Socialists and International Actions for Peace 1914–1923 9783865969491, 9783865962966

Citation preview

p o l i t i k w iss e n s c h a f t

Socialists and International Actions for Peace 1914 –1923 Masao Nishikawa Edited by Helmut Konrad

Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Masao Nishikawa (Edited by Helmut Konrad) Socialists and International Actions for Peace 1914 –1923

Politikwissenschaft, Band 4

Masao Nishikawa Edited by Helmut Konrad

Socialists and International Actions for Peace 1914 –1923 Translated by Masaki Watanabe Coordinators: Hiroko Mizuno, Stefan Benedik

Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Umschlagabbildung: Otto Griebel: „Die Internationale“ / © Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin.

ISBN 978-3-86596-296-6 ISSN 1862-6130 © Frank & Timme GmbH  Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur Berlin 2010. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. SHAKAISHUGI INTANASHONARU NO GUNZO 1914 –1923 by Masao Nishikawa © 2007 by Masao Nishikawa First published in Japan by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Tokyo, 2007. Das Werk einschließlich aller Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des ­Verlags unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, ­Ü bersetzungen, Mikro­­verfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Ver­a rbeitung ­in elektronischen Systemen. Herstellung durch das atelier eilenberger, Taucha bei Leipzig. Printed in Germany. Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. www.frank-timme.de

Table of Contents Foreword by Helmut Konrad ............................................................................7 Preface.................................................................................................................9

PART I: THE “COLLAPSE ” OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL Introduction .....................................................................................................15 I

Revival or New Birth, 1914 .....................................................................19

II

Initiative by Neutral Nations ..................................................................27

III

Moves by “South Group” ........................................................................35

IV

“International Socialist Commission” and “Bureau of Socialist International” ........................................................43

V

Stockholm, The Second “Congress Unconvened”, 1917.......................51

VI

Lenin vs. Wilson ......................................................................................65

VII Berne, February, 1919 .............................................................................73

PART II: THE THREE INTERNATIONALS I

Amsterdam and Moscow The Division of the International, March/April, 1919..........................89

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

5

II

Lucerne The Second International, August, 1919 ............................................. 101

III

Geneva Final Congress of the Second International, July/August, 1920 ......... 119

IV

Vienna Attempt to Overcome the Split, February, 1921 ................................. 133

V

London Feelers by the British Labour Party, 1921–1922.................................. 151

VI

Berlin Consultations among the Three Internationals, April, 1922 ............. 163

VII Interregnum April 1922 to January 1923................................................................... 175 VIII Hamburg Launch of the Socialist and Labour International, May, 1923 ........... 193 SUMMARY AND O UTLOOK ............................................................................ 215

Notes............................................................................................................... 245 Bibliography................................................................................................... 305 Source of Illustrations ................................................................................... 327 Abbreviations................................................................................................. 329 Index of Name................................................................................................ 331 Masao Nishikawa—Short Biography............................................................ 341

6

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Foreword by Helmut Konrad

Foreword

It was nearly 40 years ago when I first met Prof. Masao Nishikawa. He was a member of the Japanese delegation at the ITH (International Conference on Labor and Social History) in Linz, and I was at the time Vice-President of this organization. Working together for this and all subsequent conferences held every September at the picturesque conference venue “Jaegermeierhof ” in Linz, a city of historical significance, brought us close together. After I started my new appointment as professor of Contemporary History at the University of Graz, Prof. Nishikawa soon began sending us the most gifted students of his department at Tokyo University. He was successful in fostering specific interest in Austrian history among his students. Year after year, students from Tokyo came to study Austrian history at Graz. Some of them stayed for years and even earned Austrian doctoral degrees. Some of them went on to key positions at various universities in Japan. They are helping to build a strong bridge across continents by furthering the understanding of different political and cultural frameworks through history and up to the present. Prof. Nishikawa was without doubt one of the leading Japanese experts on the history of labour movements in Europe, and that from a worldwide perspective. He had an outsider’s view of Europe, which made his understanding all the more profound. And his perspective from outside added to the high quality of his works. So I am delighted to have had the opportunity to edit his final book in its English version. This was made possible by Masaki Watanabe who translated the text from Japanese into English. I would like to thank Prof. Junko Nishikawa, wife of the late professor, for her substantial support. I also thank Prof. Hiroko Mizuno of Osaka University and Mag. Stefan Benedik-Karner (Graz) for their efforts in this project. Graz, May 2010 Helmut Konrad

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

7

Preface

Preface

For my generation, the Soviet Union and socialism were a closely-felt presence whether one agreed with them or opposed them. Amidst that climate, I pursued my interest in the history of the international socialist and labor movements since the 19th century and published the work Daiichiji sekaitaisen to shakaishugisha tachi [World War I and the Socialists] from Iwanami Shoten in 1989. Shortly thereafter, the Berlin Wall came down. Although I had not foreseen such a development by any means, I had been acutely aware from what I had seen and heard during my stays in Europe that one would be caught off-guard if one did not calmly assess the real situation in the Soviet Union and the East European socialist bloc countries. Therefore, I felt no need to revise the wording of the work just because a new situation, i.e. the fall of the Berlin Wall, had developed. However, as we entered the 1990s, the sea change brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union created a situation where interest in socialist and labor movements declined rapidly. That remains unchanged today. In other words, I have been steadfastly pursuing a subject matter that has become, so to speak, “passé.” One reason for this is that I have never been “agile enough” to follow current trends and move on to a “new” subject matter, even if I might have felt discouraged that the subject of my interest had been expelled to the fringe due to turbulent changes of the times. Another reason is that there still remained a lot of topics to be researched in the original subject matter. Also, I believe that having witnessed a conclusion of sorts, namely the Soviet Union’s downfall, now is indeed the time to shed more light on the history of socialism that had a major impact on the 20th century. Moreover, we have entered the 21st century amid a widening gap between the rich and poor and the danger of major armed conflicts as if in a throwback to the 19th century, despite wishful expectations to the contrary. Given that “people of all nations of the world have the equal right to live free from fear and want and in peace (the Japanese Constitution),” there must be things that can be learned anew from issues raised by the socialists of yore.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

9

Preface When the German edition* of Daiichiji sekaitaisen to shakaishugisha tachi came out in 1999, it was received favorably in most reviews. But there was a claim that despite the work’s title, not much is written about the World War I period itself. The point is taken. Generally speaking, analyses and accounts of the history of the “Second International” often go up to 1914, the year its antiwar efforts were to prove futile. It would not be an overstatement to say that movements of the socialists during World War I all took place in the context of the pathway to the “Third International.” The most extreme of such studies were understandably those undertaken in the Soviet Union, but as it is aptly shown by the subtitle “Origins of the Third International” to a compilation of historical materials published by Stanford University’s Hoover Institute in 1940 and still valid to this day, a similar orientation of interest was shared by people elsewhere in different positions. That shows, one may point out, how earthshaking an event the Russian Revolution was, and how predominant the Soviet Union’s presence was in international affairs.** *

Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, Aus dem Japanischen von Malik Hendrike Sprotte (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1999). ** Olga Hess Gankin / H.H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origin of the Third International (Stanford, 1940). That said, another study published relatively recently shows a similar viewpoint, although its analysis is from a position different from that of the mainstream history of the Soviet Union. R. Craig Nation, War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of the Communist Internationalism (Durham, 1989). After World War I, the “Third International” was formed in a final separation from the existing “Second International.” One attempt to somehow bridge the gap between the two was the derisively so-called “Second and a half International” of Vienna. These Internationals all voiced disagreements with the allied powers’ post-war measures, and proposed ideas as good or better than the powers’ policies. But the three Internationals were not in step. Efforts were therefore undertaken to somehow create one comprehensive International. But in the end, the movement split up into the “Comintern” and the “Socialist Workers’ International,” which went on to compete with and oppose each other.

10

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Preface This work is an attempt to retrace the history up to that point and is, as such, a sequel to my previous work Daiichiji sekaitaisen to shakaishugisha tachi [World War I and The Socialists]. Conventional perspectives have tended to simplify the discussion to a dualism of whether historical events are pro- or anti-Bolshevik, and consequently even academic research tended to be narrowed down to the “correct line” disputes within the political context of the time. This work aims to present a somewhat different picture from existing views by examining the thoughts and actions of socialists in the 1914–1923 period beyond the framework of whether they supported or opposed the “Third International,” thereby retrieving those aspects and factors frequently deemed insignificant in the past. The work clarifies what circumstances led to the formation of “communism” and “social democracy,” the two major currents of the international socialist movement for 70 years. Deeply involved therein are various issues in international and domestic politics, as well as in the socialist movement. As one who has steadfastly stuck to historical research rather than support any partisan factions, I do not feel the need to radically alter my view of the subject matter, even if I might modify interpretations based on new historical material. It is nevertheless true that having gone through the “sea change” of the 1990s, I have come to evaluate some matters differently from how I had evaluated them previously. No doubt my affinity toward certain ways of thinking and personalities has unwittingly found some expression “between the lines.” In Part I, which is of course based on historical materials, I tried to establish a logical pathway of my own as I went through published studies as well as some new ones. As for Part II, while some general discussions of the subject exist, full-fledged studies of international significance were practically non-existent. As though looking for pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, I drew on historical materials to weave together my presentation. Whether I have succeeded or not can only be left to the judgement of the reader. For Part I and the first three chapters of Part II as well as “Summary and Outlook,” I did use material from my previously published articles, but I reexamined the material comprehensively and made necessary adjustments, going well beyond merely correcting mistakes and typographical errors. I also wrote anew chapters four to eight of Part II. Therefore Parts I and II together with “Summary and Outlook” were largely written afresh for the present work.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

11

Part I The “Collapse” of the Second International

Introduction

Introduction

The first international organization formed by workers and socialist movements seeking to forge solidarity across borders was the International Workingmen’s Association (IWA, the First International) established in 1864. It was Karl Marx who played a major ideological role, proclaiming “Workers of the World, Unite!”, but his ideology was by no means predominant within the Association. There were many other ideologues in their own right, such as Giuseppe Mazzini of Italy, members of the so-called Proudhon faction of France and the “anarchist” Mikhail Bakunin of Russia. Participation in the Association was indeed based on units smaller than national entities, allowing for individual participation. It was an organization reflecting the various European situations in the latter half of the 19th century. The IWA ultimately formed solidarity with the Paris Commune of 1871 with the result that some national governments tried to arrest its members. In that process, internal disputes among various groups became intense, leading to its effective selfdissolution in 1872. For some time thereafter, European labor and socialist movements were compelled to remain in relative obscurity until the situation began to change in the 1880s. In 1889, the centennial of the French Revolution, activists of labor and socialist movements from various parts of Europe gathered in Paris to take up the mantle of the IWA (the Second International). It is noteworthy that labor and socialist organizations were already nation-based, that Marxism was already carrying tremendous influence, and that its representative proponent, the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had assumed a leading role. Be that as it may, even within the SPD a so-called “revisionism controversy” developed, and France’s Jean Jaurès by temperament did not get along with Germany’s August Bebel. The socialists of the Hapsburg Empire tended to be caught up in the “issue of nationalities.” The Russians spent their time preoccupied with internal strife that was barely comprehensible to the peoples of Western Europe. However, ever since the words “war against war” were uttered at its Second Congress in Brussels in 1891, the Second International continued to hold aloft

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

15

Introduction its anti-war, pro-peace slogan. How can war be prevented? What can be done if war should break out? With congress after congress engaged in heated discussions on this issue, the Seventh Stuttgart Congress in 1907 finally adopted a resolution clarifying the organization’s position. Of course, there was no agreement of opinions on all issues. On the question of whether or not to resort to a general strike as a means of preventing war, there was continuing disagreement between the SPD which said “no,” and the French and British parties and others which all said “yes” with differences only in terms of the extent. In any case, when the (First) Balkan War broke out in 1912, the Second International called an emergency session in Basel and issued an anti-war, propeace appeal. The summer of 1914 was when World War I broke out. But that is only knowledge in retrospect; the people of the time did not think a war would erupt. The socialists were no exception. Toward the end of July, 1914 when the situation was becoming critical, the Second International called a conference of its central organ, Bureau of Socialist International (BSI) in Brussels. Gathered in attendance were prominent figures of the Second International, who changed the venue of the 10th Congress, scheduled for that year, from Vienna to Paris at the last minute in their attempt to deliver a strong anti-war message. These men, who went their separate ways promising to meet again in Paris in 10 days, would never have a chance to get together again, as the war broke out in Europe on August 4th. The German socialists would participate in “intramural peace,” the French socialists likewise would join a “holy alliance” to cooperate with their respective government’s war policies. But for a few exceptions, the situation was the same in most countries. Anti-war efforts proved futile, the socialists of different countries in opposing camps became isolated and the bond of international solidarity was undone. As for why all this happened, I would like to refer to my previous work(1). What I wish to point out here is that the thinking of the majority factions that went on to cooperate with the war policies of their national governments was that it was better to thus keep their organizations intact, than to oppose their governments and be suppressed. Then they could resume their movements as soon as the war was over. Like those on the government side, the majority socialist factions thought that the war would end soon.

16

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Introduction There were minority factions who were deeply distressed and angered by this decision and action by the majority factions. Rosa Luxemburg of Germany and Lenin in exile from Russia were among them. They were the ones who tried to repair the bond of international solidarity. The socialists of neutral countries like Italy and Switzerland as well as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian nations also began to move.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

17

I Revival or New Birth

I

Revival or New Birth – 1914 –

Belgium’s status of permanent neutrality was recognized internationally when she attained independence from the Netherlands in the first half of the 19th century. That was why the Second International’s Bureau Executive Committee and Secretariat were set up within the Belgian Workers Party.(1) But as Germany violated Belgium’s neutrality by sending in troops as part of its military offensive against France, Belgium joined the Allied powers and Émile Vandervelde, who headed the Workers Party and also served as the head of the International Bureau’s executive committee, joined the cabinet without hesitation.(2) In this way, the Second International not only had its organization disrupted up by the outbreak of war, but was also put in a difficult situation by the fact of the country hosting its secretariat no longer remaining neutral. Amid this situation, it was the Socialist Party of America (SPA), whose nation was still neutral at the time, which took the initiative to propose on September 24th, 1914 the convening of an International Socialist Peace Congress. In its message of appeal(3) , the party noted that its fraternal parties in Europe had fulfilled to the best of their ability their commitment to do the utmost to prevent war, and urged them now to work toward the war’s early conclusion. The party’s arguments such as ascribing the origin of the war to the capitalists’ national militarism faithfully followed the policy line of the anti-war resolution at the Stuttgart Congress. It is, however, noteworthy in relation to developments thereafter that the appeal made it clear the SPA was not interested in the question of which European governments had been the aggressors, and by and large expressed understanding for the actions of its fraternal European parties. This proposal, despite persistent lobbying by the SPA, did not come to fruition. In the Second International, the SPA led by Morris Hillquit along with other U.S. socialists were a recognized presence at par in terms of voting right with the Italian socialists who had fewer votes than those of Britain, Germany,

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

19

Part I France, Russia and Austria. But those people from across the Atlantic were never really a part of “our group” for the European socialists. The impression is that what with a war raging in Europe, the European socialists felt that their hands were full with their own affairs. That was probably why there was not much reaction to the proposal to speak of. Exception must be made of the various Scandinavian socialist parties, which did not ignore the American proposal by any means.(4) Let us shift our gaze back to the Europe. Rosa Luxemburg, who was reduced to tears of anger and despair upon learning that parliamentarians of German Social-democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) had voted in favor of granting war credits, and Karl Liebknecht, who had gone along with his fellow parliamentarians but then began to feel it had been a mistake, tried with some others to publicize the presence of a German minority faction, getting ready to send letters of appeal to comrades in neutral countries. From a position opposed, if anything, to that of the German minority faction in the context of the Second International’s tactical arguments, P.J. Troelstra of the Netherlands was also looking for channels of international liaison. Presumably in response to his approach, Rosa Luxemburg wrote to him for the first time in late August, expressing happiness that they had been able to “shake hands in friendship across the border.” But unlike Rosa Luxemburg who felt that “everything is lost, all that remains is our honor,” Troelstra’s assessment was that the International had merely been not strong enough and was by no means “dead.” What mattered to him was preparing in advance for the proletariat’s peace program comprising an international court of mediation, arms reduction and so on to be announced when the war was over. It is noted that the idea of convening a socialist international conference in parallel with the diplomats’ peace conferences after the war was already being expressed. From that viewpoint, he agreed that the Netherlands should remain neutral, and assumed a mediator’s role in affairs concerning the International. Since the Belgians had come to harbor strong enmity toward the Fig. 1: Rosa Luxemburg.

20

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

I Revival or New Birth SPD of Germany, Troelstra sought to relocate the Bureau of Socialist International from Brussels to the Hague, making a proposal to that effect to member parties in the name of the Netherlands’ party on October 2nd.(5)

Fig. 2: P. J. Troelstra.

Fig. 3: Robert Grimm.

It just so happened that the letters Rosa Luxemburg and others were preparing were finally sent 10 days later addressed to three men, Hjalmar Branting of Sweden, F.M. Wibaut of the Netherlands and Robert Grimm of Switzerland. They had especially high expectations of their Swiss comrade.(6) This was because they had learned that Grimm had already abandoned the “intramural peace (Burgfrieden)” policy he once espoused and begun to work on international liaisons from his new position.(7) That said, the appeal that Grimm and other Swiss socialists sent on September 16th to the Italians, whose government was also neutral, was only a brief one proposing to hold a meeting. The person who received and replied to that letter of appeal was none other than Benito Mussolini, a point of interest for those who know Mussolini as the fascist leader of subsequent years. At any rate, the first meeting between socialists across a national border since the outbreak of the war actually took place between the Swiss and Italians just 10 days later on the 27th in Lugano, Switzerland, close to the two nations’ border (the Lugano Conference).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

21

Part I In Switzerland, the socialists comprised Italian-, French- and Germanspeakers so that each group must have held different sentiments, but let us not delve further into that. Behind their desire to convene the Lugano conference was distress over the fact that future collaboration within the International was becoming increasingly difficult because of enmities between fraternal parties, along with the idea that given the situation where the Bureau in Brussels was losing influence, the parties of the neutral nations must take the intiative. At the same time, there was probably also a wish that the Italian government remain neutral, driven by their distress that they may also get caught up in the war. So it was inevitable that they first made contact with the Italians. The conference was behind closed doors, but its minutes still remain.(8) Leaving aside details of the discussions, the final resolution concluded straight away that war was a means by which the capitalist class sought new markets for their products and, at the same time, repressed the revolutionary movements by the democratic socialist parties of each nation. It also stated that neither the central European powers nor the Allied powers had the right to claim self-defence. The duty of the socialist party representatives of Italy and Switzerland, which were not at war, was to make an effort to prevent the war from spreading to even more countries by asking, together with fraternal parties of other neutral nations, their respective governments to make diplomatic approaches to the warring nations aimed at the war’s early conclusion. It was Grimm who drafted this resolution. As a matter of interest, Lenin was arrested at Nowy Targ, 65 kms souths of Krakow in what was then part of the Hapsburg Empire, where he was in exile. But he was able to flee to Switzerland, thanks to the intercession of Victor Adler, the influential leader of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. It was September 5th when Lenin arrived in Zurich. On the following day in Berne, he managed to persuade a meeting of exiled Russian comrades to adopt a resolution on “the duty of revolutionary social democrats in the European war.” It has been argued from time to time that this resolution influenced the resolution adopted at the Lugano Conference through the presence of Grimm, but this argument is not persuasive. There were a significant differences in the views of the two and, even if it is certain that Lenin and Grimm had a meeting, there is no evidence that it took place before the Lugano Conference.(9) More important, it must be emphasized that Lenin was then practically unknown among the socialists. One should not

22

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

I Revival or New Birth project the “famous” Lenin of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution or of the Soviet Union thereafter in retrospect to the preceding period. In the context of movements aimed at the regeneration of international solidarity, if one were to call the Swiss and the Italians the “South Group,” what was the “North Group,” i.e. socialists of Scandinavian nations, doing at the time?(10) They had already set up a cooperation committee before the war in 1913 for the purpose of promoting specific labor policies in their region. They were due to convene their second conference in 1915, but in response to changes in the situation brought about by the outbreak of the war, they held meetings in Stockholm on October 10th, 11th and 24th, 1914, responding to an appeal by Denmark’s Thorvald Stauning. At this first conference, they had only just received news of the Lugano conference, so the matter was not officially deliberated. The committee, of their own accord, proposed a Congress to be attended only by the socialists of neutral countries. Of greater interest, perhaps, is the participation of Troelstra as a “guest.” As stated earlier, it was he who proposed the relocation of the Bureau of Socialist International to the Hague in a circular dated October 2nd. He was trying to win over the Belgians who were arguing, quite justifiably, that such a matter should be decided by the member organizations, while also touring various cities to secure the support of Germany’s SPD, Russian socialists in exile and others. In response, the Scandinavian cooperation committee had supported the proposal at their first conference to relocate the Bureau of Socialist International to the Hague. That was how Troelstra came to attend the second conference. As it turns out, the Swiss party had also proposed on October 5th that the Bureau move to their country. After a series of exchanges, the Swiss accepted that the lobbying efforts on the part of the Scandinavian committee had gained more support, resulting in the move of the Bureau to the Hague in December, 1914. The Netherlands’ representatives thus gained a status equal to that of the Belgians. A big contributing factor was the compromise made by Camille Huysmans, who had been performing capably since 1905 as secretary-general, to back the Netherlands’ proposal from a sense of duty in his official position. The price he had to pay for his action was having to oppose his Belgian comrades, Vandervelde and others. Furthermore, he had to move his own residence to the Hague from Brussels, the loss of whose neutrality had made it inconvenient for international liaisons.(11)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

23

Part I During these several months, exiled Russians like the Bolshevik Lenin and Mensheviks Pavel Axelrod, Julius Martov and others also started their own activities in Switzerland and Paris, but there is little evidence yet of their influence. Incidentally, the messenger between Lenin and the “North Group” was Aleksandra Kollontai, who would later attract considerable following in Japan as the author of A Great Love (Akai koi). She was at the time in exile in Stockholm.(12) At that stage, the following could be stated: 1. The socialists of neutral nations began their effort to repair the damaged bond of the International. 2. The cause of the war is sought in capitalism and imperialism, without attributing the war’s outbreak to either of the two camps at war. 3. Nevertheless, even the socialists of neutral nations had their differences as to whether their sentiments lay closer to the Allied powers or to the central European powers. 4. Their foreseeable objective was the revival of what the International had been up until then.

Fig. 4: Camille Huysmans.

Fig. 5: Aleksandra Kollontai (1920s).

But if Troelstra represented the current moving toward its “revival,” Rosa Luxemburg, who had felt close to him at one time, on her part came to harbor a sense of distance toward Troelstra who continued to feel sympathetic toward

24

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

I Revival or New Birth the SPD majority. For her, Grimm was more trustworthy. This was because she had judged that the International was “dead.” But toward its “new birth,” her attitude still remained cautious.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

25

II Initiative by Neutral Nations

II Initiative by Neutral Nations

In September of 1914, the German forces were driven back in the Battle of the Marne. Although they made greater advances on the eastern front, the situation on both the eastern and western fronts eventually became bogged down. In other words, far from ending quickly, the war was still raging, contrary to what the military and government leaders of the nations involved had predicted, and what the people including the socialists had believed. Japan, which declared war on Germany on August 23rd, 1914, with its own set of calculations, went on to unilaterally present a list of 21 demands to China the following January. Unlike preceding wars which were fought by armies and navies, World War I was an “all-out effort” involving the general populace. Fully aware of the nature of that effort, the governments of the belligerent nations respectively tried to justify the war to their people by publishing suitably-edited diplomatic documents concerning events leading to the Great War. While terms like “responsibility for the war” were not yet in use, that very issue did come up at the time.(1) Until the summer of 1914, the socialist parties of the countries which remained neutral, while being important constituent members of the International, were not in the position to seize the initiative. The core was formed by various German, Austrian, French and British organizations. The outbreak of the war split that core into two opposing camps. At the same time, the issue of the “responsibility for the war” began to concern the socialists as well. Among the first to propose repairing the ties of the International was Augustin Hamon, member of the French Socialist Party (Parti socialist français, PSF) executive committee (his proposal on September 3rd). But he expected the war to end in the victory of the Allied nations within a month, and proposed in the event to convene the socialists’ international Congress in parallel with the government’s peace conferences. That Congress was to expose German’s “responsibility for war” and to deliberate on conditions for peace as well.(2) The PSF members believed justice was on their side, some having gone as far as joining France’s wartime cabinet, and were generally cool toward attempts to mediate on the part of the socialists of neutral

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

27

Part I nations. In this regard, the SPD of Germany which had violated Belgium’s neutrality was more receptive, hinting at their willingness to respond to mediation moves. But for various parties that had once split into hostile camps to come together under one roof, emotional conflicts between them had already grown too serious. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a divergence of views had developed over whether they were working for the International’s “revival” or “new birth.” There was a difference in motives. But there was a convergence of intents and purposes toward the position that a full-scale international Congress of the socialists was premature. And so the initiative inevitably shifted toward the socialists of the neutral nations. But they did not for a moment think that an international conference of their own would be adequate. They were aiming for an international conference including the parties from Germany and France.(3) An Invitation dated 11th November, 1914 was sent in the names of Sweden’s Branting, Norway’s C.H.Knudsen and Denmark’s Stauning to the social democratic parties and labor union organizations of their three nations as well as the Netherlands, asking them to an international conference to be held in Copenhagen.(4) The invitation said while they should look into whether or not it would be possible to bring the state of warfare to a quick end, the International Bureau was apparently unable to play a substantive role, so it would not be strange for the neutral nations to take the initiative and start moving. But obviously they could not concern themselves with the issue of who hastened the outbreak of the war or, in that regard, with the positions of the social democratic parties of the different countries. The aim of the conference was the realization of a peace settlement which involved no changes to existing borders (except when a people’s right of self-determination is approved), and which would be accompanied by arms reduction and mandatory international court of arbitration, and to lobby the governments of both belligerent and neutral nations toward that aim. The proposal was for Swiss and U.S. representatives to participate as “guests” along with four representatives each from the aforementioned four countries. Arms reduction and international court of arbitration were, among other things, what the Second International in its quest for international peace had proposed as realistically very achievable measures, in addition to its long-

28

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Initiative by Neutral Nations standing assertion of principles from a socialist position, at its 9th Congress in Copenhagen in 1910.(5) It is noteworthy that these measures form the basis of the idea of this invitation, as is the fact that their stance toward the “responsibility for war” issue was “neutral.” The Swiss were enraged that they were only invited as “guests,” and the Americans argued that they were the ones who were truly neutral. But at the Congress that took place in Copenhagen in January, 1915, later than originally proposed, proceeded without representatives from either country. One reason was that this conference of the “North Group” had a certain one-sided, or more specifically, pro-German tone to it. The French were always concerned about that tone, and Lenin thought it was a German conspiracy, that “there was even conspiracy by the German Chief of Staff.” Huysmans could not attend as he could not get a passport issued.(6) For whatever reason, the conference in Copenhagen came and went without creating much repercussion. But the Bureau of Socialist International had by then moved to the Hague. This may be seen as the result of the substantial activities that the “Netherlands-Scandinavian Committee” had undertaken even before its official establishment two years later. The resolution the conference adopted(7) stressed anew that war derived from imperialism and reiterated the anti-war resolution adopted at the Copenhagen Congress. It went on to state that in the forthcoming peace term negotiations, it would be an essential condition that the will of the working class be reflected. Lastly, the resolution reported that five members of the Russian Duma had been arrested and expressed its strong desire to protest against the action. In this way, the socialists of neutral nations took the initiative to work on international liaisons, but they could not even bring to fruition a conference of all neutral countries, so the prospect of an international conference including the belligerent nations as well remained dim. Amid this situation, a conference of the Socialist and workers parties of the Allied powers was held in London on February 14th, 1915. In attendance were about 40 representatives of the parties of Britain (Independent Labour Party [ILP], Labour Party, Socialist Party, Fabian Society), the Parti ouvrier français (POF) and the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) of France, the Parti Ouvrier Belge of Belgium and the the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR), among others, as well as Huysmans.(8)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

29

Part I

Fig. 6: James Keir Hardie (1910, in

Fig. 7: Édouard Vaillant.

Copenhagen).

At the conference, Keir Hardie of the British Independent Labour Party (ILP), who was chosen as moderator, stated that it had been his group who had taken the initiative for this conrference, but people like Vandervelde and the French representatives apparently had their own ideas. This is indicated by the wide difference seen in the intentions behind their statements. Hardie stated that the idea of the conference was not to determine the causes of the war but to promote the conclusion of peace terms, and proposed that the conference not be open to the public in order to facilitate free exchange of opinions. The agenda he put up were (1) rights of the peoples of some nations (especially Belgium and Poland), (2) the colonialism issue, and (3) future guarantee of peace. But right from the start France’s Édouard Vaillant argued that “we” did not force the war, that German militarism had invaded Belgium and France to threaten the liberty of the people, and that “we” now had the duty to defeat imperialism through war. Vaillant, a warrior of the Paris Commune, was aged 75 at the time. He was the one who stuck doggedly to the idea of a general strike as a means of preventing war, even after he had encountered the opposition of Germany’s SPD at the 1907 Stuttgart Congress. He continued to propose the general strike as a viable tactic at the Copenhagen Congress in 1910 and thereafter, but it was

30

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Initiative by Neutral Nations none other than Hardie, aged 59, who was his fellow proponent. The two, in other words, were famous as the duo of elders behind the general strike argument in the Second International.(9) But at the London conference, Hardie more or less took a neutral stance between the two camps at war, whereas Vaillant defended the French position. Not to be overlooked is the fact that Maxim Litvinov of the Bolsheviks also showed up and protested that he had not received an invitation, demanding at the same time that the Belgian and French socialists stop collaborating with their governments. But dismissed by Keir Hardie, he ended up departing, still protesting. Having been criticized for being part of the government cabinet, Vandervelde argued vigorously that he had done so to defend against and resist the violation of Belgium’s neutrality, and also supported Poland’s independence and the reversion of Alsace-Lorraine to France, while expressing his determination to “see it through to the end.” Quite interesting is a statement by I.A. Rubanovich of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party. While he expressed support for Vaillant and Vandervelde arguing that the victory of the Allied forces was essential for democracy, he also touched on the fact that Russia had played a certain role in the Serbian incident in the summer of 1914, and that she was occupying Galicia, suggesting that the “responsibility for war” also lay in Russian hands, Ramsay MacDonald of the ILP added his own criticism of arguments criticizing Germany and Austria without touching on Russia’s mistakes. On the other hand, Lenin who had taken the trouble of sending Litvinov to the London Conference made the assessment that the essence of the matter was that “the British socialists who had until now opposed war and conscription have agreed to fight until Germany is defeated,” and openly expressed his disappointment. In fact, the conference resolution stated that “the victory of the Alliance nations will without doubt constitute victory for the people’s liberty and national independence.”(10) Subsequently on April 12th and 13th, a similar conference of central European powers was held in Vienna. First, some explanation of the background is in order. Victor Adler was a pillar of the Austrian Social Democratic Workers’ Party and Karl Kautsky, an esteemed theoretician known as the “Marxist pope” both within the SPD and internationally. They were both around 60-years-old when they attended a conference of the Second International Bureau held in Brussels at the end of July,

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

31

Part I 1914. Faced with the outbreak of the war as soon as they had returned to their country, they tried for the time being to put up with their government’s war policies. Those who tried to oppose this stance included Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht in Germany and Fritz Adler, none other than Victor’s son, in Austria. In early 1915 V. Adler wrote a letter to Kautsky, with whom he had been corresponding for 30 years, callings such critics “foolish hotheads” and frowning on the moves by “the women” (Zetkin and others) while, at the same time, rejecting “rightists” who were collaborating Fig. 8: Victor Adler (1910, in more and more with the government. In his Copenhagen). reply, Kautsky also said the risk of his party’s disintegration came from the “rightists.” Adler then wrote to Kautsky: “I remain somewhat hopeful that the witches’ Sabbath will soon end … (and) we shall be able to discuss peace in earnest.” Nevertheless he continued that “if the fairytale ‘conference’ of the Entente nations should take place in London, we the “Central faction” must also speak up,” and that they had done nothing against their own conscience.(11) In the event, it was the representatives of German, Austrian and Hungarian parties who assembled in Vienna in April, 1915. Since they already felt somewhat liable with regard to the start of the war, they were enthusiastic about the continuation of the International. They tried to interpret the resolution of the Allied powers’ London Conference as a proposal for peace and cooperation. But in the course of the conference, the argument that to propose peace from their side would be a show of weakness overcame the objection of the German minority faction and the Austrians. A product of compromise, their resolution not only did not go beyond reiterating the anti-war resolution of the Second International Copenhagen Congress, but also went on to state that the belligerent nations’ socialist parties rising to the defence of their countries and people was not in contradiction with maintaining the international ties among all socialist parties.(12)

32

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Initiative by Neutral Nations But when Arthur Henderson, who along with his British Labour Party colleague MacDonald had been critical of his government’s war policies, joined the cabinet formed by the Liberal Party’s Asquith, the hopes of the central European socialists that dialogue with the fraternal parties of the Entente nations might still be possible were dashed.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

33

III Moves by “South Group”

III Moves by “South Group”

The Swiss Social Democratic Party (SDP) ceded the initiative to the “North Group” out of respect for the latter’s activities, but as mentioned earlier, it chose to turn away from the Copenhagen conference of January, 1915. With the intention of expanding on the achievement of the Lugano conference, however, it renewed its request to the Bureau of Socialist International to convene a conference of all political parties concerned, or failing that, of at least the parties of all neutral nations. But when the International Bureau responded that the timing was not right, the Swiss SDP decided to hold its own conference of the neutral nations’ parties in Zurich on May 30th. It should be noted here that the party’s elder Hermann Greulich, having posed himself the question “Re-Building of the International or Creation of the Third Proletariat International,” answered that “we should be united and not be divided,” and stated that “joint action by comrades of the neutral nations should succeed in bringing about the reconciliation between comrades of the belligerent nations.” In his proposal toward convening a Zurich conference, too, he asks the belligerent nations’ parties to “forget the weaknesses and mistakes of the fraternal parties of other countries and approach them again.”(1) The Italian Socialist Party decided to take part, but otherwise, only the parties of Rumania and Bulgaria (which was then still a neutral nation) agreed to come. The “North Group” did not respond to the appeal by the Swiss SDP, apparently thinking how dare the Swiss who did not even come to Copenhagen, and more importantly, because the group believed that the organizing role was the job of the International Bureau. In his letter to the Swiss party, Huysmans sought the latter’s understanding, stating that the International Bureau in its capacity can only convene a conference of all interested parties, and that the difficulty of doing that should be apparent from the stance of the French party. It was probably Oddino Margari of the Italian Socialist Party who was made to feel most acutely the gravity of the situation when he visited Paris in late April to lobby for the conference. He ran into stubborn refusal from the likes of the French Socialist Party members and Vandervelde. In the end the Swiss party was forced to give up on the Zurich

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

35

Part I conference, though this did not mean that the South and North Groups had a disagreement of opinion with respect to the aim of rebuilding the International and achieving peace.(2) On May 23rd, 1915, Italy renounced its commitment to the Triple Alliance to join the Allied side and declared war on Austria. It may be recalled that Mussolini, the person who was entrusted with the editorship of the Italian Socialist Party organ Avanti!, having achieved fame through his leading role in opposing the Libyan war of 1911–12, had by now switched his position to the pro-war side. That also placed the significance of the Zurich conference in more doubt. By then, Axelrod and Martov, the Russian Menshevik exiles, had declared themselves to be in an expressly internationalist position independent of the governments of the belligerent countries, and neutral toward the International Bureau, and had come to request, albeit cautiously, for their participation in a conference of neutral nations. What became gradually apparent was a disagreement between whether to ask for, above and foremost, an “immediate peace,” or to give priority to the “discussion of terms for a secure peace.” It seems that Grimm and others of a minority faction within the Swiss party, who had become critical of Greulich and others, formulated a new concept.(3) By then, socialist women were already on the move. The “International Conference of Socialist Women,” launched during the 1907 Stuttgart Congress, held its 2nd Conference in 1910. This was to be evolved into the “International Women’s Day” movement whose long history continued until recently. Its 3rd Conference was held in Berne in late March, 1915 under the initiative of Secretary-General Clara Zetkin. In Germany, Karl Liebknecht had just broken ranks with the party Fig. 9: Clara Zetkin (1915, in Amsterdam). line in December of the previous year to cast a vote against war credits in the Imperial Parliament in February of the

36

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Moves by “South Group” same year, Rosa Luxemburg had been imprisoned for anti-war activities before the outbreak of the war. Zetkin also belonged to their minority faction. Within Germany’s SPD, whose “responsibility for war” was being raised notably by the French and the Belgians, a resolutely anti-war minority faction had taken shape. Also noteworthy is the fact that the 30 or so delegates who gathered for the women’s conference represented Germany, Britain, France, Russia, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy and Switzerland. The women thus achieved what the South and North Groups of neutral nations had not been able to do so far, i.e. bringing together socialists who were united in their anti-war stance under one roof, regardless of whether they were from the belligerent nations or neutral nations. It was to be sure a conference of the minority factions of various parties. Of course, just because they were all anti-war minority factions, it did not mean they had the same ideas. As a matter of fact, Inessa Armand, a Lenin confidante who served effectively as his “diplomatic envoy,” was working in Berne with Lenin’s wife Nadezhda Krupskaya and others to set up the Bolsheviks’ external organizing committee.(4) At this women’s conference, they criticized the belligerent nations’ parties for approving war credits and called for revolutionary action. In response, Zetkin urged that the conference not be turned into a unilateral tribunal of condemnation, and a declaration consistent with that stance was adopted in the end.

Fig. 10: Inessa Armand (1920).

Fig. 11: Nadezhda Krupskaya.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

37

Part I The youths were also on the move. A week after the meeting of the women, the “International Organization of Socialist Youth,” which had also assembled for the first time in 1907, managed to hold a small conference, thanks to the efforts of Willi Münzenberg and others, in Berne, the same city. They expressed their lack of faith in the majority factions of the belligerent nations’ parties and in the International Bureau.(5) The “North Group” held a conference of the Scandinavian cooperation committee again in Copenhagen in September, 1915. Stauning, in particular, had some faith in the efforts Germany’s SPD had made in the interim to persuade fraternal parties of his innocence , but Branting did not go along. For that and other reasons, the “North Group” would remain hesitant about the next course of action.(6) On the other hand, the “South Group” was tenacious in its quest for an international conference, with members like Morgari and Grimm maintaining liaisons with Martov, Axelrod, Zetkin and others, and had got as far as convening a preliminary conference in Berne on July 11th. But the only ones who assembled were Axelrod, Grigorii Zinoviev and Luxemburg’s comrade Adolf Warski, along with Henryk Walecki of the Polish Socialist Party, Grimm and Morgari, who saw things differently from the first three men, as well as Angelica Balabanoff who assisted Mussolini in Avanti!. Having heard about the conference while it was under preparation, Lenin decided that it was necessary “to go if invited, and to rally ‘leftists’, i.e. supporters of revolutionary action against their own governments, in advance.” Within Germany’s SPD, he harbored a hatred toward Kautsky and others who reluctantly went along with the majority, rather than toward those who supported their government’s war policies outright. He also felt a strong distrust toward Grimm who did not send an invitation to the Bolsheviks. It was Zinoviev who spoke on Lenin’s behalf at the conference, but he found himself completely isolated at the conference. This was because while Grimm and others, who may have agreed with him as far as adherence to the principle of class struggle and seeking to rally minority factions opposed to “intramural peace” were concerned, their idea of minority factions was much broader to include the likes of Kautsky.(7) At any rate, an “international socialists’ conference” organized by the “South Group” took place from 5th to 8th of September, 1915. As Grimm had originally intended, the conference was held in the desolate village of

38

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Moves by “South Group” Zimmerwald 10 kms south of Berne to avoid the public eye, disguised moreover as a gathering of ornithologists. They numbered around 40. Four including Grimm from Switzerland and five from Italy including Morgari, Balabanoff and Giacinto Menotti Serrati who had taken over as editor of Avanti! after Mussolini was expelled, as well as participants from Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Bulgaria and Rumania. It is noteworthy that it was attended not only by Alphonse Merrheim, a self-proclaimed member of the minority faction from France, but also by 10 from Germany including notably George Ledebour, a Reichstag member who was opposed to war credits. Also present were some prominent Russian exiles with their differing views. Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Axelrod and Martov were among them.(8) First and foremost, this conference succeeded in rallying together the minority factions opposed to “intramural peace” whether they were from the belligerent nations or neutral nations. But that did not mean they agreed on everything, as seen from the example of the Russians divided into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.(9) After procedural matters were discussed, the very first item to be introduced was a letter from Karl Liebknecht (dated September 2nd, 1915). He had voted against war credits as mentioned earlier, and was conscripted into the army in February 1915 by the German government that was trying to restrict such actions on his part, and was forced to wear a military uniform. The letter said: “I have been captured and constrained by militarism. So I cannot go where you are.” But he exhorted: “Internal Uprising (Burgkrieg), Not Intramural Peace (Burgfrieden)!”(10) It was Ledebour who took part as representative of the SPD minority faction in the Reichstag Parliament, but as Rosa Luxemburg’s friend Berta Thalheimer told the conference: “Comrade Fig. 12: Karl Liebknecht (1915, on Ledebour does not represent the entirety of the way to Imperial Parliament in our opposition faction here. Within the military uniform).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

39

Part I minority faction, there is a yet smaller minority rallying around Liebknecht.” Elsewhere, Julian Borchardt who had been publishing his own monthly periodical Lichtstrahlen [Rays of Light] since 1913, and who would have supported Lenin at this conference, was removed from the German delegation due to Ledebour’s objection. Thus it became readily apparent that the international conference of minority factions, which had finally taken place, was still rife with differences in points of view. Item by item, their views were divided in many ways over the agenda, but let us look at the “Manifesto” addressed to the European proletariat, that was unanimously adopted at the end. It stated that the war which had turned Europe into a giant human slaughterhouse (Menschenschlachthaus) was the “result of imperialism,” and criticized the social democratic parties of the nations for adopting the policy of “intramural peace,” while appealing at the same time for a return to the fundamental principle of class struggle. The struggle is for liberty, friendship between peoples of different nations and socialism, it said. This can be considered, as the text itself states, reaffirmation of the anti-war resolution of the second International. One should nevertheless note fresh parts of the text such as aiming for a peace that does not involve any annexation or war reparation whatsoever.(11) It was Lenin’s group of six who supported the “Manifesto,” interpreting it as an “appeal to struggle,” with a proviso that they were not completely satisfied. Their reason was that the text made no mention of “opportunists” who were responsible for the downfall of the Second International, nor of the main method of struggle to oppose the war. After internal discussion, Lenin and others had drafted their own resolution, and it was Karl Radek attending as a Polish representative who addressed the conference to explain its intentions. Although this man’s position was close to Rosa Luxemburg, she looked upon him with some suspicion. Be that as it may, he argued that there could be no peace without revolution, and that this message should be disseminated to the people by creating clandestine organizations for the purpose.(12) “Opportunists” in Lenin’s vocabulary referred to people like Kautsky who while sounding revolutionary in their words could not in the end oppose the war. As he had respected Kautsky in some ways, Lenin hated him all the more, and referred to his tendency as “centrists” which he looked upon with greater hostility than upon the “rightists.” Such ideas of his are clearly explained in

40

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Moves by “South Group” “Downfall of the Second International” and “Socialism and War” published in 1915. At the end of the anti-war resolution of the 1907 Stuttgart Congress of the Second International, there is passage that states all efforts should be made to prevent war but “if a war should break out nevertheless, the working class has a duty to intervene to bring about its immediate cessation. And it must use every means to take advantage of the economic, political crisis arising from the war to stir up the populace from its foundation to hasten the collapse of capitalist control.” That passage had been proposed by Rosa Luxemburg in consultation with Lenin and Martov, but most of the participants were not aware of its implications. By now Lenin was trying to make use of the crisis caused by the war for his revolution. His position was that he had completely given up on the Second International, and was going to form a new Third International. Ridiculing Leon Trotsky, he criticized those who argued for an end to war that is “neither victory nor defeat” and wasted no time unfurling the slogan: “defeat of one’s own government.” There is no doubt Lenin had in mind some kind of underground “vanguard units” that could prepare for a nation-wide people’s uprising, as he had suggested in his work of 1902, What is to be done.(13) Neither Alphonse Merrheim and others of the French minority faction, nor the German “minority within the minority” faction, which had criticized Ledebour, supported Lenin’s argument. They probably had a gut feel that the working masses were not all that revolutionary. In the event, the socialists who gathered at the Zimmerwald Conference in opposition to “intramural peace” split up into those who gave priority to peace and international solidarity and those calling for revolution even at the cost of the breakup of the International, with the former becoming the majority. Rosa Luxemburg was in prison and thus in no position to receive detailed up-to-date information, but nevertheless criticized the “foolish display at Zimmerwald” in a letter she wrote to Zetkin in October. It is also reported that she, “as furious as a lioness … gnashed her teeth” at not being able to attack Ledebour and others of the SPD minority faction. In a letter to comrade Leo Jogiches in December, she chides him for not letting her know sooner about the Zimmerwald Conference and tells him it was important “to create out of the motley assortment of opposition factions that have rallied together a small but determined and active nucleus” in advance of the national Congress of her

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

41

Part I “internationalist group (forerunner of the Spartacist League)” in January 1916. This position was quite close to Lenin’s. But the resolution adopted at the national conference held in March 1916 stated that the International is something that arises from below and that “the first call of the struggle must be the enforcement of peace through organized mass movement, for only that would be the moment of the birth of a new, vibrant and active International.” Absent is the concept of “defeat of one’s own government.” This sounds similar to the tone of her work The Crisis of Social Democracy, which she wrote the previous year while in prison, and which was “smuggled out” and published under the pseudonym Junius in Zurich in the spring of 1917. Organization first or propaganda first—therein lay the difference in emphasis between Lenin and Luxemburg.(14) Another noteworthy point about the Zimmerwald Conference is that Merrheim, Ledebour and their supporters passed a resolution declaring “This war is not our war!” and extolling the collaboration between German and French socialists toward achieving peace. The statement condemned Germany’s incursion into Belgium. But it may also be noted that Ledebour argued that the workers of Elsas Rorthringen (Alsace-Lorraine), annexed with the German Empire as a result of the Prussian-French War, should not be abandoned as they we, and that while he spoke of opposing “intramural peace,” he had only gone as far as abstaining in the vote on war credits.(15) Finally, it should be mentioned that the conference decided to establish an International Socialist Commission (Internationale Kommunistische Kommission, ISK) comprising Morgari, Grimm, Charles Naine (Switzerland) and Balabanoff. Its secretariat was to be located in Berne for the time being. It was an expression of dissatisfaction with the passive stance of the Bureau of Socialist International (BSI) in the Hague, but the committee was nevertheless declared a temporary measure, not a replacement for the latter.(16)

42

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV “International Socialist Commission”

IV “International Socialist Commission” and “Bureau of Socialist International”

At the Zimmerwald Conference, Grimm issued a stern warning to the participants not to take any documents concerning the conference across national borders. The conference’s “declaration” and brief, summarized “official minutes” were published in the “International Socialist Commission’s” Bulletin and the Swiss Social Democratic Party’s organ Berner Tagwacht. Lenin, who had already defined his own position as a “Zimmerwald leftist,” became angry as soon as he read the “official minutes,” saying it was inaccurate, and dismissed Grimm as a “fraud.”(1) Having parted ways with the Zimmerwald Conference majority faction, he began to devote all his energy to rallying the leftists together. Above all, it was Radek who served as Lenin’s right-hand man in the creation of their own ideological organ. Their efforts came to fruition with the launch of Vorbote (Harbinger) edited by Anton Pannekoek and Henriette Roland Holst of the Netherlands’ opposition faction in January, 1916.(2) As mentioned earlier, Troelstra of the Netherlands’ Social Democratic Workers Party, though he was pro-German, was looking for ways to revive the International as a member of a neutral nation. More and more members were becoming dissatisfied with his policy line, including Roland Holst. She was the one who published writings about general strikes at the time of the 1905 Russian Revolution at the urging of Kautsky and, as such, was a Dutch counterpart of Rosa Luxemburg. Pannekoek was a member of the Social Democratic Party (the Tribune faction) formed by a splinter faction of radicals in 1909. The situation can be described as an opposition faction within a nation’s representative social democratic Fig. 13: Henriette Roland Holst (1898, party being joined by elements who had lithograph by husband).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

43

Part I already left that party, despite some differences of opinion. But there were also those within the Tribune faction who would not fall into step. Among them was Herman Gorter and others who, like Rosa Luxemburg, were taking a passive view of the question of the peoples’ right of self-determination, which had once again become a point of controversy among leftists.(3) It is not surprising that the first issue of Vorbote carries the “Zimmerwald leftists” resolution along with articles by Lenin and Radek. But if there was any concurrence of views, it was more as window-dressing than in substance. With Lenin whose concept of the “leftists” position was quite severe, even Radek did not go along from time to time. Elsewhere, the Swiss Social Democratic Party’s (SDP) majority faction including Greulich rejected the policy line of the Zimmerwald Conference as interference in the internal affairs of the nations’ parties, with the “North Group” taking the same position with the exception of the Norwegian party. Nevertheless, at the Swiss party’s Congress held in Aarau in November, 1915, a proposal supporting the Zimmerwald Conference was adopted by an overwhelming majority. In other words, it was Grimm’s line of thinking, which had been denounced by Lenin and supported only by a minority of the Swiss SDP leadership, that met approval in the end. Because of this, the party was able to maintain its solidarity with the Italian Socialist Party going back to Lugano. The latter had remained opposed to participation in war even after Italy lost its neutral nation’s status. Arguably, this meant that the “South Group,” which had established its “International Socialist Commission (ISK)” albeit on a temporary basis, and the “North Group,” which supported the orthodox “Bureau of Socialist International (BSI),” were no longer able to collaborate within the framework that had previously existed.(4) Indeed, the ISK not only published the first two issues of its Bulletin before the end of 1915, but also started working toward the aim of holding its second conference. For its preparation, an expanded ISK conference was held in Berne from February 5th to 9th, 1916. Over 20 people from no less than 20 nations attended. But while Germany was represented by Bert Thalheimer and another member, no one attended from France or Britain to Grimm’s disappointment. That said, the number of organizations that had joined the “Zimmerwald” group, according to his own introductory presentation, had reached 21 including not only the Swiss and Italian parties, but also the British Socialist Party and Independent Labour Party. But French and German

44

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV “International Socialist Commission” organizations were not among them. As for Russia, the two factions of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), SR and Bund had joined, with Lenin, Zinoviev (Bolshevik) and Martov (Menshevik) attending this conference. Since earlier stages of this development, Grimm and others of the Zimmerwald Conference majority faction, and Lenin and other “leftists” had been competing closely for influence over such issues as the right of representation and the right to vote. The difference between their views was demonstrated most clearly in their assessment of the factions within Germany’s SPD. Grimm intended to invite Kautsky and Hugo Haase as opposition faction members to the next conference, but Lenin and his supporters expressed their firm opposition for the aforementioned reasons. In turn Balabanoff, Martov and others submitted their own statement of opposition to that position, saying Kautsky and others should be invited. Needles to say, Grimm’s policy line was supported by the majority faction. However, it should be noted that when Lenin proposed that the peoples’ right of self-determination be included in the agenda of the next conference, he won the support of a large majority. It is notable because this issue was one of the important points of disagreement between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg.(5) By 1916, the war had spread from the western and eastern fronts to the Ottoman Empire front in the Balkans and the Italian front. In the Battle of Verdun that begun in February, the total number of men killed and wounded on the German and French sides reached 700,000, while in the Battle of the Somme in July, Britain suffered as many as 60,000 dead and wounded in one day. These were unprecedented. In order to support such severe fighting, the nations had no alternative but to demand voluntary labour and life of hardship from their people. Hence the term “all-out war.” Just why were people suffering the loss of life on battlefields and the life of hardship? Their discontent was becoming explosive. Amidst this situation, 20 SPD members of the Reichstag voted against war credits as early as December, 1915. This was followed by Haase and others breaking off from the majority faction to form the Social Democratic Workers Community (Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft) in March, 1916. In Austria, too, the opposition faction led by Friedrich (Fritz) Adler formed their “Karl Marx Association.” In October, Adler assassinated Minister-President Count Karl von Stürgkh. Franz Koritschoner, nephew of Rudof Hilferding, was

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

45

Part I by then close to the Zimmerwald movement. Later under Stalin’s dictatorship, he was sent to a concentration camp and eventually handed over to the Gestapo, his harsh destiny ending in death by firing squad in Auschwitz.(6) In Britain and even more so in France, supporters of the war had by far the greater influence as most considered the war to be just, but even there, opponents were becoming more active. It was during this time, when more people were beginning to harbour doubts about “intramural peace,” that the second “Zimmerwald Conference” was held at “Hotel Bären (Bears)” in Kiental, an alpine resort some 40 kms southeast of Berne, accessible reached by winding mountain roads. Some 40 people assembled, comprising representatives from the parties of seven nations including Switzerland and Italy as well as one international organization. By national grouping, Russia and Germany stood out with eight and seven representatives respectively. But it was already apparent by then that opinions were divided among representatives of the same nations, and that a minority opposition faction had splintered off. During the conference from 24th to 30th of April, the opposition factions that had gathered for the Zimmerwald cause argued so furiously and in- Fig. 14: Hotel Bären. tensely over their various opinions that Grimm expressed frustration, wondering whether they were ready to tackle the issues seriously, when they were all just speaking out as they pleased. It was so intense that in another scene, participants from Russia and Poland staged a walkout protest.(7)

46

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV “International Socialist Commission” At any rate, their points of contention may be narrowed down to two. One involved the “proletariat’s stance toward peace.” The policy line indicated by Grimm, as he had expressed in the past, was to return to the basic principle of the Second International before the war and, from that position, call for “democratization of diplomacy” and “immediate cease fire and peace negotiations without delay” regardless of the war’s progress and not entailing any annexation or reparations. Against this line, the “leftists” appealed to the proletariat to “lay down your arms, and then take them up against your common enemy, the capitalist governments.” The other involved an even more urgent issue of the relationship with the “Bureau of Socialist International (BSI)” which had already begun to move toward convening a conference. The majority faction of the committee drafting the resolution, though they voiced severe criticisms of BSI, considered their aim to be to making it return to its original task, rather than to desert it. But the “leftists” insisted on separation from the BSI, arguing that the main culprits behind the downfall of the International included not only the majority factions of the parties of the belligerent nations but also the executive committee of BSI (Vandervelde and others). Compromise was barely reached on both of these points of contention. Nevertheless, the “manifesto” adopted unanimously at the end shows passages such as socialists should resign from cabinets and oppose war credits, and the only means of preventing war in the future was for the working class to seize political power, as well as the label “social chauvinists” that the “leftists” applied to socialists collaborating with belligerent governments. While the “leftists” had remained a minority in the voting process, their influence was clearly visible in the text of the “manifesto.” While there were many Russians and Poles among the “Zimmerwald leftists,” other groups falling in line with them began to emerge, such as the new faction “Bremen leftists”(8) who were becoming active, and others in Switzerland and Italy. It is thus not without a basis that many studies assess the Zimmerwald movement as “shifting to the left” at the Kiental conference. Elsewhere, two of the four independent participants from France not only demanded answers from German participants about the Belgian incursion and the Alsace-Lorraine issue, but also declared that they could oppose war credits but that depended on the war’s progress. This led to the scene of a document

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

47

Part I being submitted with 19 signatures condemning the fact that the socialist majority in the French Parliament still supported war credits. The signatories included one Frenchman, and the issue did not escalate into a third major point of contention, but the intensity of nationalism among the French people was thus demonstrated even at the conference of opposition factions. As mentioned earlier, the majority at the Kiental Conference were not considering separation from BSI. But the actions of the “South Group” no doubt had the effect of convincing Huysmans that he could not maintain a passive stance for ever. Indeed, he made a public speech for the first time since the war’s outbreak at the extraordinary Congress of the Dutch party at Arnhem on January 9th, 1916. Clearly aware of the Zimmerwald movement, he stressed that “the International is not dead.” Using the old adage about “the time to be silent and the time to speak,” he said the time had now come for him to speak out, arguing at the same time that “if it had been silent until now, that did not mean the BSI executive committee was not active.” As evidence, he pointed to moves by various member organizations since the war’s outbreak to defend his position on all fronts. He made the point of noting that the committee and himself as its secretary-general were still operating under the authority of the whole International and that their objective was to rally the parties together. Not through rash action, but by waiting for the right opportunity, he added.(9) In late February, he passed on to the neutral nations’ parties a proposal by the American Socialist Party’s Hillquit on the convening of a neutral nations’ conference. The Swiss Social Democratic Party , in a courteous reply sent as late as April, expressed its position that as “the Second International has collapsed,” it was aiming for a “new active International.” To this, Huysmans politely replied that the Swiss party’s move may be considered a defection since BSI, at least, was recognized as the centre (of the international socialist movement) by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Britain and Belgium.(10) Huysmans’ speech at Arnhem provoked a retort from Vandervelde who believed in the justness of the war against Germany, but elsewhere, Denmark’s Stauning, who had already come to control the initiative in the “Scandinavian cooperation committee” of the “North Group” taking over Sweden’s role, tried to take Huysmans’ step even further. Seeking the realization of an international conference of socialist parties, he contacted the German Social democratic

48

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV “International Socialist Commission” Party and secured a positive response. The Austrian party was also going along with the German party. Citing the adage “if the mountain does not come to Mohammed, Mohammed will go to the mountain,” Huysmans on his part set off for Paris and London accompanied by Vandervelde, with whom his relationship had once been tense. But the party majority in both countries, particularly France, would not budge from their position of refusing to sit at the same table with the Germans. Thus the BSI did try to assume a more positive role than before, but it became clear that the right opportunity Huysmans spoke of had not arrived.(11) A statement released by the BSI executive committee on May 1st addressed to the member organizations only had the effect of provoking Friedrich Adler’s “open letter to Huysmans.” While paying respect to Huysmans’ efforts in the past, he was critical, saying the former “only thinks about diplomatic issues as usual, and as a result he has been covering up the issue of contradiction within the International.”(12) What finally transpired was a conference of neutral nations held in the Hague in the Netherlands from July to August, 1916. It was the first international conference convened by the BSI since the war’s outbreak, but the Netherlands was the only country attending with a full contingent of representatives. There were no participants from the “South Group” or other neutral nations, except for one each from the United States and Argentina, and even the “North Group” only sent a few participants. One reason was that the German government had refused to issue visas for passage through its territory.(13) To summarize the situation at this point, the “South Group,” having launched its Zimmerwald movement, was arguing for rejection of “intramural peace” in an effort to rally together the minority factions or opposition actions of the nations. But there was a wide gap between the “leftists” who held that the International was dead and they should part ways with the BSI, and Grimm and others of the majority faction who wanted to avoid the breakup of the International. Moreoever, there were internal differences of opinion within both factions. Within the “North Group,” too, there were differences in stance, as was made apparent at the Hague conference. On one hand, Stauning, who called for pro-active peace initiatives, was pro-German and Troelstra who shared similar views, even favorably disposed toward the “Zimmerwald” peace moves. On the other hand, Branting felt closer to the Allied (Entente) nations,

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

49

Part I and was not inclined to move. The opinions of the “North Group” were also divided over whether to place their hopes on the majority factions or the minority factions of the belligerent nations’ parties. This can be explained by the fact that while the central European powers were favorably disposed toward an international conference of socialists, France and other Allied powers’ attitude was that of rejection. The majority factions of the Allied nations’ parties shared a strong conviction that Germany was the aggressor, so they steadfastly refused to entertain the notion, shared more or less by the people of the neutral nations regardless of whether they were “northern” or “southern,” of immediate peace while shelving or even postponing the issue of “responsibility for war.” The majority factions of Germany and France remained diametrically opposed over such issues as Belgium and AlsaceLorraine. Moreover, Huysmans shared the same sentiment as Vandervelde who, unable to forgive Germany for invading Belgium, joined his wartime cabinet. That sentiment notwithstanding, he tried to play an active role as the secretary general of the International, but he could not move inasmuch as he wanted to. When Huysmans finally took action, he expressed his anguish that “first I am maligned as an agent of the Entente powers,” and now he was criticized for “having sold out to the Germans.”(14)

50

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V Stockholm

V

Stockholm – The Second “Congress Unconvened”, 1917 (1)–

The war had already claimed millions of casualties. War fatigue was mounting in every belligerent nation during the winter of 1916–17. The situation was such that even the neutral nations could get caught up any time in the interests of the warring countries. In February, 1917, when Germany adopted the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, even the livelihood of the people of a neutral nation like Switzerland, for instance, was threatened. All the more, voices calling for peace and moves toward that end were getting louder. As mentioned earlier, the minority factions of socialist parties of the belligerent nations and other opposition factions had been mounting various efforts based on their anti-war pro-peace philosophy since before the war. But there were so many views just on the single issue of whether they were working for the revival or a new birth of the International, and as for an immediate ceasefire, they were not able to find a specific formula. What changed everything was not arguments like these, but a movement of the masses. A revolution took place in Russia, starting in Petrograd (St. Petersburg) in March, 1917. Within a matter of 10 days or so, the Romanov dynasty collapsed. The revolution that many socialists had spoken of for many years without really believing it would happen had actually taken place. Lenin himself had said at a lecture in front of young people that “we old men probably will not live to see the inevitable Fig. 15: Lenin and Fritz Platten (1919). decisive battle of the revolution.”(2) As it turned out, what Lenin had argued for in his steadfast, if isolated, pursuit of revolution over peace became reality.(3)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

51

Part I With the clandestine support of comrades Grimm and Fritz Platten and behind-the-scene machinations of the mysterious “revolution salesman” Alexander Parvus-Helphand, Lenin arrived at the Finland Station in mid-April aboard a “sealed” train provided tacitly by the German government intent on exploiting anti-government forces within their enemy nation. He began devoting all his energy to turning the Russian revolutionary movement toward the direction of his own thinking by, among other things, publishing his April Theses. The April Theses, published in the April 4th (17th by the new calendar), 1917 edition of the Bolsheviks’ organ Pravda, stressed the need to take the revolution from the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie to its second stage, power in the hands of the proletariat and impoverished peasants. To this end, he wrote that the “provisional government” being the power of the bourgeoisie should not be supported in any way, that their objective was a soviet republic and not a parliamentary republic and that, with regard to the International, a new organization opposed to “social exclusivists” and “centrists” should be created. The pattern of progress of the Russian Revolution thereafter more or less followed this thesis.(4) Across the Atlantic, United States President Woodrow Wilson, who had maintained a neutral position until then, was an advocate of “liberal internationalism.” Re-elected in 1916, he argued for “peace without victory” in his speech to the Senate in early 1917 in an appeal to the belligerent nations’ governments in Europe. But the reaction of the governments concerned was negative. Arguably, a revolution occurred in Russia at the time to bring down the Czarist and pave the way toward democratization that made Wilson shift his stance. The U.S., whose interests moreover already coincided with those of the Allied nations, launched its “crusade” for democracy in April. Wilson’s position was that he opposed “traditional imperialism” while also rejecting socialism.(5) No less than the development in Russia, this move by the United States would bring about a turning point in terms of both the military balance of power and diplomatic philosophy.(6) Amidst this situation, Germany was the country in which a major change occurred in the relationship between the majority and minority factions of the socialists. Karl Liebknecht, who had cast a vote against war credits as mentioned earlier, was arrested and imprisoned for shouting“No to the War!” during a Spartacist League rally in May of the previous year.(7) That was an event that

52

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V Stockholm symbolized the dissatisfaction spreading both within and outside the SPD toward the policy of “intramural peace.” Within the party’s parliamentarians, too, an opposition faction arguing for “peace through reconciliation” was about to part ways with the majority faction. In September, 1916, when the party’s national Congress was convened, the conflict between the two factions came to a head. Under pressure from the majority faction which controlled key areas of the party’s organizational system, the minority faction eventually set up a separate organization, the Independent Social-democratic Party (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, USPD), in April, 1917. At the forefront of that movement were men like Kautsky and Haase. While the Spartacist League opted to join the new party out of the importance it attached to unity with the masses, the “Bremen leftists” would follow their own independent line.(8) To move ahead in time, the Reichstag, under the initiative of the Central Party’s Matthias Erzberger and others, adopted the proposal for “peace through negotiation” in July, 1917, and the Pope in Rome, who supported the move, made approaches to the belligerent nations. The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, while he made gestures implying his support for this development, was in the event forced to resign by forces around the military that were seeking “peace through victory,” and for the time being, a military dictatorship under General Erich Ludendorff assumed control of the situation.(9) Elsewhere, both Britain, where Lloyd George had become prime minister at the end of the previous year, and France, where Clemenceau became prime minister in November, 1917, had hardened their resolve to end the war by defeating the enemy. However, Arthur Henderson, who as secretary-general of the Labour Party served as the British contact visà-vis the BSI and who had joined the Fig. 16: Hugo Haase.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

53

Part I cabinet in 1915, had a fall-out with Lloyd George in August, 1917 and left the cabinet. Similarly in France, Albert Thomas, the Minister of Munitions from the French Socialist Party, ended up parting ways with Clemenceau.(10) Returning now to March, 1917, the Petrograd Soviet (workers’ council) issued a communique appealing to the International proletariat, saying “now is the time for the peoples of the nations to take into their own hands the decision on the issue of war and peace.”(11) The outbreak of this revolution was a development that gave fresh hopes to socialists, as varied as their aims and intentions may have been. Not only that, the birth of a “democratic Russia” was a welcome development for Wilson, who had not been comfortable with an alliance with despotic Russia. The British and French governments hoped the Russian Provisional Government would continue to stand on the Allied nations’ side to pursue the war even more effectively. The German government, on the other hand, wanted to end the war on the western front before America’s participation began to show results. To this end, it began to lobby for separate peace with Russia. On both sides of the conflict, the governments tried to secure the help of socialists to fulfill their objectives. The socialists on their part also welcomes the revolution in Russia and became actively engaged, with men from the Allied powers like Thomas, Vandervelde and Henderson, who were also cabinet members, visiting Petrograd between March and June.(12) The SPD of Germany, being part of an enemy nation, could not send a mission, so it had to be content with messages entrusted to a Danish comrade. That person (Frederik Borgbjerg, editor of the Danish party organ) was, in fact, going to Moscow because the “North Group,” at Stauning’s initiative, was trying to come to grips with the new situation. Compelled by this development, Huysmans on April 22nd called on member organizations to assemble at an international conference to be convened in Stockholm on May 15th. As he had expected, the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party replied that they would not attend. Nevertheless, he and other representatives of the “North Group” who gathered in Stockholm set up a “Netherlands-Scandinavian Committee” (with Huysmans as secretary-general), thus demonstrating their determination to make the international conference come true by postponing it to June instead.(13)

54

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V Stockholm

Fig. 17: H. van Kol, P. J. Troelstra (front row from left), Th. Stauning, Hj. Branting (back row) April, 1917 in Stockholm.

To their encouragement, the Petrograd Soviet responded on May 9th with a proposal to hold an international conference of all socialists in a neutral country. On the other hand, Grimm of the “South Group,” even as he showed willingness to accept the BSI’s invitation, made his own proposal to hold the third Zimmerwald Conference also in Stockholm to discuss “our own” unified position (May 10th). Moreover, his ISK, in response to focus of interest on the north, moved the editorial and publishing operation of its organ to Stockholm and renamed it “News Service” [Nachrichtendienst].(14) All of these moves, thus, came to be focused on Stockholm. It was the Petrograd Soviet amidst the Russian situation that was in a position to influence these moves, however unwittingly. Whether they were from belligerent nations or neutral nations, the socialists all Fig. 18: Nina Bang.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

55

Part I had their own reasons for wanting to have Russian comrades on their side inasmuch as they had different opinions about “war and peace.” However, the Russian socialists also held diverse views. After the uprising erupted, men like Irakli Tsereteli and Stalin returned from Siberia, while from western Europe Lenin and Axelrod also came back, along with other revolutionaries and socialists from the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks and other groups, who came flocking to the Russian capital.(15) Day after day, they gave grandiloquent speeches to persuade others, though nobody knew what was going to happen. Of course, the Petrograd Soviet was established by blowing apart the “intramural peace” of Russia, so it was critical from the start toward the socialist party majority factions of the other belligerent nations. On May 15th, they published an appeal seeking “peace with no annexation and no reparation, based on the principle of the peoples’ right of self-determination.” Many among the Russian socialists were already supportive of the Zimmerwald movement, but views were beginning to diversify over their position toward the Russian provisional government that was trying to resume the war anew on the side of the Allied powers. Should one support the government’s policy in order to defend revolutionary Russia (“revolution defense policy”) like Nikolay Chkheidze, the Georgian head of the Petrograd Soviet, and influential Tsereteli, or should one, like Lenin, aim for control of political power by the Soviets giving no support to the government whatsoever?(16) The fact that the Petrograd Soviet responded favorably to the “North Group’s” proposal on May 9th, as mentioned earlier, indicates that in calling for a breakup of the International, Lenin and others were still arguing from a minority position, as they themselves admitted. In the event, Iosif Petrovich Goledenberg and other representatives of the Petrograd Soviet, who went to Stockholm, got together with the “North Group” to set up a “RussiaNetherlands-Scandinavia Committee”(17) in a renewed gesture of collaboration toward realization of the “Stockholm Conference” scheduled for August 15th. On their part Huysmans and others, by May, had not only sent to member organizations a questionnaire on peace terms, basic agenda in international relations, specific proposal for the realization of their goal, actions required of the International and democracy, and plenary conference, along with a

56

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V Stockholm statement calling for the rebuilding of the International and creation of the foundation for peace, but had also been holding vigorous bilateral discussions with various organizations. In June, they had separate discussions with representatives of the majority faction of Germany’s SPD, and with those of Germany’s USPD.(18) As a matter of interest, Stockholm, where everything from milk and sausages to even white bread was easily available, seemed like a “dreamland (Schlaraffenland)”(19) to the Germans who had been suffering from hunger. By late July, Huysmans and others had already held discussions with 17 organizations from both sides of the war.(20) The Soviet delegation went on to London and Paris where they held consultations with the aim of realizing the “Stockholm Conference.”(21) In late August, 1917, a conference of socialists from the Allied powers was held in London. The “Russia / Netherlands / Scandinavia Committee” expressed its solidarity. While the London conference was unable to achieve a consensus of views, arguments in favor of participation in the “Stockholm Conference” made up the majority of views.(22)

Fig. 19: Pavel Axelrod, Yuli Martov (two on the left, May 1917 in Stockholm).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

57

Part I

Fig. 20: Eduard Bernstein, Hugo Haase, Nina Bang, Karl Kautsky (four on the left, May 1917 in Stockholm).

In response to these moves, the governments of the Allied nations, convinced that the war situation was to their advantages, adopted a counter-measure of refusing passports to socialists who wanted to travel abroad for liaisons. Even the British Seamen’s Union got into the act by refusing to take such socialists on board ships. But the responses of the governments concerned were also affected by their domestic situations, so it was not as simple as all of them falling into step by refusing to issue passports. Nevertheless, the reason men like Henderson and Thomas left their cabinets was that they could no longer remain with governments that were determined to prevent the realization of the “Stockholm Conference.”(23) At the London conference, it was their protest against the refusal of some governments to issue passports to socialists that garnered more support than the proposal calling on the parties to participate in the “Stockholm Conference.” Understandably, the refusal of passports made it impossible for the socialists of the Allied nations to go to Stockholm, undermining the whole concept of the conference. Like the summer of 1914, it too was to become an “unconvened Congress (Congrès manqué).”(24)

58

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V Stockholm On October 10th, the party representatives of the four neutral nations (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands), who supported the “Stockholm Conference issued a statement in which, most notably, they called for “no annexation, no reparations” and (possibly influenced by the Petrograd Soviet, but using a slightly different expression) “recognition of the peoples’ right of self-determination.”(25) It was a swan song for the “Stockholm Conference.” That said, the organizing committee continued to hold discussions with various organizations, conducting in November negotiations with Muslims from Morocco among other countries. It was likely a vestige of Huysmans’ pride that in early 1918, he published a lengthy 542-page report, which included responses to the questionnaire from 21 organizations, among them French, British, German and American parties.(26) The aborted “Stockholm Conference” was the first, and the last, opportunity for the rebuilding of the Second International. In fact, a “memorandum” attached to the statement described detailed conditions concerning Alsace-Lorraine and other specific issues, and as such, it would have been a guidepost to “peace through reconciliation”.(27) Had the conference taken place, the outcome of the Versailles peace talks might have been different. The report is a valuable record of the efforts undertaken by socialists toward peace and democracy, even if they ended in failure.(28) Shifting our gaze to the “South Group,” Grimm and Balabanoff finally managed to slip into Petrograd via Stockholm in May, 1917, whereupon they began to hold energetic discussions with Russians from different factions. In Stockholm the ISK “News Service,” though only a mimeograph of typed stories, was disseminating information one after another. One article it carried called for the convening of the aforementioned third Zimmerwald Conference in Stockholm.(29) But unexpectedly, a coded telegram Grimm sent to an old acquaintance, Arthur Hoffmann who was member of the Swiss Federation cabinet, was scooped by a Stockholm newspaper. Grimm was expelled from Russia by the provisional government on the suspicion of spying for Fig. 21: Angelica Balabanoff.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

59

Part I Germany. The National Congress of Soviets ratified the government’s action, and the investigation committee of the “international socialism commission” of Radek and others published their judgement that, while concluding Grimm could not be an agent of German imperialism, it could not be responsible for his actions. It was a situation where, adding to the tense relations between the Russian provisional government, the Soviets and the Bolsheviks, both the Allied powers and the Central powers were resorting to all kinds of diplomatic ruses, not just inside Russia. Despite the conclusion of the Swiss Social-democratic Party’s investigative committee that he was innocent of the spying charge, Grimm was undermined by the party’s opposition faction and forced to resign. Even though he did in fact maintain direct and indirect contact with the German authorities, it has already been established that it was for the purpose of arranging for the return trip home of exiled Russian revolutionaries staying in Switzerland (Lenin among them). It is also true that, overcoming this blow to his career, Grimm went on to organize a large-scale strike in Switzerland the following year. So the immediate significance of that “incident” was that the most influential leader of the Zimmerwald movement’s majority faction suffered a downfall. As a matter of interest, it was revealed 50 years later that Grimm’s coded telegram was reportedly intercepted by a receptionist at the Swiss consulate in Petrograd, who was a Russian intelligence agent, and given to Thomas who happened to be visiting, and subsequently leaked to Stockholm.(30) In Russia, the workers, the rural peasants and the minority races were all mounting their campaigns raising their respective sets of demands. Amidst this turbulent situation, the government launched major military offensive against the German and Austrian forces in late June. This achieved some results, but it also led to rebellion in Petrograd by soldiers, who had by then become tired of fighting beyond their borders (July Incident). While this rebellion was being quelled, Lenin managed to flee to Finland under cover, but other Bolshevik leaders including Trotsky, who had also returned from exile to become quite influential among the Soviets, were arrested. Not long after A.F. Kerensky set up his new cabinet, General Kornilov launched his counter-revolutionary coup attempt, the failure of which became apparent in late August. The situation was chaotic. But for one thing, the soldiers’ rebellion signalled the failure of the “revolution defense policy” of Tsereteli and others. Once again forced into exile, Lenin worked on his book State and Revolution which clarified

60

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V Stockholm the ideological basis for his position that without the elimination of capitalist states, peace and democracy cannot be achieved. On April 13th Radek, whose views did not always agree with Lenin’s, met the latter in Stockholm where he had stopped off on his way back to Petrograd from Zürich. Lenin took the opportunity to confer with Swedish comrades and established a Bolshevik “Central Committee external agency” there. Radek became one of its members.(31) While he had taken part as a Polish representative in the committee investigating Grimm, among other bodies, he was in fact a spokesman by then for Lenin’s argument that they should refuse to participate in the “Stockholm Conference” and hold a conference of only the “Zimmerwald leftists.” The International Socialist Commission (ISK), too, refused to cooperate with the “Stockholm Conference” in a letter sent to “Russian Workers and Soldiers Council delegates” in Balabanoff ’s name July 11th, the very day the “Russia-Nertherlands-Scandinavian Committee” was formed.(32) Balabanoff, who had taken over the responsibility for the Zimmerwald Conference from Grimm, was back in Stockholm. In an environment where no one knew where spies might have lurked, she went about energetically exchanging views with Swedish and Russian comrades and, in all likelihood, conferred with a delegation from Germany’s USPD on August 1st. By that time she had apparently come to side with the Bolsheviks.(33)

Fig. 22: A. F. Kerensky (August, 1917, during

Fig. 23: I.G.Tsereteli (August, 1917, during

the National Congress in Moscow, sketch by

the National Congress in Moscow, sketch

Iu. K. Artsybushev).

by U. K. Arzibushev).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

61

Part I From July 5th to 9th, 1917, at a time when the prospect for the “Stockholm Conference” was beginning to look all but lost, the third Zimmerwald Conference was held without fanfare in Stockholm with about 30 participants.(34) The “communiqué” they adopted was an incitement of mass movements in all workplaces. In charge of the agenda, Radek likened the Russian provisional government to the French Republican general Cavaignac whose troops repressed the June Days Uprising in Paris in 1848, and demanded that the participants either support or not support that government. But as for refusing to participate in the “Stockholm Conference,” Axelrod resisted it, and Ledebour and Haase from Germany’s USPD, while they leaned toward refusal, declined to take a decision. The conflict of views within the Zimmerwald movement had reached the point of threatening the very existence of the movement itself.(35) For those familiar with developments thereafter, it should be emphasized that Lenin’s policy line of confrontation with the “Centrists”/ “Mensheviks” was hardening significantly at the time. Thus the Zimmerwald movement entered a cul-de-sac, as did the latest moves by the “North Group” and the intention of the majority factions of the Allied nations’ socialist parties. The various peace plans conceived by different socialists had all failed to materialize. This failure arguably allowed the Allied powers’ governments to continue the war for one more year. But it was the masses once again who brought about a major change in the situation. On November 7th, 1917, the Bolsheviks leading an armed uprising of soldiers and workers finally seized power. For Lenin, it was a vindication of his prediction. On the following day, a “proclamation on peace,” an amplified version of the Petrograd Soviet’s May “manifesto,” was issued. The “proclamation” proposed that peace be achieved through negotiations based on “no annexation and no reparations,” and suggested that documents of secret diplomacy had been exposed. This was already a matter of wide agreement among socialists who were only opposition party members or activists, but the idea of a national government issuing such a proclamation shattered the norms of conventional diplomacy. It was in response to this development that President Wilson announced his famous “14 Points.”(36) The “14 Points” included a denunciation of secret diplomacy, along with an article that could be interpreted as recognition of the “people’s right of self-determination.” There was also a proposal for the formation of a “general international association,” which

62

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V Stockholm would lead to the founding of the League of Nations. Was it Wilson, or was it Lenin, now in control of a national power, who would capture the imagination of the people?(37)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

63

VI Lenin vs. Wilson

VI Lenin vs. Wilson

The seizure of political power by the Bolsheviks gave the Zimmerwald leftists the opportunity to pursue their own course with confidence. As early as November 8th, 1917, the “International Socialist Commission (ISK)” issued an appeal to the proletariat of all nations to take actions toward an immediate cease-fire and peace negotiations, with the “Bolshevik Central Committee External Representaive Office” as co-signatory.(1) For the Bolsheviks now in the position of representing their nation, however, there was a task more pressing than the creation of a new International. It was the realization of peace. The Soviet government led by Leon Trotsky, who had as a Bolshevik by now become People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, proposed to the belligerent nations to hold peace negotiations. While the Central powers, which would gain an advantage if Russia withdrew from the conflict, showed a favorable stance toward the proposal, the Allied powers were put in a difficult spot. If they were to continue the war even at a military disadvantage, they faced a need to redefine the objectives of the war. But it was the Soviet regime that was placed in an even more awkward position. As the Allied nations were not responsive to peace negotiations, Russia had no choice but to conclude a “Tilsit peace (humiliating, unequal peace)” treaty with the central European powers at Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918, giving up vast territories including the Ukraine as well as reparation payments. (In Germany the USPD refused to ratify the treaty while the majority SPD could not adopt a clear position due to divided opinions within.)(2) As in the words of Trotsky himself, that “I’ll end the war but I won’t put my name on a peace treaty,”(3) there was a great deal of resistance to giving in to German demands. It was Lenin, however, who managed to bring about the conclusion of a treaty amidst a situation in which the Allied powers’ war of interference in Russia had already begun. Lenin showed the face of a practical politician, rather than that of a dogmatic revolutionary. So much so that an unpersuaded members of the SR (Socialist Revolutionary) leftists assassinated the German ambassador to Russia in July, while the 5th National Soviet Congress was in progress in an attempt to reignite the war with Germany.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

65

Part I At a constitutional deliberation conference held on January 18th, two months before the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, the Bolsheviks were at a numerical disadvantage against the SR faction and others. After a series of long, drawn-out exchanges of views, a 12-hour recess was called the following morning, but the conference was never to resume again. At the 3rd National Soviet Congress held shortly thereafter, with Lenin declaring that Russia was a “Socialist Soviet Republic,” the Bolsheviks and the SR leftists came into power. But there still remained several points of contention between the two, including one over rural agrarian policies, so that the SR leftists eventually withdrew from political power after the conclusion of the BrestLitovsk Treaty. After the assassination of the German ambassador, the SR leftists, whose delegate count at the 5th National Soviet Congress stood at 352 against 745 for the Bolsheviks, staged an anti-Bolshevik revolt but were defeated, and subsequently expelled from the Soviet. Throughout it all, the economy was in shambles and armed conflicts were occurring in many places. As it will be discussed in Part II, the one-party dictatorship, which the two Internationals apart from the Comintern always questioned, began at that point in time.(4) In the Allied nations meanwhile, the socialists, not to mention the governments, were searching for new prospects in the aftermath of the failure of the “Stockholm Conference.” In particular, the British Labour Party after Henderson’s retirement became quite active, drafting together with the Trades Union Congress a “memorandum on war aims,” which it used as the basis for calling on the socialist parties and labour unions of the Allied nations to convene an international conference. Refusal to participate Fig. 24: Wilson vs. Lenin. came from the Rumanian Social Democratic Party and, interestingly, from the Bolsheviks who already had a clear position, as well as from the American

66

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Lenin vs. Wilson Federation of Labor (which never participated in the Second International) led by Samuel Gompers who supported Wilson’s “crusade.”(5) The Third Inter-Allied Socialist Conference, the meeting of Allied nations’ socialists that took place in London from 20th to 24th of February, 1918 (the designation “Third” implying that the conference was to be continued), was attended by dozens of representatives from eight nations, including the organizers and both the majority and minority factions from France. The “memorandum on war aims” adopted at the conference, while reiterating the aforementioned resolution in London three years earlier (see page 31) that “the victory of the Alliance nations will without doubt constitute victory for the people’s liberty and national independence,” also listed specific demands on “territorial issues” such as restoration of Belgium’s independence, the people’s right of self-determination in Alsace-Lorraine based on the restoration of France’s territorial right violated in 1871(6) and Poland’s independence. While it denounced the Ottoman Empire as a brutal oppressor, it also showed on the issue of colonies the “patriarchial” attitude that had persisted from the time of the Second International. Using the cautious wording of yielding to the judgement of an impartial arbiter, it nevertheless demanded reparations for war damages. But what is more noteworthy here is that the arguments for the “peoples’ right of self-determination” with regard to such territories, and its proposal to establish an international body as a system of guaranteeing future peace and democracy, more or less match the proposals Wilson made in his “14 Points” published in January, 1918. In fact the “memorandum” unabashedly expressed support for Wilson. The socialists of the Allied nations thought that that was the way to express opposition to the “imperialist” policies of their own governments. However, it was the “traditional” imperialist policies that they opposed, not colonial rule in general. Even the Wilson administration, while being critical of imperialism on the part of the European powers, did not lay down policies that differed significantly from Theodore Roosevelt’s “big stick diplomacy” where the Caribbean region was concerned.(7) Another thing worth noting is the proposal that at least one representative from each nation of the “working class who made so much sacrifice in the war” be seated at the peace conferences. To promote this aim, a committee made up of Thomas, Vandervelde and Henderson was established. At the same time, it was decided to ask the socialists of the central powers for their com-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

67

Part I plete and frank opinions “in order to draft an action programme for immediate and democratic peace.” The pitch was made in March.(8) The “Russia-Netherlands-Scandinavia Committee” had already held a conference in January, 1918 in response to a request for cooperation by the British Labour Party in December of the previous year. In what was to become the final statement of its aims, it issued an appeal to British workers on January 8th stating that “the dream of Stockholm was no more” and expressing hope for the rebuilding of the British Labour Party.(9) In this way, two groups came to compete each with its own peace initiatives and internal dissension. On one hand stood the Zimmerwald leftists in solidarity with the Bolsheviks, and on the other the socialists of the Allied nations who were united with the organizing committee of the “Stockholm Conference.” The “Lenin vs. Wilson” pattern of confrontation had clearly emerged. How did the socialists of the Central powers, the recipients of the pitch, respond? According to a reply to Huysmans dated 28th of June, published in mid-July in the SPD majority faction’s organ Vorwärts, his letter dated March 10th had, alas, not been received until June 3rd.(10) On one warfront, Russia had dropped out under the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, and on the western front, U.S. forces were already Fig. 25: Philipp Scheidemann. playing their part. But the position of the Central powers was practically unchanged since the time of preparations a year earlier for the Stockholm Conference. The position of the SPD majority was that, while it was less compromising than its fraternal parties in the Allied nations, it recognized the basic principles of “no annexation, no reparations, peoples’ right of self-determination,” and that it was willing to take part in a general conference if it was held in a neutral country. As for specific conditions, they remained unchanged from those

68

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Lenin vs. Wilson stated in the memorandum drafted a year earlier for the “Stockholm Conference.” That memorandum, it should be noted, had also called for the abolition of “secret diplomacy.” Up to this point, there was practically no difference in position either with the aforementioned “memorandum” for “peace through reconciliation” attached to the “Stockholm Conference” organizing committee’s statement (by this stage, it had come to be called the “neutral nations’ proposal”), or with the “memorandum on war aims” of the Allied nations’ parties. As for differences, the clearest example was the argument that ElsassLothringen (Alsace-Lorraine) should justifiably revert to Germany as ninetenths of the inhabitants were Germanic. Another was its support for the independence of Polish inhabitants albeit only in regions controlled by Russia. Also, it took a precautionary step by asserting that if compensation for war damages were demanded unilaterally, it would be tantamount to indemnity. As Philipp Scheidemann, an influential majority faction figure said in his speech in Reichstag in July, 1917, a year after he had supported war credits despite his growing disagreement with government policies, that “(the war) has to be stopped, stopped by all means, in an honorable way of course,” they were hoping desperately for “peace through reconciliation.” The reply from the USPD has not been traced, but the party’s memorandum submitted for the “Stockholm Conference” earlier had stated that the reversion of Elsass-Lothringen should be decided by a plebiscite, and that the Poles should achieve national unity including regions controlled by Germany and Austria. Moreover, Eduard Bernstein himself had raised the issue of war responsibility at a meeting with the “Stockholm Conference” organizing committee, stating that this issue should be taken off the table if a general conference of socialists were to succeed. Of this Kautsky was critical, saying that while the majority faction’s argument appeared similar to what his faction had been saying, the former were nationalists merely expressing a view reflecting the war’s progress.(11) The reply from the Austrian Social-democratic Party, which it published in the June 29th issue of its party organ (partly censored, with the complete text appearing in the July 18th issue of the Netherlands Social-democratic Workers’ Party organ Het Volk) listed the basic principles, namely, seeking mediation of international disputes to a type of an international league, no annexation and no reparations—principles which were in line with the “proclamation on

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

69

Part I peace.” It rejected “peace through victory” and called for the reformation of Austria-Hungary into a union of autonomous nations and creation of a federation of Balkan peoples. The reply from the Hungarian Social-democratic Party (its complete text published in the July 18th issue of Het Volk for the aforementioned reason) also expressed no objection to the “memorandum” of the Allied nations’ socialist parties and, reiterating its own “memorandum” in Stockholm, called for the restoration of the original borders in Belgium and Serbia while expressing strong opposition to the separation of Croatia from Hungary which would cut off the latter’s access to the sea. This reflects wariness toward moves by the southern Slavic peoples. The reply from the Bulgarian Social-democratic Party (“wide” faction), published in its organ in April and May, while expressing total support for the overall points of the “memorandum” of the Allied nations’ socialist parties, argued for Bulgaria’s unification with regard to relations with Macedonia and Serbia. The impact of Bulgaria having suffered defeat in the second Balkan war of 1913 and having then sided with the Central powers in World War I cannot be ignored. The socialists of the Ottoman Empire, who made an appearance in Stockholm the previous year, were apparently not on the minds of the Allied nations’ socialists.(12) As one has seen, the peace proposals by the “North Group” of neutral countries and the Allied nations’ socialist parties were also acceptable to the central European powers’ socialist parties in general terms. To be sure, there were differences of views between the majority factions of Germany’s SPD and the Fig. 26: Friedrich Ebert. French Socialist Party, but “peace through reconciliation” might still have been possible. The Cerntral powers’ parties were even willing to shelve the resolution of legal issues in order to achieve a cease-fire. Neither side was seeking a “peace through revolution.” What determined the outcome was the progress of the war along with actions of the masses. In Russia, not only were insurrections already breaking out on a national scale, but wars of interference by foreign powers had started. In August of

70

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Lenin vs. Wilson 1918, Japan declared it was “sending troops to Siberia.” While “democratization” due to the March revolution had been welcomed by the governments of foreign powers, the Bolshevik regime had gone against all existing practices in domestic rule and international diplomacy, thus becoming a target to be brought down.(13) The Soviet regime could only look in desperation for a route to survival. In early 1918, a wide-scale general strike took place in Germany. By the end of summer that year, the war situation had turned against the Central powers. The German military leadership finally gave in, ceding power to the cabinet under Prince Maxmillian of Baden supported by the Reichstag. Together with the Austrian government, the cabinet went on to ask Wilson for an armistice based on the “14 Points.” But it was too late. After the Ottoman Empire capitulated in October, the Hapsburg Empire surrendered the following month. Revolutions erupted in both the Hapsburg Empire and the German Empire, and on November 11th, Germany stopped fighting on the western front. The Hohenzollern dynasty came to an end and was replaced at the seat of power by SPD led by Friedrich Ebert and USPD, which would later withdraw. Amidst a chaotic situation, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, who had just been released from prison to resume their activities, were murdered by right-wing militia who still operated freely in Berlin. Such rapid changes in the German situation notwithstanding, what was abundantly clear was the defeat of the German Empire.(14) The socialists of the Allied nations had already held their (Fourth) conference in London from September 17th to 20th, in an effort to set forth a policy line of their own. Leading the effort was Henderson, who was actively lobbying for the convening of a peace conference by socialists in January of the following year. It was probably around that time that the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party sent a letter to Wilson stating “all people who seek liberty consider Your Excellency a dependable and enlightened friend.”(15) At the same time Henderson and others, having seen their demand that workers’ representatives be allowed to participate in peace conferences among governments rejected, were making an all-out effort to convene at least an international conference of socialists in the same city. This meant that among the men in the seat of power in the imperialist nations, as they all were, they placed greater

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

71

Part I hope in Wilson, a proponent of “new diplomacy” than in the proponents of “old diplomacy” like Lloyd George and Clemenceau.(16) To the London conference, it is noted that the Socialist Party of America, which had repeatedly proposed holding an international conference of socialists and which had opposed the U.S. pariticipation in the war, was not invited, while the American Federation of Labor, which had ignored the Third conference, sent a delegation led by Gompers himself. Their proposals based on Wilson’s “14 Points” supported Henderson’s proposal to convene an international conference of workers at the same time and same place as the peace conference of governments. But Gompers’ amendment that at the forthcoming international conference “only those who had publicly opposed the Central powers’ despotic leaders be received” was defeated by 63 votes to 26 votes (of which 20 were American). Thereafter, Gompers became quite uncooperative. The “memorandum on war aims’” published by the Allied nations’ socialist parties back in February was adopted with 457 votes in favor from Italy, Belgium, France and Britain. Opposed were Serbia, Greece and the French minority faction with 10 votes, while the U.S. and Canada abstained. Kerensky showed up and was allowed to attend as an observer. Meanwhile, Axelrod and other Mensheviks and Rubanovich of the Socialist Revolutionaries sent telegrams saying they supported the aims of the conference but could not attend, blaming armed suppression by the Bolsheviks. At the same time, Jean Longuet of the French minority faction condemned the Allied nations’ war of interference against Russia.(17) The following month, Longuet and others defeated the majority faction, which had cooperated with the government’s war efforts since the beginning, for the first time by a vote of 1,544 to 1,172 at the national Congress of the French Socialist Party to gain control of the party organization as the new majority faction.(18) It should be emphasized here that Henderson considered the aim of the conference to behaving a say in his government’s “diplomatic conference,” rather than settling disputes among various member organizations of the International or looking into causes of the war.(19) This was none other than the idea Troelstra had proposed immediately after the start of the war (see page 20). But before the international conference of socialists scheduled for January took place, the Central powers capitulated. Fifteen million people had died.(20)

72

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Berne

VII

Berne – February, 1919 –

1 By the end of October, 1918, the governments of the U.S., Britain and France had already started negotiations over the venue of the peace conference, nations to participate and the agenda, but now that the war was over, they decided to hold the actual peace talks in the setting of Paris from January to June of 1919. The opening day was on January 18th, the same date as a ceremony that took place in the Palace of Versailles almost half century earlier to mark the formation of the German Empire. Meanwhile, the socialists were exchanging a flurry of letters and telegrams. The memorandum drafted by Henderson in mid-December, 1918 indicates that considerable progress had been made in discussions concerning parties to be invited, the makeup of delegations and the agenda of their own international conference. There were great expectations of Wilson, the “brilliant leader of democracy in the world.” As for the idea of holding that conference in parallel with, and in the same city as, the inter-governmental peace talks, however, it had been abandoned by then due to the governments’ refusal. Instead, Geneva and Lausanne were proposed for the reason of their proximity to Paris. But neither of these proved easily feasible due to the attitudes of the Swiss government as well as the Swiss Social-democratic Party whose majority was leaning toward support of the Bolsheviks, so that Berne became the final solution.(1) Situated roughly in the middle of Switzerland, the beautiful city of Berne nestled in the Aare River valley was the venue of a conference held by German and French members of parliament back in May, 1913 shortly before the outbreak of World War I to appeal for harmony between their two countries. Now, six years later, in early February 1919, socialists from all over Europe were gathering one after another at the city’s “People’s House.” The Berne Conference was an attempt by the socialists, who had faced each other as enemies on the opposing Allied and Central powers’ sides, to gather together for the first time in four and a half years to restore the ties of international

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

73

Part I solidarity that had been broken since the war’s outbreak. But a movement that had begun earlier in Moscow would result in the founding of the Third International in March. Those in step with this movement did not appear in Berne. Ethel Snowden of the British Independent Labour Party, who was active in the conference’s preparatory stages, could not help but feel pity for the Germans. “Hermann Müller, who used to be big and robust, was still tall but, alas, thin and gaunt, his clothes pitifully loose likely because of long periods of food shortages,” she wrote. Also, that Bernstein was “stooped and aged” as if one was looking at the Fig. 27: Eduard Bernstein (1926?). “ghost of his erstwhile self.”(2) The meeting, which took place at the “People’s House,” a monument in the history of labor movement, was attended by 103 people from 26 nations (territories). For the record, the list of participants is given below.(3) • Argentina 11 (Justo and others) • Armenia 2 • Bohemia 6 (Nĕmec and others) • Bulgaria 2 (Dimitrov and others) • Denmark 4 • Germany 12 (SPD—Molkenbuhr, Müller, Wels; USPD—5 including Eisner, Haase, Kautsky, also, in an unofficial capacity, Bernstein and 3 labor union members) • Germany-Austria 7 (Friedrich Adler and others) • Elsass-Lothringen 1 (Grumbach) • Estonia 1 • Finland 2 • France 12 (former minority faction—Cachin, Frossard, Longuet, Loriot and 2 others, Faure and 1 other as proxies for a total of 8; former majority faction—4 including Renaudel, Thomas) • Georgia 2 • Greece 1

74

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Berne • Britain 10 (Labour Party—5 including Henderson, MacDonald, Ethel Snowden; Trades Unions—5 including Stuart-Bunning) • Ireland 2 • Italy 3 (“reformists” [not the “reformists” within the Italian Socialist Party, but the “Italian Socialist League” formed in May, 1918]) • Canada 1 • Latvia 1 • Netherlands 2 (Troelstra, Wibaut) • Norway 5 • Palestine 4 (Poale-Zion)(4) • Poland 2 (Poland “Bund”) • Russia 7 (Mensheviks—3 including Axelrod. SR—4 including Rubanovich, Sukhomlin) • Sweden 7 (Branting and others) • Spain 1 • Hungary 3 (Kunfi and others) • International Socialist Bureau Huysmans • Did not arrive Ukraine 2 It was to be expected that the Bolsheviks did not appear. Having started up a movement to counter the Berne Conference, they had come as far as holding the first Congress of the Third International in Moscow in March, 1919. The only ones to attend from Russia were Menshevik and SR representatives. Also absent were the Belgian Workers’ Party, who could not cast aside their feeling of hatred toward Germany’s SPD despite efforts to mollify them by Huysmans and Vandervelde, and the American Federation of Labor, which did not want to meet with socialist parties.(5) As mentioned earlier, the Swiss Socialdemocratic Party was divided. At an extraordinary party Congress held in the same city the day before the Berne International conference opened. After heated discussions lasting a whole day, the resolution not to participate in the international conference, submitted by the Zimmerwald movement supporters, defeated the resolution to participate submitted by the party executive by 238 votes to 147. Consequently, the only one to attend the conference was a representative of the Grütli Association, and only as a guest at that.(6) The three from Italy in the list were people in line with the Italian Reformist Socialist

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

75

Part I Party founded by Bissolati and others who were expelled from the Italian Socialist Party in 1912 for supporting the Italy-Ottoman Empire war. The Italian Socialist Party, which had begun to lean toward the “Third International,” nevertheless sent three delegates including Morgari as observers, apparently due to their reasoning that the conference did not respect the spirit of the Zimmerwald movement.(7) Many of the “South Group” people had by now come to follow the movement of the “Zimmerwald leftists,” which was to support the Bolsheviks. According to an intelligence agency report, some 20 “Zimmerwalders” including Morgari, Grimm, Adler and Frossard held a separate conference.(8) The Serbian and Rumanian parties also stayed away. The only participants from outside Europe were from Canada and Argentina. Some from Japan expressed their wish to participate but it did not materialize.(9) No body took part from the British Independent Labour Party, which was at the time still cooperating with the Labour Party. But it was eventually to pursue its own line.(10) In Austria-Hungary, meanwhile, not only was the Hungarian Social-democratic Party an independent entity, but the Austrian Social-democratic movement was also beleaguered by ethnic issues as reflected in the name it earned, the “little International.” In 1912, the Czechs (or Bohemia) came to form an organization separate from the Germans. The Germans’ organization was called the “German Social-democratic Workers’ Party in Austria,” but after the downfall of the Hapsburg Empire, it changed its name to the “Social-democratic Workers’ Party of Germany-Austria.”(11) In Berne, a conference of political organizations called by the “International Socialist Bureau” and a conference of labor unions called by the “International Federation of Trade Unions” took place at the same time, but for the present purpose, only the former will be discussed.(12) The expectation was that the Berne Conference of political organizations would seek a “peace through reconciliation” along the lines of the “neutral nations’ proposal” sent to the unconvened “Stockholm Conference” and the “memorandum on war aims” by the Allied nations’ parties, and based on Wilson’s “14 Points.”(13) The socialist majority factions of the central European powers, now citizens of defeated nations, were no longer in a position to raise any objections.

76

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Berne

2 In the event, on February 3rd, 1919, at three p.m., an address by Henderson opened the conference and Branting took the chairman’s seat. Next, Huysmans presented the agenda schedule in which a league of nations, territorial issues and a labor charter were to be discussed in that order.(14) But the conference turned unruly from the start. It was because Thomas of France (now in the minority faction), who asked for the floor first, spoke at length to grill the SPD’s majority faction, arguing that the first order of business was the “question of (war) responsibility.” His statement that a resolutely strong International was an “International that is not sullied by the shame of mutual distrust that might come to bear on future actions, because of treachery on the part of some of its constituents” was greeted with applause. Thomas recalled that when Hermann Müller came to Paris on August 1st, 1914 just before the war’s outbreak to exchange views with French socialists on the possibility of international solidarity, Müller had vouched that the SPD would either vote against or abstain from the war credits vote, and reproached the party for voting in favor nevertheless. What did the party majority faction’s big campaign against the Brest-Litovsk Treaty achieve? Did not Germany only have in mind peace through victory to be imposed on the world back in February and March of 1918? Thomas went on to argue. There were comrades who said his faction was no different from Ebert and Scheidemann (the two, being key figures of the caretaker government in Berlin, were in no position to come to Berne), but that was another dangerous mentality within the International. It was necFig. 28: Albert Thomas. essary to make an effort to balance

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

77

Part I national defence with international action, he asserted. When the conference resumed at eight p.m. after an intermission, it was Otto Wels, the man soon to assume leadership of the SPD together with Müller, who took the floor.(15) We do not intend to evade the question of responsibility, he began, and asserted that it was not positive for Thomas to reject the SPD majority faction by singling them out and branding them as the ones responsible. Along with people of other nations, we also tried to live with the people, for the people, he said. We never joined the government, so we do not bear joint responsibility for the war; he added. If our Swiss comrades had been here they would have said there were “Scheidemanns” in France too. We are here as representatives of a social-democratic republic. We have achieved the eighthour working day amongst other things through revolution. On the eve of the war’s outbreak, did not Jaurès also point to Russia’s threat? We never agreed with the invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Allied nations’ maritime blockade brought suffering to non-combatants in Germany as well. When prospect for peace emerged with the March revolution in Russia, it was France that demanded that Kerensky continue the war. Wels’ comments did not concede an inch, and were apparently met with more jeers than applause. Next to take the floor, Pierre Renaudel, editorial executive of the party organ L’Humanité, who had until recently been a member of the French majority faction, resumed the attack, revealing the minutes of a conference with Müller in August, 1914, that had only been partially known until then.(16) He asserted that the German majority faction should be held Fig. 29: Pierre Renaudel. responsible. “The choice is not that between us or you, but that between you or the German minority faction.” (applause) The tense atmosphere was broken the following day, when the first speaker, Kurt Eisner of the USPD said that “clarity and truth” had to be the starting point of reconciliation. Just as he had believed his country was defending itself against Russian aggression, everyone made mistakes in August, 1914. It was now clear that the war had been caused by the German military and heavy

78

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Berne industries. The SPD majority faction, as represented by Wels here, had erred for four and a half years, so it should change its ways. He too would admit to Germany’s responsibility. But the German people were not responsible, they are victims of the old system. “We would like to atone for our crime by moving foreward toward socialism. Let us join hands against our common enemy.” He said he was the only Jaurès-ist in Germany. The man who thus admitted to his responsibility frankly and sought reconciliation with the French was, two weeks later, assassinated during the Münich revolution.(17) Müller, who had been accused of going back on his word regarding GermanFrench negotiations just before the war’s outbreak in 1914, defended himself. He said, he had not thought that Haase’s group, which among the SPD parlia- Fig. 30: Kurt Eisner (1918, photo by menrtarians was trying to oppose wartime Germaine Krull). credits, would become a small minority. The French had said that if France was attacked they would support the credits. The German majority members only supported the credits because they were afraid of a Russian offensive. Whatever the case may be, if there are those responsible, let us clarify that by publishing archival materials in their entirety. Müller defended Wels, saying the German majority faction never took the position of “peace through victory” but were, on the contrary, castigated as “ones without a fatherland.”(18) In turn he accused Thomas of trying to serve as prosecutor and judge at the same time. He attacked Eisner who had criticized the majority by saying the revolution had come too late, arguing that revolution is not something that can be fabricated, and called attention to the fact that Germany’s SPD had by now become the strongest democratic force along with the British Labour Party. Next to take the floor amid cheers was Kautsky of the USPD who, in his familiar style, went on to list positions to be taken in various different situations, and asserted that the position of a socialist since Marx and Engels had

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

79

Part I been to fight governments that have waged war. In the summer of 1914, amidst a situation where it was difficult to determine who the aggressor was, the majority faction in Germany believed Russia to be the enemy, but eventually they came to realize that was wrong. So we formed the USPD. We would like the majority faction to declare with courage, that having been deceived by the government, it has pursued a potentially fatal policy. Because it has not done so, we are still surrounded by the mistrust of the whole world. In the course of his speech Kautsky eulogized Jaurès, Prekhanov, Victor Adler and Hardie. He also named Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, saying while he had been “firmly opposed to their methods in recent times,” they were “martyrs in the struggle for the liberation of the proletariat.” Everyone stood up to show their respect. After Troelstra spoke in sympathy with Eisner and Kautsky, and After Friedrich Adler took the floor to thunderous applause to criticize the majority faction,(19) an attempt at compromise was made by setting up a committee to draft the final resolution on the responsibility issue (with the resolution eventually adopted postponing judgement until the next Congress) .(20) On 5th, the following day, the agenda moved on to the international league issue.

Fig. 31: Hermann Müller.

80

Fig. 32: Karl Kautsky (1924?).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Berne To look at another related issue at this point, subsequent studies into the issue of war responsibility. After World War I, the governments of the nations involved undertook the publication of official versions of diplomatic documents, and “theories on the cause of the Great War” became a major topic of research into the history of diplomacy. Research in the years after World War II has revealed that it was the German General Staff Office that tried to start the war. This then would make the basis for Wels’ and Müller’s arguments erroneous. Even Kautsky, who was involved in the publication of archival materials, would not publish all the documents. As the result of peace talks between the governments, the Treaty of Versailles placed the responsibility for the war on Germany and imposed reparations. But since the Allied nations were also pursuing imperialistic policies, one can hardly claim that France alone had justice on her side.(21) Concerning an international league, Henderson expounded on his argument that it would have an impact on the inter-governmental conference in Paris, while MacDonald asserted that it should be a league of parliamentary representatives, rather than that of governments. The next item on the agenda was the territorial issue. With regard to Alsace-Lorraine, the German majority faction had already recognized the people’s right of self-determination. Elsewhere, demands had been sent in from eastern Europe, Armenia, Georgia, the Balkans, Ireland and the Jews (Poale Zion) among others. Among them were also a letter from Indian nationalists’ European central committee (Berlin) and a letter from advocates of Korean independence, who incidentally had sent a letter to the “Stockholm Conference.” These were discussed to various degrees, but notably with respect to colonies, it was decided that when native peoples were not developed enough to set up their own governments, administration by an international league by proxy would be desirable. This was none other than the patriarchal view expressed earlier by the Netherlands’ H. van Kol and others.(22) The next subject of deliberation was the “labor charter,” the draft of which had ben prepared by Henderson and others. This matter was of significant concern to the international conference of labor unions, that was being held in parallel at the same time, and was also linked to the assertion of workers’ position in the post-war context.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

81

Part I At the inter-governmental peace conference, people like Lloyd-Geroge and Clemenceau steadfastly asserted themselves along the “peace through victory” policy line. Nevertheless, the League of Nations was founded, the right of selfdetermination was fulfilled at least in eastern Europe, albeit in a limited way, and the International Labor Organization (ILO) was created. The socialists’ hope of putting pressure on the inter-governmental peace conference, their hopes resting with Wilson, may have sadly come to naught, but their ideas arguably were reflected to an extent on the inter-governmental level. Most noteworthy in the Berne Conference are the discussions concerning “democracy and dictatorship.” As pointed out earlier, not only the Bolsheviks but many of the Swiss and Italian parties had boycotted the Berne Conference in support of the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, Thomas, while denouncing the German majority faction on one hand, leveled his criticism at the Bolsheviks, accusing them of “destruction and caricature of socialism.” Renaudel was equally critical. On February 9th, the conference chairman Branting pointed out that the issue of democracy and dictatorship was indeed what the Bolsheviks faced, and went on to elaborate on the wording of the resolution.(23) “I recognize that there may be circumstances in which a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat not only has to be implemented but also is forced into being by the situation,” he stated, and that “revolution cannot be rejected” but “neither can democracy be abandoned.” “It is only through democracy that solid reconstruction of a new society can be achieved.” Next to take the floor was MacDonald of the British minority faction. While presenting it as a challenge from friendship rather than enmity, he levelled an even more direct criticism at all the “people who desire rapid construction of a new type of socialism.” “We welcome the revolution that have been achieved in Europe … but these revolutions must not create conditions which might be more accurately described as transition from one form of autocracy to another. Liberty and democracy are the steadfast objectives of the revolutions, so revolutions that do not establish freedom are not revolutions toward socialism,” he said. Hunger and unempoloyment make for a hotbed of Bolshevism. We would like Paris to respond regarding this situation, but Berlin should also bear whatever responsibility that is due, stated MacDonald.

82

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Berne Axelrod, who took the floor amidst applause, said that while he believed the “Bolsheviks judging from their actions as a whole are in fact anti-revolutionaries, and are trying to impose a dictatorship on the proletariat.” He had no intention of passing judgement over them, and pleaded that an investigation team be sent to Russia, as he had requested already. Rubanovich and D.G.Gavronsky of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR) presented similar aurguments. In response, Fernand Loriot of the (former) French minority faction, from the standpoint that “since last year the Bolsheviks have achieved a hardly insignificant task,” voiced his disagreement. He said, if one were to argue that the revolution had been premature, one should state what the criteria are for starting socialism in a democratic system. Friedrich Adler took the floor and said, the foundation of the International being as weak as it still was, Renaudel demanded we should clarify our position on all the issues, and Rubanovich argued mankind was exposed to danger because of the Bolsheviks. He retorted, “Where was the International in these four and half years that mankind was exposed to danger?” Quoting what Rosa Luxemburg stated at the (1907) Stuttgart Congress, he said what mattered was the historical question of whether or not capitalism that had been upset by the war was able to recover, and that questions over tactics, which the Bolsheviks had erroneously elevated into a governing principle, were a small matter. Finally, for the reasons that the resolution while criticizing the Bolsheviks did not question imperialism, that on Russia it had only consulted the opinions of one side, and that the Italian and Swiss comrades who had shown an exemplary attitude during the war were not taking part, Adler submitted, jointly with Longuet, a counter resolution opposing the resolution that might damage the unity of the International.(24) Kautsky, while supporting Branting’s draft resolution and criticizing the Bolsheviks, stated “how could he condemn only the Bolsheviks’ error” when he himself had committed errors, and took the position that the expression of attitudes was a personal matter that should not be put to a vote at the Congress. Bernstein, who did not join the radicals at the height of the German revolution, tried to seek membership to both the majority SPD and the USPD and was expelled by the latter. But the former also did not authorize him to take the floor at this conference, so he had to participate in an unofficial

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

83

Part I capacity. He nevertheless spoke, his tone being even more critical of the Bolsheviks than Kautsky’s. On “democracy and dictatorship,” a Branting proposal, an Adler-Longuet proposal and other proposals were submitted, but on February 10th, Huysmans declared that the conference would not put the matter to a vote. Branting delivered a closing address, stating that “the International has regained the strength to live on,” and that it had been the duty of the International all along to demonstrate, before the conclusion of inter-governmental peace treaties, that the workers had taken the initiative to try to reconcile and join hands under the principle of justice. Thus ended the Congress.(25)

3 Henderson and others, in fact, visited Lloyd George in Downing Street, and presented the arguments made at the Berne Conference. But as is well known, Wilson’s “new diplomacy” did not have much impact on the Paris peace conference. The resolution of the Basel Congress in 1912 had stated that if the powers’ governments resorted to war, they should be prepared for the anger of workers and revolution. It was a kind of bluff, as Lenin and his followers were probably the only ones seriously seeking a revolution. From 1917 to 1918, nevertheless, revolutions did occur in Russia and some central European nations. One could say it began with the weaker democracies. That was why “democracy and dictatorship” became a focus of discussion at the Berne Conference. Lenin believed that once the ruling class was eliminated, there would be no need for brute force and democracy would take a firmer hold. The premise for that was a socialist revolution as a world revolution (Nation and Revolution). In reality, however, as the prospect for the revolution spreading beyond Russia’s borders disappeared amidst military interference by anti-revolutionary forces both within and without, the Bolshevik regime dissolved the constitutional parliament by force in January, 1918, and forcefully quelled a militant uprising in Kronstadt in March, 1921. It is recalled that Rosa Luxemburg, who until then had been ideologically closest to Lenin within the international socialist movement, stated, while extending greatest praise to the Bolshevik revolution,

84

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Berne that dictatorship of the proletariat should “not be a dictatorship of one party and one faction, but a dictatorship of a class … in other words dictatorship accompanied by unlimited democracy.”(26) Both Henderson and MacDonald were voted out in the elections in late 1918, and Wilson’s Democratic Party suffered defeat. The Second International finally broke up at the Geneva conference in 1920. But even as revolution remained confined to the single nation of Russia, the Third International not only led to the formation of chapters (communist parties) in Germany, France and other countries, but was also becoming a solid presence attractive to peoples of colonies and dependencies. Friedrich Adler set up an “international community of socialist parties” in Vienna in an attempt to keep the international unified.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

85

PART II The Three Internationals

I Amsterdam and Moscow

I

Amsterdam and Moscow – The Division of the International, March /April, 1919 –

1 As mentioned in Part I, Chapter VII, the chairman of the Berne conference asserted in his closing address that the “International has regained the strength to live on,” and that it had been the duty of the International all along to demonstrate, before the conclusion of inter-governmental peace treaties, that the workers had taken the initiative to try to reconcile and join hands under the principle of justice. And with the aim of exerting influence on the intergovernmental peace conference, an international permanent commission comprising two representatives each from the organizations that took part in the conference was set up, with Hjalmar Branting of the Swedish Socialdemocratic Workers Party, Arthur Henderson of the British Labour Party and Huysmans serving as its three executive committee members.(1)

2 Let us follow the course of their hopes and aspirations in the period following the Berne Conference, keeping the Bolsheviks’ movements within our scope as well. Shortly after the conference on February 21st, 1919, MacDonald, Henderson and others of the British delegation at the Berne Conference visited Prime Minister Lloyd-George at his official Downing Street residence. They presented the premier with the conclusions of the Berne Conference, summarized into six points, and asked for his understanding. The points in brief were as follows.(2) 1) On the issue of responsibility for the war, an agreement has been reached by all parties including Germany’s SPD majority faction (which had concluded an “intramural peace”). 2) An international league requires the participation of peoples’ representatives.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

89

Part II 3) While their discussions have not reached conclusions on territorial issues accompanying peace negotiations, a resolution should eventually be attained to the satisfaction of socialist and workers parties. 4) An international league should have the authority to apply (their) international labor charter to member nations. 5) Democracy and dictatorship—A political principle of democraticsocialism opposed to the Bolsheviks has generally been agreed upon. An ad hoc committee to make a study visit to Russia has been designated. 6) Prisoners of war—All prisoners of war who are ill or injured should be returned to their countries of origin. These points show which the leaders of the Berne Conference considered important among the various resolutions reached at the conference. Lloyd-George expressed his support for many of these points, as it is recorded. In an attempt to publish records of the Berne Conference in the form of a “readable” book, the British Labour Party strove to procure funds while Ethel Snowden and others were busy translating the records.(3) This effort led to the holding of an international conference at the Odeon building by the Singel Canal in Amsterdam from April 26th to 29th of 1919. Huysmans, who had been serving as secretary-general of the Bureau of Socialist International, had set up a temporary residence in Fig. 33: Arthur Henderson. Keizersgracht in Amsterdam to serve as the base of the newly established “Permanent International Commission.” In May, in the name of its executive committee including himself the Second International Bulletin went into publication. The minutes of the Amsterdam Conference are carried in that publication.(4) As it turned out, on February 10th after the Berne Conference had ended, the first conference of the “International Permanent Commission” was held in Berne. During the conference, members were proposed for the commission to

90

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

I Amsterdam and Moscow visit Russia to study its political and economic conditions. Also an “action committee” was set up to take issue with the inter-governmental peace conference that was taking place in Paris at the time. The committee comprised seven people, i.e three executive members plus Pierre Renaudel and Jean Longuet of the French Socialist Party, MacDonald and G. H. Stuart-Bunning of the British Labour Party.(5) Although the Amsterdam Conference in April is described as an “international socialist conference” in the minutes, it is more accurate to think of it as the second conference of the “International Permanent Commission.” In fact a total of 30 people made up of one to three delegates each from 17 nations (territories) gathered together, so it can be considered the successor to the “Socialist International Bureau (BSI)” conference that met 16 times right up till July,1914 just before the outbreak of the Great War.(6) Looking at the make-up of the participants, it is worth noting first of all that representatives of the Belgian Workers Party took part. At the Berne Conference, they had refused to attend together with the SPD (majority faction), which had accepted Germany’s wartime policy of violating Belgium’s neutrality in the summer of 1914. Hugo Haase of the USPD was the only participant in Amsterdam. But this was only because Hermann Müller and Otto Wels of the SPD did not arrive in time due to the transport situation and other reasons. For whatever reason, no one from Austria took part. Queensland’s Prime Minister (Labour Party) from Australia, who “attended a socialist International for the first time,” was welcomed by chairman Branting. It was to be expected that only the Menshevik and SR delegates attended from Russia. Also attended delegates from the Ukraine and Georgia, reflecting the internal turmoils that Russia was going through at the time. Even more noteworthy is MacDonald’s report. At the behest of the “action committee,” he and others had a meeting with Lord Robert Cecil, who was playing a key role as a member of the British government delegation at the Paris Peace Conferences, and asked him to listen to the conclusions reached at the Berne Conference, the report said. First of all, it did not make sense that efforts were being made to exclude Germany and Russia from an international league. Next, the issue of arms reduction should be tackled. But they “did not receive a satisfactory response” on matters including the “peoples’ right issue.”(7) Judging from this statement, Lloyd-George’s response on record as

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

91

Part II mentioned on p. 90 was only lip service, but one is forced to conclude that Henderson and others might have taken it at face value. Of the 18 resolutions made at the Amsterdam Conference, 12 concerned the issue of the “peoples’ right of self-determination” raised along with the downfall of the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Empire. Others were related to issues of the German-Polish border, Ireland, and Germany’s former colonies, while two of them concerned opposition to the discrimination and persecution of Jews. The details of the resolutions concerning the “peoples’ right issue” were as follows. 1) The conference demands that the Paris Peace Conferences recognize Finland as an independent nation.(8) 2) It supports the demand for independence of the Estonians (who had been under the rule of the Russian Empire and whose position under the Bolshevik regime remained unclear). 3) It condemns the persecution of Armenians (residing in the former Ottoman Empire and elsewhere) and supports their demand for independence. 4) On the territorial issue between the Armenians and Georgians, representatives of the two sides have agreed to resolve the matter along the principles of the Berne Conference. 5) The Ukraine has the right to separate from Russia and become independent. 6) Germany-Austria (western half of the Habsburg Empire) has, as stated in Wilson’s principles, the right to unit with Germany should the people there so desire. 7) The Polish nation to be established according to Wilson’s Point 13 should without doubt be constituted by Poles, and the positions of territories where Poles and Germans reside need to be decided by plebiscites. The separation from Germany of East and West Prussian territories where Germans reside, which would occur if the region with access to the Baltic Sea is ceded to Poland, should rightfully be prevented. The control of the port of Danzig (Gdansk) is entrusted to an international league.

92

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

I Amsterdam and Moscow 8) The attempt to separate the residents of the Saar region from Germany (which France was seeking) is firmly opposed. 9) It recognizes the Irish people’s right of autonomy and right to choose their own form of government. 10) On German colonies, it welcomes the adoption of the principle that peoples who are not ready for autonomy be placed under the mandate and protection of advanced nations (a new principle in the international league’s code). This is in the sense that all peoples being equal, it is opposed to policies of imperialistic annexation. Therefore, it is opposed to the policy of confiscating colonies from Germany. 11) On the Jewish issue, it demands completely equal citizen’s rights for Jews of all nations.(9) The proposals for solutions seen in these resolutions were better in some ways for achieving stable co-existence than the proposals put forth by governments at the Paris Peace Conferences, which faced the same issues. As a result of the Paris Peace Conferences, for one thing, the demand for annexation of Germany-Austria with Germany was rejected in the Treaty of Versailles, and the so-called “Polish corridor” came into existence as Poland gained her independence. Moreover, the Saar region was placed under French rule. These developments would eventually work to the advantage of Nazi Germany. At the same time, Estonia became independent and the Ukraine became a member of the Soviet Union in the course of the process of Russia transforming herself into the Soviet Union. The independence of Armenia, even though once recognized by the Treaty of Sèvres concluded between the Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire, did not come into being. But why is it that the demands for the liberation of Indians and Koreans, presented to the aborted Stockholm Conference of 1917 and to the Berne Conference of 1919(10) were not taken up at all at the Amsterdam Conference? The Amsterdam Conference was veritably Euro-centric, not much different from Wilson’s principles in this regard. On the issue of colonies, moreover, this was not the first time the “principle that peoples who are not ready for autonomy be placed under the mandate and protection of advanced nations” was expressed. This issue had been repeatedly discussed at the Second International conferences. Discussions reached climax

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

93

Part II at its 7th Congress in 1907. While Karl Kautsky of Germany’s SPD, who had “never visited a colony,” took the floor to condemn the act of colonization per se, Hendrik van Kol, who had experience serving with the Dutch colonial administration in Indonesia, expounded on his theory about “socialistic colonies” designed to advance their level of civilization. Although his argument was rejected at that Congress, his assertion about “raising the children we have adopted to make them strong, stalwart adults who can get along without our help” sounded convincing. After all, he was saying that it was the task of the socialists of advanced nations to teach the natives of Indonesia and elsewhere about the viability of labor unions and the path to socialism. It was only natural then, that van Kol went on to submit a report “Colonial Mandates and the League of Nations” to the “International Association of Parliamentarians” during the 1920s.(11) The League of Nations devised a form of governance called “mandate” to be applied to former German colonies in Africa and Oceania, territories the Ottoman Empire was forced to cede (Palestine, Syria, etc) and other colonies. Its justification was based on the very “patriarchial” concept. As a matter of interest, the Marshall Islands and the Mariana Islands among others were placed under Japan’s mandate. These territories were to become the theatre of fierce battles during the Asia-Pacific War. Following the Amsterdam Conference, Branting and Huysmans issued an appeal during the year’s May Day celebration, which reiterated their argument and wished for the “establishment of the foundation for a new social order in international justice and peace, and victory for liberty and democracy.” The “action committee” held a meeting in Paris from 10th to 12th of the same month of May (attended by Longuet, Renaudel, Henderson, MacDonald, StuartBunning and Huysmans), and tried to explain their peace concept to the four powers. The gist of the principles they published in the form of a declaration was as follows. 1) Reparation The unforgivable devastation of Belgium, northern France and other occupied territories occurring after the declaration of war by the central European powers should be subject to compensation and reparation. 2) Peoples’ right of self-determination National boundaries of Europe are determined under the condition of official plebiscites to gauge the will of the residents who are directly affected.

94

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

I Amsterdam and Moscow 3) Militarism Militarism must perish. To ensure peace, an international league founded on democratic principles must be established. 4) Colonies The exploitation of indigenous peoples by colonial imperialism must be ended. This means the citizens of advanced nations would have to accept the responsibility, and all colonialistic territorial possessions without exception must be distributed among all democratic citizens capable of accepting such a responsibility. The economic wealth of the colonies must be offered to all citizens without discrimination. As the above shows, their views on the colonial issue do not differ much from those of the powers’ governments with respect to their “patriarchal” attitude. But it is worth noting that they regret the powers’ refusal to let Germany and Russia join the League of Nations. At the same time it stated that the “cruel methods” with which Japan acquired the Shandong Peninsula subjugating 30 to 40 million Chinese people could not be overlooked, thus showing that the European socialists’ view of Japan was more severe than that of the the powers’ governments. In conclusion, the “declaration” stated as follows. “The peace (of the Paris Conferences) is not our peace,” because the peoples of the victorious nations are once again going to be forced to see their nations’ policies to divide up the spoils of war produce inevitable results,” it said.(12) Elsewhere, they could do nothing with regard to the dispute between Armenia and Georgia, among others. On May 14th, Henderson received a reply from the Allied powers’ high-level conference, stating bluntly that although Lloyd-George himself had studied the socialists’ views, but given that the peace terms (of the Paris Peace Conferences) had already been made public, “the planned meeting would not produce any practical results.”(13) Both Henderson and MacDonald had already lost their seats in the parliamentary elections in late 1918, and Wilson’s term as president gave way to Harding’s in 1921. The dream of Berne was crushed.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

95

Part II

3 While people seeking the revival of the Second International were working to influence the inter-governmental Paris Peace Conferences, the Bolsheviks in their opposition were busy trying to set up their own international organization ahead of them. As it has been discussed, the European socialist parties that were members of the Second International had abandoned their previous anti-war, pro-peace stance when World War I broke out in the summer of 1914, and shifted their direction toward support for their own governments’ war policies. Should a new International, then, be formed? Lenin was clear on this point. The “Collapse of the Second International” he published in 1915 was a declaration of farewell to the Second International. He was striving toward “communism,” not “social democracy.” On this issue, again as discussed earlier, the opinion was also divided within the movement led by people of neutral nations, that persistently pursued an international solidarity of socialists even after the war had broken out. Even Rosa Luxemburg, who constantly criticized the aboutface of the “Second International” was cautious.(14) After he took control of the government, Lenin was beset with internal uprisings and interference by the Power’s governments. Amidst a situation where few communist parties had come into being outside Russia, he was advancing talks with comrades across borders in a bid to form a “Third” International. He finally made the move to bring about its formation when he learned that the socialists who would not endorse the Bolsheviks were holding a conference in Berne.(15) On December 24th, 1918, the Russian Communist Party Central Committee sent out telegrams “to all those standing on the foundation of the Third International,” the text of which was published in the party organ Pravda the following day. It dismissed the forthcoming Lausanne conference (whose venue was eventually changed to Berne) as an attempt to revive the “yellow International” by “traitors and pseudo-socialists,” and called upon people to rally to the “revolutionary Third International.”(16) In the event, people agreeing with the Bolsheviks did gather at the Kremlin in Moscow from 2nd to 19th of March, 1919. While one account states that 52 delegates from 21 nations and 35 organizations came together, another points out that there were only nine people who actually came from abroad.(17)

96

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

I Amsterdam and Moscow The “motion to establish the Communist International” submitted during the conference clearly reflects a strong awareness of the Berne Conference and desire to compete with it. It said: As attempts are being made in Berne at the moment, and probably in other places in the days to come, to re-build the old opportunistic International and to rally together all the unclear, indecisive elements of the proletariat again, it is our duty now more than ever to create a central unit of this kind. Therefore, it is necessary to draw a sharp line separating the revolutionary proletariats from social traitors.(18) Furthermore, the “resolution on various socialistic currents and stance toward the Berne Conference” drew attention to an appendix, drafted by Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and others, attached to the anti-war resolution adopted at the Second International’s 7th Congress in Stuttgart in 1907. As mentioned earlier, it had stated that should a war break out despite all the efforts to prevent war, the working class has a duty to intervene toward its immediate cessation. And making the utmost effort to take advantage of the economic and political crises created by the war to shake up the people’s class from its foundation to hasten the downfall of the capitalists’ control. However, as soon as the war broke out in August, 1914, the main political parties of the Second International went over to the side of their “own countries” bourgeoisie. The “(majority factions’) current of social exclusionism” has “by now become a complete class enemy of the proletariat”. The “centrist (Kautsky’s faction) current was … obstructing the workers from understanding the cause of the Second International’s collapse.” Consequently, the “communists” alone were faithful to the anti-war resolution of the Stuttgart Congress, and it was that current which has come together now as the Third International.”(19) The sentence “it is absolutely necessary to make the most revolutionary elements separate themselves” from the “centrists” deserves attention. The reason was that while those attending the Berne Conference were “social exclusionists” and the “centrists” under accusation here, they included people like Friedrich Adler who was trying to show understanding toward the Bolsheviks. Where to draw that “sharp line?” A tug of war had begun between the Comintern and the Berne Conference.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

97

Part II The Zimmerwald movement came to an end at this point. As Balabanoff stated, parodying a line from Schiller’s play Fiesco [Die Verschwörung des Fiesco zu Genua], “Zimmerwald has fulfilled its role, it may exit.”(20) But what must have been important for Lenin was to win over the SPD leftists to his camp. In fact, the Comintern’s inaugural congress was attended by a delegate of the Communist Party of Germany that had just been founded in late 1918. It was Hugo Eberlein who had been chosen as delegate for Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the party’s key Leaders, could not leave Berlin while the German revolution in progress. (One testimony says he was chosen as he was stubborn though narrow in outlook.)(21) Worse still, the two “L’s” were murdered on January 15th by the Freikorps militia, anti-revolutionary remnants of the former Imperial Army. Rosa Luxemburg, in her work Russian Revolution believed to have been written in the autumn of 1918, crticized Lenin’s policy as “something that would take liberty away from the revolution,” even as she paid him the highest respect. She herself finally decided in December 1918 to split off from the SPD and form a new party. The new party’s platform, which she drafted herself, stated that it would not seize power without the support and agreement of the absolute majority of the German proletariat masses. Her comrade Leo Jogiches had parted ways with Lenin back in 1911 over various issues involving both the Russian Social-democratic Labour Party and the Polish Social-democratic Party.(22) Eberlein (appearing under the pseudonym “Albert” in the minutes) elaborated on his party’s views in a personal meeting with Lenin. At the conference, too, he stated that while he was in favor of preparing for the establishment of the Third International, he was opposed to its immediate establishment there and then. Lenin’s design was thwarted. But he still managed to submit a motion to establish the Third International, albeit technically “interim,” and get it approved unanimously except for a vote Eberlein withheld.(23) As a matter of interest, the working language at the conference was German. At this juncture, it would do well to throw some light on the points of dispute at the time, which will be taken up in the next chapter, by touching on the Comintern. We are moving ahead a year in advance. From July to August, 1920, the 2nd Congress of Comintern was held in Petrograd and Moscow and a set of 21 conditions “for affilation to the Communist International” were

98

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

I Amsterdam and Moscow adopted. On one hand, communist parties were beginning to be formed in many parts of the world, and the Allied powers had already given up trying to bring down the Soviet regime through wars of interference. On the other hand, the Soviet regime in Hungary had long ago collapsed and the Russian army that had advanced as far as River Vistula was blocked by the Polish army, so there was by now virtually no hope of the revolution spreading to the west beyond Russia. In Russia itself, the economy was severely depressed as a result of internal uprisings, and the situation was generally so unstable that six months later sailors and soldiers in Kronstadt would stage a rebellion against the regime. In a bid probably to open up a fresh prospect in the face of such an adverse situation, the “conditions for affiliation” were quite strict. Notably, separation from “centrists” as well as the expected “social exclusionists” (article 7) was considered the foremost task. A political party to be affiliated with the Communist International had to be named a “communist party” (article 17), and “all decisions by the Communist International Congresses and all decisions by the Executive Committee thereof ” were binding for all communist parties (article 16). A “thesis on the role of the communist party in the proletarian revolution,” also adopted at the same congress, stated that “during the period of proletarian dictatorship, in particular, the communist party must be built on the iron foundation of democratic centralism.”(24) Undeniably, the Second International lacked central leadership compared to the First International. One could say they spent much of the time arguing. Therefore, it is understandable that Lenin was enraged when most of the socialists at the outbreak of World War I switched over to support for their governments’ war policies, and that Lenin, who had to endure the position of a minority within a minority until revolution broke out in Russia in 1917, leveled his charge at the “centrists” in particular. If he had followed Rosa Luxemburg’s way of thinking, he probably would not have been able to seize power as quickly. And if she had lived, she probably would have opposed the “conditions for affiliation.” On his part, Lenin did seize power. He was determined to defend the Russian revolution. His will is reflected in the “conditions for affiliation.” When he was arguing with Kautsky, he boasted that the proletarian democracy was “a million times more democratic that the bourgeois democracy.” This was supported by such actions as publication of diplomatic documents and opening of palaces to the public. But

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

99

Part II from a wider perspective, the fact that “democracy” did not flourish in the politics and society of the Soviet Union thereafter was arguably a stumbling block for this nation’s socialist system as such. Nevertheless, the text of the 8th article of the “conditions for affiliation” on “colonies and oppressed peoples” shows practically none of the “patriarchial” attitude of the people at the Berne Conference. It was likely because of this that the Comintern enjoyed overwhelming support in the non-European world.(25)

100

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne

II Lucerne – The Second International, August, 1919 – 1 Let us begin with the overall situation in Europe in the six months from February, 1919, when the Berne Conference was held. First of all, the Treaty of Versailles was concluded in such a way as to ignore the views of the socialists who came together at the Berne Conference, a matter of serious concern for them. As a counter-measure to Versailles, as well as to support the Russian and Hungarian revolutions, the Italian Socialist Party proposed an international general strike, the move winning the support of the French Socialist Party and the French General Confederation of Labor (CGT). The British Labour Party was hesitant. In the event, due to lack of coordination, the general strike scheduled for July 21st fizzled out. In Germany, the USPD had already left the government in January, having split off from the SPD. While the SPD led by Ebert valued the restoration of order even in cooperation with elements of the old establishment, the USPD placed greater emphasis on the revolutionary movements that had spread all over Germany, their hopes resting on the new Räte (Workers and soldiers’ council, corresponding to the Russian Soviet) to replace the parliamentary system. But the revolutionary movements were crushed in Berlin in March and in Munich in May under the leadership of Gustav Noske, who was put in charge of the military in the SPD government. Leading the assault were members of the Freikorps which assassinated Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Gustav Landauer and others. The new Weimar constitution was about to take effect very soon (on August 11th). In Hungary, the pro-Allied powers policies of Prime Minister Mihály Károlyi of the new republic had hit an impasse and a Soviet (Tanác) regime was established under Béla Kun in March. But that regime had also collapsed by August 1st because of military offensives by Rumania and Czechoslovakia, backed by the Allied powers. In Poland which had regained independence, a democratic government would come into being under the prime minister, who

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

101

Part II was the renowned pianist Ignacy Paderewski, but when Józef Piłsudski, a former Polish Socialist Party member, seized power, his government embarked on the course of territorial expansion in a display of Polish nationalism. Polish forces clashed with Russian revolutionary forces, and by 1920, the Russian revolutionary forces were held in check at the Vistula River. Thus, ended the possibility of the revolution that had started in Russia spreading to western Europe. In Russia, the Red Army was being developed into full-fledged regular fighting force in order to fight against the armies of Kochak and Denikin, the anti-revolutionary Russian forces supported by the interference of Germany and other powers (including Japan). Control by the Cheka (Extraordinary Commission for Combating CounterRevolution) was strengthened. The Balkans, meanwhile, saw the formation of what would later become Yugoslavia under the principle of the right of self-determination. But Fig. 34: “Let’s toast to Noske. The proletariat has due to intense ongoing disputes been disarmed.” George Grosz. between various nationalists in Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece, the future remained uncertain. Incidentally, it was in the March of that year that Mussolini founded his Fasci Italiani di Combattimenti.(1)

2 After the Berne Conference, Henderson and others continued to publicize their proposed peace terms and devoted efforts toward their realization,(2) but alas, to no avail. In June, 1919, Huysmans, who was put in charge of the affairs

102

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne of the “International Permanent Commission” set up at the Berne Conference because of his many years of service as secretary-general of the International, called for another conference as it had been agreed upon at the Amsterdam Conference.(3) That conference came to fruition from 2nd to 9th of August that year at a “[luxurious] resort facility quite out of character for a conference of socialists”(4) at the Swiss lakeside town of Lucerne.(5) Prior to this event, an “action committee” had met on June 25th and 26th in tandem with the annual Labour Party congress held in Southport, as a result of correspondence between Huysmans and Henderson (or his confidant William Gillis). Whether because of interference by police or because of his reluctance to sit together with Renaudel, Longuet was conspicuously absent. It was at this meeting that the agenda for the Lucerne Conference and by-laws under proposal for the International were discussed, and members of the Labour Party “action committee” were put in charge of drafting a report on the overall situation.(6) As in the case of the Amsterdam Conference, the Lucerne Conference was referred to in the official minutes as the “conference of international socialism and workers,” though it should be construed more as the third conference of the “International Permanent Commission.” A general conference of the International had been put on schedule for February 1920 at the Amsterdam Conference, and that conference was to take the form of the Geneva Congress, as it shall be discussed later.(7) Some 50 people from 20 nations (territories) took part in the Lucerne Conference. While most countries sent one or two delegates, France notably sent nine and Germany seven. Both nations were represented by both majority and minority factions, though France’s majority were “leftists” and Germany’s majority “rightists.” Unlike the Amsterdam Conference, there were no delegates from countries like Argentina, while delegates this time came from Bulgaria, Lithuania and Azerbaijan. Regions remote from Europe were not represented while regions in turmoil sent delegates. As before, the party from Switzerland did not show.(8) The conference opened with an address by Henderson serving as the moderator in the absence of Branting of Sweden, chairman of the “International Permanent Commission”.(9) He said “the truth still remains that the application of the principle of unlimited competition destroys humanistic nature,” adding: “Has the world entered a new era of international peace and progress, or is it about to enter an era of further regression leading to unfathomable destruc-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

103

Part II tion?” The speech by MacDonald, who wrote in his journal that the address was boring and “disappointing,” explicitly stated where the focus of the Conference lay.(10) “On one hand are the four powers, representatives of governments representing militarism, counter-reaction and capitalism. On the other hand is the Third International.” The Third International was “not constructive but destructive, not progressive but reactionary.” “Between these two positions, we must devise effective socialist policies.” What the Conference had to decide was whether the “Second International should live on or be buried and forgotten.”(11) MacDonald, who in 1914 formed the “Union of Democratic Control(12)” in his opposition to Britain’s participation in the war and thus lost his leadership position in the Labour Party, was more critical of the Second International than was Henderson who had joined Asquith’s wartime cabinet. All the more, he must have been more aware of the depth of the crisis it was facing. But Henderson clearly also felt that the “principle of unlimited competition” went against humanity and thought of socialism as an alternative system. However, the delegates’ views remained deeply divided whether toward the four powers, or toward the Third International. Before Fig. 35: Emil Vandervelde. discussing this matter, it is worth noting the aforementioned fact that the Belgian Workers Party earlier boycotted the Berne Conference in its refusal to sit together with Germany’s SPD (majority faction) which had tolerated the government’s wartime policies including violation of Belgium’s neutrality. The Belgian party did send delegates to the Amsterdam Conference, but there was no way for them to deliver a speech of condemnation as Germany was only represented by Hugo Haase of the USPD.(13) Partly because of that, Belgium’s Vandervelde at this Lucerne Conference demanded vehemently that the SPD (majority faction) accept responsibility for the war. In response, Hermann Molkenbuhr said that as the “German government is determined to undertake a complete clarification of the issue of responsibility,” and that he would be ready to discuss the matter at the next conference. Henderson as the modera-

104

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne tor was also disinclined to take up the war responsibility issue on this occasion. It should further be pointed out that Germany and Austria were the only countries whose parties represented at this conference were in control of their governments. This fact worked to the advantage of the SPD (majority faction). While the differences of views at the Lucerne Conference extended to many areas, they largely boiled down to a confrontation between rightists or centrists on one hand, and leftists on the other. Let us first look at the discussions of August 7th to 8th which clearly show this, in reverse of the chronological order. In fact, two subcommittees set up to deal with the Conference’s two main agenda, had been working on their tasks from August 3rd to 5th. The first subcommittee and the second subcommittee were entrusted with the task of sorting out the arguments presented and draft a resolution on “international politics”(14) and “reorganization of the International”(15) respectively. The report of the first subcommittee, which was delayed until after the other subcommittee’s report because of serious disagreements, was subsequently presented on August 7th by France’s Renaudel. What he presented were a resolution by the subcommittee’s majority faction(16) and another resolution “submitted just a while ago” by the subcommittee’s minority faction comprising the French majority faction and Germany’s USPD.(17) Referring to the actual discussions at the time, the differences between the two issue-by-issue were as follows.

Treaty of Versailles Henderson himself had spoken of the “serious injustices” in this and other treaties in his opening address. Wels of the SPD explained the situation where Germany’s economic difficulties forced hardships on the workers themselves and appealed that the “revision of the Treaty would be to the advantage of the whole international proletariat.” The two resolutions agreed on the point that the Treaty of Versailles should be revised. The difference was that while the majority proposal affirmed the conclusion of the Peace Treaty as the end of the war at the very least, the minority resolution asserted it was something forced upon the defeated nations by the victor nations. As such it was arguably more a difference in degree than in substance. MacDonald, who as a member of the “action committee” was deeply involved in preparations for the Conference and as secretary general of the first

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

105

Part II subcommittee was in the position to put together its final resolution, stated that “historically there have been many peace treaties, but not a single treaty of peace.” It is understandable that in the final vote he sided with the minority faction’s proposal.

League of Nations As mentioned earlier, Henderson and others who played a leading role in the Berne Conference, were highly receptive to Wilson’s League of Nations proposal and had come up with a concept worked out from the socialists’ perspective, but it was flatly rejected by the four powers’ governments. No wonder then, that those who gathered in Lucerne were critical of the “League of Nations” that had actually begun to function. Both the majority and minority factions decried the fact that the “League of Nations” was nothing more than an organization of capitalistic governments and argued that it should be replaced with a “world parliament” in which peoples of all nations would be represented. While the majority faction regarded the “League of Nations,” for all its defects, as a “budding organ of an international legal order,” the minority faction cautioned against any “illusion” regarding the “League of Nations,” and citing the cases of Russia, Germany and Austria, decried the fact that they were excluded from the “League of Nations.” As far as these views are concerned, the difference between the two factions lay only in the harshness of their expressions of dissatisfaction. In the assessment of the overall situation, too, the difference lay in the evaluation of revolutionary developments of the time. However, the minority’s resolution included clauses on the “promotion of the peoples’ self-determination” and “opposition to the Allied powers’ interference in Russia and Hungary,” which were absent from the majority’s resolution. At this point, let us sort out the outstanding issues including a report by Vliegen of the Netherlands from the second subcommittee (on “reorganization of the International”) and discussions following its presentation.

SPD vs. USPD Wels of SPD lodged a complaint, that German industrial production was lagging and her workers were being forced into slave labor because capitalists of the Entente (Allied Powers) had demanded not only reparations but also

106

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne coal from Germany. At the same time, reacting to doubts being cast about the nature of the German Revolution, he stated: “There no longer exists a bourgeois government in Germany. If the USPD had been willing to share political power with the majority faction, there would have been a genuine Workers government.” Asserting that “the German government and its democratic constitution lead the whole world in the domains of social policy and economy,” he pointed to the existence of an economic council. It was the USPD’s Rudolf Hilferding who took the floor to counter that argument. He said: Wels’ speech shows that the majority faction has forgotten everything since August 4th, 1914, and even after the revolution, it has not learned a single thing.” Moreover, “they are no longer socialists but are none other than a force paving the way toward a counter-revolution.(18) Eduard Bernstein, who had joined the USPD at its founding in 1917 and later re-joined the majority faction after the outbreak of the German Revolution, defended the majority faction with some reservations.(19) Let us look at the points of his argument in the next section.

Democracy and dictatorship As matters stood, the conflict between the majority and minority factions at the Lucerne Conference was rooted in the difference between their assessments of the Bolsheviks’ policies, which was already apparent at the time of the Berne Conference. Wels’ statement that the mercilessness of the Treaty of Versailles was “aiding insurrectionism and Bolshevism” was to be expected as a representative of the majority faction which had suppressed such radicals. Bernstein, a figure who had been labeled a “revisionist” against Marxism at the turn of the century, also spoke. In a tone reminiscent of Engels 25 years earlier, he rejected Bakunin even as he supported Marx, and characterized the Third International as “neo-Bakuninism.” He said they were resorting to violence to get something that could be achieved through democracy. Moreover, Belgium’s Louis de Broukère, who belonged to the majority faction at this conference, argued that the settlement of the class struggle should be based on the principle of democracy. Or else, there was only dictatorship.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

107

Part II There were various kinds of dictatorship, but of grave concern at the moment was the presence of people who are trying to dress up a carnival of violence as dictatorship of the proletariat. Paul Mistral, who had spoken as one of the French majority faction, yelled out at that point: “Was the French Revolution a carnival?” De Broukère responded. Comrade, please do not confuse the French Revolution which laid the foundation of democracy with that “pseudorevolution”, which destroyed democracy. He even referred to the history of ancient Rome, saying the dictatorship of demagoguery from the Gracchus brothers to Caesar led to the decline of the Roman Empire. It is hardly surprising that the Menshevik Axelrod severely criticized the Bolsheviks’ policies, saying “the workers of Russia are under a despotism far worse than the Czarist system.” Shlomo Kaplansky, a delegate of the Jewish organization Poale Zion of Palestine who was to part ways with the leftists eventually, argued that while his organization protested against the Bolsheviks’ repressive policies, it also condemned the Western powers’ policy of interference in Russia. In contrast, Artur Crispien of the USPD, referring to the German Räte system, spoke on the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat. L.-O. Frossard of the French majority faction (minority at the Conference) also declared that if given the choice between Noske and Lenin, “the French Fig. 36: Louis-Oscar Frossard. majority faction would choose Lenin without hesitation.” It is also worth remembering that Troelstra of the Netherlands from his independent position expressed his doubts about the “democracy or dictatorship” dichotomy and criticized both the Bolsheviks and the “extreme right which places excessive importance on the principle of political democracy.”(20) Amidst such a situation, it was Austria’s Friedrich Adler who waited until the 9th to speak out that he regretted the absence of the “Italian and Swiss parties which showed an exemplary attitude” during the war, although they would not join the Bolsheviks. He, son of Victor Adler, founder of the Social-

108

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne democratic Workers Party of Austria, was the person who, in his fervent opposition to the Imperialistic war went as far as to assassinate the Austrian prime minister during the war.(21) He believed that it was the “synthesis of the Second International and the Third” which showed the way to the “original International,” and was hopeful of its realization. It is also worth bearing in mind the assertion by MacDonald, one of the key figures of the “Union of Democratic Control,”(22) who said: “Is there anything to take the place of democracy? No. Can’t we improve on the form of democracy?”(23) The votes were cast on August 9th. Those who supported the proposal of the first subcommittee’s majority (the Renaudel proposal) were as follows. France (minority faction), Germany (SPD), Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, Russia (Social-democratic Labour Party [Mensheviks]), Britain (Henderson), Armenia, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands (Vliegen). Those who supported the minority’s proposal (the Longuet-Hilferding proposal) were France (majority faction), Germany (USPD and SDP), Poale Zion, Russia (SR) Britain (MacDonald), Austria, the Netherlands (Troelstra).(24) The two proposals were recorded side by side, but on the issues of territories, peoples’ rights and colonies, a joint resolution was adopted. Also approved was a “proposal on International by-laws” submitted by the second subcommittee. On the “interference in Russia,” too, a resolution to condemn it was adopted after the two factions worked out their differences of view. In addition, many other resolutions were adopted such as condemnation of the pogrom in Poland, support for the independence of Korea(25), Latvia and Lithuania, as well as denunciation of the British Raj in India (particularly the Rowlatt Act ). The main issues were as follows.

Issue of territories “The International,” the resolution declared, “recognizes that the Peace Treaty ended the violence perpetrated against the inhabitants of, among others, Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig and Poland. But the Allied powers’ governments do not listen to the inhabitants’ views. They are, moreover, committing injustices anew and, as a result, signs of new strife have already appeared. Specific arguments can be summed up as follows.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

109

Part II 1) While France may demand reparation in the form of coal from Saar, there is no justification for depriving the region’s inhabitants of their political sovereignty. [An annex to Article 45 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that the administration of the Saar district be placed under a commission representing the League of Nations for the time being, and that its reversion be decided by a plebiscite 15 years later.] 2) The restriction on Austrian-German relations should be removed. [Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles prevented the two nations’ unification through the turn of the phrase “Germany should respect Austria’s independence.] 3) For the German speaking parts and Ukranian-speaking parts of Czechoslovakia as well as Germans of the Italian-ruled part of Tyrol, the inhabitants have the right to decide their own political future. [Article 81 of the Treaty of Versailles required Germany to recognize Czechoslovakia’s total independence.] 4) In Poland, West Prussia with its German majority had a right to remain within Germany, and the plebiscites to take place in East Prussia and Silesia should be monitored not by a commission of the Allied powers, but by the League of Nations. [Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles required Germany to recognize Poland’s total independence. In a printed map of independent Poland, West Prussia was included.] 5) China’s sovereignty in the Shandong region must be recognized completely, and that “the agreement the League of Nations is being asked to adopt with the Allied powers as accomplices to the worst kind of imperialism should be abrogated.” To add to (5), Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that all rights, licences and privileges Germany possessed in the Shandong region since 1898 be ceded to Japan (included among the “21 Demands” Japan made on China in 1915). This was why the Chinese government, faced with the upsurge of the May 4 Movement, had no choice but refuse to sign the Treaty of Versailles. The European imperialist powers, which is to say the victorious nations as well as defeated Germany, had all suffered. Only the United States

110

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne and Japan had emerged practically unscathed. But there was no Wilson in Japan. Hence, “the worst kind of imperialism.”

Issue of peoples’ rights It was the minority delegates who sought to have an opinion on this issue included in the final resolution. Their aim was to reaffirm the International’s long-standing recognition of the peoples’ right of self-determination and, at the same time, sound an alarm about the “Balkanization of Europe.” Addressing in particular “the nationalist comrades” of Georgia and Armenia among others in his speech of August 2nd, MacDonald stated that while it was a good thing that “various peoples of Europe were liberated by the war,” that was “an entirely different matter from fomenting self-centered racial sentiments that make international cooperation impossible.” It was necessary to find a solution “that would satisfy the peoples’ longing and, at the same time, express the spirit of internationalism from the aspect of respect for liberty … otherwise oppressed peoples will become the tools and victims of reaction.”(26) In fact, one of the Bulgarian delegates pointed out that the Balkan situation was worse than ever, placing his faint hope in a Balkan confederation. And from the Ukraine, Mykhajlo Hrushevski, a historian who was Chairman of the Central Rada (parliament), and another delegate stated that establishing a Ukrainian independence in a democratic form was proving to be extremely difficult as the nation was caught between the Bolsheviks’ policies and the anti-revolutionary forces backed by the Allied powers. One Menshevik from Latvia also spoke up. His homeland still occupied by German forces was on the brink of starvation, and he was opposed to both Bolshevism and Noske. The SR’s Vasily Sukhomlin asserted that in Azerbaijan, the Beys and other Muslims were selling out labour movement activists of Baku to the British, and that the Ukrainian government was suppressing newspapers which support a union with Russia to serve another form of imperialism to replace Germany’s.(27) The final resolution, reached through a compromise between the majority and minority factions, noted at the start that “we welcome the fact that peoples who had been forcefully placed under the yoke of such nations as Russia and Austria rose up and gained their independence.” But the text that followed beginning with “however” was much longer. To begin with, the powers’ governments, which ought to recognize the independence of the territories of

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

111

Part II Russia’s former Czarist regime, are supporting anti-revolutionary forces trying to deny them of their political principle, it stated. But then it went on to say that as small nations were not self-sufficient economically, the solution in the Balkans in particular would be a confederation of nations. The point made in the minority’s resolution that “according to the Marxist principle, the victory of socialism is only possible when all production capacities have been developed to the maximum” apparently was the common basis of both of these views.

Issue of colonies The resolution “upholds the previous principle concerning native peoples’ rights and colonial exploitation by the powers’ capitalists,” but it also stated that as long as colonies existed in reality, placing them under the mandate of the League of Nations rather than the Allied powers would be preferable, and that it was unjust for Germany to be deprived of her colonies when she ought to govern them by mandate. During the discussion, Italy’s Giuseppe Canepa argued that if the mandate system was to be adopted, colonies should be proportionately divided among all nations capable of governing them with respect for the native peoples’ autonomy, citing Italy’s relationship with Libya’s Arabs as an example of that “capability.”(28) To be sure, he was a “rightist” who looked like he might have slipped into the Conference. But as the Second International’s “prior principles” included a “socialistic colonial policy” which was directly linked to the mandate policy, Canepa’s argument did make some sense.(29)

Pogroms It goes without saying that the resolution denounced the pogroms in Poland. It suffices here to introduce the argument of Kaplansky of the Poale Zion. He said he welcomed the efforts toward independence in the Ukraine and Poland, but he wished that such newly-independent nations would adopt a federal system, and that the rights of the Jews, an epitome of a minority race, would be protected not by the belligerent nations (including Poland) but by the League of Nations. Lastly, looking at the “proposal on International by-laws” submitted by the second subcommittee, there were three points of argument. One concerned

112

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne membership of the International. According to Vliegen’s explanation, there had been a heated debate between those arguing that it should be restricted to political groups, and those asserting that it would be pointless not to include labor unions and cooperative associations. The question of how the Räte system should be assessed had also been raised. Crispien had taken the offensive, saying it was incomprehensible that the new International would ignore the Räte. But apparently mollified by Vliegen’s explanation that the actual decision will be left up to each nation, the relevant phrase in the final adopted draft was the same as in the original proposal, namely, “those political and economic organizations of the working class which aim for the abolition of the capitalistic social form and attainment of the complete liberation of mankind through the acquisition of political power and socialization of the means of production and exchange.” Vliegen asked for understanding, saying the wording was essentially in the same form as that adopted by the London Congress of 1896.(30) The second point in dispute was over the extent of authority the international as an organization of international solidarity had over member organizations. The International Workingmen’s Association (IWA, the First International) established in 1864 had by-laws and a general council serving as its central organ, but its role was only to indicate general policy lines rather than to issue directives to member organizations. An international organization of workers, which was formed in 1889 well over a decade after the IWA had been forced to disband, claimed to be its successor. So it was to be expected, perhaps, that this organization was not interested in new by-laws or even in naming itself. To be sure, after the Bureau of Socialist International (BSI) was created in 1905 comprising two delegates each from member nations, and particularly after Huysmans became its secretary-general in 1905, the organization made significant strides. But it could not transcend its role of a coordinating body for the member nations’ organizations. This is precisely why the socialist parties of the member nations placed greater priority on their own interests after August 1914 and the International became dysfunctional. From about the time Lenin decried that situation, calling it a “collapse of the Second International,” the description “Second International” went into wide usage. Lenin must have had his own good reason for conceiving by-laws based on centralization with the communist parties of the member nations and territories as branches, when he

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

113

Part II set about establishing the Third International. There seems to have been a debate in the second subcommittee at the Lucerne Conference as well over the International’s “highest authority,” but as there were many dissenting voices about imposing “duties that are too severe” on members of the nations represented, it was decided to set up an “International Council (Internationaler Rat)” giving each member nation a measure of discretion. Thereby an agreement was reached on an “interim International Constitution.”(31) Another point concerned the allocation of deciding votes during sessions of the “International Council” (corresponding to the previous “Bureau of Socialist International”) and congresses. One dissenting argument was that while the socialist movement in Argentina was very active, it did not make sense to give only six votes to Spain and give Argentina 12, so they should both get eight votes. Nevertheless, the proposal on the allocation of deciding was adopted as it was in the original draft. Under the proposal, Luxemburg was given the fewest with just one vote, followed by Chile and seven other nations with two each, the Netherlands and four others got 10, Australia and five other 15, Italy 24, and the highest 30 votes each were allocated to Germany, the U.S., France, Britain and Russia. Giving the maximum number of votes to Russia, which had parted ways with the Second International with the Bolsheviks in power, and to the U.S. which had not contributed much to the International’s activities, was probably an expression of the wish that both nations would participate. The grading of the numbers of votes allocated had its own rationale. When one recalls that in the United Nations’ General Assembly today, where all member nations have one vote each, there may be instances when “major powers” are frustrated, it is understandable that the question of the “right of representation” is no simple matter. In the Second International, too, there was considerable debate over whether the entities to be represented should be nations, peoples or parties, with resolution finally being reached in 1907. The idea that major nations and small nations were not equal led to the introduction of the system of proportional representation. The “advanced nations first” principle as the basis of this system was inherited by the Lucerne Conference. The total of the votes allocated ranging in number from one to 30 came to 408. One cannot reasonably place the responsibility on the people who formulated this vote allocation proposal, but Asian nations are not represented at all.(32)

114

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne

3 With Henderson concluding his closing address with a tribute to Huysmans for his many years of dedicated service and an applause of gratitude for Henderson following a motion by Axelrod, the conference came to a close. The “interim International Constitution,”(33) albeit provisional, was deemed to have gone into effect, and it was resolved that an International congress to take up its ratification and various others be convened in February, 1920 in Geneva.(34) The earliest official document concerning the Geneva Conference was probably Circular No. 1 dated September 1st, 1919.(35) It is signed by Grumbach of the “publication committee.” The need for international publicity-related activities had already been debated at the Amsterdam conference. In fact, the “Second International Bulletin” went into publication in May 1919 albeit on a small scale. At the Lucerne Conference, not only did the “interim Constitution” adopted include an article concerning publications, an ad hoc committee for drafting a report anticipating the Geneva Congress was also set up. It was Salomon Grumbach representing Alsace, which had just reverted to France from Germany, who became chairman of that committee.(36) Its Circular No. 1 was an opinion survey about the organizing of a telegraphic network and financial obligation. Incidentally, the location of the secretariat was the “People’s House” in Brussels, indicating that Huysmans had returned to his old haunt from before August, 1914.(37) Circular No. 2, dated September 20th, 1919, was signed by Huysmans. It dealt with the issue of war responsibility, the resolution of which had been postponed until the Geneva Congress, asking member organizations to submit their views by October 30th.(38) Thus preparations for the Congress in GeFig. 37: Ethel Snowden. neva began right after the Lucerne Conference. But the congress in fact did not take place until six months later in July, 1920. Rather than following moves on the part of Huysmans and others who were working on it, it would be better to record briefly changes that occurred within the socialist movement as a whole from the autumn to winter of 1919.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

115

Part II First of all in Hungary, the Soviet regime collapsed in August partly because of military interference by neighboring countries backed by the Allied powers, and partly because of the failure of coordination with the Russian Red Army. After a short-lived government under the right-wing socialist Peidl Gyula, Friedrich István backed by Austria’s Duke Jozef seized power and “White Terror” spread throughout the country thereafter. In November, as the plundering Rumanian forces withdrew, Admiral Miklós Horthy leading a counterrevolutionary army, which he had organized in Szeged supported by France, entered Budapest. In March of the following year, 1920, he was elected “Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary.” Thus began the rule by this “navyless admiral of a kingless kingdom,” which was to last until 1944.(39) Regarding this situation, the resolution adopted by the Lucerne Conference declared that “it is a crime against democracy for the Entente governments … to support counterrevolution and restitution of the Hapsburg Empire.”(40) Ethel Snowden, who was staying in Vienna, wrote to Henderson in late August 1919, imploring him to appeal to the British government to send food and especially coal to alleviate the “economic distress of Austria and Hungary.” Otherwise “the state of anarchy will spread and the gulf between the left-wing and the right-wing of the socialist movement will widen,” she wrote. Also concerned about the situation, Huysmans sent a letter dated September 26th to Henderson and Branting. According to the letter, Kun who led the Soviet regime ceded power to Peidl because he had accepted terms negotiated between British and Italian government agents, and Hungarian social-democrats “who were considered moderates.” The Entente nations, which had promised to hold the Rumanian army in check and end the blockade of Hungary, went back on their word and, worse still, were doing nothing to stop atrocities being committed by agents of the very Hapsburg Dynasty they had themselves clearly repudiated, it said. Citing views of the Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party, Huysmans urged his comrades to help by condemning the Entente governments’ policies to show that Hungary’s democracy has not been forgotten. Seeing as Peidl’s regime did not last long, there was little likelihood of Huysman’s exhortation bearing fruit.(41) Meanwhile, support for the Second International was waning among the member parties.(42)

116

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

II Lucerne The Swiss Social-democratic Party, as mentioned earlier, ignored the conference held in their own country’s city of Berne in February, 1919. Moreover, it sent Platten as a delegate to the first congress of the Third International held in the following month of March. At the extraordinary party congress held in August, a proposal to withdraw from the “Second” supported by Jules Humbert-Droz and others was adopted by 459 votes to one after a debate lasting two days. Furthermore, a proposal to join the “Third” was adopted by 318 votes to 147. However, participation in the “Third” was rejected by 14,612 votes to 8,722 when all party members voted on the proposal in September.(43) In the case of Germany’s USPD, its denunciation of the majority SPD was severe, with some party members going as far as calling for the latter’s expulsion from the International. In particular, the failure of the general strike called for 21st July, 1919 to materialize resulted in a shift toward the International which had more power to mobilize. At the Lucerne Conference, the total repudiation of the argument of majority SPD’s Wels by Hilferding and Artur Crispien was not only an expression of their own beliefs but also a reflection of the sentiments of the USPD members. Hilferding believed that participation in the Third International would mean subordination to Moscow and isolation within western Europe. The party leadership published a document entitled “Why We Are Going to Lucerne.” The aim, it said, was to give the International more power to mobilize.(44) But their argument did not gain support at the Lucerne Conference. That was hardly surprising, said unhappy party members, more of whom began to lean toward the “Third”. USPD counted among its ranks people like Kautsky who had published his “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” the previous year and was branded an “apostate” by Lenin. Criticisms against him appeared in the party’s organ.(45) At the party’s extraordinary congress in Leipzig at the end of 1919, the dispute over the party’s relationship with the “Third” became so tense that it took a compromise proposal by Crispien and others to finally save party unity. Just as Germany’s USPD was established in 1917 in opposition to the SPD’s policy of collaboration with the war effort, as mentioned earlier, a similar development occurred within the French Socialist Party. Except in the case of France, the anti-war faction became the majority in October, 1918. In its effort toward the re-birth of the International, it sent delegates along with the minority faction to the Berne, Amsterdam and Lucerne Conferences, but had to live

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

117

Part II with the reality of the majority within its party being in the minority faction in the international conferences. However, against the background of a post-war upsurge in the labor movement, the result of the vote on separation from the “Second” at the party congress in Strasbourg in February 1920 was, in terms of proxy votes represented by the delegates, an overwhelming approval by 4,330 votes to 337 (53 withheld, 109 absent). Nevertheless support for participation in the “Third” garnered only 1,621 votes.(46) In Britain, the Independent Labour Party voted 529 to 144 to withdraw from the “Second” at the party congress in April, 1920. However, with regard to participation in the “Third” a proposalto deliberate the question further won the majority by 472 votes to 206.(47) As for the Italian Socialist Party, only relatively minor figures from its “reformist faction” attended during the Berne Conference to Lucerne Conference stage. But at the party congress in Bologna in October, 1919, the proposal by Giacinto Menotti Serrati and others (the so-called “Massimalista”) arguing for participation in the “Third” was approved by thunderous applause, despite a speech by long-serving leader Filippo Turati who argued for caution.(48) In hindsight, what was more important was that Benito Mussolini and other Fascists were trying to seize control of the situation. In Switzerland in early August, 1919, the big topic of conversation was, once again, a general strike.(49) In the chaotic aftermath of the Great War, both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces were engaged in armed conflict and the daily life of “ordinary people” had not returned to normal. For the Third International, these were “two Red years (il biennio rosso).”(50) As a matter of fact, a socialist movement had evolved in Japan since the end of the 19th century. It was a miniscule movement compared to the European nations, but that was not the fault of the socialists themselves as the authorities in Japan, which was still a “backward country,” repressed them brutally. So the situation could hardly be said to have matured, but 1921 saw the creation of a preparation committee for a Japanese branch of the Comintern, and in the following year 1922, the Communist Party of Japan was established.(51)

118

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Geneva

III Geneva – Final Congress of the Second International, July /August, 1920 – 1 As evident from the discussions at the Lucerne Conference that we have looked at, Friedrich Adler was intent on somehow rectifying the absence of unity in the International. At the Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party congress held in Vienna in October and November of 1919, he presented a report on the “International” in which he expressed his concern about positions favoring separation from the “Second” which the Swiss party had already adopted and which Germany’s USPD was about to make clear. To be sure, he was as vocal as anyone else when it came to criticizing the “Second” for making mistakes in 1914, which implied self-criticism as well. But he said the countries of the parties that still took part in the “Second” were “industrial nations” with “large proletarian masses,” whereas the countries of the parties forming the “Third” had no “large proletarian masses.” Therefore, either one rejecting the other would cause the International to split up and dig its own grave, the effect of which would be felt for a long time. So, probably wishing that things would move in the direction he desired, he warned against premature action and submitted a proposal that the Geneva congress be “postponed for at least six months.” During the discussion, sympathy was expressed for the revolutions in Russia and Hungary, and in that atmosphere, Adler’s proposal was adopted.(1) The conference of the “action committee” convened in London on December 20th and 21st, 1919, with Henderson as chairman decided to postpone the Geneva Congress, which had been scheduled for February, to July, accepting that proposal by not only the Austrian party but also the Netherlands and Swedish parties. Also, in his concern for the tragic situation of GermanyAustria (being denied union with Germany) under the terms of the Treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain, he reminded the Social-democratic Party of the newly-created Republic of Czechoslovakia, in particular, to be mindful of its

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

119

Part II internationalistic responsibility toward Austria’s working class. In addition, he called for some action to deal with the famines spreading through central Europe and Russia.(2) The “action committee” went on to hold another meeting on 23rd March, 1920, in Rotterdam. The members heard a report that the selection of the members for subcommittees dealing with the issues of “socialization,” “political shape of socialism,” “pogrom,” “Germany” and “Russia” was proceeding steadily. The meeting also heard and endorsed a report that the committee had resolved to express sympathy and send congratulations to the German proletariat in the name of Huysmans and others, who had visited Berlin on a study tour a week earlier, upon the fact that the former had “finally wrested from the Junkers [landed nobility of Prussia and eastern Germany] their military might.” At the same time, the meeting reaffirmed the resolution at the Lucerne Conference to support Korean independence at the behest of the Korean delegate Cho So-ang(3). Huysmans was extremely busy with the task, among others, of appropriately distributing and exchanging letters and documents received from member parties and individuals. On one hand he lamented that replies to his letters were slow in coming and that the reconstruction of the “Second” had not made any progress since the Lucerne Conference. On the other hand, he was feeling nervous about moves rejecting the “Second” within Germany’s USPD and the French Socialist Party.(4) In fact the Belgian Workers Party, to which Huysmans belonged, had at its general conference on February 18th just adopted with overwhelming majority a resolution which, being mindful of moves within Germany’s USPD, declared that “we are prepared to take part in all exchanges of views in order to resolve misunderstandings so that all workers organizations may…once again rally together under this International.”(5) The committee having negotiated the labyrinth of such complex issues, an invitation rallying delegates to the “10th International Socialist Congress” was finally sent off dated April 10th 1920.(6)

120

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Geneva

2 But the Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party, as mentioned earlier, was becoming more and more convinced that a Geneva Congress is “not the means toward our objective” of “unity and reconstruction of the International,” having observed moves on the part of Germany’s USPD, the French Socialist Party and the British Labour Party. In a letter the party leadership sent to the Bureau of Socialist International dated May 6th, it expressed gratitude for the postponement of the Geneva Congress but nevertheless said the party would not attend that congress. Its rationale was that “at present any attempt to unify the International, no matter what it is, would be premature,” and that one must wait, as frustrating as it may be, “until the arrival of an historic moment when a combative International under which the proletariat of all nations can unite .” In his reply dated May 20th, Huysmans did not conceal his astonishment and said he could not accept that position. He asked whether they were asking him to “just stand around and wait for the opportune moment.” (7) The Congress took place from July 31st to August 5th of that year int the Gemeindehaus (Civic Hall) at Plainpalais in central Geneva. It was called the “10th” because the extraordinary congress held in Basel in 1912 was, no doubt, considered the 9th. This reflected the thinking that meetings held after World War I, including the Berne Conference in February 1919, were not “congresses,” and that the Geneva Congress truly marked the “re-birth,” so to speak, of the “Second.” The participants numbered as follows. • Britain—Labour Party (MacDonald, Sidney Webb, Ethel Snowden, Tom Shaw and others) 13, Trades Union Congress 8, Fabian Society (Mrs. Sidney Webb and others) 4 • Australia—1 • New Zealand—1 • Germany (Wels, Molkenbuhr, Bernstein, Stampfer, Scheidemann and others, all from The “majority faction”) 9 • Azerbaijan—3 • Georgia—(Tsereteli and others) 6 • Sweden—7 • Belgium—(Vandervelde, de Broukère, Anseele and others) 22 • The Netherlands—(Vliegen, Troelstra, van Kol, Wibaut and another) 5 • Russia—(Rubanovich and others, all SR members) 4

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

121

Part II • • • • • • •

Denmark—(Stauning and others) 6 France—10 Switzerland—9 (Grütli Society)(8) Hungary—2 Lithuania—2 Italy—2 Poland—2

Some 110 participants from altogether 17 countries or territories. This is demonstrably less impressive, at least in numerical terms, than the 2nd Congress of the “Third” International which was held in Moscow at about the same time, attended by over 200 participants from 39 countries or territories. Moreover, the “French Socialist Party (Parti Socialist Français, PSF)”, to which participants from France belonged, was a different political entity from the “French Socialist Party” frequently mentioned in the present work, which carried the designation “Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, SFIO.” As such, the former was not recognized as a fully-qualified representative of France by the subcommittee that deliberated the qualification of delegates. The congress also witnessed the spectacle of a certain figure from Russia who, upon asserting that an anti-Bolshevik military struggle should be launched, elicited a strong protest from Rubanovich who had him rejected from the congress.(9) Let us first look at the arguments exchanged at this meeting. Branting who, as an executive member of the “International Permanent Commission,” was a key figure in the efforts to rebuild the “Second”was too busy with his official duties as the Swedish prime minister, while Henderson could not attend either because of illness. It was Tom Shaw of the British Labour Party who was chosen as chairman (the Netherlands’ Vliegen being chosen as deputy chairman). A leading figure in Britain’s Trades Union Congress, Shaw had also attended the Berne Conference but he was not necessarily respected in the international arena. Be that as it may, he stated that “since differences in political tactics and methods among socialist parties are based on differences in the countries where their activities are located and on differences in social conditions … one should not impose a rigid doctrine on the parties of individual nations.” On the issue of “war responsibility,” he asserted that one should look to the future rather than be obsessed with the past.

122

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Geneva Huysmans dwelt on the activities of the secretariat, as if to head off criticism from the leftists close to the Bolsheviks that “the International did not take enough action.” There is no doubt that he was doing hard work as a capable secretary-general. But inwardly, he was probably fed up, for he made a proposal, though calling it his “personal view,” that the headquarters of the International be transferred from Brussels to London. It was based on his judgment that the British Labour Party by now was the center of the International. That must have been why Shaw was serving as chairman. However, Henderson had decided that it would be impossible for the Labour Party to host the secretariat.(10) Following Huysmans’ proposal to pay respects to Jean Jaurès who, if he were still alive and attending the congress, “would have supported the position of working for the realization of socialism through democracy,” the delegates all stood up to honor his memory. As mentioned above Shaw had no intension of pursuing the issue of “war responsibility,” but he had no choice but to put it in the agenda. The Belgian Workers Party, which had been leading the efforts to pursue of SPD’s “war responsibility,” had already buried the hatchet, so that the resolution on this issue was adopted without much fuss,(11) the party’s La Fontaine having accepted a memorandum on “war responsibility” that the SPD had submitted in advance. However, that “memorandum”(12) asserted that greater danger had been posed by France forging an alliance with Russia than by Germany and Austria-Hungary having been in alliance which was more or less maintaining the status quo. It explained why the SPD did not oppose the German government’s war policies by saying “we would have been supporting the Czar if we had not supported the Kaiser.” To be sure, the memorandum did include passages of self-criticism. For example “it was our mistake” that the party had not done enough against “the long term risk” of the supervision of the German government’s foreign policy being beyond the Reichstag’s authority and, hence, beyond the control of the SPD, “an error which we openly admit to in front of the whole world.” But on the whole, it was self-justification from start to finish. It was, in the first place, the imperialistic policies of capitalism that made war unavoidable, and socialists have been united in their struggle against this trend, it said. Nevertheless, La Fontaine settled for a compromise, focusing on one sentence in the “memorandum” that “the greatest tragedy for the whole

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

123

Part II world was that the outbreak of the German revolution, which put an end to the rule of militarism and Pan-Germanism, came five years too late.” In the event, the fact that five years earlier, the SPD was not even thinking of plotting a revolution was of secondary importance. Let us first deal with the question of the transfer of the Secretariat. The subcommittee on “the unification of the International and transfer of the International Secretariat” expressed its conclusion that only the British party was capable of achieving reconciliation with parties that were no longer sending delegates to the International. Unification was a matter of great urgency, for otherwise the International would be splintered permanently, it stated. The Britons were not keen on the idea. Belgium’s Vandervelde stated that “I become sad when I think back to the times when I was able to serve as chairman of a single, unified International” before July, 1914. In those days, Jaurès and Lenin were also with them. Even as he recognized that the Russian Revolution had been essential for the Russian proletariat, he stated that Moscow and London were now the spiritual centers and the proletariat had to choose between the two. I choose London, he said. “His natural eloquence and enthusiasm immediately brought about a sense of great relief to the conference, so that the gathering which up ’til then appeared to harbour doubts about its capability and effectiveness seemed to become more spirited for a while,” said one newspaper article.(13) Kazimierz Czapiński of the Śląsk (Schlesien)-Cieszynski Polish Socialdemocratic Party, based in Galicia that had been under Austrian rule until two years ago, expressed sympathy toward Germany’s USPD and the Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party, and Germany’s Wels aroused the animosity of the Belgians by proposing that the secretariat be transferred to Amsterdam. In the event, the resolution calling for its transfer to London was adopted unanimously save for a few blank votes.(14) Another issue carried over from the Lucerne Conference, on which a declaration of position was needed, concerned the “Peace Treaties and the League of Nations.” On this, too, another subcommittee had prepared a draft of the resolution. The draft expressed renewed concern that the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties had “left the world in an unstable and disruptive state, a condition that is even more uncertain than before the war’s outbreak in 1914.” Regarding the League of Nations, it asserted that the League should have the authority enabling

124

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Geneva it to revise those stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles which concern the distribution of raw materials, means of transport and the war’s financial burden into “just and permanent peace terms.” In particular, it denounced the fact that the League’s Bylaw Article 12(15) recognized the “right to wage war.” Arms reduction should be the aim, it said. In order to reform the League of Nations in that direction from within, it urged socialist parties of the nations to make the utmost effort to become a delegate to the League of Nations. While Bernstein took the floor to say it was unjust to call Germans “criminal people” when there had been a revolution in Germany to bring about a major political change from the era of the German Empire, Troelstra on his part stated that the draft resolution was not critical enough of the League of Nations. His point was that the draft said the League of Nations should include all “democratic peoples” without exception, but such a condition now meant none other than the exclusion of Russia, just as the London conference of the socialists of the Allied nations back inFebruary 1915 had tried to exclude Germany by labelling it “absolutist.”(16) A new draft resolution that reflected such criticisms was adopted unanimously.(17) The next resolution, proposed by the British Labour Party’s Ethel Snowden who had been moved by the conditions in many places she had visited, referred to the famine in Russia and central Europe and urged the delegates to take action to save starving children for the future of mankind. This resolution was also adopted unanimously. She had already set up a “save the children fund” and was asking the British government for more support.(18) The resolution critical of the “counter-revolution” in Hungary remained unchanged from assertions made at the time of the Lucerne Conference.

3 There are two other points worth noting in the discussions at the Geneva conference. One of them concerned “socialization.”(19) As is well known, It was on the basis of the existence of inequality in real life, the “equality of man and citizen” hailed in France’s “human rights declaration” notwithstanding, that Buonarotti, Proudhon and Marx challenged the statement “property ownership is a sacred and inalienable right” in article 7 of the

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

125

Part II “human rights declaration.” The Basel Congress of the International Working Men’s Association in 1869 argued for the “socialization of the means of production.” As shown by the text of the “Erfurt Program,” adopted by Germany’s SPD in 1891, that “the transfer of capitalistic private ownership of the means of production … to social ownership, and the transformation of commodity production into socialistic production run by the society for the society” were necessary, this way of thinking was shared widely among socialists of the late 19th century into the 20th century.(20) It was in the context of the same political current that the Bolsheviks insisted on the nationalization of banks even before the November revolution, and a wide variety of arguments were exchanged Fig. 38: Rudolf Hilferding. over nationalization of the industries at the “(Economic) Council of the People’s Representatives” held in Moscow in may 1918 after the revolution. At the time, Russia was not only experiencing the disruption of economic order brought on by the revolution but was also amidst a civil war, so that she faced too many difficult challenges to move on to the building of a socialistic economic order. But after the nation became the Soviet Union, the financial and industrial sectors as well as commerce and agriculture were all nationalized eventually.(21) In Germany, too, the “Council of the People’s Representatives” set up after the revolution decided as early as on 18th November, 1918 that a “Socialization Committee” should be set up right away. It was to be a committee in which “prominent economists assisted by those knowledgeable of the situations on the workers’ side and the enterprises’ side will decide specific matters,” with the participation anticipated of Emil Lederer and other economists, Walther Rathenau as an entrepreneur, and Kautsky, Hilferding, Heinrich Cunow and others from the two SPDs and workers’ unions. Officially launched on 4th December, the committee ran into resistance from enterprises on one hand, and from communists and other leftists on the other, so that it was unable to achieve significant results, but it did come up with some ideas for what they were worth. In March 1919, the following year, a “socialization act” was passed

126

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Geneva by the Weimar National Assembly.(22) Elsewhere, the Fabian Society was also promoting its “nationalization” concept.(23) Let us at this point re-examine the views that the people, who were striving to maintain “the Second International” to countercheck the Bolsheviks, held with regard to “socialization.” The draft resolution submitted by the subcommittee on this issue interpreted “socialization” as follows.(24) 1) Transfer of all industrial and service sectors that serve to fulfill human needs from the ownership and management of capitalists to ownership and management of the community. 2) Replacement of uneconomical production and distribution aimed solely at private profit with appropriate production and economical distribution aimed at maximum profit for all. 3) Transition from today’s state of economic slavery, in which a large majority of the actual producers under private ownership live, to a state of comprehensive worker participation in business management. These ideas arguably remain faithful to the way of thinking going back to the days of the International Working Men’s Association and the Erfurt Program. They do not seem far removed from the way of thinking that the Bolsheviks were about to put to practice after much trial and error. However, the resolution goes on as follows. “Socialization is something that progresses step by step from one industry to the next, and this according to what the various conditions in each of the countries allow. But no matter how critical socialists are of economies based on private profits, they probably would not destroy organizations in any industry until they can be replaced with better organizations. In such a gradual socialization process, confiscation of private property without compensation would be unthinkable. This is because it is not only unjust that particular individuals would suffer from it, but also because confiscation would hurt the capitalistic enterprises of those industries that cannot undergo socialization immediately.” According to the resolution, furthermore, the necessary cost of compensation would be funded by income tax, inheritance tax and so on imposed on the

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

127

Part II propertied class. In economically-advanced societies, “socialization” takes three main forms, respectively managed by the “nation,” “regional municipalities” and “cooperative associations.” To be nationalized are land (except land owned by farmers, to be preserved) and industries of critical importance to the population (such as transport, power generation and mining), while placed under the management of regional municipalities will be not only the basic utilities of gas, water and electricity but, depending on the country, also suppliers of clothing, food and housing. The task of producing and distributing goods of daily necessity falls upon consumers’ cooperatives. While supervision will be necessary for stabilizing prices and other purposes in industries including those not mature enough for “socialization”, it is important that supervision and management of the industries be kept separate. Supervision will be handled by the national parliament. Management of the industries must be clearly separated from the government. What the resolution also stressed, at the same time, was a point that under the “broad freedom characteristic of a socialistic community,” continuation of management by farmers, artisans and artists, who do not exploit others, will not be rejected. The right to strike is also recognized. Reacting to the draft resolution as described above, a British Labour Party delegate opined that the nationalization of some industries was something that could be carried out by labor unions, and that “it was difficult to accept such an inhumane resolution,” while a New Zealand delegate said 80% of the proposals had already been realized in his country and declared that “nothing can be achieved through nationalization, as what is necessary is a radical change of the society as a whole,” drawing attention to the Bolsheviks’ major achievement. In his rebuttal, Germany’s Molkenbuhr argued that the resolution was “not a declaration of the final objective, but it addresses the way to get there,” so that social-democratic parties had to consider a specific way out of the appalling present situation. When he went on to argue that the Bolsheviks’ policies had already led to the collapse of their economy, Geneva’s “leftist socialists” sitting in among the audience made a lot of noise to disrupt, so that Huysmans was compelled to plead with the audience that although it was an open conference in which anyone could participate, he would like the audience to respect different points of view, especially as the conference venue was in a nation like Switzerland.

128

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Geneva In the event, the resolution was an adopted with 10 of the 25-member British delegation abstaining. Another point that should be mentioned is the “political system of socialism.”(25) The draft resolution, on which Sidney Webb elaborated on behalf of his subcommittee, declared that “because of the incompetence of the capitalist system as demonstrated during the war and in peace thereafter, the takeover of political power by the working class has become an historical inevitability.” Workers included all those physically and mentally engaged in production. “And an absolutely indispensable precondition for this power seizure is the existence of adequate agreement and understanding among the working class regarding the application of that power.” While direct action cannot be disregarded, naked violence and terrorism are rejected. “The principal duty of a workers’ government would be to recognize democracy and socialism as the basis for legislation and administration.” Parliament must represent all of the people, and their right to vote must be universal suffrage without any discrimination whatsoever. Parliament is also for protecting the interests of consumers, so that it may at times set prices and also cooperate with socialization. That was the gist of the resolution. Noteworthy is the article that stipulated that alongside parliament, a “central economic council” comprising representatives of various labor unions and having the authority to present proposals to parliament be created.

Fig. 39: Sidney Webb, Beatrice Webb (1982, around the time they were married).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

129

Part II During the debate, Vandervelde stated that “while rejecting application of violence in principle would mean severing ties with all revolutionary traditions, I reject the theory that deems violence to be an intrinsic or normal weapon of the proletariat.” “We distance ourselves not from the Russian Revolution which achieved a giant task but only from those who claim to be speaking on its behalf,” he said. As calm as ever, Troelstra, even as he conceded that “Moscow won more sympathy than the Second International among a considerable number of workers,” nevertheless made his intention clear that he would still rather go to London than to Moscow. That would be the way to compete with Bolshevism for a political system of not only democracy but social-democracy had to be conceived, he said. Scheidemann on his part argued that the Second International should steadfastly reject Bolshevism and be unequivocally based on democracy. “That Germany’s, particularly the German workers’ democratic thought is alive and well was amply demonstrated by the workers’ attitude during the Kapp Putsch (uprising),” he said. These words were what one might have expected from a man being being attacked from both right and left. The Kapp Putsch was a coup d’état attempted by right-wing politician Wolfgang Kapp together with discontented elements in the military in mid-March just months before the Geneva conference. The government of the Republic, which was forced to move to Stuttgart, called on workers to go on a general strike. As the workers responded to the call and the military command took a “neutral” stance, the coup collapsed in four days. Scheidemann’s assertion was well founded. However, it was also that government which permitted the bloody repression of resistance by those who felt that the SPD had made too many compromises with the right-wing and the military, in particular the workers of the Ruhr region. Elsewhere, the situation called for the resolution of the question of whether or not the SPD member Noske, who had willingly taken on the task of repressing direct actions by left-wing revolutionists during the German Revolution and had been serving as minister of defence since January 1919, should resign. Against President Ebert’s opposition, it was Scheidemann, Wels, Karl Legien, leader of the Pan-German Confederation of Trade Unions (ADGB), and others who were pushing for Noske’s dismissal.(26) Shaw, one of the men who went on a study tour of Russia, conceded that the Bolsheviks were sincere in their efforts towards Russia’s reconstruction, but

130

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

III Geneva was nevertheless critical, saying what Russia had was not a “dictatorship of the proletariat” but merely an “autocracy.” The resolution was adopted unanimously save for a single delegate of the British Independent Labour Party. There were also resolutions on the Russia-Poland situation where, as part of the wars of interference, a state of war existed, and on Azerbaijan racked with internal strife. But while the former denounced occupation by Russian forces, the latter condemned interference against Russia. Concern over the fate of Jews in Poland and Palestine was also expressed. Finally Bernstein, who was the oldest of the elders attending, expounded on his own theory that “democracy is not simply a right as a formality, but a firstclass social force,”(27) and declared that just as the split-up of the First International in 1872 had been repaired, “I am confident that the split-up of the today’s International will be overcome again,” and cried out: “Long Live the International!” The conference came to a close on that note. Afterwards, in the middle of the night, the selection of members for the executive committee took place, with Henderson being chosen as chairman, J.H. Thomas as officer in charge of the finances and Huysmans as secretarygeneral. In addition, Wels, Branting (proxy: Stauning), Troelstra, MacDonald and Vandervelde (proxy: De Broukère) were chosen as members but the seat for the French committee member was left vacant. Also the “International bylaws,” whose effect on an interim basis had been approved by the Lucerne Conference, were formally approved. It was also decided that the next congress be held in Brussels in 1922.(28) What could be gathered from the sum total of the discussions at the Geneva congress was the following stance. On one hand, it recognized the tradition of revolution, and spared no effort in appreciating the significance of the Russian Revolution. On the other hand, it opposed in varying degrees the Bolsheviks’ methods and emphasized the raison d’être of the “Second International” using democracy and the parliamentary system as buttresses. On “socialization,” too, it sought to differentiate itself from the Bolsheviks by insisting on gradual change and compensation. But it felt it was losing ground to the “Third International” as its competitor. It was not without reason that Troelstra spoke of the need for a concept that could compete with the “Third.” In the event, despite the hopes of all those who participated, this congress was to become the final congress of the “Second International.”

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

131

IV Vienna

IV Vienna – Attempt to Overcome the Split, February, 1921 – 1 One of the difficult issues the International Secretariat faced after the Geneva Congress was concerned the reversion of Upper Silesia (Oberschlesien, Śląsk). Over this territory, Poles and Germans were even resorting to armed struggles. The Allied powers’ intentions were not in agreement. A plebiscite was held in March 1921 but the issue remained unresolved and the following year, the territory ended up divided into a Polish sector and a German sector. The Secretariat had been forced to settle disagreements between Germany’s SPD and the Polish Socialist Party.(1) Even more important were the negotiations over the transfer of the Secretariat to London. Huysmans was working toward the transfer with the help of Vandervelde and Branting. Following an exhaustive discussion in a meeting of the International executive committee held on 5th and 6th November, it was decided that the British branch (Labour Party) would undertake the implementation of the resolution on the “unification” of socialists adopted by the Geneva Congress, and that Harry Gosling and MacDonald would become secretaries of the International in London. It was also agreed that Tom Shaw would replace MacDonald on the International executive committee, and that Huysmans would remain as secretary in Brussels.(2) Entrusted with this heavy responsibility, the Labour Party appointed William Gillies secretary-general of its international department.(3) Amidst these developments, a letter addressed to “Socialist and Communist Parties of the World” was drafted, signed by Labour Party Secretary-General Henderson, Trades Union Congress representatives J. H. Thomas and Gosling and MacDonald in his capacity as the International Secretary in London. The letter expressed an apprehension that “the absence of a unified International will make us miss our best opportunity and the socialist movement, which should unite in solidarity for positive action toward peace, might disappear into thin air through unproductive internal dissension.” While accepting some

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

133

Part II of the criticisms leveled by the “Third” against the “Second,” it said “the future of the International should be decided not by what happened during the war, but by the policies that we are about to follow.” It also stated that “we are hoping for a unified International established on a foundation that is more free than that demanded by Moscow,” and that “we would like you to reject section-like movements that exclude others.”(4) The response to this letter, judging within the scope of accessible historical materials obtained, was scarce. But before moving on to that topic, it Fig. 40: J. Ramsay MacDonald. would do well to point out that delegates from seven political parties including the German-Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party led by Friedrich Adler, who was critical of the “Second” but was also hesitant about joining the “Third”, held a meeting in Berne from 5th to 7th December, 1920, and expressed their official position.(5) Going back to the response to MacDonald’s letter, there was Martov, one of the Mensheviks who had painfully been forced to admit his own defeat, was once again in exile, as he had once been during the Czarist era, and now attending this meeting in Berne. He sent a long letter in German to MacDonald from Berlin dated 4thJanuary 1921, telling him that MacDonald who “does not belong to the leadership of ‘the Second’ in terms of political career and characteristic” was the only one who could make the powerful British Labour Party take his group’s side.(6) Turati of the Italian Socialist Party wrote a letter in French to Henderson from Milan dated 8th January of the same year, basically expressing his agreement, but since he was now in the party’s minority faction and, more important, as he did not want to lose his influence further within the party by moving away from its position especially with the approach of the party’s Livorno (Leghorn) Congress, he said “I cannot officially support the proposal.” While replies from Armenia’s Dashnaktsutiun (a nationalist party which had sought reform within the Ottoman Empire) and Antonio de Tommaso of the Argentine Socialist Party were sympathetic, they arguably did not constitute a strong support.(7)

134

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV Vienna

Fig. 41: “To the Socialist and Communist Parties of the World”.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

135

Part II In contrast, letters of refusals came from the Swedish Social-democratic Leftist Party, which was established in May, 1917 as a splinter group from Branting and others, and from the Austrian Communist Party and the British Communist Party, both of which had just been formed. The British Communist Party did give detailed reasons for doing so.(8) There is no evidence to confirm that the Comintern received Henderson’s letter, but even if it did, it is possible that it ignored the letter altogether.(9) Germany, France and Italy were the only countries in Western Europe where the communist parties had become forces to be reckoned with. Another notable point in the letter from MacDonald and others is its mentioning at the end “the manifesto issued by the reconstruction conference in Berne”, which clearly refers to the “appeal” issued by the aforementioned Berne meeting of seven parties. The appeal included a passage stating that the parties, which made up the organization then known as the Second International, misinterpret the theory of the historical inevitability of the revolutionary class struggle and restrict the proletariat within the framework of democratic means without paying heed to the specificities of individual nations and individual phases of development and thus, in effect, are rejecting the proletariat’s revolutionary struggle for seizing political power.”(10) The letter from MacDonald and others quoted this passage, and countered that the accusation was “completely groundless” and that “the Second International has always recognized that the means may vary according to historical situations.” There is, moreover, a “personal” letter believed to have been written by MacDonald a little while earlier. In it he expressed disagreement with the manifesto issued at Berne. His reasons were, first, that the British Labour Party and other organizations belonging to the Second International were excluded and, secondly, that whole truths were not told about various parties’ activities during the Fig. 42: Friedrich Adler. war. McDonald’s letter went on to plead, however, “Is there really any sense in continuing this public quarrel (over matters such as the dictatorship of the proletariat)? Would it not be better for both sides to patiently discuss the situation and face up to the real difficulties?”(11) The ad-

136

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV Vienna dressee was left blank, but the context becomes readily understandable if one assumes Friedrich Adler to have been the intended addressee.

2 Adler’s response is found in a lengthy open letter “What Separates Us from the Second International” addressed to MacDonald which was carried in his party’s organ Der Kampf (Struggle) and the USPD’s organ Freiheit (Freedom). Since MacDonald’s letter that is referred to therein is dated “December 20th,” it is without doubt the aforementioned “personal letter,” and not the letter cosigned by Henderson and others, dated 30th.(12) Explaining the reasons why he had rejected organizations belonging to the Second International, Adler begins anew with their positions during the war. As you know, he said, “a large majority of the leaders of the working class were exploited for imperialistic aimes.” “From this mistake the proletariat can learn a lesson for the future” and that “the only question that remains is in which ways can the belief shared by both sides that social chauvinism must be eradicated be rendered most effective.” However, the Berne Conference of February 1919 was “completely taken over by the political parties controlled by social chauvinism.” “What has to be constantly emphasized is the fact that the International does not exist today.” The International in Moscow was, as it has itself publicly stated, nothing more than the Communist Party’s central organ, and its methods were creating fresh acts of folly every day. At the same time, the remaining ruin of the Second International was “essentially nothing more than a union of political parties that still have not rejected social chauvinism.” Adler went on to point out he had reached the conclusion that ”he can no longer bear to belong to the same international union as the rightist socialists(13) who even recently committed crimes through Noske,” and that this conclusion was “the result of a deep-rooted popular movement.” Under such circumstances, Adler stated, “for us who are opposed to both ‘the Second’ and ‘the Third’ … there was no other way but to reject parties that still belonged to the Second International.”(14) It can be gathered from this letter, that he considered MacDonald, who had been critical of the Labour Party’s majority faction during the war, to be a reasonable individual he could discuss matters with. All the

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

137

Part II more, therefore, he did not conceal his surprise that MacDonald had suddenly become the secretary-general of the Second International. This reaction was to be expected. For MacDonald had been known not only during the war but also afterwards as a staunch critic of the leaders of the “Second” who had collaborated with war efforts. If only in that respect, he was even sympathetic toward the “Third”. But the developments thereafter show that MacDonald arguably became the “Second’s” savior. How did that come about? It can be gathered from his work Parliamentarism and Revolution published in the summer of 1919 that he had begun to distance himself from the Bolsheviks, or the “Third” In it, he raised the question that it might not be possible under the Soviet system to select people capable of handling nation’s serious problems, even as he conceded how inefficient a system parliament was. He objected to the dictatorship of the proletariat becoming a permanent system, rather than an ad hoc measure in the face of an emergency. He was arguably the first among the “leftists” to begin regarding the Bolshevik revolution with some detachment. That said, one cannot overlook that his statements during consultations among the executive committees of the three Internationals (see Chapter VI) held after 1922 were more scathing toward the “Second”.(15) Let us, at this point, backtrack six months in time to examine anew the adoption of 21-article “conditions for participation” at the 2nd Congress of the Comintern from July to August. The 7th Article therein, referring to Turati, Kautsky, Hilferding, Longuet, MacDonald and others by name, had said “the Communist International cannot tolerate (such) notorious opportunists having the right to consider themselves members of the Third International.”(16) As stated earlier, the socialist parties of various countries were moving away from the “Second” by 1920.(17) Nevertheless the 21-article conditions for participation unsettled the ranks of those parties. In the case of Germany’s USPD, Crispien attended the 2nd congress of the Comintern to negotiate with the “Third” but was not able to give in to these “conditions for participation.” At the party’s congress in Halle in October 1920, heated discussions arose around the 21-article “conditions for participation.” In the event, with 236 votes to 156, Ernst Däumig and others of the majority faction opted to take part in the “Third” by joining forces with the Communist Party of Germany (KPD),(18) making Crispien, Kautsky, Hilferding and others the

138

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV Vienna minority faction. The party leader Haase was not to witness his party’s splitup, having fallen to a rightist assassin’s bullet in the autumn of 1919. At its extraordinary congress in 1919, as it was mentioned earlier, the Swiss Social-democratic Party decided to withdraw from the “Second”, but it rejected participation in the “Third” by its members’ vote. At its extraordinary congress in December 1920, Grimm delivered a long discourse casting doubt on the 21article conditions for participation, and the leftists did their best to counter his arguments, but by 350 votes to 213, it again rejected participation in the “Third”.(19)

Fig. 43: Giacinto Serrati (right) and Leon Trotsky.

Fig. 44: Filippo Turati.

The French Socialist Party, although a sentiment critical of the “Second” made up a majority, had not yet reached the point of joining the “Third” as of February 1920. But when Cachin and Frossard went to Moscow to assess the situation on the occasion of the Third Interrnational’s 2nd congress, it appears they were run over by Lenin. At its congress in Tours in December, participation in the Third International was adopted by a vote of 3,208 to 1,022 leading to the birth of the French Communist Party. A telegram from the Comintern Executive Committee signed by Zinoviev, Lenin and others and dated December 24th, which was read out at that congress, rejected as “reformists” people

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

139

Part II like Longuet and Faure who had been leaders of the party’s majority faction. Now the minority faction, those men thus excluded went on to lead the French Socialist Party.(20) Within the Italian Socialist Party, it was Serrati who was pushing for participation in the “Third” but he got into an argument with Lenin when he attended the Comintern’s 2nd congress. When he took the floor to state that Turati and others were still comrades so that he could not do anything to split up the party, Lenin interjected sharply, “Let’s do away with sentimentality (Sentimentalität).” But Serrati stuck to his guns, arguing with regard to the 21articles that the particular conditions of all individual nations should be taken into consideration. At the Italian party’s congress in Livorno (Leghorn) in January 1921, with people supporting the “Third” delivering one address after another to set the tone, the resolution by Turati and others critical of the Bolsheviks received only 14,695 votes. However, the resolution by Serrati and others, who despite their sympathy with the Russian revolution were determined to maintain party unity inclusive of Turati and his supporters garnered the support of 98,028 votes. On the other hand, the resolution by Amadeo Bordiga and others calling for participation in the “Third” and rejection of “reformists” received no more than 58,783 votes. Four days later, this minority faction formed the Italian Communist Party, and it was decided that the central committee would be comprised of the “Ordine Nuovo” group of Bordiga and Antonio Gramsci of Turin, among others.(21) The Socialist Party thus split up despite efforts by Serrati and others. In Italy, too, where chaos reigned as movements on both left and right gathered momentum, the occupation of a factory by workers had been put down in April of the previous year, and in December, the city hall, which was a stronghold of the Socialist Party, was attacked by Fascists. Their acts of violence were spreading steadily.(22) Amidst such developments over the conditions for participation in the Comintern, the British Independent Labour Party, Germany’s USPD, the Swiss Social-democratic Party and the German-Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party all reached the conclusion by October to November 1920 that an international conference should be held toward the realization of an all-inclusive International, even though the parties still remained critical of both the “Second” and the “Third”.(23) Let us examine in greater detail what happened at the

140

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV Vienna resulting seven-party conference that took place in Berne in December. Delegates were sent to this conference by the following seven parties. • Germany’s USPD (Crispien, Hilferding, Ledebour, Rosenfeld) • German-Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party (F. Adler, Bauer) • French Socialist Party (Faure, Longuet) • British Indepenent Labour Party (Johnson, Shinwell, Wallhead) • Russia’s Social-democratic Workers Party (Martov) • Swiss Social-democratic Party (Graber, Grimm, Huggler, Reinhard) • Czechoslovak Republic’s German Social-democratic Workers Party (Ĉermak) On December 7th, they issued an “appeal to the socialist parties of all nations.”(24) It first asserted that since “the war has given rise to a system of (capitalist) worlddomination that directly confronts the proletarian revolution, it is necessary to bring together all the forces of the world proletariat” to counter it. Then it concluded that the “Second” no longer existed, dismissing the organization that still carried that name as “nothing more Fig. 45: Emma Goldman. than a gathering of the purely reformist, nationalistic elements.” On the other hand, it was also critical toward the “Third” which “subjugates the autonomy of individual socialist parties to the international central committee endowed with total dictatorial power…while ignoring the diversity of the specific conditions of the class struggles in individual countries.” The delegates from the seven parties who shared “a view consistent with the spirit of revolutionary Marxism,” therefore, appealed for participation in an international socialist congress to be held in Vienna on February 22nd 1921 “in order to realize the formation of a true International of the class-conscious proletariat.” The Berne Conference was characterized as a “preliminary conference” for the Vienna Congress. Participation was open to all socialist parties that had withdrawn from the “Second”. It was this point that made MacDonald

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

141

Part II protest that his party had been excluded.(25) A sub-committee made up of Adler, Grimm, Ledebour and Wallhead, which was set up during the preliminary conference, held a meeting in Innsbruck from 8th to 10th of Janaury 1921 to finalize the details, and drafted an invitation dated January 10th signed by the four men.(26) The Vienna International Socialist Congress took place at the “Workers House (Arbeiterheim)”(27) in the Favoriten District in the city’s southern part from 22nd to 27th of February 1921. Probably, the aforementioned open letter from Adler to MacDonald was published during this congress. The congress was attended by 82 delegates representing 20 parties from 20 countries or territories.(28) The delegates’ countries / territories were as follows (key people’s names and their organizations inside brackets). • Germany (USPD—Crispien, Dittmann, Henke, Hilferding. Ledebour, Lipinski, Luise Zietz and 3 others) • Britain (Independent Labour Party—Shinwell, Wallhead and 3 others) • France (Socialist Party—Faure, Longuet, Mistral, Renaudel and 1 other) • Yugoslavia (Slovenian Social-democratic Party—2, Croatian-Slavonia Socialist Workers Party—1, Serbian Social-democratic Party—4) • Latvia (Social-democratic Workers Party—2) • General Jewish Workers Union (Bund) (1) • Lithuania (Leftist Social Revolutionary Party—2) • Austria (German-Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party—Adler, Bauer, Ellenbogen and 9 others) • Poale Zion (4) • Romania (Bukovina Province International Social-democracy Organization—3, Transylvanian Socialist Party—1, Romanian Socialist Party—1, Banat Socialist Party—2) • Russia (Social-democratic Workers Party {Mensheviks}—Martov, Abramovitch and 2 others, SR Leftists—4) • Switzerland (Social-democratic Party—Grimm, Naine and 4 others) • Czechoslovakia (German Social-democratic Party—Ĉermak and 8 others) • Hungary (Group in exile “Világosság”—4)

142

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV Vienna No delegates from Italy. It was Adler who first took the floor at the Congress which opened late in the afternoon of the 22nd under Longuet’s chairmanship. He urged the delegates to recall that a congress of the Second International was to have taken place in Vienna in July 1914, but an ultimatum to Serbia issued from the very city had ignited a world conflict. Realized in Vienna was not the congess, but the “death of the Second International.” He welcomed all the more, he said, the fact that socialists across international borders could gather in that city, including in particular socialists from Serbia for the first time since then. His arguments for a truly inclusive International reiterate, more or less, his views that have already been discussed, so it should suffice here to single out those points that he elaborated on further. Turning to the pejorative label “centrists” that the “Third” had applied to his group, Adler gave a positive definition of his “centrist” position as standing between a “faction of naïve impatience that believes desire for a social revolution guarantees its victory (Moscow)” and a “faction of skeptical non-believers who think a social revolution impossible, only reformism left.” He did not hesitate to criticize the “Second” harshly, but as he himself used to belong to that group, he reasoned that its failure could not be ascribed to individual personalities, but should be interpreted in the context of historical conditions. Therefore, he wanted to speak in a tone different from the aggressive attacks of the “Third” in the “language of military barracks (Kasernenhofton).” The parties gathered here express not only a “unifying principle,” but also a variety of differences they espouse within. Against the “divide and rule” policy of Caesar-like Moscow, Adler concluded, we should “unite toward victory” in the true Marxist spirit. His speech was greeted with thunderous applause. As he pointed out, represented at the meeting was “one-third of the world proletariat” besides the “Second” and the “Third”. Adler also judged, however, that the task at hand would be extremely difficult to achieve, even as he mentioned that it had taken 17 years to organize the “Second” after the break-up of “the First.” He was so serious that he was even careful not to inject any humor into his speech.(29) On January 15 1921, immediately after the invitation to the Vienna Congress was sent off to its addressees, the Comintern published a document entitled “On the ‘Second and a half International,’ A New Attempt at Interna-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

143

Part II tional Deception” in the name of its executive committee (chairman Zinoviev), dismissing the efforts of Adler and others.(30) At any rate the conference , as did the previous congresses of the International, began with the issues of how to assess of letters of proxy (whom to recognize as delegates of which parties) and how many votes allotted to different delegations. Regarding the latter, Germany, Britain and France were allotted 10 votes each, Austria and Russia eight each, Switzerland seven and Lithuania the least with one. Relatively large numbers of votes were given to the parties comprising the main forces behind the convening of this conference. The issue of who represented which country was by its nature more difficult to clarify. With regard to Hungary for example, Adler who reported on a proposal prepared by his sub-committee said the Communists had already gone into exile in Russia, and although a political party under the Horthy regime was engaged in legitimate activities, calling itself the “Socialdemocratic Party,” and maintaining close ties with “the Second International,” it was not worth considering. That being the case, Adler said as he presented his sub-committee’s conclusion on the issue, that he would like to approve the participation of “Világos Association” represented by Kunfi Zsigmond as a full-fledged delegation of a “party” even if it is also in exile, as it agrees with the basic policy line of the conference. This was greeted by shouts of approval.(31) On the agenda item entitled “the method and organization of class struggle,” a sub-committee had drafted a proposal. It was once again Adler who took the floor to explain it. The long discourse expounded on his theories, but for now it would suffice to note the points he clarified anew. The first point is his assertion that rather than create another International like the “Second” or “the “Third,” they should for the time being establish an international working union of socialist parties (Arbeitsgemeinschaft). In the background was his pride that in Austria, unlike in other countries, 95 per cent of the proletariat continued to rally under the Social-democratic Workers Party with only a small minority going over to the Communist Party, thereby averting a “split-up, the worst scenario.” Moreover, the Austrian Labor Council (equivalent to Russia’s Soviet) has been a forum where socialdemocrats and communists came together and debated, he stated. Based on

144

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV Vienna that experience, he would like to see an “executive committee” formed, in which all the countries would be represented so that accurate information can be exchanged, he proposed. His second point was that the so-called Third International should be considered a counterpart to negotiate with, even as he firmly rejected its coercive top-down way of insisting on the 21 article conditions for participation. Negotiations with the “Second”, which was founded on “narrow reformism and fatalistic democracy” as revealed at its Geneva Congress, should take place thereafter. His position was that judgment should be based not on such abstract slogans as “democracy or dictatorship,” but on insight into the particular “historical conditions” of individual countries. More specifically, his assertion was that without an International that included the proletariat of both Britain and Russia, it was not possible to resist the world-wide bourgeois counterrevolution. His speech was greeted by “thunderous cheers and applause.”(32) During the debate on his speech, the SR leftist Alexander Schreider (residing in Rome), while still holding the Soviet system in high esteem, said it had changed into a reign of terror in Russia, while Kunfi drawing on his experiences stated that a will toward a revolution was not enough, as without the right set of conditions, it would only result in defeat. It is quite interesting that the Serbian Social-democratic Party’s Živko Topalović, in criticizing the Russian situation from a similar standpoint, used the expression “Asiatic” terrorism. Also taking their turns to explain why they leave the “Second” and would not join the “Third” were Crispien, Shinwell and Faure. While they differed in their points of emphasis, their statements on the whole supported Adler’s speech. The key points of their arguments were as follows. 1) Capitalism is critically threatening the livelihood of the working masses. 2) The only way out of this condition is the realization of socialism. 3) To that end it is necessary to realize a true International. 4) Since the “Second” collaborated with the war and has still not rectified that position, we have no choice but to reject it. 5) We recognize that the true flowering of democracy can only take place in a classless socialist society and that “dictatorship of the proletariat” is necessary in the transitional stage from capitalism to socialism. But

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

145

Part II what the “Third” is carrying out under that name is nothing but a reign of terror that has nothing to do with the ideas of Marx. 6) International cooperation of the proletariat is without question essential but that is in “spirit,” and the poltical parties of the nations should enjoy the autonomy to act according to their individual objective conditions. But the “Third” is making the International a forum for the Soviet government’s propaganda. Consequently, we cannot accept the “21article” conditions imposed by the “Third”.(33) The nine-article proposal entitled “The Method and Organization of Class Struggle” drafted by Adler’s subcommittee and presented by him, was adopted unanimously albeit after expressions of some doubt. The congress also debated and voted on “Imperialism and Social Revolution,” but no more for details. The international organization established as a result of this congress was called “International Working Union (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) of Socialist Parties” and its by-laws were also adopted.(34) It began to publish a periodical in April, putting more effort into public relations activities than the “Second” was doing.(35)

3 Let us now trace the moves on the part of the “Second” Its “executive committee” held a Meeting in a conference room of the Labour Party headquarters in London to discuss financial issues in particular, along with reactions to MacDonald’s letter “to the Socialist and Communist Parties of the world” and with the Vienna Congress. According to its report, parties from Argentina, Finland and Spain had already left the “Second”. “Political parties which consider themselves to be members appear to be the following parties,” it said in a tone far from confident. They numbered 15. Of these, however, only participants from Britain, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden were the mainstream political parties in their respective countries. It is interesting that the three other than the combatant countries are of the “North group” during the war. As urgent items on the agenda, the “reparation issue” at the League of Nations and

146

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV Vienna national issues that had emerged in the Upper Silesia and Georgia were taken up.(36) From March 30th to April 1st a meeting was held in the coffeeshop “Café Parkzicht” near Amsterdam’s National Art Museum with Henderson as chairman (as Branting was absent due to illness).(37) Ten days earlier in London, it had been decided to invite delegates from the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and from parliaments of the nations concerned to deliberate on the “reparation issue”. But since the former refused to sit for a joint conference with just the “Second,” the conference only saw the participation of eight parliamentary delegates or “experts” from Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, in addition to members of the “executive committee.”(38) On the “reparation issue” involving Germany, the key item on the conference agenda, the hard-line French government and the moderate British government had been trying to work out a compromise position in a series of conferences held by the Allied powers since 1920, although they remained consistent in their stance that they would not shirk from resorting to military force if Germany should resist. Furthermore, at a conference that began in mid-February 1921 in London, to which a German government delegation was unexpectedly invited, nevertheless was the Germans’ reparation proposal rejected in early March.(39) In Germany a national election, held in June the previous year amidst a chaotic political situation following the Kapp Putsch, had resulted in a loss of Reichstag seats for the SPD, forcing Herman Müller to give up his plan to form a cabinet, so that the government was now in the hands of the Centrist Party leadership. Matthias Erzberger (a Centre Party leftist) who signed the Treaty of Versailles was assassinated in August the same year, and Walter Rathenau (German Democratic Party), who, as foreign minister in the Wirth cabinet, was pushing an “implementation policy” in response to the Allied powers’ reparation demands, also assassinated in June 1922, both by right-wing ultra-nationalists.(40) The task of Amsterdam Conference was to formulate the “Second’s” position with regard to the “reparation issue” against a background of mounting international tensions and national economies far below pre-war standards.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

147

Part II An “expert committee” comprising de Broukère, Wels, Troelstra and MacDonald was formed to work on the draft of their proposal. These men met on the night of the 30th. When Troelstra as the meeting’s moderator tried to raise, yet again, the issue of Germany and her allies’ responsibility for starting the war, Wels countered with the argument that for the International side to cite the text of the Treaty of Versailles was to contradict its stated opposition to the Treaty. The “war responsibility” issue has already been settled at the Geneva Conference, he said. The Statement on the “reparation issue” published by the British Labour Party should be based on our proposal. That statement pointed out and expressed concern that the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles had become a major obstacle in the way of Europe’s economic recovery.(41) Wels went on to assert that the recovery of devastated territories being the most immediate task, it was necessary to recognize that Germany should make “fair compensation (Wiedergutmachung),”(42) and to come up with a solution that would be acceptable for workers of all nations. One gets the impression that Wels, who had been on the defensive over the “war responsibility” issue since the Berlin Congress of 1919, always explaining his country’s position, finally turned to the offensive. After a drawn-out debate lasting hours, a new resolution was drafted based on a proposal by de Broukère (who had already expressed an understanding for SPD’s position) and Wels, to be taken up at a joint conference of the executive committee and parliamentary delegates on the 31st, the following day. At that conference, attended also by Müller, estimates of the amounts of reparations the Allied Powers were demanding from Germany and the projected negative impact these would have on the economic recovery of Europe as a whole were discussed in terms of specific figures. One matter of concern, and also a point of serious contention in inter-governmental negotiations, was the coal production and supply situation in the Ruhr region. The resolution adopted unanimously at the joint conference of the executive committee and parliamentary delegates on April 1st (43) approved first of all the statement by Germany’s SPD that “we will meet fair demands for reparation.” It went on to reiterate that the breakdown of the reparations talks in London was the work of the capitalist Allied Powers, and then stated: “The amounts of reparations and the methods of payment should be based upon treaties between the parties concerned, as enforcement would never bring truly satisfactory results.”

148

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

IV Vienna It also said adjustments should be left in the hands of an expert committee of the League of Nations. Furthermore, it renewed a call for Germany to be a member of the League of Nations. But, as Shaw stated in a meeting with parliamentary delegates,(44) since only governments had the authority to settle reparation issues, one could not make demands on the French government, for instance, in the name of the French working class. On the night of April 1st, a meeting took place between the International Federation of Trade Unions’ leaders, who had agreed to an exchange of views at the last minute, and the “executive committee” at the IFTU hall situated also in Amsterdam. Serving as moderator was J. H. Thomas, a British Labour Party member of parliament and president of the IFTU. He stated that the statement issued by the IFTU itself on the “reparations issue” (in mid-March) is essentially as same as the statement adopted here. The IFTU had reacted negatively to the appeal from the “Second” because it had decided not to “negotiate solely with either ‘the Second’ or the ‘Second and a half ’(45)”. It should avoid favoring one or the other of the two political currents so as not to bring about an internal split, so the International in Vienna should be invited to today’s meeting, he said. He wished to know if his role as a mediator between the two was welcome. Henderson replied, while maintaining that his side had not been responsible for the split-up, that as an “executive committee” member he welcomed Thomas’ proposal. They waited for two hours, then Thomas, who had contacted the people in Vienna reported to the meeting. They turned down the invitation.(46)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

149

V London

V

London – Feelers by the British Labour Party, 1921–1922 –

1 The next meeting of the “executive committee” of the “Second” took place at the Labour Party headquarters in London on June 27th and 28th 1921, about four months after the International Socialist Congress in Vienna.(1) Though Huysmans and Branting were absent, Henderson, MacDonald and Wels were there to take up, first of all, the “reparation issue.” As already mentioned, the “Second’s” position on this issue was established at the Amsterdam Conference in March.(2) But the Allied powers had set the total amount of reparations at 132 billion marks and presented it to the German government as an ultimatum. In May, the new cabinet under Wirth accepted it, having no other choice. In the face of this reality, the “executive committee’s” resolution asserted that since a government which promised to fulfill its reparations obligation was now in power, the Allied governments should end their “sanction.” Next, on the unification of the International, it was resolved that the Party explore possibilities for solidarity with the “Vienna Working Union.” This was based on the resolution the Labour Party had adopted at its annual congress in Brighton which had just ended, that the “Second” be strengthened and “be made to accept the democratic foundation to compete against dictatorship.”(3) The executive committee of the “Second” is willing to resign for the sake of unification, if the “International Working Union of Socialist Parties” (“Vienna Working Union”) is prepared to do the same, it said. A proposal was also made to hold a conference in London in October. This resolution at the Labour Party congress was transmitted right away, dated June 28th, to the other parties concerned. On the same date, Henderson’s letter to Adler was sent off.(4) In response, Adler sent a letter dated July 14th, which reflected the arguments presented at a meeting of the “Vienna Working Union” secretariat that had just taken place (8th to 11th July in Frankfurt) .(5) Citing first of all article 6. of this International’s bylaws, adopted at the Vienna Congress, that “member parties cannot individually hold consultations on participation with other

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

151

Part II international organizations,” the letter said it was highly unlikely that individual political parties would express agreement with Henderson’s proposal. What about, then, the position of the “Vienna Working Union?” It was not about to dismantle its position of basic principle, which was as follows. The objective of establishing a comprehensive International is to enhance the power of the international proletariat in their fight against the international bourgeoisie and overcome the capitalist ruling class of all nations. The conditions for the proletariat’s fight, as the resolution of the Vienna Congress makes clear, vary from country to country. Therefore, there is little significance in counterposing “democratic principles” against “dictatorial principles” in an abstract and erroneous way. Unification must be achieved based on a shared understanding of principles, but the difference between “reformism and revolutionism” separates the “Second” from the “Vienna Working Union.” However, Adler did add that as exchange of information was necessary, he would be glad to take part in a meeting with the British Labour Party’s executive committee at a venue completely separate from the conference proposed by Henderson.(6) In his reply dated July 29th, Henderson welcomed Adler’s overture, and proposed holding a meeting between the Labour Party executive committee and the “Vienna Working Union” secretariat in London on October 13th. Moreover he sent a note dated August 5th on the upcoming meeting with the “Vienna Working Unit” to the “Second’s” member parties, and explained that the meeting was an entity separate from the general congress for the reconstruction of the Second International that the Labour Party had been planning for.(7) Even as Henderson and Adler were exchanging these letters, a wide variety of other messages were flying back and forth across international borders. But let us follow the negotiations between London and Vienna a little further. On September 12th, Adler belatedly replied, with apologies for the delay, that he accepted the invitation to the meeting between the Labour Party executive committee and the “Vienna Working Union” in London, in case no other conference was being held at the time. On the 15th Henderson responded in turn that he was making preparations, having changed the meeting date to October 18th as requested. It is clear from his letter to Adler dated 30th that the latter finally agreed after an exchange of telegrams.(8)

152

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V London The wide variety of exchanges may be narrowed down to two points worth noting here. One is the reaction of the national parties to Henderson’s letter to member parties of the “Second” dated June 28th. Those which agreed with Henderson’s proposal at the time to hold a meeting in London in October were Armenia (Dashnaktsutiun, or Armenian Revolutionary Federation), Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Italy (anti-mainstream faction), Poland, the Ukraine and Denmark. Sweden, while expressing agreement, nevertheless replied that the timing might be “premature.” Those which gave membership in the “Vienna Working Union” as the reason for refusing to attend were Austria, Latvia and Greece. Among the few which deferred their decision was, interestingly, the French Socialist Party’s Faure who had at least bothered to reply. That was because Faure and his supporters joined the “Vienna Working Union” after that party’s majority faction had joined the “Third”. Russia’s SR group was also a member of the “Vienna Working Union,” but Rubanovich, a key figure in that party, could only express his personal agreement as he was in exile. The Turkish Socialist Party, which had sent delegates to the “Vienna Working Union’s” inaugural congress, said it was sending delegates to the London meeting since it had decided to remain in the “Second”.(9) During this chaotic period, it was becoming increasingly unclear as to whether or not socialist parties claiming to represent some countries were justified by the actual situations, and whether or not they could even claim to be socialist parties. The other point concerns the activities of Münzenberg. Willi Münzenberg joined youth movements during World War I and became a member of the Communist Party of Germany and a Comintern activist after the war, but it is known that he was not necessarily a loyal believer. In any case, he sent a telegram to the “Second” from his operational centre in Berlin, asking the latter to send a delegate to a consultative meeting on August 30th for the purpose of establishing an “external committee” in Berlin for “organizing relief activities by workers” to alleviate the famine in Russia. That move was based on a “resolution of the Comintern executive committee.” The message was supposedly addressed not just to the “Second” but to all “proletarian organizations.”(10) A flurry of letters and telegrams travelled back and forth among the “Second’s” key figures.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

153

Part II Prior to that, MacDonald had sent letters to “comrades” of the “Second” to pay heed to the famine in Russia. Also the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) in Amsterdam, had resolved at its congress on August 13th and 14th that they themselves could undertake activities for the relief of Russia’s starving people. While MacDonald did not refuse Münzenberg’s invitation outright, he replied that he himself could not attend, but he did take the trouble to urge Wels to attend. Wels’ reply was a blunt refusal. Jan Oudegeest, Head of the IFTU Secretariat, also replied to MacDonald that he would not cooperate as, among other reasons, he had not received a formal invitation from Münzenberg. Those who reacted negatively to Münzenberg’s invitation smelled a “communist conspiracy” and believed relief efforts for the Russian famine should be handled in concert with the “Red Cross.” In his telegram to MacDonald dated August 28th, Münzenberg expressed his regret saying “your absence will delay the unity necessary for relief activities for the proletariat,” and renewed his appeal. On November 5th, he sent an invitation saying another international conference will be held in Berlin on the 27th of that month. If it had been Münzenberg’s intention to overcome the split in the International, that did not come to pass. On the other hand, relief activities addressing the Russian famine were spreading in Fig. 46: Willi Münzenberg. “the West.” These included activities undertaken by the American Relief Agency (ARA) led by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover in response to an appeal by the Russian author Maxim Gorky.(11)

2 The meeting between the “Vienna Working Union” and the Labour Party executive committee, in which Henderson had asked Adler to take part, took place on October 19th and 20th in London’s Caxton Hall, a meeting place for

154

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V London socialists and trade unions.(12) From the Labour Party, 20 people took part including F.W. Jowett, who served as moderator, Henderson and MacDonald, while the “Vienna Working Union” was represented by eight including Adler, Grimm (Switzerland), Longuet (France), Ledebour (German) and Wallhead (Britain). Jowett, while taking into account the discussions the Labour Party had been having with the “Vienna Working Union” so far, spoke of the efforts the Labour Party had been making toward the reconstruction of the International. He then asked whether “there is something essential” that set the Labour Party and the “Vienna Working Union” apart. Adler took the floor to express his deep gratitude toward the Labour Party for the invitation, and went on to point out the difference in the situation between Britain and the continent. While the Labour Party represented all of the British proletariat in Britain, the parties on the continent, save for Austria, were split within their countries. The “Vienna Working Union,” while it was distinct from the “Second” as well as the “Third,” did not consider itself an International in its own right. Therefore this meeting was for the purpose of “exchange of information,” and not aimed at the “reconstruction” of the International, he explained. The Labour Party’s Tom Shaw then reiterated that his party’s intention was to rally together all organizations not linked to the “Third” and sought for the agreement of the “Vienna Working Union.” However, the “Vienna Working Union’s” view was, as Ledebour explained even as he expressed sympathy with Shaw, that if one rejected communists, it would only result in two Internationals. At the same time, Ledebour did not conceal his feeling of bitterness over the situation in Germany where his party the UDSP was being subjected to accusations and attacks by the Communist Party. But there was greater criticism against the Social Democratic “rightists” on “the side of the bourgeoisie” than against the “putschism” and “terrorism” of the Communist Party. It seems that he was pessimistic about the prospects along the lines of his belief, including the activities of the “Vienna Working Union.” MacDonald, while expressing understanding for Ledebour’s view, nevertheless went on to argue fervently as follows. Whether on the part of the “Second” or of the “Third” if it was saying “we reject all those who do not belong to what we belong to,” the Labour Party rejected precisely that way of thinking. In response, Longuet citing the German case, pointed out that the disagreement between USPD and the majority SPD even reached the point of armed con-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

155

Part II flict, a situation under which it was difficult to act as though “we are all old friends.” At the same time, he said those parties which belonged to neither the “Second” nor to the “Vienna Working Union,” like the Italian Party in particular, should also be considered. When Adler, at the chairman’s prompting, resumed his argument that his group and the Labour Party shared the same objective, but had different methods, Henderson lost his patience and interjected: “It seems further argument would be a waste of time.” It prompted Emanuel Shinwell of the British Independent Labour Party to urge him to calm down. The debate continued thereafter, but the conference eventually came to a close with Adler saying he would present his group’s position in a document to avoid misunderstanding. Delivered in the evening of the 20th, that document was evaluated by members of the “International” and a document in reply was handed to the “Vienna Working Union.” Based on these, let us summarize their respective views at this point.(13) The “Vienna Working Union,” in its desire for “the unification of all of the forces of the class-conscious proletariat into a single international alliance,” is aiming for an objective at a level higher than the Labour Party’s concept. The executive committee of the “Second” says it is ready to dissolve the “Second” if necessary, but the executive committee of the “Vienna Working Union” has neither been requested to take similar action nor has any intention of dissolving itself. On the possibility of creating a comprehensive International, the situation on the continent is far more complex than that in Britain. But the fact that the proletarian forces rallied together in Germany after the Kapp Putsch and the Erzberger assassination would seem to suggest the possibility of a “joint struggle.” In the same manner, the Union would like to maintain an “exchange of information” for promoting a “joint struggle” with regard to counter-revolution, imperialistic exploitation and the Russian famine among other things. In return, the document signed by Henderson asserts thus. The Labour Party also desires the creation of a comprehensive International, having, for instance, sent an invitation to the Italian Socialist Party. It is also keeping in view even the dissolution of the “Second”. But this time, it chose not to invite the communists.(14) It is clear that the aim of the “Vienna Working Union” is to prevent real progress toward international unification “until the communists soften their position to enable their collaboration with all other socialist

156

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V London parties of the world.” It expresses its regret that it cannot “defend such an indefinite postponement.” Thus the Labour Party’s attempt to “reconstruct the International” stalled once again due to, in its opinion, the refusal of the “Vienna Working Union” side. In his letter to Branting who did not attend, MacDonald wrote: “The conference was fruitless.” Upon the publication of the documents by the “Vienna Working Union” and the Labour Party, the “Second” stated that the London conference “was a failure.”(15)

3 Responding to that outcome, the next meeting of the “Second’s” executive committee was held on November 22nd and 23rd in Brussels.(16) It was attended among others by MacDonald and Huysmans of the Secretariat, along with Vandervelde (Belgium, moderator), Wels and Stauning (Denmark). First of all MacDonald, touching on the London Conference with the “Vienna Working Union,” declared that if the “Vienna Working Union” insisted on participating only as an international organization, the Labour Party would not participate as a single party in conferences concerning the International, nor would it agree to any “reconstruction proposal” that would weaken the “Second”. The record of the meeting includes pieces of information based on informal contacts made by de Broukère, Vandervelde and Wels among others. One was that when the British Labour Party’s Shaw and Ledebour of Germany’s USPD attended the 19th Congress of the French Socialist Party held from October 29th to November 1st in Paris, the delegates expressed an “enthusiastic” approval for the former.(17) Another was how Germany’s USPD looked as though it might split into leftist and rightist factions, and yet another was that sympathy toward the “Second” was growing in Italy, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland as well. Based on such information, Belgium’s Vandervelde drafted the conclusion. Its basis was his assessment that a serious financial crisis was about to come, and his assertion that in order to deal with it, it would be entirely in order to convene a “congress of all socialist parties.” Wels thanked Vandervelde for his proposal, even as he pointed out that militarists were still powerful in Germany. The final resolution, adopted on the basis of the proposal, called for

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

157

Part II the promotion of “disarmament,” which was showing no progress despite the Washington Conference of Allied powers (which had opened in early November, 1921), and for the early convening of a congress of the “Second” to deal with the anticipated financial collapse. It appears that people were now focusing on moves on the part of the French Socialist Party. This can be gathered from the resolution adopted by the “Vienna Working Union” at its conference held in Frankfurt, as well as from reactions to it. Responding to the French Socialist Party’s proposal toward the unification of the International, the resolution(18) proposed holding in Paris a conference of the parties from Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, German-Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In his letter to Henderson dated December 22nd, Faure asked for the support of the Labour Party which meant a great deal. Vandervelde, in his letter to MacDonald on the 25th, told him that the conditions for holding a general congress of the International were more favorable than ever. Renaudel, too, said in his letter to MacDonald that although his party had left the “Second”, it had never missed an opportunity for rapprochement. The Labour Party executive committee wrote to Faure that neither the “Second” nor the “Vienna Working Union” would become the convener, implicitly placing his hopes on an initiative by the French Socialist Party.(19) But there was also cause for concern. For instance, R. Lindström of the Swedish Social-democratic Workers Party conveyed to London his strong dissatisfaction with the exclusion of the Scandinavian nations from the “Vienna Working Union’s” proposal. Wels was apparently quite concerned, alerting Branting and Stauning among others to the situation. His way of thinking is clearly expressed in his letter to MacDonald dated December 21st.(20) To wit, in order for the International to deal with the European economic crisis initiated by reparations imposed on Germany, the participation of Scandinavian nations which are also fighting through an economic crisis would be absolutely essential. Let us then hold a conference on January 16th 1922, MacDonald must have proposed as it is learned from a letter expressing basic agreement with the proposal, signed jointly by Faure and Vandervelde.(21) The time appeared ripe for the unification of the International. As if to seize the initiative, the “Vienna Working Union” secretariat disseminated a document addressed to “Labour Parties of All Countries” which

158

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V London proposed holding a conference of the three Internationals aimed at the unification of international activities by the working class. The background situation was that the aforementioned Brighton resolution of the British Labour Party, the resolution of the French Socialist Party’s Paris congress in November 1921 and the resolution of the Italian Socialist Party’s executive meeting on the 23rd had all called for the unification of the International. In addition, the “united front” policy line that the Communist Party of Germany had proposed to the Comintern executive committee was deemed a favorable factor.(22) One should bear in mind that changes were occurring within the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). As mentioned earlier, it had become a mass political party since the majority faction of the USPD joined back in October 1920. Its name had been changed to the “United Communist Party of Germany.” But it was going through the aftermath of the expulsion of Paul Levi, one of its elected chairmen, from the leadership along with Clara Zetkin and others after he had a disagreement with Lenin. This is because when the armed uprising (“the March struggle”) staged by workers in central Germany the previous month met defeat, these people criticized such action as “putschism” and clashed with the policy of the “Third.” Zetkin was even quite angry in her letter to Lenin. But in response to persuasion by the “Third’s” Zinoviev and others, they were reinstated into the KPD leadership at the Party Congress in August (in Jena). The KPD that set forth the “united front” policy line in December was arguably made up of people who supported the policies of the “Third”. That proposal was to win the Fig. 47: Paul Levi. acceptance of the “Third’s” executive arm. It was Radek, at the time a member of the “Third’s” executive department, who promoted this line. As early as December 6th, he had sent a letter to the KPD leadership urging them to work toward the unification of the International. At the same time, he was maintaining clandestine contact with Levi.(23) The adoption of the united front tactic by the “Third” surely cannot be unrelated to the fact that the Allied powers, which were planning to hold

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

159

Part II a conference on European economic recovery in Genoa the following year, had also invited Russia which had until then been ostracized internationally. Also invited was Germany, again ostracized since the end of World War I. As a matter of fact, on April 16th 1922, Russian and German representatives met in Rapallo, a resort town near Genoa, to restore diplomatic relations, thereby thwarting the Allied powers.(24)

4 In response to the “Vienna Working Union’s” secretariat’s proposal, the British Labour Party’s international department sent a letter to Branting and others to sound them out on the possibility of entering into negotiations with the “Vienna Working Union” and the “Third”.(25) While Shaw of the Labour Party expressed support “in principle,” Huysmans was opposed and Wels was quite skeptical of the KPD’s moves.(26) Serrati and Treves of the Italian Socialist Party had, just several days earlier, announced their “revolutionary” policy line. That policy announcement came amidst a political situation in Italy where, on one hand, the Communist Party of Bordiga, Gramsci, Togliatti and others had come into existence just a year ago and, on the other, the fascist movement was gaining force.(27) In this international situation, actions by the French Socialist Party proved to be the prime moving force. The party’s secretary-general Faure issued an appeal dated January 24th 1922 to convene a “five-nation conference” of Britain, Belgium, France, Italy and Germany, i.e. countries most involved in the “reparations issue.”(28) In the process, the party drafted a “memorandum” on “disarmament” and “economic situation and reparation,” issues that the “Second” had been debating all the time. That conference actually took place at a venue on Boulevard Saint-Germain in Paris from 4th to 6th February, but it was only attended by delegates of the French Socialist Party, the Belgian Workers Party and Britain’s Labour Party and the Independent Labour Party. The Italian Socialist Party cancelled its plan to attend at the last minute. The reason is not clear. But one cannot ignore the fact here that there were voices calling for a general congress of socialists to be held in Italy to counter the Genoa Conference. All the more, the Italian Socialist Party would seem to have continued to wield some influence thereafter.

160

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

V London In Germany, the SPD, the USPD and the Levi group apparently discussed the matter, but in any case, a railway strike prevented their delegates from attending. The conference was also attended by the “Vienna Working Union’s” Adler as an observer. On the other hand, Germany’s KPD, which had indicated its intention to attend, eventually decided not to attend, thus keeping in step with the Italian and French Communist Parties.(29) Following a proposal that it was not the right time to discuss disarmament and reparation issues with only representatives of three nations attending, the conference focused on the single issue, unification of the International. Vandervelde as moderator stated that while he had no objection to negotiating with the “Third”, it was pre-conditioned upon the release of the Mensheviks and SR party members languishing in prisons and restoration of political freedom in Russia.(30) He also argued that just as the “Second” had once decided, “anarchists” should be excluded from the re-organized International as well. This makes logical sense if one were to bear in mind that some had criticized the “Third’s” actions as Bakuninism. France’s Grumbach sounded a warning bell that the “Third’s” united front proposal was only a maneuver and that one should not be tricked. De Broukère argued that the Belgian Workers Party had been able to remain strong because it had kept the communists out, and that one should ask the “Third” whether it accepted such principles as “socialism is impossible without political freedom.” He also denounced the fact that the “Third” was resorting to “cell” operations. In response, Adler expressed his view that the relationship between communists and other forces varied from country to country. The assertion of Vandervelde and others might apply to Western Europe, but not to Central Europe. The Communist Party in France might be a “joke” but not that in the defeated nations. The struggle against Bolshevism would be better carried out by individual nations rather than within the dimensions of the International. He further stated that he had received a feeler that Radek was about to enter into negotiations, leaving aside issues of principle for the time being. Adler bolstered his argument by saying if principles were to be the issue, the “Vienna Working Union” would have to confront the SPD majority faction in particular with an issue over principle. Vandervelde was quick to rebut Adler, stressing that issues of principle cannot be avoided, that unification without trust and sincerity would only provide the bourgeois world with ammunition for denunciation. Recognizing the impossibility of achieving unification by the “Second”

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

161

Part II alone, he went on to argue that one should first aim for the unification of the “Second” with the “Vienna Working Union.” Renaudel expressed his support. At Adler’s proposal, the attending delegates of the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” held a consultation and decided to hold two kinds of conferences in Frankfurt. One was to be a “five-nation conference” to deal with the reparation issue, the other was a meeting of the executive branches of the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union,” the convening of the former being entrusted to the French Socialist Party. In Frankfurt, a meeting of the “Second’s” executive branch was held on the 23rd and 25th of February. At the same time consultation with the “Vienna Working Union” went on, and from the 25th to 27th of February the “five-nation conference” with the reparations issue on the agenda took place.(31) A series of consultations took place between the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union.” On the 23rd, the meeting of the “Second’s” executive committee only reaffirmed the resolution of the Brussels conference in November of the previous year, without reaching a conclusion on the “unification of the International.” On the 24th and 26th, nevertheless, a conference with the “Vienna Working Union” took place in the city hall. Attending from the “Second” were Vandervelde, Shaw, Wels, Huysmans and others, and from the “Vienna Working Union” were Adler, Ledebour, Longuet, Grimm and others. Serrati and others sat in as observers on the 26th. the “Second” responded to the “Vienna Working Union’s” proposal that in its negotiation with the “Third” it reserved the right to raise the issues of the peoples’ right of self-determination and political freedom, which Vandervelde had already raised at the Paris conference 20 days earlier. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached that negotiations between the three Internationals be “held immediately in Berlin.” The “five-nation conference” was attended by delegates from the French Socialist Party, the Belgian Workers Party, the British Labour Party and Independent Labour Party and Germany’s SPD and USPD, Levi and others and Serrati and others of the Italian Socialist Party. And “on the eve of the Genoa Conference” they resolved again to resist the capitalists’ designs with regard to the “recovery of the devastated regions” and “disarmament.”

162

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Berlin

VI Berlin – Consultations among the Three Internationals, April, 1922 – 1 Despite all reservations, it seems the “Second” went on to accept Adler’s concept step by step. This trend was already seen in the decision by such “Vienna Working Union” members as the British Independent Labour Party and Germany’s USPD to send delegates to the conference with the “Second”. Moreover, Adler together with Crispien and Ledebour had already conferred with Radek in Berlin on January 28th and February 13th of 1922. Meanwhile, the “Third” on its part had held meetings with fraternal parties of Germany (Zetkin and others), France and Italy on 19th of January in Berlin on the reparation issue.(1) On March 11th, Adler sent a letter to the “Second” proposing to hold a conference of the executive branches of the three Internationals. The letter was accompanied by a copy of a letter from Radek in Moscow to Adler dated March 8th, which asked Adler to take the initiative based on a decision by the expanded executive committee of the “Third”. The “Third’s” executive committee meeting on March 16th decided to accept Adler’s proposal and drafted detailed instructions on the position that the Comintern delegation was to adopt. According to Adler’s letter to the the “Third’s” executive, the conference of the executive branches of the three Internationals was set for April 2nd. In an exchange of telegrams, the “Third” accepted the “Second’s” proposal for April 2nd instead of March 25th which was inconvenient. The letter ended “with proletarian salutation.”(2) Faced with this turn of the tide, those members of the Mensheviks and SR who had by now no choice but to go into exile dared to express their position. Being not against the unification of the International, they condemned the arrests and trials of their comrades by the Bolsheviks as terror unseen since Czarist times, and demanded that the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” do something to improve the situation in Russia.(3) Elsewhere, Herman Gorter, a leftist of the Netherlands’ Social-democratic Labour Party who had

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

163

Part II collaborated with Henriette Roland Holst during World War I and now trying to set up a “communist workers’ International.” He sent a letter to the SPD demanding that his “fourth” International should also be allowed to take part in the conference in Berlin. The “Second” rejected Gorter’s proposal at its executive committee meeting held in Berlin on April 1st.(4) The conference of the executive committees of the three Internationals took place as scheduled From 2nd to 5th of April 1922 in Room No. 25 of the Reichstag building in Berlin.(5) As explained by Adler, who declared the meeting open at noon of April 2nd, the following four points had been agreed upon in preliminary consultations. 1) From each of the three International’s executive committees, 10 delegates with the right to vote are permitted to attend. 2) Other executive committee members may attend as “guests.” 3) Reporters of the political parties represented in the three executive committees may enter the venue. Reporters of bourgeois newspapers and other reporters may listen in a separate room. 4) Political parties not represented in the three executive committees cannot take part in these discussions. As a singular exception, the Italian Socialist Party may cast one vote and two of its members as “guests” are permitted to attend. This was for the practical reason that voices from several quarters were demanding that the congress of the International under conceptualization be held in Italy. The participants were as follows. The Second International • “Delegates” Huysmans and Vandervelde (Belgium), Stauning (Denmark), Wels (Germany), Gosling, MacDonald and Shaw (Britain), Tsereteli (Georgia), Vliegen (the Netherlands), Möller (Sweden) • “Guests” de Man (Belgium), Adolf Braun, Lütkens and Schiff (Germany), Bevin, Margaret Cox and Gillies (Britain) International Working Union of Socialist Parties (Vienna Working Union) • “Delegates” Crispien (Germany), Wallhead (Britain), Faure and Longuet (France), Kalnins (Latvia), Adler and Bauer (Austria), Martov (Russia), Grimm (Switzerland), Ĉermak (Czechoslovakia)

164

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Berlin • “Guests” Dittmann (Germany), Bracke. Compère-Morel (France), Locker and Kaplansky (Poale Zion), Abramovitch and Schreider (Russia) The Third International • “Delegates” Zetkin (Germany), Frossard and Rosmer (France), Bordiga (Italy), Katayama (Japan), Stojanowits (Yugoslavia), Warski (Poland), Bukharin and Radek (Russia), Šmeral (Czechoslovakia) • “Guests” Bujanowicz and Vujović (Yugoslavia) Italian Socialist Party • “Delegate” Serrati • “Guests” Baratono and Fioritto (Italy)

2 The first addresser was Adler who took a reserved tone in his opening speech. He chose his words carefully, saying the conference was only within the limited framework of an attempt to arrive at unification and a convergence of views, and was aimed not at the organizational unification of the three Internationals, but only at an agreement on pre-conditions for joint action. The reason we decided on convening the conference at this time, he said, is that the “imperial International of the capitalists” is about to hold a conference in Genoa and we want to see the realization of joint action by the proletarian political parties to counter it. We all know that there are conflicts of views among the delegates gathered here. But the conflicts of views concern prospects for tomorrow. Today, do we not share in common our willingness to fight? Thus, he went on, “all proletarian political parties which seek the defeat of capitalism on the basis of the class struggle, and which recognize the necessity for an international proletarian joint action toward achieving that objective meet the condition for participation in future action.” Let us talk about the difficulties and obstacles facing each other, and about the disputes between each other, and thereby lead this conference to a successful conclu-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

165

Part II sion, he implored (applause coming only from the “Vienna Working Union” delegates(6)). Next to address the conference was Clara Zetkin as delegate for the “Third”. For the first time since the Brussels Conference of the International Bureau in July 1914, all elements of the international labor movement that used to be a unified body are sitting at the same table, she began. But first there are some matters that must be clarified, she continued. Today’s split-up was caused by the fact that some levels of the working class established temporary common interest bodies with the imperialist nations, which found expression in counter-revolutionary positions taken by many political parties and other organizations of the working class, she stated. It was clearly a criticism levelled at the “Second”. The working class has to understand, she asserted, that capitalism can be defeated only by seizing power through a revolutionary struggle and by establishing a “dictatorship of the working people,” and that organizational unification of the Internationals that differ in their views on matters of principle would be even harmful. Nevertheless it is irrefutably imperative for the working class to rally together “for the sake of the defensive struggle against the world capital,” she concluded. It was necessary to convene an international congress of workers urgently. To ensure the success of such a conference, she proposed that in addition to all proletarian labor unions, delegates of the syndicalist and anarchist parties also be invited. This was because, unlike at the time of the Treaty of Versailles when the working class was unable to take action, international representatives of workers now had to accuse the representatives of world capitalists gathered in Genoa for their shameless violation of agreements. Finally, she proposed that the forthcoming international congress of workers “take up only those issue that concern immediate joint action… that would not divide but unify” the working masses, and ended her speech by raising the following five-point agenda. 1) Defence against attacks by capitalists 2) struggle against the reactionaries 3) preparation for struggle against new imperialist wars 4) assistance for the reconstruction of the Russian Soviet Republic 5) recovery of the Treaty of Versailles and devastated regions (applause coming only from the “Third’s” delegates).(7)

166

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Berlin In the session that resumed at three p.m., Vandervelde took the floor on behalf of the “Second”, with Shaw serving as moderator. According to Vanderverde, there were different kinds “reaction,” that of the industrialists, of the monarchists and of the militarists. And it was the quest for world domination by capitalists making mutual compromises that raised the possibility of future wars and created danger for socialists, he pointed out, with “the most ruthless and cynical American capitalism” at its apex. To resist such danger, he stated, it is “essential for us socialists to think of ways to create a unified defensive front.” If the resurrection of a unified International across borders like the one before the war is out of the question at present, he stated, the objective would then be reduced to the modest one of merely assembling together at one general congress. Interestingly, he added that such a congress should be attended not only by all proletarian political parties but also by all labor union organizations, echoing the statement by the “Third” and that he had no objection in principle. However, he presented several misgivings about the “Third” even as he drew laughter with a joke, alluding to a scene from the four-part opera “Nibelungen” about the transparency of a concealed intention to poison someone after an embrace. His fluctuating sentiments toward the “Third” are seen in his mixed use of “sie” and “ihr”. We are supposedly “social traitors“ and “social patriots,” he said, and I “committed a crime” according to Zinoviev, but should not personal reasons be completely ignored? We need mutual reassurance that the other side does not harbor ulterior motives. Toward that end, he summarized the outstanding issues into the following three points. 1) The guarantee that as long as one is coming to the Congress for the sake of strengthening joint action, one will not attempt to create cells, 2) the guarantee that the peoples being denied their right of selfdetermination in Russia, in particular Georgians, will be freely represented, and 3) the guarantee of the S.R. members’ and other prisoners’ right to legal defence. Do you, or do you not accept them, he asked.(8) Representing the “Vienna Working Union,” Faure said, as he reiterated the resolution of their inaugural congress in February of the previous year, that he welcomed the present conference which held aloft the objective of rallying all

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

167

Part II proletarian political parties without discrimination into a united front to resist imperialism and capitalism. He drove home the point that their objective would “only be achieved when arguments among proletarian political parties are always settled with mental weapons.” With regard to Soviet Russia, he pointed out that “the Russian socialist parties being granted equality of political rights, the Russian workers and peasants being granted the freedom to conduct their own political and economic activities, and the right of selfdetermination being restored to the working people of Georgia were essential conditions,” and expressed his deep anxiety over the death sentences meted out to SR party members. At the same time, he did not forget to point out that “in many capitalist countries, leftist socialists and communists are subjected to severe persecution even in cases where rightist socialist parties are participating in the government,” and that “the right of self-determination of various peoples is being violently suppressed.”(9)

3 After the speeches by the three delegates, the session moved on to discussion, with Radek first taking the floor. He started out by deriding Faure, saying while the “Third” did not attach any conditions to the view of the “Second and a half International” that this meeting is a “conference for action,” the “Vienna International” seems to be scheming to move away from that arena. He then levelled his charge at Vandervelde. Vandervelde presented his full account as he saw it, so we shall present our full account of the eight years too. In Basel (where an anti-war rally was held in 1912), he vowed to lead us as a leader in the anti-war struggle, but because his tone of voice and gestures still remain the same, I momentarily forgot the fact that his voice was drowned out by the roar of cannons. “This may sound unpleasant to the ears of a former minister of the Belgian kingdom,” but he has forgotten about the bloodbath and the piles of corpses. Even if “citizen Vandervelde”, man as such, should ask for a minimum of trust in his soothing voice, we have no choice but to reply “absolutely not.” “If you are so bold as to say things to negate the court trials in Russia, let us say this. We will only become involved after we have wiped clean the blood of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht (to thunderous applause

168

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Berlin from the “Third” delegates).” Nevertheless, “we intend to fight the struggle together with you. We shall make clear whether that struggle is, as you say, a maneuver on behalf of the communist International, or a tidal current that will unify the working class.” Even if you are not aiming for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as long as you are willing to struggle for a piece of bread, we shall judge you on the basis of the new reality, not the terrible past. Radek went on to attempt a rebuttal against the “conditions” Vandervelde had presented. First of all, he did not believe that Vandervelde and Germany’s SPD intended to deal seriously with the Treaty of Versailles on the agenda, as the former signed the very treaty as a Belgian cabinet minister. As for the Ukraine, the only issue being “the ghost of the Petlura government kept alive by the infusion of money from the Polish Chief of Staff,” the Ukraine will fight together with us for Russia’s recovery. In the first place, was it not the Ukrainian Rada (Parliament) assisted by the German military that drove us out? On Georgia, we would like to tell the “Second,” particularly its British delegates: “(Britain) Keep your hands off.” Finally, Radek said “we have accepted the motion of the “Second and a half ”, and asked “do you intend to stick to that proposal,” throwing the responsibility for the outcome of the conference back to the “Second” to end his speech that was jeered from time to time. It was already seven p.m..(10) April 3rd, the following day, was probably taken up by internal discussions within each of the Internationals and negotiations behind closed doors.(11) In the event, the session on the floor resumed on the 4th. With Zetkin moderating, MacDonald opened the discussion. I came here with a measure of hope, he said, and the speech by the “Third’s” delegate Zetkin the day before yesterday helped strengthen that hope. But Radek’s speech dampened my hope, he said, and switched to criticism. It was essentially summarized into the following three points, which he recited as the “Second’s” position at the end of his speech. Fig. 48: Karl Radek.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

169

Part II 1) Cessation of cell tactics 2) establishment of a committee of representatives of the three Internationals for investigating situations in Georgia and elsewhere 3) release of political prisoners On Georgia, he refuted Radek’s argument by pointing out that “the political party responsible for the socialist regime that was suppressed by you people using military force” has now joined the “Second” and its delegates are actually seated at this table. With regard to political prisoners, he was offended by Radek mentioning Rosa Luxemburg’s name. “Was she not trying to liberate Germany from what she considered autocratic,” he asked. When Radek interjected “That’s right,” he said it was then easy to explain. “Weren’t the people you’ve incarcerated also trying to liberate Russia from what they considered autocratic?” he asked. MacDonald, who had started out as a member of the Independent Labour Party and who, after the war, had been working to coordinate the Internationals’ views, did not conceal his mistrust of the “Third” in this conference he was attending as the “Second’s” secretary-general in London. To Radek’s proposal for the exchange of political prisoners between Germany and Russia, he did not hide his revulsion as he replied it was not something that should be “bartered,” and called for “justice and harmony.”(12) Next to take the floor, Serrati addressed the delegates from his unique position of not belonging to any of the three Internationals. Had they not gathered there to realize as much as possible a practical international action to counter the bourgeoisie, instead of brazenly putting one another on trial, he asked. But his statement on the floor, with which MacDonald was visibly dissatisfied calling it more of a discussion of morality than politics, was more critical of the “Second”. He had this to say about the three conditions the “Second” had imposed on the “Third”. The French Revolution which the “Second” holds high aloft cannot be appreciated without the terror and the guillotine, and now when the Russian revolution is under threat, the timing is not right for demanding the release of political prisoners. Nevertheless the Bolsheviks are also changing their attitude. Lenin said he had to change the way Cheka operated (with Abramovitch jeering: “Just a name change!”). As serious as the Georgian issue is, it arises from Georgia being turned into a tool of imperialism. The

170

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Berlin “Second” is making the right of national self-determination an issue, but “it was the government that you are a part of, which executed Sir Roger Casement who is now considered a martyr to the Irish people’s revolution. ‘Cell tactics’ are part of propaganda activities that we have been conducting since before. You call them poison, but was it not Vandervelde who was corrupted by bourgeois poison during the Great War?” At the same time, he also asked the Bolsheviks to appreciate that unity will be useful for the defence of none other than the Russian revolution. It may sound quite contradictory, but it is the SPD majority and the Bolsheviks, who share a similar situation of having to defend themselves from capitalism, who should unite.(13) Otto Bauer, who took the floor when the session resumed a little after 4 p.m., had not been as active in the International arena as Adler. He was nevertheless a figure who played a key role in the Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party after World War I up to the time of its anti-fascist struggle. He was well known as a theoretician on the nationalities issue in particular. He said he was more in agreement with MacDonald than with Serrati in the moral respect, and on the Georgian question, he stated he had no disagreement of views with the “Second”. The Georgian issue is singled out, because the forces in dispute there are both socialist parties. He said that the fact of not all socialist parties in Russia being granted full legitimacy was not consistent with the idea of the unity of the proletariat. That said, he went on to point out to the people of the “Second”. It is not only in Russia that peoples’ right of selfdetermination has been infringed, or that socialists have been imprisoned. Do they think that they can impose “conditions” unilaterally and expect the other side to accept them? Only out of a joint struggle will solidarity of the masses arise. He appealed to the “comrades of the Second…not to second-guess what our Communist comrades intend to do.” This was because with the situation changing daily, the “Third” will have to abandon its “maneuvers.” Comrades of the “Third” call me a traitor even in today’s newspaper, but I’ve gotten used to your “stock phrases” of this kind on your part. I appeal to you to place the cause of the class struggle above the cause of individual political parties, he said. As he concluded “joint international action is a hundred times more significant than debates over by-laws and methods,” his speech was greeted by applause.(14)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

171

Part II Who was to take the floor next? As one of the “Second’s” delegates, the name of Tsereteli from Georgia was mentioned, but in the event, it was Radek who ended up giving a long speech. Having pointed out that British imperialism was involved in the Georgian situation, he argued against the conditions raised by the “Second”. 1) They criticize the “cell maneuvers,” but how is it that activities by communists are obstructed in the British trade unions? 2) If they are willing to make Georgia an issue, do they have the courage to send General Dyer (the British commander during the Amritsar Massacre of 1919) to prison? 3) On the release of prisoners, he was at first sarcastic, saying he warmly accepted Vandervelde’s noble intention to serve on the defence team in Moscow. Then he stated that if they were talking about the “Second” setting up a superior court in Moscow, that defied all logic. While persistent in his rebuttals, Radek ended by declaring “we are in favor of a proletarian united front without any pre-conditions whatsoever” to a rousing applause. Clearly, he had judged that the first wave of the revolutionary tide having passed, the revolution was now going through a defensive period. While criticizing MacDonald on every issue, he paid respect to his sincerity, and did not forget to show consideration for the “Vienna Working Union” either.

4 The task of forging unity out of conflicting views fell upon a “Committee of Nine” comprising three members each from the three Internationals. The start of the general session, which had been scheduled for 3 p.m. of April 5th, was pushed back repeatedly and the clock was showing almost 12 midnight when the final session opened. It had been so difficult to arrive at a convergence of different positions that Adler, who reported on the “Committee of Nine” session, frankly admitted that the discussion almost broke down several times. Nevertheless, as modest an achievement as it is, we have laid the cornerstone for the establishment of a united front, he said as cheers erupted.(15)

172

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VI Berlin The “Second” in fact did issue a statement reiterating the three conditions it asked the “Third” for.(16) And Germany’s USPD spoke out in its statement against equating the crimes committed by a group of militiamen against Rosa Luxemburg and others during internal uprisings with the conviction of Russian proletarian leaders by the Bolshevik government. Did not the uprisings in Germany occur in the first place because Radek and others tried to force the so-called “dictatorship of the proletariat” on the people? We defended Germany’s democratic republic from the likes of Hungary’s Horthy dictatorship, and we are even proud of it. Tsereteli said in his statement that Russia was being “imperialistic” in its designs on Georgian oil fields, but Georgia’s socialist government was prepared to respond to Russia’s economic needs through a democratic agreement. The “Vienna Working Union” also called for the immediate release of political prisoners in Russia. The “Third” declared in its statement that it would give up investigations into the assassination of Rosa Luxemburg and others and into the persecution of other communists, as well as investigations into the British Labour Party’s position on Ireland and colonies, and go along with unification. This was because at the very end, the struggle of the proletarian masses would change the policies of “reformist” leaders.(17) Despite such sharply divided views, a joint communiqué of the three Internationals’ executive committees was finally drafted. It is readily perceived that the “Third” made a large concession, agreeing to provide lawyers for “political prisoners” and not to execute them, and to accept an investigation into the Georgian situation. The delegates also decided to hold a general conference if possible on April 20th during the Genoa conference of national governments. The agenda scheduled for that meeting were as follows. 1) Eight-hour work day. 2) Defeat of unemployment. The spread of unemployment due to the reparations policies of the capitalist nations seems to have no limit. 3) Unified action of the proletariat against the capitalists’ offensive. 4) Establishment of political and economic relations between all nations and, respectively, the Russian Revolution, Russia in famine and Soviet Russia. 5) Establishment of a proletarian united front in all nations and in the International.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

173

Part II Adler’s long-held wish was essentially fulfilled. “Leaving behind a period of time when no international organization even existed and the proletariat was divided to the delight of the nations’ bourgeoisie, we can once again raise our voices together starting today,” he declared, proclaiming, “Long live the International of fighting, victorious and revolutionary proletariat!” A thunderous, sustained applause was followed by the singing of the “Internationale.”(18) At the Berne Conference in February 1919, the war responsibility of Germany’s SPD was pursued particularly by the French. The Belgian Workers Party even refused to attend. But since that issue was now considered settled within the “Second,” Wels along with Vandervelde and MacDonald was at the helm of the “Second.” What now emerged was a confrontation between people who supported the war policies of their own governments in August 1914, and the Bolsheviks who not only refused to support their government but also carried out a socialist revolution in 1917. Their battles must be viewed against the background of a drawn-out chaos from the Russian revolution, wars of interference and revolutions in central Europe after late 1918 to the rise of the Fascists in Italy. There was no logical order for distinguishing between the aggressors and the victims in that situation. Moreover, in the Caucasian region for instance, there was a British imperialist presence and nationalism was erupting in various forms to counter its influence. Faced with the Allied Powers’ Genoa conference, socialists were trying somehow to find their own way to achieve better world. But how? Socialists had widely different views on this point.

174

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum

VII

Interregnum – April 1922 to January 1923 –

1 As early as April 11th, Lenin published an article entitled “We have paid too much” in the Russian Communist Party organ Pravda, stating that the concession concerning trials for SR party members, in particular, was a mistake, as it presented no quid pro quo for the international bourgeoisie.(1) This no doubt must have had a great significance in “Third’s” determination of its position. Nevertheless, the negotiations among the three Internationals continued, albeit at a slow pace. On April 8th, MacDonald wrote to the fraternal parties of the “Second,” notifying them of the gist of the Berlin Conference, and asked for their opinion on who might become the “Second’s” three representatives on the “Committee of Nine”, but their response was muted. Meanwhile, Adler and Wels received a letter on April 21, 1922 from Radek who was the “Third’s” representative in Berlin. It said a meeting of the “Committee of Nine” should be called as soon as possible as “the Russian Revolution is now literally under the threat of the capitalist nations’ diplomacy,” and asked for a reply on the matter within 48 hours.(2) With the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo on April 16th, the Soviet Union’s diplomatic position would have been more secure. Why then was Radek in such a hurry? The answer concerns the Genoa Conference at which the Soviet government was making a proposal on disarmament. On April 17th, Lenin and others of the Russian Communist Party Politburo said in a telegram to Radek and others: “We propose that you immediately raise with the nine-member committee the issue of the progress of the negotiations in Genoa (the Genoa Conference) might break down any moment now. Point out that the demand for disarmament is among the demands submitted by the Second and the Second and a half Internationals. If it should drag on for over 24 hours, you yourselves … call on all workers to protest.”(3)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

175

Part II Adler passed on Radek’s letter to MacDonald, and replied to Radek that he would do as asked. Adler was planning to convene a meeting of the “Committee of Nine” on May 5th in Amsterdam. The following day Wels, declaring that Radek had no business sending the letter to him who was not a member of the “Second’s” secretariat, also relayed the letter to MacDonald. He did not forget to add that Adler had exceeded his authority in calling for a meeting of the “Committee of Nine” and that the initiative must not be ceded to the one who had caused the “Second” to split up. In his letter to Radek, Wels said “your favorite method of notification with a time limit” does not work in these negotiations, ever more clearly expressing his mistrust of the “Third.” In the “Second” based on the democratic principle, no one can issue a communiqué that is binding on the executive committee, so the process will take time, he said. MacDonald himself could not disregard these developments, so he sent another letter to member parties of the “Second” asking them to respond to the request in his letter of April 8th. To Radek, he replied that he could not leave Britain on May 5th because of an election campaign. Adler pushed back the date of the “Committee of Nine” meeting to May 7th and also switched the venue to Düsseldorf.(4) Response to MacDonald’s request was still sparse. Moreover, Troelstra and Stauning were not in favor of a joint struggle with the communists, with only the Belgian Workers Party taking a positive stance. In any case, MacDonald intended to hold a meeting of the “Second’s” executive committee before convening the “Committee of Nine”. Meanwhile, a new obstacle emerged with the German Foreign Ministry refusing to issue a visa for Radek’s trip to Düsseldorf. Adler, in his letter to the “Committee of Nine” dated May 4th, informed them that the planned meeting of May 7th would have to be postponed, and gave them the gist of his exchanges of views with various parties in the meantime. Deeply regretting that a workers’ counter-rally could not be held while the Genoa Conference was in progress, he pointed out to the “Second’s” organizational weakness in not even being able to select its three delegates to the “Committee of Nine” as an example of obstacles to the unification of the International. With regard to the “Third,” he mentioned its suppression of Mensheviks and the SR leftists along with its disruptive maneuvers in the Scandinavian nations. The convening of a “Committee of Nine” meeting was necessary precisely for overcoming such obstacles, asserted Adler.(5) His

176

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum efforts paid off, as Adler was able to issue another call on May 16th to rally together (on May 23 in Berlin), having secured replies of agreement from MacDonald and Radek. A committee meeting of the “Second,” which MacDonald had made a pre-condition for his attending the “Committee of Nine” meeting, was held in Cologne on May 22nd. After the minutes of the Berlin Conference of the three Internationals’ executive committee delegates in Berlin in early April were acknowledged, the session moved onto debate whether or not the “Second” should continue to send delegates to the “Committee of Nine”, and the matter was finally put to a vote. Voting affirmative were Armenia, Belgium, Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Georgia, the Netherlands, Hungary, Norway and Sweden, and only Germany voted negative. That said, some of the conditions the “Second” raised for cooperating with the “Third” were severe.(6) After all that, a meeting of the “Committee of Nine” at long last came to take place on May 23rd in the USPD parliamentarians’ room in the Reichstag building in Berlin. MacDonald, Wauters (Belgium) and Wels from the “Second,” Bracke, Crispien and Adler from the “Vienna Working Union,” and Zetkin, Radek and Heckert from the “Third.”(7) But as soon as the session opened at 10:30 a.m., the atmosphere became ominous. Perhaps sensing this, Adler as the moderator proposed holding the session behind closed doors, but both Wels and Radek called for a session open to the public. This indicates some conflictions about to be seen. First of all, Radek stated that his movement had been restricted by the German Foreign Ministry or the Prussian Interior Ministry and criticized the action as unacceptable in a democratic society, levelling his accusation at Wels, a member of the German ruling party. Wels parried the charge, saying he did not know anything about the matter, and also counter-attacked, asking whether freedom of movement was guaranteed in Russia. MacDonald replied that were a similar thing to occur in Britain, he would protest to the government as much as possible. The decision was withheld until Radek produced the relevant documents in the afternoon. Next to be taken up was the question of how to handle an Armenian group from Paris, labor union people from Berlin and others who had come with various appeals. Zetkin in particular insisted that they should meet with the masses, but both Adler and MacDonald were against it, the eventual consensus being that

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

177

Part II they could not attend to it that day. No wonder, the time was ticking by and they had not even begun debating the important issues. At long last, MacDonald began to deliver his discourse, probably the result of discussions at the Cologne Conference of the “Second”. It imposed on the “Third” the same three conditions as those given in the “Second’s” communiqué after the Berlin Conference in April. 1) Judging from statements appearing in the “Third’s” publications, the future of the trials of SR members calls for even greater concern. 2) Georgia’s socialist regime was overthrown by Moscow’s military forces. Moreover, the Russian government treated Georgia as nothing more than an oil-producing country at the Genoa Conference, just as the delegates of capitalist nations did. 3) Communist parties are still conducting divisive maneuvers in various regions. In the session which resumed at 5 p.m, Radek produced documents as requested to show that the German authorities had restricted his freedom of movement, but the meeting became disruptive over the interpretation of the documents. As if to put a stop to that, Adler moved on to the declaration of the “Vienna Working Union’s” position. Our efforts to bring about a comprehensive workers’ congress are being hindered by internal disagreements within the “Second” and the “Third,” he said. Look at how the right-wing socialists of Germany and the communist parties of France and Germany are opposing a world congress of workers. Remarkably, Vorwärts and Rote Fahne in Berlin are both calling for a suspension of the “Committee of Nine’s” activities. If the “Second” and the “Third” are not willing to revise their communiqués, we have no choice but to ask their respective executive committees to leave. This was followed by rebuttals by Zetkin and Radek that they had never opposed the holding of a world congress of workers, but in the end Radek declared his secession from the “Committee of Nine”. Incidentally, his floor time took up one-third of the total amount of conference time. The three Internationals all issued their respective communiqués.(8) It was a source of perplexity for the socialists of the “Vienna Working Union” and the “Second” that the interests of Russia as a nation, rather than that of revolutionary Russia, were emerging to the surface. The nation was entering

178

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum the phase of its New Economic Policy (NEP), becoming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922. In fact, Radek was, on one hand, a leading polemic of the “Third,” and on the other hand, a member of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference, who steadfastly maintained contact with German VIPs and was a key figure behind the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo.(9)

2 On May 24th, the “Third” issued a communiqué declaring: “The Committee of Nine has been destroyed by the Second International!”(10) But the “Second” apparently had not expected Adler to give up. On May 30th, MacDonald wrote to Adler asking “whether it might be possible to undo the mistake in Berlin by holding a general congress of all socialist organizations,” and asked him to cooperate with regard to a conference of the “Second’s” political parties being planned for June 16th in London. He also wrote to Faure on the same day, asking him to use his influence vis-à-vis the “Vienna Working Union” on the matter. He also sounded out Serrati on the possibility of his coming to London(11). He apparently wrote to several others. Adler sent a reply immediately, saying that since a meeting of the “Vienna Working Union” secretariat was going to be held in Frankfurt, he would take the occasion to introduce MacDonald’s letter. The meeting of the secretariat did take place as scheduled, while as far as its minutes show, the “Second’s” proposal was not taken up. The meeting did follow up on the proposal made in the “Vienna Working Union” delegation’s communiqué in Berlin, that an international congress be held immediately and decided on its date, September 16th, and the venue, Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary). At the same time, based on reports by Martov (Menshevik) and Schreider (SR leftist), the meeting expressed its protest against the suppression of their two parties’ freedom of speech in Russia, and also adopted a Fig. 49: Paul Faure. resolution demanding justice and stay of execution for the SR rightists who were on trial at the time. Incidentally, there were

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

179

Part II already 12 political parties in the “Vienna Working Union,” with 12 more parties including the American Socialist Party applying for membership.(12) Going back to MacDonald, his letter of May 30th found support not only from the member political parties but also from the minority faction in Russia. His relationship with “France,” however, takes some explanation. Attending the “Second’s” conference were delegates from the “French Socialist Party (PSF)”(13), different from “French Socialist Party (SFIO),” a member of the “Vienna Working Union.” But the latter was also taking part in joint struggles with the British Labour Party. On May 18th and 19th 1922, for example, the British Labour Party, the Belgian Workers Party and the SFIO held a tripartite conference, and vowed to launch a joint struggle against the incompetence of the various governments at restoring peace and economic recovery following the Genoa Conference. MacDonald had a good reason for writing to Faure, asking him to liaise with the “Vienna Working Union” for him. In the event, however, Faure’s response was that a number of stages needed to be worked out before the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” could be united. The real situation was probably hard to fathom even for these men directly involved. On June 8th, Henderson sent a letter to Faure, saying he was surprised by the latter’s request to have the British Independent Labour Party take part in a joint demonstration scheduled for July, and that he would just as soon not collaborate than do that. Faure retorted that his side was the one surprised. MacDonald himself was asking them to intercede in the reconciliation between the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union,” so was not a joint struggle with the Independent Labour Party a matter of course, he asked.(14) It was on 17th and 18th of June that the conference of the “Second” parties planned by MacDonald opened in London, with Henderson as moderator. Only Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Denmark actually sent delegates. The resolution adopted by the conference was made up of the following three points. 1) They can no longer take part in any attempt to seek a consensus with the “Third”. 2) They shall convene a general congress of socialist and workers parties in Hamburg during the first week of October. They shall seek the col-

180

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum laboration of the “Vienna Working Union,” but should the latter refuse, they shall convene a congress on their own. 3) They shall collaborate with the Amsterdam International Federation of Trade Unions. MacDonald sent this resolution dated June 3rd to the fraternal parties, seeking their support.(15) But on a personal level, MacDonald was probably becoming tired of his secretary’s job. He asked fellow secretaries Gosling and Henderson if someone could take his place as he was busy with writing works. He says the same in his letter to Wels dated June 20th. That letter also expressed his satisfaction with the outcome of the London conference, and assigned Wels to a major task. He wanted Wels to deliver a report defending the role Germany’s SPD had played since the war and asserting that Germany should regain its pro-active role in Europe. He also wanted Wels to draft a resolution on policies based on social democracy in Europe. Considering that the SPD had been in the position of a “defendant” in 1919, this was quite a turn of events. Wels sent a reply dated June 28th promising to Fig. 50: Otto Wels. do all he can for the realization of the Hamburg Congress, and gave his assessment as to the responses they could expect from the various organizations to be invited (including the PSF). As for MacDonald’s request to resign from his position, Wels begged him to reconsider. As a matter of fact, on June 24th, precisely during their exchange of letters, German Foreign Minister Rathenau was assassinated by a right-wing radical. The young assassin’s motive was more his hatred of the minister as a Jew, than any dissatisfaction with his signing of the Treaty of Rapallo or his adopting an “accomodation policy” in response to the Allied powers’ reparation demands. Wels stated that he had been busy trying to grasp the situation and defending his party’s position, but now that pro-democracy rallies by workers and citizens were gathering as much force as at the time of the Kapp Putsch, he could probably resume the work at hand soon.(16)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

181

Part II On July 4th, MacDonald sent a “lengthy” letter about the general congress planned for October to the “Second’s” members concerned. After posing the question of who will manage the secretariat’s affairs, a matter of his greatest personal concern, he listed the items for which preparations had to begin, such as setting of the date, the resolution and agenda and reports from individual nations. It is noteworthy that he says he wanted at least 500 people to be able to attend to create the necessary impact, and that he called for extreme care with regard to the allocation of the deciding votes at the congress. Even more noteworthy is his statement that he had sent the first general information sheet on the general congress to all socialist parties, except for those taking part in the “Third.”(17) The “Second,” whose continued existence had been under threat only two years earlier, was beginning to assert its presence anew.

3 MacDonald’s efforts to bring about a reconciliation between the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” were to get a boost from a different quarter. It was a proposal by the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), made in its telegram of July 9th, to invite the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” to Amsterdam on July 18th (18). The IFTU, an organization close to the “Second” in terms of both political ideology and personal links, was derided by the “Third” as the “yellow … Amsterdam faction.” On its part, the IFTU did not recognize “red” labor unions as “bona fide” trade union organizations. But to an appeal for cooperation from the “Second,” it had once declared a position of “neutrality” with no intention of collaborating with either the “Second” or the “Vienna Working Union” alone.(19) This was because the IFTU, as it had indicated in March of the previous year during an exchange of views in Amsterdam, harbored a desire to bring the two groups together. Why did the IFTU make a move to mediate at this juncture? For one thing, it was probably alarmed by moves on the part of anti-Republican factions in Germany, one clear sign of which was the assassination of Rathenau. Also, it deemed the formation of a joint front among the pro-Republican factions in Germany against those moves as an opportunity favoring reconciliation between the two Internationals. In Germany, true enough, Prime Minister

182

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum Joseph Wirth (Central Party) declared in the Reichstag that “the enemy is on the right,” and protest rallies took place across the country. On June 27th, the day of Rathenau’s funeral, Germany’s Federation of Labor Unions (Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and Confederation of Free Workers (AfA), the SPD, the USPD and the Communist Party went as far as to issue a joint appeal for “the defense of the republic.” Workers all over the country left their places of work to mount demonstrations, their number reportedly reaching over 600,000 in Berlin and over 200,000 in Leipzig. Of course, this did not signify the end of the discord between the Communist Party and the other two socialist parties. On the other hand, the rapprochement that had been developing between the SPD and the USPD was to gain momentum.(20) To the proposal by the IFTU, MacDonald replied that he could not attend as he had important meetings with the British Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress at the same time. Learning this, Wels stressed the importance of the Amsterdam Conference, and appealed that participation by MacDonald and other British delegates was essential. He went on to express his doubts about the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” holding separate conferences in Hamburg and Karlsbad respectively, citing the situation created by the SPD-USPD rapprochement in Germany and the close alliance between the SFIO and the “Second.” Adler responded that he intended to accept but he needed the approval of the executive committee.(21) After a flurry of messages exchanged and schedules adjusted, the joint conference of the IFTU Joint Secretariat, the “Second,” the “Vienna Working Union” Executive Committee finally took place in Amsterdam on July 19th and 20th 1922. As it might have been expected, the IFTU leadership was represented in full including President J.H. Thomas and secretaries Oudegeest and Fimmen. From the “Second,” Shaw, Wels, Troelstra and others attended (though Henderson and MacDonald were absent due to the aforementioned reasons). From the “Vienna Working Union,” all key figures except for the Russians showed up, including Adler, Wallhead (Britain), Longuet and Bracke (France), Crispien (Germany), and Grimm and Graben (Switzerland).(22) On the first day of the conference, which began at 10:30 a.m. in the Concertgebouw (the historic venue of the 1904 Congress of the Second International, during which Sen Katayama and Prekhanov shook hands), first Thomas and then Fimmen took the floor to explain the IFTU’s position, which under-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

183

Part II lined the aforementioned concerns. To wit, they had convened the conference in such a hurry, as the German Republic was facing danger. Never has an international united front in support of Germany’s workers been as needed as now, they said. They pointed out that the cause of the nationalistic trend in Germany lay in the economic terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and went to ask the conference to work out the specifics of the revision of the Treaty’s terms, which the International had been demanding for some time. Toward that end, the IFTU expressed the wish that the Internationals in the two political domains not be preoccupied with the past (“let the dead bury the dead”) and reminded them that its position was neutral toward them. Shaw, representing the “Second” however willy nilly, spoke up to say he was not preoccupied with the past, pointing out that he and Wallhead of the “Vienna Working Union” had shared similar views when they spoke during political rallies in France, and that the SPD and the USPD in Germany, were also being compelled by the situation to collaborate. Adler took the floor next to say he was not going to argue about the past. With respect to the “Third,” to be sure, we criticize its errors, while the “Second” criticizes not only its errors but even its objectives that the “Second” shares. Despite such “political” differences, unity is essential in the domain of labor union movement. Thus expressed, Adler’s position had been approved by the executive committee meeting in Amsterdam the previous day. In the afternoon session, Wels and Crispien who had arrived late around noon, took the floor. Wels asserted that a united front for the defence of the Republic had been formed after Rathenau’s assassination but the communists insisting on their own tactics continued to slander the other two socialist parties. He then drew the delegates’ attention to the terrible situation Germany was in. Inflation had become so severe that the national finance faced bankruptcy and, moreover, the German government was being deprived of autonomy by the Entente nations the same way the Ottoman Turk government once was. Against nationalist movements being fomented as a result, the Republican factions were powerless. But the unification of the two socialist parties of Germany has begun, and its realization would be desirable in the international context. The protection of the German republic was now a matter of grave international concern.

184

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum Crispien also elaborated on the crisis Germany faced, pointing out that the German government’s “accomodation policy” could not in any way be implemented without loans from foreign countries and a moratorium on the reparations, and that inflation was advancing. In addition, he listed examples of the communists not collaborating with the united front. In one example, the German Reichstag passed an “act for the defence of the republic” by a vote of 303 to 102 on July 18th, but voting against were right-wing political parties and the Communist Party. This was something unacceptable for Crispien who had voted for the act from a broad perspective, as imperfect as it might have been. The Communist Party, which opposed the “accommodation policy,” had points to make as well. But without going into these points, what ought to be noted here is that there are no differences between Wels’ and Crispiens’ views. It has been pointed out that in the drawn-out debate that took place in the Reichstag after Rathenau’s assassination, there were practically no differences between the speeches these two made.(23) The tone of the discussion that continued was similar to what had transpired, but a new focus did emerge in the way of policy to deal with the economic crisis Germany faced. Germany’s burden of reparations should be alleviated, but since the matter is related to debt issues among the Allied nations, the governments and newspapers of these nations are expressing their firm opposition. The situation in Britain, France and Belgium is such that our view will not likely be understood by the masses. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the facts first, and then conduct our counter-propaganda. Now that the U.S. is a decisive presence, we should try to get them to listen to our assertions. Those were the gist of the points made. The various assertions and issues raised are meticulously covered in the final resolution which was adopted in the afternoon of 20th, the following day, after some amendments were made to the draft prepared by a sub-committee. The main points of the resolution were as follows. 1) The danger threatening the existence of the German Republic is a menace against the great cause of peace and the recovery of Europe. 2) As destruction of Germany would signify the destruction of Europe as a whole, giving encouragement and support to Germany is for the good of the workers of all nations.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

185

Part II 3) The burden of reparations on Germany is too heavy. The policy of the Entente nations is driving Germany into bankruptcy and reaction. 4) America helped end the war through intervention. Therefore it would be logical to expect the United States to assist in the promotion of the great cause of peace and recovery. 5) Germany should be permitted to join the League of Nations on an equal footing with other nations. (24) The conference then nominated three persons each from the three organizations to serve as members of a sub-committee set up to study the German economic situation, which was linked closely to the reparation issue. Finally, before closing, the conference responded to a telegram from the SR and the Social-democratic Labour Party in Russia by adopting a resolution that “if the death penalty is imposed” in the trial of SR members in Moscow, “it would eliminate all possibilities for the re-unification of workers of all nations over a long period.” Immediately thereafter, the “Vienna Working Union” executive committee, which had convened the conference, decided to re-think its plan to hold an international conference in Karlsbad at the request of the USPD and the Swiss Social-democratic Party. (25)

4 It is reasonable to assume that in the course of the conference, the “Vienna Working Union” gave up on the possibility of collaboration with the “Third,” which it had pursued until then. Nobody had yet spoken of union with the “Second,” but an agreement was reached for joint action by the two excluding the communist parties. On August 7th and 8th, the above-mentioned subcommittee for studying the “German political and economic conditions” met in Brussels to work out how to proceed with their task.(26) The “Second’s” executive committee held a meeting in Prague on August 12th, and approved MacDonald’s request to resign as secretary, appointing Shaw as his successor. Of importance was its decision to postpone the congress in Hamburg it had scheduled for October, in the light of the apparent move on the part of the “Vienna Working Union” to postpone its congress in Karlsbad.

186

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum Among other resolutions worth noting were: a protest against the death sentences passed at the SR members’ trial in Moscow,(27) which it said was in flagrant violation of the agreement at the Berlin Conference (of the three Internationals’ executive commitees) in April, and a resolution calling attention to the struggle of the socialist workers of Italy against cruel violence. With regard to the latter, it may be noted with interest that rather than the English term “fascists,” the word “fascisti” together with the adjective “anarchist” was used. It is an indication that the “Second,” while being wary of the movement by Mussolini and others, did not have a clear answer as to how to characterize it. It was the same with the “Third.” Fascism was still a new movement with elements that did not fit neatly into the spectrum of conventional political ideologies and movements from the right to the left.(28) Be that as it may, MacDonald in his letter of resignation stated that his role as secretary, which he had taken on for the period of emergency over the reconstruction of the International, was finished since the communists no longer posed a threat, because the agreement with the “Vienna Working Union” was coming up on schedule.(29) Whether the communist parties no longer posed a threat is doubtful, but as far as western Europe was concerned, the situation was moving in the direction he had anticipated or hoped for. On the 2nd and 3rd of the next month, September, the “Vienna Working Union” also held an executive committee meeting in Frankfurt. After the moderator Ledebour gave a speech welcoming three American Socialist Party members including Morris Hillquit, who were attending for the first time, the session went on for two day and two resolutions were adopted. One concerned the International. Recalling that the “Vienna Working Union” had pointed out, in its policies set forth at its inaugural congress, that the “process” leading to all the class-conscious proletariat coming together “may require a long period of time,” it stressed that “this process still has not reached its end today.” Sure enough, although its first step filled with hope was taken at the Berlin Conference in April, its progress thereafter was not only made difficult by the “Second’s” stance, but also rendered impossible by the action of the “Third.” This referred to the death sentences at the trial of the SR members. The “Vienna Working Union” had comrades in the “Third” too, but now that they were taking an attitude of “blind obedience” to Moscow, there was no prospect whatsoever for negotiations with the “Third.” Nevertheless, the resolution

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

187

Part II played up the difference in its stance from the “Second” by emphasizing that a world congress of workers together with the “Third” was absolutely necessary. The other resolution, taking into account the progress of the ongoing unification process between Germany’s SPD and USPD, demanded that the USPD establish in negotiations its position vis-a-vis the International on the basis of complete equality, and that the “Vienna Working Union” continue to stand by the principles it set forth at its inaugural congress.(30) Let us take a detour and take a look at the circumstances behind the unification process of Germany’s Social Democratic parties. On July 1st 1922, the SPD, which had joined the coalition cabinet with Chancellor Wirth’s Centre Party and the Democratic Party, sounded out the USPD on whether or not it was interested in joining the cabinet, in an effort to create a solid majority in the republic. That proposal did not bear fruit as the Centre Party and the Democratic Party countered with their own proposals to admit parties further to the right into the cabinet. But two weeks later, the two socialist parties agreed to take joint action in the Reichstag. And in the latter half of September, the matter was deliberated at the SPD party congress in Augsburg and at the USPD party congress in Gera respectively before a joint congress was finally held in Nuremburg on the 24th to put an end to their division that went back to 1917. To be sure, Rathenau’s assassination had served as a major trigger behind this development. It made the integration of the people under a republican system seem all the more essential. It was no coincidence that “The Song of Germany (Das Lied der Deutschen)” written and composed in 1841, which had been popular during the era of Imperial Germany, was officially designated as the national anthem in August 1922. However, one must also take into account the state of the USPD whose very existence was in question by that time. In the national assembly election of June 1920, the party collected five million votes to win 84 seats. It was remarkable compared to the SPD’s six million votes and 102 seats. In terms of party membership, too, it had 900,000 compared to the SPD’s 1.2 million. Although the number of its parliamentarians declined when its leftist faction joined the Communist Party in October 1920, half of that faction returned to USPD in April 1922 before it became a major problem. But by 1922 in terms of membership, while the SPD still maintained its earlier figure, the USPD’s membership had dropped to 300,000. A declining trend was also seen in regional elections.

188

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum Moreover, it was facing a financial crisis. Following serious deliberations during the USPD’s regional party rallies and national congress, the party understandably chose to be absorbed by the SPD for its survival. Firmly opposed to that move were Ledebour, an uncompromisingly obstinate party elder who had been a founding member and was still one of its chairmen, and a handful of his followers. They were trying to remain faithful to principles dating back to the time in 1917 when they split from the SPD over the latter’s collaboration with war efforts. Kautsky was again making his mark as a theoretician in the SPD. As a matter of interest, the Communist Party’s membership as of 1922 numbered 300,000, about the same as the USPD’s, and their seats in the national assembly 11.(31) Let us go back to the International. The agenda at the meeting of the “Second’s” Bureau held on September 25th were mostly routine business matters, but the timing happened to coincide with an armed dispute between Greece and Mustafa Kemal, who was seeking the abolition of the Turkish sultanate and establishment of a republic. It is worth noting that the Bureau addressed the dispute, criticizing Britain’s policy and military action in favor of Greece.(32) But the subject was not taken up again as the session’s focus shifted to the unification of the International. The IFTU, which had taken the initiative in convening the Amsterdam Conference in July, decided to convene another international conference calling for peace and disarmament in the Hague in December, and on September 25th, it called on the executive committee of the “Second” to take part. On how to respond to this invitation, a hurried exchange of views took place among the new secretary-general Shaw of the “Second”, executive committee members and others. But as an overwhelming number of members were wary of handing over the political initiative to labor unions, the committee ended up declaring a negative position toward the Hague international conference. Henderson, too, was of the opinion that the “Second” should continue to be in the forefront, but he and other British executive committee members were at the time more preoccupied with the British general elections that were to take place on January 15th. It is of an interest that Shaw complained to Vanderverde on his hand-writing in his letters, “I have seen many different hand-writings, but it took me days to read yours, so please do not write in ‘Greek’ in the future.” Someone complained about prices being too high in the Hague. The IFTU reassured they will be

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

189

Part II supplied with comrades’ home for stay. An international conference in the Hague was callded as scheduled. Shaw accepted the invitation.(33) However, Shaw was becoming increasingly irritated with the aforementioned resolutions of the “Vienna Working Union’s” executive committee meeting in Frankfurt. Encouraged by his “very good friend” Renaudel, with whom he could be completely frank, Shaw wrote in a “confidential letter” that the “Second” intended to stay on course and convene a congress. He was tired of hearing “Vienna’s” argument that “unification is desirable but the time is not yet ripe.” How much longer do we have to keep humoring Vienna, he asked. That said, he could hardly neglect his liaison with the “Vienna Working Union,” to which the French members and Vandervelde were insisting attention had to be paid. Shaw wrote to Adler, asking for his view on a meeting of the “Second’s” executive committee to be held in the Hague two days before the international conference, as resolved at a conference of the “Second’s” secretariat on November 21st. As it turned out, Adler’s response was favorable, the gist of it being that a meeting of the “Vienna Working Union’s” executive committee was taking place in Vienna on December 8th, so some of the committee members will proceed to the Hague thereafter. It may be noted that at the annual congress of the Social-democratic Workers’ Party of GermanAustria, which had taken place in Vienna earlier on October 14th and 15th, Crispien delivered his address as representative of Germany’s reunited SDP to the welcome of the delegates. This can be seen as part of the move to advance the unification of the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union.”(34) The “Vienna Working Union’s” executive committee meeting, held in December as scheduled, first took up the question of representation arising from the reunification of Germany’s two Social-democratic parties. Attending the conference as representatives of the former USPD were Crispien and Ledebour, who had held different views on the unification issue, along with Hilferding in his role as advisor. After an exhaustive discussion, it was decided that “German representatives (to the Vienna Working Union) … will remain as before until the next international congress.” The matter was deliberated further, taking account of the situation, that it had been the union of the two German parties that brought about the “Second’s” proposal for a conference in the Hague. In the event, the final resolution adopted allowed for seven representatives of the “Vienna Working Union” to make contact with the “Second’s”

190

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VII Interregnum executive committee in the Hague. The aim of this move, it was explained, was to set up a joint action committee to prepare for a workers’ congress, and to propose holding an international conference just before that congress to evaluate the committee’s various proposals. The text of the resolution was immediately dispatched to London.(35)

Fig. 51: A sample of Vandervelde’s hand-written letter which Tom Shaw complained was hard to read.

On the same day, December 8th, the “Second’s” executive committee met at the “Café Zuid-Holland” in the Hague with Henderson as moderator, and discussed and passed resolutions on the agenda items including a financial issue. (The “Second,” for instance, had a debt outstanding to the Belgian party, or more specifically Huysmans.) Vandervelde tried to make an issue of the suppression of a strike by white workers in Witwatersrand in South Africa, but the British delegates apparently dealt with it with perfunctory replies. At the session which resumed at “Hotel Centrale” at 8 p.m. on the 9th, the following day, the text of the resolution, sent by Adler to Shaw, was read out, and half an hour thereafter, six delegates from the “Vienna Working Union”—one less than scheduled—were invited into the meeting to start the deliberations. Adler and Shaw drafted a communique on the conclusions of the meeting, which was released to reporters on December 10th. It said a joint (action) committee,

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

191

Part II made up of five delegates each from the two Internationals, will undertake preparations for an international socialist (workers) congress. The “Committee of Ten” thus established immediately held a meeting on on the 12th and agreed to convene the congress on May 20th 1923 in Hamburg. At last, a joint international congress of the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” was put on schedule.(36) Adler wrote to the “Vienna Working Union’s” executive committee members on December 21st, asking for their views in writing on his proposal to hold a congress of the “Vienna Working Union” proper on May 17th of the following year, in the event that an international workers congress was being held on May 20th. Wels’ reaction was to write to Shaw expressing his sense of mistrust. Shaw responded to Wels that he was in total agreement, expressing his disgust with Adler’s machinations with “strategy”. Be that as it may, the “Committee of Ten” met in the town hall of Cologne on the 5th and 6th of January 1923. From the “Second,” Shaw, Stauning, Vandervelde and Wels attended minus Henderson, and from the “Vienna Working Union,” Abramovitch (Martov’s successor), Adler, Bracque, Crispien and Wallhead took part. The main conclusions of their discussions were summarized in the form of an “appeal” for participation in the Hamburg International Workers Congress, which was adopted unanimously. This was the document “To the Socialist Workers Parties of the World” issued in the name of the “Committee of Ten.” It showed the scheduling of the agenda among other things, and indicated that Shaw and Adler will be the contacts in the organizing committee. As the result of requests received from women’s and youth organizations, it was decided that their own congresses would also take place concurrently. The “Committee of Ten” did not forget to raise a strong voice of protest against the repressive policies being carried out in parts of Germany occupied by the Allied powers’ forces, particularly the Ruhr area. Shaw’s letter to Adler dated January 10th covered very specific matters such as time periods allotted to reports to the congress and allocation of deciding votes. Adler’s letter of reply also stated that he agreed with Shaw’s views with regard to these specific matters, with the exception of one question he raised. If there are a number of socialist parties in one country, he asked, why not consider a system of proportionate representation, rather than letting the strongest party represent the whole country. This was nothing but the re-emergence of an issue that plagued the International before World War I.(37)

192

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg

VIII

Hamburg – Launch of the Socialist and Labour International, May, 1923 –

1 On January 11th 1923, France and Belgium began their occupation of the Ruhr area. The occupation was under the policy of French Prime Minister Poincaré who had been unhappy for some time that Germany had failed to meet its reparations commitment. At a meeting of the Allied powers’ reparations committee two days earlier, France had, with the support of Belgium and Italy and despite opposition from Britain, secured approval of the assessment that Germany had violated the terms of the Treaty of Versailles with regard to the delivery of coal. Sixty-thousand troops, commensurate with the number of the area’s inhabitants, were to be deployed. Faced with this situation, the public opinion all over Germany “became unified as it had never been since August 1914” (Erich Eyck). It was President Ebert who personified the people’s mood, and the cabinet under Wilhelm Cuno (independent) who replaced Wirth adopted a policy of so-called “passive resistance.” Workers and civil servants of the Ruhr area refused to cooperate with the French forces. But the situation was more serious. The occupation strongly stimulated German nationalism, which had been smoldering like ember even after the war, eventually leading to Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch in November of that year. Elsewhere, the Communist Party tried to mount a struggle “against the imperialistic occupation of the Ruhr, against risk of war and fascism.” Moreover, the economic policies of the Cuno government were to lead to a staggering hyperinflation. The value of the German mark against the dollar, using the base figure of one in 1918, fell steadily to 449 in 1922, 4,280 in January 1923 and to 23,500,000 by September of that year. Haffner took special note of 1923 as the year of “an endlessly cynical illusion,” graphically describing a situation where “a pound of potatoes that still cost 50,000 marks the day before already cost 100,000 marks today. The 65,000-mark salary I brought home on Friday last week was not enough to buy a pack of cigarettes by Tuesday.”(1)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

193

Part II Amidst this situation, Shaw and Adler kept up their exchange of views on the finances, by-laws, venues for meetings and such in connection with preparations for the Hamburg Congress and meetings of the “Committee of Ten.” The overall picture is reflected in such remarks as how it was impossible to hold meetings in Germany as the international express train service had stopped due to the shortage of coal, how in the Netherlands not only was the currency exchange rate unfavorable but the border with Germany was under occupation, or how exchange of mail took as long as 10 days.(2) On January 23rd 1923, the “Vienna Working Union’s” executive committee held a meeting in Frankfurt.(3) The members did not think that the international proletariat could influence the Ruhr situation in any way, but nevertheless decided to attend the conference in Amsterdam scheduled by the IFTU. Ledebour and others drew the members’ attention to an appeal for joint action made by the “Third,” but they decided to ignore it. Also, Ledebour’s proposal that the “Vienna Working Union” hold its own congress apart from the Hamburg conference was rejected. These three items on the agenda revealed that three members including Ledebour had become a minority faction against eight members including Adler. And so on January 26th and 27th, a joint conference of the executives committees of IFTU, the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” finally took place in Amsterdam. To be precise, only Bracque among the “Vienna Working Union” delegates made it to the opening. Four others including Adler missed their train in Frankfurt and only arrived on the second day. According to the minutes not for official publication, the discussions were centred on the Ruhr issue.(4) They were of course all opposed to the occupation of the Ruhr area by France and Belgium. But what could be done to counter it? Should the British forces stay out? Should French workers work in the Ruhr following their government’s policy? These were all matters hard to forecast. Some proposed a general strike or partial strikes, but the delegates recognized that the IFTU and other organizations did not have enough power to carry them out. Wels issued a warning about the rise of nationalism in Germany, and blamed it on the policies of France and the League of Nations among others. He also said he was hurt by the Belgian people calling the Germans “Boche” and despising them. Léon Jouhaux of France, attending as a member of the IFTU, stated that the labor unions in France were becoming weaker, while

194

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg Joseph Wauters of Belgium stated that Germany was already more affluent than his country, and that it would be difficult to hold meetings for reconciliation with Germany in areas where inhabitants were killed in 1914. To a proposal that the issue be referred to the League of Nations, Theodor Leipart of Germany, who was also an IFTU delegate, expressed opposition, noting that Germany was not even a member of the League of Nations in the first place. With regard to the Saar and Upper Silesia (both territories separated from the German Empire, where national reversion was decided by plebiscites), he went on, the League of Nations did not meet Germany’s expectations. Also, the League of Nations was not considered in Germany to be neutral, but an organ of the Entente nations, and that Germany should join the League of Nations, but only at the recommendation of the powers and not of small nations like Switzerland and Sweden. The last comment was enough to draw an admonition from Jouhaux that member nations had equal status in the League of Nations. On the second day, the draft resolution prepared by a subcommittee of four including Troelstra was submitted. The delegates unanimously adopted the resolution which incorporated Adler’s view that the occupation of the Ruhr was one facet of a major struggle among capitalists in German and French heavy industries over the coal and steel regions. It concluded that the military occupation was not only useless for the recovery of the area devastated by war but would also sow the seeds for a future war, and called for caution against lies perpetrated by the bourgeois newspapers fanning the flames of conflict between the people of various nations. Pointing out that the biggest victims were the German workers, it called on the proletariat of France and Belgium to do their utmost for the withdrawal of all occupational forces from the Ruhr and, at the same time, it demanded that the German workers make the German government and capitalists fulfill their reparation obligations within their capacity for payment. On its part, the “Third” held its 4th congress over a one-month period from November 5th of the previous year in Petrograd and Moscow, holding aloft the slogan of the “united front.” Along that line, it sent an open letter on December 4th to the “Second,” the “Vienna Working Union,” and the “Amsterdam Labor Union Federation,” saying it did not ask that they fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was its objective, but demanding “whether or not you

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

195

Part II are willing to fight against the dictatorship of the capital.” In January 1923, it proposed to mount a “joint action in opposition to the Ruhr occupation.” But even the “Vienna Working Union” had no time to listen to such appeals by the “Third.”(5)

2 On February 8th 1923, a circular on the planned Hamburg Congress went out bearing the letterhead “Socialist and Labour International Hamburg 1923” and the names of Shaw and Adler as secretaries of the organizing committee along with their addresses. But the “Second” had already made its position clear that it would be futile to hold another meeting of the “Committee of Ten.” Shaw communicated to Adler repeatedly that as it would be difficult to hold a committee meeting because of the transport situation and other reasons, he would like to meet just with Adler in Berlin to discuss the details. On his part, Adler seemed to be intent on holding a “Committee of Ten” meeting as a matter of procedure. That was probably because there were within the “Vienna Working Union” people opposed to uniting with the “Second,” even if they were in the minority. While discussing the Hamburg Congress in his letter to Shaw dated February 25th, it is seen that Adler struck out “new” from the words “the new International” that he had written. To be sure, Shaw and Adler did have a meeting in Berlin for consultation, though its date remains unknown, but even thereafter, discrepancies apparently persisted in their mutual understanding. In mid-March, Adler sent some information and proposals to the “Committee of Ten” members, but responded to Shaw’s letter dated March 15th that he “cannot understand it at all…” Probably a letter that should have arrived had not, due to some situation in the postal service.(6) In parallel with the negotiations with the “Vienna Working Union,” the “Second” was promoting multilateral conferences involving Belgium, Britain, France Germany and Italy, which had already taken place a number of times to discuss the reparation issue. They began with the realization of an “interparliamentary conference” of socialist party members from different nations in Paris on March 20th 1923. That meeting was attended among others by Vandervelde and Huysmans from Belgium, MacDonald and Henderson from

196

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg Britain, all executive members of the French Socialist Party (SFIO) including Blum, Bracque, Faure, Longuet and Renaudel, and from Italy by Matteotti, who was eventually assassinated for denouncing the Fascists, the “old warrior” Modigliani and Treves. The turnout indicated that the French and Italian parties were no longer reluctant to collaborate with other parties of the “Second”. On March 28th and 29th, a similar conference met in Paris albeit with fewer delegates. Expressing concern over existing policies implemented in the Ruhr, the conference decided to draft, with the collaboration of Germany’s SPD, a proposal on measures that would replace these policies. The delegates resolved that they would initiate activities based on that proposal in their respective parliaments and, at the same time, send the proposal to the president of the U.S. to seek his agreement. (7) As for their dealings with the “Vienna Working Union,” the members of the organizing committee for the Hamburg Congress met in Bregenz on April 4th. This town on Austria’s western end on the shore of Lake Constance had been recommended as a venue by Adler at a time when other European cities were deemed unsuitable for holding an international conference because of the transport situation and/or high prices. That meeting decided on the moderators and reporters for the Hamburg Congress and got started on the draft of by-laws, before adopting a resolution opposing the Ruhr occupation and the persecution of socialists in Russia. Then on April 7th and 8th, the executive committee of the “Vienna Working Union” met in the same town. The first thing decided at this session was to hold a “Vienna Working Union” congress in Hamburg on May 20th. The delegates proposed the following three items for the congress agenda. (1) Parties in the “Vienna Working Union” shall attend the Hamburg Congress held jointly with the “Second.” (2) The agenda schedule agreed upon at the “Committee of Ten” meeting in December 1922 and the draft by-laws prepared thereafter shall be approved. (3) If the draft by-laws are based on the foundation upon which the “Socialist and Labour International” was established, and if the “Second” declares its dissolution, the “Vienna Working Union,” having completed its task, shall also dissolve itself. These three agenda items were adopted unanimously with the exception of the SR leftist delegates. (8) Thereafter, Shaw and Adler exchanged many letters. They dealt mostly with their views on declarations, reporters and adjustments to be made for

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

197

Part II the Hamburg Congress. On the aforementioned “Vienna Working Union” executive committee meeting, Adler told Shaw that the only opposition had come from a “small group.” The people of the SR leftist faction surely would have been unhappy with that description, had they known about it. Adler said he intended to dissolve the “Vienna Working Union,” and went on to explain the reason, which was to deny some people continued use of the name “Vienna Working Union”, just as Ledebour and others in Germany kept using the name USPD even after USPD was united with the SPD. Furthermore, he stated that he wanted the “Second” also to adopt a resolution dissolving itself, as people would otherwise think that the “Vienna Working Union” had been absorbed by the “Second.” Shaw continued to insist that the first reporter for the first agenda item should be Henderson. Also, he expressed his strong dissatisfaction over the fact that although IFTU’s Oudegeest had cooperated with the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” on the matter of the Hamburg Congress organizing committee back in January at the Amsterdam Conference on the Ruhr issue, he had not been provided with adequate information thereafter. The reaction of IFTU was understandable, since the International side was trying not to cede the initiative to the labour unions.(9)

3 At this point let us look at what was happening at some of the socialist party congresses that were held from the autumn of 1922 up to the time of the Hamburg Congress in 1923. What must be emphasized first is the fact that in Italy on October 28th 1922, Mussolini, having successfully carried out his “March on Rome” coup, was appointed prime minister by the king. As it turned out, the establishment of his fascist dictatorship was to take more time compared to the development after Hitler seized power 10 years later. Probably because of that, neither the socialists nor the communists were aware of the gravity of the situation in Italy at the time. It was on June 10th 1924 that Giacomo Matteotti, secretary of the new United Socialist Party created by Turati and others, who had made a speech in the Chamber of Deputies denouncing the fascist violence, was kidnapped and murdered by the fascists.

198

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg The incident provoked such a widespread protest from a majority of parties including the People’s Party and the Communist Party that Mussolini was put in a difficult spot. But an anti-fascist united front did not materialize, and Mussolini was able to consolidate his rule by force and succeeded in maintaining his hold on power.(10) Neither at the 4th Congress of the Comintern held immediately after the march on Rome, nor at the various socialist party congresses held around that time was there any presentation of significance perceiving fascism to be a new phenomenon. One cannot escape the impression that they were rehashing the same old arguments.(11) Meanwhile, the congress of the German-Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party took place in October 1922 with Crispien delivering an address as mentioned earlier. He expressed his sentiment that he “feels internally in solidarity” with the Austrian proletariat, and declared that “one can safely anticipate a future when Germany and Austria become one nation under the power of the proletariat” to an enthusiastic applause. But the actions of the “Vienna Working Union” led by Adler and others were only reported routinely without any discussion taking place. It was Bauer who delivered the lengthy keynote report entitled “the political and economic situation” at this congress, and Adler was apparently staying in the background. When the SFIO held its congress in Lille in February of the following year, 1923, its permanent administrative committee submitted a report which, again, only discussed developments toward forging a united proletarian action. It is characteristic of SFIO that it opened letters exchanged with the French Communist Party.(12) The tenor of the discussions at the British Independent Labour Party conference held in London in April of the same year was somewhat different. The Independent Labour Party was established by Keir Hardie and others as the first workers’ political party in Britain in 1893 before the formation of the Labour Party. At the time of World War I, it clearly distinguished itself from the Labour Party by taking an anti-war position. Nevertheless, the party members as a rule also belonged to the Labour Party. They were simply a minority within the Labour Party, but at the same time, they were a separate political party. This unique relationship was embodied in MacDonald. Before the Great War, he was an influential member of the Independent

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

199

Part II Labour Party as well as the man in charge of the Labour Party’s finances. He was attending the Independent Labour Party conference of 1923 as a member of the party leadership, but he was part of the Labour Party leadership as well. Moreover, he was one of the key figures of the “Second” as we have already seen. At the Independent Labour Party conference in April, to which Crispien and Longuet came to lend their support, one speaker after another voiced reservations about the Hamburg Congress. One severe critic went as far as to say he had thought that if MacDonald “is to become secretary of the ‘Second’ that does not even exist, it would be entirely for the purpose of burying the ‘Second’ with care” but instead, “he marched down the hill like the Grand old Duke of York and went back to the ‘Second.’” Lack of faith in the “Second” and sympathy for the “Third” which had, whatever the circumstances, taken action were expressed repeatedly. In the event, however, a policy decision supporting the Hamburg Congress was adopted by 265 to 52 votes. At the same time, the party’s national administrative conference was assigned duty to do its utmost to ensure that the Independent Labour Party would keep up its identity in the new International.(13) The Swiss Social-democratic Party, which did not attend the Berne Congress of 1919, the first reunion of socialists since the outbreak of World War I, out of sympathy for the Bolsheviks even though it took place in its own country, was an influential member of the “Vienna Working Union”. What kind of arguments concerning the Hamburg Congress were raised at the party’s congress held in April 1923? Its executive meeting having submitted a draft resolution on a policy decision to take part in that congress, Grimm took the floor as the “German-language reporter.” Since the USPD merged with the SPD in Germany, he stated, a sentiment tendency favoring union with the “Second” has gained strength within the “Vienna Working Union.” French comrades in the “Vienna Working Union” stated frankly that they had joined the union because the USPD belonged to it, and because they did not want to sit at the same table with delegates of the former SPD, Grimm said. Now that the situation in Germany has changed, Grimm deduced, they no longer have a reason to continue to participate in the

200

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg “Vienna Working Union,” so the logical conclusion would be that they would seek to join the “Second.” Graber, the “French-language reporter,” also attempted an explanation as if to head off any counter-argument. You might say that Vandervelde abandoned the principles of the International back in 1914, but if Switzerland had been Belgium, he argued, several Vanderveldes would have emerged from among us. Moreover, the Belgians learned from experience and, the British are on the eve of regaining power while in Italy, on the other hand, socialism practically no longer exists. A voice from the floor: “That’s a lie!” It was the executives of the canton of Basel-Stadt who, going against the intention of the Swiss party’s executive, submitted a draft resolution opposing the party’s participation in the Hamburg Congress. Reporting on behalf of the city’s executives, Friedrich Schneider did not mince his words. Please remember that we decided to part ways with the “Second” in 1919 with a vote of 459 to 1, he said and asked: “What has changed since?” As long as there is no premise yet for an International that has the capacity to wage a struggle and includes all members of the proletariat, we refuse to take part, he said. The discussion went on for half a day with several speakers taking the floor including the elder Greulich, who was by now an octogenarian. Adler, who had already given the opening speech, also asked for the floor. I have no intention of trying to influence your decision, he began cautiously and went on. I don’t think a true International would be created at the Hamburg Congress either, he argued, but the correct way to resolve differences of opinion would be to thrash them out within a single organization. He recalled Schneider’s comment that at the Hamburg Congress dicisions might be made by the major political parties of the “Second”, leaving the “Vienna Working Union” with no decision-making power, and argued that was not true. Grimm drove home the point that it was important for the “Vienna Working Union” to attend the Hamburg Congress, rather than leaving it to just the “Second.” In the final vote, the proposal of the party executive was adopted by 159 votes to 93.(14)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

201

Part II

4 Thus the Hamburg Congress was now definitely on schedule despite some voices of dissent within the “Vienna Working Union.” On May 17th and 19th the “Second’s” executive committee met at the Hamburg Trade Union Hall and resolved that in the event that unification is achieved both the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” would dissolve.(15) The “Vienna Working Union” held its second—and what was to be its last—congress in the same Trade Union Hall on May 20th.(16) Adler had said in his letter to Shaw dated April 18th that this congress was “only of formal importance.” Sure enough, Grimm in his capacity as moderator treated the union with the “Second” as a fait accompli. Against it, the SR leftists’ Isaac Steinberg declared his leave. Thereafter the meeting moved onto the only remaining item on the agenda, i.e. its position vis-à-vis the Hamburg Congress. Adler, while obviously defending the draft resolution that “we should lose no time in seizing every opportunity to advance step by step,” clarified his position anew. The splintering of labour movement was not due to any error on the part of individual leaders or party factions, but was due to the very stage the great development of the working class was in. That was why the “Vienna Working Union” had been describing itself as a tool for the creation of a single International, rather than calling itself an International, and had been making efforts accordingly. As the “Vienna Working Union” already declared, the “Second” had “died” with the outbreak of the Great War, but due to the reaction to the war, there was a possibility for internationalism to arise with renewed momentum. However, an attempt by the Bolsheviks to establish socialism in Russia, a nation of peasantry, introduced unprecedented difficulties. Internationalist thinking would have taken more solid shape after the war had it not been for Bolshevism. The meeting of the three Internationals in 1922 failed. What divides the “Third” and us is neither political theory nor views on whether dictatorship or democracy should prevail in a given country. To the contrary, the issue is whether dictatorship or democracy should prevail within the proletarian movement. In an organization of the proletariat, the decision of the majority should be followed, and the minority should not force its views on the majority. In this way, Adler explained why he now chose the “Second” between the two Internationals, from which he had been keeping distance,

202

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg while criticizing the “Third” more explicitly than ever before. Now that the two SPD factions had reunited in Germany, he argued, it went “against the interests vital to the liberation struggle of the proletariat” for SPD to be a member of one International and for SFIO to be a member of another International. He concluded his speech by asserting that the Hamburg Congress was aimed not to unite the political parties of the “Vienna Working Union” in the “Second,” but to establish a “New International” together with those parties which had belonged neither to the “Second” nor the “Vienna Working Union”. Not to be outdone, Ledebour who next took the floor as joint reporter gave his lengthy discourse. Basing his argument on his pet theory that the aim of the International was a world revolution of the proletariat, he said the situation had not changed since the establishment of the “Vienna Working Union.” A merger of the “Vienna Working Union” and the “Second” was being planned but, but he wondered whether that would bring the world revolution any closer. He went on to submit a draft resolution calling for the maintenance and continuation of the “Vienna Working Union” as a crystalline nucleus of various proletarian organizations, in view of the “Second” still beholden to the influence of wartime traditions and getting involved in coalition regimes with bourgeois political parties, and of the “Third” degenerating into a reinforcement for the Soviet government that was inducing acts of terror. The ensuing discussions may be sorted out in terms of who were in favor of, and who were against, Adler’s proposal, as follows. Those in favor included Hillquit, Crispien and Faure, who reported that the entire SFIO was for the merger, while those against included Abramovitch, who asked fellow delegates to realize that empty revolutionary rhetoric actually served to strengthen the forces of counter-revolution, and delegates from the Poale Zion and the British Independent Labour Party. Karl Čermak of the Czechoslovak-German Social-democratic Party and the Yugoslav and Rumanian delegates were in favour. Though they complained that the rights of German minorities were not guaranteed under Czechoslovakia’s new Beneš government, and that violence by reactionary forces raged in Yugoslavia and Rumania. A group of Hungarian exiles also stated that they were not even able to send delegates under the Horthy regime.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

203

Part II The most vociferous of those against was Steinberg, who had once served as the People’s Commissar of Justice in the short-lived Bolsehvik-SR leftist coalition government. Labelling Abramovitch “an agent of the devil,” he declared that “only those who have achieved a revolution of some measure themselves are permitted to criticize the Russian Revolution.” From the Swiss party, it was delegates from the minority faction who took the floor. A delegate from the Polish Independent Socialdemocratic Party complained his party could hardly participate in the same International as the Polish Socialist Party when the latter was collaborating with the Piłsudski regime in its invasion of the Ukraine. Finally, Modigliani took the floor, with something he had to say to Ledebour. If there ever was a political party to Fig. 52: Georg Ledebour. have faith in the view represented by Ledebour, it was the Italian Socialist Party. Ledebour would recall the time they sat down together at the Zimmerwald conference. The party’s policy line had not changed since the war, and nowhere was the revolutionary spirit as strong as it was in Italy. But the strength of the bourgeoisie was even greater. If he was to go back to Italy and report that he could not resolve the difference of views with Ledebour, it would only make the Fascists happy. The overall impression was that the voices of opposition sounded louder. But that was probably because, as Adler explained, more time had been given to the minority faction. That was how democracy worked, he commented. After discussions lasting some 10 hours, two resolutions were put to the vote according to a kind of proportionate representation system under a protocol dating back to pre-war days. Those in favor of the resolution proposed by Adler were the U.S. (10 votes), Britain (10 votes), France (10 votes), Germany (8 votes), Austria (8 votes), Italy (8 votes), Czechoslovak-German Social-democratic Workers Party (7 votes), Switzerland (7 votes), Russia (Mensheviks, 6 votes), Finland (5 votes), Spain (5 votes), Latvia (4 votes), Rumania (4 votes), Poale Zion (2 votes), Poles in Czechoslovakia (2 votes), Hungarian exiles (2 votes) and Luxembourg (1 vote).

204

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg The Swiss delegation, however, added the condition that it would postpone active collaboration with the new International until the next party congress decided on its final position. Those in favor of the resolution proposed by Ledebour were Germany’s Ledebour faction, the SR leftists and the Polish Independent Social-democratic Party, each with two votes. Thus Adler’s resolution was adopted by 99 votes to 6.

5 Having gone through all these procedures, the “International Socialist Workers Congress” opened on May 21st 1923 in Hamburg’s Trade Union Hall with 620 delegates from 30 nations or territories. Needless to say, the participants had received in advance not only the invitation but also various informations on the by-laws and so on. But let us take a look at the congress itself.(17) Speaking of union of the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union,” how much political strength did the two have respectively? For instance, the membership figures for the British Labour Party, Germany’s SPD, the Socialdemocratic Workers’ Party of German-Austria and the Swiss Socialdemocratic Party were respectively about 3.3 million, about 1.26 million, about 550,000 and about 32,000.(18) But as the Labour Party membership, for example, included trade union members, not only were the figures difficult to compare by the same standard, total numbers of party members did not necessarily reflect actual strengths. Hence, the vote allocation and counting system was devised. This system “ranked,” in a manner of speaking, all the political parties by factoring in their numbers of due-paying members, the importance of the respective national races, the strengths of socialistic labor unions and cooperatives, and the political strengths of the socialist parties. If a country had more than one eligible political party, more votes were allotted. Sure enough, back in 1907 when this voting system was first adopted, it made some sense to think it unreasonable for Germany’s SPD, a paragon of the socialist parties of the world, and Japan’s socialist movement, which could hardly mount significant activities, to have the same voting right when deciding on resolutions. This system was one which allowed the socialist parties of major European nations in particular to exercise initiative. It was at any rate

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

205

Part II one way of showing the actual strengths of the political parties concerned. The number of votes allocated at the Hamburg Congress after a series of advance negotiations were provisionally set as follows.(19) • Britain 30 votes (Labour Party, Trades Union Congress, Socialdemocratic League, Fabian Society*, includes 2 votes for the Independent Labour Party**) • Germany 30 votes (united SPD {SPD* and USPD** before unification}) • France 16 votes (Parti Socialiste Français** {SFIO}) • Italy 15 votes (United Socialist Party) • Belgium 15 votes (Workers Party*) • Austria 15 votes (Social-democratic Workers’ Party**, includes 1 vote for Czechoslovaks in Vienna) • Russia 12 votes (Social-democratic Labour Party {Mensheviks}, SR**) • Sweden 12 votes (Social-democratic Workers Party*) • Denmark 12 votes (Social-democratic Federation*) • United States 12 votes (Socialist Party**) • Poland 10 votes (comprising 8 votes for the Polish Socialist Party* and 2 votes for the Independent Social-democratic Party and the German SPD minority faction**) • Czechoslovakia 9 votes (comprising 8 votes for the Social-democratic Party* and 1 vote for its minority faction**) • Hungary 8 votes (Social-democratic Party*, Világosság**) • Czechoslovakia 7 votes (German Social-democratic Workers Party**) • Netherlands 7 votes (Social-democratic Workers Party*) • Switzerland 7 votes (Social-democratic Party**) • Finland 6 votes (Social-democratic Party**) • Rumania 3 votes (Socialist Party Alliance**) • Norway 3 votes (Social-democratic Workers Party*) • Georgia 3 votes (Social-democratic Party*) • Armenia 2 votes (Revolutionary Federation {Dashnaktsutiun}*) • Latvia 2 votes (Social-democratic Party**) • Bulgaria 1 vote (Social-democratic Workers Party*) • Danzig 1 vote (United Social-democratic Party*) • Estonia 1 vote (Social-democratic Party*) • Yugoslavia 1 vote (Socialist Party)

206

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg • • • • •

Lithuania 1 vote (Social-democratic Party) Luxemburg 1 vote (Socialist Party*) Poale Zion 1 vote** Turkey 1 vote (delegate absent) Ukraine 1 vote (Social-democratic Workers Party)

The names of political parties inside brackets are organizations which sent delegates to this congress, with those marked * belonging to the “Second” and those marked ** belonging to the “Vienna Working Union.” Those unmarked either belonged to neither of the two, or are difficult to determine as far as their political allegiance is concerned. In the first place, the situation, in which new international boundaries were being drawn and upheavals were rife, made it difficult to determine which organizations were active in which regions. Such cases as the Hungarian Social-democratic Party and the Polish Socialdemocratic Workers Party maintaining a liaison office in Czechoslovakia or belonging to political parties there were but a few of many examples. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude from the above table that the “Second” had an advantage of about two to one over the “Vienna Working Union.” As a purely numerical comparison, the participants at the 3rd Comintern Congress in June and July 1921 numbered 602 from 58 nations or territories, and at its 4th Congress at the end of 1922 they numbered 408 from 66 parties and other organizations from 58 nations.(20) The Comintern could hardly claim superior strength. One thing worth pointing out is that even from before 1914, Japan was the only country to take part in the International from outside Europe and the U. S.. Whatever the reason, the Comintern’s 3rd and 4th Congresses saw participants from Asia such as Iran, India, China, Korea and Japan, as well as from Latin America. In contrast, the Hamburg Congress was essentially a conference of European nations, with the exception of delegates from the U.S.. With the emergence of the issue of the right of selfdetermination of peoples after the Great War, the nations were taking seriously the various difficult issues arising in eastern Europe, the Middle East and, in particular, Georgia, but only as a matter of information.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

207

Part II

6 At 10 a.m. on May 22nd, an Easter Monday, Congress opened its session with Wels, Shaw and Adler taking their places in the Secretaries’ seats after the Hamburg Municipal Theatre orchestra played the prelude and a male chorus sang a welcoming song.(21) Not surprisingly, Wels stated that “in the class struggle of the proletariat, it is rumored that the working class is driving itself into an even greater state of misery due to conceit and to its leaders’ intransigence, but let us turn over these rumors simply to the communists”, to the delegates’ applause. He went on to speak of the need to strengthen the working class in order to defeat “the reaction of the world,” citing Marx’ historical materialism. Henderson criticized the British government for being prepared to cut off diplomatic ties with Russia when it would not cut ties with Mussolini or Horthy. Abramovitch, rather than criticizing the Soviet government, sounded an alarm from the standpoint of the Russian populace how the British government’s economic embargo policy was creating the risk of new internal uprisings. It is also worth mentioning that 10 years later in March 1933, Wels as the SPD chairman delivered a heroic speech opposing Hitler’s Enabling Act in the Reichstag surrounded by pistolpacking stormtroopers.(22) It was Austria’s Bauer who took the floor to thunderous applause to deliver his lengthy report on “the international struggle against international reaction,” one of the most important items on the congress agenda. It may appear that the state of reaction under the Vienna establishment of a 100 years ago has now made its return, he said. But there is a change that gives us courage and hope. The very existence of the bourgeoisie which put itself on the throne is now being threatened by the proletariat. He went on to list five points of risk. One was the Russian issue. While he was critical of the Bolsheviks’ Fig. 53: Otto Bauer. divisive policies, he levelled sharper charges at the capitalist governments. The second was Germany. The counter-revolution in Germany not only

208

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg killed thousands of revolutionary fighters but still kept people like Ernst Toller in prison, aided by French imperialism. The third was Italy, where fascism had destroyed all elements of democracy. “We have no choice but to establish a defence organization of the proletariat to counter the violent organization of fascism. This is because appeals for democracy are inadequate for resisting naked violence,” he said. The fourth point was the counter-revolution in Hungary under Horthy and in Rumania. Britain and other countries had schemed to create a support base for it in Austria. The last point he mentioned was the League of Nations which did not include the U.S., Russia and Germany, “the three most populous nations of white races.” This was because it was beginning to emerge as a new Holy Alliance, an instrument of reaction. But just as Britain with the rise of liberalism 100 years ago turned its back on the Holy Alliance, he hoped Britain where the Labour Party today had achieved great success would defeat the establishment of international reaction on the European continent. Bauer said passing resolutions at conferences was tantamount to doing nothing, and argued fervently for collaborative efforts in Parliament and mass action outside Parliament, if uprisings and general strikes were too much to ask for. One may recall that the workers’ armed uprising in February 1934 against the Engelbert Dollfuss regime’s repressive policies was quelled and Bauer was forced into exile in Brno where he went on to lead the “Austrian Socialists’ External Secretariat (Alös).”(23) On this topics, Abramovitch, Modigliani, Kunfi and Wels also spoke. On “imperialistic peace and the task of the working class”, Sidney Webb said the primary cause of the current political and economic dissatisfaction was the Treaty of Versailles. He asserted that “tolerance and discussion being the basic requirement of democracy,” this spirit of democracy must pervade not only through the policies of socialism but also throughout international politics allowing for the revision of treaties. Then Hilferding took the floor. He declared that Germany was going ahead with repayment (Wiedergutmachung) not out of obedience to the Treaty of Versailles but because of its moral responsibility, to the applause of Belgian and French delegates. After expressing his concern over the fact that European nations had incurred debts especially to the U.S. because of the Treaty of Versailles, and the fact that Europe had become “Balkanized” with the nations resorting to protectionism, Hilferding

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

209

Part II analyzed the state of the world economy befitting of his role as the author of Finance Capital (Das Finanzkapital).(24) In his view, the Great War waged by imperialism had brought only death and destruction, but not only have the principles of capitalism not undergone any changes, the accumulation of capital had also progressed even further so that new leaders inheriting the “spirit of violence” from the Joint Chiefs of Staff were fighting against the working class through anti-semitism and fascism. The Manchester School (laissez-faire capitalism), once inspired bourgeois revolutions, was by now aiming for absolute control by monopoly. Capitalism no longer fettered by nation states. Citing from Marx and Engels, he insisted that all the more, an empowered working class had to increasingly exercise its influence on the states. But he did not forget to add that the socialization of the means of production was not a process which can be carried out by forceful methods over a short period. Next to take the floor in response to the above two men, was Blum of the SFIO, who, despite having become a member of the minority following the split-up of 1920, had been attending international conferences as a member of the “Vienna Working Union” since around the summer of 1922.(25) Having declared his support on each of the points Hilferding had raised, and referring to Bauer’s historical comparison, Blum pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles and others had been compelled to recognize the peoples’ right of selfdetermination, unlike the Treaty of Vienna 100 years earlier or the Treaty of Utrecht 200 years earlier. But the problem was that the Treaty of Versailles had corrupted Wilsonian idealism with old, worn-out thinking, so that the peoples’ right of self-determination was being denied, most demonstrably as in the case of Austria. Reparation, a governing principle being introduced for the first time in history, was fine, but only as long as excessive demands were not made, he said, adding that he was grateful for Hilferding’s excellent comments. French and Belgian socialists had been resolutely opposed to the occupation of the Ruhr. Having gone through the Great War to begin with, no single nation in Europe could possibly hold the position of superiority any longer. The initiative in the world had shifted to another continent. It may sound funny, he said, but it took a kind of mental laundering process for the French to rid themselves of their uneasiness toward Germany. Even today, if Bavaria, for instance, were to come under the control of monarchist-militaristic reaction,

210

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg they could not help becoming nervous. He was not arguing to defend France. Far from it, the prosperity of one’s country relied on the prosperity of other countries, and love for one’s country had to be integrated with love for mankind, and that indeed was the task of the International. Blum later went on to become prime minister of the French Popular Front cabinet in 1936. After some hold-up over procedural matters, Vandervelde took the floor, seemingly with reluctance, to explain that he had signed the Treaty of Versailles as a member of the Belgian government with regard only to the point signifying Belgium’s liberation from foreign military occupation, and with reservations over many of the points, only to be greeted with jeers. The speech inevitably became long-winded, but when he closed with the words “the proletariat Fig. 54: Leon Blum. brings to the world the peace that it needs” quoting the historian Michelet, he received enthusiastic applause.(26) To start with, Huysmans presented the draft resolution of the sub committee on this issue, “imperialistic peace and the task of the working class” and it was approved. The draft resolution of the subcommittee on “international reaction and international struggle” was, according to Brailsford’s explanation, divided into two parts, the overall issue and the Russian issue. The wording of the latter was critical of the terror unleashed by the Bolsheviks, but the phrase “in order to maintain Russia as one of the pillars of the revolution and not let it become a centre of Western reaction” was added at Adler’s proposal. When the resolution was put to a country-by-country vote, the part on the overall issue was adopted unanimously, while the vote on the Russian issue turned out as follows. Despite abstention by Britain (30 votes), Switzerland (7 votes), the Ukraine (1 vote) and Poale Zion (1 vote) and votes against by the Polish Independent Socialdemocratic Party and the Czechoslovak Socialist Union (1 vote each), the votes in favor reached 196. In addition, a resolution concerning the eight-hour working day and a resolution to set up a study committee on disputes among Czechoslovak socialist parties were adopted.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

211

Part II Finally, let us look at the first part of the by-laws that were adopted following an explanation by Adler. 1) Socialist workers parties assembled in the Socialist and Labour International (Die Sozialistische Arbeiter-International, SAI) are political parties that seek to change capitalistic ways of production into socialistic modes of production, and that recognize class struggle expressed in the form of political and economic actions as a means of liberation of the working class. 2) The task of SAI is to unify the activities of its member political parties and integrate them for joint actions. The SAI shall make an effort to unify all international socialist labor movements according to the principles set forth in its by-laws. Political parties assembled in the SAI shall assume the obligation not to join any international unions of political nature other than this union that is being established. 3) The SAI can become a vibrant reality only when resolutions on all international issues have binding power on all of its component parts. Each one of the resolutions of this international organization, therefore, shall become a self-willed restriction on the autonomy of the political parties of individual nations. 4) The SAI is not only a means for dealing with various tasks during peace time, but is also a similarly indispensable means during wartime. In conflicts between various national peoples, the member parties shall recognize the SAI as the highest decision-making organ.(27) 5) The organs for the implementation of the above tasks are as follows: 1. international congresses, 2. Executive, 3. Bureau, 4. Managing Committee and 5. Secretariat. The Executive, comprising over 30 provisionally-selected delegates from about 20 countries, chose Henderson as chairman, Gosling as treasurer and Adler and Shaw as secretaries. London was selected as the seat of the Secretariat, and Abramovitch, Bauer, Bracque, Branting, Henderson, Modigliani, Troelstra, Vandenvelde and Wels were selected for the administrative bureau.(28) McDonald joined Managing Committee as one of the British representatives in the Executive. That was how the “Socialist and Labour International” was launched.(29) While the International prior to 1914 had been centered around France and Germany, the prime movers behind the new International were Britain and Germany.

212

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

VIII Hamburg

7 As Adler stated at the final congress of the “Vienna Working Union”, now there were only the “Socialist International” and the “Communist International” left standing. The Comintern reacted as one might have expected toward the Hamburg Congress. The Comintern’s expanded executive committee resolved on June 23rd as follows. “The Second International died an unnatural death in August 1918 as the result of a shameful political and moral bankruptcy. By uniting with this Second International, the Second and a half International finally and formally confirmed its own betrayal.”(30) To write any further on the histories of the two Internationals would be going beyond the scope of this work. But to add a few comments, the two Internationals spent more time in confrontation, rather than in competition. The “Communist International” could not forget the “betrayal of the Second”. The “Socialist International,” having gone through a variety of internal conflicts, came together in the end by deciding to side with “democracy” rather than the Bolsheviks’ “dictatorship.” Harboring a strong sense of distrust toward “centrists” like Kautsky, Lenin (and for that matter Rosa Luxemburg too) developed his own theory and, despite the handicap of being a minority within a minority, finally went on to lead the Russian revolution. The Bolshevik revolution and the building of the Soviet Union Fig. 55: Karl Kautsky who becomes both gave hope to people all over the Leon Trotsky when turned upside world, especially the oppressed. It would down (Stalin’s two adversaries). have been inconceivable without Lenin. But it seems that he was too obsessed with the point of origin of his experiences despite changes in the situation. The conditions for joining the Comintern were so strict that they even drove away sympathizers like Adler and MacDonald to the side of the “Second’s traitors.”(31) Rather than to ask which side was responsible for this, it would seem more important to reexamine the historical reality of a situation where the workers’ International remained divided when Mussolini was already in power. The fact that Lenin

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

213

Part II took the trouble to rebut one by one criticisms leveled by Kautsky and others indicates that there was still room for more contestation in the verbal arena. After 1922, the first conference at which the two Internationals sat at the same table took place in Brussels on October 15th 1934, after Hitler had seized power in January 1933 creating a grave situation for both of them.(32) Just at that time, workers’ uprisings were about to spread throughout Spain in a leadup to the Spanish Civil War. The “Comintern” was represented by Cachin, who had played a role in the establishment of the French Communist party, and Maurice Thorez who, at the time in his 30s, would later lead that party. The “Socialist and Labour International” was represented by none other than Vandervelde and Adler. Presuming Adler’s agreement, Vandervelde stated his personal belief that “it is essential that cooperation between European democracy and the Soviet Union be somehow organized,” and showed a favorable attitude toward the Comintern’s proposal for “anti-fascist joint action.” But the two men could not make a decision on their own. “The situation in our International is a little more democratic than in your case,” Adler quipped. Thorez responded: “We consult each other too. It’s just that we generally end up with the same views.” Adler was relentless. “In your case, you have pre-determined harmony.” (Laughter).(33) That “laughter” did not lead to a compromise between the two. To be sure, the Comintern did switch to the “popular front” tactic at Dimitroff ’s initiative at its 7th Congress in 1935. In 1936, popular front governments were established in France under Blum and in Spain under Manuel Azaña. But after September 1939, war and fascism spread not only in Europe but throughout the world. Socialists and communists fought with their lives against fascism, but as individuals or within given territories or organizations, rather than in the context of the International. In accordance with the Soviet Union’s need to pursue a joint anti-fascist front, or rather joint military actions with the U.S. and Britain, the Comintern was dissolved in 1943. Even after the war, it was not resurrected as an organization of the world’s workers. On the other hand, the “Socialist and Labour International” was dissolved de facto in May 1940, but resumed its activities in June 1951 under the new name of “Socialist International” and remains active to this day.(34)

214

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook

Summary and Outlook

In 1996, the Japan Socialist Party changed its name to the Social-democratic Party (Shakaiminshutō).(1) It was probably an attempt to respond to a situation in which the collapse of socialist governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union could make socialism less appealing. In reporting the name change, the mass media did not make any mention of the fact that Japan once had a Social-democratic Party almost a century earlier. It seems that many of the people who began advocating “social democracy” anew did not make themselves clear as to how it differed from “communism” and in what respects it could be another option in socialism. In the first place, were Japan’s Socialist Party and Democratic Socialist Party based on social democracy of the kind seen in Europe? The Communist Party, while advocating policies that are no different from “social democracy” in practice, would never say they have converted to “social democracy.” Apart from such issues of realpolitik, in the academic context, there are many studies in Japan on, say, Germany’s SPD prior to World War I, but there has not been much desire to try and elaborate on the meaning of “social democracy.” If there have been works showing such an intention, they were often writings from the political standpoint of defending “social democracy.”

1

Etymology of “Social Democracy”

Let us begin with an explanation of social democracy prior to World War I. In May 1901, the first political party aspiring toward socialism in Japan was formed under the name of the Social-democratic Party. The name was inspired by Germany’s SPD, and its program was also based on the German party’s Erfurt Program. On the day after it registered itself as a political party, it was ordered to disband by the government, and newspapers carrying its manifesto were banned.(2)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

215

Summary and Outlook What did “social democracy” mean in those days? Whether “socialism” or “democracy,” both are in the first place concepts born in Europe, even if similar ways of thinking might have existed in other parts of the world. With the English language, the early history of the term “socialism” is not necessarily clear. According to one theory, the term came into use in the 1830s in connection with the activities of Robert Owen. Its definition was the policy and theory according to which organizations seeking to put the means of production under the ownership and management of communities operated. As for “democracy,” the story becomes a lot more vague. Needless to say, the etymology of this word is Greek. Aristotle in The Athenian Constitution, uses the term “government by democracy” as a concept opposite to “government by oligarchy.” Although the term “ochlocracy (mob rule)” is not used, he wrote that “it has become a lot worse since Pericles’ death,” so that one may assume he was referring to a situation that came to be called an “ochlocracy” later on. This is an example of how “people” and “mob,” which are the same entity in reality, are evaluated differently according to points of view.(3) In modern times, the use of the word democracy is found as early as the 16th century. But is it not this phrase from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address (1863) that frankly expresses the meaning of modern democracy: “…that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” Who was included among the “people,” whether native Americans and AfricanAmericans were included, remain questions that must be examined. Elsewhere, “democracy” tended to be associated with Robespierre’s image, considered tantamount to “mob rule.” There was not much difference from the case in ancient Greece.(4) But ever since the Third Estate holding aloft the so-called “Declaration of the Rights of Man” beginning with the words “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights,” successfully asserted itself in the French Revolution, the history of 19th century Europe may be described as a process in which classes underprivileged in varying degrees demanded their fair share from the privileged classes by political means and gradually succeeded in securing it. Britain’s electoral Reform Act was a good example. In France’s February Revolution, too, the political activities of some upper class activists demanding more

216

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook electoral rights spread farther than they had intended to the citizenry, ultimately resulting in the enactment of universal male suffrage. One of the concepts characterizing 19th century Europe where people were gradually liberated from the social class system was “self-help.” The work entitled Self-Help by British author Samuel Smiles, published in 1859, helped spread this concept far and wide. In Japan, Masanao Nakamura translated the work into Japanese in 1871, and had it published under the title Saikoku risshihen (How to Succeed in a Western Nation). The work is known, among other things, for its excellent Japanese translation of the phrase “heaven helps those who help themselves.”(5) Simply put, “self－help” means one should make efforts to improve on one’s own without expecting help from others. As such, Smiles’ work can be described as a popular rendition of the ethos of the British bourgeoisie of the time, who were achieving successes through free competition.

2

Change in Interpretation of “Self-Help”

Gradually the meaning of “self-help” underwent re-interpretation by workers, and during that process, the concept of “social democracy” was born. A good example is what happened in central Europe (Germany), so let us focus on it as we continue. In the late 1850s, this region saw the resumption of a movement by liberal politicians seeking to resolve the “German nationhood issue (unification issue),” along with a labor movement about to regain its vigor. Workers who had been active even before the Revolutions of 1848 through the formation of such organizations as Stephan Born’s “Workers’ Brotherhood (Allgemeinen Deutschen Arbeiterverbrüderung)” resumed their activities under the name of “Workers’ Educational Association” following the failure of the revolutions. From the time of the “Workers’ Brotherhood,” the term “sozial” had come to signify improvement of the workers’ conditions, and “Demokratie” the expansion of political participation. It is said that the term “Sozialdemokratie” was coined by the authorities wary of such trends. One of the major cities of the former Kingdom of Saxony, Leipzig is known for its trade fair (Messe). The trade fair, which began in the 12th century, was as important as the one in Paris by the 18th century, and the tradition lived on

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

217

Summary and Outlook through the era of East Germany after World War II. In Leipzig, three prominent figures emerged in the early 1860s, namely Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, Ferdinand Lassalle and August Bebel. When the Universal Exposition was held in London 1862, workers’ representatives were sent from “Germany” (in quotation marks as the nation Germany did not yet exist) as well as from France under Napoleon III. They had all been sent to study the so-called “labor-capital relations” in Britain that were more advanced. In “Germany,” it was high-profile politicians like SchulzeDelitzsch who selected the representatives. One of the representatives upon his return began calling for a “Germany-wide” workers’ congress, going beyond the intentions of these politicians, and the “Workers Education Association” chapters across the land responded to that call. After many turns and twists, Leipzig became the centre for its preparation. (Moving ahead in chronology, that congress in the end did not materialize.)(6) Amid this situation, Schulze-Delitzsch who, as a member of the Progressive Party, was keen on the “Workers Education Association’s” activities precisely in the spirit of “self-help,” had come to Leipzig in January 1863 in an effort to steer the labor movement along his own policy line. His point of view is clearly indicated in one of his speeches at the time. “On the issue of our nationhood, you can make a much bigger contribution by first thinking about how you can better yourselves materially,” he told the workers, adding: “Democracy and such are but empty words unless workers are enabled to take part in the political process. But for workers who have been placed in such a poor situation that they have to lead a hand-to-mouth existence, is it worth their time and concern to occupy their minds with public matters? Definitely no.”(7) In other words, he said that the priority for workers was to earn enough to save money, leaving the right to vote to the more affluent classes. Let us remember that in the mid-19th century, the expansion of suffrage was considered an

218

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook important task for pro-democracy movements not only in “Germany,” but also in Britain and France from even earlier times. About the same time, people in the Workers Education Association in Leipzig such as F. W. Fritzsche, who were of the generation to experience the 1948 revolutions and who were becoming more aware of their role as workers, began a movement to wean themselves away from towing the line of the movement controlled by the high-profile politicians, which they labeled “liberal democracy.” The workers’ side had now adopted the spirit of “selfhelp.” They were drawn to one of Lasalle’s publications, “Workers’ Program” which came out in 1862. So they approached Lasalle and implored him to become their leader. Lasalle, most likely flattered, agreed to take on the role. In the event, As a result, the General German Workers’ Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein, ADAV) was founded in May 1863 in Leipzig with Lasalle as president. Its top policy priority was separation from the Progressive Party. Turning Schulze-Delitzsch’s idea of “self-help” around, they were expressing the spirit of “self-help” from their standpoint, i.e. they did not need help from the high-profile politicians. Furthermore, they listed the introduction of universal suffrage and national subsidy for production cooperatives as their tasks on the way toward socialism.(8) Meanwhile, a colleague of Fritzsche and others in the Workers Education Association began to launch his own activities. It was Bebel, one of the post1848 generation, who believed that while political issues existed, reading, writing and arithmetic were more important for workers. When the “Federation of German Workers Associations” was established in Frankfurt by Leopold Sonnemann, founder of the Frankfurter Zeitung daily, and others in June, 1863, Bebel joined in to eventually become one of the standing committee members. At the inaugural congress, chants of “Long live SchulzeDelitzsch!” were heard. These men argued that it was none other than Lasalle’s concept of “national subsidy” that was contrary to the spirit of “selfhelp.”(9) The two groups differed not only in their way of thinking, but also with respect to their bases of operations. While Lasalle’s arena of activities was in Prussia, especially the Rheinland area, Bebel was based in Saxony in southwest “Germany.”

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

219

Summary and Outlook

Fig. 56: Commemorative poster of the German Social-democratric Party’s Joint Congress in Gotha (1875).

220

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook While Lasalle died in a duel in 1864, the group around Bebel became “decisively left-leaning”(10). In 1865, the following year, they turned their attention to such political tasks as passage of a universal suffrage act. By 1868, both groups were in support of the program of the First International, founded in 1864 with decisive theoretical contribution from Marx, so that they had become practically indistinguishable in ideological terms. In 1869, the following year, Bebel’s group formed their own political party in Eisenach, calling it the Social-democratic Workers’ Party. By then, Lasalle’s group had already named their party organ “the Social-democrat.” The concept of “social democracy” that deliberately distinguishes itself from “liberal democracy” was likely born around this time. In early 20th century, Gustav Mayer called that process “the separation of proletarian democracy from bourgeois democracy,” which is basically valid, despite subsequent criticisms concerning time frames and regional variance of the “separation.”(11) After the founding of the German Empire in 1871, the Eisenach faction and the Lasalle faction, which were both being harassed by the authorities all over the country, managed to realize their so-called “Gotha union.” The counter-measure Bismarck took against this move was the “Socialist Suppression Act” of 1878. For a decade thereafter, the Social-democratic Party of Germany (SPD, new name adopted in 1890) had to suffer the exaction of inordinately heavy taxes and many other kinds of harsch treatment. Incidentally, one may reasonably assume that the spirit of the First International was grounded on the idea of the workers’ “self-help.”(12) Marx published the first volume of Capital (Das Kapital) in 1867 to considerable acclaim, but there were very few people who read the entire work, much less understood it, so that it was not until the following era that a concept such as Marxism took shape.

3

The Second International

By the time the era of the Second International, which was effectively launched in 1889, it was becoming an indisputable trend for the labor movement to be organized nation by nation. Among the movements, Germany’s SPD gradually assumed the position of leadership, having gained outstanding influence in terms of both its organization and its Marxism-reinforced ideology. In the

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

221

Summary and Outlook Reichstag election of 1890, by which time the Socialist Suppression Act had elapsed, it already became the leading party in terms of the number of votes. In the pre-World War I era, indeed, the majority of the world’s socialist parliamentarians was made up of SPD members. In terms of political theory, the Marxism-based “Erfurt Program” that the party adopted in 1891 became a model for the programs of socialist parties around the world.

Fig. 57: “International Solidarity of Workers” (Walter Crane, 1897).

222

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook The program of the Social-democratic Party established in 1901 in Japan was also influenced by it, as mentioned earlier. The parties in the Netherlands and Austria, as well as the parties in Russia and the Balkans, all under the influence of the SPD in varying degrees, all eager to include “social democracy” in their party names. In Britain, too, the Marxists called themselves the “Socialdemocratic Federation.” While some parties kept their traditional names like the Parti Socialiste Français and the Belgian Workers Party, “social democracy” was arguably synonymous with Marxism-based socialism during the era of the Second International. This is ironical if one were to recall that when the Lasalle faction named its organ The Social-Democrat, Engels called it an “unclean title” and Marx expressed his agreement.(13) Of course, it did not mean that the Second International had become monolithic ideologically. On the contrary, the member organizations differed in terms of history, tasks and temperament according to their countries or territories, and their interpretations of Marxism also varied. This is precisely what has to be addressed in historical research. Also one cannot ignore Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis of the Netherlands, who was expressing severe criticisms against Germany’s SPD at the time of the inception of the Second International. He was close to an “anarchist” in his way of thinking. And “anarchists” were rejected by the International at its congress of 1896, which adopted “social democracy” as its basic principle.(14) Against this background, let us maintain our focus on Germany’s SPD. It may be worth while to look at the “Erfurt Program.” When its precursor, the “Gotha Program,” was drafted, Marx sent personal letters to the German party’s leaders severely criticizing that program, and Engels took the trouble to publish the criticisms after Marx’s death. Effectively carrying out Englel’s intention, Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein then wrote another draft incorporating the criticisms, which became the basis for the “Erfurt Program.” In the sense that Engels, widely recognized to be Marx’s closest confidant at the time, accepted the program albeit with some reservations, it may be considered a socialist program of the Marxist position. Following a format that began with the “Eisenach Program” of 1869, the first part of the program was devoted to theoretical outlook. “The economic progress of a bourgeois society … will result in the ruin of small businesses. … it will separate the workers from the means of production to turn them into have-not proletarians, while the means of production will be monopolized by a

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

223

Summary and Outlook relatively few capitalists and big land owners”. It said. As a result, “while the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat intensifies,” the abyss between the two “will be widened further by an economic panic.” This will be “the proof that private ownership of the means of production is no longer compatible with the application it was intended for, or with its overall development.” Consequently, “the transfer of the capitalistic private ownership of the means of production … to social ownership” and “conversion of commercial production to socialistic production managed by the society for the society” were necessary. “Such a social change signifies not only the liberation of the proletariat … but also the liberation of the whole mankind. But the task of bringing about this conversion can only be accomplished by the working class.” For that to happen, the working class must seize political power, and “to organize that struggle into a willful, unified struggle and to point out the natural and inevitable objectives of the struggle, those are precisely the tasks of the Social-democratic Party.” At the core was the notion that in order to eliminate poverty and oppression and achieve the highest degree of welfare, private ownership of the means of production must be converted to social ownership. At the same time it was also believed that capitalism would inevitably “collapse.” One should recall in this connection that Article 17 of the French “declaration of human rights” called ownership, along with liberty and equality, a “sacred and inalienable right.” In disagreement, Babeuf is reported to have Fig. 58: F. Domela Nieuwenhuis. said “Property is the root of all evil,” and Proudhon, as is probably well known, wrote that “Property is Theft!” At its Brussels Congress in 1868 and at its Basel Conference the following year, the First International also established a clear policy to convert farmland as well as forests, mines and so on to social ownership. Obviously nothing was to change right away in real terms, but the governments of the time, sensing a direct challenge to the basic principle then

224

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook (and now still) of private ownership of property, came to regard the First International as an adversary. At the same time, the Program in its second part, listed a series of demands, including: a universal suffrage act; the freedom of expression, association and assembly; equality of the sexes; privatization of religion; free medical care; cumulative taxes on income and property; an eight-hour work day; prohibition of child labor and night-time labor; and guarantee of the right to organize. At the time, some of these demands had already been met in some countries and by now, of course, they have largely been realized in varying degrees in the socalled “advanced” capitalist nations.(15) These demands. of course, were “for the time being,” so that no one at the time believed that socialism would be achieved once they were met. What should be emphasized from the present perspective is that such demands were a matter of urgency for the German workers of the time, who did not have political power. Moreover, most of the demands including one for a universal suffrage act were only being made by the SPD. This was why it became the leading party in terms of votes received at the time of the “Erfurt Program.” Gaining the support of those other than the working class as well, the SPD went on to become the first party 20 years later, capturing 34% of the votes and over one-quarter of the seats in the Reichstag. August Bebel was an undisputed leader behind that progress. But let us re-examine the point made by the “Erfurt Program” that the condition for realizing an ideal society was the conversion of the private ownership of the means of production to social ownership. This “conversion” was to be realized either by the “collapse” of capitalism or by “revolution.” How can the first and second parts of the “Erfurt Program” be integrated in theoretical terms? The SPD, while holding aloft the first part like a banner, was devoting all of its day-to-day efforts to the realization of the demands in part two. In this, there was arguably some contradiction. It was Eduard Bernstein who zeroed in on that point. Upon further reflection, what exactly was the “revolution” that the “Erfurt Program” suggested? In the European memory in the second half of the 19th century, it evoked the French Revolution, the July Revolution and the European Revolutions of 1848. It was an image of disgruntled masses which, for whatever reason, take to the streets and, as often as not bearing arms, bring about the collapse of the existing dynasty to usher in the birth of a new society.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

225

Summary and Outlook Could it be that Europeans thought the overthrow of capitalist societies was going to be through such a “revolution”? The fact that Lasalle, when he founded the “General German Workers’ Association,” limited its term to 30 years shows he believed this undertaking of his would come to fruition within 30 years. For that matter, both Engels and Bebel believed that the next generation would be living under socialism. But it would seem that after the Paris Commune of 1871, “signs of revolution” gradually disappeared in Britain and western Europe. “In England, talking about an impending great revolution will only make one a laughing stock, but in Germany … it would be harmful,” Bernstein remarked in his letter to Bebel. In “advanced countries” other than Germany, nobody believed such Fig. 59: August Bebel (1896, woodblock print a “collapse” would occur, he said. But by Jan Veth). when he went as far as to utter the line that was to become all too infamous— “Whatever the ultimate objective of socialism may be, it is of no concern to me … the process is everything.”—the disarray within the party became uncontrollable, leading to the so-called “revisionism dispute.”(16) Kautsky finally broke off all relations with Bernstein,(17) and raised arguments in defense of the “Erfurt Program.” Rosa Luxemburg, who had been a virtual unknown until the publication of her highly-acclaimed work Social Reform or Revolution?, argued in it from the standpoint of “scientific socialism.” The scientific basis for socialism is made up of three points, she said, namely, enhancement of the anarchical nature of capitalism, progress of the socialization of production processes, and growth of the proletariat’s power and class awareness. And while there may be socialistic components in factory laws and city by-laws of street-cleaning, the realization of socialism is unthinkable without the social democracy movement, a movement that would break up if its ultimate objective is abandoned, she said. It was a criticism aimed squarely at Bernstein.

226

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook Apart from the pros and cons of the various points of argument, what draws one’s attention from today’s perspective is Bernstein’s interpretation of democracy. According to him, “democracy” tended to be considered synonymous with “people’s rule,” but it was not so. Critically citing Robespierre’s “reign of terror,” he said the concept of “people’s rule” did not take issue with the oppression of individuals by the majority. On the other hand “democracy,” which included the “legal concept of equal rights for all members of society,” served as protection in that regard. “Democracy is …more than just a political means useful to the extent of being a handhold for the working class … it is at once the means and the objective,” he declared.(18) Rosa Luxemburg also believed in democracy. But in her rebuttal of Bernstein, she asserted it was an “illusion” to think that development of capitalism would lead to development of democracy, and that “surely the only pillar supporting democracy today is the socialist labor movement.”(19) In 1903 at the SPD congress in Dresden, a resolution rejecting Bernstein’s argument as “revisionism” was adopted by an overwhelming majority. But it was more of a window dressing than a reflection of true sentiments within the party. Thanks to the window dressing, perhaps, the party membership soon reached about one million, so that in the 1912 Reichstag elections, the party was Fig. 60: Jean Jaurès (by L. Braun). able to achieve the distinction of becoming the leading party as mentioned earlier. That said, there was no procedure by which the party could head the cabinet as the German Empire did not follow the responsible cabinet system. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized anew that the SPD was the first political entity to rise above the politics of high-profile names to achieve real successes as a “modern political party,” and that since then up to this day, it has been a “party of the masses.”(20)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

227

Summary and Outlook At the same time, what must be noted is the scathing criticism Jean Jaurès of the French Socialist Party levelled at the Second International Congress of Stuttgart (1907). If one were to internationalize your Dresden resolution, it may not have occurred to you but it would infect international socialism with your lack of confidence and your hesitation… There is no revolutionary tradition in the history of the German proletariat. Your universal suffrage act was not won at the barricades… What is given from above could well be taken away from above as well. Because you have no revolutionary tradition, you display a sense of discomfort with the revolutionary traditions of other races. In your parliament, too, socialism cannot play the leading role even if it captures the majority … because the German parliament is only a ‘half parliament.’ Indeed, every time the French or the British proposed a general strike as a means of preventing war, Germany’s SPD would oppose it from the standpoint of protecting its organization. As this shows, even if liberation of the worker class was an international task, the historical experiences and actual conditions varied from country to country. In the field of historical research, it is important to keep one’s eyes on the specific conditions of each country and teriroty.(21) The socialist movement was also closely associated with women’s liberation movements. August Bebel’s work Women and Socialism is a classic among Marxism-based arguments for women’s liberation. Clara Zetkin also made a major contribution to women’s liberation movements in the international arena, as is well kinown. As both of them were Marxists, they believed that as in the case of workers, women could only be truly liberated in a socialist society. Therefore they assumed that the issue of women’s liberation was naturally subordinate to the workers’ liberation movement, a view which set them apart from bourgeois-based women’s liberation movements. Bebel, on his part, still shared the idea commonly accepted in bourgeois (male) society that the woman’s role was to take care of the family. Long after World War II in the 1970s, his views came under criticism from the feminist perspective.

228

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook Nevertheless, the socialist movement undeniably promoted women’s liberation with regard to suffrage and other issues.(22)

Fig. 61: Women at the Second Socialist Women’s International (Copenhagen, 1910).

The Second International was a major international social movement against war and for peace. In the process, fundamental criticisms were directed at “imperialism,” even if the term as such might not have been in use at the time, through the analysis of its actual workings. There is much to be learnt from them. Also worth noting are the arguments raised repeatedly at the congresses regarding the colonial issue, which is closely related to imperialism.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

229

Summary and Outlook When van Kol on his part unfurled his “arguments for socialistic colonies,” Kautsky countered with his arguments against colonization. On one occasion, after Hyndman spoke against the British rule of India, Naoroji from India serenely recounted sentiments from the viewpoint of a colonized people, to a rapt audience.(23)

Fig. 62: H. van Kol.

Fig. 63: H. M. Hyndman.

Without doubt, the Second International had to submit to the nationalism of “nation states” in the summer of 1914. Neither could the socialist movement thereafter prevent the rise of fascism or World War II. But if we are to look to the future of the world from here on, the thoughts of these socialists are rich in lessons far beyond anything the policies actually implemented by the Great Powers could ever teach us. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the textbook improvement movement. It was closely related to the pacifist movement as well as the socialist movement. It would do well to focus more attention on the Fig. 64: Dadabhai Naoroji. textbook improvement movement for the sake of better international understanding in our quest for peace.(24)

230

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook

4

The Bolshevik Revolution

It was in 1905 that a “revolution,” which people were beginning to feel was unlikely to ever occur, did take place in Russia. The shock waves reached western Europe, with some political theorists perceiving what happened in Russia as something of a different nature from revolutions of the past, as a preliminary skirmish to a revolution that would spread all over Europe. But the excitement gradually died down as the situation came under control in Russia. Even though the Second International holding aloft its anti-war, pro-peace banner had been struggling mightly, the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914 saw a large majority of the socialists take the position of supporting their governments’ war efforts. The assassination of Jaurès, who had become a symbolic figurehead in the Second International’s anti-war movement, on the eve of the outbreak of the war was, indeed, bad news. The socialists could not turn their backs on the waves of nationalistic fervor that swept over a large majority of the peoples despite, or rather because of, the derogatory label “people without a fatherland” they had had to put up with. Furthermore, as they expected the war to end soon, they thought it wise to protect and preserve the organizations and political rights that they had been working steadfastly to build up.(25) There was a minority of socialists who resolutely opposed such a position of the majority. In Germany, Rosa Luxemburg was one example. The Russian revolutionaries in exile generally remained more concerned about the revolution back home than about peace, though some like Prekhanov chose to side with the Allied Powers. It was the socialists of the nations that maintained their neutrality, i.e. Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, who initiated actions to weave together a network of international solidarity. But even among these people, who were trying from their long-held anti-war pro-peace position to stop socialist parties from collaborating in war efforts, there was a divergence of views. Were they trying to revive the Second International, or were they heading toward the creation of a new International? Amidst it all, Russia’s Lenin developed the most drastic and persistent argument, at least in theoretical terms. The war was an imperialist war regardless of which side one was on, so the socialists should work toward the “defeat of their own governments,” he stated, focusing his thoughts on how to bring about a revolution.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

231

Summary and Outlook But being a minority within a minority, he was not an authoritative figure in the international arena like Kautsky or Prekhanov, even if he enjoyed a measure of respect among his comrades. But of all things, another revolution broke out in Russia in March 1917 and by November, the Bolsheviks he led had seized power. A “socialist revolution” and “seizure of power by the proletariat,” ideas for which there had been no clear prospect despite the frequency with which they were discussed, had now become a reality. It was a development of overwhelming magnitude.(26) It was not surprising that socialists of many nations and territories at once focused their attention on Russia, giving rise to moves trying to emulate the Bolsheviks. In the case of the Swiss party, for instance, supporters of the Bolsheviks became the majority. But there were also opponents and critics. One of them was Kautsky who, while giving ample recognition to the historical significance of the Russian Revolution, objected to the Bolsheviks’ rejection of other socialist parties and to its dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly, thereby raising the issue of “democracy or dictatorship” (1918). Asserting that only Cromwells and Napoleons are born of civil unrest and dictatorships, he wrote that “democracy and socialism … are means to the same objective.” This is reminiscent of the words of Bernstein, to which Kautsky himself had objected violently two decades earlier. Lenin, who had held Kautsky in high esteem, was incensed all the more, eventually condemning Kautsky as an “apostate.” He was straightforward in his rebuttal. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” did not concern the issue of dictatorships in general, about which Kautsky had been arguing at length, but it was power that was won and maintained through the proletariat’s violent struggle against the bourgeoisie and as such, it was an issue of the “relationship between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy.” In the first place, exploiters and those exploited cannot ever be equal, so bourgeois democracy meant merely equality as a formality. In contrast, proletarian democracy, of which the Soviet power was an example, took wealth and privileges away from the bourgeoisie and liberated them for the oppressed masses, so that “it is a million times more democratic than bourgeois democracy,” he said.(27) Kautsky, notably in his work Terrorism and Communism (1919), discussed the relationship between terror and revolution in the context of development of capitalism, going back to the French Revolution and the Paris Commune.

232

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook While recognizing that Noske of Germany’s SPD majority had resorted to measures tantamount to a reign of terror following the example of Trotsky in Russia, Kautsky stressed that the class struggle throughout the 19th century had evolved in line with a “humanistic trend,” evoking Marx in his usual style. The subtitle “Natural History of Revolution” is very much like him. The reason a bloody revolution had occurred in Russia was that the economic precondition for a revolution had been lacking and, as was the case with the Paris Commune, it had been a result of war. A socialist revolution in essence should no longer have been associated with terror, he said.(28)

5

“Democracy” and “Dictatorship”

In February 1919 after the Great War ended with the defeat of the German side, people of the socialist parties which belonged to the Second Intrnational came to assemble for the first time in four and a half years in Berne, Switzerland.(29) Including Britain’s Arthur Henderson, they were in the main adherents of U.S. President Wilson’s “democracy.” This conference was boycotted not only by the Bolsheviks who had already launched the Third International, but also by the socialists of Switzerland and elsewhere who supported them. The moments of greatest tension during this conference were exchanges between the socialists of victorious France and the socialists of defeated Germany over the issue of the latter’s “war responsibility,” which is covered in Part I, Chapter VII of this work. But for now, let us focus on the discussions over “democracy and dictatorship.” As Hjalmar Branting of neutral Sweden, who chaired the session, pointed out, “this issue is an issue concerning the Bolsheviks, and opinions (are) wide apart.” The man in charge of the committee drafting a resolution on this issue was Ramsay MacDonald, one of the British minority faction. Explaining the draft resolution, he stated: “We may object to the people wishing to build world socialism by a new, rapid method (i.e. the Bolsheviks), but in an amicable way rather than an adversarial way.” He went on: “We welcome all revolutions achieved in Europe. But such revolutions must not create situations that could aptly be called a change-over from one form of autocracy to another form. Liberty, democracy and freedom are the firm, immutable objectives of a revolution. A revolution that does not

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

233

Summary and Outlook establish liberty is neither a revolution toward socialism, nor a revolution for which socialists ought to take responsibility.” It is worth noting here that at the outbreak of World War I, MacDonald as a member of the Independent Labour Party had opposed Britain’s participation in the war. Together with pacifiist Norman Angell, E. D. Morel, who exposed inhumane conditions in the Congo Free State, and others, he formed the Union of Democratic Control in an effort to strengthen parliamentary control over the government’s foreign policy in particular.(30) Axelrod of the Mensheviks and Rubanovich of the SR took their turns on the floor to talk about their plight of being exluded in Russia. But the overall atmosphere of the conference is reflected in the fact that they stopped short of demanding a position statement firmly criticizing the Bolsheviks, pleading instead for an investigation into the situation in Russia. The general feeling was that the fact of the Bolsheviks achieving their revolution had to be respected even if one harbored criticisms toward them, so one should desist from reckless discussions of anti-Bolshevik positions. Such a view was represented by Friedrich Adler of the Austrian minority faction. For some reason he did not explicitly mention the wars of interference that were already being waged against the Soviet regime at the time, but he did state: “One can only deplore that while we discuss an issue of the east, there are no statements opposing imperialism of the west.”(31) At Kautsky’s proposal, the delegates observed a moment of silence in the memory of his ideological opponent Rosa Luxemburg, who was murdered during the German Revolution. When Rosa Luxemburg had received news of the Russian Revolution while she was in prison, she was overjoyed, sending enthusiastic messages of support to the Bolsheviks, but still, she could not agree with the dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly in Russia. “Dictatorship of the proletariat is not a dictatorship by a single party or single faction,” she said. It had to be “a dictatorship by a class … which is to say a dictatorship accompanied by unlimited democracy.” She came up with the line “liberty is always liberty of those with different ideas,” which is indeed reminiscent of Voltaire. As this line was published by her colleague Paul Levi after he had come to oppose Lenin, it became a subject of dispute in factional politics, but the words cited here may safely be considered her true intentions.(32)

234

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook While Marxists of the time were critical of bourgeois democracy, when a Soviet regime founded upon proletarian democracy actually came into being amidst them, some of them began to harbor doubts even as they paid respect to it outwardly. It is clear that even Rosa Luxemburg, second to none in her criticism of capitalist society and among those closest to Lenin, was breathing the atmosphere of western European liberalism. By the latter half of the 1930s, a new argument had emerged criticizing fascism and communism by lumping them together from the standpoint of liberalism and parliamentary democracy. It was an argument leading to the socalled “theory of totalitarianism.” True enough, human rights were ignored and millions of people were killed under both Hitler and Stalin. But can one ignore historical backgrounds because of similarities in phenomena that resulted? In his work The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy published in 1955, Isreali political scientist J.L. Talmon divided democracy into two types, namely the “liberal” type and the “totalitarian” type, and looked for the latter’s ideological origins in Rousseau and others, even putting Marx in the same school. According to him, the former type was based on the theory of human nature being evil so that compromises were made, whereas the latter, based on the theory of human nature being good, sought radical change. As will be mentioned later, he believed that the price one had to pay would be less if one aimed for a better society, than if one pursued a radical social change all at once. The question is whether better options are chosen in making the “compromises.” It is also worth mentioning that Talmon made a distinction between “left-wing” totalitarianism which could be related to democracy, and “rightwing” totalitariansm (clearly referring to fascists) which could not.(33) But in the light of the ongoing publication of archival materials in the Soviet Union, when research on the Soviet system especially in the context of social history reaches the same depths as research on Nazism, unexpected facets may yet be revealed from comparative studies of the two.(34)

6

Thinking Behind “Nationalization” of Industries

Because of differences over positions vis-à-vis the Bolsheviks and of hostilities triggered by the Great War, the international socialist movement became

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

235

Summary and Outlook divided, so that the Geneva Conference of July 1920 became the final congress of the Second International. Under the circumstances, Friedrich Adler formed the “Working Union of Socialist Parties” based in Vienna in an effort to create a bridge between the “Second” and the “Third,” although it was derided by the Bolsheviks as the “Second and a half International.” This effort culminated in a conference of the executive committees of the three Internationals in Berlin in April 1922. He was not seeking to unify the three international organizations, but hoped at best to come up with “conditions for joint action” within a “modest framework.” The divergence of views between the “Second” and the “Third” was already extremely wide. True enough, the Bolsheviks on their side expressed agreement with a “united front of the proletariat without any reservation whatsoever.” But despite the continuation of negotiations within the “Committee of Nine” representing the three organizations, the rift was never to be repaired. The “Second” was becoming increasingly distrustful of the Bolsheviks who toppled Georgia’s Menshevik regime in order to incorporate the territory into the Soviet Union in its formative phase. On its side, the “Third” not only started out as a protest against the “Second’s” position during the Great War, but was also unwilling to condone the killing of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, leaders of the newborn German Communist Party, when Germany was under an SPD regime. In May 1923 in Hamburg, a joint conference of the “Second” and the “Second and a half ” was held, leading to the formation of a new International called the “Socialist and Labour International.” If anything, Adler seemed to believe that the responsibility for the collapse of his effort to forge a “joint action” lay with the “Second.” But when he was forced to choose between the “Second” and the “Third,” he nevertheless chose the former. Thereafter, the Communist International, which looked down on “social democracy” (abbreviated as Shamin in Japanese) as “reformism,” i.e. a position of compromise that remains within the capitalist framework, and the Socialist and Labour International, which rejected “communism” as a “dictatorship,” i.e. anti-democratic, would always confront, and compete with, each other. After Hitler came to power, the two sides again tried to form a “united front” or a “popular front,” but the two Internationals as international bodies were never able to overcome their mutual distrust.

236

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook In this manner, the socialist movement split up into two major factions over the “democracy” or “dictatorship” issue in the international arena as well as within individual nations and territories. In his work Democracy or Dictatorship (1918), Kautsky elaborated on his own position without even mentioning Lenin by name. It was at a time when revolutions had brought down the German Empire and the Social-democratic Party was in power. It is noteworthy that he listed “the placing of important means of production under state management” as one of the tasks for the “new state (Weimar Republic).”(35) Moreover, he contrtibuted actively to the policy of “socializing” the means of production. The Heidelberg Program adopted by the SPD in 1925 strongly reflected Kautsky’s thoughts re-emphasizing the effectiveness of a democratic republic as a framework for the realization of socialism and reaffirming the principles of the Erfurt Program.(36) Britain’s Fabian Society, which was hardly Marxist in its position, was also calling for “nationalization.” It is well known that in the Soviet Union, “nationalization” was considered extremely important as the “controlled high ground” of socialist nation-building. Both Internationals, in other words, were critical of the “anarchical nature” of capitalism, and believed that to overcome that was what socialism was about. They were arguably alike in pursuing the original concept of the First International, that the concrete first step toward socialism was “nationalization” even if there were different ways of implementing it. It was the same line of thinking that made the British Labour Party implement “nationalization” with enthusiasm when it came to power after World War II. In the long-term view, one cannot overlook the fact that capitalism itself, facing the challenges of socialism and national liberation movements, began to look for ways of co-opting some of their demands. How did the changes come about? How did the socialists react to them? And what kind of effects did World War II have? Specific studies on these questions are yet to be undertaken.

7

After World War II

World War II was a war of “fascism against democracy.” This was a slogan, to be sure, but it remains an irrefutable fact that Britain and the U.S. cooperated

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

237

Summary and Outlook with the Soviet Union in their war against the Axis Powers. When the Axis nations were defeated, an international confrontation that had existed since before the war came to the fore once again. The socialist sphere of influence had spread to eastern Europe and East Germany. Moreover, socialist regimes were established in North Korea and China in 1948 and 49, to be followed by Vietnam and Cuba. In addition, leaders of former colonies which became independent in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere came to advocate socialism in one sense or another. The situation was quite different from the post-World War I era when socialist rule remained confined to the Soviet Union. The capitalist camp and the socialist camp, respectively led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, entered a period of intense rivalry. Undeniably, the resulting “Cold War” was not just in terms of principles but a competition between two superpowers for world hegemony involving compromises and wheeling and dealing in the international arena. In that context, the collapse of socialist regimes and dissolution of the Soviet Union beginning in eastern Europe in 1989 were developments indicating that the U.S. had won the “Cold War.” Therefore, in any discussion of “social democracy” today, the collapse of the socialist systems in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, i.e. the failure of the “Third = communism” ideological line going back to the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in November 1917, becomes the grand premise. But even more noteworthy are the “privatization” policies implemented during the Reagan-Thatcher era of the 1980s, which even reached the point of the British Labour Party finally abandoning its “nationalization” policy in April 1995. (The “privatization” of Japan’s national railways, though not originally established by a socialist government, was also enforced amidst that trend.) The question has to be asked as to what the outlook is for a path to socialism that precludes the “socialization” or “nationalization” of the means of production.(37) There may be a hint or two in the discussions concerning socialization mentioned in Part II, Chapter III. At any rate, Germany was divided in two after World War II, and West Germany’s SPD had to struggle against conservative forces on one hand, and on the other hand maintain an identity separate from East Germany’s socialist system modelled after the Soviet Union. Proposals for “socialization” policies

238

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook going back to the Weimar era were rejected by the Western occupational authorities. (In hindsight, one might argue that was just as well.) The SPD which did not even have a clear platform amidst the post-war situation finally adopted its “Godesberg Program”(38) in 1959. It was rooted in humanitarianism, rather than Marxism. It had an undercurrent of Christianitybased ethics, but the SPD’s very political rival being the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the party had to come up with another policy line of its own. As ineffective as it might have been in that regard, the party met success in the general elections of 1969, which made its member Willy Brandt chancellor of the Republic. His “Ostpolitik” led to progress in Germany’s reconciliation with Poland in particular, which in turn contributed to the easing of tensions in Europe as is well known. The party membership exceeded one million in 1976. In 1982, power changed over to the CDU again (with Helmut Kohl becoming chancellor). On its part the SDP, which had already announced its longterm platform in 1975 called Policy Outline 85 (OR’85), immediately began a review of its policies in a bid to regain the ground it lost in becoming the oppositon party. During that process, the position of Eduard Bernstein was reevaluated. It did make sense to focus on the fact that as a socialist of 100 years ago, he already attached great importance to “democracy” as something more than just a political means. But to regard him as a prophet with exceptional foresight is more a political way of thinking, rather than historical. The SPD originally planned a congress for December 1989 in Bremen, at which it hoped to forge some kind of consensus out of a wide variety of proposals and counter-proposals, criticisms from regional and youth-oriented standpoints, and challenges from environmental protection advocates (the Green Party) and feminists whose movements were beginning to gain momentum. But shortly before the scheduled congress, the Berlin Wall came down, prompting the organizers to move the venue to Berlin.(39) At that congress, a new “basic program” was adopted.(40) The SPD that appeared finally ready to present a unifying “principle” was caught off guard by the unification of Germany which no one in the world had expected. The SPD which had taken a cautious position in continuing Brandt’s tradition was suddenly beaten by the CDU’s Kohl, who had campaigned aggressively appealing to the voters’ sense of nationalism. That said, the “cost” of this unification has also been felt in the form of, say, a rapid increase in the number of unem-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

239

Summary and Outlook ployed or terror tactics by xenophobic neo-Nazis and the like. The inhabitants of former East Germany may not reject unification, but they are reminiscing about good aspects of their old life.(41) Let us look at the SPD’s basic program of 1989 at this point. • What we desire is peace. • We shall work for a kind of world, where 1) people of all nations settle disputes not through war or arms race but through peaceful competition for a more human way of living, 2) disputes between the East and West are overcome through equal policies, 3) people of Asia, Africa and Latin America have a fair opportunity to develop on their own under a just economic order. • Internationally, peace above all, and mutual understanding within the European Community, between the world’s “North and South” and elsewhere; domestically, protection of human rights, symbiosis of the young, old, men and women, joint decision-making by entrepreneurs and labor unions, etc. The program seems to be devoid of any Marxist thought. Many parts even coincide with policies of the rival CDU. The party continues to call itself the Social-democratic Party probably to protect its 150-year tradition, but nowadays about the only difference between “social democracy” and “democratic socialism” is in nuance. One should also note that the SPD on the occasion recalled anew the draft constitution of the short-lived Frankfurt Parliament, which would have provided for basic rights, thereby linking the party’s tradition to the revolutions of 1948.(42) And when the SPD’s Gerhard Schröder, who served as federal chancellor from 1998 to 2005, tried to promote market economy with his “reform policy” but was unable to bring relief to the over five million unemployed, Party Chairman Franz Müntefering took the initiative in mounting a “criticism of capitalism” campaign. When it comes to criticisms of capitalism, the party has a rich legacy. The party was thus able to reinvigorate itself, but it had to give up the seat of the chancellor to the CDU in the elections of 2005. Such political developments aside, it is essential that serious discussions take place over different options for the future.

240

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook

8

In Closing

“Liberty and equality,” as the French “Declaration of Human Rights” loudly proclaimed without explaining what they really meant, are two ideas we human beings pursue. But in principle, the two are mutually exclusive. In reality, liberty always favors the haves, and the have-nots always seek equality even if it restricted liberty. Socialism is arguably an ideology placing emphasis on equality.(43) The work Why You Should Be a Socialist by John Strachey of the British Labour Party was translated into Japanese in 1953. About the same time, the Marxist economist Kōzō Uno wrote on the basis of his own theory that socialism was not merely “something that is selected because it is more rational than capitalism.”(44) Marx’s ideology and historical analysis, as attractive as they are, have undeniably held considerable sway throughout the world. But now that even the Soviet Union has collapsed, the first among the basic propositions of “Marxism” that has become questionable is the notion that socialism will occur in the stage following capitalism as a “historical inevitability.” The collapse of the Soviet Union is not unlike the “feudal reaction” seen in Europe, in particular Britain, between the 12th and 16th centuries. In any case, will world history progress toward a socialist system? Somehow, that seems unlikely. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s “perestroika” made progress. But, probably contrary to his wishes, it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Looking at the Chinese experience, the Soviet Union might have survived if it had given priority to the “liberalization” of the economy over “glasnost.” One does not know what the future will bring. But based on the experiences of the past half century, one could for now reason as follows. To try to change the workings of human society radically all at once might be a necessary way of thinking in the ideological dimension, but the price that has to be paid in order to carry it out in reality is too high. There is a work by the British philosopher Karl Popper entitled The Open Society and Its Enemies(45) published in 1945, which went on to attract considerable interest in Japan in the 1960s. In it, he termed the ideas of people from Plato to Marx “historicism” from his own view point. He criticized their “utopian social engineering,” and called instead for “piecemeal social engineering.” Among the SPD members searching for basic ideas during the 1970s, some showed a tendency to focus on Popper, but in the event he was deemed a “conservative” and did not become a unifying ideologi-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

241

Summary and Outlook cal force for the party.(46) So they found Bernstein. To worship the man who struggled in the turmoil of the late 19th century as some kind of a prophet is not a historical approach as stated earlier, nor is it fair to Bernstein himself. Doubts also remain as to whether Popper’s views apply to everything that happened in the past. Nevertheless, there seems to be a lot worth listening to in what they say about the “revolution” that is yet to come. Liberty is a principle of the haves. So-called “deregulation” is none other than that. It is the logic of the top-down “self-help” seen in 19th century Europe. One may recall that Lasalle satirized the liberal government of his time as a “night-watchman state (Nachtwächterstaat)” and, in criticizing the absence of general direct taxation, spoke of how unfair indirect taxation was for the poor people.(47) The have-nots of society and small countries in the international arena seek equality, and demand, from their positions, opportunity for “selfhelp” from the bottom up. It would seem that both liberty and equality, if either is taken to the extreme, will not make society, or the world, work smoothly. If that be the case, the only thing one can do would be to think creatively about where the balance should be drawn between the two. To hold steadfastly to the perspective of the have-nots in that process and aim for equality, protection of the environment and international peace as an altenative option to that of the forces oriented toward competition, development and nationalism—that is what social democracy, or democratic socialism, is all about. In that context, is not socialism something to be “chosen” as the more democratic and rational mechanism? The SPD’s basic program for 1989 is worth considering as an attempt in that direction. At the same time, the activities of the “Party of European Socialists (PES)” in the European Parliament have reached a point where they deserve more attention.(48) Capitalism has carried out its own reforms over 150 years in the face of the challenge from socialism. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the challenge became diminished and the U.S., the “sole winner,” went on to practice self-righteous policies behind the shield of “democracy” particularly after the 9.11 incident. We use the term “globalization,” but the contradictions imprinted during the era of imperialism have not disappeared. If anything, they have grown more serious.(49) At any rate, what is important is surely to come up with a way to stabilize the livelihood of ordindary people to counter trends that follow the demands

242

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Summary and Outlook of powerful American capitalism.(50) In this day and age when “mammonism” runs rampant in Asian countries too, would it not be useful to review arguments from Marx to Sartre about the “alienation of man?” At one time, Engels’ pamphlet Socialism: Utopian and Scientific had such a great impact that Rosa Luxemburg, for example, enthusiastically advocated her position of “scientific socialism” during her criticism of Bernstein. Is it not the time now for socialism to find a more fulfilling option by re-introducing for consideration the utopian ideology that Popper once criticized? And in such a case, “peace, human rights, liberty” would be a better slogan than “liberty, equality, fraternity.” Needless to say, elimination of nuclear weapons and arms reduction are top priorities. The pursuit of equality should be based not on “equality” in form but on human rights. And liberty means the freedom of citizens from all powers of the state. In pursuing these three, there should be many lessons that can be learned from the history of socialist ideas and movements. Whether to call the ideas or movements for that pursuit “social demoracy” or not is, in fact, of little real consequence.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

243

Notes to pages 16–21

NOTES (Part I: Introduction) (1) Nishikawa, Daiichiji sekaitaisen to shakaishugisha tachi (Iwanami Shoten, 1989), German edition: Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten (Bremen, 1999). Hereafter, citation of this work will refer only to German edition. As a work that attempts to explain better a subject which had seemingly been exhaustively discussed by gleaning through newspaper articles, collected letters, police records and other documents of the time, I would also like to mention Wolfgang Kruse, Krieg und nationale Integration. Eine Neuinterpretation des sozialdemokratischen Burgfriedensschlusses 1914/15 (Essen, 1993).

(Part I: I Revival or New Birth) (1) Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Paris, 23. bis 27, September 1900 (Berlin, 1900), 11. On the Bureau Socialiste International (BSI) and the Secretariat, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 11. (2) On Vandervelde in the summer of 1914, see op. cit., 131. As there are not many works on the anti-war movement of the Belgian Workers Party, I shall mention the following doctoral dissertation. Jan Godderis, “Oorlog aan de oorlog!? De houding van de Belgische Werkliedenpartij ten annzien van het leger 1885–1914,” Universiteit Gent, 2004. (3) National Executive Committee (Socialist Party of the United States), “Call for International Socialist Peace Congress,” IISG, Les Matériaux provenent du B.S.I, filme 3. (4) Martin Grass, Friedensaktivität und Neutralität (Bonn, 1975), 76f., 113–115. (5) S.D.A.P. an die dem I.S.B.angeschlossenen Parteien (1914.X.2),ABA, SD-Arkiv, 532/4. (6) Jürgen Rojahn, “Um die Erneuerung der Internationale: Rosa Luxemburg contra Pieter Jelles Troelstra,” IRSH, 1985, 30(1):137. For other sources and details, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 138–140. (7) On the Swiss “left-wing radical faction,” Cf. Hans-Ulrich Jost, Linksradikalismus in der deutschen Schweiz 1914–1918 (Bern, 1973).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

245

Notes to pages 22–24 (8) Horst Lademacher (Hg.), Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung. Protokolle und Korrespondenz. 2 Bde. (The Hague, 1967), I, 5–25. The participants numbered 10 from Italy including Balabanoff, Serrati and Turati, and eight from Switzerland including Grimm. (9) Vladimir Lenin, Lenin Collected Works (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960–1970) Vol. 21, 15–19, 45f. Willi Gautschi, Lenin als Emigrant in der Schweiz (Zurich, 1973), 112–117. (10) The “South Group” “North Group” concept comes from M. Grass. (11) Grass, Friedensaktivität, 31, 82–90, 94–106. (12) Kollontai was a feminist activist who began working together with Clara Zetkin, who was 15 years her senior, before World War I. See Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 14–15 for what she was doing at the time of the outbreak of the Great War. By 1915, she had come to accept Lenin’s way of thinking, though by no means in its entirety. She became prominent and active, for instance giving a key speech at an international communist women’s conference held in conjunction with the 2nd Comintern Congress in 1920, but by then she had already become critical of Lenin’s methods and joined the “Workers’ Opposition” faction formed by labour union leaders and others. After 1923, she moved to (made to move to) the diplomatic arena, serving as Soviet Union’s ambassador to Sweden from 1933 to 45. Barbara Evans Clements, Bolshevik Feminist: The Life of Aleksandra Kollontai (Bloomington, 1979), 85–91, 178–201; Beatrice Farnsworth, Aleksandra Kollontai: Socialism, Feminism, and the Bolshevik Revolution (Stanford, 1980), 40–67, 212–248; Cf . Alexandra Kollontai, Mein Leben in der Diplomatie. Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1922 bis 1945, hrsg. Von Heinz Deutschland (Berlin, 2003). Recently an article was published recognizing both her and Rosa Luxemburg as democratic socialists. There may be some basis to this, but there does not appear to be any connection between the two other than that Kollontai used to read Luxemburg’s writings. Michael Brie, “Rosa Luxemburg und Alexandra Kollontai,” UTOPIEkreativ, 2004(162): 312–328. On how she was perceived in Japan, see Hideko Sugiyama, Korontai to Nippon [Kollontai and Japan] (Shinjusha, 2001). Axelrod, Martov and others were active as members of the “Overseas Secretariat, Organizing Committee, Social-Democratic Workers’ Party.” Abraham Asher, Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 311. “Auswärtiges Sekretariat des Organisationskomitees der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Russlands an ISB” (Zürich, 1915. II.5), Lademacher, Zimmerwalder Bewegung, II, 13–19.

246

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 27–29

(Part I: II Initiative by Neutral Nations) (1) See Masao Nishikawa, “Daiichiji sekaitaisenshi [History of World War I]” in: Rekishikyōikushakyōgikai ed. Atarashii Rekishikyōiku [New History Education] (Ōtsuki Shoten, 1993) 82–101. World War I became a subject of historical research in the 1920s resulting in the publication of many research papers. For example, British historian G.P.Gooch’s work of commentary on historical documents and academic trends was updated and reprinted four times between 1927 and 1940. Significantly, even though World War II also became a major subject of research thereafter, recent years have seen the publication of a succession of new works on World War I. These include the following. Winter, who has been publishing prolifically works on the concept of “memory,” has co-authored a book on the history of research. Jay Winter/Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present (Cambridge, 2005). Their bibliographicals studies are limited to mostly English- and French-language works. There is also a study by a member of the generation who would be grandchildren of those who experienced World War I first hand. It revisits arguments from the early years concerning justification for the use of military force in international politics, having witnessed the reality of the growing frequency of “hot wars” following the conclusion of the cold war. David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as a Political Tragedy (New York, 2004). Rather than unearthing new historical material, the work sorts out a voluminous amount of research from a broad perspective. Some areas are glossed over, such as Japan’s participation in the war, but that is probably expecting too much. Overall, this is a history of war, anti-war movements being outside its scope. Also see Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg, hrsg. v. Gerhard Hirschfeld u.a. (Paderborn, 2003). (2) Agnes Blänsdorf, Die Zweite Internationale (Stuttgart, 1979), 67–69. Born in 1862, Hamon started out as an “anarchist.” Among his works is an article about how “anarchists” were rejected at the International Congress in London. Augustin Hamon, Le socialisme et le Congrès de Londres. Étude historique (Paris, 1897). See Masao Nishikawa, “Daini Intānashonarukeiseiki ni kansuru Shiron [Essay on the Second International’s Formative Period],” Iwanamikōza Sekairekishi, Vol. 22 (1969). (3) An interesting collection of articles on the neutral nations is Hans A. Schmitt, Neutral Europe between War and Revolution 1917–1923 (Charlottesville, 1988). (4) “An die Sozialedemokratischen Parteien und die Gewerkschaftsorganisationen in Holland, Schweden, Norwegen und Dänemark” (1914. XI. 11),AA, Hjalmar Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling, 7. (5) Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 37–38. (6) Blänsdorf, Die Zweite Internationale 109–133. Grass, Friedensaktivität, 121–138. From Lenin to Shlyapnikov (Jan. 15, 1915), Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 36, 318.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

247

Notes to pages 29–38 (7) “Kopenhagener Konferenz, Resolutionen. 17–18. Januar 1915,” AA, Socialistiska arbetarinternationalen, Vo. 7; “Résolution de la Conference Internationale de Copenhague,” Bulletin du B.S.I., No. 1 (1917), 1. (8) “Conférence des représentants des parties ouvriers et socialistes des pays alliés,” “Résolution,” IISG, Le matériaux provenant du B.S.I., filme 3; “Résolution de la Conference Internationale de Londres,” Bulletin du B.S.I., No. 1 (1917), 2; Olga Hess Gankin/H.H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origin of the Third International (Stanford, 1940), 273–285. For a comprehensive analysis using the “agenda,” Blänsdorf, Die Zweite Internationale, 150–158. (9) See Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 38–41. (10) Lenin, “On the London Conference” (29/3/1915), Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 21, 178–190. (11) Adler an Kautsky (1915.II.1.III.20), Kautsky an Adler (II.11), in: Victor Adler: Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky, gesammelt und erläutert von Friedrich Adler, hrsg. vom Parteivorstand de SPÖ (Wien, 1954), 697–609, 610f., 616–619. Kautsky also writes “Rosaurier [Rosa+saurus].” (12) Blänsdorf, Die Zweite Internationale 170–174; “Verabredung der Wiener Konferenz, 12 & 13. April 1915,” AA, Soc. dem, arbetarint, Vol. 7 and “Résolution de la Conférence internationale de Vienne,” Bulletin du B.S.I., No.1 (1917), 2. .

(Part I: III Moves by “South Group”) (1) Swiss Social Democratic Party to International Secretariat (29/3/1915), to neutral nations’ parties (26/4), “Proposal” (24/5). Lademacher, Zimmerwalder Bewegung, II, 37–39,49f., 74–77; Hermann Greulich, Krieg und Internationale (Zürich, 1915), 20, 23. (2) Grass, Friedensaktivität, 139–148; Yves Collart, Le Parti socialiste suisse et l’Internationale (Genève, 1969), 221–226; R. Craig Nation, War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of the Communist Internationalism (Durham, 1989), 75–77; Huysmans an die Geschäftsleitung der SPdSchweiz (1915. VI.11), Lademacher, II, 80f. (3) Grass, Friedensaktivität, 148–150; Collart, Le Parti socialiste suisse, 226–236. (4) R.C. Elwood, Inessa Armand: Revolutionary and Feminist (Cambridge, 1992), 125, 152. (5) For Zetkin’s “official report” and “declaration” at the Berne International Conference of Socialist Women, Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED, Reihe II, Bd. 1 (Berlin-O, 1958), 119–127; Nation, War on War, 67–71. The declaration adopted was consistent with the ideas of Kollontai who had lobbied for this conference (but did not attend). Lenin’s wife Krupskaya is said to have complained. Clements, Bolshevik Feminist, 90; Elwood, Inessa Armand, 155–157.

248

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 38–40 For the minutes and the resolution of the Youth Conference, Gankin/Fisher, The Bolsheviks, 302–308. The life of Inessa Armand has only been brought to light in recent years, although her name was long known because of her correspondence with Lenin. Michael Pearson, Lenin’s Mistress: The Life of Inessa Armand (New York, 2001). But this work makes no mention at all of the International Conference of Socialist Women or of Zetkin. The biography by Elwood, written 10 years earlier, portrays Armand as an independent woman, not just a “girl Friday (after Robinson Crusoe’s faithful servant).” Elwood, Inessa Armand, Chapt. 7: Lenin’s “Girl Friday.” On Lenin and Armand before World War I, see Nishikawa Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 106. (6) Grass, Friedensaktivität, 166–172. (7) Grimm an Aksel’rod (1915. Ende VI/Anfang VII), Lademacher, II, 83–84; “Vorbereitende Sitzung zur 1. Zimmerwalder Konferenz,” ibid., I, 31–34. From Lenin to Radek (July 1915), Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 36, 332–333. Lenin was already thinking about the creation of the “Third” International. Lenin, “Socialism and War,” Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 21, 297–338. Cf. Arnold Reisberg, Lenin und die Zimmerwald Bewegung (Berlin-O, 1966), 154. (8) Lenin and Zinoviev attended as representatives of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) Central Committee, Axelrod and Martov as representatives of the RSDLP Organizing Committee, and Trotsky as representative of the party newspaper Nashe Slovo (Our Word) that had gone into publication in Paris earlier that year. After the RSDLP split into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks at the 1903 Party Congress, the Bolsheviks had come to assume complete control of the party machinery and the party organ at a conference in Prague in January 1912. Lenin notified BSI that the sole representative of the RSDLP was the “Central Committee” (contact: Vladimir Ulyanov [Lenin] Paris). “BSI, Circulaire No. 4, 1912 (III, 18),”Correspondence entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans 1905–1914, par Georges Haupt (Paris, 1963), 104f. See “Report to the International Socialist Bureau on the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.O.L.P.”, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 17, 503–512. On one aspect of the complex relations among the RSDLP factions, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 7. Kapitel “Die russische ‘Sauerei.’” On the 1912 Party Conference and Nashe Slovo, Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921 (London, 1953), 346–404, Ian D. Thatcher, Leon Trotsky and World War One, August 1914 to February 1917 (London, 2000), 26f. et passim. (9) “Bericht über die Verhandlungen der internationalen socialistischen Konferenz abgehalten vom 5.–8. September 1915 zu Zimmerwald,” Lademacher, I, 45–180. (10) Ibid., 55f.; Karl Liebknecht : Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED, Bd.8 (Berlin-O, 1966), 305–307. (11) Lademacher, I, 166–169.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

249

Notes to pages 40–43 (12) While it has been written from time to time that it was Trotsky who drafted the final “Manifesto,” there is a considerable gap between the text he himself proposed and the “Manifesto.” Lademacher, I, 134–137. Among the members of the drafting committee, meanwhile, Blänsdorf does not mention Lenin. Blänsdorf, Die Zweite Internationale, 232. Radek was one of the contributors to Lichtstrahlen. Karl Radek, “Die Entwicklung der Internationale,” Lichtstrahlen, II, 14 (1915, VIII), 293–296, 15 (1915. IX), 313–316. (13) “The Collapse of the Second International,” “The Defeat of One’s own Government in the Imperialist War,” “Socialism and War,” Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 21, 205– 259, 275–280, 295–338, “What is to be done”, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 15, 347– 529. “Centrists” was originally a term Kautsky used in the sense of himself being the legitimate heir to Marx’position. On the surrounding circumstances and the Stuttgart anti-war resolution, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 29– 31, 44. (14) Bertha Thalheimer an Grimm (1915. XI. 4), Lademacher , II, 243–247; Luxemburg an Zetkin (1915. X. 18), an Jogiches (1915. XII. 8), Rosa Luxemburg: Gesammelte Briefe, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED, Bd. 5 (Berlin-O, 1984), 81, 93. On the resolution of the “Internationalist Group” at the national conference, “Reichskonferenz der Gruppe ‘Internationale’ am 19. März 1916 in Berlin,” in: Rosa Luxemburg: Gesammelte Briefe, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED, Bd. 4 (Berlin-O, 1974), 165–170. The part cited from this record comes from an illegal document of the time. But it is dubious whether the first part reproduced for the first time in vol. 4 of this collection was really penned by her judging from its style. IML/ZKdSED (Hg.), Spartakusbriefe (Berlin-O, 1958), 137–139. Junius, Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie (Zürich, 1916) auch in: Luxemburg: Ges. Werke, Bd. 4, 49–164. Incidentally while Lenin sympathized deeply with Junius, he still added his criticisms. “The Junius Pamphlet,” Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 22, 342. Cf. J.P.Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg (London, 1966), 624–627. (15) Cf. Ursula Ratz, Georg Ledebour, 1850–1947 (Berlin, 1969), 156–168. (16) Lademacher, I, 178.

(Part I: IV “International Socialist Commission” and “Bureau of Socialist International”) (1) Lademacher, I, 163; Internationale Sozialistische Kommission zu Bern, Bulletin, Nr.1(1915.9.21), 4–7. This Bulletin after its issue No. 6 gave up its role to a successor publication. (See (14) under notes to the next chapter). “From Lenin to Radek,” (written on Sept. 19 and 20, 1915) Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 36, 352. Nation, War on War, 100. (2) “Die Resolution der Zimmerwalder Linken,” Vorbote, Nr. 1 (1916. 1), 1–42; Cf. Nation, War on War, 112–114.

250

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 44–47 (3) Nation, War on War, 102–106. On Roland Holst, Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 21, 94. The name “Tribune faction” derives from their organ De Tribune (Rostrum). This group formed the Netherlands Communist Party in November, 1918, but became critical of the Commintern in the 1920s. Cf. Mathijs C. Wiessing, Holländische Schule des Marxismus – Die Tribunisten (Hamburg, 1980). (4) Grass, Friedensaktivität, 195f; Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages vom 20. und 21. November 1915 abgehalten im Saalbau in Aarau (Luzern, 1916), 92–107. Cf. Collart, Le Parti socialiste suisse, 274–280; Alfred Erich Senn, The Russian Revolution in Switzerland, 1914–1917 (Madison, 1971), 120f. (5) “Sitzung der erweiterten Kommission Februar 1916,” Lademacher, I, 197–253. The list of participants in these minutes does not include Lenin, but that is probably because he attended from the second day. His statements are recorded. On the membership of the British Independent Labour Party and Socialist Party, an official announcement is made in the November issue of the ISK Bulletin the previous year. ISK, Bulletin, Nr. 2 (1915. XI. 27), 1; Cf. Lademacher, I, 191–194. Zinoviev put out a report that included derisive comments about the two participants from Germany. Gankin/Fisher, The Bolsheviks, 379–384. On Lenin’s and Luxemburg’s ideas concerning peoples’ right of self-determination, see Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, 842–862, Kazuo Katō, Aporia toshite no minzokumondai [Difficult Issue of Peoples] (Shakaihyōronsha, 1989), 72–132. (6) Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden und Klassenkampf (Düsseldorf, 1974), 113–133; Hans Hautmann, Die Anfänge der linksradikalen Bewegung und der kommunistischen Partei in Deutschösterreichs 1916–1919 (Wien, 1970), 4–6; Julius Braunthal, Victor unter Friedrich Adler. Zwei Generationen Arbeiterbewegung (Wien,1965), 225–262; Rudolf G. Ardelt, Friedrich Adler. Probleme einer Persönlichkeitsentwicklung um die Jahrhundertwende (Wien, 1894), 223–225. Probably because of the shocking action of shooting a prime minister to death, Ardelt’s study of F. Adler places an emphasis on his character formation. Cf. Rudolf Neck, Arbeiterschaft und Staat im ErstenWeltkreig 1914–1918, I (Wien, 1964), 119– 122. On Koritschoner, see also, Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier international, publié par Jean Maitron/Georges Haupt, I: Autriche (Paris, 1971), 173f. (7) “Protokoll der II. Internationalen Sozialistischen Zimmerwalder Konferenz abgehalten in Bern und Kiental von 24.–30. April 1916,” Lademacher, I, 265–390. (8) The “Bremen leftists” were a group formed around Johann Knief. At the time of the founding of the German Independent Social-democratic Party, to be mentioned in the next chapter, the group even broke off from that party, unlike what the “Spartacist League” did. On the formation of the Bremen radicals before World War I, see Karl-Ernst Mohring, Die Sozialdemokratische Partei in Bremen 1890–1914 (Hannover, 1968), 119–205. For the 1914–1917 period, Herbert Schwarzwälder, Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, II (Bremen, 1987), 643–657 (It takes an un-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

251

Notes to pages 48–51 kind view.) Elsewhere, as Knief and others’ views were close to Lenin’s, they are portrayed favorably in Walter Bartel, Die Linken in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie im Kampf gegen Militarismus und Krieg (Berlin-O, 1958), 269–271, 405f. (9) The Policy of the International. A Speech of and an Interview with … Camille Huysmans (London, n.d.), 11–30. (10) “Circulaire aux parties des pays neutres” (1916. II.25), ABA, SD-Arkiv,b 517-2. On the statement by Fritz Platten (Swiss Social Democratic Party) and the exchange of letters between the Swiss Democratic Party Secretariat and Huysmans, Lademacher, I, 357–360. Cf. Huysmans à Platten (1916. V. 30), AA, Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling, 9. (11) Grass, Friedensaktivität, 225–232; Blänsdorf, Die Zweite Internationale 279–307. Huysman’s comments in an interview with the Paris newspaper Petit Parisien. Huysmans, The Policy of the International, 8. Huysmans states that Vandervelde was in agreement as far as the convening of a neutral nations’ conference was concerned. Huysmans an Branting (1916.VI.15), AA. Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling, 9. The saying about Mohammed cited by Huysmans is attributable to “XII. Of Boldness” from British philosopher/politician Francis Bacon’s The Essays (1597). (12) “Manifest des Éxecutiv-Comités an die angeschlossenen Parteien” (Haag, 1916, V.1), ABA,SD-Arkiv, 517-1.F.Adler, “Offener Brief an Camille Huysmans, Der Kampf (1916.V), in : Adler, Die Erneuerung der Internationale (Wien, 1919), 93–98. (13) Grass, Friedensaktivität, 232–242; Blänsdorf, Die Zweite Internationale, 307–329. The “circular” from the secretariat, “Vertrauliches und offiziöses Schreibern” (Huysmans, 1916. IV. 17), ABA, SD-Arkiv, 517/2. (14) On Huysmans as secretary general, see, Georges Haupt, “Camille Huysmans, secrétaire de la II-ème Internationale,” in: Bijdragen tot het Camille Huysmansonderzoek (Antwerpen, 1971), 25–48. Although he was a member of the Belgian cabinet, Vandervelde apparently did not forget he was “president” of the International. Émile Vandervelde, Souvenirs (Paris, 1939), 203.

(Part I: V Stockholm) (1) The 10th Conress of the International, scheduled to be held in Vienna in August, 1914, had to be postponed because of the approaching war and would, in fact, never be convened. In publishing a compilation of historical materials on the subject, Haupt entitled it “Congress Unconvened” [Le Congrès manqué] Georges Haupt, Le congrès manqué. L’internationale à la veille de la première guerre mondiale. Études et documents (Paris 1965). I used his expression. On the situation in 1914 see, Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 95–108. (2) “Lecture on the 1905 Revolution,” Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 23, 236–253.

252

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 51–53 (3) On the impact of World War I on the Russian economy and the livelihood of the people, see, Peter Gatrell, Russia’s World War I: A Social and Economic History (Harlow, UK, 2005), 243–260. (4) Nishikawa, “Renin no ‘fūin’ ressha [Lenin’s {sealed} train]” Gendaishi no yomikata [Interpretation of Contemporary History](Heibonsha, 1997), 64–69. N.F. Platten, “Von der Spiegelgase in den Kreml,” Volksrecht (Zürich), 1967. III. 13-IV. 17; For more details, Michael Pearson, The Sealed Train (New York, 1975); Christian Voigt, Robert Grimm. Kämpfer, Arbeiterführer, Parliamentarier, Eine Politische Biographie (Bern, 1980), 158–168; Z.A.B.Zeman/W.B.Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution: The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus), 1867–1924 (London, 1965), 210– 216. Born in Belarus, Parvus travelled around various parts of Europe making contact with revolutionaries. He once analyzed the colonialism issue from a position close to the leftists of the German SPD. Cf. Nishikawa, “Daini Intānashonaru to shokuminchi mondai (The Second International and the Colonial Issue),” Rekishigaku kenkyū, 381 (1972), 26. He was at the same time a wealthy man with a financial network in which even the German government was interested. Cf. Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station (New York, 1940). “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution. April Theses,” Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 24, 21–26. Cf. E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution (London, 1950), 77–89. (5) N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968), Arno J. Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918 (Cleveland, 1964), 44, 78; Donald E. Davis/ Eugene P. Trani, The First Cold War: The Legacy of Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations (Columbia, Mo., 2002), 29–31. (6) The idea of calling Wilson and Lenin’s policies “new diplomacy” in contrast to “traditional diplomacy,” regarding the two as competitors in the same arena, so to speak, comes from the aforementioned fruit of labour by Arno Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, Japanese edition, Uiruson tai Rēnin, transl. by Takashi Saitō and Yōichi Kibata (Iwanami Shoten, 1983). The relationship between “new diplomacy” and the socialist movements within the belligerent nations is discussed in detail. The idea of “Wilson vs. Lenin” is continued in aforementioned Levin’s work and the following study. John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, 1966). (7) Helmut Trotnow, Karl Liebknecht. Eine Politische Biographie (Köln, 1980), 221–248. (8) Protokoll der Reichskonferenz der Sozialdemokratie Deutschlands vom 21.,22. und 23. September 1916 in Berlin (Berlin, 1916. Nachdruck: Berlin, 1974), passim. On developments within the SPD, valuable information is given in the memoirs of Wilhelm Dittmann, a one-time cabinet maker who became a member of the party’s opposition faction, published in 1995. Wilhelm Dittmann, Erinnerungen , bearb. u. eingel. v. Jürgen Rojahn (Frankfurt, 1995), 463–498, XII. Kapitel, “Das Kriegesjahr 1916.” On the founding of the Independent Social-Democratic Party, Hartfrid Krause, USPD, Zur Geschichte der Unabhängigen Sozialdmokratischen Partei Deutschlands

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

253

Notes to pages 53–55 (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), 68–92; Robert F. Wheeler, USPD und Internationale. Sozialistischer Internationalismus in der Zeit der Revolution (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), 23–27. On Haase who became head of the new party, Kenneth R. Calkins, Hugo Haase, Demokrat und Revolutionär (Berlin, 1976), 137–148. (9) Miller, Burgfrieden, 303–320; Klaus Epstein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (New York, 1971), Chapt. VIII, “The Peace Resolution.” (10) Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin I, 237. (11) Ibid., 73, Hisashi Nagao, Roshiya jūgatsu kakumei [Russia’s October Revolution], (Shakaishisōsha, 1973), 15–16. (12) Cf. “Journal de Russie d’Albert Thomas. Document inédit présenté et annoté par I. Sinanoglou.” Cahier du monde russe et soviétique, 1973, 16: 86–204; Vandervelde, Souvenirs, 225–241; J.M.Winter, “Arthur Henderson, the Russian Revolution, and the Reconstruction of the Labour Party,” The Historical Journal, 1972, 15(4):753–773. (13) Comité organisateur de la Conférence Socialiste Internationale de Stockholm, Stockholm (Stockholm, 1918), viii-x; David Kirby, War, Peace and Revolution: International Socialism at the Crossroads, 1914–1918 (Aldershot, 1986), 90–92; Jürgen Stillig, Die Russische Februarrevolution 1917 und die Sozialistische Friedenspolitik (Köln, 1977), 31–38. (14) Angelica Balabanoff, “Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung 1914–1919”(Leipzig, 1928. Repr.;Frankfurt, 1969), 56–58; Hildamarie Meynell, “The Stockholm Conference of 1917,” IRSH, 1960,5: 1–25, 205–225; Merle Fainsod, International Socialism and the World War (1935. Repr.; New York, 1966), 124–146; Rex A. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace: February–October 1917 (Stanford, 1969), 50–73. Akihito Yamauchi, “Sutokkuhorumu kaigi to Tsinmeruwaruto undō [Stockholm Conference and the Zimmerwald Movement],” Shirin, Vol. 61 No. 5 (1978, 1979), 93–129, idem, “Daisankai Tsinmeruwaruto kaigi [The Third Zimmerwald Conference] Parts I and II, Miyazakidaigaku kyōikugakubu kiyō, Shakaikagaku [Bulletin of Miyazaki University Education Department, Social Science], No. 45 (March, 1979), 2–12, No. 46 (October, 1979), 21–33. Internationale sozialistische Kommission, Nachrichtendienst. From May, 1917 to September, 1918, up to issue No. 44 (typewritten and mimeographed), the editor Fred Ström. At about the same time, the BSI also began re-publishing its Bulletin, which used to be published before the war (in the Hague, only No. 1 issued). This can be interpreted as an expression of the “North Group’s” desire to hold an international conference. Bulletin du Bureau Socialiste Internationale, No. 1 (1917). Not surprisingly, there are Swedish scholars who continue to be interested in the Stockholm Conference. The “Labour Movement Archives /Library” in Stockholm held a workshop at the time of the 70th anniversary of the conference, and carried a report in its organ. Arbetarhistoria, 1988, 47(3). Cf. Johanna M. Welcker, “Zwischen Wirklichkeit und Traum. Die Stockholmer Friedenskonferenz von 1917,” ITH-Tagungsberichte, Bd. 20: 19. Linzer Konferenz 1983 (Wien, 1985), 33–68.

254

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 56–57 (15) Plekhanov, the “father of Russian Marxism,” (on his life before 1914, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten) also returned to Petrograd in March, 1917. As he had remained steadfast in his position supporting the Allied side since the war’s outbreak, he did not support the “Stockholm Conference.” It was said that he would join Foreign Affairs Minister Milyukov and others’ cabinet of the provisional government, or that he would become a member of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee, but nothing materialized. In August, he quietly moved to Moscow, where he would console himself by visiting his old haunt “Sparrow Hill.” (renamed “Lenin Hill” from 1935 to 1999, the best scenic spot in Moscow where University of Moscow is located) with few old comrades like Zasulich. To Bolshevik soldiers who came to search his home immediately after the November Revolution, his name meant nothing. Kirby, War, Peace and Revolution, 119–120; Samuel H.Baron, Plekhanov, the Father of Russian Marxism (Stanford, 1963), 351–353; idem, Plekhanov in Russian History and Soviet Historiography (Pittsburgh, 1995), 153–155. (16) Kirby, War, Peace and Revolution, 101–104: Nation, War on War, 174–177; Wade, Russian Search for Peace, 19–25. Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 194–195. (17) The make-up of the “Russia/Netherlands/Sacandinacia committee” was (the Netherlands) Troelstra, van Kol, Johan Willem Albarda, Vliegen as proxy, Wibaut; (Sweden) Branting, Gustav Möller, Ernst Söderberg; (Norway) Jakob Vidnes; and (Denmark) Frederik Borgbjerg (in the place of Stauning who had joined the cabinet), Nina Bang as proxy. Russia was represented by Goledenberg and others with Axelrod and Goledenberg staying on after the delegation went back to Russia. Stockholm, xix; Stillig, Die Russische Februarrevolution, 239–242. The NetherlandsScandinavian Committee” and the Russian representatives held discussions from 4th to 12th of July, and on the 11th drafted the “Invitation to the International Socialist Conference in Stockholm.” This historical record from the bibliographical citation note (28), Nr.P/47-P/52. On the assessment of the Mensheviks and the SR (Socialist Revolutionaries) by Roy Medvedev, the widely-recognized Soviet dissident of the 1970s, see Roy Medvedev, The October Revolution (New York, 1979). (18) The delegation from the SPD’s majority faction comprised Ebert, Scheidemann, David, Müller, Molkenbuhr, Legien and others, while that from Germany’s Independent Social-democratic Party (USPD) included Bernstein, Haase, Kautsky and Ledebour, both delegations thus comprising key figures. Stockholm, xiv. Also on the conferences with SPD (June 4th to 13th) and with USPD (June 22nd), see the historical record from the bibliographical citation note (28), P/27a-d, 28a-c, 29-29a, 30, 32a, c, 33a-c, 34a-c, 44a,b. On the conference with SPD, see Scheidemann’s memoirs along with David’s diary, which records occasional meetings with Nina Bang who was to become Education Minister in post-war Denmark, Philipp Scheidemann, Memoiren eines Sozialedemokraten, II (Dresden, 1928), 5–21; Das Kriegstagebuch des Reichstagsab-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

255

Notes to pages 57–60 geordneten Eduard David 1914 bis 1918, bearb. v. Susanne Miller (Düsseldorf, 1966), 232f. (19) Dittmann, Erinnerungen, 507. (20) Stockholm, xxf. Inspired by its own response to the BSI questionnaire, the French Socialist Party compiled its resolutions and records on war and peace from July, 1914, to the end of July, 1917. Pendant la guerre. Le Parti Socialiste, la Guerre et la Paix (Paris, 1918). (21) Wade, Russian Search for Peace, 105–117; Kirby, War, Peace and Revolution, 178– 184; Stillig, Die Russische Februarrevolution, 242–250. (22) Stockholm, xxiii-xxv; Fainsod, International Socialism, 142. (23) Kirby, War, Peace and Revolution, 178–184; Stillig, Die Russische Februarrevolution, 250–271; Meynell, “The Stockholm Conference,” 202–219; Robert Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution (New York, 1954), 66–88; C.J.Wrigley, David Lloyd George and the British Labour Movement (New York, 1976), 205–217. (24) In a letter he scribbled to MacDonald during a train trip, Bernstein lamented that the Congress did not materialize because of the “myopia of stupid politicians.” Bernstein to MacDonald (1917.IX.30), in: David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), 219f. (25) Stockholm, 491–498. (26) For Huysmans, the “Stockholm Conference” was, so to speak, the project of his lifetime. Thus it was not without basis that the Zimmerwald faction called it “Huysmans’ conference.” (minutes of the third Zimmerwald Conference). Cf. Haupt, “Huysmans,” 42; Lademacher, I, 460. (27) Stockholm, 499–521. (28) Die Stockholmer Friedenskonferenz von 1917 (bearbeitet von Martin Grass. [Stand: Dezember 2004.] Veröffentlicht im Internet ab September 2005), www.labourhistory. net/stockholm1917. This is a truly meticulous work by Grass who gleaned through historical materials from archives in Stockholm, Amsterdam and other cities and published his findings as his “Minutes of the Stockholm Conference.” It more than complements the minutes Huysmans published in 1918 (Note 13). (29) Balabanoff, “Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung,” 58–60; idem, Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse (Berlin, 1927), 143–151. “An die angeschlossenen Organisationen und Gruppen (Stockholm, 1917, V.10), ISK, Nachrichtendienst, Nr.3 (1917.V.12), abgedruckt in: Lademacher, I, 440f. (30) Voigt, Robert Grimm, 158–168. On the report of the ISK investigative committee, ISK, Nachrichtendienst, Nr.13 (1917.VII. 8), abgedruckt in: Lademacher, I, 593f. On the record of the Swiss Social-democratic Party’s investigative committee reports (July 30th, August 4th), Ibid., 595–644. Ten years later, Balabanoff defended Grimm saying he had been a victim of circumstances. Balabanoff, Erinnerungen, 157–163. One biography of Thomas states that Grimm was conspiring to bring about a bilateral peace agreement between Germany and Russia. It also states that Thomas

256

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 61–62 believed German funds were reaching Lenin’s comrades. B. W. Schaper, Albert Thomas, Trente ans de réformiste social (Assen, 1959), 145. (31) Nation, War on War, 186–188. (32) “An die Vertreter des Russischen Arbeiter- und Soldatendelegiertenrates” (1917. VII. 11), ISK, Nachrichtendienst, Nr.14 (1917.VII.15), abgedruckt in: Lademacher, I, 442f.; “Die I.S.B.und die vom russischen Arbeiterrate und holländisch-skandinavischen Komité einberufene Konferenz,” ISK, Nachrichtendienst, Nr.15 (1917.VII.22). (33) Balabanoff, My Life as Rebel (1938. Repr.; New York, 1968), 165; Dittman, Erinnerungen, 507. Born in Ukraine in 1878, Angelica Balabanoff became a socialist while she was a university student in Brussels and moved to Italy. From before 1914, she was a “star” of international Congresses as a very capable interpreter. As a member of the ISK, she played an important role in Stockholm in 1917. While she disliked Radek, she became sympathetic to the Bolsheviks’ cause and went on to become a member of the Comintern Executive Committee, but eventually had a fall-out with them and moved to Paris. After World War II, she returned to Italy (died in 1965). For the realization of a socialist society she traveled around many places, but probably because of her personality that tended to be governed by feelings, she parted ways with mainstream “politics.” When using these two types of memoirs as research material, it is necessary to consider the transition of her political positions. (34) By nationality, the participants came from 10 countries, belligerent and neutral. Figures already widely-known in the socialist movement of the time were limited to those mentioned in the present work and a few others. Participants from the U.S. were practically strangers to even Balabanoff, Needless to say, the circumstances were such that none of the key figures from the Russian Bolsheviks could possibly attend. Balabanoff, “Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung,”90; idem, My Life, 166. (35) “Offizieller Verhandlungsbericht zur Vorgeschichte,” ISK, Nachrichtendienst, Nr. 23 (1917.9.24), abgedruckt in: Lademacher, I. 473–484 only describes basic developments, probably because of wariness toward the authorities of the nations involved. For a more detailed minutes, based on one personal account supplemented with Balabanoff ’s account, see Lademacher, I, 447–484. Balabanoff ’s account was published later in 1928 in order to provide a “documentation of absolutely objective facts.” While a footnote gives the source as the ISK “Nachrichtendienst,” the minutes also include other materials, probably based on other personal accounts, which make them quite valuable. Balabanoff,”Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung,” 63–107. Nation, War on War, 197–200; Kirby, War, Peace and Revolution, 193–195. On Axelrod who returned from Switzerland, see Asher, Axelrod, 320–331. (36) “On Peace, October 26” was adopted at the 2nd National Congress of Workers and Soldiers held in early November 1917 in Petrograde. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 26, 249–253. For an analysis of the process the “Fourteen Points” were formulated and refined by Wilson’s aides like Colonel House and advisor Walter Lippman, and of the “Points” themselves, see Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 329–367. Also, August Hecksher, Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1991), 438–441.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

257

Notes to pages 63–67 (37) Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 245–248. Cf. Kurt Rabel, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker (Köln, 1973), 4–95; Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy (New York, 1994), 436–441, 459–474. Teruhiro Karawatari, Kokuminshugi to minzokujiketsu – daiichiji sekaitaisenchū no gensetsu no henka to furansu [National Sovereignty and Peoples’ Self-Determinaiton – Changes in Opinions during World War I and France] (Bokutakusha, 2003), which looks at the final stages of World War I mainly in France, is an instructive fruit of labor including a critical examination of Wilson’s arguments. It is nevertheless to be regretted that there are some errors in basic facts , such as “the peoples’ (right of) self-determination … was …raised by the Bolsheviks first, specifically in the writing of Lenin about ‘socialist revolution and peoples’ right of self-determination’ in early March, 1916” (p. 121).

(Part I: VI Lenin vs. Wilson) (1) “An die Proletarier aller Länder!”(1917.XI.8), ISK, Nachrichtendienst, Nr. 28 (1917.XI.10). (2) John Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litowsk: The Forgotten Peace (London, 1956), 243– 308; Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 293–312; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, Chapt. 11 “The Drama of Brest-Litowsk”; Miller, Burgfrieden, 358–370. Der Friede von BrestLitowsk, bearb. von Werner Hahlweg (Düsseldorf, 1971) is a work compiling documents submitted as part of research undertaken by a parliamentary investigating committee of the Weimer Republic from 1920 to 23 on the peace negotiations and the feasibility thereof (totaling 700 pages).” On the expression “Tilsit peace,” see for example Lenin, “Report on Ratification of the Peace Treaty” (March 14, 1918), Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 27, 180. (3) Trotsky’s letter to Lenin (1918 first half of January?); Wheeler-Bennet, Brest-Litowsk, 185f. (4) E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923, Vol. I (London, 1950), 112–150, 164– 169. (5) Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, Memorandum on War Aims (London, 1918), 3f.; Report of the 18th Annual Conference of the Labour Party … London, …June, 1918 (London, n.d.),7. On the close relationship between Gompers and Wilson, Philip S. Foner, History of the Labour Movement in the United States, Vol. 7 (New York, 1987), 159. (6) Alsace in the 17th century and Lorraine in the 18th century respectively became part of France, but the people of Alsace in particular spoke a German dialect. Both regions were annexed with the German Empire as a result of the Prussian-Franco War and integrated into the administrative unit called Elsass-Lothringen. The novelette “The Final Lesson” (part of Les contes du lundi), set in Alsace when the German troops arrived, concerns the end of French language class at school, but it can be gathered that the students’ day-to-day language was not French.

258

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 67–71 (7) Memorandum on War Aims, 7–13. E. Williams, From Columbus to Castro – A History of the Caribbean Region, 1492–1969, (New York, 1970), 146–150. Japanese edition, transl. by Minoru Kawakita, Koronbusu kara kasutoro made – karibukaiikishi, 1492–1969 (Iwanami Shoten, 1978) II, 186–190. Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson, 19–21; Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson, 294–298. (8) Memorandum on War Aims, 16. “To the Socialist Parties of Germany, AustriaHungary and Bulgaria (London and Le Hâvre, 1918.III.22),” LPA, LSI, 3/6. On arguments over the colonial issue, Masao Nishikawa, “Daini Intānashonaru to shokuminchi mondai,” Rekishigaku knkyū, 381. (9) Stockholm, xxix; “Réunion du Comité organisateur (1918.I.7,8),” IISG, Archief Troelstra, 437/1. “Memorandum on International Policy” (Camille Huysmans), LPA, LSI, 3/5/1-i-x. “Manifest des Holländisch-skandinavisch-russischen Komitees: Aufruf an die englische Arbeiterbewegung” (1918I.8), Stockholmer Friedenskonferenz, Dok. P/77a. (10) The Replies of the Socialist Parties of the Central powers to the ‘Mermorandum on War Aims’ (London, [1918]), 7f. This pamphlet was published jointly by a British Trades Union Congress committee and the British Labour Party Executive Committee. It carries in English position statements by socialists not only in the central European powers but also in neutral countries along with relevant personal letters. (11) For the “memoranda” of the SPD majority faction and the USPD, see respectively Stockholm , 110–118, 119–123; The Replies, 10–15, 21–24. For Bernsteain’s and Kautsky’s opinions (official communiqué in Stockholm), see ibid., 16–20, 24–26. For the latter, see also Stockholmer Friedenskonferenz, P/44c. As Scheidemann’s speech in the Reichstag was published in The Replies, 16–20, it likely attracted the attention of the London conference of the Allied nations in September, 1918. Miller, Burgfrieden, 384–395; Helmut Schmersal, Philipp Scheidemann 1865–1939. Ein vergessener Sozialdemokrat (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), 140–146. (12) For the “memorandum” of the Hungarian Social-democratic Party, Stockholm, 191–197; The Replies, 32–37. For the conferences between the “NetherlandsScandinavian Committee” and the Austrian delegation (including Adler) (25th, 26th May, 1917), between the committee and the Hungarian delegation (May 29th, 30th), and between the committee and the Ottoman Empire delegation (12th July), Stockholmer Friedenskonferenz, Dok.P/21, 22, 22a; 24, 25, 25a; 56, 56a. It is not clear what body the Ottoman Empire delegation represented. Incidentally, the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (liberal faction) refers to the so-called “reformist” faction when the party split in 1903. The “orthodox faction” was called the “illiberal” faction and became the Communist Party in 1919. It was led by Georgi Dimitrov and others. See Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 49–50. (13) Regarding the wars of interference, a study by George Kennan, who served as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, is interesting in that it is from

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

259

Notes to pages 71–72 the perspective of the United States’ policy over many years toward the socialist regime. George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations 1917–1920, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1956, 1958). (14) Werner-Maser, Friedrich Ebert, Der erste deutsche Reichspräsident (München, 1987), 187–225; Peter-Christian Witt, Friedrich Ebert (Bonn, 1987), 91–115. On the defeat of the German Empire and the German Revolution, it is no simple task even just to sort out the main trends. For the present purpose, it may suffice to cite the following two Japanese studies based on materials gleaned from archives. Seiji Kimura, Heishi no kakumei 1918nen doitsu [Soldiers’ Revolution, Germany 1918] (U of Tokyo Press, 1988), Tatsuru Miyake, Doitsukaigun no atsui natsu, suiheitachi to kaigunshōkōdan 1917nen [German Navy’s Long Hot Summer Sailors and Naval Officer Corps 1917] (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2001). Also, it should be pointed out that the major work of the Marxist Pierre Broué published in French in 1971 was recently translated into English. Pierre Broué, The German Revolution 1917–1923 (Leiden, 2005). (15) “To His Excellency, Dr. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States,” LPA, LSI, 3/123. (16) On the relationship between the international labour movement and Wilson, Cf. Austin van der Slice, International Labor, Diplomacy, and Peace, 1914–1919 (Philadelphia, 1941), 208–257. (17) For the “minutes” of the London conference (September, 1918), “Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference [London, 1918. IX. 17–20], LPA, LSI, 28/I/54. This record as well as much of the archival materials concerning the Berne Conference, to be discussed next, and its preparatory stages were published by Ritter. Die II. Internationale 1918/1919, hrsg. von Gerhard A. Ritter, 2 Bde. (Berlin, 1980). The source of the materials compiled therein shall be given hereafter in the original pagination. For example, the minutes of the London conference in Ritter’s compilation are found on pp. 133–178. For the American Federation of Labor’s proposals, “Proposals of American Federation of Labor Delegates to Inter-Allied Labor Conference, London, September 17, 18, 19, 1918,” LPA, LSI, 2/12/12. Cf. Ritter, 144–147. On Gompers’ and/or the AFL’s moves toward the European socialist and labor movements of the period, see Foner, History of the Labor Movement, Vol. 7, Chapt. 16. (18) Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 385. (19) For Henderson’s views, “Joint International Sub-Committee. Memorandum on International Situation” (Henderson), LPA, LSI, 5/4/6. (20) In the realm of European historians, studies on the World War II are understandably flourishing, but studies on World War I almost a century after the event are also being published one after another. “One general is crowned with victory at the expense of tens of thousands of lives [Isshō kōnarite bankotsu karu]” are the words of a late Tang dynasty poet, but the phenomenon continues to this day. For the

260

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 73–75 Europeans, the question of what World War I was fought for is one they continue to ask of themselves, all the more as it put an end to the “Belle Époque,” among other things.

(Part I: VII Berne) (1) On the Paris peace conference, see, Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919 (New York, 1967, 69). Masamichi Morikawa, Daiichijitaisen to parikōwakaigi [World War I and the Paris Peace Conference] (Yanagihara shoten, 1983). For Henderson’s memorandum, “Memorandum on the International Peace Conference”(Henderson), LPA, LSI, 5/4/7/, Ritter (Hg.), Die II. Internationale, II, 751–759. On the Berne Conference and preceding events, the commentary by the editor Ritter attached to the above document captures the essence. On the Berne Conference of 1913, Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 6. Kapitel. (2) Mrs. Philipp Snowden, “Socialist Personalities at Berne,” Labour Leader, 1919. II. 27. (3) LP, Report, 1919, 214. But this document has omissions. The most reliable list is the one prepared by Ritter incorporating other records. Ritter, 786f. (4) “Poale-Zion,” meaning “worker of Zion,” was formally established in 1907 under the leadership of the Zionist, Ber Borochow. Some members joined the Soviet Communist Party, while others were apparently active in Britain and Poland. After the Second World War, its tradition seems to have been carried on by the Mapam (United Labor Party) “based on Marxim-Leninism.” Ber Borodow, Die Grundlagen des Poale-Zionismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1969); Peretz Merchav, Die israelische Linke (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), 149. See also Nishikawa, “Shakaishugi, Minzoku, Daihyōken [Socialism, Nations, Representation],” Shisō, 606 (1974), 51f. (5) On the positions of the American Federation of Labor and the Belgian Workers’ Party, see Ritter, 30–32, 36f. Cf. Henderson to Buckler (1918. XII. 19, 23), LPA, LSI, 3/153, 155. For AFL’s reply, Gompers to Bowerman (n.d.), LPA, LSI, 3/158. Buckler was a councilor at the U.S.Embassy in London, Bowerman was secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions. (6) Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ausserordentlichen Parteitages vom 2. Februar 1919 im Volkshaus in Bern (Bern, 1919), 78; “Parteitag und internationale konferenz,” Berner Tagwacht, 1919. II.3; Voigt, Robert Grimm, 202f. Cf. Ritter, 32f., 39. The Grütli Association was a “patriotic, democratic association for the education of workers” established in 1838 (description by the Zürich Social Archives), which merged with the Swiss Socialdemocratic Party in 1901. Grütli or Rütli is said to be the place where the Swiss Federation was formed in 1291. Cf. Collart, Parti socialiste suisse, 36f.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

261

Notes to pages 76–77 (7) On the Italian Socialist Party Congress of 1912, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 52–53. (It was Mussolini who orchestrated the move for their expulsion). Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario 1883–1920 (Torino, 1965), 110, 351–361, 719–721. On the moves by Morgari and others, see Ritter, 40, 787, Anm. 4. (8) “Geheimdienstbericht über eine Sonderkonferenz der Zimmerwalder während der Berner Konferenz,” Ritter, 825f., Dok. 76. This separate conference is mentioned by Switzerland’s Platten in his speech at the First Congress of the Comintern. Ibid., 839, Dok 81. (9) It is believed that the request to participate from Japan came from Toshihiko Sakai and Tatsuo Kitahara. Nishikawa, Shoki shakaishugiundō to bankoku shakaitō [Early Socialist Movement in Japan and the World Socialist Party] (Miraisha, 1985), 95 (one of the sources cited in this work, Berner Tageblatt, being hereby amended to Berner Tagwacht). (10) Ritter, 46. (11) On the “little International” and its breakup, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 54–55; Hiroaki Ozawa, “Ōsutoria shakaiminshutō niokeru minzoku mondai – no kaitai to rōdōkumiai,” Rekishigaku kenkyū 1987 (10) 19–38. Also, Raimund Löw, Der Zerfall der “Kleinen Internationale”: Nationalitätenkonflikte in der Arbeiter bewegung des alten Österreich (1889–1914) (Wien, 1984). (12) On the conference of the “International Federation of Trade Unions,” see Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund, Protokoll der Internationalen Gewerkschafts-Konferenz vom 5 bis 9. Februar 1919 im Volkshaus in Bern (Bern, 1919). (13) As an analysis of the Berne Conference in the international political context, Mayer, Peacemaking, 373–409. (14) The substance of the conference was reported in an Official Bulletin which was published in Berne from the day after the opening, but only as a summary. Official Bulletin of the International Labour and Socialist Conference, Vol. I, No. 1 (1919. II. 3) ~ No. 8 (1919. II. 21). The bulletin in also available in French and German versions, but there are some differences in their content. Later, thanks to the efforts of Ethel Snowden and others, detailed official minutes were drafted in English, German and French within the year 1919, but were not published due to lack of funds (see Part II, Chapt. I, p. 90 of this work), and remained on a shelf of the Labour Party archives for the next 60 years. These were meticulously corrected and edited to see publication as Ritter (Hg.), Die II. Internationale 1918/1919, I, 187–681. For the present work, the original drafts were checked for reconfirmation, but for sourcing, the relevant parts of Ritter’s work are given. 191–193 (Henderson, Huysmans, Branting), 201–208 (Thomas), 210–220 (Wels), 220–229 (Renaudel), 230–243 (Eisner), 243–245 (Müller), 254–263 (Kautsky), 269–271 (Troelstra), 280–284 (Adler), 309–312 (MacDonald), 330–332 (Henderson), 508–510 (MacDonald), 521–523 (Loriot), 524f. (Axelrod), 552f. (Bernstein).

262

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 78–81 (15) One biography of Wels, who went on to play a key role not only in the SPD but also in the context of the “Second International,” is Hans J. L. Adolph, Otto Wels und die Politik der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1894–1939 (Berlin, 1971). (16) “Meeting of the Socialist Group (August 1, 1914, 6pm),” LPA, LSI, 3/1/i. The part that had already been known, Die Internationale und der Weltkrieg. Materialien, gesammelt von Carl Grünberg (Leipzig, 1916), 40–43. On Müller’s visit to Paris, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 124. Müller was a man who became Chancellor in 1920, and after the SPD left the seat of power, became Chancellor once again in 1928. The country suffered the Great Depression shortly thereafter, and he was forced to resign in 1930. As his memoir on the German revolution, Hermann Müller, Die November-Revolution (Berlin, 1928). (17) Cf. Freya Eisner, Kurt Eisner, Die Politik des libertären Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1979). As a thesis focussing on Eisner’s role at the Berne Conference, Robert F. Wheeler, “The Failure of ‘Truth and Clairty’ at Berne: Kurt Eisner, the Opposition and the Reconstruction of the International,” IRSH, 1973, 18: 173–201. (18) “One without a fatherland (vaterlandslose Gesellen)” is an expression Wilhem II and others used in a satirical reversal of the sentence “workers do not have a fatherland” contained in the “Communist Manifesto” during the time the “Socialist suppression law” was enforced from 1878 to 1890. Cf. Reinhard Höhn, Die vaterlandslosen Gesellen, Bd. 1 (Köln, 1964), IX. (19) Friedrich Adler, as mentioned in Part 1 Chapter IV, shot Minister-President Stürgkh to death in 1916. A special court sentenced him to death, but as it was not approved by Emperor Karl, a higher court commuted the sentence to 18 years imprisonment. On November 2nd, 1918, he was pardoned and released and, in the revolutionary spirit of the times, was even treated as a hero. His activities after the war have not been adequately discussed even by works like Braunthal, Victor und Friedrich Adler. Manfred Bauer, Friedrich Adler. Rebell der Einheit (Wien, 2004) is a work that attempted to fullfil, after a 40-year gap following Braunthal’s study, the understandable demand that there ought to be a political biography of Adler, but regrettably there are flaws in the scholastic procedure. Adler compiled the writings he released during the war into a volume he published under the title “Rebirth of the Internationale.” Its foreword was written by Kautsky. Die Erinnerung der Internationale. Aufsätze aus der Kriegszeit. Vorwort von Karl Kautsky (Wien, 1919). Cf. Österreich im Jahre 1918. Berichte und Dokumente, hrsg. v. Rudolf Neck (München, 1968), 93f. (20) Resolution, Ritter, 316. See Part II, Chapt. III, pp. 122–124 of this work. (21) See, Nishikawa, Daiichijisekaitaisen no shigakushi [Historiography of First World War], Gendaishi no yomikata [How to Read Contemporary History], (Heibonsha, 1997), 40–63. (22) India, “Europäisches Zentralkomitee der Indischen Nationalisten (Berlin) an den Herrn Sekretär der Internationalen Sozialistenkonferenz” (1915. II.3), AA, Soc. dem. arbetarint.8; Resolution, Ritter, 674. Korea, resolution, Ibid., 673f.; Stockholm,

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

263

Notes to pages 82–91 409 (“Corée”). Cf. H. van Kol, “Les mandats coloniaux et la Société des Nations. Rapport présenté à la Conférence interparlementaire” II (Genève, 1923), 23. See Nishikawa, “Daini intānashonaru to shokuminchi mondai.” (23) Ritter, 500–503, 507f. (24) Ritter, 533f. (25) Ritter, 565 (Huysmans), 567–569 (Branting). (26) On Rosa Luxemburg’s “Russian Revolution,” see Nishikawa, “Rōza Rukusennburugu to doitsu no seiji [Rosa Luxemburg and German Politics],” Shigakuzasshi, 1960, 69(2), 1–46.

(Part II: I Amsterdam and Moscow) (1) For the minutes of the Amsterdam and Lucerne conferences, which this chapter and the following Chapter II deal with, Ritter’s compilation of historical materials are cited. For related archival materials concerning events before and after the conferences, too, the pages in Ritter’s compilation are cited in the case of items covered therein. On the Berne conference resolution concerning the establishment of a “permanent international committee,” see Ritter, 464. Earlier studies closely related to the topic of the present work include the “Introduction (Einleitung)” to the above compilation and Robert Sigel, Die Geschichte der Zweiten Internationale 1918–1923 (Frankfurt/M.,1986). Sigel’s work has an appendix citing 14 items from archival materials, but individual citation is omitted from the present work. (2) “The Prime Minister & the Berne Conference,” LPA, LSI, 6/752; Ritter, 845f. (3) Gilles (?) to Huysmans (1919.III.15), LPA, LSI, 5/1/58. (4) “Bericht über die Internationale-Sozialisten Konferenz in Amsterdam (26 bis 29 Aoril1919),” Bulletin der Zweiten Internationale, No. 1 (Mai 1919), No. 2 (Juli 1919); Ritter, 573–606. (5) The Labour Party, Report of the Nineteenth Annual Conference held in … Southport, … 1919 (London, 1919 [?]), 17. It is not certain that the name “action commitee” existed from the beginning. (6) It is given as “The Second Meeting of the Permanent Commission” in the report on the British Labour Party’s Annual Congress (ibid., 19). On the “International Socialist Bureau (BSI)” before World War I, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 114. Nations (territories) sending representatives to the Amsterdam International Commission Conference were as follows (main personalities and organizations in brackets). Argentina 2, Australia 1, Belgium 3 (Anseele, Bertrand, de Broukère), Denmark 1, Germany 1 (Hugo Haase), Estonia 1, France 2 (Longuet, Renaudel), Georgia 2 (including Tsereteli), Britain 3 (Henderson, MacDonald, Stuart-Bunning), Ireland 1, Italy 1, Luxemburg 1, Netherlands 2 (Troelstra, Wibaut), Palestine (Poale

264

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 91–96 Zion) 2, Russia 3 (Mensheviks, SR), Sweden 1 (Branting) and the Ukraine 2. Also Huysmans. LP, Report, 1919, 215; Ritter, 851. (7) Bulletin d. II. Int., No. 2, 2; Ritter 575f. Ritter dates the meeting between MacDonald and others and Lord Cecil at end-March, but his basis for this is not clear. Ritter, “Einleitung,” 73. (8) On the Finnish revolution and Finno-Soviet relations, see Hiroshi Momose, TōHokuō gaikōsh josetsu – Soren-Finrandokankei no kenkyū [Introduction to the History of Eastern and Northern European Diplomacy – A Study of Soviet-Finnish Relations], (Fukumura shuppan, 1970) p. 60 onward. CF. Anthony F. Upton, The Finnish Revolution, 1917–1918 (Minneapolis, 1980). (9) Bulletin d. II. Int., No. 1, 1–6; Ritter, 598–602. (10) For example, “Memorandum, exposant, Les revendications d’un people coreen. Pour sa liberation [sic],” IISG, Archief Troelstra, 461/19. (11) See Nishikawa, “Daini Intānashonaru to shokuminchi mondai.” H. van Kol, “Les mandats coloniaux et la Société des Nations,” I, II (Genéve, 1922, 1923). (12) «Labour’s Day», LPA, LSI, 5/4/52; “Sitzung des Actions-Komités [sic],” Deklaration des Internationalen Aktions-Komités über die Pariser Friedensbedingungen,” Bulletin d. II. Int., No. 1 (Mai 1919), 5–8; «The Paris Meeting», LPA, LSI, 3/252; Ritter, 859– 864. (13) “Der Viererrat verweigert den Delegierten der Internationale die Zusammenkunft,” Bulletin d. II. Int., No. 1, 8. (14) See Part I, Chapt. III of this work, 40–42. (15) Branko Lazitch / Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern,Vol. 1 (Standford, 1972), 50; Aldo Agosti, La Terza Internazionale. Storia documentaria, I: 1919–1923 (Roma, 1974), 10, Japanese edition, Kominterunshi [History of the Comintern], transl. by Kiyonori Ishidō (Gendaishi kenkyūjo, 1987), 27. (16) Yōichi Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū [Collected Materials on the Comintern], Vol. 1 (Ōtsuki shoten, 1978). Item 1. However, according to information in a French magazine article cited by the British Labour Party, the telegram’s addressees were given as “Spartakus Gruppe in Berlin and the Communist Party in Vienna.”LPA, LSI, 3/194. Incidentally, “yellow” was an epithet employed by people who considered themselves to be revolutionary under the “red” banner against labor unions favoring cooperation with management. It dates back to a yellow banner used by labor unions favoring cooperation (syndicats jaunes) that were formed in France in the late 19th century. The use of “yellow” and “gelb” in the same context eventually spread to Britain and Germany as well. Cf. Lexikon zur Parteiengeschichte 1789–1945, hrsg. von Dieter Fricke, Bd. 2 (Leipzig, 1984), 718–728. (17) Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the O.P.S.U., Outline of the Communist International (Moscow, 1971), Japanese edition, Kominterun no rekishi, vol. I, transl. by Yōichi Murata (Ōtsuki shoten, 1973), 51. Cf. James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist International (Stanford, 1964), 17–35.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

265

Notes to pages 97–103 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a comprehensive scholastic reassessment of the history of the Comintern is yet to be undertaken based on new historical materials that have been “unearthed,” although some research has been done on limited aspects thereof. One of the few works, Kevin McDermott/Jeremy Agnew, A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin (Londion 1996), Japanese edition, Kominterunshi , transl. by Nao Hagiwara (Ōtsuki shoten, 1998), gives the number of those attending as 51 (p. 12), a figure which is based on the following study. John Riddell (ed.) Founding of the Communist International: Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919 (New York, 1987), 13. A point has then been made that this First Congress was nothing more than an activity of exiles’ circles, no different from their previous activities. Lazitch/Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, I, 67–75. (18) Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol. 1, Material 5a. (19) Ibid., Material 8. On the anti-war resolution at the Stuttgart Congress, Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 26–30. (20) Reisberg, Lenin und die Zimmerwalder Bewegung, 289；Balabanoff, Erinnerungen, 227; Nation, War on War, 217f. (21) Lazitch/Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, I, 60. (22) Nishikawa, “Rōza Rukusenburugu to doitsu no rekishi [Rosa Luxemburg and German Politics]”, Shigaku zasshi, 1960, 69 (2/), 27, 42, Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 84–86. (23) Riddell (ed.), Founding of the Communist International, 167–182. Cf. Lazitch / Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, I, 58–65. (24) Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 1, Material 38, 39. (25) See “Summary and Outlook” of this work.

(Part II: II Lucerne) (1) On the moves by socialist and labour organizations of Italy, France and Britain over the idea of staging an international general strike, see the detailed analysis, Mayer, Peacemaking, 856–873. On the USPD and the International, Wheeler, USPD und Internationale is an excellent study. In connection with this chapter, see p. 74 onward, and p. 91 onward. (2) “Preliminary Peace Proposals. France … Posted on the Walls of Paris, 11th May, 1919,” LPA, LSI, 3/266 etc. (3) Camille Huysmans, “Werter Genosse, Amsterdam, 14. Juni, 1919,”IISG, INT, 31. For a more detailed circular on matters from the beginning of July (July 1st), IISG, Archief Troelstra, 463/10–12; Ritter, 875–877.

266

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 103 (4) The cited comment, attributed to a German chargé d’affaires stationed in Berne, is contained in a news report filed by a correspondent. Ibid., 83. American entrepreneur John de Kay is said to have been a sponsor. He published The Spirit of the International at Berne privately in 1919, and was in correspondence with Huysmans and others during this period. (5) The minutes of the conference are found in: (1) Labour Party Archives collection (LSI, 8/12) “The International Labour and Socialist Conference held at Lucerne. August 1st–10th” (66 typewritten pages), (2) “Die Luzerner Konferenz (1–10 August 1919),” Bulletin der Zweiten Internationale, No. 3 (September, 1919), 1–12 (resolutions only), (3) Report from German Chargé d’Affaires stationed in Berne from the Bonn Diplomatic Archives collection, and (4) an article in the Geneva newspaper La Feuille. This writer has only seen (1) and (2). The existence of (3) and (4) was learned through the materials compiled by Ritter. The minutes therein are based on (1) as well as (3) whenever, depending on the speaker, the latter was deemed more detailed. Ritter also compared the four versions and noted the differences and similarities between them. Therefore, source references in this work shall be limited to paginations in Ritter’s compilation. Incidentally, according to Ritter who also referred to an article in Der Bund, the actual duration of the conference was from the 2nd to 9th of August. In the present work, the dates given in the minutes by the parties concerned ((1) and (2)) are respected on the assumption that meetings took place before and after the conference. Cf. Ritter, 609. (6) For Huysmans’ “Report concerning the Organization since the Berne Conference,” IISG, De Tweede Internationale, INT, ; Ritter, 881–884 (in German). There is no doubt he drafted the report for the Lucerne Conference, but it is not included in the minutes. For the correspondence between Huysmans and the Labour Party, LPA, LSI, 3/256, 257, 276. (7) In one of his statements, MacDonald said “this conference is simply a subcommittee from Berne” and, as such, had no authority to decide on matters that were not resolved at Berne. Ritter, 633. (8) The countries and territories sending delegates were as follows (key personalities and organizations in brackets): Armenia 1, Azerbaijan 1, Belgium 2 (Vandervelde, de Broukère), Bulgaria 1, Denmark 1, Germany 7 ([Majority] Wels, Molkenbuhr, Bernstein, [Minority] Crispien, Hilferding, Cohn, Kautsky), Estonia 1, France 9 ([Majority] Longuet, Cachin and others, [Minority] Renaudel and others), Georgia 2 (Tsereteli among them), Britain 2 (Henderson, MacDonald), Italy 2, Latvia 2, Lithuania 2, Netherlands 2 (Troelstra, Vliegen), Austria 1 (F. Adler), Palestine 1 (Poale Zion), Russia 6 (Axelrod and others), Sweden 1, Czechoslovakia 2 (Nĕmec, Šmeral), the Ukraine 4. Plus Huysmans. “The International. Countries and Delegates,” LPA, LSI, 8/1. This record states that Poland also sent two delegates. For the present purpose, the data by Ritter who studied several historical materials was respected. Ritter, 891f.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

267

Notes to pages 103–105 That said, a document the Labour Party published clearly after the conference lists Azerbaijan 1, Luxemburg 2, Poland 1 and Rumania 2 as those who “arrived but not in time.” The International at Lucerne, 1919. The Resolutions. The Provisional Constitution (London: The Labour Party, 1919), 21. It should be noted that under the circumstances, some governments were obstructing travel by socialists using their authority to issue passports. (9) Henceforth, pages numbers will not be given for each of the citations from the “minutes,” but basically they follow the text of Ritter, 609–654. See note (5). (10) Ritter, 84. (11) MacDonald visited Italy from late May to early June ahead of this conference as representative of the “action committee.” His aim was to secure the return to the Second International of the Italian Socialist Party which had not sent delegates to the Berne Conference or to the Amsterdam Conference. Given that sentiments within the Italian party were strong enough to call for an international general strike, as mentioned earlier, and that British Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress on their part opposed such a politically-motivated strike, his attempt at persuasion failed. Ritter, 80f. Cf. Mayer, Peacemaking, 856–859. For MacDonald’s own report, Ritter, 865–867. Italian Socialist Party organ Avanti, 1919. See also a news report dated May 30th, LPA, LSI, 3/271/2 (English transl.). One of the two Italian delegates at the Lucerne Conference was Giuseppe Canepa, a politician who founded the Reformist Socialist Party in 1912 together with Bissolati and others who were expelled from the Socialist Party. About the other delegate, as well as the Italian who attended the Amsterdam Conference, only their names are known, but it is safe to conclude that they were not representatives of the Italian Socialist Party. “ (12) Union of Democratic Control” was an organization formed by MacDonald, colonialism critic Morel (see Nishikawa, “Daini Intānashonaru to shokuminchi mondai”) and others, who were critical of Britain’s participation in the war, with the aim of placing foreign policy under Parliament’s control. Paul Laity, The British Peace Movement, 1870–1914 (Oxford, 2001), 226–234; J.M. Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War: Ideas and Politics in Britain, 1912–1918 (London, 1974), 236f.; V.H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy. 1914–1918 (Oxford, 1971), 96f. (13) See this work, 91. (14) As stated earlier in the main text, the British Labour Party played a major role in the preparation stage of this conference. There is no doubt that the basis for discussion in the first subcommittee was the report by the British delegate. In the joint resolution, most of the text thereof remained intact. For the report, Ritter, 884–891. (15) Huysman’s explanation, “Minutes,” Ritter, 619. The completemake-up of the subcommittees is not known, but for a partial make-up see Ritter, 618, Anm. 25. (16) In the English-language version of the minutes, both resolutions are included in the discussions of the day. LPA, LSI, 8/2, xxixff., xxxiff. The resolutions are compiled separately from the minutes, Ritter apparently having decided that it would be

268

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 105–109 more comprehensible that way. Ritter, 655–665. His source is Bulletin der Zweiten Internationale, No. 3 (September, 1919), which is to say the German-language version. There is no significant difference from the English-language version. Also, one of the French-language resolutions, which is essentially the same as the others, is in the possession of the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. IISG, INT, 31. However, what should be the first subcommittee is given as the “second” subcommittee. (17) It was probably proposed hastily by Longuet or someone around him, who could not (would not) go to Southport. The signatories of the “Resolution of the French Socialist Party (majority faction) and Germany’s SPD (Independent faction),” which was that proposal without doubt, were Cachin, Frossard, Longuet, Mistral and Renoult (France) and Hilferding, Crispien and Cohn (Germany). IISG, INT, 31. (18) To counter the USPD’s “biased explanation” regarding the formation of the cabinet in Germany after November 9th, 1918, the SPD distributed among delegates at the Lucerne Conference a document in the names of Wels and Molkenbuhr, the party leadership, comprising letters of correspondence between the two parties. The document concluded that “what the letters of correspondence show is that the USPD had abandoned back on November 9th, 1918, its foundation named democracy, and has since been working toward a government modeled after the Russian Bolsheviks’ Soviet government.” “Briefwechsel zwischen den Partei-vorständen…,” IISG, INT, 31. Incidentally, the turn of phrase “forgotten everything … learned nothing” is reminiscent of the words “did not forget anything … did not learn anything” of Talleyrand on the émigré issue during the period of the French Revolution. (19) For Bernstein, the most important task was reunification of the SPD. Cf. Francis Ludwig Carsten, Eduard Bernstein 1850–1932. Eine politische Biographie (München, 1993), 172ff. On Engel’s recollections of Bakunin, Nishikawa, “Daini Intānashonaru,” Iwanamikōza sekairekishi, 463–464. (20) Troelstra was the one whose “handshake of friendship” elicited an immediate response from Rosa Luxemburg, who cried tears of anger and desperation when World War I broke out. See p.20 onwards of this work. For his views around the time of the Lucerne Conference, Politische Aufgaben der Sozialistischen Internationale (Luzern, 1919); “Suggestions for a Political System of Social Democracy”, LPA, LSI, 9/14/9. (21) See Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 146, Part I, Chapt. VII, note (19) of this work, 263. Cf. Österreich im Jahre 1918, 93. (22) See earlier Note (12); Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 46–53. (23) On why MacDonald, who had opposed war and who had sympathized with the Russian Revolution, became critical of the Bolsheviks, see Marquand, MacDonald, 256–259. (24) Several points remain unclear or imprecise regarding the outcome of this vote. As Ritter compares various records on this, see Ritter, 652, Anm. 161, 162. It is curious that Germany’s SPD agreed to both proposals, but Ritter’s explanation is that it de-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

269

Notes to pages 109–112 cided to support the minority’s resolution as well, after a sentence expressing opposition to whatever form of coalition with bourgeois political parties was deleted from its text (op. cit. p. 85). However, the minority proposal attached to the result of the vote includes a clause that the International’s immutable principle is that it is founded on a “class struggle that moves forward without compromising with bourgeois political parties.” Why did the Belgian delegates, both major figures no less, not take part in the vote even though they had spoken at the conference? One can only imagine that they had perhaps gone home for some reason. (25) Those active in the March 1 Movement seeking national independence of Korean people disseminated their conviction widely around the world. The Lucerne Conference received letters including one from “K. Lee, S.M. Tjosouwang, Representatives of the Korean Socilalists’ Group.” IISG, Archief Troelstra, 466. It is believed Tjosouwang refers to Cho So-ang (pro-independence activist, 1887–1958?). (26) Georgia, famous for her native son Stalin, came under the control of the Mensheviks at the time of the 1917 Revolution. Partly for that reason, the “people’s rights issue” of this land became a drawn-out affair. In the fall of 1920, a “second” delegation (MacDonald, Vandervelde, Huysmans, Renaudel and Kautsky and his wife) undertook a two-week study tour. Cf. L’Internationale Socialiste et la Géorgie (Paris: Édition du Comité central du Parti ouvrier social-démocrate de Géorgie, 1921). On Georgia with regard to the Russian Revolution, a handy reference is Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, I, 341–350. A hint is found in, Hideaki Kimura, Roshiya gendaishi to Chūōajia [Contemporary Russian History and Central Asia], (Yūshindō, 1999), 210. Also, Jeremy Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917– 1923 (London, 1999), Chapt. 7, “The Georgian Crisis and the Formation of the Soviet Union.” Brovkin’s study which, having analyzed the clashes between various political, social and national groups during the period of turmoil, argues that the Bolsheviks’ “victory” was not backed by a majority of Russian inhabitants, is noteworthy. Vladimir N. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918–1922 (Princeton, 1994), 405–409. (27) Though it cannot be ascertained whether he spoke on behalf of the SR delegation, Sukhomlin stated that he was abstaining on the issue of the peoples. Cf. Ritter, 652, Anm. 162. Incidentally, the word “race” appears frequently in the English-language version of the minutes, but assuming that this followed the usage of speakers whose native languages were not English, it is understood as referring to “nationality.” (28) In 1911 Italian forces invaded the Ottoman Turk territory of Tripolitania (today’s Libya) and secured it as a colony in the First Treaty of Lausanne signed the following year (War of Tripoli, or the Italo-Turkish War). On the same day, the first Balkan War broke out. It was during this period that members of the Second International began to share a sense of crisis about an impending war. See Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 4. Kapitel “Der Balkan-Libyen”.

270

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 112–116 (29) Cf. Nishikawa, “Daini Intānashonaru to shokuminchimondai”. (30) A text similar to this wording at the London Congress is found in a report by the “economy and industry subcommittee.” International Socialist Workers and Trade Union Congress. London, 1896. Report of Proceedings … (London, n.d.), 48f. (31) On the new by-laws, there had already been some debate over a proposal by Henderson at the Amsterdam Conference. Thereafter, the “action committee” and others worked on a draft which was subsequently introduced at the Lucerne Conference as a proposal of the second subcommittee. Bulletin der Zweiten Internationale, No. 2, 5f. Cf. Ritter, Einleitung, 75, 84. Huysmans sent a letter to Henderson dated June 14th from the Amsterdam Bureau. He wrote: “I had forgotten in Paris (where a meeting of the ‘action committee’ took place in mid-May as mentioned in the previous chapter) to set up an ad hoc committee for drafting a report on ‘the political system of socialism and labor’ according to Troelstra’s proposal approved in Amsterdam (at the conference).” He went on to propose that MacDonald, Webb, Vandervelde, Kautsky, Hilferding, Bauer, Tsereteli, Troelstra and someone from France take part. No further detail has been found. But “I had forgotten” indicates how busy Huysmans must have been, and the names he proposed show he felt more sympathy with the “leftists.” LPA, LSI, 3/282. (32) Cf. Nishikawa, “Socialism, Nations, Representation.” In the rules agreed to in 1907, some 240 votes were distributed proportionally among 25 nations. (33) Ritter, 653f., 675–679. (34) Ritter, 681. (35) “Congrès de Genève, Commission de la Presse, Circulaire No.1 (1919.9.1),”IISG, INT, 32. (36) Ritter, 597, 622. (37) In Huysman’s circular dated July 1st cited in note (3), it is stated that the “action committee” will “move the Bureau to Brussels for the time being as soon as military censorship is abolished,” in the sense of it returning from Amsterdam. There is no record that the move was proposed at the Lucerne Conference, but it is believed it took place immediately thereafter. (38) “Congrès de Genève, Commission des Responsibilités, Circulaire No. 2 (1919.9.20),” IISG, INT, 32. The “circulars” were published up to issue No. 16 (1920.III.16). It was not possible to see all of them, but a summary is carried in the following report from the secretariat. “Bericht des Internationalen Sekretariats an den Genfer Internationalen Kongress am 31. Juli 1920,” 3–14, IISG, Archief Troelstra, 479/1. Also, ISB, Rundschreiben, No. 11 (1920. I/5), No. 13 (II.28), ABA, SD-Arkiv, 640/2. (39) Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin; The Hungarian Revolution of 1918–1919 and the Big Three (New York, 1976); Ferenz Pölöskei, Hungary after Two Revolutions (1919–1922) (Budapest, 1980); Farkas József (Hg.), Räterepublik und Kultur. Ungarn 1919 (Budapest, 1979); Kumiko Haba, Hangarī kakumeishi kenkyū [A Study of History of Hungarian Revolutions] (Keisō shobō, 1989), Parts III and IV. (40) Ritter, 668f.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

271

Notes to pages 116–118 (41) E. Snowden to Henderson, LPA, LSI, 3/312; Huysmans to Henderson (1919.IX.26), LPA, LSI, 3/320, to Branting (1919.IX.26), AA, Hjalmar Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling, 9. (42) On the moves by various nations, Julius Braunthal, Geschichte der Internationale, Bd. II (Hannover, 1963), 199–248, “Der Prozess der Spaltung” presents an overview. However, there is no mention of the Swiss Social-democratic Party in this chapter or anywhere else for some reason. (43) Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ausserordentlichen Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei der Schweiz vom 16. und 17. August 1919 in der Burgvogteilhall in Basel (Basel, 1919), 153; Voigt, Grimm, 204–206. Cf. Robert Grimm, Revolution und Massenaktion (Bern, 1919). Incidentally, Grimm did not attend this party congress as he was in prison. (44) Wheeler, USPD, 104f. The author’s account of the Independent (Unabhängige) Social-democratic Party of Germany’s (USPD) activities about that time is based on this work, 162–188, as well as on Krause, USPD, 148–172. (45) “Die revolutionarän Arbeiter der U.S.P. gegen den rechten Flügel!”[1919], Nachlass Wheeler (Hoover Institution), microfilm, Reel 17. (46) On developments in 1917, see Chapt. V, Part I of this work. Parti Socialiste (S.F.L.O.) 17e Congrès national, tenu à Strasbourg, les 25, 26, 27, 28 et 29 Février 1920. Compte rendu sténographique (Paris, s.d.), 559. (47) ILP, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Conference, Glasgow, April 1920 (London, 1920),67, 86. Cf. Robert E. Dowse, Left in the Centre: The Independent Labour Party, 1893–1940 (Evanston, Ill., 1966), 49–59. (48) Resconto stenografico del XVI Congresso Nazionale del Partito Socialista Italiano, Bologna 5–6–7–8 ottobre 1919 (Roma, 1920), 384. Cf. Gaetamo Arfé, Storia del socialismo italiano (1892–1926) (Torino, 1965), 247–286. G.D.H.Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. IV, 2 pts. (London, 1969), Chapt. XI, “Italy to the Fascist Victory,”373f. cites numbers of votes obtained by three groups at the Bologna congress (not sourced), but they seem to be completely off the mark. (49) “Generalstreik,” Berner Tagwacht, 1919. VIII. 2–5. (50) Cf. Silverio Corvisieri (a cura di), Il biennio rosso 1919–1920 della Terza Internazionale (Milano, 1970). (51) Yoshikazu Inumaru, Daiichiji kyōsantōshi no kenkyū [A Study of First Stage History of the Communist Party] (Aoki shoten, 1993), 84, 173. In Japan, while historical materials have been published and studies have been undertaken on the early socialist movement, the same cannot be said of the post-World War I period. Of this period, historical materials are yet to be revealed and research according to methods of historical study yet to be undertaken. On the early socialist movement, see Nishikawa, Shoki shakaishugiundō to bankokushakaitō.

272

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 119–122

(Part II: III Geneva) (1) Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs. Abgehalten in Wien vom 31. Oktober bis zum 3. November 1919 (Wien, 1920), 265–271. The final resolution in 129f, adoption on 274. As mentioned earlier, the party changed its name from Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in Österreich (German Social-democratic Party in Austria) to Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs (German-Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party). When the party was founded in 1888, its name had been Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs (Austrian Social-democratic Workers Party). The name changes reflect ethnic issues within the Hapsburg Empire as well as re-drawn national borders after the collapse of the Empire. On the conditions under which the Czechs came to form a separate organization, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 56–57. (2) “Rundschreiben,” Nr. 10 (Brüssel, 1920, I,.3.), ABA, SD-Arkiv, 640/2. (3) On the Resolution on Korean independence at the Lucerne Conference, see Part II Chapter II of this work. (4) “Réunion du Comité d’action international à Rotterdam le 23 mars 1920,” AA, Hjalmar Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling, suppl. 2. As a record of that conference, there is also “Sitzung des Internationalen Aktionskomitees in Rotterdam am 23. März 1920,” IISG, INT, 28. The former is Huysmans report, while the writer of the much-shorter latter version remains unknown. There are some discrepancies between the two. (5) “Rundschreiben,” Nr. 12 (Brüssel, 1920. II. 20), ABA, SD, 640/2. (6) “Einladung zum Internationalen Sozialistischen Kongress zu Genf,” ABA, SD, 640/2. (7) Ferdinand Skaret/Friedrich Adler, Für den Parteivorstand der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs, “An das Internationale sozialistische Büro Brüssel” (Wien, 6. Mai 1920), IISG, INT, 32. Huysman’s reply is carried in the Secretariat’s following report (together with the Austrian party’s letter). “Berichts des Internationalen Sekretariats an den Genfer Internationalen Kongress am 31. Juli 1920 (Brüssel, 1920. VII. 20)”, 25–27, IISG, Archief Troelstra, 479/1. (8) Needless to say, the Swiss Social-democratic Party did not take part. On Grütli Society, see Note (6) under Part I, Chapt. VII of this work. On diplomatic activities by the Swiss government during the period, see Hans Beat Kunz, Weltrevolution und Völkerbund. Die schweizerische Aussenpolitik unter dem Eindruck der bolschewistischen Bedrohung 1918–1923 (Bern, 1981). (9) Bericht vom Zehnten Internationalen Sozialistenkongress in Genf, 31. Juli bis 5. August 1920 (Brüssel, 1921), 7–9, 56f. As a record of the list of delegates, there is also “Liste des délégués au Congrès de Genève,” LPA, LSI, 9/4/5. It has some discrepancies with the official minutes, but the author followed the latter. The minutes are also available in English and French versions. On these, see Ritter, 88f. The French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Français) here separated from the French

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

273

Notes to pages 123–126 Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Français (S.F.I.O.) in November, 1919. Its key figures were those who comprised the rightist faction of the French socialist movement since the 1890s. Der Zweite Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale. Protokoll der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Petrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August 1920 in Moskau (Hamburg, 1921. Nachdruck; Erlangen, 1972), 780–788. (10) Bericht, Genf, 1920, 3–6; Henderson to Huysmans (1920.VII.26), LPA, LSI, 9/2/13. Henderson, while apologizing for not being able to go to Geneva for health reasons, wrote that only “by-laws free of all prohibitions and exclusions” would make unification of the International possible. He urged Huysman’s to stay on as his resignation would be interpreted as the death of the International, and declared that it would most certainly be impossible for the British movement to accept the responsibility for the bureau by an act of the Geneva Congress from which major national branches (referring to Switzerland, Italy, Austria. France and others) were absent. It is unclear whether this letter reached Huysmans before the opening day of the Congress. It appears Huysmans did not depart for Geneva until the 28th as he had some work to finish in Brussels. Huysmans to Gillies (1920. VII. 21), LPA, LSI,9/2/11. On the activities of Huysmans and the secretariat, the Bureau’s report is more detailed the minutes of the Congress, and includes related documents. (11) Bericht, Genf, 1920, 10f. Sigel’s account seems to indicate that a French delegate also spoke. Sigel, Geschichte, 33. (12) La Question des Responsabilités. Mémoire du Comité Directeur du Parti Socialiste Allemande présenté au Congrès Socialiste International de Genève (n.p., n.d.). “The outbreak of the German revolution was five years too late…etc” on p. 5. (13) La Suisse, 1920. VIII. 4. (14) Bericht, Genf, 1920, 15–19. There is also a memorandum by the British Labour Party. It is a lengthy document giving mainly an overview of the party’s activities concerning war and peace between 1914 and 1919. “International Labour and Socialist Congress, Geneva, 31st July, 1920: War Responsiblities. Report … Prepared by the Secretariat of the British Delegation,” IISG, INT, 32–3. (15) The League of Nations’ Bylaw Article 12 stipulated that if a dispute occurs, the parties should seek arbitration by the League of Nations, and should not resort to war before 3 months have elapsed after that ruling. This was apparently interpreted as a recognition of the “right to wage war.” (16) “Conférence des répresentants des partis ouvriers et socialistes des pays alliés, Londres, 14 février 1915.” (17) Bericht, Genf, 1920, 11–15, 19–22. (18) Ibid., 22f. (19) Ibid., 25–32. (20) See this work, 223–224. (21) E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923, Vol. 2 (London, 1952), 96–100, 131–146.

274

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 127–131 (22) Die Regierung der Volksbeaufbetragten 1918/19, bearb. v. Susanne Miller (Düsseldorf, 1969), 104; Susanne Miller, Die Bürde der Macht. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie 1918–1920 (Düsseldorf, 1978), 141–163, 360–363. Miller aptly points to the fact that around 1918–19, “socialism” and “socialization” tended to be equated, and cites a document by Kautsky as a notable example of the contradiction that arose as a result. Demokratie oder Diktatur (Berlin, 1918), 7f. The Communist Party of Germany was extremely critical of the “socialization committee.” See, for example, Die Rote Fahne, 1919. II. 25, in: Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED, VII/1 (Berlin-O, 1966), 28–31. Eitarō Hattori, Doitsu shakaiseisakuron shi, I [History of German Social Policy Discussions (Part I)], Collected Works 1 (Miraisha, 1967) looks back at the arguments put forth by the SPD during the 1920s as “a process in the collapse of the socialdemocratic social policy discussions.” See Hiromi Arisawa, Infurēshon to shakaika [Inflation and Socialization] (Nihon hyōronsha, 1948), 125–173; Masafumi Matsuba, Kinyūshihon to shakaika – Waimaru shoki doitsu kinyūshihon bunseki [Financial Capital and Socialization – Analysis of Financial Capital in Early Weimar Germany] (Yūhikaku, 1984), 73–92. On several materials concerning the “socialization committee,” see Gerhard A. Ritter/Susanne Miller (Hg.), Die deutsche Revolution 1918–1919. Dokumente (2. Aufl. Hamburg, 1975), 258–276. (23) A summary of a work by Sidney Webb / Beatrice Webb (A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain [London, 1920]), which they prepared themselves, was apparently distributed among the delegates at the Geneva Congress. The gist of it is in “‘Socialisation’ & ‘The Political System of Socialism,’”LPA, LSI, 9/14/11. See Takao Matsumura, Igirisu no shakaiminshushugi [Britain’s Social Democracy] in: Nishikawa et al., Mōhitotsu no sentakushi – shakaiminshushugi no kujū no rekishi [The Other Option – The Bitter History of Social Democracy] (Heibonsha, 1995), 252–271. On Kautsky and his socialization concept, see Gary P. Steenson, Karl Kautsky, 1853–1938: Marxism in the Classical Years (Pittsburgh, 1978), 220–228. (24) Bericht, Genf, 1920, 25–32. (25) Ibid., 36–43. (26) Miller, Bürde der Macht, 395–402; Hans Mommsen, “Die Bergarbeiterbewegung an der Ruhr 1918–1933,” in: Jürgen Reulecke (Hg.), Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr (Wuppertal, 1974), 296–314. Cf. E. Könnemann/G. Schulze (Hg.), Der KappLüttwitz-Ludendorff-Putsch. Dokumente (München, 2002), Dok. Nr. 97. There is also an interesting account of personal experiences as a middle-school student during the Putsch by a man who had always harbored a deep distaste for Hitler while feeling no sympathy for the left-wing either, and who later went into exile in Britain where he did some excellent work as a journalist. He could smell the odor of Nazism. Sebastian Haffner, Geschichte eines Deutschen (Stuttgart, 2000), 42–47. (27) In his manuscript published in 1899, which was widely condemned as “revisionism,” Bernstein stated that “democracy is…something more than a political means

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

275

Notes to pages 131–134 that is useful as far as it is evident for the working class… being a means and an objective at the same time.” Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (1899, 2. Aufl., Stuttgart, 1921, Nachdruck; Hannover, 1964), 178. CF. “Einleitung” zu: Till Schelz-Brandenburg (Hg.), Eduard Bernsteins Briefwechsel mit Karl Kautsky (1895–1905) (Frankfurt/New York, 2003), xvf. (28) Bericht. Genf, 1920, 44–46.

(Part II: IV Vienna) (1) Wels an ISB (1920. VIII. 27), Huysmans an Stauning (1920. X. 25), ABA, SD, 640/2. (2) Huysmans, “Werter Genosse!,” Brüssel, 7. Dezember 1920, IISG, INT,28. Cf. Huysmans to Branting (1920, XII. 11), ABA, SD, 640/2. (3) On the Labour Party’s involvement with the International, the party’s internal situation and Gillies’ role, the following work gives an overview of the period from1918 to 33. Christine Collette, The International Faith: The Labour’s Attitudes to European Socialism, 1918–1939 (Aldershot, 1998), 46–74. (4) “Letter addressed to the Socialist and Communist Parties of the World,” LPA, LSI, 10/3/3. Ritter refers to a list of 89 people to whom the letter from MacDonald and others (which Ritter calls a manifesto) was addressed and sent to. Ritter, 91, Anm. 544. But there is doubt about the list and the letter’s actual recipients. That is because replies to the letter include those from people not on the list (such as Tommaso). The hand-written list is headed “individuals to whom the manifesto was sent.” Regardless of what the “manifesto” may refer to, it is noteworthy that the list names only individuals and no party organizations. Perhaps the list should be considered an attachment to another “personal” letter from MacDonald (LPA, LSI, 10/3/9) described under note (11). The “manifesto” was published. LP, Report of the Twenty-First Annual Conference Held in … Brighton, on June 21st…1921 (London, n.d.), 4–8. (5) Protokoll der Internationalen Sozialistischen Konferenz in Wien vom 22. bis 27. Februar 1921 ([Wien], 1921), 7f. (6) LPA, LSI, 10/5/4. This letter says only “January 4th, Berlin” without giving the year. But in a letter sent by Axelrod dated “December 6th 1921 [sic], Zurich” and received by Henderson on January 13th 1921, Axelrod said since his party had withdrawn from the “Second” and had stopped serving as its international representative one year ago, he had relayed the letter to Martov who was the representative. On this basis, the year is assumed to be 1921.LPA, LSI, 10/5/3. On Martov, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 104–105. (7) LPA, LSI, 10/5/8, 10, 15. On Dashnaktsutiun, see Masao Nishikawa, “Socialism, Nations, Representation,” Chapt. II, 23f. On Antonio de Tommaso, cf. Richard J. Walter, The Socialist Party of Argentina, 1890–1980 (Austin, 1977), 62, 176–178.

276

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 136–138 The reply from the Latvian Social-democratic Workers Party was similar in tone. LPA, LSI, 10/5/22. (8) LPA, LSI, 10/5/18, 6, 12. (9) In a letter addressed to “all proletarian organizations” (April, 1921) regarding its 3rd Congress, the Comintern dismissed the “Second” as an “openly treacherous” existence. Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 1, Material 77. On the establishment of the Swedish Social-democratic Leftist Party, see Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. IV, 520. On the Austrian Communist Party, Hautmann, Die Anfänge der linksradikalen Bewegung; Charles A. Gulick, Austria: From Hapsburg to Hitler (Berkeley, 1948), 69–83. On the British Communist Party, James Klugmann, The History of the Communist Party of Great Britain: Formative and Early Years, 1919–1924 (London, 1987); Neil Redfern, Class or Nation: Communists, Imperialism and Two World Wars (London, 2005), Chapt. 2, “Breaking with the Past? The Birth of British Bolshevism 1917–1922.” (10) Prot., Int. Soz. Konf., Wien, 1921, 6. (11) LPA, LSI, 103/9. The addressee is left blank, and undated [December 20th?]. That this was “a little while earlier” before the letter dated December 30th is based on the episode that the latter was to be published within several days. This point is supported by Adler’s open letter to be introduced presently. As for the addressees, one could well imagine them to have been the list of names referred to in Note (4), but this is far from definite. (12) “Was trennt uns von der Zweiten Internationale?” Der Kampf, 1921, 14(2/3): 41– 44; Freiheit (Berlin), 1921. III. 2. The English translation by the British Labour Party (LPA, LSI, 10/6/3) is accompanied by a note “Freiheit, 25. 2. 21”, but the facts remain unclear. Ritter, while dating this letter by Adler as February 25th, cites as its source the March 2nd issue of Freiheit. Such minor misconceptions aside, by far the greater mistake is the inclusion of Adler’s open letter among the replies to to MacDonald’s letter of December 30th. Ritter, 92, Anm. 545. The reply from the Czechoslovak Republic’s German Social-democratic Workers Party, which reached MacDonald only in March, expressed complete agreement with Adler’s views. LPA, LSI, 10/5/20. This is also given as a reply to “the letter of December 20th.” (13) On Noske, see p. 130 of this work’s previous chapter. (14) People like Koritschoner, who eventually went on to found the Austrian Communist Party, asked Adler to take on the role of their leader. Also sharing that hope was Christian Rakowski, the Bolshevik regime’s ambassador to Vienna. (A Rumanian socialist. On his activities in pre-war years, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 49 etc.) But Adler declined. This was to bear a decisive significance in the Austrian socialist movement thereafter. Braunthal, Victor and Friedrich Adler, 280f.; Hautmann, Die Anfänge der linksradikalen Bewegung; 42f. Cf. Peter Kulemann, Am Beispiel des Austromarxismus (Hamburg, 1982), 272–294. (15) “Parliament and Democracy.” Ramsay MacDonald’s Political Writings, ed. By Bernard Barker (London, 1972), 221–235. Cf. Marquand, MacDonald, 256–259.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

277

Notes to pages 138–140 The decision on his position went against the majority view of the Independent Labour Party, to which he also belonged, that the party should keep distance from the “Second”. Cf. Dowse, Left in the Centre, 51. (16) Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 1, Material 39, 216. (17) The phenomen observed in this work as the socialist parties of various countries “moving away from the Second” is discussed from the standpoint of “approaching the Third” in the following study. Albert S. Lindermann, The ‘Red Years’: European Socialism vs. Communism, 1919–1921 (Berkeley, 1974), Chapt. V, “Paths to Moscow.” (18) Prot., 2. Kongress, Kom. Int., 1920, 310–320. In his Memoirs, Dittmann, one of the Independent SDP delegates, gives a both detailed and interesting account of Crispien’s response among other things. The account of the meeting with Lenin notes that Lenin was quite uninformed about the situation in Germany. Dittmann, Erinnerungen, II, 718–805 (Lenin, 737, Crispien, 746f.). On the split-up of the USPD, see Wheeler, USPD, 226–258, which even studies the intentions of individual rank-and-file party members. Also, Krause, USPD, 196–215. As an account by a contemporary, Friedrich Stampfer, Der vierzehn Jahre der ersten deutschen Republik (Karlsbad, 1936), 195–201. On the union with the Communist Party of Germany, Cf. Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Vereinigungsparteitages der U.S.P.D. (Linke) und der KPD (Spartakusbund) vom 4. bis 7. Dezember 1920 in Berlin (Berlin, 1921. Nachdruck; Erlangen, 1973). The results of elections thereafter did not necessarily indicate that the minority was doing badly. See Wheeler’s detailed analysis. See Tōru Yamada, Vaimaru kyōwakoku shoki no doitsu kyōsantō [The Communist Party of Germany during Early Days of the Weimar Republic] (Ochanomizu Shobō, 1997). (19) Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ausserordentlichen Parteitages vom 10. bis 12. Dezember 1920 im Volkshaus in Berne (Zürich, 1921), 24–50, 162; Voigt, Grimm, 209–211. It was also decided that communists who would eventually join the Swiss Communist party (established in March 1921) be expelled from the Social-democratic Party. SPS, Protokoll, 1920, 5f., 234. (20) Parti Socialiste (S.F.I.O.), 18e Congrès, tenu à Tours. Les 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 & 30 décembre 1920. Compte rendu sténographique (Paris, 1921), 312f., 478, 563–595 (Résolutions). On Cachin and Frossard’s visit to Moscow, see Lazitch/Drachkovich, Lenin and the Comintern, I, 289–296. Pages 271 to 317 of this book are devoted to negotiations and other exchanges between Lenin and the “leftist factions” of West European socialist parties at the Second Congress of the Comintern. Cf. Annie Kriegel, Aux origines du communisme français 1914–1920 (Paris, 1964), 627–651; Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, IV, 476–478. On Blum who, having become one of the minority by taking a clearly anti-Bolshevik position at the Tours congress, went on to play a significant role later as prime minister of the Popular Front cabinet in 1936, see Gilbert Ziebra, Léon Blum; Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik, Bd. I (Berlin, 1963). On the context under discussion, pp. 200–214. See

278

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 140–142 Takashi Umihara, Furansu shakaitō shōshi [A Brief History of the French Socialist Party] (Shinsensha, 1979), pp. 41–48. (21) Prot., 2. Kongress, Kom. Int., 1920, 338–353; Resoconto stenografico del XVII Congresso Nazionale del Partito Socialista Italiano. Livorno 15–16–17–18–19– 20 Gennaio 1921 (Roma, 1921), 288; Ch. Arfé, Storia del socialismo italiano, 287– 297; Paolo Spriano, Storia del Partito comunista italiano, I (Torino,1967), 64–107; Luigi Cortesi, Le origini del PCI, II (Roma-Bari, 1977), 281–302. Yutaka Kōno, Itaria kyōsantōshi – fashizumu to kominterun no hazama de [History of the Italian Communist Party – Between Fascism and the Comintern](Shinhyōron, 1980), 15–28. In her memoirs, Balabanoff writes of her tremendous empathy with Serrati. Balabanoff, My Life, 262–266; idem., Erinnerungen, 256. About the same period in Moscow, incidentally, she met Emma Goldman, a fellow Russian native who was very active as an “anarchist” in the U.S., through introduction by John Reed. She then had Goldman meet Lenin. While sympathetic to the revolution in “mother Russia,” Goldman had found out that “anarchists” had been imprisoned in Russia, so she asked Lenin about it. His answer only confused her. Balabanoff, My Life, 253–257. Candace Falk, Love, Anarchy, and Emma Goldman: A Biography (New Brunswick, 1990), 185f. Goldman read with deep fascination Ten Days that Shook the World (1919), that brought almost instantaneous fame to its author Reed, while she was imprisoned in a Missouri state penitentiary. Robert A. Rosenstone, Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography of John Reed (New York, 1982), 350. (22) Gaetano Salvemini, The Origins of Fascism in Italy (New York, 1973), 265–295. Born in 1873, Salvemini did take part in the Great War as a member of the Italian Socialist Party, but was nevertheless expelled from his country by the Fascists and took up teaching in the US. The manuscript of this work was drafted in 1942. See Yukio Tominaga et al., Fashizumu to Kominterun [Fascism and the Comintern], (Tokyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1978), 16. (23) Prot., Int. Soz. Konf., Wien, 1921, 3f.; ILP. Report of the NAC to the Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference, Easter, 1921 … Southport (London, 1921), 5f.; Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ordentlichen Parteitages … 3. u. 4. September, 1921 … Luzern (St. Gallen, 1921), 15–29 (Grimm’s report); Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs … in Wien vom 5. bis zum 7. November 1920 (Wien, 1920), 110 (Adler’s proposal). (24) Arbeiter-Zeitung. Zentralorgan der Sozialdemokratie Deutschösterreichs, 1920. XII. 11; Prot., Int. Soz. Konf., Wien, 1921, 5f. (25) Ibid. It is of interest that “the capitalists’ world domination” is said to be at the hands of “Britain and America,” and particularly that “preferential positions are entrusted to French militarism on the European continent and to Japanese imperialism in East Asia.”

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

279

Notes to pages 142–144 (26) “Einladung zur Internationalen sozialistischen Konferenz in Wien…,” VGA, L9/M24. It is also recorded on pp. 8–9 of the minutes of the Vienna Congress. Incidentally, it is gathered that there had been a request to participate from the U.S., but the name of the organization was not recorded. In any case, its participation did not occur. (27) Arbeiter-Zeitung, 1921. II. 20. This venue, built in 1902, was the Austrian Socialdemocratic Party’s first multi-purpose hall. Cf. Die Arbeiter von Wien. Ein sozialdemokratischer Stadtführer, hrsg. v. Kurt Stimmer (Wien, 1988), 207f. (28) Prot., Int. Soz. Konf., Wien, 1921, 133–135. Világosság, the organization taking part from Hungary, was a group of exiles in Paris. The name, taken from their party organ, corresponds in meaning to the French word clarté (light). It might have been inspired by Henri Barbusse’s magazine Clarté. Cf. Béla M. Király, War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. I (New York, 1982; Digitized, 1997), 391ff. (29) Prot., Int. Soz. Konf., Wien, 1921, 10–12. One notable feature of these minutes is that, unlike the minutes at the other congresses of the International, the names of interpreters (all notable delegates in their own right) are given for all statements made on the floor. For descriptions of the congress, see also Arbeiter-Zeitung, 1921. II.22-III.1. On the fact that Adler cast himself in a positive context as a “centrist,” see Norbert Leser, Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus. Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis (Wien, 1968), 331. The commentary accompanying a reprint of these congress minutes (Bonn, 1978) seems unaware of this point. (30) Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 1, Material 67. The drift of the document Material 68 (after late March 1921) too may be gathered from its title, “The Second and a half ” Internationals as Assistants of Russian Counterrevolution.” At home the Austrian Communist Party also disparaged Adler, publishing a pamphlet with a sarcastic title, containing writings by Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev as well texts from the above-mentioned Material 67. Die Helden der Wiener Konferenz, hrsg. von der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs (Wien, 1921). Incidentally, the pejorative “Second and a half ” [Zweieinhalb] probably originated in this Comintern document. The term “centrist (Zentrum)” was first used in a positive sense in 1910 by Kautsky who believed himself, positioned between the leftist Rosa Luxemburg and the rightist Baden Party leadership, to be the rightful heir of Marxist thinking. But after the war broke out in August 1914, Lenin derided the “centrists” as “only lip service revolutionaries” to be wary of, even more than of outright rightists, and criticized them repeatedly. In the same vein, the Comintern was wary of the “centrists.” Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 44. (31) Prot., Int. Soz. Konf., Wien, 1921, 21. Kunfi Zsigmond was a socialist who served as a minister in Károly’s cabinet. According to one specialist, his “ominous warnings that Hungary could opt for a position in between Lenin and Wilson (i.e. abandoned by both) were borne out.” Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin (New York, 1976), 147. The prepared agenda for the conference listed (1) composition (who represents whom), (2) imperialism and class struggle, (3) method and

280

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 145–148 organisation of class struggle, and (4) international struggle against counterrevolution. (2) and (4) were were combined in the course of the conference and members were selected for the three subcommittees. Prot. Int. Soz. Konf., Wien, 1921, 14. (32) Ibid., 24–32. (33) Ibid., 34–64. (34) Ibid., 68f., 111–113. For a compilation of the resolutions, see Beschlüsse der Internationalen Sozialistischen Konferenz in Wien (Wien, 1921); Preamble, Rules and Resolutions agreed to at the Vienna Conference … (London; ILP, n.d.). (35) Nachrichten der Internationalen Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialistischer Parteien (Nachdruck; Glashütten i. T., 1973). (36) “Meeting of the Executive Committee held in the offices of the British Labour Party … London … on the 18th and 19th March 1921,” LPA, LSI, 11/1/6. (37) “Tagung des Exekutivkomités [sic] der 2. Internationale mit Vertretern der parlamentarischen Fraktionen am 30., 31. März u. 1. April 1921 in Amsterdam. Sitzungsprotokolle,” IISG, LSI, 2/13–65. Cf. “Meeting of the EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE held in the Parksicht [sic], Amsterdam, on Wednesday, 30th March, 1921…,” LPA, LSI, 11/1/11 (IISG, LSI, 2/7–11). On moves made by the three Internationals from about 1921 onward, chapters including and beyond Sigel, Geschichte, Kap. 5, “Erste Schritte zu einer Annäherung der Internationale” are useful as they cover historical materials in great detail. That said, his account of this Amsterdam Conference (p. 37) is inaccurate, possibly from not having seen the minutes. There are also errors elsewhere in source citations and interpretations of materials. Incidentally, the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), which carried the same name as an earlier international organization of labor unions that had existed since 1913, was set up in 1918 with its headquarters in Amsterdam, and was derided by the Comintern side as an “International of yellow labor unions.” Cf. Lewis L. Lorwin, Labor and Internationalism (New York, 1929), Chapters XVI–XX. As a counterweight to IFTU, the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern) was formed in July 1921. See Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 1, Material 83. (38) As the French Socialist Party had already withdrawn, the parliamentarian from that country was probably not a representative of that party. With regard to the names and number of participants, there are discrepancies between the Germanlanguage minutes mentioned in the preceding note and the English-language record (which is much shorter). (39) On the reparations issue, see Susumu Takahashi, Doitsu baishō mondai no shiteki tenkai [Historical Development of the German Reparations Issue] (Iwanami shoten, 1983), especially p. 11 onward. (40) Epstein, Erzberger, 396–398. On Rathenau, see Note (20), Pt. II, Chapt. VII, of this work. (41) The statement by the British Labour Party is in LP, Report of the Twenty-First Annual Conference, 1921, 233f. However, the words Wels referred to are not found therein.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

281

Notes to pages 148–152 (42) The expression Wiedergutmachung (compensation) came to be used frequently in connection with Germany’s “war responsibility” after World War II. It is interesting that the expression was already in use in the post-World War I period. On this word in the post-World War II context, see Nishikawa, Gendaishi no yomikata [Interpretation of Contemporary History], 268. (43) “Tagung des Exekutivkomités der 2. Internationale,” Anlage V. There is also the published pamphlet Die Zweite Internationale über den Wiederaufbau. Resolution (Berlin, 1921), as well as the English version of a circular “Reparations … (Please circulate. J. Ramsay MacDonald),” LPA, LSI, 10/11/1. (44)“Tagung des Exekutivkomités der 2. Internationale,” 38. (45) As pointed out earlier, “Second and a half ” was a pejorative used by the Comintern side, but it was apparently also used for convenience. The International Federation of Trade Unions’ (IFTU) letter (dated march 31st) to MacDonald, who was staying in Amsterdam, “Meeting of the EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,” 8. (46) “Tagung des Exekutivkomités der 2. Internationale,” 51–54. According to a decision of its Bureau’s conference in January 1921, the IFTU sent delegations to Upper Silesia, the Saar region, German-Austria and Northern France for field studies. Their report was published as a special edition of its organ. Die Internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung, Anhang III (Dezember 1921):Europäische Probleme … (Amsterdam, o.J.).

(Part II: V London) (1) Notices of the meeting went out by the end of May. For example, MacDonald to Branting (1921. V.31), AA, Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling 16. The record of the meeting is in “Meeting of the EC,” LPA, LSI, 11/1/16. (2) See pp. 148–149 of the previous chapter of this work. (3) LP, Report of the Twenty-First Annual Conference held in … Brighton, on June 21st … and 24th, 1921 (London, n.d.), 147f. (4) “The Reconstruction of the International and the Brighton Resolution. Correspondence with the National Labour and Socialist Parties,” LPA, LSI, 10/14/47, 48. Henderson to Adler (1921. VI. 28), 10/5/2. (5) Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., No.3 (Juli 1921), Nachdruck, 25–29. An exchange of letters with the Labour Party is also recorded there. (6) Adler, “An das Sekretriat der Labour Party” (1921.VII.14), LPA, LSI, 10/5/3. For the bylaws of the “Vienna Working Union,” see Prot.,Int. Soz. Konf., Wien, 1921, 113. (7) Henderson to Adler (1921.VII.29), LPA, LSI, 10/15/4; “Dear Comrade” (VIII.5), LPA, LSI, 10/14/47ii. (8) Adler to Henderson (1921.IX.12), LPA, LSI, 10/15/7; Henderson to Adler (IX.15). 10/15/8, (IX.30)10/15/11/2.

282

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 153–157 (9) “The Reconstruction of the International and the Brighton Resolution.3.The Replies of the Parties,” LPA, LSI, 10/14/48. The fact that Turkey had sent delegates to the “Vienna Working Union’s” inaugural congress is not recorded in the minutes of the congress. (10) The telegram is Münzenberg, “To the Socialist International”(1921. VIII. 16), ABA, SD, 641/1,IISG, LSI, 99/21. On Münzenberg, see his biography by a woman who was his lifelong partner and who had interesting relations with members of the Communist Party of Germany. Babette Gross, Willi Münzenberg (Stuttgart, 1967). (11) For the document of the IFTU, IISG, LSI, 99/10; MacDonald to “Comrade” (1921. VIII), 99/2. Many documents remain available, but for the sake of expediency, this work will list only the letters and telegrams translated into English and compiled by the British Labour Party. “Correspondence Dealing with Invitation from Munzenberg’s [sic] Committee…,” IISG, LSI, 99/76–80. Münzenberg an MacDonald (1921, VIII. 26), 99/35, (XI.5), 99/53–54. On the “external committee for organizing famine relief activities by workers,” see Rolf Surmann, Die Münzenberg-Legende. Zur Publizistik der revolutionären deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1921–1933 (Köln, 1983), 34–39; Gross, Münzenberg, 128–131. A biography based on new archival materials including his famine-related activities, which is critical of the Münzenberg imagery of earlier studies is Sean McMeekin, The Red Millionaire: A Political Biography of Willi Münzenberg, Mowscow’s Secret Propaganda Tsar in the West (New Haven, 2003). According to this work, Münzenberg’s famine relief activities were completely unsuccessful. On Hoover’s involvement with ARA and his view of the Russian Revolution, see Lawrence E. Gelfand (ed.), Herbert Hoover: The Great War and Its Aftermath, 1914– 1923 (Iowa City, 1979), 111–142. (12) “Conference at the Caxton Hall, London, October 19th and 20th, 1921 … Report of Proceedings,” LPA, LSI, 10/17/1/i-xii; Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., No. 5 (November 1921), Nachdruck, 49–53. (13) “Conference at the Caxton Hall … 1. Declaration of the Executive of the IWUSP, 2. The Reply of the British LP,” LPA, LSI, 10/15/12. Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Edinburgh, 1922 (London n.d.), 14–16. (14) A document delivered by the Labour Party “International Department” secretary William Gillies to the party executive committee as background material for this conference (LPA, LSI, 10/15/14) contains a statement dated August 4th by the executive committee of the “Third” carried in the August 22nd issue of the Communist Party of Germany organ Rote Fahne and translated into English. The statement corresponds to Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 2 (Ōtsuki shoten 1979),Material 2 (“For the unity of the world proletariat in opposition to the alliance of social traitors” dated August 1st). It ends with “Smash the Struggle Comedy of the Tricksters of the Second and the Second and a half Internationals!” (15) MacDonald to Branting (1921. X. 26), AA, Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling16; Bulletin of the International. Issued by the Labour and Socialist International, New

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

283

Notes to pages 157–159 Series, No. 2 (November, 1921), 1. This periodical began publication with issue No. 1 in July 1921, and ended with issue No. 3 dated June, 1922. (16) This is based on two sources. “Meeting of the Executive held in Brussels on the 22nd and 23rd November, 1921,” LPA, LSI, 11/1/21; “The Executive Committee of the Labour and Socialist International held at Brussel, on 22nd and 23rd November, 1921.” 11/1/22. The latter bears a pencilled-in message from Henderson to Gillies, asking him to return it. The former appears more like the final draft, but not conclusively. The minutes of the Labour Party Congress of 1922 also mentions the meeting, but again it is only a brief explanation and the text of the resolution. (17) Ibid. (Shaw’s statement), Cf. “Der französische Parteitag,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 1 (Jänner 1922), Nachdruck 62f. Sigel, Geschichte, 41. On the French Socialist Party Congress of 1921, there certainly does exist a “report” by its permanent administrative committee, but author’s conclusion on the “stenographic record” that Sigel claims as a source, after exhaustive research, is on the doubtful side as to its existence. Cf. Parti Socialiste (S.F.I.O.), XIXe Congrès national, 29, 30, 31 Octobre – 1er Novembre 1921 Paris. Rapports de la Commission administrative permanente … (Paris, 1921). (18) “Sitzung des Büros der I.A.S.P. in Frankfurt,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 1, Nachdruck, 61. It refers to the “Paris Socialist Party’s resolution of November 2nd” but this is probably mistaken. (19) Faure to Henderson (1921. XII. 22), IISG, LSI, 87/24–26; Vndervelde to MacDonald (XII.25), 87/38–41; Renaudel to MacDonald (XII.24), 87/28–29; EC/LP to Faure (XII.29), 87/42–43. (20) Lindström an das Internationale Bureau (1921. XII. 22), ABA, SD, 641/1; Lindström to the Labour Party (XII. 23), IISG, LSI, 87/27–28. From Lindström to the Danish Social Democratic League (XII.23), ABA, SD, 641/1; Wels an Stauning (XII. 21), ibid.; Wels an Branting (XII.21), AA, Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling 16; Wels to MacDonald (XII.21), IISG, LSI, 87/19. (21) Faure/Vandervelde to Henderson (1922.I.2), IISG, LSI, 88/2. (22) Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 2 (Februar 1922), Nachdruck, 65f.; Bureau of the IWUSP, “Labour Parties of All Countries,” 1922. I. 15. LPA, LSI, 11/3/6. Cf. Adler to the Executive of the Second International (1922. I. 19), IISG, LSI, 88/5–8. (23) See pp. 138–139 of this work. The Communist Party of Germany’s (KPD’s) proposal to the Comintern executive department was carried in the December 23rd, 1921 issue of its party organ Rote Fahne. Dokumente und Materialen, VII/I, Dok. 242. For Levi’s assertion, “Unser Weg. Wider den Putschismus” (April 1921), in: Paul Levi, Zwischen Spartakus und Sozialdemokratie, hrsg. v. Charlotte Beradt (Frankfurt am Main, 1969) 44–94. On their expulsion and the KPD’s “united front” policy line, see Arnold Reisberg, An den Quellen der Einheitsfrontpolitik: Der Kampf der KPD um die Aktionseinheit in Deutschland 1921–1922. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Hilfe W. I. Lenins und der Komintern für die KPD, 2 Bde. (Berlin-O, 1971), 76–81, 317–340; Charlotte Beradt, Paul Levi (Frankfurt am Main, 1969),

284

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 160–161 99ff.; Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–1923 (Princeton, 1963. Reissued; Port Washington, N.Y., 1972), 99– 103, 171–182. On Zetkin’s letter to Lenin and the circumstances surrounding it, Tânia Puschnerat, Clara Zetkin (Essen, 2003), 256–273. On Radek’s letter, Dietrich Möller, Karl Radek in Deutschland (Köln, 1976), 205f. On the dispute between Radek and Levi, Milorad M. Drachkovitch/Branko Lazitch (eds.), The Comintern: Historical Highlights (New York, 1966), Doc. No. 2. Not only was Zetkin a close colleague of Rosa Luxemburg’s, Levi also was also a figure considered a selfacknowledged successor of Luxemburg. Radek was also positioned closed to her, but was not trusted. Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 91, 123f. As mentioned in the main text, while Zetkin re-emerged as a key figure in the KPD and the “Third” Levi set up a separate organization, but subsequently re-joined the SPD and committed suicide in 1930. Radek was purged by Stalin in 1937. On the “Third’s” official viewpoint on the united front (1/1/1922), Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 2, Material 22. Incidentally Reisberg’s work, while being detailed in terms of historical materials, takes a viewpoint emphasizing the importance of the leadership of Lenin and the Comintern as can be seen from its subtitle. As a biography of Radek, Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford, 1970), which is while somewhat scant on the negotiations between the three Internationals, quite useful for understanding his personality. (24) The Treaty of Rapallo is considered a diplomatic victory in the annals of Soviet history, collections of materials having been published on the subject. DeutschSowjetische Beziehungen von den Verhandlungen in Brest-Litowsk bis zum Abschluss des Rapallovertrages, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, Bd. 2 (Berlin-O, 1971). For a more recent comprehensive study covering, among other things, the Genoa conference, see Carole Fink et al. (eds.), Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge, 1991). (25) Int. Dept. (LP) to Branting (1922.I.24), LPA, LSI, 11/3/14. (26) Shaw to Henderson (1922.I.26), LPA, LSI, 11/3/15; Huysmans to Gillies (1922.1.28), LPA, LSI, 1/3/19; Wels to Henderson (1922. I. 31), 11/3/20. (27) “On the International Policy. The International Congress (G.M. Serrati/C. Treves),”AA, Brantings Arkiv. Brevsamling, Suppl. 2. For views on fascism on the part of the Comintern or the Communist/Socialist parties, see Tominaga et al. Fashizumu to kominterun [Fascism and the Comintern], Chap. 10. (28) “Die Fünfländerkonferenz,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 3 (März 1922), Nachdruck, 71. (29) “An International Socialist Conference. Paris, 4th, 5th and 6th, February, 1922,” IISG, LSI, 23/37; Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 3 (März 1922), Nachdruck, 71f.; Reisberg, Einheitsfrontpolitik, 360f.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

285

Notes to pages 161–166 (30) The “Second” considered the imprisonment of the Mensheviks and S.R. party members as being against “humanity and justice,” reiterating the point in a statement on February 23rd 1922. “Russia,” IISG, LSI, 92/1. (31) “Meeting of the Executive of the Second International held in … Frankfurt, on … February the 23rd, 1922,” LPA, LSI, 11/4/1; “International Unity … A Report of the Discussions at Frankfurt,” 11/4/11; “Reply of the EC, LSI to the IWUSP” (Frankfurt, 26th February 1922), 11/4/9; “The Five Countries Conference, Frankfurt 25th, 26th and 27th February,1922. Report,”11/4/13; “The Resolutions,” 11/4/15. Similar documents were published at the time. Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 2, Nachdruck, 72–74; Bulletin of the International, New Series, No. 3 (June, 1922), 3; Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 17–19.

(Part II: VI Berlin) (1) Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 3, Nachdruck, 70; Reisberg, Einheitsfrontpolitik, 358f. (2) Adler to LSI (1922.III. 11), IISG, LSI, 25/1–3. Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 2, Material 44. Adler an das EKKI (1922. III. 18), IISG, LSI, 25/5–6. (3) “Delegates of the S.D.P. of Russia to the Central Committee of the I.U. of Soc. P.,” IISG, LSI, 25/7–9 (undated but certainly after the Paris Conference, signed by R. Abramovitch, F.I.Dan, L. Martov and others). Abramovitch to MacDonald (telegram, 1922.III.8), IISG, LSI, 93/1–2; The Ukraine Social Democratic Workers Party’s external organization to the “Second” and the “Vienna Working Union” Bureau (Prague, 1922.III.17), 93/22; La Délégation du Parti Socialiste Révolutionnaire à l’étranger à Vanderwelde (Berlin, 1922. IV.1), 93/30 (signed by Chernov, Souvarine and others). (4) Gorter an den Partei-Vorstand der SPD (1922.III.29), IISG, LSI, 25/28–29. CF. H. Gorter, “The Organisation of the Proletariat’s Class Struggle “ (1921), in: D.A. Smart (ed.), Pannekoek and Gorter’s Marxism (London, 1978), 149–173; Henriette Roland Holst, Herman Gorter (Amsterdam, 1933, Reprint: Nijmegen, 1975). Needless to say, this is a separate organization from the so-called “Fourth International” formed around Trotsky in 1938 to remain influential for a long time thereafter. For the record of the “Second’s” executive committee meeting on April 1st, IISG, LSI, 6/5, 6. (5) Protokoll der Internationalen Konferenz der drei internationalen Exekutivkomitees in Berlin vom 2. bis 5. April 1922 (Wien, 1922). (6) Ibid., 4–7. The “Vienna Working Union” too held an executive committee meeting in the USPD parliamentarians’ room in the Reichstag building in Berlin. Shortly before the meeting ended, a letter from the “Third’s” representatives (Zetkin and

286

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 166–171 Radek) addressed to Adler proposing to meet for preliminary consultations was delivered. Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 4 (Mai 1922) , Nachdruck, 77. (7) Ibid., 7–10. On the Brussels Conference of 1914, see Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 9. Kapitel (“Brüssel”). (8) Ibid., 11–15. The SR members made an appeal that if the Italian Socialist Party is permitted to attend for the reason that it did not belong to any of the Internationals, they should also be permitted to participate (Souvarine, dated April 1st). Also, a representative of its external committee (Berlin) sent a letter, probably immediately, to the conference delegates, rebutting Radek’s speech, particularly its part concerning the Ukraine. IISG, LSI, 25/30, 25/36–37. (9) Ibid., 15–16. For understanding of the overall picture of the trials of SR members more research would be required. On the early period, Lutz Häfner, Die Partei der Linken Sozialerevolutionäre in der russischen Revolution von 1917/18 (Köln, 1994), 620–622. On the SR up to the Russian Revolution, see Manfred Hildemeier, The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party before the First World War (New York, 2000); Michael Melancon, The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Anti-War Movement, 1914–1917 (Columbus, Ohio, 1990). In addition, Scott Smith, “The SocialistsRevolutionaries and the Dilemma of Civil War,” in: Vladimir N. Brovkin (ed.), The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and the Civil Wars (New Haven, 1997), 83–104. (10) Prot. d. drei Int. Exekutivkomitees, 17–20. On Petlura. See Kazuo Nakai, Sovieto minzokuseisaku shi – Ukuraina 1917–1945 [History of Soviet Ethnic Policies – the Ukraine 1917–1945] (Ochanomizu Shobō 1988), 106–115. As the man responsible for the pogroms conducted while he was in power in the Ukraine, he was assassinated in Paris by a Jew. Howard M. Sachar, Dreamland: Europeans and Jews in the Aftermath of the Great War (New York, 2003), 7–8. (11) The negotiations on the 3rd not only took the form of discussion, but the “Vienna Working Union” and the “Third” also exchanged documents expressing their views. Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 4, Nachdruck, 78. MacDonald’s words on the floor on the 4th reveal that the “Second” had also drafted a statement clarifying its position anew. (12) Prot. d. drei Int. Exekutivkomitees, 21–26. (13) Ibid., 26–30. Sir Roger Casement (1864–1916) gained international fame by exposing the cruelty of the exploitation that went on in the Congo where he had stayed as British consul. He later fell in with his native Ireland’s independence movement, and sought the possibility of German assistance following the outbreak of World War I. He was eventually arrested and executed for treason. The Italian delegate had already submitted his party’s position in writing. On general congress, it said no pre-conditions whatsoever should be attached. It raised in particular the following points for the common agenda. (1) International struggle against the risk of another war, (2) abolition of imperialistic peace treaties, (3) international action

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

287

Notes to pages 171–177 against reactionary forces, and (4) recognition of the Soviet Republic and assistance for its economic recovery. Ibid., 30f. (14) Ibid., 31–35. Cf. Otto Bauer, Bolschewismus oder Sozialdemokratie? (Wien, 3. Aufl., 1921). (15) Ibid., 44. There is no record of the specific names of the members of the “Committee of Nine”. (16) Ibid., 45. the “Second” had held its own conference several times in Berlin. For their record, IISG, LSI, 6/5–9. (17) Ibid., 50–52 (Anhang). (18) Ibid., 47–49.

(Part II: VII Interregnum) (1) Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 33, 330–334. Agosti’s assessment, the establishment of the “nine-member committee … truly owed itself to Radek’s remarkable flexibility.” Aldo Agosti, La Terza Intrnazionale, Storia documentaria, I: 1919 – 1923 (Roma, 1974), 498. See Japanese language edition, Kominterun shi [History of the Comintern], transl. by Kiyonori Ishidō (Gendai Kenkyūjo, 1986), pp. 145–146. (2) MacDonald to Comrades (1922. IV. 8), LPA, LSI, 11/5/8; Adler to MacDonald (1922. IV. 21), IISG, LSI, 88/20; Wels an MacDonald (1922. IV. 22), 88/27. At the Independent Labour Party annual congress held in mid-April, MacDonald dismissed a statement criticizing the “Second” by simply stating “the Vienna Working Union is a major obstacle to unification.” ILP, Report of the Annual Conference Held at Nottingham, April, 1922 (London, n.d.), 71. At the Labour Party annual congress, a report of the executive committee’s international section was submitted (see Chapter V, Note (13)), but there was apparently no discussion over it. (3) Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Outline History of the Communist International, 153. (4) Adler to MacDonald (1922. IV. 21), IISG, LSI, 88/20; Wels an MacDonald (IV. 22), IISG, LSI, 88/22; Wels an Radek (IV. 22), 88/26; MacDonald to Comrades (IV. 22), LPA, LSI, 11/8/1; MacDonald to Radek (IV. 28), IISG, LSI, 88/29; Adler to MacDonald (IV. 29), IISG, LSI, 88/30. (5) SDAP to MacDonald (1922. IV.29), IISG, LSI, 30/19–20; Stauning to MacDonald (1922. V. [after 14]), IISG, LSI, 88/81; Adler an die Mitglieder des Neunerorganisationskomitees (V. 4), IISG, LSI, 88/38–45; “Die Einberufung des Neuner-komitees,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 4, Nachdruck, 78–81. (6) Adler to members of the Committee of Nine (1922. V. 16), IISG, LSI, 32/2; “The Committee of the Second International met at the Gewerkschaftshaus. Cologne, on Saturday May the 20th,”ABA, SD, 641/3. The Parti Socialiste Français (PSF), which represented France at this conference, split off in 1919 as a separate party from the

288

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 177–181 Parti Socialiste Français (S.F.I.O.) which was a member of the “Vienna Working Union.” As such, the former was not recognized as an official French delegation at the Geneva Congress in 1920. Completely opposed to collaboration with the communists, the party’s members complained to MacDonald that before entering into any agreement with the “Third,” a conference of all member parties ought to be held including those not represented on the executive committees such as their party. PSF à MacDonald (1922. IV. 14), IISG, LSI, 30/5–7. Sigel writes that while most of the other parties were in favor of participation in the “Committee of Nine,” the PSF demanded that a conference of the delegates of all member parties of the “Second” be held, with Wels expressing support. But no such reference is found in Wels’ letter (April 22nd), which gives the impression that he had confused the PSF with the SFIO. Sigel, Geschichte, 59. (7) “Die Sitzung der Neunerkommission der drei Exekutiven (1922. V. 23), IISG, LSI, 34/1–34. Cf. Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 5 (Juni, 1922), Nachdruck, 86–91; Bulletin of the International, No. 3, 4–9. (8) The “Third’s” communiqué was carried in its organ International-Presscorrespondence (1922. V. 27). Its Japanese translation in Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 2, Material 49. (9) The subtitle (Revolutionary, Schemer and Diplomat) to the following biography on Radek is suggestive of his personality. Dietrich Möller, Karl Radek in Deutschland. Revolutionär, Intrigant, Diplomat (Köln, 1976). The expression “key figure behind the Treaty of Rapallo” is found in this work (p. 33). Gerald Freund, Unholy Alliance: RussianGerman Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Rapallo (London, 1957), 108–113. For one of the first studies to focus on the dovetailing of revolutionary Russia and the Russian State, see Yukio Tominaga, Dokusokankei no shitekibunseki 1917–1925 [Historical Analysis of German-Soviet Relations 1917– 1925], (Iwanami Shoten, 1979). (10) Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 2, Material 50. (11) MacDonald to Adler (1922. V. 30), IISG, LSI, 35/1–2; to Faure, 35/3; to Serrati, 35/4. (12) Adler to MacDonald (1922. VI. 2), IISG, LSI, 35/6; “Bürositzung der I.A.S.P. in Frankfurt a. M. am 15. Juni 1922,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 6 (Juli, 1922), Nachdruck. 93–95. (13) See the previous note (6). (14) Replies from various organizations to MacDonald are found mostly in IISG, LSI,35 and 88. For a record of the Britain-Belgium-France conference in Brussels, IISG, LSI, 31/1–10; Report of the 22nd Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 32–36; Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 6, Nachdruck. 95–96. Faure à MacDonald (1922. V. 9), IISG, LSI, 88/90; Henderson to Faure (VI. 8), 88/89; Faure à Henderson (VI. 9), 88/92–93. (15) “Meeting of the Executive of the Labour and Socialist International held in London on … the 7th of June 1922…,” IISG, LSI, 8/5–6; 39/1–2.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

289

Notes to pages 181–186 (16) MacDonald to Gosling (1922. VI. 20), IISG, LSI, 102/2–3; to Henderson (VI. 20), 102/4; to Wels (VI.20), 102/7; Wels an MacDonald (1922. VI. 28), 102/13. (17) IISG, LSI, 13/1–3. MacDonald expressed hope that his letter’s addressees would attend a meeting of the “Second’s” British section scheduled for July 10th in London. Probably, none of them did. (18) Fimmen to MacDonald (1922. VII. 10), IISG, LSI, 42/8. (19) The “Third” levelled many criticisms at IFTU. For an example from this period, see “Rōdō kumiai niokeru kyōsanshugisha no ninmu ni tsuite no ketsugi [The Resolution on the Duties of Communists in Labor Unions] (March 4th 1922), Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 2, Material 36. On “bona fide” etc., IFTU to MacDonald (1922. V. 16), IISG, LSI, 88/68. On “neutrality”, IFTU to MacDonald (1922. VI. 8), 35/13. On the relations between the “Second” and the IFTU, see Geert Van Goethem., The Amsterdam International: The World of the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), 1913–1945 (Aldershot, 2006). On the timing of the “Second’s” Geneva Conference in particular, see its Chapter 4. (20) As a study of the political background behind the assassination of Rathenau and the motives of its perpetrator, Martin Sabrow, Der Rathenaumord (München, 1994). On the reactions of labor unions and socialist parties, Angress, Stillborn Revolution, 240–243.; David W. Morgan, The Socialist Left and the German Revolution; A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party, 1917–1922 (Ithaca, 1975), 419–422; Krause, USPD, 248f.; Reisberg, Einheitsfrontpolitik, 493–507. For the joint statement by the pro-Republican factions, Dokumente und Materialien, VII/2, Dok. 280. For a memoir of a contemporary, an example is a work by Stampfer who was editor of the party organ “Vorwärts”, Die Vierzehn Jahre der ersten deutschen Republik, 261–271; Haffner, Geschichte eines Deutschen, 47–52. Haffner rates Rathenau highly as the only politician who could “appeal to the imagination of the masses and the youth” during the Weimar Republic era. (21) MacDonald to Fimmen (1922. VII. 10), IISG, LSI, 42/7; Wels an MacDonald (VII. 13), 42/19–20. “Verhandlungen von Amsterdam, 18. bis 20. Juli 1922,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 7 (August 1922), Nachdruck, 98–99. (22) Minutes, “Conference of the Bureau of the International Federation of Trade Unions and the Executives … Held at the ‘Concertgebouw’ Amsterdam, July 19th– 20th 1922,”IISG, LSI, 44/16–48. (23) Kraus, USPD, 248. On the Communist Party’s arguments, Reisburg, Einheitsfrontpolitik, 505f. (24) “To the Workers of the World,”IISG, LSI, 44/43–45; “An die Arbeiter der Welt,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 7, Nachdruck, 97f. (25) Ibid., 99. In the event, the Committee of Nine did not meet. Shaw to the members of the EC (1922. X. 13), IISG, LSI, 10/1. (26) “Die Sitzung der Kommission in Brüssel,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 7, Nachdruck, 100.

290

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 187–192 (27) On the S.R., as indicated in Note (9) of the previous chapter, there are studies for the period from the 1890s up to 1917, it was not possible to research materials for the period thereafter, including their persecution in the Soviet Union. See Steinberg, Spiridonova: Revolutionary Terrorist (London, 1935), Japanese edition, Sayoku esueru sentōshi Maria Supiriodōnova 1905–1935, transl. by Kazuhito Kusano and Midori Hisasaka (Rokusaisha, 1970). (28) Tominaga et al., Fashizumu to Kominterun, 1–19. (29) “Meeting of the Executive of the Labour and Socialist International held at Prague … on … the 12th of August 1922 …,” IISG, LSI, 9/27–30. MacDonald, “Dear Comrade” (1922. VIII.18), 102/50. (30) “Exekutivsitzung in Frankfurt am Main am 2. und 3. September, 1922,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 7, Nachdruck, 101–103. (31) Wheeler, USPD, 276–280; Morgan, Socialist Left, 419–438; Krause, USPD, 254– 263; Ratz, Georg Ledebour, 210–222. On the process by which people sympathetic to Ledebour and other leftists split from the SPD to form the German Socialist Workers Party (SAP) in 1931 when the fear of fascism was beginning to be felt, and on that party’s activities, Hanno Drechsler, Die Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (Meisenheim am Glan, 1965). See Tominaga et al., Fashizumu to Kominterun, 198. On the “Song of Germany,” Bernd Buchner, Um nationale und republikanische Identität. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Kampf um die politischen Symbole in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn, 2001), 133–138. (32) Henderson’s letter concerning the conference on September 25th, IISG, LSI, 14/2; “To the Members of the Second International” (Henderson), IISG, LSI, 14/3. (33) Oudegeest to the EC of the Second International (1922.IX.28), IISG, LSI, 46/1–2; Shaw to Vandervelde (X. 23), IISG, LSI, 89/7; Oudegeest to Shaw (XI. 13), 46/19; Shaw to the Secretaries of the Affiliated Organizations (XI. 23), 46/25. (34) Renaudel to Shaw (1922. XI.23), IISG, LSI, 89/4; Shaw to Renaudel (XI. 27), 89/15; Shaw to Adler (XI.22), 89/13; Adler to Shaw (XI. 28), 89/16. Protokoll des Parteitages 1922. Die Verhandlungen der sozaialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs. Abgehalten am 14. und 15. Oktober in Wien (Wien, 1922), 188–191. Crispien’s attendance on this occasion was what Wels and others of the joint SPD leadership intended. Wels an Shaw (1922. X. 12), IISG, LSI, , 46/13. (35) “Exekutivsitzung der I.A.S.P. in Frankfurt am Main am 8. Dezember 1022,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 9 (Dezember 1922), Nachdruck 107f. (36) Labour and Socialist International. “The Executive Committee met in … The Hague. … 8th December 1922 …,” IISG, LSI, 10/29–33; Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 2. Jg., No. 9, Nachdruck 108. There are some discrepancies between the English language record of the “Second” and the German language record of the “Vienna Working Union.” The discrepancies have been put inside brackets. On the strike in South Africa, see Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven, 1990), 159–160; Japanese edition, Minamiafurika no rekishi, transl. by Masaoki Miyamoto et al., (Akashi Shoten, 1995), 283–284.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

291

Notes to pages 192–196 (37) Adler an die Mitglieder des Exekutivkomitees der IASP (1922. XII. 21), IISG, LSI, 89/18; Wels an Shaw (XII. 28), 89/17; Shaw an Wels (XII.30) 89/19; “Die Vorarbeiten für den Internationalen Sozialistenkongress,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 3. Jg., No. 1 (Jänner 1923), Nachdruck 111f. For the “appeal,” see ibid., 112–114. Shaw to Adler (1923. I. 10), IISG, LSI, 61/8; Adler to Shaw (I. 16), 61/24.

(Part II: VIII Hamburg) (1) Erich Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik (Erlenbach, 2. Aufl., 1957), Bd. I, 313. Cf. Harold J. Gordon, Jr., Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (Princeton, 1972), 186. “Aufruf an das Proletariat zum Kampf gegen die imperialistische Ruhrbesetzung, gegen Kriegsgefahr und Faschismus” (1923. II. 18), in: Dokumente und Materialien, VII/2, 278–281. Marc Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923 (New York, 1980), 291–335. Calculation based on Table 7 in: The Bank of Japan Research Bureau, Doitsu infurēshon to zaisei kinyū seisaku [German Inflation and Its Financial and Monetary Policies] (Jitsugyōno-Nipponsha, 1946); Haffner, Geschichte eines Deutschen, 53f. (2) Shaw to Adler (1923. I. 7), IISG, LSI, 61/25; (II. 20), 62/11; (II.21), 62/12; Adler to Shaw (II. 25), 62/14. (3) “Exekutivsitzung der I.A.S.P. in Frankfurt am Main am 25 Jänner 1923,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 3. Jg., No. 2 (April 1923), Nachdruck, 117f. (4) “The Situation in the Ruhr(Not for Publication),” IISG, LSI, 57/1–5; for the resolution alone, “Internationale Konferenz in Amsterdam, 26. und 27. Jänner 1923,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 3. Jg., No. 2 , Nachdruck, 118f.; “Joint Conference of the I.F.T.U., the Second International and the I.W.U.S.P., Amsterdam, January 26–27, 1923,”IISG, LSI, 56/1–3. (5) For the “open letter,” Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol 2, Material 88, “Open letter to the London and Vienna Internationals and the Amsterdam Trade Unions’ International (Proposal for joint action in opposition to the Ruhr occupation), ibid., Material 99. See Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Outline History of the Communist International, pp. 174– 175, Japanese translation Kominterun no rekishi, vol. 1 (of 2 vols.), p. 142. (6) “Rundschreiben” (1923. II. 8), IISG, LSI, 66/3. “The Labour and Socialist International. Meeting of the Bureau on February 19th, 1923 at House of Commons,” 17/1; Shaw to Adler (1923. II. 20, II. 21), 62/11, 12; Adler to Shaw (II. 25, 26), 62/14, 15. According to an article in the January 1923 issue of News [Nachrichten] from “Vienna,” the only views in agreement with the “union” are the resolution of the Swiss Social Democratic Party executive committee (1921. 12. 20) and the S.R. Leftist External Department’s communiqué. Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 3. Jg., No. 1 , Nachdruck

292

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 197–202 114f. Adler, “To the Members of the Committee of Ten!” (1923. III. 10, 13), IISG, LSI, 66/11, 13–15; Adler to Shaw (1923. III. 21), 63/8. (7) “Inter-Parliamentary Conference … Paris, 20th March, 1923,” IISG, LSI, 60/1; “InterParliamentary Conference … Paris, 28th and 29th March, 1923,” LPA, LSI, 4/4/5. A conference of the socialist parliamentarians from different countries was first held during the International’s Amsterdam Congress in 1904, when it set up an “Inter-Parliamentary Commission of Socialists and Workers (La Commission Interparlementaire Socialiste et du Travail).” Their fifth conference took place in 1910. After World War I, the conference met again in 1920 during the “Second’s” Geneva Conference in 1920, but it was against the background of a divided International. The “Second” continued to hold “inter-parliamentary conferences” from time to time thereafter. (8) “Organisationskomitee des Hamburger Kongresses,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 3. Jg., No. 2 , Nachdruck, 120; “Exekutivsitzung der I.A.S.P. in Bregenz am 7. und 8. April 1923,” ibid., 119f. (9) Adler to Shaw (1923. IV. 18), IISG, LSI, 64/25; Shaw to Adler (IV. 23), 65/22; Oudegeest to the Organizing Committee (V.7), 65/22. At its executive committee meeting in Hamburg in May 1923, the “Second” dismissed Oudegeest’s protest as some talk between parliamentarians that did not concern the International itself. See Note (15) for the source. (10) Salvemini, The Origins, 387–408; Spriano. Storia del PCI, I, 383–404; Carl A. Landauer, European Socialism: A History of Ideas and Movements, 2 vols. (Berkeley, 1959), 1246–1270. Cf. Piero Melograni, “Lenin, Italy and Fairy-Tales, 1919–1920,” in: Chris Wrigley (ed.), Challenges of Labour: Central and Western Europe, 1917– 1920 (London, 1993), 229–238. (11) Tominaga et al., Fashizumu to Kominterun, 109–114. (12) Prot., SPÖ, 1922, 107–110, 126–157 (Bauer); Parti Socialiste (S.F.I.O.), XXe Congrès National, 3, 4, 5 et 6 Février 1923 Lille, Rapports (Paris, 1923), 15–20, 47–59. (13) ILP, Report of the Annual Conference Held at London, April 1923 (London, n.d.), 80–93, 101–105. Cf. David Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1888–1906 (Manchester, 1983). The Centennial History of the Independent Labour Party (Halifax, 1992) is valuable in terms of its collation of research findings including local history, but the work supposedly commemorating the party’s “centennial” neither provides basic information about the Independent Labour Party nor does it present an overall picture. (14) Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ordentlichen Parteitages … April 1923 … in Bern (Olten, 1923), 4f. (Anträge), 59–102. (15) “Meeting of the Executive of the Second International … Hamburg, May 17th, 19th, 1923,”IISG, LSI, 12/4, 5. (16) “Schlusskonferenz der I.A.S.P. in Hamburg am 20. Mai 1923,” Nachrichten der I.A.S.P., 3. Jg., No. 3 (Juni 1923), Nachdruck, 121–134.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

293

Notes to pages 205–207 (17) Protokoll des Internationalen Sozialistischen Arbeiterkongresses in Hamburg vom 21. bis 25. Mai 1923 (Berlin, 1923). The participants are recorded in the minutes, but their number given here is based on a pamphlet probably published in 1925 clearly to commemorate the launch of the new International, namely The International, 1864–1924 (n.p., n.d.), 15. The minutes of the Labour Party annual congress held in June 1923 gives the figure of 424 but this probably excludes “guests.” For the invitation, IISG, LSI, 66/23. (18) LP, Report of the 23rd Annual Conference held in … London, 1923 (London, n.d.), 44; Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy, 1918–1933 (New Haven, 1964), 100; Prot., SPÖ, 1922, 60; Arbeitsgruppe für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung Zürich (Hg.), Schweizerische Arbeiter bewegung: Dokumente zur Lage, Organisation und Kämpfen der Arbeiter von der Frühindustrialisierung bis zur Gegenwart (Zürich, 1975), 403. (19) Prot., Int., Hamburg, 1923, 43–45. Why are Argentina and Spain (whose Socialist Parties had belonged to the “Second” since before 1914, and which were showing interest in the “Vienna Working Union”) not on the list? It remains unclear. What stands out about the delegations at the congress is that Denmark and Germany each sent about 50 official delegates, easily the largest number. Most likely, it was the physical proximity. From Austria over 30 attended. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party sent about 50 official delegates and the German Social Democratic Workers Party about 30. According to Adler, who explained the arguments the organizing committee had heard concerning the “allocation of votes,” the most difficult to settle had been Czechoslovakia’s case. This may explain the large size of the delegation. On the significance of voting system, see Nishikawa, “Socialism, Nations, Representation.” (20) Protokoll des III. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Moskau, 22. Juni bis 12. Juli 1921) (Hamburg, 1921), 1068–1071; See Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Outline History of the Communist International, 159. During this period, the Comintern was not making much progress. Agosti, La Terza Internazionale, Storia Documentaria, I: 1919 – 1923, 598. Japanese translation, Kominterun shi, 155–156. At the 2nd Congress, Unzō Taguchi and Gentarō Yoshihara spoke on the floor, but the nations listed in the minutes do not include “Japan.” The 4th Congress was attended by Sen Katayama and two others. For statements on the floor by Taguchi, Yoshihara and Katayama, Yōichi Murata (ed. and trans.) Shiryōshū Kominterun to Nippon [Compilation of materials The [Comintern and Japan] Vol. 1 (1919–1928) (Ōtsuki shoten, 1986) Materials 7, 10, 48. See Masahisa Kawabata, Kominterun to Nippon March 1919 – January 1922, (Hōritsubunkasha, 1982). 73–77, Kiyonori Ishidō, Hajime Katube, “Kominterun to Nippon”, Undōshi kenkyū [A Study of History of Movements], Vol 8 (San’ichi shobō, 1981), 5–29. For studies from a wider perspective, Tetsurō Katō, Kominterun no sekaizō – Sekaiseitō no seijigakuteki kenkyū [World Image of the Comintern – A Study in Political Science

294

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 208–212 World’s Political Parties], (Aoki shoten, 1991), Osamu Mineno, Kominterun to teikokushugi [The Comintern and Imperialism 1919–1932 (Keisō shobō, 1992). (21) Prot., Int., Hamburg, 1923, 13–16 (Wels), 19–20 (Henderson), 20–21 (Abramowitsch), 21–30 (Bauer), 52–53 (Webb), 53–61 (Hilferding), 61–70(Blum), 81–86 (Vandervelde), 86–87 (Abstimmungen), 97–108 (Beschlüsse), 108 (Die Exekutive der SAI). For the English text of the by-laws, LP, Report of the 23rd Annual Conference, 16–18. (22) Adolph, Wels, 254–265. Communists had been deprived of their seats in the Reichstang, and some socialists were arrested. Wels himself was being sought by the stormtroopers. In a meeting of the socialist parliamentarians’ group, such moves as abstention from voting or boycotting the vote were proposed but they decided to take part in the vote and deliberately cast negative votes. Wels risked his life to deliver a speech against the act. Interestingly, he argued against Hitler saying he was working just as hard as anyone to defend Germany’s rights in the international political arena. As proof he cited his voiced opposition to the “lie” that Germany bore the responsibility for the war at the Berne Conference in 1919. (23) Tominaga et al., Fashizumu to Kominterun, 235–241. Cf. Otto Leichter, Otto Bauer, Tragödie oder Triumph (Wien, 1970); Otto Bauer (1881–1938). Theorie und Praxis, hrsg. v. Erich Fröschl/Helge Zoitl (Wien, 1985). The most recent study on Bauer is the following work, but it does not cover his activities concerning the International. Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp, Otto Bauer. Studien zur sozialpolitischen Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main, 2005). (24) Cf. F. Peter Wagner, Rudolf Hilferding: Theory and Politics of Democratic Socialism (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1995), 134–151. (25) See Part II, Chapter IV, note (20) of this work. (26) Cf. Janet Polansky, The Democratic Socialism of Emile Vandervelde: Between Reform and Revolution (Oxford, 1995), Chapt. 8 “Internationalism.” (27) These by-laws arguably arose from regrets over the bitter experience of the dysfunction that the International, which had not bothered to institute rules, had suffered after August 1914. See this work Part II, Chapter II, 112. In a pamphlet published in 1915, Sigel stated that this was a refutation of an assertion on the part of Kautsky that the International was a peace time organization, but this interpretation is somewhat of a stretch. Sigel, Geschichte, 202, Anm. 186. (28) MacDonald, who could not attend this congress, is said to have been satisfied with its outcome. Marquand, MacDonald, 267. It seems Marquand did not think that MacDonald’s relationship with the Socialist and Labour International was worth writing about. A comparative study worth noting on the British Labour Party and Germany’s SPD, which entered into a relationship of close cooperation is Stefan Berger, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900–1931 (Oxford, 1994). Henderson noted that Wels was “Bismarck of the Labour Party” and a “fine model of a party boss.” (p. 117).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

295

Notes to pages 212–214 (29) In June and July, the Bureau members met three times in London or Brussels. The main agenda item was how to deal with the expenses that either Huysmans or the Belgian Workers Party had covered for the “Second” during its time of existence. IISG, LSI, 2-0/1, 21/3; AA, Brantings Arkiv, Brevsamling, Suppl. 2. (30) “Hanburugtaikai ni tsuite no ketsugi [Resolution concerning the Hamburg Congress],”Murata (compil. and transl.), Kominterun shiryōshū, Vol. 2, Material 115. (31) That the Bolshevik revolution would be unthinkable without Lenin is similar to France after 18th Brumaire (by French Republican Calendar) being unthinkable without Napoleon, or the seizure of power and control by the Nazis being unthinkable without Hitler. It is certain that Lenin’s accomplishment was of great significance to world history. But then why was he so antagonistic toward the “centrists?” It was arguably because of the severity of the situation. But to blame everything on that would be too simplistic if one were to consider the developments thereafter. What kind of personality was Lenin? One ought to first cite Robert Service’s epoch-making work which sees Lenin as an “enigma,” describing his political activities from a multilateral perspective. Robert Service, Lenin: A Political Life, 3 vols. (Bloomington, 1985, 1991, 1995). He then researched historical materials in Soviet Union’s archives that were opened to the public after perestroika to write Lenin’s “biography” this time. Robert Service, Lenin: A Political Life (Cambridge, Mass., 2000). This is also a fine work. But from the standpoint of author’s it may be pointed out that Balabanoff is only mentioned in one place and Huysmans not at all, and, if not as serious, he dismisses the Zimmerwald movement as “two minor Alpine conferences.” Elsewhere, Lars T. Lih, Lenin Rediscovered: What Is To Be Done? In Context (Leiden, 2006) is a voluminous work comprising a new English translation of “What Is To Be Done?” and a staggering 600 pages of notes. Creating a concept called the “Erfurt principle,” Lih asserts that Lenin was aiming for an organization and activities like those of Gerrmany’s SPD. The concept of “vanguard” had already existed within the SPD, he says, while the term “vanguard” did not appear in Lenin’s writings from the end of the 19th century into the early 20th century. The detailed descriptions of the arguments put forth by Russian socialists of the period are quite interesting, but it is difficult to agree with his conclusion. For good or for bad, did not Lenin go beyond the framework of SPD? Bruno Naarden, Socialist Europe and Revolutionary Russia: Perception and Prejudice, 1848–1923 (Cambridge, 1992) is a work concerning the deeprooted prejudices Western European socialists harbored toward Russia. It analyzes statements and assertions made between 1848 and 1923 in great detail, and discusses how they influenced the European socialist movement as a whole including Russia. In his fascinating account, the Dutch author says the thinking of the “Western European-oriented” Mensheviks is worth re-examining now in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse. (32) It is difficult to gauge the relative strengths of the two Internationals considering, for one thing, that the “Third” was backed by a national power in the form of the Soviet Union. For reference, nevertheless, the following figures may be cited from

296

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 214 the congresses the two both held in 1928. The Socialist and Labour International counted 608 delegates from 28 political parties and other organizations from 30 nations, whereas the “Third” counted 532 delegates from 57 political parties and nine organizations. Also, in terms of the totals of membership figures of the participating political parties, the former had about 6,638,000, and the latter 1,799,000. But as half of the former is made up of the British party and trade union members, and three-quarters of the latter comprises the Soviet Communist Party members, the figures only give us a certain picture, rather than a basis for comparison. Werner Kowalski u. a., Geschichte der Sozialistischen Arbeiter-Internationale (1923–1940) (Berlin-O, 1985), 105；Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Outline History of the Communist International, 273, Cf. Braunthal, Geschichte, II, 341. (33) Protokoll der Verhandlungen zwischen der II. und III. Internationale über die Unterstützung des heldenhaften Kampfes der Werktätigen Spaniens, und ihrer Ergebnisse (Strassbourg[?], 1935), 6, 29. See Tominaga et al., Fashizumu to Kominterun, 262–263. In the writing of this joint work, the assumption was that all historical materials available at the time had been covered. But following the “sea change” of 1990, a wide variety of historical materials were published. That said, Dimitroff ’s journal records practically nothing for the critical year of 1934. Georgi Dimitroff, Tagebücher 1933–1943, hrsg. von Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Aus dem Russischen, 2 Bde. (Berlin 2000). Rather more noteworthy is the following result of steadfast research. Ursula Langkau-Alex, Deutsche Volksfront 1932–1939. Zwischen Berlin, Paris, Prag und Moskau, 3 Bde. (Berlin, 2004–2005). On Thorez, a recent study is Kivin Morgan et al. (eds.), Agents of the Revolution (Oxford, 2005), 83–91 (“The Formation of the General Secretariat and the Emergence of Thorez”). (34) On the two Internationals after 1923, Braunthal, Geschichte, II, 491–547; Cole, Socialist Thought, IV, Chapters 22, 30. There is a huge volume of bibliographical materials on the Comintern, but works on its complete history are surprisingly few. One should cite the aforementioned Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Outline History of the Communist International, as well as Agosti’s work. There is not much material on the “Socialist (and Labour) International.” The following bliographical list of publications may be mentioned first. Socialist Internationals. A Bibliography: Publications of the Social Democratic and Socialist Internationals, 1914–2000, compiled by Gerd Callesen (Bonn/Gent, 2001). In the way of research papers and summaries, Werner Kowalski u.a., Die Sozialistische Internationale. Ihre Geschichte und Politik (Berlin-Ost, 1977); Karl-Ludwig Günsche/Klaus Lantermann, Kleine Geschichte der Sozialistischen Internationale (Bonn, 1977); L’Internazionale Operaia e Socialista tra le due guerre, a cura di Enzo Colloti (Milano, 1985); Werner Kowalski u.a., Geschichte der Sozialistischen ArbeiterInternationale (see above Note 32). On its stage after World War II, Braunthal, Geschichte, III (Hannover, 1971) gives a detailed account.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

297

Notes to pages 215–221

(Summary and Outlook) (1) Hikohiro Takahashi, “Shakaiminshutō hossokutaikai bōchōki” [An Observer’s Account of the Inaugural Congress of the Social Democratic Party], Ōhara shakaimondai kenkyūjo zasshi [Journal of Ōhara Institute for Social Research], June 1996, 51–55. (2) Masao Ōta, Meiji shakaishugi seitōshi [A History of Meiji-Era Socialist Parties] (Minerva Shobō, 1971), 42 onward. See Nishikawa, Shokishakaishugi undō to bankoku shakaitō, 16 onward. Shakaiminshutō hyakunen [One Hundred Years of Social Democratic Party] Shiryōkankōkai, Susumu Yamaizumi (eds.), Shakaishugi no tanjō [The Birth of Socialism](Ronsōsha, 2001). (3) On the examples of uses of “socialism” and “democracy,” OED (1933 ed.). Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution (London, 1935), XXIII, XXIX. (4) Alfred Rosenberg, Demokratie und Sozialismus (Amsterdam, 1932), 9. (5) Samuel Smiles, Self-Help with Illustrations of Conduct and Perseverance (London, 1859), 1, transl. by Masanao Nakamura, Kaisei Saikokurisshihen genmei jijoron [Revised Volume on How to Succeed in a Western Nation Title: On Self-Help] (Hakubunkan, 1878, 5th Edition 1898), 1. (6) For the situation surrounding this development, the accounts are from S. Na’aman, Die Konstituierung der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1862/1863 (Assen, 1975). See Toshiaki Yamai, Doitsu shokirōdōundōshi kenkyū – Kyōdōkumiai no jidai [A Study of the History of Early German Labor Movement – Era of Cooperatives] (Miraisha, 1993). (7) Arbeiter-Zeitung (Coburg), 1863. I. 11 (Repr.; Leipzig, 1977). (8) Lasalle received strong sympathy within the early socialist movement in Japan. Sen Katayama, Rōdōsha no ryōyū Rasaru den [The Story of Lasalle, Workers’ Good Friend]( Kingusureikan, 1897), Shūsui Kōtoku, Shakaiminshutō kensetsusha Rasāru [Lasalle, Founder of Social Democratic Party] (Heiminsha, 1904). Kōtoku praised Lasalle as a “warm-hearted man” like Chōbei Banzuiin, the chivalrous “godfather”like folklore hero. (9) Bericht über die Verhandlungen des ersten Vereinstages der deutschen Arbeitervereine abgehalten Juni 1863 (o.O.,o.J., Repr.; Bonn, 1980), 37; An Arbeiter-Zeitung article on the eve of the Congress. (10) August Bebel, Aus meinem Leben (1910–14. Neue Aufl.; Berlin-O, 1961), 118, vgl. Ausgew. Reden u. Schriften, Bd. VI. (11) Gustav Mayer, “Die Trennung der proletarischen von der bürgerlichen Demokratie” (1912), in: Radikalismus, Sozialismus und bürgerliche Demokratie, hrsg. v. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), 108–178. Incidentally, the name of the party organ, which the German Social Democratic Party was publishing in Zürich during the era of the Socialist Repression Act to

298

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 221–230 “smuggle” back into Germany was also The Social-democrat (Der Sozialdemokrat). (12) Cf. Henryk Katz, The Emancipation of Labor: A History of the First International (New York, 1992), 5–7. (13) Engels an Marx (1864. XI. 16), Marx an Engels (XI. 18), in: Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, hrsg. vom IML/ZKd-SED, Bd. 31 (Berlin-O), 23, 26. Engels was indignant, saying “Why doesn’t the guy (Lasalle) call it simply Proletariat?” (14) Nishikawa, “Daini intānashonaru”; idem, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 15–16. (15) Marx, “Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei, beschlossen auf dem Parteitag zu Erfurt 1891”, in: Felix Salomon, Die Deutschen Parteiprogramme, Heft II von 1871–1900 (Leipzig / Berlin, 1907). As a thesis which concludes that “socialist concepts criticizing capitalism,” such as those represented by this program, “have already become so diffuse that they have lost their effectiveness,” but falls short of presenting a “new paradigm,” Eiichi Katō, “SPD Fukushikokka Kyōsanshugi [SPD / Welfare State / Communism],” Shakaikagakukenkyū [Journal of Social Science] 1991, 43(1), 18–44. (16) See Nishikawa, “Doitsu dainiteisei niokeru Shakaiminshutō [SPD Under Second German Empire]”, Seiōsekai to shakaishugi [World of Western Europe and Socialism] Nihon seijigakkai edition (Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 55–88. (17) Cf. Till Schelz-Brandenburg, Eduard Bernstein und Karl Kautsky (Köln, 1992), 231–356. (18) Bernstein, Die Voraussetzungen, 178. (19) Rosa Luxemburg, Sozialreform oder Revolution? (Leipzig, 1899), 8, 46–48, vgl. Ges. Werke, Bd. I. (20) As an ideological analysis of the SPD prior to World War I, Cf. Hans-Josef Steinberg, Sozialismus und deutsche Sozialdemokratie. Zur Ideologie der Partei vor dem 1. Weltkrieg (Hannover, 1969). A work that cannot be overlooked as a compilation of a wide range of detailed data concerning the history of the German labor movement is Dieter Fricke, Handbuch zur Geschichte der derschen Arbeiterbewegung 1869 bis 1917, 2 Bde. (Berlin-O, 1987). (21) Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 33–35. (22) August Bebel, Die Frau und der Sozialismus, vgl. Ausgew. Reden und Schriften, Bd. X. It was first published in 1879 during the era of the Socialist Suppression Act with the place of publication disguised as “Zürich.” After many revisions and reprints, the 50th edition came out in 1910. Its influence on Marxist arguments for women’s liberation in Japan is clearly seen. (The work became popular under the Japanese title Fujinron.) See Nishikawa, “Fujinron to Augusuto Bēberu [Discourse on Women and August Bebel]”, Rekishi hyōron, March1980, 3–18. (23) Nishikawa, “Daini intānashonaru to shokuminchimondai,” 14; idem, “‘Teikokushugi no jidai’ wo ikani toraeruka [How to Interpret the Era of Imperialism]” in: Teikokushugi no jidai to genzai [The Era of Imperialism and the Present] (Miraisha, 1993).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

299

Notes to pages 230–235 (24) Takahiro Kondō, Doitsugendaishi to kokusaikyōkashokaizen [Contemporary German History and Improvement of International Textbooks] (Univ. of Nagoya Press, 1993). (25) Nishikawa, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten, 10. Kapitel “Burgfrieden.” (26) This work Part I, Chapter I. (27) Karl Kautsky, Die Diktatur des Proletariats (Wien, 1918), in: Peter Lübbe (Hg.), Kautsky gegen Lenin (Berlin/Bonn, 1981), 28–77. Lenin, “The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegate Kautsky,” Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 28, 227–325. It was stated at the beginning of this chapter that “Social democracy” became a term of contempt, but for whatever reason, Kautsky the “apostate” never had a collection of his works published. Cf. Werner Blumenberg, Karl Kautsky literarisches Werk. Eine bibliographische Übersicht (‘s-Gravenhage, 1960). One of the attempt to re-evaluate him is Jürgen Rojahn et al. (Hg.), Marxismus und Demokratie. Karl Kautskys Bedeutung in der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung (Frankfurt am Main, 1992). (28) Karl Kautsky, Terrorismus und Kommunismus. Ein Beitrag zur Naturgeschichte der Revolution (Berlin, 1919). (29) On the situation surrounding the Berne Conference, Part I, Chapter VII of this work. (30) Ritter (Hg.), Die II. Internationale, 509. For literature on the UDC, there is in addition to those listed in Note (12) of Part II, Chapter II of this work, Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 52–56, which notes that the UDC was quick to come up with the concept of “new diplomacy,” attracting Lenin’s attention. (31) See p. 83 of this work. (32) See p. 98 of this work. Interest in Rosa Luxemburg has not declined in Japan or in international circles. However, there is a tendency within today’s SPD to regard Rosa Luxemburg as an opponent of parliamentary democracy, perhaps in resistance to the Democratic Socialist Party (PDS, successor of the former East German ruling party) trying to elevate her status. See Nishikawa, “Rōza Rukusenburugu kinenhi ronsō [Controversy over Rosa Luxemburg Memorial],” in: Yūji Wakao/Shigeko Inoue (eds.), Kindai Doitsu no rekishi [Modern German History] (Minerva Shobō, 2005), pp. 188–190. (33) J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1955). Japanese edition, Furansukakumei to sayokuzentaishugi no kigen [The French Revolution and Origins of Left-Wing Totalitarianism], transl. by Taijirō Ichikawa (Takushokudaigaku Kaigaikenkyūjo, 1964). On the “theory of totalitarianism,” Nishikawa, “Fashizumu to zentaishugiron [Fascism and Theory of Totalitarianism]”, in: Rekishigaku kenkyūkai (ed.), Rekishikenkyū to kyōkashomondai, idem, “‘Tsukurukai’ kyōkasho o tou [Historical Research and the Textbook Issue — Questioning the ‘Tsukurukai’ Textbook]” (Aoki Shoten, 2005), 157–168. Cf. Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe (Oxford, 1991), Chapt. 7.

300

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 235–239 (34) After the end of the Cold War in West Germany in particular, it became something of a trend to discuss East Germany as a state that had been ruled by two dictatorships one after the other. While such a simplistic interpretation is losing its impact, it would not be surprising if there is renewed interest in Nazism and Stalinism as a subject of a comparative study. One example is Henry Rousso (ed.), Stalinism & Nazism: History and Memory Compared (Lincoln, Neb., 2004). (35) Karl Kautsky, Demokratie oder Diktatur (Berlin, 1918). Also see a letter Kautsky wrote in 1924 expressing his views on Lenin at the request of the editorial department of Izvestia, one of the Soviet Union’s official newspapers. “Ein Brief über Lenin,” in: Lübbe (Hg.), Kautsky gegen Lenin, 78–86. Cf. idem, Kommunismus und Sozialdemokratie (Berlin/Bonn, 1978); Beate Häupel, Karl Kautsky. Seine Auffassungen zur politischen Demokratie (Frankfurt am Main, 1993). (36) See this work pp. 125–128. On the Heidelberg Program, see Dieter Dowe/Kurt Klotzbach (Hg.), Programmatische Dokumente der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Bonn, 1990), 211–220. Cf. Massimo Salvadori, Kautsky e la rivoluzione socialista 1880/1938 (Milano, 1976), 310–315. As a study which seeks to explain “social democracy” as a concept distinct from “communism” by focusing on Kautsky, see Samon Yamamoto, Doitsu shakaiminshutō to Kautsukii [The SPD and Kautsky] (Hokkaidōdaigaku Toshokankōkai, 1981), particularly Chapt. 6. (37) See Takao Matumura, “Igirisu no shakaiminshushugi [Social Democracy of Britain],” in: Nishikawa et al., Mōhitotsu no sentakushi [Another Option] (Heibonsha. 1995), 191–273. Kenzō Mōri (ed.) Gendai Igirisu no shakaiseisakushi – 1945– 1990 [History of Contemporary British Social Policies] (Minerva Shobō, 1999), Foreword, Chapter I. On the Swedish Social Democratic Party which came to power in the 1930s and implemented effective policies, Shunji Ishihara, Shiminshakai to rōdōshabunka Suēden fukushikokka no shakaiteki kigen [Civic Society and Workers’ Culture Social Origins of Sweden’s Welfare State] (Bokutakusha, 1996). Cf. Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe (Cambridge, 1998). Also, G.A.Ritter, Der Sozialstaat. Entstehung und Entwicklung im Internationalen Vergleich (München. 1991), Japanese edition Shakaikokka—Sono seiritsu to hatten, translated by Tsutomu Kitani et al. (Kōyō Shobō, 1993), Chapter 6. (38) As a well-corroborated study of the “Bad Godesberg Program,” Masaaki Yasuno, Sengo Doitsu shakaiminshutō kenkyūjosetsu: Soshikikaikaku to Gōdesuberugu kōryō eno Michi [Introduction to a Study of Post-war History of SPD: Organizational Reform and the Way to Godesberg Program] (Minerva Shobō, 2004). See Masamori Sase, Sengo Doitsu shakaiminshutōshi [Post-War History of SPD] (Fuji Shakaikenkyūsentā Shuppankyoku, 1975), Takeshi Nakai, Nishidoitsu no shakaiminshushugi [Social Democracy of West Germany] (Iwanami Shinsho, 1979). Also, Samon Yamamoto, Doitsu shakaiminshutō nichijōkatsudōshi [History of Daily Activities of SPD] (Hokkaidōdaigaku Toshokankōkai, 1995).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

301

Notes to pages 239–242 (39) Gerard Braunthal, The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition (Boulder, Colo., 1994), 193–214. (40) Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Beschlossen vom Programm-Parteitag der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 20. Dezember 1989 in Berlin (Bonn, o.J.). Cf. Protokoll vom Programm-Parteitag Berlin 18–20.12.1989 (Bonn, 1990). 1–56; Anträge zum Programm-Parteitag Berlin 18–20.12.1989 (SPD, o.O., o.J.); Wolfgang Bok. Zeitgeist-Genossen. Das Berliner Programm der SPD von 1989 (Frankfurt am Main, 1995). (41) “Stolz aufs eigene Leben,” Der Spiegel, Nr. 27/1995 (VII.3), 40ff. On the political process of the German re-unification, Susumu Takahashi, Rekishi toshiteno Doitsutōitsu [German Re-unification as History] (Iwanami Shoten, 1999). (42) Bernd Faulenbach/Heinrich Potthoff (Hg.), Die Revolution 1848/49 und die Tradition der sozialen Demokratie in Deutschland (Essen, 1999). (43) While touching on thought, this work is, if anything, a history of a social movement. As a fruit of labour which gives an overview of the history of social thought (human awareness of its society) from ancient Greece up to the present and comes up with a unique logical order, Hiroshi Mizuta, Shinkō shakaishisōshōshi [New Historical Sketch of Social Thought] (Minerva Shobō, 2006). (44) John Strachey, Why You Should Be a Socialist (London, 1944). Kōzō Uno, “Shakaishugi niokeru jiyū [Liberty in Socialism],” Shisō, No. 329 (1951.2), 58. However, Uno was cautious in his intrepretation of the “historical inevitability.” See Note(15) for the argument of Eiichi Katō. (45) K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London, 1945, 1962). The following work by an expert on Soviet Union’s history, which attempts to re-evaluate the history of the 20th century, raises many points that one can agree with. Nobuaki Shiokawa,{Nijusseikishi} o kangaeru [Thoughts on {History of 20th Century}] (Sōkei Shobō, 2004). (46) Braunthal, The German Social Democrats, 203–210. (47) “Arbeiterprogramm,” “Die indirekte Steuer und die Lage der Arbeitenden Klassen,” in: Ferdinand Lasalle, Reden und Schriften, hrsg. v. Friedrich Jenaczek (München, 1970), 22–86, 224–347, the Japanese-language edition of the latter being, Kansetsuzei to rōdōshakaikyū, transl. by Chikara Ōuchi (Iwanamibunko, 1960). The expresssion “nightwatchman state” appears in the former (Jenaczek edition, p. 55). (48) Social democratic parties are active in the European Union’s parliament as well, but their activities may not lend themselves to historical research yet. But materials can be obtained from the PES home page, http://www.pes.org/ (2006.XII.1). SPD has carried out thorough self-examination in terms of its theories, programs and poisitions leading up to the Bad Godesberg Program. For example, Susanne Miller / Heinrich Potthoff, Kleine Geschichte der SPD. Darstellung und Dokumentation 1848– 1983 (Bonn, 1983); Thomas Meyer / Susanne Miller / Heinrich Potthoff (Hg.), Lern- und Arbeitsbuch deutsche Arbeiterbewegung, 3 Bde. (Bonn, 1984).

302

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Notes to pages 242–243 (49) Policies of the Bush administration (2001–2009) are sometimes referred to as “neo-liberalism,” but are also called “neo-conservatism.” Extolling the freedom of the principle of market competition, it tries in the political arena to maintain its position of a “have” even by military force. As an ideology, is it not anachronistic? See Hiroaki Ozawa, “Rekishino nakano shinjiyūshugi – joron [Neo-Liberalism in History – An Introduction],” Rekishihyōron, 2006 (2), pp. 31–41. (50) It was Hikohiro Takahashi who has argued from early days for the perception of social democracy as a current in contemporary history and has studied the case of Japan. His work is Gendaiseiji to shakaiminshushugi – Mittsu no chōryū to sono jikken [Contemporary Politics and Social Democracy—Three Currents and Their Experimentation] (Hoseidaigaku Shuppankyoku, 1985). Junji Banno, who tries to cover the history of Japanese politics from the 1930s to 1945 not from a position to defend or to condemn but as an attempt to identify the better option at each juncture, makes an interesting proposal. To wit, “Japanese social democrats lack appeal because they are considered one wing of socialism … so if we dare to regard them as the left-wing of democracy … wouldn’t that make their image more appealing?” “Minponshugi to shakaiminshushugi [Democracy and Social Democracy]” Shakaikagakukenkyū, 1992, 44(1) pp. 2–20. For a fruit of labor which, taking into account such new social movements as feminism, re-examines the socialist and labor movements since the mid-19th century in the context of the democratization of Europe, see Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850– 2000 (Oxford, 2002). Also, a work that looks at social democracy in Germany and Sweden is Berman, The Social Democratic Movement, Chapt. 6. “Germany’s Path to Democracy.” The concept “left-wing,” if it is to be defined as the idea of giving priority to “equality” and “human rights,” remains valid. On the semantics thereof, see David Caute, The Left in Europe since 1789 (London, 1966).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

303

Bibliography

Bibliography I

Unpublished Documents

Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, København (ABA) SD-Arkiv Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Stockholm (AA) Hjalmar Brantings Arkiv: Brevsamling Hoover Institution, Stanford, Robert Wheeler Nachlass Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam (IISG) Archives of the Secretariat in London of the Second International (Labour and Socialist International, 1921–1923)―LSI Collectie Tweede Internationale, 1919–1922―INT Les Matériaux provenent du B.S.I.1914–1920, Sur microfilme Archief Troelstra Labour Party Archives, London (LPA) Labour and Socialist International―LSI Schweizerisches Sozialarchiv, Zürich Sozialismus 335 Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Wien (VGA) L9/M24

II

Published Documents

1) Protocol Public Documents: The International Protokoll des Internationalen Arbeiter=Congress zu Paris. Abgehalten Von 14. bis 20. juli 1889. Deutsche Uebersetzung (Nürnberg, 1890). Compte rendue de Congrès International Ouvrier Socialiste tenu à Paris du 15 au 20 juillet 1889, publié par le Comité National de la Féderation des Travailleurs Socialistes de France (Paris, 1891). Congrēs international ouvrier socialiste tenu a Bruxelles du 16 au 23 aoūt 1891. Rapport (Bruxelles, 1893). Protokoll des internationalen Arbeiter=Congresses zu Paris. Abgehalten vom 14. bis 20. Juli 1889. Deutsche Uebersetzung (Nürnberg, 1890). Congrès international ouvrier socialiste tenu à Bruxelles du 16 au 23 août 1891. Rapport (Bruxelles, 1893).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

305

Bibliography Protokoll des Internationalen Sozialistischen Arbeiterkongresses in der Tonhalle Zürich vom 6. bis 12. August 1893 (Zürich, 1894). Full Report of the Proceedings of the International Worker’ Congress. London, July and August, 1896, printed and published by “The Labour Leader” (London, n.d.). International Socialist Workers and Trade Union Congress, London, 1896. Report of Proceeding… (London, n.d.). Compte rendu sténographique non-officiel de la version française du cinquième congrès socialiste international tenu à Paris du 23 au 27 septembre 1900 (Paris, 1900). Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Paris, 23. bis 27. September 1900 (Berlin, 1900). Sixième congrès socialiste international tenu à Amsterdam du 14 au 20 août 1904. Compte rendu analytique (Bruxelles, 1904). Internationaler Socialisten-Kongreß zu Amsterdam, 14. bis 20. August 1904 (Berlin, 1904). Propositions et projets de résolutions avec rapports explicatifs présentés au congrés socialiste international de Stuttgart, 18–24 août 1907.Édition en 3 Langues du Bureau socialiste International … Anträge … Proposals … (Bruxelles, s.d.,[1907]). Bureau Socialiste International, I: 1900–1907. Comptes rendus des réunions, manifests et circulaires, Documents recueillis et présenté par Georges Haupt (Paris, 1969). VIIe Congrès socialiste international tenu à Stuttgart du 16 au 24 août 1907. Compte rendu analytique (Bruxelles, 1908). Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongreß zu Stuttgart, 18. bis 24. August 1907 (Berlin, 1907). Huitième congrèsocialiste international tenu à Copenhague du 28 août au 3 septembre 1910. Compte rendu analytique (Gand, 1911). Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongreß zu Kopenhagen, 28. August bis 3. September 1910 (Berlin, 1910). Georges Haupt, Le Congrés manqué. L’internationale á la veille de la première guerre mondiale (Paris, 1965). Die Internationale und der Weltkrieg. Materialien, gesammelt von Carl Grünberg (Leipzig, 1916). Horst Lademacher, (Hg.), Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung. Protokolle und Korrespondenz, 2 Bde. (The Hague, 1969). Angelica Balabanoff, “die Zimmerwalder Bewegung 1914–1919”, in: Archiv f. d. Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, XI–XIII (1926/28), (Leipzig, 1928. Repr.; Frankfurt, 1969). Comité organisateur de la Conférence Socialiste International de Stockholm, Stockholm (Stockholm, 1918). Die Stockholmer Friedenskonferenz von 1917 (bearbeitet von Martin Grass. (Stand: Dezember 2004.) Veröffentlicht im Internet ab September 2005) www.labourhistory.net/stockholm1917. Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, Memorandum an War Aims (London, 1918). The Replies of the Socialist Parties of the Central Powers to the ‘Memorandum on War Aims’ (London, [1918]).

306

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography Die II. Internationale 1918/1919. Protokolle, Memoranden, Berichte und Korrespondezen, 2 Bde., hrsg., eingel. und kommentiert v. Gerhard A. Ritter (Berlin, 1980). Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund, Protokoll der Internationalen GewerkschaftsKonferenz vom 5. bis 9. Februar 1919 im Volkshaus in Bern (Bern, 1919). Der I. Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale. Protokoll der Verhandlungen in Moskau vom 2. bis zum 19. März 1919 (Hamburg, 1919). The International at Lucerne, 1919. The Resolutions. The Provisinal Constitution (London: The Labour Party, 1919). La Question des Responsabilités. Mémoire du Comité Directeur du Parti Socialiste Allmande présenté au Congrès Socialiste International de Genève (n.p., n.d.). Der Zweite Kongreß der Kommunistischen Internationale. Protokoll der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Petrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August 1920 in Moskau (Hamburg, 1921). Bericht vom Zehnten Internationalen Sozialistenkongress in Genf, 31. Juli bis 5. August 1920 (Brüssel, 1921). Protokoll der Internationalen Sozialistischen Konferenz in Wien vom 22. bis 27. Februar 1921 ([Wien], 1921). Beschlüsse der Internationalen Socialitischen Konferenz in Wien (22. bis 27. Februar 1921)(Wien, 1921). Preamble, Rules and Resolutions agreed to at the Vienna Conference. (London; ILP, n.d.). Die internationale Gewerkschaftsbewegung, Anhang III (Dezember 1921): Europäische Probleme … (Amsterdam, o. J.). Die Zweite Internationale über den Wiederaufbau. Resolution (Berlin, 1921). L’Internationale Socialiste et la Géorgie (Paris : Edition du Comité central du Parti ouvrier social-démocrate,1921). Protokoll des III. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Moskau, 22. Juni bis 12. Juli 1921)(Hamburg, 1921). Protokoll der Internationalen Konferenz. Der drei internationalen Exekutiv-komitees in Berlin vom 2. bis 5. April 1922 (Wien, 1922). Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale. Petrograd-Moskau vom 5. November bis 5. Dezember 1922 (Hamburg, 1923). Protokoll des Internationalen Sozialistischen Arbeiterkogresses in Hamburg vom 21. bis 25. Mai 1923 (Berlin, 1923). The International, 1864–1924 (n.p., n.d.) Protokoll der Verhandlungen zwischen der II. und III. Internationale über die Unterstützung des heldenhaften Kampfes der Werktätigen Spaniens, und ihrer Ergebnisse (Strassbourg [?], 1935). Aldo Agosti, La Terza Internazionale. Storia documentaria, I: 1919–1923, 2 parti (Roma, 1974).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

307

Bibliography

2) Protocol Public Documents: Parties and Unions (ILP) Independent Labour Party, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Conference, Glasgow, April 1920 (London, 1920). Independent Labour Party, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Conference, Glasgow, April 1920 (London, 1920). Independent Labour Party, Report of the NAC to the Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference, Easter, 1921… Southport (London, 1921). Independent Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference Held at Nottingham. April 1922 (London, n.d.). Independent Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference Held at London, April 1923 (London, n.d.). (LP) Report of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of The Labour Party. Held in the Cetral Hall, Westminster, London, S.W., on Wednesday, June 26th, 1918, and the following days (London, n.d.). Report of the Nineteenth Annual Conference held in the Palladium, Southport, on June 25th, 26th, and 27th, 1919 (London, n.d). Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Scarborough, 1920 (London, n.d.). Report of the Twenty-First Annual Conference held in the Dome, Brighton, on June 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th, 1921 (London, n. d. ). Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of The Labour Party, Edingburgh, 1922 (London, n.d.). Report of the 23rd Annual Conference, held in the Queen’s Hall, Langham Place, London, on June 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th, 1923 London, 1923 (London, n.d.). (PSF) Pendant la guerre. Le Parti Socialiste, la Guerre et la Paix. Toutes les résolutions et tous les documents du Parti Socialiste de Juillet 1914 à fin 1917 (Paris, 1918). Parti Socialiste(S.F.I.O.), 17e Congrès national, tenu à Strasbourg. Les 25, 26, 27, 28, et 29 Février 1920. Compte rendu sténographique (Paris, 1921). Parti Socialiste(S.F.I.O.), 18e Congrès national, tenu à Tours. Les 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 & 30 décembre 1920. Compte rendu sténographique (Paris, 1921). Parti Socialiste (S.F.I.O.),XIXe Congrès national, 29, 30, 31 Octobre–1er. Novembre 1921 Paris. Rapports de la Commission administrative permanente… (Paris, 1921). Parti Socialiste (S.F.I.O.), XXe Congres National, 3, 4, 5, et 6 Février 1923 Lille. Rapports (Paris, 1923). (PSI) Resoconto stenografico del XVI Congresso Nazionale del Partito Socialista Italiano. Bologna 5, 6, 7, 8 ottobtre 1919 (Roma, 1920). Resoconto stenografico del XVII Congresso Nazionale del Partito Socialista Italiano. Livorno 15–16–17–18–19–20 Gennario 1921 (Roma, 1921). (SPD) Bericht über die Verhandlungen des ersten Vereinstages der deutschen Arbeitervereine abgehalten Juni 1863 (o.O., o.J. Repr.; Bonn,1980).

308

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography Verhandlungen des Parteitags der deutschen Sozialdemokratie in St.Gallen, Abgehalten vom 2. bis 6. Oktober 1887 (Hottingen-Zürich, 1888. Nachdruck; Glashütten im Taunus / Tokyo, 1971). Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten zu Essen a.d. Ruhr vom 15. bis 21. September 1907 (Berlin, 1907). Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands Abgehalten in Chemnitz vom 15. bis 21. September 1912 (Berlin, 1912). Protokoll der Reichskonferenz der Sozialdemokratie Deutschlands vom 21., 22. und 23. September 1916 in September (Berlin, 1916. Nachdruck; Berlin, 1974). Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten in Würzburg vom 14. bis 20. Oktober 1917 (Berlin, 1917). Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten in Weimar vom 10. bis 15. Juni 1919 (Berlin, 1919). Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten in Kassel vom 10. bis 16. Oktober 1920 (Berlin, 1920). Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten in Görlitz vom 18. bis 24. September 1921 (Berlin, 1921). Die Reichstagsfraktion der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1898 bis 1914, bearb. v. Erich Matthias / Eberhard Pikart, 2 Bde. (Düsseldorf,1966). Protokolle der Sitzungen des Parteiausschusses der SPD 1912 bis 1921. Nachdruck hrsg. von Dieter Dowe, 2 Bde. (Berlin/Bonn, 1980). Dowe, Dieter/Kurt Klotzbach (Hg.), Programmatische Dokumente der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Bonn, 3. Aufl.,1990). Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Außerordentlichen Parteitages der SPD vom 13.– 15. November 1959 in Bad Godesberg (Hannover/Bonn, o.J. Repr., Bonn, 1972). Anträge zum Programm-Parteitag Berlin 18.12.–20.12.1989 (SPD, o.O., o.J.). Protokoll vom Programm-Parteitag Berlin 18.–20.12.1989 (SPD, [Bonn, 1990]). (KPD) Bericht über den Gründungsparteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund) vom 30. Dezember 1918 bis 1. Januar 1919 (o.O., o.J. Nachdruck, Berlin-O, 1968. Neudruck, Berlin-O, 1972). (USPD)Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Vereiningsparteitages der USPD (Linke) und der KPD (Spartakusbund) vom 4. bis 7. Dezember 1920 in Berlin (Berlin, 1921. Nachdruck, Erlangen, 1973). (SPÖ) Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs. Abgehalten in Wien vom 31. Oktober bis zum 3. November 1919 (Wien, 1920). Protokoll der Verhandlingen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs. Abgehalten in Wien vom 5. bis zum 7. November 1920 (Wien, 1920). Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs—abgehalten in Wien vom 25. bis 27. November 1921 (Wien, 1922).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

309

Bibliography Protokoll des Parteitages 1922. Die Verhandlungen der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschöstereichs. Abgehalten am 14. und 15. Oktober in Wien (Wien, 1922). Protokoll des Parteitages 1923. Die Verhandlungen der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschösterreichs. Abgehalten vom 14. bis 16. November in Wien (Wien, 1923). Sozialdemokratische Patei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages vom 20. und 21. November 1915 abgehalten im Saalbau in Aarau (Luzern, 1916). Sozialdemokratische Patei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages vom 2. Februar 1919 im Volkshaus in Bern (Bern, 1919). Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ausserordentlichen Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei der Schweiz vom 16. und 17. August 1919 in der Burgvogteihall in Basel (Basel, 1919). Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ausserordentlichen Parteitages vom 2. Februar 1919 im Volkshaus in Bern (Bern, 1919). Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ausserordentlichen Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei der Schweiz vom 16. und 17. August 1919 in der Burgvogteihalle in Basel (Basel, 1919). Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitage vom 10. bis 12. Dezember 1920 im Volkshaus in Bern (Zürich, 1921). Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz,Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages. Samstag und Sonntag, 3. u. 4. September 1921 im Volkshaus in Luzern (St.Gallen, 1921). Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des ordentlichen Parteitages vom 20. bis 22. April 1923 im “Maulbeerbaum” in Bern (Olten, 1923).

3) Other Documents The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origin of the Third International, by Olga Hess Gankinn / H.H.Fisher (Stanford, 1949). The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1918, by James Bunyan/H.H.Fisher (Stanford, n.d. [1934?]). Deutsch-Sowjetische Beziehungen von den Verhandlungen in Brest-Litowsk bis zum Abschluß des Rapallovertrages, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, Bd. 2 (Berlin-O, 1971). Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED, Reihe II, Bd.1: Juli 1914–Oktober 1917 (Berlin-O, 1958), Bd.VII/1: 1919–1921 (Berlin-O, 1966). Neck, Rudolf, Arbeiterschaft und Staat im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914–1918 (A.Quelen), I. Der Staat (1. Vom Kriegsbeginn bis Prozeß Friedrich Adlers, August 1914–Mai 1917) (Wien,1964). Der Friede von Brest-Litowsk, Ein unveröffentlicher Band aus dem Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen Verfassunggebenden Nationalversammlung und des Deutschen Reichstages, bearbeitet von Werner Hahlweg (Düsseldorf, 1971).

310

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography Höhn, Reinhard, Die vaterlandslosen Gesellen, Bd.1 (Köln, 1964). Konnemann,E./G.Schulze(Hg.), Der Kapp-Luttwitz-Ludendorff-Putsch. Dokumente (München, 2002). Na’amnani, S., Die Konstituierung der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1862–1863 (Assen, 1975). Österreich im Jahre 1918. Berichte und Dokumente. Eingel. u. hrsg. von Rudolf Neck (München, 1968). Die Regierung der Volksbeauftragten 1918/19, bearb. v. Susanne Miller (Düsseldorf, 1969). Ritter, Gerhard A. /S usanne Miller (Hg.), Die deutsche Revolution 1918–1919. Dokumente (2. Aufl. Hamburg, 1975). (The Sozialist International) http://www.socialistinternational.org/main.html (2005.IX.5). (Party of European Socialists) http://www.pes.org/content/view/43/0/lang.en (2005.IX.4). (Die Hartz-Kommission) http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartz-Konzept (2005.IX.5).

4) Diaries, Letters Victor Adler: Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky, gesammelt und erläutert von Friedlich Adler, hrsg. vom Parteivorstand der SPÖ (Wien, 1954). August Bebel: Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Engels, hrsg.v. Werner Blumenberg (The Hague, 1965). Eduard Bernsteins Briefwechsel mit Karl Kautsky (1895–1905), hrsg. v. Till SchelzBrandenburg (Frankfurt/New York, 2003). Das Kriegstagebuch des Reichstagsabgeordneten Eduard David 1914 bis 1918, bearbeitet von Susanne Miller (Dusseldorf, 1966). Dimitroff, Georgi, Tagebücher 1933–1943, hrsg. von Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Aus dem Russischen, 2 Bde. (Berlin 2000). Friedrich Engels—Paul et Laura Lafargue, Correspondance, Textes recueillis, annotés et presentés par Emile Bottigelli, 3 vol. (Paris, 1956–1959). Friedrich Engels’ Briefwechsel mit Karl Kautsky, hrsg. u. bearb. v. Benedikt Kautsky (Wien, 1955). Haffner, Sebastian, Geschichte eines Deutschen (Stuttgart, 2000). Wilhelm Liebknecht: Briefwechsel mit Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, hrsg. v. Georg Eckert (The Hague, 1963). Rosa Luxemburg: Gesammelte Briefe, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED, Bd. 4,5 (Berlin-O, 1974, 1984).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

311

Bibliography

5) Memoirs Balabanoff, Angelica: Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse (Berlin, 1927). —: My Life as Rebel (1938. Repr.; New York, 1968). Dittmann, Wilhelm: Erinnerungen, bearb. u. eingel. v. Jürgen Rojahn, 3 Bde. (Frankfurt, 1995). Kollontai, Alexandra: Mein Leben in der Diplomatie. Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1922 bis 1945, hrsg. von Heinz Deutschlalnd, Aus dem Russischen von Ruth und Heinz Deutschland (Berlin, 2003). Müller, Hermann: Die November-Revolution (Berlin,1928). Scheidemann, Philipp: Memorien eines Sozialdemokraten, II (Dresden, 1928). Stampfer, Friedrich: Die vierzehn Jahre der ersten deutschen Republik (Karlsbad, 1936). Vandervelde, Emile: Souvenirs d’un militant socialiste (Paris, 1939).

6) Contemporaneous Literature Adler, Friedrich: Die Erneuerung der Internationale. Aufsätze aus der Kriegszeit (Wien, 1919) —: “Was trennt uns von der Zweiten Internationale?”, Der Kampf, 1921, 14(2/3): 41–44. Anin, Maxim: “Das Nationalstatenprinzip in der sozialistischen Internationale”, Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1910, II, 885–890. Bauer, Otto: Bolschewismus oder Sozialdemokratie? (Wien, 3. Aufl., 1921). —: Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Wien, 1924). Bebel, August: Aus meinem Leben (1910–14. Neue Aufl.; Berlin, 1961). —: Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften, VI, VIII, X, hrsg. v. Gustav Seeber / Annelies Beske / Eckhard Muller (München, 1995–1997). Bernstein, Eduard: Die Verausetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (1899. Neue Ausgabe, 2 Aufl.; Stuttgart, 1921, Nachdruck; Hannover, 1964). Borochow, Ber: Die Grundlagen des Poale-Zionismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). Greulich, Hermann: Krieg und Internationale (Zürich, 1915). Grimm, Robert: Revolution und Massenaktion (Bern, 1919). Hamon, Augustin: Le socialisme et le Congrès de Londres. Étude historique (Paris, 1897). Die Helden der Wiener Konferenz, hrsg. von der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs (Wien, 1921). Hobson, John, A.: Imperialism: A Study (London, 1902). (Huysmans, Camille) The Policy of the International. A Speech of and an Interview with the Secretary of the International, Camille Huysmans, Member of the Belgian Parliament and the Brussels City Council (London, n.d.). Karl Liebknecht: Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, hrsg.vom IML/ZKdSED, Bd.8 (Berlin-O, 1966). Kautsuky, Karl: Demokratie oder Diktatur (Berlin, 1920). —: Die Diktatur des Proletariats (Wien, 1918).

312

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography —: Terrorismus und Kommunismus. Ein Beitrag zur Naturgeschichte der Revolution (Berlin, 1919). —: “Ein Brief über Lenin (1924)”, in: Peter Lübbe (Hg.), Kautsky gegen Lenin (Berlin/Bonn, 1981), 78–86. Kay, John de: The Spirit of the International at Bern ([1919]). Lassalle, Ferdinand: Reden und Schriften, hrsg. v. Friederich Jenaczek (München, 1970). Ленин, Сочинеия (4 изд.; Москва, 1941–1967). Levi, Paul: Zwischen Spartakus und Sozialdemokratie, hrsg. v. Charlotte Beradt (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). Luxemburg, Rosa: Sozialreform oder Revolution? (Leipzig, 1899). Junius: Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie (Zürich, 1916). Rosa Luxemburg: Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED, Bd. 4, Berlin-O, 1974). (MacDonald) Ramsay MacDonald’s Political Writings, ed.by Bernard Baker (London, 1972). Karl Marx / Friedrich Engels: Werke, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED (42 Bde. u. 2 Ergänzungsbde.; Berlin: Dietz, 1956–1968). Noske, Gustav: Kolonialpolitik und Sozialdemokratie (Stuttgart, 1914). Radek, Karl: “Die Entwicklung der Internationale”, Lichtstrahlen, 11, 14 (1915. VIII), 293–296, 15 (1915. IX), 313–316. Roland Holst, Henriette: Herman Gorter (Amsterdam, 1933, Reprint: Nijmegen, 1975). —: “Die Spaltung in der holländischen Sozialdemokratie”, N.Z., XXVII (1908/09)–I, 964–971. —: Herman Gorter (Amsterdam, 1933, Reprint: Nijmegen, 1975). (Ryazanov, D.) “Vera Zasulič und Karl Marx”, Marx Engels Archiv, I (Frankfurt, 1926), 309–342. Spartakusbriefe (Neudruck; Berlin, 1920. Spartakusbriefe, hrsg. vom IML/ZKdSED (Berlin-O, 1968). Terwagne,Modeste: “Kolonialfrage, Kolonialpolitik und Sozialdemokratie”, S.M., XI-i (1907), 639–644. (Thomas, Albert) “Journal de Russie d’Albert Thomas. Document inédit présenté par I. Sinanoglou”, Cahier du monde russe et soviétique, 1973,16: 86–204. Troelstra, P.J.: Politische Aufgaben der Sozialistischen Internationale (Luzern, 1919). Vandelvelde, Emile: “Die Belgier und der Kongostaat” N.Z.,XXIII (1904/05)–ii,4–13. van Kol, Henri: “Uber Colonialpolitik”, S.M., 1904, VIII-ii, 606–617. —: “Les mandats coloniaux et la Société des Nations. Rapport présenté à la Conférence interparlementaire” I, II (Genève, 1922, 1923). Webb, Sidney and Beatrice: A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (London, 1920).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

313

Bibliography

7) Periodicals Arbeiter=Zeitung (Coburg), 1862–1866(Repr.:Leipzig, 1977). Arbeiter=Zeitung. Zentralorgan der Sozialdemokratie Deutschösterreichs (Wien), 1920– 1921. Berner Tagwacht, 1918–1920. Labour Leader, 1919–1922. Bulletin Périodique du Bureau Socialiste International, No.1. 11(1909–1914). Internationale sozialistische Kommission zu Bern, Bulletin, Nr.1–6, (1915.IV.21– 1917.I.6). Internationale sozialistische Kommission, Nachrichtendienst (Stockholm), Nos. 1–44 (1917.V.14–1918.IX.1). Bulletin du Bureau Socialiste International, No.1 (1917). Bulletin official de la Conférence ouvrière et socialiste (Berne), Nr. 1–11 (1919.II). Official Bulletin of the International Labour and Socialist Conference, Vol.I, Nos. 1–8 (1919.II.3–1919.XI.18). Offizielles Bulletin der Internationalen Arbeiter- und Sozialisten-Konferenz (Bern), Nr. 1– 12 (1919.II). Bulletin der Zweiten Internationale (Amsterdam), Nr. 1–3(1919.V–IX). Bulletin of the International, Issued by the Labour and Socialist International, New Series, Nos. 1–3 (1921.VII–1922.VI). Nachrichten der Internationalen Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialistischer Parteien (1921.IV– 1923.VI) (Dt. Ausg., Engl. ed., Ed. franç., Nachdruck; Glashütten i.T., 1973).

314

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography

III

Secondary Works

ADOLPH, HANS J.L.: Otto Wels und die Politik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1894– 1939 (Berlin, 1971). ANGRESS, WERNER T.: Stillborn Revolution. The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–1923(Princeton, 1963. Reissued; Port Washington, N.Y., 1972). ARBEITSGRUPPE FÜR GESCHICHTE DER ARBEITERBEWEGUNG ZÜRICH (HG.): Schweizerische Arbeiterbewegung: Dokumente zur Lage, Organisation und Kämpfen der Arbeiter von der Frühindustrialisierung bis zur Gegenwart (Zürich, 1975). ARDELT, RUDOLF G.: Friedrich Adler. Probleme einer Personlichkeitsentwicklung um die Jahrhundertwende (Wien,1984). ARFÉ, GAETAMO: Storia del socialismo italiano (1892–1926) (Torino, 1965). ASHER, ABRAHAM: Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menschevism (Cambridge, 1972). BACH, I. A., ET AL. (HG.): Der Erste Internationale, 2 Tle. (Moskau, 1981). BARON, SAMUEL H.: Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism (Stanford, 1963). BARTEL, WALTER: Die Linken in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie im Kampf gegen Militarismus und Krieg (Berlin-O, 1958). BAUER , MANFRED: Friedrich Adler. Rebel der Einheit (Wien, 2004). BERADT, CHARLOTTE: Paul Levi. Ein demokratischer Socialist in the Weimar Republik (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). BERGER , STEFAN: The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900– 1931 (Oxford,1994). BERMAN, SHERI: The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe (Cambridge,Mass.,1998). BLÄNSDORF, AGNES: Die Zweite Internationale (Stuttgart, 1979). BLEY, HELMUT: Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894– 1914 (Hamburg,1968). B OK, WOLFGANG: Zeitgeist-Genossen. Das Berliner Programm der SPD von 1989 (Frankfurt am Main, 1995). B OYER , R. O. / H. M. MORAIS: Labor’s Untold History (New York,1955). BRAUN, BERND: Hermann Molkenbuhr (1851–1927). Eine Politische Biographie (Düsseldorf, 1999). BRAUNTHAL, GERARD: The German Social Democrats since 1969: A Party in Power and Opposition (Boulder, CO, 1994). BRAUNTHAL, JULIUS: Geschichte der Internationale, Bd. I, II (Hannover, 1961, 1963). —: Victor und Friedrich Adler. Zwei Generationen Arbeiterbewegung (Wien, 1965). BRIE, MICHAEL: “Rosa Luxemburg und Alexandra Kollontai”, UTOPIEkreativ, 2004(162):312–328. BROUE, PIERRE: The German Revolution, 1917–1923, Tr. By John Archer, ed. by Ian Birchall / Brian Pearce, with an Introduction by Eric D. Weitz (Leiden, 2005).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

315

Bibliography BROVKIN, VLADIMIR N.: Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Soviet Movements in Russia, 1918–1922 (Princeton, 1994). —(ED.): The Bolsheviks in Russian Society: The Revolution and the Civil Wars (New Haven, 1997). BUCHNER , BERND: Um nationale und republikanische Identität. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Kampf um die politischen Symbole in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn, 2001). BÜRGI, MARKUS: Die Anfänge der Zweiten Internationale. Positionen und Auseinandersetzungen 1889–1893 (Frankfurt/New York, 1996). CALDER , KENNETH J.: Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 1914–1918 (Cambridge, 1976). CALKINS, KENNETH R.: Hugo Hasse. Demokrat und Revolutionär (Berlin, 1976). CARR , E. H.: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923, Vol. 1, Vol. 2 (London, 1950, 1952). CARSTEN, FRANCIS LUDWIG: Eduard Bernstein 1850–1932: Eine politische Biographie (München, 1993). CAUTE, DAVID: The Left in Europe since 1789 (London, 1966). The Centennial History of the Independent Labour Party (Halifax, 1992). CLEMENTS, BARBARA EVANS: Bolshevik Feminist: The Life of Aleksandra Kollontai (Bloomington, 1979). COLE, G. D. H.: A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. II: Marxism and Anarchism, 1850– 1890 (London, 1964), Vol. III, 2 pts.: Second International, 1889–1914 (London, 1956, 60), Vol. IV, 2 pts.: 1914–1931 (London, 1969). COLLART, Y VES: Le Parti Socialiste Suisse et l’Internationale 1914–1915. De l’Union nationale à Zimmerwald (Genève, 1969). COLLETTE, CHRISTINE: The International Faith: The Labours’s Attitudes to European Socialism, 1918–1939 (Aldershot, 1998). CORTESI, LUIGI: Le origini del PCI, II (Roma-Bari, 1977). CROTHERS, G. D.: The German Election of 1907 (New York, 1941). CZERWIŃSKA-SCHUPP, EWA: Otto Bauer. Studien zur sozial-politischen Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main, 2005). CZUBIŃSKI, ANTON: Stanowisko socialdemocracji wobec polytiki kolonialnej II Rzeszy w latach 1876–1914 (Poznań, 1966). DAVIS, D ONALD E. / EUGENE P. TRANI: The First Cold War: The Legacy of Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations (Columbia, Mo., 2002). DE FELICE, RENZO: Mussolini il revoluzionario 1883–1920 (Torino, 1965). DELFER , LESLIE: Paul Lafargue and the Founding of French Marxism, 1842–1882 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). —: Paul Lafargue and the Flowering of French Socialism, 1882–1911 (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). DEUTSCHER , ISAAC: The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921 (London, 1953).

316

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography DRACHKOVITCH, MILORAD M. / BRANKO LAZITCH (EDS.): The Comintern: Historical Highlights (New York, 1966). DRACHKOVITCH, M. M. (ED.): The revolutionary Internationals, 1864–1943 (Stanford, 1966). DRECHSLER , HANNO: Die Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (Meisenheim am Glan, 1965). DROZ, JACQUE: Le socialisme démocratique 1864–1960 (Paris, 1966). EISNER , FREYA: Kurt Eisner: Die Politik des libertären Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1979). ELEY, GEOFF: Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000 (Oxford, 2002). ELWOOD, R. C.: Inessa Armand: Revolutionary and Feminist (Cambridge, 1992). EPSTEIN, KLAUS: Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (New York, 1971). EYCK, ERICH: Geschichte der Weimarer Republik (Erlenbach, 2. Aufl., 1957), Bd. I. FAINSOD, MERLE: International Socialism and the World War (1935. Repr.: New York, 1966). FALK, CANDACE: Love, Anarchy, and Emma Goldman: A Biography (New Brunswick, 1990). FARKAS JÓZSEF (HG.): Räterepublik und Kultur: Ungarn 1919 (Budapest, 1979). FARNSWORTH, BEATRICE: Aleksandra Kollontai: Socialism, Feminism. And the Bolshevik Revolution (Stanford, 1980). FAULENBACH, BERND / HEINRICH POTTHOFF (HG.): Die Revolution 1848/49 und die Tradition der sozialen Demokratie in Deutschland (Essen, 1999). FIEDLER , LEONHARD M., U. A.(HG.): Gustav Landauer (1870–1919). Eine Bestandsaufnahme zur Rezeption seines Werkes (Frankfurt, 1995). FINK, CAROLE, ET AL. (EDS.): Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge, 1991). FONER , PHILIP S.: History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. 2: From the Founding of the American Federation of Labor to the Emergence of American Imperialism (New York, 1955), Vol. 7: Labor and World War 1, 1914–1918 (New York, 1987). FORMAN, MICHAEL: Nationalism and the International Labor Movement: The Idea of the Nation in Socialist and Anarchist Theory (University Park, Pa., 1998). FREUND, GERALD: Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of BrestLitovsk to the Treaty of Rapallo (London, 1957). FRÖSCHL, ERICH / HELGE ZOITL (HG.): Otto Bauer (1881–1938). Theorie und Praxis (Wien, 1985).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

317

Bibliography GAMBLE, ANDREW / TONY WRIGHT (EDS.): The New Social Democracy (Oxford, 1999). GATRELL, PETER: Russia’s First world War: A social and Economic History (Harlow, UK, 2005). GAUTSCHI, WILLI: Lenin als Emigrant in der Schweiz (Zürich, 1973). GELFAND, LAWRENCE E. (ED.): Herbert Hoover: The Great War and Its Aftermath, 1914– 1923 (Iwowa City, 1979). GORDON, JR ., HAROLD J.: Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (Princeton, 1972). GRAß, MARTIN: Friedensaktivität und Neutralität. Die skandinavische Sozialdemokratie und die neutrale Zusammenarbeit im Krieg, August 1914 bis Februar 1917 (Bonn, 1975). GROSS, BABETTE: Willi Münzenberg (Stuttgart, 1967). GULICK, CHARLES A.: Austria. From Habsburg to Hitler (Berkeley, 1948). GÜNSCHE, KARL-LUDWIG / KLAUS LANTERMANN: Kleine Geschichte der Sozialistischen Internationale (Bonn, 1977). HÄFNER , LUTZ: Die Partei der Linken in der russischen Revolution von 1917/18 (Köln, 1994). HAITHCOX, JOHN P.: “The Roy-Lenin Debate on Colonial Policy”, Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII-1 (1963), 93–101. HALLGARTEN, GEORGE W. F.: Imperialismus vor 1914, 2 Bde. (2nd ed., München, 1963). HÄUPEL, BEATE: Karl Kautsky. Seine Auffassungen zur politischen Demokratie (Frankfurt am Main, 1993). HAUPT, GEORGES: “Camille Huysmans, secrétaire de la II-ème Internationale”, in: Bijdragen tot het Camille Huysmansonderzoek (Antwerpen, 1971), 25–48. —: “sozialistische Internationale”, Sowjetsystem und Demokratische Gesellschaft. Eine vergleichende Enzyklopädie, ed. C. D. Kernig, 6 vols. (Freiburg, 1966–1972), V, 1001. —/ MADLEINE REBÉRIOUX, (SUS LA DIRECITION DE): La Deuxième Internationale et l’Orient (Paris, 1967). HAUTMANN, HANS: Die Anfänge der linksradikalen Bewegung und der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschösterreichs 1916–1919 (Wien, 1970). HEATER , DEREK: National Self-Determination. Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy (New York, 1994). HECKSCHER , AUGUST: Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1991). HILDMEIER , MANFRED: The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party before the First World War (New York, 2000). HOVANNISIAN, RICHARD G.: Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times. Vol. II (New York, 20049). HOWELL, DAVID: British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1888–1906 (Manchester, 1983). HULSE, JAMES W.: The Forming of the Communist International (Stanford, 1964). HUNT, RICHARD N.: German Social Democracy, 1918–1933 (New Haven, 1964).

318

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography L’Internazionale Operaia e Socialista tra le due guerre, a cura di Enzo Colloti (Milano, 1985). Историа иторого Интернационала, I, II, Академия Наук СССР, Институт Истории (Москва, 1965–65); in German, Die Geschichte der Zweiten Internationale, 2 Bde. [Moskau, 1983]. JOLL, JAMES: The Second International, 1889–1914 (London, 1955). —: The Anarchists (London, 1969). JOST, HANS-ULRICH: Linksradikalismus in der deutschen Schweiz 1914–1918 (Bern, 1973). KATZ, HENRYK: The Emancipation of Labor. A History of the First International (New York, 1992). KENNAN, GEORGE F.: Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1956, 1958). KIRALY, BELA M.: War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. I (New York, 1982; Digitized, 1997). KIRBY, DAVID: War, Peace and Revolution. International Socialism at the Crossroads, 1914–1918 (Aldershot, 1986). KLUGMANN, JAMES: The History of the Communist Party of Great Britain; Formative and Early Years, 1919–1924 (London, 1987). KONIGK, GEORG: Die Berliner Kongo-Konferenz 1884–1885 (Essen, 1938). KONRAD, HELMUT: Nationalismus und Internationalismus: Die österreichische Arbeiterbewegung vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Wien, o.J. [1976]). KOWALSKI, WERNER , U. A.: Geschichte der Sozialistischen Arbeiter-Internationale (1923– 1940) (Berlin-0, 1985). —, U. A.: Die Sozialistische Internationale: Ihre Geschichte und Politik (Berlin-O, 1977). KRAUS, RAINER: Die Imperialismusdebatte zwischen Vladimir I. Lenin und Karl Kautsky. Eine vergleichende Analyse ihrer Theorien (Frankfurt am Main, 1978). KRAUSE, HARTFRID: USPD. Zur Geschichte der Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Frankfurt am Main, 1975). KRIEGEL, ANNIE: Aux origins du communisme français 1914–1920 (Paris, 1964. —: L’Internationales ouvrières (Paris, 1964). —: Aux origines du communisme français 1914–1920 (Paris, 1964). —: Le pain et les roses (Paris, 1968). KRIVOGUZ, IGOR: The Second International, 1889–1914 (Moscow, 1989). KRUSE, WOLFGANG: Krieg und nationale Integration. Eine Neuinterpretation des sozialdemokratischen Burgfriedensschlusses 1914/15 (Essen, 1993). KULEMANN, PETER: Am Beispiel des Austromarxismus. Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterbewegung in Österreich von Hainfeld bis zur Dolfuß-Diktatur (Hamburg, 1982). KUNZ, HANS BEATE: Weltrevolution und Vökerbund. Die schweizerische Aussenpolitik unter dem Eindruck der bolschewistischen Bedrohung 1918–1923 (Bern, 1981).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

319

Bibliography LAITY, PAUL: The British Peace Movement, 1870–1914 (Oxford, 2001). LANDAUER , CARL A.: European Socialism: A History of Ideas and Movements, 2 vols. (Berkeley, 1959). LANGKAU-ALEX, URSULA: Deutsche Volksfront 1932–1939: Zwischen Berlin Paris, Prag und Moskau, 3 Bde. (Berlin, 2004–2005). LAZITCH, BRANKO / MILORAD M. DRACHKOVITCH: Lenin and the Comintern, Vol. 1 (Stanford, 1972). LEFRANC, GEORGE: Le movement socialiste sous la Troisième République (Paris, 1963). LEICHTER , OTTO: Otto Bauer. Tragödie oder Triumph (Wien, 1970). LERNER , WARREN: Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford, 1970). LESER , NORBERT: Zwischen Reformisumus und Bolschewismus. Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis (Wien, 1968). LEVIN, JR ., N. GORDON: Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968). LIDTKE, VERNON L.: The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 19787–1890 (Princeton, 1966). LIH, LARS T.: Lenin Reconsidered: What is To Be Done? In context (Leiden, 2006). LORWIN, LEWIS: Labor and Internationalism (New York, 1929). LÖW, RAIMUND: Der Zerfall der “Kleinen Internationale”: Nationalitätenkonflikte in der Arbeiterbewegung des alten Österreich (1889–1914) (Wien, 1984). LÜBBE, PETER: Kommunismus und Sozialdemokratie (Berlin/Bonn, 1978). LUEBBERT, GREGORY M.: Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe (Oxford, 1991). LUNN, EUGENE: Prophet of Community: The Romantic socialism of Gustav Landauer (Berkeley, 1973). MARQUAND, DAVID: Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977). MASER , WERNER: Friedrich Ebert. Der erste deutsche Reichspräsident. Eine politische Biographie (München, 1987). MAYER , ARNO J.: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918 (Cleveland, 1964). —: Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919 (New York, 1967, 69). MAYER , GUSTAV: “Die Trennung der proletarischen von der bürgerlicher Demokratie” (1912), in: Radikalismus, Sozialismus und ärgerliche Demokratie, hrsg. v. HansUlrich Wehler (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). MCDERMOTT, KEVIN, / JEREMY, AGNEW: A History of International Communizm from Lenin to Stalin (London,1996). MCMEEKIN, SEAN: The Red Millionaire: A Political Biography of Willi Münzenberg, Moscow’s Secret Propaganda Tsar in the West (New Haven, 2003). MCVEY, RUTH T.: The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, 1965). MEDVEDEV, ROY A.: The October Revolution (NEW York, 1979).

320

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography MELANCON, MICHAEL: The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Anti-War Movement, 1914–1917 (Columbus, OH, 1990). The Memory of May Day, ed. By Andrea Panaccione (Venezia, 1989). MERCHAV, PERETZ: Die israelische Linke. Zionismus und Arbeiterbewegung in der Geschichte Israels (Frankfurt am Main, 1972). MEYER , THOMAS / SUSANNE MILLER / JOACHIM ROHLFES (HG.): Lern- und Arbeitsbuch deutsche Arbeiterbewegung, 3 Bde. (Bonn, 1984). MEYNELL, HILDAMARIE: “The Stockholm Conference of 1917”, IRSH, 1960, 5: 1-25, 202-225. MILLER , SUSANNE: Burgfrieden und Klassenkampf. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie im Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf, 1974). —: Die Bürde der Macht. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie 1918–1920 (Düsseldorf, 1978). —/HEINRICH POTTHOFF: Kleine Geschichte der SPD. Darstellung und Dokumentation 1848–1983 (Bonn, 1983). MINCZELES, HENRI: Histoire générale du BUND, un movement revolutionnaire juif (Paris, 1999). MOHRING, KARL: Die Sozialdemokratische Partei in Bremen 1890–1914 (Hannover, 1969). MÖLLER , DIETRICH: Karl Radek in Deutschland. Revolutionär, Intrigent, Diplomat (Köln, 1976). MOHRING, KARL-ERNST: Die Sozialdemokratische Partei in Bremen 1890–1814 (Hannover, 1968). MOMMSEN, HANS: “Die Bergarbeiterbewegung an der Ruhr 1918–1933”, Jürgen Reulecke (Hg.): Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr (Wuppertal, 1974), 296ff. MORGAN, DAVID W.: The Socialist Left and the German Revolution. A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party, 1917–1922 (Ithaca, 1975). MORGAN, KIVIN, ET AL.(EDS.): Agents of the Revolution (Oxford, 2005). NATION, R. CRAIG: War on War. Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of the Communist Internaitonal (Durham, 1989). NETTL, J.P.: Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (London, 1966). —: “The German Social Democratic Party 1890–1914 as a Political Model”, Past and Present, 1969, (30), 65–95, 1968: Magnum throughout the World, Text by Eric Hobsbawm/Marc Weitzmann (Paris, 1998). NISHIKAWA, MASAO: “Rosa Luxemburg and German politics” Shigakuzassi l960,69(2), 1–46. —: “Social Democratic Party in the Second Kaiserreich” Western world and Socialism, ed. By Japan Society of political Science, (Iwanamishoten, 1966) 59–88. —: Early Socialist Movements in Japan and the World socialist Party (Miraisha, 1985). —: First World War and the Socialists (Iwanamishoten, 1989). —: Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten (Bremen: Ed. Temmen, 1999).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

321

Bibliography —: “Karl Kautskys Beitrag zur Diskussion um eine sozialkistische Kolonialpolitik”, in: J. Rojahn u.s.w. (Hg.): Marxismus und Demokratie (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 164–173. PASTOR , PETER: Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918–1919 and the Big Three (New York, 1976). PEARSON, MICHAEL: The Sealed Train (New york,1975). PLATTEN, N. F.: “Von der Spiegelgasse in den Kreml”, Volksrecht (Zürich), 1967.3.13– 4.17. POLANSKY, JANET: The Social Democratic Socialism of Emile Vandervelde. Between Reform and Revolution (Oxford, 1995). PÖLÖSKEI, FERENC: Hungary after Two Revolutions (1919–1922)(Budapest, 1980). POPPER , K. R.: The Open Society and Its Enemies (London, 1945, 1962). PUSCHNERAT, TÂNIA: Clara Zetkin (Essen, 2003). RABEL, KURT: Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker (Köln, 1973). RAGGIONIERI, ERNESTO: Socialdemocrazia tedesca e socialisti italiani 1875–1895 (Milano, 1961). RATZ, URSULA: Georg Ledebour, 1850–1947. Weg und Wirken eines sozialistische Politikers (Berlin, 1969). REDFERN, NEIL: Class or Nation: Communists, Imperialism and Two World Wars (London, 2005). REISBERG, ARNOLD: Lenin und die Zimmerwalder Bewegung (Berlin-O, 1966). —: An den Quellen der Einheitsfrontpolitik: Der Kampf der KPD um die Aktionseinheit in Deutschland 1921–1922. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Hilfe W. I. Lenins und der Komintern für die KPD, 2 Bde. (Berlin-O, 1971). —: Von der I. zur II. Internationale. Die Durchsetzung des Marxismus im Kampf um die Wiederherstellung der Arbeiterinternationale (Berlin-0, 1980). REUTER , URSULA: Paul Singer (1844–1911). Eine politische Biographie (Düsseldorf, 2004). RIDDELL, JOHN (ED.): Founding the Communist International (New York, 1987). RITTER ,GERHARD A.: Der Sozialstaat Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich (München, 1991). ROJAHN, P. JÜRGEN: “Um die Erneuerung der Internationale: Rosa Luxemburg contra Pieter Jelles Troelstra”, IRSH, 1985, 30(1): 1–150. — ET AL. (HG.): Marxismus und Demokratie. Karl Kautskys Bedeutung in der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung (Frankfurt am Main, 1992). ROSENBERG, ALFRED: Demokratie und Sozialismus (Amsterdam, 1932) ROSENSTONE, ROBERT: Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography of Joohn Reed (New York, 1982). ROTHE, RUDOLF: “Zum Streit um die Dampfersubvention”, AFSG, I (1961), 109–118. ROTHWELL, V. H.: British War Aims and Peace Deplomacy, 1914–1918 (Oxford, 1971).

322

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography ROUSSO, HENRY (ED.): Stalinism & Nazism: History and Memory Compared (Lincoln, Neb., 2004). SABROW, MARTIN: Der Rathenaumord (München, 1994). SACHAR , HOWARD M.: Dreamland: Europeans and Jews I the Aftermath of the Great War (New York, 2003). SALVADORI, MASSIMO L.: Kautsky e la rivolusione socialista 1880/1938 (Milano, 1976). SALVEMINI, GAETANO: The Origins of Fascism in Italy (New York, 1973). SCHAPER , B. W.: Albert Thomas. Trente ans de réformiste social (Assn, 1959). SCHELZ-BRANDENBURG, TILL: Eduard Berunstein und Karl Kautsky (Köln, 1992). SCHLESINGER , RUDOLF: Die Kolonialfrage in der Kommunistischen Internationale (Frankfurt am Main, 1970). SCHMERSAL, HELMUT: Philipp Scheidemann 1865–1939. Ein vergessener sozialdemokrat (Frankurt am Main, 1999). SCHMID-AMMANN, PAUL: Die Wahrheit über den Generalstreik von 1918. Seine Ursachen, Sein Verlauf, Seine Folgen (Zürich, 1968). SCHMITT, HANS A.: Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917–1923 (Charlottesville, Va., 1988). SCHORSKE, CARL: German social Democracy, 1905–1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955). SCHRÖDER , HANS-CHRISTOPH: Sozialismus und Imperialismus. Die Auseinandersetzung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie mit dem Imperialismusproblem und der [Weltpolitik] vor 1914 (Hannover, 1968). SCHWARZWÄLDER , HERBERT: Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, II (Bremen, 1987). SENN, ALFRED ERICH: The Russian Revolution in Switzerland, 1914–1917 (Madison, 1971). SIGEL, ROBERT: Die Geschichte der Zweiten Internationale 1918–1923 (Frankfurt/M., 1986). SERVICE, ROBERT: Lenin: A Political Life, 3 vols. (Bloomington, 1985, 1991, 1995). —: Lenin: A Biography (Cambridge, Mass., 2000). SIGEL, ROBERT: Die Geschichte der Zweiten Internationale 1918–1923 (Frankfurt/M., 1986). SILBERNER , EDMUND: Sozialisten zur Judenfrage (Berlin, 1962). SILVERIO CORVISIERI (a cura di): I1 biennio rosso 1919–1920 della Terza Internazionale (Milano, 1970). SLOAM, JAMES: The European Policy of the German Socialdemocrats: Interpreting a Changing World (Houndmills, 2005) SMART, D. A. (ED.): Pannekoek and Gorter’s Marxism (London, 1978). SMITH, JEREMY: The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917–1923 (London, 1999). SPRIANO, PAOLO: Storia del Partito comunista italiano, I (Torino, 1967). STAMPFER , FRIEDRICH: Die vierzehn Jahare der ersten deutschen Republik (Karlsbad, 1936).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

323

Bibliography STEENSON, GARY P.: Karl Kautsuky, 1853–1938: Marxism in the Classical Years (Pittsburgh, 1978). STEINBERG, HANS-JOSEF: Sozialismus und deutsch Sozialdemokratie: Zur Ideologie der Partei vor dem 1. Weltkrieg (Hannover, 1969). STEINBERG, I.: Spiridonova: Revolutionary Terrorist (London, 1935). STEKLOFF, G. M.: History of the First International (1st English ed.; 1928, reissued; New York, 1968). STENGERS, JEAN: “The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo before 1914”, in Peter Duigan / L. H. Gann, Colonialism in Africa, I (Cambridge, 1969). STEVENSON, DAVID: Cataclysm: The First World War and a Political Tragedy (New York, 2004). —: 1914–1918:The History of the First world War (London, 2004). STILLIG, JÜRGEN: Die Russische Februarrevolution 1917 und die sozialistische Friedenspolitik (Köln, Wien, 1977). STACHEY, JOHN: Why You Should Be a Socialist (London, 1944). “Stockholmkonferensen 1987 om Stockholmkonferensen 1917”, Arbetarhistoria, 1988, 42(3): 3–29. SUNY, RONALD GRIGOR: The Baku Commune, 1917–1918 (Princeton, 1972). SURMANN, ROLF: Die Münzenberg-Legende. Zur Publistik der revolutionären deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1921–1933 (Köln, 1983). TALMON, J. L.: The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1955). TETZLAFF, RAINER: Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung. Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte Deutsch-Ostafrikas 1885–1914 (Berlin-W, 1970). THATCHER , IAN: Leon Trotsky and World War One, August 1914 to February 1917 (London, 2000). THOMPSON, JOHN M.: Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, 1966). THOMPSON, LEONARD: A History of South Africa (New Haven, 1990). TOBIAS, HENRY: The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its Origins to 1905 (Stanford, 1972). TRACHTENBERG, MARC: Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923 (New York, 1980). TROTNOW, HELMUT: Karl Liebknecht, Eine politische Biographie (Köln, 1980). T SUZUKI, CHUSHICHI: The Life of Eleanor Marx (Oxford, 1967). UPTON, ANTHONY F.: The Finnish Revolution, 1917–1918 (Minneapolis, 1980). VALIANI, LEO: “Dalla prima alla seconda Internazionale (1872–1889)”, Movimento Operaio, 1954, (2), 3–73. VAN DER ESCH, PATRICIA: La Deuxième Internationale 1889–1923 (Paris,1957). VAN DER SLICE, AUSTIN : International Labor, Diplomacy, and Peace, 1914–1919 (Philadelphia, 1941).

324

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Bibliography VAN GOETHEM, GEERT:

The Amsterdam International: The World of the International Federation of trade Unions (IFTU), 1913–1945 (Aldershot, 2006). VOIGT, CHRISTIAN: Robert Grimm. Kämpfer, Arbeiterführer, Parlamentarier. Eine politische Biographie (Bern, 1980). WADE, REX A.: The Russian Search for Peace: February–October 1917 (Stanford, 1969). WAGNER , F. PETER: Rudolf Hilferding: Theory and Politics of Democratic Socialism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1996). WALTER , RICHARD J.: The Socialist Party of Argentina, 1890–1930 (Austin, 1977). WARTH, ROBERT D.: The Allies and the Russian Revolution: From the Fall of the Monarchy to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (New York, 1954). WEHLER , HANS-ULRICH: Sozialdemokratie und Nationalstaat (Würzburg, 1962). WELCKER , JOHANNA M.: “Zwischen Wirklichkeit und Traum: Die Stockholmer Friedenskonferenz von 1917”, ITH-Tagungsberichte, Bd.20: 19. Linzer Konferenz 1983 (Wien, 1985), 33–68. WHEELER , ROBERT F.: “The Failure of ‘Truth and Clarity’ at Berne: Kurt Eisner, the Opposition and the Reconstruction of the International”, IRSH, 1973, 18: 173–201. —: USPD und Internationale. Sozialistischer Internationalismus in der Zeit der Revolution (Frankfurt am Main, 1975). WHEELER-BENNETT, JOHN: Brest-Litowsk. The Forgotten Peace (London, 1956). WIESSING, MATHIJS C.: Holländische Schule des Marxismus—Die Tribunisten (Hamburg, 1980). WILLARD, CLAUDE: Les Guesdistes: Le mouvement socialiste en France (1893–1905) (Paris, 1965). WILLIAMS, ERIC: From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492–1969 (New York, 1970). WILSON, EDMUND: To the Finland Station (New York, 1940). WINTER , J. M.: “Arthur Henderson, the Russian Revolution, and the Reconstruction of the Labour Party”, The Historical Journal, 1972,15(4):753–773. —: Socialism and the Challenge of War: Ideas and Politic in Britain, 1912–1918 (London, 1974). —/ANTOINE PROST: The Great war in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914–to the Present (Cambridge, 2005). WITT, PETER-CHRISTIAN: Friedrich Ebert, Parteiführer, Reichskanzler, Volksbeauftrager, Reichspräsident (Bonn, 1987). WOODCOCK, GEORGE: Anarchism (Penguin Books, 1962). WRIGLEY, CHRIS: David Lloyd George and the British Labour Movement (New York, 1976). —(ED.): Challenges of Labour: Central and Western Europe, 1917–1920 (London, 1993).

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

325

Bibliography ZEMAN, Z. A. B. / W. B. SCHARLAU: The Merchant of Revolution: The Life of Alxander Israel Helphand (Parvus), 1867–1924 (London, 1965). ZIEBRA, GILBERT: Leon Blum: Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik, Bd. I (Berlin, 1963).

326

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Source of Illustrations

Source of Illustrations 1: Rosa Luxemburg, Briefe aus dem Gefängnis (Berlin-O,1950) 2, 3, 7, 29, 33, 35, 38, 40, 42, 44, 47, 49, 52, 54, 60, 63, 64: Julius Braunthal, Geschichte der Internationale, Bd. I, II (Hannover, 1961, 1963). Most of them are owned by IISG. 4, 6, 8, 61: Internationalen. Festskrift (Malmö, 1910). 5: Alexandra Kollontai, Mein Leben in der Diplomatie (Berlin, 2003). 9: Louise Dornemann, Clara Zetkin (Berlin-O, 1957). 10: Michael Pearson, Lenin’s Mistress: The Life of Inessa Armand (New York, 2001). 11: Russian Empire in Photographs http://all-photo.ru/empire. 12: Annelies Laschitza, Karl Liebknecht. Eine Biographie in Dokumenten (Berlin-O, 1982). 13: Henriette Roland Holst (‘s-Gravenhave, 1970). 14: Taken by M. Nishikawa in 1976. 15: http://www.ansers.com. 16: Kenneth Calkins, Hugo Haase (Berlin, 1976). 17, 19, 20, 28: Die Stockholmer Friedenskonferenz von 1917, aus Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, Stockholm. 18: Undervisningsministeriets historie http://sekr.uvm.dk/histoie. 21: Angelica Balabanoff, Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse (Berlin, 1927). 22, 23: Rex A. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace, February–October 1917 (Stanford, 1969). 24: Arno J. Mayer, Lenin vs. Wilson (Meridian edition, 1964). 25, 31: http://www.nnab.com. 26: Werner Maser, Friedrich Ebert (München, 1987). 27, 32, 46, 48: Lebendiges virtuelles Museum Online http://www.dhm.de. 30: Rudolph Herz / Dirk Halfbrodt, Revolution und Fotographie. München 1918/1919 (Berlin, 1988). 34: L’Office universitaire de recherché socialiste http://www.lours.org/default.asp?pid=2. 37: Spartacus Educational http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk. 39: Royden J. Harrison, The Life and Times of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 1858–1905: The Formative Years (New York, 2001). 41: LPA, LSI, 10/3/3i,vi. 43: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image. 45: Candace Falk, Love, anarchy, and Emma Goldman (New Brunswick, 1990). 50: Hans J. L.Adolph, Otto Wels und die Politik der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1894– 1939 (Berlin, 1971). 51: IISG, LSI, 89/1,1a.

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

327

Source of Illustrations 53: Otto Leichter, Otto Bauer. Tragödie oder Triumph (Wien, 1970). 55: Till Schelz-Brandenburg, Eduard Bernstein und Karl Kautsky (Köln, 1992). 56: 1863–1963 Hundert Jahre deutsche socizaldemokrtie. Bilder und Dokumente, hrsg.v. Georg Eckert (Hannover, 1963). 57: IISG. 58, 62: Biografisch Woordenboek van het Socialisme en de arbeidersbeweging in Nederland http://www.iisg.nl.bwsa. 59: Helmut Hirsch, August Bebel (Reinbek b.Hamburg, 1973).

328

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Abbreviations

Abbreviations BSI CGT Comintern IFTU ILP ISK LP PCI RSDLP SDAP SDKPiL SFIO SPD SPÖ USPD AfSG IRSH NZ SM IML/ZKdSED

Bureau Socialiste International Confédération Géenérale du Travail Communist International International Federation of Trade Unions Independent Labour Party Internationale Sozialistische Kommission Labour Party Partito Communista Italiano Russia Social Democratic Labour Party Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij Socjaldemokracja Krolestwa Polskiego i Litwy Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvriére Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in Österreich Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Archiv für Sozialgeschichte International Review of Social History Die Neue Zeit Sozialistische Monatshefte Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

329

Index of Name

Index of Name Abramowitch, Raphael (1880–1963) Adler, Friedrich (Fritz) (1879–1960)

Adler, Victor (1852–1918) Albarda, Johan Willem (1877–1957) Almand, Inessa (1874–1920) Axelrod, Pavel (1850–1928)

Babeuf, François Émile (1760–1797) Bakunin, Mikhail (1814–1876) Balabanoff, Angelica (1878–1965) Baratono, Adelchi (1875–1947) Bauer, Otto (1881–1938) Bebel, August (1840–1913) Beneš, Edvard (1884–1948) Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932)

Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von (1856–1921) Bevin, Ernest (1881–1951) Bissolati, Leonida (1857–1920)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

142, 165, 192, 203, 204, 208, 209 32, 45, 49, 74, 76, 80, 83, 85, 97, 108, 119, 134, 137, 141, 142–144, 146, 151, 152, 154, 156, 161, 162, 163–165, 172, 174–179, 183, 184, 190–192, 194– 197, 199, 201, 202, 204, 205, 208, 211–214, 234, 236 22, 31, 32, 80, 108 255 37 24, 36, 38, 56, 62, 72, 75, 83, 108, 115, 234 224 15, 107 38, 39, 42, 59, 61, 98 165 141, 142, 165, 171, 199, 208–210, 212 15, 218, 219, 221, 225, 228 203 69, 74, 83, 107, 121, 125, 131, 223, 225–227, 232, 239, 242, 243 53 164 76, 268

331

Index of Name Blum, Léon (1872–1950) Borchardt, Julian (1868–1932) Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) Borgbjerg, Frederik (1866–1936) Born, Stephan (1824–1898) Bracke, Alexandre (Alexandre Desrousseaux) (1861–1955) Brailsford, Henry Noel (1873–1958) Brandt, Willy (1913–1992) Branting, Karl Hjalmar (1860–1925)

Braun, Adolf (1862–1929) Bujanowicz (unknown) Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938) Buonarotti, Filippo Michele (1751–1837) Cachin, Marcel (1869–1958) Canepa, Giuseppe (1865–1948) Casement, Sir Roger David (1864–1916) Cecil, Lord Robert (1864–1958) Čermák, Karl (1881–1924) Chkheidze, Nikolay (1864–1926) Cho, So-ang (1887–19?) (unknown) Clemenceau, Georges (1841–1929) Compère-Morel, Adéodat (1872–1941) Cox, Margaret (unknown) Crispien, Arthur (1875–1946)

Cuno, Wilhelm (1876–1933) Czapiński, Kazimierz (1882–1941)

332

197, 210, 211 40 140, 160, 165 54 217 165, 177, 183, 192, 212 211 239 21, 28, 38, 49, 75, 82, 89, 91, 103, 116, 122, 131, 133, 136, 147, 151, 157, 158, 160, 212, 133 164 162 162 125 74, 139, 214 112 171 91 141, 142, 165, 203 56 120, 270 53, 72, 82 165 164 108, 113, 117, 138, 141, 142, 145, 163, 177, 183– 185, 190, 192, 199, 200, 203 193 124

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Index of Name Däumig, Ernst (1866–1922) De Broukère, Louis (1870–1951) De Man, Hendrik (1885–1953) Denikin, Anton (1872–1947) Dimitrov, Georgii Mikhailovich (1882–1949) Dittmann, Wilhelm (1874–1954) Dollfuß, Engelbert (1892–1934) Dyer, General Reginald E. H. (1864–1927)

108, 115, 131, 148, 157, 161 164 102 74, 214 142, 165 209 172

Eberlein, Hugo (1887–1944) Ebert, Friedrich (1871–1925) Eisner, Kurt (1867–1919) Ellenbogen, Wilhelm (1863–1951) Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895) Erzberger, Matthias (1875–1921)

98 71, 77, 130, 193 74, 78, 80 142 107, 210, 223, 226, 243 53, 147, 156

Faure, Paul (1878–1960)

74, 139, 141, 142, 145, 153, 158, 160, 165, 167, 168, 179, 180, 197, 203 183 165 116 219 74, 76, 108, 139, 165

Fimmen, Eduard Carl (1881–1941) Fioritto, Domenico (1872–1952) Friedrich, István (1883–1951) Fritzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1825–1905) Frossard, Louis-Oscar (1889–1946) Gavronsky, D. G. (unknown) Gillies, William (1885–1958) Goldman, Emma (1869–1940) Goledenberg, Petrovich (1873–1922) Gompers, Samuel (1850–1924) Gorky, Maxim (1868–1936) Gorter, Herman (1864–1927) Gosling, Harry (1861–1930) Graber, Ernest-Paul (1875–1956) Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

138

83 103, 133, 164 279 56 67, 72 154 133, 164, 181, 212 136, 183, 201 140, 160

333

Index of Name Greulich, Hermann (1842–1925) Grimm, Robert (1881–1958)

Grumbach, Salomon (1884–1952) Haase, Hugo (1863–1919) Haffner, Sebastian (Raimund Pretzel) (1907–1999) Hamon, Augustin (1862–1945) Hardie, James Keir (1856–1915) Harding, Warren Gamaliel (1865–1923) Heckert, Fritz (1884–1936) Henderson, Arthur (1863–1935)

Hilferding, Rudolf (1877–1941) Hillquit, Morris (1869–1933) Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) Hoffmann, Arthur (1857–1927) Hoover, Herbert Clark (1874–1964) Horthy, Nagymányai Miklós (1868–1957) Hrushevski, Mykhajlo (1866–1934) Huggler, August (1877–1944) Humbert-Droz, Jules (1891–1971) Huysmans, Camille (1871–1968)

334

35, 36, 44, 201 21, 22, 25, 36, 38, 39, 42– 47, 49, 52, 59–61, 76, 139, 141, 142, 155, 162, 165, 183, 200, 201 74, 115, 161 45, 53, 74, 79, 91, 104, 139 193 27 30, 31, 80 95 177 33, 53, 54, 58, 66, 67, 71–73, 75, 77, 81, 84, 85, 89, 92, 94, 95, 102–106, 109, 115, 116, 119, 122, 123, 131, 133, 134, 137, 147, 149, 151–153, 154, 156, 158, 180, 183, 189, 191, 196, 198, 208, 212, 233 45, 107, 109, 117, 126, 138, 141, 142, 190, 209, 210 19, 48, 187, 203 193, 198, 208, 214, 235 59 154 116, 144, 173, 208, 209 109 141 117 23, 29, 35, 36, 48–50, 54, 56, 57, 59, 68, 75, 77, 84, 89, 90, 94, 102, 103, 115, 116, 120, 121, 123, 128,

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Index of Name

Hyndman, Henry Mayers (1842–1921) Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914) Jogiches, Leo (Jan Tyszka) (1867–1919) Johnson, Francis (unknown) Jouhaux, Léon (1879–1954) Jowett, Fred (1864–1944) Justo, Juan B. (1865–1928) Kalnins, Pauls (1872–1945) Kaplansky, Shlomo (1884–1950) Kapp, Wofgang (1858–1922) Károlyi, Miháli (1875–1955) Katayama, Sen (1860–1933) Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)

Kemal, Mustafa Atatürk (1881–1938) Kerensky, Alexander F. (1881–1970) Knudsen, Christian Holtermann (1845–1929) Kollontai, Aleksandra (1872–1952) Koritschoner, Franz (1892–1941) Kornilov (1870–1918) Krupskaya, Nadezhda (1869–1939) Kun, Béla (1886–1937) Kunfi, Zsigmond (1879–1929) La Fontaine, Henri (1854–1943) Landauer, Gustav (1870–1919) Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825–1964)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

131, 133, 151, 157, 160, 162, 164, 191, 196, 211 230 15, 78, 80, 123, 124, 228, 231 41, 98 141 194, 195 155 74 165 108, 112, 165 130 101 165, 183 32, 38, 40, 43, 45, 53, 69, 74, 80, 81, 83, 94, 99, 117, 126, 138, 189, 213, 223, 226, 230, 232, 237 189 60, 72, 78 28 24, 340 45 60 37 101 75, 144, 145, 209 123 218, 219, 221, 226, 242

335

Index of Name Ledebour, Georg (1850–1947)

Lederer, Emil (1882–1939) Legien, Carl (1861–1920) Leipart, Theodor (1867–1947) Lenin, Vladimir Iliich (1870–1924)

Levi, Paul (1883–1930) Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919) Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865) Lindström, Rickard (unknown) Lipinski, Richard (1867–1933) Litvinov, Maxim (1876–1951) Lloyd George, David (1863–1945) Locker, B. (unknown) Longuet, Jean (1876–1938)

Loriot, Fernand (1870–1932) Ludendorf, Erich (1865–1937) Lütkens, Gerhard (1895–1955) Luxemburg, Rosa (Róża Luksemburg) (1871–1919)

MacDonald, James Ramsay (1867–1937)

336

39, 41, 42, 62, 414, 142, 155, 157, 162, 163, 187, 189, 190, 194, 203–205 126 130 195 17, 22–24, 29, 31, 37–42, 51, 52, 56, 60–63, 65, 68, 84, 96–99, 108, 113, 117, 124, 139, 159, 170, 175, 213, 231, 232, 234, 235, 237 159, 161, 162, 234 20, 32, 36, 39, 52, 71, 80, 98, 101, 167, 236 216 158 142 31 53, 72, 82, 84, 89, 91, 95 165 72, 74, 84, 91, 94, 103, 109, 138, 139, 141–143, 155, 162, 165, 183, 197, 200 74, 83 53 164 17, 20, 21, 24, 39, 41–45, 71, 80, 83, 84, 96–99, 101, 168, 170, 173, 213, 227, 231, 234, 236, 243 33, 75, 81, 82, 85, 89, 91, 94, 95, 105, 109, 111, 121, 131, 133, 134, 136–139, 141,

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Index of Name

Martov, Julius (1873–1923) Marx, Karl (1818–1883) Matteotti, Giacomo (1885–1924) Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872) Merrheim, Alphonse (1871–1923) Mistral, Paul (1872–1932) Modigliani, Giuseppe Emanuele (1872–1947) Molkenbuhr, Hermann (1851–1927) Möller, Gustav (1884–1970) Morel, Edward (1873–1924) Morgari, Oddino (1865–1929) Müller, Hermann (1876–1931) Münzenberg, Willi (1889–1940) Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945)

142, 146, 148, 151, 154, 155, 157, 158, 164, 169, 171, 172, 174–183, 186, 187, 196, 199, 213, 133, 234 24, 36, 38, 39, 41, 45, 134, 141, 142, 165, 179, 192 15, 107, 125, 146, 208, 210, 221, 223, 235, 241 197, 198 15 39, 41, 42 108, 142 196, 204, 209 74, 104, 121, 128 164 234 35, 38, 39, 42 74, 77–80, 81, 91, 147, 148 38, 153, 154 21, 36, 38, 102, 118, 187, 198, 208, 213

Naine, Charles (1874–1926) Naoroji, Dadabhai (1825–1917) Němec, Antonín (1858–1926) Nieuwenhuis, Ferdinand Domela (1846–1919) Noske, Gustav (1868–1946)

42, 142 230 72 223 101, 108, 111, 130, 137, 202

Oudegeest, Jan (1870–1950) Owen, Robert (1771–1858)

154, 183, 198 216

Paderewski, Ignacy Jan (1860–1941) Pannekoek, Anton (1873–1960) Parvus-Helphand, Alexander (1867–1924)

102 43 52

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

337

Index of Name Peidl, Gyula (1873–1943) Petlura, Symon (1879–1926) Piłsudski, Józef (1867–1935) Platten, Fritz (1883–1942) Plekhanov, Georgii Valentinovic (1856–1918) Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1965)

116 169 102, 204 52, 117 80, 183, 232 15, 125, 224

Radek, Karl (Sobelsohn) (1885–1939)

40, 43, 44, 60–62, 159, 161, 163, 165, 168–170, 172, 173, 175–178 126, 147, 181, 184, 188 141 74, 78, 82, 83, 91, 94, 103, 105, 109, 142, 158, 162, 190, 197 216, 227 43, 164 141 165 235 31, 75, 83, 121, 122, 153, 234

Rathnau, Walther (1967–1922) Reinhard, Ernst (1889–1947) Renaudel, Pierre (1871–1935)

Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794) Roland Holst, Henriette (1869–1952) Rosenfeld, Kurt (1877–1943) Rosmer, Alfred (1877–1964) Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778) Rubanovich, I.A. (1860–1920) Scheidemann, Philipp (1865–1939) Schiff, Viktor (1895–1953) Schneider, Friedrich (1874–1957) Schreider, Alexander (unknown) Schulze-Delitzsch, Hermann (1808–1883) Serrati, Giacinto Menotti (1876–1926) Shaw, Tom (1872–1938)

Shinwell, Emanuel (1884–1986)

338

69, 77, 121, 130 164 201 145, 165, 179 218, 219 39, 118, 140, 160, 162, 165, 170, 171, 179 121, 122, 123, 130, 133, 149, 155, 157, 160, 162, 164, 167, 183, 184, 186, 190, 191, 192, 194, 196– 198, 202, 208, 212 141, 142, 145, 156

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Index of Name Šmeral, Bohumir (1880–1941) Smiles, Samuel (1812–1904) Snowden, Ethel (Mrs. Philip Snowden) (1881–1951) Sonnemann, Leopold (1831–1909) Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich (1879–1953) Stampfer, Friedrich (1874–1957) Stauning, Thorvald (1873–1942) Steinberg, Isaac (1888–1957) Stojanowits (unknown) Stuart–Bunning, George Harald (unknown) Stürgkh, Karl (1859–1916) Sukhomlin, Vasily (1885–unknown) Thalheimer, Berta (1884–1948) Thomas, Albert (1878–1932) Thomas, James Henry (1874–1949) Thorez, Maurice (1900–1964) Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964) Toller, Ernst (1893–1939) Tomaso, Antonio de (1889–unknown) Topalović, Živko (1886–1972) Treves, Claudio (1869–1933) Troelstra, Pieter Jelles (1860–1930) Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940) Tsereteli, Irakli (1881–1959) Turati, Filippo (1857–1932) Vaillant, Èdouard (1840–1915) Van Kol, Hendrik Hubert (1851–1925) Vandervelde, Émile (1866–1938)

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

165 217 74, 75, 90, 116, 121, 125 219 46, 56, 235 121 23, 28, 38, 48, 49, 54, 122, 131, 157, 158, 164, 176, 192 202, 204 165 75, 91, 94 45 75, 111 39, 44 54, 58, 60, 67, 74, 77–79, 82 131, 133, 149, 183 214 160 209 134 145 160, 196 20, 23, 24, 43, 49, 72, 75, 80, 108, 109, 121, 125, 130, 131 39, 41, 65, 233 56, 60, 115, 164, 172, 173 118, 134, 138, 140, 198 30, 31 81, 94, 121, 230 19, 23, 30, 31, 35, 47, 48, 50, 54, 67, 75, 104, 121, 124, 130, 133, 157, 158,

339

Index of Name

Vliegen, Willem Hubert (1862–1947) Vujović, Voja (1887–1986) Walecki, Henryk (1877–1937) Wallhead, R. C. (1869–1934) Warski, A. (Adolf Jerzy Warszawski) (1868–1937) Webb, Beatrice (1858–1943) Webb, Sidney James (1859–1947) Wels, Otto (1873–1939)

Wibaut, Florentinus Marinus (1859–1936) Wilson, Woodrow (1856–1924)

Wirth, Joseph (1879–1956) Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933) Zietz, Luise (1865–1922) Zinoviev, Grigorii (1883–1936)

340

161, 162, 164, 167–169, 171, 172, 174, 189–192, 196, 201, 211, 212, 214 106, 109, 113, 121, 122, 164 165 38 141, 142, 155, 165, 183, 184, 192 38, 165 121 121, 129, 209 74, 78, 79, 91, 105–107, 117, 121, 124, 130, 148, 151, 154, 157, 158, 160, 162, 164, 174–177, 184, 192, 194, 208, 209 21, 75, 121 52, 54, 62, 63, 67, 71, 73, 76, 82, 84, 92, 93, 95, 106, 111, 210, 233 183, 193 36–38, 41, 159, 163, 165, 166, 169, 177, 178, 228 142 38, 45, 139, 144, 159, 167

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

Short Biography of Masao Nishikawa

Masao Nishikawa (15.7.1933–28.1.2008)

Masao Nishikawa was born in Tokyo in 1933, the year Adolf Hitler came power. When he was in his second year of primary school, Japan and the U.S. went to war. He was educated under militarism during the war, but democracy returned to the country with the end of the war. In 1952, he entered University of Tokyo, and majored western history in the Faculty of Letters. While he was enrolled in the doctorate course of the Graduate School of Human Science, University of Tokyo, he studied for three years (1959–1962) in the United States under Dr. George W. F. Hallgarten, author of Imperialismus vor 1914. He taught western history at the Tokyo Women’s Christian College (1966–1968), the University of Tokyo (1968–1994) and Senshū University (1994–2004). Upon retirement, he was made professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo. Over these years, he was also visiting professor, from 1976 to 1977 at Ruhr University Bochum, and from October 1988 to February 1989 at University of Bremen. Nishikawa specialized in modern German history, particularly socialist and fascist movements in Germany. He wrote his first article “Rosa Luxemburg and German Politics” for publication in Shigaku-zasshi (69-2) in 1960. On fascism, he wrote the article “Adolf Hitler’s Rise to Power” published in Shisō (512) in 1967. From the late 1960s onward, he developed a lasting interest in international socialist movements, a theme on which he produced the following three works: Shokishakaishugiunsdō to bankoku shakaitō [Early Socialist Movements in Japan and the World Socialist Party] (1985); Daiichiji sekaitaisen to shakaishugishatachi [First World War and the Socialists] (1989) and its German translation, Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Sozialisten (1999); and Daini intānashonaru no gunszō 1914–1923 [Portraits of Socialist International Leaders 1914–1923] (2007). The present volume is an English translation of the third work, which became his final endeavor. He also compiled A Guidebook for German Historical Studies (1984) and edited Dictionary of World History (2001). As a member of the Rekishigaku kenkyūkai (The Historical Science Society of Japan) editorial board, he over-

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur

341

Short Biography of Masao Nishikawa saw the production of 13 volumes of the World History series (1995–1996), as well as 12 volumes of the Documents of World History series (2006– ). In 1982, when the Japanese government forced historians to rewrite school textbooks to obfuscate facts surrounding the Japanese invasion of Asian countries, Nishikawa following the example of a German-Polish conference on school textbooks organized an Asian historians’ symposium on what should be taught in history classes. He argued that government censorship of textbooks should be totally abolished, and that historians’ work should be independent of government and political interests. He was an active member of the International Conference of Historians of Labor Movement (Linz Conference) by which he had the honor of being conferred the Victor Adler Prize in 1985. Junko Nishikawa (Professor Emerita, Dokkyō University)

342

© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur