State Capacity Building in Contemporary China 9811388970, 9789811388972

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Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies

Hiroko Naito Vida Macikenaite Editors

State Capacity Building in Contemporary China

Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies Series Editors Tetsushi Sonobe, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan Takashi Shiraishi, Prefectural University of Kumamoto, Kumamoto, Japan Akihiko Tanaka, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan Keiichi Tsunekawa, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan Akio Takahara, Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan

This is the first series to highlight research into the processes and impacts of the state building and economic development of developing countries in the non-Western World that have recently come to influence global economy and governance. It offers a broad and interactive forum for discussions about the challenges of these countries and the responses of other countries to their rise. The term ‘emerging-economy state,’ a part of the series title, or its shorthand ‘emerging states,’ is intended to promote dialogues between economists who have discussed policy problems faced by ‘emerging-market economies’ and scholars in political science and international relations who have discussed ‘modern state formation.’ Many emerging states are still in the middle-income status and not immune from the risk of falling into the middle-income trap. The manner of their external engagement is different from that of the high-income countries. Their rise has increased the uncertainty surrounding the world. To reduce the uncertainty, good understanding of their purpose of politics and state capacity as well as their economies and societies would be required. Although the emerging states are far from homogenous, viewing them as a type of countries would force us into understand better the similarity and differences among the emerging states and those between them and the high-income countries, which would in turn to help countries to ensure peace and prosperity. The series welcomes policy studies of empirical, historical, or theoretical nature from a micro, macro, or global point of view. It accepts, but does not call for, interdisciplinary studies. Instead, it aims to promote transdisciplinary dialogues among a variety of disciplines, including but not limited to area studies, economics, history, international relations, and political science. Relevant topics include emerging states’ economic policies, social policies, and politics, their external engagement, ensuing policy reactions of other countries, ensuing social changes in different parts of the world, and cooperation between the emerging states and other countries to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The series welcomes both monographs and edited volumes that are accessible to academics and interested general readers.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16114

Hiroko Naito Vida Macikenaite •

Editors

State Capacity Building in Contemporary China

123

Editors Hiroko Naito Center for Northeast Asian Studies Tohoku University Sendai, Miyagi, Japan

Vida Macikenaite Graduate School of International Relations International University of Japan Niigata, Japan

ISSN 2524-5023 ISSN 2524-5031 (electronic) Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies ISBN 978-981-13-8897-2 ISBN 978-981-13-8898-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020, corrected publication 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

It was unexpected for me, a newly fledged researcher who was educated in Japan, to edit a book in English with contributors from overseas as my first editorial book ever. First of all, my biggest thanks must go to the contributors of this volume, not only for their wonderful scholarly works but also for their constant patience regarding the editing process. I am especially thankful to Prof. Vida Macikenaite who is a co-editor of this book and a superior whom I deeply respect. I am sure that the seed for the idea of this project could not have grown into publication without their support. Furthermore, I offer sincere thanks to Dr. Susie Casson for her superb editorial assistance. The papers in this book were originally presented at the conference on “Bringing the State Back in: New Frontiers of Governance Studies in China” which was held in Japan, on March 3 2019. I deeply appreciate the Center for Northeast Asian Studies at Tohoku University for financial support, and also Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies and the National Institutes for the Humanities for the co-sponsorship. Additionally, my sincere thanks go to Prof. Rumi Aoyama from Waseda University and Prof. Kazuko Kojima from Keio University for cooperating at the conference as a discussant. Their constructive opinions on our presentations assisted us greatly with rewriting and editing the papers. Also, I am particularly thankful to Prof. Hiroki Oka who gave me a great opportunity to organize the international conference, and also to Prof. Hiroki Takakura, Director of the Center, who constantly encouraged me to publish this editorial book. As this book title shows, the focus of this book is the party and state’s relationship in contemporary China. The party–state relationship is a classic topic among the studies of political science, but I believe that it also has novelty with regard to discussing the mechanism of the Chinese Communist Party’s governance. The reason why I focus on the party–state system in contemporary China is that the state is easily underestimated or recognized as a monolith with a party in the field of China studies. I suppose, however, that most scholars would agree that, whether democratization or an authoritarian regime resilience, the relationship between the authority and society is significant. Therefore, democratic theorists tend to v

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concentrate on public behavior while studies of authoritarianism examine the importance of a party system. However, many readers may know that Xi Jinping’s focus on the state has recently been growing stronger. In order to understand not only the historical transition of the CCP’s governing system but also Xi’s political strategy, it is important to reveal how the CCP can strengthen the state’s capacity and its impact on the CCP’s politics. I strongly hope that this book will bring the reader a classic but unprecedented perspective for understanding Chinese politics. Sendai, Japan Niigata, Japan

Hiroko Naito Vida Macikenaite

The original version of the book was revised: The print ISSN has been updated in copyright page. The correction to the book is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-981-13-8898-9_8

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hiroko Naito 2 Economic Modernization and the Rise of Restricted Legislative Representation in China: A Case Study of Shenzhen . . . . . . . . . . . . Chuanmin Chen

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3 State-Led Digital Governance in Contemporary China . . . . . . . . . . . Xiang Gao

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4 Managing the People’s Liberation Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Laura-Anca Parepa

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5 “Rule of Law” Under the Chinese Communist Party’s Leadership: The Case of the Professionalization of Judges and the CCP’s Governance of the People’s Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hiroko Naito 6 Elite Mobility Between the SOEs and State Institutions: A State-Centered Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vida Macikenaite

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7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Vida Macikenaite Correction to: State Capacity Building in Contemporary China . . . . . . Hiroko Naito and Vida Macikenaite

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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

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Chapter 1

Introduction Hiroko Naito

1.1 The Puzzle: Reform and State Capacity Building in Contemporary China Political reform has been at the core of the politics of the Chinese party-state ever since the launch of the reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s. At first, welcomed by the outside observers as China’s initial steps towards democratization, advancing political reform seems to be increasingly less likely to bring the country closer to the Western model of government, and even more so under the current leadership of Xi Jinping (习近平). The purpose of this book is to reveal the puzzles regarding why the political leaders developed the approach of state capacity building and how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has enhanced the state capacity for its governance. On November 18 2013, at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP, the CCP released the Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (中共中 央全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) (hereinafter The Decision). The Decision laid out the purpose of the reform as the need to improve and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as to promote the governing system of the state and modernize its governing capacity.1 As Xi explained, so far “we have discussed

1 The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Several Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, CPC news, November 15th 2013, (in Chinese, (2013年11月15日) 中共 中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定《中国共产党新闻网》http://cpc.people.com.cn/ n/2013/1115/c64094-23559163.html).

H. Naito (B) Center for Northeast Asian Studies, Tohoku University, Kawauchi 41, Aobaku, Sendaishi 980-8576, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_1

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many types of modernization, such as agricultural modernization, industrial modernization, technological modernization and military modernization. However, it is the first time to focus on modernizing the governing system of the state and its capacity.”2 He also referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union to emphasize that a regime cannot survive without state capacity building.3 Therefore, Xi insisted, raising the state capacity is the key to strengthening the leadership of the CCP.4 That is not to say that this reform was initiated all of a sudden. Xi’s reform has its roots in the idea of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) regarding the reform of the party and the state leadership system (党和国家领导制度改革) in 1980. Deng delivered a speech with the purpose of indicating that the power was too centralized, and that the party had largely replaced the role of the state.5 To tackle that problem, he raised several ideas, such as the decentralization of power and separation of the party-state. According to Deng, these reforms would not weaken the party’s leadership, but would rather strengthen it and keep it resilient.6 Jiang Zemin’s (江泽民) advocacy of the socialistic market-oriented economy at the 14th National Congress of the CCP in 1992 was also based on Deng’s ideas.7 During his Southern Tour in 1992, Deng stated that “the essential difference between socialism and capitalism does not depend on whether planned economy accounts for more or market economy does. Planned economy is not equal to socialism, and capitalism also has a plan; market economy is not equal to capitalism, and socialism also has a market. A plan and a market are both tools for economic activities.”8

2 Xi

Jinping, “Why Does the Party Need to Propose the Goal of Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (February 17th, 2014),” Discuss of Keeping the Comprehensible Deepening Reforms, Zhongyangwenxuan Press: Beijing, 2018, pp. 87–94. (in Chinese, 习近平(2018) 为什么要提出 全面深化改革的总目标(二〇十四年二月十七日)《论坚持全面深化改革》中央文献出版社: 北京 87–94). 3 Xi., Ibid. 4 Xi Jinping, “Explanation about the Manuscript and the Idea of Deepening the Party-State Reform (February 26th, 2018),” Discuss of Keeping the Comprehensible Deepening Reforms, Zhongyangwenxuan Press: Beijing, 2018, pp. 424–446. (in Chinese, 习近平(2018) 关于深化党和国家机 构改革决定搞和方案搞的说明(二〇十八年二月二十六日)《论坚持全面深化改革》中央文 献出版社:北京 424–446). 5 Deng Xiaoping, the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership (August 18th, 1980), Deng Xiaoping’s Memory Net, October 24th, 2006 (in Chinese, 邓小平(2016年10月24日) 党和国家领 导制度的改革 (一九八〇年八月十八日)《邓小平纪念网》http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/ 69113/69684/69695/4949714.html). 6 Deng., Ibid. 7 Jiang Zemin, The Jiang Zemin’s Report at the 14th of National Congress of the Communist Party (October 12th, 1992), The Database of the Report of the Successive National Congress of the Communist Party, (in Chinese, 江泽民(1992年) 江泽民在中国共产党第十四次全国代表大会上的 报告(1992年10月12日)《中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库》http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/ 64162/64168/64567/65446/4526308.html). 8 Socialism is also able to Install the Marked-oriented Economy, Deng Xiaoping’s Memory Net, October 11th, 2017 (in Chinese, 社会主义也可以搞市场经济邓小平纪念网 http://cpc.people. com.cn/n1/2017/1011/c69113-29581178.html).

1 Introduction

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In the Western way of thinking, Deng’s reforms, such as political decentralization, party-state separation and the socialistic market-oriented economy, were contradictory. Therefore, democracy theorists doubted that they would strengthen the party’s leadership. Furthermore, many of them estimated that the CCP’s political and economic reform would cause instability within the CCP’s regime (Shirk 2008; Wu 2008). Nonetheless, the CCP leaders continued to argue that such changes could be introduced under the party leadership. These ideas are inherent to Xi’s proposal for comprehensively deepening the reforms. However, his approach to the reform of the relations between the party and the state is slightly different from that of Deng. The main issue of Deng’s reform was enhancing the state autonomy and transforming the leadership by the CCP over the state from a direct to an indirect one. Contemporary Chinese history has proven that Deng’s reform created the political foundations for rapid economic development, as well as the resilience of the CCP’s regime. On the other hand, Xi has been centralizing power while developing the state capacity actively to utilize the state functions. His efforts to centralize power can be observed in the establishment of a number of committees and counterpart small groups under the CCP Central Committee, such as the CCP Central Committee National Security Commission (中央国家安全委 員会), the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (中央网络安全和信息化委员 会, formerly the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization, 中 央网络安全和信息化领导小组), and the Central Military Commission to Comprehensively Deepen National Defense and Military Reform (中央軍事委員会深化 国防・軍隊改革領導小組), over which Xi often presides. As democracy theorists doubted the possible outcomes of Deng’s reform, scholars of authoritarian regimes, similarly, view Xi’s reform as inherently contradictory in nature, as it includes both strengthening the state functions and increasing the centralization of power. Thus, they wonder how this reform can be implemented (Shirk 2018; Economy 2018). Some even question whether Xi’s reform is a reincarnation of Mao’s era (Gan 2017), also estimate which direction China’s future goes (Shambaugh 2016; Dickson 2016; Pei 2016). Chinese political leaders’ reform proposals and their logics are its core link with the argument by Huntington (1968), who argued that, whatever regime type the political leader chooses, a highly stabilized governing system can still be formed. He suggested that the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government (Huntington 1968). The purpose of this volume is to reconsider the CCP’s governing system from the perspective of state capacity building that Xi has newly proposed. In such a way, it turns back to the state—a classical topic in political science. By doing so, the chapters here reveal how the CCP develops the state capacity to stabilize the CCP’s governing system. Their authors share the idea that state capacity building is one of the strategies that the CCP adopts with the aim of improving the CCP’s governance. As there exists huge gap between the regime resilience and the party’s strategies for governing the state, the CCP’s governance is not always directly linked to the regime issues. Thus, this book has more interest in the CCP’s governance rather than the

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CCP’s survival. Therefore, it brings the state back into focus, which the contemporary Chinese political studies tend to underestimate.9

1.2 Understanding Governance by the CCP: Political Order Without Democratization The basic puzzle underlying Huntington’s argument is why there is no political order in developing countries. He doubts the modernization theory, which suggests that, once a developing country installs a democratic political system, stable governance is naturally created. He argues that there is also a possibility that a democratic political system may annoy people, who will shake and break down the governance if the system does not work properly. How political order emerges became Huntington’s major research interest and he introduced the cases of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to show that, in these countries, there is a stable political system, regardless of the type of political regime. Fukuyama (2011) evaluated Huntington’s work by stating that “the notion that a country could have a high degree of political institutionalization without being democratic shocked many people at the time but underscored Huntington’s point that political order and democracy were not necessarily interdependent and could work at cross-purposes.” Yet, at that time, Huntington’s argument failed to be proven because of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore, this volume proposes the case of China as an institutionalized political system without democratization. Huntington’s argument especially focuses on the role of the political party to understand how ordered politics is created. Referring to his argument, this volume explores how the CCP functions as the state’s role and strengthens the state capacity to uphold the CCP’s governance. Further, it examines how the policies for state capacity building are implemented in China. A review of the literature on contemporary Chinese politics shows that, in previous studies, scholars tend to conclude their works with one of the alternatives for China— democratization or a resilient authoritarian regime, and also tend to assume that the fundamental purpose of Chinese political leaders is regime survival. However, while political survival is the basic purpose of any political actor, such an assumption does not capture the essence of policy-making. Political leaders are usually surrounded by many tasks and policy issues and they need to make policy choices on a daily basis. Following this logic, the authors of this volume assume that the major purpose of the Chinese political leaders is policy management and its implementation. Therefore, this book focuses on the functioning of the state and attempts to understand 9 Several

studies that focus on the Party and the State’s relations in the field of the contemporary Chinese politics are found in Japanese such as, Nishimura and Kokubun (2009), Kamo et al. (2012); however, there are few in English such as Ortmann and Thompson (2016). The main method of Nishimura and Kokubun’s book is history. Kamo’s book only uses the military and legislature as a state body. Comparing to these existing studies, this book embraces a comprehensive understanding of the state in China, and also applies the methods of political science.

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how the CCP strengthens the state capacity for effective policy management and its implementation. The aim of this book is to widen the possibility of Chinese political studies, not only for comparative politics but also for public policy studies.

1.3 Understanding the State in China The party-state system lies at the core of the CCP’s one-party system. Understanding how the state functions and how it has been reformed under the party’s leadership is crucial for grasping the political mechanism in China. This volume employs a broader definition of the state, where it not only includes the administrative organ (Chinese Government: 政府), but also the legislature (People’s Congress: 人民代 表大会), the military (People’s Liberation Army: 人民解放军), the court system (People’s Court: 人民法院), and state-owned enterprises (SOEs: 国有企业). Xi’s reform covers each of these bodies, and each of them is individually analyzed in the chapters contained in this volume. One of the most important policies in China recently has been to build a deliberative democracy. Successive political leaders in China have repeatedly insisted that “there is democracy in China;” however, it is democracy in a different form than that defined by democratic theorists. It was difficult for researchers to figure out what democracy is in the Chinese context. Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) introduced the term deliberative democracy at the 18th National Congress of the CCP on November 8 2012, arguing that “we promote deliberative democracy widely at multiple layers and advance its institutionalization.” He clearly differentiated between two categories of democracy—democracy through elections and deliberative democracy.10 This idea has succeeded in Xi’s politics. At the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP, he explained that there is a need to “improve the cooperation with multiple political parties and the deliberative political system which are led by the People’s Congress system and the CCP.” From the speeches given by Hu Jintao as well as Xi Jinping, it can be captured that the people’s congress system is the key element when seeking to understand deliberative democracy in China. The National People’s Congress is defined as the highest organ of state power in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.11 However, China’s people’s congresses have long been regarded as “rubber stamps” and their deputies have also been criticized for being “silent deputies,” inactive in representing the voice of the people. Tracing the development of the capacity of the people’s congresses, the activities of the people’s congresses have obviously improved and there has been an increasing degree of legislative representation. A 10 “Hu Jintao’s Report at the 18th of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” People’s Daily Net, November 8th 2012. (in Chinese, (2012年11月8日) 胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八 次全国代表大会上的报告《人民网》http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151. html). 11 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” https://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution. html.

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functioning people’s congress system is key to the implementation of a deliberative democracy in China. In Chap. 2, based on the existing literature review and his original analysis of the case of Shenzhen, Chen examines the causes and impacts of the increasing legislative representation in China, and also demonstrates that legislative representation in China is a form of restricted representation. The second element in Xi’s reform is the policy for governance efficiency. The main issue of the Third Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP was the reform of the party-state. The Decision explained that “we strengthen the promotion of functional optimization, collaboration, and efficiency of party and state institutions for adapting to the new era, new circumstances, and new claims.”12 One of the detailed policies for realizing the reform of the party and the state is installing the Internet into governance and creating the e-government system. Digital governance is one of the biggest trends elsewhere. Based on the practice in democratic countries, introducing the Internet into the government is said to promote the citizens’ participation; the so-called e-democracy in China. In Chap. 3, through depicting the model of “state-led” digitalization in China and conducting a preliminary examination of China’s recent round of “Internet plus Government” since 2016, Gao demonstrates that the Chinese government’s use of information and communication technology (ICT) appears to be bringing China closer to the introduction of a Weberian bureaucratic system rather than paving the path from e-government toward e-democracy. Chapter 4 focuses on the civil-military relations. A political leader in an authoritarian regime always faces difficulties with regard to governing the military by enhancing its capacity. As the highest possibility for regime transition is a coup d’état, a political leader needs to reduce the risk of a military organization growing apart from him/her. Being no exception, the CCP also needs to control the relationship with the PLA. Comparing to Hu’s era, Xi is attempting to strengthen the CCP’s leadership toward the PLA. The Constitution of the CCP, which was revised and adopted at the 19th National Congress of the CCP on October 24, 2017, provides that the “Chairman of the Central Military Commission assumes overall responsibility over the work of the Commission.”13 There is no doubt that the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, who is also the secretary of the CCP, has been the top leader of the PLA, but this is the first time that this rule has been inscribed in the Constitution of the CCP. This revision suggests that Xi’s leadership over the PLA is growing stronger. In Chap. 4, Parepa sheds light on how the CCP managed its relationship with PLA in balancing the need for a strong military with the need to maintain its authority over 12 Xi Jinping, “Explanation about the Manuscript and the Idea of Deepening the Party-State Reform (February 26th, 2018),” Discuss of Keeping the Comprehensible Deepening Reforms, Zhongyangwenxuan Press: Beijing, 2018, pp. 424–446. (in Chinese, 习近平(2018年) 关于深化党和国家机 构改革决定搞和方案搞的说明 (二〇十八年二月二十六日)《论坚持全面深化改革》中央文 献出版社:北京 424–446). 13 “Revised Constitution of the CPC Got Passed! Clearly Implement the Overall Responsibility of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission,” People’s Liberation Army Daily, October 25th 2017 (in Chinese, (2017年10月25日) 党章修正案通过!明确中央军委实行主席负责制《解放 军报》 ).

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the military organization. Her findings show that the CCP has successfully made use of the policy readjustments and the newly-created state mechanisms to accommodate the military’s needs for development and organizational autonomy, while curtailing the financial autonomy and those roles that might give the PLA leverage over the Party. Further, this volume investigates the court system. The discussion over the reform of the court system began during the Hu Jintao era. He issued the white paper on the reform of the court system, the first such document in contemporary China.14 Xi has proposed a broader idea, which is strengthening “the rule of law (fazhi: 法治),” and raised this to becomes the main theme at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. The Statement of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP (hereinafter The Statement) also referred to “the rule of law.” Xi’s focus among the issues related to “the rule of law” is obviously the reform of the people’s court system. The Statement indicated that the “deepening of the reform of the people’s court system is needed to accelerate the construction of the socialistic court system, which is fair, efficient and authorized, and to secure the people’s right for constructing Chinese style rule of law.”15 In Chap. 5, focusing on the case of the judges’ professionalization, Naito demonstrates how the CCP promotes “the rule of law” in the Chinese context. The CCP’s motive behind professionalization is the judges’ integration with the CCP, and the CCP attempts to unify the judiciary as it is said that judgements in China are heavily biased toward protecting regional interests. The core principle of the rule of law in democratic countries is the independence of the judicial power. Zhou Qiang (周 强), the president of the Supreme People’s Court, has rejected this idea for China.16 While the independence of judicial power is the key to the rule of law in democratic countries, it means the independence of judicial power from regional interests in China. Finally, the relation between the CCP and the SOEs cannot be ignored as it is the most important state body for economic development which is indispensable to the CCP’s governance. The reform of the SOEs has been taking place since the 1990s, ) initiated this. His focus of the reform was to reduce the SOEs’ and Zhu Rongji ( occupation and expansion of the private sector in the Chinese economy to accelerate the market-oriented economy. However, Zhu’s reform had harmful effects on the income gap and produced workforce reductions within SOEs. In order to narrow the disparity and exclusive devotion to economic development, Hu Jintao proposed 14 “White

Book of Chinese Judicial Reform,” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, October 9th, 2012, (in Chinese, (2012年10月9日)  中国的司法改革  白 皮书《中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室》http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2012/document/ 1226622/1226622.html). 15 Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPU, Xinhua Net, November 12th, 2013 (in Chinese, (2013年11月12日) 中国共产党十八届中央委员会第三 次全体会议公报《新华网》http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/12/c_118113455.html). 16 “Resist the Western Style Judicial Independence,” People’s Court Net, January 15th, 2017 (in Chinese, (2017年1月15日) 坚决抵制西方司法独立等错误思潮影响《中国法院网》https://www. chinacourt.org/article/detail/2017/01/id/2512852.shtml).

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the idea of a harmonious society, and also he engaged in favorable treatment to the SOEs. According to the path of the SOEs’ reform, Xi Jinping, at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, stated the need to “drive state capital to become better and stronger (做强做优做大),” and also emphasized that the “party leadership over state-owned enterprises shall be unswervingly strengthened.”17 Xi’s reform aims to build the economic model based on strong state capital to increase and confirm the presence of the CCP within the Chinese economy. Considering that the CCP retains its leadership over the SOEs and why the CCP needs its relationship with the SOEs, revealing the mechanisms of the informal networks between the CCP and the SOEs is crucial. In Chap. 6, Macikenaite focuses on the relation between the regime and the SOEs to analyze how the CCP has utilized SOE managers’ expertise to build the policy capacity of the state institutions; i.e. their capacity to make the required policy adjustments, and thus enhance the state capacity. She reveals that the recruitment of competent corporate leaders into the state institutions has apparently served as a tool for governance to maintain the state’s expertise in specific areas. The intersystem cadre appointments from the SOEs to the state institutions in China, which began around 2000, seem to be aimed at strengthening the state’s capacity to govern effectively.

References Dickson, B. (2016). The Dictator’s dilemma: The Chinese communist party’s strategy for survival. New York: Oxford University Press. Economy, E. C. (2018). The third revolution: Xi Jinping and the new Chinese state. New York: Oxford University Press. Fukuyama, F. (2011, January 6). Samuel Huntington’s legacy – why his works on world order – political and otherwise – are still relevant today. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/ 01/06/samuel-huntingtons-legacy/. Gan, N. (2017, October 28). Why China is reviving Mao’s grandiose title for Xi Jinping. South China morning post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2117421/xi-jinpingslatest-grandiose-title-aims-take. Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing society. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Kamo, T., Kojima, K., Hoshino, M., & Takeuchi, H. (Eds.). (2012). Transition of China’s party-state system: Demands and responses. Tokyo: Keio University Press (in Japanese, 加茂具樹、小嶋華津子、星野昌裕、武内宏樹編『党国体制の現在—変容する 社会と中国共産党の適応』慶應義塾大学出版会、2012年). Nishimura, S., & Kokubun, R. (2009). The party and the state - the historical path of the political system. Iwanami Shoten (in Japanese, 西村成雄、国分良成『党と国家—政治体制の軌跡— 』岩波書店、2009年). 17 “Implementation

Opinions of the State Council on Advancing the Pilot Program of the Reform of State Capital Investment and Operation Companies,” Chinese Government Net, July 30th, 2018 (in Chinese, (2018年7月30日) 国务院关于推进国有资本投资、运营公司改 革试点的实施意见 《中华人民共和国中央人民政府》 http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid= b981aac4a885ffa9bdfb&lib=law).

1 Introduction

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Ortmann, S., & Thompson, M. R. (2016, January). China and the “Singapore Model”. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 39–48. Pei, Minxin. (2016). China’s crony capitalism: The dynamics of regime decay. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Shambaugh, D. (2016). China’s future. Cambridge, UK, Malden, MA: Polity Press. Shirk, S. L. (2008). China: Fragile superpower. USA: Oxford University Press. Shirk, S. L. (2018, April). China in Xi’s “New Era”: The return to personalistic rule. Journal of Democracy, 29(2), 22–36. Wu, J. (2008). China: The quiet revolution. Tokyo: Nikkei Publishing Inc. (in Japanese, 呉軍華『 中国—静かなる革命』日経新聞出版社、2008年). Xi, J. (2018). Discuss of keeping the comprehensible deepening reforms. Beijing: Zhongyangwenxuan Press, (in Chinese, 习近平(2018) 关于深化党和国家机构改革决定搞和方案搞的 说明 (二〇十八年二月二十六日)《论坚持全面深化改革》中央文献出版社: 北京、424– 446). Yamaguchi, S. (2012, November 2). The basic analysis of the 19th national congress of the communist party of China. NIDS Commentary (in Japanese, 山口信治「中国共産党第19回全国代表 大会の基礎的分析:➁習近平強軍思想」『NIDSコメンタリー』(2012年11月2日)), https:// www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary063.pdf.

Chapter 2

Economic Modernization and the Rise of Restricted Legislative Representation in China: A Case Study of Shenzhen Chuanmin Chen

Abstract How do we explain the resilience of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party in the process of economic modernization? Based on a case study of Shenzhen, this chapter reveals that economic modernization increases the legislative representation of the People’s Congresses by influencing the ideas, demands and capacities of the local authorities, officials, deputies, and society. Moreover, it also illustrates that the legislative representation in China is a form of restricted representation. Its development, on the one hand, improves the government’s responsiveness, thus relieving much of the social conflict and increasing the satisfaction with the government; on the other hand, it does not challenge the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which is beneficial to regime consolidation in China. Keywords Economic modernization · China’s people’s congress · Restricted representation

2.1 Introduction Modernization theory, which claims that economic modernization breeds democratization, is extremely influential in the field of political science. Seymour Martin Lipset suggested, in 1959, that “[p]erhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development.”1 Research supporting modernization theory suggests that economic development increases the complexity of the economy, generates independent sources of wealth and power from the state, heightens the citizens’ levels of education, spreads pro-democracy values, promotes the growth of the middle class and civil society, encourages the different social classes to be more 1 Lipset

(1959), p. 69.

C. Chen (B) School of Political Science and Public Administration, East China University of Political Science and Law, No. 555, Longyuan Road, Shanghai 201620, China e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_2

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accepting of democracy, and opens society up to the effects of global democratic ideas, thereby contributing to democratic transition.2 The resilience of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s rule, however, appears to be a counter-example in this regard. Although China’s economic modernization has developed at an outstanding rate, reaching a relatively high level after the reform and opening up in 1978, the CCP regime remains stable and the likelihood of democratic transition has not increased obviously. To explain the resilience of some authoritarian regimes, in recent years, a growing number of comparative studies has revealed the importance of authoritarian institutions, such as parliaments, political parties, courts, and elections, in authoritarian regimes. Researchers have found that authoritarian institutions can maintain political stability and prolong the rule of authoritarian rulers. These institutions help to neutralize external threats by co-opting potential opposition forces, providing them with institutionalized channels for policy processes, and making the regime’s promises to them appear more credible. Otherwise, institutions in authoritarian regimes can also undermine the threats from the inside by realizing a reliable power-sharing among the ruling allies and stabilizing the transfers of power.3 However, if the establishment of authoritarian institutions does not alter the relationship between economic modernization and democratization, democratic transition can still occur in institutionalized authoritarian regimes as long as the economy becomes sufficiently modernized. On the contrary, if authoritarian institutions develop with the rise of the economy, the positive effect of modernization on democracy may possibly be undermined. People’s Congresses (PCs) are important authoritarian institutions in China, serving to represent various social demands. Does economic modernization promote the rise of legislative representation in China? What is the impact of the rising legislative representation on the consolidation of the CCP regime? Based on a case study of Shenzhen, this chapter reveals that economic modernization increases the legislative representation by influencing the ideas, demands, and capacities of the local authorities, officials, PC deputies, and society. Moreover, it illustrates that the legislative representation in China is a form of restricted representation. Its development, on the one hand, improves the government’s responsiveness, 2 See,

e.g., Barro (1999), p. 158, Bollen (1979), p. 572, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), p. 903, Huntington (1991), Jackman (1973), p. 611, Lipset (1959), p. 69, Londregan and Poole (1996), p. 1. 3 Boix and Svolik, “The foundations of limited authoritarian government,” 300; Brancati, “Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects,” 313; Escribà-Folch, “Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?,” 71; Ezrow and Erica, “State institutions and the survival of dictatorships,” 1; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, “A dictator’s toolkit Understanding how co-optation affects repression in autocracies,” 332; Gandhi, “Dictatorial institutions and their impact on economic growth,” 3; Gandhi, Political institutions under dictatorship; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, “Elections under authoritarianism,” 403; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats,” 1279; Magaloni, “Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule,” 715; Miller, “Electoral authoritarianism and human development,” 1; Reuter and Robertson. B., “Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes,” 235; Schedler, “The logic of electoral authoritarianism”; Milan W. Svolik, The politics of authoritarian rule; Wright and Escriba-Folch, “Authoritarian institutions and regime survival,” 283.

2 Economic Modernization and the Rise of Restricted Legislative …

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thereby relieving much of the social conflict and increasing the satisfaction with the government; on the other hand, it does not challenge the rule of the CCP, which is beneficial to regime consolidation in China. This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review, which is followed by a brief introduction to the case of Shenzhen. The chapter then discusses the relationship between economic modernization and the representation of Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress (MPC) deputies. The impacts of such legislative representation are shown in the next section. The last section presents a brief conclusion and discussion.

2.2 Legislative Representation in China An increasing number of China’s PC deputies have become active in representing the People’s preference and demands since the reform and opening up in 1978. Many studies attribute the PC deputies’ active performance to their demographic/professional characteristics as well as their self-incentives. On the one hand, it was found that deputies’ demographic/professional characteristics significantly affected their behavior. Cho argued that workers and peasants tended to play the roles of reflectors and supervisors, intellectuals and cadres were more likely to be policy providers, while private entrepreneurs preferred to play exemplary roles.4 He and Wang found that township PCs with more senior deputies and more cadres and CCP members display better performance with regard to submitting proposals and conducting appraisal activities during the intersessional period.5 He and Liu revealed that the number of motions proposed by female deputies of the National PC (NPC) exceeded the number proposed by male deputies; older deputies tended to table more motions than younger ones; highly-educated deputies advanced more motions than those with less education; and officials brought fewer motions, while the managers of enterprises, nonprofit units and NGOs and professionals were more inclined to put forward numerous motions.6 Huang and Chen analyzed the survey data on countylevel PC deputies and discovered that deputies who were cadres performed more negatively with regard to tabling motions and proposals and that the CCP members more frequently cast opposing votes.7 On the other hand, deputies’ self-incentives had an important influence on their behavior. O’Brien found that the main reasons why some PC deputies became “remonstrators” were as follows: First, they were driven by their sense of obligation, pride and a desire to make a difference; second, they hoped to be respected in the community; third, they were eager to free themselves from their normal job and improve their autonomy and status; fourth, they longed to enter the process of policymaking 4 Cho

(2009). and Wang (2011). 6 He and Liu (2013). 7 Huang and Chen (2015). 5 He

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and implementation; and, fifth, they wished to develop valuable connections and contacts in order to attain material resources and other benefits.8 Huang and Chen illustrated that deputies with weaker authoritarian values tended to cast opposing votes.9 Recently, an increasing number of studies has begun to notice the existence of some external incentives related to PC deputies’ performance. Some of them illustrated the incentives for the support and encouragement of the CCP. Cho argued that the political guarantees granted by the CCP promote deputies actively to reflect the demands from below and supervise the other state organs.10 Manion revealed that the CCP regime allowed and even required deputies to reflect the demands of their constituents for obtaining the important information facilitating its rule, which induces the rise of authoritarian parochialism.11 Truex also found that the CCP engineered the “representation within bounds” in the NPC, encouraging deputies to convey the citizens’ demands on nonpolitical issues, so that it can respond to them accordingly and minimize the potential for collective action.12 Others, meanwhile, revealed the local and social motivations. Lai analyzed the motions submitted by the deputies of the NPC in 1988 and found that deputies from provinces that contribute more revenue to the central government are more active in putting forward motions.13 Based on the data on the congress in G province, Li discovered that deputies were mobilized by the local authorities in their constituencies to strive for local benefits and that those from economically poor regions tended to be more active in doing so.14 Moreover, Sun claimed that the increase in social stratification and emerging social classes and the awakening of civic awareness increased the activity and responsiveness of the deputies.15 Furthermore, some scholars even noticed the incentives related to PC elections. Manion revealed that PC elections could help voters to select candidates of “good types” who are more likely to represent the local interests and motivate the deputies to transmit the information concerning people’s demands.16 Huang and Chen discovered that deputies who subjectively recognized themselves as being nominated jointly by voters presented more motions and proposals than others.17 Moreover, regarding the impacts of legislative representation in China, Manion and Truex discovered that PC deputies provide the party with information about

8 O’Brien

(1994). and Chen (2015). 10 Cho (2009). 11 Manion (2014, 2015). 12 Truex (2016). 13 Lai (2001). 14 Li (2015). 15 Sun (2011). 16 Manion (2015, 2016). 17 Huang and Chen (2015). 9 Huang

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15

people’s preferences and grievances, make the regime more responsive, and minimize the danger of collective action arising.18 However, existing studies have failed to reveal clearly the causal relationship and mechanism between economic modernization and the rise of legislative representation, nor has the effect of legislative representation on regime consolidation been studied in depth at the micro-level. Thus, this study makes a contribution by further exploring the causes and impacts of legislative representation through undertaking a case study of Shenzhen.

2.3 The Rise of Legislative Representation in Shenzhen Shenzhen is one of the four special economic zones where experimental economic reform has been implemented. Benefiting from special economic policies and institutions, over the last 30 years, Shenzhen has grown from a small county into one of the most modernized and developed cities in China. The GDP of Shenzhen in 2017 was RMB 2,249.006 billion, and its GDP per capita was RMB183,544. The proportion of secondary and tertiary industries was 41.4% and 58.5%, respectively, in 2017.19 The representation of Shenzhen MPC developed rapidly in recent years and it was always at the top of the list in China. Figure 2.1 shows that, between 2000 and 2013, the total and per capita amount of proposals submitted by Shenzhen MPC deputies increased in general. The total number increased from 208 to 774, and the per capita 900

2.5 2

700 600

1.5

500 400

1

300 200

Proposal pc

Number of Proposals

800

0.5

100 0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

0

Year Number of Proposals

Proposal pc

Fig. 2.1 Number and per capita number of proposals submitted by Shenzhen MPC deputies, 2000–2013 18 Manion 19 The

(2015) and Truex (2016). data are from the Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2018.

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C. Chuanmin

number rose from 0.61 to 1.90. The per capita number of proposals from Shenzhen MPCs were placed second, first, fourth, second, and first between 2008 and 2012, respectively, in the rankings of all MPCs with available data.20 I interviewed several officials, deputies and staff members of PCs at the municipal and district levels in Shenzhen during the period 2013–2015 and collected a large amount of data (such as documents and news reports) to illustrate the causes and impacts of the increasing legislative representation.

2.4 Economic Modernization and Legislative Representation The evidence collected from interviews and various materials suggests that the rise of representation of Shenzhen MPC was partly due to the high-level economic modernization of the city.

2.4.1 Ideas Officials in the highly modernized city of Shenzhen are relatively enlightened and thus tend to tolerate the different opinions and criticisms from the MPC deputies, which generates a better political environment. Some MPC deputies are of the opinion that Shenzhen was a window to and forerunner of the reform and that, as it attracted many capable and knowledgeable migrants, thus the local leaders became more enlightened in general and the environment grew more democratic and free in nature.21 The relatively enlightened leaders and free environment in Shenzhen encourage deputies more readily to express their opinions and criticisms. Deputy Xiao, Youmei, a star MPC deputy, stated that she had never experienced any unfair treatment or interference from the leaders as a responsible deputy in Shenzhen. Due to the relatively enlightened leaders and free environment, there were many deputies who actively reflected the concerns about people’s livelihood.22 Two other outstanding Shenzhen MPC deputies also felt that the support of the municipal party secretary and the MPC director resulted in their recent effective performance.23 Furthermore, the active performance of deputies is strongly related to their own ideas which can also be influenced by a modernized economy. Many active deputies in Shenzhen MPC stated that they felt a strong responsibility and enthusiasm to represent people and point out problems, and that they were proud of what they 20 The

data are collected by the author. 1; see 163.com (2010). 22 163.com (2010). 23 Interviewee 5; see Yang (2014). 21 Interviewee

2 Economic Modernization and the Rise of Restricted Legislative …

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had achieved.24 Considering deputies’ activism in Shenzhen, a PC official at the district level explained that “when the economy has developed to certain extent, those prominent personages who have been rich seek a sense of accomplishment.”25

2.4.2 Demands As many challenges have arisen during the process of the rapid economic modernization of Shenzhen, the local leaders have a stronger demand for improving the representation of the PCs. According to a work report of the sixth session of the Shenzhen Municipal Party Congress in 2015, the new contradictions raised by the rapid development of the city became increasingly serious. In the process of development and transition, the factors provoking social conflict increased, mass disturbances occurred more frequently, and the size of the floating population also rose, placing at risk the security of the city and social governance.26 Local leaders have the incentive to improve the legislative representation so that they are fully informed about the diverse social demands and can solve social problems and conflicts and maintain social stability. The appearance and development of deputy workstations in Shenzhen attest to this. The deputy workstation located in Yueliangwan was the first in Shenzhen and one of the earliest in China. After the reform and opening up, Yueliangwan was planned to provide industrial land and many highly polluting factories were built there. As the economy developed, the area of the city increased and more residential communities were built near the factories in Yueliangwan, which led to numerous problems.27 In 2002, the government decided to build a waste incineration power plant in Yueliangwan, and the accumulating social disaffection soon erupted. Many residents protested and petitioned against the project. Thus, PC deputies were sent to inspect the site and listen to the residents’ opinions in an attempt to resolve the problem. According to Jiannan Ao, at a renowned local activist’s suggestion, some PC deputies, members of the political consultative conference, and representatives of the residents were invited to investigate similar power plants in Korea, Japan, and Macao. Ao reported his observation to the residents after he returned. The doubts and objections of the residents were relieved once they had learned more about the waste incineration power plants, and thus the project could start.28 Following this incident, the local cadres became aware of the importance of establishing a channel of communication between the government and residents. As a result, when Ao then asked whether the residents could contact the PC deputies if

24 Interviewee

5; see Zhang (2014) and 163.com (2010). 2. 26 Shenzhen CCP Committee (2015). 27 Zou and Chen (2007). 28 Ibid. 25 Interviewee

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required, the director of the street office confirmed that they could, inviting Ao and some of the residents to liaise with the PC deputies.29 In 2005, after being in an experimental stage for several years, the deputy workstation of Yueliangwan was formally set up. The workstation and its liaisons made huge efforts to solve the problems in Yueliangwan.30 The achievement of the Yueliangwan deputy workstation was admired by the local leaders, who decided to introduce deputy workstations throughout Shenzhen in 2008.31 By 2013, 141 deputy workstations in total had been established and deputies at all levels were allocated to specific workstations to fulfill their duties.32 The Shenzhen MPC required the deputies to participate in at least four activities at their workstations per year and these were necessary to reflect the issues put forward by people to the relevant departments, resolve any social contradictions and “make their own contributions to constructing a harmony society and community.”33 The establishment of deputy workstations in Shenzhen facilitated the connection between the deputies and people by providing the former with more opportunities to listen to the public’s opinions and offer people a convenient channel through which they could contact their deputies. More concerns of people could then be passed on by the PC deputies, not only during the PC sessions but also throughout the year. The deputy workstations thus improved the representation of the PCs. Furthermore, the demand by society for more representative PCs has also increased in highly developed Shenzhen, making MPC deputies more active. For example, in 2010 and 2011, a social group consisting of civil activists published the ranking lists of MPC deputies and members of the Political Consultative Conference, according to their motions and proposals. The lists sparked wide concern in society and prompted the MPC deputies to become more active.34 Pressure from Shenzhen’s highly developed media also drove the deputies to adopt greater responsibility.35 As the proportion of secondary and tertiary industries grows, the industrial structure becomes more diversified, and so do the interests of society, so the MPC deputies have a stronger incentive to express such interests. Many relevant proposals are submitted by the MPC deputies every year. For example, to boost the medical device industry in Shenzhen, one deputy suggested that the government should encourage hospitals to purchase domestic medical devices instead of imports.36 From 2010 to 2012, there were 279 proposals in the Shenzhen MPC addressing the development and regulation of specific industries, which made up 13.21% of the total.37 29 Interviewee

4; see also Zou and Chen (2007).

30 Ibid. 31 Fang

(2008). (2013). 33 General Office of Shenzhen MPC Standing Committee (2008). 34 Xu (2011). 35 Interviewee 5. 36 “Guanyu tuiguang guochan yiliao qixie zai woshi yingyong de jianyi 关于推广国产医疗器械 在我市应用的建议” (No. 20100036). Deputy Proposal of the Shenzhen MPC in 2010. 37 Calculated according to the contents of Shenzhen MPC Proposals, 2010–2012. 32 Gdrd.cn

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2.4.3 Capacities As noted previously, many capable and knowledgeable persons have been attracted to Shenzhen due to its modernized economy, thus it is less difficult for the Shenzhen MPC to co-opt talented deputies, which is also beneficial to its representation. For example, Zheng, Xueding, a very active deputy of Shenzhen MPC, was an accountant who was proficient in finance and economics, so his opinions were usually professional, pertinent and backed by data.38 Otherwise, as the region is relatively rich, the Shenzhen MPC is able to invest more resources in training its deputies and enhancing their capacity. One deputy spoke about how the Shenzhen MPC had organized deputies into groups to study at several top universities in China and the National People’s Congress. He stated that, when he first became a deputy, he was unaware of how to submit proposals but, after the training, he was able to understand and professionally check the departmental budgets.39 Lastly, the higher financial revenue of Shenzhen also gives the government a greater capacity to respond to the deputies’ requirements, motivating them to put forward more proposals.

2.5 The Impact of Legislative Representation on Regime Consolidation Does the rise of legislative representation consolidate the rule of the CCP? Based on the case of Shenzhen, it is found that such representation is a kind of restricted representation and that its development encourages the responsiveness of government to economic and social demands, but constitutes only a minor motivation for political transition.

2.5.1 Restricted Representation Restricted representation means that, on the one hand, deputies represent diversified social groups and interests to a certain extent but, on the other hand, the selection of deputies and their rights and behaviors are restricted by the rulers. The legislative representation in China can be defined as restricted representation. First, as many other studies have illustrated, the CCP manipulates the process of PC deputy election to guarantee that its preferred candidates are elected. According to the regulations, PC deputies are elected by either the lower-level PCs or by the voters 38 Zhang

(2014) and 163.com (2010). 5.

39 Interviewee

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directly. However, most of the candidates in these elections are in fact nominated or selected by the CCP, while ordinary PC deputies or voters are unable to nominate candidates based on their own preferences. Election campaigns rarely take place, as no candidates are allowed to conduct election propaganda or debates openly. Candidates who lack the support of the CCP face numerous difficulties in being elected.40 Second, the actual rights of the PC deputies are limited and the effectiveness of some of these rights relies on the support of the party. First, some important legal rights of deputies, such as interpellating or recalling major officials, cannot be exercised autonomously. The deputies who intend to use those rights must overcome the pressure from the authorities. Furthermore, without the support of the main PC leaders, who are more strictly selected by the party, some important rights of deputies become less powerful. For example, the actual influence of the proposals of the Shenzhen MPC deputies is, to a certain degree, dependent on the attitudes of the MPC officials. The key proposals (重点建议) selected by the council of MPC directors every year become more effective as the MPC leaders urge the relevant departments to take them more seriously. The government’s attitude toward the other proposals also partly relies on the pressure exerted by the MPC officials. Although the deputies have the right to require the relevant departments to respond to their proposals again if they are dissatisfied with the first response, they cannot ask them to consider the proposals a third time without obtaining permission from the council of directors.41 One Shenzhen MPC deputy made the following comment during an interview: The achievements of our deputies in this term should be owed to Director Bai of MPC. Nobody in government cares about us as the deputies outside the system. We mean nothing. We totally rely on the Standing Committee of the MPC backing us up.42

It is conceivable that, if a deputy attempts to use those rights to challenge the rule of the CCP, he or she will lose the support of the party and his or her rights will soon become far less effective, which is an important mechanism preventing PC deputies from becoming a threat to the regime. Third, PC deputies who refuse to obey the political discipline or who even intend to challenge the authority of the party are likely to be punished, possibly by exclusion from the PC in the next election or even immediately. When discussing the reelection of MPC deputies, a district-level PC official in Shenzhen said the following: The deputy who is too active and uncontrollable is unacceptable. Nobody dares to choose him. The person choosing him should be politically responsible for it, so we like the deputies to be a little more active on the one hand, but not to be too active on the other. They must be controllable, or the party secretary will query what the PC is doing.43

40 See,

e.g., Cai (2002), Sun (2013). Office of Shenzhen MPC Standing Committee (2013). 42 Interviewee 5. 43 Interviewee 2. 41 General

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As the Shenzhen MPC’s restricted representation develops, deputies are making more efforts to improve the responsiveness of the government but still keep silent about politically-sensitive issues.

2.5.2 Improving the Government’s Responsiveness to the Demands of the Residents The residents usually make many demands concerning their living facilities, streets and traffic, environmental hygiene, and public security. Many Shenzhen MPC deputies have urged the relevant government departments to respond to these demands. For example, after some residents voiced their concerns over a lack of space and facilities for recreation and sport, an MPC deputy serving in the community persuaded the government to construct a community square on disued land nearby and encouraged the public schools to open up their sport facilities to the public.44 To address the problem of streetlights being shaded by trees in another community, PC deputies at the municipal and district levels attended a meeting with officials from several departments and the residents. The government officials agreed first to prune the trees and then to lower the streetlights in order definitively to solve the problem.45

2.5.3 Improving the Government’s Responsiveness to the Demands of Social Groups Many MPC deputies in Shenzhen also strive to benefit specific social groups and urge the government to respond to their requirements. For example, one MPC deputy attempted to resolve taxi drivers’ difficulties over parking, toilets and dining by repeatedly submitting proposals over a period of several years. However, it was difficult for the government to find available land in Shenzhen to establish a taxi station for the drivers. The deputy was very anxious when his term was about to end, so he intended to address an inquiry to the relevant departments during an MPC session. The party secretary of the district persuaded him to abandon this inquiry by promising to solve the problem as soon as possible. After investigating more than ten potential locations, the department finally found two that were suitable for building taxi stations and that could accommodate a large number of drivers.46

44 Interviewee

5. (2014). 46 Interviewee 5. 45 Szlh.gov.cn

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2.5.4 Improving the Government’s Responsiveness to the Demand for Public Services The pressure from the MPC deputies also promotes the governments in Shenzhen to invest more resources in providing public services (such as education, medical services, and social welfare). In 2005, a budget review group consisting of Shenzhen MPC deputies discovered that the financial investment in the health system was insufficient and that the proportion of government appropriation in hospital incomes was declining year by year. The deputies believed this was one important reason for the high price of medical services. The government finally accepted the deputies’ advice and increased the health departments’ budgets. In 2007, the proportion of government appropriation in the income of the Shenzhen People’s Hospital grew from 4.38 to 11.32%.47

2.5.5 Improving the Government’s Responsiveness to the Demand for the Revoking of Unpopular Policies Shenzhen MPC deputies even have successfully impelled the government to withdraw some unpopular policies. In 2013, the Shenzhen government planned to build a coal-fired power plant in Baguang, Guangming New District, to resolve the problem of inadequate power levels. The policy incurred strong social objections after the media reported it. The argument was that the power plant would increase pollution and contradict the development goal of Guangming New District, which was to be constructed as a holiday resort.48 Many MPC deputies were also concerned about the issue and visited Baguang on June 5 to investigate. On June 28, as many as 43 Shenzhen MPC deputies jointly put forward an objection to the Baguang power plant, after which, on July 12, a further 39 deputies jointly submitted a similar proposal, resulting in more than one fifth of Shenzhen MPC deputies opposing the program. The pressure of the deputies led the Shenzhen government to declare the termination of the program at the end of August.49 Another case in 2014 concerned a magnetic levitation track, which was planned to be built alongside Liantang Street for the Metro Line 8 of Shenzhen. The residents of Liantang Street were extremely angry, as they thought that the track would damage their health and create a lot of noise. Many residents hung banners on their buildings and protested against the project over several weekends.

47 Liang

(2014). (2013) and Nanfang ribao (2013).

48 Guancha.cn 49 Ibid.

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Once aware of the protest, Deputy Xiao Youmei stated, in a Wechat50 group of PC deputies, her intention to visit Liantang Street to find out more about the incident. As many as 26 PC deputies from different levels joined her, and they arrived at Liantang Street on May 31. Their arrival prompted hundreds of residents to go to the street office where they met with the deputies, who promised to relay their demands to the relevant departments. The deputies then submitted a proposal requesting that the magnetic levitation track be changed to another mode. They also made an appointment with the officials from the relevant departments on June 5 so they could deliver their report and express the residents’ opinions.51 On June 13, the chair of Shenzhen Metro Company promised in the media to consider public opinion when deciding the mode of the track for Metro Line 8. On June 14, some PC deputies returned to Liantang Street and reported their actions and the progress to the residents. When Deputy Xiao inquired about the issue again during a breakfast meeting with Mayor Xu, Qing on August 26, an official replied that the government did not support building a magnetic levitation track there, and would later consult with the public about the mode of track to be used.52 After repeated communications between the residents, PC deputies, and government officials, a regular mechanism of communication between Metro Company and the residents was set up, and the banners hanging from the buildings were removed. The social conflict had been successfully settled through exerting the representative function of the MPC.53

2.5.6 Keeping Silent About Politically Sensitive Issues Although MPC deputies in Shenzhen are relatively active in voicing their own opinions, as noted previously, they tend to keep silent about issues that are politically sensitive. As Fig. 2.2 shows, in the three years from 2010 to 2012, more than half of the MPC deputies’ proposals were related to social and livelihood issues, at 59%, 68%, and 65%, respectively, while economic issues constituted 28%, 20%, and 23%, respectively. Other proposals were concerned with issues of public administration and culture, science, and sports. Only 7, 17, and 15 of the proposals focus on political and judicial issues in these three years, respectively, and the percentages they occupy are also the lowest, at 1%, 2%, and 2%, respectively. Most of these simply advised that limited improvements be made to the current political or judicial system. For example, one deputy recommended that the Shenzhen MPC should increase the use of inquiry rights and hold 50 A

social media channel which is very popular in China. (2014). 52 Xiao and Ge (2014). 53 Interviewee 5; see Xiao and Ge (2014); PC Standing Committee of Luohu. “‘Rendadaibiao jinshequ’ zhiduhua yunzuo de shijian yu sikao 《人大代表进社区》  制度化运作的实践与思考”. 51 Zhou

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100% 90%

14 49 7

80% 70%

22 54 17

25 52 15

154

185

148

Culture, Science and Sport Public AdministraƟon

60% 50%

PoliƟcs and Judicature

40% 30%

316

534

520

20%

Society and People's Livelihood

10% 0%

Economy

2010

2011

2012

Fig. 2.2 Contents of proposals submitted by Shenzhen MPC deputies, 2010–2012

an inquiry at every session of the Standing Committee.54 Other deputies suggested that the procuratorate and court should select public prosecutors or judges from outstanding lawyers.55 One proposal encouraged the government departments and PC deputies to set up public micro-blog accounts to develop their communication.56 None of the proposals raised any politically sensitive demands, such as protecting the freedom of the press, reforming the electoral system to make it more competitive, or making PCs or the courts more independent from the CCP. Even anti-corruption, which is always a hot topic in society, was only directly discussed in one proposal during the three years. The rise of restricted representation in Shenzhen is obviously not a challenge to CCP rule. The case of Shenzhen indicates that, as the MPC’s restricted representation improves, diverse social groups and interests can be partially represented and, to some extent, the government’s responsiveness to them is also strengthened. This relieves much of the social conflict and improves satisfaction with the government, thus contributing to social stability and regime legitimacy. Meanwhile, MPC deputies still remain silent on politically sensitive issues and do not aim to challenge the one-party rule. Consequently, it is concluded that the development of legislative representation in China is beneficial rather than harmful to the consolidation of the CCP regime.

jiaqiang shi renda changweihui gangxing jiandu de jianyi 关于加强市人大常委会刚 性监督的建议” (No. 20100490). Deputy Proposal of Shenzhen MPC in 2010. 55 “Guanyu xuanba youxiu lvshi danren faguan, jianchaguan de jianyi 关于选拔优秀律师担任法 官, 检察官的建议” (No. 20110179). Deputy Proposal of Shenzhen MPC in 2011. 56 “Guanyu zhengfu bumen, rendadaibiao kaitong weibo de jianyi 关于政府部门人大代表开通 微博的建议” (No. 20120280). Deputy Proposal of Shenzhen MPC in 2012. 54 “Guanyu

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2.6 Conclusion and Implications This chapter reveals that economic modernization boosts legislative representation by affecting the ideas, demands, and/or capacities of the local authorities, officials, PC deputies, and society. It also argues that the legislative representation in China is a form of restricted representation. The rise of legislative representation, on the one hand, improves the government’s responsiveness, thereby relieving much social conflict and increasing the satisfaction with the government; on the other hand, it does not challenge the rule of the CCP, which is beneficial to regime consolidation in China. The discoveries of this research imply that it is necessary for us to rethink modernization theory. On the one hand, as found in many other studies, economic modernization promotes the democratic transition in authoritarian regimes through various mechanisms.57 However, on the other hand, according to this research, economic modernization can also breed restricted representation in those institutionalized authoritarian regimes, which contributes to their survival. Therefore, the effects of economic modernization on democratization may be offset to a certain extent. In part, this may explain why in countries such as China the possibility of democratic transition does not obviously increase as the economy rapidly becomes more modernized.

Interviewee List 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Shenzhen MPC Deputy A, Shenzhen, 7 May 2013. District-level PC official B in Shenzhen, Shenzhen, 27 January 2015. Deputy Liaison C in Shenzhen, Shenzhen, 27 January 2015. Deputy Liaison D in Shenzhen, Shenzhen, 2 February 2015. Shenzhen MPC Deputy E, Shenzhen, 11 February 2015.

References 163.com. (2010, June 9). The first person who campaigned with posters in Shenzhen (in Chinese, 深圳现 海报竞选人大代表第一人 不愿徒有虚名 《网易网》 https://news.163.com/10/ 0609/11/68NUTKJB000146BD.html). Baguang power plant project has been stopped. (2013, August 8). Nanfang ribao (in Chinese, 坝光滨海电厂项目正式叫停《南方日报》https://epaper.southcn.com/nfdaily/html/2013-08/ 08/content_7214794.html). Barro, R. J. (1999). Determinants of democracy. Journal of Political Economy, 107(S6), S158–S183. 57 See,

e.g., Barro1999), Bollen (1979), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Huntington (1991), Jackman (1973), Lipset (1959), pp. 69–105, Londregan and Poole (1996).

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Bollen, K. A. (1979). Political democracy and the timing of development. American Sociological Review, 44(4), 572–587. Burkhart, R. E., & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1994). Comparative democracy: The economic development thesis. American Political Science Review, 88(4), 903–910. Cai, D. J. (Ed.) (2002). The Reports on China’s Elections. Beijing: Falv chubanshe (in Chinese, 蔡 定剑 编 (2002)《中国选举状况的报告》法律出版社:北京). Cho, Y. N. (2009). Local people’s congresses in China: Development and transition. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fang, X. Y. (2008, April 18). Guangyuan Ou said the experience of Yueliangwan work station was worth being popularized throughout the province when he visited Nanshan district. https://www. sznew.com (in Chinese, 方兴业 (2008) 欧广源在南山考察时表示月亮湾联络工作站经验值 得全省推广《深圳新闻网》https://sztqb.sznews.com/html/2008-04/18/content_138523.htm). Gdrd.cn. (2013, December 30). Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress’s exploration of promoting the work of local People’s Congress (in Chinese, 深圳市人大常委会推进地 方人大工作的探索 《广东人大网》 https://www.gdrd.cn/pub/gdrd2012/rdzt/rdxfz/xts/201312/ t20131230_138659.html). General Office of Shenzhen MPC Standing Committee. (2008, June 27). Instruction about the experiment of deputy work stations (in Chinese, 深圳市人大常委会办公厅 (2008) 关于试行 人大代表社区联络站的指导意见). General Office of Shenzhen MPC Standing Committee. (2013, December 16). The regulation of performance appraisal for addressing deputy proposals (in Chinese, 深圳市人大常委会办公厅 (2013) 深圳市人民代表大会代表建议、批评和意见办理绩效考核办法). Guancha.cn. (2013, July 3). 43 Shenzhen deputies opposed the construction of a power plant (in Chinese, 深圳43名人大代表联名反对建煤电厂 称不愿让PX事件重演《观察者网》from https://www.guancha.cn/Huanbaozhanlue/2013_07_03_155424.shtml.) He, J., & Liu, L. (2013). Research on the individual attribute and work performance of deputies of the National People’s Congress. Fudan xuebao(Shehui kexue ban), 2, 113–121 (in Chinese, 何 俊志, 刘乐明 (2013) 全国人大代表的个体属性与履职状况关系研究《复旦学报 (社会科 学版)》2, 113–121). He, J., & Wang, W. (2011). The membership structure of the deputies and their duty performances: A fuzzy-set analysis on township people’s congresses in 13 districts of Beijing. Nanjing shehui kexue, 1, 70–78 (in Chinese, 何俊志, 王维国 (2011) 代表结构与履职绩效:对北京市13个区 县的乡镇人大之模糊集分析《南京社会科学》1, 70–78). Huang, D., & Chen, C. (2015). Who are more active to fulfill the duties of the LPC deputies. Shehuixue yanjiu, 4, 169–193 (in Chinese, , (2015) 县级人大代表履职:谁更积 极? 《社会学研究》 , 4, 169–193). Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma press. Jackman, R. W. (1973). On the relation of economic development to democratic performance. American Journal of Political Science, 17(3), 611–621. Lai, H. H. (2001). Legislative activism and effectiveness of provincial delegates at the 1988 NPC. Issues & Studies, 37(1), 73–101. Li, X. (2015).‘Distributive politics’ among people’s representatives in China: An analysis of the proposals and queries in the provincial people’s congress of G province, 2009–2011. Kaifang Shidai, 4, 140–156 (in Chinese, 李翔宇 (2015) 中国人大代表行动中的“分配政治”——对 2009–2011年G省省级人大大会建议和询问的分析《开放时代》4, 140–156). Liang Y. X. (2014, July 31). Luohu district: Star deputies won applause with their hard work. https://www.sznews.com (in Chinese, 梁尹星. (2014) 罗湖区:明星代表用奔走赢掌声 《深圳新闻网》https://wb.sznews.com/html/2014-07/31/content_2958108.htm). Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. Londregan, J. B., & Poole, K. T. (1996). Does high income promote democracy? World Politics, 49(1), 1–30.

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MacFarquhar, R. (1998). Provincial people’s congresses. The China Quarterly, 155, 656–667. Manion, M. (2014). Authoritarian parochialism: Local congressional representation in China. The China Quarterly, 218, 311–338. Manion, M. (2015). Information for autocrats: Representation in chinese local congresses. New York: Cambridge University Press. Manion, M. (2016). ‘Good types’ in authoritarian elections. Comparative Political Studies, 50(3), 362–394. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414014537027. O’Brien, K. J. (1994). Agents and remonstrators: Role accumulation by chinese people’s congresses deputies. The China Quarterly, 138, 359–380. Shenzhen CCP Committee. (2015). Report in sixth congress of Shenzhen party representatives (in Chinese, 中共深圳市委 (2015) 解放思想 真抓实干 勇当“四个全面”排 头兵 努力建成现代化国际化创新型城市——在中国共产党深圳市第六次代表大会上的报 告 https://jb.sznews.com/html/2015-06/16/content_3254373.htm). Sun, Y. (2011). What drives reforms in local people’s congresses? The dynamics of local congressional developments in PRC: 1979–2011. PhD diss., Hong Kong University. Sun, Y. (2013). Municipal people’s congress elections in the PRC: A process of co-option. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(85), 183–195. Szlh.gov.cn. (2014). Deputies visited the community and made decisions (in Chinese, 代表进社区 议事决事《深圳新闻网》https://www.szlh.gov.cn/lhqrd/a/2014/e13/a262784_983750.shtml). Truex, R. (2016). Making autocracy work: Representation and responsiveness in modern China. Cambridge University Press. Xiao, Y., & Ge, W. (2014). Deputy Youmei Xiao asked Mayor Qin Xu a question about No.8 subway line. Luohuqu rendadaibiao huodong jikan, 3, 49 (in Chinese, 肖幼美, 葛微 (2014) 肖幼美代 表早 会上请问许勤市长地铁8号线问题《罗湖区人大代表活动季刊》3, 49). Xu, H. (2011, January 25). The ranking list of Shenzhen deputies’ performance was released. https://www.southcn.com (in Chinese, 许慧 (2011) 深圳两会代表履职榜出 企 业代表落“瓶底” 《南方网》https://news.southcn.com/d/2011-01/25/content_19569284.htm). Yang, Q. (2014). The duty of a deputy is to push the government. Luohu rendadaibiao huodong jikan, 3, 7–9 (in Chinese, 杨勤 (2014) 代表作用就是要让“一府两院”如履薄冰《罗湖人大 代表活动季刊》3, 7–9). Zhang, W. (2014, January 21). Xueding Zheng, a person who is open and manages to express himself https://www.ifeng.com (in Chinese, 张玮 (2014) “敢言善言者”郑学定《凤凰网》https://news. ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2014_01/21/33197902_0.shtml.). Zhou, J. (2014). Liantang group organized deputy activity to solve the problem of No.8 subway line. Luohuqu rendadaibiao huodong jikan, 3, 22 (in Chinese, 周建清 (2014)莲塘联组围绕缓 解地铁8号线矛盾, 组织开展代表进社区活动《罗湖区人大代表活动季刊》3, 22). Zou, S., & Chen, W. (2007). Constructing harmonious society: A case study of Yueliangwan deputy workstation in Shenzhen. Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe (in Chinese, 邹树彬, 陈文 编 (2007) 《构建和谐社区:深圳市月亮湾片区“人大代表工作站”个案研究》 重庆出版社:重庆).

Chapter 3

State-Led Digital Governance in Contemporary China Xiang Gao

Abstract Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has become the leading force in promoting governance modernization in China. Conventional wisdom adopts the state-society dichotomy and perceives China’s digitalization as a zerosum game between the state and society. Based on a comprehensive policy review and cross-region field studies, this chapter suggests that the measure of institutional change in examining ICT-driven political development shall move from the political system to the executive branch. The review of governance structure and digital policy since the 1980s presents a model of State-led digital governance. It confirms that the state has included containment as a strategy for digitalization but is also keen to facilitate digital technology for economic development and good governance in the executive branch of the government. This caged technology can build an iron cage for the administration system. In other words, digitalization might lead China towards a Weberian state that is highly regularized, centralized, and rationalized. This ICT-driven Weberian state contributes to a state of independence that is less likely to be captured by the society, and a centralized government system that exerts stricter control over the local agents. Keywords Digital governance · Institutional change · Political development · State-society relationship · Weberian state

3.1 Introduction China is one of the countries with the most advanced and widely used Information and Communication Technology (ICT). According to the OECD’s annual report on ICT development, China has done well in indicators such as accessibility, usage, and 1 OECD

(2019).

X. Gao (B) School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, No. 866 Yuhangtan Road, Hangzhou 310058, Zhejiang, China e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_3

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human resource.1 The Chinese government has played an essential role in promoting digitalization. It always keeps up the pace of technological development and prepares the infrastructures for the next-generation internet. For example, the Chinese government initiated a plan to upgrade the IPv4 to IPv6 since 2017. By the end of June 2019, China has 50, 268 32-bits IPv6 addresses, which is the world largest.2 The Chinese government also has an agenda of providing affordable internet services for all. In April 2015, Premier Li Keqiang mentioned at a public meeting that the “charge for data flow is too high.” The State Council later proposed to “speed up broadband and bring down internet rates” (Tisu jiangfei, 提速降费). These policies have contributed to the expansion of China’s netizens. China had 620,000 netizens in 1997. This number has increased to 0.85 billion by June 2019, accounting for 61.2% of China’s population.3 How will the development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) change the way in which China governs? Early studies suggested a model of technological empowerment, indicating that the civil society will co-evolve with the internet and lead to digital democracy (Yang, 2003a; Zheng, 2008). They believe that the expansion of the internet could contribute to a stronger society by informing the citizens through low-cost information, enabling collective actions, as well as providing the civic organizations with a new tool to develop (Yang, 2007). All of these changes would pressure the government to become more responsive and accountable (Yang, 2003b). However, others emphasize state control in the virtual space. They highlight that most of the Internet service providers (ISPs) are owned or strictly governed by the state to serve the regulatory goals (Harwit & Clark, 2006; Hu, 2011; Qiu & Liuning, 2005). Furthermore, while the information technology develops continually, so does the ability of the state to control the online society. The government has implemented frequent online censorship to contain short-term collective action (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013). Some recent studies point out that the state has also developed sophisticated skills to dominate the online discourse with strategies such as participatory persuasion (Repnikova & Fang, 2018) and emotional demobilization (Yang, 2017). To sum up, conventional wisdom focuses on the political system and perceives the ICT-driven institutional change as a battle between the state and society. The state-society dichotomy could be misleading by transplanting the perspective of power constraints in a democratic system to the non-democratic setting. As indicated by current studies, minimal evidence points to the conclusion that online society has promising prospects for facilitating political development in China. Part of such disappointment comes from the strict state control, and it is also reasonable to blame online popularism, racism (Cheng, 2011) and nationalism (Han, 2015). While the development on the side of the society remains vague, there are clues that the state is restructuring the administrative branch and bringing in elements of the modern 2 National

Internet and Information Center (中国互联网络信息中心), the Forty-fourth Statistical Report on China’s Internet Development (第四十四次《中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》 ), August, 2019. https://www.cac.gov.cn/2019-08/30/c_1124938750.htm. 3 Ibid.

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state, such as responsiveness, transparency, and accountability, by introducing information technologies to the system. Previously, Zheng (2008) noted that internet users could leverage the fragmentation of the administrative system to extend alliances in policy advocacy, while others have presented the local governments’ adoption of online communication platforms (Hartford, 2005). Nevertheless, few efforts have been made to examine the enacted technology inside the government system, the institutional change brought by these new technologies. This chapter aims to examine in depth China’s digital state from inside the government. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of the literature on China’s internet and political development. It suggests that the development of a civil society based on a state-society dichotomy shall not be the only measure of ICT-driven political development in contemporary China. The institutions serve different goals in the democratic and non-democratic system. While the democratic system pays more attention to popular representation in the political system, the non-democratic systems are more likely to devote efforts toward building the executive branch to develop the state capacity. In this context, the perspective of evolution, rather than revolution, could be more pragmatic in studying digitalization in China. Section 3 then depicts the model of “state-led” digitalization in China. It presents the leading role of the Chinese government in digitalization and distinguishes three different types of digital policy, including industrial policy, online censorship policy, and policies related to digital governance. It confirms China’s efforts to integrate the “caged information technology” into the administrative system. Section 4 offers a preliminary examination of China’s recent round of “Internet plus Government” since 2016 and discusses the possible institutional changes that have long term implications for the enacted information technologies. The last section concludes.

3.2 A Review of Studies on China’s Internet and Political Development Information is power. The studies on China’s internet development share the measure of political democratization with their western counterparts and assume that ICT has the potential for informing citizens through low-cost information and facilitating collective actions in the public sphere. However, there is no consensus about whether the expansion of the internet would lead China to democracy yet. As predicted by Taubman in 1998, the internet and non-democratic system would not co-exist peacefully together due to the decentralized nature of the internet (Taubman, 1998). Some scholars argue that the internet has empowered civil society, while others present evidence of state control. Despite these different viewpoints, both parties adopt the framework of a state-society dichotomy. They perceive ICT as a new tool that will either empower civil society to fight against the state or help the tyrant to contain society for the purpose of regime consolidation.

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Many of the early studies on the internet anticipated that technology would empower the civil society and bring in democratic governance ultimately. The origin of these observations was China’s laissez-faire internet development in the late 1990s (Damm & Thomas, 2006). At the beginning of the internet’s development in China, the government devoted considerable efforts to investing in the infrastructures, yet the concern with regulating the virtual space remained limited. The absence of online regulation is partly because the responsible agency, the National Coordinating Group for Internet and Information Security (国家网络与信息安全 协调小组), was not established until 2003. Without censorship, the early days of the internet offered great potential for facilitating civil society development in China. Yang (2003a) suggests a model of co-evolution between the internet and civil society. He identified three critical roles of the internet in nudging civil society development: namely, to foster debate in the public sphere (Yang & Calhoun, 2007), to facilitate social organization activities (Yang, 2007), and to bring in new elements of social protests such as online activism (Yang, 2003b; 2009). The internet-empowered civil society has proven to be an influential force in China’s policy process (Zheng, 2008). The case of Sun Zhigang was a symbolic event of “Crowed Changes China” (围观 改变中国). In March 2003, Sun, a 27-year-old migrant worker from Wuhan, Hubei, was detained and later beaten to death in Guangzhou, Guangdong, because he did not possess a temporary resident permit. The Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市 报) reported this case in April, and the news immediately caused a national outcry via the internet. With pressure from public opinion, the State Council abolished the “Detention and Repatriation Policy” (收容遣送条例) as early as August. As the power of the online civil society grew, so did the awareness of the state regarding internet regulation. The Chinese government has always played an active role in informatization. However, it mainly perceived the internet as an industry of the future that requires state support or a communication channel between China and the world with regard to diplomacy matters.4 The expansion of the online civil society, especially the online activism and offline protests facilitated by the internet, has reminded the government that the internet could also be a force that challenges the regime legitimacy. Since then, a large number of studies have presented the Chinese government’s efforts to contain the possible side-effects of the internet. First, China has developed a framework of regulation for the internet service providers (ISPs) to ensure the effectiveness of the Great Firewall, which aims to block unintended information entering the country from abroad (Harwit & Clark, 2006). Second, the government has established new agencies to censor the internet content providers. Content censorship is a more difficult task compared to the ISPs’ regulation. Most ISPs are SOEs and are dependent regulatory intermediaries of the government, managed by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) (Hu, 2011), but the internet is “government-regulated commercial spaces” (Jiang, 2010). The private sector is more interested in income than in ideology. Despite these difficulties, China established the “National Coordinating Group for Internet and Information Security” (国家网络与信息安全协调小组) in 2003 and later required the Propaganda 4 Author’s

Interview, September 2019, Hangzhou.

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Department (宣传部) and the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (中央网络安全与信息化委员会办公室) to take charge of online public opinion management. These agencies have developed their skills in online censorship quickly. For example, the government used only to punish the politically sensitive content providers as a warning to netizens to exercise self-censorship (Harwit & Clark, 2001), but it had deployed a range of tactics to govern the virtual spaces with advanced technologies related to online surveillance and censorship by the end of the first decade of the 21st century (King et al., 2013; MacKinnon, 2011). Third, studies also show that the government has changed from being passive to proactive regarding cyberspace management in recent years. According to Repnikova and Fang (2018), there is a new strategy of “participatory persuasion 2.0,” as the state “has been continuously moving away from explicit, crude tactics of the past toward more subtle and orderly mechanism of the present.” As indicated by recent publications, the Propaganda Department now pays more attention to propagating its ideology in the virtual space (Yang, 2014), distracting public attention from the sceptics regarding the Party and government (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017; Repnikova & Fang, 2019), and demobilizing online activism by labelling the discourse related to popular protest uncivilized (Yang, 2017). All of these discussions on civil society development and the state’s efforts to contain it are correct. However, it is also worth noting that the hidden assumption of the state-society dichotomy underlying these discussions could hinder us from understanding the long-term effect of internet development in China. The authors of these studies were keen to examine the dynamics between the internet-empowered online civil society and the changeless government. The measure adopted in these studies for examining the state-society relationship is limited to the criterion of the extent to which society can constrain the power of the state and cause a revolution that will transform China into a democratic system. The other forms of state-society interaction at the sub-political level, if not neglected entirely, are considered as secondary as there is no substantial power-sharing (Hartford, 2005). These researchers also studied the role of the state in the internet era, but with bias. The state’s efforts to control the internet have been examined thoroughly, while the institutional changes driven by the new technology inside the government have received less attention than they deserve. There are many dimensions for examining the political development in building a modern state. The measure of political democratization or formal power-sharing between the state and society is critical, but the exclusive focus on these points could lead to an oversimplified understanding of ICT-driven political development in China. The democratic and non-democratic systems have very different perceptions of the institution. While the democratic countries weigh the political institutions that could curtail the power of the state, the non-democratic ones are more interested in developing their state capacity. Thus, the same information and communication technology will be enacted in different ways in different settings of political regime. The next section presents China’s enacted information technology. It confirms that

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the ICT-driven political development in China is more likely to be a story of evolution rather than revolution. It is in this context that this chapter studies information technology and its effects from the long-neglected perspective of the state.

3.3 China’s State-Led Digitalization and Digital Governance The Chinese government is a leading force in China’s digitalization, and it has established a series of national-level leading organizations to guide China’s informatization and subsequent digitalization. As early as 1986, the State Council approved the establishment of the State Economic Information Center (国家经济信息中 心),5 which aims to provide quality policy analysis reports with the support of the new information technologies. In 1993, the Chinese government initiated the Joint Meeting of State Economic Informatization (国家经济信息化联席会议) and later upgraded it to the Steering Work Group on Informatization of the State Council (組 国务院信息化工作领导小组), headed by the then deputy premier, Zou Jiahua. The executive office of the Work Group later merged into the Ministry of Information Industry (信息产业部). This was a milestone that signaled the institutionalization of China’s state strategy of promoting information industry development. However, the State Council noted that the ministry lacked sufficient authority to organize crossorganization collaboration in promoting informatization. Thus, the State Council established the National Steering Workgroup on Informatization Work (国家信息 化工作领导小组) in 1999. In order to coordinate the related ministries effectively, this new workgroup was headed by Wu Bangguo, the then member of the Central Politburo and deputy premier of the State Council. It is important to note that all of these efforts by the state in response to the fastmoving information technology of the 20th century are development-oriented. They perceive ICT as a tool for either assisting the public administration or for promoting the industry of the future. It was not until the beginning of the 21st century that the Chinese government began to deal with internet security issues. In August 2001, the CCP’s Central Committee decided to reestablish the National Steering Work Group on Informatization Work (国家信息化工作领导小组) and, for the first time, highlighted the leading role of the central party committee in information security issues. Two years later, China set up the National Coordinating Group for Internet and Information Security (国家网络与信息安全协调小组), which was headed by a Standing Committee member of the Politburo. After that, China began to develop a sound administrative system for managing online opinions. Today, the Central Propaganda Department, together with the office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (中央网络安全与信息化委员会办公室) and the Cyberspace Administration of China (国家互联网信息办公室), take charge of internet security. The 5 The

State Economic Information Center was renamed the State Information Center in 1988, and signed by Deng Xiaoping.

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Central Propaganda Department takes the leading role in coordinating public opinion management, including online public opinion analysis, and containing discourse in the virtual space that might be harmful to the national security. The Ministry of Public Security is part of the governance system regarding internet security as well. However, it is mainly responsible for monitoring and responding to events that might cause a public safety crisis, such as gambling, drug-dealing and mounting social protests without permission. The evolution of the leading groups on informatization and digitalization suggests that China has mixed goals with regard to managing ICT. There are three types of public policies that serve different goals in China’s digitalization: the industrial policy for boosting long-term economic development, the regulation policy aiming to consolidate the regime legitimacy, and the agenda of ICT-driven government reform for good governance. First, China proposed a series of industrial policies to promote economic development. For example, China confirmed informatization as a national strategy of economic development in the Ninth Five Year Plan. This plan set concrete goals, such as the total capacity of telephone exchange should reach 174 billion, and the total length of toll cable should reach 210,000 km by 2000. After 2012, the Chinese government further proposed the concept of Digital China, demanding that the National Developmental and Reform Committee (NDRC) and the MIIT should make plans for digital industries development and the upgrading of the ICT infrastructures. For instance, the State Council issued “The Opinions on Promoting Innovative Development of Cloud Computing and Fostering New Form of Information Industry” (关于促进云计算创新发展 培育信息产业新业态的意见) and “The Executive Summary of Accelerating Big Data Development” (促进大数 据发展行动纲要) in 2015. These are typical industrial policies of a developmental state as the government aims to facilitate long-term economic development by incorporating the cutting-edge technology and industry. Second, China also implements online censorship for internet security, which has attracted considerable attention from observers. In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping stated: “if you open the window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in.” This phrase became the political and ideological background of China’s “Golden Shield Project” (GSP) in the Ninth Five Year Plan, which aims to shield China from unintended information in the virtual space. This Golden Shield, built by the Ministry of Public Security, is mainly designed to combat crime. Afterward, China developed the Great Firewall (GFW) to block undesirable foreign websites and censor online discourse. The relationship between the GSP and the GFW is unclear, but it is clear that the Chinese government has established a sound administrative system for internet security, to prevent possible threats to public safety and regime legitimacy. The governance structure, policy and the political consequences have been scrutinized in the literature related to China studies (Damm & Thomas, 2006; Harwit & Clark, 2001; Hu, 2011; Qiu & Liuning, 2005). While the internet regulation policy has been examined thoroughly, the policies of digital governance, which also have a significant political effect, have been neglected or at least understudied. Digital governance refers to the practice whereby

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the government incorporates ICT, including digital technology, into the administrative system or public governance. The Chinese government began to use ICT in the administrative system in the 1980s, and there were at least three stages of promoting the digitalization of the government system. The main task of the first stage was to build an information system inside the government. As early as the mid-1980s, the central government introduced the office automation system, and a few local governments kept pace with Beijing to develop administrative efficiency. Later, in the 1990s, the Chinese government stepped up the informatization of the administrative system and initiated the Golden Projects in response to the United States’ proposal of an Information Superhighway. The Golden Projects aim to build infrastructures of national information systems. They began with the three golden projects, including the Golden Bridge for a nationwide network of economic information, the Golden Gate for international trade, and the Golden Cards for electronic currency. Later, the Golden Projects were expanded to fields like education, industrial production and circulation, taxation, agriculture, transport, and Medicare and health service, etc. While the first stage of the ICT-driven government reform took place inside the government organization, the focus of the second stage of the Chinese government’s digitalization was open government. In 1999, China launched the “Government Go Online” (政府上网) project. The original intention of this plan was to improve government transparency. It suggested that the internet is a convenient approach to providing sufficient, accessible public information. By the end of June 2019, there were 15,143 government websites in China. Most of these websites are operated by the prefectural level government and focus on information delivery (Fig. 3.1). However, some local governments have gone beyond the one-way information delivery, and have set up online communication channels such as the “Mayors Email box” to provide citizens 140000 120000

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with a low-cost channel for making complaints, or have developed online government services, license applications, for example, to provide efficient and quality government services. The first and second stages of the ICT-driven government reform mainly perceived information technology as a tool for implementing the government’s functions, and online government is an extension of the government in the virtual space. In other words, there has been no systematic restructuring of the government. After the Eighteenth Party Congress, the digitalization of the Chinese Government entered a third stage, with a higher level of integration between the technology and the institution. For one thing, it proposed the concept of “Internet-plus Government.” This suggests a virtual government where the citizens can access quality public services at one attempt, rather than running between the fragmented public agencies. For another, it also aims to utilize new information technologies such as big data and artificial intelligence for rational policymaking. The application of these new technologies requires data sharing inside the government system, and thus calls for cross-border collaboration between departments, and governments from different jurisdictions, as well as at different levels. Since 2015, China’s digital governance has flourished in many regions, including Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Beijing and Wuhan in Hubei, where these governments have undergone a deep level of restructuring. By mapping the leading governance structure and the critical policy areas of China’s digitalization, it is safe to conclude that a state-led model of digitalization is rising in contemporary China. State-led does not equal state control, which assumes the hidden perspective of the dichotomy between the state and society. The model of state control assumes that a growing civil society in China could pose a challenge to the state authority, and a strong state will inevitably contain the expansion of society. In other words, the model of state control emphasizes a zero-sum game between the state and society. The state-led model has another perspective. It acknowledges that the state regulates the internet and contains the development of online civil society. However, it also notes the state’s efforts toward utilizing ICT for economic development and good governance. In other words, the state is searching for economic development and good governance through caged technology. The political implication of ICT-driven good governance has been underestimated. Since the late 1990s, China has developed several forms of government applications of digital technology, including the information system for efficient administration, the online government for transparent information delivery, the one-stop virtual government service for convenient and efficient accessibility, and the communication platforms for government-citizen communication. These administrative uses of ICT are usually considered politically unrelated. The online communication platforms for citizen participation is the closest format of democratic governance and has attracted academic attention. However, conventional wisdom suggests that even these online communication platforms are “more likely to be effective in improving bureaucraticadministrative operations than in fostering participatory-democratic developments or progress towards civil society” (Hartford, 2005). Overall, the current studies perceive ICT-driven government reform as a tool for delivering information and services

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(Damm, 2006; Lollar, 2006), to improve public satisfaction (Balla, 2014) and to consolidate political legitimacy (Schlæger & Jiang, 2014). In other words, the effects of digital governance are mainly administrative in nature, rather than political. The above perceptions of digital governance could be misleading for two reasons. First, the management’s use of digital technology may be mainly politically inspired, seeking to promote China’s political development. For instance, the Golden Projects initiated in the Ninth Five Year Plan were designed to promote the efficient management of vertical management departments, such as the taxation bureau. However, they are also in line with the soft centralization of China’s state capacity-building in the late 1990s (Mertha, 2005). In other words, it is essential to estimate the unintended political consequences of digital governance in China. Second, digital governance is an area where the government is willing to promote, rather than to contain, which makes it more promising in China than e-democracy. It is an acknowledged truth that the internet has fostered e-participation as a new form of democracy in western countries. However, technology alone does not determine its implications for governance. As recent studies suggest, the Chinese government has become skilful in containing the online civil society. In studying the socioeconomic and political effects of digitalization, it is more important to examine the enacted technology than the objected technology (Fountain, 2001). Objected technology refers to the internet, big data, and artificial intelligence, while enacted technology includes the users’ perception, design and use of that technology. In China, digital governance is an area which the government is willing to support and has the potential to bring about substantial political development. The following section provides a brief examination of the possible dynamics of this area in recent years.

3.4 Institutional Change in the Digital Era: A Preliminary Examination of China’s State-Led Digitalization The studies on the internet in China usually perceive digital governance at the subpolitical level as less necessary for political development. However, a preliminary examination of the Chinese government’s digitalization suggests that this could be a misinterpretation. Previously, a series of studies focused on the Chinese government in the digital era (Jiang, Meng, & Zhang, 2019; Meng, Pan, & Yang, 2017; Su & Meng, 2016). The researchers concluded that the research question should go beyond whether or not the Chinese government is responsive to public opinion to examine the variation in responsiveness across subjects, institutions and regions. This section focuses on the less frequently chosen perspective of institutional change inside the government system, driven by the enacted digital technology. It suggests that the non-political use of ICT in the administrative system is giving rise to a Weberian State in China. This institutional change has limited impact in terms of curtailing the despotic power of the chief executive over the decision-making but could put the administrative power under check through a rationalized digital cage.

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3.5 The “Self-Revolution” of the Chinese Government with Information Technology Since 2016, the Chinese government has initiated a new round of digitalization and summarized it as the “self-revolution of the government” (政府的自我改革). As in many other countries, the Chinese government is a multi-level bureaucratic organization with a divisional system. The enormous scale makes it challenging to coordinate cross-border collaboration between different levels, regions and divisions. The complexity of the government has led to poor government service quality and an unsupported “Doing Business Environment.” A national survey in 2015 shows that only 52.68% of respondents positively rated the most common and straightforward government service of obtaining an ID card.6 Other, more complicated tasks, such as obtaining a construction license, could take more than one year. To deal with this problem, the Chinese government proposed the implementation of a “one-stop service” since the late 1990s. However, the local governments were only able to require their departments and agencies to send office clerks to the “Administrative Service Center” (ASC), but failed to develop a holistic government where the related divisions were coordinated smoothly, based on process reengineering and power restructuring. Such failure of government reform is not difficult to picture. None of the local governments or their departments are willing to surrender their discretionary power, and neither does the high-level government possess sufficient tools to keep their subordinates in check. The self-revolution of the government thus refers to the ICT-support government reform, or “Internet-plus Government Service” (互联网+政务服务), according to the Chinese government. This suggests that the government could realize those promised quality public service through the new information technology. There are two distinctive characteristics of the “Internet-plus Government Service.” First, it is citizen-centred or people-centred. The State Council suggested that local governments should provide accessible government services following the citizens’ demands. In order to make this idea of being “people-centred” practical, some provincial governments proposed the slogan of “Once at Most” (最多跑一次) and stipulated that all departments and local governments should ensure that the citizens only have to go to the government once for each government service. The higher level government also conducted a third-party survey on citizen satisfaction to ensure the local governments’ compliance. The second characteristic of the “Internet-plus Government Service” is the indepth cross-border collaboration inside the government, which is also the supportive institution of the “Once-at-Most.” To ensure a one-stop or even no-stop, no-table government service, the Chinese government has initiated a significant level of government restructuring. There are three types of restructuring, including information sharing, process reengineering, and power reallocation. Information sharing is the initial request in “Once-at-most.” It aims to deal with the problem whereby citizens 6 Data

Source: The 2015 China General Social Survey.

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must apply for certification of their eligibility for government service. The proposal of the “Internet plus Government Service” suggests that the government shall not ask citizens to provide such certification if the related data have already been recorded inside the government. It stipulated that it is the responsibility of the government agencies to share information to verify citizens’ eligibility. Due to the scale and complexity of the data sharing, China has established Big Data Bureaus at the levels of the province, prefecture, and county since 2016. The Big Data Bureaus are responsible for cross-departmental and regional data sharing, and their main tasks at this stage are to build new information systems, link the OA systems of each department and develop public-data sharing platforms for data collection and sharing. In the meantime, responsible government departments are also beginning to redesign their administrative process. The process reengineering aims to simplify those crossdepartment government services by adjusting or building the Office Automatic Systems. This is a typical process of scientific management, and apparently accompanies power reallocation across the departments. It is precisely because the government shall break the department boundaries, redesign the work procedure, and reallocate the administrative powers that the Chinese government perceives the “Internet-plus Government Service” as a self-revolution of the government. For scholars familiar with China’s administration system reform, or One-Stop Service, No Table Service in western countries, this “Internet plus Government Service” is not new. However, one crucial characteristic of this round of government reform is its in-depth use of information and communication technology. For one thing, the internet-based online communication technology has consolidated all of the new procedures, standards, and authority of approval as digital codes. For another, the information sharing based on big data and cloud calculation has connected the formerly decentralized and fragmented information. This top-down promoted digitalization has led to the Chinese virtual government within a short period. Now, Chinese citizens, particularly those from the eastern coastal areas, can easily access government service via their computer, mobile phone, or automatic service machine located in their neighborhoods. They feel like they are dealing with one government agency, yet there are a series of departments either automatically approving their application or sending the necessary data to verify their eligibility. This progress is vital and eye-catching, yet it is just the tip of the systematic change that has taken place within the Chinese government in the digital era.

3.6 Digital Governance, Institutional Changes and Their Political Implications Political scientists usually have little interest in a one-stop service or virtual government. It is the tradition in a democratic system to frame a constitution rather than to run one. However, as pointed out by the wise words of Woodrow Wilson in 1887, the administration is “raised very far above the dull level of mere technical

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detail by the fact that thought its greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting maximins of political wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress” (Wilson, 1887). For political scientists, digital governance is less critical because it is unrelated to the establishment of a representative agency. China’s digitalization of the administrative system does not curtail the despotic power of the chief executive. However, it keeps the discretionary power of the executive branch under check and has contributed to the centralization of the administrative system. Both suggest that digital governance is leading to a robust Weberian state in China. The most significant change driven by the enacted ICT is the formation of a Weberian state in China. There are two main aspects of the modern state: the political system and the administrative system. The political system aims to build the mechanism for popular representation in decision-making. This process is about creating a power balance between the interest groups and between the state and society. The administrative system has a more proactive perception of power. It is more interested in developing the infrastructure power of the administrative system. However, it also needs to address the problem of power abuse within the administration. The democratic system can regulate the administrative system with the support of an independent civil society and the separation of power between the political, justice and administrative branches. Both institutions are absent in non-democratic systems. Thus, it is challenging for the ruling party of non-democratic regimes to keep their subordinates in check. Studies suggest that the mobilization system or a top-down inspector system are designed to correct misbehavior at the grassroots level (Kennedy & Chen, 2018). However, neither of these institutions is operated on a daily basis and thus is insufficient. The information and communication technologies have provided the Chinese government with a new approach to keeping the executive branch under check. Instead of building an iron cage of institutions, the digitalization of the government has successfully kept the administrative power within the iron cage of codes. Digitalization requires departments and agencies at all levels to extend their government service in the virtual space. To make online services available, the government agencies must streamline the work procedure and set clearly-defined standards for verifying the eligibility of each step. Thus, the once-vague criteria of discretion power have become the computer phrase of “if, then,” which has left no room for individual decision-making. With the support of ICT, the Chinese government is approaching Max Weber’s design of a stick by the rules organization. This digital Weberian state is unlikely to be captured by the interest groups in society and can provide impartial government services to the public. To summarize, the enacted ICT has empowered the Chinese government to become a capable organization that is independent from society. This regularized and rational Weberian organization could serve any purpose, which contributes to the growing state capacity, or infrastructure power, of the Chinese Government. The development of the administrative systems’ infrastructure power is just the beginning of the story. Another important institutional change within the ICT-driven government reform is the tendency toward centralization inside the government system. Conventional wisdom highlights the flattening organization in digitalization,

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indicating a tendency toward decentralization. It is indeed correct that one advantage of information technology is information transmission. Digitalization has reduced the cost of communication across the different levels of organizations. In a private organization, ICT may lead to decentralization as now the frontline manager can directly communicate with the headquarters. In a multi-level government system, however, ICT has empowered the higher level of government to manage local affairs directly. For instance, the prefectural level government can now collect sufficient information about county or district governance at far lower cost. As the span of control expands, the prefectural level government can step into local governance without depending on the county or district government. Digitalization is empowering the central state, rather than the local state.

3.7 Conclusion and Discussion Information technology is an essential force for political development in a modern state, yet its approaches and functions in democratic and non-democratic regimes are quite different. In countries with democratic systems, ICT could give play to its nature of decentralization and thus empower the civil society to develop from e-government to e-democracy. However, it is not the objective but the enacted technology that determines the impact of the digitalization. In non-democratic regimes such as China, the state has adopted the strategy of caged technology. The caged technology, a particular form of digitalization, suggests that the government would contain the internet in shaping and empowering a civil society, which could pose a threat to the regime legitimacy. It also notes that the government is utilizing digital technology to boost economic development and incorporating information technology into the administrative system for good governance. This selective use of information technology confirms Slater’s differentiation of institutionalization in the democratic and non-democratic systems. He suggests that “democratic institutions fundamentally serve to provide stable patterns of popular representation” by “constraining the chief executive’s ‘despotic power’,” while “authoritarian institutions primarily serve to provide a stable basis for domination” and “to supply a regime with the ‘infrastructural power’ necessary to implement its command” (Slater, 2003). Based on a comprehensive policy review of China’s digitalization, we suggest that a careful examination of the administrative system with digital technology should provide a pragmatic approach for studying the political implications of China’s stateled digital governance. In other words, it is a perspective of evolution, rather than revolution. It is in this context that we could revise Taubman’s prediction in 1998, as digital technology could also contribute to the formatting of a powerful central state. Taubman predicted the inevitable tension between the internet, with its nature of decentralization, and the non-democratic countries, with their tendency toward centralization(Taubman, 1998). With the caged technology, there is still tension between the internet and the state, yet the political consequences of digitalization are more

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likely to empower the central state than vice versa. The preliminary examination of China’s recent digitalization suggests that information and communication technology can enhance the infrastructure power of the state. First, the executive branch has been regularized, as the administrative power is now in the cage of the codes. Without a healthy civil society and an independent justice system, the ruling party, with despotic power, will struggle to make the agencies behave. With digital technology, the state is now able to make the once soft procedures and standards robust. By keeping the administrative power in the cage of codes, the central state is now able to keep the administrators in check. Secondly, digitalization also contributes to state centralization. Information technology is advantaged in communication as it overcomes the physical distance associated with information transmission. This advantage of communication has enhanced the ability of the central state to control its local agencies. Third, the state has been enhanced because the digitalization is creating a rational state. This rationalization comes from two approaches. The first approach is regularization based on scientific management. It is mostly seen in practices related to the process reengineering of the administrative system. The second approach comes from the essential characteristic of digital technology in calculation or decision making. The Weberian-style government based on documentation is born to be a data collector. The digital technology has amplified this aspect of the government and further expanded its ability to calculate the behavior patterns of the mass. Thus, the state is able to deliver services that accord with the citizens’ preferences. It is a new form of popular representation in many ways, but without a fundamental change to the political system. To conclude, China’s digitalization using caged technology could give rise to a Weberian state that is regularized, centralized, and rationalized.

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Chapter 4

Managing the People’s Liberation Army Laura-Anca Parepa

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to explore the civil-military relations in China after 1989, in a context characterized by the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to enhance the state capacity in order to stabilize its governance. More specifically, the paper will shed light on how the Chinese Communist Party managed its relationship with the People’s Liberation Army in balancing the need for a strong military with the need to maintain its authority over the military organization. The findings show that the Chinese Communist Party successfully made use of the policy readjustments and newly-created state mechanisms to accommodate the military’s needs for development and organizational autonomy, while curtailing the financial autonomy and those roles that might give the People’s Liberation Army leverage over the Party. Keywords Civil-military relations · Civil-military integration · PLA · Military autonomy

4.1 State Capacity and Civil-Military Relations The year 1989 marked the fall of authoritarian regimes in Eastern and Central Europe and the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests, events that significantly shaped the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter, the CCP). For the Chinese political leaders, the internal and international events of 1989 opened the way for a process of re-evaluation and readjustment of the relationship between the CCP and other key actors in the society, including the People’s Liberation Army (hereinafter, the PLA).

This article reproduces passages (from sections 1.4, 3.1, 3.5, 6.3) and sections 4.5–4.7 from the author’s doctoral dissertation entitled “Constructing Concordance in Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Sources of Regime Stability and External Activism” (University of Tsukuba, 2017). L.-A. Parepa (B) Institute of Policy Studies & College of Policy Studies, Tsuda University, Sendagaya 1-18-24, Shibuya, Tokyo 151-0051, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_4

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This process involved a change in the CCP’s identity from a “revolutionary party” to a “governing party” (see p. 20 in Heath 2014), for which the ability to provide solutions to concrete problems of governance has become of vital significance. In the long term, such transformation seeks to reassess the pre-eminence of the CCP based on public support and to reduce the need to rely excessively on coercion. In order to be able to design and implement effective policies through which it seeks to provide public goods, the CCP has made significant efforts to enhance various dimensions of the state capacity. State capacity is understood in the academic literature as a complex concept that encompasses several dimensions, including administrative, fiscal, legal, military and the quality and coherence of the political institutions (Hendrix 2010; Cingolani 2013). Scholars have provided significant evidence that authoritarian regimes might attempt to make use of state capacity as a tool to stabilize their rule (Andersen et al. 2014; Slater and Fenner 2011; Hanson 2018). Hellmann (2018) contends that the ability to use the state effectively toward desired political ends is affected by several contextual factors. The present article considers that the civil-military relations represent one of these, as the evolving interactions between the political and the military elites can either boost or hinder Party’s endeavors. Among the several dimensions of state capacity, military capacity, known also as the coercive capacity, has high significance regarding the stability and security of any given state. The existence of a strong military organization—that is able to guarantee the national security—can be considered one of the indicators of a state’s coercive capacity. This capacity is also reflected by the existence of effective mechanisms that oversee the implementation and coordination of the military policies, ensure accountability in defense matters or provide a framework for policy-making (Cottey et al. 2002).1 Nevertheless, the coercive capacity has a dual character: it can be used to safeguard the national territory from external threats and guarantee the security of the citizens, but can also be used to suppress disobedient actions against the state’s authorities and subdue any form of dissent. Concretely, in the case of China, the CCP has several reasons for supporting a strong military organization: first, the PLA needs to be able to fulfil its fundamental function of providing the national defense; second, it can attenuate potential interferences and pressure from external forces for democratization (Chin 2015); third, it can discourage separatist activities in particular regions; and, fourth, a loyal PLA under the CCP’s authority can play a significant role in time of authoritarian breakdown. Nevertheless, supporting the development of the PLA does not come without risks for the CCP. Scholars dealing with civil-military relations emphasize that the PLA might develop a corporate character, which is defined by Huntington (1962) as a “sense of organic unity and consciousness.” A corporate identity will influence the behavior of the military organization, leading to a “bifurcation” between the Party and the PLA (Bickford 2001; Li 2010; Paltiel 1995). Guided by own interests and 1 The coercive capacity can also include paramilitary, internal security forces and other enforcement

or intelligence agencies. This article refers to only one of these organizations: the People’s Armed Police.

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specific needs, the PLA might choose to provide support to the citizenry in time of massive social unrest or even to become a praetorian military (Mulvenon 2001). Such paradox requires an increased ability on the part of the CCP to manage the PLA in balancing the need for a strong military with the need to maintain its authority over the military organization. Traditional theories of civil-military relations hold that non-democratic regimes rely on different measures to maintain their authority over the military: strict control and intrusive surveillance through security mechanisms and party organizations (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Shirk 1993; Cheung 2015), the co-optation of military leaders into the party leadership and the political indoctrination of the military (Colton 1979; Odom 1978; Kolkowicz 1967; Herspring and Volgyes 1978). However, the reality of the authoritarian regimes across the world, and particularly the lessons that can be drawn from the civil-military relations in the former communist regimes of Eastern and Central Europe, has shown that such methods do not always achieve their aim. New theoretical contributions to civil-military relations, on which this article is built, tend to highlight the relevance of several other factors. The existence of accommodation and agreement in the definition of the responsibilities and roles of the military organization (Schiff 1995, 2009; Burk 2002; Bland 1999), and the ability of the political leaders “to fit the armed forces into its broader policy goals” facilitate the achievement of political authority over the military and reduces the necessity for intrusive control (Norden 2008). Scholars also acknowledge that, due to its fundamental functions of national defense and its functional imperative, the military seeks to promote its own development goals and obtain certain autonomy. Military development refers here to the modernization of military capabilities and the professionalization of human resources, but also includes the allocation of the necessary resources for these processes, which can involve a high financial burden. Autonomy refers to the exclusiveness of the military in institutionalizing the rules for promotion, controlling recruitment and training, defining their doctrines, and increasing the technical and technological competencies, which allows it to run with minimal external interference (Pion-Berlin 1992; Kamrava 2000; Schiff 1995; Herspring 2013; Bland 1999). Stepan makes an important point in contending that the military will accept specific limitations or changes to their rights and autonomy without contestation if such aspects “are viewed by both military and civilian leaders as an overall model of governance and civil-military relations” (see p. 93 in Stepan 1998). Therefore, the present article focuses on the policies and institutional measures adopted by the CCP in regard to the military’s roles, development and autonomy. The three aspects selected for examination are prone to create potential ground for disagreements between the CCP and the PLA. Thus, the modalities in which the CCP chooses to deal with these aspects can facilitate or inhibit the supportive attitude of the PLA toward the CCP by weakening or strengthening its governance. Methodologically, this research examines the policies and measures embraced during the presidential tenures of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping until 2017,

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although brief reference may be made to the previous period for comparative purposes. The documents on which this article is based are drawn exclusively from public sources in Chinese and English. These sources include primary and secondary data, such as documents published by the CCP, the State Council, Ministry of Defense, and different branches of the PLA, as well as data from Chinese newspapers and existing studies about civil-military relations in China. The collected data were explored using NVivo (version 11.1.1), a data management and analysis software, which was used to locate the keywords, categorize and code the documents based on specific topics, and analyze particular links.

4.2 Examining the Roles of the PLA The PLA was always seen by the CCP as a multifunctional actor that might be engaged in various roles, which do not always require the use of force, but entail the broader involvement of the military organization at the domestic level. In a traditional or democratic paradigm of civil-military relations, such roles, be they social or economic, might not be considered as roles that a military organization should perform. However, in the Chinese context, the idea that the PLA should be involved in domestic tasks is not new. In the early 1990s, immediately after the Tiananmen incident, the Party’s documents criticized the opinion expressed by some military and party leaders that the military’s role is “external rather than internal” (see p. 15 in Gurtov and Hwang 1998), an aspect which highlights a certain disagreement between the PLA and the CCP over the roles that the military is expected to play. In the early 1970s, such a perspective of the CCP regarding the domestic roles of the military has opened the door to the engagement of the PLA in the economy. When Deng Xiaoping launched in 1978 the “four modernization policy,” the military was listed as the fourth. Although he did not completely neglect the military’s modernization, his main idea was that, faced with a relatively stable environment, China could focus first on economic and social development (Shichor 1999). Within the broader process of reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, the PLA was asked to enlarge its economic role and initiate the conversion of military production to the civilian sphere. By pursuing different economic activities, the military organization would not only increase its self-reliance, but could also contribute to the overall development of the country. It was expected that the revenues generated by its commercial activities would provide the much-needed financial means for military modernization. Such measures had been necessary as the 25% reduction in the defense budgetary funding in 1979 had had a negative impact on the PLA (Cheung 1996, 2002). The PLA has engaged in its new role by establishing different companies and by producing commercial goods for the internal and external markets. According to Mulvenon (2015), by making use of its new revenue-generating prerogative, the PLA became a relatively successful entrepreneur and its involvement in economic activities reached an unprecedented level in several industries, such as tourism, pharmaceuticals, entertainment, agriculture, and machinery. Its profit, according to the official sources, was

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1 billion USD, although some scholars estimate that it reached 20 billion USD, and involved more than 20,000 companies (Cheung 1996; Mulvenon 2015). However, the success of the PLA in its economic role has been accompanied by emerging risks, which were related to both the military capabilities and human resources. In this sense, growing requests from the military commanders through petitions to the Party’s leadership, were calling for a change of the existent model of development by emphasizing the dangers that such a model posed to the PLA. They promoted the idea that military and economic development were complementary and should be pursued simultaneously, highlighting that, otherwise, the gap between the PLA and other militaries around the world would become wider and more difficult to reduce. In the long term, this aspect might reduce the effectiveness of the PLA in pursuing its fundamental role of national defense. They also underlined the risks of increasing corruption, smuggling, violations of military discipline, and the neglect of military training, which challenged not only the military’s morale and values, but also the capacity of the PLA to pursue its core roles (Yang 1992; Liu 1993; Chi 1995). As a result, a process of disengagement of the PLA from the economy began during the leadership of Jiang Zemin who banned the military’s involvement in business activities in 1998. The process of divestiture through which all PLA-owned companies were transformed into state-owned enterprises and placed under the regulatory control of the State Council was further implemented during the tenure of Hu Jintao without military contestation (Mulvenon 2015), which indicates agreement over this issue between the PLA and the CCP leaders. The CCP has shown receptiveness to the military’s opinion and dissatisfaction concerning not only the engagement of the PLA in the economy, but also its repressive role. During the Tiananmen incident, some military commanders displayed their dissatisfaction in regard to the failure of the CCP to avoid military intervention. Reportedly, they made efforts to defuse the tensions by making direct contact with the protesters and expressed their reluctance and dissatisfaction regarding the use of force against the people through direct criticism of the political leadership (Baum 1991; Jencks 1991; Scobell 2003). After 1989, during Jiang Zemin’s tenure, the People’s Armed Police (PAP)2 took over significant tasks of the PLA in regard to social stability, the Party’s leaders protection and cooperation with the local authorities (You 2016). The emergence of the PAP as a main actor in charge of social stability has led to a significant decline in the PLA’s role and allowed it to focus more on its development. Since the intervention against the Tiananmen protesters to date, the PLA has never been

2 PAP

is a structure that was created in 1982 under the dual command of the Central Military Commission and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security. Since its establishment, the PAP has acted as an extension of the PLA, a relation that changed after the Tiananmen protests. For a detailed account on the PAP, see You (2016).

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mobilized again to deal with any incidents of social unrest, despite their increasing number and intensity.3 In the case of ethnic unrest, a slightly different situation can be observed. While the PLA does not get involved in repression, it still keeps a backstage role, which implies maintaining a significant presence in particular regions (e.g. the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the Xizang Autonomous Region) and conducting military exercises. These activities are mainly intended to discourage potential separatist activities in these regions. The difference in the PLA’s behavior can be explained by the fact that, while social incidents are usually directed against local or central authorities and are linked with the maintenance of internal order, ethnic unrests are seen by the PLA as direct risks to national security and linked with its fundamental role as the guarantor of territorial integrity. The withdrawal of the PLA from repressive role was facilitated by the rapid development of the PAP, concretized in the high tactical capacity and modern capabilities necessary to deal with a wide array of crises, from social and ethnic unrest to counter-terrorism (China Newsweek 2002). The PAP has also increased its ability to coordinate with the central and local police and completely ‘seal off’ the cities in which unrest takes place. The modernization and professionalization of the PAP was supported by a growing budget for public security during the presidency of Hu Jintao. According to the official data of the State Council and the Ministry of Public Security, this increased from 1.54 billion RMB in 2009 to 2.89 billion RMB in 2010 and to approximately 6 billion RMB in 2014. Beside the growing budget, one of the elements that indicate the increasing significance given by the Party to internal security organizations is represented by the presence of the Minister of Public Security (MPS) within the Political Bureau and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (PBSC), which is considered the most significant body in the decision-making process. While the PLA representation on the PBSC was not renewed after the departure of Admiral Liu Huaqing in 1997, the Ministry of Public Security enjoyed a continuous presence. During the extensive reforms initiated from 2016, a tendency to strengthen the control of Xi Jinping over PAP can be observed. While the dual-command of the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC)4 over PAP is still maintained, the power of the CMC’s Chairman was enhanced by reinterpreting the so-called “CMC Chairman responsibility system.” This system increases the Chairman’s control over personnel appointments, the approval of PAP operations and all major decisions (PLA Daily 2016). While the military commanders showed an increased reticence toward the engagement of the PLA in its economic and repressive roles, the PLA undertook without contestation two social roles: nation building and domestic assistance. 3 Official

data reflect an increasing number of protests and riots. For concrete statistics and figures based on data collected from the Ministry of Public Security, China’s National Bureau of Statistics and the Blue Paper on Chinese Society (2005–2013), see Parepa (2014). 4 Note that there are two commissions—the Central Military Commission of the CCP (often referred to as Party CMC) and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (often referred to as State CMC)—but their membership is identical.

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The first involves the promotion of the national spirit, patriotic values, and historical heritage and is based on the ability of the military organization to shape individuals’ behavior. The framework was created as early as 1994 when the Party decided to implement a patriotic education program at the national level. The social role of the PLA was institutionalized through the adoption of the Military Service Law in 1998, the National Defense Education Law in 2001, and the National Defense Mobilization Law in 2010. Such regulations create an institutional framework that expands the prerogatives of the PLA in the social realm by allowing it to structure social relations through military training and patriotic education. Beside the educational institutions, almost any other organization in China, such as companies, enterprises, non-profit, and governmental organizations, together with the militia, were required to constitute, according to their size, special departments for military training with staff specializing in military affairs who would execute the national defense educational programs. The nation-building role implies not only promoting the desired values and norms, but also combating ideas, which are seen by the political and military elites as hostile and dangerous to China, in order to raise the citizenry’s awareness about negative influences. In this regard, the “Political Work Regulations,” elaborated in 2003, indicate that a clear responsibility of the military is to shape the perceptions and beliefs of the people. By making use of all of the media means that it possesses—radio broadcasting stations, a wide network of periodicals at the central and local level, the PLA branches within the Xinhua news agencies, an array of magazines and the participation of military officers in TV interviews or discussions—the military organization helps to foster the desired national identity. Such activities are reinforced by campaigns, commemorative events, and drills organized on different occasions, such as the PLA Day and National Defense Education Day. Beside its role of nation building, the PLA has one further social responsibility, and thus is called upon to be actively involved in supporting the people’s wellbeing through its role of providing domestic assistance. The PLA’s performance in the area of domestic assistance covers various tasks, from emergencies to the provision of public goods. The PLA is actively involved in a wide array of projects dealing with environmental protection and infrastructure construction, as well as poverty alleviation projects, by providing support to the local authorities in several remote or underdeveloped areas (see Ministry of National Defense 2009). In making use of its medical corps, PLA hospitals have engaged in cooperation with 130 civilian hospitals at the county-level while, at the city level, medical units from the PLA and the PAP have paired with 1,283 clinics according to the 2013 Defense White Paper of the Ministry of National Defense (MOD 2013). The most acknowledged contribution of the PLA is related to emergency rescue and disaster relief. In cooperation with the PAP and the militia, in 2008 alone, almost 1.4 million military personnel were involved in disaster relief following the Wenchuan earthquake in May 2008 and in southern China following snowstorms and freezing weather in January-February 2008. Furthermore, the PLA mobilized 370,000 people and 197,000 vehicles and evacuated 2.45 million people from disaster areas between 2011 and 2013 (MOD 2013).

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The overall engagement of the PLA in the above-mentioned social roles has two major positive implications for the image and effectiveness of the military organization. First, it contributes toward rebuilding the severed links between the military and the people after the Tiananmen intervention by improving its public image. Second, it represents a modality to enhance the expertise of its personnel, by using these experiences as a practice run for search and rescue operations, infrastructure building, and other operations during wartime. These benefits might explain the eagerness of the military to take over such responsibilities at the CCP’s request.

4.3 Military Development As mentioned in the previous section, the PLA’s top military brass has emphasized the complementarity between economic and military development in underlining the risks that the neglect of military needs can bring to national security. Military building was viewed as a multi-dimensional process, which targets not only capabilities through modernization, but also the quality of the human resources through professionalization (Ding1995; Liu 1993). It was emphasized that the ability of the PLA to fulfill its main role of national defense is strongly linked with the defense capabilities that it posses, especially when facing potential aggressive behavior against China from other major powers. In such context, developing a naval power was seen as a “concentrated expression of a country’s comprehensive power” (Zhang 2006). The military, through Admiral Liu Huaqing, has attempted since the mid-1980s to convince the political leadership of the necessity to develop naval capabilities, especially acquiring aircraft carriers, in the event of a potential war at sea over Taiwan. However, these requests proved fruitless until the mid-1990s when Jiang Zemin approved the necessary funds for the research and development of such capabilities (Ross 2009). Beside the importance of reducing the gap between the capabilities of the Chinese military and those of its perceived-adversaries, the PLA highlighted the need to follow the experience of the United States and focus on artificial intelligence, command and control systems and outer space capabilities (Xiong 2003). In addition, the PLA expressed its need for a well-educated military officer corps, which should possess high moral and social values, but also have significant professional and technical knowledge. Military documents emphasize the need to update the “system for military human resources” through adopting a comprehensive approach that encompasses military education and training, recruitment policies, as well as the management of human resources. The professionalization also addresses the need to increase the combat readiness and operational experiences, which further implies the establishment of a system which incorporates “real-combat requirements into training” (MOD 2015). In its turn, the CCP has pursued specific measures that answer the needs for development expressed by the military. First of all, the CCP has continuously increased the budget for the military, which has registered double-digit growth since 1990. Following the adoption of the National Defense Law in March 1997, the military budget

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and the defense assets were placed under state control through the State CMC. Such measure can be interpreted as a modality to increase the regulatory power of the state over the military and as a means of increasing efficiency and coherence, given that the national budget should be finally approved by the State Council. Within the defense budget, the share allocated for the procurement of equipment and weapons increased from 16.3% (5 billion RMB) in 1990 to 34% (64.8 billion RMB) in 2003, reducing considerably the necessity for the military organization’s involvement in raising money to fund its own modernization. Additionally, the CCP has started to promote civil-military integration by facilitating the inclusion of the PLA’s needs within a wider framework of national goals. Although the political leaders proposed different approaches to overall development, such as comprehensive, coordinated or holistic, all of them have supported the idea that economic and military development are strongly interlinked, whereas the civil–military integration has become a relevant tool for developing a modern, professionalized military force. Since 1992, several meetings of the CMC and the Political Bureau of the CCP have tackled the issues of scientific and technological development and the need to improve the Chinese military capabilities by taking into account the changes that were occurring in the international context in the early 1990s, such as the first Iraq War and the NATO campaign in the Balkans.5 The main outcome was the elaboration of new strategic guidelines in January 1993 with the main aim of ensuring a better coordination between the military requirements for weapons and equipment with the research and development focused on civilian needs (Xinhua 2007). The maintenance of the sanctions by the US and the EU on technological transfer made more necessary than ever the need to continue the scientific and technological integration, for which the CMC established in 1999 a small leadership group for New Advanced Technology and Engineering led by Jiang Zemin. Beside such changes, the concept of civil-military integration started to gain new valence during Hu Jintao’s leadership. The civil-military integration promoted by Hu Jintao—which is based on the slogans “combining civil and military sectors” and “locating military potential in civilian capabilities”—was a comprehensive approach that promoted more efficient management of resources and implied a coordinated effort for military and economic development through the integration of the defense and civilian sectors. On a different note from Deng’s concept, such integration did not imply the conversion of one industry to another, but instead focused on the production and utilization of dual-use technology. The new approach was mentioned at the 16th Congress of the CCP in 2003 and was also included in the official statement of the 17th Party Congress in 2007. It became a national strategic guideline, which was encompassed in the 12th Five Year Plan (2011–2015). This approach was strongly supported by the National Defense Minister, Liang Guanglie, and other high-ranking military officers who emphasized the need for the PLA’s modernization while limiting the constraints of choosing the development of one sector over another. 5 In

his memories, Admiral Liu Huaqing provides deep insights into the activities of the CMC, the interactions between the CMC and the Political Bureau, as well as the development of the civil–military integration process, see Liu (2004).

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Significant steps toward civil-military integration were also taken in 2005 and 2010, when documents issued by the State Council and the CMC put forward two main objectives: promoting a competitive and integrated military procurement system, and allowing private companies, specifically non-state ones without foreign investments, to enter the defense market by becoming suppliers to the PLA, an opportunity that had been prohibited up to that time (Yang 2012). The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), created in 2008, was in charge of coordinating the development of advanced technology at the national level. Within the MIIT, a special department, the Department for the Promotion of Civil-Military Integration, was established as the leading structure in charge of promoting this process at different levels. As a result, several strategies were adopted to encourage non-state companies to get involved in the defense market: from expanding the relationships between such industries, universities and research institutes, to creating national industrial bases for innovation or developing pilot programs for dual-use technologies (Liu et al. 2011; Yang 2012). A military entity, the General Armaments Department was designated as the main mechanism in charge of the process of certification and oversight of the non-state companies that might be allowed to become suppliers to the PLA (PLA Daily 2011). While this authority provides the PLA with a certain autonomy in shaping the defense-industrial policy through its requirements, the responsibility to maintain a catalog of these permits lies with both, the military and state institutions, specifically, the General Armaments Department and the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). Such sharing of responsibility, which was decided by the “Regulations for the management of permits for the production and research of weapons and equipment,” issued by the State Council and the CMC in 2008, allows the state authorities to exercise oversight over the defense modernization efforts. In parallel with the process of civil-military integration in the economic domain, that led to the rapid development of military capabilities, the CCP has sought to facilitate the professionalization of the military organization. The calls by top military commanders regarding the necessity to create a high-quality officer corps with appropriate technological and professional knowledge increased after the 1991 Gulf War and the 2001 War in Afghanistan. The PLA has made various efforts in order to enhance the military education system, which is supported by an extensive network of military universities and institutions. The efforts made by the PLA to increase the qualitative level of its universities and teachers, to diversify the curriculum and to expand its postgraduate courses, were accompanied by the CCP’s support for the integration of military education in the wider framework of national education. At the policy level, the State Council and the CMC adopted in 2000 a “Decision on Establishing a System of Military Personnel Development Based on High-Level Education,” which facilitates the PLA’s recruitment of students from civilian colleges and universities and also allows PLA officers to study at civilian universities (Kamphausen et al. 2008). As a result, beside professional military education, the PLA officers were encouraged to engage in an advanced degree or a training program at civilian institutions. It was decided that 85% of the PLA officers should have a college or higher education degree by 2005, while 40% should gain experience in

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a civilian college or university (see p. 191 in Gunness 2007). The 2002 Defense White Paper mentioned that the proportion of PLA officers with a college or higher education degree was 80%. In order to facilitate the admission of its own officers to the civilian institutions, in 1998, the PLA started to establish agreements of cooperation with the top universities, at which PLA officers could follow various advanced degree courses or training programs. In seeking to recruit its future officers from civilian universities, the PLA created open campus recruitment offices at the top universities. In addition, from 1999, a National Defense Scholarship was proposed to 21 top-level universities, such as Beijing University, Qinghua University, Nankai University, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing University of Science and Technology (Xinhua 2004). Special attention has being paid to recruitment from scientific and technological fields, in order to fulfill the need for staff in its technical and logistical departments as well as in its research institutes. Bickford mentioned that, between 1999 and 2000, 70% of those recruited by the Beijing Military Region held a degree in science, technology, or engineering (see p. 177 in Bickford 2007). The civil-military integration process also implied partnerships between military and civilian researchers and joint academic forums. Official data from the 2013 Defense White Paper indicate that, between 2011 and 2012 alone, such cooperation involved 220 common projects on key scientific and technological issues and the transfer of 180 technologies from one domain to another. The joint efforts to build a strong military through modernization and professionalization have already produced significant results at both the qualitative and quantitative levels. The PLA Air Force has become the third largest airforce in the world and the largest in Asia; the Chinese Strategic Forces possess one of the largest advanced long-range surface-to-air systems in the world; and the PLA Navy possesses the largest number of vessels in Asia. The PLA has developed asymmetrical warfare systems by focusing on cyber-technology and space programs, anti-access and anti-denial capabilities, fifth generation fighter capabilities, and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.6 Nevertheless, this rapid development of Chinese military capabilities would have been impossible without the CCP’s integration of the needs of the PLA into a wider framework of national policy goals.

4.4 Military Autonomy In regard to the PLA’s autonomy, the CCP has adopted two directions: on one hand, it has sought to reduce the PLA’s self-reliance by limiting not only its economic role, but also the PLA’s role in the arms trade. On the other hand, the CCP has allowed the military to exercise a relative high degree of autonomy in organizational matters.

6 For a comprehensive insight into China’s capabilities and their evolution, see annual reports issued

by the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense (2015, 2016).

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The involvement of the PLA in the arms trade can be traced back to Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. In 1982, the CCP decided to create the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) under the double subordination of the State Council and the CMC. This mechanism was tasked with coordinating the operational needs of the military for weapons systems with the defense industry. The COSTIND also ensured the supervision of research and development for the PLA’s weapons and equipment, as it had under its control a string of facilities for research and testing. However, the COSTIND was often criticized by military officials due to its inability to fulfill its responsibilities efficiently and provide modern systems in accordance with the military requirements. Such aspect has increased the PLA’s reliance on external procurements (Cheung 2002, 2011; Bitzinger 2004; Mulvenon 2015). The PLA has sought to address this problem, by using its newly-created companies as an economic actor. Thus, the PLA-owned companies become actively engaged in the import-export of military products, such as equipment and weapons, fostering a certain competition with existing companies belonging to the defense industry and subordinated to the COSTIND. Some of the companies established under the General Staff Department Equipment Office and the General Logistics Department were extremely beneficial to the PLA for two reasons: first, they provided financial means which increased the military’s self-reliance by limiting the need for budgetary support; and, second, they provided a modality for purchasing higher quality weapons from abroad instead of relying on procurements made through the COSTIND from defense industrial enterprises which were less competitive and slow to adapt to the new operational requirements (Cheung 2011; Bitzinger 2004; Mulvenon 2015). This situation led to the increased self-reliance and autonomy of the military, which could fulfill its own need for modernization, but could also easily bypass the potential oversight of the state regulatory mechanisms. However, significant institutional transformation seeking to limit the PLA’s prerogatives in arms trade operations began gradually to emerge during the tenure of Jiang Zemin. In 1997, a first process of institutionalization and centralization of arms control was put in place by involving new actors and establishing new mechanisms. Thus, the MOFA created the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) elaborated a Catalogue of Technologies that were restricted or banned in China. The State Commission for the Administration of the Arms Trade, created in 1998 and placed under the double supervision of the State Council and the CMC, issued the “Regulations Concerning the Administration of Arms Exports.” In the following year, 1999, the “Procedures for the Management of Restricted Technology Exports” were adopted, while in 2002 the “Regulations Concerning Arms Exports” were revised for both conventional and dual-technologies, and a new list of conventional weapons and a new licensing system were released. During the presidency of Hu Jintao, the process of institutional readjustment and inter-agency coordination continued by focusing on the reorganization of all of the mechanisms involved in military imports, and research and procurement operations. Several reforms took place in 2008, all seeking to reduce the PLA’s involvement in arms exports and to increase the oversight of such operations by enhancing the

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power of the civilian mechanisms under the supervision of the State Council. In this perspective, the COSTIND was reformed once again and restructured into the already-mentioned SASTIND, which maintained its civilian character, but became subordinated to a newly-created ministry, the MIIT. The SASTIND became the main structure for licensing military products and other conventional arms exports which are produced by the defense industrial base, while the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) became in charge of dual-use technologies. The PLA retains an advisory role, similarly with the MOFA, in reviewing military export licenses through its General Armaments Department. For sensitive exports that can impact state security and foreign policy, the agreement of both the State Council and the CMC was made necessary for final decisions (Liu et al. 2011). Although such policy measures completely eliminated the military’s extrabudgetary income and substantially reduced the military’s self-reliance, they were accepted by the military without contestation and facilitated by successive increases in the PLA’s budget. Nevertheless, these measures further represent a restriction of military autonomy in financial matters and led to an increasing dependence of the PLA on the state institutions for the financial resources needed for military modernization. Beside the above-mentioned measures, the CCP has carefully dealing with the issue of organizational autonomy. Institutionally, the Party’s leadership over the military is regulated by Article 19 of the National Defense Law7 and is implemented through the CMC of the CCP, the only structure that has “command authority” in accordance with the 2010, revised edition of Regulations for Political Work for the PLA. The chain of command runs from the President of the CMC, who is the General Secretary of the Party, through the CMC main departments toward all categories of the armed forces (Saunders and Scobell 2015).8 At present, except for the president, all other members of the CMC are top military officers. The CMC is in charge through its departments of oversight of all military matters. Such institutional arrangement shows that the Party allows a relatively high degree of autonomy and exclusiveness in regard to military organizational issues. However, during the tenure of Xi Jinping, a broad process of reforms targetting the CMC has taken place. These reforms occur in a context in which there are increasing calls by the Party for “ruling the military according to law” (translated also as “using law strictly to rule the military”) which have been interpreted by some scholars as an indication of the inability of the Party to maintain its authority over the military. Although “ruling the military according to law” became a favorite slogan during the 7 The Law on National Defense of the People’s Republic of China adopted in March 1997 states: “the

armed forces are subject to leadership by the Communist Party of China,” and Party’s “organizations in the armed forces shall conduct activities in accordance with the CCP Constitution.” 8 In regard to policy decisions, scholars point out that, when issues concerning foreign policy, economy and national security are at stake, a collective decision might be taken within the Political Bureau Standing Committee in which the military is represented by the CMC Chairman/ the General Secretary of the Party, or within an enlarged Political Bureau in which the military organization is represented by two military vice-chairmen (see p. 7 in Saunders and Scobell 2015). For more on the decision-making process, see Lieberthal and Lampton (1992), Lampton (2001) and Miller (2015).

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Xi Jinping leadership, the roots of this concept can be found as early as 1991, when it was used for the first time by Jiang Zemin—at that time General Secretary of the Party and Chairman of the CMC—in a period in which the military organization was deeply involved in economic activities and facing increasing cases of corruption and wrongdoings. The concept of “using law to rule the military,” which was embedded in the National Defense Law a few years later in 1997, should be understood within the broader framework of “ruling the country according to law” [依法治国], which was also promoted by Jiang Zemin at the plenum of the 15th Party Congress. The concept is interesting to the extent that it can be viewed as an acknowledgement by the ruling party of the growing public discontent in regard to the existing corruption within the party and the military, and understood as an attempt to limit and control certain undesirable behavior of the central and local officials, as well as of the military personnel. However, in the current context, the calls for “ruling the military according to law” can be seen as an expression of the CCP’s dissatisfaction with inefficient oversight by the CMC which is in charge of evaluating and monitoring the implementation of the existing rules within the military. In this regard, an examination of the recent measures taken during Xi Jinping’s tenure may be relevant. Concretely, before the reforms, the main three mechanisms in charge of maintaining discipline within the PLA were: the Commission for Discipline Inspection (subordinated to the General Political Department under the supervision of the CMC), the Audit Office subordinated to the General Logistics Department, and the military judicial system, composed of courts and procurators which enforce discipline based on specific regulations9 with exclusive jurisdiction over the military. The subordination of these commissions to the PLA departments, whose activities they should investigate, created an awkward situation and raised concerns about potential conflict of interest during investigations of the military’s wrongdoings. Following the recent reforms, the former Military Commission for Discipline Inspection was restructured and subordinated directly to the CMC. Beside this commission, two more mechanisms were restructured also under the direct supervision of the CMC, respectively the Commission for Politics and Law, which was placed in charge of the military judicial system, and the Audit Office, which was placed in charge of financial audits. The newly-created structures granted the CMC more oversight over the whole of the PLA by removing the risk of potential conflict of interest that might affect the military investigations (see China Military Online 2016). These changes were accompanied by a rotation of almost 50 political commissars and new appointments and promotions of military officers to the rank of general. Reshuffles and the rotation of the military personnel, that are usually based on proposals made by the CMC, became a common institutional practice during Jiang Zemin’s

9 The

main documents that regulate military conduct are ‘Regulations on Discipline in the PLA, “Internal Affairs Regulations of the PLA” and “Military Service Law,” art. 6 and 7. For more information on the military legal system, see 2011 Defence White Paper (MOD 2011), Chapter VI.

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tenure, continuing also under Hu Jintao and the current tenure of Xi Jinping. According to the provision of “Regulations on the Military Ranks of Officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” all of the promotions from the rank of Colonel and above need the approval of the CMC’s President. Such a legal provision allows control by the CCP over high-level assignments, in the sense that, while proposals are hierarchically made by the CMC and its subordinate departments, the political leadership can make use of this prerogative to enhance its power base within the military. The reinforcement of the role of the CMC as the holder of exclusive military command and the coordinating and oversight body, as well as the fact that all recent institutional and structural changes of the CMC were based on military proposals,10 show that the CCP is still allowing the PLA to have considerable organizational autonomy. By allowing the CMC to maintain its autonomy regarding specific issues, the CCP had not considered necessary to establish a monitoring system based on supervision by outsiders of the military. Such aspects are significant to the extent that they raises doubts about the efficiency of the so-called “parallel rule” which is used to described the Party’s organizations and the system of political commissaries within the military. The “parallel rule” is considered by some scholars an “intrusive internal monitoring mechanism” that “penetrates” all units of the PLA in allowing the CCP to maintain its authority over the military organization (see pp. 57–62 in Shirk 1993 and p. 84 in Heath 2014). While, undoubtedly, the Party’s organizations exist within the PLA, as well as in all Chinese institutions, their significance as intrusive monitoring structures might be overemphasized. Although, during the leadership of Mao Zedong, the Party’s organizations within the PLA were composed of outsiders dispatched by the CCP and led by civilian political commissars holding significant decision-making powers, this system was abolished as their presence gave rise to dissatisfaction and tensions between the military and the political actors (see p. 151 in You 2007). Moreover, the system of political commissars and Party organizations within the PLA underwent several changes that have resulted in the modification of their prerogatives, status, and powers. During Jiang Zemin’s leadership, the local Party secretaries were allowed only concurrently to hold the post of first Party secretary of the PLA at the county, prefecture and provincial levels (see p. 95 in You 2006), a position sometimes called First Political Commissar. Such institutional arrangements were less related to the control over the military, as was the case during Mao’s leadership, but rather to civil-military cooperation. This measure, which was taken at a time when the process of civil-military integration emphasized the need for military modernization, aimed to facilitate the coordination between the military and local authorities in regard to education, mobilization, economic development, infrastructure building, and other fields. By acting as a liaison between the military and the local authorities, it ensured that the military’s needs were integrated into 10 In March 2014, the Leading Small Group for Deepening the Reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces was created under Xi’s leadership. Until the end of 2015, the group organized more than 860 debates, workshops and surveys within the military organization. Then, in January 2016, the CMC made public the “CMC’s opinion on deepening the reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces”《中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见》 , see Xinhua (2016).

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the local and regional plans (see pp. 627–633 in Zhang 1994). Accordingly, such arrangements do not affect the chain of command from the CMC, as the powers of the political commissars were limited in regard to operational issues and administrative problems (see pp. 95–96 in You 2006). Currently, the political commissars and the Party organizations within the PLA are exercising their activities based on Article 19 of the National Defense Law (1997). Most of the political commissars are military and are subordinate to the General Political Department. The party organizations within the PLA are all composed solely of military personnel selected from the officers of each unit, which contradicts the idea of the “penetration” of the military by the Party. Accordingly, their tasks are both ideological and organizational, rather than intrusive monitoring. The political commissars have a broad array of tasks, such as political work, in order to raise the political consciousness and loyalty toward the Party, and also to enhance the morale of the troops and unity among the rank and file. In addition, they have administrative tasks related to personnel evidence, selection and recruitment, discipline, and also the military’s relations with the local authorities (Zhou 1994).

4.5 An Evolving Pattern of Managing the PLA This article investigated the civil-military relations in China after 1989, in a context characterized by the efforts made by the CCP to enhance the state capacity in order to stabilize its governance. The relation between the CCP and PLA was considered one of the contextual factors that can strengthen or weaken the CCP’s endeavors to use the state capacity for political ends. In analyzing how the CCP attempts to balance the need for a strong military with the need to maintain its authority over the PLA, this paper focused on three aspects, which can create potential disagreements between the political and military actors, specifically the military’s roles, development and autonomy. In regard to the roles of the PLA, the CCP has shown receptiveness to the military’s dissatisfaction concerning its involvement in the economic and repressive roles. Through the disengagement of the PLA from the economic role and the development of the PAP as a main structure in charge of social stability, on one hand, the CCP has proved its ability to accommodate the expectations of the PLA over the roles that it should or should not play at the domestic level. On the other hand, it has sought to alleviate a growing leverage of the PLA over the Party. Such leverage could be facilitated by the PLA’s financial self-reliance and by an excessive dependence of the CCP on the military for domestic repression. Nevertheless, the CCP has obtained the PLA’s support for a political agenda that implies two other social roles. For the Party, these social roles of the military held a relatively high significance as they contribute toward rebuilding the national unity and increasing the CCP’s legitimacy. By pursuing its role of nation building, the PLA acts as a unifying force in promoting uniformity between the social classes and ethnic groups and therefore contributing to national unity. The ability of the CCP to mobilize the military in time of crises for

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disaster relief and the ability of the PLA to provide effective outcomes in these situations are aspects that indirectly enhance the Party’s legitimacy in front of domestic audiences. Thus, the CCP has actually supported the engagement of the PLA in roles which can have a stabilizing effect on its governance. In regard to military development, the Party has proven its capacity to meet the specific needs of the PLA for modernization and professionalization. Through successive policy measures and institutional readjustments, the Party has created a framework for civil-military integration with effective outcomes for the PLA. This framework facilitated the concrete inclusion of the needs of the PLA in a wider framework of national goals. The main aim of this approach was to reduce the costs of military development by allowing the PLA to benefit from the resources that the private sector possesses, such as advanced technologies, and research and development capabilities. By promoting such integration, the CCP seeks to ensure that the PLA’s need for modernization can be fulfilled more efficiently at the national level by reducing, in this way, the reliance on external procurements and the financial burden for state authorities. Nevertheless, the CCP has successfully used the newly-created institutions and mechanisms to increase the state’s oversight and regulatory power over the PLA. In regard to military autonomy, the Party has been relatively careful when promoting changes and readjustments that curtail the PLA’s organizational autonomy. First, the CCP has completely eliminated the ability of PLA for self-reliance and autonomy regarding financial matters. In the long-term, these measures led to a growing dependence of the PLA on the state authorities for the provision of the financial resources necessary for its needs. Second, considerable autonomy has been given in the domains strictly related to military professionalization, education, and promotions up to the Colonel level. The CCP had allowed increasing autonomy in the process of procurements through the centralization of such operations by the General Armament Department and the Department for Equipment Development within the CMC. The establishment of new mechanisms and the implementation of measures that reinforced the role of the CCM allow a high degree of autonomy in defenserelated issues and assure an optimal functioning of the military organization. The successive changes that the system of the political commissaries underwent represent also an indication of the fact that the CCP has sought to eliminate those aspects, which can create potential dissatisfaction among the military. The management pattern adopted by the CCP in regard to the military’s organization has clearly shown the ability of the Party to accommodate the military expectations in regard to its roles and needs for development and autonomy while integrating them in a wider framework of national policy goals. Overall, the CCP methods have not only contributed toward maintaining its authority over the PLA while reducing the need for intrusive control, but also toward enhancing different dimensions of the state capacity. In the long-term, these two aspects may have a positive impact on the CCP’s efforts to stabilize its governance. Acknowledgements The collection and analysis of data used for this article was supported by a JSPS Grant, Kakenhi 15J01056.

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Chapter 5

“Rule of Law” Under the Chinese Communist Party’s Leadership: The Case of the Professionalization of Judges and the CCP’s Governance of the People’s Court Hiroko Naito Abstract Promoting the “Rule of Law” is one of the important issues in examining the resilience of the CCP’s leadership. The People’s Court became one of the most important governmental bodies after the CCP considered installing the “Rule of Law,” and the problem of professionalizing judges to ensure fair judgement in the court system became a main reason to discuss the “Rule of Law” in Chinese context. This chapter applies process tracing to visualize the law-making and revision process of the Judges Law and applies the framework of street-level bureaucracy to examine the reality of the professionalization of judges. This chapter reveals that the CCP’s motive behind professionalization is the unification of the judge’s quality and thier integration with the CCP, as the CCP is the most highly-educated organization, with a meritocratic political system. However, the CCP’s promotion of legal professionalization controversially revealed the conservative behavior of judges and the local people’s court. They preferred to maintain the status quo when the CCP’s policy or the law tried to change the profit structure in which they participated. Keywords People’s court · The Judges law · “Rule of law” · Professionalization

H. Naito (B) Center for Northeast Asian Studies, Tohoku University, Kawauchi 41, Aoba-ku, 980-8576 Sendai, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_5

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5.1 Introduction The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has recently stressed the importance of the “Rule of Law.”1 At the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October 2014, the CCP raised the “Rule of Law” as the most important issue to be discussed.2 Additionally, the CCP reported at the opening session of the 19th National Congress of the CPC that a Central Leading Group for Advancing Law-Based Governance in All Areas (中央全面依法治国领 导小组: zhongyang quanmian yifazhiguo weiyuanhui) was established to strengthen the “Rule of Law.”3 The “Rule of Law” has been claimed by Jiang Zemin (江泽民) since the 15th National Congress of the CPC was held in 1997, and a statement that “the People’s Republic of China governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist country under the Rule of Law” was added to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1999.4 After the Constitution was revised, although political leaders frequently mentioned the “Rule of Law,” in practice they failed to establish an organization inside the Party that promotes it, thus the Central Leading Group for Advancing Law-Based Governance in All Areas became the first of these. The People’s Court, or the judicial branch in China, became one of the most important governmental bodies after the CCP considered installing the “Rule of Law.” Since China’s move to a market-oriented economy and its rapid growth as a wealthy society, the number of problems between enterprises has increased. Further to this, the social issues, such as land disputes and environmental problems, have become more serious. As the People’s Court functions to resolve these problems legally, the importance of its role is highlighted. Chinese society expects judges to be professional to ensure fair judgment; however, although the National Bar Examination that bestows credentials on professional legal staff was created in 2001, the majority of China’s judges have been selected from government staff and veterans who cannot be defined as legal professionals. Thus, the problem of how to professionalize a judge to ensure fair judgments in court becomes a main issue in discussing the “Rule of Law” in China. 1 法治

(fazhi) in Chinese can be translated in two ways, such as Rule of Law or Rule by Law. Rule of Law means that individuals and organizations are equal under the law. Instead, Rule by Law means the political leader uses the law to govern the state and society. Therefore, Rule by Law is usually used for interpreting a legal system in an authoritarian regime, and Rule of Law shows it is a constitutional democracy. However, the reality cannot be clearly divided into two categories. Therefore, according to the understanding of the meaning of Rule of Law and Rule by Law, this paper uses “Rule of Law” with quotations as the authoritarian rule of law that the CCP promotes. 2 The CCP usually sets “Party Construction” as the main topic at the 4th Plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Assigning “Rule of Law” as the main theme of discussion is an exception. Kadozaki (2015), 78–88; Amako (2015). 3 “CPC to set up central leading group for advancing law-based governance in all areas,” Xinhua Net, 18 October 2017. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/18/ content_33404113.htm. 4 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” March 14, 2004, The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/ content_1372963.htm.

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Judges’ professionalization, which is one of the most important topics within the policy regarding installing the “Rule of Law” in China, is also connected to the regime issue. Based on the party and state system in China, the CCP retains strong leadership over the People’s Court, and denies the independence of the judiciary.5 However, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China defines that “the people’s court shall, in accordance with the law exercise judicial power independently and is not subject to interference by administrative organs, public organizations, or individuals.”6 This means that the CCP approves the independence of judgments, but does not accept the independence of judges. The difference between these two kinds of independence is crucial for discussing the CCP’s leadership of the People’s Court. The People’s Court establishes adjudication committees at all levels, and performs its duties by discussing the decision for the application of law in major, difficult, or complicated cases.7 Based on this rule, important decisions can be decided by the adjudication committees, and thus the People’s Court can be described as having independence of judgment. However, the members of the adjudication committees mostly overlap with the party members in the People’s Court committees and the judges cannot make a judgment without the authority of the adjudication committees, which are tantamount to party committees. The professionalization of legal staff was initiated in the 1990s. The Judges Law of the PRC and Prosecutors Law of the PRC were both enacted in 1995, while the Lawyers Law of the PRC was enacted in 1996. Each of these laws mentions the requirement for being a legal professional. Regarding the Judges Law, this requirement became serious after it was revised in 2001 and 2019. Professionalization is one of the most important factors for developing the independence of legal staff as the case of lawyers proves, but it has not proved why the CCP tried to realize the professionalization of the judges while strengthening its leadership of them. Also, it has not described how the CCP made it possible. While retaining strong leadership over the People’s Court, the CCP cannot approve the independence of judges; nor can it be easy for the CCP to, at the same time, encourage the professionalization of judges by installing the “Rule of Law” in China. In examining the puzzle outlined above, this chapter analyses the following questions: (1) how did the CCP promote the professionalization of judges?; (2) what has been the political behavior of judges after professionalization?; and (3) how did the relationship between the CCP and the group of judges change as a result of professionalization? This paper traces the process of creating and revising the Judges Law to reveal the CCP’s logic, and focuses on the reaction of the judges to understand the reality of professionalization in China. 5 “China’s

Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and Reformers Wince,” The New York Times, January 18th, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justicecourts-zhou-qiang.html. 6 “Constitution of the PRC (2018 Amendment),” Beijing University Law Net, http://en.pkulaw.cn/ display.aspx?cgid=311950&lib=law. 7 “Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the PRC (2018 Amendment),” Chinese Government Net, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-10/27/content_5334895.htm.

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First, this paper analyses the existing literature and explains the concept of streetlevel bureaucracy proposed by Michael Lipsky in 1969 as an analytical framework for the research. Second, it traces the process of creating the Judges Law in 1995 and the revision process in 2001 and 2019, then compares these laws to understand the CCP’s logic behind professionalizing judges. Third, it focuses on the job consciousness of the new generation of judges, and the relationship created between the former and new generations of judges in the People’s Court. Based on the analysis of these three topics, this paper reveals the transformation of the relationship between the professionalized legal staff and the CCP’s governance.

5.2 Analysis of the Existing Literature and Framework of the Paper 5.2.1 Understanding the Existing Literature Regarding the Professionalization of Legal Staff In the discussion of the professionalization of legal staff under the CCP’s leadership, lawyers receive more attention. This is because they are recognized as promoting the realization of the Rule of Law in an authoritarian regime and for effecting a gradual democratization within society (Li 2011; Kojima 2013). This standpoint is based on the experiences of the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) where common law is employed. As the lawyers become professionalized in these countries, their public persona and autonomy increase; they then become the opposition power to the government and the state (Murakami and Hamano 2012, 24–32). The existing literature about the professionalization of lawyers in China can be divided into two categories. The first category of studies concerns professionalized lawyers as strong actors in the promotion of democracy, while standing up to authority (He 2005, 83–90; He 2015, 226–242). Also, human rights lawyers and rights protection (维权: weiquan) lawyers represent the voice of society (Ako 2015, 243– 262; Ako 2017, 1–27). The nature of a human rights lawyer is to advocate for the public, independently of the CCP; thus, a conflict exists between lawyers and the CCP. As many human rights lawyers were arrested in 2015 and have not yet been released, the CCP acknowledges that there is some pressure from society because these lawyers represent the voice of the people. Although they have a strong impact, not only on society but also the CCP, their absolute numbers are still small, and it is difficult for them to shake up authority. The second category of literature explains that professionalized lawyers have an incentive to support the status quo. Considering the history of democratization in East Asian countries, lawyers who belong to the middle class would become promoters of democratization. The CCP instead recruits them to the Party, which offers the benefits of being a party member when the CCP’s regime is stable (Wright 2010).

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The CCP also orders the establishment of a party group within a law firm to avoid excessive independence and publicity for the firm (Suzuki 2012). Another study that falls into the second category shows a comparison between professionalization in Western countries, where common law applies, and in China to illustrate the characteristics of Chinese Law (O’Brien 2011, 257–269). In Europe and the US, the legal professions have emerged gradually over a long period of time. In China, the State is the prime actor and the driving force in the process of legal development. Of course, it cannot be ignored that a time-consuming process of the natural growth of economic, social, and political culture is necessary to achieve professionalization. However, the role of the State is extremely important in China, and it is needed for natural growth. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether the legal profession in China would be against the CCP’s leadership. These previous works explain the impact of lawyers in Chinese society and how the CCP manages this circumstance; however, there is a lack of analysis of the professionalization of judicial legal staff, such as judges, which forms the focus of this paper. How the CCP governs the State is significant in understanding the resilience of the CCP’s one party regime. However, judges are always considered monolithic along with the CCP, whether or not they are professionalized; therefore, variations in the relationship between the CCP and the People’s Court where a judge works are rarely examined. This chapter applies the framework of street-level bureaucracy not only to show the contrast between the CCP’s aggressiveness toward the professionalization of judges and the latter’s passivity toward it, but also to explain the reason for the appearance of this condition. This framework was applied to the chapter because the framework that was used to analyze the impact of lawyers is not suitable for analyzing judges as it has a strong bias toward democracy, and cannot demonstrate the resilience of authoritarianism.8

5.2.2 The Lawmaking Process and Street-Level Bureaucracy The definition of a street-level bureaucrat is a government worker who ordinarily interacts with the citizens, such as a police officer, staff in a local government office, or a judge. Michael Lipsky, who proposed the model of the street-level bureaucrat, emphasized the function of the bureaucrat to demonstrate the multilayers of politics involved when a policy is enacted. Understanding the background of how street-level bureaucracy appears, this chapter initially summarizes the discussions about the form and work of a bureaucrat in China. The most important interpretation of the bureaucrat is Weber’s explanation, which classifies legitimate authority into three types: rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic. The rational-legal can be realized through a bureaucracy and is dominant in the modern world. When a society undergoes modernization, it requires a department uses the judges and the judicial bureaucracy (Shiho Kanryo: 司法官僚) as an example to explain the bureaucratic system in Japan. Mabuchi (2010).

8 Mabuchi

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in which many administrative affairs are managed. An organization is established, which performs its duties fairly; it is hierarchically organized, professionalized, and uses documentation to manage and deal with jobs (Weber 2012). In the case of China, the CCP has also reformed the administrative organ repeatedly to follow the style of the Weberian bureaucrat and to create an advanced level of bureaucracy after the 1980s (Kokubun 2003, 10–16). However, it is also well known that the bureaucratic system in China does not function well, as Weber expected. The Weberian bureaucracy is a rational-machinery model, although the reality is more complicated. It can also be recognized that a bureaucracy as a social system contains conflicts and contradictions (Mabuchi 2009, 461). No matter how rational or irrational the bureaucratic system, bureaucrats have a strong influence on both the policymaking process and a political leader’s legitimacy because of their highly professionalized knowledge. The principal-agent theory can be applied to explain how a bureaucrat’s professional knowledge creates the politician-bureaucrat relationship. The principal-agent theory represents a politician as a principal who has an expectation of policy realization, and a bureaucrat as an agent who oversees policymaking and actualization. However, a professionalized bureaucrat may switch positions with a politician. During the policymaking process, a bureaucrat provides “advice” to a politician based on professional knowledge. Since a bureaucrat possesses more information, they would indirectly decide the policy direction, although a politician has the decisive power to choose a policy. Ginsburg and Moustafa concede that the CCP and the government created this principal-agent relationship, and that a conflict developed as the government decentralized and professionalized (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008). This is called the agency gap. Therefore, the CCP set up the Administrative Procedure Law to enable the court system to supervise the government by legal means and normalize the principal-agent relationship between the CCP and the government. Since this paper applies the model of street-level bureaucracy, neither the literature about the forms of bureaucracy, nor the mechanism of how professionalized bureaucrats influence policy, demonstrate their behavior after a policy has been enacted. It can be mentioned that the previous works have a strong policymaking bias and do not illustrate how a bureaucracy acts while a policy is being implemented under authoritarianism. The street-level bureaucracy proposed by Michael Lipsky emphasizes actions taken by street-level bureaucrats at their discretion, and offers an analytical perspective that considers how the policy is observed in the field, or why the policy is not constrained there (Lipsky 1998). This paper first traces the lawmaking process of the Judges Law to understand the CCP’s logic toward the professionalization of judges and, second, uses the model of street-level bureaucracy to examine how judges in China behave when the CCP enacts policies and rules. These analyses will demonstrate a new interpretation of the party-judicial relationship in China.

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5.3 Process of Making and Revising the Judges Law 5.3.1 Why Did the CCP Create the Judges Law? The Organization Law of the People’s Courts of the PRC, enacted in 1983, added the requirements to be a judge. Article 34 stated that “Citizens who have the right to vote and to stand for election and have reached the age of 23 are eligible to be” a judge and “judicial personnel of people’s courts must have an adequate knowledge of the law.” However, it was unclear what constituted “an adequate knowledge of the law” and how this knowledge could be qualified. There was no specific selection for judges before the Judges Law was issued. The function of the People’s Court gradually received attention when the economy began to grow rapidly, resulting in increased societal conflict at the same time. As the cultural revolution caused the crash of the judicial system in China, judicial education also ceased. One of the ways to create a legal profession just immediately the cultural revolution ended was to switch from being a veteran to a judge (Oguchi and Tanaka 2012, 95). To maintain the quality of the judges, it was necessary to reconsider the route to judge selection. At the 13th Central Committee of the CPC, the CCP proposed reforming the system of the personal affairs in government based on the party-government separation policy (党政分开: dangzheng fenkai) and rationalizing this system. The CCP also mentioned that they followed what the report proposed at the 13th Central Committee of the CPC and ensured the legality of judges by legally managing them. The CCP decided to create a law regulating the quality of knowledge required for judges, but they were also concerned about the political quality of the judges. Ren Jianxin (任建新) reported at the 14th National People’s Court Working Conference that “a senior judge needs to understand politics. One cannot be a good judge if knowledge about politics is lacking. A great politician should also understand the law. One cannot be a great politician if they have no knowledge about the law.”9 Ren also noted that he decided to introduce the new management system for judges on a trial basis: the Higher People’s Court and the Intermediate People’s Court would select a vice-principal of the Intermediate People’s Court, as well as a director and vice-principal of the Basic-Level People’s Court, rather than allowing these decisions to be made by the local party committee.10 The point of Ren Jianxin’s speech is that the CCP emphasizes not only the legal knowledge of the judges, but also their political talent. Making a ballance between

9 Ren

Jianxin, “Fully Developing the Function of The Judicial Institution and Promoting ‘One Central Task and Two Basic Points’” (July 18, 1988), in Ren (2005), 206. 10 Ren Jianxin, “Senior Judge Must Be a Legal Profession, Also Be a Politician” (27 July 1988), in Ren (2005), 215.

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the legal knowledge and the political talent became the significant discussion point during the lawmaking process

5.3.2 The Process of Making the Judges Law The research group for the Judges Law (法官法研究小组: faguanfa yanjiuxiaozu) was established by the Supreme People’s Court in September 1986. The Judges Law was discussed in 1994 and 1995 at the 6th, 11th, and 12th Meetings of the 8th Standing Committee of the NPC, approved in February 1995, and finally enacted on July 1 1995. Before the discussion at the Standing Committee of the NPC, the Judges Law (test draft) was discussed at the 14th and 16th National People’s Court Work Meeting in 1988 and 1992, respectively. Universities, research institutes, and several government departments also took part in the discussion. The Judges Law was introduced on a trial basis at the People’s Court in Shanghai, Ha’erbin, Hainan, Guangxi, Jilin, and Yunnan in 1991 (Zhou 2009, 53–55). The reason why the CCP was so keen to promote the Judges Law was because legal negotiation with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau was necessary to accelerate economic activity, so establishing the legal system would secure human rights and maintain public order (Fu 1995, 20–23). The CCP recognized that a uniform method of cultivating the quality of judges was important for the Judges Law and would improve the reliability of the People’s Court. Therefore, one of the aim in creating the Judges Law was to improve the quality of the judges. Article 9 of the Judges Law defined the requirements to be a judge as: (1) to be a PRC citizen, (2) to have reached the age of 23, (3) to endorse the Constitution of the PRC, (4) to have fine political and professional qualities and maintain good conduct, (5) to be in good health, and (6), in the case of graduates from law specialties of colleges or from non-law specialties of colleges, to have worked for at least two years and possess a professional knowledge of law; or for those holding a bachelor’s, master’s, or doctorate of law, to have worked for at least one year. The Organization Law of the People’s Courts of the PRC only required a judge to have professional qualities, but the Judges Law added the qualification that a judge must at least have graduated from college. However, the statistics show that only 7.5% of judges graduated from university, and most judges could not match the qualifications decreed by the Judges Law (Ji 2001, 8–12). For existing judges, Article 9 additionally defined that “an existing judge who does not possess the qualifications as provided shall receive training so as to meet the qualifications as provided by the Judges Law within a prescribed time limit.” The CCP decided to introduce the National Judges Exam to institutionalize the judges’ selection process. According to Ren Jianxin’s report at the 7th Meeting of the 8th Standing Committee of NPC, Article 11 of the draft of the Judges Law defined that a judge must pass the National Judge Examination. Ren proposed securing

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the quality and authority of the examination and establishing a rule to openly and fairly select competitive and clever judges.11 The CCP emphasized not only the professional knowledge of judges, but also their skills in politics, and additionally provided that “judges must administer the Constitution and laws faithfully, set the economic development at the core, hold the four basic rules and the open and reform policy as the basic line, and deal with cases devotedly” in the draft.12 The CCP revised the manuscript of this article to “judges must faithfully implement the Constitution and laws and serve the people whole-heartedly.” This showed that the CCP considered how to balance the aspects of judge and politician. Discussions about the institutionalization of the judge selection process raised problems regarding how the CCP maintained its authority over the People’s Court. Wang Shuwen (王叔文), who is the deputy Chief of the NPC Law Committee, pointed out that “the judges must pass the examination and receive the qualification before they are appointed. And, the qualification is given to the judges by the People’s Court.” Instead, the member of the Standing Committee and the political leader in local government mentioned that “according to the law, the People’s Court can only appoint an assistant, the others can be appointed or elected by the People’s Congress and the Standing Committee. The People’s Court gives the qualification of the judges before the People’s Congress and the Standing Committee approves. It would be better to change the phrase from ‘qualification’ to ‘requirement.’”13 They reconfirmed that authority over the personal affairs of the judges should be managed by the People’s Congress. As the CCP has authority over the People’s Congress, this means that the CCP indirectly manages the personal affairs of judges through the People’s Congress. The 12th meeting of the 8th Standing Committee of the NPC passed the Judges Law in February 1995 after several discussions. The manuscript about the judges’ selection prescribed that “persons to be appointed judges or assistant judges for the first time shall be selected through public examination and strict appraisal, from among the best qualified for the post, and in accordance with the standards of having both ability and political integrity.” This article considers that the requirements for becoming a judge are not only passing the examination, but also possessing political skills. Additionally, the manuscript added an article which states that “persons to be appointed presidents, vice-presidents, members of the judicial committees, chief 11 Ren Jianxin, “Explanation about the Draft of the Judges Law—7th Meeting of the 8th Standing Committee of NPC,” in Gazeta of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress in People’s Republic of China (Vol. 1, 1995), 71 (in Chinese, 任建新 (1995) 关于《中华人民共和国法官法( 草案) 的说明 - 1994年5月5日在第八届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议上《中华人 民共和国全国人民代表大会常务委员会公报》1: 71). 12 Ren Jianxin, Ibid., 72. 13 Wang Shuwen, “National People’s Congress Law Committee Reported the Conclusion of the Discussion About the Judges Law (draft) and the Prosecutors Law (draft)—11th Meeting of the 8th Standing Committee of NPC on December 21, 1994,” in Gazeta of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress in People’s Republic of China (Vol. 1, 1995), 75–76 (in Chinese, 王叔 文 (1995) 全国人大法律委员会关于法官法(草案)和检察官法(草案)审议结果的报告 - 1994 年12月21日在第八届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十一次会议上《中华人民共和国全国 人民代表大会常务委员会公报》1: 75–76).

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judges, or associate chief judges of divisions shall be selected from those who are experienced in practical work.” It can be considered that the CCP paid attention to the judges who were working in the People’s Court while the examination system was introduced for persons who were appointed as judges.14 At the working meeting held after the Judges Law was enacted, Ren Jianxin proposed that “We need to strengthen the political ideology-building for the political leaders’ group and keep up the level of legal operation and the political quality of the leading group through thoroughly enacting the Judges Law.”15 According to his report, it can be concluded that the Judges Law, at the beginning of the discussion, only focused on the judges’ legal knowledge; however, it gradually shifted to the political talent that the judges should also possess.

5.3.3 Revision Process of the Judges Law in 2001 The responsibilities of the People’s Court necessarily grew while the legal system developed in order to deal with the rapid economic growth. In particular, as China decided to participate in the World Trade Organization in 2001, the globalization and professionalization of the legal profession became necessary. The Director of the Supreme People’s Court, Xiao Yang (肖扬), proposed “One theme and Three Missions.” One theme implied realizing fair and effective jobs, and three missions represented: (1) judicial reform; (2) enhancing the capability of judges and the quality of their work; and (3) improving the judges’ abilities in politics and morality. The Judges Law was revised to realize his proposal (Su 2002, 12–13). According to his proposal, it is obvious that the professionalization of judges is one of the biggest reasons for revising the Judges Law. The 16th meeting of the 9th Standing Committee of NPC in July 2000 explained the revised version of the Judges Law (draft), which defined the educational requirements for becoming a judge as the following: (1) those who have worked for at least two years in the case of graduates from university law specialties or from university non-law specialties, but possessing the professional knowledge of law; and (2) those who have master or doctorate of law degrees, or non-law majors but possessing a professional knowledge of the law and who have worked for at least one year (underlining added by the author). Compared with the Judges Law in 1995, the educational requirement was upgraded to university level at the lowest, and work experience in the legal profession was evaluated. It can also be recognized that educational background and work experience created a trade-off relationship. 14 The Judges Law of PRC, Year Book of the Open and Reform in New Era in China, (Beijing: China

Democratic Legal Press, 1996), 149–151 (in Chinese, (1996) 中华人民共和国法官法《中国改 革开放新时期年鉴》北京: 中国民主法制出版社、149–151). 15 Ren Jianxin, “Fully Strengthening the Court Works for Reform, Development and Stable Service—Significant Speech about Arrangement and Works in the People’s Court,” in People’s Justice, Vol. 7, 1995, 2 (in Chinese, 任建新 (1995) 全面加强审判工作为改革、发展、稳定服务 - 任建 新就法院工作部署作重要讲话《人民司法》7: 2).

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The 22nd Meeting of the 9th Standing Committee of the NPC held a discussion on revising the Judges Law, and a member proposed that “we should consider work experience as significant in selecting a judge. The length of work experience that was proposed in the draft is too short.” The Law Committee admitted the proposal and reported that “it is appropriate to extend the length of work experience that a person should have before they become a judge. Longer work experience secures the quality of the judge’s job effectively.” Therefore, the draft was revised from two years to three, and from one year to two.16 Additional claims to the revised Judges Law were proposed at the same meeting. It was claimed that the length of work experience would be decided depending on the level of the People’s Court. The proposal added that “those who have a bachelor’s degree and at least two years of work experience can be a judge, and being a judge in the Higher People’s Court or the Supreme People’s Court needs at least three years of work experience. Also, those who have a master’s degree or a doctorate can be a judge with one year of work experience, and being a judge in the Higher People’s Court or the Supreme People’s Court needs at least two years of work experience.”17 The Higher People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Court were distinguished from the Lower People’s Court, which was added to the manuscript. Referring to the revision process of the Judges Law, a lawmaker considered that judges needs to gain not only knowledge for the examination, but also skills based on their experience in order to become professionalized. In particular, the reason they added the article about preferring longer work experience at the higher level of the People’s Court is because work experience could raise a judge’s political skill, and it would become easier for the Upper People’s Court to supervise the Lower People’s Court. The revised Judges Law further decided to set up the National Bar Examination. Xiao Yang did not mention the introduction of the examination at the 16th meeting of the 9th Standing Committee of the NPC in July 2000,18 but a member of the 16 Xiaoyang Qiao , “Law Committee of NPC’s Report of Discussion Result of the Revised Judges Law (Draft)—22nd Meeting of the 9th Standing Committee of NPC on June 26, 2001,” in Gazeta of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress in People’s Republic of China (May 2011), 396–398 (in Chinese, 乔晓阳 (2001) 全国人大法律委员会关于《法官法修正案 (草案) 》审议结果的报告 - 2001年6月26日在第九届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十二次会议 上《中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会常务委员会公报》396–398). 17 “Law Committee of NPC’s Writing Report of the Opinions for Revising the Revised Judges Law (Draft) and the Revised Prosecutors Law (Draft)—22nd Meeting of the 9th Standing Committee of NPC on June 30, 2001,” in Gazeta of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress in People’s Republic of China (May 2011), 398–399 (in Chinese, (2001) 全国人大法律委员会关 于修改法官法的决定 (草案) 和修改检察官法的决定 (草案) 修改意见的书面报告 - 2001年6 月30日在第九届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十二次会议上《中华人民共和国全国人 民代表大会常务委员会公报》398–399). 18 Xiao Yang explained that the qualification examination for judges is necessary to provide the mechanism to select a judge scientifically, but did not mention the idea of the unification of the legal examination. “The Draft of the Revised Judges Law Sets Up the Requirements for Being a Judge Step by Step,” Xinhua Daily, July 4, 2000 (in Chinese, (2000) 法官法修改案草案进一步 完善担任法官的任职条件《新华每日》 ).

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Standing Committee, the Committee for Internal and Judicial Affairs, proposed that introducing the National Bar Examination would be effective in raising the quality of the judges and in forming a strong organization. Article 55 of the revised Judges Law (draft) made a further addition that “the State establishes the National Bar Examination, and the Department of Judicial Administration, which makes an organization with the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Prosecutor takes charge of the examination.”19 Article 12 also added the term “National Bar Examination,” and these amendments were all accepted in the manuscript. To summarize the revision process of the Judges Law in 2001, it can be concluded that the lawmakers cared that professionalization had the potential to involve politicization. Therefore, lawmakers considered how to accomplish the professionalization of judges and their simultaneous de-politicization.

5.3.4 Advancing Law-Based Governance in All Areas and the Revision of the Judges Law in 2019 One of the most important topics among the policies that Xi pursues is creating law-based governance. Xi aims to realize the implementation of law-based governance in all areas; the encouragement of judicial reliability, and the safeguarding of human rights by 2020.20 The decision, which was released in October 2014 at the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC, proposed encouraging the normalization, specialization, and professionalization of the legal group and enhancing the level of its specialty and skills.21 Referring to the decision, the Supreme People’s Court released the Opinion about Advancing the Reform of the People’s Court in All Areas (关于全面深化人民法院改革的意见) and declared the

19 Xiaoyang Qiao, “Law Committee of NPC’s Report of the Situation of the Revised Judges Law (Draft)—21st Meeting of the 9th Standing Committee of NPC on April 24, 2001,” in Gazeta of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress in People’s Republic of China (May 2011), 395–396 (in Chinese, 乔晓阳 (2001) 全国人大法律委员会关于《中华人民共和国法官法修正 案 (草案) 》 修改情况的汇报 - 2001年4月24日在第九届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十 一会议上《中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会常务委员会公报》5: 395–396). 20 Xi Jinping, “Explanation of ‘the Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law,” in Documents of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2014), 68 (in Chinese, 习近平关于《中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定》 的说明 (2014)《中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第四次全体会议文件汇编》北京: 人民出版 社). 21 “The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law,” CPC News, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c64387-259276063.html (in Chinese, 中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定《中国共产党新闻 网》(2014年10月29日)).

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encouragement of the professionalization of legal staff as the most important aim of the judicial reform.22 The revision of the Judges Law was discussed from 2017 to 2019 at the 31st Meeting of the 12th Standing Committee of the NPC, and the 7th and 9th Meeting of the 13th Standing Committee of the NPC. It was finally approved in April 2019 and enacted on October 1 2019. The second draft was announced to the public and public comments were reflected in the following discussions and the manuscript. Continuing with the significant points of the revision in 2001, the revision process of the Judges Law in 2019 can be summarized as two key points; remodeling the organizational structure of the People’s Court, which is integrated with the bureaucrat system, and the correction of judicial decentralization (Xiao and Song 2014, 17–26). If these key points prove to be the reverse, it can also be interpreted as advancing professionalization and centralization. For the first point, professionalization, revising the conditions for being a judge, and the qualification requirements were discussed. These topics were also considered in the lawmaking process in the 1990s and its revision in the 2000s, and the revised law in 2001 defined “those who graduate from university law specialities” as the lowest educational requirement. The first draft of the Judges Law in 2017 raised its requirement to “those who graduate full-time university law major,”23 however, this was rewritten to “those who graduate university law major” for the manuscript. This revision occurred because it was considered that the areas in which there is a shortage of human resources cannot fulfill the requirement. Additionally, the conditions for being appointed as court presidents, vicepresidents, members of the adjudication committee, division heads, and deputy division heads were reviewed to consider the professionalization of the judges. The article was revised based on the Organic Law of the People’s Court and provided that “the People’s Courts’ presidents shall possess legal knowledge and legal practice experience, and vice presidents, adjudication committee members, division heads, and deputy division heads shall be taken from among the judges.”24 This revision indicated that the personnel management in the People’s Court would shift to a meritocratic system, which was also intended to reconstruct the People’s Court as a professional legal community which should differ from the bureaucratic system. However, Lang Sheng (朗胜), who is a member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, claimed that the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the 22 “The Opinion about the Advancing the Reform of the People’s Court in All Areas,” China Court Net, https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2015/02/id/148096.shtml (in Chinese, 最高人民法院 (2015) 最高人民法院关于全面深化人民法院改革的意见 - 人民法院第四个五年改革纲要《 中国法院网》(2015年2月4日)). 23 Zhou Qiang, “Explanation about the Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China(Draft)— 31st Meeting of the 12th Standing Committee of NPC on December 22, 2017,” National People’s Congress Net, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2019-04/23/content_ 2086166.htm (in Chinese, 周强 (2017) 关于 《中华人民共和国法官法 (修订草案)》 的说 明 - 2017年12月22日在第十二届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第三十一次会议上 《中国人 大网》(2019年4月23日)). 24 Zhou Qiang, Ibid.

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CPC proposed that an interchange of personnel between members belonging to the legislature, government, and judiciary should be encouraged. He also explained that many cases have already been illustrated in local People’s Courts, and that the channel would be closed if the People’s Court only accepts judges.25 Referring to the opinions that were raised during several discussions, the manuscript defined that such members shall be drawn from the judges, prosecutors, or other persons who have the necessary requirements to become judges.26 For the second point, there was no drastic centralization. The revised Judges Law in 2001 significantly standardized the conditions for becoming a judge and was more severe than that of 1995. After the Law was revised, the CCP received many complaints from local areas, especially in the Western and administratively lower areas, who claimed it was difficult to find judges who met the requirements in those areas.27 The CCP needed to respond to these issues while attempting to centralize the judicial system. As a compromise to deal with their differences, the condition of the judge’s educational background was moderated in several regions. Based on the Opinion of the Perfection of the Country’s Legal Professional Qualification System (关于 完善国家统一法律职业资格制度的意见), which was released in 2015, the first draft provided that “those who hold the bachelor’s degree” in specific regions, were increased to 1,444 administrative units including minority areas, such as Xinjiang, Ningxia, Xizang, Guanxi and Inner Mongolia.28 Additionally, reducing the amount of work experience for those who had graduated with a master’s or doctorate majoring in law was proposed.29 Corresponding to the opinions, the manuscript added the supplementation to consider regional differences. The centralization of the judicial system was also promoted. The incremental selection system (逐级遴选制度) was installed for judges’ participation above the 25 “The Judges Law and the Prosecutors Law God Revised: Going to the Actual Path of Standardization, Specialization and Professionalization,” Chinese People’s Congress (中国人大), January 20, 2018, 44-46 (in Chinese, (2018)法官法、检察官法修订: 正规化专业化职业化迈出实质性 步伐《中国人大》2: 44–46). 26 “Judges Law of the PRC (2019),” Xinhua Net, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-04/23/c_ 1124406804.htm (in Chinese, 中华人民共和国法官法《新华网》(2019年4月23日)). 27 According to the explanation, 2.6% of candidates have graduated from university with a law major, and only 1.3% of these passed the National Bar Examination. Most of them would be willing to get a job in the Eastern and Upper level People’s Courts while, conversely, the Western and Lower level People’s Courts encounter a lack of human resources. “Explanation about ‘The Judges Law of the PRC’: 31st Meeting of the 12th Standing Committee of NPC, December 22, 2017,” The National People’s Congress Net, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2019-04/ 23/content_2086166.htm (in Chinese, 周强关于 《中华人民共和国法官法 (修订草案)》的说明 - 2017年12月22日第十二届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第三十一次会议上《中国人大网》 (2019年4月23日)). 28 “Revising 8 Laws: Developing an Entrance System of Being a Legal Staff,” Chinese People’s Congress (中国人大), September 5, 2017, 44–45. 29 “The Report of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC about the Revision Circumstance of ‘the Judges Law of the PRC,’” The National People’s Congress Net, http://www.npc.gov.cn/ zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2019-04/23/content_2086056.htm (in Chinese, 全国人民代表大会宪法和法 律委员会关于《中华人民共和国法官法 (修订草案) 》修改情况的汇报《中国人大网》(2019 年4月23日)).

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highest level of the People’s Court. Although the People’s Congress in each administrative level has the appointing power of a judge, the People’s Court system can educate the qualified judges and filter the candidates for deliberation at the People’s Congress. The incremental selection system gives the People’s Court a centralized and merit system. Regarding this system, the first draft only defined that judges in the intermediate People’s Court or higher were to be selected incrementally up through the levels30 . The second draft added more detailed regulations whereby judges participating in the intermediate and higher people’s courts’ selection should have served for more than five years in the lower level People’s Court, and have three years’ work experience corresponding to the new position, while judges participating in the Supreme People’s Court should have served more than eight years in the lower level People’s Court, and have five years’ work experience corresponding to the new position.31 A member of the Standing Committee of the NPC claimed that the second draft failed to meet the condition that the incremental selection system provided as it was too strict and a long time was needed to find the appropriate candidates.32 It was necessary to relax the conditions and the manuscript was rewritten to state that judges of the higher level people’s courts would usually be selected incrementally up through the levels, while judges of the Supreme People’s Court and High People’s Courts may be selected from two levels below the people’s court. Judges participating in the higher level people’s courts’ selection should have served for a definite number of years in the lower level people’s court, and have work experience corresponding to the new post.33 Additional policy on the centralization requirement of the party leadership and the political skills of judges were discussed when the second draft was opened up to the public; those topics were then added to the manuscript. The importance of the political skills that the judges should have was repeatedly discussed during the production and revision processes of the Judges Laws in 1995 and 2001, as well as being clearly stipulated in the Judges Law in 2019. The next section examines whether the Judges Law was observed by applying the framework of street level breaucracy. Accordingly, it focuses on the judges’ perspectives and demonstrates how the job consciousness of the New Generation was created.

30 Zhou

(December 22, 2017). Report of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC about the Discussion Result of ‘the Judges Law of the PRC,’” The National People’s Congress Net, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/ npc/xinwen/2019-04/23/content_2086048.htm (in Chinese, 全国人民代表大会宪法和法律委员 会关于《中华人民共和国法官法 (修订草案) 》审议结果的报告《中国人大网》(2019年4月23 日)). 32 Ibid. 33 “Judges Law of the PRC (2019),” Xinhua Net, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-04/23/c_ 1124406804.htm (in Chinese, 中华人民共和国法官法《新华网》(2019年4月23日)). 31 “The

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5.4 Transforming the Structure of the People’s Court and the Judges’ Consciousness Regarding Their Jobs 5.4.1 Judges in the Former and New Generations Since the National Bar Examination was initiated in 2002, a new generation of judges selected by examination emerged. Article 9 of the Judges Law stated that judges in the former generation who do not satisfy the requirement must receive training; however, the training system did not work as the lawmakers expected because many of the judges from the former generation rejected taking the courses and believed themselves already to be legal professionals. This section first shows the structure of the People’s Court. Figure 5.1 illustrates the number of successful candidates who passed the National Bar Examination and the ratio of successful applicants since 2002. The total number of successful candidates is around 480,000. This number reflects the number of new generation judges; however, there is no exact figure for the total number of judges, and it is difficult to estimate the percentages represented among the 480,000 judges. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the educational background of lawyers. While these data do not refer to the judges’ educational background, it can be estimated that the lawyers’ data forms a similar graph as the judges’ data, because they took 30

80000 70000

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0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

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Fig. 5.1 The number of successful candidates and pass rate for the National Bar Examination. Source “Data Analysis of Number of Successful Candidates and Pass Rate of the National Bar Examination from 2002 to 2013,” On the Xueyou (学优) Net. http://www.gkstk.com/article/wk78500001221955.html

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Fig. 5.2 Transformation of the Educational Background of Lawyers. Source Li, Haiwei (ed.). 2002–2014. China yearbook of Lawyers, Beijing: People’s Court Press

the same examination. Figure 5.2 indicates that fewer than 70% of lawyers had a bachelor’s degree. This circumstance can also be observed in the judges’ data. According to interviews conducted by the author, a judge from the new generation who works in the Lower People’s Court in the upcountry district explained that “there are judges in the younger generation who passed the National Bar Examination from 2002 to 2010. On the contrary, there are judges in the older generation who used to be veterans and were reinstated as judges, but who were also executives at a factory and were placed at the People’s Court to perform a government job.”34 A judge from the former generation at the Higher People’s Court in a coastal district also stated that “Recently, many judges in the younger generation take responsibility on cases. Rejuvenation of the People’s Court happens rapidly.”35 The speed of the professionalization of judges and the personnel organization of the People’s Court should be different depending on the place and level of the People’s Court. They 34 The Judge in the Lower People’s Court, Interview by the author, X District Lower People’s Court, Y City, Z Autonomous Region, China, October 2016. People’s Daily also mentioned that “the judges were selected from a veteran, a driver who worked in the People’s Court for a long time, and a guard. The authority that recognized the job of the judges was one of the administrative treatments, not a profession.” “Judges Go to Professionalize,” People’s Daily, July 24, 2002 (in Chinese, 法官走向 职业化《人民日报》(2002年7月24日)). 35 The Judge in the Higher People’s Court, interview by the author, G City Higher People’s Court, China, February and August 2015.

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admitted that the judges in the People’s Court represented a mixture of both former and new generation judges.

5.4.2 Job Consciousness of the New Generation Realizing the professionalization of the judges provided by the Judges Law, the judges from the former generation aimed to fill the requirement, while the judges in the new generation used their professional knowledge to deal with cases. However, to get straight to the point, the professionalization of judges was not realized as expected by the lawmakers. The judges in the new generation said that “the judges in the former generation cooperate with us, the relationship with them is good.”36 They recognized that “the new generation has a high-level knowledge of legal theory. Contrarily, the former generation has rich experiences and is good at dealing with cases with human warmth (人情: renqing).”37 This tendency was also mentioned by the judges in the Intermediate People’s Court in G City and lawyers in the same district. One lawyer explained that “the reason why the legal professionals need human warmth is that customers prefer the lawyer who has it; therefore, customers tend to choose a lawyer from the former generation.”38 In court cases in China, judges usually consider the circumstances, rarely referring to a precedent in making a judgment; this is because human warmth is significant. Therefore, the judges recognized that “the new generation gets the same level of education that Western countries promote; however, their education as ‘the legal supremacy,’ too ideal. After they start working at the People’s Court and experience a real case, they notice how much people prefer a judgment with human warmth. ‘legal supremacy’ often does not work at the court, and they would recognize the gap between the ideal and reality.” They additionally pointed out that “According to this circumstance, the new generation really respects the former judges, because they can figure out the cases with human warmth, and the new generation believes that they should learn the way the former generation performs.”39 Based on the explanation that the judges in the new generation gave during the interviews, two circumstances can be observed. The first is that a preference for discussion over judgment based on the written law is still rooted in the court culture 36 The Judge in the Lower People’s Court, interview by the author, X District Lower People’s Court, Y City, Z Autonomous Region, China, October 2016. 37 The Judge in the Lower People’s Court, interview by the author, X District Lower People’s Court, Y City, Z Autonomous Region, China, October 2016, The Judge in the Intermediate People’s Court, interview by the author, G City, E Province, China, August 2016 and November 2017, the Lawyers, interview by the author, G City, E Province, China, August 2016. 38 The Lawyer, interview by the author, Y City, Z Autonomous Region, China, October 2016. 39 The Judge in the Lower People’s Court, interview by the author, X District Lower People’s Court, Y City, Z Autonomous Region, China, October 2016.

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in China.40 The second is that legal knowledge taught at university does not work when dealing with court cases, and that learning a culture that is deeply ingrained in the People’s Court is significant for performing as a “legal professional” in court. It can be observed that judges need to adapt to the court culture after they begin working at the People’s Court and it is their way of “professionalization”; nevertheless, the CCP’s definition of professionalization is to promote highly-educated judges. It can also be pointed out that the CCP’s preference for work experience de-professionalizes the judges.

5.4.3 The Progressive Party and the Conservative Court It can be observed that the conservative behavior of the People’s Court inclines a judge from the new generation to follow the ways of a judge from the former generation. The revision process of the Judges Law, conducting the National Bar Examination, and making the selection of judges stricter are all promoted by the CCP and the central government; however, the revised law cannot easily be adopted in the People’s Court. Jiankui Zhang (张建魁), who is the vice-principal of the higher level People’s Court in Sichuan province, explained that “professionalization of the judges is an essential requirement to realize [the] ‘Rule of Law’ in China,” but also pointed out that “there is a huge gap between reality and the ideal. The most significant problem is that the policy and its implementation are uniform.” He also claimed that the revised Judges Law does not concern the economic and cultural gap between the coastal areas and inland areas. Moreover, as the pass rate is very low and judges in the new generation prefer to choose the higher level People’s Court in the coastal areas, the People’s Courts located in inland areas face a severe shortage of human resources. Furthermore, the definition of “professionalization” cannot be granted merely by the examination, and rich experiences in court cases are important in professionalizing the judges. Therefore, making the rule based on educational background is not realistic.41 As well as the inland area courts, the lower level courts also face the problem of replacing judges from the former generation with ones from the new generation. According to the 2002 statistical data of the Lower People’s Court in Shaoguan city, Guangdong province (广东省韶关市), the number of judges with a bachelor’s degree was 98 out of 593 in total. If the statistics reflect the judges who attended university full-time, the number would be much less.42 Moreover, the People’s Court in the local areas manipulates the performance report of engagement with the CCP and central government. Yu Keping (于克平), the principal of the People’s Court in the Hailar district, Hulunbuir city, Inner Mongolia (内蒙古自治区呼伦贝尔市海拉 40 The previous study also mentioned that China has a strong arbitration culture. Takamizawa (1998). 41 Zhang

(2003).

42 “The Court in Rural Area,” Southern Weekly, August 21, 2003 (in Chinese, 边远法院《南方周

末》(2003年8月21日)).

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尔区), indicated that “official data that our court provides shows 98% of judges fulfill the criteria; however, the majority of them went to night school or a correspondence school at a university, not a full-time school. Therefore, the number itself meets the requirement, though the level of the judges is much lower than what the data shows.”43 Considering the reaction of the local People’s Court, Zhao Shijie (赵仕杰) and Li Chunlin (李春林), who are the representatives of the People’s Congress in Yunnan province (云南省), and Gong Pixiang (公丕祥) and Xu Xiaoyang (徐晓阳), who are the representatives of the People’s Congress in Jiangsu province, proposed that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the Supreme People’s Court need to inspect the implementation status of the Judges Law and the Prosecutors Law, because the professionalization of legal professionals as defined by these laws was not being observed. They also claimed that several locals still make illegal appointments and destroy the legal order.44 Gong Pixiang explained that, in the Lower People’s Court in Jiangsu province, only 53% of the judges graduated from an undergraduate program in 2006, although Jiangsu is one of the more economically developed cities in China. This circumstance happened because of the limitation in recruitment, shortage of training budgets, and the judges’ low status in society.45 Their proposal was accepted, and subsequent inspections of the implementation status of the Judges Law and the Prosecutors Law took place in 2006. The implementation status in Guangdong province, Zhejiang province, Yunnan province, and Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region were researched before the inspection, and the local People’s Congress discussed the contents of the inspection. Finally, inspections were conducted in Heiliujiang province, Jiangsu province, Hebei province, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Shanxi province, Jilin province, Henan province, Shanghai city, and Ningsxa Hui Autonomous Region from June to July 2006. Inspections of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Prosecutor took place at the same time.46 Judges’ Level Needs to Improve,” People’s Daily, September 26, 2003 (in Chinese, 法官 素质待提高《人民日报》(2003年9月26日)). 44 Wang, Lianyin "The Proposal was Raised by the Representatives of the People’s Congress, Zhao Shijie, Gong Pixiang, Li, Chunlin, and Xu, Xiaoyang—Necessity of Inspection toward the implementation Status of the Judges Law and the Prosecutors Law,” People’s Court Daily, March 10, 2004 (in Chinese, 王连印赵仕杰公丕祥李春林徐晓阳等代表建议 - 对法官法和减产观法实施 状况应进行大检查《人民法院》(2004年3月10日)). 45 “Gong Pixiang Proposed—the Inspection of the Implementation Status of the Judges Law and the Prosecutors Law,” People’s Congress Net, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/dbgz/dbzs/200503/08/content_336196.htm (in Chinese, 公丕祥代表建议 - 检查法官法检察官法实施状况《中 国人大网》(2005年3月8日)). 46 Gu, Xiulian, “the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Conducted the Inspection of the Implementation Status of the Judges Law and the Prosecutors Law—the 23rd Meeting of the 10th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress,” People’s Congress Net, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/jdgz/bgjy/2006-08/27/content_351856.htm (in Chinese, 顾秀 林 (2008) 全国人大常委会执法检查组关于跟踪检查《中华人民共和国法官法》 、 《中华人民 共和国检察官法》实施状况的报告 - 2007年8月29日在第十届全国人民代表大会常务委员会 第二十九次会议上《全国人民代表大会年鉴》702). 43 “The

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The result of the inspections was that the quality of the judges and prosecutors has obviously improved. As of 2005, 60.8% of judges and 63.2% of prosecutors had a bachelor’s degree, an increase of 53% for judges and 46% for prosecutors compared to the 1995 data.47 The introduction of the National Bar Examination is one of the biggest factors for improving educational background; however, around 40% of the judges and prosecutors are still unprofessional and raising their skill levels is still necessary. Additionally, inspections have taken place several times since 2006 by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, as well as by the local committees. The Judges Law has not been fully implemented as judges still have a strong conservative perspective toward the goal of professionalization that the CCP so admired.

5.5 Conclusion This paper examines the following research questions: (1) how did the CCP promote the professionalization of judges, (2) what political behavior do judges exhibit after professionalization, and (3) how did the relationship between the CCP and the group of judges transform as a result. To address the first question, we observed that the CCP promoted the professionalization of judges not only to raise their educational background, but also for de-politicization. The logic behind the CCP’s professionalization of judges is the unification of the judge’s quality and thier integration with the CCP, especially in Xi’s era. Xi has repeatedly explained the keys of the reform of the People’s Court, such as professionalization and centralization. Therefore, the CCP promoted raising the educational requirements for judges and, at the same time, evaluated their experiences in the People’s Court. The CCP is attempting to separate the People’s Court from other state organs while it creates the original human resources to supply the mechanism in the People’s Court and strengthens the leadership of the central government to the People’s Court. For the second question, the conservative behavior of the People’s Court was obviously observed after the Judges Law was revised in 2001. The National Bar Examination has been administered since 2001, and a new generation of judges has emerged. The CCP encouraged the new generation to promote the professionalization of judges; however, they did not act as the lawmakers had expected. Judges in the new generation prefer rich experiences in courts and using human warmth to deal with cases rather than acquiring knowledge for an examination. Therefore, the new generation needs to adapt to the job culture that the former generation has created and embedded in the People’s Court, showing conservative behavior. In addition, the local People’s Court manipulated the report to the central government and the CCP to achieve their criteria. This means that, although the data itself show that the judges are becoming legal professionals, the actual conditions have not changed very much.

47 Ibid.

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For the final question, this paper applied the framework of street-level bureaucracy to examine the CCP’s promotion of legal professionalization that controversially revealed the conservative behavior of judges and the People’s Court. The CCP promoted the professionalization of judges in China and enacted the Judges Law by a top-down approach; however, judges and the local People’s Courts represent “the partial form of opponent” and lacked sufficient capability to pursue the CCP’s requirements. “The partial form of opponent” implies that, under the acceptance of the CCP’s leadership, they partially showed a negative attitude toward the CCP’s promotion, but not in an obvious way, and either falsified the improvement or exaggerated their achievement. When the local People’s Courts and judges became a main focus for the observation, as the framework of street-level bureaucracy provides, it is hard to determine whether the professionalization of judges appears to have been as expected by the CCP. The local People’s Courts and judges preferred to maintain the status quo when the CCP’s policy or the law tried to change the profit structure in which they participated. Therefore, it can be concluded that the professionalization of judges neither succeeded nor failed, as they have broad discretion to implement the Judges Law and continue forming “the partial form of opponent.” This is the reality of the “Rule of Law” in China. To summarize the discussion in this chapter, why the authoritarian regime in China is still rigid while the local People’s Courts and judges show “the partial form of opponent” and do not accept the way of their professionalization that the CCP attempts needs to be considered, it is because the behavior of the local People’s Court and judges is due to the requirements of society. Their means may not follow the law; however, it works for settling disputes between individuals, so society’s dissatisfaction does not emerge and the CCP’s resilience can be retained. Acknowledgements This paper was supported by a JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Researcher Activity Start-up, Kakenhi 17H06507.

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Wright, T. (2010). Accepting authoritarianism: state-society relations in China’s reform era. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Xiao, J., & Song, Y. (2014). Mission of the Judicial Reform: A Detailed Reading on the Judicial Reform of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPCCC. Journal of Henan Univesity of Economics and Law, 6, 17–26 (肖建华、宋艳菊 (2014) 司法改革的使命 - 中共十八届三中全 会司法改革内容解读《河南财经政法大学学报》6: 17–26). Zhang, J. (2003). Several concerns about the professionalization of the judges. People’s Court Daily, January 11, 2003, National Edition (in Chinese, 张建魁 (2003年1月11日) 法官职业化建设的 几点思考《人民法院报》 ). Zhou, D. (2009). Making and revising the Judges Law in China—Celebrating the 60th anniversary of the People’s Court work. Hebei Legal, 27(10), 53–55 (in Chinese, 周道鸾 (2009) 我国法官 法的制定和修改正 - 纪念人民司法工作六十周年《河北法学》27(10): 53–55).

Chapter 6

Elite Mobility Between the SOEs and State Institutions: A State-Centered Approach Vida Macikenaite

Abstract This paper surveys the patterns of elite mobility of executives from the large central SOEs in China in the reform era between the companies and state institutions at the central and provincial levels. It shows that inter-system appointments of executive leaders became a common practice around 2000. Since then, executives have been appointed to state institutions in charge of China’s large central SOEs, mainly State-owned assets and supervision commission (SASAC), as well as the supervisory boards for large key enterprises. Such practice has transformed the profit-seeking managers of a company into bureaucrats in charge of the oversight of these companies and the overall reform of the SOE system. At the provincial level, corporate executives from the state sector have been appointed as provincial leaders. The chapter demonstrates that this specific pattern of inter-system appointments of SOE executives is the result of the regime’s cadre management system, aimed at enhancing the overall quality of public human resources in the state institutions and generally strengthening the state capacity. Keywords Elite mobility · Political mobility of economic elites · State capacity in China

6.1 Introduction State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been at the center of China’s opening-up reform since its launch in the late 1970s. From the very beginning, the separation of the state and SOEs was one of the key pillars of the reform. As the reform progressed, they continued to play a significant role as many strategic industries were still reserved for the state sector. Later, the large central SOEs were at the forefront of China’s integration into the global economy. Promoted by the central government in Beijing as the national champions, they have long led the expansion of Chinese outward FDI. V. Macikenaite (B) Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan, 777 Kokusai-cho, Minami Uonuma, Niigata 949-7248, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_6

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As advancing reforms have opened up different sectors of the economy to private enterprises, the relative economic weight of SOEs has decreased. Nonetheless, in strategic industries, they have maintained a dominant role. Moreover, SOE executives have emerged as part of China’s political and not only economic elite, as they entered the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Against this background, accurately understanding the relations between the party-state and SOEs has been the key piece to the puzzle of grasping the logics of the economic and even political dynamics in China. An extensive volume of scholarly literature on the subject serves as proof of its importance. While many have focused on the formal links between the state and SOEs, i.e. the institutional SOE reform, increasing attention has been paid to the role that SOEs play in the Chinese political system and specifically how and what influence they exert on the policy process (Downs 2007, 2008; Hao 2013). Here, the links between the party-state and major SOEs at the individual level are studied as a part of the elite mobility in China and most of them focus on the companies rather than the state. Leutert (2018) surveys the patterns of career mobility of SOE executives, while others examine what advantage political mobility offers to the corporate leaders. Brodsgaard (2012) notes that “through career advancement and circulation in the power system, leaders with a background in business have an opportunity to advance the interests of the business groups and industrial sectors in which they have worked. They also have an opportunity to protect and promote associates and subordinates in their former workplace.” Wang (2016) explores the impact of political connectedness after showing that Chinese listed companies have become more politically connected to the center, which appears also to be the case for SOEs. This is the outcome of the “revolving door” between the state and corporate sector as described by Sheng and Zhao (2013). Liou and Tsai (2014) define personnel movement between the state and SOEs as intersystem rotation as opposed to the intra-system rotation—career transfers within the corporate sector. While the literature points to the reintegration of the party-state and SOEs at the personnel level—a trend counter to the direction of the formal institutional SOE reform—questioning its effect on policies, the question remains regarding what role this has played in the Chinese party-state. There can be little doubt that the intersystem appointments of corporate executives have been the result of intentional actions by the regime. For example, Lee (2015) shows that the country-wide network of party schools is utilized to identify and indoctrinate talented and loyal officials, while Tsai and Kou (2015) argue that there exists a system for maintaining secret lists of “reserve cadres” at each level of government, who are viewed as likely candidates for promotion. Thus, the political mobility of SOE executives needs to be examined as an element of the regime’s strategic careful cadre management system, the cornerstone of the CCP regime. This chapter explores the patterns of the elite mobility of a very specific group of cadres—executives of the large central SOEs in China. While being the leaders of business entities, they are also a part of the extensive Chinese nomenklatura system and often hold ministerial or vice-ministerial rank. The analysis focuses on their mobility between SOEs and the state institutions, i.e. inter-system mobility, seeking

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to understand how inter-system appointments have been utilized by the regime in its overall governing strategy.

6.2 Data Sample and Research Design The analysis that follows is based on two sets of data. The first is the survey of career trajectories of executives from 33 Chinese companies, mainly central large SOEs.1 The data cover the full careers of the general managers, deputy general managers, chairmen, vice-chairmen, and directors or presidents (when such job title existed), incumbent in 1992, 2000, 2005, and 2010, including their later careers until 2019 (468 year-leader observations).2 Career transfers between the SOEs and state institutions at the central and provincial levels is the focal point of the analysis. The survey of career trajectories of executives from selected years and companies reveals that, in most cases, inter-system appointments occurred between the SOEs and State-owned Assets and Supervision Commission (SASAC) or SOE-supervisory institutions at the center, or between SOEs and provincial governments at the local level. To verify the initial selective data-based findings, and to observe how the large-scale anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping might have affected the patterns of inter-system career mobility, the second comprehensive dataset includes the career trajectories of all of the directors and deputy directors of SASAC (24 observations, 2003–2019 January), chairs of the supervisory boards for large key SOEs (94 observations, 2000–2018 March), and inspectors of the large SOEs (39 observations, 1998–2000). For provincial leaders under Xi Jinping administration (governors and deputy governors, or mayors and deputy mayors in the case of prefecture-level municipalities, 2012–2019), publicly available reports on their corporate backgrounds were utilized for the analysis.

1 The

companies for the data sample were selected based on the survey of career backgrounds of regular or alternate members of the CCP Central Committee (CCP CC) (from the 12th to the 18th, i.e. from 1982 to 2012) assuming that individuals with managerial experience in business entities (or industries) that the regime deemed to be important would be recruited to the CCP CC at a certain point in time. To cover up for the underrepresentation of coal industry after 1993, when China National Coal Mine Corporation was closed down, China National Coal Industry Import and Export (Group) Corporation, which later changed its name to China National Coal Group Corporation (China Coal), was also included. The companies were first selected disregarding the shareholders structure. As expected, the survey revealed that mostly managers from SOEs or their subsidiaries (with the exception of Chunlan (Group) Corporation and Haier Group Corporation) have ever held membership in the CCP CC. 2 Career data was collected using China Directory (1981–2015), People’s Daily, and online resources, mainly company websites and news reports, which were also used to crosscheck the data.

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6.3 Search for Managerial Expertise at the Center 6.3.1 From Managing an SOE to Leading the Reform of the SOE System There can be observed two stages in the patterns of inter-system appointments during the observation period from the beginning of the opening-up reform until the beginning of 2019. First was the early stage, when personnel were appointed from the state institutions to SOEs, following the logics of institutional reform. Most of the appointments occurred within the same industry. It was common practice for a ministry official to become a manager of an SOE set up on the basis of that ministry or its department (the 1980s or, where enterprise reform was delayed, the early 1990s). Further, officials from the economic policy-related institutions (e.g. State Planning Commission) in the 1980s and 1990s took managerial posts later in their careers, mostly in the key strategic industries at that time. A more interesting trend can be observed in the later decades from around 2000, when inter-system appointments occurred in the opposite direction, i.e., from a company to a state institution. It appears as if the process of separating business entities from the state was partially rebound and there was a selective renewal of links between a handful of companies and central government institutions at the individual level through inter-system cadre appointments. Starting around 2000, company managers were appointed to the SOE supervisory institutions, State Council or particular ministries, as summarized in Appendix 6.1. While other cases appear sporadic,3 there is a particular pattern regarding the appointment of the executives to the SASAC or the supervisory boards for the large key SOEs, both directly involved in SOE administration and supervision. Since the establishment of SASAC in 2003 until early 2019, three out of five directors, or 60%, were former SOE executives. The institution’s director from August 2010 until March 2013 entered SASAC as deputy director in 2003 from the defense industry, having served as the deputy general manager of China Aerospace Electromechanical Corporation and in other non-executive positions in the China Aerospace Industry Corporation since 1997. The Petro China manager followed him as SASAC director in 2013, only to be removed on corruption charges later the same year. An SOE 3 Meritocratic

principles appear to explain the majority of these appointments to the highest-level state institutions other than the ones discussed below. For example, in regards to Xiao Yaqing, former chairman of Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. appointed as the deputy secretary-general of the State Council in 2009, Downs and Meidan (2011) note that “the secret of Xiao’s success was his ability to simultaneously promote corporate and national interests” as demonstrated by the deal to purchase nine percent of Anglo-Australian mining company Rio Tinto by his company and in this way prevent one company from controlling one-third of the global iron ore market. Similarly, Miao Wei, in 2008 appointed as vice minister and in 2010 as minister of industry and information technology, was known for having turned China’s second largest automobile group Dongfeng Motor Corporation from a heavily indebted company into a highly profitable automobile maker in less than ten years (Zhang and Alon 2009). Jiang Jiemin, appointed as director of SASAC in 2013, had been praised for his achievements as a manager of Petro China.

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executive returned to head SASAC in February 2016, this time from the Aluminum Corporation of China. Similarly, among the deputy directors of SASAC were former executives from the large SOEs or their subsidiaries—the Sinopec Group (appointed in 2003), the Shenhua Group (in 2014), one individual from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China I (AVIC I) and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (in 2011), and the China National Machinery Industry Corporation (in 2018) in addition to the deputy director from the aerospace industry mentioned above. That is, six of the 19 deputy directors were former SOE executives. These SOEs, with the exception of the aviation and aerospace industry, all belong to the primary sector of the economy. Further, they are China’s leading multinational corporations. Fortune Global 500, which ranks corporations worldwide by revenue, listed the Sinopec Group 58th in 2000, 86th in 2002, and 70th in 2003 (it was ranked 4th in 2013), Petro China 6th in 2012 and 5th in 2013, and the Shenhua Group 178th and 165th in 2013 and 2014, respectively. The Aluminum Corporation of China was the world’s third largest producer of aluminum before it took over Russia’s United Company RUSAL in terms of production in 2019. China National Machinery Industry Corporation was ranked 57th on the Engineering News-Record Top 250 Global Contractors list in 2018. The international standing of the companies was apparently taken as an indicator of their executives’ expertise in corporate management, which has been crucial for SASAC. In 2003, it was set up with the major goal of taking charge of the stateinvested enterprises on behalf of the State Council. It incorporated those divisions of the State Economic and Trade Commission and of the Ministry of Finance that had previously been responsible for supervising and managing state-owned assets, as well as the Central Enterprise Work Commission. In addition to such administrative tasks as performing the responsibilities of investor on behalf of the State Council, supervising SOEs and appointing their managers, SASAC was also tasked with building a regulatory framework through “formulating rules and systems on stateowned assets supervision and administration of enterprises” (State Council 2003). Arguably, extensive knowledge and an insider understanding of the Chinese SOE system were also preferred, since SASAC was involved in tackling major problems within the SOEs; e.g., in 2005, SASAC issued comprehensive regulations on management buyouts of state assets (“Tentative Method of Transfer of Enterprise State Assets to Management,” April 14, 2005) to address the problem of potential asset stripping through “insider privatization” (see Tong 2006 for further details). In this way, the Chinese corporate executives were entrusted with reforming the SOE system, propelling “the adjustment of the layout and structure of the State economy,” and even improving “the overall quality of the State economy” (State Council 2003).

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6.3.2 Corporate Executives as Supervisors of the Large Central SOEs Another institution that recurs in the data is the supervisory boards for the large key SOEs. These boards, accountable to the State Council at the time, replaced the system of supervisors to large SOEs, and were due to “supervise the situation regarding maintenance of an increase in the value of State-owned assets in the key large stateowned enterprises.” While financial supervision was the focus, boards of supervisors also were to supervise the operational and management activities of the persons responsible for the enterprises. According to the Interim Regulations on the Boards of Supervisors in State-owned Enterprises, the boards of supervisors were to carry out regular inspections of the enterprises once to twice per year, and were also entitled to irregular inspections of the enterprises on specific matters as necessary (State Council 2000). Later, it became SASAC’s responsibility to dispatch the supervisory boards to China’s major state-invested enterprises. This system existed until March 2018, when it was decided to incorporate the duties of the supervisory boards for large key SOEs into the National Audit Office. The data survey shows that it was regular practice to appoint an executive from an SOE as the chair of the supervisory board of key large SOEs. During the 18 years for which this supervision system existed, 14 of the 94 chairs of supervisory boards of the large key enterprises were found to be appointed directly from a company, mostly representing one of China’s pillar industries: non-ferrous metals (China Aluminum Corporation (Chinalco), Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd.), aerospace and defense (Chinese General Company of Astronautics, China South Industries Group Corporation), petroleum (CNPC and CNOOC), railways (China Railway Engineering Construction Corporation), electric power generation (China Datang Corporation and State Power Corporation), engineering and construction services (China Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation), nuclear power (China National Nuclear Corporation and State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation), electronics (China Electronics Corporation), and one from a mixed industrial background with a degree in mining and work experience in China National Nuclear Corporation. These industries were represented randomly throughout the observation period. From among the supervisors to large SOEs during 1998 until 2000, only distant links with business entities could be observed.

6.4 Entrusting Industry Professionals with the Provinces Inter-system appointments of SOE executives are relatively common at the provincial level. Minister or vice-minister rank-holding executives are chosen as provincial governors or deputy-governors. There were several cases when provincial leaders from the 1990s later assumed managerial positions. Over the years, this practice

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faded away as there was an increasing trend toward the professionalization of managers—the absolute majority of the SOE executives have an industrial rather than administrative background. After the mid-1990s, most of the managers advanced through the career ladder as their industry professionals, and thus it became rare for a manager to have previous experience as a provincial leader. This trend reflects the transformation of Chinese SOEs into commercial actors. The appointment of corporate managers to provincial leaders emerged as a trend around 2000-2003, strengthening further after 2007. Appendix 6.2 provides a list of these appointments. It also includes secretaries and deputy secretaries of the provincial party committees for reference. Often, the same person would hold both the post of the provincial governor and its party secretary at the same time or consecutively. Nonetheless, company managers were appointed to provincial leaders as their industry professionals rather than cadres who had been sent to a company temporarily and then would make a return to a state institution. According to Bo (2014), former corporate managers are one of the five groups of provincial governors recently in China. The other four groups of provincial governors are former Youth League cadres, then those who spent their entire careers in local government and advanced through the system, those with extensive experience of the central party or government apparatus, and a number of former academics. Previous studies point out that performance has been the key factor in the mobility of provincial leaders. Li and Zhou (2009) note that, unlike during the pre-reform years, when political conformity was the key criterion for promoting provincial leaders, as the reform advanced, economic performance and other competence-related indicators took center stage in promotion as expertise in administrative management gained importance. Our data lend support to the argument that performance but even more so the industrial affiliation of the corporate executives explain the inter-system appointments at the provincial level. The appointment of Su Shulin, Sinopec Group general manager from 2007 to 2011, as the governor of Fujian Province in 2011 was attributed to Su’s management experience and knowledge of economic affairs (Downs and Meidan 2011). Reportedly, the leadership in Beijing was impressed with his business strategy for Daqing Oilfield (Zhao and Yang 2011). The appointment of the president of NORINCO to deputy mayor of Chongqing Municipality in 2013 was associated with the financial performance of his company. Reportedly, the revenue of NORINCO in 2011 was 300 bln. CNY and 351 bln. CNY in 2012 (Sina 2013). And yet, the executive’s industrial background appears to be the major explanatory factor with a particular pattern displayed by the data. Until around 2012, there is a high correlation between executives’ experience in a particular industry and the location of their province-level appointment. In the later period, inter-system appointments were drawn predominantly from the aerospace or defense industry, but those appointed earlier, around 2003 and 2004, were from traditional industries, predominantly petroleum but also coal and metal (steel and aluminum). In 2007, this practice was extended to the automobile manufacturing industry, with a manager from the China FAW Group Corporation assuming deputy governor post within Jilin provincial government, and a China Electronics Corporation (CEC) manager becoming deputy governor of Hunan province. Overall, the appointments in this period reflect

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the distribution of economic activities across the Chinese provinces—the executive has extensive experience in the industry dominant in the province or the SOE is even based there. As early as 1992–1993, which was a unique case observed at that time, Hu Fuguo, general manager of the China National Coal Mine Corporation, held the post of provincial governor in Shanxi province, China’s biggest coal-producing province and home to the largest number of coal companies in the country. This practice continued. In 2000, an executive from the oil industry was appointed as a governor of Qinghai province, one of the major locations of China’s oil and natural gas deposits. The manager of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was reportedly selected as the governor of Hainan Province in 2003 due to the central government’s intention to develop the oil and gas resources in the South China Sea. He had decades of experience in the industry and had successfully led the company (Chen 2003) (similar to the appointments of provincial party secretaries. In 2000, Zhou Yongkang, petroleum industry professional and deputy general manager of the CNPC prior to its restructuring, was appointed party secretary of Sichuan province, where in 1997 it was estimated that gas production constituted around half of China’s total production). An executive of Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. transferred to Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region to become deputy governor in 2004 and then governor in 2008. Guangxi province is the major site for China’s bauxite, the main source of aluminum. A general manager from the China FAW Group Corporation was appointed to Jilin provincial government, where automobile production is one of the dominant industries. The general manager of the Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation from 2005 congruently served as Shanghai’s deputy governor. A former China Electronic Corporation (CEC) executive presided over Hunan province as the deputy governor from 2007 until 2013. While there were no straightforward links with the company at the time of appointment, electronics was one of the pillar industries of Changsha National High-Tech Industrial Development Zone, approved by the State Council in 1991, and it hosts a significant number of companies in the industry. Further, in 2015, the Hunan Provincial People’s Government and CEC signed a strategic framework agreement to deepen cooperation in a number of fields and specifically concentrate on the strategy of “Made in China 2025” to establish a national experimental platform on intelligent manufacturing, among other tasks. Generally, these were appointments from industries with high economic significance for the country. The automotive industry serves as a good example besides the petroleum and steel industries. It was designated a pillar industry in 1986, but “as capital and technology were extremely scarce in all industries, and the Chinese automakers lacked experience beyond truck production, there was almost no knowledge of car development and production. The very few indigenous car brands reliant on craft production, could not meet the government objective of developing the passenger car industry” (Holweg et al. 2009). The automotive industry was again reconfirmed as being a pillar industry in 1994, when the government designated a number of industries to drive the national economy. However, the most significant change in the industry occurred only after 2000. From 2001 to 2003, the output almost doubled, and nearly tripled in 2005 (Handel 2011). Around that time, a manager from the China FAW Group Corporation was appointed to the provincial government. As

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the Chinese SOEs grew and made their names in the international market, the regime had more high-class managers to choose from to lead the provinces. While inter-system appointments to the provincial governments appears to be the result of well-performing managers being handpicked from the traditional, wellestablished industries in that province after 2000, 2011–2012 marks a notable turning point in this regard. Around that time, managers from the aerospace and defense industry entered provincial governments. In 2011, the manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) became deputy governor of Hebei Province, and governor the following year. This trend has only strengthened under Xi Jinping, when most of the appointments were drawn from the aerospace industry. Under his administration, former managers from these industries were appointed to senior positions in the governments of Chongqing and Tianjin municipalities, Guangdong, Hubei, Hunan, Liaoning, Zhejiang province, and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, marking a significant expansion of the number of provinces under former managers as the top leaders. Reportedly, under Xi Jinping, the “spirit of aerospace” has been put alongside the “spirit of the Long March,” which gives it ideological prominence. Among all the industries, only the petroleum sector has been given such importance in China (Mai 2017) and yet, while the inter-system appointments earlier from petroleum industry could be explained by their geographic distribution, no such pattern in the appointments from the aviation or aerospace industry could be observed. Overall, the inter-system appointments under Xi Jinping have tended to eliminate the industrial links between the former executives and the provinces to which they are appointed to the benefit of the aerospace or aviation industries, but the Xi Jinping administration has maintained and expanded rather than newlyintroducing the practice of inter-system appointments from the defense or aerospace industries to the provincial governments.

6.5 The Regime’s Strategy Driving Inter-system Appointments There exists a pattern in the practice of inter-system appointments between the large central SOEs and state institutions at the central and provincial levels. First, the analysis reveals that elite mobility from SOEs to the state institutions became common from around the turn of the century, when China’s large business groups started emerging as a result of the policy of “grasping the large, letting go of the small” (zhuada fangxiao), launched in 1995 and formally approved at the fifteenth National Congress of the CCP in 1997. Second, inter-system appointments mainly occurred between SOEs and the institutions in charge of SOE supervision at the center, and between the SOEs and the provincial governments at the local level. Third, the intersystem elite mobility started with a handful of industries and later expanded to include SOEs from a broader spectrum of economic sectors. This was also probably a natural effect of the development of Chinese SOEs—executives were transferred to the state

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institutions after their companies made their names as the leaders of the industry both domestically and internationally. Inter-system elite mobility intensified after 2005, probably because, by then, the regime had a wider pool of experienced corporate managers to choose from as Chinese SOEs penetrated the global economy. It turns out that this growing supply of highly-experienced corporate managers came as a timely response to the needs pronounced by the party-state. The importance of high-quality human resources in the process of China’s development was highlighted in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001– 2005). Premier Zhu Rongji reported, at the NPC session in March 2001 presenting the Plan, that implementing the strategy of “Vigorously Tapping Human Resources” was “an important guarantee for accomplishing the various tasks during the next five years.” Zhu Rongji stressed that “in light of the overall interests of the modernization drive and long-term development, we need to train and nurture a contingent of leading cadres who are highly competent, who persist in taking the socialist road with Chinese characteristics, who have a good understanding of political theory and a pioneering spirit, who have mastered modern science and culture and acquired managerial expertise, and who are well-experienced” (emphasis added by the author). In addition to the training of qualified cadres, the importance of utilizing the expertise of experienced human resources was highlighted. The proposed reform of the personnel system included improving the methods by which professionals are recruited and transferred, as well as encouraged “to make full use of their talent.” Thus, it should come as no surprise that well-experienced SOE executives with extensive managerial expertise were appointed to the positions in the state institutions from around 2000. Often, new policy measures in China are first applied in practice on a trial basis and then stipulated formally, thus, the first observed inter-system appointments occurred already in 1998 and became a regular practice later, into the 2000s. Although China is governed by the leadership of the party, the state capacity—the state’s ability to draft and implement policies effectively—is essential for the stability of the regime.4 The concept of state capacity has been somewhat amorphous but, in general, is viewed as closely related to policy outcomes and therefore to the overall efficacy of the state (Mendez and Dussauge-Laguna 2017). Since the beginning of the reform, the separation of business entities from the state has significantly eroded the party-state’s expertise in economic and managerial affairs, thus undermining the state capacity. By recruiting knowledgeable bureaucrats, the regime has been able to bridge this gap, just as any other country would do. As Hubert and McCarty pointedly capture the essence of modern bureaucracy, it is “staffed with individuals who, by virtue of ‘rational’ bureaucratic organization, are highly skilled policy experts who in principle should be able to help less knowledgeable politicians achieve their goals” (Huber and McCarty 2004). This is exactly what happened in China after 2000. As the new economic elite emerged from more than two decades of SOE reforms and relevant state policies, the Chinese party-state took advantage of their knowledge

4 For

the explanation on the problems that occured when the party substituted itself for the government and China’s return to the expanded discretion of state bureaucracy see Shirk (1992).

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and political loyalty to compensate for its relatively limited competence to achieve the regime’s goals. Through inter-system appointments, the regime was able to enhance the policy capacity of the state institutions—“the set of skills and resources—or competences and capabilities—necessary to perform policy functions” (Wu et al. 2015). Wu et al. (2015) suggest a framework for understanding the policy capacity, which encompasses three sets of skills and competences—analytical, operational, and political— at three different levels, mainly individual, organizational and systemic. While the latter two levels lie outside the scope of this analysis, at the individual level, policy professionals—policy-makers and public managers among others—“play a key role in determining how well various tasks and functions in policy process are conducted.” Individual analytical capacity describes the knowledge of policy substance and analytical techniques; mainly the ability of individuals in a policy-relevant organization to produce valuable policy-relevant research and analysis (Howlett 2015). This framework originally applies to the policy analysts in policy-related institutions, and thus explains well why SOE managers were deemed to be suitable to serve in SASAC or on the supervisory boards. SASAC was set up as the key agency in charge of China’s large central SOEs, and also due to take charge of the overall restructuring of the country’s state sector and overall economy. SOE executives were probably the only cadres with the technical expertise and thus analytical capacity to perform and overlook the execution of the duties assigned to SASAC. In addition, as the economic development of individual provinces was at the forefront of China’s economic growth, SOE managers from the major industries in those provinces again offered the much-needed analytical capacity. Further, individual managerial expertise capacity, pertaining to “the strategic management, leadership, communication, negotiation and conflict resolution, financial management and budgeting skills” (Howlett 2015), could have been the label for those managers who have served in the state-owned sector for decades and then led their companies into the global economy. Finally, the individual political, or political acumen, capacity, defined as the ability to understand the needs and positions of different stakeholders, the judgement of political feasibility, and also communication skills (Howlett 2015), helps to explain why the data survey on SASAC leaders revealed no private company executive who had been appointed to this position. Although an executive from the private sector could possess the analytical and managerial competences required, they would probably lack political capacity. A manager of a large central SOE, as a general rule, is a CCP member, often serving or having served as the party secretary in the same company (see Appendix 6.2), and therefore can be expected to have acquired significant political acumen. Needless to say, political acumen has been equally important for the provincial leaders.

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6.6 Conclusion This chapter surveyed the patterns of inter-system elite mobility in China from the large central SOEs to the state institutions. In this way, it also offered a glimpse into how Chinese SOEs may be able to exert an influence on the policies and would be able to utilize their political connectedness channels that such mobility has created, and yet this study has made the authoritarian Chinese state rather than the companies the center of attention and demonstrated that the inter-system appointments are a part of the regime’s public human resource management strategy, aimed at strengthening the capacity of the state institutions both at the center and at the provincial level. These findings also contribute to the debate on the real nature of the Chinese SOEs. The Chinese authorities have claimed that “state-owned enterprises are independent market players” (Lee 2019), no different from any other business entities in the market. It often may appear so, especially considering that most of the top-level executives have been industry professionals who have advanced up the career ladder in the companies. Such an interpretation has left many wondering how the position of the SOE executives can be reconciled with the profit-driven nature of their positions, given their proximity to the policy process, and yet the findings here shed light on their role as state bureaucrats rather than corporate managers. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP16K17060. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s organization, JSPS or MEXT.

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Appendix 6.1. Inter-system Appointments from SOEs to Central Government Institutions Company (observation year)

Central government institution (year of appointment)

Economic policy-related institutions China State Shipbuilding Corporation (1992)

State Council Economic and Trade Office, deputy director (1992)

China Petrochemical Corporation (1992)

State Economic and Trade Commission, director (1998)

SOE supervisory institutions China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec) (1992, 2000)

SASAC, deputy director (2003)

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (2005, 2010)

SASAC, director (2013)

Petro China Company Ltd. (2000, 2005, 2010)

SASAC, director (2013)

China Shenhua Energy Company (2000, 2005, 2010)

SASAC, deputy director (2014)

Aluminum Corporation of China (2005), Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000)

SASAC, director (2016)

Chinese General Company of Aeronautics Industry (1992)

Inspector to Key Large SOEs (1998)

Chinese General Company of Aeronautics Industry (1992)

Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2000)

China National Offshore Oil Corporation (2000, 2005)

Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2000)

Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000)

Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2010)

China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) (2010)

Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2010)

China Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation (CNECC) (2000, 2005, 2010)

Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2012)

Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000, 2005, 2010)

Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2014)

State Council, ministries China National Coal Mine Corporation (1992)

State Council Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development, deputy director (1999)

China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation (1992)

Ministry of Public Security, minister (2002)

China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation (1992)

State Council, councilor (2003) (continued)

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(continued) Company (observation year)

Central government institution (year of appointment)

China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec) (1992, 2000)

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, vice minister (2008)

Dongfeng Motor Corporation (2000, 2005)

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, vice minister (2008); minister (2010)

Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2005)

State Council, deputy secretary general (2009)

Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000)

Ministry of Public Security (2012)

Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000)

State Council, Councilor (2013)

Other institutions China Petrochemical Corporation (1992)

State Administration of Work Safety, director (2005)

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) (2010)

China Atomic Energy Authority, director (2013)

Appendix 6.2. Inter-system Appointments from SOEs to Provincial Governments (Positions of Party-Committee Secretaries are Included for Reference Only) Company

Local government position (year of appointment)

China National Coal Mine Corporation

Shanxi Province governor (1992) (Shanxi Provincial Party Committee deputy secretary (1992))

Wuhan Iron and Steel Company (WISCO)

Beijing Municipality deputy governor (1998), governor (1999) (Beijing Municipal Party Committee dep. secretary (1998), secretary (2002))

Petro China Company Ltd.

Qinghai Province deputy governor (2000) (Qinghai Province Party Committee deputy secretary (2003))

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) China National Offshore Oil Corporation

Hainan Provincial Party Committee deputy secretary (2003)

Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd.

Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region deputy governor (2004), governor (2008) (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Party Committee deputy secretary (2004), secretary (2007))

Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation (Baosteel)

Shanghai Municipality deputy mayor (2007) (continued)

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(continued) Company

Local government position (year of appointment)

China Electronics Corporation (CEC)

Hunan Province deputy governor (2007)

China FAW Group Corporation

Jilin Province deputy governor (2007) (Jilin Provincial Party Committee deputy secretary (2012))

Taiyuan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation (TISCO)

Shanxi Province deputy governor (2008)

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Hebei Province deputy governor (2011–2012), governor (2012) (Hebei Provincial Party Committee deputy secretary (2011))

Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd.

Hebei Province acting governor (2011) Hebei Province governor (2012)

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)

Fujian Province governor (2011) (Fujian Province Party Committee deputy secretary (2011))

Petro China Company Ltd. China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec) China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)

Liaoning Province deputy governor (2012)

China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO)

Chongqing Municipal Party Committee deputy secretary (2013) Chongqing Municipality deputy mayor (2016), mayor (2017)

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Guangdong Province deputy secretary (2013) Guangdong Province acting governor (2016), governor (2017)

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region deputy governor (2013) (Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Party group deputy secretary (2013))

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Zhejiang Province deputy governor (2014)

China Three Gorges Corporation

Hubei Province deputy governor (2014) (Hubei Provincial Party Committee deputy governor (2014))

Aviation Industry Corporation of China

Liaoning Province governor (2015)

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC)

Hunan Province governor (2016)

China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO)

Tianjin Municipal Party Committee deputy secretary (2017) Tianjin Municipality deputy mayor, mayor (2018)

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Appendix 6.3. Estimated Links Between the Surveyed Companies and Provincial Governments with Leaders/Former Corporate Managers Company

Province of appointment

Company’s connection to the province

China National Coal Mine Corporation

Shanxi Province

Major industry/resource deposits (China’s biggest coal-producing province)

Wuhan Iron and Steel Company (WISCO)

Beijing Municipality

Petro China Company Ltd.

Qinghai Province

Major industry/resource deposits (one of the major locations of China’s oil and natural gas deposits)

China National Offshore Oil Corporation

Hainan Province (party committee)

Resource deposits (the state’s intention to develop oil and gas resources in the South China Sea)

Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd.

Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region

Resource deposits (major site of China’s bauxite reserves)

Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation (Baosteel)

Shanghai Municipality

Location (company base)

China Electronics Corporation (CEC)

Hunan Province

One of the larger industries

China FAW Group Corporation

Jilin Province

Major industry (automobile production is one of the dominant industries)

Taiyuan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation (TISCO)

Shanxi Province

Location (company base)

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Hebei Province

Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd.

Hebei Province

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)

Fujian Province

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)

Petro China Company Ltd. China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec)

Location (construction of the West–East Gas Pipeline III terminating in Fujian scheduled to start in 2012)

(continued)

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(continued) Company

Province of appointment

Company’s connection to the province

China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)

Liaoning Province

Location (Liaoning province – one of the locations for China’s geographically dispersed shipbuilding industry)

China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO)

Chongqing Municipality

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Guangdong Province

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Zhejiang Province

China Three Gorges Corporation

Hubei Province

Aviation Industry Corporation of China

Liaoning Province

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC)

Hunan Province

China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO)

Tianjin Municipality

Location (Three Gorges Dam in the province)

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“We live in a world that tends to associate good outcomes with democracy and bad ones with dictatorships” (Clark et al. 2018). Authoritarian leaders have few incentives to provide public goods, since they need to reward the relatively small group of their supporters to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). However, contrary to this logic, good governance outcomes have proved to be a stabilizing factor in authoritarian rule, lending strong legitimacy to authoritarian regimes in different countries. In China’s case, regime performance is commonly regarded as the major source of legitimacy of its single-party regime. While the basic notion in political science is that the fundamental goal of any regime is to remain in power, some within China argue that the goal of the CCP is to serve the people. Indeed, this seems to have been the prerequisite for the party remaining in power (Dickson 2018), at least since the beginning of the economic reform, after the Cultural Revolution demolished Mao Zedong’s charisma-based legitimacy, leaving society disillusioned regarding the socialist ideology. It has been traditionally argued that economic growth forms the foundation for the legitimacy of the CCP rule (Shambaugh 2001; Zhao 2009). Dickson (2018) argues that the picture is more complex and that improved public goods provision is part of the party’s strategy for survival. Wright (2010) explains how the recent policies of the regime give no incentives to the different social groups to oppose the regime and, more significantly, how economic development has been reliant on state policies. Whether it be for economic growth, improving healthcare, education or other policies that uphold Chinese society’s support for the single-party regime, the implications are the same: the regime has set goals and has been able to achieve these to the extent that society would view the incumbent regime as fit to rule.

V. Macikenaite (B) Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan, 777 Kokusai-cho, Minami Uonuma, Niigata 949-7248, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_7

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Chinese scholars define “the power of the state (central government) to translate its own will and goals into reality” as the state capacity—the actual capacity for achieving the goals of state governance (Hu et al. 2017). This definition underscores a distinction, especially important for understanding the long-term political and also economic development of contemporary China. It is a challenge to be able to sense what is needed, and thus which governance goals should be set, and yet another challenge to be capable of “translating these goals into reality.” The students of China have extensively discussed how the regime’s ability to gauge the needs of society and adapt to these have stabilized its rule. However, relatively less attention has been paid to understanding what enabled the regime to achieve these goals. The focus has been on the party and its survival strategy rather than the state or its capacity to implement that strategy. There can be little doubt that the regime has delegated a specific role to the state in carrying out its strategy. Lai (2016) notes that the goal of economic governance in China was to earn legitimacy through pro-growth policies and, in turn, political governance centered around good governance, supported also by administrative effectiveness. China has well learnt the “tremendous price” of substituting the state with the party (Shirk 1992). When “the organizational lines between the Party and government blurred, and the delegation relationship disappeared almost entirely” in pre-reform China, the informational advantages of bureaucratic delegation, mainly expertise and specialization, were lost. That, in turn, led to poor-quality decisions and inefficiency. Arguably, the CCP leaders learned the importance of delegating authority in the process of the reform, where the communist party is the “principle” and the government “the agent” (Shirk 1993). Importantly, “Although the Communist Party has the ultimate authority in a communist polity, it cannot administer the country on its own. Like any principal in a large organization, it has limited information. The only way for a principal to solve this problem of limited information is to delegate authority to agents. The Communist Party allows the government bureaucracy to make and implement policies because the bureaucrats have better information than Party leaders can possibly have. The bureaucrats have specialized information, while the Party leaders must know about everything; the bureaucrats are close to the problem, whereas the Party leaders are remote” (Shirk 1992). That is to say, the party needs to delegate authority to the state institutions because they possess the capacity to create particular policies. From a different angle, it is in the interest of the regime to cultivate the capacity of the state institutions in order for it to be able to govern effectively. Needless to say, once the authority has been delegated to the state institutions, the problem of oversight arises. In pre-reform China, tight “police patrol” oversight led to the party substituting the state and blurring the organizational lines between the party and the state. Then, effective governance by a communist party is an exercise in balancing oversight under strong party leadership and capable state institutions with delegated autonomy. The centralization of authority in one pair of hands under the administration of Xi Jinping and his continuous emphasis on the leadership of the party might give the impression that the CCP is once again seeking to substitute the state. Some liken Xi’s practices and policies with those of Mao Zedong (Perry 2019). Yet, Xi has

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placed great emphasis on strengthening the governance capacity and relevant role of the state institutions. In the speech delivered on February 17th 2014, at the opening ceremony of a seminar at which provincial and ministerial-level cadres discussed the deepening of the reform laid out in the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the CCP, Xi argued that “we must adapt to the process of state modernization, and improve the Party’s scientific, democratic and legal leadership. We must enable the state agency to fulfill its responsibility, and improve the ability of the masses to administer state, economic, cultural, and personal affairs” (emphasis added by the author) (Hu et al. 2017). In the Western literature, strong party leadership is taken as an antonym of a strong capable state but, theoretically, it is possible to have strict leadership of the party over the state of high capacity, should the delegation of authority and its oversight be implemented properly. That is why there has been such great emphasis on both the party leadership, on the one hand, and the governance capacity and reform of the state system, on the other, in China recently. Deng Xiaoping has restored the country’s state system, which has subsequently been strengthened through institutionalization and professionalization. As Xi Jiping has made discipline and party supervision one of the pillars of his regime, this probably constitutes a balancing act between a strong party and the necessity to delegate authority to the state institutions in China. The question is whether such balancing would be successful in practice or whether, again, party oversight would overshadow the state. Back in 2012, Francis Fukuyama noted “the strange absence of the state in political science.” Arguably, “Since the onset of the Third Wave of democratizations now more than a generation ago, the overwhelming emphasis in comparative politics has been on democracy, transitions to democracy, human rights, ethnic conflict, violence, transitional justice, and the like. < … > Studies of non-democratic countries focus on issues like authoritarian persistence, meaning that the focus still remains the question of democracy in the long run or democratic transition” (Fukuyama 2012). Democratization, directly or indirectly, has been the dominant narrative in the scholarship on China. Predictions about the democratization of the regime dominated the first decade after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. There was a sense of temporality instigated by the widespread conviction that eventually political reform, i.e. a transition to democracy, would follow China’s extensive economic reform. As the single-party regime in China remained intact over decades, the narrative of democratization has been replaced by the inquiry into the robustness of its authoritarian regime; in other words, the factors that explain the absence of democratization in China. This argument of resilient authoritarianism—“a one-party political system that is able to ‘enhance the capacity of the state to govern effectively’ through institutional adaptations and policy adjustments” (Li 2012)—has taken ground in the field, becoming a prevailing analytical framework, based on which many academics in the West have studied the Chinese political system (Zhu 2011). In 2003, it received fresh impetus through Nathan’s observation that the resilience of the CCP regime is attributable to the increasing institutionalization. Arguably, it is regime’s responsiveness, or ability to adapt, which manifests itself through institutionalization (Nathan 2003). An extensive amount of the ensuing work focuses on the regime’s adaptation

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in an attempt to avoid any challenge to the regime (Laliberte and Lanteigne 2008; Kamo et al. 2012; Lai 2016). Some focus on the party itself (Shambaugh 2010; Kamo 2013; Lee 2015). Others survey the regime’s relations with selected institutions to demonstrate how the CCP tackles the two major problems of authoritarian rule—authoritarian control of the masses and authoritarian power-sharing within the elites (Cai 2008; Chen and Dickson 2010; Kamo et al. 2012). This extensive body of scholarly work is generally driven by a consensus that numerous institutional adjustments and overall institutionalization have contributed to the success of the reform—China’s single-party regime’s ability to maintain legitimacy through economic growth, avoiding popular uprisings or challenges from within the elite. Considering the dominant role of the CCP in the Chinese political system, it is easy to see where “the bias against thinking about state capacity,” as Fukuyama (2012) refers to the lack of attention to the state, arises in the literature on the Chinese political system. The Preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China clearly establishes the leadership of the CCP over the state and society. Reiterating it once again, the communiqué released after the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP in early November 2019 states that one of the advantages of China’s governance system is upholding the centralized, unified leadership of the Party. As a result, the party as an institution overshadows the state, creating a false impression that the state matters little in China as opposed to the CCP. This follows the lines of Huntington’s argument back in the 1960s. Writing on the foundations of political order, Huntington (2006) notes that the key to the strength of the communist regimes in Mao’s China and Lenin’s Russia was careful party organization. Nevertheless, the importance of the state in China’s single-party regime cannot be overlooked. The chapters in this volume have discussed the regime’s attempt to strengthen its actual capacity to achieve the goals of state governance through the state institutions. In his initial presentation of the resilient authoritarianism argument, Nathan (2003) implicitly incorporated the element of state capacity. The increase of meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of the political elites and also the differentiation and functional specialization of the institutions within the regime, presented as the aspects of CCP regime’s institutionalization, are indeed the key elements of the capacity of the state institutions. Viewing the CCP regime through the lens of the state institutions rather than from the broader perspective of the CCP’s survival strategy enables us to see how the CCP has been able to implement that strategy. By delegating some authority to the state, the regime has succeeded in achieving its governance goals. The focus on regime adaptation strategies explains how the CCP has been able to stay in power but a closer look at the state system and a better understanding of its capacity gives us the necessary tools for understanding whether the regime would be able to execute that strategy successfully in the long-term, because it is the state institutions that implement the goals of the regime.1 Moreover, a look at the Chinese party-state’s strength through the lens of state capacity rather than the broad framework of regime resilience enables 1 Here it is important to note two distinct aspects of state capacity (Andersen et al. 2014)—coercive

capacity (the capacity of the military and the police to ensure public order), which can be used for

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us to break out of the democratization-focused path set by the modernization theory and see how China is governed on a daily basis. Finally, a scholarly return to the state in China could also re-introduce the country to the field of comparative politics, making it less of a stranger in the field. Understanding the role that China’s single-party regime has allocated to the state would make the country more comparable across a variety of regimes,2 since often the distinction democratic versus authoritarian fails to capture the real differences across states.

References Andersen, D., Møller, J., Rørbæk, L. L., & Skaaning, S. E. (2014). State capacity and political regime stability. Democratization 21 (7), 1305–1325. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge & London: MIT Press. Cai, Y. (2008, July). Power structure and regime resilience: Contentious politics in China. British Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 411–432. Chen, J., & Dickson, B. (2010). Allies of the state: China’s private entrepreneurs and democratic change. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Clark, W. R., Golder, M., & Golder, S. N. (2018). Principles of comparative politics. Glasgow: CQ Press. Dickson, B. (2018). The dictator’s dilemma: The Chinese communist party’s strategy for survival. New York: Oxford University Press. Fukuyama, F. (2012). The Strange absence of the state in political science. The American Interest. Retrieved October 12, 2019, from https://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/10/02/thestrange-absence-of-the-state-in-political-science/. Hu, A., Tang, X., Yang, Z., & Yan Y. (2017). Modernization of state governance. In The modernization of China’s state governance (Kindle ed.). Singapore: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-981-10-3370-4_3. Huntington, S. P. (2006). Political order in changing societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Kamo, T. (2013). The CCP challenge: Political structure for maintaining single-party regime and its instability. JRI Review, 3(4), 60–76 (in Japanese). Kamo, T., Kojima, K., Hoshino, M., & Takeuchi, H. (Eds.). (2012). Transition of China’s party-state system: Demands and responses. Tokyo: Keio University Press (in Japanese, 加茂具樹、小嶋華津子、星野昌裕、武内宏樹編『党国体制の現在—変容する 社会と中国共産党の適応』慶應義塾大学出版会、2012年). Lai, H. (2016). China’s governance model: Flexibility and durability of pragmatic authoritarianism. London and New York: Routledge. Laliberté, A., & Lanteigne, M. (Eds.). (2008). The Chinese party-state in the 21st century: Adaptation and the reinvention of legitimacy. New York: Routledge. Lee, C. (2015). Training the party: Party adaptation and elite training in reform-era China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Li, C. (2012). The end of the CCP’s resilient authoritarianism? A tripartite assessment of shifting power in China. The China Quarterly, 211, 595–623. repression as a solution for the problem of authoritarian control of the population, and administrative capacity (administrative effectiveness), which is crucial for drafting and implementing policies. 2 Andersen et al. (2016) for their attempt to make an argument that state capacity stabilizes regimes, both democratic and authoritarian.

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Nathan, A. J. (2003). Authoritarian resilience. Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 6–17. Perry, E. (2019, October 1). China’s neo-Maoist moment: How Xi Jinping is using China’s past to accomplish what his predecessors could not. Foreign Affairs. Shambaugh, D. (2001). The dynamics of elite politics during the Jiang era. The China Journal, 45, 101–111. Shambaugh, D. (2010). China’s communist party: Atrophy and adaptation. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Shirk, S. (1992). The Chinese political system and the political strategy of economic reform. In K. G. Lieberthal & D. M. Lampton (Eds.), Bureaucracy, politics, and decision making in post-Mao China (pp. 59–92). Berkeley: University of California Press. Shirk, S. (1993). The political logic of economic reform in China. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wright, T. (2010). Accepting authoritarianism: State-society relations in China’s reform era. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Zhao, D. (2009). The mandate of heaven and performance legitimation in historical and contemporary China. American Behavioral Scientist, 53(3), 416–433. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0002764209338800. Zhu, Y. (2011). Performance legitimacy and China’s political adaptation strategy. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 16(2), 123–140.

Correction to: State Capacity Building in Contemporary China Hiroko Naito and Vida Macikenaite

Correction to: H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9 The original version of the book was inadvertently published with incorrect print ISSN in copyright page, which has now been updated. The book has been updated with the changes.

The updated original version of the book can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_8

C1

Index

A Adjudication committees, 71, 81 Aerospace industry, 96–98, 101 Agreement, 49, 51, 57, 59, 100 Aluminum Corporation of China, 98, 100, 105, 106, 108 Analytical capacity, 103 Analytical framework, 115 Armaments, 56, 59, 63 Armed forces, 49, 59 Arms trade, 57, 58 Assistance, 52, 53 Authoritarian, 12, 14, 42, 48, 70, 73, 74, 90, 104, 113–117 Authoritarian regime, 3, 4, 6, 12, 25, 47–49, 72, 90, 113, 115 Authority, 6, 11, 12, 14, 20, 25, 34, 37, 40, 47–49, 51–53, 56, 59, 61–63, 71–73, 77, 104, 106, 114–116 Automobile industry, 100 Automotive industry, 100 Autonomy, 3, 7, 13, 47, 49, 56–59, 61–63, 72, 114 Aviation industry, 97, 101, 107, 109

B Beneficial, 11, 13, 19, 24, 25, 58 Boards of supervisors, 98 Budget, 19, 22, 52, 54, 55, 59, 88 Building, 1–4, 21–23, 31, 33, 38, 40, 41, 52–54, 61, 62, 78, 97 Business groups, 94

C Cadre, 8, 13, 17, 94, 96, 99–103, 115 Cadre management system/nomenklatura, 93, 94 Caged technology, 29, 37, 42, 43 Capacity, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 19, 25, 35, 47, 48, 51, 52, 63, 103, 104, 114–116 CCP’s logic, 71, 72, 74 Censorship, 30–33, 35 Central Enterprise Work Commission, 97 Central government, 14, 36, 87, 89, 93, 96, 100, 105, 106, 114 Centralization, 3, 38, 41–43, 58, 63, 81–83, 89, 114 Central Military Commission (CMC), 3, 6, 52, 55, 56, 58–63 Chairman, 6, 52, 60 China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 101, 106–109 China Aluminum Corporation, 98 China Datang Corporation, 98 China Electronics Corporation, 98, 99, 107, 108 China FAW Corporation, 100 China FAW Group, 99, 107, 108 Chinalco, 98 China National Coal Mine Corporation, 100, 105, 106, 108 China National Nuclear Corporation, 98 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 98, 100 China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation, 105 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 98, 100, 105–108 China North Industries Group, 107, 109

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 H. Naito and V. Macikenaite (eds.), State Capacity Building in Contemporary China, Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9

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120 China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO), 99, 107, 109 China Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation (CNECC), 98, 105 China Petrochemical Corporation, 105, 106 China Railway Engineering Corporation, 98, 105 China State Shipbuilding Corporation, 107, 109 Chinese Communist Party, 1–8, 11–14, 19, 20, 24, 25, 34, 47–51, 54–63, 69–78, 82, 87, 89, 90, 94, 101, 103, 113–116 Chinese political system, 115 Chongqing, 99, 107, 109 Civilian, 49, 50, 53, 55–57, 59, 61 Civil-military relations, 6, 47–50, 62 Coercive, 48 Co-evolution, 32 Command, 42, 54, 59, 61, 62 Commissars, 60–63 Community, 13, 17, 18, 21, 81 Conclusion, 30, 104 Conflict, 11, 13, 17, 23–25, 60, 72, 74, 75, 103, 115 Connection, 14, 18, 108, 109 Conservative behaviour, 69, 87, 89, 90 Consolidation, 12, 19, 24 Constitution, 5, 6, 40, 70, 71, 76, 77, 116 Contestation, 49, 51, 52, 59 Control, 6, 29–31, 33, 37, 42, 43, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 60, 61, 63, 116 Coordination, 48, 55, 58, 61 Corruption, 51, 60, 96 Customers, 86

D Daqing oil field, 99 Decentralization, 2, 3, 42, 81 Defense industry, 58, 96, 98, 99, 101 Degrees, 3–5, 20, 56, 57, 59, 63, 78, 79, 82, 85, 87, 89, 98 Demand, 11–14, 17–19, 21–25, 39 Democratization, 1, 4, 11, 12, 25, 31, 33, 48, 72, 115 Department of Judicial Administration, 80 Dependence, 59, 62, 63 Deputy, 5, 11–25, 34, 77, 81, 95–101, 105– 107 Deputy workstation, 17, 18 Development, 3, 5, 7, 11, 12, 17–19, 22, 24, 29–35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 47–52, 54–58,

Index 61–63, 73, 77, 100–103, 105, 113, 114 Developmental state, 35 Digital governance, 6, 29, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42 Discipline, 20, 51, 60, 62, 115 Discretionary power, 39, 41 Dissatisfaction, 51, 60–63, 90 Domestic, 18, 50, 52, 53, 62, 63 Dongfeng, 106 Dual-use, 55, 56, 59

E Economic, 2, 3, 7, 8, 11–13, 15–17, 19, 23, 25, 29, 34–38, 42, 50–52, 54–58, 60– 62, 73, 76–78, 87, 94, 96, 99–103, 105, 113–116 Economic elite, 94, 102 Economic growth, 116 Economic performance, 99 Education, 11, 13, 22, 36, 53, 54, 56, 57, 61, 63, 75, 86, 113 Educational background, 78, 82, 84, 85, 87, 89 Educational requirements, 78, 81, 89 Effectiveness, 20, 32, 51, 54, 114 Election, 5, 12, 14, 19, 20, 75 Electric power, 98 Electronics, 98 Elite mobility, 93, 94, 101, 102, 104 Energy sector, 97 Engagement, 50–52, 54, 63, 87 Environment, 16, 39, 50 Ethnic, 52, 62, 115 External incentive, 14

F Financial, 7, 19, 22, 47, 49, 50, 58–60, 62, 63, 98, 99, 103 Force, 12, 29, 32, 34, 42, 48, 50, 51, 55, 57, 62, 73 Former generation, 84–87, 89

G Ginsburg and Moustafa, 74 Ginsburg, Tom, 74 Golden projects, 36, 38

Index Governance, 1, 3, 4, 6–8, 17, 29, 32, 35– 38, 42, 47–49, 62, 63, 70, 72, 80, 113–116 Government Go Online, 36 Great Firewall, 32, 35 Guideline, 55

H Hainan Province, 100 Human resources, 30, 49, 51, 54, 81, 87, 89, 102 Human warmth, 86, 89

I ICT-driven good governance, 37 ICT-driven political development, 29, 31, 33, 34 Idea, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 25, 39, 50, 51, 53, 55, 62 Impact, 6, 12–16, 19, 38, 42, 50, 59, 63, 72, 73, 94 Implementation, 4–6, 14, 39, 48, 60, 63, 80, 87, 88 Implication, 25, 31, 37, 38, 40, 42, 54, 113 Incentive, 14, 17, 18, 72, 113 Incremental selection system, 82, 83 Independence of judiciary, 7, 71 Industrial, 2, 17, 18, 36, 56, 58, 59, 94, 98, 99, 101 Industrial affiliation, 99 Industrial policy, 31, 35 Information and Communication Technology (ICT), 6, 29–31, 33–38, 40–43 Inspectors for large SOEs, 95, 105 Institutional, 49, 53, 58–61, 63, 94, 96, 116 Institutional adaptation, 115 Institutional change, 29–31, 33, 38, 41 Institutionalization, 115 Integration, 7, 37, 55–57, 61, 63, 69, 89, 93 Internet-plus Government, 37, 39, 40 Inter-system appointments/rotation, 93–96, 98, 99, 101–106 Interviewee list, 25 Interviews, 16, 20, 53, 85, 86 Intra-system, 94 Intra-system rotation, 94 Introduction, 6, 11, 13, 29, 70, 79, 89, 93 Intrusive, 49, 61–63

J Jianxin, Ren, 75, 76, 78

121 Jilin, 100 Jinping, Xi, 1, 5, 8, 49, 52, 59–61, 95, 101, 114 Judgement, 7, 69, 103 Judges Law, 69, 71, 72, 74–84, 86–90

L Laissez-faire, 32 Large central SOEs, 93, 94, 98, 101, 103, 104 Law specialties, 76, 78 Lawyers, 24, 71–73, 84–86 Legal profession, 69–71, 73, 75, 78, 82, 84, 86–89 Legal supremacy, 86 Legislative representation, 5, 6, 11–17, 19, 24, 25 Legitimacy, 24, 32, 35, 38, 42, 62, 63, 74, 113, 114, 116 Lipsky, Michel, 72–74 Literature review, 6, 13 Local government, 99, 100

M Made in China 2025, 100 Management, 4, 5, 33, 35, 38, 40, 43, 50, 54–56, 58, 63, 75, 81, 93, 97–99, 103, 104 Managerial expertise capacity, 103 Mechanism, 5, 7, 8, 15, 20, 23, 25, 33, 41, 47–49, 56, 58–61, 63, 74, 89 Ministry of Defense (MOD), 50, 53 Ministry of Finance, 97 Ministry of Public Security, 35, 52, 105, 106 Modernization, 2, 4, 11–13, 15–17, 25, 29, 49, 50, 52, 54–59, 61, 63, 73, 102, 115, 117 Moustafa, Tamir, 74 Multinational corporations, 97

N National Bar Examination, 70, 79, 80, 84, 85, 87, 89 National champions, 93 National defense, 3, 48, 49, 51, 53–60, 62 New generation, 72, 84–87, 89 Non-democratic regimes, 41, 42, 49 Non-ferrous metals, 98 Nuclear power, 98

122 O Once at Most, 39 One theme and Three Missions, 78 Operational, 54, 58, 62, 98, 103 Order, 4, 7, 14, 21, 34, 39, 47, 48, 52, 53, 56, 57, 62, 73, 76, 78, 79, 88, 114, 116 Organization, 6, 7, 30, 32, 34, 36, 39, 41, 42, 47–50, 52–56, 60–63, 69–71, 74, 78, 80, 85, 102–104, 114, 116 Organization Law of the People’s Court of the PRC, 75, 76 Oversight, 56, 58–61, 63, 93, 114, 115

P Partial form of opponent, 90 Party-government separation policy, 75 Party secretary, 16, 20, 21, 61, 99, 100, 103 Patriotic, 53 People’s Armed Police (PAP), 51–53, 62 People’s congress, 5, 6, 11–13, 19, 77, 83, 88, 89 People’s Court “Rule of Law”, 7 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 5, 47, 61 Personnel, 52–54, 56, 60, 62, 75, 81, 82, 85, 94, 96, 102 Petro China, 97, 105–108 Petroleum, 98, 100 Petroleum industry, 100 Pillar industries, 98, 100 Police, 52, 73 Policy, 1, 4–7, 12, 13, 15, 22, 29–32, 34, 35, 37, 42, 47–50, 54, 56, 57, 59, 63, 69, 71, 73, 74, 77, 80, 83, 87, 90, 94, 101–104, 113–115 Policy capacity, 8, 103 Policymaking process, 74 Politic, 1, 4, 5, 60, 73, 75, 77, 78, 115, 117 Political capacity/political acumen capacity, 103 Politically sensitive, 23, 24, 33 Political mobility, 94 Political skill, 77, 79, 83 Political system, 115 Pre-reform, 99 Prerogatives, 50, 53, 58, 61 Primary sector, 97 Principal-agency, 74 Procurements, 55, 56, 58, 63 Professionalization, 7, 49, 52, 54, 56, 57, 63, 69, 71–74, 78, 80, 81, 85–90, 99, 115 Prosecutor, 24, 71, 80, 82, 88, 89 Provincial government, 100 Provincial leaders/provincial governors, 93, 95, 98–100, 103

Index Provincial level, 61, 93, 95, 98, 99, 101, 104 Public comments, 81 Public human resources/human resources, 93, 104 Public service, 22, 37, 39

Q Qualification, 76, 77, 81, 82

R Railways, 98 Readiness, 54 Recruitment, 8, 49, 54, 56, 57, 62, 88 Reference, 50, 99, 106 Regime consolidation, 11, 13, 15, 19, 25, 31 Regulation, 18, 19, 32, 35, 53, 56, 58–61, 83, 97, 98 Regulatory, 30, 32, 51, 55, 58, 63, 97 Representatives of the People’s Congress, 88 Resilience, 3, 11, 12, 69, 73, 90, 115, 116 Responsibilities, 6, 16, 18, 40, 49, 52–54, 56, 58, 78, 85, 97, 98, 115 Responsiveness, 11, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, 31, 38, 115 Restricted representation, 6, 11, 12, 19, 21, 24, 25 Robert J. Barro, 12, 25 Roles, 2, 4, 7, 13, 30–35, 47–54, 57, 59, 61–63, 70, 73, 93, 94, 103, 104, 114–117

S Science, 3, 11, 23, 56–58, 101, 102, 106– 109, 113, 115 Security, 3, 17, 21, 32, 34, 35, 48, 49, 52, 54, 59 Self-incentive, 13 Self-reliance, 50, 57–59, 62, 63 Self-revolution of the government, 39, 40 SETC. See State Economic and Trade Commission, 97 Shanghai, 100, 106, 108 Shenhua, 97, 105 Shenzhen, 6, 11–13, 15–24 Sichuan, 100 Silent, 5, 21, 23, 24 Sinopec, 97, 99, 105–108 Social, 11–14, 17–19, 22–25, 32, 35, 49, 50, 52–54, 62, 70, 73, 74 Social group, 18, 19, 21, 24, 113 Social stability, 17, 24, 51, 62

Index Society, 8, 11, 12, 18, 24, 25, 29–33, 37, 38, 41–43, 47, 70, 72, 73, 88, 90, 113, 114, 116 Socioeconomic environment, 116 SOE executive/executive/corporate executive, 93, 94, 96–99, 102–104 South China Sea, 100, 108 Spirit of aerospace, 101 Stability, 12, 48, 102 Stabilize, 3, 47, 48, 62, 63, 114 Standing Committee of the NPC, 76, 77, 79, 81, 83 State, 1–8, 11, 14, 29–35, 37–39, 41–43, 47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 63, 70, 72, 73, 77, 80, 83, 89, 93–109, 111–115 State capacity, 1–5, 8, 31, 33, 41, 47, 48, 62, 63, 93, 102, 114, 116 State Council, 30, 32, 34, 35, 39, 50–52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 96–98, 100, 105, 106 State Economic and Trade Commission, 97 State-invested enterprises, 97, 98 State-led governance, 6, 29, 34, 114, 116 State-owned assets, 97 State-owned Assets and Supervision Commission (SASAC), 93, 95, 96 State-Owned Enterprise (SOE), 5, 8, 51, 95, 96, 98, 104 State Planning Commission, 96 State Power, 98 State-society dichotomy, 29–31, 33 Status quo, 69, 72, 90 Steel, 100, 106, 108 Street-level bureaucracy, 69, 72–74, 90 Subordination, 58, 60 Success of the reform, 116 Supervision, 58–61, 93, 96–98, 101, 115 Supervisory boards/boards of supervisors, 93, 95, 96, 98, 103

123 Supreme People’s Court, 7, 76, 78–80, 83, 88 Su Shulin, 99

T Technological empowerment, 30 Technology, 6, 29–40, 42, 43, 55–58, 98, 100, 106–109 Training, 19, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 76, 84, 88, 102 2005, 100

U Unity, 48, 62 Universities, 19, 56, 57, 76, 78, 81, 87, 88 Unrest, 49, 52

W Weapons, 55, 56, 58 Weberian bureaucracy, 74 Weberian State, 29, 38, 41, 43 Weber, Max, 41, 73, 74 Work experience, 78, 79, 82, 83, 87, 98 Wrongdoing, 60 Wuhan Iron and Steel, 106, 108

Y Youth League, 99

Z Zhou Yongkang, 100 Zhu Rongji, 7, 102