Societies in Transition: Subsaharan Africa between Conflict and Reconciliation 9783666560187, 9783525560181, 9783647560182

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© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525560181 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647560182

Research in Peace and Reconciliation edited by Martin Leiner

in co-operation with Beno„t Bourgine (Louvain-la-Neuve), FranÅois Dermange (Genf), Dennis Doyle (Dayton/Ohio), Matthias Gockel (Jena), Makoto Mizutani (Kyoto), Arie Nadler (Tel Aviv), Bertram Schmitz (Jena) and David Tombs (Belfast/Dublin) Volume 2

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525560181 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647560182

Societies in Transition Sub-Saharan Africa between Conflict and Reconciliation Edited by Martin Leiner, Maria Palme and Peggy Stöckner

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525560181 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647560182

With 1 Map and 6 Tables Cover image: „Child Soldier in the Ivory Coast, Africa“ by Gilbert G. Groud Ó GG.Groud 2007. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: http://dnb.d-nb.de. ISBN 978-3-525-56018-1 ISBN 978-3-647-56018-2 (e-book) Ó 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen/ Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht LLC, Bristol, CT, U.S.A. www.v-r.de All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any informationstorage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Typesetting by Konrad Triltsch Print und digitale Medien GmbH, Ochsenfurt Printed and bound in Germany by Hubert & Co, Göttingen Printed on non-aging paper.

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Content

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Martin Leiner / Maria Palme Introduction to the Present Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Register of Illustrations

I. Case Studies

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Semahagn Gashu Abebe The Dilemmas of Adopting an Ethnic Federal System as a Response to Ethnic Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa The Ethiopian Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Helga Dickow Chadian Identity Cleavages and their Markers The Competing, Overlapping or Cross-Cutting Pattern of Ethnic and Religious Affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Willem Fourie From Sullivan to King MNCs and Democratisation in South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Gladys Ganiel / Joram Tarusarira Reconciliation and Reconstruction among Churches and Faith-Based Organisations in Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Emmanuel Kla Gamoe George / Rachael Oluseye Iyanda Amnesty and Disarmament in the Niger Delta Prospects for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Nigeria’s most Conflict-Torn Sub-Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Hellen Lamunu Healing the Wounds of War in Uganda through Traditional Methods of Reconciliation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Content

Martin Leiner Films about the Genocide in Rwanda 1994 An Example of the Moral Landscape Method (MLM) in Media Analysis Ralf K. Wüstenberg Reconciliation as a Political Option? Different Ways of Dealing with the Past – The Case of South Africa

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II. Comparative and Global Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Andreas Freytag / Sarah Langlotz The Resource-Conflict-Nexus An African Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Ben Khumalo-Seegelken Which Past? Which Future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Reinhart Kößler Colonialism of a Special Kind? Aspects of the German Experience

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Maria Palme The (R)evolution of TRCs and its Impact on the African Continent

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About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Index

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Register of Illustrations

Map: Table 1: Table 2: Table 3: Table 4:

Development of Truth Commissions worldwide Conflicts in Africa Chronology of German Colonial Acquistions Military Confrontations in German Colonies International Standards for Dealing with the Past of Authoritarian Regimes Table 5: Data include all TCs and TRCs since their First Emergence in 1974 (until February 2013) Table 6: All Types of TRCs on the African Continent (until October 2013)

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p. 213 p. 175 – 176 p. 190 p. 194 p. 212 p. 213 – 214 p. 219 – 220

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Martin Leiner / Maria Palme

Introduction to the Present Volume

The second volume of the series “Research in Peace and Reconciliation” (RIPAR) continues the explorations of the first volume, published in 2012 with a geopolitical focus on Latin America.1 Once more, we investigate different approaches towards the difficult task of coming to terms with the past. This time, we look at various forms of injustice and collective or individual experiences of violence as a result of social conflict, autocratic government, or civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa. Two aspects are particularly important. On the one hand, the articles in this volume clearly demonstrate the limits of Western concepts or philosophies of law and highlight the difference between law and justice. On the other hand, they point to an increase of alternative practices and rituals for the sake of dealing with large-scale violations of individual or collective human rights. The current volume, like its predecessor, offers representative case studies of individuals, groups, or organizations that represent a deescalating and conflict transforming potential. Most of the texts were presented and discussed during the 2nd International Summer School “Societies in Transition – Sub-Saharan Africa between Conflict and Reconciliation”, which took place in July 2011.2 In general, the articles correspond to the perspective of the recently established Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS), which takes up the idea by the poet Friedrich Hölderlin that reconciliation is in the middle of strife and that every conflict already implies a resolution. The article by Ganiel and Tarusarira exemplifies our perspective by discussing the positive influence of religious non-conformist groups on the process of conflict transformation in Zimbabwe. In contrast, the article by Dickow investigates the ambivalent influence of religious beliefs on the conflict in Chad. The case studies about South Africa (Wüstenberg), Nigeria (George/Iyanda), Uganda (Lamunu) and the colonial past of Namibia (Kößler) indicate how the transfer of the concept of reconciliation from the context of European history and philosophy to different social and cultural contexts in Latin America and Africa leads to numerous theoretical and practical problems (Abebe). At the 1 The editors wish to thank Matthias Gockel, Christian Kästner, Rebecca Krey, Emrys McNeill, Marcel Urban and Philipp-Sebastian Walther for their editorial assistance and additional research. The Evangelische Kirche in Mitteldeutschland helped us to finance the publication. 2 We would like to thank the Volkswagen Foundation for the funding of the 2nd Summer School.

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same time, these problems inspire the search for alternative developments and applications of the idea of reconciliation, as evidenced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, Ivory Coast and Kenya or the Gacaca courts in Rwanda. These alternative forms of justice combine Western concepts of law and justice with regional customs and traditions of dealing with social conflicts. The solutions achieved in this way differ from the solutions used on other continents. Interestingly, rituals and symbolic or ‘magical’ acts continue to play an important role in many Sub-Saharan regions (Lamunu). Here, reconciliation often is expressed or implied by the legal act of granting amnesty, which, however, is not to be confused with the confession of guilt and the promise of forgiveness. The latter acts are distinct from reconciliation. The case of Uganda also shows how important one-sided forgiveness can be, e. g., the forgiveness of parents towards their children. When compared to the studies on Latin America in volume one of the series, the concept of reconciliation has a very positive connotation, especially in South Africa (Fourie/Wüstenberg/Khumalo-Seegelken/Palme). In addition, the role of economic factors also needs to be taken into account (Freytag and Langlotz). Most alternative methods of dealing with the past, including the institution of Truth Commissions, were developed in the context of processes of decolonization and with an active involvement of grass-roots movements (bottom-up). Initially, they were clearly distinguished from classical Western traditions of law. Since the 1990s, however, they are increasingly regarded as a useful addition to traditional Western mechanisms of law. The global adaptation and modification of the concept of Truth Commissions in different non-European cultural regions have also had effects on European transformation processes. As the preceding volume in our series made clear, there is a growing tendency to understand the task of dealing with a violent past in a broader sense. The process of conflict transformation and reconciliation is a matter not only for political experts or bureaucrats but for society as a whole. This is also true for the examples analyzed in this volume. One new factor in this context is the significance of collective participation in the process of dealing with the past, which includes the cooperation of civil or human rights groups as well as victims and their relatives and also individual perpetrators. Besides a high and enduring potential for conflict and strife in several African countries, there is also a great variety of peaceful possibilities and a potential for alternative strategies of conflict resolution that can be achieved by the African actors themselves. The foci of reconciliation processes in Africa are different from those in other countries and continents. Furthermore, the perception of conflicts by the involved parties and actors influences the process of conflict transformation.

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Introduction to the Present Volume

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The social, religious, and cultural traditions in a given society also play an important role in this process, e. g. in regard to a focus on forgiveness and regret instead of revenge. On the whole, community, rituals, and religion seem to be more important than in European or Latin American countries. Moreover, legal dealings with the past and economic restoration have to be achieved with fewer material means than in richer countries. In contrast to the case studies from Latin America, the effects of collective experiences of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa could be felt until the late 1990s and sometimes are still felt today. Hence, the corresponding investigation and reconciliation efforts should be undertaken on a sustainable basis, encompassing several generations. Moreover, the growing influence of international political actors, such as the UN, on specific processes of coming to terms with the past should be examined critically on a case-to-case basis. Successful social and political reconciliation presupposes active involvement of civil society as well as nonpartisan orientation and agreement among the actors (Palme). The interdisciplinary examinations of case studies from Sub-Saharan Africa present different theoretical approaches of reconciliation and conflict resolution in the aftermath of genocide, civil war, racial regimes, and dictatorships. The articles in the first part deal with case studies of reconciliation and resolution efforts in a post-colonial era (Abebe, Dickow, Fourie, Freytag and Langlotz, Ganiel and Tarusarira, George and Iyanda, Lamunu, Leiner, Wüstenberg). The second part focuses on reconciliation and conflict transformation in a comparative and global perspective (KhumaloSeegelken, Kößler, Palme). Semahagn Gashu Abebe analyzes the dilemmas of adopting federal systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that the achievements of democratization, prosperity and tolerance have implications for increased ethno-cultural mobilization. Based on the case study of Ethiopia, his article critically examines the use of a Soviet-style ethnic federal system since 1991 as a mechanism of addressing and accommodating ethnic diversity. In recent years, some African states have indicated their interest to ‘learn’ from the Ethiopian model of political adaption of minority rights. Aside from the positive impacts in Ethiopia, the author indicates problems due to a lack of political consensus and legitimacy. Moreover, he demonstrates the diverse cultural, economical, social and geographical preconditions of different African states that render difficult the adoption of European models. On the basis of quantitative research conducted in Chad using surveys, Helga Dickow argues that strong identification with religion can foster the tendency not to reconcile but to reinforce conflicts. Her article shows the ambivalent role religion plays in respect to conflict. Hence, religion as such cannot be regarded as a resource of peace. Instead, religious groups need to cultivate their peaceful traditions in order to foster reconciliation and nonviolence.

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Willem Fourie focuses on the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa on a macro-ethical level. He demonstrates, on the one hand, the negative effects of MNCs sustaining authoritarian regimes as an sustaining authoritarian regimes, because they represent a stabilising force for the economy, a practice, which continues to obstruct democratization efforts. On the other hand, he investigates two examples, the Sullivan Principles and the Third King Report on Corporate Governance, as positive achievements of MNCs in South Africa contributing to the transformation from Apartheid to representative democracy. The article of Andreas Freytag and Sarah Langlotz discusses the resourceconflict-nexus. They describe the interdependence between natural resources and the increasing numbers of conflicts in Sub-Saharan African countries. Based on the examples of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Sierra Leone they focus on transmission channels, such as the impact of resource wealth and a country’s economic performance as well as the impact of institutions on conflict building and violence. The article also asks about the impact of a wealth of natural resources, especially oil, on violent conflicts. The contribution by Gladys Ganiel and Joram Tarusarira deals with the relationship between religion, reconciliation and reconstruction regarding Zimbabwe’s efforts of social transformation after the colonial past. They argue that reconciliation as a grass-roots initiative should focus both on the rebuilding of social relations and the transformation of social structures. Reconstruction serves as a companion during reconciliation in order to encourage structural reforms. The case studies about religious non-conformist actors demonstrate the latter’s potential as effective proponents of transformation processes in the light of their self-perception as actors posed against the state and mainstream religion. Emmanuel K. G. George and Rachael O. Iyanda analyze the relation between the granting of amnesty and disarmament in the Niger Delta. They look at the positive and negative effects of peace building in this region. The study proves that the amnesty process since 2009 in Nigeria can serve as a prototype for other conflict zones in Africa. Furthermore, the article critically asks about the correlation and dependences between international achievements in peace building and reconciliation processes and the stability of Nigerian oil exports. Helen Lamunu’s article deals with the long-term effects of post-traumatic stress syndrome, experienced by former child soldiers which were recruited during the civil conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government. She shows the importance of re-integrative, psychotherapeutic approaches of trauma therapies for reconciliation and healing in post-conflict societies as a complementary measure to the legal system. Her article focuses on traditional rituals and their contribution to reconciliation processes between hostile tribes and divided communities. She emphasizes

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the limited application of traditional African rituals in individual cases of violence – such as manslaughter ¢ as an instrument for intergroup reconciliation in favour of cases where whole societies are affected by civil war or violations of human rights. She concludes that Ugandan traditional rituals show a high potential for the creation of alternative “hybrid judicial mechanisms” and for an integrative approach of retributive and restorative justice. The article by Martin Leiner uses the interdisciplinary moral landscape method for media analysis. It focuses on the implicit and explicit ethical elements of several movies about the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The media analysis provides new insights into the educational effects of movies on audiences, e. g. by creating empathy for the destiny of the protagonists and by raising awareness for educational programs as part of reconciliation processes. The case of Rwanda also shows that legal process and reconciliation can stand in opposition. The evaluation of the process of reconciliation remains ambiguous: on the one hand, there is real progress in overcoming hatred, accompanied by forgiveness, economic success and the stabilization of the environment. On the other hand, Tutsi feel isolated in their communities, Hutus who fled to the DRC are persecuted, and there are arbitrary verdicts as well as the suppression of dissent in Rwanda. Ralf Wüstenberg discusses the condition of the increasingly important reconciliation concept since 1990 and its development against the background of South Africa’s transition to democracy. He argues that reconciliation arose in the context of political debates as an operative and regulative idea that combined a retrospective analysis of the past with a future-oriented perspective pursuing the aim of peaceful nation building. The author concludes that reconciliation is an initiating process of bringing into dialogue hostile groups and opponents of war. The South African case demonstrates how reconciliation serves as a political instrument for recognizing crimes against humanity and integrating this acknowledgement into collective memory. The ambiguity between individual and collective or multi-perspective interpretations of past authoritarian regimes bears a new potential for the transformation of societies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ben Khumalo-Seegelken names several positive examples of countries, such as Ivory Coast and Kenya, which have drawn lessons from the South African case by establishing similar Truth, Dialogue and Reconciliation Commissions. He also points out that the case of Zimbabwe is an example of trying to correct structural injustices. He emphasizes the growing responsibility of the African Union and the UN’s achievement in regard to intra-continental initiatives on the grass-roots level. At the same time, he brings to mind the concerns of African States about possible re-colonization under the pretext of social transformation and the adoption of human rights.

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Reinhart Kößler’s article focuses on mass violence and genocide during the period of German Colonialism, especially in Namibia (formerly called “Deutsch-Südwestafrika”). The events occurred during the era of European imperialism before 1914. In critical dialogue with Goldhagen’s thesis, Kößler asks whether genocidal tendencies are inherent in the German historical trajectory or whether they are the result of modern state building processes. He argues that there exist similarities between German colonial crimes in Southern Africa and the Holocaust, but he criticizes the thesis of a German Sonderweg and argues that it hides the fundamental problem of colonialism as a part of modernity. Maria Palme analyzes the model of Truth Commissions (TRC) since their emergence in the 1980s as a paradigm change regarding the limitations of punitive mechanisms and decolonization processes. TRCs have been recognized by the United Nations as an official mechanism, in addition to retributive mechanisms, such as war crime tribunals, material compensation, and lustration. The article demonstrates the evolution of TRCs from a truth seeking instrument on the Latin American continent to a complex and powerful mechanism for reconciliation processes on the African continent, starting with the TRC in South Africa. Looking at the examples of Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC), Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) and Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the article demonstrates the potential of adopting TRC models to and optimizing them for other African states that differ in regard to culture, social structure or economic development. The article also points out positive and negative effects of UN interference in the work of several TRC bodies. Taken together, the articles portray Sub-Saharan Africa as a region that slowly is overcoming its violent past. It shows that there are many resources of peace and reconciliation in Africa itself, beginning with South Africa. We hope that this volume can contribute to the strengthening of these resources.

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I. Case Studies

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Semahagn Gashu Abebe

The Dilemmas of Adopting an Ethnic Federal System as a Response to Ethnic Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa The Ethiopian Experience Introduction The international development of human rights after the Second World War has been largely based on the assumption of a nation-state which is understood to refer to the convergence of the territory of a state with a nation whose members are united by ties of history and culture and commitment to a common future. The principal basis of rights and obligations in a nation-state is citizenship based on equality before the law and enjoying the same rights. The sovereignty of the people is expressed through the state, which provides a common regime of laws, the machinery for justice, democratic rights of franchise and candidacy in elections, and the protection of other rights of individuals (Ghai / Cottrell 2008, p. 91). In such systems, a citizen’s linguistic, religious, and cultural affiliations are largely ignored or undermined. In fact, there has been considerable consensus among many Marxist and non-Marxist scholars alike that ethnicity is a reflection of the isolation of communities and a lack of efficient communications, and therefore they blame ethno-cultural conflicts on temporary factors that would disappear through time (Karmis / Norman 2005, p. 12; Kymlicka / Opalski 2001, p. 14). It has been expected, for example, that industrialization, urbanization and the spread of modern education would reduce ethnic tendencies in the process. Marxists were also certain that socialism would mean the end of the ethnic tension and consciousness that existed in presocialist societies (Herther-Spiro 2007, p. 325). Assimilation of minorities into a large integrated whole was viewed as the inevitable future (Jalali / Lipset 1992, p. 585). By now, it is clearly established that these assimilationist assumptions are not valid. According to scholars, there is not much evidence in Western democracies suggesting that the achievement of democracy, economic prosperity and personal tolerance would lead to the abetment of ethnocultural mobilization (Kymlicka 2002, p. 82 – 83). On the contrary, ethnocultural demands have increased throughout Western and non-Western societies. In fact, it is now argued that the achievement of democratization, prosperity and tolerance has direct implications for increased ethno-cultural mobilization (Kymlicka 2002, p. 82 – 83). In recent decades, the model of the nation-state has come under considerable attack, challenging the very basis of

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the system that privileges the culture or language of the majority and marginalizes other communities, despite the fact that the state professes neutrality. In particular, the alleged exclusion of minority groups, or their under-representation in the institutions of the state, as well as limited economic opportunities, social discrimination, lack of access to the legal system, and the denial of justice in many sectors of life have become grounds of mobilization for minority groups (Ghai / Cottrell 2008, p. 91). The challenge to citizen-oriented nation states is expressed in terms of different collective demands such as rights to autonomy, language, special measures or representation in the government and proportionality in public services (Ghai / Cottrel 2008, p. 92). The contemporary challenge to multicultural society is, thus, to accommodate the national and ethnic differences in a stable and morally defensible manner (Kymlicka 1995, p. 27). In the last few decades a number of attempts have been made to accommodate ethnic diversity in different political discourses. One of the most effective mechanisms devised so far to accommodate ethnic and religious diversity is to adopt a multicultural federal system that grants territorial autonomy to minority groups. Western democracies such as Belgium, Switzerland and Canada have established effective multicultural federal systems that accommodate cultural pluralism. The relative success of the accommodation of multiculturalism in Western democracies is, however, largely attributed to the existence of economic prosperity and the democratic system. On the other hand, challenges of accommodating ethnic diversity are very intense in developing multi-ethnic countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In Africa, since there is an inclination for individuals to think of themselves primarily as Oromo, Hutu, or Masai rather than as Ethiopian, Rwandan or Kenyan, the search for a political system based on civic nationalism has never been an easy task (Spiro 2007, p. 326). Furthermore, despite the glaring diversities, most African states are in the practice of ignoring or suppressing political manifestations of ethnic identities for fear of ethnic fragmentation: “Believing that official recognition of ethnic diversity would foster divided loyalties and separatism, virtually all African states have avoided coming to terms with heterogeneity of their ethnic make-up. Such denial is an unwanted approach both as matter of expediency and as matter of constitutional theory. Far from helping to achieve the goals of national integration and political legitimacy, ignoring or suppressing ethnicity has led to militant ethnic nationalism, conflict and political disorder.” (Alemante 2003, p. 53)

Only few African states, such as Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and recently Kenya, have attempted to address their ethnic heterogeneity through establishing different constitutional and institutional mechanisms. Especially, Ethiopia is experimenting with a Soviet-style ethnic federal system since 1991 as a mechanism to address the challenges related to accommodation of ethnic

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diversity in the country. The success or failure of such an experiment shall send its own positive and negative signals to the continent that has been troubled by different socio-political setbacks. In fact, in recent years some African countries have indicated their interest to ‘learn’ from the Ethiopian mode of political accommodation of minority rights. In light of such significance, the article assesses the background of the Ethiopian ethnic federal system, including the merits and challenges the system has faced in the past two decades. In addition to this, the article provides some perspectives on a balanced approach on accommodation of ethnic diversity in the African context.

Background of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federal System In many respects, Ethiopia has had very impressive moments in its long history. Its old history has been elevated with the discovery of Dinknesh in 1974, known by the outside world as Lucy, which is the oldest fossil of humankind as old as 3.2 million years. It is also the only African state that was not colonised by a foreign power. The country has diverse cultures, languages and religions. Particularly, the incorporation of a large number of diverse ethnic groups which now inhabit the larger part of the state in the second half of 19th century has created a complex evolving situation of confrontation between the broader Ethiopian nationalism versus the narrow ethnic nationalist sentiments among minority groups. Ethiopia is also one of the most populated and ethnically diverse countries in Africa with a total population of 80 million and with more than 80 ethnic groups. According to the 2007 census, the Oromo comprises the largest ethnic group with 25 million people, followed by Amhara ethnic group with 20 million.1 The Orthodox Christian and Islam religions are the most dominant religions in the country, consisting of 43.5 and 33.9 per cent respectively.2 Despite its glaring ethnic and religious diversity, Ethiopia’s state-building strategy for a long time had been characterized by highly centralist tendencies accompanied by force. The long reign of Haile Selassie I (1930 – 1974) further 1 Each of the other ethnic groups comprises less than 5 million people. Some of the large ethnic groups are the Somali (4.5 million), Tigre (4.4 million), Sidama (2.9 million) Guragie (1.8 million), Welaita (1.7 million) Hadiya (1.2 million), Afar (1.2 million) and Gamo (1.1 million). All the other ethnic groups consist of less than one million members each. 2 Other religions in the country include Protestant at 18.5 per cent, Catholic at 0.7 per cent, traditional religions at 2.7 per cent and Others at 0.6 per cent. Regional distribution of the population by religious composition shows that the Orthodox faith followers are predominant in Tigray and Amhara Regions as well as in Addis Ababa City Administration. The Muslim population is significantly larger in Afar, Somali, Harari and Dire Dawa City Administration. Similarly, Protestants are largely concentrated in Addis Ababa, Gambella and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regions.

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strengthened the centralization process that was initiated earlier by Menilik II in the late 19th century. During the process of centralization, the tendency was towards a policy of one country, one language and one flag. There was no political willingness and understanding to accommodate the rights of minority groups. But in the 1960’s, attributed to modern education and communication, a new elite group that challenged the old traditional feudal system started to emerge. Especially university students and the intelligentsia began to show dissent from the age old feudal system. In their struggle against the feudal state, the students resorted to Marxist ideology as a readymade tool available to bring about socio-political transformation in the country. The students were primarily fond of the Stalinist notion of ‘self-determination of nations and nationalities’ to liberate the country’s 80 ethnic groups from ‘national operation’. But there was no thorough consideration made with regard to the relevance and consequences of such a notion for a country that was deeply traditional and seriously impoverished. Finally, due to mounting opposition from different sections of the society, the emperor was deposed in September 1974, ending the age old feudal system for good. After the emperor was deposed, a Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) better known as Derg in Amharic, assumed political power and declared socialism as its ideology. Though the Derg had attempted to answer the ‘national question’ on its own terms, none of the efforts had satisfied the demands of ethnic nationalists. Soon, contrary to the expectation of many scholars and students who made the revolution a reality, the Derg pursued very harsh measures against any political dissent, including ethnoregional movements. The complete closure of political space by the Derg reinforced ethno-regional movements, namely the Tigrean Liberation Front (TPLF), the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). According to the assessment of ethno-nationalists, the Derg rule was simply a continuation of the imperial period when it comes to the issue of ethnic oppression. Mobilization of these ethno-regional forces coupled with some military gains further strengthened and took the ‘question of nationalities’ beyond the scope of the Marxist view of the concept that was advocated during the period of the student movement.3 Among the ethno-regional movements, northbased Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) who fought for the ‘self-determination’ rights of the Eritrea and Tigray provinces respectively became more prominent in terms of posing a threat to the military regime.4 Finally, these two groups coordinated their 3 The students’ movement, as part of the main stream Marxist ideology, largely viewed questions of nationalities as part of a larger class struggle, while the ethnic organizations mobilized their forces merely to separate from the Ethiopian state. 4 Both regions belong to the same culture and language group, despite the fact that the former seems to have adopted some new identities due to the occupation of the region by Italy for few decades.

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forces and defeated the military regime in 1991. The EPLF took control of Eritrea while the TPLF controlled Ethiopia through its cover organization, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Soon after it controlled power, the EPRDF called a National Conference on Peace and Reconciliation in July 1991 aiming to lay the foundations for a transitional period after the regime change. A precondition for the organisations to take part in the conference was that they needed to be ethnically based (Lyons 1996, p. 123). Though the EPRDF intended to reach beyond its original base and include a variety of political groups, it managed the conference and kept participation, the agenda, and the eventual outcome firmly under its careful control (Lyons 1996, p. 123). The outcome of the transitional conference, the Transitional Charter, was largely an agenda predetermined by the EPRDF and partly by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), rather than a pact between all the political forces that had stakes in the future restructuring of the Ethiopian state. The Transitional Charter, in unprecedented fashion, recognized the rights of Ethiopia’s nationalities to self-determination including secession and established ‘local and regional councils based on the basis of nationality’. Accordingly, the country was sub-divided into fourteen administrative regions called kilil. The basis of the language and administrative policy were ethnic identity and affiliation. Later, the Transitional Government established a constitutional commission to prepare a draft constitution for submission to a specially elected Constitutional Assembly. But the constitutional drafting process was, once again, largely dominated by EPRDF party structure and ideological convictions. The drafted constitution was submitted to a Constitutional Assembly that was supposed to deliberate and ratify the constitution. The process of election to the Assembly was largely flawed. As Paul properly noted, ‘There was little meaningful public participatory debate, especially debate focused on devolution versus ethnic federalism, let alone sovereignty or self-determination […]. Just as the EPRDF controlled the Constitutional Commission’s work, so it controlled the election, and then the deliberations, of the Constitutional Assembly’ (Paul 2000, p. 189). Finally, the constitution was ratified 1995, leading to the establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), heralding the commencement of a new ethnic federal system in Ethiopia’ political discourse.

Principles of Accommodating Ethnic Diversity under the Ethiopian Constitution The most striking aspect of Ethiopia’s new constitutional design is its complete departure from the past. It has made a transformation from a

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strongly centralized monarchical (later socialist) state to a highly decentralized federal state that institutionalizes ethnic identity as organising principle of state. Ethnicity all of a sudden became the predominant explanation of many of the things that went wrong in society (Assefa 2010). The ideological backdrop of the Ethiopian constitutional model is largely the notion of ‘selfdetermination of nationalities’ that was part of the leftist political movement leading up to the 1974 revolution and its aftermath. Under the Ethiopian constitution, state sovereignty is not attributed to the ‘Ethiopian people’ as it is commonly stated in liberal constitutions, but rather to ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ (Art. 8, FDRE constitution). The attribution of sovereignty to nations, nationalities and peoples means that the constitution is a product of consensus among ethnic groups inhabiting the Ethiopian state. This indirectly implies that every Ethiopian should first identify themselves with one of the ethnic groups in the country before he or she claims the Ethiopian nationality. The constitution has established a parliamentary system of government with a strong executive body composed of a prime minister and council of ministers that function under a sovereign parliament and a president who has a predominantly ceremonial role. The federal parliament has lower and upper houses. The upper house is composed of representatives from ‘nations, nationalities and people’. This chamber has a number of roles, including interpreting the constitution and deciding on any issue of self-determination or secession. Unlike the experience of other federal systems, the upper house does not play any role in the law- making process. The lower house is composed of up to 550 representatives elected directly by the people. Though the house is constitutionally the supreme state organ, due to the fact that the political system is dominated by a single-party political landscape and the members of parliament are tightly controlled by Leninist-style democratic centralism, it is merely a rubber-stamp organ for the decisions of an increasingly authoritarian executive branch. The constitution has also incorporated the principles of constitutionalism and constitutional supremacy, human rights, secularism, transparency and accountability of government as the basic pillars of the constitutional system (Art. 8 – 12, FDRE constitution). Unlike other democratic federations, power to adjudicate constitutional issues is granted to the second chamber of parliament which is known as House of Federations. The chamber is aided by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI), an organ that investigates constitutional disputes and submits recommendations to the House on cases dealing with constitutional issues. The official justification behind the granting of power of adjudicating constitutional issues to a political organ is related to the principle of sovereignty of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ envisaged under the constitution. According to the argument advanced during the proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly, since the constitution is a political contract made between nations, nationalities and peoples, the constitution need to be

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interpreted by the nations and nationalities themselves rather than unelected judges (Minutes of Constitutional Assembly 1994). In relation to rights of regional governments, every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government, which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal governments (Art. 39 (3), FDRE constitution). Furthermore, the constitution has laid down the procedures to be applied when making use of the right to selfdetermination and secession. The procedure applicable for claims of selfadministration or secession right is a formal demand for secession, to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the legislative council of the nation, nationality or people concerned. Thereafter, the federal government has to organize a referendum which must take place within three years from the time of the demand. After these procedures have been undertaken, the secession or right to self-determination will be materialized. The constitution seems to have made secession easier than the actual political reality in the country would allow. Based on the basic notion of ‘self-determination rights of nations and nationalities’, entrenched in the constitution, nine regional units have been established. Despite the fact that the constitution claims regional units are to be delimited on the basis of settlement, language, identity and consent of the people, they are largely structured following language and ethnic lines. Though all regional governments are constitutionally symmetrical, having an equal formal relationship to the federal government, there are glaring social, economic and political differences and leverage among the constituent units. In addition to the glaring gap in population size, all the regions are heterogeneous, consisting of two or more ethnic groups. Few of them have one dominant ethnic group and different ethnic minorities, few others have two or more dominant ethnic groups, two of them are multiethnic, while city-states are considered separately.5 Though the federation consists of only nine regional units that have regional autonomy, the constitution grants every ‘nation, nationality and people’ the unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession. In practice, it is only few ethnic groups that have full territorial self rule.6 The distribution of power between the central and federal units has been 5 Regions with a dominant ethnic group with other smaller minority groups include Somali, Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Oromo regional states. Two or more minority groups of comparable proportion are found in Benshangul-Gumuz and Gambella regional states while Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State has 56 ethnic groups and Harari Region with diverse ethnic composition. Addis Abeba and Dire Dawa are city states short of having their own autonomous region. 6 Only the states of Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, Afar and Somali are relatively homogenous. In the case of all other four regions, two or more ethnic groups are forced to establish a kind of coalition government.

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made in such a way that it enumerates exclusive powers of the federal government while assuming that all other residual powers are competencies of the federal government. The only concurrent powers provided under the constitution concern certain taxation competencies. The absence of a long list of concurrent powers gives the impression that the regional governments are more empowered than the federal government. In practice, the real powers of the regional governments that have been effective are those related to cultural and language rights. The constitution recognizes equality of all languages while maintaining Amharic as a working language of the federal government. All regional governments have been empowered to use and develop their language and culture, including adopting their own working language for instruction in schools and official purposes. In this regard, the Ethiopian ethnic federal experiment has achieved a lot in terms of protecting the cultural and linguistic rights of the various ethnic groups in the country. But the achievements in regard to protection of cultural rights have not been accompanied by economic and political autonomy of ethnically defined regional governments. The constitutional design and the actual practice in inter-governmental relations indicate that the central government has the final say in many economic and political issues, and that all important powers are controlled by the federal government.7

Opportunities and Challenges to Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federal Experiment The Ethiopian ethnic federal experiment, which is new in its kind in the political discourse of the African continent, has offered different opportunities for the transformation of ethnic tension into cooperation while it has also faced serious challenges. In an effort to reinstate the autonomy of minority and indigenous groups, the Ethiopian constitution incorporates the most liberal provisions that permit the right to self-determination of ethnic groups, including the right to independence. This unprecedented move made by the Ethiopian regime is very strange to African political discourse and considered by many informed observers a risky proposition. Not only has the old Sovietstyle mode of state formation ceased to exist in the post-cold war political order, but it also has been problematic to practice such a liberal policy in a country that has never possessed independent institutions, genuine democracy and some degree of economic advancement. This experiment has provided its own opportunities and challenges. 7 Particularly, the federal government has monopolized important powers of taxation. Regional governments are largely dependent on the subsidies of the federal government, which affects the independence of the regions in terms of exercising their autonomy.

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The remarkable achievement of the Ethiopian federal experiment has been in relation to the exercise of cultural and linguistic rights that were unthinkable during past regimes. In post-1991 Ethiopia, ethnic groups are allowed to use their language for government and education as well as for developing their culture. Though Amharic is the language of the federal government, regional governments have adopted different local languages as regional official languages and language of instructions in primary schools. The new political discourse has created a sense of inclusiveness among hitherto marginalized ethnic groups in the political process and has pacified some of the language-related claims of the past. Though the Ethiopian federal experiment has been successful in terms of protecting cultural rights of minority groups, the federal experiment has faced different challenges that have handicapped the transformation of the system into a viable and vibrant multicultural federal project. The most serious challenges of the federal system are the following: the legitimacy of the federal system in its origin and discourse, the complexities related to the application of ethnicity as the sole principle for structuring the state, the ideological backdrop of the federal system that promotes centralism, the absence of consensus among major political forces concerning the structure of the state, and the missing corresponding democratization that should accompany the federalization process. As it can be learned from the experience of successful federations, the primary and fundamental basis for a federal system of government is consensus and political bargain among the various political groups. Though federalism is a national compromise between the divergent interest groups which history has thrown together, the introduction of the federal arrangement in Ethiopia emerged from revolution rather than a genuine negotiation between political forces (Amoretti / Bermeo 2004, p. 471, Ghai 2000, p. 18). The EPRDF as a political grouping that defeated the military regime in 1991 proposed and implemented ethnic federalism in light of its ideological ideals and under its firm control. Due to the fact that the process was not result of the bargaining among different political forces and all stakeholders, the federal structure and the constitution itself suffers from a serious problem of legitimacy. One the one hand, the regime is accused by ethno-regional political organizations like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as to that the principles of federalism provided under the constitution have not been implemented and that the existing system is not federal enough. On the other hand, there are groups that accuse the EPRDF‘s ethnic project as creating deep division among the various ethnic groups of the country and weakening the unity of the country. Due to such lack of legitimacy, both political groupings are waging different struggles including armed insurrections against the Ethiopian regime. In light of such serious legitimacy deficits of the existing federal system that are being pointed out by significant political groupings, the Ethiopian federal

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system needs to incorporate the political demands of the various political groupings that question the legitimacy of the system. Unless the demands of these political groups are accommodated through renegotiating the terms of the constitution, not only will the ethnic federal experiment continue to suffer from serious setbacks of legitimacy that undermine the relevance of political ideals incorporated in the constitution, but such persistent political divisions within the political discourse of the country may also affect the stability of the country. The necessary negotiations should be aimed at achieving some form of consensus about the form and structure of political system in order to accommodate the various political interests at stake, since political consensus is the single most important factor that has never been achieved in the country’s recent history. The other challenge that affects the viability of the ethnic federal experiment in Ethiopia is related to the unprecedented emphasis attached to ethnicity. Primarily, the worrying aspect of ethnicity is that it is overshadowing our common humanity and sense of citizenship since people’s ethnic consciousness tends to reduce their concern for human rights or public morality (Ghai / Cottrell 2008, p. 11). In countries where ethnic identity has been institutionalized, the social bonds that bound society together have been eroded and replaced with a very narrow ethnic identity. Since ethnic politics thinks in differences, it does not pay much attention to our common humanity and history. In his historic speech in Ghana, US-President Obama proclaims that “we all have many identities – of tribe and ethnicity ; of religion and nationality. But defining oneself in opposition to someone who belongs to a different tribe, or who worships a different prophet, has no place in the 21st century” (Obama 2009). In the Ethiopian context, despite the controversy about the making of modern Ethiopia and the injustices that were committed in the past, there have been strong cultural, historical and social ties among the various ethnic groups binding the society in its long history. Contrary to such historical ties, since regime change occurred in 1991, ethnic identity has suddenly become the normative identity on the basis of which the new state prefers to deal with its citizens in many spheres of life including politics, economy and election registration (Abbink 1997, p. 160). Such an approach has invented ethnic identity consciousness anew or, as Messay puts it, “ethnic identities that used to be weak are restructured” (Messay 2009). As Kymlicka noted, contrary to the traditional application of the principle of self-determination only to groups who clearly showed interest for such group rights, the Ethiopian federal system gives the right in blanket to every ethnic group, including to people who have not showed any interest in such rights or who have not developed any ethnic group identity consciousness, or who have no interest in expressing themselves in terms of ethnic identities (Kymlicka 2006, p. 56). Defining the political discourse solely in ethnic terms has also ignited conflicts and tensions within society. Due to the institutionalization of

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ethnicity, social relations have become more and more ethnic-oriented, the bias and prejudice of people towards ‘other’ ethnic groups is increasing and clear tensions are emerging from attempts by the elites of different ethnic groups to control political power and economic resources.8 In the last two decades, the ethnicization of the whole political discourse has also resulted in ethnic conflicts in different parts of the country. By a very conservative estimate, several thousand people were killed in inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia between 1991 and 2005 (International Crisis Group Report 2009). Ethnic politics has also increasingly become instrumental for ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize their respective groups for the purpose of controlling the local resources by playing the ‘nationality card’. Stifling of the democratization process is the other major challenge to Ethiopia’s ethnic federal experiment. The relevance of democracy to federal systems of government seems to be critical. Except in the case of socialist federations, whose downfall was attributable to a lack of democracy, federalism is a system of government that can only function in a genuine democratic context. According to Wheare: “It may be possible in theory to conceive a federal government in which general and regional governments are dictatorships and yet each remains strictly within its own sphere, but it is difficult to imagine such a federal government coming into existence in the realm of practical politics or continuing to exist or for any length of time. Dictatorship with its one party government and its denial of free elections is incompatible with the working of the federal principle. Federalism demands forms of government which have the characteristics usually associated with democracy or free government. There is wide variety in the forms which such government may take, but the main essentials are free election and a party system, with its guaranty of a responsible opposition.” (Wheare 1964, p. 48)

Different from scholarly opinions and experience of democratic federations, the Ethiopian federal system is pursued without any genuine democratic process. According to international human rights institutions, opposition groups and scholars, the regime is becoming increasingly authoritarian and the federal system is not properly functioning (International Crisis Group 2009; Human Rights Watch 2010). Recently, Freedom House has moved Ethiopia from a partially free status to ‘not free’ (Freedom House 2010). Particularly, the various measures taken by the regime since 2005 have further narrowed down the political space significantly. Ethiopia’s democratization process is generally characterized by extreme control, an atmosphere of fear 8 Aside from common conflicts over water and grazing land, during the 2005 general elections, winning or losing the election was associated with certain ethnic groups. Even the Public Prosecutor filed genocide charges against opposition leaders, claiming that they had attempted to commit genocide against the Tigrean ethnic group during the uprisings following the 2005 general elections.

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and mistrust, the lack of strong institutions, problems of protecting rights of citizens, the lack of legitimacy and the abuse of democratic values for propaganda purposes, leaving them devoid of any significant practical application. The undemocratic nature of the regime is mainly due to the fact that in the background stands the Stalinist model of federalism that fell apart with the disintegration of the former USSR and Yugoslavia. The hallmark of socialist federations is control of the regional governments through the mechanism of democratic centralism and the establishment of client parties. Since the EPRDF is a pro-Marxist party, it is led by the strong principle of democratic centralism, and every party apparatus at regional level has to enforce policies adopted by the central party organ. Formal intergovernmental relations are largely surpassed or ignored through the informal albeit powerful party power structures. As clearly highlighted by the Human Rights Watch report, “Local and national government officials from opposite ends of the country all seem to speak from the same script when it comes to the partisan administration of government services, whether regarding identification cards, teacher training, university entrance, or fertilizer and the safety net” (Human Right Watch 2010). The mechanism used to subdue regional governments in such federations is mainly through establishing regional political party’s clients obedient to the centre. The EPRDF has established its own client parties at a regional level that are directly and indirectly controlled and managed by the party power house in the centre. Largely, the party apparatus at the regional level does not represent the interests of the regional constituency since their existence is highly dependent on the will of party officials at the centre rather than having some form of political legitimacy from their respective constituency. Regional parties that claim to represent the rights of respective ethnic groups did not evolve in a regional political process. Due to a lack of genuine party structure at the regional level, the system is practically a de facto unitary state after two decades of federal experiment.

Conclusion and Recommendation Contrary to past experiences, the contemporary trend is now towards accommodating multicultural pluralism rather than attempting to stifle it. In light of such contemporary developments, one of the challenges in SubSaharan Africa is the absence of an appropriate system to address ethnic diversity. Believing that official recognition of ethnic diversity would foster divided loyalties and separatism, virtually all African states have avoided official recognition of ethnic diversity. On the other hand, scholars argue that in order to address challenges of ethnic diversity in Africa, constitution

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makers need to devise mechanisms and institutions that can best accommodate the interests of different ethnic groups cohabitating the same state in such a way that they allow integration of ethnically diverse citizens in a broad and inclusive national society that shares, represents or respects their ethnicity. Some African countries have courageously undertaken measures to accommodate cultural diversity through political institutions. One of the countries that have undertaken political reform to accommodate ethnic diversity is Ethiopia. Since 1991, Ethiopia is experimenting with an ethnic federal system as a mechanism to address the challenges related to ethnic diversity in the country. In 1995, the country officially adopted an ethnic federal system as a political settlement of the ethnic related conflicts in the past. The constitution addresses a wide range of issues dealing with the powers and duties of the federal and regional governments, including intergovernmental relations. The most striking aspect of the Ethiopian constitution is its complete departure from the past by making the transformation from a strongly centralized monarchical (later socialist) state to a highly decentralized federal state by institutionalizing ethnic identity as the organising principle of state. Ethnicity all of a sudden became the predominant explanation for many of the things that went wrong in society. Despite the fact that the measures undertaken by the Ethiopian regime to recognize minority rights are commendable, the process lacks political consensus and legitimacy and is devoid of a genuine democratization process, rendering the federal experiment fragile. To make the Ethiopian federal experiment a success, concrete measures towards political accommodation of various political groupings, the realization of genuine democracy and the establishment of efficient political institutions are crucial. Until such corrective measures are undertaken to make the Ethiopian federal experiment a sustainable project, other African countries need to take appropriate care when they attempt to formulate their political system in accordance with the Ethiopian model that is still on the crossroads. In light of the faultiness in addressing ethnic diversity in Ethiopia, there are a number of issues that need to be considered when the multicultural federal system is considered for adoption in other parts of Africa. As it has been indicated in the paper, the most important fault line of the Ethiopian ethnic federal arrangement is the absence of consensus about the mode of accommodation of ethnic diversity among the various political groups. Due to the lack of agreement on the existing federal structure in the country, the federal system lacks legitimacy among the various political parties. When other African countries engage in a system that provides autonomy to ethnoregional demands, the political discourse need to be formed through the discussion of the various political forces and other civil society groups. The other point that needs to be considered when addressing ethnic related demands is that due caution needs to be taken in the light of emphasizing

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ethnicity as a foundation for state structure. Since making ethnicity the fundamental basis for structuring the state invites ethnic polarization and conflict, other African countries need to consider other economic, social and geographic factors when structuring internal boundaries rather than entirely relying only on ethnic boundaries. The other most important factor that needs to be considered when accommodating ethnic diversity is the need for democratization of the African state. The attempt made by the Ethiopian regime to accommodate ethnic diversity without the corresponding process of democratization is a complete fiasco. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the process of accommodating ethnic diversity through processes of federalization is closely linked with the level of democratization of the system. In light of the significance of democratization processes in the process of accommodating ethnic diversity in Africa, there always has to be a commitment to democratization through the establishment of democratic institutions, freedom of association and through expressing and enhancing the role of civil society groups. The other most important perspective that needs to be considered when transplanting the ethnic federal system to the rest of Africa is avoiding the fault lines of adopting the former Soviet-style accommodation of rights. Since the model of ethnic federal arrangement that has been transplanted to Ethiopia has been devoid of an appropriate division of power between the central and regional governments ¢ due to control of the whole system by a single political force that resulted in the exclusion of other political forces ¢, following such an arrangement in order to address ethnic related demands in other parts of Africa probably exacerbates the tensions between the central government and minority groups.

References Abbink, J 1997, ‘Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ethiopia’, Journal of African law, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 159 – 174. Alemante, GS 2003, ‘Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa’, Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 28, pp. 51 – 107. Amorettti, U / Bermeo, N 2004, Federalism and Territorial Cleavages, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. Asefa, H 2010, Ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa: Myth and reality. Available at: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee06.htm [16 October 2013]. Auret, D 1990, A Decade of Development, Zimbabwe 1980 – 1990, Mambo Press, Gweru.

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Ghai, Y / Cottrell, J (eds) 2008, Creating the New Constitution: A Guide for Nepali Citizens, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm. Human Rights Watch 2010, Development without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia. Available at: http://www.hrw.org [17 October 2013]. International Crisis Group 2009, ‘Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents’, Africa Report, no. 153. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/ ~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/Ethiopia%20Ethnic%20Fe deralism%20and%20Its%20Discontents.ashx [12 October 2013]. Jalali Rand Lipset, SM 1992, ‘Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 107, no. 4, pp. 585 – 606. Karmis, D / Norman, W 2005, ‘The Revival of Federalism in Normative Political Theory’ in Theories of Federalism. A Reader, eds D Karmis / W Norman, Palgrave, New York, pp. 1 – 30. Kebede, M 2009, ‘In Search of Peace: Ethiopia’s Ethnic Conflicts and Resolution’, Ethiopian Review 10 June. Available at: http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/ 10016 [17 October 2013]. Kymlicka, W 1995, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford University Press, Oxford. – 2006, ‘Emerging Western Multinational Federalism: Are they Relevant for Africa?’ in Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, eds D Turton / J Currey, Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, pp. 32 – 64. – / Opalski, M 2001, Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Paul, CN 2000, ‘Ethnicity and the New Constitutional Orders of Ethiopia and Eritrea’ in Autonomy and Ethnicity : Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic Societies, ed Y Ghai, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 173 – 196. Spiro, N 2007, ‘Can Ethnic Federalism Prevent Recourse to Rebellion? A Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi Constitutional Structure’, Emory International Law Review, vol. 321, pp. 331 – 372. Wheare, KC 1964, Federal Government, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

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Helga Dickow

Chadian Identity Cleavages and their Markers The Competing, Overlapping or Cross-Cutting Pattern * of Ethnic and Religious Affiliation

Chad has never been a peaceful place. Tensions between the different regions in the country pre-date the colonial period. Shortly after independence from France in 1960 the young state was plunged into a lengthy civil war in which the front ran roughly between the Muslim north and the Christian/Animist south. While this north-south conflict is still a feature of contemporary Chadian politics, there are also tensions within the major ethnic groups. Another constantly stoking violent conflict are the ambitions of individual political leaders. Chad’s population is deeply divided along religious and ethnic lines: Muslims account for approximately half of the population, Christians for more than one third and adherents of traditional and other religions for about seven percent each. There are more than 200 ethnic and linguistic groups in a population estimated to range between 11 and 12 million people according to the 2009 census. At the end of 2004, a survey of attitudes and opinions on society, religion and politics was conducted for UNESCO in four cities in Chad.1 The results showed, among other things, the importance of ethnicity and religion in respondents’ self-assessments. To determine this more precisely, respondents were asked the following questions: “In any society each person belongs to a number of social groups at the same time. You are either a man or a woman; you have a job; you speak a language; you are (or are not) a member of a religious group, a community and a nationality ; you live in a village, town or city ; you have political views – and for each person each of these distinctions has a different significance.” “If somebody asks you what you are, how would you describe yourself in the first, second and third choice?”

For the first choice in their self-assessment, 43 % of the respondents defined themselves as Chadians, 21 % in terms of their ethnic group and 13 % in terms of their religious affiliation. The sequence changes for their second choice: * This paper revisits the author’s earlier explorations in Dickow 2005 and 2007. 1 The survey was conducted in the four cities of N’Djam¦na, Abeche, Sarh and Mongo (N = 1199). The results were published in Dickow 2005. I wish to thank Petra Bauerle for data processing and statistical advice.

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29 % define themselves in terms of ethnicity, 19 % in terms of religion and 11 % as Chadians. The sequence is the same for the third choice, whereby the percentage of those defining themselves in terms of religion is higher. In other words: national identity is the leading first choice by a wide margin, but is displaced by ethnicity and religious adherence in the second and third choices of self-assessment. Given the strength of ethnicity and religion as identification markers, the author decided to break down responses to four further statements or questions2 depending on the strength of the ethnic or religious affiliation of the respondents. Whereas two thirds of the respondents identify closely with their religion, a little less than three fifths identify with ethnicity. Are there differences between attitudes and opinions owing to identification with either ethnicity or religion? Although those who define themselves by ethnicity are not identical with those who do so by religion, their profiles overlap considerably. The proportion of respondents that identify themselves primarily by ethnicity or religion is well below average in N’Djam¦na, the capital, where Christians and Muslims have lived together for generations and have more contact than in the other three cities in the questionnaire, which are predominantly Muslim or Christian. Ethnic or religious identification is more widespread among Muslims than Christians. Whereas such identification increases with age, it decreases with the level of education. That said, respondents with high ethnic identification and those with high religious identification have very similar attitudes on economic, political and social questions, for example, on a “trust” scale (Dickow 2005, p. 61). Based on a cluster of questions on the topic of trust, an above-average proportion of people who expressed very high ethnic or religious identification expressed a very high level of trust in their fellow human beings. Asked to assess their own life in Chad in ten years’ time, an above-average proportion of both groups responded with “happy” or “very happy”. Given the minor differences between those who identify themselves largely in terms of ethnicity and those who identify themselves largely in terms of religion, it is sensible to treat the two groups as one. The particular circumstances obtaining in Chad support this approach. As a rule, in Chad ethnic affiliation determines religious affiliation. Traditionally, the ethnic groups in the north and the east are mainly 2 The responses broken down are those to the following statement: “People feel closer to some people than to others. For each of the following groups, please tell us whether or not you feel close to or trust them.” Interviewees could agree or disagree in respect of family, people with the same religion, friends, neighbours, people of the same language or ethnic group, people with the same living and working conditions, people from the same village, Muslim clerics, Christian clerics, people from the same residential district, and all Chadians. The third and fourth components in the identification variables is agreement with the following two questions respectively : “I feel very close to members of my religion, regardless of their level of education, wealth or political views” and “I feel very close to people who speak my language, regardless of their level of education, wealth or political views”.

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Arab Muslims, those in the south mainly African Christians with small exceptions such as the Peul or other groups that migrated from Western Africa. Conversion can take place in either direction, but is rare. Hence, the focus in the following will lie on the comparison between high-identification and low-identification respondents, regardless of their religious affiliation.3

Social Structure One third of the respondents show a low degree of identification with ethnicity and religion, while two thirds demonstrate a high degree. The figures for the four cities in which the questionnaire was conducted are as follows: Low identification High identification N’Djam¦na Sarh Mongo Ab¦ch¦ Average

42 75 75 73 67

58 25 25 27 33

Whereas in the three smaller cities the degree of ethno-religious identification is above average, in the capital N’Djam¦na it is well below average. The proximity of members of the same ethnicity and religion does not seem to play the crucial role in the big city that it does in the ethnically and religiously more homogeneous smaller cities.4 Looking at the members of the different ethnic groups, we find the following: self-identification by ethnicity is somewhat more pronounced among Muslim ethnic groups, whereas it is average or slightly below average among the ethnic groups in the south of the country. Identification by religious affiliation confirms this observation: Low identification High identification Muslims Catholics Other Christians5 Average

28 41 42 33

72 59 58 67

3 On account of intersection, the random sample is now N = 873. 4 In Mongo and Abeche more than 90 % of the respondents are Muslim (Dickow 2005 p. 53); 86 % of the inhabitants of Sarh are Sara, 63 % of the inhabitants of Mongo are Hadjarai (Dickow 2005, p. 52). 5 “Other Christians” includes Protestants, Baptists and adherents of free churches as well as evangelistic groups, whose popularity in Chad has been growing in recent years.

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There are differences between the religious groups: identification by religion is above-average among Muslims and below average among Catholics and other Christians. There is a close correlation between age and identification by religion and ethnicity : Identification is high among 83 % of respondents over the age of 50 – i. e., 16 % higher than average – and average or below in other age groups. This is not particularly surprising: as in most societies older people are more attached to tradition. By contrast, a higher level of education appears to promote detachment from religious or ethnic attributions: 40 % of the respondents in the highest education group agree that ethnicity or religion plays a major role in their identification, a full 27 % below the average; the second highest education group is still 10 % below the average. By contrast, among respondents with no formal education (72 %) and those who attended a Koran school (74 %) or completed only primary school (77 %), identification by ethnicity or religion is above average. Occupation also affects this bias. Identification is below average among white-collar workers such as civil servants, clerks and teachers, whose job requires a higher educational qualification, but also among casual labourers. At 80 %, housewives are well above average, as are manual workers and farmers (74 % each). This trend is confirmed by family income: the lower the income level is, the higher the degree of identification and the higher the income level, the lower the degree of identification. Does stronger or weaker identification with ethnicity and religion impact attitudes towards society, democracy and religion?

Fear of the Future, Trust, Caution and Powerlessness Psychosocial Factors and Attitudes towards the Economy and Society Apart from social variables such as gender, age, occupation, ethnicity, language, income and religion, personality factors also determine people’s perceptions of their environment, their society and its politics. In other sociocultural studies these factors have proved to be remarkably stable (Hanf 1990, p. 581). A joint examination of the personality and identification factors produces the following result: whereas there is little difference by level of identification in the responses to questions concerning fear of the future, trust in the immediate environment and social conservatism,6 there is a difference regarding resistance to change. To measure the last factor respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: 6 “One should be sure that something really works before taking a chance on it.”

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“If you start to change things, you usually make them worse.” Low identification High identification Agree Disagree Average

26 42 33

74 58 67

An above-average proportion of low-identification respondents (42 %) do not share the opinion that change usually makes things worse; by contrast, 74 % of high-identification respondents do. An above-average proportion of highidentification respondents appear to be traditionally conservative and expect the worst from change; a disproportionately high number of low-identification respondents do not agree with the statement. Accordingly, low identification goes hand in hand with greater acceptance of change. In keeping with this result, high-identification respondents often feel powerless and do not believe that they can influence the lives of their fellow human beings: “There is little a person like me can do to improve people’s lives.” Low identification High identification Agree Disagree Average

26 39 33

74 61 67

Almost three quarters of the high-identification respondents agreed with this statement, while more than two fifths of the low-identification respondents did not. Against this background the responses to the next statement are at first sight surprising: “Even ordinary people can make progress if they help one another.” Low identification High identification Agree Disagree Average

31 55 33

69 45 67

An above-average proportion of low-identification respondents, who previously had shown themselves to be considerably more open to innovation than high-identification respondents, do not think that ordinary people can help one another to get ahead. As people who do not see their own identity in terms of ethnic or religious affiliation they appear to lack the element of solidarity that is taken for granted among people with a strong sense of group cohesion.

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They obviously believe in their own achievements, as the responses to the following statement show: “No matter how much I try, I will never get the education and job that I really deserve.” Low identification High identification Agree Disagree Average

27 42 33

73 58 67

An above-average proportion of low-identification respondents feel that they are not losing out with regard to education and jobs. They appear to be more sanguine about opportunities, and are willing to grasp them. High identification appears to have a certain debilitating effect. Regarding attitudes to economics and society, there are no significant differences between low-identification and high-identification respondents. A majority in both groups thinks that the poor themselves are responsible for their situation, and that their children will achieve the same standard of living as themselves. This majority also tends to believe that social inequality has increased in the past two years (Dickow 2005, p. 64). However, the two groups do differ in their assessment of the most important social differences in Chad: “The most important differences in this country are between rich and poor, regardless of region.” Low identification High identification Agree Disagree Average

30 46 33

70 54 67

The proportion of high-identification respondents who regard differences between rich and poor, irrespective of ethnic origins, as important is slightly above average. By contrast, an above-average proportion of low-identification respondents do not see differences between rich and poor as a major problem. It is possible that they trust in their own ability and hence believe that overcoming differences in wealth and income is achievable in the foreseeable future. As mentioned above, in the Chad Study answers to different questions on the topic of trust7 were collated to create a scale of “trust”. Is there any correlation between ethnic and religious identification and trust? 7 See n. 2 above. However, the questions on trust in Muslim or Christian clerics were excluded on account of negative correlations. Moreover, their exclusion allows for the creation of a religionneutral scale.

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Low identification High identification No trust Little trust Average trust High trust Complete trust Average

96 82 39 19 6 33

4 18 61 81 94 67

In this instance, the behaviour of low-identification and of high-identification respondents is the exact reverse of each other. Low identification appears not to be conducive to trust in respondents’ environment, whether neighbours, family members or members of the same ethnic group or religious community. By contrast, high-identification respondents have above-average or even great trust in their environment. Whereas 94 % of those who express complete trust also have a strong ethnic and religious identification, 96 % of respondents with no trust are among those with low ethnic and religious identification. To summarise: respondents with a high level of identification express greater solidarity and greater trust, but are also warier of change. By contrast, low-identification respondents are less trusting of their environment, more willing to take risks and more open to change.

Religion, Ethnicity and Identity Is a high level of religious and ethnic identification also reflected in the degree of religiosity? Analogous to the trust scale, a religion index was also created using questions on the topic of religion in the Chad Study.8

8 The following statements and questions were used to construct the index: “I believe in a life after death, in which good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished.” yes; “I try to live my life according to the teachings of my religion.” yes; “Whatever people say, there are supernatural forces for good and evil that can help or harm me.” yes; “I am convinced that my religion is the only true one.” yes; “I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God.” no; “How often do you pray?” regularly ; “Do you attend services in your place of worship (mosque, church)?” yes, once a week. “Non-religious”: agreement with up to two items; “somewhat religious”: agreement with up to four items; “religious”: agreement with up to six items; “very religious”: agreement with all seven items.

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Helga Dickow Low identification High identification

Non-religious Somewhat religious Religious Very religious Average

35 53 69 79 67

65 47 31 21 33

The more religious a respondent is, the stronger the religious identification: it is above average among almost 70 % of religious respondents and almost 80 % of the very religious. Not surprisingly, the proportion of less religious people is disproportionately high among low-identification respondents, and twice the average among the non-religious (65 vs. 33 %). There is no difference between respondents on the question of mixed marriages across ethnic and religious boundaries. “It does not matter what people believe as long as they lead responsible lives and are good human beings.” Low identification High identification Agree Disagree Average

69 41 67

31 59 33

This statement is answered in the negative by a disproportionately large percentage of low-identification respondents. Is this a sign of intolerance towards religious attitudes or is the reason for rejection to be found in an unwillingness to take risks and have confidence in one’s own abilities, as discussed above? The following statement investigates the extent to which respondents think state and society should function in accordance with religious values: “Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of state and society.”

Agree Disagree Average

Low identification

High identification

30 46 33

70 54 67

High-identification respondents tend to agree with this statement, while almost half of low-identification respondents reject it. The result reflects Muslim and Christian ideas of state and society : strong identification coupled with agreement with this statement is above average among Muslims. According to its constitution, Chad is a secular country. So, do our results reveal fundamentalist tendencies among part of the population?

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Political Orientation and Attitudes to the Political Order President Idriss D¦by-Itno gained power in 1990 and forced his former ally Hissen Habr¦ into exile. In 2012 the International Court of Justice ruled that Senegal must put Habr¦ on trial for human rights abuses while in government. Under the constitution promulgated in April 1996 Chad is a presidential republic with a multiparty system. The president is head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Legislative power resides in the National Assembly. Executive powers are exercised by the Council of Ministers headed by a prime minister who in turn is appointed by the president. De facto, though, Chad is anything but a democracy. Constitution, multiparty system and elections serve to legitimise an authoritarian regime under the leadership of the Zaghawa ethnic minority group.9 The regime has survived several attempts to overthrow it – including by former comrades in arms and members of D¦by’s own family. The D¦by government is firmly in control of the country – not least thanks to the support of France and the arms purchased with the country’s oil income. Since 2003, Chad is an oil-producing country. Against this background, are there any differences in political orientation and attitudes towards the current situation? Asked about the most important political problem regarding the current government, there were no obvious differences between the two groups. Responses to questions about the diversity of opinions and interests produced the same result. The following question on satisfaction with the government and its policies reveal an interesting picture: “In general I think that our government is doing the right thing.” Low identification High identification Agree Disagree Average

21 40 33

79 60 67

High-identification respondents have an above-average degree of trust in the government. By contrast, an above-average proportion of low-identification respondents are of the opinion that the government is leading the country in the wrong direction.

9 “Deby is the type of African potentate who, to judge by his words, should be celebrated as a guardian of democracy but, to judge by his deeds, should be put on trial” (Scheen 2006, p. 6).

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Responses to a question on party preference paint an even clearer picture:10 Low identification High identification MPS FAR URD PLD Average

21 40 40 46 33

79 60 60 54 67

Support for the governing MPS (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut) of President D¦by is well above average among high-identification respondents – just under 80 %. Low-identification respondents are disproportionately often supporters of the PLD (Parti pour les Libert¦s et le D¦veloppement) at 46 % and the FAR (F¦d¦ration, Action pour la R¦publique) and the URD (Union pour le Renouveau et la D¦mocratie) at 40 % each. Under its former general-secretary Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh the PLD was one of the leading opposition parties, drawing its support primarily from Muslims in the north of the country. Ibni Oumar, who was arrested and disappeared in 2008 during the most serious anti-government rebellion, came from Biltine and was spokesman of the association of opposition parties (Coordination des parties politiques pour la d¦fense de la Constitution); he held a number of ministerial posts under Habr¦ and D¦by up until 1991. The leader of the FAR is Yorongar Ngarlejy, D¦by’s main opponent in the 2001 elections. Yorongar comes from a place not far from Doba in the province of Logone Oriental. He gained national and international recognition for his open criticism of the government and the oil project, his fight against the destruction of the environment and for a more equitable distribution of oil profits. Because of his criticism, Yorongar has been repeatedly detained without trial for lengthy periods. The URD was founded by Abdelwader Kamougu¦, a former army officer and leader of autonomous region of southern Chad (Comit¦ Permanent du Sud). He played a key role in the coup d’¦tat that overthrew Ngarta Tombalbaye, Chad’s first post-independence president, in 1975. He stood as a candidate in the 1996 presidential election and was president of the National Assembly from 1997 to 2003. Kamougu¦ died suddenly during the 2011 election campaign. The Chad Study shows that the ethnicity of political leaders appears to influence voting behaviour more strongly than any other social variable. Members of Muslim ethnic groups tend to vote for either President D¦by or his – now missing – political opponent Ibni Oumar ; members of Christian ethnic groups tend to vote for party leaders from the south (Dickow 2005, p. 99). This is underscored by the following: a disproportionate number of respondents for whom ethnic and religious identification is not particularly important vote for opposition parties. The politician with the greatest support in this group is 10 Only the four most frequently mentioned parties are listed.

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Ibni Oumar, a Muslim. It seems that the most serious opposition is to be found in this group of people. For me this appears to be the most important insight: political opposition is drawn mainly from among those who do not identify themselves primarily in terms of religion and ethnicity. As shown in the Chad Study, the majority of interviewed Chadians are democrats. There are no significant differences between low-identification and high-identification respondents in respect of the most important determinants of democratic attitudes, such as support for a strong civil society, the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature, freedom of the press, decentralisation of power, a multiparty system, a grand coalition, and free competition. This is not particularly surprising as the Chad Study established that responses to an astonishing high number of these questions were not significant across the range of social variables (Dickow 2005, pp. 111). Responses to questions on the independence of the courts and the president’s membership of the largest ethnic group showed a minor level of significance. Accordingly, there are virtually no differences in respect of the democratic attitudes of respondents who define themselves primarily in terms of ethnicity and religion and those who do not. If that is the case, how do people express their criticism of the government and political opponents? Can a high degree of identification with ethnicity and religion help to discourage violence? Among people who are open to violence against others, no matter who, the level of identification is above average (88 %; average: 67 %), as it also is among those who agree with boycotting businesses and with damaging property of political opponents at 78 % and 77 %, respectively. Among those who reject peaceful means of solving conflicts, 79 % identify strongly with ethnicity and religion. Thus, high identification does not necessarily go hand in hand with peaceful resolution of conflict; on the contrary, many persons in this group exhibit militant tendencies, while respondents with a low degree of ethnic or religious identification prefer peaceful protest.

Differences and Coexistence How do low and high-identification respondents assess the opportunities, problems and possibilities of coexistence between different groups? The answers to this question are revealing inasmuch as Chad’s history to date has not been particularly happy : torn by pre-colonial conflicts, patched together by a colonial power that applied different standards to the north and south of the country and treated the two parts correspondingly, a few years of postindependence democracy, followed by a botched attempt by the south to

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impose nation-building which triggered years of civil war that ultimately ended in unification under northern forces. “Think about the problems and serious conflicts in our society :” “I fear that peace and cooperation between the different groups may have become impossible.” or : “In spite of everything that has happened, peace and cooperation between the different groups can still be achieved.” Low identification High identification Peace and cooperation impossible Peace and cooperation possible Average

49 31 33

51 69 67

Unsurprisingly, fears that peace and cooperation have become impossible are above-average among low-identification respondents. This reveals the extent to which the wounds of civil war are still open and these respondents’ level of mistrust in the Muslim government: the majority of those who discount the possibility of peace and cooperation are Sara from the south of the country, for whom the experience of losing power to northern forces is very real. “Very different groups can live together in the same country, accept one another and respect one another’s rights.” Low identification High identification Agree Disagree Average

31 49 33

69 51 67

Low-identification respondents do not believe that mutual acceptance will come easily to groups that are very different. These results, too, reveal the impact of the civil war, this time on the Hadjarai, a Muslim group in the centre of the country, which bore the brunt of Tombalbaye’s excesses in the 1960s. A disproportionate number of them are among the 49 %. The above-average proportion rejecting mutual respect for the different groups in a country could be an indication of radical attitudes. Lowidentification respondents appear to prefer policies that promote harmony. Or – which brings us back to the Christian Sara in the south and the Muslim Hadjarai in the centre – is it because they already have experience of nonrecognition of their rights? The responses to the following statement could be interpreted in this way : “A country with groups with different traditions is wealthier and more interesting for it.”

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Agree Disagree Average

Low identification

High identification

31 47 33

69 53 67

45

Whereas low-identification respondents tend to reject group diversity, highidentification respondents believe that group diversity can enrich a country and make it more interesting. Does the first group reject group diversity because they feel that they do not belong to any group or because they prefer a society with fewer cleavages? “Whether we like it or not: when different language or religious groups live together in the same country, they must either dominate or be dominated.”

Agree Disagree Average

Low identification

High identification

29 39 33

71 61 67

Despite positive attitudes towards religious and cultural diversity in the country, people with a pronounced ethnic or religious identity fear being dominated by others. It is probably this fear that underlies people’s willingness to compromise, as shown by the responses to the following statement: “Given the strength of the different groups in our society, it is necessary to search for compromise and come to some agreement.”

Agree Disagree Average

Low identification

High identification

29 45 33

71 55 67

In particular high-identification respondents are more open to compromise. It is very likely that this attitude is coloured by the experience of living in a multiethnic state and – after 30 years of civil war – having to make compromises. To summarise: respondents who do not have a strong ethnic or religious identity feel less powerless, are more willing to take risks and more likely to support innovation and political change. Respondents who do identify strongly with an ethnicity or religion, on the other hand, can, in spite of militant tendencies, help to promote compromise in a multi-ethnic and multireligious country. The religious leaders in the country seem to confirm such tendencies in their communities. The Catholic Archbishop of N’Djam¦na, Mathias Ngarteri, the general secretary of the Protestant churches,

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Potiphar Souina, and the imam of the Great Mosque of N’Djam¦na and president of the Council for Islamic Affairs in Chad, Cheick Hassan Abakar are working together for peace and reconciliation (Dickow 2012, p. 13). In view of the complexity of conflicts between radical Islamist groups and moderate governments in the Sahel it is more than sensible to seek dialogue with fervently religious persons and find common ground for compromise before they turn to more radical movements.

References Dickow, H 2005, Democrats without Democracy? Attitudes and Opinions on Society, Religion and Politics in Chad. Lettres de Byblos, vol. 11, Byblos: UNESCO, ICHS. – 2007, ‘Ethnisch-religiöse Identifikation und politisches Bewusstsein. Einstellungen und Meinungen im Tschad’ in Kulturen und Konflikte im Vergleich. Comparing Cultures and Conflicts. Festschrift für Theodor Hanf, eds P Molt / H Dickow, Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp. 549 – 561. – 2012, ‘Die Hoffnung auf den arabischen Frühling versandete in der Sahara. Vom Überleben im Tschad’, Forum Weltkirche, vol. 1, pp. 8 – 13. Hanf, T 1990, Koexistenz im Krieg. Staatszerfall und Entstehen einer Nation im Libanon, Nomos, Baden-Baden. Scheen, T 2006, ‘Deby in Bedrängnis. Der Konflikt um den Präsidenten des Tschads hat auch den Sudan erreicht’, FAZ, 17. January, p. 6.

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Willem Fourie

From Sullivan to King MNCs and Democratisation in South Africa

Introduction The influence of multinational corporations (MNCs) in developing contexts is by no means unproblematic. Mathias Koenig-Archibugi identifies the possibility of “accountability gaps” between MNCs and political actors, particularly those operative in developing contexts (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). Collusion between government officials and MNCs, for example, makes it possible for these enterprises to distort the outcome of political processes (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, p. 239). Even implicitly supporting authoritarian regimes by refraining from meaningful criticism can maintain repressive and unaccountable political structures. By leveraging their financial power, MNCs may also be in a position to initiate regulatory competition between different (developing) countries, in this way ensuring regulatory environments with deficient accountability structures (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, pp. 241 – 242). In the same vein Koenig-Archibugi argues that the institutional weaknesses of failing states can be used to mislead the respective societies, for example, by engaging in dangerous marketing practices (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, p. 244). The thesis that MNCs often have a problematic influence in developing – or democratising – contexts is supported by a number of studies. A recent study on MNCs in Nigeria Singh shows, for example, that MNCs in Nigeria have an interest in sustaining authoritarianism, in effect impacting negatively on processes of democratisation (Singh 2011). He argues, viewing Nigeria in terms of rentier state theory, that MNCs “prevent exogenous economic shocks” from destabilising an – in his view – already authoritarian regime (Singh 2011, pp. 219 – 220). From a different perspective, and indeed in a different context, Chen shows how enabling the activities of MNCs within the framework of Chinese capitalism cannot be expected necessarily to support processes of democratisation (Chen 2002). Many other examples can also be cited. Despite some evidence to the contrary, this contribution attempts to investigate the other side of the phenomenon of MNCs in democratising countries, i. e. whether there exists evidence of MNCs actually supporting or even promoting processes of democratisation. In this essay it is postulated that evidence also exists of MNCs playing a constructive role in processes of democratisation. The argument will be limited by investigating only two

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examples in a particular context, namely South Africa. The Sullivan Principles (SPs) and the Third King Report on Corporate Governance (King III) are analyzed as examples of how a number of MNCs have been willing to contribute to the democratisation of South Africa. By investigating this dimension of MNCs’ influence in South Africa it is by no means implied that their impact has been altogether positive. However, for the sake of conceptual clarity and the potential use of the insight that MNCs at times are willing and able to contribute to processes of democratisation I shall focus on the more positive dimension of MNCs’ influence in South Africa. Methodologically, the argument will be presented from a macro-ethical perspective. In order to understand what exactly macro-ethics is the first section will describe basic tenets. In the second section, the SPs are investigated and characterised as a first example of the contribution of MNCs to democratisation. As a second example, King III will be investigated in the third section. The presentation ends with some preliminary conclusions.

What is Macro-Ethics? Possibly the most significant impetus for macro-ethical reflection in recent times can be found in religious communities, and particularly within the social teaching of Roman Catholicism (Barrera 1999, p. 287). In Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum, promulgated in 1891, the issue of a just society is addressed in order to search for an “opportune remedy” for “the misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working class” (Pope Leo XIII 1940, Article 3). Roman Catholic macro-ethical reflection was soon followed by similar endeavours in Protestantism. The situation of the poor working class at the end of the nineteenth century, which gave rise to Roman Catholic social teaching, is generally viewed as the genesis also of Protestant social ethics (Jäger 1981, p. 20). Industrialisation significantly contributed to changes in societal and personal relations, which created the need for new forms of ethical reflection. Some Protestant theologians, especially those with socialist convictions, responded to the challenge. Some of the best known are Leonhard Ragaz and Hermann Kutter, both from Switzerland (Jäger 1981, p. 19). Despite its decidedly religious roots, macro-ethical perspectives are presently often associated with reflection on macro-economical themes. In his classic article, written in 1987, DeGeorge reminds us that the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church in the 1870s may indeed be viewed as the first source of modern-day business ethics (DeGeorge 1987, p. 201). DeGeorge proceeds, however, by identifying a number of stages that eventually lead to

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both, the emancipation from its religious roots and the development of a macro-ethical perspective. At least three characteristics of a macro-ethical perspective are useful for this presentation. Firstly, systematic reflection on the influence of systems, institutions and societal processes seems possible and fundamentally different from reflection on the influence of individuals. Secondly, the diversity of sources and practitioners seem to confirm that macro-ethics – should one be able to use the term – is an eclectic endeavour. Insights from theology, economics, sociology and political science are integrated into a macro-ethical argument. Thirdly, macro-ethical reflection has a decidedly collaborative character. The growing complexity and differentiation of democratic societies leads to an increasing demand for collaboration, including dialogue and discussion about the argument in this presentation. Both appreciating and critiquing the influence of MNCs in developing contexts requires collaborative reflection not simply on the actions of individuals but also on the influence of institutions and systems. In the following section this perspective will be used to reflect on a first example of a positive connection between MNCs and democratisation in SA, namely the Sullivan principles.

The Sullivan Principles: Supporting Democratisation The Reverend Leon Sullivan – a minister of the Zion Baptist Church and a board-member of General Motors – developed the SPs in 1971 (Bernasek / Porter 1997). The SPs expressed the convergence of at least three developments in the 1970s, namely pressure from American society to make MNCs more responsible towards the communities in which they operate; the growing importance of socially responsible investment; and the growing international pressure on the South African government to change its political system (Seidman 2003, p. 386). The SPs were meant to assist American MNCs operative in South Africa in doing business ethically in an unethical political system. In addition, adherence to the principles allowed these MNCs to continue their South African operations with some degree of legitimacy. The SPs were based on the conviction that it should be possible for American MNCs to subvert the apartheid political system without overtly contravening apartheid legislation (Seidman 2003, pp. 389 – 390). The six principles are: 1. Non-segregation of the races, in all eating, comfort, and work facilities. 2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.

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3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time. 4. Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other nonwhites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs. 5. Increasing the number of blacks and other nonwhites in management and supervisory positions. 6. Improving the quality of life for blacks and other non-whites outside the work environment, in areas like housing, transportation, schools, recreation, and health facilities. The SPs provided MNCs with the opportunity to support democratisation by setting examples of practices that transcended the apartheid political system. Fair employment, equal pay for equal work, social non-segregation and addressing the educational and social possibilities of black people may not have been against the law, but were certainly not common business practices. Gradually, a system developed that would monitor MNCs’ compliance to the SPs. Rev. Sullivan hired Arthur D. Little, Inc. to design a “reporting system and grading procedure” (Weedon 1986, pp. 56 – 57). As the political situation changed, the American MNCs’ support for democratisation in South African was extended. The Soweto Uprising on the 16th of June 1976 provided an important turning point (Seidman 2003, p. 391). The American anti-apartheid movement reacted strongly to the increased brutality of the apartheid system, which lead to a number of protests and new forms of sanctions. Eventually the changing political situation in South Africa and the pressure from American society led to the adoption of a seventh SP in 1984, namely : 7. Working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, economic, and political justice. In 1985 the SPs, in their expanded form, became part of US-President Reagan’s “Executive Order” on sanctions against South Africa, to the extent that the US only supported those MNCs that complied with the SPs (Bernasek / Porter 1997, p. 176). This approach was of course by no means without controversy. Many antiapartheid activists viewed this as an inadequate response to apartheid. A significant grouping regarded total disengagement as the only acceptable response, as this would have both served as strong symbolic statement and harmed the South African economy and effectively the apartheid government (Bernasek / Porter 1997, p. 175). The arguments of the signatories of the SPs went in another direction. They argued that continued presence in South Africa could improve the economic and social conditions of so-called “nonwhite South Africans” and that the SPs could help American MNCs in setting an example to local corporations (Bernasek / Porter 1997, p. 175).

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Despite some serious inadequacies, the SPs nonetheless signify a constructive relationship between MNCs and processes of democratisation. In my views, this relationship can be described as an example of MNCs in support of democratisation, as the signatories of the SPs chose to subvert the apartheid system by working through institutions and frameworks set by external actors (Seidman 2003, p. 392). In the following section, we will investigate a further and more recent expression of the role of MNCs in the consolidation of the South African democracy, namely King III. It will be argued that King III expresses MNCs willingness to do more than simply supporting democratisation processes.

King III: Promoting Democratisation The King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa was formed by the Institute of Directors of Southern Africa in 1992 to investigate the role of MNCs in the new South African political dispensation, and was chaired by former judge Mervin E. King. This Committee wrote the first King Report in 1994 and it set an internationally recognised industry standard for comprehensive board practice. All three King reports are expressly written to be in line with global trends, such as those set by the United Nations’ Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative’s G3–guidelines and the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance, whilst at the same time augmenting these trends with South African realities (Institute of Directors 2009, pp. 9 – 10). King III specifically identifies “social transformation” and “redress from apartheid” as South African realities that should be integrated in South African codes of governance (Institute of Directors 2009, p. 12). King III is based on three premises. Its first premise is that “[g]ood governance is essentially about effective leadership” and that the board has the responsibility to enact the ethical values of fairness, such as accountability, responsibility and transparency in its governance (Institute of Directors 2009, p. 9). King III’s second premise is that “[s]ustainability is the primary moral and economic imperative of the 21st century” (Institute of Directors 2009, p. 9). For the argument of this presentation, its third premise is of particular interest. This premise acknowledges that “[c]orporate citizenship is central to the business enterprise” (Institute of Directors 2009, p. 9). According to King III the company is “integral to society” and should be considered “as much a citizen of a country as is a natural person who has citizenship” (Institute of Directors 2009, p. 9). The company – and MNCs in particular – therefore has responsibilities towards society, and not simply towards its shareholders. King III uses the

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“inclusive stakeholder approach” instead of the “enlightened shareholder approach” (Institute of Directors 2009, p. 9). This means that the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders do not simply have instrumental value in considering the interests of shareholders, but that these legitimate interests and expectations influence the (long-term) well-being of the company directly and should therefore be taken seriously (Institute of Directors 2009, p. 11). At least three of King III’s characteristics make the report of particular interest to the argument presented in this essay. Firstly, the report is initiated and written from within the ranks of businesses and mostly MNCs. The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – the authors of the report – is a private company owned by its members, of which the vast majority are directors of South African companies.1 King III therefore originates from within business and differs fundamentally from codes imposed from the outside. Secondly, by recognising that companies – and this includes MNCs – are also citizens with freedoms granted by society and responsibilities towards society, King III unambiguously affirms democracy and places business within this framework. Thirdly, King III suggests practices that exceed compliance to the legislation. King III is aimed at enabling companies to fulfil their role as responsible citizens by strengthening legitimate political institutions and by taking into account legitimate interests of all their stakeholders. In distinction to the SPs it is therefore possible to categorise King III as enabling MNCs not simply to support democratisation but indeed to promote democratisation. Its role in the promotion of democratisation becomes even clearer when one considers the influence the King reports have had on South African legislation. Although the King Reports opt for the “apply or explain” approach, they have led to practices that were later on taken up in law, whilst at the same time being significantly influenced by changes in the law. After the publication of King I in 1994, eight important pieces of legislation on corporate governance and related matters were introduced by the South African Parliament, with the influence of King I clear in virtually all of these acts (Kakabadse / Korac-Kakabadse 2002, pp. 307 – 308). King II again influenced subsequent laws relating to business, whereas the Companies’ Act of 2008 again played a role in the writing of King III (Institute of Directors 2009, p. 4).

1 See, for example, the internet platform of the the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA), a non-profit organisation that is unique in that it represents directors, professionals, business leaders and those charged with governance duties in their individual capacities in southern. Available at: Africa.http://www.iodsa.co.za/ [30. September 2013].

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Concluding Remarks One basic but potentially meaningful point is hopefully clear : two prominent examples from both before and after South Africa’s political transition in 1994 prove that MNCs have been willing to contribute to processes of democratisation – even in most cases in order to protect the “bottom line”. In the one instance it took the form of support of processes initiated from outside South Africa, and in the other instance it took the form of active promotion of democracy from within business itself. This conclusion is of course preliminary as more work needs to be done on the constructive as well as destructive influence of MNCs in South Africa and other developing contexts. As was intimated in the introduction, at present many arguments for destructive presence in democratising contexts are being made. Increasingly, however, arguments are also being made for the potential and in some cases real constructive influence of MNCs in democratising contexts. These scholars argue that – in addition to (often legislated) concerns for corporate social responsibility – many MNCs view stronger democracies as being more conducive to the bottom line than low-intensity democracies. Youngs (2004) cites seven reasons why this increasingly seems to be the case. Firstly, “arbitrary and unpredictable decision-making” in low-intensity democracies implies significant risks to a business enterprise (Youngs 2004, p. 132). Secondly, “patronage-based distributional coalitions” inevitably leads to stagnant – and even unsustainable – societal relations and consequently business practices (Youngs 2004, p. 133). Thirdly, lowintensity democracy often goes hand in hand with “aggressive nationalism”, aimed at compensating for the absence of “internally-derived democratic legitimacy”, which creates an unstable environment for doing business (Youngs 2004, p. 133). Fourthly, a “good quality democratic process” is needed in order to ensure sustainable market reforms (Youngs 2004, p. 134). Fifthly, forced “joint ventures with local partners” can have a negative impact on business, (Youngs 2004, p. 134) as is the case, sixthly, with the lack of technical capacities in many low-intensity democracies. Finally, businesses increasingly realise that the “repression of human rights” is the “primary cause of internal conflict”, which again impacts negatively on business practices (Youngs 2004, p. 135). It is clear, however, that a great deal of research is still required to come to a differentiated understanding of the role of MNCs in democratising contexts. It may prove meaningful, for example, to attempt to measure the influence of MNCs’ support and promotion of processes of democratisation. Or one should consider the reasons why MNCs choice to support and promote democratisation may prove meaningful. In this paper the SPs and King III were employed for another purpose, namely : simply showing that important

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examples exist of MNCs committing themselves to supporting and promoting democracy in a developing context.

References Barrera, A 1999, ‘The Evolution of Social Ethics: Using Economic History to Understand Economic Ethics’, Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 27, pp. 285 – 304. Bernasek, A / Porter, RC 1997, ‘Private Pressure for Social Change in South Africa: The Impact of the Sullivan Principles’, Review of Social Economy LV, vol. 2, pp. 172 – 193. Chen, A 2002, ‘Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117, no. 3, pp. 401 – 422. De George, RT 1987, ‘The Status of Business Ethics: Past and Future’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 6, pp. 201 – 211. Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 2009, Third King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa, Johannesburg, pp. 9 – 10. J•ger, A 1981, ‘Sozialethik als Schwerpunkt theologischer Ethik’, in Gerechtigkeit. Themen der Sozialethik, eds A Wildermuth / A Jäger, Tübingen, pp. 17 – 30. Kakabadse, A / Korac-Kakabadse, N 2002, ‘Corporate Governance in South Africa: Evaluation of the King II Report (Draft)’, Journal of Change Management, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 305 – 316. Koenig-Archibugi, M 2004, ‘Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability’, Government and Opposition, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 234 – 259. Pope Leo XIII 1940, Rerum novarum, encyclical letter of Pope Leo XIII on capital and labor, Article 3. Available at: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encycli cals/documents/ hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html [20 September 2013]. Seidman, GW 2003, ‘Monitoring Multinationals: Lessons from the Anti-Apartheid Era’, Politics / Society, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 381 – 406. Singh, N 2011, ‘Nigeria’s Elusive Quest for Democracy : Multinational Corporations and Sustenance of Authoritarianism’ African and Asian Studies, vol. 10, pp. 209 – 233. Weedon, DR 1986, ‘The Evolution of the Sullivan Principle of Compliance’, Business and Society Review, vol. 57, pp. 56 – 60. Youngs, R 2004, ‘Democracy and the multinationals’, Democratization, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 127 – 147.

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Reconciliation and Reconstruction among Churches and Faith-Based Organisations in Zimbabwe

In this article, we explore the relationship between religion, reconciliation and reconstruction in contemporary Zimbabwe. We outline the political, economic, and social crises in the country, and then develop a context-specific definition of reconciliation for Zimbabwe. We argue that reconciliation should focus both on rebuilding relationships and on transforming social structures, but we recognise that many conceptions of reconciliation emphasise the former at the expense of the latter. Therefore we advocate incorporating the term reconstruction as a companion to reconciliation, seeing this as an effective way to encourage the intentional reform of social structures. With this established, we examine the role of religious actors in reconciliation and reconstruction. We argue that in the context of an authoritarian and repressive state like Zimbabwe, from the religious field, it is religious ‘non-conformists’ – actors on the margins of established churches and faith-based organisations – who are best-placed to agitate for transformative change.1 This is due in large part to their social structural position, which allows them more freedom and flexibility to challenge both the state and the ‘mainline’ or ‘mainstream’ churches and religious organisations. We trace the actions of Zimbabwe’s religious non-conformists from the War of Independence to the present period, with a particular focus on three selected non-conformist organisations: the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA), Churches in Manicaland (CiM) and Grace to Heal (GtH). Noting that these organisations differ in their methods and approaches, we argue that there is a spectrum of religious nonconformism, ranging from radical/active to moderate to passive to latent. We conclude that religious actors can be most effective when non-conformist organisations at various points on the spectrum form networks of cooperation, allowing some organisations to take bold political stands while other sympathetic organisations engage in behind-the-scenes work. The religious contribution to reconciliation and reconstruction demands going beyond traditional approaches such as providing reactive care to victims of violence or formulating statements castigating violence – though these are not to be entirely discounted – and adopting multi-faceted approaches that capitalise on

1 The concept of religious ‘non-conformism’ underpins Tarusarira’s doctoral research at the University of Leipzig.

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the religious (and secular) resources of a variety of groups at different levels of society.

Why Reconciliation and Reconstruction? There is wide-ranging debate in the academic literature about how to define reconciliation.2 Internationally, there is some general agreement that reconciliation can occur at different levels (individual, between groups, on national or international levels), that it involves the rebuilding of relationships and trust, and that it is made more difficult if the socio-political conditions that contributed to violence are not reformed. There is disagreement over whether or not reconciliation must involve public truth-telling, acts of forgiveness, official acknowledgement of past atrocities, and so on (Murphy 2010; Philpott 2010). Others note the Christian connotations of the term and ask whether it is therefore appropriate to talk in terms of reconciliation in modern, secular states in which there is ostensibly separation between religion and politics. In Zimbabwe, the language of reconciliation has a history. The speech made by the current president, Robert Mugabe, on the eve of Zimbabwean independence in 1980, has often been called the ‘hand of reconciliation’ speech.3 One of its most celebrated sections is this: “If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should seek to revive the wounds and grievances of the past? The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten. If ever we look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, namely that oppression and racism are inequities that must never again find scope in our political and social system. It could never be a correct justification that because whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have power.” (Mugabe 1980)

Mugabe spoke about reconciliation between blacks and whites, but Zimbabwe’s political divisions were not then – and are not now – simply black and white. There had been tensions between Zimbabwe’s two largest ethnic groups, Shona and Ndebele, before the arrival of white settlers in the middle of the 19th century, which continued even during the War of Independence. In 1982, Mugabe released a special unit of North Korean-trained Shona soldiers, 2 This complication has been acknowledged by many scholars, including Du Toit 2003, p. 295; Vicencio 2004, p. 5; Lederach 1997, pp. 24 – 31; Stevens 2004, p. 29. 3 Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 after a war which pitted guerrilla groups against the forces of the white-run Rhodesian state, which had itself issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom in 1965.

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the Five Brigade, in the Ndebele homeland, Matabeleland. Over several years, it is estimated that 20,000 Ndebele were murdered and many more were tortured and raped in events that are known as Gukurahundi, which means ‘the first rains of the wet season’ and implies the washing away of all that is undesirable (Godwin 1996). This violence can be interpreted as both ethnic and politically motivated, as it is thought that Mugabe perceived his main political challenge coming from Matabeleland (Weitzer 1990; Muzondidya 2009). Though Mugabe denied the scale of the violence, killings were documented by the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Legal Resources Foundation (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation 1997). Gukurahundi was just the beginning of Mugabe’s betrayal of the vision for reconciliation he outlined in his independence speech. Post-independence, the government did not initiate any programmes to promote reconciliation, Gukurahundi was denied, and whites largely kept their heads down rather than engaging in politics (Alexander 2005). Among the more immediate items on the government’s agenda was land reform. The settlement reached to end the war included provisions for a ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ land reform programme, which was to be financially backed by the British government (Chigara 2002). This land reform programme was not as far-reaching as many Zimbabweans had hoped it would be, with fewer than 20,000 families resettled by the early 1990s – and most of these on poor land (Schleicher 2012). Most of the commercial farms continued to be run by whites, and continued to be profitable, producing food, tobacco and flowers for internal consumption and export. In 1992, the government passed a Land Acquisition Act, removing the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ provision. The government could now purchase land compulsorily (though fair compensation was promised) and redistribute it as it saw fit. The way this reform was carried out rankled farm owners, many of whom thought the government was implementing the programme unfairly, and also alienated the British Government, which stopped providing funds for land reform in 1996 (Schleicher 2012). In addition to this, in 1991 the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed a series of structural adjustment programmes. These were hugely unpopular, as they were seen to lead to a slashing of services and an increase in unemployment (Bond / Manyana 2002). By the late 1990s, economic problems had hit home for many Zimbabweans, with the result that Mugabe’s party, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), was under increasing pressure to solve them. At the same time, this party had been working hard to consolidate its political power, swallowing up its main political rival, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, in 1987 (Weitzer 1990) and enacting legislation to increase the powers of President Mugabe, including eliminating the office of the prime minister and therefore concentrating power in one person – the president. This rise in interest in

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regime security meant a decline in the human security of Zimbabwean citizens (Ganiel 2012). The threat to human security led to the disenchantment of civil society, which interpreted the developing crisis in terms of governance: for them, the government had been founded on a faulty constitution which the regime invoked when it served their interests. Hence, a coalition of civil society called the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) was formed to initiate the crafting of a new constitution. The ZANU-PF regime decided to counter this initiative by forming a similar initiative. In 2000, it called a referendum on changing the constitution, which would have given Mugabe even more powers. When the electorate rejected the constitutional changes, Mugabe said that he would accept the result. But within days he began to implement a new fasttrack land reform programme. This programme came to become known as the farm ‘invasions’ (jambanja) as groups of young men were released into the countryside to seize white-run farms or to squat on the land, intimidating the farmers until they left. The farm invasions were accompanied by a wave of anti-white rhetoric and violence (some farmers were murdered), which the security forces largely ignored. Many farms were then left vacant or settled by people who did not have the training to operate them as commercial enterprises (Mhofu 2012). In late 2011, the President of the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe, Deon Theron, claimed that the farm invasions had cost Zimbabwe £7 billion in lost production over the past decade, and that Mugabe and his family now owned 39 formerly white-run farms. The UN added that the country would need half a billion dollars in humanitarian aid in 2012 (Hunt 2012). The violence of Gukurahundi and the farm invasions are part of a wider pattern of state violence. This pattern became even more obvious around the year 2000, when increasing political ferment gave rise to a new political party and a surge in civil society activism. In 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which became a political party, was birthed from the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA)4 which was comprised of civic organisations, professional organisations, churches, trade unions, student organisations, human rights groups, and other groups and individuals including intellectuals and journalists. Initially it was set up to devise ways for revising the constitution, which likely would have included limiting the powers of the president. The MDC, now split into three factions, draws most of its support from urban areas and Matabeleland. The state interpreted this activism as a threat to its power, and violence and intimidation increased, especially around elections in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008. The leader of MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai, was reportedly subjected to assassination attempts (Hudleston 2005; Godwin 2010). After the 2005 elections, urban areas which had supported the MDC were subjected to what was called Operation Murambatsvina, or ‘drive out the 4 As of 28 September 2013, the NCA transformed itself into a political party.

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trash.’ People’s homes and businesses were destroyed with bulldozers and urban dwellers left destitute were told to go back to the rural homelands. In 2008, the first round of the presidential election produced a situation in which there should have been a run-off between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. But Tsvangirai did not contest the run-off, refusing to subject his supporters to further violence. ZANU-PF called for elections in 2012, but these were later held in 2013, with the 89–year-old Mugabe, who had said that the unity government had ‘overstayed its welcome,’ winning again. Most of the violence has been perpetrated by people acting on behalf of the state, while opposition parties and groups have remained largely non-violent, even in the face of torture and intimidation. The human effects of the violence and economic collapse have been devastating. For example, there has been widespread emigration of skilled workers such as doctors, nurses and teachers.5 Independent media have been harassed and driven underground. Unemployment was calculated at 80 % in 2005 and 95 % in 2009 (CIA World Fact Book 2012). Life expectancy has dropped from 61 to 33 years since 1990 and one in five children is an AIDS orphan (Elder 2005). In addition to the overt political violence, most Zimbabweans now live in conditions that are structurally violent, to use Galtung’s term, because their life chances and human security have been severely compromised (Galtung 1969). So when Zimbabweans approach reconciliation, it is in a context of political violence, troubled ethnic relationships, and economic collapse. Indeed, reconciliation discourses are currently employed in public debate by both secular and religious actors. Article VII of the Global Political Agreement of 2008, which assisted the implementation of a form of power-sharing government (known as the Government of National Unity – GNU), focused on ‘Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity.’ The article reads (Agreement 2008): The Parties hereby agree that the new Government: a. a.will ensure equal treatment regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origins and will work towards equal access to development for all; b. b.will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of the regions; c. shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what mechanisms might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre- and postindependence political conflicts; and d. will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency

5 For more on the Zimbabwean Diaspora, see McGregor & Primorac 2010.

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irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation. e. will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled personnel. As Machakanja has pointed out, the article did not specifically mention ‘reconciliation’ and the language was vague and aspirational (Machakanja 2010). But the various sections of the article acknowledged issues such as repatriation, uneven development, and inequality, and its language of ‘national healing’ hinted towards the stronger term ‘reconciliation.’ In addition, the GNU set up an Initiative on National Healing and Reconciliation, appointing three ministers of state responsible for ‘healing and reconciliation’ (Machakanja 2010). An Organ for National Healing and Integration, supported by the UN Development Programme, was established. But its impact was limited, with ministers unable to play more than an advisory role (Moreblessing 2011). It is also the case that people acting on behalf of the state – with its history of violence and human rights abuses against its citizens – may lack the legitimacy to promote reconciliation. Machakanja took all of this into consideration when she developed this definition of reconciliation for Zimbabwe (Machakanja 2010): “In the context of Zimbabwe, reconciliation would need to be broadly conceptualised as a dynamic, inclusive, multi-dimensional adaptive process (Chapman 2006) aimed at rebuilding and healing society ; a process of change and redefinition of social and political relationships.”

Machakanja’s definition cites two international experts, emphasising one of the all-important themes in definitions of reconciliation – building relationships – at both the grassroots (social) and national (political) levels. Further, her list of “necessary conditions for successful reconciliation and national healing” includes many elements that have been found to be important in other contexts. In the absence of effective, concrete policies from the Organ of National Healing and Integration or the ministers of reconciliation, it is worth reproducing her list of ‘necessary conditions’ in full (Machakanja 2010)6 : – – – – – – – –

Legislative reform Political will Transformative and restorative justice Civil society engagement Consensus building Truth-telling Education for national healing and reconciliation Research on trauma and grief

6 More detail about each item on the list is provided in the report.

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Counselling for trauma and grief Special healing places and community intervention projects Memorialisation and ritualisation Funding

Machakanja adds that recent debates indicate that Zimbabweans resist “a simplistic understanding of reconciliation as a linear process that automatically moves from individual trauma to national healing.” Rather they favour “an interplay between state-orchestrated initiatives such as the National Healing and reconciliation project, individual-orientated and communitybased programmes”7 (Machakanja 2010). This is in line with Ganiel’s work on Christian conceptions of reconciliation in Northern Ireland, where she notes that the Christian groups most active in reconciliation during the ‘Troubles’ had a dual emphasis on building relationships at the personal, grassroots level, and on promoting broader socio-political reconciliation (Ganiel 2013). Higgins’ definition of reconciliation encapsulates this dual emphasis well (McMaster and Higgins 2002): “Reconciliation, which is hard edged, needs to be community orientated and take the political and social context seriously. … We might then say that reconciliation is about taking initiatives and actions that make enemies into friends through give and take and by building new and different forms of community. This kind of reconciliation is about transforming relationships and structures through lengthy processes requiring courage, risk and commitment.”

Here, we have italicised the words transforming relationships and structures to highlight what we see as the key to a definition of reconciliation appropriate for Zimbabwe. The emphasis on relationships is in line with comparative, international scholarship and the need for this – in the tense relationships among rival political factions as well as between Shona, Ndebele and Whites – is obvious. But as Brewer, Higgins and Teeney have pointed out, many definitions of reconciliation (especially, they argue, Christian-influenced ones), emphasise building relationships at the expense of changing social and political structures (Brewer 2011). To put it slightly differently, such definitions of reconciliation might address personal or even political violence, but they do not address structural violence. That is why we want to emphasise the transforming structures aspect of the definition, as it highlights the need to go beyond being ‘nice’ to each other at the grassroots and recommends enacting meaningful political and economic reforms. The calls to reform the security sector, the media, the judiciary inter alia during the GNU are cases in point. Machakanja recognises this when she places ‘legislative reform’ and 7 Others question whether retribution (for example, through judicial processes), rather than reconciliation, is more appropriate in Zimbabwe’s present context.

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‘political will’ at the top of her list of necessary conditions. Accordingly, we wish to present the term ‘reconstruction’ here, alongside reconciliation, to drive this point home. For us, reconstruction is another way of saying ‘transforming structures.’ Like Brewer, Higgins and Teeney, we think reconstruction should be fundamentally a part of reconciliation. But we realise that in the real world, reconciliation often is not thought of in this way. To keep our focus on structures as well as relationships, in this paper we write about reconciliation and reconstruction in Zimbabwe. For us, reconciliation and reconstruction are urgent and inextricably linked tasks.

Religious Non-Conformism Believing that the Christian gospel should change the world is one matter, actually bringing about that change is an entirely different matter altogether. Religious activists face all sorts of constraints when they advocate their position in the public sphere. These constraints include the nature of the state (authoritarian or democratic), the receptivity of the state and other civil society activists to their message and goals, as well as the very religious structures in which the actors themselves operate. Here, we develop Tarusarira’s use of the concept of ‘religious non-conformism’ to explain why some religious actors are more effective than others when it comes to contributing to social or political change – and in the case of Zimbabwe – contributing to reconciliation and reconstruction (Tarusarira / Ganiel 2012). Religious non-conformism is a concept that takes into account both structures and principles. Structurally, it helps explain how religion functions in society and how religious non-conformists deviate from religion’s conventional functions. And as a matter of principle, religious non-conformists feel morally attached to their beliefs and compelled to act even in defiance of the mainstream religious thought. The structural component of religious nonconformism has strong sociological foundations, being in part inspired by Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, and his distinction between church and sect (Weber 2001). In Weber’s approach, a ‘church’ is what we might today identify with our traditional mainline (and some smaller) Christian denominations – an institution which is relatively inclusive, well-established, and socially respected. People may be ‘born in’ to a ‘church’ in this sense, and continue to identify with it even without making strong commitments to religious practice. Sects, on the other hand, demand high levels of activism. One cannot be ‘born in’ to a sect, one must actively choose to become involved. Sects are also often highly critical of existing social, political and religious arrangements, and are motivated to reform them. Sects have usually been understood to include smaller Christian denominations or groups, which might have been termed ‘dissenters’ or ‘non-

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conformists’ in earlier eras. Although the church-sect distinction is usually associated with Troeltsch, we have reverted to Weber’s understanding because of its greater emphasis on the socio-structural nature of sects. So, our appropriation of Weber is an ideal typical reconstruction based on hermeneutic accentuation (Kim 2004), and influenced by Berger’s and Sung Ho Kim’s ideal typical reconstruction of Weber’s thought (Berger 1971; Kim 2000). For example, Berger was concerned with the problem that Marx was dealing with in his essay on Hegel’s philosophy : namely what kind of social organisation is required to bring about radical social change? Reverting to Weber’s discussion of the role of Protestant groups in the rise of the capitalist world, Berger argues that many analysts have seen the connection between Protestantism and capitalism as psychological or cultural in nature ahead of the structural/organisational aspect. But Berger says that this should not exclusively be the case, given Weber’s use of the sect category. Basing his argument on two of Weber’s essays from 1906 and 1920, Berger argues that Weber never abandoned his interest in sects, and that the 1920 essay was a subtler continuation of his interest in their key characteristics: their stress on individualism, their ability to create new forms of organisation, their antiauthoritarian character and their inculcation of the Protestant ethic. These characteristics are achieved through the power and autonomy of the local religious community, a community which emphasises lay control, the continuous judgement of one’s whole manner of living, and the necessity of proving oneself. Weber’s reflection on sects was prompted by the fact that the associations he discovered on his visit to America could not be easily identified with the uniquely German framework of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft of Ferdinand Tönnies (1887). As Kim argues: “[What] Weber called sect like associations in America were no Gemeinschaften in that voluntary consent of individual members formed the constitutive foundation, but neither were they Gesellschaften in that entry into these associations was highly restricted in principle. They were voluntary associations that were nevertheless predicated on a particularistic principle of congregation, permeating the intermediary sphere between the state and individuals.” (Kim 2000)

Kim further argues that Weber pitted the sect-like society (Sektengesellschaft) against the church (Anstalt), a mode of association whose solidarity he characterises as mechanistic: either contractual or bureaucratic. He contrasts this with the organic and spontaneous solidarity of the Genossenschaft (cooperative) developed by Otto von Gierke, which he argues has an affinity with the sect-like society (Kim 2004). For Weber, the sect-like society represents a case in which a clear hierarchical structure of domination is absent and transcendental charisma is widely distributed among individual members of the group, instead of being monopolised by the leader(s) (Kim 2004). Weber compared German and American associational life in 1910 and concluded that

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German associational life produced men of passive conformism, characterised by training for the discipline of office and ritualised conventions. For him, the solution to overcoming passivity lay in recovering the sect man (Berufsmensch). Weber’s Berufsmensch, or person of calling, was: “a natural self of unhindered impulses and desires, seen as part of this world to be conquered and transformed by means of reason and will or intellectual integrity and objective assessment which compels public intellectual deliberation” (Kim 2000). A sect in the Weberian sense, is a type of socio-structural organisation that can empower free agency, help people develop moral reasoning and democratic values, and facilitate social and political activism and change. Similarly, Ganiel has recognised the importance of varieties of religious structures. Rather than reverting to the older church-sect typology, she argues that Christians operate within a variety of structures, such as congregations or parishes, religious special interest groups, religious networks, denominations, and ecumenical agencies (Ganiel 2008). Each of these religious structures differs in its ability to promote the development of the moral individual and to facilitate free action: the people working within the various structures have more or less flexibility to ‘get things done.’ So, in her work on Northern Ireland, Ganiel concludes that religious networks and religious special interest groups are the most effective, or in our terms, more like sects, because the activists working within them are less constrained by denominational bureaucracies and have more freedom to develop radical ideas. This structural argument resonates with Tarusarira’s use of the concept of religious nonconformism: non-conformists have structural advantages over other religious groups when it comes to getting things done.8 In addition, as we have described in more detail elsewhere, religious non-conformism has the following characteristics (Tarusarira / Ganiel 2012): – Defines itself both against the state and against mainstream religions, which may be seen to have acquiesced to state power – Has transformative potential, because it perceives present religious, social and political systems as in need of reformation – Advocates opposing injustice – Advocates freedom of expression – Uses non-violent methods to achieve its goals 8 Of course, the term non-conformism has a specific history and religious meaning. It is most usually associated with seventeenth century England, where people who did not belong to the established Anglican Church were called non-conformists or dissenters. Although some nonconformists, like Oliver Cromwell, used violence to achieve their goals, they perceived themselves as acting to oppose an unjust state and to advocate freedom of (religious) expression. That’s why Tarusarira argues that opposition to injustice and defending freedom of expression are fundamental to his conception of religious non-conformism. At the same time he draws on the ‘peace’ traditions that are present in most world religions, arguing that religious non-conformists should use non-violent methods, an approach they share with many ‘new social movements’. (Smith 1994, Casanova 1994)

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But a cursory glance at any society tells us that the religious non-conformists within it are not agitating for change at the same rate or to the same extent. Religious groups may possess the characteristics of non-conformism, yet not act on their structural advantages. Therefore, Tarusarira argues that it is helpful to think in terms of a spectrum of non-conformist tendencies, of which there are at least four types: radical/active, moderate, passive, and latent. At various times, non-conformists may move along this spectrum, with their location on the spectrum effecting the extent and effectiveness of their activism. The names of each type give some indication of the extent of their activity. Groups which are latent are by definition currently inactive, yet possess the structural characteristics of non-conformism and could therefore theoretically move to a more active point on the spectrum.

Religious Non-Conformism in Zimbabwe from the War of Independence to 2000 Colonialists from Western nations brought with them their Christian faith and their Christian missionaries. In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the traditional ‘mainline’ denominations (Catholic, Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian) associated with colonialists were later joined by what have been called African Initiated Churches (AICs) and Pentecostal Charismatics. In Zimbabwe, these include the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa and Masowe Apostles, amongst others (Ter Haar 2012; Engelke 2007; Mukonyora 2007; Maxwell 2007). Most churches, especially mainline churches, identified with colonial states (Haynes 1996). Even so, there is an impression that courageous church leaders played a key role in toppling oppressive governments and ushering in independence and democratization across the continent9 (Gifford 1995; MacLaughlin 1996; Phiri 2001). An edited volume by Ranger offers fresh evidence that this has been the case in some contexts (Ranger 2008). In this volume, Ranger divides Africa’s democratic history into three phases: the first democratic revolution of anti-colonial struggles, the second democratic revolution of challenging the injustices of post-colonial governments, and the current third democratic revolution, in which churches (especially, he argues, evangelical ones),10 offer “moral opposition to the new nationalist order” 9 Examples include Bishop Lamont, who was the President of CCJP and was deported in 1977, Fr (now Bishop) Dieter Scholz, who was deported in 1979 and Sr Janice McLaughlin (currently President of Maryknoll missionaries worldwide) who was Secretary of CCJP and was also deported in 1977, just to mention a few. 10 Ranger’s emphasis on the role of evangelical/Pentecostal/charismatic churches resonates with our argument about religious non-conformism. Historically somewhat marginalised from the mainline, these churches – which promote active engagement and usually have more flexible

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(Ranger 2008) and are therefore contributing to the “sustainability of democracy” (Ranger 2008). Ranger does not use the term religious nonconformism. But the effectiveness of religious activism, analysed throughout his volume, confirms many of the observations we have made about religious non-conformists’ structural advantages. Employing Ranger’s three-phase framework, we discuss how religious nonconformism has manifested itself in Zimbabwe during each phase. Ranger’s first phase focuses on the role of the mainline churches (Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian) in anti-colonial struggles for independence (in the 1950s and 1960s for most states, but not until the late 1970s for Zimbabwe). At first glance, the prominence of the mainline churches seems to go against our argument about religious non-conformism. But it was religious actors on the margins of these mainline denominations – not the denominations as bodies – which were most prominent and effective.11 In Zimbabwe, the non-conformists included the CCJP; the work of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC); the activism of people like Methodist minister Canaan Banana, who became Zimbabwe’s first president (when the office was largely a ceremonial role); and the Jesuit-run Silveira House, among others (Tarusarira / Ganiel 2012). These church leaders and religious activists could be located on the radical/active end of the non-conformist spectrum, as they directly challenged the regime and their contributions were felt to be real and meaningful (McLaughlin 2000; Hallencruetz / Moyo 1988). Ranger’s second phase coincides with the bedding down of new governments after independence. In Zimbabwe, some religious actors were accorded a privileged place in the new Zimbabwe, as the state conceived of the churches as partners in development and the churches seemed eager to assume this role (Hallencruetz / Moyo 1988). Although Ranger argues that the mainline churches remained ‘the only alternative networks to those of the dominant party’ during that time, they were largely unable to capitalise on their position to identify, speak out against, or act to remedy the injustices increasingly perpetrated by those dominant parties (Ranger 2008). Zimbabwe was no exception – many of the churches sought to maintain their privileged relationship with political power. Among the non-conformist groups from the structures than the older denominations – operate more like sects in the Weberian sense. See also Ganiel 2010. 11 While the work of the CCJP and Silveira House was non-conformist with regard to the colonial government, they acted under the auspices of the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC). A bishop heads the CCJP even if he is not visible most of the time. However, the CCJP had the leeway to be non-conformist because it enjoyed relative autonomy from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and their opinion did not have to be viewed as the official position of the bishops (Gundani 2001). Silveira House requires a letter from the Archbishop of Harare to apply for funding. So, we can conclude that they acted on behalf of their denominations in some way. That said, the viewpoints and actions of such organisations did not reflect those of the majority of people in their denominations.

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earlier era, it could be said they receded from a radical/active non-conformist phase. Because these groups remained on the margins, but were not especially active in challenging injustice during this time, it could be said that their nonconformism was latent or inactive. Ranger dates the start of his third phase to the early 1990s and links it to the failure of democratization throughout Africa. In this phase, Ranger decisively shifts the analysis of his volume to the evangelical churches, which he claims have superseded the mainline in terms of social and political importance. For him, these churches have accomplished this through their rapid growth and their ability to empower people through their (in some cases) participatory and democratic approaches to worship and congregational governance.12 Of course, there is great diversity among evangelical, and we would also include Pentecostal and charismatic, churches. Some have authoritarian leaders or preach a ‘prosperity gospel’ that is socially disempowering. But structurally, when compared to the mainline churches, they have come from the margins, and they tend not to be as bureaucratized as the mainline churches. With a caveat about the dangers of generalizing too widely, we think that some evangelical/Pentecostal/charismatic (EPC) churches could be located along our non-conformist spectrum.13 In our previous work, we have focused on the activities of relatively long established Christian organisations, which could be located at various points on our non-conformist spectrum (Tarusarira / Ganiel 2012). These include organisations that were active before and around the time of independence, such as the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC), the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ). These organisations could be classified as non-conformist, but they had moved closer to moderate, passive or latent positions on the spectrum by the time Zimbabwe’s crisis had intensified in the late 1990s/early 2000s. So, throughout Ranger’s three phases of democratic history, the most effective religious activism in Zimbabwe has been driven by non-conformist groups. But at the time of writing, Zimbabwe’s historic non-conformist groups seem to be latent, even though conditions are ripe for radical/active expressions of non-conformism. 12 Ranger’s volume adds to a body of literature which conceives of EPC Christianity as promoting the citizenship skills necessary for democratic citizens. See Freston 2001. 13 Tarusarira and Ganiel do not agree entirely on the extent to which evangelical churches or groups should be considered religious non-conformists. Tarusarira sees evangelical churches and organisations like the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe operating more like the mainstream churches, supporting and maintaining the status quo. Ganiel sees them as latent nonconformists (or in some cases, at more active points on the non-conformist spectrum). Ganiel thinks that evangelicals’ relatively marginalised structural position could enhance their ability to contribute to reconciliation and reconstruction, and argued that this is the case for the EPC congregation she studied in Harare. This congregation is not overtly political, but its low-key social justice and pastoral work could be described as a passive or latent form of non-conformism. See Ganiel 2009, 2010.

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Religious Non-Conformism in Contemporary Zimbabwe In the mid-2000s, three of the historic non-conformist organisations – ZCBC, ZCC and EFZ – attempted to facilitate talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC. But ZANU-PF tried to co-opt these organisations and other prominent Christian leaders. For example, the government censored their discussion document ‘The Zimbabwe We Want’ before it was published, and wooed leaders with invitations to State House. As Mpofu concluded (Mpofu 2012): “Talks collapsed in 2006 when the Heads of Christian Churches were accused by the independent media of dancing in ZANU-PF’s favour. Commenting on the initiative, the Zimbabwean newspaper declared, ‘Church Leaders Disappoint Nation’ (15 – 21 June 2006: 22). In this article, Bishop Peter Nemapare, the head of the team, is quoted as saying ‘We know we have a government that we must support, interact with and draw attention to concerns. Those of us who have different ideas about this country must know we have a government which listens (Page 22).’… This meeting, which took place at State House, marked the end of the dialogue as sponsored by the Churches. One may conclude that the Church failed to rise above political patronage.”

Given the perceived ineffectiveness of groups like ZCBC, ZCC and EFZ, it is not surprising that new religious non-conformist groups have been formed. Tarusarira’s recent fieldwork (2012) has focused on the activities of three such organisations: the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA), Churches in Manicaland14 (CiM), and Grace to Heal (GtH). His aim has been to discover what these organisations are doing, identify their strategies and motivation, and evaluate their contributions to reconciliation and reconstruction. In addition to seeking organisations on the structural margins, Tarusarira selected these organisations for the following reasons: 1. They are relatively well structured and established, easily identifiable in the public sphere. The oldest was formed in 2000. 2. They are a direct response to the degeneration of the socio-economic and political situation. 3. They base their activities on religious motivation; they are not just political actors who happen to be religious, but religious actors who, based on their religious beliefs and ideas, pursue political objectives.15 4. They are networked with each other ; therefore they may be able to be more effective (Ganiel 2008).

14 Manicaland is a Province in Eastern Zimbabwe. 15 Tarusarira is often asked whether these are political actors who happen to be religious. Based on his fieldwork, Tarusarira believes that this is not the case – these are religious actors who feel that they have been driven to political action by their interpretation of the Christian gospel.

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5. They are ‘ecumenical’ and inclusive in that they deal with people from all Christian doctrinal backgrounds and do not discriminate based on creed, race, rural or urban based, ethnicity or economic status. 6. The selection also took into consideration Zimbabwean internal geopolitics. Zimbabwean politics proceed on the basis of Shona- and Ndebelespeaking people in the main, and these organisations include people of all ethnic groups. The Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) is the most prominent group. It was formed in 2006 as a direct response to Operation Murambatsvina. In an interview on the ‘Anglican Mainstream’ blog in 2007, the director of ZCA, Useni Sibanda, described its formation this way (2007): “The energy behind it is that in May 2005 the government demolished houses. People in Bulawayo whose homes were demolished moved into the cities to seek for shelter. They moved into the Catholic Church, they moved in the Anglican Church, into the Methodist Church, into Charismatic Chapels. There were thousands of these people. The pastors began to meet and say : How could we feed these people? They could not chase them away. After that process of feeding and taking care of the people, there was so much energy spent on that, they began to say that what is the problem that has brought these people into our churches? During that reflective process, people began to say maybe we need to deal with the issue of bad governance which is the root cause of this crisis. We begin to see a new theology among these people. They began to question a lot of things they had previously believed in, to look at biblical texts as part of the struggle to actually bring democracy to Zimbabwe in a fresh way. All this is leading to a new way of practicing Christianity and a new way for the leadership to be very reflective in their approach.”

Sibanda’s statement is significant because it brings out how ZCA members began to develop a different theology from the one that they had been taught by the mainline churches, and hence began to do things differently. Similarly, the founding convener of ZCA, Bishop Levee Kadenge of the Methodist church, said that another reason the group formed was that “the formal ecumenical organisations representing the Mainline and Pentecostal denominations (the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, Catholic Bishops Conference and Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe respectively) were compromised and not responsive enough to the demands of the situation in confronting the national authorities” (Kadenge 2012). It is alleged that the Methodist church forced Kadenge to resign from his post in ZCA, or else he would lose his position in the church. In 2006, ZCA was the lead organisation in the ‘Save Zimbabwe Campaign,’ a network of civil society organisations determined to push for reform. On March 11, 2007, the Save Zimbabwe Campaign organised a prayer meeting in Harare, after which Tsvangirai (former Prime Minister in the GNU and leader of the MDC) was severely beaten. Photographs of Tsvangirai’s bruised and

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swollen body were circulated around the world. As an interviewee told Tarusarira: “ZANU-PF like any political party was invited, but rather than the government coming to pray they sent soldiers to kill people who are praying.”

Kadenge claims that this prayer rally attracted an international outcry, leading to the facilitation of the GPA: ‘Had it not been for us, there would be no GPA and no inclusive government’ (Chitando / Manyonganise 2011). ZCA has also held conferences, organised a voter education campaign in the run-up to the 2008 elections, and is the lead organisation on the three-year EU-funded Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF), which focuses on national healing and reconciliation. ZCA has also received funding from the international Christian charity Tearfund. Of all these organisations, ZCA has most actively pushed their agenda in the public sphere, and this is reflected in hostility towards them from ZANU-PF, the security forces, and the mainline denominations and religious organisations that do not agree with them. ZANU-PF has accused ZCA of being a conduit of the MDC party with a regime change agenda. Under the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), ZCA activists have been arrested, slept in cells, beaten, taken to court and found not guilty. We locate ZCA on the radical/ active end of the non-conformist spectrum. Churches in Manicaland, formed in 2000, is an ‘ecumenical’ gathering of members from Christian denominations and organisations in the province of Manicaland. The use of the word ‘churches’ does not here refer to the institutional churches but to individual Christians, including laypeople who would not normally be invited or expected to ‘speak out’ publicly. CiM also has high profile figures in its ranks, including a Roman Catholic bishop and an Anglican bishop – both in good standing with their denominations. CiM refers to itself as a forum or a loose platform and does not have a formal structure of leadership. This is to make it difficult for the state security to identify anyone as the point person of the forum and also to avoid possible leadership wrangles. In terms of personnel the only person CiM has in place is the Coordinator who works on voluntary basis. His task is simply to pass on information amongst the members. The Chairperson of every meeting is selected on the day of the meeting. This is reminiscent of Weber’s sect-like society where authority is legitimated on grounds of consensual order created voluntarily by individuals (Kim 2004). CiM’s activities have included issuing pastoral statements, visiting traditional chiefs and youth, and engaging with the media. It has called prayer rallies, sometimes in collaboration with like minded groups like the ZCA, which were always under threat from the POSA. It has run workshops to facilitate civic values needed for a better Zimbabwe. In 2006, CiM launched a publication titled “The truth will make you free”. This document – a study manual applying Christian social teaching to the crises in Zimbabwe –

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according to an interviewee, did not go down well with one senior ZANU-PF official, leading to the non-renewal of the work permit of an Irish priest who was suspected to have been behind it. One of Tarusarira’s Catholic interviewees applauded the flexibility of CiM, contrasting it to the work of another older non-conformist group, the CCJP. She said: “In as much as I have done a lot with the Catholics Justice and Peace, the bureaucratic nature and the limitations within the Catholic Church is problematic. I would say for example if there is a crisis, I must go to the Bishop, and it takes about two to three weeks before the statement is passed and by the time it is passed, it is no longer relevant. These are limitations I don’t find in CiM. We sit down and say this is what we want to do. It’s done and it will be relevant. It will be up to time and relevant…I find CiM more flexible and giving room for innovations for practical interventions.”

So, on the one hand, CiM employs approaches that can be labelled radical, such as prayer rallies, which can easily develop into politically-charged demonstrations. On the other hand, it deploys low key activities such as dialogue with the traditional leaders, politicians and also the grassroots. The presence of two prominent Bishops from the mainline churches who still validly participate in their churches makes it more difficult for the mainline churches to condemn the CiM than the ZCA. The two Bishops also have interacted with ZANU-PF by undertaking missions to challenge the state on issues of violence. The ZANUPF response to CiM has not been as repressive as the actions taken against the ZCA. As such, we characterise CiM as a moderate non-conformist group. Grace to Heal (GtH) was established in 2003 with the aim of fostering an ecumenical, faith-based process of peace, reconciliation, justice and conflict transformation in the whole of Zimbabwe. GtH emerged from the Baptist church, which according to its director is non-conformist by nature, by virtue of not operating in the restrictive mode of other institutional churches. The founding director told Tarusarira: “Our particular church, the Bulawayo Baptist church, is a non-conventional church in the sense that in the church we have a spectrum of people who believe in different aspects of the Christian doctrine. We have people that believe in speaking in tongues, some that don’t believe in that, some that believe in the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but we all somehow manage to work along and so you find that an individual conviction could easily be transmitted and become acceptable within the church.”

GtH characterises its approach as ‘principled non-violence’ and describes it in ‘approach to Peacebuilding’ this way (Grace to Heal 2012): “From a culture of violence to nonviolence: Born from a violent struggle for independence from a violent and oppressive colonial system, the nation of Zimbabwe has inevitably inherited violence as a conflict resolution tool of choice. The national psyche is steeped in violence, incidents of violence dot the history of Zimbabwe. … In the midst of so much violence, Grace To Heal believes its prime mandate is to

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deconstruct the culture of violence and help create a paradigm shift to nonviolent conflict resolution and social transformation. Grace to Heal’s approach to Peacebuilding is generational, i. e. medium to long term behavioural and attitudinal change focusing at 10 – 20 years’ work with each community.”

GtH potentially sets itself on a conflict path with the ZANU-PF part of government because the issues it deals with are a direct outcome of ZANUPF’s policies. One of GtH’s founders, who is also the Convener of ZCA, has experienced this opposition, as he told Tarusarira: “After Pius Ncube,16 I was listed as number two enemy by the state from Matebeleland province, because they say I am anti-government. I have spent considerable amount of time in prison and one month house arrest.”

In addition, Gukurahundi has been declared closed by the ZANU-PF elites, but that was GtH’s first point of call in their work. Regarding Gukurahundi, the Presidential spokesperson retorted, “That is a closed topic and people who want to talk about that era should know it.” He further said, “those still stuck in the Gukurahundi issue are agents of the Americans only interested in the postindependent issues and ignoring the atrocities committed against Zimbabweans before independence” (XolisaniNcube 2011). Due to this a member of GtH told Tarusarira: “Well, you know the government does not want to hear anybody dealing or talking about Gukurahundi…we know there is always that threat of being banned, chased away from a community because we are talking about such situations. We had encounters where the security agents have come to our meetings … trying to stop the meetings and all that…but we are trying to be as humble as we can so that we do not attract unnecessary attention from the security agents.”

But GtH also tries to play by the government’s rules. For example, it registered as a Trust as required by law and also makes use of its identity with the church, particularly the Baptist church, even though they are disappointed by the quietness and acquiescence of the church in general. Like the ZCA and CiM, GtH has provided policy discussion platforms, engaged political elites, and tried to practice what they ‘preach’ in the way they operate – in a more quiet and behind-the-scenes type of way than the other two organisations. To take another example, GtH is involved in community healing through refurbishment of the graves of the people who died during Gukurahundi. There have been open mass graves and some unknown, and GtH is securing them to stop children from playing on them and animals from walking over them. In some places they fenced the area or built a box, or just a small wall to indicate that this is a grave. Some people are able now to carry out their traditional rituals, as one interviewee said: “even if we are Christians some people still believe 16 Pius Ncube was a Catholic Archbishop who was outspoken against the ZANU-PF regime. He resigned as archbishop after an adultery scandal (Ferrett 2007).

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that you talk to the dead.” Taking its strategies and approach into account, we locate GtH in a moderate to passive position on the non-conformist spectrum.

Concluding Remarks An estimated 75 % of Zimbabweans practice some form of Christianity (US Dept of State 2007), and in rural areas, the church and the school are the only public institutions (Dube 2006). Taken together, this makes the churches Zimbabwe’s largest civil society associations.17 The churches also enjoy significant trust and moral authority, commodities that are in relatively short supply in contemporary Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos / Alexander 2006). The power, or potential power, of the churches has been recognised by Mugabe and ZANU-PF, who have attempted to co-opt prominent Christian leaders for their political cause, while at the same time seeking to silence or intimidate Christians who have spoken out against them18 (Ganiel 2011). In this chapter, we have argued that religious non-conformists are structurally better placed to contribute to social and political change than ‘mainline’ or ‘mainstream’ Christian groups. This is in large part due to their more marginal structural position; living on the ‘edge’ gives them more freedom and flexibility to get things done. We have described a spectrum of non-conformists, with different groups and their different tactics or strategies characterised as ranging from radical/active, to moderate, to passive, to latent. Tarusarira’s recent fieldwork has investigated three relatively recently-formed groups at various points on the spectrum, while at the same time recognizing that many of Zimbabwe’s historic non-conformist groups are now latent. But it is not necessarily the case that those on the radical/active end of the spectrum are always the most effective in achieving the changes they desire. For example, we have seen how the ZCA’s confrontational approach attracts a more spirited response from ZANU-PF and the security forces, which can ultimately contribute to more violence and oppression. Some of the more lowkey activities of CiM and GtH do not draw a violent or repressive response, but in the end they may be contributing to long, slow processes such as rebuilding relationships and trust. We have also noted the overlap of key individuals within these three groups, as well as within some of the older non-conformist organisations such as EFZ 17 The Religion in Zimbabwe website is helpful for keeping up to date on what’s happening in Zimbabwe’s churches. Available at: 18 For more on one of ZANU-PF’s most ardent supporters, former Anglican Archbishop Nolbert Kunonga, see the entry in: . [15 June 2012].

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and the CCJP.19 In order to optimise their effectiveness, it seems all of these organisations need each other : ZCA to take the more radical, bold public stands; GtH to work more quietly on transformation without risking too much by being too ‘political’, and so on. The boldness of one group may create breathing space for another. Tarusarira’s ongoing research on these organisations will focus further on the links between them, evaluating the quality of their relationships and the quantity of their interactions. We expect that their effectiveness will depend on their ability to maintain strong networks with each other and with secular groups – something that the (as yet unproven) Church and Civil Society Forum seems designed to facilitate. In the face of an authoritarian and violent state, it is difficult for religious non-conformists to strike a balance between radical/active, moderate and passive forms of protest. We should always bear in mind the extreme pressure these activists are operating under as they make decisions about their strategies. The repressive nature of the state makes it easier to pursue reconciliation by means of building relationships, quietly, at the grassroots. This is very important work. But as we argued earlier, reconciliation must be accompanied by reconstruction – the transformation of social structures. This is a more difficult task in an authoritarian state, where power is so firmly in the hands of a select few who benefit from the unfair and unjust structures. Reconciliation as relationship-building is important, but it is not enough. Therefore we expect that the effectiveness of Zimbabwe’s religious nonconformists will depend on their ability to put and keep reconstruction firmly on the country’s political agenda.

References Agreement between ZANU-PF and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe 2008, 15 September 2008. Available at: . [23 May 2013]. Alexander, K 2005, ‘Orphans of the Empire: An Analysis of Elements of White Identity and Ideology Construction in Zimbabwe’ in Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, eds B Raftopoulos / T Savage, Weaver Press, Harare, pp. 193 – 212. Anglican Mainstream, The Director of Zimbabwe Christian Alliance Speaks of their Role in Zimbabwe, 25 April 2007. Available at: . [28 September 2013]. 19 Although we would currently characterise these organisations as ‘latent,’ we have noted that some participants in ZCA, CiM, and GtH have overlapping memberships with EFZ and CCJP.

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Berger, S 1971, ‘The Sects and the Breakthrough into the Modern World: On the Centrality of the Sects in Weber’s Protestant Ethic Thesis’. The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 486 – 499. Bond, P / Manyana, M 2002, Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice, The Merlin Press, Pietermaritzburg. Brewer, JD 2011, Religion, Civil Society and Peace in Northern Ireland, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Casanova, J 1994, Public Religions in the Modern World, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation 1997, Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980 – 1989, CCJPZ and LRF, Harare. Chapman, AR 2006, ‘Approaches to Studying Reconciliation’ in On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation, Berghof Report no. 4, ed D Bloomfield. Available at: . [23 May 2013]. Chigara, B 2002, Land Reform Policy : The Challenge of Human Rights Law, Ashgate, Aldershot. Chitando, E / Manyonganise, M 2011, ‘Voices from Faith-Based Communities’, in Zimbabwe in transition: A view from within, eds T Murithi / A Mawadza, Jacana Media, Auckland Park. CIA 2012, World Fact Book 2012. Available at: . [23 May 2013]. Dube, JG 2006, A Socio-Political Agenda for the Twenty-First Century Zimbabwean Church: Empowering the Excluded, Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY. Elder, J 2005, HIV/AIDS: A Deadly Crisis Each Day in Zimbabwe. Available at: . [23 May 2013]. Engelke, M 2007, A Problem of Presence: Beyond Scripture in an African Church, University of California Press, Berkeley. Ferrett, G 2007, Zimbabwe’s Turbulent Archbishop. Available at: . [15 June 2013]. Freston, P 2001, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Galtung, J 1969, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 167 – 191. Ganiel, G 2008, Evangelicalism and Conflict in Northern Ireland, Palgrave, New York. – 20092, ‘Spiritual Capital and Democratization in Zimbabwe: A Case Study of a Progressive Charismatic Congregation’, Democratization, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 1172 – 1193 – 2010, ‘Ethno-Religious Change in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study of How Religious Havens can have Ethnic Significance’, Ethnopolitics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 103 – 120.

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– 20102, ‘Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity in South Africa and Zimbabwe: A Review’, Religion Compass, vol. 5, pp. 130 – 143. – 2011, Fear in the Pulpit: Will Harassment Silence the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe? Available at: . [15 June 2013]. – 2012, ‘Striking a Balance: Christianity and the Challenges of Long-Term Human Security in Zimbabwe’ in Religion and Human Security, eds J Wellman / C Lombardi , Oxford University Press, Oxford. – 2013, ‘Can Churches Contribute to Post-Violence Reconciliation and Reconstruction? Insights and Applications from Northern Ireland’ in Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims: Irish “Religious” Conflict in Comparative Perspective, ed. J Wolffe, Palgrave, Basingstoke. Gifford, P (ed.) 1995, The Christian Churches and the Democratization of Africa, E.J. Brill, Leiden. – 1998, African Christianity : Its Public Role, Hurst, London. Godwin, P 1996, Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa, Picador, London. – 2010, The Fear: Robert Mugabe and the Martyrdom of Zimbabwe, Little, Brown and Company, New York. Grace To Heal Grace To Heal’s approach to Peacebuilding. Available at: . [28 May 2013]. Gundani, PH 2001, Changing Patterns of Authority and Leadership: Developments in the Roman Catholic Church in Zimbabwe after Vatican II (1965 – 1985), University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare. Hallencruetz, C / Moyo, A (eds) 1988, Church and State in Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru. Haynes, J 1996, Religion and Politics in Africa, Zed Books, London. HoKim, S 2000, ‘In Affirming them, He affirms Himself ’: Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society’, Political Theory, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 197 – 229. – 2004, Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society, Cambridge University Press, New York. Hudleston, S 2005, Face of Courage: Morgan Tsvangirai, Double Storey, Cape Town. Hunt, G 2011, ‘From Bread Basket to Basket Case. Land seizures from white farmers have cost Mugabe’s Zimbabwe £7billion’, Mail Online News, 3 August. Available at: . [28 May 2013]. Kadenge, L 2010, Pilgrimage. Available at: . [15 June 2012]. Kuperus, T 2000, ‘Building Democracy : An Examination of Religious Associations in South Africa and Zimbabwe’ in Race and Reconciliation in South Africa: A Multicultural Dialogue in Comparative Perspective, eds WE Van Vugt / GD Cloete, Lexington Books, Oxford. Lederach, JP 1997, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC.

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– 2001, ‘Civil Society and Reconciliation,’ in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds C Crocker, F Osler Hampson / P Aall, USIP, Washington DC, pp. 841 – 854. Machakanja, P 2010, National Healing and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and Opportunities, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town. Available at: . [15 June 2012]. Maxwell, D 2007, African Gifts of the Spirit: Pentecostalism and the Rise of a Zimbabwean Transnational Religious Movement, James Currey, Oxford. Mbire, M 2011, Seeking Reconciliation and National Healing in Zimbabwe: Case of the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, M.A. thesis, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. Available at: . [23 May 2012]. McGregor, JA / Primorac, R (eds) 2010, Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival, Berghahn Books, New York. McLaughlin, J 1996, On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Baobab Books, Harare. McMaster, J / Higgins, C (eds) 2002, Communities of Reconciliation: Living Faith in the Public Place, Colourpoint Books, Newtownards. Mhofu, S 2012, Zimbabwean Farmers fighting to meet demand. Available at: . [2 June 2012]. – 2012, ‘Church Activism: A Mission and a Calling to be Attained’, pp. 15 – 24, provided by Zimbabwe Institute. Available at: . [15 September 2013]. Mugabe, R 1980, Independence Speech. Available at: . [2 September 2013]. Mukonyora, I 2007, Wandering a Gendered Wilderness: Suffering and Healing in an African Initiated Church, Peter Lang, New York. Murphy, C 2010, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Muzondidya, J 2009, ‘From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980 – 1987’ in Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, eds B Raftopoulos / A Mlambo, Weaver Press, Harare. Phiri, I 2001, Proclaiming Political Pluralism: Churches and Political Transitions in Africa, Praeger, London. Philpott, D 2010, The Politics of Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. Raftopoulos, B 2005, ‘Current Politics in Zimbabwe: Confronting the Crisis’ in Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future, ed DH Barry, Weaver Press, Harare.

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– / Alexander, K 2006, Reflections on Democratic Politics in Zimbabwe, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town. Ranger, T 2008, Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Schleicher, A 2004, ‘Zimbabwe’s Land Program’, Online News Hour, 14 April. Available at: . [15 June 2012]. Smith, C 1994, Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism, Routledge, New York Stevens, D 2004, The Land of Unlikeness: Explorations into Reconciliation, The Columba Press, Dublin. Tarusarira, J / Ganiel, G 2012, ‘Religion, Secular Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Zimbabwe’ in Religion and Conflict Resolution, ed L Marsden, Ashgate, Farnham, pp. 99 – 117. Ter Haar, G 2009, How God Became African: African Spirituality and Western Secular Thought, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Du Toit, F 2003, Learning to Live Together : Practices of Social Reconciliation, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town. US Dept of State 2007, International Religious Freedom Report. Available at: . [15 June 2012]. Vicencio, CV 2004, ‘Reconciliation’ in Pieces of the Puzzle, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town. Weber, M 2001, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Routledge, London. Weitzer, R 1990, Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe, University of California Press, Berkeley. XolisaniNcube 2011, Charamba Claims ‘Gukurahundi’ a Closed Topic, Nehanda radio on 9 October. Available at: . [16 June 2012]. BBC, ‘Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe calls for elections in 2012’, BBC News Africa on 8 December 2011. Available at: . [23 May 2012].

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Emmanuel Kla Gamoe George / Rachael Oluseye Iyanda

Amnesty and Disarmament in the Niger Delta Prospects for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Nigeria’s most Conflict-Torn Sub-Region

Introduction On May 5, 2009, the Federal government of Nigeria under the leadership of President Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’dua showed great courage when he signed the Amnesty Proclamation for the Niger Delta. In taking this action, the President was exercising the powers conferred on him under Section 175 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, upon recommendation from the Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger Delta Region. Since its introduction, a number of Nigerians and international personalities have welcomed the program as it has introduced a new lexicon for the issues of disarmament in Nigeria. However, it is important for us in this paper to examine the disarmament question and related issues and ask to what extent the process is sustainable, given the fact that over the past few decades the region involved has seen enormous conflict and instability. There is also the need to examine whether the amnesty proclaimed was capable of bringing about lasting peace and security to the region in view of the numerous socio-economic challenges; and what lessons, if any, can be learnt by the international community from the Nigerian experiment.

Brief History of the Niger Delta The Niger River, Africa’s third largest river, stretches from the Guinea Highlands to Nigeria. At the end of its long transit through five countries on the West African coast, the river creates Africa’s third largest drainage system, covering an area of about 70, 000 square kilometers and the largest known deltaic formation on the continent, known as the Niger Delta. The area serves as the home of an estimated seven million people composed of some fourteen Nigerian ethnic groups. The delta was originally the home of the Ijaw people. Over the years, the Andonis, Edos, Efiks, Etches, Ibibios, Igbos, Ikweres, Isokos, Itsekiris, KwaleIgbos, Ogonis and the Urohobos migrated to the region. According to oral traditions, the Ijaw have always been in the Niger Delta; migration within the tribe was always due to the fact that the population (often to about two

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thousand) had increased and the resources available were scarce; when it took place, it was always from one part of the Delta to another. The rapid expansion of the population was occasioned by the nefarious slave trade, which started in the area in the 15th century. The slave trade period, which lasted from 1444 to the 1860s, not only witnessed the transportation of several able-bodied men and women but also saw the massive development of the hitherto small creekside villages into powerful trading states – Bonny, Owome, Okrika and Brass (Okonta / Douglas 2001). The industrial revolution in England and the subsequent end of the slave trade saw a shift in the trade pattern in the Niger Delta. Hundreds of years of slave trade were eventually substituted by the lucrative and more “legitimate” trade in palm oil. Like the slave trade, the trade in palm oil exposed the people of the Delta to exploitation by various financial interests in Europe. It was one of these interests, the Royal Niger Company, that influenced the British government to annex the area as part of the British Empire Protectorate of the South in 1865 (Okonta / Douglas 2001). With the amalgamation of the Protectorates of the North and the South in 1914, the Niger Delta became a part of Britain’s new economically created state, Nigeria.

Background to the Amnesty Ukeje (2005) argued that since the early 1990s, the Niger Delta has witnessed an increase in the number of violent conflicts, which came in various dimensions and had far reaching ramifications. As a result, the Niger Delta was engulfed in an atmosphere of violence and insecurity. Among the major factors and forces responsible for this has been the contention between the oil communities and the multinational oil companies operating in the region, which are supported by the Federal government. Other problems are the high rate of unemployment in a region once responsible for about 75 percent of Nigeria’s revenue income, the ecological degradation and the lack or scarcity of basic social amenities and infrastructure, especially in comparison with other parts of the federation that are not oil-producing and relatively better off, e. g. Lagos and Abuja. Ethnic militancy in the Niger Delta did not begin in the 1990s, but it escalated during these years and after. The first recorded act of ethnic nationalism in the region was the short-lived but highly effective Boro ‘Revolution’ of February 1966, when a group of students united under the banner of the Niger Delta Volunteers Force (NDVF). Their major agitation concerned issues of injustice in the fiscal and resource allocation formula, the disempowerment, marginalization and exclusion of minorities from the mainstream of political and economic life, in favor of the bigger ethnic groups (Ukeje 2005). However, it was not until the 1990s that the agitations in the

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Niger Delta became more radical, when several groups, especially from Ogoniland, conducted a series of advocacy activities in the region. The people of Ogoniland, who find themselves squeezed between the Nigerian State and the multinational oil companies, blame both the state and oil companies for their plight, including the enormous damage to agricultural crops, destruction of fishing farms and pollution of drinking water in their riverine communities, brought about by the oil mining companies. The efforts of the various militants groups led to the formulation of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the adoption of the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) (Ukeje 2005; Adekanye 2007). The documents served as a working policy for the people of Ogoniland and as a point of mobilisation of cells and individuals into the struggle. By October 2, 1992 the OBR was addressed to the Federal government of Nigeria with the hope of opening a link for dialogue. It was the refusal of the Federal government under the regime of Gen. Mohammadu Buhari to honour or recognize the group that brought about the metamorphosis of the Ogoni struggle from a strictly non-violent movement into a highpitched grass root movement. Though the Federal government under Gen. Sani Abacha’s repressive regime tried to stifle the voice of the people of the Niger Delta by the brutal killing of Ken Saro Wiwa (leader of MOSOP), other ethnic groups began to intensify military action in the region. For example, on October 11, 1998, the All Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) organized a major conference in the town of Kaiama. At the conference, the various Ijaw communities and clans adopted the Kaiama Declaration, which called for the withdrawal of all military forces of repression and ‘occupation’ by the state of Nigeria from Ijawland. The Declaration added that beginning on December 30, 1998, the Ijaws would take the appropriate steps in the region against any further exploitation by oil companies. The IYC also called on all Ijaws to take necessary steps to protect the environment between January 1 and 10, 1999. By this time, the IYC and other militants group had emerged, increasing the militancy of the Council. Other militant groups in the region include the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV), the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The increase in militancy in the Niger Delta led to a high level of uncertainty and instability. The region became increasingly dangerous to live in, do business or own a property. For example, the attacks by MEND seriously hurt Nigeria oil exports – causing the nation to lose at least eight hundred thousand barrels of oil per day, that is, an estimated 25 percent of the country’s oil output (Hanson 2007). By the first quarter of 2009, losses to the nation’s oil revenue had increased to fifty percent (Nigerian Curiosity 2009). Besides the group’s regular attacks on oil pipelines in the Niger Delta and one daring attack on the Atlas Cove Jetty in Lagos on July 12, 2009, there was the kidnapping of foreign oil workers. The combination of the aforementioned factors led the Umaru Yar’ Dua

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government to accept the proposal for amnesty from the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta and other interest groups in the region. To this end, a presidential panel was set up on May 5, 2009, to address the issue of Amnesty and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). It proposed a comprehensive framework for dealing with the various ramifications of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The Amnesty On the 25th of June 2009, President Umaru Musa Yar’dua signed into law the Amnesty Proclamation for the Niger Delta. The framework of the amnesty engages the three branches of government, security or defense sector and civil society to work together. The process to engage the region in post-conflict reconstruction involves Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). Professor Adekanye (2001, p. 12) commented that the disarmament/ decommissioning question is aimed at addressing the purely military aspect of the peace process, yet the conditions for its success transcend the military problem. It also ought to include political, economic, social, cultural and even psychological factors. The disarmament exercise is unlikely to succeed if it addresses only military questions and neglects other and invariably more pressing political, economic and social dimensions. He stated that the above is the first major finding derived from comparative investigation. The second finding is that the reasons why individuals or groups are hesitant to disarm in the context of a peace process are not markedly different from those that led to their recourse to arms in the first place. He continued by emphasizing the need to remove those underlying factors, such as the feeling of insecurity in a deteriorating economic condition, which had brought about the initial recourse to arms, before the disarmament could take off and succeed. The experiences of the sequencing of the tasks of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants are more complicated and show varied results that defy logic. On a logical level, it makes sense under a given agreement to require ex-combatants to first demobilize, then disarm and subsequently either to integrate into a newly created unified military and police force, which are envisaged under the peace arrangement, or to seek further reintegration into society. The process can be defined in the following way : – Demobilization entails either the disbanding of an armed unit, the reducing of the number of combatants in an armed group, or it represents an interim stage before reassembling an entire armed group, be it regular or irregular. – Disarmament is an integral part of demobilization, with the aim to reduce the number of combatants or to disband an armed unit. The weapons used

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by personnel must be handed over to authorities, who are responsible for the safe storage, redistribution or even destruction of those arms. – Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain access to civilian forms of work and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, often with the help of external assistance. However, as Professor Adekanye has observed, there remains the problem of sequence. He also alerts us to the problem of how to be sure that the exmilitants, who have been supposedly disarmed, indeed turned in all the arms in their possession. “One important finding that will no doubt be of interest to us all is that a typical soldier tends to possess at least four of five guns at the point of demobilization; and when disarmed, s/he tends to turn in one gun, while hiding the remaining other perhaps in some private underground cache somewhere. There may not be need to resort to the use of these illegal stocked ‘surplus weapons’ if the ex-soldier is properly reintegrated and has sustainable means of livelihood and the society faces no prospect of ‘return to war’. Let none of those conditions hold, and the owner of those weapons finds the need to bring these back into circulation for use.” (Adekanye 2001, p. 16).

This means that DDR clearly is part of a peace process, and like every peace process, for it to be successful there should be confidence building on all sides. Thus the coordination of the three aspects of the amnesty is crucial to the process.

Revision of the Amnesty Process The process of Amnesty began on June 25, 2009, on the condition that the militants in the Delta renounce all forms of violence within a stipulated period of sixty days, which came to an end on October 4, 2009. The process saw a number of successes, although there remain a number of challenges which we will discuss later in this paper. The major event was the submission of a large cache of arms by militants in the region. First, on September 6, 2009, the Commander of the South Wing of MEND, Mr. Kile Selky Torughedi, with the popular militant name “Young Shall Grow”, submitted a large number of assorted guns and rifles, grenade launcher chargers, grenades, dynamite, bombs and gun boats. He also revealed that he commanded some 350 soldiers, including mercenaries from Gabon and Liberia, and that he spoke French and English fluently. What was amazing about the disarmament of “Young Shall Grow” was the fact that he

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founded and funded a school in the territory under his command and went on to pay a monthly salary of ten thousand Naira to the older women for the purpose of sanitation. Furthermore, on October 8 the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee on Amnesty announced that the number of militants who had been disarmed stood between 14.000 and 15.000. Of this number only 8.299 were fully registered with the Agency (Punch, Oct. 9, 2009). The breakdown shows that the highest number of the disarmed militants came from Bayelsa State, which accounted for 4.869, followed by Delta State (1.061), Rivers State (1.047), Ondo State (750), Edo State (250), Akwa Ibom State (162) and Cross Rivers State (160). All of these militants surrendered a total of 2.760 guns of various caliber and types, 287.445 rounds of ammunition, 18 gun boats, 763 explosives, 1.090 dynamite caps, 4 transmitter radio sets and 153 cartridges. Added to the disarmament of “Young Shall Grow”, the process also witnessed the disarmament of leading militants like Victor Ebitokatowe, commonly known as Boyloaf, Government Ekpmupolo, known as Tompolo, Ateke Tom, Farah Dagogo and Egberi Papa. The end of the disarmament process in the Niger Delta has begun to yield a dividend for both parties. The government announced that there has been an increase of oil output in the region from the previous 1.2 million barrel to an estimated 1.7 million per day. With the end of militancy, the production capacity of 2 million bpd was gradually returning. In addition, pipelines that had been previously destroyed were fixed and are now operational. Moreover, five illegal oil bunkering vessels have been detained by the JTF in the last 2 months; arms accumulation by militants is reportedly on the decline in the region and the MEND have declared a ceasefire. All of this also resulted in the Federal government becoming more optimistic about its ability to generate about 6.000 MWof electricity by December 2009, with the aim of 60.000 MW in 2020. Despite all the hand-shaking and back-patting it will amount to suicide if we conclude at this early stage of the process that those years of neglect, insecurity and militancy in the Niger Delta will come to an end with a simple proclamation and acceptance of amnesty by both the government and the militants. There are several indications that all may not be well if the peace process is not stable. First, on September 4, 7, and 25, 2009, there were a number of demonstrations by militants who were disarmed in Bayelsa states. Their agitation was over the fact that they are accommodated in dilapidated buildings as well as the non-payment of their allowances. This is clearly an issue of great concern, because, in the words of Ojo Maduekwe, Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, “the militants have accepted the amnesty and surrender, now we need to fulfill our commitment that they are rehabilitated.” Second, there is the need for the government to address the root cause of the violence in the Niger Delta: the gross injustice done to the people of the Niger Delta over the years. We have already mentioned that the conflict

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started from somewhere. The issue of resource control must be addressed, and obnoxious laws that deny the Niger Delta people ownership of their land, such as the 1999 Constitution and the Petroleum Act, must be amended. Though the Federal government has approved the payment of 10 percent equity to oil-producing regions as of January 2010, which is highly laudable and a step in the right direction, the fact remains that many good ideas often end up in bureaucratic bottlenecks. This is especially true when we consider that the details of the equity package are yet to be worked out and that deliberations have not started in the National Assembly. Therefore, there is a need for quick action to be taken so as to restore the Delta people’s confidence in the Federal government of Nigeria, whose actions, over the years, have left little to be desired. The third point of concern is the passive involvement of the international and local communities. So far the level of participation in the peace process in the Niger Delta by both local and international observers, communities and other stake-holders in the region has been very low and this is very worrisome. This is so because peace processes in the entire world require the robust participation of all stake-holders, which in turn increases the level of confidence in the process. Thus, we hold to the view that mechanisms should be put in place to encourage the participation of the communities and civil society organizations, particularly women and youth groups. Fourth, those who have over the years been responsible for the massive looting of allocations to the Niger Delta must be held accountable. Leaders like Peter Odili who are alleged to have consistently stolen directly from the coffers of their states, sometimes in complicity with government and non-government actors, should be made to account publicly for their theft and greed, which have contributed and created the present situation in the Niger Delta. What all this means is that a lasting peace cannot be created in a region that had a number of their public officers indicted for allegedly siphoning billions of Nigeria from the wealth of their states without providing accountability, justice, education, health and other necessities for the survival of a people. This is even truer, when one considers that from 1999 to 2007 the Delta State alone received 463 Billion Naira from federal sources, while it accrued less revenue by itself during the same period (Igbuzor 2007). The amount quoted is more than the added allocation to five states (Anambra, Gombe, Ekiti, Nassarawa and Plateau). It is only when the aforementioned factors are brought into the scheme of things that we can begin to think about an end of the crisis that has engulfed the region for nearly four decades. As Konyinsola Ajayi puts it, “it is a shame that Delta State is not a mini-Dubai of the Niger Delta today given the enormous resources that have been allocated to the state.” Fifth, there is a need for the government to work against the growing perception amongst Nigerians that it is unable to solve the nation’s problems. This is so because at one point in time the nation was seen to be held to ransom

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and no one seems to have had answers to the lingering questions that it was faced with. This is true when one considers that there seems to be no solution to the constant cases of armed robbery and kidnapping in most parts of the country. A number of key sectors of the economy are either embarking on repeated strike actions in favour of basic amenities that should be provided by any serious government or they are coming out of one. What is indeed curious about these times of national incident is that the President is normally absent from the country – for example, the President was in Brazil at the time of the Boko Haram attacks that killed an estimated 700 Nigerians, and visited Saudi Arabia twice during the over four months of strike by the Academic Staff Union of Nigeria Universities (ASUU). There is the perception that the president “has checked out of his role as president – a non-option for Nigeria and its people” (Nigerian Curiosity 2009). This perception left some militants concerned about the government offer for peace. Sixth, the current Petroleum Industry Bill that is under consideration by the National Assembly strangely lacks an effective strategy for the environmental, which is an international concern, and the ownership concerns of the various peoples of the Delta region. The fact that these key issues that have been a burning issue in most of the discussion about the Niger Delta continues to raise eyebrows over the sincerity of the Amnesty process and the current government. Seventh, the fact that amnesty has been offered to those who have taken up arms against the government, in contrast to those who despite their situation have been peaceful and law abiding citizens creates the notion that being a bad egg receives a lot of reward. For the peace in the Delta to work, there is the need to make available social amenities to all the people of the Niger Delta so that some will not feel ”hard done by”, thereby going to the trenches to seek redress for their grievances with the government. Eighth, efforts must be made to remove politics from the peace process. The obvious struggle between the administration of Timipre Silva of Bayelsa State and Ndutimi Alaibe over who will be the next occupant of the Government House in Yenagoa should be set aside because the current issue at hand “needs to be dispassionately tackled so that the amnesty deal does not get scuttled.” With this in mind the two Timis will quietly sheath their sword for the good of the people of the Niger Delta. Finally, the large numbers and sophistication of arms that was turned over by the militant should be a source of concern to those in the appropriate quarters and Nigerians as a whole. There is a need to find out the source of their procurement, the method of funding the procurement and their points of entry into Nigeria. This should be a prioritized post mortem because it has a lot of security implications for not only the region but the country, especially when one considers that this is not the first time that amnesty has been offered to militants in the region. In 2004 the Obasanjo government paid as much as $2,800 to militants for each surrendered weapon, regardless of condition or

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quality. The offer was made at a time when an AK-47 machine gun cost $350 on the international market.

Lessons for the Global Community The decision to grant amnesty to the militants in the Niger Delta has lessons not only for Nigerians but for the global community. In most countries in the world genuine struggles for basic human rights are often denounced as ‘terrorism’. To this end, a number of governments (Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) are engaged in all-out wars with different militants groups in their territory. The amnesty process has shown that groups which seem difficult to deal with can be brought to the table and that there are alternative means of ending dispute other than all-out warfare. On several occasions, the attacks on oil wells in the Niger Delta led to an increase in the price of oil on the world market, as the much-needed supply of oil on the international market was affected by the reduction in oil output from Nigeria. Thus, it is clear that incessant militant attacks in the Delta had adverse consequences. On the other hand, the current peace in the region has led to an increase in Nigeria crude oil export which has affected the global market. Finally, on June 8, June 2009, Shell Petroleum Cooperation abruptly settled the human rights suit it was facing from activists from Ogoniland by agreeing to pay $15.5 million in compensation for its role in the death of the Ogoni 9 and the destruction of the Delta (BBC News, June 9, 2009). What is clear from this case is that the international community and environmental activists are no longer looking the other way while multinational companies, with the consent of national government, continue to destroy the earth. The current amnesty and the subsequent ceasing of hostilities in the Niger Delta will open new investigations as to which extent multinational firms have destroyed the environment and as to at what level it will affect the international community, thereby making the provision of international laws possible that will hold multinational companies responsible for polluting the environment.

Conclusion The decision of the Federal government to grant amnesty to the militants in the Niger Delta is a welcome development. However, it is important that those grave areas that have contributed to the Niger Delta degenerating into a theatre of violence should be studied and solutions proffered. The genuine grievances of the people must be looked into and not shoved under the carpet. All sides

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should be sincere with one another. It is only when this is done that we can be in the position to conclude that the amnesty will be successful.

References Adebayo, S 2009, ‘Niger Delta: Why we met with MEND – FG’, Punch Newspaper. 16 November. Available at: . [15 May 2012]. – / Olusola, F 2009, ‘15,000 Militants accepted amnesty-FG’, Punch Newspaper. 9 October. Available at:< http://www.punchng.com>. [12 May 2012]. Adekanye, JB 2001, ‘From Violence to Politics: Key Issues Internationally’. Paper presented at the Ethnic Studies Network Conference, INCORE University of Ulster, Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland. – 2007, Linking Conflicts Diagnosis, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management in Contemporary Africa: Selected Essays, Ababa Press, Lagos. Ayankola, M / Adebayo, S 2009, ‘‘N’Delta leaders disagree on 10 % JV allocation’, Punch Newspaper. 21 October. Available at: . [13 May 2012]. Chiedozie, I 2009, ‘10 % Equity : No more justification for militancy in the N’Delta – FG’, Punch Newspaper. 6 November. Available at: . [15 May 2012]. Ejiofor, A 2009, ‘Amnesty – The Country’s Crude Output Rises’, This Day Newspaper. 25 September. Available at: . [12 May 2012]. Igbuzor, O 2009, ‘After Disarmament: What Next?’. Paper presented at the Official Launch of Association of Women Improvement in the South South, AWISS. Isine, I / Akasike, C 2009, ‘MEND declares indefinite ceasefire, commends Yar’adua’, Punch Newspaper. 26 October. Available at: . [13 May 2012]. Niger Delta Amnesty, Dividend? Nigerian Curiosity. Available at: www.nigeriancuriosity.com [20 November 2009]. Okonta, I / Douglas, O 2001, Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta, Sierra Books, New York. Ukeje, C 2005, Oil Capital, Ethnic Nationalism and Civil Conflicts in the Niger Delta. Ph.D thesis, Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University.

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Hellen Lamunu

Healing the Wounds of War in Uganda through Traditional Methods of Reconciliation?

Traditional rituals of reconciliation or reintegration have received renewed attention in the last decades, especially in those Sub-Saharan countries that experienced civil war and unrest. The following study looks at the conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, and the Ugandan government. It discusses the fate of children or young adults who were forcibly recruited into the LRA and, as a result, suffered from traumatic experiences. The first part sketches various psychological aspects of trauma, while the second part describes several traditional rituals and asks to what extent these practices may foster the process of healing and reconciliation in Uganda.

Understanding Trauma Defining Trauma The term trauma is derived from the Greek word for „wound“; it refers to any bodily injury. According to Carolyn Yoder (2005), trauma is a reaction to anything from a stressful day to a brutal murder. By this definition, traumatic events vary in magnitude. Some events may be traumatic to some people, while others may not be traumatized by the same event. On the other hand, trauma can be looked at in terms of its characteristics, e. g. a feeling of intense fear, helplessness, loss of control, or threat of annihilation. Trauma is an injury that can be physically or emotionally inflicted. This type of injury, caused by an acute experience that is beyond the range of normal experience or suffering, can interfere with the brain’s ability to function properly, both psychologically and physically. When used as a psychiatric term, trauma refers to any experience that is painful, distressful, or shocking, which may result in lasting mental and physical effects. Psychiatric trauma is essentially a normal response to an extreme event. It involves the creation of emotional memories about the distressful event that are stored in structures deep within the brain. In general, it is believed that the more direct the exposure to the traumatic event, the higher the risk for emotional harm. For example, in a school shooting a student who is injured will be most severely affected emotionally ; the student

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who witnesses a classmate being shot, even killed, is likely to be more emotionally affected than the student who was in another part of the school when the violence occurred. However, even second-hand exposure to violence can be traumatic. For this reason, all children and adolescents exposed to violence or a disaster, even if only through graphic media reports, should be watched for signs and symptoms of psychiatric trauma; the same applies to adults. Various scholars define trauma in different ways. Judith Herman describes traumatic events as „something extraordinary, not because they occur rarely, but rather because they overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations to life” (Herman 1997, p. 33). Traumatic events generally involve threats to life or bodily injury. Such events confront human beings with a different reality, evoking feelings of helplessness and terror. In particular, two conditions make an event traumatic. First, there is the nature of the event itself, usually involving actual or feared death or serious physical or emotional injury. Second, there is what the event means to the victim. Some experiences, such as the death of a loved one, violence in combat or rape are likely to be traumatic for some persons. Other events may be traumatic to one person but not another, since the way in which a person experiences and gives meaning to the event is just as important as the event itself.

Trauma and the Human Brain The brain is the center of the nervous system and a highly complex organ. It monitors and regulates the body’s actions and reactions. It continuously receives sensory information, rapidly analyses this data and then responds, controlling bodily actions and functions. For example, the brain-stem controls a person’s breathing, heart rate, and other automatic processes. The neocortex is the center for higher-order thinking, learning and memory. The cerebellum is responsible for the body’s balance, posture and the coordination of movement. When trauma occurs, the part of the brain which controls the verbal, linear sequencing, and the processing of the positive emotions shut down, thus leaving the person unable to verbalize and recall the order or the details of the event. The signs and symptoms of trauma are manifold, including nightmares, an inability to sleep, depression, mental dissociation, or chronic illness. The response to the stress caused by critical incidents can vary depending upon the nature of the traumatic event, the level of stress during the traumatic event, our prior exposure to traumatic events, and the support systems available in the aftermath of the traumatic event. In addition, the feeling of numbness is common. Other feelings and reactions include shock, disbelief, confusion, or guilt.

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Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among former Child-Soldiers PTSD is an anxiety disorder that can occur after a traumatic event. Christoph Pierre Bayer conducted a study regarding the link between PTSD symptoms and willingness to reconcile in ex-child soldiers of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He asserts that „post-traumatic stress might be an important factor influencing post-conflict situations and may contribute to cycles of violence found in war-torn regions“ (Bayer 2008, p. 126). PTSD symptoms include irritability, outbursts of anger, sleep difficulties, concentration problems, extreme vigilance and exaggerated, startled responses. A person may initially respond to the trauma with horror or helplessness and persistently relive the event. In a further study, children reported that they had been violently recruited, served an average of 38 months, and witnessed beatings, shootings and rape. More than half of them said they had killed somebody. Often, they had been compelled to help beat or hack to death fellow child captives who were attempting to escape. These traumatic experiences left about a third of the children interviewed with symptoms of PTSD. Moreover, former childsoldiers with severe symptoms of PTSD were significantly less willing to consider reconciliation and instead regarded acts of retaliation as a way to overcome their experiences. The results indicate a link between posttraumatic stress and attitudes toward reconciliation and support the need to promote both physical and psychological care for children affected by war (Bayer / Klasen / Adam 2007). Moreover, three aspects of trauma are particularly important: 1) Trauma affects a person psychologically. The typical response to a threat would be the desire to run away or to fight for survival. However, when the combination of terror and helplessness is overwhelming, the body may freeze in response. One is unable to think, move or even talk. Freezing traps the intense trauma energy, as it were, in the nervous system. If it is not discharged or integrated within a few days or weeks, this constriction of energy is believed to produce common trauma reactions later. 2) Trauma shatters meaning. A traumatic event shatters the world as we know it, leaving a person disordered, disempowered, and feeling disconnected from other people and from life. Common responses to trauma include anger, anxiety, depression, and asking questions that are both personal and global. 3) Trauma creates needs. A traumatized person has a number of needs. Such needs include social support needs, social or affection needs, psychological needs, spiritual needs and economic needs. People who have been traumatized need to know and understand what happened. They often desire information, but they also may need opportunities to tell their stories and to „restore“ their life. However, the most urgent need for trauma survivors is often safety and security – physically, emotionally

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and spiritually. A sense of community or togetherness is essential for helping individuals feel supported and cope with their reactions to traumatic events. While these feelings have a place in the grieving process, attention should be paid to acts of aggression that might frustrate building a feeling of community. An individual might look to express hostility towards others that had nothing to do with the traumatic event. Such actions divide the community, promoting distrust and irrational hate that hamper the healing process. In contrast, a sense of community can be fostered by being aware that people experience different reactions to traumatic events or by reaching out and providing support by listening to others, giving them space to voice their feelings. The next part discusses processes that shall enable individual persons to come to terms with his or her past and to be reintegrated into their communities after suffering from traumatic experiences. I am convinced that such reintegration is an important element in the national process of reconciliation in Uganda and other African countries. It should be regarded not as alternative to judicial processes of dealing with the past, but as a way to complement the legal system and provide new means of reconciliation and healing in post-conflict societies.

Alternative Responses to Traumatic Experiences through Traditional Methods of Reconciliation In 1962, Uganda gained independence, with Milton Obote becoming the first president.1 In 1971, Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin and went into exile in Tanzania. Amin himself was ousted in 1979. In 1986, Yoweri Museveni became president, and soon afterwards the insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which until 1991 was called Uganda Christian Democratic Army (UCDA), began, which caused tens of thousands of casualties and displaced almost a million people. Repeatedly, mediation attempts were launched. The amnesty act of 2000 offered exemption from criminal prosecution or any other punishment by the state for those insurgents who were willing to lay down their weapons. A person could obtain amnesty in four steps: reporting to local leaders or authorities with the request for amnesty ; renouncing the military insurgency ; returning the weapons; receiving the amnesty certificate. Persons in custody had to report to prison offices, judges or magistrates and were referred to the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), which then investigated the charges and decided on the eligibility for amnesty. The greatest challenge to the peace process was the lack of trust between the LRA and the Ugandan government and the lack of goodwill by parties towards the peace talks. 1 For a good overview of Uganda’s history and the use of the Acholi in Northern Uganda as a tool of British divide-and-rule policy, cf. Ojera Latigo 2008, pp. 86 – 87.

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Traditional leaders or elders from the Acholi community in Northern Uganda, where many persons, especially teenagers, were forced to fight for the LRA, advocate the use of traditional reconciliation ceremonies as mechanisms for reintegration in a post-conflict context.2 The 1995 constitution explicitly allowed these practices, and in June 2007, during the peace talks in Juba (Sudan), the Ugandan government and the LRA agreed that mato oput ceremonies in particular should play a role in future attempts to establish a just peace. According to Acholi customs, when an offender declares that he or she has committed an offense, a special conflict management system is triggered. Certain kinds of behavior are identified as kir, i. e., taboo. They range from the criminal to the anti-social, including violent acts, disputes over resources, or sexual misconduct. Clans must then cleanse the kir through specific rituals. Thus, communal values are affirmed. The traditional mechanisms represent important channels for reintegration and reconciliation which might be adopted in other contexts. The ceremonies can also impact children’s ability to reconcile with their parents. They differ from Western models of addressing trauma, which emphasize psychotherapeutic recounting and remembering experiences, and instead pursue the goal to create a rupture with the past. In the following, we will look at three such mechanisms, mato oput, „the bending of the spears”, and „the stepping on an egg”.

Mato Oput Mato oput literally means „drinking from the oput tree”. The smashed roots of the trees are used to prepare a bitter drink that is shared at the peak of the ceremony. The ritual is widely acknowledged and accepted among the Acholi people.3 It specifically deals with a premeditated or accidental killing that occurred in the community. It is the final act, concluding the process of reconciliation that follows the event. The ritual aims at re-establishing relationships that have been suspended between the conflicting parties due to the killing. It is carried out only after a successful round table discussion and negotiation between the involved parties. Otherwise, the ritual would be meaningless. The willingness of the offended side to engage in the resolution process allows the offending side to assume responsibility. In addition, the readiness and ability to pay adequate (but not excessive) compensation, culu kwor, is an essential ingredient of the process leading up to the ceremony. Common forms 2 The following paragraphs draw on the article by Rose & Ssekandi (2008). Although traditional leaders may have not had a clear legal status for most of the last century, their legitimacy was largely acknowledged, and many of them continued to operate informally. 3 For a detailed description of the rite, cf. Ojera Latigo 2008, pp. 103 – 104.

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of compensation are the giving of animals (cattle) or money. After the compensation has been given, the oput is drunk by both parties at the same time from the same calabash, with hands held behind their backs and heads knocking against each other throughout the process. The oput juice is bitter, thus representing the bitterness of the conflict, and red in color, thus symbolizing the blood of the life lost. The ritual also pays tribute to a spiritual concern. If the ceremony is not completed, the spirit (cen) of the person murdered might haunt the offender by causing misfortune to his or her family or clan. This belief is often a strong motivation for someone who has killed a person to initiate and support the process, especially if the killer is haunted by nightmares or disturbed by diseases that could be interpreted as being spiritrelated. The Bending of the Spears This ceremony, gomo tong, marks the end of violent conflict between clans or tribes. It functions like a cease fire and again includes compensation. The parties vow that the killings will not be renewed. Each clan then bends a spear and gives it to the other clan, thus signaling that renewed violence will ‘fall back on them’. The British scholar Dennis Pain (1997) conducted a series of studies in Acholi. He concluded that a viable and principled peace could only come from the application of a suitable traditional mechanism for achieving reconciliation. This would produce a public process that emphasizes investigation of the truth and acknowledgement of wrongdoings, involving the whole community. Stepping on an Egg (Nyono Tong Gweno) Traditionally, when someone had been away from home for a period of time and then returned, a cleansing ritual had to be performed at the entrance to the clan settlement. This is related to the belief that outside the home people could contract spirits which, if they are not cleansed, would then bring misfortune to the whole community. Such cleansing rituals were also applied to people who came back from captivity by the LRA. At the same time, the purpose of stepping on the egg goes beyond that of a mere cleansing ceremony. It can also be performed when a member has left the clan after a quarrel or disagreement within the community. The process then acts as a gesture of welcome and the commitment by both sides to live together in harmony once again. The procedure includes three items: an egg, a twig from the opabo tree, and a long stick (layibi) for opening the granary. An egg is put on the path leading to the homestead, placed between a split opobo twig, and the stick is laid behind it. On his way to the homestead the returnee steps on the egg and passes over the stick. With this brief act, the „stepping on the egg“ ceremony,

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in its narrowest sense, is complete. Hence, it can be performed without much preparation, due to the easy availability of the basic requirements for the ritual which even poor households can afford. The returnee, or formerly abducted person, steps on a raw egg that symbolizes innocence or purity. The crushed egg shell represents how impurity crushes the community’s life. The twig from the opobo tree symbolizes the cleansing, because soap is traditionally made from the opobo tree. Finally, The layibi is the stick for opening the granary and thereby marks the individual’s return to eating where he or she has eaten before. It also symbolizes that the returning ‘children’, or young adults, shall be kept properly and that keeping them is not the responsibility of one family but of each clan member. The ceremony can also be a symbol for „taking on a new life” (McKay / Mazurana 2004, p. 48). In the last decade, large-scale collective ceremonies of „stepping on the egg” were organized by the organization Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA). Victims of the LRA in Acholi included parents, brothers, sisters and village friends of former LRA fighters, which caused deep fissures in the community. The traditional processes are designed to discover the truth and to obtain acknowledgement of wrongdoing in a way the criminal justice system does not envisage. With the act of compensation, individuals can seal the acknowledgement of wrongdoing and help victims to come to terms with their traumatic past. The process takes place in public and involves both clans. The required compensation has a meaning, affordability is taken into account and the exact amount or item is determined by elders. Objections to Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Procedures Although many tribal chiefs as well as the Ugandan Amnesty Commission advocated the use of traditional mechanisms, the latter may fall short of promoting justice. In the last years, the application of such mechanisms to atrocities committed by the LRA has been questioned for a variety of reasons, and there has been an international debate about the merit or drawbacks of traditional practices. Some observers pointed out that the mato oput ceremony is well known in Uganda but may be not easily applicable by other tribes with a different cultural background from the Acholi. Many non-Acholi persons in Uganda (and southern Sudan) who were also affected by the LRA conflict have relatively little knowledge of traditional justice ceremonies and thus might not consider them to be sufficient. Moreover, the ceremony has not been used continuously nor everywhere, so that younger people question its relevance. In particular, the ceremonies may not have a significant impact when communities are unwilling to reintegrate former LRA fighters. Community leaders and victims sometimes are divided on the issue of justice, accountability, and reconciliation. Some victims

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evidently prefer retribution instead of reconciliation. Hence, even if a community accepts former perpetrators who return into their circle, individual victims might not want to grant forgiveness for serious crimes. In turn, former child-soldiers might find it difficult to return to villages where they massacred their neighbors or sometimes even their relatives.4 Finally, mato oput in its traditional form applied only to minor cases of manslaughter but not to wanton killing, rape or mutilation, nor to killings between enemies during a civil war. Thus, the ceremonies may be insufficient given the scale of the LRA atrocities, or they may not be possible at all, since they can be performed only when the identities of the perpetrator and the victim are known. Clans may not be willing to accept responsibility for actions of former LRA fighters. In this context, it is also noteworthy that the ritual of stepping on an egg, which was often performed in response to the war between the LRA and the Ugandan government, is a ritual of purification when a person returns to his or her community, rather than reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.5 Perhaps the blurring of the symbolic distinctions between rituals calls for the creation of new „hybrid judicial mechanisms” (Griswold 2007, p. 158) which can foster the process of reconciliation in new and unexpected ways. In addition, specific shortcomings of both the amnesty process and traditional reconciliation or reintegration practices might be alleviated by a truth commission and by a monitored reparations process (Rose 2008). The time has come, not only in Uganda, for an attempt „to reconcile the two systems of thought – retributive justice and restorative justice – and on that basis envision a more synthesized and comprehensive approach to peace and war” (Ojera Latigo 2008, pp. 108 – 109).

References Allen, T 2007, ‘The International Criminal Court and the invention of traditional justice in Northern Uganda’, Politique africaine, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 147 – 166. Available at: http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=POLAF_107_0147 [29 October 2013]. Bayer, CP / Klasen, F / Adam, H 2007, ‘Association of Trauma and PTSD Symptoms with Openness to Reconciliation and Feelings of Revenge among Former Ugandan 4 According to a report in the New York Times Magazine, many former child soldiers have reportedly “returned from the bush to find themselves homeless. They cannot go back to villages where people recall the night they returned with the rebels and massacred their relatives and neighbors–and sometimes, even, their own parents” (Thernstrom 2007, p. 38). 5 This is pointed out in the critical study of Tim Allen (2007, p. 153). A balanced consideration is offered by Charles L. Griswold. He concludes that “the ritual is a mixed case: part political apology, part amnesty, part pardon” (Griswold 2007, p. 171).

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and Congolese Child Soldiers’, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 298, pp. 555 – 559. Bayer, CP 2008, Psychisches Trauma und Versöhnung bei ehemaligen Kindersoldaten – eine Feldstudie aus Uganda und der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, PhD Thesis, University of Hamburg. Griswold, CL 2007, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Herman, J 1997, Trauma and Recovery : The Aftermath of Violence – from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, Basic Books, New York. McKay, S / Mazurana, D 2004, Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After the War, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Montreal. Available at: http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/Gov ernment/wps_wherearethegirls_girlsfightingfrocesinugandasierraleoneandmo zambique_march2004.pdf [28 October 2013]. Ojera Latigo, J 2008, ‘Northern Uganda: Tradition-Based Practices in the Acholi Region’ in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning from African Experiences, eds L Huyse / M Salter, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, pp. 85 – 120. Available at: www. idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Traditional_Justice_and_Recon ciliation_after_Violent_Conflict.pdf [10 November 2013]. Pain, D 1997, The Bending of Spears – Producing Consensus for Peace / Development in Northern Uganda, A report commissioned by International Alert, London. Rose, C / Ssekandi, FM 2007, ‘The Pursuit of Traditional Justice and African Traditional Values: A Clash of Civilizations – The Case of Uganda’ International Journal on Human Rights, no. 7, pp. 101 – 125. Available at: http://www.surjour nal.org/eng/conteudos/pdf/7/ rose.pdf [28 October 2013]. Rose, C 2008, ‘Looking Beyond Amnesty and Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms in Northern Uganda: A Proposal for Truth-Telling and Reparations’, Boston College Third World Law Journal, vol. 28, pp. 345 – 400. Available at: http:// lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ twlj/vol28/iss2/4 [17. October 2013]. Thernstrom, M 2005, ‘Charlotte, Grace, Janet and Caroline Come Home’, The New York Times Magazine, 8 May, p. Yoder, C 2005, The Little Book of Trauma Healing: When Violence Strikes and Community Is Threatened, Good Books, Intercourse, PA.

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Martin Leiner

Films about the Genocide in Rwanda 1994 An Example of the Moral Landscape Method (MLM) in Media Analysis

Ethics and Film Many films, movies as well as documentaries, have important ethical dimensions. In fact, the ethical dimensions are always present in films, but they rarely are explored in precise terms or by means of methodological reflection. One reason might be that media studies often are committed to quantitative approaches in social science or aesthetics, at the expense of normative and hermeneutical approaches. In this article, I use the terms “ethics” and “morals” synonymously. They refer to two basic phenomena: first, the evaluation of the behavior, thinking or the way of life of persons in terms of ‘good’, ‘just’, ‘responsible’, ‘honest’ or ‘evil’, ‘bad’, ‘unjust’, ‘irresponsible’, ‘despicable’. Films express many evaluations of behavior. This often happens implicitly rather than explicitly. The second phenomenon concerns the task of “ethics” or “morals”. They deal with questions that arise in certain situations. A central question is ‘How do you decide, so that the decision stands in accord with what is morally good or best?’ In the context of this article, the task is to find explicit and implicit ethical elements in films. In addition, we deal with a third factor : the construction of a world-view, or even an entire philosophy, which is relevant for ethics but is more closely related to issues of spirituality or religion. For example, a movie like “Peaceful Warrior” (Victor Salva, USA 2007) cannot be understood without considering the spiritual world it portrays. The ethical dimensions are found in different genres of movies and documentaries. Without pretending to be exhaustive, we can distinguish five different types: Heroes and Models of Ethical Behavior A number of films describe a particular person as a hero or as model of impressive and ethically good, or even outstanding, behavior. Often this person at first is an ordinary or even morally incorrect person. He or she is a person who learns and who takes us along an ethical journey, as it were. For example, “Schindler’s List” (Steven Spielberg, USA 1993) describes Oscar Schindler as a person who evolves from being a very ambiguous member of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), profiting from the

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German occupation of Poland, to becoming a very courageous and intelligent savior of many Jews in Krakow. His ethical attitude and his values are honored and reinforced by the movie. The Russian film “Resurrection/Woskresenje” (Michail Schweizer, USSR 1961), after the novel by Lev Tolstoy, is another example of this type. The endings of the films can be different. Since most films tell a story, in the simple version the hero will be victorious, his actions resulting in honor, glory and happiness. In some films, an element of the injustice of the world may be represented. In others, the tragedy of the hero can reinforce our commitment to the ethical message of his life. In Christianity, this effect is confirmed by the death of Jesus Christ and the commitment of his disciples. “The Last Samurai” (Edward Zwick, USA/Japan 2003) offers another example of the tragic hero. The tragic end of the film also modifies the ethical message of the film. This leads us to the next category. The Sad Developmental Story (Negative Version of Entwicklungsroman) The German term Entwicklungsroman describes a narrative focused on the intellectual, ethical, or spiritual development of the main character, for example the Medieval “Parzival” epic, Goethe’s novel “Wilhelm Meister”, and Hermann Hesse’s “Siddhartha”. Normally, the central person evolves through crises, hardships, and guilt, thus becoming wiser and a better integrated personality. In films, these stories belong to the first type. Nevertheless, for the last 200 years or so, sad developments of persons have played an important role in literature. Often these stories tell the injustice of life and society that destroys a promising and noble or, at least, a poor and suffering personality. One example of this kind of stories, “Tess of the d’Urbervilles – A Pure Woman faithfully presented” by Thomas Hardy was several times made into a movie, for example, “Tess” by Roman Polanski (F/GB 1979). In other movies, the blindness and guilt of the personalities who destroy their own life is emphasized. The German anti-war and anti-Nazi movie “Die Brücke” (Berhard Wicki, G 1959) tells the story of German boys who during World War II defend a bridge to the bitter end. All of them, except for one, perish. Another example is “Time of The Gypsies/Dom za vesanje” by Emir Kusturica (Yugoslavia 1988). It tells the story of Perhan and other Roma persons who seem to have a good chance to achieve happiness but instead destroy it. These films have other important dimensions, but their ethical impact lies in the fact that they can stimulate reflections like: ‘What should one avoid and what should one do, in order not to destroy one’s own and other people’s life and happiness?’ It is an indirect ethical impact, which depends on the viewer accepting a certain point of view. If not, the films still provoke understanding, empathy, and compassion, which can also be considered to be ethically relevant. The first type mostly provokes courage and feelings like dignity and

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pride, very often it places one single person in the center ; the second type often tells the tragedy of an entire group, as it is the case in “Die Brücke”. Stories about Relationships An important topic of ethics is the reflection upon good relationships, for example, the qualities of a good friend, a good husband or wife, a good teacher, and a good brother or sister. Movies that belong to this type show people in difficult situations in their relation to each other. They affirm certain ideas or values regarding the relations. Often they construct a larger narrative, in which these relational stories show how relationships are challenged and maintained, or not. Films show positive and negative examples of these relationships. Bob Reiner’s film “The Bucket List” (USA 2007) shows the values of friendship between men. “Jules et Jim” by FranÅois Truffaut (F 1962) is another example of this type. It portrays an unusual friendship and love story between two men, Jules and Jim, and a woman, Catherine. Although the three share moments of joy and happiness, eventually Catherine decides to kill herself and Jules by driving her car into the river. Jim is left behind and mourns the death of his friend and his lover. Presenting Ethical Dilemmas A number of films expose ethical problems. Sometimes they suggest a solution without much discussion, like “Million Dollar Baby” (Clint Eastwood, USA 2004), concerning the question of assisted suicide. Other films show that decisions taken by individuals, politicians, military commanders or other persons in charge of responsible action are ethically ambiguous. Steven Spielberg produced an entire series of ethical dilemma movies, such as “Saving Private Ryan” (USA 1998), about risking the life of many soldiers to save the life one, “A.I.-Artificial Intelligence” (USA 2001), about the rights of robots that develop feelings and consciousness, or “Munich” (USA/CA/F 2005), about the ambiguous effects of the state-organized assassinations of the presumed kidnappers of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich 1972 (“Munich”). Discovering the Truth Finally, there are films, mostly documentaries but also movies, that aim to show the truth about historical events or human behavior. For example, “Aghet” (Eric Friedler, G 2010), about the Armenian genocide 1915, has the explicit intention to counter the consistent official Turkish denial that a genocide took place. Other films have the intention to humanize and to give a voice and a face to the victims, the bystanders or the perpetrators of an

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important historical event. Clint Eastwood’s films “Letters from Iwo Jima” (USA 2006) and “Flags of our Fathers” (USA 2006) show a battle of the Pacific War between Japanese and American soldiers from two different perspectives. The movies give the soldiers from both sides a human face and correct the images of “brutal Japanese” and “heroic American” soldiers. Ethical values like the importance of historical truth and the understanding of the other side are promoted. In documentaries, the main topic can be informing and telling of the truth about parts of human history and collective identities. Although we can distinguish the ethical implications of films in more detail, these examples shall suffice. One could also add that in many films there are explicit dialogues on ethical issues, off-camera comments with ethical evaluations, or even scenes where the message is explained. At the end of FranÅois Truffaut’s movie “Small change/Argent de poche” (F 1976) the class teacher gives a speech to explain what to conclude ethically and politically from the case of a pupil whose mother was an alcoholic and who stole to bring her money. We also find a discourse regarding the message of the film at the end of the comedy “Love and Death” by Woody Allen (USA 1975). The main character, Boris Grushenko, talks about the meaning of life, about dying and about God. Some ironic elements show that today this kind of fabula docet scenes only seem acceptable with humor and distance.

Questions of Method For this expos¦, I will use the moral landscape method (MLM) to analyze the ethical elements in films. It is a hermeneutical method. As such, it must be related to empirical and quantitative methods of film studies. One current approach is the presentation of a film to a group of persons and to measure the effects of the film through questionnaires. With this method we get important results as to how the film can be understood. Very often, when questions about ethical issues are asked, the reactions of people differ. These studies are valuable, although they often say more about the viewers, their values, their knowledge, their capacities of understanding, or even misunderstanding, and their current psycho-social situation than about the film itself. According to our method, the film itself should be the ”place” where ethical interpretations can be partly verified or falsified. Our method can lead to new interpretations and new questions that deepen the understanding of the ethical dimensions of films. Regarding film as a genre, the MLM is closer to the methods of Content Analysis. The quantitative and qualitative methods of the latter are helpful to argue more precisely in regard to ethical issues in films. They should be used whenever it is possible. Nevertheless, Content Analysis is too far removed to precisely understand the meaning of a film when employed. For example, the

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use of irony can become a problem for Content Analysis when it is not recognized or its nuances escape the method. Sometimes, Content Analysis uses only the dichotomy of positive vs. negative. A hermeneutical method that wants to enter into a (fictional) dialogue about the meaning of the film and its elements should let the film speak for itself, thus leaving room to learn something new and unexpected. A third approach moral landscaping has to deal with is the author- or director-oriented approach. Here, the comments of the writer and the director, and perhaps of other persons who influenced the production of the film, are very important. Together with the indications in the film the author- or director-oriented approach can describe the intentions and perhaps the ethically relevant ideas that influenced the production. This approach is also important. Nevertheless, like every work of art, a film contains more than that of which the artist is aware, for example, unconscious or unarticulated elements.

Fundamental Assumptions of Moral Landscape Analysis The Need for Orientation To watch a film means to enter or to be taken into another world. The two senses of seeing and hearing are more or less completely occupied by the film. Watching a film is like travelling by airplane. You land in another city, for example, New Delhi. Very quickly you are in a different environment where you do not understand much. The film must explain everything to you: the persons, the time, the main issues, etc. Watching a film is a safe way of being overwhelmed by another world. It is safe because you always know that you can walk out into your normal environment, that your body remains outside the action, and that you are not really inside the film. If you do not give up, but enter into the reality of the film, your activity of trying to find orientation and to interpret is considerably increased. Normally, the film helps the viewers to enter into its world. If the world is very different, there are framing commentaries from the “off”, like: “April 1994. We are in Rwanda. Rwanda is a small State in East Africa. Some days ago a peace agreement has been signed, etc.” These framings try to connect the world of the film with the world of the audience. If there is no explicit framing, the first scenes often help to understand the situation and the main actors. These introductory scenes and framing texts are very important to understand how the viewer is placed into the moral landscape of a film. Sometimes there are already clear ethical evaluations like: “The Hutu extremists are preparing a brutal genocide”. The film gives us ethically colored glasses, as it were, to find our orientation in the

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world of the film. Every moral landscape analysis of a film should describe how the first scenes of a film try to orient the audience.

Emotions as Phenomena of Ethical Resonance Another effective but often overlooked phenomenon is that films create an emotional atmosphere. In some films, the images and the music create an atmosphere of beauty and tenderness, while in other films aggressive feelings or feelings of fear are suggested. In many films the emotional atmosphere changes, often several times. Sometimes, there is a direct cut which provokes a shock, for example, between a beautiful and harmonious scene and sudden violence. Music is a strong tool to create an emotional atmosphere. This atmosphere is ethically relevant because the evaluations and the ethical imagination people develop are in some way co-conditioned by these atmospheres. If in a movie a person constantly appears to a music that suggests fear, it is very difficult to regard this person as trustworthy. If an entire situation, for example the civil war in a country, is presented with the same kind of music, people will more likely think that it would be better not to send (more) foreign troops, or not to hope for peaceful solutions.

Ethical Discussions and Evaluations of Persons Music and other means sometimes suggest an ethical evaluation of persons, situations or decisions. There are also other evaluations, sometimes through other persons in the film. In “Time of the Gypsies”, for example, the grandmother of Perhan tells with sorrow that the character of her son has been spoilt. The sister and the son of Perhan try to call him back to life, but he is already committed to his vengeance, which will lead to his death. Other films show discussions on ethical issues: People see a dilemma and ask themselves if they shall choose this way or another. In the movie “Munich” the people who shall murder the organizers of the attack have several discussions among themselves about what is ethically right or wrong.

The Articulation of Strong Evaluations Sometimes, it is important to articulate moral issues and evaluations. The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor developed a philosophy of articulation which is relevant for understanding films. I quote one his examples of the biker and his unarticulated strong evaluations:

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“We see the leather-jacketed motorcycle rider step away from his machine and swagger toward us with an exaggeratedly leisure pace. This person is ‘saying something’ in the way of moving, acting, speaking. He may have no words for it, though we might want to apply ‘macho’ as at least a partial description. Here is an elaborate way of being in the world, of feeling and desiring and reacting, which involves sensitivity to certain things, […] certain prized pleasures (riding around at high speed with the gang) and other that are despised (listening to sentimental songs); and this way of being is coded as strongly valuable – that is, being this way is admired, and failing to be earns contempt” (Taylor 1995, p. 107).

Here, it is necessary to interpret the non-verbal expression of strong evaluations concerning certain attitudes. These evaluations should be made explicit, at least for the most important persons in a film. In many films, like in real life, persons with different strong evaluation and different value systems have to live together and interact. By articulating the strong evaluations and the value systems, we are not yet necessarily in the field of ethics. As Charles Taylor underlined, against some misunderstandings of his theory, strong evaluations also can have an aesthetical or religious character (Rosa 1998). They can be related to health, money, or a peer-group. According to Taylor, every human being makes strong evaluations in regard to wishes and possibilities a person can resent. Very often, the strong evaluation of persons includes ethical elements.

The Central Idea: Identity, Identification and Moral Landscapes Usually, people understand films through identification, often with one person in the film. Sometimes, this person is the “I” who narrates the story as his or her own story, for example, Boris Grushenko. Or the “I” is a reporter or witness, and another person is the main person with whom people shall identify. In other cases, the camera follows the main person, or one person is in the middle of the plot, like Perhan in “Time of the Gypsies”. The human tendency to identify with a person and to see the world with his or her eyes has an ethical value. Martha Nussbaum argues that the interest and the empathy for other persons enlarges our world-view and creates tolerance, understanding and caring (Nussbaum 1992, Nussbaum 2012). The identification with a person in a film leads to a spontaneous love for this person, because love is, according to Julia Kristeva, the attempt to live with, through and for an Other (Kristeva 1987). Such a love does not have to be limited to one person. When an evil-doer is persecuting the any other person, we feel with this person and cannot stop watching until the danger is over. The moral landscape interpretation focuses on the experiences and moral implications of this identification. For Charles Taylor, human identity implies a landscape of strong evaluations that are important for us. He writes: “To

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know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary” (Taylor 1990, p. 28). When these evaluations become ambiguous, we speak of an identity crisis. As already stated, not all strong evaluations are ethical. In order to describe a moral landscape, we need to underline the ethical part in the evaluation. When a film shows us a hero or a model (Type 1), the identification with this person affects our strong evaluations. The effect can be rather strong, because people watching a film are in another world, they are overwhelmed and disoriented. As a child adapts to the values of its parents, the viewer of a film is willing to enter into the moral landscape of the main identification person. The film confirms and strengthens the values the hero incorporates. Films of Type 2 are more complicated. The identification with the main person and its sad development can create understanding, but it can also reinforce those norms and values that were not respected by the person(s) in the film. For example, the movie “Die Brücke” can lead the viewer to dislike the ideal of “heroism” that animated the German boys. Films of the third type show that relationships can be strong and good. They portray impressive friendships or love-stories, which are sometimes tragic, sometimes happy. Other films show how relationships can be destroyed or destructive from the beginning. In some way the 3rd type repeats the 1st and 2nd type, although it is not the positive or sad hero but the interaction and relation between the characters that are most important. The fourth type of films discusses an ethical problem, often with a change of identification during the film. First, the viewers identify with one solution of the problem, but then they also feel compassion with the suffering of those who are affected by this solution. In “Saving Private Ryan”, the viewer feels empathy with the soldiers who lost their lives. “Munich” contains scenes that portray the victims of the assassinations as sympathetic persons with children and a sense of poetry. These films may leave the viewers in a state of confusion and thus encourage further reflection. The fifth type of films questions an established understanding of the world and of history. It is relatively open for the normal world of the viewers. A film like “Aghet” talks about direct political consequences. Among the films on Rwanda, “As we forgive” is linked to the Living Bricks Campaign, which asks for donations and supports the process of reconciliation. In all types of films there are identifications and persons with moral landscapes. To put them into relationship and to see, if the film is promoting one sight or another is an important method to understand the ethical dimensions of a film.

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Links between the World of the Film and the World of the Viewer A final, important assumption is that films often lead back to the everyday reality of the viewers. There can be direct moral appeals like: “We all should do what we can that genocide will never happen again”. Or the message is delivered in subtle ways, for example by means of an interview with a politician who is still in office or who is well known. Films can mention places, countries or show objects and persons nearer and more familiar to us. Some films talk about the “European” or “Western” population or about “the Germans”, “the Christians”, etc. Such links can help or hinder us from transferring ethical elements from the film into our own life. In any case, the hermeneutics of description shall become a hermeneutics of dialogue, which tries to discuss critically but committed to the “principle of charity” (Davidson 1974, Ch. 13) the ethical dimensions of a film. If a film is related to historical events like the genocide in Rwanda, it is important to ask why certain parts of the history were selected for the film and others were left out. The non-representation of groups or individuals who played an important role in the genocide can have artistic or practical reasons, but it can also be a sign of intentional manipulation. At least, the selection of some parts over others suggests a limited view of history.

Some observations regarding the MLM At the end of the section on the MLM, I want to underline several points: 1. Understanding is more important than the application of a method. The description and the understanding of the ethical dimensions of a film are crucial. Human beings are ‘interpreting animals’ and often understand more, or more precisely, than any method indicates. 2. The MLM can be applied to many films, perhaps even to all films, in which moral agents appear ; and even to other films, too. It reaches its limits when it comes to experimental films or educational films explaining a topic like mathematics. 3. Every film about human acts triggers processes of identification and an evaluation of moral landscapes. The ethical dimensions in a film may be important, even predominant, or they may be secondary. But as long as there are persons on the screen, they cannot be zero.

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Films about the Genocide in Rwanda As far as I know, no article has discussed every film about the genocide in Rwanda. In regard to literary documents, we have the book by Robert Stockhammer, “Ruanda – Über einen Genozid schreiben” (Frankfurt/M. 2005), which treats a good part of the written texts about the genocide. In both cases, film and literature, it is difficult to give an exhaustive overview. There are private documentaries that are not accessible to a wider public. Some films that partially deal with the topic are difficult to find or exist only in a few copies in Rwanda. The following movies and documentaries were available to me:

Movies: – 100 Days (Nick Hughes, GB/Rwanda 2001) – Hotel Rwanda (Terry George, USA/GB/Italy/South Africa 2004) – Shooting Dogs (in the US: Beyond the Gates) (Michael Caton-Jones, GB/D 2005) – Sometimes in April (Raoul Peck, USA/F 2005) – Rwanda, les collines parlent (Bernard Bellefroid, B 2006) – Un dimanche — Kigali/A Sunday in Kigali (Robert Favreau, CAN 2006) – Shake Hands with the Devil. The Journey of Rom¦o Dallaire (Peter Raymont, CAN 2007) – Op¦ration turquoise (Alain Tasma, T¦l¦filme Canal+ F 2007) – Munyurangabo (Lee Isaak Chang, USA/Rwanda 2007) – The Day God Walked Away (Philippe van Leeuw, B/F 2009). – As we forgive (Laura Waters Hinson, USA 2010) – Lignes de front (Jean Chrisophe Klotz, F 2009/2010) – Kinyarwanda (Alrick Brown, USA/Rwanda 2011)

Documentaries: – BBC Panorama Productions: Journey into Darkness (1994), A Culture of Murder (1994), The Bloody Tricolor (1995), Valentina’s Story (1997),When Good Men Do Nothing (1997). PBS-productions: Triumph of Evil (1998), Ghosts of Rwanda (2005). From the Gacaca (pronounce: Gatchaatchaa) Film Series (2002 – 2009): My Neighbor My Killer, Gacaca Living Together in Rwanda?, In Rwanda We Say…The family that does not speak dies, The Notebooks of Memory.

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Other sources: – Hutu Muslim saved Tutsis during Rwandan Genocide (2009). Al Jazeera Keepers of Memory (2004). Documentary by journalist Eric Kabera Umurage (2002). Documentary by Gorka Gamarra Flowers of Rwanda (2008). Documentary by David MuÇoz Intended Consequences, by Jonathan Torgovnik on MediaStorm Flower in the Gun Barrel (2009) Tuez-les tous. Histoire d’un g¦nocide sans importance (2009) Gacaca Justice (2009) A Generation After Genocide (2010). Directed by Torey Kohara and Jonathan Weiman Films with a more general topic: – Exploring Rwanda and Darfur (2006). TV Documentary directed by the PBS. Screamers (2006) documentary by director Carla Garapedian. Genocide: Worse than War (Daniel Goldhagen, PBS production). L’Afrique en morceaux, La trag¦die des grands lacs.(2000) documentary film directed by Jihan El-Tahri (ARTE). Afrikanische Totenklage. Peter Scholl-Latour. Documentary on 3–sat. Some films are documentaries, some are movies, and some include journalistic elements, such as interviews. Many films blend the three categories. The movie “Sometimes in April”, for example, includes archival material from the time of the German colonization to the 1990s (a speech by former USpresident Clinton). Certainly, there are other films or TV productions about the genocide in Rwanda, including reports of the events, individual testimonies (available online), and short films on certain events or topics during and after 1994. At the same time, many documentaries use the same original material, we hear almost the same explanations to frame the events, we see similar plots or a similar set of persons. Sometimes the films even seem to be related more closely to each other than to the multi-faceted and individual reality in Rwanda. The films can be ordered according to our five types: 1. “Shooting Dogs” is the tragic equivalent to “Hotel Rwanda”. Both films tell stories of people who gave shelter to a great number of Hutu refugees in the Rwandan capital Kigali. Both movies relate the same period of time, the 100 days of the genocide, and have a “hero” in the center of the plot. The main

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difference is that in “Hotel Rwanda”, Paul Rusesabagina succeeds in saving most of the lives of the Tutsi refugees in the hotel, whereas in “Shooting Dogs”, Father Christopher cannot save the refugees at “L’Êcole Technique Officielle”. Only a few films place the experience of a victim in the center. “The Day God Walked Away” by Philippe van Leeuw, which tells the story of a Tutsi housemaid, Jacqueline, and her traumatic experiences, is the only clear example of this kind of film. It is a sad story about a woman who gradually loses her will to live. A third group of films shows friendship or family relationship or love between people from different groups. “Munyurangabo” tells the story of two friends, a Hutu and a Tutsi. “Un dimanche — Kigali” tells the love-story of a white man and a Tutsi woman in the middle of the genocide. These stories tell a relational drama inside the genocide drama. Another two films are “Shake Hands with the Devil” about Rom¦o Dallaire’s experience and the French TV production “Op¦ration turquoise” about a group of 150 members of special force units. In both films, soldiers sent by the UN share their specific perspective on the events, the decisions of the politicians and on their own possibilities and limits of rescuing the victims. These films clearly set forth ethical dilemmas while they tell their story. Finally, some documentaries seek to reveal the truth and to destroy (real or alleged) political myths. For example, “Ghosts of Rwanda” claims that Western politicians like Clinton or Madeleine Albright, among others, knew what was happening in Rwanda and that it was happening on a large scale very quickly.1 Another documentary, “L’afrique en morceaux”, uncovers the invasion of Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers into the Democratic Republic of the Cong (DRC), the persecution of (real or alleged) perpetrators of the genocide and the massacres of Hutu refugees committed by Rwandan troops fighting at the side of the later president of Congo, Laurent Desir¦ Kabila.2 The documentary “Tuez-les tous. Histoire d’un genocide sans importance” reveals that the French government of FranÅois Mitterrand evacuated some of the perpetrators and even sent weapons to the Hutu government involved in the genocide. Documentaries with the goal of understanding the situation in Rwanda today are especially

1 For this topic, see also the important book, based on archival research, by Melvern, L 2004, Conspiracy to Murder, Verso, London/New York. She brings sharp accusations against the UN as well as the governments of France, the US and Great Britain. One main accusation in the films of Rom¦o Dallaire or Peter Scholl-Latour is that the genocide could have been stopped if the European and US-troops had been sent not only to rescue the citizen of Western countries. There were at least 1000 French soldiers in Eastern Congo and American Parachute Troops in Burundi who in a short time could have come to Rwanda and perhaps helped to suppress the genocide. 2 See also the documentary “Kisangani diary” (1998) or the beginning of Peter Scholl-Latour, “Afrikanische Totenklage” (2001).

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important. Some of them deal with the question of reconciliation, for example “Gacaca Justice”, “Intended Consequences” (about women who were raped and became pregnant) and “As we forgive”. Although our typology functions well for the films on Rwanda, the classification is not exhaustive, and some films do not fit into the typology. Often we find combinations of the five types. “Sometimes in April” is a combination of a hero story, a documentary with material about the German colonial history, and the story of a relationship between a Hutu and his Tutsi wife as well as between him and his brother, who participates in the genocide. “The Day God Walked Away” combines the story of the housemaid with the story about her relationship with a Hutu man she saves. The very first movie about the genocide is a film that marks the beginning of Rwandese cinema, the “Hilliwood”. It is called “100 Days” (GB/Rwanda 2001) and contains in a nutshell many elements that are found in later films about Rwanda. First of all, it is story about a relationship. The film centers on a pair of young lovers, Bapiste and Josette, and the topic of sexuality, which we find in many other films (especially in “Un dimanche — Kigali”, “The Day God Walked Away”, “Hotel Rwanda”), is evoked. Baptiste wants to sleep with Josette, but she refuses since they are not married. The happiness of the young couple ends when the genocide begins. Josette flees into a Catholic church. The Hutus break into the church and kill hundreds of women and children. Josette is one of the survivors. The priest, a Hutu, saves her life, only to rape her. Josette survives but is deeply traumatized.

Some Reflections on Choices and Omissions in the Films On our list the perspective of Western white actors in Rwanda is overrepresented. Films show the experiences of Canadian and French soldiers in UN missions, they show the dramatic story of a young European teacher and a white priest (“Shooting Dogs”) or a white man in love with a Tutsi woman (“Un dimanche — Kigali”). What is mostly lacking is the perspective of Tutsi men, Tutsi Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers, and the perspective of the perpetrators. Most of the films have been produced in countries with white majorities, like the US, UK, France, Belgium, or Germany for a public in these countries, not for Rwanda or other African countries. In these contexts, white characters serve as a ‘bridge’ for audiences watching the film. Furthermore, most films exclusively focus on Rwanda. The events afterwards in Congo, the situation in the Hutu refugee camps, and the killing of many Hutus, including children, by Tutsi soldiers does not fit the picture and is mostly omitted. Between spring 1994 and fall 1996, at least 2 million people in the region of the Great Lakes were killed (Marysse / Reyntjens 2000). The

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fact that many Hutus were killed in the genocide is widely ignored. According to Reyntjens, 600,000 Tutsi and 500,000 Hutu were killed, many of them by Hutu extremists. Even if these numbers are contested,3 it is generally admitted that there were many Hutus victims. Hence, it is highly problematic to remember only Tutsi victims and to continue the practice of ethnic discrimination. Of course, only the Tutsi as a group were victims of genocide, i. e., an intentionally planned activity to eliminate an entire population. Still, the ethical problem that the notion of genocide prevents one to see the other victims is not addressed in any film on the list. A third omission is the guilt of the Christian churches in Rwanda. With the exception of “As we forgive” and the critical statements of bishop Rucyanhana, the films present a positive image of the churches. Father Christopher in “Shooting dogs” is an impressive personality who stays at the side of the Tutsi. In “As we forgive” the reconciliation work of Christians is well represented. Even in “Op¦ration turquoise”, there is a priest who stays with his parishioners. According to Jean Hatzfeld, during the genocide perpetrators no longer went to church, while Tutsis turned toward churches to find shelter,4 but often did so in vain. Many white priests and nuns accepted to be evacuated by Belgian or UN forces and left. Some Hutu priests and nuns were involved in the genocide. The following witness of a Hutu deacon is representative: “I was a deacon, the one on the hill of Kinbungo who made arrangements for Christian gatherings … During the killings I chose not to pray to God. We had removed the Tutsi from God’s work, from the creation of mankind and even of animals. I sensed that it was not appropriate to involve Him in that … Still, when dread would grip me suddenly in the night, if I had done too much during the day, I would ask God as a personal favor to let me stop just for a few days” (Hatzfeld 2010, p. 178). The guilt of Christian priests is mentioned only in “100 Days”. None of the films asks the question what the genocide means for the Christian faith, especially for the Belgian and French Catholic Mission. Only when you read books there are deeper reflections of the impact of the genocide on the Church. Emmanuel Katongol¦’s deep and important book “Mirror to the Church” clearly underlines the uniqueness of the Rwandan genocide: “Rwanda was the most Christianized country in Africa” (Katongol¦ / Wilson-Hartgrove 2009, p. 19)5, there have been impressive revival and 3 The official statistics of the Rwandese government in 2002 indicates 1.074017 deaths, of which only 10 % were Hutus; Stockhammer discusses different statistics; see Stockhammer 2005, Ruanda. Über einen anderen Genozid schreiben, Frankfurt am Main, p. 44. 4 “The Tutsi turned immediately toward God, hurrying to seek refuge within the churches of Nyamata and Ntarama. Those who could not get there fled into the forests or down to the marshes, where the fugitives formed groups to pray and sing, until the first hunting expeditions appeared. Meanwhile the Hutus abandoned both Catholic and Protestant churches except for the ones sheltering Tutsis, where they went in for the kill” (Hatzfeld 2010, p. 176). 5 Katongol¦ describes his travel to Rwanda as a pilgrimage and Rwanda as a mirror for the Western Church with her lack of ethically relevant commitment to Christian identity.

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Church growth experiences in the last decades of the 20th Century and just in that country, in the Easter week, active and committed Christians killed their active and committed Christian neighbors. “Never before have Christians killed one another in the very spaces where they had worshipped together for generations” (Katongol¦ / Wilson-Hartgrove 2009, p. 34). Rwanda and Katongol¦’s book shows well that the opposite of the Hölderlin perspective also can be true: there is not only peace in the middle of strife, but also deadly violence in the middle of the peace of a Christian community in the Easter week in the beautiful nature of Rwanda. No film discusses these questions. No film discusses the problem whether the Belgium problem of an ethnic divide between Flames and Walloons is in some ways mirrored in the Hutu-Tutsi opposition. Bernard Lugan, “Le genocide, l’Êglise et la d¦mocratie” (Paris. Editions du Rocher 2004) gives some examples of the identification of Tutsi with Walloons among the Belgian colonial administrators in Rwanda in the 1950s. Before, the colonial administration was more or less on the side of the Tutsis, and the Catholic Church in Rwanda was directed in an aristocratic spirit by the French speaking Msgr. Classe, who gave a clear priority to the Tutsis. A fourth omission is the neglect of the small Muslim minority in Rwanda. Some, perhaps many Muslims did not participate in the genocide. This fact is highlighted in the short report Hutu Muslim saved Tutsis during Rwandan Genocide, broadcasted by Al Jazeera.6 But these stories, like the history of the Muslims in Nyamirambo, on the outskirts of Kigali, who refused to cooperate in the genocide, could have been a good source for a movie. So far such a film has not been produced (Katongol¦ 2009). In the following, I offer three analyses with the help of MLM. I choose “Hotel Rwanda” as an example of the 1st type, “The Day God Walked Away” as an example of the 2nd type, and “As we forgive” as an example of documentaries with an ethical message.

Analyzing “Hotel Rwanda” Framing and Introducing the Topic “Hotel Rwanda” offers no general explanation of the genocide or of the history before 1994. It starts with a speech of a Hutu against Tutsis on the propaganda radio “Radio T¦l¦vision libre Milles Collines” (RTLM). Director Terry George says in the booklet that he thus wants to emphasize that the radio station RTLM was the decisive element to provoke the genocide. The radio speaker 6 See also Weingardt MA 2007, Religion macht Frieden. Das Friedenspotential von Religionen in politischen Gewaltkonflikten, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart.

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expresses hate for the Tutsi and says that they collaborated with the Belgian colonial power and that they were coming back to the country. The rest is explained in the film and by the plot. For example, the hero Paul Rusesabagina visits a salesman, whose character is a portrait of the vice-president of the Interahamwe (pronounce: enter-uh-hom-wuh), Georges Rutaganda, known for his hate speeches on RTLM. By chance, a wooden container opens and many machetes fall out. On the way back, a Tutsi in a car is threatened by Interahamwe militias on the street. In this way, the beginning of the film provides a lot of information. Two Italian journalists ask a Rwandese journalist about the history of Hutu and Tutsi. The journalist presents the division of Hutu and Tutsi as an invention of Belgian colonial rule. The tall people are Tutsi, the small Hutus. Yet this information is false. There were conflicts and divisions between Hutus and Tutsis before the colonial rule began, as attested by the first European writing about Rwanda, Richard Kandt’s book Caput Nili. Eine empfindsame Reise zu den Quellen des Nils (1904). Kandt narrates his encounter with a Tutsi man: “The local Hutus are ‘bad’, he told me, and he advised me to make war against them. This is no sign for a great feeling of coherence among the Wanjarunada (the population of Rwanda), as in general Tutsis answer when you complain about Hutus: Kill them!” (Kandt 1919, p. 244).

The Hutu-Tutsi rivalry pre-dates colonial times, as German and French scholars have pointed out. In the 1960s and 1970s Belgian anthropologists published a complex reconstruction of the history of the clans of Rwanda and their reflection in local myths. A particular Tutsi clan, the Nyginya, sometime between the 11th and the 13th century (or later) seems to have set forth the idea that some of the clans living in Rwanda are Tutsi (Tutsi zigaba) like them and that they would be born rulers of the country. In the 15th century, the Tutsi nyiginya founded the Rwandan monarchy and unified the country. They called themselves Ibimanuka, fallen from heaven, to express their superiority and the fact that they came from elsewhere (Hertefeld 1971). In 1934/35, the Belgian administration underlined the difference between Tutsi and Hutu by distributing passports with Hutu and Tutsi identity markers inside. They first preferred the Tutsi, then the Hutu. But they did not invent the rivalry between the two clans. Why does the film commit such an egregious error? “Hotel Rwanda” is a joint production of producers in the US, the UK, Italy and South Africa. In these countries there are very few journalists or filmmakers who read scholarly works, let alone in French or German. No scholarly expert advised the filmmakers.

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Music, Feelings and Horror At first, the celebration of the peace accords of Arusha in the hotel creates mixed feelings changing between hope and fear. This ends when the threat of genocide arises. It starts with a cut of electricity and fearful scenes in the night. The music is dark, but without many dramatizing or loud moments. The film provokes strong feelings, due to the topic and the atrocities, and they are amplified by the music, which is often calm, sometimes creating an ‘African’ atmosphere or mourning after death. The message of the film does not foster the search for ethical solutions regarding violence and revenge, or self-defense and fighting, but rather the feeling of being overwhelmed and powerless in the face of atrocities. There are not many scenes of violence in the film, but these are sufficient to give a sense of complete insecurity and shocking acts of atrocities. One scene in the second half of the film reminds us of a horror film: Paul drives his car in the night. In the fog he believes he has lost the road. But he did not. Suddenly, there are bumps on the road, and he discovers the bodies of slaughtered people. It is the only scene in which we see Paul crying. Paul Rusesabagina, “the Hero” The moral landscape interpretation assumes that every person finds his or her identity in a field of right and wrong. In films, the identity of a central character relates to the identity of the viewer, whose identity is shaped in the field of right and wrong. Sometimes films address an implicit spectator, for example through certain comments, through music, through a person. In “Hotel Rwanda”, the central person clearly is Paul, who constantly is the focus of the camera. In the beginning, the viewer may have a certain feeling of moral superiority towards Paul, who takes bribes, has friends among the people who organize the genocide and, at first, seeks to defend only his own family. But the film creates a stable connection with Paul. He has a sympathetic appearance and way of talking. More and more, he values friendship more than money, which makes it easier to identify with him. The viewer can take part in the development of Paul’s identity. What is Paul’s moral landscape, and how does it evolve during the film? As in Charles Taylor’s example of the Biker, the way Paul moves and talks is already a sign for his moral landscape. He is often relaxed and feels emotions mostly in a tempered way. He speaks friendly, with respect and politeness. He does not become angry even when he is humiliated. He does not show any hate. He is courageous when he approaches the militias and discusses with them. It seems as if he has a superior self-confidence because of his communicative abilities to find the right word for everybody and every situation. He knows the

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importance of reflection and the fact that evil is often fast in nature, so he slows it down to rid it of its power. Even when he becomes the director of the Hotel, he does not force the employees to work but gently asks them to continue their normal work. When he calls Sabena, he only says that the Hutus will kill everybody and thanks him. He does not urge him to help. But his actions have great effect, leading even the French government to help the hotel and the people inside. In the words of Daoism, we can express Paul’s character in one single word: he has the quality of water. His primary quality is shown in several scenes. He easily finds elegant solutions for difficult situations, for example, in a scene in which lobsters were found to be rotten, he proposes to fill them with fish. He accepts to cooperate even with people he dislikes and gives big gifts and bribes to them, even to one of the main organizers of the genocide, General Bizimungu. When a neighbor is arrested and almost killed by soldiers, Paul does not respond to the wish of his wife Tatiana to help him. He says he only helps people belonging to the family. Like Oscar Schindler, to whom he has often been compared, in the beginning of the film Paul is an ambiguous personality who sometimes cheats other people. He does not seem to be burdened too much by ethical concerns. When soldiers come into Paul’s house he escapes by paying money to the chief of the group. In this context, Paul is also threatened to be killed if he does not kill the members of his household, who are Tutsi. When Paul is threatened, this is an example of how a moderate Hutus can become a victim. But he saves himself and the Tutsi by saying that he will buy them out, as it were, with money from the hotel earnings. Here, we witness for the first time regret and division in Paul. In the night, his wife thanks him for his kindness to give shelter to the Tutsis. Paul responds that he has doubts whether he has done the right thing. He fears losing his job. On the one hand, Paul shows very narrow ethics, centered on his own interest and his family. On the other hand, he helps the people who need him. It seems as if Paul does not reflect on this contradiction, but still he develops an attitude of helping others, which becomes more and more important for him, and perhaps due to his deeper being breaking free. He even lies to his family in order to bring them to a secure place and thus fulfill his different responsibilities. When the convoy with the people who are being evacuated leaves, Paul pretends that he also wants to leave together with his wife and family. But in the last moment, he stays behind in the hotel to help protect the refugees. The film slightly resembles a conversion narrative. When Paul’s hope of being protected by Western powers breaks down, he says “I have no memory, I am a fool”. In that situation, his wife Tatiana tells him: “I know who you are.” With the help of his wife, he acknowledges a new identity growing inside him. In the next scenes, Paul is tangibly a new man. He accepts many orphans to the Hotel. When Tatiana asks him to let her leave so Paul and the children may have a higher chance of surviving, he says he will always be at her side. Without a plan and without any hope of being rescued, he takes care of the people who

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need him. When militias enter the Hotel, he calls Sabena’s President Mr. Tillens and receives protection from the French government. Paul also comes up with the idea of finding escape routes by means of a visa for some of the refugees in the Hotel. He tells them to phone their friends in other countries and to talk as if they were holding their hands. He urges them to give their friends the feeling that if they let go, they will lose their friends in the hotel Rwanda forever. The phone calls also create the possibility for Tatiana and for him to leave Rwanda. When his family leaves the Hotel Mille Collines (the “Hotel Rwanda” of the film), his heroism is even greater. He decides to stay with the refugees in the Hotel because he feels responsible for them. Paul is a happy hero. He succeeds in saving the lives of his family and of more than 1,200 refugees. At the end of the film, the refugees thank him. In contrast to Paul, Colonel Oliver, who represents the commander of the UN peacekeeping forces (UNAMIR) Rom¦o Dallaire, is very emotional in his reactions. In one scene he angrily throws his casket to the floor. He drinks liquor (whisky) and in a rude fashion claims that Western nations are spitting in the face of Africans by not helping to stop the genocide. The Perpetrators of the Genocide The perpetrators are represented as two major groups: The chaotic and violent Interahamwe militias and the regular army. In the safe confines of the hotel, there is very little contact with the Interahamwe and more contact with the soldiers. They are under the command of general Bizimungu who is “a friend” and who receives bribes from Paul. In several situations, this contact saves the lives of the refugees in the hotel and the family members of Paul, especially when people with a visa for other countries are trying in vain to get to the airport and are stopped by the Interahamwe. Special Ethical Debates I: Saving Europeans and letting Rwandese People behind One of the most impressive scenes of the movie is the departure of the foreign people from Rwanda. Accompanied by sad music, it is perhaps the scene which provokes most emotions. Colonel Oliver and the Sabena director Mr. Tillens say that the White nations – the French, the British, and the Americans – are doing nothing. On the radio talks can be heard, stating that acts of genocide but not Genocide is taking place. The underlying moral question is how strong is the legacy (and reality) of racism. Is it acceptable that for the life and the survival of an American or a European, much more is invested that for the life and survival of an African?

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Special Ethical Debates II: Killing Yourself and the Children when the Militias come In a calm scene on the roof, Paul asks his wife to jump with the children from the roof before the militias come and kill them. The problematic of that scene is even underlined when in the chaos of leaving the hotel Paul is searching for his wife, runs to the roof and sees the bodies of a woman and children lying in the grass. For a moment, he fears that they are his wife and his children. This scene can provoke discussions on suicide. Are suicide and even the killing of one’s children justified when the danger of being killed in a much more humiliating and violent way is imminent?

Special Ethical Debates III: The Reasons of the Genocide In another scene an employee of the hotel asks Paul: Why can people be so cruel? His answer is: “hatred, insanity”. The ethical question is whether the cruelty of the Rwandan genocide can be understood by these categories.

The End of the Film The end of the film shows the escape of Paul, his family and many other people from the Hotel. They are protected by Colonel Oliver and arrive in a refugee camp where they meet Marja who works for the Red Cross and whom they had considered dead. They also meet the two children of Tatiana’s brother. The end of the film is accompanied by emotional music and gives some written information about the destiny of the main persons in the film. It is mentioned that Paul Rusesabagina saved 1.268 Tutsi and Hutu in the Hotel and that Paul, Tatiana their three children and the two adoptive children of Tatiana’s brother now live in Belgium. The parents of his nephews never were seen again. The closing credits continue to state “In 2002 General Augustin Bizimungu was captured in Angola and transported to the UN War Criminal Tribunal in Tanzania. At the same tribunal the Interhamwe leader Georges Rutaganda was sentenced to life in prison.” And, finally : “The genocide ended in July 1994 when the Tutsi rebels drove the Hutu army and the Interhamwe militia across the border into the Congo. They left behind almost a million corpses.” Here again, historical events are described incorrectly :

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1. The militias name is Interahamwe, not Interhamwe. The name “Interahamwe” is a Kinyarwanda word and signifies “those who work close together and are united”. It is the name of the youth organization of the MRND (Mouvement r¦volutionaire national pour le development) founded in 1991 by Rwandese president Habyarimana. During the genocide, it turned into an organized mob to kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 2. To call the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which is the army of the Tutsi, “Tutsi rebels” employs a terminology which was used first by the Rwandese and French government. After the Arusha peace agreement, the term was used by Hutu extremists. As the film “Op¦ration turquoise” shows, the French soldiers were advised not to call the RPF “rebels”, but the term is still used very often. 3. Most importantly, while the Hutu army and the Interahamwe were driven across the border of Congo, the same was true for more than 2 million refugees. In Congo, the mass-killing went on, as the documentary “Kisangani diary” shows. Evaluation The movie “Hotel Rwanda” is a typical hero-story about the evolution of Paul Rusesabagina. In terms of Laurence Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, Paul is moving from the pre-conventional ethics of persecuting only one’s interest without clear respect for rules (stage 2) into an ethics of universal responsibility (stage 6). His identity changes when his wife tells him: “I know who you are”. Although this comment is not emphasized, it is the strongest ethical element in the film, showing that through the confrontation with the suffering of others and with people asking to take responsibility, a moral development is possible. It helps a lot when this kind of development is stabilized by other persons (partners, friends, children, one can also mention teachers and pastors). Through the logic of identification the spectator is invited to confirm or to develop a universal ethics of care, even in dangerous situation and even for people from the other side in a conflict. A second valuable ethical element in the film is the character of Paul Rusesabagina. He represents the kind of character who has a better chance to survive in dealing with dangerous militias. He is a flexible and humble character. By identifying with him, people have a model which can help them to survive and endure in dangerous situations. He also gives a model to overcome Western moral rules against corruption, such as paying money for human lives or speaking with mass-murderers. The movie asks many ethical questions, e. g. under which conditions can it be ethically preferable to behave like Paul does, giving bribes or sharing drinks with the perpetrators of genocide? In regard to his family life, the questions would be: is it acceptable to tell lies to your wife to save your family from

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danger and to fulfill your responsibilities? Is it morally preferable to commit suicide with your family before you are killed by militias? Another question is raised by the genocide itself: do we live in a racist world order, where Black Africans do not count, so that the world powers do not act in a more humane way, in order to save their lives. The Rwandese genocide asks the larger question about the responsibility of the Western countries to help people in many African countries that suffer from lack of security, lack of food and lack of medical care. In many places in Africa we see disrespect for human rights, which are written in the UN charter and confirmed by the Human Rights Treaties, but Western media and politics seem to show no interest therein. Peter Scholl-Latour’s documentary “Afrikanische Totenklage” draws a comparison with 9/11. In fact, on September 11th, 2001, many more people died in Africa of hunger and violent conflicts than in the World Trade Center. Yet how much media attention, how many political activities, how much money and even two wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq were the consequences of the death of the relatively few people killed in New York? A further question is this: according to Immanuel Kant, human beings have no price but must be treated with dignity. How do you act in a situation in which you can save human lives only by paying money for their release? Should you pay, even when you know that the mass-killers can finance further activities with the money? Although the film clearly belongs to the first type (hero stories), these questions show that it has many elements of the 4th type (presenting ethical dilemmas). It is not a film of the 5th type (revealing an unknown truth), even if the booklet quotes the leading actor Don Cheadle as saying that the director of the film, Terry George, shows events that have been ignored or covered up. On the whole, the film can help Western audiences to come to a better understanding of the events in spring 1994. Not surprisingly, it grossed more than 33 million $ in movie theatres. On the other hand, the opportunity to provide a wealth of reliable information about the events was missed. It is hard to believe, as the booklet says, that one actress (Sophie Oconedo) claims to have read everything she could find about the genocide, or that Nick Nolte, who plays Colonel Oliver, even studied archival documents at Princeton University. At least these readings and studies did not have a strong impact on the film. There are historical mistakes, especially in the epilogue, but also in the report about the antecedents of the conflict. Rom¦o Dallaire presented a different account. For him, one Congolese UN soldier was the true hero who saved many refugees in the hotel, while Paul Rusesabagina’s main activities were to bribe the leaders of the Hutu soldiers with alcohol. Rusesabagina responded that Rom¦o Dallaire did not understand the difference between reality and fiction. The movie “Hotel Rwanda” is fiction (Lagercrantz 2002).7 7 The article also relates the accusation that Rusesabagina took money from the refugees in the

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Giving that answer, Rusesabagina admits that the historical truth was different from the movie. Even if the role of the real Paul Rusesabagina as a hero can be questioned, the movie succeeded in partly depicting and partly inventing the story of a Rwandese Oscar Schindler, who became famous as a result of the movie.8

Analyzing “The Day God Walked Away” (“Ruanda. Le jour o¾ Dieu est parti en voyage”) The movie is 18 minutes shorter than “Hotel Rwanda”. It presents fewer actors, a simple plot and concentrates on only one person, Jacqueline, the Tutsi housemaid of a Belgian family. As we have seen, it belongs to the 2nd type of films as the story of a young woman who is deeply traumatized by the genocide. Remarkably, there is no music in the film. We only hear human voices, birds and sounds from the forest. The color green is dominant, and we often see water. Theologically speaking, the most problematic element of the film is the title. With a minimum of religious knowledge, it should be known that for Christian believers God is present everywhere and at any place. God is not seen as present only in happy and good times; on the contrary, there is a special presence of God in human suffering. God identifies with the crucified Jesus Christ. From a Christian perspective, God is with Jacqueline who herself carries a cross around her neck until the moment when she turns mad. But even then, of course, God is with her. Politically speaking, it is the Belgian family, rather than God, who walks away. In the light of a hermeneutics of suspicion, the strange title could indicate that God somehow walked away with the Belgian family. Another interpretation could be that it is an allusion to a song of the Interahamwe that “God had abandoned the Tutsi or that he left Rwanda and would not be back until after the final massacre” (Hatzfeld 2010, p.181). Perhaps these readings are too critical, but in any case the title is problematic. In one scene, however, God is explicitly mentioned. When a young man with a machete sits close to Jacqueline near a pond, he says: “I play God when I kill you”. In combination with the title, this could mean that perpetrators took on the role of God. Still, it does not justify the title “The Day God Walked Away”. The movie has only a brief explicit frame, which tells the audience about the hotel. See also Lagercrantz, L 2012, ‘Zynisches Geschäft mit dem Völkermord’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31 January 2012. 8 He received honors and awards from many institutions. Rusesabagina can only be contacted through an agent. We wanted to invite Mr Rusesabagina to Jena in 2011, but one week would have cost around 40.000 E.

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setting: the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, where between 800.000 and 1 Million people died. The film says that most of the victims were Tutsi who died only because they belonged to this ethnic group. Here, one may question the idea that the Tutsi are in fact an ethnic group. It can also be interpreted as a social class or a combination of several clans. At least, some typical signs of an ethnic group are missing, for example, a distinct language. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa share the same language, Kinyarwanda (Sotinel 2009).9 In the first scene, the film shows the farewell of the Belgian family. The mother says to Jacqueline: “Forgive me!” Jacqueline is astonished and says that there is nothing to forgive. They encourage her to hide until the Belgians come back, but Jacqueline wants to see her children in the village. At this point already, she says that perhaps it would be better for her to be killed. Moreover, the topic of guilt is addressed. The scene raises the question whether the Belgian family is guilty. The main character, Jacqueline, is shown as a young, tall and beautiful woman. The moral landscape she personifies by her being-in-the-world is peaceful. She cares for children and is soft, weak, and willing to accept violence rather than to harm anybody else. In one scene she hides under the roof, hearing the shouts and ‘jokes’ of perpetrators about raping and killing women, the shouts of children crying for their mother, then a shot and then silence. Jacqueline does not react with hatred or even with the wish to stop the perpetrators. She cries and is afraid. Significantly, she stops speaking after this event. Afterwards, Hutu groups loot the house. They seem to be drunk, very selfconfident and aggressive, with a lack of self-control. As soon as the Hutus leave the house, Jacqueline runs into the village to find her children. She finds them dead, lying on the ground as if they were sleeping. She takes them into her arms until a woman of the village attacks her, telling Jacqueline that the house no longer belongs to her. She flees into the forest. From the forest she sees that her children are carried out of the house and brought away with a lorry. By the river, Jacqueline finds a man who is almost dead. His name is not mentioned. She helps him to survive, giving him water and medical assistance with the primitive means at her disposal. She also carries him away to hide him from the Hutus who are passing by and threaten to kill everybody. For a while, they live together like a couple. When the man becomes stronger, he wants to live with her. He hunts, kills and roasts an animal, but Jacqueline refuses to eat with him. In the night, he tries to touch her, but she refuses. When Jacqueline wants to see her house again, a woman who is now living in her house recognizes her. She and the man are chased. She then flees to a 9 In Le Monde Cin¦ma (27. 10. 2009), Thomas Sotinel criticizes the lack of framing information and claims that the film is almost incomprehensible. This critique is exaggerated, since we can presuppose some general knowledge about the events in 1994, with so many films and books on the topic being available.

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pond. A young Hutu talks to her with hatred. When he tries to leave, the man comes to the pond and kills the Hutu. Afterwards he asks Jacqueline not to leave him alone. She has to be convinced to come with him. Sitting beside the man she refuses to drink tea and to be touched by him. He talks about his wife and children, who are missing. In the night they make love. In the morning, Jacqueline shakes as if she is freezing. She is emotionally closed off against him. With a stick she tries to avoid becoming pregnant. A new development starts when the man finds a machete. He is very proud of it and imagines new possibilities. He constructs a house for them. At one point, the man carries his machete and approaches Jacqueline, but she thinks he is a Hutu. She runs away despite the fact that she can see him clearly. She stumbles and falls. When Jacqueline sits under a tree, there is another moment of conversion or identity change. She throws off two things she was wearing before at all times: her watch and the cross around her neck. From this moment onwards, she steers into emptiness. While the man is sleeping, she takes up his machete, lifts it up but then hesitates to kill him. When he wakes up, she slowly moves into the other direction and destroys the house with the machete. She runs away, rolls around on the ground and then goes, with the machete in her hand, to her village, where the woman who has taken her house now lives. She drops the machete and falls to the ground. People from the village come. Some of them are happy that she is breathing, while others want to kill her or let her die. Thus the film ends without Jacqueline saying another word. While the screen is dark, we hear voices of the citizens of the village discussing what to do with her. During the credits, we hear an African song. The perpetrators in the movie are not soldiers, nor do they belong to a specific group like the Interahamwe. They are neighbors who want to enrich themselves and, in the case of the men, rape Tutsi women and brag about it as something of which they are proud. According to the director of the film, Philippe van Leeuw, genocide could happen everywhere. He is interested in the dark side of human nature, not in the organized killing for political purposes. The film shows the destructive effects of trauma. More than anything else, the film creates understanding, empathy and compassion for Jacqueline. It also shows that the horror continues after the end of the genocide. In the film, we see only one killing and only a few dead bodies, for example the children of Jacqueline. But the horror of the genocide is constantly present through the mimics, gestures, cries, sounds and acts of Jacqueline, even more so than in most other films. Although Jacqueline and the man could build a new family and future, the film tells a negative story. Their new life is destroyed by Jacqueline’s trauma. The man cries in despair when he notices her madness and her destruction of the house. Jacqueline refuses to replace her old family with a new one, or her house with a new house. The film has no clear ethical message, but it provides a perspective to reflect in a more earnest and existential way the genocide. Such a reflection may lead to various questions, e. g., why human beings, especially men, find it difficult

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to deal with weakness, or how to create a true community of human beings where the brutality even of ‘ordinary’ life – illness, violence, death – does not lead to a refusal of the latter? The ethical effect on the audience can be that Jacqueline remains present, like a person you know. Her tragedy may influence the viewers’ thinking, so that they feel the fragility of happiness, of life, and of mental health. They become more “human” in the sense that they do not believe they can resist every attack from outside. The morally relevant need for care and protection becomes salient. The experience of watching the movie changes the moral landscape.

Analyzing “As we forgive” “As we forgive” does not deal with events during the genocide but with the way in which victims and perpetrators deal with the question of forgiveness 10 years later. The film is a documentary by Laura Walter Hinson about people trying to overcome the past and finding a future in reconciliation. The film won several awards. Afterwards, Laura Walters founded the Living Bricks Campaign, an organization that collects money for reconciliation work in Rwanda. The idea is to donate money so that perpetrators can build houses for the victims. The film itself thus is embedded in an ethical and economic project, addressing the spectator to cooperate. In a way, it is propaganda for a humanitarian organization. At the same time, the film offers a wealth of interesting material. It is unusual in that it provides time and space to perpetrators to tell their story. In addition, the daughter of a Hutu killed by the “rebels” tells her story. Since every scene contains important ethical material, the film merits a more comprehensive analysis. It represents a maximum of ethical impact, and even the booklet contains a brief discussion guide with ethical questions for further discussion. The questions are: 1. What do you think about the Rwandan government’s decision to release the genocide prisoners? Given the magnitude of the situation, could there have been a better alternative? 2. How do the stories of Chantale and Rosaria affect you? Could you forgive a person who murdered your family? What would it take for you to forgive in this way? 3. What are the limitations of seeking full ‘justice’ for violent crimes? Can mercy and justice operate together? How might forgiveness and restorative justice be incorporated into Western systems of justice? 4. Consider Rwanda’s violent history in contrast to its current reconciliation movement. What lessons can Rwanda’s past and present teach the rest of the world?

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The title of the film “As we forgive – can mercy restore what genocide destroyed?” is based on a quote from the Lord’s Prayer : “And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors” (Matthew 6:12). This title can be explained by the topic – the film is about the forgiveness of people. Like many Africans, the persons in the film are committed Christians. The title also can be explained by the expected audience which probably is familiar with the Lord’s Prayer and quickly understands the allusion of the film’s title. Some viewers also may share a Christian motivation or perceive reconciliation as a positive value in a culture marked by Christianity. Describing the Plot and its Ethical Impact The film starts with a direct address to the audience. At first, one sees the small light of a torch and hears music. A man with an African accent asks: “If you would hear that in the neighborhood a murderer would have been released. How would you feel?” The text is visualized by white letters on a black screen. This question speaks to the imagination of the spectators and evokes, if you accept to answer that question, a sense of insecurity, underlined by the dark picture. The question provokes strong feelings of fear. The next text says: “In this time we weren’t releasing one, we released forty thousand”. The film thus overwhelms the spectator with a feeling of complete fear and the need for new orientation: How can people cope with such a situation? Then we read “In 1994 Rwandans did the unthinkable”, and we see rapidly changing pictures. A male voice speaks about one million people killed and the impossibility of achieving justice. The next scene shows Rwandan president Paul Kagame and informs us that he decided to release 50.000 perpetrators. Finally, two images present the main persons of the film, Chantale and Rosaria. The voice relates: “Two women struggle to find the answer”. After that, we see the title and the cranes of a memorial for the victims of the genocide. The film also has a motto, shown after the title: “No snowflake in an avalanche will ever feel responsible. Voltaire.” Thus, the film addresses a central ethical problem: the responsibility of individuals who participate in collective action. It is a psychological fact that people who act together with others, perhaps under the authority and leadership of other persons, feel less responsible than if they act alone, following a decision they took themselves. Ethical theorists discuss if, why, and to what extent responsibility is diminished in collective action. After the furious start, the film becomes calmer. The Rwandan landscape appears. From now on, the main content are sequences of ca. 8 minutes containing interviews with the two women, Rosaria and Chantale, and the perpetrators with whom they work. As in a typical documentary, the scenes name the place, the time and the persons. The first scene is called “Rosaria and Saveri”. The place is Mbyo village, Southern Rwanda 2006. Rosaria, Chantale

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and the perpetrators speak Kinyarwanda, the subtitles provide the English translation. In the first scene we see Rosaria reading the Bible. She asks herself whether she can convince the perpetrators that killing is wrong. In the form of subtitles, the film gives some general information about the genocide (it was one of the worst genocides in history ; the reason was the hatred of Hutus against Tutsi sparked by colonialism; in 100 days almost one million Rwandese people died). Rosaria tells us that her husband and her four children were killed by neighbors in 1994. She reenacts her pleas and shows how she was cut by machetes. During the genocide she was pregnant, and her daughter was born in December 1994. She gave her the French name “Cadeau” (gift). After Rosaria has finished, Saveri tells his story. He is 40 years old and killed 7 people. He says that the government indoctrinated them that the Tutsi are evil and dangerous. A Hutu leader came to the village and led them to kill the Tutsi rebels. When they arrived, they found no rebels but only a mother with four children. The leader ordered the killing, but several men refused and were beaten. Saveri says he felt that he had no choice but to kill the Tutsi. After the killing, he could not find peace. He wondered how he could kill God’s creatures while he is also a creature of God. In this short statement, we find the essential elements emphasized by recent theories about the reasons why “normal” people suddenly become killers. Harald Welzer mentions three elements: first, the public ethics of a society changes. To kill a Jew or a Tutsi is not seen as a criminal act anymore but, instead, some persons make public claims that it is a good and necessary deed. The second element is the creation of arguments or feelings as to why you should kill certain people; for example, they are dangerous and perhaps plan to kill you. Third, situations are created in which it is expected from someone to kill. There is a person who gives orders and one must obey. These situations correspond with the famous Milgram experiment which was replicated many times in different countries. The results show that many people, irrespectively of differences in nationality, class, gender or religion, obey a person who gives orders (Welzer 2005). In addition, a fourth factor should be added: people with power and money organizing the genocide, as well as those who do not stop them. Some historical flash-backs in the film hint at this factor. After Saveri’s witness account, archival material regarding the political reasons of the genocide is presented. It tells the story of Belgian colonialists working together with the Tutsi and creating strong resentment among the Hutu. The film also mentions that the difference between Hutu and Tutsi is rather a difference of class than of race. Hutus are fieldworkers, while Tutsi possess cattle. The next scene tells the story of Chantale, who lives in Ruhuha Village. She and her daughter were the only Tutsi left in the village after the genocide. Her husband was murdered by a neighbor in 1992, perhaps an early act of genocide. Four people were in prison for murder, now they have been released. She is afraid of meeting them. One of the convicted murderers is John, who

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killed Chantale’s father in 1992 and was released in August 2005. He says that he had no problem with the Tutsi in the village before the genocide. After having murdered the father of Chantale he felt like an animal. Now he feels deep fear and shame. In John’s statement, like in Saveri’s, we find that for “normal” people becoming perpetrators in a genocide, the moral rules they learned before remain important. They very often feel ashamed and guilty. According to the theory of Arie Nadler concerning the needs of perpetrators, many of them want to change and be accepted again as moral persons (Nadler / Shnabel 2008). The next scene plays in Ruhegeri, Northern Rwanda, showing the Sonrise School, a school especially for AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) orphans. Joy, a student, narrates that her father was killed by the “rebels” when she was seven years old. Probably, Joy is a Hutu and a victim of the events in the 1990s. In the school, however, she says, ethnic differences do not exist anymore. Afterwards, a flash-back relates the story of the amnesty in Rwanda. In 2003, Rwandese president Paul Kagame made the announcement to release 40,000 perpetrators of the genocide who had confessed their guilt. In an interview, Kagame emphasizes the necessity of forgiveness and reconciliation. In another interview, Fatuma Ndangiza, the Executive Secretary of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, estimates that of the 120,000 perpetrators of the genocide that were imprisoned, 50,000 persons have been released. This leads to the issue of the Gacaca courts. Sometimes it is criticized that in this traditional legal mechanism the accused have no advocate and are judged by their peers.10 The film thinks that particularly the Christian churches and humanitarian organizations should promote reconciliation. Bishop John Rucyahana, the president of Prison Fellowship, then talks about moral consciousness. His organization approaches prisoners to encourage them to confess and seek forgiveness. The narrator tells us that up to the present, more than 32,000 prisoners have come forth with confessions and pleas for forgiveness. After that, a second motto appears: “Let us forgive each other. Only then we will live in peace. Leo Tolstoy”. Next, the film shows Reverend Stephen Gahingi, a Prison minister who worked with Saveri. The Reverend is a very tall Tutsi, 142 members of his family were killed. He talks about the mistrust of the prisoners who thought he was a spy preparing for revenge. Saveri says that in prison he was in a state where he was not open for God’s mercy. He had condemned himself. The film switches to Rosaria and tells us that she is no longer afraid of death because she has been dead already. A “reconciliation workshop” which took place in 2004 in Rosaria’s village is mentioned. Both Saveri and Rosaria attended. Saveri says that first they confessed what they had done, and then they asked for 10 See for the Gacaca courts also Friese 2010.

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forgiveness. The victims have the choice to forgive or not. Rosaria recounts that Saveri came to her several times with the wish that she should forgive him. Finally he reveals that he was the person who killed Rosaria’s sister and her children. Saveri also says that before the genocide he was friends with Rosaria and her family. Rosaria says: “How can I refuse to forgive, when I am a forgiven sinner, too. According to God’s word, I am called to forgive him, for I did not create that man or my family whom he killed. I did not create them either. His crime was against God who created the people he killed. So I placed everything in the hands of God.” Saveri quotes what Rosaria said to him: “If you and the others have sincerely confessed your crimes before God, I will forgive you, many others also forgave us. Then we embraced each other.” Afterwards, Bishop Rucyahana explains how he answers the question why people should forgive. He explains that forgiveness helps to release the victims from their past, from thinking about revenge, from their sadness. The perpetrators are also released when they are forgiven. They might ask the former victim what they can do for him or her. For example, some of them build houses for the former victims. In this story, we find the elements of the sacrament of penance which sometimes, especially in the Roman-Catholic church, is called ‘sacrament of reconciliation’: (1) confession of sins, (2) absolution or forgiveness, and (3) actions that show the will to repair the effects of sin. In difference to the actual practice in many churches, the act of penance occurs through public communication with the victims, not in a closed room with the priest. The sequence also shows that reconciliation benefits both perpetrators and victims, because it permits to put an end to the past. Rosaria becomes a model for her village and not only for her village. The film portrays her as a model for the audience, in regard not only to her words but also to her gestures, her beautiful voice and her smiling face. She appears like the sun, shining upon every person she meets. In her message we find two important elements of Christian ethics: (1) solidarity with all human beings: all are created by God, and all are forgiven sinners, and (2) distancing oneself from one’s rights. The crime was committed not against me but against God. God’s forgiveness is more important than my own act of forgiving. With this message, we enter the area of ethics. In fact, we encounter a specific Christian conception of existence with ethical implications. We can call this ethics, too, when we accept the vision that ethics is more than a theory of decision making. What Rosaria says is also important for the theory of reconciliation. She does not express forgiveness in the place, i. e., as a representative of her sister. In fact, the question whether a person can express forgiveness in the place or as a representative of another person is overcome. The next scene shows Umuvumu Tree village, a village where perpetrators of the genocide construct houses for survivors. Some houses in the new area are also for ex-prisoners. Saveri worked 6 months as a volunteer to help build Rosaria’s new house. Rev. Gahingi explains that the extreme poverty of victims

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who lost their husbands, their children, their houses, and who sometimes still suffer from injuries like Rosaria, is a major obstacle to reconciliation. The film returns to John and Chantale. John says that he learned in prison how important it is to heal our hearts, to confess and to ask for forgiveness. Chantale, on the other hand, relates that she never went to church again after the genocide. The church consists of Hutus, all the Tutsi are dead. In her heart there is no forgiveness for the cruel perpetrators. Bishop Rucyahana then explains that grief often is so overwhelming that people cannot forgive. Afterwards, a new historical blog addresses the guilt of the Church. The Bishop confesses that the Church failed not only during the genocide itself, but also in the years before. The influence of the Church was great, but they did not do enough to teach the Rwandans that genocide is an extremely grave sin. Several members of the churches have been condemned because of their collaboration in the massacres. When people fled into the churches to find shelter, in some cases priests or pastors collaborated in the destruction of their own community. Bishop Rucyanhana relates the story of one priest who went looking for a bulldozer in order to destroy the cathedral where refugees had found shelter. Coming back to the case of Chantale and John, the film explains that many reconciliation counselors were trained by humanitarian organizations. One of them, Pascal, accompanies John. He arranges a meeting between John and Chantale, who see each other for the first time after 14 years. Chantale, who throughout the film often weeps, at first says that she is very far away from forgiving John. When John confesses his crime, he says that “the evil one invaded him”. He thus distances himself from his actions with the help of Christian imagery. People can distance themselves from their misdeeds by talking about the ‘devil’ who took over the control of their acts. When the ‘devil’ has left a perpetrator, this person may be perceived again as an acceptable member of human society. Chantale, however, does not pardon John. She asks him to look into her face. She has no husband, no family, and no house anymore because of the genocide. In the end, she only says that she thanks God that she has survived and that she sees how ashamed John is. The film continues with short statements by the Bishop, by President Kagame and by the vice president of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. They all have different visions about the relationship of justice and reconciliation. The bishop says there is justice for the offence, but reconciliation for the offenders, introducing the theological difference between person and his or her acts. The vice president of the commission says there has been so much crime that justice is impossible, but reconciliation is required. Kagame says that a lot of progress has been achieved on the way towards reconciliation. Ethically, this again is interesting. There is a difference between deep reconciliation and partial reconciliation or justice. Deep reconciliation requires dealing with issues of justice. Deep justice requires more than what

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has been done in Rwanda. At the same time, perhaps, it was already the maximum of what was possible. The next scene is set in the Sonrise School. Joy relates that before she forgave she was full of anger and isolated herself from the outside world. After she had forgiven, hope returned. Afterwards, a new motto is shown: “Reconciliation is never cheap, because it is based on forgiveness which is costly. Desmond Tutu”. First, we see people of the village, including Saveri, helping Rosaria with her work with sorghum. Saveri says that he is glad that Rosaria asked him and that he can do something for her. He explains that when he does something for her this does not imply that his deeds can be undone. One can never ‘pay back’ a lost human life. Here again, Saveri says something typical for the sacrament of penance. Often one cannot restore what has been destroyed by sin, but nevertheless the sacrament insists on showing signs of willingness to bring at least some things in order. Rosaria then gives an interesting talk about trust. When the perpetrators first were released, they did not greet each other, but step by step trust has been restored. The next scene shows different people: the Bishop, Joy, President Kagame and the vice-president of National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. They all say that it is already a unique and good sign that people in Rwanda do not fight each other. Perpetrators and victims live side by side in the villages. Peace is the first sign for reconciliation. Thus, the next text reads: “Forgiveness is the final form of love. Reinhold Niebuhr”. Here the film continues with the first meeting between Chantale and John. Chantale concludes that she does not forgive John. John, however, says that he feels very happy and free because he met her. Now he can greet her when he sees her in the street. One day a week he will go to her and try to comfort her and help with practical work. Chantale says that in the night after the meeting she had nightmares. Astonishingly, shortly after the meeting, Chantale decides to take part in a nearby house-building project, in which she helps an exprisoner to build his house. He does not explain why she takes part in this project. She says that she prays to God to receive the strength to forgive John. Then the film relates, with black and white images of house-building, that it is difficult to foresee the future of Rwanda and that the Rwandans are like ‘living bricks’. This is again an image from the Bible, telling that Christians are the living bricks of the temple of God which is the Church. Finally, the narrator says that Chantale forgave John six month after their encounter. The film ends with an invitation to donate to “Livingbricks.org”. Global Evaluation With regard to historical facts, “As we forgive” is not satisfying. It is simplistic to refer to the Belgian colonial rule as the only reason for the genocide. Still,

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the film has the merit of talking about the guilt of the Christian churches. It is also simplistic to focus only on reconciliation, which is only one factor in the complex reality of Rwanda. Ester Majawayo and Saou–d Belhaddad, in their book “La fleur de St¦phanie: Rwanda entre reconciliation et d¦ni” (Paris: Flammarion 2006), show that denial on the side of the perpetrators and loneliness on the side of the isolated Tutsi women are more important factors. They also criticize that reconciliation — la Rwanda demands an effort that is more difficult for the victims than for the perpetrators. Nevertheless, the film “As we forgive” presents an underrepresented topic in films, or other media, about Rwanda. The question of how a society can live together after genocide is very important and merits more attention. In comparison to the book “La strat¦gie des antilopes” (Paris: Seuil 2007; English translation: The Antelope’s Strategy, 2010) by Jean Hatzfeld, which also describes life in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, “As we forgive” focuses on the hopeful and friendly aspects. In fact, there was and is an impressive policy of reconciliation, advocated by the Rwandese government as well as by the churches and humanitarian organizations. This policy benefits from some aid from abroad, but it is mainly a product of the Rwandan people themselves. The country really changed its atmosphere, even if peace is in danger from both sides and even if reconciliation sometimes is more instrumental than deep. These positive aspects are often neglected in the media and the public sphere in Europe. “As we forgive” shows them and puts forward many ethical questions. Besides the questions in the booklet, we could ask, is it really true that poverty is an obstacle to reconciliation? Why does reconciliation in a poor country like Rwanda seem to be more successful than reconciliation in richer countries like Northern Ireland or Bosnia-Hercegovina? On the whole, “As we forgive” offers a major contribution towards a better understanding of the events in Rwanda. It is simplistic to think that the reasons of the genocide were “hatred and insanity” as Paul Rusesabagina says in “Hotel Rwanda”. For a moral landscape analysis, “As we forgive” offers not one but many people with whom the audience might identify. Perhaps a spectator feels more like Chantale or Joy, or even like one of the perpetrators, while only few people will identify easily with Rosaria. By the identification with one or several persons in the film, the moral landscape of the spectator is changed in the sense that he or she feels that reconciliation creates liberation, comfort, happiness and a new outlook for the future. This experience, together with the persons in the film, can transform the spectators into people who discover the great value of reconciliation. In addition, Christian audiences, toward which the film is mainly directed and who already believe in the importance of reconciliation, will better understand how important reconciliation is and might become engaged themselves to work actively for reconciliation.

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Conclusion We have analyzed three different films about the genocide in Rwanda. The ethical dimensions were less present in “Le jour o¾ Dieu est parti en voyage”, more present in “Hotel Rwanda” and constantly present in “As we forgive”. All three films create possibilities for identification with the protagonists. The moral landscape of the implicit spectator is transformed by the film. In “Hotel Rwanda”, the transformation implies an emphasis on the universal responsibility of individuals, which might even include communication with evildoers. In “Le jour Dieu est parti en voyage”, the identification with the main character implies the recognition of the vulnerability of mental health. “As we forgive” emphasizes the releasing effects of forgiveness on both perpetrators and victims. Further ethical questions are raised on a political level, e. g. about the responsibility of Western countries, or on a private level, e. g. about when it is acceptable to cooperate (“Hotel Rwanda”) or to seek reconciliation (“As we forgive”) with the perpetrators. At the same time, the films have deficits in regard to the accuracy of facts about the history of Rwanda. “Hotel Rwanda” lacks serious historical research. Unfortunately, until now, every documentary about Rwanda includes mistakes in the details or omits important aspects. Nevertheless, the three films contributed to making the tragedy of Rwanda known to many people in the West, where media and population more and more seem to forget Africa.

References Davidson, D 1974, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, ed D Davidson, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 183 – 198. Friese, S 2010, Politik der gesellschaftlichen Versöhnung. Eine theologisch-ethische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Gacaca-Gerichte in Ruanda, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart. Hatzfeld, J 2010, The Antelope’s Strategy : Living in Rwanda After the Genocide, Picador, New York. d’Hertefelt, M 1971, Les clans du Rwanda ancien: el¦ments d’ethnosociologie et d’ethnohistoire, Musee Royal de l’Afrique Centrale, Tervuren. Kandt, R 1919, Caput Nili: eine empfindsame Reise zu den Quellen des Nils, Volume 2, 4th edn, Reimer, Berlin. Katongol¦, E / Wilson-Hartgrove, J (ed.) 2009, Mirror to the Church. Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda, Zondervan, Grand Rapids. Kristeva, J 1987, Tales of Love, Columbia University Press, New York.

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Lagercrantz, L 2012, ‘Zynisches Geschäft mit dem Völkermord’, Süddeutsche Zeitung 31 January. Available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/hotel-ruan da-held-in-der-kritik-zynisches-geschaeft-mit-dem-voelkermord-1.1271099 [2 January 2014]. Marysse, S / Reyntjens, F 2000, L’Afrique des Grands lacs. Annuaire 1996 – 1997, Êditions L’Harmattan, Paris. Melvern, L 2004, Conspiracy to Murder, Verso, London/New York. Nadler, A / Shnabel, N 2008, ‘Instrumental and Socioemotional Paths to Intergroup Reconciliation and the Needs-Based Model of Socioemotional Reconciliation’ in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation, eds A Nadler, TE Malloy / JD Fisher, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 37 – 53. Nussbaum, MC 1992, Love’s Knowledge. Essay’s on Philosophy and Literature, Oxford University Press, Oxford. – 2012, Not for Profit. Why Democracy needs the Humanities, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Rosa, H 1998, Identität und kulturelle Praxis. Politische Philosophie nach Charles Taylor, Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. Sotinel, T 2009, ‘Le jour o¾ Dieu est parti en voyage: une fiction contestable sur le g¦nocide au Rwanda’, Le Monde Cinema. Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/ cinema/article/2009/ 10/27/le-jour-ou-dieu-est-parti-en-voyage-une-fiction-con testable-sur-le-genocide-au-rwanda_ 1259330_3476.html [2 January 2014]. Stockhammer, R 2005, Ruanda: Über einen anderen Genozid schreiben, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Taylor, C 1990, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. – 1995, ‘Heidegger, Language and Ecology’ in Philosophical Arguments, ed C Taylor, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., pp. 100 – 126. Weingardt, MA 2007, Religion macht Frieden. Das Friedenspotential von Religionen in politischen Gewaltkonflikten, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart. Welzer, H 2005, Täter. Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main.

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Ralf K. Wüstenberg

Reconciliation as a Political Option? Different Ways of Dealing with the Past – The Case of South Africa1

The course for the process of reconciliation in South Africa was set at the beginning of the 1990s. A journalist and trusted friend of President Mandela’s wrote in retrospect of the period between the release of Nelson Mandela in February, 1990 and his swearing in as the first President of a democratic South Africa on May 10, 1994 that it “will be entered in the annals of history, and the many interrelated events that threaten to derail the negotiation process are thereby annulled.” (Sparks 1995) This paper will concern itself with these events (1990 – 1994) that preceded the establishment of the TRC. These are the questions that will be addressed in the following: What initial conditions led to the fact that reconciliation became a central theme in the political language of South Africa? What ideas did the political actors have in mind during the period when, by acts of violence, twelve thousand people died? And how were past political options for action weighed up against each other in the course of the political discussions during South Africa’s transition to democracy? Connecting the results of the comprehensive and internationally led research from the fields of law and political science on political transitions, we find that there are five courses of action open to a country that is dealing with a guilt-laden past.2 These options form the systematic framework of analysis for determining the initial conditions for dealing with guilt at the end of apartheid: – Prosecution of serious human rights violations. – The opposite: do nothing, either in the form of general amnesty or simply “letting bygones be bygones.” – Exposure of past injustices, for example, through a “Truth Commission” – Granting victims compensation (for example returning their land, financial compensation, legal restitution, moral restitution, etc.). – Sanctions for the perpetrators (for example removing offenders from public service departments, especially the police and military).

1 This chapter uses material previously published in Ralf K. Wüstenberg, The Political Dimension of Reconciliation, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids/Cambridge, 2009. 2 Cf. the international discussion Kritz 1995; Huntington 1991.

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Ultimately, the option that a country chooses depends in large measure on the nature of the system in transition. Three types of system change are outlined in the international literature: “overthrow, reform, compromise.” “Being overthrown is the fate of a regime that has refused to reform: opposition forces become stronger and finally topple the old order. When reform is undertaken, the old government plays the critical role in the shift to democracy as, initially at least, the opposition is weak. In countries where change is the result of compromise, the existing regime and opposition cannot make the transition to democracy without each other. Such was the case in South Africa.” (Sarkin 1996, p. 618) The later vice chairman of the TRC describes the initial situation in South Africa in a simple manner : “It was impossible for the state to put down the growing resistance and it was equally impossible for those who resisted overthrowing the state by force. It was a classic stalemate.” (Boraine 1995, p. 1) The words of Nelson Mandela in a memo to P.W. Botha from February 11, 1990 proved to be politically astute: “Reconciliation can only be achieved when both parties are willing to come to a compromise.” (Sparks 1995)

Punishment for Perpetrators of Political Crimes When it comes to the prosecution of serious human rights violations after a system change, we must consider the following, among other things:3 – Truth and justice demand prosecution. The new government has the moral duty to punish those who have perpetrated human rights violations; they owe this to the victims and their families. – Prosecution is necessary to demonstrate the superiority of democratic norms and values; in this way trust in justice is re-established. – After a recent transition to democracy, criminal law can only work as a deterrent when past human rights violations are punished. With regard to general prevention measures, the entire population must be shown that human rights violations will not be tolerated. – Prosecution of the perpetrators is necessary so that, in general, human rights violations are seen as a criminal act. (Supporters of the previous system usually say that they did not do anything wrong, but “defended the state” and “fought terrorism.” Opponents of the previous system likewise say that they did not commit any “crimes,” but fought for freedom). 3 The argument stems from the international literature on transition research; cf. above all Kritz 1995; Huntington 1991; Institute for Democracy Document 1994; Justice in Transition Document 1995.

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In the discussions on South Africa, the arguments for the prosecutiont of criminals have found little resonance. This is due to various factors, three of which I am able to extract: the character of the system change, legal conditions and the political will of the actors. Prosecution is incompatible with the nature of the system change in South Africa, which has, instead, provided a negotiated transition without victors. “Neither side in the struggle (the state or the liberation movement) had defeated the other side and hence nobody was in a position to enforce so-called victor’s justice.” (Final Report 1998) There should also be no “victor’s justice”: “the triumphalist approach of victor’s justice, with its inevitable selectiveness and political opportunism, was rejected in favour of ideals of nation building and reconciliation between the oppressors and the oppressed.” (Asmal 1996) However, from a legal standpoint, the example of the “Nuremberg Trials” was also rejected: There, only a fraction of the perpetrators were brought to trial; the German people were not actually involved in the process; and in the end the attention of the process was on the perpetrators and not on the victims. “The lesson of Nuremberg is that there should be no other trials following the model of the Nuremberg trials.”4 (Botman 1996, p. 121) Criminal prosecution of human rights violations binds the legal entities together. Therefore, in order to strengthen the trust in justice, events must be handled justly by the state. If one proceeds from the premise that justice demands prosecution, where does the case of South Africa fit in? At first it was not clear whether or not the process would lead to accusations, given the burden of proof lay with the state.5 (Du Toit 1996b, p. 13) One can only imagine the toll it would take on the process itself: “Any systemic attempt to investigate and prosecute many hundreds and thousands of cases on an individual basis will require massive resources and will bog down the courts for many years to come.” (Du Toit 1996, p. 13) Other punishments would not even come before the courts if one considers that “the legal system of the apartheid state prevents punishment despite human rights violations.” (Werle 1995, p. 8) Finally, we need to think of the victims. They could be cross-examined, but that would only cause their trauma to be repeated instead of contributing to healing, and the victims could potentially be abandoned by the state for a second time. B Naud¦ comments on the above problem in summary : “and if we wait for the day when all justice has been meted out legally, it will be too late for reconciliation.” (Naude / Kistner 1996) In summary, the criminal punishment of human rights violations is neither backed by the political will of both parties nor of their respective main 4 In South Africa the common opinion: “To heal the nation implies that the nation as a whole is affected.” 5 “It is well known that vital documentation has been destroyed or tampered with, while other cases may concern events of many years ago”. A report of the Goldstone Commission indicates that around 135,000 acts of the Security Police before 1994 were annulled.

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proponents, F. de Klerk and N. Mandela. With regard to both parties, R. Goldstone, a judge in South Africa, observes curtly : “No political party in South Africa is calling for mass trials of those who were guilty of the crimes of apartheid.” (Goldstone 1994, p. 2) Furthermore, both official parties – the NP and of the ANC – were involved in human rights violations, which makes it difficult at the outset to bring the involved parties closer to agreement on the fact that the committed actions were criminal acts (cf. the above argument). The ANC also never concerned itself with punishing politically motivated crimes. Rather, it attempted to morally legitimatize its actions as resistance to the violation of human rights: “the Apartheid regime deployed its massive resources with deliberate and systematic violence. By contrast, the antiapartheid resistance committed sporadic lapses, due to its material deprivation and refugee status.” (Goldstone 1994, p. 16) Additionally, in terms of numbers, the dead and wounded in the fight for freedom cannot be compared to the number of those who died defending apartheid. There is also the problem of evaluating human rights violations: namely, can the violations that were committed by the apartheid regime be compared to those of the armed resistance? The political debate focuses on the phrase “even-handedness”, whereby the human rights violations of the past should be judged “in an even-handed manner.” (Van Der Merwe 1996b, p. 1) However, in this regard, both viewpoints are put in the same double bind: 1. If one considers future human rights violations illegal according to South African law (“domestic law”), such as torture or disappearance perpetrated by the government, or murder and homicide perpetrated by the armed resistance; 2) then one will not be able to put an end to the human rights violations of the apartheid system itself – such as forced re-settlement, etc. – which is illegal in terms of “international law”. The issue for the main actors was simple: F. de Klerk wanted to retain power. N. Mandela recalls: “Despite his seemingly progressive actions, Mr. de Klerk was by no means a great emancipator. He was a (…) careful pragmatist. He did not make any of his reforms with the intention of putting himself out of power. He made them precisely for the opposite reason: to ensure power for the Afrikaner in a new dispensation.” (Mandela 1995, p. 692) Mandela, for his part, would not promote the punishment of crimes because he wanted to direct the view strictly forward to the future. “I would not mince words about the horrors of apartheid, but I said, over and over, that we should forget the past and concentrate on building a better future for all.” Mandela 1995, p. 737). But where Mandela does look back, he does not condone punishment.6 Rather, his hate is directed against the system: “I wanted South Africa to see that I loved even my enemies while I hated the system that turned us against one another” (Mandela 1995, p. 680). And one cannot prosecute a system using criminal 6 At his first press conference after being released, he said: “I knew that people expected me to harbour anger towards whites. But I had none.” (Mandela 1995, p. 680)

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means as one would prosecute a criminal; one can only expose a system’s injustices. By using the term “system,” we run into a specific problem within the context of South Africa; namely, apartheid was not the cause of human rights violations, it was itself a “crime against humanity.”7 At this very basic level, South Africa cannot relate to the experience of other countries in dealing with the past. To be sure, in Uruguay, Chile and Argentina horrible violations of human rights took place, but there was no apartheid. The authors of the book “Reconciliation through Truth” write pointedly : “Apartheid was evil.” (Asmal 1996, p. 7) “Apartheid (which means ‘apartness’) was fundamentally built on the idea of irreconcilability of peoples.” (Asmal 1996, p. 51) Thus, no “bridge to reconciliation” could be built upon the ideology of apartheid. (Van Der Merwe 1996b) Here, it quite simply has to do with right and wrong. “In the political context, reconciliation is a shared and painful ethical voyage from wrong to right.” (Van Der Merwe 1996b, p. 46) This view was not the view of either President de Klerk (and the NP) or of the other white parties during the transition negotiations, including the Freedom Front (FF) and the Democratic Party (DP). “None of the predominantly white parties (FF, NP and DP)…have addressed the fundamental question whether the history and policy of apartheid has to be regarded as a violation of human rights and as such a crime against humanity.” (Van Der Merwe 1996b, p. 3) That being the case, in October 1995 de Klerk warned his future government “to randomly alter or undo what we have done in the spirit of reconciliation and the maintaining of security and stability in South Africa.”8 It is important to note that the initial arguments were weighed against each other. The case against punishment was made during the transitional phases for the sake of the “common good”, using phrases like “national unity” and “nation building”. South Africa wanted to overcome the notion that reconciliation is only possible after punishment. On the other hand, requirements still had to be outlined to make the desired reconciliation possible.

7 Resolution Nr. 556, § 1, passed by the Security Office of the United Nations on 13.12. 1984. Already in 1976, after the bloody massacre of the student uprising in Soweto, the Security Office stated that: “apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind.” Cf. the arrangement of the international decisions on apartheid. (Final Report 1998, pp. 94) An analysis of the problem has been produced by the Ecumenical Advice Bureau, Johannesburg, cf. van der Merwe 1996a. 8 Here the concept of reconciliation of the apartheid era appears again, which assumes the nonreconcilability of the races. Reconciliation meant: separate development! (De Klerk 1995)

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Amnesty for Human Rights Violations The following arguments9 speak against punishing the perpetrators and thus in favor of general amnesty or simply of “letting bygones be bygones” (Option 2): – Amnesty is necessary in order for the young democracy to be placed on a solid foundation. The consolidation of democracy takes priority over the punishment of individuals. – Democracy must be built on reconciliation in order to overcome the divisions of the past. – In most cases the governing party, as well as the opposition party, were entwined in human rights violations. Thus, a general amnesty offers a better basis for transition to democracy than does punishment of either side. – Amnesty, or “letting bygones be bygones” of the past, can prevent an emerging democracy from sudden decline. On the other hand, punishment can provoke a coup. – The former governing parties are only ready to give up their power if amnesty is secured for them. The negotiations between the ANC and the government began in the beginning of 1990 with the question of amnesty for ANC political prisoners and ended with the Amnesty Clause of the Interim Government at the end of 1993. In order for the parties to be able to come to the negotiation table, rules had to be established, which ultimately led to the release of political prisoners and made possible the return of exiled ANC members. In his historic speech of February 2, 1990, President de Klerk announced the release of Mandela and a small circle of other political prisoners (cf. Hansard, 1990). Through the law exempting legal punishment, the so-called Indemnity Act, the ANC responded with the demand for guaranteed exemption from punishment for exiles. The government, however, went even further. In view of the continuing show of force, De Klerk submitted a bill called the Further Indemnity Act10 to Parliament in October 1992. He based this decision on the fact that the then current amnesty laws did not do enough to include those who had merely followed orders. In contrast to the earlier agreement which was made in support of the Norgaard-Principles, the Further Indemnity Act took into consideration political motivation as the sole criteria for exemption from punishment. The context and the type of deed were not to play a role. Nevertheless, the ANC threatened not to recognize the amnesty laws outlined in the Further Indemnity Acts. In an open letter to de Klerk, human rights organizations wrote: “We believe that no decision can be made to 9 The arguments stem again from the international literature on transition research. 10 Cf. the development of power in South Africa. (Porzgen 1994, pp. 109 – 120)

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forgive crimes before the truth of those crimes are known” (HRW Document 1992, p. 1). Of course, the ratification of the Further Indemnity Acts could not be halted; but the ensuing discussion threw a specific term into the political debate: namely, truth. South Africa would, of course, accept an amnesty ruling in view of the crimes of apartheid; but it would not “let bygones be bygones.” Among other things, the debate focused on the year 1992, when there was a concern that the young democracy would be jeopardized by a confrontation with the past. But one could also hear the opposing view that the “confession and renunciation of past violence can strengthen democracy immeasurably” (Asmal 1996, p. 23). The resulting debate took place in the fall of 1993 in the political negotiations of Kempton Park (Johannesburg) which led to the passing of a new constitution for South Africa (Interim Constitution) on November 18, 1993, and made possible the first secret and free elections of April 27, 1994. The South African constitutional judge, A. Sachs, recalls the political positions that were represented in the discussion: general amnesty on the National Party (NP) side, connected to the argument that: “[t]he cooperation of the Defense Force and of the South African Police was necessary during the election. How could they be expected to co-operate, if they did not have the assurance that the new government would not prosecute them.”11 (TRC Document 1994, p. 4) On the other side there was the rejection of amnesty with the reasoning that “an amnesty would take account …. of the needs and the pain of the victims.”12 The result of the negotiations of Kempton Park was a political compromise which appears in the Postscript13 (TRC Document 1994, p. 4) of the Interim Constitution under the title National Unity and Reconciliation. It reads: “This constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society…and a future founded on the recognition of human rights. The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society…There is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation; a need for ubuntu14 but not for victimization. In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the 11 Looking back, Albie Sachs says: “The insistence on an amnesty was so strong that the election would not have taken place if their concern in this matter was not taken account of.” TRC Document 1994, p. 4. 12 Ibid. The result would be, says Sachs: “The government could encounter tremendous opposition if an amnesty were granted without the people concerned disclosing what had actually happened.” 13 Sachs suggested to the hearing committee to name this section the “Postamble” because it presumes, or builds on, the whole document. 14 Xhosa word for the English “humanity.”

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past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed.” (Act No. 200 1993) In short, the problem of amnesty has been connected with the overriding necessity for “National Unity and Reconciliation.”15 With the phrase “amnesty shall be granted” the course was set for amnesty ; however, not for general amnesty ; or else it would neutralize the process of reconciliation. To conclude: the course was determined well before the vote on amnesty and the truth findings. However, no matter how the amnesty law is worded, room must be made in the transitional phase for the amnesty question to be decided by a freely elected parliament. Nevertheless, da lege lata is the current state of the existing amnesty regulations.

The Exposing of Past Injustices through the Activity of the Truth Commission The following arguments support “exposure” of past injustices (Option 3): – Large segments of the population are not aware of the dimension of past crimes. Public exposure of past injustices is therefore necessary in order to avoid misconceptions about history in society which could lead to an attitude of glorifying the authoritarian past and thus hinder the spread of a democratic orientation. – Individuals and groups (parties, churches, etc.) in society carry guilt for crimes that were perpetrated by a totalitarian system. Comprehensive exposure and clarification of crimes can therefore help aid the transfer of responsibility to society at large. – For a young democracy, it is essential that responsibility be assigned to the past government for its activities. Otherwise, proceedings against former officials may be misconstrued as acts of individual caprice and will be omitted from public scrutiny. In addition, neglecting to assign responsibility could lead to a closing of ranks within the police, and military power structures and, generally, within the public service sector. Option 3 is frequently used by countries whose transitional process is characterized as a political compromise. Historical examples are El Salvador, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. Arguments for are primarily connected to those in favor of Option 1: if prosecution is not enforceable, at least “the truth” 15 The lawyer Jeremy Sarkin observed that, “the drafters of the interim constitution recognized the primacy of reconciliation and reconstruction to the pursuit of national unity and peace and they accepted the principle of amnesty as a necessary tool for this purpose” (Sarkin 1996, p. 620).

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about the crimes should come to light. “Truth is what you offer when you can’t offer justice,” comments the observer. (Sarkin 1996, p. 618) Justice must not necessarily be suspended in favor of truth, as the above cited comment suggests. Instead of retribution – where justice is only re-established when those who have committed human rights violations have been punished – a different result is introduced into the arena of international research on transitional processes. Thus, the approach of many young democracies that have had to deal with their past is the following: the knowledge of the truth about a crime is just as important as justice. “Such an approach holds that knowledge of the truth is the most important part of a process of healing.” (Sarkin 1996, p. 619) Exposure is thus a third option between prosecution on the one hand and the forgetting of the past, on the other. In view of the system change in South Africa, specific arguments for Option 3 are highlighted: the key terms are apartheid and “African traditional justice system.”16 (Villa-Vicencio 1999, p. 4) With this option all of the energy is concentrated in overcoming the consequences of apartheid and the emphasis is on “nation building”. (One could say that, in the course of the discussion, the expression “Nation Building” evolves into concept signaling the opposite of “apartheid.”) However, in order to “build” a new nation South Africa must know its history which necessitates a “common memory.” This “common memory”, among other things, may be able to accomplish the following: “…it will provide a basis for a collective acknowledgement of the illegitimacy of apartheid; it will facilitate the building of a culture of public ethics in South African and it will make room for genuine reconciliation; it will enable privileged South Africans to face up to collective understanding and, therefore, responsibility for the past in which only they had voting rights; finally it will allow for a necessary process of historical catharsis as the previously excluded speak at last for themselves, and the privileged caste joins the South African family for the first time.” (Asmal 1996, pp. 10) Main features of the “African traditional justice system” reflect the phrase: “…there is a need for ubuntu.” The necessity for ubuntu lies in acceptance that “no one is a person without other people.” (Gerloff 1998a, pp. 18) The Zulu word (which in English is only partially conveyed by “humanity”), expresses respect for the other person. “When I destroy the humanity of another,” says Tutu, “then I ultimately destroy my own.” (Tutu 1996, p. 1) The need for “humanity” does not wish the destruction of the offenders, but desires their reintegration into society. “Reconciliation is in Africa a collective concept. The community should be re-established.” (Naude 1996) However, when I set out to destroy another person I can no longer be reconciled with them. In the context of South Africa, justice does not mean ‘vengeful justice’ or ‘blood for blood’. C. VillaVicencio says: “If justice, however, means that people who were once perpetrators are now able to participate in the building of a new society, then a 16 Cf. among others Villa-Vicencio 1999, p. 4.

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constructive justice can emerge from vengeful justice. Justice and reconciliation are then synonymous.” (Villa-Vicencio 1996) Where the prosecution of serious human rights violations is not politically enforceable, the course is set for exposure. R. Goldstone says incisively : “There is a far more efficient and satisfactory way of accounting for the past and that is to expose it.” (Goldstone 1994, p. 4) The initial situation is characterized as such: “Many people had an intuition that human right’s violations were there, but always wished that it was never true.” (Mousa 1996, p. 1) Certainly the question of the correct strategy by which to overcome the past was not an item of political debate about the democratic future of South Africa (CODESA). Nevertheless, the course was set for processing the past in a transitional phase, which is obvious from its connections to the amnesty debate. As we saw under Option 2, a general amnesty in South Africa was not feasible because it would have meant amnesia; for if amnesty is to be granted, then at least the truth should come to light. At the height of the amnesty debate in 1992, the idea of establishing a Truth Commission in South Africa was first conceived. The processing of the past in connection with the forming of a “commission” appears to also have its pragmatic reasons: a commission is able to provide a context – or a forum – for reconciliation upon which a “common memory” could be maintained, while at the same time keeping the tension “between the politics of compromise and the radical notion of justice.” (Boraine 1994, p. 1) Politics thus create parameters. According to the results of the discussion in Option 3, I agree with the statement of the Executive Secretary of the IDASA: “South Africa has decided to say no to amnesia and yes to remembrance; to say no to full-scale prosecution and yes to forgiveness.” (Boraine 1994, p. 4) As a regulative idea I therefore submit that reconciliation is not possible without truth.

Reparations to the Victims The following arguments support reparations: – An official recognition of the victims’ suffering contributes to a reestablishment of their worth. Accordingly, previously persecuted persons are able to gain some self-respect in the new society. – Reparations to the victims are vital so that, from their perspective, the injustice does not continue. Such treatment of the victims reinforces the legitimacy of a young democracy. – A democracy is dependent upon the support of all groups of the population, even those of the victims. Rehabilitation with its goal of inclusiveness in the new order advances the stability of a fledgling democracy. – Without rehabilitation of the victims there can be no subsequent

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reconciliation with the functionaries of the old order, which may put at risk the social rewards of the transition to democracy. – International agreements force the question of reparations on the agenda of young democracies.17 How should the suffering of victims of Apartheid be “compensated” for? If one thinks of “the three and one half million blacks in South Africa who were driven from their land,” “how should justice be re-established?” B Naud¦ comments realistically : “Humanly speaking it is impossible”; he argues “[i]f we make justice a condition of reconciliation, then reconciliation in our sinful world will be impossible.” (Naude 1996) From the beginning it is clear that any attempt to do justice to the term ‘reparation’ is impossible. Quite simply, reparations in the sense of complete material compensation are impossible in South Africa in view of the sheer dimensions of the incurred injustices. Reparations would not only by far exceed the capabilities of the country, they would have to be considered in the context of Option 4: the course is set in the transitional phase whereby the legislation of apartheid cannot be declared illegal retrospectively (cf. the models for Option 1 and 2).18 How can reparations take place under these conditions? In the debate, the arguments in favor of reparations are connected to those closely related to the exposure of past injustices. Thus, in Option 3: if justice cannot be exercised in the sense of criminal law or material reparations then, at least, the truth about the crimes and the suffering of the victims officially has to come to light. Accordingly, the basic need of the victims to have their suffering acknowledged will be officially recognized. “Most of the black people are walking around with things that are really disturbing them and they couldn’t come to terms with what happened to them in their lives.” (SACC Theological Consultation Document 1996, p. 1) The definition of “truth” in terms of Option 3 is thus extended on the basis of specific criteria: it is not merely about factual truth, but has to do with truth as acknowledgement; the notion of ’factual truth’ that is solely defined by its applicability in legal contexts is extended to ’healing truth’. In both, the South African discussion and the international experience of the Truth Commissions, the two aspects of truth have been connected. 17 Victims have, for example, according to Article 14 of the “Torture Convention” the right to a “just and appropriate compensation”; cf. “Agreement against torture and other cruel, inhuman or humiliation treatment or punishment” of December 10, 1984. (BGB1. II, pp. 246) 18 Thus arises a particular problem in relation to the question of giving back land, which in the framework of a case study can only be recorded on tape. Forced re-settlements were allowable. So a law had to be passed that regulated restitution claims. The so-called Land Rights Act came into effect in 1994. Before, the Land Claims Court cases could be brought up for negotiation. Until June 1998 over 27,000 restitution claims were lodged. Of those, 18,000 cases were agreeably settled in which a total of 30,000 hectares of land were involved. The remaining cases, as in the instance of the case study, are still pending. Cf. Press briefing pack on progress with the Restitution of Land Rights, September 13, 1998, p. 2.

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R. Goldstone writes about the omissions of an investigative commission that he himself had chaired:19 “My commission has never told South Africans anything they did not really know. It was not so much knowledge that was being sought but acknowledgement from an official source.” (Goldstone 1994, p. 3) With these remarks, Goldstone raises a decisive point for a future Truth Commission. Through his work he recognized the significance of the victim’s perspective: “An official exposure of what caused their hurt and suffering is the only way to enable them to begin their healing.” (Goldstone 1994, p. 3) History itself shows these experiences in dealing with the victims for South Africa are very important. A. du Toit, one of the architects of the South African TRC, reveals that torture was used as a political tool during the era of Apartheid. “It had to do (above all) for the perpetrators to demonstrate to their victims that ‘You can scream all you want, but nobody will hear you! And when you tell your story, nobody will believe you. Because in our land torture doesn’t exist!’” “That,” says du Toit, “is the core of an authoritarian and undemocratic regime.” (Du Toit 1996, 4) In contrast, it is extremely important that when the victims are for the first time able to publicly tell their stories they encounter an attitude of appreciation: “We are really listening and taking your word as experience and you don’t have to prove it. We accept that these things happened.”20 With the decision that truth is acknowledgement, the worth of the victims is again reinstated and in the process a contribution is made to the democratization of society. As outlined above in the key term ubuntu, the question of reparations also arises: the view of justice in the sense of implementation of rights (be it through prosecution or material compensation) addresses only marginally the need for justice of many victims of apartheid. R. Goldstone sums up the problem of rights and justice thus: “…fundamental to all forms of justice is official acknowledgement of what happened, whether by criminal process or by truth commission.” (Goldstone 1996, p. 13) The victims must be at the center, otherwise the discussions about penal law or amnesty, lawsuits or truth commissions only arrive at a “highly stylized debate of the white middle class”, which has nothing to do with the needs of the people at the “grass root level”. (Goldstone 1996, p. 2) A litigious western style of thinking is therefore 19 The so-called Goldstone Commission was convened as a result of a bi-partisan peace conference whose goal it was to curb power in South Africa at the beginning of the 1990s. The legal basis for the Goldstone-Commission was provided by the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act (Act No 139, 1991). Its mandate included the investigation of public power and intimidation in South Africa from July 1991 onwards. Compared to previous governmental investigation committees (such as the one founded by de Klerk in February 1990, the so called Harms Commission for the Exposure of Deed by Killer Commandos), the Goldstone-Commission had broad-reaching powers: it could call witnesses and demand the surrender of evidence. Hearings of this commission took place regularly. 20 Statement of the later Coordinator of the TRC Office in Cape Town. (Du Plooy 1996, p. 1)

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something which foreign to many South Africans who suffered under apartheid and which thus contrasts with African culture set against the background of a political history of oppression. To conclude: within the political transition process the path is set for moral reparations. Victims should be compensated so that their stories of suffering are officially acknowledged. The idea that reconciliation has something to do with acknowledgement is regulative.

Professional “Disqualification” of Complicit Officials The following arguments are in favor of sanctions beyond prosecution, as in the the removal of implicated officials from public offices of public offices of implicated officials: – Democracy respects the law. It must be made clear that no one is above the law; not even those in high office or the military. – A democratic process is not reliably possible without a change of the elite. – Should the police or the military succeed to avoid prosecution though political influence a country is still not a democracy and must fight on for the establishment of a democratic structure. – The exclusion of charged people from public office is forbidden, including police and military, in order for the loyalty of the executive branch vis-a-vis the new government to secure and usher in the process of reform. The nature of system change is to maintain the continuity of the police and the military. From that standpoint, it is understandable that Option 5 was discussed in South Africa at the beginning of the 1990s, above all in connection with Option 2 (amnesty). Contrary to the position of police and military who want amnesty for all crimes, there is the interest of exposing crimes which, above all, is represented by segments of the population including the victims of the most serious human rights violations. Thus, Option 5 is also discussed in connection with Option 3 (exposure). If the military isn’t prosecuted, at least the truth about their involvement in human rights violations needs to come to light. If Option 1 (prosecution) fails, then Option 5 (professional disqualification of implicated co-workers of the apartheid regime) should still be maintained. However, South Africa had to consider two basic hazards in dealing with sanctions outside of criminal law, which includes the military and the security police: if the transfer government had been too lenient, then the democratic beginning could have been jeopardized, but if it had been too harsh, it wouldn’t have commanded loyalty. In the worst case scenario, a coup could have loomed on the horizon. Thus, the politics of president F. de Klerk aimed

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for balance. The Further Indemnity Act served also to integrate loyal employees of the security police. The hardliners in the police and military, who did not want to cooperate with the process of democratization, were isolated. The government and the ANC acted to integrate soldiers from the ‘armed resistance’ into the South African armed forces. Certainly the military and the police lost political influence in the course of the transfer process, which also thus indicates that they were unsuccessful in pushing for a general amnesty. But their influence did not disappear entirely, which is reflected in the proceedings of Kempton Park where G. Werle remarked in summary : “And despite their revolutionary substance the transitional constitution provided for an external continuity in the law, police, and military.”21 (Werle 1995, p. 9) To conclude: prior to the elections, the path was set against job disqualification of implicated officials of the apartheid regime, including the police and the military. For democratization to work, the functionaries of the old order had to be held responsible. The idea that reconciliation includes the integration of all professions is regulative.

Regulative Understandings of Reconciliation behind the Political Debate The preceding empirical analysis of the initial conditions immediately yields “regulative ideas” about reconciliation, which were guiding in the political debate, such as: – Reconciliation is not possible without truth. – Reconciliation has something to do with acknowledgement. – Reconciliation means an all-inclusive invitation to integrate into society. The aggregate of political expressions concerning reconciliation can be understood by looking back to the empirically analyzed statement that says the gap between overcoming the past (apartheid) and the building of a nation (nation building) has priority among political decision makers. The political form of reconciliation assumes a specific function in the process of “nation building:” “reconciliation should bring together into dialogue the different groups in South Africa which otherwise stand as opponents in war.” (De Gruchy 1996) The regulative statements that exist behind the political debate of the country can be stated as follows:

21 Continuity is the overall guiding motif of the Interim Constitution of 1993. Act No. 200 (1993) deals with legal continuity (Article 229), continuity of public office, including the police and military (article 235 and 256), and of the continuity of the courts (Article 241).

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– Through “nation building,” reconciliation overcomes the gap created by apartheid. One could say that this statement (i. e., nation building) leads either directly or indirectly into the political debate as a whole. Beneath this level, other activities have proven instrumental in the political discourse: representatives of human rights organizations, the ANC, and the church. Which statements are regulative behind these political powers? With regard to reconciliation I suggest: – Reconciliation cannot be brought about by apartheid, it can only occur between personse, who have become guilty of crimes against each other as the result of past politics – Reconciliation can choose not to punish the perpetrators, but it cannot undo the truth about the incurred injustices. – Reconciliation demands a “common memory”; through a common memory different opposing views can co-exist that otherwise exist across a divide. – Reconciliation demands another type of justice than retributive justice. – Reconciliation excludes revenge. – Reconciliation is society-building; ubuntu makes possible the position for reconciliation. – Reconciliation presupposes the readiness to work with a new South Africa Among the above mentioned political powers, above all in the ANC, there are some voices which, along with others, partially oppose the implicit axioms, especially those that are ready to support the complex issue of “reconciliation and justice”: – Basic rights are not to be sacrificed in favor of national unity. Reconciliation excludes the right of the individual to bring their tormentors to justice. F. de Klerk and K. Asmal indicate how the understanding of reconciliation within South Africa can be directed by mutually exclusive axioms. We cited above De Klerk’s warning not: “…to randomly alter or undo what we have done in the spirit of reconciliation and the maintaining of security and stability in South Africa.” Which “implied axiom” is recognizable here? Behind his statement is hidden the “regulative statement”, still at work, from the days of apartheid: – Reconciliation means the toleration of the division of former days. K. Asmal grew up in a small South Africa town where it was expected that he should make room on the street for any white person that he encountered. From the above cited sentence we have: “reconciliation is a shared and painful

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ethical voyage from wrong to right.” This sentence contains the implied axiom: – Reconciliation assumes that apartheid is recognized as a “crime against humanity.”

References Asmal, K 1996, Reconciliation through Truth. A Reckoning of Apartheid’s Criminal Governance, David Philip, Cape Town. Behrens, M / von Rimscha, R (eds)1994, Südafrika nach der Apartheid, Nomos, Baden-Baden. Boraine, A 1994, Truth and Reconciliation Commission: What about Justice?, Unpublished lectures. Boraine, A 1995, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, Paper presented at the conference 7 – 9 August 1995, Guatemala City. Botman, H 1996, To Remember and to Heal. Theological and Psychological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation, Human / Rousseau, Human / Rousseau, Cape Town, Pretoria, and Johannesburg. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Africa 1998, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Palgrave Macmillan, Cape Town. Gerloff, R 1998, ‘Menschliche Begegnungen in Südafrika’, in RKZ, Vol. 1, No.17, pp. 17 – 23. Goldstone, R 1994, Address by the honorable Mr. Justice R. J. Goldstone at the graduation ceremony at the University of Natal 13 April 1994, Durban. De Gruchy, J 1995, Christianity and Democracy. A Theology for a Just World Order, Camebridge University Press, Cape Town. – 1996, ‘Christian Witness in a Secular State: Rethinking Church-State Relations in the New South Africa’. Theological Consultation SACC, 9 – 11 October 1996, Johannesburg. Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 1996, Interview with Brandon Hamber, 14 October 1996, Johannesburg. Hansard, 1990, Debates of Parliament (Hansard); Friday 2nd February 1990 (Joint Sitting) 1 – 18. Human Rights Watch Africa 1992, South Africa. Accounting for the Past, 23 October 1992. Huntington, SP 1991, The Third Wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century, University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma. Institute for Democracy 1994, Dealing with the past. Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa. ed. A Boraine, Cape Town. Justice in Transition 1995, The Healing of a Nation?, ed. A Boraine, Cape Town. De Klerk, F 1995, ‘Foolhardy to Tamper with Constitution’, Cape Times 2 October 1995.

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Kritz, N 1995, Transitional Justice. How emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, USIP Press, Washington DC. Mandela, N 1995, Long Walk to Freedom. The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, Hachette UK, London. Van der Merwe, S 1996a, Analysis of Issues of Concern to the Ecumenical Advice Bureau, Paper EAB Johannesburg, September. – 1996b, Interview with Stiaan van der Merwe, Ecumenical Advice Bureau, 14 October 1996, Cape Town. Mousa, I 1996, Interview with the Islam scholar Ibriahim Mousa, University of Cape Town. Naud¦, B / Kistner, W 1996, „Interview with Beyers Naud¦ and Wolfram Kistner” Frankfurter Rundschau 17 February 1997, p. 10. Du Plooy, L 1996, Interview with the Coordinator of the TRC Office in Cape Town, Cape Town. South African Council of Churches (SACC) Document 1996, Great Start to Truth Commission, 16 April 1996. Sarkin, J 1996, ‘The Trials and Tribulations of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 12, No. 61, pp. 617 – 641. Sparks, A 1995, ‘Als der Chef des Geheimdienstes dem Häftling die Schuhe schürte – Nelson Mandelas Begegnungen mit den Staatschefs Botha und de Klerk’, Frankfurter Rundschau 11 March. Du Toit, A 1996, ‘Philosophical Perspectives on the Truth Commission: Some Preliminary Notes and Fragments’. Paper presented to the Annual Congress of the Philosophical Society of South Africa, Stellenbosch Comment, Vol. 20, No. 2. TRC Document 1994, Notes on Institute for Democracy meeting on Proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Pretoria. Tutu, D 1996, Statement by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Chairperson of the TRC, November 22, 1996 (press release). Villa-Vicencio, C 1996, ‘Wunder der Apartheid’, Rheinischer Merkur 20 May. – 1999, Getting on with Life: A Move towards Reconciliation, unpublished paper. Werle, G 1995, Ohne Wahrheit keine Versöhnung! Der südafrikanische Rechtsstaat und die Apartheid-Vergangenheit, lecture notes at Humboldt-Universität Berlin on 18 May.

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II. Comparative and Global Perspectives

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Andreas Freytag / Sarah Langlotz1

The Resource-Conflict-Nexus An African Perspective

Introduction Since the 1990s the nexus between natural resources and conflict has attracted much attention in academia. This interest is justified by an increasing number of “resource conflicts”, of which many have taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa, e. g. in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Sierra Leone. Resources have been a motive for the onset of conflicts in both resource-rich countries (resource wealth and dependence) and resource-poor countries (resource scarcity). In both cases, it has been observed that resources can lead to problems in the economy, society and in politics. Intuitively, one would suggest that resource wealth leads to better development and resource scarcity can end in civil conflicts. Evidence, however, teaches a different story. The literature can be divided into two major branches; one underlining the impact of resource scarcity on the risk of conflict and the other stressing the negative impact of resource wealth. Interestingly, evidence for the impact of resource wealth on the risk of conflict dominates the resource scarcity argument. As resources cannot be linked solely in a direct way to the risk of conflicts, different transmission channels need to be disclosed and analyzed. One important transmission channel is the impact of resource wealth on the country’s economic performance (resource curse), which in turn has effects on the country’s risk of conflict. Another indirect link can be established through the impact of institutions. In the article, we review the main findings on the direct and indirect effects. After providing a short theoretical background we take a look at the empirical evidence, thereby referring to case studies in Sub-Saharan Africa. What are the reasons for focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa? First, many conflicts over resources have taken place in this region. Second, quite a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are rich in resources but still have not developed adequately. Third, as developing countries seem to be more prone to conflict, we need to better understand the causal relations in order to develop effective policy measures. 1 The authors wish to thank Nicole Dittrich for helpful research assistance.

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Theoretical Background Before examining the different transmission channels from a theoretical point of view, it is necessary to clarify the understanding of the terms “resources” and “conflict”. According to Basedau and Lay (2005, p. 9) “resources are generally factors of production that promote development or growth”.2 The analysis of the resource-conflict-nexus focuses on natural resources, which can be regarded as “gifts of nature” or economically speaking: windfall profits. Due to a large variety of resource types, important classifications have been made in order to analyze whether the impact depends on the resource type. First, one can distinguish resources according to their diffusiveness. “Point” refers to the concentration of resources in a specific area and “diffuse resources” are distributed within a larger region (Ross 2004b). Second, resources differ in their so-called “lootability”. This distinction refers to on the cost of the “pillage” of these resources. While alluvial gemstones, diamonds, and agricultural resources like drugs don’t require special knowledge and time to extract (“lootable resources”) oil, natural gas, and deep-shaft minerals (“unlootable resources”3) cannot easily be won (Ross 2003a). Third, Ross (2003a, p. 54) distinguishes between “obstructable” and “unobstructable” resources. A resource is obstructable “if its transportation can easily be blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons” (ibid.). Finally, an obvious distinction can be made with respect to the resources’ renewability. The understanding of the term (civil) conflict or (civil) war varies considerably in the literature.4 Normally, a civil conflict is defined by the number of casualties; according to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) it is an internal conflict with at least 1,000 conflict related deaths. However, there are more definitions. Therefore, a comparison of papers dealing with the resourceconflict- or resource-war-nexus is only possible to a limited extent. As defined by Brück et al. (2010, p. 3) we will understand “violent conflict as the systematic breakdown of the social contract resulting from and/or leading to changes in social norms, which involve violence instigated through collective action”. When comparing resource wars with ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts a major difference becomes obvious. Whereas “conflicts over resources are interest-based contests over divisible goods”, ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts “involve non-divisible values such as identity and belonging” (Ballantine 2003, p. 274). Next to these differences caused by the 2 This is only one definition of resources from the economics perspective, though resources can also be defined from a geographical, sociological or political point of view. 3 Although it seems more adequate to denote these by “not easily lootable resources” we will keep the notation used in the literature. 4 In the following we will use the term civil conflict and civil war interchangeably.

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terminology, the literature splits up into analyzing the impact on the conflict’s onset only, on its duration, intensity and even the willingness of reconciliation respectively. Furthermore, the term “resource conflicts” has to be used critically as it can be misleading. According to this term, it seems that resources and conflicts can be directly related to each other. However, in many conflicts resources have played a role, but have not necessarily been the driving factor. In this respect we need to consider the different transmission channels and indirect effects when we aim at discovering the relation of resources and conflicts. Being aware of this criticism, we will continue using this term for reasons of simplicity. In the following, we will consider both the state of resource scarcity and resource richness, but focus on the relation of conflict and resource wealth. According to Le Billion (2001), both resource scarcity and resource abundance can be regarded as a “relative social construct”. If a country has too few resources, then a so-called scarcity only evolves out of how people deal with it. The case of resource wealth can be considered analogously, and it does not need to end in resource dependence. A country might not be rich in resources in terms of the amount but in terms of the value that has first been ascribed to the resource by society. Thus resource richness as well as scarcity is constructed by society. Resource Scarcity As already stated, the relation between resource scarcity and the risk of conflicts seems to be by far more intuitive. In regions with low human, social or physical capital – conditions which are prevalent in many developing countries – natural resources are often the major contribution to development. If such countries have only little access to natural resources, the economic development might be impeded.5 Following the theoretical literature on the causes of conflict and violence, underdevelopment can end in civil conflicts. In this context, one can argue in terms of the so-called opportunity costs. When people live under bad economic conditions, their opportunity costs of becoming a rebel are smaller than for people living in an environment of a stable and good economy. That is, if people have low income or even no access to income-generating activities, then rebel groups can easily convince them to take part as they have not much to lose (Collier 2006). This argument can also hold in case of resource wealth, when the resource rents do not reach the poor but are instead concentrated in the hands of economic or political elites. Next to the opportunity cost argument, one could imagine that conflict might 5 However, if natural resources are scarce, the necessity to generate human capital and to be innovative is high. Denmark and Southern Germany are suitable examples.

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evolve out of the fight over the access to the scarce resources that might be essential for survival. Homer-Dixon (1999) is one of the major supporters of the hypothesis that resource scarcity can lead to violent conflicts. According to him environmental scarcities can trigger conflicts, especially so-called group-identity conflicts, which can lead to migration and intergroup segmentations (Homer-Dixon 1999). However, empirical evidence is only weak and the argument has been predominated by the empirical findings on the impact of resource wealth on the onset of conflict. Therefore we will now discuss the direct and indirect links of resource wealth and conflict in detail. Resource Wealth The most obvious direct link of resources and the onset of civil conflict lies in the motivation to initiate a conflict. However, a motive alone does not seem to be sufficient to lead to a conflict’s onset as the prospective rebels also need the means and opportunities to enable a conflict. In this sense, Le Billion (2001) concludes that motivation and financing are the two major direct links of conflict and natural resources. The opportunity depends on the availability of the financial means in order to enable the rebellion (Collier / Hoeffler 2004). Financing the rebellion includes the provision of arms as well as the recruitment of warriors. Besides the financial means, rebel groups have to assure mobilization and cohesion (Goodhand 2001). For the purpose of mobilizing the rebels need a reason, such as poverty or injustice. In order to ensure cohesion rebels depend on a strong group identity. This can be achieved through networks, which can for instance be defined on the basis of ethnicity or clans (Goodhand 2001). With respect to the conflict’s motivation two major triggers have been extensively discussed in the literature. They are referred to as “greed or grievance”. Following Rosser (2006, p. 17) civil wars can have their origin in the “grievance stemming from inequalities of wealth, limited political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions”. Collier (2006, p. 1) points out that “rebels are public-spirited heroes fighting against injustice”. However, this heroperspective does not hold in the case where rebellion is actually due to greed. It may also be rational for potential rebel organizations to accumulate wealth by means of the war (Rosser 2006). The availability of resource rents thereby motivates potential rebels to initiate a conflict. Consequently, greed is also regarded as a motive of civil war, which seems to be more likely in countries where rebels command resource wealth. Furthermore, the grievance hypothesis can be seen in relation to secessionist movements. In resource-rich regions grievance might evolve and can even end in violent secessionist movements. Prominent examples have been the oil-rich regions in Angola or in the Niger Delta (Basedau / Lay 2005).

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From a political-economy view, another direct motivation may arise from the opportunity to accumulate power and the evolution of elites. Governments or rebels, who have the control over the natural resource, can thus reach more power (Goodhand 2001). However, it is not sufficient to acquire power but also to keep power. Resource rents allow the political leaders to maintain their power as they can finance a system of patronage, i. e. followers can be rewarded and opponents punished (Le Billion 2001). Consequently, states with natural resource wealth are more likely to attract rebels since rents from resources can be extracted through political power (Koubi et al. 2013) and the winner of a conflict can gain more. Goodhand (2001, p. 27) adds that the “entry barriers are especially low where (a) control of the valuable commodities is divisible (b) it is possible to sell them without having to exercise control over large territories or infrastructure”.6 By manipulating state policies to their own benefit – e. g. by limiting the access to resources – elites can increase the risk of conflict (Koubi et al. 2013).7 When groups can benefit from a conflict, they might not be interested in a conflict resolution or victory. This again leads to a prolongation of the conflict and the deferral of reconciliation (Humphreys 2005). Hence, resource wealth can raise the interest in avoiding a peace deal (Rosser 2006). Other authors put forward the opposing hypothesis that natural resources can also decrease the conflict’s duration and intensity as combatants have an interest in a cooperation regarding the resource exploitation (Ross 2004a). Collier (2006) indicates that rebels might need to use predatory behavior8 in order to finance their rebel activities. Analogously, one can also argue in the opposite direction, i. e. when a group supposed to fight against inequalities actually seeks power at the same time (Basedau / Lay 2005). Following these arguments it becomes clear that in some cases the distinction can hardly be made between the motivations of greed or grievance. Besides these considerations, there is an indirect relation between resource wealth and the risk of conflicts based on two important channels. We will analyze first the effects of resource wealth on economic development (resource curse) and second the influence of institutions on this effect and vice versa.9

6 Good examples for resources satisfying these criteria are diamonds and narcotics (Goodhand 2001). 7 On the one hand, this can be explained by grievance due to an increasing inequality. On the other hand, it might become more difficult for rebels to initiate a conflict when they are deprived of their means. 8 Collier (2006, p. 3) defines predatory behavior as “the use of force to extort goods or money from their legitimate owners”. 9 According to North (1993, p. 5) “institutions are the rules of the game in a society or more formally are humanly-devised constraints that structure human interaction”.

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Resource Curse Why can resource wealth end in a so-called curse instead of a blessing? Contrary to the first intuition that resource wealth should go along with development, evidence points in the opposite direction. Wealth of resources can harm a country’s economy, society and, institutions and consequently increase the risk of conflict. The term “resource curse” (Auty 1993) has also been referred to as the “paradox of plenty” (Karl 1997). The resource curse hypothesis, which is backed by empirical findings, claims that the abundance of natural resources has an adverse impact on the economic development of a country (Sachs / Warner 2001). Sachs and Warner (2001) claim that the empirical support of the resource curse is strong enough so that one can introduce a wide list of control variables. As the resource curse is related to bad economic development this can indirectly increase the risk of civil conflicts. Evidence indicates the negative relation of resource abundance and development as well as the impact of underdevelopment on the risk of civil conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) underlined the negative influence of economic development on the risk of conflict. On the contrary they claim that “education enrollment, per capita income, and the growth rate all have statistically significant and substantial effects that reduce conflict risk” (Collier / Hoeffler 2004, p. 588). Besides, Blattmann and Miguel (2010, p. 4) state that “the correlation between low per capita incomes and higher propensities for internal war is one of the most robust empirical relationships in the literature”. When looking at countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the risk of conflict seems higher compared to other developing countries due to a low per capita income and low growth rates (Collier / Hoeffler 2002). Contrary to that, the social characteristics lower this risk since a high religious and ethnic fractionalization has a diminishing effect on the risk of conflict (Collier / Hoeffler 2002). The literature points out three main explanations for the resource curse phenomenon. These are the Dutch disease, rent seeking behavior and institutional factors. An important cause of the resource curse can be seen in the crowding out effect. As natural resources crowd out other activities, which have been drivers of growth, they restrain the country’s development (Collier 2007, Sachs / Warner 2001). This phenomenon is denominated as the so-called Dutch disease, which can be traced back to the effects of the North Sea gas on the Netherlands’ economy. The important factor in this relation is the exchange rate. If a country is rich in resources the export of these leads to a higher demand for its currency and thus its real appreciation. This, however, reduces the competitiveness of the other tradable activities a country was involved in. Basedau and Lay (2005) add that next to the damage of other sources of growth, natural resources trigger inadequate economic policies and increase the country’s vulnerability to external shocks.

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Moreover, resource wealth induces rent-seeking activities, which are negatively linked to development. DiJohn (2002) illustrates that rent-seeking becomes more attractive, when natural resource rents are relatively high compared to income. This again can lead to higher risk of distribution conflicts. Finally an important influence is made by the so-called institutional factors. In our context we mainly refer to the formal institutions as for example rules, laws and the constitution. Without a proper institutional setting resource management may not be adequate. There is evidence that the quality of a country’s institutions has a significant impact on how the resource rents are used, i. e. whether the economy and society can benefit from it or not (Basedau / Lay 2005).10 Institutions Next, we want to have a look at the impact of institutions, which have been increasingly taken into account in the analysis. Indeed, it has been more and more acknowledged that “institutions matter”. In line with this development, scholars have tried to analyze the relation of resource wealth, institutions and the risk of conflict. According to Boschini et al. (2007) the problems associated with resource wealth cannot be deduced from this fact alone but instead have to be explained by a combination of resource wealth and institutions. Following the theory of Mehlum et al. (2006), different institutions lead to different reactions with respect to the country’s resource wealth. Resource wealth can become a problem if inadequate policy responses are taken. Lay and Mahmoud (2004, p. 6) underline that “the quality of social capital, in particular of political institutions and the type of property rights arrangements, determines whether natural resource rents will be used for good”. Fearon (2005) supports this by demonstrating that resource abundant countries are more likely to suffer from conflict because they suffer more often from weak state institutions compared to other countries on the same per capita income level. David and Gagn¦ (2006/07, p. 16) approve the above by arguing that “resource-based conflicts are most likely to occur in impoverished societies governed, if at all, by very weak postcolonial regimes that are dependent on export revenues from one or a few natural resources”. Le Billion (2001) adds that the availability of resource rents leads to inefficiency in economy and budgetary mismanagement. Resource abundance can weaken economic policies and institutions which will not recover quickly. This can furthermore increase the dependence of countries on natural resources. Hence, the conflict resolution is even hampered further or the risk of a return becomes higher (Bannon / Collier 2003). Humphrey (2005) points out another aspect concerning social cohesion. 10 The impact of institutions and rent-seeking activities will be analyzed more in detail in section 2.2.2.

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Countries dependent on natural resources are often associated with a weak manufacturing sector due to the Dutch disease. Following this one can assume that internal trade does only take place on a low level. However, internal trade goes along with social cohesion and interregional interdependence. Le Billion (2001) identifies a further risk of natural resources as they “increase the vulnerability of countries to armed conflict by weakening the ability of political institutions to peacefully resolve conflicts”. So far, we have mainly focused on one direction of the causal relationship, namely the impact of institutions on how resource wealth is being handled. Next we consider the other direction, i. e. the influence of resource wealth on institutions. Natural resource abundance can lead to a deterioration of institutions, which again can augment the risk of conflict. Resource wealth can have a negative effect on democracy (Collier / Hoeffler 2005). Many resource rich countries have in fact been led by an autocratic system, which again can have adverse effects on the management of resources. Leite and Weidmann (1999) have been among the first showing that resource abundance induces rent-seeking behavior and increases corruption. Basedau and Lay (2005) highlight the risk of building up a rentier state, a concept which has been related to the nature of the political system in resource rich countries (Lay / Mahmoud 2004). Rentier states are defined by high dependence on “unearned income” instead of reliance on productive sectors (BICC 2007). In resource-rich countries the state mainly depends on the rents that can be gained by nature. Since the state can make easy profits from the resource, it will be less active in a regular economy (Fearon 2005). The availability of resource rents provokes unproductive rent-seeking activities, which can end in misled policies (Lay / Mahmoud 2004). Fearon (2005, p. 487) furthermore mentions that “states with high oil revenues have less incentive to develop administrative competence and control throughout their territory”.11 Basedau and Lay (2009, p. 759) also refer to the “sparse network mechanism” and explain that “rentier economies have a one-sided integration in the world economy and, hence, cannot develop these ‘thick’ terms of exchange which have been identified as conducive to peace and stability”. Interestingly, the theory of the rentier state can be quite contradictory to the resource curse. Governments take resources as a means to “buy off” opposition or to prevent armed rebellion, which in turn can lead to more political stability under the authoritarian regime and a circumvention of resource conflicts. This so-called “cooption effect” has been empirically observed in the Middle East oil-rich countries. One possible way for the government is to use populist policies to increase public sector employment or to offer free education and health services. Moreover, due to rents from resources the government does not need to levy taxes, which makes the population accept the government (Basedau / Lay 2009). 11 This statement does not seem to be applicable to many oil-rich countries in the Middle East.

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We can conclude that institutions can be seen as a trigger for conflicts in resource-rich countries, and as a means to enable or maintain the conflict. Either elites or rebels make use of weak institutions to accumulate wealth or to finance the conflict. However, the causal relation is highly complex and when including institutions in the analysis we have to be aware of an endogeneity problem.12 Mehlum et al. (2006) emphasize that countries with already bad institutions are confronted with a double burden since bad institutions can be dismantled more easily. The negative effects of resource wealth can even aggravate when institutions are further deteriorated. Ross (2004b) concludes from his literature review that countries with a high dependence on export of resources like oil or minerals not only suffer from lower growth rates but also from higher corruption, authoritarian governance and higher poverty rates. A further potential consequence is conflict. Finally, it is important to underline that the state of resource abundance does not per se lead to the resource curse as some countries have shown (e. g. Norway or Botswana). Furthermore one can neither deduce an economic collapse from a resource curse, nor a civil war from an economic collapse. Consequently, we can follow Goodhand (2001) who stresses that the relation between conflict and poverty is of high complexity. The link and the causal relations have been discussed widely in the empirical literature.

Empirical Evidence After presenting the theoretical point of view we will now briefly summarize the main empirical findings. The evidence is generally tested using crosscountry data and running econometric regressions, either as cross-country or as panel analyses. Since the majority of articles on the resource-conflict-nexus deal with the case of resource wealth or specifically resource dependence this branch of literature will be presented in more detail. In general one has to be cautious with the interpretation and comparison of the studies’ results since they depend on the understanding of the terms, the underlying database as well as the measures capturing resource abundance or civil conflict. Astonishingly, there is an array of studies using Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998, 2004) lists of civil wars. When comparing these findings, which all point into a similar direction, one has to be aware of a possible selection bias. According to Rosser (2006), studies using other databases cannot all support the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2002; 2004 etc.). With regard to the different measures used to represent resource abundance it 12 For a detailed explanation of endogeneity, cf. Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2007). According to Wooldridge (2002, p. 50) “in traditional usage, a variable is endogenous if it is determined within the context of a model”.

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becomes obvious that many articles use the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP (or the ratio to the total exports). Rosser (2006) as well as Ross (2004b), however, question whether this is an adequate indicator for natural resource wealth. Ross (2004b) names two major problems regarding this measure. First, the causal relationship might be in the other direction, which cannot be captured by lagged independent variables. Second, he refers to the fact of omitted variables, i. e. that the effect is not significant as it is actually driven by a third variable (e. g. weak rule of law). In addition, Basedau and Lay (2009) underline the difference between resource wealth and resource dependence that has to be taken into account when analyzing the data. Concluding, the different specifications of the empirical analyses open a wide field for discussions.13 Having these problems in mind, we will first present the findings on the general relation of resources and conflict. Following this, we will look in more detail at the empirical support for the resource curse and for the role of institutions. Africa is in the focus of many empirical studies, since a high share of observed conflicts takes place in sub-Saharan Africa. As Table 1 shows, the African continent is particularly prone to conflict. According to Table 1, we can identify more than fifty civil conflicts since the end of colonization, of which only about a quarter did not take place in resource rich countries. In addition, the countries subject to civil conflict were and are in general characterized by weak institutions. A striking example is the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has been hit by violence since the appearance of Henry Morton Stanley. The major reason for this permanent conflict is the resource abundance of Congo, e. g. in Katanga. Although we do not intend to perform an own econometric study, we can establish the argument that the empirical evidence discussed in the subsequent sub-sections to a great extent is driven by African countries and African inner-state conflict. General Nexus between Resource and Conflict Although the literature shows a quite mixed picture, the risk of conflict is more strongly associated with resource abundance than with resource scarcity.14 Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2002 etc.), studying 98 countries and 27 civil wars find that the abundance of natural resources (using the ratio of primary exports to GDP as a measure) has a strong and significant effect on the onset of civil war (Collier / Hoeffler 1998).15 Interestingly, they discover a curvilinear 13 For further examples, cf. Rosser (2006). 14 Meta-studies are among others Ross (2004a) and Koubi et al. (2013). 15 Collier and Hoeffler (2005) have also used another approach to measure natural resources,

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relation, which means that with an increasing level of export the risk is reduced again. In another paper (Collier / Hoeffler 2004), they support their earlier findings, i. e. the risk of conflict was increased by primary commodity exports in their dataset from 1960 – 1999. Collier (2006) highlights a strong link between the risk of rebellion and the primary commodity exports, the income of a country as well as the growth. Bannon and Collier’s findings (2003) are consistent with this evidence as they state that almost 50 armed ongoing conflicts in 2001 can be linked to natural resource exploitation in terms of the onset, intensity and duration. They describe the conflict diamonds of Angola and Sierra Leone as the most prominent examples. Basedau and Lay (2009) have underlined the importance of distinguishing between resource dependence and resource wealth and argue that if anything, the resource dependence causes problems. However, the following findings question these results. De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) do not support the finding of a nonlinear relationship by Collier and Hoeffler (1998), but come to the conclusion that whereas mineral resources don’t seem to have the effect, it is found for fossil fuels. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) show that resource abundance is even related to a lower risk of conflict when controlling for endogeneity. They suspected an endogenous relation between the resource variables and conflict measures and found major differences in their results when accounting for this endogeneity.16 Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin (2003) using the same dependent variable as Collier and Hoeffler (primary commodity exports) do not support their findings.17 A major opponent to the resource curse hypothesis is Homer-Dixon (1999) supporting the scarcity argument, namely that resource scarcity leads to conflict instead of the abundance. However, taking a look at Sub-Saharan Africa and the scarce resource water we don’t observe the picture proposed by Homer-Dixon (1999). With respect to the scarcity of water, one natural resource of major importance, Koubi et al. (2013) conclude from their literature review that it can neither be related to armed conflicts nor water wars. Notwithstanding, water scarcity could be related to disputes and political tensions.18 namely a rent-based measure. Using this measure, the significance of their earlier results decreases and the new measure even becomes insignificant when they include both the new and their original one. Besides their own criticism, other researchers have also questioned the findings on Collier and Hoeffler. 16 In order to control for the endogeneity problem Brunnenschweiler and Bulte (2008, p. 15) modified the analysis “by simultaneously instrumenting for resource dependence and income in a series of follow-up regressions”. 17 Ross (2004b) states in his meta-study that Fearon and Laitin (2003) question the findings of Collier and Hoeffler, as neither the used measure nor its square is significant. They have used the same database, same years and even the same five-year-period grouping but the explanatory variable in their analysis is not significant. 18 For instance, such tensions arose between different countries, as it has been observed in the dispute between Turkey (Atatürk dam) and Syria (Assad dam).

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Whereas there is no clear consensus on the impact of natural resources in general, this may be different when analyzing certain types of resources. Considering resource richness in oil, Humphreys (2005) shows that oil production is positively related to the risk of conflict. Fearon (2005) supports this presenting that oil exports have a stronger impact on the onset of conflict than other primary commodity exports. He explains this finding by the influence of the institutional framework since he found that institutions are less reliable in oil producing countries. Also, Ross (2003c) concludes that oil and non-fuel minerals in comparison to agricultural resources are detrimental to poverty reduction. By contrast, Smith (2004) shows in his study of 107 countries between 1960 and 1999 that oil wealth in fact is related to lower levels of civil war. Basedau and Lay (2009) also cannot find a resource curse with regard to the risk of conflict when using per capita wealth of oil production as a measure for resource wealth. These findings indirectly refer to the comparison between concentrated and diffuse resources. De Soysa (2000) underlines that the link between the onset of civil war and resources is higher when considering the point resources oil and mineral wealth compared to natural resource wealth in general. Comparing the impact of lootable and unlootable resources, lootable resources, especially drugs and diamonds, have stood in strong relation to civil conflicts. Notwithstanding, they are correlated with a wider spread of benefits compared to unlootable resources (Ross 2003a). Ross (2003a) also finds that in contrast to diamonds and drugs timber is not strongly related to the onset of civil war. This can be explained by the fact that the trade of diamonds and drugs is often criminalized due to its value or illegality. Furthermore Ross (2003a, p. 67) shows that “lootable resources appear to create more complicated civil wars, with greater fragmentation and shifting alliances among the armies that control the resource”. He also controls for income per capita when analyzing the impact of different types of resources and concludes that there is only little difference. Summarizing from the above there is still no clear evidence when analyzing the impact of certain types of resources separately. Besides considering different types of resources scholars have examined the resource-conflict-nexus with respect to varying definitions of the term conflict as well as different types of conflicts or wars. An interesting remark has been made by Reynal-Querol (2002) analyzing the impact of religious division on social ethnic conflicts. Religious division plays a more important role on the onset of ethnic civil conflicts than natural resources.19 However, in a country of low ethnic division resources can be an important trigger for ideological or revolutionary civil wars or for other forms of political violence. Next to this distinction regarding the type of conflict, Ross (2003a, p. 67) finds that “unlootable resources are more likely to produce separatist conflicts, and 19 In Reynal-Queral’s analysis (2002) the explanatory power of resources (using the same measure as Collier and Hoeffler) is very low, which contradicts the findings of Collier and Hoefller.

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lootable resources are more likely to produce non-separatist conflicts”. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) study the impact on secessionist and non-secessionist civil wars. They show that whereas natural resources had a negative impact on both types, a stronger relationship could be observed with respect to secessionist conflicts. The impact of resource on conflict has also been discussed with respect to its effect on the conflicts’ duration. Some articles indicate that natural resource abundance has prolonged the duration of the conflict (Ross 2004a, Ballantine 2003). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) for instance show that natural resource wealth has a significant negative impact on the success of reconciliation initiatives. Le Billion (2001, p. 578) underlines the argument that “resource wealth may weaken the leverage of external peace initiatives”, insofar as “the international community often lacks cohesion, willingness, or leverage to forge a consensus”. DiJohn (2002) also comes to the conclusion that some natural resources can lead to a continuation of war. As stated above, resource wealth does not need to end in low economic growth or in conflict as some counterexamples prove. A totally different picture can be observed when comparing Sierra Leone and Botswana in the 1970s where both were low-income countries and both were rich in diamonds. Whereas diamonds have been a major cause of the economic and social problems in Sierra Leone, Botswana used them successfully to become one of the fastest-growing countries in the world (Bannon / Collier 2003).20 Another interesting example is given by Boschini et al. (2007) who compared oil-rich countries as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Norway. Norway did not end up in a resource curse and even achieved the status of one of the richest countries in the world. Despite few counter-examples there is still a lack of robust evidence for the argument of resource scarcity causing conflict. By contrast, the evidence for the impact of resource abundance on the risk of conflict seems to be more robust. Nevertheless, a strongly robust link cannot be established by a measure including all primary commodities without differentiating between the different types of resources. We will next consider the empirical findings on different transmission channels, thereby again focusing on the role of the economic situation and the institutional framework.

20 Further examples of countries that suffered from the resource curse are Angola, Nigeria or Sudan (oil); Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo (diamond); and Colombia and Afghanistan (narcotics). Their positive counterparts are for instance Australia, Canada, the US, New Zealand, Iceland, and the Scandinavian Countries, which have all benefitted from their resource wealth (Mehlum et al. 2006).

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Transmission Channels Direct Links It has to be mentioned that from a correlation between commodities as a proxy for resource wealth and conflict one cannot explain the motivation of the conflict. For instance, it will not become clear whether the rebellion has been caused by greed or by the fact that the resources have been used as a means to finance the rebel activities (Humphreys 2005). The true motivation of rebels to initiate a conflict cannot easily be detected. It is especially demanding to deduce whether grievance has played the major role or other reasons as rentseeking were the driving factors. One of the most obvious direct links has been the “feasibility mechanism”, arguing that resources can present the means and opportunities for conflicts. Lujala at al. (2005) argue that whereas secondary diamonds have been used to finance the rebel activities and can be positively linked to civil war, they have not necessarily been the motivation for initiating the conflict. Furthermore, they show that for primary diamonds the link to civil war is even in the other direction. In the case of Afghanistan, Rubin (2002) points out that the war has been financed by an emerging war economy including drug or gem trade and smuggling. In Colombia in the 1990s rebels used drugs, extortion and even kidnapping to finance their activities (Bannon / Collier 2003). Ross (2004b) gives some further examples where rebels have financed their activities at least partly through the agricultural sector (Liberia or DRC). However, agricultural commodities (when excluding opium and coca) could not be significantly related to the onset or duration of civil wars. Contrary to this evidence Ross (2004a) discovers in his study of 13 civil wars in resource abundant countries that none of the rebel groups ever financed the initiating costs of the conflict through natural resources. With regard to the greed or grievance discussion Collier (2002) claims that greed plays a more important role than grievance. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find evidence for the argument of opportunity, whereby they explain that this can be consistent with the motivation by greed or grievance. Ross (2004a) deduces from the studies that there is no or only little evidence for the grievance hypothesis.21 As indicated above, findings on the motivation have to be questioned due to the difficulties in measuring the true incentives.

21 Ross (2004a) mentions Sierra Leone as a counterexample. For more details please refer to Ross (2004a).

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Indirect Links Resource dependent countries are at risk not only because of the resource wealth itself but rather because of the economic conditions, as Humphreys (2005) emphasizes using the example Sierra Leone, which has not experienced the process of industrialization and suffered from the resource wealth. Hence, it is important to relate the findings to indicators of the countries’ economic situation. In fact, there is strong evidence that natural resource abundance harms the economic development of a country, leading to an increased risk of civil conflicts. Brunnenschweiler and Bulte (2008) stress that countries involved in a civil conflict will suffer more from dependence on the primary sector. This can again increase the risk of a future conflict. Sachs and Warner (2001) relativize this evidence by showing that the curse can be explained by omitted geographical and climate variables. However, the evidence of their finding is only weak. Besides the indirect link through the resource curse, it has been mentioned that “institutions matter”. The literature has more and more addressed the impact of the institutional framework of a country. A number of authors highlight the relevance of the weaker state argument instead of the “greed or grievance” argument (Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005). Besley and Persson (2011), for instance, mention that the relation of natural resources and the conflict risk depends on the political institutions. Boschini et al. (2007) support this finding as he regards the combination of the resource type and the quality of institutions as crucial. According to Bannon and Collier (2003, p. 12) “rebel movements, particularly those seeking to secede on the back of natural resources, are greatly bolstered by the presence of a corrupt elite that siphons off the revenues rather than a government that uses them transparently to raise living standards across the board”. Bulte et al. (2005) found that whereas the so-called point resources lead to worse institutions, this effect cannot be confirmed for diffuse resources. In addition, Lujala et al. (2005) indicate that the impact of diamond richness on the risk of conflict is dependent on the level of ethnic fractionalization. Since ethnic and religious fractionalization also influences the institutional framework we can consider this as an aspect of the transmission channel via institutions. Institutions have been distorted in some resource-conflicts, such as in Sudan, Nigeria, Angola or DRC (Mehlum et al. 2006). Mehlum et al. (2006) confirm the hypothesis that countries with “grabber friendly institutions” end in a resource curse and countries with “producer friendly” institutions can circumvent it. According to Ballantine (2003, p. 261) the wars in Sierra Leone and the DRC, both highly depending on primary commodities, were “rooted in decades of political misrule and corruption by a parasitic state elite and exacerbated by ensuing socioeconomic deterioration and institutional decay”. Both of these conflicts have been initiated in a situation of a low legitimacy of

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the state and a weak military in terms of its capacity. This is consistent with the argument of the opportunity costs, which are lower when the state is weaker. Ballantine (2003) adds a further aspect of the weak state argument, i. e. with a weak or absent economic governance informal or shadow economies are more likely. In addition, there is evidence of the relation between the existence of a sizable informal or shadow economy and the onset of conflict or rebellion. With respect to the conflicts’ onset Ballantine (2003, p. 267) concludes from the studies that in Sierra Leone, the DRC and Angola “continued access of combatant parties to financial resources served to strengthen peace spoilers, thereby sabotaging hard-won peace agreements”. Opposing the weak state argument, Basedau and Lay (2009) present that countries rich in oil are associated with better state institutions as compared to oil-poor countries. Often oil rents are used to maintain the authoritarian regimes and thereby create internal stability. Besides this, evidence regarding the rentier state theory indicates that “governments use the large resource revenues to maintain internal peace by combining a huge security apparatus with generous distributional policies” (Basedau / Lay 2009, p. 774). Concluding from the above, we can now better understand why the resource curse has been experienced in quite a number of countries in SubSaharan Africa. Thus, African countries might have been able to achieve a better development through its resource wealth if accompanied by good institutions. Scholars have underlined the importance of the institutional framework for the economic development as well as for the risk of conflict. Since in many developing countries state institutions are weak, the risk of resource conflicts is higher compared to countries with a good institutional setting. This brings us back to the prominent counterexamples of the resource curse, namely Norway and Botswana, which have shown that resource wealth does not need to result in conflicts.

Conclusions Despite a wide array of studies dealing with the resource-conflict-nexus, the evidence still remains disputed. Nevertheless, the empirical literature provides explanations for conflicts, which enables policymakers to create the conditions for avoiding future conflicts. The first group of findings relate to different resources and their influence on violence. Ross (2004b) summarized the main findings of the studies as follows: i) the relation between oil dependence and the onset of conflict (but not the duration) has been empirically confirmed; ii) oil dependence has a stronger relation with separatist conflicts than with other conflict types; iii) gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis are not related to the onset of conflict (though they are to the duration of pre-existing wars), iv) there is no clear

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link regarding agricultural commodities and v) the literature does not provide robust evidence between primary commodities and the onset of civil conflict. Whereas the general nexus of conflict and resources will still be a topic of intense discussions, scholars have, second, reached a consensus on the impact of the institutional framework. Although the evidence is mixed it seems undisputable that resource wealth rather than resource scarcity is linked to the risk on conflict, thereby underlining the indirect relation through the influence of institutions. The effect of resources on conflict has therefore been examined in combination with the institutional framework and economic conditions. Bannon and Collier (2003, p. 11) conclude that the dependence on primary commodities for their export and fiscal revenues can be related to an “increased risk of conflict, weak governance, and poor economic performance”. As already mentioned, the different findings can partly be explained by the diverse definitions of the terms, underlying measures, databases and the set of control variables. The literature opens a wide field of comments, discussions and criticisms. Just to mention a few aspects we refer to Koubi et al. (2013) who claims that the problem of endogeneity has not been accounted for sufficiently. Besides, the state-centric focus when analyzing resource abundance or scarcity is doubtful, since resources cannot be treated as homogeneously spread across the country. Therefore, future research should expand the analysis to the micro-level. Next to these aspects the literature should address external factors in more detail. This refers to the influence of foreign countries on the resource dependent economy, on the conflict as well as on the resourceconflict-nexus. Concerning policy implications, Ross (2004b, p. 351) mentions that “in many ways, the policy world has been ahead of the academic world”. For instance, the UN Security Council engaged in preventing rebels to sell natural resources (e. g. in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC, and Angola). Besides that the “Kimberley Process” has been set up in 2000, an agreement that the trade of diamonds shall be restricted to those that can be traced back to legitimate sources (Ross 2003b; 2004b). An important step to lower the risk of conflict in resource abundance countries could be made by an increased transparency of natural resource revenues. Following Fearon (2005), an improvement can be reached through international monitoring and international influence on the distribution of oil revenues within the resource rich country. He suggests that this function could be carried out by the IMF, the World Bank or a new institution. In this case it would be important to restrict the influence in order to prevent the country from being too dependent on these international institutions. Nonetheless, the international community should support but not manage the processes within countries. Therefore, the main conclusion from the analysis of conflict and resources is that it is of utmost importance to

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ameliorate and strengthen the country’s institutions, a task which must be tackled in the countries themselves.

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– 2007, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, Oxford University Press, New York. – / Hoeffler, A 1998, ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers, no. 50, pp. 563 – 73. – 2002, ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 46, pp. 13 – 28. – 2004, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars’, Oxford Economic Papers, no. 56, pp. 563 – 595. – 2005, ‘Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 625 – 33. David, CP / Gagn¦, JF 2006/07, ‘Natural Resources: A Source of Conflict?’, International Journal, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 5 – 17. De Soysa, I 2000, ‘The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven By Rapacity or Paucity?’ in Greed / Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, eds M Berdal / D Malone, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo. – / Neumayer, E 2007, ‘Resource wealth and the risk of civil war onset: results from a new dataset of natural resource rents, 1970 – 1999’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 201 – 218. DiJohn, J 2002, ‘Mineral Resource Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A critical assessment of the Rentier State model’, Crisis States Research Centre working papers series, vol. 20, no. 1. Doyle, M / Sambanis, N 2000, ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 4, pp. 779 – 801. Fearon, JD 2005, ‘Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, pp. 483 – 507. – / Laitin, DD 2003, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’, American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 75 – 90. Goodhand, J 2001, ‘Violent Conflict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty’, CPRC Working Paper, no. 6. Greene, WH 2007, Econometric Analysis, Academic Int. Publ., New York. Homer-Dixon, T 1999, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Humphreys, M 2005, ‘Natural resources, conflict, and conflict resolution: Uncovering the mechanisms’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 508 – 37. Karl, TL 1997, The paradox of plenty, University of California Press, Berkeley. Koubi, V, Spilker, G, Bçhmelt, T / Bernauer, T 2013, ‘Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict?’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 1 – 17. Lay, J / Mahmoud, TO 2004, ‘Bananas, Oil, and Development: Examining the Resource Curse and Its Transmission Channels by Resource Type’, Kiel Working Paper, no. 1218. Le Billion, P 2001, ‘The political ecology of war : natural resources and armed conflicts’, Political Geography, vol. 20, pp. 561 – 584.

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Leite, C / Weidmann, J 1999, ‘Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and, Economic Growth’, IMF Working Paper, WP/99/85. Luckham, R et al. 2001, Conflicts and Poverty in sub-Sahara Africa: an Assessment of the Issues and Evidence, IDS Working Paper, no. 128. Lujala, P, Gleditsch, NP / Gilmore, E 2005, ,A Diamond Curse? Civil War and Lootable Resource’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 538 – 562. Mehlum, H, Moene, K / Trovik, R 2006, ‘Cursed by resources or institutions?’, Journal World Economy, vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 1117 – 1131. North, DC 1993, ‘The new institutional economics and development’, Economic History Paper, no. 9309002. Reynal-Querol, M 2002, ‘Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 46, pp. 29 – 54. Ross, M 2003a, ‘Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Role of Natural Resources in Civil War’, in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, eds K Ballentine / J Sherman, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo., pp. 47 – 70. – 2003b, ‘The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor’, in Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions, eds I Bannon / P Collier, The World Bank, Washington D.C., pp. 17 – 42. – 2003c, ‘How Does Mineral Wealth Affect the Poor?’, UCLA, unpublished paper. Available at: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/minpoor.pdf [12 November 2013]. – 2004a, ‘How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From 13 Cases’, International Organization, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 35 – 68. – 2004b, ‘What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 337 – 56. Rosser, A 2006, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey’, IDS Working Paper, no. 268. Rubin, BR (ed.) 2002, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the international System,Yale University Press, New Haven. Sachs, JD / Warner, AM 2001, ‘The curse of natural resources’, European Economic Review, vol. 45, pp. 827 – 838. Smith, B 2004, ‘Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960 – 1999’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 232 – 47. Wooldridge, JM 2002, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, The MIT Press, Cambridge.

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The Resource-Conflict-Nexus Table 1: Conflicts in Africa Country

Conflict

Year

Casualties

Angola

War of National Liberation

1961 – 1974

500,000+

Angola

First War with UNITA

1975 – 1992

500,000+

Angola

Second War with UNITA

1992 – 2002

100,000 – 500,000

Burkina Faso

Coups

1966 – 1987

n.a

Burundi

Ethnic Strife

since 1962

100,000 – 500,000

CAR

Coups

since 1966

n.a.

CAR

Central African Republic Conflict 2012

n.a.

Chad

Civil Wars

1960s–1990s

100,000 – 500,000

Chad

War with Libya

1986 – 1987