Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific : The United States, Japan and the Asia/Pacific Region, 1895-1945 9780313003943, 9780275964535

Citation preview

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific The United States, Japan, and the Asia/Pacific Region, 1895–1945 WILLIAM F. NIMMO

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nimmo, William F. Stars and stripes across the Pacific : the United States, Japan, and Asia/Pacific region, 1895–1945 / William F. Nimmo. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–275–96453–1 (alk. paper) 1. Asia—Foreign relations—United States. 2. United States—Foreign relations—Asia. Pacific Area—Foreign relations—United States. 4. United States—Foreign relations—Pacific Area. 5. Japan—Foreign relations—United States. 6. United States—Foreign relations—Japan. 7. United States—Foreign relations—20th century. I. Title. DS33.4.U6N56 2001 327.7305—dc21 00–049194 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 䉷 2001 by William F. Nimmo All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 00–049194 ISBN: 0–275–96453–1 First published in 2001 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America TM

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

3.

For Nancy, Ron, and David

Contents Preface Chapter 1

ix The Beginnings: New Experiences for Americans in Asia and the Pacific

1

Chapter 2

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

17

Chapter 3

New Century and Rising New Powers

51

Chapter 4

World War I: Big Rewards for Japan with Little Pain

81

Chapter 5

The 1920s: A Move to Liberalism in Japan and Turmoil in China

101

Chapter 6

The Japanese Army Moves in on Civilian Government

123

Chapter 7

The Early 1930s: Japan Expands While the United States Withdraws from Colonial Ambitions

137

Chapter 8

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

155

Chapter 9

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

179

Chapter 10 The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

203

viii

Contents

Chapter 11 Ending the War

229

Appendix: Romanization of Chinese Names

243

Notes

247

Bibliography

265

Index

279

Photo essay follows page 121.

Preface This book is intended to introduce the general reader to a survey of U.S. involvement with the East Asia and Pacific region in the period from 1894 to 1945, the half-century leading up to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and concluding with Japan’s surrender in 1945. An effort has been made to describe the general character of the U.S. position concerning what in the past was called the Far East and the ways in which the nations of East Asia and the western Pacific have responded. The transformation that took place during the twentieth century in Western attitudes toward Asia is reflected in the vastly changed attitudes of the United States and European powers. Japan’s position also has undergone enormous change. After the opening of Japan to the West by Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his successors in the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan attempted to surpass even the Western powers in its establishment of territorial acquisition and hegemony over a vast area of East Asia. With the discrediting of its military expansionists by the atomic bombings of 1945 and unconditional surrender, Japan seems to have been vaccinated against its former feudalistic military spirit. In the 1990s, public sentiment in Japan even opposed the dispatch of a Selfdefense Force Engineer Battalion to assist in road and bridge construction in war-torn Cambodia, on the basis that dispatch of a quasi-military unit to another Asian country might be misinterpreted as a rebirth of Japanese militarism. This book provides a historical trail of the diplomatic, economic, and military actions of the United States in East Asia and the Pacific from the first SinoJapanese War to World War II. It examines revisionist claims that the United

x

Preface

States led Japan into war in 1941, or that war could have been avoided by a more conciliatory policy on the part of Washington. Japan’s militarists were a menace to peace in Asia and the Pacific, inflicting extensive atrocities on other Asians as well as Allied prisoners of war during World War II. Japan initiated numerous “land-grabs” on the flimsiest of pretexts, and postwar revisionists attempted to justify these actions by claiming that the primary goal of Japanese conquest was to eject white colonial power from East Asia. Chinese, Korean, and Filipino sources—along with numerous groups in Japan, perhaps a majority—disagree. Expressions of outrage from Asian nations ravaged by Japanese militarism continue to be heard at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Japan, in the twenty-first century, seems far removed from its pre-1945 imperialistic nature. It is a democratic nation, with a freely elected parliament, and a constitution that provides safeguards for individual liberty. The great majority of Japanese appear to have no desire for a return to the past, but echoes of Imperial Japan are still heard from a small, but vocal minority of ultranationalist groups. Japan’s Liberal-Democratic Party (in spite of the name, it is a conservative party) often caters to this group. In May 2000, newly installed Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro called Japan “a divine nation with the emperor at its center.” Claims of the divine nature and uniqueness of Japan are precisely what led to a half-century of military and territorial expansion, culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent devastation of World War II in the Pacific. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean names in this book follow the standard practice, that is, family name followed by given name, except where the names have been Anglicized, for example, Syngman Rhee. Following the usage of official U.S. government documents, accent marks, such as the macron, which indicates that a vowel is long, are omitted. The Wade Giles system of romanization of the Chinese names and locations iı˜s used in this text because that is the system that was in use for the period covered by this survey. Accent marks and apostrophes associated with Wade Giles have been omitted because they are meaningless to the great majority of English readers. A conversion table to Pinyin is provided in the appendix. Most locations are referred to by the names used in the first half of the twentieth century. An exception is Formosa, cited a few times by that name, but more often identified by its Chinese name of Taiwan.

CHAPTER 1

The Beginnings: New Experiences for Americans in Asia and the Pacific The colonial expansion of Western nations into Asia beginning in the sixteenth century made it inevitable that China and Japan would eventually be drawn into a relationship with a nation that did not even exist at that time, one that would ultimately be founded as a result of concurrent exploration and penetration into the Western Hemisphere by representatives of some of those same European countries. Portuguese and Spanish traders arrived in Asia in the sixteenth century, along with missionaries seeking to spread the Christian faith. Russian Cossacks, looking for mineral riches, moved eastward in Siberia along the Amur River region and were making overtures for an invasion of the watershed area north of the river.1 While this foreign encroachment was taking place, a transitional era was in the making with a new dynasty, the Ching, forcing out the old Ming, and attempts being made to unify and strengthen China. Thus the Ching, or the Manchu rulers as the new regime came to be known, faced major challenges in dealing with both domestic and foreign obstacles.2 Spain and Portugal were joined by Britain, France, and the Netherlands in expanding their influence into South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Portuguese expeditions in the East Indies were replaced by the Netherlands in the late sixteenth century, which led to political and territorial control. The Philippine Islands were in Spanish hands by 1565 only a few years after the Portuguese had established an enclave at Macao on the China coast in 1557.3 (Macao was returned to China on December 19, 1999, after 442 years as a Portuguese colony.) Japan, prior to the arrival of westerners in Asia, had a maritime tradition and a reputation for having bold seafarers that sailed over much of the seas in

2

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Southeast Asia and beyond. Japanese ships were frequently in the harbors of the Philippines, Java (Indonesia), and even as far as India. Some estimates show as many as fifteen thousand Japanese living in the Philippines in the sixteenth century. But the advent of Western exploration was a major concern to Japanese rulers, who themselves were in the midst of struggles for internal control in a divided nation. In Japan, the initial reaction was one of cautious reception to the overtures of missionaries and traders from Europe. When Portuguese traders arrived in 1543, followed in 1549 by Francis Xavier, the Jesuit missionary who was instrumental in bringing Christianity to Japan, the country was still in turmoil from decades of civil war and had no controlling central authority. This era, known as the Sengoku period, the Age of Warring States, was brought to an end by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who finally unified Japan in 1590.4 Two events occurred about this time that reflect a continuity in Japan’s view of the outside world: first, an edict denouncing Christianity together with a decree expelling the Jesuit missionaries; and second, invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597.5 The denunciation of Christianity showed a rejection of foreign culture and a fear that the religion was becoming too influential, especially in southern Japan. Mistrust of the European traders and missionaries was based on suspicion of their territorial ambitions, as observed in other areas of Asia. The invasions of Korea reflect long-standing objectives of Japan for conquest of the peninsula and China. One of the primary causes was Korea’s refusal to allow passage of Hideyoshi’s troops in a planned conquest of China. The proximity had previously led to Japanese military involvement with the Korea Peninsula in the seventh century and presented a natural target for expansionist activities. Even as far back as the sixteenth century, Japan had a goal to dominate China. Although unsuccessful, a pattern was established that would be followed three centuries later by a modernized Japan in its invasions of Korea and China. It is also noteworthy that Hideyoshi began the invasions within a very short time after military unification of Japan. A large army leads—in Japan’s case, at least—to a use for that force. When Hideyoshi died in 1598, there was a scramble for power and Tokugawa Ieyasu, after defeating his rivals, was appointed shogun in 1603. There were fifteen successive leaders, all designated with the title of shogun, during the Tokugawa era (1603–1867). Tokugawa Ieyasu, who died in 1616, was concerned about Christian inroads in Japan but took no action to ban missionaries. But the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu, saw the relative weakness of Japan compared to European powers and established a policy of national seclusion— barring not only Christians, but also all foreigners—in 1639 as a means of protecting Japan from colonization. During the same era, on the other side of the world, English settlers had begun settlement of the North American colonies, first with Roanoke Island in 1587, followed by Jamestown in 1607 and Plymouth in 1620. Jesuits from England explored the Potomac River in 1634 and established a Catholic colony

The Beginnings

3

in Maryland, with an additional goal of converting the Indians. For the next two centuries, Japan continued its policy of isolation while the New World colonies developed, with thirteen of them becoming an independent nation, the United States of America. Both the United States and Japan continued as primarily agrarian societies with little or no knowledge of each other. Prior to the American Revolution, the colonies had no direct involvement with Asia. Even though colonists had developed a taste for tea, silk, spices, and porcelain, British policy required that Americans import Asian goods only through the trade monopoly of the British East India Company. British officials also levied a tax on all imports into the American colonies. The Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, where cargo from China was thrown overboard by irate colonists, was a protest against this tax. After independence, however, ships from the United States began to visit Chinese ports, and by 1810 voyages were being made on a regular basis, usually taking as much as a year for the round trip. From its beginnings as an independent nation, the United States viewed Asia as an opportunity for trade. American sailing ships visited Chinese coastal ports long before official relations were established or envoys posted there. In fact, consular duties were performed by shipping or trading company representatives.6 By the early nineteenth century, American missionaries had begun work in China that was to continue for more than a hundred years. With the advent of steam-powered vessels and the increased expansion of European powers into East Asia, a need was perceived for formalization of relations with China. The United States and China negotiated a Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce, referred to as the Treaty of Wanghia, in 1844, thereby normalizing procedures for trade, tariffs, establishment of consulates, designation of treaty ports (Canton, Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai), extraterritorial rights for American citizens concerning criminal justice, and a provision for most-favorednation treatment in relation to other treaty powers. This treaty was modeled after the 1842 British pact with China.7 Americans and Europeans were restricted to the treaty ports and special permission was required to travel to inland China. This condition was changed by the Chefoo Convention in 1876 that permitted foreigners to travel anywhere in China provided they had a passport. Most of the treaties between Western powers and China, and later pacts with Japan and Korea, contained provisions that were to earn them the general classification of “unequal treaties.” Provisions allowing Western powers to determine and govern tariff arrangements, as well as the fact that the host countries had no legal control over foreign citizens resident in the treaty ports, were to prove especially irritating. Prior to the treaties, British and American seamen accused of criminal acts against local residents by Chinese authorities were punished in brutal fashion—for example, by strangulation—with no right of appeal. Once the treaties were in effect, however, the pendulum swung the other way and local officials perceived lenient treatment of foreigners for crimes

4

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

against their citizens. As larger numbers of foreigners began to reside in treaty ports, China and Japan made removal of the unequal provisions a major priority. In less than a decade after the treaty with China, the United States began to look at trade possibilities with Japan. In addition, whaling ships from New England were dominating the lucrative hunt for whales in the Sea of Japan. Although the whalers did not visit Japanese ports, occasional shipwrecks resulted in marooning of American seamen on Japan’s shores, long imprisonment, and brutal treatment. These practices were of concern to merchant houses in Boston and New York, and to officials in Washington. The island nation also provided a desirable location for a coaling station for merchant ships on Pacific voyages. By the 1850s, American westward advancement had seen the rapid settlement of California and the Oregon Territory along with ever-increasing influence over Hawaii and other areas of the Pacific. The United States had no territorial ambitions in the Pacific or Asia, but sought to maintain and develop trading rights on a par with European nations. American predominance in Hawaii was already assured earlier in the century and cemented with an 1849 treaty of commerce, but Russia controlled Alaska and the northern Pacific rim. In 1853, U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry, with his fleet of “Black Ships,” pried Japan open to the Western nations, but in contrast to China, initial relations were established by official U.S. agencies rather than through commercial interests. Perry arrived in Tokyo Bay bearing a letter from President Millard Fillmore, making a show of force that would convince the Tokugawa Shogunate that relations with the Western world were inevitable. After spending the winter in Okinawa, Perry returned to Tokyo Bay in early 1854 and negotiated an official treaty between the United States and the shogun’s representatives, providing for the opening of two ports of call where American ships could “be supplied with wood, water, provisions, and coal, and other articles” and for “the buying and selling of articles and goods in exchange for gold and silver coins” or in exchange for other articles and goods. The treaty also permitted the United States to appoint a consul to reside at Shimoda.8 While Perry’s official instructions from Washington may have referred to trade, coaling stations, and the welfare of shipwrecked sailors, an even more important purpose of his mission was to prevent Britain from monopolizing trade in the Pacific as it had already accomplished in India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Singapore, and Hong Kong. The American commodore envisaged a steamship line from California to various ports in the Pacific, including Hawaii and Japan that would be dominated by Americans. Perry also saw Russia as a competitor for control of the North Pacific, which caused just as much concern as Britain.9 After more than two centuries of Tokugawa rule, Japan had developed problems in its class system where the samurai held a higher position than merchants. The issue was that the samurai had power but no money, while the merchants had money but no power. Thus, to some groups in Japan, this early form of gaiatsu (foreign pressure) of Perry’s visit was viewed as a beneficial opportunity

The Beginnings

5

for a restructuring of society. Furthermore, the Japanese were also concerned about a strong Russia in areas to the north of Japan. In the face of factional opposition within Japan, Townsend Harris, the first American emissary, negotiated commercial and consular treaties with the shogunate in 1857 and 1858 that provided for an exchange of embassies, the opening of additional ports, the right of American citizens to reside in those ports and to be exempt from Japanese law, and a system of customs duties.10 Japan also enacted similar treaties with the Netherlands, Britain, France, and Russia. From the beginning, relations between Japan and the United States were established under a framework of treaties regulating commercial activities, diplomatic affairs, rights of citizens residing abroad, and customs duties. The next decade witnessed major upheavals in the internal affairs of Japan between forces loyal to the Tokugawa Shogunate and their domestic enemies, who advocated restoration of imperial court authority at Kyoto. Furthermore, there was widespread opposition to the commercial treaties that led to violence as some feudal lords were placed under house arrest, antiforeign nobles and court officials were thrown out of office, and their leaders executed.11 Intense opposition to the opening of Japan to foreigners—and the murder of some of them—as well as contention between forces loyal to the shogunate and proimperial activists resulted in numerous battles and assassinations. The southern feudal lords, or daimyo, actively opposed the Tokugawa Shogunate and sought a restoration of imperial power, power that effectively had been in the hands of the shogun for most of the preceding seven centuries. Even though Ii Naosuke, the shogun’s great councilor and a staunch defender of the treaties with the West, was assassinated in 1860, the advent of modern Japan moved closer to reality. That same year, a contingent of Japanese officials traveled to the United States to participate in the ratification of the Harris Treaty in formalities with President James Buchanan in May 1860. The turmoil in Japan continued throughout much of the 1860s until the shogun’s forces were defeated bringing about the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the resumption of rule through imperial power. Japan was not the only nation experiencing internal unrest during this period. The Civil War in the United States (1861–1865) was consuming most of the energy, finances, and attention of Washington, and major portions of the country were in upheaval. Meanwhile, Britain, the Netherlands, Russia, and France, the other Western powers enjoying treaty rights with Japan, were active in establishing maritime and commercial interests. Antagonism by various Japanese elements was directed at representatives of the European powers, however, and the Americans lost little ground in those years. After the surrender of Confederate forces in April 1865, the United States began to develop rapidly as an industrial nation, one that would surpass Britain by the century’s end. Also, continued westward expansion resumed when Alaska, including the Aleutian Islands, was purchased from Russia in 1867, even though most Americans—at least those who had any opinion on the matter at

6

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

all—were skeptical of the acquisition, calling it “Seward’s Folly.” Development of the areas west of the Rocky Mountains, such as California and Oregon, however, enjoyed popular support. Earlier, the United States, during the administration of President James Knox Polk, who was elected on a “Manifest Destiny” platform, had obtained the Oregon Territory from Great Britain in 1846. As a result of Mexico’s defeat in the Mexican War (1846–1848), large territories, including California, had been ceded to the United States, leading to enthusiastic westward expansion. The transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, and continued interest in Hawaii was accelerated for commercial, political, and military activities. After 1868, Japan began an intense program of modernization so as to be competitive with the Western powers and to avoid the fate that had befallen other Asian countries that had come under domination of European nations. The Meiji emperor moved his court to Edo, renamed Tokyo (literally: Eastern Capital), in November 1868 because most Japanese saw that location as the real seat of power. Several thousand American and European experts were recruited and brought to Japan to advise and teach on Western education, technology, finance, agriculture, and government. In addition, Japanese from various professions as well as students were sent to the United States and Europe to observe and study governmental organizations, technology, banking and finance, economics, transportation, military science, and other subjects needed for the rapid modernization of Japan. In the next twenty years, vast changes were implemented in Japan, enough so that, on the surface at least, it appeared as though a different country had been created. The operative slogan during this era was fukoku kyohei (“Enrich the Country and Strengthen the Military”). All of this was in accordance with the Five Articles of Emperor Meiji’s Charter Oath: 1. Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all state affairs decided by public opinion. 2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in actively carrying out the administration of affairs of state. 3. The common people, no less than the civil officials, shall be allowed to pursue whatever calling they choose so that public apathy may not beset the land. 4. Evil practices of the past shall be abandoned, and actions shall be based on international usage. 5. Knowledge shall be sought all over the world, and the foundations of imperial rule shall be strengthened.

The first railroad line was opened in 1872, between Tokyo and Yokohama. Inauguration of a modern army based on a peasant backbone instead of the former samurai hierarchy was created the next year. Yamagata Aritomo, who served in political office as well as in positions of military leadership, was the

The Beginnings

7

chief architect of Japan’s new army. He was instrumental in the passage of the 1873 Conscription Act through which peasants were drafted for military service. The establishment of a modern Japanese navy was also begun at this time, but initial emphasis and funding was placed on the army. In the decades leading up to 1900, telegraph and telephone service were inaugurated, and streetcars, electric lighting, industrialization, and the creation of a skilled labor force were accomplished. Establishment of a parliamentary system of government, suffrage (males only, on a limited basis), and cabinet system, and development of industry, education, a modern railroad system throughout the country, and steamship lines were among the major innovations of this period. Throughout the first three decades of the Meiji era, a prime objective of Japanese officials was the revision of the unequal treaties, with major emphasis on the removal of the extraterritorial provisions concerning legal jurisdiction over citizens of Western powers resident in Japan. President Chester Alan Arthur commented on this matter in his 1883 message to Congress: The question of the general revision of the foreign treaties of Japan has been considered in an international conference held at Tokio [sic], but without definite result as yet. The Government is disposed to concede the requests of Japan to determine its own tariff duties, to provide such proper judicial tribunals as may commend themselves to the Western Powers for the trial of causes to which foreigners are parties, and to assimilate the terms and duration of its treaties to those of other civilized States.12

In its rush to modernization and attempts at hegemony over neighbors in Asia, some leaders in Japan began to look at war with Korea even as early as 1873, only twenty years after emerging from isolation. This initial effort proved abortive due to pressure from the Meiji court and the opposition of other officials who, outside the country on study missions, were hastily called back home to stop this action. However, it was not long before the war rumblings started again. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, in the face of a weakened China, the rapidly westernizing Japan established business interests in Korea, Manchuria (northeastern China), and Formosa (Taiwan), thereby paving the way for the political and military expansionists that were to follow. Japan and China concluded a commercial treaty in 1871.13 In 1874, a Japanese expeditionary force was sent to Taiwan on the pretext of punishing China for the killing of shipwrecked sailors from the Ryukyu Islands, claiming the exclusive right to speak for the Ryukyu Kingdom. After extended negotiations, China paid an indemnity to Japan for damages and for the Japanese army barracks constructed on Taiwan. China further agreed not to condemn Japan for its action, which led the British minister in Japan, Harry Parkes, to remark that the settlement was nothing more than an invitation to further aggression.

8

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Okinawa, which earlier had existed as a part of the Chinese tribute system, and more recently had been identified as the Ryukyu Kingdom with its own emperor, but was actually under the double subordination of both Japan and China, was annexed by Japan in 1879 as a prefecture. Other territories were added to Japan during the same period. The northern Kurile Islands were ceded to Japan by Russia in 1875 in exchange for Russian rights to all of Sakhalin Island. The Kurile Islands were administered as an integral part of Japan from 1875 to 1945. Also, a group of small islands extending about a thousand miles out to the southeast from Tokyo, the Volcano and Bonin Islands—known in Japan as the Ogasawara Islands—were annexed by Japan in 1876. Iwo Jima, the site of a major battle in World War II, is a part of this island group.14 As China and Japan became increasingly involved with Western nations, it became apparent that emigration of laborers would be a practical method for dealing with a burgeoning population while also providing an opportunity for impoverished peasants to earn higher wages. China supplied large numbers of laborers to Hawaii and the United States beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Japanese began arriving several decades later. Thousands of Chinese were brought to California during the gold rush of 1848–1849 and by the 1860s large contingents were working in mines and on construction of railways in the western United States. Relatively few Japanese were in the United States in the late nineteenth century, but more than one hundred thousand Chinese lived there. Californians were alarmed at the separatism of the Chinese, who saw themselves as transients who would stay in America only for a while and then return to China, and their refusal to “acculturate to the norms of American society.” Chinese often worked in the most lowly and odious of jobs, while spending only minimal amounts of money in California, and saving the rest or sending it back to families in China. These problems led to the congressional exclusion acts of 1882, 1888, and 1892, that prohibited further immigration of Chinese to the United States and placed special restrictions on Chinese already in the country.15 Hawaii did not become a territory of the United States until 1898, but for most of the century prior to that time Americans had exercised a strong voice in the affairs of the governments of the islands. American planters in Hawaii put pressure on Congress after the Civil War to pass a reciprocity treaty to remove tariffs from the import of sugar into the United States, but it was not until 1876 that such a treaty was passed and put into operation. This pact greatly increased sugar production in the islands and intensified the need for additional contract laborers. The first shipment of Japanese contract laborers to Hawaii was a small group of 148 immigrants in 1868, but disputes between Japanese and Hawaiian officials brought a halt to further immigration for the next seventeen years. Most of the Japanese remaining in Hawaii in 1885 had married Hawaiian or Portuguese women (Portuguese workers had also been brought to Hawaii) and their presence was not noticeable.16 In 1885, relations were repaired and large numbers of Japanese began to travel to Hawaii. By 1890, Japanese constituted the

The Beginnings

9

single largest category of workers, which generated fear—on the part of American residents—of a takeover of Hawaii by Japan.17 Japanese communities in Hawaii began to take on an appearance of permanence with all the trappings of home, such as Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines, festivals, and Japanese-language newspapers. American residents, unable to penetrate the puzzling language and privacy of the laborers, grew resentful and uneasy. According to William Adam Russ, Jr.: “The chief cause for the Revolution of 1893 and for final annexation was one in which sugar and immigration were entwined together. In other words, there was danger that Orientals would shortly overwhelm white civilization in the islands.”18 Debate over renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty, originally limited to a sevenyear period, was conducted in Congress from 1886 to 1887 with much criticism, especially from sugar, sorghum, and rice-producing states of the South. In addition to the economic and agricultural issues, a major controversy erupted over a proposed amendment—originated by the Senate without the consent of President Grover Cleveland or his secretary of state—that would cede Pearl Harbor to the United States. Aggressive action by Germany in the South Pacific as well as British overtures—following completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway— to increase Pacific competition gave ammunition to treaty proponents. Backed by expansionists and advocates of strong naval power in the Pacific, the Senate approved the amended treaty January 20, 1887, followed by heated disputes in both the United States and Hawaii as to whether the pact represented an actual cession of territory or a lease. After an exchange of notes indicating, in effect, that Hawaii retained residual sovereignty over Pearl Harbor and that the United States would relinquish the port in the event of abrogation of the reciprocity treaty, ratification by Hawaiian officials was given and the treaty was proclaimed in Washington in November 1887.19 While the earlier Kamehameha kings were generally viewed as noble and fair, Kalakaua, who ruled from 1872 until his death in 1891, was seen as a tyrant and scandalous in his debauched behavior as he drank heavily in the last year of his life. In addition, he was described as untruthful, corrupt, and weak. As residents of American ancestry gained control of business and government, a new constitution was adopted and put into effect on July 1, 1887, making the king responsible to them.20 By 1889, insurrections and instability in Honolulu led the United States to station a naval warship in Hawaii on a permanent basis. Liliuokalani, known previously as Mrs. John Dominis, the wife of a man born to a Boston sea captain and a Hawaiian woman, became queen upon Kalakaua’s death and experienced increasing difficulty in her dealings with the nowdominant American settlers. The queen’s decision to disband the legislature on January 14, 1893, along with her plans for a new constitution taking power away from the whites and restoring authority to the natives precipitated a revolution.21 American troops (162 officers and men) from the USS Boston landed in Honolulu and three days later a provisional government—that was to rule until

10

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

annexation by the United States—was established with Sanford B. Dole as its leader. The new government was composed of an executive council of four men—all citizens of Hawaii, but of American ancestry—and an advisory council of fourteen men, none of whom were native Hawaiians. Thus, the top officials in the new government consisted solely of men of American and European ancestry, representatives of an ethnic group that made up only a small percentage of the total population. Although most of them were classified as “Hawaiian citizens,” they were in no way representative of the native or Asian populations. Their chief goal, mainly for economic reasons, was annexation to the United States. Native Hawaiians, however, did continue to be employed in lower-level positions within the bureaucracy. The monarchy was abolished in a bloodless revolution and Liliuokalani, although making several unsuccessful appeals to the U.S. government and experiencing confrontation with Americans, never regained the throne.22 Shortly after the revolution, several officials of the new provisional government traveled to Washington to promote annexation. The group arrived in the Capitol in February 1893, the last month of President Benjamin Harrison’s administration. Again, as with the Reciprocity Treaty, some of the southern states were opposed to annexation and so were a number of influential news journals. Although Harrison, a Republican, was favorable to annexation, his successor, Democrat Grover Cleveland, whose first term preceded Harrison, resumed the office of president on March 4, 1893, with strong opposition to annexation.23 President Cleveland proposed the restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to the throne, but changed his mind when the queen revealed that one of her first acts would be to behead the members of the provisional government. Annexation Party members saw a need for a more permanent—at least for four years— government of the Republic of Hawaii.24 Debates over the new government and entitlement to citizenship, along with voting privileges, proved to be a major challenge to organizers of the new government. Proposals were made to permanently disenfranchise the Chinese and Japanese, treating them as temporary residents who would eventually return to their own country. The commander of U.S. naval forces in Hawaiian waters, Admiral J. G. Walker, reported to the secretary of the navy that there was much concern about the wisdom of denying the vote to the Japanese. He added: “Many persons here both in and out of the government think the Japanese a possible source of future danger.”25 The issue was finally resolved by declaring that all persons born or naturalized in Hawaii prior to 1894 were citizens (of Hawaii), and that subsequent naturalization would be limited to those who could pass a strict examination, which would eliminate most Chinese and Japanese. The Republic of Hawaii was proclaimed July 4, 1894, and the United States quickly recognized the new government.26 The matter of who was to govern was not settled yet, however. Residents loyal to the throne, the Royalists, attempted to overthrow the government and reestablish the monarchy by mounting an armed insurrection on January 6, 1895.

The Beginnings

11

Officials of the Republic of Hawaii declared martial law and subdued the rebels in short order. Queen Liliuokalani, who claimed she had nothing to do with the revolt, was arrested a few days later and charged with treason. She signed a statement renouncing her right to the throne, acknowledged that the government of the Hawaiian republic was the only lawful government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that the “late Hawaiian monarchy is finally and forever ended.” Nevertheless, the former queen was tried by military commission, found guilty, and sentenced to five years of hard labor with a fine of $5,000. Her sentence was later commuted to house arrest and she was released in eight months. The insurrectionists were tried and found guilty; some received death sentences while others long prison terms. Within a year, however, the death sentences had been commuted and all prisoners were paroled.27 The United States was also expanding into the southwest Pacific where rights were obtained for a coaling station at Pago Pago in Samoa in 1878. This led to rivalry with Great Britain and Germany that nearly erupted into open warfare before a joint protectorate was arranged in 1889. A partition of the islands ten years later resulted in the eastern islands—American Samoa—becoming a possession of the United States. Another area of American involvement in the Asia/Pacific region prior to 1898 was Korea. This peninsular country, jutting southward from the Asia mainland, had long been a tributary state of China, and was even more fiercely determined than Japan to remain closed to foreigners. Ships from Western nations began appearing near the Korean coastline as early as 1832, but hostile acts occurred between ships’ crews and Koreans. An American merchant ship, the General Sherman, was met with an unfriendly reception when it entered Korean waters in 1866 seeking trading opportunities. Alarmed defenders, wanting to keep Korea closed to all foreign intercourse, fiercely attacked the ship, burned it to the waterline, and killed all crewmen.28 Korean officials, keenly aware of the troubles China had experienced with foreigners, were determined to avoid similar experiences. Also, the Korean government viewed the propagation of Christianity on the peninsula with apprehension, considering religion and trade as a guise to spread Western ideas with a consequent endangerment of indigenous culture and territorial integrity. While French missionaries had been permitted earlier, resulting in the conversion of about twenty thousand Koreans to Catholicism, many of the missionaries and converts were executed after Korea began to shun foreigners and break off all contact with Western powers.29 In 1871, five years after the General Sherman incident, the United States sent a detachment of five navy ships to Korea in a belated reprisal and another attempt to establish trading relationships. Again, the Americans met fierce resistance from Korean fortifications and suffered heavy casualties. Seeing no need to force the issue at this point, the U.S. forces decided to pull back and await another opportunity. The other Western powers were preoccupied with their own problems—France with Indochina, Britain with India, and Russia with coloni-

12

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

zation of the Maritime Territory. China was in a weakened condition after internal rebellion and foreign encroachment had left it focused on its own difficulties. That left Japan with an uncontested opportunity to force an entry into Korea. After the aborted Korea attempt in 1873 and the Formosa incident of 1874, Japan created a pretext for action in 1875 by provoking an attack on a Japanese ship in Korean waters. This action forced an agreement leading to the 1876 Treaty of Friendship between Japan and Korea, known as the Treaty of Kangwha. The treaty had a two-fold purpose: to show that Korea was no longer a tributary state of China, and to set the stage for Japan’s preeminent rights in Korea. The treaty “permitted Japan to survey Korean coastal waters at will and it also contained an extra-territoriality clause authorizing the establishment of Japanese settlements on land to be leased in the opened ports, with their Japanese residents subject to Japanese law as applied by Japanese courts.”30 A report from the British commissioner of customs at Newchang, in northeast China, reflects the rapid changes experienced after Korea’s treaty with Japan: The exchange of commodities between Newchang and Corea [Korea] has not been on such an extensive scale as it was at one time, owing, it is said, to the footing which the Japanese have secured for themselves on the eastern side of the Corean peninsula. By virtue of a treaty which they have concluded with the Coreans, two places on the seaboard, called Bushan [Pusan], in the south, and Yuanshan [Wonsan], in the east, have been opened to them, and through these new ports they have been supplying the country with many things which were formerly admitted into it on the western side.31

In addition, Chemulpo (Inchon) was designated as a treaty port. Japanese officials became deeply involved in the internal affairs of Korea after 1876, especially in attempts to place a sympathetic member of the royal family in a position of influence so that Japan could accomplish its goals. When the former president of the United States, Ulysses S. Grant, visited Tokyo in 1879, he was highly impressed with Japan’s modernization and advancement, and supported the Japanese position in Korea. Britain, however, sided with Chinese attempts to continue supremacy over Korea. Hostile action in 1882 resulted in the killing of a number of Japanese in Korea bringing about the intervention of both China and Japan. Japan, relying on its 1876 treaty, sent additional ships and troops to Korea, but when China dispatched forty-five hundred troops to the peninsula, the Japanese decided to pull back and wait for another day. Chinese officials, concerned over Japan’s ambitions, prevailed upon Korea to conclude treaties with the United States, France, and other Western nations. U.S. Navy commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, initially rebuffed in his attempts to negotiate a treaty in a direct approach to Korea, was able to conclude a treaty with Korean emissaries with the assistance of Chinese officials in 1882.32 This was followed by Korean treaties with Britain, Germany, Italy, Russia, and France, giving recognition to Korea’s status as an independent nation. China, however,

The Beginnings

13

was not able to sustain its hegemonic position in the area and the treaties simply set the stage for future Japanese control of Korea. The treaty between the United States and Korea (Kingdom of Chosen) was patterned after earlier treaties concluded with China and Japan, including the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction over American citizens in Korea.33 President Arthur, in his 1883 message to Congress commented: In pursuance of the policy declared by this Government of extending our intercourse with the Eastern nations, legations have during the past year been established in Persia [Iran], Siam [Thailand], and Corea. It is probable that permanent missions of those countries will ere long be maintained in the United States. A special embassy from Siam is now on its way hither. Treaty relations with Corea were perfected by the exchange at Seoul, on the 19th of May last, of the ratifications of the lately concluded conventions, and envoys from the King of Tah Chosun [Korea] have visited this country and received a cordial welcome. Corea, as yet unacquainted with the methods of western civilization, now invites the attention of those interested in the advancement of our foreign trade, as it needs the implements and products which the United States are ready to supply. We seek no monopoly of its commerce and no advantages over other nations, but as the Chosunese, in reaching for a higher civilization, have confided in this Republic, we cannot regard with indifference any encroachment on their rights.34

Japanese influence in Korea increased significantly in the 1880s and many younger Koreans went to Japan for study, while Japanese representatives promised assistance to the progressives in Korea in the event of a coup. The progressives, seeking to modernize Korea along the lines of Meiji Japan, sought to make a break from the Chinese hegemony by overthrowing the Korean queen with her traditional ties to China. The coup attempt was made in 1884, at a time when the Korean progressives viewed an ongoing war between China and France over Indochina as keeping the hegemonic power occupied. However, 1,500 Chinese soldiers remained in Korea and were easily able to defeat the progressives and the 140 Japanese legation troops stationed in Seoul, forcing the Japanese to flee to Japan. Japan continued making determined efforts to weaken China’s dominant position on the Korea Peninsula. While Korean officials sought to hold Japan accountable for its actions in the attempted coup, the Japanese sidestepped the Korean charges and instead demanded compensation for their losses rather than take responsibility for their participation in the debacle. An agreement was worked out with China whereby both Japanese and Chinese troops would withdraw from Korea. In 1885, Japan and China concluded the Treaty of Tientsin that gave each power the right to dispatch troops to Korea, if needed, provided prior notification was given to the other power. Both nations began replacing soldiers with merchants in an attempt to maintain a presence in the Korea Peninsula and China initially won this phase of the struggle. By the 1880s, the Korea Peninsula was becoming a focal point in East Asia

14

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

for a number of powers: China, as the hegemonic power, Japan, as a new element from the east, and a number of European nations as well as the United States. President Cleveland commented in his 1885 message to Congress on relations with Korea: No opportunity has been omitted to testify the friendliness of this Government toward Corea, whose entrance into the family of treaty powers the United States were the first to recognize. I regard with favor the application made by the Corean Government to be allowed to employ American officers as military instructors, to which the assent of Congress becomes necessary, and I am happy to say this request has the concurrent sanction of China and Japan.35

But as malice built up against the Chinese merchants and their excesses, Korea began to lean to Russia, seeing that nation as a way of playing China against Japan. After an 1888 treaty that gave Russia special privileges in the northern part of Korea, Britain became alarmed and occupied a small Korean island for strategic defense against the Russian navy. China then pressured Britain to leave while Germany and the United States were sought after by Korean officials as a means of resolving the impending crisis.36 In the next few years, Japan gained economic ascendancy in Korea with large numbers of merchants from Japan establishing themselves throughout the country. Their aggressive ambition and cutthroat competition rapidly drove out Chinese and Korean merchants. The open ports of Korea—Inchon, Pusan, and Wonsan—saw the establishment of Japanese merchants on an unprecedented scale. The overwhelming majority of businesses and approximately three-fourths of the ships entering those ports were Japanese. Furthermore, most of the goods imported from Japan were actually produced in Japan, while Chinese exports to Korea were mostly reexports of goods that had been manufactured in Britain. Japan provided 81 percent of Korea’s imports in 1885, but just seven years later, because of increased imports from China, this advantage had been reduced to 55 percent. This condition caused intensified competition from Japanese merchants, who by now had spread out to rural areas of Korea, including the gouging of the peasants who had to pay with rice, priced unfairly low, for exportation to Japan. This situation along with heavy tax burdens led to a peasant revolution, spearheaded by a religious society known as the Tonghak, who ultimately called for a crusade to expel the Japanese and westerners. The peasant revolt picked up a large following and became a threat to the government in Seoul, whereupon the Korean king then called on China for help in subduing the revolt. Upon learning of this turn of events, Japan also decided to send troops to Korea. In any event, the revolt was put down by the Korean government before either Chinese or Japanese troops arrived. Nevertheless, Japan seized upon this opportunity by having its troops, which arrived in Seoul before the Chinese, hold the king under its control. The Tokyo government claimed that the Chinese notification of dispatching troops had made an unjustified claim of Chinese

The Beginnings

15

suzerainty. The Japanese navy then attacked and sank a British merchant ship (chartered by the Chinese government) that was bringing Chinese soldiers to Korea. What actually had happened was that, while ten years earlier Japan had backed away from a fight with China, it had now bolstered its military forces significantly so that it had an undeniable superiority over China—and was a match for other powers—leading Japan to begin its assertion of hegemony over other Asian nations. This action resulted in the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).37

CHAPTER 2

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1894–1895 Japanese army forces in Korea were increased significantly in May and June 1894 through the use of subterfuge by Army Vice Chief of Staff Kawakami Soroku and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. Vagueness in the wording of Kawakami’s statement indicated that a small increase in troop strength would take place, but Japanese army commanders were deliberately making a major addition of troops. And the Japanese minister in Seoul claimed he was unaware that so many troops were being brought into Korea.1 This type of misleading comment by field commanders to Tokyo officials was to be repeated many times over the next fifty years, but with the ambiguity of the Japanese language, it provided a convenient cover so that national government officials in Tokyo could claim innocence. The Japanese term for the misleading of superiors by subordinates, gekokujo, is translated in one dictionary as “overbearing of the lower against the upper,” and was a concept that dated to feudal times. Japanese negotiators, even more so in dealing with foreigners, are noted for adroitness in applying terms from their own language in translations that can cause confusion to the unwary. This obfuscation made it difficult to pinpoint any particular individual or group. In any event, once the increases in the field had transpired, even the highest officials in the Japanese government rarely reversed the actions of field commanders. This lack of corrective action by the civilian government in Tokyo is attributable to the 1889 Constitution of the Empire of Japan, the Meiji constitution, which made the army and navy chiefs directly responsible to the emperor

18

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

rather than to the national legislature, the Diet. Also, for much of the period prior to 1945, navy and war ministers, who were career military officers rather than civilian appointees, had the power to cause a dissolution of the civilian government by withholding their concurrence in the appointment of other ministers. In ancient Japan, it was assumed that the shogun—the generalissimo and military dictator—would speak for the emperor on military and foreign affairs. This tradition prevailed over a period of centuries during the Kamakura Shogunate, 1192–1333, the Muromachi Shogunate, 1338–1573, and the Tokugawa Shogunate, 1603–1867. On July 23, 1894, Japanese soldiers in Korea forced the Korean king to issue a decree expelling Chinese soldiers from Korea, but the Chinese resisted. As the disputes between China and Japan over Korea became more heated, open warfare erupted two days later, when the Japanese warship Naniwa fired upon and sank the British ship Kowshing, which had been chartered by the Chinese to transport troops to Korea. Even more appalling was the killing of Chinese soldiers in the water by machine gun fire from Naniwa. Japanese navy officers used the pretext that Kowshing did not salute Naniwa even though the latter showed an admiral’s flag and had commanded the British ship to stop. The Japanese took this action without a declaration of war, setting a pattern that was to be followed on other occasions. The sinking of Kowshing resulted in the deaths of over one thousand Chinese soldiers. The ambiguity of the Japanese language provided a pretext that was used by the naval general staff in Tokyo to falsely assert that Chinese troops had fired initially before abandoning Kowshing.2 This was also a Japanese pattern of behavior that was observed in later wars. The Kowshing had sailed from Tangku near Tientsin on July 23, 1894, and was bound for the Chinese garrison at Asan, about fifty miles south of Seoul. Foreign Minister Mutsu instructed the Japanese ambassador in London to apologize for the sinking of the British ship Kowshing. There was talk of a payment of an indemnity, but Britain eventually abandoned its right to any claim for damages.3 Again, this type of ploy was to be used on numerous occasions over the next half-century—whenever a Japanese field commander caused the peacetime destruction of a ship or other possession of a Western power, Tokyo was forthcoming with profuse apologies. This stratagem worked as the passion of the moment in Britain or the United States usually subsided within a few days. Japanese army commander Yamagata Aritomo developed contingency plans for strategic operations in Northeast Asia prior to 1894. In fact, a Japanese covert intelligence operation had been at work in China since 1879, and more recently Japanese spies in Korea and Manchuria had been collecting order of battle information on Chinese troops in those areas.4 Japan’s intentions were reflected in increased expenditures for army and navy functions during the decade from 1885 to 1894. On July 28–29, 1894, a Japanese “combined brigade” began the offensive

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

19

against Chinese troops by attacking and defeating the Chinese garrison at Songhwan, south of Seoul. These events transpired without a declaration of war that was not forthcoming until August 1. From then on, the Japanese had the upper hand as fighting proceeded north to Pyongyang where Chinese forces were defeated on September 15.5 From this point, Japanese troops continued to maintain the offensive, advancing across the Yalu River—where the Japanese navy destroyed a large number of Chinese ships—into Manchuria, thence westward to the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur. Chinese forces were completely driven out of Korea by mid-October 1894. Hiroshima served as the major headquarters in Japan for operations in Korea and China. To show that he was taking personal responsibility for the conduct of the war, Emperor Meiji established his headquarters there in September 1894 and the national Diet also convened there. It is unlikely, however, that the actual conduct of the war was directed by the emperor, but his ministers saw that it was necessary to show that direct control had been returned to the monarch as opposed to earlier rule through the military leader, the shogun. Policy direction for the war came from Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) while military operations were directed by Yamagata, the field commander of the First Army. Additionally, naval shipyards at nearby Kure, a naval academy at Eta Jima, and the army headquarters in Hiroshima made the area a site of major army and navy operations fifty years before an atomic bomb was eventually dropped there in 1945. The prime minister, Count Ito Hirobumi, addressed the Diet in Hiroshima on October 19, 1894, and thanked “the mikado [emperor] for advocating the imperial standard and for personally assuming direction of the war.” Ito concluded: “His Majesty rightly considers China the enemy of civilization. We will comply with the imperial desire to destroy the barbarous obstinacy of that power.” The Diet, according to Japanese newspapers, exhibited great patriotic fervor during this session and increased military appropriations unanimously.6 Britain, the United States, and other Western powers viewed the events unfolding in Korea with considerable interest. Britain had been in negotiations with Japan for a new commercial treaty—a revision of the earlier unequal pact— but was alarmed over the actions related to Korea. Formal talks began in April 1894, but events of the next few months led to hesitation on the part of the British. Nonetheless, the treaty was signed on July 16 and ratifications exchanged on August 25, 1894, ending British extraterritorial rights when it went into effect in 1899.7 The United States was also in the process of treaty revision with Japan, but American public sentiment generally favored the Japanese over China, viewing Japan as a civilizing force for Asia. Much of this attitude had been fostered based on careful strategy by Japanese officials to mold a favorable opinion of Japan among the American public. This public relations effort intensified during the Sino-Japanese War when government agents in Tokyo hired foreign residents of Japan—some of them die-hard expatriates from the United States—to

20

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

write material designed to win over American public opinion. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan, which replaced the earlier unequal treaties and abolished extraterritorial rights for Americans in Japan, was concluded on November 22, 1894, with the stipulation that the treaty was to go into effect in 1899.8 This, along with revised treaties with other Western powers, satisfied a major goal of the Meiji government. The United States remained neutral during the Sino-Japanese War but played an important part in the protection of lives and property in the war zone. Both China and Japan accepted American offers for the protection of civilians of one nation residing in the other nation’s territory. Large numbers of Japanese were in Tientsin and Shanghai while Chinese citizens lived at various locations in Japan, especially Yokohama and Kobe. Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham forwarded dispatches in late July 1894 to U.S. ministers in Tokyo and Peking directing them to act as agents for Chinese and Japanese residents in their respective areas for the duration of hostilities.9 Due to concern for American missionaries in Korea at the time of the Tonghak rebellion, President Grover Cleveland sent the USS Baltimore, the flagship of the Asiatic Fleet, to Korea in June 1894.10 The large number of Chinese and Japanese soldiers in Korea at this point, however, posed much more of a threat to American residents than the now-vanquished peasant rebellion group. Within a few days, U.S. Marines from the Baltimore marched into the American legation compound in Seoul.11 As hostilities spread into Manchuria, the United States became increasingly involved in protecting the lives of American residents in the affected areas. President Cleveland, the son of a Presbyterian minister and the brother-in-law of a missionary in South Asia, was particularly receptive to pleas of the American Board of Missions and representatives of Presbyterian, Methodist, and Episcopal denominations for the safety of missionaries. There were approximately a thousand missionary families in these areas. Cleveland turned to Navy Secretary Hilary A. Herbert who ordered a major portion of the fleet, small though it was in 1894, to Asian waters.12 The Japanese army deployed to the field was organized into two major commands: the First Army under Yamagata, who had previously served as chief of the general staff, cabinet minister, and prime minister, and was generally regarded as the “father of the modern Japanese army”; and, the Second Army, under General Oyama Iwao, the war minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Ito. This unusual arrangement of appointing central government officials of the highest level as field army commanders reveals the great importance Tokyo gave to the war with China. It was not to be a simple war to assure the independence of Korea; instead, the defeat of China was the real purpose. It was to be the first step in becoming an imperial power on the Asian mainland and designed to impress on Western powers the message that Japan would not be an easy target for imperialist ventures. While the First Army moved through southern Manchuria toward Newchang,

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

21

the Second Army concentrated on the Liaotung Peninsula. Two divisions sailed from Hiroshima in October 1894 and landed on the coast about fifty miles northeast of Port Arthur, the Chinese naval base. Japanese strategy was to attack the defenses of the base from the rear. Japanese intelligence agents had discovered that the coast artillery guns were useful only in defending Port Arthur against attack by sea. Troops of the Second Army captured Port Arthur on November 21, 1894, and all of the Liaotung Peninsula fell into Japanese hands. The Chinese were no match for the invaders, even though stiff resistance was noted in some areas, but, surprisingly, Port Arthur fell in a day. It was at this point that the most outrageous behavior of the entire war occurred—the murder of large numbers of Chinese civilians. Details underlying the cause of this brutal incident vary, but apparently what set the Japanese troops off was the decapitated heads of several Japanese soldiers—killed in the fighting—displayed on wooden stakes. Some reports indicate that Japanese army units then went on a rampage, murdering every Chinese in sight. Reports from individual soldiers confirmed these brutalities, even though they were quickly covered up by the Japanese High Command.13 Independent reports from an American army officer, Lieutenant M. J. O’Brien, a military attache´ in China, and substantiated by an American ship captain along with a Russian military agent confirm that there was a slaughter of civilians and defeated Chinese soldiers at Port Arthur on November 21, 1894. Reports of the massacre led to a reversal of public opinion in the United States, creating outrage over Japanese actions. But swift action by the propagandists of the Japanese ministry in Washington put a spin on the atrocity by making it appear as just a heated battle. Most Americans forgot about it within a few days.14 Japan’s Second Army, strengthened by fresh troops from Hiroshima, began the invasion of the Shantung Peninsula about a hundred miles to the south across the Gulf of Chihli from Port Arthur in January 1895, while Japan’s navy converged on the scene at Weihaiwei and destroyed the Chinese fleet on February 12, 1895. Japan completed the defeat of Chinese army forces on the Shantung Peninsula by the end of February, and units of the Second Army began to rapidly move aboard troop transports to reinforce the First Army for continued aggression into Manchuria. Some of the hardest fighting of the war took place as three Japanese army divisions faced a Chinese army with an estimated strength of about twenty thousand troops. The Japanese army captured Newchang and areas to the west in early March 1895. This put a large Japanese army within striking distance of China proper, but IGH in Hiroshima directed a move to establish control far to the south in the area around Taiwan. Naval forces, accompanied by army troops, sailed for the Pescadore Islands to assure that Taiwan would be included in the booty for its initial foray into East Asia as an imperial power.15 By 1894, Japan had made amazing changes in its external appearances. Rapid modernization following patterns of European and American industrialization

22

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

gave Tokyo and other cities the look of contemporary Western metropolitan areas. Many Japanese had adopted the clothing styles and manners of westerners, which led Americans to feel more of an affinity for Japanese than for Chinese and Koreans. This condition led opinion makers in the United States to portray the Japanese as the vanguard of civilizing influences in Asia. Extensive descriptions of the war in English, originating from Japanese sources, were published in the United States. These were done in a very clever manner, putting the best face possible on Japan’s side of the issue. However, little was in print to give Chinese or Korean views on the war. In short, Japan had not only made great strides in modernizing its economy and military forces, it had developed a great propaganda machine to further its cause. Harvard University graduate Kurino Shinchiro, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, coordinated the propaganda effort along with Hisa Michitaro and Oishi Kuma, writing in such widely read publications of the day as North American Review, Forum, and Arena, and “stressed Japan’s social and political innovations in East Asia and told how China obstructed Japan’s promotion of Western civilization.”16 Overtures for peace negotiations began in late 1894 and there was some consideration given to mediation efforts by the United States and European powers, but Japan turned these offers down, insisting on dealing directly with a Chinese representative at a site on Japanese soil. China resisted by attempting to seek the offices of Charles Denby, the U.S. minister to Peking. When that failed, the Chinese government sent a German advisor—in the employ of the Chinese— to negotiate, but the Japanese rejected that attempt. Japan would accept no less than a top Chinese official at the negotiations. Meanwhile, former secretary of state John W. Foster came onto the scene, as a private citizen, to assist the Chinese in their negotiations. The aging Li Hungchang, the governor of Chihli Province and commander of Chinese forces, arrived at Shimonoseki on March 20, 1895, only to learn of the harsh terms being demanded by the Japanese, including the surrender of areas near Peking. Li rejected these terms for a cease-fire and, upon leaving the meeting to go to his living quarters, became the victim of an assassination attempt by a young Japanese patriotic society radical. Li escaped this attempt and China actually fared better for its part because of Japanese embarrassment over its failure to protect the key negotiator. American representatives, official and private, had no further involvement in the negotiations.17 The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed by Japanese and Chinese officials on April 17, 1895, gave Japan most of what had been demanded. Important terms of the treaty included:

1. Recognition by China of the complete independence of Korea. 2. The transfer to Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, Formosa, and the Pescadores group.

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

23

3. Payment of an indemnity by China to Japan in the amount of 200 million taels, the equivalent of $150 million.18

Even as the Treaty of Shimonoseki was being signed, Russia, with its own territorial interest in Manchuria and Korea, was calling on Berlin and Paris to intervene to prevent Japan from occupying the Liaotung Peninsula. On April 23, 1895, the governments of Russia, France, and Germany “advised” the government of Japan to withdraw its forces from Port Arthur and other portions of the peninsula in return for an increased indemnity from China. This action, the Tripartite Intervention, was initiated under the pretext of concern for China’s integrity. Russia was to demonstrate in only three years what its true purpose was. Furthermore, France and Germany, and more especially Russia, backed up their demands with a substantial number of warships in the area of recently concluded hostilities. This show of force took place May 6, 1895, as Japanese representatives arrived at Chefoo on the Shantung Peninsula for ratification of the treaty with Chinese officials. Recognizing that it did not have the power to resist the “advice” of Russia, France, and Germany, and being unable to obtain the intervention of Britain and the United States, Japan quickly agreed not to permanently occupy the Liaotung Peninsula.19 This turn of events led to an angry reaction of the Japanese public and promoted support for further increases in military spending resulting in a major expansion of army and naval forces over the next few years. Chinese officials resumed possession of Port Arthur on December 12, 1895.20 U.S. representatives assisted by acting as messengers between the two parties to facilitate final arrangements, and American public opinion back home was highly favorable to the Japanese. The emperor of Japan issued a proclamation praising the good offices of the United States in protecting Japanese civilians in China as well as assistance in facilitating peace negotiations. President Cleveland was informed by the Japanese emperor: Again, as the war was nearing its final stage, the representatives of the United States at Tokyo and Peking, by Your Excellency’s authorization, provided the way whereby China was able to approach directly our Government, and it was through the facilities afforded by those two representatives by direct reciprocal communication between the Governments of Japan and China that all the preliminaries looking to the opening of negotiations for the definite termination of hostilities were adjusted . . . [leaving] nothing to be desired.21

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES BECOME POWERS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC In his annual message to Congress on December 2, 1895, President Cleveland took note of the “close of the momentous struggle between China and Japan”

24

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

and elaborated on the continued need for protection of American civilians, especially missionaries, residing in China. Cleveland also created a special American commission to visit the provinces where the most trouble had been observed and predicted that “by its demonstration of the readiness and ability of our Government to protect its citizens will act . . . as a most influential deterrent of any similar outbreaks.”22 Although the Treaty of Shimonoseki provided that Taiwan would be transferred to Japan, the act of taking possession of the island was not a simple matter. The local indigenous population and Chinese residents strenuously objected and eventually set up their own republic. Even though reports from Tokyo indicated that the Black Flags, the regional troops from coastal Chinese provinces, had been routed in August 1895, spirited resistance to Japan’s occupation continued.23 More than a year after the Shimonoseki Treaty, attacks from armed bandits in rural areas continued to plague Japanese administrators. A correspondent for the London News reported: It is doubtful whether the Chinese will ever fraternize with the Japanese, but time may accomplish it. At present they are averse, and this feeling is shown by their foolish and painful anxiety for the appearance of a deliverer. They would gladly welcome an English or German invasion, and their childish credulity discovered itself the other day when the German fleet, being in Amoy, they immediately concluded that they were coming over to drive the Japanese out. They seem quite ignorant of events outside Formosa.24

Pacification was achieved after 1898 when Japan changed its policies toward Formosa by promoting the welfare and goodwill of the inhabitants. Goto Shimpei, appointed as chief of civil administration, instituted measures that led to major improvements in the welfare, economic, political, and cultural life of the civilian population.25 Meanwhile, interest in Asia and the Pacific was growing in the United States. After William McKinley, a Republican, won the presidential election in November 1896, efforts to annex Hawaii resumed and American naval officers developed plans and a strategy for strengthening the fleet and for a stronger projection into the Pacific. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a naval captain, wrote extensively on the need for protection of the U.S. Pacific Coast and for a projection of naval power, citing three objectives: 1. Protection of chief harbors by means of coast artillery and coast-defense ships. 2. A naval force, the arm of offensive power, which alone enables a country to extend its influence outward. 3. National policy that would prohibit any foreign power from acquiring a coaling station within three thousand miles of San Francisco, a distance that included Hawaii, the Galapagos Islands, and the coast of Central America.26

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

25

Mahan noted that, since 1865, high tariffs had protected American industries and penetration of overseas markets was weak. The self-imposed isolation in commercial matters had resulted in a decline of merchant shipping and led to “an actual remoteness of this continent from the life of the rest of the world.” President Harrison’s secretary of state, James G. Blaine, had commented earlier: “It is not an ambitious destiny for so great a country as ours to manufacture only what we can consume, or produce only what we eat.”27 Theodore Roosevelt, McKinley’s newly appointed assistant navy secretary, shared Mahan’s concerns for enhancement of the fleet by promoting the building of additional ships and the creation of a two-ocean navy. The Asiatic Fleet consisted of mostly small cruisers and gunboats to guard lives and property of American merchants and missionaries. Japan’s decisive victory in 1895, along with that nation’s intrusions into Hawaii, fueled this impetus for a stronger navy. Mahan, viewing the United States as “facing the older worlds in the East and West, her shores washed by the oceans which touch the one or the other, but which are common to her alone,” warned that America must look outward.28 For Japan, more bad news was to come with the revelation that, by the RussoChinese Convention of March 27, 1898, Russia would receive a twenty-fiveyear lease for use of the Liaotung Peninsula, the territory that Japan had been forced to relinquish only three years earlier. Important provisions of the convention provided for a Russian to be named governor, the development of Port Arthur as a naval base for Russian and Chinese warships, political and administrative control in Russian hands, and authorization for the Russians to construct a railroad northward from Port Arthur and the port of Talien into Manchuria to connect with the Chinese Eastern Railway. Clearly, Russia had embarked upon a determined course to dominate Northeast Asia.29 This turn of events led to outrage in Japan and public demonstrations in Tokyo and other cities to protest Russia’s duplicitous actions. Japanese government officials, stunned by Russia’s actions, pushed additional appropriations for the army and navy through the Diet that resulted in a doubling of military expenditures over the next decade. This priority of increasing military appropriations began a trend that would continue for most of the first half of the twentieth century until the end of World War II in 1945. Meanwhile, China had become so weakened that it was unable to ward off any foreign incursions. In 1897 and 1898, virtually all of coastal China fell under the influence of foreign control. In addition to the twenty-five-year lease on the Liaotung Peninsula, Russia exercised de facto control of a large portion of Manchuria. Germany occupied and obtained a ninety-nine-year lease for Kiaochou Bay near Tsingtao; Japan obtained a promise that no territory in Fukien— opposite Taiwan—would be alienated to any other nation; France—already in possession of Indochina—received a ninety-nine-year lease to Kwangchow Bay, near Canton, and railroad rights from Tonkin to Yunnan Province; and Britain, in possession of Hong Kong since 1842, obtained a ninety-nine-year lease to Kowloon (the New Territories) opposite Hong Kong, and Weihaiwei on the

26

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Shantung Peninsula. Additionally, several European powers had special rights in the treaty ports, most notably in Shanghai. Also, China recognized “spheres of interest” (concessions, railway and mining rights, and loans) to Britain in the Yangtze River area, to Russia north of the Great Wall, to France on Hainan Island, and to Germany in the Shantung Peninsula.30 This condition meant that China had lost effective control of its entire coastal area for a distance of nearly two thousand miles. Only the British lease of Kowloon, however, ran the course of its full ninety-nine-year period. It was returned to China on July 1, 1997, along with Hong Kong Island. Britain could have retained Hong Kong Island after 1997 but determined that it was infeasible to do so without Kowloon. All of the other territorial arrangements were terminated earlier because of intervening events. By 1898, large numbers of Japanese merchants and citizens had become established in various areas of East Asia, such as China (including Manchuria), Taiwan, and Korea. Russian concerns over Japan’s predominance in Korea led to a formal agreement, the May 10, 1898, Japanese-Russian Convention Concerning Korea. Significant provisions provided that neither Japan nor Russia would appoint “military instructors or financial advisors unless negotiations to that effect have been opened and settled beforehand.” Russia also recognized that business dealings of Japan “are greatly developed in Korea, and that there are a large number of Japanese residents in that country,” and promised not to obstruct “the commercial and industrial interests existing between Japan and Korea.”31 McKinley’s presidential inauguration on March 4, 1897, gave impetus to annexationist efforts in Hawaii. But Hawaiian officials found themselves faced with a dilemma in the 1890s. Plantation owners desperately needed labor, but there was growing concern over the influx of laborers from Japan. Japanese had resumed immigrating to Hawaii in 1885, and by 1897 they numbered twentyfive thousand, one-fourth of the total population. Japanese constituted the largest ethnic group in the islands, while the number of whites stood at about eight thousand. More laborers were on the way from Japan, and in the spring of 1897 Honolulu authorities citing administrative problems, turned back a shipload of 1,174 Japanese immigrants. Japan’s recent victory over China inflated egos in Tokyo and made officials unusually sensitive to the slightest hint of discrimination. Japan protested the actions of Hawaiian officials in refusing to allow the laborers into Hawaii by citing treaty specifications; however, an even more important issue was about to surface.32 As the United States began to seriously consider annexation of Hawaii, Japan protested and sent the Naniwa, the warship of Kowshing fame, to the islands. Hoshi Toru, the Japanese minister in Washington, informed Secretary of State John Sherman on June 15, 1897: “my Government cannot view without concern the prospects of a sudden and complete change in the status of Hawaii whereby the rights of Japan and of Japanese subjects may be imperiled.” After confirmation from Sherman that indeed formal annexation plans were underway,

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

27

Japan’s ambassador lodged a protest. Secretary Sherman responded: “It is believed that there is nothing in the proposed treaty prejudicial to the rights of Japan, and certainly the United States has no disposition to disturb the friendly relations which have long existed between the Government of Japan and this country.”33 As momentum built up for enlarging the navy in connection with the Hawaii annexation and further westward projection, the New York Times editorialized about concerns being expressed by the London Globe “that the Japanese Navy could blow the American Navy out of water.” While it was doubted these claims were true, the Times stated: it is always to be remembered that in case of complications with Japan we must have a superior naval force to her in the Pacific, where her whole force is. When she makes a perfectly just protest that we are threatening to invade her treaty rights, we must, if we are going to disregard it, in the interest of heaven knows what, be prepared to prevent her from making it good. That is one of the pleasant consequences of this fool business of annexing Hawaii.34

Most American newspapers in the 1890s were partisan in their support of political parties. Democrats favored annexation of areas only if such acquisition would ultimately lead to statehood, and that did not appear likely for Hawaii in 1897. Republicans, however, favored the addition of colonial territories to the United States and were supported by such publications as the Hearst newspapers. McKinley was indeed enthusiastic over the acquisition of Hawaii and in just a few months after his inauguration an annexation treaty was signed on June 16, 1897, notwithstanding Japan’s objections. Roosevelt, the assistant secretary of the navy in the new McKinley administration and a determined advocate of annexation, ordered several navy ships to Hawaii in the event of trouble with Japan. Nonetheless, there were political problems in the United States in obtaining ratification of the treaty in the special congressional session that had been called in early 1897 to consider tariff issues to assist farmers who had been devastated by the economic depression of the 1890s. Democrats, rallying under the banner of anti-imperialism, also had a more pragmatic objective in representing domestic agriculture interests, which were opposed to annexation on the basis of increased competition from sugar cane producers in Hawaii where cheap labor was a major advantage.35 Meanwhile, Liliuokalani, the deposed queen, traveled to Washington imploring senators to vote against ratification and sending a strong protest to the State Department. She also published a book opposing annexation and gave interviews to sympathetic newspapers. In any event, the Senate was unable to take up the treaty because of other priorities. In the second half of 1897, extensive public debate continued in the United States over the annexation issue, while the Hawaiian senate unanimously ratified the treaty on September 9. Another encouraging development for annexationists occurred in December when Japan

28

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

withdrew objections to the treaty after the State Department gave assurances of amity and an offer to assume the Japanese claims. Additionally, the new treaty between Japan and the United States that replaced the earlier unequal treaty was to become effective in 1899. This was the top priority for the Japanese government and a dispute over immigration to Hawaii was not worth the risk of derailing the new pact.36 When the regular session of Congress convened late in 1897, annexationists were hopeful of Senate ratification. A two-thirds majority vote was needed and, with a total of ninety senators there were fifty-seven who were in favor of, or leaning toward, ratification. Obtaining the remaining three votes, however, proved to be more difficult than expected. After several amendments in February 1898, the measure died in committee, but there were assurances that annexation could be accomplished by another route, that is, by a joint resolution of Congress that would require only a simple majority of each house.37 This course was pursued and after the sinking of the USS Maine on February 15, 1898, McKinley actively lobbied both houses of Congress to pass the joint resolution. The House of Representatives with a majority in favor of the treaty passed the resolution in June, but stubborn opposition was still being demonstrated in the Senate. During the long, hot summer, when Congress would normally have been in recess, opponents in the Senate filibustered in one final attempt to block annexation. When this failed, the Senate voted in favor of the treaty and President McKinley signed the annexation into law on July 7, 1898.38 To resolve the dispute with Japan over immigrant rejection, the Republic of Hawaii paid Japan $75,000 in July 1898 before the actual annexation to the United States was made effective. After annexation, the issue of the large number of Japanese in Hawaii disappeared when it was quickly realized that as a territory of the United States, Japanese would make up only a very small percentage of the nation’s total population. There was no more worry about balancing the races, and by 1900 there were sixty-one thousand Japanese in Hawaii.39 After annexation became official on August 12, 1898, the laws of the United States applied and there would be no more contract labor. Hawaii, as an American territory, was the same as California with respect to immigration and citizenship laws. Japanese were eligible for immigration and anyone born in Hawaii would be classified as a natural-born American citizen. For Chinese, however, the exclusion law was already in effect and immigration was banned. Chinese born in the territory after annexation, however, were automatically native-born U.S. citizens.40 For the time being, relations between Japan and the United States were quiet, but the 1897 protest over annexation was really just the beginning of many more clashes between the two nations that would eventually lead to another major crisis involving Hawaii: the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

29

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS While action was under way to make Hawaii an American possession, the Spanish-American War was drawing the United States into an encounter that would result in new acquisitions in Asia and the western Pacific. Concern over Spanish mistreatment of Cubans and support for the Cuban independence movement was prevalent in the United States for several years before 1898. A new chapter in the history of U.S. foreign policy was about to be inaugurated in 1898 when the nation was suddenly thrust into overseas territorial acquisitions that would previously have been renounced. While the matter of Hawaii had been incubating for a number of years and the small group of Samoa Islands had presented some problems, a confrontation with Spain over the independence of Cuba focused attention on what America’s role outside of the North American mainland should be. Cuba had been a Spanish possession for more than four hundred years, since Columbus arrived there in 1492. An uprising that had begun in 1868 finally led Spanish colonial officials to promise full rights for Cubans. These were not fulfilled, however, thereby generating an independence movement that began in 1895. Heavy repression and movement of Cubans to concentration areas by the Spanish forces under General Valeriano Weyler, commonly referred to as “the Butcher,” led to serious concerns in the United States for the welfare of the Cubans. As the United States began to be drawn into the Cuban crisis, other Spanish possessions also came into play that raised the question: What role would American forces take in the event of hostilities? The nearest of these other colonial holdings was Puerto Rico, much smaller than Cuba and about five hundred miles to the east. Spain held an even larger territory in the Pacific, the Philippine Islands. Numerous smaller possessions were located in the Marianas and the Caroline Islands, including Guam. While most Americans were quite familiar with Cuba and its struggles for freedom, very little was known of the Philippines or its location. President McKinley told aides that he had heard of it but that he wouldn’t be able to locate the islands on a map within two thousand miles. But Roosevelt and Mahan knew the precise location and were set for action the moment anything happened in Cuba. There was no room left on the coast of China for an American foothold, but the Philippines could serve as a base of operations in Asia. Also, there was concern that Germany or Japan would take the islands if the United States did not. The Philippine Islands also had its insurrectionists who had been seeking independence from Spain. In 1896, members of a revolutionary party, known as Katipunan, led a rebellion against Spanish colonial forces. Harsh repression followed and rebel forces were herded into concentration camps where torture was commonplace and execution awaited the leaders. After a power struggle among the surviving insurgents, Emilio Aguinaldo became the Katipunan com-

30

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

mander, but was no match for the Spanish. In a compromise agreement in exchange for liberalization of Spanish rule, thirty-four leaders of Katipunan, including Aguinaldo, ended the rebellion in August 1897 and agreed to voluntary exile in Hong Kong. It soon became apparent that the Spanish had no intention of keeping their agreement to liberalize colonial rule. In his annual message to Congress of December 6, 1897, President McKinley explained: “The most important problem with which this Government is now called upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection.” McKinley related the history of the revolution in Cuba, explaining that the present insurrection began in February 1895 and that “the cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896.” McKinley criticized the “brutal” actions of Spanish policy and, in discussing the possibility of American intervention, stated that the annexation of Cuba by the United States was not to be thought of as it would be “criminal aggression.”41 As the attention of the nation was focused on Cuba, Assistant Navy Secretary Roosevelt made use of his political influence to get Commodore George Dewey, junior in rank to some other naval officers, appointed as commander of the Asiatic Squadron. Dewey, who saw eye-to-eye with Roosevelt and Mahan on the projection of American power in the Pacific, sailed from San Francisco in December 1897 to take command of the Asiatic Squadron. Before leaving Washington, Dewey was instructed by Roosevelt that at the first outbreak of war with Spain over Cuba, the squadron was to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. The initial concern of the United States was to ensure that the Spanish fleet in the Philippines would not be able to sail to the Caribbean to reinforce the Spanish navy there.42 As unrest in Cuba mounted in January 1898, McKinley directed the navy to send the North Atlantic Squadron and a flotilla of torpedo boats to the coast of Florida. The battleship USS Maine and a cruiser were sent to Havana as a “mark of friendship and international courtesy,” but this action was viewed with skepticism by many. As further intrigues developed—a personal letter, highly critical of McKinley, from the Spanish minister in Washington to a friend in Havana was intercepted and published by a newspaper—and the offices of proindependence newspapers in Cuba were ransacked by Spanish authorities, war fever grew throughout the United States. When the Maine was blown up in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, few were willing to wait for an investigation into the cause. McKinley, not willing to be stampeded, sent a board of inquiry to determine what had happened. When the results of the investigation revealed that the explosion had been created by a mine that had caused an “external explosion,” it was taken as “synonymous with guilt of Spain.”43 Before the results of the inquiry had been announced, Roosevelt took advantage of Navy Secretary John D. Long’s short leave of absence in late February and fired off cables and telegrams to naval units throughout the world, alerting them for action. The message to Dewey on February 25 instructed the commodore to move ships based at Nagasaki, Chefoo, and other East Asian locations

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

31

to mobilize the Asiatic Squadron at Hong Kong in preparation for action in Manila. The cable further directed: “In the event of declaration of war with Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippines.”44 In late March and early April 1898, several peace attempts were made through diplomatic channels, but hawks in Congress demanded a declaration of war. “Cuba Libre!” was replaced by “Remember the Maine,” a slogan heard with increasing fervency throughout the country, but McKinley was cautious and looked for mediation by other foreign powers—including the Vatican—to resolve the dispute. Debate continued in Congress and the president traveled extensively throughout the United States to discern public opinion, which was strongly in favor of war. Congress began debate on war against Spain and passed a joint resolution—a declaration of war—on April 24, 1898, with the unanimously approved Teller Amendment, an amendment introduced by Senator Henry M. Teller, a Colorado Republican, that disavowed any intent to annex Cuba and declared the war would be waged for Cuban independence alone.45 Orders were issued to Admiral Dewey advising that the war had commenced and directing the Asiatic Squadron to proceed to Manila Bay. The directive specified that Dewey was to commence operations against the Spanish fleet: “You must capture or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.” The Asiatic Squadron, small by comparison to the British, German, and Russian fleets in the Far East, was actually superior in strength to the Spanish naval forces in the Philippines. The six American ships in Dewey’s fleet, including the protected cruisers USS Olympia and USS Baltimore, were relatively new and outclassed the Spanish in both tonnage and firepower. The result was an easy defeat of the Spanish fleet in a matter of hours on May 1, 1898. When news of this triumph reached Washington, there was great jubilation over this first engagement in the Spanish-American War. Dewey, previously unknown to the general public, became a sensational hero and was promoted to rear admiral. Adulation of Dewey took on even greater proportions when jubilant newspapers, with considerable exaggeration, proclaimed Manila Bay to be the greatest naval victory of all time. Dewey indeed had defeated the Spanish fleet, but his small contingent of marines was not sufficient to occupy the city. At a joint army and navy conference in Washington, it was agreed that the army would send fifteen thousand troops (a number that would be significantly increased later) to the Philippines to control Manila. The main focus of operations, nevertheless, was still to be in Cuba. The United States, for the first time in its history, was going to be involved in simultaneous major warfare on opposite sides of the world and would see its army grow from twenty-eight thousand to two hundred fifty thousand. Naval personnel would double from twelve thousand to twenty-four thousand during this time.46 Roosevelt resigned his civilian post and was commissioned a lieutenant colonel of volunteers in the U.S. Cavalry. Roosevelt was determined not to miss out on what was termed a “splendid little war.”

32

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

While there was great enthusiasm for the war among Americans, and thousands of young men volunteered for active duty, the logistical problem of organizing supplies, equipment, transportation, and training of new recruits proved to be a nightmare. The army had not fought a major conflict since the Civil War, and even the Indian wars had been over for nearly ten years. Inaction and bureaucracy at the staff level had lulled the army into apathy with no desire to venture forth beyond its peacetime posts. Major changes in top personnel, however, soon enabled the army to get organized. Congress appropriated an extra $50 million for the prosecution of the war, and supplies, equipment, and troops began to roll into south Florida in preparation for shipment to Cuba. Large troop contingents were sent to the San Francisco area for training and organizing for movement to the Philippines. The navy had its share of bungling, too, and there was confusion over where to attack in Cuba. This debate was finally resolved with agreement among American officials to attack the Spanish at Santiago, in the eastern end of Cuba. McKinley insisted on “unconditional surrender,” a term that dated back to General Ulysses S. Grant’s use in the Civil War at Fort Donelson, and demanded an immediate attack on Cuba. Even with confusion in the navy, poor coordination between the army and the navy, and lack of preparedness, the United States won a resounding victory at Santiago. Colonel Roosevelt led the First U.S. Army Volunteer Cavalry—the Rough Riders—up San Juan’s Kettle Hill as U.S. forces took the heights overlooking the city of Santiago. On July 14, 1898, the U.S. Army reported the surrender of Santiago and the whole eastern end of Cuba. By late July, Spanish forces in Puerto Rico were in retreat and an armistice between the United States and Spain was set for August 12.47 Admiral Dewey and his Asiatic Squadron had been waiting in Manila Bay since the first of May for an American expeditionary force to occupy the city. In a poorly conceived concept, Dewey sent a navy ship to Hong Kong to transport Aguinaldo and other Katipunan leaders back to Manila with the idea that they could be used to defeat Spanish troops and occupy the city on behalf of the United States. Arriving back in the Philippines on May 19, 1898, the rebel leaders quickly regained their followers, defeated most Spanish garrisons in the next two months—except Manila—and captured about three thousand enemy soldiers. The dilemma for Dewey, however, was that Aguinaldo wanted no part of an American occupation; he would settle for nothing less than complete and immediate independence of the Philippines. On June 12, 1898, Aguinaldo proclaimed independence and made himself president of the Philippine Republic. He established his capital at Malalos, about thirty miles north of Manila, and instructed Dewey to refer to him as President Aguinaldo, not General Aguinaldo, and to call his fifteen-thousand-man army the Republican Army, not the Insurgent Army. Admiral Dewey, however, was not about to be stampeded into action; his instructions were to defeat the Spanish and occupy Manila. He reasoned, as proper for a field commander, that decisions concerning the destiny of Manila and the rest of the Philippine Islands were in

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

33

the hands of the president and Congress. Accordingly, he refused Aguinaldo’s requests.48 While events in Cuba and the Philippines were transpiring, preparations were under way in California to train, equip, and transport an army of fifteen thousand men for duty in Manila. Early in June 1898, the Eighth Army Corps Expeditionary Force began to take shape at the Presidio of San Francisco and at other nearby temporary camps. Officers and enlisted men of the regular army—augmented by a much larger number of enthusiastic volunteers—filled the camps, which created sanitation and logistics problems. The corps commander was Major General Wesley Merritt, an 1860 graduate of West Point and a Civil War veteran. His deputy was Major General Elwell S. Otis, a Harvard Law School graduate who had volunteered for army service at the outbreak of the Civil War, and had stayed on as a regular army officer. He was promoted to major general for the position with the Eighth Army Corps. Newly promoted brigadier generals assigned to the corps were Thomas M. Anderson, Francis Greene, Charlie King, and Arthur MacArthur, each of whom was to command an expeditionary force under Merritt.49 Because there were no transport ships available, merchant ships designed for cargo had to be converted to troop carriers, thereby delaying the date of departure. This provided a few weeks for volunteers to be trained and equipped prior to embarkation that, along with some shipboard drill and instruction, constituted the only preparation for most of the volunteer troops prior to action in the Philippines. During the summer of 1898, ships carrying troops of the Eighth Army Corps began departing San Francisco with the first units arriving in Manila Bay on July 31. Aguinaldo initially threatened to fire on any American troops setting foot on Philippine soil, but backed down when Admiral Dewey declared he would use naval gunfire in return. Troops of the Eighth Army Corps began landing in areas north and south of Manila in preparation for an attack on Spanish defenses. Even though General Merritt considered Aguinaldo a bandit leader and likened him to a Latin American dictator, he instructed his officers to cooperate with the indigenous forces but to do nothing that would imply U.S. recognition of the Philippine Republic. The weather was miserable with tropical heat, followed by torrential downpours, and even more humidity and heat. July and August provided some of the most undesirable weather of the entire year in the Philippines.50 The strategy for attacking the Spanish required MacArthur’s Third Expeditionary Force to attack the Manila fort from the south and for Greene’s troops to attack from the north. Spanish colonial Governor Fermin Jaudenes, seeing that he was going to be defeated either by the Americans or by the Philippine insurgents, made a secret arrangement with General Merritt that his troops would surrender to U.S. forces after putting up a sham defense. Surrender to the Americans would give Jaudenes some semblance of honor as opposed to submission to Aguinaldo. None of Merritt’s subordinates knew of the agreement for a staged battle and initiated a full-scale attack on the morning of August 13, 1898. Span-

34

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

ish forces, after putting up an initial show of fierce resistance, surrendered in a matter of hours. American troops, however, quickly found they were being attacked from the rear by Aguinaldo’s insurgents.51 Even though the main focus of the Spanish-American War had been on Cuba, the first and last battles of the war were in the Philippines. No one in the Philippines knew that an armistice had gone into effect the previous day, although it later would be argued that because of the International Date Line it was still August 12 in the Western Hemisphere while the battle was being fought. News of the armistice was received in Manila on August 20. Regardless, Aguinaldo was furious and issued a proclamation confining all “foreigners” to central Manila. Instead, another four thousand American troops arrived in late August and a standoff ensued for the next several weeks. The U.S. Army had superior firepower and easily controlled central Manila. But Aguinaldo’s men, who knew the lay of the land and had more room to maneuver, controlled the rest of the main island of Luzon and many of the other islands as well. A peace conference between the United States and Spain was held in Paris beginning October 1, 1898. Disposition of Cuba was not an issue—it would become independent following evacuation of the Spanish troops and a short American occupation, which ended May 20, 1902. The fate of other territories, however, was undecided. The Americans were now in possession of Puerto Rico. Guam had been taken in an unopposed action by one naval warship in July. The biggest issue—and by far the largest territory—concerned the Philippine Islands. The United States held central Manila, but insurgents controlled the rest of the country. Aguinaldo held out hope that the United States had no territorial ambitions in the Philippines—just as in Cuba—but McKinley made no announcement as to his intentions. In Washington, a group headed by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert Jeremiah Beveridge, a thirty-seven-year-old Indiana activist, and Roosevelt, who was now the governor of New York, saw the islands as essential to American commercial opportunities in China and as a base for the U.S. Navy. Their philosophy was quite similar to the justification offered by European colonial powers—and lately Japan—for expansion: that the problem of excess production capacity could be solved by Asian markets, and that a colonial policy was the most effective way to accomplish this. Roosevelt argued: “The Philippines must be ours. If we hold the other side of the Pacific, . . . the value to this country is beyond imagination.” The Washington Post trumpeted: “The guns of Dewey at Manila have changed the destiny of the United States. We are face to face with a strange destiny and must accept its responsibilities. An Imperial policy.”52 President McKinley, though enthusiastic about the annexation of Hawaii, was not convinced the United States should acquire any of the Philippines. There was considerable opposition to annexing territories that would make the United

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

35

States a colonial power. Indeed, the idea was frequently expressed that the concept of a republic precluded the acquisition of colonies and colonial subjects, but there were also many variations for disposition of the Philippines. Some observers held the view that the United States should only hold Manila and give independence to the rest of the islands, or sell them to other powers. Others realized that Aguinaldo’s insurgents had filled the vacuum on Luzon and might refuse to yield to the Americans. Also, most Democrats in Congress and some newspapers favored complete independence. But as McKinley traveled around the nation in the fall of 1898, he found most citizens favored complete annexation of the Philippines. As a result, on October 26, 1898, McKinley cabled instructions to the American delegates to the Paris Peace Conference, directing: “The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required.”53 Meanwhile, in congressional elections held November 8, 1898, Republicans scored big gains on a platform of overseas expansion. Spain strongly objected to American demands for cession of the Philippines to the United States, claiming that an armistice was already in effect when American troops captured Manila. It eventually gave in, however, when the United States agreed to pay Spain $20 million and to assume responsibility for transporting prisoners of war back to Spain. The conferees also agreed that Puerto Rico and Guam would be ceded to the United States. The treaty, signed in Paris on December 20, 1898, was submitted by McKinley to the Senate on January 4, 1899. After an extensive, month-long debate, the necessary two-thirds majority for ratification—with only a one-vote margin—was obtained on February 6. Some of the senators, even though opposed to territorial annexation, voted for the treaty because they viewed with urgency the ending of the war and the return of volunteers to civilian life. William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic Party candidate in the 1896 presidential election (and a contender for the 1900 election) switched his position and urged Democrats to vote for treaty ratification with the proviso that a resolution granting independence to the Philippines be introduced immediately following the treaty vote. Senator Augustus O. Bacon, a Democrat, introduced the resolution for Philippine independence, and the anti-imperialist votes were sufficient to sustain a tie vote, which was broken only by Vice President Garret A. Hobart’s vote in opposition.54 This was followed by a resolution from Democrat Samuel D. McEnery that annexation was for the purpose of preparing Filipinos for selfgovernment and that there was no intent to make its residents U.S. citizens or to make the Philippines an integral part of the United States. McEnery’s resolution passed the Senate and the formalities were now finished. The Philippine Islands officially became a possession of the United States, but with a pledge that the acquisition was not to be unending. The next few years, however, would prove that a treaty with Spain giving the United States title to the Philippines was a very different matter from actual physical control.

36

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

THE PHILIPPINE WAR “Benevolent Assimilation,” according to President McKinley, was to be the watchword in pacifying the Philippines and making the islands an American possession. This turn of events, however, was met with outrage from Aguinaldo and his followers, notwithstanding the promise that the purpose of annexation was to prepare Filipinos for self-government at some indeterminate date in the future. For many Filipinos, there was no substitute for the present. McKinley explained that the Philippines had been entrusted to the United States by “the Providence of God”and called for patience in this transition period. The majority of Filipinos saw the issue differently, however, and three years of warfare— much of it brutal—ensued. Spanish army troops were returned to Spain, and by December 1898 Aguinaldo had forty thousand men organized as regular uniformed troops in the Republican Army while the United States had twenty thousand men in the Philippines. McKinley ordered General Otis, who had replaced Merritt as corps commander the preceding August, to extend the military occupation of the islands “with all possible dispatch.” The president also directed that all Filipinos surrender and “accept United States sovereignty over the Philippines.” Leaders of the American forces, including MacArthur, who was newly promoted to major general as a division commander, knew Aguinaldo would not agree and that the result would be a long, hard war fought under deplorable conditions. The slogan, “Benevolent Assimilation,” was rarely used in the islands. The first objective of the Eighth Army Corps was to mount an offensive that would break General Aguinaldo’s encirclement of Manila. Even though they were outnumbered two to one by the Republican Army, American generals were confident they could defeat the Filipinos who had no artillery. The U.S. troops were supported by both naval and field artillery that provided a wide margin in firepower. Furthermore, the American regiments were defending a compact zone with coordinated zones of fire while Aguinaldo’s forces were spread out and poorly coordinated. The American offensive began in February 1899 with a plan to advance northward along a railroad line running one hundred miles to the Lingayen Gulf. The poorly trained Filipinos were no match, and Major General MacArthur’s Second Division made good progress, even though guerrilla activities quickly became a major obstacle for the Americans. The Republican Army suffered a casualty rate nearly ten times higher than MacArthur’s force, leading Aguinaldo to call for a cease-fire. One reason for this request was a hope that Japan or Germany might provide aid to the insurgents, but this assistance never materialized. General Otis refused the truce request and said there would be no negotiations and no compromises. He emphasized that “the fighting having begun must go on to the grim end.”55 MacArthur continued the attack toward Lingayen Gulf, although he was directed several times by General Otis to slow his offensive over concern for

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

37

moving supplies and equipment to the front and to await additional troops that were en route from the United States. Major General Henry Lawton, the hero of El Caney in the battle for Cuba, arrived in the Philippines on March 17, 1899, with units of the Fourth and Seventeenth Infantry Regiments, bringing the total American strength to twenty-six thousand men. Lawton’s mission was to defend Manila while MacArthur—with ten thousand additional troops—was to continue to advance to the north.56 As warm weather approached with the advent of spring, troops experienced hot and humid conditions with temperatures often reaching 100 degrees. Torrential rains became more frequent and soldiers found that keeping dry was hopeless. Jungle creatures—such as three-inch-long leeches—were a constant threat, which led to unsanitary conditions and health problems. The death rate for American soldiers from disease was more than double the number of battle deaths. At times, nearly half of the troops were on sick report. By May 1899, the one-year enlistments for volunteer soldiers began to expire and most wanted to return to the United States. Nevertheless, about ten percent of the volunteers were induced to stay on for an additional year through payment of a $450 bonus, which was equivalent to three years’ pay under normal conditions. New enlistments back home, for both the regular army and volunteer units, resulted in the forming of an additional twenty-five regiments for Philippine service, bringing the total strength to thirty thousand men by August and fifty thousand by November 1899.57 MacArthur’s reinforced Second Division reached Dagupan, on Lingayen Gulf, on November 20 after an attempt to capture General Aguinaldo and his staff failed due to heavy rains and the retreat of the Republican Army into the Benguet Mountains. For the remainder of the war, Filipino insurgents operated primarily in small guerrilla units. Eighth Army Corps commander, General Otis, claimed complete victory based on MacArthur’s triumph, but Americanoccupied areas still constituted only a small portion of the entire Philippines. Otis was a political general and knew what President McKinley and Elihu Root, the new secretary of war, wanted to hear: that things were going well and that most of the Filipino people would be very happy to be under U.S. control. McKinley was planning to run for a second term as president, and the right “spin” on events in the Philippines would deny the Democrats and the antiimperialists campaign fodder for the election. Throughout most of 1900, Otis and civilian commissioners sent to Manila would echo this refrain. Field generals disagreed, but Otis censored their dispatches—along with reports filed by news correspondents—sent by cable from Manila. Increased guerrilla activity in 1900 led American forces to alter their tactics by concentrating on the protection of towns and villages as opposed to controlling territory in the countryside. By May 1900, more than seventy-four thousand military personnel were stationed in five hundred garrisons throughout the islands, which were organized into four departments. Aguinaldo’s guerrilla troops were still a menace, however, and their operations became increasingly

38

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

brutal. Small bands of insurgents kidnapped American soldiers from outposts, tortured them, and frequently killed them with bolo knives by chopping off various body parts. This led to American reprisals on suspected enemy agents. However, there was often no way to differentiate between hostile guerrillas and civilians. Filipinos in the towns could appear to be friendly to Americans by day, but in some cases, would turn out to be guerrillas by night. Nevertheless, there were some beneficial relationships that developed between Filipinos and American soldiers. English classes were popular and army troops frequently volunteered to teach the language to villagers and townspeople. Soldiers also helped in rebuilding towns that had been destroyed by guerrillas. MacArthur replaced General Otis as the new overall military commander and governor of the Philippines on May 5, 1900, and inaugurated a policy of constructive improvement throughout the islands. Emphasis was placed on health and sanitation, a revised legal system, building of schools and hospitals, and a tariff system. MacArthur moved to the Malacan˜ang—the residence of the former Spanish governor—and began a program of improving relations with Filipino leaders with a view to fostering self-government. The new governor also offered amnesty to insurgents in exchange for a pledge of allegiance to the United States. Some of the other American officials in the Philippines, including the newly arrived civilian commissioners, headed up by William Howard Taft—the future president—saw MacArthur as overly optimistic and argued that it might take fifty or one hundred years before Filipinos were ready for self-government. The McKinley-Taft line was that the revolution had been defeated and an American governing authority would be necessary for many years in order to prepare the Filipinos for self-rule. MacArthur’s view was that the United States should initiate a transition to self-government as soon as possible; otherwise, the revolution would continue indefinitely and become even more brutal. Taft, however, echoed the party line from Washington that the rebellion was over and “most Filipinos were overjoyed to be under U.S. control.” The civilian commissioners, increasingly at odds with MacArthur, set out to make this a reality—or at least appear so through their reports. What the troops in the field were discovering, however, was that logistics support to remote areas was difficult, in many areas there were no roads, guerrillas roamed the countryside unchallenged, and that it was unsafe to travel alone or in small groups. Throughout 1900, MacArthur’s soldiers continued to search for and capture Filipino guerrillas, gradually bringing more territory under American control. Several factors militated against the insurgents, primarily disagreements between factions over strategy. Also, MacArthur’s relatively liberal policies, which appealed to some Filipino fighters, led to a decrease in enthusiasm for continuing resistance. MacArthur rejected draconian measures, and permitted personal liberties, free speech, and allowed fraternal and civic organizations to be formed. Some of the military governor’s strategy included closer relationships between Americans and Filipinos, new educational programs, encouraging officers to establish friendship with Filipino gentry, and the teaching of English. MacArthur

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

39

adapted a U.S. history textbook for Filipino usage and had copies printed for use in schools.58 Taft and MacArthur clashed on approaches to be taken in dealing with the people of the Philippines. Beyond that they argued over the authority that each had. Taft insisted that MacArthur stick to military issues and concentrate on subduing the rebels. MacArthur, on the other hand, challenged the authority of a civilian to dictate policy in a war zone, especially where no powers had been delegated by Congress in Washington to transfer authority from the military governor to a civilian board of commissioners. These disputes led to frequent communications between Manila and Washington requesting that the matter be settled. The answers from McKinley and Secretary of War Root were often ambivalent with the main point being to show things as going well, at least until after the November election. Bryan, the Democratic nominee in the 1900 presidential campaign, contended that the Philippine venture was imperialist and that immediate independence should be granted. Reports from returning soldiers and journalists giving a very different view from the administration line were used by Bryan to convince voters that McKinley’s policies in the Philippines were anathema to a republic where democracy and human rights should be paramount. Anti-imperialists supported Bryan and commented that “Old Dewey should have defeated the Spanish fleet and then just sailed away.”59 Republicans counterattacked the Democrat’s position. Roosevelt, the vice presidential nominee, vigorously denounced Bryan as “irresponsible, anarchistic, treasonable, and unpatriotic.” Senator Albert Beveridge exclaimed: “To support Bryan is to support Aguinaldo.” Republican newspapers were fierce in their support of McKinley’s position on the Philippines. The campaign rhetoric was not lost on the rebels in the Philippines. Most Filipinos were aware of the positions of Bryan and the anti-imperialists in the November election, and saw hope for their cause there. But once McKinley was reelected on November 6, 1900, many ceased resisting the American pacification program. In the next three weeks, two thousand rebels on Luzon surrendered. In December 1900 and January 1901, more Filipino soldiers surrendered and about twenty-three thousand weapons were confiscated by U.S. troops. General Aguinaldo’s hideout was discovered in February, which resulted in his capture the next month. By early May 1901, American forces were securely in control of most areas except for an area in southern Luzon and on Samar. Some bloody fighting was yet to take place there. Military strength was reduced commensurately and by June there remained about forty-two thousand U.S. soldiers in the Philippines.60 Congress was slow in passing legislation that dealt with the position of the United States in the Philippines. Republican senator John C. Spooner introduced a bill that would provide a framework for governing the Philippines, but Democrats strongly opposed this measure and threatened a filibuster. As an alternative, Spooner proposed an amendment in February 1901 to the Army

40

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Appropriations Act providing that, after the end of the insurrection and pending the passage of an Organic Act, the president was to be given all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands. This legislation, modeled on earlier congressional authority for governing the Louisiana Purchase Territory, was passed on March 2. Four months later, on July 4, Taft became governor of the Philippines and Major General Adna Chaffee was appointed military commander. After three years in the Philippine Islands, General MacArthur returned to the United States.61 After MacArthur’s departure, the war grew harsher as intense battles were fought on the island of Samar, three hundred miles southeast of Manila, and Batangas in southern Luzon. Fighting against the Moros, fierce Moslem tribesmen occupying the southern islands, continued on in some areas until 1916. At Balangiga, Samar, the U.S. Army sustained its single most bloody engagement in the Philippines on September 28, 1901, when four hundred Filipino guerrillas in disguise ambushed the seventy-four men of Company C, Nineteenth Infantry Regiment. As the insurgents began their attack, the bells of the village Catholic church began to peal giving the signal to hundreds of Filipino fighters who “swarmed out of the surrounding forest, armed with clubs, picks and machete-like bolo knives. Others poured out of the church; they had arrived the night before, disguised as women mourners and carrying coffins filled with bolos.” In the ensuing melee, “a sergeant was beheaded in the mess tent and dumped into a vat of steaming wash water. . . . The company commander was hacked to death . . . and besieged infantrymen defended themselves with kitchen forks, mess kits and baseball bats. Others threw rocks and cans of beans.”62 All but six of the American soldiers were either killed or wounded. When a nearby American infantry unit rushed to Balangiga, they found that the dead had been mutilated beyond recognition; some had their stomachs slashed and stuffed with codfish. Others had their eyes gouged out with grotesque lines smeared around the empty sockets. The Balangiga massacre happened only a few days after President McKinley had been assassinated. Roosevelt, after being sworn in as president on September 14, 1901, was determined to pursue an even more forceful policy in subduing resistance in the Philippines. He instructed General Chaffee to retaliate, which resulted in the formation of a special brigade under Brigadier General Jacob Smith, an old Indian fighter, to punish the guerrillas. The Americans began a scorched earth policy and burned most of the villages and crops on the island, and promised to make Samar a “howling wilderness.” Smith ordered a Marine Corps battalion attached to his command to kill all persons who are “capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States,” and set the minimum age limit at ten. For the next five months the marines and soldiers under General Smith torched villages, destroyed rice paddies and corn fields, slaughtered pigs, chickens, working animals, and turned the island into a wilderness.63 Word of this carnage and other brutalities seeped back to the United States, which resulted in alarm on the part of much of the citizenry and outrage in

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

41

editorials of anti-imperialist newspapers. Other journalists supported the actions and claimed it was necessary to suppress the insurrection.64 The public outcry over these “pacification” measures led to Senate investigations in early 1902 with major officials called in to testify. Taft was recalled from the Philippines, and upon arrival in Washington he was called into conference with Roosevelt and Root to develop a strategy for answering the war critics in the hearings. Taft blamed the ladrones (bandits) for the harsh measures that were used in the fighting and claimed that the majority of the Filipinos desired rule by the United States. They were not ready for self-government, Taft emphasized. General MacArthur testified in defense of U.S. troops, emphasizing that soldiers were punished if they committed crimes, but would retaliate if attacked by Filipinos. In response to senators’ questions as to whether the Philippine Islands should have been annexed, MacArthur replied that the United States needed the islands as a place to sell surplus manufactured goods, as a strategic base to expand trade with China and to protect Hawaii, and as a political base from which to spread the American form of republican government. The former military governor explained: “The archipelago affords an ideal strategic position. It is the stepping stone to commercial influence and military supremacy in the East.”65 MacArthur praised the Filipinos, stating: “The principal end to be attained by the retention of the Philippines is the initiation of the promulgation of republican principles. I do not think there is a question about the power of the Filipino to reach any standard of excellence in almost any direction.”66 The Root-TaftRoosevelt trio staunchly argued, however, that the Filipinos did not even have a notion of what self-government meant. Furthermore, Root emphasized that the people of the Philippines had no qualifications for governing themselves. MacArthur continued his explanation of the value of the Philippines to the United States: The archipelago, I think, perhaps is the finest group of islands in the world. Its strategical position is unexcelled by that of any other position on the globe. The China Sea, which separates it by something like 750 miles from the continent, is nothing more or less than a safety moat. . . . Our presence in the Philippines, possibly without the employment of any physical effort at all, will always insure, from that commanding position in that highly favored archipelago, all that we need, all that we can possibly require.67

Finally, after extensive public debate, Congress voted along party lines and passed the Organic Law on July 1, 1902, that provided a charter for governing the Philippines as a dependency of the United States. Since there was no apparatus for governing colonies, a Bureau of Insular Affairs in the Department of War was organized and made responsible for “all matters pertaining to civil government in the island possessions of the United States, subject to the jurisdiction of the War Department.”68 Although President Roosevelt proclaimed an end to the insurrection on July 4, 1902, efforts continued in the United States

42

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

to provide more self-government and eventual independence to the Philippines. Congressman William Atkinson Jones, a Democrat, was the chief architect of this goal, but it was to take more than a decade before liberalization of American rule could begin. Second Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur, who graduated from the U.S. Military Academy on June 11, 1903, reported in October to the Philippine Islands for his first duty with the army as a commissioned officer.69 His experiences in the southern islands and in Manila during the next year, plus insights gained from conversations with his father, the former commander there, gave him valuable knowledge for his assignments that were to come more than three decades later at a much higher rank.

JOHN HAY AND THE OPEN DOOR While the military forces of the United States were opening the door of entry into the Philippines to gain a foothold in East Asia, diplomats were seeking means to achieve parity with European nations and Japan in economic relations with China. The entire coastal area, while nominally remaining a part of China, was under actual control of foreign powers, and there was no room for the United States to stake out a “sphere of interest.” Furthermore, Britain and Japan, along with the United States, saw cause for alarm at the actions of the “Colossus of the North”: Russia. A major fear was Russia’s ambitions in Northeast Asia and the possibility of a break up of the Chinese empire. While the “Open Door” policy is usually linked to the United States and Secretary of State John Hay, it was first referred to in Britain. The House of Commons passed a resolution on March 1, 1898: “that it is of vital importance for British commerce and influence that the Independence of China Territory should be maintained.” A few weeks later a member of Parliament spoke of “the principle of the open door.”70 Lord Charles Beresford, representing the Associated Chambers of Commerce, traveled throughout China in the winter of 1898–99. After discovering that the largest part of foreign trade was conducted by the British, he wrote: I cannot repeat too often the profound conviction held by every trader in China that the policy of the Open Door, or equal opportunity for the trade of all nations, is the one and only policy possible for the development of trade and commerce. . . . Neither is it any use keeping the door open without insuring that the room on the other side of the door is in order. To keep the door open the integrity of the Chinese empire must be maintained.71

Beresford returned to London by way of the United States where he gave several speeches that strongly advocated the need for keeping China open to the trade of all nations. Because Britain was a colonial power in China, it was

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

43

difficult for London to advocate an Open Door policy. Therefore, British policy was to seek ways to get the United States to take the lead. Even before Beresford’s speeches in the United States, special interest in trade possibilities with China were noted. Representative William Sulzer of New York, an advocate of economic expansionism in the Asia-Pacific region, remarked in a June 1898 speech to Congress: Let me say to the businessmen of America, Look to the land of the setting sun, look to the Pacific! There are teeming millions there who will ere long want to be fed and clothed the same as we are. There is the great market that the continental powers are today struggling for. We must not be distanced in the race for the commerce of the world. In my judgment, during the next hundred years the great volume of trade, so far as this country is concerned, will not be eastward, but westward.72

The Standard Oil Company was keenly interested in China as a market for its petroleum products, primarily kerosene, which was used mainly for illumination. In the late nineteenth century, kerosene ranked fourth among all exports from the United States. Shipments of kerosene to the coastal cities of China presented little problem, but major obstacles were encountered in deliveries to inland China. Standard Oil initiated a logistics and transportation system, marketed hardware and lamps, and began an advertising program to show the advantages of the Mei Foo (Beautiful Companion) lamps, as the kerosene lanterns were called. Millions of Mei Foo lamps were ultimately purchased and put into use throughout China. Newspaper editorials predicted China would become one of the richest countries in the world when opened, and the Open Door policy was touted as of the highest importance for the United States to profit from its development. Other editorials expressed concern about Russian expansion into Manchuria. In the summer of 1899, an Englishman and an American met in the latter’s home in Baltimore to lay the groundwork for the Open Door doctrine. The Englishman, Alfred E. Hippisley, a long-time resident of China who had served as advisor to the Chinese Maritime Customs, privately contacted the American, William W. Rockhill, a diplomat with service in East Asia who had recently been appointed the Far Eastern advisor to the State Department. Rockhill was also an ardent scholar whose keenest passion was the translation of old Chinese manuscripts and the development of a Tibetan-English dictionary. In 1899, Rockhill constituted a one-man East Asia interest section in the State Department. Hippisley proposed that the Open Door policy be formally initiated by Washington since the other European powers were not suspicious of the United States. Rockhill—motivated by a love of China and not wanting to see the break up of that country—and Hippisley drafted a proposal for review by Hay. After discussion with the secretary of State—Hay until only a year earlier had been the American ambassador in London and was well versed in the British position

44

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

on China—the draft of the notes was reworked by Hippisley to include recognition of “spheres of interest” and existing agreements, such as railroad and mining rights. But the basic concept of the notes remained: the flow of trade must not be interrupted and equal tariffs must apply to all.73 The first notes were sent through diplomatic channels to Britain, Germany, and Russia on September 6, 1899, followed by notes to France, Italy, and Japan during the next two months. The statements requested that:

Each Power, within its respective sphere of influence: First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called “sphere of interest” or leased territory it may have in China. Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said “sphere of interest” (unless they be “free ports”), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government. Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such “sphere” than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its “sphere” on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities.74

Thus, the purpose of these notes for the United States was to protect the territorial integrity of China and administrative powers of China, such as the collection of tariffs. The quotation marks around “sphere of interest” reflected an unwillingness to formally recognize the term. Since the United States had no “sphere of influence” or leased territories in China, the object was to keep access open. Most of the powers agreed to the proposals provided all other powers would do the same. Russia agreed to treat citizens of all other countries equally, but would not promise to give them the same rights as Russian citizens. This reluctance to follow the protocol meant that none of the other powers were bound by the Open Door notes. In the end, however, Russia’s foreign minister, Count Nicholas Muraviev, said his country would follow the lead of France. Secretary of State Hay, applying the broadest interpretation possible, claimed success with the notes over the next year, stating that the United States “did not seek to obtain replies from the various powers . . . couched in identical terms, all that it desired was written declaration of intention.”75 The positions of other powers varied over the following years, for example, changes brought about by alliances, wars, revolutions, and international conventions, but for the United States the Open Door doctrine provided a China policy that was to be followed for the next four decades. This insistence on maintaining territorial integrity led to major confrontations with Japan over that nation’s incursions into China and eventually to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

45

THE BOXER REBELLION While the Open Door policy was being negotiated by the major powers, anxiety was building in China over threats to national sovereignty. China had suffered a major humiliation in the war with Japan only a few years earlier; its coastal region and other sections were under foreign control; the success of foreign missionaries in converting Chinese to Christianity was viewed with alarm; and the emperor was seen to be under the influence of reformers whose proposals would lead to an end of traditional Chinese culture. The Hundred Days Reform in the summer of 1898 was the outcome of changes that advocates of a modern China saw as necessary. From June to September, nearly fifty reform decrees were issued that led to policy changes in education, political administration, industry, and relations with other nations. Due to a lack of direct imperial descendants, two emperors had been appointed by the empress dowager during the preceding forty years. When Emperor Kuang Hsu was chosen to be emperor in 1875 at the age of four, the empress dowager served as coregent for the boy-emperor until 1889, when he took over on his own at the age of eighteen. Nevertheless, the empress still held substantial power and was able to remove Kuang Hsu from direct rule in 1898 by placing him in palace seclusion on an island—where he remained until his death in 1908—because of his associations with the reformers, while she resumed ultimate control over the imperial court. After Kuang Hsu was removed from power, the antireform elements—headed by the empress dowager—were swift in suppressing the reformers. Six were executed while another twenty were either exiled or dismissed. Where the reformers had seen liberal innovations and modernization—following the example of Japan—as a means to save China from foreign aggression, the empress and her advisors advocated a strong policy of resistance through armed preparation. Antiforeign generals were put in charge, troops were deployed, military strength was increased, and reactionary antiforeign movements in the provinces were encouraged.76 Major conflicts erupted between Chinese Christians and village people, especially in Shantung, the native province of Confucius. The refusal of Christians to participate in traditional ceremonies and customs, along with their withholding of financial support, led to clashes with village leaders. Also, the Roman Catholic Church was suspected of “sheltering bad characters” who sought refuge from the legal system by claiming persecution. Local groups in Shantung sprang up spontaneously to resist Christian and foreign influence, principally the I Ho Tuan (translated as “Boxers United in Righteousness,” or alternately the “Righteous Harmony Fists,” or the “Society of Righteous Harmony”). They rebelled against the special privileges enjoyed by Chinese Christian converts and embarked upon a rampage against all foreign innovations, including Christianity. Murders and destruction of foreigners’ property escalated. An English missionary was murdered in Shantung in January

46

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

1900, which led to expressions of regret from the imperial court, but investigation of the crime was not pursued.77 The Boxers and provincial officials continued to take an antiforeign stance, which extended even to symbols of modernization such as telegraph and rail lines, and the movement spread to other areas of China. After warnings from foreign powers, Chinese authorities issued cautionary statements, but the Boxers continued to wreak havoc. In May 1900, more Christian houses were burned and sixty-eight Chinese Christians were killed. Several British and American missionaries were murdered. One missionary gave this account: On June 28, 1900, a messenger rode through the city of Chang Te Ho at breakneck speed. We learned later that he carried a sealed message from the Empress Dowager to the provincial capital commanding the death of all foreigners. . . . Very many of our fellow missionaries and personal friends were being put to death by the merciless Boxers. We came under attack when we reached Nang Yang Fu. The city wall was black with people, and as we entered the gate the wild crowds crushed against our carts, and that cry, “Kill, kill,” which can never be forgotten when once heard, was shouted by perhaps hundreds of voices. After ten days we made it to Shanghai where the streets were filled with mobs. We barely made it to the docks where a ship for Yokohama was in the process of departing. We jumped on the ship with only the clothes on our backs and a few of our belongings.78

Also, rail communication between Tientsin and Peking was cut off, as the Boxers began marching on Peking on June 6, 1900. Five days later, an international force of 2,100 men from eight nations (including 915 British, 111 Americans, and 54 Japanese) met the Boxers halfway between Tientsin and Peking. About fifty Boxers were killed, but Boxer reinforcements soon arrived and stopped the advance of the international force.79 The empress praised the Boxers on June 21, 1900, and issued a declaration of war against the powers on the basis that: “The foreigners have been aggressive towards us, infringed upon our territorial integrity, and trampled our people under their feet. . . . They oppress our people and blaspheme our gods. The common people suffer greatly at their hands, and each one of them is vengeful. Thus it is that the brave followers of the I Ho Tuan have been burning churches and killing Christians.”80 It was not just against Christians that the Boxers were venting their wrath. Actions by several foreign powers led to resentment on the part of the average Chinese. The Open Door policy was consistently reflected in statements from Secretary of State Hay in attempts to deal with the Boxer Uprising. Hay emphasized: “the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”81

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

47

The intensity of the Boxer Uprising continued to escalate, placing foreign embassies and ministries under siege in Peking. The German minister in Peking and a Japanese diplomat were murdered, persecution of Chinese Christians intensified, and foreign diplomats and their families left legation compounds only at grave risk. These conditions led to urgent requests from embassies to their home ministries for the dispatch of a larger contingent of international troops to relieve the siege in Peking. The conditions experienced by legation personnel in Peking are best exemplified in a telegram sent by Edwin H. Conger, the American minister to China, to Secretary of State Hay on August 11, 1900, through the Chinese minister in Washington: Mr. Conger reports that since June 20 they have been imprisoned and completely besieged by the Imperial army, Jung Lu having command. Continued artillery and rifle firing until July 17; only rifle firing since, but daily; with frequent desperate attacks, one last night. Losses have already been reported. Possess conclusive evidence of determined purpose to exterminate all foreigners and native Christians. Thousands of the latter have been massacred. French, Italian, Belgian, Austrian, and Dutch legations, as well as all other foreign property in Pekin [sic], destroyed. All pretense of aid or protection wholly false.82

Secretary of War Root dispatched the Ninth Infantry Regiment from the Philippines to China to subdue the uprising. An exchange of telegrams between Manila and Washington led to the conclusion that, while large numbers of troops continued to be needed in the Philippines, a detachment of American soldiers could be spared for the effort in China and that the quickest means of participating would be to send troops from the Philippines. Brigadier General Chaffee, in command of the China Relief Expedition, arrived in Tientsin in early August. In all, eight foreign powers sent troops to China, with the Japanese sending by far the largest number. An International Rescue Force of twenty-one hundred Americans, eight thousand Japanese, forty-eight hundred Russians, three thousand British, eight hundred French, fifty-eight Austrian, and fifty-three Italian soldiers left Tientsin on August 4, 1900, reaching Peking ten days later. With this superior force the siege of Peking was relieved in short order. A German contingent also joined the allied force. Reports from the American minister revealed the extent of brutalities: “Native Christians are coming in daily with most horrible reports of killing, quartering, and burning women and children. Some Chinese Christians are still in hiding in the country, and I am asking General Chaffee to send troops out to rescue some of those within a reasonable distance from the city.”83 More than two hundred American, Canadian, and European missionaries, along with fifty of their children, were murdered in the Boxer Uprising and an estimated thirty thousand Chinese Christians were slaughtered. However, it was not just the Chinese Boxer elements who behaved in a brutal

48

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

manner. Some of the allied soldiers were vicious in their treatment of Chinese. Soldiers of every nationality were reported as engaging in wanton destruction, “in the spirit of deviltry, smashing furniture and glassware, and trampling books and pictures underfoot.” A report in the Washington Post of September 3, 1900, revealed: The Russians are the chief actors in this style of conquest; but the French are remarkably conspicuous, considering their small numbers. The Indian troops and the Japanese are participants only when beyond the ken of their officers. From the beginning the conduct of the Russians has been a blot on the campaign. . . . [Correspondents] saw Cossacks smash down women with the butts of their guns and pound their heads until they were dead. The Cossacks would pick children up barely old enough to walk, hold them by their ankles, and beat out their brains on the pavement. Russian officers looked on without protest.84

Once order was restored in Peking and other parts of China, negotiations began for a peace treaty and a settlement. Germany was the most demanding because of the murders of Baron Clemens von Ketteler, the German minister, and German citizens in Shantung. Just before they departed Berlin on July 27, 1900, Kaiser Wilhelm II told the German contingent: Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Attila, gained a reputation by virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China, that no Chinese will ever again dare to look askance at a German.85

In addition to Germany, Britain demanded that stiff penalties be applied against the Chinese. The United States was firmly opposed to any action that would adversely affect the Open Door policy, while Japan was concerned over Russian actions. After extensive negotiations between the foreign powers, a joint note was presented to Chinese authorities on December 24, 1900, for settlement of the Boxer Uprising. After prolonged deliberations, the Chinese government signed the protocol on September 7, 1901, promising to satisfy twelve conditions presented by the allies: 1. An apology to Germany in Berlin by a high official of the Chinese government and an appropriate monument in Peking to the slain ambassador. 2. Punishment of responsible Chinese. 3. Reparations to Japan for the murder of Chancellor Sugiyama Shigeru. 4. Restoration of monuments at desecrated foreigners’ cemeteries. 5. Prohibition of importation of arms to China. 6. Indemnity to all who have suffered. 7. Right to maintain permanent guards at legations. 8. Tangku and other forts on the coast will be razed.

Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

49

9. Right for the foreign powers to exercise a military occupation of certain points in order to maintain communication between the capital and the sea. 10. Prohibition against Chinese belonging to antiforeign societies. 11. Protection of navigation and commerce. 12. Reform of China’s organization for foreign affairs.86

The indemnity China agreed to pay represented an enormous sum at the time (about $333 million at existing exchange rates) and annual payment schedules, with interest, were worked out so that the final payment would be made in 1940. Britain and the United States later returned portions of the indemnity to be used by China for educational purposes. The United States maintained a small contingent of marines, soldiers, and naval personnel in China for the next forty years on the basis of the Boxer Protocol, while Japan exploited these rights during the same period with large numbers of troops to secure control over north China. When War Minister Aleksey Kuropatkin of Russia first learned of the Boxer Uprising, he commented, “I am very glad. This will give us an excuse for seizing Manchuria.”87 After the Russian occupation of Port Arthur in 1898, construction of the South Manchurian Railway began with the purpose of linking the Lioatung Peninsula with the Chinese Eastern Railway six hundred miles to the north. This undertaking quickly incurred the displeasure of local inhabitants who were dispossessed of land along the path of the railroad right-of-way. Refusal to comply with Russian demands on their lands led to the murder of 96 Chinese subjects and the wounding of an additional 123 people. Under the pretext of protecting its leasehold rights, Russia began moving troops to the north from Port Arthur, initially along the railway line, but eventually spreading out to occupy a significant portion of Manchuria. Boxer elements moved into Manchuria in the summer of 1900 and began to wreak havoc with the Russians, and even captured some of the railway stations. These actions led to increases in Russian retaliation, added troops, and atrocities against Chinese throughout a widespread area. On July 17, 1900, several thousand Chinese residents of Blagoveshchensk, in Russian territory just east of Manchuria, were driven from their homes, brutalized, and forced into the raging Amur River—a wide and very swift-flowing river—where most of them drowned. During the next three months Russian troops began invading Manchuria from north and south, occupying all three provinces of Manchuria by October 1, 1900.88

CHAPTER 3

New Century and Rising New Powers JAPAN TEAMS UP WITH BRITAIN: ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1902 The alleged Chinese preparations for an attack on Blagoveshchensk, a town of about eight thousand inhabitants (half of them Chinese), in July 1900 served as a pretext for a massive Russian invasion of Manchuria. Blagoveshchensk is located in Amur Province of Russia on the left bank of the Amur River. Across the river, the three provinces of Manchuria spread out to the west and south. Russia earlier had obtained from China large areas to the north and east by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and two treaties in the mid-nineteenth century (Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and Treaty of Peking in 1860). The Russian Far East, the Maritime Province, and portions of eastern Siberia were formed from this transfer of territory. Russia continued to exhibit an expansionist disposition throughout Northeast Asia in the late nineteenth century, continually showing designs on the vast area of Manchuria (475,000 square miles) with its large tracts of arable land, mineral riches, forests, and warm water ports to the south. Also, Manchuria provided the potential for a more direct rail line from Chita— near Lake Baikal—to Vladivostok, shortening the Trans-Siberian Railroad by 350 miles. After the Sino-Japanese War, Russia arranged for loans—largely from French bankers—to China to pay the indemnity owed Japan and for other purposes. Part of this arrangement called for the establishment of a Russo-Chinese Bank, ostensibly a private concern, but in reality a front for the Russian railroad providing the shorter route through Manchuria to Vladivostok. Mining interests and

52

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

other industrial development were also to be operated through the RussoChinese Bank. This secret agreement between China and Russia was signed in 1896 and led to the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER), the shorter route through Manchuria to Vladivostok. Tracks for the Trans-Siberian Railroad on the Russian side of the Amur River were not built until after the Russo-Japanese War. Russia had also obtained rights to the southern extension of the railroad in 1898. Work progressed at a rapid pace until the Boxer movement spread to Manchuria in the summer of 1900, during which extensive sabotage was inflicted by the rebels on the railroad. More than two hundred thousand Russian troops poured across the border into Manchuria in July, taking over most of the region by September 1900. Chinese villages were burned to the ground, sparing no one. Death and destruction lay in the wake of the attacking army, but Russian officials claimed their invasion was actually a military occupation—not a conquest—and that it was for the purpose of protecting railways, industrial interests, and the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula from predatory actions of the Boxer rebels. China, as well as Britain, Japan, and the United States, saw Russian actions as substantially more than a temporary occupation, nothing less than a prelude to annexation.1 Britain was troubled by Russia’s invasion of Manchuria and was concerned that its “sphere of interest” south of the Great Wall be protected from the modern invaders from the north. Japan had extensive commercial interests in Manchuria and Korea and was determined that Russia be denied any additional territory. Although it was not publicly known, Japanese army and navy officers were already developing plans to expel Russia from Port Arthur and Dairen. The United States, with no territorial ambitions on the Asian mainland, nevertheless was vitally determined that the Open Door policy be maintained so that no one power would have preferential rights in any region of China. In early 1901, representatives from Peking and St. Petersburg proposed an agreement that would nominally return Manchuria to China over a three-year period, but that would also legalize the continued occupation by Russian troops disguised as “railway guards.”2 Secretary of State John Hay expressed the American position in a note to the Chinese minister to Washington: An agreement by which China cedes to any corporation or company the exclusive right and privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any other way industrially developing Manchuria, can but be viewed with the gravest concern by the Government of the United States. It constitutes a monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulation of treaties concluded between China and foreign powers, and thereby seriously affects the rights of American citizens.3

The American capitalist and railroad magnate Edward H. Harriman was very much interested in developing and operating railways in China and Manchuria. Japan made extensive protests over the Russian action and entered into ne-

New Century and Rising New Powers

53

gotiations with Britain for a military alliance. Also, public opinion in Japan weighed heavily against Russia and several organizations evolved that were aimed at ejecting Russia from Manchuria. One of these was named after the river separating Russia and China, the Amur, or the Heilungchiang, by its Chinese name. The Japanese reading of the Chinese characters for the river is Kokuryuko (“Black Dragon River”). This secret society, the Kokuryukai, known outside Japan as the Black Dragon Society, was an ultranationalist, patriotic organization and was not officially a part of the government. Its members, however, had high-level connections to military, government, and business leaders in Japan. The society even organized its own intelligence school and sent agents to spy on the Russians in Manchuria. The American legation staff in Peking closely monitored negotiations between China and Russia and reported frequently to Washington, where the issue received the attention of President Theodore Roosevelt. In a telegram of December 6, 1901, Secretary of State Hay notified E. H. Conger, the U.S. minister in Peking, “The President trusts and expects that no arrangement which will permanently impair the territorial integrity of China, or injure the legitimate interests of the United States, or impair the ability of China to meet her international obligations, will be made with any power.” Conger advised Hay six days later that he had met with Chinese officials and had obtained the necessary assurances, but doubted that China would be able to secure consent with Russia.4 In an April 1902 agreement between Peking and St. Petersburg, the Russians promised to evacuate Manchuria in three stages at six-month intervals. China agreed to protect the Russian-owned CER, its employees and property, and all associated businesses. The first stage—evacuation from Mukden and areas to the south—was carried out on schedule in October 1902, but Russia reneged on its assurances to carry out the second and third troop removals by leaving soldiers disguised as railway guards. Even worse, the Russians moved back into previously evacuated cities of Mukden and Newchang, and the surrounding area.5 The United States viewed Russia and Germany as the primary threats to its interests in maintaining the Open Door in China during the opening years of the twentieth century. Washington officials placed their hope in a strong Britain and Japan to counter Russian attempts at hegemony over Manchuria, but military obligations in the Philippines rendered the United States incapable of making any type of formal alliance with these powers. The commander of the Asiatic Fleet, for example, did not have sufficient naval vessels to accommodate the American vice consul’s request for a gunboat to protect merchant shipping at Newchang at a time of chaos brought about by the Russian occupation.6 Furthermore, negotiations between Japan and Britain for a military alliance were conducted in secret, but Secretary of State Hay was kept informed through his British connections. The first treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan was signed on January 20, 1902, in London by Lord Henry Landsdowne, the British foreign

54

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

secretary, and Count Hayashi Tadasu, the Japanese minister to London, and was to be effective for five years. The treaty, renewed in 1905, and again in 1911, remained in effect until superseded by other treaty alliances in the early 1920s, and was an indication of Japan’s acceptance as a major power in East Asia. Meanwhile, Japan continued to increase military appropriations, and by 1903 had a modern army of thirteen divisions.7 Japan learned a lesson from the 1895 Tripartite Intervention, recognizing the penalty for isolation and the need for an alliance. Hayashi had begun consulting British officials as early as 1899 concerning a military affiliation and found a willing partner in London. The British Foreign Office had been apprehensive that Japan might enter into an alliance with Russia—temporarily ceding rights in Manchuria in exchange for guarantees in Korea—and welcomed Hayashi’s overtures.8 Britain was concerned, however, over Japanese ambitions in Korea and wanted no suggestion that would indicate British support for Japan’s aggression on the peninsula. Landsdowne had inserted a phrase in the final draft to provide “that without mutual consent no other agreement should be made by either power with reference to Korea.” Hayashi, with an eye to aspirations for annexation of Korea, changed this to provide that “the contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate agreements with another power to the prejudice of the interests above described.” Britain also wanted to include protection of its interests in India in the alliance, but Japan declined. To limit the scope of coverage, Hayashi insisted on use of the term “extreme East,” rather than “Far East.” No reference was made to Russia in the agreement, even though it was clearly understood the Russians were the focus.9 The scope of the alliance agreement was defined as: “the special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Korea.” The alliance provided for neutrality in the event either Britain or Japan were attacked by a third party and for military assistance in the event of attack by two nations upon either of the contracting parties.10 Japan now had a military ally and was to maintain an alliance with Britain until changed conditions in the early 1920s led to other arrangements. Meanwhile, Russia, while making a pretense of honoring its obligations to leave Manchuria, extended its military occupation of the territory. Japan continued to enlarge its army and navy and to make preparations to expel the Russians from not just Port Arthur, but the entire region. THE UNITED STATES AND POTENTIAL ENEMIES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC General Arthur MacArthur, the former commander and military governor of the Philippines, was assigned in 1902 as commander of the Department of the

New Century and Rising New Powers

55

Pacific, with headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco. He continued to be outspoken on matters such as reorganization of the army and potential enemies of the United States. MacArthur was alarmed over the rise of Imperial Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II. In addition, he viewed the possibility of a clash with Japan as a threat to American interests in the Pacific at some point in the future. The Territory of Hawaii was a part of General MacArthur’s Pacific command, and he made an official inspection visit there in November 1903. It had been only five years since annexation, and Hawaii was just beginning to develop a militia in the form of a National Guard to augment the regular army troops assigned there. In a personal conversation, Colonel J. W. Jones, commander of the Hawaiian National Guard, told MacArthur he was having difficulty obtaining facilities for recruit training for his fledgling militia units. Jones asked MacArthur for advice on how best to justify his request for land held by the federal government in Honolulu, near the territorial capitol building, to be converted to a training facility.11 General MacArthur explained the need for military facilities and the strategic importance of Hawaii in the defense of the United States against possible enemies such as Germany and Japan. His comments were to be used as a means of justifying to Secretary of War Elihu Root and President Roosevelt the need for training facilities. MacArthur saw Hawaii as a target for potential enemies, most likely Germany or Japan, and told Jones to stress that Hawaii would be of prime importance in the event of war. MacArthur explained his personal and private views that war with Germany or Japan was possible, not necessarily in the near future, but at some point because of rising nationalism in those countries. MacArthur saw Germany as a more pressing threat, but felt that Japan might be a danger several decades later. Admiral George Dewey and others had also warned of a possible war with Germany in the Pacific. Several days later, Colonel Jones had a meeting with the territorial governor, George R. Carter, and told him of MacArthur’s remarks and their significance. Nothing had been put in writing up to this point, but Carter asked for a memorandum outlining MacArthur’s position. Once this had been prepared and furnished to the governor, a local newspaper reporter obtained a copy without permission and made it into a front-page story. Headlines in the December 10, 1903, edition of the Honolulu Pacific Commercial Advocate thundered “GENERAL MACARTHUR WARNS HAWAII OF A COMING WAR WITH GERMANY.” The Associated Press promptly picked up this startling warning, and similar headlines appeared the next day in newspapers throughout the United States.12 The lead story on page one of the New York Times on December 11, 1903, told of General MacArthur’s remarks in Hawaii, emphasizing the warnings related to Germany. The German minister to Washington wasted no time in lodging a complaint with the State Department. MacArthur insisted he had been misquoted and that the written report “does not correctly represent his view in

56

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

any particular and utterly misrepresents them in some.” Nevertheless, it was clear that strategy for defense in the Pacific and identification of the two most likely adversaries were identified. Remarks attributed to MacArthur included: “it is the duty of the Federal Government to make itself as strong as possible, so as to be able to care for itself in any emergency. No nation, or number of nations, will be in a position to make an attack on the Pacific Coast without first capturing these islands.”13 Governor Carter explained: “The publication of Col. Jones’ report was not authorized by me, but it occurred through a misunderstanding.” Carter related that the memorandum was to preserve MacArthur’s views as justification in “getting back from the Federal Government the military barracks site near the capitol which was taken during the Spanish war. It is now wanted by the Territory for an armory. . . . He gave gratifying support to our efforts to improve the Hawaiian militia. He said in substance that Hawaii was the dominant strategic feature of the Pacific.” The New York Times concluded with the comment: “A few days ago, General MacArthur was quoted as saying the main feature of the defenses of the Territory is the protection of the naval station at Pearl Harbor and that the occupation of the other islands is not an important matter from a military standpoint, while Pearl Harbor is maintained as a strong defensive position.”14 President Roosevelt, an advocate of nationalism and empire, initially was an admirer of the kaiser, and was not satisfied with Governor Carter’s explanations. He directed Secretary of War Root to reprimand General MacArthur for embarrassing the administration. A telegram was sent to MacArthur in Hawaii directing him to say no more on the subject, and when he was met by reporters on his return to San Francisco on December 27 and asked about his comments on Germany and Japan in the Pacific, MacArthur replied: “That is a matter that I will discuss in no way. You must excuse me.”15 Although General MacArthur’s views were stifled by Washington, the unfolding of events over the next four decades proved the correctness of his assessment of the strategic need for defense of Hawaii, especially Pearl Harbor. He accurately saw Germany, the new, challenging great power, as a threat to the United States, although events would ultimately prove that Hawaii would not be a target. But MacArthur was precisely correct in his predictions on the rising new power of East Asia. The intensifying nationalism of an expansionist Japan would eventually lead to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Although he may have been embarrassed by the public release of General MacArthur’s “private” comments, especially the identification of potential enemies, Roosevelt expressed similar concerns in his annual message to Congress just two years later, on December 5, 1905: “In my judgment immediate steps should be taken for the fortification of Hawaii. This is the most important point in the Pacific to fortify in order to conserve the interests of this country. It would be hard to overstate the importance of this need.”16

New Century and Rising New Powers

57

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904–1905 While General MacArthur was on his inspection tour of Hawaii, Japan’s top generals and admirals were making final preparations for a massive war to eject Russia from Manchuria and to solidly establish Japanese control over portions of Manchuria and, more importantly, all of Korea. After October 1903, when Russia denied Tokyo’s demands for exclusive control of military affairs in Korea, the Japanese army and navy expedited plans to attack Russian military forces at Port Arthur and elsewhere in Manchuria. Detailed planning was facilitated by the fact that Japanese forces had fought there less than ten years earlier, but Russia was viewed as a more formidable foe than China and Tsar Nicholas II’s army had made significant improvements in the defenses of Port Arthur. In fact, no Asian country had defeated a European power in modern history, and Russia was viewed as the world’s foremost military power. After their victory in the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese had originally planned to use the indemnity awarded by the Treaty of Shimonoseki to build railroads in Manchuria and Korea. The reversal of fortunes, however, brought on by the 1895 Russian, French, and German demands to yield rights to Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula provided an increased indemnity from China. Instead of constructing railroads, Japan used these funds to significantly enhance its military capabilities by beginning a major naval shipbuilding program. British shipyards were paid by Japan to construct the most advanced and heavilyarmored warships of the day. On October 12, 1903, Baron Kodama Gentaro, a career army general, was reassigned from his post as home affairs minister, where he had also been governor of Taiwan, to the position of vice chief of the general staff in Tokyo. Even though Japan had adopted a constitution—operative since 1890—that provided for a parliamentary form of government, much of the leadership came from army and navy officers. All too frequently, the civilian government was under the control of the military, instead of being subordinated to the democratic process. Even the emperor, officially the commander in chief of the armed forces, was subject to behind-the-scenes manipulation to ensure that the goals and objectives of the military were carried out. Kodama, along with Katsura Taro, an army general who served as prime minister in three cabinets, strongly advocated a general staff system along German army lines. Katsura studied military science in Germany during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) and was later a military attache´ there. The success of Otto von Bismarck—the “Iron Chancellor” who unified Germany with the defeat of France—was attributed to the ideology of Karl von Clausewitz, as expressed in his text on military science, On War, published earlier in the century. After Bismarck’s resounding victory, Clausewitz’s principles— along with the German army—became the model for Japan’s army, which was refashioned in the image of Prussia. As a result, Japan’s army and navy were

58

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

ruled by a powerful general staff with an abhorrence of civilian control. Principles of war called for direct concentration of force with a mass conscript army. In the last three months of 1903, Russia, exercising control over Manchuria— notwithstanding agreements to evacuate—strengthened its units along the Yalu River and transported more of its army from the west to areas bordering on Manchuria. Japanese leaders realized that continued Russian reinforcements would cause an even further deterioration in the relative strengths of the two opposing forces. Kodama pressed for full mobilization and initiation of hostilities at the earliest. Diplomatic negotiations between Russia and Japan deteriorated to new lows. On December 24, 1903, Lloyd C. Griscom, the U.S. minister to Tokyo, reported that he had been advised by Japan’s foreign minister that Russia’s reply to Japanese proposals was “entirely unsatisfactory.” In the response, Russia refused to even discuss Manchuria and proposed for Korea the establishment of a “neutral zone of territory between the thirty-ninth parallel and the Yalu River.” Japan proposed a similar neutral zone in Manchuria, insisting that the “territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire be maintained and that Russia recognize the rights which Japan has acquired from China by treaty or convention.”17 Russia flatly turned down Japan’s counterproposal. Griscom reported that the emperor’s advisers among the elder statesmen had changed “within a week from a peaceable attitude to a firm stand, which the cabinet all along seem to have favored.” Furthermore, the council of ministers decided “that if a satisfactory reply was not received from Russia by January 4, 1904, an ultimatum would be sent fixing a definite time within which a reply would be expected.” The council also passed an emergency ordinance authorizing almost unlimited expenditure for war purposes. The American ambassador reported: “War seems very imminent unless Russia recedes from her position.”18 Reports of these events were published in the United States, but were subordinated to other stories considered a higher priority. On page one of the December 18, 1903, edition of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, for example, bold headlines proclaimed: “FLYING MACHINE SOARS IN TEETH OF HIGH WIND OVER SAND HILLS AND WAVES AT KITTY HAWK ON CAROLINA COAST,” telling of the exploits of two Ohio brothers named “Wilbur and Orville Wright.” Considerable space was also given to another topic: “U.S. Landing Party Finds Strong Camp of Colombian Troops,” relating an impasse between Colombian soldiers and an American warship in a border dispute concerning the newly formed nation of Panama. The only mention of Asia was a small, one-sentence report at the bottom of page one:

JAPANESE TROOPS TO COREA (By Cable to Virginian-Pilot) London, Dec. 17.—A Cablegram from Tokio says the dispatch of troops to Corea is imminent and that the elder statesmen have been summoned to meet the emperor today.19

New Century and Rising New Powers

59

An exchange of diplomatic notes in January 1904 between Japan and Russia yielded no further concessions on either side and the Russians continued to reinforce their army in the Far East. At the end of the month, Chief of General Staff Oyama Iwao, who had been Second Army commander in the SinoJapanese War, submitted to the emperor the recommendations of supreme headquarters calling for war against Russia. After several conferences, the emperor approved war plans on February 4, 1904.20 Griscom reported to Washington: “Warlike preparations are being rushed, and it seems that the Japanese Government has decided that it has waited longer for an answer from the Russian Government than is reasonable.”21 Japanese plans called for the severing of diplomatic relations with Russia on February 6, 1904. This was to be followed two days later by coordinated naval attacks on Russian warships at Port Arthur and Chemulpo (Inchon), Korea, with the landing of Japanese troops. In another two days, February 10, 1904, war was to be declared on Russia. As planned, the Japanese minister in St. Petersburg delivered a note on February 6 addressed to Count Vladimir Lamsdorff, the Russian minister for foreign affairs, announcing: “In the presence of delays which remain largely unexplained and of naval and military activities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely pacific aims the Imperial Government have no other alternative than to terminate present futile negotiations. In adopting that course the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position.”22 As soon as Vice Admiral Togo Heihachiro, commander in chief of the combined fleet, received notice that diplomatic relations had been broken off, Japanese warships began steaming out of the Sasebo Naval Base in Kyushu toward Chemulpo and Port Arthur. As the Japanese ships assembled off the harbor of Chemulpo, a Russian gunboat passed nearby and fired two shots at the Chiyoda, providing a convenient pretext for the Japanese warships to begin shooting at the Russians. The Japanese cruisers went on the attack, overwhelming the Russian gunboats at Inchon, and the first contingent of three thousand troops landed and began marching toward Seoul. The larger portion of Togo’s fleet steamed to Port Arthur, about three hundred miles to the west, where they attacked and destroyed—or trapped—the main elements of the Russian fleet, including seven battleships. A Japanese intelligence officer, posing as a valet to a Japanese consul, had thoroughly reconnoitered the harbor and was able to provide detailed information on the location of each ship. Furthermore, the Russian sailors had just enjoyed a raucous liberty on the town after maneuvers during the preceding week. The Japanese had achieved complete surprise, and Russian admirals were astonished at the damage inflicted on their forces. The opening of hostilities against Russia served as a paradigm for the attack on Pearl Harbor thirty-seven years later. A Japanese intelligence officer, disguised as an aide at the Honolulu consulate, reported on ship movements; dip-

60

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

lomatic relations were to be terminated with the United States just before hostilities began; the attack was to be made on a Sunday morning when the largest number of ships would be in port and the crews would be inopportuned because of the aftereffects of peacetime, Saturday night revelry; and a declaration of war was to be made after the attack. Tokyo declared war against Russia on February 10, 1904, with an imperial proclamation: We hereby declare war against Russia, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and we also command all our competent authorities to make every effort . . . to attain the national aim with all the means within the limits of the law of nations. . . . The integrity of Korea is a matter of constant concern to this Empire, not only because of our traditional relations with that country, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to our realm. [Italics added]23

It is interesting to note the phrase concerning separate existence of Korea. Later, as a colony of Japan, the “separate existence” had become a moot point. Tokyo’s propaganda machine again revealed the astuteness with which dealings with other countries were managed—all this just fifty years since Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s visit had led to a reopening of the island nation to the rest of the world. Britain cheered her ally’s battle actions and the Times of London excused the initiation of hostilities before a war declaration as: “in accordance with the prevailing practice of most wars in modern times.”24 Japan devoted much more effort to shaping publicity favorable to its war aims than Russia did and went to great lengths to court approval, especially in the United States. Kaneko Kentaro, a Harvard classmate of President Roosevelt, was called into action by officials at the highest level to present Japan’s case to the American people. Finding popular opinion in the United States on Japan’s side, Kaneko succeeded in embellishing that point of view by his meetings with Roosevelt and other government officials, as well as by giving lectures and publishing articles in prominent newspapers and journals. He remained in the United States as Japan’s spokesman for the duration of the war. Roosevelt already had a generally favorable impression of Japan, some of it fostered by influential Japanese visitors. Furthermore, the president held negative views on the actions of Nikolas II’s government and was distressed by the atrocious treatment accorded Jews in Russia over the previous two decades. The pogrom (devastation) of Jews in Kishinev (now Chisinau, the capital of Moldova) in April 1903, in which forty-five Jews had been killed, six hundred wounded, and fifteen hundred Jewish homes pillaged, had particularly shocked President Roosevelt, leading him to make the statement: “No human beings, black, yellow, or white could be quite as untruthful, as insincere, as arrogant—in

New Century and Rising New Powers

61

short, as untrustworthy in every way—as the Russians under the present system.”25 The Russo-Japanese War represented the second instance in which Japan had initiated hostilities without a declaration of war. In spite of the 1904 comment by a British newspaper that prevailing modern practices no longer dictated the need for a declaration of war, most nations did observe this practice until 1945. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, war declarations were rarely made. After the Japanese naval victories at Port Arthur, the Russian defenders began strengthening the fort in preparation for an enemy landing there, but Japanese forces aimed their initial attacks at Korea. Previously, top officers in Tokyo were apprehensive of a landing anywhere in Korea except at Pusan, at the southernmost end of the peninsula. But with the major Japanese naval victories, Chemulpo (Inchon) in west-central Korea was now viewed as safe from the Russian navy and would provide a much more favorable site to launch a march to the Yalu River for an attack on Manchuria. The problem, just as General Douglas MacArthur found forty-six years later in the Korean War—at the Inchon landing—was the huge variance between high and low tides, which can range as much as twenty feet. This situation dictated elaborate planning in timing the landing of troops, equipment, and supplies during favorable tides. At low tide, the harbor is a vast expanse of soft mud with smaller boats resting on the bottom. Three divisions, comprising the First Army (the Japanese army referred to the groupings of divisions as armies, rather than corps), landed at Chemulpo in February and March, and reached areas adjacent to the Yalu River the following month. Japanese troops were clearly the master of maneuver and surprise, constantly throwing the defenders on the Manchurian side of the Yalu off guard. Russian artillery batteries made little attempt to conceal their locations, and Japanese counterbattery fire was devastating, putting some guns out of commission in as little as thirty minutes. Japanese troops, on the other hand, excelled at concealment of their positions. At the end of April, divisions of Kuroki’s First Army moved up to positions on the banks of the Yalu and crossed on Japanese-built bridges across the delta which was made up by several rivers and islands. The meandering of the streams plus the steep banks of the Yalu in upriver locations added difficulty to the crossing. Nevertheless, Japanese troops overwhelmed the Russians and the white flag of surrender went up at 5:30 P.M. on May 1, 1904.26 Russian leaders, under pressure at home from revolutionary movements, were demoralized by these defeats from what they had viewed as a second-rate army and navy. Generals and other high-ranking officers viewed with alarm the lack of fighting spirit among the troops, especially when contrasted to the euphoria of the Japanese attackers. One Russian colonel, after being court-martialled, committed suicide. The Japanese navy had continued the bombardment of Port Arthur, and Admiral Togo reported on May 3 that the entrance to Port Arthur was completely

62

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

blocked to cruisers and other larger vessels. In truth, the harbor was only partially blocked as several Japanese ships had been sunk by mines. In fact, May 1904 was a disastrous month for the Japanese navy in the waters off Port Arthur. Tokyo made the decision that only victories were to be reported and publicized in order to keep morale high, a policy that would be followed for the next four decades. Reports from world capitals, however, soon told of eyewitness accounts of the sinking of at least two ships, a battleship and a cruiser, and the Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) reluctantly confirmed their sinking. Other losses were not reported until after the war’s end. The Second Army, under General Oku Yasukata, made landings in force about twenty miles north of Port Arthur in May 1904 with the objective of capturing Nanshan Hill, which commanded the defenses of a narrow neck of land only three miles wide. If the Japanese could control Nanshan, they would cut off Port Arthur from any support by land from the north. Oku’s guns outnumbered the Russian defenders by four to one; furthermore, Japanese gunboats arrived in nearby Chinchow Bay, thereby adding naval artillery to the attack. As the Japanese troops stormed Nanshan, they found that the terrain favored the defenders. Also, minefields on the approaches to the hill took their toll, but perseverance and suicide charges carried the day for Oku’s Second Army with the capture of Nanshan Hill on May 26. Nevertheless, casualties were high on both sides, but what alarmed Tokyo more than anything was the amount of ammunition used. The Second Army used more ammunition in capturing Nanshan than had been used in all of the Sino-Japanese War.27 IGH in Tokyo decided that General Nogi Maresuke’s Third Army would attack Port Arthur, while the First, Second, and Fourth Armies would march on Liaoyang, located about sixty-five miles south of Mukden. Nogi had taken Port Arthur in 1894 with a single regiment, but this was going to take more. Japan continued to send more troops, supplies, and ammunition, but so did the Russians. In mid-June 1904, Nicholas II and top navy officials in St. Petersburg decided to send the Baltic Fleet to the war zone. The Russian defenders were ordered to hold Port Arthur at all costs so as to have a base for the ships sent from the other side of the world. July saw Japanese army advances in the direction of Liaoyang. This area of Manchuria is typified by hills and mountains and a poor road network that offered no particular advantage to either side. The basic concept of battle doctrine for the Japanese was to constantly maintain the offensive at all costs. This principle of warfare was emphasized about 550 B.C. by the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu in The Art of War: “Those skilled in war bring the opponent to the field of battle. They do not allow themselves to be taken or drawn there.” So indoctrinated were Japanese soldiers that they flung themselves headlong into battle without precautions. If defeat or surrender seemed imminent, suicide was the only answer. One unit, rather than suffer captivity, stunned their Russian opponents by decapitating each other. The Japanese did not retreat, and when

New Century and Rising New Powers

63

Russians tried to effect a withdrawal, they found themselves enveloped by Japanese artillery.28 The siege of Port Arthur by land began on August 10, 1904, when General Nogi’s Third Army began to attack the fortress, just as the Russian Far Eastern Squadron under Admiral Vilgelm K. Vitgeft was leaving for Vladivostok as ordered by the tsar so that it could later join forces with the Baltic Fleet. St. Petersburg’s strategy was for the Russian army to hold Port Arthur, while the Far Eastern Squadron joined the Baltic Fleet to help annihilate the Japanese navy. Admiral Togo was waiting thirty miles away and intercepted the fleeing Russian ships of the Far Eastern Squadron, resulting in a fierce naval battle in which both sides suffered major damage and Admiral Vitgeft was killed. None of the Russian ships made it to Vladivostok, although some were able to return to Port Arthur and a few reached neutral ports. Togo and his combined fleet returned to the waters near Port Arthur and were now able to blockade merchant ships attempting to resupply the Russians. Port Arthur was also cut off from resupply by land as Japanese troops controlled territory to the north. The Fifth Division of the Japanese navy was detailed to provide naval gunfire support to General Nogi who was continuing the siege of the fortress. Port Arthur presented many obstacles to an assault, and there was debate at IGH over whether to bypass the fortress system. But concern that the Baltic Fleet might regain the initiative there and extend control over the waters near Newchang—the main supply point for the drive into Manchuria proper— resulted in the decision to go ahead with the attack on Port Arthur regardless of the cost. On August 19, 1904, the major Japanese attack on Port Arthur began in what was to take over four months to win, with each side suffering more than one hundred thousand casualties. Nogi wanted a frontal assault instead of an enveloping action that was preferred by Tokyo, which would have been safer and less costly in terms of human lives. But the spirit of bushido, the way of the warrior—the samurai—still prevailed even though peasant conscripts made up the rank and file of the army and many of the officers were also from peasant families. This awkward coupling—a modern army with a feudal spirit, the Yamato Damashii (Japanese spirit)—was to exist for another forty years, and the only way to overcome it was with a ratio of troops of about three to one and of supplies, armaments, and equipment of about ten to one. The Russians were not willing to come up with these heavy margins, and it was only in World War II that the Americans were able to raise the ante sufficiently with huge numbers of troops, ships, airplanes, weapons, ammunition, supplies, and equipment to finally defeat the Japanese war machine once and for all. According to one commentary: “The Japanese fought like madmen, clinging to the hillsides and running across open ground to be mowed down by the Russian fire.”29 And yet, more Japanese troops would rush forward the next day in battle after battle. So many dead were exposed to the boiling sun that the stench became unbearable, and carbolic acid or camphor was extensively used

64

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

to attempt some relief from the odor of decaying flesh. In a battle for one hill, only two hundred soldiers remained alive out of a Japanese regiment of eighteen hundred. But once started, General Nogi was resolved to never give up. It became a war of attrition that the Japanese would finally win. American opinion was solidly on Japan’s side during the Russo-Japanese War, and favorable propaganda emanating from Japanese sources was largely responsible for this fact. Also, President Roosevelt’s sympathies were with Japan for several reasons: (1) his admiration of Japan; (2) preservation of the integrity of the Chinese empire, which was threatened by an unchecked Russia; (3) the concept that Japan was assisting Britain, the chief ally of the United States, in countering Russia’s ambitions in East Asia; and (4) American support of Japan’s policies in Korea, which it was hoped, would elicit similar support from Japan for the United States in relation to the Philippines. On the diplomatic front, the United States assured both Japan and Russia of its neutrality. China declared neutrality also, but it was no secret that the ouster of Russia from Manchuria was an objective that China shared with Japan. In a telegram signed by Secretary of State Hay—but actually written by Roosevelt— the statement was made that “it is the earnest desire of the United States that the neutrality of China and her administrative entity be respected by both parties in the course of the military operations which have begun between Russia and Japan, and that the area of hostilities be localized and limited, so that undue excitement and disturbance of the Chinese people may be prevented.”30 What is noteworthy is that there was no similar petition for the protection of Korea. The policies of the Roosevelt administration were revealed in a personal letter the president wrote to Cecil Spring-Rice, a British official, in 1905: As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France in the most polite and discreet fashion that in the event of a combination against Japan to try to do what Russia, Germany, and France did to her in 1894 [sic], I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf. (Roosevelt was referring to the 1895 Tripartite Intervention, and erroneously cited the year 1894.)31

As Tyler Dennett observed in lectures at Johns Hopkins University in 1924: “President Roosevelt’s astonishing note to France and Germany served a very useful purpose. Not only did it encourage Japan when all Europe was arrayed against her, but the memory of it was a constant warning to Germany which was not forgotten.” In a December 1904 letter to Spring-Rice, Roosevelt wrote: “If it were not for the attitude of England and the United States I think that Germany and France would probably already have interfered on Russia’s side.”32 Japan’s designs on Korea were masked in a dissembling manner in a protocol negotiated with Korea on February 23, 1904, which contained the statement: “The Imperial Government of Japan definitely guarantee the Independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.”33 Japan’s intentions began to be revealed in protocols signed in August 1904, requiring the Korean government to

New Century and Rising New Powers

65

appoint a Japanese official as a financial adviser and a foreigner, recommended by the Japanese government, as a diplomatic adviser. Korea was also obligated to consult Japan before initiating contracts with any other foreign power.34 Griscom, the U.S. minister to Japan, blithely informed Secretary of State Hay that he had been informed by Baron Komura Jutaro, the Japanese minister for foreign affairs, that the agreement “was not intended to affect existing Korean treaties with foreign powers or concessions to foreigners, nor would it interfere in the future with legitimate enterprises to be embarked on by foreigners in Korea.” Griscom noted that “Mr. Megata, selected to be financial adviser to the Korean Government, was educated in America and is a graduate of Harvard University.”35 The concept among many Americans, apparently, was that an American-educated Japanese—and most certainly a Harvard man—would undoubtedly be credible. Griscom also opined that the choice of Durham W. Stevens, the American appointed by the Japanese government as the foreign affairs adviser to the Korean government, was prudent The growing body of Korean expatriates—opposed to Japan’s ever-increasing hold on Korea—had other ideas. When Stevens returned to the United States in 1908 to sing the praises of Japan’s protectorate over Korea, he was murdered in San Francisco by two Korean exiles in revenge for his connivance with the Japanese.36 The war continued to be prosecuted with intensity as Japan was determined to regain what it viewed as its right to a leasehold on Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula. Russia was just as determined to hold on to its new possessions, but dissent at home and the threat of revolution were beginning to take a toll. The battle for Liaoyang, a major strategic point on the route to Mukden, took place in August and early September 1904 and resulted in heavy casualties for each side. The Russians were determined that an Asian army was not going to defeat them, but Japanese generals were just as resolute in their zeal for victory. Japanese troops finally captured Liaoyang in early September, but at a huge cost. The number of Japanese soldiers killed in this single campaign amounted to 5,537, while 18,063 were wounded. Russian losses included 3,611 dead and missing and 14,301 wounded.37 Japan’s successes were drawing attention from military officers in the United States and Europe. Eleven officers from the United States served as military observers in Korea and Manchuria by accompanying Japanese troops. Among these were Major Payton March and Captain John J. Pershing, both of whom were to become famous generals in World War I, and General Arthur MacArthur. Several American officers also served as observers accompanying the Russian army. Two of these were captured along with Russian prisoners; they were transported to Japan and deported back to the United States. MacArthur, along with Pershing and Captain Parker W. West, arrived in Manchuria in the closing days of the war, but noted the devastation around Mukden where the heaviest fighting of the war had taken place. Cities, towns, and villages were destroyed with dead bodies still lying around. In the battle for Muk-

66

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

den, casualties had been high on both sides. Russian losses were twenty thousand men killed and forty-nine thousand wounded, and among the Japanese there were sixteen thousand dead and sixty thousand wounded. While the battle for Port Arthur continued throughout the fall of 1904, other elements of the Japanese army were moving northward into Manchuria. The First, Second, and Fourth Armies continued their attacks, incurring huge numbers of casualties in the process, but they simply had more dedication to their objectives than the Russians. In fact, General Alexei Kuropatkin, the Russian commander, reported to Nicholas II his reasons for the Japanese successes: 1. Had superiority in numbers. 2. Were accustomed to hills and hot weather. 3. Were younger, carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack transport. 4. Were energetic and had intelligent leadership. 5. Had extraordinary patriotism and military spirit. 6. Lack of such a spirit on the Russian side (caused by general ignorance of what they were fighting for).38

Two additional reasons that could have been added were: great enthusiasm among the Japanese public for the cause; and much shorter and effective supply lines to the troops at the front than what the Russians were experiencing. The battle for Port Arthur grew into a contest to see which side had the most determination. The fierce battles that had begun in August continued on in the autumn of 1904 and into the winter, and soldiers on both sides experienced the change from searing heat to bitter cold. Hospitals, for both Russians and Japanese, began to overflow, not only from combat-inflicted wounds, but also from sickness and disease. Suicide charges became a routine method of operation. A major objective, 203 Meter Hill, was captured on December 5, providing Japanese forward observers a commanding view of Port Arthur and the harbor from which they were able to direct artillery fire on significant targets. Port Arthur fell on January 1, 1905, bringing about great jubilation in Japan for something other than the usual New Year’s Day celebration. The cost in human lives, however, was enormous. More than sixty thousand Japanese died in the siege or from disease, including fourteen thousand soldiers who were killed in the attacks on Hill 203.39 More furious battles were to come in the early months of 1905 as Japanese armies marched northward into Manchuria proper. Following the capture of Liaoyang, Japanese troops were involved in combat in subzero temperatures in January and February at strategic sites leading to Mukden. The Russians were determined to make Mukden the most fortified citadel that the Japanese had ever met, one that Kuropatkin believed was impenetrable. The Russians assembled a huge army in defense of Mukden—275,000 infantrymen, 16,000 cavalrymen,

New Century and Rising New Powers

67

and 1,219 pieces of artillery, including 60 howitzers and siege guns, the largest force ever assembled in the history of war. General Nogi’s Third Army arrived from Port Arthur and a newly created force, the Army of the Yalu, arrived to join other Japanese forces in preparation for the battle of Mukden, but their combined numbers still did not match the Russians. Japanese strength came to 200,000 infantrymen, 7,350 cavalrymen, and 992 field artillery pieces.40 Superior morale and discipline, strategy that outclassed the Russians, and better logistical support enabled the Japanese to seize the initiative from the Russians, many of whom were demoralized. Reports that had filtered in of revolutionary demonstrations, including “bloody Sunday,” in St. Petersburg and of widespread discontent with Nicholas II were a factor in the poor morale of the Russian troops. Mukden fell on March 10, 1905, but the casualty rate on both sides was extremely high. The Russians lost nearly one-third of their army to battle deaths, wounds, or capture. Large numbers of Russian prisoners were in Japanese hands, but their treatment was generally satisfactory. Japanese casualty rates also reflected the intensity of the fighting: nearly sixteen thousand officers and men were killed, and sixty thousand were wounded.41 The long-awaited Baltic Fleet under the commander in chief Vice Admiral Zinovin P. Rozhestvenski, which had departed the Baltic Sea on October 17, 1904, with forty-five warships, took more than seven months to reach the Japanese Combined Fleet in the Tsushima Strait between Japan and Korea. Beset by myriad problems, the Russian fleet started off badly with a false alarm when English fishing boats in the Dogger Bank (about one hundred miles off the east coast of Britain) were mistaken in the heavy fog for Japanese torpedo boats. The Russians began firing at the stunned fishermen, and several fishing boats were sunk or damaged, and there were a number of deaths and wounded. This unreasonable fear shows how earlier Russian underestimation of Japanese capabilities had been so quickly turned around in only a matter of a few months to exaggerated fright. Prior to the opening of hostilities, Russians generally scoffed at Japanese fighting abilities—often comparing them to monkeys—but after several unexpected defeats, Russian views of the Japanese went to the opposite extreme. The Dogger Bank incident revealed an image in Russian minds that the Japanese could do anything. There was no way small Japanese torpedo boats could have traveled undetected to the North Sea. This same mindset was to affect Americans some thirty-seven years later after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, partially explaining the fear of attacks on the U.S. West Coast. Most of the Russian Baltic Fleet steamed all the way down the west coast of Africa and then up the east side to Madagascar where it met up with the few Russian ships that had gone through the Suez Canal. Major difficulties plagued the fleet everywhere they went—accidents, illness among the crew, hostility in some ports, and logistics problems with food, fresh water, supplies, and especially coal. Some of the ships were so overloaded with coal they easily could have been swamped. Russian seamen—accustomed to the cold climate of their

68

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

homeland—found the tropics unbearably hot, and the constant loading of coal in the heat was a major factor in their debilitation. By the time the fleet reached East Asian waters, many crew members were seriously ill—some affected by mental illness—and those that were not sick were close to rebellion. All efforts were in vain as the Russian flotilla entered Tsushima Strait where Togo’s combined fleet lay waiting. Rozhestvenski, instead of routing part of his fleet around the east coast of Japan, kept all of his ships together through the relatively narrow strait between Japan and Korea. Togo’s modern battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats outgunned and outmaneuvered the Baltic Fleet, resulting in the destruction of all the Russian battleships and most of the remaining warships. Out of forty-five ships, thirty-four were sunk and only three reached Vladivostok. The remainder were either scuttled or interned at neutral ports. The Japanese killed 4,800 Russian sailors, captured another 7,000, while their own losses amounted to 110 dead. Even though Japan had been scoring major victories, the war was beginning to take its toll—not only in human lives—but as a major drain on finances. Japan had raised huge sums of cash, approximately $208 million through bond sales in London and New York, but that money would have to be repaid, with interest. The Russian massacre of Jews at Kishinev was partly responsible for the ease with which these funds had been raised. Jacob H. Schiff—a New York investment banker—was outraged over the pogroms and was instrumental in promoting the fund-raising ventures. Any additional battles in Manchuria, however, would result in even higher costs—in lives and finances—according to General Kodama, who returned from the front to Tokyo to argue the case for a negotiated settlement. From Washington, President Roosevelt had already told Japanese representatives that the good offices of the United States were available in negotiating a peace settlement. Roosevelt, fearing an expansionist Japan if Russia were to collapse, favored a balance of power in Northeast Asia that would moderate the actions of the two powers. On June 8, 1905, American ambassadors in both Tokyo and St. Petersburg were instructed to convey to their host governments the good offices of President Roosevelt “to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged.” Envoys were instructed to state: “The President suggests that these peace negotiations be conducted directly and exclusively between the belligerents. . . . [and that] while the President does not feel that any intermediary should be called in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves, he is entirely willing to do what he properly can if the two powers concerned feel that his services will be of aid.”42 Cables were received in Washington a few days later acknowledging agreement on the part of the governments of Japan and Russia to initiate negotiations for a peace treaty. Even though Japan had agreed to the negotiations, Kodama saw the need to keep pressure on Russia and this was accomplished through an amphibious landing on Sakhalin on July 7, 1905. The entire island was in Japanese hands within a month. This campaign had the intended effect on the Russian tsar. It

New Century and Rising New Powers

69

was the only Russian territory taken by the Japanese and it posed a threat to Vladivostok. It would provide a bargaining chip in the forthcoming peace conference. William Howard Taft, the secretary of war, was in Japan several times during 1905, and it was on one of these visits that he exchanged confidential notes with Prime Minister Katsura. Taft agreed that the United States would recognize Japan’s suzerainty in Korea while Japan would, in turn, acknowledge that the Philippine Islands were an unquestioned possession of the United States.43 After a number of sites had been considered, the naval shipyard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was agreed upon as the location for the talks. Even after its military losses, Russia still looked down on Japan and did not want to send a delegate of the first rank to the peace conference. Eventually, however, Nicholas II was compelled—by pressure from Washington and Tokyo—to send Serge Witte, a prominent St. Petersburg statesman and a proponent of Russian economic activity in Northeast Asia, as his first representative, along with an associate, Baron Roman Romanovitch Rosen, Russia’s minister in Washington. Japan’s representatives were Baron Komura, the foreign affairs minister, and Takahira Koguro, Tokyo’s ambassador in Washington. Major Japanese demands included: 1. Russian acknowledgement of Japan’s paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea; 2. Russian evacuation of Manchuria; 3. Japan to restore to China all territory controlled in Manchuria, except for the Liaotung Peninsula and railway rights; 4. Russia to transfer and assign to Japan the leasehold rights to the Liaotung Peninsula; 5. Russia to assign to Japan the Harbin–Port Arthur railway; 6. Russia to retain the Trans-Manchurian Railroad; 7. Russia to cede to Japan the entire island of Sakhalin; and 8. Russia to pay Japan an indemnity sufficient to cover the actual expenses of war.

Crowds greeted Komura when he arrived in San Francisco in July 1905, but most of the admirers were Japanese immigrants. Public opinion in the United States was beginning to turn negative toward Japan. Witte arrived in New York in August and quickly began his strategy of discrediting Japanese demands for an indemnity, the one specification in Japan’s terms for a settlement that Russia would absolutely refuse to yield on. While Japan had previously been pictured as a noble fighter, along the lines of David versus Goliath, in attempting to free Manchuria from the Russian menace and to preserve the independence of Korea, Witte orchestrated a campaign to show Japan’s real intent was to dominate Korea and achieve preeminence in Manchuria. Witte’s position was that Russia would simply resume fighting if Japan refused to sign a treaty without financial remuneration.

70

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Witte and Komura did most of the bargaining while their associates took only small parts. Roosevelt did not actually participate in negotiations, but remained in constant touch with the conferees through clandestine means and attempted to influence the proceedings by sending notes and cables to ambassadors in Tokyo and St. Petersburg as well as to personal associates who could be influential in the outcome. These efforts were to lead to resentment in Japan after the final results of the conference were revealed. Several of the issues on the agenda were easily settled, among them: Japan’s rights in Korea; evacuation of Russian and Japanese troops from Manchuria and restoration of that area to China; transfer of most of the southern section of the CER (later to be the South Manchurian Railway) to Japan, with Russia to retain the Trans-Manchurian portion; and transfer of leasehold rights in Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan. Areas in dispute were the disposition of Sakhalin and an indemnity to cover war costs to be paid by Russia to Japan. Rumors of brutal conduct of the Japanese in Korea which came largely from reports by American missionaries stationed there, were just beginning to surface in the United States. It was also apparent that Japan’s ideas of preserving the Open Door in Manchuria were not the same as those of the United States and European nations. Thus, public opinion was changing to a largely negative mode against Japan. Roosevelt suggested through intermediaries that Japan not ask for an indemnity, but offer to “sell” all or part of Sakhalin back to Russia, thus removing the connotation of reparations from the negotiations. Komura made this offer to Witte, stating that Japan would not ask for an indemnity if Russia paid for its portion of Sakhalin. In so doing, Komura made the strategic mistake of waiving Japan’s demand for an indemnity. When Witte emphatically stated that Russia would settle for nothing less than the northern half of Sakhalin with no payment of any kind, Komura had no fall-back position. With full knowledge that Japan could not afford to continue the war, Komura gave in and dropped demands for an indemnity payment and compensation for the northern part of Sakhalin. It was an unusual weakness for a Japanese negotiator. Most observers of the time, including President Roosevelt, believed that Japan could have kept all of Sakhalin when Russia refused to make any payment. The peace treaty was signed on September 5, 1905, and as soon as word was received in Tokyo there were demonstrations that protested the lack of any monetary remuneration. The mood quickly turned hostile toward the United States as the public was aware of Roosevelt’s hand in the negotiations and the Japanese were quick to place the blame on the Americans. Japan was heavily in debt—war expenditures were estimated at more than two billion yen (approximately one billion U.S. dollars)—and a large portion was owed to foreign creditors. In fiscal year 1903, the Japanese government income from taxation had been only 27 million yen (about 13.4 million U.S. dollars). Japan’s foreign debt during the war had increased from 600 million yen to 2.4 billion yen, with an interest charge of more than 100 million yen per year. Average Japanese

New Century and Rising New Powers

71

individual income was quite low in 1905 with per-capita income about 30 yen, and more than 25 percent of that was consumed by taxes.44 General Arthur MacArthur had only recently returned from Manchuria and Korea and witnessed some of these demonstrations in Yokohama where he and his wife were staying. Secretary of War Taft, because of major differences with MacArthur, was desirous of keeping the general out of Washington where he was in line to become chief of staff of the army. Taft, while in Japan, proposed that MacArthur make a grand Asian tour to study the military situation and agreed to permit his son, Douglas, to accompany his father. For the next eight months, the MacArthur party toured Japan, China, Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), Malaya, Thailand, French Indochina (Vietnam), Burma, India, and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). The MacArthurs spent a month in Japan at the beginning of the tour and another month at the end, being entertained and escorted to various military facilities throughout the country, which gave the young lieutenant an indoctrination in policies, procedures, and capabilities of the Japanese army. Douglas MacArthur was impressed with the importance of Asia and later remarked: “It was crystal clear to me that the future and, indeed, the very existence of America, were irrevocably entwined with Asia. . . . It was to be sixteen years before I returned to the Far East, but always was its mystic hold upon me.”45 STIRRINGS OF NATIONALISM IN CHINA AND EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES The generally good relationship between Japan and the United States deteriorated in the aftermath of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, becoming further exacerbated by increasing opposition to Japanese immigration, especially along the West Coast. Chinese immigrants in the United States had long been subjected to rejection, and simmering resentment in the cities of China boiled over with anti-American demonstrations. After the Sino-Japanese War, a number of young Chinese went to Japan to study, with the idea of adopting for China some of the modernization techniques that had been so successful in Japan. The deterioration of the Manchu regime was obvious, which led to a desire for change to a more modern system of government, economic systems, and political and military relations with other nations. One of these young men was Zou Rong, who published The Revolutionary Army (1903), a book that called for an overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a republic along the lines of the modern nations of the world. He called for a total reform where the Chinese would claim their own destiny with a popularly elected government and for more individual rights than had ever been known in China. Zou described his proposed system as one where: You possess government, run it yourselves; you have laws, guard them yourselves; you have industries, administer them yourselves; you possess armed forces, order them your-

72

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

selves; you possess lands, watch over them yourselves; you have inexhaustible resources, exploit them yourselves. You are qualified in every way for revolutionary independence.46

Zou’s works along with those of other Chinese modernizers influenced revolutionary leaders such as Sun Yat-sen and the democracy movement, which led to the eventual establishment of a republican form of government. With the nationalist movement also came frustration and indignation over the humiliations China had suffered at the hands of foreigners. High among the list of grievances was the exclusion laws that limited or excluded Chinese from entering the United States. Nevertheless, Zou was arrested and died of disease while imprisoned at the age of nineteen. U.S. immigration policies favored people of Protestant Anglo-Saxon or north European background during the first half of the nineteenth century, but the Irish famine (1845–1850), which took over one million lives, prompted largescale immigration of Irish Catholics to American shores. After the pogroms, Jews escaped the devastation and the massacres in Russia by migrating to New York and the eastern part of the United States beginning about 1882 and continuing until 1910. Two million Jews left Russia, most of them coming to the United States. Immigration swelled between 1900 and 1910 to nearly nine million people in just ten years, the most in any one decade until the 1990s. Italians and others from southern Europe joined the throng, and virtually all of these immigrants settled in the Northeast and Midwest regions of the United States. This large influx brought about a reaction from native-born Americans with consequent restrictions on immigration. On the West Coast, the concern was not about the European emigrants, but rather the Chinese—and after 1905 the Japanese. In 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act that virtually barred all immigration of Chinese. After these restrictions were extended to Hawaii and the Philippines in 1898 and 1902, respectively, the bitterness that had erupted into the Boxer Uprising continued to fester, and soon erupted in resentment over the exclusion policy. Furthermore, news of the poor treatment of Chinese already in the United States added to the bitterness. The massive immigration to the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century, involving mostly people of southern and eastern European origin, led to resentment on the part of some Americans. But most of the immigrants in this era were eventually able to adapt their lifestyles so that they were indistinguishable—on the surface, at least—from others who had much older roots in the United States. This was not so in the case of the much smaller number of immigrants from Asia, whose racial characteristics easily identified them as clearly different from the larger population of European ancestry. This condition led to enormous social problems and was a major agitation in foreign relations between the United States and Asian countries. After World War II, American attitudes gradually changed, leading Congress

New Century and Rising New Powers

73

to adopt new immigration policies and to provide opportunities for immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and other regions. As a result, the last decade of the twentieth century witnessed the largest number of immigrants in the history of the United States, with the greatest majority coming from Mexico, the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Korea, and India. In 1905, however, Chinese tempers flared over the exclusionary policies that had been in effect for more than two decades and that aimed at barring coolies from entering the United States. The rules permitted temporary entry for students, government officials, tourists, and businessmen, but China claimed immigration officials were parceling out harsh treatment to all classes of Chinese and refusing entry to some who were not in the excluded category. In retaliation, chambers of commerce, merchant guilds, and influential citizens inaugurated a boycott of American goods that quickly spread to most of the treaty ports in China and gradually to interior cities and towns as well. Banners, posters, and newspapers were urging “the people of the whole Empire to boycott, after August [1905], all American schools, business, goods, products, and ships unless the exclusion treaty guarantees equitable treatment to travelers, students, and merchants entering the United States.”47 In the summer and early fall of 1905, the most confrontational issue between China and the United States was the boycott of American products and services related to immigration policies. Much of the anger in China was engendered by students and was slyly endorsed by some government officials. Reports of mistreatment of Chinese in the United States, while true in many cases, were exaggerated in their repetition. Mass meetings in Shanghai and other port cities berated the policies of the United States, calling on the people of China to retaliate. A news item in the North China Daily News, commenting on the rally, reported: “Other speakers showed how little Japan by her unity and determination had beaten her huge opponent Russia, showing the world what Asiatics are able to do when thoroughly aroused. Can not China by a united front and firm determination obtain her desire, also, by the repeal of the Chinese exclusion treaty?”48 As the matter came to the attention of President Roosevelt, he issued an executive order providing instructions to immigration inspectors that persons certified by the Chinese government as merchants, teachers, students, officials, and travelers were to be permitted entry into the United States, “allowed to come and go of their own free will and accord and are to be given all the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions accorded the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation.” Roosevelt also issued special instructions that “while laborers must be strictly excluded, the laws must be enforced without harshness.” This information was imparted to Chinese officials by the American minister to Peking, William W. Rockhill, who also explained: “Unfortunately in the past it has been found that officials of the Chinese Government have recklessly issued thousands of such certificates which were not true, and recklessness has also

74

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

been shown in the past by representatives of American consular service in issuing visas related to these certificates.”49 An imperial edict was issued August 31, 1905, pointing out that public feeling is greatly stirred up and there is too much wild talk, so it is hard to guarantee there will not be evildoers who will grasp the opportunity to carry out their wicked schemes to the detriment of the public interests. Such being the case, we must make a special proclamation in order to correct the misunderstandings and allay the general suspicion. . . . It is not right to forbid the use of American goods and take such cause of serious losses to Chinese merchants and laborers.50

American companies involved in business dealings with China quickly called upon government officials in Washington to intervene. The Standard Oil Company advised that “the petroleum industry of the United States will be gravely affected” by the boycott. As a result, the secretary of state directed Rockhill “to ascertain, in bringing the matter to the attention of the Chinese Government, whether its order prohibiting the boycott of American goods will be effective.”51 As anti-American feeling continued in some regions of China, there was a massacre of American missionaries in a rural province on October 28, 1905, that resulted in another flurry of diplomatic protests. By October, most boycott efforts had disappeared, except for in southern China. As more official pronouncements were issued from Peking and regional capitals, along with protests from Chinese merchants who were unable to sell American merchandise they had already paid for, the boycott eventually collapsed even in areas of southern China by November 1905. The boycott, however, had shown how important trade had become to relations between China and the United States. This importance was to continue for the next three decades and was to be a factor in American protests against Japanese aggression in China in the 1930s. In 1943, during the midst of World War II, the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882 and 1902 were repealed, making Chinese immigrants eligible for U.S. citizenship. FROM THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR TO WORLD WAR I The most important article in the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was the agreement that Japan “has predominant political, military, and economic interests in Korea.” While Japan also achieved other gains throughout Northeast Asia, the acknowledgement of paramount rights on the Korea Peninsula had the first priority. Japan, now free to make Korea a colony, saw a more prudent course of action in the eyes of the international diplomatic community. That route led to the initial step of establishing a protectorate over Korea. Japan sought to make this agreement appear as though it had complete accord from Korea by establishing a puppet organization, the Ilchinhoe, which had connections to the Japanese army headquarters in Seoul, with financial support from Japanese advisers. Japan’s negotiators forced the pact on the Korean emperor by threats of dire

New Century and Rising New Powers

75

consequences. Korean officials who objected were ejected from the “negotiations,” and the foreign minister’s seal that had been stolen was affixed to the treaty by Japanese hands. There were many in Korea who objected, but their voices were stifled.52 The protectorate agreement between Japan and Korea was signed on November 17, 1905, with two major provisions: 1. The Japanese government would control and direct the external relations and affairs of Korea. 2. The Japanese government would be represented at “the Court of His Majesty, the Emperor of Korea” by a “resident general.” Japan also specified the right to station “residents” at ports and other places in Korea.53

A few days later, Secretary of State Root advised the Japanese minister in Washington that instructions had been issued for the withdrawal of the American mission in Seoul with transfer of matters related to Korea to the American legation in Tokyo. The Japanese government was delighted, which led the American representative in Tokyo to report to Washington that the transfer was “received [by the Japanese government] as a welcome expression of America’s willing acquiescence in the order of things determined by the new Japan-Korea agreement; and the fact that the Government of the United States [is] the first to take this step is esteemed as a very graceful and friendly act.”54 Although the Treaty of 1905 ostensibly gave Japan the right to represent Korea in dealings with other nations, it soon became apparent that the “resident general” would exercise increasing control in the domestic policies of the country as well. Most of the Korean population was bitter over this turn of events, and opposition was widespread. Korean newspapers, even though Japanese censorship was in force, denounced the usurpation of sovereign rights, and clandestine organizations seized control in some of the provinces. Korean independence groups protested in Washington and at The Hague, but to no avail. This was the beginning of expatriate dissident groups that were to plead for Korean independence for the next four decades. Instead, Tokyo’s representatives simply became even more repressive and it was not until 1945 that Korea was to be free of the yoke of Japanese oppression. Ito Hirobumi, Japan’s preeminent statesman, was the first resident general in Korea. He was instrumental in compelling the Korean emperor to abdicate in 1907, which led to Japan’s eventual annexation of Korea in 1910. Korean expatriate groups increased in number, however, and were active on behalf of Korean independence in Washington, Shanghai, Vladivostok, and Manchuria. When Ito toured Manchuria in 1909, An Chung-gun—a Korean expatriate— assassinated him at Harbin. An was captured by the Japanese and executed in 1910, which led to his martyrdom as a Korean patriot. Japan’s takeover of Korea took place with the full consent of the U.S. government under the direction of President Roosevelt. This was confirmed by the

76

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Taft-Katsura Agreement—still secret at the time—and showed Roosevelt to be an advocate of a policy of empire for the United States. When this agreement was finally made public in 1924, the American people woke up to the fact that the United States had been a “sleeping partner” in Japan’s seizure of Korea. Roosevelt had some strong character traits, but he was also an egotistical selfpromoter. He saw the economic advantages that European nations were reaping through their colonies in Asia and Africa, and was a strong proponent of similar policies for the United States. Japan benefited by being able to obtain a quid pro quo that the United States would not interfere in Japan’s domination of Korea in return for Japan’s recognition of American sovereignty over the Philippines. Under the Takahira-Root Agreement, signed November 30, 1908, Japan gave official recognition to U.S. interests in Hawaii and the Philippines, while the United States acknowledged Japan’s position in Manchuria. The agreement also affirmed the territorial integrity of China and the provision for equal commercial opportunities. For the United States, the period from 1898 to 1912, covering the William McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft administrations, represented the apogee of imperial ambitions. Even during this period, however, American public opinion was gradually shifting away from support of colonial endeavors in distant lands, and by 1911 Congress had become an opponent of these policies. After the Korean protectorate was established, Japan hastened to claim its rights to the Lioatung Peninsula and the southern extension of the CER, renamed the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) by the new owners. In 1906, the railway was incorporated as a Japanese venture with the former civil governor of Taiwan, Goto Shimpei, appointed as its first president. The railway, running seven hundred miles southward from Changchun to Port Arthur and Dairen in the Kwantung Leased Territory was an important instrument in Japanese expansion on the Asian continent. Goto, an advocate of improved relations with Russia, supported a Russo-Japanese rapprochement aimed at effectively controlling China. Japanese imperialism in its advance into Manchuria chose to assume the form of a railroad company, “colonialism in civilian garb,” as Goto described it. “Management of Manchuria,” a term used extensively in the early days of the SMR really meant “turning Manchuria into an occupied colony of Japan.”55 Once Japan had been assured that its ventures in newly acquired possessions were securely established, Tokyo officials looked toward St. Petersburg to see which way the wind was blowing. When it became clear that the 1905 revolution would not succeed, Japan saw the need for concluding a deal with the erstwhile enemy. In fact, several open and secret treaties were concluded between Russia and Japan from 1907 to 1916, placing the two nations on a friendly basis in contrast to their recent hostile relationship. One of these agreements involved fishing rights that had been historically an important economic and commercial issue between the two nations. In 1907, Japanese and Russian representatives signed a convention at St. Petersburg that established an Open Door policy that affirmed their previous

New Century and Rising New Powers

77

agreements to defend equal trade rights for all parties in China, but this was really a screen for a secret treaty signed at the same time. In contravention of the Open Door covenant, Russia and Japan privately agreed to divide Manchuria into “spheres of influence,” and acknowledged Japan’s special claim in Korea and Russia’s interests in Outer Mongolia. Secret protocols in 1910 and 1912 involved an agreement to oppose American attempts to neutralize Manchurian railways. The last secret treaty, signed in 1916, was a mutual defense agreement concerning areas of interest in East Asia. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Soviet government repudiated these treaties.56 Although relations between Japan and Russia had become cordial after 1905, affairs between the United States and Japan began to worsen. Not only was there resentment that the Roosevelt-brokered Portsmouth Peace Treaty failed to provide an indemnity payment to cover the costs of the war, but reports filtering back to Japan from California of opposition to Japanese immigrants also led to anger and public outrage. Just as Japanese immigration had caused problems earlier in Hawaii, the focal point of opposition after 1905 shifted to the West Coast. After being victorious in two wars and defeating a major European power, the Japanese were incensed at the least slight to the notion of their own self-importance. Newspapers in Tokyo indignantly reported every incident, exaggerating some of the more minor issues in an inflammatory manner. These issues received great attention in Japan, while newspapers in the United States paid little heed. Most Americans—outside of the immediate areas affected— knew nothing of the matter, but major problems would result from the immigration issue in the next two decades. The United States had become a major power and Roosevelt inaugurated several exhibitions of the strength of the nation to show the world that the twentieth century was to have a new country among its leaders. These demonstrations were also intended to show that, although Japan had only recently destroyed the Russian navy, there was another power in the world that could not be taken lightly. The first event, the Jamestown Exposition, marking the tricentennial anniversary of the first English-speaking settlement in North America, was held in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1907. The major nations of the world sent ships from their respective navies, and Japan sent two cruisers with five hundred sailors representing the Imperial Navy, along with high-ranking admirals and army generals. The battleship USS Ohio was dispatched in 1905 from San Francisco to the Philippines where Secretary of War Taft and other dignitaries boarded for an inspection tour of the Far East, with its final destination the port of Hampton Roads at Norfolk to take part in the Jamestown Exhibition. The cruise took sailors and marines through the waters of East Asia, including Japan and China, continuing on around the world to Norfolk. Booths showing life and industry in the Philippines were prominently displayed at the exhibition. Californians, however, continued to have fears of some type of Japanese aggression against the West Coast. This was an exaggerated view of Japanese

78

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

capabilities, but one shared by Australians and New Zealanders. Perhaps the hysteria of Russian seamen in the Dogger Bank incident had been contagious. Nevertheless, President Roosevelt was determined to put these fears to rest by a show of force following the Jamestown Exposition. For several years, the U.S. Navy had been expanding and modernizing its fleet to be on a par with the world’s great navies. Now Roosevelt planned to show off this might by a cruise around the world of sixteen battleships and other vessels. On December 16, 1907, the Atlantic Fleet set out from the port of Hampton Roads on a voyage that would take it southward to the Straits of Magellan and up the west coast of South America to California. The Great White Fleet—so named because the ships had all been painted white instead of the usual battleship gray—was received with wild ovations in May 1908 at Californian ports, especially San Francisco. The great flotilla continued on across the Pacific to New Zealand and Australia to enthusiastic acclaim. The fleet then headed north to Japanese waters. As the ships approached Japan, crewmen speculated on the might of the Japanese navy—it was only three years earlier that most of the Russian navy had been destroyed at the Battle of Tsushima—and pondered what their reception would be like. There was no need to worry. When the ships arrived at Yokohama in October 1908, they were welcomed by exuberant crowds with thousands of schoolchildren who had been drilled to say in English, “Welcome” and “I love you.” American flags were flying along with signs proclaiming Japanese friendship for the United States. Japanese officials at the highest level—including the emperor—welcomed the Great White Fleet with orations and praise. American sailors were feted as honored guests in Yokohama and Tokyo.57 Behind the scenes, however, there was a different picture. The United States initially had proposed to send half of the fleet to Japan while the other half would visit China. Tokyo officials insisted that anything less than the entire fleet would not be welcome, because a major world power deserved nothing less. American officials agreed to this request and announced that the complete armada would visit China after Japan. Japanese officials again objected, complaining that China was not in the rank of major world powers and should receive a lesser honor than that accorded Japan. The State Department in Washington intervened and a portion of the fleet visited China while the other ships went to Manila. The visit of the Great White Fleet—or about half of it—to China was a major diplomatic disaster. The navy and the State Department could not agree on which port should be visited. The navy liked Chefoo, but State officials said it might cause an affront to Japan because it was too close to Port Arthur. Finally, they settled on Shanghai, but Chinese officials objected that there was too many foreign settlements there. Eventually, all sides agreed on Amoy and vast sums of money were spent by the Chinese government to decorate and prepare welcoming ceremonies. Days before the ships were to arrive, however, a typhoon

New Century and Rising New Powers

79

swept the area causing extensive damage. After the storm, the Chinese government brought in troops from all over China to repair the damage. When the ships arrived, however, the local citizenry was cool toward the American sailors—Amoy having had more than a century of friction with foreigners—and most shops and places of entertainment were closed. The Chinese government attempted to put on a good show, but it was evident that the entire affair was being conducted under a cloud of disaster. What was clear to everyone was that the central government in Peking was losing its power, and that the time was ripe for a change. Two weeks after the fleet left Amoy, both the empress dowager and the imprisoned emperor died within a day of each other— under mysterious circumstances.58 The new emperor—the “Last Emperor”—Pu Yi, was a young boy necessitating rule through a body of advisors, which only heightened suspicions among the Chinese that the ruling dynasty would be protected at the cost of constitutional reform. The fortunes of the Ching dynasty went downhill rapidly from this point. Factional disputes over control of railroads led to uprisings in the fall of 1911. Demonstrations in central and south China caused Chinese government officials and troops to flee without offering resistance. The disturbance at Wuhan, five hundred miles west of Shanghai, which occurred on October 10, 1911, represented the beginning of the Chinese revolution. After confrontations between those attempting to preserve the throne and revolutionary groups—themselves fractious—Pu Yi was forced to abdicate in February 1912, marking not only the end of the Ching dynasty, but the termination of three millennia of imperial rule. Sun Yat-sen, seen as instrumental in the overthrow of the throne, was opposed to parliamentary government and favored a closed, secret type of organization, in which he would be the paramount leader. He was briefly provisional president of the Republic of China, but resigned due to infighting between revolutionary groups. In August 1912, the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, was formed through a coalition of five political groups. The central government of China became increasingly weakened, which led to a period of “warlordism” and fragmentation of power to the provinces.59 Meanwhile, the outlook for Philippine independence brightened in 1911 when Congressman William Atkinson Jones became chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs. In consultation with Manuel Quezon, founder of the Partido Independista Inmediatista (Party for Immediate Independence) Jones introduced legislation that would provide for the independence of the Philippines. Although this bill was shelved, hard-line advocates of retaining the Philippines were weakened. Roosevelt, though no longer in office, expressed doubts about a continued colonial status for the Philippines and Jones continued attempts at independence legislation. He was successful with the Second Jones Bill, which became law on August 29, 1916, that promised eventual independence. In the 1930s, the Philippines would enter a commonwealth status, but it was not until 1946 that the Philippines became completely independent of the United States.60

CHAPTER 4

World War I: Big Rewards for Japan with Little Pain JAPAN AGAINST GERMANY: SHANTUNG PENINSULA AND PACIFIC ISLANDS Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States on March 4, 1913, and it soon became evident that he was concerned over Japan’s ambitions in China. Wilson, the son of a Presbyterian minister from Virginia, made it clear he wanted to support a continuation of the Christian missionary influence and a republican form of government in China. He selected William Jennings Bryan, the unsuccessful Democratic nominee for president in 1896, 1900, and 1908, as his secretary of state. Bryan, with strong Christian views, insisted that the U.S. minister to China should be a man who believed in the divinity of Christ. Paul S. Reinsch, a political scientist—like Wilson—met that criterion and was selected as the minister to Peking, serving from 1913 to 1919. The United States gave formal recognition to the Republic of China on May 2, 1913, with Bryan pressuring other nations to do the same.1 In the summer of 1914, Japan found itself with an unexpected opportunity to obtain more territory in China and to substantially extend its control in the region at the expense of European nations. When World War I erupted in Europe during the summer and Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, Japan eagerly offered its services to assist its ally. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as renewed in 1911 with a narrower scope than the original pact, required Japan’s armed assistance only when Britain’s interests in India or East Asia were threatened. Even though there was no sign that these conditions would occur, Tokyo nevertheless cabled London officials to ask if assistance was wanted. Britain replied

82

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

with a request that Japanese warships search for and defeat the German Asiatic Squadron that had fled to the open seas. Germany had major interests in China’s Shantung Peninsula, including the city of Tsingtao, and possessed numerous islands in the Pacific. In 1898 China was forced to award Germany a concession—a ninety-nine-year lease—in Kiaochou along the southern shore of the Shantung Peninsula that resulted in the establishment of substantial industry and trade operations there, as well as railway lines to the provincial capital of Tsinan. Earlier, Germany began its island acquisition in the Pacific in 1884 with the annexation of the Marshall Islands, subsequently obtaining the Marianas and the Carolines from Spain. On August 8, Germany requested that Japan observe strict neutrality, but Tokyo replied that its position would depend on Germany not committing any hostile acts in the Far East. Even though there were no signs of any German activity, Japan issued an ultimatum to Berlin on August 15 “in accordance with her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to maintain peace in the Far East.” The demands specified that German warships abandon the coastal area of China; that the Kiaochou leased territory be transferred to Japan before September 15 for retrocession to China; and that an unconditional reply be given by August 23. When no reply had been received in Tokyo by the specified date, Japan declared war on Germany on August 23, 1914. Japanese warships began attacking Tsingtao on August 27, but the German Far Eastern Squadron had already left for the Caroline Islands. On September 2, Japanese troops began landing on the Shantung Peninsula and attacking German positions. Tsingtao was defended by thirty-five hundred regular German army troops and about twenty-five hundred reservists. Some of the reservists had recently been German civilians working in trading companies in Japan and had been called to active duty for service in China. Japanese expeditionary forces, in significant numbers compared to the defenders, secured the entire area in two months. The Germans, however, did offer some stubborn resistance in the area around Tsingtao; two hundred Japanese troops were killed and more than eight hundred were wounded. The entire region was in Japanese hands by November 7, however, and eight thousand German prisoners were taken to Japan.2 Japanese navy warships wasted no time in reaching German possessions in Micronesia. Two squadrons arrived in September 1914 to claim all German territory north of the equator. Australia captured German territories south of the equator, including the northern portion of New Guinea, which had been in German hands since 1884. The German-held islands in Micronesia had not been developed politically and militarily, but were viewed by Berlin primarily as trading outposts in the Pacific. As a result, Japanese naval forces had little difficulty in occupying the widely scattered islands. German naval vessels in the area were not a match for the Japanese task force. All of the German-held islands north of the equator totaled only 860 square miles in land area, but they were

World War I

83

spread out over the Pacific Ocean in an area covering 3,000 miles from east to west and 1,300 miles from north to south. Japan occupied Ponape, Truk, Kosrae, Palau, and Anguar in the Carolines, and Saipan in the Marianas in October 1914. These conquests in the Pacific were conducted in secrecy and information was withheld, especially from the United States. Japan, while ostensibly an ally, revealed little information even after 1917 when the Americans entered the war. This clandestine behavior aroused American suspicions at an early date and revealed Japan’s intention to gain control of the Pacific.3 After the initial victories in China and the Pacific, there were celebrations in Japan, congratulatory speeches, and lantern parades. But enthusiasm waned when requests came from the Allies for Japan to fight against Germany in France. Japan could just as easily have fought on either side as far as the European situation was concerned; its real objective—territorial aggrandizement in East Asia and the Pacific—was met without the necessity of sending troops to Europe. Some historians have theorized that had Japan gone to war in Europe it might have fought on the side of the Germans. After all, Germany had declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914, and the Japanese army saw Russia as the major threat to its continental aspirations in Northeast Asia. The Japanese navy viewed its most likely threat to Pacific ambitions as the U.S. Navy. Japan quickly established political and military control in its new territories, along the lines of its earlier acquisitions in Taiwan, the Liaotung Peninsula, and Korea. Although initially stating that the purpose of invading Shantung was “for retrocession to China,” Japan wasted no time in establishing its own authority in the peninsula. In fact, China complained that Japan, Britain, and Germany all had made claims to protect China when it was evident they were simply advancing their own causes. A military garrison with a Japanese administration was soon appointed for the Shantung Peninsula. In addition, Japanese forces occupied the entire 240-mile length of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway. By December 1914, Japan had installed a South Sea Islands Defense Force under a rear admiral on Truk Island, with navy garrisons on several islands, including Yap, Palau, Ponape, and Saipan, each commanded by a naval officer who also functioned as a military governor for civil affairs in assigned zones. Public opinion was by no means united in Japan behind the military’s intervention in China. Hara Kei, a member of the Diet and later to be prime minister, was outspoken in his opposition to the venture. Other influential politicians spoke out against the overseas activities of the army and navy, but were pushed aside by expansionists in the military along with civilian ultranationalist groups. With its successes, the Japanese army was able to compel the cabinet under Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu to add two additional divisions—on a permanent basis—bringing the total peacetime strength to 21 divisions composed of 250,000 men. By the end of 1914, Tokyo officials saw a bright opportunity to gain entrenched economic and political control over China and other parts of East Asia

84

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

and the Pacific. While European nations, which had only recently conducted extensive commercial trading in Asia and the Pacific, were now fully occupied with the war, Japan cranked up its industrial machine to fill the void. Economic and commercial interests in Japan, not intending for this to be only a temporary wartime solution, made every effort to replace European ventures on a permanent basis. Japanese government officials were eager to help. TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS AND AMERICAN OBJECTIONS Expansion-minded military officers and civilian officials saw an opportunity to turn Manchuria and other portions of China into a Japanese protectorate along the same lines as had recently been accomplished in Korea. At a meeting in Tokyo in late 1914, Foreign Ministry officials developed a list of demands that would give Japan special privileges in its economic, commercial, political, and military relationships with China. Japan’s minister to China presented the terms not to the foreign minister, as would be normal, but directly to the president of the fledgling Republic of China, Yuan Shih-kai, on January 18, 1915. According to a telegram sent from the U.S. minister in China to Secretary of State Bryan five days later, the Japanese minister, in submitting the long list of demands, “at the same time [insisted] the Chinese President and ministers of state not divulge the character of the demands to other Powers on pain of serious consequences to China.”4 The admonition to maintain secrecy was not observed as can be seen by the rapid dissemination of this information to American sources. The United States viewed Japan’s demands as a threat to the Open Door policy regarding China, and the issue quickly gained the attention of President Wilson. The specifications presented to the Chinese government, twenty-one in total, were classified into five groups and came to be known as the Twenty-one Demands. Japan claimed the first group of demands was for the purpose of preserving peace in the Far East and strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries. 1. China shall recognize the transfer of all rights in Shantung enjoyed and acquired by Germany. 2. China shall not lease to other countries any territory or island on the coast of Shantung. 3. China shall grant to Japan the right to construct a railway from Yentai or Lungkou to connect with the Kiaochou-Tsinan line. 4. China shall open without delay the principal important cities of Shantung to trade.

The second group of demands was “proposed for the purpose of securing to Japan a position of special dominance in South Manchuria and East Mongolia,” specifically:

World War I

85

1. Extending the lease to the Liaotung Peninsula and railway rights for the South Manchuria Railway to ninety-nine years. 2. Provision for Japanese subjects to rent and purchase land in south Manchuria and east Mongolia for uses connected with manufacture or agriculture. 3. Right of Japanese subjects to reside and trade in those same areas. 4. Right of Japanese subjects to open and operate mines in south Manchuria and east Mongolia. 5. Prior consent of the Japanese government before permission could be given to citizens of other nations for certain commercial ventures in south Manchuria or east Mongolia. 6. Chinese consultation with Japan before hiring advisers or instructors in the region. 7. Japan to have control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway for ninety-nine years.

The third group was related to Japanese participation as joint owners (with a Chinese company) of a mining and metallurgical industry in central China, and assurances that no other power would become involved in these projects. The fourth group was ostensibly for the purpose of protecting the territorial integrity of China, specifically: “China shall not alienate or lease to other countries any port, harbor, or island on the coast of China.” The fifth group, the most controversial, alarmed China and the United States in that it showed Japan’s aims of establishing a protectorate along the lines of its 1905 actions in Korea. Japan’s foreign minister, Kato Takaaki, later claimed these were only “wishes,” not “demands.” Agreement related to these articles would have resulted in a major erosion of China’s sovereignty: 1. The central government of China shall employ influential Japanese subjects as advisers for conducting administrative, financial, and military affairs. 2. Japanese hospitals, missions, and schools established in the interior shall have the right to hold land in China. 3. China and Japan shall jointly police the important places in China, or employ a majority of Japanese in the police department of China. 4. China shall purchase from Japan a certain supply of the arms and ammunition used in the whole country or else must establish arsenals in China, under joint Japanese and Chinese management, and these must be supplied with experts and material from Japan. 5. China shall permit Japan to build railroads in eastern and coastal China for a distance of more than five hundred miles. 6. In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa (Taiwan) and the agreement respecting the nonalienation of Fukien, Japan must be consulted whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with railways, mines, and harbor works, including dockyards. 7. The Chinese government must recognize the right of preaching by the Japanese in China.5

86

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

The last demand, regarding the “right of preaching,” was likely intended to mock previous Chinese treaties with the United States and Britain that permitted Christian missionary endeavors in China. It is not likely that Japan intended to send Buddhist missionaries since China—and Korea—had adopted Buddhism several centuries before Japan. Shinto, Japan’s indigenous religion, is considered exclusively Japanese and would not have been a candidate for export to other countries. The Japanese ambassador in Washington presented Secretary of State Bryan with a copy of the list of demands—excluding the fifth group—but Reinsch, the American minister to China, completely aware of this group, informed Washington officials that “the granting of the demands would be the end of the independent sovereignty of China.” Reinsch explained: “The plan of Japan was not to make any annexations of territory, but with the maintenance of the formal sovereignty of China, to place the Chinese state in a position of vassalage through exercising a control over important parts of its administration and over its natural resources, actual and prospective.”6 President Wilson followed the discussions related to Japan’s demands closely, and saw a threat to the Open Door policy and the territorial integrity of China. Although the Japanese minister to China had warned President Yuan not to reveal matters concerning the demands, there was widespread dissemination in newspapers within a few days. China’s strategy was to delay responses to the greatest extent possible to permit the United States and Britain to register complaints with the Japanese government, especially with regard to the fifth group of demands. Japan made minor revisions to its demands in a revised draft presented on April 26 in an attempt to make them less offensive, but it was still patently clear that Tokyo was making a bold move that would infringe upon the sovereignty of China. Both the United States and Britain warned China that acceptance of the fifth group of demands would result in demands by other powers for the same rights. China’s reply to Japan on May 1 pointed out the objectionable features of the demands, stating that they “could not have been intended by Japan as anything other than Japan’s mere advice to China.” Japan responded in a few days that the reply was unsatisfactory and began sending large numbers of troops into various parts of China. On May 7, 1915, Japan sent China an ultimatum, but detached the fifth group for consideration at another time. China capitulated and signed agreements on May 25 for all but the fifth group.7 Secretary of State Bryan issued instructions for the American ambassador in Tokyo to present a note to Foreign Minister Kato, explaining: In view of the circumstances which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of Japan and the Government of China, and the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into . . . impairing the

World War I

87

treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.8

China’s acceptance of Japan’s list of demands, as modified with the deletion of the invidious fifth group, conferred upon Japan little or nothing that had not been obtained through earlier treaties. No further attempt was made by Japan to pursue the demands made in the fifth group. However, the pressure for China to surrender a portion of its sovereignty signaled to both the Chinese people and the governments of the United States and Britain that Japan—or at least those in Japan who held power—had relentless imperialist ambitions in East Asia.9 Another issue developing in China was the imperial aspirations of President Yuan. The Republic of China was struggling to assert itself over the provinces, many of which were not remitting required funds to the central government. Yuan let it be known in December 1915 that he would consent to becoming emperor in a restoration of the monarchy. Disturbances broke out all over China in protest against any imperial resumption, and a conspiracy to assassinate Yuan was revealed. Japan was strongly opposed and issued severe warnings to Peking against pursuing this scheme. The tumult continued, however, until Yuan became seriously ill and died on June 6, 1916.10 LEGISLATION PASSED FOR EVENTUAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES In the United States, Wilson’s campaign platform in the 1912 presidential election included a promise of independence for the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government could be established. That was a noble objective and one that many Americans—and nearly all Filipinos—could agree on, in principle. The only problem was in defining what constituted a “stable government.” The Philippine Islands consist of a group of more than seven thousand islands spread out over an area stretching more than one thousand miles from north to south and seven hundred miles from east to west, with 95 percent of the population living on the eleven largest islands. The Tagalog- and Ilocano-speaking regions included people of Malay ancestry, with leaders who had some sense of administration and governing abilities. There were, however, extensive areas of the islands where preliterate, indigenous peoples, speaking a variety of languages, posed problems for administration. Americans were able to govern through a civil administration, backed up by the extensive resources of the U.S. government and its military. The question was: What would happen if this support was removed? After three and a half centuries of Spanish rule, followed by more than a decade of the American presence, there was a legitimate concern over what would happen in the event of the complete removal of colonial administration.

88

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Congressman William Atkinson Jones, who was chairman of the House Insular Affairs Committee, had introduced legislation in 1912 that would have established a Philippine legislature, to be followed eight years later by independence, with American troops to remain in the islands for twenty years to safeguard the new government against foreign threats.11 This legislation, however, was bottled up in procedural problems and probably would have been vetoed because William Howard Taft was still president. This legislation, labeled as the First Jones Bill, was shelved until a more amenable time. In the next few years, Filipino leaders, such as Manuel Quezon, along with officials from the United States, like Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, reworked the legislation and secured political backing in Congress. There were, however, major differences of opinion within the Philippines over the approach to be taken in achieving independence. Quezon basically worked with Jones in drafting the legislation, while Sergio Osmen˜a favored authority for the existing Philippine Assembly to make changes and chart its own route to independence. In addition, Filipino leaders were concerned over insurgent groups and revolutionaries in opposition elements in the islands. Nevertheless, President Wilson agreed to the revisions on what was to be known as the Second Jones Bill in July 1914, but political infighting in Washington resulted in extensive delays in moving the legislation through Congress. Taft, though no longer president, undertook a major speaking campaign to thwart moves for Philippine independence. He was joined by several congressional allies who had similar views, but the loss of Theodore Roosevelt’s support—who, while still president, had begun to doubt the wisdom of retaining the Philippines—was a blow to the anti-independence movement in the United States. One of the areas of concern, increased Japanese involvement in the Philippines, was cited as an argument against independence. By World War I, Japanese settlers outnumbered Americans in the Philippine Islands. The Second Jones Bill, promising independence but without a definite date, finally passed both houses of Congress and was signed into law by President Wilson on August 29, 1916. The legislation abolished the Philippine Commission, which consisted primarily of Americans, and provided for the opening to Filipinos to serve in appointive positions “to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without impairing the sovereignty of the United States.” News of the passage of the Second Jones Bill, known as the Philippine Independence Bill of 1916, was celebrated with rejoicing in Manila. A silver tablet inscribed with a message of gratitude was presented to President Wilson and exuberant oratory proclaimed Jones as the “George Washington of the Philippines.” Osmen˜a, in spite of his differing views, cabled Quezon, who was in Washington: “No other living Filipino could have fulfilled such a tremendous task with such a rare success in so short a time, and it should be here emphatically stated that your sincere and steadfast efforts have saved to your country centuries of sufferings

World War I

89

which other less fortunate people have to go through on their way to final emancipation.”12 It was a step in the right direction, but complete independence would not come until 1946. LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT Wilson’s major concern during these years, however, was the war in Europe. Looking to attempts at a negotiated settlement of the war in Europe, he gave a “Peace without Victory” speech to the Senate on January 22, 1917, outlining ideas for peace. His fear was that the war was being fought simply for a new balance of power instead of for a just and secure peace. Wilson insisted that “there must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power.” He went on to say: “No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed.”13 The German High Command, however, ignored Wilson’s mediation offers and inaugurated an intensive submarine campaign attacking neutral shipping in the North Atlantic in the early months of 1917. Finally, with forces over which the United States had no control, neutrality was no longer possible. The United States entered World War I on April 6, 1917, on the side of the Allies, with Wilson’s statement to Congress and the American people that “The world must be made safe for democracy.” Meanwhile, in China serious difficulties were being experienced in attempting to plant a republican form of government. The central government was ineffective, and de facto rule was exercised by warlords, often bandit leaders with some sort of military backing, who ruled provincial areas through strong-arm tactics. Opium use was rising, corruption and lawlessness were endemic, and struggles were underway for a successor to Yuan. Tuan Chi-jui, who had opposed Yuan’s imperial restoration efforts and secured the backing of the Peiyang military academy clique where he had been a student, succeeded Yuan as premier of the Republic of China. He also had been sent to Germany to study advanced military science and had the support of other military commanders in China. In the summer of 1917, Chinese officials considered declaring war on Germany. Tuan saw advantages in this course of action that would cost a minimal amount of resources: (1) defeat of Germany would result in Shantung being returned to China; (2) pressure from the United States after April 1917 to enter the war; and (3) China would have a voice in the eventual peace negotiations. China declared war on Germany and Austria on August 14, 1917, and sent nearly one hundred thousand Chinese laborers to Europe to work at unloading ships in France. China, however, continued to be pressured by Japan. The Japanese government secretly prepared plans to bribe Chinese officials into recognizing Japan’s “special position” in various parts of China. These bribes, the so-called Nishi-

90

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

hara Loans, consisted of eight transfers of funds to China between January 1917 and September 1918 that amounted to 145 million yen (about 73 million U.S. dollars). Labeled as economic development loans, they were actually for the support of Tuan’s crooked government and to finance military campaigns against dissident warlords. Japan also gave up—for the time being—its attempts to set up separatist regimes in Manchuria, Mongolia, and southern China.14 Japan’s investment in China grew rapidly between 1902 and 1914—from one million U.S. dollars and only one-tenth of 1 percent of total foreign investment in 1902, to the equivalent of 220 million U.S. dollars and 14 percent of the total by 1914.15 After the November 1917 revolution and the overthrow of the Russian imperial house, concern grew in the United States that Bolshevik Russia would sign a separate peace accord with Germany. Indeed, a peace agreement was reached by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 when Russia made an early peace with Germany. Also, even at the end of 1917 the American Expeditionary Force was just beginning to make its presence known in France. The Allies were desirous of forestalling the transfer of large numbers of German troops from the eastern to the western front. Robert Lansing, the successor to William Jennings Bryan as secretary of state in 1915, pushed for a policy of stabilization in the Far East and sought amicable relations with Japan. There was also concern about the chaos that would ensue in Siberia in the wake of revolution and the vacuum that would result from Russia’s withdrawal from the war. To this end, he favored a policy of economic—as opposed to territorial—expansion on the part of Japan. Japan’s special envoy to Washington, Ishii Kikujiro, and Lansing, in a series of formal notes exchanged November 2, 1917, agreed on principles in dealing with a China “torn by war and revolution.” They agreed on the intent of Japan and the United States to uphold the Open Door policy and to respect the territorial integrity of China. The concern for China’s territorial sanctity was actually a continuation of American policy that had existed since 1899, and one that would eventually lead to war between the United States and Japan. The United States agreed that “territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries and consequently . . . that Japan has special interests in China, especially the part to which her territories are contiguous.” It is interesting that Japan wanted this reasoning to work in only one direction. Nothing was said about China’s “special interests” in Japan. The agreement also stated: The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.16

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, designed to show that Japan and the United States were in agreement in dealings with China, was ambiguous and contained

World War I

91

no permanent solutions. Within a few months, Lansing saw the strong influence of the military in Japan’s policies and became disillusioned with the agreement, which was annulled in 1922.

THE SIBERIAN INTERVENTION The Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent early peace agreement between Russia and Germany presented Japan with the second opportunity in less than five years to expand its influence on nearby Northeast Asian regions. The Russian Far East, more than four thousand miles from St. Petersburg, or Petrograd, was less than five hundred miles from Sapporo on Japan’s northernmost island of Hokkaido. The revolution in European Russia had left large portions of Siberia and the Far East in a vacuum. Also, the close proximity to northern Manchuria would offer Japan advantages in securing railway and other economic rights in areas contiguous to its South Manchurian Railway (SMR) operations from the south. To a crowded Japan, the vast and sparsely populated spaces of eastern Russia looked inviting and highly suitable for emigration of pioneer settlers. Initially, Japanese government officials pondered over Russia’s sudden departure from the war. As an ally of Britain and France in the war against Germany, Japan wondered what its position should be in regard to Russia’s sudden departure from the war in March 1918. The Allies pressed Japan to form a joint expedition with the United States for an offensive against Germany in the east via the Trans-Siberian Railway from Vladivostok. Tokyo assured government officials in London and Paris of continued support for the defeat of the Germanled Central Powers, but also made it amply clear that Japan would not send troops to Europe. Furthermore, Japan pledged that it would not recognize the Bolshevik regime and would not enter into a separate peace accord with Germany. The Wilson administration, for its part, was also opposed to the proposal for a Japanese-American offensive from the east. Japan and France, along with Britain, however, sent naval warships to Vladivostok to maintain what the Japanese commander called “silent pressure” on the communist revolutionaries. The first U.S. warship arrived in March 1918. In the early months of 1918, the Japanese government was faced with a changing situation in the Russian Far East and Siberia. Tokyo, while supportive of the Western Allies, was careful to ensure that the events in Russia would not interfere with its “China-first” policy. Proposals from various factions in Japan’s ruling circles ranged from taking no action at all, to mounting a full-scale campaign in the Russian Far East and eastern Siberia for the fifteen-hundred-mile distance from Vladivostok to Lake Baikal. Japan’s official position was that there would be no intervention into areas west of Lake Baikal and that troops would be sent to eastern Siberia only if the United States agreed to participate. Tokyo also insisted that any joint expedition must be under a Japanese com-

92

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

mander in chief. Wilson and Lansing continued to oppose sending American troops.17 Bolshevik domination of Siberia was shattered in the late spring of 1918 when the Czechoslovak corps, made up of approximately fifty thousand Czechs and Slovaks who had been fighting the Germans on the eastern front in Russia at the time of the 1917 revolution, made a sweep along the Trans-Siberian Railway. The original plan was to evacuate the Czecho-Slovak group through Vladivostok and ship them to Europe where they would augment the Western Allies. This plan was changed, however, and the Czechs and Slovaks joined forces with naval landing troops from the British, French, and Japanese ships in Vladivostok harbor, who were attempting to establish a government in opposition to the Bolsheviks. The United States did not concur in this position, preferring instead to leave the matter up to the Russians, but Wilson did see a need for American troops in the region. The decision to send American troops to Siberia was made on July 6, 1918, at a cabinet meeting in Washington with Wilson setting forth these goals, as expressed in an aide-me´moire from Secretary of State Lansing to the Allied ambassadors: 1. To guard the railways in the rear of the large numbers of Czechoslovak soldiers to facilitate . . . efforts to transport them to the front in Europe. 2. To protect military stores at Vladivostok. 3. To promote any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance. 4. To collaborate toward these ends with any small force sent from Japan or, if necessary, from the other allies.

Wilson, in remarks addressed to the Russian people, gave assurance that none of the governments “contemplates any intervention of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter.”18 Very likely, however, the real reason for sending American troops was the mistrust of unilateral action by Japan. Negotiations between Tokyo and Washington concerning the intervention centered on the number of troops to be provided by each country and command arrangements. The American side wanted seven thousand troops from each nation, with each side to control its own troops. Japan proposed a larger number for its forces and asked that joint command be assigned to the ranking Japanese general. Washington agreed to a Japanese force of between ten thousand and twelve thousand troops, but insisted that soldiers from the United States be under an American commander. Japanese troops began arriving at Vladivostok on August 3, 1918, followed by the American contingent two weeks later.19 Japan largely ignored its agreement on the number of troops it would send.

World War I

93

By mid-October 1918, there were thirty-one thousand Japanese troops in the Russian Far East and eastern Siberia, followed by rapid increases over the next few months.20 General William S. Graves, commander of American troops, claimed: On October 18, I reported to the War Department that Japan had at least sixty thousand troops in Siberia and it was disclosed later, that I had underestimated the number by twelve thousand. There was no military situation demanding this increase and if Japan felt there were such a need, she would have undoubtedly notified the United States with whom she had the agreement to send only twelve thousand men. I have excellent reasons for stating she did not notify the United States she had sent seventy-two thousand men to Siberia.21

The reason for Japan’s dispatch of larger-than-agreed-upon troop units to Siberia lay in Tokyo’s perception of what was so often referred to as “Japan’s special position in Manchuria.” Although northern Manchuria was effectively controlled by anti-Bolshevik “White Russians,” Japanese economic expansion into the area had been underway since 1905. The SMR involved much more than just a set of tracks running from Port Arthur to Changchun. The SMR zone consisted of territory expanding on each side of the tracks—for several miles in some locations—which was controlled and developed by the South Manchurian Railway Company. Goto Shimpei, the first SMR president and Japan’s foreign minister in 1918, set forth the company’s goals as: We must occupy a position in Manchuria wherein we are far in the lead and, full of vigor and vitality, confront our rivals with fatigue. . . . Our plan for reaching this end is: (1) management over the railroad; (2) opening of the coal mines; (3) bringing over settlers; and (4) creating facilities for cattle raising. Among these points, settlers must be seen as our most vital task.22

The realization of these goals is described by Ito Takeo in his memoirs. While a high school student on a visit to China and Manchuria in 1917, Ito recorded: “One could neither see nor hear a single thing that did not have some relation, directly or indirectly, with the SMR’s activities in the lives of Japanese living along its rail lines beginning at Dairen.”23 There was also extensive evidence north of Changchun of Japanese economic penetration, and the vacuum created by the events of late 1917 provided ample opportunity for expansion to Harbin and most sections of northern Manchuria over the next three years. After the signing of an armistice in Europe on November 11, 1918, the Allied intervention in Siberia took on a different character. The United States took the position that there was no longer a justification for foreign troops on Russian soil, while Britain, France, and Japan favored an anti-Bolshevik campaign on its own merit. Several Russian organizations had evolved to fight against the revolutionaries in Siberia. Japan increasingly saw its mission as one of backing these groups in order to forestall a Soviet takeover in the Far East and perhaps,

94

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

more importantly, to protect its ever-increasing interests in northern Manchuria. A strong Soviet presence in the Amur Basin would thwart the expansionistminded ideas of Japanese officials such as Goto and Matsuoka Yosuke, a foreign ministry official and later president of the SMR, both of whom were strong advocates of continuing the intervention. Japan supported a number of White Russian opposition groups with a strategy aimed at ensuring that no one particular organization would gain complete control in the region. Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, one of the leaders, fell into disfavor when it appeared that a consolidated Russia might emerge under his leadership. By 1919, the Japanese army, in control of most of the eastern portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, was able to cut off supplies to Kolchak’s forces, thereby ensuring his defeat. Since a Kolchak victory would have prevented Japan from dominating Siberia east of Lake Baikal, Japanese support vacillated between various factions—General Nikolai Rozanov in Vladivostok, and two “cutthroat” Cossacks, Grigory Semenov in Transbaikal and Ivan Kalmykov in Khabarovsk—whose tactics included “robbing, pillaging, and murdering the peaceful population.”24 Japanese backing of these groups led to frequent protests through consular channels and from other Allied commanders, usually to no avail. By 1920, Japan was the dominant force in the Russian Far East and in northern Manchuria. When American, British, and French forces left in June 1920, Japanese army leaders insisted on remaining despite reservations of some in the civilian government in Tokyo. Prime Minister Hara, in fact, was stabbed to death in 1921 by an ultranationalist, partly due to his objections to continuing the expedition. For Japan, the Siberian intervention continued to 1922—until 1925 in northern Sakhalin—in an attempt to extend hegemony to a greater part of northeast Asia and to exploit the region’s economy and natural resources. This strategy, along with the atrocities perpetuated by White Russian groups supported by Japan and incidents of brutality committed by Japanese soldiers, fostered Soviet enmity that was to be long-lasting. A proclamation issued by the Soviet (Council) of Peoples’ Commissars charged: “The imperialists of Japan wish to strangle the Soviet revolution, to cut off Russia from the Pacific Ocean, to seize the rich territories of Siberia and to enslave the Siberian workers and peasants. The bourgeoisie of Japan advance as the deadly enemy of the Soviet republic.”25 PROTESTS IN KOREA AND CHINA AGAINST JAPAN Japan’s despotic behavior in Korea and China after the beginning of the twentieth century led to resentment and anger that boiled over in 1919. Earlier, Tokyo had appointed General Terauchi Masatake as resident general of Korea in May 1910, under the protectorate system, and assigned him the primary responsibility of the annexation to Japan. Before his arrival in Korea, Terauchi had made arrangements for police power to be transferred to the Japanese admin-

World War I

95

istration and for a substantial increase in the number of Japanese policemen in Korea. Once Terauchi arrived in Seoul, he banned publication of most newspapers to prevent the public from realizing what was happening. Patriotic organizations were dissolved and dissidents were arrested. The prime minister, Yi Wan-yong, viewed by most Korean historians as a collaborator and traitor, signed the annexation treaty on August 22, 1910. Sunjong, the last Korean monarch, was forced to issue a proclamation a week later “yielding up both his throne and his country.” As Korean historian Lee Ki-baik commented: “Thus the Korean nation, against the will of its entire people, was handed over to the harsh colonial rule of Japan by a coterie of traitors.”26 Harsh Japanese rule in Korea intensified, and small infractions committed by Koreans easily led to severe punishment. Newspapers, in order to continue publishing, had to strictly observe guidelines; Japanese in official positions—even school teachers—wore uniforms and carried swords. The language of instruction in schools was Japanese and, eventually, most Koreans were required to speak the Japanese language, at least in public. Terauchi, also a member of the founding committee of the South Manchurian Railway Company, was an ardent advocate of Japan’s expansion in Northeast Asia. He served as governor-general of Korea from 1910 to 1916 when he was appointed as Japan’s prime minister. As prime minister, he was also an advocate of Japan’s extensive involvement in the Siberian intervention. After annexation, many Koreans fled to other countries seeking exile. Large numbers were in the Russian Far East, while others were in China and the United States where they established Korean governments-in-exile. Syngman Rhee, who was to become the first president of the Republic of Korea in 1948, was one of these. Representatives of these groups presented the Korean independence case to various international organizations, but to no avail. Diplomatic maneuvers were also attempted, but Japan was clever in convincing the major powers of the overall improvements in Korea as a result of their administration. Korean students in Japan—with more freedom than those in Korea—met at a Young Men’s Christian Association hall in Tokyo on February 8, 1919, and adopted a set of demands for independence for their homeland. When news of these events reached Seoul, along with word of Wilson’s proposals for “self-determination,” together with a Korean Declaration of Independence, “strongly influenced by Christian and Buddhist groups,” plans were set for major demonstrations in early March concurrent with funeral ceremonies for a former king, Kojong—who had died the preceding January—which would bring people from all over Korea to Seoul. On March 1, 1919, thirty-three representatives of Korean organizations issued a Declaration of Independence and proclaimed that Korea was an independent country. The declaration began with the words: We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people. We tell it to the world in witness of the equality of all nations and we pass it on to our

96

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

posterity as their inherent right. We make this proclamation, having back of us five thousand years of history and twenty millions of a united loyal people. We take this step to insure to our children, for all time to come, personal liberty in accord with the awakening consciousness of this new era. This is the clear leading of God, the moving principle of the present age, the whole human race’s just claim. It is something that cannot be stamped out, or stifled, or gagged, or suppressed by any means.27

Japanese administrators, continuing the harsh regime begun under Terauchi, took immediate action and arrested the leaders. The passion for independence, however, erupted throughout the Korea Peninsula with hundreds of demonstrations joined in by huge numbers of people. In the next few weeks, over two million Koreans participated in fifteen hundred demonstrations in virtually every corner of Korea. The demonstrations came to be known as the Samil (Threeone, or March First) independence movement. The magnitude of these gatherings shocked Japanese administrators who had deluded themselves into thinking that the average Korean was in favor of Japanese rule. Some Koreans in the colonial administration—sycophants of the Japanese—were responsible to some degree for this mistaken impression. Nevertheless, the peaceful demonstrators were brutally assaulted by Japanese police and soldiers. About fifty thousand demonstrators were arrested, and more than seven thousand were killed and sixteen thousand injured in the hail of bullets, along with hundreds of homes, businesses, churches, and schools torched or otherwise destroyed. In one village, Japanese authorities forced twenty-nine people into a church, set fire to the structure, and refused to let anyone out. This news was suppressed in Japan and went largely unnoticed elsewhere. Japan was a major power, and with previous agreements concerning Japan’s sovereignty over Korea, the United States made no official protests. Presbyterian and Methodist missionary organizations, however, attempted to pressure public opinion in the United States against the Japanese harshness. These attempts met with limited results as most Americans had never heard of Korea, or if they had, thought it was an integral part of Japan. A full year passed before order was completely restored. The demonstrations, however, did result in a change of Japanese policy toward Korea. Requirements for appointment to the position of governor-general were changed to permit a civilian appointee from Japan in lieu of a military officer; the gendarmerie police system was abandoned to demilitarize police operations; and newspapers were permitted to publish in the Korean language. However, the number of police grew by 40 percent over the next twenty years, Japanese censorship of Korean-language newspapers intensified—with heavy fines levied for violations—and the number of arrests for “ideological crimes” surged. Korean independence movements continued outside of Korea, but liberty remained elusive until Japan’s defeat in 1945.28 At the very same time that demonstrations were taking place in Korea, a major event was taking place in Europe: the Paris Peace Conference. Both China

World War I

97

and Japan participated in the deliberations beginning in January 1919, but Japan held the upper hand as a “Great Power.” French officials—specifically Georges Clemenceau—opposed Japan’s inclusion as one of the Great Powers. Unlike Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy, he noted: “who can say that in the war she played a part that can be compared for instance to that of France? Japan defended its interests in the Far East, but when she was requested to intervene in Europe, everyone knows what the answer of Japan was.”29 In the end, agreement was reached on January 12, 1919, on the admission of Japan as a Great Power to the peace conference, and Japanese officials took their place there the following day. Japanese representatives were sensitive to the least slight by members of the other four Great Powers, but did not become significantly involved in matters related to Europe. In fact, they rarely expressed their views on anything other than matters that were of direct interest to them, essentially the Shantung Peninsula and the Pacific islands formerly held by Germany. Another topic of much interest to Japan was “the question of the equality of treatment of races,” and an insistence that there should be no restrictions on Japanese emigration to any country. This position was primarily a reaction to California’s actions to restrict Japanese immigration and an act of that state’s legislature in 1913 preventing landownership by aliens that aimed primarily at the Japanese. The racial equality problem and the Shantung territorial issue were two matters that Japanese officials would use in an astute manner in deliberations with other powers over the next few months. The Japanese quest for Great Power status was the motivating element in pushing for the racial equality clause. The Japanese stand, however, was not altruistic, but nationalistic. There was no demand on their part for universal racial equality, but only for Japanese in relation to Europeans and Americans. The Paris Peace Conference, relating to settlement of war issues, lasted from January to June 1919 and was concluded by the Treaty of Versailles that established the League of Nations and a covenant concerning that organization’s charter. Ultimately, the Japanese were willing to relinquish their demands on racial equality, but made it clear they would not join the league unless Shantung and the Pacific islands were awarded to them. Australia, at that time maintaining a “whites only” policy on immigration, was solidly opposed to the racial equality clause. Prime Minister W. M. Hughes promised to boycott the conference and would refuse membership in the league in the event the clause was not removed. Prime Minister Jan Smuts of South Africa followed Australia’s lead, and pressure from western states in the United States was put on Wilson to eliminate the clause.30 As far as the Shantung question was concerned, President Wilson was the primary opponent of Japan’s quest for the area. Wilson had grown wary of the Japanese in the six years that he had been president and had heartfelt sympathy for the Chinese. Wilson cited Japan’s demand in its 1914 declaration of war on Germany that the Shantung Peninsula be ceded to Japan “for retrocession to

98

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

China.” Among the group of American officials at the Paris conference were two of the State Department’s experts on Far Eastern affairs, E. T. Williams, a former missionary in China, and Stanley Hornbeck, who had been assigned to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Both of them strongly supported the return of Shantung to China. Williams, in an April 9, 1919, memorandum to the commissioners called for “direct restitution to China of the rights in Shantung formerly pertaining to Germany.” His strongly worded note stated: “Japan’s claim is without justification, being merely a part of the infamous Twenty-one Demands made upon China without provocation and in so far as granted by China, granted under protest and because of the landing of troops and threats to use force.”31 Wilson and Lansing both echoed these words and it became a principal American objective to see the return of Shantung to China. Japanese representatives changed the wording of their demands for the territory—calling for a police force staffed by Chinese, for example, but requiring Japanese “instructors”— but by now Wilson and Lansing were on to Japan’s oft-used strategy. The “instructors” would, in all probability, significantly outnumber the Chinese policemen. The Japanese, however, made it very clear that Shantung was the one issue they were not going to give up. Either Japan would be awarded Shantung or else Japan would not become a member of the League of Nations. This dilemma greatly perplexed Wilson who saw international cooperation—the “community of power,” instead of the “balance of power”—as the route to a lasting peace. Japan in the preceding thirty years had gone from a minor regional force to a major power. Furthermore, in 1919 Japan’s navy was predominant in the Pacific because the U.S. Navy had made a decision in 1903 to concentrate all American battleships in the Atlantic.32 This factor, along with news that Japan was building new warships—including the first battleship in the world with sixteen-inch guns—motivated Wilson to yield on the Shantung issue to obtain Japan’s membership in the league. Japan, for its part, abandoned demands for the racial equality clause. Chinese delegates refused to sign the peace treaty in protest over the Shantung decision. News of Wilson’s decision, announced on April 30, was received in China a few days later, and on May 4, 1919, college and university students met in Peking to prepare a list of resolutions that came to be known as the May Fourth movement. Although sparked by the Shantung issue, the resolutions encompassed a broader spectrum of goals for reform in China. The first one objected to the Versailles decision to allow Japan to retain rights to Shantung. The second resolution called for an awakening of the “masses” to China’s dilemma, while the third and fourth called for a mass meeting of all citizens of Peking and the formation of a student union. The fifth resolution called for immediate demonstrations against the terms of the Versailles treaty. Demonstrations began on the afternoon of May 4 in Peking in defiance of police orders banning them. About three thousand students gathered at Tian-

World War I

99

anmen Square in Peking and began a march replete with shouted slogans and banners. Students passed out announcements deploring the loss of China’s territorial integrity and calling for citizens to join in the protest. Although police and legation guards prevented the students from marching on the Japanese legation, the demonstrators moved their protests to the homes of Chinese officials who were seen as collaborators with the Japanese. Violence ensued, several injuries and one death occurred, and thirty-two students were arrested. Although this demonstration did not result in the immediate return of Shantung, it set in motion a much broader scope of both ideological and pragmatic innovations that were to shape China in the coming decades. Peking University students gave impetus to Marxism and socialism and other means of modernizing and strengthening China, while calling for the elimination of Confucianism, arranged marriages, and classical Chinese language in favor of the simpler vernacular style. Pamphlets called for the rights of free speech, women’s rights, and the resignation of pro-Japanese officials. The Shantung territory was eventually returned to China after negotiations at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922.33

CHAPTER 5

The 1920s: A Move to Liberalism in Japan and Turmoil in China THE SIBERIAN INTERVENTION: JAPAN PULLS OUT UNDER PRESSURE Siberia and the Russian Far East continued to be pulled in different directions by the various factions struggling for control in the years after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. British, French, and American troops left the area by the spring of 1920, but Japanese forces stayed on in large numbers. Because of the complexities of the situation, unrest in other parts of Russia, and continued Japanese occupation, the new regime in Moscow—in April 1920—created an “independent” Far Eastern Republic that covered a large part of eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. In its charter declaration, the republic was identified as honoring “the national bonds uniting it with the remainder of the Russian people,” and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic promptly recognized the new “republic” and its provisional government. Because Tokyo refused to deal directly with the Communist regime, the Far Eastern Republic was established to enable Japan to deal with a supposedly independent government. Prospects were enhanced for Soviet control of eastern Siberia after the 1919 defeat of Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, but first it would be necessary for the Soviets to persuade Japan to withdraw its large military contingent. Termination of the Japanese intervention in Siberia was a high priority for the Far Eastern Republic. A series of incidents erupted at Nikolaevsk, a town at the mouth of the Amur River, from February to May 1920. The Amur River flows in a northeasterly direction in that part of Russia. The town of Nikolaevsk, about four hundred

102

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

miles north of Khabarovsk but only fifty miles from the northern part of Sakhalin, was the site of Japanese canneries and fishing interests serving nearby areas. Aggressive tactics of the Japanese fishermen had long rankled Russian residents. The Japanese had established a community in the town that consisted of about 450 civilians who were merchants, fishermen, and cannery operators. Also, there were 350 Japanese troops in the garrison. A series of massacres took place there as Russian partisans, cooperating with the Bolsheviks, attacked White Russians in Nikolaevsk. The Japanese garrison retaliated on March 12, 1920, and killed most of the town residents, while suffering severe casualties itself. Two months later, the Japanese force suffered additional casualties before a relief expedition could reach Nikolaevsk. When news of the incident reached Tokyo, ultranationalist groups used the occasion to whip up anti-Bolshevik sentiment and bolster support for an extension of the intervention. Public backing had been declining since the Western Allies, particularly the United States, had pulled their troops out. Although support rallied for a while among the Japanese citizenry, public enthusiasm began to wane after Japanese and Soviet Russian forces took retaliatory action in the summer. Even so, the Japanese intervention in Siberia continued with the strong backing of military and expansionist-minded civilian officials. Goto Shimpei and Matsuoka Yosuke, both connected with the South Manchurian Railway, were among those pushing for a continuation, while other civilians, for example, Prime Minister Hara Kei, advocated a withdrawal of all Japanese troops from Siberia. Demands for removal continued, and in April 1921 the Far Eastern Republic sent notes not only to Japan, but also to the United States, Britain, and France, demanding that the Japanese forces be withdrawn. The Imperial Japanese government was reminded of its original purpose for the dispatch of troops to Siberia: “in order to relieve the position of the Czecho-Slovak forces,” and advised that “with the departure of the Czecho-Slovaks [on March 31, 1920] the Japanese forces also should have gone. . . . The Czecho-Slovak question became a matter of secondary importance, and the alleged menace to Korea and Manchuria and the proximity of Siberia to Japan were brought out to the foreground.1 The note concluded on a hopeful tone: The Constituent Assembly believes that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops will be an important factor in re-establishing relations between the Japanese and Russian people. The proximity of the two countries, the importance of the Russian Far East to Japanese industry, the immense natural resources which await foreign capital for their development, all are a pledge of the future close and peaceful relations, which, when past sad memories are gone and the people return to their ordinary occupations, shall exist between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic.2

In notes from the Far Eastern Republic to the United States, Great Britain, and France, the same theme was expressed: a plea for assistance in removing

The 1920s

103

Japanese forces from Siberia and the Russian Far East. An April 1921 note to the U.S. government pointed out that Japanese troops were in Siberia as a result of a 1918 agreement between Washington and Tokyo, and commented: The last transport of American troops left Vladivostok in March, 1920, and soon after the remainder of the Czecho-Slovak forces left our country. The Japanese troops have not been withdrawn; Japan has put forth pretext after pretext to justify their stay: Japanese interests in Eastern Siberia, the possible menace to Korea and Manchuria, and the unsafe conditions menacing the life and property of her citizens. Instead of the evacuation of the Japanese troops we witnessed the events of April 4 and 5, with all the later results, and in July, 1920, Japan occupied the Sakhalin District.3

The note concluded with a request for an explanation from the U.S. government: 1. Does the American Government adhere to its declaration of August 5, 1918? 2. If it does, then how does the American Government explain the continuance of the intervention after the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops? 3. If it does adhere to that declaration, then when will the American Government declare with the same solemnity that the intervention has ended? 4. When will the American Government, which invited the Japanese Government to a military co-operation in the Russian Far East, declare a definite end to the intervention begun in 1918, by that invitation?4

The United States did not respond directly because the Far Eastern Republic was not accorded diplomatic recognition, but the State Department denied that Japan was acting within the parameters of the initial objectives of the intervention. After several complaints to Tokyo, a State Department note of May 31, 1921, to the Japanese ambassador in Washington explained: It will be recalled . . . that the Government of the United States in January, 1920, issued orders for the complete evacuation of all American troops from Siberia, inasmuch as the mission of aiding the Czechs during their stay in Siberia had been practically fulfilled. . . . The Government of the United States expected that the withdrawal of the American troops would be followed by a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops, if not soon then at least within a reasonable period of time. . . . The Government of the United States would be untrue to the spirit of cooperation which led it, in the summer of 1918, upon an understanding with the Government of Japan to despatch [sic] troops to Siberia, if it neglected to point out that, in its view, continued occupation of the strategic centers in Eastern Siberia—involving the indefinite possession of the port of Vladivostok, the stationing of troops at Khabarovsk, Nikolaevsk, DeCastries, Mago, Sophiesk and other important points, the seizure of the Russian portion of Saghalin [Sakhalin], and the establishment of a civil administration which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism—tends rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that region. . . .

104

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

. . . The Government of the United States must in candor explain its position and say to the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights, or the political or territorial integrity of Russia.5

While the Japanese presence in Siberia continued throughout 1921, the civilian government in Tokyo was increasingly being made aware of international disapproval. The Japanese military command in Vladivostok, in connivance with White Russian groups, had established the Priamur government in opposition to the Far Eastern Republic. Several heated battles were fought between these two governments, with the Japanese army providing extensive logistical assistance to the Priamur group. While the Japanese-backed government was touted as a popular alternative to communist rule, it quickly evolved into a dictatorship with rule by decree and harsh treatment of the civilian population.6 To forestall discussion of its Siberian expedition at the upcoming Washington Naval Conference, Japan had (in August 1921) initiated a conference with officials of the Far Eastern Republic. This meeting, held at Dairen, near Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula, lasted until April 1922. The Far Eastern Republic demanded that Japanese troops be evacuated from Siberia, while Japanese representatives insisted on neutralization of areas near Korea and Manchuria, plus the granting to Japan of leasehold rights in northern Sakhalin for eighty years as compensation for the Nikolaevsk incident. With increasing pressures coming from Washington and Tokyo, the conference between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic dragged to an end. The Japanese government announced on June 22, 1922, that it would remove all troops from the Maritime Province by the end of the year, but that northern Sakhalin would continue to be occupied pending settlement of the Nikolaevsk affair. As Japanese forces began their withdrawal in the autumn of 1922, the remaining White Russian forces were defeated in short order. The last Japanese soldiers left Vladivostok on October 25, 1922. Three weeks later the Far Eastern Republic dissolved itself and was incorporated into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.7 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed on December 30, 1922, and the legacy of Japan’s anti-Bolshevik activities in Siberia and the Russian Far East would plague relations between the two countries for many years to come. Soviet actions in 1945 and beyond can largely be attributed to the enmity stirred by Japan during this era. THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1921–1922 Japan’s actions following the Paris Peace Conference revealed a steady pattern of expansionism and entrenchment in the Shantung Peninsula of China, eastern Siberia, and the Pacific islands acquired from Germany. In addition, Japan embarked on a major program of building capital warships. As a result, the United

The 1920s

105

States and Britain sought ways to restrain Japan’s attempts at dominating East Asia and the western Pacific. These concerns led to the Washington Naval Conference for the purpose of limiting armaments in the Pacific and to restrict actions that would lead to infringement on the sovereignty of other nations. Residents and elected officials of California had been wary of the Japanese at least since 1906. Japan’s victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the RussoJapanese War, plus Tokyo’s continuing program of strengthening its army and navy led West Coast citizens to call on Washington for additional naval protection. Some of these concerns were rational while others, based on conjecture and popular fiction, were unwarranted. A series of articles by Homer Lea appeared in Harper’s Weekly in the autumn of 1909 describing a devastating attack by the Japanese on the West Coast. Although the Japanese navy had no capability to launch a five-thousand-mile attack on North America, these articles generated much apprehension, especially in California. Even so, it was true that defense of American possessions in the Pacific was inadequate. Hawaii, for example, was defended in 1907 by a garrison of three hundred soldiers, while the island of Guam had no defenses at all. The army increased the number of troops in Hawaii to six thousand by 1913, but this was still only half of what the Joint Army and Navy Board estimated to be necessary.8 Added to all of these concerns was a general aversion to the large numbers of Japanese immigrants into California. The Naval War College developed War Plan Orange in 1911 as a strategic plan to prepare for defense of the West Coast. Although it was not released to the public, the plan served as a blueprint for navy and army operations in the event of an attack. Japan was not specifically identified, but the code name “Orange” represented that nation while “Blue” was used to portray the United States. The plan was for contingency planning and was also used by the navy and the army in an attempt to justify additional appropriation requirements to Congress. Navy and army planners gave serious consideration to sending some of the fleet’s battleships to the Pacific, but the recent example of Japan’s destruction of Russia’s two separated fleets in 1904–1905 led to a consensus that the main battle fleet must not be divided. Instead, it was to be concentrated in the Atlantic until more ships could be built. However, General Leonard Wood, newly appointed as the army chief of staff in 1910, advocated sending the whole navy fleet to the Pacific. After long service in the Philippine Islands, Wood was “convinced of Japan’s determination to dominate as much of the Pacific as the rest of the world would permit.”9 During the William Howard Taft administration and the first years of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, appropriations were not provided for the large number of battleships navy planners wanted. After the beginning of war in 1914—and more especially after American entry into the war in 1917—navy and army appropriations were greatly increased. The entire amount, however, was allo-

106

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

cated for the Atlantic and European areas. After the war, Congress drastically cut expenditures to pay off some of the heavy war debt incurred in 1917–1918. On March 19, 1920, the U.S. Senate failed to muster the two-thirds majority required to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, thereby rejecting membership in the League of Nations. Senators voting against the treaty were largely concerned about Article 10, which called for a guarantee of the integrity and security of all nations. The open-ended nature of this commitment was seen as a major disadvantage, as well as the belief that the scheme was bound to be worthless in actual practice because league members would not react to aggression in a consistent manner. Also, there was apprehension that the treaty would impair American flexibility to protect its own interests in the Western Hemisphere. Portions of the pact, however, were incorporated in the peace treaty with Germany, specifically a demand for “adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.” Congress also reduced the size of the peacetime army to 157,000 men, a substantial reduction from what had been voted only one year earlier.10 The result was that, even by 1921, the United States still did not have adequate defenses for the Pacific and the West Coast. Britain and France also desired to significantly reduce military spending, which led to a growing clamor for disarmament among the major nations of the world. Women in the United States had achieved the right to vote in 1920, and large numbers of women’s groups petitioned Congress to promote disarmament. In one Washington parade, two thousand women marched down Pennsylvania Avenue carrying antiwar banners, one proclaiming: “We will not give up our children for another war.”11 This was the setting for the Washington Naval Conference that began in November 1921. The Washington Naval Conference served several purposes, involving—to one degree or another—representatives of the major Allied nations who participated in the war, and resulted in four major treaties, numerous agreements between nations, and abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Major concerns of the conference were to limit naval armaments and fortifications in the Pacific and the resolution of territorial and political issues in East Asia, specifically those involving China. In preparations for the conference, Japanese naval officers resisted proposals for limitations on warships, but economic considerations were to play a major role in Japan’s position. Japan’s economic boom resulting from the absence of European trading in East Asia during the 1914–1918 war dwindled as the British, French, and German companies returned. Japan was in an economic recession by 1921, and government officials needed to reduce spending. If the rest of the world was going to cut back on armaments, the most desirable route for Tokyo economizers would be to do the same. Spending on the navy in 1921 accounted for 32 percent of Japanese government appropriations.12 The conference opened on November 12, 1921, with a speech by President Warren G. Harding who explained that “all thoughtful peoples wish for real

The 1920s

107

limitation of armaments and would like war outlawed.” After his opening remarks, Harding left and turned the chairmanship over to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, who startled the conference with a proposal for a tenyear moratorium on construction of naval warships, specifying four principles for implementation: 1. that all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned; 2. that further reduction should be made through the scraping of certain types of the older ships; 3. that in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the powers concerned; and 4. that the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of the auxiliary craft prescribed.

Capital ships were identified as any armored vessel, other than an aircraft carrier, of over ten thousand tons displacement, and with eight-inch guns or larger. By this definition, all battleships and heavy cruisers would be classified as capital ships. Light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines were identified as auxiliary ships. Hughes then went into the specifics of what each nation would be required to give up. The United States would lead the way with the scraping of thirty vessels. Britain would be required to stop construction on four battleships and nineteen other ships. Japan was called on to abandon plans for construction of eight capital ships and to scrap seventeen others. The formula for ships each nation was permitted to retain would amount to a total maximum capital tonnage of five hundred thousand tons each for the United States and Britain and three hundred thousand tons for Japan, a ratio of ten-ten-six.13 The proposals of the secretary of state won great acclaim both in the United States and from foreign delegates attending the conference. Hughes spoke with such conviction that he made a deep impression on everyone, even those who disagreed with his approach. Some of the Japanese representatives, however, opposed the ratio that Hughes had set forth, and wanted a higher quota for their own navy. Many of the delegates to the conference had a military or legal background, while others held political office. Military representation from the United States included General John J. Pershing, the leader of the American Expeditionary Force during the war, and General William Mitchell, an advocate of military air power. Those with a legal background included Secretary Hughes, Elihu Root, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and Oscar W. Underwood, the Senate minority leader. Japan’s military representatives were Admiral Kato Tomosaburo and Major General Tanaka Kunishige. Ambassador Shidehara Kijuro had a legal background and Prince Tokugawa Ieyesato, descendant of the Tokugawa clan, was president of the House of Peers, the upper house of the Japanese Diet. The Japanese government in Tokyo was placed in a crisis by the assassination

108

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

of Prime Minister Hara in November 1921, just as the conference to discuss arms limitations and Pacific and East Asian affairs was beginning. Hara was at Tokyo Station to begin a journey by train to western Japan where he was to attend a regional party rally. Mori Hiromu, a university student and houseboy of Railway Minister Motoda Hajime was nearby when the incident happened at Tokyo Station. Mori explained that a small man rushed up to Hara and shouted, “Traitor to the nation.” The assailant then rushed Hara, knifing him in the right side of his ribs. Mori managed to pin down the attacker and knock the knife out of his hands with a judo technique before handing him over to the police.14 Hara, mortally wounded by the man who later was revealed to be an ultranationalist radical, died on November 13, 1921. In this confusion, Baron (Admiral) Kato, for all practical purposes, served as head of the Japanese delegation. Admiral Kato, though previously an advocate of expansion, became the leader of the “treaty faction” within the navy. Kato was from the old military class and did not favor war. General Tanaka, however, of the “young officer” class, represented the military faction with an eagerness for war. Japanese public opinion in the early 1920s favored a conciliatory attitude toward China and, in line with sentiment then prevalent in most major nations of the world, entered a period of reaction against the military. These conditions led to Japan’s acceptance of arms limitations at the Washington Naval Conference and to an agreement to protect the sovereignty of China. The Pacific islands taken from Germany in 1914 continued to be administered by Japan, but under the mandate system of the League of Nations, making them, in effect, what in later years would be called a trust territory. Japan also accepted restrictions preventing fortification of the mandated islands. The understandings reached at the conference led to the following treaties and agreements: 1. The Four-Power Pact, signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France on December 13, 1921. The powers agreed to maintain the status quo in the Pacific and to respect one another’s territorial possessions in the Pacific. Also, the AngloJapanese Alliance of 1902, as amended in 1905 and 1911, was terminated. 2. The Five-Power Treaty, officially known as the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy on February 6, 1922, was to be for a fifteen-year period. These nations agreed to a ratio of capital ship tonnage of 5–5-3–1.75–1.75, respectively. The ratio was to be reached by discontinuance of further naval construction and scrapping of any excess tonnage. Restrictions on fortifications of Pacific islands were also agreed to by the United States, Britain, and Japan. There were to be no new naval bases or fortifications west of Hawaii, north of Singapore, or south of Japan. 3. The Nine-Power Treaty, signed by the United States, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, China, and Japan, on February 6, 1922. This treaty specified that the signatories would respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of China. The treaty was basically a restatement of the Far Eastern policy

The 1920s

109

of the United States, and was intended to promise China protection from Japanese aggression in the future. The treaty, however, did not force Japan to relinquish rights and interests in China, and the unequal treaties continued to exist. The Chinese regained nothing in Manchuria. The Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway continued to be held by the Japanese. The Chinese representative reluctantly signed, however, in exchange for protection from further Japanese aggression. Advocates of expansion in Japan maintained a low profile for awhile, but increasingly gave only lip-service to this treaty, especially after 1931. 4. Another treaty signed by the nine powers specified a joint regulation of Chinese tariffs. 5. An agreement between China and Japan, though actually outside the scope of the conference, was made by which Japan agreed to restore to China the political control of Shantung, the former German leased territory. Japan, however, retained economic rights, military forces, and substantial authority in the conduct of affairs in the Shantung Peninsula.15

From a domestic viewpoint in Japan, the Washington Naval Conference was seen as a triumph of the older navy admirals, in close coordination with politicians, over the expansionist aims of the army, which cleared the way for a period of democracy.

A LIBERALIZING TREND IN JAPAN: TAISHO DEMOCRACY The reign of each emperor in Japan is given a name—at the time of accession to the throne—that is intended to be symbolic of the era of his rule. When Mutsuhito became emperor, his reign was designated in 1868 as Meiji (Enlightened Rule). After the Meiji emperor died in 1912, the reign of his son, Yoshihito, was given the name of Taisho (Great Justice). During the Taisho era (1912– 1926), significant liberalizing trends began in the promotion of democracy in Japan. Although these trends were not always in a uniformly consistent pattern—nor did the emperor personally have any connection with them—several prime ministers and their cabinets personified a more representative form of government as opposed to the earlier aristocratic hierarchy. Additionally, liberalizing influences in voting rights and other forms of direct participation were inaugurated, which led to the designation of “Taisho Democracy.” Whereas the earlier prime ministers and cabinets—beginning in 1885—had been chosen by the elites and the military, the political process began to have a stronger part in the composition of the cabinets after 1918. Hara, known as the “commoner” prime minister (1918–1921) since he was the first government leader without a peerage title (i.e., count, viscount, baron, and so on), attained power as an elected official of the majority party in the lower house of the national legislature. Hara advocated that authority over government polices should be in the hands of elected officials rather than the elites and the bureaucracy. He had only modest success in this objective, and the struggle between

110

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

elected politicians and career bureaucrats was one that was to last for many decades, continuing even into the twenty-first century. From 1918 to 1927, the cabinets of six successive prime ministers were proponents, to varying degrees (and with some important exceptions), of a liberalizing trend in Japan. Perhaps it would be even more correct to state that the cabinets were influenced by liberalizing social and cultural influences that were taking place. Among these were: (1) the growth of proletarian literature that aimed at improving the life of the working class, which had worsened after World War I; (2) a growing labor movement; (3) strikes; (4) riots against major increases in the price of rice; and, (5) the success of the Russian revolution. The Japan Socialist League was formed in 1922 and numerous student organizations at universities promoted socialist and Marxist ideas. The Japan Communist Party was also founded in 1922 as a branch of the International Commintern. Between these two organizations, moderate socialism and radical Marxism were advocated while the more conservative elements of society looked on with apprehension. Socialism, while viewed with a wary eye by the government, was permitted to be advocated for a few years. After 1925, however, increasingly repressive restrictions began to be placed on what was termed “dangerous thought.” The Communist Party never operated openly (until it was legalized by Allied occupation authorities in 1945) and became increasingly stricken by theoretical disputes between leaders of various factions. Its dedication to the abolition of the monarchy was a formidable obstacle to acceptance by any other than a small number of people and led to suppression by government authorities. Expansion of voting rights was a distinguishing characteristic of Taisho Democracy. From its earliest implementation in 1890 under the Meiji constitution, voting had been restricted to men who paid taxes above a specified amount, which resulted in a small and elite electorate. This was expanded gradually, but in 1925 the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law was passed opening the vote to all Japanese male citizens twenty-five or older. In 1945, women received the right to vote and the minimum age to vote was lowered to twenty as initiated by the Allied occupation authorities. Education was expanded during the Taisho era, especially at the university and college level, to provide wider opportunities to an expanding middle class. Prior to 1918, higher education had been limited to the imperial universities, but the University Order of 1918 expanded recognition to private colleges and specialized schools, thereby raising their status to a professional level and permitting a greater number of Japanese to achieve university graduate status. One of the key figures of Taisho Democracy was Shidehara, the ambassador to the United States and a delegate to the Washington Naval Conference. Shidehara served as foreign minister from 1924 to 1927 and again from 1929 to 1931. His conciliatory attitude toward China increasingly placed him at odds with the Japanese army. He advocated cooperation with Western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, and promoted cooperation with the

The 1920s

111

League of Nations. His policy of allowing China to establish its own tariff regulations surprised officials both in Japan and in other countries. Shidehara, seeing that Japan had already received recognition from the major powers, favored further strengthening of Japan’s position through economic means as opposed to military expansion. In the early 1920s, Japanese army leaders recognized that military expansion was no longer feasible. Matsui Iwane, the intelligence division chief of the Imperial General Headquarters, wrote in 1923: “We must substitute economic cooperation for military invasion, financial influence for military control, and achieve our goals under the slogans of co-prosperity and co-existence, friendship, and cooperation.”16 The general consensus of both military and civilian leaders in Japan was that, after the Washington Naval Conference, Japan should continue its expansion program, but through economic as opposed to military and political means. Shidehara was a strong advocate of opportunities for Japanese trade, and the United States—even with a high tariff rate—accounted for 40 percent of Japan’s exports. Shidehara’s main goal, however, was to promote economic cooperation with China. That aspiration was to prove difficult to achieve, however, because China was in turmoil for much of the 1920s as the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, in attempts to unify the country, engaged in pitched battles with provincial warlords. Even an ultranationalist such as Matsuoka, a former diplomat and a South Manchurian Railway official, insisted in 1923 that Japan’s goal in Manchuria was peaceful industrialization as opposed to militarization.17 Matsuoka, however, turned back to right-wing expansionist efforts in the 1930s. Economic investment in the Russian Far East was another area receiving close attention from Japan in the 1920s. In lieu of compensation for the Nikolaevsk incident, Japan agreed to receive concessions for the exploitation of minerals, forests, and other natural resources in North Sakhalin. Japanese investment in coal and oil companies in North Sakhalin increased after diplomatic relations were established between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1925, five months after the last Japanese troops had left, finally bringing to an end Japan’s participation in the Siberian intervention.18 Other figures who led to liberalizing tendencies in the 1920s were Yoshino Sakuzo and Minobe Tatsukichi. Yoshino was an advocate of the popular representative government within the framework of the Meiji constitution. A moderate liberal, he favored social welfare programs, labor unions, and improved working conditions. Minobe, a professor at Tokyo University, was also a proponent of liberalizing influences—including direct control of governmental policies by the electorate as opposed to the elites—and is best known for his advocacy of the “emperor as an organ of the state,” a concept that ultranationalists saw as elevating the Diet over the emperor. Both Yoshino and Minobe, though admired by the growing middle class, were condemned by militarists

112

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

and traditionalists who saw their views as detrimental to the concept of kokutai (or national essence), the national polity. Through kokutai, the emperor was viewed as the head of the family, in a relationship that would be similar to a father and his children. There were religious aspects to this relationship—tied in to Shinto—that led to the belief that Japan was unique in that the head of state was a divine being, not simply an earthly representative of the deity, and, as such, did not need a freely elected parliament to tell him what to do. Advisory councils composed of elites and militarists were, of course, a different matter. The concept of kokutai and the uniqueness of Japan had much to do with Japan’s expansionist activity leading up to World War II. Although the emperor renounced all aspects of divinity on January 1, 1946, echoes of the uniqueness of Japan continued to be heard, even at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In May 2000, Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro called Japan a “divine nation with the emperor at its center,” a comment that led to much criticism from both domestic and foreign sources. There were, however, ardent supporters in Japan for Mori’s position.19 Liberalizing tendencies of the Taisho era led to a reaction by 1925. Okada Ryohei, the education minister from 1924 to 1927, was one of the chief opponents of liberalism. He carried on a war against dangerous thought, but discovered that radicalism had made inroads among high school students. Some student leaders were arrested and kept “incommunicado.” All studies of socialism and other “dangerous” subjects were prohibited. Extensive spy networks were established in schools and universities that led to arrests of teachers and professors harboring subversive thoughts and that forced them to keep quiet on these topics or resign. The Peace Preservation Law, commonly known as the Dangerous Thoughts Bill, was passed May 12, 1925, to control communists and anarchists, but its inhibiting effect went much further, causing a restraining effect on public debate over policies. Free speech and the right to assemble were drastically curtailed. This law—in effect until 1945—decreed: “Anyone who has formed an association with the objective of altering kokutai or the system of private property . . . shall be liable to imprisonment with or without hard labor for a period not to exceed ten years.”20

THE GREAT KANTO EARTHQUAKE OF 1923 Tokyo and Yokohama were struck by one of the most devastating earthquakes in history on September 1, 1923. Casualties exceeded 143,000 deaths and 100,000 injured. The earthquake occurred on a Saturday, just two minutes before noon when thousands of hibachi (charcoal) fires in residential areas were being stoked up for cooking the noon meal. The greatest damage was done by fires started by the overturned coals; fanned by the wind, the fire quickly evolved into a firestorm propelled by heated air moving at a great rate of speed. Most

The 1920s

113

of the casualties and destruction were caused by fire rather than the actual earth tremors. Nearly 70 percent of homes in Tokyo were destroyed while Yokohama— where the epicenter was—experienced an even higher rate of destruction. Basic necessities of life quickly ran short, resulting in panic and anxiety. A report from Cyrus E. Woods, the American ambassador to Japan, gives an excellent account of the situation: Tokyo was just closing its offices for the Saturday weekend [the work week until after World War II included a half day on Saturday, as was also the practice in the United States] when one of the greatest calamities of the world fell upon this section of Japan. The great earthquake of September 1st came at 11:58 A.M. It began with a slight tremor, but rapidly gained in force and continued for fully five minutes. There was a great grinding roar, and the crash of many falling buildings filled the air, while the dust that rose was like a pall over the city. The whole afternoon was one of terror. Shock after shock came, with fires breaking out in every direction, while the streets were filled with a seething mass of humanity just escaped from death by the earthquake and once more fleeing for their lives as the flames drove them on. The water mains were broken by the first shock, and a high wind was blowing so that the fires spread with great rapidity. They were soon beyond control. . . . Immediately following the terrible night of earthquake and fire, I endeavored to get into communication by telegraph with our people in the world outside and to ascertain whether our American colony in Tokyo was safe. No word of the destruction elsewhere had reached us. I soon learned that the cable service, telegraph and commercial wireless had all ceased to function, but finally the Minister of Marine [Navy] was persuaded to send three short messages for me by radio from their Japanese naval vessels. . . . As a result of these telegrams, the first relief to arrive was American.21

By the 1920s, thousands of Koreans had been brought to Japan to work as laborers in jobs that Japanese considered demeaning. Within a few days after the earthquake struck, rumors soon cropped up that Korean residents in Japan were lighting fires and poisoning water wells. Based on these unfounded rumors, police arrested hundreds of Koreans, along with Japanese socialists and labor union members. As the rumors spread—with no newspapers or other communication methods to deny them—anxiety turned into hysteria and several thousand Koreans were murdered by neighborhood vigilante groups before order was regained. Within hours of the earthquake, President Calvin Coolidge sent a message to the emperor of Japan expressing his concern: “I am moved to offer you in my own name and in that of the American people the most heartfelt sympathy and to express to your Majesty my sincere desire to be of any possible assistance in alleviating the terrible suffering to your people.”22 Two days after the earthquake, Coolidge appealed to the people of the United States: An overwhelming disaster has overtaken the people of the friendly nation of Japan. While its extent has not yet been officially reported, enough is known to justify the statement

114

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

that the cities of Tokyo and Yokohama, and surrounding towns and villages, have been largely if not completely destroyed by earthquake, fire and flood, with a resultant appalling loss of life and destitution and distress, requiring measures of urgent relief. . . . I am prompted to appeal urgently to the American people, whose sympathies have always been so comprehensive to contribute in aiding the unfortunate and in giving relief to the people of Japan. . . . I recommend that all contributions, clearly designated, be sent to the chairman of the American National Red Cross at Washington or to any of the local Red Cross chapters for transmission to Japan.23

Count Yamamoto Gonnohyoe, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, quickly responded with a note to Washington, expressing his “desire to express in the name of the Japanese Government their most heartfelt thanks to the American Government, and at the same time to convey to the President and the people of the United States the deep sense of gratitude . . . for this noble manifestation of a sincere and generous sympathy.”24 The American Red Cross notified the State Department on September 13 that: approximately ten thousand tons of food stuffs consisting of rice, milk, fish and flour, two cargoes of lumber and shelter supplies, two hundred thousand suits underwear, three hundred thousand pairs socks, medical and surgical supplies have been purchased and are now on steamers en route to Japan. The total commitment of funds for supply purchases amounts to about $3,300,000.25

The Social Bureau of the Japanese Home Office calculated that the homes of nearly seven hundred thousand Japanese families had been damaged or destroyed, and that the percentage of afflicted Japanese families ran from 78 percent in Tokyo up to 94 percent in Yokohama. Because of the destruction of hospitals, the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States began construction of a new facility in Tokyo, St. Luke’s Hospital, as a mission project. (St. Luke’s was used as a hospital for American occupation forces from 1945 to 1952.) Ambassador Woods reported to Washington: The promptness and decision with which this emergency has been met by our people has made a deep impression upon both the Japanese Government and the Japanese people. In addition, they are not only sincerely grateful, but they look upon our help as an evidence of our friendship. The old suspicion and antagonism is broken down. Everywhere I go I hear the opinion expressed that our countries at last understand each other, and that we are united in ties of friendship, more strongly than any paper treaty could possibly establish. I believe . . . that we have gone a long way towards securing the lasting friendship of Japan.26

That rosy glow was not to last. Only eighteen years later Japanese naval forces would attack Pearl Harbor.

The 1920s

115

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA AFTER THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE Resentment erupted in China in 1925 over the Western powers’ slowness to eliminate the unequal treaties. It was widely known that similar treaties with Japan had been revised, and demonstrations broke out in Shanghai, Canton, and other cities in protest. Continuous civil war and revolution had plagued China in the wake of the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese political leader who organized the revolution against the dynasty, was one of the chief architects of the Republic of China, which was proclaimed January 1, 1912. Although elected as provisional president of the new republic, Sun resigned in favor of Yuan Shih-kai. Yuan proved to be a devious politician who could easily be compromised by provincial warlords. Also, as described in chapter 4, he had aspirations for reinstituting the monarchy and making himself emperor. With Yuan’s death in 1916, however, centralized rule in China collapsed. The republican form of government was again pursued, albeit often in chaos due to infighting between rebel generals and factional politicians. Rival groups even had difficulty deciding where the capital of the new republic would be. Sun regained control and established a military government at Canton in 1917 to subdue the provincial warlords. Canton fell to southwestern provincial leaders the next year, but was recaptured by Sun after he restructured the Chinese Revolutionary Party and renamed it the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang). Sun was formally named president of the Republic of China in 1921.27 While the United States favored the adoption of the republican form of government in China, events began to unfold in 1923 whereby the local authorities at Canton—with Sun’s encouragement—attempted to seize the customs house and its revenues. Customs receipts at Chinese ports, by treaty agreement, were to be internationally administered with a portion reserved for Boxer Uprising indemnity payments. Sun, instead, sought to use these funds to finance his military campaigns against rebel warlords from the southwestern provinces. These matters were closely followed by foreign diplomats in China. In November 1923, Jacob G. Schurman, the American minister in China, informed the State Department of events at Canton: “November 15, 3 A.M. Retreating soldiers continue to pour into Canton yesterday. Sun has established line just outside city to make last stand and serious fighting expected within 24 hours. No disorders in Canton so far.” The commander of South China Patrol of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet reported the same day that a small contingent of American marines had been put ashore to protect against possible looting.28 Schurman reported on December 1, 1923: Situation in Canton is deteriorating. Commander, South China Patrol, informs me Sun’s troops have driven back [General] Chen’s forces and reoccupied Sheklung. Conditions appear to be one of stalemate which may endure indefinitely. Sun is in desperate straits

116

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

for money and all information available here from consular, customs and other sources in Canton indicates he seriously contemplates seizing customs and not declaring a free port as he originally threatened. . . . . . . I strongly feel that we should not permit the Southern customs to be lost without making an effort to prevent it. Short of war, I favor any measure to prevent what would mean inevitably the absolute breaking up of the Chinese Maritime Customs, on the revenues of which, as the Department is aware, we are dependent by treaty for the loan and indemnity payments.29

The issue quickly came to the attention of President Coolidge who authorized the use of U.S. naval warships at Canton. Naval vessels from Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States—sent from Manila—arrived at the port of Canton by December 17, 1923. Sun, however, was able to hold off the provincial generals without raiding the maritime custom houses, which led to the departure of the allied ships. The Kuomintang, in an unlikely match, was assisted by representatives of the Soviet government, such as Mikhail Borodin, along with military advisers. They arrived in Canton in late 1923 attracted by the revolutionary aspects of the Republic of China—even though it was not communist—and the need for an ally in East Asia against Japan. For the next few years, the Kuomintang was also allied with Chinese communists, whose party had been established in 1921. Whampoa, about ten miles down river from Canton, was selected as the site of the new military training academy for the Republic of China. A younger ally of Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, who had just returned from Moscow where he had studied military strategy, was appointed as the first commander of the Whampoa Military Academy. Rather than supervising the training of army officers, however, Chiang quickly became involved in campaigns against rebel elements. By 1925, large numbers of provincial army soldiers had been defeated and their equipment seized. When Sun died in 1925, Chiang became the military and political leader of the Kuomintang. The alliance with the communists was broken in 1927 by a brutal suppression and most warlords were subdued by late 1928. Several incidents took place involving foreign powers, however. In Shanghai and Canton students demonstrated against the unequal treaties. In another case—on May 30, 1925—soldiers under British control at Shanghai fired on thousands of Chinese workers and student protesters demonstrating against foreign control in China. Eleven demonstrators were killed and twenty were wounded. In May 1924, Congress passed legislation authorizing the return of the balance of payments for the Boxer Uprising indemnity with the understanding that the funds would be used for educational and cultural purposes. New educational institutions and “study-abroad” programs were established with these funds. Several other nations also followed the American example, making it possible for Chinese students to study in the United States and Europe. With respect to treaty revision, a divergence of opinion in the United States

The 1920s

117

complicated efforts to eliminate the unequal treaties. American public opinion and the Board of China Missions favored the abolishment of special foreign rights and privileges in China, while the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai urged caution. In its view, the nationalist movement was too closely allied to the Soviet Union. By 1930, the treaties were revised to permit full autonomy to China in the establishment of customs and duties, but the abolition of the extraterritoriality provisions would have to wait until after Japanese aggression had been overpowered. Chiang and his revolutionary troops were faced with several elements that had to be subdued before unification of China could be accomplished. Even though fifteen years had passed since the fall of the Manchu dynasty, there were still imperialist sympathizers in Peking who aimed for a restoration of the throne and its autocratic rulers. In addition, warlords controlled large areas of the country with their private armies. The areas presenting the largest obstacles to the Nationalists were in the northeast, including Manchuria. The Nationalists initiated their Northern Expedition on July 9, 1926, with Chiang as commander in chief of the revolutionary army. The objective was to capture Peking and to defeat the imperialists and the warlord armies. The basis set forth for the Northern Expedition was: “The ultimate cause of all difficulties and sufferings of the Chinese people lies with the aggression of the imperialists and the cruelty and violence of their tools, the nation-selling warlords.”30 Using terms that sounded more Marxist than Nationalist, the Manifesto of the Kuomintang declared: “To whatever class, the meaning of nationalism is none other than the elimination of imperialist aggression . . . to the majority of the people, the objective in the struggle for national liberation is none other than anti-imperialism.” The Marxist terminology is also explained by the fact that the Chinese communists were cooperating with the Nationalists during this period. The political platform of the Kuomintang declared: “All unequal treaties are to be abolished: foreigners’ leased territories, consular jurisdiction, foreigners’ management of customs duties, all political power exercised by foreigners in China at the cost of Chinese sovereignty. New treaties are to be concluded based on recognition of China as an equal and sovereign nation.”31 In the 1920s, fighting between various Chinese factions, along with the threat of Japanese aggression from Shantung and the Liaotung Peninsula, led several Western powers, including the United States, to establish a Yangtze River Patrol for the protection of foreign interests and to maintain the Open Door policy. The Yangtze is a major waterway separating north and south China and is the site of several of China’s largest cities. From Wuhan and Nanking, the Yangtze flows in an easterly direction to Shanghai on the coast. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet established a river patrol force—composed mostly of converted yachts and small, shallow-draft gunboats made in the Philippines—with six gunboats on the Yangtze River and two in south China. These vessels continued their patrols for nearly two decades, providing a measure of protection against factional fighting and Japanese aggression, which became increasingly overt in the 1930s.

118

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Japan, viewing China as an area of its own special interest, observed the presence of American naval ships—even small river boats—with increasing disdain.32 Relations with Japan were also worsened by laws prohibiting Japanese immigration and land ownership in the United States. OPPOSITION TO JAPANESE IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES By 1924, Japanese emigration to the United States—mostly for the purpose of working as laborers (including farm labor)—had been a thorny issue for several decades. Just before the turn of the century, Hawaiian officials thought the problem had been solved for the Territory of Hawaii because, with annexation, any amount of Japanese immigration would be small in comparison with the total American population. While that may have been true from a statistical perspective of the entire United States, the problem ended up being a local one in California. In 1907, the peak year, 30,824 Japanese arrived on the West Coast, a small number in comparison to the total U.S. population of more than 92 million. An even distribution around the nation would have resulted in small, inconsequential numbers, but most Japanese settled in San Francisco and the vicinity, where their presence was highly visible. Later Japanese immigration to the San Joaquin Valley and the Imperial Valley was also noticeable because those areas had very small populations in the years before air conditioning. In fact, few Americans considered such regions to be inhabitable, and it was largely through the strenuous efforts of Japanese pioneer settlers and other immigrant groups that organized agriculture began to take hold there. Disputes over immigration policy frequently sparked friction between Japan and the United States. Also, these same policies led to conflict between federal government officials in Washington and local politicians in California. When the San Francisco Board of Education voted on October 11, 1906, to require children of Japanese ancestry to attend segregated schools, Tokyo lodged an official protest with the U.S. government. President Theodore Roosevelt, viewing the matter from a larger perspective, finally prevailed upon San Francisco officials to rescind their segregation orders in exchange for a promise to limit Japanese immigration. In 1907, the population of California was less than one-tenth of what it would be by the end of the twentieth century. White settlers and their descendants— in this sparsely populated region—were fearful of Japanese aggression, especially after the major victories of Japan in recent wars, and saw American defenses of the West Coast as inadequate in the event of an invasion. The heavy influx of Japanese immigrants added to this fear, which led to calls for a ban on further admissions to the West Coast. In Japan, public opinion was highly incensed over the refusal of Americans to admit them for immigration in the same manner as Europeans.

The 1920s

119

The Gentlemen’s Agreement—the series of notes exchanged between diplomats in 1907 and 1908—worked for several years to reduce Japanese immigration without having Japan suffer the humiliation of formal legislation barring their entry into the United States. In the years from 1900 to 1908, 140,000 Japanese entered the United States (including Hawaii) for an average of 15,000 per year. After 1908 the number dropped to an average of forty-two hundred per year until 1913 when it began to rise again, showing significant increases after 1918. This agreement provided that Japan would not issue passports when the intended purpose of residence was for work as a laborer. Other Japanese, such as students and businessmen, were permitted to enter. Also, the Gentlemen’s Agreement stipulated that entry would be permitted: “to join a parent, wife, or children [under the age of twenty]” with a Japanese laborer residing in the United States.”33 Because most of the Japanese laborers already in the United States were single males, the concept of “picture brides” was enlisted. This enabled a Japanese male in California to select a “bride” by mail whereby formalities were documented in Japan, thereby authorizing the newly married wife to enter the United States. Children born to these couples in California were automatically citizens of the United States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The custom at that time was for the Japanese—and Americans, as well—to have large families. By the time of the 1920 census, there was a substantial increase in the number of Japanese residents in California, much of it from childbirth, but also from increased immigration levels. Yearly immigration totals of Japanese arriving in the United States had risen to approximately ten thousand per year for 1918, 1919, and 1920. In 1920, there were 111,000 Japanese in the continental United States—most of them in Pacific Coast states—as contrasted to 24,000 in 1900. Public agitation in California led congressional representatives from that state—and other western states—to push for legislation abrogating the Gentlemen’s Agreement and to deny entry as permanent immigrants to all “aliens ineligible to citizenship as specified in the Naturalization Act of 1870.” This act prohibited naturalization of persons of Asian ancestry. The same language was used by the California State Legislature in 1913 to prohibit landownership for Japanese immigrants. Heated debate on this topic continued in Congress for several months in 1924. The administration, under President Coolidge, favored a continuation of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, and Secretary of State Hughes, after the House of Representatives passed anti-immigration legislation, lobbied senators to reject the California proposal. He might well have succeeded except for a letter from the Japanese ambassador. In a letter of April 10, 1924, Ambassador Hanihara Masanao wrote to the secretary of state: “I realize, as I believe you do, the grave consequences which the enactment of the measure retaining that particular provision [exclusion of Japanese from immigrating to the United States] would

120

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between our two countries” (italics added).34 Many of the senators took the term, “grave consequences,” as a threat of war, which led the Senate to vote in favor of the anti-immigration legislation. Most of the newspapers in the United States expressed editorial opinion in favor of the Senate action. The Louisville Times commented: “to say that a bill must be changed lest it ruffle the feelings of Japan is to timidly suggest that Americans let Japan dictate American legislation.” The Portland Oregonian remarked: “immigration is a strictly domestic question,” while the Cincinnati Enquirer pointed out “that entrance of foreigners into this country is a privilege to be granted, not a right to be demanded.”35 The Atlanta Constitution exclaimed: “an amazing letter from the Japanese Ambassador. . . . Japan has thrown down a serious challenge to the American Congress.”36 A substitute motion to extend the Gentlemen’s Agreement was defeated by the Senate by a wide majority and the new Immigration Act was passed shortly afterwards with President Coolidge signing the legislation in June 1924, effectively preventing further Japanese immigration to the United States until after World War II. News of the passage of this act led to indignant reaction in Japan and protests at the American embassy in Tokyo. This particular issue was a contributing factor in the worsening of relations with the United States, giving ammunition to ultranationalists for Japan’s return to expansionist policies in China in the late 1920s. Japan attempted to justify its aggression in other parts of Asia in the 1930s as a pan-Asian defense against the discriminatory policies of the United States. Ironically, while clamoring for admission to the United States for Japanese immigrants, Japan has never been agreeable to opening its own borders to largescale immigration of foreigners. With the exception of Korean laborers—considered to be Japanese subjects from 1910 to 1945—the Japanese government has consistently followed a policy of tightly restricting entry of foreigners for permanent residence. Ethnic Koreans with permanent residence, most of whom were descendants of people brought to Japan for forced wartime labor, numbered seven hundred thousand in 1999. Throughout the twentieth century, Japan had the lowest percentage of resident aliens as a proportion of its total population of any major industrialized nation in the world. In 1999, there were only seventy-five thousand permanent resident aliens (other than Koreans) in Japan, an infinitesimal percentage of the total population.37 By contrast, the 1990 census showed seventeen million permanent resident aliens in the United States. As the twenty-first century began, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo listed as one of Japan’s goals for the new century, “Japan should change its immigration policy to encourage foreigners to live and work in Japan.”38 In another twist of irony, after new immigration laws were enacted by the United States in 1965 and 1990—putting Japanese on the same eligibility basis as citizens of any other nation—there was no longer any great enthusiasm in Japan for emigration. While Japanese government leaders saw emigration as a

The 1920s

121

major need from 1885 to 1941 to relieve crowding in the home islands—with a population of 39 million in 1887 and 60 million in 1920—by 1990, with a much larger number of 124 million people, the government was worried about the low birth rate and a population that was not reproducing fast enough to replenish itself. Years of postwar economic prosperity brought these changes about. By 1990, Japan had ample foreign currency from its trade surpluses to purchase commodities abroad, rather than the need to produce its own. The 1990 census showed the number of permanent residents of Japanese ancestry in the United States to be 848,000, with a majority of them native-born citizens, that is, nisei, sansei, and yonsei (second-, third-, and fourth-generation Americans). At the end of the twentieth century, immigration from Mexico and Central America was a cause of concern in the United States—especially in California—but the arrival of Asians went unremarked. By 1990, residents of Chinese ancestry (1,645,000) and Filipino ancestry (1,407,000) far exceeded those who had roots in Japan. An even more startling reversal is revealed in the attitude of Hawaiian officials concerning Japanese entry into the Hawaiian Islands in the 1990s as contrasted to the 1890s. Whereas in the late nineteenth century there was apprehension over too many Japanese coming to Hawaii, by the late 1990s the major concern was that not enough Japanese were coming. The Japanese that Hawaii was looking for were not immigrants, however, but tourists with lots of yen to spend. With the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 leading to a recession in Japan, the number of Japanese tourists to Hawaii decreased significantly. While most of the United States was enjoying financial prosperity, Hawaii went into a recession. As a result, Hawaii doubled its tourism promotional budget that was aimed largely at Japan.39

U.S. Army Soldiers in the Philippines in 1900.

William Howard Taft, the first civil commissioner of the Philippines, 1900– 1901.

The Great White Fleet leaving Norfolk, Virginia, in December 1907 to begin its cruise around the world.

U.S. Navy officers host Japanese navy officers aboard the USS Connecticut, Yokohama, Japan, October 1908.

Japanese marines in Shanghai, China, 1937.

Luncheon given by Manuel Quezon, president of the Philippine Commonwealth, for Lieutenant Colonel Dwight and Mamie Eisenhower upon their departure from the Philippines in December 1939, with Field Marshal Douglas MacArthur in attendance. Left to right: Field Marshal Douglas MacArthur, Mamie Eisenhower, President Quezon, Lieutenant Colonel Eisenhower.

General Douglas MacArthur returns to the Philippines, Leyte Island, October 20, 1944.

Liberation of Manila. Filipino civilians welcome American soldiers, March 1945.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru signs surrender documents aboard the USS Missouri, Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945.

CHAPTER 6

The Japanese Army Moves in on Civilian Government ARRANGEMENT IN CHINA: RENEWAL OF EXPANSIONIST ADVENTURES Yoshihito, the Taisho emperor, died on December 25, 1926, and his son, Hirohito, immediately acceded to the throne. Because Yoshihito was sickly and in poor health for most of his life—especially after the age of forty—Crown Prince Hirohito had been appointed regent for his father in 1921. In December 1923, in the aftermath of the Tokyo earthquake, Hirohito narrowly escaped the bullet of an assassination attempt when an anarchist, Namba Daisuke, fired at the prince regent in Tokyo. Namba was sentenced to death and executed the following year. After becoming emperor in his own right, Hirohito’s reign was given the name Showa (Enlightened Peace). Taisho Democracy—figuratively and literally—came to an end with the death of Emperor Taisho. Four months after Hirohito became emperor, Tanaka Giichi, a retired army general turned politician—and an advocate of a strong Japanese position in China—became prime minister in April 1927. Tanaka, with extensive experience in Manchuria, had previously served as the war minister in three cabinets while still on active duty. He had been a proponent of a continued Japanese army presence in the Siberian intervention, and was opposed to the agreement to withdraw in 1922. In 1925 he left active duty to enter politics. He was elected president of the Seiyukai political party and became prime minister after the fall of the Wakatsuki Reijiro cabinet, brought on by a banking crisis. Tanaka’s first order of business involved resolution of the financial crisis of 1927, which had been caused by the collapse of

124

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

thirty-seven banks with overextended loans. The Tanaka cabinet brought the crisis under control by declaring a three-week banking holiday and financing of large loans from the central bank to the five largest commercial banks, thereby paving the way for the Big Five Zaibatsu banks. Once the banking crisis was resolved, Tanaka turned to his main goal: pacification and control of China. In fact, the financial problems, though cited as the cause of the downfall of the preceding Wakatsuki cabinet, were actually secondary to concerns over Japan’s position in China. In the early months of 1927, Japanese business associations along with a number of influential newspapers grew increasingly critical of Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro’s policy of nonintervention in China. Large numbers of Chinese participated in a boycott of Japanese products. In Japan, the program of nonintervention and coprosperity was seriously questioned after the Nanking incident (March 23, 1927), which targeted foreigners in general, and the Hankow incident (April 3, 1927), when Japanese were the sole object of mob attacks. The former army general had spent a large part of his career dealing with Russia and China, especially in matters involving Manchuria. Japan’s position in China was defined as: 1. It was essential to gain wide recognition of Japan’s special interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia before the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek disturbed them. 2. Good relations were to be maintained with the warlords who controlled Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and the northern provinces. 3. Anti-Japanese activity, especially boycotts and strikes, in the Yangtze Valley and the coastal cities should be avoided or prevented. 4. Japanese should cooperate with Chinese unification within the context of Japanese treaty interests.1

From these goals, it can be seen that Japan’s policy in the 1920s was to cooperate with the Nationalists in coastal and southern China, and to frustrate Chiang’s objectives in the northeast. Meanwhile, Kuomintang forces under Chiang continued to make progress in unification attempts. Nationalist occupation of Nanking in 1927 resulted in attacks on foreign concerns and residents and in the looting of businesses and residences. The foreign powers—Britain, the United States, Japan, Italy, and France—demanded apologies and a settlement, sending identical notes on April 11 to Chiang and a leftist faction still operating in Wuhan. The notes from the foreign powers called for punishment of those responsible for the incident; guarantees for the lives and property of foreigners; and compensation to individuals for injuries and property damage.2 The United States continued to maintain its legation in Peking and had not yet given recognition to the Nationalist government. Because of the fractured control situation, the United States had to deal with Chiang and leftist elements that had been established in Wuhan, three hundred miles to the west of Nanking. But Chiang’s troops demolished the leftist elements in Shanghai and other cities,

Japanese Army Moves in on Civilian Government

125

including Wuhan, in mid-April, making negotiations with the communists and other left-wing groups no longer necessary.3 Chiang established the Nationalist seat of government at Nanking on April 18, 1927, and continued unification efforts. By the end of 1927, the Nationalist capital was firmly established, and in 1928 the United States became the first major power to recognize the Nationalist government. Settlement for damages incurred in the Nanking incident was agreed upon in 1929. In 1927 and 1928, the primary goal of the United States with respect to China was to maintain the Open Door policy by advocating most-favored-nation policies concerning trade and rights of citizens of the various foreign nations residing there for business or missionary purposes. In the quarter-century since Secretary of State John Hay had first initiated these policies, however, vast changes had taken place. The Quing dynasty no longer existed and China was in turmoil due to conflict between Nationalist, communist, and provincial warlord armies. For Japan, apprehension grew over the protection of Japanese rights in the Kwantung Leased Territory, the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) and its corridor to Mukden and beyond, and in the Shantung Peninsula. Even after relinquishing political control of Shantung in 1922, Japan continued to maintain extensive business and railroad rights in the province, and more than twenty thousand Japanese resided there. After Chiang and his forces had gained control of areas to the south of the Yangtze River and strategic locations in Kiangsu Province, particularly Nanking and Shanghai, the Nationalists were set to march to the north with Peking as a main objective. Shantung Province was directly in the line of march for the Nationalist troops in their primary objective of taking control of Peking and other areas to the north. This condition presented several problems to the Japanese: first, the protection of Japanese lives and property in Shantung Province; second, the continuance of a Chinese official in Peking who would be friendly; and third, the maintenance of Japan’s “special interests” in Manchuria and Mongolia. Japanese officials were not at all certain that Chiang would fulfill these objectives. In 1927, there were forty-six hundred Japanese business firms in China. About 60 percent of Japanese investment on the China mainland was in Manchuria and 25 percent in Shanghai. Most of the remainder was in Shantung. Japanese trade associations in China pressured Tokyo for more protection and “positive solutions.” The president of the Association of Japanese Businessmen in China issued a statement in Japanese and English: “A peace policy may be all right but we cannot let Chinese mobs bring injury and harm upon our nationals and their property while we lie calmly back with non-resistance principles on our lips. We desire that the government decide upon some clearcut, definite action.”4 Railroads were a principal investment of the Japanese in China. In Shantung, the Tsingtao to Tsinan Railway was seen as in danger from the actions of Chiang’s army. In Manchuria, Japanese efforts to build new railways were rebuffed by local authorities. In some cases, Chinese constructed parallel lines to

126

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

draw business away from the SMR. There was more talk of Japan’s “special rights” in Manchuria and Mongolia. SMR president Yamamoto Jotaro viewed the impressive economic growth in the area since 1905 as due to the peace and security provided by Japan. Therefore, he claimed, Japan was really helping China. Japanese blood had been spilled in 1894–1895 and again in 1904–1905 to preserve the integrity of Northeast Asia and it was the basis for Japan’s “special interest.” In Prime Minister Tanaka’s view, Japan also had a “special responsibility” to maintain stability in Manchuria and Mongolia. Tanaka also saw this region as a solution to the population problems of Japan and Korea, and almost one million Koreans resided in Manchuria in the late 1920s.5 To coordinate policy on China, a meeting known as the Eastern Conference was held in Tokyo from June 27 to July 7, 1927. This meeting was attended by government officials, politicians, military officers, and businessmen who wanted to integrate the Japanese position in China. The outcome resulted in a “positive” China policy that would ensure protection of Japan’s special interests in China, by force if necessary. Japanese policy was to support Chiang in areas to the south, and in the north, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, a provincial general who controlled Peking and Manchuria. Because of policy developed at this conference, Japan intervened several times on the China mainland in attempting to prevent Nationalist forces from reaching Peking, and more importantly, Manchuria. By the next year, the policy would change to allow Chiang to enter Peking but to still keep Manchuria under separate control. There were several Japanese expeditions to Shantung resulting from this conference. The first occurred from May to September 1927 when Chiang forces attempted to continue their march to the north. Japan sent four thousand troops, ostensibly to protect Japanese lives and property, but for the real purpose of preventing Chiang from reaching Peking. The troops were withdrawn when Chiang suspended his Northern Expedition. Japanese troops were sent again in May 1928 when the Northern Expedition was resumed. This time about twenty thousand troops were sent, about one soldier for every Japanese resident. Major fighting took place at Tsinan and Chinese forces suffered significant casualties. This outbreak of fighting generated concern on the part of the United States. The American consul general at Shanghai reported to the secretary of state: May 4, 1928, 11 A.M. On the morning of May 3rd at about 10 o’clock there occurred a clash between Japanese and Nationalist troops [in Tsinan], the precise cause of which is as yet unknown. General firing from both sides then ensued, the Japanese sending out armored cars and detachments to clear the settlement of Southern [Nationalist] troops. In the course of the fighting which continued with considerable intensity until 6 P.M. and intermittently all night, it is understood the Japanese employed field artillery with which the Chinese wireless station was destroyed.6

Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg offered the good offices of the United States to settle the disputes between Japan and China, but the two nations in-

Japanese Army Moves in on Civilian Government

127

sisted on resolving their differences independently. John V. A. MacMurray, the U.S. Minister to China, advised Washington that Japanese actions, reported to be for the protection of foreigners in north China, were for the real purpose of halting further progress of the Northern Expedition. The Japanese government denied this, but it was later revealed that General Fukuda Hikosuke, the commander of the Japanese forces, had acted in violation of orders in the 1928 Tsinan incident. Acting on a pretext of maintaining order, Fukuda gave a twelvehour ultimatum to the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate the city and retreat to the south. When the Nationalists stood their ground, Japanese troops opened fire that resulted in the deaths of thirty-six hundred Chinese troops. This was followed by a harsh military occupation of Tsinan for the next year. But, as in many other cases involving Japan’s actions in China, General Fukuda’s insubordination went unpunished and he was welcomed back to Japan as a hero.7 Japanese policy underwent a shift in 1928 when it was decided to permit Chiang to occupy Peking, but not to advance into Manchuria. Initially, Tokyo decided that Chang, originally from Manchuria, would return to Mukden. The plan was that Japanese troops would take a stand at Shanhaikuan to prevent Nationalist troops from moving into Manchuria. Shanhaikuan, located on the Gulf of Chihli at the point where the Great Wall of China meets the sea, is an entry point into the Three Eastern Provinces, collectively identified before 1945 as Manchuria. In May 1928, however, Marshal Chang made a statement to the country at large, which alarmed some of the more militant officers of the Japanese Kwantung Army (this was the name given to the Japanese troops stationed on the Liaotung Peninsula). Chang explained: I have heard a good deal and invariably with a feeling of pain. I could not bear to see the bolshevism of this nation, and it was responding to the call of the provinces that I determined to lead my troops for a campaign against bolshevism. From the very beginning I declared that I would regard my personal foes as friends if only they concurred with me in the suppression of bolshevism. . . . . . . During the last year or two unfortunate international incidents had happened in Canton, Hankow, Nanking and Tsinan. It is highly regrettable that foreigners should be involved in our domestic struggles. If this state of affairs should be allowed to continue I shall be unable to face the whole nation as well as our friendly powers.8

High-level officers of the Japanese Kwantung Army viewed Chang’s statement as conciliatory toward the Nationalists, especially since Chiang had terminated his relationships with the communists and had brutally suppressed them. This action met the conditions of Chang’s major prerequisite. In view of the Kwantung Army concern that this turn of events might lead to unification of China under the Nationalists—with a diminishing of Japan’s position in Manchuria—Japanese staff officers requested that Tokyo change its plans to permit Marshal Chang to proceed to Mukden and that he be disarmed. The Tanaka cabinet did not concur in this proposal. Actually, public opinion in Japan—and

128

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

editorial comment in leading newspapers—favored a “hands-off” policy regarding intervention in China’s domestic affairs. Nevertheless, staff officers of the Kwantung Army decided to “rectify” the situation, citing Tanaka’s “indecisiveness.” Colonel Komoto Daisaku saw Chang as now being sympathetic to Chiang and the preeminent threat to Japanese interests in Manchuria and decided to take matters into his own hands. In another notorious case of gekokujo (insubordination), mid-level Japanese army officers—with no authority from Tokyo—plotted to assassinate Chang as he traveled by train from Peking to Mukden. The scheme called for Chang to be replaced by his son Chang Hsueh-liang who was inexperienced and thought to be easily persuaded to serve Japan’s interests. MacMurray, the U.S. minister to China, reported: Chang boarded his special train at the Chien Men Station [in Peking] early in the morning of June 3rd bound for Mukden, his departure, with full honors and to the accompaniment of music from two military bands, being not without dignity. [Nationalist troops entered Peking on June 9, 1928, and took control of the city for the Nanking government.] It is stated that the Marshal’s original plan had been to leave by automobile secretly and unostentatiously and that it was with some misgivings that he undertook to return to his stronghold in the Three Eastern Provinces in the open manner adopted. If that was the case his premonition of disaster was substantiated since a bomb explosion, mysteriously engineered by agencies as yet not determined, severely damaged his train as it was passing under a South Manchuria Railway bridge in the outskirts of Mukden on the morning of June 4th.9

Chang’s suffered severe injuries and died a few days later. His death, however, was not announced until June 21, two days after the inauguration of his son, Chang Hsueh-liang. MacMurray commented: “The delay in making known the Generalissimo’s demise was reported to have been due to the unsubstantiated fear . . . that the Japanese thereupon would seize control of Mukden.”10 Under the direction of Colonel Komoto, a staff officer of the Japanese Kwantung Army, a Japanese army captain, and his engineer troops had planted the bomb on an overpass near Mukden. It was detonated at the moment Chang’s train coach passed the bridge. The conspirators had hoped for an ensuing military conflict to use as a pretext for taking over Mukden, but it did not occur. During investigations of the murder, Kwantung Army officers claimed they knew nothing of the plans and accused Chinese of responsibility. In Tokyo, Tanaka claimed he knew nothing of the plans and called it an “unthinkable disaster.” Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) issued a statement explaining “Immediately after the incident our garrison troops spotted three suspiciouslooking Chinese attempting to clamber up the embankment of the South Manchurian Railway. Our troops at once approached and questioned them. Whereupon, the Chinese attempted to hurl a bomb at our troops. Our men promptly stabbed and killed two of them. The third man fled.” It was later

Japanese Army Moves in on Civilian Government

129

revealed that Japanese troops had bribed three Chinese vagrants to go to the scene under a pretext of receiving work, and that the innocent Chinese had been murdered to provide a cover-up for Japanese actions.11 Several months later, Tanaka learned the true story of what had happened and reported to the emperor on June 26, 1929. The emperor said: “What I have heard just now seems to be at variance with what you told me last time.” He ordered that “strict military discipline” be upheld. Tanaka ordered that the perpetrators be court-martialed, but obfuscation and dissembling on the part of the army staff led to lenient treatment. On July 1, 1929, punishment resulted in reprimands of two senior officers, the placing of the commander in chief of the Kwantung Army on the reserve list, and the suspension of Colonel Komoto, the organizer of the plot, from army service. The guiding principle of the investigating authorities in IGH was to avoid embarrassment of Japan and, above all, to deflect any dishonor on the Japanese army. With the emperor indicating his displeasure with the outcome, the Tanaka cabinet resigned the next day, July 2, 1929.12 In any event, for all their efforts, the Kwantung Army plotters soon discovered that Chang’s son, Chang Hsueh-liang, was even more loyal to Chiang than his father had been. His proposal that the flag of the Nationalist government be flown in Manchuria led to angry opposition from Japanese army officers. Even more significantly, Chang was appointed as an official in the government of the Nationalists. Chang was also instrumental in the development of Chinese railways and a port at Hulutao, which siphoned off a considerable amount of traffic from the SMR. The Chinese Nationalist flag was hoisted for the first time at Mukden on December 29, 1928.13 Less than six months later, on June 3, 1929, the government of Japan recognized the Nationalists as the legitimate government of China. Clearly, Japanese expansionists in Manchuria would have to look for another pretext to further their cause. It would come in less than three years. KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT: THERE WILL BE NO MORE WAR In 1927, Foreign Minister Aristide Briand of France initiated discussions with Secretary of State Kellogg for a pact renouncing aggressive war. Because the United States had not joined the League of Nations, this proposal offered the Calvin Coolidge administration an opportunity to show its earnestness in joining an international agreement repudiating war as a means of settling international disputes. Within a year, other nations had shown interest and the covenant was signed by representatives of fifteen governments in Paris on August 27, 1928. The treaty attracted the attention of other countries and by the time ratifications had been received and the treaty went into effect on July 24, 1929, a total of forty-six nations had accepted the provisions of the pact. Over the next three years, seventeen additional governments indicated their adherence. By the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, also known as the Pact of Paris, the leading

130

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

nations of the world—plus a number of lesser states—condemned “recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,” and renounced war “as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.”14 The events of the next decade, however, would reveal these auspicious goals to be elusive. The pact had no provision for punitive sanctions or for international cooperation in suppressing aggression committed by a signatory power. Instead, according to President Herbert Hoover, Coolidge’s successor: “Public opinion will suffice to check violence.”15 In negotiations that led up to acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, the United States played a key role. China and Japan made certain their own respective agendas were covered, which led to some ingenious wording to make their points. China saw the treaty as an opportunity to make known its complaints about treatment at the hands of foreign powers.16 For China, the principal irritants were the unequal treaties and the stationing of large numbers of Japanese troops in Shantung Province. Chinese Nationalist foreign minister Chengying T. Wang in Nanking advised the U.S. government on September 13, 1928: We are deeply sensible, however, that in order to make war really impossible, it is necessary to eliminate all causes which are likely to give rise to any international dispute, and to rigidly uphold the principle of equality and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty among all nations. My Government, therefore, firmly believes that the signatory powers will abide by the spirit of the present treaty and remove, at the earliest opportunity, all of China’s unequal treaties and encroachments upon her sovereignty, as, for instance, the stationing of large numbers of alien troops on her soil.17

Japan had several problems with the treaty. The first involved what some advisers in the Imperial Household Ministry conceived to be an infringement on the prerogatives of the emperor. The phrase in Article 1, “in the names of their respective peoples,” was deemed to be inconsistent with the 1889 constitution of Japan, which specified that: “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” Furthermore, “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution.”18 Also, “The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.”19 Obviously, the statement: “in the names of their respective peoples,” was a foreign concept to Japan. This obstacle was eventually overcome by an interpretation rendered by the Privy Council (the senior consultative body to the emperor and the government) that attached more importance to the connotation of the word “peoples” than to the interpretation of the phrase “in the names,” construing the term “peoples” to mean “states.”20 Another problem for Japan in 1928 was the fact that the government of Japan had not yet recognized the Nationalist government of China. In view of Japan’s military operations in China, this situation presented two questions: (1) “Should Japan, in the present circumstances, ratify a treaty to which China had adhered?”

Japanese Army Moves in on Civilian Government

131

(This was entirely speculative as China had not yet adhered to the treaty and did not do so until May 8, 1929.) (2) “Would it be possible to ratify the Treaty with the reservation that the obligations created by the Treaty shall not exist in respect of China so long as Japan withholds recognition from the Nationalist Government?”21 This convoluted proposition indicated that some parties in Japan wanted to treat China in one way while dealing with the rest of the world in another. In any event, these two questions were to become moot when Japan ratified the treaty in June 1929 and, at the same time, recognized the Nationalist government in China. The key to resolution of the concerns related to China lay in the answer to the next question asked by Japan specifically: “Would the right of self-defense be reserved for nations who were signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact?” The government of Japan, in effect, answered its own question with the comment: “The proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self-defense.”22 In fact, most of the signatory nations stipulated the right of self-defense meaning that use of armed force was not totally ruled out. Japan, in its subsequent use of military operations against China was careful to create a pretext that it had been initially attacked so that the basis of self-defense could be used, and not to declare war in any of its battles against Chinese troops.23 In only a few years, it would be seen that the Kellogg-Briand Treaty was little more than a pretense of international cooperation for peace. The aggressive actions of Germany, Italy, and Japan would force the other nations of the world to act in self-defense. THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE: JAPAN’S NAVY REBELS AGAINST LIMITS By 1927, the major nations of the world were again having differences of opinion regarding limitations on construction of naval warships. The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments signed by representatives of the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference applied only to capital warships of ten thousand tons or more. Between 1924 and 1927, the Japanese navy built several cruisers that exceeded the Washington treaty limits. Additionally, the United States and Great Britain disputed each other’s intentions and a rivalry was escalating, especially with respect to refueling locations for oil to power the warships. Seeking ways to reconcile their differences, the five powers met in Geneva at another conference on June 20, 1927. Representatives of the United States and Britain had major differences. Britain insisted upon a fleet of seventy vessels (below capital ship category) and proposed that the U.S. Navy be permitted to maintain forty-seven such warships, while Japan would be permitted twentyone. The United States insisted that Britain’s fleet be no larger than its own. Britain agreed to allow the United States to maintain the higher number proposed for its own navy, but refused to reduce its fleet to the size proposed for

132

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

the smaller American authorization. All of the conferees appeared to know that Congress would not provide funding to build up to the size of the British fleet. Disputes also ensued over classification of ships by tonnage category. Japanese navy representatives suggested that all nations simply stop building warships. Their recommendation was not a surprise because recent shipbuilding had given Japan more than its authorized allocation and additional appropriations would not be favorably viewed by the Diet. The moratorium was not agreeable to the other nations, and the Geneva Conference came to an end on August 24, 1927, with nothing accomplished. After the fall of the Tanaka cabinet, Hamaguchi Osachi became prime minister on July 2, 1929, bringing Shidehara with him to serve once again as the foreign minister. Less than four months later, stocks crashed on the New York Stock Exchange and were followed rapidly by major declines on stock exchanges all over the world. The global economic depression that followed affected Japan, and virtually all exports to its biggest customer—the United States—came to a halt. Tax revenues took a sharp downward spiral, and Hamaguchi dealt with the resultant stress on government funding in the same manner that most major nations of the time used: drastic reductions in spending. Military appropriations were one of the chief targets. Problems continued to fester, however, and to fill a need for agreement on naval limitations another conference was called to be held in London in early 1930. The London Naval Conference opened on January 21, 1930, with representatives of Britain, France, the United States, Japan, and Italy present. In the two-and-a-half-year period since the 1927 failure, British and American objectives had grown closer, while the other nations’ positions had grown more divergent. Japan now sought to increase the 1922 Washington treaty ratios from five-five-three to ten-ten-seven. Representatives of the Japanese Imperial Navy reasoned that an increased ratio could be used to pressure the Diet into increasing appropriations for construction of warships. A compromise was reached on the ratios between Britain, the United States, and Japan, with an agreement to divide cruisers into two types, those with eightinch guns and those with six-inch guns. A percentage of tonnage was to be transferable from one group to another. Japan agreed to accept a five-five-three ratio for the larger cruisers and a ten-ten-seven ratio for the smaller ones. The three nations also agreed to reduce the number of capital ships, specifying by name those that would be scrapped. The United States gave up three ships, Great Britain reduced its number of capital ships by five, and Japan by one. The nations agreed not to build any aircraft carriers larger than ten thousand tons, and limits were placed on the construction of submarines. It was agreed that the treaty would remain in force until December 31, 1936.24 The treaty was signed by representatives of the five nations in London on April 22, 1930, recommended for ratification by the Senate, and ratified by President Hoover for the United States on July 22, with the other governments depositing their ratifications at London by December 31, 1930. The treaty

Japanese Army Moves in on Civilian Government

133

marked the beginning of an era of closer cooperation between the United States and Great Britain. For Japan, the pact exacerbated the factional differences between protreaty and antitreaty elements in the navy that had existed since the 1922 Washington Naval Conference. Naval officers in favor of treaty restrictions tended to be older men or those who had been assigned in Western nations for extended periods, while the opposition consisted of expansionists with a desire for uncontested power. The latter group saw the unequal ratios as a national humiliation for Japan, and with their like number in the army, worked closely with ultranationalist groups to expand Japan’s territorial gains in East Asia. Prime Minister Hamaguchi’s support of the treaty led to accusations that he had encroached upon the prerogatives of the emperor’s supreme command. A member of an ultra nationalist group shot Hamaguchi in November 1930, which led to his death the following August.25 WORLDWIDE ECONOMIC DEPRESSION The optimism and booming prosperity of the 1920s for much of the world was suddenly jolted at the end of the decade by a drastic drop in the market value of shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The stock market crash of October 29, 1929, and the ensuing decline in stock prices over the next few years led to worldwide depression in the 1930s. The major nations of the world were quickly affected and the May 1931 failure of the Austrian CreditAnstalt, coupled with bank failures in the United States, crippled international finance. Rapid contraction in the money supply caused international bankruptcies and massive unemployment. By 1932, there were 12 million jobless in the United States, 5.6 million in Germany, and 2.7 million in Britain. High tariffs were imposed by most nations to protect domestic industry, thereby significantly reducing world trade. Also, major governments coped with the financial turmoil by deflationary budget balancing that made the situation even worse. Adverse economic conditions affected trade between the United States, European nations, and the countries of East Asia. Japan experienced drastic consequences caused both by a deterioration of its trade position as well as by a major outflow of its gold reserves. After the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, Japan had gone off the gold standard because of the need for huge financing and borrowing to rebuild. In 1929, plans were made—before the stock market crash—to return to the gold standard. After announcing convertibility of monetary currency to gold in January 1930, Japan’s government experienced huge outflows of the precious metal because of the overvalued rate of exchange for Japanese yen. An embargo was reimposed in December 1931. Even more damaging was the economic impact of a vast reduction in exports. By 1931, trade volume had dropped to half of its 1920s average, prices were tumbling, and the exchange rate for the yen had dropped to the point where it was only worth about half as much against the dollar as it had been a few years earlier. Prices of commodities for export fell significantly. Included in this cat-

134

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

egory were some of Japan’s major products, such as silk, cotton, thread, and soybeans. Businesses reduced the number of employees commensurate with the decreased volume of trade, which led to a high unemployment rate and a further downward spiral in the economy. Bankruptcies were widespread with all types of business concerns unable to pay debts, payroll, rent, taxes, and other expenses. Furthermore, the depression affected China’s ability to repay loans to Japanese banks and to the government. Repayment was slow or nonexistent with a principal outstanding of about 32 million yen and accrued interest of 13 million yen.26 Until the late 1920s, the government of Japan had accepted the principles of free trade and promoted the integration of Japan into the world economy. As the depression worsened, however, Japanese policymakers sought alternatives to free trade through a self-sufficient economic trade bloc enforced through political means rather than reliance on a free enterprise system. As the world then became increasingly fragmented, Japan saw the establishment of a “cocoon” for the yen trading bloc as a way to insulate itself from international economic problems. In 1931, the Diet passed the Major Industries Control Law with industrial cartels, controlled products, sales, and pricing. This law, applying only to Japan proper, led to a movement of domestic industry to Korea and Manchuria. By early 1931, total Japanese investment in Manchuria—amounting to the equivalent of 850 million U.S. dollars—made Japan the largest investor there. The Kwantung Army high command was well aware of the disastrous consequences for Japan in the depression and saw Manchuria as a key element in the solution to the problem. Even with considerable Chinese emigration to Manchuria in the 1920s, the region’s population of thirty million in 1930 was relatively sparse in comparison to the huge size of the region and its vast mineral resources. By 1930, Japan was a dominant factor in the economy of Manchuria, and the SMR was the preeminent agent in that expansion. The SMR zone— modeled on the U.S. concept used for the Panama Canal zone—covered areas on each side of the railroad tracks, including many cities and towns, for a total of 495 square kilometers. The zone was the focal point of Japanese business and industrial development, including steel mills, coal mines, and manufacturing plants. Apologists claimed Japan’s expansionist actions in Manchuria over the next several years were necessary in the search for a solution to the region’s economic problems that had been caused by the worldwide crisis.27 The yen had become overvalued in the 1920s, but after Japan’s decision to go off the gold standard in December 1931, an inflationary money policy was initiated by the government that led to a decrease in its value. Where the yen had earlier been valued at 2.17 yen to the dollar, devaluation in the early 1930s led to a fall in value to approximately 4 yen to the dollar. By the tactic of depreciating the yen’s value, abandoning the gold standard, practicing reflationary monetary policies, and increasing expenditures in Manchuria—along with the political control of business investment—the Japanese

Japanese Army Moves in on Civilian Government

135

recovered from the Great Depression somewhat more quickly than other major nations, including the United States. The strategy employed in Manchuria— along with the plotting of the Kwantung Army staff for a complete takeover— would eventually lead to a major war with China and, consequently, war with the United States.

CHAPTER 7

The Early 1930s: Japan Expands While the United States Withdraws from Colonial Ambitions DECEPTION AT MUKDEN: THE JAPANESE ARMY OCCUPIES MANCHURIA After the Tanaka Giichi cabinet was forced to resign in July 1929, Hamaguchi Osachi became prime minister and Shidehara Kijuro once again was appointed foreign minister. Because of his support for the 1930 London Naval Limitations Treaty, Hamaguchi was strongly opposed by the military clique, especially the Naval General Staff Office. Right-wing ultranationalists viewed Hamaguchi’s actions as a violation of the emperor’s prerogatives. The Meiji constitution specified that the emperor was to determine the composition of the army and navy, and military leaders claimed that neither the cabinet nor the legislature had any authority over the issue. This led to an attack by a right-wing youth on Hamaguchi in November 1930 that resulted in his death the following August. This was the first of a significant number of assassinations that would take place in Japan in the 1930s, leading to the charge of “Rule by Assassination.” Wakatsuki Reijiro, the prime minister from 1926–1927, resumed office in 1931. Shidehara served as foreign minister from July 1929 to December 1931 and was acting prime minister during a part of Hamaguchi’s period of incapacitation from wounds. Events after 1930 placed both Shidehara and Wakatsuki in opposition to Japan’s militarists. Japan’s Kwantung Army officers increasingly decided to take matters into their own hands in a land grab for Manchuria. The rupture between Japan’s civilian politicians and the army generals became obvious and was even commented on by American officials in dispatches to

138

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Washington. John Carter Vincent, the American consul in Mukden, reported on September 10, 1931: There is good reason to believe that internal Japanese politics are more responsible for the present threatening aspect of Sino-Japanese relations than anything that the Chinese have done or left undone. . . . It is my opinion that relations between [the] Japanese Army and the Japanese Foreign Office (representing non-Army elements in the Government) are as much strained just now as relations between China and Japan, and that the Army authorities are quite as willing to have the negotiations fail as the Foreign Office is anxious to have them succeed.1

There were, however, some exceptions to this generalization, and the Japanese army had its collaborators in the Foreign Ministry and in other agencies as well. Also, most officials of the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) were advocates of expansion. After taking possession of the Liaotung Peninsula in 1905, Japan viewed Manchuria as a source of raw materials and an outlet for exports from domestic industry. All along the SMR zone Japanese industry and commerce prospered. With the onset of the economic depression resulting from the stock market crash of 1929, Japan made additional efforts to expand into other areas of Manchuria. Thousands of Korean farmers—Japanese subjects—were moved to areas near Changchun, and Japanese merchants opened businesses in far-flung areas of Manchuria. This aggressive action led to friction with local Chinese authorities. Several incidents between 1928 and 1931 gave a preview of the ominous events that would take place in September 1931. Korean farmers about twenty miles north of Changchun were attacked by a large number of Chinese farmers in July 1931 at Wanpaoshan in a dispute over use of Chinese-owned land for irrigation ditches. Initially, Chinese police made the Koreans fill in the ditches and leave. Then, the Japanese consul in Changchun sent consular police to back the Koreans, but the Chinese police, in greater numbers, returned and drove the Koreans away. The Japanese consular police began firing at the Chinese, forcing them to leave. No one was hurt, but the Korean farmers returned and completed digging their ditches. The incident could well have ended there, but when word of the Chinese actions reached Korea, anti-Chinese riots broke out in Inchon, Seoul, Pusan, and Pyongyang. About four hundred Chinese who lived in Korea were murdered and property damage was extensive. Word of these barbarous deeds then led to anti-Japanese riots in China in cities such as Shanghai, Tsingtao, and Tientsin, where anti-Japanese associations were formed. The Chinese government protested to Tokyo that the actions of the Japanese police outside the grounds of the Changchun consulate were illegal, and that the Koreans were living outside of the Chientao District, to which they were limited by a 1909 agreement. No solution was reached on this matter before another incident occurred. After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Japanese army

The Early 1930s

139

.

assigned troops to the Liaotung Peninsula and designated them as the Kwantung Army. The troops, initially restricted to Port Arthur, Dairen, and the environs, began to move into adjacent parts of Manchuria after 1928 on the pretext of infringement of their treaty rights. The SMR also had railway guards assigned to the SMR right-of-way and in major cities along the line, such as Mukden. In November 1928, the Manchurian Youth League was founded in Dairen at the first meeting of the All-Manchurian Convention of Japanese. This group consisted primarily of small- and middle-level Japanese merchants throughout Manchuria and junior officials of the SMR, and their objective was “the creation of an autonomous Manchurian-Mongolian state.”2 Several of the incidents from 1928 to 1931, including the Wanpaoshan affair, were used by the Manchurian Youth League to find reasons for a complete takeover. The Kwantung Army and SMR guards found even more excuses to be active outside of their assigned areas by 1931—usually cloaked as something mundane like liaison with railway and trade associations, but more often for the real purpose of spying and making plans for a complete takeover of Manchuria. Early in June 1931, Captain Nakamura Shintaro of the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section, accompanied by a Japanese assistant and Russian and Mongolian interpreters, under the disguise of an agricultural mission, journeyed to Harbin, and from there traveled westward to the remote areas of Manchuria, in the direction of Russia and Mongolia. Captain Nakamura conducted “investigations” along the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) at Manchuli, Tsitsihar, and Hailar. Chinese intelligence agents discovered that Nakamura and his party were spies, arrested them at a small town in northwestern Manchuria, and executed them on July 1, 1931. For two weeks there was no news of the fate of the Nakamura group until newspapers began to publish rumors. John Vincent, the American consul in Mukden, reported: Japanese newspapers in Manchuria were the first to secure rumors of the fate of the party. After the appearance of a news report about July 15th, the Japanese took steps to suppress all accounts of the incident pending a thorough investigation. For this reason it was not until August 17th that the first newspaper account of the execution appeared in the Manchurian papers.3

The Japanese consul general in Mukden and a special representative from the Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) in Tokyo independently pushed for a Chinese apology, an indemnity, and punishment of those responsible for the execution. The IGH representative, a Major Mori, went even further: In dealing with so serious a case, nice diplomatic courtesies could not satisfy the Japanese Army, and I am here to see for myself what amount of sincerity is shown by the Chinese side handling the case. It goes without saying that, once we are satisfied of lack of sincerity on the Chinese side, the Japanese side might enforce its demand.4

140

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Agitation over the Nakamura incident grew in Japan as well as among Japanese and Korean colonists in Manchuria. The public was not told that Captain Nakamura was wearing civilian clothes when captured and was carrying a large amount of narcotics. The Japanese army continued to press for a settlement of the Nakamura case and other matters pending between China and Japan related to Manchuria. As the days passed, high-level staff officers from the IGH in Tokyo and the Kwantung Army began to make threats of a forced settlement. Colonel Doihara Kenji, an influential Kwantung Army officer, explained in midSeptember that if Chinese officials were reluctant to resolve the case “there might be trouble.”5 Japanese army officers—especially those in the Kwantung Army—SMR officials, Japanese industrialists, and small merchants in Manchuria, along with the Manchurian Youth League, were impatient and eager for a Japanese takeover of Manchuria and Mongolia. There were, however, two impediments to Japanese aggression: the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the collective security provisions of the League of Nations charter. With respect to the first obstacle, Japan—and most other nations—had ratified the Kellogg-Briand Pact with the proviso of the right to self-defense in the event of attack. An attack on Japanese forces would ostensibly provide the right for troops to act in “self-defense.” In the second case, the League of Nations restrictions could be overcome by making Manchuria a separate nation with sympathetic local officials in positions of responsibility, thereby giving an aura of authenticity to independence. Japan’s preeminence and suzerainty could be assured by the assignment of Japanese advisors to the puppet government. Foreign diplomats in China received several reports giving advance warning of Japan’s intentions. Nelson Johnson, the U.S. minister in China, reported on September 11 that he had been advised not “to go south to resume negotiations in regard to extraterritoriality in view of the fact that Japan was bound to take drastic action vis-a`-vis China very shortly . . . within the next three months.”6 Willys R. Peck, the American consul general at Nanking, provided additional information on September 12 of intelligence reports indicating that Japanese sources would use “provocations in Manchuria in order to provide excuses for the use of force, as well as an intensive propaganda campaign designed to blind the eyes of the world to the facts of the situation.”7 The intelligence reports were correct in their assessment of Japanese plans, but it would take only one week—not three months—for events to unfold. On the night of September 18, 1931, a junior officer from the Kwantung Army forced a railway worker to plant an explosive device along a section of track on the railway line leading into Mukden from the north. The purpose was to derail an express train on the SMR, thereby creating a pretext for Kwantung Army troops to exploit the outrage over Japanese lives lost in the incident. The site selected was just north of central Mukden less than a mile from the North Barracks, the base of elite Chinese troops. Under this scenario, the Chinese troops would rush out to investigate. The Japanese would then attack, accusing

The Early 1930s

141

the Chinese of creating the incident and the resultant deaths of Japanese crew and passengers on the SMR express. Ever since the futile 1928 attempt to create an excuse for military action by the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, Japanese army leaders had continued to search for ways to initiate hostilities in Manchuria. The expanding authority of Chiang Kai-shek and the prospect of a united China including Manchuria gave a sense of urgency to the effort to seize control in Manchuria. Three Kwantung Army officers, Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, Lieutenant Colonel Ishihara Kanji, and Colonel Doihara, had devoted a large portion of their time over the previous two years in planing for the aggressive actions. All that was needed was a pretext for action to begin. When the execution of Captain Nakamura failed to ignite the fuse, Ishihara and Itagaki contrived the plot to derail the SMR express train in what would come to be known as the Manchurian Incident. The explosion, just after 10 P.M., created a small gap in the tracks before the train arrived, but the fissure was not wide enough to derail the train. The train continued unhindered and arrived at Mukden Station on time. Miraculously, there was no derailment and no loss of lives. A nearby six-man patrol under Lieutenant Kawamoto Suemori was supposed to exploit the “serious incident” as a pretext for military action. But there was no “serious incident.” The resourceful Japanese lieutenant, however, tried to make the best of the situation. He directed his group to begin firing upon Chinese guards at the barracks gate in an attempt to get some sort of hostile action going. The Chinese, however, had locked up for the night and were not going to be drawn into the fray. In frustration, larger elements of the Kwantung Army came upon the scene and began firing field artillery howitzers at the North Barracks. The Chinese soldiers had been ordered to ignore any Japanese military action, while Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang was warned that any defense would be misrepresented. Even though some Chinese belatedly entered the fighting, Japanese soldiers quickly captured major strong points in the area and were in control of the city of Mukden by sunrise on September 19.8 Notification of the event was rapidly sent to all Japanese army units in Manchuria and Korea, as well as to General Honjo Shigeru, the commanding general of Kwantung Army, at his headquarters in Port Arthur. All Japanese forces in Manchuria were mobilized for combat and Honjo requested the commander in chief of Japanese forces in Korea to send reinforcements to Manchuria in accordance with prearranged plans. All of these orders were issued before Tokyo was even consulted. Once Prime Minister Wakatsuki and his cabinet ministers became aware of events, General Minami Jiro, the Minister of war, issued instructions to delay the sending of troops from Korea pending approval by the emperor. Events moved rapidly, however, and one brigade of Japanese troops from Korea crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria. General Honjo moved his headquarters from Port Arthur to Mukden on September 19 and ordered all his troops into action “in self defense.” Two days later, Japanese troops occupied Kirin

142

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

City and other areas of Kirin Province. The Chinese governor of the province, under threat of duress from a Japanese general, declared Kirin to be independent of China. More troops from Korea moved into Manchuria and captured additional territory. The emperor “reluctantly” gave approval for actions in Manchuria, and reprimanded Generals Minami and Kanaya Hanzo, the chief of the general staff, with the statement: “Hereafter, take heed.”9 In the stilted structure of the Japanese hierarchy, even such an innocent-sounding comment, coming from the emperor, was looked upon as a highly disparaging remark. However, it is just another example of the distancing from unpleasant events that high Japanese officials use to separate themselves from actions taken, ostensibly without their knowledge, by subordinates. The Chinese government filed a complaint with the secretary general of the League of Nations on September 20, 1931, requesting “that in virtue of article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations you forthwith summon a meeting of the Council of the League” to review the situation in Manchuria and that “the Council take immediate steps: to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to reestablish the status quo ante; and to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.”10 Even though the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, China found another route to invoke action from Washington. A note of September 21, 1931, from the Chinese charge´ d’affaires, Yung Kwai, to the secretary of state petitioned: Sir: I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by my Government to bring to your attention the occupation of Chinese territory by Japanese troops in Manchuria. Japanese troops near Mukden, without the slightest provocation, opened an attack on the Chinese barracks on September 18, at 10 P.M. and continued bombarding the Chinese camps and arsenal, killing a large number of Chinese people in spite of the complete nonresistance of the Chinese troops. The whole city of Mukden and its vicinity were occupied by Japanese troops by September 19, at 6:30 A.M. The occupation of Antung is already confirmed, and possibly other places also are now under Japanese military control. As the United States, China and Japan are all signatory powers of the Kellogg Pact, and as the United States is the sponsor of the sacred engagements contained in this Treaty . . . the Chinese Government urgently appeals to the American Government to take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far East and the upholding of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.11

The Council of the League of Nations wasted no time. The issue was taken up on September 21 at Geneva, with representatives of Japan and China engaging in a lengthy debate. The League of Nations Assembly was in session and had only a few days earlier elected China to a seat on the council with Japan’s full support. Ironically, once the news of the Mukden incident was received

The Early 1930s

143

Japan’s representative, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, insisted that China did not deserve recognition because the Nationalist government was not in full control of all of China. Yoshizawa, having been the Japanese minister in China in 1928, was very familiar with Japan’s position concerning China.12 In Washington, President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson gave attention to the Manchurian incident, instructing Hugh Wilson, the U.S. minister in Switzerland, to monitor proceedings of the council of the League of Nations concerning the Japanese aggression. Stimson informed Wilson that not only did the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 apply, but also the NinePower Treaty of February 6, 1922.13 Hoover and Stimson both accepted the view that the Japanese civilian government in Tokyo, including the prime minister and the foreign minister, had no part in the outbreak of hostilities. Hoover’s position was to rely on the Japanese government to assert its authority over the generals rather than to take a hard-line position against Tokyo. China was represented by Alfred Sze, the minister to London, who was educated in the United States and spoke English fluently. He has been described as “suave, keen-eyed and keen-witted, he was never caught off-guard, never fell into the many traps set for him by his opponent.” Yoshizawa, whose loyalty was to the army in Manchuria rather than Foreign Minister Shidehara, consistently supported the Kwantung Army position that Chinese troops had attempted to sabotage the SMR train and that the actions taken by Japanese troops were in self-defense.14 Yoshizawa went on to become foreign minister in the next cabinet and was later involved in Japan’s administration of colonial territories in Southeast Asia. He was an ardent supporter of Japan’s expansionist activities. The verbal jousting between Sze and Yoshizawa drew rapt attention from council members, the press, and spectators. When the Chinese representative condemned Japan for its continued expansion in Manchuria, Yoshizawa replied: “There still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin, and a small number of men in a few other places.” Sze responded: “This is a very interesting statement and I wonder whether the Japanese representative would tell us what he considers ‘a small number of men’ and what are the ‘few other places.’ ”15 Yoshikawa sought refuge in obfuscation, insisting that only a small number of Japanese troops were in Manchuria. China’s position was that an independent neutral commission should make an on-site inspection of the situation and report back to the council. Japan was adamantly opposed, and Yoshizawa declared that Japan had no territorial designs in Manchuria; furthermore, that Japanese troops would be held to the minimum necessary only to protect Japanese lives and property. A resolution was introduced committing Japan “to the speedy withdrawal of her troops into the railway zone,” and calling on China to protect Japanese lives and property in the evacuated areas. Sze objected by citing the subterfuge used by Yoshizawa, but reluctantly went along and the resolution was unanimously approved with the council adjourning until October 14. The president of the league council even speculated that further talks on the issue might not be necessary.16

144

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

The resolution did not provide for any type of neutral oversight, the two nations were left to resolve the dispute by themselves, and there were no fixed dates for the withdrawal of troops. It would soon be learned, however, that the Japanese army would interpret certain provisions of the resolution, such as “in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is assured,” as giving it authority to continue an indefinite occupation. China continued to send telegrams to Washington, Paris, and London warning that Japan was up to no good, but Western officials blithely assumed that Japan was carrying out its obligations. It soon became apparent that Japan was bent on a complete takeover of Manchuria. Not only were the Chinese the object of Japan’s disdain, but foreignowned companies also experienced harassment. M. S. Myers, the U.S. consul in Mukden, reported on October 5 that Japanese soldiers were patrolling the streets and stopping all foreigners to check identification papers, including a member of the American consulate staff. The American official commented: “The fact that there has never been any official notification of an establishment of control by the Japanese has made it difficult to judge just where assumption might become presumption with respect to placing responsibility.” Myers also reported that Japanese authorities had seized American-owned companies at several locations. The Mukden international radio station, constructed by the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), was off the air and Japanese consulate officials could not estimate when it would be returned to service.17 Japan expanded its activities in Manchuria by conducting the world’s first aerial bombing of a city on October 8, 1931, indiscriminately killing civilians and destroying private property. The bombing of Chinchow, 150 miles southwest of Mukden and Chang’s headquarters, shocked the world. Although bombing of cities would become commonplace in only a few years, the Japanese attack was seen as a brutal act in 1931. The Council of the League of Nations would have to rethink its position regarding a neutral, independent commission to review Japan’s aggression in Manchuria. Information from diplomatic channels described the bombing: Twelve Japanese aeroplanes yesterday attacked Chinchow on the Peking-Mukden line by dropping more than fifty bombs and firing machine guns, killing one Russian professor, one soldier and fourteen civilians, and wounding more than twenty people. There was considerable damage to the railway station, including the destruction of three locomotives, other damages being under investigation. The Department’s attention should be drawn to the fact that the provincial capital has been removed to Chinchow since the occupation of Mukden.18

Several hours after the bombing, Japanese scout planes appeared over Chinchow dropping leaflets containing an ultimatum from General Honjo, the commander of the Kwantung Army, stating that “the Chinchow Government is the

The Early 1930s

145

creation of Chang Hsueh-liang, which is conducting intrigues in Manchuria inimical to Japanese forces.”19 The war scare was not limited to Manchuria. The Nationalist government in Nanking called for a boycott of Japanese products throughout China that led to threats of reprisal from Japan. About fifty ships of Japan’s Imperial Combined Fleet were sent to Shanghai, which led to open military confrontation there in 1932. In Tokyo, meanwhile, military extremists conspired to attempt a coup d’etat in October. The group was composed of army officers; members of the Sakurakai, an organization of zealous, ultranationalist, field-grade officers; and fanatical civilians. Their objective was to murder Prime Minister Wakatsuki, take over the police department, and have martial law declared. The participants were arrested before they could carry out their plans when their intentions became known. Punishment, however, was very light. Minister of War Minami announced that because they had acted in an “excess of patriotic fervor,” the leader would be sentenced to house arrest for twenty days. No other arrests were made. This grim news from East Asia led officials at the League of Nations to the decision that talks must be resumed. On October 16, 1931, deliberations were initiated again, and Japan’s representative, Yoshizawa, became more intractable than ever. It soon became clear to all that Yoshizawa was going to obfuscate and create as much confusion as possible in the minds of the council members, while giving time to Japan’s military forces to make a complete takeover of all of Manchuria. Yoshizawa’s tactic was to create an illusion that relations between China and Japan were different from what one would expect between European countries. He emphasized Japan’s “special position” in Manchuria by virtue of its victories over China in 1895 and over Russia in 1905. When other council members proposed that the United States be invited as a participant in the proceedings in view of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Yoshizawa refused to be a party to such an arrangement. Furthermore, he rebuffed every compromise proposal and would not discuss a date by which Japanese troops would be removed to the SMR zone and the Kwantung Leased Territory. Yoshizawa’s unyielding position led to another recess at the end of October 1931, and the members agreed to meet again on November 16 to reexamine the situation.20 While Yoshizawa was employing stalling tactics, the Kwantung Army was on the march. Japanese troops entered northwest Manchuria and captured important cities, including Tsitsihar, along the CER. Chiang ordered Chang to retreat south of the Great Wall in order not to risk his troops. When the Council of the League of Nations resumed deliberations on November 16, it became apparent to all members, except for Yoshizawa, that a Commission of Enquiry would be required to make an on-site inspection of the situation in Manchuria. On December 10, 1931, a British official, the second Earl of Lytton, was appointed to head a four-man commission to investigate the state of affairs in China, Japan, and Manchuria. The inquiry was carried out in

146

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

the first half of 1932, but Japan established total control over the area and inaugurated a puppet government in March 1932. In his State of the Union message of December 10, 1931, President Hoover commented: The difficulties between China and Japan have given us great concern, not alone for the maintenance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but for the maintenance of the treaties to which we are a party assuring the territorial integrity of China. It is our purpose to assist in finding solutions sustaining the full spirit of these treaties.21

These were noble words, but Hoover was not willing to back them up with sanctions or military intervention because he feared entanglement with other nations’ affairs. Hoover had experience in China as an engineer and had been caught up in the Boxer Uprising. He knew the area well, but his Quaker background guided him to a policy of pacifism and nonintervention. Three days after Hoover’s remarks, Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned due to his inability to control the army. The cabinet demanded a government of national unity to cope with the events abroad and at home. Inukai Tsuyoshi replaced Wakatsuki as prime minister on December 13, 1931, and his economic, diplomatic, and colonial policies met with increasing opposition. BIRTH OF A PUPPET STATE IN DEFIANCE OF WORLD OPINION Despite the concerns of the League of Nations and the United States, Japan continued its expansion in Manchuria. The Supreme War Council, consisting of representatives of the ministers of war and navy, the army and navy chiefs of staff, and other government officials, approved the concept of an “independent state” for Manchuria on December 24, 1931. A few days later, Kwantung Army troops completed the military takeover of Manchuria. In Washington, Hoover and Stimson grew even more concerned over Japan’s actions. To the United States, Manchuria was a part of China. Even though Japan had treaty rights in parts of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, by its conquest of the entire region, was in violation of treaties to which China, Japan, and the United States were all signatories. The policy of the United States for thirty years, by this time, had been to protect the Open Door policy. On January 7, 1932, Stimson sent identical notes to both Japan and China, expressing his “Nonrecognition policy,” otherwise known as the Stimson policy: With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing

The Early 1930s

147

between China and Japan. But . . . the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China . . . or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy.22

Again, however, just as Hoover had done in his annual message to Congress, there was no threat of any retaliatory action—military or economic. Both Hoover and Stimson, as well as representatives of European nations, were naive in their acceptance of promises from Japanese officials. The crux of the problem was simply that Japanese government officials in Tokyo claimed they could not control the military; military officials in Tokyo, specifically the war minister and the army chief of staff, claimed the Kwantung Army was acting without authorization; and Japanese troops continued unhindered in their conquest of Manchuria. And somewhere in this chain of command was the emperor. Supposedly he was at the top, but with the vagueness and dissembling at all levels he seemed to have no practical authority at all. In reviewing the events of the next few months, however, it can be seen that most Japanese—including the emperor—went along with the actions of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, especially after it had become a fait accompli. Prime Minister Inukai provides a good example. He gave a speech on January 8, 1932, for Movietone News, intended for American audiences, in which he declared: “peace is now restored in Manchuria and . . . orderly civil processes will follow.” That same day a Tokyo newspaper carried an interview with General Minami, the war minister in the Wakatsuki cabinet, who asserted that Japan proposed to “extend her control over Manchuria and Mongolia and would brook no interference on the part of any outside nation with her activities in China.” W. Cameron Forbes, the American ambassador to Japan, asked Inukai “if this meant Japan was now proposing to extend her pretensions over Mongolia as well as Manchuria.” Inukai replied, “the Japanese speak of Manchuria and Mongolia together, meaning Eastern Inner Mongolia next to Manchuria,” explaining that Japan had no intention of reaching out after Outer Mongolia. When Forbes said that it would be helpful to have a map showing the boundaries of Manchuria, the prime minister “laughed and said it would be difficult as the boundaries are indeterminate.”23 A few days later, fighting that was generated by Chinese boycotts of Japanese products as a reaction to Japanese aggression in Manchuria broke out in Shanghai between Japanese and Chinese troops. Japanese officers created friction with the Chinese to use as a pretext for action on January 28, 1932, and fighting escalated until Chinese forces withdrew in early March. China and Japan signed a truce on May 5, 1932, that established a demilitarized zone in the International Settlement, ended the Chinese boycott, and provided for the withdrawal of Jap-

148

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

anese troops. The Shanghai incident was another example of Japan’s audacity in its position on China. It gave further evidence to Britain, the United States, and European nations of Japan’s intentions. The members of the Lytton Commission arrived by steamship at Yokohama on February 29, 1932, to begin their inspection and analysis of events that had taken place in the preceding six months. The commission members met in Tokyo with War Minister Araki Sadao, and with someone they knew well, Yoshizawa—the former representative at Geneva—who had become the foreign minister in the Inukai cabinet. News of the impending arrival of the commission hastened the Kwantung Army’s implementation of a plan to create an independent state in Manchuria. The plan called for the naming of the Last Emperor, Henry Pu-Yi, who in 1912 at the age of five had been dethroned at the termination of the monarchy in favor of a Chinese republic, as the regent for the new republic of Manchukuo. Several months earlier, Kwantung Army staff officers arranged with the Japanese army commander in Tientsin to locate and protect Pu-Yi so that he could be brought to Manchuria. Doihara Kenji traveled to Tientsin, brought the former emperor to Changchun, where Pu-Yi was to be made regent of the newly formed Republic of Manchukuo. Pu-Yi, twenty-seven, later said that he was deeply touched when a large crowd had met him at the Changchun train station on February 29, 1932. It must have been more than just mere coincidence that it was the same day as the arrival of the Lytton Commission in Yokohama. Pu-Yi wrote in The First Half of My Life (1964), that he had mixed feelings upon his arrival in Changchun. He knew the Kwantung Army was making a puppet of him, but at the same time he had hopes that he might restore the glory of his ancestors.24 Manchukuo was proclaimed an independent republic on March 9, 1932, with Pu-Yi as regent. This action was accomplished independently of the Tokyo civilian government on the basis that it was a state that had decided to establish itself as an independent nation; therefore, no approval from Tokyo was needed. It was clear that the Kwantung Army—with tacit approval from the minister of war and the army chief of staff—was operating as an autonomous element separate and apart from the Japanese government in Tokyo.25 The army and right-wing ultranationalist groups would not brook any resistance to their expansionist plans. Prime Minister Inukai, whose cabinet had to deal with the economic effects of the worldwide depression, incurred the displeasure of the military when he attempted to reign in their expansionist activities in Manchuria. It was young navy officers, however, who were incensed over the ratification of the 1930 London Naval Treaty and intended to reorganize the government and institute martial law. This group assassinated Prime Minister Inukai and members of his cabinet on May 15, 1932. After Inukai and until 1945, all prime ministers were high-ranking military officers, bureaucrats, or members of court nobility. Inukai was followed as prime minister by Saito Makoto, a career navy admiral, who had been governor-general of Korea from 1919 to 1927. Saito’s tenure revealed a sympathy for expansionist

The Early 1930s

149

activities of the Japanese army. Only a few months after Saito had become prime minister, Japan formally recognized Manchukuo as an independent nation. No doubt, there were many in Japan who were opposed to expansionist activities on the Asian continent, but it was now clear that resistance would lead to fierce opposition, and possibly death. Japan had become a dictatorship ruled by the military, specifically the chauvinistic military hotheads. Following the unilateral establishment of the “independent” state, over six hundred Japanese “advisers” were sent to positions in the new Manchukuo government. The prime minister of Manchukuo was a Chinese but the real power was in the hands of Japanese officials. The commander of the Kwantung Army and other top Japanese advisers wielded extensive influence. The top civilian leader was Japanese—ostensibly an adviser to the prime minister—with the title of “Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Manchurian State Council.” When press conferences were held for foreign correspondents, Japanese advisers hovered nearby to prompt or correct statements made by Manchukuo officials. Although the events of the previous six months in East Asia—collectively known as the Far Eastern crisis—generated concern in Washington, little concrete action was taken. Stimson was able to persuade Hoover to send ships of the U.S. Navy to East Asian waters, but they would have been outnumbered and outgunned by Japanese ships had there been any action. The budget of the U.S. government had been cut in half since the crash of 1929, and funds for the navy suffered disproportionately. There were, however, no naval encounters between Japan and the United States in the early 1930s.26 The Lytton Commission spent six weeks in Manchuria during the spring of 1932 investigating the bombing incident of the SMR in Mukden, as well as other events. Before the commission presented its report to the Council of the League of Nations, Japan formally recognized Manchukuo as an independent nation on September 15, 1932, assuming responsibility for security, both internal and external. Manchukuo was recognized by only a few other countries. The Lytton Commission, in its report released October 2, 1932, concluded that, although some Japanese soldiers may have thought they were acting in self-defense on the night of September 18, 1931, the actions of the Kwantung Army after that incident—involving the conquest of all of Manchuria in four months—could only be recognized as “sheer aggression.” Manchukuo, the commission reported, was a creation of the Japanese and was not supported by the resident Chinese population. The report did not sit well with the Japanese public, nor with Japanese army leaders. Since 1895, Japan had been on the march in asserting its authority in East Asia and the western Pacific, and any interference from outside, especially from the Western world, was just not going to be tolerated. Editorials in Japan inflamed public opinion, and arrogance among both civilians and the military reached new heights.27 A recurring theme in Japanese newspapers claimed that Japan was only following precedents set by the United States. An article in the September 3, 1932, issue of the Japan Advertiser compared Japan’s actions with the operations of

150

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

the United States in Panama three decades earlier, claiming the same principles applied to Manchuria. Wilfrid Fleisher, an American journalist in Japan, responded: That there is a similarity in the policies pursued by the United States in Panama and by Japan in Manchuria none will deny. But there is one essential difference, which is generally overlooked by Japanese writers, and that is the factor of time. American intervention in Panama was over thirty years ago. . . . There were no international commitments to stand in the way of the American Government. The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Kellogg Pact are products of the era which has followed upon the close of the World War. Formerly nations worked out their destiny by the rule of force, using war as an instrument of their national policy. Today the peoples of the world have set their faith in a new order of which the treaties are a symbol.28

In the United States, the Lytton Commission report was generally received in a favorable light. Several peace leaders were hopeful that the weight of world public opinion, through the voice of the League of Nations, would restrain Japan’s aggression in China. Others, however, warned of a “collision with Japan.” At the League of Nations there was some opposition to the report. After several months of debate, a committee endorsed the report on February 14, 1933, and ten days later the report was approved by an overwhelming majority of the league members. While the league did not specifically cite Japan as an aggressor, it condemned Japan for all of its activities in Manchuria since September 18, 1931, and called on Japan to restore Manchuria to China.29 The Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, Matsuoka Yosuke, walked out of the General Assembly after the report was approved. Japan announced on March 27, 1933, that it would leave the league. The Kwantung Army marched into Jehol (Hopei), north of Peking, annexed the area, and continued to advance to the south. A truce was negotiated—the Tangku Truce—between Kwantung Army and Chinese officials on May 31, 1933, that designated the Great Wall as the boundary between the opposing armies and established a demilitarized zone near Peking. Manchukuo became a monarchy in March 1934 when Pu-Yi was promoted from regent to emperor, all at the hands of the Kwantung Army. Japan treated Manchukuo as a separate nation—albeit one that it totally controlled—and sent an ambassador to the capital, Hsinking (formerly Changchun), and received an ambassador in Tokyo. Japan also announced in 1934 its intention to leave the Washington Naval Treaty, declaring that it would no longer abide by limitations after 1936. In early 1935, the U.S. Navy held maneuvers in the Pacific near the International Date Line, generating thousands of letters to President Roosevelt from American citizens concerned that Japan would see the action as a provocation. These letters were produced through organizations responding to Japanese press releases opposing the maneuvers.

The Early 1930s

151

Even after the conquest of Manchuria, Japanese officials were concerned over security in the northern part of the region since the CER was owned by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Army had greatly strengthened its troop contingents in areas of Siberia bordering on Manchuria. (In 1935, the Soviets would sell the CER to Japan for $85 million, and the name would be changed to the North Manchuria Railway.) Border clashes between Japanese units and Soviet forces led to an increase in Kwantung Army troop strength from 10,400 men in 1931 to 164,000 by the mid-1930s. By 1937, the northern borders did not seem to present any problems. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH Japanese aggression in the Manchurian region of China led to a reaction in the United States as to what treatment should be given to the colonial possession of the Philippine Islands. One school of thought maintained that American opposition to Japan’s incursion into China would dictate that for the sake of consistency the United States must grant independence to the Philippines. Another camp—including Stimson and Hoover—saw an American retreat from the Philippines as giving a signal to Japan that the United States was abandoning its interests in East Asia, thereby giving a green light for more Japanese conquest. By 1931, there were sixteen thousand Japanese in the Philippines, and their power was growing—in the control of fishing, timber, and general merchandising—especially in northern Luzon. The Philippine Independence Bill of 1916—the Jones Bill—promised independence, but at some unspecified time in the future. Philippine leaders, such as Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmen˜a, pushed for acceleration of independence and the setting of a date for that event. Most Americans, by the 1930s, were opposed to continued colonial rule of the Philippines, but army and navy officials saw the Philippines as an asset to the United States. Troop units and naval resources, however, were considered inadequate for defense. The Asiatic Fleet, consisting of only destroyers and a few submarines, would be inadequate for defense against a major attack. The entire U.S. Army had a total strength of only 120,000 troops, with 10,000 in the Philippines. Douglas MacArthur served five years in the Philippines in the 1920s and was a strong advocate of American presence in the islands. MacArthur, however, had an emotional attachment to the Philippines—going back to his father, Arthur MacArthur, the first military governor—that outweighed his sense of sound reasoning of what ten thousand troops could do in the face of a much stronger enemy attack. Opposition to independence for the Philippines came from four sources: (1) Americans with overseas investments in the Philippines, such as RCA, Standard Oil, and California Packing Company; (2) importers and exporters of tax-free Philippine products; (3) manufacturers and exporters of products to the tax-free Philippine market; and (4) “Manila Americans,” that is, American residents who lived in the Philippines and carried on business there.30 American agricultural

152

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

interests were proindependence as well as were several large banks, such as Chase National Bank and National City Bank. Most Americans—those without any special interests—were in favor of independence for the Philippines. A large number of congressional representatives were alarmed at Japanese actions in Manchuria, and saw a need to pull back to Hawaii. Congress had frozen additional fortification of the Philippines, partly in order to persuade Japan to accept naval limitations and the moratorium on new fortifications in the western Pacific in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. Additionally, the U.S. navy—because of funding reductions—had fallen below authorized limits, but the Japanese navy, in 1933, was right up to its authorization. Also, the Japanese army was continuing to expand while the U.S. Army was contracting. Most Filipinos were strongly in favor of independence, but a few—especially those involved in foreign trade—were opposed. More than 85 percent of exports from the Philippines went to the United States, and little or no tariff duties were applied. This was a major consideration in the early 1930s when Congress had applied high tariffs to imports from foreign countries in an attempt to protect American labor. Independence talk proliferated in the 1930s. Influential congressmen proposed independence for the Philippines with the stipulation that the United States would be permitted to retain military bases there. In April 1932, the Hare Bill, introduced by Representative Butler Hare, providing for independence with an eight-year transition period, passed in the House of Representatives 306 to 47, but stalled in the Senate. The Senate came up with its own independence bill, providing for a nineteen-year transition period. Both bills specified that U.S. Army and Navy bases would be retained in the Philippines. The reworked legislation was combined into the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill, but this was vetoed by President Hoover. The president’s basis for his veto was: Independence is not to be reached by yielding to selfish interests, to resentments, or to abstractions, but to be carefully achieved over a period of at least fifteen years, with increasing autonomy, followed by a plebiscite. Neither our successors nor history will discharge us of responsibility for actions which diminish the liberty we seek to confer, nor for dangers we create for ourselves as a consequence of our acts.31

Both houses of Congress overwhelmingly over-rode Hoover’s veto in January 1933 and the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill became law. Secretary of State Stimson felt it necessary to warn the Japanese ambassador, Debuchi Katsuji, that “whatever happened on the Philippine Independence Bill, the United States policy in the Far East would not be changed.” Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated as president on March 4, 1933, and his administration was much more sympathetic to the idea of independence for the Philippines. Opposition to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, however, came from an unsuspected quarter: the Philippines. The source of objection was the proposal for continued military bases in the islands and an unfavorable tariff arrangement.

The Early 1930s

153

Philippine leaders wanted a transitional period of exemption from tariffs on exports to the United States. Quezon spoke in opposition to the bases: “If America is going to retain these naval and military stations without adequate fortifications and garrisons, and a superior Navy, it would only serve as an invitation to war with Japan.” Quezon’s concept was that if there were no United States military presence, Japan would not view the Philippine Islands as a threat.32 After much discussion by Filipino politicians, the legislature of the Philippines rejected the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act on October 7, 1933, citing objections to the tariff and military base provisions. This rejection was a most unusual act. No other colonial power in the 1930s was even considering independence for one of its colonies, yet the Philippine legislature was rejecting an offer of liberty. That the Philippine assembly would do this reflected the assurance leaders had, such as Quezon and Osmen˜a, that a better deal could be obtained. Quezon traveled to Washington in late 1933 to present an outline to Roosevelt and Congress of what terms the Philippines desired. In January and February of 1934, Quezon held numerous meetings with members of Congress, but Senator Millard Tydings, chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, was not willing, at first, to offer anything more than an extension of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act and permit the Philippine Assembly another opportunity to accept it. After repeated discussions, including a meeting with Roosevelt, Tydings agreed to close the army bases in the Philippines while retaining the navy bases, subject to negotiation at the time of independence. On March 2, 1934, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress asking for a new independence bill. Deliberations continued in Congress over various approaches to independence. Transition periods ranged from immediate independence to two years, and in one case up to twenty-two years. Tariff issues also were debated, with some proposals for immediate treatment of imports from the Philippines to be assessed at the same rate as those from a foreign country. This dispute was resolved by agreement for a transitional period on tariffs. The legislation also provided for closing army bases in the Philippines, while retaining navy bases, subject to review at the time of independence. The Tydings-McDuffie Act, providing for a ten-year transition period to independence, was passed by Congress and signed by Roosevelt on March 24, 1934.33 The granting of Philippine independence was praised by a number of countries. An editorial in La Prensa, of Buenos Aires expressed the Argentine view: “This is the first time that a colonizing country renounces its sovereignty over one of its possessions of its own free will . . . and we congratulate ourselves that the author of this noble decision should be an American nation.”34 Immediately after passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, Quezon contacted General Douglas MacArthur, his old friend from the Philippines. MacArthur, fifty-five, was nearing the completion of his term of army chief of staff in Washington, but was not yet ready for retirement. The indigenous leaders of the Philippines, accustomed to more than three centuries of military defense being

154

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

provided by either Spain or the United States, needed training and development of an army for self-defense. Quezon asked MacArthur to be his military advisor and Roosevelt agreed to assign MacArthur to this position. MacArthur arrived in Manila and participated in the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines on November 15, 1935. Quezon was the first president of the Commonwealth, and Frank Murphy, the last governor-general of the Philippines became the first U.S. high commissioner. MacArthur immediately set to work developing plans for an army that would be based on the Swiss system of civilian-reservists. A key member of MacArthur’s staff from 1935 to 1939 was Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been an aide in Washington when MacArthur was chief of staff. Eisenhower, though ten years MacArthur’s junior, would become the supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe during World War II and president of the United States in the 1950s. Considerable difference existed between MacArthur’s concept of defense requirements for the Philippines and Quezon’s own ideas. Quezon had told an audience in Shanghai that the Philippines would have to “rely on world good will” until it had an adequate military force, and that would take fifty years. MacArthur, however, reckoned the job could be done in ten years at a total cost of eighty million dollars. Defense requirements included 250 light bombers and a naval squadron of torpedo boats, a standing army of 19,000 troops, and a citizen reserve strength of 400,000. Quezon eventually came around to MacArthur’s view and generated financial support from the Philippine legislature so that defense requirements comprised 22 percent of the national budget. In June 1936, Quezon appointed MacArthur to the rank of field marshal, making him the only American ever to hold that rank.35 In December 1941, the Philippines would find that MacArthur and his Filipino and American forces would be no match for the violent surprise offensive by the massed naval and ground forces of Japan. Japanese aggression had continued unabated since the Manchurian incident in 1931. Japan maintained an offensive posture, continually on the march. During battle lulls, Japanese forces engaged in intelligence and propaganda activities, in preparation for the next step in the conquest of China and Southeast Asia. Departure from the League of Nations in 1933 meant that Japan was internationally isolated for the first time in decades. In January of that same year, however, Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany, setting the stage for the Nazi wave of terror. By 1936, Japanese generals saw an exemplary model in Hitler’s regime and Japan signed an Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1936, with Germany. Japan agreed to exchange information with Germany on the Comintern (an international, but Soviet-sponsored, communist organization) and to take measures in opposition to it. Italy became a member of the pact in 1937. The Anti-Comintern Pact led to the Tripartite Pact in 1940 that formed the Axis alliance of the major aggressor nations of World War II.

CHAPTER 8

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE: ANOTHER PRETEXT FOR INVASION By the mid-1930s, two major factions within the Japanese army had evolved with differing ideas as to ways to strengthen and expand the Japanese empire. The Kodo-ha (Emperor Way Faction) saw a need for internal reconstruction to strengthen the position of the emperor. This group viewed the Soviet Union as Japan’s major enemy. The Tosei-ha (Control Faction) was less concerned with internal matters in Japan and saw the army’s primary objective as one of conquering Manchuria and China. On February 26, 1936, young officers and troops of the Kodo-ha led an attempted coup. Three regiments took over central Tokyo, occupied the Diet Building, the War Ministry, the prime minister’s residence, the Sanno Hotel, and other important buildings, and attempted to assassinate the prime minister and install a government more favorable to Kodo-ha objectives. Kodo-ha members assassinated former Premier Admiral Saito Makoto, Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, and several other officials, but failed to kill Prime Minister Okada Keisuke. The coup was a failure. Several leaders associated with the attempt were executed, while others were punished or transferred to remote locations. The Tosei-ha was strengthened, which led to renewed efforts for a conquest of China. Within the Imperial Navy, the 1922 Washington Naval Conference limitations had become a matter of contention. Expansionists advocated canceling the treaty, while older naval officers were concerned that a termination of these arrangements and the London agreement would draw the United States and Britain into

156

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

war against Japan. Ultimately, the militant, younger officers had their way and Tokyo announced on December 30, 1934, that Japan intended to abrogate the Washington Naval Treaty. Multilateral talks held in London in 1935 did not satisfy Japanese representatives, and the Imperial Navy began a program of new warship construction. During the mid-1930s in China, fighting between Nationalist and Communist forces continued, resulting in the Long March of 1934–1935, and the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces to Yenan. Some of the Communist leaders in China, seeing Japan as the primary danger, called for a united front of Nationalist and Communist elements in a joint stand. This shift in Communist policy resulted from a decision at the August 1935 Comintern meeting in Moscow to join in alliances with other organizations that were fighting against avowed enemies of Bolshevism and Marxism. Chiang Kai-shek opposed the united front concept, ordering the Northeastern Army under Chang Hsueh-liang—son of Marshal Chang Tso-lin who had been murdered by the Japanese in Manchuria in 1928—and the Northwestern Army to attack Chinese Communist forces in Yenan. The fighting was not effective, and Chiang flew to Sian on December 3, 1936, where he was to meet with his commanders and decide on a strategy. A mutiny broke out. Chiang was kidnapped and presented with demands for a united anti-Japanese command, including both Nationalists and Communists. This approach was viewed with alarm from Nanking, and Chiang was released Christmas Day, 1936. Chiang agreed to permit Communist troops to participate in any hostilities against Japan provided they followed Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles: nationalism, democracy, and, socialism. The antiCommunist crusade was terminated, and Chiang was given a mandate under a United Front against Japan.1 By 1937, Japanese advocates of military and political expansion had been involved in China for more than forty years. Japanese troops were posted in many parts of China, including: (1) Formosa (Taiwan), which was awarded to Japan by the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki; (2) the Peking-Tientsin area as a result of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and the Chino-Japanese Protocol of 1902; (3) the Liaotung Peninsula (the Kwantung Leased Territory, including Port Arthur and Dairen) and the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) zone, a 1905 victory trophy from the Russo-Japanese War; (4) the Shantung Peninsula where Japanese forces, after defeating German troops in 1914, were frequently stationed and Japan maintained economic rights as agreed to in a bilateral agreement between China and Japan in 1922; (5) Shanghai, where large Japanese naval forces and marines had been present since the 1920s; (6) all of Manchuria, or the so-called Manchukuo, which to the United States and China was simply the three northeastern provinces of China; and (7) areas of Jehol (northern Hopei). Goto Shimpei, first president of the SMR in 1906, saw the railway company as not only a transportation organization, but also as “military preparedness in civil garb.”2 While Goto had Manchuria in mind, succeeding leaders of the SMR—a Japanese government-owned corporation—saw opportunities in other

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

157

parts of China. The SMR Research Department was organized in 1907. In a few years, research offices were established in other parts of China, such as Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai, and the activities of these units had very little to do with the operation of a railroad in Manchuria. Most of the studies were broad in scope, including historical, geographical, literary, and political issues. Geographical studies at the Peking research office involved translation of maps, travel reports of foreign missionaries, and military affairs that encompassed Manchuria, Mongolia, and north China. Field research—including detailed land surveys—was conducted in thirteen counties of Hopei, the province closest to Peking, in the early 1930s. Additionally, the research office made studies of trade and industry throughout the region, including the Shantung Peninsula. The SMR Research Department was extensive and, at times, had as many as two thousand employees. Through the studies, ostensibly under the SMR, the Japanese army obtained extensive research on areas that it soon would be invading.3 After the 1933 Tangku Truce established the Great Wall as the boundary between Japan’s Kwantung Army and Chinese forces, Japanese troops kept up the pressure on the area around Peking and forced another concession from the Chinese by the Ho-Umezu Agreement of June 10, 1935. Ho Ying-chin, deputy to Chiang, agreed to a demand of Lieutenant General Umezu Yoshijiro, the commander of the Japanese army’s Tientsin command, to transfer Chinese Nationalist forces away from the Peking-Tientsin area. Chiang agreed to these conditions in order to concentrate on defeating Chinese Communist forces in Yenan before he turned his attention to the Japanese. This concept was overtaken by the United Front agreement of December 1936, but Nationalist troops had not been moved back to Hopei Province. Chinese militia troops in the vicinity of Peking, the Twenty-ninth Army, were under the control of General Sung Cheh-yuan, the chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The Twentyninth Army stood in opposition to Japanese advances but did not have sufficient strength to repel a major offensive.4 Army headquarters in Tokyo increased the strength of its China Garrison— the units in and around Peking—from two thousand to fifty-six hundred men in May 1936. On the night of July 7, 1937, an infantry company of one of the Japanese garrison battalions prepared for a night of maneuvers near the Marco Polo Bridge, about ten miles west of central Peking (the northern capital). Troops fired blank cartridges to simulate combat conditions. At 10:30 P.M., Chinese troops from a unit of the Twenty-ninth Army fired some shells into the general area, but there were no casualties. When the night maneuvers were completed, however, one Japanese soldier was missing at roll call. The Japanese company commander, jumping to the conclusion that the Chinese had captured the missing soldier, ordered an attack on nearby Chinese forces at Wanping, a railway junction town. The incident was reported to higher headquarters, which quickly alerted staff officers at both Japanese and Chinese commands. While the skirmish was in progress, the missing soldier returned.

158

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

He apparently had wandered away for personal reasons and had not been captured. By this time, however, the situation had escalated to the point where fighting was taking place between Chinese and Japanese units. The Chinese won this particular battle, but Tokyo activated five divisions for dispatch to China, while Chiang ordered four Nationalist divisions to march to Paoting, about one hundred miles south of Peking. This move was a cause for concern in view of the 1935 agreement between Japan and China, which specified that Nationalist troops would not be moved north of Paoting in the southern Hopei province. A major war was on, and the Japanese prime minister, Prince Konoe Fumimaro, claimed the incident was “entirely the result of an anti-Japanese military action on the part of China” and that the Chinese authorities must apologize.5 The Marco Polo Bridge incident drew the immediate attention of Nelson Johnson, the U.S. ambassador, who reported to Washington the next day: 1. A clash took place shortly before midnight last evening at Marco Polo Bridge, which is 10 miles west of Peiping, between Japanese and 29th Army (Sung Cheh-yuan’s) troops. Japanese troops have been maneuvering for some 2 weeks in that vicinity and, according to Chinese sources, attempted last evening to take Marco Polo Bridge as a part of the maneuvers. The Chinese troops which have been stationed at either end of the bridge for a long time resisted and subsequently retired into the nearby small, walled town of Wanping. . . . 2. It is understood that the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the HopeiChahar Political Council called at 1 A.M. at the Japanese Embassy here to effect a settlement. 3. However, according to Chinese guards of the barricaded gates . . . the Japanese began firing on the city about 3:30 A.M., with the result that some houses were destroyed, some tens of Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded, and ten more civilians were killed. The guards claim the Chinese side did not respond to the Japanese firing. . . . 4. . . . Peiping is quiet. No unusual movement of troops by either side.6

Ambassador Johnson also reported that the Japanese side had another view: Local Japanese Assistant Military Attache´ states to press representatives this morning that Chinese troops opened fire on Japanese troops while the latter were maneuvering near Marco Polo Bridge; that the Japanese troops stopped maneuvering, concentrated, and awaited; that Chinese again opened fire about 5 A.M.; that the Japanese, therefore, had to take self-defense measures; that the incident is undesirable for friendly relations between Japan and Hopei and Chahar; that Japan does not desire to enlarge this incident, but that will depend on the Chinese attitude. [Italics added]7

This report from the Japanese military attache´—overstating the seriousness of the incident—served as a pretext for Japan’s entry into the conquest of China. The key word “self-defense” was used again. Relations in the local area around the Marco Polo Bridge actually improved for a few days and residents and troops, both Chinese and Japanese, went back to their routine business. Tokyo

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

159

and Nanking, however, were escalating their concerns. On July 11, 1937, Japanese representatives drew up a list of terms, representing demands on China in order to resolve the issue, that called on Chinese officials for: 1. an apology; 2. punishment of the Chinese captain responsible for the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge and the censuring of the army commander; and 3. assurances for the future that comprise voluntary retirement of Chinese officials in north China who obstruct Sino-Japanese cooperation.8

A Chinese official in Peking agreed to these terms on July 19, but Chiang refused to go along with this latest accommodation, announcing: “If we allow one more inch of our territory to be lost, we shall be guilty of an unpardonable crime against our race.”9 With this, Chiang ordered four Nationalist divisions to move to the north. The Japanese government had already ordered reinforcements to north China.10 Soon there would be more Japanese divisions added to the China Garrison and major fighting to the south of Peking. From the time of the Manchurian incident in 1931, Chinese Nationalist forces had declined to make a major effort to resist Japanese aggression in China. Chiang’s decision to fight in 1937 surprised Japanese military leaders, but there would be no backing down. Misled by their own propaganda, army leaders in Tokyo predicted that the Chinese Nationalist Army would be defeated in a month or two. This marked the beginning of Japan’s protracted, undeclared land war in China, which would tie up two million Japanese soldiers (including those in Manchuria) for eight years. Even with that imprudent and reckless use of resources, the Japanese could not win. From Washington, Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a press release on July 17, 1937, that expressed concerns of the U.S. government: Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be affected. . . . I therefore feel warranted in making—in fact, I feel it a duty to make—a statement of this Government’s position. . . . This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. . . . Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations.11

Secretary Hull’s “peace statement” was so broad and in such general terms that virtually anyone could agree with it. In fact, sixty nations, including Japan,

160

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

sent congratulatory notes to Washington, extolling the virtues of peace. The only possible hint of its relevance to Japan’s China aggression was its timing. General Sugiyama Gen, the war minister in the first Konoe cabinet, who had pushed for the dispatch of three army divisions to north China, was met with opposition by Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, the navy minister. Yonai argued that sending such a large number of troops would lead to an all-out war, but Sugiyama insisted that the “China incident” would be resolved in one month. Ishiwara Kanji of the Manchurian incident fame, by now a major general, objected that the dispatch of three divisions to China would not be enough. Ishiwara insisted that fifteen divisions would be needed and that the war would be a long one. Sugiyama prevailed and the three divisions were sent to China. By the end of July 1937, large contingents of the Japanese army had been moved to north China from Japan, Korea, and Manchuria. Prime Minister Konoe gave a speech to the Diet on July 27 explaining the rationale for sending troop reinforcements: I desire to elucidate the principle which underlies the endeavors of the Government to fulfill its immense responsibilities. This principle is to make all of our policies stem from a single source, namely, the spirit of the solemn and superb polity of our Empire. Expression of this spirit means that externally we should, in concert with other Powers, strive to establish true peace firmly in the world in accordance with international justice. . . . It is a source of profound regret that . . . there has occurred the present incident in China and that the Government has been compelled to make an important decision. I am very grateful, however, that the Government has been accorded the unified support of the nation at this critical moment. In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement than to preserve the peace of East Asia. [Italics added]12

This statement by the prime minister reveals again how adroit Japanese officials were in making their aggression appear to be just the opposite, as though an offense had been committed against Japan. The phrase “preserve the peace in East Asia” was simply a prelude to the more comprehensive “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” which Japan would use in its conquests. There had been no invasion of Japan with an attempt to expropriate a region of the country. On the contrary, it was the other way around. Japan’s appetite for aggression in China was not going to be appeased by the conquest of Manchuria. The Japanese expansionists’ objective was the entire coastal region of China and the defeat of the Nationalists and the Communists. WAR IN EAST CHINA: JAPAN “FORCED” TO LAUNCH A PUNITIVE ACTION The Japanese presented terms to Nanking dictating the dismissal of the local Chinese commander in Peking and the withdrawal of all Chinese troops by July

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

161

28, 1937. The Chinese met this ultimatum by firing on Japanese troops in the Peking area, which led to a full-scale retaliation from a Japanese brigade. Lieutenant General Katsuki Kiyoshi, who commanded the enlarged Japanese force, proclaimed that he was going to “launch a punitive expedition against the Chinese troops, who have been taking acts derogatory to the prestige of the Empire of Japan.”13 Newly arrived troops from Japan joined in the attack on Chinese forces and Peking was in Japanese hands two days later. Tientsin was captured and Hopei Province was under Japanese control by the end of the month.14 As the fighting accelerated, the U.S. government advised American citizens living in China to leave, and about half of them did. Those who elected to stay, mostly missionaries and businessmen, were warned that they would be in China at their own risk. Meanwhile, some American aviators volunteered to serve in the Chinese Nationalist Army. The Japanese foreign minister asserted that the U.S. government should deter these volunteers in accordance with Neutrality Act legislation passed by Congress. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew advised the Japanese foreign ministry that the Neutrality Acts were a domestic matter and that Washington would do everything possible to deter the volunteers, but that American citizens could not be prevented from going to China.15 By this time, some congressmen, sympathetic to China’s plight, called for application of the various neutrality acts of the United States to ban war-related exports to Japan. Japan imported 90 percent of its petroleum products from the United States. The first Neutrality Act in August 1935 required that an embargo be placed on exports of “implements of war” from the United States “upon the outbreak or during the progress of war.” The second Neutrality Act of February 1936 prohibited loans to belligerents, while the third Neutrality Act of May 1937 was even more sweeping in making the embargo applicable, not only to wars, but also to civil strife and undeclared wars. Sale of nonwar commodities could be made to belligerents on a “cash and carry” basis. The law left it up to the president to decide when a state of war existed—in the absence of a declared war—and when “cash and carry” provisions should be applied. The Japanese insisted that there was no war, but euphemistically labeled their conquest the China incident. A strict application of these laws, however, would have prevented the United States from exporting most goods to China as well. With no merchant fleet of its own, China would have felt application of the neutrality laws more than Japan. Tokyo offered on two occasions in the summer of 1937 to negotiate with the Nanking government, but these offers were rebuffed by Chiang as infringing upon China’s sovereignty. The first proposal, shortly after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, demanded the dismissal of the Chinese commander and the withdrawal of troops from Hopei Province. The second offer was carried by a Japanese representative to Nanking on August 9, but these negotiations failed when it was discovered that two Japanese marines had been caught inspecting an airfield near Shanghai and killed by guards. This action led Navy Minister

162

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Yonai to seek cabinet approval for action in Shanghai and Tsingtao that resulted in the dispatch of two army divisions to Shanghai. By mid-August, Japanese troops were fighting in the Shanghai area and Imperial Navy warships were attacking Chinese shore batteries. The International Settlement in Shanghai even fell victim to bombings by both sides— accidents it was claimed. Chinese warplanes bombed civilian areas of Shanghai on August 14, 1937, hitting the Cathay and Palace Hotels and killing hundreds of Chinese civilians. Several Americans were killed or wounded as well.16 Although the Chinese government claimed the bombings were caused by malfunctioning equipment as a result of the Japanese machine gunning the planes, China’s cause in the United States and elsewhere was harmed by the news. Other accidents soon followed. Japanese naval ships firing at Chinese troops hit the USS Augusta, the flagship of the Asiatic Fleet, killing one American sailor. On August 30, Chinese airplanes bombed the American ocean liner, the SS President Hoover, while it was boarding refugees. The Chinese government apologized and claimed the ship was erroneously misidentified as a Japanese transport. Fighting escalated as more Japanese troops arrived, and the battle for Shanghai grew more intense in the autumn of 1937. Chinese Nationalist troops put up unexpected resistance in Shanghai, thereby significantly delaying the timetable of the Japanese army. The Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) designated the Shanghai-Nanking area as the Central China Expeditionary Force, which grew to a strength of two hundred thousand troops by November that pushed nearly five hundred thousand troops of the Chinese Nationalist Army westward out of the city of Shanghai along the Yangtze River toward Nanking. Even so, Tokyo still referred to the large-scale operations as the China incident. Although the fighting had been fierce, army headquarters in Tokyo did not send its best troops into the fighting in north and central China. Units with the highest readiness capability were held in Manchuria for the top priority, the “Go North” agenda for war against the Soviet Union in Siberia. In September, Japanese army divisions in the Peking area—joined with elements of the Kwantung Army—mounted a major offensive to the north and west of Peking. Kalgan and Tatung fell to the Japanese, and by November most of Inner Mongolia was under Japanese control. On November 21, 1937, the Federation of Mongolia and the Border Territories—the area north of the Great Wall and bounded by Manchukuo on the east and Outer Mongolia on the west— was created as a puppet state under Japanese tutelage, following the same principle that had been used in Manchuria. A federal committee under a Japanese supreme adviser was created the next month. This area, with a population of six million, was important to the Kwantung Army as a buffer state against the Soviet Union. In less than two years, however, Japan would find itself no longer a match in this region for the Soviet Army.17 U.S. public opinion viewed Japan as an aggressor and was sympathetic toward China, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed that ships owned by the

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

163

U.S. government be prohibited from carrying military materiels to Japan and China. Roosevelt also warned American steamship companies that their transport of such materiels would be at their own risk. On October 5, 1937, he openly attacked neutrality and isolationism in his Quarantine Speech by comparing aggression to a disease that can be restrained only by a quarantine. This speech was met with only lukewarm support by the American public.18 China appealed to the League of Nations for support against Japanese aggression. The Council of the League of Nations referred the request to the signatories of the 1922 Nine-Power Pact, generated by Japan’s earlier incursion into the Shantung Peninsula during World War I. The result of the league request was a conference held in Brussels in October to attempt a resolution. Japan refused to attend, and the conference adjourned without action.19 Japan’s publicity experts were hard at work explaining their side of the invasion of China. Summaries of newspaper editorials reflect Japanese attitudes: Hochi. If British and American peace declarations are directed specifically at Japan, Japan can only reject them. The Secretary of State’s demand for avoidance of hostilities at Shanghai is not so antagonistic as Mr. Stimson’s declarations but it clings to legalistic concepts and reveals serious misunderstanding. It fails to recognize that the Shanghai difficulties are too complex to submit to international discussion or diplomatic solution. Nichi Nichi: The Secretary of State advises Japan to settle her difficulties by peaceful means; but why give Japan that advice? No one wishes for peace more than Japan, which must pay a terrific bill for hostilities. Japan has patiently exhausted all possibility of peaceful settlement. President Wilson with regard to Mexico defined the entry of troops into a backward nation not as war but as a punitive expedition; atrocities by Chinese against Japanese give Japan the same justification. The United States and other countries must understand that special conditions prevail in the case of a backward country such as China. [Italics added]20

The editorial writer for the Nichi Nichi conveniently neglected to point out that the reason President Woodrow Wilson sent troops to Mexico was to deal with bandits who had raided areas inside the United States. General John J. Pershing’s expedition into Mexico in 1916 was to pursue Pancho Villa, and American forces were withdrawn early in 1917. In 1937, there had been no Chinese bandits who had raided areas inside Japan. THE PANAY INCIDENT: A U.S. NAVY VESSEL DESTROYED Following the retreat of Chiang’s Nationalist Army from Shanghai, Japanese Imperial Army field artillery units and warplanes began to fire at ships in the Yangtze River and at troop concentrations along the river banks. The Japanese objective was to capture Nanking, the capital of Nationalist China. Chiang and most of the Nationalist government began leaving Nanking on November 21, 1937. The Chinese Nationalist Foreign Office was relocated to Hankow—near

164

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Wuhan and about three hundred miles west of Nanking on the Yangtze River— and foreign embassies and legations were asked to move there also. The next day, Ambassador Johnson of the United States and most of his staff boarded the USS Luzon, the flagship of the Yangtze River Patrol, for Hankow. Staff members who remained behind were to protect the embassy and to render assistance to Americans who had refused to leave. The USS Panay, a small river patrol vessel built in the Philippines, was instructed to remain in Nanking to provide a communications link with the embassy and to evacuate remaining Americans, when necessary. Frequent Japanese air raids on Nanking and the steady progress of Japanese troops advancing on the capital led to the removal of the Code Section of the American embassy to the Panay on December 2. Other Americans remained on shore due to the small size of the Panay. The embassy compound was posted with proclamations, and armbands were issued to Americans—mostly missionaries—who chose to remain. On December 7, Japanese troops were within twenty miles of Nanking. Diplomatic officials still in Nanking decided that the remaining foreign embassy staffs would stay on board ships at night, returning in the daylight hours, if feasible. A temporary office of the American embassy was set up on board the Panay. The Japanese consul in Shanghai sent a radio message advising all diplomatic personnel in Nanking to evacuate the capital to avoid casualties. Two days later, Japanese authorities were notified by radio from the Panay that eighteen Americans planned to remain at the embassy in Nanking in connection with hospital, safety zone, and newspaper work, and that officers of the embassy would be ashore during the day.21 After two days of attempting to go ashore during daylight hours, during which time the Pukow waterfront—across the river from Nanking—was heavily bombed, Lieutenant Commander J. J. Hughes, the captain of the Panay, made the decision to move about two miles to the west to a petroleum company dock. As shells began to fall closer, the Panay and several British ships began moving about twelve miles up the river. Japanese artillery fire was adjusted during this move, indicating that firing on the American and British ships was deliberate and not a mistake as later claimed by Japanese sources. British officers were informed by the Japanese commander on shore that he had received “a blanket order to destroy all shipping.” On the morning of December 12, artillery firing resumed, forcing the Panay to move farther to the west. Radio messages were sent to the Japanese consul general in Shanghai that gave the exact location of the Panay and other American ships so they would not be mistakenly attacked. This was answered at 1: 30 P.M. by a flight of Japanese warplanes bombing the Panay and other foreign ships nearby. Captain Frank N. Roberts, the U.S. Army attache´ at Nanking, was aboard the Panay and reported that six light bombers with Japanese markings dropped one-hundred-pound bombs on the ships as they lay at anchorage. News correspondents on board also witnessed the bombing. A Universal News cam-

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

165

eraman took motion pictures of the Japanese airplanes in action. (In the days before television, newsreels were shown at movie theaters along with other “short subjects,” such as cartoons, in addition to the feature film.) The Japanese attack on the Panay was shown at movie theaters in the United States by the end of December 1937. Captain Roberts estimated that the bombing was conducted from an altitude of no more than one thousand feet. While on their bombing runs, the Japanese pilots machine gunned the ship as they dived. The day was clear, sunny, and still. The ship was flying an American flag and was otherwise clearly marked to show that it belonged to the United States. The attack on the Panay resulted in the death of one crewman and injuries to the captain and several of the crew. In addition, an Italian newsman, who had sought refuge on board, was killed. Several members of the embassy staff were also wounded. Seeing that the Panay was in danger of sinking, the captain ordered the ship abandoned, and the ship’s life rafts made three trips to the shore to evacuate passengers and crew. The ship sank about 4 P.M. on December 12, 1937. Several American and British merchant ships had also been sunk. Bombs had destroyed the radio on the Panay, and embassy personnel had to walk several miles to find Chinese police who could notify the Foreign Ministry in Hankow of the events. Roberts, an army captain, was awarded the Navy Cross for his endeavors in assisting in the evacuation of the disabled ship.22 As soon as word reached the American embassy in Tokyo, Ambassador Grew lodged a complaint with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Hirota Koki’s initial explanation was that “Japanese military authorities had already warned foreign nationals to evacuate the area of hostilities around Nanking.” Later in the day, Hirota visited Grew to report that confirmation had been received of the attack on the USS Panay and the American and British merchant ships. According to Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi, the commander of Japanese naval forces in China, the bombings had been an accident. Hirota offered the “profound apology” of the Japanese government. President Roosevelt, on December 13, instructed Secretary of State Hull to tell the Japanese ambassador in Washington: 1. That the President is deeply shocked and concerned by the news of indiscriminate bombing of American and other non-Chinese vessels on the Yangtze, and he requests that the Emperor be so advised. 2. That all the facts are being assembled and will shortly be presented to the Japanese Government. 3. That in the meantime it is hoped the Japanese Government will be considering definitely for presentation to this Government: a. Full expression of regret and proffer of full compensation. b. Methods guaranteeing against a repetition of any similar attack in the future.23

The sinking of the Panay became a matter of serious consideration during the next few weeks and figured prominently in newspaper articles and editorials.

166

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

At first, Japanese officials insisted that machine guns had not been used and that Admiral Hasegawa’s command was unaware of the precise location of the American ship. Grew, in Tokyo, and Hull, in Washington, promptly informed Japanese diplomats of the very detailed reports that had been received. After a voluminous exchange of details concerning the bombing, and profuse statements of regret from Tokyo, the issue was finally settled on April 22, 1938, when a Japanese Foreign Ministry representative handed Eugene H. Dooman, counselor of the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, a check for $2,214,007.36 payable to the U.S. Treasury as an indemnification for the deaths and damages of U.S. citizens and property. The payment covered the loss of the Panay and three Standard Oil Company vessels and compensated for the deaths of one crew member of the Panay and the captain and a crew member of one of the oil tankers, for the injury to seventy-four persons aboard the vessels, and for the loss of personal effects and ship equipment. The United States did not ask for punitive damages.24 The Panay sinking issue faded from public concern in the United States after Japan apologized and paid the indemnity. Even though officials from Roosevelt on down were convinced that the attack was deliberate, the acceptance of the check indicated that the United States was not willing to take action to deter Japan in 1938. Isolationist sentiment among a major segment of the American people argued against active involvement in the affairs of Europe and Asia. There were calls for Roosevelt to withdraw the Yangtze River Patrol and the South China Patrol, as well as the army’s Fifteenth Infantry Regiment stationed in the Tientsin area as a consequence of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and the Fourth Marine Regiment. In 1938, the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment was withdrawn from China after being stationed in the Tientsin area since 1912. The marine regiment, which had arrived in 1928, remained until 1941, when it was transferred to the Philippines before Pearl Harbor was attacked.25 John T. Flynn, an editor of the New York Globe, argued in 1938, “if Roosevelt wished to avoid war with Japan, why not take the Yangtze Patrol out of the Yangtze?” Flynn believed that Roosevelt would continue to create “war scares” to generate support for military spending.26 Senator Robert A. Taft, a Republican and a son of former President William Howard Taft, was very much opposed to overseas involvement of the United States. The Yangtze River Patrol was withdrawn to the Philippines in 1941 along with the Fourth Marine Regiment. Furthermore, even if the American public had been willing to intervene, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were so small and ill-prepared that sending an expeditionary force would have been out of the question. The army had an overall strength of less than 150,000 troops while the total number of marines was less than 25,000. The navy would have been a match for the Japanese— exceeding Japan in carrier-borne aircraft by 709 to 461—but dispatch of large naval elements to Asian shores in 1938 would have been beyond logistics capabilities. Japan’s actions in China, however, led to passage of the Naval Expansion Act passed by Congress on May 17, 1938.

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

167

In three more years, however, Americans were to discover—just as Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Britain did after his concessions to Adolf Hitler at Munich in September 1938—that naked aggression has an endless appetite. THE MASSACRE IN NANKING: JAPANESE TROOPS RUN AMOK By 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army had a sixty-four-year history since its creation on the model of the conscript Prussian army in 1873. The days of the samurai came to an end as Japan began its modernization, but the ideals and concepts of the ferocious warriors continued in the new army even though peasants made up the bulk of the troops. The fierceness of the samurai tradition of more than seven centuries—and the willingness to die for feudal causes—carried over into the Japanese Imperial Army. To die for the emperor was the most noble act possible for a Japanese soldier, just as the samurai dying for his daimyo (provincial lord) had been in earlier centuries. To surrender to an enemy was unthinkable and would mark one for a lifetime of shame. Likewise, any enemy soldier who surrendered instead of fighting to the death was marked for contempt. By the 1930s, Japan had developed a modern army, but with a feudal soul and fighting spirit little changed from ancient times. From the beginning of the Meiji era in Japan in 1868 to the 1930s, contempt for China had grown in view of the weakness of the monarchy and its collapse, the fractured political structure, the lack of a modern, coordinated fighting capability, the backwardness and resistance to modernization, the fighting among provincial warlords, the lack of a unified China, and, most of all, the lack of morale and spirit in its soldiers. Propaganda, often in the form of subtle insinuations—as well as attitudes taught in schools—promoted the view that the Chinese were a lower order of human being. These concepts were very similar to the racial hatred exhibited by German Nazis toward the Poles and other Slavic nationalities who were considered untermenschen (subhumans). Many Japanese soldiers—especially those in the lower ranks—were led to believe that the Chinese were somehow less than human, and that their mistreatment, assault, or murder was a diversion or amusement. In Manchuria, souvenir pictures of “bandit suppression” operations frequently showed severed heads that were mounted on poles. Standing nearby would be Japanese soldiers, smirking as if returning from a game hunt. Newly arrived Japanese soldiers in China were often put through indoctrination in which one of the requirements would be to decapitate a wounded or sick Chinese. This was simply considered a “toughening up” exercise to prepare the soldier for the brutal disregard for human suffering.27 The concept was to give an aura of fierceness and invincibility to Japanese soldiers that would intimidate and frighten the Chinese. Nanking (the southern capital) had been the headquarters for Chiang and his Nationalist government since 1927 and was seen by the Japanese as a major goal in conquering China. Preliminary to the siege of Nanking, Japanese war

168

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

planes indiscriminately bombed civilians and nonmilitary facilities within the city. More than one hundred missions were flown, and most of the casualties were civilians. The capture of the enemy’s capital would be tantamount to seizure of the entire country, or so the idea was. This, of course, was not to be the case. Chiang simply moved his capital elsewhere—initially to Hankow and finally to Chungking. Although the Japanese were not aware of it in December 1937, they would never force the Chinese Nationalists to surrender. Chinese resistance in Shanghai collapsed in November 1937, and large contingents of Japanese forces began a march to the west generally following the path of the Yangtze River. Three armies, each with three divisions, spread out about one hundred miles from north to south and invaded central China, with Nanking as the objective. Each of the armies was commanded by a lieutenant general, with Matsui Iwane commanding the troops in the central army. Matsui became sick when his chronic tuberculosis flared up and was replaced by Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, a career army officer with the rank of lieutenant general and the emperor’s uncle. Matsui was then promoted and made commander in chief of the Japanese forces in central China. When Matsui recovered enough to take on the duties of overall commander, he directed his subordinate commanders to make the taking of Nanking an exemplary event. Matsui wanted to make the Chinese place confidence in Japan. As quoted in Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, Matsui called his generals to his sickbed and instructed: The entry of the Imperial Army into a foreign capital is a great event in our history . . . attracting the attention of the world. Therefore let no unit enter the city in a disorderly fashion. . . . Let them know beforehand the matters to be remembered and the position of foreign rights and interests in the walled city. Let them be absolutely free from plunder. Dispose sentries as needed. Plundering and causing fires, even carelessly, shall be punished severely. Together with the troops let many military police and auxiliary military police enter the walled city and thereby prevent unlawful conduct.28

Matsui’s instructions were ignored by the great majority of Japanese soldiers. As the vanguard of Japanese troops entered Nanking on the afternoon of December 12, 1937, about one hundred thousand Chinese troops were in the garrison forces under the command of General Tang Sheng-chih. Tang had withdrawn all of his troops from positions outside Nanking and concentrated them inside the walled city. Here, he vowed to “live or die with Nanking.” As it became clear that Japanese troops were going to overwhelm the Chinese defenders, Tang held a meeting with his division commanders and directed that the army break out of its encirclement. The concept called for the movement of troops under protective gun and rifle fire to reach the outer perimeter of the Japanese lines. This phase of the defense was not even initiated, however, as panic set in among the Chinese troops. General Tang even joined in the frenzy,

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

169

escaping across the river and fleeing the city. Thousands of Chinese troops took off their uniforms and put on whatever civilian apparel they could find. The huge number of Chinese soldiers falling into Japanese hands presented a problem to the Japanese. There was not enough food and other supplies to take care of so many prisoners. Even though General Matsui had ordered that Nanking was to be an exemplary event, the commanders on the site decided to resolve the problem of feeding and caring for so many prisoners of war by simply killing them. When told that three hundred thousand Chinese soldiers had surrendered, an order was issued in Prince Asaka’s name to kill all captives.29 By the time the Japanese army arrived in Nanking, most of the foreign residents and diplomatic personnel had left the city. There were, however, twentyseven westerners remaining, most of them connected with missionary organizations. Fifteen of them were Americans associated with the Episcopal, Disciples of Christ, Presbyterian, and Methodist churches. There were also British, Canadian, and German civilians who stayed. Although they had been advised to evacuate the city, the missionaries and foreign businessmen stayed to protect lives through the creation of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, an area of about one-eighth of the city. This action was taken with the approval of the Nanking municipal government and with the knowledge of the Japanese embassy. About 250,000 Chinese were cared for in this small area of Nanking. The University of Nanking was operated by the United Christian Missionary Society and included a full academic program as well as a hospital. The university, within the International Safety Zone, was a focal point of activity in providing sanctuary and support to Chinese refugees. Foreign news correspondents reported the initial entry of the Japanese into Nanking, but they were evacuated to Shanghai within a few days. Reports from Chinese victims over the years have not drawn much attention, while most of the former Japanese army personnel who were at Nanking have not been forthcoming about what happened in December 1937. As the fiftieth anniversary of the Nanking massacre was observed in 1987, the world’s attention was drawn to archives where missionary diaries, photos, and amateur films were found in abundance. In 1997, the Yale Divinity School published the American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937–1938, which provided documentation of the slaughter and abuse.30 Japanese authorities, while refusing to give permission for the safety zone, nevertheless agreed not to attack any area unless it contained Chinese troops. This stipulation soon led to many problems because of the Chinese soldiers who had changed to civilian clothes. Chinese men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five became the object of intense scrutiny in searches by Japanese patrols to determine whether they were soldiers. Decisions were often based on flimsy evidence, such as whether the men had calluses on their hands. If they did it was assumed they were soldiers. As a result, many men who were laborers and

170

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

others who did manual work, but were not soldiers, were rounded up and sent off to their death. There was no outside news—except for Japanese propaganda—for almost a month. The electricity was off and there was no means of operating a radio. There also was no way for the westerners to send news to the outside world, except for an occasional letter dispatched on a river boat. Even then, it was difficult to know if the letter had been received. Eyewitness reports of missionaries provide details that have made a permanent record of one of the most chilling rampages of the twentieth century. It is no exaggeration to call it the Rape of Nanking. Miner Searle Bates reported on December 15, 1937: At Nanking the Japanese Army has lost much of its reputation, and has thrown away a remarkable opportunity to gain the respect of the Chinese inhabitants and of foreign opinion. . . . Foreigners who have traveled over the city report many civilians’ bodies lying in the streets. A considerable percentage of the dead civilians were the victims of shooting or bayoneting in the afternoon and evening of the 13th, which was the time of Japanese entry into the city.31

Robert O. Wilson, a physician on the staff of the University of Nanking Hospital, exclaimed in a letter of December 18 to his family: “The slaughter of civilians is appalling. I could go on for pages telling of cases of rape and brutality almost beyond belief.”32 Wilhelmina Vautrin, a faculty member of Ginling College, told of elaborate ploys that Japanese soldiers used to obtain Chinese girls. They took females between the ages of twelve and sixty-five for repeated rapings. There were occasions where women would have to endure being raped twenty, thirty, or even forty times a night. Rapes also took place in daylight hours.33 James McCallum, in a letter to his family dated December 19, explained: “It is a horrible story to relate; I know not where to begin nor to end. Never have I heard or read of such brutality. Rape: Rape: Rape: We estimate at least 1,000 cases a night and many by day. In case of resistance or anything that seems like disapproval there is a bayonet stab or a bullet.”34 John G. Magee was an Episcopal minister in Nanking and an accomplished movie photographer. During the Nanking massacre he took four reels of film with his sixteen-millimeter movie camera. In a video tape produced in 1997, Magee’s son, David Magee, narrated much of the film taken in December 1937 by his father. In one section he quotes a letter from Magee: The horror of the last week is beyond anything I have ever experienced. I never dreamed that the Japanese soldiers were such savages. It has been a week of murder and rape, worse, I imagine, than has happened for a very long time unless the massacre of the Armenians by the Turks was comparable. They not only killed every prisoner they could find but also a vast number of ordinary citizens of all ages. Many of them were shot

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

171

down like the hunting of rabbits in the streets. There are dead bodies all over the city from the south city to Hsiakwan.35

Magee’s account was published in the United States in the October 1938 edition of Reader’s Digest. In an unusual turn of events, a German businessman—a member of the Nazi Party—saved the lives of thousands of Chinese in 1937. While Japan had some ties with Germany in 1937, a military alliance did not come until 1940. In the mid-1930s, German military advisors worked with Chiang’s army and the anathema of Hitler was not yet known on a widespread basis. John Rabe, the German businessman, wrote a twelve-hundred-page account of the Rape of Nanking, describing how he dug foxholes in his backyard to shelter 650 Chinese, repelled Japanese troops who tried to enter his property, delivered rice to civilians whose food had been stolen by Japanese troops, and stopped numerous rapes. Rabe, who lived and worked in China from 1908 to 1938, was arrested upon his return to Germany and released after three days with strict warnings to keep silent on the subject of the massacre. His diary was discovered in 1996 and a copy of it was provided to the Yale Divinity School Library. The savagery of the attack is illustrated by a contest between two young Japanese lieutenants to see which officer could be the first to kill a hundred Chinese by beheading them with his sword. Within a few days, Lieutenant Mukai had chalked up 106 beheadings while Lieutenant Noda claimed 105. They still were not able to determine who had won their original challenge because these numbers did not reveal which one had been the first to reach 100, so they decided to extend the contest to see which one could behead 150 Chinese first. The Japanese newspaper, Nichi Nichi, reported that the race “started with renewed vigor December 11 for the goal of 150.”36 By December 28, 1937, hostilities in Nanking had been terminated, and the Japanese had installed a military occupation of the city. John M. Allison, the third secretary of the U.S. embassy, was sent to Nanking to “reopen the Embassy and survey the condition and circumstances of American nationals and property in that city.” In late January 1938, Allison was slapped in the face by a Japanese soldier, and Charles Riggs, a faculty member of the University of Nanking, was also attacked and had his collar torn by a Japanese sentry. This led to an exchange of stern diplomatic notices, but ended with a Japanese apology and information that the Japanese sentry would be court-martialed. (In a twist of irony, Allison would become the U.S. ambassador to Japan in the 1950s.) Ambassador Grew also complained to Foreign Minister Hirota of Japan concerning “the looting of American property by Japanese forces in China.” Reports from Soochow and Hangchow, between Shanghai and Nanking, indicated widespread looting by Japanese troops of American facilities. Foreign Minister Hirota—not wanting to antagonize the United States in 1938—apologized for the incidents and persuaded the minister of war to send a major general to the Yangtze River area of China to investigate. Numerous incidents related to Jap-

172

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

anese misappropriation of American property in China continued for the next several months.37 The Rape of Nanking ended as order was eventually restored by early February 1938, but it will go down in history as one of the most brutal acts of raping and pillaging, along with Attila the Hun, the Mongol invasion of Russia and Turkic lands, and the Turkish slaughter of Armenians in 1915. Credible statistics show the civilian death toll in Nanking to be at least 300,000, while Nanking archives documents put the total at 350,000. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) convicted General Matsui and sentenced him to death for war crimes committed in China, and for his command responsibility in the rape and death of thousands of civilians at Nanking. He died by hanging in 1949 during the Allied occupation of Japan. Prince Asaka, the general commanding the invading armies, escaped trial because of his royal connection. The IMTFE concluded that evidence presented at the trials conclusively established that at least 150,500 civilians were killed by the Japanese at Nanking from December 13, 1937, to February 2, 1938.38 Allied authorities used whatever evidence was necessary to obtain convictions at the trials, and the total number of murders was actually higher. Data compiled by Nanking charity organizations revealed that there were 195,240 bodies buried from December 12, 1937, to October 1938.39 Magee put the number of deaths at three hundred thousand, and other missionary organizations have arrived at similar estimates.40 This number is considerably more than the combined death toll of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Exact numbers may never be known, because many of the refugees in Nanking had come into the city from rural areas and an accurate accounting of the missing civilians is not available. Also, bodies of the butchered civilians and soldiers were placed in huge piles, soaked with gasoline, and set on fire. Others were dumped into the river. It was impossible to obtain an accurate body count later on. The total number of Chinese women raped by Japanese soldiers in Nanking is not known, but the lowest number reported is twenty thousand (by the IMTFE after the war) while most estimates are much higher. According to statistics from the International Safety Zone Committee, eighty thousand women were raped. Here again, exact numbers are unknown because many of the women who were raped—repeatedly—were eventually murdered. Others who survived were reluctant to talk about it. Although Nanking had the largest number of atrocities, numerous other Chinese cities and towns witnessed the raping, pillaging, and murders at the hand of the invading Japanese armies. Chinese women were kidnapped and taken to Japanese “pleasure chambers,” or “social clubs.” More than two thousand Suchow women, about three thousand Wuhsi women, and twenty thousand Hangchow women were kidnapped. Rapes were reported in many other places, such as Hsuchow, to the north of Nanking. The atrocious behavior of the Japanese troops in Nanking became widely known through news reports in the New York Times, the Chicago Daily News, the Times of London, and many other publications. The unfavorable publicity

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

173

led the Foreign Ministry and the Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) in Tokyo to issue instructions to improve discipline among the troops in China. Also, as Japanese army units continued their invasion of China in the spring of 1938, they found the interior areas to be more stubbornly defended by Nationalist troops and conquests were more difficult than in the previous year. Propaganda on the Japanese home front publicized only “glorious victories” and pictures of smiling, happy Chinese civilians waving small Japanese flags to welcome their liberators. These “happy” civilians were forced to pose for the camera on penalty of physical punishment. IGH did not want soldiers returning to Japan to tell the truth about what had happened in Nanking and elsewhere. A report from Tokyo in the New York Times of April 17, 1938, explained: The army, for reasons unstated, is exercising extreme caution to prevent returned soldiers from talking about their experiences in China. It is reported that the men have come back much chastened and a little uncertain about the glories of war. But owing to the Military Secrets Protection Law, plus certain less formal restrictions, they are not openly discussing their sentiments. . . . Rumors and gossip have seeped through these obstacles to indicate that, while the returned soldier is loyal to the core, he has lost the picnic spirit he had last August. Perhaps he even doubts what the Army Day pamphlet said: “To die participating in the supreme holy enterprise of mankind [war] must be the greatest glory and the height of exultation.” Nobody knows except the veteran himself and he’s not talking.41

As a means of providing an alternative diversion for Japanese soldiers in China, IGH came up with the idea of providing women at euphemistically titled “Comfort Stations.” The idea was that if prostitution facilities were available, Japanese soldiers would not rape women in the local areas. The story of the Comfort Women is one of forced prostitution, with the women obtained from Japanese colonial territories. Most came from Korea, although other areas were added later such as the Philippines, Malaya, China, and the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). Young women, mostly aged seventeen to nineteen, were recruited by civilian businessmen under contract to the Japanese army. They were usually promised work in restaurants—in another country—with good wages and an opportunity to send money home. The real purpose—working as a prostitute—was not revealed, and it was only upon arrival in China that the young woman understood the scheme. The women were forced to “service” as many as thirty Japanese soldiers a day at the Comfort Stations, which were located near the troops. Many became sick, not only from venereal disease, but also from physical abuse. Estimates of the number of Comfort Women reach as high as 140,000, assuming a ratio of one Comfort Woman per 50 soldiers, or seven million soldiers and sailors.42 For nearly a half-century after the war, the government of Japan made no mention of the forced prostitution or of the Comfort Stations. Most of the women, forced into this vile practice, were too ashamed to divulge their past. In the 1980s,

174

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

however, a few Korean women revealed what had happened and filed civil law suits for damages against Japan. The government in Tokyo, however, claimed that the army had no part in the Comfort Women scheme, stating that it was a private business operation. In 1992, Japanese researchers uncovered evidence in files of the Defense Agency Library that conclusively showed that the Japanese military was actually involved in the operation of Comfort Stations in the 1930s and up to 1945. The Comfort Women were classified as civilians accompanying the military in the field and were even subject to court-martial. This fact was first acknowledged by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi on an official visit to Korea on January 16, 1992.43

STALEMATE IN CHINA: THE WAR BOGS DOWN AMID A DIVIDED CHINA After the fall of Nanking, Japan offered Chiang peace terms in January 1938 that would provide for the continued stationing of Japanese troops in north China and a provisional government in the Peking-Tientsin area under Japanese army control. Chiang refused. On January 16, 1938, Tokyo announced that the Japanese government found it necessary to abandon negotiations and to withdraw recognition of the Nationalist Chinese government. Japan continued its invasion of other areas of China. Canton and Hangkow fell to the Japanese in October 1938, Hainan Island in February 1939, followed by the Spratley Islands—close to Borneo and the Dutch East Indies—in March. Prior to the fall of Hangkow, Chiang moved his headquarters to Chungking, in the interior of China and a thousand miles west of Shanghai. Japan’s objective was to isolate Chiang and cut off all coastal access for resupply of his army. There were no more large cities for the Japanese army to conquer. Hong Kong was a British Crown Colony that Japan could not touch until war was declared on Britain (and the United States) on December 8, 1941. Japan unleashed another first in aerial warfare on May 3, 1939. After being the first nation to conduct bombings of civilians at Chinchow in 1931, Japan became the first to use incendiary bombs indiscriminately in which thousands of civilians in Chungking were burned to death. While the Japanese government would not admit it, American and other foreign newsmen reported that Japanese agencies were introducing narcotics into China. John B. Powell, an American journalist with twenty-five years of experience in China, reported that the Special Services Section of the Japanese army sold or controlled distribution of heroin, morphine, and opium in occupied areas of China. Narcotics were strictly controlled in Japan, “but thousands of Japanese and Korean subjects of Japan are encouraged to engage in traffic among subject peoples in occupied territory.” Cost for a “pipe” or “smoke” was the equivalent of about thirty cents in U.S. money, and the cumulative effect of this practice

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

175

was to debilitate a number of Chinese while earning supplemental money for Japanese agencies at the same time.44 Foreign Minister Ugaki Kazushige of Japan negotiated with Chiang, who was willing to secretly accept Japanese suzerainty over Manchuria and autonomous Inner Mongolia, but refused to pay an indemnity or permit Japanese troops in north China. Ugaki was not able to obtain approval from the Japanese cabinet— especially the war minister—for Chiang’s counterproposal and resigned. He was succeeded in September 1938 by Arita Hachiro, a career Foreign Ministry official, who compromised with the military faction in the government. On November 3, 1938, Prime Minister Konoe announced the New Order in East Asia, claiming that it was “a new structure of peace based on true justice.” It was to be a renunciation of the treaty system in East Asia, aimed at ejecting all colonial powers—except Japan. The Nationalist government was offered a place in this “grand arrangement” with the proviso that China join in a military alliance with Japan and Manchukuo against communists—wherever they may be—and accept Japanese troops in north China and Inner Mongolia. Japan would take over the training and direction of the Chinese Nationalist Army while the economy of China would be submerged into the yen bloc. Accepting these conditions would have made Chiang little more than a figurehead, and he refused to cooperate with Japan. Wang Ching-wei, an official of the Nationalist Party who favored the Japanese proposal, fled to French Indochina where Chiang’s agents attempted to assassinate him. Secretly, Japan was making preparations to install Wang as the puppet leader of a Chinese government similar to Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia. On March 30, 1940, Japan instituted a puppet government in Nanking with Wang at the head. The Tokyo-sponsored administration, known as the Reorganized National government of the Republic of China, extended throughout the areas of Japanese occupation. Wang signed a “peace treaty” with Japan on November 30, 1940. Chiang, who never surrendered during the war with Japan, refused to recognize the legality of Wang’s capitulation.45 Japan established an Asia Development Board, better known as the China Affairs Board, to handle the financial and economic exploitation of China. Under the direction of the Japanese army, the board had branches throughout occupied China and controlled the operation of two large holding companies, the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company. Half of the investment capital came from the Japanese government while the other half came from private investors. Japan guaranteed dividend payments, and large profits were made out of the distribution and sales of opium in China. In the early 1930s, the United States began to be involved in military aid to China, primarily for the development of the Chinese air force. Government funds, however, were not used. Colonel Claire Chennault, a retired Army Air Corps officer, was hired by Chiang to strengthen the Chinese Nationalist Air Force. Initially based in Nanking, he moved to Kunming in southwest China near the Burma Road. He also established the Flying Tigers, an organization of

176

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

American pilots who flew fighter planes on a contract basis. When the United States entered the war, this group converted to an Army Air Corps unit. An American company built an aircraft assembly plant in China and established flying schools for Chinese pilots. The Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s prevented the United States from providing military materiels to nations involved in hostilities. But it left the decision up to the president as to whether an embargo was required when no declaration of war existed, as was the case with China and Japan. Movie newsreels of Japanese atrocities had placed American public opinion overwhelmingly on the side of the Chinese. Washington was ready to break its neutrality stance and provide financial assistance to Chiang and the Chinese Nationalist Army, but isolationist sentiment precluded an actual appropriation of foreign aid by Congress. In 1937, the U.S. Treasury had purchased more than one hundred million ounces of Chineseowned silver (stored at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) at the inflated rate of forty-five cents per ounce, as a means of providing dollar credits to the Nationalists. In December 1938, a commercial loan of $25 million was arranged through the Export-Import Bank that was to be repaid by Chinese exports. Most of this aid, plus a small amount from Britain, was used to obtain supplies and equipment for the Burma Road, which along with the Ledo Road and the Stilwell Road would be the only overland supply routes to the Nationalists for nearly seven years.46 In retaliation against this assistance to China, the Japanese became increasingly hostile to American and British citizens and economic interests, especially in Tientsin. Japanese guards searched Americans and British citizens, often treating them with physical abuse. Washington weighed in with retaliation in July 1939 by denouncing the Commercial Treaty of 1911 with Japan, leaving the United States free to apply economic sanctions against Japan. The termination became effective in January 1940, at a point in time when the United States had spent four decades in protecting the integrity of China through the Open Door policy. On April 1, 1940, the day after Japan gave recognition to the Wang puppet government, the United States provided a $45 million credit to the Nationalist government. In March 1941, more American aid was provided to the Nationalists in the form of lend-lease aid, which permitted the loan of U.S. military equipment to Chiang. Meanwhile, Japan’s Kwantung Army was not faring well in northern Manchuria against the Soviet Union. After 1935 the number of clashes along the fifteen-hundred-mile border grew alarmingly. Japan increased the strength of its Kwantung Army from 10,400 men in 1931 to 164,000 by the mid-1930s and to 270,000 by 1939. The Soviet Army made corresponding increases in its units near the border. A major encounter occurred in July 1938 at Changkufeng and Lake Khasan, near the intersection of the borders of Korea and Manchuria with the Soviet Maritime Province. The dispute, over the possession of two hills,

Japan’s Attempt to Conquer China

177

resulted in several thousand casualties on each side before a settlement was reached in August.47 The most serious crisis between Japan and the Soviet Union in the 1930s occurred along the Khalkin Gol River, a remote western region on the border of Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. The border war, known as the Nomonhan incident in Japan, began in May 1939 and became a major conflict by the end of June. Fighting reached a climax in August and ended the next month, with the Soviets demonstrating military superiority heretofore unseen by the Japanese.48 Japan suffered heavy losses in this war—more than twenty-thousand killed—but strict censorship of the news prevented the magnitude from being known in Japan until after 1945. Another shock to Japan was the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact concluded in August 1939. Japan had no advance information that its ally, Germany, was about to make a bargain with its northern enemy, the Soviet Union. Khalkin Gol and the Nonaggression Pact between Berlin and Moscow led the Japanese army high command to strengthen the Kwantung Army during the next three years. On September 1, 1939, the war in Europe began when Nazi troops invaded Poland, and Britain and France declared war on Germany. This event was important to Japan for three reasons: (1) Britain’s attention would be focused on Europe instead of its interests in Asia; (2) France would soon be occupied by German troops and Indochina could be occupied by Japan without resistance; and, (3) the Netherlands likewise would be overrun by the Nazis and the Dutch East Indies could be taken without interference from the home government. Japan, with more than four decades of uninterrupted success in its territorial expansion, was bogged down in mainland China. Japan’s top civilian and military leaders were not able to discern that a small nation like Japan, with limited resources, would never be able to conquer the world’s most populous nation, which was also one of the world’s five largest countries in terms of geographical area. The China war was the modern Japanese army’s first major strategic error. The stage was now set for a major confrontation between Japan and the United States.

CHAPTER 9

Confrontation between the United States and Japan THE UNITED STATES TAKES A STERN POSITION WITH JAPAN Adolf Hitler’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, marked the beginning of World War II in Europe and brought increasing concern in the United States over the hostile actions of both Japan and Germany. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt was still promising Americans that war could be avoided, an increasing number of citizens came to the view that Japan, Germany, and Italy must somehow be stopped. Isolationists, however, kept up a steady harangue in opposition to American involvement in European and Asian wars. A number of congressmen and senators from the Midwest strongly argued for neutrality and were opposed to providing economic and military aid to any of the belligerent powers. Other prominent citizens also joined the opposition. The famous aviator, Charles A. Lindbergh, spoke on a nationwide radio broadcast in October 1939 opposing all offensive weapons and proposed that Canada should sever its ties with Great Britain so that North America could be a neutral zone. Lindbergh had also visited Germany and brought back glowing reports of progress under Hitler. He was repudiated by leading American journalists who berated him for being a Nazi sympathizer. Lindbergh continued to advocate neutrality until the United States entered the war, only then changing his position to support for the war effort. On October 19, 1939, Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, recently returned to Tokyo from a home visit and conferences with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, gave his Straight from the Horse’s Mouth Speech before the America-Japan Society. Grew made crystal clear the attitude

180

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

of the American government and people concerning Japan’s invasion of China, emphasizing there was no misunderstanding, as many Japanese had alleged. To the Japanese charge that Americans were following a “legalistic view” of matters in China, he assured Japan that American policy and objectives were based on cardinal principles of the respect for sovereignty of nations, far transcending any “legalistic” approach to world affairs. Grew explained that the crux of the problem between Japan and the United States did indeed involve China: Another common fallacy which I am constrained to mention is the charge that the American Government and people do not understand “the new order in East Asia.” . . . The American Government and people understand what is meant by the “new order in East Asia” precisely as clear as it is understood in Japan. The “new order in East Asia” has been officially defined in Japan as an order of security, stability, and progress. The American Government and people earnestly desire security, stability, and progress not only for themselves but for all other nations in every quarter of the world. . . . . . . It is probable that many of you are not aware of the increasing extent to which the people of the United States resent the methods which the Japanese armed forces are employing in China today and what appear to be their objectives. . . . [T]he American people have been profoundly shocked over the widespread use of bombing in China, not only on grounds of humanity but also on grounds of the direct menace to American lives and property; . . . they regard with growing seriousness the violation of and interference with American rights by the Japanese armed forces in China in disregard of treaties and agreements entered into by the United States and Japan.1

Grew summarized by pointing out that Japan’s New Order policy would leave the American Open Door policy “truncated and emasculated,” and furthermore “that the many things injurious to the United States which have been done are wholly needless.”2 Grew’s speech was politely received, and relations—at least at the official level—seemed to improve for a few days. Soon, however, Japan’s propaganda machine was again spewing out invective against the United States. Foreign Minister Nomura Kichisaburo of Japan told a press conference that Japan’s determination to establish a New Order in East Asia “is too strong to be changed or affected by the interference of a third power.” Obviously, the third power was the United States.3 Public sentiment in the United States was beginning to change; where previously there was a consensus for neutrality related to the conflict in East Asia, many now began to favor the Chinese. Movie newsreels of the past two years showing Japan’s abusive actions in China had their effect. There was growing support for economic and military aid to China. In the same month that Ambassador Grew gave his Straight from the Horse’s Mouth Speech in Tokyo, President Roosevelt called for repeal of the arms embargo provisions of the neutrality laws passed in the mid-1930s. The Senate in Washington voted on October 27, 1939, to repeal the arms embargo. The House of Representatives likewise voted on November 2 for re-

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

181

peal, and President Roosevelt signed the legislation into law the next day. The United States—the “arsenal of democracy,” as stated by Roosevelt in a December 1940 radio address—soon began to churn out weapons, ammunition, and other war supplies for delivery to China, Britain, and France, and other nations opposing the totalitarian nations. The repeal of the embargo laws meant that the United States could take sides by supporting the Allies while placing an embargo on shipments to Japan, Germany, and Italy. In the 1930s—and increasingly after 1939—Japanese naval intelligence agents established spy networks at various locations in North America. Many of these operatives were military and naval attache´s operating out of the Japanese embassy in Washington and consulates in major cities, especially Los Angeles. At least two Americans, formerly in the navy, were recruited and paid large sums of money to provide Japanese agents in California with code books for classified radio communications. Both of these men were apprehended and sentenced to extended periods of confinement. But the Japanese intelligence agents continued their surveillance of U.S. Navy operations along the West Coast. They easily blended in with Japanese American residents. In December 1939, Ambassador Grew sent Roosevelt an analysis of the situation in Tokyo. The Japanese were strongly promoting the New Order in East Asia, and Grew wrote: the minimum conception of that term envisages permanent Japanese control of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and North China. In the Army and among certain elements of the Government and the public the conception is very much broader; those elements would exert Japanese control throughout all of China, or as much of China as can now or in future be grasped and held, including at the treaty ports and the international settlements and concessions. . . . These plans, of course, envisage long-term and probably permanent Japanese garrisons to compel subserviency to Japanese interests. . . . The pill will be most carefully sugar-coated, and the Japanese are past masters at sugar-coating their desiderata and intentions. They say, and many of them actually believe, that all this is being done to bring permanent peace to China in the interests of the Chinese themselves; theirs is a “holy war.”4

As the decade of the 1940s began, American public opinion was gradually turning to favor some type of action—short of war—to assist the Chinese. Henry L. Stimson, who had been the secretary of state in the Herbert Hoover administration, wrote a letter to the New York Times that was published on the front page on January 11, 1940. Stimson pointed out that the United States, for the past three years, had been exporting to Japan supplies and materiel for “the aid of wrong-doing in the Far East.” They have caused “inexcusable cruelty toward unoffending Chinese civilians, women, and children.” Stimson called for an immediate embargo on sales of iron ore, steel, scrap iron, and oil to Japan. He called on the United States to “act,” but did not specify what lines of action should be taken.

182

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Stimson, by this time seventy-two years old and having been the secretary of war under President William Howard Taft in 1911–1912, had been in the public eye for four decades and was influential. People listened when he talked. Many remembered his Nonrecognition policy announced in January 1932 a few months after Japan’s Manchurian aggression began. A few even remembered his service in the Philippines as governor-general in 1928–1929 where he worked closely with Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmen˜a. To Stimson, the major problem in East Asia since the turn of the century had been Japan’s ambition to control China. Shortly after Stimson’s letter was published by the Times, a coalition of several congressmen, academics, theologians, and industrialists formed the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression for the purpose of lobbying for an embargo on shipment of military materiel to Japan. Another group, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, was formed by influential Americans and well-known persons from other countries, interest group representatives, government officials, and members of Congress. This group pushed for the repeal of neutrality laws and favored military and economic aid to Britain and China and other countries fighting against aggression.5 In the spring of 1940, Pearl Harbor became a fully garrisoned naval base with ships previously based in San Pedro, California. Most naval ships assigned to the Pacific Ocean area were moved to Hawaii after April 1940 as a deterrent to Japan. This action was taken as though a chess game were being played, which would checkmate any possible Japanese moves in the Pacific. Throughout 1940 and 1941, the United States—its leaders and the general public—underestimated Japan’s intentions and capabilities. A common American misconception of the time was that Japan would not dare attack naval vessels stationed in U.S. territory; therefore, the ships were a deterrent. Events in Europe also had an influence on the Pacific and East Asia. The Germans captured Norway on May 2, 1940. A week later Winston Churchill replaced Nevile Chamberlain as prime minister of Britain. Hitler invaded Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The Germans captured Paris on June 14, 1940, and most of France fell under Nazi occupation. Britain pulled some of its troops out of Southeast Asia to bolster its forces in Europe and closed the Burma Road at the insistence of Japan. The shock of the fall of France, however, motivated Washington to increase the production of military equipment, with Roosevelt calling for “at least 50,000 planes per year.” More organizations joined in the call for action to preserve the democracies of the world. The Century Club, composed of influential foreign policy elites such as John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, retired admirals and generals, prominent lawyers and bankers, and members of the Council on Foreign Relations, publicly advocated increased defense readiness. Norman Davis, a former businessman whom Roosevelt had appointed as ambassador-at-large, declared: “the foremost requirement of the United States in a world in which it proposes to hold unquestioned power, is the rapid fulfillment of a program of complete

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

183

re-armamament.” He continued by explaining that Japan was a threat to America’s unquestioned power, and that this power needed “to be dissipated through peaceable means if possible, or through force, if necessary.”6 On July 26, 1940, Prime Minister Yonai Mitsumasa, a navy admiral who advocated friendlier relations with Britain and the United States and who was under pressure from the army and advocates of the New Order structure, resigned—after a tenure of only six months. Prince Konoe Fumimaro was brought back to serve as premier, and an outright ultranationalist, Matsuoka Yosuke, became the foreign affairs minister. Matsuoka claimed he had no new policies, but events over the next twelve months would reflect a hardening of Japan’s foreign policy. On August 1, 1940, after an imperial conference between Japan’s top admirals and generals and the emperor, the Japanese government issued a summary of “Fundamental National Policies” indicating this trend: 1. Basic Policy. The basic aim of Japan’s national policy lies in the firm establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty spirit of Hakko Ichiu [the whole world under one roof; literally, “eight cords, one roof”], in which the country was founded, and in the construction, as the first step, of a new order in Greater East Asia, having for its foundation the solidarity of Japan, Manchukuo and China. . . . 2. National Defense and Foreign Policy. Japan’s foreign policy, which aims ultimately at the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, will be directed, first of all, toward a complete settlement of the China Affair, and the advancement of the national fortune by taking a far-sighted view of the drastic changes in the international situation and formulating both constructive and flexible measures. 3. Renovation of Internal Structure. What is urgently required in internal administration is the laying of the foundation for a state structure for national defense through a complete renovation of the domestic [situation in general]: A. Renovation of education thoroughly in harmony with the fundamental principles of the national polity [schools to perform indoctrination of students for Japan’s aims in East Asia]. . . . B.

Establishment of a powerful new political structure and a unified control of government affairs. a. Establishment of a new national structure [abolish the political system]. . . . b. Renovation of the Diet as an organ for assisting the Throne [make the Diet a rubber-stamp organization subordinate to the army and navy]. . . . c. Fundamental renovation in the operation of administrative organs, and the reformation of the bureaucracy, aimed at the unity and efficiency of those organs [ensure that the bureaucrats do not hamper the new order].

C.

Laying the foundation of national defense economy, of which the keynote is to

184

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific lie in the autonomous development of the economy of Japan, Manchukuo and China with Japan as the center. [Italics added]7

These formulas established none other than the basic doctrine for Japan’s control of all of East Asia. Korea and Taiwan were included as they were considered integral parts of Japan in view of their annexation. Plans were already in the making for adding Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, and other countries once Japan’s military forces invaded Southeast Asia. Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka confirmed that the mission of Japan is to proclaim and demonstrate the kodo [Imperial Way] throughout the world. Viewed from the standpoint of international relations, this amounts, I think, to enabling all nations and races to find each its proper place in the world. Accordingly, the immediate aim of our foreign policy at present is to establish, in the lofty spirit of the kodo, a great East Asian chain of common prosperity with the JapanManchoukuo-China group as one of the links.”8

Statements made at other times by Matsuoka would indicate that there were plans to eventually extend the “great East Asian chain of common prosperity” to South and Southwest Asia, reaching as far as the Persian Gulf. After the imperial conference in late July 1940, domestic measures made life even more painful for ordinary Japanese civilians who were indoctrinated with propaganda about Japan’s “just cause” and the need for sacrifices to conserve scarce resources, such as petroleum products. A uniform civilian dress code was established to eliminate differences attributable to fashion and design. Spy-scare stories were circulated. The objective was to put the civilian population on a wartime footing. War Minister Tojo Hideki had a plan, the “Main Japanese Policy Principles for Coping with the Situation Which Has Developed in the World.” The main concept was to block supplies going to Chiang Kai-shek by blockading Indochina and Burma; to develop stronger ties with Germany; and to prepare for a Japanese invasion—diplomatic if possible, but militarily if necessary—of Southeast Asia. Tojo even considered inviting the European colonial powers—Britain, the Netherlands, France, and Portugal, but not the United States—however, the Konoe cabinet would not agree to this proposal. The conferees compromised and settled for a Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere that would encompass Japan (including Korea and Taiwan), Manchuria, China, and eventually all of Southeast Asia, with Japan as the paramount power. Events in the summer of 1940 led Japanese leaders to view Hitler’s invasion of the Low Countries and France with appreciation. The success of his blitzkrieg strategy for conquering western Europe was much admired by Japan’s army generals, which led to hope that the emulation of German Nazi military policies would bring success in the conquest of China. They concluded that even if these strategies were not practical in China, a close association with Germany would

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

185

prove beneficial to Japan’s war aims. Furthermore, Hitler’s top strategists had been attempting to lure Japan into a military pact with Germany in order to pin down British forces in East Asia. Also in August 1940, Washington and London arranged for a destroyers-for-bases agreement whereby the United States would provide naval ships to Britain in exchange for bases in the western Atlantic, such as Bermuda and Argentia, Newfoundland. On September 27, 1940, Japan signed a Three-Power Pact with Germany and Italy, commonly known as the Axis Pact (Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis). The terms of the treaty specified that Japan would recognize the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe, while Germany and Italy would give recognition and respect to the leadership of Japan “in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.” The pact also provided for cooperation among the three nations and, most importantly, “to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.”9 Since another article of the pact exempted Soviet Russia, the aim of this circuitous language was the United States. The pact was of such great importance to Japan that the emperor issued an imperial rescript. For the most part, the decree was a public relations gimmick, couched in lofty court language, exhorting the masses to: “clarify evermore the concept of national polity; think deeply and look far; united in heart and strength, and surmount the present emergency, to assist thereby in the promotion of the Imperial fortune coeval [with] heaven and earth.”10 Prime Minister Konoe added his support: “On the occasion of the conclusion of the three-power pact . . . an Imperial Rescript has been issued, setting forth clearly the aims of our empire and pointing the path our nation should follow.” The premier went on to say that he was “greatly moved by the boundless benevolence of our Sovereign.” Matsuoka, the minister for foreign affairs, gave a lengthy address, explaining: “the Government expects to achieve the ultimate aim of our Yamato race—namely, the establishment of a new order in East Asia.” He also spoke of the “wisdom of our gracious Sovereign,” and warned that “Our Government and people, united as one and grasping fully the situation both at home and abroad, should be prepared to endure all hardships and sacrifices, and redouble their efforts so as to conform to the august will of our sovereign.”11 Secretary of State Hull, in remarks given to the press, explained that the alliance confirmed a situation that had existed for several years. In other words, there was nothing new in the stated goals of Germany and Italy to impose a new order in Europe, and the aim of Japan to do likewise in East Asia. A week before the signing of the Axis Pact, Japan issued an ultimatum to the governor-general of French Indochina demanding that thirty thousand Japanese troops be allowed to enter Haiphong and Hanoi for the purpose of sealing off the pipeline for shipment of Allied military materiel to the Chinese Nationalist

186

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Army through the inland route via the southern border of China. Japanese troops landed in northern Indochina in the last week of September 1940 and quickly gained control of rail lines into China. Congress passed legislation—at Roosevelt’s request—that authorized the first peacetime draft in American history. The act also permitted the president to mobilize the National Guard into federal service. Coming in the midst of the 1940 presidential campaign, the measure for compulsory training created fiery protests against preparations for “putting our boys in foreign wars.” Roosevelt had second thoughts in view of his aspiration to be elected to an unprecedented third term, but concern for national defense preparations prevailed. The legislation was pushed through Congress where it was passed by a margin of one vote. The act gave Roosevelt the authority to activate the National Guard for service in the Western Hemisphere and provided for a selective service law for men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five. On October 16, 1940, sixteen million American men registered for the draft, but only a small percentage were actually inducted over the next year. Many more would be drafted—and the minimum age lowered to eighteen—once the United States entered the war.12 Ambassador Grew, in his analysis of events, informed Washington in late 1940 that Japan was rapidly becoming a regimented nation. Political parties had been eliminated and the whole country was being held together through loyalty to the emperor. The police were busy cracking down on anyone who opposed the new structure. Japanese citizens were commanded to be thrifty, make no lavish displays, be serious, and not express “dangerous thoughts.” New restrictions were being announced every day, and civilians were being forced to “get with it” on Japan’s new order in East Asia.13 In the last three months of 1940, Japan made several joint declarations that proclaimed alliances with puppet governments in China and Manchukuo concerning propagation of the new order in East Asia. The Japanese Foreign Office referred to the Wang Ching-wei regime in Japanese-occupied China as “The National Government of the Republic of China,” a designation that could be— and probably was intended to be—easily confused with Chiang’s Nationalist government based in Chungking. This prompted a statement by the Chinese minister for foreign affairs in Chungking for clarification: Having set up a regime to suit their own purposes, the Japanese have now signed with it the so-called treaty to facilitate their policy of domination and expansion in the Far East. Such a regime is in reality a part of the Government at Tokyo planted on Chinese soil, to be used by the Japanese militarists as an instrument for the realization of their scheme. The National Government of the Republic of China has repeatedly declared, and desires to reiterate most emphatically, that Wang Ching-wei is the arch-traitor of the Republic and that the puppet regime at Nanking is an illegal organization whose acts of whatever character are null and void in respect of all Chinese citizens and all foreign countries.14

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

187

The statement from Chungking seemed not to faze official Tokyo in the least. In fact, Japanese ultranationalists sponsored a big celebration on November 10, 1940, commemorating twenty-six hundred years since the founding of the Japanese empire. The event was observed in Tokyo and elsewhere in Japan to instill a sense of reverence for the imperial line and the uniqueness of Japan, giving the nation a “special position” as a mentor for the New Order in East Asia. Schoolchildren performed ceremonies, sang songs, marched in a military manner, and performed gymnastic displays. The only problem was that more than a thousand years of the first part of this extended period of time was represented by legendary emperors—highly publicized as factual during the 1930s for nationalistic purposes—but completely mythological. The earliest documented record of an emperor in Japan was Ojin in the early fifth century, and even then it was not until many centuries later that there was an emperor of a unified Japan. Be that as it may, the ceremony in 1940 was to whip up nationalistic and patriotic sentiment, and no one quibbled over the accuracy of the time period. No one dared, even though many older, well-educated Japanese knew the truth.

THE UNITED STATES IMPOSES TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON JAPAN During the second half of 1940, the U.S. government frequently used trade sanctions as a method of inducing Japan—with little success—to discontinue its aggression in China and other parts of East Asia. Roosevelt took action on July 26, 1940, to restrict export licenses to Japan for heavy melting scrap (about 20 percent of U.S. scrap exports to Japan), tetraethyl lead (used as an antiknock agent in gasoline), lubricating oil, and aviation fuel. Additional items were added to the list several times during the remainder of 1940. There were even more products and basic materials added in 1941. Basic materials such as aluminum, asbestos, graphite, manganese, mercury, and quartz crystals, along with aircraft parts and equipment, armor plate, and bulletproof glass were among those items subjected to licensing. The concept of licensing was that none of the designated products could be shipped to a foreign country without first obtaining an export license from the Department of Commerce. In a radio address of December 29, 1940, Roosevelt explained that the Nazi leaders of Germany intended to dominate Europe, and “then use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.” The Axis powers were tied down at present, by Britain in Europe and China in Asia, but he warned that events could change and that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer seemed as vast as they once did in the days of clipper ships. Roosevelt warned against “appeasers” and those who wanted to “hide in the bed and pull up the covers over their head.” He also cautioned against Germany and Japan’s concept of a New Order policy and explained: “what they have in

188

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

mind is but a revival of the oldest and worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope,” further dispelling the myth: The proposed “new order” is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a government based upon the consent of the governed. It is not a union of ordinary, self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate and enslave the human race.15

Roosevelt also explained that the rearmament of the United States and the sending of military materiel to the defenders of freedom would greatly assist democracy’s fight against world conquest. He continued his speech by pointing out that the United States had “the men, the skill, and above all, the will” to become the “great arsenal of democracy.” “For us,” he concluded, “this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism, as we would show were we at war.”16 On March 11, 1941, the Lend-Lease Act went into effect providing $7 billion in credits to Britain. In the case of China, a firm named China Defense Supplies was established in Washington that was actually a front for American pilots and aircraft mechanics to go to China. As individuals, they were prohibited from working for a foreign power, but it was legitimized through this corporation. Aviation personnel were recruited by Colonel Claire Chennault (the American hired by Chiang to strengthen his air force) and designated as members of the American Volunteer Group, or the Flying Tigers.17 Japan and the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact on April 13, 1941, that required both countries “to maintain peaceful and friendly relations” and to mutually respect the “territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party.”18 Tokyo’s actions in making this treaty with Moscow, along with the stationing of troops in Indochina, gave a definite indication that the “Go South” policy of invading Southeast Asia was Japan’s top priority instead of the “Go North” scheme for an invasion of Siberia. The embargo on exports from the United States—and the threat of a freeze of Japanese assets—led the Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) in Tokyo to seek the rubber plantations of Indochina and the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies as a replacement for American products. War developments moved fast after the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched a massive offensive against the Soviet Union, completely disregarding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact of 1939. Shock over this attack reverberated all the way from Moscow to Tokyo. Now that Stalin’s attention was turned to the West, the ever-pragmatic Matsuoka, in complete disregard for the neutrality pact he had so recently signed, became an enthusiastic advocate of an attack on Soviet forces in Siberia. Matsuoka saw Japan’s best hopes for the future in Northeast Asia, rather than

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

189

in South Asia, as Tokyo’s policymakers had determined by mid-1941. In spite of the foreign minister’s forceful arguments, the “Go South” advocates prevailed and Matsuoka was dismissed on July 18, 1941, probably due more to his bellicose attitude toward the United States than for his position on attacking the Soviet Union. Washington had frozen the assets of Germany and Italy in the United States on June 14, 1941, and it was obvious that Japan would be next. As expected, Roosevelt issued an executive order on July 26 freezing Japanese assets in the United States, bringing all financial and import and export trade transactions under government control. In effect, this order banned all exports of American commodities and products to Japan.19 NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN 1941 While events in Europe and Asia seemed to be propelling the United States into war, influential citizens in the United States and Japan—both in and out of government—sought a resolution on peaceful terms. An effort of this type would require an immense amount of “give and take” on both sides, difficult under the best of conditions, and nearly impossible given the world situation. In late 1940, two Catholic clergymen, Bishop James E. Walsh, the superior general of the Maryknoll Order, and Father James M. Drought, the vicar general of the Roman Catholic Foreign Mission Society at Maryknoll in New York, visited Japan and offered their services as mediators between the governments of Japan and the United States in an attempt to resolve their growing differences. They talked to an official of the Corporate Bank of Japan, Ikawa Tadao, who had connections to top civilian officials in Tokyo, and discussed the concept of starting some alternative discussions to the usual diplomatic negotiations to seek improved chances for peace. Ikawa paved the way for discussions with the minister of foreign affairs. On December 5, 1940, Walsh and Drought talked to Matsuoka who told them he wanted to improve Japanese-American relations. The foreign minister insisted “that if he could only see the President for an hour he felt sure that he could bring about an improvement in relations.” On returning to the United States, the two clerics conveyed Matsuoka’s message to Roosevelt and Hull in January 1941. Roosevelt asked them to inform Tokyo officials that informal talks in Washington would be welcome. The president also asked Walsh and Drought to inform Postmaster-General Frank C. Walker of results of informal conversations. (Walker’s function was that of a trusted aide and had nothing to do with his position as U.S. postmaster-general.) Roosevelt explained that Walker would act as the coordinator with appropriate elements of his Administration on these issues.20 On January 15, 1941, the secretary of state testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives: “The equilibrium in the Far East which had been established by the Washington Conference treaties of 1921–

190

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

1922 became seriously disturbed by the setting up by forceful means in a part of China of a regime under Japanese control under the name of ‘Manchukuo,’ and the renunciation of the 1922 Treaty.” He cited discriminatory trade restrictions in Manchukuo, large-scale military operations in China since July 1937, abusive treatment of Chinese citizens in Japanese-occupied areas, and the continued stationing of more than a million Japanese soldiers in large areas along the seaboard of China and in central provinces. Hull continued: “In these areas there were set up puppet regimes which instituted systems of controls and monopolies discriminatory in favor of the interests of the invading country.” It was clear, he said, that Japan was motivated by broad-based and ambitious plans “for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific . . . and that the ‘New Order’ means domination by one country.” The secretary of state finished his testimony with the observation that: “Notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during the recent years, this Government has made repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that her best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We have at no time made any threats.”21 Admiral Nomura, a naval officer for more than forty years and the minister for foreign affairs for several months in late 1939, was appointed as the Japanese ambassador to the United States. Before leaving Japan, he asked the IGH to send a special envoy—someone thoroughly familiar with the China incident— to the United States to assist in conversations with Hull and other American officials. War Minister Tojo selected Colonel Iwakuro Hideo, the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the IGH, as his special representative. Ikawa, the civilian official Walsh and Drought talked to initially, was to be the second member of this unusual effort at informal diplomacy. The two men traveled separately to the United States in early 1941, Ikawa arriving in February and Iwakuro in late March. Nomura arrived in Washington on February 14, 1941, affirming Japan’s peaceful intentions. The next day, without any direct connection to Nomura’s arrival, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, newly assigned as the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, issued a confidential letter to his subordinate commanders outlining contingency planning requirements. Even though rumors of a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been relayed in January from Ambassador Grew to Washington, and those reports had been forwarded to American commanders in Hawaii, Kimmel stated: “No responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by an attack on the Fleet or Base, but irresponsible and misguided nationals might try it.” The admiral explained that “a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in conjunction with a submarine raid.”22 During this period, U.S. public opinion viewed Japan’s military and naval capabilities as inept in comparison to the United States. Most people assumed

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

191

any aggression committed by Japan would be in the direction of Southeast Asia. A Japanese attack on Hawaii was not even in the realm of possibility. Congressman Charles Faddis, speaking to the members of the House of Representatives on February 19, 1941, typified American opinion of the day: “The Japanese are not going to fight with a first-class nation. They are unprepared to do so and no one knows better than they do. . . . They will not dare to get into a position where they must face the American Navy in open battle.”23 In the first half of 1941, most Japanese leaders were hopeful of obtaining their goals for movement into Southeast Asia and for absorption of large parts of China into the Japanese empire without engaging the United States in war. Konoe and Matsuoka lent their support to the informal conversations, and for a time it appeared the contentious issues could be resolved. On March 13 Postmaster-General Walker informed Hull in a memorandum of the issues he was working on: 1. Removal of Japan from the Axis. 2. Guarantee of Pacific peace. 3. Open Door in China. 4. Political integrity of China. 5. No further Japanese military or political aggression. 6. Stoppage of all Japanese shipment of supplies to Germany. 7. Obstruction to the spread of communism. 8. An agreement with Japan based on Hull’s four principles.24

Three weeks later, Walker informed Hull that Colonel Iwakuro had given his “unofficial” consent to every substantial point: 1. No military action (by Japan) against the United States should Washington decide on “protective defensive action” against Germany. 2. Mediation of President Roosevelt for China-Japan peace on basis offered to, and accepted by the president as just and prudent. 3. Acceptance of credit that would involve Japanese business in a substantial dependent alliance with the United States. 4. Mutual pledge of Pacific peace and appropriate naval placements. 5. Conference at Honolulu opened by President Roosevelt.

There were some conditions, however, to Iwakuro’s “unofficial” consent, specifically that it would be politically impossible to effect a “180 degree change” unless the Japanese government received some substantial benefits. In the economic area, it would be necessary that Japanese ownership of Dutch-East Indian oil and some rubber and tin be recognized. Politically, the Japanese would re-

192

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

quire the removal of Hong Kong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachments by the British in the East Asia.25 In talks with Nomura on April 14, 1941, Hull referred to the variety of sources that he was receiving Japanese proposals from and explained that “it would of course be understood that in considering problems outstanding . . . we could deal only with the Ambassador.” Hull asked Nomura if he had been involved in formulating the proposals from Colonel Iwakuro and Ikawa. Nomura said he knew about the proposals and had participated in their development. Two days later, Hull told Nomura that “one paramount preliminary question about which this Government is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government has the willingness and power to go forward along the lines of the proposal, to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force, and to adopt four principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest.” Hull outlined the principles he considered essential to improvement of relations with Japan: 1. respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; 2. support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; 3. support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; and 4. nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.26

Ambassador Nomura expressed his approval of these goals, but offered no concrete suggestions for dealing with the issue of China or for resolution of matters calling for settlement with the United States. Nomura actually had nothing to offer in response to Hull’s comments, except to deny that Japan was committed to courses of conquest. On May 12, 1941, Nomura presented, under instructions from his government, a proposal for a general settlement between the United States and Japan that revealed for the first time what the Japanese government had in mind. The ambassador introduced Iwakuro and Ikawa, identifying Ikawa as “being close to the most influential civilian group in the Government of Japan.” Ikawa and Iwakuro took part in subsequent conversations until the talks were interrupted in July. Hull’s analysis was that the Japanese government was proposing a “joint overlordship by Japan and the United States of the Pacific area, with apparently little thought for the rights and interests of countries other than Japan and the United States.”27 There was no indication that Japan would sever or loosen its ties with Germany and Italy. Nomura’s proposal also included the concepts that: 1. the United States would request that the government of China (the Chiang government in Chungking) negotiate with Japan a settlement of hostilities in China;

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

193

2. a mutual understanding by the United States and Japan that each would supply so far as possible commodities that the other required; 3. a mutual understanding that steps would be taken to bring about resumption of normal trade relations between the United States and Japan; 4. an understanding by the United States that Japan’s expansion in the southwestern Pacific, being declared of a peaceful nature, the United States would cooperate in facilitating the production of procurement by Japan of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) that Japan needed. The United States would also understand that it was supposed to discontinue aid to China in the event the government of China refused to negotiate. The terms that Japan was to present to China were referred to only as the “Konoe principles.”

Separately, it was explained to Hull that the Konoe principles included “neighborly friendship, joint defense against Communism and economic cooperation.” Furthermore, these principles were to imply mutual respect for sovereignty and territories; withdrawal of Japanese troops from China in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China; and recognition of the independence of Manchukuo. The Konoe principles were a restatement of Prime Minister Konoe’s New Order in East Asia statement of November 3, 1938, and the “peace treaty” with the Wang occupation regime, announced November 30, 1940. When Hull asked about defense against communism, Colonel Iwakuro pointed out that further stationing of Japanese troops in China was contemplated through the collaboration of China and Japan, and that would include Inner Mongolia and the adjacent regions of China proper, including Peking and as far south as Tsingtao. Hull pointed out that this concept meant that the Japanese military would dominate the five northern provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar, and Suiyuan with an aggregate area of more than four hundred thousand square miles and an estimated population of eighty million people. In addition, Japan would still be in complete control of Manchuria, or Manchukuo, which actually represented another three provinces of China. Iwakuro pointed out that the stationing of Japanese troops was an “absolute condition of any settlement with China.”28 Later in May, Secretary Hull participated in additional conversations with Ambassador Nomura, Colonel Iwakuro, and Ikawa, and asked for more information. Hull wanted further explanations in regard to the joint defense of China, Japan’s stance against communism, and the stationing of Japanese troops in China. The Japanese representatives, expressing surprise, claimed they thought the settlement of the China affair (upgraded from “incident,” but not to “war”) concerned only China and Japan. The secretary pointed out that a peaceful settlement between China and Japan was an essential element in the “peace of the Pacific,” and that the United States would still have obligations to China under various treaties in effect. A few days later, Nomura told Hull that the withdrawal of Japanese troops

194

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

would not include the Japanese troops needed in China for “cooperative defense against communism.” Iwakuro refused to be pinned down on numbers, and considering the past duplicity of Japanese expansionists it is likely there would have been no reduction at all.29 On June 2, 1941, Hull asked Nomura if the Japanese government “seriously and earnestly” desired a settlement for peace and nondiscriminatory commercial relations and friendship in the Pacific. When Nomura replied in the affirmative, the secretary remarked that in the light of the statements that Matsuoka and others in Tokyo were constantly making, he “was forced to inquire whether Japan really was seeking to extricate itself from the hostilities with China while otherwise going forward with methods and practices entirely contrary to the principles which would have to underlie any settlement establishing peace . . . and friendly relations in the Pacific and East Asian areas.” Matsuoka had been in Germany in March and had made public statements supportive of Hitler’s policies and goals, and in a press conference for German reporters exclaimed that “all the world’s troubles were due to Anglo-Saxon machinations.” Matsuoka again reconfirmed with Hitler the provisions of the Axis Pact that Germany and Italy would establish a New Order in Europe, while Japan instituted a New Order in greater East Asia.30 Secretary Hull, in talks on June 21, 1941, handed Ambassador Nomura a response to the May 12 proposals. The reply asked for assurances that Japan was under no commitment to take action against the United States; proposed that China and Japan enter into negotiations under guidelines acceptable to the United States; resumption of trade between the United States and Japan if other criteria were met; mutual pledges “that the activities of the two countries in the Pacific would be carried on by peaceful means and in the basis of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations”; and a joint affirmation by the two countries to seek peace in the Pacific and East Asia with a “mutual disclaimer of territorial designs there.”31 In Japan, there were differing views on what position Japan should take; there were some officials in the Konoe cabinet who were opposed to any act that would bring Japan into hostilities with the United States. Meanwhile, Matsuoka, the minister for foreign affairs, had become increasingly arrogant in his flagrant speeches (some called them “diatribes”) in support of Japan’s New Order policy and in opposition to Britain and the United States. To resolve these issues, an imperial conference was held in Tokyo on July 2, 1941, attended by both civilian and military officials of the Japanese government in the presence of Emperor Hirohito to prepare an “Outline of National Policy in View of the Changing Situation.” Policy decisions reached at this conference, cited in part 1, included: 1. Regardless of what changes may occur in the world situation, the Empire shall firmly adhere to the policy of building a Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, thereby contributing to the firm establishment of world peace.

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

195

2. In order to press forward on resolving the China Incident and in order to establish a firm foundation for self-preservation and self-defense, the Empire shall take steps to advance southward and shall solve the northern problem as changing circumstances permit. 3. The Empire shall remove all obstacles in the way of achieving these objectives.32

Part 2 of the outline was titled “Prospectus” and included procedural approaches for accomplishing the policy cited in part 1. One of the plans listed was: The Empire shall continue diplomatic negotiations and promote various other necessary measures with regard to those regions in the south important for self-preservation and self-defense. . . . The Empire shall not flinch from war with Britain and the United States in order to achieve these objectives.33

The specific details of the outline of national policies were not made public, but an official statement from the Japanese government announced, “the fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided.” Furthermore, intelligence sources in the United States had broken the diplomatic code of the Japanese government through a decrypting system known as MAGIC and had access to all radio transmissions between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and its embassies. (MAGIC was not an acronym; the system received that name because Brigadier General Joseph O. Mauborgne, the chief signal officer of the U.S. Army, referred to his cryptanalytic team as “magicians.”)34 Even without access to decoded message traffic in the Japanese diplomatic system, it was apparent to American officials that Japan was planning for a major undertaking. Military preparations were initiated by Japan on an accelerated basis, including the activation of more than a million reservists and conscripts. Japanese merchant vessels were suddenly recalled from all parts of the world, an exceptional action for a major maritime nation. Restrictions were imposed on travel in Japan, and strict censorship of mail and other communications was initiated. The Japanese press warned that “Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never equaled in all Japanese history.” It charged the United States with encroachment, using the Philippine Islands as a “pistol aimed at Japan’s heart.” A Japanese government official charged the ABCD powers (America, Britain, China, and the Dutch) with an encirclement of Japan. The Japanese press, while supporting the talks in Washington, stressed that there must “under no circumstances be any change in Japan’s policies, namely, the settlement of the ‘China Incident,’ the firm establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Axis Alliance.”35 In Tokyo, the Konoe cabinet resigned and a new cabinet was formed on July 18, 1941, with Konoe continuing as prime minister. The major purpose of this

196

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

reorganization was to dismiss Matsuoka from his post as minister of foreign affairs. Admiral Toyoda Teijiro was named as his replacement. Also in July, large numbers of Japanese troops—previously limiting their occupation to the northern part of French Indochina—invaded the southern part of the country. Officials of the Japanese government negotiated a “joint defense” agreement that left the Vichy French officials nominally in charge, but placed actual control of all of Indochina in the hands of the Japanese army. Only the previous month, Thailand had signed a friendship treaty with Japan and became a Japanese protectorate. Secretary of State Hull saw the acquiescence of the Vichy officials as resulting from pressure applied by German sources, which indicated collaboration between Japan and Germany in a policy of world domination and conquest. Roosevelt sought again, to no avail, to offer alternatives to Tokyo—making French Indochina a “neutralized” country—but Japanese forces continued their move into southern Indochina, including Saigon. Lacking any satisfactory response from Tokyo, the president issued an executive order freezing Japanese assets in the United States, and bringing all trade between the two countries to a halt. Colonel Iwakuro and Ikawa returned to Japan about this time, and there was a break in the talks between representatives of Japan and the United States. As a result of Japan’s actions in French Indochina, the War Department in Washington announced on July 27, 1941, that Douglas MacArthur would be recalled to active duty in the U.S. Army (he had been serving as a retired officer heading up the Philippine army) with the rank of lieutenant general and would becomed the commanding general of the newly constituted U.S. Army Forces, Far East (AFFE). MacArthur’s forces consisted of one U.S. Army division with eighty-five hundred soldiers, other personnel of approximately eight thousand troops of the regular army, fifty-two hundred Filipino scouts, and an impressivesounding Army of the Philippines, which had a grand total of only four thousand Filipino soldiers. MacArthur promised to have a militia of one hundred thousand trained by the end of 1941 and another two hundred thousand by the end of 1942. Concurrent with this action, strategists in Washington decided that the forward defense zone of the United States in the Pacific would be shifted from Hawaii to the Philippines.36 On August 6, 1941, the government of Japan answered Roosevelt’s plan for neutrality of Indochina by ignoring most of the proposals and instead proposing new provisions and offering not to station Japanese troops in the southwestern Pacific region other than Indochina. Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that Tokyo’s reply was lacking in responsiveness to Roosevelt’s proposal. THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE By August 1941, Roosevelt had already determined that the United States could not remain neutral in a world where Hitler and Benito Mussolini were taking over vast areas of Europe and North Africa and where Japan was ex-

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

197

tending its reach to cover Southeast Asia as well as China and Northeast Asia. A meeting between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Roosevelt—the Atlantic Conference—took place between August 9–12, 1941, and was held alternately on warships of the British Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy that were anchored at Argentia Bay in Newfoundland. Argentia was one of the British naval bases that had been leased to the United States in exchange for the loan of destroyers to the British the previous year. The army and navy staffs of each nation as well as civilian officials were present at these meetings which were veiled in secrecy. Roosevelt told Churchill that the United States would enter the war at some point, but that the first move would have to come from another nation. Neutrality proponents held such a strong position that it would not be possible for the United States to initiate hostilities. It appeared for a while that provocation would come from Nazi Germany’s submarine attacks on American ships, but public opinion held determinedly to an isolationist stance. Inevitably, it would be the Japanese who would make the move—at Pearl Harbor—that would “sting the hornet’s nest,” converting the great majority of the American people to strongly support entering the war against the tyranny and despotism of the Axis nations. Despite its name, the Atlantic Conference was actually the American-British overall, worldwide plan for the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan. British officers were initially disappointed that the United States refused to take over patrol and convoy duties in the western Atlantic. They were enthusiastic, however, over American proposals to take over responsibility for deterring Japanese attacks on Southeast Asia, and gladly yielded the B-17 bombers originally scheduled for Britain so they could be reassigned to the Philippines. The recall of MacArthur to active duty and the transfer of the B-17 bombers to the Philippines were intended to show the U.S. determination to deter any Japanese moves to seize oil supplies in the Netherlands East Indies. Washington strategists thought this action plus the transfer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet from California to Pearl Harbor the previous year would be sufficient to deter Japanese aggression. They belonged to the camp of the majority of Americans who, again, underestimated the capabilities and intentions of the Imperial Army and Navy. The Japanese were already planning for the invasion of the Philippines with an overwhelming force. In addition to the invasion, a task force—of military and civilian specialists—had been assembled in Taiwan to plan for the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Numerous decisions were made at the Atlantic Conference, including the priorities that would be followed in attacking Axis powers. Hitler would have first priority, in North Africa and Europe. War would be waged against Japan on a secondary basis at first, and then as mobilization accelerated, increasing attention would be focused on Japan. The United States would take on the primary responsibility for defeating Japanese forces in the Pacific. One of the products of the conference was the Atlantic Charter, an eight-point document that provided

198

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

a road map for the United States even before it entered the war. The charter served as the basic policy for all of the Allies who entered the war against Germany, Japan, and Italy, and was an integral element in stating the goals of what would eventually be the United Nations. Essential elements of the Atlantic Charter provided that Britain and the United States: 1. sought no territorial aggrandizement; 2. would not seek territorial changes that did not accord with the wishes of the people concerned; 3. respect the rights of all peoples to choose their own form of government; 4. advocate access on equal terms to trade and the raw materials of the world; 5. support the desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between nations on economic issues; 6. desire assurances that all people may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; 7. promote freedom of the seas and international commerce; and 8. believe that all nations of the world must come to the abandonment of the use of force in resolution of international disputes.37

THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS In a meeting with Ambassador Grew on August 18, 1941, Admiral Toyoda, the minister for foreign affairs, expressed the view that the only way to repair the relationship between Japan and the United States was for Prime Minister Konoe and President Roosevelt to hold talks on a face-to-face basis. Toyoda outlined topics for consideration and suggested the discussions be held in Honolulu. The foreign minister, though very gracious and courteous in his two-anda-half hour explanation to Grew, offered no change in fundamental principles. Most of the proposals were couched in general terms that would have needed amplification and better definitions, such as: “Japanese forces in Indochina would be immediately withdrawn when the China affair is settled.” There was no definition, in concrete terms, of what would constitute a settlement of the China affair.38 Ten days later, in Washington, Ambassador Nomura handed President Roosevelt a message from Prime Minister Konoe reiterating the need of a meeting of the two heads of government to discuss the situation involving Japan, the United States, and the entire Pacific region. The message emphasized Japan’s peaceful intentions and gave assurances that the proposals were consistent with principles previously stated by the U.S. government. In addition to the contingent withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina, the message from Konoe explained that “Japan would take no military action against the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and did not menace Japan or Manchukuo.” The message also stated that

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

199

“the Japanese Government had no intention of using ‘without provocation’ military force against any neighboring nation.”39 Roosevelt replied to Nomura on September 3 that, before the proposed meeting could be confirmed, it would be necessary to decide in advance so that a “prior meeting of minds on basic principles” could be achieved as a necessary condition. Washington never actually rejected the proposal, but preliminary agreements could not be worked out and the proposed conference between Roosevelt and Konoe was not held. As negotiations continued in Washington in the fall of 1941, it became apparent that the Japanese would not yield their demand that the Chinese Nationalist government in Chungking accept Japan’s preferential position in China. This point of view was completely unacceptable to Roosevelt in view of the Open Door policy and the various treaties to which Japan, the United States, and other nations were signatories, and which called for protection of China’s territorial integrity. In late September, the Japanese government again requested a meeting between Roosevelt and Konoe. Although not publicly announced, the Konoe cabinet had been given an ultimatum by Japanese army and navy chiefs to either obtain concessions from the United States by negotiation or get out of the way in order that moves toward war could begin. The restated proposals contained nothing new and Washington responded accordingly. After additional unsuccessful attempts of the government in Tokyo to obtain concessions, the Konoe cabinet was forced to resign on October 16, 1941, and a military government headed by General Tojo as prime minister was installed. It became obvious to keen observers—such as Ambassador Grew—that this was indeed a war cabinet. A number of retired army and navy officers had previously held the office of prime minister in the 1930s, but Tojo was an active duty general who not only assumed the post of prime minister, but also held the position of war minister, and army chief of staff. Thus, any semblance of civilian control of the military was removed. After the war, it was revealed at the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East that Tokyo’s decision for war had been made and that Tojo had every intention of carrying it out. Japan’s military forces needed several weeks to implement plans already made, however, and the Washington negotiations provided a convenient cover to stall for time. In early November, the Japanese government decided to send an additional representative to Washington, and Kurusu Saburo, a career diplomat, was sent as a special envoy to collaborate with Ambassador Nomura in negotiations with Secretary of State Hull. Kurusu flew on the China Clipper, a Pan American Airways flight from Hong Kong to San Francisco. The China Clipper was the first regularly-scheduled airline service across the Pacific and, with several refueling stops, required more than forty-eight hours for a flight of approximately eight thousand miles. Kurusu arrived in Washington on November 15, 1941, and two days later he and Nomura met with Hull and Roosevelt. The secretary of state emphasized

200

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

that Japan’s alliance with Hitler was a major impediment to a peaceful solution to Pacific and East Asian problems. Hull explained that Japan’s alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy placed other countries at the mercy of arbitrary military rule. He informed the two Japanese diplomats that the United States understood this danger and had inaugurated self-defense measures, even though the cost was measured in billions of dollars. Hull met the next day with the two Japanese and again expressed doubt that a solution could be found so long as Japan maintained an alliance with Hitler. Hull noted that the Japanese government had sent telegrams of congratulation to Hitler even though atrocities had been committed. Regular meetings in the latter part of November failed to bring agreement in the negotiations. In Tokyo, the main consideration of the top admirals in the Imperial Navy was the lack of oil to fuel warships for more than six months. Admiral Nagano Osami, the navy chief of staff, though initially opposed to hostilities against the United States, advocated in November that the time was ripe for war and that a year or two later would be too late. Nagano argued that Japan could win if it went to war immediately. Elaborate plans had been developed by the navy for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, but others argued for delaying the offensive. The navy proposed a deadline of November 20 for making the final decision to go to war, but others wanted more time for negotiations. Staff officers approved the concept that the deadline for negotiations was to be five days before the deadline for war. The deadline for war was established as December 5, 1941, and an imperial conference was then set up for December 1 that would approve the decision for war.40 While negotiations continued in Washington in late November, an attack force of the Japanese Imperial Navy sailed under radio silence from the Inland Sea to Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands to make preparations for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nomura and Kurusu had instructions to continue presenting proposals in Washington. In preparation for sending Kurusu to Washington, the War Cabinet had developed offers known in Tokyo as the “A” and “B” proposals. The “A” proposal, favored by Navy Chief of Staff Nagano, contemplated that either a full settlement would be reached or that Japan would go to war. The “B” proposal offered a limited compromise. The plan the Japanese diplomats submitted to Roosevelt and Hull was the “B” proposal. Offers and counteroffers were exchanged, but the deadlock continued with U.S. officials insisting on the same key principles presented earlier: evacuation of Japanese troops from Indochina and China; withdrawal of Japan from the Axis Pact; respect for the territorial integrity of China and all other nations; and assurances of equality of commercial opportunity for all nations in China, in accordance with treaties entered into by Japan, the United States, and other countries. These discussions continued in early December even as the Imperial Navy’s attack fleet, following a little-traveled, northern Pacific route, was steaming toward Hawaii. On December 6, President Roosevelt sent a personal message to Emperor

Confrontation between the United States and Japan

201

Hirohito warning of “tragic possibilities” unless some major changes were initiated. Outlining a number of proposals, the president summarized his message with the comment: “in the fervent hope that the Emperor might give thought to ways of dispelling the darkening clouds; that both he and the Emperor had a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.”41 Because of delays in message handling, Roosevelt’s appeal to Hirohito was not delivered to the Japanese Foreign Office until 12:30 A.M., December 8, 1941 (Japan time), only three hours before the bombing of Pearl Harbor began. On the same date that Roosevelt’s message was transmitted to Japan, a fourteen-part encoded telegram from the Japanese government began arriving at the Japanese embassy in Washington, with instructions to deliver the translated document to the secretary of state at 1 P.M., December 7, 1941, Washington time. Through the use of MAGIC intercept procedures, Hull and Roosevelt had read Tokyo’s diplomatic note before the time appointed for delivery to the State Department. The message contained a compendium of what Tokyo considered its grievances with Washington to be and concluded with the comment: “The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.”42 The message said nothing concerning the opening of hostilities nor was there a clue as to where Japan would strike. Because of difficulties in translating and typing, it was not until 2:20 P.M., Sunday, December 7, 1941, Washington time (8:50 A.M., Hawaiian time) that Nomura and Kurusu arrived at the State Department. Japanese naval aircraft had begun bombing Pearl Harbor almost an hour earlier. In Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Office informed Ambassador Grew, who by now was restricted to the American embassy grounds as an enemy alien, that the long message would serve as a response to Roosevelt’s appeal to Emperor Hirohito. In one respect, at least, Japan was following its own traditions. This was the fifth war Japan had started without first making a declaration of war. War with China in 1894, the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, war in Manchuria in 1931, and war against China beginning in 1937, all began without a declaration of war. Two and a half hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor had begun, the IGH in Tokyo announced: “The Imperial Army and Navy on December 8 at dawn entered a state of hostilities against the American and British forces in the western Pacific.” It was 10:30 A.M., December 7 in Hawaii, and 4 P.M., December 7 in Washington. (In 1941, Hawaiian standard time was five and a half hours behind eastern standard time. This later was changed to five hours.) Immediately following the announcement, the emperor’s rescript was read: We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. . . . To insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to world peace is the far-sighted

202

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

policy which was formulated by Our Great Illustrious Imperial Grandsire and our Great Imperial Sire succeeding Him, and which We lay constantly to heart. . . . It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire, and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. . . . . . . our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified economic and military pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. . . . The situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defense has not other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.43

CHAPTER 10

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War JAPAN STRIKES: PEARL HARBOR AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, DECEMBER 1941 While Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo and Special Envoy Kurusu Saburo were emphasizing “Japan’s peaceful intentions” in their Washington talks with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, secret plans were being developed in Japan by the Imperial Navy and Army for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and an invasion of Southeast Asia. Strangely enough, the proponent of the raid on Hawaii was one who should have known better: Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. Yamamoto, with extensive experience in the United States—a former graduate student at Harvard University, naval attache´ in Washington, and personally acquainted with a number of officers in the U.S. Navy—imagined that a crippling attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor “would smash the morale of the American people.” Seldom has anyone in history so profoundly misjudged the nature of the people of another nation. The Pearl Harbor attack had completely the opposite effect of what Yamamoto intended. Isolationist and antiwar sentiment were virtually wiped out in a flash, and the people of the United States became fervent supporters of a war to destroy Japan’s military capabilities and insist on unconditional surrender. The final outcome of the Pearl Harbor attack would be to strip Japan of all colonial possessions and, even more drastically, to forfeit the sovereignty of the nation as it submitted itself to a military occupation by foreign troops. Commander Genda Minoru, a navy pilot assigned to the First Carrier Division, was designated early in 1941 as the principal staff planner for the Pearl

204

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

Harbor attack. Genda’s plans envisioned the destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet so that Japan’s navy and army could invade the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Hong Kong, and the Dutch East Indies unimpeded. Basic concepts included: • A complete surprise in the attack on ships at Pearl Harbor. • Main objective to be aircraft carriers. • Secondary objective to be land-based warplanes on Oahu. • Every available Japanese carrier to participate in the operation. • The attack should use all types of bombing—torpedo, dive, and high level. • The attack should be made in daylight, preferably early in the morning. • Refueling of ships at sea would be required. • All planning must be done in strict secrecy.1

Genda and many other Japanese officers shared Yamamoto’s misconceptions of American personality traits. The heterogeneous composition of the population of the United States led to the Japanese belief that a citizenry of varied races and national origins—as opposed to Japan’s homogeneous makeup—would never become unified in the face of a disaster. On the other hand, Americans had a distorted view of the Japanese, who were seen as “not too bright,” nearsighted, makers of second- and third-rate products, lacking ability for independent thought and action, and obviously incapable of sending a fleet of aircraft carriers and supporting ships across vast stretches of open seas, undetected, and having the audacity to attack the United States. The American concept, evident for more than three decades—since the 1908 cruise of the Great White Fleet— was that stationing of U.S. Navy warships in the Pacific constituted a deterrent. It was unthinkable to the great majority of Americans—public officials as well as ordinary citizens—that Japan would dare to challenge America’s naval might. Roosevelt and other officials in Washington displayed more concern over events in Europe and the Atlantic. With increasing numbers of American merchant ships participating in convoys across the North Atlantic to provide supplies to Britain, Nazi U-Boats accelerated their attacks. Hitler placed special emphasis on construction of submarines, producing them in such large numbers they began to operate in “Wolfpacks.” To meet this challenge, Frank Knox, the secretary of the navy, ordered the transfer in April and May 1941 of sixteen warships from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet, leading to criticism for reducing the size of the “deterrent” in Hawaii. Here again, misconceptions abounded. The transfer of ships to the Atlantic, instead of reducing the size of the “deterrent,” simply meant there would be that many less ships for Japanese forces to destroy. The worst nightmare of the Japanese planners was that American ships would be gone on the day of the attack. By the autumn of 1941, frequent warnings of a possible Japanese attack somewhere in the Pacific were issued by U.S. military intelligence and other sources.

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

205

In most cases, however, estimates of enemy capability and intentions were based on the premise that Japan would invade Southeast Asia initially, followed by sabotage attacks on American possessions, especially Hawaii, and finally by an invasion of Hawaii and the Philippines. For these reasons, army and navy commanders in Hawaii put primary emphasis on sabotage prevention measures throughout 1941. One line of American strategists’ reasoning was that, once war broke out in the western Pacific, Japan would then attempt to build up a logistical base by capturing islands across the Pacific, such as Guam, Wake, Midway, and others—Japan already held the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline Islands— and then attempt an invasion of Hawaii. The Japanese, however, followed a different strategy. Their mission was to put the Pacific Fleet out of action so they could invade Southeast Asia unhindered by the U.S. Navy. The only differences of opinion among Japanese planners was whether to have aerial strikes on Pearl Harbor and surrounding defense installations for one day only or for more than one day. They had two major concerns: first that the U.S. fleet would not be in port, and, second, that they would be detected and suffer a large loss of aircraft and ships. The Pearl Harbor attack force was composed of naval elements—including six aircraft carriers— especially for this mission. There were no invasion troops included, although an invasion of Hawaii was planned for a later date, after the capture of Midway Island and other support bases.2 As planning for the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia continued, it became clear that hostilities had to be implemented around the beginning of December 1941. The governing factor was Japan’s depleted oil supplies that would have to be replenished from Dutch East Indies sources in time for refining and distribution before available reserves ran out. Thus, the timing for the bombing of Pearl Harbor was driven by the Southeast Asia invasion schedule. When news of the fall of the Konoe cabinet reached Washington on October 16, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt held a two-hour meeting with Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, and Presidential Adviser Harry Hopkins. All agreed that the new Tojo Hideki cabinet would be much more anti-American. Stimson expressed the observation that the Japanese navy was now beginning to sound as hostile as the Japanese army, a new development. Both Stimson and Roosevelt emphasized that the United States should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot.3 Japanese spying in Hawaii was extensive. The Japanese consulate in Honolulu served as headquarters for the espionage effort, with directions for spy activity provided by the Naval General Staff Office in Tokyo and funneled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regular commercial communications facilities— such as the Radio Corporation of America and MacKay Radio—were used for the intelligence network, but messages were coded in the Japanese diplomatic Purple code. Many of these communications were intercepted and deciphered

206

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

through MAGIC procedures, but American officials thought that most of the information being gathered was for sabotage purposes or for use after the start of war. Tokyo sent additional spies to Hawaii in October 1941.4 On November 24, the chief of naval operations in Washington, Admiral Stark, sent a top secret message to commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines warning of an impending crisis: Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.5

By late November 1941, Japan was indeed implementing plans to launch major attacks throughout the Pacific and in Southeast Asia. The movement of Japanese ships and troops to the south was detectable and reported to U.S. military commands by intelligence sources, but there were no aircraft carriers among these ships. What happened was that six aircraft carriers, plus assorted other warships, had sailed under utmost secrecy from various bases in Japan to Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands to assemble for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Radio operators were left at home bases in Japan where they sent and received routine messages as though their ships were in port. The attack fleet, which sailed from Hitokappu Bay for waters near Hawaii on November 26, 1941, maintained complete radio silence and followed a northern route that seldom saw any shipping. These deceptions were very effective. The United States had not even a hint that a huge armada was on the way to Hawaii. There was every reason to believe that Japan would attack the Philippines, Guam, or locations in Southeast Asia, and that explains the lack of defensive preparations against aerial attack in Hawaii. In the next several days, more intelligence reports told of Japanese naval ships sighted near Borneo, the Kra Peninsula, and the Philippines. Military commanders in Hawaii took these reports seriously, but continued under the mistaken notion that the initial attack would be in Southeast Asia. Hawaii’s need, they saw, was to guard against sabotage and prepare for an invasion at some later date. As the attack force neared Hawaii, Japanese submarines were sighted in nearby areas. Destroyers and other vessels of the Pacific Fleet sighted some of these submarines and began to search the approaches to Hawaii. Although three aircraft carriers were based at Pearl Harbor, none of them were in port. The USS Saratoga was at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, near Seattle, Washington, undergoing repairs and maintenance; the USS Enterprise was steaming to the west, near Wake Island, looking for submarines; and the USS Lexington was near Midway Island. Aircraft from Japanese carriers took off early on the morning of December 7, 1941 (Hawaii time), and scored a complete surprise in attacking naval ships

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

207

at Pearl Harbor. The results of the Japanese attack included: eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers, and four auxiliary craft either sunk, capsized, or damaged, with a significant number of military aircraft destroyed or damaged. More than twenty-four hundred Americans were killed and about twelve hundred were wounded. Japanese losses were minimal. Shortly afterward, Japanese forces launched attacks in Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippine Islands, Wake Island, and Malaya, with other areas soon to come under fire. But the seeds of destruction for Japan were already sown. Japan was at its strongest point militarily on this first day of the war; every succeeding day would see a weakening of Japan’s war potential with losses that could not easily be replaced. The United States, on the other hand, was at its weakest point on the first day of hostilities, and each following day would see a strengthening of its armed forces, with vast additions of personnel, weapons, and materiel. The attack was a limited military success for Japan, accomplishing all but one of Genda’s goals. And that one exception was the most important goal: to destroy the aircraft carriers of the Pacific Fleet. These carriers would play an important role in just a few months in turning the tide against Japan. Most of the ships docked in Hawaii were damaged or destroyed, but many were quickly repaired and put back into service.6 Army and navy commanders in Hawaii were caught completely off guard. Top officials in Washington, as well as Americans throughout the nation, were stunned. When initial reports of the attack on Hawaii were received, Hopkins’s comment was typical: “There must be some mistake. Surely the attack was on the Philippines, not Hawaii.”7 But as far as Yamamoto’s ideas of “smashing the morale of the American people,” nothing could have been farther from the actual case. The Pearl Harbor bombing, often called a “sneak attack,” galvanized the American people to such momentous and violent fury that nothing short of unconditional surrender and complete elimination of Japan’s army and navy would placate the national disposition. The next day, Monday, December 8, 1941, tens of thousands of young men lined up in front of U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps recruiting offices to volunteer to serve. On that same day, President Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress, delivering these immortal words: Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a day which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the American island of Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. And while this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or of armed attack.

208

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace. The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost.

Roosevelt then enumerated a list of places in the western Pacific and East Asia where Japan had initiated offensive actions concurrently with the Pearl Harbor attack, and continued: Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and will understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation. As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense. But always will our whole Nation remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion the American people in their righteous might will win through to the absolute victory. I believe that I interpret the will of Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but we will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us. Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger. With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.8

Immediately following Roosevelt’s speech, Congress declared war on Japan with only one dissenting vote. Hitler, citing the Axis Pact, followed with a declaration of war against the United States. On December 11, 1941, Congress, acting on Roosevelt’s request, unanimously voted for a war resolution against Germany and Italy.9 Nationalist China formally declared war on Japan on December 9, but Japan—still referring to its invasion and military occupation of China as the China incident—never declared war on China. Editorial opinion throughout the United States excoriated Japanese duplicity, especially the fact that preparations for the Pearl Harbor attack were obviously underway—including ship movements—even as Nomura and Kurusu regularly met with Hull for peace negotiations. The fact that Japan had asked for these talks made the deceit of Japan’s military government even more conspicuous. Elsewhere, Japan scored victories in the weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack. Japanese warplanes based in Taiwan attacked and destroyed most of the U.S. Army Air Corps B-17 bombers and other aircraft based at Clark Field in the

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

209

Philippines on December 8, 1941, only ten hours after the Hawaii attack. A Japanese task force invaded Guam on December 9 and easily captured the island. Japanese troops landed on the Malay Peninsula in the southernmost part of Thailand and in northern Malaya, advancing southward on Singapore through what the British thought was impenetrable jungle. Even before the invasion, Japanese companies had taken over rubber and iron-mining interests. Large numbers of a Chinese-Malay organization that had become increasingly hostile to the Japanese were executed by the Japanese army during the invasion. In the Battle of South China Sea on December 10, 1941, Japanese naval forces encountered the British Far Eastern Fleet, consisting of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battle cruiser HMS Repulse, and four destroyers, that was attempting to prevent Japanese troops from landing on the Malay Peninsula. The Prince of Wales and the Repulse were sunk by the Japanese in this engagement. Japanese land-based warplanes from airfields in Indochina inflicted most of the damage. The attack on the Philippines was far more costly in terms of strategic implications than Pearl Harbor. While General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Tom Hart, the commander of the Asiatic Fleet, were notified by radio messages and telephone within an hour of the Pearl Harbor attack, both army and navy units were slow to react. The destruction of American warplanes—including the recently arrived B17s—at Clark Field and other bases paved the way for the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and allowed Imperial Navy and Army units to advance unimpeded in their assault upon vast regions of Southeast Asia, areas where Roosevelt only four months earlier had assured Churchill that the United States would assume responsibility for protection against attacks on British territory. Frank Sackton, a professor of government at Arizona State University and a retired lieutenant general who served on MacArthur’s staff in Japan, commented that the success of the surprise attacks in Hawaii and the Philippines was due to the American mindset at that time. While war seemed imminent, nobody could believe it would really happen. If war did break out, the Dutch East Indies would be the object of Japan’s attack rather than on U.S. territory. “The mentality in this country was that the oceans were going to protect us,” Sackton explained.10 EASY VICTORIES FOR THE RISING SUN: DECEMBER 1941 TO MAY 1942 Immediately following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces began invading areas all over the western Pacific and in Southeast Asia. After several bombing raids, Japanese landing troops made an amphibious assault on Wake Island early on the morning of December 23, 1941. Wake was defended by a small contingent of U.S. Marines—outnumbered about ten to one by the Japanese landing troops—and the island easily fell to the aggressor’s onslaught the

210

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

same day. The defenders of Wake Island, however, inflicted heavy casualties on invading troops and sank two Japanese destroyers.11 The major thrust of the Japanese action, however, was to the south—to capture Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, areas that were rich in natural resources, especially oil, tin, and rubber. The overall commander for the Southern Area Operations was General Count Terauchi Hisaichi, the son of a former prime minister who had also been an army general. Terauchi’s forces included the Fifteenth Army in Burma and Thailand, the Twenty-fifth Army under Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki, who was responsible for the capture of Malaya and Singapore, and several divisions involved in the invasion of the Philippines under Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu. The main Japanese landing force for the Philippines arrived at Lingayen Gulf on seventy-six transport ships on the western side of Luzon, with another element on the eastern side of the island at Lamon Bay. Other Japanese forces attacked and captured Davao on Mindanao Island in the southern Philippines as a support base for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies. Large naval elements provided overwhelming force with two battleships, an aircraft carrier, seven heavy cruisers, five light cruisers, and twenty-five destroyers, all of which were divided into four attack groups. The Japanese navy also had several hundred warplanes, some of them were based on the aircraft carrier Ryujo, but most of them were land-based in Taiwan. The Japanese army also had fighters and bombers within range of the Philippines at airfields in Taiwan. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet, with one heavy cruiser, the USS Houston, based at Iloilo on Panay Island in the south, one light cruiser, four destroyers, thirteen submarines, six gunboats (formerly used for river patrol in China), and several patrol aircraft, was not capable of stopping the Japanese onslaught.12 The main Japanese invasion force landed at Lingayen Gulf on December 21, 1941, and overwhelmed the combined Filipino-American defenders that consisted of the Thirty-first U.S. Infantry Division, other American support troops, the Fourth Marines who had been evacuated from China just before hostilities began, and Filipino divisions, scouts, and reservists. Loss of the B-17s and other American aircraft on the first day of the war made the defense of Luzon impossible. MacArthur directed Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, in command of the north Luzon force, to move all troops to the Bataan Peninsula on December 23. By January 6, 1942, a northern defense line in Bataan had been established and sixty-five thousand troops and twenty-six thousand civilians moved into defense positions. The combined Filipino-American army held out there for more than a month until the food supply began to dwindle in mid-February. The headquarters was on Corregidor Island, a coastal artillery base constructed before 1922 that had an elaborate tunnel network and communications facilities that placed MacArthur in touch with Washington and Australia. Roosevelt directed MacArthur to leave the Philippines and proceed to Australia to form the Southwest Pacific Command, an Allied forces unified command, that would repel the Japanese.

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

211

MacArthur, his staff, and his family left Corregidor by a patrol torpedo boat on March 12, 1942, for the dangerous run to Mindanao, and flew from there in a B-17, arriving in northern Australia on March 20. From Adelaide, Australia, he spoke the immortal words: “I came through and I shall return.”13 Wainwright assumed command after MacArthur’s departure. In early April, Homma began a general offensive to capture Bataan, the last remaining area of the Philippines not under Japanese control. By the middle of the month, Japanese forces had captured more than seventy-five thousand soldiers and civilians— they had expected only forty thousand—and forced them to march sixty-five miles under brutal conditions to San Fernando. This trek, the Bataan Death March, was typified by beatings and bayonettings, with no food and water. The death toll was between 7,000 and 10,000, of whom 2,330 were Americans. Survivors of the march were then sent to various prisoner of war (POW) work camps in the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and Manchuria. About one-third of them died before the war ended. In fact, the Japanese treatment of POWs throughout Asia became infamous. Brutal treatment was the rule, rather than the exception, and a POW in a Japanese camp was seven times more likely to die than an Allied prisoner in German hands in Europe. General Homma, several subordinate officers, and prison guards later received the death penalty in war crimes trials for atrocities against POWs.14 In early May 1942, the last resistance collapsed and Corregidor fell bringing all of the Philippines under Japanese control. Several hundred Americans escaped from Bataan and fought in guerrilla warfare together with Filipinos against the Japanese. Those who were captured by the Japanese were dealt with harshly and usually executed. Others, such as Lieutenant Edwin Ramsey who organized a force that eventually reached a strength of forty thousand men, fought the Japanese in guerrilla warfare until MacArthur returned in 1944.15 Earlier, a series of meetings had been held between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, along with their combined staffs, in Washington from December 22, 1941, to January 14, 1942, and given the code name Arcadia, where AngloAmerican goals and strategies for prosecution of the war were defined. Roosevelt presented a declaration in which anti-Axis nations affirmed the principles of the Atlantic Charter pledging to: “defend life, liberty and independence,” vowing full wartime cooperation, and determination “not to cease hostilities except by common agreement.” Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that the “allied effort” was to be identified as “the United Nations.” Both leaders reaffirmed that the defeat of Nazi Germany was to be the first priority and that Italy and Japan would be dealt with as resources became available. At the Arcadia Conference, it was also determined that a joint American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) command would be established with General Archibald Wavell, the commander of British forces in India, as overall commander in chief. Roosevelt also insisted on a combined chiefs of staff organization to be located in Washington.16 Singapore fell to the Japanese on February 15, 1942, and General Arthur E. Percival, the British commander, surrendered 130,000 men to General Yama-

212

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

shita. More than nine thousand British, Indian, and Australian soldiers died in combat in Malaya and Singapore. With overwhelming numbers of men, ships, airplanes, and weapons, the Japanese moved into the islands to the south and southwest of the Philippines. Imperial Army and Navy invasion forces moved into Borneo, then the Celebes, Ambonia, Sumatra, and Java. The first objective was Tarakan Island on the northeast coast of Borneo, the location of major oil fields. Japanese troop ships left Davao in the southern Philippines with a Regimental Combat Group and special naval landing forces and quickly defeated a Dutch battalion at Tarakan. Other landings took place at Menado on the north end of the Celebes, Brunei, Jesselton, Sarawak, and at Balikpapan, the site of another oil field. Japanese losses, however, were heavy in these operations, largely the result of ship sinkings by submarines of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. Two Japanese aircraft carriers, the Soryu and the Hiryu, from the Pearl Harbor attack, operated in the waters of the Dutch East Indies in January and February. Landings were made on Ambonia and the island was secured by February 3, 1942, with all Dutch and Australian troops either killed or captured. Japanese carrier-based warplanes attacked large numbers of Allied ships in the Makassar Strait between the Celebes and Borneo. By early February, the Japanese had taken Borneo, with oil fields at Brunei and Balikpapan, and Celebes and Ambonia.17 A Japanese force of six cruisers, destroyers, and the carrier Ryujo sailed south from Camranh Bay in Indochina (Vietnam) with twenty-five transports carrying two infantry regiments on February 9, 1942. The objective of this task force was Bangka Island with its vast tin resources, about two hundred miles southeast of Singapore, and Palembang, the capital of Sumatra in the Dutch East Indies and the site of extensive oil fields. It took the task force only three days to accomplish its objectives. On February 19, Japanese bombers attacked Darwin, Australia, seriously damaging shipping and port installations. Three days later, on the other side of the Pacific, a Japanese submarine surfaced near Santa Barbara, California, and shelled the Elwood oil field. At the end of February 1942, the Japanese navy won a major victory at the Battle of Java Sea. Fifteen Allied warships from Australian, British, and American fleets opposed an invasion force of eighteen Japanese combat ships and ninety-seven transports headed for Java. Eleven Allied warships were sunk, and Java was captured by the Japanese by March 8, 1942. Three months after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had accomplished their objective of controlling the Dutch East Indies. The oil fields of Borneo, Sumatra, and Java were in Japanese hands. In the first few months of 1942, there seemed to be no way to stop the Japanese. Timor, Bali, and Burma came under attack, while the Imperial Navy roamed the Indian Ocean with impunity. Trincomalee and Columbo in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) were assaulted, and approximately 135,000 tons of Allied warships and transports were sunk in the Bay of Bengal.18

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

213

Because of the seemingly unstoppable advances of Japan’s military forces, anxiety mounted in the United States over a possible Japanese invasion of the West Coast. After Pearl Harbor, the pendulum swung again in American attitudes and opinions of Japanese capabilities. By early 1942, it seemed as though the Japanese were invincible, and there was concern over what the people of Japanese ancestry who were residents of California, Oregon, and Washington would do in the event of an invasion. About 112,000 ethnic Japanese, two-thirds of whom were American-born and therefore U.S. citizens, lived in these three states. Army officials viewed some of these persons as potentially dangerous, but most were considered completely loyal to the United States. No one knew, however, what would happen in the event of a Japanese assault on the West Coast. Sabotage and espionage were special concerns. Los Angeles held the largest contingent of Japanese Americans, many of them living close to the U.S. Navy facilities at San Pedro. Many also lived in San Francisco within sight of the bay where convoys were being made up for ocean sailings. Military authorities initially decided on a limited evacuation from these areas to forestall potential espionage and sabotage. By February 1942, however, Western Defense Command officials, along with Governor Earl Warren of California, recommended to President Roosevelt that all persons of Japanese ancestry be relocated from areas in the three West Coast states to the interior areas of the United States. Roosevelt, even after considering that a forced relocation would be contrary to rights guaranteed under the Constitution, issued Executive Order 9066 approving the move. His belief was that the Constitutional ramifications could be worked out after the war. This was not the first time constitutional rights had been waived in wartime—President Abraham Lincoln, with no authority, suspended the right of habeas corpus for a time during the Civil War. Relocation centers were built in the Mountain states, including Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado. Many Japanese Americans took this cheerfully, expressing the view that it was a sacrifice they could make to support the war effort. Once at the camps, community life was established with newspapers, schools, Boy and Girl Scout troops, Saturday night dances, and other typical family events. Many of the residents were engaged in production to support the war effort, such as farming and construction of war materials, like camouflage nets and military clothing. As the war continued, many of the Japanese American men volunteered—or were drafted—for service in the U.S. Army, sent to language school at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, where they sharpened their skills in Japanese, and then served as interpreters in combat zones and in occupied areas. Others were assigned to a Japanese American unit—the 442nd Regimental Combat Team—that fought in combat with the U.S. Army in Europe. Wartime service claimed the lives of 140 men in this unit, and 674 soldiers were wounded. The 442nd was the most decorated combat unit for its size in the history of the United States. In total, thirty-three thousand Japanese Americans served in the armed forces during World War II, and nearly eight hundred of

214

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

them were killed in action. Approximately one hundred Japanese American women volunteered for service in the Women’s Army Corps. In December 1944, the War Department revoked its order excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, expressing the belief “that the people of the Pacific Coast area will accord returning persons of Japanese ancestry all the consideration to which they are entitled as loyal citizens and lawabiding residents.” Only those persons “about whom information is available indicating a pro-Japanese attitude will continue to be excluded on an individual basis,” a Department spokesman explained.19 There were about three hundred Japanese American men who defied draft orders on civil rights grounds, but other nisei claim these draft resisters refused the draft because “their fathers were pro-Japan.”20 Some older residents, still Japanese citizens, refused to believe even after 1945 that Japan had lost the war. They had to travel to Japan in the 1950s and see the evidence for themselves. By the beginning of 1943, jobs were found for many Japanese Americans in the Midwest and East Coast areas of the United States, where they lived and worked without restraint. Additionally, college-age residents were permitted to leave to attend institutions of higher learning.21 By the time the war ended, the population of the relocation centers had dwindled to a fraction of the original size. Shortly after the war, Congress saw a need for financial compensation for property damage and loss as a “reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation or exclusion” from the West Coast. Under the Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, approximately $37 million was paid out to twenty-five thousand claimants. In 1976, President Gerald Ford issued a proclamation acknowledging: “We now know what we should have known then—not only was that wrong, but Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans.”22 In 1988 President Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act that provided for monetary reparations of $20,000 each to former internees and a formal apology. THE TIDE TURNS: CORAL SEA AND MIDWAY, MAY AND JUNE 1942 Admiral Stark, the chief of naval operations in Washington, was replaced by Admiral Ernest J. King in March 1942. Even though Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that first priority would be given to the defeat of Hitler, King was a strong supporter of diverting men and materiel to the Pacific to protect supply lines to Australia. The objective was to mount an offensive operation to take the Solomon Islands and deprive Japan of a base there. MacArthur was concerned over Japanese intentions to take Rabaul on the northeastern end of New Britain in the New Guinea area. In early 1942, however, Allied resources were insufficient to carry out all of these objectives, but the entire theater of operations in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and China and its adjacent areas was reorganized into unified commands to facilitate the destruction of Japanese military forces. Admiral Chester Nimitz was appointed as the commander in chief of Pacific

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

215

Ocean areas, including the North, Central, and South Pacific areas. MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Command included Australia, the eastern portions of the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines, while Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten of Britain was named the commander of the Southeast Asia Command, which encompassed western portions of the East Indies, Malaya, Thailand, and the Indian Ocean. General Joseph Stilwell was appointed commander in chief of the China-Burma-India theater, and Roosevelt also named Stilwell to serve as his chief liaison officer with Chiang Kai-shek. All of these jurisdictions were major Allied unified commands meaning that they had units from all components of the armed forces regardless of the branch of service of the commander in chief. Japan had three major objectives in the south: (1) Port Moresby, New Guinea, which was to be used as a base for attacks on “enemy fleet movements” and for strikes on the north coast of Australia; (2) Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, about eight hundred miles to the east; and, (3) a base in the Louisiade Archipelago, halfway between Port Moresby and Tulagi and about two hundred miles to the south. These three locations formed a triangle located in the Coral Sea region aimed at the east coast of Australia. Intercepted Japanese radio communications that were decoded at Pearl Harbor provided information to U.S. Navy intelligence officers giving names of ships, dates, and strategy for the planned operation in the Coral Sea area. Two U.S. Navy carriers, the USS Enterprise and the USS Hornet, along with support vessels, were dispatched to confront the Japanese navy. When Pacific Fleet officials learned of the large number of Japanese ships and troops involved—three carriers with 147 aircraft and invasion troops on transports—two more carriers, the USS Yorktown and the USS Lexington with a combined total at 143 warplanes were dispatched to the area. After Japanese troops began landing at Tulagi, aircraft from opposing naval forces sighted each other on May 7, 1942. The Battle of the Coral Sea ensued and resulted in losses to the Japanese of one light aircraft carrier and the shooting down of several warplanes. More importantly, the Japanese were compelled to cancel the planned invasion of Port Moresby. The United States sustained the loss of the aircraft carrier Lexington, a destroyer, and a fuel ship. It was a tactical victory for Japan, but a strategic success for the United States in that it marked the first time that Japanese advances were slowed and an invasion canceled. Additionally, it was difficult for the Japanese to replace the aircraft carrier, planes, and pilots shot down, but relatively easier for the United States. The Battle of the Coral Sea also marked a major event in air warfare in that it was the first time that two opposing navies dueled without being able to see each other.23 Japanese army and navy plans called for a swift conquest of vast areas of the Pacific and Asia in order to facilitate their goals of domination through a Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere and the ejection of American influence from the region. Control of the Central Pacific and a decisive battle with the U.S. Pacific Fleet were essential for these objectives. Successes during the first six months

216

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

of the war led to overconfidence, with the Japanese thinking defeat was impossible. The next objective was Midway Island with an invasion planned in five closely coordinated elements: (1) an advance submarine force; (2) a diversionary force aimed at the Aleutian Islands; (3) the Midway attack force; (4) a transport force bringing landing troops; and, (5) the main body following up the attack from the west. Through tedious and relentless probing, Pacific Fleet communications monitoring again enabled the United States to know Yamamoto’s plans. Japanese strength included 162 major warships, including the Yamato, the largest battleship ever built. The U.S. Navy had seventy-six major warships available. Midway Island is small—actually two very small islands—but it was the westernmost American territory not in Japanese hands in 1942, and was a stepping stone to Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States. With Midway as a base, Japan could dominate the Central and West Pacific.24 Japan, however, had minimal information on location of American warships. Although the United States had three aircraft carriers near Midway, Japanese navy operations officials thought there were none. Massive Japanese airstrikes on Midway began on June 3, but these were still not sufficient to defeat the defenders. When Japanese warplanes returned to their carriers and were being rearmed, aircraft from U.S. Navy carriers attacked. Most of these airplanes were older and slower, however, and were shot down. By this time, the Japanese admirals thought the Americans had only one carrier in the area and that its planes had largely been eliminated. A group of thirty-seven planes from the Enterprise, however, spotted the Japanese fleet, much of which was scattered in confusion because of the previous attacks. The flight decks of the Japanese carriers were jammed with parked aircraft, armaments, equipment, torpedoes, and personnel. Enterprise aircraft attacked and were soon joined by other American warplanes, sinking three Japanese carriers, the Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu, and seriously damaging the Hiryu, a fourth carrier in the area, which was later sunk. The U.S. Navy lost the carrier the USS Yorktown, a destroyer, 150 aircraft, and 300 officers and men, while the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, 322 aircraft, approximately 5,000 officers and men, and sustained heavy damage to other ships. It was the worst defeat in history up to that point for the Japanese navy and an unprecedented victory for the United States. Midway was a major turning point. It was the first time since the Pearl Harbor attack that Japan had suffered defeat in a major battle. In fact, it was only the second time in nearly half a century that Japanese military forces had experienced a serious loss. Just as the first defeat—at the hands of the Soviet Army at Nomonhan in 1939—was not publicized in Japan, there was little news for the civilian population concerning losses at Midway. For the United States, however, it was the beginning of the offensive against Japan.

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

217

PUSHING BACK THE EMPIRE: MACARTHUR AND NIMITZ, 1942–1944 During the first six months of 1942, the attention of the Japanese army and navy was focused on New Guinea. On January 23, 1942, the Japanese South Sea Detachment captured Rabaul—on the northeastern end of New Britain, an island off the eastern coast of New Guinea—from its Australian defenders. Japan established a naval and air base there to support its planned invasions to the southeast, including the Solomon Islands. Seeing no need to conquer every island, the objective was to obtain bases that could be used to interdict supply routes from Hawaii to Australia. Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) in Tokyo saw MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Command—with its British, Australian, and American forces being augmented with new troops and additional weapons, supplies, and equipment—as presenting the major threat to the occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Therefore, the capture of Port Moresby—on the south coast of New Guinea—and the continued retention of Rabaul along with strategic locations in the Solomon Islands were important objectives that would provide both a buffer zone for the East Indies and bases for attacks on shipping and the north coast of Australia. Tokyo’s goal was to capture Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia for use in controlling the sea routes to Australia, thereby preventing logistical support to MacArthur.25 Moving in this direction, Japanese forces captured and built a base on Tulagi Island in the Solomon Islands in May 1942. Tulagi, twenty miles from Guadalcanal, was the site of a Japanese radio station and a base for long-range seaplanes. Japanese patrols from Tulagi explored the much larger island of Guadalcanal, locating an area for use as an airfield, and a Japanese Construction Battalion began work in July to develop an air base there. Nimitz assigned first priority to the recapture of Guadalcanal to deny the airfield to the Japanese, since long-range bombers based there would be within striking range of shipping routes from Hawaii to Australia. As the United States began to move onto a war footing, both at home and abroad, the strategy for defeating Japan took form. The initial stages, approved at the highest levels in Washington on July 2, 1942, called for a limited offensive to take Rabaul, code named Operation Watchtower. Three tasks were involved in this plan:

1. Occupy the Santa Cruz Islands (about four hundred miles southeast of Guadalcanal) and recapture Guadalcanal. This task was assigned to the South Pacific Area Command. 2. Halt the Japanese push on Port Moresby, then send Allied troops up the northern coast of New Guinea. MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Command was responsible for this objective.

218

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

3. Other Allied forces were to move up the Solomon Islands chain, followed by an attack on Rabaul.

Strategy from 1942 to 1944 provided for forces under MacArthur’s command to advance in a northwesterly direction, defending Australia by clearing Japanese strongholds in New Guinea, the Admiralty Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago. From there, MacArthur’s troops would land at strategic locations in the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies, working their way northward toward the Philippines. Forces under Admiral Nimitz would move in a westerly and northwesterly direction from the Central and South Pacific areas, taking essential islands in the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas, while bypassing others. British and American forces in Burma were to defeat Japanese troops there and attempt to reopen the Burma Road to permit supplies to flow into China via an overland route, while Stilwell’s command was to provide direction and support—especially air support—to China in its long war against Japan. The overall strategy for defeating Japan was to move Allied forces within range for aerial strikes against the home islands, to be followed by an invasion of Japan. The objective was to capture only those locations that would further this goal, thus bypassing some major areas such as Indochina, Malaya, eastern China, a large portion of the East Indies, and the Philippines, but take Taiwan (in the summer of 1944, however, it was decided to liberate the Philippines and bypass Taiwan). The First Marine Division was assigned to make landings on Guadalcanal in early August 1942. Under cover of a large naval task force, two Marine regiments landed unopposed, but came under attack from Japanese aircraft based on Rabaul. The Japanese lost more than half of their fifty-one warplanes to American gunfire and carrier-based planes, while Guadalcanal eventually became the most contested area in the Pacific for the next few months as Japanese forces attempted to regain control of the island. U.S. Army troops were added to the marines already present on Guadalcanal. Then more marines landed, bringing the total to more than sixteen thousand. Both the Allied command and Japan’s IGH decided that Guadalcanal was an absolute necessity for their plans to be successful, which resulted in fierce land battles there in late 1942 and into early 1943 and naval battles in the surrounding seas with numerous warships lost on both sides. During most of this period, the airfield, Henderson Field, was in American hands and was used extensively for attacks on Japanese troop concentrations and naval ships. Admiral Yamamoto, however, saw Guadalcanal as a major base from which to destroy the U.S. fleet and sent two Japanese fleets to shell the island, also sending in naval landing troops. In November 1942 both sides again increased the number of troops on the island as well as sea and air forces providing support. Eventually, U.S. forces gained the upper hand by wreaking havoc on Japanese warships. Henderson

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

219

Field became the base for a wide assortment of aircraft from the U.S. Army Air Corps, Navy, and Marine Corps aviation units, for direct tactical support of ground units, for bombing of Japanese bases on other islands, and for attacks on Japanese naval forces. The Twenty-fifth U.S. Army Infantry Division arrived in December, replacing the First Marine Division, which had been hit with fiftyfour hundred casualties, not only from combat, but also from malaria. In January 1943, another marine division arrived followed by a second army division, increasing the total number of U.S. soldiers and marines to fifty thousand. Shortly thereafter, IGH decided to evacuate Guadalcanal, resulting in a major victory for U.S. forces. The marines and the army had completely outmaneuvered the Japanese who were resoundingly beaten. Of thirty-six thousand Japanese who fought on Guadalcanal, fourteen thousand were killed and nine thousand had died from malaria. Losses of U.S. personnel were sixteen hundred killed and forty-three hundred wounded.26 At Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial Army suffered its first major defeat in the war against the United States. The loss of six hundred warplanes and pilots would be difficult to replace. Japanese expansion in the Pacific had finally been stopped, and the next two years would see Allied forces making extensive landings, all aimed at pushing back the Empire of the Rising Sun to the home islands of Japan. JAPAN DIGS IN: SAIPAN, THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA, AND THE PHILIPPINES After Guadalcanal, U.S. forces began the long and arduous task of pushing back the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy in the direction of Tokyo. It was not until the middle of 1944 that General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Command forces had cleared New Guinea, adjacent islands, and the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies, and were ready for the next major step on the northward route to Japan. Pacific Ocean Area Command forces under Admiral Nimitz had taken control of several Pacific islands and were poised to take Saipan in the Mariana Islands. Saipan was vitally important as it could be used for an airbase from which the new B-29 long-range bombers would be able to strike targets in the four home islands of Japan. By July 1944, the Japanese high command fully realized that it was not faring well in the war, but still expected that—at the least—a compromise settlement would be worked out. For the time being, Japanese strategy was to make fierce, savage, and ferocious defensive stands, including suicide charges, that—they thought—would ultimately lead the Allies to agree to some type of negotiated settlement to end the war. None of this was communicated to the Japanese public, but again it shows how far off the mark the Japanese leaders were in fathoming American and other Allied public opinion. At the Cairo summit meeting in November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang had developed overall strategy for the defeat of Japan and the treatment of Japan after the war.

220

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

The leaders agreed on a requirement for unconditional surrender and that Japan would be “stripped” of all colonial conquests. This information was widely disseminated—Japan had diplomats in neutral Switzerland all through the war who informed Tokyo of such matters—and Japan’s leaders knew full well of the Cairo Declaration through radio broadcasts. Two Marine Corps divisions and one U.S. Army division from the Pacific Ocean Area Command forces landed on Saipan on June 15, 1944, and met stubborn resistance and suicide charges from Japanese defenders. After a month of fierce battles, the Japanese defenders were defeated and Saipan was being readied for American bombers by the end of July. During the Saipan campaign, the Japanese navy launched a major attack on Allied naval forces between Taiwan and Saipan—the Battle of the Philippine Sea—the “greatest of all carrier battles of World War II.” In what the Japanese hoped would be the “decisive battle” resulting in major destruction of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, the tables were turned and Japan lost 330 warplanes, leaving only about 100 available for other operations. The Japanese navy would not recover from this debacle, which Americans referred to as the “Marianas Turkey Shoot.”27 In the summer of 1944, decision makers in Washington were developing strategy for use of forces to invade Taiwan and bypass the Philippines on the march to Japan. Taiwan was closer to Japan and provided strategic advantages. The Philippines were not within bombing range of Japan—even with the new B-29s—and were heavily defended by the Japanese. MacArthur, however, had made his famous declaration, “I shall return,” and considered that any alternative would be a disgrace, not only to him, but to the reputation of the United States. Admiral King, the chief of naval operations in Washington, held out for Taiwan as did Admiral Nimitz from his headquarters in Hawaii. President Roosevelt and MacArthur met in Hawaii for a conference in late July 1944, along with Nimitz, to decide whether it would be Taiwan or the Philippines. This was a most unusual meeting—General Marshall, the army chief of staff, told MacArthur to bring no aides—and the discussions and decisions would be made only by the highest level officials with no briefings by staffers. MacArthur did his own briefing of Roosevelt, and Nimitz did his. In fact, MacArthur spent three hours alone with Roosevelt presenting his case for returning to the Philippines. The president finally agreed with MacArthur, and the meeting was over in two days. They agreed on an initial landing on Leyte Island, scheduled for December 1944 and subsequently moved it up to October. But discussions in Washington continued on with Admiral King eventually agreeing to the liberation of the Philippines as a higher priority. Taiwan was bypassed and was not liberated until after Japan’s surrender.28 The return of General MacArthur to the Philippines in October 1944 was one of a series of events in the second half of 1944 that led to major changes in the Japanese government and its policy for the conduct of the war. Although propaganda efforts on the homefront continued to exhort Japanese civilians and soldiers to fight on to a complete victory, the Supreme Council for the Direction

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

221

of the War increasingly deliberated on the idea of a compromise peace. The Supreme Council, actually an inner cabinet, consisted of the six top officials most directly involved in the prosecution of the war: the prime minister, the minister for foreign affairs, the minister of war, the minister of the navy, and the chiefs of staff of both the army and the navy. Even so, there was considerable disagreement among these officials as to the most desirable course of action. As the Allied onslaught continued to move ever closer to Japan, the War Council considered even more conciliatory terms for a negotiated settlement that, in the final analysis, would leave little more than the four home islands under Japanese control while preserving Japan’s sovereignty, thereby ensuring retention of the emperor system, preserving the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy, and forestalling an Allied occupation. These policy changes, however, were made in strictest secrecy, withheld not only from the Japanese public, but also from Washington and London. Instead, Tokyo placed its confidence in a most unusual—and as it turned out, unreliable—agent, the Soviet Union. The strategy was to obtain Moscow’s good offices to negotiate with the United States and Britain while making an all-out, herculean effort to inflict the heaviest possible damage on the advancing Allied forces, the idea being to weaken their insistence upon the unconditional surrender terms laid out in the Cairo Declaration. In its homefront propaganda in late 1944 and early 1945, the Japanese government employed the slogan, “Victory or Extermination,” to spur the public on to make the maximum effort in winning the war. People were told that American and British soldiers would kill Japanese children and rape women. Loss of the war would mean impoverishment and Japan would become a subjugated colony of the United States. In June 1944, the Imperial High Command in Tokyo decided upon a do-ordie, major effort to destroy the Allied invaders at Saipan. The failure of this undertaking forced Tojo to resign as prime minister on July 22, 1944. Another army general, Koiso Kuniaki, was named to replace him. Although few knew it at the time, Koiso was an advocate of a negotiated conclusion of the war. After Saipan, Japan’s position steadily deteriorated with major battle losses: Tinian, July 1944; Guam, July–August 1944; Peleliu, September–October 1944; MacArthur’s return to the Philippines at Leyte and the naval Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 1944; initiation of B-29 bombing attacks on the Japanese homeland from the Marianas, November 24, 1944; clearing of Leyte Island of Japanese resistance, December 1944; end of the New Guinea campaign, December 31, 1944; the invasion of Luzon, the most important of the Philippine Islands, January 9, 1945; Iwo Jima, February–March 1945; and Okinawa, April–June 1945. Plans formulated by the Koiso government called for three major elements to be applied in the objective of ending the war “on a basis satisfactory to Japan.” First, the optimistically named Operation Victory (Sho Go), was actually a comprehensive plan conceived in August 1944 for the conduct of operations in areas

222

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

where Allied forces were expected to attack: the Philippines, Taiwan and Okinawa, the Japanese home islands, and the Kurile Islands. Second, the Kamikaze Tokubetsu Kogekitai (the Kamikaze Special Attack Force [usually referred to in Japan as Tokkotai]) was established when it became obvious that conventional army and navy units were not capable of stopping the Allies. The purpose of these two elements was to inflict such brutal punishment as would cause Americans at home to lose heart for the complete defeat of Japan and force Roosevelt to settle for a negotiated peace. The third step of the plan, initiated in February 1945, called for Japan’s Foreign Ministry to seek Kremlin intervention in bringing about a negotiated peace settlement. Japan and the Soviet Union continued to observe their 1941 neutrality pact. MACARTHUR’S RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES General Yamashita, the conqueror of Singapore and Malaya in the early stages of the war, and subsequently the commander of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, was transferred to the Philippines to command Japanese defenses against MacArthur’s liberation forces. He was faced with a decision on the deployment of troops. There were not sufficient forces to fully garrison all of the seven thousand islands, even the eleven largest islands. Two islands, Mindanao and Luzon, comprise two-thirds of the total land area. IGH directed that, instead of dispersing forces throughout the islands, the bulk of the Japanese army should be stationed on Luzon.29 As MacArthur’s forces—the Sixth U.S. Army, which consisted of four divisions with a strength of 165,000 men—sailed toward Leyte Island, a huge armada of U.S. Navy vessels, the Third and Seventh Fleets, provided escort protection and naval artillery support. Only one Japanese division, the Sixteenth Division, defended Leyte when MacArthur’s troops landed on October 20, 1944. Yamashita pictured the major battle for control of the Philippines as being fought on Luzon rather than the small island of Leyte. Later in the day, however, orders arrived from Tokyo to make a major effort—“the Decisive Battle”—on Leyte. Although Yamashita objected to this strategy, his immediate superior, Field Marshal Terauchi, the commander of the Southern Army, insisted that IGH orders be followed without question. As troops of the Sixth Army continued the conquest of Leyte, the Japanese decided to use virtually all of their remaining naval forces to oppose the landing and destroy as much as possible of the U.S. fleet. Four major battles involving the major portion of Japanese naval forces were fought during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23–26, 1944. The Japanese fleet sustained serious damage from more than one thousand sorties by U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps organizations, including B-24 bombing attacks on the battleship Yamato. The huge battleship—with eighteen-inch guns—escaped the Philippines only to be sunk six months later at the Battle of Okinawa. The Japanese fleet suffered major damage at Leyte for several reasons. First,

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

223

there was no air cover because most naval aircraft—330 carrier planes—had been lost in the June 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea off Saipan.30 What few Zero fighters remained operational had been diverted to kamikaze missions. Second, the U.S. decision to move up the Leyte landings by two months forced Japanese planners to make hasty preparations. Third, Japanese forces had no contingency plans. Fourth, inadequate information and communications led to errors of judgment. The outcome of the Battle of Leyte Gulf from the Japanese viewpoint is best expressed in the memoirs of Rear Admiral Koyanagi Tomiji, the chief of staff of the First Strike Force aboard the Yamato:

The Japanese Navy’s total combatant vessels in this great battle theater was nine battleships, four aircraft carriers, thirteen heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, and thirty-one destroyers. Of these we lost three battleships, all four carriers, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and seven destroyers. These losses, most of which were caused by air attacks, spelled the collapse of our Navy as an effective fighting machine.31

IGH, in its attempt to maintain morale and fighting spirit on the homefront, provided news dispatches concerning MacArthur’s return to the Philippines, but with a definite bias that presented an untrue picture of the course of the war. It was one matter to serve propaganda to civilians at home, but IGH passed this same information to military units—including generals and admirals—so that everyone, except those involved in the actions, was in the dark as to the reality of the situation. After the war, the former chief of the press section of IGH explained that top officials had decided that military forces would fight better if they thought they were winning. Field Marshal Terauchi, “in extremely high spirits and optimistic,” supported Tokyo in its decision to fight “the Decisive Battle” on Leyte, ordering Japanese troops “to totally destroy the enemy.” Prime Minister Koiso, on November 8, 1944, even went so far as to stake the outcome of the war by committing his government to victory on Leyte. That same day, the Nippon Times reported that Japanese forces on Leyte had dealt a heavy blow to the enemy. Japanese senior commanders, made overconfident by their own propaganda— which had depicted the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Leyte Gulf as Japanese victories—and reliance on Yamato Damashii (Japanese spirit), committed their best troops to the Leyte campaign. Included among these were the First Division, recently transferred from Manchuria to Luzon and two of the best in the Japanese army, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-sixth Divisions. In relentless jungle warfare over the next two months, these divisions were annihilated because of miscalculations, faulty intelligence, lack of food and supplies, and the absence of communications facilities. Of seventy thousand Japanese soldiers sent to Leyte to fight MacArthur’s troops, only five thousand survived. On Christmas Day, MacArthur announced that the Leyte campaign was over.32

224

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

TOKYO’S PROPAGANDA ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN MORALE ON THE HOMEFRONT Communiques issued by IGH falsified results on a regular basis by claiming victories that did not exist. As units of the Sixth U.S. Army approached Leyte, IGH issued a news release explaining: The U.S. forces that had been recently defeated in the great aerial battle off Taiwan by the Japanese, this time escorting a powerful convoy, appeared in the sea area off the Philippine Islands on October 17, after mobilizing the remnants of their task force in the Central and South Pacific area. A part of the enemy force entered the Gulf of Leyte and repeatedly bombed various parts of the coast. At noon, the same day, the enemy, utilizing numerous vessels, started landing operations in the vicinity of Tacloban under cover of heavy fleet bombardment and air bombing, but completely failed after sustaining tremendous losses in the face of the vigorous Japanese counterattack. At about 11 A.M. on October 20, the enemy landing troops, divided among about 200 landing barges again launched a landing attempt near Tacloban. The Japanese forces, counterattacking the invaders, pushed the major portion of the enemy back into the sea, but a part of the U.S. troops eventually forced their way to a landing.33

A few days later, news reports from Tokyo ridiculed General MacArthur for dreaming that he could defeat the Japanese: Iguchi Sadao, spokesman of the Board of Information, said that General MacArthur’s proclamation that he would “liberate” all of the Philippines was preposterous. Mr. Iguchi pointed out that the Philippines was an independent country with a government formed in conformance with the united will of the people and that it was determined together with Japan, that the imperialistic scheme of the United States should never be realized in their part of the world. Mr. Iguchi said that MacArthur had returned to the Philippines only to be driven out again and that his landing on Leyte Island was a prelude to the disaster that will surely befall the American forces.34

Two days later, IGH claimed: “Fifteen U.S. carriers plus 12 warships were blasted in the three-day battle off the Philippine Islands; an additional 36 U.S. ships were sunk or damaged at Leyte.” On the same day, Captain Kurihara Etsuzo, chief of the Navy Press Section of IGH, claimed: “Almost the entire enemy carrier force in the Pacific has been wiped out.” Kurihara continued: “American personnel losses were 14,300.” In the inflammatory rhetoric of wartime Japan, the Nippon Times reported: “[Kurihara] jokingly added that the 14,300 bloated corpses would reach the coast of California by about next March, riding home on the Japan Current via the Aleutians and off Alaska.”35 This comment was likely intended to indicate that American civilian morale would suffer thereby making U.S. officials open to a negotiated settlement of the war. Throughout the war, special significance was given by Japanese officials to

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

225

the eighth day of each month, in commemoration of the emperor’s rescript issued on December 8, 1941, that announced the declaration of war against the United States and Britain. Japanese civilians and members of the armed forces were prodded through these monthly reminders to exert their utmost energies in winning the war. On November 8, 1944, Domei News Agency reported that Prime Minister Koiso had exhorted the nation to bolster power for a successful conclusion of the war: Declaring that the battle in the Philippines is a struggle that will decide the final issue of the present war, Prime Minister General Koiso, in his press statement on November 8, the Imperial Rescript Observance Day, exhorted the nation to devote total energies to replenishing war power of the country’s fighting forces. Prime Minister Koiso congratulated the successive victories scored in the Taiwan and Philippine areas since the middle part of October, attributing this to the August Imperial Virtues, divine aid, and the valor and loyalty displayed by the heroic members of the Imperial Armed Forces. The prime minister described the fighting on Leyte and warned that “the war situation is far from being easy.”36

A month later, after Japan had virtually lost Leyte, IGH finessed the issue by expanding the zone of the Decisive Battle: “With grim battles still remaining on Leyte Island, the firing line in the Philippines area has been expanded from the Leyte area to the West, or Mindoro, resulting in severe fighting.”37 THE WAR IN CHINA AND BURMA Policy for conducting the war in China and Burma called for continuing efforts to reopen the Burma Road to permit overland supply of Nationalist forces, clearing of Japanese troops from Burma, and defending against Japanese attempts to expand control of China into the central and western regions. Chinese troops were sent to Burma to fight alongside British and U.S. forces, while American participation in China proper was primarily involved in overall strategic planning, logistical support, and extensive tactical and strategic air operations against the Japanese. Land warfare was conducted by the Chinese Nationalist Army with U.S. Army advisers assisting. By the fall of 1944, political problems had developed between General Stillwell, the China-Burma-India (CBI) commander, and Chiang. Stilwell demanded a united Chinese effort—both Nationalist and communist—in fighting the Japanese. Chiang refused and was insistent on deploying some of his Nationalist troops to blockade Chinese Communist forces to keep them from moving out of their remote locations. Stilwell viewed this as a double diminishment of troop strength that could be employed against Japanese forces. The working relationship between these two leaders eventually became so contentious as to be intractable, requiring action by top officials in Washington.

226

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

At the Quebec Conference in September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill decided on a change in command structure, dividing the CBI into two commands, the China theater and the Burma-India theater. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, a plans officer in Washington in the early part of the war and the deputy commander of Southeast Asia Area Command under Mountbatten since 1943, was appointed the commander of the China theater, while General Daniel Sultan was named to head the Burma-India command. Stilwell returned to Washington. Strategy developed at Quebec set a goal of opening the Burma Road by the spring of 1945 and of clearing all Japanese from Burma as soon as possible. The airlift of supplies continued with the U.S. Army Air Force C-46 cargo planes flown in large numbers from India and Allied-occupied portions of Burma over the “Hump,” the huge mountain ranges between India and China, for the seven-hundred-mile journey to areas of China under Nationalist control. Wedemeyer was more conciliatory than Stilwell, and relations between the new commander and Chiang improved, even though the Nationalist leader continued in his refusal to permit Chinese Communist forces to fight alongside Nationalist units against the Japanese. Wedemeyer, knowing of the problems Stilwell had, declined to badger Chiang any further over this issue, but in an estimate of the situation sent to Washington he explained that Japanese forces were preparing for an offensive and that the prognosis for stopping them was not good. Fortunately for the Allies, IGH in Tokyo called off the campaign in China, transferring large troop elements to the Pacific in an attempt to stem their losses there. Air transport over the Hump continued to expand, however, and by January 1945 tonnage flown into China had more than doubled from what it had been six months earlier. In a few months, the Burma Road was reopened and ample supplies began to flow to Nationalist China.38 THE LAST STAGES: JANUARY TO JUNE, 1945—LUZON, IWO JIMA, AND OKINAWA By the end of 1944, it had become clear to MacArthur and Nimitz that the closer their forces advanced in the direction of Japan, the more intense and suicidal the fighting would become on the part of the Japanese. Kamikaze attacks came with increasing frequency and gyokusai (sacrificial) defenses, calculated by the high command to demoralize the Allies, were fought with savage fury. It was another miscalculation on the part of the Japanese government. The fighting men of the U.S. military forces—from generals and admirals down to privates and seamen—were not going to be intimidated. The same was true of the American public at home. The more barbaric Japanese troops became, the more resolute was the attitude of the Allies in favor of a complete defeat of Japan’s military and unconditional surrender. On January 3, 1945, Allied landings began at Lingayen Gulf (about one hundred miles north of Manila) on Luzon, the principal island of the Philippines.

The Military Dictatorship Takes Japan to War

227

U.S. forces had nearly 1,000 warships plus 3,000 landing craft and 250,000 men. The Japanese under General Yamashita numbered about 275,000 soldiers, the largest number of Japanese troops yet to be encountered by the Allies in the war. MacArthur’s forces, in the next few days, made additional landings at Nasugbu, Mariveles, and Subic Bay, areas to the northwest, west, and southwest of Manila. Losses among American troops were light as they continued their advance into the capital city. Exactly one month after the landings at Lingayen Gulf, the First Cavalry Division entered the outskirts of Manila on February 3. The Japanese military, determined to make a last stand—regardless of the cost in human lives—held off the Allied liberation of Manila for a full month.39 As the battle for Manila became more intense, urban warfare ensued with house-to-house, building-to-building (some American soldiers even said “closetto closet”) street fighting, amid extensive brutalities committed by the Japanese. Yamashita ordered Japanese army units to evacuate the city, but about thirty thousand Japanese naval forces—not under Yamashita—stayed with orders to destroy port facilities and warehouses in Manila. Commanders lost control over their troops and discipline broke down among these navy elements, resulting in a frenzy of murder and destruction. Most of the southern residential district and about 75 percent of the factories were destroyed. Even worse, the fanatical behavior of Japanese navy forces resulted in the murder of about one hundred thousand Filipino civilians, including children.40 Landings at other locations continued for the next several months, with the last organized Japanese defense in the Philippines defeated by July 1945. Even with this string of victories for the Allied forces, however, the final defeat of Japanese militarism still appeared to be far off. Military planners in Washington could see, from the increasing savagery of Japanese fighting, that the invasion of the home islands would be met with intense ferocity, including massive suicide stands. The end of the war appeared to be as much as two years away. While the fighting on Luzon was still being conducted, U.S. Marines from the Pacific theater under Admiral Nimitz landed on Iwo Jima—about eight hundred miles south of Tokyo—on February 19, 1945. Iwo Jima actually consists of three small islands, the largest of which is Naka (Central) Iwo Jima, where most of the fighting took place. Iwo Jima, six hundred miles closer to Tokyo than Saipan, was considered essential for an airfield where fighter planes to escort B-29s could be based, and where bombers damaged by antiaircraft fire on bombing runs over Japan could make emergency landings. The importance of aviation in bringing about the defeat of Japan was now obvious, resulting in many hard-fought battles for islands to be used as airfields. Interestingly, air supremacy had now become the most important element of war only four decades after Wilbur and Orville Wright had flown the first flimsy, powered aircraft a short distance at Kitty Hawk. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Marine Divisions participated in the landings and the capture of Iwo Jima and incurred the heaviest casualties in the history of the Marine Corps—6,800 killed and 19,200 wounded. The dogged Japanese

228

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

defense of Iwo Jima cost the lives of most of the twenty thousand Imperial Army troops. The island was declared to be in Allied hands on March 13, but an army regiment brought in after the Marines left killed another sixteen hundred Japanese troops and took nine hundred prisoners. By March 17, Iwo Jima was completely in American hands. A few days later, Army Air Corps fighter planes were operating from the island to accompany B29 bombing raids on Japan. Japanese cities were literally feeling the heat from U.S. bombing raids. Incendiary bombing raids on Tokyo, Osaka, and other cities created intense fires that destroyed most of the cities and killed thousands of civilians. Daily bombing attacks destroyed what was left of Japanese industrial facilities. Because many war production plants had been destroyed, manufacture of parts and equipment for Japan’s armed forces had been parceled out to Japanese houses and small businesses, thereby making the bombing of residential areas necessary. While these fierce battles were being fought in the Pacific—and the successful Allied offensive in Europe foretold the end of Nazi Germany—Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met in February 1945 at Yalta, in the Crimean region of the Soviet Union, to plan policies for concluding the war in Europe, to map the postwar political structure of various countries on the European continent, and to develop overall strategy for the defeat of Japan. The Soviet dictator agreed that “in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall then enter the war against Japan.” In return for entering the war, Roosevelt promised Stalin that several territories—lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905—would be restored to the Soviet Union. These included the southern part of Sakhalin, railroad rights in Manchuria, and the establishment of “the preeminent rights of the Soviet Union” in the port of Dairen and leasehold rights to Port Arthur. Roosevelt also agreed that “the Kuril [Kurile] Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union,” even though the southern Kuriles had never been in Russian hands. These agreements were not made public, and Japanese officials were unaware of Moscow’s intentions.41 U.S. forces, including soldiers and marines, under Admiral Nimitz made amphibious landings on Okinawa on April 1, 1945, Easter Sunday. After eighty days of intensive fighting, Kamikaze attacks, and the sinking of the Yamato, the Japanese defenders—including many civilians forced into action—were defeated. Two major events affecting the war occurred in rapid succesion. Roosevelt died suddenly at Warm Springs, Georgia, on April 12 and Vice President Harry S Truman succeeded Roosevelt as president. Nazi Germany was near collapse, but Hitler doggedly refused the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. Consequently, Germany found itself in the middle of a viselike grip, increasingly squeezed by the advancing armies of the United States and Britain from the west and the Soviet Union from the east. These mighty forces overran Germany completely, bringing on massive destruction—both from the air and the ground—that resulted in the total defeat of Hitler’s armed forces on May 7, 1945. Now Japan was alone in the world, with no ally.

CHAPTER 11

Ending the War JAPAN SEEKS KREMLIN HELP; GETS THE POTSDAM DECLARATION INSTEAD In late 1944, Tokyo appealed to Moscow on several occasions seeking to obtain a closer alliance with the Soviet Union rather than simply continuing a neutrality pact between the two powers. Tokyo increasingly became willing to promise territorial rights in exchange for Moscow’s good offices in obtaining a conditional settlement of the war with the United States and Britain. None of these overtures received favorable attention from the Kremlin, however. Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin, solidly on the winning side in Europe, knew there would be no benefit in dealing with Japan. At the start of 1945, Foreign Ministry officials in Tokyo were looking for some way to bring the war to a conclusion through a negotiated settlement. Also, the terms of the Soviet-Japan neutrality pact provided for an automatic renewal, on condition that neither side renounced the treaty one year ahead of the expiration of its original term. Thus, Japanese officials—desirous of a continuation of the pact—viewed the approach of April 1945, which would be one year ahead of the treaty’s expiration date, with anxiety. Japan was now in need of an ally—even one that for most of the preceding half-century had been an enemy—more than ever. Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sato Naotake, sought in vain to obtain information from Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on the continuation of the pact. Also, the Tokyo government knew of the Yalta Conference, but had no details. Ambassador Sato unsuccessfully sought information about Yalta. Tokyo directed Sato to seek closer relations with Moscow, with the ob-

230

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

jective of obtaining Soviet mediation efforts with Washington and London. The answer was received April 5, 1945, when Molotov, assured by now that Germany would soon be defeated, advised Sato of the Soviet government’s “wish to denounce the [neutrality] pact of April 13, 1941.”1 Two days later, retired Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, seventy-eight years old, replaced Koiso Kuniaki as Japan’s prime minister. Suzuki publicly maintained an attitude of renewed prosecution of the war, but secretly stepped up Japan’s overtures to the Soviet Union for a negotiated settlement. Moscow’s announcement of its intention to discontinue the neutrality pact caused grief in Tokyo. Officials were puzzled as to whether the Soviets would continue to observe the treaty until its scheduled expiration date of April 1946, or immediately consider the agreement void. According to Sato, Molotov gave assurance that the pact was to remain in effect for the full five years.2 After Germany’s defeat on May 7, Japan’s situation grew even more desperate. Japanese army intelligence reports revealed that large numbers of Russian units were being transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway from Europe to the Far East close to the borders of Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia. In spite of these hard facts, Tokyo began to try harder than ever to improve relations with Moscow over the next few months. During May, June, and July, the home islands of Japan experienced heavy bombing from U.S. Army Air Force B-29s based on Saipan and Tinian. Now that fighter planes based on Iwo Jima could protect the bombers from attack by Zeros, daily air raids on Japan were met with little or no resistance. It was also evident to ranking officers at Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) that large numbers of Allied troops—accompanied by an extensive array of aircraft and crews, ships, weapons, ammunition, supplies, and equipment—were en route from Europe and the United States to the Pacific theater. By the summer of 1945, Allied leaders saw the need for a summit meeting to discuss postwar policy for Europe and to coordinate plans for the final defeat of Japan. Potsdam, twenty miles southwest of Berlin, was chosen as the site of this conference, and it would be Harry S Truman’s first major international conference since becoming president. Winston Churchill and Stalin also attended, along with the foreign ministers and top military officials of Britain and the Soviet Union as well as the United States. Stalin revealed Tokyo’s overtures for a negotiated peace, but wary of a repetition of Japan’s drawn-out and duplicitous negotiations with the United States in 1941, Truman decided to accept nothing less than total victory, and along with it a complete remaking of Japan. A major outcome of the conference, held from July 17 to August 2, 1945, was the Potsdam Proclamation, issued on July 26, that called for the unconditional surrender of Japan’s armed forces—with the promise that “the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, will be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.” The proclamation also called for an Allied military occupation of Japan, punishment of war criminals, and loss of all territory in accordance with the Cairo Decla-

Ending the War

231

ration. Japan was to be “stripped” of all colonial conquests. Specifically, Japan was to be divested of all Pacific islands seized or occupied since 1914; furthermore, Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands were to be returned to China, and Japan was to be “expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.”3 In plain terms, postwar Japan was to be limited to the four home islands. The Japanese Imperial Army and Navy would be abolished, its troops disbanded, the Japanese government would continue to function, but under supervision of the Allied commander with veto power, and Japan would be militarily occupied by Allied forces—primarily the U.S. Army—for an indefinite period. The Potsdam Proclamation was issued in the names of the heads of government of the United States, Britain, and Nationalist China. Although Chiang Kaishek was not present at Potsdam, a draft of the proclamation was sent by cable to him in Chungking, and the Nationalist leader quickly cabled his approval back to Potsdam. The Soviet Union had not yet entered the war against Japan and was not included. Japan gave no official response to the Allied demands, but at a news conference on July 28, 1945, Prime Minister Suzuki announced that his government would ignore (mokusatsu) the proclamation. Although Japanese leaders later insisted that Suzuki’s use of the word mokusatsu was incorrectly translated by the Allies as “ignore” (they said Suzuki meant “defer a response”), Allied officials viewed the announcement—broadcast by shortwave radio—as a rejection. But Suzuki made other remarks at the press conference. The translation accepted by the U.S. State Department reads: “I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is no other course but to ignore it entirely and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of this war.”4 This claimed “misinterpretation” provides another example of the vagueness of the Japanese language and how it can be used to disparage efforts of Americans and Europeans to penetrate an inscrutable Japan. In this case, the implication was that it would not have been necessary for the United States to use atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki if only more careful attention had been given to Suzuki’s remarks and time had been allowed for an official reply. Standard Japanese-English dictionaries, however, show the translation of mokusatsu as “ignore” or “to take no notice of.” During the last five days of the Potsdam Conference, officials coordinated plans for Soviet entry into the war and for a joint U.S. and British Commonwealth invasion of Japan. Although development of an atomic bomb had been underway in the United States for several years, it was not until July 1945 that the first prototype was even ready for testing. A successful test was conducted at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, and Truman was promptly notified by a coded message shortly after his arrival in Germany. After hearing of Prime Minister Suzuki’s press conference remarks, Truman made plans with his military chiefs for deployment of the new weapon and gave his approval for

232

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

its use against Japan.5 The president told Stalin that the United States planned to use “a new bomb” far more destructive than any other known bomb. The United States made no announcement of the precise nature of the new weapon, but broadcasts by shortwave radio were made from Washington so that Tokyo would have some idea of the consequences that would result from continued refusal to accept the Potsdam Proclamation. Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, a naval intelligence officer with long experience in Japan and fluent in the language, explained that time was running out. The alternative to accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation was identified as “the prompt and utter destruction” of Japan. Zacharias warned that “an even worse military fate awaits Japan if she, like Germany, unwisely chooses the wrong alternative.” These broadcasts were made in both Japanese and English, at a time of day and on a frequency that would be conducive to reception in Japan. The only problem was that the general public—since before Pearl Harbor—had been forbidden to possess shortwave radios or listen to broadcasts from foreign countries. Japanese army intelligence sources, however, monitored these broadcasts but did not make them public.6 Even before the Potsdam Conference, Truman had assigned General Douglas MacArthur the responsibility for preparing two contingency plans. Operation Downfall, the first of these plans, provided for the Allied invasion of Japan. Forces under MacArthur and Nimitz, as well as troops sent from Europe and the United States, would participate in a major invasion of the home islands of Japan to deliver a final, crushing blow to the enemy. All ground units—U.S. Army and Marine Corps—with supporting tactical air commands would be under General MacArthur, while naval forces were to be commanded by Admiral Chester Nimitz. MacArthur was given overall planning responsibility, which was initiated by his staff in the Philippines in May 1945.7 Operation Olympic, scheduled for the fall of 1945, would launch divisions and supporting troops of the Sixth U.S. Army, including Marine Corp units, against southern Kyushu to secure a beachhead on the home islands of Japan. The second phase, Operation Coronet, was to begin in the spring of 1946 with three corps including eight divisions of the Eighth Army, and two more corps of the First Army in an assault on the Tokyo-Yokohama area, the Kanto Plain. The total Allied casualty estimate (killed, wounded, and missing in action) for Operation Downfall was placed at 427,000, which included 111,000 battle deaths. Japanese deaths, both military and civilian, were expected to be in the millions.8 The total number of all Allied personnel involved in Downfall would be more than one million. The second contingency plan MacArthur was responsible for was Operation Blacklist, which would go into effect in the event of the sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government and IGH. Preparation of this plan began in May 1945 and, after consultation with other theater commanders, was completed in late July. Operation Blacklist called for the occupation of fourteen major areas in Japan and between three and six areas in Korea in order that

Ending the War

233

Allied forces could assume military, political, and economic control of the occupied areas. The occupation force would consist of twenty-two U.S. Army and Marine Corps divisions, in addition to air and naval forces, plus units of the British Commonwealth forces.9 MAJOR BLOWS TO JAPAN: HIROSHIMA AND THE SOVIET ENTRY INTO THE WAR Less than a month after the successful Alamogordo test, the first atomic bomb to be used in warfare was dropped from a B-29 on August 6, 1945, on Hiroshima, the largest city in western Honshu and the site of several military facilities, including the headquarters of the Second General Army and the nearby Kure naval facilities. In an instant, at 8:16 A.M., most of the city and the military facilities were decimated. Out of approximately 320,000 civilians and military personnel in the city, 80,000 were instantly killed or wounded beyond hope of recovery. One-third of the casualties were soldiers. Among the dead were Korean laborers and several American prisoners of war (POWs).10 Several hours later, reports began to filter into Tokyo of the devastation that had occurred in Hiroshima. By the next day, IGH in Tokyo learned that the city had been hit by a new kind of bomb with devastating consequences, and Japanese scientists soon confirmed that it was a nuclear explosion. From Washington, President Truman bluntly explained, for the benefit of officials in Tokyo: We are now prepared to obliterate rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above the ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan’s power to make war. It was to spare the Japanese from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.11

In Moscow, meanwhile, Stalin and Molotov returned from Potsdam in early August and were eagerly sought out by Ambassador Sato who had been given urgent instructions from Tokyo to obtain Soviet assistance in obtaining a negotiated settlement with the United States and Britain, on terms more favorable to Japan than an outright unconditional surrender. Molotov delayed Sato’s request for a meeting, finally agreeing to see him at 5 P.M. on August 8. Sato later commented: I went to the Kremlin at the specified hour. When I went through the entrance into the palace, everything seemed the same as usual. I proceeded to Molotov’s office and, speaking in Russian, congratulated the Foreign Commissar on his safe return from Potsdam. But Molotov interrupted me saying, “I have today a communication to make in the name of the Soviet Government to the Japanese Government.” He asked me to take a seat,

234

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

then sat down himself, and read a notification to me. It was none other than a declaration of war by Soviet Russia.12

Molotov explained to Sato that because Japan had rejected the Potsdam Proclamation: the proposal made by the Japanese government to the Soviet Union regarding mediation in the Far East has become groundless. Given the Japanese refusal to surrender, the allies have proposed that the Soviet Union join the war against Japanese aggression to hasten the end of the war, reduce the number of victims and facilitate a speedy restoration of international peace. Faithful to its alliance obligations, the Soviet government has accepted the proposal of the allies and adhered to the declaration issued by the Allied Powers on July 26 of this year. The Soviet government believes that this policy is the only means of bringing peace, ridding the Japanese people of the dangers and devastation encountered by Germany following the rejection of an unconditional surrender. Given the above, the Soviet government declares that as of tomorrow, that is, August 9, the Soviet Union will consider itself at war with Japan.13

Sato’s meeting in the Kremlin took no more than ten or fifteen minutes, but Soviet Army forces were entering Manchuria while the ambassador was in Molotov’s office. The Soviet Far East and Maritime Districts are four thousand miles to the east and seven hours ahead of Moscow. It was already a few minutes past midnight, August 9, and Soviet forces were beginning their attack on Japan’s Kwantung Army in Manchuria from three directions. Most of the elite Japanese troops in Manchuria had been transferred to the Pacific, replaced by sixteen- and seventeen-year-old recruits and overage reservists, who proved to be no match for the battle-hardened Soviet troops recently transferred from the war against Germany. The Soviet Army in the Far East also vastly outnumbered the Japanese, with 80 divisions consisting of 1,500,000 men. Soviet forces also attacked Japanese troops in Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and the northern part of Korea. Red Army units defeated and occupied almost five hundred thousand square miles of territory in Northeast Asia in a matter of a few weeks. The Soviets took approximately 575,000 Japanese prisoners, sending them off to Siberia and other areas of the Soviet Union to work at hard labor for as long as four years—even longer for about 10,000 troops classified as war criminals—and carted off huge quantities of machinery and equipment from Manchuria for use in eastern Siberia.14 ATOMIC BOMBS AND THE SOVIET ATTACK LEAD THE EMPEROR TO ACT Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori and other officials in Tokyo saw the need for immediate action to accept the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation before

Ending the War

235

more death and destruction was visited upon Japan. Some military officials, however, insisted on fighting to the bitter end—even if millions of Japanese were killed. Admiral Onishi Takijiro, the father of the Kamikaze corps and vice chief of the naval general staff, announced that he was “prepared to sacrifice twenty million Japanese rather than surrender.”15 Japan’s Supreme War Council, consisting of the prime minister, the foreign, war, and navy ministers, and the army and navy chiefs, met at 10:30 A.M., August 9, 1945, to decide on what course of action to take. Faced with the calamities produced by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima three days earlier and the news that very morning of the Soviet attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria, the council was aware of the major consequences that would result from its deliberations. Thirty minutes after the meeting began, Nagasaki became the second target of nuclear bombing, and word soon reached Tokyo. It was reasonable to expect that more atomic bombs would be dropped on Japanese cities, although the United States actually had only two bombs, but no one in Japan knew that. The six council members were evenly split over acceptance of the Potsdam terms. The meeting went on late into the night, and it was only through the personal intervention of the emperor at 2 A.M., Friday, August 10, that a decision was made to end the war.16 By now, Japan had only one condition to its “unconditional” surrender agreement: assurance that the institution of the emperor be preserved. This condition, relayed by radio, was not well received by officials gathered in the White House on the morning of August 10 (Washington time). Secretary of State James Byrnes was opposed to anything less than complete, unconditional surrender. But Truman, anxious to end the war, had Byrnes draft a response that held out hope to the Japanese while appeasing Americans who wanted a surrender with no conditions attached. Byrnes’s proposed reply stated that “the authority of the emperor” was to be “subject to the rule” of the supreme commander for the Allied powers (SCAP).17 By the next day, concurrences had been received from the other Allies, and Tokyo was notified through Switzerland. Japanese officials received the Allied response just after midnight on August 12 and debated the meaning of the emperor being “subject to the rule” of SCAP if he was a sovereign ruler. The answer, of course, was that he would not be a “sovereign ruler” for the duration of the occupation, but the implication was that the institution of the emperor would be preserved. The Supreme War Council once more ended up evenly split after considering the matter for two days, and it fell to the emperor to decide on August 14 to accept the terms.18 Hirohito made a recording that night of an imperial rescript to be broadcast the next day (two records were made as a precaution against anticipated, ultranationalist intervention) announcing to the Japanese people that a settlement of the situation was being effected—his message did not use the term “surrender.” As the broadcast began at noon on August 15 (the rescript was dated August 14), millions of Japanese—expecting to hear an exhortation to fight to the bitter

236

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

end—heard the emperor speak in stilted court language few could completely understand: To Our good and loyal Subjects: After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.

Stunned beyond belief, listeners throughout Japan and its colonial territories stood in amazement as the meaning sank in. Emperor Hirohito continued: “We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all ye, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.” Continuing on in an almost blind act of faith in what had been only the most tentative of responses from the Allies concerning the retention of the “emperor system”: Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with ye, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outburst of emotion which may engender needless complications. . . . Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so ye may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.19

While it was clear from the imperial rescript that the war was being terminated, the speech contained no specific details, and no official notification to field commanders to stop fighting and surrender. IGH, however, followed with an endorsement and issuance of MacArthur’s General Order Number 1 (forwarded by radio from Manila to Tokyo) that commanded all Japanese forces to cease hostilities. American and British officials immediately discontinued fighting and terminated all bombing of Japan. Soviet field commanders, however, continued their attacks—in some cases for two more weeks—on the basis that the war was not officially over until commanders of major Japanese armies surrendered.20 STALIN’S ATTEMPT TO INVADE JAPAN BEFORE THE OCCUPATION BEGINS General Order Number 1 specified that Japanese units in Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees latitude, and Karafuto (Sakhalin) had to surrender to Soviet

Ending the War

237

forces. Nothing was mentioned about the Kurile Islands. Premier Stalin sent a request to President Truman on August 16, 1945, to specifically include the Kurile Islands and to designate Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, for exclusive occupation by Soviet forces. Truman agreed on the Kuriles but refused to agree to a Soviet occupation of Hokkaido. It was learned many years later (after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991), in documents released from Central Archives in Moscow, that Stalin had issued orders to go ahead with an invasion of Hokkaido notwithstanding Truman’s denial of his request. Commander in chief of the Soviet forces in the Far East, General Aleksandr M. Vassilevsky issued directions on August 19, 1945, to all Soviet Army and Navy commanders: Based on the tasks set for the Soviet troops in the Far East, I order that the First Far East Front occupy the half of the island of Hokkaido north of the line running from the city of Kushiro to the city of Rumoi, and the islands in the southern part of the Kuril group to the island of Shumshu inclusively, from August 19 to September 1. Over the same period, I order that one fighter and one bomber division of the 9th Air Force shift their bases to Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands.21

General Vassilevsky also ordered the commander of the First Far East Front to “prepare three divisions of the 87th Infantry Corps, and land them: two divisions on the island of Hokkaido, and one division on the southern portion of the Kuril Islands.” These plans changed suddenly on August 23, 1945, when Vassilevsky ordered a delay in the invasion of Hokkaido because the occupation of the Kurile Islands was behind schedule. Soviet troops had difficulty securing all of the Kurile Islands by the time MacArthur had specified for the Japanese surrender ceremony aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. Some of the islands closest to Hokkaido were not captured by Soviet forces even then. In a report published many years later, Boris Slavinsky, the deputy editor of Problemy Dalnego Vostoka (Problems of the Far East) explained: After Soviet troops had landed on Iturup, Kunashir, and Shikotan, the General Command [Stalin] decided to occupy Habomai. Here, it should be noted, there is practically no place in Soviet literature where the course of this operation is described, as it took place after the signing of Japan’s unconditional surrender act. . . . For this reason, [in] all of our publications there is only a brief mention that the occupation of the Kuril islands was completed on September 1. Official Soviet histories were falsified to show completion of all operations by September 1, but it was actually September 5 before occupation of the Habomai group was completed.22

No further attempt was made by the Soviets to invade Hokkaido after the surrender ceremony, but Stalin continued to seek a separate zone of occupation in northern Japan. Truman, keenly aware of the problems being experienced in Germany—after only three months—with the Soviet zone of occupation, was

238

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

adamantly opposed to a similar arrangement in Japan, insisting that there would be a unified occupation under the SCAP, General MacArthur. Truman and MacArthur envisioned that troops of all the Allied powers, including the Soviet Union, would participate in the occupation of Japan, but that all would be under the command of the SCAP. Stalin, however, refused to allow Soviet troops to serve under a U.S. commander. AFTERMATH OF WAR In September 1945, Japan lay in ruins from the devastation and destruction caused by the war its military expansionists had initiated. The starting point could be placed at December 1941, or July 1937, or September 1931, or even earlier, because each venture the Japanese army set out upon—going back to 1894—always seemed to lead to another. The cumulative effect was to prove the adage that an aggressor’s appetite is never satisfied. Acquisition of territory solves a problem temporarily, but an unchecked army perpetually finds a need for more. Perhaps the most serious flaw in the prewar Meiji constitution of Japan was that it failed to place military leaders under civilian authority. Instead, the army and the navy were under the supreme command of the emperor, who also determined the organization and employment of the military. Although military appropriations were controlled by the Diet, little opposition to expansionist ventures was ever exercised by the legislature. Even more damaging, intrigues and deliberate insubordination (gekokujo)—especially by field grade officers—often led to subversion of the emperor’s orders. As Japan became more militaristic in the 1930s, the emperor was frequently used—with some rare exceptions—as a routine endorsement of IGH actions. Although civilian leaders were often at odds with rash military operations, too often Tokyo officialdom gave belated approval to conduct it had initially repudiated, out of concern that Japan would be embarrassed (lose face) on the international scene. The Manchurian incident was a prime example of this pattern. The act of ending the war in August 1945 even saw examples of these problems. After the loss of Okinawa, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, there were still high-ranking military officials who wanted Japan to fight to the bitter end—to the last person—so that the “honor” of Japan, and especially the Japanese Imperial Army could be preserved. Some of the generals seemed to lament the dissolution of the Japanese Imperial Army even more than the destruction of the nation itself. Various reforms instituted during the Allied occupation created a solution to some of these problems. The 1946 constitution contains a renunciation of war clause (Article 9) that precludes Japan from using “force as a means of settling international disputes.” The postwar constitution also makes the emperor “the symbol of the State” (Article 1) as opposed to the Meiji constitution that pro-

Ending the War

239

vided that the “Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” Furthermore, the 1946 constitution makes the Diet the highest organ of state power and the sole lawmaking organ of the state (Article 41). Thus, should Japan ever revise Article 9 to permit establishment of an army and navy—as opposed to the “self-defense” forces that have existed for almost fifty years—governance of the military forces would be under the appropriate civilian minister who, in turn, would be subject to oversight by the Diet. More than a half-century after Japan’s defeat two issues from the war often lead to debate. The first of these is the question of whether the atomic bomb should have been used. Supporters of the Truman decision claim that, by forcing an early end to the war, millions of Allied and Japanese lives were actually saved—far more than the number of casualties experienced at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Opponents, such as Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of An American Myth (1995), maintain that Japan was attempting to arrange terms for ending the war and that surrender would have come soon even without Hiroshima. Alternately, they argue, the Allies could have enforced a complete air and sea blockade and waited for Japan’s collapse. The tenacity of Japan’s fighting forces on Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and other areas, however, provide a paradigm for what would likely have been an even more stubborn resistance to unconditional surrender. Had Truman decided not to use the atomic bomb and either wait for the November invasion of Kyushu or for a collapse of Japan brought on by a blockade, a vastly different situation in Asia would have unfolded. Japan’s diehard militarists would have likely prevailed, thereby forestalling an early surrender. Soviet troops, after conquering Hokkaido, would have invaded Japan’s largest island, Honshu, and fierce fighting would have ensued. Following the Soviet pattern of behavior in Manchuria, millions of Japanese civilians would have been murdered, raped, and savaged; Japan’s industrial equipment and machinery would have been stripped for use in building up the Soviet Far East; and several million soldiers would have been shipped off to Siberia to join other Japanese POWs from Manchuria in labor camps for four years or more. By November 1, 1945, a Peoples Republic of Japan—firmly under the control of a huge Soviet Army—would have blocked entry of U.S. and British Commonwealth forces. There would be no economic miracle. Instead of being the second-ranking economic power in the world, the People’s Republic of Japan would be fortunate to have any economy at all, to say nothing of the democratic freedoms enjoyed since the end of World War II. Truman believed he did the right thing. He explained: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it, I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used.”23 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson later commented that it would have been difficult for Truman to justify to the America people

240

Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

the monstrous loss of lives in an invasion of Japan if he had not first used the new weapon.24 A half-century after the war, the Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Memorial presents a pervasive theme that thousands of innocent civilians and children became victims through the inhumane use of nuclear weapons by the United States. It is as if to say the Americans had not played by the rules and defeated Japan only through use of unfair weapons. It certainly is true that many innocent children and civilians died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The blame for that lies not with the United States and President Truman, however, but with stubborn Japanese military leaders who, knowing that their nation had no options left for a negotiated settlement of the war, refused to accede to the demands of the Allies for unconditional surrender. Actually, a precedent existed in the United States for the mass destruction of a city in wartime. General William T. Sherman, in his comments on the need for heavy bombardment and destruction of Atlanta in the Civil War, explained: The entire South, man, woman, and child is against us, armed and determined. As long as the citizens of Atlanta remain defiant, they are enemies of the Union, and as enemies they risk annihilation. A people who will persevere in war beyond a certain limit ought to know the consequences. Many, many people with less pertinacity have been wiped out of national existence. The cost of war is not chargeable to us, but to those who made the war. The rebels forced us into the war, and . . . deserved all they got and more.25

With just a few minor changes in the wording, these same principles apply to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Finally, the matter of making amends for major atrocities—inflicted by Japanese troops—is an issue that has not yet been fully dealt with by the Japanese government, even at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In recent years, Japanese officials have made statements of regret for wartime actions in Asian countries, but still have difficulty in fully expressing complete remorse for the millions of atrocities perpetrated by Japanese troops. By contrast, Germany has taken extensive action to make amends to its wartime victims through apologies, billions of dollars in financial payments from both government and private industry, erection of monuments and memorial parks, and continuing efforts to bring war criminals to justice. Japan, on the other hand, considers World War II to be a closed issue. The war crimes trials of the late 1940s are viewed as having been sufficient to bring about justice. Since 1949, Japan has not taken any action to investigate war criminals that may have been missed by the international tribunals, and there were some. Likewise, matters related to payments to victims who suffered indignities and atrocities at the hands of Japanese forces are considered to have been resolved through peace treaties made many years ago. Also, there were thousands of Asians, as well as Allied POWs, who were forced to work under “slave labor” conditions who have not been adequately compensated. There are

Ending the War

241

some cases, such as in the Comfort Women issues, where funds from private Japanese organizations have been made available, but not from official Japanese government funds. Japan has made outstanding progress in the last fifty years, but more needs to be done to come to terms with the past. A cooperative attitude on the part of Japanese officials in locating war victims and paying restitution from government funds would greatly assist in healing the wounds suffered as a result of Japanese aggression. Additionally, a museum and cenotaph in Tokyo to honor the memory of Nanking massacre victims would be a major step in the right direction. A site near Yasukuni Shrine—Japan’s memorial to its own military war dead—would serve as a permanent reminder of the grief that results from unrestrained aggression.

Appendix: Romanization of Chinese Names The Wade Giles system of romanization of Chinese names, locations, and phrases is used in this book because that was the system in use in during the period covered by this survey. To facilitate reference, the following table shows the conversion from the older Wade Giles system to the Pinyin system in effect in China since the 1950s. Accent marks and apostrophes are not used. In some cases designations in other languages are also indicated, for example, English, Japanese, and Russian. Wade Giles

Pinyin

Amoy

Xiamen

Antung

Andong

Canton

Guangzhou

Chahar

Qahar

Changchun

Changchun

Chang Hueh-liang

Zhang Xueliang

Chang Tso-lin

Zhang Zuolin

Chiang Kai-shek

Jiang Jieshi

Chihli, Gulf of

Bohai Wan (Bay)

Chinchow

Jinzhou

Ching

Qing

Chungking

Chongqing

Fuchow

Fuzhou

Fukien

Fujian

Other

Hsingking (Manchukuo capital)

244

Appendix

Hangchow

Hangzhou

Hankow

Hankou

Heilungchiang

Heilongjiang

Hopei

Hebei

Ho Ying-chin

He Yingqin

Hsuchow

Xuzhou

Hulutao

Huludao

Kalgan

Zhangjiakou

Kiaochou Bay

Jiaozhou Bay

Kiangsu

Jiangsu

Kirin

Jilin

Kuomintang

Guomindang

Liaotung

Liaodung

Liaoyang

Liaoyang

Lungkou

Longkou

Lushun

Lushun

Nanking

Nanjing

Newchang

Niuzhuang

Ningpo

Ningbo

Paoting

Baoding

Peiyang

Beiyang

Peking

Beijing

Shanghai

Shanghai

Shanhaikuan

Shanhaiguan

Shenyang

Shenyang

Amur River (Rus.) Kokuryuko (Jpn.)

Kwantung Leased Territory

Port Arthur (Eng.) Ryojun (Jpn.)

Often spelled Peiping in 1930s

Mukden (Old name)

Sian

Xian

Soochow

Suzhou

Sung Cheh-yuan

Song Zheyuan

Sze Sao-ke

Shi Zhaoji

Alfred Sze

Taiwan

Taiwan

Formosa

Talien

Dalian

Dalny (Rus.) Dairen (Jpn.)

Tangku

Tanggu

Tang Sheng-chih

Tang Shengzhi

Tatung

Datong

Tientsin

Tianjin

Tsinan

Jinan

Tsingtao

Qingdao

Appendix

245

Tsitsihar

Qiqihar

Tuan Chi-jui

Duan Qirui

Wang Ching-wei

Wang Jingwei

Whampoa

Huangpu

Wuhan

Wuhan

Wuhsi

Wuxi

Yangtze

Yangze

Yenan

Yan’an

Yentai

Yantai

Yuan Shih-kai

Yuan Shikai

Yunnan

Yunnan

Chefoo (alternate)

Notes CHAPTER 1 1. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 92–93, 107–110. 2. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), pp. 26–48. 3. John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 151. 4. Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation, 4th ed. (New York: McGrawHill, 1990), pp. 64–68. 5. Lee Ki-baik, A New History of Korea, trans. Edward W. Wagner with Edward J. Shultz (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 210–215. 6. Thomas H. Etzold, ed., Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1978), pp. 3–24. 7. U.S. Government, Treaties, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 196–211. 8. Ibid., pp. 996–998. 9. Peter Booth Wiley, Yankees in the Land of the Gods (New York: Viking, 1990), pp. 368–370. 10. Treaties, International Acts, Protocols, pp. 998–1010. 11. Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1986), pp. 70–79. 12. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1883 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1884), p. viii. 13. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 315.

248

Notes

14. George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1958), pp. 381–419. 15. James C. Thompson Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 79–92. 16. Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 55. 17. Ibid., p. 86. 18. William Adam Russ Jr., The Hawaiian Revolution (1893–94) (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1959; reprint, Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1992), p. 34 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 19. Merze Tate, Hawaii: Reciprocity or Annexation (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), pp. 160–210. 20. Russ, Hawaiian Revolution, p. 19. 21. Ibid., pp. 65–67. 22. Ibid., pp. 69–112. 23. Tate, Hawaii, pp. 245–248. 24. William Adam Russ Jr., The Hawaiian Republic (1894–98) and Its Struggle to Win Annexation (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1961; reprint, Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1992), pp. 5–23 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 25. Ibid., p. 23. 26. Ibid., pp. 23–37. 27. Ibid., pp. 56–93. 28. Lee, A New History of Korea, p. 263. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., pp. 268–269. 31. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1882 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1883), pp. 378–380. 32. U.S. State Department, Publication 8615, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 470–476. 33. Ibid. 34. FRUS, 1883, pp. vii–viii. 35. Annual Message of the President, December 8, 1885, U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1885 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1886), p. ix. 36. Lee, A New History of Korea, pp. 275–281. 37. Ibid., pp. 281–299.

CHAPTER 2 1. Michael Montgomery, Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate (New York: St. Martin’s, 1988), pp. 142–143. 2. Ibid., pp. 144–145. 3. Trumbull White, The War in the East: Japan, China, and Korea (Philadelphia: Ziegler, 1895), p. 445.

Notes

249

4. Montgomery, Imperialist Japan, pp. 142–143. 5. White, War in the East, p. 472. 6. F. Warrington Eastlake and Yamada Yoshiaki, Heroic Japan: A History of the War between China and Japan (Yokohama: Kelly and Walsh, 1896), pp. 544–545. 7. Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 33. 8. U.S. State Department, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 1028–1036. 9. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1894 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1895), pp. 43–44. 10. Jeffery M. Dorwart, The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975), pp. 19–20. 11. FRUS, 1894, p. 41. 12. Dorwart, Pigtail War, pp. 59–71. 13. Stewart Lone, Japan’s First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894–1895 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), pp. 154–161. 14. FRUS, 1894, pp. 88–89. 15. Lone, Japan’s First Modern War, pp. 165–171. 16. Dorwart, Pigtail War, p. 98. 17. Ibid., pp. 73–88. 18. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 199–203. 19. Ibid., p. 203. 20. New York Times, 14 December 1895, p. 2. 21. FRUS, 1895, p. 969. 22. Ibid., pp. xxii–xxiii. 23. New York Times, 19 August 1895, p. 5. 24. London News, 15 July 1896, p. 10. 25. Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 161–162. 26. Alfred T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power: Present and Future (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1897), p. 26. 27. Ibid., p. 5. 28. Ibid., pp. 15–22. 29. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 182–187. 30. William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), p. 18. 31. FRUS, 1898, p. 473. (Spelling was changed from “Corea” to “Korea” in 1898 in references in the United States.) 32. Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 65. 33. New York Times, 6 July 1897, p. 3. 34. New York Times, 16 July 1897, p. 4. 35. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1898), p. 344. 36. William Adam Russ Jr., The Hawaiian Republic (1894–98) and Its Struggle to

250

Notes

Win Annexation (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1961; reprint, Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1992), pp. 194–95 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 37. Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 147. 38. Russ, Hawaiian Republic, pp. 338–356. 39. Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842–1898 (Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, 1945), pp. 288–296. 40. U.S. Congress, Hawaii Organic Act, 56th Cong., 31 Stat 141, sections 491, 494, April 30, 1900. 41. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1898), pp. xi–xii. 42. Leech, In the Days of McKinley, pp. 160–162. 43. Ibid., pp. 164–173. 44. Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 24. 45. Leech, In the Days of McKinley, pp. 188–189. 46. Ibid., pp. 210–235. 47. James C. Bradford, ed., Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 47–98. 48. Kenneth Ray Young, The General’s General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), pp. 191–192. 49. Ibid., pp. 175–178. 50. Ibid., pp. 193–195. 51. Ibid., pp. 198–201. 52. Henry F. Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection: Selected Testimony from Senate Document SD331 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. xiii. 53. Leech, In the Days of McKinley, p. 342. 54. Ibid., pp. 358–359. 55. David H. Bain, Sitting in Darkness: Americans in the Philippines (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), p. 185. 56. Young, General’s General, pp. 224–232. 57. Ibid., p. 241–242. 58. Ibid., pp. 258–266. 59. Leech, In the Days of McKinley, pp. 413–431. 60. Young, General’s General, pp. 278–288. 61. Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 159–175. 62. Robert Tomsho, “The Bells of Balangiga Have a Different Ring In Manila, Cheyenne,” Wall Street Journal, 19 November 1997, p. A1. 63. Young, General’s General, pp. 298–299. 64. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, pp. 204–212. 65. Young, General’s General, p. 302. 66. Ibid., p. 303. 67. Ibid. 68. U.S. Congress, Philippines Organic Act, 57th Congress, Chap. 1369, 32 Stat. 691. 69. Young, General’s General, pp. 306–308. 70. Mingchien Joshua Bau, The Open Door Doctrine in Relation to China (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 17–18.

Notes

251

71. Lord Charles William Beresford, The Break-up of China: With an Account of Its Present Commerce, Currency, Waterways, Armies, Railways, Politics, and Future Prospects (New York: Harper, 1900), pp. 453–454. 72. Congressional Record, June 14, 1898 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1898), p. 5906. 73. Paul A. Varg, Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1974), pp. 30–31 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 74. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 128–142. 75. Varg, Open Door Diplomat, p. 35. 76. Chester C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York: Octagon, 1975), pp. 19–27. 77. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 231. 78. Rosalind Goforth, God Answers Prayer (Newton, Kans.: Herald, 1997), p. 14–15. 79. Peter Fleming, The Seige at Peking (New York: Harper, 1959), pp. 74–78. 80. Victor Purcell, The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 225. 81. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 299. 82. Ibid., p. 159. 83. Ibid., p. 190. 84. Washington Post, 3 September 1900, p. 1. 85. Purcell, Boxer Uprising, pp. 258–259. 86. Tan, Boxer Catastrophe, p. 156. 87. Benson Bobrick, East of the Sun: The Epic Conquest and Tragic History of Siberia (New York: Poseidon, 1992), p. 364. 88. Ibid.

CHAPTER 3 1. Benson Bobrick, East of the Sun: The Epic Conquest and Tragic History of Siberia (New York: Poseidon, 1992), pp. 364–366. 2. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 401–404. 3. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1902 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903), pp. 275–276. 4. Ibid., pp. 271–272. 5. Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 404. 6. FRUS, 1902, pp. 280–283. 7. Bobrick, East of the Sun, p. 367. 8. Alfred L. P. Dennis, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,” in University of California Publications in International Relations, 1923–1929 vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934), pp. 1–5. 9. Ibid., pp. 5–6. 10. FRUS, 1902, pp. 514–515. 11. Kenneth Ray Young, The General’s General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 308.

252

Notes

12. Ibid., pp. 308–312. 13. New York Times, 11 December 1903, p. 1. 14. Ibid. 15. New York Times, 28 December 1903, p. 1. 16. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1906), pp. lviii. 17. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1903 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 621. 18. Ibid., p. 622. 19. Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, Virginia), 18 December 1903, p. 1. 20. Denis Warner and Peggy Warner, The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the RussoJapanese War, 1904–1905 (New York: Charterhouse, 1974), pp. 174–175. 21. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. 411–412. 22. Ibid., p. 412. 23. Ibid., p. 414. 24. Warner and Warner, Tide at Sunset, p. 204. 25. Ibid., p. 205. 26. Ibid., pp. 246–269. 27. Ibid., pp. 287–298. 28. David Walder, The Short Victorious War: The Russo-Japanese Conflict, 1904–5 (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 107–112. 29. Warner and Warner, Tide at Sunrise, p. 351. 30. FRUS, 1904, p. 418. 31. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1925; reprint, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), p. 2 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 32. Ibid., p. 30. 33. FRUS, 1904, p. 437. 34. Ibid., p. 439. 35. Ibid. 36. Lee Ki-baik, A New History of Korea, trans. Edward W. Wagner and Edward J. Shultz (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 308. 37. Warner and Warner, Tide at Sunrise, p. 373. 38. Ibid., pp. 353–354. 39. Ibid., pp. 427–448. 40. Ibid., pp. 466–467. 41. Walder, Short Victorious War, pp. 269–272. 42. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 807. 43. Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 112–116. 44. Ibid., pp. 236–306. 45. Young, General’s General, pp. 321–328. 46. Zou Rong (Tsou Jung), The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903, trans. John Lust (Netherlands: The Hague, 1968), p. 126, quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 237. 47. FRUS, 1905, p. 204. 48. Ibid., p. 211 (quotation from the North China Daily News, 21 July 1905).

Notes

253

49. Ibid., p. 224. 50. Imperial Edict of August 31, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 225. 51. Ibid., p. 208. 52. Lee, New History of Korea, pp. 309–311. 53. FRUS, 1905, pp. 612–613. 54. Ibid., p. 615. 55. Ito Takeo, Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988), p. 5. 56. Ernest Batson Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935). 57. Robert A. Hart, The Great White Fleet: Its Voyage Around the World, 1907–1909 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 204–236. 58. Samuel Carter III, The Incredible Great White Fleet (New York: Crowell-Collier, 1971), pp. 123–134. 59. Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 245–268. 60. Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899–1921 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 171–225.

CHAPTER 4 1. Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question (New York: Crowell, 1952; reprint, Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1965), pp. 13–14 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 2. A. Morgan Young, Japan in Recent Times, 1912–1926 (New York: William Morrow, 1929; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973), pp. 70–74 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 3. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895– 1945 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 181–184. 4. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1915 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1916), p. 79. 5. Ibid., pp. 152–153. 6. Ibid., pp. 85–86. 7. Young, Japan in Recent Times, p. 78. 8. FRUS, 1915, p. 146. 9. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East, pp. 47–48. 10. Young, p. 86–87. 11. Philippines Independence Bill, 62nd Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 22143. 12. Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899–1921 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 215–225. 13. Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 58–59. 14. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), pp. 289–290. 15. Ibid., p. 282. 16. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East, pp. 84–87 17. James William Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 229.

254

Notes

18. George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920: The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 482–485. 19. Morley, Japanese Thrust into Siberia, pp. 260–309. 20. Ibid., p. 309. 21. William S. Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920 (New York: Peter Smith, 1941), p. 64. 22. Ito Takeo, Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988), p. 9. 23. Ibid., pp. 31–32. 24. Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America, A Short Outline of the History of the Far Eastern Republic (Washington, D.C.: Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America, 1922), p. 18. 25. Morley, Japanese Thrust into Siberia, p. 149. 26. Lee Ki-baik, A New History of Korea, trans. Edward W. Wagner and Edward J. Shultz (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 313. 27. Ibid., pp. 338–342. 28. Ibid., pp. 338–347. 29. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East, p. 111. 30. Ibid., pp. 111–173. 31. Ibid., pp. 236–237. 32. Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775– 1998 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 323–325. 33. Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 310–319.

CHAPTER 5 1. Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America, A Short Outline of the History of the Far Eastern Republic (Washington, D.C.: Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America, 1922), pp. 53–54. 2. Ibid. 3. Note to the Government of the United States of America from the Constituent Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic, April 1921, appended to A Short History, pp. 56– 59. 4. Ibid. 5. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1921, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 704. 6. John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 392–393. 7. Ibid., pp. 410–414. 8. William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), pp. 3–29. 9. Ibid., p. 26. 10. C. Leonard Hoag, Preface to Preparedness: The Washington Disarmament Conference and Public Opinion (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), pp. 35–37. 11. John Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955), pp. 134–135.

Notes

255

12. Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921– 1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 59. 13. Ibid., pp. 72–73. 14. Mainichi Shimbun, 25 July 1993, p.12. 15. Mark Sullivan, The Great Adventure at Washington: The Story of the Conference (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1922), pp. 202–268. 16. Akira Iriye, “The Failure of Economic Expansionism: 1918–1931,” in Japan in Crisis: Essays in Taisho Democracy, ed. Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 245. 17. Ibid., p. 250. 18. William F. Nimmo, Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1994), p. 11. 19. Peter Landers, “Japan’s Premier May Dissolve the Parliament,” Wall Street Journal, 2 June 2000, p. A12. 20. Arthur Morgan Young, Japan under Taisho Tenno, 1912–1926 (London: George Allen amd Unwin, 1928), p. 327. 21. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 481–482. 22. Ibid., p. 465. 23. Ibid., p. 466. 24. Ibid., pp. 472–473. 25. Ibid., pp. 476–477. 26. Ibid., pp. 484–485. 27. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 514–520. 28. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 556–57. 29. Ibid., pp. 557–559. 30. William F. Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy (New York: St. Martin’s, 1980), p. 8. 31. Ibid., p. 9. 32. Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 535–537. 33. Rodman W. Paul, The Abrogation of the Gentlemen’s Agreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Alpha Chapter of Massachusetts, Phi Beta Kappa Society, 1936), p. 8. 34. Ibid., pp. 64–65. 35. Literary Digest, 1 March 1924. 36. Atlanta Constitution, 12 April 1924. 37. Masayoshi Kanabayashi, “Japan Considers Giving the Vote to Members of Korean Minority,” Wall Street Journal, 4 November 1999, p. A26. 38. Yoko Hani, “Obuchi Panel Urges Debate on Reforms,” Japan Times International Edition, 16–31 January 2000, p. 6. 39. Jim Reed, “Reeling Hawaii Tries to Get Tourists Back,” Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1999, p. A2.

CHAPTER 6 1. William F. Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy (New York: St. Martin’s, 1980), p. 9.

256

Notes

2. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1927, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 210–249. 3. Ibid., pp. 210–217. 4. Morton, Tanaka Giichi, pp. 71–72. 5. Ibid., pp. 99–111. 6. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 137–138. 7. Morton, Tanaka Giichi, pp. 118–122. 8. FRUS, 1928, vol. 2, p. 140. 9. Ibid., pp. 154–155. 10. Ibid. 11. Morton, Tanaka Giichi, p. 131. 12. Ibid., pp. 160–162. 13. FRUS, 1928, vol. 2, p. 178. 14. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 153–157. 15. Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 97. 16. FRUS, 1928, vol. 1, pp. 155–156. 17. Ibid., pp. 213–214. 18. Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 1889 (the Meiji constitution), articles 1, 4. 19. Ibid., article 13. 20. FRUS, 1928, vol. 1, p. 215. 21. Ibid., p. 216. 22. Ibid., p. 75. 23. Ninkovich, Wilsonian Century, pp. 95–103. 24. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 107–125. 25. Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775– 1998 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), pp. 349–350. 26. Morton, Tanaka Giichi, pp. 200–201. 27. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark Peattie, eds., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Princeton: N.J. Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 142–143.

CHAPTER 7 1. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1931, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 1946), p. 4. 2. Ito Takeo, Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988), pp. 136–137. 3. FRUS, 1931, vol. 3, p. 2. 4. Ibid. 5. Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 150. 6. FRUS, 1931, vol. 3, p. 3. 7. Ibid., pp. 5–7. 8. Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 159–169.

Notes

257

9. Ibid., p. 183. 10. FRUS, 1931, vol. 3, p. 25. 11. Ibid., p. 24. 12. Sara R. Smith, The Manchurian Crisis, 1931–1932: A Tragedy in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 22–23. 13. FRUS, 1931, vol. 3, p. 26. 14. Smith, Manchurian Crisis, pp. 9–10. 15. Ibid., p. 57. 16. Ibid., p. 75. 17. FRUS, 1931, vol. 3, 119–125. 18. Ibid., p. 147. 19. Ibid., p. 144. 20. Smith, Manchurian Crisis, pp. 96–127. 21. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. XI. 22. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 7–8. 23. Ibid., p. 15. 24. Staff of the Mainichi Daily News, Fifty Years of Light and Dark: The Hirohito Era (Tokyo: The Mainichi Newspapers, 1975), p. 36. 25. Justus D. Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise: American Opinion-makers and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933 (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1984), p. 94. 26. Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775– 1998 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), pp. 350–351. 27. Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise, pp. 104–105. 28. Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), pp. 40–41. 29. Doenecke, When the Wicked Rise, pp. 106–107. 30. Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929– 1946 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 81–82. 31. Ibid., pp. 105–106. 32. Ibid., p. 123. 33. Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), p. 223. 34. Friend, Between Two Empires, p. 145. 35. Ibid., pp. 163–165.

CHAPTER 8 1. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 563–565. 2. Ito Takeo, Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988), p. 18. 3. Ibid., pp. 105–160. 4. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 323.

258

Notes

5. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), pp. 444–446. 6. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 1, p. 313. 7. Ibid., p. 314 (italics added). 8. Ibid., p. 333. 9. James Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 331. 10. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 1, p. 324. 11. Ibid., p. 326. 12. Ibid., pp. 336–337 (italics added). 13. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936– 1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 46–47. 14. Michael Montgomery, Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987), pp. 388–391. 15. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Dramatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 1077. 16. Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), p. 216. 17. Meirion Harries and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 212–213. 18. Montgomery, Imperialist Japan, p. 393. 19. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 220–222. 20. Grew, Turbulent Era, vol. 2, pp. 1114–1115 (italics added). 21. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 1, pp. 517–519. 22. Ibid., pp. 532–535. 23. Ibid., p. 523. 24. New York Times, 23 April 1938, p. 7. 25. Charles G. Finney, The Old China Hands (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973), p. 258 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 26. Ronald Radosh, Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975), p. 205. 27. Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History (New York: The New Press, 1992), pp. 40–44. 28. Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: Basic, 1997), pp. 39–40. 29. Ibid., pp. 40–41. 30. Martha Lund Smalley, ed., American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937–1938, Occasional Publication No. 9 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997). 31. Ibid., pp. 13–14. 32. Ibid., p. 16. 33. Ibid., pp. 18–19. 34. Ibid., p. 21. 35. Video Film, Magee’s Testament (Cupertino, Calif: The Alliance in Memory of Nanjin Victims, 1997). 36. Tokyo Nichi Nichi (Tokyo), 12 December 1937. 37. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 574–641.

Notes

259

38. James Yin and Shi Young, The Rape of Nanking (Chicago: Innovative Publishing Group, 1996), p. 60. 39. Robert Gray, trans., Japanese Imperialism and the Massacre in Nanjing (Virginia Beach, Va.: Alliance for Preserving History of World War II in Asia, 1996), p. 20. 40. Video Film, Magee’s Testament. 41. New York Times, 17 April 1938, p. 1. 42. George Hicks, The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War (New York: Norton, 1995), p. 19. 43. Ibid., pp. 197–198. 44. John B. Powell, My Twenty-five Years in China (New York: Macmillan, 1945), pp. 285–288. 45. James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, eds., China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945 (Armonk, N.Y.: An East Gate Book, Sharpe, 1992), pp. 70–72. 46. Ibid., pp. 12–13. 47. Alvin D. Coox, The Anatomy of a Small War: The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for Changkufeng/Khasan (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1977). 48. Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985).

CHAPTER 9 1. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 1215–1220. 2. Ibid. 3. New York Times, 21 October 1939, p. 1. 4. Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), pp. 302–303. 5. Robert Smith Thompson, A Time for War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Path to Pearl Harbor (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1991), pp. 201–207. 6. Ibid., pp. 255–258. 7. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 109– 111. 8. Ibid., p. 111. 9. Three-Power Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, in FRUS, Japan, 1931– 1941, vol. 2, p. 165. 10. Imperial Rescript, in FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, p. 168. 11. Konoe Fumimaro and Matsuoka Yosuke speeches, in FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 167–169. 12. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 248–249. 13. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 327–328. 14. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 122–123. 15. Ibid., pp. 173–181. 16. Ibid. 17. Thompson, A Time for War, pp. 321–322. 18. George Alexander Lensen, The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War, 1941–1945 (Tallahassee: The Diplomatic Press, 1972), p. 8.

260

Notes

19. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 265–266. 20. James William Morley, ed., The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 12–20. 21. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 329–330. 22. Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), p. 64. 23. Congressional Record, February 19, 1941, 87, pt. 2, p. 1198. 24. Morley, Final Confrontation, p. 28. 25. Ibid., pp. 28–39. 26. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, p. 332. 27. Ibid., pp. 332–334. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., pp. 335–336. 30. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, p. 337. 31. Ibid., pp. 338–339. 32. Morley, Final Confrontation, p. 128. 33. Ibid., pp. 128–129. 34. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), p. 10. 35. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 339–340. 36. John Costello, Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill—the Shocking Truth Revealed (New York: Pocket, 1994), pp. 59–60. 37. Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther, eds., The Atlantic Charter (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), p. xvii. 38. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 416–421. 39. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 346–347. 40. John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 114–117. 41. FRUS, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, p. 379. 42. Ibid., pp. 380–384. 43. Staff of the Mainichi Daily News, Fifty Years of Light and Dark: The Hirohito Era (Tokyo: The Mainichi Newspapers, 1975), p. 103.

CHAPTER 10 1. Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 25–26. 2. John J. Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984). 3. Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p. 287. 4. Ibid., pp. 313–314. 5. U.S. Congress, 79th Cong., Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), Part 14, p. 1405. 6. Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p. 539. 7. Ibid., p. 553.

Notes

261

8. Address of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Joint Session of Congress, 77th Cong., 1st sess., December 8, 1941. 9. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Smithmark, 1996), pp. 171–175. 10. Frank Sackton, comments at MacArthur Symposium on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Leyte Landings, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia, October 20, 1994. 11. Harry A. Gailey, The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995), pp. 106–108. 12. Ibid., p. 110. 13. David Rees, The Defeat of Japan (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), p. 22. 14. Donald Knox, Death March: The Survivors of Bataan (San Diego: A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace, 1981). 15. Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele, Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Soldier to Guerrilla Commander (Washington: Brassey’s, 1990). 16. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 318–325. 17. Gailey, War in the Pacific, pp. 126–131. 18. Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775– 1998 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), pp. 396–397. 19. Washington Post, 18 December 1944, p. 1. 20. Norihiko Shirouzu, “Decades On, a Legacy of War Still Haunts Japanese Americans,” Wall Street Journal, 25 June 1999, p. 1. 21. Interview with Chizu Tachino, Fresno, Calif., August 19, 1988. 22. Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States, Executive Proclamation No. 4417, February 19, 1976, in Federal Register (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, February 20, 1976), 41:7741. 23. Howarth, To Shining Sea, pp. 401–403. 24. Ibid., pp. 403–404. 25. Gailey, War in the Pacific, pp. 173–174. 26. Ibid., pp. 173–207. 27. Ibid., pp. 301–336. 28. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1860–1964 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), pp. 363–373. 29. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936– 1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 532–533. 30. Manchester, American Caesar, p. 351. 31. David C. Evans, ed. and trans., The Japanese Navy in World War II (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1969), p. 375. 32. Manchester, American Caesar, pp. 394–405. 33. Nippon Times (Tokyo), 22 October 1944, p. 1. 34. Nippon Times (Tokyo), 26 October 1944, p. 1. 35. Nippon Times (Tokyo), 28 October 1944, p. 1. 36. Nippon Times (Tokyo), 10 November 1944, p. 1. 37. Nippon Times (Tokyo), 19 December 1944, p. 1. 38. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 185– 207. 39. Manchester, American Caesar, pp. 406–413.

262

Notes

40. Ibid., pp. 413–415. 41. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 984.

CHAPTER 11 1. Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 154–155. 2. Naotake Sato, Futatsu no Roshiya [Two Russias] (Tokyo: Sekai no Nihonsha, 1948), pp. 188–189. 3. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 448. 4. U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 1293. 5. Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts, Ruin from the Air: The Enola Gay’s Atomic Mission to Hiroshima (Chelsea, Mich.: Scarborough House, 1977), pp. 202–211. 6. Ellis M. Zacharias, Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer (New York: Putnam’s, 1946), pp. 399–424. 7. Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 132–138. 8. Ibid., pp. 203–215. 9. General Staff, GHQ, SCAP, Reports of General MacArthur—MacArthur in Japan: The Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966) pp. 1– 10. 10. Thomas, Ruin from the Air, pp. 315–326. 11. Robert J. C. Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 150–151. 12. Sato, Futatsu no Roshiya, p. 207. 13. FRUS, Conference of Berlin, vol. 2, p. 1474. 14. William F. Nimmo, Behind a Curtain of Silence: Japanese in Soviet Custody, 1945–1956 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1988), pp. 12–13. 15. Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1973), p. 75. 16. Ibid., pp. 24–34. 17. Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. 118. 18. Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day, pp. 46–81. 19. Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender, p. 248. 20. S. M. Shtemnko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941–1945 (Moscow: Progress Publications, 1970), p. 346. 21. Izvestia, 13 May 1992, p. 6, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (USR-92070), 10 June 1992, p. 6.

Notes

263

22. Ibid. 23. J. Robert Moskin, Mr. Truman’s War: The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the Postwar World (New York: Random House, 1996), p. 279. 24. Ibid. 25. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 213–214.

Bibliography Adamson, Iain. The Forgotten Men (Commandos in War-time China). New York: Roy, 1965. Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. Trans. John Bester. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979. Albright, Harry. Pearl Harbor: Japan’s Fatal Blunder. New York: Hippocrene, 1988. Allan, Sheila. Diary of a Girl in Changi, 1941–1945. Kenthurst, Australia: Kangaroo, 1994. Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Code-name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth. New York: Knopf, 1995. Bailey, Thomas A. “Was the Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?” In Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1937. Bain, David H. Sitting in Darkness: Americans in the Philippines. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984. Barber, Noel. A Sinister Twilight: The Fall of Singapore, 1942. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968. Barnhart, Michael A. Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. ———. Japan and the World since 1868. London: Edward Arnold, 1995. Barrett, David D. Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Bau, Mingchien Joshua. The Open Door Doctrine in Relation to China. New York: Macmillan, 1923.

266

Bibliography

Beale, Howard K. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956. Beasley, W. G. The Rise of Modern Japan. New York: St. Martin’s, 1990. Beisner, Robert L. Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. Beloff, Max. Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944–1951. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. Beresford, Lord Charles William. The Break-up of China: With an Account of Its Present Commerce, Currency, Waterways, Armies, Railways, Politics, and Future Prospects. New York: Harper, 1900. Best, Anthony. Britain, Japan, and Pearl Harbor. London: Routledge, 1995. Birtle, Andrew J. U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997. Bobrick, Benson. East of the Sun: The Epic Conquest and Tragic History of Siberia. New York: Poseidon, 1992. Borg, Dorothy. The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938: From the Manchurian Incident through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. Boyne, Walter J. Clash of Titans: World War II at Sea. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. Braddon, Russell. Japan against the World, 1941–2041: The 100-year War for Supremacy. New York: Stein and Day, 1983. Bradford, James C., ed. Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993. Braisted, William Reynolds. The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958. ———. The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909–1922. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971. Brands, H. W. Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Breuer, William B. The Great Raid on Cabanatuan: Rescuing the Doomed Ghosts of Bataan and Corregidor. New York: Wiley, 1994. Brinkley, Douglas, and David R. Facey-Crowther, eds. The Atlantic Charter. New York: St. Martin’s, 1994. Buckley, Thomas A. The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970. Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988. Bunker, Paul D. Bunker’s War: The World War II Dairy of Colonel Paul D. Bunker. Ed. Keith A. Barlow. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1996. Burns, James MacGregor. Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. New York: Smithmark, 1996. Buruma, Ian. The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994. Butow, Robert J. C. Japan’s Decision to Surrender. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954. ———. Tojo and the Coming of the War. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961.

Bibliography

267

Calman, David. The Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism. London: Routledge, 1992. Carter, Samuel, III. The Incredible Great White Fleet. New York: Crowell-Collier, 1971. Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. New York: Basic, 1997. Clemens, Dianne Shaver. Yalta. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Cohen, Warren I. America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Cole, Bernard D. Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925–1928. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1983. Coltman, Robert, Jr., M.D. Beleaguered in Peking: The Boxer’s War against the Foreigner. Philadelphia: Davis, 1901. Congressional Record. June 14, 1898. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1898. ———. February 19, 1941. Vol. 87, pt. 2. Connaughton, R. M. The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5. London: Routledge, 1988. Connaughton, Richard, John Pimlott, and Duncan Anderson. The Battle for Manila. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995. Conroy, Hilary. The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868–1898. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. Controvich, James T. The Central Pacific Campaign, 1943–1944: A Bibliography. Westport, Conn.: Meckler, 1990. Cook, Haruko Taya, and Theodore F. Cook. Japan at War: An Oral History. New York: The New Press, 1992. Coox, Alvin D. The Anatomy of a Small War: The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for Changkufeng/Khasan. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1977. ———. Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985. Costello, John. Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill—the Skocking Truth Revealed. New York: Pocket, 1994. Crowley, James. Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Daniels, Jonathan. The Time between the Wars: Armistice to Pearl Harbor. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966. Danner, Dorothy Still. What a Way to Spend a War: Navy Nurse POWs in the Philippines. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Daws, Gavan. Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific. New York: Morrow, 1994. Deakin, F. W., and G. R. Storry. The Case of Richard Sorge: The Story of Moscow’s Spy-master in Japan. New York: Harper, 1966. Dennett, Tyler. Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War. New York: Doubleday, Page, 1925. Reprint, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959. ———. John Hay: From Poetry to Politics. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934. Dennis, Alfred L. P. “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance.” In University of California

268

Bibliography

Publications in International Relations, 1923–1929. Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934. Divine, Robert A. A Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II. New York: Atheneum, 1967. Doenecke, Justus D. When the Wicked Rise: American Opinion-makers and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1984. Dorwart, Jeffrey M. The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975. Dower, John W. War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: Pantheon, 1986. ———. Japan in War and Peace. New York: The New Press, 1993. ———. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: The New Press, 1999. Drea, Edward J. MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942– 1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. Drummond, Donald F. The Passing of American Neutrality. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968. Dudden, Arthur P. The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Dunn, William J. Pacific Microphone. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1988. Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. Victory at Sea: World War II in the Pacific. New York: Morrow, 1995. Duus, Peter. Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968. ———. The Rise of Modern Japan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. Duus, Peter, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark Peattie, eds. The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. ———. The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. Eastlake, F. Warrington, and Yamada Yoshiaki. Heroic Japan: A History of the War between China and Japan. Yokohoma: Kelly and Walsh, 1896. Etzold, Thomas H. Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784. New York: New Viewpoints, 1975. Evans, David C., ed. and trans. The Japanese Navy in World War II. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1969. Fairbank, John King. The United States and China. 4th ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979. Feifer, George. Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb. New York: Ticknor, 1992. Feis, Herbert. The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953. Fifield, Russell H. Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question. New York: Crowell, 1952. Reprint, Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1965. Finney, Charles G. The Old China Hands. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961. Reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973. Fleming, Peter. The Siege at Peking. New York: Harper, 1959.

Bibliography

269

Friedman, Irving S. British Relations with China: 1931–1939. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. Friend, Theodore. Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929–1946. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965. Fussell, Paul. Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Gailey, Harry A. The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995. General Staff, GHQ, SCAP. Reports of General MacArthur—MacArthur in Japan: The Military Phase. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. Gibney, Frank, ed. Senso: The Japanese Remember the Pacific War. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1995. Giles, Donald T., Jr., ed. Captive of the Rising Sun: The POW Memoirs of Rear Admiral Donald T. Giles. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Goforth, Rosalind. God Answers Prayers. Newton, Kans.: Herald, 1997. Gordon, Ernest. Miracle on the River Kwai. London: HarperCollins, 1963. Graff, Henry F. American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection: Selected Testimony from Senate Document SD331. Boston: Little Brown, 1969. Graves, William S. America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920. New York: Peter Smith, 1941. Gray, Robert, trans. Japanese Imperialism and the Massacre in Nanjing. Virginia Beach, Va.: Alliance for Preserving History of World War II in Asia, 1996. Grew, Joseph C. Report from Tokyo: A Message to the American People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942. ———. Ten Years in Japan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944. ———.Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. Grunder, Garel A., and William E. Livezey. The Philippines and the United States. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951. Guillain, Robert. I Saw Tokyo Burning: An Eyewitness Narrative from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981. Guillermo, Artemio, and May Kyi Win. Historical Dictionary of the Philippines. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow, 1997. Hane, Mikiso. Modern Japan: A Historical Survey. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986. Harries, Meirion, and Susie Harries. Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army. New York: Random House, 1991. Harris, Sheldon H. Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–45. London: Routledge, 1994. Hart, Robert A. The Great White Fleet: Its Voyage around the World, 1907–1909. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965. Heinrichs, Waldo H., Jr. Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. ———. Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Heppner, Ernest R. Shanghai Refuge: A Memoir of the World War II Jewish Ghetto. Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 1993. Hicks, George. The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War. New York: Norton, 1995.

270

Bibliography

Hoag, C. Leonard. Preface to Prepardness: The Washington Disarmament Conference and Public Opinion. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941. Honda Katsuichi. The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame. Trans. Karen Sandness. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1999. Howarth, Stephen. To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1998. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. Hsiung, James C., and Steven I. Levine, eds. China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945. Armonk, N.Y.: An East Gate Book, Sharpe, 1992. Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Humphreys, Leonard A. The Way of the Heavenly Sword: The Japanese Army in the 1920s. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995. Inoguchi Rikihei, and Nakajima Tadashi, with Roger Pineau. The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978. Iriye, Akira. “The Failure of Economic Expansionism: 1918–1931.” In Japan in Crisis: Essays in Taisho Democracy. Ed. Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. Irokawa Daikichi. The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan. Trans. Mikiso Hane and John K. Urda. New York: The Free Press, 1995. Ito Takeo. Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo. Trans. Joshua A. Fogel. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1988. Iyenaga T., and Kenosuke Sato. Japan and the California Problem. New York: Putnam’s, 1921. Johnson, Paul. A History of the American People. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. Kase Toshikazu. Journey to the Missouri. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950. Kennan, George F. Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920: The Decision to Intervene. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958. Kennedy, Malcolm D. The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917–1935. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Kerr, George H. Okinawa: The History of an Island People. Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1958. Kiyosaki, Wayne S. A Spy in Their Midst: The World War II Struggle of a JapaneseAmerican Hero. Lanham, Md.: Madison, 1995. Knox, Donald. Death March: The Survivors of Bataan. San Diego: A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace, 1981. LaFeber, Walter. The Clash: U.S.–Japan Relations throughout History. New York: Norton, 1997. Large, Stephen S. Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography. London: Routledge, 1992. ———. Emperors of the Rising Sun. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1997. Leckie, Robert. Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II. New York: Viking, 1995. Lee Ki-baek. A New History of Korea. Trans. Edward W. Wagner with Edward J. Shultz. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. Leech, Margaret. In the Days of McKinley. New York: Harper, 1959. Lensen, George Alexander. The Strange Neutrality: Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War, 1941–1945. Tallahassee: The Diplomatic Press, 1972.

Bibliography

271

Levine, Alan J. The Pacific War: Japan versus the Allies. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995. Linderman, Gerald F. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War. New York: The Free Press, 1987. Linn, Brian McAllister. The Philippine War: 1899–1902. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. Lone, Stewart. Japan’s First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894–1895. New York: St. Martin’s, 1984. Lord, Walter. Incredible Victory: The Battle of Midway. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. MacNair, Harley Farnsworth, and Donald F. Lach. Modern Far Eastern International Relations. New York: Octagon, 1950. Mahan, Alfred T. The Interest of America in Sea Power: Present and Future. London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1897. ———. The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies. Boston: Little, Brown, 1900. Manchester, William. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978. Martin, William A. P., M.D., L.L.D. The Seige in Peking: China against the World. New York: Ravell, 1900. Matthews, Tony. Shadows Dancing: Japanese Espionage against the West, 1939–1945. London: Hale, 1983. McCordock, R. Stanley. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894–1900. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. Reprint, New York: Octagon, 1976. McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. McGovern, William Montgomery. Modern Japan: Its Political, Military, and Industrial Organization. New York: Scribner, 1920. Messer, Robert L. The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Millard, Thomas F. Democracy and the Eastern Question. New York: The Century Company, 1919. Miller, Stuart Creighton. Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982. Montgomery, H. B. The Empire of the East: A Simple Account of Japan As It Was, Is, and Will Be. Chicago: McClung, 1909. Montgomery, Michael. Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate. New York: St. Martin’s, 1988. Moon, John Ellis Van Courtland. Confines of Concept: American Strategy in World War II. New York: Garland, 1988. Morley, James William. The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. ———. Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. ———, ed. The China Quagmire: Japan’s Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933– 1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. ———, ed. The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

272

Bibliography

Morton, William F. Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy. New York: St. Martin’s, 1980. Moskin, J. Robert. Mr. Truman’s War: The Final Victories of World War II and the Birth of the Postwar World. New York: Random House, 1996. Mosley, Leonard. Hirohito: Emperor of Japan. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Musicant, Ivan. Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century. New York: Holt, 1997. Myers, Ramon H., and Mark R. Peattie, eds. The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. Nakamura Masanori. The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Grew and the Making of the “Symbol Emperor System,” 1939–1991. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1992. Neumann, William L. America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963. Nimmo, William F. Behind a Curtain of Silence: Japanese in Soviet Custody, 1945– 1956. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1988. ———. Japan and Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1994. Ninkovich, Frank. The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Nish, Ian. Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. ———. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London: Longman, 1985. Norman, Elizabeth M. We Band of Angels: The Untold Story of American Nurses Trapped on Bataan by the Japanese. New York: Random House, 1999. Ogata, Sadako N. Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–1932. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. Osborne, Sidney. The New Japanese Peril. New York: Macmillan, 1921. Pacific War Research Society. Japan’s Longest Day. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1973. Paul, Rodman W. The Abrogation of the Gentlemen’s Agreement. Cambridge, Mass.: Alpha Chapter of Massachusetts, Phi Beta Kappa Society, 1936. Pelz, Stephen E. Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. Perlmutter, Amos. FDR and Stalin: A Not So Grand Alliance, 1943–1945. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993. Perret, Geoffrey. Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur. Holbrook, Mass.: Adams Media Corporation, 1996. Pott, Francis L. Hawks. The Outbreak in China: Its Causes. New York: James Pott, 1900. Potter, John Deane. Yamamoto: The Man Who Menaced America. New York: Viking, 1985. Powell, John B. My Twenty-five Years in China. New York: Macmillan, 1945. Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. New York: Random House, 1995. Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Bibliography

273

Preston, Diana. The Boxer Rebellion. New York: Walker, 2000. Price, Ernest Batson. The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935. Purcell, Victor. The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963. Pu Yi Aisin-Gioro. The First Half of My Life. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1964. Radosh, Ronald. Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism. New York: Free Life Editions, 1975. Ramsey, Edwin Price, and Stephen J. Rivele. Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander. Washington: Brassey’s, 1990. Rees, David. The Defeat of Japan. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997. Reischauer, Edwin O. Japan: The Story of a Nation. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. Renehan, Edward J., Jr. The Lion’s Pride: Theodore Roosevelt and His Family in Peace and War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Rhoades, Weldon E. Flying MacArthur to Victory. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987. Rhodes, James Ford. The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897–1909. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1922. Rogers, Paul P. MacArthur and Sutherland: The Bitter Years. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1980. Ruoff, E. G., ed. Death Throes of a Dynasty: Letters and Diaries of Charles and Bessie Ewing, Missionaries to China. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1990. Russ, William Adam, Jr. The Hawaiian Republic (1894–98) and Its Struggle to Win Annexation. Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1961. Reprint, Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1992. ———. The Hawaiian Revolution (1893–94). Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1959. Reprint, Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1992. Sato, Naotake. Futatsu no Roshiya [Two Russias]. Tokyo: Sekai no Nihonsha, 1948. Satterfield, Archie. The Day the War Began. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992. Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Schaller, Michael. The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. ———. Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. ———. Altered States: The U.S. and Japan since the Occupation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Schonberger, Howard B. Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989. Shimazu Naoko. Japan, Race, and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919. London: Routledge, 1998. Shtemnko, S. M. The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941–1945. Moscow: Progress Publications, 1970. Sih, Paul K. T., ed. Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945. New York: Exposition, 1977. Silberman, Bernard S., and H. D. Hartootunian, eds. Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taisho Democracy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974.

274

Bibliography

Skates, John Ray. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994. Smalley, Martha Lund, ed. American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre, 1937–1938. Occasional Publication No. 9. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997. Smethurst, Richard. J. A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Smith, Sara R. The Manchurian Crisis, 1931–1932: A Tragedy in International Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America. A Short Outline of the History of the Far Eastern Republic. Washington, D.C.: Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America, 1922. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton, 1990. Staff of the Mainichi Daily News. Fifty Years of Light and Dark: The Hirohito Era. Tokyo: The Mainichi Newspapers, 1975. Stanley, Peter W. A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899– 1921. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974. Steeds, David, and Ian Nish. China, Japan, and 19th-century Britain. Dublin, Ireland: Irish Academic, 1977. Steiner, Jesse Frederick. The Japanese Invasion: A Study in the Psychology of Interracial Contacts. Chicago: McClurg, 1917. Stephan, John J. Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984. Stevens, Sylvester K. American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842–1898. Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, 1945. Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York: The Free Press, 2000. Suguhara Seishiro. Japanese Perspectives on Pearl Harbor: A Critical Review of Japanese Reports on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Trans. Theodore McNelly. Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1995. Sullivan, Mark. The Great Adventure at Washington: The Story of the Conference. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1922. Sumida Haruzo. Trial of Sumida Haruzo and Twenty Others (The “Double Tenth” Trial). London: Hodge, 1951. Ta Jen Liu. U.S.–China Relations, 1784–1992. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1998. Takaki, Ronald. Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995. Takemoto Toru. Failure of Liberalism in Japan: Shidehara Kijuro’s Encounter with AntiLiberals. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1978. Tan, Chester C. The Boxer Catastrophe. New York: Octagon, 1975. Tanaka Yuki. Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996. Tansill, Charles Callan. Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941. Chicago: Regnery, 1952. Tate, Merze. Hawaii: Reciprocity or Annexation. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968.

Bibliography

275

Taylor, George E. The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership. New York: Praeger, 1964. Thayer, William Roscoe. John Hay. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1908. Thomas, Gordon, and Max Morgan Witts. Ruin from the Air: The Enola Gay’s Atomic Mission to Hiroshima. Chelsea, Mich.: Scarborough House, 1977. Thompson, James C., Jr. American-East Asian Relations: A Survey. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. ———. While China Faced East: American Reformers in Nationalist China, 1928–37. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Thompson, James C., Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry. Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia. New York: Harper and Row, 1981. Thompson, Richard Austin. The Yellow Peril, 1890–1924. New York: Arno, 1978. Thompson, Robert Smith. A Time for War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Path to Pearl Harbor. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1991. Timperly, Harold John. What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China—A Documentary Record. London: Victor Gollancz, 1938. Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936– 1945. New York: Random House, 1970. Treat, Payson J. Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan: 1895–1905. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963. Trefousse, Hans L. Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy. Malabar, Fla.: Krieger, 1982. U.S. Congress. Hawaii Organic Act, 56th Cong., 31 Stat 141, sections 491, 494, April 30, 1900. ———. Philippines Organic Act, 57th Cong. Chap. 1369, 32 Stat. 691. ———. Philippines Independence Bill, H.R. 22143, 62nd Cong., 2nd sess. U.S. Government. Treaties, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers. Vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910. U.S. State Department. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1882–1932. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1884–1948. ———. Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941. Vols. 1–2. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943. ———. Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961. ———. Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference of Berlin (Postdam), 1945. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960. ———. Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955. Van Sickle, Emily. The Iron Gates of Santo Tomas: The Firsthand Account of an American Couple Interned by the Japanese in Manila, 1942–1945. Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 1992. Varg, Paul A. Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952. Reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1974. Video Film. Magee’s Testament. Cupertino, Calif.: The Alliance in Memory of Nanjin Victims, 1996. Vinson, John Chalmers. The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955.

276

Bibliography

Wade, Tom Henling. Prisoner of the Japanese: From Changi to Tokyo. Kenthurst, Australia: Kangaroo, 1994. Wainstock, Dennis D. The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. Walder, David. The Short Victorious War: The Russo-Japanese Conflict, 1904–5. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. Warner, Denis, and Peggy Warner. The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues. Comfort Women’s Testimony of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. McLean, Va.: Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues, 1996. Weintraub, Stanley. The Last Great Victory: The End of World War II, July/August 1945. New York: Truman Talley Books, Dutton, 1995. Westwood, J. N. Russia against Japan, 1904–05: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War. Albany: State University of New York, 1986. Wetzler, Peter. Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision-making in Prewar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998. White, John Albert. The Siberian Intervention. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950. White, Trumball. The War in the East: Japan, China, and Korea. Philadelphia: Ziegler, 1895. Wiley, Peter Booth. Yankees in the Land of the Gods. New York: Viking, 1990. Williams, Peter, and David Wallace. Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II. New York: The Free Press, 1989. Willmott, H. P. The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. New York: The Free Press, 1989. Willoughby, Westel W. The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935. Winslow, Walter G. The Fleet the Gods Forgot: The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in World War II. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982. Wordell, Charles B. Japan’s Image in America: Popular Writings about Japan, 1800– 1941. Kyoto: Yamaguchi, 1998. Wray, Harry, and Hilary Conroy, eds. Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983. Yahara, Colonel Hiromichi. The Battle for Okinawa: A Japanese Officer’s Eyewitness Account of the Last Great Campaign of World War II. New York: Wiley, 1995. Yamamoto Ichihashi. The Washington Conference and after: A Historical Survey. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1928. Yin, James, and Shi Young. The Rape of Nanking. Chicago: Innovative Publishing Group, 1996. Yoshihashi Takehiko. Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963. Young, A. Morgan. Japan in Recent Times, 1912–1926. New York: William Morrow, 1929. Reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973. Young, Arthur Morgan. Japan under Taisho Tenno, 1912–1926. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928. Young, C. Walter. The International Relations of Manchuria. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1969.

Bibliography

277

Young, James Yin Shi. The Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs. Chicago: Innovative Publishing Group, 1996. Young, Kenneth Ray. The General’s General: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994. Young, Marilyn Blatt. The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895–1901. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968. Zacharias, Ellis M. Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer. New York: Putnam’s, 1946.

Index Aguinaldo, Emilio, 29–32, 33, 35–39; capture of, 39 Aigun, Treaty of (1858), 51 Air supremacy, high priority in World War II, 227 Alaska, sale by Russia to U.S., 1867, 5 Allison, John, 171 All-Manchurian Convention of Japanese, 139 ABCD Powers (America, Britain, China, and Dutch), 195 ABDA (American, British, Dutch and Australian) command, 211 American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, 117 Amoy, treaty port, 3 Amur (Heilungchiang) River, 49, 101– 102 An Chung-gun, 75 Anderson, Thomas, 33 Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, 51–54, 81–82, 106 Anti-Comintem Pact (1936), 154 Araki Sadao, 148 Arthur, Chester Alan, 13 Asaka Yasuhiko, 168–69, 172

Asiatic fleet (squadron), U.S., 20, 25, 30, 32, 53, 115, 117, 162, 209; action against Japanese navy, 210 Atlantic Conference, 196–98, 211 Atlantic fleet, 204 Atomic bomb: debate over use of, 239– 40; Hiroshima bombing, 233; testing of (July 16, 1945), 231; U.S. decision to use, 231–32 Australia, 97; Japanese bombing of Darwin, 212; MacArthur arrives in (1942), 211 Bacon, Augustus, 35 Bandit suppression operation (Manchuria), 167 Bataan Death March, 211 Big Five Zaibatsu banks, 124 Beresford, Lord Charles, 42 Beveridge, Albert Jeremiah, 34, 39 Black Dragon Society, 53 Blagoveshchensk, 49, 51 Blaine, James, 25 Board of China missions, 117 Bolshevik Revolution, 91–94, 101–102 Borodin, Mikhail, 116

280 Boxer Rebellion (1898–1901), 45–49, 52, 72, 115–116, 146, 156 Brest-Litovsk, treaty of (1918), 90 Briand, Aristide, 129 Britain: Anglo-Japanese alliance, 51–54; claims against Nationalist China for losses in Nanking incident (1927), 124; colonization of North America, 2–3; early involvement in Asia, 1; Japan declares war on, 201–202; Open Door policy, 42–44; treaty with Korea, 12 Bryan, William Jennings, 35, 39, 81, 84, 86, 90 Buchanan, James, 5 Burma: Allied strategy in, 218, 225; Burma Road, 176, 226; Japanese invasion of, 204; Japanese plans for inclusion in Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 218, 225 Byrnes, James, 235 Cairo Conference (1943), 219–21, 231 California: ceded to U.S. from Mexico, 6; Japanese attacks on, 212, 213, 224; Japanese emigration to, 105, 119–21; U.S. settlement of, 4 Canton, treaty port, 3 Caroline Islands, 29, 82–83, 205 Carter, George, 55–56 Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 4, 212 Chaffee, Adna, 40, 47 Chamberlain, Neville, 167, 182 Chang Hsueh-liang, 128, 141, 145, 156 Chang, Iris, 168 Chang Tso-lin, 126–28; 141, 156; assassination of, 128 Chase National Bank, 152 Chefoo, 3, 23, 30 Chennault, Claire, 175, 188 Chiang Kai-shek, 111, 116, 126–27, 141, 156, 184, 215, 219, 225, 231 China, Imperial, 84–87; commercial treaty with Japan (1871), 7; early involvement of Western nations with, 1; early Japanese attempts to invade, 2; early trade with U.S., 3; Japanese business interests in, 7; open door policy,

Index 42–44; trade with U.S., 73–74; war with Japan (1894–95), 17–23 China, Nationalist, 87, 115–16, 124, 156, 185, 199; capital established at Nanking (1927), 125; declares war against Germany (1917), 89–90; 84–87; Japanese attitude towards, 167; Twenty-one demands, 84–87; U.S. military assistance to, 174–76; war with Japan (1937–45), 155–77, 200, 225 China Affairs Bureau (Asia Development Board), Japanese, 175 China-Burma-India Theater, 215, 225–26 China, Reorganized Government of (puppet government under Japanese), 175 Chinese Communist forces, 156, 226 Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), 25, 52, 70, 139, 145, 151 Chinese emigration to U.S., 8, 72–74 Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 72, 74 Ching Dynasty, 115, 125; transition from Ming, 1 Christianity: banning of in Japan, 2; Boxer rebellion and, 45; early establishment in Korea, 11 Churchill, Winston, 182, 196, 209, 211, 214, 219, 226–28, 230 Civil War, U.S., 5, 32, 240 Clemenceau, Georges, 97 Cleveland, Grover, 10, 14, 20, 23 Columbia, 58 Columbus, Christopher, 29 Comfort Women, 173–74, 241 Comintern, 156 Commercial Treaty of 1911, U.S. and Japan, 176 Communist Party, Japan, 110 Confucius (Confucianism), 45, 99 Conger, Edwin, 47, 53 Constitution (1889), Japanese, 17, 110, 130, 238 Constitution (1946), Japanese, 238–39 Coolidge, Calvin, 113, 116, 119–20, 129– 30 Coral Sea, battle of, 215 Cuba, 29, 34

Index Dairen, 52, 139, 156, 228 Davis, Norman, 182 Debuchi Katsuji, 152 Denby, Charles, 22 Dennett, Tyler, 64 Dewey, George, 30–33, 39, 55 Diet building, 155 Doihara Kenji, 140, 148 Dole, Sanford, 10 Dooman, Eugene, 166 Drought, James, 189 Dulles, Allen, 182 Dulles, John Foster, 182 Dutch East Indies (Indonesia): early Japanese involvement with, 2; Japanese landings in, 212–213; oil motivates Japanese attack on (1941–42), 205; plans for inclusion in Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, 184, 188, 197 Economic depression (1930s), 132–35 Eisenhower, Dwight, 154 Empress dowager, China, 45–49 Espionage, 205–206 Extraterritorial rights: in China, 3–4, 117; in Japan, 3–4, 19; in Korea, 3 Faddis, Charles, 191 Far Eastern Republic, 101–104 Fleisher, Wilfrid, 150 Flying Tigers, 175–76, 188 Flynn, John, 166 Forbes, Cameron, 147 Ford, Gerald, 214 Foster, John, 22 France, 1, 12, 124 French Indochina (Vietnam), 185, 196, 198; Japanese forces at Camranh Bay, 212 Fuchow, treaty port, 3 Fukien, 25 Fukuda Hikosuke, 127 Genda Minoru, 203–204, 207 Gentlemen’s Agreement (1907–1908), 119–120

281 Germany: Boxer rebellion and, 45–49; declares war on U.S. (1941), 208; defeat of Nazi Germany (1945), 228; identified as potential threat to Pearl Harbor (1903), 54–56; Japan declares war on (1914), 81–83; Nazi Germany alliance with Japan, 200; Paris Peace Conference (1919), 97; postwar memorials to World War II victims, 240; submarine attacks on U.S. shipping (1941), 197, 204; treaty with Korea (1882), 12; in World War I, 81–91 German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (1939), 177, 188 Goto Shimpei, 76, 93–94, 102, 156 Grant, Ulysses, 12, 32 Graves, William, 93 Great Kanto Earthquake, 112–14, 133 Great White Fleet, 77–79, 204 Greene, Francis, 33 Gresham, Walter, 20 Grew, Joseph, 161, 165–66, 171, 179–81, 186, 190, 198–99, 201 Griscom, Lloyd, 58, 65 Guadalcanal, 218–19; first defeat for Japanese army in World War II, 219 Guam, 29, 105; ceded by Spain to U.S., 34; Japanese invasion of, 205–207; U.S. retakes, 221 Hamaguchi Osachi, 132–33, 137 Hanihara Masanao, 119 Hankow incident (1927), 124 Hara Takashi (Hara Kei), 94, 102, 108, 109 Harding, Warren, 106 Hare, Butler, 152 Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill (1933), 152–53 Harriman, Edward, 52 Harris, Townsend, 5 Harrison, Benjamin, 10 Harrison, Francis Burton, 88 Hart, Tom, 209 Hasegawa Kiyoshi, 165–66 Hawaii, Kingdom of: early U.S. influence in, 4; Japanese immigration to (1868– 90), 8–9; Japanese immigration to

282 (1885–97), 26; reciprocity treaty with U.S. (1876), 8 Hawaii, Republic of (1894–98), 10; U.S. annexation of, 27–28, 29 Hawaii, Territory of, 55–56, 105, 196; Japanese plans for invasion of, 205; Pearl Harbor attack, 200–209 Hay, John, 46, 52–53, 64, 125; open door policy, 42–44 Hayashi Tadasu, 54 Herbert, Hilary, 20 Hippisley, Alfred, 43–44 Hirohito emperor. See Showa emperor Hiroshima, 172, 231; atomic bombing of, 233, 235, 238, 240; major military headquarters (1894–95), 19, 21 Hirota Koki, 165, 171 Hisa Michitaro, 22 Hitler, Adolf, 167, 171, 179, 182, 185, 188, 194–97, 200, 214, 228; becomes chancellor of Germany (1933), 154; declares war on U.S. (1941), 208 Hobart, Garret, 35 Hokkaido, 237 Hong Kong, 174, 172; early British involvement with, 4; Japanese invasion of, 204, 207; lease on Kowloon (New Territories), 25 Honjo Shigem, 141, 144 Honma Masaharu, 210, 211 Hoover, Herbert, 130, 132, 143, 146–47, 151–52, 181 Hopkins, Harry, 205, 207 Hornbeck, Stanley, 98 Hoshi Toru, 26 Ho-Umezu Agreement (1935), 157 Ho Ying-chin, 157 Hughes, Charles Evans, 107, 119 Hughes, William, 97 Hull, Cordell, 159, 165–66, 179, 185; peace negotiations with Japanese emissaries, 190–94, 196, 199–201, 203 Ii Naotake, 5 Ikawa Tadao, 189, 192–93, 196 Ilchinhoe, 74 Imperial Combined Fleet, Japan, 145, 200, 203; battle of Java Sea, 212

Index Imperial General Headquarters (IGH), 19, 21, 62, 128, 139, 162, 173, 188, 190, 203, 219, 223–24, 230, 233; calls off China offensive (1945), 226; determined stand on Guadalcana1, 218–19; strategy for Southeast Asia, 215 Incendiary bombing raids on Osaka and Tokyo (March 1945), 228 Indian wars, U.S., 32 International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, 169–72 International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), 172, 199, 240 Inukai Tsuyoshi, 146–47 Ishihara (Ishiwara) Kanji, 141, 160 Ishii Kikujiro, 90 Itagaki Seishiro, 141 Italy: claims against Nationalist China for losses incurred in Nanking incident (1927), 124; fascism in, 200; treaty with Korea (1882), 12; U.S. declares war on (1941), 208 Ito Hirobumi, 19, 75 Ito Takeo, 93 Iwakura Hideo, 190–93, 196 Iwo Jima, 230; annexed by Japan (1876), 8; battle of (1945), 221, 227–28 Jamestown Exposition (1907), 77 Japan: Anglo-Japanese alliance, 51–54; banning of missionaries and foreigners from, 2; Boxer rebellion and, 45–49; claims against Nationalist China for losses in Nanking incident (1927), 124; coaling station, 4; commemoration of founding of Japanese empire ( 1940), 183–84; concern over Russia, 4; consular treaties with U.S. (1857–58), 5; early involvement in Southeast Asia, 4; fourteen-part telegram and breaking off negotiations with U.S. (Dec. 7, 1941), 201; fundamental national policies (1940), 183–84; identified as potential threat to Pearl Harbor (1903), 54–56; modernization of, 7; New Order in East Asia, 190, 195; Pearl Harbor attack and(1941), 200–202, 203–209; Russia and treaties with (1907–1916),

Index 76–77; Russo-Japanese War, 57–79; war with China (1894–95), 17–23, (1931–32), 137–51; (1937–45), 155–78; war with Soviet Union (1945), 233–35, war with U.S. (1941–45), 203–41 Japanese Americans, relocation of (1942), 213–214 Japanese army: 219, 221, 231, 238; border wars with Soviet Union in Manchuria, 176–77; control (Tosei ha) faction, 155; emperor way (Kodo ha) faction, 155; traditions, 167 Japanese emigration: to Hawaii, 8–9, 26, 120–21; to U.S., 8, 118–121 Japanese navy, 155, 200, 203, 205, 219, 221, 231; attack on Pearl Harbor, 200– 204, 206–208; battle of Coral Sea, 214– 16; battle of Leyte, 222–23; battle of Midway, 215; battle of Philippine Sea, 219–22 Japanese-Russian convention concerning Korea (1898), 26 Jaudenes, Fermin, 33 Johnson, Nelson, 140, 158, 164 Jones, James, 55–56 Jones, William Atkinson, 79, 151; sponsor of Philippine Independence bill (1916), 42, 87–89, 151 Kalakaua, king of Hawaii, 9 Kalmykov, Ivan, 94 Kamakura era, 18 Kamikaze special attack force, 222–23, 228, 235 Kanaya Hanzo, 142 Kaneko Kentaro, 60 Kato Takaaki, 85 Kato Tomosaburo, 107–108 Katsuki Kiyoshi, 161 Katsura Taro, 57, 69 Kawakami Soroku, 17 Kawamoto Suemori, 141 Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris) (1928), 129–31, 140, 143, 145 Kellogg, Frank B., 126, 129 Khalkin Gol (Nomonhan) (1939), 177 Kimmel, Husband, 190 King, Charlie, 33

283 King, Ernest, 214, 220 Kishinev (Chisinau) (1903), Massacre of Jews in, 60–61, 68 Knox, Frank, 204 Kodama Gentaro, 57–58, 68 Koiso Kuniaki, 221, 223–24, 230 Kolchak, Aleksandr, 94, 101 Komoto Daisuke, 128 Komura Jutaro, 65, 69–70 Konoe Fumimaro, 158, 160, 183, 185, 191, 193, 198–99, 205 Korea: allied occupation of (1945), 232; attempts by progressives to modernize (1884), 13; Chinese and Japanese involvement in, 11–15, 17–23; colony of Japan (1910–45), 74; Japanese attack on, 1875, 12; Japanese invasion, sixteenth century, 2; Japanese merchants in, 7; Japanese plans for invasion of (1873), 7; Japanese settlements in, 26; Japanese soldiers in Korea north of thirty-eighth parallel surrender to Soviet army, 236–37; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and, 57–71; Sam II (March 1) movement of 1919, 94–96; Soviet Union attacks Japanese forces in areas north of thirty-eighth parallel (1945), 234; war between China and Japan for control of (1894–95), 17–23 Koreans in Japan, 113, 120 Kowloon (New Territories), 25–26 Kowshing, 18 Koyanagi Tomiji, 223 Kuang Hasu, emperor, 45 Kurihara Etsuzo, 224 Kurile Islands: ceded to Japan by Russia (1875), 8; Japanese attack fleet assembles at Hitokappu Bay (November 1941), 200, 206; Soviet Union attacks Japanese forces in, 234–37; Roosevelt agrees at Yalta conference to transfer all of Kurile Islands to Soviet Union (1945), 228 Kuropatkin, Aleksei, 49, 66 Kurusu Saburo, 199–201, 203, 208 Kwantung army (Japanese), 127, 134–35, 222; border wars, 176–77; Mukden incident and establishment of Manchu-

284 kuo, 137–51; Soviet Union attacks, 234– 37 Kwantung Leased Territory, 125, 139, 145, 156. See also Liaotung peninsula Lamsdorf, Vladimir, 59 Landsdowne, Henry, 53 Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 89–91 Lansing, Robert, 90, 92, 98 Lawton, Henry, 37 Lea, Homer, 105 League of Nations, 107, 129, 154, 163; established by Treaty of Versailles (1919), 97; Manchuria and, 140, 142– 45; U.S. rejects membership in (1920), 106 Lee Ki-baik, 95 Lend-Lease Act (1941), 188 Leyte, Battle of: landing of U.S. troops, 221; liberation of, 222–25; U.S. decision to attack, 220 Liaotung (Kwantung) Peninsula, 23, 25, 52, 57–66, 76, 83, 117, 139, 156 Liliuokalani, queen of Hawaii, 9–11, 27 Lincoln, Abraham, 213 Lindbergh, Charles, 179 Lingayen Gulf: allied landing (1945), 226– 27; Japanese landing (1941), 210; in Philippine War, 36–37 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 34, 107 London Naval Conference (1930), 131– 33, 148 Long, John, 30 Lytton Commission, 145–51 Macao, 1 MacArthur, Arthur, 151; observer in Russo-Japanese War, 65, 71; in Philippines, 33, 36, 38–39; testimony before U.S. Congress (1902), 41; warns of potential German and Japanese threat to Pearl Harbor (1903), 54–57 MacArthur, Douglas, 61, 220, 224, 232– 33; appointed field marshal of the Philippines, 154; appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), 235–36; early years in the Philippines, 42; impressed with impor-

Index tance of Asia. 71; Japanese attack on Philippines and, 209–210; military adviser to Commnonwealth of the Philippines, 151–54; named commander of Southwest Pacific Command by Roosevelt, 210; offensive against Japanese in New Guinea and, 217–19; ordered to proceed to Australia (1942), 211, 214; recalled to active duty and appointed commander of U.S. Army Forces, Far East (AFFE), 196–97; return to Philippines, 221–28 MacKay Radio, 205 MacMurray, John, 127, 128 Magee, David, 170 Magee, John, 170–72 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 24–25, 29 Malaya, 204, 207–210, 222 Manchu dynasty. See Ching dynasty Manchuria, 51, 228, 230; border wars between Japan and Soviet Union, 176– 77, 190, 198; early Japanese business interests in, 7; Japanese settlements in, 26; Japanese spies in, 18; Manchurian incident and establishment of Manchukuo, 137–51, 156; Russian control of, 25; Russians invade (1900–1904), 49; Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and, 57–71; Soviet Union attacks Kwantung (Japanese) army (1945), 234–35; surrender of Japanese soldiers to Soviet forces (1945), 236–37; U.S. concern over Russian expansion into, 43 Manchurian Youth League, 139–40 Manila: allied liberation of, 227 March, Peyton, 65 March First (Sam II, Three One) independence movement of 1919, Korea, 94–96 Marco Polo Bridge incident (1937), 155– 61 Mariana Islands, 29, 82, 205, 219; bombing of Japan from, 221; Marianas Turkey Shoot (1944), 220 Marshall, George C., 205, 220 Marshall Islands, 82, 205 Matsui Iwane, 111, 168–69, 172

Index Matsuoka Yosuke, 94, 102, 111, 150, 183– 85, 188–89, 191, 194, 196; proclaims “mission of Japan” (1940), 184 Mauborgne, Joseph, 195 May Fourth Movement (1919), 98–99 McCallum, James, 170 McEnery, Samuel, 35 McKinley, William, 24, 26–27, 29–31, 34– 39; assassination of, 40 Meiji, emperor of Japan (Mutsuhito), 19, 23 Meiji Restoration of 1868, 5–6 Merritt, Wesley, 33, 36 Midway Island: Japanese attack on, 205; Battle of (June 1942), 216 Minami Jiro, 141–42, 145, 147 Minobe Tatsukichi, 111 Missionaries: abusive treatment of, in Korea, 11, 20; expelled from Japan, 2; in Korea, 94–96; murder of, in Boxer Rebellion 45–49; in Nanking, 169–71 Mitchell, William, 107 Miyazawa Kiichi, 174 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 188, 229, 233–34 Mongolia and the Border Territories, Federation of, 162 Mori Hiromu, 108 Mori Yoshiro, 112 Motoda Hajime, 108 Mountbaten, Louis, 215, 226 Mukden incident (1931), 140–46 Muraviev, Nicholas, 44 Muromachi era, 18 Murphy, Frank, 154 Mussolini, Benito, 196 Mutsu Munemitsu, 17 Nagano Osami, 200 Nagasaki, 172, 231, 235, 240 Nakamura Shintaro, 139–41 Namba Daisuke, 123 Nanking: incident (1927), 124; rape of Nanking (1937), 162–74, 240 Narcotics, sales of by Japanese agency in China, 174–75 National City Bank, 152 Naval Expansion Act, U.S. (1938), 166 Nerchinsk, treaty of (1689), 51

285 Netherlands: early involvement in Asia, 1; Netherlands East Indies (See Dutch East Indies) Neutrality acts, U.S., 161, 176 Neutrality pact, Japan and Soviet Union (1941), 188–89; Soviet denouncement of (1945), 229–30 New Guinea, 221 Nicholas II, Russian tsar, 57, 60, 66, 69 Nikolaevsk, 101–102 Nimitz, Chester, 214, 220, 227; offensive against Japanese in central and South Pacific, Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana islands, 217–18 Ningpo, treaty port, 3 Nishihara loans, 89–90 Nogi Maresuke, 62, 64, 67 Nomura Kichisaburo, 180, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198–99, 200–203, 208 Northern expedition (Chinese Nationalist army), 124 North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway before 1935), 151 Norway, 182 O’Brien, M.J., 21 Obuchi Keizo, 120 Oishi Kuma, 22 Okada Keisuke, 155 Okada Ryohei, 112 Okinawa: annexed by Japan (1879), 8; battle of (1945), 221–22, 228, 238 Oku Yasukata, 62 Onishi Takijiro, 235 Open door policy, 42–45, 52, 70, 76–77, 90, 117, 125, 176, 180, 199 Operation Blacklist (plans for allied occupation of Japan), 232–33 Operation Downfall (plans for allied invasion of Japan), 232 Oregon, 4 Osmen˜a, Sergio, 88, 151–54 Otis, Elwell, 33, 36–37 Oyama lwao, 20, 59 Pacific fleet, U.S., 197, 203–205; aircraft carriers not in port on Dec. 7, 1941, 206–207; Japanese attack on at Pearl Harbor, 206–209

286 Panama, 58 Panay incident (1937), 163–67 Pancho Villa, 163 Paris Peace Conference: Spain and U.S. (1898), 34; World War I (1919), 96– 98, 104 Peace Preservation law (Dangerous Thoughts bill), 112 Pearl Harbor, 28, 59–60, 182, 190, 197; Japanese attack on (1941), 200–202, 203–209; U.S. obtains by treaty with Hawaii (1887), 9; warning that rising nationalism in Germany and Japan could involve possible attacks on Hawaii and Pearl Harbor (1903), 54–56; Peck, Willys, 140 Peking, Treaty of (1860), 51 Peleliu, 221 Percival, Arthur, 211 Perry, Matthew Calbraith, 4, 60 Pershing, John, 65, 107, 163 Philippines: annexed by U.S. (1898), 35, 40; ceded to U.S. by Spain (1898), 34; colonization by Spain, 1; Commonwealth of, 151–54; Corregidor and allied forces (1942), 210–211; early Japanese involvement with, 2; forward defense zone of U.S., 196–97; Independence Bill (U.S. Congress), 87–89; Japanese invasion of (1941), 204–207; Japanese destruction of U.S. warplanes at Clark Field, 208–209; liberation of (1944–45), 222–28; organic law creating U.S. dependency (1902), 41; Philippine War, 36–42; SpanishAmerican War and, 29–35 Philippine Sea, battle of (Marianas Turkey Shoot), 220, 223 Polk, James Knox, 6 Port Arthur, 21–25, 49, 52, 54, 57–66, 139, 141, 156, 228 Portsmouth, treaty of (1905), 69–71, 74– 75, 77 Portugal, early involverment in Asia, 1 Potsdam Conference (Declaration) (1945), 230–32, 235 Powell, John, 174

Index Puerto Rico, 29, 32, 34 Pu Yi, emperor, 79, 148, 150 Quebec Conference (1944), 226 Quezon, Manuel, 88, 151–54, 182 Rabe, John, 171 Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 144, 205 Ramsey, Edwin, 211 Reagan, Ronald, 214 Reinsch, Paul, 81, 86 Republican army of the Philippines, 36– 39 Rhee, Syngman, 95 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 188 Roberts, Frank, 164–65 Rockhill, William, 43, 74 Roosevelt, Franklin, 151, 152–53, 162– 63, 165–66, 179, 204–205, 219–22, 226; defense preparations and, 186–89; last-minute message to Japanese emperor (Dec. 6, 1941), 200–201; meeting with Churchill and combined staff, 211; negotiations with Japan, 189, 196–97, 199; relocation of Japanese Americans and, 213–15; requests Congress to declare war on Japan, 207–210; Yalta conference (1945) and, 228 Roosevelt, Theodore, 25, 29–34, 39, 75– 79, 88, 118; becomes U.S. president, 40–41, 55; Russo-Japanese War and, 60–61, 68–71 Root, Elihu: secretary of state (1905– 1909), 75, 107; secretary of war (1899– 1904), 37, 47, 55 Rosen, Roman Romanovitch, 69 Rozanov, Nikolai, 94 Rozhestvenski, Zinovin, 67 Russia: Boxer Rebellion and, 45–49; early involvement in Asia, 1; invades Manchuria (1900–1904), 49; Japanese concern over, 5; lease of Liaotung peninsula, 25; Russo-Japanese War and, 57–79; sale of Alaska to U.S., 5; treaties with Japan (1907–1916), 76–77; treaty with Korea (1882), 12 Russo-Chinese Bank, 51–52

Index Russo-Chinese Convention (1898), 25 Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), 57–71, 105, 138 Sackton, Frank, 209 St. Luke’s (Episcopal) Hospital, Tokyo, 114 Saipan, 83, 219–22, 230 Saito Makoto, 148, 155 Sakhalin, 103–104, 111, 228; Japanese surrender to Soviet forces in, 236–37; Russo-Japanese War and, 68–70; Soviet Union attacks Japanese forces in, 234 Samoa, 11, 29 San Francisco Board of Education, 118 Sanno Hotel, Tokyo, 155 Sato Naotake, 229–30, 233–34 Schiff, Jacob, 68 Schurman, Jacob, 115 Semenov, Grigory, 94 Shanghai: incident (1932), 147–48; Japanese attack on (1937), 162–64 Shantung peninsula, 21, 23, 25–26, 81– 84, 97–99, 104, 117, 125–26, 130, 156, 163; Boxer Rebellion and, 45–49; Returned by Japan to China (1922), 109 Sherman, John, 26–27 Sherman, William, 240 Shidehara Kijuro, 107, 110–111, 124, 132, 137, 143 Shirnonoseki, treaty of (1895), 22–24, 57, 156 Showa emperor (Hirohito), 123, 129, 147; accepts Potsdam Declaration, 235–36; declaration of war on U.S. and Britain after Pearl Harbor attack. 201–202; lastminute message from Roosevelt, 200– 201 Shufeldt, Robert, 12 Siberian intervention, 123; Japan (1920– 25), 101–104; U.S. and Japan (1918– 20), 91–94 Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), 17–23, 51, 71, 105 Smuts, Jan, 97 Socialist League, Japan, 110

287 South Africa, 97 South Manchurian Railway (SMR), 49, 70, 76, 91–94, 102, 125–28, 138–39, 143; Research Department, 156 Southeast Asia Command, 215, 226 Southwest Pacific Command, 210–11, 215, 219 Soviet Union, 151, 155, 162, 221–22, 228, 229–30; border wars with Japan in Manchuria, 176–77, 198; declares war on Japan, 233–34; plans for invasion of Hokkaido, 237 Spain, 1, 82 Spanish-American War, 29–35 Spooner, John, 39 Spring-Rice, Cecil, 64 Stalin, Joseph, 228, 229–30, 233, 237 Standard Oil Company (Exxon Mobil Corporation), 43, 166 Stark, Harold, 205–206, 214 Stevens, Durham, 65 Stilwell, Joseph, 215, 225–26 Stimson, Henry, 143, 146–47, 151–52, 181–82, 205 Sugiyama Gen, 160 Sultan, Daniel, 226 Sun Tsu, 62 Sun Yat-sen, 115, 156 Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, Japan, 220–21, 235 Suzuki Kantaro, 230–31 Sze, Alfred, 143 Taft, Robert, 166 Taft, William Howard: in Philippines, 38– 41; president, 88, 105, 166, 182; secretary of war, 69, 71 Taft-Katsura agreement (1905), 76 Taisho emperor (Yoshito), 109, 123 Taiwan (Formosa), 21, 24, 156, 197; allied plans to invade, 218; decision to bypass, 220; Japanese expeditionary force invades (1874), 7; Japanese settlements in, 26 Takahashi Korekiyo, 155 Takahira Koguro, 69 Takahira-Root Agreement (1908), 76 Tanaka Giichi, 123, 127–29, 132

288 Tanaka Kunishige, 107–108 Tangku truce (1933), 150, 156 Tang Sheng-chih, 168 Tangku truce (1933), 150, 156 Teller, Henry, 31 Teller Amendment, 31 Teller, Henry, 31 Terauchi Hisaichi, 210, 222–23 Terauchi Masatake, 94–96 Tinian, 221, 230 Togo Heihachiro, 59, 61–62 Togo Shigenori, 234–35 Tojo Hideki, 184, 190, 199, 205, 221 Tokugawa era, 2, 18 Tokugawa Iemitsu, 2 Tokygawa Ieyasu, 2 Tokugawa Ieyesato, 107 Tokyo War Crimes Trials. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) Tonghak rebellion, 14, 20 Toyoda Teijiro, 196, 198 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 2 Trans-Siberian Railroad, 51, 91–94, 230 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S. and Japan (1894), 20 Treaty of Friendship between Japan and Korea (Treaty of Kangwha), 12 Treaty of Tientsin, China and Japan (1885), 13 Tripartite pact (Axis alliance), 154, 185, 194, 200 Triple intervention (1895), 23, 54, 57 Truman, Harry, 232–33, 235; at Potsdam, 230; becomes U.S. president, 228 Tsingtao, 25 Tsushima, battle of (1905), 67–68, 78 Twenty-one demands, 84–87 Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), 153 Tydings, Millard, 153 Ugaki Kazushige, 175 Umezu Yoshijiro, 157 Underwood, Oscar, 107 United Nations, 198 United States: Alaska, purchase of (1867), 5; consular treaties with Japan (1857–58), 5; declaration of war on Ja-

Index pan (1941), 208; early trade with China, 3; first peacetime draft (1941), 186; isolationism wiped out by Pearl Harbor attack, 203, 207; Nationalist China, claims against for Nanking incident (1927), 124; Philippines: public opinion favors annexation of (1898), 35; annexation of, 40; organic law for administration of Philippines (1902), 41; Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce with China (1844), 3 United States army units: Fifteenth Infantry Regiment, 166; First Cavalry Division, 227; Sixth Army, 222, 224; Thirty-first Infantry Division, 210; Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, 219 United States immigration policy, 72–74 United States Marine Corps units: in China, Fourth Marine regiment, 166; at Guadalcanal, First Marine division, 218– 19; at Iwo Jima, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Marine divisions, 227–28 United States Navy, 182; Pacific Ocean Area Command, 214–15; Third and seventh fleets, 222 Universal Manhood Suffrage Law, Japan (1925), 110 University Order of 1918, 110 Vassilevsky, Aleksandr, 237 Vautrin, Wilhelmina, 170 Versailles, treaty of (1919), 97–98, 106 Vincent, John Carter, 138–39 Vitgeft, Vilgelm, 63 Vladivostok, 51, 91–94, 101–104 Wainwright, Jonathan, 210–11 Wakatsuki Reijiro, 123–24, 137, 141, 145– 46 Wake Island, 205, 207, 209–210 Walker, Frank, 189, 191 Walsh, James, 189 Wang Chengying, 130 Wang Ching-wei, 175, 186 Wanpaosan incident, 138–39 War ministry, 155 War Plan Orange (1911), 105 Warren, Earl, 213

Index Washington Naval Conference (1921–22), 99, 104–110, 131, 133, 150, 152, 155– 56, 189 Wavell, Archibald, 211 Wedemeyer, Albert, 226 West, Parker, 65 Weyler, Valeriano, 29 Wilhelm II, kaiser, 48, 55–56 Wilson, Robert, 170 Wilson, Woodrow, 81–92, 95, 98, 105, 163 Witte, Sergei, 69–70 Wood, Leonard, 105 Woods, Cyrus, 113–14 World War I, 81–98 Wright brothers, Orville and Wilbur, 58, 227

289 Yale Divinity School, 169, 171 Yalta conference (1945), 228–29 Yamagata Aritomo, 18, 20 Yamamoto Gonnohyoe, 114 Yamamoto Isoroku, 203–204, 218 Yamashita Tomoyuki, 210–212, 222, 227 Yangtze River Patrol, 117, 163–67 Yasukuni Shrine, 241 Yonai Mitsumasa, 160, 162, 183 Yoshino Sakuzo, 111 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 143, 145 Yuan Shih-kai, 84–87, 115 Yung Kwai, 142

Zacharias, Ellis, 232 Zou Rong, 71–72

About the Author WILLIAM F. NIMMO is a researcher and historian specializing in foreign relations, military affairs, and the Allied Occupation of Japan. He served as an Army officer in the Korean War and held civilian positions with the Department of the Army in Washington. He later taught history and political science as an adjunct faculty member at several colleges and universities, and has participated in symposiums at the General Douglas MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia, serving as editor for the symposium proceedings. He and his wife, Fontaine, live in Virginia Beach, Virginia.