Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean: A Short Case Study 3031404424, 9783031404429

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Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean A Short Case Study

Emanuel Quashie

Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean

Emanuel Quashie

Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean A Short Case Study

Emanuel Quashie The University of the West Indies Kingston, Jamaica

ISBN 978-3-031-40442-9    ISBN 978-3-031-40443-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40443-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover pattern © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

This book is dedicated to my mom Joanne Quashie who currently suffers from mental illness. She remains a key source of my strength and motivation.

Foreword

Amid the vast literature that now exists regarding the subject of terrorism, it is exciting to discover new works that possess true originality. Dr Emanuel Quashie’s Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean is one such work. Indeed, the book is doubly original. Dr Quashie’s articulation of the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept offers a novel way of reading the complexities and ambiguities of this violent form of politics and its outcomes. In addition, he then applies this concept specifically to an underscrutinised region of the world—the Caribbean—invaluably innovative fashion. Quashie therefore offers some redress for two of the main problems with current terrorism scholarship: the infrequency with which new theoretical insights are offered within that literature and the lack of work originating from and focusing on the global south. Emanuel Quashie’s book reflects its author’s intellectual sophistication, but it also evinces his concern with the practical implications of academic work. Dr Quashie is concerned from the outset of this book to ask about the Caribbean’s preparedness (or not) for terrorist threats. This is a real strength. The best time to address terrorist crises is before they emerge, rather than in the blinding light of explosive crisis itself. Informed, evidence-­based reflection on what Caribbean preparedness for terrorist challenges involves is therefore timely, valuable and significant. This book offers precisely that contribution. Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean is carefully organised, its argument building well from an exposition of the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, through wide-ranging discussion of other scholars’ relevant work and how this book adds to it, to a focus on the Caribbean vii

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FOREWORD

and how the book’s argument can be applied fruitfully to that region. Dr Quashie is very comfortable with scholarly ideas and arguments and writes energetically and engagingly. Thus, the book is a fascinating and original account of a genuinely important subject. Queen’s University Belfast Belfast, UK June 2023

Richard English

Preface

This book offers the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept with a view to more fully understanding the Caribbean’s preparedness for and vulnerability to terrorism. In doing so, it presents an original assessment of the underscrutinised subject of terrorism as it relates to the Caribbean. It argues more broadly the existence of a complex inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives that are simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. In a nutshell, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept offers a more systematic understanding of terrorism by explicitly and systematically showing clearly and bringing into sharper focus the tangible and intangible negatives and positives that are ever-­ present in most situations concerning terrorism activism. This volume derives its novelty from its original assessment of the prevailing literature on the specific stakeholders of terrorism (US mainstream media, ISIS and individual actors) and terrorism within the context of the Caribbean through the book’s Stakeholders of Terrorism concept—a concept developed following a laborious, meticulous and methodical procedure of triangulation and convergence of the sources of data (elite interviews, focus groups and terrorism-related documents). Hence, it cannot be stressed enough the importance of the book’s chosen methodology—qualitative research methods—as it is crucial to understanding how the book’s Stakeholders of Terrorism concept was developed and how the author derived his valid inferences. Moreover, another unique contribution this volume makes to the sea of terrorism-related scholarships comes from its assessment of the Caribbean’s vulnerability to and preparedness for terrorism and the recommendations that follow. ix

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Furthermore, it is important to note that although the geographical focus in terms of the researched area is the anglophone Caribbean, specifically the English-speaking CARICOM member states, it is essential to have a much broader understanding of terrorism beyond the region’s shores. Hence, the inclusion of existing literature on the six explanatory frameworks (psychology, religion, strategy, culture/civilisational context, economics and political dimensions) aimed at offering a multifaceted, multidimensional and holistic understanding of terrorism; the three specific stakeholders of terrorism, US mainstream media, ISIS and individual actors/lone wolf terrorism, highlight the various ways non-state actors can either directly or indirectly affect or be affected negatively or positively by terrorism. The aforementioned terrorism-related areas were also purposefully chosen for their vital role in offering a holistic understanding of terrorism more broadly and specifically within the context of the Caribbean. Thus, for the sake of clarification, and at the risk of reputation, there are two central components to this volume: the author’s Stakeholders of Terrorism concept and understanding terrorism within the Caribbean context. The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is central to the book in showing clearly how and in what ways the concept offers a more systematic understanding of terrorism than the current literature does not and then deploys it to offer a holistic examination of terrorism within the Caribbean context (which includes an understanding of terrorism within the caribbean context through the various explanatory frameworks, Caribbean’s vulnerability of and preparedness for terrorism). The last essential component of the book is the conclusions and practical recommendations. The sequence of argument is as follows. First (Chap. 1) provides a definition of stakeholders of terrorism and expounds on the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, which seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. The chapter also provides a clarification as it relates to what the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is not arguing, as well as the concept’s limitations. Second (Chap. 2) offers a systematic examination of existing scholarly explanations for the emergence and sustenance of terroristic violence (including psychological dimensions, cultural/civilisational contexts, religious dimensions, strategic dynamics, political contexts and frameworks and economic dimensions); this chapter also sets out the prevailing literature as it relates to the specific stakeholders of terrorism (US mainstream media, ISIS, individual

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actors). Third (Chap. 3) offers a detailed explanation and illustration on how the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept borrows from and adds to the existing literature in relation to the six explanatory frameworks (psychology, religion, strategy, culture/civilisational context, economics and political dimensions) and the specific stakeholders of terrorism (US mainstream media, ISIS and individual actors). Fourth (Chap. 4) offers a concise overview of the existing literature on terrorism-related matters as it pertains to the Caribbean. Fifth (Chap. 5) presents a detailed discussion of the data collected (findings), which seeks to offer a full understanding of terrorism within the Caribbean context by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. In doing so, it adds to the prevailing literature as it pertains to the specific explanations of terrorism as well as the specific stakeholders of terrorism, and most importantly, the existing literature on terrorism-activism within the Caribbean context. Lastly (Chap. 6), drawing on the findings, the book presents concluding arguments based on the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept and offers some practical recommendations aimed at reducing the region’s vulnerability to and enhancing its preparedness for terrorism. Caribbean states are characterised by a myriad of vulnerabilities, including small and fragile economies that are heavily dependent on international trade and investments and tourism, and a terrorist attack would undoubtedly adversely affect foreign direct investments, economic growth, trade and investments, and the region’s tourism industry. Despite the region’s extreme vulnerability to terrorism, some scholars have noted the scant literature as it pertains to terrorism-related matters in the Caribbean (e.g. Izarali, 2017; McCoy and Knight, 2017; Knight, 2019). The region’s vulnerability to terrorism is further exacerbated by its high unemployment and underemployment rates, poverty and inequality, which creates fertile grounds for the Islamic State (ISIS) to radicalise, recruit and train individuals who can easily pose a terrorist threat to the region in the form of individual actors/lone wolf terrorists. Notwithstanding the significant strides the Caribbean has made thus far with respect to its counterterrorism efforts, such as a wave of “anti-­ terrorism” laws that have since passed in recent years, among other counterterrorism measures, none of these counterterrorism measures/policies goes far enough. They do not sufficiently address the issue of home-grown terrorism or the possibility of individual/lone wolf terrorism, the potential influence of the US mainstream media to shape Caribbean youth’s perspective on terrorism, creating a counternarrative to ISIS propaganda and radicalisation message in order to mitigate recruitment of disaffected

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youths, nor do they evenly address the multiplicity of tangible and intangible direct and indirect negatives and positives ever-present in most situations concerning terrorism. Moreover, the region continues to suffer from porous borders, limited law enforcement agencies specifically tasked with countering terrorism and insufficient interagency cooperation on terrorism-related matters. Thus, the research presented in this book seeks to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the main purpose of the book is to deploy the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept to fully understand the phenomenon of terrorism within the Caribbean context. In doing so, the book presents a qualitative research study that was conducted, which thoroughly investigated and explored the phenomenon of terrorism within the context of the Caribbean. Furthermore, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to fully understand terrorism within the Caribbean context with a view to help the region forge more sensible and practical counterterrorism policies at both national and regional levels, policies that recognise the complex inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. The aim is to provide an academic analysis from which to urge relevant bodies in the region (government heads, ministries, departments, local and regional institutions) to concentrate on simultaneously reducing the multiplicity of negatives and positives that is seemingly ever-present in most situations concerning terrorism. Howbeit, there are some practical implications that can be achieved from the Stakeholders of Terrorism that might prove to be quite useful in assisting the region in crafting anti-terrorism-related policies that offer a wider menu of appropriate responses to efficaciously combat terrorism. Moreover, the research presented in this book seeks to aid in the reduction of those risk factors/pre-conditions relevant to the region that can make terrorism more likely and make it advantageous for ISIS to recruit nationals to become foreign terrorist fighters, or even potential lone wolf attackers that might be motivated to carry out terrorist attacks in the name of ISIS, or in support of the transnational terrorist group cause in the region. Therefore, the general aim of the book is to offer a few sensible and pragmatic recommendations, ranging from community programmes

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to a six-pillar response towards mitigating the region’s vulnerability to and enhancing its preparedness for terrorism by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. Kingston, Jamaica 

Emanuel Quashie

References Izarali, M. R. (2017). The Caribbean in current global security affairs: The issue of terrorism. In Crime, violence and security in the Caribbean (pp. 240–267). Routledge. Knight, W. A. (2019). The nexus between vulnerabilities and violence in the Caribbean. Third World Quarterly, 40(2), 405–424. McCoy, J., & Knight, W. A. (2017). Homegrown violent extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local patterns, global trends. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(4), 267–299.

Conceptual Terms

Caribbean includes mostly the anglophone Caribbean states that are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). In this context, the book will primarily focus on Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and the associate member states of CARICOM: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands. Caribbean Vulnerability is conceptualised as the region’s inability to respond and exposure to terrorism. Caribbean’s Preparedness is conceptualised as the region’s capacity to respond to terrorism. Direct is conceptualised as those tangible and intangible negatives and positives that directly affect the stakeholder of terrorism as a result of their engagement (coverage of, or active participation) in terrorism. Indirect is conceptualised as those tangible and intangible negatives and positives that indirectly affect a third party as a result of the stakeholder of terrorism engagement (coverage of or active participation) in terrorism. Individuals: Perpetrators of terrorism, such as lone actors, or individual actors who can also have links or be part of a group and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) within the Caribbean context. Intangible is conceptualised as those negatives or positives that are not physical, that are untouchable or discarnate. xv

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CONCEPTUAL TERMS

Negatives is conceptualised as intangible and tangible factors that can have either a “deleterious effect” or a “causal effect” or a combination of both in relation to terrorism-related activities (either coverage of or actively partaking in terrorism). The negatives can also have a direct effect on the specific stakeholder or an indirect impact on a third party other than the stakeholder. However, it must be a result of the stakeholder’s engagement in terrorism. Positives is conceptualised as intangible and tangible rewards that have a “beneficial effect” for the actor from either their coverage of (US mainstream media) or engagement in terrorism (ISIS and individuals). The positives can also have a direct effect on the specific stakeholder or an indirect impact on a third party other than the stakeholder. However, it must be a result of the stakeholder’s engagement in terrorism. Stakeholders of terrorism: Media: US mainstream media; Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) and individuals (lone wolfs/leaderless resistance). Tangible is conceptualised as those negatives or positives that are either physical, noticeable, visible or quantifiable (quantitative, numerical). Third Party is conceptualised as any individual, or group of individuals, or property of any kind (tangible or intangible) indirectly affected by a terroristic episodic event.

Acknowledgements

The completion of the research that was crucial to the publication of this book could not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many people whose names may not all be enumerated. Nevertheless, their contributions are sincerely appreciated and gratefully acknowledged. However, I would like to express my sincerest and deepest appreciation and gratitude particularly to the following: To all elite interview participants: Assistant Director of CARICOM IMPACS Miss Tonya Ayow; national security expert Professor Anthony Clayton; regional security expert Professor Suzette Haughton; former Assistant Director at the Regional Security Systems and current Attorney General of St Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenville Williams; Permanent Representative of the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations Inga Rhonda King; world renowned on terrorism, Professor Louise Richardson; former Minister of Tourism of St Vincent and the Grenadines, Cecil Mckie; Minister Counsellor/Political Coordinator, Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations, Isis Gonsalves; Stockholm Professor of Journalism, Christian Christensen and reporter for The Intercept, Murtaza Hussain. To all the focus group respondents: Demion Mctair of St Vincent and the Grenadines; Denasio Frank of St Kitts and Nevis, Thalia Thomas of Trinidad and Tobago; Rochelle Ogilvie of the Cayman Islands; Khrystal Walcott of Barbados; Jason Green of Jamaica; Franz George of St Vincent and the Grenadines and Garry McLean of Jamaica. I would like to say thank you for your scholarly contribution and willingness to participate in the research study. Also, I would like to express xvii

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

my deepest gratitude to the library staff at Queen’s University Belfast, PhD research annual review body and examiners, the UK Commonwealth Scholarship programme, and my PhD supervisors Professor Richard English and Dr Mike Bourne. However, I must express further gratitude to Professor Richard English for his unwavering support, excellent guidance, expert advice and continued vote of confidence, which was crucial in helping me to ably undertake this ambitious and important project and see it to its successful completion during a global pandemic and thereafter. Thanks to everyone.

Contents

1 Methodological Consideration  1 Defining Stakeholders of Terrorism   4 Conceptualisation: Stakeholders of Terrorism Concept   7 Limitations  11 Bibliography  16 2 An  Overview of the Existing Literature 19 Introduction: Understanding Terrorism  20 Defining Terrorism  20 Explanations of Terrorism  21 Psychological Dimensions  22 Religious Dimensions  27 Strategic Dimensions  32 Cultural/Civilisational Context  37 Political Dimensions  40 Economic Dimensions  45 Concluding Thoughts  49 Stakeholder of Terrorism: Media  50 Rationale: Why the US Mainstream Media Is Purposeful for This Volume?  50 A List of Some Pertinent Existing Literature on the US Mainstream Media  52 US Mainstream Media: Agenda-Setting and Framing  55 The US Mainstream Media Benefits from Terrorism  58 xix

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CONTENTS

US Mainstream Media Portrayal of Muslim Violence and Linkage of Terrorism to Muslim/Islam  61 Concluding Thoughts  62 Stakeholder of Terrorism: Islamic State (ISIS)  63 The Emergence and Sustenance of ISIS  64 ISIS and Social Media  69 ISIS Revenue and Support: How It Benefited from Terrorism  71 Concluding Thoughts  73 Stakeholder of Terrorism: Individuals  74 Introduction  74 The Lone Wolf  76 Rationale Behind the Use of the Case Examples  79 Case Examples of Lone Wolf/Individual Actors  80 Case Number One: Theodore Kaczynski  80 Case Number Two: Anders Behring Breivik  82 Case Number Three: Timothy McVeigh  84 Case Number Four: Eric Robert Rudolph  85 Case Number Five: Brenton Tarrant  86 Case Number Six: Ramzi Yousef  88 Concluding Thoughts  89 Bibliography  90 3 Contribution to Knowledge 99 What Does the Stakeholders of Terrorism Concept Tell Us?  99 Psychological Dimensions 101 Religious Dimensions 102 Strategic Dimensions 103 Cultural/Civilisational Context 103 Political Dimensions 104 Economic Dimensions 105 The Stakeholders of Terrorism: US Mainstream Media, ISIS and Individuals 107 Deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism Concept 112 Bibliography 114

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4 Terrorism  and the Caribbean117 Introduction: A Brief History of Terrorism and the Caribbean 119 Caribbean Terrorism Problems: Home-Grown Terrorism, Extremism and Tourism 123 Shane Dominic Crawford and Kareem Ibrahim 125 Tourism, Terrorism and the Caribbean 127 Terrorism’s Potential Impact on Tourism 129 ISIS and the Caribbean 131 Concluding Thoughts 133 Bibliography 135 5 Understanding  Terrorism, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean: A Caribbean Case Study139 Understanding Terrorism Within the Caribbean Context 141 Psychological Dimensions 142 Religious Dimensions 144 Strategic Dimensions 145 Culture/Civilisational Context 146 Political Dimensions 147 Economic Dimensions 148 Social Dimensions 149 Concluding Thoughts 151 Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean 152 The Caribbean’s Vulnerability to and Preparedness for Terrorism 164 Bibliography 175 6 Conclusion and Recommendation177 Conclusion 177 Recommendations 180 Appendix187 Bibliography201 Index

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About the Authors

Dr Emanuel Patrick Quashie  is currently a Lecturer in the Department of Government at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, and a former UK Commonwealth Scholar. Dr Quashie holds a BSc in International Relations (First Class Honors), and a MSc in Government specializing in International Relations (Distinction) from the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, and a PhD in Politics specializing in terrorism studies (with no corrections) from the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast. He is a Qualitative Research and International Relations Specialist with over 7 years’ experience in conducting research using various qualitative research methods and teaching a variety of courses in International Relations. He also has an in-depth knowledge in terrorism studies, particularly as it relates to the simultaneous negatives and positives associated with terrorism-activism and within the Caribbean context.

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Abbreviations

AIPS AML/CFT AQI ARU CARICOM CARICOM IMPACS CIGMS DHS FATF FIU FTFRs ISIL ISIS JTWJ NEMO OECS RSS SVG USA PATRIOT ACT VBIEDs WTC

Advanced Passenger Information System Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism Al-Qaeda in Iraq Asset Recovery Unit Caribbean Community The Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security Collaborative Intelligence Gathering & Monitoring System Department of Homeland Security Financial Action Task Force Financial Intelligence Unit Foreign Terrorist Fighter Returnees the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Jama’ at al-Tawhid wa’ al-Jihad The National Emergency Management Organization Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Regional Security System St Vincent and the Grenadines Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices World Trade Center

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List of Tables

Table 1.1

Table 3.1 Table 3.2

Table 4.1 Table A.1 Table A.2 Table A.3

Displays the direct and indirect intangible and tangible negative and positive themes related to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept after triangulation and convergence of the gathered data from all sources of evidence (elite interviews, focus group and documents) 12 Illustrates how the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept borrows and adds to the existing explanations of terrorism in seeking to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality106 Illustrates the themes related to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, and how it borrows and adds to the existing literature in seeking to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality110 Displays a list of some terrorist incidents/plots that occurred in the Caribbean over the last 50 years, 1972–2022 123 189 189 Overview of identified key findings and how they triangulate across the data gathered from elite interviews, the focus group and documents 192

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CHAPTER 1

Methodological Consideration

Abstract  Chapter 1 provides a definition for stakeholders of terrorism and expounds on the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, which seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situation concerning terrorism. The chapter also provides a brief methodological explanation on how the concept was developed using the qualitative methodology as well as a clarification as it relates to what the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is not arguing and the concept’s limitations. Keywords  Stakeholders • Stakeholders of terrorism • Tangible • Intangible • Direct • Indirect • Negatives • Positives • Causal effects • Deleterious effects • Beneficial effects • Inherent duality • Triangulation The Caribbean is characterised by a myriad of vulnerabilities, including small and fragile economies that are heavily dependent on international trade and investments and tourism, and a terrorist attack would undoubtedly adversely affect foreign direct investments, economic growth, trade and investments and the region’s tourism industry. In fact, some scholars have since noted how the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, that took place not in the Caribbean but in the United States of America, impacted the region in various ways—like, for instance, Ivelaw L. Griffith

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Quashie, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40443-6_1

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Caribbean security in the age of terror: Challenge and change (2004); Anthony Hall “The response of the tourism industry in Jamaica to crime and the threat of terrorism. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes” (2012); Godfrey Pratt “Terrorism and tourism: Bahamas and Jamaica fight back. International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management” (2003). In spite of the region’s extreme vulnerability to terrorism, some scholars have noted the scant literature as it pertains to terrorism-related matters in the Caribbean (e.g., Izarali, 2017; McCoy and Knight, 2017; Knight, 2019). Though there exists very limited literature with respect to terrorism-related matters within the Caribbean context, a few prominent and distinguished scholars have written brilliantly and contributed in a profound manner to this specific subject matter—like, for example, Simon Cottee (2021) Black Flags of the Caribbean: How Trinidad Became an ISIS Hotspot. Bloomsbury Publishing; Simon Cottee (2019) “The calypso caliphate: how Trinidad became a recruiting ground for ISIS.  International Affairs”; Stanislas and Sadique (2019) International Attitudes to Teaching Religion and Faith and the Policing of Minority Communities. In Policing and Minority Communities (pp. 11–27). Springer, Cham; Ken Chitwood (2019) “The Global “War on Terror” and the Tenuous Public Space of Muslims in Latin America and the Caribbean. Hamsa. Journal of Judaic and Islamic Studies”; Andy Knight (2019) “The nexus between vulnerabilities and violence in the Caribbean. Third World Quarterly”; Sanjay Badri-Maharaj (2017) “Globalization of the jihadist threat: Case study of Trinidad and Tobago. Strategic Analysis”; John McCoy and Andy Knight (2017) “Homegrown violent extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local patterns, global trends. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism”; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo (2013) “Latino immigrant men and the deportation crisis: A gendered racial removal program”; Douglas Massey and Karen Pren (2012) “Unintended consequences of US immigration policy: Explaining the post-1965 surge from Latin America. Population and development review”; Anthony Hall (2012) “The response of the tourism industry in Jamaica to crime and the threat of terrorism. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes.”; Dion E. Phillips (2008) “Terrorism and security in the Caribbean before and after 9/11. In Armed forces and conflict resolution: Sociological perspectives. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.”; Emma Björnehed (2004) “Narco-terrorism: The merger of the war on drugs and the war on terror. Global Crime.”; Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith (2004) Caribbean security in the age of terror: Challenge and change;

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Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith “The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st Century: Country, Change, Challenge. Published by the University of Miami North-South Center.”; Godfrey Pratt (2003) “Terrorism and tourism: Bahamas and Jamaica fight back. International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management”; Dion E.  Phillips (1997) “The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force: Origin, Structure, Training, Security and Other Roles. Caribbean quarterly”; Dion E. Phillips (1990) “Defense Policy in Barbados, 1966–1988. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs”. Admittedly, many of the aforementioned citations were also unknown to me prior to embarking on this ambitious project because they are buried deep beneath the ocean of scholarly literature in terrorism studies that has evidently underscrutinised the region in this regard. This, however, is explored along with Caribbean’s vulnerability to and preparedness for terrorism and offering a more holistic understanding of terrorism within the Caribbean context through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept in Chap. 6. Notwithstanding the significant strides the Caribbean has made thus far with respect to its counterterrorism efforts, such as a wave of “Anti-­ Terrorism” laws that have since passed in recent years, among other counterterrorism measures, none of these counterterrorism measures/policies goes far enough. They do not sufficiently address the issue of home-grown terrorism or the possibility of individual/lone wolf terrorism, the potential influence of the US mainstream media to shape Caribbean youth’s perspective on terrorism, creating a counternarrative to ISIS propaganda and radicalisation message in order to mitigate recruitment of disaffected youths, nor do they evenly address the multiplicity of tangible and intangible direct and indirect negatives and positives ever-present in most situations concerning terrorism. Moreover, the region continues to suffer from porous borders, limited law enforcement agencies specifically tasked with countering terrorism and insufficient interagency cooperation on terrorism-related matters. Thus, the book seeks to offer a more holistic understanding of terrorism-activism within the Caribbean context by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. The main purpose of this book is to deploy the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept to fully understand the phenomenon of terrorism within the Caribbean context (a region that has been substantially underscrutinised in the existing literature) and the region’s vulnerability to and preparedness for terrorism. In doing so, the researcher conducted a

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qualitative research study to thoroughly investigate and explore the phenomenon of terrorism. The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to fully understand terrorism within the Caribbean context with a view to help the region forge more sensible and practical counterterrorism policies both at the national and regional levels, policies that recognise the inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. The aim is to provide an academic analysis from which to urge relevant bodies in the region (government heads, ministries, departments, local and regional institutions) to concentrate on simultaneously reducing the multiplicity of negatives and positives ever-present in most situations concerning terrorism. Furthermore, the practical implications of the book can assist the region in crafting anti-terrorism-related laws and policies that apply the appropriate response to effectively combat terrorism. Moreover, the book seeks to aid in the reduction of those risk factors/ pre-condition relevant to the region that can make terrorism more likely and making it advantageous for ISIS to recruit nationals to become foreign terrorist fighters or even potential lone wolf attackers that will be motivated to carry out terrorist attacks for ISIS in the region. Thus, the book aims to offer a few sensible and pragmatic recommendations, ranging from community programmes to a six-pillar response towards mitigating the region’s vulnerability to and enhancing its preparedness for terrorism by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept.

Defining Stakeholders of Terrorism The word “stakeholders” within the context of terrorism is not a new phenomenon. For instance, other studies have examined stakeholders in various ways in relation to terrorism-related matters from using a stakeholders-­approach to countering terrorism to governments and tourism stakeholders as a tool for managing possible terrorism crises in the future. In the case of the former, for example, Eji Eugene (2016) in his article titled “Rethinking Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy” called for an “all-stakeholders approach” which must encompass the public and private sectors to aid in the country’s counterterrorism efforts; however, this all-stakeholders approach must be supplemented by information and security tanks to produce effective ideas as it pertains to national security (p. 216). Regarding the latter, Anyu Liu and Stephen Pratt (2017) in their article looked at tourism stakeholders such as destination marketing

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organisations, local media, host governments, among others, should conjoin their efforts to efficaciously mitigate “the impact of terrorism on tourism and restore the destination image” (p.  413). Other scholars have highlighted the importance of including relevant stakeholders in anti-­ terrorism/counter-terrorism policies from tourism stakeholders to security network stakeholders (e.g., Paraskevas & Arendell, 2007; Omale, 2013). For example, Alexandros Paraskevas and Beverley Arendell (2007) emphasised “the importance of particular destination stakeholders in the planning and implementation of the anti-terrorism strategy and the pivotal role of the DMO in coordinating the entire effort” (p.  1570). Moreover, Don John O. Omale (2013) noted the important role of certain stakeholders in security networks such as counterterrorism and human trafficking networks. There exists somewhat of a consensus or not much of a contention regarding who or what qualifies as a potential or definite stakeholder(s). This includes individuals, neighbourhoods, institutions, groups, organisations, societies and even the environment (Mitchell et al., 1997). Mitchell et al. (1997) also pointed to varying stakeholder definitions in the prevailing literature. Some were vague, such as that of Alkhafaji who defines stakeholders as “groups to whom the corporation is responsible” (1989: 36) and Thompson, Wartick and Smith, who define stakeholders as groups “in relationship with an organization” (1991: 209). Other definitions include that of Freeman and Reed (1983), who define a stakeholder as any individual or group who “can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (p.  856). The Collins English Dictionary Essential Edition (2019) defines stakeholder as “a person or group not owning shares in an enterprise but having an interest in its operations, such as the employees, customers, or local community”. Another definition is by Derek H.T.  Walker, Lynda Bourne and Steve Rowlinson (2008) who define stakeholders as “individuals or groups who have an interest or some aspect of rights or ownership in the project, and can contribute to, or be impacted by, either the work or the outcomes of the project” (pg. 73). On the other hand, Edward Freeman (2010) defines stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives” (p. 25). Firstly, a stakeholder of terrorism is not an organisation or a group of organisations or managers in a firm seeking to achieve an organisation’s objectives. For this book, the “stakeholders of terrorism” is defined as

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non-state actors who in one way or another have an interest in terrorism (by either coverage of, or active participation in it) and can either directly or indirectly affect or be affected negatively or positively by terrorism or the outcomes of terroristic violence. This definition is guided by Freeman (2010), Walker et al. (2008) and the Collins English Dictionary Essential Edition (2019). The stakeholders of terrorism specifically considered in this volume are the Islamic State (ISIS), individual actors/lone wolf and the US mainstream media. The definition allows for flexibility because the stakeholders of terrorism do not necessarily have to “own shares” in terrorism per se, but rather possess an interest in it, or affect or are affected by the outcomes of terrorism. However, their interest by means of either coverage of, or actively partaking in terrorism can result in either a direct or indirect negative or positive (intangible or tangible) effect. For example, the US mainstream media do not have an interest in terrorism in terms of committing acts of terrorism; in contrast, ISIS and lone wolf actors are people whose chosen application of violence is terrorism. Nevertheless, all could legitimately be considered to be stakeholders of terrorism. The US mainstream media’s interest in terrorism is by means of its coverage of terrorism-related activities that can have either a direct or indirect negative and positive effect. For example, the media’s coverage of the terroristic violence can result in a direct tangible positive (increased viewership, sales, etc.) and simultaneously have an indirect intangible negative (spreading of fear, intimidation, creating a misperception of risk, etc.) on the side of the viewing public. Moreover, active participation in terrorism by both ISIS and individual actors could also be understood as indicating their having an “interest” in terrorism that can have a direct or indirect negative or positive affect (intangible or tangible). For instance, the Islamic State (ISIS) has a distinct interest in building an Islamic State (e.g., Byman, 2015) and used terroristic violence in pursuit of this goal, which would have had a direct positive for the transnational Islamic terrorist organisation. For example, before the so-called ISIS physical caliphate was dismantled, its radical Sunni proto-state had a “beneficial effect” to the terrorist group ranging from its “criminalised war economy” to being able to train, mobilize and plan attacks around the globe (Gerges, 2016). Simultaneously, it applied terroristic violence resulting in an indirect tangible negative effect on countless of Muslims and non-Muslims who would have been victims of the terrorist group’s use of terroristic violence. At the same time, it had a direct tangible negative effect on formal members of the terrorist group,

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such as the death of the group’s recent leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and one of its formal members Shane Crawford from the twin-island of Trinidad and Tobago who went by the nom de guerre Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi. Moreover, ISIS “beheadings/executions” can also be understood as having an inherent duality, an intangible indirect negative effect (psychological impact) on those who viewed the terrorist group’s brutal beheadings and executions of many of its hostages (Koch, 2018) and the beheadings/executions simultaneously had a direct intangible positive for ISIS in terms of propaganda purposes and to garner global attention (Greene, 2015; Mahood & Rane, 2017, etc.). Likewise, individuals actors also have an interest in terrorism whether to use it as a means to redress personal grievances, garner attention/notoriety, revenge or even financial rewards, among other things. For example, George Metesky (nicknamed the “Mad Bomber”) had engaged in terroristic violence by placing some 30 bombs across New York City in various public places in protest against a local electric utility company and to redress personal grievances he had with the state of New  York “for not giving him an appropriate pension after he was injured while working” (Winick, 1961, p. 26). Further analysis of the specific stakeholders of terrorism (US mainstream media, ISIS and individuals) through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is done in the contribution to knowledge section.

Conceptualisation: Stakeholders of Terrorism Concept The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations regarding terrorism. The concept borrows and adds to the existing literature in seeking to establish terrorism’s inherent duality more systematically than the literature in this volume currently does. The six explanatory frameworks scrutinised (psychology, religion, strategy, culture/civilisational context, economics and political dimensions) and the specific stakeholders (US mainstream, individuals (perpetrators) and ISIS) were also chosen because of their applicability to the Caribbean. For the sake of methodological consideration, and strict adherence to the qualitative methodology, the author finds it necessary to explain how the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept was developed. Therefore, some of the gathered data will be used when

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expounding on how the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept systematically and simultaneously shows the inherent duality that is present in most cases concerning terrorism that the current literature in this volume have not sufficiently stressed. The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept was developed after triangulation and convergence of the gathered data from all three sources of evidence: elite interviews, focus group and documents with a view to fully understand terrorism within the Caribbean context. This approach is also in keeping with the case study approach defined by Robert Yin (2009) and discussed further in the methodology section below. At the conceptual level, terrorism can have different meanings or conceptual meanings. The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situation concerning terrorism. The research topic and main research question seeks to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. It is important to clarify what the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is not arguing. It is not attempting to categorise terrorism as being either “good” or “bad”. Quite the opposite. The concept, however, seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality by borrowing from and adding to the existing literature. There are indeed a multiplicity of intangible and tangible negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. The negatives and positives are calculated on the basis of the specific stakeholder engagement in terrorism, which could be either coverage of (US mainstream media), or active participation (ISIS and individuals) in terrorism. The negatives are those causal effects that can lead to or be a main driver for why the stakeholder decided to engage in terrorism. Another important facet of the “negatives” category is the deleterious effects from either coverage of, or actively partaking in terrorism-related activities. The positives are those beneficial effects that the stakeholders derive from their engagement in terrorism, which involves either coverage of (US mainstream media) or actively participating (ISIS and individuals) in terrorism-related activities. Both negatives and positives can have a direct or an indirect effect, meaning the specific stakeholder’s engagement in terrorism (either coverage of, or actively partaking in) can result in a direct negative or positive effect, or an indirect negative or positive effect on a third party. For example, using data collected from the

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Caribbean—themes such as a sense of belonging, social exclusion, disappointed expectations, supporting a cause, relative deprivation, meaning and purpose, Wahhabi influence, not being well-versed in Muslim faith, a sense of lost identity, yearning for respect, feeling like a low life, personal grievances, identifying with a struggle, among others were categorised as intangible direct negatives and intangible indirect negatives because they could be understood as having both a “causal effect” on the side of the individual and a “deleterious effect” on the side of a third party (the possible death of innocent civilians and destruction of property). Though the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept’s inherent duality feature is conceptually distinct (negatives and positives), these are not completely mutually exclusive or exhaustive clauses and thus, the same themes can simultaneously exist in both categories. This makes the inherent duality feature more flexible. For instance, some of the same themes (such as a sense of belonging, supporting a cause, meaning and purpose, being offered some money to fight, prospect of a better life and securing one’s economic future) could be understood as having an intangible direct negative, as well as a tangible indirect negative and simultaneously intangible direct positives because of their “causal effect” in terms of being key motivating factors for some individuals (the Caribbean nationals who migrated to join ISIS) to engage in terrorism-related activities that can have a “deleterious effect” on a third party (civilian death, destruction of property, adverse effect on the tourism industry, etc.) and simultaneously a “beneficial effect” on the side of the perpetrator (individuals who migrated to join ISIS). This is due to the fact that on the one hand, some individuals went in search for a better life, were motivated by the fact that they were being offered money to fight, and some yearned for a sense of belonging, meaning and purpose and sought a cause to support. On the other hand, it can be argued that they garnered some inherent psychological reward/benefits with regard to the feelings of belonging to something, supporting a cause, meaning and purpose in their life, prospect of a better life, securing one’s economic future, as well as being offered money to fight. In these instances, the simultaneous negatives and positives are more clearly identified by deploying the stakeholders of terrorism concept. There are some themes that were only categorised as either negatives or positives. However, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept allows for such flexibility because the inherent duality can either be a set of distinguishable or similar negatives and positives simultaneously present in both categories. The distinguishable themes do not mean that inherent duality has not

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been achieved. For example, themes such as yearning for respect, feeling like a low life, Wahhabi influence and being not well-versed in the Muslim faith were understood as intangible direct negatives and indirect intangible negatives. Though these themes are deemed as having both a “causal effect” (key motivating factors for some to individual participation in terrorism-­ related activities) and a possible “deleterious effect” (as the casual factors that drove the individual to engage in terroristic violence, can result in the death, physical harm or psychological damage of both the individual and their potential victims, destruction of property, etc.), the individual simultaneously garnered a sense of power, respect, influence in the streets, increased in social status and meaning and purpose in their life (intangible direct positives) and thus, no longer felt like a low life or yearned for respect and his/her conversion to Islam through the Wahhabi influence also played a crucial role in ascertaining those intangible direct positives. Moreover, while individuals who engage in terrorism might have garnered a “sense of belonging” (direct intangible positive) or a tangible direct positive in terms of being offered “a more attractive salary” as result of their active participation in terrorism, they can also simultaneously be killed or be incarcerated (direct tangible negatives), as well as have an indirect tangible negative effect on the side of a third party (if they were to carry out a lone wolf attack or a Mumbai-style terrorist attack killing innocent civilians). Hence, the existence of an inherent duality to which the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept points, as being critical to our understanding of terrorism as having a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism-related activities. Furthermore, themes such as recruiting terrorist sympathisers, encouraging disaffected youths to become involved in extreme violence were understood as having an intangible direct negative, while concerns about ISIS children and ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) returnees were categorised as intangible indirect negatives; an attack on tourism sites, targeting of Western tourists (soft targets), killing civilians, psychological impact, encouraging terrorist sympathisers to carry out terrorism-related acts and exploiting the region’s banking system were categorised as tangible indirect negatives and all themes were simultaneously categorised as tangible direct positive. The aforementioned themes show a clear set of negative impacts, such as encouraging disaffected youths to engage in terroristic violence, or ISIS children a concern and ISIS FTFs all pose a severe

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terrorist threat to the region. Moreover, a terrorist attack is likely to result in the possible loss of many lives, destruction of property and a negative impact on the region’s tourism industry (tangible indirect negatives). At the same time, there are also a clear set of positives on the side of the Islamic State because ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) returnees will be beneficial to ISIS in helping with local knowledge, coordinating attacks and helping to move other ISIS members undetected and evade regional law enforcement. Moreover, the targeting of Western tourists and attacks on tourism sites also have a “beneficial effect” on the side of ISIS who are likely to gain global attention as a result of Western media coverage of the terrorist attack, and it might even yield ISIS some short-term strategic victory. The exploitation of the region’s banking system could also have a “deleterious effect” (negative) on the Caribbean banking sector (being blacklisted, pressure from US and other Western powers, etc.) and simultaneously have a “beneficial effect” (positive) on the side of ISIS in terms of being able to fund their terrorism-related operations. In the case of the US mainstream media, the data was insufficient to properly capture the inherent duality within the Caribbean context. This might be due to the fact that there exist very little to no reliable and valid research data regarding the US mainstream media coverage of terroristic episodic events that have occurred in the Caribbean, given that the region has not experienced any terrorism likened to the 9/11 attack or any that will be attractive enough to make it into U.S mainstream press. Thus, the researcher can only speculate that any terrorist attack in the region may yield certain benefits, such as “increased viewership, commercial activities and sales”. Nevertheless, the gathered data clearly indicates that the US mainstream media has the ability to influence people’s perspective, create a misperception of risk and adversely affect the region’s tourism industry regarding coverage of terrorism-related matters. The themes related to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept using the gathered data from the field are presented in Table 1.1.

Limitations The author acknowledges that every theory, concept and even definition comes with its limitations in one way or another. The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is not immune to this problem. Furthermore, some might argue that the concept’s “binary approach” to understanding terrorism might be problematic. However, the Stakeholders of Terrorism

Individuals

Stakeholders of Terrorism Intangible

Tangible Direct Likelihood of being killed; likelihood of being separated from your family; likelihood of imprisonment; maimed. Direct intangibles* can lead to the aforementioned Indirect Might be used to carry out attacks; possible lone wolf attacks; Mumbai-­style/ Sousse-stye terrorist attack; killing civilians; maiming civilians; psychological impact; social impact; destruction of property; direct intangible negatives* (death, destruction of property, physical, social and psychological impact of potential victims)

Intangible

Direct A sense of belonging; social exclusion; disappointed expectations; supporting a cause; relative deprivation; Wahhabi influence; not well-versed in Muslim faith; a sense of lost identity; meaning and purpose; yearning for respect; feeling like a low life; personal grievances; identifying with a struggle; a contact in jail; separated from your family; lose your life; offered some money to fight; securing one’s economic future; prospect of a better life; radicalisation (through peer-to-peer networks, religious leaders and social media) Indirect A severe threat to the region

Direct Securing one’s economic future; Prospect of a better life; feeling like a great jihadi warrior; power; respect; influence in the streets; intimidating other gangs; meaning and purpose; a sense of identity; identifying with a struggle; supporting a cause; a sense of belonging; economic advantages; increased social status

Positives

Negatives

Stakeholders of Terrorism concept

Direct Power; rise to senior positions in gangs; organised crime groups and violent gangs help FTF’s move undetected; a more attractive salary; offered money to fight

Tangible

Table 1.1  Displays the direct and indirect intangible and tangible negative and positive themes related to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept after triangulation and convergence of the gathered data from all sources of evidence (elite interviews, focus group and documents)

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Intangible

Tangible Direct Likelihood of being killed; separated from your family; likelihood of being imprisoned Indirect An attack on tourism sites; targeting of Western tourists (soft targets); killing civilians; maiming civilians; encouraging terrorist sympathisers to carry out terrorism-related acts; cyberterrorism; psychological impact; social impact; destruction of property; exploiting the banking system; bio-terrorism; organised crime groups and violent gangs

Nil

Intangible

Direct Radicalisation (through social media); recruiting terrorist sympathisers; encouraging disaffected youths to involve in extreme violence; Wahhabi influence Indirect ISIS children a concern; ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) returnees; a severe threat to the region; a severe threat to tourism

Indirect Impact region’s tourism; misperception of risk (travellers); influences people’s perception of terrorism.

ISIS

US Mainstream

Direct ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) returnees; targeting Western tourists (gain attention, attack on West); recruiting terrorist sympathisers (foot soldiers); exploiting the banking system (helps ISIS fund terrorism-­related activities); organised crime groups and violent gangs (help move ISIS undetected, foot soldiers); an attack on tourism sites (short-term strategic victory) Nil

Tangible

NB: For additional information regarding the meticulous and rigorous methodological procedure involved in building the Stakeholders of Concept, please see Appendix on pages 208–222

Increased viewership; commercial activities; sales *

Direct Using the region to access North America; using the region as a transit or resting spot; radicalised individuals who could be directed to carry out attacks

Positives

Stakeholders of Terrorism concept

Negatives

Stakeholders of Terrorism

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concept does not take a binary approach. It is quite the opposite. The concept attempts to fix this problematic view (those who might be inclined to view it as binary) by not making the negatives and positives “mutually exclusive” elements. This is because related themes can simultaneously coexist in the same category. For example, “a sense of belonging” or “being offered money to fight” can be understood as having both a casual and deleterious effect (negative) and simultaneously a beneficial effect (positive) on the side of the practitioner of terrorism. Moreover, the theme “psychological impact” can be understood as having an indirect intangible negative effect (on the part of the victims) and a direct intangible positive effect (for the terrorist group or perpetrator(s) who might have sought to cause a psychological impact). Another possible challenge to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is that of “suicide terrorism”. The typical question might be who will be the “beneficiary”? or more straightforwardly, how will the suicide terrorist “benefit” from their terroristic violence if death is assured? Surely not the individual who engaged in this Kamikaze-style asymmetrical warfare. However, even here I argue that the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept might prove illuminating. First, the suicide terrorist’s family might improve their economic conditions significantly (indirect benefit), while the terrorist themself might gain inherent psychological benefits through their belief that they will receive immediate acceptance into heaven, having their sin rescinded, and possibly also escaping from their unpleasant life (direct benefit). These can be deemed as indirect and direct tangible and intangible positives (“beneficial effects”) that the suicide terrorist garnered prior to their assured death. The positives in this case would not be limited to just the individual or confined by the rules of life, time and space. Thus, the indirect and direct benefits are as a result of the suicide terrorist’s engagement in terrorism. There would also, of course, be the direct and indirect negatives of the suicide terrorist’s engagement in terrorism. The former would include their assured death and the latter will be the devastation caused from blowing themselves up (in a crowd of people, destruction to property, etc.). There are also indirect and direct negatives related to the “causal effects”. For example, psychological dimensions (anger, rage, hatred, a sense of belonging, yearning for respect, etc.) and religious dimensions are direct causes of terrorism, while economic dimensions (poverty, unemployment, high underemployment, etc.) are indirect causal effects (risk factors/pre-conditions) that make terrorism more likely.

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Another limitation that some might suggest regarding the Stakeholders of Terrorism argument could be that it offers a “simplistic” analysis. Taking a complex, multi-layered, multifaceted phenomenon like terrorism, and attempting to view it through such a simplistic, bifurcated concept might pose some credible challenges. But this book argues that the Stakeholders of Terrorism approach is far from “simplistic”. It involves a complex operational procedure, which includes the gathering of relevant information pertaining to the specific terroristic episodic event from credible sources of evidence, triangulating the gathered data from the sources of evidence, and systemically placing the relevant themes extracted from the data into their respective categories in order to discern the inherent duality: the direct and indirect multiplicity of intangible and tangible negatives and positives related to the specific terrorism incident. Indeed, the author argues that it is actually the complexity, rather than the simplicity, of terrorism that emerges strongly from this research and argument by offering a more systematic understanding of terrorism. The rationale for using the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is to fully understand the Caribbean’s preparedness for and vulnerability to terrorism, with a view to assist the region in forging more sensible and pragmatic counterterrorism policies that evenly recognise the complex inherent duality of terrorism, i.e. the set of negatives and positives ever-present in most situations concerning terrorism. The six explanatory frameworks, and the stakeholders of terrorism scrutinised in the book, were also specifically selected by the researcher because of their applicability to the case study area (the Caribbean). The multifaceted nature or characteristics of terrorism can sometimes make it inherently difficult for governments, especially small island developing states governments like the Caribbean, to formulate effective counter-terrorism policies. The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, however, seeks to overcome some of these inherent challenges by offering sensible and practical recommendations towards mitigating the region’s vulnerability to and enhancing its preparedness for terrorism. Although the region has made significant strides in building its counterterrorism capacities by strengthening its partnership at the international, regional and subregional levels, the region suffers from what one might consider a “lax” security preparation to prevent and effectively tackle terrorism at both the national and regional levels. This is exacerbated by the failure of some Caribbean states to infuse sensible and pragmatic counterterrorism measures with law enforcement agencies or establish a separate security unit tasked with specifically addressing the risk

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factors, root problems and potential benefits associated with terrorism. Some of these issues were highlighted at the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) virtual briefing on “The threat of terrorism in Latin America and the Caribbean” on December 14, 2020. This reinforces the significance of the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept in enhancing the Caribbean’s preparedness for and reducing its vulnerability to terrorism. More importantly, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is not arguing that the inherent duality (negatives and the positives) is evidence of a set of clear-cut or well-defined boundaries that do not overlap in most situation concerning terrorism. Though they are conceptually distinct, they are not completely mutually exclusive or exhaustive clauses. There are times when certain related themes might interlink or be present in both categories. This occurred after triangulation and convergence of the gathered data and reflects the extreme complexity of terrorism and its dynamics. In fact, Moshe Farjoun (2010) highlighted that “social theorists who invoke duality (e.g. Elias, 1991; Giddens, 1984) can maintain conceptual distinctions without being committed to a rigid antagonism or separation”, which was the case in Giddens’s “duality of structure” (p. 204). The idea of duality as interpreted by Giddens emphasises how dimensions or elements can be interdependent and no longer diametrically opposed or separate, “although they remain conceptually distinct” (Jackson, 1999). The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality and reinforce this dualism to urge policy makers to forge counterterrorism policies that honestly recognise the negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism.

Bibliography References Badri-Maharaj, S. (2017). Globalization of the jihadist threat: Case study of Trinidad and Tobago. Strategic Analysis, 41(2), 173–189. Björnehed, E. (2004). Narco-terrorism: The merger of the war on drugs and the war on terror. Global Crime, 6(3–4), 305–324. Chitwood, K. (2019). The Global “War on Terror” and the Tenuous Public Space of Muslims in Latin America and the Caribbean. Hamsa. Journal of Judaic and Islamic Studies, (5). Cottee, S. (2019). The calypso caliphate: How Trinidad became a recruiting ground for ISIS. International Affairs, 95(2), 297–317.

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Cottee, S. (2021). Black flags of the Caribbean: How Trinidad became an ISIS Hotspot. Bloomsbury Publishing. Dictionaries, C. (2019). Collins English Dictionary essential edition. HarperCollins Publishers. Eji, E. (2016). Rethinking Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 18(3), 198–220. Farjoun, M. (2010). Beyond dualism: Stability and change as a duality. Academy of Management Review, 35(2), 202–225. Freeman, R. E. (2010). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Cambridge University Press. Freeman, R. E., & Reed, D. L. (1983). Stockholders and stakeholders: A new perspective on corporate governance. California Management Review, 25(3), 88–106. Gerges, F. A. (2016). ISIS: A history. Princeton University Press. Golash-Boza, T., & Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2013). Latino immigrant men and the deportation crisis: A gendered racial removal program. Latino Studies, 11(3), 271–292. Greene, K. J. (2015). ISIS: Trends in terrorist media and propaganda. International Studies Capstone Research Papers. Griffith, I. L. (2004). Caribbean security in the age of terror: Challenge and change. Ian Randle Publishers. Hall, A. (2012). The response of the tourism industry in Jamaica to crime and the threat of terrorism. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes, 4(1), 59–72. Izarali, M. R. (2017). The Caribbean in current global security affairs: The issue of terrorism. In crime, violence and security in the Caribbean (pp. 240–267). Routledge. Jackson, W. A. (1999). Dualism, duality and the complexity of economic institutions. International Journal of Social Economics. Knight, W. A. (2019). The nexus between vulnerabilities and violence in the Caribbean. Third World Quarterly, 40(2), 405–424. Koch, A. (2018). Jihadi beheading videos and their non-Jihadi echoes. Perspectives on Terrorism, 12(3), 24–34. Krippendorff, K. (1989). Content analysis. In E.  Barnouw, G.  Gerbner, W.  Schramm, T.  L. Worth, & L.  Gross (Eds.), International encyclopedia of communication (Vol. 1, pp. 403–407). Oxford University Press. http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/226 Liu, A., & Pratt, S. (2017). Tourism’s vulnerability and resilience to terrorism. Tourism Management, 60, 404–417. Mahood, S., & Rane, H. (2017). Islamist narratives in ISIS recruitment propaganda. The Journal of International Communication, 23(1), 15–35. Massey, D. S., & Pren, K. A. (2012). Unintended consequences of US immigration policy: Explaining the post-1965 surge from Latin America. Population and Development Review, 38(1), 1–29.

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McCoy, J., & Knight, W. A. (2017). Homegrown violent extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local patterns, global trends. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(4), 267–299. Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 853–886. Omale, D. J. O. (2013). Terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical paradigms and lessons for public policy. Canadian Social Science, 9(3), 96–103. Paraskevas, A., & Arendell, B. (2007). A strategic framework for terrorism prevention and mitigation in tourism destinations. Tourism Management, 28(6), 1560–1573. Phillips, D. (1990). Defense Policy in Barbados, 1966–1988. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 32(2), 69–102. Phillips, D. (1997). The Trinidad and Tobago defence force: Origin, structure, training, security and other roles. Caribbean Quarterly, 43(3), 13–33. Phillips, D. E. (2008). Terrorism and security in the Caribbean before and after 9/11. In Armed forces and conflict resolution: Sociological perspectives. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Pratt, G. (2003). Terrorism and tourism: Bahamas and Jamaica fight back. International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management, 15(3), 192–194. Stanislas, P., & Sadique, K. (2019). International attitudes to teaching religion and faith and the policing of minority communities. In Policing and minority communities (pp. 11–27). Springer. Thompson, J. K., Wartick, S. L., & Smith, H. L. (1991). Integrating corporate social performance and stakeholder management: Implications for a research agenda in small business. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, 12(1), 207–230. Walker, D. H. T., Bourne, L., & Rowlinson, S. (2008). Stakeholders and the supply chain. In D. H. T. Walker & S. Rowlinson (Eds.), Procurement systems: A cross industry project management perspective (pp. 70–100). Taylor & Francis. Winick, C. (1961). How people perceived “The Mad Bomber”. Public Opinion Quarterly, 25(1), 25–38. Yin, R.  K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods (applied social research methods).

CHAPTER 2

An Overview of the Existing Literature

Abstract  This chapter offers a systematic examination of existing scholarly explanations for the emergence and sustenance of terroristic violence through six explanatory frameworks: psychological dimensions, religious dimensions, strategic dynamics, cultural/civilisational contexts, political contexts and economic dimensions. This chapter also sets out the prevailing literature as it relates to the specific stakeholders of terrorism: US mainstream media, ISIS and individual actors/lone wolf. This chapter illustrates how it has been established in the exiting literature that there are numerous causes, impacts and benefits associated with terrorism activism; however, the prevailing literature does not sufficiently or explicitly, systematically or consistently emphasise the inherent duality as it pertains to the related themes associated with the specific explanatory frameworks in relation to terrorism-related activism. The chapter further highlights this as it relates to the specific stakeholders of terrorism—like, for instance, the US mainstream media wide-ranging debates and extensive literature on the US media in relation to terrorism focuses primarily on the media’s symbiotic relationship (between the media and terrorists), framing, packaging, presenting, Orwellian-style coverage, among others, however, it does not explicitly or systematically stress or reinforce the existence of an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism, in this case, the US mainstream media’s coverage of terrorism. The same for the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) and lone wolf/individual actors in which the prevailing © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Quashie, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40443-6_2

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literature extensively examines the former emergence, brutal terroristic violence, proficient use of social media, its criminalised war economy, source of revenue, among other things and the latter’s most salient causes, impacts and even the benefits that some lone wolf/individual actors might garner from their engagement in terrorism activism. Howbeit, the literature similar to the existing literature on the US mainstream media in relation to terrorism-activism, does not sufficiently, or explicitly, and neither systematically stresses the existence of an inherent duality as it relates to ISIS’s and lone wolf/individual actors’ engagement in terrorism-activism. Keywords  Defining terrorism • Psychology • Religion • Strategy • Culture/civilisation • Politics • Economics • ISIS • Lone wolf • Individual actors • US mainstream media

Introduction: Understanding Terrorism Defining Terrorism The term terrorism has its political roots in the French revolution in terms of terror by the state (Akinyode, 2014). For example, in Jude Jacques book (2011), The Fundamental Fair Pact: Government Reforms 101 stated: “In the early revolutionary years, it was largely by the violence that governments in Paris tried to impose their radical new order on a reluctant citizenry. As a result, the first meaning of the word ‘terrorism,’ as recorded by the Academie Francaise in 1978 was ‘system or rule of terror’” (p. 50). So, what is terrorism? Terrorism is violence or threats employed with political objectives involving a myriad “of acts, of targets, and of actors” that holds a significant psychological dimension, resulting in terror or fear among an intimidated group to garner political communication or achievements, which is best viewed as “subspecies of warfare and therefore it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage” (English, 2009, p. 24). Professor English (2009) argues that “psychology, civilization, religion, and strategy” may not provide the best lens in understanding or explaining terrorism in isolation. However, they can achieve a more holistic, multifaceted and critical approach to explaining terrorism once incorporated and placed into a political framework within a broader political setting that gives much attention to all elements: psychology, civilisation-culture, religion and strategy (p. 52). Therefore, the book will be using the definition put forward by Professor Richard English (2009) as it is holistic,

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multifaceted, multidimensional and more purposeful for the book’s central arguments. The existing literature offers an extensive and valuable body of explanations for terrorism. Richard English’s definition perfectly captures all relevant explanatory frameworks, thus cementing its purposefulness for this volume. This section will analyse six specific dimensions (psychology, religion, strategy, culture/civilisational context, economics and politics) thematically before enriching them by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. Furthermore, the six explanatory frameworks were specifically chosen because of their applicability in seeking to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context, the geographical location of the case study area. Explanations of Terrorism The idea of terrorism has become more embedded in our thoughts following the 9/11 attack and rise in international terrorism, and it has also become abundantly clear that Bush’s War on Terror has been ineffective in eradicating all forms of terrorism (Shrivastava, 2005). Notwithstanding the abundance of research and a sea of scholarly publications that offers a holistic and multifaceted understanding and explanation of terrorism, society still grapples with fully understanding the inner workings of terrorism. Therefore, it is vital to pay attention to what terrorists are trying to articulate regardless of how ill-informed, incoherent or brutal it may seem and take their various ideologies seriously into one’s analysis (English, 2009, p. 49). One must consider “ideological convictions” and make it central to explaining the extreme manner to which so many people behave that typify terrorism regardless of whether that terrorism is leftist, revolutionary, nationalist, liberationist, anti-colonial or other (English, 2009, p. 49). Professor Richard English (2009) suggests recognising “the multi-­ layered, interwoven nature of political explanation” and reject the “monocausal” approach to explaining terrorism. For instance, the denial of one’s fundamental rights (social, linguistic, cultural or ideological) by a particular political and social order can fuel terrorist violence or a type of terrorism, for example, the “ethno-nationalist causes such as Basque separatism and in conflicts in Sri Lanka, Chechnya, and Kashmir” (Newman, 2006, p. 753). Obviously, “terrorism involves the pursuit of expressly political goals, ranging—among others—from irredentism to regime change, to policy alteration, to redress of specific grievance, to religious transformation, to decolonization and liberation from empire, and beyond” (English, 2009, p. 48). Hence, terrorism cannot be fully understood or explained

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outside of a political framework that involves various elements incorporated within a much larger political setting. There exists a fundamental problem in the public debate as it relates to terrorism-related incidents, as more time and effort is committed to the condemnation of terrorism rather than the explanation of it, an understandable, but still regrettable, instinct in the wake of heinous violence, as any attempts to do so can sometimes inadvertently mean giving sympathy or some justification to those who engage in acts of terrorism (English, 2009, p. 27). It may pose a fundamental problem towards eradicating terrorism because it is essential to explain it rather than to perceive explanation as a justification to effectively combat terrorism (English, 2009, p.  28). Thus, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seek to shape our understanding of terrorism by borrowing from and adding to the existing explanations of terrorism. In doing so, the concept seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. This section will further explore the six explanatory dimensions (psychology, religion, culture/civilisation, strategy, economics and politics) with a view to having a full understanding of the existing debates regarding the understanding and explanation of terrorism. Psychological Dimensions Terrorism is vast and complex and poses a challenge even to the most astute of scholars and experts across the various scientific (social sciences) fields to explain terrorism or terroristic violence. Anyone trying to comprehend terrorism, the subject will undoubtedly “give pause to anyone whose aim is to understand it”, but in the wake of a terrorist attack, there exist two main constants: “The public [turns] to psychiatrists and psychologists … to explain this aspect of terrorist behavior; and psychiatrists and psychologists, just as regularly, have rushed to give explanations, sometimes without even being asked” (Reich, 1990b, p. 261 as cited in Horgan, 2017, p. 201), even though psychological studies have stressed the normality of practitioners of terrorism and even made clear that terrorists “are not insane at all” (Richardson, 2006 as cited in English, 2009, p. 29). Monahan (2015) states that no study exists in any society that has revealed any distinguishing personality traits between practitioners of terrorism and those who refrain from terroristic activities (Monahan, 2015 as cited in Horgan, 2017, p.  201). This argument is also in concert with

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Martha Crenshaw’s findings that “the outstanding common characteristic of terrorist is their normality”, as her studies of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the 1950s found members to be generally normal (Whittaker, 2001, p. 22). Professor Louise Richardson (2006b) reinforced this position in her book What Terrorists Want, writing that the one common characteristic shared among terrorists is their “normalcy” (p. 61). Professor Richard English, a Professor of Politics at Queen’s University Belfast, in his book, Terrorism: How to Respond clarified this point even further and made very clear that, “Research suggests that there is, in fact, nothing inherently psychologically damaged or psychopathological about those who practise terrorist violence” (p. 28). Similarly, Professor John G. Horgan, in his book, The Psychology of Terrorism (2017) also wrote that there exists a body of evidence in support of the argument that terrorists are not characterised by any specific type of distinctive personality traits and thus, “Explanations of terrorism (particularly at the level of the individual) in terms of personality traits are insufficient in trying to understand why people become involved in terrorism” (Horgan, 2017). Moreover, (McCauley, 2002 as cited in Cottam et al., 2010) has suggested that “psychopathology and personality disorder” are not more likely to be found among terrorists as opposed to non-terrorists from the same background in all of 30 years of research (Cottam et al., 2010, p. 271). Furthermore, anthropologist Scott Atran has also refuted many of the misconceptions about practitioners of terrorism following his interviews with failed and prospective suicide terrorists: “Far from being ignorant, impoverished, nihilistic, or men mentally ill…suicide terrorists tend to be educated, middle class, morally engaged and free from obvious psychopathology” (Pinker, 2011, p. 429). Many experts/scholars have a tendency to refute the existence of distinguishable psychological characteristics of terrorists and make clear that research has shown there exist little to no connections between particular psychological traits or psychopathology and individuals involved in terrorism (Whittaker, 2001, p.  19; Stout, 2004, p.  35; Richardson, 2006a, pp. 17–18; Richardson, 2006b, p. 61; Post, 2007, pp. 3–4; English, 2009, p.  28 and Cottam et  al., 2010, p.  271; Pinker, 2011, pp.  429–430). However, they also agree that there are indeed some psychological dimensions associated with people who engaged in terrorism. For instance, psychological dimensions such as rage, anger, hatred, indignation, jealousy, humiliation and the desire for revenge or hitting back in retaliation have at times played a vital role in the understanding and explanation of terrorism (Stout, 2004, pp. 38–39; Richardson, 2006a, p. 18; Richardson, 2006b,

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pp. 62–113; English, 2009, p. 30; Pinker, 2011, pp. 430–431; Turrettini, 2015, p. 183). In support of this, Newman (2006) asserts that “dispossession, human rights abuse, alienation, and humiliation are sources of conflict that are also linked to terrorism” (pp.  752–753). Furthermore, “a burning sense of injustice and dispossession” along with “desperation and uncontrollable rage” are also apparent factors in the preparation to use terrorist violence (Hoffman, 1998; Stern, 2003 as cited in Newman, 2006, p. 753). Another example is the 1984 Brighton bomber, Patrick Magee, who stressed that his “own arrest and beating-up at the hand of the British soldiers” played a significant part in his decision to join the IRA (English, 2009, p. 64). He stated that there was “a sense of anger. Real anger. I felt I just couldn’t walk away from this, and I did join up” (English, 2009, p. 64). Although Patrick Magee’s grandfather was a member of the IRA, it was not the deciding factor that influenced him to join the IRA, but lieu, feelings of “anger” and a “desire to fight back” (English, 2009, p. 64). In fact, some analysts have included in their analysis some of these psychological dimensions; for instance, hatred was enunciated in Jerrold M. Post’s assessment in terms of collective identity in some groups, especially nationalist-separatist groups and that this hatred is established through collective identity from early so that “hatred is bred in the bones” (Richardson, 2006a, p. 18). This bred in the bones hatred was evident in the case of Omar Rezaq, a member of the Abu Nidal Organisation, who was “socialised to the path of violent terrorism” and “taught to hate all Israelis and their American sponsors” (Post, 2007, p. 23). The word revenge is sometimes the most frequently used theme and primary motive for some practitioners of terrorism, be it past or present, secular or religious, left or right-wing terrorists (English, 2009, p.  31, Richardson, 2006a, p. 18; Richardson, 2006b, p. 113). For instance, the martyr book of the Palestinian suicide bomber Abu-Surur compiled by his elder brother Suhail al-Hindi after his brother’s death vehemently expressed the power of revenge: “that day he was born for revenge…revenge for me and my country and my people and the honor of the umma. Revenge for Majdal from which my parents were forced to flee, despite their passionate love of their soil, despite their sweat and blood, despite their huge love of its soil. Yes, he will take revenge, he will take revenge, he will take revenge, Allah permitting” (Richardson, 2006b, p.  113). Similarly, the theme revenge also rang loudly in Brenton Tarrant’s (responsible for the Christchurch massacre in New Zealand in 2019) manifesto:

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“To take revenge on the invaders for the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by foreign invaders in European lands throughout history. To take revenge for the enslavement of millions of Europeans taken from their lands by the Islamic slavers. To take revenge for the thousands of European lives lost to terror attacks throughout European lands. To take revenge for Ebba Akerlund” (Tarrant, 2019). Moreover, a desire for revenge could be attributed to “generationally transmitted” hatred. For example, Omar Rezaq sought revenge for the damage done to his parents and grandparents, ensuing from “the generational transmission of hatred” (Post, 2007, p. 21). Further evidence of the existence of psychological dimensions or impulses can be found in the case of “lone wolf” terrorists. For example, Timothy McVeigh, infamously known as the Oklahoma City Bomber, bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killing 168 people, including 19 children (McCooey, 2012). The McVeigh Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 was the deadliest act of terrorism to ever take place on American soil before the September 11, 2001 attacks (McCooey, 2012). However, McVeigh’s act of terrorism was driven by an act of revenge as he stated, “he sought revenge against the government for its handling of the 1993 Waco siege, which ended in the death of seventy-six people exactly two years prior to his bombing of the Murrah Federal Buildings” (Turrettini, 2015, p. 193). Additionally, results from interviews conducted with suicide bombers show that respondents (suicide bombers) agreed that “feelings of humiliation, revenge, and despair are important explanatory factors in certain types of terrorism” (Levy-Barzilai 2002, 2003; Hassan 2001 as cited in Newman, 2006, p. 753). Other evidence also suggests the existence of “inherent psychological rewards” that some practitioners of terroristic violence may garner from martyrdom, such as admission into heaven or a cancellation of one’s sins; and there might even be psychological rewards to be gained from suicide terrorism (English, 2016). There is also a sense of heroism that is attached to terrorism, along with an increase in social status, a sense of respect, honour and feelings of patriotism for simply being referred to or listed as the most wanted man. For example, a nationalist member of Fatah described having garnered “respect” and witnessing his “social status” greatly enhanced following his recruitment, and Shane Paul O’Doherty (sentenced to 30 life sentences for his bombing campaign in England) described how he no longer felt like an “insignificant teenager” who

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“became heroic overnight” and “felt almost drunk with power” when he was waging war against Britain (Richardson, 2006b, p. 96). Lastly, some practitioners of terrorism also garner a sense of patriotism or patriotic feelings from simply being referred to as the “most wanted man” like Prabhakaran who saw himself as a “true Tamil patriot” after being referred to as the most wanted man in Sri Lanka (Richardson, 2006b, p. 98). Although Professor Richard English’s (2009) definition and inclusion of his “psychological dimensions” provides an opportunity to incorporate “psychology” when explaining terrorism within a broader political framework, he was cautious not to imply that there are indeed psychological traits. For instance, he made clear that psychopathology cannot provide a “sufficient or serious explanation as to why there were high levels of terrorist violence in Belfast in 1972 but not in 1962, or in 1972 Belfast but not in 1972 Glasgow” (English, 2009, p. 29). Although scholars like Martha Crenshaw noted that the “outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality” (Spaaij, 2010; Whittaker, 2001), how does one explain terroristic violence carried out by “lone wolf” terrorist who display some form of “psychopathology” such as detachment from the real world and retreat into virtual realities like video games? For instance, Anders Behring Breivik, the lone wolf terrorist who was responsible for the 2011 Norway attacks and saw himself as a “Justiciar Knight”, lost himself in videos games as a way to detach from reality and base his existence on “cover stories, fake identities, avatars, secret bank accounts, and lies” (Turrettini, 2015, pp.  3–5). Also, Stout (2004) even posits that lone wolf terrorists like Theodore Kaczynski, the “Unabomber”, may have suffered from psychopathology (p.  37). Moreover, other scholars such as Professor Ramon Spaaij also noted that “lone wolf terrorists are relatively likely to suffer from some form of psychological disturbance”, and that case studies of prominent lone wolf terrorists such as Theordore Kaczinski, David Copeland and Franz Fuchs (all diagnosed with personality disorders) support this point (Spaaij, 2010, p. 862). Although the abundance of research has concluded that terrorists do not suffer from any particular psychological type or unique personality traits, there is no doubt that psychological dimensions (inter alia, anger, hatred, frustration, revenge) can play a crucial role in understanding and explaining terrorism. On the other hand, although most leading ­experts/ scholars have made it clear that the common characteristic shared among terrorists is their “normalcy”, some practitioners of terrorism, like in the

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case of a “lone wolf”, do sometimes exhibit particular personal traits or psychopathology. This was evident in the case of Anders Behring Breivik, who detached himself from reality, based his reality on “fake identities” and even saw himself as a “Justiciar Knight”, or Theodore Kaczynski, who displayed signs of psychopathology. On the other hand, psychological dimensions can be a useful template to understand the inherent psychological rewards that some practitioners of terrorism garner that ranges from an increase in social status to patriotic feelings after being placed on the most wanted list. Nevertheless, psychological dimensions have much to offer as it pertains to understanding and explaining terrorism. However, it is insufficient in isolation and might be fruitful once incorporated with the other dimensions and placed within a broader political framework. The following explanatory framework to be analysed in the literature concerns religious dimensions. Religious Dimensions Many scholars have noted the significant nexus between religion or religious belief and terrorist activity since one distinguished sociologist of religious terrorism stated, “religion seems to be connected with violence virtually everywhere” (English, 2009, p. 34). The link between religious belief and terrorism became more prominent as many people began to draw the connections between the two (religion and terrorism), especially in the wake of 9/11 and the years of terrorist violence that followed after that (English, 2009, p. 35). However, there was never a general consensus on religion as a crucial element to understanding and explaining terrorism, especially before 9/11. For instance, a podcast interview between Professor Richard English of Queen’s University Belfast and Georgetown University Professor Bruce Hoffman, conducted on June 30th, 2020, emphasised the importance of religious dimensions and their relevance to the understanding and explanation of terrorism in our contemporary society as also decades ago. For example, Professor Hoffman stated that, though his book, at the time, received largely positive reviews, there were some profound push backs because some people argued that religion was “inconsequential” and even perceived it [the focus on religion] as “fear-­ mongering”. However, during his time at the RAND Think Tank in the mid-1980s, as he was perusing the vast data on international terrorism and subsidiary domestic terrorism incident list, he found that religion was a

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“salient dimension” and a key “motivational factor” in most of the terrorist incidents (English, 2020). Bruce Hoffman also contends that religion has played a prominent role in the justification and legitimisation of both terrorism and higher levels of violence, such as in the case of the 9/11 terrorist attack and the emergence of ISIS as prominent examples (English, 2020). On terrorist actors, he argued that religion also affects how perpetrators engage in terrorism, because clerics and other religious figures/leaders were becoming increasingly involved in terrorism, and it played a critical role in transforming terrorism from a secular or ideological or nationalist/separatist phenomenon to a more religious one (English, 2020). Hence, terrorism became somewhat of a “divine commandment and that the perpetrators were defying the…word of God communicated by these religious authorities” if they refused to engage in terroristic violence (English, 2020). Hoffman’s findings are in substantial agreement with many scholars/ experts who see religion as integral to understanding and explaining terrorism, and who therefore suggest that the removal of religion or religious belief might take away an essential causational explanation of terrorism (Brown, 1987, p. xi; Cilluffo & Tomarchio, 1998, p.  441; Crenshaw, 2001, p. 1; Jacquard, 2002, p. 1; Dawkins, 2002; Hoffman, 2006, p. 82; English, 2009, p. 35; Spencer, 2010, p. 16; Pinker, 2011, pp. 425–433). Roland Jacquard (2002) argued that violence in the name of religion is as old as history and that “a global rise in religious terrorism has been documented”. For example, the “Irish Catholic and Protestant nationalists in Britain, the Hindu-Buddhist, Aum Shinri Kyo sect in Tokyo, Algerian Islamist in France, Christian militia…Palestinian suicide bombers and Jewish religious extremists in the Middles East” and among others (Jacquard, 2002, p.  1). A distinguished expert on terrorism, Professor Martha Crenshaw, also argued that “Extremist religious beliefs play a role in motivating terrorism, but they also display an instrumental logic” (Crenshaw, 2001, p. 1). Robert McAfee Brown (1987), who was a well-known theologian, argued that “there is no more potent creator of terroristic impulses than religious fanaticism. Christians who rather too quickly point to “holy wars” by Islamic sects need to remember that the Crusades and the Inquisition, which justified torture and death for the sake of “truth”, are part of their own history” (xi). Professor Richard Dawkins of Oxford University also asserted that “Only religious faith is a strong enough force to motivate such utter madness in otherwise sane and decent people”, in

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reference to the 7/7 London bombers of 2005 (as cited in English, 2009, p. 25). Moreover, in an op-ed article titled Design for a faith-based missile, Dawkins referred to the 9/11 hijackers as a “human guidance system” and that “religion” was the key factor that placed such courage in these men to fly a plane into a skyscraper, while not caring about “being blown up” (Dawkins, 2002). He even challenged the label that had been given to the 9/11 hijackers by leaders as “mindless cowards”, and stated that they [hijackers] had “sufficiently effective minds braced with an insane courage”, which came from religion and that “Religion is also, of course, the underlying source of the divisiveness in the Middle East that motivated the use of this deadly weapon in the first place” (Dawkins, 2002, p. 8). When it comes to the use of “suicide bombings” by terrorists or terrorist groups, Professor Richard Dawkins might have a point. For example, there were about 312 reported suicide attacks carried out between 2000 and 2003, to which 70% of suicide attacks in 2000 were carried out by organisations motivated by an infusion of religious and political goals (Atran, 2003; Atran, 2006 as cited in Ginges et al., 2009, p. 224). On the flip side, it can also be argued that religious groups are more likely to use suicide attacks because it is much easier to mobilise support for such attacks than other groups because of a “constituent” community (Ginges et  al., 2009, p.  224). Conversely, distinguished scholar Marc Sageman oppose the argument or the belief in some circle that “suicide terrorism” is primarily driven by “religious” fervour, particularly that of terroristic violence carried out in the name of the Islam region. In his book, Misunderstanding Terrorism, he stated: “More than a billion people believe in Islam and only a few hundred people have committed suicide in a terrorist act. Furthermore, many non-Muslims have carried out suicide terrorism. So, looking for the answer in Islam does not explain why the overwhelming majority of Muslims (a ratio of more than a million to one) do not commit such heinous acts and why non-Muslims do carry them out” (Sageman, 2017, p. 100). Apart from terrorist violence carried out by a group with religious dimensions, there may be other evidence to support the argument that there does exist a link between religion and terrorism. For example, Eric Robert Rudolph, nicknamed the Olympic Park Bomber, was a lone wolf terrorist “responsible for a series of bombings across the United States between 1996 and 1998” that resulted in the deaths of two people and injuring 150 others (Turrettini, 2015, p. 191). Eric Rudolph was primarily “motivated by his religious beliefs against abortion and gays”, and this

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was evident in the fact that even before setting off the bomb in the Centennial Park, he had sent letters to the news media claiming the “Army of God” was responsible (Turrettini, 2015, p. 191). On the other hand, it must be noted that religious zeal is not necessarily linked to terrorism, especially suicide terrorism or martyrdom operations. Although suicide terrorism is deployed as a tactic by Islamic terrorists, it is not exclusively linked to the religion of Islam or the “modern period” nor a “single region” (English, 2009, p. 36). For example, secular groups such as the Tamil Tigers (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE), the PKK, short for the Kurdistan Workers Party (English, 2009, p. 36) and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-­ Front, or DHKP-C (A leftist group) have all used “suicide bombings” (Parkinson & Peker, 2013) in their application of violent terroristic attacks. Other practitioners of terrorism have not expressed any form of religious beliefs in connections to their terrorist campaigns throughout history and present times, for example, “the 1970s terrorism associated with leftist groups in Germany and Italy” (English, 2009, p. 35). Another example is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC—Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), which is a socialist revolutionary organization driven by a Marxist-Leninist ideology that also employs “terroristic tactics to intimidate its political adversaries” (Post, 2007, pp. 149–150). While religion may sometimes be exploited to justify and intensify terrorist violence, it “doesn’t occur in isolation from other social and political forces and factors” (English, 2009, p. 39). Terrorism or acts of terror may include religious dimensions, but religious beliefs or religion are often a part of a broader political objective. For example, the IRA “has effectively been a Catholic organization in terms both of composition and of the communal grievances and support which have made it politically relevant”, but the IRA’s primary theme of its campaign was not religious motivation, but lieu the “interaction of political (particularly nationalist) beliefs with religious background which has made the organization so important” (English, 2009, p. 36). The IRA also garnered most of its support from the Catholic community, but its main goal was to seek “nationalist self-­ determination” and not religious aspirations; and although the IRA nationalism has been built on the communal grievances of the Catholic community in Ireland, religion was just part of a broader political story (English, 2009, p. 36). Osama bin Laden had exemplified this, for example, when he stated that “Here is America struck by God Almighty in one of its vital organs,

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so that its greatest buildings are destroyed. Grace and gratitude to God” following the 9/11 attack (English, 2009, p.  37). Before that, he had issued a “Declaration of Jihad” aimed at pushing US military forces out of the Arabian Peninsula, ousting the Saudi regime and freeing “the holy sites of Islam at Mecca and Medina” (English, 2009, p.  42). Even the “Bush administration’s signature foreign policy initiative, the “war on terrorism”, which of course resulted in the “Global War on Terror” also had with it “religious resonances” (Cady, 2008, p.  184). Now, all of these reveal precise religious dimensions mixed with political grievances, from the holy war to the Islamic struggle against non-Muslims (US troops) trespassing on holy grounds (Mecca and Medina) and to the driving out of US troops from the gulf and overthrowing the Saudi regime (English, 2009, p. 42). The former issues speak to religious dimensions, while the latter highlights apparent political grievances. Furthermore, there might also be some inherent psychological rewards that can be connected to religious dimensions. For instance, the inherent psychological rewards an individual might derive from martyrdom, such as “prompt admission into heaven and immediate remission of sins” to “psychological rewards derived from sacrificing oneself for (or devoting one’s work and career and activities to) an inherently valuable and noble and holy purpose or cause” (English, 2016, p. 164). Although Islam and other religious practices like Judaism and Christianity are not pacifist religion, there is a tendency, especially in the Western world, to view Islam as an exclusively violent religion mainly ensued from “historical prejudice and ignorance” (AbuKhalil, 2002, p. 29). Most importantly, the misuse of religion is often driven by a political climate intended to seek a political objective, for example struggles during the 1980s and 1990s against the Egyptian government by Muslim fundamentalists were inspired by opposition to the policies and actions of the government, and not by scripts of the Koran (AbuKhalil, 2002, p. 29). Omar Ashour (2009) argues that “Jihadism is a radical ideology within Islamism that stresses the use of violence as a legitimate, and in some versions the legitimate method of political and social change” and that jihadists primarily rely on “selective and literal Salafi interpretations of Islamic sources, hence the term “Salafi-Jihadism” (p. 8). Moreover, Jihadism can trace its roots in Egypt during the late 1960s and 1970s, an ideology that “was partially built on an interpretation of Sayyid Qutb’s writings, a prominent Islamist intellectual” (Ashour, 2009, p. 8). Nevertheless, “the concept of jihad, and all complex social, cultural, and economic nuances that

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drive politics” are disregarded and omitted in the media (AbuKhalil, 2002, p. 29). The cultural talks surrounding the nexus between terrorism and Islam has even turned the religious experience into political strategy by distinguishing between “good Muslim” and “bad Muslim” rather than terrorist from civilians (Mamdani, 2002, p. 766). However, the same logic is not applied to Christians as being “good Christian” or “bad Christian”, when Christian fundamentalists bombed abortion clinics or when African Americans were being lynched or victimised or tied to burning crosses by Ku Klux Klan (AbuKhalil, 2002, p. 30). Therefore, we can conclude that religion (even if sometimes misused) is integral to understanding and explaining terrorism. However, it is often interwoven with other elements, such as strategic dimensions (in the case of suicide attacks that sometimes tends to have a certain apotheosis attached to it) or political dimensions in the case of Eric Rudolph, who was motivated by his religious beliefs but sought a much broader political goal. Moreover, religion is also used by practitioners of terrorism for radicalisation, and to garner legitimacy and support to achieve a much broader political objective. Therefore, religious dimensions must be placed within a broader political framework along with other non-religious forces in providing a holistic understanding and explanation of terrorism. The following explanatory framework to be considered in the literature is that of strategic dimensions. Strategic Dimensions Religion is often used when explaining acts of terror, especially regarding terroristic violence carried out by known terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and its former leader, Osama Bin Laden. However, Osama Bin Laden is also useful in another explanatory framework, namely “strategy” (English, 2009, p. 43). Though some experts might have been hesitant to use the word strategy in some instances of applied terroristic violence, it [strategy] nonetheless plays an important role in the explanation of terrorist activism regardless of whether the strategy proves to be an “ill-judged one in practice” (English, 2009, p.  43). However, many leading experts consider strategic dimensions to be fundamental in the understanding and explanations of terrorism (Crenshaw, 2001, g. 1; Charles, 2005, p. 150; Hoffman, 2006, p.  3:132; Richardson, 2006b, p.  59; Wilkinson, 2006, pp.  6–7;

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Cronin, 2008, pp. 11–22; English, 2009, p. 43; Wright-Neville, 2010, p. xi; Pinker, 2011, p. 416; Horowitz, 2015, p. 75; Bale, 2018, p. 4). For instance, Steven Pinker (2011) suggested that “terrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare, a tactic of the weak against the strong” (p. 416), and Bruce Hoffman (2006) argues that “terrorists have become increasingly attracted to suicide attack because of their unique tactical advantage” (p.  132). Furthermore, Professor Louise Richardson (2006a) cautioned that “terrorism is a tactic” that “will continue to be deployed by those seeking changes as long as it proves to be effective (p.  247). Professor Richard English (2009) also argued that “as with other kinds of warfare, terrorist violence centrally does involve strategy: a plan of action with a view to achieving a goal, outcome or objective” (p. 43). Jeffery M. Bale (2018) argued that “terrorism is nothing more than violent operational technique, specifically a violent technique of psychological manipulation” (p. 4). Professor Paul Wilkinson (2006) argued that terrorism “can help weaken the enemy by a campaign of attrition” and that “terrorism is a low-cost, potentially high-yield and relatively low-risk method of struggle for the perpetrator” (p. 7). Furthermore, a leading expert on terrorism and Emerita Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science at Stanford University, Martha Crenshaw, sees terrorism as a strategy: the 9/11 attacks were a culmination of anti-­ American terrorism on the international level because America was the preferred target since the 1960s, mainly because it supported local government or regional enemies (Crenshaw, 2001, p. 1). This type of terrorism, she argues, “can be interpreted as a form of compellence: the use or threat of violence to compel the United States to withdraw from its external commitments. Terrorism should be seen as a strategic reaction to American power in the context of globalized civil war” (Crenshaw, 2001, p. 1). Though terrorists have been singlehandedly unsuccessful in achieving their much broader political objective and even strategically ineffective and unproductive in many instances, terrorism constitutes a species of war that involves strategic thinking to achieve a particular goal or outcome (English, 2009, p. 43). These strategies and tactics have been demonstrated by prominent terrorists, such as Timothy McVeigh and the former Al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden. For example, Timothy James McVeigh had detonated a truck bomb in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, that resulted in the deaths of 168 people (Faria, 2014). However, the bomb was constructed using fertilisers, demonstrating even

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when faced with financial constraints, “terrorists can adopt inexpensive technologies and use ‘creativity’ to carry out deadly attacks” (Faria, 2014, p. 291). This sort of adoption and creative thinking can be placed within a strategic framework. His “strategic thinking” was vital in him being creative and innovative in making his bomb amidst financial constraints to carry out his terroristic violence. In this context, the strategy includes tactics employed, creative thinking or creativity, and innovation employed in either the processes or application of terroristic violence. Unlike McVeigh, Osama bin Laden drew on past experiences during his time in Afghanistan with the Mujahidin helping to drive out a superpower (Soviets), which had emboldened him into believing that he can repeat the same in defeating another (English, 2009, p. 46; Geltzer, 2009, p. 87). For instance, in 2004, Osama bin Laden remarked that “We gained experience in guerrilla and attritional warfare in our struggle [in Afghanistan] against the great oppressive superpower, Russia, in which we and the mujahidin ground it down for ten years until it went bankrupt, and decided to withdraw in defeat…We are continuing to make America bleed to the point of bankruptcy” (English, 2009, pp.  45–46). Moreover, Al-Zawahiri also stated that “the defeated Soviet Union fled from Afghanistan, turning their back only to face their own political break-up and intellectual collapse. This is the fate that awaits America in Afghanistan…” (Geltzer, 2009, p. 87). This notion of making America bleed to bankruptcy signifies strategic thinking, tactic, and one that takes on “long-term and attritional quality”, and if the terrorist violence is sustained long enough, it would have eventually forced Bin Laden’s opponent in “Clausewitzean fashion” to capitulate to his demands (English, 2009, p. 45). In other words, Osama Bin Laden strategic plan may have been to sustain the terrorist violence over a long-term period to compel his opponent (America) to accede to his demands. Furthermore, strategic explanations of terrorism are also vital to explaining the kind of terroristic violence employed by terrorists or terrorist groups, such as the use of “suicide attacks”. This is because “suicide terrorism has a coherent strategic logic: it represents a particular brand of violence chosen with a view to advancing political goals” (English, 2009, p.  46). For example, Palestinian groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Al-Qaeda have all employed “suicide attacks” to force Israel to leave the West Bank and Gaza, pressure the Sri Lanka government to accept an independent Tamil homeland and force the United

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States of America to withdraw from the Saudi Arabian Peninsula, respectively (Pape, 2003). In all these instances, suicide terrorism was employed in mind to achieve a political goal. In the past, studies tended to focus on the “irrationality” of the act of suicide on the individual part, arguing that one is either motivated by some religious conviction or the individual is characterised to have some psychological disposition (Kramer, 1990; Merari, 1990; Post 1990 as cited in Pape, 2003, p. 343). Although religious dimensions or religious beliefs may, in some instances, play a role in suicide terrorism, as previously discussed, it does not account for a non-religious terrorist organisation like the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), who overwhelmingly employed suicide terrorism (Pape, 2003, p.  343). It is important to note, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ideology has Marxist/Leninist elements and mainly recruits from the Hindu Tamil population located in the northeast of Sri Lanka (Pape, 2003, p.  343). Between 1980 and 2001, there were approximately 186 suicide attacks to which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) accounted for a staggering 76% of all suicide attacks during that time (Pape, 2003). Although other factors such as religion or psychological dimensions can explain suicide terrorism in some instances, they are not the only reasonable explanation for using this kind of terrorism because suicide attacks are also strategic. Pape (2003) asserts that suicide terrorism is “strategic” because the vast majority of suicide attacks are not isolated or random acts but are employed as part of a more extensive campaign by a group aimed at achieving a specific political goal (p. 344). Additionally, suicide terrorism is often deployed to achieve a specific territorial goal to force foreign states’ military troops from the terrorists’ homeland. For example, suicide terrorism campaigns from 1980 to 2001 were primarily about establishing or maintaining self-determination of one’s homeland by pressuring the enemy to withdraw; and this was evident in many of the suicide terrorism campaigns between the same period from Lebanon to Israel to Sri Lanka to Kashmir and Chechnya (Pape, 2003, p. 344). While strategic dimensions are central to understanding and explaining terrorism, it is also important to ask ourselves, in thinking about the central goal of terrorism, does it [terrorism] work? Professor Paul Wilkinson (2006), in his book Terrorism versus liberal democracy, wrote: “In reality, the history of modern terrorism campaigns shows that terrorism as a major weapon has only very rarely succeeded in achieving a terrorist group’s strategic goals. The clear exceptions to this in recent history occurred in

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the period of anti-colonial struggles against the British and French after the Second World War, for example, in ending British Mandate control in Palestine, in ending British control of Cyprus and Aden and in ending French rule in Algeria” (p. 6). Also, Professor Richard English (2016), in his book Does Terrorism work? A History pointed out that distinguished terrorism scholar Professor Louise Richardson has suggested that “Terrorist groups have been singularly unsuccessful in delivering the political change they seek, but they have enjoyed considerable success in achieving their near-term aims” (p. 8). Though terrorists have been largely unsuccessful in achieving all their central goals, that is, political goals, there is no doubt that terrorists can undoubtedly have a strategic impact on international relations and political realms from time to time (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 6). For example, the use of suicide bombings against the Israeli civilians in the 1990s sabotaged the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, the 1996 mass hostage-­ taking by Chechen terrorists forced the Russian government “to make major concessions to the Chechen leadership”, and the 9/11 attack caused catastrophic damage to US foreign and security policies and it had an enormous impact on, inter alia, international relations and the Middle East conflict (Wilkinson, 2006, p.  7). Moreover, the “1972 Munich Massacre…was a great propaganda strike” because “at least a quarter of the world knew what was going on at Munich; after this, they could no longer ignore the Palestinian tragedy”, wrote Professor Richardson (2006) in her book What Terrorists Want. Moreover, terrorist targets are also typically towards the West or an establishment in an effort to bring attention to a particular set of issues or identifying with a cause or struggle, such as “to the cause of the Palestinian people” (Post, 2007, p.  3). The targeting of westerners, however, also bespeaks the strategic nature of terrorism, especially practitioners of terrorism like Al-Qaeda and ISIS that have a set of transnational strategic objectives (seek to topple governments that are supported by the West, rid sacred lands of foreigners, or even to establish their own “Islamic State”). However, terrorists in predominantly Islamic countries have a proclivity to target western tourists also known as “soft targets” because “the strategic goals are often best served if terrorist groups attack ‘Western’ targets” (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016). This is because western targets are more likely to attract enormous global media coverage, the killing of western tourist can also serve as a potential recruitment tool to recruit other likeminded radical Islamist individuals/groups who share similar

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“anti-­Western sentiments”, and it can be economically devastating for those Islamic countries that are heavily dependent on tourism as an important source of revenue (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016). Also, when terrorists use violence against victims, they seek to convey their message to a wider audience beyond the targeted victims such as constituents and potential recruits; and targeted victims are usually unarmed, and the randomness of the attacks means anyone at anytime and anywhere could be a victim of terrorism (Post, 2007, p. 3). Therefore, this type of terroristic behaviour is one of “strategy” in the manner in which terroristic violence is used against victims to reach a wider audience, with the aim of achieving a political goal, as a particular species of political violence or psychological warfare (Post, 2007, p. 3; English, 2009, p. 30). Unequivocally, strategic dimensions can play a critical role in understanding and explaining terrorism activism as strategic explanations of terrorism compel us to listen to what the terrorist is claiming as reason or justification for engaging in terrorism. Terrorism is indeed a tactic, a campaign of attrition and asymmetrical warfare in an attempt to compel one’s opponent in Clausewitzean fashion to capitulate to one’s demands. However, like the other dimensions, strategic explanations are insufficient in providing a much-needed or fruitful understanding and explanation of terrorism in isolation. Nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge strategic dimensions to terrorism and to place it within a broader political framework. The following explanatory framework to be considered in the literature is cultural/civilisational context. Cultural/Civilisational Context When the United States of America was attacked on September 11, 2001, by audacious Islamic terrorists, the “clash of civilisation” became for many the clear lens through which to try and make sense of or explain the horrific terrorist attack; and not simply because Samuel Huntington predicted a possible hostility between “Islam” and the “West” (Christianity) in the 1990s (Yadav, 2001, p.  3808; Abrahamian, 2003, pp.  529–531; Elden, 2009, pp.  7–8; English, 2009, p.  32). This fear of such cultural war or “Clash of Civilisation” became even more apparent following the backlash Muslims received after the 9/11 attacks (Yadav, 2001, p. 3808). Even the US mainstream press “automatically, implicitly and unanimously adopted Huntington’s paradigm to explain September 11” (Abrahamian, 2003, p. 529). In 2002, for example, Philosopher Roger Scruton asserted that

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“Samuel Huntington’s celebrated thesis that a “clash of civilizations has succeeded the Cold War” has more credibility today than it had in 1993 when it was first put forward. For many observers, reflecting on the calamity of September 11, the world has divided into two spheres: the sphere of freedom and democracy, and the sphere of despotism, “failed states”, and religious zeal” (as cited in English, 2009, p. 32). While culture/civilisational context (“Clash of Civilization”) was at the centre of Huntington’s analysis in predicting future conflicts or post-Cold War conflicts, he had also placed it in a sort of geographical context. For instance, Stuart Elden (2009) asserted that “Huntington identified a number of broadly geographically defined civilizations in the world and outlined the potential conflicts to come”, but he did not stand alone in this analysis about post-Cold War conflicts and suggesting that “Islam is a single cultural-political category” (p. 7). For example, key members in the Bush administration such as Richard Perle and Dick Cheney were among his admirers who heavily relied on Bernard Lewis’s work (on which Huntington’s clash of civilisation heavily drew) on Islam because it was proven to be extremely important and influential (Dunn, 2006, p.  3; Elden, 2009, p. 7). Moreover, this idea of a “clash” commenced in the West with former US President Richard Nixon who had even suggested that “the main future enemy would be Islam”, and even NATO’s secretary-­ general echoed similar sentiments, suggested Al-Zayyat, who also implied that “Bush’s use of the word “crusade” on September 16, 2001, was not a mistake, in that it brought into the particular logic of this confrontation, and that these sentiments had been echoed by Tony Blair” (Elden, 2009, p. 7). Considering the recent surge of nationalistic political leaders, in particular US President Donald Trump, studying terrorism in all its dimensions could not be more consequential in our contemporary society. For instance, the clash of civilisation by Samuel Huntington (1993) could explain President Donald Trump response to acts of terrorism. Most notably, the president’s “travel ban” can be cited as evidence of how the former US president views terrorism along cultural lines. Also, his attacks on one of America’s first Muslim Congresswomen Ilhan Omar, over her speech at the Council on American-Islamic Relations (Cair), in which she was trying to elucidate the issue of “Islamophobia” and delineate the discomfort of being viewed as a second-class citizen (McCarthy, 2019), bespeaks the fact that Trump views the issue of terrorism along cultural lines. For example, President Donald Trump had used his Twitter account to attack the

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Congresswoman by tweeting a spliced footage that shows a snippet of Ilhan Omar’s speech with a video of the 9/11 attacks, “including planes striking the World Trade Centre and the Twin Towers falling” (McCarthy, 2019). The clash of civilisation by Samuel Huntington (1993) asserts that: the patterns of association and conflict among nations in the post-cold war are that nations will be aligning themselves along cultural lines. For instance, “countries of similar culture will form alliances and those which historically are culturally different may come apart…we’ve witnessed this with the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia” (Huntington, 1993). Samuel Huntington (1993) premise is that conflicts in the post-cold war, i.e. the new world order, will not be as a result of ideological or economic factors, but “the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (p. 22). Today, the clash of civilisation could not be more evident within the context of certain public officials like the former US President, Donald Trump and his aides who were the architects of the controversial travel ban and believed that they were “involved in a struggle to save western civilisation” (Rachman, 2017). For example, the president’s former embattled national security advisor, Michael Flynn, in his book Field of Fight, suggested that “We’re in a world war against a messianic mass movement of evil people, most of them inspired by a totalitarian ideology: Radical Islam” (Rachman, 2017). Similarly, Steve Bannon, the president’s former chief strategist, back in 2014  in a seminar held at the Vatican asserted that the West is at the “beginning stages of a global war against Islamic fascism” (Rachman, 2017). To add insult to injury, the US mainstream media coverage of a massacre that happened in Quebec City in 2017 portrayed the Moroccan born Mohamed Belkhadir as a suspect. For example, Fox News tweeted out that the “Suspect in Quebec Mosque terrorist attack was of Moroccan origin”, even though the attacker was white, and the Moroccan was the one that called police after hearing shots fired—further underscoring how terrorism is viewed along cultural lines as the news media often links “Muslims” with “terrorism” (Corbin, 2017, pp. 459–460). However, there is a danger to overgeneralise culture and civilisation as an explanation of terrorism or terroristic violence as “Civilisation and culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people”; this danger of overgeneralisation was also highlighted in Roger Scruton’s statement as it relates to his contrast between the West and the rest that “the difference

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between the West and the rest is that Western societies are governed by politics; the rest are ruled by power” (English, 2009, p. 32). Ironically, much terrorist-related violence has occurred within and not so much between civilisations (English, 2009, p. 33). For example, Basque political violence in Spain, paramilitary conflict in Northern Ireland, radical leftist terrorism in Germany, the use of terror in Colombia’s civil war by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army: ELN (English, 2009; Feldmann, 2017). While culture/civilisational context may be helpful in explaining terroristic violence, it is also crucial to avoid simplistic overgeneralisation when using culture/civilisational context as a template for understanding and explaining terrorist activity. Likewise, culture/civilisational context must be married with other elements and not used in isolation, in order to provide a more holistic understanding and explanation of terrorism. The following explanatory framework to be considered is that of political context. Political Dimensions While no single dimension or factor is sufficient in isolation in offering a holistic explanation of terrorism, most experts/scholars agree that political context is a vital component to the understanding and explanation of terrorism (Crenshaw, 2001, p.  1; Cronin, 2003, p.  33; Hayden et  al., 2003, p.  143; Charles, 2005, pp.  150–154; Richardson, 2006b, p.  20; Hoffman, 2006, p. 3; Wilkinson, 2006, p. 1; Cronin, 2008, pp. 11–22; English, 2009, p.  48; Sandler, 2015, p.  1; English, 2016, p.  1). For instance, Audrey Cronin (2008) argued that “terrorism’s strategic logic is to draw enough power from the nation-state so as to enable a weaker, non-state actor to accomplish its political aim” (p. 11). Moreover, terrorism or the use of terroristic violence is invariably about achieving a political goal, to either “precipitate political change” or about fighting for justice or the perception of it (Cronin, 2003, p. 33). Todd Sandler (2015) asserts that “terrorists seek to circumvent normal channels for political change” and do so by the use of barbaric violence that traumatises the public to compel a government to capitulate to their demands (p.  1). A similar view is also shared by a leading expert on terrorism, Professor Richard English (2016), who suggests that terrorism “is focused on the pursuit of political change” (p. 1).

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Also, J. Daryl Charles (2005), in his book, Between Pacifism and Jihad: Just War and Christian Tradition, pointed out that “Christopher Harmon has reminded us, terrorism never loses its essential nature, and that is the abuse of innocent in the service of political goals” (p. 150). He went on to say, “terrorists live in a clandestine world, much like organized crime, though with markedly political and not merely economic goals” (p. 154). Even Al-Qaeda’s use of terroristic violence is not merely to gain a tactical advantage or engage with the enemy in attritional warfare but to achieve a political goal. General Sir Mike Jackson (head of the British Army during the 2003 invasion of Iraq) noted: “Al-Qaeda’s end is not terrorism…that is their way of applying the means of violence; its end is the political one of achieving the ascendancy of Islamic fundamentalism” (English, 2009, p. 130). Like all the other dimensions, politics plays an essential role in explaining terroristic violence as “terrorism involves the pursuit of expressly political goals” (English, 2009, p. 48). These political goals can range from, among other things, regime changes, policy modification, rectifying particular grievances, revolutionary social change, decolonisation to religious transformation (English, 2009, p. 48). In support of this, David Rapoport described “modern terrorism”, mainly those orchestrated by groups like Al-Qaeda, as “religiously inspired”; however, earlier acts of terrorism were linked to the “break up of empires, decolonization and leftist anti-­ Westernism” (Cronin, 2003, p. 35). For example, one of the first documented uses of such political violence [terrorism] was by the Sicarri, who were a zealot religious sect fighting against the Roman rule in Palestine between AD 66–73 (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; Waldmann, 1998, pp. 99–103 as cited in Spencer, 2010, p. 9). Moreover, around the nineteenth century to World War I witnessed the frequent use of bombings and assassinations by revolutionaries and anarchists in their fight against autocracy and that “terrorism became an important part of the anti-colonial struggles after the Second World War” (Spencer, 2010, pp. 9–10). For example, in the post-World War II era, the use of terroristic violence was crucial in “ending the British Mandate control in Palestine, ending British control of Cyprus and Aden and ending French rule in Algeria” (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 6). These victories, however, were not solely because of the use of terroristic violence, but other elements along with terroristic violence played a vital role. For instance, Professor Paul Wilkinson (2006) noted: “there were special factors militating in favour of the rebels” in all three cases as the public, and the government of the colonial territories had no real

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appetite “to occupy these countries or sacrifice the lives of young soldiers and colonial police, or to expand their scarce resources, already severely denuded after six years of world war” (p. 6). Professor Richard English suggests recognising “the multi-layered, interwoven nature of political explanation” and calls for a rejection of the ‘monocausal’ approach to explaining terrorism, and lieu opt for a multi-­ causal approach that links together all elements in a multiple-causation explanation (English, 2009, p. 52). The reason for this is that terrorism is not solely created due to psychological impulses, or culture/civilizational clashes, or religious beliefs or convictions, and neither is it mainly as a result of strategic thinking outside the realm of politics, but instead because of a political cause and context which can bring them all (and other elements) together” (English, 2009, p. 52). Professor Paul Wilkinson (2006), who was a leading terrorism expert also argued “terrorism can be conceptually and empirically distinguished from other modes of violence and conflict”, as it is premeditated violence “designed to create a climate of extreme fear” …directed at a wider audience beyond the immediate targets, “inherently involves attacks on random or symbolic targets” and among other characteristics (p. 1). However, he argued that “it [terrorism] is used primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political behaviour of governments, communities or specific social groups” (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 1). While many may doubt or disagree with terrorist’s beliefs or assertions that their violent methods are an effective, legitimate, justifiable and the only available course of action to ascertaining their political agenda, one cannot dispute the fact that “many terrorists themselves consider existing political realities to be intolerable, and that they think terrorist violence necessary in order to achieve essential change” (English, 2009, p.  48). Take it from Saadi Yacef, a former leader of the Algerian National Liberation Front (NLF), whose own words were: “it’s our only way of expressing ourselves” (English, 2016, p. 2). Additionally, one of the most famous former Provisional IRA or Irish Republican Army leaders, Patrick Magee, had expressed in an interview with Professor English: “At one time that was all we could do, that was the only avenue open to us, was to engage in armed struggle” (English, 2016, p. 2). Today, many terrorist groups like ISIS and PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) still used violence as they perceive it as an “effective and legitimate tool to achieve their political objectives” (Daskin, 2016).

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Also, distinctions must be made between terrorist groups whose goals and operations are primarily localised to those that are more globalised with their ambitions (English, 2009, p. 49). For example, Al-Nusra Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, is a terrorist organisation and once a regional Al-Qaeda group, whose operations are more localised in Syria as it is fighting against the Syrian government, and its goal is to establish an Islamic state in the country (Andersen, 2017, pp. 9–11). Abu Muhammad al-Julani, leader of the Jabhat Al-Nusra group, once declared in a statement that “Jabhat al-Nusra currently does not regard Syria as a base for attacks on the West”, however, it “is not only to get rid of the Bashar a-Assad regime, but also something greater”, i.e. a Sharia-based Islamic state and, in the long term, a caliphate”, according to Charles Lister (Andersen, 2017, p.  9). Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda’s objective is more globalised, especially more so today than under Osama bin Laden whose primary goal was to target the United States of America and remove the superpower from the Middle East (Andersen, 2017, p. 10). However, the new Al-Qaeda is less centrally controlled and has a more regional approach, making it even more dangerous to the Middle East and the West (Andersen, 2017, p. 10). Another important facet to the political dimension is the “political legitimacy” complication that is typically associated with nationalist terrorism, given that nationalism is often a crucial ingredient used for explaining terroristic violence; for example, “from Spain to Ireland to Israel/Palestine to Chechnya and beyond, the explanation from nationalism is often decisive when assessing the most valuable framework for explaining terror” (English, 2009, p. 50). Nationalism is arguably one of the most powerful (if not the most powerful) of all modern forces in our human history (English, 2009, p. 51). Terroristic violence has also been used to pursue nationalistic goals, especially when a particular group feels that their self-­ determination is being impeded and when nationalities deem present-day political arrangements to be illegitimate, these have been grounds for enduring conflict, and terroristic violence has at times been part of this process (English, 2009, p. 51). Another political factor is the “political impact” ensuing from terroristic violence. A terrorist attack tends to enhance public fear, anxiety and create a sense of misperception of risk. This might eventually lead to shifting public opinion on certain topical issues and public support of counterterrorism-­ related policies. For instance, a research study conducted in July 2018 found that the majority of the respondents supported

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enhanced security measures towards combating terrorism (Haner et  al., 2020). For example, a total of 967 respondents who partook in the study were asked how much they agreed with a series of statements that were rated on a Likert scale, and the results showed that a majority of respondents supported increased security in public settings: “(1) increased airport security—72.2%; (2) increased transit security—62.6%; (3) increased building security—60.6%; (4) border control to prevent Islamic terrorists—60.2%” (Haner et al., 2020). While enhanced security measures like establishing a remote drop-off and pickup lot, might aid in mitigating large airports’ vulnerability to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), it also comes with a “significant cost and inconvenience to passengers” (Stewart & Mueller, 2014). The same is true for enhanced security measures implemented in parking restriction areas near terminals, and increased search and screening measures can cause delays for some passengers, and even result in anxiety and fear, all of which can “deter many from flying at all” (Stewart & Mueller, 2014). There is also “political impact” interwoven with “strategic impact” on the side of the individual actors. For example, the 9/11 attack by Al-Qaeda undoubtedly had an impact on international relations and politics and forced the world’s greatest superpower into a war on false pretexts regarding Iraq’s weapon capabilities (Weapons of Mass destructions) and Saddam Hussein’s alleged links to the transnational Islamic terrorist organisation (English, 2016). In fact, America’s invasion of Iraq caused “calamitous damage” to its international reputation, credibility and global standing (Brzezinski, 2007). The use of terroristic violence can also force governments and the wider public to pay attention to a particular set of political grievances like the 1972 Munich Massacre, which was a “great propaganda strike”, given that some 900 million people in 100 countries were witnessing the terroristic episodic event through their television screens; this meant that the world “could no longer ignore the Palestinian tragedy” (Richardson, 2006b, p. 95). Moreover, the bombing of the Nelson’s Pillar in March 1966 could also be viewed as a sort of “political impact”, as Roisin Higgins candidly observed that: “the blowing up of Nelson’s Pillar represented the most literal commemorative act of 1966. Physically, it reproduced rubble on O’Connell Street; and symbolically, it re-enacted the toppling of empire” (Higgins as cited in Daly & O’Callaghan, 2007, p.  275). Furthermore, Higgins stated that it [blowing up of Nelson’s Pillar] also “threatened to upstage the government’s plans to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the 1916 Rising…” (Higgins as cited in Daly &

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O’Callaghan, 2007, p.  275). The IRA’s superior engineering skills also somewhat became a part of the “mythology of the Pillar’s demise” (Higgins as cited in Daly & O’Callaghan, 2007, p. 274). Notwithstanding the importance of politics in explaining terrorism, it cannot in isolation provide the best lens to understand and explain terrorism. Nevertheless, it is essential and relevant to the understanding and explanations of terrorism regardless of the motivations behind the acts of terror (religious convictions, psychological impulses and strategy); it usually comes down to one central goal: to achieve a political objective. The following explanatory framework to be considered in the literature is economic dimensions. Economic Dimensions Following the 9/11 attacks, some prominent observers and policy advisors were calling for increases in “aid and educational assistance” as a solution for ending terrorism, and even President Bush had declared, “We fight against poverty…because hope is an answer to terror” (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002, p. 27). However, many experts/scholars see economic dimensions such as poverty, inequality, or social and economic deprivation as “risk factors” that can make terrorism or terroristic violence more likely (Newman, 2006, p. 751; Richardson, 2006b, p. 78; English, 2009, p. 63; Piazza, 2011, p. 341; Enders & Hoover, 2012, p. 267). In countries or regions where high poverty rates exist, it can foster resentment and desperation among the citizenry that can result in support for political extremism and provide grounds for grievances and most importantly, poverty-­stricken societies tend to lack the capacity to prohibit terrorist crisis or terrorist recruitment and suffer from insufficient resources to invest in the types of educational programmes that could reduce recruitment for terrorism (Newman, 2006, p. 751). Therefore, “states that lack legitimacy and control over the economy and other traditional levers of power provide the space and oxygen for terrorist groups to flourish” (O’Neill, 2002 as cited in Newman, 2006, p. 751). For instance, this is why local and transnational terrorist organisations can set up base of operations and thrive and garner support in countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, Somalia and Georgia (Newman, 2006, p. 751). The same has been true in Nigeria, where the government, its military and security have come under local and international scrutiny concerning its effectiveness in combating the terrorist group, Boko Haram

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(Adelaja et al., 2018, p. 37). Nigeria has provided Boko Haram with space and oxygen to thrive, set up a base of operation and even garner support because of corruption, especially in the Nigerian Defence Sector, which has led to insufficient supply of equipment such as ammunition and fuel to effectively tackle Boko Haram (Adelaja et al., 2018, p. 37). On the other hand, some studies and empirical research have found no causal link between poverty, inequality and terrorism when examining terrorism at the individual level. They have also found that people who are economically deprived or uneducated or unemployed are not always most likely than the average person to be terrorist perpetrators or support terrorism (Piazza, 2011, p.  339). Another distinguished scholar, Louise Richardson, does not think that economic deprivation, poverty and inequality are valid causal explanations for terrorism. If this were true, “Africa, the poorest continent on the planet, would be awash in terrorism”, or countries in Africa and Latin America that have the highest rates of inequality would have the highest rates of terrorism (Richardson, 2006b, p. 78). Professor Louise Richardson’s assertions are in significant agreement with other scholarly writings: between the years of 1968 and 2007, 11% of all terrorist incidents occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean (Cottam et al., 2010, p. 265), despite the region suffering from high underemployment and unemployment rate and high levels of poverty and inequality (CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2018, p. 7). However, Professor Richardson (2006b) noted, “rather than being a cause of terrorism, poverty and inequality are risk factors that increase the likelihood of terrorism” (p.  79). Krueger and Maleckova (2002) also made clear that evidence shows very little connection between poverty, education and terrorism. They also argued that it might be more accurate to view terrorism as a response to political conditions and deep-rooted “indignity and frustration”, rather than viewing it [terrorism] “as a direct response to low market opportunities or lack of education” (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002, p. 27). On the other hand, unequal access to government health care, education, social services, housing and lack of economic opportunities that are available to the general public, can make an aggrieved minority population (minority economic discrimination) distrustful of state authority and institutions and more likely to be susceptible to radicalization (Piazza, 2011, p. 341). These types of conditions may also create fertile grounds for terrorist organisations to recruit soldiers, raise money and even plan attacks (Piazza, 2011, p. 341). For example, case studies conducted in Northern

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Ireland and the Latin American region, as well as survey research in Western Europe, found that minority group’s experience of discrimination to be a “root source of minority community radicalization that is exploited by extremist movements and terrorist organizations” (O’Hearn, 1987, Cleary, 2000, Klausen, 2005, as cited in Piazza, 2011, p. 341). Also, social and economic deprivation can be a root cause of violent conflicts. In the 1970s, for instance, social and economic deprivation suffered by the nationalist people in Northern Ireland was one of the primary sources that triggered the violence in Ireland, claimed the IRA: “peaceful attempts to deal with such problems had failed; the problem of such deprivation was maintained by the British rule; and force was the only means of removing the evil of the British presence in Ireland” (English, 2009, p. 63). On the flip side, minority groups that do not experience economic discrimination or effectively addressing economic discrimination problems through remedial policies can help integrate minorities into mainstream economic society and make them [minority groups] less susceptible to radicalisation. For example, (Hewitt’s 1984, as cited in Piazza, 2011, p.  341) qualitative study of counter-­ terrorism responses in Northern Ireland, the Spanish Basque region, Italy against the Red Brigades, Uruguay against the Tupamaros and Cyprus against EOKA, “credits the poor economic status of specific groups within the population, instead of the overall economic climate, as a crucial element in fuelling terrorist group recruitment and activities” (Piazza, 2011, p. 341). However, implementing proactive remedial economic programmes to address the specific issues likened to the education and housing subsidies of Catholics in Northern Ireland, which Hewitt credited “with reducing the threat of terrorism”, can be practical tools in tackling terrorism (Piazza, 2011, p. 341). Also, changes in economic circumstances can impact the type of terrorist activity. For instance, Enders and Hoover (2012) found that poverty has a strong influence on domestic terrorism as opposed to transnational terrorism on which it had little effect (p. 267). It is also important to differentiate between domestic and transnational terrorism because the former’s motives generally differ from the latter (Enders & Hoover, 2012, p. 267). For example, the FARC intended to “seize power for the purpose of instituting a Marxist-Leninist regime” (Marks, 2017, p. 489) whereas Al-Qaeda possessed a more global objective, especially more so than under Osama bin Laden whose primary goal was targeting the United States of America and removing the superpower from the Middle East (Andersen, 2017, p. 10).

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Additionally, it is difficult to identify which nation’s poverty is most applicable in the analysis. For example, the so-called “underwear bomber”, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was a Nigerian operative for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempting to blow up an airplane en route from Amsterdam to Detroit” (Enders & Hoover, 2012, p. 267). Nevertheless, economics can play a meaningful role in the explanation of terrorism or terroristic violence. For example, the greater Horns of Africa (Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya) is home to interlocking conflicts, weak/failing states, rampant corruption and extreme poverty, gained much attention following the 9/11 attacks as a possible haven for Al-Qaeda to gain recruits (Lyman & Morrison, 2004, p.  76). Like all other dimensions, economic dimensions are insufficient and ineffective in offering an accurate explanation of terrorism in isolation. More importantly, economic dimensions such as poverty, unemployment or minority economic discrimination are more accurately viewed as “risk factors” or “pre-conditions” that makes terrorism more likely. On the other hand, implementing proactive economic remedial policies to tackle specific economic-related issues can mitigate the risk factors and reduce specific groups within a population susceptibility to terrorism. Furthermore, economic dimensions can also be viewed not just as a “risk factor” within the context of terrorism; it can also be viewed as a beneficial effect that can act as an incentive to encourage or motivate individuals to engage in terrorism-related activities (beneficial, when seen from the perspective of the terrorist organisation). The beneficial effect can either have a direct or indirect effect. The former relates to the economic benefits that the practitioner of terrorism derives from their active participation in terrorism, while the latter refers to the economic benefits a third party (like the terrorist’s family) might garner from their engagement in terrorism. For example, evidence has suggested “that in some cases the prospective economic improvement of their families’ situation played a role in motivating Palestinian suicide bombers to adopt that tactic” (English, 2016, p. 164). Though suicide bombers tend to be mostly understood through religious or strategic dimensions (as previously explained), economic dimensions also have much to offer once incorporated with other elements (psychology, strategy, culture/civilisational context, religion and political) and placed within a broader political framework.

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Concluding Thoughts Evidently, it has been established in the prevailing literature that there are numerous causes, impacts and benefits associated with terrorism activism. This is evident through the various explanatory frameworks (psychological, strategic, religious, culture/civilisational context, political and economic dimensions) that were used as meaningful templates by a number of scholars and experts on terrorism in one way or another in offering a holistic understanding of terrorism (e.g. English, 2009; Richardson, 2006b; Hoffman, 2006; Cronin, 2008; English, 2016; Wilkinson, 2006; Newman, 2006; Piazza, 2011; Enders & Hoover, 2012; Wright-Neville, 2010; Pinker, 2011; Horowitz, 2015; Crenshaw, 1981; Whittaker, 2001; Crenshaw, 2001; Horgan, 2017; Brown, 1987; Sageman, 2017; Post, 2007; Brown, 1987). It can be then argued that the prevailing literature strengthens the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept by implicitly recognizing the inherent duality of terrorism to varying degrees through the multitude of explanatory frameworks. However, the prevailing literature does not sufficiently or explicitly, systematically or consistently, emphasise the inherent duality as it pertains to the related themes associated with the specific explanatory frameworks in relation to terrorism-related activism. For instance, though the prevailing literature offers a multifaceted understanding and explanation of terrorism, such as in the case of suicide terrorism by explaining the causes, impacts and even benefits (on the side of the suicide bomber and or his/her family), it does not explicitly state or show readers how “suicide terrorism” can have an indirect and direct negative effect and simultaneously an indirect and direct positive effect. This, however, is achieved more systematically by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, a concept which provides for a more systematic and effective recognition, across many instances of terrorism, of the inherent duality currently implicit in the existing scholarly literature. The following subheadings will provide an overview of the existing literature on the stakeholders of terrorism themselves. The sequence is as follows: US mainstream media, the Islamic State (ISIS) and individuals. After the detailed and concise overview in relation to the aforementioned stakeholders of terrorism, the following chapter (Chap. 2) will then explain what interpreting these actors explicitly as stakeholders of terrorism can reveal.

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Stakeholder of Terrorism: Media Rationale: Why the US Mainstream Media Is Purposeful for This Volume? The term “mass media” is often considered to encompass primarily the most well-known media outlets, particularly the most popular corporate media channels such as “popular television, film and book publishing outlets” (DiMaggio, 2008, p. 20). In this research study, the mass media is primarily focused on the US mainstream media, which comprises network news stations like, inter alia, CBS, MSNBC, CNN, NBC and ABC, as well as the elitist print media: the New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times as they play a vital role in agenda-setting for locally based newspapers, national and local prime time television news programmes, cable and radio news, and they also possess the power to reach, shape and influence international audiences (DiMaggio, 2008, p. 21, 42), particularly a Caribbean audience that is in large part due to our close geographical proximity to the United States of America. Some scholars/experts or even censorious readers might ask why the US mainstream media as opposed to other reputable internationally-­ recognised media from other countries/regions— like, for instance, from the UK or France? Or why not examine the Caribbean media? All good and valid questions. However, US mainstream media (as mentioned earlier) was purposefully chosen for its applicability in offering an understanding of terrorism within the context of the Caribbean through the US media landscape. This book will be focusing on the US mainstream media, particularly those that are now easily accessible via online, which now includes cable news channel like CNN and MSNBC and elitist print media (New York Times, Washington Post, etc.) contents that are available across social media websites (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) and the internet, making them internationally ambitious. Particular attention will also be paid to US mainstream media because of its ubiquitous nature, global dominance in the global media communication system. For example, Robert W. McChesney, author of several media-related books and professor of communication at the University of Illinois found that the “global commercial media system” was dominated “small number of super-­ powerful, mostly US-based transnational media corporations” (McChesney, 2000). Professor McChesney’s research also found that CNN International, a subsidiary of CNN that had established itself as the

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premier global television news channel with 10 satellites beaming into over 200 nations and 90 million subscribers by 1994 (McChesney, 2000). In 2019, CNN also topped in share of global audience with a staggering 166  million unique multiplatform visitors in July 2019 to the BBC’s 148  million unique visitors, Yahoo News 117  million, FoxNews.com 111 million, The New York Times Brand 106 million and the DailyMail. co.uk 104 million (CNN, 2019). Also, there is no literature on Caribbean media and terrorism and neither any credible quantitative nor qualitative research study has been conducted in this regard. Hence, another reason for the inclusion of the US mainstream media to explore and examine the phenomenon of US media capacity to influence/shape Caribbean nationals (particularly Caribbean youths) understanding of terrorism. This approach is congruous with and guided by the qualitative research method—case study method—as defined by Robert Yin (2009). Moreover, the lack of research interest in this field might be because the Caribbean has not experienced as much terroristic violence as other parts of the world and regional media houses tend to dedicate few articles in the coverage of terroristic episodic events. Moreover, the US mainstream media’s inclusion was also due to its ability to influence/shape public opinion on issues like violence and terrorism (e.g. Dolliver & Kearns, 2019; Huff & Kertzer, 2018). However, there have been very little research conducted to explore the US mainstream media’s ability to influence/shape its global audience (which includes the Caribbean)—given its global dominance in the global media realm—perspective on topical issues like violence and terrorism. The findings, however, from the focus study group study in this pool have found that this is a possibility. For instance, ALL focus group participants unequivocally stated that US mainstream media, particularly cable news channels like CNN and MSNBC and elitist print media content online from The New  York Times and Washington Post influence/shape their understanding of terrorism. Thus, the focus group study provided ample evidence and further justification for the inclusion of the US mainstream media as opposed to other internationally recognised mainstream press or the Caribbean news outlets. It is important to note that though the focus group study offers a unique insight into the US mainstream media’s ability to influence/shape Caribbean nationals (particularly Caribbean youths) perspective on terrorism, the study is not a true reflection of the entire Caribbean community.

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Nevertheless, the empirical evidence from the focus group study in this book, combined with the fact the US mainstream media dominates the global media landscape, has the ability to influence/shape people’s perspective on terrorism (including the Caribbean as evident by the focus group study), the lack of existing literature on the Caribbean media within the context of terrorism coverage and more importantly, the significance of the US mainstream media to the book’s novel Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, it was therefore important to have a much wider and deeper understanding of the US mainstream media. Hence, the extensive overview of the prevailing literature on the US mainstream media coverage in relation to terrorism-related matters. Hopefully, the inclusion of the US mainstream media can offer an opportunity to encourage future research that can add and support a growing academic discourse concerning the US mainstream media, as well as other internationally recognised mainstream media ability to influence Caribbean nationals’ perspective on terrorism. This in turn can be crucial to media, terrorism-related studies and public policy in helping to garner an understanding of how important it is to include in their curricula the various conceptual understandings of terrorism that can include the mainstream media coverage of terroristic violence. A List of Some Pertinent Existing Literature on the US Mainstream Media This volume will briefly explore the US mainstream media within the context of terrorism-activism, given that the US mainstream media in relation to terrorism-related matters has already been extensively explored and examined in the prevailing literature. For example, in Anthony R DiMaggio’s book Mass Media, Mass Propaganda: Understanding the News in the War on Terror (2008), the author examined the US mainstream media’s performance within the context of the Bush War on Terror in terms of the media’s failures to properly scrutinise the Bush administration’s claims leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and thus, the “media failures aided the Bush administration’s march toward a disastrous and costly war based on flimsy evidence, superficial analysis, and unwarranted assumptions regarding Iraq’s weapons capabilities and ties to international Islamist terrorist organizations…”; John Street’s book Mass Media, Politics and Democracy (2nd ed) (2011) looked at the use of “frame” and “framing” in media’s coverage and how this technique was deployed in relation

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to the aftermath of the 9/11 attack and that the media’s “coverage largely reproduced the frame adopted by President Bush” (p.  51); Andrew Hoskins’s book Televising War: from Vietnam to Iraq (2004) highlights how the US mainstream media adopted a more “entertainment format of reality television” following the 9/11 attacks and how they drew upon the living memory of the 1991 Gulf War like the use of POWs (prisoners of wars) during their coverage leading up to the 2003 Iraqi invasion; Peter van der Veer and Shoma Munshi in their book Media, War and Terrorism: Responses from the Middle East and Asia (2004) examined the “mediascape” or media response to the 9/11 attack and subsequently the global war on terrorism in specific Asian and Middle Eastern nation-states (India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey and Iran), as well as the US media’s coverage of 9/11 and its aftermath (war on terrorism). For example, the book examined media-related coverage problems, ranging from “war propaganda” to the “framing of the narrative” in relation to the 1991 Gulf War and how the continued war on terrorism is a perfect example of media framing (packing and presentation). Like Andrew Hoskin, the book also argues that there exists “…a kind of intertextuality between war coverage, Hollywood movies, television miniseries and video games that have created a virtual reality that seems to be open primarily to metaphysical, mystic and Manichean interpretations” (p.  12). Furthermore, the book stressed an important point with regard to the belief that United States of America has a free and open press and found a case example that might contradict this notion. For example, Osama bin Laden had broadcasted his interview expressing his political position with regard to the US foreign policy that was aired on Arab networks but was withdrawn from US media networks “under pressure” from the Bush administration at the time (p. 20). In addition, it has been established in the prevailing literature that the US mainstream media framing of Muslim violence or terroristic violence perpetrated by Muslims serves to reinforce certain misconceptions and mythologies about Muslims/Islam (e.g. AbuKhalil, 2002; Alsultany, 2007; Trevino et al., 2010; Peek, 2011; Haque et al., 2019; Nickerson, 2019; binti Osman et al., 2020). Likewise, some scholars/experts have also suggested that the US mainstream media coverage of Muslim violence has played a critical role in creating an “organic link” between Islam and terroristic violence (e.g. AbuKhalil, 2002; Al Mannan & Al-Af, 2017; Sultan, 2016). On the other hand, in Dominic Rohner and Bruno S. Frey article “Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists

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and the media” (2007), shows how terrorist attacks in Western countries like in North America and Europe receive far more coverage as opposed to terrorist attacks in developing countries on the African continent, despite the fact that “terror attacks tend to involve less fatalities and injuries” in the former, whereas the “number of injuries and deaths per terror incident is much higher” in the latter (p. 141). The authors also provided empirical evidence which suggests “a strong symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorists” exists (p.  142). Moreover, some scholars/experts have recognised the unfortunate “symbiotic relationship” between terrorists and the media in which both benefit from terroristic episodic events (DiMaggio, 2008; van der Veer & Munshi, 2004; Spencer, 2010; Rohner & Frey, 2007). Though the symbiotic relationship is primarily concerned with the unintended mutually beneficial partnership, it can also be argued that the existence of this symbiosis between the media and terrorists highlighted by scholars/experts (as previously mentioned), strengthens the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept by implicitly, to some degree, recognising the inherent duality in relation to the media’s coverage of terrorism. For example, this unintended mutual beneficial partnership between the media and terrorists can be viewed as a direct tangible positive on the side of the media and simultaneously an indirect intangible positive on the side of the practitioner of terrorism, as a result of the media’s coverage of the particular terroristic episodic event. At the same time, the media’s coverage of the particular terroristic episodic event can have an indirect intangible negative on the side of the viewing public. However, the prevailing literature regarding the symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorists does not explicitly emphasise or constantly stress the existence of an inherent duality, which involves a multiplicity of direct and indirect tangible and intangible negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. Furthermore, the symbiotic relationship is primarily about the symbiosis between the media and terrorists and does not solely focus on the multiple set of direct and indirect positives and negatives as a result of the media’s (in particular, the US mainstream media) coverage of terroristic episodic events. On the other hand, other scholars have noted how the media benefits from violent episodic events and simultaneously how the portrayal of violent programmes in the media can have an adverse effect on the viewing public (e.g. Gentile, 2003). Again, it does highlight the adverse effect media coverage of terroristic violence can have on the viewing public, but

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it does not explicitly emphasise the inherent duality with regard to the media’s coverage of terroristic violence. However, given that terrorism is a form of violence (i.e. political violence), it in some ways lends support to what the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is arguing: the existence of an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives ever-present in most situations concerning terrorism. In this case, the US mainstream media coverage of terrorism can have a direct and indirect positive and negative affect from its coverage of terroristic violence. US Mainstream Media: Agenda-Setting and Framing Many scholars/experts have noted that the media plays an important role known as “agenda-setting” (e.g. MDiMaggio, 2008; McCombs, 2002; Matusitz & Ochoa, 2018). For instance, Anthony DiMaggio noted that Greg Philo and members of the Glasgow University Media Group had once argued that: “it [British television news] has a profound effect, because it has the power to tell people the order in which to think about events and issues. It ‘sets the agenda,’ and decides what is important and what will be featured” (DiMaggio, 2008, p. 42). Other research studies have also highlighted that the mainstream media has the ability to shape people’s perceptions of violent events like terrorism (e.g. Dolliver & Kearns, 2019; Huff & Kertzer, 2018). For instance, Jonathan Matusitz and David Ochoa in their article “Agenda-Setting Theory in the U.S.  Media: A Comparative Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in France and Nigeria” (2018) noted that the “Agenda-Setting Theory” developed by McCombs and Shaw argues or is based on the premise that the “media has ability to determine the salience of topics in the public domain”, which is done through “over-reporting” or discussing a particular issue more or less frequently. As a result, the over-reporting or under-reporting of a particular issue in the media can influence the public perception, such as the public’s perception about the threat international terrorism poses to the Western world (Matusitz & Ochoa, 2018). In fact, other scholars like Bernard Cohen made a similar point earlier with regard to how foreign policy-related matters “reaches…those of us who are interested and attentive” in the external world through the media or the press (Cohen, 1963, p. 13). He further argued that the foreign audience “operational map of the world” is not drawn by cartographers, rather it is drawn by reporters and editors; however, he also acknowledged that: “the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is

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stunningly successful in telling readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, p. 13). However, the media’s ability to influence public perception or tell them what to think about is not that straightforward in some instances. For example, Matthew Dolliver and Erin M. Kearns (2019) in their research study concluded that: “media consumption and Islamophobia” were critical to whether or not a person would classify a violent act as terrorism (p. 13). Moreover, some scholars/experts have also noted that while the media has the ability to set the agenda and shape people’s perception on topical issues (like crime and violence, terrorism, etc.), it does not necessarily mean that it [media] invariably has the power to influence people’s opinion about “events and issues” because trust in the media is vital for people to accept it as a credible and sole provider of information on particular events or issues (Tsfati & Cappella, 2005; Kohring & Matthes, 2007; Jackob, 2010). For instance, Matthias Kohring and Jorg Matthes in their article “Trust in News Media: Development and Validation of a Multidimensional Scale” (2007) argued that trust in news media can be considered “hierarchical factor”, which involves trust in selectivity of topic and facts, accuracy of depictions and journalistic assessment. Therefore, trust in the news media plays a crucial role in the media’s ability to influence people’s perception because people will selectively put their trust in specific topics, or a set of facts, how accurately a topic is depicted and also the journalist’s assessment of the topic. On the other hand, some people would choose to watch multiple news sources (even untrustworthy news) in order to garner a better understanding of “events and issues” and examine them from different angles (Tsfati & Cappella, 2005, pp. 253–254). Another crucial role that the literature has established that is played by the media is known as “frame” and “framing” (e.g. DiMaggio, 2008; Nevalsky, 2015; Street, 2011). Framing is used by the media to analyse media contents, given that “news is a distilled form of the multiple events taking place in the world” and therefore, the media has to select particular events in order to make sense of them to readers and viewers; and in doing so, certain events and perspectives will have to be cancelled out while emphasising others, and this entails fitting them in a frame (Street, 2011, p. 50). This sort of framing was evident in the case of the media’s coverage in the aftermath of 9/11 as the “coverage largely reproduced the frame adopted by President Bush” (Street, 2011, p.  51). In support of this, other scholars have also noted that the US mainstream media simply echoed and “amplified” the Bush administration message and framed with

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the 9/11 attack in a such a dramatic fashion that, in some ways, assisted in justifying the administration’s subsequent counterterrorism policies, such as the Afghanistan war, the USA PATRIOT ACT and the Iraq War (Nacos et al., 2011). Also, news of terroristic events can be framed in a particular way depending on the “geographical location” of where the terrorist attack took place. For example, Eric Chien Nevalsky’s (2015) study in which he analysed 44 articles published in the top 5 US newspapers (The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), The New York Times (NYT), USA Today (USA), LA Times (LAT) and New York Daily News (NYD)) related to the Paris attack and the Boko Haram attack in Borno, found that the US mainstream media framed the Paris attack in a more “forgiving” manner, compared to the Boko Haram attack in Borno in which it used the “blame placement” frame on Nigeria. Other scholars have noted few popular methods to which the media use framing, such as Anthony DiMaggio who argued that nationalism is done through “nationalistic pressure” by presenting the US as a benevolent superpower in global affairs to which the media reinforces the notion that the United States of America is fighting a war between the “good”, “civilised”, world and the “evil” terrorists, who many Americans accept (DiMaggio, 2008, p. 43). Moreover, individuals who dissented from the pro-war orthodoxy, dared to criticise or sought answers from the Bush administration regarding the attack on September 11 was labelled as either “un-American” or “un-patriotic”. For example, Author Stephen Kaposi in his book The Real Axis of Evil: The Invasion of Iraq, Western Imperialism, Lies and the Police State (2004) recalled a remark made by former US Vice President Dick Cheney on May 18, 2002, in which he said that it was “unpatriotic during a ‘war’ to suggest that the government ignored warnings”. Stephen Kaposi also noted that “warmongers and Bush apologists in American media were quick to discredit claims about what the government knew as mere “second-­guessing” and “hindsight” that has no place in times of war”, and the “un-American” label was also deployed and used against those who sought answers about “what the government knew” (Kaposi, 2004). Anthony R DiMaggio (2008) also argued that George Orwell’s “doublethink” concept became apparent in Bush’s administration declaration on the “War on Terror”, in portraying America as a nation that is simultaneously committed to peace and permanent war. For example, the former president had characterised America as a “peaceful nation”, while at the same time stating that “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it

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does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (DiMaggio, 2008, p. 165). The media also applied “doublethink” framing in defence of the Bush’s administration War on Terror. For instance, “Operation Enduring Freedom” (Official name used by the US government for the global war on terrorism) was described by CNN as combining “humanitarian action with a military campaign”, specifically about the 37,500 food packages that were dropped alongside cluster bombs in Afghanistan each day throughout October 2001 and thereafter (DiMaggio, 2008, p.  166). Furthermore, a CNN news article published on November 1, 2001, with the headline: U.S. changes color of food aid, was also laced with doublethink language in Orwellian fashion. For example, concerning the Pentagon colouring food aid and dropping bombs, the article reads: “The dropping of food aid as well as bombs on Afghanistan has been an important part of the public relations campaign pushed by the Bush administration, which has repeatedly stressed that it has no quarrel with the Afghan people themselves” (CNN, 2001). This sort of doublethink framing also helps to present America as the “good freedom-loving nation” that is only fighting a war against “evil freedom-hating terrorists”. The US mainstream media had also regurgitated similar statements made by the former president. For instance, “in his televised address to the nation announcing the start of military strikes in Afghanistan”, he [President Bush] stated, “As we strike military targets, we will also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan” (Hayden et al., 2003, p. 114). This bespeaks how the US mainstream media readily and obediently swallows and recites the political rhetoric from those in power (particularly the US President) by framing their message and simply acquiescing to the administration’s official policy or refusing to be critical about it. The US Mainstream Media Benefits from Terrorism Today, the term “terrorism” is exploited by the US mainstream press because it provides “the media with emotional, exciting and bloody news which helps them sell their product” (Ganor 2005, p.  231 as cited in Spencer, 2010, p. 5). This might be because “terrorism” is a form of violence, and there is a belief among media corporations that “violence sells”. For instance, Douglas A.  Gentile book Media violence and children: A complete guide for parents and professionals (2003), highlighted the

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existence of this belief when representative Dan Glickman, during a congressional debate on television violence in 1988 suggested that: “An obstacle to a voluntary reduction in violence by networks is that, in this intensely competitive business, it is commonly held that violence sells” (Congressional Record, 1988 as cited in Gentile, 2003, p. 13). However, Douglas A.  Gentile (2003) also noted how this long-held belief in the media industry that “violence sells” might be “largely unfounded” as some research studies have pointed out (p. 18). The media’s coverage of terrorism is also mutually beneficial to both the media and terrorists. This unintended mutually beneficial partnership between terrorists and the media is described as a “symbiotic relationship” (DiMaggio, 2008; Rohner & Frey, 2007; Spencer, 2010; van der Veer & Munshi, 2004). This is because the terrorists benefit from free publicity while the media makes money because “reports of terror attacks increase newspaper sales and the number of television viewers”, says Bruno S. Frey of the University of Zurich and Dominic Rohner of Cambridge University (Rohner & Frey, 2007, p. 142). This was evident in the case of the Paris terrorist attack in 2015. For example, Rick Kissell, a reporter for Variety Magazine, an American media company, provided quantitative data showing how US cable news networks witnessed a drastic increase in viewership following the 2015 Paris terrorist attack: “According to preliminary Nielsen estimates, roughly 9.1 million viewers were watching Fox News Channel (4.4  million), CNN (3.2  million), MSNBC (1.2  million) and HLN (308,000) from 8 to 11  p.m. on Friday—a 153% surge over the average for the prior four weeks (3.6  million). By comparison, roughly 20.3  million viewers were watching the Big Four broadcasters on the night, with ABC’s ‘20/20’ (5.1 million) and NBC’s ‘Dateline’ (3.6 million) devoting their hours to Paris coverage” (Kissell, 2015). Despite the existence of this “symbiotic relationship”, it is important to note that the US mainstream media cannot avoid coverage of a terrorist attack, especially in a democracy that prides itself on freedom of speech and a free society. Therefore, the media cannot censor information about terroristic violence because it may infringe on the public’s right to know and may result in a breakdown of public trust in the media and confidence in the political system based on the free exchange of ideas (Silke, 2003, pp. 177–178). On the other hand, it has also been established in the prevailing literature that the media’s coverage of terrorism inadvertently aids practitioners of terrorism in terms of, inter alia, conveying their messages, gaining

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publicity, spreading fear and bringing attention to their causes, demands, and grievances (Powell, 2018; Nacos, 1994; Wilkinson, 1990 as cited in Silke, 2003, p. 177). For example, Kimberly Powell stated in her article “Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism from 2011–2016” (2018) that the media is used by terrorists to convey their message and “Media coverage of terrorist acts helps achieve the final goal by inciting fear” (Powell, 2018). This was also in relation to US mainstream media framing of terrorism in particular, terrorist acts committed by non-Muslim vs Muslim since 9/11 that also aids “Islamic terrorists in their goal of creating fear” (Powell, 2018, p. 9). Altheide (2004 as cited in Lutz & Lutz, 2018) argued that the media coverage of terroristic violence in post-9/11 has not only “played into the hands of terrorist groups by publicizing attacks”, but has also helped to increase people’s “perceptual levels of fear” (As cited in Lutz & Lutz, 2018). This is because it is to “media’s organisation self-interest” to magnify and prolong the “fear and anger” associated with the spectre of war expressed as an “Attack on America” or “America’s New War” following the 9/11 attack (Nacos et al., 2011, p. 11). In addition, the media can also be problematic to the individual who were “direct victims” in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. For instance, journalists need to tell or retell the traumatic story after an attack may result in an “intrusive re-experiencing” of “PTSD” (post-­traumatic stress disorder) and the media’s coverage of a terroristic episodic event is also “capable of retraumatising” victims “through images which rekindle arousal linked to the attack” (Silke, 2003, p. 179). In addition, the media involuntarily helps terrorists spread “fear” to a wider audience beyond the targeted individuals by reaching “indirect victims” who were not physically present at the targeted place but are able to watch it on the news (Silke, 2003, p. 179). In addition, the US mainstream media also tends to base “its framing of events on what will generate the most viewership, predominately what is sensational, dramatic, and shocking” (Nickerson, 2019, p. 550). Not all terroristic events are given equal coverage because not every terroristic episodic event yields enormous “monetary benefits”, or will result in an increase in viewership, or is appealing enough to make it into Western news coverage. For example, an empirical study conducted by Dominic Rohner and Bruno S.  Frey (2007) found that terrorists can commit a minor terrorist incident with very few casualties in Western countries and make it into Western news coverage, whereas terrorists in developing countries will have to “produce” a much more bloodier terror attack to

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gain the attention of the Western media (p. 141). Also, Jonathan Matusitz and David Ochoa (2018) in their comparative analysis of three prominent US mainstream press (New York Times, The Washington Post and USA Today) coverage of terrorist incidents that occurred in France and Nigeria between 2011 and 2016, found that US media has been “over-reporting” the terrorist attacks in France and “under-reporting the attacks in Nigeria”. The authors also postulated that another hypothesis for the “over-­ reporting vs. under-reporting” could also be because “terrorist events that occur within Western civilisation gain more views because they are more likely to generate more revenue” (Matusitz & Ochoa, 2018, p. 5). US Mainstream Media Portrayal of Muslim Violence and Linkage of Terrorism to Muslim/Islam Some scholars/experts have also suggested an organic link between Islam and violence has developed, in large part due to the US mainstream media portrayal of Muslim violence vs Western violence because the mainstream press has played a pivotal role in creating much of the context for its viewers to make the link, or believe that there is a nexus between the religion of Islam and acts of terrorism (AbuKhalil, 2002; Al Mannan & Al-Af, 2017; Sultan, 2016). Muslim violence is often linked to terrorism, while Western violence is presented in the media by a “different set of standards and a different set of terms” (AbuKhalil, 2002, p. 26). There also exist presumptions about Islam/Muslim societies as being inherently violent, as the term “Islamic Terrorism” seems to denote that there is a “unified nexus between acts of terror and practice of Islam” (Sultan, 2016). Other research studies have shown how the US mainstream media has a tendency to frame violence or acts of terrorism carried out by Muslims in a manner that only helps to reinforce the misconceptions and mythologies about Muslims/Islams and attach a sort of theologocentric belief to violent acts carried out by Muslims (e.g. AbuKhalil, 2002; Alsultany, 2007; Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010; Peek, 2011; Haque et  al., 2019; Nickerson, 2019; binti Osman, Muda, & Mohammed, 2020). The US mainstream media also tend to portray Muslims or followers of Islam as uncivilised, violent fundamentalists with a “hatred of everything Western”. This was evident in the case of a Time Magazine photograph of praying Muslims with their weapons that were captioned as “Religious War”, and it continued “Guns and prayer go together in the fundamentalist battle” (Hippler & Lueg, 1995, p. 12). The word “aggression” is also

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often implied as a characteristic of Islam and followers of the religion: “Islam as a whole…is the aggressor against the West. It embodies a theology of conquest and victory, but no theology of defeat”, wrote Jean-­ Claude Barreau in his book, Del’Islam en general et du monde modern en particular (Hippler & Lueg, 1995, p. 9). This negative portrayal and linking terrorism to Muslim/Islam became even more apparent post-9/11 attack, in which the US media portrayed Muslims/Islam as a “threat to universal values of democracy and freedom” and terms like “radical Islamic terrorism” were being used frequently (Nickerson, 2019). There is also a theologocentric belief attached to violent acts committed by Muslims as being “Islamic” violence, while violent acts carried out by Western groups are rarely (if ever) portrayed by US mainstream media in religious terms (AbuKhalil, 2002, p. 26). Arabic words such as “jihad”, for example, are grossly misunderstood and exploited by US mainstream media and used for its sensational impact in Western media coverage, despite the fact that “Etymologically, the word refers to struggle in general, or striving for whatever purpose…and “the Koran in no way uses the concept to exclusively refer to holy war” (AbuKhalil, 2002, p.  27). Although radical Islamists do use the concept of holy war (jihad) in “their call to do battle against their adversaries”, it has also been used by others such as the secular Saddam Hussein, who had done so during the Gulf War to “legitimise his aggressive polices”, to which many pundits/commentators in the West were hoodwinked by this “pseudo-religious argument” (Hippler & Lueg, 1995, p.  9). The allies war against Iraq was described as “jihad” by Saudi Arabian legal scholar Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, reinforcing how the word “jihad” can be exploited and misused by “people holding widely varying positions and for many different reasons and aims” (Hippler & Lueg, 1995, p. 9). Concluding Thoughts The wide-ranging debates and extensive literature on the US media in relation to terrorism focuses primarily on the media’s symbiotic relationship (between the media and terrorists), framing, packaging, presenting, Orwellian-style coverage, the media’s negligence of its responsibilities to democracy, failure to properly scrutinise the Bush administration in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, nationalism and patriotism narrative during the War on Terror era, the political economy of the media, and the tendency to amplify fear, reinforce misconceptions about Muslims/Islam,

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misperception of risks, re-traumatising victims of terrorism, among other things. However, the prevailing literature does not explicitly or systematically stress or reinforce the existence of an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism, in this case, the US mainstream media’s coverage of terrorism. For example, the prevailing literature highlights how the media’s coverage of terrorism carried out by fundamentalist Islamists tends to apply a bad guy vs good guy element, reinforce certain misconceptions about Muslims/Islam, which can also incite anti-immigrant sentiments (negatives), and simultaneously its framing of terrorism carried out by fundamentalist Islamists can be economically beneficial, as fear and a bad guy vs good guy element is profitable, terroristic violence increases viewership, which in turn increases sales and commercial activities (positives). Nevertheless, the inherent duality (the simultaneous negatives and positives) is not explicitly accentuated in the sea of scholarship pertaining to the US mainstream media coverage of terrorism. This is achieved by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, which therefore offers an original and systematic way of revising our understanding of this important aspect of terrorism.

Stakeholder of Terrorism: Islamic State (ISIS) The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/DAESH) was critical to the research in this book as an exemplar of terrorism activism. The transnational terrorist organisation can play a crucial role in helping to seek an understanding of the inherent duality of terrorism, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. More importantly, ISIS is also vital to the researcher’s case stay area (Caribbean). The Islamic State (ISIS) appears to be the number one Islamic terrorist group that is radicalising and recruiting Caribbean nationals. This volume will present a concise overview of ISIS terrorism-activism, given that many scholars/experts have extensively and brilliantly written about the Islamic States’ (ISIS/ISIL/DAEASH) emergence, continued sustenance, as well as its social media presents and revenue (e.g. Alzyoud, 2022; Amadar & Tuttle, 2018; Byman, 2015; Cockburn, 2015; Gerges, 2016; Lister, 2015). For instance, Partick Cockburn’s book The rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the new Sunni revolution (2015) shows clearly how the West created the conditions that provided the impetus for ISIS’s

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violent rise by adding fuel to the Syrian crisis/war, as well as how the United States of America and NATO underestimated the potential of the Islamic State (ISIS) and in doing so, failed to combat ISIS sponsors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. For example, Cockburn argues that Saudi Arabia’s importance to Al-Qaeda’s rise is often misunderstood, not in terms of its vast wealth, but in its “propagating of Wahhabism, the fundamentalist, eighteenth-century version of Islam that imposes sharia law”, given that both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) ideology is heavily influenced by Wahhabism. Lastly, Charles Lister’s book, The Islamic State: A Brief Introduction. Brookings Institution Press (2015) and Fawaz A.  Gerges’s volume, ISIS: A History. Princeton University Press (2016) explores ISIS’s and Al-Qaeda’s revenue support and ISIS war chest. For example, Lister (2015) averred: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had established a financial command council, with Mosul being the principle source of income as a “complex extortion network” that was created in Mosul was generating about $12  million a month by 2014 (pp.  37–38). Likewise, Gerges (2016) noted that ISIS has built a lucrative “criminalized war economy” that it used to fund its wars and state building that encompassed “oil sales, drug trafficking, kidnapping, theft, and sale of small religious and cultural artifacts” (p. 266). The Emergence and Sustenance of ISIS The Islamic State (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) roots can be traced back to 1999, after its founder Ahmad Fadl al-Nazal al-Khalayleh (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi), was released from prison after serving 5  years of a 15 years sentence for possession of weapons and affiliation with Bayat al-­ Imam, a militant organisation founded in 1992 by Issam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi (Lister, 2015, p. 6; Wagemakers, 2014) also known by the “pseudonym Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi” (Gerges, 2016, p. 54). Both Zarqawi and Maqdisi accused the judiciary and the Jordanian King of “treason for acting against the teachings of the Qur’an during their 1995 trial”; however, they were sentenced to 15 years in prison for the establishment of an illegal jihadist cell (Gerges, 2016, p.  55). Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was subjected to recurrent torture and solitary confinement, and he was even traumatised by his experience in the Jordanian prison called “al-Suwaqah” (Gerges, 2016, p. 54). After his release from prison, Zarqawi migrated to Afghanistan and upon his arrival in Qandahar, he sought out the attention of the Al-Qaeda leader to which he made

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contact and was granted permission along with a $200,000 loan to build a training camp (McCants & McCants, 2015, p. 6; Lister, 2015, p. 6). He then used the training camp as a base for forging his jihadi group (Jund al-Sham) and within months the group was renamed “Jama’ at al-Tawhid wa’ al-Jihad”, abbreviated as “JTWJ” (Lister, 2015, p. 6). Through the years of 2004 and 2006, Jama’ at al-Tawhid wa’ al-Jihad (JTWJ) rapidly increased its operations through the use of multiple suicide bombers, and Zarqawi even became feared for his notorious kidnappings and beheadings of foreign hostages, such as businessman Nicolas Berg in 2004 (Lister, 2015, p. 9). However, not to digress, this horrific violent tactic continued well after the death of Zarqawi, such as with the gruesome beheadings of American hostages James Foley and Steven Sotloff, British nationals David Haines and Alan Henning, among others (Brandt et al., 2016; Mahood & Rane, 2017). The JTWJ became the nucleus of a growing jihadi movement in Iraq ensued from its growing prominence and its “extensive international recruitment networks” as well as its ability to incorporate like-minded groups into its organisation; however, JTWJ pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in September 2004, after months of negotiations and became known as Tanzim Qa ‘idat al-­ Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn or often simplified as al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI (Lister, 2015, p. 9). Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) sustained its prominence and continued to attract support from other “Iraq-based insurgent groups” and on January 15, 2006, it announced its merger with 5 other groups “(Jaysh al-Ta’ ifa al-Mansura, Saraya ‘Ansar al-Tawhid, Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami, Saraya al-­ Ghuraba, and Kataib al-Ahwal)” and created Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (MSM), “whose aim was to unite and better coordinate Iraq’s jihadi insurgency” (Lister, 2015, p.  10). It is important to note that, Zarqawi was instrumental in both building a base for Al-Qaeda in Iraq which created the foundation for the emergence of ISIS and “the beginning of the revolt against founders of the global jihadist movement, bin Laden and Zawahiri” (Gerges, 2016, p. 57). In 2006, after the death of Zarqawi and his spiritual leader Sheikh Abd al-Rahman, AQI appointed a new leader, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and a few months later the “MSM announced the establishment of al-Dawla al-­ Islamaiya fi Iraq, or the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)” (Lister, 2015, pp. 10–11). The intended goal of ISI following its establishment was to be an insurgent group that would transform into a military-political actor tasked with the responsibility of governing territory (Lister, 2015, p. 11).

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In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed leadership of ISI following the death of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and AQI leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri (Lister, 2015, p. 15). Thereafter, to mark the start of Ramadan, ISIS issued a series of media releases to underscore the organisation’s accomplishments and goals, as well as to attract a wider following, but the most vital of all media releases was on June 29, 2014  in the form of an audio recording (in five languages) announcing the “establishment of the caliphate” (Lister, 2015, p. 22). In addition, videos were also released titled “Breaking the Borders” and “The End of Sykes-Picot” that showed the Syria-Iraqi land barrier, which separated the two being destroyed, as well as a militant traversing an Iraqi border post that was captured (Lister, 2015, p. 22). On July 1, 2014, Baghdadi celebrated the creation of the caliphate through an audio statement, followed by a video on July 5, which was his first public appearance as “caliph” (Lister, 2015, p. 22). By its very name, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, conveys its intent to establish an Islamic state in “Iraq and in “al-Sham” or greater Syria” (Cockburn, 2015, p.  43). Daniel Byman (2015), Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution wrote: “The Islamic State seeks to build, well, an Islamic state, but on its own terms. As such, it has gone beyond terrorism and even insurgency, establishing an army and state-like structures in the vast territory it controls. In contrast to Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State does not see itself as a vanguard fighting to rouse the Muslim world and force the West to withdraw from the Middle East. Rather, it wants to build a state, purify it, and then expand it: it proclaims baqiya wa tatamadad (‘lasting and expanding’) as its motto” (p. 170). From the group’s early days, its original leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi argued with the Al-Qaeda leadership (Zawahiri and Bin Laden) whose central focus was on US targets, as opposed to Zarqawi (including those who took over following his death in 2006) who was seemingly more concerned about a sectarian war and launching attacks on Sunni Muslims (who were deemed as apostates) that were collaborating with the Shi’a-led regime in Iraq (Byman, 2015, p. 166). In fact, ISIS has brutally murdered other Muslims that it deemed were “crusaders and apostate kufaar (unbelievers)” that were “enemies of the Islamic State”, who sought to undermine the terrorist group’s plan to build a caliphate, such as a Jordanian pilot who was burnt alive in a cage

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and another group of men who were drowned in a cage in a swimming pool (Mahood & Rane, 2017, p. 22). The increasing instability in the Middle East poses a significant threat to Western interest, as it creates an environment for jihadi groups to exploit to their benefits, and this perpetuating instability extends across Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, as well as the Turkish and Jordanian borders (Lister, 2015, p. 1). In mid-2011, the regional destabilisation was in large part due to the militarisation of the Syrian revolution, however, the most significant risk to the region’s long-term stability came about from the vision championed by the jihadis that the world came to know after 2013 as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as ISIS short for the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (Lister, 2015, pp. 1–2). Although the Islamic State underwent numerous name changes, the name “Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham” came about following its large presence in Syria that led it to add “al-Sham” (the Arabic term for Greater Syria)” (Byman, 2015, p. 164). A previously mentioned, alternatively, it is referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), however, some news media outlets along with the US Government translate “al-Sham” as “the Levant”, which refers to the “eastern Mediterranean area that includes Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon, which is where the acronym ISIL comes from” (Byman, 2015, p. 164). Charles Lister (2015) writes that “On June, 29, 2014, the first day of the Islamic holy month of USRamadan, ISIS former spokesman Taha Subhi Falaha (Abu Muhammad al-Adnani) announced the restoration of the caliphate under the leadership of Ibrahim Awwad Ibra-him Ali al-Badri al-Samarra’iyy (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi)” (p. 2). ISIS spokesperson, Adnani further declared that the group hereafter would be known as the Islamic State (IS) and Baghdadi as “Caliph Ibrahim” (Lister, 2015, p.  2). Ostensibly, the caliphate has been brought back to life along with fulfilling the prophecy and thus, all Muslims must now bow to Abu Bakr al-­ Baghdadi who was now known as Caliph Ibrahim al-Baghdadi (McCants & McCants, 2015, p. 122). Thus, as Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would become the “commander of the faithful” and therefore, “Muslims everywhere would owe him obedience” (Byman, 2015, p. 165). However, al-Baghdadi as claimant to the office of the “Caliph” was rejected by Middle Eastern regimes, Sunni religious leaders, most jihadist groups and even the tens of millions of Muslims around found “his proclamation absurd” (Byman, 2015, p. 165). The caliph wielded considerable political and spiritual authority over all Muslims during the early times of

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Islam and there has been no true claimant to office of “caliph” since the Ottoman sultan was defeated in World War I (McCants & McCants, 2015, p. 122). Moreover, distinguished “theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi declared that Baghdadi’s declaration is void under sharia” (Byman, 2015, p. 165). Nevertheless, the literature documents how the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had metamorphosed the politics in the Middle East (Cockburn, 2015). Before capturing Mosul and Tikrit in June of 2014, ISIS had already captured and taken over significant territories, such as Fallujah just 40 miles or roughly 65 kilometres west of Baghdad, “a city famously besieged and stormed by US Marines ten years earlier” (Cockburn, 2015, p. 1). Around the same time, the Islamic State replaced Al-Qaeda, terrorist group founded by Osama bin Laden and now led by Ayman al-Zawahiri to become the most powerful jihadi group, as it has proven to be even more violent and sectarian than what US officials deemed the core Al-Qaeda based in Pakistan and also because of its rapid and “multipronged” strikes in various parts of central and northern Iraq in June of 2014 (Cockburn, 2015, p. 2; Cockburn, 2016, p. 336). The Islamic State (ISIS) has also proven to be a formidable group, despite coming under sustained bombings and ground offensives by “US-led coalition and other local forces against ISIS targets in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, ISIS has shown resilience, creativity, and organizational depth and has carried out spectacular terrorist operations worldwide” (Gerges, 2017). Fawaz A. Gerges (2017) asserts that it is very likely that ISIS will be overrun militarily in the coming years or so and therefore, will see the terrorist group reverting to “its original type…urban gruella warfare and counterinsurgency in the Middle East and, terrorism worldwide” (p. x). On May 23, 2019, however, ISIS suffered a major defeated territorially, as “Syrian Democratic Forces declare total elimination of so-called caliphate and 100 per cent territorial defeat of Isis”, said Mustafa Bali, spokesman of the US-backed group, wrote Richard Hall, Middle East Correspondent for the UK Independent Newspaper (Hall, 2019). Moreover, in late October of the same year, the self-proclaimed Caliph and leader of the Islamic State (ISIS) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was reported killed himself during a US military operation in North-West Syria (Aljazeera, 2019; BBC, 2019). A few days after al-Baghdadi’s death following a raid by “US special forces in Barisha”, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) announced “Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi as its new chief” in an audio announcement that was “distributed by the group’s media arm, Al Furqanon” on Thursday October 31, 2019, by

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ISIS new spokesperson Abu Hamza al-Qurayshi, who also took over from his predecessor Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir following his death (Aljazeera, 2019). Although the Islamic State has since been defeated territorially as “Syrian Democratic Forces declare total elimination of so-called caliphate and 100 per cent territorial defeat of Isis” (Hall, 2019), the Islamic State remains a serious threat. In support of this, the head of US Central Command, General Kenneth McKenzie declared that “Isis will remain a threat” during a showcase at the Pentagon of the footage of the raid conducting against the group former leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi on his hideout in Syria (Borger, 2019). ISIS and Social Media As studies of the group have suggested, the Islamic State (ISIS) will also remain a severe threat through the use of social media. The transnational terrorist group has a proven track record of being proficient at using social media platforms to spread propaganda and for recruitment purposes (Lister, 2015, p.  41; West, 2016, pp.  15–17). For example, ISIS proficiency in its use of social media was evident when it had outperformed all other militant groups on Twitter as of August 2014, before its removal (Lister, 2015, p.  41). With its ability to articulate its jihadist doctrine through an unorthodox and multifaceted narrative while having complete control over its individual operatives in Western jurisdictions, the Islamic State had established itself as the most proficient terrorist group using and exploiting social media (West, 2016, p. 9). Moreover, in 2015, there were about 300 extremist websites, forums and social media accounts in Southeast Asia in Bahasa or Malay language along with “500 extremist social media accounts” that belonged to Malaysian citizens that “contained evidence of a strong support for ISIS, its objectives and its ideology” (Yasin, 2015, p. 27). Other scholars/experts have also noted ISIS dominant presence on social media, and its formidable online propaganda machinery. For example, Brigitte L. Nacos and Melih Barut in a chapter titled “The History of Terrorism and Communication” in the book The Cambridge History of Terrorism (2021) edited by Richard English wrote: “No other terrorist organisation established so potent an online propaganda machine as the Islamic State, or ISIS. Take the carefully staged and marketed executions of hostages. On a Tuesday in August 2014, the media centre of the Islamic State uploaded its video ‘#NewMessagefromISIStoUS’ to YouTube,

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which depicted the desperate pleas of the American journalist James Foley and his gruesome beheading. While the video was soon removed from YouTube, the horrific content dominated the news in the United States and elsewhere” (p. 548). Furthermore, the ISIS online propaganda magazine Dabiq is used to reach nearby supporters and potential recruits from around the world and encourage them to migrate from their homes and join the Islamic State (Gambhir, 2014, p. 2; Ingram, 2016, p. 15; Azman, 2016, p. 4; Uberman & Shay, 2016, pp. 16–18). The Islamic State also uses the online magazine [Dabiq] to demonstrate that it is “not simply a military or terrorist organization”, by making religious justifications a critical component of its propaganda campaign and thus, many of the languages used in its publications featured that of “prominent jihadists, such as Abu Bakr Naji, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Zarqawi mentor Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi” (Gambhir, 2014, p. 2). The Islamic State also uses its online magazine to promote its perverted version of Islam, such as exploiting the concept of “Hijrah” to attract potential foreign fighters (Azman, 2016, p. 3; Uberman & Shay, 2016, p. 16). For example, Uberman and Shay (2016) point to a text written in issue 2 of the Dabiq magazine in 2014 that states, “Many readers are probably asking about their obligations towards the Khilafah…The first priority is to perform Hijrah from wherever you are to the Islamic State, from darul-kufr to darul-Islam. Rush to the shade of the Islamic State with parents, siblings, spouses and children” (p. 17). The Dabiq magazine is also used by ISIS to request its supporters to engage in terroristic violence and calls on “IS soldiers … to attack without delay and use any means possible” (Azman, 2016, p. 3). The Islamic State (ISIS) also uses social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Telegram to publicise its horrific executions and reach millions of its “desired audience” around the world (Koch, 2018). For example, roughly 2000 people (95% of victims were locals while 22% were foreigners to attract global attention) were executed by means of drowning, being crushed by tanks, burned alive, blown up by rocket-­ launchers, shootings, beheadings or even have an explosive device attached to them by ISIS member from 2015 to early 2018, according to Judith Tinnes who monitors ISIS execution videos (Koch, 2018). Many of ISIS’s executions/beheadings are purposefully filmed and distributed online for the purpose of propaganda and to attract global attention (e.g. Greene, 2015; Mahood & Rane, 2017). So, how is ISIS able to fund its

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propaganda and its entire terroristic operation? The Islamic State has a large cash chest, ensuing from its engagement in terroristic violence. ISIS Revenue and Support: How It Benefited from Terrorism The Islamic State financial network predates the group’s announcement of its establishment of an Islamic caliphate on 2014, as the terrorist group was using the same dark fund-raising methods as its predecessors (Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq—ISI) and between 2008 and 2009, “ISIS made an average of US$1 million per month maintaining a meticulously balanced budget and generating a budget surplus” (Stergiou, 2016, p. 191). The Islamic State, however, has also been financing itself almost entirely since 2005, but external funding to AQI, MSM and ISI amounted to no more than 5% of its total “income” between 2005 and 2010 (Lister, 2015, p. 37). The group has been also benefiting from its terroristic violence after taking control of territories under its so-called caliphate: after assuming leadership in 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had established a financial command council, with Mosul being the main source of income as a “complex extortion network” that was created in Mosul was generating about $12  million a month by 2014 (Lister, 2015, pp.  37–38). Although the income earned through extortions proved to be lucrative and more sustainable, however, revenue the group earned from underground sales of Syria and Iraq oil was far greater (Lister, 2015, p. 38). For example, while ISIS was making about $12 million a month from its complex extortion network by 2014, however, the group daily income from its oil sales were estimated to range from $1  million to $3  million, which would have amounted to $365 million to $1.1 billion over a 12-month period (Lister, 2015, p. 38). By mid-2014, reports had even suggested that ISIS was the “richest terrorist organisation in the world” (Luna & Zoltán, 2015, p. 370). Multiple reports from local activists, who resided in the so-called caliphate (before its caliphate crumbled in 2019) revealed that the Islamic State had “built a lucrative criminalized war economy” that it used to fund its wars and state building that encompassed “oil sales, drug trafficking, kid-­ napping, theft, and sale of small religious and cultural artifacts” (Gerges, 2016, p.  266). The group also collected millions from Western and regional hostages; for example, it was claimed from an unnamed NATO source in Brussels that the group was paid a huge $18  million for the

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exchange of four French hostages in April 2014 (Lister, 2015, p. 39). In 2014 alone, it was reported that the Islamic State (ISIS) made roughly $45 million from ransom payments (Dutton, 2016). Also, it was estimated that ISIS had more than $2 trillion in assets under its control along with an annual income of about $2.9 billion, according to a 2014 Thomson Reuters study (Gerges, 2016, p. 267). Abu Saad al-Ansar, an ISIS official in Mosul, had even declared in January of 2015 that the group’s budget for the year sat at $2  billion, though UN monitors and independent observers had expected it to be half that amount (Gerges, 2016, p. 267). Additionally, Adam Szubin, who served as the acting Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, in December 2015, purported that a “tiny share” of ISIS revenue came from international donors and therefore, making it a difficult task to contain the terrorist group (Gerges, 2016, p. 267). He also asserted that ISIS had made more than $500 million from its oil sales on the black market in Syria and Iraq, looted somewhere between $500 million and $1 billion from banks located in territories under its control and gained millions more that it extorted from Syrian and Iraqi citizens residing in areas under its rule (Gerges, 2016, p. 267). In 2015, the group total revenues were estimated to be between $1 billion and $2.4  billion, according to RAND Corporation, a non-profit research organisation (Clarke et  al., 2017, p.  8). In addition, RAND asserted that ISIL had controlled some 60% of oil wells located in Syria and 5% as of mid-2016, and the group continued to sell oil, oil products and gas to a range of buyers that included dealers from both Syria and Iraq who in turn resell them to “local market and the Assad regime” (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 8). Lastly, most of ISIL oil revenue was generated from local sales that are “taxed multiple times along the supply train from the oil refinery to local markets” and as of spring 2016, it was estimated that ISIL gained roughly $250 million to $365 million per year from oil revenue (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 8). Although the Islamic State suffered a territorial defeat in 2019, the United States of America and its allies were nowhere near to dismantling the terrorist group’s “economic powerhouse”, as experts estimated that the group still has access to hundreds of millions of dollars and it can easily depend on a “battle-tested playbook to keep money flowing into its coffers”—which comes with severe risks because it would be able to “retain the allegiance of a committed core of loyalists and wreak havoc through terrorist attacks for years to come” (Kenner, 2019). As a matter of fact, it was uncovered that ISIS even has

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investments in legitimate commercial enterprises, ranging from real estate to automobile dealerships in the Iraqi city of Erbil; and even some of ISIS “money-services businesses in Syria and Iraq” (which the Treasury Department has sanctioned) have “connections as far away as the Caribbean” (Kenner, 2019). Concluding Thoughts The prevailing literature on ISIS covers in great detail the emergence of the transnational terrorist group, the many leaders and their own agenda since its inception, its brutal terroristic violence (beheadings, suicide bombings, etc.), the group’s primary objectives and how it differs to its forefather (Al-Qaeda), the group’s proficient use of social media, its criminalised war economy, source of revenue, among other things. However, the existing literature does not explicitly or implicitly stress or reinforce the existence of an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situation concerning terrorism, in this case, the Islamic State’s (ISIS) active participation in terrorism. The prevailing literature highlights that ISIS’s terrorism has resulted in the killing of scores of non-combatants (innocent civilians), horrific executions and beheadings of local and foreign hostages, death of many of its prominent leaders and members of the group, building a criminalised war economy (oil sales, drug trafficking, kidnapping, theft, sale of small religious and cultural artifacts), tarnishing the Muslim faith/Islam, spreading of fear and even exploiting the Islamic religion for radicalisation and recruitment purposes, among other things (negatives). At the same time, ISIS’s criminalised war economy was financially beneficial to the terrorist group, as it was able to garner significant revenue and build an economic powerhouse to fund its terrorist operations, gained ransom from many foreign hostages and even global coverage, among other things (positives). Nevertheless, the inherent duality (the simultaneous negatives and positives) is not accentuated in the sea of scholarship pertaining to ISIS active participation in terrorism. This systematic recognition of duality can, however, be achieved by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept.

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Stakeholder of Terrorism: Individuals Introduction John Horgan asserted that the most commonly asked question about terrorism put forward by Wardlaw (198) as cited in Silke (2003). is “why do people become terrorists?” There are seemingly many myths or misperceptions about individuals who engage in terrorism, the most common ones appearing to be that they are either crazed fanatic, psychopaths, immune to their victims suffering, characteristically attracted to violence, suffering from a pathological attraction for violence and inflicting harm onto others (Silke, 2003, pp. 29–30). However, in a book edited by Louise Richardson, The Roots of Terrorism (2006a) noted that it is a long-held belief among psychologists, particularly at the individual level that there exist no specific personality traits for becoming a terrorist and the claims about terrorist being “crazed fanatics” is not supported by the “plentiful empirical evidence available” (p.  3). Jerrold Post in his book, The mind of the terrorist: the psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al Qaeda (2007) argued that there is a generalised premise in the “lay community” about individuals and groups that commit acts of terrorism aimed at a political goal being “crazed fanatics” because no “psychologically normal” individual would engage in such heinous acts of violence against innocent women and children (Post, 2007, p. 3). He also made clear that those who have studied terrorism have since concluded that “most terrorists are “normal” in the sense of not suffering from psychotic disorders” (Post, 2007, p. 3). Jerrold Post’s statement is in substantial agreement with another prominent scholar/expert on terrorism, Martha Crenshaw who argued that: “What limited data we have on individual terrorists (and knowledge must be gleaned from disparate sources that usually neither focus on psychology nor use a comparative approach) suggest that the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality” (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 390). Although most leading experts/scholars have made it clear that the common characteristic shared among terrorists is their “normalcy” (e.g. Crenshaw, 1981; English, 2009; Post, 2007; Richardson, 2006a; Richardson, 2006b), some practitioners of terrorism in particular lone wolf terrorists, do sometimes exhibit particular personal traits or psychopathological disorders. For example, the Norwegian domestic “lone wolf” terrorist Anders Behring Breivik who detached himself from reality, hid

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behind ersatz identities and even saw himself as a Justiciar Knight (Turrettini, 2015). Also, the infamous lone wolf terrorist Theodore Kaczynski also known as the “Unabomber” might have suffered from psychopathology (Stout, 2004). Moreover, the anti-abortion extremist Scott Roeder, who assassinated abortion doctor Geroge Tiller, suffered from a “history of mental illness”, according to his brother (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). These can be used as prominent case examples of practitioners of terrorism, who might not share the common characteristics of “normalcy” at the individual level. Some scholars/experts have argued that there are also individual actors/lone wolf terrorists who do not necessarily act alone, as they can be the mastermind with other co-conspirators that are carrying out a terrorist attack that is either driven by a cause or inspired by other networks of groups (e.g. Bakker & De Graaf, 2011; Parachini, 2000). A prominent case example of such an individual, would be Ramzi Yousef. Yousef was the main co-conspirator and credited as the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, and it has since been established that he was inspired and supported by several Islamic militant groups in America and around the world, without being a formal member of any of the groups (Parachini, 2000, p. 195). Another prominent example of a notorious lone wolf terrorist would be Timothy McVeigh, who along with suspected co-terrorist, Terry Nichols, was responsible for the bombing of the Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 21, 1995 (Whittaker, 2004). However, the terrorist attack (bombing of the Alfred P.  Murrah Building) was decided, planned and executed by Timothy McVeigh without any formal instructions from any group or hierarchy. In fact, it was the Waco siege incident that left eighty disciples to perish in the blazing fire that drove Timothy McVeigh into “action phase” in order to avenge his fellow compatriots (Whittaker, 2004). The act of terrorism carried out by individuals, be it, lone wolf operations or terrorism carried out by unorganised cells or leaderless groups, have also been encouraged as an effective strategy by terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and related Islamist groups (Spaaij, 2012, p. 26). For example, Abu Musab al-Suri, a prominent figure in the jihadist movement, who was a known top aide to Osama bin Laden until his arrest in 2005, also wrote about the importance of “individual terrorism by loners or self-sustained independent cells” (Lia, 2007, p.  11). Abu Musab al-Suri, in his over 1600-page manuscript proposed a next level of jihad, one which characterised terrorism being carried out by individuals or autonomous groups

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that are labelled as “leaderless resistance” (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011, p. 45). In 2006, Abu Jihad al-Masri, a former Al-Qaeda leader had also urged more individual terrorism “with a call to arms, entitled “How to fight alone” circulated widely in jihadist networks” (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011, p. 45).

The Lone Wolf The idea of ‘lone wolf” terrorism was primarily associated with “White supremacists and anti-government resistance” during the second half of the twentieth century, particularly with the concept of “leaderless resistance” (Spaaij, 2012, p.  24). This might be because white supremacists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis popularized the term lone wolf in the late 1990s and used it to encourage fellow racists to “act alone for tactical security reasons when committing violent crimes” (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011). However, Fred Burton and Scott Stewart (2008) in a STRATFOR essay titled The “Lone Wolf Disconnect”, stressed that lone wolf terrorists differ from a “sleeper operative” because the former is usually a “standalone operative” that is embedded within the targeted society and can self-activate at any time, while the latter infiltrates the targeted society or organisation and remains dormant until he/she is activated by a group or organisation (Burton & Stewart, 2008). They further emphasised the importance of having a clear definition of the “lone wolf” to avoid the misuse or an imprecise use of the term (Burton & Stewart, 2008). However, a consensus on the definition of “lone wolf” terrorism continues to elude the academic realm. For example, Burton and Stewart (2008) argue that a lone wolf is an individual that acts on his/her own without any instructions from or links to an organisation. Similarly, Ramon Spaaij (2010) defines lone wolf terrorism as any terrorist attacks conducted by a sole individual who is not a formal or otherwise a member of any “organized terrorist group or network, and whose modi operandi are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy” (p.  856). Likewise, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley (2011) view lone wolf terrorism as any individual actor that is capable of politically-motivated violence directed towards non-combatants (p. 115). On the other hand, Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf (2011) argue that any “definition of lone wolf terrorism has to be extended to include individuals that are inspired by a certain group but who are not under the

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orders of any other person, group or network” (p. 44). They further suggested that the individuals might also be members of a network like in the case of Timothy McVeigh who was linked to several right-wing groups, but who still decided, planned and carried his attack without any formal instructions from a hierarchical command structure (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011). For the purpose of this book, the author borrows from the definitions offered by Burton and Stewart (2008), Ramon Spaaij (2010), Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011) and Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf (Bakker & De Graaf, 2011). Thus, a “lone wolf” is conceptualised as any individual actor that is capable of carrying out a terrorist attack alone, or with co-conspirators that can be inspired by, or have links to, or be members of a network or group, but who decide, plan and execute a terrorist attack without any formal instructions from any network, group or hierarchy. This is more purposeful for this volume, as it allows for a broader and more flexible definition to accommodate both individuals and “standalone operatives” who act alone, as well as individuals who are sometimes the mastermind of an operation, which involves co-conspirators like in the case of Ramzi Yousef that involved co-conspirators. For instance, though the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing was carried out by Ramzi Yousef and his friend Eyad Ismoil and co-conspirators, Yousef was credited as the mastermind behind the bombing (e.g. Bergen & Pandey, 2006; Parachini, 2000; Sprinzak, 2001; Weiser, 1998). According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, as “mastermind” is typically an intelligent individual “who plans and directs a complicated project or activity (often one that involves a crime)”. Thus, Ramzi Yousef as a case example of lone wolf/individual actor fits perfectly with this volume’s definition, that allows for individuals who are sometimes the mastermind of a terrorist attack, which involves co-conspirators, but who decides, plans and executes a terrorist attack without any formal instructions from any hierarchical command structure. Moreover, the definition makes room for the inclusion of lone wolf actors who can have links to or be inspired/motivated by other networks or groups, but who decide, plan and carry out a terrorist attack on their own without any formal instructions from a hierarchical command structure— like, for instance, in the case of Timothy McVeigh, who along with suspected co-terrorist, Terry Nichols, was responsible for the bombing of the Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 21, 1995, but by all evidence decided and planned the attack without any formal

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instructions from any of the groups that he had links too, or was a member of at the time of the attack. Many scholars/experts have written extensively on lone wolf actors in order to provide the academic world and beyond, a full understanding and explanation of lone wolf motives and varying personality traits (e.g. Spaaij & Hamm, 2015; Turrettini, 2015; Edwin Bakker & Beatrice de Graaf, 2011; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011; Spaaij, 2012; Spaaij, 2010; Stout, 2004). For example, Professor Ramon Spaaij in his article “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment” (2010) noted that lone wolf actors typically suffer from “some form of psychological disturbance”, such as in the case of prominent lone wolf terrorists: Theodore Kaczinski, David Copeland and Franz Fuchs, who were all diagnosed with personality disorders (p. 862). Furthermore, Unni Turretini in her book The Mystery of the Lone Wolf Killer: Anders Behring Breivik and the Threat of Terror in Plain Sight (2015) detailed the life and motive of lone wolf terrorist Anders Behring Breivik and argued that Breivik lost himself in videos games as a way to detach from reality and base his existence on “cover stories, fake identities, avatars, secret bank accounts, and lies”, and even saw himself as a “Justiciar Knight” (pp. 3–5). She further noted some of the Norwegian-born political motives that drove him to commit such heinous terroristic violence on July 22, 2011, in Norway; for example, he had issues with Norway’s immigration policy, and he believed that “Muslims must be driven out of the country and if that effort fails, then they must be killed” (p. 94). Moreover, David Whittaker in his book Terrorists and Terrorism in the contemporary world (2004) and Chris E.  Stout in his edited book Psychology of Terrorism: Coping with the Continued Threat (2004) also wrote about notorious lone wolf terrorists, such as Timothy McVeigh and Theodore Kacynski’s personality and primary motives behind their terrorism campaign. The varying personalities traits and motivates of lone actors/lone wolf terrorist are further illustrated through the use of prominent case examples of notorious lone wolf actors identified in the literature: George Metesky, Theodore Kaczynski, Anders Behring Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, Eric Rudolph, Brenton Tarrant and Ramzi Yousef.

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Rationale Behind the Use of the Case Examples Before proceeding to the case examples, it important to note that none of the examples are from the Caribbean because of the fact that there are no case examples of such terrorist attack taking place in the region by any Caribbean national, or from any external lone wolf/individual actors. However, the case examples were used for their purposefulness for this volume. In fact, during my interview with University of the West Indies Professor Anthony Clayton who was also the lead consultant/author of Jamaica’s 2014 National Security Policy (which proposed the ‘clear, hold and build’ strategy now being pursued by the Government of Jamaica) and advisor on the development of CARICOM’s Crime and Security Strategy also noted the possibility of lone wolf and small group attacks might be a possibility in the Caribbean in the future. Thus, it is critical to explore the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism broadly and specifically within the Caribbean context. Moreover, the other sources of data such as terrorism-related regional policy documents analysed using the Qualitative Content Analysis in this volume noted the possibility of lone wolf terrorism (though they did not explicitly mention the word lone wolf terrorism by name) in terms of a Mumbai-style terrorist attack, as well as Director of the Asset Recovery Unit (ARU) of the Regional Security System (RSS), Mr Grenville Williams alluded to such a scenario in terms of a lone individual shooting up western tourists on any of our popular tourist beaches. As a matter of fact, Mr Williams also suggested the use of case studies/ examples of terrorism incidents, such as lone wolf attacks that took place in North America and Europe, to aid in developing educational awareness programmes throughout the region in an effort to dissuade individuals from engaging in terrorism and to assist relevant law enforcement agencies in being able to detect and mitigate possible lone wolf attacks. Hence, the rationale and significance for using some of the most notorious and prominent case studies/examples of lone wolf/individual actors to have a much broader understanding of lone wolf terrorism, to explore the possibility of this growing phenomenon ever happening in the Caribbean and to aid in developing educational programmes and counterterrorism policies to effectively address the possibility of a lone wolf-style terrorist attack. This, however, can be achieved by examining the case examples below, given that the region has never experienced such type of terroristic violence. Moreover, the use of the case examples is also critical to the book’s Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, which is as equally important as the

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case study area (Caribbean) to the book. This is because the book seeks to offer a more systematic understanding of terrorism-activism through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, which explicitly stresses the existence of a complex inherent duality in most situations concerning terrorism. Therefore, lone wolf/individual actors can also play a vital role in helping us to see clearly the multiplicity of negatives and positives present in most situations involving terroristic violence. For instance, some of the case examples used in this volume were driven by a sense of revenge; however, the theme revenge is viewed as a causal effect (negative) and simultaneously a beneficial effect (positive). The theme revenge in relation to lone wolf terrorism is not sufficiently, nor explicitly, or systematically presented as such in the prevailing literature. This, however, is achieved through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. First, the section will be commenced by exploring six prominent case examples of lone wolf terrorism in keeping with this volume’s definition. For the sake of repetition, lone wolf is defined/conceptualised as any individual actor that is capable of carrying out a terrorist attack alone, or with co-conspirators that can be inspired by, or have links to, or be members of a network or group, but who decide, plan and execute a terrorist attack without any formal instructions from any network, group or hierarchy.

Case Examples of Lone Wolf/Individual Actors Case Number One: Theodore Kaczynski Between the years of 1978 and 1995, Theodore “Ted” Kaczynski carried out a letter-bombing campaign of terror that resulted in the deaths of 3 people and severely injuring 23 others (Stout, 2004, pp. 82–83; Barnett, 2015, p.  60). Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the “Unabomber” because his early targets were mostly connected to universities and airlines, had managed to evade authorities for 17 years until his brother noticed striking similarities to the language used and the writing styles of his brother to that of the Unabomber in his manifesto and notified police (Stout, 2004, p. 83; Barnett, 2015, p. 60). His main grievances were against technology and those who he believed were corrupting the American society and promoting technological advancement to the detriment of the natural environment (Stout, 2004, p. 82; Barnett, 2015, p. 60), for example, during his bombing campaigns he sent letters to “various computer scientists, industry leaders, and other

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individuals whom he believed promoted technology to the detriment of the natural environment in the United States” (Barnett, 2015, p. 60). The Unabomber typifies a lone individual [wolf] terrorist whose terroristic endeavours ensued from emotional instability (Stout, 2004, p. 82), as Kaczynski was fuelled with feelings of anger, rage, shame, hatred and even humiliation during periods of his life starting from very early on, for example, during his high school and college years he would find himself becoming “terribly angry and because he could not express that anger or hatred openly, he would indulge in fantasies of revenge” (Stout, 2004, p. 83). Unlike George Metesky, whose grievances were against a major utility company and the New  York State, Kaczynski was driven by his hatred developed from social rejections and his detestation towards to the organised society that hindered his ability to be his true self. For instance, Chris E.  Stout (2004) asserted that “Kaczynski described the source of his hatred as social rejection” and the “fact that organized society frustrates my very powerful urge for physical freedom and personal autonomy He also described experiencing anger from other sources and then turning his hatred toward organized society” (p. 84). He also lamented how technology erodes one’s freedom. In his manifesto, Industrial Society and Its Future, Theodore Kaczynski (1995) wrote: “Once a technical innovation has been introduced, people usually become dependent on it, so that they can never again do without it, unless it is replaced by some still more advanced innovation…Technology repeatedly forces freedom to take a step back, but technology can never take a step back…” In his manifesto, Kaczynski also expressed his personal grievances, that is, “Industrial Revolution” and the “development of technology” has “destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human beings to indignities, have led to widespread psychological suffering (in the Third World to physical suffering as well) and have inflicted severe damage on the natural world”. He went to say, if the development of technology persists it will only exacerbate the situation and will only lead to “greater social and psychological suffering” and “physical suffering even in advanced countries”. He also blamed “modern industrial society” for all “social problems”. In support of this, Kaczynski asserts that “any of the foregoing symptoms (inferiority, superiority, leftism, oversocialization, autonomy, etc.) can occur in any society, but in modern industrial society they are present on a massive scale”.

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Theodore Kaczynski urged for a “revolution” against the industrial system: “We therefore advocate a revolution against the industrial system. This revolution may or may not make use of violence; it may be sudden, or it may be a relatively gradual process spanning a few decades. We can’t predict any of that. But we do outline in a very general way the measures that those who hate the industrial system should take in order to prepare the way for a revolution against that form of society” (Kaczynski, 1995). However, he also made it clear that it is not a “political revolution” as the revolution objective will not be to overthrow governments, “but the economic and technological basis of the present society”. Lastly, he was very critical of “leftism”, which he believed “hates science and rationality because they classify certain beliefs as true (i.e. successful, superior) and other beliefs as false (i.e. failed, inferior). In his manifesto, he wrote: “Oversocialized types who try to satisfy their drive for power by imposing their morality on everyone have certainly been around for a long time. But we THINK that the decisive role played by feelings of inferiority, low self-esteem, powerlessness, identification with victims by people who are not themselves victims, is a peculiarity of modern leftism” (Kaczynski, 1995). Kaczynski’s hatred and anger towards an industrialised society that he perceived as too “organised” whereby “leftism” reigned supreme was a key motivating factor for his engagement in terroristic violence. He believed that something had to be done to bring about the sort of changes he desired. However, it can only be achieved through the use of terroristic violence. Case Number Two: Anders Behring Breivik On July 22, 2011, Norway suffered a devastating terrorist attack of “unprecedented magnitude” (Wollebæk et al., 2012, p. 32). On that day, Norway and the world witnessed a savage murdering rampage involving a sequential bombing and shooting attack that resulted in 77 people being killed (Turrettini, 2015; Wollebæk et al., 2012, p. 32). The terrorist attack began with a car bomb explosion outside the offices housing the central government, killing 8 people, followed by a brutal massacre of 69 people, mostly teenagers, at a “Labor Party youth camp at Utoya outside Oslo” (Wollebæk et al., 2012, p. 32). The perpetrator was a right-wing extremist, Anders Behring Breivik, “another lone wolf…determined to make his mark on the world” (Wollebæk et al., 2012, p. 32; Turrettini, 2015).

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Anders Breivik saw himself as a “crusader warrior fighting for Christendom” who claimed to be a member of a clandestine society or military order which he called “Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici, or simply the Knights Templar, an order whose functions ceased in the fourteenth century (Pantucci, 2011, p. 30; Kirchick, 2012, p.  76). After moving back home with his mother, for instance, Breivik even stated in his manifesto that “some people will think you are freak for living with your parents at the age of thirty-one but this is irrelevant to a Justiciar Knight” (Turrettini, 2015, p. 3). Breivik spent a considerable amount of time playing video games like the Call of Duty series and TV series like Dexter as the games helped him to escape an old life and be a part of something, which he failed to achieve both in school and politics (Turrettini, 2015, p. 4). Thus, for the lone wolf killer (Anders Breivik) reality was based on a series of cover stories, pseudo identities, “avatars, secret bank accounts and lies” (Turrettini, 2015, p. 5). Anders Breivik was also strategic, well-organised and articulate in the way he carefully planned his attack. This was evident in his “ten pages” justification of a large amount of fertiliser he had ordered and claimed that it was for “testing the production of sugar beets” (Turrettini, 2015, p. 8). He also had issues with the country’s (Norway) immigration policies and expressed some of these frustrations at length in his manifesto. For example, a concluding statement in his manifesto stated that “Muslims must be driven out of the country and if that effort fails, then they must be killed” (Turrettini, 2015, p. 94). Like Theodore Kaczynski, Breivik shared similar characteristics, such as failure of an attachment at an early age, and he was intelligent and full of rage (wanting to strike back), but he was also narcissistic and saw killing as a means of releasing and being noticed was important to him; hence, the mass killings (Turrettini, 2015, p. 183). In November 2012, psychiatrist declared Breivik to be a paranoid schizophrenic and of course, it did not sit well with him, he found it to be an “insult” and many citizens, especially those of the “predominantly left-­ wing cultural, political and academic elite” found themselves in agreement with him (Kirchick, 2012, p.  77). However, a second evaluation concluded that Anders Breivik was “not psychotic at the time of his actions of terrorism and he is not psychotic now”, and he was given the maximum sentence offered to a criminal who is sane of up to 21  years in prison, which prosecutors can challenge at the end of the 21 years sentence for him to remain behind bars (Kirchick, 2012, p. 77).

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Case Number Three: Timothy McVeigh On April 19, 1995, a bomb that was placed in a rental truck ripped through the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, resulting in the deaths of 168 people who were inside the building (Steiker, 2001, p. 186). The 168 people killed included 19 children who were spending the day in the day care centre located inside the Murrah Federal Building, and in addition to the 168 people killed, the attack also injured another 642 people (Silke, 2003, p.  141; Stout, 2004, p.  84). Although McVeigh was the main architect behind the Oklahoma City bombing, both Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were convicted for their involvement in the bombing (Steiker, 2001; Whittaker, 2004). However, McVeigh was sentenced to death while Nichols was sentenced to life imprisonment (Steiker, 2001, p. 186). Prior to the attack, Oklahoma City was perceived as an unlikely place for an act of terrorism to take place because it was a small US city “with no strong political presence and no identified industrial, communication, transportation, military or financial targets”; however, Oklahoma City proximity to the Branch Davidian fire in Waco, Texas, might have resulted in its vulnerability to terrorism (Silke, 2003, p.  141). This became evidently clear after it was established that Timothy McVeigh was driven by a sense of revenge against the federal government’s siege of the Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, some 2 years prior his bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building (Steiker, 2001, p. 1). It was an incident (Waco siege) that resulted that resulted in the deaths of his right-wing compatriots at Waco and Ruby Ridge (Stout, 2004, p. 85). Timothy McVeigh saw himself as a patriot who was fighting for the “greater good against a bullying government” (the US government), and even perceived his death sentence as nothing more than a “state-assisted suicide” (Stout, 2004). David Whittaker also noted in his book Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World (2004) that Timothy McVeigh would later confess that the “resentment of neighbouring blue-collar workers in a car assembly plant” and the perceived disregard of the common folks by Washington “were the beginnings of an apocalyptic drive to bring down a repressive federal authority” (Whittaker, p. 65). However, McVeigh’s first encounter with bullying came on the Little League baseball field, when a bully punched him, which “humiliated and embarrassed him in front of his team” (Stout, 2004, p.  85). From that point, he detested bullies of any kind (person, institutions and even nation) that

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appeared to be “picking on the weak” (Michel & Herbeck, 2001, p. 20 as cited in Stout, 2004, p. 85). For instance, McVeigh reiterated this in an interview when he asserted that his “anger” against the federal government ensued primarily from the “killing of right-wing activist Randy Weaver’s wife and son by federal agents at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992 and by killing of some 80 members of the Branch Davidian religious sect in Waco” (Stout, 2004, p. 86). He perceived the federal government (US government) as being a “bully” that was picking on “weaker” opponent, Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. Up until his death, McVeigh saw himself as the “lone defender of America against a violent and illegitimate government” and he went to his death with a great sense of “historical accomplishment” (Sprinzak, 2001, p.  73). He achieved martyrdom—“a very public martyr”—when he was executed in the eyes of many in June 2001 (Whittaker, 2004, p. 66). Case Number Four: Eric Robert Rudolph Between the years 1996 and 1998, America will once again witness a series of bombing attacks from another home-grown lone wolf terrorist, Eric Rudolph (Turrettini, 2015, p. 191). His terroristic violent bombing campaigns resulted in the deaths of two people and injuring at least 150 others and although Erich Rudolph’s terroristic violence (bombings) were primarily motivated by his “religious beliefs against abortion clinics and gays”, he gained the nicknamed the Olympic Park Bomber following his bomb attack on July 21, 1996, of the Centennial Olympic Park during the Atlanta Summer Olympics (Turrettini, 2015, p. 191). The Atlanta Police Department had also received a brief 911 phone call just 10  minutes prior to the explosion of the bomb at the Centennial Olympic Park, saying “There is a bomb in Centennial Park…You have thirty minutes…” (Pellom & Hansen, 1997). The news media also received letters sent to them by Eric Rudolph, claiming that the “Army of God” was responsible for the bombing (Turrettini, 2015, p.  191). The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) also believed that the group called the “Army of God”, was not only responsible for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing, but also for the attack of an abortion clinic and a lesbian bar and that the group was led by Eric Rudolph (Blazak, 2001, p. 984).

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In the first month (January) of 1997, an abortion clinic in Atlanta was also bombed and following the bombing of the abortion clinic in Atlanta, a gay nightclub came under attack the following month (February) of the same year in Atlanta, with a second bomb being detonated in an attempt “to kill the first responders” and the group known as the “Army of God” took credit for these bombing attacks (Turrettini, 2015, p. 191). The following year, on January 30, 1998, an off-duty police officer by the name of Robert Sanderson, would meet his fate that day at an abortion clinic in Birmingham, when a bomb was triggered by a remote control and this time, Eric Rudolph stood just a few yards away (Turrettini, 2015, p.  191). He was identified as Eric Rudolph after someone thought he looked suspicious and decided to follow him and took down his license plate number, but he would elude police for another 5 years until his capture and apprehension in 2003 (Turrettini, 2015, pp. 191–192). Eric Rudolph wanted to embarrass the US government as he was angry at them for sanctioning abortions, and this he elucidated as his rationale for the bombing: to “confound, anger and embarrass the Washington government in the eyes of the world for its abominable sanctioning of the abortion on demand” (Turrettini, 2015, p. 191). Case Number Five: Brenton Tarrant On March 15, 2019, Australian-born terrorist known as Brenton Tarrant mercilessly slaughtered more than 50 innocent people and injured some 40 others at the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand (Snaith, 2019). Brenton Tarrant’s use of terroristic violence was primarily driven by his anger, hatred, rage and a sense of revenge towards the Muslim community in New Zealand and beyond, with the latter being the most potent factor. In Brenton Tarrant’s manifesto, for example, he expressed “anger” towards what he called the “invaders”, which was written in a “Q. and A.” interview format. For instance, he asked himself: “Was there a particular event or reason you decided to commit to a violent attack?” To which he responded: “Ebba was walking to meet her mother after school, when she was murdered by an Islamic attacker, driving a stolen vehicle through the shopping promenade on which she was walking. Ebba was partially deaf, unable to hear the attacker coming. Ebba death at the hands of the invaders, the indignity of her violent demise and my inability to stop it broke through my own jaded cynicism like a sledgehammer” (Tarrant, 2019).

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The theme revenge also rang loudly in the case of Brenton Tarrant, as it was enunciated in his manifesto: “To take revenge on the invaders for the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by foreign invaders in European lands throughout history. To take revenge for the enslavement of millions of Europeans taken from their lands by the Islamic slavers. To take revenge for the thousands of European lives lost to terror attacks throughout European lands. To take revenge for Ebba Akerlund” (Tarrant, 2019). This again reveals how revenge is often a common theme among individuals who engage in the use of terroristic violence, aimed at achieving a political outcome; and is still relevant to the understanding the explanation of terrorism as it was also a critical element in the case of Brenton Tarrant. Brenton Tarrant also asserted that one of his reasons for carrying out the terrorist attack was due in large part: “To most of all show the invaders that our lands will never be their lands, our homelands are our own and that, as long as a white man still lives, they will NEVER conquer our lands and they will never replace our people… I could no longer ignore the attacks. They were attacks on my people, attacks on my culture, attacks on my faith and attacks on my soul. They would not be ignored”. Thus, denoting a sense of cultural/civilisational context as well as white supremacist and far-right extremist ideology, as other potential casual factors for his use of terroristic violence. Brenton Tarrant might have been motivated by his anger and hatred towards Muslims and sought revenge against what he called the “invaders” (Muslims), but he also had a set of clear social and political objectives. For example, he also sought changes to the European Union (EU) immigration policies, pushing Turkey out the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and turning it into a “foreign…enemy force”. However, his primary political goal was changing the EU immigration policies as he outlined in his manifesto that he seeks “to directly reduce the immigration rates to European lands” (Tarrant, 2019). This is because he also thought the “environment is being destroyed by overpopulation” and that the “invaders are the ones overpopulating the world” and destroying the environment. He even wrote in his manifesto: “Kill the invaders, kill the overpopulation and by doing so save the environment” (Tarrant, 2019).

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Case Number Six: Ramzi Yousef There are other individuals who are either leaders of an autonomous group that may sometimes be “leaderless” or they can simply be the mastermind with other co-conspirators of a terrorist attack, motivated by a cause or inspired by a terrorist group without formally being a member, such as Ramzi Yousef (Parachini, 2000, p. 195). On February 26, 1993, a truck exploded in the underground car park between the World Trade Centre Tower One and the World Financial Centre, killing six people and injuring about 1042 (Reeve, 1999, pp.  1–15). Although the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Centre (WTC) bombing happened to be a group of men suspected of terrorism for over 2 years from New Jersey (Parachini, 2000, p. 187), the mastermind behind the WTC bombing was a lone figure, Ramzi Yousef, who along with his old friend, Eyad Ismoil who drove the van packed with the explosive into the underground parking lot (Reeve, 1999, p.  24). On April 2, 1993, Ramzi Yousef became the most wanted man in the world, making the famous “Ten Most Wanted List” which was extended to 11 in order to accommodate Ramzi Yousef (Reeve, 1999, p. 43). Apparently, the World Trade Centre was not selected because of its symbol to Western values or its financial power, but primarily because the terrorists intended to cause a colossal amount of damage and thus, toppling the twin towers would have made it possible (Parachini, 2000, p. 189). In fact, Ramzi Yousef had planned to cause more destruction and enormous human casualties as he intended for one of the towers to topple into the other that may have resulted in about “250,000 fatalities in the entire WTC complex” (Reeve, 1999, p. 24). Yousef was primarily driven by the fact that he wanted America to pay for its friendship with and support of Israel, its treatment of Palestinians, acknowledge that it was at war and that the “Great Satan must suffer casualties similar to those inflicted on the Japanese at Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (Reeve, 1999, p. 24). Although expressions of religious convictions were not notable in his terroristic endeavours, Ramzi Yousef worked as a professional terrorist in the name of Islamic jihad as he travelled around the world recruiting and training likeminded followers; and his ability to charm and persuade others to join his cause was proven to be a vital asset in his terroristic ventures (Parachini, 2000, p. 187). In early 1994 (between February and March), Yousef had flown from Pakistan to Thailand, where he assembled a small terrorist cell to either attack the United States of America or Israel embassy

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in Bangkok (Reeve, 1999, p. 63). However, the Bangkok plot did not go as planned due to the amateur terrorist getting into an accident en route to their target and Thai police discovering the abandoned truck and forensic experts finding Yousef fingerprints on the bomb found in the truck (Reeve, 1999, pp. 64–65). He was also slated to assassinate President Bill Clinton when he visited the Philippines on November 12, 1994, but realised his limitations as the security around the president posed a severe challenge even for a suicide bomber, much less for one who values his own skin (Reeve, 1999, p. 76). Instead, he decided to focus on his original plot, the “Bojinka Plot” codenamed by himself (Reeve, 1999, p. 77). The “Bojinka Plot” was intended to be a large-scale terrorist attack to blow up 11 airliners that would have killed roughly 4000 passengers flying from Asia to the United States of America, assassinate Pope John Paul and crash a plane into the CIA headquarters (Henegar, 2011). Although the plot was foiled by Filipino police whose attention was drawn by a chemical fire, one passenger was still killed during the course of the plot on board the Philippines Airlines Flight 434 (Henegar, 2011). On February 7, 1995, Yousef’s professional terrorist campaigns around the world would come to an end, as FBI agents arrested him at the Su-Casa guesthouse in Islamabad, with the help of their informant, Ishtiaque Parker (Reeve, 1999, pp. 101–106). In 1998, Yousef was sentenced to life imprisonment with solitary confinement for his role in the 1993 WTC attack and he was also convicted in 1996 for his role in planning to “bomb several American airliners over the Pacific in 1995” (Crenshaw, 2001, p. 5). In his closing statements he made reference to the “atomic bomb dropped on Japan, the war in Vietnam, embargoes imposed on Iraq and Cuba and America’s support for Israel and opposition to the Palestinian peace process” (Crenshaw, 2001, p. 5). Concluding Thoughts The prevailing literature on individuals (lone actors) who engage in terrorism has extensively examined the most salient causes, impacts and even the benefits that some practitioners might garner from their engagement in terrorism activism. However, the existing literature does not explicitly or systematically stress or reinforce the existence of an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situation concerning terrorism, in this case, individuals who actively

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participate in terrorism-related activities. This, however, is achieved by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. For example, there are a multiplicity of salient causes or primary motives (negatives) for why some lone wolf actors engage in terrorism (such as a sense of anger, hatred, rage, frustration, personal grievances, religion, supporting a cause, generationally transmitted hatred, among other things) and simultaneously a multitude of benefits (positives) that lone wolf/individual actors might also garner from their engagement in terrorism (ranging from garnering some personal and inherent psychological rewards, revenge, renown, publicity, communicating their message, a sense of power, an attached heroism, among other things). Simultaneously, the indirect negatives (the damage caused by such lone wolf violence) must also be recognised. Nevertheless, the inherent duality (the simultaneous negatives and positives) is not stressed enough in the sea of scholarship pertaining to individual’s active participation in terrorism. This is achieved more effectively by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. Though the existing literature (as established in thus far in this book) has extensively and thoroughly examined the predominant explanations of terrorism, and the relevant stakeholders of terrorism (US mainstream media, individuals and ISIS), it does not explicitly nor implicitly stress or emphasise systematically enough the inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. However, this is achieved by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. The following Chap. 3 borrows and adds to the prevailing literature by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept in seeking to understand terrorism as having an “inherent duality”, and thereby enriching our understanding of this complex phenomenon.

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CHAPTER 3

Contribution to Knowledge

Abstract  This chapter offers a detailed explanation and illustration on how the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept borrows from and adds to the existing literature in relation to the six explanatory frameworks (psychology, religion, strategy, culture/civilisational context, economics and political dimensions) and the specific stakeholders of terrorism (US mainstream media, ISIS and individual actors). The chapter further illustrates the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept possible applicability in understanding terrorism in other geographical area beyond the Caribbean. Keywords  Stakeholders of Terrorism • Inherent duality • Psychology • Religion • Strategy • Culture/civilisation • Politics • Economics • ISIS • Lone wolf • Individual actors • US mainstream media • Donald Trump • Capitol Hill • Christchurch Massacre • Brenton Tarrant

What Does the Stakeholders of Terrorism Concept Tell Us? So, can we not see the negatives and positives of terrorism outside of the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept? Admittedly, the prevailing literature has extensively examined the causes, impacts and benefits associated with terrorism, ranging from the plethora of psychological dimensions (anger, frustration, rage, hatred, etc.) to the abundance of research that has since © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Quashie, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40443-6_3

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revealed certain “inherent rewards” associated with terrorism for its practitioners, such as “psychodynamic rewards, to other personal and psychological rewards and even inherent “tactical advantages” (e.g. Crenshaw, 1993; English, 2016; Pearlstein, 1991; Sprinzak, 2000). However, it does not sufficiently or systematically reinforce or stress the inherent duality of terrorism. In fact, the existing literature on terrorism does not as such explicitly or implicitly (though it does to some extent as pointed out earlier) recognise the existence of an “inherent duality”. However, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to offer a more systemic understanding/interpretation of terrorism. It argues systematically the existence of an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. Moreover, many analyses and many people (within and beyond the academic world) are reluctant to frame anything positive in relation to terrorism, for reasons that are understandable, but which arguably get in the way of a holistic understanding of terrorism. Perhaps, this avoidance to frame terrorism-related activities as “positive” could also be due to the fact that the cost far outweighs the benefits. As one distinguished scholar and expert on international terrorism Louise Richardson candidly observed during our interview: “Yes, I think there are some benefits to joining a terrorist group. In so far as you become a member of a close-knit community. Depending on the environment, it may increase your social status within the community. And you may get the power that goes along with wielding a weapon, but there are also enormous costs. The likelihood is that you are going to die; the likelihood is that you are going to be separated from your family, and you are going to be—if not killed— imprisoned. So, yes there are some benefits but there are enormous costs as well. And most rational analysis will suggest that the cost will greatly out-weigh the gain” (Richardson, 2019). Also, an expert might argue that they can simultaneously see the negatives and positives of terrorism. So, what does the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept do differently? Perhaps through the trained/experts’ eyes, one might be able to simultaneously see the negatives and positives of terrorism (though, the framing of it is likely to differ). However, many of the elite interview participants did not effortlessly discern or see the inherent duality associated with most terrorism-related activities. Howbeit, the researcher was able to extract the information after asking some probing questions in relation to the stakeholders of terrorism. More importantly, some experts’ ability to effortlessly discern the negatives and positives for

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joining a particular terrorist group, or an extremist group, or simply engaging in terrorism, lends support to and in some ways validates the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, a concept that seeks to stress the existence of an inherent duality (simultaneous negatives and positives) in terrorism. The untrained eyes, however, are also less likely to simultaneously see the negatives and positives of terrorism. The research findings have also confirmed the likelihood of such a scenario. The focus group participants were not able to simultaneously see the negatives and positives of terrorism, especially the latter. Moreover, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept also seeks to shape our understanding of terrorism, particularly counterterrorism policy drafters and policy makers alike to avoid the mistake of not taking into serious consideration the simultaneous negatives and positives of terrorism. In fact, the findings show that this tends to be case. For example, after conducting a content analysis of several documents related to terrorism both at the national and regional level, the “benefits” (positives) were either noticeably omitted. It is important to evenly recognize and address both the negatives and positives of terrorism. As mentioned earlier, the prevailing literature does not sufficiently stress the inherent duality of terrorism, nor is it apparent in the existing literature. However, this is achieved by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. The book will now demonstrate the added insights that are available through the Stakeholders concept, in relation to the various explanatory frameworks that were discussed earlier in the existing literature. Psychological Dimensions Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the inherent duality feature allows for flexibility. Although the inherent duality feature is conceptually distinct (negatives and positives), they are not completely exclusive or exhaustive clauses. Hence, similar themes can simultaneously exist in two different categories. For example, themes such as psychological impact/damage, spreading fear and intimidation were categorised as an indirect intangible negative and simultaneously as a direct intangible positive. This is what the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept is arguing in seeking to understand terrorism, by showing systemically how the same themes/factors concerning terrorism-related matters can have a “deleterious effect (negative) on the path of the victims and simultaneously a “beneficial effect” (positive) on the path of the practitioners of terrorism. Thus, the existence of an

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inherent duality to which the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to stress as being critical to our understanding of terrorism. Furthermore, the inherent duality can either be a set of distinguishable or similar negatives and positives simultaneously present in both categories. For example, rage, anger, hatred, indignation, jealousy, redress humiliation, a desire for revenge, hitting back in retaliation, among others were categorised as direct intangible negatives while a sense of glory, most wanted list, feelings of patriotism, an attached heroism, a sense of revenge, psychological impact/damage, spreading fear, intimidation, the belief one will be immediately accepted into heaven or have their sins rescinded (inherent psychological rewards), among others were categorised as direct intangible positives. This is because the former are those factors that drove the practitioners of terrorism to engage in terroristic violence, while the latter are the benefits the practitioner’s garners from their participation in terrorism activism. In order fully to understand the ways in which psychological factors explain the dynamics of terrorism, we need simultaneously and systematically to keep all such aspects in view. The Stakeholders concept provides a lens through which to achieve this. Rather than, as is often the case, isolating particular elements (such as the hatred which motivates an ISIS member to use violence against their enemy), the full explanatory effect of all psychological elements comes more clearly into view. Religious Dimensions The same can be argued for religion. For example, themes such as extreme religious belief, radicalisation, recruitment and suicide terrorism were categorised in this research as direct intangible negatives because they are “causal effects” that in one way or the other lead to the would-be terrorist engagement in terrorism. Themes like immediate acceptance into heaven and remission of sin (often associated with suicide terrorists), fighting for a noble and holy cause, garnering legitimacy and support/potential recruits were categorised as direct intangible positives because they are those religious “beneficial effects” that the practitioners of terrorism garner. Also, “suicide terrorism” was categorised as a direct intangible negative and simultaneously a direct intangible positive because of the fact that religion can simultaneously be a strong motivator (causal effect) in encouraging certain practitioners of terrorism to engage in terroristic violence and have certain inherent psychological rewards connected to religion (beneficial effect) on the side of the suicide terrorist (acceptance into

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heaven, having their sins rescinded, etc.). Again, therefore, rather than either seeing religious motivation as the basis for negative violence, or as the foundation for positive self-realisation, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept forces us to recognise all elements simultaneously and fully. Strategic Dimensions The same goes for strategy. For instance, “suicide terrorism” as a strategy/ tactic was categorised in this research as both an indirect and direct tangible negative and simultaneously as a direct intangible positive. This is because suicide terrorism results in a “deleterious effect” on the side of a third party (innocent civilians being killed, psychological impact on nearby victims, damage to property, etc.), as well as the suicide terrorist because he/she will likely die instantly; but it can be seen simultaneously as a “beneficial effect” on the side of the practitioners of terrorism as it can be considered a low cost method with potential high yielding results for terrorist groups like ISIS (killing as many targets, damaging properties, the psychological impact that follows, etc.). Also, the themes “compellence” and “campaign of attrition” were categorised as an indirect intangible negative and simultaneously a direct intangible positive because of the fact both compellence and campaign of attrition have a “deleterious effect” on a third party (usually a regime/government the terrorist opposes and seek to compel them into taking a particular action and wearing down the enemy through sustained terrorist attacks). At the same time, both campaign of attrition and compellence have a “beneficial effect” on the side of the practitioners of terrorism who is likely to garner a short-term strategic victory. The literature on terrorism was shown in this book to stress that terrorists mostly fail to achieve their central strategic goals, but that terrorists nonetheless continue to see terrorism as strategically useful; the Stakeholders framework helps to explain this paradox, by showing the simultaneous negatives and positives embodied within the world of terrorist strategy. Cultural/Civilisational Context For cultural/civilisational context, themes such as a perceived attack on one’s culture, a clash between civilisations (Islam vs West) and a sense of Us vs Them were categorised in this research as a direct intangible negative, while defending one’s culture or way of life was categorised as a direct

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intangible positive. The former is due to the fact that it has a “causal effect” that can in some ways be a strong motivator or encourage groups or individuals to engage in terroristic violence like in the case of Brenton Tarrant, who saw Muslim immigrants as “invaders” that were invading his lands and attacking his culture, and the latter is because of the “beneficial effect” that the practitioner of terrorism might garner from their engagement in terrorism as he/she is likely to feel a sense of “patriotism” or even “heroism” believing that they are defending one’s culture/way of life. Once again, simultaneous recognition of the full range of dynamics is available through the lens of the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. Political Dimensions As it relates to political dimensions, themes such as change in domestic policies and enhanced security were categorised in this research as an indirect tangible negative and simultaneously a direct intangible positive, as well as an indirect tangible positive. For instance, both themes were deemed an indirect tangible negative because “change in domestic policies” crafted in the name of combating terrorism can sometimes come with a human rights cost like the USA Patriot Act that resulted in human rights violations (spying on citizens, little judicial review, etc.), and “enhanced security” can cause hindrance, fear and anxiety among the public and even be costly to taxpayers. At the same time, “change in domestic policies” to combat the threat of terrorism can afford those in political office with increased powers like the USA Patriot Act that give Bush’s administration sweeping powers (direct intangible positive); as well as “enhanced security” measures (and change in domestic policies) can also be beneficial to political leaders if the voting public feels a sense of safety (indirect intangible positive). On the other hand, themes such as a desire for political change or to redress specific grievances, seek policy alteration or regime change, social change, anti-colonial struggle/decolonisation or to believe it is the only available option were categorised as direct intangible negatives because they are considered causes (causal effects) that can lead to terroristic violence, while political legitimacy, influence governments, political impact (damage countries reputation, undermine the government, adversely affect country’s economy and compellence) were categorised as direct intangible positive because of the politically “beneficial effect” it has on the path of the practitioners of terrorism. The literature on terrorism

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articulated in this book stress that terrorists have been singlehandedly unsuccessful in achieving their broader political goals, but have nonetheless achieved short-term strategic victories; however, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to shape our understanding of terrorism by systematically showing the simultaneous multiplicity of “political” negatives and positives embodied in the world of terrorism. Economic Dimensions While economic dimensions are mostly viewed as a “risk factor” (indirect intangible negatives) that can make terrorism more likely in the prevailing literature (e.g. Enders & Hoover, 2012; English, 2009; Newman, 2006; Piazza, 2011; Richardson, 2006b), the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to understand economic dimensions as having an inherent duality (like all other dimensions) within the context of terrorism. For example, the “prospect of one’s family economic conditions improving” was categorised as a direct intangible negative and simultaneously an indirect intangible positive because it has a “causal effect” (direct intangible negative) on the side of the individual actors (as the prospect of one’s family conditions improving was a potent motivator for some individuals like in the case of some Palestinian suicide bombers) and simultaneously a “beneficial effect” (indirect intangible positive) on the side of a third party, i.e. the individual actors family economic conditions improving as a result of their active participation in terroristic violence. The aforementioned explications and analysis succinctly describe how the prevailing explanations (psychological, religious, strategic, culture/ civilisational context, political and economic dimensions) are enhanced and enriched by the Stakeholders of Terrorism. In other words, it is argued that the Stakeholders of Terrorism draws on, complements and adds significantly to the existing explanation in the prevailing literature in seeking to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives ever-present in most situations concerning terrorism. This is further illustrated in Table 3.1. If terrorism is read through the Stakeholder’s lens, then a fuller, more balanced and capacious understanding of the phenomenon emerges, and a calmer and more effective menu of responses can be achieved.

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Table 3.1  Illustrates how the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept borrows and adds to the existing explanations of terrorism in seeking to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality Stakeholders of terrorism concept Existing explanations

Negatives

Psychological dimensions

Direct intangible Rage; anger; hatred; indignation; jealousy; redress humiliation; a desire for revenge; hitting back in retaliation; generationally transmitted hatred; hatred bred in the bones; personal grievances; dispossession; a burning sense of injustice; detachment from reality; fake identity Indirect intangible Fear; intimidation; psychological impact/damage

Religious dimensions

Economic dimensions

Strategic dimensions

Positives

Direct intangible A sense of glory; most wanted list; feelings of patriotism; an attached heroism; a sense of revenge; psychological impact/ damage; spreading fear; intimidation; belief one will be immediately accepted into heaven or sins will be rescinded; belief one is fighting for a noble and holy cause; prospect of one’s family economic condition improving; a sense of respect; increased social status; power Direct intangible Direct intangible Extreme religious belief; radicalisation Suicide terrorism; immediate and recruitment; suicide terrorism acceptance into heaven and remission of sin (suicide terrorists); fighting for a noble and holy cause; garner legitimacy and support Direct intangible Direct tangible Prospect of one’s family economic Economic benefits; financial condition improving (Palestinian dimensions suicide bomber) Indirect tangible Indirect intangible Prospect of one’s family Risk factors (poverty, unemployment, economic condition improving. inequality, social and economic deprivation, etc.) Indirect tangible Direct intangible Suicide terrorism; destruction of Low-cost method; potentially property; killing non-combatants; high-yield; Cost-effective; Low beheadings; compellence campaign of risk; Tactical advantages/ attrition strategic impact; suicide Direct tangible terrorism; compellence Suicide terrorism campaign of attrition (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Stakeholders of terrorism concept Existing explanations

Negatives

Positives

Cultural/ civilisational context

Direct intangible A perceived attack on one’s culture; a clash between civilisations (Islam vs West); a sense of us vs them. Direct intangible A desire for political change; redress specific grievances; seek policy alteration or regime change; social change; anti-colonial struggle/ decolonisation; believe it is the only available option Indirect intangible Change in domestic policies (USA Patriot Act: human rights violation); enhance security (causes hindrance, costly, and can cause fear and anxiety)

Direct intangible Defending one’s culture or way of life (an attached patriotism or heroism) Direct intangible Change in domestic policies (USA Patriot Act give Bush sweeping powers); political legitimacy; influence governments; political impact (damage countries reputation); enhance security (people feel safe a positive for political leaders) Indirect tangible Change in domestic policies; enhance security (can increases public safety)

Political dimensions

This was calculated after triangulating the existing explanations in the prevailing literature

The Stakeholders of Terrorism: US Mainstream Media, ISIS and Individuals Though the inherent duality (negatives and positives) is conceptually distinct, they are not completely mutually exclusive or exhaustive clauses as previously stated. This is evident in the case of the US mainstream media, for example. The symbiotic relationship that exists between the media and terrorists can be understood as having an inherent duality and hence, it was categorised as an indirect intangible negative and simultaneously a direct intangible positive. The former is because the media’s coverage of terroristic violence benefits the practitioners of terrorism but can have an indirect “deleterious effect” on a third party (the viewing public) by helping the terrorists to convey their messages, intimidate and spread fear to a wider audience. Furthermore, the media’s coverage can cause a series of psychological impact/damage on the viewing public, such as post-­ traumatic stress disorder, retraumatising victims, creating a misperception

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of risk and can even reinforce misconceptions about Muslims/Islam that can fuel anti-immigrant sentiments towards Muslims. The latter is because the media’s coverage of terroristic episodic events can result in increased viewership, increase commercial activities, help sell their products, and increase sales and profits. In the case of the Islamic State (ISIS), the theme “criminalised war economy” was categorised as an indirect intangible negative and simultaneously a direct intangible positive. This is because ISIS’s criminalised war economy had a “deleterious effect” on the third party, which includes the kidnapping of foreigners, beheading of foreign and local hostages, illegal oil sales of Syria and Iraqi oil that adversely affected both countries’ economy, among other things. At the same time, it [criminalised war economy] had a “beneficial effect” on the side of ISIS, such as the revenues it generated from its illegal oil sales, drug trafficking, kidnappings of foreign hostages (ransoms), theft, and sales of small religious and cultural artifacts. Moreover, the themes “Execution and Beheadings” were categorised as an intangible indirect negative because of the “deleterious effect” it will have on both the immediate victims and those who viewed the uploaded videos of the brutal beheadings and executions of many of its hostages online (psychological damage/impact) and simultaneously categorised as a direct intangible positive for ISIS in terms of propaganda purposes and the global attention it may yield. For individual actors, the themes death, destruction of property, fear, intimidation, conveying their message, revenge, prospect of one’s family economic condition improving, defending family and supporting a cause were categorised as a set of direct and indirect tangible and intangible negatives and simultaneously a set of direct and indirect tangible and intangible positives. For example, death and destruction of property were categorised as indirect tangible negatives while fear, intimidation and conveying their message was deemed as indirect intangible negatives because of the “deleterious effects” (whether physically or not) on the path of a third party. At the same time, death, destruction of property, fear, intimidation and conveying their message were categorised as direct tangible and intangible positives because of the “beneficial effects” on the side of the practitioner of terrorism who either sought to cause as much death and destruction (for example, in the case of Ramzi Yousef), or psychological damage/impact through intimidation and spreading fear, as well as to convey their message to a wider audience. The themes revenge, supporting a cause and the prospect of one’s family’s economic conditions

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improving were categorised as direct intangible negatives and indirect tangible negatives, and simultaneously as direct and indirect intangible positives. For example, the prospect of one’s family’s economic condition improving can be understood as having a direct intangible negative and an indirect tangible negative because it can sometimes be a key motiving factor for some practitioners of terrorism (in the case of some Palestinian suicide bombers), as well as death is a likelihood for both the perpetrator and innocent civilians (third party) and simultaneously an indirect intangible positive because of the “beneficial effect” on the side of the terrorist family (the Palestinian suicide bomber’s family). Moreover, the themes “revenge” and “supporting a cause” could be understood as having both a direct intangible negative and indirect tangible negative because they can sometimes be key motivating factors for why some individuals might engage in terrorism, and their partake in terrorism is likely to result in imprisonment (in the case of Ramzi Yousef, Shane Paul O’Doherty, etc.) or the death of both the individual and innocent civilians. At the same time, both themes could be understood as having a direct intangible positive because of the inherent psychological rewards that come with taking revenge or supporting a cause. These themes are further presented in Table 3.2. In addition to the existing literature particularly as it relates to the US mainstream media and its coverage of terrorism-related episodic events, the media has a tendency of applying a “bad guy” vs “good guy” element in the framing of news coverage related to terrorism carried out by Salafist-­ Jihadists, or Islamic fundamentalists can be understood through the friend-enemy distinction. For example, As’ad AbuKhalil argued that the US mainstream media have a proclivity to present the news in Manichaeism-­ style by dividing the world between “good Muslim” and “bad Muslim” rather than terrorist and civilian, which became the central theme of America’s mass media following the 9/11 attacks (AbuKhalil, 2002, p. 30). This was also enunciated by Stockholm Professor of Journalism Christian Christensen during our interview who suggested that there might also be an underlining political-economic benefit to the media’s “bad guy” vs “good guy” frame. Professor Christian Christensen, during our telephone interview averred: “There is a clear political-economic benefit to heavy coverage of terrorism, which includes a clear bad guy and a good guy element, and it also has other elements like violence, which, unfortunately, are selling points for news. Violent events where there is a

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Table 3.2  Illustrates the themes related to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, and how it borrows and adds to the existing literature in seeking to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality Stakeholders of terrorism concept Stakeholders of terrorism

Negatives

Positives

US mainstream media

Indirect intangible Symbiotic relationship (benefits practitioner of terrorism in spreading fear, intimidation and conveying their messages); bias coverage; fuelling anti-immigrant sentiments; reinforcing misconceptions/myths about Muslims/ Islam; conveying terrorist’s message; post-traumatic stress disorder; retraumatising victims; misperception of risk Direct intangible Anger; hatred; frustration; rage; personal grievances; extreme religious beliefs; supporting a cause; generationally transmitted hatred; defending family; detachment from reality; revenge; prospect of one’s family’s economic well-being improving Direct tangible Likelihood of dying; likelihood of imprisonment (direct intangible themes) Indirect tangible Death; destruction of property (direct intangible themes) Indirect intangible Fear; Intimidation; Conveying their message.

Direct tangible Increased viewership; increased newspaper; ales Direct intangible Symbiotic relationship (benefits media); selling products; increased commercial activities/ profits; Fear is profitable

Individuals

Direct intangible Revenge; a sense of power; respect; a sense of patriotism; attached heroism; defending family; increase social status; renown; remission of sin; immediate acceptance into heaven; supporting a cause; fighting for a holy and noble cause; fear; intimidation; conveying their message Direct tangible Death; destruction of property Indirect intangible Prospect of one’s family’s economic well-being improving.

(continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Stakeholders of terrorism concept Stakeholders of terrorism

Negatives

Islamic Direct intangible State (ISIS) Radicalisation and recruitment (through social media & exploiting the religion of Islam) Direct tangible Death (ISIS former leaders and members) Indirect tangible Killing of non-combatants; executions and beheadings (of local and foreign hostages) Indirect intangible Criminalised war economy (oil sales, drug trafficking, kidnappings, theft, sale of small religious and cultural artifacts); tarnishing the Muslim faith/Islam; beheadings (to terrify perceived enemies of Islam); fear; intimidation; conveying their message

Positives Direct tangible ISIS revenue Direct intangible Criminalised war economy (oil sales, drug trafficking, kidnapping, theft, sale of small religious and cultural artifacts); Economic powerhouse; ISIS investments in commercial enterprises; ISIS soldiers; potential foreign fighters; execution and beheadings (propaganda and attract global attention)

This was calculated after triangulating the prevailing literature/existing debates on each stakeholder of terrorism

clear bad guy, where people have some kind of cultural familiarities with the victims, like Britain or Paris, tend to sell better” (Christensen, 2019). Furthermore, in an interview with Murtaza Hussain, a reporter at The Intercept who has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, BBC and other news outlets stated that: “States which are deemed friendly to the United States their violence is deemed de facto legitimate. Whereas non-state actors who are in bad terms with the US or even states which are in bad terms with the U.S., their violence are deemed under the category of terrorism” (Hussain, 2021). Mr Hussain’s claims are in substantial agreement with other arguments: Daya Kishan Thussu Professor of International Communication at the University of Westminster in London wrote about how the Western media (including the US mainstream press) tends to manipulate the truth about terrorism, and highlighted how “the Israeli invasion of Lebanon between April 11 and 27” was portrayed in the

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Western media: “Israel’s state aggression was portrayed in the western media as ‘self-defence’ while ‘Lebanese resistance to occupation was labelled as fundamentalist terrorism’” (Thussu, 1997). Moreover, the US mainstream media even adopted, developed and amplified the “US vs Them” theme or “Friend vs Enemy” or “Islam vs West” narrative that have since created an “atmosphere fear of terrorism” with a tendency to repeatedly link to Islam/Muslims to terrorism (Powell, 2011; Powell, 2018).

Deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism Concept Can the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept be used to understand other terroristic episodic events beyond the specific ones previously mentioned or the specific region being examined in this book? This book argues that it has the potential to do so. Take the events that transpired in the United States of America on January 6, 2021, when a pro-Trump mob stormed the Capitol Hill in order to prohibit US Congressional Representatives from executing their constitutional duty in certifying President-Elect Joe Biden’s presidency and reverse the results of the November Presidential election in favour of Donald Trump. In utilising the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept to understand the terrorist attack that took place on Capitol Hill, one would be able to discern the multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present at the time of the riot. For instance, a sense of anger, frustration, distrust in the electoral system, a romanticism with America’s racist past and civil war days and even damage to America’s global standing and international reputation would be categorised as intangible direct and indirect negatives, respectively. This is because the former (a sense of anger, frustration, distrust in the electoral system, a romanticism with America’s racist past and civil war days) would be categorised as “casual effects” (intangible direct negatives) that may have drove some of the pro-Trump rioters to attack the Capitol Hill, while the latter (damage to America’s global standing and international reputation) would be deemed as the resulting “deleterious effects” (indirect intangible negatives) on the third party (America as whole) ensuing from the Capitol Hill episode. On the other hand, the arrests, charges, deaths and immediate damages to the Capitol Hill would be categorised as tangible direct and indirect negatives. At the same time, a sense of power that comes with intimidating elected officials, wall to wall media coverage and even being called a

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“patriot” by then President Donald Trump would be categorised as intangible direct positives on the side of the individuals who participated in the attack on the Capitol Hill. Granted, this suggested route of analysis would require more detailed exposition. However, it illustrates that the Stakeholders of Terrorism Concept has the potential to be used to fully understand the multiplicity of negatives and positives present at the time of terroristic violence in other countries or regions other than the Caribbean. However, this must be done after establishing some facts about the event through a variety of sources of evidence (interviews with some of the participants, interviews with individuals involved in some of the cases like lawyers and investigators and analysing case document, FBI reports, etc.). The related themes could then be placed in respective categories as presented in Table 1.1. To further illustrate the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept’s potential applicability in other parts of the world outside of the Caribbean, I decided to briefly examine the Christchurch massacre case through the STC (Stakeholders of Terrorism concept). The indirect tangible negatives (having a deleterious effect) would be the more than 50 innocent people who were killed and the roughly 40 others injured at the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand on March 15, 2019, during Brenton Tarrant campaign of terror (Snaith, 2019). Moreover, Brenton Tarrant motives (casual effects) such as anger, hatred and a sense of revenge would be categorised as a direct intangible negative. For instance, after a careful examination of Brenton Tarrant’s manifesto, it clearly shows that he was motived by anger and hatred towards Muslims immigrants and sought “revenge” against the Muslim population, in which he deemed as “the invaders”. This was evidently clear in his manifesto written in a “Q. and A.” interview format, which was also replete with the language of “revenge”. For example, Brenton Tarrant stated in his manifesto that: “To take revenge on the invaders for the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by foreign invaders in European lands…To take revenge for the thousands of European lives lost to terror attacks throughout European lands” and “To take revenge for Ebba Akerlund” (Tarrant, 2019). Simultaneously, Brenton Tarrant seeking revenge for the thousands of European lives lost to previous terrorist attacks, the hundreds of thousands of deaths on European lands and the death of Ebba Åkerlund, all caused by what he deemed as “invaders” (Muslim immigrants) would also be categorised as direct intangible positives as it may have offered him some inherent psychological reward. This along with the

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ephemeral attention he garnered from live streaming the attack followed by the wall-to-wall media coverage of his terrorist attack. Other scholars have noted the existence of similar inherent psychological rewards (e.g. English, 2016; Richardson, 2006b).

Bibliography Elite Interviews Christensen, C. (2019, October 16). Telephone interview with Stockholm University Professor of Journalism, Christian Christensen. Hussain, M. (2021, January). Telephone interview with American journalist who writes for The Intercept, and has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, BBC and other news networks, Murtaza Hussain. Richardson, L. (2019, October). Telephone interview with the Vice Chancellor of Oxford University, distinguished scholar and world-renown leading expert on terrorism, Professor Louise Richardson.

References AbuKhalil, A. (2002). Bin Laden, Islam, and America’s new war on terrorism (Vol. 7). Seven Stories Press. Crenshaw, M. (1993). Review of the mind of the political terrorist, by R. M. Pearlstein. Political Psychology, 14(1), 169–171. Enders, W., & Hoover, G. A. (2012). The nonlinear relationship between terrorism and poverty. The American Economic Review, 102(3), 267–272. English, R. (2009). Terrorism: How to respond. Oxford University Press. English, R. (2016). Does terrorism work? A history. Oxford University Press. Newman, E. (2006). Exploring the “Root Causes” of terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(8), 749–772. Pearlstein, R. M. (1991). The mind of the political terrorist. Scholarly Resources. Piazza, J.  A. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 339–353. Powell, K. A. (2011). Framing Islam: An analysis of US media coverage of terrorism since 9/11. Communication Studies, 62(1), 90–112. Powell, K. A. (2018). Framing Islam/creating fear: An analysis of US media coverage of terrorism from 2011–2016. Religion, 9(9), 257. Richardson, L. (2006b). What terrorists want: Understanding the terrorist threat.

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Snaith, E. (2019, March 21). Brenton Tarrant: Christchurch Mosque attacker charged with terrorism. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/australasia/brenton-­tarrant-­terrorism-­new-­zealand-­mosque-­ shooting-­christchurch-­trial-­a8922951.html Sprinzak, E. (2000). Rational fanatics. Foreign Policy, 120, 66. Tarrant, B. (2019). The great replacement: Towards a new society. Thussu, D. K. (1997). How media manipulates truth about terrorism. Economic and Political Weekly, 264–267.

CHAPTER 4

Terrorism and the Caribbean

Abstract  Chapter 4 offers an overview of the existing literature on terrorism-­ related matters within the Caribbean context from notable scholars such as Andy Knight, John McCoy, Simon Cottee, Dion E.  Phillips, Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, Perry Stanislas, Kim Sadique, among others. The majority of the current terrorism-related literature on the Caribbean primarily focuses on Trinidad and Tobago mostly within the framework of radical Islamist, violent extremism, foreign fighters/extremist travellers and the twin-island nation’s history with Islamist terrorism. However, there is scant literature as it pertains to lone wolf terrorism or potential lone wolf attacks likened to a Mumbai-style attack, the threat terrorism poses to the region as a whole beyond the scope of tourism and Western interest in the region, the US mainstream media potential ability to shape Caribbean nationals’ perspective on terrorism, nor does it systematically or explicitly emphasise the inherent duality of terrorism within the Caribbean context. Keywords  Caribbean • Tourism • Islamist terrorism • Trinidad and Tobago • Guyana • Radicalisation • Violent extremism • Foreign fighters

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Quashie, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40443-6_4

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Notwithstanding the fact that there exists limited literature as it pertains to terrorism-activism within the context of the Caribbean in the wider terrorism studies as a few distinguished scholars have candidly observed (e.g. Izarali, 2017; McCoy & Knight, 2017; Knight, 2019), however, there are a few notable distinguished scholars that have since made a stupendous contribution to this subject matter (e.g. Cottee, 2021; Stanislas & Sadique, 2019; Chitwood, 2019; Knight, 2019; Cottee, 2019; Badri-­Maharaj, 2017; McCoy & Knight, 2017; Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-­ Sotelo, 2013; Massey & Pren, 2012; Hall, 2012; Phillips, 2008; Björnehed, 2004; Griffith, 2004; Pratt, 2003; Phillips, 1990). For example, Perry Stanislas and Kim Sadique’s article, “International Attitudes to Teaching Religion and Faith and the Policing of Minority Communities” (2019) noted that Trinidad has become a breathing ground for religiously-­ inspired violence and a recruitment hub for the Islamic State (ISIS) and that mostly young males of African descent who were also among the economically marginalised group and in some cases largely involved in violent criminal/gang activity prior to their conversion were more susceptible to radicalisation; Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj’s article “Globalization of the jihadist threat: Case study of Trinidad and Tobago. Strategic Analysis” (2017) pointed out the link between organised crime and ISIS in Trinidad and how easy it is for extremist leaders of criminal gangs to motivate recruits to become a “potential source of personnel for ISIS” (p. 181); Dion E. Phillips’ article, “Terrorism and security in the Caribbean before and after 9/11” (2008) tackles the issue of terrorism before and after the 9/11 attack within the Caribbean context and meticulously in table format displayed the series of “political terrorism” incidents that took placed in the Caribbean between the years of 1962–1995; Simon Cottee’s book, Black Flags of the Caribbean: How Trinidad Became an ISIS Hotspot (2021), explored how ISIS was encouraging citizens from Trinidad and Tobago to leave their homes and migrate to join the Islamic State in search of a new life by examining the background of prominent ISIS-affiliated individuals from the twin-island state, such as Abu Abdillah (Milton Algernon), Abu Isa (Stuart Mohamed), Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi (Shane Crawford) and found that they were motivated by a sense of duty to help their Muslim brothers and sisters, in search of a better life, searching for a purpose, among other things; John McCoy and Andy Knight’s article “Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, Global Trends” (2017) mostly examines the issues of “Homegrown Violent Extremism” (HVE), an issue they argued that is still not given

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sufficient attention. They also examine other issues ranging from extremist travellers to other motivating factors (a sense of adventure, prospects of financial gains, etc.) that played a vital role in so many Trinidadians leaving their homes to join the Islamic State. Moreover, both Anthony Hall’s article “The response of the tourism industry in Jamaica to crime and the threat of terrorism. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes” (2012) and Godfrey Pratt’s article “Terrorism and tourism: Bahamas and Jamaica fight back. International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management” (2003) examined the impact of the 9/11 attack on the Caribbean tourism industry and the threat terrorism poses to the vibrant tourism industry, particularly Jamaica and the Bahamas. However, there still remains scant literature on the issue of terrorism within the Caribbean context, and this volume intends to play its role in filling the gap in the prevailing literature in the wider terrorism studies. Hence, this section will present an overview of the existing literature on terrorism in relation to the Caribbean by commencing with a brief history of terroristic episodic events that occurred in the region over the past 50 years.

Introduction: A Brief History of Terrorism and the Caribbean Caribbean leaders have long acknowledged that terrorism is a “global” issue and that no state or region is “immune” and also recognised the threat international terrorism poses to the Caribbean, whether in terms of a direct attack as Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba have experienced to using the Caribbean as a platform to launch attacks in overseas territory. For example, Barbados Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs et al., Ms Billie Miller, in her address to the United Nation General Assembly in 2001, stated that “terrorism is a global phenomenon to which no country can consider itself immune” (United Nations Official Records, 2001, pp.  12–13). Likewise, Former Grenada Minister of Foreign Affairs and Corporation Elvin Nimrod was also in agreement with his Barbados counterpart and stated that his country has decided to suspend the Economic Citizenship Programme out of concern that terrorists might use the country’s passport to engage in international terrorism (United Nations Official Records, 2001, pp. 15–16). Between the years of 1968 and 2007, 11% of all terrorist incidents occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean (Cottam et al., 2010,

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p. 265). Moreover, the Central American and Caribbean region recorded a total of 237 terrorism-related deaths since 2002, with 11% of those registered deaths from terrorism occurring in 2019 alone (Global Terrorism Index, 2020). The percentage may seem miniscule when compared to other regions—like, for instance, between 2002 and 2019 the Middle East and North Africa registered the largest number of terrorism-­ related deaths: 96,000 deaths, while “South Asia recorded roughly 74,000 deaths over the same period, with another 50,000 occurring in sub-­ Saharan Africa” (Global Terrorism Index, 2020). Nevertheless, the Caribbean remains extremely vulnerable to terrorism especially susceptible to religiously-motivated terrorism of Islamic nature. The 9/11 attack might still be imprinted in many people’s minds who lived through such a horrific and tragic terroristic episodic event. However, few might be cognizant of the fact that the Caribbean had experienced a terrorist attack by means of an “airplane” long before September 11, 2001. In 1972, for instance, the governments of Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago had established diplomatic relations with Cuba and the countries also “entered into a joint air services agreement together” to America’s disapproval and in “defiance of an Organization of American States (OAS) sanction” and it was also met with outrage from anti-Castro forces (Phillips, 1990, p. 76). On October 6, 1976, in retaliation, “a Cubana Airlines civil jetliner, en route on a scheduled flight from Guyana to Havana via Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica, exploded and crashed in the sea approximately 10 minutes after departure from the Grantley Adams International Airport (then called Seawell) in Barbados, as a result of bombs planted aboard by two members of the CORU (Comando de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas), an anti-Castro terrorist group code-named El Condor” (Phillips, 1990, p. 76). The terrorist attack resulted in 78 people being killed and introduced the Caribbean nations to the politics of the Cold War (Phillips, 1990, p.  76). In the same year, the Guyanese Embassy Port of Spain, Trinidad was also bombed “during the bloody summer of anti-Castro violence in 1976” (Kornbluh, 2005). During the same period, in 1976, the Soviet Union vessel “Dzrordano Bruno” came under attack by gunfire from a small boat while it was anchored just 5 miles from the Bahamian island—luckily, no one was injured, and it was suspected that “anti-Castro” exiles were responsible for the attack, given that they were also responsible for previous attacks on Soviet ships (Jenkins et al., 1983). In 1980, a separatist group calling themselves the “Guadeloupe Liberation Army” conducted a series of terroristic violence, which include exploding

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of a 12-pound time bomb in a baggage locker that shattered the passenger terminal at Guadeloupe’s airport, as well as the wounding by unseen gunmen of the “only white member of the City Council of Pointe-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe’s largest city” that kicked off the campaign of violence that year (Prial, 1981). The group claimed responsibility in a statement and declared that they were starting a “‘campaign of harassment’ against ‘French colonialism’ and warned all French living on the seven islands in the Caribbean to ‘pack their bags and leave before Dec. 31, 1980’” (Prial, 1981). In 1983, in Haiti, the government newspaper Le Nouveau Monde was struck by a “strong explosion”, and a few days later an auto agency connected to the then President Jean-Claude Duvalier family was bombed; however, no one had claimed responsibility, but Haitian officials, at the time, “added the blasts to a growing list of largely ineffectual attacks that nevertheless indicate new determination among those violently opposed to the government of President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier” (Cody, 1983). However, both Haitian and US officials had attributed less than a dozen previously violent acts to two Miami-based exile groups (Cody, 1983). In the same year (1983), the assassination of the former Grenadian Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, leader of the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) at the hand of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), would also be considered an act of terrorism, repressive terrorism as defined by Dion Phillips (Phillips, 2008). In 1987, there were two separate bombings in the Dominican Republic in commemoration of the 22nd anniversary of the US invasion of Santo Domingo on April 24, 1965: the Mormon Church was bombed on April 24, and a bomb exploded against the perimeter wall of the Peace Corps Office on April 30 (U.S. Department of State, 1988). The Maximiliano Gomez Revolutionary Brigade claimed credit in an anonymous telephone call for the Mormon Church bombing, while an anonymous caller claimed credit in the name the Maximiliano Gomez Revolutionary Brigade for the bombing of the Peace Corps Office (U.S. Department of State, 1988). In 1990, Yasin Abu Bakr and a small religious group (Jamaat-al-­ Muslimeen) sought to overthrow the government of Trinidad and Tobago in a brief attempted coup on July 27, 1990, which involved holding the Trinidad government hostage for approximately 6 days before surrendering (Collihan & Danopoulos, 1993, p. 436). At the time, Yasin Abu Bakr perceived Trinidad to be a sort of dystopian society, an unjust society that was morally corrupted and being led by “evil men” and thus, it was his

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solemn duty to charter a “new national direction inspired by the will of Allah” (Collihan & Danopoulos, 1993, p. 441). In 1995, the twin-island state of Trinidad and Tobago “experienced its first political assassination” following shooting death of the former Attorney-General and Minister of National Security, Selwyn Richardson by unidentified assailants on June 20, 1995 (Phillips, 1997). This was also listed as an act of political terrorism in the Caribbean by Dion E.  Phillips in his 2008 article titled: “Terrorism and Security in the Caribbean before and after 9/11”. In 1996, Cuban exiles Luis Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch “claimed responsibility for terrorist actions against Cuba” on live television in Miami, “which at that stage involved the bombing of tourist hotels in Havana” (Anderson, 2005, p.  33) as three hotels came under bomb attacks in the Cuban capital on September 5, 1997, killing an Italian tourist by name of Favio di Celmo (Independent, 1997; Anderson, 2005, p.  33). In 2005, bomb explosion rocketed the city of Trinidad when a bomb placed in a dustbin exploded on the corner of Frederick and Queen Streets in Port of Spain on July 11, 2005, injuring 14 people with two in critical condition (BBC, 2005). In 2018, Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) with assistance from the US military thwarted a “carnival terrorist attack” following anti-terror raids on February 8, 2018, that resulted in the capture in four “high value targets” (Browne & Starr, 2018). The acting Assistant Superintendent of the Corporate Communications Unit and TTPS PRO, Michael Jackson (at the time) stated that the “police uncovered a threat to disrupt the Carnival activities and detained ‘several persons of interest’” (Browne & Starr, 2018). On July 7, 2021, the 43rd President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated in his private residence in the capital, Port-au-Prince, which thrust the country into further political turmoil (BBC, 2023). In November 2022, Gérald Nicolas was charged with “terrorism” on three separate charges: “leaving Canada to facilitate a terrorist activity, facilitating a terrorist activity and providing property for terrorist purposes” (Watts, 2022). The investigation into Gérald Nicolas, which commenced in 2021, revealed that he “allegedly planned to stage an armed revolution in Haiti and ultimately seize power” (Watts, 2022). A list of some terrorist incidents/plots in the Caribbean over the last 50 years, 1972–2022 (Table 4.1).

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Table 4.1  Displays a list of some terrorist incidents/plots that occurred in the Caribbean over the last 50 years, 1972–2022 Year

Terrorist incidents

1976 Bombing of the Cubana Airline 1976 Bombing of the Guyanese Embassy 1976 Attack of Soviet Union vessel “Dzrordano Bruno” 1980 Bombing at airport 1980 Attempted kidnapping of Jamaica Defense Force Chief of Staff and capture of the country’s Prime Minister Michael Manley 1983 Government newspaper Le Nouveau Monde bombed 1983 Assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop 1987 Bombing of the Mormon Church and Peace Corps Office 1990 Jamaat-al-Muslimeen attempted coup d’état 1995 Assassination of Attorney-General and Minister of National Security, Selwyn Richardson 1996 Bombing of tourist hotels 2005 Dustbin bomb explosion in Port of Spain 2015 Cyberterrorist attack on Jamaica Information Service (JIS) 2018 Failed carnival terrorist plot 2021 Assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse

Country Barbados Trinidad and Tobago Bahamas Guadeloupe Jamaica Haiti Grenada Dominican Republic Trinidad Trinidad Cuba Trinidad Jamaica Trinidad Haiti

Caribbean Terrorism Problems: Home-Grown Terrorism, Extremism and Tourism The Caribbean is known to many for its sun, sea and land and tourists are lured to the region for its unique cuisines in hopes of whetting their insatiable palates, dance to the rhythm of our colloquial songs embedded with the spirits of our ancestors, soak their feet in the sands of our beautiful beaches and traverse our beautified nature trails. This perpetual paradise offers the perfect opportunity for tourists to escape the hustle and bustle of rural life and the brutal winter as the region provides an environment of tranquillity and warm. Despite the Caribbean’s eternal paradise, it is vulnerable to a myriad of exogenous shocks such as climate shocks, economic shocks and security shocks like transnational crime, drug trafficking and terrorism that pose immense challenges for the region’s governments as well as cause calamitous damage to Caribbean countries’ economy. Notwithstanding the importance of the climate shocks, economic shocks and other

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security-related shocks besides terrorism, the Caribbean remains extremely vulnerable to terrorism; there is, however, very limited literature in the sea of terrorism publications regarding terrorism-related matters within the Caribbean context, as some scholars have noted (e.g. Izarali, 2017; McCoy & Knight, 2017; Knight, 2019). As one distinguished scholar Professor Andy Knight (2019) opined: “One security threat to the region which has received little examination in the scholarly literature until recently is the growth of home-grown extremism in some parts of the Caribbean” (p. 417). He also acknowledged that it has yet to be recognised as a “major existential vulnerability” by the majority of Caribbean heads, and even in the country where it is most prevalent, i.e. Trinidad and Tobago, the government has been lethargic in tackling this problem (Knight, 2019). Another major terrorism-related problem is that of Homegrown Violent Extremism (HVE) and “extremist travellers” in the Caribbean, particularly in the twin-island state of Trinidad Tobago that witnessed an estimated 89–125 extremist travellers migrating to join IS (McCoy & Knight, 2017). To add insult to injury, there was a high-profile case in 2014, involving approximately 19 Trinidadians and Tobagonians who were detained in “Venezuela under suspicion that they were making their way to Syria to engage in militant activities”, and it has also been alleged that the accusers received training from two Venezuelan police officers in preparation for joining the Islamic State in Syria (McCoy & Knight, 2017, pp. 280–281). John McCoy and Andy Knight (2017) further stressed that the case can be used as an example to underscore the existence of a connection between “extremists in the Caribbean and South America regions, especially between Trinidadians and Tobagonians and Venezuelans” (p. 281). This all underlines how the Caribbean is extremely vulnerable to terrorism, and though the region has not recently witnessed any terrorist attack likened to the 1976 Cuban airline terrorist bomb attack in Barbados, or the Islamist terrorist attack in Trinidad in 1990, the region remains extremely vulnerable to terrorism in the form of homegrown terrorism, extremism, foreign fighters such as Caribbean nationals who have migrated to join ISIS and are now returning home will continue to pose a problem to the region. Even the region’s vibrant tourism industry is constantly under severe threat from the effects of terrorism. While the Caribbean does not have sufficient or any real case examples of “lone wolf” terrorism activism within the region, it is essential to highlight a few prominent case examples of Caribbean nationals who have engaged in acts of terrorism/extremism either in the region or abroad.

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These case examples, though cannot be considered lone wolf terrorism, nevertheless presents somewhat unique case examples that places the Caribbean within a much broader and global context in relation to terrorism-­related matters. More importantly, the cases might also prove useful in offering an understanding of the kind of lone wolf-style terrorism that may occur in the Caribbean after a close examination of the case example, given that some of the individuals highlighted in this section do share similar characteristic behavioural traits to other known lone wolf and/or well-known practitioners of terrorism. Shane Dominic Crawford and Kareem Ibrahim Shane Crawford who was known by his nom de guerre Abu Sa’d at-­ Trinidadi, was one of the first Trinidadian citizens who migrated to join the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria (Cottee, 2019). In his lengthy interview in ISIS Dabiq magazine, aimed at potential recruits and terrorist sympathisers, the Trinidadian national called for bloodshed in the streets against his fellow citizens (Cottee, 2019; Graham-Harrison & Surtees, 2018; Badri-Maharaj, 2017). For example, in his message, he called upon Muslims in Trinidad and Tobago to use terroristic violence against his fellow citizens and to “terrify the disbelievers in their own homes and make their streets run with their blood” (Cottee, 2019; Badri-Maharaj, 2017). Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi (Shane Crawford) also lambasted his co-­ religionists for deciding to stay in a country “where you have no honor and are forced to live in humiliation, subjugated by the disbelievers” (Cottee, 2019). This call to action bespeaks Crawford’s motivations, beliefs and even perhaps, his primary goals, i.e. he sought to redress perceived indignation, subjugation and humiliation that he and his co-­ religionists had and continue to experience in Trinidad and Tobago. In fact, his message was aimed at East Indian Muslims and converted black Afro-Trinidadian Muslims who were associated with the Jamaat al Muslimeen group, an extremist group that was responsible for the attempted coup d’état in Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 (Cottee, 2019). Interestingly, Shane Crawford exuded similar characteristic behavioural traits to Omar Rezaq in terms of his disposition for the use of “extreme militancy”. Both men thought that their former group was not “militant enough”. For example, Omar Rezaq had first joined the Intifada group, and later became a member of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) because he found the former group to be “insufficiently militant” (Post, 2007,

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p. 20). Similarly, Shane Crawford, in his Dabiq interview, had condemned the widely feared (and still is) Jamaat al Muslimeen group “for not being militant enough, and for not practising the right kind of Islam” (Cottee, 2019). There was a certain religiousness, piety, interwoven with psychological and political dimensions attached to Shane Crawford’s engagement in terrorism. In fact, before his trip to join ISIS in Syria, Crawford would “frequent Nazim Mohammed’s Mosque, where he would have listened to the imam’s fiery sermons condemning democracy and calling for a purification of the faith” (Cottee, 2019, p.  313). Moreover, Crawford was arrested along with several suspects on “suspicion of involvement in an alleged plot to assassinate the prime minister and cabinet ministers” (McCoy & Knight, 2017). Crawford also struggled in his youthful days to find meaningful employment and supported himself financially through odd jobs like selling fish for a time, and it was indicated that he was experiencing feelings of “wanderlust and frustration” (McCoy & Knight, 2017). However, Shane Crawford terrorism activism would come to end after he was killed by a US drone strike in 2017 (Thomas-Johnson, 2019). On the other hand, Kareem Ibrahim was a prominent leader of the Shiite Muslim community in Trinidad and Tobago who was one of the co-conspirators in a terrorist plot to blow up fuel tanks at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport with a view to cause calamitous damage (Barnett, 2012; Carafano et al., 2012; McCoy and Knight, 2017). In 2007, Kareem Ibrahim from Trinidad and Tobago along with other Caribbean nationals from Guyana were arrested as part of a plot to blow up “aviation fuel tanks and pipeline at the John F. Kennedy International Airport” located in New York City; however, the four men involved in the plot believed that it would have caused “greater destruction than in the September 11 attacks” (Carafano et al., 2012, p. 10). The leader of the group, Russel Defreitas was arrested in Brooklyn, while Abdul Kadir, Kareem Ibrahim and Abdel Nur were detained in Trinidad and later extradited in 2008 (Carafano et al., 2012, p. 10). Both Abdul Kadir and Adbel Nur are from Guyana, and they had ties to “Islamic extremists in South America and the Caribbean”; Kadir was also an imam in Guyana and a former member of parliament in Guyana, and Kareem Ibrahim was a citizen from Trinidad and Tobago (Carafano et al., 2012, p. 10). Following a cross-examination, Kareem Ibrahim admitted that he had “advised the plotters to present the attack plan to revolutionary leaders in Iran and to use operatives ready to engage in suicide attacks at the airport” (Barnett, 2012). In fact, in one of the recorded conversations that were

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entered into evidence, Ibrahim was heard telling Russel Defreitas that the assailants (attackers involved in the plot) must be prepared to “fight it out, kill who you could kill and go back to Allah” (Barnett, 2012). This underscores the strategic thinking interwoven with religious dimensions, as Ibrahim along with his co-conspirators had a set of clear thought-out plans that they believe would have caused extensive damage to the JFK International Airport and the US economy and resulted in the death of many civilians (Talanova, 2011). If the plan had been successful, it might have rewarded Ibrahim and his co-conspirators with a short-term strategic victory, and inherent psychological reward interwoven with religious dimensions because they believe if they were killed in the process (suicide terrorism) that they would “go back to Allah”. Tourism, Terrorism and the Caribbean In addition to such individual threats, another problematic area of concern as it relates to terrorism in the region, is that of the tourism industry. Caribbean states are characterised by a myriad of vulnerabilities such as small size, geographical location and a small and fragile economy that is dependent on international trade and investments and tourism. Additionally, the region’s characteristic economic problems are exacerbated by worrying levels of corruption. For instance, in a study conducted by Philmore Alleyne and Marissa Chandler, who examined the “potential impact of whistleblowing on corruption in the Caribbean financial sector” found that the various financial scandals that have since occurred over the past decade in the Caribbean “have made corruption a cause for concern in the region” (as cited in Hawthorne & Magu, 2018). This concern should not be taken lightly, given that corruption can impact social and economic development, undermine democracy, erode public trust and even aid in the facilitation of conflict, organised crime and terrorism (Hawthorne & Magu, 2018, p. 240). More importantly, the facilitation of terrorism would undoubtedly result in an adverse effect on the region’s economy as a whole, especially the tourism industry. For instance, a terrorist attack would likely cause calamitous damage to the region’s economy, such as a significant reduction in foreign direct investments (FDIs), lower economic growth, a decrease in trade, and a decline in tourism, given that “economic impacts of terrorism are greatest in small terrorism-plagued countries and developing countries” (Keefer & Loayza, 2008; Sandler & Enders, 2008 as cited

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in Sandler, 2015, p. 2). The latter is especially relevant to the Caribbean, given that is a region that is home to a host of small island developing states. Though the region as a whole remains extremely vulnerable to terrorism, the tourism industry is especially vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. During the latter half of the twentieth century, for instance, the Caribbean region was undergoing fundamental changes as “many former colonies became nation states” similarly to Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic who were already independent countries long before, and they began the process of creating their own political, economic and cultural roadmap; however their economic structures mirrored that of other Third World regions characteristically dependent on “foreign investment, foreign aid, and the export of raw agricultural products” (Pattullo, 2005, pp. 5–6). Howbeit, the tourism industry became an important stakeholder by the turn of the twenty-first century as all Caribbean territories became involved in the business of tourism so much so that the region’s politicians declared it “the engine of growth”, despite the limited attention it received during policy-making (Pattullo, 2005, p. 6). Nevertheless, the tourism industry was of the utmost importance to the Caribbean. As a matter of fact, top ranking consultants, diplomats, international tourist industry officials, lending agencies and even development banks were all singing the same tune. For example, international bodies such as the World Bank financed hotels in the 1970s, United Nations endorsed tourism for the Third World and the “third Lomé Convention which enshrined Europe’s special relationship with states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, also recognised the ‘real importance of the tourism industry’ and provided a broad range of financial provision” (Pattullo, 2005, p. 6). Tourism was not just a regional phenomenon; it became the world’s largest industry at the end of the twentieth century as projected tourist arrivals more than doubled as figures drastically jump from US$664 million in 1999 to US$1.6  billion by 2020, according to figures from the United Nations (Pattullo, 2005, p. 7). Tourism is an important industry, and the sector has become integral to economic growth and development and economic prosperity for many small island developing states, particularly Caribbean countries. In Jamaica, for example, tourism has become one of the largest and fastest-growing industries as well as the main driver for economic growth over the past two decades, contributing approximately 9–10% to Jamaica’s gross domestic product (PIOJ, 2002, as cited in Singh et  al., 2006, p.  184). Moreover, 82,500 jobs (7.3% of

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employment) were directly supported by the tourism sector, while contributing 8.1% of Jamaica’s gross domestic product (GDP) in the same year and was projected to contribute 4.7% the following year, according to the World Travel and Tourism Council, (Wood, 2017, p. 261). In the Bahamas, some 51,000 jobs (27% of employment) were directly supported by the tourism sector, while contributing 19.4% of Bahamas gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 was forecasted to rise by 6.7% in 2015 (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2015). In Grenada, some 3000 jobs (6.4% of employment) were directly supported by the tourism sector, while contributing 7.0% of Grenada gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 was predicted to increase by 2.5% in 2015 (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2015). Before the climax of the COVID-19 global pandemic, “the Caribbean was one of the most tourism-intense regions of the world with international tourism contributing, on average, to 20% of exports, 15% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), and 14% of labor” (Peterson, 2020, p. 2). The point is to emphasise the significance of the tourist industry to the Caribbean and the fact that a terrorist attack can cause catastrophic damage to the Caribbean’s overall economy and severely impact people’s lives and livelihoods. Thus, the region’s extreme vulnerability to terrorism especially the tourism industry is not just a national security matter, but also an economic one. Terrorism’s Potential Impact on Tourism Undoubtedly, any suspicion of violence of any kind especially fears of a potential terrorist attack, or a misperception of risk of being targeted by terrorists could cripple the tourism sector of the Caribbean. In fact, Graham Norton noted in his article, “Tourism and International Terrorism” (1987) how an erroneous forecasting by an American political analyst’s firm of possible violent outbreaks in Jamaica during the course of 1986 resulted in “thousands of cancellations in January of that year” (p. 30). Thus, it can easily be argued that it is indubitably that a terrorist attack could cause calamitous damage to the Caribbean’s tourism industry and the region’s economy as a whole, as it has already been previously established how significant the industry is to the region’s economy. Moreover, the region’s tourism industry is also extremely vulnerable to terrorism in terms of the targeting of tourists by practitioners of terrorism with a view to achieve a strategic or political goal, which can encompass exploiting the “excitement and commotion at tourist centers as a cover for

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their activities, destabilizing the economy, or gaining much needed media attention” (Sönmez et  al., 1999). In fact, many scholars/experts have pointed out how the tourism industry is vulnerable to terrorism on the side of the tourists themselves as they are often seen as “soft targets” for terrorists (e.g. Sönmez et al., 1999; Paraskevas & Arendell, 2007; Lisle, 2016). Though the deliberate targeting of Western tourists by terrorist groups is not a new phenomenon, the direct terrorist targeting of tourists and tourist resorts took on a different meaning following the 9/11 attack and “tourists themselves were drawn into the War on Terror as the soft target of choice for terrorists” (Lisle, 2016, p. 241; 254). Similarly, other scholars have noted how tourists, foreign aid and workers, foreign direct investments and foreign businesses, especially for terrorist groups that have an “anti-Western orientation” can become potential targets for “economic warfare” (Lutz & Lutz, 2017). Moreover, some scholars have also analysed the impact of terrorism on the Caribbean tourism industry within the context of the 9/11 attack (e.g. Korstanje & Clayton, 2012; Lutz & Lutz, 2018; Hall, 2012; Pratt, 2003; Griffith, 2003). The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed higher levels of terrorist incidents and fatalities that were linked to the decline in tourist visits to the Caribbean, which of course, can be attributed to the 9/11 attacks given that there were very limited number of terrorist incidents in the region during that time (Lutz & Lutz, 2018). For example, though the 9/11 attack was a terrorist attack on American soil, the Caribbean tourism industry was nonetheless negatively impacted by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack because many US citizens were primarily concerned about the safety of air travel following the 9/11 attack (Pratt, 2003; Hall, 2012). In fact, in Jamaica, that earns roughly US$1.2 billion per  annum from tourism and employs more than 30,000 persons was adversely affected by the events of the 9/11 attack, as Air Jamaica lost a staggering US$11 million within a matter of weeks following the attack on September 11, 2001 (Griffith, 2003). Barbados was also negatively impacted by the 9/11 attacks, as the country authorities predicted a 30–45% drop in the cruise enterprise, as well as a decline in tourist spending of US$9.2 million (Griffith, 2003). Moreover, hotels in the Bahamas emptied by the numbers as paranoia regarding the safety or security of air travel permeated the minds of US bound travellers (Pratt, 2003, p. 192). Around the same time, Jamaica witnessed a 41% decline in total air travel, which fell to 23% in the following weeks and was later estimated to have dropped to 16% (Pratt, 2003, p. 192).

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Another point of consideration is that the region’s tourism industry can also be adversely affected by the US mainstream media coverage of a terrorist attack. In fact, some experts/scholars have highlighted how the misperceptions of the risk of danger of being targeted by terrorism, in large part, due to the media coverage of terroristic events can have a negative impact on tourism demand and adversely affect the tourism industry (Sönmez et al., 1999; Pizam & Smith, 2000, p. 125; Bianchi, 2006, p. 67; Korstanje & Clayton, 2012, pp.  16–17). Brenda J.  Lutz and James M. Lutz (2018) also pointed out that the negative impact on the tourism industry in the Caribbean, following the 9/11 attacks could have also been due to a number of reasons ranging from the fact that “flights to the Caribbean frequently included intermediate stops in the United States” to “American tourists, who form an important part of the market for Caribbean vacations, had become especially sensitive to the threat of terrorism in other countries and modified their travel plans accordingly” (pp. 4–12). Next, ISIS and the Caribbean. ISIS and the Caribbean Moreover, inter-state security threats reminiscent of the cold war era has been replaced by a myriad but “interconnected set of security threats and risks”, ranging from international terrorism to transnational crime, among other threats/risks that have the potential to undermine the wider international community (Bourne, 2011, p. 491). This underscores the serious threat international terrorism poses to the international community, which includes the Caribbean community. On the issue of international terrorism, specifically the threat that the Islamic State (ISIS) poses to the Caribbean, there remains very limited literature on this subject matter in terrorism studies. In fact, majority of the prevailing literature as it pertains to ISIS and the Caribbean mainly focuses on Trinidad and Tobago (e.g. Cottee, 2021; Chitwood & Cotte, 2021; Knight, 2019; Stanislas & Sadique, 2019; McCoy & Knight, 2017). For example, Simon Cottee’s Black Flags of the Caribbean: How Trinidad Became an ISIS Hotspot (2021), wanted to understand how the “self-­ proclaimed Islamic State” was “able to capture the hearts and minds of a small number of citizens” from Trinidad and Tobago to encourage them to desert the island in search “for a new life in a strange land riven by war?” The book does so brilliantly by going deeper into several Trinidadians’ background who migrated to join ISIS, such as Abu Abdillah (Milton

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Algernon), Abu Isa (Stuart Mohamed) and especially the most infamous of all Shane Crawford who went by the nom de guerre Abu Sa’d at-­ Trinidadi and found that some were motivated by a sense of duty to help their Muslim brothers and sisters, in search of a better life, searching for a purpose, among other things. John McCoy and Andy Knight’s article “Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, Global Trends” (2017), highlighted the issues of “Homegrown Violent Extremism” (HVE) and “extremist travellers” in the Caribbean, particularly in the twin-island state of Trinidad Tobago, and pointed to other factors like “identity issues”, “a sense of adventure” and the prospects of “financial gains”, among other things, as key motivating factors for why some nationals decided to migrate to join ISIS. Andy Knight’s other article “The nexus between vulnerabilities and violence in the Caribbean” (2019) also addressed the growing threat of home-grown extremism in the Caribbean that is seemingly more of a problem for Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica, especially Trinidad and Guyana because they are “more susceptible to radical Islamist overture than most other Caribbean countries” because of their already established Muslim population whereby “extremist individuals of that persuasion can blend”. The article also made clear that this problem is not limited to these specific countries, rather it is a problem for the wider Caribbean community given that the “extremist ideas of ISIS and al Qaeda are finding some resonance among individuals” who are religious novice (not-­ well versed in Islam), disaffected youths, “the marginalised and the oppressed” (p. 418). Moreover, the Caribbean as a whole is extremely vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism and the increasing overlap between transitional terrorism organisations like the Islamic State (ISIS) and organised crime and violent gangs. For example, in the Caribbean, gangs serve as a “force multiplier” for terrorism because they are a source of recruits, weapons and local knowledge; and ISIS operatives are exceptionally skilled at recruiting gang members and disaffected youths, usually via social media, according to Professor Anthony Clayton (2017). In fact, Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj’s article “Globalization of the jihadist threat: Case study of Trinidad and Tobago. Strategic Analysis” (2017) noted the link between organised crime and ISIS in Trinidad, given that extremist leaders of criminal gangs can easily “attract aspiring, impressionable and motivated recruits toward extremist ideology” became a “potential source of personnel for ISIS” (Badri-Maharaj, 2017, p. 181).

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Several Caribbean countries are also extremely vulnerable to terrorism in a unique fashion; for example, Trinidad and Tobago is vulnerable to Islamist extremist, a country (only country in the Western Hemisphere to date) which suffered an attempted coup by jihadi insurgence in the 1990s, and Jamaica which has approximately 300 gangs and countless disadvantaged young men, whom ISIS tend to target as potential recruits (Clayton, 2017). In 2016, St Vincent and the Grenadines Prime Minister, Dr Ralph Gonsalves, in an interview, even stated that ISIS remains “a serious issue” for the Caribbean Community (Ragoonath, 2016). The same year, General John Kelly also warned about ISIS fighters in the Caribbean; and several Caribbean security experts were also concerned that extremist might exploit the region’s open borders with the United States of America and Canada (Jamaica Observer, 2016, January 9). Many government heads, relevant policy makers and regional security experts have to some extent recognised ISIS as a serious threat to the Caribbean, with a heavy focus on Trinidad and Tobago, understandably so, given that it was deemed one of the world’s biggest recruitment hub for the Islamic State per capita (Knight, 2019; Chitwood & Cottee, 2021). Notwithstanding the significant strides the region has made so far with respect to counterterrorism, the region continues to suffer from porous borders, limited law enforcement agencies, little to non-existent relevant legislation and insufficient interagency cooperation (U.S.  Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2018, p. 194). Moreover, the region is also vulnerable to terrorism in the form of extremist individuals likened to Shane Crawford who went by the nom de guerre Abu Sa’d atTrinidadi and Kareem Ibrahim who was a prominent leader in the Muslim community in Trinidad; such people can serve as examples of the type individuals ISIS might target to carry out attacks within the region. It must be noted that Kareem Ibrahim might not have been a suitable candidate for ISIS, given that he was a prominent leader of the Shiite Muslim community. Nevertheless, he fits the behavioural characteristic traits of other prominent lone wolf and leaderless resistance-like terrorists who carried out terrorist attacks in the name of a terrorist group or in support of a struggle/cause. Concluding Thoughts The majority of the current terrorism-related literature on the Caribbean primarily focuses on Trinidad and Tobago mostly within the framework of radical Islamist, violent extremism, foreign fighters/extremist travellers and the twin-island nation’s history with Islamist terrorism. However, there is

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scant literature as it pertains to lone wolf terrorism or potential lone wolf attacks likened to a Mumbai-style attack, the threat terrorism poses to the region as a whole beyond the scope of tourism and Western interest in the region, the US mainstream media’s potential ability to shape Caribbean nationals’ perspective on terrorism, nor does it systematically or explicitly emphasise the inherent duality of terrorism within the Caribbean context. There is also scant examination of terrorism through other useful templates/ dimensions, such as psychological dimensions, cultural/civilisational context, strategic and so on. This does not disregard the brilliant work done by others like distinguished scholar Professor John McCoy and Andy Knight in their article “Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, Global Trends” (2017), which highlighted some psychological dimensions, such as “identity issues” and a “sense of adventure” in relation to why some people were attracted to groups abroad and recruitment purposes. The issue of “identity” was mostly linked to issues within the wider Muslim community in Trinidad and Tobago, as it has also been alleged that the Anjuman Sunnatul Jamaat Association (ASJ), the largest Islamic organisation in Trinidad and Tobago, engaged in discriminatory practices towards the Afro-Muslims, and even some Indo-Muslims complained about being marginalised by the dominant Hindu Indian identity; a local lawyer and Muslim community leader also claimed that Afro-Trinidadian and Tobagonian Muslims are being marginalised from the “mainstream” Muslim institutions; and Afro-­Muslims (Muslims of African descent) are attracted to “alternative identities” like “trans-nationalistic and universalistic ideas of Muslim identity” (McCoy & Knight, 2017). It can be then argued that the prevailing literature strengthens the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept by implicitly recognising, to some extent, the complex inherent duality of terrorism in relation to psychological dimensions and individuals who migrated to join ISIS, such as “identity issues” and “a sense of adventure” (which can be interpreted as both a casual effect and a beneficial effect). However, the prevailing literature does not sufficiently explore the psychological dimensions. For instance, it does not sufficiently explore the various psychological dimensions (negatives and positives alike) in relation to terrorism, which includes a multiplicity of causal effects, deleterious effects and inherent psychological rewards/beneficial effects. Moreover, the existing literature does not explicitly or implicitly emphasise the inherent duality. As mentioned earlier, the issue of “identity” and “a sense of adventure” can simultaneously have a causal effect and a beneficial effect. This is further explored by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. Moreover, majority of the prevailing literature on ISIS and the Caribbean is heavily

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focused on Trinidad, understandably so, given that the country was deemed one of the biggest recruitment hub for ISIS per capita (e.g. Knight, 2019; Chitwood & Cottee, 2021). Also, a majority of the prevailing literature offers an understanding of ISIS within the Caribbean context mainly through extremist religious groups with shared interests and individuals who migrated to join the terrorist group in the Middle East. However, the existing literature has not sufficiently examined the possible threat of individual actors/lone wolf terrorists or even offered a definition of such an individual actor within the Caribbean context. Nor does the literature explicitly or systematically stress the inherent duality, i.e. the multiplicity of tangible and intangible negatives and positives associated with ISIS and those who migrated to or claim a connection to the transnational terrorist group. This, however, is achieved by utilising the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept to fully understand terrorism within the Caribbean context.

Bibliography References Anderson, T. (2005). Contesting “Transition”: The US plan for a “Free Cuba”. Latin American Perspectives, 32(6), 28–46. Badri-Maharaj, S. (2017). Globalization of the jihadist threat: Case study of Trinidad and Tobago. Strategic Analysis, 41(2), 173–189. Barnett, J. (2012, January 14). Imam sentenced to life in prison in JFK airport terror plot. https://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/13/justice/new-­york-­airport-­ plot/index.html BBC. (2005, July). Bomb rocks Port of Spain. Retrieved from https://www.bbc. co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2005/07/050711_trinidad-bomb.shtml BBC. (2023, February). Haiti president’s assassination: What we know so far. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­latin-­america-­57762246 Bianchi, R. (2006). Tourism and the globalisation of fear: Analysing the politics of risk and (in) security in global travel. Tourism and Hospitality Research, 7(1), 64–74. Björnehed, E. (2004). Narco-terrorism: The merger of the war on drugs and the war on terror. Global Crime, 6(3–4), 305–324. Bourne, M. (2011). Netwar geopolitics: Security, failed states and illicit flows. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13(4), 490–513. Browne, R., & Starr, B. (2018). US Military helps thwart Trinidad carnival terror attack. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/09/politics/trinidad-­ carnival-­terror-­attack-­thwarted/index.html

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Carafano, J. J., Bucci, S., & Zuckerman, J. (2012). Fifty terror plots foiled since 9/11: the homegrown threat and the long war on terrorism. Backgrounder, 2682, 25. Chitwood, K. (2019). The Global “War on Terror” and the Tenuous Public Space of Muslims in Latin America and the Caribbean. Hamsa. Journal of Judaic and Islamic Studies (5). Clayton, A. (2017). Anthony Clayton | The threat from terrorism in the Caribbean. The Jamaica Gleaner. Retrieved from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/ news/20170828/anthony-clayton-threat-terrorism-caribbean Cody, E. (1983). Haitian exiles’ bombs create no echoes. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/03/20/ haitian-­e xiles-­b ombs-­c reate-­n o-­e choes/60b421c3-­e 4ee-­4 89b-­b 2e6-­ c004afce3b09/ Collihan, K. M., & Danopoulos, C. P. (1993). Coup d’Etat attempt in Trinidad: Its causes and failure. Armed Forces & Society, 19(3), 435–450. Cottam, M.  L., Mastors, E., Preston, T., & Dietz, B. (2010). Introduction to political psychology. Psychology Press. Cottee, S. (2019). The calypso caliphate: How Trinidad became a recruiting ground for ISIS. International Affairs, 95(2), 297–317. Cottee, S. (2021). Black Flags of the Caribbean: How Trinidad Became an ISIS Hotspot. Bloomsbury Publishing. Golash-Boza, T., & Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2013). Latino immigrant men and the deportation crisis: A gendered racial removal program. Latino Studies, 11(3), 271–292. Graham-Harrison, E., & Surtees, J. (2018, February 2). Trinidad’s jihadis: How tiny nation became Isis recruiting ground. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/02/trinidad-­jihadis-­isis-­tobago-­tariq-­abdul-­haqq Griffith, I. L. (2003). The Caribbean Security Scenario at the Dawn of the 21st Century: Country, Change, Challenge. Published by the University of Miami North. Griffith, I. L. (Ed.). (2004). Caribbean security in the age of terror: Challenge and change. Hall, A. (2012). The response of the tourism industry in Jamaica to crime and the threat of terrorism. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes, 4(1), 59–72. Hawthorne, O.  E., & Magu, S. (Eds.). (2018). Corruption scandals and their global impacts. Routledge. Institute for Economics and Peace. (2020). Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring and the impact of terrorism. Institute for Economics and Peace. Izarali, M. R. (2017). The Caribbean in current global security affairs: The issue of terrorism. In Crime, violence and security in the Caribbean (pp. 240–267). Routledge. Jenkins, B. M., Cordes, B., Gardela, K., & Petty, G. (1983). A chronology of terrorist attacks and other criminal actions against maritime targets. RAND Corporation.

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Knight, W. A. (2019). The nexus between vulnerabilities and violence in the Caribbean. Third World Quarterly, 40(2), 405–424. Korstanje, M. E., & Clayton, A. (2012). Tourism and terrorism: conflicts and commonalities. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes, 4(1), 8–25. Kornbluh, P. (2005). Documents linked to Cuban exile Luis Posada highlighted targets for terrorism. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 218. Edited by Peter Kornbluh. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB218/index.htm Lisle, D. (2016). Holidays in the danger zone: Entanglements of war and tourism. University of Minnesota Press. Lutz, B. J., & Lutz, J. M. (2017). Globalization and the economic consequences of terrorism. Palgrave Macmillan. Lutz, B.  J., & Lutz, J.  M. (2018). Terrorism and tourism in the Caribbean: A regional analysis. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 12(1), 55–71. Massey, D. S., & Pren, K. A. (2012). Unintended consequences of US immigration policy: Explaining the post-1965 surge from Latin America. Population and Development Review, 38(1), 1–29. McCoy, J., & Knight, W. A. (2017). Homegrown violent extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local patterns, global trends. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(4), 267–299. Norton, G. (1987). Tourism and international terrorism. The World Today, 43(2), 30–33. Paraskevas, A., & Arendell, B. (2007). A strategic framework for terrorism prevention and mitigation in tourism destinations. Tourism Management, 28(6), 1560–1573. Pattullo, P. (2005). Last resorts: The cost of tourism in the Caribbean. New York University Press. Peterson, R. R. (2020). Over the Caribbean Top: Community Well-Being and Over-Tourism in Small Island Tourism Economies. International Journal of Community Well-Being, 1–38. Phillips, D. (1990). Defense Policy in Barbados, 1966–1988. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 32(2), 69–102. Phillips, D. E. (2008). Terrorism and security in the Caribbean before and after 9/11. In Armed forces and conflict resolution: Sociological perspectives. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Pizam, A., & Smith, G. (2000). Tourism and terrorism: A quantitative analysis of major terrorist acts and their impact on tourism destinations. Tourism Economics, 6(2), 123–138. Post, J. M. (2007). The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda. Palgrave Macmillan.

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CHAPTER 5

Understanding Terrorism, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean: A Caribbean Case Study

Abstract  Chapter 5 presents a detailed discussion of the data collected (findings) in the field by means of the qualitative research methodology. The findings presented in Chap. 5 seeks to offer a full understanding of terrorism within the Caribbean context through the various explanatory frameworks and by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. In doing so, it adds to the prevailing literature as it pertains to the specific explanations of terrorism, and the stakeholders of terrorism within the Caribbean context. The research findings provide considerable evidence to further validate the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, which seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. The data in this chapter highlights how many Caribbean nationals who migrated to join ISIS were motivated by various casual factors and simultaneously perceived beneficial factors such as a sense of belonging, meaning and purpose, social exclusion, status, power, offered money to fight and so on. The findings also illustrate the Caribbean’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks from ISIS and possible attacks from lone wolf or “stand alone” individual actors. It also shows the potential for the US mainstream

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Quashie, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40443-6_5

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media to shape the perspective of Caribbean nationals in relation to terrorism. However, it urges more research on the latter point. Keywords  Caribbean • Terrorism • Causes • Impacts • Benefits • Psychological dimensions • Religious dimensions • Strategic dimensions • Culture/civilisational context • Economics dimensions • Political dimensions • Social exclusion • Caribbean vulnerability • Caribbean preparedness This section is dependent on the qualitative research for the book that was conducted primarily in the Caribbean. The qualitative study was dependent upon a series of interviews (which involved a combination of elite interviews and a focus group study) and a qualitative content analysis of various documents. Most of the interviews were conducted in a face-to-­ face setting and by means of telephone interviews. For instance, a total of ten 10 elite interviews were conducted; two of them including the focus group study were conducted in Jamaica in a face-to-face setting. However, 5 of the 10 elite interviews were carried out in Barbados, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago via a WhatsApp video/audio call and in some instances, via a regular telephone and email interview. Moreover, it is important to note that three of the elite interviews were conducted outside of the Caribbean region because of their expertise, broadly, in the areas of terrorism and the US mainstream media. The list of interviews is provided in the book’s Bibliography. Therefore, the researcher deemed it necessary to include world renowned experts and other professionals/scholars in the respective fields, such as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford Professor Louise Richardson, who is a world-renowned expert on terrorism; Stockholm University Professor of Journalism Christian Christensen and American journalist Murtaza Hussain who writes for The Intercept and has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, BBC and other news outlets. The other elite interview participants from the Caribbean are CARICOM IMPACS Assistant Director Tonya Ayow, Regional Security System, Assets Recovery Unit Director Mr Grenville Williams, UN Ambassador Her Excellency Inga Rhonda King, former Minister of Tourism Mr. Cecil McKie, Head of the Department of Government at the University of the West Indies, Mona and regional security expert Dr Suzette Haughton, Alcan Professor of Caribbean Sustainable Development in the Institute for Sustainable

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Development, University of the West Indies, Chairman of the Broadcasting Commission Jamaica and national security policy expert Anthony Clayton and Isis Gonsalves, Minister Counsellor/Political Coordinator, Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations. In addition to the interviews, the research examined several terrorism-related documents from a number of anglophone Caribbean states. The sequence of discussing the findings is as follows. First, the researcher deployed the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept in seeking to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context. Second, the researcher sought to understand how and in what ways the region is vulnerable to and its preparedness for terrorism. Lastly, the researcher further explains how the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept attempts to shape our understanding of terrorism by borrowing from and contributing to the prevailing orthodoxies and existing literature on terrorism.

Understanding Terrorism Within the Caribbean Context At the conceptual level, terrorism can have different meanings or conceptual meanings depending on who you talk too. For instance, Mr Grenville Williams of the Regional Security Systems (RSS) made this point during our interview when he stated that, “our view (including him) of terrorism has been shaped the events of 9/11” (Williams, 2019). He also pointed out that the 1990 Trinidad coup d’état was never labelled an act of terrorism, and neither were the individuals who partook in the attempt to overthrow the Trinidadian government were branded as “terrorists” at the time. This is because there were no laws in the region explicitly addressing the issue of terrorism at the time. As a matter of fact, Trinidad and Tobago “Anti-Terrorism Act” came into effect on September 13, 2005, more than a decade later following the coup attempt on July 27, 1990. Moreover, Trinidad and Tobago along with other Caribbean countries have not only passed anti-terrorism legislations but have since amended or taken steps to address the issue of Foreign Fighter Returnees. In other words, the region’s understanding of terrorism has evolved since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, in the United States of America. Mr Williams also noted that depending on which side of the equation you are standing, one man’s terrorist might be perceived as another man’s freedom fighter.

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Hence, the researcher sought to use the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept to fully understand terrorism within the Caribbean context. In doing so, it borrows and adds to the existing literature to reinforce the inherent duality of terrorism more systematically. A multiplicity of negatives and positives are simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. The six explanations (psychology, religion, strategy, culture/civilisational context, economics and political dimensions), and the specific stakeholders (US mainstream, individuals (perpetrators) and ISIS) were also chosen because of their applicability to the Caribbean. The study’s findings provide ample evidence to substantiate the appropriateness of the six explanations and the specific stakeholders of terrorism, as crucial templates through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept to fully understand terrorism within the Caribbean context. Psychological Dimensions First, psychological dimensions. There were clearly emergent themes such as a sense of belonging, a sense of adventure, frustration, supporting a cause, influence, power, increased social status, a sense of meaning and purpose, among others, emerged as useful dimensions for understanding and explaining terrorism within the Caribbean. For example, Miss Tonya Ayow argued that “a sense of belonging…could be one of the biggest benefits” that might have driven some Caribbean nationals to emigrate and join ISIS (Ayow, 2019). Likewise, Professor Anthony Clayton sees psychological dimensions as a potent factor in the understanding and explanation of terrorism within the Caribbean context (Clayton, 2019). With respect to terroristic violence and fundamentalist ideology, he argued that it would not be difficult for a country like Jamaica to encourage and motivate persons to engage in violence like terrorism “because people are already very familiar with the use of violence to achieve certain goals like status and survival. All you have to do is give them little context, little purpose…little meaning” (Clayton, 2019). Professor Clayton also noted during our face-to-face interview that a lot of individuals who came back from Syria garnered a sense of “real power, influence, respect and status in the streets” (Clayton, 2019). Similarly, St Vincent and the Grenadines Minister of Tourism Cecil McKie (at the time of the interview) also believes that psychological dimensions, such as “frustration and being able to identify with a cause or struggle” were among the most salient reasons why some people from the

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Caribbean emigrated to join the Islamic State (ISIS) (McKie, 2019). In addition, “a sense of adventure” was mentioned as another factor for why some nationals might have migrated to join ISIS.  For instance, Mr Grenville Williams of Regional Security Systems (RSS) during our telephone interview candidly observed that: “a lot of persons may have seen going to Syria as more of an adventure and they expect to come back alive. Because there are cases where some Trinidadians may have taken their wives and their young children. I do not think they go into a war zone thinking that my wife is going to be killed, my young children, the next generation is going to be killed. So, in terms of psychological, a part of this is a lack of understanding of what a war entail. I think a lot of it is a misunderstanding of what ISIS represents, a misunderstanding of what terrorism really represent and a misunderstanding of what my situation is going to be when I travel into a conflict zone” (Williams, 2019). Lastly, a sense of loss identity also emerged as a critical explanatory framework for understanding terrorism within the context of the Caribbean. For example, Professor Louise Richardson, a world-renowned expert on terrorism, during our interview noted that “a sense of loss of identity” can be a factor for some individuals [Caribbean nationals] who migrated to join the Islamic State (Richardson, 2019). She expounded: “we are [individuals] looking for a group with whom to identify especially if you are the first person in your generation…in your family to have gone to university. You may feel somewhat removed from the social environment in which you grew up creating another community, creating another sense of identity and that is something like ISIS can provide” (Richardson, 2019). Louise Richardson’s arguments are in substantial agreement with other scholarly research, such as John McCoy and Professor Andy Knight’s research on homegrown violent extremism in Trinidad and Tobago in which they found that “identity issues” played a crucial role in the recruitment process of some Afro-Trinidadians and Tobagonian Muslims who migrated to join ISIS (McCoy & Knight, 2017). Their findings also showed how some Muslims and African descendants are “attracted to alternative identities and ideologies”, such “trans-nationalistic and universalistic ideas of Muslim identity” (McCoy & Knight, 2017, p.  282). Though it is clear from the empirical evidence that psychological dimensions can play a crucial role in understanding terrorism within the Caribbean context, it is insufficient in offering a holistic understanding in isolation.

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Religious Dimensions Religion was also cited as a primary concern in many of the documents that were analysed using the Qualitative Content Analysis technique. For example, the CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy Report (2018) stated that religion is used both “online & offline” for radicalisation and recruitment of Caribbean nationals. Furthermore, the document further stressed that there is a troubling concern that extremist religious leaders might exploit religion to radicalise, recruit and encourage terrorist sympathisers to carry out terrorism-related activities that are largely religiously motivated. Moreover, “religion” was a key component of the anti-­ terrorism legislations that were analysed. For example, St Lucia “Anti-­ Terrorism” legislation defines a “terrorist act” as, inter alia, an action that “is intended, or by its nature and context, may reasonably be regarded as being intended to—(aa) intimidate the public or a section of the public, or (ab) compel a government or an international organization to do, or refrain from doing, any act, and (ac) is made for the purpose of advancing a political, ideological, or religious cause.” Similarly, St Vincent and the Grenadines “Anti-Terrorism” legislation also states that “terrorism” means the use or threat that is “designed to influence the government of the State or of a country (or a part of a country) other than the State, or an international organisation, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.” This was also the same for Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Barbados anti-terrorism legislations/acts. On the other hand, Professor Anthony Clayton does not see “religious dimensions” as a “strong predictive factor” to the understanding and explanation of terrorism within the Caribbean context. However, he agrees that the less religiously informed an individual is about the Islamic faith or the Koran (especially recent converts to Muslim), they are more likely to be targeted and recruited by the Islamic State as opposed to someone who is versed in the Muslim faith. For example, he stated that, “We have one or two umm Muslim fundamentalists in Jamaica who were predominantly raised in Christian households and then converted to the Muslim faith. What you’re looking at is a pattern which is conversion to an extreme form of the Muslim faith like a Wahhabi influence version, typically late teens—early twenties and then you look at somebody who has all the zeal of a recent convert, and they are more likely to be involved

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in acts of violence than people who are actually raised in moderate Muslim families”. Thus, these are the kinds of people ISIS prefers to recruit; the ones who are “not deeply versed in the Muslim faith because somebody who is deeply versed in the Muslim faith” would be able to discern “when you are talking foolishness about the Koran”, says Professor Clayton (Clayton, 2019). Mr. Grenville Williams also sees religion as integral to the understanding and explanation of terrorism within the Caribbean context because a lot of the people who migrated to join ISIS were radicalised through religion, especially in Trinidad and Tobago because they have a greater mix of religion and a significant religion in Trinidad is that of the Muslim faith (Williams, 2019). He went on to say that most Caribbean countries, such as Haiti, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica and the wider Caribbean region, with the exception of Guyana, “do not have a significant Muslim population”; however, “the few persons who have been specifically identified, it has been clearly shown that they were Muslims and therefore, I would attribute their willingness to participate in terrorism to their religion and not necessarily their socioeconomic standing”, Mr Williams opined (Williams, 2019). This is plentiful evidence that highlights religious dimensions can be a useful template to understand terrorism within the context of the Caribbean. However, it will be insufficient in isolation. Strategic Dimensions Furthermore, strategic dimensions were highlighted as another useful template in terms of ISIS use of social media as an effective strategy to encourage disaffected youths to engage in terroristic violence, the rise of gangster Jihad and the burgeoning overlap between terrorism and organised crime, especially to avoid detection from law enforcement within the Caribbean. For example, Professor Clayton noted that ISIS uses “social media for recruiting, training and encouraging disaffected youths to get involved in acts of extreme violence and it is this that I think makes ISIS the forerunner of a new model of terrorism” (Clayton, 2019). He also stresses the importance of “the emergence of gangster Jihad and the increasing overlap between terrorism and organized crime” (Clayton, 2019). Likewise, the CARICOM Counter Terrorism Strategy Report (2018) also emphasised the growing relationship between organised crime groups, violent gangs and terrorism are of “strong concern” because they

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[organised crime groups and violent gangs] can be used as a means to “facilitate undetected departure of foreign terrorist fighters”. In addition, Mr Williams of RSS had suggested the possibility of a Mumbai-style/ Sousse-style terrorist attack when he noted that it is easy for someone to “shoot 100 tourists on the beach” in the Caribbean. (Williams, 2019). Furthermore, Professor Clayton predicts that the Caribbean might likely experience a terrorist attack in the future from lone wolf or small groups (Clayton, 2019). All of this suggest that strategic dimensions can also play a critical role in the understanding of terrorism within the Caribbean context, but not in isolation to the other dimensions. Culture/Civilisational Context On the other hand, the study found that an infusion of cultural/civilisational context can be a useful tool in understanding terrorism within the Caribbean if infused with religious dimensions. For instance, Grenville Williams argues that Caribbean people “are generally averse to taking risk” which also applies to terrorism and thus, it is not likely that someone from the Caribbean will engage in suicide terrorism because their cultural orientation will prevent them from being “persuaded that the afterlife is just as good as the present” (Williams, 2019). Professor Clayton echoed similar sentiments, as he does not see terrorism by “suicide bombing” as a possibility within the Caribbean context because it “takes a little bit more of the sense of willing to give up your own life for a greater cause. You have to be willing to lose yourself in the greater cause. That takes a little bit more doing” (Clayton, 2019). Interestingly, other scholars like Oliver Roy in his book Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State (2017) noted the “systemic association with death”, particularly the fascination with death that is found among new Jihadis that join the Islamic State. However, the empirical evidence, according to my sources of data, shows quite the opposite for the most part in relation to the disaffected youths from the Caribbean who are being radicalised and encouraged to engage in extreme violence by ISIS, do not necessarily have such fascination with death. They are, however, more interested in joining ISIS for a sense of adventure, among other things. While culture/civilisational context can play a role (granted limited) in understanding terrorism within the Caribbean context, it is insufficient in isolation.

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Political Dimensions The religious dimensions infused with political dimensions could also be a useful template for understanding terrorism within the Caribbean context. For example, Miss Tonya Ayow of CARICOM IMPACS stated that the Jamaat Al Muslimeen group that led a coup in Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 was partly motivated by political ambitions, “but it was a political fueled by religious beliefs” (Ayow, 2019). Yasin Abu Bakr, the Jamaat Al Muslimeen group leader, intended to fix the “societal ills” that he was witnessing in Trinidad and Tobago at the time (Ayow, 2019). He believed, based on his own religious beliefs, that he could have changed or improved the country “had he used the political tactics of say a Gadhafi and use religion to control how people behave”, opined Miss Tonya Ayow (Ayow, 2019). Moreover, political dimensions were a key component of the anti-­ terrorism legislations that were analysed using the Qualitative Content Analysis technique. For example, St Lucia anti-terrorism legislation makes clear that a terrorist act constitutes an act that seeks to “compel a government or an international organization to do, or refrain from doing, any act, and (ac) is made for the purpose of advancing a political” and other causes (religious and ideological). Likewise, Trinidad and Tobago anti-­ terrorism legislation defines a terrorist act as any act aimed at compelling government or any international organisation from either refraining from or engaging in any act and is intended “for the purpose of advancing a political, ideological or a religious cause”. This was also the same for Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados and St Vincent and the Grenadines anti-terrorism legislations/acts. Professor Anthony Clayton views political dimensions as critical to understanding terrorism. However, he stressed that there is an “overlap between criminality and terrorism” because “organizations start out getting involved in criminality to support the ideology”, such as in the case of the FARC in Colombia (Clayton, 2019). For example, he stressed that the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) “started out as Marxist-Leninist and it was about defending the poor and the oppressed in the rural areas [political cause]. Years later, their main business is trafficking cocaine and extortion and racketeering” (Clayton, 2019). Hence, an infusion of political dimensions and economic dimensions can be useful in offering a full understanding of terrorism-related activism. Clearly, political dimensions are key to understanding and explaining terrorism within the context of the Caribbean whether from a historical standpoint

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to a more contemporary understanding. However, as evidence suggests, it is inadequate in isolation in offering a full understanding of terrorism-­ related activities as it pertains to the region. Economic Dimensions There was almost unanimity among the elite interview participants as it pertains to the use of “economic dimensions” in the understanding of terrorism within Caribbean context. They all argued that economic dimensions, such as poverty, unemployment, underemployment and inequality are more of a “risk factor” or a “pre-condition” that can make terrorism more likely (Clayton, 2019; Richardson, 2019; Haughton, 2019; Ayow, 2019; Williams, 2019; McKie, 2019). For example, Professor Clayton contends that economic dimensions are “better understood as potential risk factors…It may be a precondition, but there are other factors that must be present”. Furthermore, economic dimensions are “far too simplistic, and it is just simply wrong to attribute high levels of violence or the use of violence to any social or economic factor in isolation” (Clayton, 2019). Similarly, Mr Grenville Williams does not see economic dimensions such as poverty, inequality and the high unemployment rate as a valid casual explanation of terrorism within the Caribbean context because most of the Caribbean nationals who it is alleged emigrated to join the Islamic State (ISIS) came from Trinidad and Tobago (Williams, 2019). However, Trinidad and Tobago are also “one of the Caribbean countries with the lowest unemployment rate and there is no lack of opportunities for those persons in terms of changing their economic status if they were in fact people who were in poverty or of the lower economic rank”, says Mr Williams (Williams, 2019). He further argued that if economic dimensions were a salient causality, then there would be more terrorist fighters from countries like Haiti, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Dominica which are “on the lower end of the economic scale when you look at income” (Williams, 2019). Likewise, the Honourable Minister Cecil McKie does not see economic dimensions as crucial to the understanding and explanations of terrorism within the Caribbean context (McKie, 2019). Similarly, Miss Tonya Ayow also contends that economic dimensions such as poverty, unemployment and inequality are not the main causes of terrorism within the context of the Caribbean. Instead, she believes that it has more to do with “finding something to belong” and to avoid “feelings of marginalisation” (Ayow, 2019).

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On the other hand, Dr Suzette Haughton cautiously argues that economic dimensions as well as political can play a crucial role in the understanding and explanation of terrorism within the Caribbean context (Haughton, 2019). However, she further stressed that no single factor in isolation can adequately provide an understanding and explanation of terrorism within the Caribbean context as there are a “combination of factors”, ranging from “religious” to “social dimension” (Haughton, 2019). In fact, many of the Caribbean nationals that migrated to join ISIS were individuals who were peripherally involved in crime, and some were professionals who might have been underemployed or even unemployed that were being offered some money to fight, and in some cases, a more attractive salary than the one they were receiving at their current job (Ayow, 2019). Moreover, there was also huge economic benefits for some persons who like to claim a connection to ISIS, especially some gang members who played this card for economic advantages, Anthony Clayton opined (Clayton, 2019). Evidently, economic dimensions can be a useful template for understanding and explaining terrorism within the Caribbean context. However, like all other dimensions, it is inadequate in isolation in offering a holistic understanding of terrorism-related matters within the context of the Caribbean. Social Dimensions Interestingly, the findings revealed another useful template for explaining terrorism within the Caribbean context. This explanatory framework is called “social dimensions”. The social dimensions emerged as another suitable element that can play a crucial role in explaining why some individuals might have migrated to join the Islamic State. For example, it was revealed that some individuals migrated to join ISIS because of a sense of social exclusion, in search of a better life, were concerned about their economic future and sought to improve their economic well-being and secure their economic future. Moreover, many were of African descent who were recently converted and not well-versed in the Muslim faith, but also felt a sense of “social exclusion” and might have felt like they were being denied access to certain economic opportunities that were available to non-­ Muslims. The research findings are in substantial agreement with other empirical studies. For example, Perry Stanislas and Kim Sadique discovered that Trinidad has become a breeding ground for religiously-inspired violence and a recruitment hub in the Caribbean for ISIS (Stanislas & Kim

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Sadique, 2019). However, majority of those who were part of a “militant Islam” and more susceptible to “radicalisation” were predominantly young males of African descent who are “economically marginalised”, and in many cases “were heavily involved in violent criminal and gang activity prior to conversion” (Dearden, 2016, Maharaj, 2017: 178 as cited in Stanislas & Sadique, 2019, p. 19). Another social dimension and a likely risk factor are a “sense of disappointed expectation”. This might have also played a crucial role that drove some Caribbean nationals to join ISIS. This was also observed by Louise Richardson, a world-renowned expert on terrorism, who argued that when you have an educated population, particularly of young males emerging into an economy that cannot absorb them, there is likely going to be high expectations and then disappointed by the fact that they cannot translate their education into economic wellbeing (Richardson, 2019). However, it might not always be the case. As mentioned earlier, it was indeed the case in some instances as many migrated to join ISIS out of a genuine concern for their “economic well-being” and to secure their “economic future” (Ayow, 2019; Haughton, 2019). Moreover, Louise Richardson averred that “when you look at particular Islamist movements, there does seem to be a disproportionate number of people with high-status degrees like engineering and law, but most particularly engineering, who are attracted to these groups” (Richardson, 2019). This suggestion is also supported by other elite interviewees; for example, there were many professionals like engineers, lawyers and doctors who migrated from the Caribbean, especially from Trinidad and Tobago to join the Islamic State, according to Miss Tonya Ayow of CARICOM IMPACS. The concept of “relative deprivation” might also help to explain why some Caribbean nationals decided to migrate and join the Islamic State (Richardson, 2019). The idea of one’s absolute condition relative to the condition of others to which one compares themselves too (Richardson, 2019). Professor Clayton also echoed similar sentiments within the context of lottery scamming in Jamaica and how a lottery scammer can easily become somewhat of a role model to other disaffected youths by looking at their absolute condition relative to someone who was once poor like them but is now living a lavish life-style off the proceeds of crime (Clayton, 2019). Plus, how such an environment can become fertile grounds for a fundamentalist ideology message to take root. For example, Professor Anthony Clayton during our interview candidly observed that: “I have been into some of the scammer communities, and you see these

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opulent mansions, and you see these high-end vehicles. I have seen one house which is now up to about nine (9) storeys…That was built by a guy, who two years ago, his living was fixing car radios and stealing goats and now this guy has got so much money. This is all lottery scamming money. So, your role model now, the guy who you see move in two years from the same level of poverty as you to opulence and wealth is all proceeds of crime. Now, think about how an ideology, a fundamentalist ideology plays out in a context like this. This is very fertile territory for messages like this” (Clayton, 2019). Thus, Anthony Clayton’s anecdotal evidence offers somewhat of a novel understanding and rich information regarding the concept of “relative deprivation” within the context of terrorism and the Caribbean. Undoubtedly, social dimensions can be a useful framework to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context. However, like all other dimensions, it can only offer a full understanding of terrorism-­ related matters within the Caribbean context, if interwoven with other dimensions.

Concluding Thoughts The research findings provide considerable evidence to further validate the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, which seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. There were a number of psychological dimensions that drove some Caribbean nationals to join ISIS that could be understood as having an inherent duality. For example, some psychological dimensions (themes) such as a sense of belonging, supporting a cause/struggle, meaning and purpose would be categorised as intangible direct negatives and simultaneously an intangible direct positive because of the simultaneous “causal effect” and “beneficial effect” on the side of the individuals who migrated to join ISIS. This because they were in search of something (belonging, a purpose, a cause or struggle to support) and simultaneously might have garnered some inherent psychological rewards (the feelings that come with supporting a struggle or cause, gaining a sense of meaning and purpose in their life and belonging to something) from their engagement in terrorism-related matters, i.e. migrating to join the Islamic State (ISIS). The same for religious dimensions in which radicalisation and recruitment could be understood as a direct intangible negative and simultaneously a direct tangible positive because radicalisation and the recruitment process plays a critical role in

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encouraging would-be terrorists to join the Islamic State (causal effect), and simultaneously these radicalised individuals are recruited as foot soldiers for ISIS (beneficial effect on the side of ISIS). Another example of the existence of the inherent duality within the Caribbean context, is the theme “offered money to fight” (economic dimensions). This theme could be understood as a direct intangible negative because it is a strong motivator for encouraging Caribbean nationals to join ISIS and simultaneously a direct tangible positive, given that they would be paid money (granted that they receive the money) to fight. Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean S takeholders of Terrorism Concept: US Mainstream Media and the Caribbean The research study primarily focused on the US mainstream media as a key element of the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, given the Caribbean’s close geographical proximity to the United States of America, and the US mainstream media’s ability to influence people’s perception or perspective of violence and terrorism. The focus group study was especially critical to the research in this regard. The results from the focus group provides ample evidence to suggest that the US mainstream media influences people’s perception of terrorism and offers a unique insight into the US mainstream media ability to shape Caribbean youths understanding of terrorism might be shaped by the US mainstream media, particularly mainstream cable news channels like CNN and MSNBC and elitist print media content online from The New York Times and Washington Post. For example, Franz George, former Caribbean and US Region Representative for Commonwealth Youth Council (at the time of the interview) from St Vincent and the Grenadines stated that the US mainstream media helped to shape his understanding of terrorism. Likewise, Jason Green of Jamaica also said that the US mainstream media “definitely played a part in how we [Him including his colleagues] view terrorism on a whole”. The same for Khrystal Walcott of Barbados, who stated that the US mainstream media helped to influence her and other Caribbean youths understanding of terrorism. This sentiment was also shared by Demion Mctair, a local and regional journalist from St Vincent and the Grenadines, Denasio Frank of St Kitts and Nevis, Thalia Thomas of Trinidad and Tobago and Rochelle Ogilvie of the Cayman Islands who all contended that the US mainstream

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media has in fact shaped or influenced their perspective of terrorism. The findings contribute to broader research on the media’s ability to influence public opinion on topical issues like violence and terrorism (e.g. Dolliver & Kearns, 2019; Huff & Kertzer, 2018). However, the research stresses future qualitative research post-COVID-19 environment on how the US mainstream media shapes the public in general perception of terrorism. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence from the study highlights a need for more youth-focused education about terrorism beyond US media description. Moreover, in seeking to fully understand the US mainstream media beyond the scope of influencing Caribbean nationals, particularly the lay community and young people’s perspective of terrorism, the study found that the region’s tourism industry suffered a significant recession following the 9/11 attacks. This is because most of the islands that are tourism dependent witnessed roughly around 70% decline in tourist arrival from North America ensued from a misperception of risk, Professor Clayton opined (Clayton, 2019). This suggestion is also supported by other experts/scholars who have also highlighted how the misperceptions of the risk of danger of being targeted by terrorism, in large part, due to the media coverage of terroristic events can have a negative impact on tourism demand and adversely affect the tourism industry (Sönmez et al., 1999; Pizam & Smith, 2000, p. 125; Bianchi, 2006, p. 67; Korstanje & Clayton, 2012, pp. 16–17). When asked if he thinks news report of terrorism could have a negative impact on the tourism industry in the Caribbean amidst the region’s close geographical proximity to the United States of America, Professor Christensen (2019) was very circumspect in his response as he stated that he “cannot speak specifically about the Caribbean”. Nevertheless, he pointed to Europe as an example to illustrate the fact that there is a “sort of perception that there is a lot of terrorism” happening in places like Paris and admittedly, “there have been large scale attacks of course”, he says (Christensen, 2019). Too add insult to injury, there have been heavy reporting on these attacks in the US media, however, “I have not seen any clear evidence that this is led to a big drop-off in tourism to Europe,” says Professor Christensen (2019). He also stated that “there is a lot more coverage on Europe than there is on the Caribbean in the United States” and from an “ad-hoc observation”, it did not seem to impact tourism in Europe (Christensen, 2019).

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Another concern that was raised regarding the US mainstream media and a potential terrorist attack in any Caribbean country, was that the media’s coverage can result in a tourist decline similarly to what happened in Egypt and Tunisia following a terrorist attack on tourists. However, Stockholm University Professor of Journalism Christian Christensen believes that it has more to do with “the image” of a country or region prior to a terrorist attack which helps to “reconfirm people’s preconceived notions” about the particular country or region in the event of a terrorist attack (Christensen, 2019). Therefore, it is less likely that a terrorist attack in the region will see an enormous decline in tourism ensued from the US mainstream media coverage in the long-term. However, it is more likely to have an immediate and short-term negative impact on the region’s tourism industry as highlighted in Pratt’s (2003) study. Though the research findings on the US mainstream media within the context of the Caribbean were mostly dependent on the focus group study, it provided ample evidence to suggest that the US mainstream media can shape Caribbean nationals (especially young people) perspective on terrorism. Thus, stressing the importance of more youth-focused educational programmes on terrorism. Furthermore, the research findings revealed that a terrorist attack in the Caribbean can result in a misperception of the risk of danger of succumbing to a terrorist attack, in large part, due to the media’s coverage of the terrorist attack, which will undoubtedly have an adverse effect on the region’s tourism industry. Howbeit, the negative impact will likely be a short term one rather than long term. S takeholders of Terrorism Concept: The Islamic State (ISIS) and the Caribbean The study’s findings also conclude that the Islamic State (ISIS) remains a “severe threat” to the Caribbean, especially through radicalisation and recruitment of disaffected youths through social media, other related propaganda online and peer-to-peer networks. The threat ISIS poses to the tourism industry is also one of a “legitimate concern”. However, the study found that a major concern is the threat ISIS poses to North America through the Caribbean because of the region’s close geographically proximity to North America, as well as exploiting the very close diplomatic relationship between the two regions. Moreover, another major concern is that ISIS can also use the region’s ports as a means to transport terrorist materials that they will try to assemble when they arrive in the United States of America. This is because ISIS “might not be interested in

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detonating a bomb” in the region, but they might be more “interested in using the region as launching pad to get to the United States”, says Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies Dr Suzette Haughton (Haughton, 2019). A similar sentiment was echoed by former White House Chief of Staff General John F. Kelly back in 2016, who was seemingly concerned about ISIS fighters in the Caribbean and several “Caribbean security experts were also concerned that extremist might exploit the region’s open borders with the U.S. and Canada” (Jamaica Observer, 2016, January 9). The documents also noted the region’s close geographical proximity to North America can increase the risk of terrorism-­ related activities. For example, The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy Report (2018) noted that, “The Region’s porous borders and the close links between the Caribbean and the USA may also increase the risk.” Likewise, CARICOM Counter Terrorism Strategy Report (2018) also stressed the fact that Western countries can be targeted by ISIS and other affiliated groups within the Caribbean, as well as Western presence and intertest in the region can also increase the risk of potential terrorist attack in the Caribbean: “CARICOM States could be targeted as an intermediate objective to affect the strategic economic interests of the United States of America, Canada and European countries. The significant presence of western interests on our shores, coupled with the Region’s porous borders may also increase the risk of a potential terrorist attack in the Caribbean”. The Islamic State (ISIS) also pose a serious threat to the region in terms of “cyberterrorism”. A cyber-attack on critical infrastructures, supplies and services were also highlighted as a serious concern. In fact, the Jamaican Information Service (JIS) experienced a cyber-attack in 2015 that was attributed to the Islamic State. For example, Dr Haughton candidly observed that: “in 2015, Jamaica Information Service was hit by terrorists. What they did is that they shut down the platform and wrote on it that “Jihadis are here to deal with the infidels and so on”. They had a message on it. But that was more linked to “cyberterrorism” than normal terrorism” (Haughton, 2019). Moreover, the increasing flow of ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) returnees (those loyal to ISIS), along with the influence of extremist religious leaders, and recruiting newly converted Muslims who are not “well-versed” in the Muslim faith poses a severe and direct threat to the Caribbean. The Islamic State also poses a threat to the Caribbean in terms of radicalisation and recruitment of “disaffected youths” through social media, the study also found that there is a

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genuine concern that ISIS could potentially benefit from lone wolf attacks in the Caribbean through Foreign Terrorist Fighter Returnees (FTFRs). Another area of major concern for the Caribbean, is the children that are returning from the ISIS training camps. Assistant Director of CARICOM IMPACS, Miss Tonya Ayow candidly observed: “What worries me is that children are returning. You have a number of children that are returning from this, and they can also be classified as child soldiers. So, you can almost imagine the PTSD, the types of things they may have seen and may have experienced. And how do you rehabilitate and re-integrate those children into society. They may have lost their parents, or they have come back with parents” (Ayow, 2019). The Islamic State also pose a severe threat to the region’s tourism industry in terms of targeting Western tourists as “soft targets”, which will no doubt reward ISIS with propaganda material, and the global coverage and international media attention they seek. In fact, other studies have also highlighted how ISIS benefits from targeting and executing Western hostages like American journalist James Foley and British aid workers David Haines (Mahood & Rane, 2017). Thus, the targeting of Western tourists in the Caribbean might yield similar propaganda effect for ISIS. Another “worrisome” area is that ISIS may likely attack critical tourism infrastructures or any major tourism-related spaces and other recreation facilities. On the other hand, the Islamic State (ISIS) could also benefit from the Caribbean by using the region as a “transit point” and in some instance, as a “resting spot” to evade law enforcement and security services, as well as a “recruitment hub”, and some countries can also be used to “raise funds” for the Islamic State. Moreover, the increasing overlap between organised crime and violent gangs and the potential exploitation of the region’s banking system could be to the benefit of the Islamic State to move its foreign fighters undetected and evade law enforcement agencies. In the case of the latter, the terrorist group could exploit the banking systems to fund regional terror networks and terrorist attacks in the region or in North America. These were some of the major concerns raised in several of the documents that were analysed using the Qualitative Content Analysis technique. An important question some may ask: what is the current threat level of ISIL? Or is the threat of ISIL still relevant for the Caribbean following the transnational terrorist group territorially defeated back in 2019? Based on current data, the threat of ISIL remains relevant, though a generally low threat to the region, according to Isis Gonsalves, Minister Counsellor/

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Political Coordinator, Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations. During our brief interview, Isis Gonsalves stated that the threat of ISIL to both the Latin American and Caribbean community remains very relevant, but a “generally low” threat, which was the message emerging from the Virtual open briefing of the Counterterrorism Committee of the UNSC on “The threat of terrorism in Latin America and the Caribbean” on December 14, 2020. Additionally, Mrs. Gonsalves cautioned against the perceived generally low threat, because while the region is not a “terrorist hotspot”, the region is “not immune to the threat of ISIL ideology or other terrorist groups”. To illustrate the fact that ISIL remains a threat to the region, Isis Gonsalves elaborated a bit further on the issue of ISIL recruitment of Caribbean nationals in particular, nationals from Trinidad and Tobago, foreign fighters and the repatriation of ISIL foreign fighters. Mrs. Gonsalves candidly observed: “The recruitment rates of ISIL fighters from Trinidad are estimated to be the highest per capita among western countries. I leave room for arguments that this data is skewed (due to small population size and other factors) but the point is that there was significant recruitment from Trinidad. To date, 3 Trinidadian nationals remain on the 1267 sanctions committee list. Also, there remain the families of foreign terrorist fighters from Trinidad in camps in Syria and there are calls for repatriation. I understand that discussions are ongoing about how to deal with this issue. The most recent Secretary General report to the Security Council on ISIL notes that in the reporting period, ‘UNDP supported the Government of Trinidad and Tobago in setting up and running sustainable centres to receive women and children believed to be associated with foreign terrorist fighters following their return from camps in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic’”. Another important point as it relates to the ISIL/ISIS threat to the Caribbean was also raised by Mrs. Gonsalves: ISIL affiliated groups. For instance, Mrs. Gonsalves suggests that there are terrorist groups across the African continent that are loosely affiliated with ISIL, but for which ISIL has no command and control. However, “these groups commit terrorist acts and sometimes ISIL claims responsibility but the linkage between the terrorist act and ISIL is, at times, tenuous. So, not only is the threat of ISIL still relevant to the Caribbean, but the threat of other terrorist groups and ideologies continues to be relevant”. The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality in most situations concerning

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terrorism-­related matters. This was also evident in the case of the Islamic State (ISIS) in relation to the Caribbean. For example, in seeking to understand ISIS threat within the Caribbean context, the most salient negatives related to ISIS were the threat it poses through Foreign Fighter Returnees (FFR), extremist religious leaders, online radicalisation, training and recruitment, mobilising and encouraging radicalised individuals to carry out attacks. Moreover, ISIS children returnees are a strong concern, using the region as an access point to launch attacks against some of the region’s closest allies (North America, UK and EU), attacks on the region’s tourism industry, cyberterrorism, exploiting the region’s banking system to fund terrorist activities, the targeting of Western tourists as soft targets and using organised criminals and violent gangs by ISIS for recruitment of foot soldiers and to move undetected were all categorised as indirect intangible and tangible negatives because of the “deleterious effect” on the side of a third party and simultaneously a tangible direct positive because of the “beneficial effect” on the side of ISIS. These themes and more as it relates to ISIS as a stakeholder of terrorism through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept within the Caribbean context, are illustrated in table 3 on page 44. S takeholders of Terrorism Concept: Individual Actors and the Caribbean A critical point that must be noted is the distinction between individuals who migrated to join ISIS or claim a connection to the group, from those individuals who became formal members of the Islamic State family like in the case of former ISIS member Shane Crawford, who went by the nom de guerre Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi and rose to prominence in the group. This is because not all the men and women (Caribbean nationals) who migrated to join ISIS or claim a connection to the terrorist group became formally integrated into the ISIS family. Thus, in this volume the threat of terrorism from “individual actors” within the Caribbean context will be interpreted to emerge from individual/lone actors who are detached (in a formal sense) from ISIS.  This distinction is also consistent with the researcher’s definition of “lone wolf” terrorism that allows for both “standalone operatives” and “individual actors” who can have links to or be inspired/motivated by other networks or groups, but who is capable of deciding, planning and carrying out a terrorist attack on their own without any formal instructions from a hierarchical command structure. In line with this, Dr Suzette Haughton during our face-to-face interview argued that many of the “Trinidadian fighters that went to join ISIS” were either

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driven/motivated by the idea of “extending Islamic views…It was about supporting the cause” (Haughton, 2019). However, they are not considered formal members of the Islamic State. A distinction that was implicitly, and in some cases, explicitly made by some of the elite interview participants (particularly the Caribbean professionals and experts/scholars) and in some of the documents that were analysed. In line with this research, previous studies have also made a similar distinction, such as distinguished scholar Dr John McCoy and Professor Andy Knight in their article “Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, Global Trends” (2017), referred to Caribbean nationals who migrated or attempted to migrate and join ISIS as “extremist travellers”. Thus, the distinction in the study is also in keeping with previous research study. Many of the individuals who migrated to join ISIS and came back, also found it beneficial in several ways to claim a connection to the transnational terrorist organisation. Professor Anthony Clayton during our interview also candidly observed that: “ISIS had a message which was very specifically geared to people who were low-ranking gang members and it said if you want to be in a gang, you want to be in a powerful big gang, and if you look at some of the witness statements from the guys in Trinidad who came back from Syria, a lot of them found that even saying they had a cousin who went to Syria gave them real power on the street, real influence, now people would step out of their way. So, you have to understand how this plays out that having a connection or claiming a connection gives you respect, status and power. Even saying that they have a cousin who is connected to ISIS. It gives them a lot more power in the game. It means that they can now intimidate other gangs, rise to a more senior position on the gang, and they play these cards for their advantages, economic advantages” (Clayton, 2019). Moreover, even some criminal organisations were claiming a connection to ISIS because it was beneficial to do so in several ways: “There were criminal organizations who claimed to be affiliated to Isis, who probably even were not, but it enormously enhanced their power as criminal organizations to claim that they are part of much bigger, more feared organizations”, says Professor Clayton (Clayton, 2019). While these key findings/ themes might help to shape our understanding of terrorism within the Caribbean context, some of the same themes were also highlighted in previous studies regarding individuals who engage in terrorism. For example, in Professor Louise Richardson’s 2006 book, What Terrorists Want, respect and increased social status were mentioned in relation to a national

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member of Fatah, and themes like power and a sense of heroism were attached to Shane Paul O’Doherty, who served a jail sentence for his bombings in England (p. 96). The research study also found that the “individual” terrorist threat to the region, will more likely be in the form of either “lone wolf” or “small group” attacks carried out by extremist individual actors, or Foreign Terrorist Fighter Returnees (FTFRs). Following the collapse of its so-­ called caliphate, ISIS might revert to using a lot of “small groups” and “lone wolf attacks” in the future, most of which will most likely be radicalised and recruited through social media. For example, during our interview, Professor Clayton stated that: “I think increasingly in the future, a lot of what we are going to see is small group and lone wolf attacks, and a lot of them are going to be recruited and to some extent trained through social media” (Clayton, 2019). Furthermore, he stressed that the threat of radicalisation is not limited to ISIS, but to other extremist organisations like far-right extremist organisations that are becoming extremely effective at radicalising individuals to engage in terroristic violence (Clayton, 2019). Moreover, he also noted that the concept of “self-radicalization” like in the case of the Christchurch terrorist attack, can become a possible threat with regard to individual/lone actor threat within the Caribbean and beyond (Clayton, 2019). In addition, there were also other factors besides power, respect, increased social status and real influence that drove some individuals to join the Islamic State, such as “a sense of belonging” and searching for “a sense of purpose in their life”. For example, in a face-to-face interview with Miss Tonya Ayow, she indicated that two of the “biggest benefits” that “some will tell you” [Caribbean nationals who migrated to join ISIS] was a “sense of belonging” and “a sense of purpose in their life” (Ayow, 2019). Likewise, Professor Clayton expressed a similar view during our interview when he suggested that ISIS was giving “them [Caribbean nationals who migrated to join ISIS] a philosophical context” and “give their lives purpose and meaning” (Clayton, 2019). Moreover, many of the men and women who emigrated to join ISIS were also being offered “some money to fight”, and often, the money that ISIS was offering might have been more attractive than the money they were earning at their current job. For instance, Miss Ayow believes some went to join ISIS for financial reason and that there were claims of that some were being “offered how much [money] every week to fight” (Ayow, 2019). On the other hand, some persons might have been hoodwinked to join ISIS on a belief that they can

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benefit, financially. This is because they might have thought that “the salaries are high and may perceive that as something you [the individuals] can potentially benefit from”, Regional Security System, Asset Recovery Unit (ARU), Director, Mr Williams opined (Williams, 2019). The “salary” theme follows a similar pattern that was revealed in other empirical studies. For instance, it was rumoured in the Muslim community that some persons who migrated to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq would be paid a whopping “1000 USD” per day (McCoy & Knight, 2017). Though some of these themes were mentioned earlier as part of the “psychological dimensions” within the context of the Caribbean, they are also relevant to understanding why some individuals might have migrated to join the Islamic State. This is because ISIS was also providing individuals who felt far removed from the social environment a “sense of identity”. A sense of “frustration and being able to identify with a cause or struggle” were some of the other reasons cited for why some people from the Caribbean emigrated to join the Islamic State. Moreover, a “sense of adventure” might have also driven some individuals to join the Islamic State. The study’s findings show that some took their family, wives and young children to join ISIS in Syria, and it is believed that many did not think about the perils of a “war zone” prior to leaving their homes for Syria. Moreover, “a sense of loss of identity” was also cited as another possible factor. Louise Richardson stated individuals who might have migrated to join ISIS might have been “looking for a group with whom to identify” with, especially if they are the first person in their generation to have attended university (Richardson, 2019). They might have felt somewhat removed from the social environment that they grew up and sought to create another community, “create another sense of identity and that is something like ISIS can provide” (Richardson, 2019). These themes mirror other empirical study’s findings. For example, an article published in the peer-reviewed journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, by John McCoy and Professor Andy Knight titled “Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, Global Trends” (2017), revealed that many who migrated to join ISIS were attracted to a “sense of adventure” and “identity issues” were another motivating factor, according to a local lawyer and community leader from the Muslim community. The real enigma arises from individuals who “claim” a connection to ISIS for personal benefits. This is because they cannot be labelled as terrorists, or even lone wolf actors, and they are not part of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters description. The question is, would they be willing to

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engage in any possible ISIS-inspired terrorist attack in the future? For now, it seems that their claim of a connection to ISIS is solely driven by personal gains, such as power, influence and financial gains/economic advantages. Nevertheless, they should be monitored along with other foreign terrorist returnees, radicalised groups, individual extremists, extremist religious leaders and any other violent extremists. A “greater ideological force” was also highlighted as a possible casual factor for why some Caribbean nationals decided to join ISIS in Syria or Iraq. For instance, many of the Trinidadian fighter’s wo migrated to join ISIS did so to support a cause, it was about extending Islamic views— Jihadism. The data also revealed that it was about having a particular “world view” because a potential recruit was typically an individual who thinks he/she is a low life, has some personal grievance with the world, personal issues, not well educated, religious novice (not well-versed in the Muslim faith/Islam), not getting the kind of respect he/she desires and probably peripherally involved in crime. Thus, ISIS was recruiting individuals by promising to give them “something extraordinarily valuable” to live by, such as making them feel like they are a “great and mighty Jihadi warrior and giving them a philosophy and a sense that they are a soldier in a conflict that goes back…1400 years”, opined Professor Clayton (Clayton, 2019). In fact, some of the aforementioned themes highlights a certain pattern or similar trajectory in other countries/regions—like, for instance, Caribbean nationals who were more likely to be radicalised and become a potential recruit for the Islamic State (ISIS) were individuals already involved in crime (mostly low-level criminals), and religious novices are consistent with (and complement) other scholars’ findings in other countries/regions concerning Jihadism and Islamisation of radicalisation. For example, Oliver Roy noted that roughly 50% of all jihadis from France had a history of “petty crime” and a similar percentage was also found in other countries like Germany and the United States of America (Roy, 2017, p. 28). He also pointed out that many were arrested for “drunk driving”— another evidence of their low level of religious observance (p.  28). Although some of the themes like marginalised youths and low-level gang members are in keeping with some of Roy’s argument, however, Oliver Roy sees them as mostly troubled individuals who want to act out their violent and cruel fantasies; in contrast, Gilles Kepel sees them as “cogs in a system” as noted in a New  York Times article published on July 12, 2016, titled: ‘That Ignoramus’: 2 French Scholars of Radical Islam Turn Bitter Rivals. Notwithstanding that some of the Caribbean who migrated

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to join ISIS exuded similar characteristics (particularly peripherally involved in crime or feeling a sense of marginalisation), their reasons for migrating to join or claim a connection to ISIS were primarily motivated by different set of goals to the terrorists Oliver Roy and Gilles Kepel were referring to that were seemingly using Islam as a cover to carry out heinous acts of extreme violence. For example, many of the Caribbean nationals who migrated or claimed a connection to the Islamic State (ISIS) as highlighted in this book, did so mostly for benefits (perceived or real), ranging from economic rewards (a salary, a better salary than the one they were receiving, to secure their economic future, increased social status, respect and power in the street, etc.) to psychological rewards (a sense of belonging, meaning and purpose in their life, etc.) and not necessarily to act out fantasies of “extreme violence” or commit themselves to a senseless death—like, for instance, engaging in suicide attacks. Interestingly, the author even found it difficult to garner a definitive answer to the possibility of “suicide terrorism” being committed by individuals (Caribbean nationals). Grenville Williams of the RSS, however, opined that “we [Caribbean nationals] are generally averse to taking those sort of life risks” as it pertains to lone wolf and terrorism in general because he believes that our [Caribbean] “cultural orientation” will make it difficult for ISIS to persuade Caribbean nationals—even those who are enamoured with the transnational terrorist group religious practices or tangible benefits (being offered money to fight, a more attractive salary, a better life, etc.)— that an afterlife is just as good as the present (Williams, 2019). Additionally, both Grenville Williams and Professor Clayton, as well as some of the documents suggest the possibility of lone wolf attacks in the Caribbean in the future, such as a Mumbai-style or a Sousse-style terrorist attack, given that individuals can easily hop into a speeding boat and shoot hundreds of tourists on any given day (particularly during tourism peak period) on any of the popular beaches that are usually crowded with western tourists in the Caribbean. This finding offers a unique perspective on the type of possible lone wolf terroristic violence that is likely to occur in the Caribbean. It is something that Caribbean governments and all relevant law enforcement agency and regional bodies should not take lightly. This empirical data offers a much deeper insight into the multiplicity of intangible and tangible negatives and positives simultaneously present in the case of individuals who decided to migrate to join the Islamic State. These include, but are not limited to, a sense of belonging, feeling like a low-life, a sense of lost identity, frustration, a sense of adventure, not

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well-­versed in the Muslim faith, social exclusion, among other things were categorised as “negatives” (having a causal effect). At the same time, some individuals might have garnered a sense of real power, respect and influence in the streets, increased social status, a sense of identity, meaning and purpose, feeling like a great jihadi warrior, among other things, which were categorised as “positives” (having a beneficial effect). More importantly, the study provided ample evidence that lends support to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, which seeks to understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situation regarding terrorism. Though the negatives and positives are conceptually distinct, they are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive clauses. For instance, themes such as “a sense of belonging, identifying with a struggle and offered some money to fight” were equally categorised as negatives (causal effects that can lead to individuals engaging in terrorism) and positives (beneficial effects: inherent psychological reward individuals may garner from being part of a group or something, or fighting for something and also being paid for fighting). Furthermore, some individuals who might have garnered a sense of belonging (direct intangible positive) or migrated to join ISIS because they were being offered a more attractive salary (direct tangible positive), can also simultaneously be killed or be incarcerated (direct tangible negatives) or have an indirect tangible negative impact on the side of a third party (if they were to carry out a lone wolf attack or a Mumbai-style terrorist attack resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians, or destruction of property, or both) as a result of their engagement in terrorism-related activities. Hence, the existence of an inherent duality to which the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept seeks to emphasise as being critical to our understanding of terrorism as having a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism-related activities. These themes and more as they relate to the individual stakeholder through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept within the Caribbean context, are illustrated in Table C on page 27. The Caribbean’s Vulnerability to and Preparedness for Terrorism  aribbean’s Vulnerability to Terrorism C While the findings show that the Caribbean is “extremely vulnerable” to terrorism as a whole, it was apparent from the data that some countries

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were more or less vulnerable to terrorism in various ways. For example, the country most at risk regarding religious extremism and religious radicalisation is Trinidad and Tobago because a few of the people who migrated to join ISIS were radicalised through religion (an extreme version of the Muslim faith like the Wahhabi version), have since returned back to the country (Clayton, 2019). Additionally, roughly 60% of those who migrated to join ISIS were raised as Muslims, while 35–40% of the converted ones who migrated to join ISIS were initially raised as Christians and most of them were also not-well-versed in the Muslim faith, says Professor Anthony Clayton (Clayton, 2019). Professor Clayton claims are also in substantial agreement with Professor Andy Knight’s findings, who also found that many of the “Trinbagonians” who migrated to ISIS “were recent converts to Islam and were “certainly not steeped in Muslim religious traditions and not well versed in the holy texts of the Quran or the Hadith” (Knight, 2019, p. 417). On the other hand, the Eastern Caribbean states (OECS countries) like St Vincent and the Grenadines are seemingly more vulnerable to terrorism in the form of “bioterrorism” or “chemical warfare” and an attack on the country’s tourism, agriculture and healthcare sector. This the Minister of Tourism (at the time), the Most Hon. Cecil McKie had noted as a major concern: “Terrorism can also come in the form of chemical warfare…diseases through the agricultural sector, the health sector. Therefore, it is important that we [SVG and the wider Caribbean community] have mechanisms in place that could respond to such possibilities as well” (McKie, 2019). The findings also show that terrorism is deemed as a low probability, with high impact. Currently, the approach to terrorism within the Caribbean context is about “risk management” and reducing the threat level. Several of the counterterrorism documents also noted that terrorism poses a “significant risk” to the region. To be precise, terrorism is categorised as a “low risk” with “high impact”. However, the possible exception to this approach is Trinidad and Tobago where the problem is more prevalent. Professor Clayton noted: “Tier two is much more about risk management, reducing the threat level, and that is the approach at this stage in the Caribbean with regard to terrorist risks. Possible exception being Trinidad where the problem is more present. I think the risk is going to be through things like social media and through recruitment of disaffected youths. So, we are looking at much more global and small group attacks in the future. Probably less, at least for now, in terms of conventional military operations on the ground” (Clayton, 2019). Though Professor Clayton believes we

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[Caribbean] is more likely to witness “small group” terrorist attacks, he did not rule out the possibility of lone wolf-type of terrorism occurring in the region in the future. Though the data suggests that the region is vulnerable to terrorist attacks from small groups and lone wolfs, suicide terrorism was ruled out as a possibility. This is because the region’s “cultural orientation” might not permit potential terrorist sympathisers or lone wolf attackers to be persuaded into believing that an “afterlife is just as good as the present”, given that “for some people our culture is that we want to stay on this earth as long as possible”, Mr Williams opined (Williams, 2019). After all, many of the FTFs went in search of a “better life” with a view to secure their “economic future” (Haughton, 2019; Ayow, 2019). However, suicide terrorism, though appears to be unlikely possibility based on the gathered data, it must not be ruled out as a possibility given that the data also shows that extremist religious leaders (a severe threat) can influence those not-well versed in the Muslim faith to carry out terrorist attacks (including suicide attacks). Moreover, a major concern that was highlighted in the findings is the “emergence of gangster Jihad” and the growing relationship between organised crime group, violent gangs and terrorism within the region (Clayton, 2019). This is because they [organised crime groups and violent gangs] can be used as a means to “facilitate undetected departure of foreign terrorist fighters”. Dr Suzzette Haughton, a regional security expert and author of the book Drugged Out: Globalisation and Jamaica’s Resilience to Drug Trafficking, noted during our face-to-face interview that there is not enough empirical evidence to suggest that there is nexus between drug traffickers in the Caribbean and terrorism because drug traffickers are mainly “economically driven” (Haughton, 2019). However, “the possibility exists that terrorist organisation could use drug trafficking or drug cartels to fund their operations as in the case with Sendero Luminoso in Peru” (Haughton, 2019). Other empirical studies have also discussed the relationship between organised crime and terrorism (e.g. Makarenko, 2003; Makarenko, 2004). Despite some of the recurring themes in previous studies, it is consistent with (and complements) the main findings of the research study. There were a few more “strong concerns” for the region that were cited in the findings: the relocation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) who has since returned, money laundering and terrorist financing, the influence of extremist religious leaders, radicalised terrorist sympathisers,

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violent extremists who might be inspired to carry out an attack, the increasing volume of accessibility of terrorist group propaganda online and through peer-to-peer networks, and the funding of terror networks through the region’s banks. Moreover, the increasing overlap between organised crime groups, violent gangs and terrorists that can be a means to “facilitate undetected departure of foreign terrorist fighters” are also of a “strong concern” for the region. Moreover, the issue of “cyber-attacks” from terrorists were also among serious concerns. The data found that the region is very vulnerable to potential cyber-attacks from terrorists that can cause serious damage to “vital infrastructures, supplies and services”. Head of the Department of Government at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, Dr Suzette Haughton candidly observed: “In 2015, the Jamaica Information Service (JIS) was hit by terrorists–cyber criminals. They shut down the platform and wrote on it that ‘jihadists are here to deal with the infidels…and so on, but that was linked to more cyberterrorism than it was normal terrorism’” (Haughton, 2019). Another major concern is the use of social media by ISIS to radicalise, train and encourage disaffected youths to get involved in acts of extreme violence in the name of the Islamic State. In fact, the Islamic State has been using social media/online platforms to radicalise and recruit potential sympathisers to join their cause through the Dabiq magazine that featured a lengthy interview with fighter Abu Sa’d al-Trinidadi, formerly Shane Crawford in 2016, which he spoke about his conversion, trip to Syria and ended “with threatening death to Christians and bloodshed in the streets of his former home” (Graham-Harrison & Surtees, 2018). Though social media is not considered a stakeholder of terrorism, it plays a critical role in assessing Caribbean youths, particularly disaffected youths are the most likely targets to be radicalised and recruited by the Islamic State (ISIS) through social media. This concern was also accentuated in the interview with Alcan Professor of Caribbean Sustainable Development in the Institute for Sustainable Development, University of the West Indies, Mona Anthony Clayton: ISIS is “pioneering” the “use of social media for recruiting, training…and encouraging disaffected youths to get involved in acts of extreme violence and it is this that I think makes ISIS the forerunner of a new model of terrorism”. Similarly, Head of Department of Government at UWI and Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies also suggests that Caribbean governments should consider monitoring social media in the region, to prevent radicalisation of Caribbean youths.

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For example, former St Vincent and the Grenadines Minister of Tourism Mr. Cecile McKie stressed the importance of social media as an effective tool for ISIS in radicalising and recruiting Caribbean nationals, but it can also be used by the region’s governments to provide a counter-narrative to ISIS and educate people and dissuade them from joining the Islamic State. For instance, “these mechanisms [social media]” can be used “to reach our people…to educate them and advise them against joining these organizations, which may not be…of benefit to them short-term” and “certainly not…in the longer-term,” opined Cecile McKie. Similarly, Dr. Haughton also agrees that social media is an effective tool for ISIS and other terrorist organisation because social media helps to communicate ISIS’s message and drive “fear” in people who are not present where an atrocious act like “beheadings” took place. On the other hand, Miss Tonya Ayow believes that the “dark web” is more of an effective tool to ISIS, however, she agrees that social media remains still an effective tool for ISIS. She also suggests that “web screening” is important to detect ISIS’s radicalisation and “arrangement for funding of the process”. Mr. Grenville Williams also agrees that social media is an effective tool for ISIS because it is “very cost-effective” and they have used it for “radicalizing” and “recruiting” individuals from the Caribbean. In fact, the Islamic State has been using social media/online platforms to radicalise and recruit potential sympathisers to join their cause through the Dabiq magazine that featured a lengthy interview with fighter Abu Sa’d al-­Trinidadi, formerly Shane Crawford in 2016, which he spoke about his conversion, trip to Syria and ended “with threatening death to Christians and bloodshed in the streets of his former home” (Graham-Harrison & Surtees, 2018). Notwithstanding the region’s vulnerability to terrorism as a whole, the tourism industry is particularly “extremely vulnerable” to terrorism. The findings revealed that the region is vulnerable to a “Mumbai-style terrorist attack”, particularly targeting tourists from North America and Europe. In fact, Mr Grenville Williams alluded to this scenario during our interview: “We [Caribbean] are very vulnerable to terrorism. You can get on a boat with many firearms from out of Venezuela or even the Florida coast, and sail into our waters and shoot 100 tourists on the beach. In that sense, we are very vulnerable” (Williams, 2019). There is also a genuine concern that the Caribbean might perhaps witness a Sousse-style terrorist attack like what took place in Tunisia in 2015. For instance, Professor Anthony Clayton had pointed out that a major concern for the region is a terrorist

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attack on tourists, a similar attack to what took place in Tunisia that directly targets Western tourists, would severely impact the region’s tourism industry (Clayton, 2019). St Vincent and the Grenadines Minister of Tourism, Mr Cecil McKie also reiterated that the region’s tourism industry and the Caribbean on a whole is “very vulnerable” to terrorism because “our borders are very porous” and individuals can enter the region without being properly identified. To add insult to injury, the region’s vulnerability to terrorism is exacerbated by the fact that it is almost impossible to manage every square inch of our borders, especially in the case of small islands like St Vincent and the Grenadines that is made up “32 island and cays”. The tourism minister also noted that St Vincent and Grenadines saw a rapid increase in tourist arrivals from western countries over the last four years (2016–2019), upwards of roughly 700,000 by air and 300,000 by sea and that “these figures can easily include persons who may be incline to carry out terrorist activities”. Plus, local persons might also be “very well inclined to carry out acts of terrorism against tourists”, known as “soft targets” who are vacationing in the Caribbean because a majority of the region’s tourists are from North America and Europe who are typically the soft targets for terrorists like ISIS, says Minister of Tourism Mr Cecil McKie. The tourism minister further stressed that a terrorist attack can “virtually wipe out all of our tourism because it could affect tourism figures significantly, and it could cripple the tourism sector”. This would no doubt result in an economic crisis, especially for small states like SVG that are heavily dependent on tourism. In line with the tourism minister’s comments, CARICOM IMPACS Assistant Director Miss Tonya Ayow stated that the region is vulnerable to terrorism, especially the “smaller islands like St Vincent and St. Lucia”, who are also very much dependent on tourism and a “terrorist attack” can have an adverse effect on the smaller Caribbean countries’ overall economy. In addition, the region is vulnerable to a terrorist attack from individuals or terrorist groups like ISIS that would not only result in economic perils for the region as a whole, but also “social” and “psychological impact”. This is because “victims of terrorism”, will have to live with the psychological impacts especially those who have either been “maimed” or have lost family members in the wake of the terrorist attack, say Miss Ayow. Another area of concern is the fact that the region has not sufficiently developed the capacity to deal with terrorism because most of the intelligence and law enforcement capacity, primarily focuses on drug trafficking

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and other non-terrorism-related criminal matters. However, Mr Williams during our interview stated that: “Terrorism has now been put on the agenda of the regional security cluster. So, organisations like CARICOM IMPACS, terrorism is now part of the agenda for the area of crime and security. It is now part of the agenda for the RSS. It is now part of the agenda for other agencies that deals with security…We now have to build capacity in this area [counterterrorism]. What we are seeing more from FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit) and other institutions responsible for this work, is the demand for training in the area of counterterrorism, but more specifically in terror financing”. Moreover, the Caribbean is also “vulnerable at all points and ports of entry” because individuals do not need a license boat or a license aircraft to enter the region’s shores. However, the latter might be more challenging, opined Mr Williams. Notwithstanding that the threat ISIS poses to the region’s tourism industry is a “legitimate concern”, being able to access North America through the various Caribbean countries ports (airports, seaports, etc.) to transport terrorist materials that they will try to assemble when they get to the United States of America is a major concern, opined Dr Haughton. Additionally, the documents analysed reiterated that the Caribbean is extremely vulnerable to terrorism. However, there was a noticeable shift in the narrative in some of the documents as it relates to the threat terrorism poses to the region. For example, some of the earlier documents (pre-2018) had labelled terrorism as a either a “direct and serious risk’ or “significant risk”, while those 2018 and later views terrorism as a “serious and direct threat” to the region. For example, the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy Report (2018) stated that terrorism poses a “serious risk” to the region’s critical infrastructures (airports, hotels, major industrial estates, ports, etc.), tourism industry and the region’s porous borders and close relationship with its neighbour to the north, increases the risk. Moreover, the UNODC Regional Programme in support of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (2014–2016) also suggests that terrorism poses a “significant potential risk” with “high impact, but low probability”. On the other hand, the CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2018) stated that terrorism poses a “serious threat” to the region and that the Islamic State (ISIS) poses a “direct threat” to the region, especially in the form of extremist religious leaders who might be radicalising and recruiting individuals or terrorist sympathisers to commit terrorism-related activities in the name of the Islamic State. Like in the case of the Jamaica-based Islamic cleric Sheikh Abdullah Al-Faisal who was accused by US Authorities

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of “encouraging individuals to carry out acts of terrorism in the name of the Islamic State”, among other things. The documents also made clear that the region’s tourism industry is extremely vulnerable to terrorism, which is exacerbated by the region’s porous borders and its close relationship with the United States increases this risk. Evidently, the Caribbean remains extremely vulnerable to terrorism, especially the region’s tourism industry, banking system and critical infrastructures. Though the region is vulnerable to terrorism, the Caribbean as a whole has also been slowly, but surely putting the necessary laws in place to minimise the threat of terrorism. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence shows clearly that the inherent duality of terrorism is also embedded in Caribbean’s vulnerability to terrorism. For example, the Caribbean is vulnerable to ISIS Foreign Fighter Returnees (FFR), ISIS children, bioterrorism (attack on agriculture and health sector), money laundering and terrorist financing, the increasing overlap between organised crime groups and violent gangs that can be a means to “facilitate undetected departure of foreign terrorist fighters”, extremist religious leaders and Caribbean nationals who might be more susceptible to ISIS radicalisation and recruitment such as individuals who are not well-versed in the Muslim faith, disaffected youths who might be feeling a sense of disappointed expectation, a sense of belonging, searching for meaning or purpose, among other things (negatives). At the same time, those same individuals who are most likely to be receptive to ISIS radicalisation might think they can derive some sort of personal and inherent psychological benefits, such as an increase in social status, respect, power and influence in the streets, a sense of meaning and purpose in their life, and even a sense of belonging, the prospect of a better life or securing their economic future and being offered an attractive salary (positives). In utilising the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, the researcher sought to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context and the findings offer ample evidence that shows an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situation concerning terrorism. In this case, the Caribbean’s vulnerability to terrorism.  aribbean’s Preparedness for Terrorism C Notwithstanding the Caribbean’s extreme vulnerability to terrorism, the region has made significant strides over the years to enhance its preparedness for and mitigate its vulnerability to terrorism. For example, the region has established a “sanctions list” that outlines a number of “listing

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criteria” to determine acts or activities to determine whether an individual, group or entity is associated with ISIS or Al-Qaeda or any associated networks eligible for inclusion on the sanction list. The sanctions list criteria include: “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; and recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof” (King, 2020). This was officially stated by Her Excellency Inga Rhonda King. Eastern Caribbean sates like St Vincent and the Grenadines has also established a number of health facilities as part of the country’s preparedness to respond to emergency situations, such as a natural disaster or a terrorist attack. Moreover, many Caribbean states have since implemented anti-­ terrorism legislation. However, there are some notable differences in phrasing of terrorism in some of the Caribbean countries anti-terrorism legislations, such as “terrorist activity” vs “terrorist act” and slight differences in meaning. For example, Chapter 3.16 of the St Lucia’s Anti-­ Terrorism Act (ATA) (2015) states that a “terrorist act” constitutes an act or omission in or outside of St Lucia within the scope of a counter terrorism convention, includes, but not limited to, a threat of action, severe bodily harm, serious damage to property, creates a serious health risk to the public or a section of it, the use of toxic chemicals, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substances or any other biological agent or toxin with a view to disrupt communication services, banking, financial services and essential services (police, medical, etc.) that is intended to advance a ideological, religious or political goal. On the other hand, Jamaica’s (not an OECS member) Terrorism Prevent Act states that a “terrorist activity” can constitute the use of force to seize or hijack an aircraft, threaten or use violence against passengers, or unlawfully and intentionally destroy or damage any property where the destruction, damage or interference endangers the safety of any aircraft flight. Moreover, the unlawful or intentional use of any weapons or substance to destroy or severely damage an airport or even an aircraft not in service. This is according to 12, 13, 16, 17, 17A or 18 of the Aircraft (Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions) Act. However, both the St Lucian Anti-Terrorism Act and the Jamaica Terrorism Prevent Act spoke about chemical and other bioagents, terrorist bombing convention and made it clear that an act of terrorism constitutes

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an act or omission that is intended to intimidate the public or a section of it, compel a government or an international organisation to do or refrain from any act, and created with a view to advance a political, ideological or religious goal. There was a noticeable difference in the definition of terrorism related to the intended goal or purpose. For example, St Lucia and Jamaica anti-terrorism legislation includes any threat or act that is intended to advance a political, ideological or religious cause, while St Vincent and the Grenadines Anti-Terrorism Act (2015) includes all of the above with “racial cause” added to the intended purpose. Barbados Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) also include the words “armed conflict”, which is not apparent in the other countries’ definition. In addition, the Barbados Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act (2019) explicitly addresses the issue of “funding terrorism”: “A person who in or outside Barbados directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds or provides financial services or makes such services available to persons, in any case, with the intention that the funds or services are to be used, or with the knowledge that the funds or services are to be used, in full or in part in order to carry out an act described in section 3(1); for the travel of an individual to a State other than his State of nationality or residence for the purpose of committing, planning, preparing for, or participating in, an act described in section 3(1) or of providing or receiving training in committing, planning, preparing for, or participating in such an act; by a person in respect of whom a terrorist designation order….” Moreover, every country’s terrorism legislation that was analysed all make reference to the same conventions (the Aircraft Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, etc.). The “financing of terrorism” was a recurring theme throughout the documents and the elite interviews. In addition to passing anti-terrorism legislations and incorporating international conventions in domestic laws, some countries have taken other steps towards effectively combating terrorism. For example, St Vincent and the Grenadines recently bought a 43-meter offshore vessel from Holland to strengthen its border patrol capacity. Regionally, specifically the Eastern Caribbean region, the Regional Security Systems (RSS) treaty allows for collective security among its seven member states (Barbados and the six OECS member states). This means that the RSS treaty allows for any law enforcement officer from any of the member states to enter another country and enjoy the same powers as a police officer in the country they have entered. Making it easy to coordinate and

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mobilise a regional response in the event of a terrorist attack. Furthermore, the RSS increasing commitment to combating terrorism in the region, has in its possession “two C26 aircrafts that have been properly reconfigured to collect information and Intel is shared with partners including the US, Britain, France, and the Dutch, as all have overseas territories in the Caribbean,” SVG’s UN Ambassador Her Excellency Inga Rhonda King officially stated (King, 2020). Moreover, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has conducted a lot of work in the area of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) and with the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). At the same time, some Caribbean countries like Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana have tried to include individuals like immoderate imams into their discussions, as part of their strategy to minimise the threat of terrorism. Additionally, Trinidad and Tobago have even commenced what is called “community programming geared towards minimizing the numbers of soldiers that go off” to join the Islamic State, says Miss Tonya Ayow (Ayow, 2019). Also, some Caribbean countries have also adopted into their domestic criminal laws, the United Nations Security Council resolution 2178 that “called for the criminalization of persons going to Syria to fight” and to join the Islamic State (ISIS). Notwithstanding the significant strides that have been made thus far to combat terrorism in the Caribbean, in terms of the passing of anti-­ terrorism legislations at the national level and regional security agencies, such as CARICOM IMPACS and the Regional Security System (RSS) who has made combating terrorism central to their agenda; however, the Caribbean remains “extreme vulnerable” to terrorism. For example, the wave of “anti-terrorism” legislations/acts that has since been passed in the Caribbean still falls short in fully addressing the issue of “individual actors/ lone wolf” terrorism and neither does the legislations go far enough in adequately addressing the “risk factors” that can make terrorism more likely, online and offline radicalisation and recruitment, home-grown terrorism, extremist individuals and the multiplicity of negatives and positives associated with terrorism-related matters. Therefore, in utilising the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept in seeking to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context, the research offers a few practical recommendations that were forged from the study’s findings. These recommendations are geared towards the enhancement of existing counter-terrorism policies/measures and offer a few sensible and practical approaches

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towards mitigating the region’s vulnerability to and enhancing its preparedness for terrorism (see Chapter: Conclusion and Recommendations).

Bibliography Elite Interviews Ayow, T. (2019, September 20). Telephone interview with Assistant Director of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), Miss Tonya Ayow. Christensen, C. (2019, October 16). Telephone interview with Stockholm University Professor of Journalism, Christian Christensen. Clayton, A. (2019, June 14). Face to face interview with University of the West Indies, Mona Professor, lead consultant/author of Jamaica’s 2014 National Security Policy, as well as an advisor on the development of CARICOM’s Crime and Security Strategy, Anthony Clayton. Haughton, S. (2019, June 17). Face to face interview with Head of the Department of Government and Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Dr Suzette Haughton. King, R. I. (2020, November). Email interview with St Vincent and the Grenadines Permanent Representative to the United Nations, who currently sits on the United Nation Security Council as a non-permanent member, her Excellency Inga Rhonda King. Knight, W. A. (2019). The nexus between vulnerabilities and violence in the Caribbean. Third World Quarterly, 40(2), 405–424. Korstanje, M. E., & Clayton, A. (2012). Tourism and terrorism: conflicts and commonalities. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes, 4(1), 8–25. McCoy, J., & Knight, W. A. (2017). Homegrown violent extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local patterns, global trends. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(4), 267–299. McKie, C. (2019, September). Telephone interview with the Honourable Minister of Tourism, Sports and Culture of St Vincent and the Grenadines (at the time of the interview), Mr Cecil McKie. Richardson, L. (2019, October). Telephone interview with the Vice Chancellor of Oxford University, distinguished scholar and world-renown leading expert on terrorism, Professor Louise Richardson. Williams, G. (2019, September). Telephone interview with the Director, Asset Recovery Unit (ARU) of the Regional Security System, Mr Grenville Williams.

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Documents CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy. (2018). CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy (the CT Strategy) was adopted at the Twenty-Ninth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 26–27 February 2018. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/285295.pdf

References Bianchi, R. (2006). Tourism and the globalisation of fear: Analysing the politics of risk and (in) security in global travel. Tourism and Hospitality Research, 7(1), 64–74. Dolliver, M.  J., & Kearns, E.  M. (2019). Is it terrorism?: Public perceptions, media, and labeling the Las Vegas shooting. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–19. Graham-Harrison, E., & Surtees, J. (2018, February 2). Trinidad’s jihadis: How tiny nation became Isis recruiting ground. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/02/trinidad-­jihadis-­isis-­tobago-­tariq-­abdul-­haqq Huff, C., & Kertzer, J. D. (2018). How the public defines terrorism. American Journal of Political Science, 62(1), 55–71. Mahood, S., & Rane, H. (2017). Islamist narratives in ISIS recruitment propaganda. The Journal of International Communication, 23(1), 15–35. Makarenko, T. (2003). ‘The Ties that Bind’: Uncovering the relationship between organised crime and terrorism. In Global organized crime (pp.  159–192). Springer. Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime-terror continuum: Tracing the interplay between transnational organised crime and terrorism. Global Crime, 6(1), 129–145. Pizam, A., & Smith, G. (2000). Tourism and terrorism: A quantitative analysis of major terrorist acts and their impact on tourism destinations. Tourism Economics, 6(2), 123–138. Pratt, G. (2003). Terrorism and tourism: Bahamas and Jamaica fight back. International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management, 15(3), 192–194. Roy, O. (2017). Jihad and death: The global appeal of Islamic State. Oxford University Press. Sönmez, S.  F., Apostolopoulos, Y., & Tarlow, P. (1999). Tourism in crisis: Managing the effects of terrorism. Journal of Travel Research, 38(1), 13–18. Stanislas, P., & Sadique, K. (2019). International attitudes to teaching religion and faith and the policing of minority communities. In Policing and minority communities (pp. 11–27). Springer.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion and Recommendation

Abstract  This chapter draws upon the findings and presents concluding arguments based on the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept and offers some practical recommendations aimed at reducing the region’s vulnerability to and enhancing its preparedness for terrorism. Keywords  Caribbean • Stakeholders of Terrorism • Inherent duality • Counterterrorism

Conclusion The research presented in this book sought to systematically understand terrorism as having an inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. The research borrows and adds to the existing explanations of terrorism (psychological, strategic, religious, culture/civilisational context, political and economic dimensions) and uses three specific stakeholders of terrorism (ISIS, individuals and US mainstream media) in seeking to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context. The research study provides ample evidence after triangulation and convergence of the gathered data from all sources of data (elite interviews, focus group and documents) that shows terrorism could

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be conceptually understood as having an inherent duality. The duality, though conceptually distinct, are also not mutually exclusive or exhaustive clause. For example, themes such as “a sense of belonging” and “offered money to fight” are equally deemed as “casual effects” (negatives) that are considered as main drivers for why some individuals decided to join ISIS and simultaneously a “beneficial effect” (positives) in terms of garnering some personal or inherent psychological reward one gets from feeling like belonging to something or being financially rewarded for one’s engagement in terrorism-related activism. In deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, it is understood that a multiplicity of negatives and positives played a critical role for why some Caribbean nationals decided to emigrate and join the Islamic State (ISIS). These include, but are not limited to, a concern of one’s economic future, yearning for respect, a sense of belonging, a sense of adventure, not well-versed in the Muslim faith, a sense of loss identity, a sense of disappointed expectations, peripherally involved in crime, being offered some money to fight, a more attractive salary, among other things (negatives) and simultaneously a sense of increase social status, respect, influence and power in the streets, feeling like a great jihadi warrior, meaning and purpose in one’s life (positives) drove some Caribbean nationals to migrate and join ISIS. Interestingly, the research findings also revealed how economic dimensions can simultaneously be viewed as a risk factor/pre-­ condition, main driver/key motivator and a beneficial effect concerning terrorism-related activities within the Caribbean context. Also, social dimensions can be a useful template for understanding terrorism within the context of the Caribbean. As it relates to the Islamic State (ISIS) and the Caribbean, the region remains “extremely vulnerable” to the transnational terrorist organisation. In utilising the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept in seeking to understand ISIS within the Caribbean context, the most salient negatives related to ISIS were that it poses a threat to the region through Foreign Fighter Returnees (FFR), extremist religious leaders, online radicalisation, training and recruitment, mobilising and encouraging radicalised individuals to carry out attacks, ISIS children returnees (noted as a strong concern), using the region as an access point to launch attacks against some of the region’s closest allies (North America, UK and EU), attacks on the region’s tourism industry, the targeting of Western tourists as soft targets, cyberterrorism, exploiting the region’s banking system to fund terrorist activities and using organised criminals and violent gangs to help ISIS

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fighters move undetected, among other things. At the same time, the Islamic State (ISIS) might benefit from foot soldiers, using the Caribbean as a transit point, recruitment hub, a resting spot and to raise finances to fund terrorism-related activities, the targeting of Western tourists will also be beneficial to ISIS (attracting global coverage, attacking the West, using western tourists for ransom, etc.) and even the use of organised criminals and violent gangs will be advantageous to ISIS. Once again, re-emphasising that the negatives and the positives are not mutually exclusive. On the US mainstream media, the findings shows that it has the potential to shape Caribbean nationals (especially young people) perspectives on terrorism and a need for more youth-focused education on terrorism. However, this volume also stresses future qualitative research post-­ COVID-­19 to garner more Caribbean nationals understanding of terrorism, and how or to what extent the US mainstream media may or may not play a role in shaping their perspective on terrorism. Furthermore, the research findings revealed that a terrorist attack in the Caribbean can result in a “misperception of risk” of being a likely target of terrorism, in large part, due to the media’s coverage of the terroristic episodic event. This in turn will adversely affect the region’s tourism industry. Howbeit, the negative impact will likely be a short-term one rather than long-term. Notwithstanding the significant strides achieved so far by Caribbean states in an effort to mitigate its vulnerability to terrorism, the region remains extremely vulnerable to terrorism. The region’s vulnerability to terrorism includes, but are not limited to, ISIS Foreign Fighter Returnees (FFR), bioterrorism (attack on agriculture and health sector), terrorist financing, the increasing overlap between organised crime groups and violent gangs that can be a means to “facilitate undetected departure of foreign terrorist fighters”, extremist religious leaders and Caribbean nationals who might be more susceptible to ISIS radicalisation and recruitment, such as individuals who are not well-versed in the Muslim faith, disaffected youths or individuals who might be feeling a sense of disappointed expectation, relative deprivation, feeling like a low life, yearning for respect, among other things (negatives). At the same time, individuals who are most likely to be receptive to ISIS radicalisation might think they can derive some sort of personal and inherent psychological benefits, such as an increase in social status, respect, power and influence in the streets, a sense of meaning and purpose in their life, the prospect of a better life, securing their economic future, among other things (positives). Thus, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept was also helpful in seeking a holistic

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understanding of the Caribbean’s vulnerability to terrorism by discerning the multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism—in this case, Caribbean’s vulnerability to terrorism. Nevertheless, the region has implemented a series of counterterrorism measures/policies. Some of these counterterrorism measures/ policies includes, inter alia, the Joint Communication Centre created during the 2007 Cricket World Cup that was held in the Caribbean, the Caribbean Financial Task Force (CFTF), the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CTF), Advance Passenger Information System, counterterrorism units in local police forces and anti-terrorism legislations in some Caribbean countries. In conclusion, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept was helpful in seeking a holistic understanding of terrorism within the Caribbean context. In utilising the concept, the researcher was able to discern the inherent duality, a multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. In this case, the stakeholders of terrorism in relation to the Caribbean and the region’s vulnerability to and preparedness for terrorism. The research study also hopes to advance the debate on terrorism by shaping our understanding of the phenomenon through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept and encourage more research and serious discussions (among academic scholars, government heads and security experts in the Caribbean) on terrorism. Lastly, the research study offers a few sensible and practical recommendations/best practices that might be useful towards mitigating the region’s vulnerability, enhancing its capacity to respond to the threat of terrorism in the twenty-first century. These recommendations/best practices are presented below.

Recommendations The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept was deployed in seeking to understand terrorism within the Caribbean context. In doing so, the study proposes the following practical recommendations. • First, the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept suggests the value of establishing “community programmes” specifically addressing the issue of terrorism throughout the Caribbean. However, each community programme must also be tailored according to each individ-

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ual country’s terrorism-related problem. These community programmes must also evenly recognise the intangible negatives and positives (inherent duality) to effectively reduce all risk factors, causal effects, deleterious effects and beneficial effects related to terrorism. The community programmes will include an educational curriculum on terrorism-related matters (on ISIS, lone wolf/individual actors and differentiating between journalistic explanations of terrorism by US mainstream press from academic explanations); programmes to help disaffected youths and those feeling a sense of marginalisation and social exclusion to build their own resilience and capacity to find meaningful employment; and periodically conduct psychological assessments on the most vulnerable/disaffected young people, such as those who might be feeling like a low-life, searching for an identity or a sense of belonging. The community programmes can be implemented as a national and regional policy geared towards addressing the possible threat of home-grown extremism, extremists, individual actors or lone wolf terrorists who might be inspired by terrorist groups like ISIS, but who are capable of deciding, planning and executing a terrorist attack without any formal instructions from ISIS or any other terrorist organisation. If such programmes honestly recognise the attractions seemingly offered by terrorism (positives) as well as the extensive harm that can be caused by such violence (negatives) then they are more likely to be effective. • Second, the findings in this volume suggest the value of creating an “educational programme” to educate and dissuade individuals regarding the dangers and risks of, and consequences for joining terrorist groups like ISIS.  The use of international case examples of prominent lone wolf actors can be incorporated into educational programmes to further develop them with a view to discourage and dissuade individuals from partaking in any terrorism-related activities. Like the community programmes, the educational programmes must emphasise the multiplicity of negatives and positives, such as the possibilities of being killed, imprisoned, separated from your family, etc. (negatives), as well as some of the positives (money to fight, a sense of identity, a sense of belonging, a sense of adventure, etc.) in order to create a more holistic, credible and effective counternarrative. The educational programme can be implemented as part of secondary and tertiary level educational institutions, as well as

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part of a community drive conducted every quarterly in  local communities. • Third, there is a need to make use of “moderate imams” in schools and in the community programmes to educate young people about Muslim/Islam, especially those individuals who are not “well-versed in the Muslim faith”. This can be used as counternarrative to “extremist religious leaders” teachings and the Wahhabi version of Islam deployed by ISIS for radicalisation and recruitment purposes. The use of the imams can play a crucial role in effectively tackling some of the intangible negatives (not well-versed in Muslim faith) and simultaneously some of the intangible positives (Respect, power, believe one will be a great jihadi warrior, etc.), along the lines identified in this book. Caribbean governments should seriously consider implementing “web screening” policy to detect ISIS’s radicalisation, arrangements and funding processes, and monitoring social media in the region. The monitoring of “social media” must be done within the confines of the rule of law and in harmony with international laws. • Fourth, another best practice is the constant “gathering of intelligence” and “vigilance” at the national and regional levels. This can be done through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept by gathering intelligence on the possible multiplicity of negatives and positives related to terrorism activities and addressing them accordingly. For example, when gathering intelligence on ISIS activities within the region, the relevant national and regional security bodies must evenly be mindful of the indirect and direct intangibles and tangible negatives and positives as displayed in Table 1.1 on page 27. Again, this will reinforce the credibility and honesty of the analysis and counter-­ terrorist response. • Fifth, in addition to the best practices previously mentioned, a more practical recommendation would be to create a “Collaborative Intelligence Gathering & Monitoring System” (CIGMS). This will be a system whereby local and regional agencies collaborate to build a regional intelligence network based on gathered intelligence, to monitor, detect and mitigate the risks of a potential lone wolf or even leaderless residence-type terrorist attack. This will limit the possibility of a Mumbai-style/Sousse-style terrorist attack or even potential lone wolf attacks, attacks from small groups or other individuals at the behest of ISIS. The research in this volume demonstrates how much danger there is to the region if coordinated efforts are not able

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to prevent major attacks. The gathered intelligence can be fed through a system that searches for characteristic behavioural traits likened to prominent lone actor’s case examples, which will be enhanced by the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept allowing the system to simultaneously scan for those direct and indirect, tangible and intangible positives and negatives. For example, a good case example could be Ramzi Yousef who was inspired/motivated by Al-Qaeda cause, but who decided, planned and carried out his terrorist attack along with co-conspirators. This is the kind of lone actor (who might be ISIS-inspired) that might likely pose a threat to the region. • Sixth, there is a need for more discussions, and more honest and credible debate, about home-grown terrorism, lone wolves, leaderless resistance and the possibility of small group attacks in the Caribbean. These discussions must be done through more collaboration among members states, inter-agencies, public and private sector coordination and research departments under a single theme: Countering Home-Grown Terrorism and Lone Actors. The themes garnered from the gathered data on individuals who either migrated or claimed a connection to ISIS, such as a sense of belonging, money to fight, a sense of power, influence, increased social status, respect, a sense of adventure, lost identity, among others, can be central to these discussions. These themes are crucial in understanding the motives behind individuals who are willing to engage in terrorism-­ related activities, such as migrating to join ISIS or deciding and planning to carry out a terrorist attack on their own or with co-conspirators in support of ISIS’s cause. However, it must not be simply limited to the themes garnered from this study. The Stakeholders of Terrorism concept can be useful in helping to further research in seeking an understanding of homegrown/lone wolf terrorism within the Caribbean context, by examining closely the inherent duality associated with individual actors/lone wolf terrorists. • Seventh, the researcher also proposes a “Six Pillar” initiative that can be guided by the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept: (1) take a proactive approach through education, monitoring and detecting terrorism, (2) considerably reduce all risk factors/pre-conditions that make terrorism more likely and more importantly examine the main roots of the problem (negatives: causes) and simultaneously the advantages or benefits of terrorism (positives), (3) establish a regional central command that gathers intelligence in real-time, (4) our pre-

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paredness can be enhanced by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept as a model to help shape the region’s understanding of terrorism in the twenty-first century, mitigate its vulnerability to, and enhance its preparedness for terrorism, (5) make sure all responses to terrorism strictly adhere to and promote liberal democratic principles, (6) the stakeholders of terrorism concept can be central to counterterrorism policies in order to ensure that legal penalties outweigh the benefits of engaging in terrorism activism. • Eighth, from a legislative standpoint, the Caribbean community (nationally and regionally) must adequately address the issue of individual actors/lone wolf terrorism, home-grown terrorism, offline and online radicalisation and the risk factors in their counter-­ terrorism polices. Moreover, the counterterrorism policies must strictly adhere to liberal democratic principles, such as the rule of law and respecting individual’s right to challenge his/her detention/ arrest. This is to avoid the abandonment of liberal democratic principles and international laws, especially in “moments of exception” (a terrorist attack) and bending the laws under the guise of tackling a perceived emergency crisis following a terrorist attack. As detailed in this volume, these problems were evident in the case of the Guantanamo Bay Detentions, for example, whereby inmates were being denied their legal rights, such as habeas corpus and the use of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay detention in Cuba that was in contradiction to liberal principles. However, the transgressing of liberal democratic principles could become advantageous for terrorists or terrorist groups who might be inclined to exploit for radicalisation and recruitment of disaffected youths, or the marginalised minority. These laws/polices can also be informed by the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept by evenly recognising the multiplicity of negatives and positives simultaneously present in most situations concerning terrorism. • Ninth, the Caribbean as a whole must implement specific maritime counterterrorism legislation/laws that allow for the enhancement of monitoring our regional waters for potential terrorist threats. This is because a terrorist can easily traverse our waters on a boat and shoot a large number of tourists (in Mumbai-style terrorist attack) and also use our waters to easily recruit terrorist sympathisers and ship sup-

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plies to North America to assemble them in order to carry out a terrorist attack. This legislation must be aided by local police and terrorist units in collaboration with regional security bodies and ­border patrol officer to efficaciously counter terrorism within our nautical boundaries. • Tenth, another recommendation for the Caribbean would be to emulate the Regional Security System (RSS) Treaty and apply it region-wide (beyond the OECS). This is because the RSS Treaty allows for any member state of the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to have jurisdiction in any other member state, which makes it less complicated and much easier to provide the necessary assistance in “very short notice” to another state in the event of an emergency crisis. More importantly, this type of collaboration will make it easier for any member state which might be under a terrorist attack to receive immediate assistance in real-time and not having to deal with the challenges and hurdles that come with the bureaucratic processes. • Lastly (eleventh), in the event of a terrorist attack, the mainstream media in the Caribbean must adopt certain practices in their coverage of the terrorist attack to avoid the sort of stereotypes and misconceptions that have been shown in this book to typify the US mainstream media coverage of terrorism-related activities. This is because stereotyping of any groups in society like the “Muslim community” in the Caribbean will only help to reinforce patterns of discrimination and disenfranchise an entire group in society, making it more likely for malignant ideology to take root and for religious extremist leaders to radicalise and recruit disaffected youths, especially those not well-versed in the Muslim faith. Also, in the wake of a terrorist incident it probably makes best sense not to use the names of individual attackers and not to share or publish any terrorists’ manifestos via their online media platform nor read/quote any information directly from the manifesto. The latter is extremely important, given that terrorists seek to reach a wider audience beyond their immediate victims. The former, however, is to deny terrorists the notoriety/attention they desire. In the academic realm, the use of practitioners of terrorism’s names and their manifestos, or any of the terrorists’ publications, are crucial for research purposes that can be

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useful for informing counterterrorism policy initiatives (like in using the case examples of prominent lone wolf terrorists, as previously suggested as a recommendation). But, in light of some of the “positives” identified in this book through the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, there appears to be practical advantage in not magnifying terrorist arguments and names in the aftermath of an atrocity.



Appendix

Professor Sharan B. Merriam (2009), for instance, asserted that an “important characteristic of qualitative research is that the process is inductive; that is, researchers gather data to build concepts, hypotheses, or theories rather than deductively testing hypotheses as in positivist research” (p. 15). In line with Professor Merriam (2009) regarding the use of qualitative “researchers gather data to build concepts”, the researcher built the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept after triangulation and convergence of the gathered data. The research study also sought to explore and investigate how and in what ways the stakeholders of terrorism concept help us to fully understand the Caribbean’s preparedness for, and vulnerability to terrorism. In developing the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, the researcher first borrows and then adds to the prevailing literature the six specific explanations of terrorism (psychological, strategic, religious, cultural/civilisational context, economic and political dimensions) and the specific stakeholders of terrorism. The researcher then drew upon data collected in the field from three sources of data (elite interviews, focus group and documents/reports) in order to add to existing literature. The

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concept development involved a rigorous process, which required triangulation and convergence of the gathered data, then deploying it [Stakeholders of Terrorism concept] to fully understand the Caribbean’s preparedness for, and vulnerability to terrorism.

Methodological Triangulation Nigel G.  Fielding and Jane L.  Fielding (1986) classified methodological triangulation in two approaches: “within method” and “between method” approaches (p. 25). For this research book, the “within method” approach was employed. This approach allows a researcher to use multiple strategies within a single method “with a view to reliability…check on data quality and an attempt to confirm validity” (Fielding and Fielding, 1986, p. 25). Moreover, the researcher used three qualitative textual tools to analyse the data. First, the Recursive Abstraction was specifically used to extract the rich and in-depth information and related themes to the overall research topic and main question. Second, the Constant Comparative Method was used to compare and contrast the varying perspectives from Caribbean youths on the subject area. Lastly, the Qualitative Content Analysis technique was more suitable for systematically examining the documents concerning the subject area. It is important to note that all three qualitative textual tools complemented each other. The researcher used three strategies of data collection (elite interviews, a focus group and documents) to gather data on the subject area with a view to reliability and an attempt to strengthen the research and confirm validity. Therefore, if a researcher sometime in the future decides to research the same subject area using the same research methods, data collection strategies and qualitative techniques of analysis, they should arrive at the same conclusion or draw similar valid inferences.

Triangulation: Triangulating the Data The most cited primary purpose of triangulation is the converging of data from different methodological approaches to achieve an in-depth and complete understanding of the particular phenomenon under investigation, which in turn increases confidence in the results and enhances the research credibility and validity (Farmer et  al., 2006; Jonsen & Jehn,

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2009). Briller et al. (2008) stated: “A major strength of triangulation is the integration of multiple forms of evidence, various perspectives and different analytic strategies; such integration can yield more meaningful research findings than any single approach” (p.  246). Notwithstanding the benefits of triangulation, however, it [triangulation] suffers from a lack of explicit and detailed procedural steps or protocols (Farmer et al., 2006, p. 379; Briller et al., 2008, p. 246). Even Robert Yin (2016) in his book Qualitative Research from Start to Finish (second edition), wrote about triangulation as being one of the various ways that can be used to strengthen the credibility of a study. However, Yin noted that it is “a principle not yet captured by any formulaic procedure” (Yin, 2016, p. 87). For this book, the convergence coding scheme for the triangulation protocol was guided by Farmer et al. (2006). See Tables A.1 and A.2. Convergence coding scheme for triangulation protocol, guided by Farmer et al. (2006) triangulation protocol. Table A.1

Coding label

Convergence coding

Agreement Partial agreement Silent Dissonance

Finding fully identified Findings partially identified Not apparent Differing views identified

Table A.2 Convergence coding scheme Agreement

Partial agreement Dissonance

Silent Not addressed

This shows full agreement in the findings on the subject area (e.g., most elements were addressed, meanings and examples provided and were closely related) This shows partial agreement on the subject area (e.g., elements were partially addressed, meanings and examples partially related) This shows differing views in the findings on the subject area (e.g., elements were addressed with some meanings and examples, but viewed differently) This is when findings on the subject area are not so apparent (e.g., insufficiently addressed, limited to no meanings and examples) There is when the subject area was not addressed (e.g., questions were not asked about the specific issue or the issue was not addressed)

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It was also important to deploy different methods for gathering data to produce sufficient empirical evidence to establish themes related to the main research question. John W. Creswell (2009) states that triangulating data from “different sources of information by examining the evidence from the sources” can create a more coherent justification for the related themes. Furthermore, “if themes are established based on converging several sources of data or perspectives from participants, then this process can be claimed as adding to the validity of the study” (Creswell, 2009, p. 191). The limitations or dissimilarities of the purposes of the collected data were also acknowledged and taken into serious consideration before conducting the triangulation process. For example, some of the elite interview participants allowed for the data collection on all research questions, while some could not (e.g., Professor Christensen and Murtaza Hussain were not asked some questions related to the Caribbean). The focus group participants could not provide an answer to some of the more technical questions related to the research study (given their limitations in terms of experience and in-depth knowledge of the subject area). Lastly, the documents provided some content on some, but not all, research questions. The coding scheme materialised through an inductive approach in line with the qualitative research process, guided by Qualitative Research Methods Expert Professor Sharan B.  Merriam (2009). The researcher combed through and analysed the gathered data from all sources of data (elite interview, focus group and documents) to identify specific themes, compare and contrast themes, reoccurring themes, patterns, new/emerging themes related to the main research question. Moreover, it is not uncommon for elite interview researchers to collect data from multiple sources as a method of triangulation, such as inter alia, interviewing participants with diverse backgrounds, interviewing a sizeable number of individuals and people from different geographical locations (Natow, 2020, p. 164). In this case, the elite interviews comprised of nine participants with diverse professional backgrounds to provide rich and in-­depth information on the phenomenon under investigation. Each elite interviewee’s specific expertise and professional background played a critical role in providing substantive information in addressing specific aspects of the main research question in relation to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept. Second, the related themes extracted from all sources of data (elite interview, focus group and documents) were triangulated to create a coherent justification for the specific themes related to the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept within the Caribbean context are presented in Table 1.1.

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Fourth, themes were established from the key findings in relation to the main research question and presented in Table A.3. Moreover, Table A.3 also displays the imbalance between the sources of data (elite interviews, focus group and documents) on the key findings related to the main research question. For example, both the elite interview and focus group participants were mostly in “agreement” on providing a definition of terrorism that addressed most of the elements, meaning and provided some examples. On the other hand, the documents’ definition of terrorism was mostly “dissonance” because of a heavy focus on terrorism financing, terrorist activity, Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), among other things. Another notable difference was on the threat terrorism poses to the region. The responses from both the elite interviews and focus group saw terrorism as both a severe threat and a significant risk. The former mostly related to Trinidad and Jamaica, while the latter was in relation to the Caribbean as a whole. On the other hand, the documents mostly saw terrorism as a “significant risk”. On other key findings such as the tourism industry vulnerability to terrorism, both the elite interviews and documents were in full “Agreement”, while the focus group response on the matter was mostly “silent”. On the understanding of terrorism, both the elite interview participants and focus group were mostly in “Agreement”. The documents and the elite interview participants were mostly in “Agreement” on the definition of terrorism. In addition, some definitions more or less emphasised certain key themes such as terrorism financing, terrorist bombings, use of chemicals or toxins, nuclear, aviation and so on. Also, some included “race” as part of their definition of terrorism. For instance, St Vincent and the Grenadines Anti-Terrorism Act included racial cause as one of the intended purposes in its definition of terrorism. Lastly, both the elite interviews and documents provided substantial recommendations on combating terrorism that were strikingly similar (mostly in “Agreement”), compared to the focus group in which it mostly did “Not Addressed”. This further highlighted the imbalance between all sources of data. The table also illustrates the importance and rationale for using the three different sources of evidence. For example, the table shows how important the elite interviews were to the research in providing rich information and in-depth analysis on the subject area (mostly Addressed the key findings), compared to the focus group and the documents that did “Not address” most of the key findings in the study. This is illustrated in Table A.3.

Partial agreement Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Silent Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Silent Not addressed Not addressed Silent Not addressed Partial agreement Not addressed

Agreement Partial agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Partial agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement

Terrorism is a tactic that has psychological dimensions with the aim of seeking some sort of political change Terrorism financing is major concern Economic factors are more of a risk factor, not a cause of terrorism Psychological impact typically greater than the physical attack Many who migrated to join ISIS were peripherally involved in crime The emergence of gangster Jihad Increasing overlap between terrorism, organised crime and violent gangs Some professionals migrated to join ISIS Some who migrated to join ISIS yearned for respect and power Some who claim a connection to ISIS to garner respect, power, influence and increased social status Some who claim connections to ISIS rose to senior positions in gangs Extremist religious leaders pose a threat to the region Social exclusion drove some Caribbean nationals to join ISIS Some join ISIS through a contact in jail Some who migrated concerned about their economic future Some Caribbean nationals migrated or claim a connection to ISIS for economic benefits ISIS targets recent converts not well-versed in the Muslim faith Some were radicalised through an extreme version of Islam (Wahhabi) US mainstream media benefits from terrorism coverage US media pushes a nationalist narrative in terrorism coverage US media coverage of terrorism can impact tourism Media stereotypes reinforces patterns of discrimination

Focus group

Elite interviews

Key findings

Not addressed Agreement Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed

Not addressed Agreement Silent Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed

Silent Not addressed Silent

Agreement Agreement Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Agreement

Dissonance

Documents

Table A.3  Overview of identified key findings and how they triangulate across the data gathered from elite interviews, the focus group and documents

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Agreement Partial agreement Partial agreement Agreement Partial agreement Partial agreement Not addressed Silent Silent Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed

Partial agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Partial agreement Partial agreement Partial agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement

US media shape some Caribbean youths’ perspective of terrorism Social media an effective tool for ISIS ISIS uses social media to radicalise and recruit Caribbean nationals The Caribbean is very vulnerable to terrorism Terrorism poses a severe threat to the Caribbean Terrorism is a significant risk: low probability, high impact ISIS is likely to use the region to launch attack abroad Tourism industry extremely vulnerable to a terrorist attack A deliberate attack on tourists (soft target) Children returning from ISIS is a major concern A terrorist attack will negatively impact tourism The region’s borders are very porous Forecast small group, lone wolf attacks in the Caribbean Terrorists might use the region ports to assemble materials A country can be a source for terrorists with a view to assist in carrying out a terrorist attack Using the region as a transit or resting spot Jamaica has the response capability Some anti-terrorism legislations passed Community programming in Trinidad Advanced Passenger Information System Counter terrorism units in police forces The creation of a sanctions list Regional Security Systems can mobilise troops Money laundering and terrorist financing Financial Action Task Force (FATF) outlined recommendations to address terrorism financing FIU tracks terrorist financing Strengthening of coastguard capacity and our borders

Focus group

Elite interviews

Key findings

(continued)

Agreement Agreement

Agreement Not addressed Agreement Silent Silent Silent Silent Silent Agreement Agreement

Not addressed Partial agreement Agreement Agreement Dissonance Agreement Silent Agreement Agreement Not addressed Agreement Agreement Not addressed Silent Agreement

Documents

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Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Silent Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Silent Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed

Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement Agreement

Intel sharing with relevant stakeholders like USA, Britain, France and the Dutch A need for community rehabilitation and more community programming’s Better understanding of the root causes of violent extremism and radicalisation targeting young people Address the root causes at the community level An effective anti-gang strategy in a country like Jamaica Educate people within our formal academic structures Sever the links between politics and organised crimes More discussions on home-grown terrorism needed Online platforms are used to radicalise individuals to engage in religiously motivated violence Monitor social media for radicalisation and recruitment Make use of moderate Islamic clerics A lot of psychological work with youths Avoid stereotypes in coverage of terrorism Establish an intelligence hub to focus on terrorism A sense of adventure Fully implement recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Focus group

Elite interviews

Key findings

Table A.3  (continued)

Silent Silent Silent Not addressed Silent Silent Agreement

Agreement Silent Silent Silent Not addressed Agreement

Agreement

Silent

Partial agreement

Documents

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195

Sampling Techniques The researcher decided to use purposive sampling for this study. Palys (2008) posits that purposive sampling is virtually synonymous with qualitative research as qualitative researchers are less concerned about central tendencies and how a large group thinks about a particular phenomenon. Researchers of qualitative studies are more interested in case study analysis and what a particular set of people or group thinks about a specific issue (Palys, 2008). This supports the research study as the researcher will be using the qualitative case study method. Upon deciding to use this sampling technique, the researcher needed to ask himself “what do they aim to accomplish and what they want to know?” (Palys, 2008, p. 697). There are some examples of purposive sampling, for instance, “stakeholder sampling, extreme or deviant case sampling, typical case sampling, paradigmatic case sampling, maximum variation sampling, criterion case sampling, theory-guided case sampling, critical case sampling and disconfirming or negative case sampling” (Palys, 2008, p. 697). For this book, the researcher/author used the “criterion sampling technique”, to develop the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept and deploy it to fully understand Caribbean’s preparedness for and vulnerability to terrorism. In doing so, the researcher identified specific individuals to contact and conduct an interview with to garner rich and in-depth information about the specific stakeholders of terrorism (media, ISIS and individuals) in light of the negatives (causes and impacts) and positives (benefits) of terrorism. For example, the researcher contacted Stockholm University Professor of Journalism Christian Christensen and reporter for the award-winning news organisation The Intercept Murtaza Hussain (see a full list of all elite interviewees in Bibliography) to ask questions about the US mainstream media concerning its coverage of terrorism, and how and in what ways it may have been negatively or positively impacted, or a combination of both by it. On the other hand, Professor Anthony Clayton, St Vincent and the Grenadines United Nations Representative Her Excellency Inga Rhonda King and Miss Tonya Ayow, among other professionals from the Caribbean, were contacted and interviewed in relation to ISIS threat to the Caribbean, the region’s preparedness for and vulnerability to terrorism. However, the research for this volume was not limited to just the criterion sampling technique as other aspects of purposive sampling were also useful, such as “stakeholders sampling” which involves identifying the major stakeholders

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and who might be affected by the phenomenon under scrutiny (Palys, 2008, p. 697). This is because both focus group and elite interview participants can be affected by terrorism one way or the other. On the other hand, criterion sampling “involves searching for cases or individuals who has meet certain criterion” pertaining to the study (Palys, 2008, p. 697). The purposive sampling allowed the researcher to identify and include persons that he deemed to be “information-rich” (Patton, 2002). In doing so, the researcher ensured that the data collected was substantive to provide the research study with rich and in-depth information. For instance, Professor Louise Richardson was selected for her expertise on international terrorism. However, Stockholm Professor of Journalism Christian Christensen and reporter for The Intercept Murtaza Hussain were both selected for their expertise and professional working experience with US mainstream media houses, respectively. In relation to the Caribbean, the researcher selected Assistant Director of CARICOM IMPACS Miss Tonya Ayow, national security expert Professor Anthony Clayton, Senior Lecturer and regional security expert Dr Suzette Haughton and Assistant Director at the Regional Security Systems Grenville Williams for their expertise on regional security and terrorism-related matters within the Caribbean. The former Minister of Tourism of St Vincent and the Grenadines was selected for his profound expertise and years of experience in the tourism industry. The United Nations Ambassador Her Excellency Inga Rhonda King was selected for her expertise, and as one of the current non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, given that “terrorism” is one of the themes that the Ambassador and her team are also exploring in relation to the Caribbean. Finally, the researcher selected young professionals (focus group participants) of a certain age group (under 35) from various Caribbean countries to try and capture the Caribbean youth’s perspective on terrorism (see full focus group list in the Bibliography).

Delimitations and Limitations of the Study Simon (2011) contends that delimitations are those characteristics that limit the scope as well as define the boundaries of the research study. This process is completely controlled and directed by the researcher, and it is crucial that delimitations are established, in order for the researcher themselves to fully understand what the study will not cover. As it relates to this volume, the researcher was intent on finding out if the deployment of the

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Stakeholders of Terrorism concept can play a critical role in assessing the Caribbean’s vulnerability and preparedness to terrorism. Therefore, the following were identified as the delimitations of the study: • The type of participants interviewed limited the scope of the research. The researcher’s use of elite interviews, limited respondents/participants to individuals that were considered to be experts on the subject matter and those who are revered within the respective field of the subject area with years of experience and in-depth knowledge on the phenomenon under investigation. The nine elite interviews were deemed sufficient after it was evident that there was a lot of recurring themes and simultaneously difficult to gain access to anymore elite interview participants. This, however, granted the researcher the ability to control the quality and type of information that was gathered for the data. Likewise, the focus group was limited to a maximum of 8 participants who were ages 35 and under from various Caribbean countries in order to specifically capture the youth’s perspective on the research topic. • The researcher also limited the documents to terrorism-related legislations/acts at the national level, and regional counterterrorism policies because they specifically addressed the issue of terrorism within the Caribbean. More importantly, the documents were of interest and relevance to the research study. The researcher also only analysed several regional documents and anti-terrorism legislations from five Caribbean states, after related themes were recurring throughout the documents. Thus, the redundancy signal to the researcher that there was “data saturation” and analysis of documents must come to end. • While the focus group was composed of young, educated people of varying academic background, gender as well as from a particular economic stratum and from at least 6 different Caribbean countries, the researcher contends that the focus group may not necessarily be an adequate representation of the general youth population of the Caribbean region. There are, however, focus group participants who drew on their experiences and interactions with other Caribbean youths. For example, Franz George drew on his experiences working and interacting with young people from across the Caribbean as the Regional Representative of the Caribbean and the Americas of the Commonwealth Youth Council. Likewise, Demion Mctair drew on his experience as a local and regional journalist and the same for the

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other focus group participants. Therefore, their contribution played a crucial role in making the focus group a bit more representational of Caribbean youth’s perspective on terrorism. Nevertheless, the researcher recommends further research in terms of more focus group studies, in order to capture the youth’s perspective on a much broader scope. • The research for this volume was confined to a specific set of “stakeholders” of terrorism and the Caribbean. Specifically, a systematic examination of the Islamic State (ISIS), individual actors, the mainstream media to fully understand Caribbean’s (CARICOM & OECS) vulnerability to terrorism and its preparedness. This was done as the researcher recognised that terrorism is a very broad and complex field, especially studying ISIS or individuals who engage in terrorism as well as mainstream coverage of terrorism, not delimiting the study to focus primarily on specific stakeholders of terrorism as it relates to the Caribbean only, may have resulted in information saturation and having too much data or even data that may not have been relevant to the research study. This may have also resulted in confusion or even having to many inconsistencies, causing the researcher to arrive at a conclusion that is incongruous to the study topic. • The research for this volume has also restricted the mainstream media primarily to US corporate media, which includes network televisions and to some extent elitist print media. This was because they play a vital role in agenda setting for locally-based newspapers, national and local prime time television news programmes, cable and radio news and they also possess the power to reach, shape and influence an international audience, which also made them relevant to the research study. More importantly, it was crucial to do so because of time constraint, given the wide ranging and complex nature of the media environment, which might have posed too large a challenge if the researcher did not narrow down this stakeholder (to US mainstream media) to focus the research study to a specific area of interest. • The research study was also limited to the Caribbean region, which includes CARICOM and OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States) member states only. As it relates to the CARICOM member states, it includes both members and associate member states. This made the data collection procedure less confusing and somewhat more effective in pooling together the relevant information, as the

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researcher was able to make effective use of time by simply interviewing experts/professional individuals who are revered in their respective field (directors, assistant directors, members of parliaments, diplomats, national security experts/policy makers, etc.) that work on behalf of the Caribbean community at either a national, regional or international level. However, it must be noted that that not all Caribbean countries were individually captured in the research for this volume, to make it less cumbersome and the book sought to capture the issue of terrorism broadly within the Caribbean context by deploying the Stakeholders of Terrorism concept, though the threat of national and international terrorism may vary in some instances, and this volume briefly encapsulates some those unique threats as it relates to Trinidad, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines and the OECS to an extent. The unique threats are also brilliantly addressed in other scholarly work (e.g., Chitwood, 2019; Cottee, 2021; Knight, 2019; Stanislas & Sadique, 2019; McCoy & Knight, 2017), to which this volume seeks to add too. Simon and Goes (2013) contends that “every study, no matter how well conducted and constructed, has limitations”. Unlike the delimitations, limitations are unavoidable; and they are often out of the researcher’s control (Simon & Goes, 2013). The limitations that are associated with qualitative research studies are validity and reliability (Simon & Goes, 2013). This is due to the fact that “qualitative research occurs in the natural setting”, thus making it “extremely difficult to replicate” (Wiersma, 2000, p. 11 as cited in Simon & Goes, 2013). As it relates to case studies, limitations associated with this type of study stem from the fact that the study usually involves the behaviour of a person, group or organisation and it makes “unclear” the “generality” of its findings (Simon & Goes, 2013). The following were identified as the limitations of the research study: • A major limitation was the accessibility to certain elite interviewees, such as prime ministers and ministers of national security. Since the study relied heavily on having access to experts or individuals who have a wide knowledge on terrorism, the stakeholders of terrorism, and most importantly, the Caribbean region, the accessibility to certain individuals was limited by the lack of cooperation that was often due to other commitments on the part of interviewees from the

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Caribbean, such as prime ministers, ministers of national security and other relevant members of parliament. This is because they often have a hectic schedule. However, it only affected the total amount of elite interviews that the researcher was eventually able to interview. Nevertheless, this limitation did not hamper the research study in any significant manner. • The study was also limited by financial constraints. This is because the researcher was operating on a slim research budget as well as time, in order to compete the necessary fieldwork. Given that the fieldwork was primarily conducted in the Caribbean, which came with a considerable cost ensuing from travel and living expenses, it restricted the researcher’s ability to conduct more than one focus group study in order to adequately capture the Caribbean’s youth perspective on terrorism. Nevertheless, the focus group study remains valid to the research study as it was composed of participants of varying academic, social and economic background that provides, to an extent, a broad enough picture or representation of Caribbean youths. Most importantly, the Regional Representative of the Caribbean and the Americas of the Commonwealth Youth Council was one of the participants of the focus group; his participation was crucial to the focus group study as it drew from his personal experiences as well as his experiences as the representative and voice of Caribbean youths and he used the latter experience as a point of departure during the focus group interview. • The access to “elite interviews” participants from the region was also another major challenge, exacerbated by the global pandemic. This is because regional government officials, specifically Minister of National Security, were extremely difficult to reach, and some cited that they were pre-occupied with dealing with COVID-19 at the moment.

Bibliography

Elite Interviews Ayow, T. (2019, September 20). Telephone interview with Assistant Director of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), Miss Tonya Ayow. Christensen, C. (2019, October 16). Telephone interview with Stockholm University Professor of Journalism, Christian Christensen. Clayton, A. (2019, June 14). Face to face interview with University of the West Indies, Mona Professor, lead consultant/author of Jamaica’s 2014 National Security Policy, as well as an advisor on the development of CARICOM’s Crime and Security Strategy, Anthony Clayton. Gonsalves, I. (2023, May 10). Email interview with Isis Gonsalves, Minister Counsellor/Political Coordinator, Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations. Haughton, S. (2019, June 17). Face to face interview with Head of the Department of Government and Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies at the University of the West Indies, Mona, Dr Suzette Haughton. Hussain, M. (2021, January). Telephone interview with American journalist who writes for The Intercept, and has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, BBC and other news networks, Murtaza Hussain. King, R. I. (2020, November). Email interview with St Vincent and the Grenadines Permanent Representative to the United Nations, who currently sits on the United Nation Security Council as a non-permanent member, her Excellency Inga Rhonda King.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Quashie, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40443-6

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McKie, C. (2019, September). Telephone interview with the Honourable Minister of Tourism, Sports and Culture of St Vincent and the Grenadines (at the time of the interview), Mr Cecil McKie. Richardson, L. (2019, October). Telephone interview with the Vice Chancellor of Oxford University, distinguished scholar and world-renown leading expert on terrorism, Professor Louise Richardson. Williams, G. (2019, September). Telephone interview with the Director, Asset Recovery Unit (ARU) of the Regional Security System, Mr Grenville Williams.

Focus Group Interviews Frank, D. (2019, August). Face to face interview with University of the West Indies student from St Kitts and Nevis, Denasio Frank. George, F. (2019, August). Face to face interview with former Commonwealth Youth Council Representative for the Caribbean and the Americas, Franz George of St Vincent and the Grenadines. Interview conducted on August 26, 2019, at 6:00pm at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus. Green, J. (2019, August). Face to face interview with Data Analyst at the Jamaica’s Ministry of National Security, Jason Green of Jamaica. Interview conducted on August 26, 2019, at 6:00pm at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus. McLean, G. (2019, August). Face to face interview with Assistant Monitoring and Evaluation Officer from Jamaica, Garry McLean. Interview conducted on August 26, 2019, at 6:00pm at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus. McTair, D. (2019, August). Face to face interview with local and regional journalist from St Vincent and the Grenadines, Mr Demion McTair. Interview conducted on August 26, 2019, at 6:00pm at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus. Ogilvie, R. (2019, August). Face to face interview with University of the West Indies student from the Cayman Islands, Rochelle Ogilvie. Interview conducted on August 26, 2019, at 6:00pm at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus. Thomas, T. (2019, August). Face to face interview with University of the West Indies student from Trinidad and Tobago, Thalia Thomas. Interview conducted on August 26, 2019, at 6:00pm at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus. Walcott, K. (2019, August). Face to face interview with University of the West Indies student from Barbados, Krystal Walcott. Interview conducted on August 26, 2019, at 6:00pm at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus.

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Documents CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy. (2018). CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy (the CT Strategy) was adopted at the Twenty-Ninth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 26–27 February 2018. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/285295.pdf Government of Barbados. (2002). Anti-Terrorism Legislation. Chapter 158. Printed by the Government Printer, Bay Street, St. Michael, by the authority of the Government of Barbados. Government of Barbados. (2019). Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2019-34. An Act to amend the Anti-Terrorism Act and to alter the Constitution to the extent necessary to give effect to certain provisions of that Act. Government of Jamaica. (2016). The Terrorism Prevention Act. Government of St Lucia. (2015). St Lucia Anti-Terrorism Act. Chapter 3.16. Revised edition showing the law as of 31 December 2015. St Lucia Law Revision Commissioner. Government of St Vincent and the Grenadines. (2015). Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Anti-Terrorist Financing and Proliferation Act 2015. Government of Trinidad and Tobago. (2016). Anti-Terrorist Act. Chapter 12:07. Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs. Trinidad and Tobago. IMPACS, C. (2013). CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013: Securing the region. Adopted at The Twenty-Fourth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM, 18–19 February 2013. United Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016). UNODC Regional Programme in support of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy. Preventing and Countering Illicit Trafficking and Organized Crime for Improved Governance, Justice and Security (2014–2016).

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Index

A Abu Bakr, Yasin, 121, 147 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 64 Afghanistan war, 57 Afro-Muslim, 134 Afro-Trinidad, 125, 134, 143 Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 34, 65, 66, 68 Anjuman Sunnatul Jamaat (ASJ), 134 Anti-Money Laundering & Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), 174, 180 Anti-terrorism, 3, 5, 141, 144, 147, 172–174, 180, 197 B Bin laden, Osama, 30, 32–34, 43, 47, 53, 65, 68, 75

Bush, George W., 21, 31, 38, 45, 52, 53, 56–58, 62, 104 C Caliphate, 2, 6, 43, 66–69, 71, 160 COVID-19, 129, 200 Criminalized war economy, 64, 71 D Dabiq, 70, 126, 167, 168 F Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), 174 Foreign Fighter Returnees(FFR), 141, 158, 171, 178, 179

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Quashie, Stakeholders of Terrorism and the Caribbean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40443-6

223

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INDEX

Foreign Terrorist Fighters(FTF), xiii, 4, 10, 11, 146, 155, 157, 161, 166, 167, 179, 191 G Global Terrorism Index, 120 Guyana, xiii, 120, 126, 132, 145, 174 H Hijrah, 70 Homegrown Violent Extremism (HVE), 118, 124, 132, 143 I Ibrahim, Kareem, 125–127, 133 Indo-Muslim, 134 Iraq war, 57, 62 Irish Republican Army, 42 Islamist extremist, 133 J Jamaat al Muslimeen, 121, 125, 126, 147 John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport, 126

N Nur, Abdel, 126 O Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), xiii, 165, 172, 173, 185, 198, 199 Orwellian, 58 R Radicalisation, xi, 3, 32, 46, 47, 73, 102, 118, 144, 150, 151, 154, 155, 158, 160, 162, 165, 167, 168, 171, 174, 178, 179, 182, 184 RAND Think Tank, 27 Recruitment hub, 118, 133, 135, 149, 156, 179 Roy, Oliver, 146, 162, 163 Russel Defreitas, 126, 127 S Shiite Muslim, 126, 133 Suicide bomber, 24, 25, 28, 48, 49, 65, 89, 105, 109 Sunni Muslims, 66 Symbiotic relationship, 54, 59, 62, 107

K Kadir, Abdul, 126 Kepel, Gilles, 162, 163

T Trump, Donald, 38, 39, 112, 113

L Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 30, 34, 35

W War on Terror, 2, 21, 52, 57, 58, 62, 130