy producers can receive tax reduction or exemption depending on type and location of the projects. Other aspects which make Vietnam attractive for foreign investors are solar investment projects are able to apply for the reduction of land rent, land-use fees and surface water rent for floating solar farms. This openness to foreign investor and international development agencies make Vietnam a competitive market. – Low concern for environmental problems impedes the adoption of renewable energy. According to data interview, Vietnamese nowadays “do not have much concern for the environmental impact of fossil fuels” (Participant 20, 15/6/2020). Moreover, the high cost of installing solar system discourages potential adopters. – In terms of corporate sourcing of renewable energy, currently EVN does not have the option to subscribe renewable electricity. Corporates are opting for installation of solar panels or purchase of international RECs that are widely available mostly from solar and wind energy. RECs from Vietnam renewable energy projects are available via international traders. In the future, the government is exploring to introduce RPS mechanism that set a maximum power capacity for large power generation companies generating renewable energy. Customers purchasing electricity from this scheme will be compensated.

9.5 The Way Forward In this research, the previous section has explained the availability of existing renewable energy procurement schemes in three countries of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. From the analysis, this research concludes that Malaysia and Vietnam are leading the countries in terms of the acceleration of renewables, with reasons below. First, for Malaysia, the deployment of renewables is supported by regulatory framework consistently stipulated by the authorities, including SEDA, state utility companies and Energy Commission. More specifically, the primary data and research interviews collected for this research suggest that the moderate growth of renewable energy demand in Indonesia was caused by an unfavourable regulatory framework,

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i.e., the low export value of net metering in Indonesia. In addition, complex bureaucracy and frequent lack of coordination between the central and local governments in Indonesia complicate the presence of RE100 companies in the country. Second, there is an absence of green electricity tariff in Indonesia and Vietnam for regular customers of utility companies. This absence is not found in Malaysia. Adequately responding to renewable energy issues is an important indicator of a country’s fast track towards low-carbon society. Many countries have declared commitment to renewable energy deployment; however, there is limited public’s access to such energy. As high cost of investments is needed to use renewable energy; low-cost alternative for the consumers is important. Vietnam has been leading the effort to renewables via solar panel projects. The Renewable Electricity Certificates (RECs) are also readily available in Vietnam to purchase by industries wishing to offset their carbon footprints. From a policy perspective, creating a policy environment that facilitates the production and distribution of renewable energy is also linked to public’s acceptance. In particular, the accessibility, affordability and responsibility to the environment are factors that influence acceptance. According to previous studies, community acceptance refers to factors related to distributional and procedural justice (Sovacool & Lakshmi Ratan, 2012). This research findings, therefore, align with arguments that procedural and distributional justice are important and potentially powerful in altering community resistance towards renewable energy technology. Economic factor is one of the key components in shaping the decision-making process on adopting renewable energy schemes. Moreover, access to financing, incentives and financial subsidies for solar panels equipment and cheaper green electricity tariff, may increase the acceptance of renewable energy schemes. The absence of subsidies for household electricity users is a common finding in all three countries. The public needs transparent information regarding the benefit and ways to purchase renewables. Thus, potential procurers who understand the benefits of renewable energy technology are assumed to be interested in purchasing if there is a certain benefit of compensation in using those technology. The importance of benefit was illustrated by the interview results from Indonesia. The policy of renewable energy deployment largely focused on power producers supplying electricity to the national grid. Over the long term, if the policy is shifted towards accessibility of end users, then it can be expected to increase the demand for renewables. Any planned future transition away from fossil fuel, therefore, needs to be supported by strong governance and better-informed citizen.

9.6 Conclusion Southeast Asia is a global manufacturing hub that attracts foreign investors, including those who are looking to utilise renewable energy. This chapter examined the availability of renewable energy procurement schemes in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Drawing from academic literature and interviews, this chapter concluded

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that Malaysia and Vietnam are leading a more attractive investment place for RE100 due to the availability of a green electricity tariff, renewable energy certificates and an attractive net metering scheme. In addition, this chapter concluded that factors such as access to financing and incentives for renewable energy project developers will likely made Vietnam and Malaysia the winner of the race to Net Zero compared to Indonesia.

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Chapter 10

Determinants of Social Acceptance

Abstract This chapter reviews and discusses important findings from the precious chapters that underpin existing patterns of social acceptance in Southeast Asia. This is achieved via the exploration of research focused on the topic as part of a wider investigation in which a pattern is identified across the different case studies. Special attention is paid to the emergent themes of the socio-political-market and community. The chapter then systematically overviews the development of the debate focusing on different elements of energy justice—distributional, procedural and recognition.

10.1 Introduction Studies argue that emerging economies in Southeast Asia have been locked into the fossil-fuel-based energy system, termed carbon lock-in. They asserted that increasing social acceptance of renewable energy technologies could potentially contribute to the achievement of renewable energy targets. This chapter analyses the conditions in which resistance or acceptance towards renewable energy technologies may be provoked or mitigated and proposes strategies to increase acceptance of these technologies. While social acceptance provides a conceptual basis for understanding the elements required to succeed in gathering public acceptance for renewable energy projects, it also generates discussion of and renewed attention to difficulties in aligning energy transition goals with other development agendas. The main findings reveal that socio-political-market and community factors such as regulatory instruments, leadership and government coordination, financing support, environmental impacts and affordability influence the social acceptance of energy sources. Southeast Asia represents one of the very diverse, fastest-growing and attractive markets for investors (The World Bank, 2010). After growth decelerated in 2021 due to the impacts of the COVID-19 lockdown, it has rebounded up to 5% for 2022 (ADB, 2021). The solid economic growth also shapes many aspects of the global economic and energy outlook, including rising fuel demand and facilitating investment in fuel, power supply and energy infrastructure. One common element is that policymakers across different countries have been intensifying their efforts to ensure a secure, affordable and more sustainable pathway for the energy sector, which translated © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_10

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into policy actions to facilitate investment in fuel, power supply and infrastructure (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2015). However, IEA (2015) also warned that rising fuel demand in Southeast Asia had made it on the verge of becoming a net importer of fossil fuels for the first time. Why is phasing out fossil fuels, namely coal, in Southeast Asia so difficult? Studies proposed the possibility of a carbon lock-in (the economy is dominated by carbon-intensive technology (Erickson et al., 2015; Mattauch et al., 2015; Schmidt & Marschinski, 2009). Literature offers several strategies for transitioning away from carbon lock-in. Escaping the lock-in conditions needs to be generated externally with exogenous forces (Unruh, 2002). The forces include internal factors (Janipour et al., 2020), culture of industry regime, (Geels, 2014), actors with high leverage effects to influence policy changes (Trencher et al., 2020) and energy transition discourses (Buschmann & Oels, 2019). A common theme is that the literature seemed to have paid little focus to the role of civil society in generating carbon lock-out. Carbon lock-out starts with a policy change. In the definition of carbon lock-in, the “economy” is the object of change; carbon lock-out sets out to trace particular conditions that can constitute and construct carbon-intensive energy sources as a policy problem. In emergent democracies (such as most countries in Southeast Asia), government is under considerable pressure to deliver on policy performance to broaden support for political survival (Dahlberg et al., 2015; Doorenspleet, 2012; Marien & Hooghe, 2011; Reich, 1999; van der Loos et al., 2020; Yap, 2019). This implies that policy prioritisation follows popular public opinion and market demand. Meanwhile, policy prioritisation in emerging democracies follows development agenda such as poverty reduction and economic growth (Asian Development Bank, 2018) that often are not aligned with energy transition goals (Lima & Gupta, 2013). Thus, the planning and implementation of energy policy relates closely to the broader trend of rising energy consumption and fossil fuels prioritisation in energy policy (for example energy subsidy that encourages fossil fuel consumption remains popular in Indonesia). Therefore, a different approach may be required in order to escape carbon lock-in. Current social science research suggests social acceptance, in the form of consent, support and acceptance to new energy technology, can mitigate resistance and accelerate energy transition (Batel, 2020; Devine-Wright et al., 2017; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). A focus on social acceptance in various energy technology in Southeast Asia can therefore identify the conditions required to succeed in gathering acceptance for renewable energy projects.

10.2 Reflecting on Justice Concerns Going beyond the Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) explanation, this section details social acceptance reflected in various justice discourses: distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition. A wide range of scholars have identified these elements of justice as factors that can explain social acceptance (Tabi & Wüstenhagen,

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2017b; Velasco-Herrejon & Bauwens, 2020; Walker & Baxter, 2017). Across the five cases studies, there are emergent themes of cost, geography, health and economy. Drawing from materials and insights presented in the case studies, this section now discusses how elements of justice manifest in the case study results.

10.2.1 Distributional Justice Distributional justice involves the perception of fairness in the distribution of cost, or how the hazards and externalities of the energy system are disseminated throughout a society (Sovacool et al., 2016). Distributional injustice might arise from a combination of inequalities in income, energy prices and geographical locations (Neuhoff et al., 2013; Steckel et al., 2021; Yenneti & Day, 2016). In this research, issues of distributional justice have been explored across the five case studies, with consideration paid to findings from previous studies. To begin, Table 10.2 summarised the perception of justice reflected in the case studies’ findings (Table 10.1). The government showed its intention to accommodate technological advances in renewable energy when it introduced the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No.49/ 2018 on Rooftop Photovoltaic Solar Systems. This policy allows customers of the State Electricity Company, PLN, to install solar panels at home, connect to the PLN national grid and export excess energy to PLN with an export rate valued at 65% of the normal electricity tariff (in other countries, such as Malaysia, the export rate value is 100%). This much anticipated regulation has drawn criticism from both potential users of solar panels and solar panel industry associations. For this particular scheme, distributional justice manifests in two ways: financial constraints and lack of access to renewable energy. The absence of government subsidies and funding to procure solar panel systems means that this particular technology is only available for wealthy citizens and therefore serves to exacerbate inequalities in access to renewable energy. In Chap. 4, I identified issues faced by consumers in adopting solar panel systems under the current government scheme, such as high capital costs, Table 10.1 Case study findings Case studies Solar photovoltaic system

Electricity Nuclear power charging stations

Green electricity

Extractive industries

Results indicated equity in electricity pricing and environmental concerns influenced respondents’ acceptance

The government recognised the vulnerability of street vendors in the electricity system

The most important factors that influenced acceptance are ecological impact and price

Distributional justice and recognition justice emerged as main concerns

The distribution of risk (safety) is the main concern regarding acceptance

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Table 10.2 Perceptions of distributional justice across five case studies Distributional justice principles

Definition

Solar panels

Electricity charging stations

Nuclear power

Green electricity

Extractive industries

Availability

Sufficient energy resources

X

O

O

X

O

Affordability

The cost of energy resources is affordable for all stakeholders

X

O

O

X

O

Accessibility

Access to energy resources

X

O

O

X

O

Sustainability

Energy O resources should be depleted with consideration for precaution and livelihoods

O

O

O

X

Intra-generational equity

All people X have a right to reasonably access energy services

X

X

X

X

Inter-generational equity

Future X generations have a right to consume energy resources undisturbed by the damage our energy systems inflict on the world today

O

X

X

X

long-term return on investment and lack of information, as well as institutional issues such as the limited role of PLN and the absence of government financing mechanisms (Setyawati, 2020). The reduction in the potential profitability of solar panels makes this scheme less attractive than schemes in other countries, where customers can apply for various benefits, such as free solar system installation in Italy or a solar bonus scheme in addition to the export net tariff in Australia. The absence of financial

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incentives or government subsidies for installers of solar panels makes the technology unaffordable for most citizens. According to the National Statistics in 2020, the average monthly income of the population in February 2020 was USD10 (in the agricultural sector), USD11 (in non-agricultural sectors, for example the construction industry), USD42 (for small stall owners) and USD106 (for office workers). Overall, the national average net monthly income was US42, less than the national average per capita expenditure of USD84 per month. The absence of financing or subsidies for solar panels means that people are required to pay up front for photovoltaic systems, at a cost of USD2700, or 5 years’ salary. This financial barrier to solar panel uptake has been widely identified by a range of scholars (Alsabbagh, 2019; Burke et al., 2019; Lau et al., 2016). While marginalisation is evident in the case of solar energy policy, there is a socially positive form of energy distribution: electricity charging stations (discussed in Chap. 5). Electricity charging stations (ECS) are electricity facilities developed by the government to provide safe electricity connections for general public use, and specifically for street vendor communities. Before these stations were established, the vendors were dependent on illegal connections, retrieving electricity from unauthorised extensions from the power lines of nearby houses. Since street vending areas are not recognised as legal habitual residences, the vendors were unable to access electricity within these areas. With ECS, users can connect to and purchase electricity without registering with the State Electricity Company, PLN. The presence of these stations indicates that the government recognises the rights of street vendor communities. Meanwhile, participant observation revealed that the vendors pay monthly electricity bills collectively as a community, so the poorest vendors can pay lower costs to cover the cost of operation, illustrating evidence of the benefit to marginalised communities. In Chap. 6, research on the social acceptance of nuclear power revealed that health and safety are the main issues of concern for respondents. This evaluation is supported the analysis of a national survey (n = 4000) distributed in 2016 and a provincial survey in West Kalimantan (n = 600) distributed in 2018. Despite these health and safety concerns, it was found that half of the respondents in each survey were in favour of developing nuclear power plants. Respondents believed that the development of nuclear power plants would diminish power outages and reduce electricity costs, hence, increasing their access to resources. In addition, it was also found that respondents who recognised the benefits of nuclear power (benefits to themselves, the economy and the environment) were more likely to agree to the development of nuclear power plants. This assertion both follows and develops the work of a range of researchers who suggest that more positive attitudes might arise from greater knowledge of the benefits of nuclear power plants by local people (Jenkins et al., 2017; Venables et al., 2012). In Chap. 7, articulations of distributional justice emerged as concerns about the price of, and access to, green electricity. In this context, the availability and cost of this green electricity influenced the respondents’ willingness to pay. Similarly, research by (Sagebiel, 2017; Sagebiel et al., 2014) in Germany also found a cost attribute to be important in examining consumers’ willingness to pay for electricity.

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Differences in sustainability aside, responses to coal and geothermal are strikingly similar. For coal, articulations of distributional justice did not just focus on the coal mining facility itself, but instead manifested as concerns over changes in the landscape and natural habitat. For example, NGO reports refer to the abandoned coal mines and their impact on community safety and local biodiversity. Similarly, local residents cited the loss of forest cover, soil contamination and air pollution, among others. Furthermore, government representatives focused on issues of jobs, energy security and local economic prosperity as positive examples of the provision of justice, without reference to the wider critique of the mining industry.

10.2.2 Procedural Justice Studies suggest that perceived procedural injustice can be the driving force behind local opposition to renewable energy projects (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). In my study, compared to the perceptions of the programs and regulations’ outcome, study participants in the solar panel and geothermal/coal case studies were less satisfied with the process, especially in terms of their degree of participation and their interactions with government representatives. Even though government respondents stressed the importance of citizen engagement in renewable energy generation and in areas of future development of, in particular, the goals to achieve energy transition, many participants were dissatisfied with the government efforts to make the process open. Table 10.3 shows that results for selected issues related to perceptions of procedural justice. These data indicate possible explanations for local resistance against energy projects. Articulations of procedural justice in the case of solar panels follows a similar pattern with geothermal and coal, as the study participants were dissatisfied with the procedures of decision-makings. Similarly, NGO respondents criticised the lack of procedural engagement for communities living in close proximity to mining areas. They also cited concerns over the exclusion of individuals and groups from consultation processes. However, government respondents emphasised the mechanisms were in place to support local economy, and the need to keep pace with rising energy demand, while adding that the situation is sufficiently urgent to call for the building of new coal power plants. In other cases, study participants were relatively satisfied with the procedures. For example, in the nuclear power study case, participants agreed that the procedures by which nuclear power plants’ locations were determined were fair and the procedures for public participations were fair. Indeed, (Simcock, 2016) indicated that participation of all stakeholders may not be feasible depending on the type of project decision being made. In a centralised energy system, it is unlikely that policymakers will empower communities to make democratic decisions about whether a scheme

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Table 10.3 Perceptions of procedural justice across five case studies Procedural justice principles

Definition

Due process

Solar panels

Electricity charging stations

Nuclear power

Green electricity

Extractive industries

The government X respect due process and human rights in their development and use of energy programs

O

O

X

X

Transparency and accountability

All people have X access to the information about energy and the environment and transparent, and accountable forms of energy decision-making

O

O

X

X

Democratic participation

All people are X able to participate in energy decision-making and planning to the extent they desired

X

X

X

X

is allowed to proceed. In order for energy programs to be implemented in a procedurally just manner, stakeholders’ normative expectations should be considered in the policymaking process. This would serve to demonstrate fairness and legitimacy in the implementation of the programs in relation to the local community.

10.2.3 Justice as Recognition In energy systems where democratic decision-making is limited, justice as recognition becomes central. If people are unable to participate in making decisions about energy, then there should be a recognition of which stakeholder groups are positively or negatively affected by energy programs. Justice as recognition is often less studied than other aspects of justice (McCauley et al., 2016), implying that the people who receive an unfairly small distribution of the earth’s resources are not only poor, but also marginalised, and that they suffer from a lack of recognition, which in turn leads to various forms of social exclusion (Hurlbert & Rayner, 2018). This section discusses how, in the context of the energy programs studied in this work, policymakers and private sector groups were perceived to hold more

146 Table 10.4 Perceptions of justice as recognition across five case studies

10 Determinants of Social Acceptance Recognition to Solar panels

• Households’ consumers • Industrial and commercial consumers • Future generations

Electricity Charging Stations • Street vendor communities Nuclear Power

• Communities living in proximity to nuclear facilities • Future generations • General population

Green Electricity

• Consumers of State Electricity Company • Non-subscriber of State Electricity Company

Geothermal and Coal

• Local communities, especially children • Workers • Future generations

responsibility for the provision of justice as recognition than other actors in the energy system. Table 10.4 outlines themes of “justice for whom?” which were raised by findings in this research. In the solar energy case study, my findings revealed that solar panel deployment will impact current consumers in terms of having an additional renewable energy supply and a greener lifestyle. This echoes data from green electricity and electricity charging station studies concerning consumers of electricity who are impacted by these energy programs. In the case of electricity charging stations, Indonesian law holds that street vendor communities possess the same procedural rights as any other group and like others, they are formally entitled to energy under the Indonesian constitution. The results of other case studies are more nuanced. For instance, the NGO respondents asserted that the impact of coal mining on local communities needs to be recognised. These local communities face a greater risk of exposure to soil contamination and air pollution, thus highlighting the potential impacts on health. This concern was also expressed by survey respondents in the nuclear case study, where health and safety concerns were cited as reasons to oppose the development of nuclear power plants. Communities expressed concerns about a greater risk of exposure to radioactive contamination and negative health externalities. To achieve the recognition of justice advocated the implementation of energy programs should allow for consensual decision-making on matters impacting the environment and energy generation for local communities (Schlosberg, 2004). Should these steps be taken, an appropriate remedy for the societal and environmental impacts of infrastructure development will naturally follow.

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10.3 Emergent Themes in Case Study Comparison This section reflects upon the recurring variables, in terms of justice, in the results of this study. The findings show that while a consideration of distributional and procedural justice is necessary, without contemplating the element of recognition justice, it cannot be sufficient. Above all, this research indicates that people’s concerns about potential ecological impacts, availability, price and recognition parity are important determinants of social acceptance. Across the five case studies, there were both similarities and differences in articulations of justice that influenced social acceptance. The nature of energy sources, generation activities and the ecological footprint unique to the particular energy source influenced how communities perceived social acceptance. For instance, solar energy and nuclear power, which have lower carbon footprints than coal (Pehl et al., 2017), were met with positive acceptance. Despite concerns about safety playing a central role in acceptance of nuclear power, the majority of respondents agreed that nuclear power deployment could increase the availability of electricity in terms of stabilising the electricity connection, lowering electricity prices and preventing power outages. This research also found that customers are willing to pay more to upgrade from the current default electricity to a more environmentally friendly electricity mix, mirroring a similar finding that was identified in a study in Germany (Kaenzig et al., 2013). Additional services from the State Electricity Company proved to be of lower importance at the time of the study. The value of eco-labels for electricity products may, for example, be recognised by customers and introduced by the government to add higher value to environmentally friendly energy products. Yet, another important finding of this research is that large-scale energy infrastructure is perceived as a disturbance by local communities. Local residents living in close proximity to planned geothermal facilities have protested against their development, citing possible contamination of water and soil. Similarly, coal mining operations negatively impact the surrounding physical and social environment, by means of deforestation, environmental degradation and air pollution. Therefore, justice as recognition, in the form of community sovereignty, economic benefits and cultural protection, is required to influence citizens’ acceptance of new energy programs. This research additionally identified the impact of some demographic variables on the social acceptance of new energy programs. A preference for minimising the ecological impact correlates with education and wealth, supporting the findings of (Burke et al., 2019). This suggests that the majority of educated respondents prefer energy sources to be deployed in an environmentally friendly, responsible way. At the socio-political level, the way international, national and local levels respond to energy technology opportunities determine which solutions will prevail under differing socio-political circumstances (Devine-Wright et al., 2017). Regulatory instruments, policy leadership and the coordination between national-local governments are key drivers of social acceptance. In the case of Indonesia, coal energy is being prioritised for meeting the energy demand of the domestic market. Here,

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coal enjoys a significant advantage over other energy sources as the State Electricity Company will rely increasingly on coal as a cheap way to generate electricity in many provinces (Dutu, 2016). The recent Indonesian ban on thermal coal exports has proven that Indonesia has almost maximised its coal reserves, and therefore, need another energy strategy that does not rely exclusively on coal. At the same level, the policy of solar photovoltaic was funded by the state-owned electricity company in each country. The implementation of the policy would create a certain level of opportunities for all societies to access solar energy as a cleaner form of energy. FiT/Net metering scheme in Malaysia is regulated under Electricity Supply Act 1990, which stipulates the permission of private electricity generation. Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA) Malaysia introduced net metering that allocates excess solar PV generated energy back to the grid on a “one-on-one” offset basis, in early 2019. Every 1 kWh exported to the grid will be offset against 1 kWh consumed from the grid (ratio 1:1). The government also introduced a solar leasing scheme, allowing consumers to lease and install solar panels at no upfront cost, which makes solar panels more affordable for the consumers. However, in several cases, political commitments may hinder the transition to deploying solar energy or other cleaner sources of energy (Mori, 2020). Meanwhile, the coordination of nationalgovernments is key in archipelagic countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. For example, geothermal policy in Indonesia is implemented via a complex governmental system that must abide by all national and locally established regulations (ADB, 2015). At market level, key stakeholders in the case of wind energy in Austria have stressed the importance of including relevant infrastructure that affects the sociopolitical and market acceptance. Similar to (Höltinger et al., 2016), this research identified infrastructure preparedness as one of the key drivers of market acceptance, in addition to the impact to the labour market, the presence of technical skills, financing support and material availability. Indeed, infrastructure preparedness is essential in the distribution of energy sources. The coal power plants that have been present since the early independence days most prominently in Indonesia have established infrastructure that was intended to meet the demand of the national electricity grid. Vietnam attracts foreign investors due to availability of a young labour market and multiple free trade agreements, including with the European Union and the US. The manufacturing sector employs about 16 million people and global brands such as H & M, Nike and Samsung have invested in the country. Vietnam is also an attractive market for foreign investors, who are able to own 100% of Vietnamese companies, including the energy sector. In addition, renewable energy producers can receive tax reductions or exemptions depending on the type and location of the projects. More specifically, solar investment projects are able to apply for the reduction of land rent, land-use fees and surface water rent for floating solar farms. In the case of nuclear energy, the lack of technical skills needed to develop nuclear power plants and financing support from the private/public sectors hinders its market acceptance. Similarly, high exploration costs, the lack of economic incentives and the lack of business models were identified as barriers to geothermal power generation in

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Malaysia (ERIA, 2016). These barriers were also found in Indonesia, as mentioned by interview respondents from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. At community level, the drivers of social acceptance were quite similar for largescale infrastructure facilities such as geothermal, coal and nuclear. The drivers were locality, environmental impacts and economic development. It is also important to note that from the interview with representatives from the Government of Indonesia, the respondents highlighted that geothermal exploration is often met with resistance from local communities. Apart from environmental issues such as pollution, there are also issues of customary land rights versus surface land rights’ holders. In contrast, coal energy is largely accepted at the community level because it can create jobs for the local populations and boost the local economies, findings that were echoed in previous literature (Sharpe & Martinez-Fernandez, 2021). Coal can also improve the affordability and availability of energy to the consumers of state-owned companies that utilise a national electricity grid system. Apart from these frequently mentioned factors, coal can also become a source of local income from the transformation of a coal mining city into a tourist attraction (Armis & Kanegae, 2020). Negative environmental impacts can also potentially reduce the community acceptance of energy technology, indicated in the results in the study case. Based on the results, not only large-scale infrastructure facilities can pose threats to biodiversity, but also solar photovoltaic in the form of waste solar panels (Gautam et al., 2021). In addition, there were concerns from the community that perceive solar panels might further divide the social class—who can afford solar panels and who cannot; and the way in which the government disseminates information on solar panels that should be informative (Do et al., 2020; Setyawati, 2020; Solangi et al., 2015). The similarity was that there was a low level of awareness among respondents about solar photovoltaic energy. From a policy perspective, creating a policy environment that facilitates the production and distribution of renewable energy is also linked to the public’s acceptance. In particular, accessibility, affordability and responsibility to the environment are factors that influence acceptance. According to previous studies, community acceptance refers to factors related to distributional and procedural justice (Tabi & Wüstenhagen, 2017a). Our findings, therefore, align with arguments that procedural and distributional justice is important and potentially powerful in altering community resistance towards renewable energy technology. Interestingly, it seems that nuclear energy received some level of community acceptance in this research. In a study in Malaysia, the respondents gave the impression to consider nuclear energy as an integral part of the impending energy mix; out of 40.10% of respondent agreed that nuclear energy will make a substantial future contribution to reliable and secure supplies of electricity in the future (Misnon et al., 2017). In a public survey conducted by the Indonesian nuclear agency in 2016 (n = 4000), the majority of respondents support nuclear power because they mentioned that nuclear might make electricity prices cheaper. Respondents also expressed concerns about the safety issues. However, they think that the benefits outweigh the risks. In a study on Vietnam, although respondents opposed the building of nuclear power plants due to the country’s perceived lack of expertise, they mentioned that their

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countries should develop nuclear power facilities if neighbouring countries in SEA were to build nuclear power plants (Ho et al., 2019). Addressing the identified drivers is key to increasing social acceptance specific to this study case and can also be applied in other settings. For example, the affordability and availability of coal might be the main drivers of high social acceptance in other coal-dependent countries, such as Mongolia. Aligning energy transition goals with development agendas can be done through several phases. Phase one is a bottom-up management approach that collects community perspectives on their ideas of feasible low-carbon energy projects. The second phase may involve the private sector at the market level to identify challenges and collaborate solutions with the government. Lastly, the political commitments to phase-out coal from the highest government levels, for example, the commitment in Malaysia and Vietnam, is key to accelerating the energy transition.

10.4 Implications to Energy Transition Social acceptance theory focuses on issues such as support from key stakeholders, the dedication of policymakers and public attitudes with regard to new energy technology (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). The application of the findings of social acceptance studies is useful for researchers, policymakers and the general public. For example, in designing effective customer segmentation strategies, raising public awareness and meeting global sustainable development objectives via the use of technological innovations in renewable energy. The findings of this study have implications to energy transition in the following ways. First, transforming the Indonesian energy system would create desirable opportunities for achieving energy transition. Low-carbon innovations in the household sector, such as solar panels and green electricity, have immense opportunities to deliver positive co-benefits. Solar panels can reduce household energy consumption, lower carbon emissions and add power from generated electricity. Meanwhile, green electricity can invite household participation in the deployment of low-carbon energy sources. Nuclear and geothermal power plants have lower carbon emissions than coal power and are able to add supply to the energy network. Electricity charging stations can enhance accessibility and affordability of electricity for marginalised communities in urban areas. These new avenues of energy service could reveal new routes to eliminating energy poverty. Second, these transformations come with complex risks that need to be managed effectively. These risks especially concern the recognition of energy justice principles, such as: affordability, sustainability and equal distribution of the benefits and costs of the energy system. Affordability problems can be addressed by ensuring that energy programs are available for all segments of society, including those who are less advantaged. Sustainability principles can be upheld by fostering environmental compliance from mining industries and rehabilitating ecosystems to ensure environmental quality. To ensure an equal distribution of benefits and cost in the

10.5 Conclusion

151

energy system, the three justice concepts, distributional, procedural and justice as recognition can be applied in energy decision-making. Moreover, a comparative analysis of renewable energy procurement with Vietnam and Malaysia indicates that institutional constraints, the dominance of coal and the absence of renewable energy incentives for household consumers, mean that Indonesia lags behind in the race towards low-carbon transition. There is no financing or subsidy for the purchase of solar panel systems, and green electricity has not yet been introduced. The vibrant renewable energy markets in Vietnam and Malaysia are attracting foreign investors who are looking for investor-friendly renewable energy policies.

10.5 Conclusion The broad picture that emerges across the case studies is that social acceptance is predicated on justice as recognition alongside other attributes, including procedural justice and distributional justice. Following an examination of articulations of distributional justice, this study introduces the emergent themes of cost, geography, health and economy. Under the tenets of procedural justice, I discussed the emerging concerns of finance, access, participation and inclusiveness. Justice as recognition calls for greater attention to be placed on the implications of energy programs for all stakeholders, including minority communities, households and commercial consumers. This chapter discusses the implications for energy transition, including prioritising households in the promotion of renewable energy and Table 10.5 Social acceptance criteria of energy program Degree of acceptability

High

Medium

Low

Distributional justice

A fair distribution of costs and benefits, in terms of affordability, accessibility, environmental/health burden and equal values on lives

Partially fair distribution of costs and benefits

Disproportionate distribution of costs and benefits

Procedural justice

Active stakeholders’ Partial engagement to engagement at all levels, a specified extent to the extent that each stakeholder desired Treatment with respect and dignity

Constraints of engagement in policy decisions

Justice as recognition

Equal recognition of all people

Exploitation of people and violation of people’s rights

Partial recognition of local communities

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managing risk to achieve a just energy transition that considers energy justice principles, including sustainability, affordability and equal distribution of the benefits and costs of the energy system. In addition, a comparison with Vietnam and Malaysia suggests that renewable energy programs in Indonesia are not sufficiently attracting potential consumers due to limited incentives formulated by the government. All in all, I have suggested three main criteria with which to assess the feasibility of the social acceptance of energy programs: elements of distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition (See Table 10.5). The criteria were then synthesised within the social acceptance framework that resulted from the discussion in the previous sections (See Fig. 10.1). The environment in which social acceptance is expected is categorised into three levels: socio-political, market and community. In each environment, the conditions related to justice dimensions are specified. Therefore, social acceptance associated with renewable or non-renewable energy sources may increase or decrease depending on the environment and presence of particular justice factors. The framework also illustrates the causal relationship model that includes variables that benefit the introduction of new energy technologies and justice tools in order to promote acceptance. The model consists of perceived distributional justice, procedural justice and recognition justice.

References

153 Socio-political environment

Procedural justice Transparency and accountability All people have access to the information and accountable forms of energy decision-making

Democratic participation All people are able to participate in energy decision-making and planning to the extent they desired

Availability Sufficient energy resources

Affordability The cost of energy resources is affordable for all stakeholders

Accessibility Access to energy resources is available for all stakeholders

Sustainability All people have a right to reasonably access energy services

Intra-generational equity Energy resources should be depleted with consideration for precaution and livelihoods

Inter-generational equity Future generations have a right to consume energy resources undisturbed by the damage our energy systems inflict on the world today

Due process The government respect due process and human rights in their development and use of energy programs

Distributional justice

Market environment Proper business models Investment costs Payback period

Recognition justice Community environment

Recognition to the marginalised, underrepresented, rural communities, future generations and general public

Fig. 10.1 Social acceptance framework integrating elements of energy justice, modified from Sovacool et al. (2017) and Delina and Sovacool (2018)

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Chapter 11

Conclusion

Abstract This chapter provides a concluding summary of the key findings of the book in the context of its study purpose and objective and recommends possible avenues for policy and future research.

11.1 Introduction A study of energy transition might be taken as a promising concept to accelerate emission reduction. However, success has thus far proven elusive. Fossil fuel still makes up the majority of the developing world’s energy use. Globally, countries have committed to Nationally Determined Contributions, net zero and sustainable energy transitions; however, action needs to be accelerated. Governments and industries that rely on fossil fuel consumption complain that energy security and economic growth might be interrupted. It is therefore legitimate to ask how the energy transition needs to be aligned with economic goal and designed to reach effectiveness. To answer this question, this study develops an analytic framework to measure the indicators of the social acceptance context at the local level, which in turn measures the prospect of energy transition performance with a rich set of information. Indicators are defined as a set of principles to track overall progress to achieve fair and equitable access to resources and technologies, account for distributive, procedural and recognition justice, in decision-making relating to energy system. Four critical factors determine the level of realisation of social acceptance objective. These are equity in electricity pricing, environmental concerns, recognition of vulnerability and distribution of risk and benefits. Compared to the social acceptance in the European countries’ study cases, it can be observed that empirical evidence suggests an immediate contrast. The European study cases emphasised on local involvement in sitting decisions for the relative success in implementation (Toke et al., 2008). The most obvious area of contrast between Europe and Indonesia, apart from their energy consumption per capita, is the fact that little form of democracy is present in the Indonesia’s (and other Southeast Asian countries’) energy system. The electricity market is dominated by the ownership and management of the state. For most Southeast Asian countries, state © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1_11

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involvement is still the norm. The state owns the grid and is responsible for running the grid. This backdrop influences the restriction with which Indonesian citizens can participate in energy decision-making. Although environmental concerns were repeatedly mentioned in the case studies’ findings, it only serves as indirect determinant of sustainable consumption behaviour. The argument is not that Indonesian society is incapable of playing a role in tackling climate change, but that inclusive participation will mean changing the current energy regime, the economy, political behaviour, political culture and the functioning of political institutions. It is also interesting to note that the concept used in the Indonesian energy transition framework is “just transition”, defined by the International Labor Organization as “greening the economy in a way that is as fair and inclusive as possible to everyone concerned, creating decent work opportunities and leaving no one behind”. For Government of Indonesia, just transition means emphasising on the people’s welfare, economic growth, affordable electricity price and the stability of the labour market, rather than focusing on the technological transition, justice or the coal phaseout. This is different with the definition of just transition proposed by energy justice scholars, who taken the concept of equity and fairness from Amartya Sen. Just transition will also be understood differently by the private sectors operating in the oil and gas, mining or the power sectors. For them, definition of “just” will likely be tied with profitability, sustainability, survivability and resilience of the supply chains.

11.2 Social Acceptance and the Critical Factors Much of the debate over energy system change has centred on the questions of “who wins?” and “who loses?”. How does energy transition bring equal benefit and how does the loss be compensated equally? It seems that one of the main reasons that Indonesia is lagging behind in the race for decarbonisation is that it still maintains the traditional top-down energy decision-making processes. As discussed in Chap. 3, there is limited participation of local governments in energy decision-making. The energy system is also centralised to a national grid where the main provider of electricity is the State Electricity Company. As such, the scope for individual political actors to accelerate the energy transition appears to be smaller than in Western countries where there the market is liberalised. There is an argument that in a liberalised environment, the costs of ambitious climate policy goals will be increasingly obvious to energy customers and political support will be tougher to achieve than with stronger state intervention in the energy market (Pollitt, 2012). However, the liberalisation of the electricity market may play a supplementary role to mitigate renewable energy intermittency, which in turn should promote renewable energy development (Gao et al., 2018). Coal is currently the principal power generation source in Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia. In Indonesia, the energy policy and regulations still favour the fossil fuel industries, such as domestic market obligation or the domestic price cap on coal. The monopolistic nature of Indonesia’s electricity landscape has been criticised to be

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inefficient and does not take into account the depleting of domestic fuel resources and does not consider long-term benefits such as environmental sustainability (Maulidia et al., 2019). Therefore, the proposal is to open the market to more participants, which will give more stability to the electricity supply and make market prices more competitive. As for Malaysia and Vietnam, both countries have been supporting the development of a regulatory framework for the deployment of renewables. Both countries are also applying a centralised energy market in which energy decisionmaking is conducted in a top-down process. The key lesson from the Vietnamese case is that there has been strong political and public support to publicly motivate the adoption of solar and wind power (Do et al., 2021). The manifestation of justice in social acceptance is reflected in the form of distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition. Specifically, the different sets of respondents from two case studies, solar panel systems and green electricity, expressed concern regarding the costs associated with the technology. This finding emerges in resemblance to other social acceptance studies, which identified price as one of the most important factors in influencing social acceptance. Meanwhile, findings from the geothermal and nuclear case studies indicate a similarity in articulations of energy justice. The data reveals concerns over the impact on health and the environment of each of these methods of energy generation, in line with previous studies that have explored large infrastructure development (Petrova, 2013; Uji et al., 2021). In terms of procedural justice, the findings indicate that this particular element of justice is rather constrained by the current centralised energy system. Above all, this research indicates that while consideration of procedural and distributional justice is necessary; it is not sufficient to ensure social acceptance without considering justice as recognition. Following an introduction to the background of the energy system in Indonesia, Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 analysed social acceptance in the following case studies: solar photovoltaic systems, electricity charging stations, nuclear power, green electricity and extractive industries (coal and geothermal). Four common themes were found in the case studies, they are: equity in electricity pricing, environmental concerns, recognition of vulnerability and distribution of risk and benefits. Equity in electricity pricing is the most relevant critical factor in the social acceptance concept. Equity in electricity pricing can be defined as the affordability of energy costs that should not be more than 10 percent of the income. The fact is that it impacts several elements of social acceptance attainment: affordability, accessibility and availability of energy services. In Indonesia, since energy service is considered to be not affordable for all citizens; a national subsidy system is in place to ensure that fair and equitable benefit-sharing takes place. However, the subsidy system is causing a burden on the state’s budget and encourages the overconsumption of resources (Burke & Kurniawati, 2018). One group of scholars propose key ingredients to induce positive social tipping dynamics, such as “removing fossil-fuel subsidies, incentivising decentralised energy generation, building carbon neutral cities, divesting from assets linked to fossil fuels, revealing the moral implications of fossil fuels, strengthening climate education and engagement and disclosing greenhouse

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gas emissions information” (Otto et al., 2020). From the case studies, equity in electricity pricing is reflected in different ways. In solar energy case study, it can be observed that only people in the higher income bracket can afford solar photovoltaic systems, thus renewable energy use is limited and not available for all citizens. The support for nuclear energy was given under the possibility that nuclear may make electricity prices cheaper. Meanwhile, economic motivators were the strongest of the themes with the most frequent response from green electricity case study participants for purchasing green electricity being the lowest price. Environmental concerns play an important role in the attainment of social acceptance. Environmental concerns emerged as a recurring social theme in the case study of solar panels, green electricity and extractive industries. Some participants oppose the operation of coal and geothermal facilities because both cause major environmental damage to the current and future generations. The green electricity case study shows the environmental motivator as one of the strongest factors influencing respondents’ choice in accepting green electricity. In the solar panel study case, the major variables influencing customer decisions to install solar panels were “saving electricity bill” and “supporting clean energy and environment”. Recognition of vulnerability is another aspect of social acceptance, one that mainly impacts the technology development phase. The recognition of the most affected by energy technology can mitigate the societal resistance and risk arising from the changes brought by new infrastructure development. This factor is especially relevant in energy programs that require major infrastructure developments, including in nuclear, geothermal and coal operating facilities. Differing types of social acceptance influencing factors were found in the solar panel study case where this theme is hardly mentioned by the participants. The distribution of risk and benefits also impacts the social acceptance of energy programs. Different from economic motivation, the distribution of risk and benefits relates to the energy programs being fair, just and impartial. The case studies have taught us key lessons about opportunities to include the dimension of justice in energy program planning processes. As the discussion of the street vendors’ electricity access in Chap. 5 illustrated, the electricity system does not distribute benefits and harms equally among the stakeholders affected. The energy program analysed in this chapter, in this case, electricity charging stations, may provide opportunities for street vendors to access renewable energy. The subsequent chapters, Chap. 6 explored the social acceptance of the development of nuclear power plants by both communities and parliamentary members. The results show that both the general public and members of parliament members strongly accept nuclear development, which holds significant implications for the future trend of nuclear energy adoption in Indonesia. The study also revealed concerns about the health and safety of communities living in proximity to the proposed nuclear facilities development, indicating risk perception as one of the main factors that may have influences on public acceptance, replicating finding in other studies on nuclear acceptance (Chung & Kim, 2018; Nam et al., 2021; Ram Mohan & Namboodhiry, 2020; Wang et al., 2019).

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11.3 Gaining Acceptance of Renewables There is considerable evidence to say that it may be the people rather than national governments that can precipitate an energy transition tipping point. As an entity, the national government is constrained by the centralised regulatory framework and traditional energy system which depends on fossil fuel production facilities. This is because the national energy mandate is not to move to a low-carbon economy, but to ensure affordable energy supplies, energy security and sovereignty as stipulated in the Constitution. Energy is nevertheless a highly contested political issue. It has become a powerful discourse in public information campaigns during the election. It has also shaped the national as well as local economies in coal mining regions. How then, can we accelerate energy transition? I suggest several strategies in order to empower the people to take a more active role in energy decision-making. First, targeting renewable energy campaigns and information to a wider set of audiences, tailored to each demographic target may increase public involvement in the decision and planning process for renewable energy plants and increase social acceptance of the projects. It is important to note that recognising the existing diversity among stakeholders needs to be recognised and valued and that the community needs to be empowered to establish mutual learning processes that eventually support improved decision-making (Toke et al., 2008). Given that the case study demonstrated shared interest among participants towards renewable energy use, regardless of their gender, educational background, social economic status and demographic characteristics, tailoring government-directed public information campaigns to a specific target audience, may result in strong acceptance of new infrastructure development and achieve a policy result. This can be achieved by promoting a gender perspective when designing sustainable policies at family level, or a cultural perspective for sustainable policies at local level, and a youth perspective for campaigns targeting student groups. Therefore, energy infrastructure planning requires knowledge input about the local societal and geographical patterns in which the project operates. Second, based on the solar panel study case, it is indicated that people in the age range of 30 to 60 years old have more knowledge about renewable energy. Therefore, it is assumed that environmental education is needed to influence environmental awareness, everyday lifestyles and sustainable consumption behaviour of younger generations. It has been suggested that a positive human-nature relationship is important for countering today’s environmental problems, and the earlier children are exposed to the environment, the more they can sustain connectedness with nature (Liefländer et al., 2013). Today’s, younger generation will have a major influence on the policy direction of climate solutions as more and more youth are speaking up and pushing for better environmental management. Third, one of the most significant motivators to adopt new energy technology is the availability of incentives that stemmed from behavioural economics literature (Sommerfeld et al., 2017; Tantisattayakul & Kanchanapiya, 2017; Tanaka et al., 2014). While incentives, such as tax reduction, subsidy purchase or attractive Feedin-Tariff, may be sufficient to attract potential adopters in cases such as electric

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vehicles and solar panels, different types of incentives are expected for other energy programs, especially those that affect rural indigenous communities. In order to eliminate barriers at deeper political, cultural and social levels, policymakers must also create consistent regulatory frameworks and improve institutional capacity so that new renewable energy technologies are embraced by users (Sovacool et al., 2011). The fourth strategy involves the protection of indigenous areas and practices. This relates to the findings from the Chap. 8 case study where there is often strong societal resistance against geothermal facilities development because the facilities are located in areas where indigenous people are heavily dependent on local ecosystems. This is also evident in other cases, such as the attempts to promote nickel mining development in Sulawesi that has partially failed because they did not appreciate the importance of culture. They have assumed that money and area development are sufficient incentives in ensuring acceptance and neglecting aspects such as trust and empowerment (Hudayana & Widyanta, 2020). This is highly problematic in many regards, often resulting in heightened tensions generated by exploitation activities. A final strategy relates to the promotion of energy programs that emphasise on perceived self-efficacy of the users in tackling wider climate solutions. If individuals believe that their actions will have impacts on the environment, then they are willing to orchestrate their capabilities in pursuing pro-environmental behaviours.

11.4 The Need for a Systemic Change To accelerate the energy transition, I propose the coalition of multi actors along with systemic change are of vital importance. Demand-side behavioural changes may do little to influence the energy market if the energy system remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Systemic change in these regards refers to the liberalisation of electricity generation and distribution to promote a competitive renewable energy market, the coal phase-out via the introduction of cap and trade or extensive carbon tax policies as economic incentives to reduce carbon emission, removing fossil fuel subsidies for better targeted social spending and public information campaign targeting behavioural change of the heavy polluters. Reflecting on the current and previous energy policies and campaigns, definitely more political commitments for energy transition are needed. In 2011, the same year when NASA scientists recorded an average temperature of 0.92 °F (0.51 °C) warmer than the mid-twentieth century baseline (McCarthy, 2012), the Government of Indonesia launched an energy-saving campaign by reducing its water and energy consumption through a 10-percent cut in the use of subsidised oil by its agencies and offices. This underscores the urgency of acknowledging the problems and the logic to create a more favourable environment for change. If the policymakers are not in a position to make decisions about societal priorities and investment, then who holds the power? A study examining the politicaleconomic factors affecting coal-related policies shows that regardless of the political

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or economic system, the finding shows ministry of energy, the head of state and the ruling party are consistently the most important political actors, while utilities and mining companies are the most influential economic actors, while societal actors are the least influential (Ohlendorf et al., 2022). So there is the economic incentive factor—which we must emphasise—that encourages political commitments and actions to pressure heavy polluters to support low-carbon transition. The recent launch of the Just Transition Energy Partnership at the G20 Meeting in Bali, in November 2022 paints a hopeful picture for the future of Indonesia’s energy transition. The partnership commits to a USD$20 billion to accelerate a just energy transition and includes a pathway to reduce power sector emissions, based on the expansion of renewable energy and the phase down of coal. Led by the Coordinating Ministry of Economy, the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment Affairs, and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the partnership invites numerous global partners for institutional and capacity support. Still, Indonesia is among the countries with largest planned coal power capacity additions. A study finds that under President Joko Widodo, energy policy formulation has been driven by the development of public infrastructure while securing popularity for the presidential election in 2019; state-owned enterprises represent a source of political patronage and are employed to achieve those goals and there is a strong incentive to sustain coal mining as a key economic activity, as associated royalties significantly contribute to local and national public budgets (Ordonez et al., 2021). Phasing out coal will require a strenuous effort that may not be accomplished by monetary commitment alone. The same study finds that the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and Ministry of Finance have incentives to support the extraction of coal as a source of public revenues. Similar incentives at the sub-national level result in resource-rich provinces such as East Kalimantan and South Sumatra. Lack of law enforcement capabilities at the local level and corruption further aggravate this political bias (Ordonez et al., 2021). It remains to be seen whether the JETP could challenge the embedded oligarchic structures related to coal and natural resources in Indonesia and frame the energy sector as a key issue in climate change.

11.5 Closing Remarks In developing energy social science research, the results of this study have contributed to a growing body of academic work that advances the idea from concepts from justice and acceptance provide a discussion to think about the wider implications to society. This research contributed to developing and extending the concept of social acceptance inspired by Wüstenhagen et al. (2007). The social acceptance framework developed in this research from the keystone of the concept of justice and social acceptance. It aims at guiding policymakers towards successful energy programs and at fostering participation with all key stakeholders. For example, the

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11 Conclusion

concept of justice as recognition can be used to identify leverage points to bring a transformational change towards a low-carbon transition. Several policy implications can be derived from this study. One major implication is about the price policy instrument in an environment where coal is a cheaper option than renewables. The present renewable energy schemes do not provide strong enough incentives for customers to take up renewables. The other implication relates to the lack of procedural justice element in the energy programs design and implementation, suggesting an area for further reform. Policies that support the community’s engagement in energy decision-makings could make new programs more acceptable. De-risking energy programs could also ensure that the policies are accessible, affordable and available for all segments of society. Going forward, I wish that this study has served as a timely contribution both to energy social science scholarship and energy transition research, making social acceptance a tool that can help policymakers mitigate environmental and societal risks of energy decisions that can be asserted ethically and morally. Policy reforms need to focus on making renewable energy available, accessible and affordable to society. The existing energy policy may be more focused on the needs of today rather than tomorrow. Instead, we must craft decarbonisation poverty that enhances principles of justice spatially and temporally. At the end, energy transition is about political commitments of the leaders and the consensus of the public to determine the psychology of transition. The leader who currently serves in the office knows that he or she needs to seize the momentum for a good ending for our study of green growth and transition. The Paris Agreement is not legally binding, but exists nonetheless. There is a great possibility that we can still make the world more liveable for our future generations, if we are determined enough to make it a reality.

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Appendix 1

a. List of street vendors interviewed. Data for Chapter 5. Location: Bogor city, 10 October 2020. 1. Electricity charging stations (ECS), Taman Kencana 2. ECS Sukasari 3. ECS Taman Sempur Location: Jakarta Province. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

ECS Barito Park ECS Melawai ECS Blok S ECS SMPN 88 ECS Meruya ECS Pujasera ECS Kalijodo

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 D. Setyawati, State-of-the-Art Indonesia Energy Transition, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2683-1

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