Soldiers, Society, and National Security 9781685853860

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Soldiers, Society, and National Security

Soldiers, Society, and National Security Sam C. Sarkesian John Allen Williams Fred B. Bryant

Published in the United States of America in 1995 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB www.eurospanbookstore.com/rienner

© 1995 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sarkesian, Sam Charles. Soldiers, society, and national security / Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, Fred B. Bryant. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-273-5 (alk. paper) 1. Sociology, Military—United States. 2. United States. Army— Officers—Psychology. 3. National security—United States. 4. Persian Gulf War, 1991. I. Williams, John Allen, 1945– . II. Bryant, Fred B. III. Title. UA23.S274 1995 303.6'6—dc20 94-28308 CIP

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

∞

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents Preface 1

U.S. Military Professionalism and the Changing Security Agenda Part 1: The Military and the Changing Context of National Security

vii 1

2 3

The American Way of War and the Conflict Environment Military Force Structures and the Strategic Landscape

29 59

4 5

Democratization and the Military Professional Perceptions and Self-Images

75 89

6 7

The Profession and Politics Civil-Military Relations

111 133

8 9

The Military Profession: Changes and Challenges A New Hypothesis

147 155

A

Final Report: Civilian Graduate Education and the U.S. Military Profession

167

Part 2: U.S. Society and the Military Profession

Part 3: Political-Military Dynamics

Part 4: Conclusions: The Emerging Military Profession

Appendixes:

v

vi

B C D

Contents

Survey Results Technical and Procedural Details of the Data Analysis Procedures Used in Data Cleaning and Data Reduction

Selected Bibliography Index About the Book and the Authors

177 187 193

197 205 215

Preface In 1988 we began research on civilian graduate education and U.S. military professionalism. The purpose was to determine the impact of such education on the values and attitudes of military professionals—in this case army officers—who were in full-time civilian graduate education programs or had just completed them. In such programs, officers virtually revert to the civilian world and become graduate students immersed in the academic milieu. The research began as a focused effort limited to the relationship between graduate education and military professionalism. During the 31-month study, however, dramatic changes occurred in the international security environment. The convergence of our research effort with these changes provided a rare opportunity to study army professionalism more generally and to assess its relationship to U.S. national security and the new security landscape. Relevant parts of the research results are incorporated with results of a variety of other research to address the primary subject of this study. The purpose of this book is to analyze military professionalism in the post–Gulf War era. We look at four broad topics: the military and the changing context of national security, U.S. society and military professionalism, political-military dynamics, and the emerging military profession—that is, how the military profession is affected by and responds to the strategic and domestic landscapes. Each of these topics is a component of the hypothesis of our study, which is explained in Chapter 1. Although our specific focus is on the U.S. Army professional officer, we draw conclusions about the military profession in general. The first chapter provides a broad overview of the major components of our approach, plus a summary of our research results on civilian graduate education. (A fuller explanation, including the methodology and data, is in the Appendixes.) The final chapter draws conclusions, focusing on the approach and the emerging military profession. Four research techniques are used in this study: research on civilian graduate education, which includes a number of personal interviews; studies and surveys that provide major elements relevant to this study; reviews of the relevant literature; and participant-observer research techniques. Each chapter incorporates some aspect of military professionalism from our empirical research, expanded and incorporated into the broader vii

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subject of each chapter. Because a number of subjects important to the study of military professionalism need to be examined from various perspectives, the same subject may be included in several chapters. For example, the Vietnam War is studied in more than one chapter. In one instance, it is viewed from military command and control perspectives; in another, it is viewed from a civil-military perspective. As a result, there is some intentional repetition in topics from chapter to chapter. We are aware of the complexity of the subjects addressed and the difficulty in coming to grips with them. Further, we recognize that many changes may occur that are difficult to anticipate and some projections and conclusions may be speculative. Our conclusions will be tested by the developments in the coming years—years full of unpredictable events and ill-defined forces. Too often studies of military professionalism border on a rather simplistic formula rooted in civil control of the military and adherence to military professional norms. In fact, military professionalism includes a variety of components ranging from the military to the political and the socioeconomic and is further complicated by the forces shaping it, including a variety of external factors emerging from the new world order. This complexity makes such a study more difficult, but we believe that scholarship should challenge the difficult and disentangle the complex. We hope we have made a worthwhile step in that direction. Various parts of our book have been read and commented on by colleagues in academia and in the military. We wish to acknowledge particularly the assistance of Melvin Sorg and Terry Williams, Loyola University Chicago; Paul Yarnold, Northwestern University Medical School; Robert A. Vitas, Lithuanian Research Center (Chicago); and Raoul H. Alcalá, Colonel, USA (retired). Their help has been invaluable. The research and this book would not have been possible without the support of the Spencer Foundation in Chicago and the encouragement of its vice president, Marion Faldet. In addition, it would have been impossible to conduct serious research on army professionals without the support and encouragement of Gen. Carl E. Vuono, who was chief of staff of the U.S. Army during the time the research was conducted. Without the efforts and support of all these individuals, little could have been accomplished in our research effort. The research results and the conclusions in this book are solely our responsibility. Sam C. Sarkesian John Allen Williams Fred B. Bryant

1 U.S. Military Professionalism and the Changing Security Agenda The last decade of the 20th century has thus far witnessed dramatic changes in the international security system. From the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the internal dissolution of the Soviet system to the economic integration of Europe and the obsolescence of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology, the international security landscape has undergone changes unforeseen even a few short years ago. The emergence of Boris Yeltsin and the creation of the Russian state saw the focus of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union shift to their own internal problems. Not only has this last decade brought with it a transition from superpower confrontation and bipolar ideological blocs to a multipolar world, it has eroded the military raison d’être that has sustained the U.S. military for the past four decades. As a result, the U.S. strategic rationale and force posture have become almost irrelevant. This is the case, even though China and Japan seem to have embarked on a major expansion and modernization of their military forces and have a growing ability to project power into the Asian and Southeast Asian areas. The new era poses serious questions about the capacity and effectiveness of the U.S. military to respond to contingencies across the conflict spectrum. This is particularly challenging for the U.S. Army, which is the service most affected by changing force postures and strategic reorientation. This chapter is an overview of these issues and of the way they challenge the prevailing notion of military professionalism. In subsequent chapters these issues will be analyzed in detail. Although there is a great deal of literature on U.S. domestic issues and the changing strategic landscape, little attention has been given to what all of this means in terms of military professionalism. The United States has entered a new security era—fundamental changes are taking place in U.S. national security, the relationship of the military to society, and military professionalism. With the significant changes in U.S. national security as well as changing domestic views regarding military threats and the role of the military, it is important to examine military professionalism and the way it is affected 1

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by the changing security agenda. What is learned from that inquiry will help us understand the relationship of the military to the democratic society it serves and the challenges the military faces in responding to the changing context of national security. Conceptual Framework

Our analysis is based on a conceptual approach consisting of four components and an overarching hypothesis:1

1. The changing context of national security policy requires not only new force structures but new strategic predispositions and mind-sets within the military profession. This includes a broader notion of conflict and an understanding of various strategic cultures that do not necessarily conform to European strategic precepts. All this must be reconciled with the American way of war.2 2. Although the political-social character of the U.S. military must be compatible with society, a degree of separation (psychological distance) must be maintained between U.S. society and the military profession to ensure military capability and combat effectiveness. This encompasses the degree to which the armed forces reflect society and are responsive to domestic socioeconomic forces. 3. The political-military dynamics resulting from the role of the profession in politics should ensure nonpoliticization of the profession and nurture a degree of trust and respect between the profession and national leaders. This trust and respect must also be reflected in relationships between the military institution and the political system in general. In addition, public perceptions of the military profession must support the politicalmilitary posture and status of the profession. In the aggregate, these relationships constitute civil-military relations. 4. Military professional norms and ethos must be compatible with and supported by the first three components. The substance and scope of training and education of military professionals must support and reinforce the core components of military professionalism and military culture.

The overarching hypothesis is that a cohesive military, fine-tuned to respond to contingencies across the spectrum, can be achieved only by the melding of the key substantive elements in each of the four components into a reasonably coherent whole. 3 It is this synergism that is the critical measure of military capability and effectiveness and an indicator of the strength of the military professional ethos. This does not necessarily preclude differences or gaps between the various components. However, such

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differences must not seriously detract from the synergism. The greater the distance and differences between and within these components, the more likely that the synergistic process will be less effective, signaling the weakening of military cohesion and esprit and causing turmoil within the profession. Each component is examined in detail in the following chapters. To set the preliminary reference points, we begin with an overview of the conceptual framework. In addition, some factors that are not necessarily part of the framework are discussed to provide the necessary background and the context in which the subject is analyzed. Overview

The United States is trying to respond to the changed international security situation and to readjust its strategic perspectives and force posture to challenges that emanate increasingly from outside Europe. This is made more complicated by domestic priorities, the hope for a peace dividend, resource limitations, and increasing awareness of the economic component of national security and domestic well-being. Of all the military services, the U.S. Army faces the most difficult adjustment. The Military and the Changing Context of National Security

In August 1990, Pres. George Bush outlined a broad strategy for reshaping our forces for the new security era. He stated, “The size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence . . . a policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today’s world as in the time of conflict and cold war.”4 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney elaborated on this broad strategy, focusing on four major elements.5 He stated that strategic defense and deterrence necessitate a “diverse mix of survivable and highly capable offensive nuclear forces.” In addition, this requires worldwide protection against limited ballistic missile strikes. Forward presence requires that some U.S. forces remain overseas as a visible sign of U.S. commitment and serve as a credible deterrence. Further, such forces would be the base for engaging in other contingencies. Crisis response means that U.S. conventional forces “must be able to respond rapidly to short-notice regional crises and contingencies that threaten U.S. interests.” And finally, force reconstitution is based on the need to “maintain the ability to reconstitute a larger force structure if a resurgent threat of massive conflict returns.” Numerous international, domestic, and historical factors shape the U.S. military’s role in the broader context of U.S. strategy. Five interrelated

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components are paramount in designing U.S. strategy in the new era. First, policy and strategy must be global in response but regional in impact. A global view is necessitated by international economic interdependence and the rise of a form of political universalism. The United States is the one power capable of projecting its power globally. Yet it also seems clear that conflicts will be limited and regional in scope and will take a variety of forms, ranging from political-military contingencies to conventional combat. Second, regardless of the global/regional power projections, the United States is limited in what it can do. These limitations and constraints are imposed not only by the geostrategic and political-military character of likely conflicts but also by the finite resources of the United States. Deficits, productivity, and the economic state of the country preclude simultaneous forays into all parts of the world. Costs and domestic priorities are sure to impose severe constraints on what the United States can and should do in responding to national security issues. The obvious exception is when the people of the United States perceive a major threat to U.S. national security. But this will happen only rarely, given the increasing improbability of wars between major powers. Third, conventional conflicts such as the Gulf War will be a major reference point in the use of military force. This is unfortunate because many future conflicts are likely to be unconventional (in official parlance, “lowintensity conflicts”). Much effort is being made in reshaping the U.S. Army into a smaller and more mobile force, equipped with the most modern weapons; at the same time, a lot of rhetoric has been expended on responding to unconventional conflicts. A great deal needs to be done in reshaping strategy and forces to respond to unconventional conflicts, when and if the need should develop. Fourth, for the United States, an adequate deterrence is necessary in nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry. Four states of the former Soviet Union—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—retain stockpiles of nuclear weaponry, and both chemical and biological weapon capability are widespread. Even though a Commonwealth of Independent States has been established, it is not clear what kind of governing structure will eventually emerge. A particularly troubling problem is how the military is to be controlled and supervised. Moreover, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation continues, much of it in Third World states. This reinforces the need for a credible U.S. deterrence as well as serious efforts at arms control and antiproliferation efforts. Fifth, it is likely that the U.S. Army, when committed, will be involved in a non-European theater where the indigenous strategic cultures will differ considerably from those of the United States and there will be differing concepts of proper conduct in combat. Notions of war and peace,

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rules of warfare, and “just” political systems may create a political-military environment difficult for effective U.S. military operations, thus increasing the importance of officers educated to deal with complex international issues. Although other components of U.S. national security have a bearing on the role of the U.S. Army, those we have noted cover many of the critical dimensions. These will continue to have a major role in reshaping the army’s force posture and in refashioning its composition and organizational structure. The link between the changing international security landscape and the posture and organizational shape of the U.S. Army was well expressed by Gen. Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stated: The community of nations has entered into an exciting and promising era. Global war is now less likely and the US national security strategy reflects that fact. . . . Future threats to US interests are inherent in the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing world. We can meet challenges of the foreseeable future with a much smaller force than we have had in recent years.6

The army will no longer be able to concentrate mainly on a known adversary postured for a European battlefield. It will not be clear who the enemy is or where the enemy will need to be confronted. Further, the need to use land forces for future contingencies is more ambiguous than in the past. Involvement in a ground war has always been disconcerting to U.S. citizens, who find it much easier to accept the more romanticized view of war associated with naval and air forces.

The conflict environment. Before the 20th century, the presumption was that the ground soldier—the foot soldier or horseman—was the critical instrument in war. War was virtually meaningless without the visible presence of this element. Defeat of a state or the taking of territory was not final until the ground soldier physically occupied the area and became the instrument for destroying the enemy’s governing structure or in securing captured territory. The strength of sailing vessels and navies could seriously affect an adversary but could not substitute for the ground soldier. The 20th century opened an era in which increasingly sophisticated weapons, including warships and aircraft, played an important part in defeating an adversary. World War II epitomized the effectiveness of weapons technology and new modes of warfare. But the ground soldier remained critical in any outcome. However, the use of atomic weapons and their decisiveness in defeating Japan without placing even one ground soldier on the Japanese homeland raised important questions regarding armies and military posture. Following World War II, the U.S. military went through several organizational shifts in trying to integrate ground soldiers

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within the nuclear battlefield. The Korean and Vietnam wars, among other conflicts, seemed to reinforce the basic point that the ground soldier remained the critical instrument. Some argued that in major war, such as conflicts between superpowers or a war reminiscent of World War II, the critical instruments would be nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. This was not to suggest that ground war would be unimportant, but it was recognized that a successful ground war could not be undertaken without effective naval and air power and the capability to bring massive nuclear destruction on the enemy. Some believed that nuclear war would change the role of the ground soldier to one of a follow-on force, simply to secure an area after nuclear devastation. There were also those who argued that limited nuclear war would do little to change the basic role of the ground soldier. But as the Cold War became global in scope, it became clear that confrontations between the superpowers could lead to proxy wars of a nonnuclear character. The need for both strategic and limited war capabilities was the basis for the U.S. maintenance of both strategic and general-purpose forces. For the United States, a capable army with modern weapons was essential to national security policy and strategy. For many, air and naval power remained supplementary to and supportive of the ground soldier. Even with various nuclear war scenarios, it was the accepted view that ground soldiers would need to become engaged, particularly if a “broken back” nuclear war occurred. All this was premised on a nuclear conflict and major war with the Soviet Union that embroiled Europe. The 1991 Gulf War not only marked a dramatic shift in the political dynamics in the Mideast, it also seemed to many to be a watershed in U.S. strategy and force posture. U.S. air power appeared to have been the major instrument in defeating the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq. Although the ground forces were critical in expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait, air power was decisive in the success of the coalition forces. To be sure, the ground forces were deemed capable of defeating the Iraqi forces in the long term. But air power not only proved decisive in destroying or damaging Iraqi capability and thus reducing Allied casualties, it also demonstrated the ability to devastate all of Iraq if need be. High-tech weaponry, ranging from laser bombs and Tomahawk missiles to night surveillance devices and command and control instruments, was critical in the conduct of the war. An increasingly important aspect of such warfare is the managerial and technological competence of the military forces. The conduct of the Gulf War was not devoid of political-military problems, which included antimissile weaponry and the effectiveness of Total Force Policy. But the performance of the U.S. military reflected a high level of professionalism, esprit, and effective “jointness.” Moreover, the ability to bring together a

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coalition of forces, including some from the Middle East, was a worthy political achievement. Nonetheless, according to Lt. Col. Jeffrey McCausland: Due to the speed of the conflict and the relatively low coalition casualties some experts have concluded that future wars will be a massive “video game” and can be undertaken “surgically.” Supporters of this view believe that in the post–Cold War world with less of a threat of escalation to nuclear weapons, Western military power can be used readily as an instrument. Nothing could be further from the truth. . . . Such a conclusion about future war would not only be militarily incorrect, but also morally bankrupt.7

Regardless of the focus on conventional conflicts, unconventional conflicts, particularly their major manifestations in revolution and counterrevolution, are likely to characterize a large part of the future conflict environment. As mentioned earlier, the official parlance is “low-intensity conflict,” although more recently the term “peacetime engagement” has been used in official sources.8 The “peacetime engagement” label appears to be more realistic, but it does not convey the complex nature of the environment that often erupts into a shooting conflict. In addition, many have suggested categories of low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts. The label “unconventional conflict” is used here as a means of moving away from the notion that these categories can realistically describe the intensity of conflict on the ground. Also, the concept of “unconventional” clearly distinguishes such conflicts from conventional ones and focuses on the conditions of the conflict arena. Finally, the changed international security landscape combined with U.S. domestic priorities and economic considerations have led to demands for what some have called a U.S. peace dividend. All of this is likely to foster a domestic environment far more concerned with domestic priorities and policies rather than military power projections. It is also the case that professionals just completing civilian graduate education appear better prepared to accept and to understand the more complex strategic landscape and the way this may affect the military. They are also more likely to recognize the decreased utility of military force in a variety of international situations.

Force structure and the strategic landscape. Force structure refers mainly to the conflict orientation of the force and the mix and specialization of units within that force. In this respect, although the U.S. military must maintain a global vision, it also has to be prepared to respond to the various types of conflicts that are likely to occur in specific regions. 9 Force structure must be shaped accordingly. Future threats to U.S. security interests are likely to emanate from non-European areas. Although this was the case more than a decade ago, the trend has since accelerated.

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The U.S. Army is faced with a number of important problems of force posture and composition resulting from these national and international developments. A U.S. Army publication identifies several of these problems, stating that “the Army of the future will look substantially different than today’s Army.” The publication continues: First, with the reduced requirement for forces designed to counter the Soviet Union in Europe and elsewhere around the world and with more time available to reconstitute the force in response to a resurgent Soviet threat, the Army will substantially reduce the size of the Total Force and consider innovative methods, such as cadre divisions, for reconstituting forces. Second, the future Army will be largely CONUS [continental United States]-based. . . . Third, the readiness requirements for rapid deployments have caused the Army to focus on maintaining sufficient forces in the Active Component to satisfy short-notice peacetime contingencies, crisis response, and most forward presence requirements.10

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these strategic and force structure issues for the U.S. Army became even more challenging. Given that its size is smaller than in the past, the U.S. Army is likely to focus on maintaining an operational inventory of the most modern weapons and sophisticated equipment. It follows that increasing importance will be placed on technical and managerial skills. Indeed, it can be argued that managerial skill and technical competence in providing adequate logistical and administrative support for ground forces was critical in the success of the U.S. military in the Gulf War, perhaps as important as leading troops into battle. For success in battle, it is likely that a smaller army will increasingly depend on high-tech weaponry and what earlier was called the electronic battlefield rather than on overwhelming numbers. In turn, officers with technical and managerial skills are likely to gain an equal place with the “warrior” for leadership and command positions and careers. Although the fear of major wars has considerably diminished, such conflicts cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, the Total Force Policy must be reexamined and revised as a result of the Gulf War experience. In this respect, the role of the National Guard and the reserves is critical in responding to a variety of contingencies, including major wars. The Total Force Policy and forces-in-being are related matters that need to be reconciled. This is important because most of the U.S. Army will be stationed in the continental United States, with all that means regarding the need for air and sea mobility and the capability to respond in various parts of the world. (These matters are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.)

Military Professionalism & the Security Agenda

U.S. Society and Military Professionalism

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The end of the Cold War brought a call for a peace dividend and with it expectations that defense spending would be considerably reduced and shifted to domestic programs. This was reinforced by efforts to reduce the massive federal deficit, as many U.S. citizens looked to the more than $300 billion yearly defense budget as a major culprit. The anticipation of a peace dividend seemed to shape much of the political rhetoric of the 1992 presidential campaign and continued well into 1993. Indeed, the election of Bill Clinton as president reflected the inward tendency of U.S. political attitudes. At the same time, there were demographic and socioeconomic changes taking place in the United States that promised to have an impact on the U.S. military. Population projections indicated that ethnic minorities would be a majority in the United States by the year 2010. In addition, the drive for multiculturalism in schools and in the political arena reflected a changing cultural climate. As one military professional has written, “The societal trends indicate a fundamental change in national values. The country’s primary value-influencing institutions are promoting altered values for future recruits. These altered values are significantly different than the Army’s values.”11 Further, the military is faced with problems in dealing with the issues of women in combat and homosexuals in the military. Sexual harassment has also become a major concern within the military. Earlier notions that the military was isolated from these societal issues have become a thing of the past. The question is how much the military can reflect society and still be able to maintain combat effectiveness. These issues have an important impact on military professionalism—not only on professional self-images but on the way military professionals interpret the challenges and attitudes emanating from society. The problems of responding to the domestic environment became even more troublesome as the military was faced with dramatic cuts in the defense budget and manpower, and with redeployment. A recent front cover of the Army Times headlined “The Incredible Shrinking Army.” 12 Problems of reducing the military and redeployment to the United States not only created personnel turmoil but affected the career attractions of military life. The very notion of long-term service to the country through military careers came under question. As our research reveals, many army professionals in civilian graduate education were sensitive to domestic social issues and forces. There seemed to be an awareness that the military had to be prepared to respond to such issues as they found their way into the ranks. This occurred even

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before issues such as women in combat and homosexuals in the military became highly political and contentious. In 1994 it was not clear how these issues would be resolved. Political-Military Dynamics

The relationship between the military and society, in general, and the perceptions and attitudes of military professionals regarding national leaders and domestic politics are important parts of the study of military professionalism. The relationship between national leaders and the political system and the military profession can be generally categorized as the political-military equation. This equation is shaped by the role the military plays in political decisions and by the political dynamics resulting from military purpose and domestic expectations and policies. The relationship of a military institution to its country’s political system can be categorized in one of three ways: military dominance of the political system; a balance between the military and the political system with no apparent dominance of one by the other; and civilian dominance (civilian control) of the military. Clearly, the U.S. civil-military relationship is in the last category. But this does not mean that the military has no political influence or that it is necessarily apolitical. Every military system, regardless of the nature of society and the political system, is a political as well as a military institution. The U.S. military has a degree of political influence through a variety of military associations and retired-military associations. These include the Retired Officers Association, the Navy League, the Air Force Association, and the Association of the U.S. Army. Also, the relationships established between military professionals and a variety of civilian decisionmakers inside the Beltway can have a subtle but important impact on the political process. Public perceptions of military competence, sense of purpose, and status have a clear impact on military professional views of domestic politics. In turn, military professional perceptions of the values advocated and nurtured by opinion leaders and the media, for example, also have an impact on professional perceptions of the military’s relationship to society. The policies of the national leadership, the domestic political environment within which the military must function, U.S. democratic culture, and the perceptions of the strategic landscape affect the nature of civilmilitary relations. Also, the tone of the administration regarding the military has important consequences for the way the leadership is viewed by the military. In 1994, there was a serious gap between the military and the Clinton administration, represented not only by the tone set by the president himself but by defense policies that many saw leading to a “hollow

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military.” A number of officers perceive that the military is being put into a paradoxical position. Defense resources are being reduced as U.S. citizens turn inward, focusing on the domestic economy and social issues, yet the scope of military contingencies has expanded. The military is thus placed in the unenviable position of doing more with less. As a result of the changing agenda and the emerging domestic environment, the U.S. military will need to compete aggressively for its share of federal resources. This will lead to a more clearly visible military involvement in the national political scene, sharpening interservice disputes as each service seeks political allies. Interservice issues will stem from a reduced defense budget, the need to delineate and clarify military contingencies and missions, and the need for more effective joint-service operational efforts. The fight over budget dollars is closely related to what is certain to be an interservice struggle over missions and contingency responses. Quite simply, this will be a battle over operational turfs. This promises to be a particularly troubling issue between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. When the army was focused primarily on the Soviet Union and the European battlefield, its missions were reasonably well defined. This became less true as it created light forces, triggering the response by the marines that they are already light forces in being, with an integrated air arm as well. The future holds even more problems as the U.S. Army shifts its operational focus to contingencies outside the European area, spilling over into what many consider the marines’ primary mission as the nation’s contingency force.13 The Emerging Military Profession

Although the use of force is as old as human history, the modern concept of military professionalism evolved over a period of several centuries. It achieved its modern form with the evolution of the nation-state in the 19th century. As Samuel P. Huntington points out: “The emergence of the officer corps as an autonomous professional body cannot, of course, be given any precise dates. It was gradual and faltering. Two facts, however, stand out. Prior to 1800 there was no such thing as a professional officer corps. In 1900 such bodies existed in virtually all major countries.”14 Technological developments in weaponry and the centralization of state systems proved the inadequacy of military officers appointed by virtue of aristocratic birth or imperial favors and also the inadequacy of civilian levies. The survival of the state in the new security environment required trained and educated military officers.15 The nation-state itself provides the environment in which the military profession must function:

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An army is an emanation of the nation it serves, reflecting social, political, and technological foundations. To study an army is to gain insights into the nation it serves because a nation and its army are interdependent. An army is not a mirror image of the nation, nor a microcosm—the nation writ small; it is in organization, purposes, attitudes, and behavior conditioned by the sustaining state.16

The general characteristics of the military profession are shaped by the concept of “state.” These formative factors include the role and purpose of the military profession, the nature of the state and the political system served by the military profession, and civil-military relations. Each of these components must be understood as it affects the nature of the military profession. First, regardless of the various views of the military profession in contemporary times and the variety of social and political forces that interact with the military, the primary purpose of the military profession remains as it has been throughout modern history: to win wars. In more scholarly terms, the purpose of the military profession is the organized application of force in the service of the state. What has changed over time is the concept of victory, the means to achieve it, and the military’s relationship with society. Second, the profession of arms must be examined in the context of the political system from which it evolves and which it is supposed to serve. There are certain universal principles of military professionalism, but these must be tempered by the values and character of the particular political system in which each military finds itself. Indeed, the character of the state determines the character of the military profession and of the military system as a whole. Third, the first two components establish the basis for civil-military relationships. The military profession, the system of political control (the state structure), and the proper role of the military within that state structure are shaped by the system’s ideology, culture, and political-military traditions. Scholarly Views

In analyzing the changing strategic landscape in terms of changes in the U.S. national security agenda, military professionalism, and the military and society, several conceptual guidelines are relevant. For this study, these are drawn from the works of Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos, and Sam C. Sarkesian.17 Our purpose is not to review once again the debates about military professionalism and civilmilitary relations but to draw commonalities from these scholarly views.

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These commonalities are the basis for designing an approach to military professionalism. Huntington identifies the basic components of U.S. military professionalism, reflecting many of the elements discussed earlier: service to the state (particularly in the management of violence), special skills, and loyalty. Generally, the professional is not motivated by financial gain but by patriotism and service to society. An especially pertinent observation concerns the military ethic: The modern officers corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man. . . . The military ethic is . . . pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative.18

The dilemma faced by the military profession, according to Huntington, is that in the United States the conservative military profession operates within a liberal society. Although the military serves society, it must not become a close reflection of that society. Huntington argues that “the direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer.”19 He goes on to note that “the skill of an officer is neither a craft (which is primarily mechanical) nor an art (which requires unique nontransferable talent). It is instead an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training.”20 Huntington’s view has been labeled the traditional concept of military professionalism. His analysis has stood the test of time and remains a basic pillar in the study of U.S. military professionalism. Writing after the publication of Huntington’s work, Janowitz argued that the traditional view of military professionalism was changing and had to be qualified by the changing political and demographic dimensions of the officers corps. He further argued that although the military mind is mainly conservative, military and civilian organizations would tend to converge. This reduced the dilemma that Huntington saw with a conservative military in a liberal society. From this Janowitz offered a “constabulary” concept, distinguishing between absolutists and pragmatists: the “‘absolutists’—men who thought in terms of traditional conceptions of military victory” and the “‘pragmatists’—men concerned with the measured application of military force and its political consequences.”21 This led Janowitz to conclude that the “warrior” concept of military professionalism was being challenged by the rise of the manager-technician and the politically sensitive officer. These skills and political orientations did not fit the traditional concept of military professionalism.

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Janowitz further concluded that:

the constabulary force is designed to be compatible with the traditional goals of democratic political control. The constabulary officer performs his duties, which include fighting, because he is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth. Civilian society permits him to maintain his code of honor and encourages him to develop his professional skill. . . . He is integrated into civilian society because he shares its common values.22

Although focusing primarily on the enlisted system in the U.S. military, Moskos’s concept of institutional (profession) or occupational (job) orientation has a significant bearing on military professionalism.23 The issue raised by Moskos is whether the military profession is beginning to reflect some characteristics of an occupation—that is, with individuals entering the service primarily for financial return and acquiring skills for use when returning to society. Service to society, commitment, and calling do not necessarily enter the equation when seen through the occupational lens. According to Moskos, the occupational model is driven by the marketplace, where supply and demand dynamics prevail. It follows that those in the occupational arena have some input into the working conditions and work environment. Thus, there is a large degree of self-interest rather than attention to organizational loyalty and institutional well-being.24 In contrast, the institutional model reflects characteristics paralleling those discussed earlier. These include loyalty to the values and norms of the institution and an individual motivation based on a calling or vocation. In this respect, performance and status are based on effectiveness and efficiency according to the norms and regulations established by the institution. Moskos concludes that the military is moving toward the occupational model.25 This trend is shaped by the changing notions of military service, the commitment to the volunteer military system, prevailing notions of inducements for enlisting and reenlisting, and the increasing “family” orientation of the military. Finally, Sarkesian focuses on politics and the profession. In his view, the U.S. military is not apolitical at all in terms of its awareness of and sensitivity to political demands placed on the military institution. 26 The politics evolving from this are not necessarily partisan politics but are intended to protect the institution, individual careers, and specific services. This view is supported partly by the fact that various private organizations comprising retired and reserve officers and former officers and enlisted persons, as well as civilians, engage in a great deal of political activity in advocating and lobbying for the political interests of the military.

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Sarkesian also focuses on organizational politics. Thus, bureaucratic politics and the politics of career advancement and choice assignments are an inherent part of the military. Although career advancement rests primarily on performance, politics increasingly enters into the equation. Thus, officers with networks linking them to important sources at higher echelons and with political shrewdness about the right channels and appropriate support for particular assignments are an increasingly important part of the career advancement and assignment syndrome. The “protégé” system remains a part of this military-bureaucratic political world. When future assignments are being considered, officers who have established personal links with higher-ranking officers have a distinct advantage over contemporaries without such links. These brief summaries do not capture the scope and analytical insights offered by the original works of the four authors cited. Moreover, coming to grips with how the new security landscape and the changing U.S. security agenda may affect military professionalism and the relationship of the military to society is a difficult proposition. Nonetheless, these scholarly views provide useful perspectives from which military professionalism in the new security environment can be analyzed.

Characteristics of the Military Profession

From the scholarly studies just mentioned, four fundamental characteristics emerge: the profession is not a monolith; it is a basically conservative system operating within a democratic system; the notion of duty, honor, and country is a core component; and the primary purpose of the profession is success in combat. In addition, the officers corps forms a “conscious and coherent group operating within but largely apart from the governmental structure. Such a group has . . . its own distinctive entrance and tenure procedures, its own sensitivity and code of privacy. It constitutes as it were a guild.”27 The primary distinctive feature of the military profession is “ultimate liability,” the willingness to give one’s life as part of the professional ethos. Also, its sole client is the state. And finally, these characteristics are incorporated into the notion of war and success in battle. As Bacevich has written: In Western armies, the concept of professionalism incorporates the belief that the use of force to achieve political ends is exclusively the province of regular military establishments. Professional soldiers have a stake in preserving the tradition of war as a gladiatorial contest—a contest between opposing regular forces, governed by rules and customs and directed by an officer elite. They conjure up doctrine that assumes such a paradigm of war and that reinforces their monopoly.28

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These special characteristics separate the military profession not only from society but also from other professions. In brief, military professionals are expected to be prepared to give their lives to serve the profession and the state. Their services can be legitimately offered only to the state. Although these characteristics and self-perceptions are often imperfectly reflected in the military profession, they are critical in shaping professional mind-sets and behavior, in formally articulating the meaning of “military profession,” and in determining the professional’s relationship to the state. These characteristics are starting points for examining the military profession as related to specific types of political systems. In this respect, professions, including the military, have a number of common characteristics. These include the following:

1. A corporate-bureaucratic structure. Among other things, this structure establishes a system of rules and regulations for the behavior of those in the profession and sets performance standards. 2. Requirement for special knowledge and education. This demands certain expertise in those skills needed by society not readily available to nonprofessionals and includes the need for continuing education unique to the profession. 3. Professional self-regulation. Members at the top of the professional ladder and those selected to be the regulating agency determine entrance and promotion requirements and the status of various ranks within the profession. Additionally, professions expect loyalty of their members and adherence to professional standards. Thus, the profession also serves as a disciplinary agency for its members. 4. A sense of professional calling and commitment. Most professionals believe that their work is not simply an occupation. It demands more than job skills and financial motivation. Commitment to a profession comes primarily from the inner self, leading to a commitment to serve society regardless of financial remuneration. Professionals are motivated by a sense of service and responsibility to society.

The United States and most Western-style democratic systems tend to adhere closely to the classic concept of military professionalism already described.29 U.S. military professionalism is also characterized by two additional factors: external orientation and a degree of separation from policymaking circles and domestic politics. The primary thrust of U.S. military posture is oriented externally— that is, toward foreign threats to the interests of the state. Knowledge of modern weaponry and the ability to use modern tactics are essential parts of the professional orientation. Further, strategic thought is rooted primarily in a Clausewitzian notion of the “center of gravity” resting on the

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armed forces of the adversary. In some Western systems the military has been called upon occasionally to assist in maintaining internal order, but this tends to be the exception rather than the rule. Society not only accepts the external orientation as the legitimate military enterprise but also uses this military posture as a norm, making it difficult for the military to stray far from this mainstream. The second factor of military professionalism is the political-military control system. In the United States, the military is expected to be subservient to civilian leadership. Equally important, civilian leadership appoints the top echelon of military leaders on the basis of merit and professional skills, without reference to political orientation. Finally, military professionals are expected to devote their time and effort to sharpening military capabilities. The ideas of an apolitical military and a distinct separation between the military and society are institutionalized norms in Western-style democracies. In reality, however, although military professionals in the United States rarely become visibly involved in domestic politics, they can exert political influence through links and channels between the military and various civilian groups and between the military and political decisionmakers through specialized knowledge and advice. Such political influence is usually exercised indirectly and informally. Although one may speak theoretically of an apolitical military, even in the United States the military profession has a political dimension—although not generally a partisan one. Training and Education of Officers

Underpinning most of the studies referred to here is the attention given to the training and education of military officers. Training is intended to develop the necessary skills to perform effectively on the battlefield, and education is aimed at developing the intellectual wherewithal to deal with the broader changes in the security landscape. The nature and character of training and the quality of education are fundamental components of military professionalism. Today, the quality of the education of military officers is an inextricable component of military professionalism. Indeed, a serious analysis of the educational component of military professionalism is necessary in the study of military professionalism and its response to the changing security agenda. Civilian graduate education appears to have made army professionals sensitive to the complexities and ambiguities of the emerging strategic landscape and the conflict environment. This was particularly the case regarding counterinsurgency (unconventional conflicts).

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These matters have long occupied the military leadership. In this respect, the senior military schools, such as those of the U.S. Army (the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College), have a relatively long history. More recently, the educational aspects of senior service schools have been criticized in both political and military circles for not providing the kind of intellectual depth necessary for the profession to perform effectively today.30 In response to much of this criticism, the Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Congressman Ike Skelton, assessed “the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) professional military education (PME) system to develop officers competent in both strategy and joint (multi-service) matters.”31 The Skelton report outlined corrective action for the U.S. military senior service schools.32 But little attention was given to officer education in civilian institutions. Although education of large numbers of officers in civilian institutions is a relatively recent development, there are historical precedents. In 1868, Congress authorized the training of medical officers at civilian institutions. The years 1871 and 1873 saw similar authority being granted to the Chief of Engineers and the Chief of Ordnance, respectively. A more general program was authorized in 1914, and formalized in the National Defense Act of 1920.33 The major thrust of officer education in civilian institutions was on science and engineering, but by 1960 increasing numbers of officers were studying social science and business. By the end of the 1960s, the number of validated positions for graduate study by U.S. Army officers in the social sciences quadrupled. At the same time, military officers’ aspirations for graduate education increased substantially.34 The importance of graduate civilian education to the military profession has been noted by a number of scholars and authorities. In the early 1970s, largely as a consequence of the Vietnam War, various books and articles were published on the military profession.35 In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, several studies appeared on the U.S. Army and the military profession, many performed as a consequence of the evolving security landscape.36 Several of these studies included attention to civilian graduate education and the education of military professionals in general. Indeed, Janowitz provided a scathing critique of military education.37 Implicit in his view was the importance of the intellectual dimension of the profession. Although there are various views regarding the utility of civilian graduate education to the military profession, most agree that such education is of benefit to the individual officer as well as to the profession as a whole. These conclusions rest on the premise that intellectual sophistication and the experience in civilian institutions offer the kind of intellectual development that is not possible within military institutions. And it is

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the civilian experience and intellectual maturity that provide the understanding and sensitivity necessary to deal with the complex security landscape and the increasingly complex military institution. As suggested earlier, the U.S. Army is likely to be the most affected by the changing security agenda. Changes in the international arena, the total army strategy and doctrine, and the budgetary outlook hit this laborintensive institution with particular force. It follows that U.S. Army professionalism will need to make serious readjustments, contingent on how “duty, honor, country” is interpreted and implemented in response to the security agenda. These professional changes stem not only from the dynamics of the contemporary period but from historical factors bearing on the role of armies. In this respect, civilian graduate education for selected military professionals provides an intellectual stimulus and reference point for responding to the changing domestic and strategic landscape. It is important, therefore, to consider the results of a major research project studying the impact of civilian graduate education on military professionals. Research Results: Summary

Civilian graduate education is an inherent part of military professionalism. The research described in the Preface and detailed in the Appendixes was a first attempt to identify the effect of civilian graduate education on U.S. Army officers and on the army itself and to draw inferences for civilmilitary relations, professionalism, and officers’ perspectives on the security environment. This preliminary research provides useful reference points for the various components of our approach. These reference points serve as starting points for a more comprehensive application of the approach to the study of military professionalism in the new era. Several preliminary conclusions are suggested by this research:

1. Army officers who become involved in the civilian graduate education program differ in important ways from those who do not do so. In addition to their own interest in graduate study, their suitability for it is indicated by their acceptance into the program. The groups of officers just entering and those just completing graduate study both believe that an advanced degree will enhance their careers (either in the army or after it), and they both place a high value on the degree. This suggests that the belief in the importance of the degree is more a reason for attending graduate school than it is a result of the attendance. 2. Civilian graduate school attendance does have an effect on the officers’ beliefs, even if only on the margins. This is most apparent regarding

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preference for active military policies, where those just completing graduate school give such policies a lower priority than do those just starting graduate school or army majors without graduate degrees. This suggests that those seeking advanced degrees are not different in this respect initially but after graduate study give lower priority to such policies as counterinsurgency, military commitment abroad, the defeat of communism, increase in nuclear capability, and reinstatement of the draft. Civilian graduate education seems to affect the way these officers view the external world, at least relative to the utility of military force. It is interesting that army majors with master’s degrees do not differ from majors with bachelor’s degrees, suggesting that this effect may fade over time as the officers are resocialized into mainstream command and staff positions. 3. The strongest effect of civilian graduate education is on short-term job qualifications and general enhancement of the officers’ careers. If there is a long-term impact on values and beliefs, it is not apparent from our analyses. This is, perhaps, not surprising. Officers selected for the program in question are career officers and already have had at least six years of socialization as full-time military officers. Their belief systems are not likely to be radically altered by one or two years of graduate education. In addition, most of the officers in question return to military assignments where they are quickly resocialized into military norms and expectations. Graduate education is but one tour of duty among many, and its value-related impact can be overshadowed by the day-to-day demands of mainstream operational tours over the years. There are two apparent exceptions to this rapid resocialization process. For officers returning to duty at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, the effect of graduate education appears to fade more slowly. A similar phenomenon occurs for those officers completing graduate education programs in technical fields (such as engineering) and involved in a technical utilization tour. 4. Civilian graduate education does not significantly alter officers’ notions of military professionalism. Professional principles learned in service schools and practiced in the military system remain generally unchanged through the graduate experience and beyond. If anything, the program reinforces the officers’ notions of military professionalism and influences them to feel that the army is making a special commitment to them (this latter impression led many to feel, sometimes with unwarranted optimism, that they would not be susceptible to job cutbacks as the army downsized). Open-ended interviews showed that many officers viewed their graduate education as important for a post-army career, whether or not their leaving the army was voluntary. Those interviewed showed, without exception, that the officers could articulate a coherent meaning for the term “military professionalism,” generally offering some variant of duty, honor, country.

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5. For many officers the impact of civilian graduate education is on long-term career considerations and intellectual mind-sets. Also, coming to grips with the long-term impact of a military career is more speculative. Certainly, officers who had attended graduate school would remember many important aspects of their educational experiences, just as they would any intense operational tour. In the same way that the specific knowledge gained in school provides a foundation for later utilization tours, the noncognitive aspects of the educational experience may also provide a foundation for future attitudes about civilian society and the role of the U.S. military in defending it. The awareness of the academic world, the sense of acquiring knowledge, and the uniqueness of the educational experience may well remain with officers for the rest of their careers. Over the long term, such programs could help to reduce the intellectual distance between military professionals and both the academic community and society at large. Conclusions

The changing security landscape and the decreasing likelihood that the United States will be involved in wars with major powers have reshaped the U.S. national security agenda. Although the possibility of major wars cannot be totally precluded, the strategic orientation has shifted to nonEuropean areas and a variety of contingencies heretofore considered on the periphery. The problems faced by the U.S. military are compounded by the changing domestic political and socioeconomic environment. The relatively comfortable relationship with society and political leaders that the military generally enjoyed during the Cold War—Vietnam being a major exception—has been transformed, with societal issues spilling over visibly into the military. At the same time, the repositioning and redeployment of U.S. military forces, combined with force reductions, have changed the political-military equation in the United States. Though it is not clear where all of this will lead in the 21st century, new notions of military professionalism, civil-military relations, and political-military realities are emerging. Although the core principles of military professionalism—duty, honor, country—remain, how these are interpreted and translated into behavior and operational guidelines appears to be changing. Also, notions of apolitical military and civilian control of the military are undergoing qualitative shifts. Open-ended interviews combined with survey results support the view that although most army officers have an understanding of military professionalism in broad conceptual terms, there is no coherent or consistent body of views regarding the specifics or operational definition of

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military professionalism.38 To be sure, most regard loyalty, commitment, and service to the country as important components, but beyond these notions, the concept of military professionalism includes a number of seemingly disjointed views. These range from such concerns as “taking care of my men,” “doing well in my job,” and self-education. There is a commonality of values and beliefs regarding proper behavior and job competence, but it is unlikely that these values and beliefs can be designed into a concept of military professionalism that can serve as an overall theory. Military professionalism and its fundamental components are well understood and agreed upon at the general level, but there does not appear to be a concept based on individualized notions of military professionalism. Complicating the issue is that prior to the Gulf War, and before plans were put into place for a drawdown of the army, there was a large degree of uniformity within the mainstream military regarding perceptions of the world environment and regarding professional perspectives. For many army professionals, the “military mind-set” appeared well institutionalized. The notion of a lifetime commitment to the profession is also undergoing change—a military career may be but one of several careers individuals follow in their lifetimes. Finally, the concept of the military profession emerging in the new security era may increase the gap between traditional military professionalism and the realities of the profession as interpreted and practiced within the officers corps. At some point, traditional principles and the new realities will require a reconciliation, and that is sure to lead to turbulence within the military institution. (Later chapters discuss the various political, social, and military ramifications of these developments.) Even though these issues are complex and controversial, they can be examined according to scholarly procedures to identify their essence, and conclusions can be drawn for responding to the new security landscape. Final resolution of these matters is critical because it will shape the concept of military professionalism over the long term and in turn will affect the capability of the U.S. military to respond to the new security environment and to operate effectively within a democratic society. Using this approach as a conceptual framework, the purpose of this book is to examine these issues and draw conclusions on soldiers, society, and military professionalism in the context of the changing security agenda. Finally, the shape of the military profession and the military system are contingent on how well the components are integrated and the degree of synergism that results. Much of this depends on the national leadership, the shape of the security landscape, and the policy and strategies that emerge. From another level, the relationships between the military and society and the character of civil-military relations will surely affect the coherency and synergism. If such coherency and synergism are lacking, an

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erosion of the military purpose and professional ethos is likely to result. It follows that the military profession will be faced with three clear options. First, it can incorporate all the societal demands placed upon it in terms of force composition and quality of personnel and respond as well as it can to military contingencies while attempting to change the societal and political demands for a more accommodating environment. Second, it can attempt to retreat into the “splendid isolation” of the 1920s and 1930s with all that portends in terms of civil-military relations, resources, and capabilities. Third, the military profession can accommodate itself to political and societal demands officially while reshaping the military system internally to maintain its purpose and professional ethos—all without violating societal expectations and political guidelines. In the final chapter, conclusions are presented on these options. Notes

1. James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1973), p. 24. 2. Rusell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). 3. For a definition and discussion of various elements of a “theoretical mold,” see Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, pp. 21–29, especially p. 24. 4. George Bush, “Reshaping Our Forces,” speech delivered at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colo., August 2, 1990, in Vital Speeches of the Day, 1990, p. 677. 5. Richard Cheney, “U.S. Defense Strategy and the DoD Budget Request,” in a prepared statement to the House Armed Services Committee. Defense Issues 6, no. 4, p. 3, February 7, 1991. The following quotes are from this source. 6. National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992), Preface. 7. Jeffrey McCausland, The Gulf Conflict: A Military Analysis, Adelphi Paper 282 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 1993), p. 82. 8. For a brief discussion of the new label, see George T. Talbot, “‘Peacetime Engagement,’ The Demise of the Cold War Prompts a Name Change,” SO/LIC News 3, no. 3, August 1991, p. 5. 9. Some have suggested that the U.S. Army will need to develop specialized forces oriented toward specific regions and types of conflicts rather than generalpurpose forces. See, for example, Michael J. Mazarr, Light Forces and the Future of U.S. Military Strategy (McLean, Va.: Brassey’s, 1990). 10. Army Focus (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 1991), p. 51. 11. Robert L. Maginnis, “A Chasm of Values,” in Military Review 73, no. 2, February 1993, p. 11. 12. Army Times, “The Incredible Shrinking Army,” March 22, 1993, p. 1. 13. However, Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, disputes the notion that the army and marines are competing with each other. See his testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,

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September 25, 1991, p. 23. We think he is expressing a wish rather than describing a reality. 14. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 19. 15. The concepts of military profession and military professionals refer to the officers corps. Professional noncommissioned officers play a critical role, but the shape and substance of the professional ethic and the relationship between the military and society are determined mainly by the officers corps. 16. O. D. Menard, The Army and the Fifth Republic (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 5–6. 17. See notes 1 and 6. See also Charles C. Moskos and Frank E. Woods, eds., The Military—More Than Just a Job? (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), especially Charles C. Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces,” pp. 15–26; Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981); and Charles C. Moskos, “Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update,” Armed Forces and Society 12, no. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 377–382. 18. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 7, 79. 19. Ibid., p. 11. 20. Ibid., p. 13. 21. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. xi. 22. Ibid., p. 440. 23. See Edward E. Blankenhagen and Thomas R. Rozman, “The US Army Officer’s Learning Contract,” Military Review 71, no. 7, July 1991, pp. 75–77. See also William J. Taylor, Jr., “Military Professionals in Changing Times,” Public Administration Review, no. 6, November/December 1977, p. 636. 24. Moskos, “Institutional/Occupational Trends: An Update,” p. 379. 25. Ibid., p. 377. 26. Sam C. Sarkesian, The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975). 27. Walter Millis with H. C. Mansfield and H. Stein, Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 6. 28. A. J. Bacevich, “New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism,” Parameters 20, no. 4, December 1990, pp. 15–16. 29. Military professionalism has been studied and analyzed by such scholars as Samuel P. Huntington; and Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1972). 30. More than two decades ago, Morris Janowitz provided a sharp critique of military education while arguing that intellectualism was a necessary commodity within the profession. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 427–430. See also Richard Halloran, “Armed Forces: Troubling Ratings on Military Education at Top,” New York Times, “Washington Talk,” September 20, 1988. See also “War College Curricular Conflicts,” Insight, December 14, 1987, pp. 24–25. 31. Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 101st Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 1. 32. Following up on the Skelton report, the U.S. General Accounting Office examined the progress of various service schools and reported its findings to Skelton. See “Professional Military Education at Four Intermediate Service Schools,”

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Government Accounting Office, June 1991, and “Professional Military Education at Three Senior Service Schools,” Government Accounting Office, June 1991. 33. Robert A. Vitas, “Education and the Contemporary Military Professional,” unpublished manuscript, March 1, 1990, p. 30. 34. Ibid., p. 31. 35. See, for example, Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971); Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., and Frederic J. Brown, The United States Army in Transition (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1973); William L. Hauser, America’s Army in Transition: A Study of Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., “The Military Man in Academia,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 406, March 1973, pp. 129–145; and Sam C. Sarkesian and William J. Taylor, Jr., “The Case for Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers,” Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 2, February 1975, pp. 251–262. 36. See, for example, Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams, eds., The U.S. Army in a New Security Era (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990); A. J. Bacevich, “New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism,” Parameters 20, no. 4, December 1990, pp. 12–23; Mark D. Redina, “An Officer Corps for the 1990s,” Military Review 70, no. 10, October 1990, pp. 64–72; and James Berry Motley, Beyond the Soviet Threat: The U.S. Army in a Post–Cold War Environment (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991). 37. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 425–430. 38. See Appendixes and Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Fred B. Bryant, “Civilian Graduate Education and U.S. Military Professionalism,” paper delivered at the American Political Science Association convention, Chicago, September 3–6, 1992.

Part 1 The Military and the Changing Context of National Security

2 The American Way of War and the Conflict Environment From the American Revolution to the Gulf War, the United States has been involved in a variety of wars and conflicts extending across the conflict spectrum. Yet the American psyche expects the United States to take up arms only for moral crusades. At the same time, the U.S. military is driven by a particular notion of combat that shapes its military organization, doctrine, and professional ethos. The uncertainties of the new security landscape and their impact on U.S. political-military posture call into question the relevance of a whole gamut of issues concerning the “American way of war,” including traditional U.S. military views of conflicts and professional military ethos. U.S. historical experience, democratic imperatives, and concepts of the adversary are important factors in shaping the American way of war. In turn, these affect how military professionals perceive their approach to conflict and the way their professional responsibilities are carried out. The American way of war is the context within which military professionals function on the battlefield. The United States and War

Alexis de Tocqueville examined the characteristics of democracy and pointed to the democratic nations’ aversion to military life. He wrote: When a nation loses its military spirit, the career of arms immediately ceases to be respected and military men drop down to the lowest rank among public officials. They are neither greatly esteemed nor well understood. . . . [T]he elite of the nation avoid a military career because it is not held in honor, and it is not held in honor because the elite of the nation do not take it up.1

The necessities of war draw the elite into the military, although generally for only a short period of time. Various commentators note that, 29

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even then, the elite generally avoid the more onerous aspects of military life—that is, service in the ground combat arms. The best educated and most intelligent individuals rarely serve in combat infantry units and are usually found in technical and support units.2 It would seem that people in democracies, in general, have a deep distrust of the military world and see wars as aberrations of normal life. To be sure, the United States has been involved in a number of wars and has given homage to its military men and women. But such homage is reserved for specific performance in particular wars (Vietnam being a partial exception) and does not necessarily extend to the general notion of military life. As Huntington has concluded, “Liberalism is divided in its views on war but it is united in its hostility to the military profession. . . . The pacifist sees the military man contaminating his peace; the crusader sees him contaminating his crusade.”3 Part of this tendency occurs because U.S. citizens usually make clear distinctions between war and peace. In the late 1950s, Robert Osgood wrote, “With the country at peace, foreign policy is formed and executed with little regard for considerations of military power, but with the country at war, foreign policy has been largely suspended.”4 This prevailing view within the U.S. polity along with policy distinctions made between military and civilian instruments have made it extremely difficult for the United States to develop policy and strategy for the use of the military as a foreign policy tool, particularly in the complex political-military environment of the new security era.5 U.S. ideals of a just political system shape attitudes regarding war. According to these ideals, the United States should engage in just wars only, and citizens need to conduct themselves morally on the battlefield. Further, an important component of just wars is a clear identification of objectives, the enemy, and U.S. interests. As Dennis Drew and Donald Snow have written: The first characteristic of a good political objective is that it is simple, straightforward, and unambiguous. . . . Second, the objective should be morally and politically lofty. . . . The third is that attaining the objective must be seen as vital to the interests of the United States. . . . The fourth criterion is that the interests of most Americans must appear to be served by the decision to go to war.6

During the Cold War era, most of these criteria were well established in responding to the Soviet Union. The threat of communism and the recognition that the Soviet Union was a military superpower were key components of U.S. national security policy and were accepted by most U.S. citizens. Between World War II and the Gulf War, conflicts in which the United States has been involved have been motivated at least in part by the threat of communist expansion. The Cuban missile crisis was a clear

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example of this. Even in lesser efforts, such as in Central America, communism and the fear of Soviet power projection underpinned U.S. efforts. The major change was marked by the 1991 Gulf War, which occurred during a period in which the security landscape was changing. U.S. citizens expect their wars to be fought only for moral purposes, for clear objectives, and in a just manner. Also, they expect that wars will be short and result in total victory and the triumph of higher values. Thus, wars are to be fought between clearly identifiable “good” and “evil” sides—where one side wins all and the other loses all. According to Stanley Spangler: “American military leaders, because of a fixation on ‘victory’ and ‘winning wars,’ have too often viewed conflict as a zero-sum game. . . . [T]oo many leaders continue to focus on conflict as a contest to be ‘won’ rather than an international malady that requires flexible and imaginative management.”7 Writing more than three decades ago, Robert Tucker concluded: “The American doctrine of just war . . . is distinguished by the assumption that the use of force is clearly governed by universally valid moral and legal standards; it is distinguished further by the insistence with which these standards are interpreted as making the justice or unjustice of war.”8 Although these idealistic notions have shaped general attitudes about war, historical evidence shows that there are considerable gaps between such notions and the realities of war and conflicts.9 In the new security era, serious questions are raised regarding the relevancy of the American way of war. The Changing Security Environment

As pointed out in the first chapter, the security landscape emerging after the recent dramatic changes in Europe and in East-West relations has lessened the threat of wars between major powers. At the same time, it has had a major impact on the U.S. security agenda, on U.S. perceptions of security, and on the posture and missions of the U.S. military.10 From a period of clear adversarial relationships the United States has moved into a period of uncertainty and transition. There are obvious links among the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the changing strategic landscape, and the American way of war. In 1994, the United States was responding to international change and trying to adjust its strategic perspectives and force posture to challenges emanating primarily from non-European areas. But the general attitude within the U.S. polity was that non-European areas were of minor importance to U.S. national interests, with the exception of Japan, China, and parts of the Middle East. This scenario was made more complicated by domestic priorities, hope for a peace dividend, resource limitations, and an increasing concern

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regarding the economic component of national security and domestic wellbeing. As John Roper concludes: “While the need for strategy will be present ‘without the threat’ as it was in earlier times, it may be that the ‘fog of peace’ and conflicting national priorities will make it even more difficult to formulate declaratory strategies, particularly for alliances.”11 A basic part of the problem facing U.S. policymakers is the need to break with the traditional and orthodox conceptual basis of the Cold War without doing violence to the essentials of U.S. strategy. Graham Allison has written that “the first task is therefore conceptual: to understand what is happening and why. Intellectually, we must begin to stretch: Beyond containment. . . . Beyond traditional Western alliance. . . . Beyond bipolarity. . . . Beyond nuclear deterrence.”12 Particularly important is the need to develop an understanding within U.S. policymaking circles and the body politic about the use of military forces to further foreign policy and national security goals, without necessarily expecting or triggering armed conflict. The use of the military as an instrument of policy was well established in the historical policies of European powers. Spangler notes that since the end of World War II, “the U.S. has relied very heavily on the use of military force to influence the decisions of other states.”13 But the same author also concludes that “the United States has too frequently relied on military force to secure political objectives without fully understanding the relationships between force and diplomacy, between sticks and carrots.”14 New Security Themes

Various new security themes are finding their way into the American psyche, and these are certain to affect the American way of war. One theme stresses the increasing importance of economic strength as a component of national security. Economic strength, both domestic and international, is viewed as paramount in the pursuit of U.S. national interests and successful national security policy. This is reinforced by plans for downsizing the U.S. military. There is a growing perception of a diminished relative importance of the military in national security policy, leading to a call for a peace dividend in the 1990s. Another theme is economic interdependence—a concept of the global village. This gives economics an international thrust. There are those who advocate economic nationalism, arguing that the ability of the United States to reach global markets and function in a global economic environment is an essential component in securing U.S. national interests and paramount in national security policy. The reshaping of national security by these economic themes is also affecting the American way of war. The military is seen as less important in preventing wars and in achieving

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long-range U.S. security goals. Moreover, national interests are interpreted more in terms of economic health and strength, and successful pursuit of these interests is thought to be less a function of military power than of economic power.15 Another evolving theme is the acceptance of the futility of wars between major powers. Such wars have changed from being zero-sum games to being zero-zero games. Given the increased lethality of weaponry and the possibility of mass destruction of all adversaries, there can be no winners in wars between major powers. This has been true for some time, and the demise of the Soviet Union has greatly reduced the threat of such a war occurring Moreover, because it is no longer clear who U.S. adversaries are, the traditional American way of war is further challenged. The ambiguity and uncertainty of the emerging world order and the apparent lack of clear adversarial relationships between major powers bolster the view of a reduced threat environment. Ironically, adversaries are more likely now to emerge in Third World regions—regions that have been seen historically as less important to U.S. national interests and in designing national security policy and strategy. In sum, the resolution of international disputes increasingly depends on nonmilitary interests and the use of political and economic power. Major threats to international peace and stability evolve from economic issues and problems, and their resolution over the long term cannot be resolved by military power but by political-economic power. These various themes place the U.S. military in a secondary position as an instrument for the protection of national interests and implementation of national security policy. Of equal importance, the disappearance of the country’s main opponent has confused the perception of threats and adversaries. The clear ideological distinctions that characterized the Cold War have become muted in the changing security environment. Snow has noted: As the Cold War winds down, these areas—principally in the Third World—are where America may still be challenged. The irony, then, is that the United States is unlikely to use force where its vital interests are engaged, but may wind up using force in areas which, by definition, are not important enough to “defend.”16

Another problem facing the United States is designing policy and strategy that is effective in responding to conflicts across the spectrum. Not only is effective design needed, but the U.S. public must become sensitive to the complex nature of these new threats and challenges and the strategic options facing the United States. This will require major changes

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in the American way of war. Nonetheless, some effort must be made to provide a new vision of the security landscape, one that is not necessarily a new version of the Cold War or one that withdraws the United States into an island stronghold. As S. J. Deitchman wrote: We have to redefine our strategic interests and goals, giving up the easy mark of a national opponent for the much more complex opposition of ill-defined needs and risks in uncertain areas. We must change the size and structure of our armed forces, and in the process change the easy habit of distributing resources among the Services relatively evenly and instead do it the hard way, with much argument, according to the logic of changing strategic needs.17

In 1990, Gen. Carl Vuono, then the chief of staff of the U.S. Army, characterized the international order this way: On the threshold of a new century, the United States is confronted by a world in the throes of fundamental and unprecedented change. While some threats to U.S. security appear to be abating, other complex and dangerous challenges are emerging. These include terrorism, trafficking in illicit drugs, proliferation of sophisticated weaponry in potentially hostile developing nations, and regional instability that threatens democratic regimes.18

To respond to this new landscape, General Vuono laid out the future direction of the U.S. Army, which anticipated what is taking place today— that is, the movement toward a smaller, more versatile, and mobile army. But before we examine how these changes have affected military professionalism, it is important to review the strategy, doctrine, and operational principles that have driven the U.S. military over the past 45 years. These fit into the American way of war. In 1994, Gen. Gordon Sullivan, the army chief of staff, expressed concern over the U.S. Army force posture and capability to respond effectively to a variety of contingencies: “Simply put, international and domestic realities have resulted in the paradox of declining military resources and increasing military missions, a paradox that is stressing our armed forces. The stress is significant. It requires fundamental changes in the way the nation conducts its defense affairs.”19 The Conflict Spectrum

The U.S. military and a number of strategists have moved away from the concept of conflict spectrum to that of continuity of contingencies and peacetime engagements. This change is based on several premises. First,

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future conflicts are so interconnected that they cannot be delineated in operational terms. Second, although major wars between major powers are not likely to occur, lesser conflicts, a host of semimilitary confrontations, peacekeeping operations, and a variety of noncombat contingencies can be expected. Third, the planned drawdown and downsizing, combined with demands for increased mobility and flexibility, pose serious problems for the U.S. Army because it does not have integral sea- and air-lift capabilities to respond effectively in all situations. However, the precise nature of strategies and conflict characteristics remain unclear. Acknowledging the notion of the military operational continuum, however, we remain focused on the conflict spectrum as a valid perspective in assessing future threats and the emerging conflict environment. We will examine the nature of conflicts along the conflict spectrum, noting the changes that are still taking place. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the prevailing and revised views on the conflict spectrum. Each figure provides an explanation of its various components. An assessment of the conflict spectrum is based on a number of factors. First, during the Cold War the army was concerned primarily with the European battlefield. This was not only reflected in its force composition and posture but also in its strategic orientation and military culture. Clausewitzian in thought and operations, the U.S. Army has regarded the adversary’s military as the strategic center of gravity. The 1991 Gulf War confirmed this and demonstrated the utility of the AirLand battle concept in a conflict environment that was primarily conventional in nature with roots in the European battle environment. Second, the former orientation of the entire U.S. military system was toward the “big battle” concept and major wars. Strategy, weaponry, training, and organization were directed to that end. The nature of the enemy was known, and the enemy’s military order of battle and capabilities were generally understood. Third, unconventional conflicts continue to be a common phenomenon. According to one authoritative source, in 1991 there were more than 20 conflicts in progress that were primarily unconventional in character.20 But given their nature and the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the army preferred to keep its distance from such conflicts. The Special Forces were created in the early 1950s, followed a number of years later by the Special Operations Command. Somewhat later a command structure was created at the national level, including an assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict and supporting boards and agencies. But all this remained peripheral to the orientation of the U.S. military and individual career motivations, at least until the present. Fourth, the changing nature of threats, their ill-defined characteristics, and their geographic locations are distant from the current posture and

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Noncombata Shows of Force

▼

Low

Low Intensityb

Special Operations

Low-Intensity Conflict

Conventional Wars

Nuclear

Limited/Major

U.S. Capability

Good ––––––––– Fair to–––––––––– Good to Excellent Poor

▼

Operations Other Than War

▼

Figure 2.1 The Conflict Spectrum: Prevailing Views

Level of Intensity in Policy Terms

—————————————————————————————— High

Notes: The amount of space devoted to each category of conflict shows their perceived relative importance in the overall U.S. national security equation. Conventional conflict, using the Gulf War as a reference point, is the basis for force structure and operational doctrines in the current period. a. Includes a variety of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations as well as coalition strategies and policies. b. Special operations and low-intensity conflict are currently viewed as almost synonymous and have taken on a conventional veneer.

capability of the U.S. military. In brief, the military has long been prepared for major wars on one end of the scale and is capable in noncombat roles, but it is not well prepared for involvement in unconventional conflicts. It is still well postured and prepared for involvement in limited conventional wars following the pattern set by the Gulf War. Fifth, the most likely conflicts in the foreseeable future are not likely to conform to the American way of war. Conflicts of the Old Order

The old order that ended in 1990 was based on threats and conflicts focused primarily in Europe. The central battle on the plains of Europe was the driving scenario for the U.S. military, with the primary adversary the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. This confrontation had a global dimension, with the United States basing its strategy on deterrence and containment. Writing before the end of the Cold War, Snow noted:

War & the Conflict Environment

Figure 2.2 The Conflict Spectrum Revised

Operations Other Than War

▼

Noncombata + Unconventional Conflicts + + Special Low-Intensity + b Conflictc + Operations + Revolution/ + Counterrevolution +

Conventional

Limited/Major

37

Nuclear

Notes: +Erosion of clear distinctions: any number of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations may set the stage for unconventional conflicts. a. Shows of force: military/economic aid and assistance, peacekeeping, and humanitarian contingencies. b. Counterterror, hostage rescue, spearhead, surgical strikes, hit-and-run raids. c. Phase 1 Combined economic and other nonmilitary assistance and aid; weapons training teams; police training and assistance; military training cadres. Phase 2 Special Forces “A” teams plus Phase 1. Phase 3 Special Forces Headquarters (Teams B and C), additional A teams plus Phases 1 and 2. Phase 4 Light infantry forces—defensive role plus Phases 1 through 3, inclusive. Phase 5 Light infantry forces—active combat; administrative and logistical bases for expanded role plus Phases 1 through 4, inclusive; requisite air and sea support.

Regardless of the basis, preventing World War III in Europe is clearly priority business. The United States’ most vital interests after the physical integrity of American territory are linked to Western Europe, and the Soviet Union is concerned about stability and change in Eastern Europe. . . . A war in Europe would . . . almost certainly be total in both its political purposes and military conduct.21

Throughout the Cold War, the battle in Europe, as well as U.S. military doctrine, were both fixed in Clausewitzian notions of war and the clash of armed forces. The center of gravity was on the battlefield. The curricula of service schools focused primarily on combat with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and conventional doctrine. The identification and character of the enemy and the battle terrain were reasonably clear. Moreover, for most military professionals, the order of battle and battle tactics of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were easily incorporated into their military experience and training. U.S. military forces were organized and postured accordingly. Although the Korean War introduced the concept of limited war, it was seen as extension of the main threat and battle orientation. Although the U.S. Army aimed primarily at the ground war in Europe, U.S. strategic forces focused on Soviet strategic capabilities. U.S. strategic

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capabilities were based on the three legs of the triad—manned bombers (B-52s, B-1s, and perhaps B-2s), submarine launched ballistic missiles (Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident I and II missiles), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (Titan II, Minuteman, and M-X Peacekeepers). Ground combat in Europe and strategic deterrence and second-strike capabilities were the cornerstones of U.S. strategy and military thinking. The U.S. Navy also reflected this orientation, with its “Maritime Strategy” blueprint for a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. Clausewitz, Mitchell, Douhet, and Mahan were the theorists underpinning U.S. military mindsets.22 And U.S. citizens, in the main, supported the U.S. military posture and its Eurocentric focus. Such an orientation represented a continuation of U.S. historical traditions. Major battles with major adversaries—the “big battle” syndrome —remained the intellectual linchpin for military professionals. This reached back to the U.S. Civil War and continued through both world wars. This was the case, even though U.S. military history is filled with stories of unconventional conflicts and small wars. Indeed, this was not only a matter of earlier history but ironically was also an important characteristic of the Cold War era: “The map includes such places as the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, and Lebanon—all very unlike central Europe, and none of which have figured prominently in planning.”23 Mainstream military posture and conventional thinking, however, were seriously challenged by the Vietnam War. This challenge took on political and psychological as well as military dimensions. Even with the overwhelming victory of U.S. arms in the Gulf War, there has yet to be a reconciliation within the military profession of the political, psychological, and military dimensions that characterized the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War

U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was both a political and a military watershed. Politically, it divided the country and marked a distinctly divergent political and social era. Militarily, it showed not only the limits of military force but also the contradictions between U.S. and foreign strategic cultures. From a political-psychological viewpoint, the Vietnam War was contrary to the American way of war. By and large, the war was perplexing to most in the United States. Using conventional lenses, it was virtually impossible for people to understand the nature and character of unconventional conflicts in general and the Vietnam War in particular. Again, the American way of war is based on the notion of moral imperatives, just war principles, and clear

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objectives. This is underpinned by a need for clear identification of the adversary and a sense of supporting good versus evil. These are not criteria that can be adapted easily to revolution and counterrevolution. The contradictions and ambiguous nature of the war were perhaps best illustrated by the impact of the Tet Offensive in 1968. During the Buddhist New Year, Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces attacked a number of South Vietnamese provincial centers, as well as Saigon. The battle for Hue was particularly critical.24 But what made a telling impact on the U.S. people were televised reports of Vietcong soldiers who occupied the U.S. embassy in Saigon and caused havoc in the city. Thus, after U.S. citizens were told of the “light at the end of the tunnel,” they were faced with the realities of the adversary running amok in many South Vietnamese cities. Even though the Vietcong and North Vietnamese suffered serious military setbacks during Tet, U.S. television portrayed the offensive as a major U.S. and South Vietnamese military disaster. This had important implications for U.S. politics.25 Studying the impact of media reporting on the Tet Offensive, Peter Braestrup concludes: What began as hasty initial reporting of disaster in Vietnam became conventional wisdom when magnified in media commentary and recycled on the hustings in New Hampshire, in campus protest, and in discussions on Capitol Hill. The press “rebroadcast” it all uncritically, even en thusiastically, although many in the news media should have known better.26

In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, many military professionals began to detect that no decisive victory could be achieved in the war. At the same time, resistance and opposition to the war in the United States increased. Frustrated with the war and troubled by U.S. attitudes, many military professionals concluded that the military was left to fend for itself as the war became increasingly difficult to prosecute. Although some military frustration was based on the indecisiveness of military operations, much of it was based on U.S. public attitudes. In a 1992 survey of over 900 student officers and faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), “concerning the main source of antiwar and antimilitary sentiments in some segments of American society,” John Moellering found that almost 40 percent surveyed felt that the reason for such sentiments was that “the politicians got the Army into a war it didn’t want to fight and placed undue restrictions on it which precluded its proper mission accomplishment.” Another 20 percent felt that such sentiments occurred because of “the general lack of commitment to traditional values by the youth of the country.” In the same survey, the author found that somewhat over 67 percent of those surveyed rated the “American Public’s view of US Army involvement

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in Vietnam” as negative.27 In that survey, Moellering also found that the great majority of those surveyed felt that the media was either “highly biased and antagonistic” or “usually biased against the Army.”28 Following the Tet Offensive, U.S. strategy in Vietnam turned to Vietnamization. The major combat role shifted to the South Vietnamese military and led to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973 and the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975 At this point it is important to examine several key elements in the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. These will provide a framework for drawing conclusions on U.S. military professional thinking about the war and establish a basis for studying the characteristics of conflicts in the new era. The debate over American strategy in Vietnam has a long history. During the early advisory years, American reporters in Vietnam, military advisors like the legendary John Paul Vann, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all criticized aspects of our policy and operations. As the United States assumed the major combat role in 1965, criticism of strategy grew.29

The public eventually was drawn into the debate. Some of this led to demonstrations against the war. Combined with the culture of the 1960s and the civil rights movement, considerable turmoil prevailed in U.S. politics, soon finding its way into the ranks of those serving in Vietnam. This continued until the end of selective service and U.S. withdrawal from the war. U.S. strategy and military operations were also increasingly questioned as the war progressed. Many publications have examined the strategy and prosecution of the war.30 Although questions still remain, the fact is that early in the war there was political support for involvement and for pursuit of a particular strategy that drove U.S. operations.31 The United States followed a conventional strategy and conventional doctrine, while the Vietcong and North Vietnamese based their strategy and operations on a modified Maoist theme. For the U.S. forces, the center of gravity was the armed forces of the adversary as shaped by Clausewitzian logic. For the Vietcong and North Vietnamese, the center of gravity was the political-social mileu of the opponent’s system—a concept evolving out of Sun Tzu.32 These differences are revealed in George Herring’s study of first battles. The battle at Ia Drang in the central highlands of Vietnam was the first between U.S. forces and North Vietnamese regulars. For the United States, it confirmed the effectiveness of the conventional war thesis, which was to continue through most of the war. Although a significant victory, the Ia Drang may therefore also have been deceptive in its consequences. It did not produce significant changes in leadership, doctrine, or strategy. Rather, responsible officials seem to

War & the Conflict Environment

have interpreted it as indicating that the United States was on the right path. In fact, it set the tone for much of what lay ahead: more search-anddestroy missions, vast destruction, numerous “victories”—and ultimate frustration.33

41

Thus, a combination of public attitudes and conventional operations in the conduct of a counterrevolutionary war increasingly affected military professional views of the war and their standing in U.S. society. Conventional strategy and operations remained the driving forces of the U.S. military in Vietnam. And ultimately many people in the United States, of every political persuasion, felt that the war could not be won and demanded that the United States withdraw. The U.S. military withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, South Vietnam collapsed in 1975, and the U.S. military quickly turned its attention back to the European battle area—to the relief of many military professionals. The Gulf War and Its Aftermath

The quick success of the allies in the Gulf War seemed to confirm the relevancy and appropriateness of AirLand doctrine emanating from the European scenario. Joint operations, coalition strategies, sophisticated weapons, and air superiority overwhelmed Iraqi resistance. As a way of comparison, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. operations in the Gulf War, stated that this was not like Vietnam. Indeed, it was not. The Iraq-Kuwait battle arena was in stark contrast to that in Vietnam, as were the nature and character of the adversaries, the political cohesion of the allies, and the political-military objectives. Another marked difference was the wide use of U.S. reserves and National Guard in the conduct of the war. Moreover, the war ended relatively quickly and, for most in the United States, decisively—the Iraqis were expelled from Kuwait. Vietnam seemed to be forgotten in the euphoria of the quick and decisive military victory over Iraq. In the final analysis, the U.S. involvement in the Gulf War seemed to epitomize the American way of war. The lessons of Desert Storm have become a critical part of the plans for downsizing the U.S. military and preparing for future conflicts. Indeed, for many the experience in the Gulf War seemed to presage future conflicts. Moreover, lessons for operational principles, strategy, and doctrine emanating from the Gulf War are easily grasped by military professionals. However, the relevancy of the Gulf War experience to future conflicts is not entirely clear. The U.S. military is likely to be faced with a variety of contingencies ranging from humanitarian assistance to socially relevant missions. One of the authors has written that “the military will also have to accept an increased role in mission areas previously thought peripheral

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to their raison d’être. These include, but are not limited to arms control agreement monitoring, peacekeeping, border control, drug enforcement, and public works.”34 Also, the U.S. military may be faced with contingencies in the unconventional environment. Quick response and effectiveness in unconventional conflicts will be difficult. “For the U.S. military, particularly the ground forces, the dilemma and challenges are compounded not only because of the responsibility to respond across the conflict spectrum, but also because national policy, strategy, and doctrine for responding to unconventional conflicts remain the most elusive and ambiguous.”35 Additionally, the expansion of the drug trade into a full-blown “war” complicates the problems in coming to grips with unconventional conflicts. The intermingling of drug wars with unconventional conflicts obscures the nature of the adversary to an unparalleled degree, as drug cartels and overlords intermingle with revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries. This casts a large shadow on how the U.S. Congress reacts and how it affects the opinions of the U.S. people. On one hand, some of the more dovish elected officials may speak out stridently against drug cartels and demand U.S. military action. On the other hand, the same individuals may oppose with as much vigor U.S. involvement in unconventional conflicts. This paradox complicates the design of strategies and plans for contingencies and sends confusing signals to potential adversaries. Since the end of the Vietnam War, however, the United States has avoided unconventional conflict approaching the scope of the Vietnam experience. Indeed, any suggestion of such involvement is likely to provoke cries of “not another Vietnam.” Yet, it may well be the case that the United States may be compelled to engage in unconventional conflicts to protect its security interests over the long run.36 Despite the euphoria that accompanied the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the dynamics in the Third World are often characterized by conflict in one form or another that can entangle the United States and threaten its national interests. U.S. involvement in unconventional conflicts not only is a critical concern but is filled with controversy. This is because such involvement entangles the United States into a particular area and in support of one or another contending indigenous group in an ambiguous environment shaped by a foreign culture. Complicating this matter are strategic cultures that have different conceptions of conflict and their engagement. Involvement in unconventional conflict becomes a test of U.S. policy, strategy, national will, political resolve, and staying power. Moreover, it signals the strategic importance of the area to U.S. interests and in the process links U.S. power to the area in question. As important, as will be detailed later, is that the characteristics of unconventional conflict are in direct contradiction to

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the American way of war. Thus, becoming involved in unconventional conflicts must never be undertaken lightly or with misperceived notions regarding the nature of the conflict and its important domestic and international consequences. The New Era

The new era, dramatized by the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, reshaped the strategic landscape. Not only has the superpower era ended, but threats of major wars between major powers diminished considerably. A superpower world had been replaced by a multipolar system with regional power alignments. There is also a long-term view that envisions the possibility of conflicts between regions that are beyond the notion of nation-states. According to Huntington, “civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interaction among seven or eight major civilizations. . . . The conflicts of the future will occur along cultural fault lines separating civilizations.”37 In the immediate future, however, the strategic landscape remains dominated by Western powers, even though this landscape is in transition and its shape uncertain. Militarily, Russia remains one of the few countries able to destroy the United States in an afternoon. Happily, the frictions that made nuclear war even remotely plausible have receded greatly. The future of Russian conventional forces remains problematic. With so many armed conflicts occurring in the states of the former Soviet Union (some of these involving ethnic Russians), Russian attention will not be directed abroad for a time. Power projection is expensive, and forces able to project power against a sophisticated opponent are almost prohibitively so. Nevertheless, Russia’s ability to project naval, air, and eventually land power beyond her borders will likely improve over time once domestic disturbances are in hand. Where these forces might be directed is an open question, but it is not difficult to imagine circumstances on the Russian border (the “near abroad,” as they now call it), or more distantly in the Third World, where military forces would be useful to support Russian national interests. The result of the foregoing is that the likelihood of war between the United States and another major power approaches zero in the near term, and there would be a period of many months or even years to prepare if another challenge were to emerge. (This assumes, of course, that U.S. intelligence services would detect a hostile buildup and that U.S. leaders would believe them and muster the political will necessary to reconstitute the armed forces.) The secretary of defense stated in his 1992 annual

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report that the United States is “no longer engaged in a global ideological confrontation with an aggressive, expansionist state that pursues policies inimical to our basic values. . . . It is improbable that a global conventional challenge . . . will reemerge from the Eurasian heartland for years to come.”38 Therefore, as noted in a recent Joint Military Net Assessment: “We will not retain the forces required for global conventional conflict. . . . Reconstitution can take on several forms depending on the assessed time available to prepare the forces and equipment. Combatant commanders must plan for this eventuality, but as a last priority.”39 Officers surveyed and interviewed by the authors at the beginning of these international changes generally saw the diminution of the global threat. Survey results showed a statistically significant increase in the percentage of officers who felt that communism is no longer a threat to the United States. One respondent later interviewed saw the problems faced by the Soviets with particular clarity, including the centrifugal forces related to ethnicity and the nationalities issue, and predicted the breakup of the country before many academic specialists did.40 An army aviator felt that the threat had been exaggerated all along, commenting that “in retrospect we probably painted a worse picture than was actually out there.”41 Some respondents were still concerned about the Russian threat, however. One captain remarked with respect to the Cold War, “I don’t think it’s over. I just think it will take a while before we can relax that they are thinking the way we are.”42 Another was even more concerned: “Things definitely haven’t stabilized in Russia, and they still represent a huge [military] threat.”43 Peacetime Engagements

In 1990 President Bush outlined a revised national security strategy in response to the changed strategic landscape: The size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence. . . . What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy, a policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today’s world as the time of conflict and cold war.44

This has been translated in a strategic outline encompassing strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The notion of peacetime engagements established the basis for changing the Cold War strategic and operational doctrine to fit the post–Cold War era. At the same time, it created a strategic basis for reducing, restructuring, and redeploying U.S. military forces. (These matters are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.)

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The new strategic view requires a global focus but a regional response. It also envisions operating with the United Nations and regional organizations. At the same time, many contingencies and missions are likely to be shaped by a variety of nontraditional issues. Needless to say, these matters remain to be translated into operational doctrines and force structures. Nonetheless, various Cold War issues continue in the new era including such matters as arms control and nuclear proliferation. Regional Conflicts

A major problem for which the military services are planning is regional war, or, in the language of the military, MRCs (Major Regional Conflicts). As the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it: Because of changes in the strategic environment, the threats we increasingly expect to face are regional rather than global. . . . [O]ur plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars.45

The secretary of defense noted the potential threats that could arise in the Third World, including the possible use of weapons of mass destruction (discussed later in the chapter). Even though the likelihood that a regional conflict could trigger a global war has been virtually eliminated, vital interests still need to be protected. The secretary noted, “We want to ensure that other powers do not dominate critical regions of the world thereby preventing them from posing a serious global challenge.”46 As the army has officially noted, the regions of concern are diverse and present different security challenges. Ethnic and economic problems abound in Europe; communist states still function in Asia; the Middle East and Persian Gulf continue almost unchanged by recent global events; Africa has endemic economic, political, and health problems; and Latin America continues to have difficulties entirely unrelated to previous Soviet and Cuban interference.47 Despite the favorable political changes in the Middle East, it may be, as the army suggests, that “instability is the greatest cause for concern.”48 In such a security landscape, it is crucial that leaders have the ability to deal with complexity and ambiguity and to understand not only the military but the political, social, and economic factors affecting regional stability. Officers surveyed identified stability as a major problem, and they noted several regional areas where it could be threatened. It is not surprising that the Middle East was mentioned by many officers. Because of its unique characteristics, the most recent regional war in which the United States was involved is not a good basis for strategic planning.49 Logistical problems in the Gulf War were great, but it was extremely helpful to have the use of Saudi Arabian airfields built to U.S. Air

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Force standards, plus all the necessary petroleum readily at hand. Also, the brutal nature of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, not to mention the character of Saddam Hussein himself, made it much easier to secure allied cooperation and popular support for the war. Future conflicts, many of which will be economically motivated, are not likely to have such an obvious character of “good versus evil” that was apparent in the case of the Gulf War. The American way of war requires a moral cause, and the U.S. people will not willingly send their sons and daughters off to die for an economic cause. Given the evolution of the threat away from an armor duel on the plains of Europe, several respondents pointed out the need for light forces that can be mobilized more easily. One stated: Mission-wise, we are going to have to perhaps reorient ourselves on more of a contingency type mission focus where we would have more people permanently stationed in the states, a lighter type force with more easily deployable type equipment, and Air Force and Navy equipment that enhances deployability.50

Another respondent was particularly emphatic about the need to spare special operations forces (of which he was a member) from the impending reductions. He feared that cuts would be made across the board, without considering the strategic value of special forces in the new security environment.51 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Despite the greatly reduced threat of global war, one cannot exclude the possibility of nuclear war. The breakup of the Soviet Union saw Russia as the successor state and the one to which Soviet nuclear weapons were returned, but a considerable number of nuclear weapons remain in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In addition, several other states have the capability of making nuclear weapons.52 The signing of START II in January 1993 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and President Bush may provide a basis for inviting other nations to reduce and control nuclear weapons. The most likely situation for nuclear war is an attack by one Third World country on another, but with improved delivery systems the United States could also be targeted. With the withdrawal of Pershing II missiles from Europe in the wake of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, the army’s role in delivering nuclear weapons has diminished significantly, but its role in antimissile defense could increase. There is perhaps an even greater threat from other weapons of mass destruction. Both chemical and biological weapons can be manufactured

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relatively easily, and army professionals leading operations against Third World countries need to plan and train for the eventuality that such weapons could be used against their troops. The U.S. Defense Department estimates that almost every area of the world has countries with chemical or biological weapons capability. It is unfortunate that “our biological defensive capabilities are limited” and our chemical defense equipment needs to be modernized.53 The threat from these weapons complicates planning and training and requires leaders capable of functioning in the most complex battle environments. The implications of this in terms of the quality of leaders are apparent. A major theme of this book is that battlefield competency is not sufficient for army leaders. Meeting the demands of the battlefield itself is already a highly complex undertaking, and the nonbattlefield demands of military professionals enhance the need to find the right people for leadership positions and to train them well. (We shall return to this issue later in the book.) Nontraditional Challenges

The challenges of “normal” military operations are increasing as battlefields become more complex. At the same time, nontraditional military and quasi-military operations are increasing in frequency and severity. Some of these operations look much like traditional military operations, but they differ in ways that pose serious challenges for the military professional. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, long suppressed ethnic rivalries have erupted in violence, both in Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union. The combination of hypernationalism and ethnic intermingling is a volatile one, as all the ethnic groups in a dissolving Yugoslavia learned to their dismay in 1992 and 1993. An overlay of religious diversity on top of ethnic differences only adds to the volatility of a situation. Russia itself is a multiethnic society with numerous pockets of nonethnic Russians. It is surrounded by countries in which there are truly nasty ethnic struggles, several of which eventually could have international consequences. The world watches as Armenians and Azerbaijanis struggle over NagornoKarabakh, North and South Ossetians do battle over reunification, and Abkhazians fight with Georgians. Tadzikistan, too, is unsettled as these words are written. Many ethnic Russians live outside Russia, and they are sometimes the target of discrimination (or worse). Russians are not always full citizens in the Baltics, and they are fighting in a civil war on the left bank of the Dneister in Moldova. As a result of the foregoing, the U.S. Army may find itself involved in both peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in a number of Third

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World areas as well as near the territory of the former Soviet Union, most likely under UN auspices.54 In principle, peacekeeping operations are easier to accomplish because they involve keeping separate those warring parties who have generally agreed to a separation. It also assumes that there is a modicum of peace to be kept. Peacemaking is far more complex and requires forces to interpose themselves between warring factions and to impose some sort of order on a situation. But both kinds of operations require a level of sophistication and understanding of foreign cultures that is far beyond that required for conventional warmaking, which itself is becoming far more complex. The humanitarian assistance mission received increasing attention as U.S. forces created a “safe haven” for Kurds in northern Iraq in 1991 and even more attention as troops moved into Somalia in late 1992 for emergency famine relief. The circus of reporters with klieg lights that met the marines and Navy Seals as they hit the beach belied that this was a military mission, one that was essential to perform if the humanitarian assistance was to go forward. It is unfortunate that the ease of initial entry was deceptive as U.S. forces became concerned about casualties and as civilian leaders debated the wisdom of transforming the humanitarian character of the mission into the far more difficult tasks of peacemaking and political reconstruction—the example of Somalia was a large factor in the delayed U.S. response to the humanitarian tragedy in Rwanda in 1994. Humanitarian relief efforts are not confined to natural and man-made foreign disasters, of course. The U.S. military has proved its utility in such work by responding quickly and efficiently to domestic disasters as well. One of the authors has written extensively about the difficulties U.S. forces face when dealing with another category of nontraditional operation: unconventional conflicts.55 He has concluded that the political-socialmilitary milieu of a revolutionary war requires an understanding of revolutionary dynamics on the part of professional military officers that few can develop naturally (the most important conclusions of the author’s studies are presented elsewhere in this book). To deal with these conflicts, leaders must be developed by the military and civilian school systems whose intellectual scope and understanding of strategic cultures goes beyond the Clausewitzian precepts and the American/European psyche. It is to be expected that some of these conflicts will eventually spill over into the United States. In such a case, terrorist incidents will become more frequent and domestic police agencies will have a difficult time controlling them. Were that to happen, the public outcry could involve the military in domestic police-type actions—an outcome to be avoided if the proper relationship between civilian and military spheres is to be preserved. An increase in domestic terrorism could combine with economic and cultural concerns to raise worry about the relatively porous state of the

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U.S. border with Mexico. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is unable to stop the flow of illegal immigrants (or, if one prefers, undocumented workers) across that border, and there have already been calls to use the military to seal the border. Whether this would be acceptable politically or feasible economically is difficult to say, but it is a possible future mission that is receiving attention at the Army War College.56 This would draw the military (presumably the U.S. Army) toward activities previously civilian in character that move it away from its raison d’être: success in armed combat. Clearly, 19th-century prohibitions against the military becoming involved in civilian law enforcement would be eroded further by such a mission. Another nontraditional mission being assumed by the U.S. military is drug control, as civilian leaders look to the military to solve the U.S. drug problem by interdicting the supplies closer to their source. The Defense Department notes: The supply of illicit drugs from abroad, the associated violence and instability, and the use of illegal drugs within this country pose a direct threat to the security of the United States. . . . The Department of Defense has a major role to play in cutting the shipment of drugs across U.S. borders.57

This mission is not without its dangers, however necessary it may be. Not only are soldiers themselves at risk, but the separation between civilian and military matters is broken down in the name of expediency. Furthermore, counterdrug operations are inextricably bound up in the domestic politics of the target countries, which may include revolutionary movements. In such situations, U.S. military officers find themselves operating in a political-social milieu that does not necessarily conform to conventional and democratic mind-sets. This does not mean that such operations should never be attempted, only that they need to be undertaken with the full knowledge of their complexities and by officers prepared by training and inclination to deal with them. The great drawdown in nuclear weapons stockpiles, particularly in the former Soviet Union, will involve military officers more closely in another mission, that of arms control. U.S. military forces will be involved in verification and will likely play a significant advisory role regarding the security, transport, and destruction of fissionable material. The expertise needed for these missions is highly technical and must be combined with a high degree of intercultural sensitivity and understanding. A new component of the equation is a willingness on the part of the United States to work more closely with international organizations in pursuit of security objectives. Although traditionally unwilling to put U.S. forces under UN command, the trend is toward greater consultation with

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the United Nations and integration with its activities. The old pattern, in which the United States effectively had total control of an operation (as in Korea) or did not participate militarily (as was the usual case), seems to be eroding in favor of more genuine cooperation and burden sharing. The movement toward smaller forces for the U.S. military will accelerate this trend, as it will become physically impossible to be the world’s police. At the same time, it is frequently necessary for the United States to be the catalyst for international action if any is to occur, whether or not the United States supplies the bulk of the forces.58 Some future missions for the U.S. Army will be far removed from the battlefield, and for many of them there is a clear precedent. The Army Corps of Engineers, for example, has a long-standing mission of domestic infrastructure development. A report of the Army War College proposes a study, “Army Involvement in a Domestic Marshall Plan,” to determine whether the U.S. Army as a whole can take up this mission “without an additional tax burden on the population or reducing military readiness.” This latter point is crucial because it is not certain that the missions of a military service can be reoriented in this way without detriment to its combat potential. The report assumes that a peacetime focus will be supported politically because “Congress and the American people will expect the Army to play a greater role in peacetime missions, both domestic and foreign.”59 Another Army War College study cites the long history of the U.S. Army’s civilian missions, starting with the Lewis and Clark expedition of 1804, and argues that the army is “uniquely qualified to help win these ‘wars without combat’ through the peaceful use of its equipment. Further, the Army’s command and control apparatus, with its ability to mobilize and shift personnel and equipment, enables the Army to provide resources with efficiency.”60 Proposed missions include surveillance of the southern border of the United States, maintaining roads and public buildings, providing basic health care, and helping local police perform “routine administrative duties.”61 This latter task is troublesome for those wishing to distance the military from activities that erode the separation between proper civilian and military responsibilities.62 Whatever decisions are made on U.S. Army missions, a continuing basis for all of them will be the moral element. The U.S. people respond to moral criteria when presented to them; they did so even in the Cold War period. Two prominent observers have noted: The one element that remained constant in U.S. post–World War II defense policy was its strong moral component. The conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies was depicted as a fight against godless atheists in the Kremlin. Military and nonmilitary intervention was justified in terms of defending freedom, championing democracy, and liberating captive peoples.63

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To this list we can now add rescue from hunger and, in some instances, from domestic violence. Snow writes that “another shared characteristic of Third and Fourth World conflicts is that they are militarily unlike the kinds of problems presented by the prospect of fighting in Europe.”64 What is even more troubling is the view held by a number of military professionals that U.S. forces trained for big battles are as capable and effective in unconventional conflicts, which are seen as a lesser included contingency. In addition, many accept the notion that the U.S. military is now trained to fight across the conflict spectrum. However, there are significant differences between conventional and unconventional conflicts.65 These differences affect strategy, operations, training, and doctrine. It is the authors’ view that only the U.S. Special Forces are postured to engage successfully in the most critical forms of unconventional conflicts—revolution and counterrevolution. It follows that capability in the most critical forms also creates capability in lesser forms of unconventional conflicts. It is unfortunate that the opposite is not true—capability in lesser forms does not bring capability in the most critical forms. Although written more than a decade ago, the following assessment is still relevant today: The consequences for the military profession seem clear. It can no longer rest on traditional concepts of “victory” or force employment. The political and social impact of military force has become so attenuated that military professionals cannot properly perform as “professionals” without a deep sense of the political and social. Additionally, all the political and social consequences of wars must be an important part of professional dimensions. . . . [W]ars as envisioned in the modern era lack clear distinctions between military and society.66

The irony in all of this is that the United States still remains best prepared to fight the least likely wars (conventional European style) and least prepared to fight the most likely wars (unconventional). This is true even though efforts have been made to develop a more effective posture to respond to unconventional conflicts. Some strategic rethinking is also taking place. Unconventional Conflicts and the Strategic Landscape

The difficulty facing the United States is due in no small part to the characteristics of unconventional conflicts and the U.S. command and operational structure that has evolved over the past several years.67 The characteristics of such conflicts have been examined in detail elsewhere.68 In brief, they are clearly distinguished from conventional conflicts in a number of ways. Among other things, unconventional conflicts are asymmetrical.

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For the United States these are limited conflicts, whereas for the indigenous adversaries they are in the nature of total wars. This reflects differences not only in strategic cultures and political-social systems but in conflict objectives as well. Unconventional conflicts are likely to be protracted in nature, challenging and testing the national will, political resolve, and staying power of the United States. If history is any guide, democracies do not fare well in such tests, except in clearly defined major wars. Moreover, unconventional conflicts are not only strategically unconventional, they are also tactically so. This means that hit-and-run raids, assassinations, and terrorism are major characteristics of operations on the ground—operations enmeshed in the political-social milieu of society. Such conflicts are also ambiguous and ambivalent. It is difficult to identify the adversary clearly and to determine the progress of the conflict. In other words, it is rarely clear who is winning and losing. And finally, the center of gravity of such conflicts is not Clausewitzian armed forces—more accurately, they follow the dictum of Sun Tzu, for whom the center of gravity is in the political-social milieu of the indigenous system. This center is one that the U.S. political-military strategies have yet to demonstrate a capacity to engage effectively. All these characteristics are diametrically opposed to the mind-sets, posture, and operational techniques of conventional forces. Unconventional conflicts are difficult for the U.S. people to understand. This is compounded by U.S. military mind-sets. U.S. military thought is not merely apolitical but antipolitical. One of the lessons military professionals seem to have gained from the Vietnam experience is that excess concern with nonmilitary issues was an important factor in the U.S. failure there. This is a dominant theme in the unofficial but influential folk wisdom that is an unwritten component of U.S. military doctrine.69 Even though these are perennial problems for the military, in the past 45 years they were diminished because of the Cold War and the armed conflicts that occurred periodically. During this period, the primary strategic orientation was against the Soviet Union, and force compositions were designed to counter that threat. The definition of threats and the identification of major adversaries have become elusive, leading to serious questions of strategic orientation and force posture. These problems are also reflected in the notion of military professionalism. Conclusions

The U.S. military faces a dilemma in the security landscape of the 1990s. It must be prepared to engage in conventional conflicts and peacekeeping

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operations. At the same time, it must be prepared to face a variety of unconventional contingencies that are not easily encompassed in mainstream military training, force structures, or operational principles. This dilemma is compounded by the need to adjust to civil-military relations that will be markedly different than in the past decade. The U.S. military establishment has always had a tendency to prepare for the most recent war. Although it is important to draw lessons from past experiences, these must be placed in a context that helps explain future conflicts. In earlier times, the preparations for war, professional training and education, military structures, and doctrine reflected a close link with European systems. Though this changed to a degree with the U.S. experience in the Civil War, the two world wars provided U.S. professionals a uniquely U.S. context. The major thrust of military professional education and military forces was aimed at European-type battles. Doctrine and force organization as well as strategic visions were rooted in conventional principles and Clausewitzian precepts. Unconventional conflicts were not seen as serious threats to U.S. security. As such, these were (and still are) on the periphery of military doctrine and U.S. professional training and education. Unconventional conflicts were dismissed as short-term annoyances rather than serious threats. The U.S. military inherited and contributed to this perspective. The new security landscape promises to be extremely challenging to the U.S. military, particularly the army. It will require that traditional battlefield notions be revised by a variety of nonmilitary factors. At the same time, the U.S. military will need to consider a number of domestic and international factors in designing strategy and doctrine. This will have important implications in planning, organizing, and training. In this respect, the emergence of a multipolar and changing world generally precludes the use of the military as a visible (although blunt) instrument in less than major conflicts and in other than internationally sanctioned operations. “Soft power” as conceived by Joseph Nye promises a strategy that recognizes the danger of using military options in local conflicts: Traditionally, the test of a major power was its strength in war. Today the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force. The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power. . . . National security has become more complicated as threats shift from military to the economic.70

Yet it is also important for the U.S. military to be prepared to engage in contingencies in support of diplomatic and economic efforts. This means that the intellectual horizons of military professionals must expand beyond traditional battlefield concerns. Military professionals need to see the military as an instrument of foreign policy, one that requires considerable

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restraint in the use of firepower. It means that sophisticated shows of force must be directed at specific political targets and objectives. The concept of “soft power” may be the most relevant.71 It seems clear that the character of conflicts in the remainder of this decade and into the next will not necessarily conform to the American way of war. In responding to such conflicts, the military profession will be hard pressed to articulate moral and legitimate purposes acceptable and supported by the U.S. people. Notes

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1969), p. 648. 2. See, for example, Arthur Hadley, The Straw Giant (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 175–178. This was also true in one of the more popular wars, World War II. See Paul Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army,” in Peter Karsten, ed., The Military in America (New York: Free Press, 1980), pp. 399–425. 3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 153. 4. Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge of American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 29. 5. See Stanley E. Spangler, Force and Accommodation in World Politics (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991), and Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 6. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, The Eagle’s Talon: The American Experience at Wars (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), pp. 13–14. 7. Spangler, Force and Accommodation, pp. 5–6. 8. Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), p. 1. 9. See, for example, Sam C. Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984). 10. See Les Aspin, “The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, September 1, 1993). 11. John Roper, “Shaping Strategy Without the Threat,” America’s Role in a Changing World, Part II (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), Adelphi Papers 257, Winter 1990/91, p. 82. 12. Graham Allison, “National Security Strategy for the 1990s,” in Edward K. Hamilton, ed., America’s Global Interests: A New Agenda (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), pp. 214–215. 13. Spangler, Force and Accommodation, p. 293. 14. Ibid., p. 294. 15. Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80, Fall 1990, pp. 151–171. 16. Donald M. Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems in a Changing Defense Environment (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 301.

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17. S. J. Deitchman, Beyond the Thaw: A New National Security Strategy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), p. 236. 18. Carl E. Vuono, “The U.S. Army: A Strategic Force for a New Security Era,” in Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams, eds., The U.S. Army in a New Security Era (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 19. 19. Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1993), p. 8. 20. John Laffin, The World in Conflict, 1991: War Annual 5, Contemporary Warfare Described and Analyzed (London: Brassey’s, 1991). 21. Snow, National Security, p. 141. 22. See, for example, Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (New York: Atheneum, 1969). 23. Snow, National Security, p. 172. 24. Michael Herr, Dispatches (New York: Avon, 1978). 25. Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1971). 26. Ibid., p. xxxiii. 27. John H. Moellering, “Future Civil-Military Relations: The Army Turns Inward?” Military Review 53, no. 7, July 1973, p. 79. 28. Ibid., p. 80. 29. Joe P. Dunn, “On Legacies and Lessons: The Literature and the Debate,” in Lawrence I. Grinter and Peter M. Dunn, eds., The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies, and Implications for Future Conflicts (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 3–4. 30. See, for example, Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), and Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982). 31. See, for example, John M. Gates, “Vietnam: The Debate Goes On,” in Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds., Assessing the Vietnam War: A Collection from the Journal of the U.S. Army War College (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1987), pp. 43–56. 32. See Anatol Rapoport, ed., Clausewitz on War (Baltimore: Penguin, 1986), and Sun Tzu: The Art of War, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). 33. George C. Herring, “The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley, 18 October–24 November 1965,” in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stoft, eds., America’s First Battles 1776–1965 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), p. 326. See also Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1992). 34. John Allen Williams, “Challenges and Requirements for the Future,” in Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams, eds., The U.S. Army in a New Security Era (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 294. 35. Sam C. Sarkesian, “U.S. Strategy and Unconventional Conflicts,” in Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams, eds., The U.S. Army in a New Security Era (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 212. 36. See Carl W. Steiner, “The Strategic Employment of Special Operations Forces,” Military Review 71, no. 6, June 1991, pp. 2–13.

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37. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 25. 38. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, p. 3. 39. Secretary of Defense, Joint Military Net Assessment, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1992), section 2, p. 15. 40. Confidential interview JW-16. 41. Confidential interview JW-23. 42. Confidential interview JW-24. 43. Confidential interview JW-20. 44. George Bush, “Reshaping Our Forces,” speech delivered at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colo., August 2, 1990, in Vital Speeches of the Day, 1990, p. 677. 45. Secretary of Defense, Joint Military Net Assessment, section 2, p. 9. 46. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report, pp. 5–7. 47. Department of the Army, Army Focus 1992, pp. 8–9. 48. Ibid., p. 10 49. The recommendations of the House Armed Services Committee followed a “threat based” scenario for force-level planning, in which Operation Desert Storm was an important test case for the number and kind of forces needed for the future. The alternative, “uncertainties based,” planning assumed that one could not know in advance what specific threats might arise and that it was prudent to plan against uncertainty. This is attractive in principle, but sensible plans need to be based on some notion of the threats they are intended to counter. In practice, this is done; the proper areas of dispute are the likelihood of the “threats” arising and the need to counter them. 50. Interview JW-14, p. 6. 51. Interview JW-16, pp. 7–8. 52. Secretary of Defense, Joint Military Net Assessment, section 1, pp. 2–3. 53. Ibid., section 11, pp. 33–34. 54. It is difficult to imagine U.S. forces imposing themselves on the territory of the former Soviet Union, but it does not strain credulity to conceive of some role for U.S. forces to monitor a cease-fire between some of the myriad opposing forces there. 55. See Sam C. Sarkesian, The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflict (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986); Sam C. Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984); and Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975). 56. Strategic Studies Institute, The Army’s Strategic Role in a New World Order: A Prioritized Research Program 1992 (SSI Special Report) (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, February 1, 1992), p. 6. 57. Secretary of Defense, Joint Military Net Assessment, 1992, section 8, p. 13. 58. In a particularly apt analogy, Robert S. Wood compares the position of the United States in the world with that of a U.S. marshall on the frontier, who would occasionally find it necessary to round up a posse when his own resources were inadequate. The portrayal of the United States as a global police force is not as useful. 59. Strategic Studies Institute, Army’s Strategic Role, pp. 5–7. 60. Philip A. Brehm and Wilbur E. Gray, Alternative Missions for the Army (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), p. 1.

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61. Ibid., pp. 12–13. 62. Even those willing to let the army assume some police responsibilities at a clerical level would probably be troubled by a hypothetical suggestion (not found in the army studies mentioned here) that the army should help organize elections or, in the absence of martial law, become directly involved in law enforcement. This has not been seriously proposed, but it does show that there is some limit to what “assistance” to the civilian sector is desirable. 63. Lawrence J. Korb and Robert H. Gromoll, “The United States,” in Douglas Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 33. 64. Snow, National Security, p. 173. 65. See Sarkesian, The New Battlefield. 66. Sam C. Sarkesian, “Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West,” International Political Science Review 2, no. 3, 1981, p. 289. 67. See C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990). 68. See, for example, Sarkesian, The New Battlefield. 69. Thomas K. Adams, “LIC (Low-Intensity Clausewitz),” Small Wars & Insurgencies 1, no. 3, December 1990, p. 271. 70. Nye, “Soft Power,” pp. 155, 157. 71. See note 32.

3 Military Force Structures and the Strategic Landscape Previous chapters have discussed the changing security landscape in general terms. We now look more specifically at U.S. national security interests and how current and foreseeable challenges to them relate to military professionalism and military force structure. We focus on those challenges faced by military professionals, specifically army officers, as they pursue their careers. U.S. National Security Interests

Changes in the presidency are unlikely to alter the national understanding of basic U.S. national security interests. The following interests were identified by President Bush in his last National Security Strategy of the United States:1 The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

The pursuit of these interests will involve many actions besides traditional military activities. These are noted in the document just quoted and include counterterror and antidrug operations, arms control, environmental concerns, 2 encouragement of democratic change in the former Soviet Union, strengthening of the United Nations, and support for economic development. Some of these nontraditional activities have already begun to alter the operations of the U.S. Army to a significant degree, and there is potential for even greater change. 59

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The need for change in service operations is apparent in planning documents produced by the military. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff produces the National Military Strategy of the United States, which is based on the president’s National Security Strategy of the United States, the Defense Planning Guidance, and the secretary of defense’s Annual Report to the President and the Congress,3 and refers to both military and nonmilitary factors that affect the security interests of the United States. Such factors include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological) and their delivery systems, the “continuing struggle to improve the human condition throughout the world, particularly in lesser developed countries,” drug trafficking, and the “momentum toward increased political, economic, and military cooperation in Europe, the Pacific, and other regions.”4 The sequence of documents just noted is a practical manifestation of civilian supremacy in the making of national security policy noted earlier. The highest-ranking military officer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, does not make an assessment until the guidance of the president and the secretary of defense is in hand. Challenges to U.S. National Security Interests

National security challenges are diverse as never before. In addition to the traditional concern of military leaders—fighting the nation’s wars—a host of challenges affects the security of the country and the careers of military professionals. The challenges to U.S. national security interests are numerous, and there is no lack of possible traditional and nontraditional missions for the U.S. Army. Given the variety of possible challenges, what capabilities does the army need to deal with them? It is clear that whatever the ultimate size of the army, it will need to be highly efficient, combat effective, and technologically superior and must include the best trained and motivated officers and enlisted personnel possible. Peacetime Engagements

In a speech at Aspen, Colorado, in August 1990, President Bush outlined a broad strategy for “reshaping our forces” for the new security landscape. The president stated in part, “The size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence . . . a policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today’s world as in the time of conflict and cold war.”5

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Elaborating on the president’s statement, Secretary of Defense Cheney proposed four major elements of a new U.S. defense strategy.6 He said that strategic defense and deterrence necessitate a “diverse mix of survivable and highly capable offensive nuclear forces.” This requires worldwide protection against limited ballistic missile strikes. Forward presence requires that some U.S. forces remain overseas as a visible sign of U.S. commitment and serve as a credible deterrence. Further, such forces would be the base for engaging in other contingencies. Crisis response means that U.S. conventional forces “must be able to respond rapidly to short-notice regional crises and contingencies that threaten U.S. interests.” And finally, force reconstitution is based on the need to “maintain the ability to reconstitute a larger force structure if a resurgent threat of massive conflict returns.” Thus, in addition to retaining high-quality personnel and a capable industrial and technological base, Total Force Policy (use of reserves and National Guard) has an important role in force reconstitution as well as in all other elements of strategy.7 In a further elaboration of strategy as it applies to the U.S. Army, then– Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone stated that the army must be prepared to fight two concurrent regional conflicts. This was based on what is labeled MRC (major regional conflict) East and MRC West.8 Interestingly enough, according to a recent RAND study, “when the drawdown is over, the United States will be unable to respond simultaneously to two major crises.”9 Also, from the U.S. perspective, the various alliances and treaties established during the Cold War period seem obsolete, at least in their original intent and substance. Further, a new set of relationships is emerging with former adversaries, including Vietnam. Others point to the need to prepare a new policy with respect to Cuba. Equally important, the Pacific Basin area has emerged as a potential for power projection and conflict as China and Japan vie for advantage in the area.10 Conventional contingencies and major-power security relationships are overshadowed by the concept of “operations other than war.” This gained prominence in the early 1990s as the United States became involved in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.11 The concept includes peacekeeping contingencies and humanitarian missions. For some, such missions are based on moral indignation and wars of conscience and are “video” driven. Taken to its logical conclusions, the U.S. military will be engaged in a variety of operations that may have little to do with national interests. In the strategic landscape of the 1990s, operations other than war may become the rule rather than the exception. Further, the operational doctrine and the mind-set appropriate for operations other than war differ from the primary purpose of the U.S. military: success in combat. This places considerable pressure on the military to balance the skills, operational techniques, and mind-sets required for success in combat with those required for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

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Force Structure and Command and Control

In response to the end of the superpower era, the Bush administration planned a reduction in the U.S. military over a five-year period. This included the trimming of the U.S. defense budget by $50 billion and the reduction of military personnel. The U.S. Army was expected to take the brunt of personnel reduction; its end strength was to be reduced by at least 25 percent, to 525,000 by 1995, which would reduce the number of active army divisions from 18 to 12.12 Moreover, for the first time in decades, most of the U.S. Army was to be stationed in the continental United States. In 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the Clinton administration was planning even deeper reductions in the U.S. military.13 For the military, not only was the additional cut in defense dollars difficult to absorb, but the reduction in total strength raised fears about military capability in responding to a variety of contingencies. The new budget revised the earlier Base Force concept and evolved from a 1992 study on ground force structure by then–Congressman Aspin.14 In that study, various options were presented. These options evolved from four conceptual structures using the forces employed in Desert Storm as the reference point. Option A was based on 8 active army and 2 marine divisions; option D envisioned 10 active army and 3 marine divisions. In 1992 The National Military Strategy of the United States envisioned a Base Force founded on option D: the reduction of active army divisions from 16 to 10, navy carrier battle groups from 15 to 12 (plans called for 11 active and 1 reserve), and air force fighter wings from 22 to 15. 15 Some critics argued that although the plan is basically a modified Bush administration proposal, the final version envisions reduction of the military to option D.16 By 1994, military plans called for the reduction of the military to the Base Force structure. Critics also point out that the plans for reduction of forces have little to do with strategic planning and more to do with shifting of resources to domestic programs. According to one authority: Largely self-inflicted economic weaknesses now indirectly threaten our national security. . . . Despite the euphoria over America’s success in the war in Iraq, the 1990s will be a decade of new and increasing tensions for the United States between international needs and economic constraints. As the full implications of being the world’s largest debtor dawn on us and on the rest of the world, the gap between our interests and our capacities will become larger, more obvious, and more painful.17

In addition, changes in the various structures of government were promised by the Clinton administration. Secretary of Defense Aspin began restructuring the Defense Department in early 1993. Among other offices, an assistant secretary of defense for democracy and human rights and an

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assistant secretary of defense for arms proliferation have been established.18 These changes seemed to move in a political-diplomatic direction, prompting some to see a mini Department of State emerging in the Department of Defense. These changes were reversed when William J. Perry became secretary of defense in February 1994. It also appeared that the role of assistant secretary of defense for special operations and lowintensity conflict was deemphasized based on Secretary Aspin’s view that it was a leftover from the Cold War, even though some argue that it was an innovative structure intended to go well beyond the Cold War. Also, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell announced a plan for consolidating some military activities while avoiding more drastic restructuring within the military.19 Earlier plans called for the restructuring of the Unified and Specified Commands into four: the Atlantic, Pacific, strategic, and contingency commands. 20 In 1994 it was not clear where these changes would lead or whether they would be final. Congressional reaction to these changes had not crystallized. It is not clear whether, if these changes are institutionalized, the new structures will be able to respond more readily to issues of national security. Another, potentially serious problem has emerged: the renewing of interservice rivalries.21 Although such rivalries historically have been part of the military system, with the reduction in defense budgets and planned reductions in military manpower these disputes take on special significance. Battles over missions, turfs, and piece of the defense budget (which is getting smaller), are emerging in full array. These were signaled by the publication of various manuscripts designed to rationalize the importance of each service in future conflicts. For example, a monograph coauthored by the army chief of staff on land warfare in the twenty-first century emphasized the technical revolution occurring in ground forces and the impact this will have on land warfare, underpinning the importance of ground forces in any future conflict.22 The air force monograph Global Reach, Global Power and the navy’s . . . From the Sea represent similar attempts to forge a strategic vision for each of those services.23 With the end of the Cold War and the rising public expectation for a peace dividend, the issue of force size came to the forefront of political discussion. There is substantial consensus that U.S. military forces should be “sufficient” but much less agreement as to what that entails in terms of the number of personnel under arms, the proper level and type of equipment, and the amount of military research and development that should be undertaken. There is also fundamental disagreement on the methodology to use in answering such questions, centering on the role of assumed threats as a basis for force planning. 24 One position is threat based—that is, specific conceivable threats are used to determine the number and type of forces

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needed. A variant of this is to use the 1991 Gulf War as a prototypical example of the challenges the United States faces and then to build forces to deal with that sort of contingency. This would be a more acceptable methodology if the unique character of that war were always borne in mind when attempting to draw important lessons from it25 and if specific emerging threats were more obvious. The alternative methodology is based on uncertainty rather than specific threats. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified before Congress, in the context of Europe: “I don’t even use the word ‘threat’ anymore, Mr. Chairman, because it doesn’t have the same meaning it did in the past.”26 That is, challenges to U.S. interests have tended to arise suddenly, and basing force posture on narrowly conceived threats could result in the United States being unable to respond effectively. Therefore, it is necessary to have forces that are flexible enough to respond to a variety of contingencies, seen and unseen. However, some kind of threat assessment (even if only for a notional threat) is needed for planning purposes.27 The soundest basis for planning, in our judgment, considers threats and uncertainties but focuses on capabilities. That is, what capabilities do the armed forces need to conduct reasonably foreseeable missions in both peacetime and wartime contexts? Illustrative planning scenarios will still be required, but planners should understand that challenges could come from sources far removed from what is expected. It is also necessary to consider what peacetime force levels are needed, irrespective of particular combat expectations.28 Certain capabilities are required, not only for peacetime missions but to maintain the forces that would be necessary in wartime. Another consideration is that of quality. In an environment of declining resources for defense, the choice for increased quality will have a strong impact on the quantity of forces that can be maintained. Quality is expensive, but as the Gulf War showed the Iraqis, a lack of quality has its own costs in terms of lives and battles lost. Since World War II we have planned to compensate for the greater numbers of Warsaw Pact personnel and equipment with superior quality as a “force multiplier,” and this orientation will continue. The extraordinary expense of high-technology weapons was justified by the military success of the Gulf War, in which these weapons played a decisive role. No army planner wants to return to the “hollow army” of the late 1970s, which had a large skeleton but was inadequately staffed, led, and funded.

The Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review

The Bush administration began a reduction in military forces toward what was called the Base Force, named in part to suggest that it would be

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imprudent to shrink it further.29 The Base Force included forces for strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution, thus fitting in with the four fundamental demands of the new era identified in the president’s National Security Strategy of the United States.30 For the U.S. Army, this meant a reduction from 16 active and 10 reserve divisions in fiscal year 1991 to 12 active and 6 reserve divisions (plus 2 cadre divisions) by the end of fiscal year 1995. 31 The Base Force was to be organized into four military force packages—strategic forces, Atlantic forces, Pacific forces, and contingency forces—and assisted by the four “supporting capabilities” of transportation, space, reconstitution, and research and development.32 The Base Force levels have been revised downward by the Clinton administration based on their Bottom-Up Review. This may result in no more than 10 active army divisions and 2 marine divisions. One wonders how effective this smaller force will be, given the multiplicity of challenges before it. The Defense Department believes that it will be effective, although with an important limitation: The Base Force is capable of resolving quickly—with low risk—only one major regional crisis at a time. For two crises occurring close together, the United States would have to employ economy of force and sequential operations and make strategic choices. The risk to U.S. objectives in either case is no more than moderate, but there is little margin for unfavorable circumstances.33

The Reserve Component

A final consideration with respect to forces is important both militarily and politically: What should be the distribution of active component and reserve component forces? With the reduced global threat, the requirement for a large number of trained forces to deploy immediately is reduced to the point where the Department of Defense believes that active forces can meet the requirement for immediate response—even for regional crises: Our planning no longer focuses on the threat of global war; instead it is on short-notice regional crises. This new environment requires a smaller overall force, with AC [active component] units providing the majority of immediate response to regional crises and RC [reserve component] forces reinforcing, supporting, sustaining, and augmenting the response.34

One of the lessons of Operation Desert Storm was that the Army National Guard “roundout” brigades were not as well prepared as they needed to be to go into combat immediately. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the major problem was the inability of more senior officers to coordinate large-scale operations on the modern battlefield.35 With the smaller force of the Bottom-Up Review, of course, the margin for unfavorable circumstances

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is even smaller. Accordingly, the chief of staff of the army at the time, General Vuono, sent them for further training in the continental United States before committing them to battle. This was not a popular decision with leaders of the National Guard and their supporters in Congress, but it was the correct one. Subsequent analysis showed, not surprisingly, that reservists whose civilian occupations were closest to their military occupation specialties required the least training after mobilization. In any case, the problem was not so much the individual skills but “the relative difficulty of large unit as opposed to individual skills.”36 In brief, the reserve component forces will shift their focus away from the immediate deployment of combat power, although there could well be some early mobilization of support personnel. Individuals with civilian skills that can be easily transferred once on active duty, such as pilots or physicians, can be trained in the reserves and be fully ready for mobilization. Combat forces that need not be reconstituted quickly can be in the reserves as well. Other units performing missions not needed much in peacetime, such as ammunition-moving units, can also be left in the reserve component.37 The shift in emphasis in the missions of these forces is yet another indication of the complexity of the modern battlefield.38 Personnel

Given the foreign and domestic challenges so far discussed, there will be a need for maximum flexibility in the capabilities of these forces and a concomitant increase in the expertise and adaptability required from the army professionals who lead them. In the smaller force of the future there will be little margin for error, whether in force structure or in personnel selection, motivation, and training. In short, the leaders of tomorrow’s army at all levels must be of the highest quality. At the same time, changes in personnel regulations opening new specialties to women, permitting women to serve in combat ships and aircraft, permitting women to serve closer to combat in ground units, and ending the service ban on members with homosexual orientation (discussed in more detail elsewhere) make the milieu in which leaders practice their profession even more challenging. Whatever their personal opinion on the wisdom of these changes, leaders wishing to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem will need to consider how to integrate these soldiers into preexisting units composed of some individuals who have very strong opinions opposed to the new policies. It will require maximum leadership skills—including knowledge of human behavior and interpersonal relations—to manage these difficult transitions smoothly. And it will be at relatively low levels of command that the success or failure of the integration will be determined.

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Part of the challenge is not new: to help the soldiers being integrated do their job as well as possible. This is not dramatically different from the daily tasks of training and providing resources and motivation that have occupied military professionals through time. A greater problem will be helping the other soldiers, many of whom will not like the changes, to do their jobs as well as possible, too, and not hamper the progress of anyone else. Leaders will have to confront their feelings on these issues and be prepared to confront the feelings of others. To preserve as much morale and unit cohesion as possible, standards against sexual harassment, sexual assault, and fraternization must be stringent and rigorously enforced. The army does not need to condone any type of sexual activity, but it does need to make clear that such considerations will not be permitted to interfere with mission accomplishment and that discrimination will not be tolerated. The changes discussed will have the effect of enlarging the pool from which the army can select its recruits, providing there is not a popular reaction against the innovations strong enough to affect recruiting. Given the inevitable downsizing of the army, this means that the service can be very selective in recruiting and in approving reenlistments. There will be little need to keep marginal performers on the payroll, which will improve overall quality. It is clear that future army professionals will have their work cut out for them. The threat environment is more benign overall, but individual threats of great seriousness can arise suddenly and catch those unaware off guard. The environment within the army will also become more complex, with both leaders and the led increasingly divided by race, religion, gender, and sexual orientation. Training and Education

In the situation just described, the need for a sound program of training and education is apparent. Throughout the career of a military professional, training is crucial to helping the individual become as competent militarily as possible. The need for this kind of professional military education to deal with the modern battlefield does not need much justification, and the lack of attention to it here is not intended to diminish its importance. In addition to military training, there is also a need for military and civilian education. Education differs from training, which is the inculcation of desired responses or the development of specific competencies. Education’s objectives are broader, and they include an understanding of history, context, processes, and interpersonal relations at an advanced level. Although education is to be found in some aspects of the service academies and war colleges, an important element is the education provided by

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the private sector’s graduate education programs. The importance of such education is twofold: it helps military professionals to do their jobs better and it helps to keep the civilian and military sectors of society in proper balance. One prominent retired army officer, Col. William J. Taylor, Jr., noted that when he got into graduate school and had to deal with complexities, “I understood that things were not just as simple as I thought they were, and it prepared me in a lot of ways to be a much better professional officer.”39 Another respondent noted that civilian graduate education “changed my view of how the profession fits into the policies of the United States.” He went on to say, “I think I have a greater appreciation of not only what the military must do, and why it must be disciplined and under control of civilian authority, but also the struggle civilian authorities have in attempting to understand how to use the military.”40 This, of course, is what one hopes the outcome of such study would be. Another respondent pointed up the importance of civilian as opposed to military schools to avoid “tunnel vision.”41 Officers in graduate programs were especially inclined to think such programs are important, and the perceived importance of civilian graduate education for military professionals increased significantly for all groups throughout the study.42 Part of the military education process involves the senior service schools: the Army War College, the Naval War College, the Air University, and the National War College (part of National Defense University). The educational quality at these institutions is often extremely high. Respondents felt strongly that attendance at one of these institutions was more important professionally than civilian graduate education, even if done at a prestigious civilian university. As Colonel Taylor noted, to make flag officer (that is, general or admiral), “it’s been the kiss of death not to attend the senior service college. . . . [T]here is still a stigma attached to lack of attendance at a senior service college.”43 We will return to the subject of the training and education of military officers later in the book. For now, we merely note the need for the most effective training and education possible if the U.S. Army is to meet the challenges that lie before it. Challenges to Military Professionals

The foregoing considerations will make the profession of arms as challenging in the future as it has been in the past, despite the elimination of the global threat. In this connection, several themes have appeared in this chapter, and we would like to close by drawing these together. First, the battleground of the future is becoming ever more complex, and the need for acute analytical abilities grows apace. This complexity is

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due not only to the increased demands of sophisticated weapons and command and control systems but also to the need to consider political and social factors when performing military missions generally grouped under the rubric “unconventional warfare.” Only the most qualified individuals will be able to perform well in that environment. Second, there is a need for military professionals to be trained to operate “beyond the battlefield,”44 which is where society’s political institutions lie. Also, it is necessary that the military present its case for resources and priorities effectively to the civilian leaders who control them. At the same time, military leaders should not become partisan or involve themselves with elections. Certain limits must not be crossed if the civilian and military spheres are to maintain the necessary separation.45 Third, military professionals will operate in a milieu that is increasingly heterogeneous. They must learn to manage diversity of race, religion, gender, and affectional preference and do so in a context of generally conservative subordinates, some of whom will vigorously oppose the changes. Fourth, these themes need to be incorporated into a professional ethos that nurtures professional competence compatible with the values and norms of democratic society and its political character. With these challenges in mind, we turn in the next chapter to a consideration of military professionalism and the domestic political-social environment. Notes

1. National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991), pp. 3–4. 2. The army is now taking the environment very seriously. A special report of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College is noteworthy in this connection. See the SSI Special Report The Army and the Environment (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, July 1990) and Department of the Army, Army Focus 1992: The Army in Transformation (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, September 1992), pp. 29–31. The “four pillars” of the army’s conservation program are compliance, restoration, prevention, and conservation. 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992). The Defense Department report is Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992). 4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, p. 1. 5. George Bush, “Reshaping Our Forces,” speech delivered at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colo., August 2, 1990, in Vital Speeches of the Day, 1990, p. 677. 6. Richard Cheney, “U.S. Defense Strategy and the DoD Budget Request,” in a prepared statement to the House Armed Services Committee. Defense Issues 6, no. 4, p. 3. The quotes related to the new strategy are from this source. See also

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Lewis Libby, “Remarks on Shaping US Defence Strategy: Persistent Challenges and Enduring Strengths,” America’s Role in a Changing World, Part II, Adelphi Papers 257, Winter 1990/91, pp. 64–75, and Paul D. Wolfowitz, “The New Defense Strategy,” in Joseph Kruzel, ed., American Defense Annual, 1990–1991 (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 176–195. 7. For an analysis see Brian J. Ohlinger, Peacetime Engagement: A Search for Relevance? (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), October 15, 1952. 8. Michael P.W. Stone, secretary of the army, in a speech delivered at the National Strategy Forum, Chicago, February 20, 1992. 9. Jim Wolffe, “RAND Recommends Reshaping,” Army Times, May 3, 1993, p. 30. 10. See James Schlesinger, “Quest for a Post–Cold War Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1, 1993, p. 28. 11. Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993), p. 11. 12. National Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 1992). 13. See FY 1994 Defense Budget Begins New Era, news release (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense—Public Relations, March 1994). See also Jim Tice, “Drawdown Accelerates,” Army Times, April 12, 1993, p. 4. 14. See Les Aspin, chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, memorandum, “Sizing U.S. conventional forces,” January 22, 1992. Also see charts by Aspin on “The New Security: A Bottom-up Approach to the Post–Cold War Era.” 15. FY 1994 Defense Budget. 16. Tom Donnelly, “100,000 More Troops Could Be Cut by 2000,” Army Times, April 19, 1993, p. 26. 17. Peter G. Peterson and James K. Sebenius, “The Primacy of the Domestic Agenda,” in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond Cold War to a New World Order (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1994). 18. Michael R. Gordon, “Aspin Overhauls Pentagon to Bolster Policy Role,” New York Times, January 28, 1993, p. A17. See also John Lancester, “White House Outlines Vision of New Military,” Washington Post, January 30, 1992, p. A-10. 19. See, for example, William Matthews, “Powell Reports on Service Roles and Missions,” Army Times, February 22, 1992, p. 4. 20. National Military Strategy 1992, p. 19. 21. See Tom Donnelly, “Services Outline Their Futures in High-Stakes Era,” Army Times, April 26, 1993, p. 25. See also Molly Moore, “War Exposed Rivalries, Weaknesses in Military,” Washington Post, June 10, 1991, pp. A-1, A-17. 22. Sullivan and Dubik, Land Warfare. 23. Secretary of the Air Force, Global Reach, Global Power (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, n.d.); Department of the Air Force, A Report, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War, September 1991. See also U.S. Navy, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, The United States Navy in “Desert Storm,” Washington, D.C., May 15, 1991. 24. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Perspectives on Worldwide Threats and Implications for U.S. Forces (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, April 16, 1992), for a discussion of various assumptions and their effect on force planning.

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25. Unfortunately, the “lessons” of wars are not always obvious. Interpreting them is like reading an ink blot, and the results frequently tell more about the assumptions and policy preferences of the interpreter than they do about the war itself. In this connection, one should not be surprised that the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force gave what he called “the mother of all briefings” after the Gulf War to anyone who would listen, highlighting the contribution of his service to the victory there. Those with different vantage points (and rice bowls) disagree on the lessons. 26. Colin Powell, Testimony Before the Defense Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee, September 25, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 45. 27. Documents such as the classified Defense Planning Guidance often include illustrative scenarios. These can be quite embarrassing when they appear in the New York Times, as frequently happens. The argument that they are just examples is disingenuous to the extent that such scenarios are known to become the de facto basis for planning. 28. A U.S. Navy example illustrates this point well. Six aircraft carriers were eventually used in the Gulf War, the largest contingency now planned for. This would seem to indicate a need for six carriers, or perhaps seven or eight to allow for extended overhauls. But a certain number of carrier battle groups need to be on station during peacetime to ensure timely crisis response. The need for maintenance, training, and travel time to and from station means that it requires, on average, three total carriers to maintain one stationed forward. If there are to be four carriers on station at any one time, hardly an excessive number given the size of the globe, it will require twelve carriers to do it. 29. The Secretary of Defense’s Joint Military Net Assessment 1992 notes, “The plan for downsizing and reconfiguring our forces to the Base Force level is both prudent and fiscally attainable. Faster reductions risk the danger of destroying the cohesion, morale, and military effectiveness of today’s forces” (section 3, p. 2). 30. National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 25. These are further developed in the National Military Strategy of the United States, pp. 6–8. See also Department of Defense, An Overview of the Changing Department of Defense: Strategy, Budget, and Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, October 1991). 31. Secretary of Defense, Joint Military Net Assessment 1992, section 3, p. 3, and Department of Defense, An Overview of the Changing Department of Defense, p. 8. 32. Secretary of Defense, Joint Military Net Assessment 1992, section 3, pp. 3–10. There is some concern among those with a vested interest in current organizational arrangements that these force packages could become the basis of a new Unified Command Plan to replace the current unified and specified commands. See the Joint Military Net Assessment, section 4, p. 3, for a listing of these, their location, and their areas of responsibility. 33. Ibid., section 9, p. 15. 34. Ibid., section 12, p. 1. 35. The evidence is anecdotal because any issue concerning the readiness of the U.S. Army National Guard is politically sensitive, and knowledgeable people are not inclined to speak to it on the record. After-action reports addressed the issue cautiously, as in this comment in Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), section 11, p. 6: “The complexity of modern

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combat may indicate that Roundout brigades will continue to require some training following activation.” It is fortunate that the United States did not discover this in the context of a more stressful situation, such as a NATO–Warsaw Pact war. 36. Ibid., section 11, p. 3. 37. Powell, Testimony, p. 30. 38. For an excellent analysis of the role of the reserve components in the new era, see Charles E. Heller, Twenty-First Century Force: A Federal Army and a Militia (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), June 14, 1993. See also James C. Hyde, “Uncertainty Clouds Future for USAF and Army Reserve,” Armed Forces Journal International 130, no. 6, January 1993, p. 29. 39. Interview with William J. Taylor, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.), May 22, 1989, p. 3. 40. Interview JW-5, p. 3. 41. Interview B-3, p. 3. 42. See Appendix A. 43. Interview with William J. Taylor, Jr., p. 2. For some earlier thoughts of Colonel Taylor and one of the authors on this topic, see Sam C. Sarkesian and William J. Taylor, Jr., “The Case for Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers,” Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 2, February 1975, pp. 251–262. 44. Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). 45. In this connection, the participation of a number of retired flag and general officers in the 1992 presidential election was troubling.

Part 2 U.S. Society and the Military Profession

4 Democratization and the Military Previous chapters have explored changes in the international context of U.S. national security policy and the effect these have had on the American way of war; we have also discussed the relationship between military professionals and the political system. It is not surprising that the areas of continuity outnumber those of change. This is partly because of the innate conservatism of a military that does not embrace change quickly or gladly; it is also because the changes in the security environment are still recent and the institution and its members have not had time to adjust their professional expectations, behavior, and self-images in response to them. For these reasons the effects of the changes are likely to grow in significance. Demographics and Cultural Diversity

Within the next two decades, the United States will undergo important changes in its demographic makeup. It is estimated that by the year 2015 the “minorities” in the United States will have become “majorities.” That is, people who have roots in the European culture will constitute less than 50 percent of the total population. Also, women outnumber men, and this will continue well into the next century. It seems that the demographic changes also indicate cultural shifts that may reshape the Judeo-Christian cultural basis as we know it today. However, it is not clear what impact all this will have on the composition of the military force. Hispanic, Asiatic, and African cultures are likely to have a more significant impact on the concept of U.S. culture. Combined with changing demographics and religious diversity, these cultural shifts are likely to find their way into the ranks of the military. What this may mean in terms of cohesion, esprit, morale, and military discipline is unclear. It will, however, pose a complex set of cultural issues to the military. How this will be translated into a combat-effective military is also not clear. Along with the notion of democratization, changes in the U.S. domestic environment will pose difficult adjustment problems for the military. 75

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These social issues reflect an increasing move toward democratization of the military—that is, the perception that the military must reflect society, albeit not a perfect reflection but one that must account for the social changes occurring in the United States. The critical question is how far the military can go in accommodating these changes and still maintain its capability to respond across the conflict spectrum, from major wars to limited contingencies and humanitarian operations. The debate has two critical themes. One theme argues that the military must indeed accommodate the major changes in U.S. society. This is necessary if the military is to maintain its proper role in a democratic system. According to this view, the military cannot be separate and autonomous within a democratic system. Without such accommodation, the military will not have society’s psychological and political wherewithal to carry out its missions. The second theme argues that the military is primarily a collectivity and its capability and effectiveness is rooted in unit cohesion. Thus, individuals must be subordinated to that unit goal, even if it means that they must give up certain rights. It follows that affirmative action, diversity, and social accommodation must be secondary to unit effectiveness. Moreover, social accommodation can be very expensive if it erodes military capability and the ability to further U.S. national interests. Increasing religious diversity may have some impact on cultural diversity in society and spill over into the military This is likely to reflect cultural diversity within the services and in more specific terms have an impact on the way military chaplains define their role. For many years the military regarded all Protestant chaplains in the same manner, so there was no attempt to look for, say, a Lutheran chaplain or a Methodist chaplain for a particular position. In practice, one was not likely to find a chaplain of one’s own denomination, but an exact match was not expected. As the number of religions accommodated in the military increases, the likelihood that the particular chaplain assigned will match one’s own denomination decreases still further. In such a circumstance the purely religious role of the chaplains will also decrease. Chaplains are the main counselors at military institutions, and the success of this function is not essentially dependent on a religious match. A final role is as unofficial “morale officer,” in which capacity the chaplain arranges tours and sees to the morale of the troops. Although important, this is the lowest common denominator of the roles and is likely to be emphasized as religious diversity increases. At the same time, both continuities and changes in the societal environment in which the military operates and from which it draws its sustenance will have profound impacts on the military and military professionalism. These include a diminishing level of resources devoted to defense

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purposes, a continuing lack of civilian understanding of the military profession, and increased concern for racial equality, incorporation of women and gays in the military, national service, and family issues. This chapter explores some of these important issues and the way they may affect military capability. To what extent should the military reflect society in its composition, ethos, and regulations? Is there a point at which the military becomes too close to society to be militarily effective? On the other hand, is there danger in developing a military that is too far removed from society to empathize with it and defend it effectively? What balance should be struck between being representative of society and maintaining combat effectiveness, if it can be shown that there is tension between the two objectives? Can the military be engaged with society on social issues without altering its basic character to the detriment of its raison d’être, success in battle? Is there a point at which society will withdraw support from a military institution that is perceived as too far removed from societal norms and concerns? We now turn to some issues that relate to these questions.1 Civilian-Military Interpenetration

The following question is very significant but probably impossible to answer in the abstract: How much interpenetration should there be between the civilian and military sectors of society? One of the authors noted several years ago that “military professionalism and civil-military relations are closely connected,” pointing out that “the military has increasingly been influenced by the values, skills, and expectations of civilian life.”2 Adam Yarmolinsky noted that the causation can run both ways: “One must explore the impact of the military on the civilian as well as of the civilian on the military. It is certainly [more] possible that the civilian society has become more militarized than that the military has become civilianized.”3 It is important not only that military people understand civilian society but that civilians understand the military. Therefore, opportunities should be sought for interaction between civilians and the military that enable them to learn from one another without at the same time necessarily taking on the other’s perspective. Civilian graduate education presents an occasion where civilian students and faculty and military students can break down unhelpful stereotypes. The following responses from officers interviewed for our research project are typical: I had one professor that I guess could loosely be referred to as a Marxist historian. By the second year he would invite my wife and me over to

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dinner and he would take me to his den and show me his Sandinista revolutionary posters and the next week I would have him over to my house for dinner and we would go down to my den where I had an eight-inch howitzer that said, “Peace through superior firepower.” . . . Many of the graduate students that were in the program we still correspond with. Many of them are far left but we found being able to sit down and talk with each other that not all military officers were war mongers.4

Another said, “I was considered about two steps to the right of Attila the Hun, . . . and I believe I became more liberal in my political beliefs as a result of being there, but . . . I think they learned more and gained a greater respect for my opinions than I did for theirs.”5 Another respondent spoke to the gap in understanding between civilians and the military: My perception is that the civilians do not understand what the military people do. . . . I didn’t sense a hostility. In fact, it was probably the opposite. . . . With the draft being over, there are a lot of civilians never exposed to the military. Sitting in class was the first time that they had even talked to someone in the military. They understand the need for a military but they don’t understand what the military does.6

There are, of course, numerous other opportunities for military professionals and civilians to interact with one another, but the graduate school environment is particularly opportune. The contacts extend for a long enough time to move beyond superficiality, enabling students from different backgrounds to get to know one another. Also, students may cooperate on projects, increasing the sense of working together for a common purpose. Although difficult to quantify, over the long term this experience and common purpose can be the basis for mutual respect and understanding permeating civilian and military circles. Sociological Representation

In principle it should not be necessary that the defenders of a society “look” like that society physically or morally. In practice, it is good that the military is to some degree a microcosm of the larger society. This increases the legitimacy of the military in the minds of the citizens, each of whom can identify with some group represented there. It also increases the empathy of military people toward the society they are protecting. One important consideration in this connection is the demographic changes that are occurring in the United States. The U.S. Hispanic population is growing faster than any other because of high birth rates and high rates of immigration. Policymakers will have to determine to what extent the military of the future will need to take account of this change in its recruiting, and they must decide whether language difficulties will present significant training problems.

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Although African Americans have been integrated into the military, some problems remain. It is also possible that problems between African Americans and Hispanics in a number of metropolitan areas may spill over into the military system. However, given the military’s relative effectiveness in integration, it is likely that such problems will be minor compared with what occurs in society in general. The problem is that there are several dimensions to consider, and it is difficult to meet “quotas” for every combination that is theoretically possible. This is especially true if race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation are all factored in. The vastly increased problems of leadership that such a diverse army presents are discussed later; for now we note only that broadly trained officers will be best able to meet the challenge. Social Issues Within the Military

Many factors affect combat effectiveness, and relatively few of them deal with grand strategies or logistics. Many relate to social issues that have great impact on the military’s ability to do its job effectively. Given the consequences that such issues have on leadership challenges, unit morale, and the personnel to be led, a change in combat effectiveness is to be expected. Military Social Character

Observers have frequently commented on the social conservatism of military officers. But this should not be confused with an inability to deal with change; indeed, change is the most constant factor in a professional soldier’s life. This is apparent when considering the varied duties soldiers are assigned over the course of their careers and the frequent job and location changes that are involved. Despite the varied duties that military professionals share, or, perhaps, because of them, they also share many values and perspectives. Officers who are newly stationed at, say, Fort Riley in Kansas will almost certainly know several people there—some of them quite well—from previous assignments. There is a bond created by having shared similar experiences— one does not need to talk about the weather to find common ground quickly. In the past, because of the relatively short length of tours, officers and their spouses knew that if they planned to have friends, they needed to make them fairly quickly. The common bond operated to make this as easy as possible, and there was no expectation that one needed to know someone for several years before becoming a good friend. 7 Such an environment can be very supportive.

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In light of the major changes taking place in force structures and in reduction of the military, it is likely that military personnel will have longer tours at one installation or post. Changes in military life-styles are likely to occur, with more military families looking to the civilian community for housing, schools, and social activities. Yet, it is too early to determine how the military communities will change. In any case, the bonding process is very real and is facilitated not only by the common experiences just discussed but also by the moral center provided to the profession by the imperatives of duty, honor, country. One respondent in our research was particularly articulate about the importance of trust for this process: I can talk to another military officer and I tell him something, [and] I expect him to believe what I’m telling him because I’m a military officer. When he tells me something I’m going to believe it just because of who he is and the position that he has. . . . I think for the most part the people that are in the military that I know and that I associate with have the same sorts of values and ethical standards that I have, and that’s very important. . . . And that personal bonding that you have with another guy who wears the uniform is just tremendous.8

A key component of the military social character is the military family. Despite the acknowledged importance of families, military service is unavoidably hard on them. One respondent noted that his army father was gone for 6 of the 17 years the respondent was living at home. He said, “So for assignments I have gone out of my way to try to keep the family together, to get assignments where they can be with me—and knowing that somewhere in the course of a career you’re going to have family separations, but minimizing those when I possibly can.”9 Numerous respondents reported marital difficulties, either their own or someone else’s, due to the pace of army life. Comments included “Those first two years of graduate civil schooling were the first two years in losing a family,” “I’ve been divorced once. . . . [B]asically the breaking point was graduate school,” and “Marriages have bit the dust.” Clearly, the stress of a military career takes its toll on the family. In 1993 the U.S. Marine Corps announced that beginning in 1995, only “single” individuals would be recruited as enlisted men and women into the corps for the first term. The basis for this is that many marines spend six months of each year away from families, which can lead to difficult marriage problems and divorces. President Clinton and Defense Secretary Aspin quickly overruled this policy, based partly on the fact that neither was consulted before the announcement and also because of the expected negative political response such a policy would likely trigger. Another key element in the social character of the military is the orientation of the military members to the institution itself. Charles Moskos’s

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path-breaking studies on the “institutional” versus “occupational” orientation of service members have already been mentioned (see Chapter 1). An important evaluation of this hypothesis using the U.S. Marine Corps as a data base showed that occupational tendencies (that is, service in return for some tangible gain) were present among the junior officers of the corps, rather than just the institutional criteria (loyalty to the institution) that would better serve the corps over time.10 As suggested earlier, military communities have a strong link based on the family and a commonality of careers and service. This tends to reinforce the notion of military professionalism, inward-looking community, and a sharp distinction between military and society. The changing military system may well forge a closer link between military and society, but it is unclear what the consequences of such linkage will be. Women in the Military

Women have served in the military, albeit often unofficially, throughout U.S. history. The world wars provided an official role for women in designated units. This was particularly the case in World War II, where women served in the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), later renamed the Women’s Army Corps (WAC), and in the navy equivalent, the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), as well as in other branches of service. In addition, women pilots were involved in operations ferrying bombers from the United States to England. Moreover, the role of military nurses is well documented. The major issue in the contemporary period, however, has to do with women in combat units. Although the role of women in the military has expanded significantly over the past 10 years, the basic issue has been whether women should serve in combat units, particularly ground combat units. The apparently successful integration of women in combat support missions during Operation Desert Storm was used as evidence that the role of women in the military should include combat missions. The literature on this subject is too voluminous to review here, but the issue strikes to the very core of how women are viewed and treated in our society. Is it discriminatory to preclude women from serving in combat? Clearly it is. Does it necessarily follow that it is therefore impermissible? Under current court interpretations, it does not. Discrimination refers to the making of distinctions, a practice that cannot be avoided. At issue are what kind of distinctions are made, on what basis, and to what ends. In 1993 the Clinton administration opened all combat units to women, except those in ground combat arms. At the same time, women in the military have raised issues of the relationship between the sexes and of sexual harassment. The molesting of numerous women, many of them naval officers, at a 1991 meeting of the

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Tailhook Association in Las Vegas became a cause célèbre, despite the eventual dismissal of criminal charges for technical reasons. It marked both the low water mark and the turning point in military efforts to confront and combat sexual harassment and sexual assault. The Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives concluded that the problem was not an isolated one and that it stemmed from a military culture basically hostile to the presence of women in the traditionally male military occupation.11 If the study is correct in this conclusion, it will be a leadership problem of the first magnitude to turn the situation around. One female officer interviewed for our study felt under particular pressure because of her gender, although she did not report sexual harassment. She said, “I think sometimes you may be expected to do a better job. Or you feel that you have to do a better job because they are watching you. If you mess up, it’s not, Well, Captain —— messed up. It’s, A female officer messed up. . . . You tend to represent a group.”12 Another female officer was not supportive of opening up all job specialties to women. She opposed complete integration of men and women, noting, “There are just some jobs that I don’t think physically women can perform.”13 The 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces voted narrowly to recommend that women be excluded from combat, even combat aircraft, but to permit them on certain types of surface ships. The Clinton administration disregarded this recommendation and, as mentioned earlier, approved women in combat roles except in the ground combat arms.14 But the role of women in combat units remained a serious question for both the military and society. This issue has also complicated the question of the relationship between the sexes, particularly what may or may not occur as a result of the stress of military service—especially the stress of combat. Homosexuality and the Military

From World War II until the Clinton presidency, homosexuals could not be recruited into the military; if homosexuals were discovered there they were subject to discharge.15 Although later discharges were of the nonpunitive, “administrative,” type, the fact remained that homosexuality disqualified a person from being in the military. This policy eroded after the 1992 election as the new president sought to fulfill his campaign promise to end such exclusion. In 1993 the Clinton administration accepted the notion of “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue.” In effect, this policy did not lift the ban on homosexuals in the military but simply avoided the issue of whether to ask about sexual orientation when persons entered the military. Homosexual conduct while in the military still makes one subject to discharge from the service. In 1994 this policy was still being debated, with serious questions remaining regarding proper implementation. For example, Sen. Sam Nunn,

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chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, proposed legislation to implement the new policy. But this proposal sounds tougher overall than what Clinton has proposed, because it contains a set of “findings” expressing congressional intent. Among the 15 findings are the following statements: “The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military service. There is no constitutional right to serve on the armed forces.”16

The rationale for the homosexual exclusion policy as it evolved was unrelated to potential breaches of security and was not based on scientific evidence.17 Rather, it was based on a professional military judgment of the effect the elimination of the ban would have on military effectiveness.18 But one author has written that measurments of combat effectiveness must consider subjective assessments and intuitive judgments as well.19 Because of the difficulty in dealing with subjective issues, many tend to rely solely on objective measures, which are less difficult to address but may not come to grips with all the basic issues of combat effectiveness. Quantitative measures cannot assess the totality of combat effectiveness. Nonetheless, according to the Armed Forces Journal International, about 95 percent of those in military service opposed homosexuals serving openly in the military.20 The comparison of homosexuality in the military with the integration of blacks in the military in 1948 is an obvious one, but misleading. President Truman’s executive order integrating the armed forces was not selfenforcing; true integration did not become effective until many years later, when the personnel were needed and societal norms had evolved to support racial equality. Military efforts on behalf of equal opportunity were assisted by a societal commitment to equality that was marked by the racial integration of schools in 1954, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Even in the 1970s race relations in the military were marked by occasional outbreaks of violence as both black and white militants inflamed racial passions. But in fact, blacks have served openly in the U.S. military in black units for many years, as, for example, in the Civil War, Buffalo Soldiers of the Western plains, in World War II units, and the Tuskegee Airmen. To be sure, homosexuals have served honorably in the military, but they have generally done so without revealing their sexual orientation. In the case of homosexuals and the military, efforts to integrate the force will be hampered to the extent that the broader society has not accepted homosexuality as a valid and morally equivalent alternative to heterosexuality. So long as a significant percentage of society regards homosexuality negatively (ranging from thinking it undesirable to thinking it a moral abomination), the military will find it difficult to find a moral

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foundation on which to base an education program for its members. 21 Writing about the earlier and successful racial integration, one retired general noted that military leaders “had to believe that integration was right and in the best interest of the armed services. Without that conviction, little progress would have been made.”22 To the extent that this conviction does not exist in the military, progress in assimilating homosexuals will be a difficult task. The concern expressed by many in the military regarding homosexuals is reflected in the views of retired army colonel David Hackworth, the most decorated living U.S. veteran. With respect to Congresswoman Pat Schroeder’s efforts at lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military, he wrote, “I cannot think of a better way to destroy the fighting spirit and gut U.S. combat effectiveness.”23 One need not agree with Colonel Hackworth’s conclusion to see the difficulty posed by the pervasiveness of such sentiments. Kevin M. McCrane, a retired New Jersey businessman, relates a personal account of the devastating negative impact on the crew’s morale of a small group of homosexuals in 1945 aboard a U.S. Navy Attack Cargo Auxiliary ship. With respect to the ban on homosexuals in the military, he concludes, “my experience does suggest that military officials are right to worry that ‘good order and discipline of the services will be impaired’ if the ban is lifted.”24 As one of the authors noted previously, the exercise of leadership becomes more problematic as the group to be led becomes more diverse.25 In the final analysis, the governing principle for the military is based on unit cohesion and unit effectiveness. Thus, for many military men and women it is incumbent upon those who support the assignment of homosexuals in the military to show how such an experiment can be undertaken without undue danger to military capability. It is possible that court decisions will render this discussion moot, but after the courts have spoken the leadership problems will remain.

National Service

Another factor that will alter the military’s personnel practices is the advent of some form of national service. The legislation passed in 1993 was strongly supported by President Clinton, who had given it a high priority. But this program is a far cry from the original concept of national service. As Col. Charles Heller has written, “The Administration should rethink its current National Service plan. It is not National Service, it is a make work community projects program that results in educational handout for participants.”26 Heller concluded that “the current legislation to give educational vouchers to youth enrolled in National Service has the potential of destroying the recruitment of quality military age youth for the Armed Forces.”27

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National Service was the theme at a 1993 conference held at the Cantigny estate in Illinois, sponsored by the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation. According to the conference report, “most agreed, however, that national service is debased if it is seen primarily as a way to pay back college loans. Don Eberly spoke for most participants when he said Clinton should ‘frame national service as a challenge to serve, not as a way to pay back loans.’”28 Given that the all-volunteer force was working rather well, it remains to be seen whether the result of this experiment will be to increase military effectiveness or to do the reverse.29 Conclusions

Discussions of social issues and their effect on the military and on civilmilitary relations leave more questions unanswered than answered. It is not possible to predict with certainty what the effect will be of various changes in the social milieu or what will happen in the military if certain changes are made. We would have more confidence in the wisdom of the changes being proposed if we were more certain that they are intended to enhance the combat power of the military. The raison d’être of the military is to defend the country, and the liberal democratic state above all others requires a strong defense. The military is not a jobs program or a laboratory for social experimentation; it is the armed force of the state. At the same time, it would be a grave mistake for the military to ignore the social changes that are taking place. Our research shows that many in civilian graduate education are sensitive to domestic social issues and believe that the military has to respond accordingly. It is believed that, unless the military is sensitive to such issues, the military’s legitimacy in the minds of civilians would be harmed and it would be harder for professional officers to empathize with the values of society. Somehow, a balance must be struck between societal responsiveness and military effectiveness. We next consider in more detail major challenges faced by the military as it adjusts its professional perceptions and self-images to respond to the new political-military equation shaping civil-military relations, particularly in terms of army professionals. Notes

1. We are indebted to Robert A. Vitas for many of the ideas in this section. See Robert A. Vitas, “Education and the Contemporary Military Professional,” unpublished manuscript, March 1, 1990.

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2. Sam C. Sarkesian and William J. Taylor, Jr., “The Case for Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers,” Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 2, February 1975, p. 285. 3. Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971), p. 84. 4. Interview JW-3, pp. 3–4. 5. Interview JW-1, p. 9. 6. Interview JW-12, p. 2. 7. One of the authors was pleasantly surprised when teaching at the U.S. Naval Academy by the reaction of his officemate’s wife (to whom he had previously never spoken) when she found out about the impending birth of the author’s first child. She wanted to be assured that the author’s wife was going to have a baby shower, because if not, she was going to host one for her. 8. Interview JW-10, p. 4. 9. Interview JW-3, p. 6. 10. Charles B. Johnson, Why We Serve: A Follow-Up Study of Society’s Occupational Effect on Junior Marine Officers (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University, 1991). The degree to which occupational tendencies seen in the study have corrupted marine junior officers seems to an outside observer to be quite low. Perhaps the existence of any such tendencies is a problem, however. 11. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Women in the Military: The Tailhook Affair and the Problem of Sexual Harassment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, September 1992). The study also looked at the ways the military dealt with racial integration and drug use to see what lessons could be learned for the issue of sexual harassment. 12. Interview JW-24, p. 2. 13. Interview JW-22, p. 2. 14. The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 15, 1992). 15. The Defense Department defines a homosexual as “a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.” These acts are defined as “bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires.” The definition, as expanded in 1982, includes not only persons who engage in homosexual acts but also those who have homosexual inclinations or desires. See General Accounting Office, Defense Force Management: DOD’s Policy on Homosexuality (Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, June 12, 1992), p. 2. 16. Rick Maze, “House, Senate Agree on Policy,” Army Times, August 9, 1993, p. 10. See also Nick Adde, “Military Gay Policy Is Subject of Suit,” Army Times, August 9, 1993. 17. Maze, pp. 35–38. 18. Comments from the assistant secretary of defense for force management and personnel, in ibid., p. 69. 19. Sam C. Sarkesian, “Introduction: Combat Effectiveness,” in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1980), pp. 8–9. 20. James C. Hyde, “SASC Says Up to 95% of Military Opposed to Homosexuals Serving Openly,” Armed Forces Journal International, June 1993, p. 8.

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21. Most likely, the army will neither condone nor condemn homosexuality so long as it does not violate long-standing rules against sexual harassment, sexual assault, fraternization, or inappropriate displays of affection. 22. Neil Creighton, “Another Challenge for the Military,” Chicago Tribune, November 25, 1992, section 1, p. 13. 23. David Hackworth, “The Case for a Military Gay Ban,” Washington Post, June 28, 1992, p. C5. 24. Kevin M. McCrane, “Gays in the Military? A Cautionary Tale,” Wall Street Journal, December 2, 1992, p. A10. 25. John Allen Williams, “Interpersonal Influences and the Bases of Military Leadership,” Military Review 62, no. 12, December 1982, pp. 56–65. 26. Charles E. Heller, “National Service: A Modern Civilian Conservation Corps?” Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, unpublished working draft, July 4, 1993, p. 31. 27. Ibid., p. 28. 28. Nancy Ethiel, Building a Consensus on National Service, Cantigny Conference Series (Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, April 21–23, 1993), p. 21. 29. For strong arguments in favor of national service, see Charles C. Moskos, A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community (New York: Free Press, 1988); Charles C. Moskos and Frank E. Woods, eds., The Military— More Than Just a Job? (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988); and Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

5 Professional Perceptions and Self-Images As we move into the next century, military professionals who served in Vietnam and in the immediate post-Vietnam period are disappearing from the professional ranks. Professional self-esteem and self-images will be shaped increasingly by those who served during the Gulf War period (1991). The traditional notion of “military professional” remains the critical component in shaping professional perceptions, but these various perceptions and self-images are affected by the attitudes and beliefs of the society at large, in particular of opinion leaders and those in governing positions. Although it may appear self-evident, it is still important to remind ourselves that how the individual professional sees his or her career and the purpose of the profession is critical in affecting professional cohesion, professional ethos, and the sense of esprit of the military institution. It is also true that military professionals must relate the credibility of the profession to the culture and values of the society that they serve. The dynamics between professional self-image and societal values and beliefs are at the core of professional and institutional cohesion and are critical to the legitimacy and credibility of military service. These are not easy matters to examine or to reconcile. In this respect, one is reminded of the view expressed by William Tecumseh Sherman of Civil War fame that “there is a soul to an army as well as to the individual.” 1 Too often the numbers game, budgetary considerations, and career motives seem to overshadow the army’s soul. It is useful to reflect on the meaning of self-images and self-esteem and how they relate to military professionalism. Self-image refers to the way one sees himself or herself as a human being and a professional and affects the importance placed on a professional career. For our purposes, self-esteem refers primarily to the regard one places on himself or herself in the performance of professional duties and in the degree of competence one perceives he or she brings to the profession. For high self-esteem, there must be a deep sense of professional purpose and accomplishment, 89

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not only in the individual but also as the individual sees the profession. These matters are affected by how the professional perceives the stature and role of the profession within U.S. society. In turn, much of this latter condition is shaped by the nature of the times—that is, such matters as the prevailing political environment, public attitudes, sense of progress, and quality of life. As noted earlier, the military claims a distinction from other professions. This rests on the notion of “ultimate liability.” Further, the state is the sole client of the profession, with all this suggests regarding control of the military. As one authority concludes, the officers corps forms “a conscious and coherent group operating within but largely apart from the governmental structure. Such a group has . . . its own distinctive entrance and tenure procedures, its own sensitivity and code of privacy. It constitutes as it were a guild.”2 In more specific terms, professional images evolving from core traditional notions and from a coherent and conscious group identity include selflessness, commitment to the state, loyalty to the institution, loyalty to the “regiment,” professional behavior, and honorable service. Further, although all military professions exhibit some universal characteristics, each profession is distinct in the way it serves its own state and society. In turn, U.S. professional self-images and notions of honorable service to society and the state are shaped by democratic culture and the attitudes and beliefs of the nation’s people. It follows that military professionals also expect society and the political system to reflect certain preferred characteristics and social behavior. When these do not conform to professional perceptions, professional self-images are affected, causing dysfunction between the military and society. This can also lead to professional self-examination and a rethinking of the professional relationship to society and of professional stature and behavior. Military professionals have their own notions of social and political priorities. These reflect the dynamics of a particular period and perceptions of threat. In the new security era and into the next century, the changes in U.S. society and the changing nature of the security landscape are challenging prevailing military professional self-images and professional perceptions about the international landscape and the shape of the military institution.3 In coming to grips with prevailing views and perceptions and how these may be changing, it is useful to review how these have been affected in the past. Over the past 40 years, while the core traditional notion of duty, honor, country remained firm, professional self-images and perceptions underwent three challenging periods and are in the process of going through a fourth. These periods include the Cold War era, the Vietnam era, restoration and the technological era, and the Gulf War period and transition

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afterward. The first three periods were shaped by the superpower system and the challenges of the Soviet Union. The last period is being shaped by the collapse of the Soviet challenge, the emergence of a new world order, and the changing U.S. domestic environment. The Cold War

Following World War II and well into the Vietnam period, the military profession generally felt comfortable with its self-image, the way it perceived its relationship with society, and the general nature of society itself. This was particularly true during the Eisenhower administration, when political order and a sense of satisfaction seemed to pervade most sections of society and the political system. For the military professional, the notion of duty, honor, country was not only translated into loyalty, commitment, service, and integrity but was seen generally as part of the U.S. political order. To be sure, there always were gaps between the idealized view and realities. Nonetheless, the idealized view is the driving force for professional self-images and notions of the political-social system. “The idealized climate is characterized by: individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical competence, and an unconstrained flow of information. It is epitomized in the words, Duty-Honor-Country.”4 One authority has written that 1950–1968 was a period in which “the American military enjoyed a privileged position within the American political system . . . the Pentagon received its manpower at virtually no cost . . . [and] within the councils of government the Pentagon and its leaders had a strong impact on policy.”5 This was generally true, even though during the Korean War there were some signs that students in universities viewed the military negatively.6 When societal notions place the military in an exalted position or perceive it as a moral and credible institution, the military profession is likely to translate this into positive self-images. Positive professional perceptions of society are driven, in part, by a sense of order and satisfaction with the quality of life. This also reinforces what military professionals expect of a well-established political system. Even those writing in the 1960s and 1970s who were highly critical of the U.S. Army in the Vietnam period acknowledge that “during the post–Pearl Harbor years the theory that ‘armed forces do not make wars’ and that military strength is the only source of security and peace, became the dominating philosophy. The Korean War, although it became extremely unpopular and resulted in the defeat of the party in power, was to see little erosion of military prestige.”7 An important part of this prestige

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and positive self-image existed because from the Korean War through the mid-1960s the specter of communism and the Soviet Union provided a clearly identifiable enemy. The positive view of the military was reinforced by the need to develop an effective posture for the nuclear arms race, deterrence, and the possibility of nuclear war. Military professional self-images were also reinforced by domestic political-social dynamics and attitudes of the U.S. people. The link between these seems self-evident. Additionally, there was a high degree of satisfaction and well-being within the U.S. polity. In turn, these reinforced the view of many military professionals regarding what many considered a well-ordered and satisfying civilian environment. A. J. Bacevich has written that “society’s reliance on professionals to perform their critical role provides the source of prestige and prerogatives, underpinning professional self-esteem. Thus, members of any profession have powerful incentives to cherish and protect their ‘ownership’ of the service that they provide to society as a whole.”8 Although perceptions and social-military dynamics varied from time to time, during the period until the Vietnam War these remained generally positive and reinforcing. Further, they tended to give credence to professional perceptions regarding the “good” society and the “evil” empire. In the long term, these relationships and events strengthened the legitimacy and credibility of the military institution. This is not to suggest that professional self-images were not deprecated during the pre-Vietnam period. A marine corps officer, examining a public opinion poll conducted by the Gallup organization in 1956, concluded that there was a “diminishing prestige and waning trust and confidence” within the “general body of commissioned officers.” He went on to note that, “seen through the eyes of the individual officer, a great deal of the tangible evidence of this derogation comes from within the Department of Defense—from policies and attitudes at least partially of our own making.”9 Some also have pointed out that much of the popular literature on the military and military professionals during the past decades has been very uncomplimentary, with many writers highly critical of the military. “In twentieth century American literature, the professional military (both the institution and the individuals who belong to it) is criticized, suspected, feared, and not infrequently identified as the enemy.”10 Nonetheless, U.S. military professionals, including those in the army, to which much of the literary criticism was directed, have developed a decided disdain regarding the fairness and objectivity of writers in literature and in the mass media.11 However, the military profession remains both attuned and sensitive to the general attitudes of society. Thus, although it may be argued that professional self-images and perceptions of the “outer world” underwent some deterioration in the

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aftermath of the Korean War, the general themes in U.S. society seemed to support the stature and prestige of the military profession. It was also a time of change within the military institution. As noted earlier, the U.S. military was desegregated by a 1948 executive order, changing the institution’s entire sociology. In addition, the U.S. Army went through a period of readjustment in the post–Korean War period while trying to develop force structures for a “nuclear” war. These developments placed pressures on professional self-esteem and self-images and affected how professionals perceived U.S. society. But compared with the Vietnam period, the 1950s appear to have been good for the military profession’s self-image. Although spoken in 1969, when the Vietnam War was taking its toll on the U.S. military, the following statement offers insights into traditional professional self-images and perceptions of domestic society. Aimed primarily at West Point graduates, it is relevant to U.S. Army professionals as well: We do not know when the great fountain of honor, duty, and love of country as stored in the hearts and minds of the some twenty-five thousand graduates of West Point . . . will be the granite strength which will preserve this country from the evil forces now seeking to undermine it. . . . [A]uthority in the government and self-discipline in the citizenry are the urgent needs of the day.12

The general stature and prestige of the U.S. military and professional self-images established in the 1950s continued until the mid-1960s, until about the turning point of the Vietnam War. This change took place in 1968, following the Tet Offensive and President Johnson’s decision not to seek a second term. Vietnam

The U.S. Army experience in Vietnam began with high hope and confidence and ended in humiliating withdrawal and the subsequent defeat of South Vietnam. As the war moved into 1968, critics within the United States became louder and more numerous. Increasingly, the critics focused on army operations and military behavior. Ultimately this criticism was heard by the U.S. populace and affected its view of military competence. Army professionals began to look more closely at themselves, their own competence, and the role of the army in Vietnam. As early as 1967, signs of U.S. discontent with the war had appeared. These did not go unnoticed by U.S. personnel in Vietnam. In 1967 Hugh Mulligan wrote:

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In no other war have respected voices in the community, people in authority, people of eminence—senators, representatives, clergymen, professors, even some military men—questioned the morality as well as wisdom of our intervention and raised grave doubts about our motives . . . while half a world away 400,000 American troops already are committed to fighting and dying.13

In sum, as the war progressed and signs of dissatisfaction and disaffection began to appear in U.S. society, army operations and the conduct of military personnel were examined more critically by the media and were transmitted back to the United States. Media assessments of the impact of military operations in Vietnam became less complimentary. Thus began a steady decline in U.S. support of the war, eventually affecting army professionals and the conduct of the war itself. And as Janowitz pointed out, in reference to the Korean War, “such public attitudes serve to deprecate the image that the professional officer holds of himself.”14 Confidence and Faith in the U.S. Army

As pointed out in the preceding chapter, by 1968 many in the United States had lost confidence in the country’s ability to prosecute the Vietnam War successfully. This erosion of national will and political resolve affected the views and perceptions of army professionals. As Andrew Krepinevich concluded: At the beginning of 1968, despite the absence of appreciable progress, the Army’s faith in its attrition strategy remained unshaken. Nothing was wrong with the way the Army was fighting the war, the brass maintained. The Army would prevail—eventually. . . . For the American people and the Johnson administration, the Tet Offensive provided the shock that led to their loss of faith in the Army’s strategy.15

This loss of faith spilled over into the officers corps, exacerbating the erosion of confidence within the lower ranks. This erosion and disintegration were graphically portrayed in popular books such as Haynes Johnson and George C. Wilson, Army in Anguish; George Walton, The Tarnished Shield: A Report on Today’s Army; and James Pickerell, Vietnam in the Mud.16 There were also numerous articles written and studies performed on the U.S. military and Vietnam. By the middle of 1968, serious questions were being raised in the United States through the media and in the literature. The spillover of antiwar and counterculture sentiments was beginning to be seen in army ranks. Army professionals were beginning to question the state of the profession, their self-images and perceptions of U.S. society, and the nature of the Vietnam War. The privileged position of the earlier period had disappeared.17

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One of the most scathing critiques of the army profession emerging out of Vietnam was that of Col. David H. Hackworth, a highly decorated infantry officer. Colonel Hackworth retired from the army in 1971 and charged that the institution was corrupt, practiced “ticket punching,” and focused on careerism. He also charged the army with poor leadership and top-heaviness in brass. Although some questioned Hackworth’s credibility, Hackworth’s service was unquestioned and his assertions found some support in later studies.18 As the war progressed and U.S. support waned, army professionals were faced with problems of combat effectiveness and sense of purpose. The antiwar sentiment and decisionmaking process of the war seemed to fly against the notions of cohesion, discipline, and loyalty. This erosion of the high ideals of army professionalism deepened as events surrounding the My Lai incident became public. The My Lai Incident

The My Lai incident added considerable fuel to the degradation of the army’s posture in Vietnam, its stature, and its members’ self-esteem. An attack on My Lai 4, a small hamlet in South Vietnam, on March 16, 1968, by Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, led to the massacre of many civilians. This was followed by the U.S. Army charging Lt. William Calley in the murder of more than 400 civilians.19 Subsequently, an authoritative report on the incident by Maj. Gen. William R. Peers revealed poor leadership at various levels of command, eventually involving the superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, who had served as division commander of the units involved at My Lai.20 Not only did the report reinforce the view of those who held that the war had a largely negative impact on American fighting men, but it also concluded that there was a serious negative impact on US military professionalism. The cover-up of the My Lai massacre by several high-ranking army officers did little for the image of the military officer as a moral, ethical, and thoughtful professional.21

One research study found that career officers “equalled or exceeded civilians in their opposition to obedience in a My Lai–type situation—an inappropriate and unprofessional use of military force.”22 The involvement of a number of army professionals, some of high rank, in My Lai and its aftermath was partially responsible for the erosion of self-image, self-esteem, and the concept of duty, honor, country. Even in the contemporary period the My Lai incident remains a compelling story. It is clear that My Lai represents a dark page in U.S. Army annals and for army professionals.

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U.S. Army War College Studies on Military Professionalism

Several studies were conducted during 1970–1972 under the auspices of the U.S. Army War College that offer revealing insights on problems within the U.S. Army military profession encountered during the Vietnam period. These studies include Leadership for the 1970’s, Army Tasks for the Seventies, and Study on Military Professionalism.23 The last study was viewed as so damaging to the idealized notions of the military profession and the behavior and conduct of army professionals in Vietnam that it was originally marked “For Official Use Only.” In attempting to focus on leadership issues resulting from Vietnam and to go beyond the context of the war, the army organized an 18-person team to conduct research for the Leadership study. Data were collected from 1,800 individuals “representing a broad base of Army leadership up to and including 8–10 percent of the Army’s general officers.”24 Although the focus of the research varied from other studies, it did reveal common themes. For example, the study concluded that, almost without fail, when professionals talk about professionalism, there is the recurring theme of the ambitious, transitory commander—marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties—engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks. . . . Despite concerted efforts to remedy much of the non-professionalism illustrated by the theme, the theme persists.25

This study also contained a comprehensive bibliography covering material on management, organization, and human relations, as well as leadership principles and concepts. Many of the references focused specifically on military professionalism, the problems emanating from Vietnam, and what needed to be done to improve army professionalism. (Army Tasks followed the path originally established by the Leadership study and will be discussed in more detail in the following sections because it specifically attempts to get beyond Vietnam.) According to the Study on Military Professionalism, “the focus of the research effort was on the value system of today’s Army officer. The major portion of the data base was derived from interviews, seminars, and questionnaires conducted and administered in May 1970.”26 Accordingly, 450 officers responded to the questionnaire and 250 of these participated in group discussions. Some of the most damaging conclusions of the study relate to professional self-images, esteem, and perceptions of the profession: The ideal standards of ethical/moral/professional behavior as epitomized by “Duty-Honor-Country” are accepted by the Officer Corps as proper, meaningful, and relevant for the Army of today.

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There are widespread and often significant differences between the ideal ethical/moral/professional standards of the Army—as epitomized by Duty-Honor-Country—and the prevailing standards. . . . The most frequently recurring specific themes describing the variance between ideal and actual standards of behavior in the Officer Corps include selfish, promotion-oriented behavior; inadequate communication between junior and senior; distorted or dishonest reporting of status, statistics, or officer efficiency; technical or managerial incompetence; disregard for principles but total respect for accomplishing even the most trivial mission with zero defects; disloyalty to subordinates; [and] senior officers setting poor standards of ethical/professional behavior. The present climate is not conducive to retaining junior officers who place strong emphasis on principle rather than expediency.27

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Part of the Vietnam experience carried over well into the post-Vietnam era. In the aftermath of the war, critics of the military and the military profession linked much of their assessment to the Vietnam War. Until Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Desert Storm (Persian Gulf), analyses of the military and the profession often were reflected through a Vietnam lens. For example, the author of Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn’t Win wrote: The American military is in serious trouble. Its recent historical record, to say nothing of its disastrous performance in Vietnam, has been marked far more often by failure than by success. Its military plans and execution have been unrealistic and unsuccessful. The officer corps by any historical standard is lacking in the spirit and expertise that have characterized the more successful officer corps in history.28

Even though the historical facts do not necessarily support such conclusions and the author’s view of Vietnam can be challenged, the author’s claim reinforced criticism of the army and its officers corps during and after the Vietnam period.29 Indeed, Military Incompetence gave additional substance to the earlier findings of the Study on Military Professionalism. Beyond Vietnam

For Army Tasks for the Seventies, questionnaires were sent to 4,200 army officers in 1972 to determine their attitudes and perceptions. Of these, approximately 3,900 were returned. Despite an orientation toward the Soviet threat and nuclear war, some of the findings are particularly revealing with respect to self-images, esteem, and perceptions of the U.S. political-social environment.30 Younger officers saw social and domestic problems as the greatest dangers while senior officers focused on traditional foreign enemies. . . .

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Young officers feel that more emphasis should be placed on Army social problems, remedial education, direct involvement in the nation’s ecological problems, and the cadre function.31 Those who felt that the United States should guarantee the integrity of its allies believe that the greatest dangers to the United States are external, primarily military threats, while those who felt the opposite believed that the primary dangers are internal and/or social problems. Those who saw a purpose for a strong military (i.e., external military threats, need to defend allies, etc.) also believed that a military career for a newly commissioned officer is relatively more satisfying than did those who did not see such a purpose.

This study was concluded in 1972, during the last days of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The all-volunteer military was on the horizon, and the United States was well into its withdrawal from Vietnam. But it seems clear that for the younger generation of officers, U.S. political-social matters were important to their own views of the role and purposes of the military. Such matters were linked to the individual professional self-images and perceptions of the outer world. Like any army moving from war to peace, this Army was entering a period in which it would search high and low for its soul. Only the vanquished truly learn anything from the last war, according to an ancient maxim, and the issue now confronting America was whether the defeated nation and the nation’s vanquished Army would learn anything from Vietnam.32

Society, the War, and the Army

The period from the mid-1960s well into the 1970s was one in which the U.S. military was trying to adjust to the demands of an unconventional conflict that seemed to defy all the Clausewitzian and traditional notions of military doctrine and combat. At the same time, U.S. society and its political system were going through dramatic and traumatic changes posed by the civil rights movement; the assassinations of Pres. John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King; the growth of a counterculture, and the rise of strong antiwar movements that ultimately included both liberal and conservative groups. Particularly damaging was the spillover of counterculture sentiments into the ranks of the army in the late 1960s. Fraggings, the use of dope, and military operations and atrocities in Vietnam were prominently reported in the mass media. Even though much of the media provided only fragments of the war and sometimes distorted these, the impact on U.S. society was deep. This impact, in turn, affected army professionals’ views of their profession and the U.S. political-social environment. It was terribly disturbing for them as well as for the army as an institution. Dissatisfaction with the

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profession and the military career was epitomized by the resignation of a number of army officers while assigned as members of the faculty at West Point.33 The agonizing and deeply disturbing developments in army professional ranks and the institution evolving from the Vietnam War were reflected in the words of a graduate of West Point. Writing in 1973, he concluded: It can be stated categorically that our recent experience was, for us, historically unique. Never before had this nation, while faced with an extended and burdensome war, encountered such vigorous, sustained challenges to its value system. In earlier conflicts, war-time was a period for reaffirmation of “basic Americanism” and for pride in the soldier’s role in its defense. The appropriate role of the professional soldier in America is surely more confused now than at any previous time.34

By 1972 U.S. strategy in Vietnam had come full circle, from advice and support to Americanization to Vietnamization. A cease-fire was agreed to between the United States and North Vietnam in 1973. This agreement stipulated that the United States and third countries would remove their forces from South Vietnam within 60 days and all military activities against the North would cease. However, the North could keep all its forces in the South, making South Vietnamese military bases vulnerable to attack. Several months after this agreement was signed, the U.S. Congress prohibited any further military involvement in Vietnam. By 1975, with no further aid and assistance from the United States, South Vietnam was conquered and occupied by the North Vietnamese. It is impossible to overestimate the full impact of the South Vietnamese defeat on U.S. Army professionals. For many, the defeat of the South was a political-military failure due to the collapse of U.S. political resolve brought about by society’s loss of faith and confidence in the U.S. military. Although it can be argued that there were hints at a “stab in the back” attitude felt by professionals, more blamed themselves and the U.S. military institution.35 Even in 1992, some army professionals focused on the impact of U.S. attitudes on the withdrawal from the Vietnam War: We withdrew from Vietnam because the American people as a whole had lost the will to prosecute the war. There were many reasons for that loss of endorsement, but perhaps the most gnawing was the widespread belief that we had “lost the moral high ground,” that it was immoral for us to continue fighting as we were fighting. . . . The soldier learned that his sacrifices and sufferings were misunderstood, unappreciated and even ridiculed by many Americans.36

In this context, an incident at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1975 is particularly revealing. In the auditorium of assembled

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students of the college, many of whom served in Vietnam, the president of the class, a U.S. Army major, took the rostrum to announce the fall of South Vietnam. He then asked for a minute of silence in honor of the South Vietnamese who had fought and died for their country. The young officer left the rostrum with the parting comments that we had let our allies down and had left South Vietnam with our tail between our legs.37 Professional self-images and esteem suffered as the gap between society and the military grew, driven by anger and bitterness. Segments of society appeared to place blame on the army and its professionals for conducting an evil and immoral war. This view, in turn, seemed to permeate the media, particularly television, portraying an army adrift and conducting a war on its own terms—a war that had degenerated into savagery. Trying to maintain a sense of self-esteem and self-images based on honor and integrity in such a domestic environment was extremely difficult. Emerging from the Vietnam War, military professionals were disillusioned, to say the least. Many were angry towards the American public for its lack of support or appreciation for the sacrifices made by the nation’s men and women in uniform, who, after all, were only carrying out the policies of the country’s leaders, elected by the people themselves. Finally, there was an inner-directed anger at having been pushed into fighting a war on the enemy’s terms instead of its own.38

By the mid-1970s, the all-volunteer military had taken effect. Selective service had ended and the U.S. military entered the recruiting game in earnest, with the U.S. Army facing the most difficult problem. Many enlistees lacked a high school diploma and scored in Category IV on the Armed Forces Qualification Test—the lowest mental category.39 This was not the first time the army was faced with such problems. During the latter part of the Vietnam War, Project One Hundred Thousand was implemented as an experiment designed to place people of relatively low intelligence into the armed forces. Many of them became riflemen in Vietnam. 40 Equally disturbing, the army officers corps was still reeling from the effects of the Vietnam experience. Not only had there been a dramatic reduction in enrollments in ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) on college campuses during the latter part of the Vietnam War, some argued that entrance standards for officers had been lowered.41 According to Shelby Stanton, “the decline of the American Army was well under way by the end of the year [1969].”42 This decline continued well into the 1970s. Thus, as the army withdrew from Vietnam and tried to focus on new tasks, it was faced with lingering unit problems of racism, sexism, discipline, and motivation. A gap between officers and enlisted

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personnel also remained a problem. For many army professionals, this led to a loss of confidence in their own profession, negative self-images and esteem, as well as some very critical views of domestic society. It was from such an environment that the army tried to renew and restore its sense of purpose and to restore its pride. Perceptions of U.S. Army Professionals

Research by academicians and by the U.S. Army in the immediate postVietnam period revealed views and perceptions of army professionals on a variety of issues. One study found, not surprisingly, that public views of Vietnam and of the military were closely related. “One possible interpretation . . . is that those who are generally supportive of the military establishment have, as a result, been least critical of our past involvement in Vietnam. . . . Vietnam views are shaped by broader attitudes about the military.”43 Another interpretation is that views “about the Vietnam involvement are generalized to the larger military establishment, so that negative feelings about Vietnam lead to negative views about military spending, influence, leadership, and the like.”44 The same study found that career officers believed that military influence in the political process was low. Contradictory themes showed up in polling and in research studies. In the early 1970s, for example, the U.S. public seemed to reject U.S. involvement in Vietnam; but it had a positive view of the military as an organization. Indeed, in a newspaper poll in 1974 it was found that the military was the most admired U.S. institution.”45 Yet the Study on Military Professionalism revealed that army professionals were highly critical of their own profession and the behavior of many superior officers. In the post-Vietnam period, until the 1980s, mixed reviews remained in the civilian sector regarding the role and influence of the military in society. Although the military as an institution received high grades, civilian views regarding large-scale military spending were negative. Also, the shift to a volunteer system seemed to isolate the military from society. The military tended to retreat to a traditional mold, one that it was more comfortable with and that seemed to separate it from the preying eyes of society. Writing in 1978, one observer concluded that the military had abandoned its territory to civilian agencies and that it, “in effect, has become a guardian of traditions that appear unrelated to everyday activities.”46 Even as late as 1979 one army officer wrote: The Army has inherited from society a number of serious social problems. Although the Army has not been the principal source of these problems, they have, nevertheless, negatively affected both its general efficiency in such areas as morale, proficiency and discipline and its combat readiness. . . . [T]he Army is currently facing another major societal

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induced threat to its combat readiness and general military efficiency— sociopolitical alienation.47

It was during this period that the army chief of staff, Gen. Edward C. Meyer, labeled the service a “hollow army,” with all that suggested regarding quality and combat capability.48 Although certain problems within the army were blamed on U.S. society, social issues had a lingering effect on some army professionals. Recent studies show that a body of opinion exists within army professional ranks that is more sensitive to domestic social issues and more open in trying to deal with them.49 In retrospect, the 1970s was a period of transition, with the army and its professionals trying to get beyond Vietnam and rebuild the institution and the profession and to restore a sense of purpose, self-esteem, and positive self-images. Referring to the West Point class of 1966 and how it fared in the aftermath of Vietnam, Rick Atkinson wrote, “The Army had spent the 1970s trying to cure itself of the ills of Vietnam. . . . In the early 1980s, things began to change. . . . As the Army regained its self-confidence, it lost patience with drug users and racist troublemakers—black, white, brown—who were summarily booted from the service.”50 Renewal and Regrouping

The decade of the 1980s provided the psychological and financial wherewithal for the army and the U.S. military establishment in general to regain confidence, to restore a high sense of self-esteem, and to reshape positive self-images. The shift to an all-volunteer system provided an increasingly high quality of recruits. Public opinion also gave high marks to the military system. These changes seemed to provide the psychological sustenance for the profession to overcome much of the Vietnam tarnish. This was underpinned by the concentration on the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The focus of the military on clear objectives, combined with doctrine and operational principles embedded in mainstream military posture and mind-sets, reinforced the concept of traditional military purpose, strengthening esprit de corps. Equally important, the U.S. public seemed to understand the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Union—in stark contrast to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The military profession settled into a relatively comfortable position buoyed by positive civil-military relations and a sense of purpose lost during the Vietnam era. But as the decade ended, changes in the security landscape and world power relationships posed a serious problem for the U.S. Army and its military professionals.

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The drive to renew military capability and professional purpose during the 1980s seems to have been vindicated by what many felt was U.S. “victory” in the Cold War. With a considerably lessened threat, plans were developed to draw down the size of the military, with the U.S. Army facing the greatest challenge. Before such plans were seriously put into place, the United States became involved in the Gulf War. It was in the immediate aftermath of the success of U.S. arms in the war that the renewal of professional self-esteem and pride reached a high point. Following the Gulf War, plans for the drawdown and downsizing of the U.S. Army began in earnest. As these plans progressed, concern resurfaced within professional ranks regarding the future role of the army. A body of army officers saw the world in more complex terms even before the demise of the Soviet Union. They believed that challenges and threats were beyond simple ideological distinctions of communism and capitalism. Moreover, these officers believed that the military had to be more attuned to the political and social issues within U.S. society. Yet it seems that the dramatic changes that took place in 1990 and 1991 had gone beyond even these views. In this context, research has shown that most army officers tended to be cautious about accepting dramatic changes in the military system. This reflected concern not only about the future role and missions of the military but also about the officers’ own careers. Nonetheless, in the post–Gulf War period, most professionals took pride in the accomplishments of the army, reinforcing the sense of pride that was achieved during the Reagan era. Yet, it is also clear that there is a greater awareness of changes taking place within the military, changes that may have a detrimental impact on individual careers and the army’s capability to respond to future threats. There is also a degree of fear that the civilian world not only lacks a serious understanding of the military professional but that it also is too optimistic about the movement toward a peaceful world. Consequently, a creeping erosion of professional self-image and pride in the profession has begun. The fear that the public and elected officials will, in the long run, undermine the combat capability and raison d’être of the army has provided some momentum to this erosion. Probably the most difficult issue facing army professionals is to reconcile the restructuring of the U.S. Army and its reduced size with the individual’s professional career and his or her relationship with the civilian world. And as one researcher noted, “It is undeniable that in spite of the ongoing problems in staff and structure, and impending changes being imposed by a changing environment, there is a high level of pride associated with service in the Army by those officers surveyed.”51 Most felt that only in the military could they fulfill their goals in life. Further, many believed that only in the military can one truly serve one’s country. Officers

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exposed to civilian graduate education tended to be more flexible and open-minded about other professions in service to the country, but they also felt a high degree of loyalty to the military and to the notion of service to the country. One long-standing, simmering issue within the profession has become sharper and more pronounced in the post–Gulf War period. This has to do with the debate over whether the army should focus once again on being a “war-winning” profession or whether it should broaden its focus to include a variety of contingencies, from humanitarian assistance and socially relevant missions to unconventional conflicts. U.S. involvement in Somalia beginning in 1992 and in Rwanda and Haiti in 1994 highlighted this issue even more. This is further reflected in the debate over the importance of combat leadership (being with the troops) as compared with “dual” professionalism and on the importance of military technicians and managers. Those in the combat branches appear concerned about the apparent denigration of troop command as a result of the impact of a high-tech military machine with sophisticated weaponry, complex communications systems, computers, and the consequent rise of the military specialist. Again, the army seems to be faced with the most difficult adjustment. Army professionals have been in the process of trying to reconcile professional ethos and self-pride with a smaller army that in the early 1990s had yet to come to grips with the new security landscape. Equally important, with most of the U.S. Army stationed in the United States and the probability of lengthy stateside duty in one location for many professionals, the whole notion of civil-military relations is bound to undergo changes at the local level. This is also true at the national level, as civilian society and its elected leaders embark on cutting the U.S. Army by at least 25 percent. The Army is searching for appropriate missions in the new era. Professionals are faced with reconciling their careers and a period of illdefined threats and contingencies that have made it difficult to maintain the raison d’être of the profession in terms as compelling as was possible in the 1980s. Thus, the profession is faced not only with reconciling itself with a liberal society intent on a peace dividend but also with a new security environment where threats and challenges are ill defined and emanate from uncertain areas.

Notes

1. William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman (New York: Library of America, 1990), p. 879. 2. Walter Millis with H. C. Mansfield and H. Stein, Arms and the State: CivilMilitary Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 6.

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3. Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Fred B. Bryant, “Civilian Graduate Education and U.S. Military Professionalism,” paper delivered at the American Political Science Association convention, Chicago, September 3–6, 1992. 4. U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: June 30, 1970), p. 13. This study was originally marked “For Official Use Only.” 5. Lawrence J. Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 1970s (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 4–5. 6. See Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 226. 7. George Walton, The Tarnished Shield: A Report on Today’s Army (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1973), p. 26. 8. A. J. Bacevich, “New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism,” Parameters 20, no. 4, December 1990, p. 15. 9. R. D. Heinl, Jr., “Special Trust and Confidence,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 82, no. 5, May 1956, p. 463. 10. Alfred Kern, “Literary Perception of the American Military,” Military Ethics: Reflections on Principles—The Profession of Arms, Military Leadership, Ethical Practices, War and Morality, Educating the Citizen-Soldier (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), pp. 203–204. 11. See, for example, Lloyd Matthews, ed., Newsmen and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable? (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1991). 12. Abbot Boone, “To Get Ahead Requires Hard Work . . . but a Little Luck Helps,” Assembly 27, Spring 1969, p. 49, as quoted in Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore, School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 14. 13. Hugh Mulligan, No Place to Die: The Agony of Vietnam (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1967), p. 318. 14. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 226. 15. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 237. 16. Haynes Johnson and George C. Wilson, Army in Anguish (New York: Pocket Books, 1972); George Walton, The Tarnished Shield; and James Pickerell, Vietnam in the Mud (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966). 17. Part of these observations are based on personal experience during a tour of duty in Vietnam (1966–1967) by one of the authors of this book. 18. See, for example, David H. Hackworth, “Army Leadership Is Ineffective,” Washington Post, June 29, 1971. See also the discussion of Colonel Hackworth and Lt. Col. Anthony B. Herbert in William L. Hauser, America’s Army in Transition: A Study of Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 178–183. 19. See, for example, Seymour Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath (New York: Vintage Books, 1970). For a detailed analysis, see William R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (New York: Norton, 1978). See also Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz, The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of Law? The Peers Commission Report (New York: Free Press, 1976). 20. Peers, My Lai Inquiry. 21. Sam C. Sarkesian, The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 140.

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22. Jerald G. Bachman and John G. Blair, Soldiers, Sailors & Civilians: The “Military Mind” & the All-Volunteer Force (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 93. 23. Leadership for the 1970’s: USAWC Study of Leadership for the Professional Soldier (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, July 1, 1971), hereafter referred to as the Leadership study; Army Tasks for the Seventies—The Decade of the Seventies: Perspectives and Implications for the United States Army (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, June 1972), hereafter referred to as Army Tasks; and Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, June 30, 1972). 24. Army Tasks, p. v. 25. Leadership Study, pp. 37–38. 26. Study on Military Professionalism, p. 4. 27. Ibid., pp. 30–31. 28. Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn’t Win (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 199. 29. For a highly critical attack on the views of Richard Gabriel, see James H. Webb, “Military Competence,” Defense Issues 1, no. 61, remarks prepared for delivery at the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, August 28, 1986. 30. Army Tasks. This study was performed under the direction of the chief of staff of the U.S. Army. The conclusions that follow are taken from this report, pp. IV-1 and IV-2, except as indicated. 31. The last sentence is from Army Tasks, p. IV-17. 32. Rick Atkinson, The Long Gray Line (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989), p. 369. 33. Ibid., pp. 347–349. 34. C. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 202. 35. See, for example, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), and William J. Colby with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989). 36. Thomas J. Begines, “The American Military and the Western Idea,” Military Review 72, no. 3, March 1992, p. 43. 37. One author of this volume was present during this incident in 1975. What is recounted here is based on memory. No written records are available. 38. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, p. 269. 39. For a brief discussion of the problems of the all-volunteer army during the 1970s, see Sam C. Sarkesian, “Who Serves?” Society 18, no. 3, March/April 1981, pp. 57–60. 40. Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1973 (New York: Dell Publishing, 1985), p. 279. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., p. 280. 43. Bachman and Blair, Soldiers, Sailors & Civilians, p. 128. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid., p. 33. 46. Robert Leider, “Muddling Through Won’t Do,” in John B. Keeley, The All-Volunteer Force and American Society (Charlottesville: University of Virgina Press, 1978), p. 197.

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47. Stephen D. Wesbrook, “The Alienated Soldier: Legacy of Society,” Army, December 1979, p. 18. 48. See Atkinson, Long Gray Line, p. 494. 49. See Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant, “Civilian Graduate Education.” 50. Atkinson, Long Gray Line, p. 494. 51. Melvin Sorg, “Restoration and Renewal,” unpublished report, May 3, 1992, p. 3.

Part 3 Political-Military Dynamics

6 The Profession and Politics Military professionals historically have been suspicious of politicians and contemptuous of political activity. Bargaining, making negotiations and compromises, and consensus building have been seen as self-serving and contrary to professional principles. Also, order, stability, and predictability have been seen by military professionals as the characteristics of effective political systems. Accordingly, discipline, skill, loyalty, and obedience form the basis for responding to challenges and solving problems.1 These professional characteristics were summed up by C. Wright Mills, who wrote, “Inside their often trim bureaucracy, where everything seems under neat control, army officers have felt that ‘politics’ is a dirty, uncertain, and ungentlemanly kind of game; and in terms of their status code, they have often felt that politicians were unqualified creatures inhabiting an uncertain world.”2 According to this perspective, the military world attempted to keep its distance from the civilian world and from politics in general. This is not to say that military professionals isolated themselves completely from the civilian political realm. Early in U.S. history, military officers not only engaged in internal politics but also did not hesitate to attack elected officials. At times, some professional officers—most notably, Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower—also entered the political arena.3 In the first half of the 19th century, army officers periodically attacked fellow officers or disparaged politicians whom they felt knew little of the military. According to one officer, “While military men might disagree on politics, almost all took a dim view of politicians, who appeared ever ready to interfere in Army matters beyond their ken. The attitude persisted despite most officers’ belief that they themselves had every right to participate vigorously in the political process.”4 In any case, the relationship among politicians, the political system, and army professionals continues to be an uncomfortable one. In the contemporary period, the traditional distaste for politics and dislike of most politicians continues. There are exceptions, depending on the nature of the times and whether a politician has served in the military. In turn, the 111

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ingrained antimilitary tradition in the United States as a liberal society is not lost on most army professionals. The relationship is not reconciled by isolating the military from the political realm. As N. Fotion and G. Elfstrom have written, “It does not follow that the proper level of involvement by the military in political matters must be total abstinence. The military establishment deserves a fair hearing in the political arena as do other establishments . . . since each provides service[s] to the community that need to be explained and funded.”5 Earlier Years

In the aftermath of the Civil War, the army found itself engaged in Indian wars and in the westward movement. Although internal politics remained a characteristic of the army, much effort and energy were focused on westward expansion. Also, a system of advanced military schools was created to train officers in military skills. The combination of schools, field experience, and the emergence of the United States as a world power by the beginning of the 20th century focused the attention of the profession on the external world. By the turn of the century, the United States had gained possessions in the Philippines and in the Caribbean, occupying the efforts of army officers. The broadened responsibilities and worldview that had developed in the officers corps made it essential that officers focus attention on the new national posture and its military implications. Professionalism demanded concentration on military skills and battlefield competence at a higher and broader level than in the past. A professional military ethos emerged that saw political involvement as not only a detraction from but a denigration of military professionalism. This reinforced the view of many in the officers corps that politics should be disdained and that the military should keep its distance from domestic politics and the political process. Following World War I, the army was reduced in strength as the United States withdrew into isolationism. Yet the army officers corps, and military professionals in general, managed to develop the skills and intellectual competence to design far-reaching doctrine that served well in World War II. In addition, the military education of officers provided a cadre of leaders for World War II. “Clearly, it was the education and expertise of the officers corps that ensured Army readiness to transition from insular isolation to global responsibility and conflict.”6 Many army professionals believe that there is an inherent antimilitary theme in U.S. politics and attitudes. James Barber noted: American attitudes toward the military services and the role played by the military in the social and political systems of the United States have

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deep roots in the American heritage. . . . From England the colonists inherited a distaste for a professional military and a distrust of a standing army. These attitudes have permeated American civil-military relations ever since.7

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Nevertheless, the military emerged from World War II with the highest accolades from the U.S. people. That it was a war requiring national mobilization against an enemy perceived to be a threat to all that was “good” made the military effort a common one for U.S. citizens. Indeed, most look back at World War II as a “moral crusade.” One writer calls it the “Good War.”8 It is also true that almost immediately following World War II, the U.S. military was virtually dismembered. Selective service ceased, albeit for only a short time, and the massive forces organized for the war were demobilized. This followed a historical pattern of attempts to return to the “normalcy” preceding war. The military was virtually forgotten, and army professionals seemed to return to the prewar years. This lasted but a short period of time, ending with the onset of the Cold War. The Postwar Years

The advent of the Cold War and the demands of national security and foreign policy on a global scale not only eroded the gap between the military and politics, it also reshaped the notion of military professionalism. No longer could military leaders concentrate solely on “military things.” Political factors became closely linked with military considerations. Military professionals could no longer carry out missions or prepare for various contingencies without considering the political-social dimensions of foreign involvement. Involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the need to consider European views and to develop interrelationships within a circle of allies were the most visible manifestations of the emerging new professionalism. Moreover, in the aftermath of World War II, a new national security establishment was created. Part of this establishment attempted to meld civilian and military expertise into a working system. Congress became a more important player in the national security policy process. The highest levels of military leadership were pushed into a partnership with civilian experts and elected officials. This new environment encompassed the atomic/nuclear era and the beginning of the technological age. These became part of the strategy and force structure of the military institution. Equipment, training, and operations became more expensive. Not only were more demands placed on the military profession, but, increasingly, professionals recognized that

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resources allocated by elected officials were a critical element in the military’s ability to perform its missions and to prepare for a variety of contingencies. The U.S. military became a political as well as a military institution, in the sense that congressional committees and committee chairpersons dealing with the armed forces became critical players in the overall political-military equation. The military profession could not ignore this development if it intended to maintain competence and readiness in responding to global challenges. “National security” emerged as an important term in the military professional’s lexicon. One astute observer commented: Defense policies, needless to say, involve considerations that go beyond explicitly military concerns, but for too long a sophisticated discussion of military affairs has been stifled by the application of politically motivated restraints upon such exposure of views, restraints imposed both from outside and inside the Department of Defense.9

For most of the 1950s the military received virtually all resources it asked for from Congress. Also, the military did not necessarily concern itself with domestic political and social issues. Draftees and volunteers provided enough recruits to allow the military to maintain some distance from domestic issues. Yet by this time the military had been desegregated by executive order of President Truman. This placed the military in the vanguard of institutions trying to develop a more equal playing field. For this decade the primary concern of army officers was the Soviet threat, with the Chinese communists seen as simply an extension of the Soviet system. The Korean War reinforced this view. It also led to a reassertion of civilian control over the U.S. military, with the removal of General MacArthur by President Truman. But the energy and perspectives of military professionals remained focused on external matters evolving primarily from Soviet military power projection. The policy of containment had its national security dimensions, which shaped much of the thinking of the professional military. The army, in turn, developed doctrine and experimented with organizational structures based on nuclear weaponry and major war in Europe aimed primarily at the only serious enemy, the Soviet Union. Subtle changes were taking place, however, in the relationships between military professionals and politics and the political process. Civilian experts and elected officials, under the imperatives of the national security process and defense policy, forged a close link among the military, politicians, and the national security policy process. This became apparent during the Vietnam War. It was during the same period that serious scholarly attention turned to military professionals and the military as an institution. As discussed in

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Chapter 1, the works of Huntington and Janowitz are noteworthy in this respect.10 One of the underlying themes from such works is that politics and military professionalism were generally seen as two separate and distinct spheres. This was particularly true in Huntington’s view. Liberal society and the demands of a strict military hierarchy based on authoritarian orientation were seen as opposite ends of the political spectrum. Any kind of war short of a Jihad war was, is, and will be unpopular with the people. . . . [S]uch wars are fought with legions and Americans, even though proud of them, do not like their legions. . . . Legions have no ideological or spiritual home in a liberal society. The liberal society has no use for its legions—as its prophets have long proclaimed. Except that in this world there are tigers.11

Historically, however, military professionals have been involved periodically in the political realm, not necessarily seeking partisan political goals but as a way of protecting their careers and the stature and position of the military. How these political efforts were undertaken and for what purposes are critical to the study of military professionalism and the concept of self-images and perceptions of the outer world. It was in the Vietnam period that these goals and efforts went through serious changes, having major impact on how professionals viewed politics, politicians, and political-military policy. The Vietnam Era

The 1960s propelled political and social issues into the ranks of the military, with the army facing the brunt of these issues. Military professionals from the most junior grades to the most senior grades became part of the politics of the Vietnam War, which was brought to U.S. homes as television footage and print journalism reported ground forces’ activities. The military became the focus of antiwar groups and street demonstrators; antiwar sentiments found their way into the military; and officers found themselves dealing with drugs, antiwar sentiments, and a variety of cultural and social issues associated with the sixties generation. The social implications of these issues on army professionals is discussed later. The concern here is how changes within the United States affected the political-military relationships and political views of army professionals. The army became actively involved in the Vietnam War with the support and confidence of most political leaders and the U.S. public. But by 1968, U.S. Army professionals began to question the political resolve of their civilian leaders and the direction of the U.S. effort. In turn, highranking army officers were increasingly frustrated by the attempts of civilian

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leaders and officials, including those in the Oval Office, to control the detailed conduct of the war. Some of this frustration turned to anger and spilled into the ranks of the army in Vietnam. One of the most telling statements came from a West Point graduate who in 1973 wrote: Our armed forces today desperately need a sense of national direction, and that direction must come from the people as a whole. It cannot come from within the military alone, where philosophical problems are agonized over but get lost in the practical day-to-day process of implementing political-military policy and decisions. Nor should the guidance come solely from official Washington, whose short-term goals shift too conveniently with the political winds and with the personalities of appointed and elected officials.12

The political dimensions of the Vietnam War, however, were not limited to the activities in Washington. They formed a complex mosaic of internal military politics, the political dynamics among elected officials in the Vietnam War, and the relationship that evolved between U.S. society and the army. These dimensions affected the perceptions of army professionals regarding the nature of political decisionmaking and the policy process in the conduct of the Vietnam War. In the final analysis, the result was professional bitterness not only toward the political system and its leaders but also toward society as a whole for what some professionals considered a “stab in the back.” Most of this was kept from public view, but it was characteristic of the profession well into the 1970s. The officers corps, to its enormous credit, never complained during or after Vietnam of being betrayed at home, never evinced the kind of bitterness toward the Republic that had poisoned some defeated armies. Yet a certain maundering self-pity was apparent. . . . The war had been lost, the Army beaten. For many officers, that realization made the hard peace even harder.13

However, contrary to the views of some academicians and segments of the U.S. populace, the military profession is not a monolith. There are various views within the profession regarding the operational dimensions of duty, honor, country; perceptions of the outer world; and moral and ethical issues. This is true with respect to politics and the policy process.

The U.S. Army: Internal Politics

As the Vietnam War progressed, one of the most disturbing developments was divisiveness within army ranks. A gap developed between regulars and draftees, with the former being tagged derisively as “lifers” by the latter. In addition, a political-psychological gap appeared between officers

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and enlisted personnel (particularly draftees), many of whom brought with them antimilitary sentiments and a distaste for war. Equally disturbing was the anger and frustration within the army officers corps regarding the behavior of superiors. A study in 1970 of officers attending the U.S. Army War College revealed that many officers believed that superiors were more concerned for their careers than for the welfare of their men.14 The same study showed that “ticket punching” and competition for choice career assignments seemed to pervade the army officers corps in Vietnam. Combined with problems within the enlisted ranks, the dissatisfaction surfacing within the officers corps led to what some have called the disintegration of the army. Equally important, internal politics took on a degree of self-interest, tarnishing the whole notion of duty, honor, country. Two army professionals addressed the problems emerging from the Vietnam era and concluded that “the professional standard is rigorous. Our reputation must be one of dedicated service, professional competence, personal integrity, and absolute honor. In the eyes of many, we as a group fail to meet that high standard today, either to ourselves or both to trusting and skeptical outsiders.”15 To make matters worse, interservice struggles over the conduct of the Vietnam War were reflected in the character of internal politics. For example, commenting on those in the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) headquarters in Saigon, Edward Luttwak concluded that “these men were forced to occupy much of their time with office politics, because the petty politics of interservice rivalry was in fact the only medium of decision. . . . None was empowered to decide—everything had to be mediated, compromised, and sold. . . . Amidst the urgencies of war [such procedures] were tragically inappropriate.”16 In sum, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War eventually led to problems within the U.S. Army and within the army profession. Also, problems surfaced between the army and society, with politicians and a large segment of the U.S. public opposing the war as it dragged on into the late 1960s. The attitudes of the public and the social divisiveness of the war eventually found their way into the army profession, with damaging results.

External Politics

The civilian-military command structure that was in place during most of the Vietnam War was a source of complaint and anger for a number of officers. There was a sense that the political environment in Washington and decisions regarding the war were driven by politics rather than by the realities of the military situation. This was compounded by the convoluted military command structure emanating out of Saigon and the MACV. The

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command structure did little to develop confidence and trust between military and civilian leaders. High-ranking army officers believed that political infighting and political heavy-handedness toward control of military operations eroded their authority and responsibility. There was also an underlying notion that military professionalism and competence in battle had become political casualties. “Top level civilians around President Johnson in Washington controlled the basic decision-making and strategy formulation during the winter of 1964–1965, as the nation moved doggedly into the Vietnam war. In this respect, Vietnam was a civilian-run war.”17 In addition, “Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, commanders of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) . . . have also been handicapped by a command relations structure imposed upon them by the politicians in Washington and the admirals at Pearl Harbor.”18 The tone and structure of the command relationships were set by Pres. Lyndon Johnson, whose “entirely political manner of running the war, [and] his consensus-oriented modus operandi, effectively stifled debate. . . . The President and his top advisers also imposed rigid standards of loyalty on a bitterly divided administration.”19 Compounding the problem of command was that Gen. William Westmoreland was theoretically under the command of the Pacific commanderin-chief. Nonetheless, in the main, General Westmoreland dealt directly with the Oval Office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also, complete control of the air campaign was not under MACV but was co-opted by Washington. To further the confusion, the South Vietnamese military operated under its own command structure; the South Korean forces in Vietnam had their own command structure also, which Korean officers felt was coequal with Westmoreland and MACV. Although the army officers at the battalion and company levels paid little attention to these matters, those involved at the MACV level and beyond were only too cognizant of these complications, which created a maze of military politics and confrontations over operational turfs. It is no wonder that a number of army officers in Vietnam had had severely disconcerting experiences with the command structure and the political control of the war. Nonetheless, later in the war those at the operational level became increasingly aware of the political-military agenda in Saigon and the external politics in Washington. The political climate in Washington in 1968 and the serious questions being raised about the conduct of the war were felt even in the lesser ranks of the army profession. At this level it was difficult to separate the social and cultural dissatisfaction with the war and its conduct from the politics of the conflict that emanated from higher levels. The attitudes of many members of Congress and their increasing disdain for U.S. involvement in the war left a mark on army professionals in Vietnam. The most common view was that the president and Congress

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committed the military to a war but, when things got tough, left it to twist in the wind. In referring to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his view of the Vietnam War, one former marine corps officer has written, “Like so many of his civilian colleagues in the Pentagon, he had no conception of the realities of the battlefield. His chief concern was the collection of facts and data rather than with an understanding of their significance.”20 An even more critical charge was leveled against both civilian and military leaders by an army officer: During the final years of the Republic of Vietnam, few if any of our national level civilian leaders were inclined to take much interest in the fate of South Vietnam. Even in the Department of Defense it had become a lost cause. The attitude was one of “It did not happen on my watch” as well as “We did our best and now there’s nothing more that we can do.”21

At the end of the war, all signs seemed to point to a profession disturbed not only about its own performance but also about the sense of domestic political order, the role of politicians in micromanaging the military, and the domestic political perceptions regarding the conduct of the war. In general, there was bitterness within the profession about the political process and political decisionmaking that placed the army in a war from which most politicians later tried to distance themselves. The bitterness and frustration lingered well into the 1970s. The act of Congress that cut off all aid and assistance to South Vietnam in 1973 was the final bitter pill that army professionals swallowed regarding their role and that of the army in the war. Perhaps the way army professionals felt was best expressed by the leadership of South Vietnam. Nguyen Cao Ky, former prime minister of the Republic of Vietnam, in looking back on the final days of South Vietnam, wrote, “I knew it was the end from the way Americans refused to look me in the eyes. . . . Perhaps the United States could never have won the war. But even if one cannot achieve victory, the alternative is not necessarily the humiliation of abject surrender.”22 In any case, army professional views of politics and nationally elected officials, as a whole, tended to remain negative even in the more recent period. Robert Ivany, for example, notes: For the past several years, Congress has consistently ranked near the bottom of major institutions in public confidence. . . . If asked, soldiers would probably echo the sentiments of their countrymen. . . . What has increasingly begun to rankle the nation’s military leaders, however, is the growing propensity of Congress to use its constitutional mandate for reg-

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ulating military service as a pretext for micromanaging them.23

In the following chapter, we will more fully examine how the fall of South Vietnam affected the self-images and perceptions of army professionals who served during the Vietnam period. The fall of South Vietnam, combined with the apparent collapse of U.S. national will and political resolve to continue the war, left many army professionals wondering about the staying power and political leadership of the United States. U.S. Politics and the Military: A Vietnam Legacy?

There seems to be little question that U.S. attitudes and political agendas emanating from Washington had an important impact on army professionals during the Vietnam period. The political environment shaped by the antiwar movement (which in the final phases encompassed all political persuasions) and the apparent turmoil within the national leadership found their way into the ranks of the officers corps. Although these factors do not necessarily provide a direct measure, they do offer convincing evidence of how the political views and perceptions of army professionals were shaped. Some sense of the impact of U.S. society and political dynamics on army professionals can be garnered from the media’s role. For example, in 1970 one newspaper reported, “The Age of Aquarius is not a happy time for the U.S. military establishment. . . . In colleges and high schools, new heroes have emerged whose battle cry is ‘resist’. Politicians decry militarism, priests and doctors and lawyers encourage draft evasion, military recruiters are driven from college campuses, ROTC buildings are stoned and burned.”24 A considerably diminished military image emerged in the early 1970s and was reflected in the media—in popular films as well as in print journalism. The My Lai massacre, the alleged graft and corruption associated with senior enlisted circles, the military-industrial complex, and the stress of the mass media on military activities within Vietnam created the type of image that made “duty, honor, country” sound hollow during the latter part of the Vietnam era. These views eroded the sense of trust and confidence army professionals had in the political decisionmaking process and domestic politics in general. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam also remains an issue for a number of academicians, leading to periodic publications on the war. Although most of these publications focus on policy issues, the Washington environment, and presidential politics, indirect references tend to link the military and military professionalism to the debate. The appearance of such

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publications also offers insights on the prevailing views of army professionals who fought in the Vietnam War. For example, a retired army colonel who served four tours in Vietnam had this to say about a recent book published on Vietnam: There is little new information in this polemical text. It is a celebration of protest from the political Left, taken from thousands of condemnatory pamphlets. [The author’s] text is not history; it is a prosecutor’s brief, lacking even the pretense of balance. . . . [The author’s] catechism and dogma are being accorded the status of history by publications without riposte.”25

In exploring the link among the political system, the policy process, and perceptions of army professionals during the Vietnam period and immediately thereafter, important clues can be derived from opinion polls on the conduct of the war. These can be interpreted as reflecting national will, political resolve, and staying power. In turn, these have some impact on army professional views of the political environment and U.S. politics. The results of such polls and analyses also offer a framework within which to relate the views of army professionals to internal and external politics. A study on “The American People, Viet-Nam and the Presidency” prepared by Albert H. Cantril in 1970 offers such insight.26 According to the author, the “conclusions are based upon publishing survey findings, as well as upon the results of several studies by our Institute [Institute for International Social Research] in recent years.”27 Cantril’s findings are categorized in three phases: 1963–1965, 1966– 1967, and 1968–1970. In the first phase, “the public tended to believe that military measures were the answer.”28 There was general approval of such measures taken to conduct the war effectively against the adversary in Vietnam. For example, based on Gallup figures, “71% approved the retaliatory bombing after the Tonkin incident (August 1964).” In the second phase, U.S. involvement in Vietnam increased considerably, and opinion polls showed that an increasing number of people in the United States believed that the “U.S. had made a mistake sending troops to fight in VietNam.” In 1965 this figure was 24 percent of those surveyed, and by October 1967 it had risen to 46 percent. Also, the number of those who believed that the “war in Vietnam . . . will go on for a long time” also increased. In October 1965 this figure stood at 54 percent of those surveyed; by May 1967 this had risen to 81 percent. The Tet Offensive in January–March 1968 highlighted the third phase. It was characterized by the belief of many in the United States that somehow U.S. strategy and military efforts in Vietnam were not accomplishing what U.S. leaders had led them to believe. According to William Colby, the Tet Offensive had a dramatic impact on the U.S. public: “The Ameri-

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can body politic suffered a shock similar to being awakened from a warm sleep by a dousing with a pail of cold water. . . . [M]ost importantly TV coverage in America of Tet 1968 was to turn public opinion critically to the belief that the American effort in Vietnam was hopeless and should be ended.”29 Following the Tet Offensive, most people in the United States believed that the country was either losing ground or standing still in Vietnam.30 As important, by the end of the third phase, it was concluded that U.S. public opinion was in a “state of ambivalence.” Further, “the public on balance has made up its mind that the war in Viet-Nam is too costly to sustain much longer.”31 The changing opinions of the U.S. public regarding the conduct of the war and U.S. purpose in Vietnam correlated with increasing frustrations within the military regarding the effectiveness of U.S. political leadership. These factors also seem to correlate with the anger expressed regarding the behavior of senior army officers. One must be careful in drawing firm conclusions from such observations, but it seems reasonable that the perceptions of army professionals regarding U.S. domestic politics and the policy process would be negatively affected by the rising tide of antiwar sentiment and public opinion showing increased dissatisfaction with U.S. military measures and the conduct of the war. U.S. national will, political resolve, and staying power eroded precipitously following the Tet Offensive, after which there were also signs of army disintegration and ineffectiveness. Immediately following U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey found that in contrast to the public (43 percent of those polled wanted to keep the military role in foreign policy about the same), political leaders were “substantially in favor of a lesser role [for the military in foreign policy].32 Only 4% believe the military should be more important than it was then and 55% believe it should be less important, for a balance of 51% for a lesser role.”33 The same 1975 report concluded that regarding attitudes on the Vietnam War, “only 8% of the public think that the Vietnam War was a ‘proud moment’ in American history; 72% think it was a ‘dark moment.’”34 An army officer looking back on the Vietnam experience and the views of the U.S. people wrote, “We withdrew from Vietnam because the American people as a whole had lost the will to prosecute the war. There were many reasons for that loss of endorsement, but perhaps the most gnawing was the widespread belief that we had ‘lost the moral high ground,’ that it was immoral for us to continue as we were fighting.”35 He went on to say, “The soldier learned that his sacrifices and sufferings were misunderstood, unappreciated and even ridiculed by many Americans.”36 In sum, there was a relative correlation between the views of the U.S. public on the war and the concerns of army professionals regarding inter-

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nal military politics and relationships with national leaders. This was well expressed by a chaplain speaking at the West Point cemetery in October 1986. Three hundred members of the West Point class of 1966—a class that, in the main, had served in Vietnam—gathered to honor their dead classmates. They heard the chaplain say the following: We stand here in the shadow of death. You hold in your hands a list of your classmates who have died. Look at them for a moment. . . . Does our society somehow recognize their contributions? Does a self-indulgent society like ours somehow make their sacrifice worthwhile? Probably not. Yet it seems that the strong soldier, the superior soldier, is always the one willing to give his life. Any great leader in any society probably gives better than he gets. That’s just a fact of life.37

Restoration and Renewal

No specific date or event signaled the beginning of a restoration of army professionals’ trust and confidence in the qualities of political leadership and the domestic political order. The charges that the Vietnam War was immoral and dishonorable echoed in the halls of Congress and in segments of society into the 1980s, particularly among those who avoided military service. Yet by the end of the 1970s, some things began to change. As a 1979 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations report concluded, “During the past four years, since the United States concluded direct involvement in the divisive Vietnam War, the focus of attention has shifted to the growing Soviet strategic military build up.”38 But even as late as 1983 a Chicago Council report noted that 72 percent of the public holding opinions “agree Vietnam was fundamentally wrong and immoral,” with only 45 percent of U.S. leaders agreeing with that statement.39 By the late 1980s, it appeared that most people in the United States had reconciled themselves to the Vietnam War. Hardly any mention is made of Vietnam in a 1991 Chicago Council report, and then only with respect to restoring relations with Vietnam.40 Exemplifying the reconciliation was President Reagan’s view that the U.S. effort in Vietnam was a “noble cause.” The creation of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial in Washington and the efforts of veterans’ groups to recast the image of the military and the cause of Vietnam had begun to shape more positive images of the war and those who fought in it. This momentum continued into the 1990s, culminating with the U.S. success in the Gulf War in 1991. Interesting enough, some of those opposed to the war began to change their views in the early 1980s. “Years after the war, the relief . . . many of the Vietnam generation felt at having evaded the military has been supplanted by shame. These nonveterans suddenly must heal wounds that they

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never knew they had.”41 In the early 1990s, some nonveterans tried to explain why they were unable to serve during the Vietnam period. In effect, those who did serve may be seeing the burden of guilt shift to Vietnam-era nonveterans. In retrospect, in the 1980s professional trust began to be restored and confidence in the political decisionmaking process and in elected leaders began to be rebuilt. Combined with the concentrated attention on the Soviet Union and the implications for U.S. security from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this rebuilding established the basis with which army professionals could refocus on the European and Soviet challenge. Public opinion and U.S. leaders condemned the Soviet Union for its military actions in Afghanistan. All these events reinforced efforts to restore the traditional notion of military professionalism—one that provided a more comfortable relationship with society and the political system. During the 1980s, various publications, including military journals, gave a great deal of attention to the Soviet system and the European theater and only occasional attention to the Vietnam experience. For example, in a military journal focusing on leadership, only one article made serious reference to Vietnam.42 Vietnam was not totally forgotten, but it was overshadowed by the effort to prepare for conventional conflict in Europe against Soviet forces. During this period, opinion polls consistently gave higher marks to the military than to the media and elected officials. Also, much was done in the army to try to relegate the Vietnam experience to the past. Attention turned to military doctrine and training focusing on the AirLand battle and a European battle scenario. This was reinforced by the efforts of the Reagan administration to strengthen U.S. military posture and increase defense spending. The raison d’être of the army seemed strengthened, and the role of the army professional seemed clear. The U.S. public, politicians, and army professionals seemed to have developed a generally common view of the security landscape. The army was overcoming the “hollow army” syndrome—much of which was blamed on the Carter administration. Although authorities may disagree on the accomplishments of the Reagan administration in restoring the prestige of the military, there is agreement that at least the early years of the Carter presidency were a virtual disaster to military capability and the military profession.43 This judgment was symbolized by the failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in Tehran in April 1980. In an account of that attempt, which was called Operation Eagle Claw, two authorities on military affairs concluded that it was based on “a militarily unsound plan [which] was approved by high-ranking officers who wished to please the President and the Secretary of Defense rather than see American arms suc-

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ceed. . . . It was planned to conform with President Carter’s desires that there be no combat.”44 In any case, the Reagan buildup became the subject of articles in popular magazines and military journals. For example, one publication concluded that “after six years of President Reagan’s rearming the U.S. defenses, no one can agree exactly what shape the Pentagon is in.”45 According to another publication, “After the malaise of the 70s, today’s new breed of warriors is brighter and better educated than any in history. But how well can they fight?”46 After a long discourse, the question remained unanswered. Nonetheless, most army professionals felt that the army had developed into a highly effective force with high-quality personnel. Similarly, army professionals seemed to be more comfortable with the political environment of the Reagan period, which strengthened orthodox notions of military professionalism. Most army professionals had a positive view of the personality and character of President Reagan and the tone he set for his administration, the Iran-contra affair notwithstanding. Though the force of the optimism may have faded with time, most army professionals believed that the Reagan administration provided the political leadership of domestic politics that was essential in reshaping and reinforcing the U.S. military profession, institutionally and professionally. These perceptions and attitudes were well expressed by James Fallows, who concluded: More than most of us they [military officers] feel the weight of their responsibility for the nation’s safety. But they need help in discharging that responsibility. Unless politicians understand the special realities of the military task, they will not give soldiers the tools they need—and may assign them duties they cannot carry out. Unless the public also understands, it will not support politicians who defend the military’s interest. Unless the press understands, it cannot shape the way the military’s future is discussed.47

By 1990, most army professionals were convinced that the quality of the army had reached unprecedented heights. This was confirmed by the quality of recruits and the level of combat effectiveness, as measured by field tests and the performance of the army in the Gulf War. However, even in 1990 there were still some within the profession who expressed severe reservations regarding the quality of the army. For example, in one study, the author (an army officer) concluded not only that the U.S. Army was oversold but that it did not rate with the first-class armies of the world.48 The fact that the officer had served as commander of the Army Research Institute gave his views particular credibility. Yet most would point to the effectiveness of the army in the Gulf War to indicate the army’s quality.

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In the 1992 presidential election campaign, military service and Vietnam became issues as the public debated Gov. Bill Clinton’s avoidance of military service and his possible role in organizing demonstrations against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. While some retired senior officers publicly supported Bill Clinton for president, others had a different view. They were outspoken about Clinton’s avoidance of military service and highly supportive of President Bush’s leadership in the Gulf War. The intrusion of senior military officers, even retired ones, into a partisan political campaign is rather unusual and is thought by many to be highly inappropriate. Regardless of the various views and interpretations, it appears that most army professionals had placed much of the criticism and malaise of the 1970s behind them and had recognized the quality and capability of the new army. In turn, their confidence and trust in the political decisionmaking process were reinforced, and they were encouraged in their view of U.S. politics and the political order. The New Era First Phase

The beginning of the 1990s ushered in a new security era. The changing security landscape in Europe, resulting primarily from the dissolution of the Soviet system, in turn changed the global security agenda. Signs had already appeared in the late 1980s that Cold War issues were dissipating. The Gorbachev period signaled a new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as a new approach to security issues. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Berlin Wall also signaled the beginning of a new security era in Europe. The United States turned its attention to future military strategies and force structures, increasingly based on reduced military forces. This was linked to the end of the Reagan administration and the beginning of the Bush presidency in 1988 and 1989. The drawdown of the U.S. military was already in the planning stage by the time of the Gulf War in 1991 and long before the collapse of the Soviet system and the end of the Gorbachev era. Although the full import of these changes was not fully appreciated within army professional ranks, signs of change were in place and being felt within the profession. The new era is an important reference point to use when coming to grips with the substance and quality of army professionalism in the remainder of this decade and into the next. At this point, new research was undertaken to assess army professionalism—to compare it with that from the past and to project what it would

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be in the future. The research found that regardless of the time period involved, army professionals remained committed to the core notions of military professionalism. Even for those who entered into full-time civilian graduate education as part of their army careers, there was a strong feeling that “regardless of the nature of education provided for military officers, it is the command of military units that is the most important experience for any officer.” At the same time, there appeared to be a prevailing view that engaging in politics is contrary to professionalism. This is in specific reference to partisan politics but does not necessarily exclude involvement in advocating the army position. The notion of “politics” in the broadest sense appears to be viewed with suspicion, particularly among younger officers. Even with changes in world perspectives and more sensitivity to domestic political issues, most army professionals perceive the world through orthodox lenses and from traditional value systems. As such, politics is seen as one separate arena and the military as another. However, some reports indicate that this separateness does not prevail at the highest ranks, particularly among those serving inside the Beltway.49 Nonetheless, even with the changes in the security landscape, army professionals saw little change in their own professional status while continuing to view domestic politics and the policy process according to long-established professional frameworks. This is true even though professional views surfaced that were more concerned about the nature of the political system and the policy process than had been the norm. This concern was expressed primarily by army professionals who had recently completed fulltime civilian graduate education or who were in such a program. In reflecting on military professionals and politics, Fallows writes: It is easy to understand why military politics usually proceed on two levels: one of the expert discussion within the military community, and another of slogans, accusations, and promises made by politicians and public commentators. Those on the outside are held at arm’s length by their lack of expert knowledge. Those on the inside see little reason to invite others in—and, in the case of active-duty soldiers, they are aware of the constitutional limits on their involvement in political discussions.50

Second Phase

The Gulf War is an important reference point in studying army professional perceptions of domestic politics and the policy process. In addition, the aftermath of the Gulf War ushered in a period of planned drawdown and downsizing of the U.S. Army, which has important implications for the army as an institution and for individual professionals. These implications affect army force structures and strategies as well as the internal

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character of the institution. Yet a 1991 General Accounting Office report concluded: “The Army is reviewing the results of its recent assessment of the changed threat’s impact on its training strategy for combat forces. Although the review is not complete, the Army does not anticipate that major revisions to its training strategy will be necessary.”51 The experience in the Gulf War reinforced the army’s force structure and doctrine. Studies show that army professionals who had not served in the Gulf War believed they had lost a great opportunity not only to advance their careers but to strengthen their own professional commitment and to enhance their loyalty to the institution. Those who served, whether in ground units or in Special Forces–type operations, reinforced their sense of purpose and professionalism. In turn, regardless of the experience or lack thereof in the Gulf War, the firmness of the national leadership in prosecuting the war and the evident support offered by the U.S. people strengthened the army professionals’ positive view of the policy process and national leadership. This was highlighted by the continuing analogies to Vietnam, but in reverse. At the highest levels of government and in senior army circles, the basis for planning and for command and control rested on the view that the Gulf War was not going to be like Vietnam. Most army professionals accepted the notion that the army was finally allowed to fight a war without micromanagement from the Oval Office. But it was not lost on a number of army professionals that Congress was belated in its support for U.S. involvement and that many members of Congress did not support it at all. Similarly, a number of army professionals noted Bill Clinton’s ambivalence regarding U.S. involvement in the Gulf War. In studies completed just prior to the Gulf War, a number of army professionals differed in their perceptions of conflict characteristics. Some believed that unconventional conflicts were the wave of the future, with European-type conflicts less likely. This may have been simply a nod toward unconventional conflicts, with little change contemplated in the needs of the army. The eventual outcome of U.S. involvement in Somalia beginning in 1992 and Haiti in 1994 may also have some impact on the perceptions of conflicts, strategies, and missions in Third World areas. Army professionals who have completed civilian graduate education and faculty officers at the U.S. Military Academy saw the world in more complex terms and appeared to be more aware of the limits of military power than those professionals following mainstream career patterns. But it remains that differences within the profession regarding national politics are primarily of the degree of mistrust of elected officials. Also, in the lower ranks of the profession, it is believed that there is little time to contemplate external politics. Most of the energy and effort of the profession is on completing day-to-day operational tasks. These views begin to

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change as officers reach higher rank and have to deal with the Pentagon environment. In addition, most army professionals understand the importance of the congressional role in defense budgeting and in affecting public views about the military. Underpinning all of this, however, appears to be the prevailing traditional theme of the military and politics as separate spheres, with most following the perspective that politics and the military do not mix—regardless of how unrealistic that may be. These views on and relationships with the political realm are more complicated and complex than in the past. The uncertainty of the international security landscape, the ill-defined threats, and the debate and disagreement between the president and Congress over defense budget matters and force levels are continuing to have an impact on professional attitudes and views of the external environment. This situation was compounded by plans for deeper military cuts and was exacerbated by the political tone of the Clinton administration regarding the military. President Clinton’s avoidance of service during the Vietnam War did not help matters between the administration and the military. In turn, there appears to be a degree of apprehension within the profession regarding military careers as the direction of the political system moves toward a considerably reduced force. How this plays in society and the military profession has a direct impact on civil-military relations. This is examined in the following chapter. Notes

1. The ideas in this paragraph are those of Robert A. Vitas, one of the consultants for this research. 2. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 174. 3. See also A. J. Bacevich, Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1949 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989). 4. Stanley L. Falk, “Feudin’ And Fussin’ in the Old Army,” Army 34, no. 11, November 1984, p. 58. 5. N. Fotion and G. Elfstrom, Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 90. 6. Mark D. Redina, “An Officer Corps for the 1990s,” Military Review 70, no. 10, October 1990, p. 65. 7. James Alden Barber, Jr., “The Military Services and American Society: Relationships and Attitudes,” in Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., eds., The Military and American Society: Essays & Readings (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 290. 8. Studs Terkel, The Good War: An Oral History of World War Two (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). 9. Donald Atwell Zoll, “The Moral Dimension of War and the Military Ethic,” in Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds., The Parameters of Military

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Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989), p. 122. 10. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971). 11. Thomas R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 428. 12. C. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 2. Emphasis in the original. 13. Rick Atkinson, The Long Gray Line (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989), p. 369. 14. U.S. Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, June 30, 1972). 15. Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., and Frederic J. Brown, The United States Army in Transition (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1973), p. 233. 16. Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), p. 28. 17. James A. Donovan, Militarism, U.S.A. (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1970), p. 147. 18. Ibid. 19. George C. Herring, Cold Blood: LBJ’s Conduct of Limited War in Vietnam, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, U.S. Air Force Academy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 8. 20. Donovan, Militarism, p. 129. 21. Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (New York: Touchstone, 1984), p. 140. 22. Nguyen Cao Ky, How We Lost the Vietnam War (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), pp. 7, 9. See also Cao Van Vien, The Final Collapse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983). 23. Robert R. Ivany, “Soldiers and Legislators: A Common Mission,” Parameters 21, no. 1, Spring 1991, p. 47. 24. Richard Harwood, “Troubled Times for the Military,” Chicago Sun-Times, July 19, 1970, section 2, p. 1. Nearly 30 percent of those surveyed in a 1970 Gallup poll gave the Pentagon a “highly unfavorable” rating. See Chicago SunTimes, August 9, 1970, section 2, p. 12. 25. Paul F. Braim, “Book Review: Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990,” Parameters 22, no. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 119–120. 26. Albert H. Cantril, “The American People, Viet-Nam and the Presidency,” paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association convention, Los Angeles, September 8–12, 1970. 27. Ibid., p. 2. 28. The material and quotes in this paragraph are based on ibid., pp. 3–5. 29. William Colby with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), p. 231. See also Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1971), and Michael J. Arlen, The Living Room War (New York: Penguin Books, 1982). 30. Cantril, “The American People,” p. 7. 31. Ibid., p. 11. See also Atkinson, Long Gray Line, p. 346.

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32. John E. Reilly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1975), p. 20. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., p. 17. 35. Thomas J. Begines, “The American Military and the Western Idea,” Military Review 72, no. 3, March 1992, p. 43. 36. Ibid., p. 46. 37. Atkinson, Long Gray Line, p. 34. 38. Reilly (1979), p. 25. 39. Reilly (1983), p. 37. 40. Reilly (1991). 41. Christopher Buckley, “Viet Guilt,” Esquire 100, no. 3, September 1983, p. 69. 42. Military Review 60, no. 7, July 1980. 43. See, for example, John Allen Williams, “Defense Policy: The Carter-Reagan Record,” Washington Quarterly 6, no. 4, Autumn 1983, pp. 77–92. Also see John Allen Williams, “The U.S. Navy Under the Reagan Administration and Global Forward Strategy,” in James Brown and William P. Snyder, eds., Defense Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), pp. 273–304. 44. Stuart L. Koehl and Stephen P. Glick, “Why the Rescue Failed,” American Spectator, July 1980, p. 25. 45. Philip Gold, “The Shape of a Rearmed Pentagon,” Insight, March 9, 1987, pp. 8–14. 46. Michael Satchell with Robert Kaylor, Rene Rikley, H. G. Summers, Jr., and Sharon F. Golden, “The Military’s New Stars,” U.S. News and World Report, April 18, 1988, p. 33. 47. James Fallows, “Public Perception, Political Action, and Public Policy,” in Asa A. Clark IV, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey S. McKitrick, and James W. Reed, eds., The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 345. 48. William Darryl Henderson, The U.S. Army Is Oversold and Undermanned (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990). 49. See, for example, Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); the politics of the Gulf War are as reported in “The Generals’ War,” Army Times, March 2, 1992. 50. Fallows, “Public Perception,” p. 335. 51. U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Training: Changing Threat Not Expected to Significantly Affect Combat Training (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, December 1991), p. 1.

7 Civil-Military Relations The end of the Cold War has shifted strategic concerns, with a major impact on U.S. force composition and deployment. Although these two factors are important, they have overshadowed other equally important matters: civil-military relations and military professionalism, which are in the process of change in response to the new security landscape and the domestic political and economic environments. Civil-military relations and military professionalism are critical components in any study of the role and missions of the military in the security environment and its capacity to respond effectively. Civil-military relations encompass the political relationships among the professional officers corps, the leaders of the nation, and the military and the society it serves. Although there is fundamental incongruity between the values and expectations of a liberal society and the purpose, values, and disciplinary thrust of the professional military, the United States has rarely feared domestic military power. This incongruity has its roots in the founding of the republic and the establishment of the U.S. constitutional system. Moreover, U.S. historical aversion to standing armies, evolving from the Revolutionary War and the cautions expressed by the nation’s founders about the dangers of standing armies, are deeply rooted in the American psyche.1 Though this aversion remains the driving force of civil-military relations, the balance between society and the military has shifted one way or the other depending on the times. The rise of the United States as a superpower, combined with four decades of Cold (and occasionally hot) War, established a particular type of civil-military relations—the military was given prominence and visibility. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order and security landscape, civil-military relations in the United States are in the process of being transformed. The driving forces behind this transformation include the drawdown of the military and popular perceptions of a considerably reduced military threat to the United States, the Gulf War notwithstanding. What is the shape of this transformation and how will it affect U.S. national security? This question is examined with a primary focus on the 133

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U.S. Army as the service most likely to face major adjustments in the new environment. Overview

The core value of civil-military relations is civilian control of the military, and the basis for civilian control is the fundamental principle of civilian supremacy inculcated in every military officer. It should not be surprising that other cultures, with less scrupulous attention to this point, have had problems with military intervention in the civil realm. Mr. Justice Jackson put it well in his famous dissent in the case of Korematsu vs. United States, in which he pointed out that if military power were to fall into “unscrupulous hands,” the military would be too powerful to restrain. 2 The true basis of civilian control is actually not a characteristic of civilians but of the military: they believe in it and would not seriously entertain a proposal to overturn it. The question arises how to ensure that this value is present—not only among military leaders but in the ranks as well. As indicated in earlier chapters (especially Chapter 1), there are two answers to this: objective civilian control, associated with Samuel P. Huntington, and subjective civilian control, associated with Morris Janowitz. Using these earlier studies as reference points, we focus specifically on the link between civil-military relations and military professionalism. Huntington suggested that the best way to ensure civilian control of the military is to encourage professionalization of the military and keep it as far away from politics as possible. The dominant U.S. ideology of liberalism is fundamentally opposed to the military institution. Liberals have tried to solve the problem of civil-military relations by various combinations of “the virtual elimination of all institutions of violence” (which Huntington calls “extirpation”) and “the refashioning of the military along liberal lines” (which he calls “transmutation”).3 According to Huntington, inculcating liberal democratic values into the military, the essence of subjective control, is a dangerous idea that would cause the military to lose its military character and presumably become impotent. Janowitz, on the other hand, wrote that the officers of his proposed “constabulary force” would share the values of society yet maintain a sense of professionalism. He concluded, “To deny or destroy the difference between the military and the civilian cannot produce genuine similarity, but runs the risk of creating new forms of tension and unanticipated militarism.” 4 For Janowitz, the danger is not that the military would be contaminated by liberal society but that it would not be sufficiently in harmony with the values of liberal society to protect it.

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The requirements of civilian control in the modern era are closer to those outlined by Janowitz. The “splendid isolation” of the military profession proposed by Huntington is a useful heuristic construct but not a good guide for public policy. Clearly, the requirements for effective civilian control of the military include a commitment to protecting society and obeying the appropriate authorities. Total emulation of civilian values by the military is not necessary, but the military must understand such values lest it lose faith in what it is supposed to be protecting. Two critical factors facing the U.S. military profession in the new era are U.S. domestic attitudes and the uncertain world environment. The end of the Cold War has led many in the United States to expect a peace dividend. Indeed, for many the drawdown of the U.S. military confirms the view that serious security threats are over. Many wonder why the money saved cannot be used for domestic purposes. The peoples and governments of the Americas turned their faces inwards in 1991. The heavy emphasis on internationalist cooperation that had marked the last six months of 1990 reached its climax with the coalition victory over Iraq and the proclamation by President George Bush of the dawn of a new world order. It had hardly been floated before it sank unmourned beneath a wave of concern about domestic economic and political problems.5

Thus, civil-military relations were bound to take on a new meaning in the 1990s as U.S. public opinion and national policy focused on domestic needs driven primarily by nonmilitary concerns. Also, the U.S. military profession was faced with reconciling the security landscape and conflict characteristics to its sense of purpose and mission. Scholarly studies offer important starting points for looking at civilmilitary relations and professionalism in the contemporary period. From such studies, three important dimensions of civil-military relations emerge: political relationships, democratization, and military professional views on politics and society. Military professionalism must also be analyzed as a distinct concept in its own right and as part of the institutional orientation. The dynamics of and relationships among these elements and components shape the composite notion of civil-military relations.

Politics and Political Leaders

Although civilian control and supremacy is an established institutional and constitutional fact, it is also clear that military involvement in political decisions on foreign policy and national security policy is an accepted if not publicly proclaimed role. This places the military in an awkward position and often poses a dilemma. As Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore conclude:

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Perhaps more than any other group, the military is victimized by a divided allegiance; on the one hand, they are charged with carrying out dictates of the elected or appointed civilian leaders; on the other hand, as the Americans most intimately acquainted with the implementation of our military policies, they are most likely to have personal qualms about the effectiveness of their policies.6

This dilemma is compounded because many professionals have accepted the view that there is an inherent antimilitary theme in U.S. politics and attitudes. This has nurtured military professional disdain of politics and political leaders, even though some elected leaders were former military men. Political leaders generally accept the notion that the military should maintain its proper distance from politics. This has been a consistent pattern in U.S. history, but in light of the major changes taking place, this pattern may be changing. The most recent confrontational period between political leaders and the military was during the Vietnam War. A number of military professionals believed that military operations in Vietnam were unduly affected by political interference from civilian sources in Washington. As the war became increasingly difficult to prosecute, domestic political support eroded and ultimately led to U.S. withdrawal. Although this did not necessarily generate a “stab in the back” mentality, it did create bitterness within the military profession and disenchantment with political leaders. As one former military professional with Vietnam experience has written: The country that sent us off to war was not there to welcome us home. It no longer existed. . . . Many of our countrymen came to hate the war we fought. Those who hated it the most—the professionally sensitive—were not, in the end, sensitive enough to differentiate between the war and the soldiers who had been ordered to fight it. They hated us as well.7

This disenchantment was more than matched by professional disillusionment with the U.S. media. As part of the political landscape, the media has been viewed suspiciously by most military professionals. 8 The prevailing relationship is adversarial and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.9 Though the media-military relationship is not an exact replica of civil-military relations, it is an important linkage institution—one that is viewed as the fourth branch of government—and has a major impact on setting the political agenda in the country. In the not too distant future, a new generation of elected officials at every level of government will take over the reins of government. Some of this is seen in the Clinton administration. Few, if any, will have had military experience. Although this will not necessarily lead to inappropriate political-military policies, it may create an environment in which strategies,

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political-military policies, and decisionmaking lack sensitivity to the realities of military life. If this would be the case, military professional views of politics and elected leaders may again reflect the disdain and disenchantment of the Vietnam years. According to Robert Bresler, in the 1992 Congress only 18.2 percent of the House freshmen and 3 of the 14 freshmen Senators had prior military experience. Two freshmen Senators and 13 House freshmen had wartime service. . . . This is in contrast to the 47.7 percent of the current House incumbents and 60 percent of the 1974 House freshmen class who had military experience. This reflects a generational shift as the 1992 class represented both the Vietnam and the post-Vietnam generation.10

The author concludes:

The 103rd Congress is the first of the post–Cold War. Its new members, elected in a time of economic dislocation, focused their campaigns and, it appears, their congressional careers on domestic concerns. . . . Those new members of Congress who joined the Armed Services Committees did so largely out of an apparent need to protect the interests of their district rather than out of a broader interest in military issues.11

The complexity of the political-military relationship is likely to be compounded by the characteristics of the new security landscape, which has shifted from a global strategic dimension to a more narrow, regional one focused on the Third World. In the process, military strategy and force posture, particularly the ground forces, will lose the high visibility and prominence associated with the confrontation with the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union. Combined with increasing prominence of nonmilitary components of national security, the traditional raison d’être of the military may be lost in the peace dividend and in the politics of peace.

Democratization and the Military

An important part of the study of civil-military relations concerns the closeness between society and the military. This usually focuses on the degree to which the military reflects the composition of society and responds to social issues. Such issues became important in the aftermath of World War II. Previously, its very small numbers and relative isolation from society placed the military outside serious societal scrutiny. This was reinforced by the attitudes of many who viewed the military in less than favorable terms and believed that it was out of the mainstream anyway. During the Cold War the comfortable relationship between the military and society was the result not only of relatively clear objectives and

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security posture but of a selective service system that brought a large group of civilians into the military for relatively short periods of time. The creation of the volunteer military system in 1973, however, initially distanced the military from society. Only later did the volunteer system broaden its social representativeness, increase its quality, and restore its link with society. While the volunteer system resulted in a high-quality military, the new domestic political and social environment posed serious challenges. As a result of such factors as demographic changes and the increasing heterogeneity of the U.S. populace, the military finds itself struggling with political-social issues that will affect force composition and the professional value system.12 In the process, military professionalism is being forced to concentrate on matters that detract from the military’s main purpose and erode the coherence of the military institution and its professional ethos. These are discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Military Professionalism

The notion of duty, honor, country shapes the broad principles of military professionalism, but the way it is interpreted and translated into institutional terms and individual behavior has varied over the course of the years. As Walter Millis has written: Military service stands by itself. It has some of the qualities of a priesthood, of a professional civil servant, of a great bureaucratized business organization and of an academic order. . . . [I]t has something of each of these in it but it corresponds exactly to none. . . . Again [the military professional] is set apart, therefore, from those who have followed other walks of life.13

As noted earlier, the military profession is also distinguished by “ultimate liability”—that is, the professional must be prepared to give his or her life to achieve professional goals.14 Further, its sole client is the state. These characteristics separate the military profession from other professions. Yet, as Orville Menard has observed, “an Army is an emanation of the nation it serves.”15 As U.S. domestic economic and educational systems change to respond to the new world order and as the strategic landscape takes on the features of a more technological age, military professionalism will need to reconcile a variety of other professional notions within its ranks. Those in the military who are weapons technicians, managers, doctors, lawyers, administrative specialists, and logisticians consider themselves not only professionals in their own skill but military professionals as well. In brief, the military profession is an aggregate of a number of other professions.

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This is becoming even more complex as many professionals increasingly view their military careers as but one part of their working life. For many, skills and education acquired in the military are seen as part of the preparation for second careers. Thus, the notions of occupation and institution as developed by Moskos appears relevant today.16 This is further complicated by the resurfacing of the “two armies” concept—one army associated with ground combat arms and the other concerned with the military support system. These are not new concepts. Distinctions between two types of military forces and two armies were suggested earlier by Moskos, William L. Hauser, and others.17 These were concepts seen by some as curiosities rather than realities, but the analysis here leads to the conclusion that such categories are emerging within the military.18 The drawdown of the U.S. military will change career patterns and force composition. These changes will necessitate a rethinking of the traditional professional worldview, one that focused primarily on external threats as the driving force of the military system. Although concern with external threats remains an integral part of the professional mind-set, an increasing link with domestic issues and concern with noncombat contingencies will likely become part of the professional ethos. A new and potentially disturbing development surfaced in the 1992 presidential election campaign. A number of retired U.S. military officers—including the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William Crowe—publicly endorsed the Democratic Party candidate, Gov. Bill Clinton. Though retired military men and women have supported one or another candidate in the past, this was usually done passively, without media fanfare. In 1992, not only was Admiral Crowe’s endorsement of Bill Clinton made publicly, it was given television coverage, with Clinton and Crowe appearing together on national TV a short time before the election. In addition, the grouping together of a number of retired officers supporting Clinton suggested an organized effort. For some, this appeared as crossing the line, injecting a partisan posture that bodes ill for the notion of military professionalism.19 (Interesting enough, in 1994 President Clinton appointed Admiral Crowe U.S. ambassador to England.) Equally disturbing to the concept of military professionalism is the role played by a number of military officers at the Pentagon in trying to influence the selection of the secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. The New York Times reported that Congressman Dave McCurdy tried to maneuver himself into the post by asking a number of “senior officers at the Pentagon . . . [to] exert influence on his behalf. . . . [T]he officers went to members of President-elect Bill Clinton’s transition team and told them that they preferred Mr. McCurdy to Mr. Aspin.”20 If such political activity becomes an established pattern—with future presidential candidates lining up one or another group of retired military officers for public endorsements or active officers lobbying for one or the

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other candidate seeking cabinet office—the line between politics and the military will become dangerously partisan. In such circumstances, the qualitative nature of civil-military relations will be affected to the detriment of democratic norms. Contrast such activity with that of retired general Norman Schwarzkopf in the 1992 presidential campaign. His views on Bill Clinton’s avoidance of military service and President Bush’s leadership in the Gulf War were made known, but he declined to endorse anyone publicly. Given these domestic and international changes, the qualitative character of military professionalism is likely to change. While the notion of duty, honor, country will remain the guiding principle, how it is interpreted and translated into military life is likely to differ from the past. Recent research suggests that this is indeed the case. 21 A group of officers who have been through full-time civilian graduate education have shown that they are more politically aware, more socially sensitive, and less convinced of the utility of military force in responding to noncombat contingencies than are many within the general command and staff. Finally, as is the case with political leaders, the successor military generation will be a new breed. The Vietnam generation of officers will have passed from the scene. Those with experience in the Gulf War will shape strategic posture and operational principles as well as military professionalism. In addition, this new breed is likely to be more politically sensitive and concerned with the political-social role of the military. Conclusions

Civil-military relations and military professionalism in the new security era face one paramount problem: how to reconcile a profession that in the past was driven by a primary focus on the battlefield and skills specifically related to success in war with a number of new forces that are peripheral to the traditional ethos. Complicating this, the military profession is faced with the problem of maintaining military effectiveness and responding to “democratization” and increasing technological advances. “While the incorporation of managerial and technological factors has been relatively easy, the military has found it extremely difficult to accept and digest ‘democratization.’”22 The degree of democratization and the way it is reconciled with the U.S. political system will be important factors shaping civil-military relations. The question now is how well the military can respond to the new forces while ensuring that it establishes an acceptable relationship with society and still maintains effectiveness in performing its primary mission, success in battle. Most seriously, there is potential for diminished support for the military profession, with a loss of prestige and esteem to accompany the

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expected diminution in resources. Military isolation in the barracks on the model of the interwar years of the 1920s and 1930s would accelerate this tendency and must be avoided. In this respect, the military is not a passive actor in shaping the character of civil-military relations, nor is it the only actor in determining the character of military professionalism. The perceptions and expectations of the U.S. public and its political leaders have a major impact on military professional ethos. People in the United States must accept that the military is part of the political system and, as such, is both a military and a political instrument. Historically, this has not been the accepted view, and for some it may deviate from the notion of civilian control and supremacy. But in responding to security challenges in the new world order and in trying to maintain its links with society, the military cannot simply dwell on a battlefield orientation. In the new environment, political-military matters will range from battlefield proficiency to foreign strategic cultures and domestic politics. These will necessitate a broad intellectual base and keen insights into political-social matters. Without these, the profession will remain rooted in the notions of the orthodox battle arena—which may not be enough for effective response in the new conflict environment. The military profession must resist a return to an isolationist posture, separating itself from society in the false hope that this will inoculate it from the ills of society and allow it the necessary autonomy to get on with its business. An important measure in this regard is to develop a posture of enlightened advocacy based on education. This means that the education of military professionals must go beyond battlefield skills and include the knowledge and understanding of the political, social, and economic factors shaping U.S. society and the international order. Part of this education involves understanding the notion of strategic cultures that evolve from nonWestern ideologies and political systems. Military professionals who complete civilian graduate education can then bring into the military an intellectual thrust that will help it to respond more effectively to these new landscapes. Education must be accompanied by enlightened advocacy. The military profession must offer an intellectually sound view of its capability and of the policies and strategies that offer the best path to further U.S. national interests. This means that the military profession must become involved in the part of the political process that focuses on national security and defense policies while balancing the politics of social engagement with societal acceptance. This is not to suggest partisan politics. If the military profession falls into such a trap, it will surely erode its legitimacy. Yet, to remain passive and to allow misjudgments and misguided policies and strategies to emerge from the political arena without a thorough debate on the military’s perspective also erodes its legitimacy. In the long term,

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such a process will reduce the military’s ability to respond to security challenges. It does not follow that the proper level of involvement by the military in political matters must be total abstinence. The military establishment deserves a fair hearing in the political arena as do other establishments . . . since each provides service to the community that need to be explained and funded.23

In terms of civil-military relations, this means that while retaining and reinforcing the notion of civil control and supremacy, the military cannot remain a silent partner. It must become an educated, enlightened, and legitimate actor in the political system and yet retain enough distance to ensure that it does not become another civilian institution, eroding its capability to win wars. In the final analysis, both military personnel and civilians need to recall the words of General Sherman: “There is a soul to an army as well as to the individual man, and no General can accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul of his men, as well as their bodies and legs.”24 Written after the Civil War, General Sherman’s words are as relevant now as they were then. The soul of an army reaches into both the military and the civilian arena. For the military profession, engagement with the political-social system should be the future course. But this must not be at the expense of the raison d’être of the military. Social and political accommodation is not a serious substitute for combat effectiveness. The profession must also make a serious and persistent effort to provide some sense of the realities of military life to national leaders and the public in general. Without these kinds of efforts and accommodations in both civilian and military worlds, the soul of the military may become a thing of the past. Notes

1. James Alden Barber, Jr., “The Military Services and American Society: Relationships and Attitudes,” in Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., eds., The Military and American Society: Essays & Readings (New York: Free Press, 1972). See also Allan R. Millett, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1979). 2. Korematsu vs. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245–246 (1944). Mr. Justice Jackson was dissenting in the 6–3 decision upholding the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas in the West Coast region of the United States during World War II. Although he would not have tried to interfere with the military decision, he was unwilling to give it constitutional sanction by legitimizing it. He wrote, “A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes

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the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.” 3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 155. 4. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 440. 5. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1991–1992 (London: Brassey’s, 1992), p. 53. 6. Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore, School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 180. 7. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1992), p. xv. 8. Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 184. 9. See, for example, Reporting the Next War, Cantigny Conference Series, Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, report of a conference held at Cantigny, Wheaton, Ill., April 23–24, 1992, especially pp. 9–10. 10. Robert J. Bresler, The New Freshmen, the 103rd Congress, and National Defense: Separating Rhetoric from Reality (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 1993), p. 12. 11. Ibid., p. 18. 12. Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 285. 13. Walter Millis, “Puzzle of the Military Mind,” New York Times, November 18, 1972, p. 144. 14. The characteristics of professions are examined in a number of publications, including those of Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos, Sarkesian, and Millis. 15. O. D. Menard, The Army and the Fifth Republic (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), p. 5. 16. Charles Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces,” in Charles C. Moskos and Frank E. Woods, eds., The Military—More Than Just a Job? (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), pp. 15–26. 17. Ibid., see also William L. Hauser, America’s Army in Transition: A Study of Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 18. See, for example, Daniel P. Bolger, “Two Armies,” Parameters 19, no. 3, September 1989, pp. 24–34. 19. See, for example, William Matthews, “Generals Side with Clinton,” Army Times, October 26, 1992, p. 19. The author notes, “But critics say retired officials have ax to grind.” 20. Clifford Krauss, “Foley to Oust House Panel Chief Over Jockeying to Join Cabinet,” New York Times, January 9, 1993, p. 1. 21. Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Fred B. Bryant, “Civilian Graduate Education and U.S. Military Professionalism,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association convention, Chicago, September 3–6, 1992. 22. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield, p. 294. 23. N. Fotion and G. Elfstrom, Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 87. 24. William Tecumseh Sherman, The Memoirs of W. T. Sherman (New York: Library of America, 1990), p. 879.

Part 4 Conclusions: The Emerging Military Profession

8 The Military Profession: Changes and Challenges As this study has shown, major changes are taking place in each component of our conceptual framework, including the overarching hypothesis. In this chapter we review these changes, draw conclusions, and reflect on what this means for the military profession and the military system. Overview

The combination of domestic and international issues promises to weigh heavily on the military profession and its strategic and doctrinal orientation. These issues strike at the core of the professional ethos. Even more challenging is that the military profession must be prepared to respond to a variety of national security challenges with diminished resources and considerably fewer personnel, and it must do so even in the face of skepticism within the body politic regarding issues of national security. Exacerbating all of this is that few politicians and academic commentators in the new era have had any real military experience. Although experience is not the sine qua non for serious examination and analysis of national security and the military profession, without that experience it is difficult to design realistic national security policies or to understand the nature and character of the military profession.

The Military and the Changing Context of National Security

Changes in the strategic and domestic arenas are having a significant impact on the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army in particular. On the one hand, the United States has entered a period of relative peace and diminished nuclear threat with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, numerous other threats and challenges have emerged, many of them ill defined and uncertain. One observer has labeled these challenges “gray areas,”1 which may be an appropriate label given that the threats and 147

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their consequences are so ambiguous. Not only is the U.S. military faced with the uncertainties of the “fog of peace” in the international arena, there is also the same fog in the domestic arena. The U.S. military must operate in this strategic environment with a much smaller force, with the army located mainly in the United States and functioning in a domestic political environment shaped by expectations of a peace dividend. In 1989, research indicated that some military professionals were in the process of changing their strategic perspectives, anticipating the changes that occurred in 1993. Some had begun to broaden their vision of threats and challenges.2 Although it was not clear where these threats and challenges would come from, most felt that issues had gone beyond the threat of communism and what remained of the old Soviet Union. Many placed drugs and the problems they posed to the United States high on the list. The international view was tempered by concerns over the state of the domestic political and economic situation. Many officers believed that domestic economic capability had become closely linked to the ability of the United States to pursue national objectives. More army professionals became sensitive to the link between U.S. military capability and the domestic political order. Although much of this concern was a lingering heritage from the Vietnam era, it was reinforced by the changing nature of the world environment, the restructuring of the U.S. Army, and the impact of the army’s drawdown and downsizing. These issues were increasingly troubling to professional army officers, who were uncertain not only of what the future might hold but of the ability of the United States to respond to the new threats and challenges. What many army professionals saw several years ago regarding the changing nature of threats and challenges was confirmed by the events of the early 1990s. In January 1990, the chief of staff of the U.S. Army, Gen. Carl Vuono, observed that “in the years ahead, the United States will face unprecedented challenges in an increasingly complex, volatile, and unpredictable world. This changing environment will place far-reaching demands on the US military establishment, particularly on our conventional forces.”3 In 1992 the chief of staff of the U.S. Army was Gen. Gordon Sullivan. He had initiated a self-examination, launching a program “that will require the Army to take a hard look at how it wants to be organized, equipped and trained in the late 1990s and into the next century.”4 In the process, the drawdown was moving ahead in earnest. Army professionals, however, were cautious in accepting major changes. Though most recognized that the world was changing, they appeared to be far less convinced that there was an immediate need for dramatic transition in the U.S. Army. The Gulf War seemed to confirm the need to proceed more slowly than proposed by many U.S. lawmakers.

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Moreover, many were concerned about what a rapid drawdown might do to morale and effectiveness. Some believed that beyond a certain critical point the army would be unable to carry out the variety of contingencies being contemplated in the new era, and they were concerned about policies and plans for forced reductions in the officers corps. Missions and contingencies for the army will be more complex and uncertain than even during the Vietnam era. As a consequence, it will be more difficult to explain the military role to the U.S. people, who do not necessarily see serious military threats to the United States. Perhaps more than any other military service, the U.S. Army is faced with the most serious readjustment. It is trying to maintain its esprit de corps and to train for realistic missions and contingencies. There is nothing so debilitating to the esprit of the ground forces than to become convinced that they are trained and organized for irrelevant and improbable contingencies. In the new security era, there is a double-edged danger. On the one hand, the possibility of the use of ground forces outside the United States may become so remote that it will be difficult to maintain a high state of combat readiness and sense of purpose. On the other hand, the preoccupation with esprit and effectiveness may direct the use of ground forces in missions that have no military solutions, that are muddled affairs, or that are simply exacerbated by U.S. involvement. Forces in search of a mission are no solution. Also, most contingencies for the U.S. military may be in non-Western areas, and many will be unconventional conflicts—this will pose new challenges in political, social, and psychological dimensions. The U.S. military is being placed in a position to do more with less. In sum, American political leaders are requiring the military to contract in both size and budget, contribute to domestic recovery, participate in global stability operations, and retain its capability to produce decisive victory in whatever circumstances they are employed—all at the same time. . . . [I]nternational and domestic realities have resulted in the paradox of declining military resources and increasing military missions, a paradox that is stressing our armed forces. The stress is significant.5

U.S. Society and Military Professionalism

The changing demographics, the political-social character of U.S. society, and social issues are having an impact on the U.S. military. The present debates over women (particularly women in combat units) and homosexuals in the military are troubling for many military professionals. Even though in 1993 the Clinton administration decided to allow women in most combat units except ground combat units and adopted a policy on homosexuals based on “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue,” much controversy

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remained regarding the implementation of such policies.6 In a 1992 television interview, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney made the point that the critical factor was combat effectiveness, not necessarily socially acceptable dictates.7 Minority composition in the military will also be of some concern, particularly because of the planned drawdown. Although the military has been a leader in offering equal opportunity and in integrating minority groups into the system, the considerably diminished numbers planned over the next several years are likely to have a negative impact on minority recruitment and accessions into the officers corps. All of this has been complicated by other issues in U.S. politics and society. These include issues such as single-parent families, child care, and the role of military spouses. Further, the concentration of the army in certain parts of the United States and the closing of a number of bases also portend difficult personnel adjustments. One consequence is that professionals will be likely to spend a greater proportion of their careers with one particular unit or at one post. This raises a number of questions regarding post housing, schools, relationships with the civilian community, career proficiency, and promotions. It has long been held that an effective military system is based partly on the autonomy of the military institution and its relative distance from serious domestic social issues. In 1993 the distance between the military and society appeared to narrow, raising questions about military cohesion and effectiveness. This was reinforced by Clinton administration plans to make even deeper cuts in the U.S. military. The critical issue is how closely the military can replicate society in terms of social compatibility and still retain a sense of autonomy, community, professional ethos, and combat effectiveness. In 1994 the issue remained in doubt.

Political-Military Dynamics

The U.S. military is faced with adjusting to a different political climate and a changing civil-military relationship. It will need to reestablish a relationship with its conservative, disciplined, and law and order environment and the more liberal, egalitarian, and civil rights–oriented civilian arena. The possibility of the military withdrawing into isolation reminiscent of the 1920s and 1930s is real. Yet it is also possible that the military will become more enmeshed with civilian communities because of the changing nature of assignments and the relationship of military bases and posts to the local community. Samuel P. Huntington examined such relationships, focusing on the gap between a liberal society and a military based on discipline and an authoritarian system. He felt that civil-military relations in such an environment were best pursued by maintaining a separateness between the military

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and society.8 Morris Janowitz added considerably to the understanding of the military profession by his examination of pragmatist and absolutist perspectives. He concluded that the best system for a democracy was a constabulary force in which the profession was knowledgeable about politics and became involved to a limited degree in the political system.9 Others searched for a more politically involved military profession, balanced by political sophistication and conflict capability.10 In 1993 the Clinton administration created a different political environment and brought to the Oval Office a different mind-set regarding the military. Moreover, the new Congress included many members who had little or no military experience. Indeed, the emergence of a new generation of elected officials whose mind-set and political orientation are shaped primarily by the post-Soviet strategic landscape and new domestic environment will have long-term implications for the political dynamics that shape political-military relationships. Civil-military relations are being affected accordingly. The Emerging Military Profession

The challenge to the military profession has evolved from the changes that have occurred in the first three components of our thesis. In the past, the strategic orientation, weaponry, and force composition provided the psychological sustenance and skill criteria for the profession. There was a clear enemy and a clear professional purpose that reinforced and expanded the notion of a profession committed to the service of the country. Duty, honor, country was a meaningful focus for most professionals. In a contrary way, this became more evident during the Vietnam War: it was apparent after 1968 that the United States was looking for a way out, and the profession became disenchanted with the strategy and tactics of the war. Indeed, following the Vietnam War, professionals quickly turned their attention again to the European theater, where the U.S. Army was more comfortable and clear in its purpose. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the drawdown and downsizing of the U.S. military resulted in problems similar to those during the last half of the Vietnam War. Strategic reorientation, personnel turmoil, and restructuring have emerged as critical issues. Society has changed its view of external threats, shifting its concern to domestic issues. These are not new problems, but how they are to be resolved while maintaining an effective military force remains unclear. Indeed, General Sherman’s concerns are still relevant today: I admit, in its fullest force, the strength of the maxim that the civil law should be superior to the military in time of peace; that the army should be at all times subject to the direct control of the Congress; and I assert

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that, from the formation of our Government to the present day, the Regular Army has set the highest example of obedience to law and authority; but, for the very reason that our army is comparatively so very small, I hold that it should be the best possible, organized and governed on true military principles, and that in time of peace we should preserve the “habits and usages of war,” so that, when war does come, we may not again be compelled to suffer the disgrace, confusion, and disorder of 1861.11

There is now a diminished threat of major wars or nuclear war, at least from the former Soviet Union. Also, national security is going through a metamorphosis, with many now seeing it primarily in terms of domestic and economic issues. Thus, economic strength, drug abatement, humanitarian missions, and a variety of socially relevant contingencies have surfaced as prominent components of the national security debate. Indeed, for some, “national security” is an outmoded Cold War phenomenon. As a consequence, the military profession is faced with a variety of complex and difficult issues arising from the domestic and international environments. It must also serve as a reservoir of national security skills, and provide the intellectual leadership for addressing a variety of illdefined threats and challenges. The “fog of peace” shrouds a difficult and challenging period for the U.S. military. The security landscape and civil-military relations have been critical components in shaping the U.S. Army in the modern period. Underpinning all of this is the nature and character of the military profession—the way the professional views the profession, his or her role in it, the profession’s moral and ethical underpinnings, and its relationship to society are essential ingredients for effective responses to security challenges and the expectations of society. With respect to the U.S. Army in particular, perhaps the most critical question concerns the training and education of the army professional. What competence does he or she need to develop to be prepared to respond to ill-defined threats emanating from uncertain areas? Equally important, what is needed to ensure that the U.S. Army is best prepared to serve the elected national leadership and the U.S. people in this new and uncertain era? The Hypothesis

As outlined in the first chapter, the main part of our conceptual framework is the hypothesis that a cohesive military, fine-tuned to respond to contingencies across the spectrum, can be achieved, maintained, and nurtured only by the melding of the critical mass of the four components (national

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security context, U.S. society, political-military dynamics, and military professionalism) and the degree of synergism that results. In sum, civilmilitary relations must shape a political-social system among the military, society, and elected officials that provides the psychological and political sustenance for the military to respond successfully to military challenges and contingencies. Based on our study, this hypothesis and the notion of synergism need to be reexamined and a new hypothesis must be constructed. Conclusions

The new strategic landscape necessitates a new professional mind-set focused on operations short of war, unconventional conflicts, a variety of domestic missions, and peacekeeping missions. Most of these differ considerably from the conventional war focus. Also, the distance between the military and society has narrowed, with a number of political-social issues still unresolved. Further, the political environment shaped by the Clinton administration and the Congress promises to create a different relationship between elected leaders and the military. The military professional mind-set concerning the concept of the military as a career is changing. The importance of higher education, the notion of second careers, dual professionalism, and military-social issues have become important parts of military professionalism. Although it is not clear where this will lead, it is clear that the old generation is passing and the traditional view of military professionalism and civil-military relations is changing. What this means in terms of the military profession and the military system needs to be reexamined. Notes

1. Xavier Raufer, “Gray Areas: A New Security Threat,” Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active Measures, and Terrorism Report, no. 20, Spring 1992, pp. 1, 4. 2 .See Appendixes. 3. Carl E. Vuono, “A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond” (U.S. Army, January 1990), p. 1. 4. Jim Tice, “‘Lousiana Maneuvers’ Look to the Future,” Army Times, June 1, 1992, p. 16. 5. Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993), p. 8. 6. See, for example, Rick Maze, “House, Senate Agree on Policy,” Army Times, August 9, 1993, p. 10. In 1993 there was disagreement between the legislation proposed by Sen. Sam Nunn and the Clinton administration policy on homosexuals in the military. The Nunn policy sounds tougher overall than what Clinton has proposed, because it contains a set of “findings” expressing congressional intent. Among the 15 findings are

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The Emerging Military Profession the following statements: . . . “The military society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal behavior, that would not be acceptable in civilian society.”

See also Nick Adde, “Military Gay Policy Is Subject of Suit,” Army Times, August 9, 1993, p. 10. 7. Richard Cheney, CNN television interview, August 2, 1992. 8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1964). 9. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971). 10. See, for example, Sam C. Sarkesian, “Changing Dimensions of Military Professionalism: Education and Enlightened Advocacy,” Military Review 59, no. 3, March 1979, pp. 44–55. 11. William Tecumseh Sherman, The Memoirs of W. T. Sherman (New York: Library of America, 1990), p. 899.

9 A New Hypothesis The nature of the new strategic landscape combined with changing civilmilitary relations show that battlefield skills will not be enough for the military professional to respond to the new environment. To limit professional competence to battlefield skills, as some have recommended, virtually denies the ability of military professionals to understand, analyze, and respond to the conflict environment—which is proving to be complex and shaped in no small measure by a variety of nonmilitary components.1 The “fog of peace” has brought with it innumerable benefits but also a number of confusing and ill-defined threats and challenges to U.S. security. To be well prepared for both international and domestic demands, the U.S. military profession must expand its professional horizons and its intellectual competence. Civilian graduate education provides the necessary dimension to U.S. military professionalism to enable it to respond to the new strategic landscape and the U.S. domestic milieu. Education and the Military Profession

More than a decade and a half ago, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster recognized the importance of academic civilian education. His views are particularly appropriate in today’s environment: Education of the highest order will be needed to grapple with unsolved problems of American security—those now unsolved, such as an adequate yet supportable security policy toward the Third World, and those that will arise as stable relationships now existing are eroded or altered by new technological discoveries and applications or by shifts in the strength of alignment of nations. . . . In subjects that are uniquely or primarily military, the educational needs of military personnel are met in military schools. But many subjects in which military personnel require training lie in areas of educational needs that the military shares with the civilian community, and programs in these subjects can best be civilian based.2 155

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Our research supports much of General Goodpaster’s view of the importance of civilian graduate education to the military profession. Various judgments are offered regarding graduate education and military professionalism. First, the civilian graduate education experience is personally and professionally beneficial to U.S. Army officers. The impact on careers is both immediate, in terms of specific competencies enhanced, and long range, in terms of a residual positive impact. Second, the program offers a channel for mutually beneficial interaction between the military profession and the academic community (and, therefore, to the society at large). Third, civilian graduate education for military officers is important in strengthening military professionalism, as it stimulates intellectual growth and creates centers of intellectual curiosity throughout the U.S. Army. In the long term, this is beneficial both to the military and to society. Fourth, the demands of the new security environment require that military officers reach beyond traditional battlefield skills. Civilian graduate education is the starting point for that. Finally, an educational program would also have a positive impact on the university faculty and civilian students involved. Open-ended interviews with officers revealed their perception that channels of communication and understanding had been opened, and many intended to maintain a link with their universities. For many civilians in universities, their interaction with the officers in this program provided their only first-hand knowledge of military people. Both civilians and military can better understand the other’s world, thus breaking down rigid stereotypes. Senior service schools are avenues for military professionals to develop intellectual competence in dealing with strategic and operational issues. But their focus is on military perspectives and operations, with only a nod toward nonmilitary factors and the complexities of political-psychological components in shaping the conflict arena. Moreover, analytical and operational skills in conflict causes and roots, conflict termination, and postconflict governance are important components of an effective U.S. Army response.3 These matters are not easily digested and institutionalized in senior service school curricula. Moreover, the attempt to study such matters isolated from a civilian milieu runs the risk of sterile assessments and shortsighted perspectives. This leads to an important theme of this book: full-time civilian graduate education for a large number of career officers is an essential part of military professionalism. This does not mean that all army professionals need to complete degree programs in full-time civilian graduate education. But U.S. Army professionals who have completed at least one year in such a program bring to the military system a much needed perspective and

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intellectual competency to deal with the new strategic landscape and U.S. political realities. The military profession is not a monolith. A handful of officers coming out of civilian graduate education and immersed in the profession bring a greater flexibility of ideas and a closer link with society than most other military professionals. They also bring an appreciation of the complexities of the domestic and international arenas, complexities that they understand are not necessarily resolved by the application of military force. These short-term characteristics, combined with the continuous input of officers into the military mainstream who have successfully passed through fully funded civilian graduate education, have an impact on long-term characteristics of military professionalism and civil-military relations. In the long term, incremental changes in military professionalism and civil-military relations probably do occur. Although this does not rest with civilian graduate education, such education can provide an important part of the stimulus for incremental change. Military professionalism remains fixed in the notion of duty, honor, country, even in the short term, for those completing civilian graduate education. However, such education instills a degree of flexibility in translating this into more specific terms. Although there remains a conservative bent in the concept of military professionalism, this is not rigid and it does not preclude recognition of a diversity of ideas. Moreover, an advanced degree is recognized not only as a career enhancement but as a tool for gaining meaningful employment in a second career. Thus, for a number of officers, a career in the military is not seen as a lifelong commitment. Also, there appears to be little question that emerging military professionalism and civil-military relations are becoming qualitatively different than they were a generation ago. Although this is due partly to the changing nature of modern war, it is also due to the intellectual stimulus injected into the military institution by a select number of officers completing fulltime civilian graduate education. The security environment of the future requires a military profession described by one British observer almost three decades ago, in the aftermath of Britain’s loss of empire: “The traditional pattern of centralized command in battle is no longer possible; commanders must be more flexible, familiar with a wide range of techniques of combat, above all more highly educated; they cannot be expert in all fields now relevant to their job but they must be able to handle and digest expert advice.” 4 These words can be used to describe the challenges facing the U.S. Army professional in today’s environment. Focusing on the army professional, the best way to prepare for future challenges and threats is to develop a group of officers who are educated

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and who can serve as vanguards for enlightened advocacy, infusing the profession with the kind of driving force well described by Josiah Bunting: The truly liberally-educated soldier is the soldier who can reconcile the necessity for training and education, and be happy in both. . . . For it is the man liberally educated, not the technically educated, who will be the most sensitive to the great flux of civil life; it is the man who is both liberally and professionally educated who will be the better soldier.5

The military professional must not only be driven by “educated” professionals but also must adopt a posture of enlightened advocacy. Enlightened advocacy is based on horizons and perspectives not bound by military considerations and encompasses the view that political, psychological, social, and economic factors are an integrated part of any conflict. This mix of civilian and military dimensions is best understood by those with civilian graduate education.6 The alternative to this intellectual dimension of military professionalism is a military isolated from society and remote from the realities of the international security landscape. For the military profession, therefore, engagement with the politicalsocial system should be the future course. But this must be balanced by the raison d’être of the military, to fight and win wars. Social and political accommodation is not a substitute for combat effectiveness. At the same time, the profession must make a serious and persistent effort to provide some sense of the realities of military life to national leaders and the public in general. The driving principle is that the military must serve a democratic society. All of this is made extraordinarily complex by the uncertainty of the international world and its ill-defined strategic shape. Without an awareness of these issues in both civilian and military sectors, it is questionable that the U.S. military will be able to respond effectively to the challenges emerging in the new security era. At this time, the issue remains in doubt. The Civilian Dimension

The issues we have discussed do not rest solely within the military professional world. As this study has shown, the civil-military relationship is complex. How the military is viewed from the civilian world, particularly from the perspective of civilian decisionmaking circles, is critical. In this respect, the writing of Alfred Kern is particularly revealing: In twentieth century American literature, the professional military (both the institution and the individuals who belong to it) is criticized, suspected, feared, and not infrequently identified as the enemy. A quick

A New Hypothesis

survey of the books from World War I to the present—sixty years—supports this assertion almost without exception.7

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The U.S. public and its elected leaders must accept the notion that the military is part of the political system, is an inextricable part of society, and is a political instrument as well as a defense tool. This has not been the traditional view of many who fear that deviation from strict interpretation and isolation of the military may reduce civilian control and supremacy. The new world order and the security landscape demand that the military not only broaden its political and military horizons beyond battlefield orientation but also be particularly sensitive to domestic politicalsocial forces. These new dimensions must replace the latent civilian views that often rest on antimilitary attitudes and fears of the “man on horseback.” The Nature of Leadership

The quality of leadership in national security is critical in affecting the strength of military purpose, the military professional ethos, and the coherence among strategy, operational doctrine, and military effectiveness. The president’s leadership is the determining factor in all of this. In assessing presidential leadership, “the style and character of the president himself is every bit as important as the inherent power of the institution . . . we must consider three factors: a president’s sense of purpose; his political skills; and his character.”8 Military leadership studies point out three major dimensions of command and authority. One dimension is of being elected or appointed to an office that carries with it legal authority. The second dimension is the respect engendered by the personality and character of the individual who occupies the office. And the third is the perception of those within the organization that the leader has shown his or her willingness to undergo the same trials and tribulations of those he or she is commanding. Further, an individual elected to the highest office does not have unlimited or unrestrained powers as commander in chief. Indeed, a basic assumption is that the individual occupying the Oval Office will be a leader with sensitivity for and understanding of the institutions of government and, more important, the men and women in those institutions. This is particularly true with respect to the military. Leadership begins at the top. The leader must show respect for those who are to be led. Those in the military understand this—it is a first principle of leadership. Again, as General Sherman once wrote, “There is a soul to an army as well as to the individual man, and no General can

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accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul of his men, as well as their bodies and legs.”9 In sum, the relationship between the president and the military profession and establishment is a critical one in matters of national security. This means something more than simple inheritance of the powers of the Oval Office. The relationship rests primarily on personal character and style and the quality of leadership that permeates the military ranks. The Military Profession: To What End?

In 1994 it was not clear where the issues evolving from civilian graduate education, civil-military relations, and the nature of national security leadership were likely to lead. We suggest three directions here. For one, military professionalism and civil-military relations could parallel de Tocqueville’s concept of an inward-looking, self-centered, and isolated military in a world of its own.10 Another direction could lead to a military whose professional views demand a global vision and intellectual horizons wide enough to respond to the variety and complexity of future conflicts. In turn, such a military must remain closely linked to society—it must be understanding of and sympathetic to the needs of an increasingly complex society and to the political dynamics in the domestic and international systems. The downside is that a narrowing of the distance between the military and society with emphasis on democratization may have a detrimental impact on military cohesion and effectiveness. Finally, there is the possibility of continuing professional disagreement and confrontation between those who have a clear direction and those who do not. In any case, the uncertainty of the direction is cause enough to rethink existing notions of military professionalism. Complicating this uncertainty is the impact of downsizing the U.S. military, which is likely to have a particularly important impact on the army. There has been a great deal of soul searching within the higher levels of the U.S. Army regarding the impact of force reduction and redeployment. The need to implement a reduction in force continues to have demoralizing implications for the officers corps. This is exacerbated by the uncertainty regarding the impact of social issues on the military system. All of this has raised questions about careers and, in the broader sense, the raison d’être of the army. Three Military Systems: A New Hypothesis

Although not explicit in the analysis, there are signs that a military response to the perceived denigration of the synergism among the military

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profession, domestic society and political leadership, and the strategic landscape is leading to a restructuring of the military system from within. In brief, the synergism evolving from the four components of the approach and its overarching hypothesis is likely to be perceived by many in the profession as being denigrated by forces not under the profession’s control or influence. In the broader sense, the conclusions of this study suggest that political-social issues emanating from domestic society and the political sphere have created a more politicized and democratized military. In addition to a complex and ambiguous strategic landscape, the military profession is faced with internal changes as well. It is likely to respond by focusing on internal military matters over which it can exercise some control. Unable to affect domestic political-social forces to preclude such a development, the military professional is likely to reinforce the notion of the two-army concept (as discussed earlier) and expand it into a threemilitary-system concept. The National Guard and the reserves are likely to follow similar developments. The first component will be a mainstream military system containing primarily combat support and combat service support elements (i.e., the noncombat elements of the military). The second system will consist primarily of the ground combat arms, including the combat divisions of the army and the marine corps. The third system will be primarily the special operations forces, including Ranger units, Navy Seals, special air squadrons, and the Special Forces. On the one hand, with the exception of the ground combat units, the mainstream military system (first system) will be forced to reconcile itself to the democratization of the military, with all that suggests about homosexuals and the role of women. On the other hand, the ground combat units (second system) and elite units and special operations forces (third system) will attempt to resist any erosion of their cohesion and effectiveness by trying to preclude homosexuals and women. It is likely that the third system will be dogmatic in these matters. Even if legislation is passed toward that end, the internal military control mechanisms will attempt to severely limit and will likely not allow such legislation to be effective in the second and third military systems. The new hypothesis is that, implicitly, three military systems will be established. The first system will be closest in nature to society, absorbing social forces and focusing on technical and support services. It will be shaped more like a corporate structure and civilian-oriented profession than the traditional military system. It will provide the necessary administrative and logistical support for the first two systems and retain more of a civilian flavor than the other. The second system, while maintaining some distance from society, will be driven by the prime purpose of the military. The third system will also maintain some distance from society (to be least susceptible to social forces) and will continue to focus on carrying out society-sanctioned violence in the service of the state.11

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The new hypothesis is that the nurturing of a cohesive military, finetuned to respond to contingencies across the spectrum, can be achieved, maintained, and nurtured only by ensuring that some distance remains between society and the elite and special operations forces; a degree of distance must remain between society and the mainstream ground combat arms. Combat support and combat service support elements of the military can readily absorb the political-social demands of society and create a link among these, the ground combat arms, and the elite and special operations forces. In essence, a three-system military can create an acceptable organization for the transition period and establish the basis for a military institution into the next century. We find nothing wrong in this development as long as the three-military syndrome is consistent with the broader expectations and norms of democratic society. We believe that it can be. Notes

1. See, for example, Martin L. Van Creveld, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance (New York: Free Press, 1990). 2. Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington, Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 35, 54. 3. See, for example, Richard Shultz, “The Impact of Democratization on Civil-Military Relations: U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Panama,” paper presented at the Mershon Center Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, December 4–5, 1992. 4. Philip Abrams, “The Late Profession of Arms, Ambiguous Goals and Deteriorating Means in Britain,” European Journal of Sociology 6, no. 2, 1965, p. 246. Emphasis in original. 5. Josiah Bunting, “The Humanities in the Education of the Military Professional,” in Lawrence J. Korb, ed., The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: International Studies Association, 1976), p. 158. 6. See Sam C. Sarkesian, “Changing Dimensions of Military Professionalism: Education and Enlightened Advocacy,” Military Review 59, pp. 44–55. 7. Alfred Kern, “Literary Perception of the American Military,” Military Ethics: Reflections on Principles—The Profession of Arms, Military Leadership, Ethical Practices, War and Morality, Educating the Citizen Soldier (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), pp. 203–204. 8. Erwin C. Hargrove and Roy Hoopes, The Presidency: A Question of Power (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), p. 47. 9. William Tecumseh Sherman, The Memoirs of W. T. Sherman (New York: Library of America, 1990), p. 879. 10. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, edited by J. P. Mayer. Translated by George Lawrence (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1989), p. 648. 11. See Major Steve Eden, U.S. Army, “Preserving the Force in the New World Order,” Military Review vol. 74, no. 6, June 1994, pp. 2–7. This article was the winner of the 1993 Military Review writing contest. Although differing in

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concept from the new hypothesis presented here, Eden argues that the army must be prepared for challenges in the new world order by establishing three training priorities. He writes:

Certain units—we will call them Class A units—would be “fenced off” from operations other than war, solely dedicated to conventional combat. Class B units would train primarily for conventional warfare, though sustaining a minimum level of expertise in more mundane aspects of operations other than war. Class C units . . . would prepare for missions other than high-intensity maneuver warfare (pp. 4–5).

Appendixes

Appendix A Final Report: Civilian Graduate Education and the U.S. Military Profession Summary and Explanation Purpose and Procedures

Our research on the impact of civilian graduate education on the U.S. military profession was funded by a Spencer Foundation grant that extended from June 1, 1988, to December 31, 1990. We focused on two fundamental questions: What is the impact of civilian graduate education on attitudes and mind-sets of military professionals? and What impact does civilian graduate education have on the officers’ notions of military professionalism? The research was conducted in a longitudinal, two-phase survey and with selected open-ended interviews. Approximately 11–12 months lapsed between phase 1 and phase 2. The same survey instrument was used in both phases, with 675 officers completing phase 1 and 314 of these completing phase 2.1 It was recognized that the research would, by necessity, be exploratory in nature because we would be examining heretofore unexplored areas and because the work was shaped by a variety of assumptions about military professionalism and was affected by the characteristics of the subject population.

Literature review. As part of our research, consultants were asked to review the literature on military professionalism and higher education. The major thrust of the review on military professionalism suggests that in the military system, civilian graduate education is not considered a mainstream career assignment. Indeed, for many, assignments outside of branch (e.g., infantry, signal corps, quartermaster) specialties are useful, but they are not a critical enterprise for military effectiveness. This is particularly true of combat arms branches (infantry, artillery, armor, and combat engineers). The fundamental notions of the military profession remain 167

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fixed in duty, honor, country and capability in field operations. Moreover, the literature reveals no clear link between civilian education and military professionalism. For most, civilian graduate education is considered a lower priority than education at any senior service school (e.g., U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College). Finally, there is little published material on the notion of resocialization after an interlude of graduate education. The review of the literature on higher education shows few, if any, studies examining the impact of higher education on the values, belief systems, and mind-sets of graduate students. The absence of a literature base on this subject is surprising because a great deal of research has been conducted on the impact of higher education on undergraduate student values, attitudes, and belief systems. Most of the literature focuses on the nature and purpose of graduate education, curriculum, administrative structures, academic politics, and demographic issues. However, the absence of published empirical research should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that graduate study does not have an impact on student attitudes, values, and belief systems. The academic environmental conditions that seem to foster the type of socialization in which student values and belief systems are most likely to be shaped involve frequent opportunities for students to interact with faculty over an extended period of time. Graduate students often self-select the graduate field of study and institutional program in which they enroll. Thus, it is likely that many of these students already subscribe to many of the values and beliefs of the faculty.

Changes from initial research proposal. It was determined early in the study that the research would focus exclusively on U.S. Army professionals. The decision to exclude other services was based on a number of considerations. First, project control necessitated some manageability of the size of the population to be sampled and interviewed. Second, the issues of professionalism, civil-military relations, and graduate education appear to be more clearly discernible with respect to U.S. Army professionals because of the nature of army operational missions. Third, the character of the U.S. Army, its mission, and its direct contact with populations of other countries provided substantive components important to this research. The substance of the initial proposal was not changed during the course of the research. However, some revisions were made in the subject population. The two-group category of officers was refined to include five groups: 1. Majors with B.A. degrees (n = 57) 2. Majors with M.A. degrees before becoming involved in phase 1 (n = 63)2

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3. Captains who were attending the Command and Staff School (CAS3) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during phase 1 (n = 19) 4. Officers just entering civilian graduate school at phase 1 and who were attending fully funded civilian graduate programs during phase 2 (n = 86)3 5. Officers who were in civilian graduate programs during phase 1 and were recent graduates of civilian graduate schools at phase 2 (n = 89)

The total number of responses (n =) in each group includes only those that responded in both phase 1 and phase 2. The more detailed categories were designed to account for different officer career patterns that included civilian graduate education pursued during “off duty” hours (not fully funded, full-time programs) and previously awarded graduate degrees. Additionally, an attempt was made at generational distinctions (e.g., captains attending the Command and Staff School and majors attending the Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth). One factor had a strong impact on the longitudinal portion of the research: halfway through the study, “peace” broke out in Europe. The end of the Cold War is having many beneficial effects, but the blessing is decidedly mixed for officers wishing to make their careers in the army. The virtual elimination of the threat of land war in Central Europe—the single most important element determining the size of the U.S. Army—means a smaller army, even in light of the challenges to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. Conclusions

The most striking finding of the research is that so few differences were found between groups. Only 5 out of 116 dependent variables showed group differences at the .01 level of statistical significance; 96 percent of the measures showed no statistically significant intergroup differences. Clearly, the five groups surveyed are far more alike than they are different. The strongest conclusion that can be drawn from the results is that civilian graduate education does not profoundly alter the values and beliefs of U.S. Army officers. Three pieces of evidence support this general conclusion: 1. Officers with civilian graduate degrees (i.e., recent graduates and older majors with M.A. degrees) are largely comparable with officers without civilian graduate degrees (i.e., those just entering civilian graduate school, majors with B.A. degrees, and CAS3 captains) in their responses

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to survey items. If graduate education produced pervasive changes in values and beliefs, then these groups of respondents should have differed from one another. 2. Officers just finishing civilian graduate school show very few differences from officers just entering graduate school. If graduate education had a stong immediate impact on values and beliefs, then these groups should have been more strikingly different from one another. 3. Officers just entering graduate school at phase 1 showed no unique changes in responses over the one-year span of the longitudinal survey. If obtaining a graduate education changed values and beliefs, then officers should have responded differently subsequent to completing their graduate education at phase 2 from when surveyed during phase 1.

The fact that the responses of recent graduates of civilian graduate schools are equivalent to those of earlier graduates (majors with M.A. degrees) further suggests that graduate education does not have a delayed impact on values and beliefs. Evidently, any effects of civilian graduate education are just as strong immediately following the education experience as they are after personnel return to military duty. Among majors, those with graduate degrees show no statistically significant differences when compared with those without graduate degrees. This suggests that the few differences that exist between recent graduates and earlier graduates may well dissipate over time as officers are resocialized into the military. Longitudinal analyses comparing phase 1 with phase 2 revealed that responses of officers with graduate degrees and those without graduate degrees are largely comparable in both phases. Indeed, only three dependent measures demonstrated the predicted effects, and these stable differences did not hold for all the groups that were expected to differ. The most powerful and pervasive effects found in the longitudinal data set are shifts in responses over time that held for all groups of officers. These shifts reflect historical changes in values and beliefs that have developed between phases 1 and 2. For example, during the one-year period between phases, all respondents shifted toward a lower national priority for active military policies and a larger military budget. These temporal shifts may reflect a reduction in the perceived likelihood of war that resulted from the dramatic change in Eastern Europe during the year of the survey. These views may well have changed again, however, in the wake of the 1990–1991 crisis involving Iraq and Kuwait. Also during the one-year period between phases, military professionals shifted toward a greater belief in the value of civilian graduate education. All respondents came to agree more strongly with the statement that

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“regardless of the nature of education provided for military officers, it is the command of military units that is the most important experience for any officer.” This may appear paradoxical in light of the “greater belief in the value of civilian graduate education,” but it is likely that the commitment to the profession and to the “core” values that stress military command as the critical component of the profession prevails over the commitment to other career paths. Finally, group changes were comparable over time and no unique temporal changes were found for a particular group. This suggests that there is a large degree of uniformity in perceptions of the world environment and professional perspectives. In brief, the “military perspective” appears well institutionalized within the military profession regardless of officer career patterns. However, four sets of group differences do emerge in the research:

1. Recent graduates of civilian graduate education show some differences when compared with majors without graduate degrees. Recent graduates see a graduate degree as more valuable for career enhancement and give a lower national priority to aggressive military policies than do majors without graduate degrees. 2. Recent graduates show some differences when compared with officers just entering civilian graduate schools. Those just completing school give a lower national priority to aggressive military policies and believe it is important to read national print media such as the New York Times. 3. Officers just entering civilian graduate school show some differences from majors without graduate degrees. Not surprising, those just starting graduate school see a graduate degree as more important for career enhancement than do majors without such degrees. 4. Officers completing civilian graduate programs show a greater tolerance for a diversity of ideas. They appear to have broadened their view of the world as a result of exposure to the academic environment.

These research results are the basis for some general conclusions. First, officers who are chosen and who choose to become involved in civilian graduate education are in some ways different to begin with from those who choose not to become involved. Even before beginning graduate education, those who seek an advanced degree believe it will enhance their career. However, officers just starting and officers just finishing graduate education do not differ from one another in the value they place on an advanced degree. This pattern suggests that the belief that graduate education will enhance one’s military career is more a reason for attending civilian graduate school than it is a result of such attendance.

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Second, although those with graduate degrees are in some ways initially different, getting a civilian graduate education also seems to change officers’ beliefs in some ways. The most striking change is the lower national priority given to aggressive military policies. Those just completing graduate school give aggressive military policies a lower national priority than do either those just starting graduate school or majors without graduate degrees. Apparently, those who seek an advanced degree are not different in these terms initially but rather come to see counterinsurgency, military commitment abroad, the defeat of communism, an increase in nuclear capability, and reinstatement of the draft as having a lower national priority only after completing civilian graduate education. Thus, civilian graduate education does seem to have some impact on the way officers view the external world and the relative utility of military force. But the fact that majors with M.A. degrees do not differ in this respect from majors with B.A. degrees suggests that this effect may fade over time, probably as a result of the resocialization of officers into mainstream command and staff patterns. In the broader sense, the preliminary findings suggest that civilian graduate education serves as an enhancement for careers and short-term job qualification. It does not appear to have a long-term impact on values and beliefs. This may be because U.S. Army officers have been well socialized into the military system and had made a commitment to the military profession before they became involved in civilian graduate education. The fact that most have served six years or more in full-time military careers probably provides a system of socialization, career commitment, and belief that cannot be dramatically changed by one or two years of civilian graduate education. Further, the fact that most officers return to the military institution and a military environment upon completing civilian graduate education means that they are again immersed in military operations and are expected to abide by mainstream military norms. This is reinforced by the fact that most officers become involved in civilian graduate education as but one tour of duty among a multitude of mainstream military tours over a number of years. The day-to-day demands of military duties and operational considerations associated with virtually every mainstream military assignment tend to overshadow the impact of the relatively short period of time officers spend in civilian graduate education programs and are a major factor in the resocialization process. The exception to this conclusion relates to those officers who enter into an academic environment immediately after completing graduate education. This includes mainly those officers assigned as faculty at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point, New York). The fading of the civilian graduate education experience appears to be delayed in such cases. This

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also appears to be the case for officers completing graduate education programs in technical fields (such as engineering) and involved in a comparable utilization tour. Civilian graduate education does not make an appreciable impact on officers’ notions of the military profession; there is no significant change in the way officers perceive professionalism as a result of their graduate experience. The principles of military professionalism are usually learned within the military system and service schools and generally remain unchanged even through civilian graduate education. Civilian graduate education tends to reinforce the officers’ notions of military professionalism and provides a positive professional experience—a belief that the army has a special commitment to the officer. Interesting enough, open-ended interviews revealed that a number of officers felt that advanced degrees were important for civilian employment if the officers had to leave the army. The residual impact of civilian graduate education over the long term is not clear. Conclusions regarding the long-term impact are more speculative than they are data based. Officers with civilian graduate education experience are likely to remember several of its important aspects, as they tend to do with mainstream tours of duty. Thus, though the substantive intellectual component of the academic experience may fade with time, the awareness of the academic world, the sense of acquiring knowledge, and the perceived uniqueness of the educational experience are likely to remain with the officer over an extended period. Also, it is probable that over the long term, civilian graduate education will help reduce the intellectual distance between military professionals and the academic community, as well as society at large. An often overlooked, but important, consideration is that civilian graduate education generally has a positive impact on the university faculty and students. The link between the military and a particular institution of higher learning often is established and maintained by officers who have experienced fully funded civilian graduate education in that institution. This can provide the basis for a long-term link between the military and the academic community. Further, for many civilian faculty and students, their only firsthand knowledge of the military may come from their contact with officers in civilian graduate education programs. Officers responding to an open-ended question expressed the view that not only does civilian graduate education provide insights into “civilian thinking,” it also offers an important avenue for “civilians” to gain insights into the military world. Another common response was that civilian graduate students were inquisitive about and not hostile toward military officers in civilian graduate programs. However, many respondents felt that civilian students held a stereotypical view of the profession and military officers.

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Future Research

This research is one of the first that has attempted to explore the impact of civilian graduate education on military professionals. Thus, it is more exploratory than comprehensive. This was a matter of necessity given the relative paucity of research in this area. Much of what is available tends to be based on assumptions and subjective assessments. The first steps, therefore, were to define the issues, to identify the parameters of the subject, and to design a research framework. Future research can build on what has been learned through this exploratory effort. Two important areas require additional study: 1. Comprehensive research on the impact of civilian graduate education in general on values and belief systems 2. Comprehensive research on the impact of civilian graduate education on the military profession as a whole (all services); in terms of professional performance, values, beliefs, and mind-sets; and on what the impact might be in the long term

In addition, various specific areas identified by this research are important and should be included in follow-up research:

1. The completion of a phase 3 survey to refine the assessment of the impact of civilian graduate education and build on the investment already made in phases 1 and 2. Further, this will provide a basis for examining more thoroughly the resocialization process and value change, if any, over time. 2. The utility of allowing younger officers to enter civilian graduate education within one or two years of commissioned service. 3. The distinctions that may evolve from officers attending different institutions of higher education. For example, does it make any difference if an officer attends Harvard, Princeton, or Columbia University rather than Northwest Missouri or Georgia State? This also should include a comparison of the impacts of types of educational programs being followed (e.g., the distinction between liberal arts and hard sciences). 4. Longer-range research that focuses specifically on what the military labels “utilization” tours. Research should be conducted on how officers who have completed fully funded civilian graduate education are utilized in duties immediately following the education experience. In brief, is civilian graduate education a requisite for quality performance in a utilization tour? Is a utilization tour necessary for such education programs to be worthwhile to the military and the society in the longer term?

Appendix A

A Final Word

175

After a 31-month involvement in this research—which encompassed not only the formal framework but also many discussions, personal contacts with many within the military, numerous telephone conversations, constant review of the data, consideration of the import of the research, and attempts to fit the pieces together—the research team offers the following additional conclusions: We believe that the civilian graduate education experience is beneficial, both personally and professionally, to U.S. Army officers. This conclusion is based on the synthesis of quantitative and qualitative data, openended interviews, and the reflections of the research team. Although long-term effects of civilian graduate education on army professionals were not clearly discerned, tendencies and subtleties throughout the research experience suggest a residual positive impact of civilian graduate education lasting throughout the officer’s career and beyond. Further, we believe that civilian graduate education offers a channel for mutually beneficial interaction between the military profession and the academic community. Civilian graduate education programs may be the only interchange experienced among military professionals, faculty, and graduate students at civilian institutions. Indeed, for some, these contacts may provide an enduring source of intellectual growth and a link between the military and the academic community. Finally, based on the results of the research and subsequent assessments, the research team strongly believes that the civilian graduate education program is an important factor in strengthening military professionalism, providing intellectual growth and experience for selected officers, and creating centers of intellectual curiosity and strategic thought throughout the U.S. Army. In the long term, both the military and society benefit. Notes

1. There are differences between the total number of responses received and the responses received within a specific time frame and usable for research purposes. 2. Captains generally have been in service for an average of 6–10 years and are usually in the 26–30-year age category. Majors normally have served an average of 10–14 years and range in age from 30 to 36 years. There is a clear professional distinction between captains and majors: captains are considered “company grade” officers and majors are “field grade” officers. 3. Generally these are captains with about 6–10 years of active service.

Appendix B Survey Results Overview

The results of the survey have been divided into three sections. Before addressing substantive findings, the first section presents a brief summary of the steps involved in processing and analyzing the data (these technical procedures are described in full detail in Appendixes C and D). Following this background information, the second section reports the results of three sets of analyses evaluating the impact of civilian graduate education on the values and beliefs of military professionals. The first set of analyses examines the data from the initial wave of the survey in search of differences between officers who had just completed civilian graduate school and officers who were just preparing to enter civilian graduate school. The second set of analyses examines the data from both waves of the longitudinal survey in search of differences that were stable over time between officers who had obtained a graduate degree prior to the first wave of the survey and officers who never attended civilian graduate school. The third set of analyses examines the data from both waves of the survey in search of changes over time that were unique to officers just preparing to enter civilian graduate school at time 1. Finally, the third section of this appendix reports changes in responses over time that were found to hold for all groups of officers. These changes represent historical shifts in values and beliefs that have evolved over the one-year course of the survey. Background

Preliminary work. Before we began the analysis, the data were cleaned and checked for accuracy and the number of dependent variables was reduced by eliminating highly skewed variables and by constructing reliable composite indices. Appendixes C and D describe the specific details of these procedures, as well as the item-content and reliability of the six composite indices retained for analysis. 177

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Data analysis. Scores on the six indices and responses to the remaining 110 single-item dependent measures were then analyzed—first crosssectionally using only time 1 data and second longitudinally using the data from both waves of the survey. Appendixes C and D describe the specific statistical procedures used to test relationships between the independent and dependent variables, to contrast the responses of individual groups with one another, to control for demographic differences between groups, and to establish levels of statistical significance. Assessing the Impact of Civilian Graduate Education

At time 1, do officers just finishing graduate school differ from officers about to enter? If civilian graduate education immediately changes the values and beliefs of military professionals, then those just completing graduate school during the initial wave of the survey should differ from those about to enter graduate school at the time of the initial wave. Analyses of time 1 data, however, revealed that the responses of these two groups are largely comparable. Indeed, the two groups showed statistically significant differences on only one of the 116 dependent measures. Specifically, officers just finishing graduate school scored lower than officers about to enter graduate school on the index of perceived national priority of an active military policy, F(1,173) = 6.29, p < .0001. Thus, when compared with officers preparing to enter civilian graduate school, recent graduates gave a lower national priority to reinstituting the draft, committing troops abroad, countering insurgency, defeating communism, and increasing our nuclear capability. The overall pattern of no differences indicates that officers graduating and officers entering civilian graduate school are far more alike than they are different from one another. It further suggests that, although recent graduates may perceive active military policies as less necessary, graduate education does not have a strong immediate impact on values and beliefs. Across both waves of the survey, do officers with graduate degrees differ from officers without graduate degrees? If civilian graduate education creates enduring changes in the values and beliefs of military professionals, then those who already have a graduate degree should differ at both waves of the survey from those who have no graduate degree. Specifically, officers just completing graduate school at time 1 and older majors with master’s degrees should respond differently than either older majors who hold only a B.A. degree or captains attending CAS3 (i.e., those without graduate degrees) across both time periods. Longitudinal analyses, however, revealed that the responses of officers with and officers without a graduate degree are largely comparable at both points in time. Indeed, only three dependent measures demonstrated

Appendix B

179

the predicted effects, and these stable differences did not hold for all the groups that were expected to differ. First, across both waves of the survey, officers completing graduate school at time 1 scored lower than majors with B.A.’s on the index of perceived national priority of an active military policy. This finding is consistent with the difference found at time 1 between officers just completing and officers just entering civilian graduate school. This convergence of results supports the conclusion that recent graduates of civilian graduate school view active military policies as less important than do officers who have not attended graduate school. The second difference between officers with and officers without graduate degrees that held at both time points concerned beliefs about the utility of civilian graduate education for military professionals. Across both waves of the survey, officers just completing graduate school at time 1 and officers about to enter graduate school at time 1 scored higher on the index of perceived value of graduate education than did either majors with B.A. degrees, majors with master’s degrees, or captains attending CAS3. Thus, perhaps not suprising, those recently attending graduate school, relative to those not recently attending, reported that (a) civilian graduate education was more important, expanded thinking more, was more desirable for full colonels, and was more necessary for promotion and for job performance; (b) studying the great philosophers was a more important part of professional education; (c) a master’s degree and a Ph.D. had a higher priority for enhancing their military career; and (d) the military profession provided more opportunity to use the knowledge gained in graduate education. The final difference that was stable over time was as follows: officers just completing graduate school at time 1 perceived reading the New York Times to be more important than did either officers just about to enter graduate school at time 1 or majors with only a B.A. degree. The overall pattern of results indicates that officers with graduate degrees and officers without graduate degrees are far more alike than they are different from one another. Consistent with the earlier conclusion, this suggests that, although completing graduate school may be associated with less emphasis on active military policies, graduate education changes military professionals very little. The fact that the responses of recent graduates of civilian graduate education are largely equivalent to those of older graduates (i.e., majors with M.A. degrees) further suggests that graduate education does not have a delayed impact on values and beliefs. Indeed, among older majors who have been in active duty longer, those with graduate degrees show no statistically significant differences when compared with those without graduate degrees. This latter result suggests that the few differences that exist between recent graduates and older graduates are either unique to this

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particular cohort of recent graduates or are likely to dissipate over the years. (See Table B.1 for a summary of the statistically signficant group differences that held over time.) Do officers about to enter graduate school at time 1 show different changes over time compared with the other groups? If civilian graduate education changes the values and beliefs of military professionals, then officers should respond differently after receiving their graduate degree than they do beforehand; and these temporal changes should be different from those evidenced by the other groups. Longitudinal analyses, however, revealed that officers preparing to enter civilian graduate school at time 1 show no unique statistically significant changes in responses over the one-year span of the survey. In other words, officers who went through civilian graduate school during the course of the longitudinal survey changed in the same ways as did the other groups. This result further supports the notion that civilian graduate education does not dramatically alter the values and beliefs of military professionals. What can we conclude from these analyses? First, officers who choose to get a civilian graduate degree are in some ways different to begin with from those who choose not to get a civilian graduate degree. Even before starting graduate school, those who seek an advanced degree believe that it will enhance their career more than do older majors without graduate degrees. However, officers just starting and officers just finishing graduate school do not differ from one another in the value they place on an advanced degree. This pattern of findings suggests that the belief that graduate education will enhance one’s military career is more a reason for attending civilian graduate school than it is a result of attending civilian graduate school. Second, although those with graduate degrees are in some ways different to begin with, getting a civilian graduate education may also change officers’ beliefs in certain ways. The most striking change is the lower national priority that recent graduates give to active military policies. Those just finishing graduate school give aggressive military policies a lower national priority than do either those just starting graduate school at time 1 or older majors without graduate degrees. However, officers entering graduate school at time 1 showed a decrease over time in the perceived national priority of active military policies that was no greater than the decrease shown by other groups. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know whether (a) the historical decrease in scores on this index observed for all groups has masked temporal changes caused by civilian graduate education or (b) the lower national priority given to active military policies by recent graduates is unique to this particular group.

Appendix B B.1

181

Statistically Significant (p < .01) Group Differences That Held Over Time

Dependent Measure

Index of perceived value of civilian graduate education for military professionalsb Importance of reading the New York Times

Index of perceived national priority of an active military policyb

Group Differencesa

F

df

p
(groups 1 and 4)

4.3

4,334

.002

(groups 1 and 4) > (group 5)

(groups 4 and 5) > (groups 1, 2, and 3)

Note: These results are from repeated-measures analyses of variance. Dependent measures have been residualized for age, number of years served, and the age ⳯ number of years served, to control for these demographic variables. See Appendix C for the technical and procedural details of the data analysis. a. Based on Scheffe contrasts (p’s < .05). Group 1 = 57 majors who held only a B.A. degree and had never attended civilian graduate school. Group 2 = 63 older majors who had received a master’s degree before time 1. Group 3 = 19 captains who were attending CAS3 at time 1. Group 4 = 86 officers who were preparing to enter civilian graduate school at time 1 and who were attending graduate school at time 2. Group 5 = 89 officers who were attending civilian graduate school at time 1 and who were recent graduates at time 2. b. See Appendix D for a description of the specific items composing this index and a report of its reliability at both time points in the longitudinal survey.

Assessing Historical Changes in Values and Beliefs

By far the most powerful and pervasive effects found in the longitudinal data set are shifts in responses over time that held for all groups of officers. These shifts reflect historical changes in values and beliefs that have developed between the first and second waves of the survey. In presenting these historical effects, we first report findings that met our criterion for establishing statistical significance. After presenting these more reliable results, we then report, as interesting trends, findings that achieved marginal levels of statistical significance.

Statistically significant effects. Table B.2 presents a summary of the dependent measures for which temporal changes emerged that were statistically significant at p < .01. As is evident from this table, most of the historical change in responses occurred for measures that reflect perceptions of the need for a stronger U.S. military capability. For example, over the

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B.2

Statistically Significant (p < .01) Changes Over Time That Held for All Groups

Dependent Measure

Index of perceived value of civilian graduate education for military professionalsb Index of perceived national priority of an active military policyb

Belief in the competence of the volunteer military

National priority of a larger military budget

F

df

p
(time 1)

26.9

1,335

.001

(time 2) < (time 1)

26.8

1,347

.001

(time 2) < (time 1)

25.9

1,275

.001

(time 2) < (time 1)

Belief that communism is no longer a threat to the United States

7.1

1,345

.008

(time 2) < (time 1)

34.4

1,347

.001

(time 2) > (time 1)

Belief in the need for operational restraints to ensure political objectives in another limited war

8.4

1,347

10.2

1,342

.002

(time 2) > (time 1)

9.8

1,344

.002

(time 2) > (time 1)

Belief in U.S. inferiority to Soviets in conducting low-visibility operations

National priority of trust in government

Belief that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide a coherent and positive viewpoint for the president and citizens

.004

(time 2) < (time 1)

Note: These results are from repeated-measures analyses of variance. See Appendix C for the technical and procedural details of the data analysis. a. Based on pairwise t-tests (p’s < .05). The two waves of the longitudinal survey were one year apart. b. See Appendix D for a description of the specific items composing this index and a report of its reliability at both time points in the longitudinal survey.

Appendix B

183

one-year period separating the two waves of the longitudinal survey, all respondents shifted toward a lower national priority for active military policies (i.e., the composite index concerning counterinsurgency, military commitment abroad, defeating communism, increasing nuclear capabilities, and reinstituting the draft) and a larger military budget. These temporal shifts may reflect a reduction in the perceived likelihood of war that resulted from the dramatic change in Eastern Europe during the year of the survey. These views may well have changed again, however, in the wake of the recent crisis involving Kuwait. Ironically, although all respondents have come to give aggressive military policies a lower national priority, they have shifted toward greater disagreement with the statement that “communism is no longer a threat to the United States.” This seemingly paradoxical finding may reflect the belief that, although we can take a somewhat less aggressive military stance for the present, we cannot afford to be lulled into a false sense of security regarding the threat of communism. Indeed, respondents may well believe that there is an even greater communist threat once the United States “lowers its guard.” This shift toward a greater perceived threat of communism may thus represent a belief in the need for increased vigilance as communist regimes “appear” to accept democracy and as the status quo changes. Consistent with this interpretation, all respondents have also shifted toward greater disagreement with the statement that “the volunteer military is competent to handle every contingency that might face the United States in the next five years.” While all respondents have come to see the volunteer military as less capable of handling all eventualities, they have also shifted toward greater disagreement with the statement that “the U.S. military is second to the Soviet Union in its military capability to engage in low-visibility operations (counterinsurgency).” This latter change may be the result of reductions in the perceived military competence of the Soviets, following widespread democratic revolution in Eastern Europe and glasnost revelations about Soviet military weaknesses. Over the one-year period between waves of the survey, all respondents also shifted toward greater agreement with the following statement: “If the United States is involved in another limited war, the military must accept operational restraints if it means ensuring that political objectives are achieved.” In addition, all respondents showed some temporal change in their beliefs about the U.S. political system. Specifically, over the one-year period of the survey, respondents shifted toward a lower national priority of trust in government and greater agreement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide a coherent and positive military viewpoint to the president and to the people.

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The remaining temporal effects that achieved statistical significance concern the perceived utility of civilian graduate education. Over the oneyear period, all respondents shifted toward a stronger endorsement of the positive value of graduate education, as measured by the index of perceived value of graduate education. There are several plausible explanations for the observed increase over time in positive attitudes toward graduate education. First, completing the initial wave of the survey may have increased respondents’ awareness of graduate education and its potential benefits, or it may have sensitized them to consider the possible advantages of graduate education during the following year. Alternatively, receiving the second wave of the survey may have increased respondents’ perceptions of the army’s interest in graduate education; or completing the survey a second time may have increased respondents’ perceptions of their own personal interest in graduate education. In addition, it is possible that the geopolitical changes that occurred during the course of the survey have actually increased the utility of a civilian graduate degree for military professionals.

Trends. Table B.3 presents a summary of the dependent measures for which temporal changes emerged that were not statistically significant at p < .01 but were statistically significant using the unadjusted criterion (p < .05). We refer to such effects as trends that have only marginal statistical significance. Because these trends are likely to be less reliable than effects that are statistically significant, they should be given less credence. Nevertheless, they largely corroborate the statistically significant findings and are suggestive of findings worthy of future, more directed research. Again reflecting the historical changes in Eastern Europe, all respondents have shifted toward lower scores on the index of perceived inevitability of war and a higher national priority of good relations with Europe. All respondents have also moved toward greater disagreement with the statement that “the most important consideration about politics is the results achieved regardless of the means.” In addition, respondents show some temporal trends that seem to reflect a shift toward a more “liberal” attitude regarding the expression of political dissent among military personnel. Specifically, all respondents have moved toward greater agreement with the statement that “military men and women should be allowed to express their reasoned judgment in public on military policy, even if it is contrary to the existing administration’s policy.” All respondents have also shifted toward greater disagreement with the statement that “orders from the president as commander in chief must be followed by the military regardless of the impact on U.S. society.” Respondents also showed some temporal trends regarding the types of training and experiences that are perceived as being important for military

Appendix B B.3

185

Statistically Marginal (.01 < p < .05) Changes Over Time That Held for All Groups

Dependent Measure

Index of perceived inevitability of warb

Belief that the most important consideration about politics is the results achieved regardless of the means Belief that tactical training should include knowledge about the people in the operations area

Belief that, regardless of education provided, the command of military units is the most important experience for any officer

df

6.1

1,345

.02

(time 2) < (time 1)

6.2

1,347

.02

(time 2) < (time 1)

4.4

1,345

.04

(time 2) > (time 1)

3.9

1,350

.05

(time 2) > (time 1)

1,344

.04

(time 2) < (time 1)

1,349

.03

(time 2) > (time 1)

Belief that military personnel should follow orders from the president, regardless of the impact on U.S. society 4.3

Belief that military personnel should be allowed to publicly express their opinions about military policy even if they contradict existing policy 5.1

p
(time 1)

National priority of pollution

3.8

1,347

.05

(time 2) > (time 1)

National priority of inflation

6.4

1,347

.02

(time 2) < (time 1)

Note: These results are from repeated-measures analyses of variance. See Appendix C for the technical and procedural details of the data analysis. a. Based on pairwise t-tests (p’s < .05). The two waves of the longitudinal survey were one year apart. b. See Appendix D for a description of the specific items composing this index and a report of its reliability at both time points in the longitudinal survey.

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personnel. Specifically, there has been a shift toward a stronger belief that tactical training should include knowledge about the people in the area of operations. In addition, all respondents have come to agree more strongly with the statement that “regardless of the nature of the education provided for military officers, it is the command of military units that is the most important experience for any officer.” Finally, all respondents show two other temporal trends that seem to reflect changes in political concerns. While the perceived national priority of inflation has decreased over the one-year period, the perceived national priority of pollution has increased. This temporal shift may be a consequence of the stabilization of the U.S. economy that occurred during the study and the growing emphasis on environmental issues. Conclusions

First, over the one-year course of the survey, military professionals shifted away from a belief in the need for a stronger military capability. Evidently, as peace was breaking out in Eastern Europe, officers came to see the threat of war as less imminent. At the same time, they also shifted away from the belief that communism is a threat to the United States and that the volunteer military is competent to handle all future contingencies. This suggests that officers became cautiously optimistic about the threat of war, perceiving less need for an increased military capability while believing that we should “keep up our guard.” Although the perceived need for increased military strength seems to wane in times of peace, the perceived need to maintain vigilance does not seem to diminish. Second, over the one-year course of the survey, military professionals shifted toward a greater belief in the value of civilian graduate education. Third, the fact that group changes were comparable over time and that no unique temporal changes were found for a particular group suggests that there is a large degree of uniformity in what some mistakenly call “the military mind.”

Appendix C Technical and Procedural Details of the Data Analysis I. Overview II. Data analysis strategy A. Testing mean differences 1. Cross-sectional analyses 2. Longitudinal analyses a. Differences among groups that hold over time b. Changes over time that hold for all groups c. Differences among groups in changes over time B. Controlling for demographic differences C. Establishing levels of statistical significance

I. Overview

The purpose of this appendix is to describe the statistical procedures used to: test and interpret relationships between the independent and dependent variables; control for demographic differences between groups; and establish levels of statistical significance. All statistical analyses were accomplished via SPSS-x (Norusis, 1985) run on an IBM 3830 mainframe computer under VMS. II. Data Analysis Strategy

A. Testing Mean Differences

There were two stages to the analysis of the longitudinal data set. First, the data from the initial wave of the survey were examined cross-sectionally for differences between officers just completing and officers just entering civilian graduate school at time 1. Second, the data from both waves of the survey were examined longitudinally for change and for stability in responses over time. 187

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1. Cross-sectional analyses. In the first stage of the data analysis, responses to the 110 single-item dependent variables and to the six composite indices from the initial wave of the survey were analyzed using oneway analyses of variance. Scheffe contrasts were used specifically to compare the mean scores at time 1 of officers just finishing civilian graduate school and officers just preparing to enter civilian graduate school.

2. Longitudinal analyses. In the second stage of the analysis, responses to the dependent measures were analyzed across both waves of the longitudinal survey using repeated-measures analyses of variance. Group membership was treated as a between-groups independent variable, and time was treated as a within-subjects independent variable. Group membership was coded as a categorical variable with five levels: (1) officers who were preparing to enter civilian graduate school at time 1 and who were attending graduate school at time 2 (n = 86); (2) officers who were attending civilian graduate school at time 1 and who were recent graduates at time 2 (n = 89); (3) older majors who received an M.A. degree before time 1 (n = 63); (4) older majors who held only a B.A. degree at both time points (n = 57); and (5) captains attending CAS3 at time 1 (n = 19). Time was coded as a dichotomous ordinal variable representing each wave of the longitudinal data set. Each repeated-measures analysis of variance evaluates the statistical significance of three types of effects: a. Differences among groups that hold over time. A statistically significant main effect for group membership for a particular dependent variable indicates that at least two of the five groups differ from one another in their responses to the given measure at both points in time. To specify the nature of these group differences, responses to dependent measures that showed statistically significant group main effects were collapsed across time points, and Scheffe tests were used to contrast all possible pairs of group means (i.e., 10 contrasts). Group effects with no statistically significant Scheffe tests (i.e., all p’s > .05) were not considered further. b. Changes over time that hold for all groups. A statistically significant main effect for time for a particular dependent variable indicates that all groups show the same change over time in response to the given measure. To specify the nature of these temporal effects, responses to dependent measures that showed statistically significant time main effects were collapsed across groups, and pairwise t-tests were used to contrast overall means at time 1 and time 2. c. Differences among groups in changes over time. A statistically significant interaction between group membership and time for a particular dependent variable indicates that at least two of the five groups have changed differently from one another over the two time points. To specify

Appendix C

189

the nature of these interaction effects, separate pairwise t-tests were used for each group to contrast mean scores at time 1 and time 2 for each dependent measure that showed a statistically significant group ⳯ time interaction.

B. Controlling for Demographic Differences

Responses to background items assessing age, number of children, and number of years of military service were also evaluated for group differences. One-way analyses of variance (and subsequent Scheffe contrasts) revealed two important demographic differences between groups. First, there were group differences in age, F(4,354) = 30.7, p < .0001. Majors were older than the other groups, and officers just entering graduate school at time 1 were younger than the other groups. There were also group differences in number of years served, F(4,353) = 82.4, p < .0001. Majors had served longer than recent graduates of civilian graduate education, who in turn had served longer than either CAS3 captains or officers just entering civilian graduate school at time 1. To control for these group differences, we treated these demographic variables as covariates in our data analysis. Specifically, multiple regression analyses were used to remove from each dependent measure at both waves of the survey the variance associated with age, number of years served, and the age ⳯ number of years served interaction. These residualized versions of each dependent variable were then saved for later analysis. To be certain that group differences and group ⳯ time interactions could not be attributed to demographic differences, only the results of analyses using these residualized dependent measures have been reported. In testing for the main effects of time, however, these demographic controls were not used, because partialing the variance associated with age, number of years served, and the age ⳯ number of years served interaction from the dependent measures at both time points of the survey would effectively remove the effects of time from the dependent measures. Therefore, the main effects of time have been reported for unresidualized versions of the dependent measures.

C. Establishing Levels of Statistical Significance

An important threat to the validity of statistical conclusions involves the problem of “inflation” of alpha (i.e., the probability of rejecting a hypothesis being tested when in fact the hypothesis is true) that results from conducting multiple statistical tests within a single study (Cook and Campbell, 1979). The possibility of capitalizing on chance is particularly problematic in the present set of analyses, in which a total of more than 400 statistical hypotheses were evaluated. To correct for alpha inflation, we decided to adopt a more stringent alpha level for the present analyses.

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The most conservative method of alpha adjustment is a type of “Bonferroni” approach suggested by Ryan (1959) to correct for the error rate per experiment (see Cook and Campbell, 1979). With this procedure, one divides the desired alpha level (.05) by the number of statistical hypotheses evaluated (444) to establish a more stringent alpha level that controls for Type I errors (e.g., Holland and Copenhaver, 1988). For the present study, this adjusted alpha would be (.05/444 =) .0001. Using this conservative criterion, only statistical tests with associated p < .0001 would be considered statistically significant. There are at least two reasons, however, why this type of alpha adjustment is likely to be too conservative for the present study. First, the vast majority (94 percent) of the survey items involve a crude four-point response format that is relatively insensitive to response differences, thereby increasing the likelihood of drawing incorrect no-difference conclusions (i.e., Type II errors). Second, there is much uncontrolled heterogeneity within the groups surveyed that likewise operates to obscure response differences. For these reasons, an adjusted criterion of p < .0001 may “stack the cards” too heavily in favor of finding no statistically significant effects. Therefore, we decided to adopt a somewhat less conservative approach to control for alpha inflation. Instead of using p < .0001, we chose to adopt p < .01 as the criterion for statistical significance in examining the main effects of group membership and of time and the interaction between these two variables. This adjustment yields an alpha that is 80 percent more stringent than p < .05, rather than 99.8 percent more stringent (as the Bonferroni-adjusted alpha would be). This alpha adjustment allowed us to reduce the likelihood of capitalizing on chance while decreasing the likelihood of drawing false no-difference conclusions. We have reported results that were statistically significant at p < .01 as statistically significant effects. Results that were significant at p < .05 but not at p < .01 (i.e., for which .01 < p < .05) have been reported only as trends. Although these latter effects are statistically marginal and should be considered in need of replication, trends are reported because they may be suggestive of potentially important findings for future, more focused research. References

Cook, T. D., and D. T. Campbell. Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979. Holland, B. S., and M. D. Copenhaver. “Improved Bonferroni-Type Multiple Testing Procedures.” Psychological Bulletin 104, 1988, pp. 145–149.

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Norusis, M. J. SPSS-X: Advanced Statistics Guide. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985. Ryan, T. A. “Multiple Comparisons in Psychological Research.” Psychological Bulletin 56, 1959, pp. 26–47.

Appendix D Procedures Used in Data Cleaning and Data Reduction I. Overview II. Establishing data quality A. Cleaning the data B. Checking for response consistency III. Reducing the data A. Deleting skewed variables B. Constructing composite indices 1. Value of graduate education 2. National priority of an active military policy 3. Equal rights for women in the military 4. Inevitability of war 5. Importance of community service 6. Need for combat restraint to protect civilians I. Overview

The purpose of this appendix is to describe (a) the procedures used in cleaning and reducing the longitudinal data set and (b) the item-content and reliability of the six composite indices retained for analysis. Steps taken to ensure data quality are first described. Procedures used to reduce the number of dependent variables are then presented. Finally, the set of composite indices included in the analysis is reported in detail. II. Establishing Data Quality

A. Cleaning the Data

Each wave of longitudinal data was entered, cleaned, and checked separately following its receipt. After completed survey forms had been coded 193

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and entered into a computer file, a random subset of these data was carefully checked for accuracy of entry. No coding or entry errors were found. Variables were then checked for illegal code values via inspection of frequency histograms. Data from the two time periods were merged and analyzed only after these assurances were made of the quality of data coding.

B. Checking for Response Consistency

Another step taken to ensure data quality was to examine the match between the group membership assigned to respondents on the basis of official records and the group membership assigned to respondents on the basis of their responses to background items assessing rank and level of civilian education. As expected, chi-square tests revealed that captains and majors accurately reported different ranks and that majors with M.A. degrees accurately reported a higher level of educational attainment than did either CAS3 captains or majors with B.A. degrees. Additional chi-square analyses disclosed no inconsistencies in the patterns of missing data across items. III. Reducing the Data

It was first necessary to reduce the number of survey items to be analyzed, for both practical and statistical reasons. Analyzing all 137 of the items contained in the main survey questionnaire would not only be unwieldy but would also entail an unnecessary amount of redundancy in item content. Furthermore, doing separate statistical tests for multiple items when these items can be combined and analyzed by one statistical test runs the risk of capitalizing on chance through Type I errors. For these reasons, we first sought to reduce the number of survey items before analyzing the data.

A. Deleting Skewed Variables

This reduction in the number of dependent variables was accomplished in two ways. First, we eliminated variables that showed insufficient variability in responses (i.e., with absolute skewness values greater than 2). Because these highly skewed variables would function as constants in the data analysis, they would not be expected to demonstrate statistical relationships with other variables. Six items were omitted from the analysis for this reason: the perceived importance of voting in elections, of being promoted to general officer, and of personal satisfaction with the job and the perceived priority to the military profession of honor, of honesty, and of morality and ethical correctness.

B. Constructing Composite Indices

Appendix D

195

A second method of data reduction involved constructing composite indices by combining variables that showed significant intercorrelations with one another. Two procedures were used to identify sets of variables that could be combined to create reliable composite indices. First, survey items that seemed on the basis of their content to tap the same construct were standardized and averaged with unit weighting, and the reliability of each of these indices was assessed at both time points in the survey using Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of internal consistency. Second, a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was performed on time 1 responses to the set of 137 survey items to identify clusters of items that formed well-defined dimensions. The items constituting interpretable factors were then standardized and averaged with unit weighting, and the reliability of each of these indices was likewise assessed at both time points using Cronbach’s alpha. Initially, 30 composite indices were constructed, either on the a priori basis of shared item content or on the a posteriori basis of the factor analysis. Twenty-four (80 percent) of these indices, however, had unacceptably low reliability coefficients at either one or both time points of the longitudinal survey. These unreliable indices were therefore discarded, and the items composing them were analyzed separately. The remaining six indices, in contrast, evidenced acceptable reliability for both waves of the survey and were therefore retained for data analysis. The six composite indices included in the data analysis were as follows:

1. Perceived value of graduate education for military professionals, an 11-item index, reflects (a) the perceived importance of graduate education in general in relation to completing the Command and General Staff College and in relation to completing the Army War College; (b) the perceived necessity of a graduate degree for promotion and for performing duties well; (c) the desirability of full colonels having completed relevant graduate courses; (d) the degree to which graduate education is believed to expand thinking beyond the bounds of military perspectives; (e) the desirability of studying the great philosophers as part of a professional education; (f) the perceived priority of a master’s degree and of a Ph.D. for enhancing one’s military career; and (g) the degree to which the military profession is perceived as providing little opportunity to use the knowledge gained in graduate education (reverse scored). The respective Cronbach’s alphas for this index at times 1 and 2 were .59 and .63. 2. Perceived national priority of an active military policy, a 5-item index, reflects the national priority that one believes should be given to

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reinstituting the draft, committing troops abroad, countering insurgency, defeating communism, and increasing our nuclear capability. The respective Cronbach’s alphas for this index at times 1 and 2 were .60 and .61. 3. Attitudes toward equal rights for women in the military, a 4-item index, reflect beliefs about equal military opportunities for women in combat, about equal respect and loyalty to male and female commanders, about unlimited military duties for qualified women, and about the national priority of women’s rights. The respective Cronbach’s alphas for this index at times 1 and 2 were .65 and .70. 4. Perceived inevitability of war, a 3-item index, reflects the degree to which one believes that there will always be war, that war is caused by human nature, and that war is sometimes the only alternative. The respective Cronbach’s alphas for this index at times 1 and 2 were .62 and .68. 5. Perceived importance of community service, a 2-item index, reflects how important one believes it is to participate in community organizations and in on-post service activities. The respective Cronbach’s alphas for this index at times 1 and 2 were .66 and .71. 6. Perceived need for combat restraint to protect civilians, a 2-item index, reflects the degree to which one believes that there are times when one should not attack the enemy because of civilian inhabitants and when one should not engage in combat operations because of the consequences for innocent civilians. The respective Cronbach’s alphas for this index at times 1 and 2 were .51 and .71.

Selected Bibliography Books

Abrahamsson, Bengt. Military Professionalism and Political Power. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1972. Allard, C. Kenneth. Command, Control, and the Common Defense. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990. Ambrose, Stephen E., and James Alden Barber, Jr., eds. The Military and American Society: Essays & Readings. New York: Free Press, 1972. Atkinson, Rick. The Long Gray Line. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1989. Bacevich, A. J. Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1949. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989. Bachman, Jerald G., and John G. Blair. Soldiers, Sailors & Civilians: The “Military Mind” & the All-Volunteer Force. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975. Bradford, Zeb B., Jr., and Frederic J. Brown. The United States Army in Transition. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1973. Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1971. Brehm, Philip A., and Wilbur E. Gray. Alternative Missions for the Army. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992. Brown, James, and William P. Snyder, eds. Defense Policy in the Reagan Administration. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. Cain, Stephen Alexis. Analysis of the FY 1992–1993 Defense Budget Request. Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, 1991. Clark, Asa A., IV, et al., eds. The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Clotfelter, James. The Military in American Politics. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. Cochran, Charles L., ed. Civil-Military Relations. New York: Free Press, 1974. Colby, William, with James McCargar. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989. Collins, John. America’s Small Wars: Lessons for the Future. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1991. Craig, Gordon A., and Alexander L. George. Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Prepared with the assistance of David Holian, Loyola University Chicago. 197

198

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de Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. J. P. Mayer, ed.; translated by George Lawrence. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1969. Deitchman, S. J. Beyond the Thaw: A New National Security Strategy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. Donovan, James A. Militarism, U.S.A. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1970. Drew, Dennis M., and Donald M. Snow. The Eagle’s Talon: The American Experience at Wars. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988. Ellis, Joseph, and Robert Moore. School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. Fehrenbach, Thomas R. This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness. New York: Macmillan, 1963. Foerster, Schuyler, and Edward N. Wright, eds. American Defense Policy, 6th ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. Gabriel, Richard A. Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn’t Win. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985. Goldstein, Joseph, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz. The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of Law? The Peers Commission Report. New York: Free Press, 1976. Goodpaster, Andrew J., and Samuel P. Huntington. Civil-Military Relations. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1977. Grinter, Lawrence I., and Peter M. Dunn, eds. The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies and Implications for Future Conflicts. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987. Hadley, Arthur. The Straw Giant. New York: Random House, 1986. Hamilton, Edward K., ed. America’s Global Interests: A New Agenda. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989. Hauser, William L. America’s Army in Transition: A Study of Civil-Military Relations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Heller, Charles E., and William A. Stoft, eds. America’s First Battles 1776–1965. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986. Henderson, William Darryl. The U.S. Army Is Oversold and Undermanned. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990. Herring, George C. Cold Blood: LBJ’s Conduct of Limited War in Vietnam. The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, U.S. Air Force Academy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. Hersh, Seymour. My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. New York: Vintage Books, 1970. Hunt, Richard A., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds. Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. Huntington, Samuel P. The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. ——— . The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. New York: Vintage Books, 1964. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic Survey 1991–1992. London: Brassey’s, 1992. Jacob, Philip E., and James V. Toscano, eds. The Integration of Political Communities. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1964. Jacob, Philip E., et al. Values and Active Community: A Cross-National Study of the Influence of Local Leadership. New York: Free Press, 1971.

Selected Bibliography

199

Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, rev. ed. New York: Free Press, 1971. ———. The Last Half Century: Social Change and Politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. ———. The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. ———, ed. Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1971. Janowitz, Morris, and Roger Little. Sociology and the Military Establishment, rev. ed. New York: Russell Sage, 1965. Johnson, Charles B. Why We Serve: A Follow-Up Study of Society’s Occupational Effect on Junior Marine Officers. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University, 1991. (Copies are available from the Marine Corps University Library, Marine Corps Combat Development Command [MCCDC], Quantico, VA 22134–5001.) Johnson, Haynes, and George C. Wilson. Army in Anguish. New York: Pocket Books, 1972. Karsten, Peter, ed. The Military in America. New York: Free Press, 1980. Keeley, John B. The All-Volunteer Force and American Society. Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1978. Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973. Kemble, C. Robert. The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973. Korb, Lawrence J. The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 1970s. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. ———, ed. The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S. Pittsburgh, Pa.: International Studies Association, 1976. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Laffin, John. The World in Conflict, 1991: War Annual 5, Contemporary Warfare Described and Analyzed. London: Brassey’s, 1991. Luttwak, Edward N. The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. Masland, John W., and Laurence Radway. Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Matthews, Lloyd, ed. Newsmen and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable? Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1991. Matthews, Lloyd, and Dale E. Brown, eds. The Parameters of Military Ethics. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989. Mazarr, Michael J. Light Forces and the Future of U.S. Military Strategy. McLean, Va.: Brassey’s, 1990. Menard, O. D. The Army and the Fifth Republic. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967. Millett, Allan R. The American Political System and Civil Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1979. Millis, Walter, with H. C. Mansfield and H. Stein. Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958. Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1992.

200

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Moskos, Charles C. A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community. New York: Free Press, 1988. Moskos, Charles C., and Frank E. Woods, eds. The Military—More Than Just a Job? Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988. Motley, James Berry. Beyond the Soviet Threat: The U.S. Army in a Post–Cold War Environment. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991. Mulligan, Hugh. No Place to Die: The Agony of Vietnam. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1967. Nguyen, Cao Ky. How We Lost the Vietnam War. New York: Stein and Day, 1984. Osgood, Robert Endicott. Limited War: The Challenge of American Strategy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. New York: Touchstone, 1984. Peers, William R. The My Lai Inquiry. New York: Norton, 1978. Pickerell, James. Vietnam in the Mud. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966. Reilly, John E. American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy. Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1979, 1983, and 1991. Sarkesian, Sam C. Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. ———. America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984. ———. The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986. ———, ed. Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1980. Sarkesian, Sam C., and John Allen Williams, eds. The U.S. Army in a New Security Era. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990. Sherman, William Tecumseh. The Memoirs of W. T . Sherman. New York: Library of America, 1990. Snow, Donald M. National Security: Enduring Problems in a Changing Defense Environment. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. ———. Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. Spangler, Stanley E. Force and Accommodation in World Politics. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1973. New York: Dell Publishing, 1985. Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1981. ———. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982. Teitler, G. The Genesis of the Professional Officers’ Corps. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publishing, 1977. Tucker, Robert W. The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960. Van Vien, Cao. The Final Collapse. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Vuono, Carl E. A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond. U.S. Army, 1990. Walton, George. The Tarnished Shield: A Report on Today’s Army. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1973. Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

Selected Bibliography

201

Yarmolinsky, Adam. The Military Establishment. New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1990.

Periodicals and Book Chapters

Abrams, Philip. “The Late Profession of Arms, Ambiguous Goals and Deteriorating Means in Britain.” European Journal of Sociology 6, no. 2, 1965, pp. 238–261. Adams, Thomas K. “LIC (Low-Intensity Clausewitz).” Small Wars & Insurgencies 1, no. 3, December 1990, pp. 266–275. Aldunate, Eduardo. “Observations on the Theory of LIC and Violence in Latin America.” Military Review 71, no. 6, June 1991, pp. 80–86. Bacevich, A. J. “New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism.” Parameters 20, no. 4, December 1990, pp. 12–23. Begines, Thomas J. “The American Military and the Western Idea.” Military Review 72, no. 3, March 1992, pp. 39–48. Blankenhagen, Edward E., and Thomas R. Rozman. “The US Army Officer’s Learning Contract.” Military Review 71, no. 7, July 1991, pp. 75–77. Buckley, Christopher. “Viet Guilt.” Esquire 100, no. 3, September 1983, pp. 68–72. Bush, George. “Reshaping Our Forces.” Speech delivered at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colo., August 2, 1990. Vital Speeches of the Day, 1990. Cheney, Richard. “U.S. Defense Strategy and the DoD Budget Request.” Defense Issues 6, no. 4, February 7, 1991. Daniel, Dan. “U.S. Special Operations: The Case for a Sixth Service.” Armed Forces Journal International, August 1985, p. 72. Eden, Steve. “Preserving the Force in the New World Order.” Military Review 74, no. 6, 1994, pp. 2–7. Falk, Stanley L. “Feudin’ and Fussin’ in the Old Army.” Army 34, no. 11, November 1984, pp. 57–61. Gates, John M. “The ‘New’ Military Professionalism.” Armed Forces and Society 11, no. 3, Spring 1985, pp. 427–436. Grace, John J. “The Need to Be More Professional . . . Whatever That Means.” Naval War College Review 27, no. 6, May–June 1975, pp. 7–23. Gold, Philip. “The Shape of a Rearmed Pentagon.” Insight, March 9, 1987, pp. 8–14. Heinl, R. D., Jr. “Special Trust and Confidence.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 82, no. 5, May 1956, p. 463. Ivany, Robert R. “Soldiers and Legislators: A Common Mission.” Parameters 21, no. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 47–61. Jordan, Amos A., and William J. Taylor, Jr. “The Military Man in Academia.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 406, March 1973, pp. 129–145. Kemp, Kenneth W., and Charles Hudlin. “Civil Supremacy Over the Military: Its Nature and Limits.” Armed Forces and Society 19, no. 1, Fall 1992, pp. 7–26. Kern, Alfred. “Literary Perception of the American Military.” Military Ethics: Reflections on Principles—The Profession of Arms, Military Leadership, Ethical

202

Selected Bibliography

Practices, War and Morality, Educating the Citizen-Soldier. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987, pp. 203–213. Korb, Lawrence J., and Robert H. Gromoll. “The United States.” In Douglas Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds. The Defense Policies of Nations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 25–74. Military Review 60, no. 7, July 1980. Moellering, John H. “Future Civil-Military Relations: The Army Turns Inward?” Military Review 53, no. 7, July 1973, pp. 68–83. Moskos, Charles C. “Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update.” Armed Forces and Society 12, no. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 377–382. Probert, John R. “Vietnam and United States Military Thought Concerning CivilMilitary Roles in Government.” In Charles L. Cochran, ed., Civil-Military Relations. New York: Free Press, 1974. Raufer, Xavier. “Gray Areas: A New Security Threat.” Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active Measures, and Terrorism Report, no. 20, Spring 1992, pp. 1–4. Redina, Mark D. “An Officer Corps for the 1990s.” Military Review 70, no. 10, October 1990, pp. 64–72. Roper, John. “Shaping Strategy Without the Threat.” America’s Role in a Changing World, Part II (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies). Adelphi Papers 257, Winter 1990/91, pp. 76–83. Sarkesian, Sam C. “Changing Dimensions of Military Professionalism: Education and Enlightened Advocacy.” Military Review 59, no. 3, March 1979, pp. 44–55. ———. “Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West.” International Political Science Review 2, no. 3, 1981, pp. 293–297. ———. “Who Serves?” Society 18, no. 3, March/April 1981, pp. 57–60. Sarkesian, Sam C., and William J. Taylor, Jr. “The Case for Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers.” Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 2, February 1975, pp. 251–262. Sorley, Lewis. “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime.” Parameters 21, no. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 35–49. Steiner, Carl W. “The Strategic Employment of Special Operations Forces.” Military Review 71, no. 6, June 1991, pp. 2–13. Talbot, George T. “‘Peacetime Engagement,’ The Demise of the Cold War Prompts a Name Change.” SO/LIC News 3, no. 3, August 1991, p. 5. Taylor, William J., Jr. “Military Professionals in Changing Times.” Public Administration Review, no. 6, November/December 1977, p. 636. Taylor, William J., and James Blackwell. “The Ground War in the Gulf.” Survival 33, no. 3, May/June 1991, pp. 230–245. Tonelson, Alan. “What Is the National Interest?” Atlantic Monthly, July 1991, pp. 35–52. Van Evera, Stephen. “The Case Against Intervention.” Atlantic Monthly, July 1990, pp. 72–80. “War College Curricular Conflicts.” Insight, December 14, 1987, pp. 24–25. Webb, James H. “Military Competence.” Defense Issues 1, no. 61. (Remarks prepared for delivery at the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, August 28, 1986.) Wesbrook, Stephen D. “The Alienated Soldier: Legacy of Society.” Army, December 1979, p. 18. Williams, John Allen. “Interpersonal Influence and the Bases of Military Leadership.” Military Review 62, no. 12, December 1982, pp. 56–65. ———. “Defense Policy: The Carter-Reagan Record.” Washington Quarterly 6, no. 4, Autumn 1983, pp. 77–92.

Selected Bibliography

Reports

203

Army Tasks for the Seventies—The Decade of the Seventies: Perspectives and Implications for the United States Army. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, June 1972. Department of the Army. Army Focus: The Army in Transformation. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, September 1992. Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report to Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991. ———. An Overview of the Changing Department of Defense: Strategy, Budget, and Forces. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, October 1991. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. (JCS Pub. 1). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 11, 1991. ——— . Joint Military Net Assessment 1992. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992. ———. National Military Strategy of the United States 1992. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992. Leadership for the 1970s: USAWC Study of Leadership for the Professional Soldier. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, July 1, 1971. National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991. Powell, Colin. Testimony Before the Defense Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee. September 25, 1991. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. Report to the President. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 15, 1992. Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to the President and Congress, 1992. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992. Strategic Studies Institute. The Army and the Environment. SSI Special Report. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, July 1990. ———. The Army’s Strategic Role in a New World Order: A Prioritized Research Program 1992. SSI Special Report. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, February 1, 1992. Study on Military Professionalism. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, June 30, 1972. Study on Military Professionalism. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, June 30, 1970. U.S. Congress, Committee on Armed Services. Women in the Military: The Tailhook Affair and the Problem of Sexual Harassment. House of Representatives, 101st Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, September 1992. ———. Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress. House of Representatives, 101st Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989. U.S. General Accounting Office. Army Force Structure: Lessons to Apply in Structuring Tomorrow’s Army. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, November 29, 1990. ———. Professional Military Education at Four Intermediate Service Schools. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1991.

204

Selected Bibliography

———. Professional Military Education at Three Senior Service Schools. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1991. ———. Army Training: Changing Threat Not Expected to Significantly Affect Combat Training. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, December 1991. ———. Perspectives on Worldwide Threats and Implications for U.S. Forces. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, April 16, 1992. ———. Defense Force Management: DOD’s Policy on Homosexuality. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 12, 1992. ———. Defense Force Management: Related to DOD’s Policy on Homosexuality. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 12, 1992.

Miscellaneous

Alcalá, Raoul Henri. “The Military Profession in the New Security Era (Post–Gulf War).” Unpublished manuscript, June 18, 1992. Cantril, Albert H. “The American People, Viet-Nam and the Presidency.” Paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association convention, Los Angeles, September 8–12, 1970. Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams, and Fred B. Bryant. “Civilian Graduate Education and U.S. Military Professionalism.” Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association convention, Chicago, September 3–6, 1992. Sorg, Melvin. “Restoration and Renewal.” Unpublished report, May 3, 1992. Vitas, Robert A. “Education and the Contemporary Military Professional.” Unpublished manuscript, March 1, 1990. Williams, Terry E. “A Report on American Graduate Education.” Unpublished manuscript, December 12, 1990.

Index Adversaries, U.S., 5; ill-defined, 33 Afghanistan, 124. See also Soviet Union Air force: Global Reach, Global Power, 63 Air power: Gulf War, and, 6 AirLand battle, 41, 124 Allison, Graham, 32 All-volunteer military, 100, 102, 138, 182 America: conflict spectrum, and, 29; moral crusade, and, 29; turmoil (1990s) in, 40; standing armies, and, 133 American isolationism: military development, and, 112. See also U.S. military American people: Vietnam, and, 94; support for the Gulf War, and, 128; “Viet-Nam and the Presidency” study, 121 American way of war, 2, 29, 36, 43; major changes in, 33–34 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 60 Antiwar movement, 120. See also American people, Vietnam Armed Forces Journal International: homosexuals and the military, 83 Armenia, 47 Army: Chief of Staff, 63; civilian missions, 50; difficult adjustment period, and, 104; diversity within, 67; importance of ground forces, 63; Indian wars, and, 112; raison d’être, 124; reduced resources, and, 104; social problems, and, 97–98. See also U.S. military, army professionals Army Corps of Engineers: domestic missions, and, 50 Army in Anguish, 94 Army leaders: battlefield competency, 47 Army National Guard: Desert Storm, and, 65. See also Gulf War Army officers’ views: life careers, and, 103; post-Vietnam period, and, 103

Army professionals: adjustment to postVietnam period, 104; difficulty in restructuring, 103; erosion of trust, 120; high-quality army, and, 125; impact of Vietnam on, 99; relationships with political system, 111; studies on post-Vietnam views, and, 101; questioning of Vietnam involvement, and, 115 Army Research Institute, 125 Army Times, 9 Asia, 1 Aspin, Congressman Les: study on force structure, 62 Aspin, Secretary of Defense Les, 62, 80; reorganization of Defense Department, and, 62–63. See also Base Force, Bottom-Up Review Atkinson, Rick, 102 Azerbaijan, 47

Bacevich, A. J., 15, 92 Barber, James, 112 Base Force, 62; Clinton administration, and, 65; four military packages, 65. See also Bottom-Up Review Belarus, 46 Berlin Wall, 1 Beyond the battlefield, 69 Big battle syndrome: military professionals, and, 38 Black Americans: integration into the military, and, 79; military service, and, 83 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 61. See also Yugoslavia Bottom-Up Review, 65. See also Base Force; Aspin, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin Braestrup, Peter, 39 Bresler, Robert, 137 British empire, 157 Broken back war, 6 Bryant, Fred B., 206

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206

Index

Buffalo Soldiers, 83. See also Black Americans Bush administration: Base Force, and, 64; force reductions, and, 62 Bush, Pres. George, 46, 59, 126; leadership in Gulf War, and, 126; peacetime engagements, and, 44, 60; new security era, and, 3. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War Calley, Lt. William: My Lai, and, 95 Cantril, Albert H., 121 Carter administration: hollow army, and, 124; U.S. hostages in Iran, and, 124 Center of gravity: See Clausewitz, Carl von Central America, 31 Central Europe, 47 Charlie Company (Vietnam): My Lai, 95 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 45, 60; threat perceptions, and, 64 Chemical and biological weapons, 46–47 Cheney, Secretary of Defense Dick, 150; peacetime engagements, and, 61; strategy, and, 3 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 123; report 1979, 123l report 1983, 123; report 1991, 123; survey on military role, 122 China, 1, 31, 61 Chinese communists, 114 Civilian graduate education, 9, 17, 160; avoidance of tunnel vision, and, 68; battlefield skills, and, 156; benefit to profession, 18; career assignment, as, 167, 172, 174; effect on officers, 19–20; effect on values and beliefs, 168–173, 178–176; impact on military professionals’ views, 104, 140; impact on officers’ careers, 20, 156, 171–172, 175, 179, 181–182; importance of, 18, 19; interaction with society, 156–157, 173, 175; long-term impact, 21; military professionalism, and, 155–158, 167–175; military professionals and civilian academia, 77; military professionals and politics, and, 127; political awareness, and, 140; research summary, 19–21; resocialization, 168 172–174; social sciences, and, 18; studies on, 18; technical vs. liberal education, 158, 172–174; type of institution, and, 174; value of, 179, 180, 184. See also army professionals, U.S. military, military professionals

Civilian society, 158–162; civilian control, 159; perspectives of, 158. See also civilmilitary relations Civil Rights Act of 1964, 83 Civil-military relations, 2, 12; Cold War, and, 133; core value of, 134; Huntington’s views on, 134, 135; Janowitz’s views on, 134, 135; meaning of, 133; military and society, and, 137; military conduct of Vietnam War, and, 115–116; military professional linkages, and, 114; new era, and, 133, 135, 140; three categories of, 10; three dimensions of, 135; transformation of, 133. See also army professionals, U.S. military Clash of civilizations, 43. See also Huntington, Samuel P. Clausewitz, Carl von, 48, 98; center of gravity, and, 52; European battle, and, 37; Vietnam, and, 40; Clinton administration, 62, 150, 151, 153; gap with military, and, 129; military and, 10. See also Clinton, Pres. Bill Clinton, Democratic Party candidate Bill, 139 Clinton, Pres. Bill, 9, 80, 128; avoidance of military service, and, 125–126, 129; homosexuals in the military, and, 82; military, and, 129; national service, and, 84 Cohesion: democratization, and, 160; distance from society, and, 150; three military systems concept, and, 160–162. See also military cohesion, U.S. military Colby, William, 121 Cold War, 6, 9, 152, 156; alliances and treaties, 61; continuities into new era, 45; force size, and, 63; impact on military professionals, 113; U.S. ideals, and, 30. See also U.S. military Combat effectiveness: distance from society, and, 150; effect of drawdown on 149; personnel policies, and, 150; raison d’être of military, 158, 160; social issues, and, 79 Command: importance of, 185, 186 Commonwealth of Independent States, 4 Communism, 44, 148, 178, 182–183, 186; Third World, and, 45 Conceptual framework: hypotheses, 2, 147, 152–153, 160–162 Conflict character: American way of war, and, 54 Conflict environment, 5–7 Conflict spectrum, 34–36; revised, 37

Index Conflicts: complexity of environment, 155, 161; differences between conventional and unconventional, 51–52; politicalpsychological components, 156, 158; termination of, 156 Congress: anti-Vietnam views, 118, 123, 129; as critical player, 114; belated support for Desert Storm, 128; control of army, and, 151; end of aid to South Vietnam, and, 119; impact on military professionals, 118; military experience of members, 151; military in the 1950s, and, 114; officer training, and, 18; post–World War II security system, and, 113; reaction to military restructuring, 63; training of medical officers, and, 18 Containment policy, 114 Contingencies: complexity and uncertainty of, 149, 157; conventional contingencies, 61; effect of drawdown on, 149; non-Western areas, and, 149 Counterculture: the military, and, 98 Counterdrug operations, 49. See also peacetime engagements, U.S. military Counterinsurgency, 183. See also conflict spectrum, unconventional conflicts Crisis response, 3. See also peacetime engagements; Bush, Pres. George; Cheney, Secretary of Defense Dick Crowe, Retired Admiral William: endorsement of candidate Bill Clinton, and, 139 Cuba, 61; Cuban missile crisis, 30, 31

de Tocqueville, Alexis, 29, 160 Defense Planning Guidance, 60 Deitchman, S. J., 34 Democracy, 59, 162; distrust of the military, and 30; effect on cohesion and effectiveness, 160; political-social issues, and, 161. See also America, American way of war Demographic changes: U.S., 75 Department of Defense, 65. See also U.S. military Department of State, 63 Desert Storm, 41, 62, 97. See also Gulf War Domestic environment: military in Vietnam era, and, 100. See also American way of war, Vietnam Domestic factors, 155, 159, 161; missions, 152; U.S. military capability, and, 148. See also American way of war

207

Domestic Marshall Plan: U.S. Army and, 50 Domestic police-type actions: U.S. military, and, 48. See also U.S. military “Don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue,” 82. See also homosexuals; Pres. Clinton, Bill; U.S. military Drew, Dennis, 30 Drug wars, 42; national security threat, and, 148; trafficking, 60. See also conflict spectrum, unconventional conflicts Duty, honor, country, 19, 21, 80, 91, 120, 151, 157, 158. See also army professionals, military professionals Eberly, Don, 85 Economic issues: effect on officers’ views, 186; national security, and, 151; pursuit of national objectives, and, 148 Eisenhower administration, 91 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 111 Elected officials: new generation of, 136–137 Elfstrom, G., 112 Ellis, Joseph, 135–136 Emerging military profession, 11. See also civilian graduate education, military professionalism, U.S. military Enlightened advocacy, 158; military professionalism, and, 141. See also civilian graduate education, military professionalism Ethnic conflicts, 47. See also Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia- Herzegovina Europe, 151; military battle scenario, 124; new security in, 126. See also Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Fallows, James, 125, 127 Family issues, 150 Female officers’ views: women in the military, and, 82 “Fog of peace,” 148, 152, 155 Force multiplier, 64 Force reconstitution, 3. See also peacetime engagements, Bush, Pres. George; Cheney, Secretary of Defense Dick Force structure, 7–8 Foreign strategic cultures, 38, 48 Former adversaries: new relationships, 61 Forward presence, 3. See also peacetime engagements, Bush, Pres. George; Cheney, Secretary of Defense Dick

208

Index

Fotion, N., 112 Future battleground, 68 Future conflicts, 35, 36. See also conflict spectrum Future research, 174

Gallup poll: 1956 on professional self-image, 92 Georgians (Soviet Union), 47 General Accounting Office: on army restructuring and training, 127–128 Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew J., 155–156 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 126. See also Soviet Union Grant, Ulysses S., 111 “Gray areas,” 147–148 Ground forces: use outside the United States, 149 Gulf War, 4, 6, 31, 35, 45–46, 64, 89, 103, 123, 125; differences from Vietnam, 41; lessons of, 148; planned drawdown, 127; reference point, 127; reinforcement of army system, and, 128; reserve components, and, 41; U.S. Army, and, 125. See also Desert Storm

Hackworth, Col. David H., 84, 95 Hauser, William L., 139 Heller, Col. Charles: criticism of Clinton national service plan, 84 Hispanic population: U.S., 78. See also demographic changes Hollow army, 64, 102 Hollow military, 10, 11 Homosexuals: “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue,” 149–150; in the military, 82–84; military professionals’ views of, 149; military response, 83–84; three-militarysystems concept, and, 161. See also Clinton, Pres. Bill; U.S. military House Committee on Armed Services: sexual harassment in the military, 82 Hue (Vietnam), 39 Humanitarian missions, 152. See also conflict spectrum, peacetime engagements Huntington, Samuel P., 11, 20, 43, 115, 150, 205; liberalism and the military, 134–135; U.S. military professionalism, 13 Hussein, Saddam, 46. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War Hypothesis (conceptual framework), 2

Ia Drang: battle of, 40 Illegal immigration, 48–49 Immigration and Naturalization Service, 49 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), 46. See also nuclear weapons International disputes: nonmilitary resolution of, 33 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 205 Interservice rivalries: army and marines, 11; new era, and, 63. See also U.S. military Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), 215 Iraq, 6, 48. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War Ivany, Robert, 119 Jackson, Mr. Justice, 134 Janowitz, Morris, 8, 12, 94, 115, 205; constabulary concept, 13–14, 151; incongruity between liberalism and the military, 134–135; pragmatists and absolutist perspectives, 151 Japan, 1, 31, 61. See also former adversaries Johnson, Haynes, 94 Johnson, Pres. Lyndon, 93; command structure in Vietnam War, 118 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 182, 183. See also U.S. military Joint Military Net Assessment, 44 Judeo-Christian culture, 75 Just Cause (Panama), 97 Just war, 30, 31. See also American way of war

Kazakhstan, 46 Kennedy, Pres. John F.: assassination of, 98 Kennedy, Robert: assassination of, 98 Kern, Alfred, 158 King, Martin Luther: assassination of, 98 Korean War, 6, 37; military professionalism, and, 91–92, 93, 114 Korematsu vs. United States, 134 Krepinevich, Andrew, 94 Kuwait, 6, 183. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War Ky, Nguyen Cao, 119. See also Vietnam

Leadership, 159–160; presidential, 159, 184, 185. See also various presidents Leadership for the 1970’s, Army Tasks for the Seventies, 96

Index Liberalism: civil-military relations, and, 134. See also military professionalism, U.S. military Literature review, 167–168 Low-intensity conflict, 7. See also conflict spectrum, future conflicts, unconventional conflicts Luttwak, Edward, 117

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 114 Mainstream military: Vietnam, and, 38. See also U.S. military, Vietnam Major powers: confrontation in new era, 35 Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), 45, 61. See also Bottom-Up Review; Aspin, Secretary of Defense Les Maoist theme: North Vietnam and Vietcong, 40 Marxism-Leninism, 1. See also communism, Soviet Union McCausland, Lt. Col., Jeffrey, 7 McCormick Tribune Foundation: Cantigny conference on national service, 85 McCrane, Kevin M: homosexuals in the military, 84 McCurdy, Congressman Dave, 139 McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert: on Vietnam, 119 Media, the: adversarial relations with the military, 136; criticism of the military profession, 98, 100; diminution of military image, and, 120; Vietnam, and, 94, 120. See also Braestrup, Peter Menard, Orville, 138 Methodology, 167–169; 177–178; 187–196 Mexico, 49 Meyer, Gen. Edward C.: hollow army, and, 102 Middle East, 31; regional conflicts, and, 45 Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), 117; convoluted command structure, 118 Military associations, 10 Military bonding, 80 Military chaplains, 76 Military cohesion, 67. See also cohesion, military profesionals Military effectiveness, 159. See also military professionals, U.S. military Military ethos, 112. See also military professionals

209

Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn’t Win, 97 Military isolationism, 141. See also civilmilitary relations Military mind-set, 22, 38, 139. See also civilian graduate education, military professionalism, military professionals Military officers: history of internal politics, 111. See also military professionalism, officers’ views Military personnel: homosexuals in the military, 66; impact of restructuring, 80; women in the military. See also homosexuals in the military, U.S. military, women in the military Military principles: unit cohesion and effectiveness, 84. See also U.S. military Military professionalism, 9–10; dual professionalism, 138–139; study conclusions and results, 96–98. See also army professionals, military professionals Military professionals: anger at Vietnam involvement, 100; antipolitical mind-sets, 52; autonomy of, 150; battlefield skills, 155, 156; beyond the battlefield, 141; bitterness over Vietnam, 119; challenges to, 68; changes in Vietnam period, 115; characteristics of, 12, 15, 111, 138; civilian graduate education impact, 128; civilian interaction, and, 78; Cold War, and, 91; combat leadership, and, 104; conceptual framework, and, 147; conflict spectrum, and, 51; conservative perspective, 157; continuing professional status, 127; core notions, 126–127; criticism of in literature, 92; culture, 89, 90; discipline, and, 150; disillusionment with media, 136; “dual” professionalism, and, 104; erosion of, 95, 103; Europe, and, 53; focus in new era, 140–141; four challenging periods, 90–91; future course, 142; gap between ideals and reality, 96–97; heterogeneous milieu, and, 69; importance of command, 127; influence of politics, 139; intellectual competence, 155; internal self-interest, 117; links with society, 157; military code, 90; military mind, 186; moral and ethical underpinnings, 152; national interest, and, 141; need for education, 141; new generation, 140; not a monolith, 116; orthodox lenses, and, 127; passing of Vietnam generation, 140;

210

Index

political involvement of, 115, 141–142, 161; political system, and, 12; political relationships, 114; politicians, and, 111; positive images of, 91; positive socialmilitary dynamics, 92; post–Gulf War views, 103; post-Vietnam civil-military relations, 102; primary purpose, of, 12; professional perspectives, 152, 153, 159, 167; public and Vietnam, and, 117; raison d’être, 104; reaction to civilian control during Vietnam war, 116; refocus on Soviet Union, 102; restoration of trust, 124; role confusion, 99; second careers, and, 153, 173; social status of, 90; society, and, 92; society’s lack of understanding, 103; “stab in the back” mentality, 136; strategic perspectives of, 148, 160; superior-junior officer gap, 96; suspicion of politics, and, 127; three options, 23; training and education of, 67; two critical factors in new era, 135; two political spheres, and, 115; uncertain directions, and, 160; ultimate liability, and, 15; U.S. force capability, 51; Vietnam, and, 94, 136; Vietnam generation, and, 89. See also American way of war, civilian gradute education, military professionalism, U.S. military, Vietnam Military purpose, 85 Military spouses, 150. See also family issues Military technological developments: military professionalism, and, 138 Millis, Walter, 138 Mills, C. Wright, 111 Minorities: drawdown, and, 150; officer accessions, and, 150; recruitment of, 150. See also black Americans Moellering, John, 39–40 Moore, Robert, 135–136 Morale: effect of drawdown on, 149. See also U.S. military Moskos, Charles, 12, 80–81, 139, 205; institution or occupation, 14 Mulligan, Hugh, 93–94 Multipolar world, 43 My Lai (Vietnam): impact on military professionals, 95

Nagorno-Karabakh, 47 National Defense Act of 1920, 18 National Guard, 66; three-military-systems concept, and, 161

National leadership: U.S. military, and, 10. See also civil- military relations, military professionals National security, 60; military profession, and, 114 National Security Strategy of the United States, 59, 60, 65 National service, 84–85 National Strategy Forum, 205 Naval power, 6 Navy: . . . From the Sea, 63 New Security era: challenge to U.S. military, and, 53; characteristics of, 43; dissolution of Soviet system, and, 126; military phases, and, 126–129; military reference point, and, 126; security landscape, 137. See also military professionals, U.S. military New York Times, 139 Non-European conflicts, 31, 38. See also future conflicts Nontraditional challenges, 47–51 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 113. See also Cold War Nuclear weapons, 6 Nunn, Sen. Sam, 82–83 Nye, Joseph, 53

Officers corps: as a guild, 90; Vietnam and loss of faith, 94. See also military professionals, U.S. military, Vietnam Officers’ views: attitude of American people, and, 122; cautious about changes, 103; civilian graduate education, 77–78; force structure, on, 46; future, and, 46; global threats, 44; left-wing publications, and, 121; marital difficulties, on, 80; military families, 80; My Lai, 95; special operation forces, on, 46; withdrawal from Vietnam, 122. See also civilian graduate education, military professionals Old order: conflicts in Cold War, 36 Operation Eagle Claw, 124. See also Carter administration Operations other than war, 61. See also conflict spectrum, peacetime engagements Opinion polls: changing views on Vietnam, 121–122; high marks for military, 124. See also U.S. public Osgood, Robert, 30 Ossetians (former Soviet Union), 47

Index Pacific Basin, 61 Panel on Military Education, House Armed Services Committee, 18 Peace dividend, 148 Peacekeeping mission, 153. See also peacetime engagements, conflict spectrum Peacetime engagements, 7, 44. See also Bush, Pres. George; Cheney, Secretary of Defense Dick Peers, Major General William R: My Lai, and, 95 Pentagon, the, 128; officer lobbyists in, 139. See also military professionals, U.S. military Perry, Secretary of Defense William J., 63 Persian Gulf, 169. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War Philippines, the, 112 Pickerell, James, 94 Planning basis: capabilities and quality, 64 Political-military dynamics, 10–11, 150–151. See also civil- military relations Population issues, 9. See also demographic changes Post–Cold War: challenge to U.S. Army, 103; peace dividend, and, 135. See also new era, military professionals, U.S. military Post–Gulf War: debate on army’s role, 104. See also Gulf War, U.S. military Post–Korean War: military profession, and, 93. See also military professionals, U.S. military Post-Vietnam era: Vietnam continuities, 97. See also civilian graduate education, military professionals, U.S. military Post–World War II: military reduction, and, 113; new national security system, 113. See also Cold War, U.S. military Powell, General Colin, 5, 63 President: leadership, 159, 184, 185; perception of, 159; personality and character, 159, 160; powers of, 159, 160; relations with military, 160. See also various presidents Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces: President Clinton’s disregard of, 82. See also U.S. military, women in the military Profession: common characteristics, 16. See also military professionals Professional ethos, 147; civilian perspectives, and, 141; new issues, 69. See also military professionalism, military professionals

211

Project One Hundred Thousand, 100 Public opinion: future army missions, and, 149

Race relations: U.S. military, in, 83. See also black Americans, U.S. military RAND, 61; U.S. inability to respond to two MRCs, 61 Reagan administration, 126; military buildup, 125 Reagan, Pres. Ronald: noble cause, and, 123; positive military views of, 125 Regional conflicts, 45–46 Reserve components, 65; call to active duty, 66; shift in emphasis, 66; three-militarysystems concept, and, 161. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War, National Guard Resources, 147; mission mismatch, and, 149 Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), 100 Retired military associations, 10 Retired military officers: political activity, and, 139–140 Roper, John, 32 Russia, 47; conventional forces, and, 43; in former Soviet republics, 47; near abroad, 43; nuclear weapons, and, 46; Rwanda, 48, 104

Saigon, 118. See also South Vietnam, Vietnam Sarkesian, Sam C., 12, 205; U.S. military and politics, 14–15 Saudi Arabia, 45. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War Schroeder, Congresswoman Pat: homosexuals in the military, and, 84 Schwarzkopf, Gen. Norman, 41, 140. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War SEALS (Navy): three-military-systems concept, and, 161 Secretary of defense, 43–44, 45. See also under various secretaries of defense Security environment: changes in, 31 Security themes: American way of war, and, 32; economic strength, 32; interdependence, 32. See also U.S. national security Senior officers: criticism of candidate Bill Clinton, 126 Senior service schools, 18, 68, 156, 168 Sherman, William Tecumseh, 89, 142, 151, 159

212

Index

Sixties generation: U.S. military, and, 115 Skelton, Congressman Ike: Skelton report, 18. See also civilian graduate education Snow, Donald, 30, 33, 36–37, 51 Soft power, 54 Somalia, 48, 61, 104, 128 South Korean Forces: Vietnam, and, 118 South Vietnam: collapse of, 99, 100. See also Vietnam Southeast Asia, 1 Soviet system, 1 Soviet Union, 30, 37, 124, 148, 182; Cold War, and, 52; dissolution of, 31, 147; former, 4, 59; global war, and, 38; possible war with, 182, 183. See also Afghanistan, Cold War Spangler, Stanley, 31, 32 Special air squadrons: three-military-systems concept, and, 161 Special Forces, 35; three-military-systems concept, and, 161. See also U.S. military, U.S. Special Forces Special Operations Command structure, 35. See also U.S. military Special operations units: three-militarysystems concept, and, 161–162 Spencer Foundation, 167 Stanton, Shelby, 100 Stereotypes: breakdown of, 77; civilian and military, 77 Stone, Secretary of the Army Michael, 61 START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), 46 Strategic defense and deterrence, 3. See also peacetime engagements Study of Military Professionalism, 96, 101 Sullivan, Gen. Gordon, 34; on U.S. Army selfexamination, 148 Sun Tzu, 52; Vietnam, and, 40 Superpower era, 43; military professional selfimages, and, 90–91 Support units: three-military-systems concept, and, 161–162 Survey results, 177–186 Synergism, 153, 160–161

Tehran, 124. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War Third World, 47, 128, 155; regional focus, and, 137. See also various countries Threats: ill-defined, 152. See also peacetime engagements, unconventional conflicts

Three-military-systems concept, 160–162 Traditional military operations, 47 Two-army concept, 161

Unconventional conflicts, 4, 7, 35, 48, 149, 152, 153; American way of war, and, 42–43; characteristics of, 51–52; U.S. avoidance of, 42. See also conflict spectrum, Special Forces Unified and Specified Commands, 63 United Nations (UN), 48, 59; United States, and, 49 United States: antimilitary views, 112, 113; changes in, 98; changing international security, and, 3; Cold War victory, 103; collapse of national will and Vietnam, 120; communist expansion, and, 30; conventional strategy and Vietnam, 40; criticism of Vietnam strategy, and, 40; cultural changes, and, 75; demographic changes in, 78; emergence as a world power, 112; domestic concerns, and, 7; gap between society and military, 100; Iraq, and, 51; just political systems, and, 30; just wars, and, 30; limitations on, 4; majorpower wars, and, 43; new security era, and, 1; new strategic view, 4–5, 45; religious diversity, and, 76; Vietnam, and, 40, 94. See also U.S. public, Vietnam U.S. air power, 6. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War U.S. Army: changing international security, and, 3; decline of, 100; diversity within, 79; downsizing and drawdown, 35; force composition and posture, 8; hostages in Iran, and, 124; ill-defined missions, and, 11; impact of nuclear weaponry, and, 114; national interests, and, 59; non-European areas, and, 4; peacekeeping and peacemaking, and, 47–48; personnel reductions, 62; response to domestic violence, and, 51; stationing, 8; uncertain challenges, and, 5. See also peacetime engagements, unconventional conflicts, U.S. military U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 169; survey (1992), 39 U.S. Army War College, 49; report on domestic Marshall Plan, 50; studies on professionalism, 96; study (1970) on superior- junior relationships, 117. See also

Index senior service schools, U.S. Army, U.S. military U.S. citizens: just wars, and, 31; support of U.S. military, and, 38. See also American way of war, U.S. public U.S. Congress, 42; Vietnam, and, 99. See also United States and various U.S. agencies U.S. Department of Defense, 47, 49. See also U.S. military and various secretaries of defense U.S. defense budget: interservice rivalries, and, 11; reductions in, 9. See also U.S. military and various military services U.S. forces: humanitarian missions, 48. See also peacetime engagements, U.S. military U.S. Marine Corps, 81; recruiting effort, 80. See also U.S. military U.S. military: American political system, and, 10; antidrug campaign, and, 49; antiwar groups, and, 115; big battle concept, 35; capability in new security environment, 22; characteristics, 6; civilian control of, 135; civilian law enforcement missions, and, 49; Cold War organization, and, 37; common bond, 79; conflict dilemmas, 42; conflict spectrum, and, 1; criticism of, 101–102; cultural changes, and, 75; democratization of, 76; demographic changes, and, 75; dilemma in United States, 135, 136; diminished resources, and, 11; domestic political-social environment, and, 21; drawdown, and, 126; external orientation, 16–17; future forces, and, 66; Gulf War, and, 8; homosexuals, and, 9, 10; instrument of foreign policy, 32; integration (1948), and, 93; managers and leaders, 104; managers and warriors, 8; noncombat missions, 61; nuclear weapons destruction, and, 49; officer-enlisted gap, 100, 101; operational dilemmas, 53; political institution, as, 114; political military control system, and, 17; political-social issues, and, 11, 138; post-Vietnam focus, 102; preparation for past wars, and, 53; privileged position (1950–1968), and, 91; racial issues, and, 79; raison d’être, 142; redeployment, and, 21; restructuring, 63; resurgence (1980s), and, 102; secondary in new era, 33; security landscape dilemmas, and, 52; smaller forces, and, 50; social accommodation, and, 76; social change,

213

and, 85; society, and, 2, 77; support of nonmilitary missions, in, 53; synergism, and, 2; transition (1970s), 102; vague national interest operations, and, 61; Vietnam strategy, 41; withdrawal from Vietnam, 41; women in combat, and, 9. See also conflict spectrum, Desert Storm, Gulf War, homosexuals, military professionalism, peacetime engagements, Vietnam, women in the military, and various military services U.S. Military Academy (West Point), 128, 172; class of 1966, 123; officer resignations, and, 99; Vietnam, and, 122–123 U.S. military communities, 81 U.S. military professionalism, 2. See also military professionalism, U.S. military U.S. military professionals: civilian graduate education, and, 7; core principles, of, 21–22; not a monolith, 15; resocialization of, 20; sole client—the state, 15; success in battle, and, 15; synergism, and, 22; three options, and, 23. See also military professionalism, U.S. military U.S. multiculturalism: U.S. military and, 9. See also U.S. military U.S. national interests: economic strength, and, 33 U.S. national security, 1; changes in, 21; nonEuropean areas, and, 7 U.S. Navy: maritime strategy, and, 38. See also navy U.S. people: moral criteria, and, 50. See also America, American way of war U.S. policy: global response, and, 4; new era, and, 30. See also America, American way of war, peacetime engagements U.S. policymakers: U.S. military in new era, and, 32; response to new security environment, 32. See also America, American way of war, U.S. military U.S. public: diminished support for Vietnam, and, 122; divisiveness over Vietnam, and, 101, 117; new era, and, 33; positive view of military, and, 101; refocus on Soviet threat, 123; Vietnam, and, 40, 101, 122. See also America, American way of war, U.S. military, Vietnam U.S. Reserve Forces: Vietnam, and, 41. See also Desert Storm, Gulf War, reserve components

214

Index

U.S. Special Forces, 51. See also conflict spectrum, Special Forces, unconventional conflict U.S. society: demographics, and, 149; military professionalism, and, 149–150. See also military professionals, U.S. people U.S. strategic forces, 38 U.S. strategy: Cold War, in, 37–38; end of Cold War, 133. See also American way of war, U.S. military, Vietnam U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, 99–100. See also senior service schools, U.S. Army, U.S. military Ukraine, 46. See also Soviet Union

Video-driven contingencies, 61. See also the media Vietnam (Vietnam War), 6, 35, 148, 149, 151; academicians’ views of, 120; American way of war, and, 38; Americanization of the war, 99; cease-fire (1973), 99; civilianmilitary command structure, 117–118; criticism of U.S. military profession, and, 93; declining support in United States for, 95; gap between U.S. regulars and draftees, 116–117; impact on military recruiting, and, 100; military profession, and, 52, 91, 93, 115; opinion polls, and, 121; overshadowed by Europe, 124; political and military watershed, 38; political dimensions, 116; stab in the back view, 116; television, and, 39; U.S. Army problems, and, 117; U.S. decline of interest in, 124; U.S. enlisted ranks, and, 98; U.S. failure in, 99; U.S. withdrawal from, 99; Vietnamization of the

war, 99. See also American way of war, military professionals, U.S. Army, U.S. military Vietnam in the Mud, 94 Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial, 123 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 83 Vuono, Gen. Carl, 34, 66, 148

Walton, George, 94 Wars: nature of modern, 157; new era in, 33; Soviet Union demise, and, 33. See also new security era Warsaw Pact, 37, 64; dissolution of, 126 Washington (D.C.): political impact on army professionals, 120, politics during Vietnam, 118. See also America, U.S. Congress, and names of various presidents Westmoreland, Gen. William, 118. See also Vietnam Williams, John Allen, 205 Wilson, George C., 94 Women in the military, 81–82, 149; threemilitary-systems concept, and, 161. See also female officers’ views, U.S. military Women Accepted for Volunteeer Emergency Service (WAVES), 81 Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), 81 Women’s Army Corps (WAC), 81 World War I, 159 World War II, 5, 30; moral crusade, as, 113

Yarmolinsky, Adam, 77 Yeltsin, Boris, 1, 46. See also Russia Yugoslavia, 47

About the Book and the Authors The changing strategic landscape and shifting U.S. domestic and international priorities have reshaped national security issues, as well as the dynamics between the military and society, and the military now faces the challenges of responding to this new environment. This book explores that response, its roots in the perceptions, attitudes, capabilities, and selfimages of the military profession, and the implications of both for the military profession, civil-military relations, and national security. Focusing on the U.S. Army as representative of the military profession as a whole in the United States, the authors expand on, and sometimes challenge, concepts introduced earlier by Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos, and Sarkesian. Their research uniquely explores the interrelationships among changing strategic priorities, domestic economic imperatives, military professionals, and the military profession.

Sam C. Sarkesian is professor emeritus of political science at Loyola

University Chicago. He has published in the areas of national security, military professionalism, and unconventional conflicts, including U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics and Unconventional Conflicts in the New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. He chairs the Academic Advisory Committee of the National Strategy Forum and is a fellow of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London). He served for more than 20 years in the U.S. military, with tours in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam.

John Allen (Jay) Williams is an associate professor and chair, Department of Political Science, at Loyola University Chicago. He has published in the areas of naval strategy, military leadership, and strategic policy, and he is coeditor (with Sam C. Sarkesian) of The U.S. Army in a New Strategic Era. He is vice-chairman and executive director of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and a captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve specializing in strategic planning. 215

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About the Book and the Authors

Fred B. Bryant is professor of psychology at Loyola University Chicago. He has published more than 50 articles, primarily in the areas of psychological well-being, Type A behavior, and research synthesis. His research interests include the investigation of how people go about savoring positive moments, anticipating upcoming events, and reminiscing about past positive experiences.