Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Inequalities 3030937941, 9783030937942

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An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Inequalities

MARA A. YERKES MICHÈLLE BAL

Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies

Mara A. Yerkes  •  Michèlle Bal Editors

Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Inequalities

Editors Mara A. Yerkes Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science Utrecht University Utrecht, The Netherlands

Michèlle Bal Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science Utrecht University Utrecht, The Netherlands

ISBN 978-3-030-93794-2    ISBN 978-3-030-93795-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

We would first and foremost like to acknowledge the past and future students of the courses Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies as well as Social Risks in Europe: a Matter of Social Policy and Public Health, both at Utrecht University’s Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science. They are the primary inspiration and motivation for this book, and we hope that it contributes as much to their learning process as it has to ours. In particular, many thanks to Rozafa Jahaj, Taryn Vosters, and Esther van der Wekken for reading several chapters to provide us with a student’s perspective on topics we sometimes take for granted. We are also indebted to the authors involved in this edited volume. They all agreed to this project weeks before the COVID-19 pandemic became a part of our daily reality. A very warm thank you to each and every one of you for sticking with us throughout this process, despite any challenges going on in your personal and professional lives. Our apologies for any chaos on our end (particularly during lockdowns when our work hours were limited). Your dedication to this project is greatly appreciated. Special thanks also to the authors who helped us by reviewing other chapters in the book. It pleased us to hear that many of you experienced reviewing as a mutual learning process, particularly on an interdisciplinary project like this one. We are also grateful to our colleagues in the research group of social policy and public health, and more broadly within the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science. We truly appreciate your support and involvement in the book. The interdisciplinary and highly collegial environment we have together encourages collaborations beyond our own disciplinary knowledge, in both research and teaching. Without it, we wouldn’t have had a conversation about how our mutual disciplines (sociology and psychology) talked about the same topics (solidarity and social justice) but using different terms and varying points of methodological and substantive focus. We owe Robin Buning a big thank you for his careful reading and editing of the first draft version of the manuscript and Roos Knopper, for her assistance with editing and indexing. Each of us would also like to acknowledge our personal support systems. Michèlle Bal: I’d like to thank Kees van den Bos and John de Wit for the many inspiring and thought-provoking discussions we have had and will hopefully continue to have on social justice, social inequalities, and social scientific research more broadly. I’d also like to thank Marijn Stok for setting up many fruitful collaborations with me, especially on the topic of ­sustainable v

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behaviours and sustainability transitions, and Chantal den Daas, for being there for me during all my academic (and non-academic) endeavours. And of course, my gratitude goes out to Jasper and Isolde – who keep me balanced and sane on this academic journey. Mara Yerkes: I am very grateful to Christel Lutz, for intellectually stimulating discussions on the connection between teaching and research, often held during long walks in the middle of the pandemic. Special thanks as well to Marit Hopman, Trudie Knijn, and Dorota Lepianka, for being a source of academic inspiration on solidarity and social justice. I value our continued conversations on these topics. And to Thijs and Jonas – whose love and support gets me through everything – thank you. Finally, we’d like to thank the anonymous reviewers whose thoughtful comments helped sharpen our reasoning and writing, and Sharla Plant at Palgrave Macmillan, for her welcome suggestions and continuous support. Mara A. Yerkes Michèlle Bal

Contents

Section I  Introduction............................................................................    1 1 Why Solidarity and Social Justice Still Matter Today������������������   3 Mara A. Yerkes and Michèlle Bal Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    3 Key Concepts in the Book ��������������������������������������������������������������    4 Outline of the Book��������������������������������������������������������������������������    5 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   11 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   12 Section II  Theoretical Perspectives on Solidarity and Social Justice  15 2 Who We Are and Who We Choose to Help (or Not): An Introduction to Social Identity Theory������������������������������������������  17 Morgana Lizzio-Wilson, Zahra Mirnajafi, and Winnifred R. Louis Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   17 A Brief Introduction to Social Identity Theory��������������������������������   17 How Can Social Identities Encourage Intergroup Animosity and Resistance to Social Change?����������������������������������������������������������   18 How Can Social Identities Facilitate Intergroup Solidarity and Social Change?��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   21 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   24 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   24 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   26 3 Understanding Solidarity in Society: Triggers and Barriers for In- and Outgroup Solidarity ����������������������������������������������������  29 Marit Hopman and Trudie Knijn Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   29 Forms of Solidarity: To Whom Do We Owe?����������������������������������   29 Social Justice: What Do We Owe?��������������������������������������������������   30 Macro−/Meso-level Solidarity: Sociological Ideas About Social Justice and Solidarity������������������������������������������������������������   31 Micro-level Solidarity: Psychological Ideas on Solidarity��������������   34 Conclusion: Social Justice and Solidarity����������������������������������������   35

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Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   37 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   38 4 Social Justice and the Justification of Social Inequalities������������  41 Michèlle Bal and Kees van den Bos Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   41 What Is a Just Distribution of Burdens and Benefits?����������������������   42 How Can We Create a Just Decision-­Making Process? ������������������   43 Who Is Included in Our Justice Judgments?������������������������������������   44 How Do People Justify Injustice and Inequalities? ������������������������   45 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   47 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   48 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   49 5 The Philosophy of Social Justice and Welfare Provision: Towards Capacitating Solidarity����������������������������������������������������  53 Anton Hemerijck, Azizjon Bagadirov, and Pablo Puertas Roig Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 The Good Polity: From T.H. Marshall to John Rawls ��������������������   54 The Good Life: From the Means of Economic Security to the Ends of Human Flourishing ������������������������������������������������������������   56 ‘Stepping-Stone’ Solidarity to Complement ‘Robin Hood’ and ‘Piggy-­Bank’ Social Security����������������������������������������������������������   58 Conclusion: The Correlates of the Good Life in the Good Polity ��   60 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   62 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   63 6 Who Should Get What and Why? Insights from Welfare Deservingness Theory����������������������������������������������������������������������  65 Tijs Laenen and Femke Roosma Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   65 The Welfare Deservingness Model��������������������������������������������������   66 Individual and Contextual Differences in Deservingness Opinions  70 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   72 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   73 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   73 Section III  An Empirical Overview of Social Inequalities Across Societal Fault Lines.................................................................................  77 7 Gender Stereotypes: What Are They and How Do They Relate to Social Inequality?������������������������������������������������������������  79 Loes Meeussen, Aster Van Rossum, Colette Van Laar, and Belle Derks Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   79 Where Do Gender Stereotypes Come From and How Are They Reinforced?��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   79 Gender Stereotypes and Social Inequality ��������������������������������������   80 Promoting Gender Equality ������������������������������������������������������������   82 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   84

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Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   84 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   84 8 Gender Inequality: Perceptions of Fairness and Justice��������������  87 Mara A. Yerkes and Judy Rose Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   87 Gender Inequality in Housework, Care Work, and Paid Employment������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   87 A Social Justice Framework for Understanding Gender Inequality  88 Empirical Example: Accepting Unfair Arrangements at Work��������   91 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   93 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   93 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   94 9 Modern Ageism and Age Stereotyping������������������������������������������  97 Rachel S. Rauvola, Nicholas P. Carruth, and Cort W. Rudolph Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   97 Age-Related Stereotypes������������������������������������������������������������������   98 Stereotype Origins ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 Consequences of Stereotypes����������������������������������������������������������  101 Countering Modern Ageism������������������������������������������������������������  102 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  103 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  104 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  104 10 Is the Intergenerational Social Contract Under Pressure? Studying Age Cleavages in Attitudes Towards Government Support for the Young and the Old������������������������������������������������ 107 Tim Reeskens and Wim van Oorschot Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  107 Age and Attitudes Towards Welfare Provision for the Young and the Old ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  108 Data and Methodology��������������������������������������������������������������������  110 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  113 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  114 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  115 11 How to Study and Understand Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 117 Andrea Mudd, Sanne Verra, Michèlle Bal, and Carlijn Kamphuis Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  117 Defining and Measuring Socioeconomic Position��������������������������  118 Intersectionality, Self-Perceived SEP, and Stereotypes�������������������  119 Consequences of SEP for Health and Well-Being ��������������������������  121 Battling Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health and Well-Being������  122 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  123 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  123 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  124

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12 Deservingness and Socio-­Economic Cleavages������������������������������ 127 Maša Filipovič Hrast and Katharina Zimmermann Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  127 Deservingness theory and Socio-­Economic Differences ����������������  128 Deservingness perceptions in Slovenia and Germany ��������������������  129 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  134 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  134 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  135 13 They Take Away Our Jobs! They Undermine Our National Culture! Public Perceptions of Immigrants and Their Consequences for Solidarity Across Ethnic Boundaries�������������� 137 Borja Martinović and Fenella Fleischmann Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  137 Are They Friendly and Competent? Stereotypes of Immigrants ����  138 Stereotypes as Barriers for Inter-­Ethnic Solidarity in the Context of Immigration��������������������������������������������������������������������  138 Host Society Members’ Perceptions of Economic and Cultural Threats�������������������������������������������������������������������������������  140 Threat Perceptions as Barriers for Host Society’s Solidarity with Immigrants ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  141 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  142 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  143 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  143 14 Welfare Chauvinism: Are Immigrants Granted Access to Welfare State Benefits? �������������������������������������������������� 147 Marcel Lubbers and Verena Seibel Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  147 Welfare Chauvinism in Relation to the Welfare Deservingness Literature������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  148 Explanations of Welfare Chauvinism����������������������������������������������  148 Incidence of Welfare Chauvinism����������������������������������������������������  149 Welfare Chauvinism: EU Versus Non-EU Immigrants and Different Welfare State Domains ����������������������������������������������������  149 Immigrants Themselves on Welfare State Access����������������������������  151 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  152 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  153 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  154 15 Sexual Orientation as Social Justice Fault Line: The Role of Stigmatised Identities and Minority Community Solidarity in Social Inequalities in Wellbeing������������������������������������������������������ 157 John de Wit, Philippe Adam, and Chantal den Daas Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  157 Social Inequality Affecting Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual People������  158 Social Stigma, Minority Stress and Wellbeing of LGB People ������  160 Solidarity to Achieve Social Justice for LGB People����������������������  162 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  163 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  164 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  165

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16 Perceptions of Deservingness: Civil and Social Rights for Same-­Sex Families��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 169 Giulia Dotti Sani, Cristina Solera, and Mara A. Yerkes Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  169 Civil and Social Rights of Same-Sex Families Within the EU: The Debate ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  170 The Current Study: Data and Methods��������������������������������������������  172 Results����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  172 Civil and Social Rights of Citizens Who Move Within the EU ������  174 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  175 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  177 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  177 Section IV  Global Challenges to Solidarity and Social Justice..........  179 17 Leaving No One Behind: Climate Change as a Societal Challenge for Social Justice and Solidarity ���������������������������������� 181 Michèlle Bal and Marijn Stok Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  181 Environmental Justice in Reaction to Climate Change��������������������  182 Individual Behaviour in Climate Change Mitigation����������������������  183 Beyond the Motivation for Sustainable Behaviour��������������������������  184 Sustainability Transitions: Challenges for Solidarity and Social Justice������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  185 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  186 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  187 18 Digitalisation of Public Services as a Challenge to Social Justice������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 191 Luciana Lolich and Virpi Timonen Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  191 Digitalisation of Public Services Provision ������������������������������������  191 Social Justice and the Digital Divide ����������������������������������������������  192 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  196 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  197 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  198 19 The Covid-19 Pandemic and Societal Challenges to Solidarity and Social Justice: Consequences for Vulnerable Groups ���������� 201 Michèlle Bal, Marijn Stok, Carlijn Kamphuis, Jaap Bos, Marcel Hoogenboom, John de Wit, and Mara A. Yerkes Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  201 Inequalities in the Prevalence and Severity of COVID-19��������������  202 Inequalities in the Impact of Measures to Curb COVID-19������������  203 Challenges to Solidarity and Social Justice During the Ongoing Pandemic������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  205 Conclusion ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  208 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  209 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  209

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Section V  Conclusions............................................................................ 213 20 Understanding Solidarity and Social Justice: Barriers that Remain�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 215 Mara A. Yerkes and Michèlle Bal Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  215 Key Conclusions About Solidarity and Social Justice ��������������������  216 Solidarity, and Social Justice in a Changing World? ����������������������  218 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  220

Index���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 221

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Philippe Adam  is Senior Research Fellow at the UNSW Sydney, Australia. His research spans the fields of sociology, psychology, and health promotion. He has led studies on sexuality and health among young people, gay men, and injecting drugs users. He seeks to understand how people balance risk and pleasure and what are the key individual and social barriers to uptake of HIV prevention, HIV/STI testing and antiretroviral treatment that can be addressed by programs. Azizjon Bagadirov  is a Ph.D. researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His research focuses on well-being, social stratification, and social justice. Michèlle  Bal  is Assistant Professor in Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University. Her research revolves around perceptions of justice and injustice. She studies the factors that influence these justice perceptions, how they develop, and how perceptions of justice are used to guide behaviour, for instance in sustainability transitions, in justifying health inequities, and in the process of societal polarization. She is currently also coordinator of the Fair Energy Transition Center. Jaap  Bos  is Associate Professor of Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. He has an interest in historiography and theory of the social sciences, as well as in communication studies. His projects span the problem of marginality in institutional settings, uses of humour in political debate, strategies of persuasion in management, and analysis of historic controversies. Nicholas P. Carruth  is a graduate student at DePaul University. He has a background in psychology, and works on research related to team dynamics, computational modeling, and natural language processing. Chantal den Daas  is a Senior Lecturer in Health Psychology at University of Aberdeen, Scotland. She is social scientist with an interest health behaviour and behavioural change. Her research focuses on behaviour and decision-making in sexual health and infectious disease transmission. Her main focus is on STI, HIV, and HIV cure and associated (social psychological) factors derived from social cognitive theories. xiii

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Belle Derks  is Professor of Social and Organisational Psychology at Utrecht University. Her research focuses on psychological (motivation, self-esteem), physiological (cardiovascular) and neural (EEG/ERP) consequences of  the stereotyping that women and ethnic minorities face in work- and educational settings. John de Wit  is Professor of Public Health at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University. John is a social psychologist who works across social psychology, health psychology, public health, and health promotion. His interdisciplinary research is concerned with the interplay of individual, social and structural factors in health-related behaviors, outcomes and inequalities, with a particular interest in gender and diversity issues. Giulia  Dotti  Sani  is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Milan, Italy. Her main research interests include sociology of the family, female employment and social stratification. Her works appear, among others, in the European Sociological Review, Journal of Marriage and Family and Sex Roles. Fenella  Fleischmann  is Professor of Sociology and member of the programme group Institutions, Inequalities and Life Courses at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Trained as an interdisciplinary migration researcher, her work revolves around the integration of immigrants and their descendants with a particular focus on religion. Anton  Hemerijck  is Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His research interests include social investment in Europe and beyond; the politics of inter-temporal policy choice; open institutionalism as corrective to prevailing determinist account of policy legacies, political institutions, and their socioeconomic impact. Marcel  Hoogenboom  is Associate Professor of Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. His research interests include comparative welfare state analysis in unemployment provision and social assistance, the history of the welfare state, the welfare state and modernization, and new private initiatives in welfare and care. Marit  Hopman  received her PhD in 2012 on value orientations in youth care interventions and Dutch youth policy. After working as a post-­doctoral researcher on international comparative research projects around parenting support and solidarity, she now works as a researcher for the Netherlands Ombudsman for Children. Maša  Filipovič  Hrast  is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana and head of research at the Centre for Welfare Studies. Her research topics include welfare state development, welfare attitudes, social policy and social exclusion as well as issues linked to ageing and long term care.

Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors

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Carlijn  Kamphuis  is Associate Professor at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University. With her research, she aims to increase our understanding of how physical environmental, sociocultural and policy-related factors contribute to socioeconomic inequalities in health and health-behaviours (food consumption, physical activity). Trudie  Knijn  is Emeritus Professor of Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University. Her research interests were on comparative approaches to the relationship between the development and implementation of social policy in the field of work and care, family relationships, gender, and citizenship. More recently she has published on solidarity, justice, and social welfare. Tijs  Laenen  is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences of Tilburg University (the Netherlands) and the Centre for Sociological Research of Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium). His main research interest and expertise lies in studying popular attitudes towards differently targeted and differently designed welfare state policies. Morgana  Lizzio-Wilson  is a Research Fellow in Social, Political, and Feminist Psychology at Flinders University in Adelaide, Australia. Her research focuses on creating and maintaining social change along two lines. The first examines when and why people engage in political action while the second seeks to evaluate and identify effective prejudice confrontation strategies that encourage members of historically advantaged groups to reconsider their biases and act in solidarity with members of disadvantaged groups. Luciana Lolich  is a Postdoctoral Research Officer at the Marino Institute of Education, an associated College of Trinity College Dublin, Ireland. She has a background in social sciences and business. She is interested in examining complex societal challenges at the intersection of public policy and markets. Winnifred R.  Louis  is Professor in Psychology at the University of Queensland, Australia. Her research interests focus on the influence of identity and norms on social decision-making. She has studied this broad topic in contexts from political activism to peace psychology to health and the environment. Marcel Lubbers  is Professor of Interdisciplinary Social Science: Relations between groups and cultures at Utrecht University and leads ERCOMER (European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations). He is affiliated to NIDI-KNAW and the sociology departments of the University of Groningen and Radboud University in the Netherlands. He has published internationally on understanding radical right voting behaviour and euroscepticism. Borja  Martinović  is Associate Professor at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science and researcher at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) at Utrecht University,

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the Netherlands. Her research revolves around group identities, territorial ­ownership claims, and intergroup relations, both from the perspective of ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities. Loes  Meeussen  is a postdoctoral researcher at the Center for Social and Cultural Psychology, University of Leuven (KU Leuven, Belgium) and Lector in Applied Psychology at Thomas More (Belgium). She conducts research on how cultural norms and social stereotypes shape contexts that signal the devaluation or valuation of members of different social groups (men and women, cultural minorities, and majorities); and how people protect their well-being and performance when they are faced with devaluation. Zahra Mirnajafi  is a PhD scholar studying inequality and discrimination, minority-majority social dynamics, and intergroup solidarity. Andrea  Mudd  is a PhD candidate at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University, the Netherlands. Her research focuses on understanding the dynamic, complex factors that influence socioeconomic inequalities in health and health behavior. She primarily uses quantitative research methods and is especially interested in the interplay between structure and agency. Rachel  S.  Rauvola  is Assistant Professor of Industrial & Organizational Psychology at DePaul University. She received her BA from Macalester College, and her MS and PhD from Saint Louis University. Her research focuses on occupational health as it relates to aging, trauma, and marginalization, promoting attention to the intersections between diversity, equity, health, and work in a variety of veins. Tim  Reeskens  is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, the Netherlands. His research interests focus on comparative studies of political and social attitudes, with a particular focus on social capital, trust, national identity, and attitudes towards the welfare state. He is currently the national coordinator of the European Values Study for the Netherlands. Pablo Puertas Roig  is a PhD candidate in Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. His research focuses on analytic philosophy, political theory, and European Union politics. Femke Roosma  is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Tilburg University. Her main research interests regard the social legitimacy of welfare states, the cross-national analysis of multiple dimensions of welfare attitudes, solidarity and deservingness perceptions. Judy  Rose  is a Research Methods Advisor in mixed methods at Griffith University in Queensland, Australia. Her current research interests are in the area of domestic violence and coercive control, and she teaches on mixed methods, survey design and validation, and interviewing skills.

Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors

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Cort  W.  Rudolph  is Associate Professor of Industrial/Organizational Psychology at Saint Louis University. Dr. Rudolph’s research focuses on a variety of issues related to the aging workforce, including the application of lifespan development perspectives, wellbeing and work-longevity, and ageism. Verena Seibel  obtained a PhD from the Humboldt University of Berlin. She was previously a researcher at the University of Konstanz, Germany, and Assistant Professor (Sociology, University of Groningen), and now works as Assistant Professor at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University, the Netherlands. Her research interests include inter-ethnic relations, welfare state attitudes, and migrant labor market integration. She participated in the N ­ ORFACE-­Welfare State Futures program ‘Migrants’ Welfare State Attitudes’ (MIFARE). Cristina  Solera  is Assistant Professor of Sociology in the Department of Cultures, Politics and Society at the University of Turin and fellow at Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin. Mainly through a life course and comparative perspective, her research focusses on the effect of education and class on women’s labour market participation and fertility, on care-work reconciliation practices and policies, on gendered divisions of unpaid work and new models of fatherhood, on gender inequalities in the labour market. Marijn  Stok  is Assistant Professor in Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University. She applies an interdisciplinary perspective to understanding human behaviour and to designing and understanding social policy for behaviour change. Focus areas in her research are health behaviour and sustainability behaviour. Virpi Timonen  is Professor in Social Policy and Ageing at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland. Professor Timonen’s work focuses on the sociology of ageing and social policies as they are unfolding in ageing societies. Kees  van den Bos  is Professor of Social Psychology and Professor of Empirical Legal Science at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. His research focuses on conflicts in society, integrating social psychology and empirical legal research. Topics that he studies include the issue of fair processes in government-citizen interactions, the role of group deprivation and breaches of morality in terrorism and radical behaviour, and the psychological processes that lead people to trust government and important societal institutions. Colette Van Laar  is Full Professor of Social Psychology at the Center for Social and Cultural Psychology, University of Leuven (KU Leuven, Belgium). She conducts research on social identity and stigma, examining social psychological processes that transfer negative group stereotypes into lower participation and outcomes in education, work and on the domestic front.

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Wim van Oorschot  is Emeritus Professor of Social Policy at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Leuven University, Belgium. His research focuses on the relationships between culture and welfare, which he studies through comparative analysis of welfare attitudes and beliefs in relation to economic and institutional national contexts. Aster Van Rossum  is a PhD candidate at the Center for Social and Cultural Psychology, University of Leuven (KU Leuven, Belgium), funded by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO; grant number: 1114222 N). She conducts research on how stereotypes about masculinity affect men’s health and well-being, focusing on the domains of (physical) health behaviour, social relationships, and communal self-concept. Sanne  Verra  is a PhD candidate at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University, the Netherlands. Her research focuses on socio-economic inequalities in health. Specifically, she investigates how multiple layers of socioeconomic disadvantage influence the perceived importance of health and health behavior. Mara A. Yerkes   is Associate Professor at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University. She is an interdisciplinary social scientist trained in social policy and sociology. Her research focuses on comparative social policy (including welfare states, family policy, industrial relations and citizenship regimes) and social inequalities (around work, care, communities and families, in particular in relation to gender, generations, and sexuality). Katharina Zimmermann  is Assistant Professor of Economic Sociology at the University of Hamburg. Her research topics include welfare state research and welfare attitudes.

Notes on Contributors

List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2 Fig. 14.1 Fig. 14.2 Fig. 14.3 Fig. 15.1 Fig. 16.1 Fig. 16.2 Fig. 16.3 Fig. 16.4

The welfare deservingness model����������������������������������������������������� 66 Averages of support for welfare provisions by age (16–90 years), pooled sample ��������������������������������������������������������� 111 Illustration of a focus group discussion—the reasoning behind the high ranking of those who are unemployed����������������������������� 132 Illustration of a focus group discussion—reasoning for the high ranking of an old person ��������������������������������������������������������� 135 Support for welfare chauvinism������������������������������������������������������� 150 Domain-specific welfare chauvinism towards EU and non-EU-migrants ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 151 Immigrants’ attitudes towards the accessibility of welfare resources for their own immigrant group��������������������������������������� 152 LGBT-free zones sticker by Gazeta Polska ����������������������������������� 163 Decisional capacity on civil and social rights��������������������������������� 173 Desire for a common legal framework for civil rights (marriage/partnership) ��������������������������������������������������������������������� 173 Desire for a common legal framework for civil rights (adoption ARTs) and social rights��������������������������������������������������� 174 Ability to maintain civil and social rights throughout Europe������� 175

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List of Tables

Table 7.1

Gender stereotypes, related inequalities, and how to reduce these���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 82 Table 10.1 Multilevel model of support for state responsibility for elderly welfare provision and for childcare provisions regressed on individual level variables �������������������������������� 112 Table 12.1 Focus group participants’ ranking orders of vignettes �������� 131

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List of Boxes

Box 4.1 Stereotypes and the Stereotype Content Model������������������������������� 47 Box 11.1 Important Sociological Theories Related to SEP��������������������������� 118 Box 14.1 Welfare Chauvinism Explained������������������������������������������������������� 148 Box 15.1 Defining Sexual Orientation ����������������������������������������������������������� 158 Box 15.2 Societal Views of Sexual Orientations and Gender Identities������� 159 Box 15.3 Sexual Identity Development����������������������������������������������������������� 161 Box 16.1 Attitudes Towards Civil and Social Rights for Diverse Families in Comparative Context (Yerkes et al., 2018)����������������� 170 Box 17.1 Climate Change Scepticism������������������������������������������������������������� 186 Box 19.1 The COVID-19 Virus����������������������������������������������������������������������� 202 Box 19.2 Case Study 1: Gender Inequalities Deepened by Lockdown Measures������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 204 Box 19.3 Case Study 2: Stigmatization of People with an Asian Appearance��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 207

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Section I Introduction

1

Why Solidarity and Social Justice Still Matter Today Mara A. Yerkes and Michèlle Bal

Introduction Solidarity and social justice are necessary but contested elements in social policies aimed at combatting social inequalities in contemporary societies. Moreover, they often play a central role in public debates on these issues. But what do the concepts of solidarity and social justice mean? Why are they contested? And why do these two concepts still matter today? These concepts and associated questions are at the heart of this volume, which tries to understand and explain the existence of social inequalities across contemporary welfare states, public perceptions of these inequalities (including stereotypes), the perceived deservingness of social policies developed to address them, and ultimately, how these perceived inequalities relate to solidarity and social justice. This book will challenge readers to compare and contrast patterns of social inequality, as well as welfare state responses to and diverging public opinions on social inequality. Taking a sociological, psychological, and political philosophical

approach to these topics, this book offers an interdisciplinary approach to understanding solidarity and social justice in response to social inequalities in contemporary societies. The book answers the following questions: How do various societies respond to enduring, growing or changing inequalities? Do these challenges lead to an expansion of solidarity or an erosion of solidarity, in an ‘us versus them’ rhetoric? And to what extent do societies differ in their social justice values and hence the acceptance of social inequality? In this introductory chapter, we briefly discuss three concepts central to the book: solidarity, social justice, and social inequality. We also introduce additional key concepts such as the welfare state, social policy, social dilemmas, and self-­ transcending values. Two additional key concepts, stereotypes and deservingness, are introduced and explained in Chaps. 4 and 6 respectively. The remainder of the chapter outlines the book, detailing the questions to be dealt with in separate sections and chapters.

M. A. Yerkes (*) • M. Bal Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_1

3

4

Key Concepts in the Book Given their contested nature, concepts such as social justice, solidarity, and social inequality are notoriously difficult to define. In the current volume, we see social inequality as the uneven allocation of burdens and valued resources across members of a society based on their group membership, in combination with the undervaluation of these members of society based on this same group membership. Social inequality is not only about disadvantage. Whereas some groups are unfairly disadvantaged, others enjoy privileges, which can equally be considered unfair (e.g., Black & Stone, 2005). The current volume focuses largely on understanding social inequality as unfair disadvantage, although some chapters will discuss privilege to some degree as well. Societies continue to face persistent structural inequalities arising from differences across race, ethnicity, class, gender and more. In fact, in recent years the class divide has become even stronger, with rising inequality between the rich and the poor. And despite significant progress in recent decades, substantial gender inequalities, such as unequal divisions of work and care, remain. At the same time, European societies are confronted with emerging inequalities, for instance, in relation to sexual orientation, migration and health. Part of the undervaluation of specific (disadvantaged) groups is exemplified by negative stereotypes and the degree to which these social groups are perceived as more or less deserving of welfare state support. Deservingness, in turn, reflects individual attitudes towards citizens’ social rights (the right to work (full employment), income protection, housing, education and healthcare) and civil rights (due process under the law; Marshall, 1950; see Chap. 6). The articulation and protection of these rights are the foundation of modern welfare states, which traditionally provide government-protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education (Wilensky, 1975). Social policies form a crucial part of the ways in which welfare states attempt to identify and address social inequalities as well as social risks that have

M. A. Yerkes and M. Bal

societal consequences, such as mass unemployment. They take they form of services, facilities, and broader support of social groups. Social policy support can be provided by, financed and/or regulated by the welfare state as well as other actors, such as NGOs or trade unions (Dean, 2019; Yerkes et al., 2022, forthcoming). In contemporary welfare states, there is ambiguity in knowing where individual responsibility ends and where welfare state support is required, particularly in relation to social inequalities (Van der Veen et al., 2011). In fact, social inequalities, and the related social policy responses, can generally be viewed as social dilemmas (Van Lange et  al., 2013). Social dilemmas are situations in which short-term self-interests conflict with longer-­term societal interests. In these dilemmas, individuals are better off if they do not act cooperatively, but everybody is better off if everyone cooperates compared to the situation in which no one cooperates. If no one cooperates, everyone will be worse off in the end. As such, to sustain the welfare state and encourage sufficient levels of welfare state support to disadvantaged groups in particular, citizens need to be able to look past their individualistic tendencies. Well-known examples of social dilemmas are the prisoner’s dilemma as well as public goods and resource dilemmas. In resource dilemmas, a certain resource can be used freely by all (e.g., an open pasture, our oceans). However, intensive use of the resource will exhaust it. Consequently, on an individual level, it might make sense to use as much of the public good as possible in the short run (e.g., taking as many fish from the oceans as you want). But everyone is better off in the long run if all individuals use the resource in moderation, allowing it to replenish itself. Questions surrounding social inequality could be framed as social dilemmas in which some individuals or groups may have to give up certain privileges now to end up with a fairer society for all in the end. Motives of solidarity and social justice are essential for acting on these more long-term societal interests. People can move past their self-interested behavioural tendencies by adopting self-­ transcending motives, i.e., motives that extend

1  Why Solidarity and Social Justice Still Matter Today

beyond the self. Both social justice and solidarity can be considered self-transcending motives. Some theories question the existence of such motives in pure form (e.g., rational choice theory and the theory of evolution). However, one could argue that the fact that we care about justice and sometimes behave in a solidaristic manner shows these self-transcending motives do indeed exist. Moreover, studies find that people not only dislike being undercompensated, but they also dislike being overcompensated (Van den Bos et al., 1997). In particular, a dislike of overcompensation is difficult to explain from a self-interest point of view, as overcompensation benefits an individual. Solidarity is one example of a self-­transcending motive. In the most simplistic terms, solidarity is about common identity, suggesting a mutual attachment between individuals in society, both practically (i.e., depending on each other) and normatively (i.e., what we expect of each other; Bayertz, 1999 see also Chap. 3, this volume). But the concept of solidarity is more complex. Historically, solidarity has strong roots in the concept of fraternity, or brotherhood, as well as Christian values of fellowship (Bayertz, 1999). As the concept evolved, solidarity encompassed the idea of shared interests and community. Contemporary scholarship shows that solidarity not only relates to common identity but can also cross group boundaries (see Droogendyk et  al., 2016 and Chap. 3, this volume). The concept of solidarity has been the focus of much political philosophical, psychological, and sociological thought, and in Chap. 3 as well as other chapters, these insights will be discussed in more detail. For now, it is sufficient to know that the meaning of solidarity is subject to change. As societies evolve, so too do our understandings of solidarity. Solidarity is contested, the subject of much societal and political debate. This remains true today, even across differing welfare state contexts. If solidarity is about having a common identity and a willingness to share resources, even across group boundaries, social justice provides the rules through which people can do so. Social justice is concerned with different types of ques-

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tions about allocation: Who is deserving of what, and how is this to be achieved? In classic social science theories and research, most attention was given to questions regarding the distribution of burdens and benefits across members of a society (i.e., distributive justice Adams, 1965). In the late 1980s and 1990s, questions about just procedures leading up to these distributive outcomes became increasingly important (i.e., procedural justice Lind & Tyler, 1988). Besides this classical distinction often made in the social justice literature, other forms of justice can also be distinguished. Notably, if distributive justice addresses questions about what is to be distributed and procedural justice addresses questions about how this is to be done, questions about by whom and for whom are addressed in theorizing on justice as recognition and the scope of justice (Clayton & Opotow, 2003; Fraser, 1998). This threefold distinction in the forms of social justice will be further elaborated on in Chap. 4 of this volume. In line with solidarity, the concept of social justice is also contested and central to many societal and political debates. These debates, and the contested nature of social inequalities, solidarity, and social justice, are central to this book. However, readers should not expect any definitive answers to these debates here. Rather, this book offers a state-of-the-art overview of theoretical perspectives and empirical research on these topics from an interdisciplinary perspective. As such, this book will challenge readers to develop their own viewpoints concerning solidarity, social justice, and social inequalities in contemporary societies.

Outline of the Book The book consists of five sections. Following this introductory section, section II provides the theoretical foundation needed to study debates around solidarity, social justice, and social inequality from an interdisciplinary perspective (sociological, psychological, and political philosophical). Section III of the book looks empirically at several social inequality fault lines visible in society today, including gender, age, ethnicity, sexual

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orientation, and socio-economic position. Subsequently, in section IV, the volume considers solidarity and social justice in relation to three contemporary global challenges: climate change, digitalisation, and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Section IV concludes the book, looking towards the future of solidarity and social justice in contemporary societies.

Section II In section II of this volume, the chapters will explore the following questions: What is solidarity and with whom are we solidaristic? What is social justice and how do historical perspectives on social justice inform what we as society perceive to be fair and unfair? And how does this relate to viewing different groups in society as deserving or undeserving of welfare state support in overcoming social inequalities? Because solidarity and social justice are contested concepts, their definitions and use also differ across and within social science disciplines. The chapters in this section will offer varying perspectives on these concepts as well as definitions used throughout the book, which will be crucial for considering the empirical questions in sections III and IV of this volume. The first theoretical chapters provide a foundation for understanding solidarity and social justice from sociological and psychological perspectives. From a psychological perspective, understanding solidarity starts with understanding identity. In Chap. 2, Lizzio-Wilson, Mirnajafi, and Louis provide an overview of Social Identity Theory (SIT). The core premise of SIT is that people have identities not just as individuals (personal identities, “I”) but also as members of groups (social identities, “we”). When people become aware of their social identity, such as being a member of a nation state, a religion, or a social group, they distinguish between in-groups (people who are like them) and out-groups (others who are not like them). This social identification process and its outcomes can have serious implications for solidarity and social justice. Chapter 2 will briefly review the literature on

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social identity and solidarity, focusing on the questions of why we are usually more likely to help ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. It also considers the extent to which the norms of groups usually specify whom we should help, and how we should do so. Chapter 3 builds on Chap. 2, integrating the sociological perspective with the psychological perspective. Authors Hopman and Knijn focus on inter-group and intra-group solidarity on both the individual and the societal level. In reviewing psychological and sociological literature, the chapter will begin by highlighting the ways in which solidarity can be inclusive as well as exclusive. Subsequently, the authors provide an overview of acts and practices of solidarities based on identity identification (e.g., age, ethnicity, gender). Lastly, the chapter focuses on drivers and barriers of solidarity between different groups and communities. In describing the processes of group identification and classification on both micro and macro levels, Chap. 3 ties together different theoretical approaches to explaining solidarity. Chapter 4 provides an overview of key theoretical notions and influential empirical studies on social justice from an interdisciplinary social scientific perspective. Authors Bal and Van den Bos explain the primary distinction often made between distributive justice (i.e., the distribution of burdens and benefits) and procedural justice (i.e., the fairness of the processes leading up to these distributions). Moreover, within distributive justice, a distinction can be made between three justice principles: equity, equality, and need, which will be discussed. Next, the chapter considers procedural justice studies, in which significant attention is given to fair process and due consideration effects. As the authors will show, across time, additional forms of justice have been distinguished, notably interactional justice and justice as recognition. In addition, scholars have started to study the scope of justice as well. Chapter 4 will end with a discussion of influential theories on how people use justice in daily life, such as just-world theory and system-­ justification theory. Chapter 5 integrates the concepts of solidarity and social justice by discussing the modern wel-

1  Why Solidarity and Social Justice Still Matter Today

fare state and how this is based on the image of a social contract with claims on equality, equity, inclusion, and inter- and intra-generational solidarity. How are ongoing efforts to reform welfare states in relation to contemporary social inequalities (re-)constructed in terms of social justice and solidarity? This chapter takes an historical-­ philosophical perspective, starting with Rawls’ transcendental conception of distributive justice as fairness to more recent notions of social inequality and social wellbeing in relation to capabilities. In Chapter 5, Hemerijck, Bagadirov and Puertas Roig argue that the capability approach to twenty-first century welfare provision runs into practical limitations by inadvertently ‘personalizing’ welfare state provision, while lacking a more overarching social justice framework or a self-transcending framework of capacitating solidarity in twenty-first century welfare states. Given these foundations of solidarity and social justice within contemporary welfare states, the final chapter in this section deals with the question who deserves what and why. This question has and remains central to welfare state debates about redistributive justice and welfare targeting. In Chap. 6, Laenen and Roosma outline deservingness theory, which can help us understand why individuals and groups formulate different criteria for distinguishing deserving groups from those considered less deserving of solidarity. Chapter 6 aims to provide theoretical perspectives both on why deservingness principles differ among various social groups as well as within different institutional contexts (of welfare regimes or specific social policy domains). The authors first discuss the theoretical foundations of the deservingness framework outlining five deservingness criteria, i.e., deservingness principles, that individuals draw upon in evaluating the deservingness of different target groups of social policy. Secondly, the authors explore more in depth existing and new theoretical explanations for individual and contextual differences in deservingness principles and the potential consequences for the social legitimacy of welfare state policies.

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Section III Having covered core theoretical foundations needed to understand problems of social inequality, in section III we move on to an empirical discussion of several social inequality fault lines visible in societies today and the questions of solidarity and social justice underlying these inequalities. The fault lines we look at include gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and socio-economic position. To investigate each of these fault lines, we start with a short introductory text, which offers an interdisciplinary perspective on the topic at hand and guides readers through the process of making interdisciplinary connections on these topics. These introductory texts also define these concepts, discussing important distinctions in terminology. Following this introduction, two empirical chapters will consider societal stereotypes and public perceptions of deservingness and welfare state responses respectively. These empirical chapters start by looking at men versus women, followed by younger versus older persons, ethnic majorities versus ethnic minorities, low versus high socio-­ economic groups, and heterosexuals versus different sexual minorities. Social inequalities are apparent across all these groups in society, but to what degree are these inequalities accepted and, vice versa, to what extent are these inequalities perceived to be (un)fair and/or (un)deserved and why? Answering these questions provides key insights into whether and to what degree societies feel these inequalities should be mitigated through social policies. Each chapter ends with three comprehension questions, to gauge understanding of the material, as well as two discussion questions, allowing for more in-depth engagement with the chapter. Note that while we aim to cover a broad range of fault lines in the book, the themes discussed here are selective. Important discussions remain, for example around stereotypes and perceived deservingness for individuals with disabilities, for individuals living in different household constellations (e.g., singles, lone parents, multiparent families), gender minorities, and so forth.

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In Chaps. 7 and 8, we focus on gender. Significant gender inequality exists in modern societies, particularly in relation to paid work, household work, and care. These inequalities are partially explained by gender stereotypes that tell us that women are perceived as more communal (warm, caring, sensitive) while men are perceived as more competent (rational, assertive, independent). In Chap. 7, authors Meeussen, More, Van Rossum, Van Laar and Derks will outline where these gender stereotypes come from and why these stereotypes matter for social justice: Ideas of what men and women are like often translate into ideas of what men and women should be like. This process socializes people into gendered roles and punishes those who deviate, hence restricting people’s choices. The authors highlight how stereotypes can translate from norms into injustices in different life domains: Women may face lower career opportunities and are held primarily responsible for care tasks, while men may face lower opportunities to engage in care tasks and are held primarily responsible for breadwinning. Finally, the authors discuss what can be done to change gender stereotypes and promote social justice. In Chap. 8, authors Yerkes and Rose provide empirical evidence on gender inequality in paid and unpaid work in relation to distributive, procedural and interactional justice. From this framework, it becomes possible to understand why the gender inequality inherent in unpaid care and household work is often perceived to be fair and deserved. The authors then apply this framework to paid work, focusing on the experiences of Australian mothers and their return to work ­following childbirth. To what extent do mothers perceive the flexibility arrangements they commonly enter into upon return to work as fair and just? Most mothers view their workplace arrangements as fair, consistent with a distributive justice framework. Many women also place great importance on interactional justice, particularly in their experiences in negotiating flexibility. Because of this, inequalities in workplace arrangements will more likely be viewed as fair and deserved by these women, leading to the perseverance of gender inequalities in paid work, household work,

M. A. Yerkes and M. Bal

and care. Hence social policies remain unchallenged in addressing these gender inequalities. From gender we shift to age. Age-related stereotypes exist for both younger and older persons, and across generations. For instance, in some societies older adults may be stereotyped as slow, and young adults may be stereotyped as lazy. In Chap. 9, authors Rauvola, Carruth, and Rudolph take a psychological approach to understanding age-related stereotyping in the modern world. They address what predominant age-­ related stereotypes exist in and across life contexts, the origins of these stereotypes, and their pervasiveness. The authors discuss how these stereotypes impact individuals and groups, addressing what their significance is for social justice. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how to counter modern ageism and age-related stereotyping, and how to promote solidarity and social justice across the age continuum. Following, in Chap. 10, Reeskens and Van Oorschot investigate intergenerational solidarity in relation to perceptions of deservingness, questioning whether the intergenerational social contract is under pressure. In modern welfare states, there are concerns that younger age cohorts are less likely to contribute to elderly welfare provisions, and vice versa, older cohorts are believed to be more negative towards welfare provisions that benefit younger and more active sections of the population. The empirical evidence does not support the idea of such an ‘age war’ in relation to welfare state attitudes. Rather, the authors show empirically how small but meaningful age gaps in opinions about elderly welfare provisions and childcare services exist. They discuss the mechanisms behind these intergenerational solidarity gaps and why younger or older individuals are more or less inclined to support welfare redistribution, and what this means for social justice. In Chaps. 11 and 12, stereotypes and perceptions of deservingness regarding socio-economic position (SEP) will be discussed. Socio-economic inequalities are growing in many (Western) societies and the cleavages between richer and poorer individuals as well as people with low and high education are increasing. Chapter 11 will first discuss several complexities in understanding

1  Why Solidarity and Social Justice Still Matter Today

and studying SEP. Varying definitions exist (e.g., income, educational level, occupation), which evoke different stereotypes and associated stigmas. After this discussion, authors Mudd, Verra, Bal, and Kamphuis show how SEP affects one important life domain, namely that of health and wellbeing, and provide central perspectives and explanations for these socioeconomic health inequities. The authors reflect on diverging social policy responses, their effectiveness in reducing socioeconomic inequalities, and policy makers’ preferences in choosing one or the other. After this more specific focus on health inequalities, we consider public perceptions of deservingness of various socio-economic groups targeted by social policies more broadly. This rich field of empirical research aims to understand how people perceive social justice within the welfare state and investigates perceptions of deservingness in relation to socio-economic position. In Chap. 12, authors Filipovič Hrast and Zimmermann first discuss quantitative research findings showing relative stability in people’s perceptions of deservingness across time, across countries and welfare state regimes, and across different social groups. Perceptions of deservingness towards groups with differing SEP vary according to self-interest and ideological preferences, as these factors influence the type of policies being supported or views on deservingness for specific groups. The authors then discuss a qualitative study investigating how people in different socio-economic positions view welfare state transfers, and the deservingness of different groups. The results of this qualitative study show that wealthier (e.g., middle-class) individuals are perceived to be more deserving of welfare state support than less well-off recipients. In Chaps. 13 and 14, we move on to a discussion of inequalities, stereotypes and perceptions of deservingness related to migration and ethnicity. Processes of large-scale international migration mean contemporary societies are characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity. In Chap. 13, authors Martinovic and Fleischmann show that while levels of diversity are comparable across Western European and North American countries, with around 20% of the population being foreign-born

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or local-born children of foreign-­born parents on both sides of the Atlantic, the ethnic composition of the immigrant population differs markedly. Who is perceived to be a ‘typical immigrant’ therefore differs across societies, yet the stereotypes of newcomer groups show striking similarities. Consequently, some individuals and groups fear competition about economic resources (e.g., jobs, housing, and welfare) as well as attacks on national culture and identity. Such fears are frequently mobilized by political actors who advocate for more stringent migration and integration policies. Chapter 13 reviews the stereotype content model as well as theories of group threat to explain prejudice and exclusionary behaviour (e.g., labour market discrimination, voting for farright parties) directed against immigrants in Western societies. In Chap. 14, authors Lubbers and Seibel build on these insights by discussing research on attitudes towards immigration which shows that majority members of a nation with negative attitudes towards immigration often fear immigrants to be a major burden for the welfare state. This is frequently accompanied by a desire to restrict access to social policies. This phenomenon is known as welfare state chauvinism, whereby majority members aim to restrict welfare state access to the native-born population. The authors provide an overview of the incidence of welfare chauvinism in Europe, investigating whether the majority distinguishes between immigrant groups in deservingness of access to welfare. The chapter further discusses to what extent welfare chauvinism is linked to solidarity within societies. To this end, the authors distinguish between hard and soft forms of welfare chauvinism in Europe, outlining why people differ in their welfare chauvinism. They consider the empirical evidence for both forms of welfare chauvinism, highlighting how welfare chauvinism varies between countries, across welfare domains, and changes over time. We close off this third section with a discussion of inequalities, stereotypes, and perceptions of deservingness related to sexual orientation in Chaps. 15 and 16. Deviations from societal heterosexual norms can lead to negative social judgements and stereotypes. In contemporary

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societies, lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people are still socially marginalized, ranging from more subtle forms of social exclusion to blatant discrimination and persecution. In Chap. 15, authors De Wit, Adam, and Den Daas study the relationships between sexual orientation, sexual identity, stereotypes, stigma, and solidarity and social justice. They discuss how degrees of social marginalization reflect degrees of stigma affecting LGB people, resulting from social structures, such as marriage, which are exclusively organized around heterosexual arrangements. Stigma, thought of as a ‘spoiled identity’, can have profound effects on the wellbeing of LGB people. Unique for sexual identity in comparison to other social identities is that most people at some point have a ‘coming out’, and formally disclose their identity. In addition, sexual identity is often celebrated in Pride events to alleviate stigma and regain power. The relationships between sexual orientation, sexual identity, stereotypes, stigma and solidarity and social justice are highlighted in this chapter using real-life examples. The stigmas faced by LGB people are also reflected in welfare state arrangements and social policy. Many social rights (e.g., work-family benefits, housing benefits, health care) and civil rights (e.g., the right to marry) within welfare states reflect heterosexual family norms, thereby excluding LGB people from access to certain welfare state arrangements. Yet little is known about individual attitudes towards the perceived deservingness of individuals in diverse family forms. Chapter 16 focuses on these attitudes. Authors Dotti Sani, Solera, and Yerkes use data from a study fielded in 2014 and 2015 among students in Denmark, Spain, Croatia, Italy, and the Netherlands to review cross-country differences in beliefs about the civil and social rights of same-sex vs. heterosexual families. In particular, at a time when solidarity within and across European countries is potentially under pressure, they use these data to explore attitudes towards the role of the EU in maintaining these rights. The authors show how attitudes differ between countries that appear more traditional (i.e., Italy and Croatia) and less traditional (i.e., Spain and the Netherlands) and that equality in social rights

is generally more widely accepted than equality in civil rights. They discuss these findings in relation to European solidarity (e.g., when certain civil or social rights are recognized in some member states but not others) and social justice (e.g., who is deserving of civil and social rights).

Section IV Social inequalities and associated stereotyping and perceptions of deservingness are often viewed along fault lines such as the ones investigated in section III. At the same time, in this era of globalization, many cross-cutting societal challenges exist that go beyond these fault lines and beyond the borders of nation states. How do global challenges, including climate change, digitalisation, and the COVID-19 pandemic potentially create new inequalities and/or undermine solidarity in contemporary societies? What social justice questions arise from these challenges and inequalities? And how can these social justice issues be addressed? These questions are the focus of the chapters in section IV. We start with climate change. Climate change poses a major challenge to societies worldwide. Environmental degradation and global problems of an unprecedented scale are arising due to global warming. Contemporary generations are the first to experience these negative consequences first-hand. This means that people will have to drastically change their behaviour in order to save the Earth. In Chap. 17, authors Bal and Stok argue that the required behavioural change needed to address climate change is not equally attainable for everyone, possibly leading to an exacerbation of existing social inequalities and an undermining of solidarity. Specifically, those who occupy less privileged positions in society are likely to have fewer financial and social resources available to facilitate and support them through the sustainability transition. This may be due to more limited capabilities (e.g., skills, knowledge), but also because beliefs about responsibility for and the necessity of change may be lower. These developments also pose serious challenges to solidarity and social

1  Why Solidarity and Social Justice Still Matter Today

justice. However, as will be explained in Chap. 17, social justice perceptions may also be helpful in motivating people to change towards more sustainable behaviour. From climate change we shift the discussion to digitalisation and the consequences of an increasingly digitalised world for solidarity and social justice. In Chap. 18, authors Lolich and Timonen explain how digitalisation is driven by attempts to improve the efficiency of public service provision and cost concerns, yet inadvertently may also lead to new societal divisions and related social justice concerns. Digital services encompass the entire life span from the registration of births to health care records at the end of people’s lives. Digitalisation, particularly in the form of well-designed digital services, can have advantages over conventional services, for example, by eliminating delays associated with paper forms or the need to repeatedly provide the information for such forms. However, digitalisation also has disadvantages. It can create new administrative categories that are unfamiliar and alienating for service users, and digitalisation can create or worsen inequalities, for example through digital divides that persist between different age, socioeconomic, and ethnic groups. Digitalisation thus impacts social justice because it can create categories and divisions that separate those who understand the logic of digital service provision and have the requisite skills, from those who are not as digitally literate and savvy in negotiating the new systems, rules and requirements that digitalisation entails. Finally, this book was written in the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, a chapter on this immense global challenge could not be omitted. In Chap. 19, authors Bal, Stok, Kamphuis, Bos, Hoogenboom, De Wit, and Yerkes consider how the COVID-19 pandemic challenges solidarity and social justice in multiple ways. The authors start off by highlighting how social groups are unequally affected by the SARS-CoV-2 (corona)virus as well as by the measures taken to curb the spread of the virus. They zoom in on socio-economically disadvantaged groups, who, on average, run higher risks of contracting the virus and are more negatively impacted by the

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COVID-19 counter measures. In addition, the chapter considers calls for and challenges to solidarity brought about by the pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic continues to lead to calls for solidarity, for example with employment sectors and/or workers harder hit than others, such as the self-employed and flexible (often younger) workers. On the other hand, it challenges solidarity when certain groups become stigmatized and/or discriminated against as a result of the pandemic (e.g., citizens with an Asian appearance living in societies outside of Asia). Chapter 19 introduces two important societal challenges the pandemic raises – for intergenerational and global solidarity respectively  – and discussed the social justice questions these challenges evoke.

Section V Throughout this volume, it will become clear that solidarity and social justice are necessary elements in addressing social inequalities, now more than ever. Yet historical and emerging societal inequalities and challenges are placing solidarity and social justice under pressure. In Chap. 20, the conclusion of the book, we outline the most important conclusions to be drawn from this interdisciplinary look at solidarity and social justice. What do insights into stereotypes and perceptions of deservingness teach us about solidarity and social justice in society? What social inequality fault lines are visible, and what fault lines are emerging that require more attention? And most importantly, where do we go from here? We conclude this volume by connecting back to the theoretical foundations underpinning our understandings of solidarity and social justice, while looking forward to the societal challenges that lay ahead.

Glossary Self-transcending motives: motives that extend beyond the self, such as justice values and feelings of solidarity (can be contrasted with self-enhancing or egoistic motives).

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Solidarity: common identity, suggesting a mutual attachment between individuals in society, both practically (i.e., depending on each other) and normatively (i.e., what we expect of each other; see Chap. 3). Social dilemmas: situations in which short-term self-interests conflict with longer-term societal interests in such a way that individuals are better off if they do not act cooperatively, but everybody is better off if everyone cooperates compared to the situation in which no one cooperates. If no one cooperates, everyone will be worse off in the end. • Resource dilemmas (take-some dilemmas): social dilemmas in which a course of action that offers positive outcomes for the self leads to negative outcomes for the collective • Public goods dilemma (give-some dilemmas): social dilemmas in which an action that results in negative consequences for the self would, if performed by enough people, lead to positive consequences for the collective. • Prisoner’s dilemma: social dilemma in which (usually) two players simultaneously face a choice between cooperating with each other or defecting, where the best outcome for Player A is the one where they defect and the other cooperates, while the worst outcome is where they cooperate and the other defects. Social inequality: the uneven allocation of burdens and valued resources across members of a society based on their group membership in combination with the undervaluation of these members of society based on their group membership. Social justice: considerations of who is deserving of what and how this is to be achieved. Usually a distinction is made between dis-

tributive and procedural justice, but more forms can be distinguished, such as the scope of justice and justice as recognition (see Chap. 4). Social policies: the services, facilities, and broader support of social groups through which welfare states attempt to identify and address social inequalities as well as social risks. Welfare state: a nation state providing government-­ protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education, guaranteed in the form of citizenship rights.

References Adams, J.  S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L.  Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp.  267–299). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-­2601(08)60108-­2 Bayertz, K. (1999). Solidarity (K. Bayertz, Ed.). Kluwer Academic Publishers. Black, L. L., & Stone, D. (2005). Expanding the definition of privilege: The concept of social privilege. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development, 33, 243–255. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2161-1912.2005. tb00020.x Clayton, S., & Opotow, S. (2003). Justice and identity: Changing perspectives on what is fair. Personality and social psychology review, 7, 298–310. https://doi. org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0704_03 Dean, H. (2019). Social Policy (3rd ed.). Polity Press. Droogendyk, L., Wright, S.  C., Lubensky, M., & Louis, W. R. (2016). Acting in solidarity: Cross-group contact between disadvantaged group members and advantaged group allies. Journal of Social Issues, 72(2), 315–334. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12168 Fraser, N. (1998). Social justice in the age of identity politics: Redistribution, recognition, and participation. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 19, 1–67. Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. Springer. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class, and other essays. Cambridge University Press. Van den Bos, K., Lind, E.  A., Vermunt, R., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1997). How do I judge my outcome when I do not know the outcome of others? The psychology of the fair process effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1034–1046. https://doi. org/10.1037/0022-­3514.72.5.1034

1  Why Solidarity and Social Justice Still Matter Today Van der Veen, R., Yerkes, M. A., & Achterberg, P. (2011). The transformation of solidarity. Changing risks and the future of the welfare state. In Changing welfare states. Amsterdam University Press. Van Lange, P. A., Joireman, J., Parks, C. D., & Van Dijk, E. (2013). The psychology of social dilemmas: A review. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120(2), 125–141.

13 Wilensky, H.  L. (1975). The welfare state and equality; structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. University of California Press. Yerkes, M. A., Nelson, K., & Nieuwenhuis, R. (2022). Changing European Societie. The role for social policy research (K. Nelson, R. Nieuwenhuis, & M. A.Yerkes, Eds.). Edward Elgar.

Section II Theoretical Perspectives on Solidarity and Social Justice

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Who We Are and Who We Choose to Help (or Not): An Introduction to Social Identity Theory Morgana Lizzio-Wilson, Zahra Mirnajafi, and Winnifred R. Louis

Introduction A key task in achieving social change is inspiring people to champion the interests of disadvantaged groups (e.g., women, or sexual, cultural, religious, and ethnic minorities,) to which they do not belong. However, this challenge is often met with indifference, resistance, and even overt hostility toward these groups. Why might this be the case? One might attribute these negative reactions to individual level factors, such as personality differences (e.g., some people are inherently selfish) or ideological beliefs (e.g., some people are prejudiced). However, locating explanations purely at the individual level of analysis fails to consider the influence of broader identity and group factors that affect people’s reactions to and willingness to engage in social change. That is, people do not only see themselves and others as individuals (i.e., ‘I’) but also as members of social groups (i.e., ‘we’). Further, they are inclined to distinguish between ingroups (that they belong to) and outgroups (who are dissimilar to members of their group) which, in turn, influences the types of people they are willing to help or

M. Lizzio-Wilson (*) Flinders University, Adelaide, SA, Australia e-mail: [email protected] Z. Mirnajafi • W. R. Louis The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

not help. Thus, conceiving of solidarity in intergroup terms better enables us to understand when and why people are more inclined to co-­operate with and help others, or to engage in indifferent or even discriminatory behaviours. In the following chapter, we use Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to explain how social identities influence people’s orientations toward certain groups, focussing in particular on when and why these identities facilitate intergroup animosity versus intergroup solidarity (see also inclusionary outgroup solidarity in Chap. 3, this volume). We finish by outlining specific strategies that leverage social identities to minimize animosity, enhance receptivity to social change, and promote political solidarity and action on behalf of disadvantaged groups.

 Brief Introduction to Social A Identity Theory Many early approaches to understanding the origins of prejudice focused on the role of personality and individual needs, goals, and identities (see Fiske, 1998 for a review). However, there has since been an increasing recognition of the significance of collective or social identity for intergroup relations. Henri Tajfel and John Turner formulated SIT to conceptualise the influence of social identities and group membership on intergroup relations. There are many intricacies of SIT

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_2

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(see Hornsey, 2008 for a review), but at its core, this framework proposes that a person’s self-concept ranges from being purely interpersonal to purely intergroup. On the one hand, a person’s self-concept is comprised of attitudes, memories, behaviours, and emotions that define them as idiosyncratic individuals, distinct from other people (i.e., a personal identity). On the other hand, selfconcept is also defined by the social categories to which a person belongs as well as the emotional and evaluative consequences of this group membership (i.e., a social identity). Importantly, the salience of social identities (i.e., the extent to which people are thinking of themselves as members of a group at one moment in time) influences how people interact with others. That is, when group memberships are salient, people are more likely to define themselves in terms of these social identities and make evaluative distinctions between their ingroup and other outgroups (i.e., between ‘us’ and ‘them’; see Hornsey, 2008 for a review of the factors influencing social identity salience). These evaluative distinctions play an integral role in the formation and perpetuation of intergroup bias and animosity (and are therefore also important processes to reduce or eliminate these biases). As people use their social identities as a point of self-definition and evaluation, they are motivated to maintain a positive image of their own social group. One means of achieving this goal is to represent the ingroup more favourably than an outgroup (i.e., ingroup favouritism). Indeed, compared to outgroup members, people allocate greater rewards to ingroup members (Lonsdale & North, 2009), are more trusting towards them (Insko et  al., 1990), and more cooperative (Haslam & Ellemers, 2011). However, a positive social identity can also be achieved by devaluing or discriminating against relevant outgroups (i.e., outgroup derogation) which serves to bolster the ingroup’s status or image (Mummendey et al., 2001), especially when the outgroup is perceived as a threat to the ingroup (see ‘Social identity threat’ section below for elaboration of this point). These processes set the stage for the rest of this chapter, in which we more fully explore how ingroup favouritism and outgroup deroga-

tion emanate from salient social identities that influence intergroup relations and receptivity to social change.

 ow Can Social Identities H Encourage Intergroup Animosity and Resistance to Social Change? As outlined above, outgroup derogation and intergroup animosity fulfil important identity functions for group members. Namely, they can serve to bolster the ingroup’s status and help protect against subjective outgroup threats. Similarly, resistance to change and rejection of deviance have important intragroup functions, such as protecting a groups’ norms and values from those who appear to undermine them. In the following sections, we further elaborate on these functions and discuss identity processes that have been consistently shown to increase the likelihood of social animosity.

Social Identity Threat Because people are motivated to maintain a positive self-concept, the status and perceptions of the groups to which they belong are central to achieving this goal. However, when the value or image of a salient social identity is threatened, people are motivated to restore their positive identity. Although the nature and origin of these threats vary, they initiate and legitimate the expression of hostility and prejudice with the goal to protect a personally meaningful group identity. Branscombe, Ellemers, et  al. (1999) proposed four distinct types of social identity threat, two of which have been explored extensively in relation to outgroup derogation and intergroup animosity, which we describe below.

Distinctiveness Threat Outgroup derogation is more likely to occur when group members perceive that the ingroup

2  Who We Are and Who We Choose to Help (or Not): An Introduction to Social Identity Theory

identity is no longer meaningfully and positively distinct from relevant outgroups (i.e., distinctiveness threat). People are motivated to differentiate their ingroup from other groups in order to maintain or enhance their group’s distinct, positive, and cohesive identity. Thus, when group members perceive that the group’s identity is being eroded or subsumed by other superordinate identities, they are more inclined to react aggressively to outgroups whom they perceived as the source of this threat to the group’s existence. For example, distinctiveness threat has been shown to predict more negative intergroup attitudes between Albanians and Serbs in post-­ conflict Kosovo as they negotiate a new national identity which encompasses both unique ethnic identities (Maloku et al., 2019). More generally, distinctiveness threat predicts greater negative affect toward outgroup members (Reysen et al., 2012), and lower willingness to seek out and engage in contact with outgroups (Maloku et al., 2019; Schmid et al., 2009) thereby blocking avenues for intergroup reconciliation and improved intergroup attitudes. Threat also prompts greater competition and an intensification of (sub)group identification (Tausch et al., 2007) as a means of defending a threatening identity by differentiating from the relevant outgroup (Jetten et  al., 1997). Though not the primary focus of this chapter, there is also evidence that ingroup members who blur group boundaries are also negatively evaluated (see Hornsey & Jetten, 2004 for a review).

Group-Value Threat People can maintain positive feelings about their own group to the extent that a positive comparison with another group can be achieved. However, exposure to a negative social comparison between the ingroup and a relevant outgroup which compromises the perceived value and/or status of the ingroup can evoke ingroup favouritism and/or outgroup derogation as a means of defending that identity.

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Importantly, group-value threats can occur along a number of different dimensions that may compromise the perceived positive distinctiveness and value of the ingroup. For example, an outgroup can elicit threat directly by discriminating against the ingroup or expressing hostility, leading group members to derogate the source of the threat as a means of protection. For example, African Americans’ perceptions of discrimination may lead to increased identification with the ingroup and greater outgroup hostility towards Whites (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). Similarly, both Italian Northerners and Southerners reported more negative evaluations of each other when led to believe that the outgroup allegedly endorsed negative evaluations of the ingroup (e.g., that Southerners view Northerners as selfish and intolerant; Voci, 2006). These defensive responses are particularly evident when the group’s moral value is called into question. When members of historically advantaged groups are confronted with their negative intergroup history and mistreatment of disadvantaged groups, group members are more likely to respond to threat by endorsing more prejudicial attitudes and engaging in harmful behaviours toward the outgroup. For example, men are less supportive of the #MeToo movement if they perceived that the campaign mars their group’s moral reputation (Kende et al., 2020) and are more likely to sexually harass women when reminded of their gender-based privileges and negative intergroup history with women (Dall’Ara & Maass, 1999; Maass et al., 2003). However, outgroup derogation is also evident when the ingroup’s performance or social standing is compromised relative to a salient outgroup (e.g., a Russian beating an American in a boxing match; Bourhis et  al., 1979) especially among higher identifiers (i.e., group members for whom their social identity is a more integral part of their self-concept). Thus, threat and outgroup derogation can be elicited even when the ingroup is portrayed as less successful than the outgroup because of its own failure, rather than because of an ‘unfair’ bias against the ingroup on the part of the outgroup.

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 ocio-Structural Differences Between S Groups

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cation (i.e., men whose gender identity is a more integral part of their self-concept; Maass et  al., 2003). On the other hand, highlighting illegitiSIT further proposes that group members’ expe- mate ingroup advantage has also been shown to rience of threat (and subsequent expression of induce feelings of collective guilt among high-­ intergroup prejudice) is determined by the socio-­ status group members (Miron et al., 2006), leadstructural context in which groups are embedded. ing to more positive outgroup attitudes and In particular, the experience of threat is influ- behaviours (Doosje et  al., 1998). Thus, experienced by the extent to which status differences encing threat as a result of (il)legitimate interare stable (i.e., enduring or likely to change) and/ group status differences can both repair and or permeable (i.e., whether individual members further strain intergroup relations. of lower status groups can gain membership in a higher status group; Ellemers et al., 1993). When there are potential or actual changes to the status Internalisation of Group Norms quo which may erode a group’s higher status, group members may endorse discriminatory atti- In addition to forming the basis of people’s self-­ tudes and behaviours as a means of protecting concepts, social identities provide group memtheir dominant position. For example, advan- bers with norms and expectations for behaviour taged groups (e.g., men, White people) can react (Hogg & Tindale, 2005). When strongly identifynegatively to and experience threat when faced ing as a member of a social group, individuals are with anticipated changes in the status hierarchy more likely to assimilate the norms that are pro(Scheepers et al., 2009), and often report greater totypical of their ingroup (regardless of whether anger and fear toward outgroups who are seen as they relate to prosocial or antisocial behaviours) destabilizing the status hierarchy and threatening and apply them to their own sense of self (Terry the prosperity of the ingroup (Outten et al., 2012). & Hogg, 1996). Thus, people will be more likely Further, perceptions of permeable intergroup to engage in a particular behaviour if it is in boundaries are associated with greater intergroup accordance with the norms of a relevant and bias and derogation by advantaged group mem- salient group identity. By doing so, group members (Bettencourt et al., 2001), indicating that the bers affirm and celebrate their group’s identity social mobility of only a select number of lower and values, which may involve obligations in status group members is enough to threaten helping (e.g., giving to charity) and/or discrimihigher status group members and elicit group nating against others (e.g., shunning or stigmatizprotection responses. Practically, this means that ing other groups). As such, norms play an social change efforts which attempt to change important role in intergroup relations, such that status differences between advantaged and disad- discriminatory intergroup norms often develop vantaged groups (e.g., organisational diversity which legitimate hostility and discrimination initiatives) are often met with resistance (see toward relevant outgroups. Indeed, perceptions Dover et al., 2020 for a review). of hostile national norms (Louis et al., 2007) and However, the extent to which status differ- group norms that endorse inter-group hostility ences are legitimate (i.e., fair or deserved) can (Smith & Postmes, 2009) predict more severe elicit both pro- and anti-social responses from intergroup discrimination toward relevant outgroup members. On the one hand, advantaged groups. In terms of how and why such norms groups can experience threat when the legitimacy develop and are adopted by group members, of their higher status and privilege is questioned. Amiot et al. (2020) propose that a number of disFor example, women who question the legiti- crete group processes and identity-related motimacy of men’s higher status are more likely to be vations explain how and why discriminatory sexually harassed by men (Dall’Ara & Maass, intergroup norms develop and are autonomously 1999), especially men higher in gender identifi- adopted by ingroup members.

2  Who We Are and Who We Choose to Help (or Not): An Introduction to Social Identity Theory

First, group members may come to internalise and enact discriminatory norms because they are instrumentally beneficial to the ingroup. That is, outgroup derogation can be used instrumentally to facilitate social change and improve ingroup status, helping the group acquire material resources, and preparing ingroup members for intergroup competition and threat. In one example, group members provided more feedback to ingroup (versus outgroup) members on a group task, which helped to improve the group’s performance in the next round (Scheepers et al., 2003; Scheepers et al., 2006). This is especially likely among strongly identified group members (Nickerson & Louis, 2008) who are particularly inclined to bolster the ingroup and defend against actual or perceived intergroup threats. Second, intergroup animosity and discrimination may become normative because it serves to celebrate and affirm a positively distinct social identity. For example, people tend to view their ingroup as possessing more ‘uniquely human’ qualities than outgroup members (e.g., intelligence, language, refined emotions), even in the absence of intergroup conflict (see Leyens et al., 2007 for a review). Thus, this denial of outgroup humanity likely emanates from the belief in the ingroup’s inherent superiority and ‘uniquely human’ identity, rather than a reactive response to threat. This suggests that discriminatory inter-­ group attitudes can also serve as a form of identity expression rather than a group-protection response.

Summary Social identities can give rise to intergroup animosity as a means of bolstering the ingroup and protecting against intergroup threats. Outgroup derogation often emerges as a reaction to social identity threat (i.e., when a value identity is diminished or devalued in some way). It serves as a means of defending against outgroup threats to the existence and/or boundaries of the group (i.e., distinctiveness threat) and the perceived value and/or status of the ingroup (i.e., group-value

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threat). This defensive reaction is particularly likely to occur when status differences between groups are unstable and/or group boundaries are permeable (either objectively or subjectively). This is because potential or actual changes to the status quo may erode a group’s status or advantages, thereby undermining a personally meaningful and important group identity. However, group norms that legitimate and promote intergroup animosity can also form even in the absence of intergroup threat. That is, group members can endorse and enact intergroup discrimination because of its instrumental benefits (i.e., status improvement, acquisition of material resources) or because they serve as a celebration and affirmation of a valued social identity.

 ow Can Social Identities Facilitate H Intergroup Solidarity and Social Change? Thus far, we have painted a rather bleak picture of social identities and intergroup relations. However, there is ample evidence that social identities can also facilitate intergroup pro-­ sociality under certain conditions. In the following sections, we outline how social identities can be leveraged to improve intergroup relations and enhance receptivity to social change. In particular, we focus on the different types of identities that encourage solidarity and motivate members of traditionally advantaged groups to act on behalf of disadvantaged groups to achieve equality. While we adopt the perspective that social identities play an integral and positive role in catalysing social change, we acknowledge that this is influenced by our view that dismantling intergroup inequality is necessary to improve the treatment of and opportunities for disadvantaged groups. However, we understand that not everyone may share this view, and some may have a different perspective about hierarchies and group status differences (e.g., they reflect fair and just differences in ability or deservingness of resources and opportunities).

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Superordinate Versus Subgroup Identities We have discussed how intergroup animosity reflects a desire to protect and bolster people we share salient group memberships with and denigrate people who we perceive as devaluing or threatening those groups. Therefore, it follows logically that inducing members of different groups to view each other as having shared or overlapping identities may decrease a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and improve intergroup relations. The Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) proposes that different group representations and (re)categorisations mediate intergroup attitudes and orientations. On the one hand, this framework proposes that a key means to improving intergroup relations is inducing members of different groups to conceive of themselves as members of a single more inclusive, superordinate identity, rather than as two completely separate (even competitive) groups. Thus, identification with the superordinate category (e.g., Christian) which is inclusive of both subgroup identities (e.g., Protestant and Catholic) should lead to less negative evaluations of the former outgroup through an increase in the attractiveness and liking of that group. In support of this approach, stronger common ingroup identification has been shown to reduce perceptions of intergroup threat (Riek et al., 2010) and promote more positive intergroup attitudes and behaviours, including intergroup helping (James & Zagefka, 2017); intergroup forgiveness, trust, and empathy (Noor et al., 2008), and collective action on behalf of disadvantaged groups (Cakal et  al., 2016). Thus, common ingroup identification can bolster intergroup solidarity. However, common identities are not a panacea for tumultuous intergroup relations and can evoke resistance. Attempts to replace highly valued existing group identities with a single superordinate identity can elicit distinctiveness threat, thereby impeding the development of a

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common group identity and exacerbating intergroup bias as a way to affirm positive distinctiveness (Jetten et  al., 1997). This rejection of shared identities is particularly likely among people who are more strongly identified with their (sub)group identity (Crisp et  al., 2006). Further, stronger common ingroup identification can reduce collective action intentions among members of disadvantaged groups (Ufkes et al., 2015) suggesting that this form of identification can reduce their sensitivity to potential biases against them. To combat these potential downfalls, an alternate model of group recategorization has been proposed to assuage group members’ distinctiveness concerns. The Dual Identity Model proposes that encouraging group members to conceive of two subgroup identities (e.g., White and Black) as distinct entities within the context of a shared superordinate identity (e.g., American) should avoid the threat that downplaying subgroup identities poses to distinctiveness. This dual identity approach (see Hornsey, 2008) allows group members to preserve their original, positively distinct identities while encouraging the simultaneous adoption of a superordinate identity that allows them to see members of other groups in non-adversarial terms. Importantly, there is ample evidence for the intergroup benefits of dual identities. For advantaged group members, conceiving of dual identities between themselves and disadvantaged groups may improve their intergroup attitudes and actions (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013). For disadvantaged groups, dual identities may preserve their collective action intentions (Ufkes et  al., 2016) and increase their willingness to engage in contact with majority group members while maintaining their social change motivation (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011). Thus, improved intergroup relations and social change may be best achieved when both superordinate and subgroup identities are preserved.

2  Who We Are and Who We Choose to Help (or Not): An Introduction to Social Identity Theory

Politicised Identities and Solidarity

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of the elected government (Bliuc et  al., 2007), and a supporter or opponent of marriage equality A second important line of work focuses on the (Lizzio-Wilson et  al., 2021). Importantly, comrole of social identities in promoting solidarity mitment to such opinion-based groups is a much between historically advantaged and disadvan- stronger predictor of action (Bliuc et  al., 2015) taged groups and spurring political mobilisation to compared to category group memberships (De challenge the status quo. The Social Identity Weerd & Klandermans, 1999). Thus, cultivating Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van these identities is a particularly important precurZomeren et al., 2008) proposes that identity is both sor to political action and solidarity. a direct and indirect predictor of collective action. Though comparatively less work has examIngroup identification, and in particular its politi- ined the origins of politicised identification, norcised version (e.g., identification with a social mative conflict can be a key precursor to movement), predicts collective action directly. politicised identity formation and social change However, identification also predicts action indi- action. That is, the extent to which an individual rectly via a sense of group-based anger or injustice experiences a discrepancy between a descriptive (i.e., individuals’ perceptions of unfairness or norm (i.e., norms about how people actually experience of anger about the group’s disadvan- behave in a given situation) in an existing group tage), and group efficacy (i.e., individuals’ beliefs and their personal ideals about injunctive norms that the group is able to achieve group goals (i.e., norms about how people should behave in a through unified effort). Thus, identification gives given situation). While research has found that group members a sense of togetherness, which normative conflict undermines motivation to enhances the likelihood that they will affirm the change for those who are not already committed efficacy of their group or subjectively experience to a cause, it may function as a call to arms for the shared injustice that their group has been people who already are (see Louis et al., 2020 for exposed to. Importantly, politicised group identifi- a review). Smith et al. (2015) propose that when cation can arise because of violated moral convic- an individual experiences normative conflict, tions about social equality (van Zomeren et  al., some may be motivated to speak out against the 2012) especially among members of advantaged perceived discrepancy between the way the world groups (van Zomeren et al., 2011). Thus, in reject- is (i.e., what we do) and the way they believe the ing unfairness and injustice, collective action and world should be (i.e., what we should do). Voicing solidarity are preceded by the subjective sense of this discrepancy can, in turn, spark interpersonal “who we are” and “what we will not stand for” discussion about the appropriateness of particular (see van Zomeren et al., 2018). social change actions and help the formation of In the context of collective action, encourag- new groups that develop new norms premised ing identification with a politicised or opinion-­ around shared ideas for how the world should based group (i.e., identities based on opinions change (provided that these voiced opinions are about how the world should be; McGarty et al., shared and socially validated by others). For 2009) is particularly important. This is because example, Thomas et  al. (2019) asked people to these identities help people to form a common engage in small group discussions to devise stratcause with others based on shared opinions egies for providing safe drinking water to people (including shared opinions about the relations in developing countries. As expected, greater between groups) or about a need for change (see consensus within group discussion regarding Louis et  al., 2020 for a review). Contemporary desired social change increased participants’ examples of politicised identities include identi- internalisation of these beliefs, and their adoption fication as a climate change ‘believer’ or ‘skep- of novel social identities (i.e., as a supporter of tic’ (Bliuc et al., 2015), a supporter or opponent ‘Water for Life’, a United Nations program aimed

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at securing safe drinking water), which promoted commitment to social change. In terms of how this may be achieved, one approach is incorporating such discussions into structured intergroup contact sessions (i.e., bringing together members of different groups in a structured experience that is supervised and monitored and runs according to clear rules concerning participants’ behaviour; see Amichai-Hamburger et al., 2015 for a review). The higher levels of control over the interaction will allow supervisors to gradually introduce intergroup issues into the conversation as a means of encouraging participants to reach consensus about norms for intergroup behaviour and treatment. Structuring the conversation in this way also may enhance participants’ sense of personal responsibility and increase the likelihood that they will voice dissenting opinions.

Summary Particular types of social identities best facilitate intergroup solidarity. Dual identities allow group members to preserve their original subgroup identity while encouraging the simultaneous adoption of a superordinate identity shared with outgroup members. Making both subgroup and superordinate identities salient decreases distinctiveness threat and promotes more positive intergroup attitudes. In contrast, encouraging identification with a single superordinate identity can elicit distinctiveness threat and reduce action intentions among members of disadvantaged groups. Politicised identification (i.e., identification with a social movement or opinion-based group) is a much stronger predictor of solidarity with a disadvantaged group and of collective action than identification with category group memberships. Politicised identities are also potentially able to unite advantaged and disadvantaged groups to fight for a common cause and potentially to reduce advantaged groups identification with their advantaged identity, which prevents engagement in system-challenging forms of collective action.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have summarised the extensive literature on SIT to illuminate the identity and group processes that influence intergroup animosity, solidarity, and people’s receptivity to social change. In particular, we have focussed on how people’s need for a positive self-concept is defined by the groups to which they belong and, most importantly, the perceived value and social standing of those groups. Thus, their pro- and anti-social reactions to others are driven, in part, by their membership in the same or similar group as them, and any actual threat they pose to their positively distinct identities. However, our review has also identified different types of identities (i.e., dual and politicised identities) that can be harnessed to improve intergroup attitudes and increase people’s willingness to fight for social change

Glossary Collective action: any action that promotes the interests of one’s group or is conducted in political solidarity (e.g., via political protest, signing a petition, voting on an issue). Common Ingroup Identity Model: a framework which proposes that a key means to improving intergroup relations is encouraging members of different groups to conceive of themselves as members of a single, more inclusive group (e.g., American), rather than as two completely separate groups (e.g., Black and White; see also superordinate identities; subgroup identities). Distinctiveness threat: a specific type of social identity threat that occurs when group members perceive that their ingroup identity is being eroded or subsumed by other superordinate identities (see also social identity threat; superordinate identities). Dual identity model: a framework which proposes that a key means to improving intergroup relations is encouraging members of different groups to simultaneously conceive of

2  Who We Are and Who We Choose to Help (or Not): An Introduction to Social Identity Theory

themselves as members of their own subgroup (to protect distinctiveness) and members of a single, more inclusive group (to promote ingroup positivity). Group-value threat: a specific type of social identity threat that occurs when a negative social comparison between the ingroup and a relevant outgroup compromises the perceived value and/or status of the ingroup (see also social identity threat). Ingroup favouritism: the tendency to favour ingroup members over the outgroup in behaviour, attitudes, preferences, or perceptions (e.g., allocating greater rewards, greater trust, and cooperation). Outgroup derogation: unfavourable evaluations of outgroups and their members as a means of bolstering the ingroup’s status or image (e.g., intergroup discrimination). Politicised identities: identifying as an ‘activist’ and/or with a social movement organization (e.g., Greenpeace). Social change: changes in human interactions and relationships that transform cultural and social institutions. These changes occur over time and often have profound and long-term consequences for society. Social Identity Model of Collective Action: a model which explains why people come to engage in collective action on behalf of a cause. This framework proposes that ingroup identification (e.g., identification with a social movement) motivates a sense of injustice about the status quo and group efficacy (i.e., individuals’ beliefs that the group is able to achieve group goals through unified effort). Together, the three factors each predict greater collective action engagement. Social identity salience: the extent to which people think of themselves as members of a particular group in any given situation. Social Identity Theory: a theory that proposes that a person’s self-concept is comprised of both a personal identity (i.e., comprised of their unique attitudes, memories, and emo-

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tions) and social identities, which are defined by the social categories and groups to which they belong. These social identities, in turn, influence how they interact with and treat other people who have the same or different social identities to them (see also social identity). Social identity threat: a sense of threat the occurs when an important social identity is devalued or viewed negatively (see also distinctiveness threat; group-value threat). Social identity: the aspect of a person’s identity that is defined by the social categories to which they belong (e.g., gender, race, religion) and the emotional and evaluative consequences of this group membership (see also Social Identity Theory). Subgroup identities: a distinct social identity nested within a larger superordinate identity or group (e.g., Catholics and Protestants are both forms of Christianity). Superordinate identities: a common, inclusive social identity which unites people from distinct subgroups (e.g., the American national identity comprises both Black and White Americans).

Comprehension Questions

1. According to Social Identity Theory, people are motivated to maintain a positive image of the social groups to which they belong. Broadly, what are the two ways group members can achieve this goal? 2. Under what conditions are members of advantaged groups most likely to feel threatened and engage in discriminatory behaviour toward disadvantaged groups? Why? 3. Imagine that you are a member of an activist group and you are trying to garner more support for your cause. List three broad strategies you might use to enhance people’s solidarity with your cause, and briefly explain how each strategy is in line with Social Identity Theory.

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Discussion Questions

1. How can we harness insights from Social Identity Theory to lessen people’s identity concerns (e.g., threat) and enhance their solidarity with disadvantaged groups? 2. Which aspects of intergroup discrimination and solidarity has Social Identity Theory yet to tackle?

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2  Who We Are and Who We Choose to Help (or Not): An Introduction to Social Identity Theory Kende, A., Nyúl, B., Lantos, N. A., Hadarics, M., Petlitski, D., Kehl, J., & Shnabel, N. (2020). A needsbased support for #MeToo: Power and morality needs shape women’s and men’s support of the campaign. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 593. Leyens, J.  P., Demoulin, S., Vaes, J., Gaunt, R., & Paladino, M. P. (2007). Infra-humanization: The wall of group differences. Social Issues and Policy Review, 1(1), 139–172. Lizzio-Wilson, M., Thomas, E.  F., Louis, W.  R., Wilcockson, B., Amiot, C.  E., Moghaddam, F.  M., & McGarty, C. (2021). How collective-action failure shapes group heterogeneity and engagement in conventional and radical action over time. Psychological Science, 32(4), 519–535. Lonsdale, A. J., & North, A. C. (2009). Musical taste and ingroup favouritism. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 12(3), 319–327. Louis, W. R., Duck, J. M., Terry, D. J., Schuller, R. A., & Lalonde, R. N. (2007). Why do citizens want to keep refugees out? Threats, fairness and hostile norms in the treatment of asylum seekers. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(1), 53–73. Louis, W.  R., Thomas, E., McGarty, C., Lizzio-Wilson, M., Amiot, C., & Moghaddam, F. (2020). The volatility of collective action: Theoretical analysis and empirical data. Political Psychology, 41, 35–74. Maass, A., Cadinu, M., & Guarnieri, G. (2003). Sexual harassment under social identity threat: The computer harassment paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(5), 853–870. Maloku, E., Derks, B., Van Laar, C., & Ellemers, N. (2019). Stimulating interethnic contact in Kosovo: The role of social identity complexity and distinctiveness threat. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 22(7), 1039–1058. McGarty, C., Bliuc, A. M., Thomas, E. F., & Bongiorno, R. (2009). Collective action as the material expression of opinion-based group membership. Journal of Social Issues, 65(4), 839–857. Miron, A.  M., Branscombe, N.  R., & Schmitt, M.  T. (2006). Collective guilt as distress over illegitimate intergroup inequality. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(2), 163–180. Mummendey, A., Klink, A., & Brown, R. (2001). Nationalism and patriotism: National identification and out-group rejection. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40(2), 159–172. Nickerson, A.  M., & Louis, W.  R. (2008). Nationality versus humanity? Personality, identity, and norms in relation to attitudes toward asylum seekers. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38(3), 796–817. Noor, M., Brown, R., Gonzalez, R., Manzi, J., & Lewis, C.  A. (2008). On positive psychological outcomes: What helps groups with a history of conflict to forgive and reconcile with each other? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(6), 819–832. Outten, H.  R., Schmitt, M.  T., Miller, D.  A., & Garcia, A.  L. (2012). Feeling threatened about the future:

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Whites’ emotional reactions to anticipated ethnic demographic changes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(1), 14–25. Reysen, S., Snider, J.  S., & Branscombe, N.  R. (2012). Corporate renaming of stadiums, team identification, and threat to distinctiveness. Journal of Sport Management, 26(4), 350–357. Riek, B.  M., Mania, E.  W., Gaertner, S.  L., McDonald, S.  A., & Lamoreaux, M.  J. (2010). Does a common ingroup identity reduce intergroup threat? Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13(4), 403–423. Scheepers, D., Ellemers, N., & Sintemaartensdijk, N. (2009). Suffering from the possibility of status loss: Physiological responses to social identity threat in high status groups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(6), 1075–1092. Scheepers, D., Spears, R., Doosje, B., & Manstead, A. S. (2003). Two functions of verbal intergroup discrimination: Identity and instrumental motives as a result of group identification and threat. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(5), 568–577. Scheepers, D., Spears, R., Doosje, B., & Manstead, A. S. (2006). Diversity in in-group bias: Structural factors, situational features, and social functions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(6), 944–960. Schmid, K., Hewstone, M., Tausch, N., Cairns, E., & Hughes, J. (2009). Antecedents and consequences of social identity complexity: Intergroup contact, distinctiveness threat, and outgroup attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(8), 1085–1098. Smith, L. G., & Postmes, T. (2009). Intra-group interaction and the development of norms which promote inter-group hostility. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(1), 130–144. Smith, L. G., Thomas, E. F., & McGarty, C. (2015). “We must be the change we want to see in the world”: Integrating norms and identities through social interaction. Political Psychology, 36(5), 543–557. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An intergrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Brooks/Cole. Tausch, N., Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J., Cairns, E., & Christ, O. (2007). Cross-community contact, perceived status differences, and intergroup attitudes in Northern Ireland: The mediating roles of individual-­ level versus group-level threats and the moderating role of social identification. Political Psychology, 28(1), 53–68. Terry, D. J., & Hogg, M. A. (1996). Group norms and the attitude-behavior relationship: A role for group identification. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(8), 776–793. Thomas, E. F., McGarty, C., Stuart, A., Smith, L. G., & Bourgeois, L. (2019). Reaching consensus promotes the internalization of commitment to social change. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 22(5), 615–630.

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three socio psychological perspectives. Psychological Ufkes, E. G., Calcagno, J., Glasford, D. E., & Dovidio, J. F. Bulletin, 134(4), 504–535. (2016). Understanding how common ingroup identity undermines collective action among disadvantaged-­ van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2012). On conviction’s collective consequences: Integrating moral group members. Journal of Experimental Social conviction with the social identity model of collective Psychology, 63, 26–35. action. British Journal of Social Psychology, 51(1), Ufkes, E.  G., Dovidio, J.  F., & Tel, G. (2015). Identity 52–71. and collective action among European Kurds. British van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., Spears, R., & Bettache, Journal of Social Psychology, 54(1), 176–186. K. (2011). Can moral convictions motivate the advanvan Zomeren, M., Kutlaca, M., & Turner-Zwinkels, F. taged to challenge social inequality? Extending the (2018). Integrating who “we” are with what “we” social identity model of collective action. Group (will not) stand for: A further extension of the social Processes & Intergroup Relations, 14(5), 735–753. identity model of collective action. European Review Voci, A. (2006). The link between identification and in-­ of Social Psychology, 29(1), 122–160. group favouritism: Effects of threat to social identity van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). and trust-related emotions. British Journal of Social Toward an integrative social identity model of colPsychology, 45(2), 265–284. lective action: A quantitative research synthesis of

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Understanding Solidarity in Society: Triggers and Barriers for In- and Outgroup Solidarity Marit Hopman and Trudie Knijn

Introduction As we have seen in the Introductory chapter, solidarity is essentially about common identity and sameness (Chap. 1, this volume). This collective identity forms the foundation for intragroup relations (Chap. 2, this volume). In this chapter, we take a closer look at solidarity (to whom do we owe) in relation to distributive social justice (what do we owe). We will do so on both the social and the individual level guided by two main questions: (1) Why do people express solidarity with ‘the other’ (inclusionary outgroup solidarity), see also intergroup solidarity in Chap. 2, this volume) in addition to, or instead of, with ‘the same’ (exclusionary ingroup solidarity)? (2) What does solidarity imply at the macromeso level of society, and what are social-psychological triggers of solidarity? In reviewing psychological and sociological literature, the chapter will highlight (a) the way solidarity can be inclusive as well as exclusive, and (b) triggers and barriers of solidarity between different identities, groups and communities. The chapter will conclude that new forms of inclusive M. Hopman (*) Netherlands’ Ombudsman for Children, The Hague, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] T. Knijn Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

outgroup solidarity are a reaction to the absence of civic solidarity (within and between groups, sometimes referred to as collective solidarity) by including marginalized people. These new forms of solidarity challenge existing boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, requiring new modes of identification and classification. The ambiguity inherent to solidarity practices of including and excluding others also asks for a revision of solidarity theory.1

 orms of Solidarity: To Whom Do F We Owe? According to Bayertz (1999), solidarity implies a mutual attachment between individuals on both a factual (i.e., in practice) and a normative (i.e., expected) level. The basic assumption of solidarity theory, then, is that individuals are not solidaristic with just anyone. Bayertz distinguishes four forms of solidarity, highlighting what solidarity is and whom solidarity concerns: (1) Human solidarity, which focuses on the ties between human beings, and which originally had a naturalistic ground (family ties, blood relations); (2) This chapter is largely based on a working paper ‘Theoretical paper regarding inter- and intragroup solidarity and identities’ written by the authors as a contribution to the international comparative study into ‘Solidarity in European Societies’ (SOLIDUS, Horizon2020, Grant number 649489).

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Social solidarity, which refers to solidarity as the ‘cement’ for the cohesion of society. Solidaristic feelings are in this perspective related to a shared history or a shared culture; (3) Political solidarity has a more active connotation and refers to a group of individuals standing up for their common interests; and lastly; (4) Civic solidarity reflects measures that are taken by welfare states to redistribute wealth and which forms the basic legitimation of the welfare state. In this latter instance, solidarity is not necessarily tied to a moral duty (on an individual basis) but is legally formalized through welfare state institutions (Bayertz, 1999; Scholz, 2007). We signal two problems with Bayertz’ overview of solidarity forms. First, it does not distinguish between the subjects and the objects of solidarity  – that is, the actors and the goods  – thereby running the risk of confusing solidarity and social justice. Solidarity theory mostly focuses on the actors involved (to whom do we owe), while social justice, in particular distributive justice, is about what is redistributed (resources, goods, means). In Bayertz’ overview however, human and social solidarity refer purely to the actors involved: family members and the community. In contrast, political solidarity lacks such a unit of actors by only describing the goods that are the object of solidarity, namely interests of any kind. The definition of civic solidarity describes the actor, being the collective of citizens in a welfare state, as well as the goods that are the object of solidarity: the wealth to be redistributed. A second critique concerns the assumption of the exclusiveness underlying each of these forms of solidarity, which is also recognized by Bayertz. In his words: “One is solidary with those to whom one is close due to some common ground: a shared history, shared feelings, convictions or interests. In this sense, a particularistic – maybe even exclusive – dimension is inherent in the general use of the term solidarity” (Bayertz, 1999, p.  8). However, solidarity is not always exclusive; inclusionary outgroup solidarity also occurs. Exclusionary ingroup solidarity comes to the fore when the ingroup intentionally or unintentionally excludes others outside the group. Such

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exclusionary ingroup solidarity can take on multiple forms: when welfare state politicians reserve  – and are elected for  – a welfare state aimed only at ‘our own people’ (i.e., welfare chauvinism, see Chap. 14, this volume); when mafia families protect their kin at all costs; and when neighbourhoods object against social housing for immigrants, for example. In contrast to exclusive ingroup solidarity, inclusionary outgroup solidarity comes to the fore in solidaristic expressions, behaviour and activities on behalf of people outside our ingroup. Examples include protests of men in India against the group rape of women, white people’s support for the Black Lives Matter movement, in the public welcoming of refugees, and in volunteer activities in food banks on behalf of the poor. Recent developments show multiple forms of outgroup solidarity that are currently disregarded in solidarity theories. In general, inclusionary outgroup solidarity does not take a prominent place in solidarity theory and is sometimes even assumed to be exceptional. Social justice theory can be a helpful addition for explaining inclusionary outgroup solidarity.

Social Justice: What Do We Owe? Social justice concerns the distribution and allocation of resources for fulfilling needs of people who deserve support, and as such it is subject of contentious – often political – debate (see Chap. 4, this volume). A wider definition of social justice also includes procedural justice, that is, the way in which distributive justice is to be achieved (see Chaps. 1 and 4, this volume). However, procedural justice is also the subject of contestation. For reasons of clarity, we therefore focus only on redistributive social justice in this chapter. Criteria of needs and deservingness are not easy to formulate. What do people need and what are legitimate grounds for claims? In general, resources could be distributed according to rights, demands, claims, or wants. However, framing social justice in a needs-discourse adds an important emotive element, thereby enforcing people to feel responsible (Woodhead, 1997). As Fraser

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(1990) argues, groups of citizens with a shared trait or interest (the ingroup) politicize needs by framing their rights or demands in a needs-­ discourse. Expectations about who should fulfil those needs and for whom, differ across forms of solidarity (as described, for instance, by Bayertz, 1999). This redistribution of resources to fulfil needs relates to what we understand as social ­justice. In most cases we do not ask just any fellow citizen to provide housing for us if the welfare state fails to provide sufficient houses, nor do we expect our parents to secure our pensions, or our neighbours to assist us in taking care of our mother suffering from dementia. Conversely, we do not expect a civil servant to assist us in fixing our broken window if we failed to take out insurance for such situations. In short: we expect various needs to be accommodated by different social domains: the family, the community or the collectivity of citizens (the welfare state). This is part of a continuous redefinition of to whom we owe solidarity, and who can claim solidarity. Extending from this aspect of solidarity, what we owe to other people (and thus, what is just) depends on how we define needs, an important criterium of deservingness. As outlined by van Oorschot (2000, see also Chap. 6, this volume), five criteria define the conditionality of deservingness: (1) Control; the less control people have over their neediness, the more deserving they are of solidary actions, (2) Need; when needs are high, people are more deserving, (3) Identity; the closer to ‘us’ people are, the more deserving they are, (4) Attitude; the more docile, grateful or compliant, the more deserving people are, and (5) Reciprocity; having earned support in earlier times, the more deserving people are of solidary support. Van Oorschot’s original research shows that of these five criteria, control appears to be the most important one, followed by needs and identity (van Oorschot, 2000). His research also shows that there are differences between two groups of people in the “strictness” with which they uphold these criteria; lower-educated, older people and those with lower socio-economic status (SES) appear to be stricter about the deservingness criteria than higher-educated, younger and higher SES peo-

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ple. One explanation may be that people who are ‘better-off’ have more to gain from a more universalistic solidarity system. Another explanation may be that those ‘not-so-well-off’ see ‘others’ as more direct competitors for solidarity schemes (van Oorschot, 2000). Follow-up research on the CARIN criteria, however, shows that the hierarchy of deservingness criteria is less stable, depending upon (1) the target group (for instance migrants or lone mothers); (2) individual ideological perceptions or socio-economic status; and (3) context-specific factors (e.g., socio-economic conditions and welfare regime types (for an overview, see Chap. 6, this volume).

Macro−/Meso-level Solidarity: Sociological Ideas About Social Justice and Solidarity From a sociological (macro/meso) perspective, there are several triggers and barriers to solidarity and processes of boundary drawing which affect social justice principles. Civic solidarity, or what is also more commonly referred to as ‘collective’ solidarity (Bayertz, 1999; van der Veen, 2012) is situated at the macro level. There politicians and policymakers decide upon and implement social justice by measures relating to the redistribution of resources via a variety of institutions. Triggers for social justice refer to the ‘why?’ question (Blau & Abramovitz, 2004), such as: Why have higher education scholarships declined, elderly homes closed, and social assistance been made increasingly conditional in recent decades? This redistribution often follows politicized definitions of categorical needs and may thereby become a barrier to collective solidarity. For instance, pensions for older people versus higher education scholarships for younger generations (see also Chap. 10, this volume). Comparably, the current refugee crisis stirred heated debates about the protection of ‘native’ Europeans’ privileges over the rights of refugee newcomers (regarding housing and welfare benefits; see also Chap. 14, this volume). In response to such measures and debates, citizens may endeavour to fill the gaps left by politicians and policymakers,

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thereby acting in either the interest of their ingroup  – for instance by protesting an asylum centre  – or in the interest, of outgroups by responding to the needs related to these gaps, for instance, supporting language training for refugees. Post-war welfare states aimed to be inclusive by guaranteeing citizenship rights, i.e., citizens’ rights to have basic needs fulfilled as a right of citizenship rather than charity. Marshall (1950) defined social citizenship rights as the right to income, work, healthcare, education, and housing (see also Chap. 5, this volume). The combination of these social rights allows citizens of a welfare state to fully participate in society. On the one hand, these rights aim towards economic prosperity (maximum employment and security), on the other hand, they include moral principles: social justice for all and solidarity between high-­risk and low-risk groups (such as collective health insurance; van der Veen, 2012). These social citizenship rights suit the idea that more equal societies are beneficial for all people involved (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), as well as suiting more general ideas about the interdependency between individuals (van der Veen, 2012). Due to political, social and economic developments, however, moral principles underlying the welfare state as expressed in social justice are weakened, and solidarity faces increasing layers of conditionality since the 1980s (Kampen et al., 2020). In general, solidarity becomes problematic when questions arise about the ‘we’ in the solidarity group. For instance, a national identity can become contested when there is a high influx of migrants, or when a higher-order identity is asked for (e.g., being Dutch versus being European; Hollinger, 2006; Hogg & Haines, 1996). Similarly, solidarity can become contested when new identities suddenly become prominent, such as ‘generational identity’ in a debate about pensions (see Chap. 10, this volume) or vulnerabilities during a pandemic (see Chap. 19, this volume). These contestations lead to boundary drawing, i.e., processes of inclusion and exclusion regarding the ‘scope of justice’, and this occurs across civic, social and familial solidarity. Classical sociological theories based on Durkheim’s and Weber’s

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seminal work explain this boundary drawing through the functionality of the solidarity imperative, either on behalf of mutual interests and interdependency, or on behalf of cultural empathetical bonds. In the former, we are solidaristic with others who share the same interests but exclude those whose interests may counter ours. In the latter we are solidaristic with groups and individuals with whom we share social and cultural identities (see van Oorschot & Komter, 1998; van Oorschot, 2000, see also Chap. 1, this volume). In both cases, the issues of ‘owing’ to others and claiming one’s ‘due’ represent the most stringent obligations regarding social justice. Ignoring these obligations might lead to exclusion from the civic, social and/or family spheres. At the level of civic solidarity (e.g., citizenship) Knijn et  al. (2020) distinguish three additional criteria that simultaneously represent arguments for boundary drawing between citizen and non-citizens. Territorial affectedness assumes a political community whose members are equally affected by the community’s decisions and therefore, have the claim to participate in making these decisions. This excludes all non-­citizens who are affected by the community’s decision making, for example, Afghani interpreters who served the Dutch government who are not involved in the decision of whether they were granted asylum when the Taliban returned to power in 2021. Sedentariness points to the idea that citizens have long-term ties to a specific territory, an argument that is challenged by the EU’s labour migration policies (e.g., unprotected work migrants within the EU who are not sedentary but mobile). Finally, national belonging presupposes some form of ethnic belonging to the imagined community (Anderson, 1983) as the pre-condition for granting citizenship. Given the multi-cultural composition of populations all over Europe, such an argument is difficult to maintain. Yet, boundary drawing also takes place on the basis of ‘social’ features such as income, educational level, or job status (Hollinger, 2006; Sandel, 2020). According to Putnam (2007, p.  173), people are able to create “new cross-­ cutting forms of solidarity and more encompassing identities” when confronted with outgroups.

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Nonetheless, social identity is an important source for social power and exclusion; the categorization that takes place in the communication to form an ingroup can equally be used to form an outgroup (e.g., Chap. 2, this volume). In other words, the same elements can be used to ­‘produce’ solidarity or antagonism. Overall, the perception is that solidarity inherently has inclusive and exclusive elements (Ross, 2010). To establish social justice for all, a minority group, based on the construction of a shared identity, needs to revolt against the established authority (e.g., the government or executive boards). Here, the role of the majority population (usually silent about controversial topics) as well as the social-political context (dominant political parties, media, and social partners) needs to be considered (Subasic et  al., 2008; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The majority population and people in positions of authority and power usually share values and interests, while the minority group tries to play into this alliance. In that process, a shifting is required between ‘me’ and ‘us’ and between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by influencing and persuading the majority population to alter their alliances (Subasic et al., 2008; Mouffe, 2005). For the authority to re-establish social stability, processes of re-categorization need to take place. From this perspective, “solidarity implies that people are united not only despite group differences but precisely because we are different” (Subasic et  al., 2008, p.  337 (italics added); Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Solidarity has a fundamentally active character, and implies a transformative capacity (Ross, 2010). According to Simon and Klandermans (2001), expanding solidarity to marginalized groups assumes the formation of a “politicized collective identity”. Three steps are required to come to such a formation: an awareness of shared grievances, blaming an external “enemy” and involving or getting the support of society. Grievances often stem from issues like illegitimate injustice (for instance when legal rights are withheld from marginalized populations), violated principles (e.g., when the principle of equality is violated by disrespect for low income or LGBTI persons) or threatened privileges (e.g.,

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when unemployment benefits are reduced) (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The transformative capacity of solidarity may well take place on the grounds of the earlier-mentioned criteria of deservingness as formulated by van Oorschot (2000): lack of control, high needs, framing and classifying identities, or emphasizing attitudes and forms of reciprocity may establish a sense of solidarity in the ‘(silent) majority population.’ A lack of social change is mostly due to ‘failing’ to persuade the majority to change their alliances (Subasic et al., 2008). Such ideas about the development of solidary action are in line with the sociologist Tilly’s (1999, p. 256) argumentation that solidaristic movements are not coherent groups but rather “a cluster of performances.” Moreover, Tilly (1999) introduces the concept of opportunity hoarding, i.e., controlling access to resources by privileged groups, which is not so much motivated by outgroup antipathy to outsiders but mainly by ingroup favouritism expressed in protecting the vested interests of those already ‘in’ the group. Power relations are an important aspect in boundary drawing by way of “choosing” solidarities; some (groups of) people have more authority over whom or what they want to identify with than others (Hollinger, 2006; Nadler, 2002). Theoretically, the Social Dominance Theory (SDT) explains the way in which both social discourse and individual and institutional behaviour contribute to and are affected by a (group-based) social hierarchy, reflecting differences in power. SDT relates this social hierarchy to the ‘profit’ some groups have regarding their social and economic value (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). From a political-­economic perspective, solidarity raises questions about whose energies and resources can be claimed (Hollinger, 2006), or what Lindenberg (1998) calls ‘solidarity costs’. Although people are all capable of multiple solidarities and affiliations, a finite set of resources and energies limits people’s capacities for social justice and solidarity in terms of setting priorities (Hollinger, 2006). Consequently, the state must play a role in the issue of solidarity, and it does so by exercising power in a twofold way. First, by boundary drawing on the basis of a categorical

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differentiation of individuals (i.e., their identities, nationalities, needs and rates of deservingness). Second, by considering the redistribution of resources in achieving social justice. Then, the state decides on who must take responsibility: will social justice be achieved through public responsibility? Or are responsibilities decentralized, to the local level, the community, or the family? With respect to the latter, a shift in responsibilities has taken place in Western welfare states in recent decades, downplaying the collective role of the state and increasing the role of decentralized local governments, markets and families (Knijn, 2000; Knijn & Hopman, 2015).

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text; ethnic identity might be a relevant and salient issue in experiencing (a lack of) access to the labour market but may hardly be experienced on a more personal level, for instance in the context of family relations, while the opposite might be true for a religious identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Identification processes matter and they vary whether it relates to defining oneself and defining one’s group membership. As Putnam (2007) points out, a religious identity might be important to someone personally, maybe even more so than his/her ethnic identity, but religious differences may not be a salient marker in defining the social identity. Religious identities have, for the most part, become permeable (Putnam, Micro-level Solidarity: 2007). Ethnic identity in contrast, might be a more salient factor for social identity and conPsychological Ideas on Solidarity sequently be more important in solidaristic It is also possible to distinguish several triggers practices, if only because of the state-based catand barriers to solidarity and processes of egorization of identities that either stimulate boundary drawing regarding solidarity that diversity or attempt to stipulate differences affect social justice from a micro perspective. between natives and outsiders (Putnam, 2007). Solidarity is not only characterized by a politi- Moreover, Hogg and Haines (1996) have cal-economic structure, but also by a social- pointed out that high status groups often (incorpsychological structure (Hollinger, 2006). As rectly) perceive their status as stable and tend to noted above, triggers for social justice and soli- believe their status is legitimate. darity ask for conscious commitment and are It could be argued that the difference between usually based on a shared interest or a shared exclusionary ingroup and inclusionary outgroup trait (Hollinger, 2006, p.  24). Boundary draw- solidarity is related to which ‘factor’ is triggered: ing based on identification may indeed be a exclusionary ingroup solidarity is triggered choice (see e.g., Benhabib, 1996) because through opportunity hoarding and ingroup favouhumans have multiple, sometimes even over- ritism (Tilly, 1999), while inclusionary outgroup lapping, cross-cutting or conflicting, identities, solidarity is triggered through a broader social and are capable of multiple solidarities. justice scope, leaving room for defining a cause Whether or not a particular social identity or a need (e.g., poverty) as ‘unjust’. At the same becomes salient, depends upon both person-­ time, it should be noted that an act of solidarity variables (i.e., ‘readiness’) and social context-­ may include both forms of solidarity. For variables (i.e., ‘fit’) (Simon & Klandermans, instance, the well-known group Women on Waves 2001). Readiness and fit partly depend upon shows practices of exclusionary ingroup solidarprior life circumstances, which can make peo- ity by fighting for the rights of women only (speple susceptible to specific issues (e.g., belong- cifically related to abortion rights). At the same ing to an ethnic minority group). They also time, this group could be defined as inclusionary partly depend upon intra-individual changes outgroup solidarity when taking into consideracross the life course: changes in life can ‘insti- ation elements such as nationality, religion, ethgate’ new susceptibilities (e.g., encountering nicity, etc. Again, which identifying factor is gender discrimination or, in contrast, feeling salient may be decisive in determining which insulted by gender equality). Next to this, an form of solidarity is evident. Therefore, solidarity identity must be meaningful in the social con- definitions based on identity and identification

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might be too static to explain inclusionary outgroup solidarity. Such definitions neglect to recognize that some people might also be triggered by deservingness and needs (social justice), no matter whom it concerns. Moreover, identity-­ based definitions of solidarity ignore multiple identities, the permeability of identities, and the legitimation of related statuses. A further critique of identity-based definitions of solidarity is that being aware of a social problem and identifying with that social problem does not necessarily mean people come into action to address the problem, nor that they uphold a long-­ term alliance to it. For instance, Kawakami and colleagues showed that what people think or believe might not be congruent with how they act and may thus not be enough to overcome (or recognize) implicit attitudes (Kawakami et al., 2007; Kawakami et  al., 2009). According to Thomas et al. (2009, p. 195) a sustainable commitment to action is “a process of crafting a social identity that has a relevant congruent pattern of norms for action, emotion and efficacy”. Social action will only take place when group norms relating to action, emotion and efficacy align. Individuals come to such an alignment of norms by deducing identity and norms through various information sources, as well as inductively through ingroup communication, negotiation, and the resulting consensus building. Communication about the group simultaneously helps to establish funding, increase membership et cetera, thereby solidifying a group’s base (Thomas et al., 2009). According to these authors, efficacy is not so much related to actual change (“effectiveness”), but rather to a group’s belief in change and the probability that things can change. Thomas and colleagues therefore claim that “empowerment is the outcome of the alignment processes” (Thomas et al., 2009: 213). Efficacy is also related to the expected efficacy of the form of help that is offered (Lepianka, 2012). Emotion, or even outrage, plays a central role in motivating people for action (see e.g., Thomas et al., 2009; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Hogg & Haines, 1996). However, an important distinction needs to be made between emotion on behalf of the self (defensive anger) and emotion on behalf of a (political) collective (moral anger; (Mouffe,

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2009; Ruitenberg, 2009; compare also to group-­ based relative deprivation, Chap. 2, this volume)). Defensive anger is not necessarily solidaristic as it usually stems from a threat to one’s own privileges (exclusionary ingroup solidarity). Moral anger, in contrast, stems from feelings of injustice and inequality  – which may be related to one’s own group or to other groups  – and may consequently lead to exclusionary ingroup or inclusionary outgroup solidarity. Superordinate goals, support for intergroup contact and equal group status are decisive factors in establishing exclusionary ingroup cooperation and solidarity (Sherif, 1958; Pettigrew, 1998). Power relations, however, can also have a detrimental effect on social justice and solidarity: the profit of some ingroups (economically and/or socially) helps maintain a social hierarchy, for instance through social discourse and institutional behaviour (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This social hierarchy also affects the choices that are made regarding the redistribution of resources (Hollinger, 2006), where a scarcity of resources means a struggle over these resources between antagonistic groups. In order to gain a fair share of resources, a minority group needs to ally with the majority population. (Subasic et  al., 2008). Failing to persuade this majority creates a barrier to social justice given a lack of inclusionary outgroup solidarity.

Conclusion: Social Justice and Solidarity Solidarity has always been a contested subject. As Ross has argued, “solidarity is the periodic specifications of social bonds in a political perspective” (2010, p. 8). Social identity might bind people together (exclusionary ingroup solidarity) and also offers options for inclusionary outgroup bonding (Putnam, 2007). Framing solidarity in a social justice-based needs-discourse helps establish solidary feelings and actions (Fraser, 1990, but see also van Oorschot, 2000). In this chapter, we have theoretically distinguished between solidarity (to whom do we owe) and social justice (what do we owe), showing that both concepts are intertwined though separate,

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and relate to macro-meso sociological and micro psychological processes. On both levels, social identifications, interests, and socio-cultural contexts, such as power relations, the scarcity of resources and  – media  – (information), triggers or drives social justice and solidarity as well as boundary drawing between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Moreover, we have indicated that at the macrolevel, social institutions like the family, the community, and the state each have their own criteria for solidarity based on who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’, as well as based on what resources are redistributed within the specific sphere. At the micro-level, we saw that identity-based solidarity only partly explains ‘to whom we owe’. This leaves room for inclusionary outgroup solidarity because identities are not fixed, can develop, or change during the life course, and because individuals are able to overcome self-interests if they observe injustice or violated principles. In sum, we have critically evaluated some solidarity theories that assume mainly exclusionary ingroup solidarity based on self-interest, functionality and ingroup identification. We have also challenged the assumption that social justice can only exist on the basis of exclusionary ingroup solidarity and have shown that other options are possible. If we apply the theoretical insights to current debates and policies, we note that the past decades show quite a few examples of exclusionary ingroup as well as of inclusionary outgroup solidarity. As presented in this chapter, exclusionary ingroup solidarity occurs when people demonstrate against asylum seeker centres, while inclusionary outgroup solidarity occurs when volunteers help refugees by providing language training. Likewise, at the moment of writing, a cross-border European collective of journalists ‘Lost in Europe’2 draws attention to the fact that during the last three years, 18,000 minors have disappeared from asylum centres that are legally See https://lostineurope.eu/ (last accessed 24 July 2021). This team of investigative journalists from the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Germany, France, Greece, Romania and the UK, collaborate to find out what has happened to the disappeared children in Europe. 2 

M. Hopman and T. Knijn

obliged to protect them (according to EU law). In the meantime, no coordinated police action nor EU-coordinated policy has been initiated to protect these children, most of whom are trafficked for drugs crime, prostitution, or equivalent slave labour. At the same time, we note that throughout Europe, volunteers and activists put effort into filling the gaps that the civic solidarity of welfare states leaves behind. The state (as representative of the collective of citizens, i.e., the majority population) plays a role in the issue of solidarity by exercising power to discursively and institutionally categorize individuals (i.e., assign them with an identity that is not necessarily of one’s own choosing), partly and by setting criteria for the redistribution of resources such as education, income and healthcare. On the one hand, the nation state tends to draw boundary lines between citizens on the basis of territorial belongings, sedentariness and ethnicity (see above), through institutionalized racism in tax policies, by policing ethnic minority neighbourhoods, or by withholding resources for minority education (Bugra & Akkan, 2020; Lepianka, 2019). These ‘state-based’ boundaries also make it harder – if not impossible – for people to show solidarity. At the same time, the collectivity of citizens has an interest in social cohesion and accommodating the social integration of all identities and social groups that partake in society. This results in a fluid and continuous debate about solidarity and social justice. A debate in which some will choose the option to align only with those with whom one can identify, and others will choose to be solidaristic with all, independent of age, ethnicity, able-­ bodiness or descent. A debate which also centres on what we should share, and what needs should be addressed to guarantee equal participation in society. This debate on solidarity and social justice will continue. In this chapter we combined a review of sociological and psychological literature to better understand (a) the way solidarity can be inclusive as well as exclusive; and (b) the triggers and barriers of social justice and the way boundaries are drawn in solidarity between dif-

3  Understanding Solidarity in Society: Triggers and Barriers for In- and Outgroup Solidarity

ferent groups and communities. A main conclusion is that theoretically, no strict division can be made between inclusionary and exclusionary solidarity. Institutional settings (family, community, or citizenry) as well as identities, are fluid entities that define the scope, meaning and significance of ‘to whom we owe what’. New forms of solidarity developed in the past decades, that challenge the boundaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and which ask for new modes of identification and classification. They also ask for a revision of solidarity theory, which allows for the ambiguity of including and excluding others in solidarity practices. Identity takes centre stage in sociological as well as social-psychological solidarity theories. These theories (van Oorschot, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Turner & Reynolds, 2012; see also Chap. 2, this volume) assume identification is restricted to the ingroup, sharing the same habits, norms, and values. At the same time, shared interests and power relations (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tilly, 1999) explain acts and practices of solidarities based on ingroup identification. People might adhere to solidarity with those with whom they identify based on a single characteristic; being a woman, a farmer, a Moroccan-Dutch youngster, a queer, or a white pensioner. In the real world, however, such onedimensional identifications are scarce. Therefore, an important amendment to the identification assumption is that social identity is neither fixed nor one-dimensional. Interestingly, new forms of solidarity show that solidarity also goes in the opposite direction, through identification with ‘the other’: people from backgrounds varying in class, ethnicity or nationality. Inclusionary outgroup solidarity develops to resettle questions of social justice, driven by feelings of shame about the shortcomings of public policy, by superordinate goals (Sherif, 1958; Pettigrew, 1998) or by moral anger (Thomas et al., 2009) and informed by a needsdiscourse (Fraser, 1990). Nonetheless, ambiguity remains. Social justice-oriented solidarity initiatives confront nation

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states and their populations with a tendency to confirm the status quo by making choices regarding the redistribution of resources and the recognition of identities (Hollinger, 2006; Fraser, 2009; Knijn & Lepianka, 2020).

Glossary Boundary drawing: the process of including or excluding others based on social, economic, political and/or cultural lines between “us” and “them”. Civic solidarity: solidarity in the form of measures that are taken by welfare states to redistribute wealth. It forms the basic legitimation of the welfare state. Defensive anger: an angry emotion on behalf of the self. Exclusionary ingroup solidarity: solidarity between a group of people based on a shared identity, common interests and/or social-­ cultural or territorial heritage, thereby excluding those who do not share that identity, interest, or heritage. Human solidarity: solidarity based on the ties between human beings, which originally had a naturalistic ground (family ties, blood relations). Inclusionary outgroup solidarity: solidarity with groups/individuals who have different identities, interests and/or social-cultural or territorial heritage than oneself. Moral anger: an angry emotion on behalf of a (political) collective. National belonging: criteria for inclusion or exclusion of citizenship based on the assumption of some form of ethnic belonging to an imagined community. Political solidarity: solidarity between a group of individuals standing up for their common interests. It has a more activist connotation compared to other forms of solidarity. Politicized collective identity: commitment of (a group of) people to address authority and majority norms in order to expand solidarity to marginalized groups.

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Sedentariness: criteria for inclusion or exclusion of citizenship based on the idea that citizens have long-term ties to a specific territory. Social Dominance Theory (SDT): social scientific theory that explains the way in which both social discourse and individual and institutional behaviour contribute to and are affected by a (group-based) social hierarchy. SDT relates this to the ‘profit’ some groups have regarding their social and economic value. Social justice: concerns the distribution and allocation of resources for fulfilling needs of people who deserve support and the way in which this distributive justice is to be achieved. Social solidarity: solidarity as the ‘cement’ for the cohesion of society, it relates to a shared history or a shared culture between (groups of) people. Solidarity: an agreement of feeling to whom do we owe. Territorial affectedness: criteria for inclusion or exclusion of citizenship based on the assumption that there is a community whose members are equally affected by the community’s decisions and therefore have a claim to participate in making these decisions.

Comprehension Questions

1. What are potential justifications for exclusionary ingroup solidarity and what justifies inclusionary outgroup solidarity? Can you give some examples of both forms of solidarity that are not mentioned in the chapter? 2. Can you explain the process of boundary drawing and how this relates to the inclusion and exclusion of solidarity? 3. According to Simon and Klanderman, what kind of process needs to take place in order to expand solidarity to marginalized groups? 4. Can you explain the difference between sedentariness, national belonging, and territorial affectedness as criteria for the inclusion/ exclusion of citizenship?

Discussion Questions

To what extent do you agree with the authors’ assumption that solidarity theories based on identity and identification are too static to fully explain the concept of solidarity? Why? Based on what you’ve learned in this chapter, do you think contemporary societies are characterized more by exclusionary ingroup solidarity or inclusionary outgroup solidarity? Why?

References Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities. Verso. Bayertz, K. (1999). Four uses of “solidarity”. In K.  Bayertz (Ed.), Solidarity (pp.  3–29). Kluwer Academic Publishers. Benhabib, S. (1996). From identity politics to social feminism: A plea for the nineties. In D. Trend (Ed.), Radical democracy (pp. 27–42). Routledge. Blau, J., & Abramovitz, M. (Eds.). (2004). The dynamics of social welfare policy. Oxford University Press, reprinted in 2014. Bugra, A., & Akkan, B. (2020). Education and justice: inclusion, exclusion and belonging. In T.  Knijn & D.  Lepianka (Eds.), Justice and vulnerability in Europe. An interdisciplinary approach (pp. 143–159). Edward Elgar Publishing. Fraser, N. (1990). Struggle over needs: Outline of a socialist-­ feminist critical theory of late-capitalist political culture. In L. Gordon (Ed.), Women, the state and welfare (pp.  199–226). University of Wisconsin Press. Fraser, N. (2009). Who counts? Dilemmas of justice in a postwestphalian world. Antipode, 41(1), 281–297. Hogg, M.  A., & Haines, S.  C. (1996). Intergroup relations and group solidarity: Effects of group identification and social beliefs on depersonalized attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(2), 295–309. Hollinger, D. (2006). From identity to solidarity. Daedalus (Fall 2006). Retrieved July 24, 2021, from https:// ethos-­europe.eu/sites/default/files//docs/d4.4_combined_complete.pdf Kampen, T., Sebrechts, M., Knijn, T., & Tonkens, E. (2020). Streng maar Onrechtvaardig. De Bijstand Gewogen. Van Gennep. Kawakami, K., Dunn, E., Karmali, F., & Dovidio, J.  F. (2009). Mispredicting affective and behavioral responses to racism. Science, 323, 276–278.

3  Understanding Solidarity in Society: Triggers and Barriers for In- and Outgroup Solidarity Kawakami, K., Phills, C. E., Steele, J. R., & Dovidio, J. F. (2007). (Close) distance makes the heart grow fonder: Improving implicit racial attitudes and interracial interactions through approach behaviors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(6), 957–971. Knijn, T. (2000). Marketization and the struggling logics of (home) care in the Netherlands. In M. Harrington Meyer (Ed.), Care Work (pp.  232–248). Routledge Press. Knijn, T., Belic, J., & Zala, M. (2020). Living and theorizing boundaries of justice. In T. Knijn & D. Lepianka (Eds.), Justice and vulnerability in Europe. An interdisciplinary approach (pp.  233–250). Edward Elgar Publishing. Knijn, T., & Hopman, M. (2015). Parenting support in the Dutch ‘participation society’. Social Policy & Society, 14(4), 645–656. Knijn, T., & Lepianka, D. (2020). Justice and vulnerability in Europe. An interdisciplinary approach. Edward Elgar Publishing. Lepianka, D. (2012). Motywy i uwarunkowania ludzkig solidarnosci  – poszukiwania teoretyczne. Prakseologia  – The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 153, 169–184. Lepianka, D. (2019). Mapping the construction of justice and justice related tensions in Europe  – A comparative report of National Media Debates on (Minority) Education in Six Countries. ETHOS Report 4.4 accessed on December 9, 2020. Lindenberg, S. (1998). The microfoundations of solidarity: A framing approach. In P.  Doreian & T.  Fararo (Eds.), The problem of solidarity. Theory and models. Gordon and Breach Publishers. Marshall, T.  H. (1950). Citizenship and social class. Reprinted in T.  H. Marshall & T.  Bottomore (Eds.). (1992). Citizenship and social class. London: Pluto Press, pp. 3–51. Mouffe, C. (2005). The return of the political. Verso. Mouffe, C. (2009). Democracy in a multipolar world. Millenium  – Journal of International Studies, 37, 549–561. Nadler, A. (2002). Inter-group helping relations as power relations: maintaining or challenging social dominance between groups through helping. Journal of Social Issues, 58(3), 487–502. Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 65–85. Putnam, R. (2007). E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the 21st century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(2), 137. Ross, M. (2010). Solidarity – A new constitutional paradigm for the EU? In M. Ross & Y. Borgmann-Prebil (Eds.), Promoting solidarity in the European Union (pp. 1–36). Oxford Scholarship Online.

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Ruitenberg, C. W. (2009). Educating political adversaries: Chantal Mouffe and radical democratic citizenship education. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 28, 269–281. Sandel, M. J. (2020). The tyranny of merit. What’s become of the common good? Penguin Books Ltd. Scholz, S. J. (2007). Political solidarity and violent resistance. Journal of Social Philosophy, 38(1), 38–52. Sherif, M. (1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict. American Journal of Sociology, 63(4), 349–356. Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance. An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression. Cambridge University Press. Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity. A social psychological analysis. American Psychologist, 56(4), 319–331. Subasic, E., Reynolds, K. J., & Turner, J. C. (2008). The political solidarity model of social change: Dynamics of selfcategorization in intergroup power relations. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 14(4), 330–352. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (2004). The social identity theory of intergroup relations. In J. T. Jost & J. Sidanius (Eds.), Political psychology: Key readings in social psychology (pp. 276–293). Psychology Press. Thomas, E. F., McGarty, C., & Mavor, K. I. (2009). Alignig identities, emotions and beliefs to create commitment in sustainable social and political action. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 13(3), 194–218. Tilly, C. (1999). Conclusion. From interaction to outcomes in social movements. In M.  Giugni, D.  McAdam, & C.  Tilly (Eds.), How social movements matter (pp. 253–271). University of Minnesota Press. Turner, J.  C., & Reynolds, K.  J. (2012). Selfcategorization theory. In P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), The handbook of theories of social psychology (pp. 399–418). SAGE Publications. Van der Veen, R. (2012). Risk and the welfare state. Risk, risk perception and solidarity. In R.  Van der Veen, M. Yerkes, & P. Achterberg (Eds.), The transformation of solidarity. Changing risks and the future of the welfare state (pp. 13–31). Amsterdam University Press. van Oorschot, W. (2000). Who should get what, and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public. Policy & Politics, 28(1), 33–48. van Oorschot, W., & Komter, A. (1998). What is it that ties…? Theoretical perspectives on social bond. Sociale Wetenschappen, 41(3), 5–24. Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2009). The spirit level. Bloomsbury Press. Woodhead, M. (1997). Psychology and the cultural construction of children’s needs. In A. James & A. Prout (Eds.), Constructing and reconstructing childhood (pp. 63–85). Routledge.

4

Social Justice and the Justification of Social Inequalities Michèlle Bal and Kees van den Bos

Introduction Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice? (Martin L. King Jr., 1963)

In this quote, famous civil rights activist Dr. Martin Luther King questions how people deal with injustice, arguing for two types of reactions: creating a more just society (through peaceful protest for change) or the persistence of gross social inequalities (through extreme negligence and inertia). This quote came from a letter he wrote in 1963  in the midst of the US civil rights movement that battled against racial segregation and severe injustices carried out primarily against people from African American descent. Yet, this insight is still relevant today when explaining people’s varying reactions to injustice. In the current chapter, we will focus on explaining these divergent reactions, but first we introduce the social science of theory and empirical research on social justice.Justice is seen as a great virtue for individuals as well as

M. Bal (*) • K. van den Bos Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

for societies. At the individual level, people want to be treated in a just manner and to receive just outcomes, but they also care deeply about justice done to others, especially those with whom they strongly identify (Greene, 2013; Lind & Tyler, 1988). At the societal level, people want to live in a just society where members adhere to rules and regulations that do justice to everyone (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1999). As such, social justice and solidarity are closely related self-transcending motives. Both justice1 and solidarity reach beyond the individual level and are focused not only on what we want for the self, but also what we value for others. If solidarity, as explained in Chaps. 2 and 3 (this volume), sets the boundaries for who we care about and are willing to share resources with, considerations of justice provide the framework through which we can do so. Scholars from different fields of research, and especially philosophy, including great minds such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, and Rawls, have been studying questions of justice for a long time. Philosophical questions focused primarily on what constitutes a just society (e.g., Rawls, 1971) or on how people can live a moral and virtuous life (e.g., Beauchamp, 2001) or a good life (Sen, 1999; see also Chap. 5, this volume). Legal scholars also study questions of justice, focusing The terms justice, referring to perceptions of justice, and social justice are used interchangeably in this chapter.

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on “black-letter-law”, which refers to law as it is written in legal codes and enacted by legislators (Finkel, 2000). They study how laws and legislation should work and how their workings can be improved. Both philosophical and legal perspectives on justice are mostly normative, that is, focusing on questions of what a just society or individual ought to be and do. The social sciences, on the other hand, are more concerned with descriptive questions pertaining to justice, focusing not on what ought to be, but on what is. Within psychology and sociology, questions such as ‘What do people consider just and unjust?” and “What happens when people are confronted with injustice?” are studied. One could argue that psychology is more concerned with discerning general trends in what people think, feel, and do regarding justice issues, whereas sociology tends to focus more on institutional, historical, and cultural trends in issues of justice (for a more thorough description, see, e.g., Cohen, 1986). The differences between psychological and sociological approaches notwithstanding, it is oftentimes difficult to tease the two apart. Indeed, part of the reason why social justice is exciting is because it can be considered an interdisciplinary field of study, where the social sciences intersect, and normative and descriptive insights may be more strongly related to each other than is often realized. For example, concerns that something in society is fundamentally wrong and unjust can drive societal protest (Klandermans, 1997). Repeated failure to improve conditions of perceived injustice may even provide impetus to various forms of radicalization (Bal & Van den Bos, 2017; Van den Bos, 2018). For this reason, the combined normative and descriptive study of social justice is fundamental. A brief look at the philosophical account on the normative question of what a just society should entail and how this forms the foundation for ‘appropriate’ social policy responses to social problems is presented in Chap. 5 (this volume). In the current chapter, we focus on the descriptive study of social justice from a social sciences perspective. Descriptive questions on what people consider (un)just and how

M. Bal and K. van den Bos

they react to unjust situations have led to a wealth of theories and research, an overview of which will be presented here. We start by looking at the distinction between different forms of justice in social justice theorizing. First, a classical distinction is made between distributive justice (i.e., the just allocation of burdens and benefits, inputs, and outcomes), and procedural justice (i.e., the fairness of the processes and treatment leading up to these decisions). Later, more forms of justice were differentiated. Notably, justice as recognition focused not on what (distributive justice) or on how (procedural justice), but on the question of who should be considered in these questions of justice. This tripartite distinction of different forms of justice (distributions, procedures, recognition) will be used as the basis of the first part of this chapter. We will then continue with a discussion of the existence of justice and injustice in daily life, focusing on why and how social inequalities and other injustices are sometimes justified.

What Is a Just Distribution of Burdens and Benefits? Most classical research on social justice focused on questions regarding the fair allocation of burdens and benefits (i.e., distributive justice). A seminal theory on distributive justice is equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1978). The basic premise of equity theory is the proportionality principle, which postulates that people are assumed to judge an outcome as just or fair when their own outcome-to-input ratio equals a referent outcome-to-input ratio. Put simply, people prefer equal outcomes for equal inputs in a comparison to others. That this is truly a justice motive which extends beyond egoistic tendencies, is exemplified by the research finding that people dislike being disadvantaged, but they also dislike unfair advantage (Van den Bos et  al., 1997). To judge whether outcomes are proportional, people can make both temporal and social comparisons; they can compare current outcomes to outcomes obtained for similar inputs in the

4  Social Justice and the Justification of Social Inequalities

past or they can compare their outcomes to those of similar others respectively. These social comparisons have been the focus of the theory of individual and group-based relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966; Crosby, 1976). Relative deprivation refers to the feeling of angry resentment invoked by the judgment that a person or a group of persons are unfairly ­disadvantaged compared to a relevant other individual or group. Stouffer et  al. (1949) introduced the term in the 1940s to explain why pilots in the army were less satisfied with their rapid promotion prospects than the military police were with their slower promotion prospects. According to Stouffer, this could be explained by the comparison referents (i.e., the point of comparison) that were available to these different groups. That is, pilots compared themselves to pilots from the air force who were promoted more often and more rapidly. As a result, the army pilots felt relatively disadvantaged. In contrast, members of the military police compared themselves to other military police members and felt less disadvantaged as all their peers were similarly slowly promoted to higher ranks. As these two groups rarely came into direct contact with each other, these intergroup comparison referents were not available to them. Relative deprivation consists of four elements. It is a combination of (1) a comparison process of which (2) the outcome is unfavourable to the self (or one’s group), which results in (3) a label of unfairness as well as (4) negative emotions of angry resentment (i.e., anger in combination with holding a grudge against the advantaged person or group or the system in which these inequalities persevere; Smith et al., 2012). Feelings of relative deprivation, and especially feelings of relative group deprivation, have been found to play an important role in people’s willingness to engage in protest behaviours against social inequalities (Klandermans, 1997; van Zomeren et al., 2008). While relative deprivation has been studied extensively, its counterparts of relative gratification (i.e., feeling relatively advantaged in comparison to other groups or individuals) and visceral relative deprivation (i.e., sympathizing with groups or individuals who are relatively disadvantaged) have received much less attention (Bal, 2014; Bal

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& Van den Bos, 2017), although these feelings may also play important roles in the persistence and reduction of social inequalities, especially when focusing on intergroup or inclusionary outgroup solidarity (Chaps. 2 and 3). In answering the question what a just distribution of burdens and benefits is, equity theory focused on proportionality as a distributive justice principle. In later theorizing, two additional distributive justice principles were distinguished: equality and need (Deutsch, 1975). Which distributive justice principle is applied will differ both situationally and dispositionally (i.e., between individuals). Proportionality may be the default principle in many (Western) societies, where an economic orientation is pervasive, and hard work, efficiency and effectiveness are all rewarded with higher outcomes. Equality and need may be more suitable in solidarity-oriented and care-oriented settings respectively. When the primary goal is to build or maintain enjoyable social relationships (e.g., when working in a team or amongst friends), individual contributions may matter less than people’s shared group identity, and people often opt for an equal division of outcomes. In situations in which people want to foster personal development (e.g., parents caring for their children), or situations primarily concerned with another person’s welfare (e.g., when supporting victims of a natural disaster), people are willing to sacrifice some of their own benefits or resources on the others’ behalf and will be most concerned with providing for those who are in need. Importantly, which distributive justice principle is chosen to judge a situation will also determine which redistributive policy measures are deemed necessary or acceptable.

 ow Can We Create a Just Decision-­ H Making Process? While much seminal work has been devoted to studying questions of distributive justice, in the 1980s and 1990s the study of procedural justice gained significant ground (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987, 1989; Van den Bos, 2005, 2015). This shift led away from a focus on outcomes

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towards research and theorizing about the processes leading up to these outcomes. Studies of procedural justice commenced in the courtroom, where influential initial work showed that the perceived fairness of legal procedures influenced people’s evaluations of both the verdict and the decision-makers (e.g., lawyers and judges; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Subsequently, studies have extended beyond legal decisionmaking and have shown that at times, the decision-making process is deemed even more important for people’s satisfaction with the outcome, their trust in authorities, and the legitimacy of the system more generally than the outcome itself (e.g., Van den Bos et al., 2001). A fair process is therefore essential when people must deal with outcomes that are disadvantageous for the self. This positive effect of procedural justice on outcome judgments is called the fair process effect. Scholars have tried to specify what aspects of a decision-making process are vital for procedural justice. Studies have shown that an important determinant of procedural justice judgments is whether people have a voice in the process and whether their opinions were also considered in the decisions being made (e.g., Van den Bos et  al., 1996). While the majority of studies focused on these effects of voice, there are additional procedural aspects that contribute positively to people’s judgments of procedural justice. These encompass consistency (decisions need to be stable across situations and over time), impartiality (decision-makers need to be unbiased), decision quality (decisions need to be made based on accurate information), correctability (there needs to be an opportunity to correct mistakes in the decision-making process), and ethicality (the decision-making process needs to uphold moral and ethical standards; Leventhal et  al., 1980). While some of these factors may weigh more heavily in certain circumstances (Leventhal, 1980), together, these procedural aspects of decision-­making processes demonstrate that people need to feel they are duly considered to judge procedural justice as high. This combined effect of procedural aspects is known as the due consideration effect.

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Some organizational justice scholars (i.e., those focusing on fairness in the workplace) distinguish between formal procedures on the one hand and informal interactions on the other and talk about interactional justice when focusing on the latter (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; see also Chap. 8, this volume). According to this perspective, procedural justice is about to what degree rules were followed correctly in coming to a decision, whereas interactional justice is about how you were treated by decision-makers in this process. Studies making this distinction have shown that procedural justice judgments were more related to organizational outcomes (e.g., commitment to the organization), while interactional justice judgments more strongly related to evaluations of the decision-makers (Colquitt, 2001). However, other scholars consider this distinction to be artificial, arguing that interactional justice is a facet of procedural justice judgments and, more specifically, that they are already included in due consideration determinants. Indeed, it seems that the term “procedural justice” captures the informal way in which people are treated in various decision-making processes, and is not limited to formal procedures (Van den Bos, 2005).

Who Is Included in Our Justice Judgments? To date, most empirical work within the field of social justice focused on distributive and procedural justice. However, important theorizing both within sociology and psychology has been done focusing on who is included in our justice considerations (i.e., who is recognized, acknowledged, and included as a stakeholder). Justice as recognition was coined as a countermovement against the focus on mainly distributive justice in classical research and theorizing (Fraser, 1998; Honneth, 2004). According to scholars within this field, the justice of a situation should not be judged based on the distribution of burdens and benefits or how many goods a person should have (i.e., distributive justice). Rather, it should be focused on the degree to which individuals and groups are recognized

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and respected and on status differences between societal groups (i.e., justice as recognition). They argue that social inequalities cannot be resolved through redistribution (alone) but should be addressed by fully recognizing disadvantaged groups and their group members. Scholars taking a justice as recognition approach feel the only way to provide full autonomy for individuals to pursue the lives they value and equally participate in public life is through this process of creating mutual recognition and respect for equal dignity. Clear examples of a growing emphasis on justice as recognition and a shift away from a distributive justice focus are provided by analysing different waves of social rights movements (e.g., Fraser, 1995). For instance, looking at the women’s rights movement in Western countries, the first wave focused on gaining essential rights, such as the right to vote and the right to work. Hence, these efforts were focused mostly on increasing distributive justice. A subsequent wave focused on recognizing differences and compensating inequalities (e.g., through affirmative action programs), thereby combining issues of maldistribution and misrecognition. Currently, a shift from recognizing differences to valuing or even celebrating differences is occurring (e.g., valuing unpaid work in the home and creating equal opportunities to participate in care for both men and women). This can be seen as an increased focus on obtaining equal respect and mutual recognition. Similar processes are taking place in other social rights movements as well. These shifts away from a focus on gaining equal rights (thereby reducing blatantly unfair distributive differences), to recognizing blatant and more subtle differences, to valuing and celebrating differences (thereby creating equal respect and dignity), could be viewed as an increased focus on justice as recognition. While the term justice as recognition is more common outside of psychology, within psychology, ideas on the scope of justice have been postulated regarding the who-question of justice (Clayton & Opotow, 2003; Opotow, 1996). According to these ideas, justice judgments intersect with questions concerning identity in such a way that justice judgments always concern specific groups. People are oftentimes most con-

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cerned about their in-group and justice considerations apply specifically to them (e.g., citizens of their country). What scope people consider and who should thus be included in justice considerations is therefore dependent on identification processes (see also Chap. 3, this volume). For instance, sometimes distributive and procedural justice concerns encompass all of mankind and sometimes they are focused much more narrowly on one’s closest friends. Increasing the scope of justice may be a viable route to decreasing specific social inequalities.

 ow Do People Justify Injustice H and Inequalities? Thus far, we have discussed social science theorizing and research about different forms of justice. How these rather theoretical notions of distributive, procedural, and scope of justice, as well as justice as recognition, have played out in welfare state development over time, is discussed in Chap. 5 (this volume). In this second part of the chapter, we focus on how people (at times) justify inequalities and injustice as well. We began our chapter with the notion that people care about justice. Yet, injustices occur daily, and social inequalities persist. How can these two facts  – people striving for justice and the existence of injustice – be reconciled? In what follows, we take a look at two theories that have focused on this question: just-world theory (Lerner, 1980) and system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Both theories focus on explaining why people sometimes justify unjust situations and argue that these justifications can be caused by motivated reasoning and sense-­making processes. As noted in the introduction of this book, justice is an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1955). This means that, on average, people value justice to a great extent and have an intuitive sense for signalling injustice. However, while we generally agree on the importance of justice, it is more difficult, if not impossible, to define it unambiguously. As such, there is great philosophical as well as public debate on what justice should entail and how it can best be achieved (e.g., through adopt-

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ing different principles of equity, equality or need; or by focusing on redistribution or recognition; see also Chap. 5, this volume). Importantly, because of its’ contested nature, justice is very much in the eye of the beholder, meaning similar situations can be viewed as just by one person, but considered to be a grave injustice by someone else. This subjective element in justice judgments opens avenues for these judgments to be influenced by personal motives, as we will see in our discussion of just-world theory and system justification theory.

Just-World Theory In the 1980s, Lerner (1980) was puzzled by the fact that victims of injustice are sometimes blamed for what happened to them. In just-world theory, he posited that victim blaming was the paradoxical result of a deep concern for justice. More specifically, people want to believe that they live in a just world, in which people get what they deserve. This deservingness principle is necessary to provide meaning to the social world and to trust that one’s efforts will pay off in the end (Bal & Van den Bos, 2012). Put differently, investing in the future and focusing on long-term goals for which outcomes are often uncertain only makes sense when the world is just. A victim of injustice threatens this belief in a just world (BJW), and to deal with this threat, people blame the victim, especially when more benign options to deal with the threat (e.g., helping, supporting, or compensating the victim) are difficult or costly. Subsequent empirical studies focused primarily on explaining victim blaming and on factors determining the degree to which victims were blamed for their misfortune (for an overview, see Hafer & Bègue, 2005). These studies showed that some characteristics of the situation determined how much victims were blamed for the event. When situations posed a higher BJW threat to the observer, the victim was blamed more (e.g., victim innocence, victim proximity, and a perpetrator not being caught; Bal & Van den Bos, 2010, 2012; Correia et  al., 2007; Hafer, 2000). Studies also showed that some factors on the observer side can increase victim blaming. For instance, studies

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showed that a stronger BJW, a focus on the self, and a strong future-orientation all increase victim blaming (Bal & Van den Bos, 2012, 2015; Correia et  al., 2007; Hafer, 2000). Later, different reactions, such as the belief in ultimate justice (seeing a silver lining to the victimization) or immanent justice (attributing the victimization to prior misdeeds) were studied as well as factors increasing more benign reactions to innocent suffering (e.g., support; Callan et  al., 2006; Harvey & Callan, 2014; Bal & Van den Bos, 2015). People are known to vary in the degree to which they endorse the BJW (Sutton & Douglas, 2005). In research, a higher BJW has been related to better well-being, positive affect, optimism, and effective coping with stress (for an overview, see Furnham, 2003). These positive consequences of the BJW seem to be related mostly to the belief in a personal just world (e.g., “I get what I deserve”; Sutton & Douglas, 2005; Sutton et al., 2008). The BJW for others (e.g., “People get what they deserve”; e.g., Bègue & Bastounis, 2003) and victim sensitivity (i.e., being sensitive to perceiving situations as unfair for the self; Gollwitzer et al., 2013; Schmitt et al., 1995), in contrast, have been related to defensive reactions and negative attitudes towards disadvantaged groups.

System Justification Theory In the 1990s, justice research was complemented with the introduction of system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Similar to just-world theory, system justification theory proposed that people are motivated to see the existing system in which they live as good, fair, and just, and that perceptions of social inequalities pose a system threat that needs to be resolved. In this theory, focus shifted from explaining reactions to individual cases of victimization to explaining reactions towards disadvantaged groups in society. According to system justification theory, stereotypes (see Box 4.1) can be used to justify social inequalities, because stereotypes can provide reasons for the disadvantaged positions of certain groups and the advantaged position of others. As such, system justification theory provided a motivated reasoning for the use of stereotypes.

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Box 4.1 Stereotypes and the Stereotype Content Model

People hold stereotypes towards different social groups, which contain the perceived prototypical attributes of members of these groups. According to the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; Cuddy et al., 2009), these group stereotypes are based on two core dimensions: competence and warmth. In social interactions, people want to be able to determine the other’s intent and capability. For this purpose, they ask themselves, (1) does this person want to harm me? (i.e., warmth), and (2) are they capable of doing so? (i.e., competence). As such, competence and warmth can be considered the basis of stereotypes people hold towards different groups in society and this stereotype content will determine how people feel towards these groups. People feel envious towards groups considered high in competence, but low in warmth (e.g., the rich) and they feel paternalistic towards groups considered high in warmth, but low in competence (e.g., the old). While the majority of groups is categorized as high(er) in one dimension and low(er) in the other, some groups are considered to be low in both competence and warmth (e.g., the homeless), which may lead to them being derogated. Finally, mainstream society and the in-group are usually considered relatively high on both dimensions.

Initial research on system justification theory focused on finding support for the idea that status-­congruent stereotypes can indeed serve as justifications for the disadvantaged status of certain groups in society (Jost et  al., 2004; Kay et al., 2009; Friesen et al., 2019). Studies showed that presenting people with a threat to the system led to a higher endorsement of negative stereotypes for disadvantaged groups (Kay & Friesen, 2011). Moreover, an important and controversial hypothesis tested in this regard was that if people are indeed motivated to jus-

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tify the current status quo, including existing social inequalities, this must also be true for people belonging to disadvantaged groups themselves. And indeed, the more importance these people placed on the belief that society was fair, the more likely they were to blame themselves for their disadvantaged position in society by endorsing negative stereotypes about their own group (Laurin et al., 2011). More recently, the idea of complementary stereotypes was introduced (Kay & Jost, 2003; Kay et  al., 2007). Complementary stereotypes are stereotypes in which positive and negative characteristics are balanced out within and between groups (e.g., poor but happy; lazy but sociable; low IQ but athletic). These stereotypes can justify existing social inequalities, while at the same time leaving people’s perception of the system and the self as fair and just intact, as the system produces balanced end-results in which no group has it all. However, the positive characteristics used cannot be causally related to the disadvantaged position (Kay et  al., 2005). For instance, economic disadvantage cannot be compensated for with being perceived as hard-working, as these two are causally related. However, perceptions of economic disadvantage can be related to perceptions of greater happiness. In line with just-world theory, people also differ in the degree to which they defend the current status quo (e.g., Kay & Jost, 2003). This has been related to individual differences in political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003) as well as cognitive rigidity, a resistance to change in beliefs, attitudes, or personal habits (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Nevertheless, people’s tendencies to defend existing social systems and the status quo, including current social inequalities, will always be influenced by a combination of personal, social, and contextual factors.

Conclusion This chapter provided an overview of social scientific research and theorizing on social justice and on the justification of social inequalities. We discussed different forms of justice that together try to provide answers to the question: Who is

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deserving of what by whom? Distributive justice focuses mainly on what can be considered just, procedural justice studies how these just outcomes can best be achieved, and justice as recognition is mostly concerned with the who-question. It is important to note that it is impossible to fully disentangle these different forms of justice. For example, questions of distributive justice cannot be answered without considering who is involved and studies about justice as recognition also need to consider the processes through which recognition is achieved or denied. As such, the differentiation of the various forms of justice is mostly a useful theoretical distinction. In practice, these different forms of justice need to be considered in an integrative way, focusing on the ways in which these forms combine to impact people in various ways across different societal contexts. A complicating factor in determining what is just in practice, is that unjust situations are oftentimes justified through processes of motivated reasoning. By introducing and discussing just-world theory and system justification theory, we have provided insight into two seminal theories that focus on these justification processes to explain why those people who are treated unjustly are, at times, blamed for their misfortune and why social inequalities can persist through the endorsement of negative and complementary stereotypes.

Glossary Complementary stereotypes: group stereotypes in which positive and negative characteristics are balanced out within and between groups. Distributive justice: the just allocation of burdens and benefits, inputs, and outcomes. Due consideration effect: the positive effect of procedural aspects of having voice, consistency, impartiality, decision quality, correctability, and ethicality on people’s procedural justice judgments. Equity theory: a theory of distributive justice postulating, as a central premise, the proportionality principle (sometimes called: equity

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principle), which holds that people are assumed to judge an outcome as just or fair when their own outcome-to-input ratio equals a referent outcome-to-input ratio. Fair process effect: the positive effect of the decision-making process on people’s satisfaction with the outcome, their trust in authorities, and the legitimacy of the system. Just-world theory: a theory focused on how people deal with a confrontation with an innocent victim and that can explain victim blaming by postulating that people hold on to a deservingness principle. This principle holds that we live in a just world in which people get what they deserve, and that innocent victims pose a threat that needs to be resolved. Justice as recognition: a countermovement against the focus on mainly distributive justice in classical research and theorizing, in which the focus is on the degree to which individuals and groups are recognized and respected and on addressing unfair status differences between societal groups. Justice principle: the principle (or rule) chosen to judge the distributive justice of a given situation. In addition to the equity principle (see equity theory), an equality principle and a need principle can be distinguished. Procedural justice: the fairness of the processes and treatment leading up to outcome decisions. Relative deprivation: the feeling of angry resentment invoked by the judgment that a person or a group of persons are unfairly disadvantaged compared to a relevant other individual or group. Scope of justice: the range of people or groups included in people’s justice judgments. Status-congruent stereotypes: group stereotypes that align with the status of that group in society. Stereotype content model: a model that proposes that group stereotypes are based on competence and warmth. Stereotypes: public images containing the perceived prototypical attributes of members of a social group.

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System justification theory: a theory focused on explaining derogatory reactions towards disadvantaged groups in society by postulating that people are motivated to see the existing system in which they live as good, fair, and just, and that perceptions of social inequalities pose a system threat that needs to be resolved.

Comprehension Questions

1. What makes equity theory a theory of distributive justice (instead of merely a theory of preference or a theory about procedural justice)? 2. According to Deutsch, distributive justice principles are pluralistic, consisting of at least equity, equality and need. He argues that each principle will be applied in different types of situations or relations. Which are these? 3. What do the fair process effect and the due consideration effect entail and how do they differ from each other? 4. Why can we consider justice as recognition to be a countermovement to distributive justice research and theorizing? 5. How do just-world theory and system justification theory both contain a form of motivated reasoning? Discussion Questions

1. Is it possible to come up with a universal theory of justice? Why or why not? 2. According to system justification theory, stereotypes can help us see the status quo as good, fair, and just. The stereotype content model further explains which stereotypes we hold towards certain groups, based on the core dimensions of competence and warmth. Combining these insights, do you think that stereotypes can also be used to create resistance against an unfair status quo (i.e., social inequalities)? What might be ways through which such resistance could be achieved?

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The Philosophy of Social Justice and Welfare Provision: Towards Capacitating Solidarity Anton Hemerijck, Azizjon Bagadirov, and Pablo Puertas Roig

Introduction The modern welfare state is perhaps the most successful achievement of mid-­ twentieth century social engineering. Advanced welfare states in Europe and beyond have been able to eradicate old-age poverty, provide universal access to health care and education, and institutionalize social security in case of unemployment and sickness. More than ever, the fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted how crucial welfare provision is to keep society together at moments of socio-­economic crisis. Unsurprisingly, the welfare state remains popular with national electorates across Europe (Cicchi et al., 2020). In normative terms, the modern welfare state is based on the image of a social contract – that is, a political agreement among citizens on the terms of social cooperation, rights and obligations, involving claims on equality, equity (Chap. 4, this volume), inclusion and inter- and intragenerational solidarity (Chap. 3, this volume). Hence, it is imperative to analyse how the normative understanding of the basis of social justice and solidarity has evolved on par with the trends in welfare reform in relation to the changing nature of twenty-first century social risks and inequalities. Over the past decades, an emerging A. Hemerijck (*) • A. Bagadirov • P. Puertas Roig European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

shift can be observed from a transcendental conception of distributive justice (Chap. 3, this volume), associated with John Rawls’s seminal work A Theory of Justice (1971), to a more agencybased and contextualized conception of social justice and well-being in line with Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom (1999) and Martha Nussbaum’s Creating Capabilities (2009). This incipient shift in the normative foundations of the welfare state runs parallel to the incremental spread of social investment reform across Europe over the past two decades (Hemerijck, 2013). The social investment perspective tilts the welfare balance towards social risk prevention, alongside compensation, in times of economic or personal hardship. In ever more fluid labour markets  – where workers frequently move between spells of full-time employment, part-time employment, self-­employment, unemployment, and precarious gig work – human capital (i.e., skills and education) may be wasted or underused if jobseekers (especially young, low-­skilled workers, and minorities) fail to successfully manage these transitions, and ultimately struggle to access rewarding jobs. This, in turn, threatens the long-term financial sustainability of the welfare state, which rests on the number (quantity) and productivity (quality) of future employees and taxpayers. The key objective of social investment is to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty through targeted interventions that help capacitate individuals, families, and societies to

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_5

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respond to the changing nature of social risks. This goal is pursued by investing in human capabilities from early childhood through to the old age, while improving work-life balance provision for working families and reducing household poverty through social protection. To be effective, these social investment policies in the areas of early childhood development, family services, active labour market policies, and active ageing, must take into account individual particularities and family conditions of policy beneficiaries. This chapter follows in four sections. First, we highlight, in section “The Good Polity: From T.H.  Marshall to John Rawls”, the intellectual correspondence between the mid-century welfare state with its primary concern for social (income) security and Rawls’ theory of justice. Next, in section “The Good Life: From the Means of Economic Security to the Ends of Human Flourishing”, we exemplify the critique by Amartya Sen of John Rawls and present his advocacy for a more contextualized conception of social justice in terms of capabilities. We devote special attention to the adaptation of the capability approach by Jonathan Wolff and Avner deShalit, who place ‘risks’ and their temporal consequences at the centre of their important study Disadvantage (2007). Then, section “‘Stepping-Stone’ Solidarity to Complement ‘Robin Hood’ and ‘Piggy-Bank’ Social Security” reviews how the multidimensional thrust of recent welfare reforms and expansion of social service provision have opened up the political space for a normative recalibration, centred around the notion of capacitating solidarity. Section “Conclusion: The Correlates of the Good Life in the Good Polity” concludes on the intimate  – practical and intellectual  – correlates of the ‘good life’ and the ‘good polity’.

 he Good Polity: From T.H. Marshall T to John Rawls Many countries introduced sweeping social reforms in the 1940s and 1950s. The main objective of the post-war welfare state was to provide

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freedom from want through inclusive social security. With the memory of the Great Depression fresh in mind, policymakers from all mainstream political inclinations agreed that the public sector had a key role to play in ‘taming’ the capitalist economy. In his seminal essays Citizenship and Social Class, British sociologist T. H. Marshall described social citizenship rights as ‘the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall, 1963 [1949], p.  74). Marshall saw the introduction of social rights as a final stage in a long evolutionary and mutually reinforcing process of emancipatory democratization: from the introduction of civil liberties in the eighteenth century, to the establishment of political rights in the nineteenth century, and the development of social rights to income security, health care, education, housing and employment, by the mid-twentieth century. Marshall identified modern social policy as a democratic intervention to ‘supersede, supplement or modify operations of the economic system in order to achieve results which the economic system would not achieve on its own’ (Marshall, 1963 [1949], p. 107). There is a ‘double bind’ in Marshall’s understanding of social rights, which connects the economic means of the right to material security to the social end of equalizing citizens’ life chances to live and fully participate in a society according to prevailing standards. In this respect, Marshall’s normative position was primarily concerned with the equalization of social status through equal access to public health care, education, housing, employment and social security protection, and less so with income redistribution per se. The basic form of worker protection and security in the post-war decades was a combination of social security and universal access to health care and education, along with the collective pooling of the social risks of unemployment and old age, for which private insurance was deemed inadequate. In terms of aggregate spending, pensions, unemployment benefits, sickness and disability insurance, and social assistance, took up the lion’s share of social expenditures in the industrialized world. Taking heed from T.H.  Marshall

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four decades later, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 3) tagged the universal right of protection against economic risks as decommodification, that is, ‘the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation’. In terms of political legitimation, the modern welfare state conjured up the normative and practical challenges of demarcating social rights and civil liberties in a democratic polity. Unlike civil liberties and political rights, the substantive character of social rights raised questions about benefit levels and duration, eligibility criteria, target groups, behavioural requirements, and collective financing through contributions and taxation, that is, about distributive justice (Chap. 4, this volume). In this context, John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) assumes special relevance. In this treatise, published at the apex of the expansion of the post-war welfare state, Rawls attempts to advance principles of distributive justice on which ordinary citizens could politically agree. For this purpose, Rawls proposes the thought experiment of the original position in which individuals are formally free and equal to deliberate and make decisions behind a veil of ignorance that deprives them of all knowledge of their personal traits, abilities and social circumstances. According to Rawls, individuals would agree on two lexically ordered principles  – i.e., the first having priority over the second. The principle of equal basic liberties would establish that ‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 266), thus putting basic rights and liberties – personal integrity, freedom of conscience and association, political liberties, etc. – beyond any kind of utilitarian calculations. Then, the second principle can be divided into two sub-principles, which would demand that social and economic inequalities must be: (a) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Principle of fair equality of opportunities);

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(b) to the greatest benefits of the least advantaged (Difference principle). These principles are aimed at determining how social cooperation should be arranged among free and equal citizens. While the principle of equal basic liberties protects civil and political rights, thus delimiting a sphere of individual autonomy that cannot be violated for the sake of other social goals; the requirements of the second principle can be regarded as spelling out the kind of solidarity distributive justice demands from citizens of a liberal democratic state. The principle of fair equality of opportunity simply stipulates that citizens with the same talents and willingness to use them should have the same social and economic opportunities regardless of their specific social circumstances (cf. the principle of proportionality discussed in Chap. 4). The difference principle goes beyond this meritocratic view of social justice, allowing for unequal remunerations only insofar they benefit all citizens and particularly those who are worst-off. Rawls’ rather stringent understanding of social solidarity is premised on the thesis that the distribution of natural endowments and talents is essentially undeserved and that, therefore, they should be regarded as common societal assets. In this view, those better endowed should be incentivised to put their gifts to work – thus allowing some incentive-generating inequalities – but they should not be expected to reap the full economic benefits of their talents, since the range of allowed inequalities would be constrained by the difference principle. Strikingly, Rawls’s theory of justice is in tune with the normative foundations of the mixed-­ economy which, in addition to the acknowledgement of civil liberties and political rights, affirms the idea that economic liberties must be constrained and embedded in a broader socio-­ political order for the sake of social justice and political solidarity (Chap. 3, this volume). Post-­ war centre-left and social liberal political parties that pushed for welfare state expansion never really vouched for a system of full economic equality, since they understood that absolute income equality might damage the interests of

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the least well-off, as diminished work incentives may reduce the overall size of the benefits of social cooperation, shrinking the share of the worse-off members of society. Of course, it is an empirical question what level of income inequality is most effective in balancing economic incentives for income-maximization with fair redistribution. However, Rawls’ sophisticated philosophical argumentation has been criticized, among others by Amartya Sen (see below), for being overly abstract, that is, poorly grounded in empirical reality and therefore impractical as a guide for public policy. From a sociology of knowledge perspective, it is our contention that the principles of political cooperation advanced by Rawls, not very surprisingly, capture the post-war consensus of striking a balance between liberty and equality under democratic rule rather well. This is especially true given the fundamentally political nature of Rawls’ theory of justice. In essence, his theory embodies a vision of the ‘good polity’ understood as a ‘fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons’ who, despite affirming different conceptions of the ‘good life’, are able to converge on an overlapping consensus about the principles of justice that should shape their political institutions. As such, Rawls’ theory of justice is better understood as a workable ‘rule of thumb’ conception for an advanced democratic polity, one that could potentially generate its own political support basis by shaping the character and interests of citizens in accordance to the rules and reasons of ‘justice as fairness’ (Rothstein, 1998). Like T.H.  Marshall before him, Rawls attempted to resolve the conflict between liberty and equality, a necessary task to build a broad consensus of political norms and values indispensable for the floursing of liberal democracy. Even today, the power of Rawls’ normative framework continues to hold sway, not only because its association with the incredibly popular post-war welfare state, but also because Rawls’ theory pays tribute to the importance of efficiency and social equality, showing how they can be coherently combined in a parsimonious conception of social justice.

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 he Good Life: From the Means T of Economic Security to the Ends of Human Flourishing Since the introduction of social security as a right of social citizenship in the 1950s, welfare progress became rather singularly identified with the reduction of income poverty and inequality through social security. For John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge, the intellectual fathers of the post-war welfare state, mass unemployment was the root cause of social exclusion in the 1930s. As such, the primary objective was to restore the dignity of productive employment for male breadwinners with a living-wage for their families. Compulsory social security, masterminded by Beveridge, was secondary to the objective of full male-breadwinner employment in a free society (Beveridge, 1944). In other words, modern social security cannot be separated from the positive aspirations of ‘earning a living’, ‘raising a family’, ‘learning a trade’, ‘caring for the sick and frail’ as core strivings for social respect. This is where the writings of Amartya Sen and his critique of Rawls assume importance (Sen, 1992, 1999, 2009; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993; Robeyns, 2005, 2017). Sen’s core objection is that Rawls’ theory is too preoccupied with the distribution of resources; but for resources to be effective they have to be put to use. According to Sen, what Rawls overlooks is the fact that people face different conversion factors, that is, different personal, socio-political and environmental conditions that determine the capacity of a person to transform resources into functionings understood as various states of doings and beings that are valuable to them. If conversion factors were the same for all citizens, an elementary measure of fair income distribution would easily conjure up a proper benchmark for assessing social (dis)advantage. However, in a world of widespread differences in terms of economic development, health, gender, ethnicity, age, skills and working conditions, extant contextual diversity arguably requires a more demanding view of social justice than fair income compen-

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sation for the worst-off. On this score, Sen’s capability approach provides an enriched answer to the questions of real equality and opportunity by shifting the focus from resource constraints to capabilities, understood as a person’s freedom to achieve certain functioning in light of the different personal and environmental factors. In general, we can observe a transition from a Rawlsian theory of justice tightly linked to a conception of distributive fairness and democratic citizenship, to a more individualistic agency-­based conception of justice linked to the promotion of human development and the improvement, expansion, and maintenance of those capabilities that enable citizens to live flourishing lives (cf. the distinction between distributive justice and justice as recognition as discussed in Chap. 4). However, this nuanced approach also runs into difficulties, since any relevant set of capabilities is bound to vary across time and place, physical and environmental characteristics, labour market conditions, and personal and family context. The main challenge of Sen’s approach is that the polity is unable to master an all-embracing responsibility for citizens’ well-being and, since ‘real world’ contextappropriate capabilities cannot be derived from ideal principles, we have no other choice but to rely on democratic procedures to take these kinds of decisions as social risks change over time and place. Sen’s theory reflects both the flexibility and multi-purpose nature of the capability approach as well as a worrisome lack of a systematic conception of justice as the one envisaged by Rawls. Nevertheless, the capability approach has proven to be fruitful, and several more specific ‘capability theories’ have been advanced to try to fill this lacuna. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, has transformed Sen’s evaluative general framework into a normative framework specifying a core set of values, and, famously, a list of ten central human capabilities that should be incorporated into constitutions, embracing among others: life, bodily health and integrity, imagination, play, practical reason, and control over one’s environment (Nussbaum, 1990, 1992, 1999).

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Nussbaum’s primary intent is to identify concrete commitments of the capability approach by specifying foundational capabilities and a set of political principles that makes a claim to these capabilities a matter of justice. Critics, however, have pointed out that her list of central human capabilities carries a double-edged sword: while equipping humans, on the one hand, with a predetermined list of moral entitlements to address issues of social justice, it inadvertently, on the other hand, overshadows the importance of democratic processes and public deliberation (Robeyns, 2017; cf. the distinction between distributive and procedural justice as discussed in Chap. 4). There are other theorists (Robeyns, 2017; Claassen, 2018; Anderson, 2010) working within the capability approach who have attempted to improve on the elusiveness of Sen’s initial theory, while allowing for a more concrete context-­sensitivity. Relevant for social policy in p­ articular, Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit (2007) have embarked on a research endeavour that puts ‘risk’ at the centre of the analysis. Their so-called ‘Secure Functionings Approach’ tries to avoid some problems of operationalization and measurement inherent to the concept of capability that makes it difficult for the purposes of public policy. Instead, they propose to focus on ‘genuine opportunities’ for ‘secure functionings’, based on the following reasoning: (1) when we think about capabilities, we usually do so in terms of the opportunities people potentially have; (2) however, in doing so, we easily overlook that capabilities are not passive entitlements, as they require agency to strive and actually transform capabilities into functionings; (3) such choices involve obvious opportunity costs that, under conditions of vulnerability, spill-over into other valuable functionings; (4) therefore, the emphasis on genuine opportunity for ‘secure’ functionings serves to highlight that real opportunities are only present when the actions aimed to achieve desired functioning do not require excessive costs or additional risks that can put into jeopardy other important functionings.

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One of the most distinctive insights of Wolff and de-Shalit’s (2007) account is that disadvantages tend to cluster in real life. As the sociologist Matthew Desmond has shown in his seminal study Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City (2017), eviction not only deprives individuals and families from a place to live, it also triggers dramatic snowball effects with severe negative fallout effects on children’s cognitive abilities to learn at schools, parental depression and pervasive disadvantage on the labour market (Hemerijck, 2020). It goes without saying that housing deprivation and homelessness undermines well-being and fosters social exclusion, however its effects run deeper into the structure of social disadvantage. As a result, people who are disadvantaged in one sphere are likely to become more disadvantaged in others as well, creating a distinguishable underclass. Following up on this fundamental empirical insight, Wolff and de-Shalit suggest that public policies should focus on preventing the clustering of corrosive disadvantages through the promotion of what they call fertile functionings, i.e., those functionings the securing of which are likely to secure further functionings. For example, evidence on European countries where public housing benefits are generally available to poor families, shows that housing benefits have no negative disincentive effect on work, and actually serve to increase employment participation and improve educational attainment for children (Hugo et al., 2005). Wolff and de-Shalit’s adaptation of Sen’s theory introduces a quintessential temporal orientation to the capability approach that underscores how secure functionings implies the ability to sustain a certain level of functioning over time. Here, the concept of ‘risk’ is particularly relevant in the analysis of capability deprivation, which cannot simply be understood as the lack of opportunities for important functionings, but rather in terms of the inability or uncertainty to sustain a certain level of functioning over time. The risk of being deprived a central functioning – e.g., housing – easily spills over to other functionings (e.g., work), resulting in a disabling effect of enhanced stress and uncertainty (Wolff & de-Shalit, 2007,

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p.  68). Hence, insecure functioning can trigger so-called planning blight, i.e., a difficulty to plan important aspects of one’s life to the extent of considering everything to be beyond one’s control. In this regard, the important insight of Wolff and de-Shalit (2007, pp.  68–69) is that uncertainty can prevent individuals from planning and acting even in circumstances that are open to improvement. With respect to social policy, the sense of security and reasonable expectations that the secure functionings approach underscores, bring to the fore the importance of adequate safety nets. Beyond immediate income protection safety nets foster individuals’ psychological health and emotional wellbeing, as well as their capacity to act and plan as autonomous and responsible agents under conditions of temporal distress. This is where social investment policies, evident in contemporary welfare states, assume importance.

‘Stepping-Stone’ Solidarity to Complement ‘Robin Hood’ and ‘Piggy-Bank’ Social Security The British economist Nicholas Barr (2020) distinguishes between two principles of solidarity upholding the post-war welfare state. First, there is what Barr calls ‘Robin Hood’ solidarity: poverty relief based on redistributing income and wealth from the rich to the poor, so as to reduce social exclusion. Originally, William Beveridge’s commitment to universal provision of benefits, financed though progressive taxation, was firmly anchored on the principle of ‘Robin Hood’ solidarity. Second, ‘Piggy Bank’ solidarity alludes to social insurance over the life course, based on contributions and earnings. Introduced by Otto von Bismarck in late-nineteenth century Germany, Piggy-bank solidarity is squarely rooted in status-preserving compulsory insurance. Today, most European social security systems increasingly operate on the basis of encompassing combinations of Bismarckian insurance-based Piggy-bank solidarity and Beveridgean means-tested Robin-Hood redistribution (Korpi & Palme, 1998).

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Despite their immense achievements and unrelenting political support, welfare states have been challenged by intrusive economic and social transformations ever since the 1980s. In a context of international economic interdependence and adverse family demography, the phenomenon of ‘cumulative inequalities’, consisting of the snowballing of disadvantages experienced at earlier life stages, has become pervasive due to the still limited toolkit of current welfare states. The multidimensional nature of inequality today  – where different types of disadvantage, linked to socioeconomic status, geography, gender, age, or migration background, interact and reinforce each other (see also the discussion of intersectionality in Chap. 20, this volume) – implies that social policy responses focused only on one dimension of disadvantage or one type of policy instrument are bound to fail. As a consequence, advanced welfare states across the OECD region have enacted various reforms that, in part, addressed the retrenchment of the welfare state in some countries. Alongside the overall integration of Robin Hood and Piggy Bank solidarity, there have been deliberate attempts to rebuild welfare programmes and to accommodate welfare policy repertoires to the new economic and social realities of twenty-first century post-industrial societies. In the process, the concept of social investment gained traction (Giddens, 1998; Esping-­ Andersen et  al., 2002; Morel et  al., 2012; Hemerijck, 2013, 2017, 2018). The social investment approach proposes to equip individuals, families and societies with the skills and resilience needed to navigate rapid change and uncertainty. The aim of these policies is mainly to break up patterns of self-reinforcing (and often intergenerational) inequality and marginalisation, while enhancing employment and productivity in the knowledge economy, thereby putting the welfare state on more solid fiscal footing. In effect, the social investment approach views welfare provision as a productive investment, rather than a cost in public accounting. Depending on policy synergies, investing in human capabilities from early childhood through old age (‘stock’ policies), while improving work-life balance provision for working families (‘flow’ policies) and

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mitigating household poverty through social protection (‘buffer’ policies) can have the potential not only to generate a multiplier effect of wellbeing returns at an individual level, but also to foster employment levels to the point of securing the macroeconomic sustainability of inclusive income protection and consumption-smoothing at the national level (Hemerijck, 2017, 2018). Fundamentally, the social investment approach transcends and complements traditional welfare state functions by adding to ‘Robin Hood’ (redistribution) and ‘Piggy Bank’ solidarity (insurance) a novel form of ‘Stepping-stone’ solidarity (capacitation). This innovation is needed because, despite basic income and social security, people still fall between the cracks if they are not given the opportunity to cultivate the ‘capabilities’ to navigate social risks over the life course. In this respect, Stepping-stone solidarity is aimed at bolstering people’s capabilities in transitional moments of life, providing temporally-­specific support structures to prevent cumulative disadvantage during life course transitions –often associated with training, housing, childbearing, employment and health. In contrast to the classic ‘Robin-Hood’ and ‘Piggy-bank’ solidarity, which share a family resemblance with John Rawls’ focus on income security favouring the least advantaged; ‘Stepping-stone’ solidarity is more multidimensional and contextualized, in sync not only with Sen’s critique of Rawls, but also with Wolff and de-Shalit’s (2007, pp. 24–32) rejection of the compensation paradigm primarily focused on cash outlays. Thus, ‘Stepping-stone’ solidarity departs from conventional poverty relief and social insurance not only in terms of its core objective, but also in terms of its target population, provision logic, temporal horizon, and mode of governance. It is firmly established that remedial programs like adult education (in addition to insurance and compensation for temporal disadvantages) are becoming less effective in the absence of prerequisite capabilities, since learning motivations depend on the socio-economic conditions of early childhood in the first place (Esping-­ Andersen et al., 2002). In terms of a target population, the conventional measures of Robin Hood

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and Piggy Bank solidarity are targeted at the working-age population; ‘Stepping-stone’ solidarity, on the other hand, takes into purview the entire life course, with a strong focus on specific risks, ranging from child poverty and single-­ mother work-life balance predicaments to low skill and older-worker unemployment. Social disadvantages go beyond a lack of valued skills in the labour market since they may also affect a much wider range of capacities that are necessary to live a flourishing life in contemporary society. For instance, child poverty and labour market disadvantage may spillover to functionings strongly related to family well-­ being. ‘Stepping-stone’ solidarity extends the time horizon of social investment beyond conventional metrics of levels and duration of social benefits towards a more dynamic assessment of the prospects of every citizen to sustain wellbeing in life course transitions from early childhood to old age. With respect to policy provision, there is an obvious predisposition towards social servicing. This does not, however, deny the prime importance of income security, the essential innovation of the modern welfare state. ‘Capacitating’ social services, a term coined by Charles Sabel in health, housing, education, and employment, give individuals and families the capabilities to navigate potentially rough transitions in their lives – in health, housing, education, family and childcare, and/or employment  – amid volatile labour markets and more fluid family structures (Sabel et al., 2017). At the micro level, capacitating social services benefit individuals and families, by facilitating their career development, social mobility, and fostering resilience to crises (both economic and personal). At the macro level, cumulative gains can be reaped in terms of improved productivity and higher employment, as well as lower gender gaps and reductions in poverty  – which are all key to ensuring the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state in knowledge economies and ageing societies. Indeed, aggregate evidence seems to confirm that countries with welfare states combining all three types of solidarity – redistribution, personal insurance, and investments in long-term

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capabilities  – are best able to reconcile economic competitiveness and social inclusion (Hemerijck, 2013; Hemerijck and HuguenotNoël, 2022; Hemerijck & Matsaganis, 2022). Needless to say, ‘Stepping-­ stone’ solidarity flourishes on the backbone of adequate income protection, especially for the least advantaged. Therefore, ‘Stepping-Stone’ solidarity should not be viewed as an alternative to ‘Robin Hood’ and ‘Piggy Bank’ solidarity, but rather as an important complement in post-­industrial economies and societies (Esping-­ Andersen et  al., 2002; Hemerijck, 2013). Finally, in terms of governance, ‘Stepping-­ stone’ solidarity, based on the particular needs of beneficiaries, requires institutional toleration and trust in decentralized policy customization, e.g., local deviations from national equality principles. Therefore, the temptation of central administration to impose rules that limit local autonomy and innovation must be avoided (Sabel & Simon, 2017).

Conclusion: The Correlates of the Good Life in the Good Polity Today, welfare states are required to absorb and adapt to turbulent change coming from skill-biased technological innovation, unstable families, a feminized labour market, and a more volatile capitalist economy. In terms of broad societal preferences, a political economy that aligns civil, political, and social rights remains the norm. The overriding political preference for inclusive welfare provision inescapably puts pressure on policymakers to design social policies aimed at capacitating citizens to adapt to rapidly changing economic and social conditions. Unsurprisingly, a transformative welfare reform momentum has given rise to a dynamic redefinition of the norms and values behind contemporary welfare provision. From the 1990s, a shift from a predominantly passive social security welfare states, confined to Robin-Hood redistribution and Piggy-bank consumptionsmoothing, to a more active welfare state, supported by a life course commitment to ‘Stepping-stone’ solidarity. The ideas of ‘human

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flourishing’ of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum inspired a broadening of the scope of political commitment from income benefits to services in education, health, housing, and family support. In a context of adverse family demography and accelerating technological change, heterogeneous life course contingencies easily spill over into cumulative disadvantage, therefore a more proactive and preventative social investment welfare state is urgently needed. Raising the stakes for ‘Stepping-stone’ solidarity is not to suggest that ‘Stepping-­stone’ solidarity is in any way superior to resource-based ‘Robin Hood’ and ‘Piggy-­bank’ solidarity, the central innovations of the post-war welfare state. ‘Stepping-stone’ solidarity in postindustrial societies fundamentally builds on and supports the other two prerequisites under the more encompassing heading notion of capacitating solidarity. Many economists, strongly influenced by the work of Amartya Sen, are also questioning whether GDP growth is still a useful yardstick for social development. In the 2009 Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, written for the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the economist Joseph Stiglitz, together with Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Amartya Sen, argues that the time is ripe for including important capacitating-oriented indicators, such as quality health care, housing, early childhood development, adult numeracy and literacy, access to employment services, work-life balance, life satisfaction and environmental sustainability, in our understanding of economic prosperity and social progress in the twenty-first century (Stiglitz et  al., 2009). In light of this ideational change, it may be conceded that Sen’s substantive and more contextualized understanding of social justice may supersede Rawls’ more transcendentalist and resource-based notion of justice as fairness. However, two outstanding issues remain. First, it is true that the normative goals of maintaining human capital ‘stock’ through life course training and education and easing the ‘flow’ in fluid labour markets to reconcile work and family life seems difficult to tie into the Rawlsian normative prior

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of distributive fairness. In practical terms, however, significant progress in measuring the multidimensional nature of poverty and well-being brings to light the intimate correlates between relative poverty and social capacitation. There is ample evidence today that social investments in childcare, generous paid parental leave, family services and benefits, significantly contribute to employment, increased tax revenue, reduced long-term reliance on compensatory social protection policies, and lower levels of (child) poverty (Plavgo & Hemerijck, 2020). Second, although it can be accepted that Sen’s capability approach provides a much richer informational basis than a narrow focus on resources, Rawls’ theory still provides an invaluable answer to the conundrum of political cooperation (Sugden, 1993). Any democratic welfare state, based on a social contract of rights and obligations, cannot survive for long without a broad consensus on political norms and Sen’s piecemeal approach falls short of providing it. Moreover, the capability approach can easily lead to inflationary and utopian expectations regarding welfare provisions in European countries, with the result of dismissing real progress in employment, education, training, and active ageing (Dean et  al., 2005). To be sure, this is not Sen’s fault. As a development economist, always focused strongly on real world contingencies such as famines and environmental degradation and never settled for a simple expansive interpretation of capabilities. However, the anti-transcendental stance of his work, staying clear from intellectually delineating the contours of a just society, entails a problematic disconnect between an empirically informed account of the ‘good life’ in terms of well-being and the necessary political prerequisites of a ‘good polity’ able to sustain human flourishing. In conclusion, we advocate to delineate a set of secure capabilities to be provided by the polity that, à la Marshall, are deemed critical to live ‘according to the standards prevailing in the society’. As such, we remain in need of a broader theory of political cooperation that aims for universal human flourishing achieved through the realization of capacitating solidarity.

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Glossary Capability: a person’s freedom or opportunity to achieve certain functionings, taking into account relevant personal characteristics and external factors. The capability set of an individual refers to the options available for her to choose. Decommodification: the degree to which citizens can sustain an acceptable standard of living independently of market participation. Human capital: skills, education, capacity and attributes of labour that determine its productive capacity. Life course analysis: captures the temporal dynamic of welfare policy provision at the level of individuals and households, by giving explicit attention to how welfare provision from early childhood onwards affects material wellbeing (employment and income) and helps to mitigate (or reinforce) social risks later in life, through cumulative (dis-)incentives for skills acquisition and easing (or frustrating) gendered labour market transitions over the entire life course. Original position: an imaginary situation whereas the parties must agree on basic principles of justice given no one knows their personal circumstances. Secure functionings: functionings that individuals have genuine opportunities to achieve, meaning that (1) their probability of success is high if they strive to achieve them (2) and doing so does not require them to sacrifice or put into jeopardy the achievement of other relevant functionings. Social citizenship rights: basic access to social protection and provisions of education and primary health care, made available to the population at large, as a universal right, on par with liberal and democratic rights. Social contract: a political agreement among citizens on the terms of social cooperation,

rights and obligations, involving claims on equality, equity, inclusion and inter- and intra-­ generational solidarity. Social investment: welfare provision with a focus on ex-ante risk prevention and capacitation, alongside ex-post income insurance and redistribution, to enhance people’s capabilities and opportunities in post-industrial labour markets, with a view to ensuring high levels of employment and inclusive social protection coverage. Stepping-stone solidarity: a multidimensional and contextualized form of solidarity aimed at bolstering people’s capabilities and providing for temporally-specific support structures to prevent cumulative disadvantage during life course transitions. Veil of ignorance: a feature of the original position that deprives the parties of all arbitrary facts that could influence the agreement on principles of justice, that is, depriving parties of knowledge about their society and themselves (such as one’s race, gender, class, age, talent, etc.).

Comprehension Questions

1. Thinking about the mid-­century welfare state in relation to Rawls’ conception of justice: Why are inequalities arising from social policy coordination and/or incentive-­generating inequalities preferred over general equality (of outcomes)? 2. What are the benefits and disadvantages of highly contextualised conceptions of social justice such as Sen’s capability approach? 3. What are the key objectives of the social investment approach? 4. Reflect on the disagreement between John Rawls and Amartya Sen: What is Sen’s main criticism of Rawls? Why does Rawls’s theory remain relevant after all?

5  The Philosophy of Social Justice and Welfare Provision: Towards Capacitating Solidarity

Discussion Questions

1. Which social risks and disadvantages do you think the welfare state is unable to address? What would the solution to those issues be? 2. Why do you think that the capabilities approach to questions of social justice, developed by Amartya Sen in the context of developing economies, is increasingly becoming a reference point for social policy problems and solutions in advanced post-industrial economies?

References Anderson, E. (2010). Justifying the capabilities approach to justice. In H.  Brighouse & I.  Robeyns (Eds.), Measuring justice: Primary goods and capabilities (pp. 81–100). Cambridge University Press. Barr, N. (2020). The Economics of the Welfare State. Oxford University Press. Beveridge, W. H. (1944). Full employment in a free society: A report. Allen & Unwin. Cicchi, L., Genschel, P., Hemerijck, A., & Nasr, M. (2020). EU solidarity in times of Covid-19 (Policy Briefs, 2020/34, European Governance and Politics Programme). European University Institute. Claassen, R. (2018). Capabilities in a just society: A theory of navigational agency. Cambridge University Press. Dean, H., Bonvin, J.-M., Vielle, P., & Farvaque, N. (2005). Developing capabilities and rights in welfare-to-work policies. European Societies, 7(1), 3–26. Desmond, M. (2017). Evicted: Poverty and profit in the American city. Penguin Books. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Polity Press. Esping-Andersen, G., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A., & Myles, J. (2002). Why we need a new welfare state. Oxford University Press. Giddens, A. (1998). The third way: The renewal of social democracy. Polity Press. Hemerijck, A. (2013). Changing welfare states. Oxford University Press. Hemerijck, A. (2017). The uses of social investment. Oxford University Press. Hemerijck, A. (2018). Social investment as a policy paradigm. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(6), 810–827.

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Hemerijck, A. (2020). Correlates of capacitating solidarity. Housing, Theory and Society, 37(3), 278–288. Hemerijck, A., & Huguenot-Noël, R. (2022). Resilient Welfare States in the European Union. Agenda Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne. Hemerijck, A., & Matsaganis, M. (2022). Stress-testing the welfare state. Lessons from the great recession for a postpandemic social compass. Oxford University Press. Hugo, P., Kemp, A., & Varady, D.  P. (2005). Housing vouchers in the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands: Current issues and future perspectives. Housing Policy Debate, 16(3–4), 575–609. Korpi, W., & Palme, J. (1998). The paradox of redistribution and the strategy of equality: Welfare state institutions, inequality and poverty in the western countries. American Sociological Review, 63(5), 661–687. Marshall, T.  H. (1963). Sociology at the crossroads and other essays. Heinemann. Morel, N., Palier, B., & Palme, J. (2012). Towards a social investment welfare state? Ideas, policies, challenges. Policy Press. Nussbaum, M. (1990). Aristotelian social democracy. In G.  M. Mara & H.  S. Richardson (Eds.), Liberalism and the good. Routledge. Nussbaum, M. (1992). Human functioning and social justice: In defense of Aristotelian essentialism. Political theory, 20(2), 202–246. Nussbaum, M. (1999). Women and equality: The capabilities approach. International Labour Review, 138(3), 227–246. Nussbaum, M. (2009). Creating capabilities: The human development approach and its implementation. Hypatia, 24(3), 211–215. Nussbaum, M., & Sen, A. (1993). The quality of life. Oxford University Press. Plavgo, I., & Hemerijck, A. (2020). The social investment litmus test: Family formation, employment and poverty. Journal of European Social Policy. Online First. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928720950627. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Belknap Press. Robeyns, I. (2005). The capability approach: A theoretical survey. Journal of Human Development, 6(1), 93–117. Robeyns, I. (2017). Wellbeing, freedom and social justice: The capability approach re-examined. Open Book Publishers. Rothstein, B. (1998). Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare state. Cambridge University Press. Sabel, C., & Simon, W. H. (2017). The management side of due process in the service-based welfare state. In N. R. Parrillo (Ed.), Administrative law from the inside out: Essays on themes in the work of Jerry L. Mashaw (pp. 63–86). Cambridge University Press. Sabel, C., Zeitlin, J., & Quack, S. (2017). Capacitating services and the bottom-up approach to social invest-

64 ment. In A. Hemerijck (Ed.), The uses of social investment (pp. 140–149). Oxford University Press. Sen, A. (1992). Inequality re-examined. Harvard University Press. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford University Press. Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Allan Lane. Stiglitz, J.  E., Sen, A., & Fitoussi, J.  P. (2009). Report by the commission on the measurement of economic

A. Hemerijck et al. performance and social progress. Retrieved July 24, 2021, from https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/ finances/presse/dossiers_de_presse/090914mesure_ perf_eco_progres_social/synthese_ang.pdf Sugden, R. (1993). Welfare, resources and capabilities: A review of Inequality reexamined by Amartya Sen. Journal of Economic Literature, 31(4), 1947–1962. Wolff, J., & de-Shalit, A. (2007). Disadvantage. Oxford University Press.

6

Who Should Get What and Why? Insights from Welfare Deservingness Theory Tijs Laenen and Femke Roosma

Introduction Who should get what from our welfare state, and why? For decades, this question of solidarity has been peaking high on political agendas across the globe. Especially today, when all sorts of reform pressures, such as population ageing, mass migration and the COVID-19 pandemic, raise doubts about the financial sustainability and social legitimacy of the welfare state. In these times we, as a society, are faced with difficult choices on how to distribute the increasingly scarce public resources among the population in the fairest possible way, to achieve social justice. This chapter approaches this question from a citizen’s perspective, by examining who is considered deserving of social welfare in the public’s view. Our core concept, welfare deservingness, is defined here as the degree to which specific social policy target groups (such as the elderly, the sick and the unemployed) are considered worthy of social benefits and services (such as old-­age pensions, healthcare and unemployment benefits) by the general public. Important to note is that we treat perceived deservingness as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, ranging from ‘very undeserving’ to ‘very deservT. Laenen (*) Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] F. Roosma Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

ing’, with a broad range of possible positions situated in between the two extremes (van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). In this regard, we differ from earlier (mainly American) literature, in which a dichotomous distinction was often made between the “deserving” on the one hand, and the “undeserving” on the other (e.g., Katz, 1989). The concept of deservingness already featured in some of the earliest studies trying to explain popular support for the welfare state. Perhaps the very first was Cook (1979), who saw deservingness as a potential explanation for her observation that some social services received higher (or lower) levels of support than others. Especially in the 1990s, many other (mainly American) scholars came to see deservingness as an important driving force behind popular welfare attitudes (e.g., Gilens, 1999; Will, 1993). However, it was not until van Oorschot’s seminal work (2000, 2006) that the concept of welfare deservingness turned into an integrated and structured theoretical framework. Based on earlier studies, van Oorschot (2000) identified five crucial criteria underlying popular welfare preferences: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need. These so-­called “CARIN criteria” still lie at the heart of the current welfare deservingness model (shown in Fig. 6.1), which has been developed further by many other scholars building on van Oorschot’s original ideas (e.g., Jeene, 2015; Larsen, 2006; Laenen, 2020; Meuleman et  al., 2020; van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_6

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T. Laenen and F. Roosma

Contextual

characteristics

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Control:

-…..Ta…..+

Attitude:

-.….Ta…..+

Individual

characteristics

Reciprocity: -…..Ta…..+ Identity:

-…..Ta..…+

Need:

-.….Ta…..+

Ec

Ea Er Ei

Deservingness of target group A

Support for the social rights or obligations of target group A

En

Fig. 6.1  The welfare deservingness model

In the following, we delve deeper into the welfare deservingness model by describing its different nuts and bolts and explaining how these are combined into a coherent theoretical framework. After that, we explore individual and contextual differences in popular deservingness opinions. To end with, we demonstrate the relevance of deservingness theory beyond the field it has traditionally been applied to, i.e., public opinion about the welfare state.

The Welfare Deservingness Model We start our discussion of the welfare deservingness model (see Fig. 6.1) by looking closer at its core components: the CARIN criteria. The first criterion, control, is about the perceived degree of personal responsibility welfare claimants have for being in the situation they are in. According to Jeene (2015, p. 18), this criterion consists of two sub-components: “control for getting in, which means who is to blame for being in the poor situation, and control over getting out, which refers to the effort that people make to end their hardships”. The second criterion, attitude, refers to a broader collection of norm-conforming attitudes and behaviours, such as people’s gratitude, docility, compliance, honesty and pleasantness. The third criterion, reciprocity, relates to perceived contributions to society claimants make (either in the past, present or future), such as paid work, tax

payments, caring responsibilities and job-seeking efforts. The fourth criterion, identity, has to do with feelings of similarity, proximity and cultural closeness between those judging the deservingness and those being judged. Most often, the identity dimension has been reduced to issues of race, ethnicity and nationality in the deservingness literature. However, in line with other chapters in this volume (cf. Chaps. 2 and 3, this volume), we consider this interpretation of the identity criterion too narrow, as it neglects the fact that individuals derive their social identities from multiple group memberships, which may include, among other things, their age, gender, social class and religion. The fifth criterion, need, refers to the perceived financial destitution and/or poor health status of those seeking help.

Deservingness Perceptions According to the deservingness framework, a target group’s overall perceived deservingness depends, in first instance, on how it is evaluated (or ‘scored’) on these CARIN criteria (cf. ‘-… Ta…+’ in Fig. 6.1). These evaluations or scores are called “deservingness perceptions”. In general, target groups are considered more deserving if they (a) are not considered personally responsible for their situation (‘Control’), (b) adhere to prevailing societal norms and values, such as showing gratitude when help is offered

6  Who Should Get What and Why? Insights from Welfare Deservingness Theory

(‘Attitude’), (c) make a contribution to our society, in the past, present or future (‘Reciprocity’), (d) belong to the dominant social or cultural group with which most people can easily identify (‘Identity’), and (e) have severe financial and/or health needs (‘Need’). From this perspective, deservingness theory helps to explain why the public at large ranks some target groups –such as the elderly and the sick– consistently higher than others –such as unemployed people and immigrants– when it comes to their deservingness of social welfare (van Oorschot, 2006; Laenen & Meuleman, 2017). Let us illustrate the logic behind deservingness theory by contrasting two primary target groups of welfare policy: the elderly and the able-bodied unemployed. First, these groups are usually scored quite differently on the criterion of control: while old age is a biologically determined life event, joblessness is a condition that stems from someone’s (lack of a) position in the labour market, and can thus be attributed to structural or individual causes (e.g., economic recession vs. laziness) (Jensen & Petersen, 2017). Second, the stereotypical image of the grateful and docile pensioner stands in stark contrast to that of the deviant, working-aged unemployed (the attitude criterion) (Larsen, 2008). Third, it is commonly assumed that most elderly people have contributed more to society than most unemployed people (the reciprocity criterion). Fourth, we generally find it much easier to identify with the elderly than with the unemployed, because almost everyone has some sort of personal contact with elderly persons, and most of us expect to grow old ourselves (the identity criterion). Last, both the elderly and the unemployed meet the criterion of financial need. For the elderly this is a more permanent need because their age prevents them from working, while the financial need of the unemployed is more likely to be temporary (van Oorschot, 2006). However, this only tells the general story behind the welfare deservingness model. As shown on the left-hand side of Fig. 6.1, the model explicitly argues that people’s deservingness perceptions (i.e., how they score target groups on the CARIN criteria) are influenced by their individ-

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ual characteristics as well as the characteristics of the broader context in which they live. The way in which a policy target group is evaluated on the CARIN criteria could thus vary across individuals and contexts (van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). As a result, different individuals living in different contexts are likely to diverge in their overall deserving assessment of a given target group. In the next section, we will explain the different types of individual and contextual factors in more detail and provide some relevant examples.

Deservingness Valuations Up until now, our discussion of the deservingness model has been focused on the way in which target groups are perceived, or ‘scored’, on the CARIN criteria. This is, however, only part of the welfare deservingness model. For such deservingness perceptions to have real consequences, people should also attach importance to the underlying (CARIN) criteria (cf. ‘Ec, Ea, Er, Ei and En’ in Fig. 6.1). To illustrate this point, imagine the particular situation of Mr. X, who values reciprocity more than need. Although Mr. X thinks that the typical unemployed person has limited financial resources, he also feels that financial neediness should not determine who gets what from the welfare state. His perception of need is thus unlikely to determine how he judges unemployed people’s welfare deservingness. Instead, Mr. X values the criterion of reciprocity strongly: people have to contribute to society to earn their right to welfare provisions. However, because Mr. X believes unemployed people are able to work but are not taking the opportunities offered, he argues they are not contributing and should thus not be entitled to any benefits or services. Unlike his perception of need, his perception of reciprocity is likely to influence how Mr. X thinks about the deservingness of the unemployed. What this illustration demonstrates is that the overall perceived welfare deservingness is determined not only by people’s perceptions of a target group, but also by the value they attach to the different deservingness criteria. The stronger the valuation of a deserv-

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ingness criterion, the heavier the weight of the score on that criterion (Laenen, 2020; Meuleman et al., 2020). In this chapter, we refer to these as ‘deservingness valuations’. This brings us to the ongoing academic debate about the relative importance of the CARIN criteria, which is stretched between two extreme positions. At one end, there is the idea of a law-­ like hierarchy of deservingness criteria that is the same for everyone, always and everywhere. In this view, some of the criteria are simply more important than others. Although complete consensus is lacking in the literature, the tendency has been to pinpoint control and reciprocity as the most critical deservingness criteria (Larsen, 2006; van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). Most explicit in this regard are proponents of the so-­ called ‘deservingness heuristic’, who argue that humans have developed a psychological reflex over the course of evolution to categorize help-­ seekers either as ‘cheaters’ or as ‘reciprocators’ (e.g., Aarøe & Petersen, 2014; Jensen & Petersen, 2017). To ensure the long-term survival of the social group, most people are only willing to help those who display efforts to contribute to the common good (i.e., the reciprocators). In this evolutionary framework, ‘deservingness-based welfare opinions are not influenced by all types of positive or negative perceptions of welfare recipients but, in particular, by perceptions of recipient effort’ (Petersen, 2012, p.  2). At the other end of the debate, there is the view – endorsed in this chapter– that a universal, fixed rank order of deservingness criteria does not exist, because their relative importance is (1) target-­ specific, (2) person-specific and (3) context-­specific. First of all, the importance of the different CARIN criteria is likely to vary across policy target groups (see e.g. Heuer & Zimmermann, 2020; Kootstra, 2017). When people judge the welfare deservingness of migrants, for example, the criterion of identity might be more salient to them than any of the other criteria. When thinking about the unemployed, by contrast, it could well be that issues of personal responsibility (the control criterion) are most

T. Laenen and F. Roosma

important. Second, like individual and contextual factors influence deservingness perceptions, they also influence deservingness valuations. People’s emphasis on deservingness and its underlying criteria is likely to be influenced by individual characteristics and preferences and depends on the broader context in which they live. We will come back to the individual and contextual drivers of popular deservingness valuations in the next section.

From Deservingness to Support The final step in the deservingness model (see Fig. 6.1) embodies the idea that the overall perceived deservingness of a target group shapes the extent to which people support government involvement in granting social rights to, and imposing social obligations on, that particular group (Laenen, 2020). Initially, most existing studies were concerned primarily with rights rather than obligations, by examining how people’s deservingness opinions are related to their support for social benefits and services such as old-age pensions, unemployment benefits and healthcare (van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). It has indeed been well-documented in the literature that popular support for benefits and services increases when they are targeted at groups that are ‘scored’ more positively on (some of) the CARIN criteria (Meuleman et  al., 2017). For example, it is a well-established finding that people are considerably more generous if they attribute the cause of a social risk –such as unemployment or sickness– to structural forces beyond one’s control instead of individual behaviour (i.e., the control criterion; Larsen, ­ 2006; Gollust & Lynch, 2011). Gradually, interest in the other side of the coin, social obligations, also began to rise among deservingness scholars. A number of studies now show that deservingness is negatively related to support for social obligations: the more deserving a target group is perceived to be, the less support there is for imposing all sorts of duties, such as job-­

6  Who Should Get What and Why? Insights from Welfare Deservingness Theory

seeking requirements, on that group (e.g., Larsen, 2008; Roosma & Jeene, 2017). Crucial to note, however, is that there seem to be slightly different deservingness logics underlying support for social obligations and support for social rights. A recent study, for example, demonstrates that German citizens prioritize other deservingness considerations in relation to different aspects of the unemployment benefit system (Buss, 2019). When assessing the generosity thereof, claimants’ child caring responsibilities prove to be most important for determining deservingness: the more children a claimant has, the higher the level of benefit should be (i.e., social rights). When considering the conditionality of those benefits, by contrast, the age of the claimants was of primary significance: the older unemployed were exempted more frequently from work-related requirements than their younger counterparts (i.e., social obligations). Thus, it seems that in addition to who is being judged (target specificity), who is doing the judging (person specificity) and when and where those judgements are being made (context specificity), it also matters what is being judged: rights or obligations (see also Laenen & Meuleman, 2019; Gielens et al., 2019). Finally, we want to emphasize the importance of drawing a conceptual distinction between the deservingness component and the support component of the welfare deservingness model. (Laenen, 2020). At first sight, it might seem that these components are basically the same thing, as was already noted by Cook (1979, p. 172): The very generality of the relationship between deservingness and support must make one suspect that deservingness and support may form a common factor instead of being two unique constructs (i.e., being deserving may mean being deserving of support). Thus, it may be that deservingness is more usefully conceptualized as an indirect measure of support rather than as an independent determinant of support.

However, in our view, equating support with deservingness risks ignoring the fact that the support component is also driven by factors

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other than deservingness. Besides popular opinions of deservingness, we know that self-interest considerations, general ideological beliefs and evaluations of social policies (among other things) also constitute important determinants of public support for social rights and obligations (Laenen, 2020). This is inadequately recognized by the many scholars who deduce a target group’s deservingness from measurements of the support component, such as often-used survey items concerning government responsibility and government spending (Meuleman et  al., 2017). However, simply observing that support is higher for welfare policies targeted at groups that, from a theoretical perspective, ought to be considered deserving by the general public hardly counts as definite proof that support is actually, or single-­ handedly, driven by such deservingness opinions. To illustrate this point, let us reconsider the above-described contrast in deservingness between the elderly and the unemployed. It is indeed a well-documented finding that welfare schemes targeted at the former, such as old-age pensions, receive higher levels of support than schemes targeted at the latter, such as unemployment benefits (van Oorschot, 2006). Although deservingness is likely to play a part in this, other, complementary explanations potentially exist. From a self-interest perspective, for one, it can be argued that old-age pensions are more popular because they are of personal interest to nearly all citizens, rich and poor alike; unlike unemployed benefits, which are known to disproportionally benefit lower socioeconomic strata. As a result, upper and middle classes are not as likely to consider unemployment schemes as good value for their (tax) money, and accordingly, express lower support for them. Alternatively, unemployment benefits might also be less popular because they attract greater ideological opposition, by going against the mainstream work ethic (Wendt et  al., 2011), or because they are generally perceived to perform worse in terms of effectiveness, cost efficiency, administrative complexity and procedural fairness (Laenen, 2018).

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In the next section, we will only discuss the individual and contextual drivers of the deservingness component; not of the support component. More specifically, we identify some of the most important drivers of both deservingness perceptions and deservingness valuations.

Individual and Contextual Differences in Deservingness Opinions As displayed in Fig.  6.1, the CARIN model assumes that people’s deservingness opinions are influenced by their personal characteristics and by the characteristics of the broader context in which they live. Most obviously, these characteristics have an impact on the way in which people evaluate or ‘score’ target groups on the different CARIN criteria (i.e., deservingness perceptions). Additionally, personal and contextual characteristics also affect the importance people attach to deservingness criteria (i.e., deservingness valuations). For both perceptions and valuations, individual and/or contextual characteristics can either exert influence on deservingness in general, or, alternatively, on specific deservingness criteria. Taken together, this leads to four potential theoretical mechanisms through which individual and contextual characteristics may shape deservingness opinions: 1. Individual/contextual characteristics influence how people evaluate a target group in general, across all deservingness criteria (‘general perceptions mechanism’); 2. Individual/contextual characteristics influence how people evaluate a target group on specific deservingness criteria (‘specific perceptions mechanism’); 3. Individual/contextual characteristics influence the importance people attach to deservingness in general, across all deservingness criteria (‘general valuations mechanism’); 4. Individual/contextual characteristics influence the importance people attach to specific

T. Laenen and F. Roosma

deservingness criteria (‘specific valuations mechanism’). To make these theoretical mechanisms more tangible, we discuss a number of informative examples of how different individual and contextual characteristics may affect popular deservingness opinions.

Individual Level Differences At the individual level, to begin with, two main types of factors have been widely recognized in the literature: a ‘structural’ factor, referring to a person’s sociodemographic position within society (e.g., age, gender, income), and a ‘cultural’ factor, relating to his or her ideological orientations towards that society (e.g., egalitarianism, individualism, political ideology) (see e.g., Jeene et al., 2013; Laenen, 2020; Meuleman et al., 2020). We focus here on two specific individual characteristics; age (as a structural factor) and political left-right ideology (as a cultural factor). Let us first consider potential differences between older people and their younger counterparts. With regard to deservingness perceptions, it has, for one, often been argued that the older we grow (and the closer we get to our retirement), the more favourably we perceive pensioners altogether (van Oorschot, 2006). Driven by feelings of empathy, older people start to automatically evaluate this target group more positively on all deservingness criteria, with no distinctions being made anymore (‘general perceptions mechanism’). It is equally plausible, however, that older people score pensioners more favourably on some specific criteria, rather than in general. For example, older people are in a better position to understand the grievances of pensioners compared to their younger counterparts, and thus score them more positively on the specific criterion of identity (‘specific perceptions mechanism’). With regard to deservingness valuations, it has previously been shown that older people are more conditional in their solidarity with oth-

6  Who Should Get What and Why? Insights from Welfare Deservingness Theory

ers, suggesting that they tend to put greater emphasis on issues of deservingness in general (‘general valuations mechanism’) (van Oorschot, 2006). At the same time, however, it seems plausible that older people prioritize some specific criteria over others. For example, they are likely to stress the criterion of reciprocity more strongly, because they feel they have contributed more to society during their lifetime than their younger counterparts have (‘specific valuations mechanism’) (Jeene et al., 2013). For political (left-right) ideology, similar mechanisms are at play. To left-wingers, the whole concept of deservingness seems less important when they form welfare opinions, because they have a strong ideological allegiance to the welfare state and believe social provisions should be widely available and easily accessible for people (Jeene et  al., 2013; van Oorschot, 2000). To right-wingers, by contrast, questions of deservingness prove to be much more relevant to distinguish deserving from undeserving beneficiaries (‘general valuations mechanism’). An alternative hypothesis, however, is that deservingness matters as much to left-wingers as it does to right-wingers, but that they emphasize different criteria. It could well be, for example, that the criteria of identity (‘Are you one of us?’) or control (‘Are you responsible for your situation?’) are most important to people who see themselves as politically right-wing, but that the criterion of need (‘How needy are you?’) is most fundamental to people who affiliate as politically left-wing (‘specific valuations mechanism’). In a similar vein, opposing hypotheses can be formulated regarding deservingness perceptions. On the one hand, left-wingers’ loyalty to the welfare state project could make them more positive about different policy target groups in general, across all deservingness criteria (‘general perceptions mechanism’). Most empirical research indeed seems to conclude that politically left-leaning individuals perceive the poor and unemployed more positively compared to their right-wing counterparts (e.g., Larsen, 2006). However, it should be noted that much of this research

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focuses exclusively on the perceived causes of poverty and unemployment, which are closely related to the criterion of control. From these studies, we know that left-wingers are more likely to see structural forces as the primary reason for poverty and unemployment, while right-­ wingers attribute this more often to a lack of effort on the part of individuals. These results indicate that political ideology does not determine perceptions of deservingness in general, but rather influences perceptions regarding specific deservingness criteria (‘specific perceptions mechanism’).

Contextual Level Differences As mentioned above, deservingness opinions are not only influenced by characteristics of the individual, but also by characteristics of the context. Three general and interrelated types of context have been recognized in the literature: (1) the social-structural context, (2) the cultural-political context and (3) the institutional-policy context (Jeene et al., 2014; van Oorschot & Meuleman, 2014). While the first mainly relates to economic and demographic characteristics, the second type of context refers to a broad and diverse set of cultural and political factors, including, to name but a few, a society’s religious heritage, its shared values and norms, and its political landscape. The third type of context encompasses different public policies and institutions, especially those of the welfare state. Discussing the influence of the three different types of context on deservingness opinions is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter (see Laenen, 2020 for a more detailed discussion). For the sake of brevity, we only discuss the role played by the institutional-policy context, with a clear focus on welfare state policies. According to the policy feedback literature, existing welfare policies are an important driving force of people’s welfare attitudes, including their deservingness opinions (van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). Depending on the type of deserv-

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ingness opinion, however, different policy feedback mechanisms are at play (Laenen, 2020). On the one hand, policy feedback may work through deservingness perceptions, whereby policy design influences how a target group is evaluated or ‘scored’ on different deservingness criteria. On the other hand, policy feedback may operate through deservingness valuations. In that case, policy design affects which criteria of deservingness people attach importance to. To illustrate how this might work, we zoom in on the policy design characteristic that has featured most prominently in previous work: the universality/ selectivity of welfare benefits. Many scholars have argued that highly selective welfare schemes which are for instance only available to poor people through means testing, foster the stereotypical image that welfare claimants are a ‘different kind of people’, characterized by a deeply rooted unwillingness to contribute meaningfully to society (Larsen, 2006). Universal schemes, which are accessible to all on the basis of citizenship or residency regardless of actual financial needs, are claimed to be much less divisive, and therefore generate less stigmatizing attitudes. These are clear examples of what we have called ‘general perceptions mechanisms’, in which the institutional design of welfare policies influences how target groups are generally evaluated in terms of their deservingness. There are, however, plenty of examples in which policy design affects popular perceptions related to specific deservingness criteria. Relevant examples of such a ‘specific perception mechanism’ include the positive impact a higher degree of means-testing may have on popular perceptions of need, as means testing tends to raise awareness that welfare recipients are actually living in poverty (Laenen, 2020) or the impact insurance-based provisions may have on perceptions of reciprocity, the idea that you may benefit only if you contribute as well (Wendt et  al., 2011). This stands in stark contrast with universal provisions, which also benefit higher-income categories that are not seen as in need of support or non-workers who have not paid social security contributions.

In a similar vein, it has been argued that different types of welfare provision trigger different deservingness logics emphasizing different criteria (Laenen, 2018). When people decide who should get what from a selective, means-tested scheme, for example, the criterion of need is claimed to play a pivotal role. In the case of contributory social insurance, by contrast, the criterion of reciprocity is likely to play a more important part in determining perceived deservingness. The crux of the matter here is that citizens are expected to echo the specific deservingness criteria that are embedded most strongly in the programmatic structure of different welfare provisions (‘specific valuations mechanism’). Others argue, however, that policy design may also determine the importance people attach to deservingness in general. One of the most frequently made claims in this regard holds that highly selective welfare provisions make deservingness discussions more prevalent and salient, precisely because they single out poor people as the beneficiaries (Larsen, 2006). The broad coverage in the universal approach to welfare, by contrast, is said to downplay the overall importance of deservingness considerations (‘general valuations mechanism’).

Conclusion This chapter focused on the ‘who should get what and why’ question that is omnipresent in ongoing debates about solidarity and social justice in the welfare state. It does so from a citizen’s perspective, by providing a thick description of the welfare deservingness model, one of the most influential theoretical frameworks in the welfare attitudes literature. After clarifying the different nuts and bolts of the model, we explored individual and contextual differences in popular opinions of welfare deservingness. To conclude, we want to emphasize that the usefulness of the deservingness framework presented in this chapter is not confined to the specific case of public opinion about the welfare state, but that it can be (and already is) applied to a broader array of

6  Who Should Get What and Why? Insights from Welfare Deservingness Theory

research topics, in a diverse set of academic fields. Insights from the deservingness model have for example recently been used to understand, to name but a few things, popular attitudes towards migrant settlement (De Coninck et  al., 2021), discretionary decisions made by policy administrators (De Wilde, 2017), and court rulings regarding migrants’ access to social assistance in the Court of Justice of the European Union (Davies, 2018). This comes to show that the scope and reach of deservingness theory is much broader than the social policy domain. Important to note, however, is that in most cases this will not be a simple story of copy and paste. Instead, deservingness theory needs to be translated and adapted to the specificities of the new research topic and research field it is being applied to. This implies that (some of) the CARIN criteria might well have a different meaning in different fields, or that other criteria of deservingness are recognized, leading to acronyms other than CARIN. We hope that this chapter serves as a starting point and source of inspiration for students and researchers to sail the deservingness model into new, unknown waters.

Glossary CARIN criteria: five criteria of deservingness underlying popular welfare preferences: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need. The higher a target group’s score on the five criteria, the higher the perceived deservingness of this target group. Deservingness perceptions: people’s evaluations of a target group’s deservingness, depending on how they score the target group on the five deservingness criteria (CARIN criteria). Deservingness valuations: the importance people attach to the different deservingness criteria (CARIN criteria). The stronger the valuation of a criteria, the more important this criteria becomes in the overall assessment of a target group’s deservingness.

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Welfare attitudes: people’s opinions towards different dimensions of the welfare state, such as the goals of the welfare state, the redistributive design of welfare provision, the range of welfare policies, the efficiency and effectiveness and the outcomes of the welfare state. Welfare deservingness: the degree to which specific policy target groups (such as the elderly, the sick and the unemployed) are considered worthy of social benefits and services (such as old-age pensions, healthcare and unemployment benefits) by the general public. Comprehension Questions

1. What is the difference between deservingness perceptions and deservingness valuations? Can you give an example of each? 2. Why is it important to make a distinction between the deservingness component and the support component of the welfare deservingness model? 3. In what different ways can individual and contextual circumstances influence the deservingness of a target group? Provide an example for each mechanism. Discussion Question

There are domains, other than social policy, in which the deservingness of individuals is evaluated. Consider for instance the domains of migration, humanitarian aid and criminal justice. How could the welfare deservingness model and/or the deservingness criteria be applied to these domains?

References Aarøe, L., & Petersen, M. B. (2014). Crowding out culture: Scandinavians and Americans agree on social welfare in the face of deservingness cues. The Journal of Politics, 76(3), 684–697. Buss, C. (2019). Public opinion towards targeted labour market policies: A vignette study on the perceived deservingness of the unemployed. Journal of European Social Policy, 29(2), 228–240.

74 Cook, F. (1979). Who should be helped? Public support for social services. Sage. Davies, G. (2018). Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deservingness of litigants as an element in Court of Justice citizenship adjudication. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(10), 1442–1460. De Coninck, D., Swicegood, G., & Matthijs, K. (2021). Does the concept of deservingness apply to migrant settlement? In T.  Laenen, B.  Meuleman, A.  Otto, F. Roosma, & W. Van Lancker (Eds.), Leading social policy analysis from the front. Essays in honour of Wim van Oorschot (pp. 263–274). Centre for Sociological Research, KU Leuven. De Wilde, M. (2017). Deservingness in social assistance administrative practice: A factorial survey approach. In W. van Oorschot, F.  Roosma, B.  Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness (pp. 225– 240). Edward Elgar Publishing. Gielens, E., Roosma, F., & Achterberg, P. (2019). Deservingness in the eye of the beholder: A vignette study on the moderating role of cultural profiles in supporting activation policies. International Journal of Social Welfare, 24(4), 442–453. Gilens, M. (1999). Why Americans hate welfare: Race, media and the politics of anti-poverty policy. The University of Chicago Press. Gollust, S. E., & Lynch, J. (2011). Who deserves health care? The effects of causal attributions and group cues on public attitudes about responsibility for health care costs. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 36(6), 1061–1095. Heuer, J., & Zimmermann, K. (2020). Unravelling deservingness: Which criteria do people use to judge the relative deservingness of welfare target groups? A vignette-based focus group study. Journal of European Social Policy, 30(4), 389–403. Jeene, M. (2015). Who should get what and why, under which conditions? Descriptions and explanations of public deservingness opinions. Ridderprint. Jeene, M., van Oorschot, W., & Uunk, W. (2013). Popular criteria for the welfare deservingness of disability pensioners: The influence of structural and cultural factors. Social Indicators Research, 110(3), 1103–1117. Jeene, M., van Oorschot, W., & Uunk, W. (2014). The dynamics of welfare opinions in changing economic, institutional and political contexts: An empirical analysis of Dutch deservingness opinions, 1975–2006. Social Indicators Research, 115(2), 731–749. Jensen, C., & Petersen, M. B. (2017). The deservingness heuristic and the politics of health care. American Journal of Political Science, 61(1), 68–83. Katz, M. (1989). The undeserving poor: From the war on poverty to the war on welfare. Pantheon Books. Kootstra, A. (2017). Us versus them: Examining the perceived deservingness of minority groups in the British welfare state using a survey experiment. In W. van Oorschot, F.  Roosma, B.  Meuleman, & T.  Reeskens

T. Laenen and F. Roosma (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness (pp.  263–280). Edward Elgar Publishing. Laenen, T. (2018). Do institutions matter? The interplay between income benefit design, popular perceptions, and the social legitimacy of targeted welfare. Journal of European Social Policy, 28(1), 4–17. Laenen, T. (2020). Welfare deservingness and welfare policy. Popular deservingness opinions and their interaction with welfare state policies. Edward Elgar Publishing. Laenen, T., & Meuleman, B. (2017). A universal rank order of deservingness? Geographical, temporal and social-structural comparisons. In W. van Oorschot, F. Roosma, B. Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness. Edward Elgar Publishing. Laenen, T., & Meuleman, B. (2019). Public support for the social rights and social obligations of the unemployed: Two sides of the same coin? International Journal of Social Welfare, 28(4), 454–467. Larsen, C.  A. (2006). The institutional logic of welfare attitudes. How welfare regimes influence public support. Ashgate Publishing. Larsen, C. A. (2008). The political logic of labour market reforms and popular images of target groups. Journal of European Social Policy, 18(1), 50–63. Meuleman, B., Roosma, F., & Abts, K. (2020). Welfare deservingness opinions from heuristic to measurable concept: The CARIN deservingness principles scale. Social Science Research, 85, 1–15. Meuleman, B., Roosma, F., & van Oorschot, W. (2017). Evaluating the fruitfulness of deservingness theory. In W. van Oorschot, F.  Roosma, B.  Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness (pp. 335– 351). Edward Elgar Publishing. Petersen, M.  B. (2012). Social welfare as small-scale help: Evolutionary psychology and the deservingness heuristic. American Journal of Political Science, 56(1), 1–16. Roosma, F., & Jeene, M. (2017). The deservingness logic applied to public opinions concerning work obligations for benefit claimants. In W. van Oorschot, F. Roosma, B. Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness (pp.  189–205). Edward Elgar Publishing. van Oorschot, W. (2000). Who should get what, and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public. Policy & Politics, 28(1), 33–48. van Oorschot, W. (2006). Making the difference in social Europe: Deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states. Journal of European Social Policy, 16(1), 23–42. van Oorschot, W., & Meuleman, B. (2014). Popular deservingness of the unemployed in the context of welfare state policies, economic conditions and cul-

6  Who Should Get What and Why? Insights from Welfare Deservingness Theory tural climate. In S. Kumlin & I. Stadelmann- Steffen (Eds.), How welfare states shape the democratic public. Policy feedback, participation, voting, and attitudes (pp. 245–267). Edward Elgar Publishing. van Oorschot, W., & Roosma, F. (2017). The social legitimacy of targeted welfare and welfare deservingness. In W. van Oorschot, F.  Roosma, B.  Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted

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welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness (pp. 3–33). Edward Elgar Publishing. Wendt, C., Mischke, M., & Pfeifer, M. (2011). Welfare states and public opinion. Perceptions of healthcare systems, family policy and benefits for the unemployed and poor in Europe. Edward Elgar Publishing. Will, J.  A. (1993). The dimensions of poverty: Public perceptions of the deserving poor. Social Science Research, 22(3), 312–332.

Section III An Empirical Overview of Social Inequalities Across Societal Fault Lines

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Gender Stereotypes: What Are They and How Do They Relate to Social Inequality? Loes Meeussen, Aster Van Rossum, Colette Van Laar, and Belle Derks

Introduction An important dividing line in society is gender. We continuously classify people into male and female, and these categories are filled with ideas about what it means to be a man or a woman. Such ideas constitute our gender stereotypes. Generally, there is a stereotype that men are and should be more competent (and broadly speaking also more rational, assertive, and independent) than women; and that women are and should be warmer (and broadly speaking also more caring, sensitive, and supportive) than men (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; cf. stereotype-content model, see Chap. 4, this volume). Moreover, stereotypes indicate that men and women should not be what is stereotypical for the opposite gender: e.g., Men should not be too caring and women not too assertive. Gender stereotypes warrant the idea that men and women are suited for different roles in society: Men are seen as more fitting for roles requiring strength and leadership, and women for roles requiring underL. Meeussen (*) University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Research Foundation Flanders, Brussels, Belgium Thomas More, Mechelen, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] A. Van Rossum • C. Van Laar University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium B. Derks Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

standing and empathy (Eagly & Wood, 2012). This chapter looks at where these gender stereotypes come from, how they are socially reinforced, and what this means for social inequality.

 here Do Gender Stereotypes W Come From and How Are They Reinforced? Social role theory explains how we came to think of men and women in stereotypical terms (Eagly & Wood, 2012). According to this theory, gender roles (i.e., what we expect of men and women in society) have historical origins in some physical differences between men and women, i.e., men are generally taller and stronger than women, while women give birth and breastfeed. These differences led men in early societies to take up more roles requiring physical work and women to take up more caring roles. Over time, this early gender segregation into separate social roles reinforced itself beyond biological differences because societies organised themselves to prepare men and women for these gendered social roles through a socialisation of corresponding skills and behaviours. People learn gender stereotypes early in life. For instance, from age three onwards, children describe girls as nice and liking dolls, and boys as active and rough (Martin & Ruble, 2010). Gender roles are also learned and internalised through socialisation processes such as gender-specific play (e.g., com-

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_7

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petitive games for boys), gendered task assignment by caretakers (e.g., girls participating in housework), and interactions and comparisons with same-sex peers (Edwards et al., 2004). Such processes may lead men and women to make gendered choices later in life, e.g., investing more in their career or family (Brown & Diekman, 2010). Stereotypes are reinforced because people generally adhere to gender roles; they want to fit in with their gender group. Adhering to roles provides them a sense of identity and belonging (see SIT; Chap. 2, this volume), which is important for health and wellbeing (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Yet, gender stereotypes are also socially regulated. Following gendered expectations is typically rewarded. For instance, male CEOs who talk a lot during work interactions, which signals power, received higher leadership ratings than male CEOs who spoke less (Brescoll, 2011). Conversely, deviating from gender stereotypes results in backlash, i.e., “social and economic sanctions for counter-stereotypical behavior” (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004, p. 157). For example, direct and assertive female job applicants were rated as less likable and hireable than direct and assertive male applicants (Rudman et al., 2012). Similarly, men displaying modesty during a job interview were perceived as weak and were disliked more than equally modest women (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). Gender stereotypes are reinforced and maintained through these processes of socialisation, rewards, and backlash.

 ender Stereotypes and Social G Inequality Gender stereotypes foster social inequality because they have consequences for the ways men and women are treated and for the choices they have in life (see system justification theory; Chap. 4, this volume). Here, we outline how gender stereotypes relate to social inequalities in two major life domains: paid work and care roles.

Women in Paid Work Despite significant societal changes in recent decades, women remain disadvantaged in paid

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work. In Europe, 67% of women are currently employed compared to 79% of men (European Commission, 2018). Working women also earn 16% less per hour than men (European Parliament, 2020) and remain underrepresented in high-status positions (Barreto et  al., 2009). Consequently, women have less influence in decision-making processes and are less economically independent than men, putting them at greater risk of poverty (European Union, 2016). Gender stereotypes indicating women are not as competent as men restrict women’s opportunities in paid work (Ellemers, 2014; Heilman, 2012). As competence is valued in work roles, there is less overlap between the qualities required at work and stereotypical ideas of women compared to men (Lyness & Heilman, 2006). This perceived lack of fit between women and work roles affects women’s career opportunities in several ways. Firstly, women encounter biased job evaluations as people expect them to perform worse than men, be less ambitious, or less qualified as a leader. Women’s competence and performance is generally evaluated as lower than men’s (Joshi et al., 2015). For example, experimental studies investigate the role of gender bias using the same performance or resumé, alternating male and female names, showing that women were evaluated as less competent and given a lower salary compared to men (Begeny et al., 2020). Secondly, stereotypes may undermine women’s actual performance. Experiences of discrimination negatively affect women’s performance and well-being at work (Dardenne et  al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2014). Even in the absence of other people, negative stereotypes about women’s competence may trigger anxiety, self-doubt, and distraction, resulting in decreased performance and lower career aspirations (Schmader et al., 2008). Thirdly, women who are successful at work may face backlash for violating gender stereotypes (e.g., jeopardizing men’s status position; Chap. 2, this volume) and face more incivility from colleagues (Gabriel et  al., 2017). Similarly, female politicians are rated as less moral and competent, and receive fewer votes when they (are perceived to) seek power, unlike male p­ oliticians showing the same behaviour (Brescoll & Okimoto, 2010).

7  Gender Stereotypes: What Are They and How Do They Relate to Social Inequality?

Men in Care Roles Men face disadvantages and show lower participation in care roles such as parenting or caretaking of other family members (Croft et al., 2015). In 2016, US American fathers spent 10 hours per week on childcare tasks compared to mothers’ 14 hours (PEW Research Center, 2019). This is an important inequality, as men’s higher involvement in care roles improves their own as well as their partners’ well-being and reduces behavioural problems in their children (Meeussen et al., 2020). The prevalent stereotype about men is that they are less warm and less capable caretakers than women. In 2016, 53% of US Americans believed mothers do a better job than fathers caring for a baby (PEW Research Center, 2019). This is also reflected in and reinforced by the childcare time given to men: Some mothers show reluctance to hand over childcare responsibilities to fathers, a behaviour known as ‘maternal gatekeeping’ (Allen & Hawkins, 1999). Similarly in governmental and organisational policies, women are consistently allocated more leave to care for their children than men across the world (e.g., European Parliament, 2015). Moreover, men may face backlash and their masculinity may be questioned (‘are you a real man?’) when they engage in stereotypically feminine roles, which may prevent them from pursuing care roles (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). One study showed that while men and women similarly attributed high importance to work flexibility and work-life balance, men were more reluctant to seek such flexibility because they feared being seen as less masculine (Vandello & Bosson, 2013). In sum, gender stereotypes restrict women’s opportunities in paid work and men’s uptake of care roles, because they entail negative expectations about women’s competence and men’s warmth.

Women in Care Roles Given dominant gender stereotypes, women are unlikely to be frowned upon for taking up care roles. Yet, this positive expectation of women’s warmth can be costly. A societal dis-

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course of ‘intensive mothering’ holds women to standards of perfect parenting, ensuring children’s’ every need is met (Hays, 1996). This ideal that women should prioritise motherhood before all other roles has several negative effects. Pressure to be a perfect mother induces guilt, stress, and self-­doubt, and puts mothers at risk of depression and parental burnout (Henderson et al., 2016; Meeussen & Van Laar, 2018). Intensive mothering norms also restrict women’s career investments and thus reinforce labour market inequalities (Meeussen & Van Laar, 2018). Beyond parenting, emphasis on women’s warmth can maintain gender inequalities, evidenced by research on benevolent sexism, which emphasizes and celebrates women’s warmth in a patronizing manner (Glick & Fiske, 2011). Despite its positive tone, benevolent sexism relates to sexual harassment, domestic violence legitimation, and national gender inequality (Glick & Fiske, 2011). Moreover, women confronted with benevolent sexism perform worse on work tasks than women confronted with more overt sexism, because its subtle character makes it harder to dismiss (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Dardenne et al., 2007).

Men in Paid Work Similar to women in care roles, men taking up work roles will not commonly face devaluation. Still, positive stereotypes about men’s high competence may also create very high standards to live up to. ‘Work devotion norms’ prescribe the ideal worker to work full-time for their entire career, with work as the central focus of their life (Williams et al., 2013). Men are expected more than women to live up to these standards, as prioritising work is part of male stereotyping, and men are still held primarily responsible for ­financially providing for their family (Haines & Stroessner, 2019). When men deviate from work-­ oriented expectations, they face social penalties such as being seen as less masculine, and receive lower job evaluations (Butler & Skattebo, 2004; Rudman & Mescher, 2013). As such, high expec-

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tations for men at work can also restrict men in investing in care roles. In short, the positive stereotypes about women’s warmth and men’s competence may also feed into gender inequalities.

Promoting Gender Equality Given the inequalities resulting from gender stereotypes, the question arises: what can be done to reduce such inequalities? Several approaches can be taken (see Table 7.1). In relation to negative stereotypes, some initiatives focus on the individuals facing these stereotypes, aiming to improve their skills, confidence or interest in the gender a-­stereotypical domain. Examples include interventions aimed at enhancing women’s confidence to work in stereotypically male fields or increasing their leadership motivation and knowledge (Casad et  al., 2018; Knipfer et al., 2017). Moreover, women’s interest in such jobs may be stimulated by emphasising warmth aspects of the job (Diekman et al., 2010) and by using role models to inspire and increase perceived attainability (Morgenroth et  al., 2015). Similarly, for men in care roles,

training programs aim to improve men’s caregiving confidence and skills (Olshansky, 2006). Secondly, social support from one’s own and/or the other gender group is an important form of solidarity (see Chap. 3, this volume) that can help people in contexts where they may experience devaluation. For instance, at work, women may be supported in female support networks or mentoring programs (Dennehy & Dasgupta, 2017) and by men who confront sexism (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). Similarly, men may receive support from other men to engage in caretaking roles, for instance with organised support networks for fathers. Women may also support men in caregiving, as women seek caring qualities in a future partner and exhibit greater life satisfaction and lower conflict between work and family the more their partner is family-oriented (Meeussen et al., 2019). Improving individuals’ interest, skills or confidence and providing social support are means to help people better cope with negative stereotypes rather than changing these stereotypes. Moreover, such a focus on ‘fixing’ men and women is problematic as it places the cause and the responsibility for change in the stereotyped group rather than in the socio-cultural factors maintaining these stereotypes (Van Laar et  al., 2019).

Table 7.1  Gender stereotypes, related inequalities, and how to reduce these Domain Women in paid work

Men in care roles

Stereotype Negative: women are not and should not be competent

Social inequality - Discrimination and bias against women - Underrepresentation of women - Underperformance of women - Backlash against competent women Negative: Men are - Underrepresentation of men not and should not - Men miss out on advantages of caregiving be warm - Backlash against warm men

Women in care roles

Positive: Women are and should be warm

Men in paid work

Positive: Men are and should be competent

Overall

How to promote gender equality - Inclusive organisational climates and practices that reduce the potential impact of bias - Increase interest, skills, and confidence by reframing roles, through training and role models - Solidarity and mentoring - Affirmation of men in care roles - Longer (compensated) paternal leave - Alter organisational climate and - Intensive mothering: Overly high stimulate work-family balance expectations of mothers relate to guilt, - Parental leave policies for both stress and depression parents - Backlash against working mothers - Training to recognise and cope with - Benevolent sexism - Work devotion: overly high expectations overly high standards - Setting ‘good-enough’ standards of workers as part of masculinity (e.g., in media and healthcare) - Backlash against men who do not - Solidarity prioritize work - Changing social roles can change gender stereotypes - Altered socialisation: broad choices and examples, gender-neutral education, discussing stereotypes

7  Gender Stereotypes: What Are They and How Do They Relate to Social Inequality?

Therefore, a more effective solution is reducing structural inequalities for women in paid work and men in care roles. For instance, inclusive organisational climates, in which people feel they and their gender group are valued, are beneficial for women’s organisational commitment and performance (Gonzalez & Denisi, 2009). Moreover, organisational practices can be changed to reduce the impact of (implicit) bias. For instance, by explicitly writing out selection and promotion criteria in order of importance before reviewing candidates, gender (or other) bias is less likely to play a role when deciding between candidates (see https://biasinterrupters.org). An inclusive climate for men in caregiving may entail valuing and affirming them, partners refraining from maternal gatekeeping, and a condemnation of mocking men’s caregiving skills. Structurally, governments and organisations can increase paternal leave, ideally with sufficient income replacement (O’Brien, 2009). Stimulating work-­ family policies among men also benefits women, as mothers experience less work-family guilt in organisations in which fathers also use such policies (Aarntzen et al., 2020). Similarly, actions can be taken to increase gender inequality in the face of positive stereotypes. Firstly, interventions can help people recognise overly high standards and their impact on their (partners’) decisions and teach ways to cope with these standards. For instance, people can be trained to look at their work and family roles with self-compassion, set good-enough standards, and focus on what goes well rather than perfect. Second, solidarity from others can help people cope with high expectations. This can be practical support from others, such as partners, grandparents, or others, making childcare a shared responsibility rather than primarily mothers’ responsibility. To this end, programs teaching couples to discuss the division of domestic tasks can be helpful (Cowdery & Knudson-Martin, 2005). Solidarity can also be emotional support, with people sharing difficulties and signalling that struggles are common and ok (as opposed to perfect images on social media maintaining high standards; César et  al., 2018). At work, support can be colleagues being mindful of care responsibilities when planning meetings and deadlines, or taking over tasks or

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shifts when work becomes too much. Colleagues and managers can also break with work devotion norms by sharing information about their responsibilities and interests outside of work. Of course, more effective than stimulating men and women to manage overly high expectations would be to alter these expectations. To decrease intensive mothering norms, mass media could reduce images of perfect mothers and stories of ‘bad’ mothers (Douglas & Michaels, 2004) and health workers could communicate information and advice in a way that is not experienced as pressure towards perfection (Jackson & Mannix, 2004). Longer, well-paid paternal leave may combat intensive mothering norms, as this signals both parents are expected to care for children. In paid work, organisations can signal employees need not be solely devoted to work, for instance by scheduling meetings that do not interfere with dropping off or picking up children from school, work-life balance conversations between managers and employees, and encouraging use of work-family flexibility policies (Fagan & Walthery, 2011). Moreover, managers can be visible role models in seeking a healthy work-family balance themselves (Hammer et al., 2011).

 hanging Gender Stereotypes C in Future Generations The above-mentioned ways of decreasing gender inequalities may improve opportunities for women in paid work and men in care roles, and they may lower expectations for women in care roles and men in paid work. As such, they provide more leeway to pursue one’s interests without facing discrimination or devaluation when these interests deviate from stereotypical gender roles. When more people take up non-­ stereotypical roles, gender stereotypes may also begin to change (Eagly & Wood, 2012). Changing contemporary gender roles will also influence the aspirations and choices of future generations. For instance, daughters of more involved fathers have less stereotypical aspirations (Croft et  al., 2014). Similarly, describing traditionally male occupations in less stereotypical ways increases girls’ interest in such jobs

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(Vervecken et al., 2013). Young children can also be socialised in less gender-stereotypical ways, allowing them to explore different interests. This can be done by providing children a wide variety of choices and role models, using gender-neutral schooling (e.g., avoiding dividing classrooms into boys and girls or references to tasks or toys being female or male; Shutts et al., 2017), and/or programs in which gender stereotypes are explicitly discussed and questioned (Barker et al., 2012).

Conclusion This chapter evidenced how gender stereotypes reinforce inequalities: they restrict women’s career opportunities and men’s caregiving opportunities, and they provide overly high standards for women in care and men in paid work. To promote gender equality, people can be trained and supported to cope with stereotypes, and more crucially, societal and organisational changes can reduce (the impact of) gender stereotypes.

Glossary Backlash: Social and economic sanctions for counter-stereotypical behaviour. Benevolent sexism: Attitudes toward women typically emphasising their warmth and morality that have a subjectively positive tone, yet are sexist as they are based on a stereotypical, patronising view of women. Gender roles: Shared societal expectations about the behaviour and occupations of men and women on the basis of their gender. Gender stereotypes: Psychological representations of the characteristics of men and women. Intensive mothering: Parenting ideology stating that mothers are naturally better caregivers than fathers and should invest their time and energy primarily in being a perfect parent, putting the child’s needs above their own. Social role theory: Social-psychological theory arguing that gender stereotypes are the result of the perception that men and women possess different traits, which are produced by men and women occupying distinct social roles in society. In turn, these roles reinforce gender stereotypes.

Work devotion norms: Difficult to achieve workplace standards that result from the idea that one’s job should be the central focus of one’s life, demanding and deserving great loyalty and commitment. Comprehension Questions

1. What are the general stereotypes about men and women and how does social role theory explain the emergence of these gender stereotypes? Through which processes are they maintained today? 2. How do negative and positive gender stereotypes foster social inequality for both women and men? Give examples. 3. In what ways can social inequality resulting from positive and negative stereotypes about men and women be reduced? Discussion Questions

1. Do gender stereotypes inevitably lead to social inequality? When do and when don’t they? Why?

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8

Gender Inequality: Perceptions of Fairness and Justice Mara A. Yerkes and Judy Rose

Introduction Significant gender inequality, i.e., inequality in the treatment of individuals (e.g., in the division of tasks or resources) based on their gender and the under-­appreciation of these tasks, exists in modern societies, particularly in relation to paid work, household work and care (Bianchi & Milkie, 2010; Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020; Yerkes, André, et al., 2020). This inequality is persistent and slow to change (England, 2010). A key barrier to reducing gender inequalities is the perception that inherently unequal or unjust situations are fair (Baxter, 2000; Thompson, 1991; Yerkes et  al., 2017). In this chapter, we take a social justice approach to understanding the persistent gender inequality in paid

Fragments of this chapter are taken from: Yerkes, M. A., B.  Martin, J.  Baxter, and J.  Rose. (2017). An unsettled bargain? Mothers? Perceptions of justice and fairness in paid work. Journal of Sociology 53(2): 476–491.

M. A. Yerkes (*) Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] J. Rose Griffith University, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

work, household work and care.1 We highlight research that shows why the gender inequality inherent in care and household work is often perceived to be fair and apply it to the domain of paid work. We focus on mothers’ perceptions of the fairness (and hence justice) of the flexibility of arrangements they commonly enter into upon returning to work following childbirth (Yerkes et al., 2017).

 ender Inequality in Housework, G Care Work, and Paid Employment Gender inequality is a persistent social problem across multiple domains. It is a problem that relates to historical ideals of men as primary earners and women (both with a without children) as secondary and/or less well-paid earners (Connell, 2005). More women participate in paid employment now than in previous decades, but women remain overrepresented in part-time work (O’Reilly & Fagan, 1998; Rose & Hewitt, 2019). Women spend more time caring for children (Craig & Mullan, 2011) and the elderly (Saraceno, 2008), and compared to men, have

We acknowledge that while we approach gender in binary terms – male and female – gender is dynamic and not limited to these two categories. 1 

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_8

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less leisure time (Craig & Mullan, 2013) and lower quality of leisure (Bittman & Wajcman, 2000; Yerkes, Roeters, & Baxter, 2020). Persistent gender inequality is also evident across multiple domains for men. Men typically work longer hours than women (Moen & Sweet, 2003), which can be a barrier to spending more time on care (Rehel, 2014). Men may even be implicitly or explicitly discouraged from taking on caregiving tasks (Miller, 2011; Rose et  al., 2015). Gender inequality in paid work is particularly persistent. This inequality becomes acutely evident around the birth of a child. Following the birth of a child, many women enter into flexibility arrangements that often have negative long-­ term effects on their careers (e.g., Abendroth et  al., 2014; Budig & England, 2001). These ­flexibility arrangements include things like parttime work (e.g., working less than 35  hours a week), flexible hours (e.g., flexibility in when you start or end work), or taking jobs that have fewer demands, particularly outside of regular employment hours (e.g., no evening work). This flexibility is seen to help (new) mothers combine work and care (Rose & Hewitt, 2019). Yet, flexibility arrangements like these are an important part of the explanation for women’s continued disadvantage in earnings (Bardasi & Gornick, 2008; Budig & Hodges, 2010) and lower occupational status (Dex et  al., 2008; Kauhanen & Nätti, 2015). They also are key to explaining other gender unequal career effects, such as slower career progression (e.g., not being promoted or moving up the career ladder more slowly), being assigned less interesting or less complex tasks at work, and fewer leadership and management opportunities (Wattis et  al., 2013; Williams et  al., 2013). In addition, by seeking increased flexibility in paid work, women ultimately take on arrangements that allow them to also take up the majority of housework and care responsibilities (Rose, 2017). One potential explanation for why mothers accept unequal flexibility arrangements, is because they accept the trade-off between gender inequality (evident in the effects on their career) and flexibility for combining paid work and family work, as fair.

M. A. Yerkes and J. Rose

 Social Justice Framework A for Understanding Gender Inequality As outlined in Chap. 4, a social justice framework addresses both distributive justice (i.e., who does what), as well as procedural justice (i.e., due consideration/fair process). An essential part of procedural justice is interactional justice (i.e., informal interactions; how one is treated). In line with many organizational scholars (including organizational sociologists), we applied a justice framework to women’s sense of fairness in paid work (Yerkes et al., 2017), viewing interactional justice as a separate component of a justice framework. Social justice frameworks have played a key role in explaining gender inequalities (e.g., Baxter, 2000; Fraser, 1994; Thompson, 1991). Moreover, the ways in which workers perceive justice (e.g., what is fair or unfair) is gendered and may differ for women compared to men. A seminal article drawing attention to the importance of gender in social justice frameworks as they apply to divisions of labour comes from American sociologist Linda Thompson (1991). Thompson starts from the premise that questions about gender inequality in the division of care and household work are inherently about distributive justice but critiqued previous work for paying insufficient attention to women’s perceptions of fairness. Thompson thus shifts thinking about gender inequalities towards why women view their situation as fair – even when the situation is unequal. She demonstrates the contested nature of justice (Chap. 4), showing how while we might value justice, that our perceptions of what is fair or unfair are based on gendered understandings, i.e., shaped by our experiences as men, women, non-binary gender, etc.

Gendered Understandings of Outcome Values, Comparison Referents, and Justifications Thompson (1991) shows that when we judge whether outcomes are fair or unfair, there first needs to be agreement on what outcomes are

8  Gender Inequality: Perceptions of Fairness and Justice

being compared. But agreement on what people value as an outcome is absent. For example, many gender scholars study the division of housework and care work focused solely on which tasks men and women do (e.g., vacuuming, doing the dishes) or the time they spend doing it (e.g., how many hours men or women spend on cleaning or childcare). Yet other outcome values may matter more. Thompson (1991) found that mothers place greater value on outcomes such as interpersonal relationships, such as fathers interacting with their children, than on the actual amount of time fathers spend on care tasks. Similarly, Baxter and Western (1998) have shown that women value men taking up ­non-­traditional tasks and roles in the home, i.e., helping with chores traditionally done by women such as preparing and cleaning up after meals, more than an equal division of labour. Applying Thompson’s framework to paid work, we investigate the extent to which women value flexibility upon return to work as an outcome more than gender equal outcomes related to career progression (Yerkes et  al., 2017). We will show that these outcome values differ depending on mothers’ employment situation. Less-educated mothers (without university degrees) who work in female-dominated occupations (e.g., administrative, sales or caring occupations) that are lower paid, can view themselves as having limited career possibilities. They tend to view paid work from a more practical perspective, valuing flexibility or other convenience aspects of employment, such as where their jobs are located. In other words, for some women, trade-­offs between gender unequal career outcomes and flexibility at work are often already built into their occupational trajectories (Hook, 2015). This situation differs from highly educated mothers, who often work in occupations with clear career opportunities and greater earnings capacity. They tend to value flexibility arrangements that help maintain these longerterm career prospects. They are therefore more ambivalent about making trade-offs necessary to achieve flexibility, or they view these trade-offs and loss of career prospects as unfair.

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The sense of fairness we experience also differs depending upon our comparison referents (Chap. 4, this volume): to what standards do we judge or with whom do we judge our situation? Or as Thompson (1991, p.  186) explains, “Outcome values define what people desire; comparison referents define what people deserve.” Thompson (1991) critiques the assumption that women rely on their partner for making judgments about what is fair. Her critique is well-­ founded, as research on social justice suggests our choice of comparison referents is both complex and gendered (Tyler et al., 1997), i.e., takes on different forms and meaning for men and women. Empirical research suggests that women more often make within-gender comparisons (i.e., comparing themselves with other women) than between-gender comparisons (i.e., comparing themselves with men), most generally, their partner. For example, Hochschild and Machung (1989) show that as women re-entered paid employment, they often attempted to ‘do it all’ – working a paid job while continuing to do the same amount of housework and care work. In judging their ability to manage the combined tasks of paid work, housework and care, they compared themselves to other women. Within-­ gender comparisons can also be made in relation to what husbands or partners do (or don’t do). For example, women may reason that the situation at home is fair because their husband/partner does more than their friend or sister’s husband/partner – or more than their own father did. Research on men’s perceptions of fairness is less common, but a psychological study comparing men and women’s perceptions of fairness in housework and income differences and their impact on relationship satisfaction suggests that men and women employ different standards of fairness in determining what is fair or unfair, with men potentially basing their perceptions on equity and women on equality (Gillespie et  al., 2019). Moreover, cross-national research suggests men distinctly respond to social policy contexts supporting gender equality; in countries with stronger policy support for gender equality, men are less likely to regard unequal contributions at home as fair (Öun, 2013).

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Differences in men and women’s work situation may explain variation in comparison referents. If women work in female-dominated jobs or organizations, with few men in jobs similar to their own, women may be more likely to make within-gender comparisons. For women working in male-dominated jobs or workplaces, the process of making comparisons is less straightforward. In such situations, women might make between-gender comparisons, comparing themselves to men in jobs similar to their own, or they may make comparisons within their networks of friends and family. We investigate these differences below. Lastly, the work of Thompson and other scholars applying a justice framework suggests men and women differ in the justifications they give for unequal distributions of housework, care and paid work. In some contexts, it might be easy to suggest that women do more housework and care work because they participate less in paid employment. This would be in line with the so-­ called time constraints theory. The time constraints theory posits that the more time men and women spend in paid employment, the less time they have to contribute to housework and care tasks (e.g., Bianchi et al., 2000). However, empirical evidence to support this theory is mixed. Where some studies, like those of Bianchi and colleagues confirm this theory, other studies (e.g., Craig & Mullan, 2011; Rose & Hewitt, 2019), demonstrate that even in households where women and men spend an equal amount of time on paid work, women spend more time on household and care tasks. Such unequal distributions can be justified as fair because the contributions of men and women in household work are justified in gendered ways, i.e., evaluated differently for men and women (Baxter, 2000). For example, Rose and colleagues (Rose et al., 2015) find that men justify smaller amounts of care work following childbirth by highlighting mother-specific roles such as breastfeeding (e.g., I’d do more, but I can’t, because when the baby cries, it’s crying for its (breastfeeding) mother). A father from the same study recounted how he helped to change the nappy before or after breastfeeding, as a way of taking part in newborn care (Rose et al., 2015).

M. A. Yerkes and J. Rose

In other words, men’s and women’s assessments of fairness (in this example, related to care) are seemingly based on biological differences, but often reflect gender norms and stereotypes as well, prescribing which roles men and women should and shouldn’t take on in society (Chap. 7, this volume). Building on gender inequality research stemming from a primarily distributive justice framework, a growing group of organizational sociologists considers the role of other justice principles, such as procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980) and/or interactional justice (Cropanzano et al., 2007; Major, 1993; see also Chap. 4, this volume). For mothers returning to work following childbirth, if flexibility arrangements are made without procedural justice, mothers may view these arrangements as unfair. Whether issues of procedural justice arise is likely dependent upon whether procedures for negotiating flexible work arrangements are established within the workplace, for example in formal organizational policies. In the absence of established procedures, procedural justice issues are more likely to arise. Interactional justice has been shown to matter for perceptions of fairness in the division of household work (Major, 1993) as well as perceptions of fairness in the work setting (e.g., Cropanzano et  al., 2007). Mothers’ perceptions of the fairness of flexibility arrangements entered into upon their return to work may depend on whether they feel they are treated respectfully, honestly and with dignity by managers and supervisors. In particular, if distributive norms are absent in the workplace, an interactional justice frame may be crucial, for example, whether mothers feel their concerns are seen to be legitimate and heard by employers. Managers and employers play a key role in the realization of work-family arrangements in the workplace (den Dulk et al., 2017). As such, mothers’ perceptions of fairness may depend on the extent to which managers and employers are sensitive to the challenges they encounter in attempting to combine paid work with care responsibilities outside of work, seeing these claims as legitimate (Daverth et al., 2015).

8  Gender Inequality: Perceptions of Fairness and Justice

 mpirical Example: Accepting E Unfair Arrangements at Work Between 2010 and 2011, we conducted in-depth interviews with 109 Australian mothers, with babies aged 11 to 15 months, about their time off from paid work, their return to work, and the division of work and care at home and in paid work. This diverse group included both first-time mothers (58%) and mothers who already had one or more children (42%). They ranged from 19 to 46 years of age, with 25% of mothers from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds and 15% Indigenous Australians. The majority of women (87%) were living in partnered (married or cohabiting) relationships. Three-fourths (75%) of mothers had returned to paid work with close to a third of mothers (29%) employed in precarious forms of employment (e.g., temporary, fixed-­term or casual jobs). Using the justice framework outlined above (Major, 1987; Thompson, 1991), we consider what mothers value upon return to work (outcome values), who they compare themselves with (the comparison referent), and which justice principles (distributive, process, interactional) they use when justifying these arrangements. We provide relevant quotes to illustrate mothers’ experiences (for a full discussion, see Yerkes et al., 2017).

 utcome Values: Flexibility upon O Return to Work We found what mothers value upon return to work to be gendered. For example, one mother shared how she valued the flexibility of her private company job as it allowed her to perform household or care tasks in between her paid work hours, such as looking after her sick child or grocery shopping. At the moment, I’m doing a couple of days in the office and a couple of days at home. [Company] are really supportive and they’re so flexible. I can duck out, especially if I’m here all day, duck out during my lunch break and go and do a grocery shop. (Mother 050)

However, this same outcome value (flexibility at work) was not expected of her husband’s job as a hotel manager.

91 He does [get carer’s leave] but […] he’s responsible; he’s got so much pressure on him. It’s not like he can just – you go on holidays and he’s on his BlackBerry […] If something happens at the hotel, he’s ultimately responsible and he’s got people he’s got to report to. (Mother 050)

Although this mother expressed some dissatisfaction with her husband’s job, she also seemed to accept that his lack of access to flexibility was fair due to his role and responsibilities. This mother’s flexibility (and the absence of it for her husband) aligns with typical gender norms valuing men’s employment over women’s, particularly in countries where part-time employment is common among mothers. Flexibility is valued as an outcome as it allows mothers to manage their paid work and care responsibilities. Thus, mothers’ perceptions of fairness were closely tied to gender-specific expectations around flexibility and gender roles, which led some women to seek work where flexibility is widely available more secure, and formalized (e.g., in organizational policies). This generally meant women sought employment in public sector, rather than private sector organisations: I purposely chose government work so that I would have that flexibility…. If I need to leave, if he’s sick, I can just go. There’s never any question about that. (Mother 004)

Comparison Referents We found that mothers most often compared themselves to other women in the workplace to determine whether their flexibility arrangements were fair. One mother spoke about how she did not expect her workplace to pay for her maternity leave, explaining that this was different from what many other women might expect (and also went against policies in place providing paid leave): I never expected my firm to pay for me to have a child. I know women all think differently, but I thought it was my decision to have a child and I didn’t expect them to pay, so I wasn’t disappointed that I didn’t have [paid] maternity leave. (Mother 046)

Women in workplaces expected to get the same conditions as other mothers, irrespective of the

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kind of job they held. Thus, women compared their working conditions against those of other mothers, not fathers or other men in the workplace. Women reported their managers also made within-gender comparisons. For example, one mother in a workplace where there were several others who became pregnant, clearly thought it was inappropriate that her female manager was resisting her request for flexibility, based on the within-gender comparison her manager made: I asked for unpaid leave and I was met with a little bit of resistance […] Her comment to me was: “Well, I did my master’s with my two-year-old on my knee and I was in the first trimester” […] I remember thinking, “Well that’s not fair that you had to do that; no one else should have to do that. (Mother 029)

For women working in male-dominated workplaces, making within-gender comparisons was not possible. The absence of similar comparison referents led mothers to expect more of themselves in the workplace: At that time, working part-time, especially in the investment banking industry even in HR, was unheard of, and if people worked part-time it would typically be four days, three minimum. […] I sort of felt like I had to make inroads on my days off so I could hit the ground running […] that initial period I wanted to prove myself. I wanted to […] have a bit of an impact […] so I went the extra mile. (Mother 032)

Justifications from a Justice Perspective Mothers’ justifications for accepting flexibility arrangements that disadvantaged them in their career varied, dependent upon education level and occupation. Distributive justice principles were highlighted by the interviews with many mothers, who assessed the fairness of their situation based on what they traded to have the flexibility they desired. Highly educated mothers in occupations with clear career trajectories were generally aware of the long-term consequences of working flexibly, and felt these consequences were a fair exchange. Despite accepting that some type of trade-off was inevitable, the

experiences of this same group of mothers highlights the uncertainty many of them face in practice. The terms of their flexible arrangements and the fairness of these arrangements were much less settled and clear, as highlighted by a mother in a position with a clear path for advancement. Upon returning to work, she accepted a part-time position which involved a loss of career prospects, accepting the same pay she had before she took leave: They wouldn’t let me go back to my Team Co-ordinator position, which was a bit of a shock to me. But […] my manager was good in that she managed to negotiate with our HR section to get me at least the same pay and sort of create a new position for me. (Mother, 031) When it came to procedural justice principles, thinking about formal procedures and due process, most of the women we interviewed suggested these principles were generally observed in their workplaces, and breaches of procedural justice in negotiating flexible arrangements were infrequent among mothers. Interactional justice, however, is a crucial aspect of return-to-work negotiations by mothers. For example, mothers expressed having ‘such an understanding employer’. Many mothers placed great importance on this form of justice, particularly in their experiences of negotiating time off from work to deal with urgent situations such as a sick child. One mother described such positive interactions with her supervisors: They’ve been really good. I think occasionally I’ve had to ring in sick to say I can’t come in because he’s got conjunctivitis or whatever, and I’ve said, “Do I need a doctor’s certificate?” They’ve said, “No that’s fine, don’t worry.” (Mother, 021) Another mother sought flexibility in her work hours and was pleased with the outcome of negotiations with her employer: They’ve been really good actually […] I asked if I could do […] eight till four which means then I can […] get home and be back by about a quarter to five and […] she said yes to that… so she’s very supportive and understanding. (Mother, 053) This empirical example from Australia highlights the multiple and varied ways in which gender shapes our perceptions of what is fair and unfair.

8  Gender Inequality: Perceptions of Fairness and Justice

While the quotes presented here might appear to be quite specific, they are illustrative of the experiences of a large and diverse sample of mothers returning to work and confirm findings about the gendered nature of perceptions of fairness in other domains, such as household and care work.

Conclusion There are clearly significant and persistent gender inequalities between men and women in relation to paid work, housework, and care. Applying a social justice framework to these inequalities can be useful to understand their tenacity. Using an empirical example of the perceived fairness of flexibility arrangements mothers enter into upon return to work, we highlighted multiple aspects of a social justice framework to be considered. First, outcome values may differ between men and women; individuals may have reason to value differing outcomes in life (Sen, 1992; Chap. 5, this volume). What people value is embedded in gendered notions of what we expect from mothers and fathers around the birth of a child (PfauEffinger, 2016). Second, our sense of fairness varies by the gendered ways in which we use comparison referents. Within-gender comparisons in highly feminized occupations can lead to a sense of fairness, whereas between-­gender comparisons or an absence of comparison referents in male-dominated occupations can lead to a sense of unfairness or uncertainty about fairness. Third, while distributive justice frameworks may be useful for explaining the persistence of inequality in care and household tasks, we find that interactional justice principles, alongside distributive justice principles, are crucial for explaining the persistence of inequality in paid work. A key limitation to this chapter is an absence of data on men’s perceptions of fairness of flexibility arrangements at work. As highlighted in the

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literature discussed here, research comparing men and women’s varying perceptions of fairness in the home is widely available, but research on perceptions of fairness in paid work is more limited. Despite these limitations, the study provides key insights into why women accept gender unequal situations as fair. In modern societies, where gender norms are slowly shifting in some countries, e.g., with new ideals of fathers who are more involved in care, research into perceptions of fairness for fathers entering into flexibility arrangements is also needed. Greater knowledge on how gendered perceptions of fairness function as a potential barrier to achieving greater gender equality in paid work is crucial. If women and men continue to view the unequal situations they are in as fair, then there is little reason to challenge the status quo, helping to maintain gender inequality in society.

Glossary Between-gender comparisons: comparisons between two or more genders. Flexibility arrangements: agreements between workers and employers regarding flexibility at work, such as part-time work, or flexibility in start or end times at work. Gender inequality: inequality in the treatment of individuals (e.g., in the division of tasks or resources) based on their gender and the under-appreciation of these tasks. Justifications: the reasoning behind a given outcome, generally related to the procedures leading up to that outcome. Perceptions of fairness: what we view as fair or unfair, which is based on gendered understandings of outcome values, comparison referents, and justifications for outcomes. Within-gender comparisons: comparisons within one’s own gender.

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Comprehension Questions

1. What are comparison referents and why do they matter in relation to mothers’ perceptions of justice? 2. What is the key outcome value for mothers when returning to work and how is this outcome gendered? 3. We show how mothers’ perceptions of fairness are embedded in gender-­specific expectations of flexibility. What is meant by this? Discussion Questions

1. Thinking about your own country, how might valued outcomes in paid work, housework, and care work be shifting in today’s society in relation to gender? Do you think men and women will continue to value these things in different ways? Why or why not? 2. Do gendered perceptions of fairness always lead to inequality? Why or why not?

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9

Modern Ageism and Age Stereotyping Rachel S. Rauvola, Nicholas P. Carruth, and Cort W. Rudolph

Introduction For much of recorded history, both aging and youth have been subjects of lament and envy: individuals may want to mature faster or avoid growing older, and this duality is a consistent source of age-related stereotyping, conflict, and strife. Age-based stereotypes, much like other forms of stereotypes, can often appear harmless; indeed, the topics of aging, being young, and growing old are frequent fodder for comedians and other popular culture media. Despite their commonality and long cultural tradition, ageism and age-based stereotyping (i.e., beliefs about the attributes and behaviours of members of certain age groups; Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996) are far from benign. Instead, they insert and normalize patterns of bias, discrimination, and prejudice that pervade our daily lives, culture, and institutions. Whole industries, consultancies, and media outlets devote themselves to work that reaffirms ageist narratives: from “anti-­aging” beauty products and plastic surgery procedures to “generation”-based management books and periodicals, the manifestations of age-based stereoR. S. Rauvola (*) • N. P. Carruth DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected] C. W. Rudolph Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO, USA

typing are both wide-ranging and normalized (Gullette, 2004; Parry & Urwin, 2011; Rudolph et al., 2018). This is yet more apparent when considering the form that ageism has taken in recent years: generationalism (Rauvola et  al., 2019). Defined as “the belief that all members of a given generation possess characteristics specific to that generation, especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another generation” (Rauvola et al., 2019, p. 2), generationalism is a form of modern ageism. In other words, it is analogous to modern racism (e.g., McConahay et al., 1981) in that it is more subtle and based in purportedly justifiable beliefs and values, yet it still holds the power of “traditional” ageism and is no less damaging. Indeed, generational cohorts are used as a palatable modern proxy for more insidious, long-held stereotypes about relatively younger and older people. In this chapter, we take a broad, psychological perspective in reviewing ageism and age-related stereotyping in the modern world, placing particular focus on generationalism and its associated stereotypes. In doing so, we answer the following three questions: (1) What predominant age-­related stereotypes exist in and across life contexts?; (2) What are the origins of these stereotypes and their popularity/pervasiveness?; and (3) How do these stereotypes affect individuals and groups (i.e., what is their significance for social justice)? In our conclusion, we discuss ways to counter modern ageism and age-based

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_9

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stereotyping, and to more broadly promote solidarity and social justice across the lifespan. For purposes of this chapter, we present a number of example stereotype implications from the work context, as this is one predominant environment in which relatively “younger” and “older” adults are most likely to regularly interact. Still, it is important to bear in mind that modern ageism and stereotyping span many domains, and the workplace is but one area where discrimination occurs and should be remediated. Moreover, these examples are useful regardless of context, with age-related phenomena at work generalizing to other domains.

Age-Related Stereotypes There are a wealth of different stereotypes held about younger and older adults, many of which are structured in mutual opposition, such that where one end of the age spectrum flourishes, the other is found lacking. More specifically, from a generationalist perspective, the “older generation” (e.g., Baby Boomers) and “younger generation” (e.g., Millennials, Gen Z) are pitted against one another in terms of various qualitative characteristics (e.g., self-involvement, work ethic, political views, adaptability). Although the range of stereotype content existing in this space is outside the scope of this chapter, we discuss some prominent examples and the concept of generations more generally. Generations are a long-used tool for categorizing and stereotyping individuals of different ages (Kriegel & Hirsch 1978; Pilcher, 1994). The current use of generations largely owes its legacy to work by Mannheim (1927/ 1952) and other sociologists (e.g., Ortega y Gasset, 1933). First discussed in terms of sociological thought experiments, generations were originally used to explain how change occurs as a function of shared exposure to influential events among individuals in similar life stages (and therefore born around the same time period). The concept of “generation” has since been co-opted and transformed to fill a variety of needs and purposes, including its central role as a thinly veiled vehicle for ageism and age-based stereotyping. Perhaps nothing makes this more obvious than the unreli-

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able and conflicting ways we define birth year ranges for generational cohorts (e.g., Costanza et  al., 2012; Rudolph et  al., 2018; Smola & Sutton, 2002). If we can be so flippant, imprecise, and inconsistent with our labels, do they really “mean” anything, aside from signalling whether we are stereotyping younger or older individuals? Moreover, we have no available statistical analyses or methodologies that would allow us to accurately make claims about generational attributes separately from factors such as age and time period (e.g., increases in narcissism; see Costanza et al., 2017; Rudolph et al., 2020a). Members of younger generations – more precisely, younger people – are stereotypically categorized as lazy, narcissistic, entitled, rash, flighty, and impatient. These stereotypes are quite prevalent in the work context, where, for example, younger adults are stereotyped as “job hoppers” with low commitment to organizations and little care for interests outside of their own career or desire for work-life balance (e.g., Robison, 2020). They are also commonly derided for having short attention spans and an obsession with technology, which has troublingly already made its way into contexts such as work in the form of implicitly ageist recruitment and training practices (e.g., recruitment catering toward younger adults’ stereotypically short attention spans; differential training opportunity provision, based on the assumptions about older adults’ willingness to learn new things and use technology). Members of older generations  – more precisely, older people – are contrasted here as being slow and burdensome, concerned with maintaining tradition and the status quo and unwilling to adapt to new processes and technologies (e.g., at work, Fisher, 2018). Indeed, relatively older individuals are stereotyped to be undesirable, incompetent, risk-averse, and conservative: they are inflexible and untrainable, and they are especially problematic when they refuse to recognize their obsolescence and “make way” for younger generations (e.g., by retiring, relinquishing social, political, and economic power; Lewis, 2019; White, 2013). This stereotypical stubbornness and resistance to transition, among other stereotypes, is unfortunately rampant in the work context as well (e.g., Morris, 2021).

9  Modern Ageism and Age Stereotyping

Age-based stereotypes fundamentally operate upon an ageist zero-sum assumption, wherein both social resources and personal capacities are limited by population age diversity and individual aging, respectively. Such assumptions underlie the maintenance of age-based stereotypes and modern ageism, which we discuss more next.

Stereotype Origins Now that we have established some of the predominant age-related stereotypes in modern society, we turn our attention to the origins of these stereotypes  – in particular, both practically and theoretically, what prompts them to be pervasive and popularly held.

General Mechanisms The mechanisms integral to age-based stereotype creation and continuation are interrelated, forming a network of supports and connections that reify age-based stereotypes as a common and welcome part of our social vocabulary. It is important to note from the outset that the literature largely focuses on stereotypes and ageism directed toward relatively older adults as opposed to those levied toward relatively younger adults. Still, these problems work in both directions, which is particularly apparent when considering the negative narratives directed toward both younger and older “generations” alike. This first set of mechanisms, historical precedent and familiarity, refers to the repetitive nature of age stereotypic characteristics. There has been impressive consistency over time in the emergence and nature of age-based stereotypes (Kitch, 2003; Kriegel & Hirsch, 1978; Rauvola et  al., 2019): young people have long been rebuked for disregarding (or even subverting) norms in the service of self-interest and frivolity, while older people have been cast as doddering and traditional forces of societal immobility. This means that ageism, including its modern form of generationalism, is both salient and customary. We are all aware of the tropes and archetypes used to

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describe age and aging; indeed, they are implicitly and explicitly woven throughout our language and institutions (e.g., Levy & Banaji, 2002). We are accustomed (and encouraged) to use these ageist devices in making sense of our own identity, development, and environment. To this point, age-based stereotyping is not only accessible and conventional – ageism is also socially sanctioned. In many cases, ageist stereotypes and motifs are so normalized that they are openly espoused (e.g., common gripes about “young people these days,” or references to the COVID-19 pandemic as a “Boomer Remover”; Rudolph & Zacher, 2020a, b). Because they are unidentifiable as “ageist,” age-based stereotypes are instead treated as benign humour or insights into the human experience. The construal of age-based stereotypes as humorous truths likely stems from a combination of bodily and socio-political narratives about aging, including dialogue around growth and change as well as societal contributions and autonomy. For example, from a developmental and biological perspective, aging is defined in terms of physical declines, losses, stagnancy, and debilitation, whereas youth is characterized by abundance, activity, and energy, in addition to naivete and impatience (e.g., see stereotypes in Chasteen et al., 2002; Rothbaum, 1983). In addition, socio-political narratives problematize both younger and older adults as “weighing on” society in different ways. Though younger adults believe they are autonomous, they are viewed as impetuous, threatening the stability of social structures, systems, and traditions. Older adults, on the other hand, are viewed as burdens on social services, as they no longer meaningfully contribute to society and must instead rely on (and risk depleting) civic resources and others to care for them (e.g., North & Fiske, 2013; White, 2013). The physical and social attributes of both ends of the aging spectrum are thus extrapolated and dramatized, contributing to our social acceptance of age-based stereotypes as fact and canon. Finally, in addition to being based on purportedly objective narratives, age-based stereotypes also reinforce other convenient social observations and myths. These myths give us comfort-

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able, categorical fictions about the discreteness and sources of change: they help us ignore the inherent ambiguity and uncertainty of social shifts, as well as the discomfort that comes with liminal or transitional spaces. Indeed, being concretely “old” or “young” is perhaps more tolerable than being something in-between. Blaming the “old” or “young” for societal ills likewise reassures us of our own innocence, and it provides us with an outlet for our resentments and perceived burdens. As Timonen and Conlon (2015) write, generations are used “to apportion blame, to express pity, concern and solidarity, to highlight unfairness and inequity, and to depict differential agency” (pp.  8–9). Similarly, White (2013) discusses generations as providing us with historical explanations and organization, connection and community, methods for identifying and naming injustice, and a source of anticipated or “impending” conflict and crisis (p. 226). Age-based stereotypes, and the ageism and generationalism that they promote, allow us to avoid the ideas that aging and development exist on a continuum, and that there are multidirectional and unpredictable forces underlying societal change and challenges. By periodizing society and life, we make our world seem more structured and knowable.

Theoretical Frameworks One useful theoretical framework for the mechanisms behind age-based stereotyping is Social Identity Theory (SIT; see Chaps. 2 and 3 in this volume). According to SIT, individuals tend to categorize themselves into groups on the basis of various social categories such as age, gender, and other types of affiliations (e.g., organizational membership; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Through these categorizations, perceptions of “ingroups” and “outgroups” are formed and ingrained. Depending on the nature of individual’s perceptions about these categorizations, younger people may be more motivated to identify strongly with their age-based ingroup, pushing away from older people in an attempt to promote their own self-esteem, personal identity, and sense of

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belonging (Kite & Wagner, 2004; North & Fiske, 2012). The categorization of individuals on the basis of age may be particularly prevalent in specific contexts, where age-related differences may be more salient. For example, within an organizational context where workers of varying ages work alongside one another applying their skills and abilities to the tasks at hand, age-related differences may be perceived as more apparent, leading to intentional or unintentional social categorizations on the basis of age (Truxillo et al., 2015). A context such as an organization may therefore provide a particularly ripe environment for age-based in- and outgroup categorizations to emerge (Rudolph & Zacher, 2015). Existing stereotypes about specific groups may provide the basis for social categorization: for example, viewing a particular group of individuals (i.e., on the basis of age, ethnicity, gender, or other affiliations) as more intelligent than another, may provide justification for a member of that group to distinguish between their particular group and the other, leading to the formulation of in and outgroups. On the other hand, existing stereotypes about a particular group may serve to reinforce some already established social categorization, further solidifying the separation between groups. In this latter case, individuals may feel further validated by perceived membership of a particular group. The Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2007) proposes that people universally differentiate others on the dimensions of warmth and competence (see also Chap. 4 in this volume). Older people are stereotypically viewed as being high on warmth but low on competence, a combination referred to as a “pitied group” which is generally perceived to a be a lower status social group; younger people, on the other hand are stereotypically viewed as low on warmth but high on competence (Fiske et al., 2007; North & Fiske, 2012). Thus, when individuals (particularly younger people) categorize themselves on the basis of age, one prevalent stereotypical way to distinguish themselves may be along these dimensions. Furthermore, seeing older adults as less competent may lead to actualized judge-

9  Modern Ageism and Age Stereotyping

ments or discriminatory behaviours in contexts where competence is critical. For example, an individual who perceives older individuals who they work with as less competent may choose to avoid working with older adults when given the chance to decide who to work with on various projects and tasks. With respect to stereotypes toward the young, this means that younger individuals might be viewed with more mistrust (e.g., less interpersonal warmth and acceptance) while seen as more competent or self-sufficient than they necessarily are (e.g., resulting in higher workload and less support or training in certain areas). This occurs across levels as well, and in interaction with other social identities, which will be discussed more next.

Consequences of Stereotypes Stereotypes are not only deeply embedded in our society; they also have profound effects on individuals and the groups to which they belong (or are perceived to belong). Research has linked ageism to poorer health outcomes and higher healthcare costs (e.g., Chang et  al., 2020; Levy et al., 2020), in addition to isolation, fewer labour and training or educational opportunities, and less health-conducive lifestyle habits (e.g., Swift et al., 2017), among other consequences. Considering one age-salient life domain in particular, the workplace, a number of adverse outcomes result from modern ageism and generationalism. Indeed, employment contexts are ripe with age-based discrimination toward both younger and older adults and “generations” (e.g., Perry et al., 2013; Raymer et al., 2017; Toomey & Rudolph, 2017). These can manifest in areas as diverse as hiring practices (including recruitment and selection; e.g., Abrams et al., 2016), performance appraisal criteria and ratings (as well as promotions; Posthuma & Campion, 2009), ­training and development (Stypinska & Turek, 2017), mentoring and leadership (Rudolph et al., 2018), and experienced exclusion or perceived stereotyping from co-workers and others in the workplace (Finkelstein et  al., 2015; Weiss & Perry, 2020). Hiring practices, for example, can

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be shaped by age-related stereotypes at a variety of levels, including job description framing and advertising (e.g., emphasizing stereotypically desirable aspects of jobs, targeting job postings through social media channels that are homogenous in terms of age), application format (e.g., choosing application methods that assume certain technological abilities or preferences), interview protocols (e.g., offering certain interview formats to younger vs. older applicants based on presumed technological mastery), and ultimate selection decisions and job offer characteristics (e.g., favouring older rather than younger applicants for positions due to perceived commitment and loyalty; offering or emphasizing different development and mentoring benefits to younger rather than older applicants). There have been recent Age Discrimination in Employment Act cases brought forward, in part, on generationalism (e.g., Babb v. Wilkie, 2020). By relying on and perpetuating age-based stereotypes, we not only further age-based discrimination, but we shut out and ignore many layers of complexity, individuality, and agency. Indeed, people belonging to certain age groups vary greatly in their interests, preferences, and attributes (including those related to ageist stereotypes). In addition to the inaccuracy and coarseness of this practice, modern ageism and generationalism allow us to ignore intersectional identities and experiences (Calasanti, 2020; Calasanti & King, 2015; Crenshaw, 1991) which, in turn, may exacerbate existing inequities in addition to other forms of stereotyping and discrimination at multiple levels. By blaming “Boomers” for wealth concentration, for example, we ignore the conflict and variability within generations, and we allow the sources of wealth concentration therein to become further entrenched. Indeed, the idea that there are more imbalances between rather than within age groups or generational cohorts serves to obfuscate more pernicious problems (Timonen & Conlon, 2015; White, 2013). It also covers up the ways that ageism might interact with other forms of discrimination and multiply oppress people all the way from the individual to the policy level. The social construction process surrounding gen-

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erationalism and ageism not only structures our internal and interpersonal worlds, but also our societal institutions. Social support mechanisms, other age-relevant policy and practices (e.g., economic and tax reform, labour regulations, retirement benefits, health promotion and prevention programs), and age segregation in society are shaped by, and in turn shape, ageism (Bratt et al., 2020; Calasanti, 2020; Calasanti & King, 2017; Hagestad & Uhlenberg, 2005)  – in addition to existing alongside and interacting with other “isms” (e.g., sexism, classism, racism). For example, being “old” and “female” translates into different forms of stereotyping and oppression than those faced by individuals who are “old” and “male” (e.g., in terms of perceived competence, desirability). Moreover, being “young” and “female” bears its own unique challenges in comparison to other age and gender configurations (e.g., with respect to maternity expectations or penalties). These forces cyclically reaffirm the same stereotyping processes upon which society has long relied, and it cements their utility and thereby their prevalence over and over again.

Countering Modern Ageism Age-based stereotypes clearly have a long-­lasting legacy, and one that will not subside without intervention; however, there are apparent “levers” for change in this space, and the consequences of these stereotypes demand our effort and attention. To counter modern ageism, we suggest a few specific shifts in the academic and applied communities. First, we call for a shift toward a lifespan perspective on age within and across life contexts (e.g., Rauvola & Rudolph, 2019; Rudolph et al. 2020b), which better accounts for individuality, nuance, and multiple sources of influence in the aging and development process. Largely stemming from work by Baltes (1987), the lifespan perspective on development would shift our thinking about age away from the cate-

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gorical and toward the continuous, helping us to appreciate individual diversity and agency in aging. Concretely, this means that we should end our use of generational labels and tropes in research, practice, and popular culture. Just as we promote more dynamic, fluid, and self-­ determined ways of thinking about other social identities, we should push for the same kinds of perspectives on age and aging. Second, and relatedly, we will need to adopt more inclusive definitions of “successful aging,” and inclusive, evidence-based practices and policies to accompany them. There have already been pushes to adjust our negative, loss-based and decline-focused view of aging toward a more balanced perspective: one which recognizes the gains and advantages that come with age, and thereby the challenges and complexities of all life stages (e.g., Rowe & Kahn, 1997, 2015). Many have argued that current conceptualizations of successful aging are still too one-dimensional or exclusionary, however: these definitions and their associated paradigms often fail to recognize that avoiding stigma or enabling individuals to age “successfully” in the eyes of society are not the same as eradicating ageism and celebrating differences (e.g., Calasanti & King, 2017, 2020). To thoroughly address ageism through successful aging narratives, then, we must promote conceptualizations of successful aging that recognize intersecting identities as well as the social positions and systems that contextualize lifespan development. Furthermore, we must apply these definitions in ways that both seek to change the systems that disadvantage and discriminate against different age groups, as well as the underlying mechanisms by which generational and ageist stereotypes persist. Intentional awareness-building around the origins of age-based and generational stereotypes will help us move in this direction. Overall, attention to the scope and impact of modern ageism, to the purposes and people age-based stereotypes serve and harm, will aid in a more socially just and “critically conscious” society (see Jauregui

9  Modern Ageism and Age Stereotyping

et al.’s, 2020, p. 63, further discussion of “generational humility”). This serves both younger- and older-adult-directed stereotyping and ageism by understanding the foundations of “young” and “old” tropes as well as the benefits and strengths that exist at all stages of the lifespan. As a first step, we recommend more efforts be made to publicize the wealth of evidence disputing the presence of generational differences in addition to displaying the variety of positive experiences that characterize the full lifespan. This, in combination with more continuous treatment of age and aging, should result in reduced ageism, starting from the interpersonal level and eventually reaching the institutional level. Aside from these more general shifts, the theoretical perspectives on stereotypes discussed herein provide some insight into how ageism and generationalism might be dealt with. First, attempts can be made to eliminate the presence, or existence of ageist beliefs or stereotypes in the first place. Second, focus could instead be placed on mitigating the potential negative impacts of these beliefs and stereotypes. In regard to the former, utilizing SIT to develop strategic initiatives to reduce the prevalence of ageism could be advantageous. For example, in organizational contexts, attempts can be made to reduce the salience of age as a variable with which individuals might categorize themselves. This could be done by ensuring that workers of varying ages within teams at an organization are equally represented, or by providing workers with different categorization variables (e.g., affiliation at work) to counter the tendency to differentiate on the basis of age. By ensuring that individuals are equally exposed to a variety of different-aged co-­ workers, individuals may feel more similar to one another than different. Alternatively, organizations could provide other ways for workers of different ages to affiliate with one another such as social opportunities, mentoring relationships, or collaborative projects. Providing healthier ways for individuals to differentiate themselves allows them to continue navigating their social spaces using social categorizations, but without those categorizations coming at the expense of particular demographic groups.

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In terms of mitigating the negative impacts of ageism, SCM provides some insight as well. Given the prevalence of the stereotype that older adults are less competent, efforts could be made to provide younger and older adults with opportunities to recognize their own competencies. For example, placing older adults in positions where they have a great amount of experience and knowledge may promote a healthier dynamic between themselves and younger adults. In such a scenario, younger adults may come to view older adults as “experts” or individuals that they can learn from, ask questions of, or receive coaching from to develop their own skills. This may not only reduce the prevalence of the stereotype that older adults are less competent, but also counter the effects of existing stereotypes by ensuring that older adults are aware of their own abilities and do not feel as threatened. Similar efforts could be made with respect to the other age-based stereotypes discussed earlier as well.

Conclusion This chapter highlighted the presence and attributes of modern ageism and age-­related stereotyping, discussing both the mechanisms by which these issues persist and how they have potential to be remediated. Age-based stereotyping and ageism are nothing new. They have existed in public consciousness and discourse for thousands of years, owing to their roots in fundamental facts of life: youth and growing old. That these processes are unavoidable and universal only reinforces the power of (modern) ageism. However, universality also holds the key to promoting solidarity and social justice. Although generationalism is convenient, familiar, and comfortable, it has pernicious consequences. To counter it, we will need to move toward recognition of nuance and individuality across the lifespan, and away from deterministic and well-worn claims about youth and old age. Aging may be unavoidable, but ageism and its stereotypic claims are not. Just as we possess agency in our development, so, too, can we craft a more age-inclusive future.

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Glossary Age-based stereotyping: the cognitive process of forming beliefs and making attributions about an individual’s characteristics purely on the basis of their age or perceived age (i.e., perceived youth vs. oldness) Ageism: the belief that individuals in certain periods of life or (perceived) age strata (i.e., younger vs. older adults) systematically vary and therefore warrant differential treatment on the basis of their age Ageist zero-sum assumption: the fallacious belief that the processes of individual aging and development, as well as population aging and societal age diversity, are governed by an exact balance of possible gains and losses whereby only one group (e.g., younger vs. older adults) can experience benefits at a time while the other group experiences decrements Generationalism: the belief that all members of a given generation possess characteristics specific to that generation, especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another generation Modern ageism: a subtle but equally damaging form of age-based discrimination and stereotyping wherein problematic and reductive beliefs and values about younger and older generations are treated as justified and legitimate

Discussions Question

1. Based on what you read in this chapter, how might you provide counterarguments to someone making modern ageist/generationalist claims or statements? 2. The majority of this chapter focused on upward ageism (i.e., ageist stereotypes toward older people). How does this apply to downward ageism (i.e., ageist stereotypes ­ toward younger people)? What are similarities and differences in stereotype content and consequences?

References

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Is the Intergenerational Social Contract Under Pressure? Studying Age Cleavages in Attitudes Towards Government Support for the Young and the Old

10

Tim Reeskens and Wim van Oorschot

Introduction Whether intergenerational solidarity from the young to the old is under pressure is a concern of many European governments. This concern is mainly inspired by increasing welfare expenses due to population ageing, which are carried disproportionately by a decreasing active share of the population. Such inequity could eventually lead to a break of the social contract that spans generations (Bengtson & Achenbaum, 1993; Esping-Andersen & Sarasa, 2002). This concern is further exacerbated by the belief that modernization has eroded general feelings of solidarity, especially between age groups (Popenoe, 1988). Moreover, times of crisis, like the economic recession initiated in 2008 which put many young people in unemployment, or the COVID-19 pandemic that tied medical risks to age, have the potential to sharpen concerns surrounding the intergenerational social contract (see also Chap. 19, this volume). Such societal processes might ultimately increase age-specific welfare demands even more, drawing attention to

T. Reeskens (*) Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] W. van Oorschot University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

the challenge of balancing the interests and needs of different generations. To evaluate tensions in the intergenerational social contract, a strand of studies addresses the issue on the basis of public opinion surveys that ask about people’s attitudes towards welfare provision for the elderly (Busemeyer et  al., 2008; Kohli, 2006; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2015). The idea is that large age gaps in such preferences, where older people would be much more supportive and younger people much less, would signal problematic intergenerational solidarity. Our chapter fits in this tradition and contributes to it uniquely by not only looking at age gaps regarding provisions for the elderly, but also regarding provisions for younger people. The possibility of an intergenerational solidarity conflict between both sides of the age spectrum, or the possibility of an ‘age war’ as it is called in the US (Hamil-Luker, 2001), would be stronger if one would not only find that younger people support welfare for the elderly substantially less than older people, but also, if the elderly in turn would show lower support for provisions for younger generations. This chapter focuses on potential age differences in support for welfare policies that are tailored to the needs of specific age groups, i.e., support for elderly care provisions (that most directly benefit older cohorts) and support for childcare services (that most

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_10

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directly benefit younger cohorts). The present economic context of increased pressure on intergenerational equity and solidarity makes this study ever more relevant precisely because the institutional viability of welfare state programs depend on their public legitimacy (Brooks & Manza, 2007). As Busemeyer et al. (2008, p. 23) argue, “[T]he magnitude of age stratification in social policy preferences can be interpreted as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for latent cleavages to become manifest.” The scarce evidence on the presence of such generational differences in welfare support nonetheless limits the evaluation of whether such an ‘age war’ is taking place in present-day Europe. For this study, we analyse data from the ‘Welfare Attitudes’ module of the 2016 European Social Survey.1 It contributes to the few existing studies on this issue, firstly, by analysing attitudes towards welfare provision for the elderly and for the young, and secondly, by specifically exploring the mechanisms through which age may affect attitudes by investigating mediating respondent characteristics.

Age and Attitudes Towards Welfare Provision for the Young and the Old An Age War in Europe? Since the early 1980s, a vivid debate about the costs of population ageing has taken place in the US (e.g., Preston, 1984). Proponents of the ‘grey peril’ idea sketch a future in which “a growing older population increasingly composed of middle class and politically active retirees voting in their self-interest could fuel conflict between age groups” (Hamil-Luker, 2001, p.  338). This idea of a growing political force questioning the allocation of welfare to younger cohorts is not absent in Europe (Esping-Andersen & Sarasa, 2002). Yet, European political agendas are particularly concerned about the expected increase in pension and health care costs and the related strain on intergenerational solidarity and equity,

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as addressed in the European Commission’s Towards a Europe for All Ages (EU, 1999). Contrasting the American ‘grey peril’ thesis, the core of the European debate regards the potential erosion of the solidarity of the young with the old, meaning that younger generations would be less inclined to contribute to welfare provisions for the elderly (Knijn & Komter, 2004). In spite of these political concerns, scientific studies on a possible ‘age war’ are limited and are mainly concerned with opinions on welfare provision for the elderly. In the US, opponents of the ‘age war’ idea argue that age cohorts are too heterogeneous to form an interest group that could lead such a ‘war’ in the US, creating larger attitudinal differences within generations than between generations (Hamil-Luker, 2001).2 As for Europe, where the young are particularly seen as the offensive actor in such a war, Kohli (2006) points out that it is highly questionable whether the interests of younger people foster an increased demand for reducing provisions for elderly people for various reasons. As he argues, there are direct short-term and long-term financial returns from old-age welfare provisions for the younger cohorts. In the short run, adequate welfare provisions for the old may lessen or even fully abolish young people’s burdens for caring for their elderly relatives in cash and/or in kind, and they may further miss out on financial support from these relatives, for instance by direct financial support from grandparents or through inheritance. In the long run, the intergenerational social contract assumes that over the life course, each generation pays their due in order to justify being on the receiving end in the future. The generation that breaks this contract runs the risk of being left empty-handed when their time comes. A rational calculus therefore suggests that younger people will be reluctant to engage in a war over welfare with the elderly. Strong ideological barriers, too, would refute the idea of an ‘age war’, in the sense that among the young, the elderly are also seen as highly deserving of welfare provisions (van Oorschot, 2006; see also Chap. 6, this volume).3

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These arguments help in understanding why empirical studies on age cleavages in welfare opinions tend to find only small differences between age groups. Analyses of the 1996 American General Household Survey finds no support for an ‘age war’, with 44% of the oldest age group believing that government spends too little on Social Security compared to just more than 50% among younger groups; moreover, class and political preference outweigh age considerations (Hamil-Luker, 2001). Cross-national studies including European countries confirm these findings (Kohl, 2003; Busemeyer et  al., 2008). For example, a study on 26 European countries concludes “age does not constitute such an important dividing line in welfare policy issues” (Svallfors et al., 2012, p. 172). Based on these empirical studies, one might not expect large age cleavages in support of provisions for the elderly. However, as we argued in the introduction, and related to the ‘grey peril’ idea from the US, a more complete picture of a possible ‘age war’ in Europe also requires information about the other side of the issue: the degree to which older people would be substantially less in favour of welfare provision for the young, compared to younger people themselves.

 echanisms Underlying Age M Conflicts in Welfare Attitudes Our analytical starting point is that the idea of an ‘age war’ would suggest age has a substantial positive effect on attitudes towards welfare support for the elderly, and a negative effect on welfare support for the young. However, such effects should not be taken at face value, as age might not in and of itself drive attitudes, as much as intermediate factors that are affected by age, which in turn affect attitudes (Hamil-Luker, 2001; Svallfors et  al., 2012). In line with Svallfors et  al. (2012) and others (e.g., Jaeger, 2006), our starting point is two sets of variables that are found to affect opinions in the general welfare attitudes literature: variables that indi-

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cate people’s interest position towards welfare provision, and ideological variables which indicate people’s ideological stance towards welfare provision. In relation to people’s interest position, people in weaker socio-economic positions (e.g., those with lower income, lower education, people actually dependent on welfare, or the unemployed) are generally found to be more pro-welfare (Kangas, 1997; Svallfors, 2004). In addition, in our case, we assume that people with dependent children will be more in support of childcare provision than people without children. In relation to ideology, it has been shown repeatedly that political left-right stance is important, in the sense that leftist people are generally more supportive of welfare (Jaeger, 2008), as are people who perceive vulnerable groups as larger and thus believe there are greater social needs in society. Finally, to control for the degree to which the attitudes we measure regarding provisions for elderly and younger people are confounded by a general positive or negative attitude to welfare redistribution by the state, (i.e., regardless of the (target age of the) evaluated welfare program concerned), we include ‘general support for welfare redistribution’ as a mediating variable. We assume here that elderly people, compared to younger people, are generally more in support of welfare redistribution. Although research that disentangles life cycle effects from generational effects in explaining welfare opinions is rare, we nonetheless propose two mechanisms in this respect. On the one hand, young people might be less supportive of welfare provision in general because they have not yet fully experienced the positive life-cycle aspects of the welfare state (Komp & van Tilburg, 2010; Svallfors, 2008). On the other hand, insights on generational change would say that because older generations have grown up in an economically less wealthy era, precisely this older age group is more likely to prefer the welfare state as an institution that secures welfare in case a risk occurs (Inglehart, 1990).

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Data and Methodology Data The data for this study are from the 2016 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS Round 8, 2016). This comparative biennial survey project was carried out in 23 countries.4 After listwise deletion of missing observations, 39,381 respondents remain for the analysis.5

Variables We have two dependent variables. One concerning peoples’ attitude towards welfare provision for the elderly, and one concerning provision for the young. The first attitude is measured using the item “Please tell me, how much responsibility you think governments should have to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?” The second is measured with the question: “Please tell me, how much responsibility you think governments should have to ensure sufficient childcare services for working parents.” Both items were offered with a response scale ranging from “should not be governments’ responsibility at all” (0) to “should be entirely governments’ responsibility” (10).6 Age serves as our independent variable. In our data it ranges from 16 to 90  years. As will be made clear further on (Fig. 10.1), the relationship between age and support for government responsibility for elderly welfare programs and childcare provisions respectively is curvilinear. To deal with this curvilinear relationship in the appropriate manner, we estimate a linear and curvilinear age effect for the mediation analysis. Regarding intermediary variables, the first set regards sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics, which are first of all measured by a dummy for whether the respondent has children living at home. Achieved educational level is measured using the harmonized 7-level ISCED scheme, ranging from less than lower secondary

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education to higher tertiary education (MA level or higher). We include objective income, using a 10-point scale. Because of non-response (16.3 percent of the sample), we apply means-­ substitution on income, meaning that those respondents with a missing value receive the mean value on this variable. We also include a dummy variable to indicate whether someone is welfare state dependent, measured by asking whether one’s main source of income is welfare benefits. Employment status at the time of interviewing is coded as having paid work (reference), being unemployed, being a student, being retired, or being in another position (e.g., being a carer). Second, political ideology is measured using the self-rated left-right scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Given considerable item-­ nonresponse on this variable (11.2 percent), we apply the same means-substitution technique as applied to income. Perceived social needs is measured on a scale from 1–11 that asks about which percentage of people in the country one believes is unemployed and looking for work (with 1 = 0–4 percent to 11 = 50 percent or more). The final relevant intermediary variable is general opinions about welfare redistribution, which is proxied by the question “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”, offered with a 5-category response scale, ranging from “disagree strongly” (1) to “agree strongly” (5). Before moving on to the results, we note that across Europe, age is related to each intermediating variable. Older people tend to have a lower educational level, less income, and rely more on benefits. As for work status, we see a small age difference between the employed and unemployed, and of course a larger difference between retired people and students. Further, the elderly have fewer children living at home. As for the ideological variables, we see that older people are a bit more rightist, but nevertheless are generally more supportive of welfare, and they believe there are slightly fewer social needs in society.

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A. Support for Elderly Welfare Provisions

B. Support for Childcare Services

Fig. 10.1  Averages of support for welfare provisions by age (16–90 years), pooled sample

Results  upport Levels and Age Cleavages S In a first exploratory step, we demonstrate the existence of age cleavages across European countries. Analysing the pooled ESS data, the upper pane of Fig. 10.1 shows that people’s support for government taking responsibility for the standard of living of the old is generally at a high level (M

= 8.13, SD = 1.82 on a scale from 0 to 10), which confirms the generally very high level of perceived deservingness of the elderly (van Oorschot, 2006; see also Chap. 6, this volume). Figure 10.1 also shows there is a slight curvilinear age gradient: support increases a bit with age until the age of about 50, and from there on it decreases slightly. Over the whole age range, we see that the difference in support between the

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youngest and the oldest respondents is merely about 0.2 on the 0–10 scale. Because of small sample sizes among the oldest respondents, we see less precise estimates for the oldest categories. The lower pane of Fig.  10.1 indicates that support for childcare provision is somewhat lower than support for elderly provision (M = 7.84, SD = 2.09). Yet, also for childcare provisions, a small curvilinear age effect is apparent, with highest support among the 25–45-year-olds, (i.e., those respondents of reproductive age) and somewhat lower support among the older and youngest categories). Despite clear curvilinearity of the relationship, the general trend is somewhat negative.

 nderstanding Age Gaps U To understand the age differences in support for welfare provisions for the young and the elderly as depicted in Fig.  10.1, we applied multiple regression analysis. If the theoretical mechanisms hold empirically, then the age effect would disappear when adding the intermediary variables. Further, in regression analysis, one usually

assumes linear effects, implying that an increase of one unit in the independent variable translates to a certain change (i.e., the unstandardized regression coefficient) in the dependent variable. By adding a quadratic term, we are able to test for non-linear effects as displayed in Fig. 10.1, that is, to test the u-shaped character of the relationship between the two variables. In our analysis, we included a linear effect as well as a quadratic effect of our key variable age and added the set of potential mediating variables. Model 1  in Table  10.1 shows an unstandardized linear age effect of 0.022368, combined with a quadratic effect of −0.000179.7 This means that the relationship between age and support for elderly welfare provisions is small, and a bit curvilinear as depicted in Fig. 10.1. Adding relevant mediators (Model 2 of Table  10.1), we see that the age effects (linear and quadratic) only become (very) slightly modified (whereas the linear effect increases to 0.023548, the quadratic age effect is now −0.000224). Doing the same exercise for support for childcare provisions (Model 3 of Table  10.1), we

Table 10.1  Multilevel model of support for state responsibility for elderly welfare provision and for childcare provisions regressed on individual level variables

Intercept Age linear Age squared Levels of education Unemployed Student Retired Other category Ref: Employed Income Income nonresponse Welfare dependent Children (ref: No) Left-right ideology Left-right nonresp Perceived needs General welf support

Elderly welfare provision Model 1: Model 2: Age only Full model Unstd. Unstd. Coeff. T-value Coeff. 7.57*** 101.74 6.51*** 0.02*** 8.70 0.02*** −0.00*** −6.81 −0.00*** −0.01*** −0.10* −0.08* −0.13** 0.08* −0.01* 0.04 0.17*** 0.04 −0.03*** 0.17*** 0.04*** 0.29***

Childcare services Model 3: Age only Unstd. T-value Coeff. T-value 61.92 7.67*** 90.36 7.02 0.02*** 8.15 −6.32 −0.00*** −8.64 −4.41 −2.27 −2.08 −3.01 2.38

Model 4: Full model Unstd. Coeff. 7.00*** 0.01** −0.00*** −0.00 −0.13** −0.15** 0.08 0.05

T-value 58.16 3.26 −4.86 −1.14 −2.66 −3.29 1.64 1.43

−2.18 1.62 5.16 1.82 −6.39 5.78 13.23 31.69

0.02** −0.05 0.17*** 0.22*** −0.06*** 0.13*** 0.04*** 0.26***

3.20 −1.79 4.65 9.30 −13.10 3.96 11.55 24.18

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. N = 39,381; 23 countries

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observe a linear age effect of 0.0239 and a quadratic effect of −0.000259. Again, this means there is a small age effect, and a bit of curvilinearity. Here, the addition of the selected mediators also changes the age effects just very slightly (the linear age effect is now 0.012512, while the quadratic age effect declines to −0.000198). For both welfare provisions, we therefore see that the theoretically relevant socio-demographic and socio-economic variables are not able to explain the age effects. With regard to the mediators, while socioeconomic status is generally regarded to be a determinant of welfare attitudes, in our case we see that the sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics are inconsistently related to support for age-specific welfare programs. First, education is negatively related to support for the elderly, implying that the lower educated particularly favour more welfare intervention for the old; yet there is no educational gradient in support for childcare services. Even though retirement and age are correlated, we do see that, holding everything else constant, among the older categories the people who are actually retired are a bit less supportive of elderly welfare provision. This is a finding that needs to be addressed in future research, since it might be suggestive of specific factors playing a role in intergenerational support, for example, a difference in (perceived) income security and satisfaction between retired respondents and other older respondents. Furthermore, we see a small negative effect of reported income on support for elderly welfare services. By contrast, a positive effect of reported income on support for childcare provisions exists; that is, people with higher incomes are slightly more supportive of such welfare provision. In addition, being dependent on welfare is related to having stronger supportive attitudes towards welfare intervention for both the elderly and childcare provisions. Finally, while having children at home does not affect one’s attitude towards elderly welfare provisions, it is positively related to support for childcare provisions. Ideological variables are consistently related with our outcomes: respondents towards the

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rightist end of the political self-placement scale are, all else equal, more negative towards government support for the old and for childcare provisions; the effect is slightly larger for support for childcare provisions. People who perceive more social needs in society are also more supportive of both welfare programs. Respondents who favour greater income equality are more supportive of elderly welfare programs and childcare services, compared to those who believe incomes should not be made more equal. In sum, our regression analysis confirms the descriptive analysis presented in Fig. 10.1, namely that age gaps do exist, but also that they are (very) small. They are statistically significant, but so small that they cannot be regarded as substantially significant. In other words, our main conclusion is that there is little to no evidence of an ‘age war’ in Europe. True, when including mediating variables in the analysis, the age gap in preferences for elderly care provision grows slightly, while the age gap in preferences regarding the provision of childcare services becomes somewhat smaller. Apparently, age-related motivations are a little bit stronger regarding attitudes towards welfare state responsibility for elderly provisions than in the case of childcare provisions. One possible interpretation is that all else being equal, support for elderly welfare provision is more closely tied to particular phases across the lifespan than support for childcare services. Future research needs to clarify this. But still, even the increased age gap in case of attitudes towards welfare provision for the elderly is very small.

Conclusion Given current pressures, the social contract that spans generations is under pressure, and some allege an ‘age war’ is looming in Europe. However, scientific evidence for such a conflict between the generations is limited and mostly questions the viability of the idea of strong welfare distributional conflicts between generations. Our study confirms this: whereas younger people are indeed significantly a bit less in support of old-age welfare provisions in a statistical sense, the age cleavage (at

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least between the youngest and oldest age brackets) is so small that it cannot be called substantially significant, meaning that it cannot be expected to have impactful social consequences. Even though there are some meaningful differences between certain age groups, our study shows that in contrast with prevailing suggestions and beliefs, younger people are certainly not clearly opposed to generous public provisions for the elderly. In the case of childcare provisions, we also see that age cleavages exist, but are very small, which means that older generations are not substantially opposed to government support for such services to younger cohorts. All in all, our study suggests that an ‘age war’ is not really present in European countries concerning two of the most exemplary forms of intergenerational solidarity – support for elderly welfare programs and childcare services. From a policy and scholarly interest, a logical subsequent question is what alternative empirical evidence exists for governments and political parties when they suggest in the social debate that solidarity between the generations is at peril. If there is no objective reason for an age war, as our study confirms, what subjective ideas have sparked the debate to prioritize intergenerational social solidarity as an important issue on political agendas? Are political parties using the idea of solidarity conflict as an instrument to further their political interests? For instance, to gain voter support among the young to retrench (health) care and pension systems and expenditures that mainly benefit the old? Or the other way around, to suggest to the elderly that their income and social security is threatened by new, individualized and self-­centred younger generations? Future studies should clarify this, and its implications for intergenerational solidarity.

Glossary ‘Age war’: a catchy term referring to a situation in which generations struggle to improve their welfare outcomes at the cost of other generations.

T. Reeskens and W. van Oorschot

‘Grey peril’: a catchy term referring to older generations possibly using their (electoral) power to reduce their costs and increase their revenues of welfare redistribution, at the expense of redistributive outcomes for younger generations. Intergenerational solidarity: solidarity between generations, concerning the degree to which people from different generations (are willing to) support each other’s (material or immaterial) well-being. Intergenerational solidarity conflict: a situation in which there is not only a lack of solidarity between generations, but also a conflict between them about the redistribution of welfare costs and revenues.

Comprehension Questions

1. Why is it interesting to compare the attitudes of different generations towards the redistribution of welfare provisions? 2. What is the difference between the way in which the intergenerational conflict issue seems to be framed in America compared to its framing in Europe? 3. Does the analysis of the European Social Survey data lead to the conclusion that there is evidence for an ‘age war’? Why or why not? Discussion Questions

1. This chapter relied on a comparison of relevant opinions of different age groups to find evidence for the existence or absence of an ‘age war’ concerning the redistribution of welfare policies. What other methods or approaches can you think of that could be applied to research the potential existence of an ‘age war’? If applied, would they necessarily lead to the same general conclusion made here? 2. If there is no objective evidence for an intergenerational solidarity conflict, why do you think political parties continue to use the idea of conflict?

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References Bengtson, V.  L., & Achenbaum, W.  A. (1993). The changing contract across generations. Aldine de Gruyter. Brooks, C., & Manza, J. (2007). Why welfare states persist. The importance of public opinion in democracies. The University of Chicago Press. Busemeyer, M., Goerres, A., & Weschle, S. (2008). Demands for redistributive policies in an era of demographic aging. MPIfG Discussion Paper 08/3. Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. Esping-Andersen, G., & Sarasa, S. (2002). The generational conflict reconsidered. Journal of European Social Policy, 12(1), 5–21. ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 2.2. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. https://doi. org/10.21338/NSD-ESS8-2016; https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/conditions_of_use.html. EU. (1999). Towards a Europe for all ages: Promoting prosperity and intergenerational solidarity. European Commission. Hamil-Luker, J. (2001). The prospects of age war: Inequality between (and within) age groups. Social Science Research, 30(3), 346–400. Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton University Press. Jaeger, M.  M. (2006). What makes people support public responsibility for welfare provision: Self-interest or political ideology? A longitudinal approach. Acta Sociologica, 49(3), 321–338. Jaeger, M.  M. (2008). Does left-right orientation have a causal effect on support for redistribution? Causal analysis with cross-sectional data using instrumental variables. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20(3), 363–374. Kangas, O. E. (1997). Self-interest and the common good. The impact of norms, selfishness and context in social policy opinions. Journal of Socio-Economics, 26(5), 475–494.

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Knijn, T., & Komter, A. (Eds.). (2004). Solidarity between the sexes and the generations. Edward Elgar. Kohl, J. (2003, August 21–24). Principles of distributive justice in pension policies: Cross-national variations in public opinion. Paper Presented at the ISA-RC19 Conference on ‘New Challenges for Welfare State Research’. Toronto. Kohli, M. (2006). Ageing and justice. In R. H. Binstock & L. George (Eds.), Handbook of aging and the social sciences (6th ed., pp. 456–478). Academic. Komp, K., & van Tilburg, T. (2010). Ageing societies and the welfare state. Where the inter-generational contract is not breached. International journal of ageing and later. Life, 5(1), 7–11. Popenoe, D. (1988). Family change and decline in modern societies. Transaction Publishers. Preston, S. (1984). Children and the aged in the US. Scientific American, 251(6), 44–49. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American community. Simon and Schuster. Reeskens, T., & van Oorschot, W. (2015). Is intergenerational solidarity under pressure? Comparative analyses of age cleavages in opinions about government support for the young and the old. In I.  Salagean, C. Lomos, & A. Hartung (Eds.), The young and elderly at risk. Individual outcomes and contemporary policy challenges in European societies (pp.  229–252). Intersentia. Svallfors, S. (2004). Class, attitudes and the welfare state: Sweden in comparative perspective. Social Policy & Administration, 38(2), 119–138. Svallfors, S. (2008). The generational contract in Sweden. Age-specific attitudes to age-related policies. Policy & Politics, 36(3), 381–396. Svallfors, S., Kulin, J., & Schnabel, A. (2012). Age, class, and attitudes toward government responsibilities. In S.  Svallfors (Ed.), Contested welfare states: Welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond (pp.  158–192). Stanford University Press. van Oorschot, W. (2006). Making the difference in social Europe: Deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states. Journal of European Social Policy, 16(1), 23–42.

How to Study and Understand Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health

11

Andrea Mudd, Sanne Verra, Michèlle Bal, and Carlijn Kamphuis

Introduction Socioeconomic position (SEP) refers to the position members of social groups hold in the societal hierarchy. As such, SEP has an important impact on life chances. SEP determines people’s access to resources within society, such as money, power, or prestige, and their exposure to advantaged and disadvantaged conditions, which leads to social inequality (Mackenbach, 2019). In general, people with a higher SEP grow up, play, reside, work, and age in more favourable physical, social, cultural, and financial circumstances than those with a lower SEP. The fault lines in society created by SEP are likely deeper than those created by other social indicators like gender, age, migrant status, and sexual orientation, as the social networks of different socioeconomic groups are largely separate and individuals with different SEP rarely mix (Volker et  al., 2014). In the workplace, different socioeconomic groups fulfil different positions and often do not meet or collaborate. People with a higher SEP live in different, more attractive,

Andrea Mudd and Sanne Verra share first authorship of this chapter. A. Mudd (*) · S. Verra · M. Bal · C. Kamphuis Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

and liveable neighbourhoods and have better quality housing than people with a lower SEP (Volker et  al., 2014). The limited interaction with and exposure to people belonging to different social classes has been shown to diminish tolerance and sympathy for those in other social classes, which influences perceptions about fairness and social justice (Mijs, 2018). This distance also leads to substantially different political preferences and cultural tastes between higher and lower socioeconomic groups (Kuipers & van den Haak, 2014). Limited interaction between social classes negatively influences beliefs about the deservingness of those who are worse off (Mijs, 2018), creating great challenges for solidarity and social justice and further strengthening class segregation, with potentially severe consequences for those with a lower SEP. An important life domain that is highly influenced by SEP is health. Those in higher socioeconomic groups generally experience better health, live fewer years with diseases and disabilities, and die at older ages than those in lower socioeconomic groups. In the Netherlands, for instance, those in low socioeconomic groups live an average of about six years less than those in high socioeconomic groups and about fifteen more years with diseases or disabilities (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated how SEP affects life conditions, including health. The most vulnerable

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_11

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have been disproportionately impacted by the pandemic; for instance, those in lower socioeconomic groups could less easily follow the social distancing guidelines because they were more likely to have jobs that could not be practiced from home, and when infected with COVID-19, those in lower socioeconomic groups were more likely to fall severely ill due to having more comorbidities (Bambra et al., 2020). These health differences between lower and higher socioeconomic groups are not simply referred to as differences but as inequalities or inequities. The term socioeconomic inequalities (or inequities) in health indicates that these health differences are unfair, unjust, unnecessary, and avoidable and should be reduced (Krieger, 2001), since they are largely seen to emerge from unequal access to resources and harmful exposures (to, e.g., pollution, violence). Socioeconomic inequalities in health are persistent and observed worldwide (Mackenbach et al., 2008, 2017). There is substantial literature on socioeconomic inequalities in health, its main explanations, and potential policy approaches to reduce these inequalities. We will address these topics in the current chapter, but before we do so, we first tackle the question of what exactly SEP is and how it can be operationalised in empirical studies. Differences in how SEP is defined can have important consequences for solidarity and social justice; people labelled as having a low SEP according to one definition but not others may still experience the negative stereotypes associated with low SEP, and people struggling to make ends meet may not receive the help they need because of the definition of low SEP used to determine who receives help. Perceptions of people targeted by social policies to address socioeconomic inequalities will be discussed extensively in Chap. 12.

Defining and Measuring Socioeconomic Position Hierarchy and inequality are inevitable in any society (van Kleef & Cheng, 2020), although some societies have traditionally been more hier-

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archal and unequal than others. One extreme example is the former caste system in India, where individuals were born into a universally acknowledged caste that determined rights and privileges (Chanana, 1993). In Europe, where welfare states originated, inequality is less extreme and societies are more informal, although there are still substantial differences between European countries. Welfare schemes, which generally rely on underlying solidarity with others, enable the redistribution of wealth and minimise inequities to some extent. Despite this, SEP also varies widely between individuals within countries, with important consequences for the life opportunities, health, and well-being of those with a lower SEP. In line with seminal sociological theories about social class and social inequalities (see Box 11.1), SEP is most commonly operationalised by three different indicators in empirical work: highest attained educational level, type of occupation, and income (Mackenbach, 2019). The measurement of income and highest attained educational level is relatively straightforward, although most people are less reserved in reporting their educational level than their income. One measure of occupation is the Goldthorpe class scheme, which places highly skilled workers at the top of the scheme and unskilled workers at the bottom. The scheme was created to fit the occupational structure of the UK in 1992 (Savage et  al., 2013), but these occupational classifications change over time and context. For example, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, traditionally low status positions such as cleaners

Box 11.1 Important Sociological Theories Related to SEP

The influential social scientists Marx, Weber, and Bourdieu focused on interpreting differences in social class in their work, each focusing on explaining different facets of how contemporary inequalities function. Closely related to SEP, social class refers to one’s position in society that car-

11  How to Study and Understand Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health

ries with it group membership, norms, and socialization patterns. In Marx’s view, social classes are driven by unequal access to economic resources. An individual could either belong to the powerful upper class that controls the means of production or to the (much larger) less powerful working class (Bendix, 1974; Saunders, 1990). More dimensions of social structure were introduced by Weber, who emphasised the importance of class (economic wealth), status (derived from honour and respect from others), and party (political power) in determining social position (Bendix, 1974). Consistent with social identity processes of ingroup glorification and outgroup derogation (see Chap. 3, this volume), a working class member who gained access to economic or political power could still be socially excluded from the elite due to differences in status, as social classes can create barriers and tend to exclude those who do not fit their social prestige. Bourdieu considered social structure to be shaped and maintained by the distribution of capital among individuals (Bourdieu, 1986). He distinguished between economic capital (i.e., material resources that are immediately and directly convertible into money), social capital (i.e., the size and quality of the network of connections a person has), and cultural capital (i.e., a person’s knowledge, skills, and behaviours). According to Bourdieu, unequal access to these forms of capital is what leads to social inequalities. To summarize, Marx focused on the social means of production, Weber focused on social and economic market capacities, and Bourdieu focused on the impacts of the three forms of capital on social inequalities. These viewpoints are not incompatible with each other, and an understanding of all three can help illuminate and explain different aspects of social inequalities (Curran, 2016).

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(low status based on type of occupation) or primary school teachers (low status based on income) suddenly became more appreciated and in many countries were characterised as key to the functioning of the economy (see Chap. 19, this volume). Although the three main indicators of SEP are inherently associated, each indicator can lead to different results, magnitudes, and interpretations of the causal mechanisms that contribute to socioeconomic inequalities. For instance, in one study, educational level was found to predict diabetes type-2 more strongly than income or occupation, whereas income was the strongest predictor of mortality (Geyer et al., 2006). These results show that income, educational level, and occupation cannot always be used interchangeably; the choice of a particular indicator of SEP in empirical research should fit the research question but also depends on the data available.

Intersectionality, Self-Perceived SEP, and Stereotypes Although research often examines these SEP indicators individually, the experiences of individuals are rarely restricted to one layer. Personal factors, such as social class, but also, for ­example, one’s ethnicity, gender, and disability, heavily influence a person’s experience of inequality. Yet, similar to the SEP indicators, personal factors are often considered in research and policy as if they are mutually exclusive and unidimensional (Bowleg, 2012). The intersectionality framework states that multiple social categories (such as SEP, race, and gender) intersect at the micro level in forming one’s individual experience (Bowleg, 2012). For example, the experience of a low-income Black female can be very different from the experience of a high-income Black female, a low-income Black male, or a lowincome Caucasian female. Bauer and Scheim (2019) studied how day-to-day discrimination influenced inequalities in psychological distress across different intersections of disadvantage, specifically in Indigenous and Middle Eastern sexual and gender minority groups. They found

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the accumulation of disadvantages to be greater than the sum of effects of individual disadvantages. The intersectional approach enabled them to identify a group at particular risk of health inequalities as a result of discrimination and highlighted the need to study the accumulation of factors in research about inequality rather than single indicators of SEP (Bauer & Scheim, 2019). In addition to traditional indicators of SEP like education, income, and occupation, SEP can be operationalised as a subjective measure, self-­ perceived SEP. Self-perceived SEP may capture the individual experience of SEP more broadly and the intersectionality of social class with other social identities better than traditional indicators of SEP. Perceiving and experiencing social identity can lead to comparisons of one’s own social identity to others’ (Tajfel, 1982). Comparing your own SEP to others’ SEP can lead to the experience of relative deprivation (see Chap. 4, this volume). Instead of having a high self-­ perceived SEP because you have a high absolute level of education (e.g., a bachelor’s degree), you may perceive your SEP as low because you have a lower level of education relative to others in your surroundings (e.g., with a PhD), resulting in feelings of dissatisfaction with your own SEP. In a 1847 pamphlet, Marx wrote, “A house may be large or small; as long as the neighbouring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut.” (Marx, 1893). The idea of determining perceived SEP by making comparisons with neighbours through displays of material wealth (“keeping up with the Joneses”) persists in modern societies and contributes to materialism (Kim et al., 2016). While comparing yourself to others within your social category used to be more common than comparing yourself to those higher up the social ladder (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984), this seems to have changed. In modern society, we are bombarded with relative deprivation-­ provoking cues. Through targeted advertising, regular launches of new iterations of products (e.g., iPhones), and social media, comparisons of social status can be continuously

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communicated. Being connected with people you know as well as with celebrities, vloggers, people in advertisements, and people from totally different backgrounds may lead to feelings of being worse off than others (high relative deprivation) (Bruni & Stanca, 2006), which may negatively impact life satisfaction and well-being. These processes of social comparison based on SEP may also enforce group boundaries (see Chap. 2, this volume) and, as such, challenge solidarity. SEP is also experienced through SEP-related stereotypes, cultural products that support gaps between those with low and high SEP (Durante et  al., 2017). Complementary stereotypes (see Chap. 4, this volume) are observed in research about SEP-related stereotypes. Those with a high SEP are often viewed as more competent but colder, and those with a low SEP are viewed as less competent and warmer. This was found to be true regardless of the SEP of the person being asked, indicating that these stereotypes are also endorsed by stereotyped groups themselves (Durante & Fiske, 2017). Findings about SEP-­ related stereotypes have been relatively consistent for different measures of SEP (income, educational level, occupation), although especially for occupation, other attributes like trustworthiness may play a significant role within groups defined by SEP. For example, doctors are considered more trustworthy than lawyers despite both being occupations associated with high SEP. At a societal level, the amount of inequality also impacts stereotype perceptions. In more unequal countries, status is more strongly linked with competence, reinforcing the stereotype that people with a lower SEP are considered less competent (Durante & Fiske, 2017). People with a higher SEP were considered colder in countries with higher inequalities. In short, inequality penalises the perceived competence of people with a lower SEP and penalises the perceived warmth of those with a higher SEP.  One study found that stereotypes about the wealthy were associated with participants’ tax policy preferences (Ragusa, 2014), showing that SEP-related stereotypes can put pressure on between-group solidarity.

11  How to Study and Understand Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health

 onsequences of SEP for Health C and Well-Being Overall, those in low socioeconomic groups experience poorer health than those in high socioeconomic groups (Cookson et  al., 2016). These inequalities are observed for many health indicators: life expectancy, chronic diseases like Type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular diseases, different types of cancers, and respiratory diseases. While it is clear that socioeconomic inequities in health exist, there are two competing hypotheses about the direction of the relationship between SEP and health: social selection and social causation. The social selection hypothesis posits that being in poor health can, over time, lead people to either drift to a lower socioeconomic group or fail to move to a higher socioeconomic group. For example, the symptoms of prolonged mental illness could limit a person’s ability to stay in school or keep a job, leading to a drop in SEP (Mossakowski, 2014). The social causation hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that experiencing disadvantaged SEP leads to an increased risk of poor health via different underlying mechanisms. Although there is evidence for both hypotheses, the social causation hypothesis has been studied most often in the field of social epidemiology (Mackenbach, 2019), with studies aiming to find explanatory mechanisms on which policies and interventions could intervene to reduce inequalities. Within the social causation hypothesis, multiple explanations for socioeconomic inequities have been put forward, including material, psychosocial, and behavioural approaches (Bartley, 2004). All three approaches propose certain intermediary mechanisms that drive the effect of SEP on health. The materialist approach focuses on material resources, like income, and what those resources enable in terms of population health (e.g., welfare programs, adequate housing, access to services). The psychosocial approach focuses on the unequal social distribution of psychosocial risk factors, such as self-esteem and social support, and the impact of those risk factors on health. The behavioural approach empha-

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sises the role of health-related behaviour (e.g., smoking, physical exercise, and diet), as lower socioeconomic groups are generally more likely to practice unhealthier behaviours than higher socioeconomic groups. While the three approaches were developed separately, they are not mutually exclusive; material, psychosocial, and behavioural factors all play a role in shaping health, and other types of factors, such as cultural, biomedical, and environmental factors, are increasingly considered by researchers. Studies on this topic have shown that many types of factors, considered simultaneously, help explain socioeconomic inequities in health outcomes (Duijster et al., 2018). These types of studies are helpful, but they assume that each type of factor influences socioeconomic inequities in health through isolated pathways. There is increasing recognition that understanding the interplay between different factors may be important to help understand, and ultimately reduce, socioeconomic inequities in health. For instance, smoking (a behavioural factor more common among those with a lower SEP (Stronks et al., 1997)) may be a means to cope with stress (a psychosocial factor) caused by financial problems or job uncertainty (material factors). The broader socioeconomic, environmental, and political contexts that individuals live in (structural factors), which are largely out of the i­ ndividual’s control, have also been considered important in explaining socioeconomic inequities in health (Diez Roux, 1998; Macintyre et al., 1993). The interplay between structural and individual factors may be key to understanding how resources can be transformed into action and how socioeconomic inequalities in health are shaped (see Sen’s capabilities approach in Chap. 5, this volume). The mechanisms driving socioeconomic inequities in health are numerous, multileveled, interrelated, and complex, which has led to recommendations that researchers consider the broader systems shaping health and well-being rather than examining single mechanisms (Diez Roux, 2011).

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observed in Finland and the UK (Melkas, 2013; Williams & Fullagar, 2019). The tendency of policy-makers to circle back to lifestyle factors Depending on the definition of SEP as well as the instead of structural factors is referred to as the mechanisms deemed central to explaining health lifestyle drift (Popay et al., 2010). inequities, different policy approaches are likely The lifestyle drift not only takes away to be taken. The role of the individual is key in resources from targeting structural factors but has the behavioural approach, leading to interven- been suggested to contribute to the widening of tions like health education that place the respon- socioeconomic inequalities in health (McGill sibility for changing health behaviours and et al., 2015), which likely has an adverse impact outcomes on the individual. As a result, individu- on solidarity because these types of policies alised approaches, focusing on groups like “the unfairly place blame and responsibility on disadobese” or “the smokers”, are likely to induce stig- vantaged individuals. Moreover, education promatisation (MacLean et al., 2009). Interventions grams or lifestyle interventions are relatively based on the material approach (such as subsi- more accessible to those with a higher SEP, dies) or the psychosocial approach (targeting the whereas those who are in highest need are the social environment by enhancing social support, most difficult to reach and the least likely to benfor example) may be less stigmatising and more efit from these types of interventions (Broeders effective (MacLean et al., 2009). Vice versa, the et  al., 2018). Lifestyle interventions are often policy approach taken is also likely to affect pub- designed by professionals educated in the field of lic opinions regarding SEP and ill health (see, for health promotion and, consequently, by people instance, Chap. 12, this volume). with a high SEP. This makes identification with Many policy initiatives aim to address health and fully understanding and considering the inequalities by targeting the root of the issue, the needs of people with a lower SEP difficult. As social determinants of health, that is, structural interventions are often designed from the perfactors such as housing and employment. spective of people with a high SEP, they often However, evaluations have shown that it can be primarily match the needs and opportunities of challenging for health policy to impact these those in higher social positions (Adler et  al., social determinants of health due to health policy-­ 1993). This contributes to the lack of effect of makers’ lack of power, influence, and expertise in lifestyle interventions on those with a lower SEP other policy areas (Gore & Kothari, 2012; (Williams & Fullagar, 2019). The few Melkas, 2013; Popay et  al., 2010; Williams & ­interventions that do achieve positive outcomes Fullagar, 2019). When priorities for social justice for those with a low SEP cannot be expected to are not aligned between policy domains, opportu- have lasting results without simultaneously nities to develop and implement policy at the addressing structural factors (Gore & Kothari, structural level may be limited. A review of diet 2012). and physical activity policy initiatives in Canada There is a need to move from the lifestyle and found that the more an intervention was focused individual responsibility viewpoint to a focus on on structure, the less it was supported by the pub- health equity, addressing social determinants of lic, which the authors posited was partly due to health and enabling equal opportunities for Canada’s increasingly neoliberal political and healthy behaviour across all layers of society, economic policy (Gore & Kothari, 2012). The thereby increasing social justice (Godziewski, review also found that the vast majority of poli- 2020). However, the size of socioeconomic cies remained focused on individual and behav- inequalities in health in a society can challenge ioural factors, showing that alignment in what is solidarity and, specifically, people’s willingness perceived as a social justice priority between dif- to contribute to the costs of healthcare and disferent policy domains is necessary to effectively ease prevention. For example, people with a high target structural factors. This trend has also been SEP are less willing than people with a low SEP

11  How to Study and Understand Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health

to invest in cures for diseases that are strongly associated with unhealthy behaviours (i.e., lung cancer, which is strongly linked to smoking behaviour), as they consider these behaviours controllable and, therefore, preventable (Penner et al., 2018). Further, the stereotypes people hold regarding those with low and high SEP may influence which policies are deemed necessary, fruitful, and acceptable. People with political power often have a high SEP and are likely to be socially distanced from those with a low SEP. As a result, people with political power may be more likely to hold negative stereotypes towards those with a low SEP compared to those without political power (Cozzarelli et al., 2001). For instance, if those with political power or the public consider people with a low SEP to be lazy, they might be more in favour of behavioural approaches that emphasise individual responsibility for a healthy lifestyle. However, when those in political power or the public consider SEP to be largely determined by luck and living environment, they may be more inclined to accept subsidies that target individuals by improving the material conditions they live in. As such, SEP-­ related stereotypes may influence and be influenced by the social policies that are in place to address health inequalities.

Conclusion Socioeconomic position (SEP) is a major fault line in contemporary Western societies. It is a highly defining social identity that largely determines with whom people interact. Moreover, SEP has far-reaching consequences, not only for where people are born, grow up, play, reside, work, and age, but also for the health state in which they are able to do so. SEP significantly impacts health and well-being, and these socioeconomic inequalities seem to be widening (Mackenbach, 2019). In this chapter, we have shown how difficult it is to study and combat socioeconomic inequalities in health. Not only is it a complex process that may have varying causes and involve many interrelated factors, but public health policy-makers trying to battle

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socioeconomic inequalities in health also have to deal with stereotypes that may impede the acceptance of policies aimed at changing structural factors, both by policy-­makers in other domains as well as society. The COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately hit the most vulnerable and further contributes to widening socioeconomic inequalities in health, yet it may also create a window of opportunity for structural, equitable improvements and for future breakthroughs in public health.

Glossary Intersectionality: The complex, cumulative way in which multiple aspects of personal identity (such as gender, SEP, and race/ethnicity) intersect in forming one’s experience of marginalisation. Lifestyle drift: The tendency of policymakers to focus on lifestyle- and disease-related factors instead of the social determinants of health while aiming to address socioeconomic health inequalities. Public health policy: Policy that aims to protect and improve health for the general or a specific population. Relative deprivation: The extent to which a person or social group is deprived compared to others in society. In highly unequal societies, relative deprivation is larger than in less unequal societies. SEP-related stereotypes: An oversimplified characterisation of a certain group or type of individual based on their perceived SEP, such as stereotyping those with a low level of education as lazy and implying blame for their position. Social causation: The hypothesis that economic hardship, or having a low SEP, increases the risk of poor health outcomes. There are three main explanatory mechanisms through which SEP influences health: material (i.e., housing), psychosocial (i.e., social support), and behavioural (i.e., dietary) factors. Social class: The broad culture, norms, social identity, and socialisation patterns associated

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with belonging to a certain socioeconomic group. Social determinants of health: The non-medical factors that influence one’s health. These are the wider set of forces and systems shaping the conditions of daily life, such as education, healthcare, working conditions, housing, safety, and social inclusion. Social selection: The hypothesis that poor health outcomes lead to economic hardship or to having a low SEP. Socioeconomic inequalities (or inequities) in health: Systematic health differences between individuals or groups that are socially produced and that stem from a form of injustice. Socioeconomic health inequalities between those in lower and higher SEPs reflect an unfair distribution of social determinants of health. In the public health literature, there is a distinction between inequalities and inequities. In this book, we use the two definitions interchangeably. Socioeconomic position: A concept used to define an individual’s socioeconomic standing within society. The concept captures both resources and prestige and is often measured using one or more indicators such as level of income (economic status), educational level (social status), and occupation (work prestige). Note that the objective measurement using SEP indicators is different from subjective measures of SEP, where people are asked about perceptions of their SEP relative to others’ SEP. Comprehension Questions

1. What is an example of how to measure absolute SEP and relative SEP, and how could one’s absolute SEP be different from one’s relative SEP? 2. Provide an example of how material, behavioural, and psychosocial factors affect one another. How do these interactions contribute to why those in lower socioeconomic groups generally experience poorer health than those in higher socioeconomic groups?

3. How could SEP-related stereotyping negatively influence solidarity and the willingness to invest in social policies? Discussion Questions

1. One could argue that public health policymakers are mainly responsible for developing policies and interventions to reduce socioeconomic inequalities in health. However, given the interplay between the many factors that contribute to socioeconomic inequalities in health, one could also argue that interventions from other policy domains are at least as important. Which other relevant policy domains can you think of, and what policy measures could they put in place to improve the living conditions and thereby the health of those in lower socioeconomic groups? 2. Which intersections of social categories do you think are most important in shaping people’s experience of inequality in society? Why?

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11  How to Study and Understand Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health Bowleg, L. (2012). The problem with the phrase women and minorities: Intersectionality – An important theoretical framework for public health. American Journal of Public Health, 102(7), 1267–1273. https://doi. org/10.2105/AJPH.2012.300750 Broeders, D., Das, J., Jennissen, R., Tiemeijer, W., & de Visser, M. (2018). Van verschil naar potentieel. Een realistisch perspectief op de sociaaleconomische gezondheidsverschillen. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid. Bruni, L., & Stanca, L. (2006). Income aspirations, television and happiness: Evidence from the world values survey. Kyklos, 59(2), 209–225. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. (2020). Gezonde levensverwachting; onderwijsniveau; 2011/2014– 2015/2018. Retrieved, 24 July 2021, from https:// www.cbs.nl/nl-­nl/cijfers/detail/83780NED. Chanana, K. (1993). Accessing higher education: The dilemma of schooling women, minorities, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in contemporary India. Higher Education, 26, 69–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/ BF01575107 Cookson, R., Propper, C., Asaria, M., & Raine, R. (2016). Socio-Economic Inequalities in Health Care in England. Fiscal Studies, 37(3-4), 371–403. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2016.12109 Cozzarelli, C., Wilkinson, A. V., & Tagler, M. J. (2001). Attitudes toward the poor and attributions for poverty. Journal of Social Issues, 57(2), 207–227. https://doi. org/10.1111/0022-­4537.00209 Curran, D. (2016). Thinking with Bourdieu, Marx, and Weber to analyse contemporary inequalities and class. In  Risk, power, and inequality in the 21st Century, 63–82. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi. org/10.1057/9781137495570_4 Diez Roux, A.  V. (1998). Bringing context back into epidemiology: Variables and fallacies in multilevel analysis. American Journal of Public Health, 88(2), 216–222. Diez Roux, A.  V. (2011). Complex systems thinking and current impasses in health disparities research. American Journal of Public Health, 101, 1627–1634. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2011.300149 Duijster, D., Oude Groeniger, J., van der Heijden, G.  J. M.  G., & van Lenthe, F.  J. (2018). Material, behavioural, cultural and psychosocial factors in the explanation of socioeconomic inequalities in oral health. European Journal of Public Health, 28(4), 590–597. Durante, F., Bearns, C., & Fiske, S.  T. (2017). Poor but warm, rich but cold (and competent): Social classes in the stereotype content model. Journal of Social Issues, 73(1), 138–157. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12208 Durante, F., & Fiske, S.  T. (2017). How social-class stereotypes maintain inequality. Current Opinion in Psychology, 18, 43–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. copsyc.2017.07.033 Geyer, S., Hemström, Ö., Peter, R., & Vågerö, D. (2006). Education, income, and occupational class

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126 all? Systematic review of socioeconomic inequalities in impact. BMC Public Health, 15(457). https://doi. org/10.1186/s12889-­015-­1781-­7 Melkas, T. (2013). Health in all policies as a priority in Finnish health policy: A case study on national health policy development partnerships. Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 41(11, Suppl), 3–28. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1403494812472296 Mijs, J.  J. B. (2018). Inequality is a problem of inference: How people solve the social puzzle of unequal outcomes. Societies, 8(3). https://doi.org/10.3390/ soc8030064 Mossakowski, K. N. (2014). Social causation and social selection. In The Wiley Blackwell encyclopedia of health, illness, behavior, and society (1st ed.). John Wiley & Sons. Penner, L. A., Phelan, S. M., Earnshaw, V., Albrecht, T. L., & Dovidio, J.  F. (2018, January 15). Patient stigma, medical interactions, and health care disparities: A selective review. The Oxford Handbook of Stigma, Discrimination, and Health. https://doi.org/10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780190243470.013.12 Popay, J., Whitehead, M., & Hunter, D. J. (2010). Injustice is killing people on a large scale – But what is to be done about it? Journal of Public Health, 32(2), 148– 149. https://doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdq029 Ragusa, J.  M. (2014). Socioeconomic stereotypes: Explaining variation in preferences for taxing the rich. American Politics Research, 43(2), 327–359. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1532673X14539547

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Deservingness and Socio-­Economic Cleavages

12

Maša Filipovič Hrast and Katharina Zimmermann

Introduction The European landscape of social policies is not static but is constantly changing and adapting. Some of the most important changes arise from economic pressures, resulting in various cutbacks to social policies in times of recession in many countries (Schubert et al., 2016; van Kersbergen et  al., 2014). However, even prior to the 2008 recession, most European countries experienced cutbacks linked to the neoliberal logic of stimulating economic growth and reducing public expenditure (Taylor-­Gooby et al., 2017). In contrast, social investment ideas (see Chap. 5, this volume), and the growing needs of specific groups, such as women entering the labour market, as well as demographic pressures for developing long-term care policies, have also meant the expansion and adoption of new social policies (Blum et  al., 2020; Schubert et  al., 2016). In political decision-making processes, public perceptions of the deservingness of specific groups receiving welfare state support, benefits and services can be important for either preventing cut-

M. F. Hrast (*) University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia e-mail: [email protected] K. Zimmermann University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

backs or making them more publicly acceptable. These perceptions can also be important in supporting the development of new, more generous welfare state policies or deterring their implementation. Research shows that perceptions of deservingness vary according to individual characteristics, self-interest, ideological preferences, and institutional context, as these influence the type of policies being supported or views on the deservingness of specific groups (van Oorschot, 2006; van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017; Laenen & Meuleman, 2017; see Chap. 6, this volume). In this chapter, we focus on socio-­economic differences in perceptions of deservingness, that is, how those with higher socio-economic status perceive and argue for or against the deservingness of different welfare state services and transfers. Taking socioeconomic cleavages into account is vital when attempting to gain an understanding of the conditions of rising social inequalities in European countries (see Piketty, 2014). Understanding arguments behind how groups categorise others as being more or less deserving of welfare state support is of particular importance. These arguments must be analysed in comparative perspective, that is, comparing people from different socio-economic backgrounds, as well as comparing different societal and welfare contexts, as institutional settings influence deservingness perceptions as well as the formation of solidarities (Larsen, 2008).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_12

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 eservingness theory and Socio-­ D Economic Differences People apply various criteria when thinking about what help and support people deserve from the welfare state, as outlined in Chap. 6 of this volume (see also van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). Based on these criteria, it seems there is a pattern of ranking various groups and “that Europeans share a common and fundamental deservingness culture” (van Oorschot, 2006, p.  23). Europeans relatively consistently rank older people, as well as those who are sick and/ or disabled as more deserving, whilst ranking the unemployed, people receiving social assistance and, in particular, immigrants, as less deserving (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). However, this assumption of a universal ranking has been challenged by research indicating that ranking is related to national context, specific economic conditions, and institutional factors, such as the universality of welfare policies (Laenen & Meuleman, 2017). Furthermore, there are significant individual differences in perceptions based on, for example, age and political preferences. Moreover, Laenen and Meuleman (2017) have shown that there is a large group of ‘welfare egalitarians’ who rank the elderly, those who are sick, and those who are unemployed as equally deserving. When we put the ranking of various groups in society into the context of socio-economic differences, the literature offers insights into three different dimensions. The first dimension relates to the socio-economic position of (potential) beneficiaries. On the one hand, need as such is an important criterion and it therefore makes those in lower socio-economic groups be perceived as more deserving. On the other hand, when combined with other criteria, especially control and reciprocity, perceived need often means that the poor are ranked lower on the deservingness scale than those with middle or higher incomes. Here, the second dimension comes into play: the reasoning behind rankings (i.e., behind the deservingness criteria). A lower ranking of people in weak socio-economic posi-

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tions (especially e.g., people who are poor or unemployed) has been linked to the role stereotypes play in forming attitudes, such as perceptions of certain groups as lazy, or dishonest. These perceptions are often even linked to gendered and racial stereotyping—such as ‘the black welfare queen’ (Vries, 2017; van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). These stereotypes are further supported by biased and stereotypical media representations and discourse (van Doorn & Bos, 2017). Another important framing context for these perceptions is misperceived reality, e.g., incorrect perceptions of the levels of spending for the unemployed or levels of benefit fraud, which fuels negative attitudes towards the poor (Baumberg Geiger, 2017). Such negative perceptions are also linked to increased support for the conditionality of benefits, that is, linking the receiving of benefits to specific obligations and conditions, especially evident in wealthier countries and Eastern European former socialist countries (Buß et al., 2017). The third dimension of the relationship between deservingness perceptions and socio-­ economic differences relates to the socio-­ economic position of people. Income and education affects individual attitudes towards welfare programmes and how individuals rank deservingness (Svallfors, 2010). Individuals with a higher socio-economic status were found to believe that individuals are in control of their own life, and they therefore emphasized control criteria. Furthermore, they differentiated more between those who can and cannot ‘control’ their neediness (e.g., sick vs. unemployed). Higher socio-economic individuals were also found to emphasize reciprocity more, as they feel they have contributed more to society themselves and are therefore more supportive of benefits for groups who they also feel have contributed to society (e.g., the elderly). Furthermore, attitudes towards welfare recipients and welfare programmes are linked to self-interest (Svallfors, 1997; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Chung & Meuleman, 2017). Therefore, those with lower socio-economic status are likely to support wel-

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fare programmes for those with a lower socio-­ economic status to a higher degree. Also, the position of lower socio-economic individuals towards immigrants might be more exclusionary, in line with literature on welfare chauvinism or welfare nationalism (see Chap. 14, this volume). This literature indicates an important part of arguments for or against the deservingness of certain groups are driven by the political belief that welfare benefits should primarily target citizens amidst fears that new immigrant groups will take away jobs and welfare state benefits and services from citizens (Ervasti & Hjerm, 2012; Larsen et al., 2018). As Larsen et al. (2018) emphasize, however, the existence of more widespread antiimmigrant positions towards those with lower socio-economic backgrounds could be linked not only to self-interest, but also to stronger ethnicnation perceptions, stronger prejudices against outsiders, and stronger concerns that migration in general will have a negative societal and economic impact. Laenen and Meuleman (2017, p.  50) have found that those with lower socioeconomic status are significantly less likely to opt for the universal rank order of deservingness. These differences are not only linked to an individual’s characteristics but must also be understood in the context of collective identity, in which intergroup solidarity and perspectives also explain people’s orientations toward other groups (see Chaps. 2 and 3, this volume). In the current chapter we further advance our understanding of the relationship between deservingness perceptions and socio-economic differences. We focus on a) how the judgement of deservingness differs for (potential) recipients in different socio-economic positions; b) people’s actual reasoning when making deservingness judgments about (potential) beneficiaries across different socio-economic groups; c) the role of the socio-economic position of people when reasoning about deservingness; and d) how national/welfare state regime differences relate to these deservingness judgments. For hands-on reflections about these dimensions and in-depth insights into the research process, we will present a case study from a comparative research project in which we studied deservingness perceptions in

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Slovenia and Germany. These two countries belong to two different welfare regimes (Heuer & Mau, 2017; Filipovič Hrast & Rakar, 2020): Germany belongs to the conservative-corporatist regime, and Slovenia to a so-called post-socialist one (but simultaneously shows some characteristics of a conservative-corporatist regime and a social democratic regime). A comparative perspective is highly interesting, as it allows us to not only focus on the individual socio-economic position of respondents and how this frames their attitudes, but also on the institutional background of the welfare states they live in, which is known to also considerably shape people’s perceptions of welfare and welfare recipients (Larsen, 2008). For instance, people from Central and Eastern European countries have been found to have a more critical view and to rank the deservingness of some welfare groups lower than those of others, such as immigrants (see Chap. 14). Moreover, due to higher levels of unemployment in the region, they sometimes judge those who are unemployed less harshly, ascribing their position more to structural causes, while conservative welfare states like Germany are known for their stronger emphasis on work efforts and hence a harsher attitude towards the unemployed (see Buß et al., 2017).

Deservingness perceptions in Slovenia and Germany Methodological Remarks The case study draws on research from focus groups (FGs) dating from a study conducted in autumn 2016 as part of the research project “‘Welfare State Futures: Our Children’s Europe’ (WelfSOC).1 In this project, FGs were formed (each group session lasted two hours) with parThe project was funded by NORFACE and led by Professor Peter Taylor-Gooby (University of Kent). In the project, empirical research was not only conducted in Slovenia and Germany, but also in Denmark, Norway, and the UK. For the project and for this chapter we acknowledge the NORFACE funding (grant 462-14-050) and funding of the Slovene research agency (n. J5-2559, 462-14-052).

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ticipants who had similar socio-economic backgrounds. Among others, one focus group was made up of individuals from a higher socio-­ economic background (here: middle class) and one with individuals from a lower socio-­economic background (working class).2 To stimulate discussion, focus group participants received different vignettes (i.e., fictitious examples; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 129) of target welfare groups: an unemployed person, a retired elderly person who was previously employed, a family with a median income and two children, a person with a low income (if applicable, the minimum wage), a person with a high income (well above the average income for that country), and a migrant (without further specification). For each vignette, the group was asked what social benefits and services the person(s) should receive and why, as well as what should be demanded from the person(s) and why. Thus, the discussions revolved around rights, entitlements, conditions, obligations, responsibilities, needs and deservingness. At the end of the discussion, each participant was asked to rank the vignettes according to who is most deserving of welfare state support and who is least deserving. The transcribed recordings of the focus groups were coded using Nvivo software. The coding scheme initially consisted of the type of focus group and vignette, and the deservingness criteria outlined in the literature, with the possibility to amend or refine these categories based on the data. More information on the methodological background of the WelfSOC project and the focus groups can be found in Taylor-Gooby and Leruth (2018) and Heuer and Zimmermann (2020).

Empirical Analysis Our empirical analysis follows the three dimensions of the relationship between deservingness perceptions and socio-economic differences mentioned above. In a first step, we focus on FG participants’ opinions regarding the deservingness of different (potential) welfare recipients in different socio-economic positions. We are hence first interested in how the participants ranked the different vignettes, and whether we can observe different positions towards potential recipients who hold different socio-economic positions. As we are not yet interested in the socio-economic positions of the FG participants in this step, we will only focus on differences between the two countries under study. To analyse how our focus group participants judged the deservingness of the different vignettes (i.e., potential recipients in different socio-economic circumstances), we present data from the ranking exercise at the end of the FG discussion. As Table 12.1 shows, the groups seem to be relatively unanimous in their positions towards the bottom end of the deservingness scale: the well-off person is ranked either at position 5 or 6 in all groups; the same applies to the immigrant in all but one group.3 For the top positions (1 and 2) there is no apparent unanimity: here, we find the unemployed, the old person, the family and the immigrant scattered across all four focus groups. However, an interesting pattern appears when taking a closer look at the German and Slovenian FGs: in Slovenia, the unemployed rank first in both groups, whereas in Germany, the old person and the family share the top deservingness positions. Both the findings for the bottom positions (well-off, immigrant) and those for the top posi-

Each participant was asked to rank the vignettes individually. The mean position indicates the average position on which each vignette was positioned across the group (e.g., if the unemployed vignette was placed on rank 1 six times and on rank 2 two times, the mean position would be 1.25). The mean standard deviation indicates the standard deviation across all mean positions in a specific focus group and can roughly be interpreted as an indicator for how homogenous or heterogeneous a ranking in a specific group was (low value = homogenous). 3 

Participants were recruited based on their income, their occupation, and their educational degrees. The groups were mixed in terms of age groups, gender, and family status. For reasons of simplicity, we will speak of ‘middle class’ and ‘working class’ groups in our case study, without applying a theoretical concept of class (see Chap. 11, this volume). 2 

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Table 12.1  Focus group participants’ ranking orders of vignettes Slovenia middle class Rank Vignette 1 Unemployed 2 Immigrant 3 Old person 4 Family 5 Low- income 6 Well-off Mean standard deviation

Mean position 1.89 2.56 3.11 3.67 3.78 6.00 0.97

Germany middle class Rank Vignette 1 Old person 2 Family 3 Unemployed 4 Low-income 5 Well-off 6 Immigrant Mean standard deviation

Mean position 2.4 2.83 2.86 3.25 5.00 5.25 1.20

Slovenia working class RANK Vignette 1 Unemployed 2 Low income 3 Old 4 Family 5 Well-off 6 Immigrant Mean standard deviation

Mean position 1.5 1.88 2.88 3.86 5.14 5.71 0,57

Germany working class RANK Vignette 1 Family 2 Old 3 Low-income 4 Unemployed 5 Well-off 6 Immigrant Mean standard deviation

Mean position 2.13 2.25 3.13 3.50 4.88 5.13 1.22

tions (unemployed in Slovenia, old person, and family in Germany) cannot be explained simply by analysing the ranking results. Hence, in a second step, we turn towards the actual reasoning people apply when making deservingness judgments about (potential) beneficiaries in different socio-economic groups. Here, we draw on the transcripts of our focus groups and analyse the arguments put forward by respondents when justifying why they perceive a certain group (i.e., a vignette) as more or less deserving, and how these arguments relate to the CARIN-criteria. When we look at the discussions relating to the ranking of the well-off earner, it becomes clear that, unsurprisingly, in all groups, participants ranked this vignette lower as they reasoned there was an absence of need, as illustrated in the following quotes. In Slovenia and Germany, participants thought that the well-off earner was “doing just fine” (DE-WC 4), was “in a position to see to it that he’ll be doing fine in the future, too” (D-WC 7), and that they, if at all, “should only be entitled to the basic things. Subsidised kindergartens [i.e., childcare, expl. by auth.], but at a minimal level” (SI-WC 8.8). When analysing why the immigrant was ranked last, we find a mix of different criteria in both countries. Several participants expressed a lack of identity with the immigrant, for instance

stating that “the older [person] and the others were more important to me” (DE-WC 3), or that “until we have taken care of our own, it is unfair to give to a foreigner who comes here” (SI-WC 5.5). Furthermore, statements such as “Do they [immigrants] ever contribute anything to the state? They just take” (SI-WC 5.7) or “even if he’s a refugee, he doesn’t pay into the system here at all” (DE-MC 8) highlight the crucial role of the reciprocity criterion, which was also pronounced in the debates in both countries. Interestingly, different criteria were also merged when talking about the deservingness of ­ immigrants. For instance, when a Slovenian participant demanded benefit conditionality for immigrants, this was tied to a certain behaviour and willingness to obey given criteria or being compliant with societal norms and values (i.e., the attitude criterion), as this quote illustrates: “Does the eligibility for benefits change if they are not willing to integrate? You have rights, but you have to first fulfil the obligations stemming from those rights” (SI-MC 4.2). When we look at the deservingness perceptions of higher ranked vignettes, we observe clear country differences. In Slovenia, the unemployed person was judged as highly deserving in both focus groups, while in Germany the unemployed individual was only ranked third (working class group)

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Fig. 12.1  Illustration of a focus group discussion—the reasoning behind the high ranking of those who are unemployed

and fourth (middle class group) respectively. When we take a closer look at the frequently used criteria in the discussions on the deservingness of the unemployed, similar criteria exist in both countries: control, need and reciprocity. Hence, the debates in the two countries seem to be highly similar, a finding which clearly contradicts the different descriptive ranking results (with unemployed individuals ranked as highly deserving in Slovenia, whilst being ranked more in the middle of the “deservingness field” in Germany). In order to better understand this puzzle, we need to take a closer look at how the criteria were applied in the debates. Figure 12.1 shows coded sequences from the debates in the German and the Slovene working-class group debates. As these sequences show, the usage of the same criterion can differ substantially when used in different contexts. While the criteria reciprocity/ attitude, control and need appear in both debates, the Slovene statements show that for the participants, unemployment was viewed as more of an involuntary situation, beyond the control of the individual (“he was willing to work”). In contrast, the German quotes somehow imply a sense

of ‘the lazy unemployed’ (i.e., unemployed individuals are in control of their situations and should show some reciprocal activity in exchange for receiving benefits) with statements like “There’s enough work to go around”. Similarly, the German participants do not perceive the unemployed to be in need of social welfare (“unemployed people can get by”), while this is different in Slovenia, as statements in other sequences also highlight (“I think fundamentally an unemployed person cannot afford food” [SI-­ MC 4.5]). Therefore, although the unemployed have low incomes in both countries and could therefore be labelled as a group in need (e.g., in comparison to middle class or old people), the depth of this need is judged quite differently, in relation to the functioning of the welfare state and the generosity of unemployment benefits. This results in a different ranking. In short, while the arguments for the lower deservingness of immigrants and well-off earners were very similar in Slovenia and Germany, both the ranking and the reasoning behind this ranking differed for the unemployed vignette. In Slovenia, this resulted in high deservingness, mostly due to

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a high perceived need and lack of control. In Germany, this resulted in medium deservingness due to a perceived lack of need combined with individual control. These findings are clearly in line with the deservingness literature: As stated above, while the need criterion plays an important role when it comes to how people judge how deserving an individual in a lower socio-­economic position is, it is often combined with some form of control and reciprocity. This is because deservingness judgements are linked to certain stereotypes, as reflected in the German discussion around the ‘lazy unemployed’. Furthermore, as mentioned above, public (mis)perceptions of reality are also a crucial factor in deservingness judgements. The Slovenian participants who saw the unemployed as not being in control of their situations are a good example, given the structural problem of high unemployment. The criteria used in both countries are the same (control), however they are applied in different unemployment contexts that exist in both countries, such as periodically high unemployment rates and a deeper recession in Slovenia, contrary to better economic circumstances in Germany. This results in a different ranking of the group. Having discussed the role of the socio-­economic situation of (potential) welfare beneficiaries, in a third step, we now turn towards the socio-economic position of the FG participants and whether this position influences their deservingness perceptions. Hence, we are interested in differences in the ranking and the reasoning between the middleclass group and the working-­class group in both countries. The most remarkable group-difference in Slovenia is the fact that the working-class FG ranked the immigrant last, while the middle-class FG ranked the immigrant in a very high position (position 2). As mentioned above, the low ranking of the immigrant in the working-class FG was due to a lack of identity, that is, labelling it as an us versus them situation (“There’s not enough work, even for us” [SI-WC 5.9]), emphasising reciprocity (“…they should have to contribute” [SI-WC 5.7]). Participants in the Slovene working-class group instantly perceived the immigrant as a refugee, and the discussion on this vignette was generally very harsh and even hostile at times.

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When we take a closer look at the middle-­ class group in Slovenia, the debate is indeed quite contrary. Here, the first statements suggest that the participants do not want to differentiate between whether a potential beneficiary is a Slovene citizen or not (“They should have all the rights that belong to the rest of us”; SI-MC 4.2). However, they almost all agree that certain groups of immigrants are in need of financial and other support (“They need it the most” [SI-MC 4.1]; “If someone completely new came, they should be put in the first place in my opinion. [SI-MC 4.3]), even if some degree of reciprocity was demanded by some participants (“Conditions should be fulfilled to receive the benefit” [SI-MC 4.6]). One possible line of reasoning for these differences is self-interest theories used to explain attitudes (Svallfors, 1997; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Larsen et al., 2018). From a self-interest perspective, those in lower socio-economic positions perceive themselves to be potential beneficiaries of the welfare state, from which the new, needy group will take away needed resources, clearly evident in a few statements (e.g., ‘not enough jobs, even for us’). It also indicates the importance of context—(e.g., higher unemployment rates in Slovenia compared to Germany), which can bring certain criteria for particular groups to the fore, (such as identity in the lower-class FG). These differences therefore relate to the different valuations people have of certain deservingness criteria (see Chap. 6, this volume). Another explanation for the described differences can also be linked to group identity theory, which shows how norms can play an important role in intergroup identity, legitimizing greater hostility and lower deservingness of ‘outsiders’ (see Chap. 2, this volume). Hence, the diverse judgments of the deservingness of the immigrant might be interpreted as an interesting case for class-specific ‘cultural repertoires’ (Lamont & Thévenot, 2000), which seem to offer group-­ specific frames of references to interpret the social world. Another example for such shared worldviews that influence the respondents’ perception of deservingness is the debate on the old person vignette in Germany. Both the working-­ class group and the middle-class group ranked

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the old person as highly deserving (rank 1 and rank 2), which strongly indicates that both groups agree on the deservingness of older people. However, when we look at the debates within both groups, it is most striking that they base their decision on very different lines of argument. In the eyes of the middle-class group, the old person—who was defined as a woman— is especially deserving because she probably worked her whole life and should therefore be rewarded (as well as because she is seen to be in need). The working-class group argues she is deserving because older people shouldn’t be poor, and because old age is a stage in everyone’s life. Hence, as Fig.  12.2 illustrates, the working class particularly refers to need and identity as deservingness criteria, while the middle-class group refers to reciprocity and control, again indicating different valuations of specific deservingness criteria (i.e., deservingness valuations; see Chap. 6, this volume).

Conclusion Deservingness is a complex phenomenon that is linked to among others, context and institutional settings, group identity, and individual characteristics (see Chap. 6). In this chapter, we investigated the relationship between deservingness perceptions and socio-economic differences. We looked at how people evaluated the deservingness of (potential) recipients in different socio-­economic positions and found important differences in our case study of focus group discussions in Germany and Slovenia. Even though participants in both countries emphasized criteria of control and need (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; van Oorschot et  al., 2017), their deservingness rankings differed. For example, they judged the deservingness of a (fictitious) unemployed benefit recipient very low in the German case and very high in Slovenia, due to contextual differences in the unemployment and economic situation in both countries, as well as potentially different stereotypical and media representations of the unemployed. Furthermore, interesting differences arose when observing the distinctions in which criteria

were applied and the perceptions of deservingness between the participants with higher versus lower socio-economic backgrounds. One of the most striking disparities was the attitude towards immigrants: those with a lower socio-economic background placed this group much lower on the deservingness scale. This can be explained by selfinterest theory linked to the welfare chauvinism literature, which indicates an important part of deservingness perceptions are driven by fears of losing jobs and welfare state benefits and services to immigrants (see Ervasti & Hjerm, 2012; Larsen et al., 2018). We also saw that the identity criterion was stronger among lower socio-economic groups, while need was emphasized in higher socio-economic groups, showing different deservingness valuations (i.e., how people evaluate different criteria; see Chap. 6, this volume) due to socio-­ economic status. These differences can also be interpreted in the context of class and social identity theories (see Chap. 2, this volume). The chapter therefore illustrates how people from different socio-economic groups evaluate other groups and their deservingness differently, and how these evaluations are made in specific country contexts. It also showed how specific cleavages between groups can be formed and how people employ an ‘us against them’ reasoning, which threats (e.g., job threat) they perceive, and how solidarity amongst groups can be limited due to these perceptions. These distinctions in perceptions and use of arguments therefore enable us to better understand potential social cleavages in society.

Glossary Welfare chauvinism: Political belief that welfare benefits should be only or primarily provided to natives of a certain country; see Chap. 14, this volume. Welfare nationalism: See welfare chauvinism. Vignettes: A brief description of a specific scenario that is provided to participants in social scientific studies to assess participants’ individual reactions to the scenario.

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Fig. 12.2  Illustration of a focus group discussion—reasoning for the high ranking of an old person

Comprehension Questions

References

How are poor people ranked on the deservingness scale and which CARIN criteria influ- Baumberg Geiger, B. (2017). False beliefs and the perceived deservingness of social security benefit claimence these rankings? ants. In W. van Oorschot, F. Roosma, B. Meuleman, & What are the three different dimensions of T. Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness. Edward the relationship between deservingness and Elgar Publishing, Inc. socio-economic divisions? Blekesaune, M., & Quadagno, J. (2003). Public attitudes How do those in higher socio-economic toward welfare state policies: A comparative analysis positions differ from those in lower socio-­ of 24 nations. European Sociological Review, 19(5), 415–427. economic positions when applying deservingBlum, S., Kuhlmann, J., & Schubert, K. (Eds.). (2020). ness criteria?

Discussion Questions

Think about how socio-economic positions could intersect with other categories discussed in the book (e.g., gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation). How might these intersections affect the deservingness rankings discussed here? The chapter compares deservingness perceptions in Germany and Slovenia. What might these deservingness perceptions look like in other European welfare states? Why?

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136 Filipovič Hrast, M., & Rakar, T. (2020). Restructuring the Slovenian welfare system: Between economic pressures and future challenges. In S. Blum, J. Kuhlmann, & K.  Schubert (Eds.), Routledge handbook of European welfare systems. Routledge. Heuer, J. O., & Mau, S. (2017). Stretching the limits of solidarity: The German case. In P.  Taylor-Gooby, B. Leruth, & H. Chung (Eds.), After austerity: Welfare state transformation in Europe after the great recession. Oxford University Press. Heuer, J.  O., & Zimmermann, K. (2020). Unravelling deservingness: Which criteria do people use to judge the relative deservingness of welfare target groups? A vignette-based focus group study. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 30(4), 389–403. Laenen, T., & Meuleman, B. (2017). A universal rank order of deservingness? Geographical, temporal and social-structural comparisons. In W. van Oorschot, F. Roosma, B. Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. Lamont, M., & Thévenot, L. (2000). Rethinking comparative cultural sociology: Repertoires of evaluation in France and the United States. Cambridge cultural social studies. Cambridge University Press. Larsen, C. A. (2008). The political logic of labour market reforms and popular images of target groups. Journal of European Social Policy, 18(1), 50–63. Larsen, C.  A., Frederiksen, M., & Nielsen, M.  H. (2018). European welfare nationalism: A democratic forum study in five countries. In P.  Taylor-Gooby & B.  Leruth (Eds.), Attitudes, aspirations and welfare. Springer International Publishing. Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Harvard University Press. Ritchie, J., & Lewis, J. (Eds.). (2003). Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers. Sage Publications. Schubert, K., De Villota, P., & Kuhlmann, J. (Eds.). (2016). Challenges to European welfare systems. Springer. Svallfors, S. (1997). Worlds of welfare and attitudes to redistribution: A comparison of eight Western nations. European Sociological Review, 13(3), 283–304.

M. F. Hrast and K. Zimmermann Svallfors, S. (2010). Public Attitudes. In F.  G. Castles, S.  Leibfried, J.  Lewis, H.  Obinger, & C.  Pierson (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the welfare state. Oxford University Press. Taylor-Gooby, P., & Leruth, B. (Eds.). (2018). Attitudes, aspirations and welfare. Springer International Publishing. Taylor-Gooby, P., Leruth, B., & Chung, H. (Eds.). (2017). After austerity: Welfare state transformation in Europe after the great recession. Oxford University Press. van Doorn, B., & Bos, A. (2017). Are visual depictions of poverty in the US gendered and racialized? In W. van Oorschot, F.  Roosma, B.  Meuleman, & T.  Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. van Kersbergen, K., Vis, B., & Hemerijck, A. (2014). The great recession and welfare state reform: Is retrenchment really the only game left in town?: Is retrenchment really the only game left in town? Social Policy & Administration, 48(7), 883–904. van Oorschot, W. (2000). Who should get what, and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public. Policy and Politics: Studies of local government and its services, 28(1), 33–48. van Oorschot, W. (2006). Making the difference in social Europe: Deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states. Journal of European Social Policy, 6(1), 23–42. de Vries, R. (2017). Negative attitudes toward welfare claimants: The importance of unconscious bias. In W. van Oorschot, F.  Roosma, B.  Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. van Oorschot, W., & Roosma, F. (2017). The Sociaervasl legitimacy of targeted welfare and welfare deservingness. In W. van Oorschot, F. Roosma, B. Meuleman, & T. Reeskens (Eds.), The Social Legitimacy of targeted Welfare and Welfare Deservingness. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. van Oorschot, W., Roosma, F., Meuleman, B., & Reeskens, T. (Eds.). (2017). The social legitimacy of targeted welfare: Attitudes to welfare deservingness. Globalization and welfare. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

They Take Away Our Jobs! They Undermine Our National Culture! Public Perceptions of Immigrants and Their Consequences for Solidarity Across Ethnic Boundaries

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Borja Martinović and Fenella Fleischmann

Introduction Due to large-scale international migration, today’s societies are characterized by considerable ethnic diversity. Levels of diversity are comparable across West-European and North American countries; around 20% of the population are foreign-born or local-born children of foreign-born parents. Yet, the ethnic composition of the immigrant population differs markedly across immigrant destinations (Lessard-­Phillips et  al., 2014). These compositional differences follow mostly from differences in geographic location, legal regulations of immigration, postcolonial ties between origins and destinations, and specific recruitment policies of destination countries (e.g., the post-WWII West-European ‘guestworker’ programs; de Haas et  al., 2020). Consequently, who is perceived as a ‘typical immigrant’ differs across societies, with Americans being more likely to think of people from Latin America, the British of South Asians, and Germans of Turkish immigrants.

B. Martinović (*) Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

Despite this variation, the content of the stereotypes of newcomer groups shows striking similarities. Immigrants are generally perceived as less friendly and less economically successful than the non-migrant population. As a consequence of such stereotypes, immigrants are seen to occupy lower places in an ethnic hierarchy and can be seen as a source of threat. Fears about competition over economic resources (e.g., jobs, housing, and welfare) as well as about attacks on national culture and identity are prominent in the discourse on the management of immigration and diversity, and these fears are frequently mobilized by political actors who advocate for more stringent migration and integration policies. Research has shown that stereotypes and intergroup threats are two central explanations of negative attitudes (prejudice) and behaviour (discrimination) directed against immigrants in Western societies. Vice versa, they can help explain solidarity with, and a striving for social justice for these groups (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Therefore, in this chapter we review theories and evidence related to the stereotype content model and intergroup threat theory in relation to ethnic minorities of immigrant origin.

F. Fleischmann University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_13

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 re They Friendly and Competent? A Stereotypes of Immigrants

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receiving societies also shows that immigrant out-groups are stereotyped with many different qualifications (e.g., thrifty vs. quick-tempered) Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, but they are generally described in considerably 1979, see Chap. 2 of this volume) was developed more negative terms than the majority population to explain intergroup conflict, prejudice, and dis- (Hagendoorn & Hraba, 1989). crimination in society and stereotypes play an When comparing a range of groups within the important role in this theoretical perspective. In same society in terms of the content and (positive this context, stereotypes have been conceptual- vs. negative) valence of the stereotypes that are ized as the cognitive aspects of prejudice that held about them, a hierarchical structure is typiproduce specific behavioural intentions in combi- cally revealed where majority members are at the nation with the emotions that they elicit (Cuddy top and described in most positive terms. et al., 2007). To understand negative behaviours Different immigrant groups subsequently follow that undermine social justice, such as ethnic dis- in a specific order, such that some groups are crimination, but also positive behaviours like seen as more similar to the majority and are more solidarity with refugees, or speaking out against positively stereotyped whereas others occupy the ethnic discrimination and for social justice for lowest rungs of the ethnic hierarchy. In the immigrants, we need to understand the content of Netherlands, for instance, post-colonial migrants the stereotypes about a particular immigrant from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles are typigroup and the emotional reactions these stereo- cally perceived as nicer and more culturally simitype contents elicit. lar than former ‘guestworker’ and prevalent Qualitative and cross-cultural research reveals Muslim immigrant groups from Turkey and an abundance of different derogatory terms used Morocco – though they are still more negatively for immigrant groups and their alleged ‘national stereotyped than the non-immigrant population character’. Based on the stereotype content (Verkuyten et al., 1996). model (SCM; Cuddy et  al., 2009; Fiske et  al., Notably, minority members have been found 2002; see Chap. 4, this volume), groups that are to agree with many of the group stereotypes and more economically successful are generally rated rank other minority groups in an order that is higher on competence, and groups that are more consistent with majority perceptions (see Chap. strongly perceived as competitors for resources 4, this volume, on system justification theory). are rated lower on warmth (Cuddy et al., 2009). The one exception concerns their own group, which, in line with SIT, they position closer to the top of the hierarchy (Hagendoorn, 1995). Sticking Stereotypes as Barriers for Inter-­ with the previous example, Turkish-Dutch also position Moroccan-Dutch lower in the ethnic Ethnic Solidarity in the Context hierarchy than Surinamese- and Antillean-Dutch, of Immigration which are in turn positioned lower than non-­ Because of their implications for prejudicial feel- migrant Dutch. In that sense, the group stereoings and discriminatory behaviour toward types held by Turkish-Dutch reproduce the ethnic immigrant-­origin ethnic minorities, negative out-­ hierarchy perceived by the majority; yet they group stereotypes have been the topic of a large describe the Turkish-Dutch group just slightly body of research. Early work on how these groups less positively than the majority and position in the US were commonly described revealed a Turkish-Dutch immediately after non-migrant plethora of stereotypes that are still common in Dutch in the hierarchy, followed – at a distance – contemporary cultural representations (e.g., by the other minority groups (Verkuyten et  al., Germans being scientifically minded and indus- 1996). trious, Italians being artistic and impulsive; Katz Research on ethnic hierarchies reveals the & Braly, 1933). Later work in other immigrant complexity of group stereotypes in terms of how

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multiple groups are positioned vis-à-vis each other. Importantly, according to the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2002), stereotypes of out-groups are often mixed rather than uniformly positive or negative, and the specific combination of competence and warmth stereotypes shapes emotional and behavioural reactions towards out-groups (Cuddy et  al., 2007). The most favourable combination of high warmth and high competence is typically reserved for one’s in-group and its allies. This stereotype content elicits feelings of admiration and behaviours that are described as active facilitation, which includes things like seeking collaboration and providing support. By contrast, ethnic groups that are perceived as low in warmth (‘they want to harm us’) and high in competence (‘they are likely to succeed in inflicting harm’), such as Asians in the US and Canada (Kil et al., 2019; Lee & Fiske, 2006), are perceived as most threatening (Phalet & Poppe, 1997) and therefore met with envy and the intention to actively go against their goals (‘active harm’, cf. Cuddy et al., 2007). Ethnic discrimination (e.g., turning down equally qualified minority candidates for a job interview) can be understood as a behavioural response to emotions of envy elicited by group stereotypes that reflect high competence and low warmth to the extent that it occurs consciously (‘actively’) with the goal to exclude immigrants from specific social positions. Ethnic out-groups with the opposite pattern of mixed stereotypes, on the other hand, are likely to encounter quite different treatment: if a group is seen as warm but incompetent it is met with pity and paternalistic behaviours (i.e., offering help and support while maintaining one’s dominant position, ‘passive harm’). This specific combination of stereotype contents was found, for instance, among Italians and Irish in the US and Jamaicans in Canada (Kil et  al., 2019; Lee & Fiske, 2006). Finally, ethnic groups that are perceived to be neither warm nor competent face contempt as prevalent emotional reaction and elicit both active and passive forms of harmful behaviour (e.g., aggression and refraining from helping

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even in need; Cuddy et  al., 2007). This is for instance the case for immigrant workers in the US, both when this generic label is used as well as when specifically, Mexicans and Latinx  – groups that often migrate for work  – are mentioned (Fiske et al., 2002). This finding extends to immigrant groups in other destinations who primarily migrate for economic motives, e.g., immigrants from Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Turkey in Switzerland (Binggeli et al., 2014). Compared to economic migrants, refugees tend to be rated even lower on competence due to their lower economic self-sufficiency, but also as generally lacking in warmth. The latter might be surprising given the more positive attitudes towards people who migrate involuntarily compared to those who actively seek a better future for themselves (e.g., Gieling et al., 2011). Yet, in two studies comparing stereotype contents of multiple immigrant groups, Somalis, who primarily migrate as refugees, were perceived as both incompetent and cold by English-Canadian and Norwegian participants and thus more negatively than groups who migrated for economic reasons, such as Jamaicans in Canada or Polish in Norway (Bye et  al., 2014; Kil et  al., 2019). A more detailed study of distinct refugee groups in Germany confirmed that when no origin is specified, ‘refugees’ or ‘asylum seekers’ are seen as low on both warmth and competence. When origins were differentiated, however, participants assigned different levels of warmth to the groups depending on their reasons for migration, region of origin, and religious affiliation (Kotzur et al., 2019). Specifically, war refugees were rated higher on warmth than refugees fleeing economic hardship, and when participants thought about a generic group of ‘Muslim refugees’, they perceived them as less warm than refugees from specific Muslim majority countries that are known to be in crisis (Syria, Afghanistan; Kotzur et  al., 2019). The SCM helps us understand why different immigrant groups elicit different emotions and behavioural reactions, depending on their expected contributions to the national economy of the receiving society and the competition for material and symbolic resources that they are

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perceived to engender. Many specific types of attitudes, emotions, and behaviours towards immigrants can be understood from this general model based on the two core dimensions of stereotype contents (warmth and competence), four primary emotions (admiration, envy, pity and contempt) and four types of behavioural intentions (active and passive harm vs. facilitation, Cuddy et al., 2007). Yet, the related literature falls short of providing more detailed explanations for the specific exclusionary attitudes and behaviours that we witness in contemporary immigrant-receiving societies. Other theoretical approaches that probe into the perceptions of group threat consider negative out-group stereotypes either a distinct aspect of group threat, as posited by Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) or a precursor of threat perceptions (Velasco González et al., 2008; see also Intergroup Threat Theory by Stephan et  al., 2015), which in turn can fuel behaviour such as voting for anti-immigrant parties. For this reason, in the remainder of this chapter we turn to theories of group threat as explanations of negative interethnic attitudes and behaviours.

 ost Society Members’ Perceptions H of Economic and Cultural Threats When there are different ethnic groups present in a society, there can be competition over resources. According to Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Sherif & Sherif, 1969), competition can elicit perceptions of ethnic threat and worsen intergroup relations. Competition does not even have to be real: as long as people perceive it, this can have consequences for their reactions toward the ‘rival’ outgroup. In fact, threat perceptions are more strongly related to prejudice than objective measures of threat (Stephan et  al., 2015). And whereas people can feel threatened in their individual position (e.g., losing one’s job), perceptions of group-based threat (e.g., threat to the status of one’s group as a whole) matter more for intergroup attitudes (Scheepers et al., 2002). This is particularly the case among people who strongly identify with their group (Bizman &

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Yinon, 2001; Tausch et al., 2007). In the following we will focus on threat as a group-level phenomenon. Depending on the type of resource at stake, we can distinguish between realistic and symbolic threats as two main sub-dimensions of ethnic threat. Realistic threats encompass threats to tangible scarce resources such as jobs, housing, and welfare benefits that are crucial for one’s material well-being, but also threats to the very existence and physical well-being of one’s group, such as warfare, crime, and terrorism (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The former are referred to as economic and the latter as safety threats (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Symbolic threats, in contrast, are threats to intangible resources such as culture, norms, and values (Riek et  al., 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). When encountering cultural ‘others’, one can have a perception that one’s group’s identity and culture are being challenged or undermined (Riek et al., 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It is therefore not surprising that people have a preference for interacting with culturally similar others, and that ethnic homophily (i.e., marrying someone from one’s own ethnic group) is a rule rather than exception (McPherson et al., 2001). Immigration can trigger perceptions of realistic threat, both in terms of economy and safety. Most newcomers in Western countries are labour migrants (IOM, 2018), who compete with natives for available jobs. According to Ethnic Competition Theory (Scheepers et  al., 2002), economic threat perceptions will primarily arise among majority members who personally find themselves in competitive conditions, such as the unemployed. Furthermore, as labour migrants, at least in Europe, are predominantly low-skilled (de Haas et  al., 2020), majority members employed in low-skilled jobs also might feel threatened by an increase in immigration. As a result, they might want to exclude migrants from full participation in the host society, for instance, by refusing to grant them civil rights, which is a form of discrimination. A cross-national study in Europe has confirmed that manual workers and unemployed individuals are particularly likely to deny civil rights to immigrants, and this is largely

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explained by their higher perceptions of threat (Scheepers et al., 2002). In other intergroup situations, following the same theoretical mechanism, high-skilled immigrants could be perceived as economically threatening to the high skilled local population. Malhotra et  al. (2013) have shown that Americans working in high-tech industry compared to those in other occupation or the unemployed ones show more opposition to the granting of temporary visas for Asian high-­ tech workers. Apart from attracting labour migrants, since 2015 Europe has been receiving unprecedentedly high numbers of applications for asylum by people who were forced to leave their countries of origin due to war and political persecution (Pew Research Center, 2016). Asylum seekers can also be perceived as competing with the host population for material resources and thus posing an economic threat. For instance, in the Netherlands there was commotion among ethnic Dutch because authorities had prioritized asylum seekers over natives in their allocation of housing facilities (NOS, 2018). In addition, there is also a fear that there are terrorists among asylum seekers, and there have been incidents of violence, such as the Cologne sexual harassments of women in 2016 by asylum seekers (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Hence, this recent wave of immigration has also been discussed in society and the media in terms of posing a safety threat to ethnic majority members. These threat perceptions can also increase if the receiving society has doubts about this group’s migration motive and sees them as fortune seekers. A study by Hercowitz-­ Amir et  al. (2017) has shown that Danes and Israelis who think that most asylum seekers are not really escaping persecution perceive higher levels of both economic and safety threats. Next to realistic threat, immigration can also trigger perceptions of symbolic threat. Immigrants crossing international borders often bring along culture and traditions that are different from those of the host society, and their presence can be experienced as threatening to the continuity of the local culture and the general way of life (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Particularly the arrival of Muslims in Europe has

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resulted in tensions between them and the predominantly Christian or secular ethnic majorities (Velasco González et al., 2008). Similarly, Arab immigrants in the US are perceived as posing a symbolic threat to Americans (Hitlan et  al., 2007). Research has shown that when people fear that the continuity of their group identity is at stake, they may react negatively towards groups that are considered to be triggering this continuity threat (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014). Symbolic threat in response to cultural differences introduced by immigration tends to be experienced more by host society members who are politically conservative as opposed to liberal (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Similarly, those who highly identify with their national identity (as opposed to low identifiers) are more sensitive to perceiving symbolic threat when thinking about racial and ethnic diversity (Morrison et al., 2010). This is because conservatives and higher national identifiers are more concerned with maintaining the cultural values and traditions of their nation.

 hreat Perceptions as Barriers T for Host Society’s Solidarity with Immigrants Researchers have examined the consequences of realistic and symbolic threat perceptions for intergroup relations, including outcomes related to both intergroup solidarity (see Chaps. 2 and 3 of this volume) and exclusion in immigrant-­ receiving societies. Aspects of solidarity that are typically considered are intergroup helping, trust, and support for immigrant rights (including the right to get naturalized), whereas exclusion is often captured in terms of prejudice, voting for anti-immigrant parties, and collective action against immigrants. Studies using an overarching measure of threat perceptions (combining realistic and symbolic threats) have shown that ethnic threat is positively associated with voting for anti-immigrant parties (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012), support for collective action against refugees (Hasbún López et al., 2019), and the refusal to grant rights to immigrants (Scheepers et  al.,

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2002), and is negatively associated with outgroup trust (Schmid et al., 2014). However, which type of threat (realistic vs. symbolic) matters more for intergroup outcomes is dependent on contextual factors (Rios et  al., 2018). Realistic threats tend to matter when the economic conditions are declining (Meuleman et  al., 2009), and symbolic threats in contexts with clear cultural differences (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Whereas in Israel only realistic but not symbolic threat was related to higher prejudice toward immigrants (Bizman & Yinon, 2001), in Northern Ireland the opposite was found, with symbolic but not realistic threat being a predictor of Catholic and Protestants’ inter-group feelings (Tausch et  al., 2007). Similarly, in the Netherlands it was found that only symbolic threat was related to negative feelings toward Muslim immigrants (Velasco González et al., 2008). Importantly, negative stereotypes were also related to negative feelings via higher symbolic threat, in line with Intergroup Threat Theory (Stephan et  al., 2015) in which stereotypes are a precursor of threat. Realistic threat did not play a role, possibly because Muslims in the Netherlands are predominantly seen as a threat to Dutch values and culture and less as competitors on the labour market. In a study in the US on reactions to Asian Americans, however, it was found that stereotypes of warmth were related to both less realistic and symbolic threat, and indirectly to less negative intergroup emotions (Zhang, 2015). Furthermore, the role of threat differs when it comes to immediate versus long-term reactions to immigration. A study in Greece (Thravalou et al., 2021) examined provision of humanitarian assistance and support for permanent settlement of asylum seekers. Realistic threat perceptions did not present an obstacle for providing immediate help; however, they represented a barrier to long term acceptance of asylum seekers. Greeks who perceived them as a threat to the Greek economy and the safety of locals were less supportive of their permanent settlement. This is because immediate help is more motivated by feelings of sympathy,

whereas long-term concerns such as permanent settlement raise questions of competition for resources. Another study among Swiss and Portuguese participants (Pereira et  al., 2010) showed that realistic threat was related to opposition to immigration, whereas symbolic threat was related to opposition to eventual naturalization of immigrants. The latter could be understood in terms of social identity processes, whereby naturalization implies that former outgroup members (immigrants) become ingroup members (compatriots). It is particularly people who perceive cultural differences as threatening to the continuity of the host society’s customs and traditions that oppose the idea of naturalization. Altogether, there is evidence that immigration and the related stereotypes of immigrants can bring about perceptions of both realistic and symbolic threat, and that threats can trigger negative attitudes and behavioural intentions toward immigrants, but also that the relevance of each type of threat varies across intergroup contexts and in relation to immediate and long-term acceptance of immigrants.

Conclusion In this chapter we covered the main theories and research on stereotypes and threat perceptions in response to immigration in Europe and North America. This literature primarily focuses on negative outcomes such as prejudice, discrimination, and other forms of exclusion, which ultimately stand in the way of achieving solidarity and social justice. However, we have also shown that some stereotype contents can motivate people to engage in helping behaviour and that threat perceptions can be an obstacle for long-term acceptance of immigrants but are less detrimental when it comes to short-term reactions, such as the provision of humanitarian assistance. We conclude that in trying to achieve solidarity and social justice in the context of immigration it is important to consider the content of the stereotypes and the type of threat elicited by specific immigrant groups.

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Glossary Ethnic discrimination: A behavioural response to stereotypes and threats that involves unfair or exclusionary treatment of group members based on their ethnic origin. Ethnic hierarchy: A cumulative sequence of preferences for or societal acceptability of ethnic groups based on the stereotypes that are held about them. Group stereotypes: A set of beliefs about personal attributes of a group of people. Prejudice: A generalised negative attitude towards members of a group. Realistic threats: Threats to tangible scarce resources (e.g., jobs, housing) that are crucial for one’s group’s material well-being, but also threats to the physical well-being of the group (e.g., crime). Stereotype contents: Group stereotypes can be subsumed under two underlying dimensions, one referring to perceived warmth/morality of a group (‘do they want to harm us?’) and the other to their perceived competence (‘are they able to harm us?’). Symbolic threats: Threats to intangible group resources such as culture, norms, and values.

Comprehension Questions

1. Based on the Stereotype Content Model, what are the specific emotional reactions to immigrants that follow from the different combinations of perceived competence and warmth? 2. What is the difference between realistic group threat and symbolic group threat? Could you provide an example of a group of migrants that is likely to be seen as threatening in realistic terms, and an example of a group that is likely to be perceived as threatening in symbolic terms? 3. How do stereotypes of immigrants differ from the perceptions of threat these groups pose, and how are the two concepts related to each other?

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Discussion Question

1. Most of the literature on stereotype contents and threat perceptions focuses on negative attitudes and behaviours, such as prejudice, discrimination and voting for anti-­immigrant parties. While it is evident that these negative outcomes are formidable challenges for social justice and solidarity, e.g., with refugee groups, one could posit that achieving social justice and solidarity entails more than the mere absence of negative attitudes, emotions, and behaviour. Do you think that the current understanding of stereotypes and threat perceptions is sufficient to address how social justice and solidarity can be achieved, or would more theoretical elaboration and research be needed to connect these concepts? Why? 2. Which contemporary trends contribute to the negative reactions toward immigrants? And how can these be explained and countered from a social justice and/or solidarity perspective?

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144 Retrieved February 19, 2021, from http://www. dw.com/en/string-­of-­new-­years-­eve-­sexual-­assaults-­ outragescologne/a-­18958334 Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878–902. https://doi. org/10.1037/0022-­3514.82.6.878. Gieling, M., Thijs, J., & Verkuyten, M. (2011). Voluntary and involuntary immigrants and adolescents’ endorsement of cultural maintenance. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 35, 259–267. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2010.09.003 Hagendoorn, L. (1995). Intergroup biases in multiple group systems: The perception of ethnic hierarchies. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 199–228). Wiley. Hagendoorn, L., & Hraba, J. (1989). Foreign, different, deviant, seclusive and working class: Anchors to an ethnic hierarchy in the Netherlands. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 12, 441–468. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198 70.1989.9993647 Hasbún López, P., Martinovic, B., Bobowik, M., Chryssochoou, X., Cichocka, A., Ernst-Vintila, A., Franc, R., Fulop, E., Ghilani, D., Kochar, A., Lamberty, P., Leone, G., Licata, L., & Žeželj, I. (2019). Support for collective action against refugees: The role of national, European, and global identifications, and autochthony beliefs. European Journal of Social Psychology, 49, 1439–1455. https://doi.org/10.1002/ ejsp.2608 Hercowitz-Amir, A., Raijman, R., & Davidov, E. (2017). Host or hostile? Attitudes towards asylum seekers in Israel and in Denmark. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 58, 416–439. https://doi. org/10.1177/0020715217722039 Hitlan, R. T., Carrillo, K., Zárate, M. A., & Aikman, S. N. (2007). Attitudes toward immigrant groups and the September 11 terrorist attacks. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 13, 135–152. https://doi. org/10.1080/10781910701270970 International Orgainzation for Migration (IOM). (2018). Global migration indicators. Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC). Katz, D., & Braly, K. (1933). Racial stereotypes of one hundred college students. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 28, 280–290. https://doi. org/10.1037/h0074049 Kil, H., Noels, K. A., Vargas Lascano, D. I., & Schweickart, O. (2019). English Canadians’ cultural stereotypes of ethnic minority groups: Implications of stereotype content for acculturation ideologies and immigration attitudes. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 70, 104–118. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijintrel.2019.03.005 Kotzur, P. F., Friehs, M.-T., Asbrock, F., & van Zalk, M. H. W. (2019). Stereotype content of refugee subgroups in Germany. European Journal of Social Psychology, 49, 1344–1358. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2585.

B. Martinović and F. Fleischmann Lee, T.  L., & Fiske, S.  T. (2006). Not an outgroup, not yet an ingroup: Immigrants in the stereotype content model. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30, 751–768. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ijintrel.2006.06.005 Lessard-Phillips, L., Fleischmann, F., & van Elsas, E. (2014). Ethnic minorities in ten Western countries  – Migration flows, policies and institutional differences. In A.  F. Heath & Y.  Brinbaum (Eds.), Unequal attainments: Ethnic educational inequality in ten Western countries (pp.  25–61). Oxford University Press. Lucassen, G., & Lubbers, M. (2012). Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats. Comparative Political Studies, 45(5), 547– 574. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011427851 Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y., & Mo, C.  H. (2013). Economic explanations for opposition to immigration: Distinguishing between prevalence and conditional impact. American Journal of Political Science, 57, 391–410. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12012 McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 415–444. https://doi. org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415 Meuleman, B., Davidov, E., & Billiet, J. (2009). Changing attitudes toward immigration in Europe, 2002– 2007: A dynamic group conflict theory approach. Social Science Research, 38, 352–365. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2008.09.006 Morrison, K.  R., Plaut, V.  C., & Ybarra, O. (2010). Predicting whether multiculturalism positively or negatively influences White Americans’ intergroup attitudes: The role of ethnic identification. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1648–1661. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167210386118 NOS. (2018). Aantal gemeenten wil af van voorrang asielzoekers bij sociale huur. Retrieved July 24, 2021, from https://nos.nl/artikel/2256449-­aantal-­gemeenten-­wil-­ af-­van-­voorrang-­asielzoekers-­bij-­sociale-­huur.html Pereira, C., Vala, J., & Costa-Lopes, R. (2010). From prejudice to discrimination: The legitimizing role of perceived threat in discrimination against immigrants. European Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 1231– 1250. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.718 Pew Research Center. (2016, August 2). Number of refugees to Europe surges to record 1.3 million in 2015. Retrieved July 24, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-­of-­refugees-­to-­ europe-­surges-­to-­record-­1-­3-­million-­in-­2015/ Phalet, K., & Poppe, E. (1997). Competence and morality dimensions of national and ethnic stereotypes: A study in six eastern-­ European countries. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 703–723. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-­ 0 9 9 2 ( 1 9 9 7 1 1 / 1 2 ) 2 7 : 6 < 7 0 3 : : A I D -­E J S P 8 4 1 > 3.0.CO;2-­K Riek, B.  M., Mania, E.  W., & Gaertner, S.  L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A meta-­

13  They Take Away Our Jobs! They Undermine Our National Culture! Public Perceptions of Immigrants… analytic review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 336–353. https://doi.org/10.1207/ s15327957pspr1004_4 Rios, K., Sosa, N., & Osborn, H. (2018). An experimental approach to intergroup threat theory: Manipulations, moderators, and consequences of realistic vs. symbolic threat. European Review of Social Psychology, 29, 212–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2018. 1537049 Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M., & Coenders, M. (2002). Ethnic exclusionism in European countries. Public opposition to civil rights for legal migrants as a response to perceived ethnic threat. European Sociological Review, 18, 17–34. https://doi. org/10.1093/esr/18.1.17 Schmid, K., Al Ramiah, A., & Hewstone, M. (2014). Neighborhood ethnic diversity and trust: The role of intergroup contact and perceived threat. Psychological Science, 25, 665–674. https://doi. org/10.1177/0956797613508956 Sherif, M., & Sherif, C.  W. (1969). Ingroup and intergroup relations: Experimental analysis. In M. Sherif & C. W. Sherif (Eds.), Social psychology (pp. 221–266). Harper & Row. Smeekes, A., & Verkuyten, M. (2014). When national culture is disrupted: Cultural continuity and resistance to Muslim immigrants. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 17, 45–66. https://doi. org/10.1177/1368430213486208 Sniderman, P. M., & Hagendoorn, L. (2007). When ways of life collide: Multiculturalism and its discontents in the Netherlands. Princeton University Press. Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S.  Oskamp (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimination (pp.  23–45). Psychology Press.

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Welfare Chauvinism: Are Immigrants Granted Access to Welfare State Benefits?

14

Marcel Lubbers and Verena Seibel

Introduction Imagine you move to a new country and try to find your way in that new country. When do you expect to have access to welfare state services? When immigrants should have access to welfare state arrangements and under what conditions is the focus of this chapter. This question is related to a broader discussion on supposed declining solidarity with outsiders. It feeds a dilemma labelled the ‘new progressive dilemma’: “the fear that there is trade-off between pro-immigration and pro-welfare state” (Kymlicka, 2020, p.41). As long as welfare systems have been nationally organized, it is thought that some kind of national solidarity is needed, which nationhood would help promote. The progressive force of nationhood is widely disputed since it is often linked to the exclusion of non-­nationals. However, nationhood also contributes to sustaining welfare states (Kymlicka, 2020). If national solidarity wanes under increasing immigration, the legitimacy for an expensive, redistributive welfare state comes under pressure. For welfare state development,

M. Lubbers (*) • V. Seibel Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

the choice appears to be the lesser of two ‘evils’: inclusion without solidarity (the neoliberal multiculturalism model) or solidarity without inclusion (the welfare chauvinism model; see Box 14.1) (Kymlicka, 2020). The neoliberal multiculturalism model pursues a more open nation, with high levels of mobility and immigration but with decreasing levels of welfare state arrangements and generosity. This model champions mobility, also of immigrants, over national solidarity (Kymlicka, 2020). The welfare chauvinism model pursues a nation that trumps ingroup solidarity and upholds high levels of welfare state arrangements and generosity. However, in order to guarantee welfare state affordability and support, the welfare state in this model is exclusive, thereby restricting immigration. In this chapter, we provide an overview of the incidence of hard and soft forms of welfare chauvinism in Europe, discussing why people differ in their welfare chauvinism. Following, we show empirical evidence of hard and soft welfare chauvinism within Europe to demonstrate that welfare chauvinism not only varies between countries and changes over time, it also varies across welfare domains (e.g., healthcare versus social assistance). Finally, we add an immigrant perspective to this chapter, investigating the attitudes of immigrants themselves.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_14

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Box 14.1  Welfare Chauvinism Explained

In 1990, Andersen and Bjorklund introduced the term ‘welfare chauvinism’ referring to the attitude that ‘welfare services should be restricted to our own’ (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990, p.212). An attitude expressing the wish to exclude immigrants from welfare state benefits and arrangements and never giving them access to these benefits is labelled hard welfare chauvinism. In this most extreme form of welfare chauvinism, people are likely to prefer no immigration altogether because of the burden immigration is thought to place on the welfare state. Soft welfare chauvinism refers to granting immigrants access to the welfare state, but under certain conditions. These conditions relate to, for example, the duration of residency within the country, whether immigrants contributed to the welfare state for a certain period of time by paying taxes or whether they obtained the host country’s nationality.

 elfare Chauvinism in Relation W to the Welfare Deservingness Literature Welfare chauvinism and welfare deservingness (see Chap. 6, this volume) literatures are closely related. Within these literatures, immigrants are identified as one of several relevant groups whose perceived deservingness to access welfare resources is debated. Across countries and social categories, immigrants are consistently seen to be the least deserving of welfare state support (Van Oorschot, 2006). As outlined in Chap. 6 (this volume), the CARIN-criteria can be used to explain deservingness perceptions based on Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need

M. Lubbers and V. Seibel

(Oorschot, 2000). For our focus on granting immigrants access to welfare, the Identity principle is crucial. The Identity principle includes the perception of deservingness based on national identity, related to ideas such as “only people whose parents are nationals are entitled to social services and benefits” and “when granting benefits, people who have been born here should get priority over people who have not been born here”. Full agreement with this identity dimension of the CARIN-criteria based on national identity is thus rather close to the hard form welfare chauvinism: the exclusion of immigrants from welfare state benefits and services. It is good to keep this overlap in mind between welfare chauvinism and welfare deservingness when it is applied to the Identity principle.

Explanations of Welfare Chauvinism To explain welfare chauvinism, theories address (1) general support for the welfare state, (2) attitudes towards immigrants and (3) egalitarian attitudes. First, welfare chauvinism is supported because people reject a (generous) welfare state altogether. The literature on welfare state attitudes shows that people who are or expect to be reliant on the welfare state are more likely to support a generous and extensive welfare state (e.g., Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012; Degen et  al., 2019). In particular, lower socio-economic strata are more supportive of an extensive welfare state (Mewes & Mau, 2013; Degen et al., 2019). Second, welfare chauvinism is explained by unfavourable attitudes towards immigrants (Freeman, 2009). Aside explanations of racism for why people exclude immigrants from welfare access, ethnic competition theory offers theoretical insights. The axiom here is that groups in society compete over scarce resources (e.g., economic, cultural, or power-related resources). When immigrants are not perceived as ingroup members (see also Chap. 13), competition will

14  Welfare Chauvinism: Are Immigrants Granted Access to Welfare State Benefits?

exist between natives and immigrants. Immigrants may be perceived as taking up resources through reliance on welfare, which natives may perceive to be theirs. Therefore, people who perceive immigrants to be a greater threat to their ingroup interests will be more welfare chauvinistic (Kros & Coenders, 2019). Third, welfare chauvinism can be understood through support for egalitarianism (i.e., the idea that people are equal and deserve equal rights; Andreß & Heien, 2001; Svallfors, 1991). This egalitarian attitude generally extends towards different groups in society (Frankfurt, 1987) and would possibly encompass immigrants as well, which would then lower welfare chauvinism. This idea is supported by empirical evidence from the UK (Kros & Coenders, 2019). Yet, welfare chauvinism is at the intersection of egalitarianism and perceptions of ethnic threat: welfare chauvinists are egalitarian for the ingroup only (Van der Waal et al., 2010).

Incidence of Welfare Chauvinism To what extent do natives in Europe support hard or soft forms of welfare chauvinism? We analyse the incidence of hard and soft welfare chauvinism using two rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS; 2008/2016). Europeans from 17 countries were asked to what extent immigrants should have the same rights to access benefits and services as citizens already living in the country. Respondents could choose from ‘immediately, on arrival’, ‘after a year, whether or not have worked’, ‘after worked and paid taxes at least a year’, ‘after they have become a citizen’, and ‘they should never get the same rights.’ Respondents opting for the first answer category ‘immediately, on arrival’ grant the same rights to immigrants as to citizens, without imposing any conditions. This group is therefore considered to hold no welfare chauvinistic attitudes at all. The last option (never) is seen as the hard form of welfare chauvinism as it reflects total exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state. Soft wel-

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fare chauvinism is reflected by the remaining options. Drawing on Meuleman et  al. (Meuleman et al., 2018), we present the 2008 findings alongside the 2016 findings (see Fig. 14.1). This comparison allows us to consider the extent to which welfare chauvinism remained stable across these two time points. We draw two main conclusions from this Figure: First, in most countries, people hardly express hard welfare chauvinism, but soft welfare chauvinism is prevalent. We note two exceptions to this first conclusion. One, Sweden is the only country in which the population shows stable support for an absence of welfare chauvinism: In both years, around 20% of Swedes believe immigrants should have access to welfare state services immediately after arrival. Two, at the other extreme are the Czech Republic and Hungary, where in 2008, over 10 percent of the population already believed immigrants should never have the same welfare rights as natives, thereby expressing hard welfare chauvinism. The second conclusion drawn from Fig.  14.1 is that Central and Eastern European countries such as Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Hungary show a strong increase in hard welfare chauvinism from 2008 to 2016. Portugal and Spain stand out in the opposite direction. One likely explanation for these opposing changes in attitudes is the refugee crisis that began in 2015, which led to quite different reactions across European countries. Whereas Central and Eastern European countries expressed very little solidarity with refugees, Spain and Portugal expressed empathy (Koos & Seibel, 2019), a notion which likely reduced welfare chauvinism.

 elfare Chauvinism: EU Versus W Non-EU Immigrants and Different Welfare State Domains Research on welfare chauvinism often asks people to evaluate immigrants’ general access to welfare state benefits and services. However, an increasing

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Fig. 14.1  Support for welfare chauvinism. (Source: European Social Survey, 2008 and 2016)

number of researchers (Seibel & Hedegaard, 2017; Seibel & Renema, 2020; Renema & Lubbers 2018; Lubbers et al. 2018; Kros & Coenders, 2019) argue that this overall question does not reflect the different evaluations people make with respect to what kinds of welfare services. People may be willing to grant immigrants access to healthcare services but less willing to grant access to social assistance schemes. Moreover, people might be more willing to grant access to immigrants to whom they feel close to and better able to identify with. These more nuanced measures are often not included in large-scale, international datasets, such as those we use in this chapter. However, drawing on a dataset specifically designed for this purpose, the Migrants Welfare State Attitudes data (MIFARE), we can address these issues. The MIFARE dataset contains information on the extent to which Dutch natives would grant EU and non-EU immigrants access to

various welfare resources, distinguishing between five welfare domains: social assistance, unemployment benefits, pensions, childcare, and healthcare. Figure 14.2 shows that the general measurement of welfare chauvinism, as applied in the ESS, does not capture the large variation of people’s attitudes. Interestingly, the extent to which natives demonstrate soft or hard welfare chauvinism depends much less on the migrant group than expected. Overall, for non-EU immigrants, the conditions posed for welfare access are slightly stricter and hard welfare chauvinism is found only slightly more often than for EU-migrants. However, major differences are found with respect to the domain to which immigrants should (or should not) be granted the same rights as natives. These patterns tend to partly reflect the factual situation of what is required for immigrants to access each domain. In the domain of healthcare, the majority

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Netherlands - social assistance - non-EU immigrants Netherlands - social assistance - EU immigrants Netherlands - unemployment benefit - non-EU immigrants Netherlands - unemployment benefit - EU immigrants Netherlands Child care - non-EU immigrants Netherlands Child care - EU immigrants Netherlands - pensions - non-EU immigrants Netherlands - pensions - EU immigrants Netherlands - health - non-EU immigrants Netherlands - health - EU immigrants Netherlands - general measure ESS 2016 0%

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Fig. 14.2  Domain-specific welfare chauvinism towards EU and non-EU-migrants. (Source: MIFARE (Migrants’ Welfare State Attitudes), 2016)

(60%) of Dutch natives think immigrants should have immediate access after registering as a resident. This finding also implies that 40% of individuals disagree with the current policy that grants immigrants immediate access to healthcare. For unemployment benefits and state pensions, the majority think that immigrants should work and pay taxes first, which is in fact not the case for state old-age pensions. For social assistance, a large group also supports conditional access, requiring immigrants to work and pay taxes. A relatively large share also supports the notion to make social assistance access conditional to immigrants obtaining Dutch citizenship, whereas in fact immigrants have access to social assistance after living in the Netherlands for 5 years (and refugees even earlier). The hard form of welfare chauvinism, whereby natives believe immigrants should never have access to social assistance, is supported by 15% of Dutch natives in the case of non-EU immigrants.

Immigrants Themselves on Welfare State Access So, how do immigrants themselves feel about access to welfare state benefits? There are good reasons to believe immigrants perceive their right

to access welfare resources differently than natives (Renema & Lubbers, 2019; Seibel & Hedegaard, 2017; Seibel & Renema, 2020). First, as welfare resources help immigrants to gain a ‘good’ standard of living in the receiving country, immigrants are likely to have a strong self-­interest in demanding fast access to welfare resources. In addition, immigrants have, on average, a lower socio-economic status than natives, which makes them more vulnerable to economic hardship. Hence, immigrants might express a greater demand for fast access to welfare resources than natives. Next to immigrants’ self-interest, the literature identifies immigrants’ socialization in different welfare regimes as a driving factor influencing their attitudes towards the welfare state (e.g., Seibel & Renema, 2020). Immigrants often compare their situation in the receiving country with their situation in their home country (Röder & Mühlau, 2012). Depending on the development of the welfare state in their home country, immigrants might demand faster, or slower, access to welfare resources. Compared to other parts of the world, most European countries provide ‘generous’ welfare packages. Immigrants who have been socialized in less extensive welfare states might simply have lower expectations than natives regarding their entitlement to access these resources.

M. Lubbers and V. Seibel

152 Non-EU immigrants - social assistance EU immigrants - social assistance Non-EU immigrants - unemployment benefits EU immigrants - unemployment benefits Non-EU immigrants - childcare EU immigrants - childcare Non-EU immigrants - pension EU immigrants - pension Non-EU immigrants - healthcare EU immigrants - healthcare 0%

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Fig. 14.3  Immigrants’ attitudes towards the accessibility of welfare resources for their own immigrant group. (Source: MIFARE (Migrants’ Welfare State Attitudes), 2016)

Figure 14.3 presents EU and non-EU immigrants’ entitlement perceptions for their own immigrant group’s access to welfare resources. Compared to the results presented in Fig. 14.2, it seems that immigrants generally prefer faster access to welfare resources than perceived by the native population. However, like the native population, immigrants make significant distinctions between the different welfare domains. The majority of EU and non-EU immigrants believes their own immigrant group should have access to healthcare and childcare immediately after registering as residents. However, this is hardly the case for the other welfare domains. For social assistance, unemployment benefits, and pensions, most immigrants feel immigrants from their own group should first work and pay taxes before being eligible to access these resources. This shows that immigrants are less demanding of access to the welfare state than is often presumed by the public. If immigrants have different perceptions regarding their own access to the receiving country’s welfare resources, do they also express welfare chauvinistic attitudes? On average, non-EU immigrants seem to be more ‘generous,’ independently of whether they were asked about access to welfare resources by non-EU immigrants or EU immigrants. Non-EU immigrants also do not seem to discriminate between EU and non-EU

immigrants and grant similar access to both groups. EU immigrants, on the other hand, express more welfare chauvinistic attitudes, though to a lesser extent than natives. On average, they grant immigrants from EU countries faster access to welfare resources than immigrants from non-EU countries. Unlike natives, EU immigrants hardly express ‘hard’ welfare chauvinism. In addition, both groups similarly take differences between the welfare domains into account. Both EU and non-EU immigrants grant other immigrants more social rights for childcare than for unemployment benefits.

Conclusion In this chapter, we showed that people vary strongly in the strength of welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The majority of Europeans thinks immigrants should only have access to welfare resources after meeting certain conditions, such as residency or employment and tax contribution (soft welfare chauvinism). However, a small but growing number of Europeans expresses hard welfare chauvinism, believing immigrants should never have the same welfare rights as natives. These notions vary across countries, time, and welfare domains. People are much more gener-

14  Welfare Chauvinism: Are Immigrants Granted Access to Welfare State Benefits?

ous when it comes to healthcare and childcare than with regards to unemployment benefits. People also distinguish between EU and non-EU immigrants, granting fewer rights to the latter. Finally, we showed how immigrants generally prefer faster access to welfare resources than the native population, particularly concerning healthcare and childcare. But immigrants also often agree welfare access should be conditional. Immigrants themselves also express welfare chauvinism: EU immigrants in particular believe non-EU immigrants should have fewer rights than EU immigrants. What does this mean for solidarity with immigrants in the welfare state? First, we find that only a limited share of European populations supports hard welfare chauvinism. The majority thinks restrictions are only needed for the first years after migration, or until immigrants have paid taxes. Second, this widespread belief in conditional access tends to mirror the perspective of immigrants themselves. Overall, immigrants prefer faster access than majority members, but still feel conditionality is reasonable. Based on these two findings, we could conclude there is little support for a hard form a welfare chauvinism. Although immigrants face rejection from the receiving society and European welfare states increasingly support the position of majority members who favour restricting access to immigrants, we still find that, by far, most Europeans do not think immigrants should be denied access to welfare state benefits. At the same time, both immigrants and natives in most European countries believe having a strong welfare state is important (Lubbers et al., 2018). This conflicts with the idea of a neoliberal multiculturalism model, in which mobility and immigration are stimulated but welfare state arrangements and generosity are cut back. This is formulated as a dilemma of solidarity , with people who rely on welfare versus solidarity with immigrants. But why can’t both be addressed? Kymlicka (2020) recently suggested more attention is needed for how to reach inclusive solidarity. A model of multicultural national solidarity (or a multicultural welfare state as it is sometimes labelled) is seen as a possible way out, although Kymlicka acknowledges remarkable little

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research has been done on the topic. Multicultural national solidarity is a “form of multiculturalism that enables immigrants to express their culture and identity as modes of participating and contribution to national society” (Kymlicka, 2020, 67). In this model, the extent that newcomers participate and invest in the country they live in is rewarded as making an important contribution to society, both economically and socially. Such participation should not be coerced (as is the case in many European countries today). Activities from an immigrant group should instead be understood as a contribution towards nationbuilding. A multicultural welfare state model relies on longer-term investment from immigrants but can be at odds with the large share of temporary migration and needs exemptions for particularly vulnerable groups such as refugees. Kymlicka (2020) argues a model of inclusive solidarity will be particularly successful with permanent residents and immigrants with a selfinterest in investing in society. Based on our empirical findings, we may add that European populations and immigrants alike support soft chauvinism: generous welfare regulations, with conditional access, depending on the welfare domain, which may support a model of multicultural national solidarity. Further discussion is needed on how strict these conditions can be and still be seen as soft welfare chauvinism, as well as to what extent conditions that include demands for socio-cultural assimilation are at odds with multiculturalism.

Glossary Welfare chauvinism: the attitude that welfare services should be restricted to a national ingroup. Hard welfare chauvinism: An attitude expressing the wish to exclude immigrants from welfare state benefits and arrangements and never giving them access. Soft welfare chauvinism: An attitude expressing the willingness to grant immigrants welfare state access, but under certain conditions.

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These conditions relate to, for example, duration of residency within the country, whether immigrants contributed to the welfare state for a given period of time by paying taxes, or whether they obtained the nationality of the country they moved to. Neoliberal multiculturalism model: A national model in which policies stimulate mobility and relative openness towards immigrants, but with low levels of welfare state arrangements and welfare generosity. Welfare chauvinism model: A national model in which policies restrict migration, combined with high levels of generous welfare state arrangements to which newcomers have limited access. Multicultural welfare state model: A national model in which policies stimulate national solidarity including towards immigrants, reducing the otherness of immigrants, combined with generous levels of welfare state provision. Comprehension Questions

1. What is welfare chauvinism and why is the difference between soft and hard welfare chauvinism relevant? 2. What is the relevance of studying welfare chauvinism in relation to various welfare domains? 3. Why does it matter whose welfare rights people are evaluating? Discussion Questions

1. To what extent do you think it is realistic to have an open society that is lenient to immigration, and to simultaneously have an extensive welfare state, with generous welfare arrangements for its citizens? Why? 2. The literature suggests immigrants who have been socialized in less extensive welfare states might have lower expectations than natives regarding their entitlement to access to welfare state resources. How might this argument be used to explain the varying perceptions immigrants have of their own group’s access to welfare resources?

References Andersen, J.  G., & Bjørklund, T. (1990). Structural changes and new cleavages: The progress parties in Denmark and Norway. Acta Sociologica, 33(3), 195–217. Andreß, H. J., & Heien, T. (2001). Four worlds of welfare state attitudes? A comparison of Germany, Norway, and the United States. European Sociological Review, 17(4), 337–356. Degen, D., Kuhn, T., & van der Brug, W. (2019). Granting immigrants access to social benefits? How self-­ interest influences support for welfare state restrictiveness. Journal of European Social Policy, 29(2), 148–165. Frankfurt, H. (1987). Equality as a moral ideal. Ethics, 98(1), 21–43. Freeman, G.  P. (2009, October). Immigration, diversity, and welfare chauvinism. In The forum (Vol. 7, No. 3). De Gruyter. Koos, S., & Seibel, V. (2019). Solidarity with refugees across Europe. A comparative analysis of public support for helping forced immigrants. European Societies, 21(5), 704–728. Kros, M., & Coenders, M. (2019). Explaining differences in welfare chauvinism between and within individuals over time: The role of subjective and objective economic risk, economic egalitarianism, and ethnic threat. European Sociological Review, 35(6), 860–873. Kymlicka, W. (2020). Solidarity in diverse societies: Beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism. In Minorities and populism–critical perspectives from South Asia and Europe (pp.  41–62). Springer. Lubbers, M., Diehl, C., Kuhn, T., & Larsen, C. A. (2018). Immigrants’ support for welfare state spending in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Social Policy & Administration, 52(4), 895–913. Meuleman, B., van Oorschot, W., Gugushvili, D., Baute, S., Delespaul, S., Laenen, T., … Rossetti, F. (2018). The past, present and future of European welfare attitudes: Topline results from round 8 of the European Social Survey. ESS Topline Series. Mewes, J., & Mau, S. (2013). Globalization, socio-­ economic status and welfare chauvinism: European perspectives on attitudes toward the exclusion of immigrants. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 54(3), 228–245. Renema, J. A., & Lubbers, M. (2018). Immigrants’ support for social spending, self‐interest and the role of the group: A comparative study of immigrants in The Netherlands. International Journal of Social Welfare, 28(2), 179–195. Van Oorschot, W. (2000). Who should get what, and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public. Policy & Politics, 28(1), 33–48. Van Oorschot, W. (2006). Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of

14  Welfare Chauvinism: Are Immigrants Granted Access to Welfare State Benefits? European welfare states. Journal of European social policy, 16(1), 23–42. Reeskens, T., & Van Oorschot, W. (2012). Disentangling the ‘New liberal Dilemma’: On the relation between general welfare redistribution preferences and welfare chauvinism. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 53(2), 120–139. Renema, J. A., & Lubbers, M. (2019). Immigrants’ support for social spending, self-interest and the role of the group: A comparative study of immigrants in the Netherlands. International Journal of Social Welfare, 28(2), 179–195. Röder, A., & Mühlau, P. (2012). Low expectations or different evaluations: What explains immigrants’ high levels of trust in host-country institutions? Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38(5), 777–792.

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Seibel, V., & Hedegaard, T.  F. (2017). Immigrants’ and natives’ attitudes to formal childcare in the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany. Children and Youth Services Review, 78, 112–121. Seibel, V., & Renema, J.  A. (2020). Immigrants’ and natives’ attitudes toward public healthcare provision in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. International Journal of Public Opinion Research. Svallfors, S. (1991). The politics of welfare policy in Sweden: Structural determinants and attitudinal cleavages. British Journal of Sociology, 609–634. Van der Waal, J., Achterberg, P., Houtman, D., De Koster, W., & Manevska, K. (2010). ‘Some are more equal than others’: Economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism in the Netherlands. Journal of European Social Policy, 20(4), 350–363.

Sexual Orientation as Social Justice Fault Line: The Role of Stigmatised Identities and Minority Community Solidarity in Social Inequalities in Wellbeing

15

John de Wit, Philippe Adam, and Chantal den Daas

Introduction On 1 April 2001, the Netherlands became the first country where same-sex couples could legally marry in the modern era. By 2020, this was possible in (parts of) 28 United Nation (UN) member states, mostly in Europe, the Americas and Australasia (Mendos et  al., 2020). Over the past two decades, changes in social norms and laws occurred in many, mainly Western countries, reflecting increased social acceptance and equal rights of people in same-sex relationships (Poushter & Kent, 2020). However, heteronormativity, the presumption and privileging of gender conformity and heterosexuality (Oswald et  al., 2009), prevails and affects the lives of lesbian, J. de Wit (*) Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] P. Adam Centre for Social Research, UNSW Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia C. den Daas University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

gay and bisexual (LGB) people, and of other sexual orientation (see Box 15.1) or gender identity minority people (Pollitt et al., 2021). In this chapter, we address how sexual orientation acts as a social justice fault line. We limit ourselves to social science research and theory originating in Western countries to examine and explain the social inequalities experienced by LGB people. Our focus is on increased rates of adverse mental health outcomes of LGB people compared to their heterosexual peers. We recognise the manifold social injustices and their serious impacts experienced by transgender people but cannot appropriately cover these in the context of this chapter and in light of our own specific expertise. Occasionally we refer to research regarding LGB people that also includes transgender people, which we note explicitly. Drawing on contemporary theory and evidence, we address the psychosocial mechanisms underlying social inequality in mental health by sexual orientation, highlighting the role of stigmatised social identities that reflect negative stereotypes. We complete the chapter by exploring how various forms of solidarity are critical for rectifying social injustices and mitigating their impacts.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_15

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orientation discrimination, 57 UN member states had laws providing broad protection from sexual Sexual orientation is an enduring pattern of orientation discrimination, and 81 UN member sexual interest directed towards people of states had legal protections from sexual orientaone or more genders, which may be the tion discrimination in employment. Also, 28 UN same as or different from the individual’s member states allowed same-sex marriage, and gender (cf. Bailey et al., 2016). Heterosexual 34 recognised same-sex partnerships. (straight), homosexual (gay or lesbian), Data from a 2019 survey conducted in 34 and bisexual are commonly used sexual countries show a persistent divide between counorientation labels (Sell & Petrulio, 1996). tries in the social acceptance of homosexuality, Sexual orientation is a multidimensional with highest rates in wealthiest countries (Poushter construct (Ashmore et  al., 2004), encom& Kent, 2020). Acceptance rates were above 80% passing sexual attraction, sexual behaviour, in Western Europe, Canada and Australia, and and sexual identity. These components higher than 90% in Sweden and the Netherlands. need not overlap, as, for instance, same-sex The survey data also showed that, in many counattracted people may not sexually act on tries, younger generations, women, higher edutheir erotic desires, and people with same-­ cated people, people with a left-wing political sex experiences may not personally or pubpreference and non-religious people are more licly identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual. accepting of homosexuality. Nevertheless, social acceptance is also increasing and conforming to dominant attitudes in minority population groups with traditionally more conservative views of homosexuality, including ethnic/racial minorities Social Inequality Affecting Lesbian, (e.g., Glick et  al., 2015), religious people (e.g., Schnabel, 2016) and migrants (e.g., van der Gay and Bisexual People Bracht & Van de Putte, 2014). Surveys in Western societies generally find that Despite the positive developments in legal less than 5% of people have a predominant same-­ frameworks and social acceptance, social inequalsex interest (Bailey et  al., 2016). It is then per- ities persist between LGB people and their heterohaps unsurprising that heterosexuality is socially sexual peers. Increasing evidence shows that expected and valued as the natural and normative sexual orientation is associated with social sexual orientation. However, this heteronorma- inequalities in physical health, including poor tivity devalues other expressions of sexuality self-rated health, increased risk of cancer, and (Warner, 1991), and LGB minority people have higher rates of diagnoses of chronic conditions, long remained unacknowledged and unaccepted, such as cardiovascular disease, asthma, and diaif not criminalised. According to a 2020 global betes (Lick et al., 2013). LGB people also experioverview of legislation related to sexual orienta- ence earlier all-cause mortality (i.e., they die at a tion (Mendos et al., 2020), 69 UN member states younger age from any cause) than heterosexual continued to criminalise consensual same-sex people, controlling for differences in demographic sexual activities. In addition, at least 41 UN characteristics and HIV-infection in men (Cochran member states had some legal barriers that et  al., 2016). Findings also showed that higher affected freedom of expression related to sexual death rates in LGB people were associated with orientation and gender identity diversity. On a worse self-rated health, more recent distress, positive note, while only 11 UN member states more health risks (i.e., overweight and hypertenprovided constitutional protection from sexual sion), and more health risk behaviours (i.e., Box 15.1  Defining Sexual Orientation

15  Sexual Orientation as Social Justice Fault Line: The Role of Stigmatised Identities and Minority…

tobacco use and binge drinking). LGB people are also more likely to use alcohol and other drugs, and to experience abuse or dependence on alcohol and other drugs (e.g., Roxburgh et al., 2016). Most research regarding sexual orientation-­ related social inequalities has been concerned with mental health (Bränström et al., 2016). This found that LGB people are more likely to experience depression and anxiety than heterosexual people and are more likely to make use of mental health services (Filice & Meyer, 2018). Setting the stage for later research, an early study in a representative sample in the United States found that rates of depression, panic attacks, and distress were higher in gay and bisexual men than in heterosexual men (Cochran et  al., 2003). Also, rates of anxiety-related problems were higher in lesbian and bisexual women than in heterosexual women (Cochran et al., 2003). Improvements in legal equality and social attitudes may positively impact the wellbeing of LGB people. A study in a representative sample in the Netherlands found, however, that social inequalities in mental health problems related to sexual orientation persisted in the years after same-sex marriage was recognised (Sandfort et al., 2014). Several LGB demographic and sexual orientation subgroups are at increased risk of adverse mental health outcomes. Importantly, LGB youth, as well as transgender youth, are found to be particularly vulnerable to mental health problems (Russell & Fish, 2016). These encompass emotional distress, symptoms and diagnoses of depression and anxiety, and problematic substance use. They are also at higher risk of self-­ harm, suicide thoughts and attempts than non-LGB youth. Bisexual people are also especially at risk of poor mental health. A systematic review of 52 studies found that rates of depression and anxiety in bisexual people were similar to or higher than those for lesbian and gay people; rates were lowest for heterosexual people (Ross et al., 2018). Mental health problems are also particularly pressing among LGB and other non-­heteronor mative refugees, especially those ­ originating from Muslim-majority countries (Alessi et  al., 2018). Refugees are not only at risk of victimisa-

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tion (i.e., cruel or unjust treatment) and trauma (i.e., an overwhelming response to an extremely distressing event) in their country of origin. In their host country, LGB refugees continue to be at risk of sexual orientation-related violence and abuse from other refugees, and can experience discrimination based on race, religion, and immigration status from the host country population (Alessi et al., 2020; see also Chap. 14, this volume). LGB refugees may also be treated negatively and unfairly by interpreters and immigration officials (Alessi et  al., 2018). Furthermore, LGB refugees are likely to experience the double injustice of having been persecuted for their sexual orientation in their home country, which may have resulted in keeping a low profile, and then having to fit Western expectations of living openly as an LGB person in order to convince officials the persecution they suffered was indeed due to their sexual orientation (see Morgan, 2006).

Box 15.2  Societal Views of Sexual Orientations and Gender Identities

The social disapproval of LGB people is deeply rooted in many religious teachings, notably the prohibition of sodomy, in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as immoral and against the laws of nature. This prohibition at some point became enshrined in criminal laws in many countries, and the criminalisation of consensual same-sex activities prevails in some former British colonies and Muslim-majority countries in Africa and Asia (see Mendos et al., 2020). In 2020, the death penalty was required or possible for consensual same-­ sex activity in 11 of the countries that criminalize same-sex practices. With the advent of modern medical science in the mid-nineteenth century, the term homosexuality came in use to designate deviant behaviour (i.e., behaviour that violates laws or social norms), and mental disorder. The American Psychiatric

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Association removed homosexuality from its list of mental disorders only in 1973 (Silverstein, 2009). Nevertheless, conversion therapies, that is, therapies to ‘cure’ homosexuality, continue to be practised. The American Psychological Association (APA) cautions its members that such sexual orientation change efforts are not evidence-­based, and that homosexuality is a normal and positive variation of human sexual orientation (Anton, 2010). Drescher (2010) distinguishes three conceptual perspectives on the causes of homosexuality. These reflect different cultural contexts that shape understandings, social attitudes, therapeutic practices and public policy on same-sex practices and relationships. Despite changes in expert views, a persistent view of homosexuality among lay people is that it is a mental disorder. According to a more benign, but nevertheless disapproving, view, homosexuality is a sign of immaturity, a phase some young people go through but grow out of. In many contemporary societies, mostly in Western countries, the dominant view of homosexuality is that it is a natural variation. People holding this view are most accepting and consider sexual orientation as something innate (i.e., ‘born this way’), and not as a choice reflecting a changeable preference.

 ocial Stigma, Minority Stress S and Wellbeing of LGB People Contemporary research and theorising of the increased mental health problems of LGB people sees these as caused by the social environments in which LGB people experience social disapproval (for a more extensive discussion, see Cochran, 2001). Various terms are used to refer to the social disapproval experienced by LGB people, including homophobia (i.e., negative feelings towards homosexual people), homonegativity (i.e., negative views of homosexuality), hetero-

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sexism (i.e., a bias in favour of heterosexuality), and heteronormativity (Lottes & Grollman, 2010). While distinct, these terms all reflect that non-heteronormative people often experience social stigma. Goffman (1963) originally defined social stigma as an attribute (i.e., bodily mark, behaviour or group membership) that is deeply discredited by society and reduces the person “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (p.  3). Socially stigmatised ­individuals are likely to experience societal rejection and a negatively evaluated, or ‘spoiled’, social identity (see Chap. 2, this volume). Social stigma, including of LGB people, has been posited as a fundamental cause of social inequalities in health (Hatzenbuehler et  al., 2013). Research has found that social stigma of LGB people is linked to their health behaviours, mental and physical health outcomes, and lack of resources that buffer or mitigate poor health (Hatzenbuehler et  al., 2013; Rice et  al., 2021). Link and Phelan (2001) posit that social stigma and its impacts results from consecutive social psychological processes that start with placing LGB people in a separate social category (i.e., a group of people that have one or more attributes in common), that is labelled as deviant in a society. Negative stereotypes (see Chap. 4, this volume) become attached to the label (e.g., gay, lesbian, bisexual), and the separation of ‘us’ from ‘them’ according to the label (i.e., ingroup-­ outgroup differentiation, see Chap. 4) results in status loss (i.e., devaluing) of LGB people. Status loss can result in discrimination of LGB people, which may be overt and blunt (e.g., physical violence) or covert and subtle (e.g., microaggressions – social interactions that contain, intentional or unintentional, denigrating messages). LGB discrimination is multidimensional, including general (public) discrimination (e.g., in stores, restaurants), verbal or physical victimisation (e.g., name calling, threats), and healthcare discrimination (e.g., with respect to insurance or treatment) (Rice et al., 2021). Minority Stress Theory posits that social stigma and discrimination adversely affect the health and wellbeing of LGB people because they experience unique stressors related to their sexual orientation, in addition to general stressors

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everyone can experience (Meyer, 2003). Minority cealment is hypothesised to have mixed effects, Stress Theory distinguishes between distal and including protecting against discrimination, genproximal minority stressors. Distal minority erating stress from hiding one’s identity, precludstressors are objective, stressful events and con- ing access to beneficial community supports, and ditions (e.g., experiences of discrimination or reduced exposure to potentially harmful norms violence), that can be one-off or repeat occur- and practices, such as regarding substance use rences. Distal minority stressors affect the health (Pachankis et al., 2020). and wellbeing of LGB people through proximal A review of almost 200 studies found a small, minority stressors. Proximal minority stressors positive association between sexual orientation are subjective experiences, and encompass concealment and mental health problems (i.e., expectations of rejection, concealment of one’s depression, anxiety, distress) (Pachankis et  al., sexual orientation, and internalised negative soci- 2020). These findings may reflect a negative effect etal attitudes, commonly referred to as inter- of the stress of hiding one’s sexual orientation, nalised homonegativity. The term internalised and/or absent or limited access to community suphomophobia also remains in use and internal- port. A small, negative association was found ized biphobia/negativity are used to specifically between sexual orientation concealment and subrefer to the experiences of bisexual people. The stance use problems. This may reflect that people theory further posits that self-identification as a who conceal their sexual orientation are likely less sexual minority can result in the experience of involved in LGB communities and less exposed to further stressors because of perceiving the self as substance use norms and practices. In contrast, socially stigmatised and devalued. Self-­research has also shown that disclosure of one’s identification can also strengthen or weaken the sexual identity can have positive consequences, impact of stressors, depending on the prominence including less anxiety, more positive feelings, and (i.e., importance) of a person’s LGB identity to greater self-esteem, social support, and involvethemselves. Minority Stress Theory underscores ment in the lesbian and gay community (Jordan & that self-identification can also be a source of Deluty, 1998). There is also evidence that LGB strength, by providing opportunities for affilia- people experience better mental health if they tion, social support, and coping. Social support develop pride in their sexual identity and can inteand coping resources, that may originate from grate their sexual identity as one aspect of a community or family, can buffer the impact of broader self-concept (i.e., how someone thinks minority stressors, and include individual about themselves; Halpin & Allen, 2004). strengths, such as self-esteem and pride. Meyer (2003) provided an early overview of research into the relationship between minority Box 15.3  Sexual Identity Development stressors and the mental health of LGB people. More recently, a systematic review of 62 studies Conceptualising sexual orientation as a reported substantial support for associations naturally varying, inborn characteristic between minority stressors and depression, suiimplies that, at some point in their life, cide thoughts and attempts, and substance use LGB people become aware that their sexamong lesbian, gay, bisexual as well as transgenual interests are different from the majorder people (Mongelli et  al., 2019). Internalised ity of people (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, homonegativity is a particularly impactful minor1995). This awareness typically arises ity stressor that is found to be associated with during adolescence but may also occur at adverse mental health in a growing body of a later age. Awareness of one’s non-norresearch (Berg et al., 2016). There is also much mative sexual orientation poses psychoresearch into the association between efforts to logical and social challenges related to conceal their sexual orientation and the mental self-acceptance as well as public disclohealth of LGB people. Sexual orientation con-

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sure (Mosher, 2001). Coming to terms with one’s sexual orientation is generally thought to require that LGB people accept and integrate their non-­normative sexuality into their self-concept, which is seen as a precondition for ‘coming-­ out (of the closet)’ to others as an LGB person (Mosher, 2001). A supportive social environment can contribute to self-­acceptance (Vincke & Bolton, 1994). The process of sexual identity formation is predominantly captured in socalled stage models of sexual identity development that have been proposed and critiqued since the 1970s (Bilodeau & Renn, 2005). Focused on the resolution of internal conflict, these models have in common that they posit a series of identity development stages, although labelling may differ. As summarised by Bilodeau and Renn (2005), stage models start with a denial stage, followed by gradual recognition and acceptance. Subsequently, a period of experimentation with sexual attraction and/or sexual behaviour is thought to occur, as well as a growing sense of normality. Increasing self-acceptance enables a sense of sexual identity that becomes an integrated, positive aspect of one’s self-concept. While useful as a mental shortcut, stage models also have limitations. Sexual identity development is more fluid than discrete stages suggest, and not all individuals with same-sex sexual interest develop an LGB identity or publicly come out. Also, sexual identity development as a non-heterosexual person today is likely different from when stage models originated, and sexual identity development may differ between cultural settings.

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 olidarity to Achieve Social Justice S for LGB People The past and present success of the quest for social acceptance and legal equality for LGB people is premised on the solidarity of LGB people with each other, and the solidarity of straight (i.e., heterosexual) allies. Straight allies can have diverse motives, which, as summarized by Russell (2011), reflect fundamental principles (e.g., social justice, civil rights) or personal experiences or roles (professional roles, family relationships). Gay-straight alliances are a prominent contemporary example of how LGB people work together with straight allies. Gay-straight alliances are student-led initiatives that aim to create safe and supporting school environments for LGB young people. Broader gender-sexuality alliances are explicitly inclusive of transgender young people. Research found that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender as well as questioning students attending schools with a gay−straight alliance experienced less bullying and reported less health and wellbeing concerns, such as depression, sleep problems, and unhealthy weight control (Lessard et al., 2020). Also, personal contact with LGB people promotes positive attitudes and ally behaviour in straight young people (Heinze & Horn, 2009; Scheer & Poteat, 2016), and adults (Henry et al., 2020). Moreover, the coming together of LGB people, and their allies, enables the social activism that is critical to achieving social justice for LGB people. Notably, social activism requires and contributes to building, organising, and empowering LGB(T) communities, and LGB people link a sense of belonging to an LGB community to better wellbeing (Formby, 2012). LGB community activism encompasses promoting the visibility and self-affirmation of LGB individuals and communities. Pride events (e.g., the Pride Amsterdam Canal Parade) and organisations (e.g., Workplace Pride) are an important feature of this strengths-based (i.e., focused on positive

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Fig. 15.1 LGBT-free zones sticker by Gazeta Polska. (Retrieved 24 July 2021, from https:// commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/ File:02019_1570_ LGBT_free_zone,_ cursed_rainbow,_ Gazeta_Polska_stickers. jpg)

attributes) model of social activism. Research has found that the public disclosure of one’s sexual orientation enabled by pride events and organisations can make important contributions to empowerment and reducing self-stigma in LGB people (Corrigan et al., 2013). In Western countries, social activism of LGB communities has been critical to successful LGB emancipation (Bernstein, 2002), which is reflected in increasing social acceptance and legal equality, including the abolishing of criminalising and discriminating laws. However, the social environment in many countries continues to be unsupportive or may even be increasingly hostile of LGB people. This is, for instance, the case in countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where conservative municipalities and regions declared themselves ‘LGBT free’ (see Fig. 15.1). Unsupportive and hostile social environments reflect a lack of solidarity and can adversely affect the health and wellbeing of LGB people. This is underscored by a study of gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men in 38 European countries, which showed that the national social environment was associated with differences in sexual identity concealment or disclosure that affected HIV risk and prevention behaviours (Pachankis et al., 2015).

Conclusion Sexual orientation is a social justice fault line associated with social inequalities in the health and wellbeing of LGB people. Social activism is required to address sexual orientation-related health gaps, similar to social action on social inequalities in health related to socio-economic position (Marmot, 2017; see Chap. 11, this volume). Sexual orientation stigma in particular is a fundamental cause of social inequalities in health (Hatzenbuehler et  al., 2013), which adversely affects LGB people through the additional stressors they face (Meyer, 2003). Mitigating social stigma is an essential social policy goal to promote the health and wellbeing of LGB people, and a critical component of interventions to promote the health of LGB people that might otherwise be less effective (Layland et al., 2020). LGB communities founded on the solidarity between LGB people, and of their allies, are essential to enabling social activism for equal rights and creating supportive environments. Social activism is especially needed to address the LGB-related social stigma that remains structurally embedded in the laws, policies, and norms of many societies (Hatzenbuehler, 2016). Ultimately, the health and

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wellbeing of all people benefits from living in a society with a high level of social acceptance of LGB people (van der Star & Bränström, 2015).

Glossary Gender conformity: people’s behaviours that are in accordance with culturally prescribed gender roles, that is, expectations for how men and women are expected to behave. Gender identity: people’s personal sense of being female, male or something else, which can be aligned with or differ from their assigned sex (i.e., based on physical characteristics), and need not be binary female or male (e.g., nonbinary). Internalised homonegativity: subjective experiences that include expectations of rejection, concealment of one’s sexual orientation, and internalised negative societal attitudes related to (also) being attracted to people of one’s own gender. Internalised homophobia: older term sometimes considered synonymous with internalized homonegativity, which has been criticised for a limited focus on experiences of fear and avoidance. LGB communities: more broadly referred to as LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and t­ ransgender) communities (historically: gay communities); loose groupings of organizations and subcultures that can be geographically bounded (e.g., city, country) as well as internationally connected. LGB emancipation: also LGBT emancipation or (historically) gay liberation; the social process (including social activism and advocacy) through which lesbian women, gay men, bisexual, and transgender persons have sought equal rights and social opportunities. Sexual identity: how a person thinks about their own sexual orientation, that is, the gender(s) to which they are (mostly) attracted (e.g., gay, lesbian, bisexual, pansexual). Social activism: a form of working together with others that challenges existing social structures

and beliefs (i.e., the status quo) to bring about social change, typically to improve the situation of more disadvantaged groups in society. Social stigma: the social discrediting of people based on a specific, perceivable characteristic, notably a bodily mark, behaviour, or group membership. Transgender people: transgender (also: trans) refers to people whose gender identity differs from the sex they were assigned at birth.

Comprehension Questions

1. Explain in your own words what sexual orientation means. Include how this is similar to, or different from, sexual attraction, sexual behaviour, and sexual identity. 2. What is social stigma according to Goffman (1963)? How do Link and Phelan (2001) explain the relationship between social stigma and discrimination? Use your own words. 3. How does Minority Stress Theory explain differences in health between sexual minority and sexual majority people? Mention specific distal and proximal minority stressors.

Discussion Questions

1. Pride events are annual festivals or parades in cities around the world to celebrate social and self-acceptance and underscore the importance of equal rights of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people as well as transgender people. Pride events are sometimes criticised for having too much of a focus on sex and eccentricity, which gets highlighted in the media and may not do much good for the social acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people. What is your view on pride festivals and their contribution to self- and social acceptance? What do you base your view on? 2. Addressing social injustices related to sexual orientation can be done through multiple

15  Sexual Orientation as Social Justice Fault Line: The Role of Stigmatised Identities and Minority…

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orientation really matter? American Psychologist, 56(11), 931–947. Cochran, S. D., Björkenstam, C., & Mays, V. M. (2016). Sexual orientation and all-cause mortality among us adults aged 18 to 59 years, 2001–2011. American Journal of Public Health, 106(5), 918–920. Cochran, S. D., Sullivan, J. G., & Mays, V. M. (2003). Prevalence of mental disorders, psychological distress, and mental health services use among lesbian, gay, and bisexual adults in the United States. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 71(1), 53–61. References Corrigan, P.  W., Kosyluk, K.  A., & Rüsch, N. (2013). Reducing self-stigma by coming out proud. American Journal of Public Health, 103(5), 794–800. Alessi, E.  J., Kahn, S., Greenfield, B., Woolner, L., & Manning, D. (2020). A qualitative exploration Drescher, J. (2010). Queer diagnoses: Parallels and contrasts in the history of homosexuality, gender variance, of the integration experiences of LGBTQ refuand the diagnostic and statistical manual. Archives of gees who fled from the Middle East, North Africa, Sexual Behavior, 39(2), 427–460. and Central and South Asia to Austria and the Netherlands. Sexuality Research and Social Policy, Filice, E., & Meyer, S. B. (2018). Patterns, predictors, and outcomes of mental health service utilization among 17(1), 13–26. lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals: A scoping review. Alessi, E. J., Kahn, S., Woolner, L., & Van Der Horn, R. Journal of Gay and Lesbian Mental Health, 22(2), (2018). Traumatic stress among sexual and gender 162–195. minority refugees from the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia who fled to the European Union. Journal of Formby, E. (2012). Solidarity but not similarity? LGBT communities in the twenty-first century. Sheffield-­ Traumatic Stress, 31(6), 805–815. Hallam University. Retrieved July 24, 2021, from Anton, B.  S. (2010). Proceedings of the American https://shura.shu.ac.uk/6528/1/LGBT_communities_ Psychological Association for the legislative year final_report_Nov2012.pdf 2009: Minutes of the annual meeting of the Council of Representatives and minutes of the meetings of the Board Glick, S.  N., Cleary, S.  D., & Golden, M.  R. (2015). Increasing acceptance of homosexuality in the of Directors. American Psychologist, 65(5), 385–475. United States across racial and ethnic subgroups. Ashmore, R.  D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes, (2004). An organizing framework for collective 70, 319–322. identity: Articulation and significance of multidimensionality. Psychological Bulletin, 130(1), Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on a spoiled identity. Prentice-Hall. 80–114. Bailey, J.  M., Vasey, P.  L., Diamond, L.  M., Breedlove, Halpin, S. A., & Allen, M. W. (2004). Changes in psychosocial well-being during stages of gay identity S. M., Vilain, E., & Epprecht, M. (2016). Sexual oridevelopment. Journal of Homosexuality, 47(2), entation, controversy, and science. Psychological 109–126. Science in the Public Interest, 17(2), 45–101. Berg, R.  C., Munthe-Kaas, H.  M., & Ross, M.  W. Hatzenbuehler, M. L. (2016). Structural stigma: Research evidence and implications for psychological science. (2016). Internalized homonegativity: A systematic American Psychologist, 71(8), 742–751. mapping review of empirical research. Journal of Hatzenbuehler, M. L., Phelan, J. C., & Link, B. G. (2013). Homosexuality, 63(4), 541–558. Stigma as a fundamental cause of population health Bernstein, M. (2002). Identities and politics: Toward a inequalities. American Journal of Public Health, historical understanding of the lesbian and gay move103(5), 813–821. ment. Social Science History, 26(3), 531–581. Bilodeau, B. L., & Renn, K. A. (2005). Analysis of LGBT Heinze, J. E., & Horn, S. S. (2009). Intergroup contact and beliefs about homosexuality in adolescence. Journal identity development models and implications for of Youth and Adolescence, 38(7), 937–951. practice. New Directions for Student Services, 111, Henry, R. S., Smith, E. R., Perrin, P. B., & Rabinovitch, 25–39. A.  E. (2020). Structural equation model preBränström, R., Hatzenbuehler, M.  L., & Pachankis, dicting LGB ally behaviors in heterosexuals. J.  E. (2016). Sexual orientation disparities in physiSexuality Research and Social Policy. Advance cal health: Age and gender effects in a population-­ online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/ based study. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric s13178-­020-­00461-­x . Epidemiology, 51(2), 289–301. Cochran, S.  D. (2001). Emerging issues in research on Jordan, K.  M., & Deluty, R.  H. (1998). Coming out for lesbian women: Its relation to anxiety, positive affeclesbians’ and gay men’s mental health: Does sexual

forms of solidarity, including the solidarity of LGB people with each other, the solidarity of straight (i.e., heterosexual) allies, or combinations of solidarity. Which form of solidarity do you think is most critical for rectifying social injustices related to sexual orientation? Why?

166 tivity, self-esteem and social support. Journal of Homosexuality, 35(2), 41–63. Kitzinger, C., & Wilkinson, S. (1995). Transitions from heterosexuality to lesbianism: The discursive production of lesbian identities. Developmental Psychology, 31(1), 95–104. Layland, E.  K., Carter, J.  A., Perry, N.  S., Cienfuegos-­ Szalay, J., Nelson, K. M., Bonner, C. P., & Rendina, H.  J. (2020). A systematic review of stigma in sexual and gender minority health interventions. Translational Behavioral Medicine, 10(5), 1200– 1210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2020.02.020. Epub 2020 Jun 15. Lessard, L.  M., Puhl, R.  M., & Watson, R.  J. (2020). Gay-straight alliances: A mechanism of health risk reduction among lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning adolescents. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 59(2), 196–203. Lick, D. J., Durso, L. E., & Johnson, K. L. (2013). Minority stress and physical health among sexual minorities. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 521–548. Link, B.  G., & Phelan, J.  C. (2001). Conceptualizing stigma. Annual Review of Sociology, 27(1), 363–385. Lottes, I. L., & Grollman, E. A. (2010). Conceptualization and assessment of homonegativity. International Journal of Sexual Health, 22(4), 219–233. Marmot, M. (2017). Social determinants and the health gap: Creating a social movement. International Journal of Epidemiology, 46(4), 1335–1339. Mendos, L.  R., Botha, K., Carrano Lelis, R., López de la Peña, E., Savelev, I., & Tan, D. (2020). State-­ sponsored homophobia 2020: Global legislation overview update. ILGA World. Retrieved July 24, 2021, from https://ilga.org/state-­sponsored-­homophobia-­ report-­2020-­global-­legislation-­overview Meyer, I.  H. (2003). Prejudice, social stress, and mental health in lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations: Conceptual issues and research evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 129(5), 674. Mongelli, F., Perrone, D., Balducci, J., Sacchetti, A., Ferrari, S., Mattei, G., & Galeazzi, G.  M. (2019). Minority stress and mental health among LGBT populations: An update on the evidence. Minerva Psichiatrica, 60(1), 27–50. Morgan, D.  A. (2006). Not gay enough for the government: Racial and sexual stereotypes in sexual orientation asylum cases. Law & Sexuality, 15, 135–162. Mosher, C. M. (2001). The social implications of sexual identity formation and the coming-out process: A review of the theoretical and empirical literature. The Family Journal, 9(2), 164–173. Oswald, R., Kuvalanka, K., Blume, L., & Berkowitz, D. (2009). Queering the family. In S. A. Lloyd, A. L. Few, & K.  R. Allen (Eds.), Handbook of feminist family studies (pp. 43–55). Sage. Pachankis, J.  E., Hatzenbuehler, M.  L., Hickson, F., Weatherburn, P., Berg, R. C., Marcus, U., & Schmidt, A.  J. (2015). Hidden from health: Structural stigma, sexual orientation concealment, and HIV across 38

J. de Wit et al. countries in the European MSM Internet Survey. AIDS, 29(10), 1239–1246. Pachankis, J.  E., Mahon, C.  P., Jackson, S.  D., Fetzner, B.  K., & Bränström, R. (2020). Sexual orientation concealment and mental health: A conceptual and meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 146(10), 831–871. Pollitt, A.  M., Mernitz, S.  E., Russell, S.  T., Curran, M. A., & Toomey, R. B. (2021). Heteronormativity in the lives of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer young people. Journal of Homosexuality, 68(3), 522–544. Poushter, J., & Kent, N.  O. (2020). The global divide on homosexuality persists but increasing acceptance in many countries over past two decades. Pew Research Center. Retrieved July 24, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/06/25/ global-­divide-­on-­homosexuality-­persists/ Rice, C.  E., Fish, J.  N., Russell, S.  T., & Lanza, S.  T. (2021). Sexual minority-related discrimination across the life course: Findings from a national sample of adults in the United States. Journal of Homosexuality, 68(2), 252–268. Ross, L. E., Salway, T., Tarasoff, L. A., MacKay, J. M., Hawkins, B.  W., & Fehr, C.  P. (2018). Prevalence of depression and anxiety among bisexual people compared to gay, lesbian, and heterosexual individuals: A systematic review and meta-analysis [Special issue]. Journal of Sex Research, 55, 435–456. Roxburgh, A., Lea, T., de Wit, J., & Degenhardt, L. (2016). Sexual identity and prevalence of alcohol and other drug use among Australians in the general population. International Journal of Drug Policy, 28, 76–82. Russell, G. M. (2011). Motives of heterosexual allies in collective action for equality. Journal of Social Issues, 67(2), 376–393. Russell, S.  T., & Fish, J.  N. (2016). Mental health in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) youth. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 12, 465–487. Sandfort, T. G. M., de Graaf, R., ten Have, M., Ransome, Y., & Schnabel, P. (2014). Same-sex sexuality and psychiatric disorders in the second Netherlands mental health survey and incidence study (NEMESIS-2). LGBT Health, 1(4), 292–301. Scheer, J.  R., & Poteat, V.  P. (2016). Factors associated with straight allies’ current engagement levels within gay-straight alliances. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 43, 112–119. Schnabel, L. (2016). Gender and homosexuality attitudes across religious groups from the 1970s to 2014: Similarity, distinction, and adaptation. Social Science Research, 55, 31–47. Sell, R. L., & Petrulio, C. (1996). Sampling homosexuals, bisexuals, gays, and lesbians for public health research: A review of the literature from 1990 to 1992. Journal of Homosexuality, 30(4), 31–47.

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health and well-being: A cross-European study among members of same-sex and opposite-sex couples. BMC Public Health, 15, 812. Vincke, J., & Bolton, R. (1994). Social support, depression, and self-acceptance among gay men. Human Relations, 47(9), 1049–1062. Warner, M. (1991). Introduction: Fear of a queer planet. Social Text, 1991(29), 3–17.

Perceptions of Deservingness: Civil and Social Rights for Same-­Sex Families

16

Giulia Dotti Sani, Cristina Solera, and Mara A. Yerkes

Introduction The concept and the experience of ‘family’ has grown increasingly diverse in recent decades. While heterosexual married households still dominate family structures across Europe, cohabitation and births outside of marriage are on the rise (OECD, 2015) as well as childfree couples, “living apart together” couples and oneparent families or same-sex families (Ruspini, 2013; Sobotka & Toulemon, 2008; Saraceno, 2012; Pailhé et  al., 2014). With this ongoing diversification of families, at least two critical issues related to solidarity and social justice arise. First is the issue of how welfare policies legitimize and support diverse families across countries (whom is included in this support; see Chap. 4, this volume). Second, increasing family diversity and recognition of this diversity can challenge European solidarity, given the tension between the free movement of persons within the European Union (EU) and variation in citizenship rights across European member states

G. Dotti Sani (*) University of Milan, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] C. Solera University of Turin, Turin, Italy M. A. Yerkes Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

(i.e., individuals’ rights to have basic needs fulfilled as a right of citizenship, not charity; see Chaps. 3 and 5, this volume). In this chapter, we explore cross-­country differences in attitudes towards citizenship rights for same-sex versus heterosexual families (couples with and without children) by assessing whether people feel such rights should be established at the national or European level, as well as attitudes towards these rights being transportable when moving within Europe. For the purposes of this chapter, perceptions of deservingness are defined as attitudes towards citizenship rights. Are same-sex couples perceived to deserve the same citizenship rights as heterosexual couples? And if so, what role does the EU potentially play in guaranteeing such rights and their portability (i.e., can they be taken with you when moving) across member states? How do these attitudes differ across European countries? We investigate these questions with an explorative, empirical analysis comparing five European countries representing a broad variety of welfare regime types: Croatia, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. The chapter distinguishes between civil citizenship rights and social citizenship rights. Civil citizenship rights include marriage, civil partnerships, divorce law, abortion, adoption, and assisted reproductive technology (ART). We focus here on the right to marriage and partnership, and parenthood (adoption, ART). Social citizenship rights include tax benefits, housing

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_16

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benefits, family allowances, childcare benefits, childcare services, and paid parental leave.

 ivil and Social Rights of Same-Sex C Families Within the EU: The Debate The literature on perceptions of deservingness towards citizenship rights for same-sex versus heterosexual families is limited. The question whether individuals in diverse family forms “deserve” social rights has only been asked with regard to inheritance rights, social security benefits, health insurance and some employee benefits (e.g., Brewer & Wilcox, 2005). Attitudes towards the right to family-related social rights, such as welfare state support for a partner and/or children, public childcare services or allowances, and paid parental leave (i.e., paid time off to care for a child), remain mostly unexplored. Research into attitudes towards the role of Europe in creating or maintaining more uniform rights is similarly limited. Given the absence of literature on these topics, it can be difficult to formulate clear hypotheses for our empirical analysis. We therefore provide an exploratory, empirical description of the attitudes of individuals towards the role of the EU.  We do this by drawing on two separate literatures: attitudes towards marriage and alternative forms of partnership, and attitudes towards European integration. From this first literature, Gerhards (2010) and van den Akker et al. (2013) show that in wealthier, well-educated countries, where post-­ materialist values (e.g., cohabitation and a sense of freedom and autonomy in developing one’s own life) dominate, and where church attendance is lower, individuals tend to be more accepting of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. In addition, a country’s level of gender equality (i.e., a composite measure of women’s reproductive health, empowerment and economic position in society), and a country’s economic wealth (measured as gross domestic product (GDP)) are key indicators of more positive individual attitudes towards the rights of same-sex families (Yerkes et  al., 2018). Hooghe and Meeusen (2013) and Dotti Sani and Quaranta (2020) further show the

G. Dotti Sani et al.

importance of national legislation for attitudes: In countries with full recognition of same-sex family formation (i.e., marriage), disapproval of homosexuality is the lowest. While approval of homosexuality may not necessarily equate to believing same-sex families should have the same rights as heterosexual families, we previously found significant individual-level differences in the perceptions of deservingness for social and civil rights of same-sex vs. different-­ sex couples across countries differing on these indicators (see Box 16.1). Building on these find-

Box 16.1  Attitudes Towards Civil and Social Rights for Diverse Families in Comparative Context (Yerkes et al., 2018)

Across our case countries, and at the time of study (2015), Denmark and the Netherlands exhibited a higher distribution of post-materialistic values and had higher levels of gender equality than in Croatia and Italy. Both countries legally recognized rights to marriage, adoption and assisted reproductive technology (e.g., IVF) for same-sex couples and/or single women. Denmark and the Netherlands were also wealthier countries (in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita), followed by Spain and Italy, while Croatia had the lowest GDP per capita. Spain occupied a hybrid position: levels of gender equality were lower than in the Nordic countries, and the spread of post-materialistic values and cohabitation looked more like Italy and Croatia. Yet, unlike Croatia and Italy, Spain had permissive laws concerning partnership (i.e., cohabitation and/or marriage) and parenthood rights (i.e., access to IVF or adoption) for diverse families. In these societal contexts, we expected individual attitudes towards support for the social and civil rights of same-sex families to be highest in Denmark and the Netherlands, lowest in Italy and Croatia, with Spain in the middle.

16  Perceptions of Deservingness: Civil and Social Rights for Same-Sex Families

In our study, we found that students in Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark have more favourable attitudes than students in Italy and Croatia towards equality in civil rights between heterosexual and same-sex couples. Furthermore, we showed that in all countries, equality in access to registered partnerships was supported more than equality in access to marriage. According to most respondents, parenthood rights should be granted to married heterosexual couples, while fewer respondents were in favour of parenthood rights for cohabitating same-sex couples. Spanish respondents were the most in favour of parenthood rights for cohabitating same-sex couples, followed by the Netherlands and Denmark, while the least in favour of such rights were Italian and Croatian respondents. Overall, our results indicated that students in Spain, the Netherlands, and Denmark agreed that parenthood rights should be granted to all types of couples, regardless of family formation (same-sex vs. different-sex, married vs. cohabitating). In this manner, the attitudes from students in these three countries are self-­ transcending, supporting parenthood rights for all (cf. Chap. 4, this volume). In contrast, according to Croatian and Italian respondents, married heterosexual couples were more entitled to parenthood rights than other couples, suggesting the potential absence of justice as recognition (of entitlement to parenthood rights; Chap. 4, this volume).

ings, in the current study we explore the idea that students in Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark will have more supportive attitudes towards the portability of civil and social rights of same-sex families than respondents in Croatia and Italy. The second literature focuses on European integration, which is a topic in its own right but as the process of integration requires some harmo-

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nization of citizenship rights, it is relevant here. For example, in some policy areas, such as policies aimed at improving how individuals balance their work and private lives, the EU has played an important role in harmonizing social rights through the passage of European directives (i.e., goals that create minimum standards across Europe). In 2019, the European Union enacted the Work-Life Balance directive (European Parliament, 2019), which creates European minimum standards for, among other things, paid time off for fathers around a child’s birth. European directives thus lead to some harmonization of rights across all member states. As such, European integration creates potential for a reduction in social rights’ inequalities. However, such integration efforts could also be contentious if the harmonization of rights is perceived to worsen rights rather than provide minimum standards. Understanding when individuals oppose (or support) European integration could therefore provide insights into when individuals may oppose or support the role of the EU in harmonizing the rights of same-sex families. Various arguments are put forth to explain cross-country differences in attitudes towards European integration. Support for a stronger role for the European Union depends on corruption levels and welfare state spending; support is higher in countries where corruption is higher and welfare states are less economically developed (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). Another explanation focuses on cultural factors, suggesting lower support for European integration arises from social identities (see Chap. 2, this volume), and national identities in particular (Kriesi & Lachat, 2004; Diez Medrano, 2003; Carey, 2002). Strong national identities lead to lower support for a strong EU, especially in countries with greater political division and with stronger anti-EU parties. The social and civil rights of same-sex families are less developed in Spain, Italy, and Croatia, therefore the ‘cost’ of transferring sovereignty on these rights to Europe is relatively low. This is not the case in Denmark and the Netherlands, where social and civil rights for same-sex families were more strongly developed (Yerkes et al.,

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2018). As such, in the current study we could expect higher support for a strong EU in harmonizing social and civil rights in Spain, Italy, and Croatia (see Yerkes et al., 2018 for a detailed discussion). A more cultural explanation, however, might suggest that in Italy in particular, but also Croatia and the Netherlands to some extent, exclusive national identities and the absence of feeling like a European citizen will lead to lower support for the EU in harmonizing civil and social rights for same-sex families. Hence, we could also expect lower support for a strong EU in Italy, Croatia, and potentially the Netherlands.

 he Current Study: Data T and Methods For space reasons, we provide limited information here on data and methods. For a detailed description, see Yerkes et al. (2018). Study participants included 991 Humanities and Social Sciences students in five countries: Denmark, Spain, Croatia, Italy, and the Netherlands. All respondents were asked whether EU membership is a good or bad thing for their country (on a scale from 0 = very bad to 10 = very good) and indicated whether they thought specific civil and social rights should be determined at the national or European level (0  =  completely national level  –  10  =  completely at European level). Respondents were also presented with a set of vignettes (hypothetical situations; see Chap. 12) of individuals moving within the EU and were asked whether individuals living in this situation should be entitled to retain their civil and social rights when moving. For example: “A same-sex couple living in Spain  – where same-sex marriage is legal  – decides to get married. A year later, the couple decides to move to Italy, where same-sex marriages are not allowed. Do you agree or disagree that their marriage should be considered legally valid in Italy, and that it should be recognized by Italian law?” Possible responses ranged from 0 to 10, where 0 stood for completely disagree and 10 for completely agree.

When respondents were presented with vignettes about maintaining social rights when moving within Europe, they were also asked to indicate who they believed should pay for the benefit indicated in the question: the sending country, the receiving country, the EU, or nobody. We present descriptive data here, showing mean values by country, not controlled for individual-level differences (e.g., gender, age, etc.).

Results Attitudes Towards the Role of the European Union In all countries, on average, students feel that being part of the European Union is a good thing. The highest average score is in Italy (M  =  7.8, SD = 2.1), followed by the Netherlands (M = 7.3, SD = 1.8), Spain (M = 6.9, SD = 2.3), Denmark (M  =  6.7, SD  =  3.1) and Croatia (M  =  6.1, SD = 2.5). We find considerably less support for the idea that the EU should decide about the social and civil rights of diverse families (see Fig. 16.1) although cross-national differences are evident. Italian and, less so, Spanish students appear to be most in favour of EU interventions in determining both civil and social rights. In Denmark we find considerably lower support for the idea that the EU should decide about the social and civil rights of diverse families. The findings presented here also suggest there is a distinction in attitudes between civil and social rights: In all countries, students believe the EU should play a greater role when it comes to civil rather than social rights. If we look in more detail at attitudes towards civil rights, Fig.  16.2 shows that students are more in support of a harmonizing role for the EU regarding civil partnership versus marriage, with no relevant differences based on the recipients of these rights (i.e., different-sex vs. same-sex couples). This finding is surprising in light of the limited attitudes literature, which notes the importance of legislation guaranteeing civil

16  Perceptions of Deservingness: Civil and Social Rights for Same-Sex Families

6.4

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Fig. 16.1 Decisional capacity on civil and social rights

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Fig. 16.2  Desire for a common legal framework for civil rights (marriage/partnership)

rights in shaping attitudes but does not suggest a distinction exists between civil partnership and marriage rights. Yet our findings suggest the gap between attitudes towards the role of the EU in standardizing civil rights for marriage versus civil partnership is somewhat larger in those countries where a legal recognition of civil unions is absent or only recent (i.e. Italy and Croatia). No meaningful differences emerge in the Netherlands and Denmark, where culturally and

institutionally, marriage and civil partnership (for both different-sex and same-sex couples) are equally legitimate. If we continue to look in more detail at civil rights relating to parenthood, we see only minor variation in support for a European framework on the right to adopt children (see Fig. 16.3), and only marginal differences for the regulation of assisted reproductive technologies, with the exception of Italy and Croatia. For these civil rights, students in

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Fig. 16.3  Desire for a common legal framework for civil rights (adoption ARTs) and social rights

all countries appear to support more strongly having a common European legal framework for assisted reproduction in comparison to adoption. However, the gap between the two rights is much smaller in Denmark and the Netherlands, where access to parenthood for diverse family forms is more accepted and allowed, compared to the other countries. In contrast, Spanish and more so Italian students believe closer national control should be maintained on adoption rights rather than on rights related to ARTs. The similarity between the two southern European countries is somewhat surprising, considering that Spanish national laws grant diverse families greater parenthood rights compared to Italian ones, where neither adoption not ARTs are allowed for same-sex couples. We also find no variation across family types in attitudes towards support for a common legal framework in social rights (Fig. 16.3). Notably, the request for a stronger EU with regards to social rights is considerably weaker in countries with greater acceptance of family diversity, such as Denmark and the Netherlands. In these countries, social rights for same-sex families are already largely available. In fact, the regulation of these rights seems to be considered more of a national than a European responsibility.

 ivil and Social Rights of Citizens C Who Move Within the EU Which rights should people keep while moving from one country to another within the European Union? Consistent with the high support for a common legal European framework in terms of civil rights discussed above, students appear more in favour of the portability of rights (e.g., these can be maintained when moving within Europe) if these involve civil rather than social rights. As Fig.  16.4 shows, while students, on average, strongly agree that civil rights should be portable while moving across Europe, with an exceptionally high level of agreement in Spain, agreement on the need for portable social rights is much lower. This is particularly the case in Denmark and the Netherlands, where average agreement with the statement regarding social rights is exceptionally low and where, as seen before, students find that the regulation of these rights is a national issue rather than a European one. One of the problematic aspects about EU citizens maintaining their social rights as they move across countries concerns who should pay for such rights. Our data allow us to identify who should finance the portability of social rights of

8

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Fig. 16.4  Ability to maintain civil and social rights throughout Europe

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10

16  Perceptions of Deservingness: Civil and Social Rights for Same-Sex Families

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Response options range from “Completely disagree” (0) to “Completely agree” (10). Mean values by country.

citizens who move within the EU according to the respondents. A very high percentage of respondents in Denmark (49%) and the Netherlands (76%) believe social rights should not be portable, and no one should pay for them. In the other three countries, students were much less likely to give this answer (~15% on average) and were much more likely to answer that either the EU or the receiving country should pay for the maintenance of these rights. Notably, a considerable percentage of students felt that the receiving country should guarantee funding for the social rights of citizens who move within the EU (33% Spain, 36% Croatia, 43% Italy, and up to 39% in Denmark). Nearly 30% of respondents in Spain, Croatia and Italy believed the EU should fund such rights, compared to 5% of students in Denmark and 7% in the Netherlands. The variation in these answers could suggest potential variation in solidarity – both in terms of who should regulate civil and social rights, as well as who should pay for them  – across the European Union. In particular, our results seem to indicate less cross-national solidarity in Denmark and the Netherlands, where students essentially believe each country should be responsible for its citizens, whereas students in Spain, Croatia and Italy favour greater crossnational solidarity in supporting citizens who move across Europe. However, the latter finding

could also be related to self-interest, wanting the EU or the receiving country to pay for rights that are otherwise limited or non-existent in their own country. Similarly, the opposition to a strong EU in countries with well-developed rights could reflect self-interest in the opposition of sharing these benefits with non-residents.

Conclusion In this chapter, we explored cross-country differences in attitudes towards social and civil rights for same-sex versus different-­sex couples and we investigated what role, if any, the European Union should play in developing more uniform civil and social rights for diverse families. We also verified whether these rights should be maintained when moving to another country within the EU.  Our analyses, based on data from five European countries representing different welfare regime types, focused on attitudes towards citizenship rights defined as perceptions of deservingness of citizenship rights for same-sex as opposed to different-­sex couples. We find several cross-country differences, suggesting legislation supporting the civil rights of same-sex families matters for individual-level attitudes supporting a common European framework for

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civil partnership versus marriage. We also find notable distinctions between civil and social rights, distinctions not currently made in the literature. In all countries, students believe the EU should play a greater role when it comes to civil rather than social rights. The call for EU intervention in establishing these rights is lower in countries where the rights of sexual minorities are well established. A possible interpretation of this result could be that, given the broadly defined social and civil rights for diverse families in these contexts, the intervention of Europe might be perceived as a threat to these rights, rather than an opportunity for further confirmation of these rights. This distinction between civil and social rights is also evident when we consider the potential mobility of rights within the EU, whereby the portability of civil rights receives broader support. Finally, students in countries where recognition of social and civil rights is greater showed less willingness to have the EU fund more uniform recognition of these rights throughout Europe. It is also worth noting that we find no evidence of lower support for a strong EU in Italy, Croatia and the Netherlands, as an explanation based on the strength of national identities would have called for. Moreover, across the five considered countries, only marginal differences emerge in attitudes towards the role of the EU in unifying the rights of same-sex vs. different sex couples. Such results suggest that the perceived equality between the two groups is rather high. Interestingly, the unifying role of the EU for civil rights is invoked more strongly for same-sex than for different-sex couples in countries where the rights of sexual minorities are not fully established. For example, Italian students are more in favour of EU intervention in the area of assisted reproductive technologies for same-sex couples than for heterosexual ones, possibly because the latter are in need of legal recognition in this respect, as Italian legislation grants such rights to different-sex but not same-sex couples. Based on findings presented here, at least two issues relating to solidarity, and social justice appear to be evident: First, is the question of who deserves citizenship rights on the basis of family formation related to sexuality (i.e., justice as rec-

G. Dotti Sani et al.

ognition; Chap. 4, this volume). Our findings suggest achieving social justice for same-­sex families requires the recognition of subtle differences, such as the distinctions between and within civil and social rights. A second and related point concerns the potential challenge to European solidarity when social or civil rights for diverse families are recognized in some European member states but not in others. For countries that have gone further in recognizing family diversity by extending social and civil rights to same-sex families, further involvement of the EU may be less welcome for fear of a downgrading of these rights, which can potentially challenge cross-national European solidarity. It may also signal a lack of awareness of any issues arising from differences in the social and civil rights of same-sex vs. different-­sex couples when respondents are using their own national context as a point of reference. When we consider the potential mobility of rights within the EU, the challenge for solidarity and social justice becomes even more complex, with the issue of whether previously granted social and civil rights are recognized by other member states and the solidarity issue of who is expected to pay for this recognition. Once again, we saw a key distinction between social and civil rights. The potential portability of citizenship rights was more supported for civil rights than for social rights. Moreover, students in Denmark and the Netherlands, with greater recognition of social and civil rights, showed less willingness to have the EU fund more uniform recognition of these rights throughout Europe. Note that the Danish and Dutch welfare states offer more generous social protection compared to the other countries considered here. In our hypothetical portability of rights scenarios, citizens moving across borders to more generous welfare states could benefit from these more generous welfare arrangements (regardless of who would pay for the rights). While this finding might relate to an absence of awareness of the differences in citizenship rights across countries, it is also plausible that the observed variation in solidarity is driven by economic motivations that can be traced back to welfare state generosity: the less generous and comprehensive the welfare state, the more citizens have to gain from sharing their wel-

16  Perceptions of Deservingness: Civil and Social Rights for Same-Sex Families

fare system with other countries, and the more they support the portability of rights. If this is the case, European solidarity could become dependent upon economic motivations like these, rather than a common social and cultural identity of being European and thus being solidaristic across countries within Europe. In the absence of this solidarity, questions of justice as recognition (who deserves which citizenship rights and in which countries) become even more pronounced.

Glossary Civil citizenship rights: Civil citizenship rights include marriage, civil partnerships, divorce law, abortion, adoption, and assisted ­reproductive technology. For a discussion on citizenship rights, see Chap. 3, this volume. Portability: referring to whether civil and social citizenship rights can be maintained when moving countries within the European Union. Post-materialist values: values associated with a greater sense of freedom and autonomy in developing one’s own life. Social citizenship rights: Social citizenship rights include tax benefits, housing benefits, family allowances, childcare benefits, childcare services, and paid parental leave.

Comprehension Questions

1. The ongoing diversification of families gives rise to critical solidarity and social justice issues. Which are these? 2. Based on the literature discussed in the chapter, what characterizes countries where individuals tend to be more accepting of homosexuality and same-sex marriage? 3. Based on the results presented, if the European Union were to introduce a common legal framework for civil rights for same-sex couples, which countries would be more favorable toward such an intervention? Why?

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4. According to the authors, why is the call for EU intervention in establishing civil and social rights for same-sex couples lower in countries where the rights of sexual minorities are well established? Discussion Questions

1. For the countries analyzed in this chapter, why do you think students are more in favour of an EU intervention for partnership rights than for marriage rights for same-sex couples? 2. The survey respondents used in this study were students. How do you think the results might differ if respondents came from other categories of the population, for example the elderly or the unemployed? Discuss.

References Brewer, P. R., & Wilcox, C. (2005). Same-sex marriage and civil unions. Public Opinion Quarterly, 69(4), 599–616. Carey, S. (2002). Undivided loyalties: Is national identity an obstacle to European integration? European Union Politics, 3, 387–413. Diez Medrano, J. (2003). Framing Europe: Attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Princeton University Press. Dotti Sani, G. M., & Quaranta, M. (2020). Let them be, not adopt: General attitudes towards gays and lesbians and specific attitudes towards adoption by same-sex couples in 22 European countries. Social Indicators Research, 150, 351–373. European Parliament. (2019). Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (p. 15). Gerhards, J. (2010). Non-discrimination towards homosexuality. The European Union’s policy and citizens’ attitudes towards homosexuality in 27 European countries. International Sociology, 25(1), 5–28. Hooghe, M., & Meeusen, C. (2013). Is same-sex marriage legislation related to attitudes toward homosexuality? Trends in tolerance of homosexuality in European countries between 2002 and 2010. Sexuality Research and Social Policy, 10, 258–268. Kriesi, H., & Lachat, R. (2004). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Switzerland and France compared. Paper prepared for a Workshop on the Analysis of Political Cleavages and Party Competition, Duke University.

178 OECD. (2015). Family database. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. www.oecd. org/els/social/family/database Pailhé, A., Mortelmans, D., Castro, T., Trilla, C. C., Digoix, M., Festy, P., Krapf, S., Kreyenfeld, M., LyssensDanneboom, V., Martín-García, T., Rault, W., Thévenon, O., & Toulemon, L. (2014). Changes in the life course. Families and Societies Working Paper Series, 6, 2014. Ruspini, E. (2013). Diversity in family life: Gender, relationships and social change. Policy Press. Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000). The political basis of support for European integration. European Union Politics, 1(2), 147–171. Saraceno, C. (2012). Coppie e famiglie. Non è questione di natura. Feltrinelli.

G. Dotti Sani et al. Sobotka, T., & Toulemon, L. (2008). Changing family and partnership behaviour: Common trends and persistent diversity across Europe. Demographic Research, 19(6), 85–138. van den Akker, H., van der Ploeg, R., & Scheepers, P. (2013). Disapproval of homosexuality: Comparative research on individual and national determinants of disapproval of homosexuality in 20 European countries. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20(1), 64–86. Yerkes, M.  A., Dotti Sani, G.  M., & Solera, C. (2018). Attitudes toward parenthood, partnership, and social rights for diverse families: Evidence from a pilot study in five countries. Journal of Homosexuality, 65(1), 80–99.

Section IV Global Challenges to Solidarity and Social Justice

Leaving No One Behind: Climate Change as a Societal Challenge for Social Justice and Solidarity

17

Michèlle Bal and Marijn Stok

Introduction Climate change poses a major challenge to societies worldwide. Environmental degradation and global problems of an unprecedented scale are arising because of global warming and contemporary generations are the first to experience these negative consequences first-hand. That climate change is a problem that needs immediate action is recognized by researchers, policymakers, and citizens alike. Several influential scientific reports allude to the urgency of the problem (IPBES, 2019; IPCC, 2018), stating that if we do not act now, the negative consequences of climate change will be irreversible, such as the extinction of species, increases in extreme weather types, and rising sea levels. Moreover, many governments are working together in treaties such as the Paris agreement and the EU Green Deal, where the latter emphasizes social justice in their key aim to ‘leave no one behind’. In these treaties, governments are trying to curb the climate crisis by reducing the emission of greenhouse gasses and investing in circular economies (i.e., climate change mitigation) as well as by developing resilience plans to cope with the

impact of rising temperatures (i.e., climate change adaptation). That at least a substantial proportion of citizens is also concerned about climate change and feels we need to act now is exemplified by the large climate change protests of 2019. The grassroots initiative for these protests quickly grew into a massive worldwide movement of youth and young adults especially (mostly students) taking to the streets to raise public awareness and pressure politicians into taking action (Wahlström et al., 2019). The protests were instigated by the individual actions of Greta Thunberg, a young Swedish climate activist who went on strike from school to protest climate change inaction. In December 2018, at the UN Climate Change conference, in a moving speech that went viral, she stated: “You say you love your children above all else, and yet you are stealing their future in front of their very eyes” (Thunberg, 2018), which brought about the worldwide climate protests a few months later. In the current chapter, we will discuss environmental justice principles and broader beliefs and norms as important drivers of climate change protest and sustainable behaviour change. Moreover, we will explain why these are not enough to understand sustainable behaviour change or lack thereof.

M. Bal (*) • M. Stok Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_17

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tion, Chap. 4 this volume). First, regarding environmental issues, the scope of justice can be extended with the inclusion of future generations, The term ‘environmental justice’ was initially including current younger generations (i.e., interused as an activist term to flag that lower socio-­ generational environmental justice). The quote economic and Black communities were dispro- by Greta Thunberg above illustrates how interportionately burdened and put at risk by generational justice can indeed be an important environmental hazards as these are often located motive for climate action. By considering the near their neighbourhoods (e.g., toxic waste sites interests of future generations, questions regard(Bullard & Johnson, 2000)). Moreover, the nega- ing the burdens we are putting on them become tive consequences of climate change, such as explicitly included in distributive justice deciinjury, illness, and deaths from extreme climate sions. Second, by adopting a global environmenevents or infectious diseases, as well as food and tal justice principle, people worldwide are water insecurity, disproportionately burden included into one’s scope of justice, especially already vulnerable populations (Ebi & Hess, taking economically disadvantaged groups into 2020; Green, 2016; Mitchell & Chakraborty, account. Global environmental justice most 2014; Shepard & Corbin-Mark, 2009), and thus closely aligns with the way environmental justice further exacerbate existing inequalities. This was conceived as an activist term. Questions effect can be seen both when comparing coun- regarding what is fair for the Global South, where tries (e.g., developed countries versus developing individuals have been historically burdened and countries (Ebi & Hess, 2020)), but also within currently struggle more in transitioning to more countries and regions when comparing, for sustainable forms of living than individuals in the example, racial/ethnic minority groups to major- Global North, are key to a global environmental ity groups and lower socio-economic status justice principle. Third, ecological environmental groups to higher socio-economic status groups justice is about extending of the scope of justice (Mitchell & Chakraborty, 2014). toward an inclusion of nature and non-human In social scientific research, the term environ- species (i.e., other animals). By extending the mental justice has also been applied more scope of justice beyond the human species, as broadly, to encompass a set of questions related with intergenerational environmental justice, to fairness and justice in climate change adapta- entities that otherwise do not have a voice in the tion and mitigation. Within the social sciences, environmental debate are included in people’s different terms are used to refer to environmental fairness considerations. justice (e.g., green justice, climate justice). Research on these environmental justice prinMoreover, with regard to specific sustainability ciples in relation to climate change reactions has transitions, specific operationalizations of justice only recently started to develop. In studies on have been put forward (e.g., energy justice sustainable behaviour intentions, intergenera(Jenkins et  al., 2016; Sovacool & Dworkin, tional justice concerns were found to increase 2015)). In the current chapter, we discuss and people’s anger about environmental damage, and refer to environmental justice throughout, as we this in turn somewhat increased people’s sustainconsider this to be the most widely adopted and able behaviour intentions (e.g., protecting biodineutral terminology. versity; buying products from local farmers Research on environmental justice has (Reese & Kohlmann, 2015). In contrast, adhering revealed that three justice principles can be dis- to an ecological justice principle increased a tinguished (Clayton & Opotow, 2003; Reese & sense of responsibility, which had a stronger posJacob, 2015). These principles can be viewed as itive effect on people’s sustainable behaviour extensions of the traditional scope of justice in intentions. Of the three environmental justice which rights of and responsibilities towards spe- principles, global justice concerns were least cific others are recognized (cf. justice as recogni- influential on intentions for sustainable behav-

17  Leaving No One Behind: Climate Change as a Societal Challenge for Social Justice and Solidarity

iour. Nevertheless, subsequent studies focused specifically on increasing these global justice concerns. Such studies showed that activating a global human identity positively influenced sustainable behaviours and intentions, and that this relationship was mediated by global justice concerns (Reese & Kohlmann, 2015; Reese, 2016; Renger & Reese, 2017). Questions of social justice, and environmental justice specifically, are thus important drivers of people’s motivation to take action against climate change.

I ndividual Behaviour in Climate Change Mitigation To date, the sociotechnical perspective dominates the conceptual understanding of sustainability transitions, a perspective where economic development, technological innovation, and policy change are considered critical factors in shaping sustainability transitions, the energy transition in particular (Cherp et al., 2018; Sovacool & Hess, 2017). Sustainability transitions encompass a transition from less sustainable ways of being to more sustainable ones and these are needed in several life domains, such as energy, food, and mobility. Accordingly, research investigating sustainability transitions overwhelmingly focuses on the development of new technologies and their implementation. The sociotechnical transitions approach has been critiqued for its biased focus on technologies and systems (de Haan & Rotmans, 2018; Shove & Walker, 2010) and a lack of attention for people’s behaviour and underlying drivers of behaviour (Bögel & Upham, 2018). Crucially, a successful sustainability transition requires major and unprecedented adaptations to citizens’ attitudes and behaviour (Franceschinis et  al., 2017; Glad, 2012; Kammen & Sunter, 2016; Michie et  al., 2011). Individuals must critically change their energy use (e.g., adopting technological innovations like solar panels and heat pumps, investing in home insulation, taking shorter showers), food consumption habits (e.g., eating more local and seasonal products, reducing food waste, and decreasing animal protein intake), transportation

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patterns (e.g., flying less, switching to electric cars, using more public or shared modes of transportation), and general consumerism (e.g., buying sustainable clothing, recycling waste, switching to reusable and green products) to enable a successful sustainability transition. Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory provides extensive insight into this ‘human side’ of the transition process (Steg et al., 2014; Stern, 2000). According to VBN theory, values (i.e., the general goals that people strive for in life), more sustainable-behaviour-specific beliefs, and personal norms are key determinants of people’s sustainability attitudes and behaviours. Four types of core values have been discerned (de Groot & Steg, 2008; Steg et al., 2014; Stern et al., 1998). First, two types of self-transcending values (see Chap. 1, this volume) motivate sustainable behaviour intentions, namely biospheric values (i.e., valuing the environment) and altruistic values (i.e., valuing the welfare of other human beings and fairness considerations). These self-transcending values overlap with the environmental justice principles presented earlier. Altruistic values overlap with intergenerational and global justice principles, while biospheric values and ecological justice principles also align. Second, two types of self-enhancing values typically hamper sustainable behaviour intentions, namely egoistic values (i.e., valuing personal resources and achievement), and hedonistic values (i.e., valuing pleasure and comfort). VBN theory further posits that the extent to which people hold these four values (biospheric, altruistic, egoistic and hedonistic) affects sustainable-­ behaviour-specific beliefs (i.e., awareness of the consequences of climate change and beliefs about who is responsible for (mitigating) climate change). These beliefs, in turn, shape people’s personal norms – their perceived moral obligations to preserve the environment. Research has shown that among people who hold strong pro-environmental personal norms, a so-called ‘green identity’ can be discerned and cultivated (Soron, 2010). Such self-identification as a pro-­ environmentalist predicts engagement in various sustainable behaviours (Johe & Bhullar, 2016;

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Schwartz et  al., 2020; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). Alongside personal norms and self-identity, social norms (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) and social identity (Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1975) play a crucial role in shaping people’s sustainability intentions and behaviours (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016); Chap. 2, this volume). Research has shown that when social ingroups hold pro-environmental social norms, this positively affects individuals’ engagement in, for example, sustainable activism (Fielding et  al., 2008), organic product purchase and sustainable food consumption (Kim, 2019; Salazar et  al., 2013), energy conservation (Smith et  al., 2012) and littering less (Kallgren et al., 2000).

M. Bal and M. Stok

capabilities (psychological and physical capacity to engage in a particular act) and opportunities (factors located in the physical as well as social environment that enable or prompt behaviour). Crucially, capabilities to transition may lag behind in certain groups, most notably lower socio-economic groups, as these groups tend to have a lower level of sustainability-related skills and knowledge (Pohjolainen et al., 2016; Vainio et  al., 2020). Indeed, it has been shown that groups with lower socio-economic status tend to be late adopters of new, sustainable behaviours (Franceschinis et  al., 2017). Moreover, people who occupy less privileged positions in society typically have fewer resources (e.g., finances, time, social capital) available to support them through the energy transition (Abrahamse & Steg, 2011; Trotta, 2018). Crucially, multiple Beyond the Motivation studies have shown that lower socio-economic status groups are not less motivated, nor do they for Sustainable Behaviour have fewer intentions to behave sustainably Environmental justice research, VBN theory and (Abrahamse & Steg, 2011; Pearson et al., 2018). the social identity approach increase our underMoving beyond a primarily motivation-based standing of the factors underlying people’s moti- account of sustainable behaviour and applying vations for (not) wanting to engage in sustainable insights from COM-B to the sustainability transibehaviours. Yet, motivational processes alone are tion can provide deeper insights into the proinsufficient for understanding why people do or cesses shaping the transition for different groups do not engage in sustainability transitions. In in society. This in turn can inform policies and fact, by focusing on motivational processes only, interventions aimed at facilitating participation in we run the risk of blaming those who lag behind the sustainability transition for everybody, conin this transition for lacking the motivation to tributing to the global aim of ‘leaving no-one counter climate change. For instance, people behind’. However, research specifically targeting with a low socio-economic position are some- specific socio-economic groups in the sustaintimes portrayed as not behaving in sustainable ability transition is scarce. Primary insights come ways because of a lack of motivation (e.g., from a Dutch case study on social housing resibecause they do not feel responsible for climate dents’ attitudes (who typically belong to lower change or do not feel it is very urgent (see, for socio-economic groups) toward a sustainable example, Santangelo & Tondelli, 2017). Yet, renovation of their building (Bal et  al., 2021). more factors are at play. The Capability-­ This study found that residents were in fact conOpportunity-­Motivation-Behaviour (COM-B) cerned about climate change and held corremodel (Michie et al., 2011) outlines why the tran- sponding environmental justice beliefs. sition to more sustainable behaviours is not Moreover, they typically already engaged in variequally achievable for everybody, and why being ous sustainable behaviours, and were motivated motivated to act sustainably is insufficient. to increase their sustainable behaviours followFollowing this model, engagement in the sustain- ing the renovation. They largely believed global ability transition is shaped not only by individu- warming was problematic and had a personal als’ motivation (mental processes that energise norm to save energy. Hence, motivation to take and direct certain behaviour), but also by their part in the sustainability transition was high.

17  Leaving No One Behind: Climate Change as a Societal Challenge for Social Justice and Solidarity

Interestingly, respondents were motivated both by self-transcending values as well as by self-­ enhancing values, while the latter usually hamper sustainable behaviour intentions (de Groot & Steg, 2008; Steg et al., 2014). It might be the case that sustainable renovations and sustainable technology investments by municipalities and housing corporations can decrease energy consumption and, at the same time, increase residents’ living comfort while decreasing their expenses, particularly in social housing. Nevertheless, in line with the COM-B model, perceived social norms were not always supportive of behaving sustainably and respondents sometimes failed to recognize the sustainable value of these behaviours, indicating limited capabilities to transition. Especially when the sustainability aspect of certain sustainable behaviours was unclear (e.g., leaving the heating on when leaving the house or actively blocking the sun from your apartment), unsupportive social norms negatively impacted people’s intention to engage in these sustainable behaviours.

Sustainability Transitions: Challenges for Solidarity and Social Justice Taken together, climate change and the necessary sustainability transitions raise important challenges for solidarity, and social justice. First, social justice can be an important instigator of climate action. However, an extension of the scope of justice is necessary, going beyond the here and now and beyond the human species. Research on environmental justice shows that three principles of social justice can be distinguished that extend the scope to future generations (intergenerational environmental justice), to people worldwide, with an emphasis on disadvantaged groups (global environmental justice), and beyond the human species to nature and other animals (ecological environmental justice). These environmental justice principles can stimulate sustainable behaviour. Related to this, an important goal of the Green Deal is to ‘leave no one behind’. Most social sci-

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entific research has been focused on factors motivating individuals to engage in sustainable behaviour. However, the shift towards a sustainable transition is not equally attainable. Existing social inequalities will likely transfer into this sustainable transition process or may even become exacerbated (Shepard & Corbin-Mark, 2009). Not taking part in the transition is sometimes attributed to a lack of interest or motivation. However, studies show that this is not the case, and that other factors, notably a lack of opportunities and capabilities, also hamper the transition process. Moreover, the burdens of climate change are not equally distributed across all people, with vulnerable groups carrying a disparately large share. Thus, vulnerable populations suffer a double burden in the sense that they are disparately affected by the negative effects of climate change, while at the same time they have structurally lower opportunities and capabilities, which makes it more difficult for them to participate in the sustainability transition. This may, in fact, even undermine these groups’ solidarity towards sustainable efforts. Together, the issues described in this chapter clearly demonstrate that climate change is a wicked problem (Incropera, 2016). This means the problem is complex, influenced by a multitude of factors, with outcomes of both action and non-action being uncertain. Because of its wicked nature, several justice questions arise (e.g., How can we take future generations into account? How should we account for uncertainties inherent to the transition process? What does a just transition process look like? Who should get a voice in this process?). These questions are difficult to answer and evoke ample discussion both in policymaking and within the general public, which can lead to polarization on climate change issues and climate change scepticism (see Box 17.1 below). Solving wicked problems requires the involvement of all sectors of society and considerations across a multitude of dimensions (e.g., technological, medical, social, economic, political, moral). In the current chapter, we discussed several questions surrounding solidarity and social justice that warrant further discussion in transitioning to a more sustainable world.

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Box 17.1  Climate Change Scepticism

Up until now, most research on climate change reactions has focused on identifying the factors driving sustainable behaviour. However, in contemporary societies, climate change scepticism seems to be on the rise (e.g., Eurobarometer, 2019; O’Neill, 2020). Such scepticism can be an important barrier to sustainable behaviour. Although climate change scepticism has only recently started to attract substantial scholarly attention (Postmes, 2015), at least four types of scepticism have been distinguished: trend (Is the climate changing?), attribution (Is climate change caused by humans?), impact (How severe are the consequences?), and effectiveness (Do my actions help counter climate change? (Poortinga et  al., 2011). Climate change scepticism seems to fit well in larger, contemporary trends of growing distrust towards governments (e.g., the rise of populism), science (e.g., science scepticism), large corporations (e.g., fears of greenwashing, where companies use PR and marketing to present themselves as greener than they actually are), and the growing attraction of conspiracy theories in society (e.g., related to COVID-19 and vaccination in general; e.g., (Douglas et  al., 2017; Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020).

Glossary

M. Bal and M. Stok

Approaching climate change scepticism from a motivated reasoning perspective, where people’s reasoning processes are biased towards attaining a certain desired reasoning outcome as opposed to an accurate one (e.g., to reduce negative emotions or cognitive dissonance), (Feygina et  al., 2010; Haltinner & Sarathchandra, 2018; Hennes et  al., 2020), these forms of scepticism could paradoxically be stemming from a concern about climate change. That is, climate change can be perceived as a threat to us (e.g., our existence, our values, the current status quo) and we already know from research on victim blaming and system justification (Chap. 4, this volume) that we sometimes deal with threats by using defensive coping strategies. As such, we may sometimes be motivated to reduce the threat of climate change by increasing climate scepticism. Studies have indeed shown that after a dire message regarding climate change, climate scepticism increased, particularly among those for whom justice was salient and for whom living in a just world was more important (Feinberg & Willer, 2011). Moreover, people who saw environmentalism as a threat were more likely to be sceptical of climate change (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016).

Environmental justice: a set of questions related to fairness and justice in climate Capability-Opportunity-Motivation-­Behaviour change adaptation and mitigation, and the (COM-B) model: a model outlining how theories and research studying them. (The capabilities (psychological and physical term was initially used as an activist term to capacity to engage in a particular act), opporflag that lower socio-economic and Black tunities (factors located in the physical as well communities were disproportionately buras social environment that enable or prompt dened and put at risk by environmental hazbehaviour), and motivations (mental processes ards as these are often located near their that energize and direct behaviour) shape peoneighbourhoods.) ple’s intentions to change their behaviour. Global environmental justice: an extension of Ecological environmental justice: an extension the scope of justice towards people worldof the scope of justice towards nature and non-­ wide, especially taking economically disadhuman species. vantaged groups into account

17  Leaving No One Behind: Climate Change as a Societal Challenge for Social Justice and Solidarity

Green identity: the extent to which you see yourself as a type of person who acts environmentally friendly. Intergenerational environmental justice: an extension of the scope of justice towards the inclusion of future generations, including current younger generations Sustainability transitions: a shift in how we use the earth’s resources from exhaustive to sustainable by reducing as well as changing our consumption patterns. (Sustainability transitions can be identified in different realms, such as energy, food, and transport.) Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory: a theory outlining how self-transcending (i.e., biospheric, altruistic) and self-enhancing values (egoistic and hedonistic), more sustainable-behaviour-­ specific beliefs, and personal norms shape people’s sustainability attitudes and behaviours.

Comprehension Questions

1. Which three environmental justice principles can be distinguished, what do they entail, and how do they relate to sustainable behaviour (intentions)? 2. What do the letters V, B, and N stand for in VBN-theory and why does this theory not suffice in explaining sustainable behaviour (intentions)? What other types of factors should also be considered? 3. What do the results of the study amongst residents of a social housing building during the sustainable renovation of their apartment building show in terms of the COM-B model?

Discussion Question

1. This chapter discusses extensions of the scope of justice towards including new groups (i.e., future generations, people worldwide and specifically disadvantaged communities, and nonhuman species and nature). However, in Chap. 4 (this volume) several other forms of justice

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have also been introduced. How could these be used to stimulate sustainable behaviour? 2. Would you consider sustainable behaviour and climate scepticism opposite sides of the same coin? Why or why not? Based on your answer, how could we best address climate scepticism and stimulate sustainable behaviour?

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Digitalisation of Public Services as a Challenge to Social Justice

18

Luciana Lolich and Virpi Timonen

Introduction In this chapter, we examine public services digitalisation through a social justice lens, a consideration that is often side-lined despite the (implicit) aim of most public services to promote equality. New opportunities for digitalisation of public services have been discussed enthusiastically by scholars and policymakers (Matheus et al., 2018; European Commission, 2016). Emerging digital technologies are promoted on the basis that they might improve efficiency and service quality by reducing waiting times, increasing transparency, and offering seamless service provision across departments (Lindgren et al., 2019). Some proponents have been even more ambitious, foreseeing citizen empowerment through technology (May, 2006) and opportunities for democratising services and innovation (Lupton, 2014; Von Hippel, 2006). This chapter focuses on the examples of education and elder care, as these two public policy areas have experienced increased digitalisation in the past decade (Papadogiannis et  al., 2020) and have a key role in shaping inequalities of opportunities and outcomes (Green, 2017;

L. Lolich (*) Marino Institute of Education, Dublin, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] V. Timonen Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

OECD, 2019). In education, the development of information and communication technology (ICT) has created excitement about its power to enhance access and improve learning results, prompting policy efforts to integrate digital technology into education (Sancho-Gil et al., 2020). In elder care services, technologies have been conceptualised as a potential solution to limited budgets. Optimistic expectations of digitalisation can be identified in policy documents and initiatives that aim to create and promote a variety of technologies so that older people can age at home (Lolich & Timonen, 2021a). If welldesigned and accessible, ICT can contribute to older people’s wellbeing and autonomy (Neves & Vetere, 2019). However, the digitalisation of public services can bring about challenges to social justice as people’s capacity to engage with these services is mediated by their social position and context (United Nations General Assembly, 2019).

 igitalisation of Public Services D Provision Researchers have described the processes of digitalising public services as proceeding from an initial focus on ICT access, to the development of skills, and subsequently a more contextual understanding of ICT integration within particular institutional cultures (Angst &

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_18

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Agarwal, 2009; Selwyn, 2013). The premise behind the ‘democratization of innovation’ (Von Hippel, 2006) is that citizens’ ability to access and use digital products and services is improving rapidly, and that citizens can even participate (through the use of online platforms) in designing new products and services (Lolich & Timonen, 2021b). At the global level there are great disparities in the application of different ICT policies. In some regions, the focus is still on access to basic ICT and whether expenditure on ICT represents good value vis-à-vis other investment (May, 2006). For instance, introduction of computers into schools might be ineffective if there are problems with electricity supply (Traoré, 2008). While there are regional and national contexts where inequalities around access and use are still relevant, in many developed countries current inequalities centre on the digital persona that is imagined as the service user. This digital persona is conceptualised as a selfdirected and motivated individual who can access, use and benefit from ICT – adapting, customising and in some cases co-creating public services to better suit their needs (Lolich & Timonen, 2021b). While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this aspiration, individuals’ capacities to become digital citizens are mediated by a range of factors – from individual factors, institutional and cultural contexts to the supply of basic local and national infrastructure (Unwin, 2009). Becker (2019) argues that the term digital citizen not only includes digital competences and skills, but also a critical awareness of the digital environment’s power to influence and shape the individual. The social construction of this digital citizen marginalises the voices of the less digitally literate and enhances the ability of the already adept to take further advantage of digital resources and, thus, might reinforce social inequalities (Lolich & Timonen, 2021b).

Social Justice and the Digital Divide Miller (1999) characterises the scope of social justice debates as pertaining to ‘how the good and bad things in life should be distributed among members of human society’ (p. 1). Chapter 4 in

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this book expands upon this to explain that an unjust situation should not just be judged on the distribution of burdens and benefits, but also on the degree to which individuals and groups are recognised and respected and on the status people have compared to others. Social justice is understood ‘as requiring some form of equality’ (Miller, 1979, p.  1) between individuals and groups. Baker et  al. (2004) proposed a five-­ dimensional framework to examine equality, incorporating (1) inequalities of respect and recognition; (2) inequalities of resources; (3) inequalities of power; (4) inequalities of love, care and solidarity; and (5) inequalities of working and learning. These five dimensions potentially overlap and intersect with each other as well as with the forms of justice (distributive, procedural, recognition) discussed in Chap. 4. This framework per se is not dissected further here. Rather, we utilise this conceptualisation to organise our analysis below and clarify each dimension under a separate heading. The term digital divide refers to inequalities in access to or use of ICT (OECD, 2001). Scholars have suggested that when thinking about inequalities and digitalisation, a shift is needed from a focus on access and use to outcomes of ICT such as unequal technological capital (Korupp & Szydlik, 2005). Technological capital refers to differential ability to benefit from the use of technology, for example saving money by purchasing online or being able to voice political opinions on online forums (van Deursen & Helsper, 2015). An additional form of digital inequality is the ‘data divide’ between those who generate data (ICT users) and those who collect, store, sort and use it, most notably multinational ICT companies (Andrejevic, 2014, p. 1674). Since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, digitalisation of education and care services has expanded and accelerated, comprising a diversity of functions, such as online classes for schoolchildren and teleconsultation for patients. While the benefits and services that can be (partly or fully) accessed digitally are varied, in the case of public services they tend to pertain to basic rights and needs of citizens. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that digitalisation is increasingly a part of the system of allocating the benefits of citizen-

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ship, of distributing important resources, and as such digitalisation is undeniably an essential medium in the implementation of social justice. The following sections will examine the five dimensions of inequalities in relation to social justice and the digitalisation of public services, unpacking different arguments across two key areas: education and care services.

Inequalities of Respect and Recognition The first dimension of social justice refers to recognising the equal status of all citizens while also acknowledging their differences (Baker et  al., 2004; see also Chap. 4 this volume). When digital public services mediate the interaction between citizens and public services, the ICT system assumes the role of the public official. Therefore, the provision and design of these systems become particularly important (Lindgren et  al., 2019). Digitalising service delivery raises the stakes of misclassification and inaccurate profiling because there is no face-to-face interaction with users to correct errors. In the area of elder care, developers designing and providing the technology enabling digital public services tend to belong to a homogenous group, mainly young middle-class men (Irani, 2015a). Researchers have pointed out that while care technology targeting older adults (such as remote consultations and virtual home visits) represents a growing industry, older people are underrepresented in the development and evaluation of these technologies (Gallistl & Wanka, 2019; Lolich & Timonen, 2021b). In care services, evaluations of digital initiatives are often based on selected groups of individuals who are typically younger, better educated and have higher digital skills compared with older users (Poli et  al., 2019). This can result in the binary stereotyping of older adults as empowered consumers of technology or as vulnerable people at risk. Technology that does not take into account how people’s needs and abilities change as they age, can leave some older adults struggling with inaccessible devices and technologies such as

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‘unreadable tiny screens’ (Pirhonen et al., 2020, p. 6). Some technologies can exacerbate feelings of vulnerability or fragility in independent older adults. For instance, fall prevention bracelets can create a user-image of being frail, vulnerable, and constantly at risk (Aceros et al., 2015). Similarly, the Covid pandemic demonstrated that the homogenous representation of young people as well-connected digital natives (Williamson et al., 2020) is misleading. There is significant variety in the ways young people access, use and benefit from the internet and other technologies, with an important minority who are excluded. For some young people, coronavirus restrictions spelled exclusion from much of their education and social networks (Williamson et al., 2020; also see Chap. 19, this volume). The transformations brought about by the coronavirus pandemic might pave the way to significant progress in digitalisation of education but this is not without risk of harm for ‘disconnected’ learners (Mohan et al., 2020).

Inequalities of Resources Inequalities of resources exert a major influence on access to and ability to benefit from digitalised care and education services. Older people’s access to technological capital is shaped by individual factors such as age, gender, social class, and previous experience with computers (König et  al., 2018). Pupils in areas characterised by lower coverage of high-speed broadband (mainly rural) and lower household incomes are not able to benefit from online education to the same extent as pupils in wealthier areas and households (Mohan et al., 2020). Even in its most open and accessible forms, digitalisation can deepen inequality of resources in education. Open educational resources (OER) are digitalised materials that are offered freely and openly to educators and students to use and reuse for teaching, learning and research. OER have been proposed as way ‘to complement and augment formal education provision, especially for those who lack the resources to follow traditional learning paths’

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(Macintosh et  al., 2011, p.  5). However, OER might not just complement but supplant important elements of education provision if campus attendance becomes unnecessary and the use of OER dominates the educational experience (Knox, 2013). The activities of teaching and learning take place independently of a centralised institution (a university), and institutional involvement is reduced to assessment and accreditation (Macintosh et al., 2011, p. 1). This can lead to inequalities in terms of qualification, e.g., online degrees using OER might not command the same respect as campus-­based alternatives (Macintosh et  al., 2011) and also in the quality of guidance and support (Knox, 2013) provided to campus-based students compared to those who study at home.

Inequalities of Power The third dimension concerns the protection of basic civil and personal rights against the state and other powerful actors. With the public service taking on the form of a programmed ICT system – as opposed to human actors with whom citizens can discuss and negotiate  – the asymmetrical relationship between the citizen and public services can be worsened. The citizen might not know where to obtain an explanation of a decision, and it might become more challenging to understand and redress decisions such as rejection of an application for a certain welfare benefit (see Madsen & Kræmmergaard, 2016). According to Andrejevic (2014) big data mining undermines the democratizing and empowering promise of digital technologies. Allowing users access to their own data does not fully address the discrepancies associated with the data divide: that is, differential capacities for putting data to use and benefiting from it (Andrejevic, 2014). For example, there is no software that allows an individual user to aggregate all their data from their social networks, calendars, maps and fitness gadgets  – whereas such data might be gathered by technology companies for marketing and profiling purposes.

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In education, power inequalities can result from the use of artificial intelligence (AI; the simulation of human intelligence in machines) and adaptative technologies in educational programmes, which can gather vast amounts of information about students to create complex algorithms. While this can result in a learning programme that better suits the needs and learning style of a student, collecting, interpreting and acting upon such data raises issues linked to reliability, responsibility, and informed consent. Secondary school final examination results based on a controversial algorithm during the 2020 school closure in the United Kingdom were scrapped, after accusations that the system was biased against students from poor backgrounds. Beard (2020) provides an example of cameras being used in a school in China to assess student engagement and response to a teacher, raising concerns about the use of this information to rate social compliance and trustworthiness. Similarly, data governance and privacy are major concerns in the adoption and use of care technologies (Milligan, 2009). For example, in 2019 it was reported that Google had access to the health records of millions of patients in the US through a partnership with a healthcare provider (Singer & Wakabayashi, 2019). Eubanks (2011) argues that rather than framing digital equity issues in terms of access, we should think of them in terms of power, allowing us to account for new inequalities between those gathering the data and those whose data is mined.

I nequalities of Love, Care, and Solidarity Human beings typically have both a need and a capacity for intimacy, attachment and caring relationships. Being deprived of the capacity to develop such supportive affective relations is a serious deprivation for most people (Baker et al., 2004). In the past, the concern around technology was that ‘rich students would have access to the internet earlier, gaining tech skills and creating a digital divide’ (Bowles, 2019, para. 4). Now, the concern has flipped to expose a new type of inequality. In the Silicon Valley area, ‘throwback

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play-based preschools’ are becoming popular in wealthier neighbourhoods, while states are funding virtual preschools for those who cannot afford a ‘traditional’ preschool for their children (Bowles, 2019, para. 4). For some children this means that they are deprived of the care of a human teacher. Similarly, in Japan, roboticists at the Tokyo University of Science promoted Saya, the robot teacher, as a way of providing teachers for remote rural areas where there are teacher shortages (Kobayashi, 2009 cited in Demetriou, 2009). The educational system is an important site for promoting equality of love, care and solidarity (see Chap. 3, this volume), which can be challenged by digitalisation. During the coronavirus pandemic, serious incidents of domestic violence and child abuse are estimated to have increased (Schmidt & Natanson, 2020) as school closures deprived students of the care of ‘real teachers’ who could identify vulnerable children and bring them to the attention of social services before problems escalated. Similarly, concerns have been raised that a move from humans to care technologies implies a shift from ‘warm’ to ‘cold’ care (Mol et  al., 2010). This could lead to isolated older people being surrounded by technologies yet receiving no support from caring staff (Lolich et al., 2022). The replacement of ‘real people’ with digital services can exacerbate loneliness and vulnerability in people who lack other social outlets. Economic inequalities could result in wealthier older adults having access to the best robots, devices, and home-care technology. On the other hand, similar to the discussion on education, it could transpire that human care becomes the service of choice of the privileged few, while the rest of the older population are ‘cared for’ by technology applications such as ‘screen visits’ (Lolich et al., 2022). Caring relationships in the form of warm experts (close and trusted persons, often a child or grandchild), are also important for older people in accessing, using and benefiting from technology. Olsson and Viscovi (2018) showed that warm experts were pivotal in every stage of technology adoption by older adults from appropriation (identifying the need, buying the item, installing and adjusting it) to incorporation

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(choosing and downloading suitable apps, learning how to use them, and solving technical problems).

Inequalities of Working and Learning This final dimension refers to the large differences between individuals and countries in ‘the burdens of work’ (Baker et  al., 2004, p.  8). Inequalities of work are closely related to inequalities in learning and inequalities of educational attainment. The potential inequalities that can result from digitalising education can affect students in the amount and type of work they can obtain in the future as more valued educational credentials are correlated with better-quality and higher-paid employment. Furthermore, educational technologies can also make academic jobs more precarious and worse paid as teachers become something akin to Uber drivers of education (Beard, 2020). Irani (2015b) has argued that uneven rights, compensation, and safety are not exceptions, but rather constitutive of the roles and ideologies of high-technology work (see also Gregory, 2020). If AI designs the course content, teachers become merely talking heads in video lessons (Beard, 2020). Inequalities in the ability of students to build social capital, i.e. individual’s resources derived from their social networks, might become more pronounced with the OER model. Most of the advantages to be gained from taking a full programme of ‘traditional’ study at a university are not accessible through their online counterparts – especially as experienced in ‘free’ forms like the Massive Open Online Course (Selwyn, 2014). The full value of attending a (prestigious) educational institution can only be gained through their physical forms, where one can access face-to-­ face connections, personal relationships and physical presence (Selwyn, 2014). Digitalisation of public services moves ‘the public encounter’ (Lindgren et al., 2019) to people’s homes, individually shaping working and learning conditions as some homes are better suited for teleconsultations and online lessons than others, as they vary in layout, cleanliness,

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atmosphere, inhabitants, equipment, and space. With the introduction of care technologies, traditional concepts of the home and work are transformed (Milligan et  al., 2011). During the coronavirus lockdowns, many students were uncomfortable with the concept of ‘bring your own school home’ (Williamson et  al., 2020, p. 111) and some found it embarrassing to share their (lack of) personal space on camera (Jones, 2020). Having deployed the five dimensions of inequality in the above analysis, we now turn to summarising our reflections on digitalisation’s impact on social justice.

Conclusion The scope of digital services is constantly widening and deepening, and as such the questions posed in this chapter are set to become more acute. Nonetheless, the potential of digitalisation to deepen inequalities must be balanced against the disadvantages of ‘traditional’ public services provision. The non-digital route can be extremely laborious (e.g., involving multiple forms that might get misplaced or lost in the post). Face-toface encounters with public services are not always pleasant, easy or egalitarian. A principal in a Chicago school explained that during the lockdown, some students told her that they could concentrate better at home and were glad not to have to worry about bullies or what to wear (Slevin, 2020). Furthermore, digitalising large parts of the education and care systems could enable a redirection of resources, so that overall services become more responsive, or better targeted to those who need them most. Were this to happen, digitalisation would be a force for greater equality. While some countries (e.g., Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands) are already pursuing a strategy of ‘digital first’ in public service provision, the coronavirus pandemic accelerated this trend. Steps towards selective digitalization (e.g., in Belgium) where face-to-face interactions and support are reserved for those with digital skills challenges (ILO, 2019) arguably represents

L. Lolich and V. Timonen

effective and just use of resources. However, to date we know little about the impact of these digital transformations: to measure their effectiveness, longitudinal research is needed. Eubanks (2018) proposes the need to develop basic technological design principles to minimise harm, something akin to a Hippocratic Oath for data scientists, systems engineers, and administrative officials that centres around the non-harm principle. In the past, outcome measures of digital initiatives often focused on access (Williamson et al., 2020) – whether a laptop is provided to a student or a tablet with internet connection set up for an older person. While this is reasonable, a more sophisticated approach to examining inequalities in the digitalisation of public services is needed, for example by focusing on the digital persona that the user is imagined to be. The imagined digital citizen typically is construed to ‘the image and likening’ of ICT developers. Digital services too often presume extensive resources and capabilities on the part of their users: access to ICT, and a high level of cognitive capabilities to navigate the sometimes complex steps in the digital environment. It also assumes that time and geography are the biggest barriers to social justice – framing the digitalisation of public services as the ‘technical fix’ (Selwyn, 2014) to inequalities in education and care by providing access ‘anytime’ and ‘anywhere’. When measuring the success of digitalisation we should be aware of the activities and practices that no longer happen or are less likely to happen as a result of technology-­based education and care provision: what is lost and displaced as well as what is retained and added when a lesson takes place online or where a visit by a social care worker is replaced by a screen visit. A lack of care can emerge when the ‘public encounter’ is moved online. Inequalities of respect and recognition, power, resources, love, care, and solidarity and, working and learning are not necessarily solved by technical means and in some cases can be worsened through digitalisation. Digitalisation is not enough to fix inequality and empower citizens amidst concrete conditions of severe inequality.

18  Digitalisation of Public Services as a Challenge to Social Justice

This chapter neither endorses nor dismisses the digitalisation of public services, but rather suggests a rigorous and ongoing examination through the five-dimensional conceptualisation of inequality proposed by Baker et  al. (2004). Digitalisation by itself is neutral – neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’  – how governments implement it is decisive for the impact on social justice. Technology per se cannot fix inequality. There are cases where digital technology does appear to be associated with genuine disruption and change to public provision arrangements around the world (e.g., Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands) albeit in an admittedly inconsistent and uneven manner (Selwyn, 2014). While it is important to recognise that for some people, access to the digital version of a medical visit or school lesson might be better than what they currently have, this does not mean technological innovation automatically leads to progress and social justice. The politics of the digitalisation of public services are affected by a range of issues beyond economic competitiveness and upskilling of citizens that currently dominate discussions. There are links between educational and care technology and the commercial pursuit of profit, as well as governments’ concerns about public expenditure, factors that could increase rather than decrease equality. The digitalisation of public services can only make a clear-cut and major difference to social justice if it is accompanied by structural changes that bring about greater equality of power, resources, recognition, care, and respect in society.

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Data divide: inequalities between those who generate data (ICT users) and those who collect, store, sort and use it, most notably multinational ICT companies. Digital citizen: a dynamic set of competences and skills an individual should have to successfully participate in today’s digital world. This includes not only an instrumental perspective (how to use, control and benefit from the internet) but also a critical awareness of how the digital environment influences and shapes the individual. Digital divide: inequalities in access to or use of information and communication technologies (ICT). Five dimensions of equality: this refers to inequalities in terms of respect and recognition; resources; love, care and solidarity; power; and working and learning. Open educational resources (OER): digitalised materials offered freely and openly to educators, students and independent learners to use and reuse for teaching, learning and research, for example course materials and assessments. Selective digitalization: situation where (public) services are generally digitalised but face-to-­face interactions and support are still available for those with digital skills challenges. Technological capital: ability to benefit from the use of technology. Warm experts: close and trusted persons (often an adult child or grandchild) who can help to accomplish important tasks such as computer use by an older person.

Glossary Comprehension Questions

Algorithm: a process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-­solving operations, especially by a computer. Artificial intelligence (AI): refers to the simulation of human intelligence in machines that are programmed to think like humans and mimic their actions.

1. Select one of the five dimensions of inequality outlined in this chapter and give an example of its relevance to the digitalisation of public services. 2. When considering implications for social justice, why might it be important to move away

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from a focus on access and use of ICT to focus instead on the benefits and outcomes of ICT use? 3. Can you think of similarities in the digitalisation of the two public policy areas discussed in this chapter, i.e., education and elder care? Conversely, what might be a significant difference between them?

Discussion Questions

1. Do you think that the digitalisation of public services worsens existing social inequalities or are you more inclined to argue that digitalisation can advance social justice? Why? 2. Thinking about the welfare state you are from: What other public policy areas (i.e., not discussed in this chapter) are affected by digitalisation and what are possible implications for social justice?

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The Covid-19 Pandemic and Societal Challenges to Solidarity and Social Justice: Consequences for Vulnerable Groups

19

Michèlle Bal, Marijn Stok, Carlijn Kamphuis, Jaap Bos, Marcel Hoogenboom, John de Wit, and Mara A. Yerkes Introduction The COVID-19 pandemic is considered the most challenging global crisis in recent history. This is due in large part to its severe negative health consequences (see Box 19.1). But it also stems from the high demand on limited health care capacity and the resulting delay of planned health care, including care for serious conditions, to free up capacity to provide acute care for people with COVID-19. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic also has serious adverse economic and social consequences related to the prevention measures imposed globally to reduce the spread of the virus.

This chapter is based on: Stok, F.  M., Bal, M., Yerkes, M.  A., & de Wit, J.  B. (2021). Social Inequality and Solidarity in Times of COVID-19. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(12), 6339. This chapter was written between April and August of 2021. M. Bal (*) • M. A. Yerkes • M. Stok • C. Kamphuis • J. Bos • M. Hoogenboom • J. de Wit Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

The COVID-19 pandemic presents a systemic shock to societies worldwide and raises many questions regarding solidarity and social justice. The COVID-19 pandemic was initially hailed by some journalists as ‘the great equalizer’ (Mein, 2020). The idea was that COVID19, as a virus, does not discriminate and affects individuals and societies in similar ways. As this chapter will highlight, emerging scientific evidence suggests otherwise. Crucially, the social inequalities emerging from and amplified by the pandemic are visible along many of the societal fault lines that feature in this volume, including race/ethnicity, age, socio-economic status, and gender. Importantly, in addition to the pandemic itself having unequal effects across societal groups, the measures taken to curb the spread of the virus also affect social groups differently. We start by outlining the health and social inequalities related to the pandemic, as well as the inequalities related to the measures taken to curb the spread of the virus. Subsequently, we discuss important challenges for solidarity and social justice, presenting two case studies to illustrate and deepen our understanding of issues of solidarity and social justice.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_19

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There are several reasons for these social inequalities related to the impact of COVID-19. COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) is a First, ethnic minority groups and socio-­ health condition caused by SARS-CoV-2 economically disadvantaged groups are more (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronalikely to have pre-existing, chronic health condivirus 2), and symptoms include fever, tions, such as overweight, high blood pressure, cough, difficulty breathing, and fatigue and heart conditions, which put them at higher (WHO, 2020). While most people who risk of COVID-19-associated morbidity and moracquire SARS-CoV-2 experience no or tality (Ali et al., 2020). Second, structural differmild symptoms, a minority of people with ences make it more difficult for socio-economically COVID-19, mainly elderly and people with disadvantaged groups to engage in health behavpre-existing conditions, experience severe iours that boost the immune system, for instance, symptoms (e.g., shortness of breath, oxyproper rest, sufficient exercise, healthy eating, and gen deficiencies, respiratory failure, or stress avoidance (Burstrom & Tao, 2020; Patel multiorgan dysfunction; WHO, 2020). The et al., 2020). Third, people who are less well-off World Health Organization (WHO) typically have poorer health insurance and health declared COVID-19 a global pandemic on care access, and receive less optimal health care March 11th, 2020. As of 7 August 2021, when they do access health services (van Dorn more than 200 million diagnoses of et  al., 2020; Patel et  al., 2020; Price-­Haywood COVID-19 across 217 counties have been et  al., 2020; Rollston & Galea, 2020). Socioreported to the WHO, including 4.3 million economically disadvantaged people are hence people who died (WHO, 2021). less likely to receive optimal care when they acquire COVID-19. Social inequality in access to quality health care access can currently also be observed in social differences in vaccine access Inequalities in the Prevalence (Gostin et al., 2020; Bolcato et al., 2021). Fourth, socio-economically disadvantaged groups may and Severity of COVID-19 also have lower health literacy and less access to COVID-19-related morbidity and mortality are correct health information, which makes them socially stratified (Ahmed et  al., 2020). more vulnerable to misinformation and misperSpecifically, ethnic minority groups and socio-­ ceptions (Ahmed et  al., 2020; Ali et  al., 2020; economically disadvantaged groups bear a dis- Laurencin & McClinton, 2020). As a result, socioproportionate share of the disease burden (Ali economically disadvantaged groups are less likely et  al., 2020). For example, in the US, rates of to adhere to preventive and protective measures, COVID-19 diagnosis and mortality are about which increases the risk of infection. three times higher for African Americans than for Finally, socio-economically disadvantaged European Americans (Abedi et  al., 2020), and groups may also be less able to adhere to prevenmortality rates are nearly twice as high in high tion measures. Due to the nature of their work, poverty counties compared to low poverty coun- workers in less skilled and lower wage occupaties (Chen & Krieger, 2021). Similar trends are tions, for example, are less often able to work observed around the world. In Sweden, infection from home (Atchison et al., 2021; Blundell et al., rates were found to be three to four times higher 2020) and are likely less able to adhere to social in some socio-economically disadvantaged areas, distancing measures during their work (Burstrom compared to other areas (Burstrom & Tao, 2020). & Tao, 2020). Furthermore, recommended preIn North-East Brazil, COVID-19-mortality rates ventive measures often assume people have a are noted to be higher in socio-economically dis- home and have access to running water and soap, advantaged neighbourhoods than in other neigh- which may not be the case for specific marginalbourhoods (Martins-Filho et al., 2020). ized groups (Silva & Smith, 2020), such as homeBox 19.1  The COVID-19 Virus

19  The Covid-19 Pandemic and Societal Challenges to Solidarity and Social Justice: Consequences…

less people (Tsai & Wilson, 2020), and people living in close congregation (Berger et al., 2020), for example in shelters (Abrams & Szefler, 2020), slums (Poornima Wasdani & Prasad, 2020), refugee camps (Raju & Ayeb-Karlsson, 2020), and prisons (Keller & Wagner, 2020).

Inequalities in the Impact of Measures to Curb COVID-19 Various prevention measures are implemented worldwide to curb the spread of the virus, to protect the most vulnerable, and to ensure the need for hospitalization of people with COVID-19 does not exceed the availability of health care services. Yet, these prevention measures, especially those that promote social distancing, also affect people in multiple intrusive ways, including people who are more likely to be affected by COVID-19 related health impacts. For example, social distancing measures are likely to increase experiences of social isolation and psychological distress (Daly et al., 2020), and of stress-related physical illness symptoms (Ford, 2020). Several groups are at heightened risk of these adverse consequences of social distancing measures. Notably, whereas some of these risks cut across socio-economic lines, socio-economically disadvantaged groups who already carry a higher burden of the disease are also more likely to be at a higher risk of specific, adverse consequences. Many people are impacted economically as a result of COVID-19 prevention measures, in particular social distancing measures (e.g., reduction of working hours, job loss, loss of income), with some sectors (e.g., hospitality) affected most. Impacted workers are disproportionately female, young, in low wage jobs, and on temporary contracts (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020; Blundell et al., 2020). The financial insecurity resulting from COVID-19 prevention measures disproportionately affects people in lower socio-economic groups (Patel et  al., 2020), and socio-economic inequality has grown significantly since the beginning of the pandemic.

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Furthermore, social distancing measures appear to affect adolescents and young adults more than any other age group. Adolescence and young adulthood are phases of life during which social identities are formed, and peers become the most important source of social influence (Arnett & Hughes, 2014). The need for social connectedness is at its highest in this stage of life, and limiting young people’s ability to go out into the world and meet each other significantly impacts their wellbeing (Power et  al., 2020). It has been shown that while mental health problems increased across all population groups, these grew most steeply among young adults (Daly et  al., 2020; Power et  al., 2020). Young people are thus asked to make large individual sacrifices to curb a pandemic that, on average, is least dangerous to them. Moreover, a meta-analysis has shown that almost 80 percent of younger children across the world are also negatively affected by the pandemic and prevention responses in some way, including experiences of anxiety, depression, irritability, boredom, sleep disturbances, excessive fear, or inattention (Kumar Panda et  al., 2020). COVID-19 prevention measures, such as school closures, may negatively affect educational outcomes, academic performance, and the wellbeing of all children. Yet, these effects are likely to be larger for children from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds who are less likely to have the required resources to successfully manage their schoolwork (e.g., no quiet place to do homework, no stable Internet connection, no books, no adequate heating, less help available; Van Lancker & Parolin, 2020). Furthermore, children from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds more often rely on school meal programmes (Abrams & Szefler, 2020; Van Lancker & Parolin, 2020), and schools can provide a safe space for children in unstable home environments (Abrams & Szefler, 2020; Berger et  al., 2020). The absence of these safe spaces can thus lead to increases in food poverty and children’s exposure to family violence.

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School closures also place a large burden on parents (Blundell et al., 2020; Garbe et al., 2020) although not in equal measure (see Box 19.2). They are required to take care of their children at home, provide home schooling, and continue to work and attend to other (care) responsibilities. Parents are facing additional demands at a time when outside help (e.g., from grandparents or hired professionals) is less accessible than usual (Yerkes, André, Besamusca, Kruyen, et al., 2020). This additional demand is higher for poorer families and parents in less skilled and lower-wage occupations, who are less likely to be able to work from home, less able to take time off from work to take care of their children, and have lower financial resources to cover unforeseen expenditures (Yerkes, André, Besamusca, Kruyen, et al., 2020; Blundell et al., 2020).

Box 19.2  Case Study 1: Gender Inequalities Deepened by Lockdown Measures

Initially, scientists warned that lockdown measures could exacerbate gender inequalities (e.g., Landivar et al., 2020), particularly in relation to the distribution of paid work, housework and care. This increase in inequality was expected because of pre-­ existing gender differences in these domains (see Chap. 8, this volume). Consequently, it was felt women would take on a larger share of additional demands for housework and care and experience greater risk of job loss than men, due to their overrepresentation in sectors most affected, such as retail and hospitality services (ILO, 2020). Whereas men generally experience greater risk of job loss during economic downturns, this pattern was expected to be reversed given the unique nature of the pandemic and sectors particularly affected by lockdown measures. Cumulatively, then, women were expected to be harder hit by the pandemic than men. In contrast, some scientists questioned whether the pandemic might lead to a

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decrease in gender inequality, citing two reasons (King et al., 2020). First, the sudden shock of the pandemic and changes to the way people work and provide care could lead to a change in gender norms. The increase in working from home, for example, could lead to normative discussions around who does what in paid work, housework, and care, thereby challenging existing unfair distributions of work and care. Second, the pandemic led to the labelling of some occupations as ‘essential’ to the functioning of economies and societies. While the definition of ‘essential’ differs across countries, these occupations typically included many female-dominated occupations, such as education, health care, and social services. Women’s overrepresentation in these sectors created a necessity for many women to work outside the home during the pandemic. Consequently, mothers and their male partners in non-­ essential occupations might potentially (have to) renegotiate divisions of work and care. The evidence emerging in the first year of the pandemic primarily suggests an increase in gender inequality in the division of work and care, but a closer look reveals important nuances within and across countries. In relation to paid work, women generally are facing greater economic consequences than men (Alon et  al., 2020; Queisser et  al., 2020). Mothers, more than fathers, reduced working hours, and job and income losses are also likely to disproportionately affect women (Queisser et  al., 2020). In the Netherlands, for example, while men initially experienced greater job losses than women, women’s unemployment is now increasing at a higher rate than men’s (CBS, 2020). Findings in some contexts are more nuanced with respect to household and care work. In general, mothers have taken on a greater proportion of household and care tasks than fathers (e.g., Collins et al., 2020;

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Hipp & Bünning, 2020; Yerkes, André, Besamusca, Kruyen, et al., 2020). Even in countries considered to be the most gender equal, such as Iceland, mothers feel they are confronted most with extra care work during the pandemic (Hjálmsdóttir & Bjarnadóttir, 2020). Yet in some countries, like the Netherlands and the US, fathers and mothers report doing more care tasks than prior to the pandemic (Petts et  al., 2021; Yerkes, André, Besamusca, Kruyen, et  al., 2020). In the Netherlands, the proportion of fathers doing more care tasks continued to increase, even after primary schools and childcare centres reopened (Yerkes, André, Besamusca, Hummel, et  al., 2020). These studies suggest that alongside the intensification of gender inequality in some contexts, slight decreases in inequality are also occurring. Initial evidence does not suggest, however, that gender norms are shifting towards greater equality. In fact, in the Netherlands, fathers who worked from home while their partners worked outside the home became even more traditional in their beliefs that women are better able to care for children than men (Begall & Verbakel, 2021).

 hallenges to Solidarity and Social C Justice During the Ongoing Pandemic The social inequalities related to the impact of the pandemic and social inequalities related to measures taken to curb it, pose unique challenges to solidarity and social justice. Initially, the response to the crisis was mostly one of spontaneous empathy and solidarity. Many governments stressed that we ‘were all in this together’ and that we could only get out of the pandemic by looking out for each other and being solidaristic (e.g., the Dutch national COVID-19 prevention campaign entitled “Only together will we beat the coronavirus” (Alleen samen krijgen we

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corona onder controle) and the #AloneTogether campaign in the US). This call for informal solidarity (i.e., not formally organized by the state) resonated with the public, where many initiatives were developed to support the vulnerable (e.g., the elderly) and where a new appreciation for essential workers developed. Simultaneously, many countries witnessed an increase in formal, institutionalized forms of solidarity, such as welfare state support to protect workers (Nieuwenhuis & Yerkes, 2021). However, as the crisis continues, solidarity and social justice may increasingly be under pressure. One key social justice challenge of the pandemic relates to intergenerational solidarity, that is, solidarity between generations (see Chap. 10, this volume). COVID-19 was initially presented mainly as a threat to the elderly. For this reason, younger generations were asked to be solidaristic with older generations (i.e., upward solidarity). Social scientists acknowledged the many solidaristic initiatives to support the elderly and other vulnerable people (e.g., by helping them buy groceries or by checking in with them to reduce loneliness). Yet, because COVID-19 was framed as primarily affecting older individuals, scholars also warned against increases in ageism (Ayalon et al., 2020; Ellerich-Groppe et al., 2020; Fraser et al., 2020; Previtali et al., 2020). COVID19 related ageism is reflected in social media hashtags, such as “#BoomerRemover”, quotes by politicians (e.g., stressing the economic benefits of the pandemic affecting older persons), and public debates on triage criteria (i.e., the priority assigned to people presenting with COVID-19). As the pandemic continues and young people are disproportionately negatively affected by social distancing measures, there is a shift from upward to downward expectations of intergenerational solidarity in public discourse. Younger people (and/or organizations speaking on their behalf) are asking for solidarity from the elderly (e.g., by staying at home) to allow some social distancing measures to be lessened, thereby reducing some of the harmful social impacts on younger generations. In other words, continued COVID-19 prevention measures challenge reciprocity as a basis for intergenerational solidarity

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(e.g., Daatland & Lowenstein, 2005; Dykstra & Fokkema, 2011). Reciprocity in intergenerational solidarity has been studied before (e.g., Daatland & Lowenstein, 2005; Dykstra & Fokkema, 2011; see Chap. 10, this volume). Research showed that whereas, in general, formal solidarity is mainly directed upward (e.g., through pension systems and institutionalized old age care), informal solidarity is more often directed downward, with intergenerational transfers of money and care being provided by older generations to younger ones within families (e.g., providing financial support to buying a (first) house, caring for grandchildren; Daatland et  al., 2012). Hence, overall money and care transfers seem to even out between generations, when taking both formal and informal forms of solidarity into account (Gál et  al., 2017), thus intergenerational solidarity is reciprocal. During the pandemic, it is much more difficult to determine whether solidarity is balanced. Usually, intergenerational exchanges of solidarity primarily concern welfare state exchanges (formal solidarity) or informal exchanges within families (e.g., money and care). Now, intergenerational solidarity trade-offs are about exchanges between the risk of disease (for mainly older generations) and restrained freedoms (for mainly younger generations). In terms of distributive justice, how can one equate the availability of hospital beds with the value of mental well-being? This solidarity and social justice dilemma can be illustrated by debates in many countries about the reopening of elementary schools. Young children arguably face the fewest health risks. Reopening schools would benefit them greatly as many young children experienced learning delays and were affected by the absence of social contacts during school closures. At the same time, reopening schools would help parents with their reconciliation of work and care. However, school reopening puts older generations at an increased health risk. This happens directly when considering older teachers who substantially increase their social contacts when teaching in the classroom again, even with social distancing measures

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in place. It happens indirectly, too, as children may transmit the virus asymptotically to ­vulnerable elderly (e.g., their grandparents) and thus could cause a new surge in infections. A second key challenge relates to global solidarity, that is solidarity with people worldwide. Increased calls for global solidarity in the wake of the pandemic raise questions about who we consider to be part of our scope of justice and thus who warrants consideration in allocation questions, for instance with regard to vaccine distribution. In this global pandemic, people are expected to be solidaristic with groups around the globe, in particular disadvantaged population groups. Yet, taking on such an identification at the global human level has proven challenging (Jetten et al., 1997; see Chap. 2, this Volume). In addition, global solidarity may require a shift in justice principles from our default equity perspective (i.e., outcomes should be proportional) to more solidaristic and caring principles of equality and need (Deutsch, 1975; see Chap. 4, this volume). Some scholars question whether global solidarity and the adoption of justice principles based on solidarity and caring can be expected to curb this global pandemic, especially in an age of growing populist nationalism (Gostin et al., 2020). In empirical studies, COVID-19-related global solidarity is oftentimes operationalized as support for development assistance aimed at curbing the pandemic. When studying such support from people in high income countries, two types of contrasting responses might be expected (Dolan & Nguyen, 2020; Kobayashi et al., 2020; Schneider et  al., 2020). A reduction in global solidarity may occur, as people may experience a realistic threat to their national economy or their health when national funds are allocated to development assistance. In contrast, an increase in global solidarity may also occur if people see similarities with others worldwide, which makes it easier to identify with them. For instance, people may feel they experience similar COVID-19 risks and burdens as people in other settings, thereby increasing feelings of solidarity.

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Empirical evidence for changes in global solidarity defined in this manner is still limited and mixed. In two US-based studies, when people had been exposed to the effects of COVID-19 (i.e., when they or one of their loved ones had contracted COVID-19 or when they experienced job loss because of it; Dolan & Nguyen, 2020) and when concern about the impact of COVID-­19 on their country’s financial situation was made salient (Kobayashi et  al., 2020), people’s support for COVID-19-related development assistance was reduced. However, global solidarity increased when the national benefits of providing development assistance were emphasized (e.g., when developmental support could help curb the next wave of the disease at home; Kobayashi et  al., 2020). In a German sample (Schneider et  al., 2020), public support for development assistance was not negatively influenced by COVID-19related health and economic risk perceptions. In fact, for people who trust their government, concerns about the loss of friends or relatives increased support for development assistance. It thus seems that global solidarity is context-­ dependent and may be malleable. Calls for global solidarity need to be framed carefully to maintain support for measures aimed at curbing the crisis (e.g., framed in terms of who benefits and under what conditions), especially when divisions between those with access to vaccines and those without are growing and when the balance of those already vaccinated and those still awaiting vaccination is shifting. Two additional issues related to global solidarity can be mentioned. First, in these initial studies, the definition of global solidarity as related solely to development assistance might be too narrow. Other, broader operationalizations might lead to other conclusions. Second, and directly related to this point, is that alongside these general reflections on challenges related to global solidarity, the pandemic has given rise to more specific issues related to global solidarity. One example of such a specific challenge is the rise of new forms of stigma, which we elaborate on in Box 19.3.

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Box 19.3  Case Study 2: Stigmatization of People with an Asian Appearance

Worldwide, social stigma, discriminatory behaviours, and violence have been reported towards people wearing face masks or people (perceived to have) been in contact with the COVID-19 virus, including people with an Asian appearance (van Daalen et al., 2021; Fiere & van Bon, 2020; Liu et  al., 2020). Disease-related stigmatization is not unique for COVID-­19. Examples of stigmatization can be found for other infectious disease outbreaks as well, for instance towards people affected by (or associated with) HIV/AIDS, towards Asian people during the SARS4 outbreak, and towards people of Mexican/Latin American descent during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, inadequately called ‘Mexican flu’ (van Daalen et  al., 2021). During the COVID-19 pandemic, Asian, Black, and Hispanic Americans were more likely to perceive discrimination than other racial/ethnic groups in the US (Liu et  al., 2020). In other countries, like the Netherlands, manifestations of stigmatization and discrimination were mainly targeted at people with an East-Asian appearance (Fiere & Van Bon, 2020). In many cases, these concerned open hostility (e.g., verbal abuse) and other forms of intimidation (e.g., chasing, neglect). From a psychological perspective, the stigmatization and discrimination of people with an Asian appearance possibly reflects older stereotypes. This is evidenced by the fact that the media sometimes inappropriately labelled the coronavirus by race, using headlines such as ‘Chinese virus pandemonium’ (Wen et  al., 2020). Nevertheless, an additional reason why COVID-related stigmatization may occur is because the pandemic arouses feelings of uncertainty. Threats to existing certainties

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(e.g., jobs, relationships, health), uncertainties about what the future will bring, fear and confusion about COVID-19, as well as possible perceptions of the institutional uncontrollability of the pandemic may trigger negative feelings. These personal feelings of uncertainty are known to increase outgroup derogation (e.g., Van den Bos, 2009; see Chap. 4, this volume). From a sociological perspective, stigmatization might be related to broader societal developments. Contemporary societies can be thought of as modern ‘risk societies’ (e.g., Beck et al., 1994; Giddens, 1999), which are, among other things, characterized by a fundamental change in our perception of the origins of risks. As Giddens (1999) claims, until recently many social risks – like, for example, illness, disability etc. – were generally thought to be external. These ‘external risks’ could strike individuals or groups unexpectedly, but no one specifically was thought to be responsible for them. Yet, due to the enormous growth of our knowledge of the world and technological advances, the character of risk has changed fundamentally. For example, our knowledge of certain health hazards (lung cancer, certain types of diabetes, etc), has increased such that it is now considered one’s own individual responsibility (“you should not smoke” / “have a better diet” etc.) rather than ‘bad luck’ if it affects one’s health. Likewise, other hazards, like global warming, nuclear accidents etc., are a direct result of consciously acting collectives or even societies and carry a collective responsibility. Thus, in each of these cases, what were once considered unforeseeable external factors have become foreseeable factors, or in the words of Giddens (1999: 4) ‘manufactured risks’, i.e., risks resulting from deliberate decisions of well-informed individuals or groups.

This change in our perception of risks has opened a whole new political and societal discourse in which specific individuals or groups may be singled out and held responsible for the occurrence of a certain problems because they are believed to have failed to ‘manage’ circumstances sufficiently to prevent the risk from occurring. Whether the COVID-19 crisis is a manufactured risk depends on one’s perspective. If seen as a ‘health hazard’, the likes of which have always plagued mankind, it is not. But if COVID-19 is seen as a problem of risk management, then specific individuals or groups run the risk of being blamed for failing to manage certain risks, giving new momentum to the ‘old’ issue of stigmatization. Indeed, some group identities may be considered ‘suspect’, leading group members to be viewed as ‘perpetrators’, e.g., people visiting ‘unsafe’ markets, refusing to wear a face mask, or become vaccinated.

Conclusion COVID-19 and its health, economic and social impacts will be with us for some time to come. We are currently experiencing the immediate effects of the pandemic in terms of morbidity and mortality, the impacts on social well-being, and exacerbated social inequalities, most notably regarding socio-economic position. In this chapter, we reviewed the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic and prevention measures in terms of solidarity and social justice. We argued that the pandemic is not the ‘great equalizer’ some expected it to be (Mein, 2020). The pandemic affects socio-­economically disadvantaged groups and countries more than others. In addition, social distancing measures affect social groups unequally; people in lower socio-­economic positions, young people, and women are affected most. However, we also showed that, depending on the country context,

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the pandemic may result in increases in equality, for instance regarding gender inequalities, although these increases may be modest and possibly temporary. The pandemic and mitigating responses pose critical challenges to social justice and solidarity. For intergenerational solidarity, the balance between upward and downward solidarity is being questioned, with qualitatively incomparable trade-offs required. Consequently, the pandemic challenges reciprocity as the base for solidarity. With regards to global solidarity, calls to extend the scope of justice towards disadvantaged populations as well as towards people who might be perceived as scapegoats, are challenging in their own right. Yet, they may be even more challenging considering the context of the pandemic where many people face elusive risks and where divisions between the haves and the have-nots in terms of vaccination are rapidly developing. How societies rise to these new challenges for solidarity and social justice will only become clear over time, but their responses may significantly alter our future.

Glossary Global solidarity: solidarity with people worldwide. Intergenerational solidarity: solidarity between generations. Manufactured risks: risks resulting from deliberate decisions of well-informed individuals or groups (as opposed to external risks: risks that affect individuals or groups unexpectedly, for which people are not held responsible). Reciprocity: a relationship based on exchange and mutual benefit.

Comprehension Questions

1. In the chapter, five reasons for social inequalities related to the impact of COVID-19 are mentioned. Which four are these?

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2. The measures implemented to curb the spread of the virus likely impact certain groups in societies more than others. Which reasons are provided for why young people and women specifically may be impacted more than older people and men respectively? 3. How does the pandemic put pressure on intergenerational and global solidarity? How does this relate to social justice?

Discussion Questions

1. This chapter was written between April and August 2021. The pandemic will likely be in a new phase by the time the book has been published. Can you describe which new questions concerning solidarity and social justice have come up since the writing of this chapter (e.g., with regards to vaccine access and distribution, or with regards to the opening up of society)? 2. COVID-19 is one of multiple contemporary global challenges, two more of which have been discussed in this book (i.e., digitalisation (Chap. 18, this volume) and climate change (Chap. 17, this volume). These global challenges are also interrelated. How can the COVID-19 pandemic pose additional challenges as well as an opportunities for social justice and solidarity in digitalisation and climate change?

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Mein, S. A. (2020). COVID-19 and health disparities: The reality of “the great equalizer”. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 35, 2439–2440. Nieuwenhuis, R., & Yerkes, M. A. (2021). Workers’ well-­ being in the context of the first year of the COVID-­19 pandemic. Community, Work & Family, 24(2), 226–235. Patel, J.  A., Nielsen, F.  B. H., Badiani, A.  A., Assi, S., Unadkat, V. A., Patel, B., Ravindrane, R., & Wardle, H. (2020). Poverty, inequality and COVID-19: The forgotten vulnerable. Public Health, 183, 110–111. Petts, R.  J., Carlson, D.  L., & Pepin, J.  R. (2021). A gendered pandemic: Childcare, homeschooling, and parents’ employment during COVID-19. Gender, Work and Organization, 28(S2), 515–534. https://doi. org/10.1111/GWAO.12614 Poornima Wasdani, K., & Prasad, A. (2020). The impossibility of social distancing among the urban poor: The case of an Indian slum in the times of COVID-19. Local Environment, 25(5), 414–418. Power, E., Hughes, S., Cotter, D., & Cannon, M. (2020). Youth mental health in the time of COVID-19. Irish Journal of Psychological Medicine, 37(4), 301–305. Previtali, F., Allen, L. D., & Varlamova, M. (2020). Not only virus spread: The diffusion of ageism during the outbreak of COVID-19. Journal of Aging & Social Policy, 32(4–5), 506–514. Price-Haywood, E. G., Burton, J., Fort, D., & Seoane, L. (2020). Hospitalization and mortality among black patients and white patients with Covid-19. New England Journal of Medicine, 382(26), 2534–2543. Queisser, M., Adema, W., & Clarke, C. (2020). COVID-­19, employment and women in OECD countries. Raju, E., & Ayeb-Karlsson, S. (2020). COVID-19: How do you self-isolate in a refugee camp? International Journal of Public Health, 65(5), 515–517. Rollston, R., & Galea, S. (2020). COVID-19 and the social determinants of health. American Journal of Health Promotion, 34, 687–689. Schneider, S. H., Eger, J., Bruder, M., Faust, J., & Wieler, L. H. (2020). Does the COVID-19 pandemic threaten global solidarity? Evidence from Germany. World Development, 140, 105356. Silva, D.  S., & Smith, M.  J. (2020). Social distancing, social justice, and risk during the COVID-19 pandemic. Canadian Journal of Public Health, 111(4), 459–461. https://doi.org/10.17269/s41997-­020-­00354-­x Tsai, J., & Wilson, M. (2020). COVID-19: A potential public health problem for homeless populations. The Lancet Public Health, 5(4), e186–e187. van Daalen, K.  R., Cobain, M., Franco, O.  H., & Chowdhury, R. (2021). Stigma: The social virus spreading faster than COVID-19. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 0, 1–2. https:// doi.org/10.1136/jech-­2020-­214436 Van den Bos, K. (2009). On the psychology of the uncertain self and the integration of the worldview defense zoo. Psychological Inquiry, 20(4), 252–261. Van Dorn, A., Cooney, R.  E., & Sabin, M.  L. (2020). COVID-19 exacerbating inequalities in the US. Lancet (London, England), 395(10232), 1243–1244.

212 Van Lancker, W., & Parolin, Z. (2020). COVID-19, school closures, and child poverty: A social crisis in the making. The Lancet Public Health, 5(5), e243–e244. https://doi.org/10.1016/ S2468-­2667(20)30084-­0 Wen, J., Aston, J., Liu, X., & Ying, T. (2020). Effects of misleading media coverage on public health crisis: A case of the 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak in China. Anatolia, 31(2), 331–336. https://doi.org/10.1080/130 32917.2020.1730621 World Health Organization. (2020). Coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Available online: https://www.who. int/emergencies/diseases/novel-­c oronavirus-­2 019/ question-­a nd-­a nswers-­h ub/q-­a -­d etail/coronavirus-­ disease-­covid-­19#:~:text=symptoms. Accessed 1 May 2021.

M. Bal et al. World Health Organization. (2021). WHO coronavirus (COVID-19) dashboard. Available online: https:// covid19.who.int/table. Accessed 1 May 2021. Yerkes, M.  A., André, S., Besamusca, J., Hummel, B., Remery, C., van der Zwan, R., Kruyen, P. M., Beckers, D. G. J., & Geurts, S. A. E. (2020). CoGIS-NL COVID Gender Inequality Survey Netherlands; Tweede policy brief over de periode juni 2020. Yerkes, M. A., André, S. C., Besamusca, J. W., Kruyen, P.  M., Remery, C.  L., van der Zwan, R., … Geurts, S.  A. (2020). ‘Intelligent’ lockdown, intelligent effects? Results from a survey on gender (in) equality in paid work, the division of childcare and household work, and quality of life among parents in the Netherlands during the Covid-19 lockdown. PLoS One, 15(11), e0242249.

Section V Conclusions

Understanding Solidarity and Social Justice: Barriers that Remain

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Mara A. Yerkes and Michèlle Bal

Introduction Throughout this volume, it has become clear that solidarity, and social justice are necessary but contested societal elements in addressing social inequalities. If solidarity is about a shared identity, aims, and interests, and the willingness to share resources within and across groups, social justice provides the rules and values through which people can do so. Our social identities play a key role in shaping intergroup animosity, solidarity, and our receptivity to social change (Chaps. 2 and 3). Furthermore, group boundaries help determine who is included in our scope of justice (see Chap. 4). As noted by Lizzio-Wilson and colleagues in Chap. 2, our need for a positive self-concept is defined by the groups to which we belong and, crucially, the perceived value and social standing of such groups. How we respond to others is therefore driven by our membership in groups similar to or different from us. These identification processes take place at multiple levels, as discussed in Chap. 3, including macromeso sociological and micro psychological processes. Knijn and Hopman highlight how social identifications, interests, and socio-cultural contexts such as power relations, and the scarcity of

M. A. Yerkes (*) • M. Bal Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

resources (e.g., media, information), can trigger solidarity, and social justice at both levels, as well as boundary drawing between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Conversely, as multiple contributions to this volume highlight, when individuals perceive situations to be unjust, and/or when social justice aspects of certain situations are highlighted, individuals may be more willing to be solidaristic with others in society. In Chap. 2, the authors highlight how identifying dual and politicised identities can be important drivers of people’s willingness to seek social change. Similarly, Knijn and Hopman (Chap. 3) suggest that framing solidarity, in a social justice-based needsdiscourse can help create feelings of solidarity and solidaristic actions. In short, the interrelationship between solidarity and social justice forms a foundation of societal willingness to tackle social inequalities. Despite the necessity of solidarity, and social justice, historical and emerging societal challenges are putting them under pressure. Knijn and Hopman (Chap. 3) note that social justiceoriented solidarity initiatives challenge nation states and their populations about the redistribution of resources and the recognition of identities. Indeed, as discussed in Chap. 4, questions of who is deserving of what and by whom are at the forefront of much social scientific research. In this chapter, it becomes clear that justice is about much more than distributive questions alone, and at a minimum, questions about procedures,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9_20

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scope, and recognition also need to be addressed. How these can best be addressed remains contested, as dispositional, situational, and societal differences influence which form of justice people feel should be given primary consideration and which justice principle is preferred. The discussion by Bal and van den Bos also helps explain why injustices continue to endure, for example through our justifications of others’ misfortune, or through the application of stereotypes. Indeed, as Laenen and Roosma show in Chap. 6, our perceptions of who is deserving of welfare state assistance and under which circumstances differs depending upon our perception of people’s control of the situation, their attitude, reciprocity towards society, identity processes, and perceived need. Arguably, public opinion of the welfare state might matter for social policies aimed at addressing social inequalities (e.g., Sachweh, 2016; Sharp, 1999). But historically, welfare states have differed in the extent to which they are willing to address social inequalities dependent upon their normative foundations (Chap. 5). As Hemerijck and colleagues suggest, the continued popularity of welfare states puts pressure on policymakers to design social policies in a capacitating way, allowing citizens to adapt to rapidly changing economic and social conditions. Whether social policies are sufficiently able to address citizens in a capacitating way is a question of continuing debate (Parolin & Van Lancker, 2021; Yerkes et al., 2019), but clearly the normative pillars of solidarity, and social justice underlying welfare states have undergone significant redefinition. To understand the impact of these shifting foundations and continued contestations of solidarity and social justice, we focused our attention on societal fault lines related to gender, age, socio-economic position, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. What do these explorations teach us about solidarity and social justice in society?

 ey Conclusions About Solidarity K and Social Justice First and foremost, these explorations demonstrate the constant struggle for solidarity, and social justice in contemporary societies.

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Solidarity is dynamic and shifting within and across groups, within and beyond welfare state borders. Our perspectives on what is just in society are similarly fluid, influenced by processes of identification in ever-changing societies, which affects our perceptions of what is fair and who is deserving of help from the welfare state. These struggles for solidarity and social justice are reflected in the empirical chapters of the book. In Chaps. 8 and 9, Meeussen and colleagues and Yerkes and Rose demonstrate the contested nature of gender, gender roles, gender stereotypes, and gendered perceptions of what is fair. We’ve seen how societal expectations of men and women differ, which affects not only our behaviour, but also our views of what is fair, as highlighted by the case of flexibility upon return to work (Chap. 8). Inequalities along gender lines continue to characterise contemporary societies, and in some countries are exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic (see Chap. 19). Yet dominant stereotypes and gender roles can be challenged, as discussed in Chap. 7, which could lead to different expectations of future generations of men and women and thus differing views on ­gendered (in)justices. Inclusionary outgroup solidarity could strengthen such developments, for example challenging the misrecognition of women in the public and men in the private sphere. Just as stereotypes shape what we expect of men, women or other genders, age-based stereotypes shape what we believe about younger and older cohorts (Chap. 9). The inevitable process of ageing makes age-based stereotypes pernicious and persistent, but not unavoidable as Rauvola and colleagues show. Moreover, despite the strong presence of age-based stereotypes in our society, often used by political parties to suggest an ‘age war’ is taking place, Reeskens and van Oorschot demonstrate there is little empirical support for such a claim. They do find that younger cohorts are slightly less supportive of old-age welfare provisions, but not in the manner that popular representations of generational conflict would have us believe. In other words, intergenerational solidarity appears strong, although social injustices in the representation and recognition of age groups remain.

20  Understanding Solidarity and Social Justice: Barriers that Remain

Potentially one of the largest societal fault lines in contemporary societies is socio-­economic position. As highlighted in Chap. 11 by Mudd and colleagues, socio-economic position captures the complex interaction of income, educational level, and occupational differences in society that crucially shape multiple life outcomes. Health inequalities along socio-economic lines are some of the most despairing inequalities, with far-reaching consequences for social justice. However, whether we believe individuals with varying socio-economic backgrounds are deserving of help from the welfare state depends to a great extent on the societal context in which we are living in combination with processes of identification. As Filipovič Hrast and Zimmermann demonstrate in Chap. 12, stereotypical representations of various socio-­economic groups and differing mechanisms of identity (lower socio-economic groups) and need (higher socio-economic groups) shape our perceptions of deservingness along classed lines. Our willingness to share resources with other groups is further challenged by processes of migration in contemporary societies and subsequent ethnic diversity. Fears about competition for economic resources like jobs, housing, and welfare as well as fears about the preservation of national culture and identity give rise to ethnic stereotypes (Chap. 13) and feelings of welfare chauvinism (Chap. 14). Ethnic stereotypes are associated with prejudice, discrimination, and other forms of exclusion, which Martinovic and Flesichmann suggest ultimately stand in the way of achieving solidarity, and social justice. These same stereotypes can, however, incite helpful behaviour in some groups, such as support for short-term humanitarian help. Clearly, the extent to which such stereotypes pervade society differs across countries, and Lubbers and Seibel demonstrate the distinctions between soft and hard forms of welfare chauvinism. These forms range from citizens believing immigrants should only receive welfare state support under certain conditions (soft welfare chauvinism) to citizens feeling migrants should be excluded from welfare state support or immigration should be halted altogether (hard welfare chauvinism). Whether a

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multicultural national solidarity model is sufficient to challenge these distinctions remains a matter of debate. The final societal fault line explored in this volume is sexual orientation, a multidimensional concept shaped by history and culture. De Wit and colleagues highlight the particularly negative effects of sexual orientation-based stereotypes, leading to stigma and significant health and wellbeing consequences for sexual minorities. Recognitive justice (i.e., the recognition of sexual diversity) can help to overcome these stereotypes and can also create an institutional setting in which citizens are more accepting of diverse family forms, as highlighted by Dotti Sani and colleagues in Chap. 16. These chapters on sexual-­ orientation related stigma and attitudes towards diverse families demonstrate the interrelationship between societal acceptance of diversity as reflected in welfare state policies, and societal acceptance, as reflected in the occurrence of stigma and public perceptions of deservingness. Alongside these societal fault lines, we focused on several overarching challenges to ­solidarity and social justice. Clearly, the Covid19 pandemic is an example of such an overarching challenge, as it has placed unprecedented pressure on solidarity and social justice, as discussed in Chap. 19. The analysis by Bal and colleagues suggests the need to move beyond nation state-­based forms of identification and solidarity towards a global scope of justice to successfully address the social and health crisis at hand. As the pandemic continues, the pressures on solidarity and social justice change. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, a clear upward intergenerational request for solidarity was made. In the ongoing throes of the pandemic, we see a need for reciprocity (i.e., downward intergenerational solidarity) clearly appearing in multiple Western societies. As we finalize this book, we remain in the midst of the pandemic; the eventual impact on solidarities, social inequalities, and our sense of justice remains unclear. But what is clear is that how we cope with the pandemic now, with whom we choose to be solidaristic, and which principles of social justice take central stage in our decisions on how to handle the pandemic, will have a

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great impact on what societies will look like in the future, not only with regards to health, but also with regards to societal well-being and social inequalities. Similar to the need to extend our scope of social justice and solidarity in the pandemic, the far-reaching effects of climate change (Chap. 17) and the continued rapid expansion of digitalisation in social services (Chap. 18) are global challenges that raise questions about solidarity and social justice extending beyond welfare state borders. In addition, the pandemic creates cross-­ cutting impacts on the global challenges discussed in these chapters, particularly on digitalisation. Digitalisation accelerated at an unprecedented pace during the pandemic as workers, pupils, and students shifted to online working and education. Consequently, the pandemic accelerated and exposed the weaknesses of digitalisation, including inequality of access (Faraj et al., 2021), an issue discussed in Chap. 18. This and other concerns of digitalisation outlined by Lolich and Timonen have thus been exacerbated by the rapid and ongoing changes to digitalisation efforts. The two policy fields discussed in Chap. 18, elder care services and education, have been differentially impacted by the pandemic. Whereas elder care services have witnessed minor changes, for example through the use of telehealth (Baumgart, 2020) or robotics (Khan et al., 2020), the pace of these changes is likely much slower compared to the acceleration of digitalisation in education. Whether the momentum of digitalisation created by the pandemic will continue remains to be seen. As noted by Cone et  al. (2021), the complexity and uncertainty of the long-term effects of these processes are shaped by the multiple actors involved, and an ongoing need for legitimacy. But the pandemic has clearly impacted and worsened inequalities in educational opportunities (Bol, 2020), which creates new social justice challenges for the future. Lastly, as discussed in Chap. 17, the challenges of climate change extend beyond the border of nation states. Climate change will impact future generations more than current ones, people from disadvantaged communities more than most

M. A. Yerkes and M. Bal

Western high-income countries and will potentially have major consequences not only for human species, but also, or maybe even more so, for nature and non-human species (e.g., biodiversity loss). While most lay people understand these issues, it remains challenging to create a feeling of inclusionary outgroup solidarity toward these groups (i.e., future generations, people from disadvantaged communities, and non-­ human species and nature) as they are traditionally considered beyond the scope of justice and feel too far removed from us (either in space or in time) to consider their needs as equal to those of current human generations living nearby. The complexity and inherent uncertainties of climate change as well as sustainability transitions further complicate the creation of a shared sense of solidarity towards these groups. To create fair sustainable transitions, however, we not only need to account for new groups in our considerations of solidarity, and social justice, but we also need to ensure that all human groups (e.g., lower SEP groups) can engage in these transitions equally, or in other words, that ‘no one is left behind’. In Chap. 17, Bal and Stok argue that to achieve equal and fair transitions, we need to move beyond motivational accounts of sustainable behaviour towards a relational approach that accounts for the context in which individuals live, with varying opportunities and capabilities for participating in sustainability transitions. Overall, these global challenges require us to consider new scopes of justice and potentially new questions of justice to create and sustain a shared sense of solidarity needed to address these issues.

 olidarity, and Social Justice S in a Changing World? This book centres on three key questions: How do various societies respond to enduring, growing or changing inequalities? Do these challenges lead to an expansion of solidarity or an erosion of solidarity, in an ‘us versus them’ rhetoric? And to what extent do societies differ in their social justice values and hence the acceptance of social

20  Understanding Solidarity and Social Justice: Barriers that Remain

inequality? Underlying these questions is a more basic question: To what extent do solidarity and social justice still matter in contemporary societies? Reflecting on these questions is crucial because significant ambiguity exists in contemporary societies and welfare states about where individual responsibility ends and/or where welfare state support is required. Enduring and existing social inequalities are exacerbated in many contemporary welfare states (e.g., in relation to socio-economic position). Moreover, new inequalities are emerging in light of global social challenges, such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Individualistic tendencies can make it more difficult to look past short-term individual burdens (e.g., of needing to pay into the system) towards sustaining the welfare state in the long run. These global social challenges make reflections on solidarity, and social justice – both self-transcending values – all the more important. This book highlights the importance of solidarity and social justice in contemporary welfare states as well as how they are constantly (re)constructed in contemporary debates around varying societal fault lines. Looking at gender inequality, for instance, we see that patterns of inequality as well as demands for equality are changing. Whereas early demands centred on women gaining equal rights to men, contemporary discussions focus increasingly on more subtle effects of misrecognition and on creating equal value for multiple roles in society, including traditionally gendered ones (e.g., care). Increasingly, societies also recognize patterns of inequality related to sexual orientation, including recognition of demands aimed at securing equal rights for sexual minorities and LGB communities. These structural inequalities remain unequally addressed across countries, and the developments in several Central and Eastern European countries show that advances towards equality for sexual minorities can even be reversed. These ongoing inequalities can be a crucial barrier for combatting societal stigma and the multiple long-­ term, negative effects associated with the societal stigmatization of sexual minorities. With regard to age, societies continue to maintain ideals cen-

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tred on youth, at least in appearance, thereby undervaluing older age. However, demographic processes such as increased longevity create ageing societies, which pose new challenges to intergenerational solidarity. Intergenerational solidarity is placed under even greater pressure by the COVID-19 pandemic. Societal fault lines related to socio-economic position also appear to be deepening. While the existence of the fault line between people of lower and higher socio-­ economic position is recognized widely, addressing it has proven difficult, given its deep entrenchment in many facets of our lives. And as this book goes to press, Europe once again finds itself embroiled in discussions around migration, for example in calls for solidarity, with Afghani citizens seeking asylum following the return of the Taliban to power. In short, enduring and changing inequalities lead to continued contestations. Welfare states and the citizens living within them respond with varying forms of solidarity and social justice. This changing nature of social inequalities together with the global challenges outlined in this book and beyond require a continued discussion about and need for new solidarities and viewpoints on social justice. The discussions in this book are intended to provide a fruitful starting point. While this book is comprehensive and interdisciplinary in its approach to issues of social inequality, solidarity, and social justice, we note a number of limitations. First, our interdisciplinary perspective focuses primarily on the integration of (social) psychological, sociological, and some political philosophical perspectives on these topics. Clearly other disciplines, including history, economics, cultural anthropology, and political science address issues relevant to solidarity, and social justice in contemporary societies, which will at times show overlap with the themes discussed in this book, but can also be complementary. This book does not aim to offer a definitive collection of interdisciplinary debates, but rather a starting point. Second, while we focused on several key societal fault lines, others have been excluded due to lack of space, such as inequalities related to disability. Similarly, as the book offers a broad view of societal fault lines, this

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precludes chapters from going more in-depth on certain topics, such as the fluidity of gender or the intersectionality of social inequalities (see, e.g., Williams, 2021). Lastly, the focus here has primarily been on social inequality defined as an uneven allocation of burdens and valued resources in combination with the undervaluation of members of society based on their group membership. The aspect of privilege, also experienced by members of society based on their (oftentimes majority) group membership, has received less attention but remains a critical aspect of discussions on social inequality. With the far-reaching extent of many of the social issues outlined in the book, some readers may now be looking for how to solve these social issues, and thus how to create social change. These readers may be disappointed. For while some chapter authors suggest ways in which social change could be achieved, this book is explicitly aiming to show the complexity of the social issues at hand without providing a definitive answer on how to solve them. For example, we recognize the presence of wokeness debates (i.e., an awareness of social justice issues, particularly pertaining to race) in many societies, yet this book is not a call to action. Quite simply, there are no easy answers to these social issues. What this book does, is outline numerous theoretical and empirical perspectives intended to help readers reflect. To reflect on why we feel particular social policy responses to social inequalities are needed, or not (i.e., whether we are willing to be solidaristic with others). To reflect on why we feel these responses are fair or unfair, just or unjust. And throughout these reflections, to recognize that debates and contestations about these issues are ongoing, and an inherent part of the societies in which we live.

References Baumgart, D.  C. (2020). Digital advantage in the COVID-19 response: Perspective from Canada’s largest integrated digitalized healthcare system. NPJ Digital Medicine, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1038/ s41746-­020-­00326-­y Bol, T. (2020). Inequality in homeschooling during the Corona crisis in the Netherlands. First results from the LISS Panel. Cone, L., Brøgger, K., Berghmans, M., Decuypere, M., Förschler, A., Grimaldi, E., Hartong, S., Hillman, T., Ideland, M., Landri, P., van de Oudeweetering, K., Player-Koro, C., Bergviken Rensfeldt, A., Rönnberg, L., Taglietti, D., & Vanermen, L. (2021). Pandemic acceleration: Covid-19 and the emergency digitalization of European education. European Educational Research Journal. https://doi. org/10.1177/14749041211041793 Faraj, S., Renno, W., & Bhardwaj, A. (2021). Unto the breach: What the COVID-19 pandemic exposes about digitalization. Information and Organization, 31(1), 100337. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. infoandorg.2021.100337 Khan, Z. H., Siddique, A., & Lee, C. W. (2020). Robotics utilization for healthcare digitization in global COVID-19 management. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(11), 3819. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17113819 Parolin, Z., & Van Lancker, W. (2021). What a social investment ‘litmus test’ must address: A response to Plavgo and Hemerijck. Journal of European Social Policy, 31(3), 297–308. https://doi. org/10.1177/09589287211012974 Sachweh, P. (2016). Social justice and the welfare state: Institutions, outcomes, and attitudes in comparative perspective. In C. Sabbagh & M. Schmitt (Eds.), Handbook of social justice theory and research (pp. 293–313). Springer. Sharp, E.  B. (1999). The sometime connection: Public opinion and social policy. State University of New York Press. Williams, F. (2021). Social policy. A critical and intersectional analysis. Polity Press. Yerkes, M. A., Javornik, J., & Kurowska, A. (2019). Social policy and the capability approach. Concepts, measurement and application (M. A. Yerkes, J. Javornik, & A. Kurowska, Eds.). Policy Press.

Index

A Ageism, 97–104, 205 Aging, 97, 99, 100, 102–104 Algorithms, 194 Artificial intelligence (AI), 194 B Backlash, 80, 81 Bias, 18–20, 22, 44, 80, 83, 97, 160, 194 Boundary drawing, 31–34, 36, 215 C Capability approach, 54, 57, 58, 61, 62 Capability-Opportunity-Motivation-Behaviour (COM-B) model, 184–186 CARIN criteria, 31, 65–68, 70, 73, 131, 148 Citizenship rights, 32, 169 civil citizenship rights, 4, 10, 41, 140, 162, 169–177 portability, 169, 171, 174, 176, 177 social citizenship rights, 4, 10, 32, 45, 54, 55, 60, 62, 68, 69, 152, 169–177 Climate change, 181–186 adaptation, 181, 182, 186 mitigation, 181–184, 186 scepticism, 185 Climate scepticism, 186 Collective action, 22–25, 141 Common Ingroup Identity Model, 22, 24 Competence, 79–82, 100–102, 120, 138–140, 143 COVID-19, 53, 65, 99, 107, 117, 118, 123, 192, 193, 201–208, 217, 219 D Data divide, 192, 194 Defensive anger, 35 Deservingness, 6–9, 21, 30, 31, 33, 34, 65, 66, 117, 127–134, 148, 169–177 deservingness perceptions, 3, 4, 7, 31, 35, 66–68, 70–73, 111, 127–134, 148, 169, 170, 175, 217 deservingness principle, 7, 46, 48

deservingness theory, 7, 66, 67, 73, 128–129 deservingness valuations, 67–68, 70, 72, 73, 134 Digitalisation of public services, 195 Digitalization/digitalisation, 191 digital citizens, 192, 196 digital divide, 11, 192–196 selective digitalisation, 197 selective digitalization, 196 Discrimination, 9, 10, 19–21, 25, 34, 80, 83, 97, 98, 101, 104, 119, 120, 137, 138, 140, 142, 158, 160, 161, 207, 217 ethnic discrimination, 138, 139, 143 LGB discrimination, 159, 160 Distinctiveness threat, 18–19, 21, 22, 24, 25 Dual identity, 22, 24 Due consideration effect, 44, 48 E Energy transition, 183, 184 Environmental justice, 181–185 ecological environmental justice, 182, 185, 186 global environmental justice, 182, 185, 186 intergenerational environmental justice, 182, 185, 187 Equity theory, 42, 43, 48 F Fair process effect, 44, 48 Five-dimensional framework to examine equality, 192, 197 G Gender, 6–8, 60, 79–84, 216, 220 gender conformity, 157 gender identity, 20, 157 gender (in)equality, 4, 8, 80–84, 87–94, 170, 204, 205, 209, 219 gender roles, 79, 80, 83, 84, 91 Gender (in)equality, 82 Generational cohorts, 97, 98, 101 Generationalism, 97, 99–104

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. A. Yerkes, M. Bal (eds.), Solidarity and Social Justice in Contemporary Societies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93795-9

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Index

222 Generations, 31, 83, 97–101, 104, 107–109, 113, 114, 205, 206, 218 Green identity, 183, 187 H Heteronormativity, 157, 158, 160 Heterosexism, 160 Homonegativity, 160, 161 Homophobia, 160, 161 I Identification processes, 6, 25, 34, 45, 215–217 Immigrants, 9, 129, 131, 132, 134, 137–139, 141–142, 147–154, 217 Inclusion, 32, 37, 38, 60, 62, 102, 103, 124, 147, 182, 187 Individual responsibility, 4, 122, 123, 219 Ingroup favouritism, 18, 19, 25, 33, 34 Integrated Threat Theory, 140 Intensive mothering, 81, 84 Intergroup Threat Theory, 137, 140, 142 Intersectionality, 119–120, 123, 220 J Justice as recognition, 5, 42, 44, 45, 48, 176, 177, 182 Justice principle, 6, 31, 43, 48, 90, 91, 182, 206, 216 equality principle, 48, 60 need principle, 48 Just world theory, 45–48 belief in a just world, 46 L LGB communities, 161–163, 219 LGB emancipation, 163 LGB people, 10, 157–164 Lifespan perspective, 102 Lifestyle drift, 122, 123 M Masculinity, 81 Maternal gatekeeping, 81, 83 Minority stress, 161 Minority Stress Theory, 160, 161 Moral anger, 35, 37 Multicultural welfare state model, 153, 154 N National belonging, 32, 37 Neoliberal multiculturalism model, 147, 153, 154 Normative theory, 53–57, 61 Norms, 20, 21, 23, 24, 35, 37, 60, 71, 90, 99, 123, 133, 140, 143, 161, 163, 181

gender norms, 90, 91, 93, 204, 205 group norms, 18, 20–21, 35 intensive mothering norms, 81, 83 national norms, 20 personal norms, 183, 184, 187 political norms, 56, 61 social norms, 66, 131, 157, 159, 184, 185 work devotion norms, 81, 83, 84 O Older adults, 8, 98–101, 103, 104, 134, 193, 195 Open educational resources, 193–195, 197 Opportunity hoarding, 33, 34 Outgroup derogation, 18, 19, 21, 25, 208 P Perceptions of fairness, 87–94 Policy feedback, 71, 72 Politicised identity, 23–25, 215 Politicized collective identity, 33, 37 Power relations, 33, 35–37, 215 Prejudice, 9, 17, 18, 20, 97, 129, 137, 138, 140–143, 217 Proportionality principle, 42, 48 Public health policy, 123 Public opinion, 66, 72, 107, 110, 122, 216 Public services digitalisation, 191–193, 196, 197 R Relative deprivation, 35, 43, 48, 120, 123 S Same-sex families, 10, 158, 169–177 Scope of justice, 45, 48, 182, 185–187, 192, 206, 209, 215, 217, 218 Sedentariness, 32, 36, 38 Self-transcending motives, 4, 5, 11, 41 Sexism, 81, 82, 102 benevolent sexism, 81, 84 Sexual identity, 10, 161, 163, 164 sexual identity development, 161 Sexual orientation, 9, 157–161, 163, 164, 217, 219 Social activism, 162–164 Social causation, 121, 123 Social change, 17–25 Social class, 108, 109, 117–120, 123, 130, 132–134, 193 Social comparison, 19, 25, 42, 43, 120 Social contract, 7, 8, 53, 61, 62, 107, 108, 113 Social determinants of health, 122–124 Social dilemma, 4, 12 prisoner’s dilemma, 4, 12 public goods dilemma, 12 resource dilemma, 4, 12 Social Dominance Theory, 33, 38

Index Social identities, 18, 101, 102 Social Identity Model of Collective Action, 23, 25 Social Identity Theory, 6, 17–18, 25, 100, 103, 138 Social inequality, 4, 7, 11, 12, 79, 80, 117, 157, 202, 218–220 patterns of inequality, 3, 219 socio-economic inequality, 203 Social investment, 53, 54, 58–62 Social justice, 3–12, 29–38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 53–63, 65, 87, 89, 97, 117, 122, 137, 138, 142, 157–165, 169, 176, 181, 185, 191–197, 201–209, 215–219 descriptive justice, 42 distributive justice, 8, 42–45, 48 interactional justice, 44, 88, 90, 92, 93 normative justice, 42 procedural justice, 5, 30, 42–45, 48 social justice framework, 7, 88–90, 93 Social obligations, 68, 69 Social role theory, 79, 84 Social selection, 121, 124 Social support, 82, 102, 121–123, 161 Socialisation, 79, 80, 84, 123 Societal challenges, 10, 11, 215 Socioeconomic inequalities (or inequities) in health, 118, 119, 121–124, 160, 163 Socioeconomic position, 117–119, 123, 124 Solidarity, 4, 5, 12, 17, 21–24, 29, 54, 55, 58–62, 137, 147, 153, 157, 162–163, 169, 176, 185, 215–220 civic solidarity, 29–32, 36, 37 exclusionary ingroup solidarity, 29, 30, 34–36, 38 global solidarity, 206, 207 human solidarity, 29, 37 inclusionary outgroup solidarity, 17, 29, 30, 34–36, 38, 43, 216, 218 inclusive outgroup solidarity (see Solidarity, inclusionary outgroup solidarity) inclusive solidarity, 153 intergenerational solidarity, 107, 108, 114, 205, 206, 209, 216, 217, 219 intergroup solidarity, 17, 29, 129, 141 political solidarity, 30, 37 social solidarity, 30, 38 Stereotypes, 46–48, 79–84 age stereotypes, 97–103 complementary, 47, 48, 120 gender stereotypes, 8, 79–84 group stereotypes, 47, 138–140, 143 SEP-related stereotypes, 120, 123 status-congruent stereotypes, 47, 48 stereotype content model, 47, 48, 100, 138, 139 stereotype contents, 138–140, 142 Stigma, 9–11, 20, 72, 102, 122, 157, 160, 161, 163, 164, 207, 217, 219

223 Sustainability transitions, 182–185 Sustainable behaviour (intentions), 182–187 System justification theory, 45–49, 138 T Target groups, 7, 55, 65–73 Technological capital, 192, 193, 197 Territorial affectedness, 32, 38 Threat, 134, 137, 140–143, 149, 176, 205, 207 economic threat, 140, 141 ethnic threat, 140, 141, 149 group-value threat, 19, 21, 25 intergroup threat, 137 realistic threat, 140–143, 206 social identity threat, 18, 21, 24, 25 symbolic threat, 140–143 Transgender people, 157, 161, 164 V Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory, 183, 184, 187 Values, 3, 5, 18, 20, 33, 37, 56, 57, 60, 66, 71, 97, 104, 131, 140–143, 183, 215, 218 altruistic values, 183 biospheric values, 183 hedonistic values, 183 post-materialist values, 170, 177 self-enhancing values, 183, 185, 187 self-transcending values, 3, 183, 185, 219 Victim blaming, 46, 48 Vignettes, 130, 131, 134, 172 Voice, 44, 48, 182, 185, 192 W Warm experts, 195, 197 Warmth, 47, 48, 81, 82, 84, 100, 101, 120, 138–140, 142, 143 Welfare attitudes, 65, 71–73, 107–110, 113 Welfare chauvinism, 9, 30, 129, 134, 148, 149, 153, 217 hard and soft welfare chauvinism, 147–153, 217 welfare chauvinism model, 147 Welfare nationalism, 129, 134 Welfare state, 3, 4, 30–32, 34, 36, 37, 45, 53–56, 58–63, 67, 71–73, 108–110, 113, 118, 127–130, 132–134, 147–149, 151–154, 171, 176, 205, 216–219 Welfare state support, 4, 6, 9, 170, 217 Wokeness, 220 Work-family policies, 83 Y Younger adults, 8, 98, 99, 103, 181, 203