South Africa–China Relations: A Partnership of Paradoxes 3030547671, 9783030547677

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South Africa–China Relations A Partnership of Paradoxes Edited by Chris Alden · Yu-Shan Wu

South Africa–China Relations “This comprehensive analysis of South Africa–China relations represents the research of some of the best minds working on China-Africa issues. It reflects the thoughtful perspectives of scholars from Africa, China and Western countries.” —David Shinn, George Washington University, Washington DC, USA “This book is a refreshingly blunt, thought provoking, and provides a thoroughly informed discussion of China–South Africa relations. Unlike several China Africa books that tend to demonstrate a bias towards either Chinese or Western thinking, this book unapologetically dispels any myths or narratives surrounding China-South Africa political and economic relations. The various sections in the book shed excellent light on the political influences shaping economic diplomacy, particularly given the complex global, regional and local economics regarding both countries. This is also one of the very few books that scientifically unpacks identity, and the impact of economic transformation on South Africa’s local Chinese community. The book sections serve as an invaluable resource for policy makers, civil societies, and academics interested in understanding South Africa-China bilateral ties.” —Dr. Funeka Yazini April, Coordinator, BRICS Research Center, Human Sciences Research Council

Chris Alden · Yu-Shan Wu Editors

South Africa–China Relations A Partnership of Paradoxes

Editors Chris Alden International Relations London School of Economics and Political Science London, UK

Yu-Shan Wu University of Pretoria Pretoria, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-54767-7 ISBN 978-3-030-54768-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Alex Linch/shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

In any a book project of this duration there are many people and institutions to thank for their support and guidance throughout. These include the Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP) at the Journalism department of the University of Witwatersrand, for supporting the writing process; the Political Sciences department at the University of Pretoria, especially Professor Maxi Schoeman and Anthony Bizos; the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) for supporting our early works on China–South Africa relations and to the South African stakeholders and officials at foreign embassies and DIRCO, as well as Chinese diplomats, who we’ve interacted with and learnt a great amount from over the years. At the LSE, we would like to thank the Department of International Relations for its support in facilitating frequent research trips to South Africa and China. We would also like to give a special thanks to Palgrave Macmillan— especially Arun Kumar, Anca Pusca and Katelyn Zingg—for coordinating and guiding us during this book project and to the blind reviewers for supporting it. Finally we are grateful to the authors who gave their personal time, experiences and intellect so generously in order to better unpack and understand the many facets that contribute to China–South Africa relations today.

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Contents

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Introduction Chris Alden and Yu-Shan Wu

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Part I Foundations 2

Explaining South Africa’s China Choice Christopher Williams

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Leadership, Global Agendas and Domestic Determinants of South Africa’s Foreign Policy Towards China: The Zuma and Ramaphosa Years Chris Alden and Yu-Shan Wu

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South Africa–China Relations of Seven Decades (1949–2019): Review and Reflection Lu Jiang

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CONTENTS

Part II Political Economy of Building a Special Relationship 5

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The Political Economy of South Africa–China Trade and Economic Relations Garth le Pere Manufacturing for Intra-Africa Trade: A Focused Response to China’s Dominant Position in Africa for South Africa Jeremy Stevens Behind the Headlines: China’s Media Engagement in South Africa Yu-Shan Wu and Cobus van Staden

Part III 8

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Dissecting Relations: Sectoral Studies

South Africa’s Special Economic Zones as Destinations for Chinese Investment: Problems and Possibilities Anthony Black and Chongsheng Yang The Drive for Chinese Investments in Agriculture: Comparing South Africa to the Continent Angela Harding, Lu Jiang, Ward Anseeuw, and Chris Alden

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Chinese and South African Labour Relations: An Analysis Arina Muresan and Sanusha Naidu

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The Role of Culture and Education in South Africa–China Relations David Monyae

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CONTENTS

Part IV

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Chinese Communities, Relations and Identity

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South Africa’s Chinese Communities: An Update Yoon Jung Park and Anna Ying Chen

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The Chinese Community and the Search for Security Barry van Wyk

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Melting Point—A Personal Essay by Ufrieda Ho Ufrieda Ho

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Chris Alden teaches International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and is a Director of LSE IDEAS. Professor Alden holds, a Research Associate post at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria and is a Senior Research Associate with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). He is author/co-author of numerous books, including Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State (Palgrave, 2003), South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy (with G. Le Pere, Adelphi Paper IISS, 2003), China in Africa (Zed, 2007), Land, Liberation and Compromise in Southern Africa (with W Anseeuw, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) The South and World Politics (with M. Vieira and S. Morphet, Palgrave, 2010), Foreign Policy Analysis —New Approaches 2nd edition (with A. Aran, Routledge 2017), and co-editor of New Directions in AfricaChina Studies (Routledge, 2019), China and Africa—Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent (Palgrave, 2017), China and Mozambique: From Comrades to Capitalist (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014), China Returns to Africa (Hurst, 2008), as well as having written numerous articles in internationally recognised journals. Professor Alden has been held fellowships at Cambridge University, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo; Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto; Ecole Normale Superieure (Cachan), Paris; and University of Pretoria. Ward Anseeuw is a development economist and policy analyst, is a research fellow at the Agricultural Research Centre for International Development (CIRAD). He is presently seconded to the International xi

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Land Coalition as a Senior Technical Specialist responsible for “Knowledge, Learning, Innovation and data”. Previously, he was seconded to the University of Pretoria, as a senior research fellow to the Post-Graduate School of Agriculture and Rural Development and as the co-director of the Center for the Study of Governance Innovations (GovInn)—which he founded in 2012. His work focuses mainly on issues of agricultural and land policies, agrarian and land reforms, large-scale land acquisitions as well as to participatory approaches of data generation, governance and advocacy regarding land. He has published extensively on these issues in scientific journals and with renowned publishers; including Land, Transition and Compromise (with Chris Alden, Palgrave, 2009), The Struggle Over Land in Africa—Conflicts, Politics and Change (with Chris Alden, HSRC Press, 2010), South Africa’s Agrarian Reform (In French, Editions Universitaires Européennes, 2011), South Africa’s Agrarian Question (HSRC Press, 2016) and Inclusive Businesses in Agriculture (SunMedia Press, 2017). Anthony Black is Professor in the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town and a former director of the School. He is currently director of the research unit, Policy Research in International Services and Manufacturing (PRISM) and a Senior Research Fellow at the Environmental Policy Research Unit (EPRU). He has published widely in the fields of industrial policy and the automotive industry, trade, regional integration, foreign direct investment and employment. He was a leading advisor to the South African government on its programme to develop the automotive industry. Black has also acted as an advisor or consultant to a number of other African governments as well as to international organisations including UNIDO and UNCTAD. His books include an edited volume entitled Towards Employment-Intensive Growth in South Africa (2016) and the recently published co-edited volume, Value Chains in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges of Integration into the Global Economy. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Cape Town. Anna Ying Chen is a Chinese researcher based in South Africa. She has extensive academic interests in researching Chinese investment, Chinese companies and Chinese immigrants in Africa, especially in South Africa. She is the former sector head for Standard Bank China Business in South Africa. She has also held positions as research associate at South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and served as a collaborating researcher at both the Center for Chinese Studies (CCS) and the Center

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for Sociological Studies at the University of Johannesburg (UJ). Anna has authored and co-authored a number of articles and book chapters; these have appeared in SAIIA’s working paper series, African and Asian Studies, and REMI, amongst others. Angela Harding completed her master’s in 2013, at the University of Pretoria, and has since been working as a researcher for the Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension & RD, University of Pretoria. She focuses on Chinese land deals for agriculture in Africa. She also works as the coordinator for the Land Matrix Initiative Regional Focal Point for Africa. She has held several scholarships working on land governance and land transparency issues in Mozambique and South Africa. Ufrieda Ho is a journalist based in Johannesburg, South Africa and is the author of Paper Sons and Daughters—a childhood memoir of growing up Chinese in South Africa (PanMacmillan, 2011). Lu Jiang is a research fellow of the International Development Cooperation Academy based at Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, and a research associate with Fudan Development Institute in Shanghai. She gained her Ph.D. degree in International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Her research interests revolve around international development, with a special focus on Africa, and China–Africa relations. Garth le Pere teaches international political economy at the University of Pretoria and has published widely on Africa–China relations and South African foreign policy. His publications include the edited volume China in Africa: Mercantilist Predator, or Partner in Development (Midrand, ZA: Institute for Global Dialogue; Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2007), and China, Africa and South Africa: South-South Cooperation in Global Era (Midrand, ZA: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007) co- authored with Garth Shelton. Dr. le Pere is the former executive director of the Institute of Global Dialogue. David Monyae is Co-Director of the University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI). An international relations and foreign policy expert, he holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Witwatersrand. He previously served as Section Manager: International Relations Policy Analysis at the South African Parliament, providing strategic management, parliamentary foreign policy formulation and monitoring

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and analysis services. Prior to that he served as Policy Analyst at the Development Bank Southern Africa (DBSA), where he undertook extensive research on Regional Economic Communities (RECS) in Africa, with a special focus on infrastructure investment opportunities for the DBSA. He also designed and launched the DBSA’s Policy Briefs and Working Papers, and represented the Bank on major infrastructure projects in Africa. He also formed part of the South African academic delegations at meetings of the India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum in 2010 and the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) summits in Beijing in 2011, New Delhi in 2012, and Durban in 2013. For nine years prior to that he lectured on South African foreign policy and African international relations at the University of the Witwatersrand. He has published widely and is a respected political analyst, featuring in the national and international media. Arina Muresan obtained her Masters in Politics in 2017, a B.A. Honours degree in Politics obtained in 2012, and a B.A. Politics obtained in 2010 from the University of Johannesburg. She is currently a Researcher in geopolitical dynamics and governance at the Institute for Global Dialogue. Her research interests include South-South cooperation, perception studies linked to public diplomacy and nation branding, as well as African First ladies. She is part of an ongoing project the African First Ladies Database, a research project analysing the political ambitions, leadership, role and influence of the continent’s post-colonial First Ladies. Sanusha Naidu is a foreign policy analyst. Her research interests include Democratisation in Africa; Africa’s Political Economy and Development; Africa’s relations with Emerging Powers from the South (BRICS and IBSA); South African Foreign Policy Analysis; and the role of track two diplomacy in International Relations. Ms. Naidu has a Masters in International Relations from the University of Staffordshire, United Kingdom. She has previously worked at the Centre for Conflict Resolution based in Cape Town and managed the South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) at the Open Society Foundation for South Africa. In the past several years Ms. Naidu has also managed a programme that focused on Africa’s international relations with China and Emerging Powers based at Fahamu from 2008 to 2010. She has an extensive publications record which includes two edited volumes on Africa–China relations: Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa, Pambazuka Press, September 2010 (co- editors: Axel Harneit-Sievers and Stephen Marks;

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and Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008 (co-editor: Kweku Ampiah). Ms. Naidu is a regular media commentator national and international issues for major news agencies including Al-jazeera News, CCTV, BBC Radio, SABC, and CBS Africa. She is also a regular analyst on South Africa’s domestic politics and electoral trends. Yoon Jung Park is an international scholar and a leader in the growing field of China/Africa studies. Her work sits at the intersections of migration studies, African and China studies, work on the Global South, and identity studies. Her research focuses on ethnic Chinese in southern Africa and perceptions of Chinese people by local communities, centring on migration, race/ ethnicity/identity, race/class/power, gender, affirmative action and xenophobia. Dr. Park is the author of A Matter of Honour. Being Chinese in South Africa (Jacana/Lexington Books) and dozens of articles and book chapters in scholarly publications including, African Studies Review, African Studies, African & Asian Studies, the Journal of Chinese Overseas, Transformation, and Les Temps Modernes. She is currently working on her second book on Chinese migrants in Africa. She holds affiliations at the Sociology Department at Rhodes University (South Africa), African Studies at Georgetown University (Washington, DC), and the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. She is also co-founder and executive director of the Chinese in Africa/Africans in China (CA/AC) Research Network, an international network of scholars, researchers, graduate students, journalists, filmmakers and practitioners. Jeremy Stevens is Chief China Economist at Standard Bank, based in Beijing. His research gives special attention to the Chinese economy, and how the shift towards a multipolar world is recalibrating Africa’s external and internal dynamics. His papers have been presented at the FOCAC Summits (Egypt in 2009 and Beijing, 2012), the AfDB, ADB, OECD, IMF, WB and a host of other regional and local gatherings and conferences. He advises Standard Bank’s clients and African central banks, policymakers and corporates on developments in the Chinese economy and financial markets. In addition, he works with Chinese corporates, policy banks and think tanks on opportunities in Africa. Stevens frequently comments across a host of international media forums, including Bloomberg, CNBC, The Economist, The Financial Times, Reuters, and The Wall Street Journal. He also regularly contributes to

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China’s domestic media, including CCTV, China Daily, Caijing, China Securities Journal, and elsewhere. Stevens writes the weekly Inside China newsletter, which features a mix of insights, data, and analysis on the Chinese economy. Cobus van Staden is a Senior Researcher: China–Africa, at the South African Institute of International Affairs, and a visiting lecturer at the Department of Media Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He is also a co-founder of the online multimedia platform, the China Africa Project. Barry van Wyk has been Project Coordinator of the Africa-China Reporting Project at the Journalism Department of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg since 2015. The Project provides support to African and Chinese journalists and facilitates Africa–China reporting. Prior to this he spent eight years in China studying Chinese and then working as a business strategy consultant (The Beijing Axis, 2008– 2012) and media industry project manager (Danwei, 2012–2014), and is fluent in Mandarin Chinese. He holds an M.Sc. in Economic History (London School of Economics, 2005), an MHCS in South African History (University of Pretoria, 2004), and a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) (University of Pretoria, 2003). Barry’s research focuses on Chinese media and especially South African Chinese media. Christopher Williams is a postdoctoral research fellow and adjunct lecturer in the International Relations Department at the University of the Witwatersrand. He holds an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University, and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. In 2018 Christopher was a selected as a Bradlow Fellow at the South African Institute for International Affairs. His research has been published in the South African Journal of International Affairs and the South African Historical Journal. Yu-Shan Wu is a NIHSS Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Pretoria. During the process of editing this book, she was also a Research Associate at the Africa–China Reporting Project (ACRP), Department of Journalism, University of Witwatersrand. She previously undertook research on foreign policy issues at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), between 2010 and 2017. She completed her Ph.D. (International Relations) at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria.

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Chongsheng Yang is a Ph.D. candidate in Politics at Tsinghua University. His research interests include regional development in Sub-Saharan Africa, special economic zones (SEZs) around the world, especially in developing countries, and economic history in Africa.

Abbreviations

ACFTA ACFTU ACRP ANC ANDA APDP ATDC AU BAIC BBBEE BRI BRICS BRNN CACS CAP CASA CCA CCP CCTV CDB CFTA CGTN CI CICM CNADC CPAFFC

Africa Continental Free Trade Area All-China Federation of Trade Unions Africa–China Reporting Project African National Congress Alfred Nzo Development Agency Automotive Production and Development Programme Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres African Union The Beijing Automotive Investment Corporation Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Belt and Road Initiative Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Belt and Road News Network Centre for Africa-China Studies China-Africa Project Chinese Association of South Africa Customs-Controlled Area Chinese Communist Party of China China Central Television China Development Bank Continental Free Trade Area China Global Television Network Confucius Institutes Confucius Institute for Chinese Medicine China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries xix

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ABBREVIATIONS

CPC CPF CPIFA CPOSA CPS CSF DA DIRCO DStv ETDZ FDI FEDUSA FOCAC GEAR GNU GPSJS HSK IBSA ICBC IDZs IFP JIMWG MMA MMC NACTU NAMA NDB NDR NEPAD NP NTU NUMSA OBOR PAC PLA PRC RMB RSA SABC SACP SACTWU SADC SANDF

Communist Party of China Community Police Forum Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs Chinese Professionals Organization of Southern Africa Community Policing Strategy Community Safety Forum Democratic Alliance Department of International Relations and Cooperation Digital Satellite Television Export Trade Development Zones Foreign Direct Investment Federation of Unions of South Africa Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Growth Employment and Redistribution Government of National Unity Governance, Public Safety and Justice Survey Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi India Brazil South Africa Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Industrial Development Zones Inkatha Freedom Party Joint Inter-Ministerial Working Group Media Monitoring Africa Member of Mayoral Council National Council of Trade Unions Non-Agricultural Market Access New Development Bank National Democratic Revolution New Partnership for African Development National Party Nanjing Tech University National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa One Belt One Road Pan-African Congress People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Renminbi Republic of South Africa South African Broadcasting Corporation South African Communist Party South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union Southern Africa Development Community South African National Defense Force

ABBREVIATIONS

SANEF SAPS SDI SEZ SIDICA SOE TCA UJ UNSC VAT

South African National Editors Forum South African Police Service Spatial Development Initiative Special Economic Zones State International Development Cooperation Agency State Owned Enterprises The Chinese Association University of Johannesburg United Nation Security Council Value Added Tax

xxi

List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5

Fig. 6.6 Fig. 6.7

Fig. 6.8

Fig. 6.9 Fig. 6.10 Fig. 6.11 Fig. 6.12

Exports as a share of total GDP (Source CEIC) Rising penetration of Chinese exports (Source ITC) African manufacturing an informal affair—share of manufacturing employment (Source Rodik 2016) China–Africa trade balance (Source CEIC) China–South Africa trade data (monthly, annualized) (Source China’s General Administration of Customs and CEIC) African nation’s bilateral trade balance with China (Source ITC) Deviation in China and South Africa’s reporting of South Africa sales to China (Source SARS and General Administration of Customs) Commodities not elsewhere specified vs three forms of gold (Sources SARS, General Administration of Customs and ITC) Comparison between Switzerland and South Africa’s reporting of sales of HS7108 to China (Source ITC) African and South African sales to China in 2018 by product group (Source CEIC) South Africa export size and growth to China relative to peers (Source MOFCOM) Distribution of GDP growth in Africa (Source IMF)

110 111 112 113

114 114

115

116 117 118 118 122

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 6.13

Fig. 6.14 Fig. 6.15 Fig. 6.16 Fig. 6.17

Fig. 8.1

Consistency in data for China’s export sales to South Africa (Sources SARS and General Administration of Customs) Composition of South African imports from China compared to the rest of Africa (Source CEIC) Chinese cumulative loans to Africa, by country (Source Atkins et al. 2018) Cumulative Greenfield investment by geography and sector (Source FDI Intelligence) Change in ease of doing business and average GDP growth (Sources Freedom House, Heritage Foundation & IMF) The designation of IDZs and SEZs, 2019 (Source Authors based on information from Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Special Economic Zone’ and ‘Special Economic Zone Fact Sheet 2019’, https://www.thedti. gov.za/industrial_development/sez.jsp)

123 124 127 127

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Chris Alden and Yu-Shan Wu

One of the truism of societies stricken by the coronavirus crisis is that it brings out the best and the worst in people. In the case of South Africa and China, the repatriation of nearly two hundred South Africans from the epicentre of the virus in good health after 54 days in lockdown in Wuhan caused President Cyril Ramaphosa to thank China profusely for the good treatment of its citizens during confinement. He also expressed great admiration for the success of restrictions in stopping the spread of Covid-19 and, in late March, adopted the same approach when declaring an unprecedented national lockdown to halt the progress of the virus in South Africa (Ramaphosa 2020). The corporate sector in China and South Africa, too, was quick to demonstrate equal measures of generosity and business acumen in this time of crisis. Alibaba’s Jack Ma, newly engaged in philanthropic works in Africa, donated Covid-19 test kits and hundreds of thousands of face masks to the continent in mid-March while

C. Alden International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] Y.-S. Wu (B) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_1

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a South African manufacturer of face masks gave away tens of thousands of its products to China, immediately securing massive orders from wholesalers (Nyabiage and Choi 2020; Chalumbira 2020). Others were far less generous or scrupulous, such as the Chinese businessman in Durban apprehended by the South Africa police for using child labour in squalid conditions to produce face masks to meet the spike in demand, drawing a swift retort from the Chinese consulate quick to emphasis the sizable contribution China makes to the anaemic economy (Singh 2020). All of this occurred against the backdrop of a rise in incidents in South Africa demonising the country’s sizable Chinese community as a source of the contagious disease, tapping into the troubled society’s very localised and virulent ‘social disease’ of xenophobia (Pon 2020). South Africa’s relationship with China is a complex one, reflecting in part changing domestic conditions over time in a society shaped by the brutalities of colonialism and apartheid built on the back of extractive industries, commercial agriculture and state-led industrialisation. The coming of democracy opened up the possibility of diplomatic ties with China and its economy to Chinese FDI, though both—for very different reasons—took far longer than anticipated to be realised and, in the case of investment, to have an economic impact. It is a relationship refracted through the rough-cut prism of international politics and Africa’s continental affairs where South Africa’s leadership ambitions have taken it to the pinnacles of power and prestige at the UN Security Council, the G20, the African Union Commission and BRICS. And, it is a relationship lived through the interaction of communities, in particular layers of Chinese migration dating back to the late nineteenth century right up to the present day which has made its mark on South Africa’s diverse society. In short, it is a relationship of paradoxes and promise that acts as a bellwether for the peculiar combination of idealism, parochialism, fractured domestic interests, economic ambitions and hegemonic intent that constitutes the South African experience over the past two and a half decades. This book intends to uncover the wide-ranging and sometimes paradoxical facets that compose this, to employ the prevailing diplomatic jargon, comprehensive strategic partnership between South Africa and China today. It is a relationship with distinctive features that sometimes set it apart from South Africa’s ties with ‘traditional’ global actors such as Britain or even the United States, in the sense that the physical distance is matched by broad historical and cultural distances, gaps that are bridged by ideology, commercial opportunism and ordinary social

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interactions. It is these differing levels of analysis and sectoral or case study specific assessments that, to our minds, provide the basis for a collective understanding of complexities of ties. Much of our focus is on relations since 1994—when South Africa re-emerged on the global stage inaugurating an unbroken period of democratically elected governance by the ANC—and more importantly, we consider the changes and shifts that have taken place under Zuma and Ramaphosa’s respective leaderships. The key themes explored in the different parts of the book focus on aspects of diplomacy and foreign relations, including the role of the media; economic engagement at macro and micro-levels, including the role of labour; and finally, broadly construed examinations into identity, community and social relations as seen through the South African Chinese community.

Paradoxes of Engagement Myth plays a role, as it does for all national stories, in the forging of diplomatic relationship be they putative enemies or erstwhile allies, and this has been the case with South Africa and China. Beijing had always supported African independence movements and Mao Zedong even met with (ANC) leaders like Walter Sisulu and South African Communist Party (SACP) stalwarts like Yusuf Dadoo in the early 1960s as the newly banned political party sought international support (Ellis 2012; Alden and Alves 2008). At the same time, revolutionary solidarity between China and the liberation movements subscribed to the reductionist logic of the Sino-Soviet split, with the SACP’s close ties to the Soviet Union profoundly influencing the position of its ANC ally in seeing China as a divisive force in the unifying impulses of the socialist camp (Ellis 2012; Shubin 2009). Following from this same logic, it was the PanAfricanist Congress which garnered Beijing’s support as a liberation movement with, at least initially, a more radical agenda and methods (Lodge 1983). During the apartheid era, the National Party government in South Africa—despite its open support for Taiwan—pursued a quiet strategy of low-level military cooperation with China including opening an office in Beijing in the early 1980s and arms sales for use in selective southern African conflicts (Open Secrets 2017). Nelson Mandela’s presidency (1994–1998), celebrated in Beijing as well as around the world, was marked by the curious delay in switching diplomatic recognition, a situation explored by Williams and Lu in this

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book. Likewise it is true that while bilateral relations under Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008) were largely cordial, there was more emphasis on his grand continental strategy of African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) whose primary aim was to strengthen aid and investment ties with the G8 countries (Alden and Wu 2016, 207). Nevertheless, some of the very institutional foundations that led to the forging of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2010 under his successor Jacob Zuma were established under the Mbeki administration such as a binational commission and the signature Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a triennial meeting between China and African counterparts. Towards the end of his tenure in office, Mbeki did publically express worry over Chinese long-term intentions and the creation of a dependent relationship (Alden and Wu 2016, 207). Intimately linked to the above themes is the impact of domestic dynamics within South Africa in shaping bilateral ties with China. For instance, South Africa experienced tens of thousands of jobs lost in its textiles and clothing industries to more affordable imports from places like China and Bangladesh. With criticism led by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the SACP, Mbeki’s administration was pressured to appeal to Beijing for voluntarily restraint of exports (Alden 2007). South Africa’s relatively developed economy has attracted Chinese commercial interests and accelerated a booming two-way trade largely cohering to the north-south exchange of commodities for finished manufactured goods. This generated its own concerns, with South African officials petitioning the Chinese government for greater investment in value-added production facilities (‘beneficiation’, particularly employment creation) in the mining sector and elsewhere since 2009. At another level, South African firms both at home and especially in other parts of the continent are direct economic competitors with Chinese firms. For South African businesses and local labour markets, the price and other advantages that Chinese firms’ tend to have brings great pressure to bear on their own costs and wage packages. And, for Chinese South Africans the pride and opportunities growing out of deepening links with Beijing nonetheless carry with it exposure to local societal prejudices as well as entanglement with the machinations and political intrigues of foreign interests. The paradoxes experienced in South Africa-China ties extend into international relations. Both countries share economic and geopolitical

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interests in other African countries and often hold similar stances— including ‘representation’ of voices from the South—on the global stage and, where there are differences, manage to maintain regular consultation on such issues. South Africa’s unique standing as Africa’s only BRICS country has coincided with a strengthening of its international cooperation with China and, at the level of party-to-party ties, a closer collaboration. The idea of a Chinese development model, especially in the form of the Special Economic Zones at Coega or in Limpopo province, as a tool for rapid economic growth emerged from successful examples of Chinese investment in other parts of Africa. However, China’s expanding role on the continent can spark dissent within South African circles. For instance, a Chinese shipment of arms directed to Zimbabwe at the height of elections in 2008 commandeered by COSATU at the Durban docks, set in motion criticism by South African civil society and regional governments (Fritz 2009). Given that human rights featured so prominently in the anti-apartheid struggle and the early years of Mandela’s foreign policy, there continues to be expectations that South Africa will lead in this area. South Africa’s careful positioning on Beijing’s core interests like the South China Sea and treatment of Uighurs, reflected in its unwillingness to endorse China’s achievements in human rights at the UN Human Rights Council, continues to guide its approach (Shinn and Eisenman 2020, 285–286). At the same time, sidestepping human rights concerns in China at the UN or blocking the Dalai Lama’s visits to South Africa, while generating a sharp rebuke from opposition parties, overlooks survey data which suggests 44% of South Africans give preference to ‘promoting economic growth’ over ‘promoting human rights’ (Van der Westhuizen and Smith 2013, 8). Bilateral ties experienced a surge in the aftermath of the signing of $6.5 billion worth of deals in December 2015, but one which brought with it a host of complexities and problems as well. South Africa’s simmering domestic political scandal of ‘state capture’—embodied by the business and government dealings of the Gupta family during Zuma’s second term—as well as financial uncertainty both at home and internationally, along with currency depreciation, have had ripple effects on ties that are still felt at present. Concurrently, state prosecutor’s investigations have exposed Chinese firms’ involvement in some of the corrupted deals which transpired under Zuma, eliciting criticism and even court orders. Still, the expectation that Chinese finance can play a key role in resolving the perennial economic problems facing South Africa, be they the ailing condition

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of state-owned enterprises or integrating South Africa in emerging global production chains, continues to drive policymaking in South Africa. More recently, Chinese loans to state-owned enterprises under Ramaphosa’s leadership reflect concerns about the debt owed to China but also for opposition parties, the opaque nature of these agreements. What becomes clear is that the current leadership continues to inherit and is required to address issues of suspicion and trust between South African constituencies and China. Ironically, these suspicions have their parallel in debates within China itself: Chinese loans mooted to ailing state-owned enterprises like ESKOM are subject to criticism for their absence of returns or Chinese netizen outrage at expenditures that they believe could be better directed towards inward development. Finally, it needs to be recognised that the story of bilateral ties is still primarily told through the media’s gaze, with South African reporting on relations tending to be cautiously optimistic, particularly when reporting from an economic lens (Wasserman 2018). On social media, by way of contrast, impassioned commentary emerges when emotive issues like the ivory trade are discussed or when particular interests—sometimes economic in nature—are threatened. And behind all of these aggregate statistics, diplomatic utterances and trending ideas, are human stories that illuminate real content of lived experience of South Africa-China relations. The dominating narratives of any single issue do not arrive at the full picture of the story; and neither does personal sentiments and disagreement bring society any closer towards a solution to longstanding problems, such as finding a policy or collective response to illegal wildlife poaching.

Part and Chapter Overviews In order to make sense of contemporary South Africa-China ties in all its diversity, we have selected themes and authors whose recognised expertise provides historically informed, analytically rich and grounded analysis of these dynamics. In keeping with this, Part I begins by addressing important historical foundations of bilateral ties and moves to examining the trajectory of these in light of changes in South Africa and the world at large. All of these contributions by Williams, Alden and Wu, and Jiang point to a long-standing debate over the role of the leadership versus contingencies in shaping policy outcomes. This is reflected in Chapter 1 where Williams’

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focuses on Nelson Mandela’s complex decision to switch recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) where the role of national leader and the party they lead are demonstratively intertwined with regard to foreign policy decision-making. In Chapter 2, Alden and Wu pick up the institutional dynamics of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and how deepening diplomatic ties corresponded with increased domestic attention on leveraging Chinese finance to help South African development under Zuma and Ramaphosa. Jiang’s Chapter 3 gives us an inside look at China’s long-term strategic thinking on South Africa, providing a context for understanding how Beijing views the significance of changing dynamics in South Africa and its role on the African continent over time. Part II examines the political economy of building the South Africa– China relationship, from its financial and commercial drives to changing local conditions and their impact on relations. This is set out in Le Pere’s Chapter 5, balancing China’s own global ambitions and interactions with South Africa within the wider context of the trade war between China and theUnited States. As much as government pronouncements indicate hope for prosperous relations and collaboration, the reality is South Africa has a range of factors that make it both tempting but also worrying as an investment environment. This situation is addressed in Chapter 6 by Stevens on South Africa-China trade and investment and the potential it holds for expanding South African ambitions to grow its manufacturing sector. The role of the media in defining agendas and influencing South African perceptions of China forms the bulk of analysis in van Staden and Wu’s contribution in Chapter 7. In Part III, the focus shifts to a series of sectoral studies which aim to unpack the content of the relationship as experienced in distinctive areas such as manufacturing, agriculture, labour and education. In Chapter 8, Black and Yang drill down into how Special Economic Zones, supported by Chinese investment into manufacturing, are acting as policy vehicles for realising South African development aspirations in the Eastern Cape. China’s involvement in South African agriculture, through instruments as different as technical training programmes and FDI in commercial wineries is investigated by Harding, Jiang, Anseeuw and Alden in Chapter 9. Domestic contestation and discontent plays out in the response of South African trade unions to China’s growing influence in the South African economy, as underscored in Chapter 10 by Muresan and Naidu. Monyae’s Chapter 11 on the educational sector

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and, in particular, the soft power of Confucius Institutes as a means of expanding knowledge and projecting cultural values in South African society. In Part IV, the local Chinese community is put under the spotlight and the impact of changing economic circumstances and migratory patterns affect commerce, security and identity. In Chapter 11, Park and Chen reflect how the post-2015 period has affected the activities of Chinese traders who have had to search for new economic opportunities. Van Wyk, writing in Chapter 12, investigates the effects that increased inequality in South African society has had on community safety and response. Finally, Ho provides a personal account of growing up as a Chinese South African and illustrates how the perceived homogeneity of the Chinese community is itself a contested concept.

Bibliography Alden, C. (2007). China in Africa. African Arguments. London: Zed Books Ltd. Alden, C., & Alves, A. C. (2008). History and Identity in the Construction of China’s Africa Policy. Review of African Political Economy, 115, 43–58. Alden, C., & Wu, Y. S. (2016). South African Foreign Policy and China: Converging Visions, Competing Interests, Contested Identities. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 54(2), 203–231. Chalumbira, N. (2020, February 3). SA Comes to the Rescue: Local Company Donates 30,000 Masks to Fight Coronavirus. News 24. https://www.new s24.com/Video/SouthAfrica/News/watch-sa-comes-to-the-rescue-local-com pany-donates-30-000-masks-to-fight-coronavirus-20200302. Accessed 31 March 2020. Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa. (2004, July 28–29). Joint Communique on the Second South AfricaPeople’s Republic of China Bi-national Commission. Pretoria. http://www. dirco.gov.za/docs/2004/chin0629.htm, Accessed 22 January 2020. Shinn, D., & Eisenman, J. (2020, February). Evolving Principles and Guiding Concepts: How China Gains African Support for Its Core National Interests. Orbis, pp. 271–288. Ellis, S. (2012). The External Mission: The ANC in Exile. London: Jonathan Ball. Erasmus, C. (2019, September 3). Chinese Experts Train Crime-Hardened Police of South Africa’s Biggest City. South China Morning Post. https:// www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/3025494/chinese-experts-traincrime-hardened-police-south-africas-biggest. Accessed 30 March 2020. Eyewitness News. (2020, February 5). Prejudice and Stereotypes: The Coronavirus’ impact on Chinese Community in SA. https://ewn.co.za/2020/02/

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05/prejudice-and-stereotypes-the-coronavirus-impact-on-chinese-communityin-sa. Accessed 1 April 2020. Fritz, N. (2009, July). People Power: How Civil Society Blocked an Arms Shipment for Zimbabwe. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) (Occasional Paper, 36). Johannesburg. http://www.saiia.org.za/occasionalpapers/people-power-how-civil-society-blocked-an-arms-shipment-for-zim babwe. Accessed 14 April 2014. Lodge, T. (1983). Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. London: Longman. Nyabiage, J., & Choi, M. (2020, March 17). Alibaba Founder Jack Ma Donates Millions of Face Masks, Test Kits to each of the 54 African Countries. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/art icle/3075538/alibaba-founder-jack-ma-donates-millions-face-masks-test-kits. Accessed 31 March 2020. Open Secrets. (2017, October 31). Declassified: Apartheid Profits—China’s Support for Apartheid Revealed. Daily Maverick. https://www.dailymave rick.co.za/article/2017-10-31-declassified-apartheid-profits-chinas-supportfor-apartheid-revealed/. Accessed 2 April 2020. Pon, E. (2020, February 5). Chairman of the Chinese Association in Gauteng Interviewed by Eyewitness News. Prejudice and Stereotypes: The Coronavirus’ Impact on Chinese Community in SA. https://ewn.co.za/2020/02/05/pre judice-and-stereotypes-the-coronavirus-impact-on-chinese-community-in-sa. Accessed 1 April 2020. Ramaphosa, C. (2020, March 30). Wuhan Evacuees: A Good Example of Effectiveness of Lockdown. SABC News. https://www.sabcnews.com/ sabcnews/president-cyril-ramaphosa-meets-evacuated-south-africans-fromwuhan/. Accessed 31 March 2020. Republic of South Africa. (2018, September 3). Remarks by President Cyril Ramaphosa during the China-Africa High Level Dialogue with Business Representatives Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Beijing, China. http://www. dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2018/cram0903.htm. Accessed 15 September 2018. Shubin, V. (2009). ANC: The View from Moscow (2nd ed.). Johannesburg: Jacana. Singh, K. (2020, March 30). Chinese Consulate ‘Shocked’ After Man Held for Allegedly Forcing Workers to Make Masks. News 24. https://www.news24. com/SouthAfrica/News/chinese-consulate-shocked-after-man-held-for-allege dly-forcing-workers-to-make-masks-20200330. Accessed 30 March 2020. Somdyala, K. (2020, November 16). Children, Illegal Workers Found in Raid of Chinese Factory in Joburg. News 24. https://www.news24.com/SouthA frica/News/children-illegal-workers-found-during-raid-at-chinese-factory-injoburg-20191116, Accessed 31 March 2020.

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Van der Westhuizen, J and Smith K (2013) South Africa’s Role in the World: A Public Opinion Survey. The South African Foreign Policy Initiative, Cape Town, Policy Brief 55. Wasserman, H. (2018). China-Africa Media Relations: What We Know So Far. Global Media and China, 3(2), 108–112.

PART I

Foundations

CHAPTER 2

Explaining South Africa’s China Choice Christopher Williams

When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994 it inherited a situation in which South Africa had formal relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan—a legacy of the international ostracism both Pretoria and Taipei had shared for the previous two decades—rather than with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But in the 1990s the ROC and South Africa were moving in different directions. While the world embraced the new South Africa, Taiwan was increasingly marginalised—in 1994 only twenty-nine states formally recognised the ROC whereas one hundred and fifty-five countries recognised the PRC (Lin 2001, 121). The PRC’s One China principle holds that Taiwan is an integral part of China and that the PRC is the single and authentic authority that rules all of China (Wei 1999). Taiwan is regarded as a renegade province, not an independent state. This precludes the option of a state having diplomatic relations with governments in both Taipei and Beijing—every state in the international system must make a choice. Though Taiwan possessed a sizable and sophisticated economy, due to the ROC’s friendship with the

C. Williams (B) International Relations Department, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_2

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apartheid regime and the PRC’s global economic and political import, it was widely expected that once the ANC came to power it would adhere to the international norm and switch recognition from Taipei to Beijing (Business Day 1993; Natal Mercury 1993). The initial years of South Africa’s democratic dispensation were accompanied by a dizzying array of foreign policy opportunities. Once an international outcast, Pretoria was welcomed back into the global fold. It joined a range of international organisations, and established diplomatic relations with seventy-eight states during the first two years of President Nelson Mandela’s administration (DFA 1996). Despite many predictions to the contrary, the PRC was not among the list of South Africa’s new friends. Rather than choose which China to acknowledge, Mandela sought an unprecedented middle course—diplomatic recognition of both Beijing and Taipei—a two Chinas policy. While he welcomed relations with the PRC, Mandela repeatedly expressed strong support for the ROC, and said it would be immoral for him to turn his back on Taipei (SAPA-AFP 1996b). While the ROC accepted this approach, the PRC did not, prompting thirty months of public disputes and difficult private deliberations. Then, suddenly, the discussion over South Africa’s position on the two Chinas came to an end. On 27 November 1996 Mandela called a press conference to announce what the Citizen (1996) newspaper labelled a ‘shocking’ decision: South Africa would sever formal relations with the ROC and establish official relations with the PRC. This chapter explores the texture and timing of South Africa’s decision to switch relations from the ROC to the PRC by drawing on a wide range of previously unconsulted archival documents and interviews with former officials. It highlights the importance, but not the omnipotence of President Mandela in ANC decision making, as well as the pressure the PRC placed on South Africa to switch relations.

ANC Relations with the Two Chinas During South Africa’s Transition Due to the Sino-Soviet split and the ANC’s close association with Moscow, the ANC did not have friendly ties with the PRC during much of its time in exile. Though the ANC grew closer to the PRC in the 1980s and 1990s, unfamiliarity and uncertainty, caused in part by a lucrative trade in military hardware between the PRC and apartheid South Africa, lingered (Van Vuuren 2017, 393–405). Yusuf Saloojee of the ANC’s

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Department of International Affairs, reminded the journalist Gaye Davis (1996), ‘in the mid-1980s China had sold AK-47s to the South African Defence Force.’ The ROC, for its part, had been an important ally of apartheid South Africa since the early 1970s. The two pariahs had partnered on a range of issues including trade, nuclear research, and military hardware exchange and development.1 The economic relationship burgeoned to such a degree that in 1994 the ROC was South Africa’s seventh largest trading partner (Havenga 1995). Taipei was slow to acknowledge the changes taking place in South Africa in the early 1990s. Even after the ANC was unbanned, the party’s representative in East Asia, was refused a visa to visit Taiwan because Taipei still viewed the ANC as a ‘terrorist’ organisation (UFH, NAHECS, 26 May 1990). The following year, now appreciating the fundamental changes taking place in South Africa, the ROC sought to befriend the ANC. In January 1992 the ROC ambassador to South Africa, Loh I-Cheng, wrote to Mandela to confirm that the ROC would make a donation to the ANC so party members could undertake study programmes abroad and enroll in practical training courses in areas such as farming and automation. Loh emphasised to Mandela the ROC’s ‘interest in further cementing the good relations with your organisation and yourself’ (UFH, NAHECS, 30 January 1992). In July 1992 the ROC’s Foreign Minister, Frederick Chien, invited Mandela to visit Taiwan, and expressed how ‘for many years, we have watched with admiration your selfless sacrifice towards the goals of a free and fair democratic South Africa’ (UFH, NAHECS, 27 July 1992). In a matter of less than two years the ROC (like several other states) had switched its view of the ANC—once dangerous terrorists, ANC leaders were now valued friends. The ANC’s response to Taiwan’s offer of financially lubricated friendship was informed by the organisation’s magnanimity and mendicancy.2 In need of the support on offer from the ROC, Mandela graciously thanked Taiwan for its assistance and indicated he would visit the island in 1993 (UFH, NAHECS, c. 1992). The PRC was not idle while Taiwan wooed the ANC. Officials in Beijing forged a closer connection to the South African government when an agreement was struck to establish reciprocal ‘Study Centres’ (in lieu of formal embassies) in the capitals of the two countries. These two Centres, which opened in Pretoria in December 1991, and in Beijing in March of 1992, proved a critical conduit through which South African and Chinese

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officials could communicate in the ensuing years. Beijing also strengthened ties with the ANC during this period and successfully arranged for Nelson Mandela to travel to China. During Mandela’s October 1992 visit he thanked the PRC for its ‘anti-apartheid efforts,’ and commented that the PRC’s economic growth provided a compelling example for South Africa to follow (Chinafrica 1992). Though Mandela did not specifically reply to media enquiries as to whether he had been fundraising in Beijing, he stated that ‘His mission had been successful in all respects’ (Kohut, 11 October 1992). An ANC report of the trip indicates that the party’s request for financial assistance was requited: Madiba asked the Prime Minister for a private meeting and took the Treasurer-General [Thomas Nkobi] and P[allo] Jordan for that special meeting…At the end of that private consultation Madiba came back to us and told us that he was pleased with the response of the Chinese Premier. (UFH, NAHECS, c. October–November 1992).

By 1992 the competition between the ROC and the PRC to win favour with South Africa’s soon-to-be ruling party was well underway. Loh (2002), the ROC ambassador, writes that Mandela’s trip to mainland China in 1992 indicated ‘the PRC has gained the leading position in the race.’ The PRC’s Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen (2005), recalled the battle between the two Chinas: The Taiwan authorities were extremely nervous about our diplomatic overtures to South Africa, and kept a close watch on our actions, doing everything possible to create obstacles and undermine our efforts. It [Taiwan] used every means to win over the South African government and the ANC, which was about to come to power.

While Mandela’s 1992 visit to the PRC was certainly a positive development for Beijing, there were signs of complications in the PRC–ANC relationship. Zhong Weiyun and Xu Suijiang (2008, 1228) point out that ‘China had hoped that Mandela would make a clear-cut stand on the issue of Taiwan, but his public statement was ambiguous […].’ According to Qian (2005), Mandela privately told Chinese officials, ‘The ANC and I are grateful for China’s long-term support, and we value our friendship with China. South Africa will establish diplomatic relations only with the People’s Republic of China and get rid of Taiwan’s office.’ It was an assurance the PRC would be forced to remind Mandela of.

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Mandela’s Trip to Taiwan The focus of Mandela’s trip to the ROC in late July 1993 was fundraising. A few days before he set foot on the island, ANC and ROC officials arranged ‘That US $10 million will be given to the President [Mandela] during his courtesy call at the President’s [Lee Teng-Hui] office at 18h00 just before dinner on Friday, July 31’ (UFH, NAHECS, 28 July 1993). Mandela’s mission to Taiwan placed him in a potentially tight spot. While the ANC was eager to receive ROC largesse, the organisation’s emerging policy seemed to be acknowledgement of Beijing at the expense of Taipei. At the end of a two-day foreign policy workshop about a year before Mandela embarked on his trip to Taiwan, the ANC’s Department of International Affairs had concluded: – ANC no official recognition of Taiwan – Cue taken from international position – Taiwan’s position as a major trader and its huge exchange reserves cannot be ignored (UFH, NAHECS 21–22 August 1992) Upon Mandela’s arrival at Chiang Kai-Shek airport, the ROC press corps wasted no time in querying Mandela on the issue of the ANC’s future policy towards the two Chinas. Mandela was diplomatic, but did not deviate from his party’s support for the PRC, commenting that after the 1994 election ‘South Africa will remain a member of the United Nations, of many international organisations. We will thus be bound to the policies and decisions of these organisations’ (Lagardien 1993). Since the ROC is not recognised by the United Nations or other international organisations, Mandela’s comments were a tacit recognition of Beijing. This did not sit well with his hosts, and the visit got off to a rocky start. Despite this difficult beginning, Mandela’s charm and his subsequent comments about ‘a new chapter’ in ROC–ANC relations soothed the apprehensive Taiwanese public (Viljoen 2010, 165; Sapa 1993). The ROC government also contributed to the positive rapport with offers of assistance for the country Mandela would soon lead. At a dinner for Mandela, Taiwan’s Prime Minister, Lien Chan, stated, ‘If you want anything, Dr. Mandela, we are here, just say it and we will do it. We are ready to support the new South Africa’ (Sithole 1993). Later, Mandela told President Lee Teng-hui in regards to the two Chinas issue, ‘After next year’s election and [sic] interim government of national unity would

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(jointly) make the decisions’ (Lagardien 1993). The ANC president had begun the trip by voicing indirect, but relatively clear support for Beijing, but as the visit progressed his statements were increasingly ambivalent. Mandela’s visit to Taiwan was deemed a ‘diplomatic coup’ (Sithole 1993). He had successfully solicited assistance from the ROC for his party’s upcoming election effort, as well as promises of training and support to revitalise South Africa’s economy, all while maintaining ambiguity on the ANC’s approach to the two Chinas.3 As South Africa’s 1994 elections drew near the PRC was wary of ANC intentions. Despite assurances that the ANC regarded the PRC as the sole representative of China, Foreign Minister Qian worried, ‘The ANC’s idea was neither to abandon Taiwan nor ignore China’s international status and influence.’ He recalls, ‘We were on high alert […] they wanted to resort to “dual recognition”.’ Qian was right to be concerned. The PRC’s economic power and future potential combined with its political prominence on the world stage guaranteed that the new South Africa would move to recognise Beijing—but as part of this move did South Africa need to give up relations with the ROC? This was the question that Mandela’s government would explore for its first thirty months in office.

1994: A New Government---A Contested Policy Once inaugurated, Mandela wasted no time in setting the direction of South African policy on the two Chinas issue. On 11 May 1994, the day after he was sworn in, Mandela and his Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo, met with President Lee Teng-Hui and Foreign Minister Frederick Chien from the ROC. At the meeting Mandela told Lee, ‘the ROC need not have any fears on the question of future relations with South Africa.’ The grateful ROC leaders expressed their eagerness to assist South Africa in a range of fields from small-scale agricultural development to vocational training; this was of course, ‘provided diplomatic ties remain intact’ (DIRCO, 19 May 1994). Because South Africa did not formally recognise the PRC, Beijing sent a low-level delegation to Mandela’s inauguration. In his meeting with the PRC representatives Mandela no longer promised that his new government would transfer ties to Beijing. He told the Chinese delegation ‘When a country had established diplomatic relations with another country something had to happen to cancel that relationship’ (DIRCO, 28 September 1994). Mandela’s position was elaborated on in a secret

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Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) internal paper that explained, ‘President Mandela has expressed full confidence in the leaders of the PRC and the ROC and support for their efforts to resolve the China question.’ It went on to say ‘It is on this basis that the South African government would hope to strengthen and improve the relationship with the People’s Republic of China on the one hand, and the Republic of China on the other’ (DIRCO, c. May 1994 [a]). After less than a week in the Union Buildings, South Africa’s new president had deviated from ANC policy towards the two Chinas issue. While his party had long viewed Beijing as the legitimate Chinese authority, Mandela had chosen not to choose. Instead, the hope was that an improvement of relations between Taipei and Beijing would obviate South Africa’s potentially painful choice, or, that China might actually accept dual recognition. This wait-and-see policy was to the advantage of Taipei, which already enjoyed full diplomatic relations with South Africa. The PRC was left in limbo. Unless it dropped its insistence on the One China principle, a fundamental tenet of its national zeitgeist, relations with South Africa were uncertain. Mandela backed away from the ANC’s previous policy on the two Chinas question for several reasons. The Director General of the DFA, Rusty Evans (2017), believes Mandela felt the ANC ‘owed a debt of gratitude to the Taiwanese, which translated into […] the idea of [a] two Chinas policy.’ Evans thinks Mandela’s efforts to retain ties with Taiwan stemmed from a ‘sense of fair play’, which ‘amounted to ‘they’ve [the ROC] been our friends and helped us and we can’t kick them in the teeth.’ Aziz Pahad (2017), the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new government, agrees. He says that Mandela believed, ‘you can’t dump friends after receiving so much assistance from them.’ The mutually supporting testimony of two senior foreign policy officials strongly indicates that Mandela’s fidelity to the ANC’s new financial backer was an important contributing factor to South Africa’s initial adoption of a two Chinas policy. Another factor that prompted Mandela’s pursuance of a dual China approach was his belief that such a policy was actually feasible. P. J. Botha (2017), the head of the Asia Directorate in the DFA at the time, points out that Mandela ‘was riding the crest of his international stardom and strength,’ which according to Aziz Pahad (2017), gave rise to a sense of ‘South African “exceptionalism’’.’ The former Deputy Foreign Minister recalls that Mandela’s ‘big thing was that South Africa…being this new

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person on the block […] achieved our negotiated solution, we can achieve a two Chinas policy.’ Neither Pahad nor Botha thought their president’s personal influence could sway the PRC. Mandela had a different idea. His confidence in his own power to persuade combined with the celebrity status he and the country he led enjoyed, seems to have made him believe South Africa could be the first state to successfully implement a two Chinas policy.4 Pallo Jordan (2017), the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications in Mandela’s new government, believes Mandela’s adoption of a two Chinas policy was also informed by prudence in a world that was undergoing precipitous change: I think there was a little bit of uncertainty on his part about what would happen in the case of China. You had the Soviet Union, sixty years and then one day it was as if [a] snowball in the sun, gone…And I think he had the sense that the same sort of thing might happen in the case of China […] Taipei was a bird in hand, in a way.

Zola Skweyiya (2017), the minister of Public Service and Administration in Mandela’s cabinet, confirms Jordan’s view. He recalls that after the surprising collapse of the USSR, ‘Mandela said he does not want to go and recognise China [PRC]’ because he worried it ‘would end up like the Soviet Union.’ Jordan (2017) pointed out to Mandela the many differences between the PRC and the former USSR, as he was worried that the potential decay of the PRC played a factor in Mandela’s thinking. Another possible consideration for Mandela was that South Africa’s political system more closely resembled that of the ROC than the PRC. As Deon Geldenhuys put it, ‘The PRC labours under a communist dictatorship, whereas the ROC is a full-fledged liberal democracy’ (Geldenhuys 1995).5 While many in the ANC did not believe a two Chinas policy was feasible, deference to Mandela meant that such an approach was implicitly adopted (E. Pahad 2014). Disagreement Within the Department of Foreign Affairs South Africa’s two Chinas approach immediately prompted disagreement within the DFA. Rusty Evans (2017) valued the relationship South Africa had built with the ROC, and did not support suddenly severing ties with the island. He recalled, ‘there was a lot at stake in terms of what you were

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giving up […] it’s like getting a divorce.’ Evans believed it was ‘inevitable’ that South Africa would recognise the PRC, but he advocated a gradual effort to build relations with Beijing. Many of the officials who worked in the DFA bridled at this go-slow approach—they wanted to speed up the switch to the PRC. Advocates of a quick switch to Beijing received an opportunity to make their case in May 1994 when Joe Slovo, the new Minister of Housing in the Government of National Unity (GNU), raised the issue of recognising the PRC at a cabinet meeting. Soon after, the DFA’s Asia Directorate produced a memorandum on the matter. The document summarises the pertinent points of the two Chinas debate. On the one hand, was the ROC’s large and dynamic economy, as well as its willingness to provide substantial assistance to the Mandela Administration’s Reconstruction and Development Programme provided formal ties between Pretoria and Taipei endured. On the other, the PRC was described as a ‘political, economic and military superpower’ that ‘offers South Africa a potentially massive market.’ The rapid increase in commerce between Beijing and Pretoria (from 1992 to 1993 trade between the two countries increased by 169.5%) supported this argument (Havenga 1995). In addition, the memo injected a sense of urgency to the China decision by pointing out that in July 1997 Hong Kong would revert back to Chinese control after one hundred and fifty-five years of British suzerainty. This meant that access to Hong Kong’s substantial market needed to be factored into the economic equation. Though trade between the ROC and South Africa was larger than that between the PRC and South Africa, South Africa’s combined trade with Hong Kong and the PRC eclipsed South African trade with the ROC.6 The memorandum went beyond a bland economic comparison. It also pointed out that recognition of the PRC was pervasive throughout the international community, and politically important since the PRC was a permanent member of UN Security Council and thus wielded considerable influence. The memo argued: With South Africa’s return to the international community it is incongruous that it maintains diplomatic relations with the ROC and only informal relations with the PRC. South Africa is currently swimming against the tide of world opinion regarding diplomatic recognition of the PRC. (DIRCO, c. May 1994 [b])

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Finally, the document described dual recognition, as ‘anathema’ to the PRC, a clear statement that attempting formal ties with both Chinas was futile. Not long after a policy of friendship toward both the ROC and PRC had been promulgated, officials in the Asia Directorate were challenging that policy. Despite the push towards the PRC from many in the DFA, no policy change was forthcoming. For the time being, the new South Africa’s China would be the same as the old South Africa’s China.

1995: Chequebook Diplomacy and Diplomatic Delay Despite Mandela’s hesitance to quickly embrace Beijing, other senior members of the government were eager to move towards the PRC. Some of the ANC’s key foreign affairs officials—Thabo Mbeki, Alfred Nzo, and Aziz Pahad—all believed, according to Pahad (2017), ‘that you cannot sustain a two Chinas policy. And its best we move towards normalising like the world had done.’ These views added weight to calls from DFA bureaucrats that the switch to Beijing was in South Africa’s best interests. But as 1995 progressed, the China issue did not. In March, Ji Peiding, the director of the PRC’s South African Study Centre returned to China to debrief the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on his efforts in South Africa. While in Beijing, Ji met Les Labuschagne, his counterpart at South Africa’s Study Centre in China, for a private discussion on relations between their two countries. In their conversation, Ji made clear that if South Africa delayed switching to the PRC its access to Hong Kong would be jeopardised. In a cable back to Pretoria, Labuschagne worried that ‘China has the might, muscle, and meanness to close our Hong Kong Consulate and clamp down on other private sector commercial activities […].’ Labuschagne’s (DIRCO, 13 March 1995) conclusion was ominous: ‘It would seem as if the velvet glove covering the iron fist is wearing thin and I interpret the oblique message as an indirect indication that China is not prepared to lose face over the South African issue.’ These concerns did not initially impact Mandela’s approach to the problem. In July 1995 Mandela told the journalist Patrick Bulger (2018) ‘South Africa…would always recognize Taiwan.’ Noting Mandela’s sympathetic approach to Taiwan, Loh I-Cheng, sought to build broad support for his country across the South African political landscape by providing development assistance and constructing a vocational training centre for former uMkhonto weSizwe veterans (Loh 1995; Chandler

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1995). The ROC also sponsored trips for South African politicians, journalists and academics to Taiwan. Gaye Davis (1995a) reported, ‘scores of parliamentarians—some sources suggest as many as 200—have enjoyed all-expense paid trips to Taiwan…’ Greg Mills, director of studies at the South African Institute of International Affairs, commented, ‘It is extremely embarrassing that the Taiwanese seem to be buying our foreign policy’ (De Ionno 1995). Despite the ROC’s lobbying, the ANC was slowly moving towards a decision point on the two Chinas issue. In December 1995 the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) announced its decision to dispatch a mission to the PRC ‘to speed up the process of arriving at a common position on relations between the two countries’ (Lengane 1995). Pallo Jordan (2017) recalls, ‘There had been very heavy discussion during the NEC, and the tide was very much recognition of Beijing, but Mandela had his own style…whether he would have been able to go against that tide is another question.’ That question would be answered the following year—while a choice had been deferred throughout 1995, 1996 would be a year of decision.

1996: A Year of Decision In March 1996 Alfred Nzo led a delegation of senior officials to the PRC. Max Sisulu (2017), one of the members of the delegation, remembers, ‘Part of the visit was to just gauge if it [dual recognition] was possible.’ The PRC’s response was unequivocal and uncompromising. The report on Nzo’s visit (DIRCO, c. April 1996) states, ‘The Chinese leadership made it patently clear that they will never accept dual recognition and that the South African government should not endeavor to set a precedent in this regard.’ Sisulu (2017) recalls, ‘It wasn’t like it was a shock, we knew this.’ The Nzo mission had hoped to move directly from Beijing to Taiwan to conduct similar high-level meetings with ROC officials, but elections on Taiwan made this impossible, as a new government would not yet be in place. Nzo’s delegation would have to wait until late June to visit the ROC, but the PRC visit had made clear that South Africa had only two choices in the China matter—the PRC or the ROC—there was no middle way (DIRCO, 12 March 1996). In April of 1996, South Africa and the PRC signed a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) agreement which meant that South Africa would receive

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the same access to the Chinese market as all other states trading with the PRC. The MFN deal—agreed to before formal diplomatic relations had been established—was an effort to incentivise South Africa’s switch to the PRC. One headline called it ‘China’s trade carrot’ (Lautenbach 1996). The gesture seemed to have little impact on Mandela. In July he told a group of journalists: Taiwan supported us during the later phase of the struggle against apartheid […] as did the People’s Republic of China. It is not easy for me to be assisted by a country, and once I come to power say ‘I have no relations with you.’ I haven’t got that type of immorality and I will not do that. (Sapa-AFP 1996a)

The report from Nzo’s delegation would say otherwise. It pointed out that it was critical South Africa make a clear decision soon because of the impending handover of Hong Kong to the PRC before concluding: Our view is that it is in line with our interests as a country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC as a matter of urgency […]. Regrettably, it is our view that there is no alternative way of establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, other than transforming relations with Taiwan into unofficial relations (….) the choice is unavoidable. (UFH, NAHECS, c. July–August 1996)

Nzo’s report was circulated in July. Not long after, the ANC’s NEC decided to recognise the PRC without further delay (DIRCO, 23 August 1996). Despite this, Mandela persisted in his effort to find a compromise solution. In August 1996 Mandela asked Zola Skweyiya, who was visiting the PRC, to relay the message that he ‘would like to discuss the matter with the PRC’s President Jiang Zemin anywhere in the world including the PRC on the basis of mutual interest and in terms of mutual understanding and the recognition of the status quo as it exists’ (DIRCO, 23 August 1996). The PRC’s President did not agree to a meeting with Mandela. Instead, his country exerted pressure on South Africa to persuade Mandela to switch relations.

Pressure from the PRC While Mandela made continued attempts at dual recognition, the PRC began to apply pressure, especially when Mandela took actions that raised Beijing’s ire. In August 1996, the ROC’s Vice-Premier, Hsu Li-teh, travelled to South Africa with a retinue of forty-eight business people and

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government officials to meet with Mandela and explore the possibility of Taiwanese joint ventures with black businesses. After this meeting, Mandela reiterated his position that it would be immoral to break relations with Taiwan, eliciting delight from Taiwan, and denunciations from Beijing (Sapa-Reuter 1996; Hadland 1996). The PRC’s foreign ministry spokesman said Beijing was ‘greatly concerned’ by Mandela’s statement, and noted that he had ‘preached “dual recognition”’ (DIRCO, 3 September 1996). The PRC’s anger was compounded because during his statement Mandela had referred to Taiwan as a ‘country.’ A strongly worded article in the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Daily said that South Africa’s behaviour ‘hurts the feelings of the Chinese people and damages the image of South Africa in the world (Xinhua 1996).’ In mid-September the PRC’s Xinhua news agency published a commentary that stated that if Pretoria did not normalise relations with the PRC ‘South Africa would have greater short-term and long-term losses’ (DIRCO, 6 September 1996). The interpretation in the DFA (DIRCO, 18 September 1996) was that ‘The PRC is highly upset by the recent statement by President Mandela’ and that, ‘foreign-policy makers in Beijing have moved towards a more hard-line attitude towards South Africa.’ The problem, as Aziz Pahad (2017) recalls, was that ‘Madiba was speaking out’ in support of Taiwan, which made South Africa’s position on the two Chinas ‘high profile.’ Mandela’s statements embarrassed Beijing, and drew attention to the fact that South Africa had flouted the PRC’s insistence on the One China principle for more than two years. There was even talk that the South African stance might jeopardise the global One China consensus. With so much on the line, the PRC decided it would not countenance further delay from South Africa. In October 1996 Nzo dispatched a letter to Mandela that alerted him to the PRC’s strong reaction to his comments during the visit of the ROC delegation. The foreign minister’s letter (DIRCO, 16 October 1996) highlighted that the PRC seemed to ‘especially take umbrage at the alleged reference to Taiwan as a “country”.’ It went on to remind Mandela that both the ROC and PRC ‘scrutinise our every word and deed’ and that ‘in such delicate and sensitive situations between countries, words are often misconstrued and this is patently so in the case of the PRC’s strong and emotional reaction.’ Early in November, Nzo (DIRCO, 4 November 1996) sent another letter to Mandela describing how ‘the attitude of the PRC had indeed

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hardened towards South Africa to the degree where they are contemplating various punitive measures against South Africa.’ This letter warned that the PRC was considering: closure of South Africa’s Consul-General in Hong Kong, revocation of MFN Status, finding an alternative location from which to import valuable minerals (such as gold), and the imposition of additional taxes on South African goods entering Hong Kong. Nzo described these possible measures as a ‘pre-negotiation strategy by the PRC in order to apply pressure on us’ in the looming negotiations over South Africa’s future diplomatic status in and economic access to Hong Kong. Nzo (DIRCO, 4 November 1996) stated that it was ‘of deep concern that our bilateral relations with the PRC have deteriorated to this low level…’ For thirty months South African efforts at dual recognition had carried no real costs. In fact, keeping formal ties with Taipei while slowly engaging the PRC had been to South Africa’s benefit. Pretoria had attracted the promise of (and in some cases actual) aid and investment from both Chinas as the ROC sought to keep an ally and the PRC attempted to gain one. During this period, South Africa had felt only very gentle pressure from the PRC—recognition assessments had been coloured more by the relative benefits of relations with the ROC or the PRC rather than by the costs of not establishing relations. A ratcheting up of Chinese compulsion in the latter half of 1996 altered this calculus. Nzo’s letter indicates that Beijing was now seeking to accomplish by pressure what it had not through patience. By late November Mandela realised it was time to act. Pressure from both his party and the PRC, as well as the impending Hong Kong handover all militated for a decision sooner rather than later. On 26 November 1996 Mandela called Loh I-Cheng to his office and told the disconsolate ROC ambassador that South Africa would switch recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Evans, who was at the meeting, recalls Mandela explaining to Loh that the ANC had made the decision telling him ‘… it’s out of my hands. It’s the organisation you know.’ The next day Mandela held an impromptu press conference at his home in Johannesburg.7 The president announced, ‘We are now giving diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China and we are therefore downgrading relations with Taiwan.’ Mandela (1996) offered only a single explanation for his decision:

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In its international relations, South Africa has become an active participant within the ambit of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement as well as within the UN system. A permanent continuation of diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China, or Taiwan, is inconsistent with South Africa’s role in international affairs.

And with that, South Africa’s China choice had been made.

Denouement of the Decision By the mid-1990s the PRC was an international economic and political power, and was widely recognised as the sole legitimate governing Chinese authority. It was this reality combined with South Africa’s growing international involvement that President Mandela referred to when he explained that it was ‘inconsistent with South Africa’s role in international affairs’ to continue relations with the ROC. While this was certainly true, it had been so since Mandela became president. The biggest question around South Africa’s decision to switch from the ROC to the PRC is not that this decision was made, but why it was made in November 1996 (Fabricius 1996). The first important reason for Mandela’s announcement of the switch late in 1996 was the ANC’s decision to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the PRC in August of that year after Nzo’s fact-finding mission. This decision hemmed Mandela in and put a timeline on his dual China approach. Exploring the ANC’s role in South Africa’s China choice reveals that the locus of decision-making was Shell House, not the Union Buildings.8 Max Sisulu (2017) recalled: ‘We had made our decision collectively, so the ANC had decided that this is the best way to go…The recommendations coming from Nzo’s mission. And so, Madiba had to live with it. That’s the nature of a democracy.’ President Mandela did not make the decision to switch from the ROC to the PRC, he adhered to it. The ANC’s critical role in the decision highlights the importance of investigating the relationship between the president and the party he leads when studying foreign policy decision-making in South Africa. While the president is certainly powerful both in party and governmental structures, at times that power can be circumscribed (Suttner 2007). At the time of the decision Loh I-Cheng and National Party leader F. W. de Klerk, saw red (De Lange 1996). De Klerk commented, ‘We know that the many Communists within the ANC in their high ranks are getting

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restless, are turning the screws…they are now apparently beginning to do so with regards to foreign policy’ (Sapa 1996). It is certainly true that many senior members of the SACP forcefully advocated shifting to the PRC. Charles Nqakula (2017), the General-Secretary of the SACP during this period, recalls ‘We were tenacious in our campaign and raised the matter with Madiba on several occasions.’ While the SACP factor was not unimportant, if only the SACP had supported the move to the PRC, it is unlikely to have succeeded in effecting the switch. But, as this chapter has demonstrated, most ANC NEC members, as well as many DFA officials, also believed it was time to move to the PRC. Pierre Dietrichsen (2017) of the DFA said simply, ‘I was pro-switch and I was not a communist.’ A variety of economic and geopolitical considerations, far more than any sort of comradeship among communists, account for the change. A second cause of South Africa’s switch to Beijing was the growing pressure applied by the PRC—a factor that is almost completely absent from previous assessments of South Africa’s China choice.9 One reason for this omission is that the pressure applied by Beijing, for example, ‘reminders’ about South African access to Hong Kong after its handover to China, was generally understated. However, as South Africa drew out the deliberation process over the two Chinas issue, and President Mandela continued to publicly endorse the ROC, Beijing became less willing to wait. Pahad (2017) points out, ‘we had [been] warned that there’s a limit, and …unfortunately, [South Africa] sometimes gave the impression that we aren’t just quietly arguing with the Chinese, but we are also trying to influence other countries.’ Evans (2017) recalls that the PRC ‘…put it starkly to us that “You either break off the relations now or you count us out.” Very much so. They played quite hardball at the end.’ Chinese pressure sent the message that the status quo would not continue—if South Africa chose to string out its two Chinas approach there would be costs. As pressure from the PRC increased, calls from within the DFA and the ANC for a switch to Beijing became more persuasive. In addition to pointing to the many economic and political benefits of recognising the PRC, advocates of the switch began to emphasise the costs of having poor relations with Beijing. The timing of Nzo’s letter to Mandela alerting him to China’s increasingly threatening approach, just over three weeks before Mandela announced the switch, indicates that Beijing’s turn to a more ‘hardline’ posture was an important factor in South Africa’s China switch.

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Conclusion The thirty-month delay in the new South Africa’s recognition of the PRC can be explained by a combination of the strategic use of inducements by Taiwan, Mandela’s loyalty to the ROC, his uncertainty in regards to the PRC, and unfamiliarity between the PRC and ANC caused by an ambivalent historical relationship. Though the majority of senior ANC officials did not share Mandela’s view on the two Chinas issue, respect for their president convinced these officials not to rush the China choice. The result of these factors was an extended attempt at a dual recognition approach. The timing of the switch was precipitated by a combination of Chinese pressure and President Mandela eventually bowing to the will of the party he led. Confronted by the need to implement the ANC’s decision on the two Chinas and Beijing’s growing frustration Mandela finally announced the move he had long ‘agonised over,’ the choice to switch from Taipei to Beijing (SABC 1996). Acknowledgements This chapter is based on a longer journal article the author published with Claire Hurst. I thank Claire for her valuable assistance on that project. Readers interested in a more detailed account of South Africa’s decision to switch relations from the ROC to the PRC should consult our article published in the South African Historical Journal, Volume 70, Number 3, 2018. Our research benefited from the recollections and insights of many of the key South African decision makers involved in their country’s China choice. We would like to thank the following officials for generously agreeing to research interviews: Iaan Basson, PJ Botha, Pierre Dietrichsen, Leo ‘Rusty’ Evans, Nina Karen Human, Pallo Jordan, Aziz Pahad, Zola Skweyiya, and Max Sisulu. The authors also benefitted from Ronel Jansen van Vuuren’s assistance at the archives of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, and the help of Mosanku Maamoe at the University of Fort Hare’s Liberation Archives. Hungting Teng was invaluable in helping to translate sections of the memoirs of Loh I-Cheng from Mandarin to English. Dr. Gary Song-Huann Lin provided several important insights, and Professors Michelle Small and Arianna Lissoni suggested many helpful revisions.

Notes 1. For accounts of ROC-RSA ties during the apartheid period see Lin (2001), Van Vuuren (2017, 465–468), and Pickles and Woods (1989). 2. The ANC was in a difficult financial situation in the early 1990s as longtime donors halted assistance. Fundraising was therefore a key foreign policy priority during this period so the ANC could effectively contest

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3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

the 1994 elections. For example, the minutes from a two-day workshop of the ANC’s Department of International Affairs in August 1992 stated “Material support for transition period essential” (UFH, NAHECS, 21–22 August 1992). For more on the fundraising aspect of ANC foreign policy during this period see Alden (1993, 76–77). At the time the donation was not explicitly acknowledged although Mandela did say the ANC had found ‘a readiness to assist’ (Waugh 1993). It was only in December 1995 that Mandela explicitly acknowledged what he called a $10 million dollar ‘donation’ (Davis 1995b). Richard Stengel (2010, 5–6), who worked on Long Walk to Freedom, writes that Mandela ‘regards himself not so much as the Great Communicator but as the Great Persuader’ In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela (1994, 606), in a moment of self-reflection, comments that he had ‘perhaps too high a regard for the importance of face-to-face meetings’ and of his ‘own ability in such a meeting to persuade men to change their views.’ A copy of Geldenhuys’ paper was found by the author in Mandela’s files at the University of Fort Hare suggesting that the paper may have had some influence on Mandela or those who advised him. The ‘Hong Kong Factor’ became important in discussions within the South African government (Pahad 2017). Pahad (2017) was not informed of the decision beforehand. The ANC relocated its party headquarters from Shell House to Luthuli House in 1997. Singh (1997, 53) was one of the few commentators that appreciated this factor.

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Bulger, P. (2018, July 15). Mandela’s World. Sunday Times. Business Day. (1993, August 19). Comment: One China. Chandler, N. (1995, December 8). R146-m Boost for Training of Demobbed SA soldiers. Star. Chinafrica. (1992, November 23). Citizen. (1996, November 28). Shocking. Daniel, J. (1995). One China or Two? South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemma. In The Taiwan Experience: Implications for South Africa (pp. 157–174). Johannesburg: The Consulate-General of the Republic of China. Davis, G. (1995a, February 3). MPs Feted with Taiwan Holidays. Mail & Guardian. Davis, G. (1995b, December 8). For Sale: SA’s Diplomatic Relations. Mail & Guardian. Davis, G. (1996, April 3). Nzo’s Visit to China Didn’t Reflect GNU. Mail & Guardian. De Ionno, P. (1995, June 11). South Africa’s Chinese Puzzle. Sunday Times. De Lange, F. (1996, November 29). Strong Note to S Africa. The Citizen. Fabricius, P. (1996, November 28). Timing of Taiwan Decision a Surprise. The Star. Financial Mail. (1996, September 13). Deadline and Delay. Geldenhuys, D. (1995). South Africa and the China Question: A Case for Dual Recognition (Working Paper Series, 6). East Asia Project. International Relations Department, University of the Witwatersrand. Hadland, A. (1996, September 1). Taiwanese Trade Mission’s Visit to South Africa Provokes Chinese Rage. The Sunday Independent. Havenga, M. (1995). The Dilemma of the Two Chinas: An Economic Perspective. In SAIIA Research Group (Ed.), South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma (pp. 32–46). Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue. Jiang, L., & Shu, Z. (2019). “There Was No Real Information About China in South Africa:” Revisiting the History of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between South Africa and China (1950s–1990s). South African Journal of International Affairs, 26(3), 455–479. Kohut, J. (1992, October 7). Mandela Finds Firm Assurances Elusive. South China Morning Post. Kohut, J. (1992, October 11). Mandela Tarnishes His Image. South China Morning Post. Lagardien, I. (1993, August 2). Mandela on the Spot in Taiwan. Sowetan. Lautenbach, D. (1996, May 5). Madame Wu Steeps China’s Trade Carrot in the Political Dressing of Diplomatic Recognition. The Sunday Independent. Lengane, J. (1995, December 10). ANC Calls for Mission to Be Sent to Beijing. City Press.

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Lin, G. (2001). The Relations Between the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa (PhD thesis). University of Pretoria. Available at https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/22924/Com plete.pdf?sequence=8. Accessed December 2016). Loh, I. C. (1995, November 1). Small-Scale Agriculture Needs to Be Developed. Business Day. Loh, I. C. (2002). Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors: The Memoirs of Loh I-Cheng. 微臣無力可回天—陸以正的外交生涯 Taipei: Commonwealth Publication. Makhanya, M. (1996, November 28). Shock as SA Dumps Taiwan for China. The Star. Mandela, N. (1994). Long Walk to Freedom. London: Abacus Publishing Imprint, reprint 2013. Mandela, N. (1996, November 27). Statement by President Nelson Mandela on South Africa’s Relations with the Greater China Region. Available at http:// www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1996/961127_china.htm. Accessed December 2016. Mills, G. (1997). South Africa and Asia: New Opportunities, Lessons, and Dilemmas. In W. Carlsnaes & M. Muller (Eds.), Change and South African External Relations (pp. 190–210). Johannesburg: Thomson Publishing. Natal Mercury. (1993, August 23). SA and the Two Chinas. Nqakula, C. (2017). The People’s War. Johannesburg: Mutloatse Heritage Trust. Pickles, J., & Woods, J. (1989). Taiwanese Investment in South Africa. African Affairs, 88(353), 507–528. Qian, Q. (2005). Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy. New York: HarperCollins. SABC. (1996, December 4). Mandela Meets John Chang. 71940MT. SABC Media Libraries, Johannesburg. Sapa. (1993, August 3). Mandela: New ANC-ROC Chapter Opened. The Citizen. Sapa. (1996, November 29). ANC Bowing to Red Pressure, says de Klerk. The Citizen. Sapa-AP. (1996, August 28). Beijing Insists That South Africa Can’t Have It Both Ways. The Star. Sapa-AFP. (1996a, July 4). Taiwan Connection: Still Firm Friends. The Daily News. Sapa-AFP. (1996b, August 28). Taiwan Gratified by SA’s Stance. The Citizen. Sapa-Reuter. (1996, August 27). Cutting ROC Ties Would Be Immoral: Pres. The Citizen. Siko, J. (2014). Inside South Africa’s Foreign Policy. London: I.B. Tauris. Singh, S. (1997). Sino-South African Relations: Coming Full Circle. African Security Review, 6(2), 52–59. Sithole, E. (1993, August 8–14). Mandela’s Visit to Taiwan: What It Did, What It Didn’t. Sunday Nation.

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Stengel, R. (2010). Mandela’s Way. London: Virgin Books. Sono, T. (1995). The Case for Dual Recognition. In SAIIA Research Group (Ed.), South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma (pp. 72–80). Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue. South Africa. Department of Foreign Affairs (hereafter DFA). (1996, June). South African Foreign Policy: Discussion Document. Available at http://www.gov.za/documents/foreign-policy-south-africa-discussion-doc ument. Accessed December 2016. Suttner, R. (1995). Dilemmas of South African Foreign Policy: The Question of China. In SAIIA Research Group (Ed.), South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma (pp. 4–9). Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue. Suttner, R. (2007). (Mis) Understanding Nelson Mandela. African Historical Review, 29(2), 107–130. Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. New York: Routledge. Van Vuuren, H. (2017). Apartheid Guns and Money. Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media. Viljoen, J. (2010). Between the ROC and a Hard Place. In P. Wolvaardt, T. Wheeler, & W. Scholtz (Eds.), From Verwoerd to Mandela, South African Diplomats Remember, 2. Johannesburg: Crink Books. Waugh, E. (1993, August 2). Taiwan to Fund Centre in SA. The Star. Wei, S. (1999). Some Reflections on the One-China Principle. Fordham International Law Journal, 23, 1169–1178. Weiyun, Z., & Sujiang, X. (2008). China’s Support for and Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle. In South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) (Ed.), The Road to Democracy in South Africa (Vol. 3, pp. 1213– 1252). Cape Town: Zebra Press. Wolvaardt, P., Wheeler, T., & Scholtz, W. (Eds.). (2010). From Verwoerd to Mandela: South African Diplomats Remember, 2 (pp. 151–184). Johannesburg: Crink Books. Xinhua News Agency. (1996, September 5). ‘Dual Recognition’ Unacceptable says People’s Daily.

Interviews Basson, C. (2017, January 20). Interviewed by Christopher Williams. Skype Conversation. Botha, P. J. (2017, February 17). Interviewed by Christopher Williams. Cape Town. Dietrichsen, P. (2017, June 9). Interviewed by Christopher Williams. Pretoria.

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Evans, L. (2017, March 2). Interviewed Christopher Williams and Claire Hurst. Pretoria. Human, N. K. (2016, December 5). Interviewed by Christopher Williams and Claire Hurst. Pretoria. Jordan, P. (2017, March 14). Interviewed by Christopher Williams. Cape Town. Pahad, A. (2017, March 7). Interviewed by Christopher Williams. Johannesburg. Pahad, E. (2014, September 10). Interviewed by Joel Netshitenzhe and Tony Trew, Johannesburg. The Nelson Mandela Foundation Archive. Available at https://archive.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/tpy-6-transcript-essop-pahad. Sisulu M. (2017, February 28). Interviewed by Christopher Williams. Johannesburg. Skweyiya, Z. (2017, June 30). Interviewed by Christopher Williams. Pretoria.

Archival Documents University of Fort Hare (UFH), National Heritage Cultural Studies Centre (NAHECS) UFH, NAHECS. (26 May 1990). Japan Mission, Box 6, File 16, ANC-Tokyo Office Press Release, ‘Taiwan Withdraws Visa for ANC Chief Representative to Japan’. UFH, NAHECS. (30 January 1992). Secretary General’s Office, Box 22, Folder 186, Letter from I-C. Loh to N. Mandela. UFH, NAHECS. (27 July 1992). NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, Letter from F. Chien to N. Mandela. UFH, NAHECS. (21–22 August 1992). Papers of the Secretary General’s Office, Box 5, Folder 34, ‘DIA Workshop’. UFH, NAHECS. (c. 1992). NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, Letter from N. Mandela to F. Chien. UFH, NAHECS. (c. October–November 1992). Walter Sisulu Papers (WSP), Box, 13, Folder 55, ‘Report: Visit of the President of the ANC, Comrade Nelson R Mandela to Pakistan and China’. UFH, NAHECS. (28 July 1993). NMP, Box 294, Folder 22, Facsimile transmission from T. Ditshego to B. Masekela ‘President’s Visit to R.O.C. on Taiwan’. UFH, NAHECS. (c. July 1993). NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, n.a. ‘Programme for the Visit of President Nelson R. Mandela to the Republic of China, July 30–August 2’. UFH, NAHECS. (1995). NMP, Box 193, Folder 409, Geldenhuys, D. South Africa and the China Question: A Case for Dual Recognition (Working Paper Series, 6). East Asia Project. International Relations Department, University of the Witwatersrand.

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UFH, NAHECS. (c. July–August 1996). NMP, Box 186, Folder 354, Report and Recommendations of the ANC Component of the Presidential Delegation to People’s Republic of China and Taiwan’. South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (DIRCO) DIRCO. (19 May 1994). Folder 1/24/3, J. Viljoen, ‘Talks with Foreign Minister Frederick Chien’. DIRCO. (28 September 1994). Folder 1/24/3, ‘Notes on the People’s Republic of China: Meeting between Minister A. Nzo and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’. DIRCO. (c. May 1994 [a]). Folder 1/24/3, ‘Policy Position on the two China’s’. DIRCO. (c. May 1994 [b]). Folder 1/24/3, Cabinet Memorandum, ‘The Possibility of Establishing Formal Diplomatic Relations with the People’s Republic of China’, n.d. DIRCO. (13 March 1995). Folder 1/24/3, L.B. Labuschagne, ‘China/RSA Relations: Discussions with Ji Peiding: Director’. DIRCO. (c. April 1996). Folder 1/24/3, Report on Visit to the People’s Republic of China by a Presidential Delegation Under the Leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. A. B. Nzo: 24–26 March 1996’. DIRCO. (12 March 1996). Folder 1/24/3, T. Mazibuko, ‘Proposed Ministerial Visit to China and Taiwan: Current Status of the visit’. DIRCO. (23 August 1996). Folder1/24/3, L. Labuschange to T. Mazibuko, ‘Notes: Meeting Between Foreign Minister Skweyiya and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, 22 August 1996’. DIRCO. (3 September 1996). Folder 1/24/3, S. Guofang (Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson), Comments quoted in L. Labuschange, ‘Diplomatic Relations with Taiwan: Reaction by the PRC to Statement by President Mandela’. DIRCO. (6 September 1996). Folder 1/24/3, R. Yingjie, ‘South Africa Should Discard Illusion’. Xinhua News Agency. DIRCO. (18 September 1996). Folder 1/24/3, C. Basson, ‘PRC Reaction to President Mandela’s Recent Statement on Continued Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China’. DIRCO. (16 October 1996). Folder 1/24/3, Nzo to N. Mandela, ‘Reaction by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Continued diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan’. DIRCO. (4 November 1996). Folder 1/24/3, A. Nzo to N. Mandela, ‘Greater China Region: Important Political Developments’.

CHAPTER 3

Leadership, Global Agendas and Domestic Determinants of South Africa’s Foreign Policy Towards China: The Zuma and Ramaphosa Years Chris Alden and Yu-Shan Wu

The significance of the presidency and its impact on South African foreign policy towards China, especially on seminal questions like diplomatic recognition and joining initiatives like BRICS, should not be underestimated. At the same time, as Moloka’s critique of South African foreign policy analysts suggests, an over-reading of executive influence as the sole significant source and driver of foreign policy does not do justice to the role of foreign (and economic or security) institutions and policy actors at other levels of government (Moloka 2019). In the case of South

C. Alden International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] Y.-S. Wu (B) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_3

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Africa–China ties, behind the key decision to raise the status of the relationship to that of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was an effort by Beijing to place ties on an institutional footing which, amongst other things, would ameliorate against the tidal forces of executive decisions and changing inputs. It would, in other words, not only improve policy alignment on issues of shared concern but it would develop personal links between middle-level bureaucrats that could facilitate closer cooperation and understanding over the long haul. This introduction of stability to the relationship was considered to be foreign policy necessity by Beijing as a step towards fostering longer term bilateral cooperation. By 2009, following the abrupt ousting of Mbeki from the ANC leadership in December 2007 and his subsequent replacement as South African president by the caretaker administration of Kgalema Motlanthe in 2008, Beijing was anxious to ‘upgrade’ the relationship. On the South African side, as the implications of the global financial crisis and China’s ability to weather it began to sink in, Jacob Zuma’s presidential campaign started touting the lessons for South Africa from adopting an Asian-style ‘development state’ approach. Early insights into the incoming Zuma administration’s aspirations for the relationship can be gleaned from a presentation on South Africa’s future economic relations with China made in November 2009 by Minister of Economic Development, Ebrahim Patel. He framed ties with China in terms of a set of domestic economic priorities, including the need for Chinese policies towards South Africa (and the continent as a whole) that would meet its needs for large-scale infrastructure development and employment creation. Fundamentally, he called for efforts to ensure that the current structure of trade, whereby South Africa was a supplier of raw materials and Europe and North America were exporters of manufactured goods, was not replicated in the relationship with China (Patel 2009, 13). Having granted China ‘market economy status’ in line with the WTO back in 2004 as part of the announcement of a joint ‘Strategic Partnership’, the South African government still expected more concrete progress in gaining market access to China and foreign investment into productive sectors of the economy. These remain the very issues prioritized and discussed with China under the Ramaphosa administration over a decade later. This chapter seeks to unpack the interplay between leadership, institutionalization and domestic factors in bilateral relations, and how these dynamics shape South African foreign policy towards China. Efforts to

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strengthen bilateral ties through the institutionalization of their respective government bureaucracies and concurrent engagement between party elites marked the first part of the decade. However, the growing significance of domestic factors, led by an ailing South African economy and corrupted practices under the Zuma administration, increasingly defined the push and pull of South Africa–China ties, eventually overshadowing even its international dimensions. These dynamics underscore the variety of sources of foreign policy and, against the backdrop of only partial success at institutionalization, the contingent nature of leadership and domestic aspects in defining bilateral ties.

South Africa and China in the Era of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership During President Zuma’s first state visit to China in August 2010, China and South Africa announced a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, which formally elevated bilateral ties from the previous ‘Strategic Partnership’. The Beijing Declaration, as it became known, signed by both presidents during the ‘upgrade’ in relations (Davies 2012), expressed the desire to deepen and strengthen cooperation and exchanges between the two countries through a set of concrete measures. Behind the decision to push forward in formal diplomatic relations from that of a strategic partnership and later a comprehensive strategic partnership was recognition of their shared outlooks in international affairs underpinned by economic interests and a concomitant desire by Beijing to strengthen coordination and planning between the two countries (Interview with retired diplomat, 2013). The expectation was that there would be closer policy alignment between the two countries and, with that, sharing of information and exchange of ideas that would facilitate closer cooperation. The mechanism for realizing these policy objectives was the Joint Inter-Ministerial Working Group (JIMWG) on China–South Africa Cooperation (see below). Specifically, the declaration outlined 38 bilateral cooperation agreements, ranging from political dialogues to trade and investment to mineral exploration and agriculture, most of which were identical to or elaborations of the areas identified in the strategic cooperation agreement six years beforehand (Alden and Wu 2014, 10). With regard to political and regional affairs, the two countries committed to enhancing joint efforts in the global arena, such as in the United Nations and FOCAC, and

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the presidents agreed to maintain frequent contact in order to enhance mutual understanding of and support for each other’s positions and interests (Stratsis Incite 2010). The establishment of the JIMWG on China–South Africa Cooperation at the meeting held in Beijing in 2010 was aimed, according to the South African Foreign Minister’s statement at the time of the launch, to ‘identify and work through any obstacles to the implementation of our bilateral commitments’ (Republic of South Africa 2010). Zuma appointed five Cabinet Ministers to serve on the South African side. The new arrangement envisaged bi-annual meetings of deputy president/prime minister and annual meetings at ministerial levels, coupled with more regularized contact between South African officials and Chinese diplomats, which would build trust and facilitate better cooperation. The two countries formally ratified the JIMWG only in March 2013, the delay itself a worrying sign from Beijing’s perspective. The practical implementation of this initiative remained problematic, however, with South African officials sometimes unable to attend or fully participate in joint events. This led one senior Chinese diplomat to suggest that the excessive workload of civil servants was contributing to occasional breaches in protocol by the South Africans (Centre for Chinese Studies 2007, 104). Despite this issue, DIRCO officials and their counterparts in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs met annually between 2008 and 2013 (Business Day 2013). During the same Zuma visit to China (accompanied by 370 representatives from the South African business community), South African and Chinese companies signed more than a dozen agreements covering investments in railway, power transmission construction, mining, insurance, telecoms and nuclear power. Most importantly, his trip was the last of a series of visits to the other BRIC countries that gave Zuma an opportunity to personally make the case for inclusion in the BRICs grouping, an initiative that was to pay dividends in late 2010 (Stuenkel 2013, 311). Expanding diplomatic engagement with China and the BRICS group was in the eyes of South African officials a precursor to improving bilateral and continental trade and investment regimes. In particular, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis harnessing Chinese development finance and construction expertise—though admittedly South African construction firms expected to play the key role in this sector at least domestically—to support infrastructure development would represent the best means of realizing South Africa’s development ambitions for itself and the continent (Nkoana-Mashabane 2012). These ambitions were

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reflected in DIRCO’s African Agenda, a re-articulation and extension of the Mbeki era’s pan-Africanist initiatives including the promotion of the New Economic Partnership for African Development and the establishment of the African Union (DIRCO 2011, 20–23; Nkoana-Mashabane 2016.) And yet at the 2012 FOCAC ministerial meeting, international media coverage of the event focused on Zuma’s comment that China– Africa relations were ‘unsustainable’ as they stood at that point. This reflected not—as portrayed by Western journalists—a lack of confidence in the ties but rather a shared view with Beijing that the contemporary economic foundation of the relationship needed to shift away from the pattern of unequal exchange if it was to thrive (The Presidency: the Republic of South Africa 2012; Hook 2012). Though only a minor feature of bilateral ties, military-to-military relations have also followed the pattern of gradual upgrading during the decade and a half of official diplomatic ties. The first meeting of the China–South Africa defence committee, a forum created in 2000 with the Pretoria Declaration, was held in April 2003 and it was only a year later that a formal agreement was signed allowing for training of South African soldiers and a donation of electronic equipment to the SANDF (Ntuli 2004). By 2010, the fourth China–South Africa defence committee meeting in November expanded security cooperation towards the continent. Under Zuma, acknowledgement of China’s expanded role in peacekeeping and supportive position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and at the African Union (AU) has resulted in greater enthusiasm in military circles for cooperation. South African Major-General Ntakaleleni Sigudu declared his appreciation of the Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA) contribution to achieving ‘the AU’s objectives of building its own strong, effective and efficient peacekeeping capability’ and endorsed the desire for closer coordination between the two militaries in bringing stability to the continent (Radebe 2013). In parallel, since the signing of the Beijing Declaration in 2000, commercial transactions between South Africa’s armaments manufacturer, Denel, and the Chinese military increased. The PLA has taken delivery of South African technologies related to anti-aircraft gun ammunition, antitank guided missiles and air-to-air missiles while South Africa’s aerospace industry has also established strong links in China, such as in developing unmanned aerial vehicle programmes (Grevatt 2010). Chinese pilots also received flight training from ex-South African air force and navy personnel in Mafikeng starting in 2010.

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Nevertheless, while there was an increased exchange of military personnel at this stage there is little trade in military goods between the two countries in this period, as South Africa continues to manufacture much of its own military equipment while sourcing the remainder from the European Union (Centre for Chinese Studies 2007, 111). Indeed, despite opening an office in Cape Town in the late 1990s, the Chinese industrial equivalent to Denel has been notably unsuccessful in penetrating the South African market. Party to party relations, on the other hand, thrived throughout this period. The SACP invited the CCP to the first party congress held in South Africa since its unbanning and return from exile and, along with the ANC, maintained close ties thereafter (Pahad interview, 2014). SACP Secretary General, Blade Nzimande, visited President Jiang Zemin in Beijing in November 1998 and they launched a mutual consultative mechanism, the ‘first of its kind’ for the CCP according to some sources (Le Pere and Shelton 2007, 163). This relationship, manifested through annual exchanges and participation in party conferences, became a channel for discussion of international issues. In 2010, the ANC leadership signed an agreement to send all members of its National Executive Committee to Beijing for three weeks training in management and organizational skills. This move reflected a broader interest on the part of the ANC in learning from the Chinese experience, which resulted in a longstanding programme to send government officials from various ministries for training with their counterpart ministries in China (Ubuntu Radio 2015). Finally, it should be recognized that the depth of diplomatic ties between South Africa and China went beyond the central state to include provincial links (Chen and Jian 2009). South African provinces like Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape partnered with Chinese provinces and cities. In the course of interaction, for instance, the Gauteng Economic Development Agency conducted eight missions to China between 1998 and 2002 as well as opening a ‘China desk’ to manage ties (Cornelissen 2006, 131). Indeed, the incoming ANC premier of Gauteng, addressing a gathering of leading businessmen in May 2014, expressed his administration’s specific desire to encourage more Chinese FDI into the province (Bizos, interview, 2014).

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South Africa and China Partnership as Implemented---From BRICS to FOCAC One of the signature events for South Africa–China relations was the invitation issued by Beijing, with the concurrence of its partners, to join the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group in December 2010 (Kornegay and Bohler-Muller 2013). Coming after years of Chinese lobbying to seek association with the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) group, the decision to bring South Africa in underscored the transformative effect of global financial crisis had had on the international system. With the establishment of the G20 group in 2009 to manage the crisis, composed of leading economies across the world including South Africa as Africa’s only member, emerging economies sought to strengthen their bargaining position within the group by mobilizing their own ‘G7 of the South’. For South Africa, this recognition of its premier position as Africa’s representative was both a vindication of Mbeki’s decade-long diplomacy and its own self-belief as the continental leader (Alden and Schoeman 2013). The impact on South African foreign policy overall and towards China was twofold. First, the South African government devoted considerable resources to the BRICS development finance agenda, picking up New Delhi’s initiative to create a BRICS bank when it hosted the BRICS Summit in 2013 (Nkoana-Mashabane 2012). Indeed, its own expectations—some would say delusions—led it to restructure the Development Bank of South Africa in anticipation of the New Development Bank (NDB) being situated in-country and expanding its lending portfolio to include Africa at large.1 South African financial contributions as a member were, in per capita terms quite significant while its participation in NDB and formal acceptance of the RMB as a reserve currency demonstrated its willingness to look beyond Western financial institutions (Kirton and Bracht 2013; Zuma 2015). The other impact of joining the group was to give increasing prominence to BRICS in its declarative diplomacy in international settings. For instance, South Africa endorsed the BRICS statement in 2014 in support of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and actions in eastern Ukraine (Keck 2014). Foreign policy alignment with China’s positions became more pronounced as well, reflected in the ANC International Department’s unashamedly positive view of China’s development experience and its shared outlook on anti-imperialism, especially in the aftermath

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of NATO’s incursion into Libya in 2011, in the 2015 ANC’s National General Council’s policy discussion document: China economic development trajectory [sic] remains a leading example of the triumph of humanity over adversity. The exemplary role of the collective leadership of the Communist Party of China in this regard should be a guiding lodestar of our own struggle. (African National Congress 2015)

Indeed, China was mentioned favourably—a record nine times—in terms of South Africa’s relationship with it and its rising role in the global arena (SABC News 2015). This generated unease from some South African foreign policy analysts and NGOs, who voiced concern that the government was moving away from the Mandela-era precepts on foreign policy (Allison 2015). An ascendant South Africa launched a controversial but successful bid to take over the AU Commission Chair in 2013 and, in that continental setting, assumed leadership (Alden and Schoeman 2013). Longstanding expectations of diplomatic and developmental collaboration with South Africa on the continent, signalled over the previous decade at a number of sponsored conferences and public utterances, seemed on the cusp of realization (Mpungose 2018). Despite Nksosana Dlamini-Zuma’s abruptly curtailed tenure in office, she used her capacity as Chair to steer the AU closer to China’s 4-6-1 Cooperation Framework with the signing of an MOU in January 2015 designed to pave the way for China to lead a continental-wide infrastructure development programme (China Daily 2015). The 4-6-1 Cooperative Framework envisaged Chinese financing and construction of three transport infrastructure networks and a substantive programme for industrialization of the continent. Two projects in particular, the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway that is a passage for landlocked Ethiopia and the Standard Gauge Railway connecting the coastal city of Mombasa to Nairobi in Kenya (and eventually onto Uganda), were seen as closely cohering with the ideas of ‘flagship’ programmes,2 namely the ‘world class infrastructure crisscrossing Africa’ identified by AU officials as part of its newly endorsed Agenda 2063 (African Union 2015, 4; Ndazendze and Monyae 2019). For her own part, the AU Chair and strong contender for the South African presidency expressed admiration for China’s development successes and its applicability to Africa:

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We believe we can effect change in a generation (in Africa). China did it, so we can too. (IOL 2015)

The primary pre-occupation of South Africa–China relations during this period was South Africa’s proposed hosting of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2015 (Shelton et al. 2015). South Africa’s conduct during the build up to the event elicited considerable concern in Beijing, for instance, the agenda proposed by the South African embassy in Beijing which MOFA assumed represented the government’s perspective on key issues for the upcoming FOCAC VI turned out to be at odds with what DIRCO officials said when they met with Chinese counterparts in Pretoria in early 2014 (Interview with senior diplomat, 2014). Such was the alarm in Beijing that they indicated that they were sceptical of FOCAC VI being designated as a summit—that is involving political leadership, including Xi Jinping, rather than a ministerial-level event—unless South Africa could demonstrate its ability to successfully host the AU Summit in June. In addition to logistical concerns, Beijing was worried that South Africa’s forthright position in the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the degree that this put it under obligation to detain Sudan’s Al-Bashir if it hosted an all Africa summit. A key advisor to the Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), DIRCO minister, Eddy Moloka, publicly stated at the time the determination of the government to host all these events, saying emphatically ‘our foreign policy focus is summits’ (Maloka 2015). Though the Sudanese president’s visit was marred by domestic controversy, including a late night secret departure from the summit to avoid protests and even seizure by police empowered by the courts, South African officials demonstrated that they were able to bring all African leaders to the country (Van der Vyver 2015). These events demonstrated that the once uneven response by the South African government to work more closely through the JIMWG in 2010 had been replaced four years later by a strong policy impetus to institutionalize relations with China not only in terms of diplomatic alignment but more significantly to cooperate at a continental level on promoting African development. This trend, however, was already being countered by domestic factors operating both within and outside of the relationship that would challenge South Africa’s capacities, its vision and even its bona fides as a continental leader as the subsequent sections demonstrate.

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Zuma’s Second Term: Captured by Domestic Politics The hosting of FOCAC VI was to be the seminal event for South Africa–China relations in Zuma’s second term in office and, as such, it represented all the features at play in South Africa that shape foreign and domestic aspects of policy. The South African government’s longstanding push for an integration of infrastructure and industrial development both domestically in its bilateral relations and at the continental level, with Chinese financial resources and know-how playing a crucial role, became central to the FOCAC agenda for 2015. Cyril Ramaphosa, then Deputy President, indicated this when he addressed the China–South Africa Business Forum held in Durban ahead of FOCAC VI, where he remarked on the already ‘strong foundation for a mutually beneficial trade, investment and development relationship’ (South African Government 2015a). In particular, he touched on the importance of the following as fundamental to enhancing closer ties: South African firms’ interest in entering China and other emerging markets, the prospects of Chinese investment in local manufacturing and beneficiation through industrial zones and finally, appreciation for China’s support as a vehicle for continental growth and development. Notably, Ramaphosa requested that China encourage its firms to invest in ‘ten investment projects’ in South African SEZs and incorporate ‘ten (South African produced) value-added products included in (Chinese) supply chains’ (South African Government 2015a), both seen as policies that would ameliorate the trend based on classic ‘African commodities for Chinese finished goods’ trade structure. He also recommitted the South African government to improving bilateral instruments of cooperation, namely the bi-national commission and the JIMWG. Zuma’s own state visit to Beijing in September 2015 formally committed FOCAC to be elevated to a summit level event (Wekesa 2016). And, after additional ministerial-level negotiations, a few days in advance of FOCAC VI, Xi Jinping signed a wide-ranging set of 26 agreements valued at R94 billion, which laid out a programme of Chinese investment, including into manufacturing and beneficiation, the development of special economic zones, infrastructure development and development financing (Wekesa 2016; South African Government 2015a). The FOCAC Summit itself was held in Johannesburg 4–5 December 2015, it reflected these national and international concerns in its thematic

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focus and especially in the Action Plan for 2016–2019. President Xi Jinping elaborated upon the previous agreements at the AU such as 4-61 and announced the jointly agreed ‘10-5-1’ framework for cooperation that is: ten cooperative plans focused on industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure finance, green development, trade and investment, poverty reduction, public health, cultural people-to-people exchanges and, finally, peace and security. These were underpinned by five pillars highlighting the nature of the relationship, that is political equality and mutual trust, win–win economic cooperation, mutual learning between Chinese and African civilization, mutual assistance in security, and solidarity and coordination in international affairs. Finally, Xi declared that the core of the relationship was the one comprehensive and strategic cooperative partnership between China and Africa (April, Shelton, Li 2015). The surprise pledge of an unprecedented US$60 billion in development financing by China drew much applause from African delegates and generated considerable excitement. This ‘leveraging of global partners’ to further the aims of Agenda 2063, recognized to be fundamental to achieving these ambitions, seem to have found its most accommodating partner in China. Though China–South Africa ambitions to expand ties considerably across government departments and between the governing political parties were partially realized under President Zuma, there were already signs that the efforts to institutionalize were stalling. Discussions were held on the occasion of Zuma’s state visit to China in May 2015 about, in Zuma’s words: (T)he implementation of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, through the Bi-National Commission and the Inter-ministerial Joint Working Group established recently. Yesterday we took our cooperation further and signed the 5 to 10 Year Framework on Cooperation to further enhance the implementation of the outcomes of the Bi-National Commission and Inter-ministerial Joint Working Group. (South African Government 2015b)

The emphasis on yet another re-framing of South Africa’s commitment to operationalizing key components of the five-year-old Comprehensive Strategic Partnership underscored Beijing’s frustration in dealing with the South African government.

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Behind these concerns was the deepening controversy that dogged the Zuma presidency and increasing evidence of his flagrant abuse of office for personal enrichment. The disjointed and chaotic government conduct that accompanied this process began to spill over in unexpected ways into South Africa–China ties. DIRCO itself, which opened Zuma’s second term in office in January 2015 with the replacement of ANC stalwart Ibrahim as deputy foreign minister by two provincial party figures with no experience in international relations and as well as the departure of ministerial advisor Eddy Moloka, continued to lose capacity and direction. The result was, with the exception of DIRCO’s head of the Asia desk Anil Sooklal, regular institutional engagement envisaged by the JIMWG began to atrophy. China’s National Day celebrations in Pretoria, for instance, became an opportunity for fundraise by one of Zuma’s wives for her charity, the Sizakele MaKhumalo Zuma Foundation, while even the Chinese ambassador reportedly complained about being ‘summoned’ to the Gupta’s mansion in Saxonwold (Johannesburg) for discussions in late 2014. If party politics as personal enrichment was intruding into the conduct of bilateral relations, the operational realities of the economic relationship exposed were not exempt from opportunism and elite collusion. The first significant Chinese investment into the South African mining sector bore all the hallmarks of such collusion with a Chinese investment entity, state-owned Shandong Gold Group, providing US$100 million to take a 65% share in the Aurora Empowerment Group whose directors included the president’s nephew, Khubuluse Zuma and Nelson Mandela’s grandson, Zondwa Mandela (Evans 2014). Zuma’s official visit to Beijing way back in August 2010 reportedly lay the foundation for a series of deals involving Khubuluse Zuma and Shandong but extended further to include distribution deals with Chinese state-owned car manufacturer Dong Feng Motor Company. Aurora had taken over the ailing Grootvlei and Orkney mines from Anglo-Ashanti Gold in October 2009 but its subsequent financial difficulties, poor environmental record at the mine sites and failure to pay its workers eventually caused it to go bankrupt, with the case ending up in a court battle between Aurora and Shandong Gold (Seccombe 2010; Plaut 2011; Evans 2014). Another example involved the deal between South African parastatal Transnet and China’s state-owned CRRC-E Loco to supply 1064 electric locomotives as part of upgrade of the ageing railway network. The US$1.6 billion deal signed in 2014, facilitated by a consultancy with links

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to the Gupta family which received an estimated $300 million in fees, involved a persistent manipulation of information by the Transnet board of executives to ensure that Chinese firm won the tender (Umraw 2019). The delivery of the first consignment of 95 locomotives, which were at wildly inflated costs and when tested proved to be defective, continued nonetheless to be produced until a court order forced the company to cease production and return some of the money (Matiwane 2019; Umraw 2019; Comrie 2019). If these cases represented egregious examples of involvement in corruption, the launching of an assembly plant by the television and appliance manufacturer, Hisense, in the Western Cape in June 2013, was a more positive example (Kim 2016). Entering the South African market in 1996, the Chinese state-owned company elected to invest in a factory which, while experiencing difficulties with local unions over low wages and conditions, nonetheless has been able to profit by capturing both the local market and even serving as an exporter to the region (Kim 2016, 220). A decision to invest a further US$4.5 million in 2019, expanding local employment to over 500 fulltime local workers in a region largely bereft of new jobs, was indicative of the contribution that Chinese FDI could make in re-developing the South African economy towards exports (SA News 2019; Kim 2016, 221–223). Much like Hisense, Shanghai’s FAW automobile firm entered the South African market back in 1994, and after commercial success in selling its vehicles, decided to open an assembly plant in Coega in 2014. Initially employing over 100 local workers, the R600 million investment (supported by the China–Africa Development Fund, a special financing instrument of the China Development Bank) into the moribund Coega industrial zone in the Eastern Cape not only was an anchor project for the zone but was an important boost to the local economy as well (Low Velder 2018). By 2018, it had produced and sold over 1000 vehicles and was exporting to countries in the region. Ironically, a key competitor was FAW-China, whose vehicles were sometimes able to command a lower ticket price than those produced locally at Coega (Creamer Media 2019).3 The narrowing focus of Zuma’s foreign policy and its institutional weaknesses had, by 2016, provided a gap which the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second largest party in the country, attempted to fill with a revised form of Mandela-era foreign policy concerns while the smaller Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) used this demise in state-led foreign

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policy to produce a populist internationalist agenda. The visit to Taipei by Solly Msimanga, the newly elected DA mayor to Tshwane4 in December 2016 in search of foreign investment and training produced a risible shock in Beijing and an open letter in the media by interests claiming to represent the whole Chinese community denouncing the move (China Daily 2017; Haffajee 2017). This was despite the fact that it was later disclosed how Minister Rob Davies of Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) himself, along with eighteen other business representatives had conducted a similar business visit to Taiwan in August 2014 (Biznews.com 2017). However, coming in the aftermath of the DA’s criticism of the ANC government for refusing to grant a visa for the proposed visit by the Dalai Lama in April 2014, the third such request in five years, this contributed to the sense that the ANC’s diminished electoral success might translate into changes in South Africa-China ties if the DA came to power (News24 2014). Firebrand Julius Malema, an ex-ANC Youth League leader and founder of the radical EFF, also periodically offered his own populist (and sometime contradictory) critique of China and especially Zuma’s relationship with Beijing that played well with his supporters (Sunday Independent 2011; The South African 2019). Moreover, by this time the ANC government’s image also began to suffer back at home, where it not only experienced voting losses at municipal polls in late 2016 but serious revelations of corruption scandals also emerged (Madonsela 2016). Details of the extent of state capture were further illuminated the following year as thousands of emails that implicated the Gupta family’s influence over state institutions under Zuma’s leadership, also known as #GuptaLeaks, were revealed by whistle-blowers and thereafter voluminous investigative reports were published by local media. The struggle over the control of the National Treasury assumed greater significance as Zuma and his cronies sought to remove the last vestiges of financial accountability that blocked their ambitious looting of state resources. Partly for these reasons as well as internal ANC party pressure, Zuma was eventually forced to resign in early 2018, making way for the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa.

Ramaphosa at the Helm: Towards Realizing a Development Partnership In the midst of ANC party and government leadership changes, there was little indication of how this sudden shift as well as Ramaphosa’s rhetoric of ‘change’ would impact South Africa’s relations with China, particularly as links appeared to have progressed most rapidly under Zuma.

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Some continuation of relations was however expected, as Ramaphosa was already involved in interactions between the two sides as the country’s former deputy president. Formally taking office on 15 February 2018, Rampahosa faced a range of formidable international and domestic challenges. Global circumstances had changed considerably since his last public role as the ANC chief negotiator during the constitutional talks in the early 1990s. Signs of a US–China trade war appeared imminent and threatened to impact South Africa’s economy through a general loosening of American commitments to the liberal international trading system and specific measures like restrictions on Chinese high-tech products. These were on top of an economy with anaemic growth, persistent demands domestically to create jobs (with an alarming and stubborn 27.7% unemployment rate), the need to tackle issues of corruption and residue of political scandals from the previous administration, as well as regain voter confidence for the ruling ANC ahead of national elections the following year (Van Zyl 2018). South Africa’s links going forward with China would be informed by these realities, particularly as the pressure to direct the country’s development trajectory in a positive direction mounted. These priorities found policy expression in existing and proposed projects between China and South Africa. For example, it was announced that Beijing Automobile International Corporation (BAIC)—which opened a plant in the Coega Special Economic Zone (Port Elizabeth) in 2012—would launch its production line in 2018 (Lin 2018). More investments into auto manufacturing were expected to follow as Ramaphosa later announced in 2019, with the opening of the Tshwane Automotive Special Economic Zone in 2021 (where nine international companies will be involved). Likewise when Xi Jinping paid South Africa a state visit, off the back of the BRICS summit in July 2018, China pledged to invest $14.7 billion5 as well as offer loans6 to the state’s power utility, Eskom, and logistics company, Transnet (Mhlanga 2018). This followed from Ramaphosa’s successful efforts to secure investments ($10 million) from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates respectively, contributing to his target of raising $100-billion worth of investments (Mvumvu 2018). During Ramaphosa’s participation in the FOCAC VII Summit in Beijing that same September, the two sides inked a deal for a 4600megawatt coal power station in Limpopo. Linked to the coal fire plant was a bevy of nine Chinese companies reportedly planning to invest up to R145 billion in the sixty square kilometre Musina-Makhado SEZ

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anchored by a one million tonne ferro-maganese plant, a 450,000 tonne silico-maganese plant and a 300,000 tonne ferrosilicon plant (African News Agency 2018; Bloom 2020). Controversy, however, surrounded this ‘metallurgical cluster’ and its accompanying coal fire plant: not only was there a lack of transparency on its legal standing in Eskom, critics have pointed to its environmental impact—with unrestricted flow of toxins and other industrial pollutants into the Limpopo river possible—and the expected displacement of local communities. Moreover, the power produced by the plant would not, as initially claimed, be used to address the pressing national energy shortage (Van Rensburg 2018; Bloom 2020). Complementing these domestic projects were Chinese initiatives in neighbouring countries with direct impact on the South African economy. Intra-regional trade received a boost with the Maputo-Catembe Bridge a 3-kilometre long suspension bridge connecting Mozambique and South Africa, constructed by China Road and Bridge Corporation and underwritten by a $785 million loan from China Exim Bank taken out by the Mozambican government (Rangongo 2018). The bridge drastically reduces the travel time between Maputo and South Africa’s Kosi Bay, from 6 to 1.5 hours, contributing to Ramaphosa’s stated vision of greater African economic integration. At the same time, although 2018 started with new-found hope and momentum in relations, it became clear that Ramaphosa had inherited a set of pressing concerns that contrasted with the celebratory nature of state visits and agreements signed, as well as the strong links already forged by high-level government and business ties. In particular, the government was criticized by the South African civil society and opposition parties for the lack of transparency in relations with Beijing and even alarm over China’s ‘undeniable’ influence in the country (Booysen 2018). More specifically, local commentators queried7 the 2018 loans from China, some raising concerns over repayment and interest rates in an already dire economic situation. Exaggerating matters was the circulating debate over Africa’s general debt situation with China, in light of headlines like Sri Lanka’s ‘debt trap’ and dependence on China that local observers would reference, causing some to question the consequences of China acquiring some of the country’s strategic state enterprises (Khaas 2018). What became apparent was the limited publicly available information on these loan agreements that contributed to concerns, so much so that opposition parties—particularly the DA8 —demanded that details of the agreement between Eskom and China Development Bank (CDB) be

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made public. Their argument was predicated on the expectation that the debt issue would impact taxpayers and also the fact that the Guptas had siphoned previous loans from the same bank. Similar concerns emerged over the coal power station in Limpopo, where some commentators questioned the future of coal in the country and even the ailing parastatal, Eskom; others noted the plant would likely only service the Chinese-run industrial park (Wasserman 2018; Daniel 2018). The president did respond to some of these queries. For instance, during a National Assembly session in September 2018, Ramaphosa assured opposition that China had no imperialist intentions and that government was acting primarily in South Africa’s national interest regarding loans (National Council of Provinces 2018; Kekana 2018). He added that the loan that Eskom took from China was with CBD, and it was globally competitive and that no assets were promised against it (National Council of Provinces 2018, 51). Likewise he mentioned that Transnet’s loan came from ICBC and not CBD and amounted to R4 billion, it has a 5-year grace period.9 The same line was taken during the FOCAC VII meeting, along with Rwanda and Senegal, where criticisms over debt were refuted.

IV Conclusion The ANC’s victory in the general election held in May 2019, winning 57.5% of the votes appeared to have given Ramaphosa the momentum to continue with 2018 objectives—for example, South Africa managed to host a second South African Investment Conference in November 2019, where more investment commitments were made. At the same time, the challenges that the country faces appear to run deeper than anticipated. Details of corruption remain ingrained in South Africans’ memories as new revelations surfaced with the launch of the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture in August 2018. While only meant to last 180 days, new testimonies continued to pour in over the course of 2019 and 2020 with the commission’s extension into 2021. South Africa’s economic future looks uncertain in this context, impacting upon the vision of enhanced engagement with China. Signs of continued debate and concern over the country’s borrowing—including from China—remain. Details surrounding the agreements of South Africa’s state-owned enterprises remain ‘anecdotal’ according to some critics; while others demand that the mismanaged taxpayer funds paid

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out to Chinese firms and the Guptas, by Transnet, be paid back (Collocott 2019; Duvenage 2019). However, the issue also runs deeper than relations with China, as of December 2019 South Africa had taken out $2 billion in loans from the BRICS’ NDB, with majority of the loans (4 of 8) being approved that year (Fabricius 2019). Compounding these economic woes, the country was also downgraded to sub-investment—or ‘junk’—status by Moody’s in late March 2020. In all of this, Ramaphosa has been left with a gruelling task of consolidating domestic dynamics and relations with China and other partners, along with deeper problems that span beyond his presidency. For instance, the country’s energy future remains contested, due to ageing coal plants and Eskom’s uncertain financial future that continued to contribute to a series of power cuts in 2019 and into 2020. These power cuts have taken place intermittently since 2008. Yet few solutions seem to have surfaced, despite the fact that Ramaphosa had announced the power utility would be restructured during his 2019 SONA address (and again in his 2020 speech). The complications appear to run so deep that the Chinese lender, CBD, reportedly withheld scheduled funds out of concern that construction of agreed projects would not materialize (Head 2019). In any case, it appears that the South Africa–China relationship also has its boundaries. This was expressed by former Chinese ambassador Lin Songtian10 who stated that South Africa could only attract Chinese investment if it resuscitated its stagnant economy, renovated its infrastructure and guaranteed the governance of state-owned enterprises (Times Live 2019). Though by this time the preponderance of the domestic agenda weighed heavily on South Africa–China ties, not all activities related exclusively to localized concerns. It remained visible on the global stage as South Africa carried out its third term on the United Nations Security Council (2019–2020) and furthermore, Ramaphosa assumed African Union chair in early 2020 where he was expected to drive the launch of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA). Yet again, as with relations with China, high-level diplomacy has yet to meet with adequate returns and match local reality. This is reflected by the concurrent problems of power cuts and in the last quarter of 2019, a serious wave of xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals that tarnished the country’s standing abroad (Human Rights Watch 2019). Beyond Africa, the annual BRICS Summits provided an opportunity for South African diplomacy to utilize that platform to give expression to its views on global affairs (BRICS Information Centre 2020). At

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the BRICS Summit hosted by South Africa in 2018, the South African government outlined positions on conflict in Syria, UN reform, SDGs, climate change alongside its partners, as well as the necessity for industrialization in Africa. This BRICS diplomatic cooperation was extended further into areas like the country’s first joint naval training exercises with China and Russia conducted in 2019 in waters just off of the Western Cape (Zhen 2019). Given that India and Brazil conducted equivalent naval exercises with South Africa under the auspices of the India–Brazil– South Africa (IBSA) tripartite group in 2014, 2016 and 2018, and neither were participating, this seemed to signal of South Africa’s growing diplomatic proximity to Beijing and Moscow. Equally, Chinese support was an important factor in South African efforts to earn an unprecedented third term in less than fifteen years as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. South Africa’s long road to closer relations with China has traversed ground that has taken it from the trials of revolution through to the challenges of development. Their shared reading of global affairs, however, masks their differences at times over specific issues, the conduct of companies and policy approaches towards achieving development aspirations. This is acutely felt by a South African government seeking ways of restoring institutional resilience and economic prosperity at home, while maintaining its perceived leadership role on a continent where Chinese interests increasingly dominate. Balancing deepening dependency on Chinese economic interests with South African desire for autonomy is a dilemma facing policy makers and businesses alike. Further unlocking a relationship which both sides believes holds potential for greater cooperation remains an ambition that has yet to be fully realized.

Notes 1. In the end, the NDB was located in Shanghai. 2. These were reframed as Li Keqiang’s ‘Three Networks and Industrialisation’ projects for Africa. 3. Rob Davies had initially hoped that there would a greater gain for employment at 400 jobs and higher production of up to 5000 vehicles sold (Gabara 2014). 4. Pretoria, the administrative capital of the country, had been renamed Tshwane in the late 2000s. 5. The sectors included: oceans economy, green economy, science and technology, agriculture, environment and finance.

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6. Eskom reportedly secured a $2.5 billion long-term loan facility with China Development Bank and Transnet received an undisclosed long-term loan from the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd and Naspers Ltd. 7. For example, see opinion piece by: Terry Bell, China Loans: Explain the Fine Print, Please, 3 August 2018, https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/ china-loans-explain-the-fine-print-please-20180803-2. 8. This was not the first time the opposition challenged Chinese engagement with the country. In May 2018 the Economic Freedom Fighters took issue with land that was awarded to Chinese companies to grow rice and build a power station in Mpumalanga. See https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ row-over-land-set-aside-for-chinese-20180518. 9. According to Kekana (2018) the principal amount would be paid in 20 instalments over 10 years. Although unlike the Hansard report he refers to Eskom and not Transnet. 10. At the time of finalising this chapter, the Chinese government had recalled Ambassador Lin; although details of the decision remain anecdotal. See https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-19-suddenrecall-of-chinas-ambassador-to-sa-raises-questions-offers-few-answers/.

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CHAPTER 4

South Africa–China Relations of Seven Decades (1949–2019): Review and Reflection Lu Jiang

Introduction Bilateral official contact can be traced back to the early twentieth century the British Empire’s colonial possessions in South Africa and the Qing Empire between of China (Yap and Man 1996, 171–174). For most of the time during the first-half century, however, there was only a loose consular-level link (Lin 2001, 54) with limited interaction between the two sides. This was in part due to the extremely turbulent domestic situation in China (and to a lesser extent in South Africa), but also reflected the lack of interest or strategic needs of the two for each other as well. It is only after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949 that more meaningful interactions started to take place between China and a diversity of political stakeholders in the Republic of South Africa (RSA). In particular, a decades-long partnership has been formed between the African National Congress (ANC) and the CPC, from providing mutual political support

L. Jiang (B) Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_4

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at (quasi-)party-to-party level during the early years to seeking SouthSouth solidarity at state-to-state level with the power assumption of the ANC in 1994 and establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1998. The past two decades since 1998 have witnessed a dramatic development of all-around relations between South Africa and China. Particularly notable is the fact that within a mere ten years (2000– 2010) the bilateral ties were upgraded from ‘partnership’ to ‘strategic partnership’ and then ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, which clearly denotes an increasing consensus of both sides on the necessity of strengthening cooperation in a broad array of areas with each other. That said, there have also been a few visible and potential obstacles that may impose challenges for the proclaimed ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ to be fully realized.

Review: Harmony and Discord in the RSA–PRC Relations (1949–2019) The seven-decade relations between South Africa and China from 1949 can be divided into three phases, marked by two important historical events—the ANC’s accession to power in 1994 and the establishment of diplomatic links between the two countries in 1998. The three phases are characterized by different relational features and periodic themes in bilateral ties: from (quasi-) party-to-party connections between the ANC and CPC mutually seeking political support in the early stage (1949–1994), to interactions over the establishment of diplomatic relations (1994– 1997), and then development of normal and comprehensive state-to-state relations (1998–2019). 1949–1994: Early Non-official Connections Between the RSA and PRC In 1949, the PRC was founded. In line with US policy at the time, the National Party (NP) government of RSA did not recognize the PRC but kept connections with the Kuomintang regime, which had already retreated to Taiwan after losing the civil war to the CPC. ‘Consular’ links were formally established between Pretoria and Taipei in 1967 (Lin 2001, 59). The bilateral ties were further strengthened during the 1970s as both of the two became increasingly isolated by the international community. In 1976—five years after Taiwan was expelled from the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) and two years after South Africa was suspended

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from participating in the UN Congress—both sides decided to enhance their bilateral ties to full ‘diplomatic’ relations and started to exchange ‘ambassadors’ (Lin 2001, 59). It is for this reason as well as the antiapartheid considerations that the PRC did not develop political contacts with the RSA from 1949, and further cut commercial and communication (post and telegraph services) ties with the latter since the 1960s. As a result, there were no diplomatic links between the Pretoria and Beijing during 1949–1994—although some initial contacts between the two sides started to develop from the late 1980s with the policy adjustments taken by the de Klerk administration, which also led to the setting-up of quasiofficial representative offices in Pretoria and Beijing respectively in 1992 (Jiang and Shu 2019, 7–10). At non-official levels, however, the PRC maintained contact with the liberation organizations and political parties of South Africa from the early 1950s. The key pairs of relations were developed between China and the South African Communist Party (SACP), ANC and Pan-African Congress (PAC), which dated back roughly to 1950, 1951 and 1961 respectively.1 Relations with the SACP were dealt with by the CPC directly, particularly after 1960 when the two established formal party-to-party links. Contacts with ANC and PAC, on the other hand, were initially treated as people-to-people exchange and dealt with by a variety of CPC-led mass organizations, such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) and Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), among others (Zhong and Xu 2008, 1217). This situation did not change until the 1980s when inter-party relations were also established by the CPC with both ANC and PAC (see below). Throughout the 1950s–1980s, the PRC provided continual support to the three entities, either in terms of political endorsement, financial and material assistance or cadre training (Zhong and Xu 2008, 1219–1251). From this perspective, it is true that—as commented by Chinese former President Jiang Zemin—‘China has always been staunchly supporting the just struggle of the South African people’ (People’s Daily 1994). However, what is less noted are some unpleasant episodes between the PRC and South African political organizations and parties—particularly the ANC–SACP alliance. Indeed, the two sides experienced a split-up of relations twice in their four-decade interactions. The first time was in the mid-1960s when the ANC–SACP alliance took harsh attitudes towards China during the high tide of Sino-Soviet dispute. As a response, China

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then unilaterally severed direct links with the ANC and SACP, and soon transferred support to the PAC (the ANC’s competitor). From the midto late 1970s, there was once a short period of reconciliation between the ANC and CPC. It, however, soon cooled down during 1978–1979 when the ANC–SACP, in line with the Soviet Union, publicly criticized the PRC over the Sino–Vietnam conflict. Again, China responded by cutting ties with the ANC–SACP. These episodes proved to have left negative impressions on some rank-and-file fellows and even high-level officials of the ANC until the early 1990s, and thus a ‘sense of distance’ between the two sides (Jiang and Shu 2019, 4–5). The restoration of relations between the CPC and ANC–SACP started since the early 1980s, against the context of the policy shifts of China as well as the CPC on foreign affairs (Han 1988, 337–339). During Oliver Tambo’s visit to China in 1983, the CPC formally established inter-party relations with the ANC.2 Soon after that the CPC–SACP relationship was also normalized, marked by the SACP Secretary General Joe Slovo’s visit to China in 1986. People-to-people interactions resumed during the same period (Jiang and Shu 2019, 5–6). After the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, he was immediately invited to visit China. Mandela finally made his trip to Beijing in October 1992 upon the invitation from China’s then President Yang Shangkun. To many, particularly those on the Chinese side, the relations between China and the ANC was steadily on the up since reconciliation in the 1980s. This caused an atmosphere of overconfidence among many of the Chinese about the ANC’s choice of Beijing over Taipei once it took power. 1994–1997: An Unexpected Delay in the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations With the victory of the general election in 1994, Nelson Mandela became the first black President ever in the history of RSA who enjoyed unprecedented renown and popularity around the world. By that time, one of the two barriers in between RSA–PRC relations—the apartheid regime—was removed. Regarding the other barrier—the Taiwan issue—the Chinese diplomats did not expect it to become a major problem. After all, the PRC had experienced a decade of reconciliation with the ANC and kept benign interactions with its Party President Mandela, while Taiwan had long maintained close partnership with the apartheid regime and started to approach ANC only since late 1991 (Jiang and Sh 2019, 7). In February

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1994, two months before the general election, then Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei visited South Africa and delivered a letter from Chinese President Jiang Zemin, wherein Jiang suggested both sides start to put onto agenda the issue of building formal relations. Tian even brought with him copies of a draft Joint Communiqué and Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between South Africa and China, as per the suggestion made by the International Department of the ANC in late 1993. However, the South African side decided to postpone that process, explaining that they needed to consider the existing relations between Taiwan and the NP government (Jiang and Shu 2019, 11–12). Indeed, Mandela’s attitude towards China and the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with it was positive in the early 1990s. Things turned out to change dramatically after he finished his Taiwan trip in 1993. A few factors—the economic performance of Taiwan as well as the largesse donated by Taipei, among others—may help explain the shifts of Mandela’s attitude. As a result, despite all the reassuring gestures made to the mainland before and immediately after his Taiwan trip, Mandela soon started to proclaim his ‘dual recognition’ position in April 1994 and stuck to the stance for more than two years (Jiang and Shu 2019, 12– 14). At least three factors may have contributed to President Mandela’s insistence to the ‘dual recognition’ stance which imposed significant challenges for the Pretoria–Beijing relations during 1994–1996. First, the active ‘diplomatic’ efforts made by Taipei misled President Mandela to believe that ‘dual recognition’ was a possible solution although in fact even Taipei itself knew clearly that Beijing would in no way accept it. Second, President Mandela, among other stakeholders in South Africa, was not well informed of China and its policy (and bottom-line) on the Cross-Strait issue, particularly during 1994–1995; this lack of information and understanding was further strengthened by the once popular ‘South African exceptionalism’ mindset. Last, the existence of several South African interest groups in favour of Taiwan served as a public opinion foundation for President Mandela’s ‘dual recognition’ position (Jiang and Shu 2019, 14–16). Given the reasons above, it was not until November 1996 that President Mandela finally made the difficult decision to choose Beijing over Taipei. It was almost entirely out of President Mandela’s personal ‘sense of timing’; even the Foreign Minister and his deputy were informed of the decision at the last minute on 26 November. On the next day, the decision

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was formally announced to the public. Two rounds of negotiation were held between Pretoria and Beijing in 1997 before the Joint Communiqué and Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations was signed at the end of the year. The Republic of South Africa and People’s Republic of China formally became diplomatic partners since 1 January 1998 (Jiang and Shu 2019, 16–18). 1998–2019: Development of Comprehensive Inter-State Relations The past two decades since the establishment of formal diplomatic ties in 1998 have witnessed a rapid and comprehensive development of bilateral relations between the RSA and PRC, which is particularly visible under President Zuma’s term (2009–2018). The advancement is remarkable in that relations have been upgraded to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ within only ten years of formal state-to-state interactions.3 That said, tensions also exist around evolving themes and at different levels between the two countries. To a certain extent, a ‘sense of distance’, as seen in earlier years of their interactions, is still there, despite the ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ claimed on official documents. To start with the upside of bilateral relations, the achievement gained over a mere twenty years is indeed encouraging. Frequent meetings of leaders and high-level officials, held either through mutual state visits or on multilateral occasions, have brought a series of agreements and mechanisms spreading over a diversity of cooperation fields. Most notably, as just mentioned, the bilateral ties have been positioned from ‘partnership’ by the Pretoria Declaration signed in 2000, to ‘strategic partnership’ in 2004, and then ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ via the Beijing Declaration signed when the newly elected President Zuma visited China in 2010. Concurrently, at least two important constant exchange mechanisms have been put in place. One is the high-level binational commission formally established in 2001, which has since held seven (as at November 2019) plenary meetings and a number of sub-committee meetings on issues of diplomacy, commerce, technology, defence, education, energy and mining. The other is a strategic dialogue mechanism launched in 2008, held almost annually.4 In 2014, South Africa and China signed for the first time a medium to long-term strategic plan (2015–2024) that aims to guide and further boost the bilateral cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2019). Alongside the top-level meetings and cooperation frameworks at government level, constant political exchanges

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also take place between the legislative agencies, political parties and militaries between South Africa and China (Alden and Wu 2014, 11–12). Economically, the bilateral trade volume has increased by more than 26 times from $ 1.6 billion in 1998 to $ 43.5 billion in 2018 (National Bureau of China). Only a decade after building official ties, China became and remained the largest trading partner of South Africa since 2009 while South Africa became the largest trading partner and investment destination of China in Africa since 2010 (SAfm 2019). In addition, public diplomacy has also been greatly enhanced. In 2017, South Africa became one of the eight countries in the world (and the only one in Africa) that China established a high-level people-to-people exchange mechanism with, which covers a wide diversity of areas from education, culture, technology, sanitation, media, tourism, among others (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2017). Finally, in terms of multilateral cooperation, the most significant achievement was the inclusion of South Africa as member of the BRICS during China’s chairmanship in 2010. In addition, South Africa has also actively engaged in China-initiated multilateral mechanisms such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Despite an overall rapid and positive development of bilateral relations, tensions also occurred on different fronts. Some of the typical examples can be seen, for instance, in the trade clashes and different approaches to the UN reform agenda between the two sides. As noted above, the trade relations between South Africa and China grew significantly over the two decades since 1998. While regarding China as an important trade partner, its strong manufacturing and export capacity has also contributed to South Africa’s existing deficit pattern in external trade, a threat to its home industry development (Alden and Wu 2014, 15–18). President Mbeki, for instance, warned the continent against ‘merely becoming a supplier of raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods’ soon after the Beijing Summit of FOCAC in 2006 (Mail & Guardian 2006); President Zuma also referred to the trade structure between Africa and China unsustainable during the 5th FOCAC held in Johannesburg (IOL News 2012). As an indication, from 1998 to 2018, South Africa took up 33 anti-dumping actions against China. This is incomparable with the main anti-dumping measures raised against China, from advanced countries (e.g. the United States, EU and Australia) and the developing world (e.g. India, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil), but South Africa still ranks top of Chinese trade partners in Africa

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(only followed by Egypt). This was even more visible during the early 2000s when South Africa used to be among the top ten countries that raised the most anti-dumping sues against China (CTRI). While a common practice in international trade, China would expect trade problems, particularly with ‘strategic partners’ like South Africa, to be dealt with through negotiation and coordination, instead of blunt antidumping actions or even politicization.5 Despite that, according to Liu Haifang (2017), China’s reaction towards South Africa’s anti-dumping practice against China has appeared to be moderate and calm, encouraging Chinese companies who view this as an ‘irritant and hindrance’, to ‘accept South Africa’s anti-dumping measures as part-and-parcel of the experience of going abroad and part of an unavoidable learning cure, especially in export-dependent sectors’. This rational attitude of the Chinese side is also confirmed by Liu Guijin (2014), former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa: While recognizing that the existing nature of trade structure between South Africa and China is not something unique in [the] case of the two countries only, and it’s mainly the responsibility of South Africa to restructure and diversify its economy so as to offer more competitive commodities, it comes the time when the Chinese side has to rationally think over and try to work together with South African government and business to mitigate and cope with the real challenges.

Another visible difference of views, albeit inexplicitly, concerns the UN reform and in particular South Africa’s seeking of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC). The call for reform has maintained for decades, which requires amendments to the Permanent 5’s exclusive control over the UNSC. The new South Africa since Mandela’s administration has consistently sought to expand membership to include more African countries, with an explicit pursuit to seek a permanent seat representing Africa (DIRCO 2011). To win support from other African countries, South Africa joined the ‘Africa Group’ by agreeing to the consensus achieved in 2005 by African Union. That said, South Africa is also members of L67, a broader coalition of developing countries and IBSA, which serve as platforms to facilitate its reform objectives. Understandingly, while expressing general support for the UNSC reform in favour of the shared interests of all and the strengthening of representativeness of developing countries, China tends to take a modest

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attitude on this issue and avoids to rush into any reform actions. Also, China does not generally express its position towards specific countries, except strong opposition to the inclusion of Japan, and implicitly, that of India. The proactive acts of South Africa to hasten reforms and in particular, its cooperation with India,6 through L67 and particularly IBSA, clearly do not fit well with China’s position on the UNSC reform issue. On the other hand, South Africa is also not satisfied with China’s lack of support on the UN.7 While South Africa has increasingly coordinated positions with China (Bradley 2016, 889), this issue may stand as one of the few that the two sides are not easy to attain agreement with each other.

Reflection: A ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ to Be Fulfilled The first part of the article has reviewed the seven-decade interactions between South Africa and the PRC, in particular since 1998 when formal diplomatic links were established. Despite the rapid upgrading of bilateral relations, there are a few factors which may impose challenges for South Africa and China to further their ‘comprehensive partnership’. Economic frictions, as touched upon earlier, are a factor at work, but should not be overstated for the current trade balance and structure problems between the two are neither unique in the external trade relations of South Africa or that of China with the rest of the continent. It is argued here that at least two other aspects, the ‘African agenda’ and the value factor, should also be taken into account. The ‘Africa Agenda’ in Between South Africa–China Relations The foreign relations of contemporary South Africa can be seen as resting on four pillars according to the partner types, respectively relations with the African continent, the developing world (‘the South’), the advanced countries (‘the North’) and the global community (DIRCO of South Africa). Of these, seeking a leadership in Africa has always been at the core of South African foreign policy.8 To achieve that, South Africa has been actively involved in addressing key security and development issues on the continent through playing out a series of roles from an examplesetter, mediator-integrator, diplomat, to the voice of Africa (Landsberg and Monyae 2006, 132–138). The Southern and Northern relations of

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South Africa, further, are the two sides of the same coin. While both serve as the objects of its economic diplomacy, at the political level however, the increasingly affirmative stance on South-South solidarity and at times an ‘anti-West’ narrative of the ANC and its government since 1994 (see e.g. ANC 2015), have to a certain extent alienated South Africa from the bloc of developed countries (Landsberg 2010, 285–286; Landsberg and Hierro 2017, 123). Last, a reformist of global governance, South Africa has also tirelessly engaged in multilateral platforms like the UN, Bretton Woods institutions and G20, with a view to reshape the international system into one that demonstrates global equality and social justice. Having said that, constrained by the priority order as well as the country’s actual power (and thus its global reach), the African pillar or agenda—i.e. pursing leadership on the continent—has arguably occupied the centrality of South Africa’s foreign policy and informed its dealing of relations on the other pillars. Indeed, as argued by Alden and Schoeman (2016, 14–15), ‘multilateralism and global summitry activism’ that featured prominently in South Africa’s Southern, Northern and global diplomacy, ‘are more than an effort to promote a reformist internationalist agenda and end the marginalization of the continent… By consciously articulating these issues through a global platform, the South African government reaffirms the country’s primus in pares status to a regional and international audience as the only African state capable of addressing complex global issues leading the continent’. Within the mapping set above, China can be found on the second-tier, that is within the Southern link of South Africa’s foreign policy. Though a power on the rise, China did not gain special attention from the South African leadership particularly in the initial decades after the two established diplomatic ties. The ‘African agenda’ and the accompanying intent to gain support from the developed countries for South Africa-led initiatives such as the NEPAD, occupied so much enthusiasm and efforts of the government—since Mandela’s time but more evidently during Mbeki’s term—that China was relatively ‘neglected’ (Alden and Wu 2014, 8). This inadequate attention towards China was felt by the Chinese diplomats9 and observers.10 The bilateral relations started to take momentum only after President Zuma took office in 2009.11 While largely inheriting the foreign policy from his predecessor, the Zuma administration took a more affirmative attitude on economic diplomacy; on the other hand, the increasing economic power and global influence of China, particularly against the context of global economic slowdown since 2008, as well as

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its growing ties with Africa, have made a neglect of China impossible. This is exemplified by the fact that Zuma was accompanied by more than 200 business leaders and entrepreneurs during his first state visit to China in 2010 (South African Government 2010). The ‘African agenda’ can also be seen in the bilateral interactions at multilateral occasions. Take the FOCAC as an example, while South Africa has been one of the most successful at utilizing the platform to its own benefits (Alden and Jiang 2019), it has also worked hard to use FOCAC to strengthen its image as the voice of Africa. As mentioned earlier, South African leaders were among the most active to warn against some of the negative effects of commercial links of the continent with China at the FOCAC. Similarly, the BRICS has become another important platform for South Africa to project its role as an African leader. South Africa has successfully incorporated the continental initiatives such as the NEPAD, Agenda 2063 and PIDA into the joint declarations when it hosted the BRICS summit in 2013 and 2018. It has also actively promoted outreach dialogue between BRICS and African countries during its chairmanship, with a view to making the BRICS better serve the development needs of the continent. With the first regional centre of the New Development Bank launched in South Africa in 2017, President Zuma proudly pronounced it as a moment which ‘points to a brighter future for the people of our continent and the developing world in general’ (South African Government 2017). On the issue of UNSC reform, furthermore, driven by the motives to seek a permanent seat for itself—but as a first step, to fight for representation for the continent—South Africa has always been a stalwart advocate and promoter for the institutional transformation. This was apparently not congruent with the more moderate approach taken by China. Furthermore, out of the consideration to form coalition within the UN, among others, South Africa also did not respond actively to China’s proposal to merge the IBSA into the BRICS (Xu 2019, 244). The ‘African agenda’, or the underpinning mentality of seeking African leadership, of South Africa has made strategic coordination of bilateral positions over the UNSC reform issue more challenging. Balancing Between Values and Interests The entirely different historical trajectory and cultural legacies, and particularly the respective political progress in the twentieth century, have

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greatly informed the political values or ideologies of the two countries. Though in realpolitik, values often serve no more than a sort of ‘moral statecraft’ upheld only when they are in no obvious conflicts with a country’s national interests (including that of its close allies), they sometimes do play an evident role in inter-state relations, and perhaps more notably in some relatively ‘young’ regimes, such as the PRC (1949–) and RSA (1994–), in the international arena. The balance between values and interests were seen from both sides during the seven-decade interactions of South Africa and China, and indeed, can be said to be a factor that contributes to the ‘sense of distance’ between the two countries. On the side of China, the two split-ups between the CPC and ANC–SACP were a case in point. Though not without strategic considerations—particularly a perceived pressing security threats imposed by the Soviet Union—the ideological weapons taken up by the newly established PRC and inflexible dealings of relations with countries in the Soviet bloc, proved to have brought significant diplomatic obstacles to China during the 1960–1970s.12 The African policy of China then was greatly affected by its ever-worsening relations with the Soviet Union insofar that it chose to severe links with those pro-Soviet states or domestic groups and turn to support others who sided with China (who often were political opponents of the former).13 It is against such context that China unilaterally cut ties with the ANC–SACP alliance and quickly transferred its political and financial support to the PAC. This sort of ‘drawing lines by USSR (yisu huaxian)’ mentality and practice turned out to have lasting negative effects for the bilateral relations with those related African countries, including that with South Africa. The turn of the late 1970s and early 1980s marked an important watershed in the history of China’s national development and foreign relations. With ‘economic construction (jingji jianshe)’ being highlighted as the first priority of the country, it also became the primary aim that China’s foreign policy was meant to serve (Jiang 2020, 41–42). Such shift of foreign policy objective from the previously ‘proletarian internationalism’ to ‘national interests’ is believed as the most significant feature of China’s foreign policy transformation since the 1980s, and has shaped the fundamental diplomatic thinking of China until the present time (Niu 2010, 198–199, 253–254). In other words, China’s diplomacy has grown increasingly pragmatic, with national interests overweighing political ideology. The establishment of inter-party relations between the CPC and ANC in 1983 was just a good example. It was indeed a pragmatic

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move made by the CPC not only in terms of a reconciliation gesture burying the contentious past, but equally important, a willingness to recognize the ANC as a partner political party in contrast to the earlier days when the ANC was treated only as a national liberation group due to the different ideologies of the two. While pragmatism has increasingly grown to a key feature of China’s contemporary foreign policy since the 1980s, the new South Africa, on the other hand, also went through a period of value-charged diplomacy since the ANC took power in 1994. The long struggle for equality and freedom throughout the apartheid years as well as the global renown awarded to the country and its leaders have inevitably put the ANCled South Africa on a sort of ‘moral high ground’. Human rights, for instance, were pledged as the light that guided the country’s foreign affairs (Mandela 1993). Certain values have been so much emphasized in its dealing of external relations that, as commented by some, ‘South Africa conducts itself as if it did not have interests or as if values are more important than interests’ (Zondi 2011, 8, cited in Alden and Schoeman 2013, 118). This is particularly evident during the first two administrations led by President Mandela and Mbeki (Nathan 2005; Barber 2005), though it seems more and more difficult for South Africa to maintain such an idealistic stance in a world of realpolitik. In relations with China, different understanding of certain values was (and to some degree remains) as an obstacle for the bilateral relations. Take the Dalai Lama issue as an example.14 Although South Africa allowed him to visit three times (1996, 1999 and 2004), President Mbeki avoided meeting the Dalai Lama personally despite the pressure and criticism from home in 2004. Subsequently, the Dalai Lama was continually denied visas (2009, 2011 and 2014) when South Africa–China relations gained momentum during President Zuma’s term.

Conclusion The bilateral relationship has gone through three different phases over the past seven decades, from initial non-official interactions to comprehensive inter-state relations. Despite a rapid development of bilateral relations, particularly since 1998 when the two established formal diplomatic links, a few factors still contribute to a ‘sense of distance’ and impose challenges to the proclaimed ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. It is argued in this chapter that, apart from the economic frictions, the ‘African agenda’

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which occupied the centrality of new South Africa’s foreign policy has to a certain extent affected its dealing of relations with the PRC after 1998. It is since President Zuma’s term that the development of bilateral relations seems to have accelerated. That said, the different understanding of political values also added to the ‘sense of distance’ between the two countries, which leaves certain uncertainties for the future development of the South Africa–China relations.

Notes 1. Based on the official reports by People’s Daily on the mutual telegraph correspondence between China and the three entities. That said, constant telegraph correspondence was also made with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) in the 1950s. 2. Inter-party relations were also established between the CPC and PAC in the same year of 1983 Zhong and Xu (2008, 1245). 3. Other countries that have ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with China are Egypt and Algeria. There are also seven African states that have forged ‘comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership’ with China. 4. Except for 2015 and 2018. Against African context, similar strategic dialogues are also held with Egypt (since 2006) and Nigeria (since 2009). 5. Interview with a former senior Chinese diplomat on 25 October 2019. 6. China remains to be the only P5 that not publicly support India to enter the UNSC. 7. Interview with former Chinese diplomat. 8. In fact, this is said to be the overarching aim that has kept being pursued by South Africa throughout the apartheid period until the present time (see Alden and Schoeman 2013, 112–113). 9. As recalled by a former senior Chinese diplomat, on the FOCAC in 2001, China once proposed to position China–South Africa relations as ‘strategic partnership’ but the South Africa side preferred to omit the expression of ‘strategic’. The Chinese diplomats respected the opinions of South Africa but was left the expression that South Africa had not considered that high of its relations with China. Interview on 29 October 2019. 10. South Africa’s foreign policy under Mbeki’s term was described by Yang Lihua (2010, 513), a respected Chinese expert on South Africa, as one that was ‘Africa-based and West-focused’. 11. That said, one senior South African diplomat warned the author of ‘attributing too much of the bilateral relation progress to Zuma’. Rather, he believes that the bilateral progress was motivated mostly by its own momentum (Interview on 21 December 2019). This view was shared by two other Chinese senior diplomats who dismissed it as too simplistic to

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think President Zuma attached more importance to China than President Mbeki did despite more visible bilateral progress were witnessed during Zuma’s term (Interviews on 25 October 2019 and 29 October 2019). 12. This became further emotionally charged and difficult to rectify during the leftist domestic ‘Cultural Revolution’ in China between 1966 and 1976. 13. Interview with former Chinese diplomat. 14. Despite often being regarded as a ‘spiritual figure’, Dalai Lama’s political stance on Tibet has fundamentally challenged the bottom line of ‘one-China’ principle of the PRC. Any reception of Dalai Lama by other governments can be taken politically by observers as showing sympathy towards him, and thus is a situation which the Chinese government would not like to see.

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Han, N. (Ed.). (1988). Dangdai zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy]. Beijing: China Social Science Press. Jiang, L. (2020). Beyond Official Development Assistance: Chinese Development Cooperation and African Agriculture. Governing China in the 21st Century. Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan. Jiang, L., & Shu, Z. (2019). “There Was No Real Information About China in South Africa”: Revisiting the History of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between South Africa and China (1950s–1990s). South African Journal of International Affairs, 26, 1–25. Landsberg, C. (2010). The Foreign Policy of the Zuma Government: Pursuing the ‘National Interest’? South African Journal of International Affairs, 17, 273–293. Landsberg, C., & Hierro, L. (2017). An Overview of the EU-SA Strategic Partnership 10 Years On: Diverging World Views, Persisting Interests. South African Journal of International Affairs, 24, 115–135. Landsberg, C., & Monyae, D. (2006). South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Carving a Global Niche. South African Journal of International Affairs, 13, 131–145. Lin, S.-H. (Gary). (2001). The Relations Between The Republic of China and The Republic of South Africa, 1948–1998 (PhD thesis). University of Pretoria, Pretoria. Liu, G. (2014). Fifteen Years of South Africa-China Relations and Beyond. In Y. April (Ed.), Perspectives on South Africa-China Relations at 15 Years (pp. 26– 37). Pretoria: African Books Collective. Liu, H. (2017). South Africa and China: Solidarity and Beyond. In A. Adebajo & K. Birk (Eds.), Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Security, Diplomacy and Trade. London and New York: I.B. TAURIS. Mail & Guardian. (2006). Mbeki Warns Africa on Relationship with China. https://mg.co.za/article/2006-12-13-mbeki-warns-africa-on-relationshipwith-china. Mandela, N. (1993). South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2017, April 14). Regular Press Conference. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/ t1453794.shtml. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2019). Zhongguo tong nanfei de guanxi [China’s Relations with South Africa]. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_678284/sbgx_678288/. Nathan, L. (2005). Consistency and Inconsistencies in South African Foreign Policy. International Affairs, 81, 361–372. Niu, J. (Ed.). (2010). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxishi gailun, 1949–2000 [Introduction to History of Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–2000]. Beijing: Peking University Press.

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People’s Daily. (1994, May 6). Jiang Zemin Telegraphs Mandela, Congratulating the ANC on Its Victory in the General Election of South Africa. SAfm. (2019, May 7). World News: SA-China Relations. The Focal Point: Interview with Lin Songtian, Chinese Ambassador in South Africa. https://www. iono.fm/e/685301. South African Government. (2010). President Jacob G Zuma Arrives in the People’s Republic of China for a State Visit. https://assets.documentcloud. org/documents/2447178/anc-ngc-documents-international-relations.pdf. South African Government. (2017). President Jacob Zuma: New Development Bank Africa Regional Centre Launch. https://www.gov.za/speeches/presid ent-jacob-zuma-new-development-bank-africa-regional-centre-launch-17-aug2017-0000. Xu, G. (2019). Yindu yu nanfei huoban guanxi yanjiu [Research on India-South Africa Partnership]. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [Social Sciences Academic Press]. Yang, L. (Ed.). (2010). Nanfei (South Africa). Beijing, China: Social Sciences Academic Press. Yap, M., & Man, D. L. (1996). Color, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Zhong, W., & Xu, S. (2008). China’s Support for and Solidarity with South Africa’ Liberation Struggle. In SADET (Ed.), The Road to Democracy in South Africa (pp. 1213–1252), Pretoria: Unisa Press. Zondi, S. (2011). Reconciling National Interests and Values: A Dilemma for South Africa’s Foreign Policy? Pretoria: Institute for Global Dialogue.

PART II

Political Economy of Building a Special Relationship

CHAPTER 5

The Political Economy of South Africa–China Trade and Economic Relations Garth le Pere

Introduction A little more than two decades have now passed since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and South Africa. The year of 2018 is also auspicious since it marks the centenary of the birth of Nelson Mandela who was the architect of establishing such ties based on the ‘One China’ policy; while also in the process of downgrading relations with Taiwan. Since the formalisation of relations in 1998, as has been noted, “China’s relations with South Africa have clearly advanced significantly at both the political and economic levels” (Shelton 2008, 271). Relations have traversed frontiers of progress from a bilateral to a ‘Strategic Partnership’ in June 2004, and then culminating in a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ framework for development and cooperation in August 2010. An important outcome of the initial framing in terms of the ‘Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China’ was the launching of a Bi-National Commission (BNC) in December 2001 in Beijing.

G. le Pere (B) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_5

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The BNC has certainly served as a catalyst for broadening the ambit of relations between China and South Africa which includes a common global political outlook and internationalist ethos which has been very consequential for “…building a new form of South-South cooperation which could be very effective in advancing African interests and reforming the existing global political and economic order” (Shelton 2008, 273). The foundational elements of the China-South Africa model have been strengthened over the years, including putting in place the joint interministerial working group on China-South African Cooperation in 2013. Importantly, in July 2017 President Xi Jinping made his third state visit to South Africa, the only country to receive three such visits; while a month later, President Cyril Ramaphosa also paid a reciprocal visit to China. In the realm of economic relations, China has been South Africa’s largest trading partner for nine years in a row; and for eight consecutive years, South Africa has also been China’s largest trading partner in Africa. Two-way trade totalled $39.7 billion in 2017 which is almost than 20 times the 2002 figure of $2 billion. China’s direct investment in South Africa reflects a diverse portfolio and exceeds $25 billion cumulatively. South African companies are also the biggest African investors in China, with direct investment exceeding $800 million in more than 200 projects in a lucrative but difficult and challenging Chinese market. Based on a High-Level People-to-People Exchange Mechanism, Chinese tourism to South Africa has grown significantly, twinning arrangements have been established between the countries’ cities and provinces, and five Confucius Institutes have been set up at South African universities. In addition, there are more than 2600 South African students studying in China, reflecting a year-on-year increase of 11.5% (Wenjun 2018). There has been improved cooperation and coordination on the global stage, especially at the levels of the UN, the G77, and G20. The two countries worked closely together when South Africa hosted the 10th BRICS Summit from 25 to 27 July 2018. This event was preceded in 2017 with the setting up of the first Africa Regional Centre of the BRICS New Development Bank in Johannesburg (IGD, UNISA 2017). And since 2012, South Africa and China have jointly chaired the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as a platform for enhanced ChinaAfrica growth and development. The high-water mark of the FOCAC process was South Africa hosting the 2015 Summit where President Xi announced a package of ten cooperation plans worth $60 billion. A new opportunity frontier will be opened for a potential African nexus and

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promising connectivities of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which joins different regions and countries, at different stages of development in an open and inclusive cooperation platform. Another opportunity frontier which will test the resolve of both China and South Africa is the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in Rwanda in March 2018. The CFTA will become operational on 1 July 2020 and as such, will be the largest free trade area of its kind involving 54 countries of the continent (le Pere 2020). However, the record of cooperation and growing synergies between the two countries should not mask serious challenges on the fronts of their domestic arenas and foreign settings. While China’s drive to growth and modernisation has lifted some 680 million Chinese citizens out of poverty over the last three decades, it is experiencing growing levels of inequality, widening cleavages between urban and rural areas, worrying levels of environmental degradation, natural calamities, and pollution, and growing external imbalances. For is part, South Africa’s promising democratic transition has been marred by rising levels of racialised poverty, unemployment, and inequality while almost a decade of ‘state capture’ has exposed how egregious corruption, fraud, mismanagement, and abuse of public resources have crept into the anatomy of state-owned enterprises and various levels of government, thereby fatally undermining the neutrality of public power and compromising a fragile social contract of transformation that was supposed to inaugurate a better life for all (Thompson and Wissink 2018). Externally, both countries must confront the headwinds of a changing global order, punctuated by growing volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. For example, we are witnessing rising military tensions, disruptive trade and commercial relations, political paralysis in dealing with climate change, a rise in social protests, corrosive nativist identities, and intractable proxy conflicts. Moreover, geo-economic fault lines have come to define the current arena of conflict and rivalry as much as military confrontation. Geo-economics thus represents a new “logic of conflict and grammar of commerce” (Luttwak 1990, 7). An essential underpinning of geo-economics points to how the economic ties that bind countries together are commanded and manipulated to protect or pursue power and hegemony in terms of flows of goods, capital, investment, services, and data (Frankopan 2018). Both South Africa and

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China will therefore be challenged to adjust their relations to accommodate these new realities. This will require bold leadership, determination, institutional development, and judicious economic management.

A Conceptual Reflection In a pathbreaking collection, Chris Alden and Daniel Large have attempted to reframe and recast the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of China-Africa studies, with a focus on first-order methodological and theoretical questions (Alden and Large 2019). Among a variety of the rich veins highlighted at the coalface of ChinaAfrica studies, they provide an analytical register for understanding the vectors of autonomous agency which could be the basis of an emancipatory agenda and an ontological gestalt that signifies a different existential moment in international relations. The same agency and ability to act autonomously could shape a different normative discourse in China– South Africa relations in ways that challenge the nostrums and dictates of the Western realist and neoliberal orthodoxy. The challenge for both countries is how they negotiate their way through the difficult and problematic shoals that buffet their difficult domestic regimes and demanding foreign policy settings, particularly when it comes to ensuring that globalisation still matters for developed and developing countries alike and that shared prosperity is not quixotic. Changing Dynamics in China China is the world’s second largest economy with a GDP of $13.4 trillion in 2018 and accounts for 16.3% of global GDP. However, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the country is in the process of undergoing a profound transition which will require strategic and tactical adaptation by its major trading partners. China’s relations with the United States have become especially fraught since “China has staked its claim as a rising power to be reckoned with. Its rise has triggered structural shifts in the coordinates of global power in ways that have induced hostile responses from established powers such as the US” (Qobo and le Pere 2019, 7). Even among other major powers in the Eurozone, China is viewed through a lens of ambivalence, that is, variously as a threat, a competitor, and a partner. This has disruptive effects and unintended consequences on the already fragile stability of global order. Graham Allison has eloquently

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demonstrated such effects and consequences by examining the impulses that flow from the ‘Thucydides’s Trap’ where a rising China is bound to clash with an immovable America (Allison 2017). For China to keep its rising global profile, it has had to make serious domestic policy interventions. Here there are two critical aspects to its transition and restructuring at the domestic level. The first is that China is beginning to restrict the expansion of credit and reduce levels of indebtedness in its domestic economy. The second is the deceleration of domestic demand for raw materials and natural resources (Unay 2013). South Africa has been a principal source of raw materials and natural resources for China and as the future unfolds, the former will face serious challenges in how it redefines its relations with China in terms of the established principles of mutual benefit and support, cooperation, friendship, partnership, sincerity, and constructive dialogue. China has sought to rebalance and recalibrate its economy in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, and since then it has been attempting to move up the value-added chain by 2025. Not only South Africa, but the major country circuits of China’s economic partnerships among developed and developing countries will have to make incremental changes to how they deal with the fast-changing domestic political economy of China. New forms of value addition in China will require that it shift away from energy, heavy industry (iron, steel, non-ferrous metals, basic machinery, and automobiles), and construction to more sophisticated industries and sectors (Frankopan 2018). The breakthrough landscape of its post-industrial cycle includes next generation IT; high-end digital control machine robots and tools; aerospace development; oceanographic engineering equipment and hightechnology shipping; advanced rail transportation; energy efficient and new-energy automobiles; new forms of energy generation with a focus on renewables; agricultural machinery; biopharmaceuticals; and highperformance medical equipment. All these interventions feature prominently in the Made in China 2025 initiative as well as the 13th Five-Year Plan (Kennedy 2015). This will be underpinned by accelerated indigenous innovation and large-scale investment in human capital through intensive training of professionals at the best universities in China and abroad; while also putting in place incentive schemes and programmes to attract the best and the brightest of foreign professionals, scientists, and researchers to employment in China (Morrison 2019).

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South Africa and other emerging markets could benefit and learn from the Chinese model of indigenous innovation which will be driven by ‘global champions’. This includes granting favourable access to capital for technology acquisitions; investing in and encouraging joint ventures; giving preferential treatment to high-technology imports; and helping to facilitate lower technology and technology transfer to developing countries by promoting Chinese technology standards in production. In addition—and while a source of great intellectual property acrimony with the United States—China has made significant company acquisitions or has struck dramatic deals in areas as diverse as high-tech agriculture (agro-chemicals, seeds, and packaging), cloud computing, aviation, mobile telephony, digital imaging, robotics, base metals, shale gas, oil sands, hydropower, and clean energy (OECD 2018). The ambition of the BRI and the sheer magnitude and scale of China’s external engagements puts it in a very strong position to challenge Western hegemony in new forms of trade and technology innovation. As has been argued China now has the capacity to “…establish its technical standards as ‘global defaults’ in a number of fields” (OECD 2018, 27). A compelling example is China’s Digital Belt and Road which aims to harness big data to address and solve challenges of sustainable development. The aim is to introduce smart buildings, smart electricity grids, and smart transport logistics to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and water needs among BRI-participating countries (Brown 2017). Energy solution technologies is another area where China is fast building a competitive and comparative advantage, especially in ultra-high voltage lines, solar power cells (where it controls 60% of global production), advanced wind power, hydroelectric R&D, and batteries (where China controls 62% of global cobalt mining) (OECD 2018). Another aspect that South Africa and Africa for that matter will have to come to terms with is developing synergies and linkages with BRI connectivities based on policy, infrastructure, trade, finance, as well as people-to-people education, cultural, and scientific exchanges. How the BRI will be rolled out in Africa has implications for ongoing FOCAC plans, programmes, and commitments as well as the embryonic CFTA. South Africa’s role in any negotiations that will seek to create BRI synergies and linkages will be critical, given the high levels of confidence and trust that exists between it and China. There are currently six economic

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corridors of the BRI and Africa has the growth and development potential to become the seventh based on the scope and promise of the CFTA (Zhou and Esteban 2018). BRI investment projects are spread over the current 94 participating developed and developing countries and these projects are expected to add over $1 trillion for infrastructure funding over the ten-year period from 2017 to 2027. The Silk Road Fund (with a capitalised pledge of $40 billion) is the main funding vehicle of BRI projects but state-directed development and commercial banks also play a strategic role, complemented by a multilateral formula that brings in multilateral development banks and public–private partnerships. As an integrated development ecosystem, the BRI is also intended to support China’s ascent to greater value addition in terms of high-technology and enhanced services provision (Zhou and Esteban 2018). As part of its internal restructuring, China intends to relocate 80 million manufacturing and low-technology jobs to external BRI geographies as an integral part of this exercise in value addition. Its ‘hardware-first’ strategy is therefore meant to promote external demand for raw materials and Chinese technology and skills (Morrison 2019). Between 2005 and 2017, China’s global construction projects were valued at $480 billion for BRI countries, with Africa receiving $170 billion of this total. This takes on added significance as part of global patterns to shift low-technology abroad and China is following a similar logic of moving its capacities in iron, steel, cement, clothing and textile, machinery and equipment, and automobile assembly to BRI developing countries. However, it must be borne in mind that BRI investment projects must be debt funded across some very problematic business environments, and financial and debt burdens will be hard to avoid. Many African countries already labour under the burdens of Chinese debtfunded infrastructure projects at a time when they face extreme fiscal stress due to declining global commodity demand and resulting falling public revenues (Qobo and le Pere 2018). There is emerging evidence of the high-risk quotient associated with BRI projects. Various aspects of the cumulative value of BRI assets and programmes can be described as ‘troubled’. Troubled programmes are worth $370 billion of global transactions; while a major area of concern is BRI troubled assets worth $102 billion (OECD 2018, 29). This ‘troubled’ nature includes the collateral value of the investment being below its liabilities; loans that are non-performing; and cancelled deals due to

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review delays or political opposition. It is a cold reality of BRI geo-politics that many of its participating countries are found in very unstable regions, which are subject to political violence, war and conflict, insurrections, and sanctions. Changing Dynamics in South Africa The strong China political and economic connections have certainly helped to prevent South Africa from sinking into a deeper morass of economic decline. With support from China, the NDB has provided South Africa with loans totalling $2.3 billion at the end of 2019. In addition and at South Africa’s urging during the 2015 FOCAC summit, China made commitments to assisting it and African countries with improving industrial capacity cooperation, especially the beneficiation and value addition of products at source (although this issue did not feature as prominently at the 2018 FOCAC summit in Beijing). While difficult to predict, the future of the South Africa-China engagement will be determined by the extent to which South Africa is able to address a steadily eroding domestic order and problematic global image. Since its democratic transition in 1994, the new government of the African National Congress (ANC) has made a conscious attempt to address the deprivations of South Africa’s apartheid legacies, especially as these concerned reconstituting its domestic political economy through a raft of public policy interventions that would serve as catalysts of transformative facilitation. The aspiration was to develop the foundations of both a developmental and competition state (Thompson and Wissink 2018). The developmental dimension was intended to aggressively confront spatial forms of racialised differential incorporation and socio-economic gaps that had defined the apartheid architecture; while the competition dimension was meant to locate the country’s economic reform processes squarely within the ambit of export-led globalisation and market liberalisation. After more two and half decades, however, while progress in some of these dimensions has been registered, the overall record shows that South Africa has fallen short on the scope and ambition embodied in both dimensions, particularly when it comes to relieving the plight of the majority of the population who continue to suffer from the scourges of poverty, inequality, and unemployment (Seekings and Nattrass 2015). South Africa’s foreign policy was anchored on serving the ends of development and competition through an avowed multilateralism that

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was morally defined and ethically driven in the course of the presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. The currency of this normative internationalism has depreciated and has become more pronounced under the presidency of Jacob Zuma, where ‘state capture’ has become a metaphor for a ruling ANC aristocracy and elite class in the public sector that have been seduced by the trappings of power and self-enrichment as exemplified by the egregious abuse of public resources, rampant corruption, and poor governance (le Pere 2017). It was thus left to the incoming President Cyril Ramaphosa to correct the pathologies and dysfunctionalities within the state and society that have become so pervasive and deeply embedded in South Africa’s stressed body politic and ailing economy. Throughout this period—marked by a descent into a patrimonial and predatory type of politics—South Africa’s international standing and image had suffered great harm. Among international investors and political partners alike, there was a creeping loss of trust and confidence in the country as it faced a long Gramscian interregnum of morbid symptoms reproducing themselves. It is in the economic realm where the depth of the problems Ramaphosa had to confront was clearly visible. At the beginning of 2019 and with a nominal GDP of $360 billion, economic growth was forecast at 1.7% while Ramaphosa promised long-awaited reforms that would lift the economy out of the doldrums and fix anaemic state-owned enterprises. At the end of that year, the country was skating perilously close to recession and was encountering serious structural and management problems in the reliable supply of energy (where the euphemism of ‘load-shedding’ which cuts electricity has now become part of the daily vocabulary). And for the first time since 2009, South Africa was stuck in a low-growth trap of under 1%, despite the refrain of promised growth-enhancing reforms (Joffe 2019). Factionalism within the ruling party was to prove a potent constraint on Ramaphosa’s attempts to change the course of the economy, especially in dealing with systemic corruption across all areas of government and state institutions. As has been observed “…the extent of rent-seeking within the ANC itself, creates a powerful lobby against reforms to the supply chains and management of the state-owned enterprises as well as within the state itself” (Joffe 2019). To add to Ramaphosa’s woes, while public debt was 30% of GDP in 2008, the Treasury’s estimate is that it will rise to 74% of GDP in 2023 thereby signifying an astonishing collapse

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of the country’s macro-economic fundamentals, especially in view of the fact that debt service costs are expected to rise at 14% a year. Such costs, it has been asserted “…will be larger than the budget for public health care, larger than the combined budget of the criminal justice system and military, and greater than the allocation for financing economic development” (Bernstein 2019). In addition, fiscal sustainability has been compromised by the government’s inability to rein in its spending—which will grow from $120 billion in 2019 to $147 billion by 2022—together with the continuous demands of bailing out poorly run and debt-ridden state-owned enterprises. In July 2018, the stateowned electricity utility, Eskom, announced a government-backed loan of $2.5 billion from the Export-Import Bank of China, supported by the China Development Bank. The loan was ostensibly to be used to complete the construction of a coal-fired power station, but its details have been shrouded in secrecy since Eskom is mired in debt of $30 billion An editorial in the influential Sunday Times thus lamented that “Ramaphosa has been slowly developing a reputation for indecisiveness. Making things worse for him is that his administration has, on a number of occasions, failed to provide clarity on critical policy issues and government programmes” (Sunday Times 2020). The current government thus operates under a penumbra of confusion and uncertainty where almost daily there are persistent demands for an unequivocal reversal of the current malaise. These include robust institutional reform to keep the rating agencies at bay as the country veers close to junk status; a determined programme of business restructuring, especially the stifling red-tape; dealing with the problems of electricity generation and distribution; increasing the productive capacity of the economy; putting in place more open and user-friendly tourist and skilled immigrant visa regimes; assisting tech-dependent companies by urgently setting in motion the auctioning of spectrum; and providing clear directives on property rights and the nationalisation of the South African Reserve Bank. Anything less than this would be an unmitigated disaster for the country in a social environment scarred by growing despair and a crisis of confidence and leadership.

Perspectives on Cooperation and Partnership Even though some equilibrium—albeit more symbolic than real—has been restored in the escalating and punitive trade wars between China and

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the United States, business and investor confidence have been severely undermined, with world-wide consequences. The IMF lowered its global output forecast for 2019 from 3.3 to 3% (down from 3.6% in 2018). This is the lowest decline in global growth since the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, the IMF further anticipates that the big four engines of global growth, namely, the United States, China, the Eurozone, and Japan will show no appreciable improvement in their aggregate growth rates for the next five years (Giles 2019). The downward spiral is evident in Germany as the Eurozone’s apex economy whose growth forecast was reduced from 0.8 to 0.5% for 2019; and from 1.8 to 1.1% for 2020 (Wearden 2019). In the case of China, its economy has slowed significantly. From 2008 to 2010, its real GDP growth averaged 9.7% but declined for the next six consecutive years, falling from 10.6% in 2010 and 6.7% in 2016; and then declining further to 6.1% in 2019. The IMF further projects that its growth will fall to 5.5% by 2024 (IMF 2019) but this outlook did not reckon with the far-reaching effects of the Coronavirus which could cut China’s growth further to 4.1% in 2020. Compounding the virus’s severity on China’s economy and society has been its global repercussions which are perhaps symptomatic of the impact this will have on South Africa–China relations. In 2019, South Africa’s exports to China were mainly mineral products valued at $7 billion, followed by iron and steel products at $4 billion. Vegetable and citrus product exports were valued at $500 million (Thukwana and Mashego 2020). The recalibration and restructuring of the Chinese economy will certainly mean lower demand for South African goods, resulting in a Chinese demand gap. The opposite also applies since many South African industries depend on baskets of Chinese inputs and finished products such as clothing and textiles, footwear, electronic appliances, mobile telephony, tools and machinery, and motor vehicles. Recent testimonies by South African companies with operations in China are indicative of a negative outlook as South African companies feel the effects of the Coronavirus. Naspers, with headquarters in South Africa, is a multinational company whose principal operations are internet communication, entertainment, gaming, and e-commerce. The company has a 31% stake in China’s media giant, Tencent. Early in February 2020, it suspended all company travel to and from China until further notice. Vitality Health International of the Discovery Group, which has a 25% stake in the Chinese health insurer, Ping An Health, has withdrawn all

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employees from China. Similar protocols of returning employees to South Africa have also been applied by Standard Bank which has operations in different areas of China, including Beijing, Guangdong, and Wuhan (Thukwana and Mashego 2020). These testimonies are suggestive of the importance of China to South African companies and it might be useful here to review the nature of the historical and contemporary girders that uphold the strategic, policy, and operational eco-system of South Africa–China relations. This takes on added importance in view of the extent to which the Chinese experience has become an instructive model of growth and development across Africa. For instance, when speaking about Chinese initiatives, Alden has argued that those “…being promoted in Africa are drawn in the main from the transformative policy approaches and implementation strategies that were behind the rapid development of the modern Chinese economy over the last four decades” (Alden 2019, 284). Alden and Wu (2014) provide an insightful overview of the textures that have shaped the evolution of South Africa–China relations. They note some of the critical features of what they term a ‘unique partnership’ that operates at bilateral, continental, and multilateral levels and has its origins going back to the nineteenth century, beginning with South Africa hosting Africa’s largest and oldest Chinese community. After diplomatic ties were established in January 1998, they write that “…formal diplomatic engagement between South Africa and China was one marked by co-operation and cautious optimism” (2014, 7). Following the initial heady Mandela period, his successor, Thabo Mbeki, was distracted in nurturing relations with China since his focus was on big pan-African initiatives such as the African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In addition, Mbeki had a critical view about the asymmetries regarding China’s role in Africa, cautioning against Africa becoming a supplier of commodities to China in exchange for manufactured goods. There was also disquiet about South African businesses facing increasing competition from Chinese burgeoning interests at home and in Africa (2014, 8). After Mbeki’s exit from the political stage in December 2007, which was followed by a brief interregnum by Kgalema Motlanthe, it was under Jacob Zuma that ties with China were significantly ‘upgraded’, culminating in the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ in August 2010 in the course of Zuma’s first state visit to Beijing. This visit was especially auspicious since it included 370 business representatives and the signing

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of more than 12 investment agreements in railways, power transmission construction, mining, insurance, telecoms, and nuclear power. Crucially, Zuma was able to successfully lobby the Chinese to support South Africa’s membership in the BRICS grouping (2014, 10). Alden and Wu then highlight three critical areas of strategic engagement. The first is at the continental and multilateral levels. In international affairs, there has been close cooperation such that “[t]he strengthening of South Africa-China co-operation on global affairs has been a hallmark of the relationship” (2014, 12). The manifestations of this have been through the conduits of four multilateral platforms, namely, the UN Security Council, FOCAC, BRICS, and the G20. In its first two tenures as a non-permanent member of the Council (2007–2009 and 2011–2013), South Africa’s voting patterns closely corresponded with those of China. They also note the significance of South Africa working closely with China on Africa’s security issues when it came to the framing of common positions on the Security Council. Their second area of focus is evolving and increasingly complex trade patterns, whose growth has been propelled by China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in December 2001, South Africa’s granting China market economy status, and establishing the ‘Strategic Partnership’ in 2004. Two-way trade grew during the Zuma administration so much so that China became South Africa’s largest trading partner on a country basis; and this trade was especially important in helping South Africa to weather the effects of the global financial crisis in 2008 (2014, 15). As far as the third area of investment is concerned, Alden and Wu note a paradox, namely, that until 2007 “South African companies have invested more in China than their Chinese counterparts had done in South Africa” (2014, 18). In 2009, it was estimated that Chinese businesses in South Africa represented 78 (or 1%) of 4100 officially registered foreign concerns in the country. Compared to over $800 million that South African companies had invested in China, by the end of 2002 Chinese firms had only invested $160 million in their 98 projects in South Africa. Alden and Wu qualify China’s investment anomaly in South Africa by noting that as a maturing economy, investment opportunities are limited, exacerbated by a difficult regulatory regime, a rigid labour market, and a highly unionised environment (2014, 18). In an early exposition (2007), Naidu noted certain ‘complications’ that were already testing South Africa–China relations. These included that Chinese investment was resulting in a flood of cheap products, thereby

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endangering and crowding out local industries and undermining the South African government’s efforts in job creation and poverty reduction. Other concerns are also raised such as: the nature of unequal exchange which reduces South Africa to an exporter of primary commodities to help meet China’s domestic demand; China’s growing trade and investment interests in Africa which pose a challenge to Mbeki’s African Renaissance project and initiatives aimed at improving good governance; the extent to which South Africa’s quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat could be compromised by different and competing visions of South– South cooperation; and possible strains and tensions that might emerge from competitive trade practices which might be construed as protectionist and unfair in WTO terms. In view of these considerations and chastened by realpolitik, Naidu reaches a sobering and prescient conclusion that “…the present nature of Sino-South African relations extends beyond just expediency—if anything the relationship masks more of the hidden threats than the mutual opportunities. As this relationship grows, the inequality already evident in it will also increase” (2007, 199). In the broad context of the ferment in China–Africa relations, le Pere and Shelton consider the prospects for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between South Africa and China (2007, 173–179). The essential logic of such an FTA would be the removal and/or the reduction of barriers to market access and related regulatory restrictions that actually or potentially affect South Africa’s exports and business investments in China. They discern three positions that could shape the contours of such an FTA. The first is the ‘idealists’ who see the size and dynamism of the Chinese market as a great opportunity for the fairly sophisticated South African financial, industrial, and commercial sectors. For ‘idealists’ this interface could be a catalyst for an enhanced and robust strategic partnership and will be material in how China supports South Africa’s global South and multilateral agenda. This could include support for South Africa’s expanding role in NEPAD and the African Union, as well as its desired candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. An FTA could also be consequential for more substantive forms of South– South cooperation and addressing the growing cleavages between rich and poor countries by demanding greater equity and fairness in trade. The second position is held by the ‘pessimists’ who fear that increased trade with China and the penetrative power of its companies will lead to a major loss of employment in South Africa and blunt its competitive edge in sectors like manufacturing, and clothing and textiles. Representing

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a neo-mercantilist view, the pessimist contention is that FTAs between countries which are at different and unequal stages of development will typically result in the less developed country—South Africa in this case— bearing the burden of the adjustment costs. There are thus few benefits in an FTA for the South African economy but higher risks and onerous costs. Questions are also raised about South Africa’s decision to grant China market economy status since this will effectively undercut local manufacturers and thereby give Chinese producers an unfair advantage. This includes the dumping of cheap products on the South African market and other unsavoury business practices. The third position of ‘realistic optimists’ acknowledges the vast opportunities that come with economic globalisation for competitive economies but raise first-order questions about the ability of South Africa to manage the complex policy demands that come with such opportunities, especially given its exposure and vulnerability as an export-oriented economy. China’s high growth rates, expanding economy, and diverse consumer market will become increasingly important to South Africa as an export and investment destination. However, the ability of South African companies to operate in the Chinese market must be leavened with a healthy dose of realism and must not be underestimated since there are more than 400,000 multinational enterprises that are well established in China. They have enough of a muscular presence to compete in a complex and diverse landscape of highly efficient and competitive domestic producers and traders. While there are opportunities, South African companies must also be mindful of the impediments to doing business in China. These include non-tariff barriers such as import licenses, registration and certification requirements, and restrictive technical and sanitary standards; a weak rule of law regime where the enforcement of contracts will prove to be difficult; cultural preferences where Chinese consumers prefer their own products and services; and a difficult investment environment which is complex, competitive, and opaque. The three positions point to the demands for clear analytical and policy thinking about South Africa’s specific objectives vis-à-vis an FTA with China as well as a carefully constructed calculus of the expected impact, costs and benefits of increased two-way trade with China which is inherently asymmetric and underscores the structural constraints of unequal exchange. Finally, in an inventive application of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, Phungula (2013) examines the patterns of trade between South Africa and China. The model derives from the two Swedish economists’ theoretical

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postulate that relative resource factor endowments and abundance intensities drive patterns of trade between countries and provide the essential logic of why countries trade in the first place. For example, a capital rich country with high labour costs will tend to export capital intensive products while a country with cheap labour and costly capital will depend on labour-intensive exports. Based on Ricardian comparative advantage, trade will thus be driven by the differences not only in factor endowments but also in the relative prices of different goods and services among trading countries. This observation is important in helping to explain the patterns of trade between South Africa and China: South Africa exports natural resources to China, while China exports finished products to South Africa based on the causal matrices of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Hence, South Africa’s trade deficits with China will persist and endure. South Africa must, therefore, undergo major macro-economic reform and structural transformation of its economy in the pursuit of value addition and movement up regional and global value chains. If not, this pattern of trade is bound to reproduce and replicate itself over time as we have seen, with serious implications for relieving the high levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. The persuasive and demonstrable effects of the Heckscher-Ohlin model draw attention to the need for South Africa to get its domestic political economy in order if its relations with China are to have greater meaning and efficacy in terms of addressing its raft of growth and development challenges, notwithstanding encomiums of a win–win partnership and strategic dialogue with China.

Future and Evolving Challenges The future of South Africa–China relations will be profoundly shaped in the crucible of two fronts: firstly, in addressing their domestic growth and development challenges as set out in the conceptual reflection. However, there are the ‘second generation’ challenges of how the two countries could develop common synergies and joint strategies in addressing Africa’s integration prospects, especially the deadweight forms of extractive state rentierism and embedded patronage systems which have historically stunted the continent’s growth and development potential. The record shows that both South Africa and China have enhanced Africa’s growth and development prospects; in South Africa’s case since its

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expanded commercial engagements since 1994 where it accounts for 34% of the intra-African market; and in the case of China, over the institutional life of the FOCAC process since 2000 (le Pere 2015). President Cyril Ramaphosa has assumed the presidency of the African Union for 2020 and among other goals, he has made the operational agenda of the CFTA one of his key focal areas. Here is a unique opportunity for South Africa and China to forge a common framework for helping to drive continental integration. The CFTA is a major achievement in its scope, promise, and ambition. However, its adoption occurs at a turbulent and uncertain moment in the global trading system as well as in transnational economic relations. This is because the very foundations of the liberal international order are coming under increasing threat and pressure and a variety of centrifugal forces are at work. Global norms are being eroded and multilateral institutions are being further weakened amid growing cleavages of power and interest (Kissinger 2014). We are witnessing rising military tensions, disruptive trade and commercial relations, environmental degradation, the abuse of cyber sources of hard and soft power, corrosive nativist identities, atavistic bigotry and racism, opportunistic narcissism, and intractable proxy conflicts (Frankopan 2018). Such a depressing mix of global problems, however, should not discount the importance of the CFTA in the overall political economy of the continent and the opportunities that arise for enhanced South Africa-China cooperation in this enterprise. The passage of the CFTA is a product of protracted negotiations in pursuit of a common continental vision and draws its inspiration from the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (1980) and the Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (1991). It is signing in Kigali, Rwanda on 21 March 2018 represented a bold step in creating a conceptual and political edifice for accelerating the trade and economic integration of the continent. Thus far 54 out of 55 countries have signed the framework to create a single market for goods and services which includes the unhindered movement of people, investment, and other production factors. At last count, there were 25 countries which have ratified its various instruments, thus making Africa the largest free trade area in the world in terms of the number of participating members. The functional efficacy of the CFTA is expected to deliver major gains from which both South Africa and China could reap benefits. The litmus test for both countries is to further develop the virtuous circles that have

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already been established through the FOCAC process and that could be significantly expanded through the BRI. With a current African market of 1.2 billion people and a GDP of $2.2 trillion, total employment is expected to increase by 1.2%, with great benefits for the manufacturing and agricultural sectors; most countries will register GDP growth of between 1 and 3%; there will be $16 billion in general welfare gains based on increased employment, better domestic resource usage, and access to cheaper products (le Pere 2020). Quite importantly, from the current level of 17%, the CFTA is expected to boost intra-African exports to 52% by 2025 through the creation of new trade opportunities and the diversion of trade away from the markets of developed countries towards Africa. This will be salutary for reduction of countries’ trade deficits. In addition, dynamic gains could also be registered from improvements in trade facilitation and customs operations, services trade reform, improved competitiveness, and collaborating on investment, intellectual property, rules of origin, and technology transfer (UNECA, AUC, AfDB, and UNCTAD 2019). A major opportunity which South Africa and China can jointly help to drive is the structural transformation of Africa in terms of value chain and industrial development. Both countries have similar industrialisation experiences that could be salutary for Africa’s economic diversification. Forging stronger relations with South Africa and China in the context of the CFTA could assist African countries to upgrade their capabilities to make incremental shifts between product spaces which includes the improvement of skills, institutions, and infrastructure that is based on coherent and effective industrial policy (Chang 1994). As elaborated by Rodrik, this entails “strategic collaboration between the private sector and the government with the aim of uncovering the most significant obstacles to restructuring and determining what interventions are most likely to remove them” (Rodrik 2007, 100). The CFTA can unlock new dynamism in the intra-African market and trade in manufactured intermediate products—where both South Africa and China enjoy a comparative advantage. This certainly could be the catalyst for deeper and wider economic diversification. Africa’s fast-changing demographic profile will demand higher labour-intensive activity that can add 10 million jobs every year to absorb a burgeoning population of youth. Furthermore, ‘smart protectionism’ could also generate resources for diversification. This includes the strategic use of tariffs, subsidies, local content requirements, foreign investment, and

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technology transfer (Qobo and le Pere 2018). The CFTA will become operational on 1 July 2020 but it is the institutional deficits, competitive constraints, and production obstacles that must be addressed, and it is in this regard where South Africa and China could make a lasting contribution to the continent’s structural transformation.

Concluding Remarks Based on our conceptual reflection, both South Africa and China must confront the reality that global capitalism has provoked a dark and gloomy period in the post-Cold War era, best symbolised by the global financial crisis of 2008 and its damaging and destructive aftermath. This points to an underlying existential dilemma related to serious structural, political, and normative deficits in current forms of global governance and multilateral institutions. Consequently, simple Keynesian solutions are not capable of sustaining ‘liberalism’ or ‘capitalism’ amidst violent social disruptions, environmental degradation, trade wars, financial meltdown, rising levels of global poverty, and growing cleavages between rich and poor countries; all of which deprive individuals, societies, and countries of their freedom, creativity, and human potential (Chang 1993). Within the orthodoxy of their ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, there must be a rethinking, reimagining, and reworking of the basic roles and functions of their respective political leaderships and private sectors in a common enterprise of mutual growth and development. This becomes even more important in managing difficult and often intractable global externalities, particularly since geo-economics has now come to define the “logic of conflict and the grammar of conflict”. The asymmetric vulnerabilities inherent in any geo-economic calculus thus provide dominant and powerful geo-economic actors like the United States, the Eurozone, and Japan with the leverage to conduct power politics in ways that do not require military means. Such practices are typically accomplished by recourse to economic nationalism and protectionism. A hallmark of current geo-economics is that interdependence is often asymmetric and implies risks, crises, and turbulence that can upset the circuits of trade and commerce, especially as concerns regional and global supply and value chains. What this ultimately means for both South Africa and China—and indeed, for the Global South of developing countries—is that economic security has been catapulted to the top of the global agenda such that

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geo-economic calculations now play out “with disposable capital in lieu of firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military-technical advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases” (Luttwak 1990:18). The critical question for South Africa and China is how they will respond in ways that maintain the integrity of their carefully constructed strategic and political edifice while dealing assertively with the difficult dynamics in the political economy of their domestic regimes. As Rodrik has cogently argued: “Responding to the economic and political crises of our day requires that we restore a healthy balance between an open global economy and the prerogatives of the nation state. That requires us to be honest about trade’s consequences—not just the economic opportunities they create for our businesses and consumers, but the stresses they create for our social compacts” (Rodrik 2017, 1).

References Alden, C., & Wu, Y.-S. (2014). South Africa and China: The Making of a Partnership (Occasional Paper 199). South African Institute of International Affairs. Alden, C., & Large, D. (Eds.). (2019). New Directions in Africa-China Studies. London and New York: Routledge. Alden, C. (2019). A Chinese Model for Africa: Problem-Solving, Learning and Limits. In C. Alden & D. Large (Eds.), New Directions in Africa-China Studies. London and New York: Routledge. Allison, G. (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Bernstein, A. (2019, November 17). The Cost of Servicing Our Debt Is Eating Our Future. Sunday Times (Johannesburg). Brown, R. (2017, June). Beijing Silk Road Goes Digital. Council on Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/blog/beijings-silk-road-goes-digital. Accessed 30 January 2020. Chang, H.-J. (1993). Kicking Away the Ladder: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury Press. Chang, H.-J. (1994). The Political Economy of Industrial Policy. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Editorial. (2020, February 9). President Needs to Ditch the Broken Record and Tell Us What He Wants to Happen. Sunday Times (Johannesburg). Frankopan, P. (2018). The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

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Giles, C. (2019, October 16). IMF Slashes Global Growth Forecast After Trade War Batters Confidence. Financial Times. Joffe, H. (2019, December 15). How Ramaphosa’s Reforms Ran into 2019’s Big Fat Reality Check. Sunday Times Business Times (Johannesburg). Institute for Global Dialogue and University of South Africa. (2017, November 22). South Africa’s BRICS Engagement. Proceedings Report of a Symposium by IGD and UNISA, Pretoria. International Monetary Fund. (2019, January). World Economic Outlook Update. Washington, DC. Kennedy, S. (2015, June 1). Made in China 2025. Critical Questions, Center for Strategic and International Studies. www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025. Accessed 4 February 2020. Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order. New York: Penguin Press. Le Pere, G., & Shelton, G. (2007). China, Africa and South Africa: South-South Co-operation in a Global Era. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue. Le Pere, G. (2015). The China-Africa Connection: An Ambiguous Legacy? In C. Freeman (Ed.), Handbook on China and Developing Countries. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Le Pere, G. (2017). Ubuntu as Foreign Policy: The Ambiguities of South Africa’s Brand Image and Identity. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 39(1), 93– 115. Le Pere, G. (2020). The Geo-Economics of Global Trade: Implications for the African Continental Free Trade Area. In F. Kornegay & P. Mthembu (Eds.), Africa and the World: Navigating Shifting Geopolitics. Johannesburg: Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection. Luttwak, E. (1990). From Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce. National Interest, 20, 17–23. Morrison, W. M. (2019). China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States (CRS Report RL33534). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Naidu, S. (2007). Mutual Opportunities or Hidden Threats? South Africa’s Relations with the People’s Republic of China. In K. K. Prah (Ed.), Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present & Future. CASAS Book Series No. 45. Cape Town: The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape. Paris: OECD Business and Finance Outlook. Phungula, N. (2013). The China-South Africa Relationship: An Economic and Political Assessment of Benefits and Costs (MA thesis). University of KwaZuluNatal, South Africa.

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Qobo, M., & le Pere, G. (2018, March). The Role of China in Africa’s Industrialization: The Challenge of Building Global Value Chains. Journal of Contemporary China, 27 (110), 208–223. Qobo, M., & le Pere, G. (2019, September). China and US Economic Tussle and Implications for Africa. International Journal on Belt and Road Initiative, 2(3), 3–26. Rodrik, D. (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rodrik, D. (2017, January 27). It’s Time to Think for Yourself on Free Trade. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/27/its-time-tothink-for-yourself-on-free-trade/. Accessed 10 February 2020. Seekings, J., & Nattrass, N. (2015). Policy, Politics and Poverty in South Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shelton, G. (2008). South Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership. In C. Alden, D. Large, & R. S. De Oliveira (Eds.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace. London: Hurst & Company. Thompson, P., & Wissink, H. (2018, September). Recalibrating South Africa’s Political Economy: Challenges in Building a Developmental and Competition State. African Studies Quarterly, 18(1), 31–48. Thukwana, N., & Mashego, P. (2020, February 9). SA Firms Feel Chill of China Outbreak: Coronavirus Shutdown Begins to Play Out in Operations, Outlook for Local Companies. Sunday Times Business Times (Johannesburg). Unay, S. (2013, Spring). From Engagement to Contention: China in the Global Political Economy. Perceptions, 28(1), 129–153. UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Union, African Development Bank, & UN Conference on Trade and Development. (2019). Assessing Regional Integration in Africa: Next Steps for the African Continental Free Trade Area. Addis Ababa: UNECA, AU, AfDB, and UNCTAD. Wearden, G (2019). Germany on brink of recession as business confidence nosedives. The Guardian (London), 26 August. http://www.theguardian. com/world/2019/aug/26/german-recession-fears-business-confidence-eur ope-economy/ Wenjun, C. (2018, September 25). Twenty Years on, China-SA Embrace a New Chapter. Business Day (Johannesburg). Zhou, W., & Esteban, M. (2018, July). Beyond Balancing: China’s Approach Towards the Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of Contemporary China, 27 (112), 487–501.

CHAPTER 6

Manufacturing for Intra-Africa Trade: A Focused Response to China’s Dominant Position in Africa for South Africa Jeremy Stevens

Introduction Overall China’s commercial footprint in South Africa is weighty, wideranging and multifaceted. South Africa is China’s largest export destination in Africa (albeit Nigeria is close behind) and the largest source of imports from Africa (having usurped Angola in 2011). South Africa hosts the most outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) from China into Africa, even when China’s largest investment in Africa—the sizable USD5.8bn purchase by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s (ICBC) purchase of 20% of Standard Bank Group—is excluded. South Africa has also amassed the largest share of China’s greenfield investment in Africa (tallying nearly twice the size of its nearest rival on the continent cumulatively since 2001)—investments made by nearly 100 different Chinese firms across a range of sectors.

J. Stevens (B) Chemsunny World Trade Center, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_6

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Despite a plethora of measurable and real gains, much space remains to further leverage the China–South Africa partnership. The next phase of China–South Africa ties and partnership must more forcefully and singlemindedly prioritize tactics for further industrialization, job creation and technology transfer. Policy attention is necessary to mobilize Chinese investment in manufacturing industries, led by its private sector firms, in a manner that supports South African and African growth and development, and better integrates South Africa’s economic structure for intra-Africa trade. Attracting greater Chinese engagement and investment in South African manufacturing, which includes not only the transfer of capital, but crucially the movement of firm-specific assets such as technology, managerial ability, corporate governance and access to markets. Herein lies a unified, clear and unwavering overarching policy objective. Indeed, the size, growth, competitiveness and productivity of South Africa’s manufacturing sector is critical to ensure that economic growth is sufficiently labour absorptive to support development. Chinese firms have developed the experience and know-how, emerging as the largest manufacturer in the world—known as the world’s factory— championed by globally competitive manufacturing firms. The countries own recent history suggests Chinese policymakers are familiar with the nature of the goal. In addition, the timing is good: the Chinese economy is in the process of transformation—expanding more slowly in a less factor- and investment-led manner, shifting towards a pattern of growth driven by services and consumption; propelled by innovation and with market forces determining the allocation of resources. Acknowledging the ground is shifting under the long-standing status quo, attempting to ring-fence China’s South African engagements from these ongoing trends is nigh impossible. South Africa must proactively construct (to position itself) its policy framework to both ameliorate the more harmful impacts of China’s internal adjustment and to benefit most from the current developments underway inside the Mainland. At the same time, Africa’s promising structural drivers and the launch of the continental free trade area are alluring. Already some of China’s fastest growing export markets are in Africa; China’s exports to Africa have expanded by 10% and 7% in 2018 and 2019, respectively; from 2009 to 2015 nine of China’s fifteen fastest growing export markets were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Setting up production facilities in some of these fast-growing export markets—even if the starting point is on lower valueadded assembly operations in the host nation—is a logical consideration

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for many Chinese firms. Perhaps even a number of regional minded hubs are required to service Africa’s internal demand. That said, South Africa must position itself to this end and align diplomacy and concomitant metrics to measure progress, clearly stating its half of the win-win bilateral partnership with China is tied to this end. South Africa has plenty to lose should Chinese firms choose to set up operations elsewhere—in Asia or Africa—further eroding South Africa’s position in intra-Africa trade.

China Manufacturing Path and Learnings for South Africa China’s reforms and opening up, started in 1978 kick starting a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, including a structural reduction of its tariffs and non-tariff barriers (Zhu, 2011:14) accompanied by liberalization of its foreign direct investment regimes and economic reform (Chai 2002: 25). The results have been spectacular: The share of exports in China’s GDP has surged from less than 7% in 1979 to a peak of 35% in 2007, attracting significant inwards FDI and accumulating the worlds largest FX reserves, through the fortyyear period. From less than 25% in 1979, today China’s manufactured goods account for over 90% of all exported goods of the country. Moreover, the relative share of high-technology goods increased from less than 5% of total exports in 1990 to as much as one-third in 2008 (Yang 2014: 8) (Fig. 6.1). China’s experience and learnings offer a powerful scaffolding for South Africa–China relations. Chinese leadership in the 1980s moulded China’s development strategy in a manner that emphasized the importation of advanced technology and equipment, financed through innovative measures designed to attract foreign capital. The catalyst were Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and later Export Trade Development Zones (ETDZ). Sectors prioritized were those where Chinese firms were deficient (Rosen 1999). The end: to produce products primarily for export (Jia 1994). The means: foreign capital. In fact, foreign partnership and investment was so central that more strident critics claimed that the SEZs were effectively creating foreign colonies by selling territorial rights to foreign investors (Reardon 1991). Between 1979 and 1991, about 70% of all FDI in China was placed in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, where these SEZs and ETDZs were located (Zhang and Felmingham 2001: 85; RoyChoudhury 2010: 116).

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Exports-to-GDP 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 1979

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Fig. 6.1 Exports as a share of total GDP (Source CEIC)

China’s export industries benefited from an abundance of relatively well-educated and efficient labour, tremendous economies of scale and agglomeration effects, growing integration into the global economy and financial system, serviced by first world infrastructure in export-orientated special economic zones, the inflow of foreign capital, skills and expertise and direct and indirect government support (Adams et al. 2004: 9–11; Pettis 2013). Directly, the project created 30 million jobs from 1995 to 2007 (Kyota 2016: 66), primarily by private-owned firms (RoyChoudhury 2010: 119). Even though exports of manufactured goods surged most obviously, the SEZs also created a significant positive spillovers for non-manufacturing industries, which depend upon manufacturing exports through vertical inter-industry linkages. Most importantly, the SEZs unleashed competition amongst different parts of China and accelerated liberalization inside the SEZs and, by the early 1990s, across the rest of China (Leong 2013: 551).

The Implication of Fast-Growing Chinese Sales to Africa Today China is the world’s largest exporter. Across Africa, Chinese goods have penetrated markets deeply, increasing from 3.7% of Africa’s total

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imports in 2001 to 17.0% in 2018. Around two-thirds African countries list China as their largest source of goods. In contrast to China’s growing penetration, Africa’s traditionally large trading partners, such as France, the UK and the US, have seen their market share decline. Similarly, South Africa’s share of Africa’s total imports peaked in 2003 at 8.0% and has subsequently slipped to 4.6% in 2018. Granted, South Africa remains countries like Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, but its foothold is being diminished. A foreboding trend that requires confronting head-on (Fig. 6.2). Unlike the rapidly growing Asian economies, whose rising incomes have been associated with structural shifts from agriculture to industry, African countries have tended to by-pass manufacturing, shifting from agriculture to services, with relatively sluggish industrial employment growth (Kumar and Bergstrom 2013: 54). Indicatively, the share of African manufacturing in GDP rose from 6.3% in 1970 to a peak of 15.3% in 1990 and has since significantly declined, to around 10% last year. However, manufacturing—where it exists—remains an important driver of structural transformation in Africa: contributing, in absolute numbers, to greater value added and employment, higher labour productivity growth and better quality of jobs than those in many services and Share of total trade (per cent) 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 2001

2005 United States of America

2009 India

2013 South Africa

Fig. 6.2 Rising penetration of Chinese exports (Source ITC)

2017 Japan

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agriculture (Naude 2018: 144). Conversely then, growth without industrialization has meant that Africa’s growth has not been sufficiently labour absorptive to allow the type of upward income migration of the majority of the population necessary for structural and socially important change. Another discouraging feature of African manufacturing is that it is dominated by firms in the informal sector. Unfortunately, these firms are not on the same escalator as modern firms with access to technology, markets and finance (Fig. 6.3). The divergent path between Asia and Africa is glaringly evidenced in Africa’s poor intra-regional trade relations. A mere 13.5% of Africa’s total trade occurs amongst African nations, which is lower than Latin America (16.5%), and much lower than Asia (58%). Herein lies the rub: The overlap between African demand and supply is negligible. The dearth in the production of finished goods means that Africa is reliant on imports. Meanwhile, Africa currently has a narrow export basket— notably base metals and mineral products—originating from a tight-knit group of nations, purchased by countries like China, the US and other developed markets. Consider that Africa accounts for just 2.7% of the 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Botswana Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Malawi Nigeria Senegal Tanzania South Zimbabwe Africa Formal Informal

Fig. 6.3 African manufacturing an informal affair—share of manufacturing employment (Source Rodik 2016)

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world’s imports of mineral products. Therefore, as this juncture, Africa’s own markets do not generally matter to Africa. In contrast, Africa’s markets are mattering more and more to China. Chinese exports to Africa have risen 12-fold since 2001—Africa’s exports to Africa have only doubled over the same period. Worryingly, for the first time, China’s overall trade with Africa surpassed total intra-Africa trade in 2018. Intra-Africa trade peaked at USD182bn in 2013 and subsequently fell to a low of USD125bn in 2016. Since then, intra-Africa trade has increased by 9% y/y and 5% y/y in 2017 and 2018, respectively, tallying USD144bn in 2018. Meanwhile, China’s total trade, led by fast-growing exports, tallied over USD200bn in both 2018 and 2019 (Fig. 6.4). Focusing in on South Africa, according to China’s General Administration of Customs, South Africa is one of a dozen African countries that does have a trade surplus with China. A trade surplus that narrowed from 2012 to mid-2016 and has since been broadly stable hovering around USD10bn per annum, but rising to USD18bn in 2019 (Figs. 6.5 and 6.6). Admittedly the narrative deviates considerably when South Africa’s customs data is used rather than China’s. According to the South USD bn 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 -40 2001

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African imports

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African exports

Fig. 6.4 China–Africa trade balance (Source CEIC)

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African trade balance

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USD bn 60

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0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

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Fig. 6.5 China–South Africa trade data (monthly, annualized) (Source China’s General Administration of Customs and CEIC)

Fig. 6.6 African nation’s bilateral trade balance with China (Source ITC)

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African Revenue Service, South Africa’s exports to China came in below USD10bn in 2018—far lower than the USD27bn reported by China— implying that South Africa runs a trade deficit with China. Even including South Africa’s sales to Hong Kong, which may be used as a conduit for products destined for the Mainland, the adjustment is minor, and the trade deficit remains steadfast (Fig. 6.7). The real point of departure in the respective trade data—at least until 2015—is due to a relatively obscure product sub-group, which is labelled by the Harmonized System (HS) for classifying goods as “Commodities Not Elsewhere Specified” (HS999999). From virtually zero exports of this product sub-group from South Africa to China, Chinese customs started to report the manifest of South African exports of this product group in 2008, surging rapidly to a peak of over USD30bn in 2013. In fact, before crashing to zero in 2015, HS999999 sales more than doubled South Africa’s other exports to China. Meanwhile, South Africa reported zero exports of HS999999 to China. Then, quite dramatically and clearly owing to a reclassification, China reported a large jump in the import of gold for non-monetary use in powder, unwrought or semi-manufactured forms—from South Africa, rising from zero in US bn 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2001

2005 China from South Africa

2009 South Africa to China

2013

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South Africa to China and Hong Kong

Fig. 6.7 Deviation in China and South Africa’s reporting of South Africa sales to China (Source SARS and General Administration of Customs)

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2014 to USD15bn in 2015. In contrast, curiously, the South African side continues to report zero exports of these three forms of gold— powder (HS710811), unwrought (HS710812) and semi-manufactured (HS710813) (Fig. 6.8). For purpose of comparison, back in 2011 when China’s imports of commodities not elsewhere specified (HS999999) reached the scale that distorted the bilateral data, Switzerland was in a similar position and eventually—just like South Africa—China’s imports of HS999999 fell from tens of billions to zero corresponding with a similar rise in HS7108 occurred. The difference though between South Africa and Switzerland is that the Swiss statistics captured some of the reclassification, reflecting in a sudden surge in the exports of aforementioned sub-groups of gold sales whilst South Africa’s statistics have not captured this reclassification (Fig. 6.9). This contestation aside, what is undisputed is that the disease of a narrow basket of products infects South Africa—akin to the rest of Africa—when it comes to relations with China. South Africa’s export basket is heavily skewed towards commodities. Despite stated intentions to alter the status quo and rebalance trade, South Africa’s exports to USD bn 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Gold, incl. gold plated with platinum, unwrought or not further worked than semi-manufactured . . . Commodities not elsewhere specified

Fig. 6.8 Commodities not elsewhere specified vs three forms of gold (Sources SARS, General Administration of Customs and ITC)

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USD bn 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2001

2004

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Swizterland to China

2010

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Fig. 6.9 Comparison between Switzerland and South Africa’s reporting of sales of HS7108 to China (Source ITC)

China remain mineral products, like iron ore, coal, chrome, manganese and lead are material; base metals like iron & steel, copper, nickel and aluminium, and other commodities like platinum, wood, paper & pulp, leather & hides and fruit & nuts (Fig. 6.10). Worryingly, South Africa is falling down the pecking order in China’s hierarchy of trade partners: in 2013 South Africa was China’s 12th largest source of goods—albeit accounting for just 2.4% of China’s total imports—and has since fallen outside the top 20 and down to 1.3%. Meanwhile, several other emerging markets, like Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have seen sales to China increase rapidly over the past decade (Fig. 6.11). Worse still, the near-term outlook is muddied by trade tensions between the US and China, which may, to some extent catch certain African nations in the crosshairs. In addition, the balance of probability tilts towards a further breakdown in relations rather than a genuine resolution since the inking of Phase One in early 2020. First, the more difficult issues have yet to be addressed, and there seems to be limited space for Beijing to make any additional concessions regarding the remaining (and far more stubborn and entrenched) issues. Second, China hasn’t really been given much, apart from the US side has pledging to

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US bn Other Transport equipment Machinery & mechanical appliances Base metals & articles Articles of stone, plaster, cement Footwear & headgear Textiles & clothing Wood, wood & pulp products Hides & skins Plastics & rubber Chemical product Mineral product Prepared foodstuff Animals & vegetable products -

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Fig. 6.10 African and South African sales to China in 2018 by product group (Source CEIC)

Average annual growth in 2019

100% Gabon

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Fig. 6.11 South Africa export size and growth to China relative to peers (Source MOFCOM)

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reduce its 15% tariffs on USD 120 billion worth of Chinese goods to 7.5% and suspend plans for other tariffs; resentment will build. Third, China has over-committed, agreeing to purchase a staggering USD200bn in goods and services from the US by the end of 2021—an increase of 100% y/y in 2019 and 45% y/y in 2021. If these are too be met, third countries from both the developed and developing world need to be prepared. Meeting the target forces China to shift purchases of oil seeds, for example, away from Brazil, Argentina, Ethiopia, Tanzania and others. The same applies to fish and lobster away from Russia and Canada; cars from the EU or Japan; industrial machinery at the expense to the EU, Japan and Korea; and pharmaceuticals from Switzerland. We could go on. Obviously over the medium- to long-term, prioritizing accelerating sales growth to China should not be ignored. The opportunity is large as China’s rising purchasing power and social transformation is already bringing sweeping economic changes (Zhu 2011: 68). And more is to come: whilst forecasts range and vary according to definitions, nearly 35% of the population, or around 480m consumers, will meet definitions of upper middle-income and high-income by 2030 (EIU 2016). That represents a sharp increase from 132m at present. The emergence of this large population, with a personal disposable income of at least USD10,000, will alter the consumer landscape in China. Rising discretionary income will drive changes in consumer tastes and preferences (Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010: 484).

Rebalancing of China Implies an Adjustment to the Status Quo What is more pressing though is that how China connects to the rest of the world is changing, and African nations are yet to fully just. Simply put, China’s “New Normal” matters. On the face of it, trade with China is a multi-billion-dollar juggernaut. However, it is foolish to ring-fence this from current developments underway inside the Mainland. China’s slowdown, rebalancing, de-risking of the financial system, and emphasis on the Belt and Road initiative, along with distraction of the Trade War has already diverted China’s attention from Africa. Evidence suggests that the broader China–African relations are already seeing a more selective and focused engagement is emerging from China (World Bank 2013: 16–21; Zhang and Chen 2017: 3). Yet, more importantly, irrespective

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of the specific growth printed in 2020, China is amid a profound longterm economic transition, that will likely see growth trend towards 3–4% in 2025. Hence, China’s economic performance should be seen in the context of cyclical movements around a decelerating trend—upswings will be shorter than before, and downswings longer. Given the rich representation of South Africa across the spectrum of global commodities, it is no surprise that South Africa is sensitive to changes in China. China primarily imports raw materials from South Africa. China imported USD25.5bn from South Africa in 2019. In fact, since 2016 around one-third of China’s purchases from Africa have originated from South Africa. China accounts for a largest proportion of global imports in the natural resources that South Africa traditionally exports, such as iron ore (55%), aluminium ore (33%), copper ore (62%) and coal (53%). As such, China’s demand and increasingly supply fluctuations shape the prices of South Africa’s primary exports and terms of trade. Moreover, Drummond and Liu (2013: 5) estimate that a one percentage point increase in China’s domestic investment growth is associated with an average 0.8 percentage point increase in South Africa’s export growth—higher than the 0.6 pp acceleration for SSA. World Bank (2013) estimated that one percentage point reduction in China’s growth results in a 0.37 percentage point decline in output growth in South Africa. The trade data clearly bears this out: South Africa’s exports to China peaked at USD48bn in 2013, and has averaged USD25bn each year over the past three years (coming in at USD26.5bn in 2019). China’s role in global commodity markets is changing as it undertakes a transition from a growth pattern that is highly intensive in its use of natural resources, driven by investment and the development of heavy industry, to a more sustainable path that uses these resources less intensively (Mi et al. 2018: 1007; Roberts et al. 2016: 147). China’s lower growth rate and changing demand composition are already affecting commodity prices, with particularly strong impacts on global mineral markets (Pigato and Tang 2015: 10).

China Will Focus on Africa’s Markets for Exports, Buoyed by CFTZ The more long-standing force at play though is that accelerating real wage growth and rising unit labour costs in China from the mid-2000s

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has created the incentives for Chinese production and jobs from exportoriented labour-intensive—especially light manufacturing industries to low-income countries (Xu et al. 2017: 3). For the time being, the preferred respond to the challenges of rising costs and tighter demand by means of adjustments in existing operations—upgrading technology, controlling costs, expanding markets or product ranges—rather than by establishing production operations in a new location. Simultaneously, facing soft demand abroad in advanced economies, Chinese exporters have worked hard to diversify the markets towards emerging markets, and tapping into fast-growing consumer markets. Africa is now the destination for 4.2% of China’s total exports, slightly less than 4.6% in 2016. Still, this is double that of a decade ago, and more than Africa’s share of global GDP of 2.8% in 2018. In all likelihood, Chinese exporters will tighten their hold on Africa’s consumer markets and by 2024, exports to Africa could surpass USD200bn. Looking further ahead, as wage rates in China continue to rise and firms refocus their attention on domestic demand, countries in Africa will be well positioned to exploit emerging opportunities for investment in export-oriented manufacturing (Pigato and Tang 2015: 5). It is a logical progression that outbound investment in manufacturing will follow Chinese sales, and some of China’s fastest growing export markets are in Africa. This is exactly what South African corporates should be leveraging, thinking of ways to collaborate with Chinese firms in Africa—especially as industrial restructuring in coastal China forces some labourintensive firms to relocate to other parts of the developing world, including Africa. Importantly, the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) fits many criteria to indeed be the catalyst for China–Africa ties. Potentially, inside these more open economies will be opportunities in consumer-facing industries such as retail, telecommunications and banking; infrastructure-related industries; across the agriculture-related value chain; and in resource-related industries. The AfCFTA is a mediumto long-term opportunity for Africa, potentially attracting manufacturing business migrating from China. In many respects, whether the AfCFTA will succeed as a driver for African development will largely depend on its impact on regional integration, buttressing trade and developing nodes of growth. Even more powerful benefits will come if the dismantling of tariff barriers occur in conjunction with improving the efficiency of customs, tackle bureaucratic delays and reduce opportunities for corruption; and

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improving the management of economic corridors and invest in physical infrastructure and logistics networks (De Soyres et al. 2018: 33). Looking at Africa makes sense: Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region expected to have accelerated in 2019 (from 2018) and is expected to be the second fastest growing region over the next five years (IMF 2020). Sub-Saharan Africa is forecast to expand by an average of 4.0% over the next five years, more than twice the speed of advanced economies. Relatively robust economic growth in Africa will be led by rapid growth in some key economies such as Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Mozambique and Ghana. In addition, over half of Africa’s economies will likely expand by at least 4.0% in the next five years. This improved cyclical story weds neatly to the favourable structural forces playing out, like favourable demographics, urbanization and industrialization, and rising incomes and a growing middle class, which remain intact (Abaogye and Nketiah-Amponsah 2016: 298). Hence, it is well understood that African economies continue to present a host of compelling opportunities for trade and investment (Fig. 6.12). Share of countries (per cent) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 80s Less than 2%

Fig. 6.12

90s 2-4%

00s 4-6%

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Distribution of GDP growth in Africa (Source IMF)

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Threat to South Africa Exports to the Rest of Africa, and Its Manufacturing Sector Canvassing the continent, South Africa plausibly has the most to lose from greater competition with China, home to a relatively developed industrial sector—certainly the most scalable in Africa, accounting for one-third of Africa’s manufacturing capacity. With an estimated USD16.5bn in imports from China in 2019, South Africa is the largest consumer of Chinese products in Africa—ahead of Nigeria and Egypt. South Africa purchases around 14.9% of all the goods China sells to Africa. Promisingly, unlike South Africa’s export data, in terms of South African purchases from China the data from both China and South Africa is consistent (Fig. 6.13). The share of machinery and mechanical appliances in South Africa’s basket of goods is higher than that of the rest of Africa, driven by hefty purchases of telephones and automatic processing machines, exemplifying South Africa’s large population of 58 million people and greater consumer purchasing power of that population. In contrast, the share of transport equipment and base metals is lower, underlying the less weighty role of USD bn 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2001

2004

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2010

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Fig. 6.13 Consistency in data for China’s export sales to South Africa (Sources SARS and General Administration of Customs)

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Chinese loans and construction in the China–South Africa narrative than elsewhere on the continent (Fig. 6.14). Much like in other emerging markets with nascent manufacturing sectors, say Mexico for example the inflow of Chinese products has had a profound impact on a host of domestic industries in South Africa. Granted, South Africa’s own particular political and socio-economic difficulties have also served as headwinds (Naude 2018: 147). However, Edwards and Jenkins (2014: 454) conclude that Chinese penetration of the South African displaced imports from other countries, but declines in domestic production accounted for the bulk of the increase in imports from China. Losses in sales are particularly high in textiles and clothing, footwear and leather, electrical and electronic products and some types of machinery. The impacts have been seen not only in textiles, but also clothing, toys and household appliances (Morris and Einhorn 2008: 370), and, more recently, high-technology and machinery equipment (Edwards and Jenkins 2014: 4). In short, imports from China do provide headwinds to employment, prices, inflation and wage growth (Sandrey and Jensen 2007). It is clear that in the face of increased competition from imports, Share of total (per cent)

South Africa

Africa

0%

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Fig. 6.14 Composition of South African imports from China compared to the rest of Africa (Source CEIC)

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domestic firms were unable to defensively innovate by upgrading capital stock, and upgrading skills. It is also worth considering that the lack of dynamism of South Africa’s manufacturing sector has been a key factor explaining slow growth and high unemployment in South Africa (Rodrik 2008). Concerns have been expressed over the “deindustrialisation” of the economy (Maia 2011). Given that since 2008, 3.5 million people have entered the labour force, but only 1.6 million additional jobs have been created. The unemployment rate has risen from 22.5% in 2008 to 29.1% in 2019. Nearly 6.2 million people are unemployed, or 9.3 million if those who have stopped looking for work are included. (Including these discouraged workers, South Africa’s unemployment rate is 38.5%). Of those looking for employment, as around 60% have not worked in the past five years— more than twice the number of just a decade ago. What is clear, over the past few years, economic growth has been too low to generate sufficient jobs. The manufacturing sector has the potential to absorb a notable share of the labour force. Consider, for example, Ethiopia where China’s investments in manufacturing have been robust: employment levels grew from just about one million workers in 2004 to more than 5.6 million workers by 2015 (Naude 2018: 145). Most important, failure to get the partnership right may marginalize South Africa from intra-Africa trade. Chinese goods have eroded the competitiveness of South African exports to its neighbours (Renard 2011: 24). Being crowded out from Africa’s growing consumption and rising middle class is an acute concern; the risk is real as it is here where the overlap of products is largest and where South African firms have disproportionately exported their manufactured goods (Edwards and Jenkins 2014: 8). Put differently, South Africa’s long-term relevance to China is wedded to South Africa’s relevance to Africa. Therefore, the manner in which South Africa coordinates its industrial and trade policy, and infrastructure, with other leading African economies, is critically important.

Chinese Manufacture-Based Private-Owned Firms Have Already Started to Enter South Africa Importantly, there is a material difference in the sector distributions of private- and state-led investments in Africa. First, private firms preferably invest in high-income and middle-income countries. Second, private firms

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tend to invest in manufacturing and services industries whilst SOEs are more likely to invest in construction and mining (Lu et al. 2011: 224). Third, private firms are attracted to host-country strategic assets and are averse to economic and political risks when choosing investment locations abroad, whilst, state-owned enterprises follow the strategic needs of their home country and invest more in natural resource sectors, being largely indifferent to the political and economic conditions in the host countries (Amighini et al. 2012: 20). Private companies are not creating establishments in government-sponsored special economic zones (SEZs), which are in fact struggling to survive (Pigato and Tang 2015: 8). This is somewhat unique to South Africa. By and large, elsewhere in Africa, Chinese banks—specifically China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China—offer loans to African countries and SOEs to build infrastructure projects such as roads, dams, railways or industrial plants built by Chinese companies, manifesting in imports of related equipment and machinery, wide trade deficits; and gradual repayment of interest and sometimes principal’s on loans back to China. However, Chinese loans to South Africa are relatively marginal—accounting for 2.3% of Chinese loans to SSA from 2000 through 2017 (Atkins et al. 2018). As a result, engineering, procurement and construction contractors have not been the lynchpin for China’s engagements in South Africa; rather private-owned firms have held the reigns (Fig. 6.15). Latest data estimates that China’s FDI stock in Africa is USD50bn in 2019—up from USD13bn in 2010 (UNCTAD 2019). Thus, in terms of FDI stock, China ranks behind countries like France, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. In addition, on this score, China’s interests in Africa are less than two times bigger than South Africa’s USD36bn according to offical statistics recorded by the South African Reserve Bank. However, the story certainly doesn’t end there: take a data set that estimates capital investment based on the total investment the company is making at the time of the project announcement or opening, for instance. Such a data set includes capital raised locally, recognizes that investments may be phased over a time, and firms may channel their investment through different countries for tax efficiency. Here the data is divergences from the official data on FDI flows. On this score, Chinese interests in Africa reached USD95bn in 2017, having expanded at an average of 33% p.a. since 2003 (Fig. 6.16). Of this greenfield investment,13% of have been made inside South Africa. This explains why there is evidence on the ground that Chinese

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Other Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Senegal Zimbabwe Mozambique Tanzania Cote d'Ivoire Uganda Egypt DRC Ghana South Africa Nigeria Cameroon Zambia Sudan Kenya Ethiopia Angola 0

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Fig. 6.15 Chinese cumulative loans to Africa, by country (Source Atkins et al. 2018) 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 South Africa Nigeria Mozambique Ethiopia Angola Zambia Guinea Niger Kenya Zimbabwe Sudan DRC Ghana Tanzania Malawi Other

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Other Rubber Food & Tobacco Pharmaceuticals Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools Non-Automotive Transport OEM Electronic Components Ceramics & Glass Business Services Chemicals Communications Alternative/Renewable energy Warehousing & Storage Textiles Automotive OEM Building & Construction Materials Transportation Metals Coal, Oil and Natural Gas Real Estate

Fig. 6.16 Cumulative Greenfield investment by geography and sector (Source FDI Intelligence)

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firms have already established operations in a diverse range of sectors across South Africa despite official Chinese FDI stock only accounting for 5% of South Africa’s total. On aggregate, their foray into South Africa is a sea-change from the path of Chinese firms interests in other parts of Africa, which has traditionally been weighted towards commodity acquisitions and large-scale government-to-government negotiated construction contracts. Instead, the private-led footprint reinforces broader global trends and reflects both the relative wealth of South Africa and the maturity of South Africa’s economy, institutions, corporates and depth of financial markets. In the past, the key motivations for manufacturing firms to invest in Africa were to circumvent US and EU trade restrictions on Chinese products. Today, this is no longer the case. Much like China’s investments elsewhere, the most often cited motivations for investing in Africa is to gain access to the local consumer markets or avoid competition in an increasingly saturated Chinese market (Gao 2014: 366). The resource seeking motivation is relevant for manufacturing FDI to high-income countries with relatively high fuel abundance, and to low-income countries with primary resource abundance (other than fuels) (Amighini et al. 2013: 311).

Prospects for South African Manufacturing and Policy Priorities Even though African countries are relatively open to Chinese investment, which has been identified by Beijing as an important consideration in assessing total outward investment strategies, the business environment in Africa remains challenging. According to a survey of attractiveness for outbound investment, each of the seven African nations assessed—Tunisia (48), South Africa (49), Egypt (51), Algeria (61), Kenya (65), Nigeria (66) and Angola (67)—ranked in the bottom third, out of 67 countries. Another survey, the Global Foreign Direct Investment Country Attractiveness Index, reported that South Africa’s rank had deteriorated from 43 in 2013 to 48 in 2019. Furthermore, South African manufacturing faces several stubborn obstacles. These issues include: access to finance, access to trade finance, complexity of tax system, customs and trade regulations, corruption, availability of qualified labour, labour regulations, employee health, reliable electricity supply, cost of electricity, transport costs, loss due to transport (breakage, theft, delays), physical infrastructure, ability

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to own land/premises and physical crime (Kumar and Bergstrom 2013: 58). That said, South Africa has advantages. First, labour cost; for instance: the average wage in South Africa masks the country’s high wage inequality. And, more than 5 million workers currently earn the minimum wage. Second, South Africa has an abundance of natural resources, essential inputs in production such as skins for footwear, timber for the furniture industry and land for agribusiness. Third, South Africa has an already substantial domestic market. Fourth, South Africa has favourable access to the region—a region which is experiencing rapid growth in their consumer markets, urbanizing rapidly and enveloped in favourable demographics. Fifth, South Africa has superior institutions underpinning the economy. That said, to fortify its current position and compete more effectively with other markets across the globe—most notably in developing Asia—South Africa must make good on its commitment for incremental improvements in ease of doing business and competitiveness to create a better climate for partnerships. One of the specific targets set by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa as part of government’s economic reform agenda, is to improve the country’s rank in the World Bank’s annual global Ease of Doing Business survey to top 50, from 82 in the latest assessment. Interestingly, China too has made tremendous progress in these areas, especially in the past three years. Over the past year, China ranked amongst the top 10 performers in implementation of reforms, improving 15 positions to rank 31 out of 190 economies. Improvement to the environment for doing business matters as many African countries are defiantly testing environments, and, as such, many Chinese firms prefer to business in South Africa (Fig. 6.17). Importantly, Lu et al. (2011: 226) confirm that supportive government policies are important motivators for private firms in making outward FDI decisions. Promisingly, South Africa has hosted the most high-level diplomatic visits from China over the past decade—galvanized more recently by South Africa’s inclusion in the BRICS, which includes a host of annual state- and ministerial-level meetings, and a host of auxiliary bilateral engagements. Enveloping these engagements, both governments have actively and constructively aimed to realize the comprehensive strategic partnership envisaged in 2010 (Alden and Yushan 2014). The confluence of these high-level visits usher in a range of agreements covering various

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Fig. 6.17 Change in ease of doing business and average GDP growth (Sources Freedom House, Heritage Foundation & IMF)

issues including economic cooperation (Grimm et al. 2014). Additionally, and on the softer end of the power spectrum, South Africa has the greatest number of Confucius Institutes in Africa—used to promote its language and culture and thereby to shape its image (Hartig 2012: 53). Another plank laying the foundation for close bilateral commercial cords, China has increasingly flexed soft power, encompassing techniques of diplomacy, cultural and educational exchange opportunities, and others to position itself as a model of social and economic success, and develop stronger alliances (Kurlantzick 2007: 17). Again, South Africa has proven to be a fertile territory, which is a critical prerequisite for the general growth of Chinese commercial cords (Fijalkowski 2011: 233). Increasingly over the past 50 years, the number of Chinese people that have moved to, or been born in, South Africa has surpassed half a million

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people. The largest number of ethnic-Chinese people in Africa. Whilst obviously a divergent group of individuals, the substantial number of people in South Africa with direct and indirect linkages to China, naturally means that the most significant pockets of Chinese communities in Africa exist inside South Africa (Park 2009: 154–155). Hence, the larger the metropolitan area, the greater number of Chinatowns and Chinese communities (Mhaka and Jeke 2018: 5). These, today, thereby, soften the proverbial landing of Chinese people entering South Africa, ameliorating some of the ethnic differences between Chinese migrants and most South African citizens (Lin 2014: 182). Meanwhile, the communities themselves lower the relative barriers of entry into South Africa by creating social networks made up of relatives and friends and connections that buttress and reinforce the movement of people from China to South Africa (Lin 2014: 195: Zolberg 1999: 75).

Conclusion China is a visible force for development and growth across Africa, led by dazzling growth in bilateral trade and investment. It is upon the crest of state-led investment projects that corporates and individuals have shifted their gaze towards Africa. It seems that this trend will continue to grow—especially as industrial restructuring in coastal China forces some labour-intensive firms to relocate to other parts of the developing world, including Africa. There is no doubt that since the turn of the century, a number of important internal changes, including better macroeconomic management, improved institutional credibility, better quality and economic growth have complimented the emergence of China as an important trading partner and source of capital. However, it is also probably fair to say that Africa’s favourable structural drivers have proven most relevant in attracting the interest of China’s corporates. The next phase of China–Africa ties must focus on industrialization, job creation and technology transfer through investment in manufacturing industries, led by the private sector in a manner that supports African growth, development and intra-Africa trade. South Africa has a host of advantages. Indeed, for South Africa to attract a larger share of Chinese capital and corporate externalization, the coordination of trade and tax policies is necessary, infrastructure and financial sector development requires further prioritization, whilst public governance and accountability constitute a critical prerequisite and require continual attention.

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Most importantly, the quality of human capital requires constant attention as people (in concert with soft and hard infrastructure) play the most crucial role in differentiating Africa from the herd. Most important, failure to get the partnership right may marginalize South Africa from intra-Africa trade. Chinese goods have eroded the competitiveness of South African exports to its neighbours. Being crowded out from Africa’s growing consumption and rising middle class is an acute concern; the risk is real as it is here where the overlap of products is largest and where South African firms have disproportionately exported their manufactured goods. Put differently, South Africa’s long-term relevance to China is wedded to South Africa’s relevance to Africa.

References Abaogye, S., & Nketiah-Amponsah, E. (2016). The Implication of Economic Growth, Industrialization and Urbanization on Energy Demand. Journal of Applied Economics & Business Research, 6(4), 297–311. Adams, G. F., Gangnes, B., & Shachmurove, Y. 2004. Why Is China So Competitive? Measuring and Explaining China’s Competitiveness (Working Paper No. 04-6). University of Hawaii. Alden, C., & YuShan, W. (2014). South Africa-China Relations: Evolving Cooperation, Collaboration and Competition. http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-ana lysis/. Amighini, A., Rabellotti, R., & Sanfilippo, M. (2012, October 25–26). Do Chinese SOEs and Private Companies Differ in Their Foreign Location Strategies? Paper presented at the Third Copenhagen Conference on “’Emerging Multinationals’: Outward Investment from Emerging Economies”. Copenhagen, Denmark. Available on line at: http://www.gdex.dk/ofdi12/Alessia% 20Amighini%20et%20al.pdf. Amighini, A., Rabellotti, R., & Sanfilippo, M. (2013). China’s Outward FDI: An Industry-Level Analysis of Host-Country Determinants. Frontiers of Economics in China, 8(3), 309–336. Atkins, L., Brautigam, D., Chen, Y., & Hwang, J. (2018). Chinese Loans to African Governments. Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative. Available on line at: http://www.sais-cari.org/data. Chai, J. C. H. (2002). Trade and Environment: Evident from the Manufacturing Sector. Sustainable Development, 10, 25–35. De Soyres, F., Mulabdic, A., Murray, S., Rocha, N., & Ruta, M. (2018). How Much Will the Belt and Road Initiative Reduce Trade Costs. International Economics, 159(159), 1–43.

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Drummond, P., & Liu, E. X. (2013). Africa’s Rising Exposure to China: How Large Are Spillovers Through Trade? (IMF Working Paper). Available on line at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13250.pdf. EIU. (2016). The Chinese Consumer in 2030. The Economist Intelligence Unit. Available on line at: http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler. ashx?fi=Chinese-Consumer-in-2030-English.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid= Chineseconsumer2030. Edwards, L., & Jenkins, R. (2014). The Impact of Chinese Import Penetration on the South African Manufacturing Sector. The Journal of Development Studies, 51(4), 447–463. Available online at: http://www.dpru.uct.ac. za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/36/Publications/Policy_Briefs/ DPRU%20PB%2014-40.pdf. Fijalkowski, Ł. (2011). China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29(2), 223–232. Gao, Q. (2014). Chinese Non-Resources Investment in Australia: Current State and Outlook. Economic Papers, 33(4), 362–373. Grimm, S., Kim, Y., Anthony, R., Attwell, R., & Xioo, X. (2014). South African relations with China and Taiwan: Economic Realism and the One-China Doctrine. Viewed 23 June 2015, from http://www.ccs.org.za/wp…/02/Res earch-Report_FEB-2014_Formatting.pdf. Hartig, F. (2012). Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 17 (1): 53–76. Available online at: https://link.springer. com/article/10.1007/s11366-011-9178-7. IMF. (2020). World Economic Outlook Datatbases. International Monetary Fund. Available on line at: https://www.imf.org/en/Data. Jappelli, T., & Pistaferri, L. (2010). The Consumption Response to Income Changes. Annual Review of Economics, 2(1), 479–506. Jia, W. (1994). Chinese Foreign Investment Laws and Policies: Evolution and Transformation. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Kumar, S., & Bergstrom, T. C. (2013). African Manufacturing Firms’ Need for Innovation to Achieve Competitiveness. Information Knowledge Systems Management, 12, 53–73. Kurlantzick, J. (2007). Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. Kyota, K. (2016). Exports and Employment in China, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea. Asian Economic Papers, 15(1), 57–72. Leong, C. K. (2013). Special Economic Zones and Growth in China and India: An Empirical Investigation. International Economic Policy, 10, 549–567. Lin, E. (2014). “Big Fish in a Small Pond”: Chinese Migrant Shopkeepers in South Africa. International Migration Review, 48(1), 181–190.

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Lu, J., Liu, X., & Wang, H. (2011). Motives for Outward FDI of Chinese Private Firms: Firm Resources, Industry Dynamics, and Government Policies. Management and Organization Review, 7 (2), 223–248. Maia, J. (2011). The Changing Structure of the South African Economy. In B. Turok (Ed.), The Controversy About Economic Growth. Jacana Media: Auckland Park. Mhaka, S., & Jeke, L. (2018). An Evaluation of the Trade Relationships Between South Africa and China: An Empirical Review 1995–2014. South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 21(1), 2106. https://doi.org/ 10.4102/sajems.v21i1.2106. Mi, Z., Zheng, J., Meng, J., Shan, Y., Zheng, H., Ou, J., et al. (2018). China’s Energy Consumption in the New Normal. Earth’s Future, 6(7), 1007–1016. Morris, M., & Einhorn, G. (2008). Globalisation, Welfare and Competitiveness: The Impacts of Chinese Imports on the South African Clothing and Textile Industry. Competition and Change, 12(4), 355–376. Naude, W. (2018). Brilliant Technologies and Brave Entrepreneurs: A New Narrative for African Manufacturing. Journal of International Affairs, 72(1), 143–158. Pigato, M., & Tang, W. (2015). China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global Context. Washington, DC: World Bank. Park, Y. J. (2009). Recent Chinese Migration to South Africa: New Intersections of Race, Class & Ethnicity. In T. Rahimy (Ed.), Representation, Expression and Identity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (pp. 153–168). Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press. Pettis, M. (2013). The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Reardon, L. (1991). The SEZs Come of Age. China Business Review, 18(6), 01637169. Renard, M. F. (2011). China’s Trade and FDI in Africa (Working Paper Series No. 126). Tunis, Tunisia: African Development Bank. Roberts, I., Saunders, T., Spence, G., & Cassidy, N. (2016). China’s Evolving Demand for Commodities. Reserve Bank of Australia. Available on line at: https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2016/pdf/rba-con ference-volume-2016-roberts-saunders-spence-cassidy.pdf. Rodrik, D. (2008). Understanding South Africa’s Economic Puzzles. The Economics of Transition, 16, 769–797. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14680351.2008.00343.x. Rodik, D. (2016). An African Growth Miracle. Journal of African Economies. Rosen, D. H. (1999). Behind the Open Door: Foreign Enterprises in the Chinese Marketplace. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. RoyChoudhury, K. (2010). Review Paper: Special Economic Zones in China. SIES Journal of Management, 7 (1), 114–120.

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Sandrey, R., & Jensen, H. G. (2007). Revisiting the South Africa-China Trading Relationship (Tralac Working Paper No. 6). UNCTAD. (2019). World Investment Report. World Bank. (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious and Creative Society. Xu, J., Gelb, S., Li, J., & Zhao, Z. (2017). Adjusting to the Rising Cost in Chinese Light Manufacturing: What Opportunities for Developing Countries. Centre for New Structural Economics. Yang, L. (2014). China’s Growth Miracle: Past, Present, and Future. Available on line at: http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BD6AB/%28httpAux Pages%29/2893F14F41998392C1257BC600385B21/$file/China%27s%20g rowth%20miracle%200808.pdf. Zhang, J., & Chen, J. (2017). Introduction to China’s New Normal Economy. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 15(1), 1–4. Zhang, Q., & Felmingham, F. S. (2001). The Relationship Between Inward Direct Foreign Investment and China’s Provincial Export Trade. China Economic Review, 12(1), 82–99. Zhu, D. (2011). Consumption Patterns of the Middle Class in Contemporary China: A Case Study in Beijing. University of Manchester. Available on line at: https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/54507982/FULL_T EXT.PDF. Zolberg, A. R. (1999). Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy. In C. Hirshman, P. Kasinitz, & J. DeWind (Eds.), The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience (pp. 71–93). Russel Sage Foundation: New York, NY.

CHAPTER 7

Behind the Headlines: China’s Media Engagement in South Africa Yu-Shan Wu and Cobus van Staden

Introduction and Contextualisation China’s media role in South Africa is expanding and this includes economic engagement. However the extent of its reach and influence is still to be determined. In many ways, China’s media role in South Africa mirrors its broader media engagement on the African continent. Media exchanges between China and Africa began around the 1950s at the same time that diplomatic relations were being established with select countries (Wu 2012, 11–12). From the 1960s fuelled by the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing sought ideological support from other nations and gave support to the communication projects of African liberation movements. Chinese media coverage tended to emphasise political links in the 1980s and again in the early 1990s, as China sought to repair its international

Y.-S. Wu (B) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] C. van Staden South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_7

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image. This eventually gave way to increased reporting on the burgeoning economic ties between China and Africa. As relations became further institutionalised through FOCAC in 2000, China’s media engagement on the continent was characterised by official exchanges, technical support, as well as skills transfer (via exchange programmes and training for the use of media hardware) (Wu 2012, 14–15). This engagement was refined further over time. By the 2006 FOCAC or Beijing Summit, training expanded from a technical focus and incorporated the sharing of China’s perspective on media practises and its experience on issues like development (Wu 2012, 16). It was clear that in order for Chinese media to become internationally recognised, more understanding of its media system and perspective was necessary. It was however from around 2009 that China’s media as an instrument of public diplomacy—that is, engagement with global and African publics—became a key focus. This was sparked by events like the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the added criticism of China’s role in places like Darfur and Zimbabwe. It became acutely aware of its image deficit and the need for its perspective to be heard. Media players like China Central Television (CCTV)—rebranded as China Global Television Network (CGTN)—as well as Xinhua news agency and China Daily began to build their media footprint, including setting up a physical presence on the continent, in order to share China’s world view along with dedicated African coverage. The importance of public diplomacy and communication continues under Xi Jinping. In late 2012 at the 18th CCP National Congress, China signalled that public diplomacy would be formally integrated into its national strategy (Han 2013). At the 2015 FOCAC Summit held between China and African leaders in Johannesburg, Chinese media houses provided much more detailed coverage of the meeting and discussions compared to previous such meetings. This included regular tweets1 as well as live coverage online. At the same time, China’s role in media hardware assistance continues to grow. In the midst of US-China tensions over issues such as the communication giant Huawei’s operations in North America, and 2018 allegations that Huawei spied on the African Union (AU) Headquarters in Addis Ababa, the AU still signed a Memorandum of Understanding in early 2019 to further deepen collaboration with Huawei. This included collaboration on 5G, artificial intelligence and internet provision. Likewise the digital TV operator, StarTimes, is expanding its presence across the continent. It is reported to hold a 60% share in ZNBC (Zambia’s

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state broadcaster) for the next 25 years and thanks to its affordability, StarTimes has gained about 1.5 million subscribers in Kenya (Marsh 2019). These developments reflect the evolving nature of China’s media engagement in Africa, where it seeks to advance its interests and narrative as well as, increasingly, to serve greater audience needs. But this also leads to questions about the direction of Chinese media in Africa and specifically how they operate in an environment like South Africa. These questions include whether Chinese media have reached their capacity as strictly public diplomacy instruments, considering that they are already a well-established presence on the continent both physically and via their regular reporting and commentary. How does the media space interact with or counteract other areas of engagement? To what extent is profit an added prerogative to some Chinese media outfits in South Africa today? Overall, this chapter demonstrates the breadth of Chinese media in South Africa, as well as how this relationship signifies the complex environment in which China finds itself operating.

China Media Role in South Africa In the following sections, China’s media engagement in South Africa is demonstrated as both unique in approach, as well as conditioned by the local environment. The primary question is how much of its media engagement with South Africa reflect the trends explored at the continental level, and whether media remains a useful channel for China’s public engagement and image-building activities. It is necessary to understand the local media environment, in order to unpack how Chinese media operate in South Africa. South Africa’s media market is a reflection of both global trends and local characteristics. Much like other established and competitive media environments, there is a steady rise of users in the digital space. In fact 2018 figures show that 29% of South Africans are active on Facebook, the most used social networking platform in the country (Patricios and Goldstuck 2018). Also most users access the platform by mobile phone or tablet devices—and the rise in numbers is also thanks to Facebook Lite, which requires less data costs, and some mobile operators even allow users to use it without data charges (Marklives 2017).

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This also links to the general restructuring of the traditional newsroom. With the rise of online platforms, over 70% of South Africans are opting for alternative ways to access news such as through websites, news apps and social media (Smit 2019). Wider implications are being felt as a result of this. Consumers are less interested in paying for news and moreover, online advertising revenue has been largely redirected to other platforms (like Google and Facebook); this has resulted in retrenchments in the newsroom as well as further interest in increasing revenue through subscription models (Finlay 2018, 5). Daniels (2018, 18) provides a sobering estimate that the number of professional journalists in South Africa has also halved since about a decade ago. This takes place against a backdrop where South Africa’s overall unemployment rates stood at 29% of the population in the second quarter of 2019 (Republic of South Africa 2019b). A caveat to the increase in news content through non-traditional means is the higher susceptibility to disinformation (the intention to deceive) and ‘fake news’ (false and sensational information framed as ‘news’). This phenomenon has grown so exponentially that Collins Dictionary called ‘Fake News’—a term regularly used by then US President Donald Trump—the word of 2017 (Hunt 2017). The threat of disinformation has even affected South Africa’s election season. For example during the 2014 election campaigns, opposition parties were left disgruntled and forced to find alternative platforms, due to the ruling African National Congress’ (ANC) grip of the public broadcaster, the SABC, which reaches millions of South African voters (including vernacular speakers in rural areas) (Plaut 2019). During the 2019 national elections the threat of the proliferation of fake news as a result of political competition was heightened. This however led to the rise in significance of media organisations, like Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) and Africa Check, who became central to monitoring media reports and social media. Greater connectivity is not just affecting the news space. The television and film industries are seeing changes too. For example online media service providers like Netflix are penetrating the South African market and could impact the revenue of traditional television broadcasters—especially from high-end consumers. At the same time pay-tv providers are proactively offering a variety of subscription models, at a cheaper cost and with different templates of channels according to viewer demands and interests (Marsland 2018). Moreover the proudly South African broadcast satellite service DStv (Digital Satellite Television) owned by Multichoice, still

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offers more local content, which appeals to the mid- and mass-market segments (Tarrant 2019). Meanwhile the public broadcaster, the SABC, continues to be mired with problems from management issues, financial woes to party politics often linked to key placements in the broadcaster (Sibanda 2019; Bratt 2017). At the same time, the SABC continues to dominate the radio landscape in terms of audience numbers. The local media space is further complicated by factors beyond the commercial. Thanks to the relative freedom of South Africa’s media and civil society, the country was ranked number 31 (out of 180 countries) in the 2019 World Press Freedom Ranking—albeit it dropped from 28th in 2018 (Republic of South Africa 2019a). As a result of the memory of apartheid censorship, South Africans are also very sensitive about any infringements on their right to freedom of expression (Lloyd 2013, 22). The media has even played an important check and balance in the country, an example is the investigative journalism outfit amaBhungane and its role in #Guptaleaks, an expose of 2017 emails that showed clear signs of state capture between the government and the Gupta2 family (Harber 2018, 50). The link between government and perceived foreign influence is something ordinary South Africans continue to be wary about, particularly when information on interactions are not disclosed and could be misconstrued as impingement of freedom. Another trend however lies closer to home and that is the examples of verbal attacks and threats from government and party individuals towards journalists over their critical reporting (Daniels 2019; Davies 2019). Public Diplomacy Perspective The complex trends mentioned could impact the manner in which Chinese media engage in South Africa, whether it is to build a positive image of China or for purely commercial purposes. With a shrinking newsroom and expansion of the digital space and the operators within it, China is engaging in an already competitive media environment (with concentrated ownership) and as a relatively newer player. There seems to be a degree of understanding of this, as CGTN (China Global Television Network)—formally CCTV (China Central Television)—chose to launch its main African broadcast centre in Nairobi around 2012. Still other international media houses are based in the East African hub too, which suggests CGTN was following a broader trend as well. The caveat is how to ensure that communication is received in an environment like

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South Africa. For instance on the DStv platform, CGTN joins other news players like BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, Russia Today and a host of other local news content providers (Wu 2016, 8). So while its presence is made, it is a battle over whose narrative and coverage dominates. Albeit CGTN did offer an alternative perspective on China and Africa respectively, as well as the overall relationship early on; but other news providers’ also started to shift and consolidate the local African perspective. Furthermore as changes take place in the pay-tv service space, the channels on offer will be more susceptible to customer demands and what specific selection of channels they want to receive in their packages. Hence there is competition on various fronts. Besides the role of CGTN engaging in South Africa and a broader continental audience, the China perspective has made its way into the local space through both traditional and non-traditional means. What is clear is that news broadcasts are only one means of engaging audiences and instead other communication strategies have been adopted in the local case. Take for example the Chinese embassy based in the administrative capital Pretoria, who has become more active in engaging South Africans. The embassy has been disseminating e-newsletters to local recipients since 2012–2013. They share information and press clippings on China’s international relations (such as about its economy and position on issues like the South China Sea and the Huawei ban in the US) and on its engagement in Africa (from China’s assistance in the Ebola crisis to official visits, events, activities and speeches, as well as responding to news developments like China’s wildlife engagement in Africa). Albeit the numbers and details of local email recipients and how they utilise these updates, is unknown. At the same time, embassy staff have been active in other ways such as responding to local media reports and in opinion pieces, including the written response by the press counsellor, Pan Peng (2013), to the Mail and Guardian article titled ‘Rhino horn trade thrives in Johannesburg’. Likewise since 2017 and specifically after the arrival of former Chinese Ambassador Lin Songtian, there has been greater engagement with local media outfits. For instance, Ambassador Lin held a press briefing in August 2018 at the South African National Editors Forum (SANEF), regarding information on the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held later that September as well as outlining the outcomes of the July BRICS Johannesburg Summit, respectively hosted in

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Beijing and Johannesburg (Tutu 2018). The ambassador has also written in local media such as the January 2018 piece titled ‘Joining Hands towards a New Journey in China-South Africa Relations’3 and is regularly quoted in local media reports. In fact a study by Finlay (2013, 155) states that the more official Chinese sources are made available to local journalists, the more likely coverage of China in the local press is positive. The embassy has also participated in more public events, where for instance the ambassador participated in a donation ceremony and handed over funds for wildlife protection in the Kruger National Park (People’s Republic of China 2018). Gumba and Chelin (2019) add that China’s increasingly proactive stance against illicit wildlife trafficking in Africa, for example, its enhanced cooperation with local partners, could help change trends in the crime. Of course there are also other media sources available besides broadcast such as China Daily Africa (an English language newspaper based in Nairobi) as well as ChinAfrica magazine—a monthly magazine based in South Africa published in English and French by Beijing Review, which is linked to the Chinese government. The latter was launched in 2012 as a means to promote ‘harmonious’ China–Africa relations and to also sound out African views (People’s Republic of China 2012). Although the circulation numbers of the print and online versions amongst local readers is unknown. It should also be noted that promotion through media engagement is but one avenue that works in tandem with the communication of other platforms such as Confucius Institutes and activities like the 2015 China Year in South Africa series of cultural events. These initiatives are clear intent to bring the Chinese perspective closer to a local audience. At the same time much like the commercial space, there is a range of voices outside of the official ambit that are seeking to make sense of the relationship and capture issues that may be overlooked so far. Outfits like the Africa-China Reporting Project (ACRP), based at the Journalism Department at the University of the Witwatersrand and the China Africa Project (CAP), who regularly hosts podcasts with experts and practitioners on China-Africa relations, offer platforms to mediate understanding about China-South Africa. Although they have some roots in South Africa, they serve to inform a broader community of African journalists, academics, practitioners and officials. Hence they demonstrate that media today is not easily confined to a single national location. Likewise are opportunities that bring about understanding of Chinese culture outside of official activities. The Proudly Chinese in SA Facebook

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group is a platform where Chinese in South Africa are promoted regularly through posts on activities and announcements of individual Chinese community member’s achievements (although this largely features the Chinese living in South Africa, many of which describe themselves as #ProudlySouthAfrican). There also exists local Chinese-language media outfits, like African Times, however they tend to inform the Chinesespeaking community in South Africa rather than to foster links between China and the local environment. Film is another space where perspectives on relations are emerging. There is greater collaboration in film festivals such as the 2018 BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa] Film Festival, where each country showcased a selection of their films in the city of Durban. Further away from official drives are films like the Chinese blockbuster Wolf Warrior 2 that was filmed in South African locations bringing filmmakers closer in proximity.4 There is also the South African directed film Buddha in Africa that was showcased at the 2019 Durban International Film Festival, about a Malawian teenager caught between his local roots and Chinese cultural upbringing (Screen Africa 2019). Thus, there exists a rich tapestry of voices when it comes to understanding and communicating about China-South Africa, outside of government spaces. That said, these interactions are still somewhat limited. The main challenge to engaging a South African audience through public diplomacy lies in the fact that the links between China and South Africa continue to be concentrated and perceived at the official level— and as mentioned in the previous section, local government and public perspective are even at times in conflict with one another. (Likewise not all citizens agree that culture or media should be instruments of the state.5 ) The official links in media appeared cemented in 2013 when the Sekunjalo Independent Media Consortium headed by Dr Iqbal Survé, purchased Independent News and Media, one of South Africa’s main media groups. It was reported that 25% would be owned by the ruling ANC, and 20% purchased by ‘Chinese state instruments’ that was later identified as Interacom Investment Holdings (Cronje 2019a; Trewhela 2014). This purchase raised alarms bells and concern over the meaning of government-related ownership for the independence of local media, leading to articles such as ‘China-ANC alliance a threat to media freedom in SA’ (Trewhela 2014). This section has thus reflected on the idea that the official Chinese perspective is but one perspective in a complex media environment like

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South Africa. Instead as will be further discussed, commercial imperatives intermingle with political ones. For example, in mid-2019 Dr Survé was also appointed to head the $1 billion (about R14 billion) Belt and Road Africa Fund. This fund is linked to China’s grand, transregional interconnectivity drive, the BRI, and will focus on Chinese and African co-investments in various areas such as e-commerce, infrastructure, resource beneficiation and technology. He is also to serve on the first Council of the Belt and Road News Network (BRNN), along with other media leaders, in order to build global media networks to promote the initiative.6 Media as Commercial Engagement As the preceding sections have made clear, media is a key tool in China’s public diplomacy arsenal. It provides both the opportunity to build broad affinity between China and a foreign population, as well as giving a tool to address them with specific messages. However, media is also a commercial enterprise, and it has to be profitable in addition to being useful as a medium for public diplomacy. Up to the present, scholars of China-Africa media relations have tended to focus on the public diplomacy aspect of China’s media engagement on the continent (see, for example, Wu 2016; Matingwina 2016; Becard and Filho 2019). However, more recent developments are drawing attention to the commercial side of Chinese engagement with African media. This opens an important second front in the line of enquiry of China-Africa media relations and how this media is used as a form of public diplomacy. This is because some instances of commercial expansion operate in tandem with, and strengthen, public image as well. However, even in cases where no explicit public diplomacy dividend is garnered, the very forging of commercial relationships and the demonstration of a commitment to Africa as an emerging market, carry public diplomacy payoffs. This section will explore this rapidly developing field. Here, one caveat is necessary. As pointed out above, a narrow focus on country-to-country bilateral relations sometimes makes it harder to see wider trends. This is even truer when one looks at Chinese commercial engagement in African media, where a country is frequently eclipsed by region. As will be explained in the final part of this section, the specific nature of South Africa’s media economy further complicates this issue. However, in order

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to point out wider media trends on the continent, this section occasionally expands beyond South Africa. Hybridised Commercial Engagement The rapid expansion of Chinese state media into Africa drew a lot of attention. However, despite the impressive optics of large production facilities and a network of bureaus across the continent, little research has so far emerged to prove that these media platforms are gaining significant audiences. In fact, because these outfits don’t release official ratings statistics, detractors have been able to claim that they don’t get any traction with African audiences at all, while Chinese state media can claim that it has received an enthusiastic reception. The reality is that it is extremely challenging to quantify the reach of traditional Chinese state media. In contrast, the expansion of Chinese commercial media is more explicit. It lives in the spreadsheets and annual reports of a growing number of publicly traded companies and stateowned enterprises. While they aren’t necessarily more transparent than their contemporaries in China’s state media sector, these companies’ own quantification of their market success at least provides tools not available to the researcher before. However, the problem of opacity is immediately replaced by the problem of classification. The media rollout described above took place in conventional fields like TV news and radio, and maintained a split that has dominated much contemporary media studies: a focus on media content over the technological hardware that transmits the content. The rollout of commercial Chinese media in Africa challenges both these delineations. In the first place, much of the commercial media rollout hasn’t been in the conventional fields dominated by state media, but rather in the fields of new media and satellite TV. In the second place, the most striking expansions have been a rollout of networks and devices, rather than content. In fact, a solid argument can be made that Chinese network provision is enabling the rapid circulation of Western and African content on the continent (and to an extent, addressing Africa’s serious digital divide), rather than necessarily favouring Chinese content. The expansive mobile phone networks set up by Chinese companies like Huawei, frequently in collaboration with African service providers like MTN, is an example of this dynamic. The fact that these networks were largely set up by Chinese companies don’t necessarily mean that users are using applications or content provided by Chinese companies.

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Yet, the network provision has its own public diplomacy payoffs. For example, the fact that South African companies work closely with Huawei, has reportedly informed South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 2019 comments in support of Huawei, and criticising the US clampdown on the company (Cronje 2019b). Ramaphosa was quoted as saying: ‘[The United States] are jealous that a Chinese company called Huawei has outstripped them. And because they’ve been outstripped they must now punish that company and use it as a pawn in the fight they have with China’ (Gavaza 2019). Ramaphosa’s public support of a Chinese company, and public rebuttal of US policy (to the extent that Robert Strayer, US deputy assistant secretary of State for cyber and international communications and information policy felt the need to respond publicly [Fabricius 2019a]) must surely be counted as a media diplomacy victory for China. However, this victory is borne out of the commercial importance of investments in the African media economy, rather than through maximising the South African consumption of Chinese media. In addition, its true achievement was in fostering elite-elite discussions, and then moving them from closed meeting rooms onto an amplified public platform, rather than public diplomacy’s classic aim, to foster greater understanding for a government in the hearts of a foreign public. This example illustrates a wider trend: Chinese media and communication companies are increasingly focusing on Africa as an emerging market. As will be shown below, this engagement frequently dovetails with public diplomacy initiatives. However, even without a clear public diplomacy agenda, these investments create systems that may become useful for messaging later. For example, the Chinese mobile phone maker Transsion has become the largest retailer of mobile phone handsets on the continent (Adepoju 2019). These come with an embedded music streaming service called Boomplay. The rapid spread of Transsion’s Tecno phone in Africa (due to the company’s willingness to adapt the design of the phone to African realities and then sell it at razor-thin profit margins) has also installed Boomplay as the continent’s leading music streaming service, reaching tens of millions of consumers (Salaudeen 2019). The success of Boomplay came as Western competitors like Spotify and Apple Music are only starting to explore the continent. The Transsion rollout is more than the simple provision of technology. Rather, it is the institutionalisation of media platforms that then enable both the dissemination of Chinese and non-Chinese content. Even if the amount of Chinese content consumed via the Boomplay network is currently negligible, the very act of network

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provision means that this might not always be true. The very existence of a network arguably primes it for future public diplomacy work. This becomes more clear when we look at StarTimes. StarTimes is a private Chinese satellite television company with a growing footprint in Africa. Like companies like Huawei, it is involved in multiple tiers of the African media economy at once: setting up satellite networks, providing content for those networks, and acting as a service provider selling packages of channels to African consumers (Los Angeles Times 2017). It has also become an important partner in African countries’ transition from analogue to digital broadcasting. This ‘digital migration’ process is frequently funded by loans from Chinese state banks, and while StarTimes is a private company, it has frequently slotted into the role of Chinese state-owned enterprises in African infrastructure deals. Chinese loans are tied, which means that they necessitate the appointment of a Chinese contractor if the infrastructure deal is financed by a Chinese state bank. In the case of the digital migration contracts, StarTimes became the preferred contractor (Madrid-Morales 2018). These realities have shaped StarTimes’s role as an unlikely vector of public diplomacy. While it is ostensibly a private company, StarTimes is increasingly acting as a technical partner enabling public diplomacy campaigns by the Chinese government. The best example of this is the 10,000 Villages Project. This project entails the provision of satellite TV coverage to rural areas in East and West Africa (Abuya 2018). StarTimes provides the hardware and networks, and the Chinese state provides the money. The project is explicitly a public diplomacy one: in each of the 10,000 villages, a sign is erected that claims the tech provision as an instance of country-to-country friendship, complete with national flags (Marsh 2019). The users of the new StarTimes networks have a variety of options, separated by price point. Its cheapest package offers local news, Al Jazeera and the China Global Television Network (CGTN), together with channels featuring Chinese soap operas, dubbed into African languages at StarTimes’s production facility in Beijing (startimestv.com, n.d.; Marsh 2019). At higher price points, they can get a variety of other channels, including a wider variety of African content, and many Western channels. The case of StarTimes shows how public diplomacy, content provision and network provision can’t easily be disentangled in China-Africa research. In addition, it also shows that despite national differences, certain trends are developing across the continent. While South Africa

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certainly presents a more complex and competitive media environment than many other African countries, many of the trends mentioned above are also true for South Africa. StarTimes maintains a commercial presence in South Africa, in the form of StarSat. It faces severe competition from South Africa’s MultiChoice, constraining its presence in the market. Yet even within these limits the company’s lists demonstrate its hybrid role as both a commercial competitor and a vector for public diplomacy. In its cheapest package (R50 per month at the time of writing) StarSat offers about fifty channels. These include local free to air channels eTV and SABC 1, 2 and 3. It also offers the Chinese state media channels CGTN, CGTN Documentary and CNC World. In addition, it offers thirteen StarSat Channels, aggregating various kinds of content. These include one channel of dubbed Chinese dramas, and another offering Chinese martial arts film. But five of these channels focus on content in African languages, including Yoruba and Kiswahili, and one focuses exclusively on Nigerian pop music (starsat.co.za). This makes clear that even at the lowest cost level, StarTimes functions not only as a vector for Chinese public diplomacy, but also for the dissemination of large amounts of African content. Crucially, one needs to keep in mind that all of this takes place in a commercial context focusing on providing African consumers what they want in order to make profit, rather than as part of a traditional public diplomacy rollout. And yet, also in South Africa StarTimes is performing a dual role of commercial player and public diplomacy partner to the Chinese government. In 2018, it was announced that StarTimes’s 100,000 Villages project would be expanded to South Africa, bringing free satellite TV access to one thousand impoverished South African villages, in collaboration with the South African government (Naik 2018). At the same time, the commercial realities of South Africa’s media market also constrain the commercial expansion of Chinese media companies, which has a knock-on effect on their public diplomacy impact. South Africa is a much more competitive media environment than many other African countries. In the first place, South Africa is often the launchpad for Western multinationals before they expand into the rest of the continent. For example, both Netflix and Spotify have set up shop in South Africa, which complicates the entry of Chinese entities like Boomplay into the market (Kazeem and Chutel 2018; McKeown 2018). In the second place, South African companies are often direct competitors to Chinese

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entrants into the market. The key factor inhibiting StarTimes’s rise on the continent is the South African satellite TV provider Multichoice, which has long reigned as the continent’s primary Satellite TV provider. StarTimes has managed to undercut Multichoice in terms of price in parts of the continent, but Multichoice still maintains almost full dominance in Southern Africa, albeit at narrowing margins (ICASA 2018). The dominance of Multichoice points to a third factor complicating the relationship. South African companies are some of the only African firms heavily invested in China. MultiChoice famously made an extremely well-timed investment into the Chinese company TenCent, which has subsequently grown to one of the largest companies in Chinese tech. This has led to some instances of synergy, for example when Multichoice tried to promote TenCent’s WeChat social messaging service in South Africa (ventureburn.com 2014). However, on a larger scale, the reality of cross-investment changes the larger structural logic of public diplomacy: rather than simply addressing a foreign public via media, the media channel becomes a vector for profit maximisation. While MultiChoice’s investment in China ostensibly opened the door for full synergy on messaging, in reality MultiChoice hasn’t proved a particularly strong channel for Chinese messaging in South Africa. The same two CGTN channels offered by StarSat are also offered by MultiChoice. Beyond that, the carrier seems relatively disinterested in promoting a more robust Chinese voice in South Africa. Most of its bouquet is made up of South African, African and Western content, including a large and varied selection of sports channels—arguably the secret to its dominance in South Africa and beyond. This selection reflects a focus on the bottom line via providing South African consumers with what they want, including lots of sports, many current hits from the US and UK, several channels offering South African drama series and telenovela, many channels offering movies from the rest of the continent, and channels aimed at South Asian and other diaspora communities. Within those, a small number of Chinese channels are also present. This inadvertently reflects a wider South African reality—even though China plays a massive economic role in both South Africa and MultiChoice, it has a much smaller presence in popular South African culture. This is a classic conundrum for foreign diplomats—one that the tools of public diplomacy have ostensibly developed to address. However, despite the apparent opportunities for corporate/diplomatic synergies,

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the economics of maintaining MultiChoice’s market dominance seem to have limited much cooperation.

Conclusion This chapter has focused on China’s media engagement in South Africa and the impact of this engagement on public diplomacy. It attempted to both provide perspectives based in public diplomacy, as well as those focused on commercial expansion. These have shown that there is no easy distinction to be made between the two. Or, in more accurate terms, Chinese public diplomacy in the media sphere increasingly depends on synergies with commercial media entities, rather than solely depending on state-affiliated media. It also reveals that media-based public diplomacy isn’t necessarily limited to media content, but increasingly also dovetails with the provision of media hardware and networks. The traditional distinction between media content and media hardware is particularly complicated by the growing dominance of private Chinese companies in various levels of mobile phone and internet provision, from undersea cables to handset service provision. Finally, South Africa provides a rich case study of Chinese uses of media in public diplomacy within complex environments. As was shown above, it ranges across state and commercial media, as well as hardware and content. The nature of the China-South Africa relationship also reveals a third layer: engagement oscillates between elite-elite and popular communication. Rather than directly changing the hearts and minds of a whole population, media engagement occasionally functions as an intervention in elite-elite relationships amplified by its positioning in a public forum. An example of this dynamic is provided by China’s former ambassador to South Africa, Lin Songtian between 2017 and 2020. While the Zuma era was marked by both South Africa and China paying public lip service to their close relationship, whether framed as south-south cooperation, BRICS membership, development partnerships and so forth. However, Lin took a different approach, using the media to launch thinly veiled criticisms of the South African government, albeit swathed in praise and professions of solidarity (see, for example, Fabricius 2019b). He also engaged directly in public media briefings and interviews with local news outfits. While we lack the space to unpack this dynamic in full, we would argue that it represents an interesting new use of media in China-Africa diplomacy, where media is used as a way to

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amplify elite-elite discussions that usually take place behind closed doors, into the wider public conversation. The approach seems to indicate an interesting middle way between traditional elite-elite diplomacy exercised at high levels of opacity, and public diplomacy, with its direct address of domestic populations by a foreign government via mass media. This chapter showed that no clear line can be drawn between media business and public diplomacy. China’s presence in Africa as a whole, and South Africa in particular, is eliciting intriguing new developments in both fields, as well as complex interactions between them. These changes are not only affecting how the Chinese state communicates itself to African publics, but also how Africans interact with the outside world and with their own continent. South Africa’s complex media economies and its close political relationship with China makes it a key case study of how these trends are changing in real time.

Notes 1. While Chinese media have adopted a presence on social media platforms such as Twitter, their true influence and impact are still difficult to measure. They could be generating new followers or even multiple retweets, as sources of ‘new’ information. However it is one thing to distribute information and another to engage with audience queries and criticisms in an interactive manner. They need to be assessed on both fronts. 2. The Guptas are one of the wealthiest families in South Africa whose business interests have been linked to key government positions. 3. For the full piece visit the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa website: http://za.china-embassy.org/eng/ sgxw/t1523439.htm. 4. Likewise are other international television networks that are looking to South Africa as a viable location for filming. The most recent example being the US-based HBO/Cinemax who shot the 10-part series Warrior in Cape Town, which was inspired by Bruce Lee and set in nineteenth Century China Town, San Francisco. 5. This was reflected upon during a report back of the BRICS Civil Forum (held in Russia), amongst local stakeholders, Pretoria, August 2015. 6. For more information, see ‘Top Honour for Survé in China’, https:// www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/top-honour-for-surve-in-china21837574, 24 April 2019.

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PART III

Dissecting Relations: Sectoral Studies

CHAPTER 8

South Africa’s Special Economic Zones as Destinations for Chinese Investment: Problems and Possibilities Anthony Black and Chongsheng Yang

Introduction China dominates global manufacturing and its industrial development has been synonymous with Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which operate on a vast scale in the country. Chinese firms are also rapidly expanding investment globally, including in Africa. A growing share of Chinese investment in Africa is being directed into manufacturing and part of this is located within SEZs, some of which have been established by Chinese firms. South Africa, while the largest industrial power in Africa, has been experiencing low growth over an extended period and the manufacturing sector’s share of GDP has declined sharply. The country also has a long history of policies designed to influence the spatial distribution of

A. Black (B) School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] C. Yang Tsinghua University, Beijing, China © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_8

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manufacturing. Since 1994, a number of Industrial Development Zones were established and these have now been superseded by SEZs. These zones are, however, marginal to overall economic development and have achieved little success in attracting transformative investment. Although large firms such as FAW and Hisense do have plants in these zones, Chinese investment in South Africa’s SEZs has been limited although the South African economy, more broadly, is an important recipient of FDI from China. There is also a longer history to Chinese investment in South Africa. Before the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa ran a politically driven system to decentralise industrial development in an attempt to provide an economic basis for the bantustan system. This aimed at relocating industry to the peripheral bantustan areas. This decentralisation policy provided generous incentives and did attract fairly significant investment in light manufacturing. A significant portion of this investment was from Taiwan, which had a close relationship with the apartheid government. Since the system and its associated incentives were phased out in the early 1990s, most of these decentralisation zones have fallen into disrepair. One noteworthy exception is Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal where mainly Taiwanese firms still operate albeit under pressure from government on minimum wages. It has been argued that rising wages in China hold the prospect of a very large-scale relocation of manufacturing employment to other parts of Asia and also to Africa (Lin and Xu 2019). This argument has been taken up in South Africa. For example, a leading business think tank, the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) has proposed an export processing zone (EPZ) at the Coega SEZ in the Eastern Cape province with the explicit aim of attracting Chinese industrial jobs, which may be relocating to lower wage countries. This chapter sets out to examine the development of Chinese investment in South Africa’s special zones. This means tracing the trajectory of locational industrial policy both during and after apartheid. Current investment in special zones has been quite limited and this in itself raises important questions about zone policy and implementation. It also raises questions about industrial policy more generally. We, therefore, also consider also the question of their potential as bases for inward investment by Chinese firms. The chapter concludes by suggesting some ways in which this investment could be significantly enhanced.

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Chinese Investment and Manufacturing Development in South Africa Chinese Investment in Africa and South Africa Chinese involvement in Africa is growing rapidly and the country is already Africa’s most important economic partner. Chinese trade with Africa at $188 billion in 2015 was more than three times larger than that with Africa’s second largest trade partner, India (McKinsey 2017). China is also by far the largest external source of infrastructure financing in Africa. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown from $1bn in 2004 to $42 billion in 2016. Although the stock of FDI ranks fourth after the United States, United Kingdom and France, the pace of expansion has been exceptional, growing at 40% per annum from 2004 to 2015. According to McKinsey (2017), South Africa is the largest recipient with a stock of US$5.9 billion in 2014, followed by Nigeria, Zambia, Angola and Ethiopia and this is from a tiny base of just $59 million in 2004. These are official figures and it also clear that there is considerable unofficial investment, which is not picked up in the official Chinese data. For example, according to Shen (2015) national data in recipient countries provide numbers of projects which in some cases are several times larger than (China’s) Ministry of Commerce data. These unofficial projects are generally smaller and include firms in trade but also in manufacturing. The McKinsey survey also identified the existence of much larger numbers of firms than official statistics and estimate that if unrecorded investment is included, the stock of FDI in Africa is some $49 billion, 17% larger than official figures (McKinsey 2017). The nature of Chinese economic engagement in Africa is evolving rapidly (Alden 2019). Following the economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping, Chinese relations with Africa have gradually moved away from being based on cold war solidarity to being driven more by market based criteria. The rhetoric is now one of development partners and a ‘win–win’ type of engagement (Alden 2019). There is, of course, a search for resources and markets for Chinese goods. But manufacturing has become more important. Of the firms surveyed by McKinsey, 31% were in manufacturing and they estimate that Chinese firms already account for as much as 12% of Africa’s foreign-owned manufacturing output (McKinsey 2017, 30). These firms report high rates of profitability in domestic

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African markets, which are characterised by lower levels of competition than back in China. There is also enormous potential. Much attention has been devoted to how Chinese manufacturing jobs are relocating overseas as a result rising wage costs (Xu et al. 2017; Calabrese et al. 2017; Lin and Xu 2019). Firms in China are responding by upgrading technology but also by relocation. Most of the relocation is likely to be to burgeoning industrialisers closer to home such as Vietnam and Myanmar. But some will go to Africa. This in turn depends on enabling conditions being met, including the establishment of SEZs together with proactive and targeted investment promotion (Lin and Xu 2019). Also, Chinese investment is closely intertwined with state strategy and state-owned enterprises and may operate with a longer term horizon than western FDI. For example, there is a strong focus on productionoriented infrastructure. The China Export–Import Bank (Exim Bank) also plays an important role and the One Belt, One Road Initiative is becoming increasingly central. Within the Belt and Road Initiative, the recently established State International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDICA) will play a coordinating role in overseas development projects. But a particular feature is the important role of SEZs as locations for Chinese investment (Bräutigam and Tang 2011). This is in part a result of the role of SEZs in China’s own development. In 2019, China had 2543 SEZs (UNCTAD 2019, 138) which accounted for over 30 million jobs and more than 60% of exports (Alexianu et al. 2019). In many developing countries, SEZs provide good infrastructure which is sorely lacking elsewhere in the country. There is also the desire by Chinese firms to cluster in specific locations. In fact, many SEZs in Africa have had direct Chinese involvement in their development and in some cases have been initiated and run by Chinese firms. The earliest Chinese effort to establish special zones in Africa was the joint venture with Egypt to set up a special zone near the Suez Canal, which started in 1994. Chinese state-owned enterprises initiated additional zones in Zambia and Nigeria in 2003. But it was at the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in 2006 that Hu Jintao announced the establishment of economic and trade cooperation zones (ETCZs) in Africa as a matter of policy (Alves 2011). The benefits for China include an extension of ‘soft power’, expanded exports

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of machinery and reduced trade friction including with advanced countries as goods exported from China could now be supplied by Chinese firms based in Africa (Bräutigam and Tang 2011). If conducted on a large scale, this could assist the restructuring of Chinese industry, with more labour-intensive enterprises moving offshore. The results of these initiatives have been mixed. The Chinese established ETCZ in Mauritius has not been a success even though Mauritius has its own impressive history with EPZs. The most enthusiastic recent adopter is Ethiopia, which is showing a rapid increase in labour-intensive exports and is explicitly following the Chinese development model in a number of important respects. This includes learning from the Chinese SEZ experience and a high level of involvement by Chinese firms in the establishment and operation of special zones in the country (Tang 2019). Problems in SA Manufacturing The question then arises as to how this outward drive in infrastructure and investment impacts on South Africa’s economy and in particular on manufacturing in SEZs. Like China, South Africa is an upper middleincome economy. High growth in China and low growth in South Africa has resulted in China’s per capita income overtaking that of South Africa. Also because of its extreme levels of inequality and unemployment South Africa has a much higher poverty rate. Unable to deal with the legacy of apartheid and hobbled by rampant ‘state capture’ under the former Zuma administration, the South African economy is in a crisis of low growth and massive structural unemployment. An important contributing factor has been the relative decline of the manufacturing sector, and South Africa is an exemplar of what Rodrik (2016) terms ‘premature’ deindustrialisation. This is the situation whereby in developing countries deindustrialisation is happening at an earlier stage, or ‘prematurely’ compared to the now developed world. According to Rodrik, in developing countries, globalisation and trade liberalisation have been major drivers. In South Africa, deindustrialisation has been particularly severe and between 1994 and 2011 manufacturing employment fell at an annual compound rate of 1.3% per annum (Zalk 2014, 348). Industrial and Trade Policy Since 1994

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The African National Congress (ANC) government which came to power under the leadership of Nelson Mandela in 1994 faced a litany of problems, which were the direct legacy of segregation and apartheid. Apart from high unemployment and gaping inequality, there were also huge regional disparities in levels of income and development. Apartheidera economic policy severely distorted the South African economy in a number of ways. There was strong direct and indirect support for various heavy and ‘strategic’ industries, the so-called ‘mineral energy complex’ (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). The other side of this coin was that the underdevelopment of the bantustans coupled with legislation to prevent urbanisation created the ‘need’ for the decentralisation policy that followed. The growth performance of the South African manufacturing sector has been extremely poor compared to other countries at a similar level of development. Exports have grown but the level of import penetration has increased very rapidly, particularly in labour-intensive sub-sectors. With South Africa’s extraordinarily high rates of unemployment, the manufacturing sector remains unusually capital-intensive compared to comparator countries. Post the first democratic elections in 1994, industrial policy pursued several corrective objectives, with international competitiveness as a central aim. Trade was liberalised with average tariffs declining from 28% in 1990 to 8% by 2006 (Zalk 2014) and a series of sector-specific industrial policies were introduced. Black et al. (2016) have argued that South Africa has adopted strategies that did not exploit potential comparative advantages such as unskilled labour—and rather encouraged production in sub-optimal capital-intensive sectors.1 The resulting combination of low output growth and higher capital intensity has been disastrous for employment. The list of support measures for heavy industry included capital subsidies, dedicated infrastructure support and artificially low electricity prices. The latter together with large scale corruption and mismanagement of the state electricity utility, Eskom, has led the economy to its current predicament of inadequate electricity supply and sharply rising prices while Eskom battles a massive debt burden. Rising energy prices combined with difficult market conditions have stalled the development of heavy industry, a recent example has been the mothballing of Saldanha Steel, a large, export-based steel plant north of Cape Town.

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Of even greater concern for employment has been the poor performance of light manufacturing. The share of ultra labour-intensive manufactured exports has been in sharp decline since 1970 and by 2012 this category represented only 9.7% of manufactured exports. The largest decline occurred in the (labour-intensive) textiles and clothing sectors. The share of this subsector in manufacturing output declined from 7.6% in 1990 to just 1.8% in 2010 (Black et al. 2016). A significant part of this decline in light manufacturing took place in the poorer regions of the country including the former decentralisation points. For example, in the Eastern Cape the textiles, clothing and leather sector was the largest manufacturing employer with 26,000 workers in 1996, equal to 19.8% of the manufacturing labour force in the province. By 2012, employment had collapsed to just 10,700 workers, 11.8% of a much smaller manufacturing labour force (Kaplan et al. 2014, 25). Ironically therefore, South Africa has performed poorly in light manufacturing. With a very high rate of unemployment of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, the government has clearly failed to mobilise the investment in light manufacturing, which could have had an impact on this problem.

Regional Policy and Special Zones Decentralisation Policy Under Apartheid In order to understand the development trajectory of current spatial planning and SEZs, in particular, it is necessary to take account of the history of spatial planning under apartheid. A feature of South Africa’s legacy of colonialism, land dispossession and apartheid has been regional inequality. The ‘reserves’ set aside for black ownership comprised only 13% of South Africa’s land surface and suffered from severe underdevelopment. Essentially, they were labour reserves characterised by low productivity agriculture on very small landholdings. The main source of income consisted of remittances from migrant workers. Formal apartheid policy in 1948 led to major restrictions on the urbanisation of black South Africans to the towns and cities of ‘white’ South Africa. This led in due course to the imposition of ‘grand apartheid’ in terms of which the ‘black reserves’ were to become self-governing and in some cases nominally ‘independent’ states. To provide a semblance of

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legitimacy to this strategy, there had to be some kind of economic basis for these entities. From the late 1950s, there was a series of regional development interventions to encourage manufacturing firms to locate in designated growth points in peripheral economic regions within or close to the reserves (Wellings and Black 1986). The Regional Industrial Development Programme identified 80 growth points across the country. These growth points offered incentives specifically designed to attract labourintensive firms (Tomlinson and Addleson 1987). The major incentive and the most important from the point of view of investors was a wage subsidy. This was tax fee incentive of up to 95% of the total wage bill for seven years, subject to a maximum amount of R110 per worker per month. High levels of unemployment and the repression of trade unions meant that wages were in any event very low. While the programme is generally regarded as an ideologically driven failure it did lead to significant investment in terms of employment creation in labour-intensive industries. In 1972 there were approximately 100,000 employees in the decentralisation points accounting for about 8.8% of South Africa’s manufacturing employment. By 1984, employment in the decentralisation points had tripled, and accounted for 21.7% of total manufacturing employment (Wellings and Black 1986, 13). The decentralisation points also attracted a fair amount of foreign investment. This was dominated by investment from Taiwan which retained friendly relations with apartheid South Africa. For instance, of the 159 approved investments by foreign firms in the decentralisation points from April 1982 to March 1985, 63 were from Taiwan. These also accounted for 48% of the projected employment of 34,183 that would be created by these approved investments (Pickles and Woods 1989).. The levels of investment for each enterprise were relatively low. For example, Taiwanese industrialists had invested just $20 million by early 1987 to establish 68 factories in Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (Pickles and Woods 1989, 510). These were labour-intensive firms with relatively low levels of technology. Meanwhile Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and tight labour market meant the government was keen to encourage capital intensification and this meant that labour-intensive light industries had to relocate or upgrade their technology. Major recipients at the time were mainland China, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (Pickles and Woods 1989; Zhang 2005). The expansion of Taiwanese firms and the relocation of South

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African light manufacturing to homeland areas evoked resentment by unions and employers alike in metropolitan areas (Wellings and Black 1986). The system of incentives was subject to extensive fraud with frequent claims of ‘ghost workers’ and the overstatement of wages paid. The programme was also costly which placed ongoing pressure on the fiscus. Another concern was limited linkages with spending flowing out of the decentralisation regions. The programme was suspended in 1991 and without incentives many of the industries established in these locations shut down with significant job losses in places such as Butterworth and Dimbaza in the Eastern Cape. Post 1994 After 1994, the democratic government faced the same problem of severe spatial inequality though the bantustan system had been disestablished. It also faced a more generalised jobs crisis and embarked on a range of interventions including those with a regional development dimension (Nel and Rogerson 2014). The Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) programme was introduced and was followed by the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) programme in 1995. SDIs were based on the notion of development corridors and aimed to unlock development along regional and transport corridors (Jourdan 1998). One relative success was the Maputo Corridor, which improved transport linkages from Gauteng to the Mozambican port city (Rogerson 2001). From 2000, the government started to establish IDZs located near international transportation centres including Coega (outside Port Elizabeth), East London, Richards Bay and OR Tambo International Airport (ORTIDZ) outside Johannesburg. The Saldanha Bay IDZ was established on the west coast and in 2014 the Dube Tradeport (DTPIDZ) in KwaZulu-Natal was designated. The objectives were mainly to encourage export-oriented manufacturing and attract FDI. (Centre for Development and Enterprise 2012; DTI 2015a, 2016b; Jourdan 1998). The IDZ programme failed to meet expectations mainly as a result of the fact that the zones received little in the way of special incentives (Nyakabawo 2014). But poor planning and marketing were also contributing factors (Yang et al., 2020). The DTI itself acknowledged

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this poor performance (DTI) and as a result it decided to convert the programme into an SEZ programme. The SEZs Policy The Special Economic Zones Bill of 2011 proposed the establishment of 10 possible zones at which there would be targeted economic activities supported by special support measures. The objectives were not that different to the IDZs although there was no more reference to regional development and the new economic growth points were also aimed at incubating SMEs. The Special Economic Zone Bill of 2014 identified four types of zones—free ports, free trade zones, industrial development zones and sector development zones (Yang et al., 2020). The zones are indicated in Fig. 8.1. By 2016, DTPIDZ, ELIDZ, RBIDZ and Coega were operational. Atlantis, Nkomazi, Saldanha Bay, Maluti-A-Phofung and Musina/Makhado were added to this group by 2019. The others have been proposed but are not yet operational. The zones comprise a mixed bag. Zones such as Coega, ELIDZ and the RBIDZ are well located adjacent to established industrial areas and have established infrastructure. But other zones are more remote and some are located in backward regions, which clearly have locational disadvantages. They also have a focus on specific sectors, the logic of which is not always apparent. The Saldanha Bay IDZ is an established oil and gas services complex. The rationale has been the large amount of offshore activity in the region although it would have helped if South Africa itself had not delayed by years implementing its own enabling legislation which may eventually lead to a massive increase in offshore exploration.2 Atlantis is focused on renewable energy and clean technologies. While these are growth sectors, they make less sense as an industry cluster as there are few synergies between producing solar panels and wind turbines, for instance. The remote northern town of Upington includes aircraft and maintenance among the chosen fields of endeavour. Approximately half the SEZs are located in the former ‘homelands’ and some are far from established nodes of economic activity. One of the reasons for the failure of the former IDZ programme was the negligible incentives on offer. These have been upgraded significantly and include Value added tax (VAT) and customs relief if located within a Customs Controlled Area (CCA), the employment tax incentive (ETI),

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Fig. 8.1 The designation of IDZs and SEZs, 2019 (Source Authors based on information from Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Special Economic Zone’ and ‘Special Economic Zone Fact Sheet 2019’, https://www.thedti.gov.za/ind ustrial_development/sez.jsp)

building allowances and a lower corporate income tax of 15% compared to the national rate of 28% (DTI 2015b). For low salaried employees, firms can claim tax reductions under the ETI. While the national ETI scheme only applies to youth, in the SEZs there is no age restriction. Performance Overall performance has been unspectacular in terms of investment and employment. The DTI’s 2015/16 SEZ Performance Analysis Bulletin indicated that of the 73,000 jobs created in the IDZs by that stage, as many as 64,500 or 88.3% were in construction or ‘indirect’ jobs. Only

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8500 were direct jobs in manufacturing and zone service industries. This is after a colossal investment in infrastructure. While the pace has picked up since then it is clear that this has been very slow. This is the case even at Coega, which is regarded as a relatively successful SEZ. According to the Coega Development Corporation’s 2018/2019 Annual Report (CDC 2019) the five-year target for operational jobs was exceeded. But the target was only 8902 jobs and the actual achievement of 10,886 was not much greater. The bulk of Chinese investment in South Africa has been in resources although the share in manufacturing has been expanding. Certainly a disproportionately large share of Chinese manufacturing investment has been in SEZs but the actual numbers remain small. This is in spite of much official encouragement. SEZs and the prospect of Chinese investment have figured prominently in high-level statements by senior officials. As far back as 2015, then Deputy President Ramaphosa referred extensively to South Africa’s SEZs in a speech to the China–South Africa Business Forum in Durban.3 They are also mentioned specifically in the 2016–2019 FOCAC Action Plan. On a visit to Coega in 2017, the Chinese ambassador hailed it as the best special zone on the African continent.4 A large number of South African officials have visited China for training on SEZs (Thompson 2019). High profile Chinese investments include FAW and BAIC at Coega and Hisense in Atlantis. These are aimed mostly at supplying the internal market with some export to the region. FAW undertakes final semiknocked down (SKD)5 assembly of medium and heavy commercial vehicles using mainly imported parts. The Beijing Automotive Investment Corporation (BAIC) investment in Coega was unveiled with considerable fanfare by Presidents Ramaphosa and Xi in 2018 with a purported investment of as much as R11 billion.6 Such an investment would be more than enough for a very large scale, integrated assembly faculty. Actual investments so far have been much lower and industry commentators see little prospect of a large scale assembly plant being developed over the medium term. An interesting aspect is that South Africa’s state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has a 35% stake in the project. Hisense operates a medium-sized refrigerator and television plant at Atlantis which employs 500 people and exports to several African countries. There have been discussions about assembling mobile phones.

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The Musina-Mukhado SEZ is strategically located near the border with Zimbabwe. The focus of this SEZ is on logistics and mineral beneficiation. Since becoming operational it has been managed by a Chinese company, South African Energy Metallurgical Base, which is a subsidiary of the Chinese conglomerate, Shenzhen Hoi Mor Resources Holding Company.7 China is also investing in two science parks the Musina Metallurgical Cluster and the High Tech Science Park in Gauteng (Thompson 2019) but few actual investments have materialised to date. There is little evidence on aspects such as employment and local sourcing and whether these vary from other firms in the sector. In the Hisense, FAW and BAIC plants, local content is very low but may expand over time. FAW is little different to most other South African truck plants, which with one or two exceptions, operate on an SKD basis with minimal local content. BAIC is unusual in that is has started SKD assembly of light vehicles. This means that it does not qualify for the light vehicle incentives under the Automotive Production and Development Programme (APDP). According to McKinsey (2017), local employment by Chinese firms in South Africa (not only in SEZs) is only 78%, below the 89% average in the eight surveyed countries. Only 23% of managers in South African operations are local compared with an average of 44% across all eight surveyed countries. Yang et al. (2020) identify four main areas of difficulty in relation to investment in the zones in general. The first is an overdependence on government financing. The Department of Trade and Industry has invested enormous sums establishing SEZs including the development of land and infrastructure, marketing and management costs. The state is further burdened by tax concessions and ongoing subsidisation. The second problem is that half of the proposed zones are located in or adjacent to the 23 poorest districts in South Africa. These are areas which are disadvantaged locations far from markets, with limited infrastructure and skills availability. The infrastructure constraints may be partly ameliorated by the National Infrastructure Programme (Yang et al., 2020). Thirdly, there is the question of what is special about the SEZs. The lower tax rates are potentially attractive but are not as low as those offered in other zones around the world. Fourthly, the location of some zones is not adjacent to main transport routes. The rationale is that the government is wanting to develop poorer

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regions but that will require greater inducements given these disadvantages. There are other problems as well. More generalised infrastructure constraints such as electricity and high rail and port tariffs are impeding investment. Most important, the South Africa’s anaemic growth rate and low investment confidence are a major constraint. SEZs can aim at establishing industry competitiveness via improved infrastructure, establishing clusters or dealing with economic distortions. They can also be used to experiment with reform, the Shenzhen SEZ founded in China in 1980, being a classic example. The actual rationale in South Africa is not very clear. The stated objectives of the SEZ programme are wide-ranging and include stimulating regional growth, attracting foreign and domestic investment and developing strategic industrial capabilities (Yang et al., 2020). While the objective of reducing spatial inequalities can be understood in terms of South Africa’s history, this may be in conflict with growth objectives. The location of SEZs in backward regions will impact negatively on their ability to attract investment because of infrastructure and skill contraints and weak linkages to supply chains (Farole and Sharp 2017).

Possibilities for Light Manufacturing Around the world, special zone enterprises are usually labour-intensive and assembly-oriented within the ambit of light manufacturing. Since 1994 this has not been the case in South Africa, which is surprising in terms of the country’s employment crisis and its poor performance in light manufacturing. One of the pre-1994 industrial development zones that continues to operate, albeit without special incentives, is the clothing cluster in Newcastle in northern KwaZulu-Natal. Historically, this has been the single biggest concentration of Chinese manufacturing investment in a special zone. Supported by growth point incentives, the municipality encouraged Taiwanese firms to relocate to Newcastle in the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Newcastle had 1000 Chinese residents and 54 large Chinese-owned factories providing thousands of jobs, mainly in the clothing industry (Nattrass and Seekings 2014). The industry has since contracted under pressure from the withdrawal of incentives, declining import tariffs, currency volatility and rising minimum wages imposed by the National Bargaining Council for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry (Nattrass and Seekings 2014). But a

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number firms remain which continue to compete and in many cases to evade tough minimum wage legislation. An interesting proposal by the Centre for Development and Enterprise, is for an EPZ at Coega, which would focus on attracting labour-intensive firms for export (CDE 2016). It makes explicit mention of estimates that 85 million manufacturing jobs could eventually move out of China (CDE 2016, 1). While noting that most of these relocations are likely to be to other Asian countries such as Vietnam, Bangladesh and India it anticipates that some will go to African countries such as Ethiopia. It then goes on to argue that South Africa should try and attract these jobs. According to the CDE, an export processing zone (EPZ) at Coega could be a competitive location if firms were free to negotiate wages and working conditions directly with employees and use piece work contracts (CDE 2016, 1). Working conditions would still be subject to basic safeguards. In terms of this proposal, firms would be required to produce 100% for export and would not be able to relocate from elsewhere in South Africa. Only new firms and activities would be allowed. However, this proposal unrealistically expects this South African zone to compete with very lowwage producer countries such as Cambodia, which appears unlikely given that South Africa remains an upper middle-income country. But there is certainly more that could be done to promote Chinese investment in light manufacturing in Coega and other SEZs. A key problem is that government has not set out to specifically attract light manufacturing and create the appropriate investment environment. Nor has there been a significant effort to engage the private sector in the management of these zones.

Conclusion This chapter has sought to draw the connections between inward Chinese investment, manufacturing decline in South Africa and special zones. The main features of the argument are clear. Inward investment from China to Africa and South Africa is significant and growing rapidly. South Africa faces a crisis of low growth in manufacturing and structural unemployment. Its special zones have performed poorly, both before and after apartheid, albeit for somewhat different reasons. With its well-developed infrastructure and financial system, large domestic market and easy access to African markets, South Africa is unusually well placed to more effectively tap into Chinese investment and, in particular, to attract investment in light industries. This will

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require much more proactive government support, amendments to labour legislation and the resolution of infrastructure problems. Greater private involvement, including by Chinese firms, in the management of SEZs should be considered. South Africa’s looming economic and social crisis require bold steps and new strategies. The more established special zones offer top-class infrastructure and the potential to introduce reforms within a designated area. They are ideally placed to experiment with such a new strategy.

Notes 1. Lin (2009) refers to such strategies as ‘comparative advantage defying’ (CAD). 2. See ‘State hits gas after nine wasted years’, Business Times, 26 January, 2020. 3. See ‘Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa: China-South Africa Business Forum’, July 2015, https://www.gov.za/speeches/deputy-president-cyrilramaphosa-china-south-africa-business-forum-15-jul-2015-0000. 4. See ‘COEGA - “The best Special Economic Zone in the African Continent”’ Business Report, 20 September 2017. 5. SKD assembly refers to the final assembly of components which are already in a semi-assembled state. It incorporates minimal domestic value added. 6. See ‘BAIC SA opens vehicle assembly plant at Coega IDZ’, Engineering News, 24 July 2018. https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/baic-saopens-vehicle-assembly-plant-at-coega-idz-2018-07-24/rep_id:4136. 7. See ‘Musina/Makhado SEZ to become link to rest of Africa’, Limpopo Mirror, 2 August 2018.

References Alden, C. (2019). Evolving Debates and Outlooks on China-Africa Ties. In A. Oqubay & J. Lin (Eds.), China-Africa and Economic Transformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alexianu, M., Saab, M., Teachout, M., & Khandawal, A. (2019). Doing Special Economic Zones Right: A Policy Framework. International Growth Centre. Alves, A. (2011). Chinese Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones in Africa: The Case of Mauritius (Occasional Paper Number 74). South Africa Institute for International Affairs. Black, A., Craig, S., & Dunne, P. (2016, November). Capital Intensity, Industrial Policy and Employment in the South African Manufacturing Sector (REDI3x3 Working Paper 23).

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Bräutigam, D., & Tang, X. (2011). African Shenzhen: China’s Special Economic Zones in Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 49(1), 27–54. Calabrese, L., Gelb, S., & Hou, J. (2017). What Drives Chinese Outward Manufacturing Investment? A Review of Enabling Factors in Africa and Asia. (Background Paper October 2017). Overseas Developement Institute. Centre for Development and Enterprise. (2012, June 19). Special Economic Zones: Lessons for South Africa from International Evidence and Local Experience. Paper Presented to the CED Round Table Johannesburg. Centre for Development and Enterprise. (2016). An EPZ for the Nelson Mandela Metro. Growth Series Report 7. Johannesburg. Centre for Development and Enterprise. Coega Development Corporation. (2019). Integrated Annual Report 2018/2019. DTI. (2012). Policy on the Development of Special Economic Zones in South Africa. The Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria. DTI. (2015a). 2014/15 SEZ Performance Analysis Bulletin. The Department of Trade and Industry. http://www.dti.gov.za/industrial_development/docs/ IDZ_Performance_report.pdf. DTI. (2015b). The DTI’s Special Economic Zones Tax Incentive Guide. Pretoria: DTI. Farole, T., & Sharp, M. (2017, June). Spatial Industrial Policy, Special Economic Zones, and Cities in South Africa. Washington: World Bank. Fine, B., & Rustomjee, Z. (1996). The Political Economy of South Africa-from Minerals-Energy Complex to Industrialisation. London: Hurst. Jourdan, P. (1998). Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs)—The Official View. Development Southern Africa, 15(5), 717–725. Kaplan, D., Morris, M., & Martin, L. (2014). Identifying and Developing Sustainable Interventions to Promote Non-automotive Industries in the Eastern Cape. Report prepared for National Treasury. Lin, J. (2009). Economic Development and Transition: Thought, Strategy and Viability. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lin, J., & Xu, J. (2019). China’s Light Manufacturing and Africa’s Industrialization. In A. Oqubay, & J. Lin (Eds.), China-Africa and Economic Transformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McKinsey. (2017). Dance of the Lions and Dragons—How Are Africa and China Engaging, and How Will the Partnership Evolve? McKinsey & Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/global%20themes/middle% 20east%20and%20africa/the%20closest%20look%20yet%20at%20chinese%20e conomic%20engagement%20in%20africa/dance-of-the-lions-and-dragons. ashx. Nattrass, N., & Seekings, J. (2014). Job Destruction in Newcastle: Minimum Wage-Setting and Low-Wage Employment in the South African Clothing Industry. Transformation, 84, 1–30.

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Nel, E. L., & Rogerson, C. M. (2014). Re-spatializing Development: Reflections from South Africa’s Recent Re-engagement with Planning for Special Economic Zones. Urbani Izziv, 25(Supplement), 24–35. Nyakabawo, W. (2014). The Geographic Designation of Special Economic Zones. TIPS, South Africa. Pickles, J., & Woods, J. (1989, October). Taiwanese Investment in South Africa. African Affairs, 88(353), 507–528. Rodrik, D. (2016). Premature-de-industrialisation. Jounal of Economic Growth, 21, 1–33. Rogerson, C. M. (2001). Spatial Development Initiatives in Southern Africa: The Maputo Development Corridor. Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie, 92(3), 324–346. Special Economic Zones Bill 2014 (16 of 2014). Shen, X. (2015). Private Chinese Investment in Africa: Myths and Realities. Development Policy Review, 33(1), 83–106. Tang, K. (2019). Lessons from East Asia: Comparing Ethiopia and Vietnam’s Early Stage Special Economic Zone Development (Working Paper No. 2019/26). China Africa Research Initiative, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. Thompson, L. (2019). Alternative South-South Development Collaboration? The Role of China in the Coega Special Economic Zone in South Africa. Public Administration and Development, 39, 193–202. Tomlinson, R., & Addleson, M. (1987). (Eds.), Regional Restructuring Under Apartheid: Urban and Regional Policies in Contemporary South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. UNCTAD. (2019). World Investment Report 2019. Geneva: UNCTAD. Wellings, P., & Black, A. (1986). Industrial Decentralisation Under Apartheid: The Relocation of Industry to the South African Periphery. World Development, 14(1), 1–38. Xu, J., Gelb, S., Li, J., & Zhao, Z. (2017, December ). Adjusting to Rising Costs in Chinese Light Manufacturing: What Opportunities for Developing Countries? Overseas Developement Institute. Yang, C., Wang, Y., Black, A., & Chen, M. (2020). Evaluating Special Economic Zones in South Africa: History, Performance, and Challenges. In T. Niblock, G. Yang, & Z. Zohu (Eds.), Area Studies: New Realities, New Conceptions. Beijing: Social science Academy Press. Zalk, N. (2014). Industrial Policy in a Harsh Climate: The Case of South Africa. In J. Salazar-Xirinachs, I. Nubler, & R. Kozul-Wright (Eds.), Transforming Economies: Making Industrial Policy Work for Growth, Jobs and Development. Geneva: International Labour Office. Zhang, K. H. (2005). Why Does so Much FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan Go to Mainland China? China Economic Review, 16(3), 293–307.

CHAPTER 9

The Drive for Chinese Investments in Agriculture: Comparing South Africa to the Continent Angela Harding, Lu Jiang, Ward Anseeuw, and Chris Alden

Introduction1 Agriculture forms a significant platform to drive aid and investments in Africa. This is backed by several external actors with different motivations. However, arguably, Chinese-based aid and investment in the agricultural sector in Africa has attracted the most attention and interest by media and scholars (Brautigam 2015b). China has had a long-standing complex involvement in African agriculture, starting in the 1960s with technical assistance programmes large

A. Harding (B) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa L. Jiang Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai, China W. Anseeuw Agricultural Research Centre for International Development (CIRAD) & International Land Coalition (ILC), Rome, Italy © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_9

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state-owned farms and followed by a movement into developing demonstration farms and extension support for smallholders in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the focus was on making economic relations with Africa more sustainable and mutually beneficial, through various consolidation and experimentation projects. These projects led to a substantial change in aid policy in 1995; with a more significant focus on aid which generates ‘mutual benefit’. By 2007 significant backlash had arisen against the idea of Chinese large-scale land acquisitions—with a focus on putative African land grabs for export back to China occupying media attention (Brautigam and Tang 2009). South Africa has not been a target country in Africa for technical assistance or agricultural investments during much of this period. However, this is not the case anymore, where several Chinese-driven projects in the agricultural sector have been set up recently. This is especially relevant in light of the 2010 Beijing Declaration, where South Africa was upgraded to a Strategic Comprehensive Partner, and both governments agreed to promote trade and investment growth (Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Cape Town 2010). This contributed to the growing strength of economic ties between South Africa and China, though investment in agriculture has been an area of neglect (Alden and Wu 2014). In addition, in light of the significant investment drive initiated by President Ramaphosa, the extent and scale of agricultural projects may be expected to increase. In order to ensure maximum benefit for both investors and country as a whole, it is relevant to study the modalities of the existing or promised investment projects. While the various aid and commercial projects implemented in several African countries by Chinese-based investors have been extensively documented by well-known scholars (Brautigam 2015b; Brautigam and Tang 2009; Jiang et al. 2016), this is less so the case for South Africa. This chapter describes the Chinese-driven agricultural projects in South Africa in the context of how China is engaging elsewhere on the continent. Our analysis situates these projects in the framework of broader Chinese-driven agro-investment dynamics on the rest of the continent.

C. Alden International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

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These projects not only reflect the differing dynamics and practicalities occurring on the ground in Chinese agro-investments more generally, but they also highlight the distinctive features of the South African context and its impact on Chinese investors realising ambitions in this sector, particularly in light of the current investment drive led by President Ramaphosa.

Agricultural Assistance and Investments in Africa In his opening speech at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China– Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 2018, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed his commitment to support agricultural cooperation mechanisms, in order to continue with the implementation of the government’s commitment to enhance food security and boost the agricultural development of Africa (XINHUANET 2019). This pushes forward the detailed ten-point plan to enhance economic and political cooperation between African and Chinese states for mutual benefit. Several areas of cooperation were agreed to including; project financing, infrastructure development, agricultural modernisation and trade and investment, amongst others (Shelton 2018). Indeed, the South African Government has been actively involved with FOCAC; hosting the Johannesburg Summit of FOCAC in 2015, acting as co-chair for several years and recently attended the first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Agriculture (FOCACA) meeting hosted in December 2019. While FOCAC is continent-wide, South Africa is also effectively engaging with China through BRICS mechanism (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The BRICS mechanism was created to enhance development and cooperation amongst member states. South Africa joined BRICS for several reasons including; the promotion of regional integration and continental infrastructure programmes, to advance national interests, including agricultural development and advancement (South African Government 2013). During the literature review and our field research, we found that there is a combination of mechanisms utilised by Chinese-based actors to engage in the African, and South African, agricultural sector supported by FOCAC and BRICS. These mechanisms are overlapping and interrelated, complimenting one another.

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Arguably, one of the primary mechanisms is demonstration, research and training programs. As part of FOCAC, in 2006, the Chinese government proposed fourteen agricultural technology demonstration centres (ATDC) in selected African countries—ranging from Sudan to Liberia and Ethiopia to Mozambique. Brautigam and Tang (2009) list the countries along with the implementing province or organisation. The ATDC is a flagship project of the Chinese contemporary agricultural aid programme in Africa. ATDC is seen as a way to continue providing aid to Africa while promoting commercial opportunities for Chinese companies to provide agricultural technology and seed varieties to Africa (Brautigam and Tang 2009). It combines both diplomatic and commercial goals, involves a diversity of actors and adopts a complicated operational mechanism. The policy underlying ATDC is a hybrid of different forms of aid programming previously utilised by the Chinese state designed to avoid the negative experiences of aid provision in the past (Jiang et al. 2016). Beyond the ATDC programme, the Chinese state is also engaged in the deployment of agricultural experts and technicians to African states, as well as learning programs. Indeed, over 850 Chinese agricultural experts have been sent to more than 20 developing states—including several in Africa (Brautigam 2015a). In addition, several African States have sent extension and agricultural officers to China to participate in different training courses. The latest dispatch of 25 representatives from Liberia is one example of this (The New Dawn 2019). The Chinese state and Chinese-based investors are also involved in the agricultural sector directly through land investments, outgrower schemes and equity arrangements. The China ‘Going Global’ policy was launched, in order to create business opportunities abroad, whereby Chinese firms and citizens are encouraged to invest overseas (Cotula 2012). China’s foreign farming policy rests upon three principles (Ping 2008): • The farms are located in countries, on good terms with China, which have abundant natural resources, a strong labour force and political stability; • Companies which are experienced and well-funded are encouraged to invest abroad; • Finally, companies investing abroad must combine their experiences gained from interaction in the Chinese markets with foreign domestic resources.

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Several significant debates regarding the geography of land acquisition, including by the Chinese, have taken place in the global arena. The worries of China ‘invading’ Africa through the increase in the number of Chinese farmers and citizens on the continent, coupled with comments of positive virtues of farming in Africa and the increase in land deals between African countries and Chinese-based investors have put China in the centre of the debate. China is often seen as taking the lead in land acquisitions in Africa, partly since they are the 3rd largest nation acquiring land in Southern Africa in terms of announced projects. However, they rank as the 22nd largest nation acquiring land in Southern Africa when considering projects verified (The Land Matrix 2019). Alden (2005) identified several drivers which have encouraged the Chinese to acquire land abroad. Firstly, Chinese-based investors are looking to create new markets and further investment opportunities. One example of this is the use of rural and informal trading markets to distribute low-value consumer goods. Another is the establishment of agro-processing plants in Africa through joint ventures with domestic investors. The output from these processing plants is then sold to the western markets at concessional rates (Alden 2005). Secondly, China is looking abroad to secure vital commodities due to resource scarcity. The resource scarcity that China is facing is due to strengthening and sustained economic growth. In addition to economic growth, increases in consumption and population with an increase in agricultural land lost to industry, have put food security at risk (Alden 2005; Hofman and Ho 2012). As such, land acquisitions are seen as a ‘restructuring and expansion of the industrial food system, based on capital intensive large-scale monocultures for export markets’ (GRAIN 2010). However, many critics argue against the notion that production in these foreign aid projects is exported to China due to the challenges of logistics, high costs of shipping and security risks due to political instability (Consultancy Africa Intelligence 2013). Due to the challenges encountered with the exportation of produce, investment in infrastructure is another mechanism in which Chinese-based actors are engaging in the African agricultural sector. One of the most notable examples is the One Belt One Road programme. Indeed, in addition to the significant mechanisms stated above, several others are also utilised by Chinese-based actors. One of these is the ease of availability of Chinese manufactured machinery, often cheaper and more

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suitable to African conditions and other agricultural inputs (Houmy et al. 2013). Chinese agro-inputs are now widely available in (most) African countries—including South Africa. The most recent example of this is the 80 strong delegation of Chinese investors in Tanzania investigating opportunities to import and export machinery and products (Daily News 2019). Another is the developmental assistance through the provision of loans for African states (Buckley 2011). As can be seen through these mechanisms, like other foreign actors, China’s engagement in African agriculture remains a contested arena, which has deep historical roots and social impacts (Buckley 2011). It forms part of a multifaceted rapidly evolving phenomenon based on mutual benefit, involving a complex array of actors (Taylor 2006; Brautigam and Tang 2012; Buckley 2013). This approach taken by China, rooted in technical and financial assistance, lays the foundation for long-term involvement in Africa’s, and South Africa’s, agricultural sector (Alden 2013).

Chinese-Based Agro-Investments in South Africa Despite the investment drive launched by President Ramaphosa at the State of the Nation address in 2018—and the growth and investment opportunities highlighted in the agricultural sector (Industrial Development Corporation and InvestSA 2019), we see very few memoranda of understandings or pledges in the agricultural sector, and even less by Chinese-based investors. At the time of our research, we identified four projects in differing negotiation statuses—but all launched before President Ramaphosa’s investment drive. Additional projects have since been identified including a pig farm in the Eastern Cape, numerous interventions in the wine industry and a rice farm in Mpumalanga. Four of these Chinese agro-investments targeting various sectors are presented. Although some projects have been in the negotiation phase for several years, or while others have failed already, all projects are presented. They provide ideal case studies to learn from because they differ in forms, mechanisms, actors and objectives. Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre, Free State The South Africa China ATDC is based on the premise of providing training, demonstration and research of freshwater aquaculture. The

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project has a footprint of 47 hectares, with land ownership remaining with Free State Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Fraser 2013). China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation (CNADC), a subsidiary of the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, is the managing agent. The cooperation was initiated in 2007 when the joint statement of intent on economic and technological cooperation was signed. The construction phase lasted four years, with the final project inspection held in February 2013, and cost 30 Million RMB (Renminbi), funded by the Chinese government (Fraser 2013). The technical cooperation phase commenced in February 2014 and lasted three years. During this phase, the Chinese staff were charged with running the centre, while the South African staff played a supportive role. The Chinese government provided funding for all operations during the phase. This is in line with the typical managerial and financial structure design of these centres (MOC & MOA 2011). The main courses offered were freshwater fish biological features, aquaculture and financial management and policy development. However, the outcomes were limited due to several issues; limited trainee knowledge on aquaculture before the training, lack of advanced technologies and infrastructure in their personal capacity and communication barriers (Fraser 2013). In addition to training and research, the centre also produced fish for commercial purposes. Sharptooth Catfish, Carp, Mozambique Tilapia and Goldfish were raised (Fraser 2013). While the final output market was still under development when the cooperation phase ended, in the interim, it was supplied to community fishponds and local Chinese restaurants and communities in Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. The establishment of a cannery in order to export produce to China was under investigation (Fraser 2013). In an attempt to make these projects more sustainable, a commercial element is usually introduced once the three-year technical cooperation stage ends. Typically, this is manifested through building up business platforms for additional investment by Chinese agro-companies in aidrecipient countries (MOC & MOA 2011). The implementing agent makes a start at market-oriented production, based on the production of the centre, through the establishment of a separate agribusiness. In addition, the agent develops an information platform on the investment

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environment in aid-recipient countries, thus facilitating subsequent investment (Jiang et al. 2016). Although CNADC has not established a separate agribusiness, they initiated the establishment of a platform collecting information on South Africa’s investment environment, while keeping their headquarter in Beijing informed. This could not only change the objective of the initial investment but also the outcome of this centre. Pomelo Project, Eastern Cape In contrast to the previous case study, this is a commercial, mainly exportoriented project. It involves the production of pomelo grapefruit primarily by smallholders, with the product being acquired by a Chinese buyer, Shanghai Yebo Africa Trading Hall (ATH). This project is still under negotiation. The first phase is to supply the pomelo to the domestic market in China without processing. An initial pilot area of 500 hectares has been identified at Bizana, Eastern Cape, with possible expansion to 10,000 hectares. The identified land is owned communally, used for subsistence farming. The cultivation is organised as a cooperative group. The second phase will be to add value; juice, rind and oil, which will also be exported (Fraser 2013). The leading role players are the smallholders, together with Alfred Nzo Development Agency (ANDA) and ATH, a private company incorporated in China. The Alfred Nzo Development Agency acts as a facilitator and is responsible for getting the cultivar into South Africa, ensuring smallholders are willing to participate and providing extension workers. ANDA is a municipal entity of the state-owned Alfred Nzo District Municipality (Alfred Nzo Development Agency 2014). Cooperation commenced in 2009, at a point when ANDA was encouraging businesses to develop the region. At the same time, ATH was looking to extend their trade links, mainly through contract farming. The two parties signed a memorandum of understanding at the 5th BRICS summit in 2013 (Fraser 2013). ATH will contract the smallholders and provide technical expertise. Two technical experts will be sent to South Africa and will work with extension officers in order to build their pomelo production skills. The farmers will manage their output with assistance from the extension officers and Chinese experts. As such, ATH, although engaged in the

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value chain, will only engage indirectly within the agricultural production sector. A nursery was to be established in Bizana to establish the stock; however, the agricultural restrictions prevented this from occurring, limiting the availability of planting material. This has delayed the project, and it now sits in limbo as a result. It is uncertain when and if it will go ahead, due to a number of challenges encountered—mainly being unable to bring the cultivar into South Africa from China (Fraser 2013). The project, if it proceeds, is expected to have several positive impacts. Firstly, the inclusion of smallholders, boosting the local economy. Secondly, increased knowledge through the production of a new citrus variety. However, to date, the project has had no social or economic impact as it is still under negotiation. BEK-PengxinAgritech Dairy Farm, Kwa-Zulu Natal Initially interested in the establishment of agri-parks, Pengxin shifted their focus into dairy farming. However, the establishment of this project has failed. The aim was to produce up to 1 million litres per day, equivalent to about one-third of the present daily milk production in Kwa-Zulu Natal (Fraser 2013). According to Pengxin’s investment plan, all output would have been processed into infant milk powder and exported to China. The agro-investment project was first proposed at the 5th BRICS Summit held in 2013. A Memorandum of Understanding for agrocooperation was signed between Pengxin Group, BEK Holdings and the Economic Development and Tourism Ministry of South Africa. The Pengxin Group, registered in China, was expected to provide the capital (R3 billion)and expertise. BEK Holdings (Pty) Ltd., the local agent, is registered in South Africa and is mainly involved in the mining sector. This agro-investment would represent the implementation of a diversification strategy, from the mining to the agricultural sector. In pursuit of this project, twenty sites were identified, totalling around 20,242 hectares, in the Umzimkhulu area. These sites would form the ‘core estate’ with expansion to neighbouring farms. The land identified is communal, used for subsistence farming, administrated through Ingonyama Trust. The land lease would have been between the local community, in this case, the Malenge community, and the Ingonyama

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Trust. This design aims at maximising profits for both the local community and the Pengxin Group, as Pengxin Group would pay higher lease fees if they approached the Trust directly. Although the project was Chinese led and focussing on the market in China, there are three ways that the local community would have benefited; employment, training and skills development and economic profits as a shareholder. However, the project has stalled. The last interaction between the two sides was in June 2014 when the third delegation, including an international consulting group, was assigned to South Africa. No news has been heard from the Chinese side since then, and it is accepted that the Chinese partner has abandoned their agribusiness plan, and have shifted their investment interests to New Zealand (MOC 2015). The stakeholders feel that the main reasons for the failure of the project—since the Chinese did not formally communicate—are as follows: (1) the South African government could not provide sufficient tax incentives, whereas by investing in New Zealand, Chinese could be 22% better off from the taxation point of view; (2) initial infrastructure set-up would have been very costly. Val de Vie Wine Farm, Western Cape The deal came about during the financial crisis in 2007–2008, when Leopard’s Leap Farm Pty (Ltd.), a private company incorporated in South Africa, was looking for additional export opportunities (Cape Wine Academy 2011). Perfect Wines of South Africa (PWSA) is a partnership between Perfect China (51%) and Leopard’s Leap Farm Pty (Ltd) (49%) (Val de Vie 2013). Perfect China was incorporated in 1994 as a subsidiary of Perfect Resources (M) Sdn Bhd (Perfect China 2014). Perfect China purchased the L’Huguenot Farm vineyards, within the Val de Vie Estate, Paarl, in 2013. L’Huguenot Farm has a size of 25 hectares; 17 hectares of vineyards, 3 hectares of citrus, Manor House and cellar. The primary purpose of the L’Huguenot Farm is the allocation of a business address for Perfect China within South Africa—it eases imports back home. The farm will also be used, to a lesser degree, as a demonstration facility for the salespersons from Perfect China with the largest sales of L’Huguenot wines (Fraser 2013). Perfect China owns the farm while PWSA owns the L’Huguenot brand. This being said, Perfect China controls the majority of the decision-making for PWSA, and thus makes all strategic, financial,

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marketing, distribution and sales volume-related decisions. Perfect China issues a contract to PWSA stating the volume required. Presently, the entire production, more than 2.7 million bottles, is exported. The production volumes are met by making use of the L’Hugenot cellar and other companies vineyards and cellars (such as KWV) (Fraser 2013). From a socio-economic perspective, this project has minor impacts as it is a takeover of an established business. The outcomes lie more in the ownership structure, which has consequences on the activities (grape varieties, production levels), strategies (markets focussed on export). As such, this project illustrates how foreign control over production and value chain is amending the objectives and strategies of the enterprise, focussing entirely on re-orienting production towards the Chinese markets. Indeed, this project marks the first Chinese investment in the South African wine industry (Val de Vie 2013). Several other initiatives within the industry have subsequently arisen. This is evident by the additional equity investments, such as by Chinese individual William Wu’s 51% stake in Swartland winery, the promotion of South African wines in China by WOSA, and their roadshow events (Beijing Review 2017).

Analysis As can be seen, several mechanisms are applied in South Africa, ranging from; technical expertise, research, demonstration (ATDC), contract farming (Pomelo project), equity investments (Val de Vie) and direct investment throughout the agricultural value chain (BEK Pengxin). The projects have different implementation statuses and have faced several challenges—some related to the design of the aid and investment mechanism and others related to the investment destination and environment. FOCAC is predominantly implemented through the ATDC, as is the case in many other African countries. The BRICS platform plays an integral role in introducing investors into South Africa; in line with the agenda of strengthening the cooperation between members. As such, in the pomelo case, ATH and ANDA utilised the BRICS summits as meeting platforms. Similarly, Pengxin Group used the 5th BRICS summit to sign the Memorandum of Understanding for agro-cooperation. This section presents an analysis of the case studies by comparing the latter between each other and assessing them in the framework of literature. This analysis will focus on five issues: actors, land ownership and

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production model, agribusiness value chain, market and progress and impact of projects. Actors Chinese agricultural enterprises are either state-owned, capturing markets or securing commodities or private enterprises (Asanzi 2012). South Africa follows the trend of Chinese agro-investment in Africa, where private companies represent the vast majority of the Chinese investors (Jiang 2015), with only the ATDC initiated by a state-owned company. Two aspects of the South African case are, however, different from the experiences of Chinese agro-investment in the continent. Firstly, we do not see a multitude of Chinese agricultural enterprises consisting of individual farmers (Holslag 2006). Not uncommon in Africa, these individual farmers are business entrepreneurs (Asanzi 2012). Secondly, established South African and Chinese agro-investors play an integral role in opening the market for additional Chinese agro-investors. These investors store and pass on information to potential investors; acquisition process, regulations, in-country contacts and more importantly investment opportunities. The Chinese staff at the ATDC stated that they are already looking for further investment opportunities. As Asanzi (2012) notes, having access to this information assists in ensuring the effective implementation, and even success, of the business venture. Land Ownership and Production Model Ownership of land within the investments is less critical in the South African cases compared to Chinese investments elsewhere on the continent; due to the small size of the projects, in conjunction with the ownership and production structures. In all projects, except the wine farm, Chinese actors are not directly involved in land transactions; they take ownership of the project and not the land directly. This is distinctively different from the Chinese agricultural investment structures in other African countries (Jiang 2015). In both the pomelo and wine projects, contract farming forms the primary production model. Under the dairy project, the land lease would have been the community and the Ingonyama Trust. In the case of the ATDC, the land still belongs to the Free State Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

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These observations emphasise divergent strategies compared to other land investors in Africa, who focus on land acquisitions (Anseeuw et al. 2012). This confirms with literature that Chinese investors are not the major land acquirers on the continent (Brautigam and Zhang 2013); however, they are nevertheless very visible. Agribusiness Value Chain All projects concentrate on the production and downstream stages of the value chain, with emphasis on the latter. The pomelo project involves production through contract farming and downstream activities. In Val de Vie, apart from the production and processing of magnums, for all other products, the only involvement in the value chain is in the downstream activities. This being said, the company still oversees the production and processing of all the products. Pengxin Group would have been involved from the diary production to the processing and marketing of the powdered milk. Here too, this trend differs significantly from Chinese investment in agriculture in other African countries, where investors concentrate on the primary stage of agro-production, with downstream investment only serving as complementary (Jiang 2015). Furthermore, the greater involvement in the downstream value chain in South Africa, which has much to do with the country’s relatively advanced agroproduction system, confirms the idea that the production-centred investment modality of Chinese companies in Africa is related to the poorly developed agro-production on the continent (Jiang 2015). Also, this difference in investment strategy might be related to political sensitivities surrounding land in South Africa. These strategies are ‘less visible’ and less sensitive (as they do not involve land—an emotional asset—directly), but still have significant consequences on who controls land (Anseeuw and Ducastel 2013). One may expect that such strategies will increasingly be applied. Land investments have proven too risky for investors, socio-politically, as well as economically (Boche 2014). Therefore, controlling the value chain appears to become a prominent control mechanism within the world food system (Swinnen and Maertens 2007).

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Markets All projects assessed involve varying degrees of export to China: in some projects produce serves the local markets first, while in other projects, 100% of the produce is exported or expected to be exported. This is not surprising given the gap between demand and supply of agricultural products in China (Jiang 2015). It is also partly as a result of the production efficiency in the potential investment-destination countries, either due to their long-standing produce ties (e.g. wine in South Africa) or comparative advantages in production (e.g. pomelo and dairy products in South Africa). Caution is necessary though in considering the implications of this analysis, as China is self-sufficient with regard to several commodities. As emphasised by Bräutigam and Zhang (2013), Chinese agricultural investments do not necessarily occur to serve solely food security issues back home. As such, local markets constitute an important outlet for the produce, specifically for the Chinese community. We see this in the ATDC project, where the Chinese communities in Johannesburg and Bloemfontein hold the biggest market share. This is standard practice for the Chinese farms operating in Africa: local market serves as the primary outlet, of which, the Africa-based Chinese communities occupy a significant proportion (Jiang 2015). As such, it shows that Chinese investments as a security measure is too simplistic and does not take into account other drivers for investments (Ekman 2014). Progress and Impacts of Projects Despite the expressions of interest, some projects are still under negotiation, while others have resulted in failed negotiations. Several factors are at play here. In some instances, South Africa’s more stringent regulatory measures hinder foreign investment (Alden and Wu 2014). This is particularly evident in the Pomelo project, where agricultural procedures related to the import of the cultivar hinders the implementation. In the case of the ATDC, the first environmental impact assessment was deemed insufficient and did not take into account significant potential impacts. Thus, another assessment was carried out, which delayed the implementation of the project.

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In other instances, the Chinese investor relocates the project to other countries due to the high costs of implementation. Comparatively higher transactions costs, lack of infrastructure and limited foreign investment incentives are problems for investments in South Africa, and indeed elsewhere in Africa (Alden and Wu 2014; Boche 2014). Cultural aspects also had a—negative—effect on the progress of the implementation. This is seen in the dairy project, as well as in the ATDC where the language was a problem (Harding et al. 2018). As in the rest of Africa, these agro-firms face considerable obstacles, ranging from a lack of understanding about sociopolitical conditions and ignorance on the amount of land required for their investments (Asanzi 2012). The uncertainty of the investors tends to prolong their investigation and negotiation process in order to, understandably, avoid investment loss. Related to the above, impacts of the Chinese projects in South Africa remain quite limited—from a positive and negative point of view—and challenging to assess. Few projects reach effective production phases and those who do, are mainly based on enterprise take-overs or cooperation strategies, where only marginal socio-economic impacts occur (Harding et al. 2018).

Conclusion Chinese-based agro-investment has ensued in Africa for years (Alden et al. 2008), however, there has been a marked increase in the last couple of years into countries previously ‘unexplored’. South Africa features in this expansion with several modalities of aid and agro-projects initiated by Chinese-based investors and actors, with legitimacy from FOCAC and BRICS. These Chinese investments, although confirming specific Chinese characteristics, also highlight differing trends from that which is generally described in the literature. Private companies dominate, taking control and ownership of the project rather than the land directly themselves—with the exception of the L’Hugenot wine farm. These actors focus primarily on (production and) downstream activities, whereas elsewhere in Africa downstream activities are seen as complementary. Exportation of produce to China is occurring in the wine project and was also planned under the other projects to varying degrees. However, the local market is the main outlet of produce, as with most Chinese-based investments in Africa. While South Africa’s specificity in Africa and long-standing produce ties explain some

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of these differences, some divergences seem to be illustrating specific Chinese strategies with regard to South Africa, as well as more broadly its investment strategy in African agriculture. These projects are all the more important, and specifically the ATDC project, in a country where smallholder farming is declining, coupled with the high unemployment rate (Statistics South Africa 2016). However, these projects experienced several challenges during the negotiation and implementation phases (Harding et al. 2018), leading to some projects failing or being abandoned. While some reasons for project failure are ‘transactional’ in nature and easily corrected, others require structural adjustments of policy and aid programmes—and indeed also impact on investments and aid programmes initiated by Chinese-based actors elsewhere in Africa (Harding et al. 2018). A large number of bilateral agreements and memorandum of understanding (MOU’s) on investments have been signed over the last couple of years between South Africa and China (Engineering News 2018; IOL 2019). However, we see a substantial commitment to other sectors, such as manufacturing, infrastructure, telecommunications, Special Economic Zones and transport, amongst others. A smaller share seems to be allocated to the agricultural sector and primarily involves trade agreements for specific products such as dried fruit and nuts as well as beef. This research confirms this, where we found that MOU’s have been signed for a handful of agricultural investments, but of these only two are currently operational. The successes and failures within these case studies should not be taken lightly, particularly if President Ramaphosa is serious about the R1.2 trillion investment drive. In addition to the specific factors which caused failures of these projects, the government must investigate the business environment around agricultural investments—notably, because South Africa’s ranking in the Doing Business report is dropping from 82nd in 2019 to 84th in 2020 (World Bank Group 2020). Moreover, domestic land disputes and calls for the resumption of an accelerated approach to land reform have raised uncertainty in this sector. Given the limited successes and achievements made in the domestic land reform arena in South Africa, the failure to deal with the issue of land in its entirety has brought about a reassertion of conflict (Anseeuw and Alden 2010). In light of these challenges, adding agricultural and land investments, in particular by external investors into the mix in South Africa presents an ever-increasing complex and contested land matrix.

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Note 1. A limited portion of the material in this chapter is based on earlier research completed and published in a chapter the edited volume April, F. Y., Shelton, G., Alden, C., & Hu, B. (Eds.). Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): Industrialisation and Modernisation (vol. 2). Tswane: Africa Institute of South Africa/Human Sciences Research Council 2018.

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Food in Crisis: Conflict, Resistance and Renewal (1st ed., pp. 139–155). New York: Monthly Review Press. Harding, A., Jiang, L., & Anseeuw, W. A. C. (2018). Between Promise and Profit: Chinese Agro-Investment and the Challenges of Operating in South Africa. In F. April, G. Shelton, C. Alden, & B. Hu (Eds.), Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Industrialisation and Agricultural Modernisation (pp. 192–208). Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Hofman, I., & Ho, P. (2012). China’s “Developmental Outsourcing”: A Critical Examination of Chinese Global “Land Grabs” Discourse. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(1), 21–48. Holslag, J. (2006). China’s New Mercantilism in Central Africa. Journal of African and Asian Studies, 5, 133–168. Houmy, K., Clarke, L., Ashburner, J., & Kienzle, J. (2013). Agricultural Mechanization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Guidelines for Preparing a Strategy. Rome: Plant Production and Protection Division Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Industrial Development Corporation and InvestSA. (2019). The Case for Investing in South Africa: Accelerating Economic Growth by Building Partnerships. Available at: https://sainvestmentconference.co.za/wp-content/ uploads/2019/11/The-case-for-investing-in-South-Africa-2019-Full-public ation-31-October-2019.pdf. Accessed 22 January 2020. IOL. (2019). Chinese Economic and Trade Delegation Sign 93 Agreements During SA Visit. Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/chi nese-economic-and-trade-delegation-sign-93-agreements-during-sa-visit-271 52883. Accessed 22 January 2020. Jiang, L. (2015). Chinese Agricultural Investment in Africa: Motives, Actors and Modalities (SAIIA Occasional Paper, Volume 223). Jiang, L., Harding, A., Anseeuw, W., & Alden, C. (2016). Chinese Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre in Southern Africa: The New Business of Development. The Public Sphere, Issue LSE Africa Summit Edition 2016, Challenging Conventions. MOC & MOA. (2011). Guidance on Promoting the Sustainable Development of the Aid Project of the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre in Africa. Beijing: MOC & MOA. MOC. (2015). Available at: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/l/201 501/20150100883074. Accessed 16 July 2015. Perfect China. (2014). Company Information. Available at: http://www.perfec t100.com/en/Com_Info. Accessed 25 August 2014. Ping, L. (2008). Food Security: Hopes and Strains in China’s Overseas Farming Plan. Economic Observer, Volume 374. Rotberg, R. I. (2008). China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

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Shelton, G. (2018). FOCAC, Agricultural Development and China-Africa Cooperation. In Y. April, G. Shelton, C. Alden, & B. Hu (Eds.), Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Industrialisation and Agricultural Modernisation (pp. 209–231). Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. South African Government. (2013). Fifth BRICS Summit-General Background. Available at: https://www.gov.za/events/fifth-brics-summit-general-backgr ound. Accessed 10 September 2019. Statistics South Africa. (2016). Community Survey. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Swinnen, J., & Maertens, M. (2007). Globalisation, Privatisation, and Vertical Coordination in Food Value Chains in Developing and Transition Countries. Agricultural Economics, 27 (1), 289–302. Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge. The Land Matrix. (2019). International Land Coalition (ILC), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD), Centre for Development and Environment (CDE), German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für. Available at: http://www.landmatrix.org. Accessed 12 August 2019. The New Dawn. (2019). 25 NaFAA Staff Leaves for China Tuesday. Available at: https://thenewdawnliberia.com/25-nafaa-staff-leaves-for-china-tuesday/. Accessed 16 September 2019. The World Bank. (2010). Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? Washington, DC: The World Bank. Val de Vie. (2013). Wine. Available at: http://www.valdevie.co.za/wine/media. Accessed 12 July 2014. World Bank Group. (2020). Doing Business 2020: Economy Profile South Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. XINHUANET. (2019). Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Opening Ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit. Available at: http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm. Accessed 10 September 2019.

CHAPTER 10

Chinese and South African Labour Relations: An Analysis Arina Muresan and Sanusha Naidu

Introduction The relationship between South Africa and China has not always been one of a picture-perfect postcard. Historically, the engagement between the African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was shaped by the polemics of the Cold War where the South African Communist Party (SACP) played the role of a strategic disruptor in influencing and swaying the ANC towards the Soviet bloc. Even after establishing formal diplomatic ties in 1998, the highlevel state-to-state interactions underpinned by the Presidential Binational Commission, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and more recently the adoption of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership have not significantly illustrated the strategic value that both actors see in the relationship outside of the rhetoric. As much as China’s invitation

A. Muresan · S. Naidu (B) Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] A. Muresan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_10

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to the Zuma Presidency to join the BRICS in late December 2010 was hailed as recognising South Africa’s continental leverage, much of this seems to remain more in the imagination of political and economic elites rather than highlighting any serious traction that Pretoria still holds as a strategic actor in the world. The interests and views of elites include government, big business and academics; but labour, as a critical constituency in the Tripartite Alliance, seems to be less visible, especially in issues of strategic interest regarding international relations or diplomacy to trade and investment that is aimed at consolidating China-South Africa relations. But is this really the case? It is widely acknowledged that labour has an immediate interest in the South Africa-China relationship since it offers a nuanced perspective regarding the way labour federations like the Congress of the South African Trade Unions (COSATU) play a significant role in shaping domestic political affairs. From this perspective, this chapter explores the engagement between South Africa and China with a view of understanding to what extent labour does influence the bilateral engagement. Through the positioning of South Africa’s labour federations who are important influencers in the political, economic and social dimensions of policy-making, the issue at hand is to understand where does labour fit in Pretoria’s structural relationship with Beijing. Therefore, this chapter explores: 1) the role that the Tripartite Alliance1 played in the antiapartheid struggle and in advancing the interests of workers’ rights in the country’s apartheid socio-economic landscape; 2) the space that labour currently occupies as a strategic actor in South Africa’s post-apartheid transition and what influences this has had on in terms of adopting the One China Policy and current relations with the East Asian giant and 3) to what extent does labour envision that through the engagement with China the country’s domestic socio-economic challenges can lead to the creation of a developmental state that tackles the triple oppression of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Chinese-South African Relations: The Historical Context The tripartite alliance is not the sole representative of South Africa’s political perspectives, though it does represent the gravitas of the antiapartheid struggle that reoriented itself in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the alliance between the ANC and SACP and later in 1990 with

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the inclusion of COSATU. The socialist or Marxist/Leninist ideological leanings saw the ANC and SACP develop a cohesive historical fit that was strengthened by the Soviet Union being to a large extent the primary source in supporting the anti-apartheid movement. The Soviet bloc kept a number of liberation organisations sustained through aiding as well as lobbying for their legitimacy on official platforms, such as the United Nations (Filatova 2011) notwithstanding political and military training for cadres in the movement. Of course China also showed support for Africa’s liberation movements as in Zimbabwe and Angola as well as support to the ANC’s military wing, uMkhonto weSizwe.2 However, it is useful to point out here that such external support in political and military training, resources and education was also caught in the crosswinds of the competition between Beijing and Moscow and later the Sino-Soviet split by 1962. The ANC’s shift towards Moscow was shaped by the SACP’s aligning towards Moscow’s brand of Communism which saw Beijing also grappling with whether its orientation towards the Pan African Congress (PAC) was a strategic choice. As Naidu (2006) has shown in her analysis of the historical ties in the Sino-South Africa engagement, relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PAC was never comfortable, and it seemed that from her perspective the Chinese saw the PAC as a subordinate actor to the ANC (Naidu 2008). The Sino-Soviet schism had also impacted on the way cadres in leadership positions interacted that led to a degree of mistrust among each other where some receiving training from China were accused of treason against the ANC (Alden and Alves 2008; Mail and Guardian 2016; City Press 2018) with others undergoing retraining in Moscow.3 The above broad sketch of the historical context of relations between China and the Soviet Union with the main proponents of the antiapartheid movement is critical in evaluating how relations were influenced by the trajectory of the Cold War. The introduction of political and economic reforms in 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev,4 Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the extent to which Mbeki wished to reduce the ANC’s dependence on support from the Soviet Union, and the transformation of structural conditions in the global landscape in 1989 impacted on the 1994 negotiated political settlement and transition towards a democratic dispensation in the country cannot be ignored as strategic factors in the South Africa’s negotiated transition and the PRCs rise (Weiss and Rumer 2019). In the 1990s and 2000s its geographic location, with port access to both the East and West coasts

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of Africa, and developed infrastructure set it apart as a favourable international partner and gateway into Africa, held strategic importance to China’s ‘going out’ strategy; and so, on the cusp of South Africa’s new dawn, the ANC (bolstered by support from the SACP and COSATU, who also shared similar values with the CCP) were central players (among others) to China’s foreign policy strategy. It is from this context that locating the role that labour has played as a tripartite actor in the Sino-South African engagement needs to be understood. The point of departure for this reflection is that all three actors of the Tripartite Alliance saw the socialist approach from an interpretation of a Marxist/Leninist point of view and used this as a foundational approach to how a post-apartheid state would pursue the process of Reconstruction and Development. Couched in the rhetoric of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), all three tripartite alliance actors argued that given South Africa’s history of unequal relations of race and class, the creation of a just society could only be realised through the adoption of a developmental project that had to be seen as state led and which would be able to reconcile the contradictions of its liberalist Constitution with a socialist economic framework underpinned by the Freedom Charter (ANC 2018, 2019; de Jager and Steenekamp 2016; SACP 2012). In this way enabling the pursuit of a developmental state that would also advance South Africa’s integration into the global economy. In the immediate postapartheid period, the Mandela presidency’s foreign policy values were tested by the ‘Two China Dilemma’. Of course, this dilemma also intrinsically unveiled to what extent labour was prepared for the consequences of the ANC’s own contradictions in its economic policymaking that seemed to be out of sync with its supposed Marxist/Leninist discourse.

South Africa’s Two China Dilemma, Tripartite Views The ANC led government articulated its sovereignty through a path of non-alignment, which was reflected in the view of ‘harmony without uniformity’. At the same time transition to a democratic state saw South Africa adopt a value-based foreign policy approach located around the iconic identity of Nelson Mandela as a human rights champion (Le Pere et al. 1999). This meant that South Africa would be seen as positioning itself as a moral actor in how it conducted its global affairs. Unfortunately the clash between rhetoric and practice was not always coherent.

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And the One China Policy was one of the first tests that the Mandela administration had to address. Democratic South Africa had always intended to extend relations with Beijing; however, how this relationship would be expressed in diplomatic terms was questioned. The apartheid regime cultivated extensive trade and investment linkages with Taiwan, but Mainland China’s increasing political and economic ascendance in the global setting could not be ignored. As part of this debate, Greg Mills (1995) outlined three possible scenarios. The first scenario called for the maintenance of the status quo. The second scenario—attempt at dual recognition and the third scenario—downgrade relations with Taiwan in favour of the PRC —flowed from international consensus. This was primarily based on China’s rapidly growing economic influence and the opportunities this opened up for South Africa’s business community. The Two Chinas dilemma forced the Mandela Presidency to realise that this decision was fraught with internal contradictions (Suttner 1995). Firstly, forging ties with Beijing would send out a confused message about its own values in terms of its democratic and human rights norms, especially after the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989, and the political fallout with Nigeria after Mandela criticised the Nigerian military regime of General Sanni Abacha in 1995. Secondly, if the leadership sought to switch ties to Beijing, it had to reconcile itself to the loss of the financial inducements it received from Taipei as part of the latter’s chequebook diplomacy, which was designed precisely to encourage Pretoria to retain the status quo.5 In the early 1990s, Taipei announced increased investments in South Africa through a series of loans and contracts to Eskom, MacSteel, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) while making commitments (on paper at least) to undertake projects valued at over R1 billion linked to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).6 Such financial incentives compelled the Mandela leadership to evaluate the implications which disinvestment by Taiwan when compared to the small amount of PRC investment in the country at that time and if PRC investment could increase to match the financing of the RDP. The Hong Kong factor was another consideration. With Hong Kong destined to return to Chinese rule in 1997, Pretoria had to consider the implications this would have for its economic linkages with the island, which was South Africa’s fifth largest trading partner at the time. Since there were no formal ties between the PRC and Pretoria, South Africa’s economic interests and political status on the island were not protected

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by basic law. This meant that the status of its mission, the air service agreements as well as duties on goods entering the market would be at the discretion of the PRC and determined by whether Pretoria afforded Beijing diplomatic recognition. Against this backdrop, the dynamism of Hong Kong being included into China’s economy and the rising living standards on the mainland would open up new opportunities for South African goods, which could well surpass those offered by maintenance of relations with Taiwan. Pretoria could not ignore the rise of China in the international system and the attendant benefits that establishing formal ties with Beijing would bring, especially with regard to the new regime’s aspirations in the reformed Security Council and in the context of South–South cooperation. That South Africa dragged its feet in making its choice may well have reflected the new government’s recollection of Beijing’s initial inability to commit wholly to the ANC’s anti–apartheid struggle, as well as clandestine trading with the apartheid regime (Taylor 2000). The CCP and the tripartite alliance underlined a common ideological identity. In the case of the SACP it was the notion of the apartheid system has been characterised as ‘Colonialism of a Special type’ that informed its Marxist–Leninist leaning. In a similar vein the ANC saw the anti-apartheid struggle as a just fight against an unjust regime. While for COSATU it was the unfair and exploitation of labour that saw the federation ‘as a model of a militant and progressive movement simultaneously improving the wages and working conditions of its members while engaged in a successful struggle for democracy against the apartheid regime’ (Webster and Buhlungu 2004, 39). The ideological bent, however, provides only one of part of the explanation relating to the growing affinity between Beijing and Pretoria. It was clear early on that the ‘Two China’ Dilemma would be underpinned by the way domestic actors would perceive Taiwan and Mainland China. For partners in the Government of National Unity (GNU), namely the Nationalist Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) maintaining relations with Taipei was the preferred diplomatic choice given the historical engagement both political parties had enjoyed with the island state during the apartheid years. The Democratic Party (now the Democratic Alliance), leaned more towards aligning to global realities relating to the rise of China and its indelible positioning as a formidable actor in global affairs.

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The real test for the partners in the Tripartite Alliance was whether they could justify diplomatic relations with Taiwan that had closely associated with the apartheid regime. For the SACP and to a lesser extent COSATU, maintaining the status quo of relations with Taiwan was seen as a contradiction of their ideological stance. But the deeper implication, especially for factions of the tripartite alliance led by the SACP, was the view that Taiwan represented a legitimation of the past, which needed to be severed for all intents and purposes.7 From this perspective the apartheid government’s close political, economic and security cooperation with Taiwan was seen as justifying Taipei’s support for a white minority regime and its discriminatory policies. As much as elements in the ANC including Mandela considered a more pragmatic approach of trying to shift the landscape towards dual recognition, it was clear that Mandela had to be mindful of the endorsement that ANC needed from the SACP and COSATU in the 1994 democratic elections, which was equally important. So as much as Mandela looked to be taking a gradual approach and hoping that exhausting options like the scenarios presented would provide the basis for considering a policy approach that would be amendable to all parties, it was difficult for the Mandela administration to sit on the fence for longer than anticipated. Of the two partners, it would appear that it was pressure from the SACP that seemed to carry more traction and push the Mandela government and members in the cabinet to adopt the One China policy (Williams and Hurst 2018). The irony of the situation was that the SACP’s historical pivot to Moscow, which had influenced the ANC’s shift towards Russia, was muted in the SACP’s rhetoric that the liberation actors and Beijing enjoyed a long engagement of support (Grimm et al. 2014). Nevertheless it would seem that the influence and weight that members of the SACP enjoyed through holding positions in the government, the National Parliament and in the National Executive Council of the ANC assisted in eventually seeing Mandela announce in November 1996 that South Africa would downgrade relations with Taiwan and officially recognise and formalise full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China from 1 January 1998. To a large extent, COSATU’s role in the policy decision engagements and processes relating to the One China policy appeared to be secondary and following the conventional wisdom of the SACP and those in the ANC which supported switching diplomatic recognition in favour of Beijing. The positioning of the labour federation seemed to align

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with the overall consensus that recognising Taiwan would contradict the alliance’s perspective that the foreign policy stance of the post-apartheid should incorporate a stance that addressed historical injustices. Of course the purview by labour was that the PRC would boost investment into the country that was needed for the country’s economic reconstruction. This then begs the question around whether COSATU’s initial consideration of the One China policy incorporated any reflection of the pending impacts this would have on the country’s trade and industry policy and implementation, especially in terms of protection of labour intensive industries that formed the mainframe of COSATU’s consistency base.

The ‘One China Policy’ Versus Industrial Strategy? Up until 1998, the relationship between China and South Africa (led by the ANC) was based on solidarity and global anti-imperialism along with socialist principles that the Tripartite Alliance supported. However, after 1998, China’s prowess in the global economy and ability to adapt to globalisation was unparalleled, and to partners like South Africa such a dynamic produced new dilemmas where industrial policy could not adapt to WTO regulations and protect labour or domestic industries. Lambert and Webster highlight that the textile industry was severely affected by ‘The China Price’ and survival of the industry was compromised as local textile owners could not compete with the cheap imports from China, thereby leading to stagnant wages despite protests from workers (2017, 3). From the 2000s trade unions particularly lobbied against cheaper Chinese imports to South Africa that specifically had a long-lasting impact on South Africa’s textile industry. Minister of Trade and Industry, appointed in 2019, and a stalwart in the labour movement, Ebrahim Patel, explained that in the 1980s this industry was highly protected. But with the liberalisation of trade policy after 1994, tariff barriers were consistently lowered. By 2002, the South African tariff was lowered to 40% and locally made textiles and clothing had fast become replaced with cheaper Chinese imports, which was not accompanied by policy to protect the industry (Patel 2016). The drowning textile industry fast became an example where government had failed to incorporate an inclusive and well thought out industrial policy to maintain control over a domestic market. The latter became a moot issue for SACP, COSATU, South

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African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU), the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) and National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) who specifically rallied around this point and sought greater government intervention for stronger protection of South African workers and consumers (SACTWU 2006; Mail and Guardian 2013). By 2006 a detailed cooperation agreement between South Africa and China was discussed, which incorporated quotas, pledges to reduce import tariffs for certain products and include local job creation as part of the partnership. This was well received by the ANC government (Mail and Guardian 2006). However, the haemorrhaging of the clothing and textile industry was still evident with the sector feeling the impacts of shock therapy; by 2011, an industry that had started at 260,000 workers in the 1990s, had been reduced to 110,000 (Patel 2016).8 COSATU had warned that Chinese growth, coupled with a downward trend in trade volumes with the US and UK would continue to impact all sectors and unemployment would be on the rise (South African Broadcasting Corporation 2006). In 2009, Tony Ehrenreich, then provincial secretary to the COSATU, made a presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry in the National Parliament, where he articulated that South Africa’s growth led economic policy had been flawed (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2009). While acknowledging that there were some gains, Ehrenreich pointed out that the nature of South Africa’s economic structure made it uncompetitive in global markets. Characterised as being a primary exporter of low value added raw materials and importing high valued added commodities, Ehrenreich noted that this represented a flaw in the South Africa’s industrial strategy, which not only distorted the country’s balance of payments but also made the country vulnerable to the growing footprint and rise of countries like China and India. Ehrenreich explains that in the case of South Africa, the trade liberation policy which was embedded in the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic framework could not sustain a cohesive foreign economic policy engagement with external partners such as China whose comparative economic advantage in the global economy was entrenched. And South African government needed to protect the national economic space and look towards implementing tariff structures in order to address the historical economic imbalances and encourage industrial development. Perhaps the most striking element of Ehrenreich’s brief to the Committee was that the international trade agreements that South Africa had entered into with external partners were unfavourable to

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meet the country’s economic needs. To this end Ehrenreich highlighted that such agreements needed to have significant safe-guards built into them that will ‘defend short-term interests’ and promote light industries (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2009). It was clear from Ehrenreich’s presentation that the structural economic constraints confronting the South Africa’s integration into the global economy was linked to whether the state could advance some sort of protectionism towards those industries that were undoubtedly affected and exposed to the changing nature of the multilateral trading structure, especially in terms of Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA). More importantly, what became evident from the briefing was the more subtle issue regarding whether South Africa’s economic pathway was a sustainable one which will see employment creation and material and social benefits accruing to the majority of ordinary South Africans. In addition, Habib and Padaychee (2000) emphasise the nature of South Africa’s transition and transformation. And much of the industrial policy narratives coming from the ANC government that would punt GEAR and the RDP did not anticipate how a liberalised approach to development could harm South African labour and prevent it from achieving economic restructuring and transition. The perspective from COSATU was how it could shape South Africa’s industrial capacity (Twala and Kompi 2012). With that said the underlying question seemed to be that as much as COSATU saw this as part of its role in the Tripartite Alliance, its criticism of the growth led economic policy was precisely an issue directed more towards the South African government’s neoliberal economic trajectory rather than an outright rejection of the One China policy. Or so it would seem from the way COSATU has responded to the China engagement. This is not to suggest that COSATU has not voiced it criticisms of the SA-China relationship especially when it came to denying a visa to the Dalai Lama.

The Status Quo After 2009 The shift in the political structure of the South Africa state came after the ANC’s 2007 national elective conference in Polokwane. The rise of the Jacob Zuma constituency was a decisive moment for COSATU. For the most part COSATU’s positioning in the Tripartite Alliance, especially in the period after 1994 until the run-up to the 2007 elective conference was a contested terrain. In many ways the Thabo Mbeki’s aggressive

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stance against criticism levelled against the economic policies by alliance partners heightened tensions within internal factionalism in the alliance nor did it deepen support for the Mbeki leadership both in the Party and as the government in power (Buhlungu and Ellis 2011; Twala and Kompi 2012). In some ways the Polokwane moment was interpreted as grass root mobilisation against the antithetical nature of Mbeki’s free market ideology and recalibration of the role that labour would play in elevating its policy influence in the economic architecture of the state. For some in the labour movement it also meant a return to the leftist ideological positioning in state politics. What Did This Mean for Relations with China? At the very outset it would seem that the Zuma Presidency, which came to power in 2009, was more aligned to deepening the diplomatic engagement with the Chinese state. As much as the Mbeki government saw the pragmatism of the One China Policy and supported FOCAC, there appeared to be a more cautious approach to the relationship (Alden and Wu 2014). This could have been informed by Mbeki’s own developmental agenda for the continent found in the vision of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) that was punted towards the G8’s interests and support. Nevertheless, with the Zuma administration the Chinese saw more traction being built around developing greater political and economic cooperation and ties. The disposition of the Zuma government meant that South Africa was open for business. As a result relations were upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2010 during Zuma’s state visit to Beijing. For labour this reorientation in the engagement drew on the inclusion of the federation in the Zuma cabinet, especially the portfolio of economic development with Ebrahim Patel as the minister. The latter coincided with labour’s desire in becoming a central actor in the policy space and also advancing Zuma’s project of a developmental state that could be modelled along the lines of the Asian experience. In fact, Minister Patel made one of the first indications to this effect regarding the relationship with China where he highlighted key areas of investment that the East Asian giant could play a strategic role in, namely infrastructure development and projects including agricultural, mineral, telecoms and transport cooperation as well as collaborative value added production that could facilitate employment creation and growth (Alden

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and Wu 2014). The engagement was also underpinned by tapping into the China’s burgeoning tourism industry particularly in view of South Africa hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup. At the multilateral level both sides renewed shared commitment and interests to strengthen engagements through the UN, the G20, FOCAC and other platforms around reforming the international order. China’s invitation to Pretoria to join the BRICs at the end of 2010 was another facet to the strategic partnership between Beijing and Pretoria. For both sides it was the ambit of increasing much needed resources to boost South Africa’s domestic development agenda. Joining the BRICS platform also gave South Africa the impetus in strengthening its role in global affairs. For China, it was really about having another ally that could augment its position at the global level as well as to deepen its access into the African markets. Of course, the other aspect in elevating this focus on China was the ideological leaning in the framing of President Zuma’s Presidency vision, which had reset itself through anti-Western lens that found broad support with key elements in the alliance setting, which had the potential to boost job creation and placate labour unions’ ambivalent orientation towards the impact of china’s partnership (South African Broadcasting Corporation 2006). Even though at the 2012 FOCAC Ministerial meeting Zuma paused to re-iterate warnings against the asymmetrical nature of the engagement with China (Wekesa 2017), this was seen as less of a blight on the bilateral engagement and more about a where the relationship could be re-examined through the joint ministerial platforms based on consensus and common interest. But China still represented what some in COSATU interpreted as a threat to the country’s economic rebalancing. As Alden and Wu (2014) highlight the impact of China’s direct competition on the manufacturing sector posed structural challenges to COSATU’s own vision of a protected market where the former COSATU Secretary General Zwelinzima Vavi, characterised the relationship as ‘colonial’ and replicating an ‘exploitative [engagement] with traditional Western industrial economies’. This reaction underpinned a subtext of competing views in the labour federation. In this regard there were those who did not share similar views like Vavi. Instead the interpretation of the engagement was more optimistic followed by the assumption that it will lead to long-term benefits through knowledge sharing on how China was able to achieve its economic success

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as well as taking lessons on the Chinese restructuring policies of its stateowned enterprises. This wavering of positions in COSATU was informed by the shifting leadership battles in the federation. By the time Zuma took office for a second term in 2014, the bilateral relationship had not yielded the dividends that were envisaged from the previous Zuma administration; in particular, the favourable navigation of South African procurement laws and policy. The relationship became overwhelmed by the manifestation of state capture. Even though investment did flow into South Africa like the setup of the Hisense factory plant in Atlantis in the Western Cape, this did little to make a veritable dent on more sustained bilateral guarantees (Businesstech 2019; News24 2014). Moreover, the fluidness of Zuma’s foreign policy engagements also made it difficult to determine which external actors were on the priority list to be awarded contracts or enabling investment commitments. Another example is the failed Aurora gold mines. In 2009 the Orkney and Grootvlei gold mines were placed under Aurora and the board further stripped the mines of assets thus rendering the mines unproductive; Aurora mines were bought by Golden Haven (Chinese firm) and jointly managed with BEK Holdings, and in 2018 was liquidated for a second time due to looting (Mail and Guardian 2018). The murky impact of state capture on procurement made the Chinese uncomfortable about not knowing where the levers of influence were in decision-making. In short the Chinese way of conducting its foreign economic relations was being undone by having to deal with a network of Zuma-ites who were driving and shaping the economic landscape by acting as middlemen9 to how business transactions and deals with the state were undertaken. In this regard the Chinese engagement through Guanxi was put to the test. In all of this labour seemed to be caught in its own crosshairs. By being in government, COSATU had to reconcile how it mobilised the rights and living standards of its worker base, while simultaneously pushing the growth led industrial plan as the viable policy framework. During this time shifts in the labour movement became evident. The federation was divided in its support for the Zuma Presidency. Labour became embroiled in an internal political battle where the Vavi faction supported by the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) saw the Zuma Presidency as more destructive in its selfish interests than addressing the plight of the workers. By 2014 the fragmentation of the labour movement was entrenched with Vavi and NUMSA leaving its ranks. At the same time the Labour Survey conducted in 2014 showed that the constituency

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base of COSATU had also fundamentally shifted with representation moving more towards public sector unions while those in the resource and manufacturing base did not form a big enough membership (Bezuidhout 2017). The significance of this point cannot be ignored as it showed that COSATU’s focus on representing the interests of the working class which it had always claimed as its primary objective was starting to pivot towards the interests of civil servants since the state became the biggest employer in the country.10 This reorientation in the South African labour landscape pointed to two issues. The first was that the low skilled base that informed COSATU representation had moved significantly towards a more professional class, which, in turn, led to the question around where did low or unskilled workers fit in COSATU’s broader mandate and what rationale COSATU’s advocacy followed? Moreover this pointed to the changing nature of South Africa’s employment dynamics where the casualisation of the labour market including subcontracting and informal opportunities made the situation that much more diffuse when it came to upholding for workers’ rights. Within this context, as much as COSATU may rhetorically argue that they represent the broader interests of workers across the rubric, on the ground monitoring and safeguarding the interests of workers employed in mom and pop industries did not necessarily always follow the script. Previously, COSATU would advocate severely against alleged illegal and imported foreign labour akin to human trafficking, as was the case in Durban where 16 Chinese ZTE Corporation workers were arrested and further questioned (Craven 2010). However, this posture had softened where a similar case of alleged irregular permitting issued by the Departments of Home Affairs and Labour was cited against 242 Chinese workers that were brought in to work on a PPC project from 2015 to 2018 (African News Agency 2017). Or take for example the recall of arms shipment to China. South African Transport and Allied Workers Union refused to unload or transport arms that were destined to bolster the ZANU–PF under then president Robert Mugabe. While Mbeki’s ANC call was to respond to the 2008 Zimbabwe crisis through quiet diplomacy and renounce sanctions, COSATU was much more vocal on the legitimacy of Mugabe’s leadership and expressed pride at the mobilisation of civil society to impact foreign policy (Craven 2008). Definitely after Polokwane the reticence in being openly critical of the treatment and protection of workers’ rights on Chinese projects in

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other African countries, or the effects of China’s FDI on other African economies began to become evident. The point of interest here was COSATU’s own positioning and solidarity with labour movements across the continent. One possible explanation could be that the slate politics in the ANC following Polokwane intensified in Zuma’s second term and led to the labour federation become more self-censored in voicing its concerns. Another explanation could be that COSATU’s positioning on the question of China and labour is fraught with complexities that originated in the 1985 compromise where shop-floor traditions were replaced by an ANC and SACP led national democratic tradition in representing the interests of workers (Lambert and Webster 2017). At best, the censure or compliment of China’s involvement in South Africa and Africa is based on contrasting political positions, which skews trade unions’ abilities to determine concise positions themselves and engage in informed discussions at shop-steward level. China is attempting to rectify this with invitations to labour unions; however, at the risk of ‘losing face’, China is likely to include top ranking officials who do not communicate frequently at shop-steward level and have the potential to engage trade union members on a more meaningful level.

Conclusion: Where to from Here? Through the lens of the tripartite agreement, labour’s reaction to South Africa’s engagement with China had less to do with the actual One China Policy and its pervasive nature in eroding labour intensive industries in the country, such as the clothing and textile sector and more orientated towards the country’s post-apartheid industrial policy. The nature of the tripartite relationship links and attracts a large voter base towards the Chinese model of development through socialism. But this is as far it goes. The real dynamic of labour’s view of the bilateral engagement between the two countries is more focused on South Africa’s competitive behaviour rather than an outright dismissal that Beijing is the cause of the country’s economic weaknesses and deindustrialisation. This is not to suggest that labour has not in the past or even presently being critical of Chinese investment in the country. The January 2020 proposed strike action at the Hisense manufacturing factory in the Western Cape pointed to this where NUMSA called for better working conditions and a wage increase. Such an incident highlights the reality of South Africa’s labour

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market today in two ways: (1) the workforce at the Hisense factory is only three hundred workers but the company remains a major employer in the west coast town of Atlantis and (2) in a country where unemployment has reached its highest over the past two decades of just under 30%, labour movements do not have the leverage to exert over the corporates. All of which points to the fragility of the labour market in the current political economy landscape. There is an added dimension to the latter, which Seekings and Natrass (2016) allude to regarding how labour has become a vested partner in the very industries that they are representing whether through benefiting from Black Economic Empowerment deals or holding considerable shares in investment vehicles that have a large scale footprint in industries that include the infrastructure and construction sectors, hospitality and media outlets. There is an added dimension to the latter, which Seekings and Natrass (2016) allude to regarding how labour has become a vested partner in the very industries that they are representing. Labour benefits from Black Economic Empowerment deals or holding considerable shares in investment vehicles that have a large scale footprint in labour intensive industries; this includes the infrastructure and construction sectors, hospitality and media outlets, and more recently in the public sector through their investment interests in state-owned enterprises. China recognises that labour has an immediate bearing on the bilateral relationship and the Tripartite Alliance had seemed like the surefree partnership for China because of its mass voting power in South Africa’s multiparty democracy and strategic support for the ANC. The CCP, which also holds widespread political support is able to determine strategy, policy and implementation in a cohesive manner. And as such the expectation is its bilateral partnerships with countries have a similar trajectory. In this way envisaging that the approach between China and its partners share a similar centrist organisation strategy. Where previously ideology was a clear enough rationale to forge close bilateral ties, the emergence of new complexities in a changing global economy that has led to China’s emergence as a veritable global political and economic actor has exposed the vulnerabilities for countries that have been unable to compete with China’s adoption of the neoliberal model and becoming the ‘face of globalisation’ (Lambert and Webster 2017).11 And South Africa is no exception to this. At the same the headwinds of factionalism in the Tripartite Alliance and policy uncertainty is equally frustrating for China when it comes to forging greater investment ties with Pretoria. As

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much as the Tripartite Alliance remains monolith in South African politics, COSATU’s positioning as the voice of workers has become a blight for the ANC government economic and industrial policy, especially when it comes to SOE reforms and attracting more inward investment. This frustration had been echoed on many occasions by the former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa, Lin Songtian.12 In going forward it would be important to note that with the current Presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa, who came through the ranks of the National Union of Mineworkers, the relationship with China is once again considered to be of premium importance. Fascinated with the way the Chinese Special Economic Zones, fast trains and smart cities have underpinned the Chinese economic model, President Ramaphosa is keen exponent of the Chinese development experience. In addition, the ANC has also looked towards replicating the Party school of the CCP in its ranks. Here is where Chinese investment in the moribund state utilities will be seen as critical. At the same time Ramaphosa will expect labour with its focus on the public sector to be able to play a constructive role in getting civil servants on board with restructuring of public entities. So far this has been the battle that has confronted the Ramaphosa Presidency with public section unions threatening legal against forced retrenchments that may arise through business rescue plans. For now the executive leadership of COSATU remains the interlockers between state and the civil servants. On the part of China, the timing could not better to push with its investment interests in South Africa’s state-owned enterprises and more broadly in the broader economic infrastructure and social develop programmes of President Ramaphosa. In business circles it seems that unbundling of SOEs could see the Chinese build traction in South Africa’s energy market and transport and logistics sectors. For now, though, the onus will be on the leadership of the labour federation, especially COSATU, to be able to convince their federation of unions that government’s approach to reforming the public sector and repurposing the focus of some industries will be critical for revitalisation the country’s growth path. This will remain a task that labour should explore as part of its corporative governance approach by also exploring more interaction with its counterparts in China around strategies of cooperation and knowledge learning.

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Notes 1. The Tripartite Alliance consists of the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). 2. Though there seems to be discrepancies about whether China was initially open to supporting the armed struggle. Ellis highlights that Walter Sisulu’s visit to Beijing in 1953 saw a cautious approach to the strategy of an armed struggle. This changed seven years later in 1960 where the Chinese leader showed interest. Ellis also notes that there were discussions between Moscow and a high level South African delegation in 1960 around the question of the armed struggle. Shubin, on the other hand, notes that it was only in the latter part of 1961 that the question of the armed struggle was raised. See Ellis, S. (2013). External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also see Shubin, V. (1999). ANC: A View from Moscow. Belville, South Africa: Mayibuye Books. 3. See Ellis, op cit. 4. According to Filatova (2011) In the 1990s, ANC cadres started to reflect that Mikhail Gorbachev’s political reforms perestroika was a betrayal to communism, and the collapse of the Soviet Union cooled relations between the ANC and Moscow. 5. It was reported that the ANC received R33 million from Taiwan for its electoral campaign in 1994 but Taipei denied this and instead argued that the money was earmarked for assisting returning ANC soldiers (Mills 1995). The Star newspaper of 25 February 1995 reported that following the democratic elections in 1994, the Taiwanese authorities embarked on a massive sponsorship drive of all expense-paid trips for South Africa’s new parliamentarians (248 members including key Cabinet Ministers like Joe Modise and Jeff Radebe as well as personalities like Winnie Mandela and Peter Mokaba) and members of the media and academics to visit Taipei hoping to lobby support for the maintenance of relations. 6. Mills (1995) notes that the announced Taiwanese investment comprised of the following: the Taiwan Railway Administration awarded a contract of R420 million to Union Wagon and Carriage of South Africa, a joint computer venture with ACER, that the Taiwan Feed Industry Association would purchase 300 000 tonnes of maize before April 1995 worth R122.5 million while the Taiwan Power Company would also increase the purchase of coal by 0.5 million tonnes and R140 million would be donated to vocational training under the RDP. The loans to Eskom, MacSteel and the Development Bank of Southern Africa were valued at R105 million, R70 million and US$15.5 million respectively (Mills 1995). 7. Anonymous interview 4 January 2020.

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8. This could be partly attributed to the Multi-fibre agreement (MFA) that had imposed import quotations on Asian producers for a period of 30 years dating from 1974, and which had come to an end in 2004, thereby opening up competition in the global textile market. 9. The case in point here is the infamous Gupta Family 10. This is where COSATU’s shift towards civil servants saw the professional class in state owned entities and the state bureaucracy become a key focus for COSATU. And where perhaps China’s frustrations also percolated against cumbersome labour legislation and bureaucratic wrangling that acted as barriers to investment flows into the country. 11. South African corporates had first mover advantage in the Africa market immediately after 1994. See Daniel, J., Naidoo, V., & Naidu, S. (2004). The South African’s Have Arrived: Post-apartheid Corporate Expansion. In A. Habib, J. Daniels & R. Southall (Eds.), The State of the Nation 2003–2004 (pp. 368–390). Cape Town: HSRC Press. As China adapted to the dynamics of globalisation, facilitated by its entry into the WTO and its global economic footprint started grow, South Africa corporates could not compete with Chinese companies entering the African market whether it was in the infrastructure or telecoms sectors. This was also enabled by China’s adoption of its ‘Going Out’ Strategy which provided institutional support and competitive loans by the Chinese state to public and private companies. See the China Africa Research Initiative (http:// www.sais-cari.org/) on China’s investment footprint in Africa. 12. Daily Maverick, P., 7 October 2019. Chinese Ambassador Spells Out Blunt Truths About Investment in South Africa. https://www.dailymave rick.co.za/article/2019-10-07-chinese-ambassador-spells-out-the-blunttruths-about-investment-in-south-africa/. Accessed 28 March 2020.

References African News Agency. (2017, January 27). COSATU Wants Illegal Chinese Workers Deported. https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/cosatuwants-illegal-chinese-workers-deported-7517636. Accessed 11 March 2020. Alden, C., & Alves, A. (2008). History & Identity in the Construction of China’s Africa Policy. Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), 43–58. Alden, C., & Wu, Y. (2014, August). South Africa and China: The Making of Partnership (Occasional Paper 199). South African Institute for International Affairs, Johannesburg. ANC. (2018, November 21). ANC Discussion Document on the Reconfiguration of the ANC-SACP-COSATU-SANCO Alliance. https://www.anc1912. org.za/sites/default/files/ANC%20Discussion%20on%20Reconfigured%20A lliance%20-%2021%20November%202018-2.pdf. Accessed 11 March 2020.

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ANC. (2019). Constitution of the ANC. https://www.anc1912.org.za/constitut ion-anc. Accessed 9 September. Bezuidhout, A. (2017, August 24). Has the Labour Movement Become a Middle Class Movement, News24. https://www.news24.com/Analysis/hasthe-labour-movement-become-a-middle-class-movement-20170824. Accessed 15 December 2019. Buhlungu, S., & Ellis, S. (2011). The Trade Union Movement and the Tripartite Alliance: A Tanged History (Unpublished Paper). Businesstech. (2019, March 19). Hisense Injects R72 Million into SA Economy. https://businesstech.co.za/news/technology/306072/hisense-inj ects-r72-million-into-sa-economy/. Accessed 28 August 2019. Chen, W. (2018, September 25). Twenty Years on, SA-China Relations Embrace a New Chapter. Business Day. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/ asia/2018-09-25-twenty-years-on-china-sa-relations-embrace-a-new-cha pter/. Accessed 15 December 2019. China in the Republic of South Africa. (2018, July 9). http://za.china-embassy. org/eng/dsxx/t1575693.htm. Accessed 28 August 2019. City Press. (2018, August 5). And Now the ANC Trusts China. Craven, P. (2008, April 23). COSATU on Recall of Chinese Arms Ship. https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/cosatu-on-recall-ofchinese-arms-ship. Accessed 11 March 2020. Craven, P. (2010, November 15). COSATU Condemns Human Trafficking of Chinese Workers. https://www.politicsweb.co.za/party/cosatu-condemnshuman-trafficking-of-chinese-worke. Accessed 11 March 2020. de Jager, N., & Steenekamp, C. L. (2016). The Changing Political Culture of the African National Congress. Democratization, 23(5), 919–939. Filatova, I. (2011). The ANC and the Soviets. PoliticsWeb. https:// www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-anc-and-the-soviets. Accessed 09 September 2019. Grimm, S., Kim, Y., & Ross, A. (2014). South Africa relations with China and Taiwan: Economic Realism and the ‘One-China’ Doctrine. http://www.ccs. org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Research-Report_FEB-2014_Form atting.pdf. Accessed 23 October 2015. Habib, A., & Padayachee, V. (2000, February). Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy. World Development, 28(2), 245–263. Lambert, R., & Webster, E. (2017). The China Price: The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the Repressed Question of International Labour Standards. Globalizations, 14(2), 313–326. Le Pere, G., Lambrechts, K., & van Nieuwkerk, A. (1999). The Burden of the Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy Challenges in the New Millennium. Global Dialogue, 4(3), 3–8.

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Mail & Guardian. (2006). South Africa-China Textile Pact Welcomed. https://mg.co.za/article/2006-06-22-south-africachina-textile-pact-wel comed. Accessed 9 September 2019. Mail & Guardian. (2013). Minimum Wage Disputes: Is It Worth the Fight in Newcastle? https://mg.co.za/article/2013-05-29-made-in-newcastle-cutfrom-a-different-cloth-china. Accessed 28 August 2019. Mail & Guardian. (2016). Tales from the Armed Struggle: There Were Heroes in MK But Villains, Too. https://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-26-00-talesfrom-the-armed-struggle-there-were-heroes-in-mk-but-villains-too. Accessed 9 September 2019. Mail & Guardian. (2018, December 7). Ex-aurora Mines To Be Sold Off, Again. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-12-07-00-ex-aurora-mines-to-besold-off-again/. Accessed 11 March 2020. Mills, G. (1995). The Case for Exclusive Regognition. In South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Research Group (Ed.), South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma. Johannesburg: SAIIA. Naidu, S. (2006). South Africa’s Relations with the People’s Republic of China: Mutual Opportunities or Hidden Threats. In Sakhela Buhlungu, John Daniel, Roger Southall, & Jessica Lutchman (Eds.), State of the Nation 2005–2006 (pp. 457–483). Cape Town: HSRC Press. Naidu, S. (2008). Balancing a Strategic Partnership: South Africa-China Relations. In K. Ampiah & S. Naidu (Eds.), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and China (pp. 167–191). Scotsville, South Africa: Universsity of Kwazulu Natal Press. News24. (2014, August 12). Hisense Positive About Investment in Atlantis Factory. https://www.news24.com/Video/Sci-Tech/News/Hisensepositive-about-investment-in-Atlantis-factory-20140812. Accessed 28 August 2019. Patel, E. (2016). Unravelling the Fabric of the Industry: South Africa’s Clothing and Textile Business. http://www.thejournalist.org.za/spotlight/unrave lling-the-fabric-of-the-industry-south-africas-clothing-and-textile-business. Accessed 28 August 2019. Parliamentary Monitoring Group. (2009, September 8). SA International Trade and Industrial Policy and the World trade Organisation: COSATU Briefing, Parliamentary Monitoring Group. https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/ 10777/. Accessed 10 February 2020. SACP. (2012). SACP Constitution, Amended 2012. https://www.sacp.org.za/ content/sacp-constitution-0. Accessed 9 September 2019. SACTWU. (2006). Press Release: SACP Statement in Support of China Deal. http://www.sactwu.org.za/pr-and-news/archived-2006/79-sacp-statementin-support-of-china-deal.

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Seekings, J., & Natrass, N. (2016). Setting the Level of a National Minumum Wages: What Can South Africa Learn From Other Countries’ Experiences? Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 92, 1–36. South Africa News Broadcaster. (2006). COSATU Warns of Job Losses. https:// www.bilaterals.org/?cosatu-warns-of-job-losses-on-sa. Accessed 11 March 2020. Suttner, R. (1995). Dilemmas of South African Foreign Policy: The Question of China, in South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma. Taylor, I. (2000). The Ambiguous Commitment: The People’s Republic of China and the Anti-Apartheir Struggle in South Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 18(1), 91–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/025890000 111986. Twala, C., & Kompi, B. (2012). The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Tripartite Alliance: A Marriage of (In)convenience. Journal of Contemporary History, 37 (1), 171–190. Webster, E., & Buhlungu, S. (2004). Between Marginalisation and Revitalisation? The State of Trade Unionism in South Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 100(39), 229–245. Weiss, A. S., & Rumer, E. (2019). Nuclear Enrichment: Russia’s Ill-Fated Influence Campaign in South Africa. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Wekesa, B. (2017, November 17). South Africa—China Relations at 20 Years: Part 111: Retracing Politics and Diplomacy. Africa-China Reporting Project. https://africachinareporting.co.za/2017/11/south-africa-china-rel ations-at-20-years-part-iii-politics-diplomacy/. Accessed 5 February 2020. Williams, C., & Hurst, C. (2018). Caught Between Two Chinas: Assessing South Africa’s Switch from Taipei to Beijing. South African Historical Journal, 70(3), 559–602.

CHAPTER 11

The Role of Culture and Education in South Africa–China Relations David Monyae

To build a beautiful image of our country, we should display the Chinese civilization of a long history and unity of diversified ethnic groups with varying cultures; an Oriental power with honest and capable political administrations, developed economy, thriving culture, stable society, unified people and splendid landscape; a responsible great power that is committed to peaceful development, common growth, international fairness and justice, and contributions to mankind; and a socialist power opening its doors wider to the outside world, full of hope, vigour and vitality. (Xi Jinping 2014)

Introduction South Africa and China diplomatically interact with each other at a much wider scope than most countries in the international relations. These interactions range from a comprehensive and strategic one at bilateral level which flourished significantly since 1998 (when South Africa switched

D. Monyae (B) Centre for Africa-China Studies, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_11

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from officially recognising Taiwan to mainland China) to multi-pronged engagement within multilateral fora. South Africa and China constantly interact with each as members of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the Group of Twenty (G20), Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), United Nations (UN), and many other critical institutions of global governance. Scholars focus on assessing South Africa–China relations tend to be more biased towards traditional trade and security matters at the expense of the emerging cultural and educational diplomacy. This chapter therefore aims to carry out a clear assessment of South Africa’s relationship with China from the perspective of Confucius Institutes (CIs). Having switched recognition from Taipei to mainland China what benefits has South Africa obtained from its partnership with China? How have CIs fared in deepening Sino-South African relations and what are the perceptions and implications of CIs on these relations? By taking this route, the chapter will focus on the cultural aspects of Sino-South African relations. It will draw on some information from the University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI) (where the author is a director).

Historical Background Expanding trade and cultural relations between South Africa and China is for some an opportunity for South Africa to achieve its strategic development goals and in the case of China, South Africa as a fast paced developing market forms part of its growing interest in Africa for resources, resource markets and diplomatic support. Wasserman contends that South Africa is regarded by Beijing, as “the continent’s mineralogical treasure house’, the world’s largest producer of gold and big reserves of industrially important metals and minerals” (Wasserman 2016). South African leading firms such as SAB Miller, NASPERS and Investec have also effectively entered the China markets as well as that of other Asian countries. The relationship between South Africa and China mainly rests on overt but also concealed vested interests. South Africa remains China’s biggest partner not only in terms of trade but also in respect to cultural exchanges. China remains South Africa’s top exporter and importer from the time it usurped the United States in 2015 (Mhaka and Leward 2018). In terms of diplomatic relations, the active relationship between South Africa and China as emerging powers within the changing geopolitical and geo-economic order was re-established when South Africa joined

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the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) group of emerging countries in December 2010 with the support of China (Andreasson 2011). South Africa’s entry into this association not only underscores its role as a leading economy on the African continent, but also reaffirms its growing partnership with the BRICS member countries and most importantly with China. In addition to the shared interests of reforming the global governance architecture, more precisely “democratizing” the Bretton Woods institutions, South Africa and China have both played key roles in promoting South-South solidarity and cooperation (Matshanda 2010). This follows the spirit of the Bandung Conference of 1955, when 29 Asian and African countries came together in Bandung in Indonesia to build solidarity among the newly independent countries as well as built upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence namely: “Political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, noninterference in internal affairs, and equality of all states” (Dieleman et al. 2010). The conference focused on “promoting Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism and neo-colonialism” (Acharya 2016). Amid optimism about South Africa–China relations, several scholars, the media and even the general African citizenry have lamented the current and future implications of China’s growing engagement in South Africa and on the African continent at large. At the centre of this suspicion and ambiguity is China’s record of human rights abuses, which some fear might dent South Africa’s human rights image, especially considering the significant efforts made by South Africa’s former heads of state Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki in shaping a well-meaning democracy that champions the respect for human rights.

Confucius Institutes in Africa As part of its cultural exportation drive, China has opened 54 Confucius Institutes and 27 Confucius classes in 54 African countries (Textor, September 23, 2019). Globally, between November 2004 and August 2011, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established 530 Confucius Institutes (CI) and 473 related Confucian classrooms in more than 104 countries and regions, Confucius Institutes, as tools to promote linguistic and cultural exchanges between China and the world at large, hold an important place in Beijing’s foreign policy. This chapter will situate the

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CI projects as part of China’s soft power projection (Chinese Language Council International 2011). The growth of CIs generated heated discussions and debates regarding their purpose. The question asking whether Confucius Institutes represented the rise of in pessimists went as far as labelling CIs Trojan horses in Beijing’s spying toolkit. The broader Chinese foreign policy initiatives in Africa targeted at increasing people-to-people diplomacy. CIs as the leading initiative will be discussed in detail in an effort to illustrate Chinese efforts to increase people-to-people diplomacy through promotion of its culture and education. Much of the focus on the role and contribution of CIs in Africa centres around the African public universities. In addition, arguments against the functioning of CI’s and subsequent allegations against the institution were mainly emanating from the rising diplomatic tensions between China and the United States. Due to strong diplomatic ties with China, Africa has avoided entangling itself in China–US rivalries with regard to the rising CIs suspicions in the western world, particularly in the United States and Australia. Although the African continent have fewer CIs than the United States and most western countries, it still welcomes and promotes cultural and educational strong relations with China. Soft Power Soft power since its inception into academic space through the work of Harvard professor Joseph Nye has transformed how social scientists debate and discuss non-cohesive means of persuasion in the international relations arena. According Nye, who coined the term, “soft power,” refers primarily to ways in which a nation’s cultural resources constitute a form of power that enhances, or even substitutes for military and economic strength (Nye 1990). The term was not totally new to academia; scholars argue that it is an extension of Carr’s (1954), idea “power over opinion” and Lukes’ (1974), “third dimension of power.” Central to the latter is the thesis that holds that nation’s culture, ideals, policies, education and diplomacy influences other states to comply with its objectives. Nye explained the essence of soft power by noting “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants” (Nye 2004). A state’s economic power, language,

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media and education and societal values are examples of what has been previously used to build up soft power. In 2014, President Xi Jinping declared, “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s messages to the world” (Shambaugh 2015). Nye recognised the Chinese growing soft power by pointing to the success of Beijing’s Summer Olympics and popularity of Chinese literature, particularly in the United States. The possibilities of Chinese soft power are endless on the African continent. African people are getting used to Chinese products like Huawei mobile phones, clothing, and house appliances, which are sold at relatively affordable prices. African people are increasingly opting for Chinese products against the backdrop of being consumers of traditional stakeholders on the African continent like Japanese, European and American products. Because of Chinese close relations and increased activities on the continent, there has been high suspicion causing massive anti-Chinese rhetoric. One can argue that Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisation” captures in ideological terms is what is behind the rise of anti-Africa-Sino pessimists. According to Pun, the CI project can be seen as a form of cultural diplomacy that is state-sponsored and university-piloted, based on the project’s overall rationale, its close ties to the state, diplomatic concerns over the name given the institutes, the use of CIs to showcase the PRC’s diplomacy and foreign policy and the use of Chinese universities to link the CI network around the world (Pan 2013). It is widely acknowledged that the Chinese rise in the global economy has resulted in Mandarin becoming an emerging language in Africa. The language is therefore a mechanism that Africans are using in order to participate in the global economy. Confucius Institutes are part and parcel of many African universities however they are funded by the Chinese government with the aim of promoting Chinese language and culture. In the quest to strengthen the already thriving Sino-Africa relations, both Chinese and African governments are actively supporting cultural exchanges and people-to-people diplomacy. According to Cummings, “cultural diplomacy” is the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding (Cummings 2003). Public diplomacy on the other hand is however a bit different in that it is aligned to a state’s foreign policy in order to attain approval of certain policies.

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Soft power is a useful tool of analysis in understanding CI’s role on the African continent. Chinese soft power cannot be limited to CI’s as this will be undermining other successful people-to-people initiatives that have been shared between African and Chinese people. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama published the essay, “End of History?” In this essay, Fukuyama argued that liberal democracy will engulf all other forms of political systems. The collapse of the Soviet Union largely due to the triumph of the US’s capitalism over Soviet Union’s communism might have blinded Fukuyama’s analysis. China today is flourishing with a socialist republic run by the Chinese Communist Party of China (CCP). There is no liberal democracy in China as Fukuyama had predicted but rather a one party state system. China today is great power which economic and military power to be reckoned with. It is important to understand that after China took an isolationist strategy thereby minimally contributing to global affairs, however with its rise and importance in the international area, Beijing has been on the forefront of reclaiming its space in the global arena. China’s foreign policy has subsequently taken the strategy of interpreting its own narrative. African states’ ties with China were strengthened during the Cold War mainly through the solidarity stance Beijing took during the liberation struggle. China and Africa have a shared history of conquest and imperialism. Post-colonial African states have kept close ties with Beijing and return China has substantially assisted Africa with foreign aid and solidarity on multilateral platforms. The Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) framework established in 2000 has been the vehicle which China and Africa drive their relations. Since the formation of FOCAC, the relationship between China and Africa has significantly improved. Scholars have been preoccupied with analysing the economic boom that has come as a result of the organised FOCAC framework. Cultural and People-toPeople exchanges have been strengthened with the increased trade and contact between Chinese and African people. China has signed inter-governmental cultural cooperation with more than 48 African countries. African counties like Mauritius, Benin, Nigeria and Egypt and Tanzania have established Chinese cultural centres. After taking a long isolationist position, China’s economic development that uprooted millions out of poverty, together with the “Go Out” policies of the 1990s, Chinese culture and business started to spread again in the global affairs. The movement of Chinese people as well as business

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has directly influenced the demand of the Chinese language and culture around the world. Recently, China’s One Belt One Belt Initiative has brought additional attention on Confucius Institutes. At the heart of this initiative lies language.

Confucianism and Relevance to Chinese Foreign Policy China’s Confucius Institutes around the globe that teach China’s language and culture are an example of soft power. Understanding why China has resorted to using Confucianism as part of its foreign policy reveals its national moral thinking. The “Chinese Dream” narrative is embedded in China’s “Two Centenary Goals” aimed at building a prosperous society by 2049, simultaneously with the 100th anniversary of the CCP. Domestic endeavours of most countries are reflected by their foreign policy and China is no different. China’s 5000-year-old civilisation is a history that holds an important place in China’s history. Not only Chinese people but also the rest of East Asia also take Confucianism seriously. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew is an example of an Asian prominent influential leader who lived according to the Confucius ideology. Confucius Institutes around the world take their name after the famous Chinese ancient philosopher and educator Confucius. This an obvious move to signal to the world that China wants to incorporate its ancient values into today’s globalised world. In July 2006 Hanban organised its first ever International Confucius Institute which was hosted in Beijing with the aim to standardise CIs globally. Despite the growth of CIs worldwide, majority of them, remain underdeveloped due to limitation of funds and staff. Since the first CI establishment in 2004, the institutes have shown signs of growth and increased relevance, bringing them on par with long established French Alliance Francaise or British Councils. It is however important to note that within the shortest period of their existence, CIs have contributed a lot of academics spaces in most African countries. Confucianism has been embedded in Chinese people’s daily life for more than 2000 years. Today the philosophy shapes the social, ethical and political foundations of Chinese cultures. According to Confucius, there are four social strata based on occupation: scholars (Shi), farmers (nong), workers (gong) and businesspersons (Park and Chesla 2007).

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Some political thinkers like Joseph Leverson have argued that Confucianism is irrelevant to contemporary Sino politics (Levenson 1969). Widespread support for Confucianism has been evident in academia with most scholars supporting the philosophy as a potential remedy to deficiencies and excesses in Western culture and politics. Shaohua Hu notes that Chinese scholars recognise that Confucianism and the modern West belief systems place a different emphasis on communitarian values and individual autonomy, respectively, but found Confucianism nonetheless compatible with individual human rights and peaceful existence (Hu 2007). Peaceful existence and harmony in the international system have been Beijing’s stance ever since it re-emerged in the global arena. That goes to say that the Confucius philosophy, which is uniquely Chinese, has an important place in Beijing’s ideological agenda. The way the Chinese government is spreading Confucian ideology through establishment of Confucius Institutes abroad is a clear signal to the external world that it takes the philosophy seriously and demands to be understood in that context.

Confucius Institutes In 2004, the first Confucius Institute was established and countless other Chinese language learning institutes have been opened throughout the world. As of 2015, there are 465 institutes in 123 countries, with 97 institutes in the United States, more than 95 in Asia, 149 in Europe and 38 in Africa (Hanban 2016). Confucius Institutes were created as a mechanism to spread Chinese language, values and culture to the world. In China, the institution is known as Hanban; it is run by the Office of Chinese Language Council International and in addition works closely with the Chinese Ministry of Education. The institutes collaborate up with local universities and a Chinese university thereby making them part of high education in the countries they are situated in. Unlike other foreign powers institutes that act independently like the British Council or Alliance Française, CI’s do not stand alone. They are supported by a local university as well as heavy funding from the Chinese government. The funds are used to set up resources needed for their function. It is important to note that the CIs are not required to make profit. Students registering pay a very minimum registration fee and in most cases study free of charge.

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According to the official Confucius Institute website, the institute seeks to address the demands of foreign Chinese learners around the world and contribute to the development of multiculturalism and the development of a “harmonious world” (Hanban 2016). The function of CIs is clearly explained on its official websites as: To make policies and development plans for promoting Chinese language internationally; to support Chinese language programs at educational institutions of various types and levels in other countries; to draft international Chinese teaching standards and develop and promote Chinese language teaching materials. (Hanban 2016)

The following are some of the activities offered by CIs, (i) Basic, Intermediate, Advance and Business Mandarin Chinese, (ii) Chinese History, (iii) Chinese Painting, (iv) Chinese Calligraphy, (v) Taijiquan, and (vi) Shaolin Kungfu and other Chinese related cultural activities. In addition, CIs offer the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) examinations which are standardised Mandarin examinations for non-native speakers. HSK is important for students who wish to further their studies in China since most institutions require a certain level of proficiency before getting space. The institutes have been hosting book launches, cultural days, exhibitions (film, book and art) to attract the university populous and communities around them to the Chinese cultural learning institution. CIs have been on the forefront of debates about China and their respective countries and regions. Topics on Chinese aid, business investments, South–South solidarity and One Belt One Road are often conducted with academics and expect from prestigious institutions at home and China taking part. Janina Tan argues that, “the Confucius Institutes have become a way for China to show the world who the Chinese people are, their values, characteristics and even nuances” (Tan 2016). This is important in Africa where Chinese presence has been misunderstood for long. Chinese President Xi Jinping echoed the same sentiments when he stated that CIs are “a symbol of China’s unremitting efforts for world peace and international relations [that] links the Chinese people and people of other countries.” and that they have an “important role… in enhancing understanding and friendship between Chinese people and people of other countries” (Wang 2014). Confucius Institutes have been credited with bringing the spotlight on Chinese universities. Collaborative research and forums have been

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conducted between Confucius Institute hosting university and Chinese partner universities. CIs have a history of offering programmes and scholarships to its students in order for them to advance their Chinese language proficiency. The CI’s website openly admits that it offers doctoral level degree scholarships in China in an effort to attract foreign students into the country. Students who study in China get exposed to the Chinese daily living conditions and cultures which they can export back to their respective countries. Exchanges done through the CI’s are instrumental in achieving some of the goals the African states have with China as set in the FOCAC agendas.

Debates Around Confucius Institutes Operating on the African Continent The Ministry of Education of China estimates that there will be interactions with as many as 100 million people in a total of 1000 overseas CIs by 2020. A significant number of the latter will obviously be on the African continent given the increase in business and diplomatic relations between African governments and China. The first CI in Africa was established in Nairobi, Kenya in 2005. Currently on the African continent, South Africa is home to the largest number of Confucius Institutes and Chinese language learners (The People’s Republic of China Embassy in South Africa, 2016). In African states, a lot of critics point to Chinese cultural invasion and the investment in Chinese language against the backdrop of poorly developed African languages as a chief reason why CIs should not be expanded. Critics have argued that CI’s are language institutes with an aim of spreading Chinese propaganda. It is not a secret that China does not establish diplomatic relations with countries that do not recognise the “One China Policy,” countries such as Eswatini that still recognise Taiwan. CIs do not engage controversial topics like the banned practice of Falun Gong, the role of the Dalai Lama and the Tiananmen Square protests. The lack of academic freedom and allegations of political influence are issues that critics have raised against CIs. Dependency on Hanban for financial funding is a problem that most analysts bring to the table. The argument is that if the government of China through Hanban suddenly withdraws its funding or reduces it, the institutions face possibilities of closing down. Other than CIs there are no substitute institutions on the African continent where Africans can go and learn the Chinese language and culture.

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The University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute South Africa plays a central role in Chinese plans in Africa since the country remains its biggest trading partner. Other than South African membership in the BRICS alliance, the country has consistently been engaged by China because it is the largest economy in Africa and remains a critical player in African economics and leadership. The country hosts the largest number of CI’s on the continent (there are 6 as of 2019). This alone speaks volumes to the intentions of China. South Africa as the gateway to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is an important place to strengthen Sino-Africa people-to-people diplomacy. The UJCI was established in July 2014 as a joint venture between the University of Johannesburg (UJ), Nanjing Tech University NTU), and the Confucius Institute Headquarters or Haban, with the aim of facilitating language training, cultural exchanges and public diplomacy that deepen Sino-South African relations. This institute is the youngest in South Africa and is situated in Johannesburg. However, UJCI has grown exponentially. In 2019 it enrolled 3300 students compared to 2018’s 1300 students. This marks a 253.8% growth rate from the 2018 academic year, with new classrooms established in Malvern High School, teaching at St. John’s and UJM continued (UJCI and CACS 2019). The launching of the UJCI is particularly important because Johannesburg holds a special place in Sino-Africa history. Chinese migrants mostly arrived in Johannesburg during the gold rush and are credited in building up cosmopolitan Johannesburg, as it is known today. With its rich commercial possibilities, Johannesburg has, over the years, provided a particularly rich and diverse hub of Chinese commercial activities, captured in the phenomenon of South Africa’s “China Malls” such as Dragon City, China Mall, China Mart and China City—make up the majority of the market (Dittgen 2014). The demand for Chinese culture and language in the city can be understood in the broader context of centrality of South Africa and Africa, as well as Johannesburg commercial hub in both South Africa and Africa. One of the most unique aspects about the UJCI is that since November 2018 it has been joined by the Centre for Africa-China Studies (CACS), a purely academic and African initiative that does not form part of the Chinese government’s initiatives. Through impartial and objective scholarship, CACS offers the UJCI the academic rigour that other CIs do not enjoy.

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The Future of African CI’s and Recommendations Confucius Institute could possibly be some of the biggest vehicles of China’s soft power in Africa, considering the importance that universities as places of learning. It is indeed in universities that knowledge is most developed. Thus, by penetrating the university space, CIs could actually influence the African narrative of how China is perceived. Confucius Institutes could conceivably play a major role in shaping the next generation’s attitudes towards China. The effort China has been putting in creating better relationships with Africa has been bearing fruit. According to a 2013 survey by the Pew Research Centre, out of six African countries surveyed (Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria and South Africa), a majority of respondents in five had a positive view of China (in South Africa, 48 per cent had a favourable view of China). As explained earlier, CI’s are not the only mode that China extends her people-to-people diplomacy. There are countless other initiatives such as Cultural Centres, music festivals, exchanges between think tanks and media exchanges. For CIs to enjoy credible acceptance in Africa, they have to demonstrate their willingness to also promote African languages and culture. Acceptance by African institutions could be important because in the event that China is unable to continue funding the institutes, an accepting African host, aware of the value of CIs could be more willing to fund the institutes. UJCI has done well in promoting both Chinese and local culture. Most of the events hosted usually have a blend of both Chinese and African cultural aspects.

Conclusion South Africa occupies a special place within China’s Africa Policy and global strategy. It comes as no surprise therefore that the flourishing diplomatic relations goes beyond the traditional spheres of foreign policy such as trade and security. Cultural and educational interactions between these states in recent years has taken an upward trend. The cultural and educational exchanges underpinned within FOCAC appearing tangibly trickling down to bilateral relations between South Africa and China. One of the major vehicles to drive this approach is none other than the six CIs established in South Africa. The outbreak of Coronavirus in Wuhan City in Hubei Province in China and subsequent spread across the globe will in short and medium term have a huge impact of South Africa and China

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cultural and educational exchanges. However, this will not disrupt cultural and educational activities between the two nations. What will more likely be going to happen will be digitisation of these programme within the ambit of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

References Acharya, A. (2016). Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR Perspective. Australian Journal of International Affairs. Andreasson, S. (2011). Africa’s Prospects and South Africa’s Leadership Potential in the Emerging Markets Century. Third World Quarterly, 32. Carr, E. (1954). The Twenty Years’ Crisis. New York: Macmillan. Chinese Language Council International. (2011). About the Chinese Language Council International. Available at: http://baike.baidu.com/view/911559. htm. Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban). (n.d.). Retrieved 20 October 2016, from http://english.hanban.org/. Cummings, M. (2003). Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey. Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture (1–3). Dieleman, M., Konings, J., & Post, P. (2010). Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change: Alternative Perspectives, Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change. BRILL. Dittgen, R. (2014). Joburg’s China Malls Phenomenon. Think Africa Press. Hu, S. (2007). Confucianism and Contemporary Chinese Politics. Wagner College. Levenson, J. (1969). Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A Radical View. New York: Macmillan. Matshanda, N. T. (2010, March 3). China and South Africa in the Context of South-South Cooperation: Cooperation in the United Nations and World Trade Organisation. WIReDSpace, Wits Institutional Repository Environment on DSpace. Mhaka, S., & Leward, J. (2018). An Evaluation of the Trade Relationships between South Africa and China: An Empirical Review 1995–2014. South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 21(1). Nye, J. S. (1990). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New. York: Basic Books. Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Pan, S. (2013). Confucius Institute Project: China’s Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection. Asian Education and Development Studies, 2(1), 22–33.

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Park, M., & Chesla, C. (2007). Revisiting Confucianism as a Conceptual Framework for Asian Family Study. Journal of Family Nursing, 13(3), 293–311. Shambaugh, D. (2015). China’s Soft-power Push. Foreign Affairs Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-ssoft-power-push. Accessed 13 October 2016. Tan, J. C. (2016). Balancing Soft Power: Gaining Leverage with China Through Confucius Institutes (Working Paper Series No. 186). Textor, C. (2019). Number of Confucious Institutes in Africa 2018 by Country. The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation, Achievements of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Over the Past 15 Years (2016). University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI) and University of Johannesburg Centre for Africa-China Studies (CACS). (2019). Annual Report. Wang, Y. (2014, September 27). Xi Backs Confucius Institutes’ Development on Anniversary—Xinhua English.news.cn. Retrieved 10 October 2016, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/27/c_1 33677094.htm. Wasserman, H. (2016). China’s “Soft Power” and its Influence on Editorial Agendas in South Africa. Chinese Journal of Communication, 9(1). Published online: 26 Jun 2015. Xi Jinping. (2014). The Governance of China.

PART IV

Chinese Communities, Relations and Identity

CHAPTER 12

South Africa’s Chinese Communities: An Update Yoon Jung Park and Anna Ying Chen

Introduction The media, politicians, and academics alike have paid a great deal of attention to Chinese engagement with and on the African continent over the past two decades. Several countries, however, seem to receive greater attention than others; among these is South Africa, which boasts well over a dozen researchers dedicated to the study of various aspects of China– South Africa, as indicated by this volume. Interest in China-South Africa ties has resulted in multiple PhD theses (Xu 2017; Hwang 2018; Liu n.d., under review) and a small but growing library of research. South Africa is also home to the largest number of Confucius Institutes on the continent (six at last count) as well as several research programs, centers, and institutes focused specifically on China-Africa ties. That said, it has been

Y. J. Park (B) China Africa Research Initiative, Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Y. Chen Independent Researcher, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_12

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nearly a decade since the last comprehensive update on Chinese people in South Africa. In that intervening period a great deal has changed even as the overall numbers of Chinese people in the country have remained fairly consistent. This chapter focuses on population shifts, inter- and intra-community dynamics, political engagement, and economic activities. To start, there are a number of seemingly contradictory trends. First, even as the numbers of Chinese people in South Africa hovers around the 350,000 mark (Park 2012, 2019), there has been a great deal of movement both into and out of the country. Secondly, the very composition of the Chinese migrant communities has changed and they have become increasingly diverse; at the same time, there are also preliminary signs of the formation of pan-Chinese solidarity, across generational, language, and citizenship lines. Thirdly, Chinese communities show signs of becoming more embedded in South Africa, visible across economic, social, and political arenas, while simultaneously showing greater connection to an increasingly global China. This chapter starts with an introduction to South Africa’s multiple Chinese communities, focusing primarily on the newer migrants from mainland China. It then moves on to Chinese economic activities in South Africa. This is followed by brief sections on Chinese social and cultural engagements focusing on Chinese community organizations and Chinese schools and Chinese language education. The last two substantive sections focus on Chinese political engagement and a note on crimes against the Chinese.

South Africa’s Multiple Chinese Communities South Africa is one of the few African countries that is home to several distinct ethnic Chinese communities. These include the Chinese South Africans (or South African Chinese) whose ancestors arrived after the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the 1870s and 1880s, the Taiwanese South Africans who arrived in South Africa during the latter years of the apartheid era, and the newer Chinese migrants from mainland China who arrived in significant numbers after the end of apartheid in the late 1990s.

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The South African Chinese The history of Chinese in South Africa dates back to the mid-to-late seventeenth century when the Dutch East India Company occupied South Africa. Chinese, together with others from South and Southeast Asia, arrived as political prisoners, convicts, and company slaves in the Cape after it had been established as a refreshment station. Some of the ethnic Chinese from this era eventually completed their period of service and returned to Asia; others married with other ethnic groups and became part of the local mixed race groups (Cape Coloured and Cape Malay); those who died in the Cape were buried there as evidenced by a small number of Chinese-marked tombstones (Yap and Man 1996; see also Armstrong 1997, 2013; Harris 1995; Park 2019 for more on this early history). A much larger Chinese migration of over 63,000 took place between 1904 and 1910 when Chinese laborers were transported to South Africa to work on the gold mines; nearly all of these workers were repatriated to China after 1910 (Yap and Man 1996, 103; see also Huynh 2008). These Chinese indentured laborers were part of a larger and longer stream of Chinese workers who were imported by European colonial administrations throughout the African continent from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries (Li 2012; Harris 1995; Park 2019). While none of these involuntary labor migrants were the ancestors of the Chinese in South Africa today, their histories remain relevant insofar as they continue to impact present-day populations of Chinese people. There were also small numbers of independent and voluntary Chinese migrants who ventured to South Africa in the late 1800s, drawn by the promise of diamonds and gold; still more arrived before and after World War II to escape the Chinese civil war. These Chinese migrants were mostly from Guangdong province. These are the Chinese people who took root in South Africa and became the South African Chinese. This group of South African Chinese survived both the segregation and apartheid periods of South Africa, never consistently seen as black or white, but always falling between the cracks. The implementation of the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act in 1904 and later apartheid-era legislation, particularly the Group Areas Act of 1950, imposed harsh restrictions and influenced all aspects of their lives (for more see Harris 1995; Yap and Man 1996; Park 2008). A large number of the second-, third-, and fourth-generation Chinese South Africans emigrated to the USA, Canada,

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and Australia, among other countries, to escape apartheid-era restrictions and violence. The current population of South African Chinese, is approximately 10,000. Taiwanese Migrants During 1970s and 1980s, the South African government was subject to comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the international community because of apartheid; at this time the apartheid government reached out to other “pariah” nations, including Taiwan. Apartheid-era government policies were designed to attract Taiwanese (and other) investors to South Africa with extremely favorable investment and tax policies. It was during this period that the total number of Taiwanese living in South Africa surged to between 20,000 and 30,000 as investors came and brought their families (Chen interviews 2018–2019; see also Park 2008). Given the preferential investment and tax policies, many of them opened up factories in the homeland areas of South Africa and created local employment opportunities. In the 1990s a significant number of these Taiwanese either returned home or emigrated to other countries. The expiration of subsidies, increasingly difficult labor relations, poor business planning together with increasing competition from cheaper Chinese imports, and a shift in South African diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China were among the reasons for the mass exodus. It is estimated that the number of migrants from Taiwan is currently only 5000 to 6000 (Chen interviews 2018–2019; see also Park 2008, 2012). This number has remained relatively steady for the past ten years. New Chinese Migrants in South Africa New Chinese migrants from the mainland have been entering South Africa since mid-to-late 1980s, with numbers growing significantly in the late 1990s and into the 2000s. China started its Reform and Opening Policy in December 1978. The 1980s saw tides of young people going abroad, eager to study or work in Japan, the USA, and Europe. Increasing numbers also moved to former Soviet states and developing countries, including South Africa, often when entry to first choice developed Western countries were denied and visa regulations, tightened. The numbers of Chinese people moving to Eastern European countries peaked in 1989; subsequently, some of these people re-migrated to South Africa

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often via Northern African countries (Chen interviews 2018–2019). This early group of new migrants were typically educated, mostly from big cities in China; all were yearning for a different life. They hoped that South Africa could provide such opportunities. The first arriving Chinese adventurers were followed by clusters of family and friends who introduced more and more newcomers to the “new world” of South Africa following a pattern of chain migration established by earlier nineteenthand twentieth-century flows. With limited finances and language barriers, many started off working in Chinese restaurants and Taiwanese factories, shops, and companies. After gaining a foothold, some of the new migrants started their own ventures, first as street vendors in the city centers of Johannesburg and later in small retail shops, importing goods directly from China. The majority of them engaged in wholesale trade or production of light industrial products and retail trade in inexpensive consumer goods. Chinese from Hong Kong also arrived in South Africa during the 1990s. These were mostly business migrants with financial capital and business experience. They were optimistic about the living environment and business opportunities in South Africa and hoped to open up new markets. In the period immediately before the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Africa in 1998, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also began to enter the South African market in search of business opportunities in support of China’s diplomatic plans to reconnect with South Africa. Some of the expatriates who traveled to South Africa with the SOES, enjoying the climate and lifestyle in South Africa, chose to resign their government-tied positions at the end of their terms in order to remain in South Africa. Most of the expatriates who stayed had the advantage of English proficiency and professional backgrounds. Because of their knowledge of the South African market and their connections to Chinese businesses at home, they had multiple advantages in terms of business and investment opportunities; these connections ensured many business successes. China’s Reform and Opening Policy of the late 1970s also created many opportunities; the period between 1990 and 2000 was a golden era of economic development for those who were prepared to take their ventures overseas. At this time China became the world’s factory specialized in manufacturing textiles and other light industrial products. Seeing the huge business potential in South Africa at the end of apartheid and

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spurred by the establishment of diplomatic ties, many Chinese businessmen and factory owners from Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Fujian arrived in South Africa, hoping to expand their businesses into southern Africa through the base of South Africa. Arriving in tandem with these entrepreneurs were villagers from Fujian. Fujianese, with a strong cultural tradition of migration (Li 1999/2016), arrived in large numbers to South Africa often via the services of migration brokers1 hoping to cash in on the opportunities created by the earlier entrepreneurial migrants. While some newer arrivals settled in and around the established Chinatowns in Johannesburg, the more established Chinese migrants are scattered throughout the suburbs of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, and Bloemfontein—South Africa’s major cities. However, one can also find newer Chinese migrants—mostly from Fujian Province— across South Africa, in rural areas and remote towns, operating small grocery stores, restaurants, and “China shops” (for more see Park and Chen 2010); many of these migrants live on the same premises as their business, often above or at the rear of their shops. The South African Department of Home Affairs stopped publishing migration figures in 2005 (Taiwan Overseas Chinese Statistics Office, June 2011) and the Chinese government does not keep official statistics on Chinese migration; as such there are no official figures on the number of new Chinese migrants in South Africa. However, media and academics estimate that the numbers of Chinese in South Africa peaked at close to 500,000 but settled at around 300,000–350,000; of this figure more than 95% are new Chinese migrants (Chen interviews 2019; Park 2012, 2019).

Chinese Economic Activities in South Africa While there are still a handful of Chinese South Africans engaged in entrepreneurial activities, most have moved solidly into the South African professional classes; as such it would be nearly impossible to separate out their economic activities from those of other South Africans. Earlier Taiwanese manufacturing activities and their contributions to South Africa’s economy have been addressed in other publications (Pickles and Woods 1989; Tseng 1991). This section, therefore, focuses on the new Chinese migrant communities, Chinese state-owned entreprises, and Chinese foreign direct investment in South Africa.

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Chinese Migrant Entrepreneurial Activities: Phases and New Trends The economic activities and business engagement of the new Chinese migrants can be divided into three phases. Phase one begins with their first arrival through 2000 when the new migrants were still getting to know the country; during this period, most Chinese migrants were either employed by Taiwanese investors in clothing factories or running their own small shops, often engaging in small-scale importation of consumer goods from China. A smaller number were involved in service industries to meet the needs of other Chinese migrants; these businesses included: restaurants, travel agencies, custom clearance companies, shipment agencies, accounting firms, and immigration agencies. During this early stage, the numbers of new Chinese migrants were still in the thousands and their contributions to the South African economy were minimal. The new millennium brought the second phase (2002–2014) of economic engagement by new Chinese migrants in South Africa. During this period Chinese businesses flourished and the number of migrants grew substantially. Their business engagement with the local economy broadened in degree, quantity, and scale. There were many more newcomers to the market, either employed by other Chinese businesses or opening shops across South Africa’s cities and small towns. However, the already established Chinese migrants began moving up the economic ladder, setting up small factories and importing on a larger scale. Also during this period, Chinese entrepreneurs began buying existing shopping malls or establishing new wholesale and retail shopping malls; these began to spring up in major cities in South Africa as well as in neighboring countries, including Namibia and Zimbabwe. Chinese businesses diversified and localized. The more established Chinese business community had accumulated both experience and capital; with knowledge of the strengthening relationship between the two countries and the complementary nature of the two economies, they started to venture into other business areas, including in mineral trade and mining investment, real estate development, construction and manufacturing, tourism, renewable energy, agriculture, fisheries, science and technology, investment consulting. Chinese migrants have also moved into the microlending business in South Africa’s townships; while further research is required to learn more about these ventures, preliminary anecdotes from others working in the townships indicate that Chinese microfinance operations are prevalent.2 Many also made moves to invest

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in neighboring countries, including Namibia, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, and Mozambique. The last phase began in 2015 and continues through the present; this period is marked by greater business challenges as the South African economy faces recession caused by changes in global economy as well as corruption and state-capture. Dramatic currency depreciation, which started in 2015, increased costs of production in China, and the Chinese government’s new environment protection regulations have squeezed profit margins of Chinese importers. At the same time, leading global retailers including Zara and H&M present stiff competition to Chinese importers. Some smaller traders eventually exited the market; many others continue to search for opportunities by expanding product lines, trimming supply chains, transforming sales channels, and investing in related industries. Those who left the market include older Chinese migrants who have retired, others who have moved their businesses to neighboring countries, and more established, successful business people who have emigrated to USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. We observe a few trends over these three phases of Chinese economic engagement in South Africa. First, there is a shift from a single retail salesbased business form to a wider range of industries, with more extensive and deeper participation in the local economy. The modes of investment and forms of operations have also diversified. As far as trading is concerned, many Chinese businessmen have transformed from a onestore business model into chain stores with their own brands or becoming agents or suppliers to well-known retail chains in South Africa. Secondly, during the past ten years, the second generation of the first group of Chinese migrants grew into adulthood and took over their family businesses. Most of them had completed their university studies locally. In contrast with their parents, they have no language barriers and fewer cultural challenges; they also have a better understanding of local market needs and the broader South African socio-economic context. They have brought a new mindset to traditional Chinese trade. For example, some of them exited the Chinese shopping centers (or “China Malls”) and opened chain stores in local shopping centers. Others innovated with online businesses and marketing via social media (including Instagram, WeChat, and Facebook). Another area of expansion included Chinese e-payment channels tailored for Chinese retailers and wholesalers in the market. Thirdly, facing harsh competition and a stagnant economy in South Africa, many Chinese businessmen continue to expand their business into

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Southern and Eastern Africa, including Zambia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Lastly, the experience accumulated by the new Chinese migrants in South Africa over the years has become a valuable asset which can be used for the new Chinese enterprises entering the South African market. This also contributes to deeper exchanges between China and South Africa. These business practices represent a great deal of learning from past successes and failures. These earlier periods of Chinese migrant economic engagement in South Africa has also created a talent pool of Chinese professional, both older and younger, who can contribute to deeper and more meaningful scientific, technological, and business exchanges between China and South Africa. Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Private FDI in South Africa Since 2009, China has been South Africa’s largest trading partner, its largest export market, and its greatest source of imports. Conversely, South Africa has been China’s largest trading partner in Africa for seven consecutive years. In 2016, bilateral trade between China and South Africa amounted to US$35.3 billion; of this total, China’s exports to South Africa amounted to US$12.8 billion and China’s imports from South Africa amounted to US$22.5 billion.3 With the deepening of economic exchanges between the two countries, relying on Chinese government’s policy support and encouragement, more and more Chinese state-owned enterprises have entered the market of South Africa. Given the relatively solid infrastructure and rather stable political and economic investment environment of the country, they often set up their African head office in South Africa. From 2008 to 2017, Chinese companies thrived in South Africa, with significant increases in the number of companies, the size of their businesses, the number of expats sent, and local employees hired. The start of this period might be marked by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Limited (ICBC) 5.6 billion USD investment in (and 20% share of) Standard Bank in October 2007. This investment (still the single largest Chinese investment in Africa) has served to pave a financial highway for other Chinese companies operating in Africa. According to the Chinese Embassy in South Africa, by the end of 2016, more than 300 Chinese companies had invested in South Africa; of these 160

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were large and medium-sized Chinese enterprises. More than $13 billion has been invested in South Africa.4 Chinese companies’ investments in South Africa are concentrated in the fields of finance, mining, telecommunications, engineering, transportation, renewable energy, manufacturing, automobiles, and heavy machinery. These Chinese SOEs exist in different forms ranging from representative offices to branch offices, wholly owned subsidiaries, and partnerships with local enterprises through overseas mergers and acquisitions. Two companies, in particular, have become emblematic of the success of Chinese brand recognition in South Africa. Often referred to as the “Two Hs” in China, Hisense and Huawei have become recognized and respected Chinese brands in the country. Ten years of market cultivation and penetration have yielded a number of successes. For example, Hisense opened a new plant in Atlantis (in the Cape) in 2013 and employs about 700 people; of these 95% are locals.5 Using a targeted social media campaign they have introduced new products, marketed their brand, promoted sales, and communicated with customers. By sponsoring major sporting events, including the 2019 Currie Cup, they continue to increase their visibility and brand recognition. In 2016, Hisense became SA’s biggest seller of televisions.6 Huawei, similarly, has been working to raise its profile as a global brand. Since 2016 they have hosted an annual Huawei Joburg Day. It has partnered with well-known South African music radio station 94.7 and the event features popular local music stars. Huawei’s Joburg Day has become a favorite music festival in Joburg known for its celebration of music, the Huawei brand, and its products and services. It is also important to note that with more family-oriented changes in company policies, spouses, children, and even parents of the expat employees of Chinese SOEs have been permitted to move to South Africa during their tenure in the country. Though most of these Chinese live only temporarily in South Africa and their absolute numbers are not high they have had an outsized impact. For example, they brought with them advanced technologies, knowledge, and practices from China and their other overseas experiences, including the use of technology for distance education, Chinese mobile payment systems, e-commerce, and international carrier services. They have also created niche market demand for higher-end services and high-quality Chinese education for their children. In short, they are changing both the composition of the

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Chinese community in South Africa and the lives of overseas Chinese communities. Beyond the more prominent Chinese SOEs and large private business enterprises and the expatriate Chinese that have migrated with them, the range and scope of Chinese migrant business activities has expanded tremendously. One of these is Aberdare Cables, a South African firm at risk of liquidation, which was acquired by a listed Chinese company, the Hengtong Group. They have since successfully structured BEE deals and hired 1500 South African people in its three local factories. Another company, New Hope, has expanded from producing animal feed for chicken, to growing and operating duck and cow farms. Other areas of expansion include agricultural activities, including rice farming and the production and export of traditional South African products such as fruit, fruit juices, rooibos tea, wine, and beef.

Social and Cultural Engagement Chinese social and cultural activities have become increasingly diverse as the various Chinese communities become more embedded in South Africa. A decade ago, most Chinese community organizations were social in nature, providing opportunities for Chinese to meet and socialize with other Chinese people. Today, while Chinese provincial (social and business-oriented) community organizations continue to exist, they are more numerous, more specialized, and more focused, engaging in more than just social events, but also philanthropic activities in the country. Chinese Community Organizations in South Africa In the early days, new Chinese migrant associations in South Africa existed in the form of provincial associations and chambers of commerce with significant regional characteristics. Some of the first-established chambers of commerce included the Southern African Fujian Association; the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Southern Africa; the General Chamber of Commerce of Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao in Southern Africa; and the Shunde Association of South Africa. In addition, the All-African Association for the Peaceful Reunification of China and the South African Chinese Police Forum are the two most important Chinese community organizations in South Africa.

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The All-African Association for the Peaceful Reunification of China7 is one of many “friendship associations” across the continent. Founded in January 2002, this and other similar organizations work to leverage Chinese influence in African countries, undermine Taiwan’s economic influence in Africa, and serve as a source of information on local economic and business developments. These friendship associations maintain regular contact with China through trips, seminars, and goodwill visits of African and Chinese dignitaries. The South African Chinese Police Forum, set up by new Chinese migrants in 2004, is a community-based crime-combatting organization connecting the Chinese community with the South African Police Service; their primary aim is the protection of the Chinese community and its members. It has been an effective channel of communication with local police and has offered tremendous support to many Chinese in need. This mechanism has become a model promoted by the Chinese government and similar centers have been set up in many other foreign countries for the safety, protection, and support of overseas Chinese. Chinese community associations have flourished over the past ten years and more have been created as the Chinese communities expand and mature. In addition to the provincial/regional associations and chambers of commerce, many specialized associations have been formed; some of these include the South African-Chinese Cultural and Arts Exchange Association, the Huaxing Art Group, the Southern African Federation of Chinese Experts and Scholars, the South African Chinese Education Foundation, the Southern African Chinese Visual Arts Association, and Gauteng Chinese Shooting Team. Sports clubs are also popular: golf, table tennis, basketball, volleyball, football, badminton, and hiking clubs provide opportunities to enjoy leisure time beyond the casinos, which were quite popular among many new Chinese migrants when they first arrived in South Africa. Because of the nature of these organizations and clubs, they have provided a platform for connecting the different Chinese communities around the country: the South African Chinese, the Taiwanese, the new Chinese migrants, and the expatriates of the Chinese SOEs. A case in point is the Chinese Easter Tournament, once an annual sports event organized by the South African Chinese and sponsored by the Taiwanese government, is now an all inclusive sports gathering of all Chinese living in South Africa; the Chinese ambassador to South Africa is in regular attendance and the event is now supported by many Chinese SOEs. It also

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offers a platform for cultural engagement whereby Chinese nationals and Chinese South Africans mingle with other South Africans on the sports field. Similarly, Chinese artists now participate in the annual South African Heritage Day parade and are often invited to perform in local celebrations and events. In addition to these specialized voluntary community associations, several professional associations have also been established. One of these, the Chinese Professionals Organization of Southern Africa (CPOSA), was registered in 2015. With a membership base of 234 scholars, professors, engineers, and other professionals residing across southern Africa,8 CPOSA has become a valuable asset to the community and resource for further exchange and cooperation between South Africa and China. Its sub-committees cover a wide range of industries and fields including mining and geology, chemical engineering, biology, electronic engineering, computer science, education, medicine and medical science, banking and finance, language and translation, sports, music. To date CPOSA has published 19 issues of African View & Analysis through its Wechat public page, bringing in-depth industrial knowledge about South Africa to its members. It has served as a starting point for many Chinese scholars, professionals, and entrepreneurs getting to know about South Africa. Chinese professors working in South African universities have also become bridges, serving as liaisons between their home country and South Africa. They recruit Chinese PhD and Master’s students to study in South Africa to conduct cutting edge research in mining, engineering, chemical science, agriculture, among other fields. They also facilitate and lead bilateral research projects to link South African universities and research institutes with their Chinese counterparts. Finally, they recommend and refer South African experts and professors for research and teaching exchanges at Chinese universities.

Chinese Schools & Chinese Language Education Unlike the first group of Chinese migrants who chose to send their children back home for education, many of the newer Chinese migrants prefer to have their children live with them. In addition to doing their basic schooling in South Africa, Chinese parents who want their children to acquire Mandarin language skills now have quite a few options.

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Chinese language instruction has also become widely available to nonChinese through both Confucius Institutes and other Chinese language institutions. Beyond Chinese language education, South Africa is also attracting significant and growing numbers of Chinese tertiary students. This section focuses on the history of Chinese schools and their current status and Chinese language instruction for Chinese children and for South Africans. History of Chinese Schools in South Africa9 The first Chinese school (the Chinese Mission Primary School aka the Queen Street School) was established in 1918 in Port Elizabeth. Over the years, a total of twelve Chinese schools were established in South Africa. While some of the schools were supported solely by the Chinese communities, several others received financial and in-kind support from the Taiwanese government over a period of several decades. Several of these only remained open for a few years, several more closed in the post-World War Two years, and several others closed during apartheid. Only three survived into the 1980s; these were the amalgamated Kuo Ting School and the Johannesburg Chinese school in Johannesburg, the Pretoria Chinese School, and the Chinese Primary and High School in Port Elizabeth. Johannesburg’s Chinese schools were combined in 1950 when they moved from Ferrierastown to Doornfontein; the school was moved again to Brampton Park, just at the outskirts of Alexandra, in 1981. The Chinese Primary and High School in Port Elizabeth was renamed Morningside High School in the late 1990s when the Chinese community transferred the school to the Eastern Cape Education Department; since that time, it has lost any distinctive Chinese features and the current student body is predominantly black. Johannesburg’s KuoTing School also lost its distinctive Chineseness in the 1990s when it was transferred to the Gauteng Department of Education. It is now a general public school, also with a predominantly black South African student body, without any Chinese offerings. In fact, the board of KuoTing School is currently suing the Gauteng Department of Education for compensation for the land where the school is currently located; this fight has been going on for well over a decade (Chen interviews 2018). The Pretoria Chinese School chose a different path; it became a private school run by an independent board. It continues to offer classes from

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grade 00 to grade 12. The medium of instruction is English but it maintains mandatory teaching and learning of Chinese as a second language for all grades. The Pretoria Chinese School, because of its high academic standards and the Chinese language instruction, has become increasingly diverse, with a student body that is both racially diverse and international. Chinese Language Instruction—For Chinese Children With the influx of Chinese migrants who arrived from 2000 through the early 2010s, there are now a growing number of young Chinese families settled in South Africa. A significant number of their children were born in South Africa. While some of the earlier migrants chose to send their children back to China to be raised by grandparents and to learn Mandarin, many more of these families have decided to keep their children with them, to grow up in South Africa. This younger, newer generation of parents believes that keeping families together is better for their children’s growth and development. In 2010 there was only one part-time Chinese language school in Johannesburg—the Hua Hsin Chinese Cultural and Educational Foundation. As the number of school age Chinese children has increased, many more Chinese language schools have been established. There are now at least seven Chinese language schools in the country: four in Johannesburg, two in Cape Town, and one in Durban. These schools provide Chinese language and cultural courses on weekends. The expansion of Chinese language schools serves as an indication of the growth and maturing of the Chinese migrant community. For example, the Chinese Language Foundation School in Johannesburg was founded in early 2016, offering five classes. They started with an enrollment of 46 students. Today, the school, which is open to anyone, offers 7 levels of Chinese and has an enrollment of over 500 students. Most of the Chinese schools teach Chinese language at different levels and also offer cultural courses in Chinese calligraphy, martial arts, dancing, traditional Chinese music instruments, as well as table tennis. In addition, an annual root-seeking (Chinese heritage) summer camp for overseas Chinese youth organized by the Overseas Chinese Office has become a popular opportunity for second generation Chinese migrants to learn about China.

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Confucius Institutes and Chinese as a Second Language The founding and growth of Confucius Institutes in South Africa also benefited the teaching and learning of Chinese in South Africa. South Africa is home to the largest number of Confucius Institutes and classrooms in Africa: there are now six Confucius Institutes and three Confucius Classrooms (see more under Monyae Chapter). The establishment of both private Chinese language schools and public Confucius Institutes are emblematic of the growth of the Chinese community as well as a testament to the growing importance of China in South Africa. Mandarin has become an attractive second language for South Africans. In 2015, the Department of Basic Education of South Africa announced that Mandarin would be added to the South African school curriculum and classes would be available from January 2016.10 The Minister of Basic Education set a goal of 500 South African schools teaching Chinese by 2021. As of 2017, there were already 53 schools offering Chinese classes as an elective subject in South Africa. As the Chinese language becomes more popular in South Africa, the government of South Africa together with the government of China announced in August 2019 to set 17 September as the Chinese Language Day in South Africa. Beyond language instruction, the Confucius Institute for Chinese Medicine (CICM) was launched at the University of Western Cape in September 2019. CICM aims to offer specialized training in Chinese Medicine; it is the first of its kind on the African continent.

Chinese on the South African Political Stage Chinese South Africans have only been able to actively participate in South African politics since 1994 when they won the right to vote alongside other South Africans; however, it wasn’t until the early 2000s that one ethnic Chinese group, the Taiwanese, became more politically active. Since that time, ethnic Chinese from all three Chinese communities have been engaged in various aspects of South African politics, from launching court cases to overtly supporting political parties and running for political office. The significance of this level of political activity cannot be overstated: as a highly visible, tiny, and vulnerable minority community, during most of their history in South Africa, Chinese people worked to remain

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unseen and unheard, fearful of bringing unwanted attention to themselves. Today, ethnic Chinese appear to boldly claim both their South Africanness as well as their heritage and their connections to a strong China as evidenced by two highly publicized court cases and all of the news coverage surrounding these (see below). Local Chinese Political Engagement Ethnic Chinese first entered national politics in 2004 when four Taiwan-born South Africans became members of South Africa’s Parliament. The four belonged to four different political parties: Shiaan-Bin Huang (African National Congress), Sherry Su-Huei Chen (Democratic Alliance), Eugenia Shi-Chia Chang (Inkatha Freedom Party), and Christopher Wang (Independent Democrats). Until recently, Michael Sun, another Taiwanese South African, served as a Member of the Mayoral Council (MMC) for Public Safety under the previous Mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba (then DA). Sun, the principal attorney for Sun Attorneys, has been a local councilor since 2006; he served under the previous Mayor starting in 2014. In 2016 several China-born South Africans, ran for office in the municipal elections. The best known of these was Jianling (or Jenny) Wu11 who ran for office on an ANC ticket for Ward 118 in the local elections. She moved to South Africa in 1995 and was naturalized as a South African citizen in 2005, giving up her Chinese citizenship (Ho 2016). Her candidacy drew much public curiosity and a great deal of media coverage; some of these articles were suspicious about the nature of her connection to both China and the ANC and speculated that generous donations to the ANC had secured backing for her candidacy in internal elections (Ho 2016). Others included SI Hai (ANC) and Xiaomei ZHANG (ANC). Due to the poor performance of the ANC in this election, none of these individuals is currently in office. Still, this election stands out as one with greater Chinese presence and participation, not just in terms of the handful of people who ran for offices, but also those involved in campaign activities. Images of one event held in July 2016 at Bruma Lake (a suburb of Johannesburg) show Chinese people in yellow ANC t-shirts handing out leaflets in the mall, with people dancing and chanting and even singing the South African national anthem. Yap and Man (1996) wrote that both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments have provided support to various political

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parties and some ethnic Chinese individuals have contributed monetarily to campaigns in the past; however, this is a level of public Chinese political participation that has never before been seen. While some of these political activities take place in the public eye, others are negotiated in private. Prior to the 2014 municipal elections ANC campaign posters appeared in Cyrildene and other areas of Johannesburg frequented by Chinese people. In 2016, bilingual “Vote ANC” materials were circulated, ostensibly in commemoration of the Chinese Year of the Monkey. It is unclear who is behind these Chinese language ANC campaign materials. China does not permit dual citizenship and very few first-generation Chinese migrants have become South African citizens—a prerequisite to voting. Who then are these materials targeting? One can only speculate that these ANC election materials were the results of some sort of collaboration between wealthy Chinese businesses and local ANC councilors involved in either influence-buying or influence-peddling. What is not clear is who is trying to buy or sell influence. Chinese are not only getting involved in local and national politics, but they are also fighting for rights and recognition as South Africans through the courts. Fighting for Affirmative Action, Fighting Against Hate Speech In 2008 the Chinese Association of South Africa (CASA), an umbrella organization made up of provincial Chinese associations founded by Chinese South Africans, sued the South African government in a case involving affirmative action. Arguing that they wanted a clear judgment about whether or not they, as a community, were included in the nation’s two pieces of affirmative action legislation—the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) and the Employment Equity Act—CASA won their case. Their court victory, however, was marred by backlash from the media, government officials, and black South African groups, mostly due to complexities about “how we as South Africans remember our history; how we view race and race classification; and toward whom we channel frustrations about unemployment, economic inequalities, and the process of black economic empowerment” (Erasmus and Park 2008). In hindsight, timing was clearly also a factor as the judgment in the case was announced June 2008, just a little over a month after one of the worst episodes of xenophobic violence in the country. Still, the

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case was significant as a testament to Chinese South African determination to have their history acknowledged and their rights affirmed. The Chinese were in court again in 2019. This time, the case addressed anti-Chinese hate speech. After the airing of a segment of the television program, Carte Blanche, in February 2017, a number of individuals posted hateful comments targeting Chinese people on the pages of the Facebook accounts of the show (and a larger number of the public “liked” these), the Karoo Donkey Sanctuary, and the Chinese Association (TCA)’s Facebook pages. The episode focused on the recent uptick in the sale and slaughter of donkeys for their hides, which are used in traditional Chinese medicines. The show explained that donkeys are sometimes stolen rather than purchased and that they are inhumanely slaughtered. Because the primary market is in China, the hateful comments were targeted Chinese people, even though there was not a single Chinese person shown in the episode. The TCA, together with 40 other community organizations, are currently seeking sanctions against 12 respondents, including criminal charges related to hate speech as outlawed under the South African constitution, damages and community service for a charity nominated by the complainants, and an unconditional apology (Erasmus 2019; Ndaliso 2019; Pon 2019). Final statements were heard in court in late November/early December 2019 and final judgment in the case is expected in March 2020. Chinese South African community spokespersons, including Erwin Pon and Melanie Yap (co-author of Colour, Confusion, and Confessions 1996) have argued that this case “was a shocking verbal assault on the Chinese…(and focuses) on the harmful, hurtful and discriminatory effects of hate speech that denies the dignity and equality of Chinese people” (Yap 2019). One of the most notable aspects of this court case is that it has drawn support from various Chinese communities in South Africa. TCA supporters have maintained a visible presence both in and outside the courthouse. While the outcome of the first court case on the matter of Chinese exclusion from South Africa’s affirmative action policies directly impacted only South African citizens of Chinese descent (mostly Chinese and Taiwanese South Africans), the current case affects all Chinese people in the country—Chinese nationals as well as South African citizens. As such, the court challenge against the racist hate speech and against racebased social media attacks has drawn support from a wide range of Chinese community organizations.

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A Note on Chinese in South Africa and Crime With the official unemployment rate as high as 29% coupled by the absence of the death penalty, corruption, and lengthy and cumbersome sentencing procedures of court cases, South Africa has a reputation as a haven for criminals. Chinese migrants in South Africa can be found on both sides of the law, as perpetrators and as victims. Chinese criminal syndicates from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the mainland have been reported to be active in South Africa since the early 1980s (Gastrow 2001). More recent reports have focused on Chinese involvement in the trafficking of endangered species, including rhino horn and ivory (Huang 2013). More often, however, Chinese migrants find themselves victims of crime. Chinese in South Africa, especially those operating in the wholesale and retail industry who often trade in cash, are highly likely to be victims of vicious robberies and other crimes. During the course of our field research in 2008–2010 every single one of the dozens of Chinese migrants interviewed reported that they had been a victim of a robbery or a car hijacking (Park and Chen 2010). In the first few years of the Chinese influx to South Africa, the situation was intensified by Chinese criminals within the community who committed serious crimes including robbery, kidnapping, and murder of other Chinese. In view of the high crime levels involving Chinese people, the two governments signed the China-South Africa Police Cooperation Agreement, the China-South Africa Extradition Treaty, and the Sino-South Africa Criminal Justice Assistance Treaty in 2004. In addition, in 2005 the Chinese Government started sending police liaison officers to work at the Chinese embassy in South Africa. The establishment of the Police Liaison Officer has effectively deterred the criminals from within the Chinese community and strengthened the cooperation with the South African police, thus helped with the detection and arrest of Chinese related crimes and successfully reduced crimes committed by Chinese against the Chinese. The growing economic and political strength of China has offered new Chinese migrants better protection and stronger support. The Chinese Embassy in South Africa and the consulates have made the protection of the safety of lives and property of the Chinese a top priority. In the past ten years, though there have been riots, strikes, and xenophobic attacks, with the Embassy’s contingency emergency mechanisms,

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resources are actively mobilized to alert and protect Chinese migrants as well as their investments and property. For example, two years ago, the Chinese Embassy launched the “Peaceful South Africa” WeChat public page which sent safety messages and alerts timeously to Chinese in South Africa.

Conclusion The composition of the Chinese community is more complicated today than ever. While some entrepreneurs have left, unable to make profits during the economic downturn, others, especially expatriates with Chinese SOEs and private companies, are arriving. In addition to those moving in and out of South Africa, there is now a second generation— children of Chinese migrants who have grown up in South Africa and who were born in South Africa. In addition to the Chinese South Africans and the Taiwanese South Africans, some Chinese migrants have now lived in South Africa for over two decades. A small number have become South African citizens; many more now have permanent residence. And regardless of their legal status, they are more deeply embedded in South Africa. Chinese economic engagement has both broadened and deepened. Economic impacts of Chinese-owned businesses are much greater today than they were a decade ago. Sectorally, they have broadened well beyond the wholesale and retail trade of China-made goods, into mining, property-development, and services, among others. There is clear evidence of job creation, skills transfer, and capacity building, and changing commodity chains. Chinese economic contributions to South African society extend beyond their business dealings, to home ownership, employment of domestic workers, and giving to local communities. With the growth of wealth within the Chinese communities, more and more individual Chinese as well as its community associations regularly organize charity or disaster donations to local black townships, orphanages, and nursing homes. Whenever there is disaster in South Africa, there are helping hands from the Chinese community organizations. Chinese migrant impacts can be evidenced in South Africa’s cultural calendars, and seen in the tremendous growth of language and food offerings, particularly in South Africa’s larger cities. On an individual level, there are also professional contributions. We’ve also seen a rise in Chinese

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political engagement. The longer they remain in South Africa, the more they engage and interact with South African society. While we have emphasized the three distinct Chinese communities, one of the most significant findings is that there are indications of a gradual “coming together” of these communities. Mixing between different groups of Chinese takes place at the level of community associations, especially around sports. However, more recently, the ugly anti-Chinese hate speech arising after the Carte Blanche donkey hide episode and the court case addressing it have rallied these communities to fight together to address these issues. Simultaneously, with greater embeddedness in South African life and greater episodes of cohesion among the distinct Chinese communities, many Chinese migrants remain deeply connected to China and their family and friends who are there. Partly because of the decreased costs of travel, certainly because of social media and improved communication technologies, but also because of the nature of the Chinese government and an increasingly globalized China, the ties that bind migrants to the mainland have remained intact.

Notes 1. A wide range of migration brokers operate from China and other migrant sending countries; these operate on a continuum of completely legal, registered businesses to quasi-legal service providers and illegal human smugglers, often referred to as “snakeheads.” 2. Personal email communication between Deborah James and Chris Alden, February 2020. 3. Lu Anqi: China has been South Africa’s largest trading partner, export market and source of imports for 8 consecutive years, China and Africa Network, http://www.chinafrica.cn/chinese/focus/201703/t20 170301_800088783.html, 2018, March 1. 4. Ibid. 5. https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Industrial/chinese-firms-aim-for-wcape-20151206. Accessed on 2019, September 17. 6. https://www.fin24.com/Tech/Companies/hisense-mulls-doubling-sastaff-as-tv-sales-soar-20170111. Accessed on 2019, September 17. 7. http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtch/fz/nf/qfztch/201 510/t20151022_10887619.html. 8. Members also include former residents who have moved to other countries or back to China.

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9. All the information in this sub-section is from Yap and Man (1996, 289– 303) and Park PhD Chapter Four. 10. https://www.caglobalint.com/recruitmentafrica/blog/2015/03/30/ mandarin-official-second-language-for-south-africas-curriculum/. 11. She is known in the Chinese community by her maiden name, Zhao.

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and International Migration: Chinese Perspectives (pp 181–198). New York: Routledge. Liu, Y. Y. L. (no date). Intra-Migrant Economy: Chinese Restaurant Entrepreneurship and Zimbabwean Migrant Workers in South Africa. Anthropology, Carelton College Ndaliso, C. (2019). Chinese Community Take 12 South Africans to Court for Hate Comments. Daily News. https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/kwa zulu-natal/chinese-community-take-12-south-africans-to-court-for-hate-com ments-19949033. Accessed 27 April 2019. Park, Y. J. (2008). A Matter of Honour. Being Chinese in South Africa. Johannesburg: Jacana Media. Park, Y. J. (2012). Living in-Between: The Chinese in South Africa. In Migration Information Source. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/dis play.cfm?id=875. Park, Y. J. (2017). The Politics of Chineseness in South Africa: From Apartheid to 2015. In M. Zhou (Ed.), Contemporary Chinese Diasporas (pp. 29–52). London: Palgrave-Macmillan. Park, Y. J. (2019). Early Chinese Migrants in Africa: Contract Labourers and ‘Entrepreneurs’. In K. Giese & L. Marfaing (Eds.), Encounters Between African and Chinese Entrepreneurs—New Sources of Social Transformations? (pp. 84–99). Leiden: Brill. Park, Y. J., & Chen, A. Y. (2010). Intersections of Race, Class, and Power: Chinese in Post-Apartheid Free State. In L. Heinecken & H. Prozesky (Eds.), Society in Focus: Change, Challenge and Resistance: Reflections from South Africa and Beyond (pp. 308–328). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Pickles, J., & Woods, J. (1989). Taiwanese Investment in South Africa. Affiracian Affairs, 88(353), 507–528. Pon, E. (2019). Racist and Violent Speech Aimed at Chinese South Africans a Threat to Democracy. News 24. https://www.news24.com/Columnists/Gue stColumn/racist-and-violent-speech-aimed-at-chinese-south-africans-a-threatto-democracy-20190310. Accessed 26 April 2019. Taiwan Overseas Chinese Statistics Office. (2011). 2010 Chinese in South Africa: Population Statistics Estimate. Tseng, H. (1991, November). The Adaptation of Taiwanese Immigrants in the Republic of South Africa (PhD thesis). University of Pretoria. Yap, M. (2019, March 22). Chinese South Africans Still Fight Racism. Mail & Guardian. https://mg.co.za/article/2019-03-22-00-chinese-south-africansstill-fight-racism. Accessed 27 April 2019.

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Yap, M., & Man, D. L. (1996). Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Xu, L. (2017). On the Edge of Capitalism: Local African States, Chinese Family Firms, and the Transformation of Industrial Labor. African History, Harvard University.

CHAPTER 13

The Chinese Community and the Search for Security Barry van Wyk

Introduction: The Primary Need to Be Safe and Secure The South African Chinese community is unique in the world. The largest Chinese community in Africa (according to Park and Chen’s chapter the number is around 350,000) with at least half of all Chinese people living on the continent, and with a history dating back to the nineteenth century, this community has endured successive oppressive political dispensations. It has maintained a strong Chinese identity in an always challenging South African environment, with its own media and newspapers and a large variety of community organisations and associations. Yet perhaps most notable of all, it has developed its own proactive solutions

All translations by the author. B. van Wyk (B) Africa–China Reporting Project, Journalism Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4_13

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to keep Chinese people safe and their property secure in a notoriously dangerous environment where crime and murder are a daily reality. There are various lines of differentiation within South Africa’s Chinese community: Of political and personal disagreements, or divisions between “old” and “new” Chinese or between different associations, or friction between Johannesburg’s two separate Chinese communities in Newtown and Cyrildene—it is even questionable whether Chinese people in South Africa are part of one or in fact multiple communities. Yet this chapter takes a different perspective, because for many Chinese people at any time anywhere in South Africa—regardless of their affiliation or their social standing—help and assistance for any kind of need is readily at hand. Over recent years the community has put these support and security structures in place; it has made use of technology and social media to establish elaborate networks; and it has developed a homegrown South African Chinese-language media including news agencies, web portals, and newspapers. While Chinese people in South Africa may be divided in various ways, the support structures and networks that have been put in place support the community as a whole, and hence in the context of safety and security at least, this chapter considers the Chinese community as an integrated entity. The lack of safety and security in South Africa is a complex phenomenon related to a long history of entrenched problems like poverty and inequality. Most South African communities are obliged to implement some form of their own networks and support structures to supplement the police and law enforcement to deal with the immediate concerns of safety and keeping property secure. As this chapter illustrates, the Chinese community has been particularly proactive in dealing with these problems, yet the community remains somewhat isolated and poorly understood within the broader national context. While the community has had some success with protecting and maintaining itself in a dangerous environment, its relatively miniscule size and lack of integration with the rest of South Africa’s population—not to mention the sheer extent of criminality—has as yet limited a broader engagement by the Chinese community with the rest of the country on addressing crime and poverty. Within the Chinese community itself, however, dealing with safety and security is a remarkable and largely untold story.

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Safety and Security in South Africa According to the crime statistics (i.e. reported cases) for April 2018 to March 2019 compiled by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and released in parliament in September 2019, 21,022 murders were committed in South Africa, up from 20,336 a year earlier. This amounts to an average of 58 murders every day. 44 cars are hijacked on average every day, and 132 cars or motorcycles are stolen. There are on average 444 victims of common assault every day and 468 assaults with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. An average of 142 common robberies occur every day, 384 robberies with aggravating circumstances (i.e. with the use of a gun or a weapon), 61 house robberies, and 605 house burglaries (i.e. with no contact between victim and perpetrator) amounting to 220,865 instances annually (Africa Check 2019). Yet it is important to note that the SAPS crime statistics only account for reported crimes. The SAPS statistics are complemented by data from the Governance, Public Safety, and Justice Survey (GPSJS) conducted by Statistics South Africa from April 2018 to March 2019, based on a sample of 27,071 households. According to the GPSJS report released in October 2019, in 2018/2019 there were an estimated 1,345,196 incidences of housebreaking—the leading crime in South Africa—affecting 969,567 households, yet only 48% of these households made any report to the police, hence this number is significantly larger than the number recorded in the SAPS statistics (220,865). The GPSJS report also indicated that Indian/Asian households were the most likely victims of housebreaking, i.e. 9.09% of all Indian/Asian households, compared to 7.28% of White households and 5.58% of Black households (Statistics South Africa 2019). This lends some support to the view commonly held by Chinese people in South Africa that they are specifically targeted by criminals, be it when they are trailed from the airport or because Chinese shops can be found in urban areas as well as remote rural towns all over the country. Michael Sun, the former City of Johannesburg Member of Mayoral Council (MMC) for Public Safety who was born in Taiwan and lived in South Africa from the age of 12, put it as follows: “Due to Chinese people’s lifestyle and business methods, and due to the fact that they are less likely to report crimes to the police, they are more likely to be targeted by criminals” (Zhang 2017). Certainly, the language barrier is a factor why some Chinese people may not report crimes to the police, and the perception

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that Chinese people always carry cash and use a cash economy in their shops are all reasons why they could be targeted by criminals. In response to these security challenges, Chinese people living in or travelling to South Africa are regularly admonished by Chinese state media and the Chinese Embassy and Consulates in South Africa to keep a low profile, mind their own business, and not attract any unwanted attention. This has been codified in the so-called “Six Don’ts” that were formulated by the Chinese Consulate-General in South Africa. These are published regularly in Mainland Chinese media coverage on South Africa. For example, on 7 February 2017, three days after a Chinese couple and their daughter on holiday in South Africa was shot in a brazen late-night robbery in the lobby of a hotel at the OR Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg, the website of the Chinese state-owned news agency Xinhua published an article (Zhao 2017a) on the hotel shooting and robbery along with counsel on how it could have been avoided if the security risks had been fully appreciated. The article then produced the Six Don’ts, “to be remembered at all costs”: • • • • • •

Don’t Don’t Don’t Don’t Don’t Don’t

carry large amounts of cash exchange currency at the airport show money openly or flaunt wealth board flights arriving in the evening reveal travel plans to any unfamiliar people store passports together with other documents and cash

Given this situation, in an entire year, it would appear, there are only a day or two when Johannesburg’s Chinese suburbs in Newtown and Cyrildene invite the public to join them in celebrating the Spring Festival, when Chinese people can wander the streets inattentively and carefree. For all the other days they have to watch their every move and be constantly on the lookout for danger, and their eyes must “watch six roads and ears listen in all directions”, with no choice but to endure their lot in silence and swallow their anger. This injunction to prioritise safety and security at all costs and to remain as unobtrusive as possible accords with the external perception of the passive and taciturn Chinese nature, obscured behind a language as well as culture barrier. South Africa’s Chinese community is certainly not unusual in this regard. Academic studies of overseas Chinese communities around the world have noted their reticence to draw unnecessary attention to their already precarious and often invidious positions within

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host societies, as they prefer to remain as unobtrusive as possible within their adopted environment (Harris 2009). Yet this is a very simplistic view of South Africa’s Chinese community, a perspective borne of uncomprehending external perceptions. The community may appear quiet to outsiders, but it is actually a highly networked community that has developed elaborate structures and networks to keep its members safe and their property secure. The community comprises a wide variety of associations, business chambers, and other community organisations with strong links to Mainland China, facilitating a vibrant Chinese presence in South Africa; and has a homegrown local South African Chinese media to tell and document its own story. It is in the search for safety and security, however, so crucial in South Africa, that the Chinese community has implemented its most notable and practical solutions. It is no exaggeration to say that currently in South Africa any Chinese person, whether a resident or a tourist, no matter if they are in the middle of a city or in the remotest rural area, if they have any need, distress or emergency can phone or send a WeChat message to receive immediate assistance from other Chinese people who will likely not ask for any remuneration. This state of affairs is the result of a remarkable organisation founded and maintained by the Chinese community: The South Africa Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre (南非华人警 民合作中心 Nánf¯ei Huárén Jˇıngmín Hézuò Zh¯ ongx¯ın) (hereafter “the Centre”). With its headquarters in Cyrildene, Johannesburg, and with a network extending across every South African province, the primary objective of the Centre’s 13 offices around the country is to liaise with the South African police and to provide support to Chinese people interacting with the police. Yet in practice the Centre’s staff act not only as first responders and problem solvers but often tread on the firing line of violence and criminality to support and protect Chinese people. The Centre has come to play a prominent and indispensable role in the Chinese community, not just in safety and security matters. But it is virtually unknown to the rest of South Africa’s population, or where it is known it is subject to misunderstanding and unfounded conjecture. When an official ceremony took place in October 2018 in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape province, to mark the opening of a Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre (hereafter “Eastern Cape Centre”) in that city, outraged messages exclaiming neocolonialism were posted on Twitter and on news blogs about China supposedly opening 13 “police stations” in

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South Africa; even opposition MP Julius Malema joined in to express his outrage. The Chinese Embassy rightly dismissed these concerns as fake news, and released information about the Centres and their role and purpose, specifying that they have no law enforcement authority and are intended to participate in community policing to safeguard the Chinese community. In explaining the Centres, the Embassy spokesperson made specific mention of deaths due to crime suffered by the Chinese community over several years, averaging about 20 per year between 2004 and 2014 (Nkosi 2018).

Proactive Solutions: The Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre In his numerous meetings over the years with delegations from China, Wu Shaokang, Director of the Centre for three terms from 2011 to 2018, would often reflect back on the very difficult time in 2003, just before the establishment of the Centre, when more than 20 Chinese people were murdered in that year alone. On 23 June 2017, for example, Wu told a visiting delegation from the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the Shanghai municipal government that because of the security situation in 2003, …in 2004 we formed the Centre, and now 13 years later we are handling more than 300 cases a year, including disputes, death and injury and so on. We wanted to provide prompt and effective assistance for Chinese people in every province, so we established Centres in every province and city. In the last two years we have even started to assist Chinese people in other southern African countries, helping those who have suffered robbery and harm to get medical treatment in South Africa. We are honour-bound to do all we can to help. (Sun 2017a)

In April 2017 the Centre was able to report that the total number of Chinese people that died due to criminal activity in South Africa in 2016 had decreased to 12 (Sun 2017b). This was corroborated by Counsellor Wang Zhigang, who was the Police Liaison Officer for several years at the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria. In March 2017 he told the China News Service’s Johannesburg-based journalist that the number of Chinese killed due to criminal activity decreased from an annual average of 20 in previous years to 16 in 2014, 15 in 2015, and 12 in 2016 (Song 2017).

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This decrease is in contrast to SAPS murder statistics for the country as a whole, which in 2018/2019 reached the highest ever number of 21,022 (the number in 2014/2015 was 17,805) (SAPS 2019a). The legal foundation for the establishment of the Centre is the Community Police Forum (CPF) or Community Safety Forum (CSF), statutory bodies defined in the South African Police Service Act of 1995 to facilitate cooperation between the police and members of the community on policing and law and order (Civilian Secretariat for Police, n.d.). CPFs are intended to serve as platforms for community members and organisations as well as other relevant stakeholders to meet with the police to discuss local crime prevention initiatives. The CPFs are a core component of the SAPS’ Community Policing Strategy (CPS) aiming to enhance community–police partnerships in the fight against crime via multidisciplinary collaboration. According to the SAPS Annual Performance Plan for 2019/2020, in 2017 99% of the 1,149 police stations in South Africa had functioning CPFs (SAPS 2019b), although the SAPS has acknowledged that its training of CPFs is inadequate due to a lack of funding (Civilian Secretariat for Police Service 2019). In 2003, on the initiative and with the support of the Chinese Embassy, Li Xinzhu, at the time the Director of the Southern African Fujian Chinese Association, began to recruit a group of Chinese residents to prepare for the establishment of the Centre. The Centre was formally established in January 2004, and Li was elected as the first Director; he would serve three terms until 2011. The main functions of the Centre were described as to serve as a bridge between the Chinese community and local law enforcement agencies, to cooperate with police in cracking down on various types of crime against Chinese people, and to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese community (Nanfei365 2013). The first years of the Centre, however, were very difficult. Li often had to spend his own money to support operational costs and take time out from his business to attend to cases. As the only two people to have served as directors of the Centre, the life stories of Li Xinzhu and Wu Shaokang are closely intertwined with the history of the Centre and the South African Chinese community. Both men came to South Africa in the 1990s to pursue business opportunities, both became successful entrepreneurs and closely involved in local community organisations, and both developed their own views on how Chinese people can best integrate and prosper in South Africa. Born in a village in Fujian province in southern China in 1962, Li dropped

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out of high school early to start working on construction sites, and then opened his own business. Seeing potential for growth, in 1992 he moved to South Africa, even though it had no formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, and opened a shop selling clothing in Pretoria. He soon expanded his business to the Northern Cape, Free State, and other provinces, and with the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1998 Li’s business interests expanded to manufacturing and mining. By the time Li became the first director of the Centre in 2004, his experience in South Africa had convinced him that the only way the Chinese community can integrate successfully in South Africa is for it to actively give something back to society, and to accumulate goodwill (Baidu Online Encyclopedia: Li Xinzhu 2018). Like Li, Wu Shaokang was born in Fujian province in 1960; at the age of 18 Wu moved to Hong Kong, and in 1996 to South Africa, where he eventually opened a shop in Cyrildene, Johannesburg, selling Chinese household electric appliances. He then moved into light manufacturing, started his own business and also opened a loudspeaker factory under the brand name Omega. In 1998 Wu moved into real estate and then mining, eventually buying up and developing large commercial properties. In addition to being a successful entrepreneur, Wu is also known as a philanthropist and supporter of the local community (China Today Magazine 2014). As director of the Centre from 2011 to 2018, Wu applied the knowledge of his long experience in South Africa, which was to encourage Chinese people in South Africa not just to try make quick money, because things do not usually happen that fast in this country, but instead to rather aim to make “slow money”, i.e. to learn gradually and integrate better over time (Nanfei8 2015). At a social function at a Chinese mall in Johannesburg on 30 September 2019 to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, an occasion with songs and flag-waving, Wu was having a discussion with a journalist from the Mainland China newspaper Nanfang Daily. Wu felt inspired to reflect on the history of the Centre, a story that to him vividly embodies the struggle of the local Chinese community to integrate with confidence in South African society. “When Chinese South Africans encounter difficulties”, he said, “they turn to the Centre, and hence the people behind the Centre spare no effort or cost to ensure their safety and successful development”. When the decision was made in 2003 to launch the Centre, Wu recalled, he provided an office space at a Chinese mall he owned, some people

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brought computers from their own homes, and various Chinese organisations banded together to raise R1 million (about US$150,000) in startup capital for the Centre (Nanfang Online 2019). Li described the first years of the Centre as “crossing the river by feeling the stones”, i.e. a cautious and gradual progression. At the beginning, according to Li, the Centre was not recognised by the SAPS. But then in 2006 when four policemen were killed in the line of duty, Centre staff attended the memorial service and raised R160,000 (about US$25,000) to support the families of the deceased. Via this action the police came to realise the good intentions of the Chinese community, according to Li, and their attitude towards the Centre started to change. Gradually the Centre established close working relations with the police, so that it could depend on quick reaction by them in case of emergencies (China News Service 2019). The Centre consists of a management section with a council that elects a director and other positions every two to three years; and an operational section with staff based in all the regional offices, although there are only a small number of full-time staff. The Centre operates as a non-profit organisation whose daily operational expenses are covered by annual membership fees paid by the members of the council; subsidies from the Chinese Embassy; contributions from overseas Chinese groups, individual Chinese people living in South Africa, Chinese corporations, and the Chinese government; and donations from South African government departments (Nanfei365 2013). On 1 March 2017, for example, the Centre received a donation of US$5,000 from businessman Carlos Chan, owner of the Oishi brand of snacks and candy and also the Philippines Presidential Envoy to China, at a reception hosted in Johannesburg (Sun 2017c). Like most Chinese associations in South Africa, the Centre has strong links to Mainland Chinese institutions, and regularly receives delegations that are reported in South African Chinese media. During the first half of 2017, for example, it hosted delegations from among others the Nantong Public Security Bureau in Jiangsu province, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the Guangdong provincial government, the Shanghai Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the Guangdong Committee of the Political Consultative Conference on Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs, the Wenzhou City Government, and the Global Hakka Association. In December 2016, moreover, Wu Shaokang led a delegation from the Centre to Mainland China, visiting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

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the United Front Work Department, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the Ministry of Public Security, and a range of cities and institutions in Fujian province (African Times 2017a). According to Li, the Centre has handled around 3,000 cases since 2004, or around 300 per year (China News Service 2019), and receives on average five or six calls for help every day, but often as many as ten. Apart from assisting Chinese people who have been robbed or attacked, the Centre handles various other kinds of requests for help with a 24-hour hotline; deals with complaints and disputes within the Chinese community; and maintains social media networks and issues security warnings, tips, and useful information (Nanfang Online 2019). At a meeting at the Centre’s headquarters in Johannesburg on 21 April 2017, it was reported that in 2016 the Centre handled a total of 378 cases with a breakdown as follows: • 97 cases related to robbery, murder, extortion, and other criminal activities (25%) • 32 cases related to civil disputes and dispute resolution (8%) • 29 cases related to assisting or coordinating with the police, and participation in community activities (8%) • 224 cases related to telephone assistance, translations, and legal consultations (59%) (Sun 2017b). In September 2019 Nanfang Daily described the experience of walking through Cyrildene, the Chinese neighbourhood in Johannesburg, and noticing armed security personnel hired by the Centre keeping guard. The local police station, moreover, was found to be coordinated by the Centre, there are police officers on duty 24 hours a day, and the Centre also has fully armed vehicles patrolling the area. This stable and prosperous situation, the report concluded, is the result of appeals by Chinese people and their own implementation of security measures: They will no longer accept passively to be bullied. This is a new generation of overseas Chinese who have stood up with the rise of China. They have a more active spirit of self-reliance and group consciousness. The Centre is an excellent model of such an overseas Chinese organisation. (Nanfang Online 2019)

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The Centre’s services are by no means largely confined to Johannesburg or even South Africa’s larger cities. In September 2017, for example, a Chinese tourist from the Chinese city of Tianjin was driving on his own in Northern Cape province when his car broke down in Kimberley. He found himself stranded in a place where he knew not a single person, with almost no money. But a call to the Northern Cape Centre, which was established in July 2016, was enough to get his car fixed at no cost to him at all (Consulate-General of the PRC in Cape Town 2016; ConsulateGeneral of the PRC in Cape Town 2017). Earlier in 2017 the Northern Cape Centre also handled the case of a Chinese liquor store owner who was plagued by a few police officers who would regularly come into his shop and issue him with various vague fines or confiscate his stock. He reached out to the Northern Cape Centre, whose contacts with the police caused the officers to be transferred elsewhere, and the problem was solved (South Africa Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre 2017a). The Northern Cape Centre assists Chinese residents in such multiple ways, but is also rushes to all corners of the arid, sparsely populated province when Chinese shops are robbed, owners shot, kidnapped or stuck in the middle of a protest action. When a Chinese shop outside Kimberley was robbed in February 2017, for example, the director of the Northern Cape Centre immediately drove 480 km to check on the victim and to support the police investigators (South Africa Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre 2017b). Such is the daily reality for the now 12 regional offices established by the Centre in Nelspruit (Mpumalanga), Nelson Mandela Bay in Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape), East London (Eastern Cape), Polokwane (Limpopo), Upington (Northern Cape), Cape Town (Western Cape), Durban (KwaZulu-Natal), Newcastle (KwaZulu-Natal), Rustenburg (North-West), Mahikeng (North-West), Bloemfontein (Free State), and Maseru (Lesotho). An important component of the Centre’s work is to provide advance warning through its social media networks of impending protest actions or disturbances, or when necessary ensuring that Chinese people are safely evacuated from trouble spots, even if they are in remote rural towns. When the municipality of Motherwell in the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan area in Eastern Cape province started clearing illegal dwellings and occupiers of municipal land in June 2017, for example, protests erupted in the town. Some Chinese shops were vandalised and

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two Chinese shop owners were trapped in their shops. They were able to contact the Nelson Mandela Bay Centre, who arranged for them to be escorted to safety in an armoured police vehicle (African Times 2017b). Or when a mob started ransacking shops in the small town of Delareyville in North West province in April 2018, the Centre sent out a bulletproof patrol vehicle and ten fully armed personnel to protect Chinese shops. They guarded the five Chinese shops all through the night, so the mob ransacked other shops in the town instead (African Times 2018). In recent years the Centre’s reach has even begun to extend beyond the borders of South Africa and well into the continent. In March 2017, for example, a Chinese girl was shot in the head during a robbery in Mozambique. The Centre advanced R880,000 (about US$70,000) for her to be airlifted to Johannesburg for emergency surgery (Sun 2017d). The Centre previously also provided for a Chinese person to be airlifted to Johannesburg after a boating accident in Madagascar, and for another after he contracted malaria in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Nanfei Caihong 2017). In May 2017 a Chinese couple who suffered injuries in a fire in Mozambique were airlifted for treatment to Johannesburg (Chinese in Africa 2017), and in June 2017 two Chinese burn victims were transferred from Gabon to Johannesburg. In all these cases Centre personnel visited the victims in hospital and provided for their recovery (African Times 2017c).

Other Solutions: Private Security Companies and Guns The South Africa Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre is a significant achievement by the Chinese community to deal with the issue of security, yet it is not the only way that Chinese people have responded to this problem. Various Chinese private security companies, some of which are mentioned below, have emerged in South Africa; often these would be established by people who were robbed, hijacked, and/or shot in the past themselves, and felt compelled to do something to assist other Chinese people avoid the same fate. Lu Liran moved to South Africa in 1998, and was shot five times in a house robbery in 2006. In 2008 he established what was reportedly the first Chinese security company in South Africa, not with the goal of making money, he said, but to protect Chinese people (CCTV International 2017a). Reports were published in South African media in

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2011, however, about the arrest of Lu Liran—described by police as operating an illegal security company in Cyrildene called Southern Africa Xuan Dragon Security—and two South African police officers for beating up a man in Cyrildene and leaving him for dead (Bailey 2011). Longwei Security, established in Durban in 2014, has around 500 staff comprising guards, patrolling teams, and an elite flying squad called the Flying Tigers. In April 2017 this elite team confronted a number of robbers and rescued four Chinese people who had been hijacked and kidnapped outside Durban (Huaqiao Xinwenbao 2017a). In June, the Chinese television channel CCTV-4 broadcast a segment about Longwei Security chasing a group of robbers and fighting a running gun battle with them through a forest, afterwards arresting one robber who had been shot in the leg (CCTV International 2017b). ESS Security was established in Johannesburg in 2010 by Chen Bin, who believes that “if you haven’t been robbed in South Africa, you haven’t really been there yet”. ESS employs around 300 armed staff members, and the company is reportedly responsible for securing ten assembly points for Chinese people within a parameter of 40 km in Johannesburg. According to Chen, his staff are better equipped and better trained than the police, and they are not afraid to shoot and fight back at critical moments, when “you have to be brave and courageous” (People Online 2017; Zhao 2017b). Riot Security Services is another Chinese security company in South Africa. In June 2017 the company’s founder, Li Yun and five of his staff gave an open training session on a public square in Johannesburg on selfdefence, incorporating skills from Chinese martial arts. According to Li, the private security industry in South Africa is already very crowded and it is too late for any new Chinese competitors to enter the market (Tian 2017). In 2014 HW Raid Security was founded in Johannesburg as a joint venture between a South African private security company, Raid Security, and a Chinese security conglomerate, Shandong Huawei Security Guard Group. Chinese state media website People Online (2014) reported the new joint venture as an important precedent for Chinese security companies to go abroad and to actively promote the safety of Chinese overseas investors. A Chinese gun club was formed in Johannesburg in 2015, the Africa Chinese Firearms Association, to train Chinese people to use firearms to defend themselves (Huaqiao Xinwenbao 2015). From late 2016 members

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of this Association started conducting joint community patrols with the police and private security companies in Johannesburg, and were involved in the apprehension of criminals (Huaqiao Xinwenbao 2017b). Furthermore, Chinese journalists have produced news reports on Chinese people in South Africa joining gun clubs or buying weapons and learning to defend themselves as a result of the dangerous environment (Pear Video 2017).

Conclusion: A Unique Community with Unique Solutions It appears that for a Chinese person in South Africa with an urgent need or emergency, at any time and place, assistance and support—in and by Chinese—is readily at hand. For the South African Chinese community, the South Africa Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre is a pragmatic and innovative response to the overriding problem of security. Yet it is also the coordinated expression of a community growing in confidence and ability to protect and maintain itself, to mobilise its resources and networks, and to form its own small component of the diverse population of South Africa. Whether by organising and networking or by arming themselves and working closely with the police, the Chinese in South Africa have grappled with safety and security and have not been content or too taciturn to accept matters as they were. The Chinese community has a plethora of organisations and associations, and a vibrant if small homegrown South African Chinese-language media including news agencies, web portals, and newspapers. The rest of South Africa is almost entirely ignorant or misinformed about the activities of the Centre and its various offices around the country, but the newspaper and websites of African Times (非洲时报 F¯eizh¯ou Shíbào)—a news agency founded by Li Xinzhu, Wu Shaokang and others in 2005 to document the South African Chinese community—as well as news portals like South Africa Chinese Web (published at Nanfei8.com) report daily in Chinese on all the crimes affecting the Chinese community and the responses, security warnings and notifications. In this the Chinese community of South Africa has a unique story to tell: Of a community with a long history that is implementing new and modern solutions to security challenges in a tough environment; of a community that may appear quiet to outsiders but is actually highly networked and organised; and of a vibrant community in Africa that

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is emblematic of a new China’s rise in the world—even though it still regularly suffers murder and criminal activity. Its story and achievements, however, remain to be widely told and understood and, where possible, replicated by the rest of South Africa.

References Africa Check. (2019, September 12). FACTSHEET: South Africa’s Crime Statistics for 2018/19. Africa Check. https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheetsouth-africas-crime-statistics-for-2018-19/. Accessed 11 November 2019. For the full SAPS Crime Statistics for 2018–2019 see https://www.saps.gov.za/ services/april_to_march2018_19_presentation.pdf or https://www.saps.gov. za/services/crimestats.php. Accessed 11 November 2019. African Times. (2017a, February 14). 致南非华人警民合作中心的感谢信. Nanfei8.com. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/shetuanhuodong/ 2017-02-13/41737.html. Accessed 21 November 2019. African Times. (2017b, June 20). 南非PE市马瑟韦尔地区发生大规模骚乱 多家外国人店铺遭到打砸抢. Nanfei8.com. http://www.nanfei8.com/huaren zixun/huarenzixun/2017-06-20/47345.html. Accessed 22 November 2019. African Times. (2017c, June 12). 驻约堡总领馆、警民中心先后看望从加蓬转 至约堡的两名烧伤患者. African Times. https://www.52hrtt.com/za/n/w/ info/D1497260463943. Accessed 22 November 2019. African Times. (2018, April 21). 图文:警民中心派出装甲车保安 骚乱区华商安全 度过惊险一夜. African Times. https://www.52hrtt.com/za/n/w/info/D15 24033246848. Accessed 22 November 2019. Bailey, C. (2011, August 11). Cops Linked to Chinese Assault. IOL News. https://www.iol.co.za/news/cops-linked-to-chinese-assault-1115633. Accessed 22 November 2019. Baidu Online Encyclopedia: Li Xinzhu. (2018). 李新铸. Baidu Baike. https:// baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%9D%8E%E6%96%B0%E9%93%B8. Accessed 20 November 2019. CCTV International. (2017a, June 15). 央视报道: 破产富翁勇闯南非 五声枪响 逼出一个“华人镖师”. Nanfei8.com. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/ huarenzixun/2017-06-15/47129.html. Accessed 22 November 2019. CCTV International. (2017b, June 1). 央视报道:南非华人小伙创业开安保公 司 曾在树林与劫匪激战, (CCTV-4). Nanfei8.com. http://www.nanfei8.com/ huarenzixun/huarenzixun/2017-06-01/46488.html. Accessed 22 November 2019. China News Service. (2019, May 29). 南非华人警民合作中心李新铸:争做侨 胞平安保护神. Nanfei8.com. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/huaren zixun/2019-05-29/63407.html. Accessed 15 November 2019.

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Nanfei365 (2013), 南非警民合作中心 简介, Nanfei365.com, 11 July, http:// www.nanfei365.com/home.php?mod=space&uid=830&do=blog&id=1364. Accessed 15 November 2019. Nkosi, B. (2018, November 16). China “Not Opening Police Stations” in SA. The Star. https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/china-not-opening-police-sta tions-in-sa-18142156. Accessed 12 November 2019. Pear Video. (2017, February 23). 南非华人开始持枪自卫 (South African Chinese People Using Guns for Self-Defense). Pear Video YouTube Channel. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tRGGb4yrnA. Accessed 22 November 2019. People Online. (2014, December 20). 中国首家海外合资保安公司在南非成 立. People Online. http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/1220/c1002-262 45692.html. Accessed 22 November 2019. People Online. (2017, December 9). 华人商户的保护神 - 南非知名华人保安 公司再盘点. People Online. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/huaren zixun/2017-12-09/55386.html. Accessed 22 November 2019. SAPS. (2019a). South African Police Service Crime Statistics 2018/2019. https:// www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php. Accessed 15 November 2019. SAPS. (2019b, July 17). South African Police Service Annual Performance Plan 2019/2020. Presentation to the Select Committee on Security & Justice. http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/190717 SAPS.pdf. Accessed 15 November 2019. South Africa Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre. (2017a, January 20). 尽心尽责,北开普省华人警民合作中心为华商排忧解难!. Nanfei8.com. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/huarenzixun/2017-01-20/40721. html. Accessed 22 November 2019. South Africa Chinese Community & Police Cooperation Centre. (2017b, February 8). 金佰利华人超市遭抢劫 女店主沉着冷静未遭伤害. Nanfei8.com. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/huarenzixun/2017-02-08/41489. html. Accessed 22 November 2019. Statistics South Africa. (2019). P0341 Victims of Crime. Governance, Public Safety and Justice Survey GPSJS 2018/19. http://www.statssa.gov.za/public ations/P0341/P03412018.pdf#page=34. Accessed 11 November 2019. Song Fangcan. (2017, March 1). 南非连续发生两起中资企业员工遭持枪抢劫案. China News Service. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/huarenzixun/ 2017-03-01/42349.html. Accessed 15 November 2018. Sun Xianglu. (2017a, June 23). 上海市侨办代表团走访南非华人警民合作中心并 举行座谈. African Times. https://www.52hrtt.com/za/n/w/info/D14982 12222248. Accessed 15 November 2019. Sun Xianglu. (2017b, April 22). 南非华人警民合作中心召开2017年安全工作 常务会议. African Times. https://www.52hrtt.com/za/n/w/info/D14927 46200701. Accessed 15 November 2019.

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Sun Xianglu. (2017c, March 2). 警民中心获捐5千美金 菲律宾总统中国特使施恭 旗访问南非受到热烈欢迎. African Times. https://www.52hrtt.com/za/n/ w/info/D1488438472187. Accessed 21 November 2019. Sun Xianglu. (2017d, March 25). 莫桑比克90后女子遭抢劫头部中枪 南非华 人警民合作中心积极协助到约堡医院救治. African Times. http://www.nan fei8.com/huarenzixun/huarenzixun/2017-03-25/43413.html. Accessed 20 November 2019. Tian Hongyi. (2017, June 27). 中国“教头”助力南非防范暴力犯罪. Xinhua Africa. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/huarenzixun/2017-06-27/ 47686.html. Accessed 22 November 2019. Zhang Jiexian. (2017, February 21). 南非去年涉华劫案有所减少 约堡严重犯罪 降10%. People’s Daily Online. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/huaren zixun/2017-02-21/42025.html. Accessed 11 November 2019. Zhao Xi. (2017a, February 7). 南非旅游被劫遭“爆头” 要命的事本可这样避免. Xinhuanet. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-02/07/c_129470162. htm. Accessed 12 November 2019. Zhao Xi. (2017b, June 12). 南非华人“镖局”:雇300名黑人“镖师” 配枪近200 支. Xinhuanet. http://www.nanfei8.com/huarenzixun/huarenzixun/201706-12/46963.html. Accessed 22 November 2019.

CHAPTER 14

Melting Point—A Personal Essay by Ufrieda Ho Ufrieda Ho

∗ ∗ ∗ “Don’t be such a snowflake,” my sister says. I’m fuming; I can’t even half-sneer at the casualness of her response that I’m being too precious, too fragile, that I think I’m going to melt. It’s a hundred miles from the indignation I want to stew in and the reason I phoned her in the first place. I had clicked on two emails and found I had been invited to a function literally because I’m a “Person of Colour.” The first email with the invite arrived in my inbox cordially enough, “requesting the pleasure of my company” and all of that. It was the preceding mail I clicked on second that revealed the thread that had me gobsmacked and then fuming. Either by mistake or sheer absence of nous instead of oblivion this email was forwarded to me. Here in the to and fro messages between colleagues was a thread asking for “people of colour” to be put on the invite list— “Including Chinese and Japanese,” the man’s email had continued. His

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colleagues wrote back to him, offering up, quite cheerfully, my name and that of one other person: a black female politician. “It’s the way the world works and if you want to stay on the invite list and you want to go to the event then you have to get off your high horse and suck it up,” my sister says, deliberately matter of fact, deliberately annoying. Her lunch is burning, she says (still deliberately matter of fact, still deliberately annoying) and it’s more important than my indignation. She hangs up before I can dive deep into what I have to say about blinkers, privilege and whitesplaining and half a dozen other bitter labels stuck in my throat. ∗ ∗ ∗

Sink or Swim Fahfee Man “Suck it up, don’t rock the boat … just eat your lunch”—it still how Chinese South Africans and many Chinese living in South Africa navigate life and their expected place in society. We’re expected to get over it, because we always have. It’s a hangover maybe from surviving by invisibility as a minority group regarded as second-class citizens in apartheid South Africa like all non-whites, but still having more concessions and benefits than other race groups relegated to a lower rung on the racial stepladder in a Nationalist Party-run country. In the apartheid days my parents would have always had to slot into someone else’s framing of the world so they didn’t draw too much attention to themselves. They’d nod and smile knowing that it made life simpler and they could get on with their agenda mostly of saving some money to raise me and my three siblings to have the aspiration of an education—and importantly, a university education, which really was the first prize for my parents. They knew it would be the key out of the grudge work and grind, which was the reality for my fahfee man father. Fahfee is a distinctly South African illegal gambling game in which betters place bets on numbers between 1 and 36. It is characterised by choosing “lucky” numbers from dream symbology and patterns of life and is associated predominately with Chinese operators and black betters, especially during the apartheid era.

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While dad headed out six and half days a week for a boss who had several “banks” or groupings of regular betters dotted throughout Johannesburg, my mom kept house and raised four children. As a migrant from China, someone who arrived in South Africa as a “paper son”—having had to use someone else’s identity fraudulently to dodge authorities—this was what livelihood looked like for my father. In the townships and locations, the so-called kasis, the fahfee man made the calculated gamble of pitting recorded betting patterns up against luck and chance and the whimsy of dreams and superstition. It’s how betters and bankers chose their numbers, even now, in the hope of winning a few rands. Fahfee operates in the shadows, with the stigma of illegality and stays deliberately invisible and unknown. Under apartheid it was staying under the radar of white authorities and white people in general. Fahfee loomed large in my family, it made my identity one that was curated, hidden and tweaked, depending on who it was presented for. And fahfee was never gambling in my family, it was work and it was how my dad put rice on the table. My parents were hardworking and committed even to this drudgery. They knew to survive meant staying the course, also about making nice with giving gifts of bowties and brandy. It kept police and polite white polite enough to look the other way. They knew if they didn’t suck it up they would be told to “go back to China.” It was infuriating, insulting of course, but just convenient and advantageous enough to silence whatever protestation they may have had. Fahfee became and still is synonymous of a generation of working-class Chinese men like my father. To outsiders he was only ever one of these two things: the fahfee man or the Chinaman. We all weigh up trade-offs and choose a side on the scale that gives us more personal benefits. We also know sacrifice, as we do self-preservation. It’s not unlike the choking truth of the Cantonese idiom that translates loosely about eating something lovely but knowing it hits your gut not via the usual channels, but via the bumpy discomfort of going down your spine—sometimes there are bitter pills to swallow. ∗ ∗ ∗

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Skin in the Game Skin colour doesn’t change, it’s a visual marker, it’s the part of your identity you can’t escape—your skin colour marks you and speaks for you even before you say a single word. Skin colour doesn’t change—identity though does. The shaping of the identity of the Chinese in South Africa is of course no different to any other group of people inventing and reinventing themselves. There’s no easy way to untangle the stories of the different Chinese communities living in South Africa today. We are too conveniently lumped together as “the Chinese community.” There’s little wish to understand that the Chinese, like any other group or community, can’t possibly be a homogenous monolith. That being proud of your Chinese ethnicity and heritage is not an automatic match-up to being supportive of China’s politics, policies or even cultural practices of other Chinese. Of course there are complexities, individual identities, loyalties and leanings and an evolving dynamics that’s true of any community. Identity is never fixed, not for anyone. We hold on to some things tighter and discard others as their usefulness and relevance keep shifting. Identity is confused, complex, contradictory but also perfectly rational and perfectly ordered. It’s individual as well as collective—always it’s personal. Understanding identity is understanding that we are the things that pull us apart, the things we would rather leave unmentioned; it’s the things that unite us and the things we foreground for compliments and affirmation. For the Chinese living in South Africa identity takes it shapes from shifting personal experiences, changing intergenerational dynamics, the whims of global politics, the tilt of global economic power in China’s favour and the full range of evolving perspectives of China’s presence in Africa. Identity is also shaped these days by social media’s echo chamber and where we find the convenience and comfort of confirmation bias. Racial injury, real or perceived, is a reason for righteous outrage and to mobilise, even if it’s via a hashtag. Social media allows people to signal allegiance and to stand proud in defence of “Chineseness”—and increasingly and disturbingly that’s become enmeshed to mean China’s politics too. It’s

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hopelessly narrow and quite absurd to assume that the Chinese communities in South Africa are a single entity with wholesale allegiance to a superpower that draws misgivings, distrusts and suspicion. Going against the grain of “the glorious China” narrative comes with perils. You can see it with the signalling of allegiance on a Whatsapp group or on a Facebook page; it’s a statement also a lure to note who’s mute on what issue. It allows a quick identification of who deserves cheering on, acceptance and recognition. It also defines insider, allies and mere onlooker. The sense of ourselves these days can also find a boost from the most tenuous links and in the seemingly most odd places. It’s the like of the movie Parasite’s success at the Oscars in 2019 and the mainstream success of Crazy Rich Asians (2018). Neither film is Chinese, but ‘Asian’ has become another label to be co-opted in the broader skin tone umbrella. The impact of the cross-over success of the feel-good, formulaic romcom directed by Jon M Chu wasn’t the movie per se, it was the message of Asians telling their stories in a way they wanted it told, played by characters who at least look like them and was led by directors and crew that had Asian connections, even if by surname alone. Writing an opinion piece in the New York Times, columnist Viet Thanh Nguyen (2018) put it down as: “We live in an economy of narrative scarcity, in which we feel deprived and must fight to tell our own stories and fight against the stories that distort or erase us.” Closer to home South Africans grasp onto the success of someone like Dr Patrick Soon-Shiong lauding him on Facebook posts and shares. SoonShiong may have left South Africa decades ago, has little to do with the country these days, but he is still claimed. He remains the South Africanborn surgeon and one-time top Wits University graduate who has gone on to become a US biotech billionaire and the very high-profile owner of the LA Lakers and the LA Times. Negative stereotypes too hold potency as rallying points that feed off outrage. Take the Covid-19 pandemic, the annual horrors of the Yulin’s dog eating festival and, in our backyards in South Africa, the abuse and inhumane treatment of donkeys raised and slaughtered for their skins for the Chinese traditional medicine market—they all flame racist vitriol and small-minded intolerance against the Chinese. The angrier people are about being bullied, about being targeted, the easier it is to blindside them to heed the call to “stand together” to “stand proud” and to “show the world that China is strong and resilient to

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the Western influencers’ lies.” Stoking righteous anger and the urge to retaliate makes paper enemies real-life ogres. The “defend China and Chinese and at all costs” programme however, trips itself up when it’s a kneejerk reaction. It crosses the line from rightly calling out China and Chinese-bashing, racism, bigotry and intolerance and becomes a retreat to laagers to throw stones back or to play mindless cheerleading or to parrot the default “West against China” narrative. Identity can sway in this narrow band of ethnic pride and a belief of exceptionalism on one hand, and on the other, stay miserably weighed down by massive chips on shoulders and an inferiority complex that masquerades as bravado. But sectionalism makes us smaller, it makes the world devastatingly polarised and all of us a little more insular and blinkered. When we fail to step out from the circle of petty sniping and outrage it adds to the portrayal of the Chinese once again lumped together—as thin-skinned, paranoid and myopic. It makes the identity question spin wildly and more pertinently as a question of what it means to be Chinese in the South Africa today. Or asked differently: what chameleon do you want to be today? … Maybe skin colour does change after all. ∗ ∗ ∗

I Am Ah Kee’s Daughter This thing happens sometimes when I’m in the supermarket. I do this now even as an adult as I’ve done since I went shopping with my mom as a kid back in the 1980s. I see a Chinese uncle or aunty in the supermarket aisle—they look familiar but I’m not sure, I think that they know my parents. Being not sure is not good enough to dodge a gaze and to pretend like you’re looking for low fat yoghurt not the Greek variety that’s directly in front of you. So I greet, a standard greeting in Cantonese, respectful and warm. The old uncle or aunty looks at me and says hello, haltingly maybe, a little uncertain themselves. Then they say almost instantly in that quite brash, unapologetic way some Cantonese uncles and aunties have—“Whose daughter are you?” they ask.

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And I tell them “I am Ah Kee’s daughter and my mother is Ah Yee.” They pause. They use the seconds to locate them on the map in their heads of where all the Chinese South Africans they know fit in. They find my parents, then they find me. Now they smile and nod and tell me to send greetings to my mother. I say I will, thank you very much. We’re bound by these first threads of our identity. They’re laid down when our world is not yet ours. Our parents, our grandparents, our siblings and our networks of extended family community set up our codes of norms and customs, of duty and of expectations we must strive for. Greeting aunties at the veggie aisle is demonstrating that you have good manners, that your parents brought you up right and that you care that they “don’t lose face.” Growing up in Joburg’s eastern suburbs, my Chinese community is small and the Chinese school I attend is insular, tiny and contains a snug world view. There is a lot to wonder about but not as much to question. It’s only growing up and growing into new ways of seeing and being that the picture starts to look less cosy, less easy to contain and less easy to agree with without more critical interrogation. The tangled bits means my personal identity has me wondering still. It also means that till I find different answers I’ll probably carry on stopping to greet the old Chinese uncles and aunties in the supermarket. ∗ ∗ ∗

Where Did the “Made in Taiwan” Stickers Go? Just about everything had a “Made in Taiwan” sticker when I was growing up—a small gold oval sticker affixed to the base of plastic ornaments and behind photo frames and on the packaging of cutesy erasers I loved as a teen. Then the stickers disappeared one day and it seemed like no one noticed. Of course it wasn’t just the stickers that made their exit, it was Taiwan exiting the politics frame in a changed South Africa. The seismic shifts of democracy in 1994 were beginning to rumble into place; the ruling ANC party would align with the People’s Republic of China. Trade and diplomatic ties would be with the PRC and the island standing

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its ground against the mainland would be muscled back into orphan territory. The diplomatic shake-up in 1998 was one of the key signallers that the story of China in South Africa was set to enlarge, like its footprint. It would also change how the Chinese South Africans would be perceived. In that time Chinese South Africans sought to separate themselves from the newcomers, desperate to make the distinction of being “South African Born Chinese” the so-called SABCs. Somehow this acronym, they believed, marked them as better, as more “refined” as removed and above the caricature of the hock-and-spit Chinese hawkers who seemed to have arrived overnight en masse. Making a distinction also associated Chinese South Africans with a merit of long lineages linked to generations on the southern tip of the African continent. By the late 1990s hawkers had populated Joburg’s streets then spread to the Joburg East suburb of Cyrildene where a second Chinatown in Joburg was mushrooming. Before long the ubiquity of sub-divided warrens in hulking warehouses would become the boom of China malls dotted across the industrial landscapes of the city. The nascent presence of Chinese migrants turned to bulging and swelling, so much so that in the next few years the newcomers would outpace the SABCs in numbers and would come to be called “a wave” of migration. But in this window period Chinese migrants were easily labelled as chance-takers, small-fry, law-benders and the people bringing down the “good name” of the Chinese. More specifically, it made the invisible Chinese community squirm under a spotlight they worked so hard to dodge. These “interlopers” in their numbers were tearing at a neatly sewn up presentation of the Chinese as unobtrusive, hardworking, law-abiding and compliant—the “good” stereotypes of being Chinese that are easy to own up to. It happened often enough those days that someone would seek me out at a function or gathering and tell me something like “you should write something about this, so people don’t think that we’re not like them.” There may have been a headline about a Chinese syndicate involved in an abalone or rhino horn bust. These people collaring me might have been somewhat angry about the poaching crisis but more outraged to be identified as “them” as “these people” and completely blind to their own xenophobic tendencies.

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Fast forward to the present day and the one-time newcomers are after two decades not just a wave, but a force and a force that shapes the question of China in Africa with convincing dominance. Those “hock-and spit” hawkers who started off selling every imported thing of cheap ubiquity from a single shipping container, or who shared floor space with six or seven other migrants in highrises in Hillbrow have become wealthy and materially successful. They’re tied to property development empires mostly of China malls; they own restaurants that have become successful chains or have made the simple iteration of import and export businesses become the sum of many valuable parts. They’re also the people who leverage political expediency unapologetically, spinning it as due loyalty to ruling parties both in South Africa and in China— “building those bridges of friendship and cultural exchange” but knowing that towing the party line builds favour. In contrast the Chinese South Africans have been markedly absent from politics. It’s likely linked to a history of a people who, like all non-whites, were disenfranchised before democracy in 1994 and many who were not just second-class citizens but considered outsiders too. Now SABC seems like a less-wise moniker to foreground. Now, saying that you “stand with China” earns slaps on backs, heart emojis and a new kind of political agency and connection. Polishing up on Mandarin over English or even Cantonese is essential to creep closer in proximity to this new power. Demonstrating this closeness is a new identity marker too for the Chinese in South Africa today. ∗ ∗ ∗

Sorry I Don’t Speak Mandarin My Cantonese is shaky, I also speak a kind of village-Cantonese, I’m told. I used to apologise and I used to be embarrassed a little that my Cantonese sounded so country bumpkin. But I’ve grown to love that my accent is way off from posh because it marks me as someone descended from people who came from a village, the simple places that my parents and grandparents called home at some time in their lives and therefore also holds bits of my origin story. I also know I can say this living in a world which I navigate in English and that I may not feel the same if advancing in this world came down to

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my Cantonese accent and how this might mark social standing, level of education and class. I also don’t speak Mandarin. “You don’t speak Mandarin, why?” the man at the crowded Dragon City mall in Joburg’s industrial western townships barks in English at me. It’s the summer of 2019. He is impatient and dismissive about the journalism project I’m working on about crime and the Chinese traders who have stepped up their formalisation of Chinese policing forums. He doesn’t fob me off immediately largely because I’m a distraction from the monotony of selling the shoes and clothes jammed into his fluorescent-lit trading space in a corner shop in the giant mall. First I apologise with the few sentences of Mandarin I am able to mutter that really are “Sorry, I don’t speak Mandarin”. We stumble along with a bit more English and I try Cantonese and he shakes his head some more, with equal disdain for the home language I grew up with. He shows me a few things on his phone about police forum meetings and WeChat group exchanges about their activities but he’s not keen to reveal too much, it’s clear. I don’t get much from him and in minutes I’m ready to leave. “You must speak Mandarin,” he shouts as parting shot. I can’t help but shout back “You must speak Cantonese.” All the time we’re saying this to each other in English and the irony is not lost on me. Something shifted for me in that exchange though. This was 2019, the man didn’t need to be accommodating or polite about my inability to speak Mandarin. In fact he was going to point out that it was a failing in his eyes and it would exclude me from knowing about the activities of the policing forums. Even as fear and paranoia that Chinese nationals were singled out as crime targets was spiking he didn’t need me to know about it, he didn’t need me—even a Chinese South African—to report on it or even to be interested in it. It struck me later that in the last few years his community had reached critical numbers to support its own structures, connections and economic and political muscle. It’s allowed them to keep things within a closed inner sanctum. If there was an agenda to assimilate 15 or 20 years ago it was a distant memory now. Thing is, I too was not going to apologise that Cantonese and English are two of the languages that I communicate in as a Chinese South African. I didn’t have to be particularly polite to him as a one-time newcomer and neither of us considered the exchange particularly rude.

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I was born in South Africa, not in the mighty Middle Kingdom; so sorry, not sorry—I don’t speak Mandarin. ∗ ∗ ∗

We’ve Been Here Before, We’ll Be Here Again Joburg has the distinction of having two Chinatowns. The one at the western end of Commissioner Street is the one I call “the Chinatown of my childhood.” It’s tiny and contained in the two or so blocks in this part of town. Its history dates back to the late 1880s when Johannesburg became a gold mining town with Chinese relegated to this corner as the fortune hunters and labourers on the wrong side of white also trying their luck under the shadow of the “golden mountain”—what Joburg is called in Cantonese. Some Saturday mornings when my dad got a late start to his fahfee shifts we kids would join in on trips to Chinatown. My dad would get on with adult things that needed doing and we’d tag along. Sometimes he would be in Chinatown to leave a donation in lieu of flowers for someone’s funeral at the Chinese provisions store Sui Hing Hong. Maybe he’d also have to buy a stack of printed fahfee betting sheets or some of the cheap round purses fahfee men sold on to their betters in which they placed their betting slips and the money for their bets. Sometimes it was to catch up on gossip or community news. There would also be groceries to buy and we’d pick up bunches of spinach and spring onions wrapped in newspaper, jars of mini-blocks of fermented tofu in a stinky brine or imported long-grain rice in coarse brown hessian sacks. There would also be treats. My dad was absent so much from our home just working and working that he spoilt us when he could. There would be pillowy steamed bao with char siu, the sticky roasted pork chunks, or baos filled with black lotus paste, smooth and sweet, or the crispy deepfried stuffed green peppers with a centre of pounded fish, oozing an oil slick onto the brown paper bags they were packed in all the way home. Chinatown was a space of community, customs and connection and therefore also of identity. Here we could find the foods that never appeared on the shelves at the local supermarkets but made it onto our kitchen dining table. The dishes may have been cooked up weirdness for

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some people, but for Chinese families like mine were the deliciousness of home and culinary heritage. These days Chinatown along Commissioner Street shrinks in size and significance all the time. People have moved out, emigrated even and the next generations have fulfilled the promise of professional life that those of my parents’ generation worked so hard for us to have. Every day this Chinatown slips further into memory, blurring into the past it allows another natural evolution of community to emerge. Now it’s Cyrildene Chinatown that keeps up a simple hum of everyday life, as it has done from the mid to late 1990s. It’s more recent arrivals from China who call the suburb home now. Life here spills onto the streets with produce and trade and in the small restaurants bowls of noodles and broth are served up for locals’ lunches as much as they are for visitors looking for the “authentic” Chinese food experience. Sometimes there are noisy, smoky celebrations in restaurant rooms where lazy Susans spin dishes marking off reasons to gather, to eat and to raise a glass. They’re celebrations made possible as the passage of time cycles round and as another year clocked up living South Africa turns acquaintances into friends with whom to share milestones. In-between lunch and supper trade TVs may blare from the restaurants with Chinese soapies or news from “back home.” A mah-jong game or two is played and sometimes there are children doing homework in English. It’s children that have become most notable over the last few years in Chinatown. Babies and little ones are distinct features as they’re bounced in their mothers’ arms or seen crossing the road clutching a grownup’s hand. They are a new generation of Chinese growing up as South Africans. They represent a maturing community that has set down roots. Those newcomers from 25-odd years ago are now people who have families, extended families, babies and growing children many presumably born South Africans. I see myself in those little ones sometimes, as a daughter of migrants myself. They will grow to straddle worlds. Maybe they will be torn between the imaginings of home and motherland that is their parents’ reality still. But they will have to find their way in a country that is diverse and grappling with its questions of race, contested histories and the tension points of inclusion and exclusion. They will also grow up in a democracy, imperfect and tense, but triumphant in rushing to debate and even to disagree. It’s also a country that doesn’t baulk from

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taboos like not from speaking about Tibet, Taiwan, the Hong Kong democracy protests or the human rights abuses of the Uighurs in China. Maybe these children will remember to Facetime with their grannies in China, speaking in Mandarin for a while till their Chinese becomes increasingly broken, till they remember only how to say their names in Chinese or the words for their favourite Chinese dishes. They will find bullies too with the weary old racist taunts. Some of their friends will think that “100-year-old” eggs gross or that an altar in a home honouring ancestors is spooky or bizarre. Maybe like me they’ll go to school in South Africa to be taught Geography and History in English, not Mandarin. And when they stand to attention at school it will be a national anthem of this land, and they’ll know every word. ∗ ∗ ∗

Of Snowflakes and Melting Points Being Chinese in South Africa is an evolving picture—, exactly as you’d expect. There’s a struggle for a new visibility now for Chinese South Africans today. It’s a visibility that comes through expressing distinct narratives that are about individual stories even as they are impacted on by collective histories unfolding and all the forces and pressures of a world constantly in flux. Knowing who we are is the truth we seek, or the truth we try to outrun. It makes getting closer to the identity question a journey, also a negotiation. And yes, I RSVPed cordially and went along to my “person of colour” event. I went not feeling like I had to suck it up or with the intention to sulk. I attended open to the possibility of enjoying myself and enjoying my hosts’ good graces that were indeed on display. I drank their wine, loved the canapés and engaged. I didn’t say a thing about the invitation that landed in my inbox as an insult. I didn’t make a fuss or take to social media to leave angry screen grabs as bait for Facebook or Twitter to gorge upon. Maybe I was too scared to speak out or too polite for the drama—but I also know that you have to choose your battles. And the truth is it’s not the first time it’s happened and it won’t be the last. My skin colour will always speak for me even before I say a word. That doesn’t change but I know skin colour is not my whole identity either. Just as I know I’m not a snowflake—I’m too much a “person of colour” to melt so easily.

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Bibliography Nguyen, V. T. (2018, August 21). Asian-Americans Need More Movies, Even Mediocre Ones. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/ 21/opinion/crazy-rich-asians-movie.html. Accessed 23 February 2020.

Index

A Africa Agenda, 73 African National Congress (ANC), 3, 13–20, 22–24, 26–30, 38, 42–44, 48, 50, 51, 53, 65–69, 74, 76, 77, 92, 93, 140, 144, 166, 200–202, 204–208, 212–215, 253, 254, 287 Agribusiness, 129, 185, 188, 190 Agricultural sector, 102, 179, 181–184, 187, 194 Agricultural technology demonstration centre (ATDC), 182, 189, 190, 192–194 Aid, 4, 26, 179, 180, 182, 183, 189, 193, 194, 226, 229 Alfred Nzo, 18, 22, 23 Associations, 14, 43, 223, 247–249, 254, 257, 258, 264, 267, 271, 276 B Beijing Summit, 51, 71, 92, 138, 181 Boomplay, 147, 149

BRICS, 2, 5, 37, 40, 43, 51, 55, 71, 75, 97, 129, 144, 151, 181, 186, 189, 193, 210, 222, 223, 231 C China Global Television Network (CGTN), 138, 141, 142, 148–150 China-South Africa ties, 108, 237 Chinese in Africa, 274 Chinese media, 137–139, 141, 146, 147, 149, 152 Chinese migrants, 131, 231, 238–240, 242–245, 247–249, 251, 254, 256–258, 288 Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 126, 148, 164, 215, 241, 245 Cold War, 137, 201, 226 Commercial projects, 180 Communist Party of China (CPC), 44, 65–68, 76, 78 Community organisations, 263, 267, 269

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 C. Alden and Y.-S. Wu (eds.), South Africa–China Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54768-4

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INDEX

Community policing, 268 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 2, 4, 7, 38, 39, 47, 66, 70, 77, 78, 85, 96, 103, 129, 209 Confucius Institutes (CIs), 8, 86, 130, 143, 222–232, 237, 250, 252 Crime, 129, 143, 238, 256, 264, 265, 268, 269, 276, 290 Crime prevention, 269 Crime statistics, 265

D Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), 14, 19–22, 25, 28

E Economic activities, 170, 238, 242, 243 Education, 7, 70, 71, 90, 201, 224, 225, 228, 238, 246, 249, 250, 282, 290 Equity investment, 189 Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, 66, 69, 70, 241

F Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 4, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 71, 75, 78, 86, 90, 92, 97, 101, 102, 138, 142, 164, 181, 182, 189, 193, 209, 210, 222, 226, 230, 232 Free trade zone, 170

G Gupta, 5, 48–50, 53, 54, 141, 152

H Huawei, 138, 142, 146–148, 225, 246

I Industrialization, 44, 47, 108, 112, 122, 131 Intra-Africa trade, 108, 109, 113, 125, 131, 132 Investment, 2, 4, 5, 7, 26, 38–40, 46–51, 53, 54, 71, 86, 87, 89, 91, 97–99, 101, 102, 107–109, 120–122, 125–128, 131, 147, 150, 161–165, 167, 168, 171–175, 179–181, 183–194, 203, 206, 209, 211, 214–217, 229, 230, 240–246, 257

J Job-creation, 98, 108, 131, 207, 210, 257

L Land investment, 182, 191, 194

M Mandarin, 29, 225, 229, 249, 251, 252, 289–291, 293 Mandela, Nelson, 3, 5, 7, 14–30, 48, 68, 69, 72, 74, 77, 85, 93, 96, 166, 202, 203, 205, 223, 273 Manufacturing, 7, 46, 51, 71, 91, 98, 102, 108, 110–112, 121, 123–125, 128, 131, 161–169, 172, 174, 175, 194, 210, 212, 213, 241–243, 246, 270 Markets, 4, 21, 24, 38, 42, 46, 49, 86, 90, 92, 97–99, 101, 102, 104, 108, 110, 112, 113, 117,

INDEX

120, 121, 124, 128, 129, 139, 140, 145–147, 149, 151, 163, 164, 166, 168, 172, 173, 175, 182, 183, 185, 186, 188–190, 192, 193, 204, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 217, 222, 231, 241, 243–246, 255, 258, 275, 285 Mbeki, Thabo, 4, 22, 38, 41, 43, 71, 74, 77–79, 93, 96, 201, 208, 209, 212, 223 Migration, 2, 112, 148, 239, 241, 242, 258, 288 Military, 3, 14, 15, 21, 41, 42, 71, 87, 94, 101, 103, 201, 203, 224, 226 Multichoice, 140, 149, 150

N Networking, 139, 276 New Development Bank (NDB), 43, 54, 55, 75, 86, 92 News reporting, 276

O One China principle, 13, 19, 25 Outgrower scheme, 182 Overseas Chinese, 247, 248, 251, 266, 271

P Political engagement, 238, 258 Political values, 76, 78

R Ramaphosa, Cyril, 1, 3, 6, 7, 38, 46, 50–54, 86, 93, 101, 129, 147, 172, 180, 181, 184, 194, 215 Rebalancing, 119, 210

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S Social media, 6, 140, 152, 244, 246, 255, 258, 264, 272, 273, 284, 293 SONA, 54 South Africa, 1–7, 13–29, 38–47, 50–55, 65–67, 69–78, 85–90, 92, 93, 95–104, 107–109, 111, 113, 115–118, 120, 123–126, 128–132, 137, 139–146, 148–152, 161–163, 165–168, 170, 172–176, 180, 181, 184, 186–194, 200–215, 221–223, 230–232, 237–253, 255–258, 264–271, 273–277, 282–289, 291–293 South African Chinese community, 3, 263, 267, 269, 276 Special economic zones (SEZs), 5, 7, 46, 109, 110, 126, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167, 170–176, 194 StarSat, 149, 150 State capture, 5, 50, 53, 87, 93, 141, 165, 211 Summit, 43, 45, 46, 51, 75, 86, 92, 138, 142, 189 T Taiwan, 3, 13, 15–19, 22–26, 29, 50, 66, 68, 69, 85, 162, 168, 203–206, 216, 230, 240, 248, 256, 265, 287, 293 Trade, 4, 6, 7, 14, 15, 21, 38–40, 42, 46, 47, 51, 52, 71–73, 86, 87, 90, 94, 97–104, 112–117, 119–122, 125, 126, 128, 131, 142, 163, 165, 166, 168, 180, 181, 186, 194, 203, 206, 207, 213, 222, 226, 232, 243–245, 256, 287, 292 Trade imbalance, 207 Transsion, 147

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V

Value chain, 100, 102, 103, 121, 189–191

Z Zuma, Jacob, 3–5, 7, 39–41, 43, 46–50, 70, 71, 74, 75, 77–79, 93, 96, 97, 151, 165, 208–211, 213