Some Observations on the Elections & Coalition Formation in Thailand, 1976 9789814376600

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

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Some Observations on the Elections and Coalition Formation in Thailand, 1976

by

Somporn Sangchai

Occasional Paper No. 43 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Price:

S$6.00

Dr. Somporn Sangchai ' s " Some Observations on the Elections and Coali tion Formation i n Thailand , 1976" is the forty-third publication in the Institute ' s Occasional Papers series , This series was inaugurated 1n 1970 and for the most part consists of discussion and other papers prese n ted at the Institute's Occasional and In-House seminars . The observations that follow were completed within less than two months of the April General Elections in Thailand. In the c1rcurnstances, it would be too much to expect deta1led analysis or firm conclusions. All the same , tentative though some of the observations may be , the attempt is nevertheless both timely and necessary. Perhaps , more important, let us hope this report will St1mulate a more serious and thorough-going study of r ecent Thai polit1cs 1n general and the April 1976 General Elections in particular . In the meantime , while wishing Dr. Somporn and his work all the best, it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opin1ons expressed in the material that follows rests excius1vely with Dr ~ Somporn and his i nterpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute or its supporters. 1 6 June 1976

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Acknowledgements The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of and straight-forward opinions fro~various officials at the Thai Ministry of the Interior, as well as officers and/or advisors of many political parties. They spared their time to discuss with the author matters related to party policies, elections and coalition f ormation . Their friendly and generous attitudes have made th~s study more complete . It was the writer 's privilege and honour to share their confidence and thoughts. Since the a~thor has promised to keep their names anonymous, the~r names do not and will n ot appear in this study or elsewhere. They are referred to in this study merely as " observe:rs," "pundits" or "analysts". The author spent ~he per~od between 27 March and 18 April 1976 in Bangkok and its vicin~ty . With data and a greater understanding of prevailing moods in Thailand before and after the elections , the author was able to quickly complete th~s study. The reason for this study being more readable and easi1y comprehens~ble can be attributed to the superb The edit~ng work of Christine Tan, the !SEAS Editor. typing pool , particularly Cel~na Heng Sang Noi who typed the f~nal copy of all the author's works and Yuen Mei-lin who carefully typed earlier drafts from the author's illegible handwriting, has done an excellent job . They have withstood constant pressures of demands and deadlines from all sides, and produced admirable results. To them- the Editor, the typing pool, and others at !SEAS whose names are not mentioned herein - the author sincerely conveys his appreciation and best wishes , Singapore May 1976

Somporn Sangchai

LIST OF TABLES Page I:

Prediction s o f Ele c ti o n Results in Bangkok

II :

Nat ionwide P redict ions o f Election Result s for c ignificant Parties

12

III:

Results of the 1975 and 1976 General Elections

14

IV :

19 76 Election Results i n Bangkok

16

V:

Part y Can didates and Results o f Elect ion s , 1975 and 1976

21

VI :

Un ited Parties Cabinet Members wh o Failed to be Reelected

27

VII:

Four-Party Coalition Cabi net

34

5

DIAGRAM I :

Ide olo g ~ca l Pos1tions of Some Political Parties

7

APPENDIXES

A:

Fo rmer M.Ps Switching Parties

39

B:

The Four-Party Coalition Government ' s Policy Statement

41

C:

Im portan~

Parties and Thei r Officers

50

In trod u ct ion Since 1 4 October 1973 when the students unexpectedly o verthrew the military regime a n d sent into exile Marshals Thanom Kittikach o rn, Prapas Charusatien and Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, Thailand has been heading towards democracy . Sanya Thammasak wa s appointed by the King as care - taker Prime Minister in order t o draw up a Constitution and admi nister the country until an elected government took over . The Jan uary 1975 General Election resulted in a Parliament composed o f twenty-two pa rties. The Democrat Party, led by M.R. Seni Pramoj , a n d the Social Agrarian Party of Sawet Piampon gsarn formed the first government . However this Democ rat-Social Agrarian minor~ty coalition lasted only two weeks , a n d a United Part~es coa l ition M.R . Kukrit Pramoj of the Social governmen t took o ver. Action Party be came Prime M~nister , at the head of this coali tion, compris~ng four major par~ies - the Soc~al Just~ce , Chart Thai, Social Action, and Social Nati o na l ist Parties - and t welve " under-ten " parties, that ~s , minority parties w~th less than ten seats i n Parliame n t . Kukr~t's Un ited Parties Governme nt faced great internal and external Internally , Kukrit had to s~rike a bolunce problems. between the military and the activists , the rich and the p oor, and the urban comfort and the rural hardship. Externally , the vic tories o f communist forces i n South Viet nam, Laos, and Cambodia placed Thailand in a very diff~cult pos~tion , since Thai land t ook act~ve par~ ~n the Indochinese confl~ct against the communists . Wh~le Kukr it managed to cope successfully w~ th these p r oblems , he fa~led to establish unity and co-ope rat~ on among members Conflicts and parties ~n the U n ~ted Part ies coalit ion. between General Prama rn Adireksarn, leader of the Chart Tha~ Party , and Dewitt Klingpratoom , leade r of the Social Just~ce Party, as well as ambiti o us M.Ps asp~ L1 n0 to cab~ne t seats were the two mo st d1ff1cult problems for Kukrit . The Un1ted Parties coalition governmen~ had weathered serious co nfl~cts and ln-fi gh ting, as well as social unrest ~ nstigated by activists thr oughout the country , for almost a year , successfully res1sting the demands among ~he In Un ited Part~es M. Ps ~o reshuffle the cab~net ~n 1975 . January 1976 , however, some of the disappo1nted M.Ps defected t o the Opposition which was cal ling for a vote of no-confiden ce M.R. Kukri~, therefore , on the U n i~ed Par~ies Government. members of the cabine~ his into brought and negotiated recalled , was the be will it wh~ch, , Party Soc~al Agrarian Agrar~an coalition Democrat-Social partner in the short- llved

2

government after the January 1975 General Elections . The inclusion of members of the Social Agrarian Party split the Soci al Agrarian Party and simultaneously created greater disappointment among the ambitious United Parties M.Ps . The Social Nationalist Party under Prasit Karnchanawat and members o f the Social Justice and the "under- ten" part ies secret ly agreed to vote for the Democra~New FO~-S oci alist-United Socialist Fron t sponsored no-confiden c e motion in exchange for cabinet seats 1n a new left-leaning government . The m1litary reportedly objected to any formation of a leftist government for fear of leading Tha1land toward a face similar to that o f the K1ngdom of La o s i n June 1 975, and pressured Kukrit to diss oive Par l 1amenc. Kukrit consequently dissolved Parliament on 12 January 1976 and called f or a General Elect1on on 4 Apr1l 197 6, citing the existence of cwentytwo parties in Parliament and the diff1culty of govern1ng the country ~hrough a multiparty coalicion. He hoped that the April e l e ction would les sen the number of part1es in Parliament and that a few major parties wo~ld emerge so as to give Thailand a more scable government . Such p olit1cal developments as the foregoing are of cons1derable s1gn1ficance not only to Tha1land but also to the region as a whole . Accordingly, it would appear both timely and necessary that chere is serious study of Thai politics in general and the Apr1l 1 976 General Elections in parc i cular, as the General Eleccions may in some ways In the meant1me an attempt be a turning-po1nc in Thailand . 1& made here t o reporc and tentat1vely analyse the April 1976 General Elect~ons 1n Thailand. The ma1n focus 1s on the preelec~1 on cond1t1ons, the election results, and the It is a result of a br1ef subsequent coal1t1on format1on. f i eld tr1p to Tha1land, dur1ng wh1ch data was gachered and 1nterv 1ews wi ch offic1a ls at che M1n1stry of the Incerior and w1ch off1cers and advisors o f various pol1t1cal parties In general, the prevaillng mood of the were conducted . publ1c was gauged through 1nterv1ews w1th 1nd1 viduals and

l

For addltlo~al 1nformac1on about events atle r 1~ Occobe r i 9 7J ~p to the aisaolution or Par l1 ament , see Somporn Sangc.hai, "Tha1. l and : Demo c racy, Di c tato rship , ot Domino ?" 1.n T'l'end s in ThaiLand II~ ediced by Somporn Sangc.hu and Lim Joo-J ock ( Slngapot e: S1ngapore U1aver11ty Press, 1976) . Se£ als o , Sompotn Sangcha1, "Ihe R1S1ng of rhe lllghtlit Photnu . " in SotAthsast AB'Lan Affa'l-'l'B, J 9 ?o {S1ngapote : PEP lnternat1ona l , 19 76) , pp . 357-393 .

3

through the reading of the mass media. As for general information , both leftist and rightist newspapers were used extens ively as sources , in addition to official data and interviews. It is somewhat early to draw definitive conclusi ons from this election , in view of the nature of the All the same, it is hoped that informat~on available . this paper will stimulate further discussion and serious studies of this election and the associated political developments in Thailand. Thro ugh o ut this study , the left~st and rightist labels are used in the same context as the practice in Thailand. In this sense , this usage may not coincide with that In Thailand , leftists prevailing in the West or elsewhere. Rightists include can range fr o m liberals to communists. middle- o f - the-r o ad liberals to ultra-conservatives or military strongmen . The labels are relative, depending on one ' s own ideo l o gy or thinking in terms of the Left-Right In 197 4, the " rightist " label was used to spectrum. st i gmat~ze o ne's opponents; ~n 1975 and 1976 the " leftist " Consequently , these labels may l abel als o be came a stigma. c onvey dero ga t o ry connotations, with no clear-c ut ideological In general, the leftists categorize ~mpl icat ion s . "feudalists" "imperialists" "milita r ists" " c ap~talists" while the rightists ultra-rightists, s a and "fascists" i ncluding such categories is, that leftist, very e c ateg o r i ze as "act~v~st s " and "agit ators" as communists , communistTherefore, ~nsp~red symp a th~ zers, or communist stooges. it i s d~fficult to di ff erentiate a leftist from a rightist, unles s he ~s on the extreme left or extreme right. Some individuals, howeve r, have publicly declared their Some of these are the socialists , ide o l o gical positions. the New Fo rce po liticians, and some student and political act ~ v~sts wh o c la~m to belong to the New Left movement. I t is n o t t h e purpose of this paper to try and place It ~ndivid u als in their particu lar ideological positions. mere l y r e fers t o indiv~dual ~de o log1cal stands as they are r e f erred t o in much of the mass media in Tha~land . In general, the mass media tends to consider only three parties - the Socialist Party o f Thailand , the New Force, and the United So cia l ist Front - as left1st ones; the rest of the parties are either middle-of-the-road or right~st. It is interesLing to note, however, that the United Social~st Front Party is considered not as radical as the other two leftist parties , because its leadership 1s

considered very pragmatic and " incrementalistic". This party had supported many United Parties' programmes which it considered useful to the people and/or which represent steps leading towards traditional socialism. The Social Action Party had proposed several socialistic programmes, without claiming to be a leftist-oriented party. Most observers have tended to place it slightly left-ofthe~entre o n the Left- Right spectrum . The Democrat Party had claimed to be mildly socialistic 1n 1975, but changed to a " neither left nor right" position Its policy, however , is for the April 1976 Elections. considered slightly right of the middle. The Chart Thai Party has moved from a very rightist position towards the middle, and its policy n ow accept, and is embracing, the welfare state system. Many observers , however, st1ll conside r it essentially rightist in nature because o f the number o f retired military figures within its leadershi p echel o n. The mo st rightist party in 1976 is , of course, the Dharmacracy Party which is affiliated to the Navopol, a Diagram I attempts to place militant right-wing movement. some impo rtant parties on the Left-Right spectrum for the purpo ses o f the discussion that follows.2 Here it should be noted there are factions within Most factions, however , rally mo st p o l i tical parties . around certain personalities and not around certain Such, however, is not the case with ide o l o gical p ositions. it is split into several Instead Party. crat the Demo fa c ti o ns, the most important being the "le ftist" and "r i gh t1st" fact1 ons . The leftist and rightist labels are l oosely used in th1s particular case , but all the same the leftist facti o n was able to exert its influence within the party in 197 4 and 1975 and lead the party toward "mild s ocialism. " For the April 1976 Electi ons, however, the more cons e rvative r1ghtist fact1on gaine d mo mentum . This 1n t r aparty confl 1ct between the left and the right within the Pa rty 1 s b y n o means over.

2

Fo r addi t ion a l i nf o rmation on politi c al parties and their i deo l ogy, ~e e Amnue y Suwanakijboriharn , "Current Political Conflicts in ib1d . Tha i land ," in Sangc.hai and Lim

Diagram 1:

Ideolog ical Positi ons o f Some Political Part ies

Unite d Socialist Front

Social Agrarian I I I I I I

New Force Coannunist D1.ctatorship

l l

I I

Socialist Party of Thailand

:_efr ist Parties

I

Populist

Dharmacr acy

Social Justice

Social Ac tion r

T Military l. Dictatorship Democrat

Chart Thai

Social Nationalist

Rightist Parties

6

Preelection Conditi ons Election campaigns began in earnest one day after the dissolution of Parliament , when the Democrats held a public rally at the Prarnaen Ground to denounce Kukrit and his "unsportsman- like conduct" in not allow1ng other parties a chan ce to set up a new coalition . The New Force and the socialist parties also held rallies to denounce Kukrit for The Social "destroy1 ng the budding democracy" i n Tha1land. Justice Party under Dewitt Klinprat oorn was also extremely unhappy and publicly castigated Kukrit for the dissolution In addition , Dewitt openly obstructed the o f Parl iame nt . on price-support for rice. Kukrit policy United Parties subsequently dismissed Dewitt from his posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives. The Chart Tha1 Party of General Prarnarn Adireksarn and the Social Act1on Party of Kukrit meanwhile declared that they would co- operate in campaigns for the corning election and 1n a poss1ble coalition attempt after the election. The Soc1al Just1ce and the Social Nationalist parties, therefore , secretly agreed with the Democrat t o refrain from attack1ng each o ther's candidates in the elect1on and to form a The lefti sts also coalit1on government after the election. attempted to negot1ate secretly with some left-leanlng Democ rats f o r a poss1ble coalition . Of course, some candidates 1n the provinces did not observe the1r party's agreements and went ahead attacking rivals belonging eve n to the allied parties during the elect1on campaigns. Their actions, over t as well as covert , caused great concern amo ng the parties ' leadership and created stresses and st ra1ns among the co- operating parties . As happe ned 1n the last election, there was a proli ferat1on of political part1es, increasing from forty Two most significant two to fifty-five by April 1976. changes concerning pol1tical parties, however, were as firstly, Air Marshal Dawee Chullasap decided to follows: openly JOin the Soc1al Just1ce Party, after having He replaced manipulated behind the scene for a year. Dewitt as the leader o f the party , while Dewitt moved to the po~ t o f Secretary-General of the party . Secondly , sin ce the indications seemed t o fav ou r the two major government parties - the Chart Tha1 and Social Act1on parties - many of the si x ty-six f ormer M Ps who switched parties JOined e 1ther one o f the two abovementioned parties at the expen se of the Social Justice, Social Nationallst About half of the Social and the "under-ten" part1es .

7

Agrarian M.Ps, however, followed Sawet Piampongsarn to the Democ rat Party (see Appendix A). Since the population has increased to about 42.7 million and eligible voters to about 20.9 million at the end of 1975, the number of Members of Parliament has also increased from 269 to 279.3 Of all, 2,369 candidates in the April elections, 241 former M.Ps sought reelection, 74 candidates were female, o r 827 candidates contested previously in the January 1975 elections; they represented Only 9 parties fielded more than only 39 parties, however. Democrat (260), Social Action the were they 100 c andidates; (2 0 4), Social Justice Force New (215), Thai (23 4 ), Chart (203) , Populist (151), Socialist (125), Dharmacracy (110) , and Socialist Nationalist (100). Candidates from these 9 parties constituted about two-thirds o f the total candidates . It was also n o ticeable that two avowed leftist parties New Force and Socialist p arties - and two allegedly rightist parties - Populist and Dharmacracy parties - fielded a large number of candidates in the election, in the hope of capturing significant number of seats in Parliament. Two important trends emerged during the election Firstly, the leftist influence was in the wane, campaign. t o the point that important Socialist Party leaders and f o rmer M.Ps refused to contest in the election. The leftist had faced counter-attacks from the rightists throughout 1975, and the general population appeared to be It was very convenient for tired o f civil disturbances. their opponents to accuse the socialist and New Force candidates of being communists wh o would "destroy all sacred institutions in Thailand and accept the domination o f No rth Vietnam." During the campaign, the New Force Party was accused of accepting 152 million baht from the KGB, o f having leaders o f Vietnamese descent, and of being traitors to Thailand's national interests in siding with the communists of Indochina. Candidates of the New Force, Socialist , and United Socialist Front parties faced great difficulties in the ca.mpaigns in the provinces, since many righti st activists prohibited them from entering certain l ocalities or discouraged people fr om attending their

3

Ban&kok is entitled to 2 more representatives , while an additional

representative is allocated to each of the following provinces: Prachin, Trang, Narathivas, Surat, Burisam, Roi-it, Kalasin and ~orn .

8

Student activists were also expelled campaign rallies. from many prov i nces , and mob mob~lization tactics used by the leftists were greeted with violence and bloodshed. Dr. Boonsanong Punyodhyana, Secretary- General o f the Socialist Party, was assassinated during this period. ~ grenade was thrown i nto a New Force rally, and the student demonstrati on against the American bases in Thailand o n 21 March 1976 was marred by a bomb which killed o r in J ured In general, the several demonstrat o rs and bystanders. leftists faced stiff opposition and campaign smears throughout the country, i ncludi ng Bangkok in which the New Force posed a great threat t o the Democrat d omi nati o n . An other trend indicated that, i n additi on t o the ideological struggle between the leftists and the rightists, dirty campaign techniques had been empl oyed Vote - buying was o ut o f among cand idates of most parties . fashion; a new betting technique came into mode. The representatives of candidates would g o around and bet with people against the candidates , in order t o en courage the voters to vote for the same candidates and wi n the bets. While the election was relatively clean as far as cheati ng was concerned, defaming one 's opponents o r obstructing one's opponents from w~nn~ng votes in the electo rates were Some cand~dates , v o te-canvassers, and common pract~ces. locally important supporters were n ot o nly ~ntim~ da ted but The mo st n o t or1ous attempted also assaulted , and murdered. murder was the shooting of PanJa Kesorntho ng, Deputy Minister of Educat~on of the second United Parties co alition government, who was campaign~ng successful ly in Petchbun under the Social Agrarian banner. There have b een reports and great speculat~on on violence during the electi on It should, however, be borne in m1nd that on campaign. close inspection the amo unt o f violen ce during this election was n o more or no less than, say, dur1ng the 1975 General Electi o ns. On the other hand, it is po ssible that the violence this year may have attracted mo re attention than in prev~ous years because of the attacks on some of the leading political personal1t1es. seem~ngly

There were two aspects o f great interest and spe c ulatlon among the public in this election: the contest f o r Parllamentary seats 1n Bangkok , and the number o f part1es 1n For th e questi on of whether Parliament after the election . or not the Democrat Party could manage to hold on t o 1ts dominance in Bangkok, there were at least two points Firstly, in the Dusit const~tuency which ~s raised. supposedly a mil~tary district, could the Democrat w1n any

9

of the three seats held by the previous incumbents , M.R . Kukrit, Colonel Prakob Prayoonpokkara j and Pratuan The latter two were Deputy Ministers in ~ornmayanond? the Un1ted Parties Government and both belonged to the Chart Thai Party. They were up against the very outspoken conservative Democrat, Samak Sunthornravej, who was the leader of the Democrat Party's team of candidates. Samak is very well liked by the military a nd is influential within the Democrat Party. At the early stage , most observers expected the reelection of the incumbents . However, after the demonstration against the American bases by student activists on 21 March and the handling of the problem of the American presence by Kukrit, many observers predicted the downfall of Kukrit in this military constituency. Yet, many other observers still predicted the victory of Kukrit . These observers believe that ~he exoneration of Thanom Kittikachorn , Prapas Charusatien and Narong Kittikachorn from a n y guilt in the 1 4 October 1973 uprising by the Ministry of Defence only a few days before the election might win back the support o f the military in Dusit for Kukrit and the Chart Thai Party.4 Secondly, some observers considered the New Force Party as a potential party to replace the Democrat in Bangkok ; and others seemed to expect the Democrat to win a maJority of the twenty-eight seats in Bangkok , with the rest of the seats going to the Social Action , Chart Thai, and New Force candid ates. Most liberal establishments, however, predicted a very strong challenge comi ng from the New Force candidates , while the conservative pundits tended to suggest the increasi ng significance of the Chart Thai and the Social Action parties in Bangkok.S The National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) Polls earlier predicted eight seats for the New Force, six for the Social Action and only one for the Chart Thai parties , leaving the Democrat Party with only thirteen seats . In its third survey, however , NIDA Polls predicted twenty - four to twentysix seats for the Democrat, one to three seats for the Social Action, and one for the Chart Thai. The result of th1s last polling was not released until the elect1on days,

4

Prachachart Daily , 1 April 1973.

5

See The Nation, 30 March 19 76, and Table I on the predic t1 on of election results in Bangkok .

10

for fear of influencing voters' choice of candidates. The earlier prediction , nevertheless, was denounced by Kukrit , other politicians, and academics as a political tool of the New Force Party in creating a public opinion favouring Despite various unfavourable predictions the New Force Party. Bangkok, the Democrat Party surveyed in results of election the electorate in Bangkok and maintained that it would sweep the seats in Bangkok , defeating the New Force , Chart Thai and Social Action candidates in all constituencies . Table I:

Predictions of Election Results tn Bangkok

Elect ion 19 Chart Thai Analysis Survey Group**

Party

Democrat

Raiwan

Prachachart

NIDA Polls*

Estimates Estimates 2nd

3rd

21

21

13

23-26

2

3

1

6

1-3

2

6

4

1

1

l-2

1

1

5

8

23

19

Social Ac t1on

2

Chart Thai New Force Sources:

Democrat Survey

28

The Nation , 4 April 1976; Bangkok Post , 30 March 1976 ; "NIDA Polls" 16 and 24 Mar ch and 4 Apri l 1976, (mimeographed); Raiwan , 4 April 1976.

* **

NlDA Polls did not predict any election results in its first pollin~ be c ause about 457. o f respondents were unde ci ded . Election 19 Anaiysis Group was a private group sponsored by The

Nation . Another concern f or this election was whether or not the Parliament would be fragmented with an o ther multiparty composition , similar to the previous Parliament. The Ministry o f the Interior took pains to publicize the election of parties, instead of individuals , c laimi ng that casting votes for a party was an equivalent to listening to music from a wh ole band. Most parties also tried to attract votes

11

for their candidates by using attractive slogans. The Chart Thai Party appealed to nationalism; the Social Action Party rallied around the personality of Kukrit; the New Force Party offered a new hope, justice and equality ; the Yet , Democrat Party claimed to be neither left nor right. most political pundits seemed to agree that the new Parliament would be composed of man y parties , that there would be at least five " big" parties , that is , the Democrat , Chart Tha1, Soc1al Action , Social Justice , and New Force part1es, and that the socialist politicians i n general would be defeated (Tab le II). Judging from various pred1ctions, however , the major parties after the election would only be the Democrat, the Chart Thai , and the Social Action parties; and o ne of these three parties would const1tute the core of a coalition government . For the country as a whole it was expected that the Democrat Party , despite its strong showing in Bangkok , would lose some support because of its alliance with the leftists in their abort1ve attempt to vote out Kukrit in January , that the Chart Tha1 Party would gain significantly from the general publ1c's appa rent l y unfavourable react1ons to cornrnun1st threats, and that the Social Action Party would receive a tremendous number of votes because of the Tarnbol \Commune) Development Projects , funds provided to the Tarnbol Council It must be noted that the New for development purposes. Force Party was expected to win some seats over the Democ rat 1n Bangkok and replace the socialists in the Indeed , the New Force Party was so very rural areas . con£1dent of winn1ng a signif1cant number of seats that 1 t formed a shadow cabinet 1n late March 19 76 . Many seasoned observers , however , class1£ied the New Force Party as " leftlst " in nature a nd p r edic-c.ed an almost total defeat o f the New Force and the socialist parties in this election . The Elect1on Results Despite rumours of c oup d ' etats and o ther "nati o nal emergenc1es " wh1ch could prevent the holding of the elect1on on 4 April 1976 , 1t was w1th relative calm that v o ters went to the polls. Heavy rain a nd storms 1n certain parts of the North and the Northeast and terror1st attacks in some remote areas prevented voters from exerc1s1ng their rights at the polls. Only about 29% of eligible voters in Bangkok and about 40% of the 20 . 9 m1llion elig1ble voters throughout the country cast their ballots , compared to Resul"t.s of 33% and 47 % respect1vely in -c.he 1975 Elections. with hours, twenty-four with1n reported the elect1ons were

Table II:

Party

Nationwide Predictions of Election Results for Significant Parties

Election 19 Analysis Group

Chart Thai Survey

Chula Mass Communications Faculty

Military Su rvey

Ministry of the Interior

The Nation

Democrat

63-112

60

70-84

75

90

70-75

Social Action

82-149

57

52-66

44

50

Chart Thai

54-96

77

57-68

46

60

New Force

11-35

13

12- 19

21

20

Social Justice

29-66

31

25- 32

39

Social Nationalist

8- 20

6

-

Social Agrarian

8- 15

7

Socialist Front

8- 15

Socialist Populist So urces :

Prachachart Daily

Ban Muang Survey

71

88

50

61

40

so

47

35-50

25- 30

18

20

35

30- 35

36

30

10

-

-

9

-

10

-

-

8

2

-

4

-

-

3

2-8

7

-

7

10

-

4

5- 14

6

-

10

-

10-15

9

The Nation , 4 April 1976; Bangkok Post , 30 March 1976 ; Ban Muang , 4 Apr il 1976 ; Prachachart Daily , 4 April 19 76 ; Daily News, 3 April 19 76; etc .

13

the excepti o n of a few pol ling stations located in the remote areas of Maehongsarn and Udorn. Speculat1on and predictions aside, th e election results produced a few shock waves. Firstly, the Democrat Party swept Bangkok, and totally defeated Kukrit and candidates o f the Chart Tha1, Social Action and New Force Parties. Secondly, the leftist parties - the New Force , Socialist , and United Soc1alis t Front - were defeated almost totally at the po lls; these three part1es won only s1x seats in all compared to thlrty -seven seats 1n the previous Parliament. Th1rdly, the Democ rat Party unexpectedly won many seats in It becomes the South, the Northeast and the Central regions. the o nly party 1n Parliament with over 100 members in Indeed, its 114 M. Ps constitute about 41% of Parl1arnent . Fourthly, only four 1n Parl1ament. strength total the - the Democrat, election th~s from emerged ma jor part1es they captured Justice; Soc1al and t1on Ac Social Chart Thai, F'ifteen themselves. among seats ab o ut seven-- eighths of the "under-ten" new the as classified be o ther part1es wh1ch can part1es share amo ng the mselves thirty-s1x seats. Soc1al Agrarian and Social Nationalist parties joined the underten group s1nce they won on ly n1ne and eight seats respectively . Th1s new Parliament 1s an improvement on the prev1ous Parl1arne nt 1n terms of a smaller number of lmpor tant part1es. Lastly, many former M.Ps and ministers fa1led 1n this election, including those who sw~t ched to the Soc1al Ac t 1on and the Chart Tha1 part1es. ln the Dus1t constituen c y of Bangkok, despite the c l o se co-operation between Kukrit and two other Chart Tha1 c and1da tes , the Democrat team led by Samak Sunthornrave j narr owly edged o ut Kukrit for all the three seats by almost Samak himself received about 10 , 000 votes more 1 , 000 votes. than Kukrlt as well as the other two successful candidates Indeed, Kukrit's o f th e Democ rat Party (see Table IV) . only seri ous the was perfo rmance in Dus1t const1tuency In , Bangkok 1n challenge to the Democrat dominance Tha1 Chart add1t 1on to Kukrit and the two unsuccessful cand1date s 1n the f1rst constituency , candidates of the Soc1al Act1on and the Chart Tha1 parties in the third a nd fourth const1tuenc1 es prov1ded the stiffest competit1on to the Democrat Party 1n ~angk ok . The much - talked about challenges from the New Force candidates 1n the fifth , n1nth and tenth const1tuenci es d1d not mater1al1ze . Although the New f o rce teams carne second to the Democrats, they did n o t ser 1ously threaten the Democrat supremacy. In fact, the New Fo rce c and1dates did not pose as much chal l enge

Table III:

Results of the 1975 and 1976 General Elections

.... ~

Democrat Chart Th a i Social Act ion Social Justice Social Agrarian Social Nationalist New Force Populist Socialist Pr ovinci al Development United Socialist Fr ont Dharmac racy Thai Pr a te c t ion Unit ed Demo c rat Fr ont Labour New Siam Thai Soc ia l

North

Central

Bangkok

South

Northeast

Total

1975

1976

1975

1976

1975

1976

19 75

19 76

1975

1976

1975

19 76

23 2 1

28

10 9

16 3 6

15

4

17 16 14

10

18 3 2

30 2 2

5 11 5

24 27 19

72 28 18

114 56 45

-

-

11

-

-

14

9

5

5

6

2

20

12

45

28

-

-

10

4

4

1

1

-

4

4

19

9

-

-

7 2 1

4

2 3

1

-

2

8

)

16 12 2

1

15

2

-

-

1

2

1

1')

-

-

2

1

6 7 1 11

2

-

-

-

2

-

2

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

2

) )

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

10

-

-

l

-

1 1

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

1 1

-

-

1 1

1

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

1

-

-

-

-

-

1

Table III con t ' d Regions

Bangkok 1975

Party

1976

Democra cy Social Progress Peaceful People People's Justice Tha i Nati onal Revival Tha i Earth People's Soverei gnty Agri cul turist Free People Economist Total Source:

Cen tral

North

1975

1976

1

1

1975

1976

South 1975

Northeast

1976

1975

1976

1

Total 1975 2

1976 1

1

5

3

1

2

8

1

6 1

6 4

2

3 2

2

1

1

2 1 1 1

1 1

1

26

28

66

67

49

49

35

38

93

97

269

279

Adapted from the Ministry of the Interior, ELeations 1975, Local Administrative Press, 1975 ; and the Ministry of the Interior , "Results of the 4 April 1976 Elections ," mimeographed.

Other parties which fielded c andidates but failed to be elected in 1976 are the People's Force , People ' s Progress, Sri Araya, People's Social Justice , Free Force , Siam Nation , Siamese Force , People•s Peaceful Front , Professional Welfare and Charity, Thai United Thai, Siam City , Nationalist, Free Thai and Thai - ist parties.

16

TabJ.e IV :

1976 Election Results 1n Bangko

Name District 1 - Dusit (3 Representatives) Samak Sunthornravej Gen. Tavich Seniwong na Ayudhya Prates Rommayanond M.R. Kukrit Pramoj Col. Prakob Prayoonpokkaraj Pratuan Rommayanond etc. Distri ct 11 - Phyathai (3 Represent a tives) Veera Musikkap ong Damrong Lattap1pat Somboon Siri th orn Ocha Attawaethi , M.D. Sira Patthamakom Darunee Pramuanbanakarn etc. Distri c t 111 - Prakanong, Nongjok , Ladkrabang (3 Represe n tatives) Lek Nana Pich ai Rattakul Dr. May oon Viseskul Mrs. Sasima Srivikorn Prakaipetch lntusophon Dr. Arjong Chumsai na Ayudhya etc. Di s tri c t IV - Bangkhen , Hueykwang , Bangapi, M1nburi (3 Representatives) Prayoonsak Chalayondecha Nathawut Suthisongkram Naeb Pongpae...1 Chaiwat Leungamornlert Sama1 Ch innaphah Chalerm Sangurai Air - Marshal Bua Si r isap etc.

Party

Democrat

" " Soc i a 1 Ac t i on Chart Thai

"

..

Democrat Social Action Cha rt Thai

Democ rat

" " Social Ac t ion It

Ch a r t Tha i

Democrat It It

Chart Thai Social Ac tion Chart Thai

"

Votes

33, 3 35 24 , 874 24,330 2 3 . 6 )4

2 2 . 118 21 , 981

24 , 763 24 , 406 2 3 , 134 12,940 12,317 10 , 77 1

40 , 348 38 , 765 36 ,062 34 , 814 29. 714 29 , 373

34 , 420 34 , 355 31 . 26 7 25,8 74 25,61L. 25 , 365 24 , 797

Distri c t V - Patumwan ,

Pomprabsat rupai (3 Representatives) Sen1 Pramoj Pipob As inrat Dr. Kamol Somvichien Dr. Athlt Urairat

M. R.

Democ rat

" " New Force

17 . 708 15 . 739 15 , 4 ; 8 1 1 , 000

17

Table IV cont'd Name Dr , Pramote Nakorntab Dr. Sopha Chupikulchai etc . District VI - Bangkoknoi, Bangkokyai (3 Representatives) Nithipat Chaleechan Thong Thanakarn Pol . Col . Watcharee Uthaichalerm , M.D. Charn Maethangkul Suchin Prakobpol Mani Pongkrerman etc . District VII - Thonburi, Klongsan (3 Representatives) Panthipa Watcharobon Akom Sorasuchart, M.D. Pisith Sanithwong na Ayudhya Boonmee Para Termpong Suksathith Kasin Boonchusawang etc . District VIII - Bangkunthian , Phasichareon , Rajburana, Talingchan, Nongkaem (3 Representatives) Chana Rungsang Boonying Nantapiwat Suchart Aphaiwong Phew Muangsiri Chai Sajja Sudjit Champeethong etc . District IX - Sampanthawong, Pranakorn , Bangrak (2 Representatives) Singtoh Changtrakul Sanong Tuchinda Dr . Suebsang Prombun Dr. Prasarn Tangjai etc . District X - Yannava (2 Representatives) Charern Kanthawong Vichit Visessuwannaphum Boonyiam Meesook Prapan Hutasing etc

Party New Force

"

Democrat II

"

New Force Chart Thai

"

Democrat

" II

New Force

"

"

Democrat

" "

Social Action

"

Chart Thai

Democrat

"

New Force II

Votes 9,506 9,425

29,064 28,094 26,901 8 , 941 8 , 910 8,608

27,261 26,609 25 , 750 10,448 10,272 9,459

35,893 32,351 29,968 15,840 12 , 465 10,254

19 '114 19,111 12,833 11 '803

Democrat

24 ,426

"

23 ,334

"

9 ,818

New Force

9,89 ~

18

to the Democrat in Bangkok as the Chart Thai and Social Perhaps, the Democrats themselves as well Action candidates. as political observers in general overestimated the New Force challenge. Simultaneously, the defeat of Kukr1t depr1ved him of the chance of becoming Prime Minister again, thereby creating a leadership problem for the Social Action Party, and pushing Samak upward in the Democrat Party. The personal defeat of Kukrit has been attributed to the following reasons by most observers : firstly the encouragement to vote for the party, instead of a personality. This caused people to vote for the Democrat team because the general public is familiar with this oldest of political parties. Secondly, the Chart Thai - Social Action team of cand1dates created some problems for the voters who might not want to vote for either one of t he two parties . Some military voters reported splitting their votes for the Chart Thai and the Democrat parties, in preference of Samak to Kukrit . Some voters allegedly split their votes between Kukrit and the Democrat candidates. Whichever way they voted, howe ver , Samak was on the winning side Thirdly, the pubjic appe a rs t o have disapproved of Kukrit's liberal methods of handling agitation and violence and succumbing to pressure It is the impression that the public seems to be gro ups. tired of c1vil disturbances , violence, and the general Kukrit ' s conflicts with the disorder with1n the country. press media , too, did not help his image ; most newspapers attacked him severely and created unfavourable public Fourthly , it is wellknown the military op1nion toward him. was also not happy with the lack of public law and order; perhaps more important it was particularly incensed by Kukrit ' s decisions to (a) almost totally expel the American military personnel from Thailand, (b) to control tightly the military's secret funds, and (c) to generally overlook the interests of the military. Fifthly, it was reported that General Kris Sivara, a former Commander-in-chief of the Army, was not happy with Kukrit and the United Parties Government and was instrumental in persuading M. Ps of var i ous parties to support the no- confidence motion in the previous In orde r to obtain a stable and nonleftist Parliament. government, Kris decided to support the Democrat Party by allegedly contributing to the Democrat campaign coffers and by using h1s influence among the m1litary to vote for the Democrat candidates . 6 F1nally , the public in general

6

Ban MUang , 3 April 1976 and Siamrath, 1 7 April lY76

19

seems to have liked Samak for h1s outspoken critic1sm of corruption , student demonstrations , and labour strikes , and for his staunch anticommunist stand. Samak ' s latest conflict with the Federation of Labour Unions of Thailand (FLUT) which he characterized as a "gang of street hoodlums" appealed to many members of the public and the military. The latter wanted to maintain Samak within the Democrat hierarchy as a rightist spokesman in order to prevent the domination of the party by the leftist faction within it. His oratory, his bit1ng criticisms of the left, and his willingness to fight under great pressure from within and without the Democrat Party stood him in good stead with the traditionally conservative voters of the Dusit district. It was, thus, no surprise that Samak left other candidates far behind in the polls, and that he in the process also pulled the other two Democrat candidates to victory. The v1rtually total defeat of candidates of the New Force, Socialist, and United Socialist Front parties in Bangkok and elsewhere was described by General Pramarn as " an indication of popular rejection of leftist or communistinspired parties and doctrines . " Obviously, the campaign against communist aggressive designs on Thailand, and the danger that communism poses for Thai sacred institutions, by radio and television and also by various rightist and moderate newspapers has struck a responsive chord. All radio and television stations in Thailand had been broadcasting compul sory news programmes and patriotic songs , aiming at inculcating nationalism and warning of communist aims and objectives . The election campaign songs of the Min is try of the Interior also urged the public to avoid voting for individuals and parties which were " communist-inspired ." In addition, during the month preceding the election there was a devastating campaign of anonymous leaflets denouncing candidates of these three leftist parties as " KGB agents," " sex perverts, " "lackeys of North Vietnam," " trouble-makers," " destroyers of the Thai nation, religion and the monarchy" and so on. These were distributed widely in Bangkok as well as in the outer regions . Indeed , the New Force Party spent most of its time and energy on the defence in trying to counteract against these smear campaigns . Then, it would appear that the Thais are not as yet attuned to turmoil and unrest and much less to "revolutionary changes." Unfortunately , the leftists and other progressive individuals seem to have misread the Thai character and attempted to rapidly transplant in toto certain alien values

20

and practices i nto Thai society. backfired on them .

Their good intentions

At the same time , there were coming out of Laos and Cambodia , stories telling of the Laotian King be~ng forced to abdicate and Buddhist monks being forced to work in the rice-fields. Other s tories told of hardships , and of Vietnamese "atrocities and oppression" in Laos and Cambodia. Since the New Force and s ocialist parties were reputedly " sympat:hetic " to North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao , this too appe ars to have worked against them . This t ogether with attacks on Thailand by Hanoi radio and armed clashes along the border, tended to turn the Thai public away from the le ftists . The sum tota l of the foregoing fa~tors was that leftist: candidates lost badly , even in the Northeast where the majority of their former M. Ps were elected to the previous In all only four representatives of the three Parliament. leftist parties were returned from the Northeast i n this election, compared wi th twenty-eight M.Ps in 1975. The greatest swing away from the left thus occurred in the Northeast, the very area which had given them the best support in the p ast . Interestingly , the New Force and socialist parties have They have also analysed their poor showing themselves. smear the firstly, : pointed to the followin g factors parties; campaigns and violence mounted by the rightist secondly, the inexpe rience of the New Force Party which dared to pitch itsel f against the most seasoned and most experienced party in Bangkok- the Democrats; and lastly, the fast and unsystematic growth of the New Force and the other leftist socialist parties. The mass mobilizations and protests in the past few years had created an euphoria among left~st planners that Thailand was ready for socialistic and lefti st politics. This false sense of hope , drummed up constantly in the leftist publications, led the New Force Party to almost double its candidates for Parliamentary seats . The Socialist Party also fielded about 50% more candidates than it did in 1975 . The United Socialist Front Party , however, fielde d only half of the number of 1975 candidates in this election. This is not to say, however , that o nly the leftists were carried away by their own euphoria , some extreme rightist and moderate parties - the Populist , Dharmacracy, United Democratic Front, and Thai Protection - also misjudged the mood of the Thai public. They f i elded a great number of candidates who

21

Table V:

Party Candidates and Results of Elections , 1975 and 1976

1975 Party

Candidates

Demo c rat 231 Chart Thai 210 Social Action 230 Social Justice 237 Social Agrarian 120 Soci~l . 146 Nat1onal1st New Force 106 Populist 12 Socialist 82 Provincial 4 Development Dharmacracy Thai Protection United Democrat Front United Socialist 74 Fr ont Labur 28 New Siam* Thai Social Democracy 82 Social 13 Progress Others 623 Total

2,198

Source:

*

1976 M.Ps

Candidates

M.Ps

New M.Ps

Old M.Ps

72 28

260 215

114 56

63 41

51 15

18

234

45

29

16

45

203

28

17

11

19

76

9

7

2

16

100

8

6

2

12 2 15

204 151 125

3 3 2

2 3 1

1 1

1

6

2

1

1

110

1

1

71

1

1

87

1

1

10

37

1

1

49 43 19 16

1 1

1 1

1

6

1

1

279

176

2 28

232

269

2, 369

1

1 1 1

103

Adapted from Prachatipatai, 8 April 1976 . New Siam Party was established in 1975 by 3 M.Ps 1vho were expelled from the Socialist Party of Thailand .

22

failed to be elected . At any rate, the leftist parties failed to consolidate their positions, spreading themselves too thinly in this election. Some of the leftist politicians and leaders seem to have correctly judged the public mood and did not contes t in this elections. Many important individuals in the socialist parties stayed away from the election and instead vowed to fight in "non parliamentary politics . "? After the elections, they nevertheless claimed that not only had they stayed away from the polls but 60% of the eligible voters had also not cast their votes. By this they implied that this Parliament and a subsequent government are not the government and Parliament of the majority of Thais, who would keep a close watch over the situation. They went on to state that the government deriving from this new Parliament will fail to satisfy 60% of the population and will fight within itself for vested interests; the people would throw them out, in the same manner as the " people " did in Vietnam . As such, they claim, "the struggle of the people has just begun - on 4 April 1967. " 8 It is interesting to note that the leftists have more or less repudiated the newly elected Parliament , in which they have only six representatives . In the previous Parliament in which they held thirty-seven seats, the leftists accepted the verdict from about 47% of eligible voters.9 In addition to their success in Bangkok, the Democrats fared extremely and unexpectedly well in the Northeast and the South. In the South, the Democrat Party grasped 30 of the 38 available seats; in the Northeast, it captUred 19 seats more than the 1975 elections- and in the Ce ntral region , it unexpectedly gained 7 extra seats more than last year. In the North, however, it lost 1 seat.

7

"Commen taries," Praohachart Dail-y , 14 April 196 7 .

8

"Ediwrial," Praohatipatai , 7 April 1976 and "Editorial," Pr>achachar>t Daily, 14 April 1967.

9

It should be pointed out that in praccically ali ele ctions in Thailand , eligible voters who cast ballots rarely reached the 50% level, and that the military governments used these low turn- our s as indications of unreadiness of Thais for democracy ,

23

Bangkok and the South have become Democrat st r ongho lds; in all, the Democrats received about a-quarte r , a-thi rd, and another quarter of the seats in the Centra l, North It seems t h e and the Northeast regions respectively. of the Social expense the at gained Democrat Party has Justice, the under-tens and the leftist parties. Various variables appear to have contrib uted to t he success of the Democrats . Firstly , the encouragement to the public to vote for party , instead of personality, favoured the Democrat Party since it is the oldest and the best- known party in Thailand . Many voters remembered only the Democrat label and tended to vote for it out of sheer habit or when they did not know which party or Secondly , it is possible that some individual to vote for. people may not have been happy with Kukrit ' s performance and with the political turmoil and social unrest of the day and may have wanted the Democrats to solve these problems. Perhaps, the people did not want solutions to such problems from either the extreme left or the extreme right. Since the Democrat Party was more middle-of-ther o ad than other parties, it apparently became the natural choice of the public . Thirdly , the Democrat Party wa~ apparently not directly involved in the leftright c onflict pe r s e ; it condemned both side s and presented itself to the pub lie as "the least o f the evils." At the same time, both the leftists and the rightists seemed to have left the Democrats alone. The right destroyed the left for the benefit of the Democrat. Fourthly, the military supported the Democrats in this election and negotiated a co- operative pact between the Democrat, Social Justice, and Social Nationalist parties during and after the elections . Consequently , there was little smearing of one another ' s candidates. Fifthly , the Democrats had cultivated voters in the South throughout 1975, and fielded Muslim candidates in the four Southern provinces in this election. The Social Action and Chart Thai parties were reluctantly contesting for seats in the South; indeed, they practically gave the South away to the Democrats. Lastly , the Democrat Party's campaign platform coincided with the desires of the people. Ac co rding to a survey of opin~ons conducted ,by the Public Relations Department just before the elect i on, 85 % o f the public ~~ r~ concerned with their own economic well-be i ng, 6 7% with the problem o f economic and s o cial g aps , 38% with the maintenance o f public law and order, a nd 33% with corruption in the government . The Democr a ts simply promised t o d o sornethings to solve t he "mo uth-and-stomach"

24

problem, to keep law and order, and to comb at corruption. This seems to have worked. However i t would be a mistake to maintain that the public voted for the Democrat candidates simply because the Democrat Party offe red a middle-of-the- road or a moderate platform. Other factors have also to be taken into account . In the fir s t place the Democrat Party has been more or less divided into moderate left and conservative factions , and voters thus had a wider choice of options within one and the same party in the sense that those who, for example , preferred leftist or rightist policies could have voted for Democrat candidates whose political thinking was closer to their preferences. Secondly , the victory of Samak over M. R. Kukrit and of many o ther conservative Democrat candidates elsewhere might have only underscored the prevailing mood of the country - which was a shift toward It is speculated that Samak, the outspoken conservatism. young conservative, may replace Damrong Lattapipat, a leader of the moderate left, as the Secretary-General of the Democrat Party.lO Lastly, unlike the "mi ld socialism" platform of the Democrat Party in 1975, the 1976 platform was everything but socialistic; if anything , i t was more rightist. The plurality of the Democrat in the new Parliament is an indication of the victory of the moderate right< Together with the Democrats, three other c onservativeleaning parties returned close to 90% of all M.Ps. With only six M. Ps representin g the three leftist parties , this Par liament is definitely rightist in nature. The Chart Thai Party made significant gains in the Central , North and Northeast, and has doubled the number of i ts representatives from twenty-eight in t he old Parliament to fifty-s ix in the present Parliament. The Social Action also made small gains in the Central and the North , and significant gains in the Northeast . Although it lost many seats in all other regions , the Social Justice held its seats in the North . Other conservative parties did not fare very well; they lost many seats to the Democrat , Chart Thai or the Social Action parties . As a result, the new Parliament is composed of four major moderate, right and conservative parties (Table III) . Since General Kris Sivara was behind the Social Justice Party and also supported the Democrats,

10

Ban

~ang,

6 April 1976.

25

the new Parliament could also be considered a victory for the military and 1ts return to the political scene within the democrati c framework . ll This , of course, is in additi o n to the Chart Thai Party of General Pramarn . It is 1nteresting to note that both the Chart Thai and the Soci al Action parties gained a number of seats , especially in the Northeast. The reasons for this are unclear but some observers feel that the situation in Laos and Cambodia may have contributed to such a development. Both parties also gained some seats in the Central and Northern provinces , where concern over the communist victory in Laos and Cambodia may not have been as strong as in the Northeast . Perhaps the Tambol Development Fund contributed greatly to the popularity of the Social Action and the Chart Thai parties here , and consequently many kamnans (subd1strict chiefs) and puyaibans (village chiefs) supported cand1dates of these two parties . Candidates of other parties in the United Parties Government could not right ly cla1m the credit of the Tambol Development Fund the leader of the Social Justice Party was d ismis sed from the cabinet , members of the Social Agrarian Party newly jo1ned the coalition government , and the Social Nationali st Party played a m1nor role in the government which it decided f1nally to overthrow by joining the opposition parties i n the aborted no- confidence motion. Both the Chart Thai and the Social Action, therefore, seemed to benefit from this development scheme more than other parties . Wh1le all 1mportant leaders of the four major parties 1ncluding both Dewitt Klinpratoom of Social Justice Party and Maj or General Siri Siriyothin of the Chart Thai Party who had failed in 1975 election , were elected , Kukrit was the only casualty among the leadership of any major party. Indeed, Kukrit was one of the 138 i ncumbents who failed in this election , The public returned 103 former M. Ps to Parliament and elected 176 new M. Ps . Half of the successful former M.Ps are 1n the Democrat Party; about o ne-third, one fourth, and one- sixth of the successful new candidates in th1s election belong to the Democrat , Chart Tha1 and Social It 1s h1ghly Action partie s respectively (Table V) . signif1cant, however, that the voters t urne d down a large number of foimer M, Ps - about 30 each from the Democrat ,

11

" 1976 Elec.t.ion Analysis,"

Chaturat WeG;kly , 20 At:- eti. i9 76, pp . .13- 36.

26

Chart Thai , and Social Action parties, about 20 from the Social Justice, and about 30 from the three leftist parties. Only 22 of the 66 M.Ps who switched parties retained their seats in the House - 9 out of 9 in the Democrat Party, 8 out of 27 in the Social Action Party , 3 out of 20 in the Chart Thai Party and 2 out of 5 in the Social Justice Party.l2 It seemed that the public did not like "professional opportunists " or "fickle politicians ," that it is was willing to discard o l d politicians and experiment with newer faces , that it had faith in parties rather than in individuals, and or that it disapproved of Kukrit personally but not of the Social Action Party . It is worth noting that in addition to Kukrit , 14 other Ministers and Deputy Ministers in the United Parties cabinets failed to be retur ned to Parliament . As indicated in Table VI below , most of them were junior ministers. About half of them had switched parties to join either the Chart Thai or the Social Action parties; and about half of them served in e~ther one of the two Un ited Parties cabinets . With the exception of Kukrit , most of the defeated Ministers were inconspicuous or notorious on account of their " unethical practices . " Perhaps, the public is political ly wiser now and has reJected individuals of low competence or questi onable integrity. After only one year of democracy , the pattern of power in Thailand has changed drastically . The traditional opposition party - the Democrat - has rece i ved more popular support than any other party . The fol l owers of the late Marshals Phin Chunhawan and Pibulsongkram have improved their position through the Chart Thai Party . The Social Action Party , comp r ising former members of the Democrat Party and liberal members of the defunct United Thai People ' s Party {UTPP) , also drew great.er support particularly from traditional liberals. Kris Sivara and Dawee Chullasap, on the other hand , in the Social Justice Party drew less suppor t from the public in 1976 than in 1975. Three othe r UTPP - successor part~es or groups - the Soc~al Nationalist Party is composed of supporters of Marshal Prapas Charusatien , the Social Agrarian Party is composed of supporters of Police Major General Sa-nga Kitt ikachorn and General Sawaeng Sananarong, the " underten " parties are generally in support of Pol~ce General

12

The Nation, 7 April 19 76 .

27

Un1ted Part1es Cabinet

Table VI:

Members who Failed to be Reelected

Portfolio

Name Social Act1on Party 1 - M R, Kukrit Pramoj 2. Surin Thepkarnchanal 3. Chaisir1 Ruangkarnchanasetl 4. Prapatpong Vejjajival / 2 Chart Thai Parry 5. Col Prakob Prayoonpokkaraj 6 . Pra~uan Romrnayanond2 7 Suwan Thanakanyal 8 , Uthai Chunhachandl 9. Prasert Boonsoml/3 10 Lr Gen . Chan Angsuchc-::el/3

Prime Minister and Mi nister of the Interior Minister of Industry Deputy Minister of Comme rce Deputy Minister of Fi nan ce Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of M1n1sLer of Bureau Universities

the Interior Communication Education Public Health Education of State

Soc1al Nat1onal1st Party 11. Thanes Ia- sakul 2

Deputy M1n1ster of Conunerce

Social Agranan 12 . Pratuang Khamprakob2

Deputy Minuter of Foreign Affairs

Tha1 Part.y 13 . Anant Pakprapai3

Deputy Minister of Agri culture and Cooperatives

Populist: Pany 14 , Boonkum Chandsr1suriyawong3

Deputy Minister of Justice

Peaceful People Parry 15. Anant Cha1sang4

Depucy Min1ster of Pubhc Healch

Notes:

1

Changed parties in th1s election .

2

Portfolios in the second Un1ted Parties cabinet.

3

Por tfolios 1n the first Un1red Parties cabinet. Deputy Minister of Commun1cations in the first cabinet and 1:es1gned from the se cond cabu,e t 1n protest of the reshuffle.

4

28

Prasert Ruch1rawong - decreased 1n s1gnificance w1th this election , The political power 1n Thailand is now shared by the Democrat Party , the Manangkasila Party of Pibulson gkram , the UTPP faction under Kris and Dawee , and the former liberal members of UTPP and Democrat part1es . While the Social Agrarian and the Social Nationalist parties won only 9 and 8 seats respectively in this election, the more important "under-ten" part1es have been absorbed i nt o the Soc1al Action Party . Consequently, the influence of Prasert can st1ll be found as expected among some members of the Social Action Party . An Attempt Towards

Coalition Format1on

S1nce it is customary for the biggest party in Parl1ament to form a government, the Democrat Party automatically became the centre or core of the new coalition Its 114 M.Ps d1d n ot constitute a majority in government. Parliament , The Party needed at least 26 more votes in The choice of part1es for coalit1on purposes Parl1ament. was more or less settled , even before the election. P£ior to the elect1on, through General Kris Sivara 's influence, the Social Justice and the Social Nationalist parties had moved towards the Democrat Party in the1r attempt to overthrow the Kukrit Government . During the elect1ons, all three part1es co- o perated with one another. It thus seemed natural that the Democrat Party would select the Social Justice and the Social Nationalist parties as partners in its new coalition government . The Social Justice's 28 M.Ps and the Social Nationalist 's 8 M.Ps are more than the 26 additional required votes for the Democrats to have a maJority in Parl1ament. These three parties together now command 150 votes . The Soc1al Justice Party, however, does not reputedly have a good record as far as d1scipline is concerned. During Kukrit ' s Unit ed Parties era , most conflicts and struggles for pos1tions 1nvo l ved members of the Social It was also rumoured that Social Justice Just1ce Party M.Ps could be "e asily bought . " Indeed, many observers cons1dered them as the "divisive cause " w1thin the United Part1es coal1t1on. Consequently, many Democrat leaders had reservat1ons about the Soc1al Just1ce Party, even though Kris and Dawee were there to exercise better con tro l than The reservat1on about party disc1pline and s i nce r1t~ before of party leadership to some extent appar~ ntiy a ~so a ~pl1ed

29

to the Social Nationalist Party, which it will be recalled , had broken away from the Un~ted Parties coalition and led to the dissolution of Parliament . The liberal and left-leaning members of the Democrat Party also preferred a coalition with the Social Justice and Social Nationalist parties, because these two parties did n ot have strong ideological orientations. Moreover , the two parties could apparently be easily controlled and guided by the Democrat Party. With more important cabinet seats allocated to them the liberal and left-leaning Democrat members also hope to influence the policy of this new coalition government through the control of important ministries . The pragmatic leadership and conservative members of the Democ rat Party disagreed with the liberal and leftist Sen i himself indicated members over the matter of coalition . that t he coal1tion government must control as many votes in Parliament as possible , in order to guarantee the existence of a stable government . l3 He seemingly also wanted a coalit~on large enough to withstand possible defections of Social Justice and Social Nationalist M.Ps. Partly on account of this , some conservative members of the Democrat Party proposed the inclusion of the Chart Thai Party in the coalition as well , in order to counter-balance the Social Justice Party and to serve as built- in insurance. The Chart Thai Party would also be an asset to the coalit ion in another sense; it was better disciplined than most other parties in Parliamen t, Th e re was also the need of preven ting the Chart Thai and the Social Action parties from joinin g up on the opposition benches, thereby threatening the stability of th e coalition. Thus incorporating t h e Chart Thai Party into the coalition reduced the effectiveness of In short , the opposition , led by the Social Action Party. by taking the Chart Thai Party into the coalition , the Democrat hoped to effectively prevent the resurgence of the United Parties coalition . However , all was not plain sail~ng . There are significant differen c es between the Social Justice and the Chart Thai parties. To strengthen its position within the coalition , the Social Justice immed1ately propose d that the Defence portfolio shou ld be given to Kris Sivara, who Has very popular among the military and who would have brought 13

" I Want A National Coaliti or. Gove rnment , " Prachachart Daily~ lO April

1976 .

30

stab~lity to the coal i tion government. The Social Justice Part~ and liberal/leftist Democrat members hoped that by

de~y~ng _ t~e Defence portfolio to Pramarn Adireksarn, Deputy and Minister of Defence in the United Parties coalition, the Chart Thai Party would refuse to join the coalition . l4 The exclusion of the Chart Thai Party would presumably also mean a larger number of cabinet posts allocated to the Social Justice Party. The "plot " to discourage the Chart Thai Party from joining the coalition was, however, only partially successful, since the Democrat leadership readily accepted Kris as the Defence Minister . As pointed out earlier, the Democrat Party considered Kris as one of its benefactors and allocated the post to him within the Democrat quota of seats in the cabinet.lS Nevertheless, the appointment of Kris to the Defence Ministry was questioned by some Democrat M.Ps but after some d iscussions within the party, Kris was accepted by the majority of Democrat M.Ps and t he Party Central Committee. Pr~me M~n~ster

The Chart Thai Party on its part appears to have adopted a somewhat moderate attitude in the matter of sharing power. Since the Democrat Party had adopted a somewhat conservative stand and had promised to enforce l aw and order, the Chart Thai Party felt that its most important platform had been met. It, therefore , asked the Democrat to allocate the First Deputy Prime Minister ' s position and an important ministry - either Defence, the Interior, Agriculture or Finance - to Pramarn i n order to "save face, " and to allocate fairly other cabinet posts to the Chart Thai Party. Its surprising flexibility deprived the Social Justice and the liberal/leftist members of the Democrat of reasons to exclude the Chart Thai from the coalition. The Chart Thai Party appears to have considered the advantages and the disadvantages of joining the Democrat-led coalition , and felt that it could better imp lement its platform and i nfluence the direction of the government if i t were in the coalition rather than in the opposition. The opponents of the Chart Thai Party on the other hand did not take Chart Thai 's joining of the coalition k i ndly. Some 14

"Ti Len Ti Jing , " Siamrath , 19 April 1976.

15

Siamrath , 17 April 1976; and Praahaahart Daily , 14 Apr il 1976.

31

of the main objections were due firstly to the Chart Thai Party's working very closely with the Social Action parties in the United Parties coalition and during the election campaign . The Democrat should not "steal away someone else's former wife,"l6 in the sense that the Chart Thai Party might betray the Democrat by working with the Social Action Party against the coalition. Secondly, the Chart Thai Party should become the constitutional Royal Opposition Party, in order to prevent parliamentary dictatorship. With Chart Thai's 56 seats within the coalition, the qo vernment with a t .otal of 206 votes in Parliament would By joining the d o minate the ent1re political scene. Demo c ra t -led c o alitlon, the Chart Thai was neglecting its Th1rdly, the Chart Thai Party had n o t const i tuti onal duty. the Social Justice Party, and the with terms d been on goo problems for the Democrat-led future o t lead may conflicts coa l 1tio n; since the Democ rat has previously agreed to join the Soc 1al Justice and th e Social Nati onalist, it is logica l that th e Chart Thai Party remains o utside the Fo urthly, the Chart Thai Party apparently coal i t1 o n . " j umped" at the o ppo r tu nity of joi nin g the g o vernment because lt has 1mmense e conomic interests to safeguard. Presumably it needed t o be 1n power, in order to protect its interests and t o be nef i t further. F1fthly, the Chart Tha i Party was far mo re conservative than the Democrats and as su ch may J e o pardize the implementation of policies, even t o the extent o f damaging the Democrat's reputati o n. In thia c onne c t ion, it was h o ped that the Democrats would n ot f o llow the Chart Tha1's atiff law-and-order policy and auppreas those seek.1ng justice and human diqn ity.l7 Lastly, aince the milltary was fully behind Kris, the prospective Defence Mini s ter, there was n o need for the support of the Chart Thai Party which could n o t really influence the military. Having f o rmed the f o ur-party c o alit1 o n, it was agreed that 1n the coalit 1on c ab1net, eighteen p o sts (th o se o f the Prime M1n1ster, six Ministers and eleven De p uty ~nist e r sJ are t o be all ocated t o th e Democ rat, eight p o sts (th o s e o f three Min1sters and f i ve Deputy Ministers ) t o the Chart. Thai,

16

" Coal i t ion Tallu• Ente r the Hl ufflna F1n al e , " 1'ha Nat.iur, , 14 April 19 76. p . 2 .

17

PN.ohaoha r t

lkJ i l y. 15 Ap ti 1 19 76 and PN.whaoha.n

19 76 • pp. 6 - 8 .

Wf3E- k ! y. 2 2 Apn ~.

32

four posts (those of two Min1sters and tw o Deputy Min i sters ) to the Social Justice , and one Ministerial post t o the Since Kris had already been given the Social Nat1onalist . Defence portfo lio , Pramarn was at first given the p o rtf o l io of the Interior in addition to the First Deputy Pri me Minister ' s position. The Democrat Party Central Commit t ee, however, disagreed with the allocati o n of the portfoli o of the Interior to Pramarn since the Ministry is 1n charge o f The Democrat, therefore , offered the law and order. Agriculture and Co- operatives ~ortfolio to Prarnarn; in addition, the Chart Thai received the Industry and Education portfolios and five other Deputy Ministerial posts . Pras1t Karnchanawat of the Social Nationalist Party was allocated the Just1ce portfo lio without much problem. Dawee o f the Social Justice Party was given a Deputy Prime Minister's position and the Communicatio nsportfolio at first. Dewitt who aimed for the Agriculture and Co-operatives Ministry but was given the Public Health portfolio instead It was Dawee who seems to have was apparently very upset. for the Public Health Communications the decided to exchange post, and pacifying Dewitt. The Social Justice also received the Bureau of the State Universit1es portfol1o and another Deputy Minister's post.l8 Most observers seem to agree that the negotiat1on among the coalition partners was accomplished in a friendly atmosphere and with a fair amount of give - and - take, with the exception of Dewitt. Paradoxically, such friendly exchanges , however, did not exist in the struggle for power and positions within the Democrat Party itself. The liberal/leftist faction of the Party under the leadership of D~rong Lattapipat , the Secretary-General of the Party, has been quite powerful within the party . It was Damrong who negotiated with the New Force and the two socialist parties in their abortive attempt to overthrow the Kukrit Government through a vote of no-confidence in Parliament in January 1976. The failure tarnished Damro ng's reputat ion. Si nce Darnrong had a running c o nfl i ct with Samak Sunth o rnravej , a Deputy Secretary General o f the Democr a t Pa r t y and th e spokesman of the conservative fa ction, the overwhe lmin g victory of Sarnak over M.R. Kukr1t i ntensif i ed t he s t rugg l e between Damrong and Samak. The l i bera l / le f t is t f a ct1o n

18

Bangkok Post, 23 April 1976. has a sho rt and conc is e art icle about the f ormat ion of the coalition .

33

and some "young Turks " at first objected to the coalition with the Chart Thai Party but they were overruled by the pragmat1c leaders and the conservat1ve fact ion. The allocation of the Justice portfolio to Prasit Karnchanawat of the Social Nationalist Party spelled the defeat of the liberal / leftist 1n general and Damrong in particular. Damrong was hoplng that Prasit would be given the Commerce portfolio s1nce Prasit 1s a well-known businessman , successful banker and a former Min1ster of Commerce in the If Prasit took the Commerce portfolio , Thanom Government , Damrong who was M1n1ster of Commerce in the short- lived Democrat-Soc1al Agrarian coalition government would have to be given another portfolio . Since Damrong had an educational background in political sc1ence and also some experience in local adm1nistration, he would or should logically be in the portfolio of the Interior . Also Thamnoon Thien- ngern , the Minister of the Inter1or in the short-lived government , has been elected Governor of Bangkok Metropol1s. He presumably could not resign from the governorship and become M1n1ster of the Interior again. Due to the fact that the Interior M~nistry is one of the most powerful ministries 1n Thailand, all factions made a bid for it. The candidates for the Inter1or portfolio - Damrong, Samak , and Somboon Siridhorn - represented various factions within Damrong's amb1tions were dashed by a stalemate the party . and by a compromise to name Sen1 to the Interior portfolio. Damrong was named M1nister of Commerce , Samak and Somboon became Deputy M1n1sters of the Interior and an M.P. representing the liberal/left1st fact1on was selected as the Secretary to the Minister of Interior . The negotiation and arrangement of portfolios within the Democrat Party took as much , if not more , t1me as the negot1ations with the Chart Thai, Social Justice, and Social Nationalist parties . The new cab1net was subsequently appointed by the King on 21 Apr1l 1976 (Table VII). It is 1nteresting to note that while the Bangkok M.Ps are heavily represented 1n the Democrat quota of cabinet portfol1os, all regions cf the country have the1r share of ministers in the cabinet. The Central, North and Northeast have two members each 1n the cab1net, the South has four; Until h1s death, General Kris had been and Bangkok seven . cons1dered a nonpart1san . With the exception of Bangkok and the Northeast, all regions hav e been allocated approximately one cab1net seat to every seven M, Ps. Since most M.Ps from the NorLheast are first-term ones and since the Democrat Party usually gives priority to individuals with at least two terms or longer in Parl1ament , there are

34

Table VII:

Four-Party Coalition Cabinet

Name Democrat Party 1 . M. R. Seni Pramoj 2. Sawet Piampongsarn 3. Chuan Leekphai 4. Sur in MasdH

9. 10.

General Kris Sivar a (none lee ted)* Pichai Rattakul Damrong Lattapipat General Tav1ch Seniwong na Ayudhya* Lek Nana Kraisorn Tanti pong

11. 12. 13. 14. 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 .

Boonkerd Hiranyakham Khai La- ongmani Khunthong Phuphiewduen Samak Sunthornravej Somboon Siridhorn Sidd1k Shar1ff Preeda Mus1kul Paen Sirivejjaphand

5 6. 7. 8.

Chart Thai Part:y 19. Major General Pramarn Adireksarn 20. Maj or General Siri Siriyothin 21 . Maj or General Cha rtchai Chunhawan

*

Portfolio

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Second Deputy Prime Minister and Mi nister of Finance Minister of the Prime Minister's Office, and Deputy Hinis"C.er of Justice Minister of the Prime Minister 's Office Minister of Defence Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Commerce Deputy Minister of Defence Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of and Cooperatives Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of Deputy Minister of

Foreign Affairs Agriculture Communications Connnerce the Interior the Interior the Interior Education Pub lie Health Industry

Firs t: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Cooper at 1ves Minister of Education Min1ster of Industry

Kris Sivara passed away only two days aft~r rhe cab1net was appoi ~ ed by the King. Tavich Seniwong na Ayudhyb. was appul.nted Minis t e-.. of Defence ,

35

Table VII cont'd Name Char'C Thai Party (cont'd) 22 , Wing CommE.nder Thinnakorn Bhankravi 23 . Dr , Anuwat Wattanapongsiri 24 ., Choo-sanga Ritthiprasart 25 , Dab chai Akkaraj 26 . Banharn Silapa-acha Soci al Justice Party 27, Air Chizf Marshal Dawee Chullasap 28 . Dewitt Kl i np r atoom 29 . Dr . Nibondh Sas idhorn

Portfolio

Depury Minis t er of Finance Deputy Mi nister of and Cooperatives Deputy Minister of Deputy Mi nister of Deputy Minister of

Agricul ture the Int erior Education Industry

30 . Prachocm Ratanapian

Thi r d Deputy Pri me Mini ster and Mi n i ster of Public Health Minis t er of Communications Mini ster of Bureau of State Universities Deputy Mi ni ster of Communications

Social National1st Party 31 . Pras it Karnchanawat

Mi n1ster of Justice

not many M.Ps from the Northeast who meet the requirements. Consequently, the Northeast is underrepresented by about one seat in the cabinet. Since Bangkok is the Democrat stronghold and since most M.Ps from Bangkok are party faithfuls of long standing, more M. Ps from Bangkok are qua~1fied for and thus awarded with cabinet portfolios. It should be also noted that two Muslims are included in the cab i net: Lek Nana from Bangkok and Siddik Shariff from Narathiwas , one of the three Southern Muslim provinces . Of course , Sawet Piampongsarn and Paen Sirivejjaphand switched over from the Social Agrarian Party and Boonkerd Hiranyakham from the People's Sovereignty Party but they are known as the Democrat ' s faithful all i es and supporters . The inclusion of Kris as the Defence Minister and General Tav1ch Seniwong na Ayudhya as Deputy De~e nce Minister was ostensively an attempt to please and pacify the military . While most high - ranking Armed Forces officers lauded the nami ng of Kris to the Defence p ort folio, there were a few dissenters nevertheless . They wanted Kris to

36

stay o ut of politics and serve as the behind-the-scene stab1lizer for the military and the government. They appear to have felt that by staying above politics , Kris could retain and exercise his influence as a statesman as a barr1er aga1nst any attack on the military establishment and as a moderating voice for the rejuvenating democratic system. Unfortunat ely, the matter was decided by the untimely death of Kris only two days after he was officially appointed Min1ster of Defence . Tavich was promoted to the Defence Min1stry post, since th is is considered as belonging to the Democrat Party and since Tavich is the only military man elected under the Democrat label . Apparently, to appease the young Turks within the party, a young Democrat was selected as the coalition candi date for the post of Speaker of the House of Representat1 ves c Uthai Pimjaichon was duly eiected by an overwhelming 210- 62 marg1n against a Social Action candidate ; Mongkol Sukhonthakachorn of the Chart Thai Party was chosen I~ addition, the M.Ps of the Democrat Deputy House Speaker . Party were allowed to pass a vote of no-confidence in the party aga1nst ministers who are 1nefficient or corrupt, and It is to re commend their dismissal to ~he Pr1me Minister. believed that this measure would apply ~o cabinet members This last concession sounds from all coalitio n parties perfect 1n theory but 1n prac~ice it could be misused by fac tions against cabinet members of other factions or 19 part1es. It may even ~ead ~o the collapse of the coalition . After the coali~ion forma~ion , Seni submitted the coalition government's policy to Parliament. The coal ition urgently a ims to a1d farmers , to lower the cost of living, to keep public law and order, to eradicate corruption , to decentralize local administration , and to expand the rural It also stated its long- term elec~rif1cat1on programme . political, economic, social and administrative policies (Appendix II) . On the surface, various programmes reflect a reduction of m1l1tary influence 1n Thai pol1ties , and a greater concern for the welfare of the rural secto r and the poor. The Parliament del~berated on the policy on 30 April 1976. And before the votes were taken, ~he Social Action M.Ps walked out of Parliament 1n protest of "Parliamentary

19

Fo! those who are Interested in coalit1on polltlcs 1n Thailand, see Somporn Sang~ha~ , Coalition Behaviour in Modern Thai Pol~t~~s : A ISEAS Occasional Paper No . 4~, 1976 ). Tha~ Perspeat~v~ ( ~ ngapore:

37

Dictatorship. " All the same , Parliament accepted the policy by 21 2 to 5 votes . Some Conclusions The United Parties coalition government of M. R. Kukrit Pramoj finally collapsed when , faced with a probable defeat in a vote of no- conf1dence in Parliament , Kukrit decided to dissolve Parliament and call for a new election on 4 April 1976. It was hoped that a more stable government would emerge from the new election. Among the highlights of the election results were firstly, the defeat of M. R. Kukrit in the Democrat sweep of Bangkok. Secondly , the leftist parties fared badly even in the Northeast. Thirdly, the Democrat Party won the largest number of seats in Parliament and became the core of a new coalition government. Fourthly, only four parties won significant number of seats. In addition to the Democrat's 114 seats, the Chart Thai Party won 56 seats , the Social Action Party 45 seats and the Social Just1ce Party 28 seats. Lastly , many former cabinet members and M.Ps were defeated in this election . The election results confirmed that the public by and large wanted a stable and responsible government, the enforcement of law-and- order , and a bett er economic programme t o solve "mouth and stomach " problems . In this sense , public sentiment has swung t .o the right , 20 On the surface , the new coalition government seems to be very stable . Yet , the longevity of the government will to a considerable extent depend on the ability of the cabinet andthe Democrat leaders in overcoming problems mainly of (1) extra- Parliamentary pressures coming from student, labour and farmer activists, (2) factional struggles within the Democrat Party, (3) individual animosities of some of the coalition members, ( 4 ) ideological differences between the liberal/left i st faction of the Democrat Party and other conservative coalition partners, and (5) in- fighting within the Army , Any one of these factors would lead to a collapse of the Democrat- led coalition . The last factors can possibly even bring about a military cou p d'etat. 20

Far Eastern Eoonomio Review, 30 April 1976 , pp . 10-ll,attributes Kukri t ' s defeat to the behind- the-s cene manoeuvres of Kris Sivara and , as an always convenient and fashionable scapegoat , to the C, I . A< because "the U. S. Embassy in Bangkok had channelled a large sum of money to the Democ rat Party . " (pp c 30- :H . )

APPENDIX

Appendix A:

List of Former M.Ps who Switched Parties*

Name 1. Boonlert Lertpri cha 2. Choosin Konat 3 . Surin Thepkarnchana 4. Lt . Gen. Cham Angsuchote 5. Preecha Pet chsingh 6. Prasert Boonsom 7. Charoon Vatthanakorn 8. Boonaui Prasertsuwan 9. Thongyod Chittavira 10. Suchint Chauvisith 11 . Suwan Thanakanya 12. Somboon Bandhit 13 . Siri Toongtong 14. Sawet Piempongsarn 15 . Sant Thepmanee 16 . Phaen Sirivechaphan 17 . Sudin Phuyutthanon t 18. Suthin Jaijit 19. Boonmee Parmwongse 20 . Manit Pommahanont 21. Manit Saivichit 22. Thavil Pi~hintr 23. Payap Karnchanaran 24 . Somsart Ratanas ak 25. Chamnan Pudpong 26. Darong Singto t ong 27. Anand Boo r an avani ch 28 . Preeda Patthanathabutr 29. Prapan Ampuch 30. Chaveng Vongyai

*

Provin ce

From

To

Nakhon Nayok Satul Samutsakhon Kanchanab uri Loei Ayutthaya Ra t ch aburi Suphanburi Suphanburi Si Sa Ket Nakhon Ratchasima Nan Utha i Than i Rayong Lumphun Kanchanabu r i Pattani Yasothorn Lopbur i Si Sa Ke t Kalas in Roi-Et Chiang Rai Chiang Rai Rayong Chonburi Ayutthaya Chiang Mai Chiang Rai Ch i ang Ra i

Social J ustice Social J us ti ce Social Justi ce Social Jus t ice Social Justice Social Jus t ice Social J us tice Social Justi ce Social Justice Social Just ice Social Justi ce Social Justi ce Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Soci al Agrarian Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Social Agrarian Peaceful People Peaceful People Peaceful People Peaceful People Peaceful People Peacef ul Peopl e

Social Act i on Social Action Social Action Chart Thai Chart Thai Chart Thai Cha rt Thai Chart Thai Social Action Populist Chart Thai Soci al Action Social Justice Democrat Democ r a t Democrat Democra t Democr at Labour Char t Thai Chart Th ai Demo cr a t Cha rt Thai Democrat Chart Thai Social Action Social J ustice Social Action Chart Thai Social Action

The re we r e sixty-six former M.Ps who swi t ched parties; The Nat ion , however, recorde d only s ixty-four . Two other f ormer M. Ps are not named a t t he time of writ i ng.

Appendix A cont'd Name 31. 32. 33. 34 . 35. 36. 37. 38.

39 . 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48 . 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54 . 55. 56. 57. 58. 59 . 60,

61. 62. 63. 64.

Charoon Kuvanond Bunlue Noimanee Kunying Baukhiew Rangkasiri Uthai Choonhachan ~iyo m Vorapanya Sura Chaivirat Boonkerd Nakadee Samak Chareonrat Chaisiri Ruengkarnchanaset Ong-art Tangsthitchai Meechai Pantvora Yasertr Vongthonglua Thongseng Phuvichai Kam Kongchan Prapatpong Vechachiva Thavatchai Namvongpom Pakorn Kulkamchon Songtham Panvadee Kamthon Racharoj Am Rong-ngern Boonkerd Hiranyakam Som Vassna Term Sueppan Suneerat Taran Manit Uthisen Thavil Puangsamlee Choos ak Tarakam Savat Sirikonut Pi Bunnag Rermrat Chitpakdi Sunthorn Yingnakorn Somsak Somboonsap Smarn Chomputhep Som