Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials: Emerging from the Political Shadows of Strongmen (SpringerBriefs in Political Science) 3030885453, 9783030885458

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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Adegbola Ojo

Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials Emerging from the Political Shadows of Strongmen 123

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Adegbola Ojo

Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials Emerging from the Political Shadows of Strongmen

Adegbola Ojo School of Geography University of Lincoln Lincoln, Lincolnshire, UK

ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Political Science ISBN 978-3-030-88545-8 ISBN 978-3-030-88546-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88546-5 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

“This book breaks new ground in examining the part that millennials might play in reforming governance in African states. The book is especially welcome at a time when the credentials of many elderly African leaders are being questioned as never before—perhaps this is the era of the ‘African Spring’—and the restlessness of young Africans seems to increase by the day. The author provides a strong conceptual foundation for the book, deftly handling the central notions of governance, millennials, aspirations, democracy, nationalism and leadership. A striking element of the book is its innovative methodology, focusing on quantitative analysis of big data on 29,000 millennials’ attitudes across 36 African countries. Building on the recognised expertise of Dr Ojo, this quantitative approach is a major contribution to the literature and a special selling point for the book. The central argument is that African states need to reflect the voice of the upcoming generations rather than the voice of the elderly elites currently clinging to power often by force, electoral manipulation and corruption. Dr Ojo may sometimes seem controversial or even provocative—for instance, some young people in African countries might be indignant at being characterised as anti-democratic nationalists or as exhibiting colonial cravings—but he is to be commended for having the courage of his determination to go wherever the data points. The governance of African states is widely taught in universities across the world, either in dedicated modules on African politics or as part of comparative politics modules. I have no doubt that this book will quickly find its rightful place in the libraries and curricula of these institutions and that it will also appeal to a general readership interested in following the exciting political journey of Africa’s young millennials.” —Tim Gray, Emeritus Professor of Political Thought, Newcastle University “This important book links the complexities of contemporary politics in Africa to the particularities of youth activism in a continent with one of the fastest growing populations of young people. The essays successfully combine the anguish of dysfunctional leadership and decadent institutions with the optimism of renewal, announcing a renaissance of genius, commitment and fresh assertive voices of hope. The book compellingly and adroitly communicates the expansive possibilities of still

unfolding and unpredictable processes capable of creating a new Africa, a new light and a new horizon.” —Toyin Falola, University Distinguished Teaching Professor and Chair in the Humanities, the University of Texas and author of Nigerian Political Modernity and Postcolonial Predicaments

This book is dedicated to the memory of my loving father-in-law, Chief Ademola Adedeji Ashiru who sadly passed away during the production of the work. In addition to being a great source of inspiration for me, Chief Ashiru was a lover of deep intellectual research and firm believer in a progressive and prosperous Africa for future generations. Chief Ashiru contributed to the research showcased in this book and he was involved in several stimulating conversations that helped to shape my thoughts throughout the project.

Foreword

Across Africa, young people have always considered themselves as the neglected majority in an unjust social order. The bright future they eagerly looked forward to while they were in school suddenly evaporated, and they are faced with a present and future of uncertainty. The sad reality is that, unless immediately addressed, this trend is most likely to continue and may even get worse. A question that is frequently asked, often rhetorically, is ‘who is wrong in the management of young people’s affairs in Africa’. With due respect to those who address this problem from this angle, I beg to differ. The issue, to me, is not ‘who is wrong’, but rather, ‘what is wrong’. This is because knowing who is wrong may only result in rebuking individuals or a group of people, but rather, knowing what is wrong may result in correcting what is wrong and guide against the future occurrence of ‘what is wrong’. In my opinion, ‘what is wrong’ is a situation where culture has dictated that a segment of the population should not challenge the mundane view of older population just because of the biological accident of being younger; where young people are not being consulted in the discussions of issues that relate to them; where even young people are willing to mortgage their future because of the pittance that they get as daily-paid thugs of political elites; where young people who work as civil servants in government ministries operate more as ‘evil servants’. The list is endless. It is against this background that Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials: Emerging From the Political Shadows of Strongmen by Adegbola Ojo is a welcome intervention to our understanding of what young people across the African continent actually desire and how their aspirations could be met. This book could not have come at a better time. The divide and inequalities have never been this pronounced, bad and dangerous in the history of the continent. We now have a population that can be categorised as ‘The Left-Behinds’, and they are ravaging the continent with vengeance. The 1990s saw the outcome of this in West African countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and presently many countries across the continent are witnessing young people asking fundamental questions about how they should be governed. ix

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Foreword

I am of the very strong opinion that the author should be thanked for bringing out this neglected dimension of our continental challenge. While, of course, his book will not address all the challenges facing young people across the continent (none will ever), it has raised some fundamental questions about what is happening and suggested ways of how the challenge can be addressed. He has identified and effectively addressed a major continental challenge, and for this, he deserves our gratitude. King’s College, London, UK

Abiodun Alao

Preface

There is broad consensus among policy makers, the academic community, and civilsociety representatives that the current African political class have not succeeded in their mission to build nations characterised by justice and progress. The African continent is predominantly populated by young people and young Africans are taking a stand against the current politics in their nations. They are attempting to prepare the way for societies that are less hierarchical by establishing new youth movements from urban cultures and suburban areas. African stakeholders are obsessed with talking about the “youth bulge”, but little attention is paid to “how” young Africans wish to be governed. Consequently, there is a yawning knowledge gap about the governance aspirations of young Africans. Given the demographic configuration of the African continent, it is almost impossible to effectively open up development without adequately considering the governance aspirations of young people. The large numbers of young Africans offer the nations across the continent the potential to achieve rapid economic growth and social transformation. Secondly, if Africa’s demographic dividend is maximised by understanding aspirations of its youthful population and providing supportive governance environments, this can translate into a reduction of dependency ratio (ratio of those not in the labour force and those in the labour force) across the continent. Reduced dependency ratio combined with policies that nurture health and education while also promoting employment opportunities can ultimately translate into more sustainable development. Most of the existing works about millennials in Africa simply focus on the subject of the continent’s youth bulge. Current debates centre on whether this could translate into a demographic dividend or disaster for Africa. No comprehensive work has examined the future political and leadership implications of Africa’s youth bulge. Consequently, there is an expanding appetite for a book that unravels the subject using provocative and current examples. This book stands out from the crowd because it provides a far richer narrative that delivers meaning to audiences from the southern and northern hemispheres.

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Preface

By threading through the intrinsic relationship of colonialism with the emergence of political strongmen, and the failures in leadership and governance in “independent” countries in Africa, the book adopts a rigorous diagnostic approach to Africa’s daunting challenges and systematically proffers solutions. Through dynamic analysis, this book shares unique perspectives and insights on leadership and governance behaviour and citizens’ expectations, in the hope that Africa will reimagine itself in the face of global dynamics, such that emerging young African leaders will indeed be the source of inspiration and excitement to citizens regarding what is possible in Africa. It is from such an environment that the new generation of African leaders would find the platform and have the credibility of their behaviour and convictions to engage the world regarding global threats and fairer global systems to benefit all humanity. Lincolnshire, UK

Adegbola Ojo

Acknowledgements

This book is a product of an intellectual journey that began from rich conversations with three friends and colleagues—Dr David Kieghe, Emeka Ibeh, and Juliana Akuawunwa Ojinnaka-Osammor. These three people are the most important supporters of this work. Their constructive suggestions helped me to sharpen my thoughts on several issues subsumed within this book and I am forever indebted to them. I am also grateful to numerous contributors to the research that yielded rich insights discussed in the book. Without the enthusiastic and cheerful encouragement from Niko Chtouris (Springer), the publishing journey may never have commenced. I am grateful to him. I also wish to extend my sincere appreciation to all the reviewers of my book proposal. Finally, I am forever indebted to my wife (Funmilola) and my children (Damilola, Oladapo, and Aderinsola) for their encouragement and support. These are my heroes and I owe much to them. Although every effort has been made to ensure that the account given in this book is error-free, I recognise that it is not unlikely that there may be some omissions. The opinions expressed in this book are solely those of the author.

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Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Overview of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Why this Book Was Written . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Who Should Read this Book? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 A Note on Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

1 1 3 4 5 6 7 8

2

Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Aspiration and Realities of the Young African . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Revisiting the Concept of Aspiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Hopes, Fears, and Realities of Young Africans . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Traditions and Institutions as Pillars of Governance . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Fragile States Index (FSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Impact of Poor Leadership on African Millennials . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11 11 11 13 16 21 23 24 27 28 28

Understanding Political Strongmen and Rising Out of Their Shadows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Origins of Strongman Mentality in African Leadership Spaces . . 3.2 The Mindset of the Typical African Strongman . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Power Acquisition Mindset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Survival Mindset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Populist and Celebrity-Style Mindset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.4 Private Benefits Acquisition Mindset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 How Strongmen Consolidate Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33 33 35 41 42 43 43 44

3

. . . . . . . .

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Contents

3.4

Why Is It Difficult for Young Africans to Unseat Strongmen? . . 3.4.1 Lack of Internal Democracy within Existing Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Politics of Patronage and Godfatherism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Illegal Use of State Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.4 Erosion of Confidence in Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.5 Compromising the Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.6 Exploitation of Power of Incumbency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.7 Diminishing Mainstream Publicity Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.8 Divide-and-Rule Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.9 Attempts to Distort Corruption Narratives . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

5

.

46

. . . . . . . . . . .

47 47 47 48 48 48 49 49 49 50 50

Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African Millennials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Social Revolutions: A Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Data Preparation and Methodological Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Dependent Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Predictor Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Statistical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Continental Predictors of Social Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Descriptive Characteristics of Study Participants . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Logistic Regression Analysis Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 General Discussion and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53 53 54 56 58 61 62 62 65 68 70 71

Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance Aspirations of Millennials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 A New Approach for Evaluating Governance Aspirations of Young People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Governance Aspiration Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Analytics for Mapping and Profiling Governance Aspiration People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Emerging Geographical Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Anti-Democratic Nationalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Afropolitan Melting Pot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 Pro-Democratic Nationalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Hybrid Anti-military Polities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 Colonial Cravings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.

73

. . .

73 74 75

. . . . . . . . .

79 84 91 91 92 93 94 94 95

Contents

6

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Recognising the Power of Millennials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Organising the Power of Millennials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Concluding Thoughts: Young Africans Must Avoid Familiar Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Culture of Low Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Absence of Compromises and Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Lopsided Ethno-Religious Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 Ideological Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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97 97 99 100 100 100 101 101 103

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

About the Author

Adegbola Ojo is Director of Teaching and Learning and Programme Leader at the School of Geography, University of Lincoln, UK. He sits on the Management Group of the Lincoln Centre for Water and Planetary Health and he is a member of the UKNigeria Diaspora Covid-19 Response Consortium. Adegbola is part of the Advisory Board of the African International Documentary Festival Foundation (AFIDFF). He is also Director of Innovation, Enterprise and Knowledge Exchange at AFIDFF. Adegbola is a member of the International Advisory Board (IAB) and College of Collaborating Experts, Dominican University, Nigeria. He has held scholarly positions in various higher education institutions, and he combines his academic proficiency with a wealth of experience gained from industry practice. He received his PhD in Quantitative Human Geography from the University of Sheffield, his MSc in Geographic Information Science from the University College London and his BSc in Geography and Planning Sciences from the University of Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria. His research embraces novel transdisciplinary practices for understanding and responding to the complexities of humanitarian science, social justice and societal prosperity. He has published books, monographs, evidence reports and research articles with reputable journals. Outside his academic and research activities, he continues to actively involve himself in voluntary and charitable work with various organisations in the southern and northern hemispheres.

xix

Abbreviations

AFDB AGF AGI APC APRM AU BPOA CAST CDD CIA CPDM DARU DfID EAC ECA ECOWAS FFP FSI GSDRC IDS IGAD IIAG IJR ILO IREEP LDCs MDGs MIF NEPAD NGO

African Development Bank Africa Governance Forum Africa Governance Inventory All Progressives Congress African Peer Review Mechanism African Union Brussels Programme of Action Conflict Assessment System Tool Centre for Democratic Development Central Intelligence Agency Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement Democracy in Africa Research Unit Department for International Development East African Community Economic Commission for Africa Economic Community of West African States Fund for Peace Fragile States Index Governance and Social Development Resource Centre Institute for Development Studies Intergovernmental Authority on Development Ibrahim Index of African Governance Institute for Justice and Reconciliation International Labour Organisation Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy Least Developed Countries Millennium Development Goals Mo Ibrahim Foundation New Partnership for Africa’s Development Non-governmental Organisation xxi

xxii

OAU OECD PDP SADC SDGs UN UN-DESA UNDP UNESCO UNFPA UN-Habitat WGI WHO WPP

Abbreviations

Organisation of African Unity Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development People’s Democratic Party Southern African Development Community Sustainable Development Goals United Nations United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation United Nations Population Fund United Nations Human Settlements Programme Worldwide Governance Indicators World Health Organisation World Population Prospects

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1

Overview of the Book

The African continent is predominantly populated by young people (Drummond et al., 2014). By the beginning of 2035, the number of young Africans reaching working age will exceed the combined total for the rest of the world (UN-DESA, 2019). This trend is expected to continue every year for the rest of the current century. Estimates also indicate that by 2050, one in every four humans on Earth will be African and by the end of the century, Africans will account for 40% of the world’s population (UN-DESA, 2019). There is growing recognition that Africa’s impending demographic dividend will add to its economic significance (Ojo, 2020). For instance, evidence shows that since 2000, roughly 50% of the countries in the world with the highest annual growth rate are located in Africa (Signe, 2018). Similarly, it is expected that 4 in 10 Africans will join the ranks of the global middle and upper classes by the end of the present decade (Signe, 2018). Furthermore, by 2030 household consumption would have grown to $2.5 trillion, more than double the figure of $1.1 trillion in 2015 (Signe, 2018). Despite its rising economic significance, the rapid change being experienced across Africa also presents monumental challenges that are not necessarily being contained within the boundaries of the continent. The persistently high absolute number of people in poverty (Barrett & Carter, 2013), the absence of good quality physical infrastructure (Ojo et al., 2018), ongoing conflicts and insecurity challenges (Ojo & Ojewale, 2019), and continuing problems with democratic governance and corruption (Kieghe, 2016) are combining to make Africa the world’s largest source of emigrants (Asserate, 2018). There is now broad consensus among academics, policy makers, and civil-society representatives that the current African political class have not succeeded in their mission to build nations characterised by justice and progress (Cheeseman, 2015). Young Africans are taking a stand against the current politics in their nations. They are attempting to prepare the way for societies that are less hierarchical by establishing new youth movements from urban cultures © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Ojo, Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88546-5_1

1

2

1 Introduction

and suburban areas. African stakeholders are obsessed with talking about the “youth bulge”, but little attention is paid to “how” young Africans wish to be governed. Consequently, there is a yawning knowledge gap about the governance aspirations of young Africans. There is an increasing recognition that beyond a continents overall size, its age structure is of great economic significance (Canning et al., 2015). Given the demographic configuration of the African continent, it is almost impossible to effectively open up development without adequately considering the governance aspirations of young people. The large numbers of young Africans offer the nations across the continent the potential to achieve rapid economic growth and social transformation. Secondly, if Africa’s demographic dividend is maximised by understanding aspirations of its youthful population and providing supportive governance environments, this can translate into a reduction of dependency ratio across the continent. Reduced dependency ratio combined with policies that nurture health and education whilst also promoting employment opportunities can ultimately translate into sustainable development. Deriving possible benefits of Africa’s demographic dividend therefore starts with understanding the governance aspirations of young people and involving them in decision-making. However, widespread evidence suggests the contrary. It appears that young Africans are being excluded from decision-making and they are being denied the chance to contribute to their economies and societies (Mengistu, 2017). The frustration being experienced by large sections of Africa’s youthful population is contributing to social and political instability and creating room for civil unrest. Some scholars have described this scenario as an impending demographic disaster— the opposite of a possible demographic dividend (Agbor et al., 2016). In this book, the concept of “millennial” is used to refer to a category of young people that the author aims to understand, describe, and possibly educate. The term “millennial” is widely used but not always formally defined. However, most scholars use it to describe people born between the early 1980s and 2000 (Bannon et al., 2011; Holliday & Li, 2004). Although it is believed that millennials now form a sizeable and influential proportion of Africa’s population, the Euro-American characterisation of millennials may not necessarily be applicable within an African context. In Euro-American literature, the millennial generation, also known as Generation Y or Gen Y—that is young people born between 1980 and 2000, which has turned its back on politics (Yamamoto et al., 2016). It is believed that this generation is comfortable with the digital world and with social networks (Loader et al., 2014) and is at ease when it comes to social media. This population cohort also grew up surrounded by various digital learning technologies; therefore, print newspapers and serious news analysis on television play a minima role in the leadership and political socialisation members of this generation. There are some similarities and sharp contrasts between African millennials and their counterparts in the West. Whilst millennials in the West enjoy the fruits of continuous technological progress, their counterparts across rural Africa struggle (Adeniran, 2019). Furthermore, Euro-American literature have established that

1.2 Why this Book Was Written

3

millennials in the West are experiencing massive uncertainty as a result of the unpredictability of the age in which we live. An ageing population in Western nations is believed to be contributing to the shock and economic pressure being experienced by millennials in the West (Harper, 2013). On the contrary, Africa’s population is not necessarily ageing. In spite of their comparatively low income, African millennials appreciate and embrace technology like their Euro-American counterparts. However, there are stark inequalities between urban and rural areas in terms of the uptake of these technologies (Adeniran, 2019). Consequently, those millennials residing within the countryside have not sufficiently latched onto the benefits of technology and its associated trends to create opportunities for themselves. Unlike their counterparts in the West, the potentials of African millennials are often not matched with an equal measure of opportunity. For instance, African millennials have repeatedly highlighted the education gap as a source of frustration (Pankhurst et al., 2017; Musau, 2018). Quality is generally found to be lacking at all levels of the education system, a system characterised by a lack of investment that has resulted in poorly trained teachers, decaying infrastructure, and high levels of pupil and teacher absenteeism. Similarly, the scale of unemployment experienced by African millennials distinguishes them from their Western counterparts. There is strong opinion among African millennials that the labour market has been hijacked by corruption and nepotism (Akande, 2014), with some employers forming a dangerous habit of deliberately discriminating against young people (Altman, 2007). Just as underemployment levels are very high among African millennials (Fox et al., 2016), it is also common practice to find people doing jobs that they’re not qualified for. Public sector appointments are largely political, thereby creating a situation where square pegs are forced into circular holes (Kieghe, 2016). Socio-economic polarisation is adversely affecting African millennials. However, the disruptive influence that polarisation may be exerting on their leadership and democratic ideals has not been examined and established in detail. Some have argued that forms of anti-democratic norms are being engendered among African millennials as a result of polarisation but there are knowledge gaps about the nature and extent of such norms. This book utilises a mixed-methods approach to address and unpack these issues.

1.2

Why this Book Was Written

There is currently no clear narrative about why Africa’s current political class is denying young people the opportunity to chart the future direction of their nations. Furthermore, there is no firm picture of how young Africans wish to be governed. This book is offered as a contribution that embraces an interdisciplinary approach to fill these knowledge gaps. The book is about political leadership and governance in Africa going forward and the role of millennials. Africa is in the process of

4

1 Introduction

significant change. The nature, dimensions, and what change might bring would depend on young people who now represent three quarters of the population of the continent (UN-DESA, 2019). This book contributes to ongoing discussions and provides a pathway, guide, and handbook for a new generation of young African leaders to emerge, not to miss the opportunity for real transformative change. This book provides a thought-provoking analysis of how political leadership deficit has contributed to underdevelopment across Africa and how millennials can be the catalyst for change in leadership and governance behaviour and to improve the fortunes of Africa’s estimated 1.3 billion people. This is intended to be the go-to book and companion for African millennials in and out of political leadership, inspired by the factual circumstances of Africa’s significant history, a deep understanding of current global issues, geopolitics, and power relations, and motivated by an ambitious vision of Africa’s role in the world.

1.3

Who Should Read this Book?

This book has multiple audiences and is therefore not limited to a specific group. However, scholars and students of African Development Studies, Sociology, Political Science, Geography, History, International Studies, Women’s Studies, Economics, Social Policy, Policy Administration, Black Studies, and Caribbean Studies will find the book interesting. We also believe that the book has a global appeal especially for those who are interested in development issues across the various African regions and those corners of the globe with comparative challenges to governance and development. The book has global appeal for areas of the world considered to be economically and politically challenged. It will serve as a template for addressing the obstructions faced by millennials and galvanising the potential of the same cohort. Parts of the book will be of interest as reading material in master’s degree courses. This may stimulate students to engage the full book. The book will be of interest to doctoral candidates in the fields of Geography, Social Policy, Leadership and Development Studies. It is likely that they will find the book useful as a reference resource. The book will further be of interest to policy makers and professionals interested in the possibilities of and constraints to improving their understanding and responses to youth and development matters. The audience for this book includes instructors across several disciplines, students in higher educational institutions, and practitioners in industrial settings. We recognise that some users of the book might be reading it for their own professional purposes, whilst others might be reading it as assigned for a course. We have therefore written the book in a way to facilitate meaningful learning for different stakeholder groups.

1.4 A Note on Sources

1.4

5

A Note on Sources

This book is based upon insights drawn from a number of empirical scientific projects. The research design underpinning these projects was therefore structured as a robust blueprint which secondary and primary data collection processes. Data from the United Nations Statistics Division was incorporated into this book. The Division is committed to the advancement of the global statistical system. Therefore, they compile and disseminate global statistical information, develop standards and norms for statistical activities, and support countries’ efforts to strengthen their national statistical systems. Furthermore, the Division facilitates the coordination of international statistical activities and supports the functioning of the UN Statistical Commission as the apex entity of the global statistical system. This book also subsumes data from the Fragile States Index (FSI). The FSI is produced by the Fund for Peace (FFP) and it measures the vulnerability of states to implode. The FSI not only highlights the normal pressures that all states experience but also identifies when pressures exceed the resilience capacity of a state. The FFP assembles a substantial number of reports and information from around the world, detailing existing social, economic, and political pressures. Based on the comprehensive social science approach of their Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), data from three main streams (pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis) are triangulated and subjected to critical review to generate the final index scores (FFP, 2018). The higher the index score the closer a state is to failure. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) was set up by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2007 to promote meaningful change and democratic development on the African continent. This is being achieved by providing the tools to support progress in political leadership and public governance. This book embraces the IIAG data for understanding and visualising some patterns and aspects of governance which is described by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation as governance as “the provision of political, social, economic and environmental public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their government, and that a government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens” (MIF, 2020). Effective governance is regarded as a major contributor to the social integrity of any country. It includes the internal social structures and processes internal that make up the foundation upon which economic and environmental progress relies. This is important for young Africans. Our book complements other governance indices with the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The rationale for examining governance through the lens of multiple measures is to gain a holistic and objective perspective on the subject. The WGI gives a sense of social integrity and resilience. Another important dataset integrated into this book is the World Population Prospects (WPP) which is published annually by the United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. This resource represents a comprehensive data source for population and

6

1 Introduction

official projections of global demographic estimates undertaken by the Population Division since 1950. The database provides major demographic indicators like birth rate, death rate, mortality rate, fertility rate, etc., for each member country of United Nations for 1950–2050 by age and sex of the population (UN-DESA, 2017). One of the most important sources of secondary information used in our book is the Afrobarometer Study. The Afrobarometer study focuses on public attitudes, democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related public safety and social issues in more than 35 countries in Africa (Afrobarometer, 2016). The study which has been ongoing since 1999 is implemented through a partnership comprising the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD Ghana), Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP) in Benin, Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi, the Democracy in Africa Research Unit in the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town, and the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University. The primary datasets were derived from interactive discussions and key informant interviews. Much of this book was written during the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic which frustrated efforts by the authors to conduct large-scale primary field research. Nevertheless, contextual information was captured from a broad range of stakeholder groups and individuals which contribute towards making the discussions in this book robust and defensible.

1.5

Structure of the Book

This book is written to help readers gain proficiency in understanding some essential constructs underlying leadership and governance nexus as it relates to millennials. The book should also help readers gain a grasp of some theory, scientific methodology as well as application of techniques which can be replicated in other contexts. Chapter 2 paints a picture of the hopes, fears, and aspirations of African millennials. The chapter also engages the concept and meaning of aspiration within the context of governance. This is followed by a discussion of the pillars of governance. This discussion highlights the contribution of aspects of historical African culture in shaping modern day governance values and institutions. The chapter also evaluates approaches that are used to measure good governance and stresses that these existing metrics do not focus on young people. The chapter concludes by explaining the impact of poor political leadership on young Africans. Chapter 3 focuses on some of the key dynamics that young Africans must consider in order to emerge from the shadows of political strongmen. The chapter begins with a detailed account of the origins of strongman mentality. A mapping of the mindset of the typical African strongman follows this with a robust analysis of how strongmen consolidate their power base. Towards the end of the chapter, the specific distractions put in place by strongmen are discussed with an emphasis on why young Africans have been unable to mount a formidable challenge.

1.6 Conclusion

7

Chapter 4 establishes the underlying determinants of the propensity for millennials to join social rebellions. In this chapter, logistic regression analysis was used to predict the propensity for social revolutions among thousands of millennials spread across 36 African countries. Results derived from the empirical analysis suggest that discontent with corrupt governments has been driven to the tipping point, fuelled by thousands of young unemployed people who are linked via social media as they have never been before. The results further indicate that economic development matters (overall management of the economy, handling of educational needs, crime and the provision and maintenance of infrastructure), regime types (constitutional monarchies), and state effectiveness (performance of parliamentarians and heads of states) need to be given careful consideration. Chapter 5 argues that existing global metrics of governance do not explicitly focus on millennials in Africa because the indices often do not incorporate direct opinions of millennials across the continent. Therefore, there is a significant knowledge gap about the political and governance orientation of Africans across several countries. This chapter discuss how a numerical approach has been used to group African nations according to the aspirations of young people for good governance. Chapter 6 concludes the book by pulling together the body of findings through an integrated analysis that combines various sources of information. By bringing together and linking the themes in this book, this chapter encapsulates what African millennials need to be doing to channel their energy away from violent agitations into mobilisation and organisation as a call to action to bring about positive transformational change.

1.6

Conclusion

There are some exciting precursors and texts to the subject of leadership and governance in Africa. Whilst they provide a wealth of insight, they may be criticised for being far less forward-looking. There is clearly a significant gap in the market. Prior to the publication of this book, there has been no known published work that succinctly connects the past, present, and future of African and global geopolitics in an accessible way that resonates with the yearnings of Africa’s millennial generation. Furthermore, we believe that the specific focus of our work on African millennials will help to properly amplify the voices of Africa’s burgeoning youth population in a way that should also grab the attention of governments, scholars, students, and international development partners working towards a more prosperous and peaceful Africa. Readers from these contexts would choose this book because of the authors’ good grasp of everyday lived experiences of African millennials and how the book unmasks solutions and pathways that can help to address persisting problems for the purpose of good governance today and in the future.

8

1 Introduction

References Adeniran, D. (2019). Africa’s young people speak out about ending digital exclusion in their countries. World Bank Blogs. Accessed January 19, 2021, from https://blogs.worldbank.org/ youth-transforming-africa/africas-young-people-speak-out-about-ending-digital-exclusion Afrobarometer. (2016). Afrobarometer. University of Capetown. Agbor, J., Taiwo, O., & Smith, J. (2016). Sub-Saharan Africa’s youth bulge: A demographic dividend or disaster? Africa growth initiative. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Akande, T. (2014). Youth unemployment in Nigeria: A situation analysis. Brookings Institute. Accessed January 19, 2021, from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/ 09/23-youth-unemployment-nigeria-akande Altman, M. (2007). Youth labour market challenges in South Africa. Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Asserate, A. (2018). African exodus: Migration and the future of Europe. Haus Publishing. Bannon, S., Ford, K., & Meltzer, L. (2011). Understanding millennials in the workplace. The Certified Public Accountants Journal, 81(11), 61–65. Barrett, C. B., & Carter, M. R. (2013). The economics of poverty traps and persistent poverty: Empirical and policy implications. The Journal of Development Studies, 49(7), 976–990. Canning, D., Raja, S., & Yazbeck, A. S. (Eds.). (2015). Africa’s demographic transition: Dividend or disaster? The World Bank. Cheeseman, N. (2015). Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform. Cambridge University Press. Drummond, P., Thakoor, V., & Yu, S. (2014). Africa rising: Harnessing the demographic dividend. International Monetary Fund. FFP. (2018). Fragile states index annual report 2018. The Fund for Peace. Fox, L., Senbet, L. W., & Simbanegavi, W. (2016). Youth employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges, constraints and opportunities. Journal of African Economics, 25(1), 3–15. Harper, S. (2013). Ageing societies. Routledge. Holliday, W., & Li, Q. (2004). Understanding the millennials: Updating our knowledge about students. Reference Services Review, 32(4), 356–366. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators: Methodology and analytical issues. The World Bank. Kieghe, D. (2016). National ambition: Reconstructing Nigeria. New Generation Publishing. Loader, B. D., Vromen, A., & Xenos, M. A. (2014). The networked young citizen: Social media, political participation and civic engagement. Information and Communication Society, 17(2), 143–150. Mengistu, M. M. (2017). The quest for youth inclusion in the African politics: Trends, challenges, and prospects. Journal of Socialomics, 6(1), 1–5. MIF. (2020). 2020 Ibrahim index of African governance. Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Musau, Z. (2018). Africa grapples with huge disparities in education. Africa Revewal. Accessed January 18, 2021, from https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2017-march2018/africa-grapples-huge-disparities-education Ojo, A. (2020). GIS and machine learning for small area classifications in developing countries. Taylor and Francis. Ojo, A., & Ojewale, O. (2019). Urbanisation and crime in Nigeria. Palgrave Macmillan. Ojo, A., Papachristodoulou, N., & Ibeh, S. C. (2018). The development of an infrastructure quality index for Nigerian metropolitan areas using multivariate geo-statistical data fusion. Urban Science, 2, 59. Pankhurst, A., Araya, M., & Woldehanna, T. (2017). Education and learning: Preliminary findings from the round 5 survey in Ethiopia. Oxford Department of International Development.

References

9

Signe, L. (2018). Why Africa is turning the heads of investors. World Economic Forum. Accessed January 10, 2021, from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/03/capturing-africa-s-highreturns UN-DESA. (2017). World population prospects: The 2017 revision, methodology of the United Nations population estimates and projections. Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.250. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. UN-DESA. (2019). World population prospects 2019: Volume I: Comprehensive tables. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Yamamoto, M., Kushin, M. J., & Dalisay, F. (2016). Social media and political disengagement among young adults: A moderated mediation model of cynicism, efficacy, and social media use on apathy. Mass Communication and Society, 20(2), 149–168.

Chapter 2

Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

2.1

Aspiration and Realities of the Young African

Recent debates and dialogue about the stratification of democratic and governance choice across the African continent (Herbst, 2000; MIF, 2017) present an opportunity to advance the often-neglected subject of aspiration among young people. There is no consensus definition of aspiration in the governance and development sector. Many times, the terminology is mentioned in the context of inequalities in specific socio-economic and cultural attainments among young people (Archer et al., 2013; Archer & DeWitt, 2017).

2.1.1

Revisiting the Concept of Aspiration

Social scientists who are interested in understanding human motivation and behaviour also sometimes confuse the concept of aspiration with expectation. In an array of academic and policy literature, these two concepts have been discussed through the lens of a chicken and egg prism, as though they were distinct yet inseparable (Cook et al., 1996; Bandura et al., 2003; Leavy & Smith, 2010). From a range of studies, it is becoming clear that the goal-orientations of individuals or groups of individuals are in part controlled by the expectations that others have for them. It would therefore seem that the term “expectation” is broadly used to connote those things that alter the egos of people. Much of Africa’s governance agenda has been pursued through the lens of expectation of donor agencies rather than the aspirations of its inhabitants. Continued focus on the ethos of expectation sometimes encourages unproductive debates which have the potential to undermine political support for long-term engagement and multi-lateral partnerships (Manji & O’Coill, 2002; Clemens et al., 2007). For instance, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted by world’s © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Ojo, Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88546-5_2

11

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2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

Fig. 2.1 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs

leaders in 2000. Many of the targets subsumed within the MDGs were missed leading to a scenario where some countries receiving international aid blamed donor failings (Nunnenkamp & Öhler, 2011). Donors, on the other hand, pointed to corruption, natural disasters, and other challenges as reasons for the shortfall (Clemens et al., 2007). Both arguments are largely incorrect as widespread evidence shows that the goals were missed primarily because of the fundamental limitations of how they were set (Ojo & Ezepue, 2011). This “expectations” approach distorts the planning and programming of resources and development efforts, and leads to agendas that do not reflect national priorities. During the 2000–2015 period, being “on-track” to meet the expectations of MDG donor agencies was perceived as evidence of good government performance. Being “off-track” was considered as an indication of incompetence and neglect. These dispositions failed to recognise that progress depends as much on a country’s point of departure as it does on the effort towards prescribed development goals (Ojo & Ezepue, 2011). In order to properly comprehend the concept of aspiration, a good starting point is Abraham Maslow’s work on humanistic psychology (Maslow, 1943, 1987). He developed a hierarchy of needs based on motivational theory. The pyramid depicted in Fig. 2.1 was used by Maslow to formulate progression from basic to complex human needs. With this pyramid, Maslow maintained that once the basic needs of people are met, their craving evolves upward. The levels progress upward and become more psychological with the individual ultimately reaching the level of self-actualisation. The definition of actualisation being the process of growing and developing as a person to achieve individual potential. Maslow (1943) initially stated that individuals must satisfy lower level needs before progressing on to meet higher level growth

2.1 Aspiration and Realities of the Young African

13

needs. However, he later clarified that satisfaction of a need is not an “all-or-none” phenomenon, admitting that his earlier statements may have given “the false impression that a need must be satisfied 100 percent before the next need emerges” (Maslow, 1987 p. 69). Glasser (1985, 1998, 2010) approaches the concept of aspiration through the lens of five human essentials. These include survival, love and belonging, power and recognition, freedom and fun. Unlike Maslow’s hierarchy, Glasser’s five basic human needs do not demonstrate a progression. Survival needs are similar to Maslow’s physiological and safety level. They are basic needs which are of little interest unless they are threatened. Love and belonging needs are similar to Maslow’s belonging need and recognise how important it is for people as a tribal species to be accepted by their peers. Power and recognition needs map to some extent to Maslow’s esteem need, although the power element focuses on the ability of people to achieve our goals. Glasser’s freedom needs refer to the ability to do what we want, to have free choice. It relates to procedural justice where we seek fair play. “Fun” is an interesting ultimate goal. When all else is satisfied, we just “want to have fun”.

2.1.2

Hopes, Fears, and Realities of Young Africans

Within the context of African governance and development, the concept of aspiration among millennials has not been the subject of much explicit theorising. In this context, aspiration may be accepted as a shorthand for at least three descriptions: • What young Africans need • What young Africans want • What young Africans desire These three descriptions of aspiration have some semantic overlapping which open up distinct conceptual possibilities for theorising the concept. The governance needs of young Africans are generally considered to be the fundamental requirements that can help to meet the demands of their functional existence (Hofmeyr, 2012). Such needs include basic human rights, good standard of living, formal education, good quality of life, and wellbeing for all. These are unconditionally necessary. Wants are used to express a sense of lack among young people in Africa (Osumah & Aghedo, 2011). In general, wants are a step ahead of needs and are principally reliant on needs. For instance, if a group of young Africans want to increase their employment chances, they may strive to gain access to the best available formal university education. However, access to the best institution of formal higher education does not always automatically translate into an advantage in the labour market (Tomlinson, 2006) if training in effective problem solving is inadequate and graduates are unable to creatively utilise their knowledge in relevant employment sectors (Ezepue & Ojo, 2012).

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2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

For young Africans, desire represents the icing on the cake—those governance dividends that young Africans aim for. This desire is often generated by the thirst or hunger to apprehend the things that they want. For instance, some scholars have argued that the present ruling generation in Africa remains ideologically obtuse to the revolutionary yearnings of young people on the continent (Abdullahi et al., 2014). Schramm (2010) submits that the desire of the majority of young Africans is to build an integrated continent that is politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance. The ineffectiveness of youth policies across Africa stems in part from a feeble understanding of young people’s aspirations and needs. In a nutshell, researching aspirations of young Africans can help to exhume insights about “how young Africans want to be governed”. This is important because the future of Africa is young and the impending demographic dividend of the African continent will only add to Africa’s global economic importance (Drummond et al., 2014). Given the direction of the demographic structure of the continent and the short-comings of past global developmental agendas, it becomes imperative on other regions of the world to build a growth relationship, based upon diplomatic cooperation and a focus on the aspirations of young people for good governance. As African millennials transit from adolescence to adulthood, they are confronted by a complex set of fears across socio-economic, geographical, political, and cultural divides. African millennials are eager to attain economic emancipation. However, this aspiration is increasingly being hampered by weakening societal structures (Honwana, 2013). Roughly seven in ten people across Africa are under the age of 35 (Hajjar, 2020). This demographic represents a valuable human capital base for the continent if they are equipped with necessary skills. Millennials are keen to help propel the Africa onto a path of higher growth. However, evidence across the continent shows that labour markets across Africa have not been successful in absorbing the current generation of millennials (Meyer, 2017; Fakih et al., 2020). As a result of their disconnection from the labour market, millennials have become some of the most vulnerable members of African societies. Natama (2014) has argued that millennials constitute the majority of the Africa’s poor who survive on less than $1.25 a day. Although there are regional fluctuations, unemployment among young people is alarmingly high across Africa. Evidence from research conducted by Brixiová and Kangoye (2014) also show that young Africans excessively concentrated within the low-skill sector. The public sector employs far fewer young people in Africa. The implication of this is that young people are much more exposed to local and global labour market oscillations such as the impact of the global 2008 financial crises and more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. There are some differences in the working conditions of urban and rural millennials. African millennials who are resident in rural areas often work in informal or vulnerable employment (Kilimani, 2017). Evidence shows that majority of Africa’s young people are employed within the agricultural and services sectors (Coulibaly et al., 2019). Those engaged in agriculture are mainly employed in subsistence farming. The millennial demographic based in urban centres attract higher incidence

2.1 Aspiration and Realities of the Young African

15

of unemployment. Consequently, young people in both rural and urban centres experience significant levels of poverty, although evidence points to higher rates of poverty among rural millennials (AfDB et al., 2017). African millennials continue to grapple with rapidly changing social expectations. Millennials in Africa tend to be associated with a higher than average propensity for problematic behaviours. Although some scholars associate this with peer pressure (Patrick et al., 2010), more recent evidence shows that these behaviour trends are very much connected to the inability of African societies to achieve shared values or to solve jointly experienced problems (Ezemenaka, 2021) as a result of dislocations in leadership and governance spaces. African millennials possess a limited albeit unique set of resources at their disposal. For instance, most African countries do not offer their unemployed citizens any form of financial safety net such as unemployment benefits. Unemployed millennials in these countries therefore rely heavily on the support that they receive from intergenerational members of their immediate and extended families during times of stress. There is broad consensus in literature that African millennials residing in urban centres express a more progressive attitude towards new and emerging forms of technology in comparison with people in older age categories (Counted & Arawole, 2015). The appreciation of new forms of technology among millennials is critical for understanding how young Africans engage with their economies. Furthermore, technology is critical for driving the new forms of entrepreneurial activities that millennials are generating in Africa. The fascinating relationship that young Africans have with new forms of technology opens new markets and broadens their relationship with the labour market. If properly harnessed, this huge appetite for emerging technologies can be a source of comparative advantage for African countries. Unfortunately, the progressive appetite of many young Africans for technology is being quenched by infrastructural deficits such as epileptic power supply. Added to this problem, some African countries have passed laws that dimmish or damage the opportunities that new forms of technology provide. For instance, the Nigerian government recently banned Twitter and followed its controversial ban with wider regulations reining in the press and social media companies (Akinwotu, 2021). Actions like this damage the new markets and economies that millennials are creating on the continent. Instead of erecting stumbling blocks, Africa’s political class should be creating enabling environments that will allow young people to flourish with technology. Scholarly voices in Africa have complained about a mismatch between labour market demands and the skills that young African graduates offer (Ezepue & Ojo, 2012). The skills shortage charge is a fair charge. However, it is also important to stress that several African governments have not succeeded in establishing educational systems that provide higher-order skills. Teachers and lecturers are regularly at loggerhead with government officials. They grapple with a wide range of issues such as funding and provision of educational infrastructure which exert detrimental effects upon the morale of lecturers. Consequently, strikes are commonplace in most educational institutions across Africa. African millennials endure repeated

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2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

interruptions to their academic and skills training, and when there are no interruptions, young people have to learn from demotivated instructors. As a consequence, some educational and training systems are exposed to corrupt practices with students bribing their way through the system (Katundano, 2019).

2.2

Traditions and Institutions as Pillars of Governance

Governance means different things to different people. Kaufmann et al. (2010) define governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4). Virtually every country’s governing administration is underpinned by two important pillars—traditions and institutions (Painter & Peters, 2010). These two pillars are fundamental to the process of governance. Traditions represent a set of beliefs, norms, principles, and value-systems that underpin how a nation administers a set of rules and obligations. These clusters of cultural practices often constitute a set of anticipations about public behaviour (Perez-Diaz, 1993). In the democracies of Western Europe and North America, for instance, four distinct governance traditions have been identified (Loughlin, 1994). These administrative traditions include: • • • •

Anglo-Saxon (minimal state) Continental European: Germanic (organicist) Continental European: French (Napoleonic) Scandinavian (mixture of Anglo-Saxon and Germanic)

The dominant features of Euro-American state traditions are summarised in Table 2.1. Painter and Peters (2010) admit that there is a fundamental difference between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European traditions. The Anglo-Saxon tradition is characterised by government departments and the state does not exist as a legal entity as such. Conversely, for Continental European traditions the state is perceived as an overarching entity that is capable of entering into legal contracts (Painter & Peters, 2010). It is noteworthy to mention that the work of Painter and Peters (2010), though comprehensive, fails to unmask the core traditions that drive governance among African nations. This leaves a huge gulf for researchers who wish to make the connections between traditions and institutions in African governance spaces. African governance traditions are not as clear-cut as their Euro-American counterparts. However, one of the ways to dissect the values that underpin contemporary governance in Africa is by examining some statements about governance credited to some key African leaders in recent times. These samples of leaders’ quotes are shown in Box 2.1.

2.2 Traditions and Institutions as Pillars of Governance

17

Table 2.1 Characteristics of Euro-American state traditions Is there a legal basis for the “State”? State-society relations Form of political organisation Basis of policy style Form of decentralisation

Dominant approach to discipline of public administration Countries

Anglo-Saxon No

Germanic Yes

French Yes

Scandinavian Yes

Pluralistic

Organicist

Antagonistic

Organicist

Limited federalist Incrementalist

Integral/organic federalist “Muddling through” legal Cooperative federalism

Jacobin, “one and indivisible” Corporatist legal

Decentralised unitary Technocratic consensual Strong local autonomy

Public law

Public law

Germany; Austria; Netherlands; Spain (after 1978); Belgium (after 1988)

France; Italy; Spain (until 1978); Portugal; Quebec; Greece; Belgium (until 1988)

“State power” (USA); local government (UK) Political science/ sociology

UK; USA; Canada (but not Quebec); Ireland

Regionalised unitary state

Public law (Sweden); Organisation theory (Norway) Sweden, Norway, Denmark

Source: Loughlin, J. (1994). Nation, State and Region in Western Europe. In: L. Beckemans (Ed.), Culture: The Building-Stone of Europe, 2004. Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires

Box 2.1 Selected Governance Quotes Credited to Past and Present African Leaders “. . . Some factors that are important for development are peace, security and stability. Accordingly, the leadership of the African continent saw the importance of breaking the vicious cycle of wars, conflict and instability which contributes to a very large degree, to the deep levels of poverty and underdevelopment...” (Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa, 2004). “. . . Everything is a priority in Africa, but there are some super priorities. For NEPAD, there were 8, now they are 10. It’s good first governance, here the good governance of public affairs, ie democracy, the state, the transparency, elections, human rights, etc. . . . and good private governance . . .” (Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal, 2002). The vision 2020 “. . . provides our road map for development. In it, we sketch seven key objectives, namely: Good political and economic governance; Rural economic transformation; Development of services and manufacturing; Human resource development; Development and promotion of the private sector; Regional and international economic integration, and (continued)

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2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

Box 2.1 (continued) Poverty reduction. On all these fronts, we are making real progress. In particular, we have made significant gains in good political and economic governance, despite the challenges and constraints of our recent history . . .” (Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda). “. . . We all have a stake in Enterprise Nigeria and each of us stands a better chance in getting optimum dividends if, instead of asking “What’s in it for me”, we ask “what’s in it for Nigeria”, to determine our choice of action when our sense of duty and service is called upon. Among other things, this is the only way to ensure replenishment of that proverbial national cake, which we all love so much to partake of. This is the ultimate solution for combating such negative social tendencies as corruptibility, ethnicity, lack of patriotism, lawlessness, inefficiency, diminished sense of justice, and lack of dignity and mutual respect for fellow citizens. . . .” (Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, 2003). “There is no miracle and I do not claim to be able to work miracles. The only miracle remains the work, the work of the Algerian people as a whole. It will make Algeria today and tomorrow. It will create development. It will create happiness. I call all the people to reconnect with the values of work. I call all the people to go to war against the sloppiness, the waste, and mismanagement” (Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria). To an extent, these statements subsume some of the positive aspects of traditional African culture like consent by the people, consensus and consultation, that should inform the core values of contemporary governance in African societies. The Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) argues that such traditions and the institutions erected to support them were largely responsible for the development and survival of pre-colonial African states (CDD-Ghana, 2001). On the premise of this argument, 11 distinct characteristics of state traditions of pre-colonial African administrations were postulated by CDD-Ghana. These include: (a) Humanism and Communitarianism: Africans place great emphasis on community, human welfare, and on what philosophers describe as “personhood”. (b) Reverence for Age: The principle of age as a criterion of wisdom in Africa distorts social relations and encourages gerontocracy, the rule by elders that is not necessarily based on achievement or knowledge not motivated by love and service to country and kind consideration for fellow citizens. (c) Competitive Succession: In pre-colonial Africa, the hereditary nature of some leadership positions ultimately led to the assumption that the institutions were undemocratic and unreflective of popular will. (d) Consent by the People: Most African monarchs in pre-colonial era acknowledged that they hold power in trust for those they govern and that ordinary

2.2 Traditions and Institutions as Pillars of Governance

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(j) (k)

19

citizens have a say right from the beginning of the election process, and are able to assert their will through young men and pressure groups. Checks on Power: Leadership tenure was subject to popular controls. No monarch was absolute as there were countervailing powers that were generally recognised, including spiritual powers such as the power of ancestors. Consultation: Consultation was a cardinal principle of African leadership as was broad based participation. Traditional leaders were bound by their oath to consult the elders on all matters and to obey their advice. Consensus: Under the indigenous system laws were arrived at by consensus, not unilateral declarations, royal decrees or vetoes; and so the word of the traditional leader was not automatically law. Decisions were a product of consensus of the traditional leader and his counsellors. Transparency: African traditional rulers may have relied on divination and mysticism, but there was also a strong element of public participation in public policymaking. Accountability: Accountability was linked with gerontocracy. The privileges of the aged in traditional Africa, appear to have been oversimplified. Age and leadership attracted more responsibilities than privileges. The responsibility of older people was in living up to high standards in responsible behaviour expected of their age. Inclusiveness: Traditionally the principle of inclusiveness was manifested in the integration of outsiders such as people of minority ethnic groups into the polity. Fairness: It was normally required that the traditional leader speaks last on key issues. This was meant to help ensure that the elders’ opinions were not prejudiced by the leader. The leader then gets a sense of the various positions before pronouncing judgment.

Some of these values and practices are appropriate and potentially applicable to contemporary systems of governance. However, there are arguments that support the view that many of these positive African traditional values eroded following the broad adoption of some new post-colonial systems of government (Hearn, 2007). For instance, in the adopted systems of government, institutionalised criticism is normative, and those youths who are critical of authority have sometimes been accused of insubordination (CDD-Ghana, 2001). African governance spaces function effectively when traditional and formal institutions work in partnership (Pejovich, 1999; Englebert, 2002). Collaborative engagements between these two forms of institutions help to avoid the duplication of efforts by key societal stakeholders. Similarly, partnership working helps to ensure resolution of conflicts and the creation of mechanisms that facilitate strong and agile state building. These partnership working mechanisms also create decision-making possibilities for accommodating interests of different sub-state entities and the protection of minority interests (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). The recognition and involvement of traditional institutions by formal institutions further attracts benefits of decentralised decision-making, resolving conflicts by narrowing differences, making key decisions by consensus and such other features of traditional governance

20

2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

can contribute to bringing the state under broader popular control, grounded in Africa’s political and cultural values (ECA, 2007). Good governance means focusing on collective national ambition and developmental outcomes for all citizens. It requires contemporary governments to be clear about the purpose and intentions of their administrations and to work towards ensuring value for money for taxpayers. Good governance also means promoting those positive national values, putting them into practice and ensuring that those in leadership positions behave in ways that uphold and exemplify effectiveness and efficiency. Good governance means taking informed and transparent decisions based on rigorous evidence, quality information, broad advice, and support. Good governance means developing the capacity and capability of governing administrations to be effective. This can be achieved when square pegs are fitted in square holes. It is the responsibility of leaders to also work towards developing the capacity of people with governance responsibilities and to evaluate their performance and delivery, as individuals and groups. Despite the existence of relatively robust institutions across the African continent during the pre-colonial period, the post-colonial period has witnessed the neglect and many times, deliberate attempts by African leaders to weaken formal and traditional institutions (Posner & Young, 2007). Consequently, emphasis has tended to be placed on a “warped” narrative of nationalism (Wintrobe, 1998). This form of patriotism is often misguided, with leaders demanding loyalty at all cost from citizens and young people. This often leads to scenarios where constructive criticisms on governance are misinterpreted as antagonism or rebellion. Attempts have been made to reach convergence on governance principles in Africa. In May 1963 African leaders created the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which was committed to helping bring about change, freedom, and restoration of dignity to many African countries (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). The initiatives of the OAU paved the way for the establishment of the African Union (AU). The AU seeks to speed up economic and political integration in the continent (Adi & Sherwood, 2003). In the decades following the establishment of the AU, African leaders adopted a range of governance strategies and they also established a range of mechanisms in a bid to promote good governance and mitigate deepening economic and social challenges. Some of these strategies and mechanisms include the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Africa Governance Forum (AGF), the Africa Governance Inventory (AGI), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Brussels Programme of Action (BPOA) for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite the implementation of these and numerous other strategies and mechanisms, African nations still face inconsistencies between governance concepts and the practical implementation of good governance strategies (Makinda et al., 2016). Furthermore, and perhaps surprisingly, these attempts hardly take the governance aspirations of young people into cognizance despite an increasing recognition and agitation among young Africans that their nations are experiencing good governance deficits (Gavin, 2007). In order to give a sense of what the future political and

2.3 The Fragile States Index (FSI)

21

governance geography of Africa might look like, the remainder of this chapter focuses on using an empirical approach to segment the aspirations of young people and explain how they want to be governed. African citizens are now increasingly aware of the repercussions of the costs of poor management and corruption (Kieghe, 2016). Public attitudes are changing, albeit at a slow pace, towards inefficient and retrogressive governance. These changing public attitudes have resulted in a number of mini-revolutions (Sommers, 2011) and in some cases they have triggered surprises in electoral outcomes (Ojo et al., 2019). Similarly, international agencies such as the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DfID) are increasingly dispensing scarce resources to governments on the basis of good governance, although Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016) disclosed that development assistance deteriorates economic and institutional governance with little or no effect on political governance. With growing numbers of citizens of developing countries demanding better performance from their governments and increasing calls for new ways to diagnose governance failures and proffering solutions, a set of regional and global governance monitoring metrics have emerged. These include the Fragile States Index (FSI); the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG); and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).

2.3

The Fragile States Index (FSI)

Fragility presents a serious impediment to the social and economic development of the African region. There is broad agreement that “fragility” stems from state institutions’ lack of capacity and/or political will to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development, and safeguarding the security and human rights of their inhabitants (OECD, 2007). Addressing fragility across Africa has become pivotal due in part to shifting security dynamics, wherein new and evolving domestic threats (e.g. internal displacement) challenge long-held distinctions between humanitarian and development needs and their associated responses. The Fund for Peace (FFP) recognised the need for better comparative understanding of the internal forces that trigger fragility and the need for responses to nip them in the bud before they spiral out of control. The FSI has been published annually since 2005. The index identifies when pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure (FFP, 2018). The FFP triangulate data from pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis to generate the FSI. The dimensions of the FSI span across: • • • •

Cohesion Indicators Economic Indicators Political Indicators Social and Cross-Cutting Indicators

Fig. 2.2 Fragile states index scores 2018. Source: Authors elaborations based on FFP (2018). Fragile States Index Annual Report 2018. Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace

22 2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

2.4 The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)

23

Figure 2.2 shows the scores of the FSI for African Countries in 2018. The FSI scores should be interpreted with the understanding that a lower score represents greater stability. No African nation is categorised within the sustainable category of the index. Mauritius and Seychelles are the only African countries classified in the index’s second favourable category of “stable”. Not surprisingly, the number of African countries increases the closer one gets to the bottom of the index. A major shortcoming of the FSI relates to how countries have been categorised. A comprehensive scrutiny of the methodology deployed by the FFP reveals that the thresholds for determining categories of countries are neither theoretically nor empirically justified.

2.4

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)

Since 2007, the IIAG has delivered an annual assessment of the quality of governance in every African country. It incorporates a total of 100 indicators. These indicators are built up into fourteen sub-categories which are further decomposed into four categories and one overall measurement of the performance of governance in each country. Table 2.2 shows the categories and sub-categories used to construct the 2016 IIAG. Promises are easy to make but actions speak much louder than words. The IIAG therefore looks beyond mere declarations of intent made by African leaders. Rather, it focuses on measuring the specific outputs and outcomes of policies implemented by different governments. The indicators used to construct the IIAG include official data, expert assessments, and citizen surveys, provided by more than 30 independent global data institutions (MIF, 2017).

Table 2.2 Categories and sub-categories of the IIAG indicators

Categories Safety and Rule of Law

Participation and Human Rights

Sustainable Economic Opportunity

Human Development

Sub-categories Rule of Law Accountability Personal Safety National Security Participation Rights Gender Public Management Business Environment Infrastructure Rural Sector Welfare Education Health

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2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

When prioritising governance decisions, the aim is to maximise benefits for all given limited resources whilst not compromising the fair distribution of those resources. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the IIAG gives members of the public, government’s institutions, and the private sector the opportunity to gauge equity and fairness in the way public goods and services are being channelled towards the needs of citizens. In Fig. 2.3, the overall scores of the 2016 IIAG have been stratified into deciles. One of the interesting observations that can be deduced by comparing Figs. 2.2 and 2.3 is that the top four performing countries in terms of governance (IIAG) are also the least fragile nations. Figure 2.4 shows the scatter plot for the latest editions of the IIAG and FSI. Each point corresponds to one of the 54 African nations included in the analysis which yields a strong negative correlation coefficient value of 0.8. This suggests that African countries with lower governance performance are more fragile and vice versa. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation suggests that the IIAG is a tool for accurately evaluating the outcomes of public policy within African governance spaces. Policy evaluation applies appraisal principles and methods to examine the content, implementation, or impact of a policy. It is the activity through which we develop an understanding of the merit, worth, and utility of a policy. One criticism that may be levied against the IIAG is that even though there are claims that it may be used as a policy evaluation framework, this cannot be achieved without taking cognizance of the nature and extent of external influences as well as the relationship between different policies and their impacts.

2.5

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)

We now focus on the WGI which is slightly different in terms of methodological approach from the FSI and the IIAG. The WGI is comprised of six amalgamated indicators which have been developed since 1996. These indicators include: • • • • • •

Voice and Accountability Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Government Effectiveness Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of Corruption

The main difference between the WGI approach and the earlier two metrics is that whilst the FSI and IIAG decompose all variables into a single overall performance index, there are six composite indices available for the WGI. The WGI measures are based exclusively on public perception responses to surveys of households and firms. It also subsumes expert assessments created by a range of organisations. According to Kaufmann et al. (2010), public perception data yields value in measuring governance for at least three reasons. First citizens and organisations often act

Fig. 2.3 Deciles of the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance Scores. Source: Authors elaborations based on MIF (2017). 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance. London: Mo Ibrahim Foundation

2.5 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 25

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2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

140.0

120.0

FSI - Fragility

100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0 R2 = 0.7206

20.0

0.0 0

10

20

30

40 50 IIAG - Governance

60

70

80

90

Fig. 2.4 Country level correlation of governance vs fragility

based on impression and views. For instance, business owners decide to invest based on their view of the investment climate (World Bank, 2018) whilst electorates make their voting decisions based on their perceptions of the performance of government (Ojo et al., 2019). A second reason why public perception data is important for assessing governance is because for sensitive topics like corruption, there is practically no alternative than relying on public perception. The perpetrators of corruption leave behind almost no paper trail (Kieghe, 2016; Kaufmann et al., 2010) and this makes it challenging to measure its scale in an objective manner. A third reason given for the use of public perception data is the divergence between officially sanctioned data captured based on de jure notions and grassroots realities on the ground. Table 2.3 shows that positive associations exist across the six WGI composite measures for 54 African countries. The strongest association is between the rule of law and the effectiveness of government. The WGI is one of the widely used governance metrics; therefore, it has attracted a number of criticisms. The high level of interdependence among these six composite indices, as indicated in their high correlation values could effectively suggest that they are all measuring the same thing. Additional criticisms of the WGI have been documented by the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) which is based at the University of Birmingham. The GSDRC (2010) observed that the WGI are not suited to between-country comparisons overtime and lack transparency and the metrics suffer from sample bias with high likelihood of correlation of errors among the sources used.

2.6 Impact of Poor Leadership on African Millennials

27

Table 2.3 Correlation Matrix of 2017 Worldwide Governance Indicators for 54 African Nations Voice and accountability Voice and accountability Political stability Government effectiveness Regulatory quality Rule of law Control of corruption

2.6

Political stability

Government effectiveness

Regulatory quality

Rule of law

0.91 0.80

0.89

Control of corruption

0.63 0.71

0.67

0.76

0.66

0.90

0.75 0.74

0.71 0.69

0.95 0.86

Impact of Poor Leadership on African Millennials

There is a yawning gap between the hopes of young Africans and the realities they are experiencing. Leadership failure across Africa has resulted in a generation of millennials who are becoming increasingly cynical about their chances of accomplishing their tall dreams. Evidence from research indicates that this cynicism is spreading rapidly among young people (Ibrahim, 2019) as the dividends of democratic governance fail to trickle downwards. By implication, millennials who lack a meaningful channel for letting out their drive, energy, and optimism are turning to destructive activities such as antisocial behaviour, crime, substance abuse, prostitution, and violence. The impact of poor leadership in Africa is further heightened by the expanding gap between public officials and those who are governed. African leaders are increasingly disconnected from people at the grassroots and, consequently, their policies often do not match the needs and aspirations of young people. For instance, a study conducted by Ezepue and Ojo (2012) revealed that government approved higher educational curriculum in some African countries often bear no relation to workplace demands. The implication of this leadership failure is that upon graduation, several African millennials are impoverished in terms of their ability to creatively use their knowledge in relevant business and industry sectors. This further exacerbates mass graduate unemployment across the continent. Poor leadership in Africa is extinguishing the entrepreneurial spirit of millennials (Adeyemi, 2017). Apart from weakness in generating new forms of digital age employment, leaders in African public institutions tend to recycle a much older labour force thereby restricting opportunities from accruing to millennials (MIF, 2018). Millennials therefore often turn to small and medium scale entrepreneurial activities. However, officials of the same public institutions are making it harder for these entrepreneurial minded young Africans to start-up and sustain their enterprises. Millennials struggle to acquire capital because start-up loans often require unrealistic

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2 Salient Features of Being a Young African and the Effects of Poor Leadership

collaterals that can only be provided by people who have built up significant wealth (World Bank, 2020). Additionally, young African entrepreneurs tend to be confronted by bureaucratic bottlenecks and impeded by officials who demand bribes (Kieghe, 2016). A deficit in visionary leadership has resulted in a situation where there are few social protection programmes that make risk-taking attractive to young entrepreneurs across the African continent. The Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as the Boko Haram crisis in West Africa has given attention to radicalisation of millennials when confronted with leadership failure and harsh economic and political conditions (Alao, 2013; Abdel Salam, 2015). Leadership failure is accelerating a sense of social injustice and the need for dignity among young Africans thereby creating opportunities for young people to join extremist groups and uprisings (UNDP, 2017). For African millennials, democracy is not automatically translating to liberty. African leaders must meet the challenges of youth poverty, illiteracy, militarisation, the elimination of corruption, and the protection of freedom of information and human rights.

2.7

Conclusion

Young people all over the world are increasingly becoming connected due to nearreal-time information accessibility. Young Africans see the quality of life being experienced by those in the northern hemisphere. They also desire to have the same comforts. Rising aspirations are good, and when met with opportunities they can lead to an explosion of dynamism among young people. This in turn helps engender inclusive and sustainable growth. However, the rising aspirations of young Africans are being met with frustration. This has the potential to trigger and possibly exacerbate fragility, conflict, extremism, and migration. Africa is at a tipping point because segments of its giant and youthful population want to radically change the continent for the better. However, this chance is being squandered. Despite their energy and aspirations, a substantial demographic of African millennials presently lacks hope, prospects, and opportunities.

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Adi, H., & Sherwood, M. (2003). pan-african history: political figures from africa and the diaspora since 1787. Routledge. AfDB, OECD and UNDP. (2017). African economic outlook 2017: Entrepreneurship and industrialisation. OECD Publishing. Akinwotu, E. (2021). Nigerian Government threatens to rein in press after Twitter Ban. The Guardian, 29 June. Accessed July 20, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/ jun/29/nigerian-government-threatens-to-rein-in-press-after-twitter-ban Alao, A. (2013). Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism in Nigeria. Conflict, Security and Development, 13(2), 127–147. Archer, L., & DeWitt, J. (2017). Understanding young peoples science aspirations: How students form ideas about becoming scientists. Routledge. Archer, L., DeWitt, J., & Wong, B. (2013). Spheres of influence: what shapes young people’s aspirations at age 12/13 and what are the implications for education policy? Journal of Education Policy, 29(1), 58–85. Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C. (2016). Foreign aid and governance in Africa. International Review of Applied Economics, 30(1), 69–88. Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. (2003). Self-efficacy beliefs as shapers of children’s aspirations and career trajectories. Child Development, 72(1), 187–206. Brixiová, Z., & Kangoye, T. (2014). Youth employment in Africa: New evidence and policies from Swaziland. In M. Ángel Malo & D. Sciulli (Eds.), Disadvantaged workers: Empirical Evidence and labour policies. Springer International Publishing. CDD-Ghana (The Ghana Centre for Democratic Development). (2001). Governance, democracy and development in Africa: A cultural approach. Dakar, Senegal, 10–14 December. Clemens, M. A., Kenny, C. J., & Moss, T. J. (2007). The trouble with the MDGs: Confronting expectations of aid and development success. World Development, 35(5), 735–751. Cook, T. D., Church, M. B., Ajanaku, S., Shadish, W. R., Jr., Kim, J., & Cohen, R. (1996). The development of occupational aspirations and expectations among inner-city boys. Child Development, 67(6), 3368–3385. Coulibaly, B. S., Gandhi, D., & Mbaye, A. A. (2019). Job creation for youth in Africa: Assessing the employment intensity of industries without smokestacks. Brookings, 16 December. Accessed November 20, 2020, from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/12/ 16/job-creation-for-youth-in-africa-assessing-the-employment-intensity-of-industries-withoutsmokestacks/ Counted, A. V., & Arawole, J. O. (2015). We are connected, but constrained: internet inequality and the challenges of millennials in Africa as actors in innovation. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 5(3), 1–21. Drummond, P., Thakoor, V., & Yu, S. (2014). Africa rising: Harnessing the demographic dividend. International Monetary Fund. ECA. (2007). Relevance of African traditional institutions of governance. Economic Commission for Africa. Englebert, P. (2002). Patterns and theories of traditional resurgence in tropical Africa. Worlds in Development, 118, 51–64. Ezemenaka, K. E. (2021). Youth violence and human security in Nigeria. Social Sciences, 10(7), 267. Ezepue, P. O., & Ojo, A. (2012). Addressing economic development goals through innovative teaching of university statistics: A case study of statistical modelling in Nigeria. International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology, 43(8), 1013–1032. Fakih, A., Haimoun, N., & Kassem, M. (2020). Youth Unemployment, gender and institutions during transition: Evidence from the Arab Spring. Social Indicators Research, 150, 311–336. FFP. (2018). Fragile states index annual report 2018. The Fund for Peace. Gavin, M. D. (2007). Africa’s restless youth. In P. N. Lyman & P. Dorff (Eds.), Beyond humanitarianism: What you need to know about africa and why it matters. New York, NY.

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Glasser, W. (1985). Control theory: A new explanation of how we control our lives. Harper and Row. Glasser, W. (1998). Choice theory: A new psychology of personal freedom. Harper Collins. Glasser, W. (2010). The control theory manager. Harper Collins. GSDRC. (2010). Helpdesk research report: Critique of governance assessment applications. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham. Hajjar, B. (2020). The children’s continent: Keeping up with Africa’s growth. Geneva: World Economic Forum, 12 January. Hearn, J. (2007). The uses and abuses of civil society in Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 28(87), 45–53. Herbst, J. (2000). States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control. Princeton University Press. Hofmeyr, J. H. (Ed.). (2012). The youth dividend: Unlocking the potential of young South Africans. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Honwana, A. (2013). Youth, waithood, and protest movements in Africa. International African Institute. European Conference on African Studies, Centro de Estudos Internacionais do Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. Ibrahim, M. (2019). Governance lags behind youth expectations and needs. Brookings, 11 January. Accessed June 18, 2021, from https://www.brookings.edu/research/governance-lags-behindyouth-expectations-and-needs/ Katundano, T. (2019). Rebuilding ethical leadership in African universities. International Journal of Educational Theory and Practice, 2(4), 24–33. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators: Methodology and analytical issues. The World Bank. Kieghe, D. (2016). National ambition: Reconstructing Nigeria. New Generation Publishing. Kilimani, A. (2017). Youth employment in developing economies: Evidence on policies and interventions. IDS Bulletin, 48(3), 1–32. Leavy, J., & Smith, S. (2010). Future farmers: Youth aspirations, expectations and life choices. Future Agricultures Consortium. Loughlin, J. (1994). Nation, state and region in Western Europe. In L. Beckemans (Ed.), Culture: The building-stone of Europe, 2004. Presses Interuniversitaires. Makinda, S. M., Okumu, F. W., & Mickler, D. (2016). The African Union: Addressing the challenges of peace, security and governance (2nd ed.). Routledge. Manji, F., & O’Coill, C. (2002). The missionary position: NGOs and development in Africa. International Affairs, 28(3), 567–583. Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4), 370–396. Maslow, A. H. (1987). Motivation and personality. Pearson Education. Meyer, N. (2017). South Africa’s youth unemployment dilemma: Whose baby is it anyway? Journal of Economics and Behavioural Studies, 9(1), 56–68. MIF. (2017). 2017 Ibrahim index of African governance. Mo Ibrahim Foundation. MIF. (2018). Public service in Africa. Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Natama, J. B. (2014). State of Africa and the African Union Agenda 2063. [Facebook] 5 May. Accessed June 20, 2020, from https://www.facebook.com/notes/10224706919648252/ Nunnenkamp, P., & Öhler, H. (2011). Aid allocation through various official and private channels: Need, merit, and self-interest as motives of German donors. World Development, 39(3), 308–323. OECD. (2007). Principles for good international engagement with fragile states. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Ojo, A., & Ezepue, P. O. (2011). How developing countries can derive value from the principles and practice of geodemographics, and provide fresh solutions to millennium development challenges. Journal of Geography and Regional Planning, 4(9), 505–512.

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Ojo, A., Ibeh, S. C., & Kieghe, D. (2019). How Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election outcome was forecasted with geodemographics and public sentiment analytics. African Geographical Review, 38(4), 343–360. Osumah, O., & Aghedo, I. (2011). Who wants to be a Millionaire? Nigerian youths and the commodification of kidnapping. Review of African Political Economy, 38(128), 277–287. Painter, M., & Peters, B. (Eds.). (2010). Tradition and public administration. Palgrave Macmillan. Patrick, M. E., Palen, L., Caldwell, L., Gleeson, S., Smith, E., & Wegner, L. (2010). A qualitative assessment of south African adolescents’ motivations for and against substance use and sexual behaviour. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 20(2), 456–481. Pejovich, S. (1999). The effects of the interaction of formal and informal institutions on social stability and economic development. Journal of Markets and Morality, 2(2), 164–181. Perez-Diaz, V. M. (1993). The return of civil society. Harvard University Press. Posner, D. N., & Young, D. J. (2007). The institutionalisation of political power in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 126–140. Ramsbotham, O., Miall, H., & Woodhouse, T. (2011). Contemporary conflict resolution (3rd ed.). Polity Press. Schramm, K. (2010). African homecoming: Pan-African ideology and contested heritage. Routledge. Sommers, M. (2011). Governance, security and culture: Assessing Africa’s youth bulge. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 5(2), 292–303. Tomlinson, M. (2006). The degree is not enough: ‘Students’ perceptions of the role of higher education credentials for graduate work and employability. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 29(1), 49–61. UNDP. (2017). Journey to extremism in Africa. United Nations Development Programme. Wintrobe, R. (1998). The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge University Press. World Bank. (2018). Doing business 2018: Reforming to create jobs. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. World Bank. (2020). Unlocking finance for youth entrepreneurs: Evidence from a global stocktaking. The World Bank Group.

Chapter 3

Understanding Political Strongmen and Rising Out of Their Shadows

3.1

Origins of Strongman Mentality in African Leadership Spaces

In 2009, the first and only black leader of the United States of America (USA), President Barack Obama, visited Africa. During that trip, Mr. Obama delivered a well-received speech in the Ghanaian parliament. It is noteworthy to mention that Ghana was the destination of choice because of its comparatively strong democratic record, not to mention the embarkation point for most African slaves from West Africa to the new world (Menocal, 2015). Although the former president conceded that the legacy of Africa’s colonial heritage had helped breed governance and developmental challenges across the continent, he also argued that blaming colonialism alone was mediocrity in action and that this in part is responsible for Africa’s stalled pace of development. Mr. Obama focused his message on four key areas, which he believed were critical for Africa’s future as well as the rest of the developing world. These include democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Carson, 2013). Expanding on the democracy theme, Mr. Obama used some blunt words for those African countries, which have been undermined by despotic and corrupt leaders. Specifically, Mr. Obama made the following statement: “Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions”. What does Obama mean by strongmen and what is the origin of these African strongmen? The concept of strongmen is generally believed to be a non-gendered description often used interchangeably with dictators (male or female) who run authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Within the context of political governance, a strongman is regarded as a political leader who rules by force with little or no regard for representative or collective democratic norms. Strongmen are part of political elite who exert great power and control over their territories of control using morally questionable and often violent mechanisms to sustain their power (Reno, 1998).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Ojo, Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88546-5_3

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3 Understanding Political Strongmen and Rising Out of Their Shadows

One of the criticisms levied against current definitions of the strongman concept is its non-gendered interpretation. This approach to defining the concept of strongmen suggests that women leaders have also led totalitarian regimes exerting great power with complete control of state institutions. This is arguable and there is specifically no evidence of women leading totalitarian regimes in Africa. For nearly five decades, African political spaces have endured the rise and fall of numerous political strongmen. Strongman politics remains fashionable among much of Africa’s contemporary ruling elite (Hyden, 2013). However, we argue that these post-colonial despots bear little resemblance to the types of leaders and institutions that characterised Africa prior to the colonial era. Leaders of pre-colonial traditional institutions had to abide by a semblance of democratic traditions, which limited their powers. In his 1974 book entitled The Destruction of Black Civilisation, Chancellor Williams used a powerful incident to capture a sense of the strength of consultative leadership that existed in Africa prior to the colonial period. He wrote as follows: A fairly good example is the written account of a European explorer in East Africa. He was outraged because he and his party had to wait two weeks to present a request to explore the country to the African king. The black autocrat, the account went on, had the presumption to keep white men waiting (italics mine) in order to show his people how high and mighty he was. The whites were denied even a brief audience, while the king would quickly receive any Black that wandered in from the countryside (Williams, 1974, p. 32).

Unknown to this European explorer, the reason why the monarch could not have an audience with him for two weeks was because the king required the permission of the council of elders before he could entertain foreigners. African monarchs were not entitled to unrestrained powers. Consequently, in an attempt to paint a negative picture of pre-colonial governance systems in Africa, Williams (1974) recounts that this European explorer unwittingly showcased how African pre-colonial democracies worked. Williams (1974) argued further that these African consultative democratic leadership tenets were in existence even before Athens or Greece (often described in western literature as the birthplace of democracy). One therefore wonders why these African consultative practices were readily abandoned for more oppressive, though supposed democratic systems. Due to their self-seeking ambitions, colonial regimes were largely exploitive in nature. Consequently, the systems of pre-colonial checks and balances that existed were eroded and replaced, sometimes violently, with suppressive colonial regimes (Austing, 2010). African protesters against these new regimes were sometimes massacred in cold blood. A classic example is the Aba Women’s Riots that took place in Nigeria between November and December 1929. On January 1, 1914, the first Nigerian colonial governor, Lord Lugard, enforced an indirect system of governance upon southern Nigerians. This system enabled British colonial administrators to rule locally through Igbo warrant chiefs appointed by the governor (Mba, 1982). The British administrators encouraged systematic cronyism and further empowered the warrant chiefs by allowing them to impose special taxes on Igbo market women. The increasing oppression of the warrant chiefs, encouraged by their colonial masters forced thousands of market women to organise public

3.2 The Mindset of the Typical African Strongman

35

demonstrations against the oppressive warrant chiefs. The demonstration turned violent and colonial police officers were asked to intervene. The forceful intervention resulted in more than 100 causalities amongst the women with over 50 women killed (Van Allen, 1976). European colonial powers ruled Africans with an iron hand exhibiting racial superiority. Following the departure of the colonialists in the late sixties, Africans adopted the institutions that were left behind, and they embraced dictatorial practices, which they had learned from the colonial powers (Ake, 1996). Former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere maintained in a 1997 speech at the University of Edinburgh, that independence from colonial powers was granted to systematically aid neo-colonialism and to continue the suppression and oppression of Africans by their own. According to Nyerere, “Independence made it easier for them to exploit us. We became neo-colonies. In practice, colonialism, with its implications of racial superiority, was replaced by a combination of neo-colonialism and government by local elites who too often had learned to despise their own African traditions and the mass of the people who worked on the land” (Ayittey, 2005 p. 9). Africans converted the racial dominance exerted for decades by the departing Europeans into ethnic superiority. These are the origins of some of the ethnic conflicts witnessed across Africa today. Religion had also been introduced to Africa as a tool to keep people under control and to remain subservient to other fellow human beings rather than a means of accessing the love of God (Ellis & Haar, 2004). Today, religion is big business across Africa generating fortunes for religious leaders who have mastered the art of covertly and overtly extorting money from unsuspecting members of their congregations (Oladipo, 2011) whilst keeping the same members subservient to the leader’s beck and call. Just like the departing colonial powers, some of the African ruling elites had also learned to despise their own African civilisations as well as the peasants who worked on their behalf—a subtle form of neo-colonialism. These were the origins of the emergence of strongmen in African political and governance spaces.

3.2

The Mindset of the Typical African Strongman

Many African citizens can probably relate to a common story, which goes as follows. An individual aspires to become their leader and launches a political platform. During the campaign, the aspirant makes all sorts of usual promises including reducing poverty, fighting corruption, addressing ethno-religious divides, and providing basic infrastructure and healthcare. Once in power, the vision laid out during the campaign quickly fades away. Political patronage and other powerful societal forces stifle the vision and the elected leader becomes trapped by a circle of elite who either helped the leader attain power, or who benefit from the patrimonial system. The leader feels both paralysed and authorised by the ensuing pressures. Selfish ambitions build up quickly, and in order to bolster their power base they

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allocate public privileges among the influential elites to secure important support as soon as the opportunity for re-election or re-selection appears again and again. The picture painted in the preceding paragraph is an image of what much of contemporary Africa’s political situation looks like—The emergence of people who mistakenly stumble upon political power, discover that it is “sweet” and then decide that directly or indirectly, they want to hold on to that power perpetually. These networks of power brokers consist of people who have enriched themselves through public funds, which they also recycle into funding electoral campaigns in order to gain advantage and win elections (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002). In contemporary Africa, these political strongmen invest heavily in state-controlled media whilst discrediting other competing news outlets, in order maintain a credible image for their candidates. These political strongmen are the new neo-colonialists rampaging Africa. Africa’s foremost Pan-Africanist, Kwame Nkrumah described neo-colonialism as the worst form of imperialism because according to him, “for those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress” (Nkrumah, 1965, p. 11). The rise of African political strongmen through neo-colonial podiums is perceived to be potentially more dangerous than old-fashioned colonialism. When the colonial leaders were ruling across Africa, they had to justify or explain some of their decision-making protocols to their homebased governments in Europe. On the contrary, strongmen exert neo-colonial unrestricted powers without the equivalent responsibility that should accompany the exercise of power. The colonial leaders were at least accountable to the homebased governments. African strongmen are neo-colonialists who have become unaccountable to any institution and many of them are accountable to their neo-colonial masters because to some extent, this is their power base. In a bid to salvage their nations, one of the fundamental questions that regularly springs up in the minds of many African millennials is what are the factors that motivate African strongmen in their thirst for perpetual power? This is a difficult question to answer. Whilst there are generic underlying factors (history and impact of colonialism) that account for the behaviours of strongmen across Africa, there are also peculiar within-country dynamics that motivate them to stay in power. Furthermore, individual psychological drivers vary and play a key role in their thirst for perpetual power. One way to understand some of the underlying stimulants of these power-drunk individuals is to examine some of their key tactics. In Table 3.1, we profile key characteristics of some of Africa’s most prominent strongmen. Some of the quotes give a sense of the psychological motives of these strongmen. It is immediately apparent from the list compiled in Table 3.1 that there are no women. This again bolsters the argument the non-gendered definition of the concept of strongmen probably needs to be revised. A review of the key quotes and tactics of the people profiled in Table 3.1 reveals a mix of a number of dominant attributes, which include: • Arbitrariness in the exercise of power • Abolition of juridical bonds

3.2 The Mindset of the Typical African Strongman

37

Table 3.1 A profile of some of Africa’s most prominent strongmen —selected quotes and tactics Name Ahmed Sékou Touré

Country Guinea

Years in power 26 years (1958– 1984)

Charles Taylor

Liberia

6 years (1997– 2003)

Denis Sassou Nguesso

Republic of the Congo

34 years (1979– 1992); (1997– present)

Francisco Nguema

Equatorial Guinea

11 years (1968– 1979)

Gaafar Nimeiry

Sudan

16 years (1969 – 1985)

Gnassingbé Eyadema

Togo

38 years (1967– 2005)

Hastings Banda

Malawi

31 years (1963– 1994)

Hissene Habre

Chad

8 years (1982– 1990)

Selected quotes and dominant characteristics Quote: “Guinea prefers poverty in freedom to riches in slavery” (1958). • Elimination of civil liberties • Distrust of the West, Soviet Union, and other African nations • Use of state power to punish opponents Quote: “I have accepted this role as the sacrificial lamb” (2003). • Fearmongering • Conscription of child soldiers • Politicising the military and domestic security agencies Quote: “We have a mandate from the people, and we will carry it out to the end if God wills it” (2017). • Systematic efforts to silence the media • Intimidation of political opponents to boycott elections • Impulsive form of decision-making Quote: “I consider Hitler to be the saviour of Africa” (1967). • Arbitrariness in the exercise of power • Abolition of juridical bonds and throttling of opposition • Family affair approach to running government Quote: “Everything must change” (1969). • Pretentious rule by consent • Nationalistic predilection and abolition of civil institutions • Systematic administrative governance re-divisions Quote: “African democracy moves along at its own pace and in its own way”. • One party politics • Politicising the military and domestic security agencie. • Elimination of political opponents Quote: “I do not like this system of apartheid. But I prefer to talk” (1971). • One party politics • Conservative economics • Use of state power to punish opponents Quote: “Down with imperialists. The trial is a farce by rotten Senegalese politicians, African traitors and Valet of America” (2015). • Arbitrariness in the exercise of power and (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Name

Country

Years in power

Idi Amin Dada

Uganda

8 years (1971– 1979)

Idriss Deby

Chad

28 years (1990– present)

Isaias Afwerki

Eritrea

25 years (1993– present)

Jose Eduardo Dos Santos

Angola

38 years (1979– 2017)

Mobutu Sese Seko

Democratic Republic of the Congo

32 years (1965– 1997)

Muammar Gaddafi

Libya

42 years (1969– 2011)

Muhammad Hosni Mubarak

Egypt

30 years (1981– 2011)

Selected quotes and dominant characteristics predominant aggressive • Impulsive form of decision-making • Systematic ethnic cleansing Quote: “Politics is like boxing—you try to knock out your opponents” (1978). • Use of state power to punish opponents • Arbitrariness in the exercise of power • Government surveillance against domestic opponents Quote: “We are in total control, not only of the capital, but of all the country” (2008). • Use of state power to reward backers • Use of child soldiers • Politically-motivated disappearances Quote: “I will not be scared by someone coming telling me ‘well you have to go, we have to find a change’ ... I’m not a fool” (2008). • Extrajudicial executions • Media suppression • Charismatic and persuasive but mercilessly vindictive Quote: “The concept of the sovereignty of the states is still valid and we cannot accept the interference of third parties in our internal affairs” (2002). • Widespread corruption • Highly refined political craftsmanship • Establishment of a political dynasty Quote: “If you steal, do not steal too much at a time. You may be arrested. Steal cleverly, little by little” (1991). • Endemic corruption • Arbitrariness in the exercise of power • Using of state power to reward backers Quote: “I am an international leader, the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims, and my international status does not allow me to descend to a lower level” (2009). • Nationalistic rhetoric and socialist-style policies • Civil society repression • Human rights violations Quote: “This dear nation... is where I lived, I fought for it and defended its soil, sovereignty and interests. On its soil I will die” (2011). (continued)

3.2 The Mindset of the Typical African Strongman

39

Table 3.1 (continued) Name

Country

Years in power

Omar al-Bashir

Sudan

29 years (1989– 2019)

Paul Biya

Cameroon

36 years (1982– present)

Robert Gabriel Mugabe

Zimbabwe

30 years (1987– 2017)

Sani Abacha

Nigeria

5 years (1993– 1998)

Siad Barre

Somalia

22 years (1969– 1991)

Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo

Equatorial Guinea

39 years (1979– present)

Selected quotes and dominant characteristics • Use of emergency laws • Monopolisation of power • Politicising the military and domestic security agencies Quote: “The confrontation would be better and cheaper for us than to sign that we accept U.N. forces in Darfur” (2006). • State sponsored violence • Fierce opposition against pluralism • Human rights violations Quote: “Slowly but surely, we are acquiring that famous culture of democracy, which is our objective” (2004). • Elimination of civil liberties • Political and social control • Politicising the military and domestic security agencies Quote: “Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer—its guarantor” (1976). • Tight consolidation of power • Repression and persecution of political opponents and civil society • Using state powers to reward backers Quote: “This regime will be firm, humane and decisive. We will not condone nor tolerate any acts of indiscipline. Any attempts to test our will, will be decisively dealt with” (1993). • Arbitrariness in the exercise of power • Elimination of civil liberties • Human rights abuses and the crushing of dissenting voices Quote: “We should teach the foreigners and colonialists that Somalia cannot be led by other people and that the traitors who fled the country will never lead Somalia” (1978). • Clan-based totalitarian dictatorship • Creation of an elite loyalist paramilitary brigade • Predominant aggressive Quote: “Critics should agree with me that in a regime of dictatorship and oppression public trials do not occur, death sentences are not commuted, and foreign terrorists (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Name

Country

Years in power

Yahya Jammeh

The Gambia

23 years (1994– 2017)

Yoweri Museveni

Uganda

32 years (1986– present)

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali

Tunisia

24 years (1987– 2011)

Selected quotes and dominant characteristics and mercenaries convicted of international crimes are not pardoned, as occurs in Equatorial Guinea” (2010). • Endemic corruption • Opaque and secretive financial practices • Government run as a family affair Quote: “There is no reason that anybody should demonstrate. Demonstrations are the loopholes that are used to destabilise African governments” (2016). • Intimidation and control of the media • Elimination of civil liberties • Fearmongering Quote: “Some people think that being in government for a long time is a bad thing. But the more you stay, the more you learn. I am now an expert in governance” (2012). • Human rights abuses • Systematic efforts to intimidate the media • Widespread corruption and politicising the military and domestic security agencies Quote: “I will say to you once more loud and clear: Do write on any subject you choose. There are no taboos except what is prohibited by law and press ethics” (2001). • Restrictions to free press • Using of state power to reward backers • Muzzling of opposition

Source: Authors compilation based on research findings

• • • • • • • • • • • •

Loosening of political power Elimination of civil liberties Substantial restriction of civil liberties Predominant aggressiveness Impulsive form of decision-making Political and social control Systematic efforts to intimidate and control branches of the media Politicising the civil service Politicising the military and domestic security agencies Government surveillance against domestic opponents Using state power to reward backers; using state power to punish opponents Anti-union/worker organisations

A further examination of the antecedents of many of the strongmen profiled in Table 3.1 reveals that many of them often started as popular representatives of the public (Fig. 3.1). They enjoyed the broad support of their people prior to the point of

3.2 The Mindset of the Typical African Strongman

41

Fig. 3.1 Broad mindsets of Africa’s political strongmen

regime change and they often portrayed ambitious dreams for their nations. Along the line, they lose their way and become desperate to stay in power perpetually. We will explore further the mindset of typical African strongmen through four underlying motivational lenses. African strongmen want to acquire power at all cost. They want to stay in power irrespective of their performances. These leaders crave for fame but are not prepared to work it. The final mission of these strongmen is to enrich and protect themselves and their immediate family members with illicit material derivatives of public office.

3.2.1

Power Acquisition Mindset

The primary motive of African political strongmen is to secure political power. When in opposition, strongmen generally present themselves as champions of democratic principles (Reno, 1998), often capitalising on the desperate thirst of the people for good governance at all cost. These strongmen act like chameleons that can change the colour of their skin in order to blend in with their surroundings. The quest for power compels strongmen to modify their political viewpoints from time to

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time in order to blend in with the group from which support is sought. For instance, when bidding for power, strongmen thrive on the fears, social and economic disparities of the public. Many contemporary African strongmen do not possess a history of active involvement with community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, professional associations, and similar foundations. African strongmen recognise that they do not possess strengths in mustering support from civil society when aiming to seize power; therefore, their mindset is tuned towards mobilising support from ethnic and faith-based movements (Nolte et al., 2009). When strongmen use ethno-religious patronages to mobilise support for their leadership, institutional structures are also organised around these movements.

3.2.2

Survival Mindset

Once in power, strongmen generally find ways to retract from their promises. Irrespective of their performances, clinging on to power becomes their next priority. There is a general recognition among people in political leadership that their consolidation of power requires the support of others (Clapham, 2007). The mindset of African strongmen is programmed to calibrate the risk-reward calculus of holding on to power under at least two scenarios—(a) non-dictatorial and (b) dictatorial scenarios. Under more democratic non-dictatorial regimes, public scrutiny is allowed to thrive and evidence shows that the chances of using state resources to support backers is diminished (Halperin et al., 2010). On the contrary, African political strongmen seem to favour a dictatorial regime, which allows them to use state resources to hold on to power. The mindset of strong men paints a picture that tells them that their essential followers may choose to drift under the wings of alternative political challengers who are capable of satisfying their urge for patronage. An appraisal of the tactics of former and current African strongmen also suggests that they have a huge advantage over rivals, especially when they rely on relatively few people to function and when the pool of replacements for government is large (Decalo, 1998). African strongmen systematically map out those who count. They know that it is the successful and reliable delivery of political promises to those who count that provides the basis for their advantage. Their survival mindset is therefore shaped to function in a way that enables them to discard some of those who helped them get to power (possibly because they know their dirty secrets which may be used against them at later date), whilst replacing them with others deemed to have similar mindsets and able to help the man at the top to consolidate power.

3.2 The Mindset of the Typical African Strongman

3.2.3

43

Populist and Celebrity-Style Mindset

The typical strongman is afraid of people who express different or sometimes superior opinions to themselves (Brownlee, 2007). Good leaders find ways to embrace sensible and evidence-driven arguments and propositions that are superior to theirs, placing the national interest above their narrow political interest. However, this is not the way the minds of typical African strongmen work. They are too arrogant to recognise the opportunities presented by a landscape of rich diversity of policy expressions (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). The haughtiness that characterises the mindset of political strongmen makes it difficult for them to recognise that those in opposition indirectly undertake part of the intellectual thinking for the ruling party when they are allowed to present alternative viewpoints. Rather, strongmen use state resources to intimidate the opposition, threaten the free media and civil society, and allow domestic security agencies to harass ordinary people (e.g. Al Bashir of Sudan). They create a semblance of artificial popularity by pursuing those policies that give them the best chances of holding on to power even where such policies are not in the national interest.

3.2.4

Private Benefits Acquisition Mindset

Self-interest plays a fundamental role in the calculations that take place in the minds of African strongmen. We have already established that political strongmen develop survival mindsets that rely on small core set of supporters. There are at least two reasons why strongmen avoid large coalitions of critical support bases. Firstly, they seek to prevent the loosing of concentrated power, as they believe that it is generally easier to work with a few trusted loyalists (Zanker et al., 2015). Secondly, these strongmen constantly evaluate the financial and material derivatives of power. If they surround themselves with an excessively large pool of loyalists, the purchase of loyalty becomes too costly and this has knock-on effects on their loot. The entrenchment of a small groups of loyalists help African despots to establish stable, corrupt, and private-goods-oriented dynasties (Tangri & Mwenda, 2013). They are normally confronted by the options of enhancing the broader societal welfare or enriching a privileged few. However, the mindset of these strongmen is primarily framed around selfish motives and the fear of what might happen should they lose power forces them to prepare for the rainy day by illegally acquiring the resources that belong to the people.

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3.3

3 Understanding Political Strongmen and Rising Out of Their Shadows

How Strongmen Consolidate Power

In the previous section, the desire to hold on to power for as long as possible was identified as one of the prime motives of African strongmen. In this section, we focus our discussion on a range of tactics that African strongmen use to consolidate power. It is practically impossible for a strongman to be able to hold on to power for very long without establishing a cult personality (e.g. Emperor Bokassa and Idi Amin) (Decalo, 1998). Many African strongmen are obsessed with this form of identity. It is therefore not atypical to regularly witness a massive entourage of supporters around such individuals at public events. These identities are used to depict strongmen as superhero with clouts of strength and invulnerability (Ferim, 2012) especially where such individuals have managed to survive assassination attempts, for instance. The longevity of strongmen in Africa is also enhanced by the inability of their most powerful rivals, to humble themselves and form unified coalitions of opposition. This is often due to a question of trust and lack of compromise among rivals. Strongmen also have a way of systematically penetrating rival opposition figures by mapping out the individuals who lack strong character or ideals. Strongmen recognise that sound knowledge is equivalent to power; therefore, they know that one of the most potent mechanisms for taking power from people is to truncate their access to information. This tactic has been perfected over the years by numerous African strongmen (Wasserman, 2013). Dictators like Teodoro Obiang, Paul Biya, and Yoweri Museveni regularly constrict public access to information. They control the press either by buying up key media outlets or using force to restrain the flow of information to masses of electorate that have long been starved of the facts about governance. In most African countries, key radio and television stations are still run as government parastatals or agencies, which makes it difficult for journalists to avoid unbiased reporting. Although the African continent has witnessed the emergence of some private media outlets, these are still run by the same strongmen who bankroll the salaries of journalists and other administrative staff (Emoruwa, 2019). Millennials lack the resources to float and sustain powerful media platforms without special interests. Strongmen work with informants, spies, or other forms of surveillance that help them to quickly nip threats to their incumbency in the bud. They do not perceive uprisings against them as signals of unpopularity. Rather, they claim that such acts of civil disobedience represent attempts to destabilise the state and they label civil rights protesters as enemies of the state. In order to keep their grip on power, they find ways of co-opting state security apparatuses to do the leaders bidding (Ayittey, 2011). Besides their knack for suppressing powerful opposition figures, some African strongmen have also managed to hold on to power by positioning themselves as trusted Western allies (Human Rights Watch, 2005). For instance, during the years that Hissene Habre ruled Chad, he was used by the United States and France as a bulwark against Muammar Gaddafi (Human Rights Watch, 2016). During Habre’s

3.3 How Strongmen Consolidate Power

45

visit to the United States in 1987, Late American President Ronald Reagan made the following declaration at the White house: “President Habré and I are convinced that the relationship between our countries will continue to be strong and productive, one which will serve the interests of both our peoples. It was an honour and a great pleasure to have had him here as our guest” (Human Rights Watch, 2016, p. 1). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated his rise to power. Alongside France, the CIA fortified him with military ware and logistical information (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Another strategy often deployed by strongmen to consolidate power is the floating of rival artificial political parties or platforms. Strongmen sometimes set up political parties or other politicians to initially act as though they are rivals. However, closer to the main elections, these impostors quickly converge together to pledge their support for the leader in order to shore up the support base of the incumbent. Recently during Cameroon’s 2018 presidential election, a coalition of twenty opposition parties threw their weight behind the candidature of incumbent, Paul Biya (Ngalame, 2018). The 20 opposition parties disclosed that they decided to back Biya’s seventh consecutive term in office because he possesses the qualities required to pursue peace, economic progress, and to restore respect from the international community. Similarly, the late Nigerian despot, Sani Abacha deployed the same tactics in 1998 when he secured the endorsement of all five rival political parties ahead of the August 1998 presidential election, effectively paving the way for his self-succession (Amuwo et al., 2001). In multiparty electoral systems, internal party democracy is essential for ensuring that credible representatives of the people emerge. Strong and sustainable democracies rely upon functional and vibrant political party structures. Internal democracy helps to ensure that party procedures are clearly known to members and applied consistently. It is centred on principles conceived to embrace the idea that all stakeholders should be part of the decision-making process. However, African political strongmen use various mechanisms to systematically weaken internal party politics in order to edge out potential rivals especially younger participants (as in Nigeria recently). In African democracies where the political spaces are rapidly expanding and the intensity of electoral competition is growing, there is a lack of corresponding improvement in internal party democracy (Lotshawo, 2009, 2011). This further weakens party structures and diminishes public perception on the true representativeness of political parties. National electoral institutions are expected to function as unbiased umpires who regulate the conduct of elections at various administrative levels. As independent bodies, electoral institutions should normally have neutral civil servants on their boards. However, Jinadu (1997) contends that many African nations inherited fragile and stunted electoral machineries at the point of gaining independence from colonial powers. According to him, the inherited electoral institutions were based upon narrow and restrictive franchises largely designed to ensure that political succession remains favourable to the departing colonial regimes (Jinadu, 1997). However, the goals of the colonial powers were not achieved. Instead, the political strongmen who emerged after the colonialist departed preyed upon the existing weak electoral

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institutions. Strongmen see no reason to strengthen independent electoral institutions because doing so would end up undermining their ulterior motives of retaining power for as long as possible. Affordability of electoral nomination fees is an important first step towards ousting long-term incumbents. However, African political strongmen and their cronies find ways to block the emergence of younger male and female candidates by indiscriminately hiking electoral fees. For instance, the presidential nomination forms for some major political parties in Nigeria such as the All Progressives Congress (APC) costs 45 million Naira ($125,000). The presidential nomination form of the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) costs 12 million Naira ($33,000). Similarly, the governorship nomination forms for the APC and PDP costs 22.5 million Naira ($62,000) and that of the PDP costs six million Naira ($16,500). These costs indicate that access to nomination forms in mainstream political parties is reserved for an exclusive club of people. Strongmen also find ways to modify laws in order to remain in power. Paul Biya of Cameroon altered the Constitution in order to allow him contest for a third term in 2008. At the point, he had been in power for 25 years and was keen on maintaining his authority over the country. His party, Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) was able to pass the change as they had a majority of 153 out of 180 seats in parliament. He is among presidents such as Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, The Republic of Congo’s Denis Sassou Nguesso, Chad’s Idriss Deby, Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza, and Guinea’s Lansana Conte who changed the constitution to increase their terms or scrapped term limits altogether.

3.4

Why Is It Difficult for Young Africans to Unseat Strongmen?

Young visionary African men and women are growing increasingly uncomfortable with long-term incumbents and are becoming increasingly hungry for political power (Bafana, 2018). Despite the desire for change, young people appear unable to mount credible challenges to many established strongmen across the continent. Multiple dynamics work against young people who want to unseat political strongmen across the continent. In order to ensure that a new generation of visionary leaders do not emerge within African governance spaces, the current political class have deliberately installed multiple hindrances. The main obstacles erected by Africa’s mainstream political class are discussed in this section.

3.4 Why Is It Difficult for Young Africans to Unseat Strongmen?

3.4.1

47

Lack of Internal Democracy within Existing Political Parties

Internal democracy refers to intra-party practices for including members of political parties in the decision-making and deliberation of political party structures. The practice of internal democracy is crucial for ensuring that the representatives of political parties are capable candidates who have been selected by the party hierarchy (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). A large number of established political parties in Africa lack internal democracy (Lotshawo, 2009, 2011; Ojukwu & Olaifa, 2011). Lack of internal democracy is a deliberate ploy by political strongmen to obstruct the emergence of capable young politicians. Although some of these political parties conduct a semblance of candidacy elections, several other key elements of internal party democracy fly in their faces. They embrace centralised leadership styles that ensure individuals or National Executive Committees (NEC) dominate decisionmaking thereby excluding the broader membership and lower party structures. These practices stifle the debate of important issues and policies and ensure that strongmen further consolidate their power and position.

3.4.2

Politics of Patronage and Godfatherism

The appointment or hiring of a people based on personal or partisan loyalty also known as politics of patronage is common practice within some African polities. Linked to the practice of politics of patronage is the rise of the political godfatherism. Political godfathers are often those persons who have enriched themselves to the point that they can use their financial contributions to political campaigns to sway or determine the outcomes of elections. Although godfatherism is not peculiar to Africa (Albert, 2005), it represents a particularly significant impediment working against young African men and women. Whilst some of these godfathers have no interest in occupying public offices, they use their wealth to plant their protégés in political offices. Once in office, these protégés submit state funds and resources to godfathers, which means that godfather’s rule by proxy, and obstruct young vibrant African men and women.

3.4.3

Illegal Use of State Resources

Many political strongmen have unrestricted access to state funds often used illegally to bankroll their political campaigns (Hope, 2000). The availability of such huge resources poses a tremendous challenge for young aspiring African leaders who are unable to compete on a level playing field during democratic elections.

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3.4.4

3 Understanding Political Strongmen and Rising Out of Their Shadows

Erosion of Confidence in Elections

African political strongmen recognise that elections remain the chief mechanisms for legally unseating them. Therefore, they systematically undermine public confidence in electoral processes. For instance, problematic voter registration (Evrensel, 2010) and hastily scheduled elections (Omotola, 2010) have been used to systematically disenfranchise significant numbers of supporters of potential young leaders. Public distrust of voter’s registration and related electoral processes sometimes lead to voter apathy and diminished participation in electoral processes.

3.4.5

Compromising the Judiciary

Political strongmen have mastered the art of undermining the system of courts that interprets and applies the law in legal cases. Two mechanisms are often used to undermine the judiciary. Ill-gotten state resources are used to bribe judges and magistrates handling electoral cases whilst threats and intimidation have been used to scare those judicial officers who choose to remain incorruptible (Omodia, 2009). These practices frustrate those electoral cases that make it to the courts, resulting in slow and unfair outcomes (Edroma, 2013). The judiciary should symbolise impartiality, this is not always the case. However, justice is expensive in Africa. Many young men and women politicians in Africa lack the financial muscle to match strongmen in the law courts.

3.4.6

Exploitation of Power of Incumbency

The many perks of holding public office are translated into significant electoral advantages for incumbents in Africa’s emerging democracies (Bamfo, 2005). The flagrant abuse of the power of incumbency has seriously discouraged young aspiring African leaders from contesting against incumbent public office holders. Strongmen use the power of incumbency as a prime obstacle for eroding democratic competitiveness, political accountability, and the general “fairness” of elections. Aspiring young African leaders often fear that contesting elections against incumbents is futile, so they give up. Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that pockets of African electorates are gradually beginning to punish politicians who exploit the power of incumbency at the polls by voting them out of office (Olawoyin, 2019; Bleck & Van de Walle, 2019).

3.4 Why Is It Difficult for Young Africans to Unseat Strongmen?

3.4.7

49

Diminishing Mainstream Publicity Spaces

Powerful African politicians have managed to establish themselves as celebrities who enjoy the cult following of some ill-informed electorates. They buy up publicity spaces within mainstream media channels such as newspapers, radio, and television interviews. Young aspiring leaders are barely known because they are denied from accessing the channels for taking their ideas to key parts of the electorates (Garman & Malila, 2016). Mainstream media organisations are partly to blame. Some of these organisations have a survival mentality. Consequently, they offer their campaign podiums and tabloid advertorial pages to the highest bidders thereby choking many visionary young politicians out of the public enlightenment process. Younger African politicians generally rely upon new media such as social media, as was witnessed in the struggle in The Sudan where young women used their knowledge of social media to chart their political activities. Persisting inequalities in access and use of new media particularly in rural Africa (Bornman, 2016) means that these young aspiring leaders do not penetrate certain demographic groups.

3.4.8

Divide-and-Rule Politics

It has established in literature that colonial Africa was underdeveloped and exploited through divide-and-conquer strategies practiced by European colonisers (Mulinge & Lesetedi, 1998). Contemporary African political strongmen have mastered and extended the practice of divide-and-rule to survive in political office. These strongmen systematically exploit socio-economic and ethno-religious and gender fault lines in their countries. They use these fault lines to break up support for young African politicians by stirring up unnecessary arguments, propaganda, and tensions in the support bases and political strongholds of younger politicians.

3.4.9

Attempts to Distort Corruption Narratives

Corruption affects virtually every facet of Africa’s socio-economic fabric including political leadership spaces (Kieghe, 2016). Corruption continues to hurt efforts to eradicate poverty and improve the lives of people. Established evidence paints a grim picture of embezzlement of state funds among the current political class in Africa. More than half of African citizens believe that corruption is worsening under the current crop of African political leaders dominated by strongmen (Pring & Vrushi, 2019). Whilst the current crop of political leaders does not deny the corrupt identities that they have acquired for themselves, they seem to be painting a potentially misleading picture about the next generation of leaders. African strongmen are increasingly portraying the younger generation of Africans as corrupt. These

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3 Understanding Political Strongmen and Rising Out of Their Shadows

strongmen are trying to use this new narrative to deceive the broader African public in order to sustain themselves in public office. Strongmen believe that by smearing the next generation of young Africans with the label of corruption, the leadership prospects of young people will be undermined.

3.5

Conclusion

Africa is desperate for visionary, tested, and committed young men and women who can bring energy, passion, and drive into leadership and governance spaces. There are young Africans who possess the intellectual acumen, vision, and leadership skills to stand toe to toe with the best leaders anywhere in the world. However, for multiple reasons, many African nations have been rigged by and for mediocrities. This chapter has thrown light into the colonial and post-colonial origins and metamorphosis of the strongman politics that continues to restrict the emergence of a long desired new political class on the continent. The chapter recognises that the task of unseating political strongmen is an enormous one, which may be likened to the decolonisation wind that blew across Africa during the 1960s. Many of these strongmen and political godfathers have embezzled state resources, which they regularly use to fund their political dominance. They have also mastered various strategies for distracting and obstructing youth political movements. Sadly, some young Africans have fallen prey to the gimmicks of political strongmen whose ultimate desire is to consolidate power perpetually. Young visionary African’s with leadership potentials must liberate their minds by improving their familiarity and understanding of the historical developmental trajectory of their nations.

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Bleck, J. & Van de Walle, N. (2019). Change and continuity in African electoral politics since multipartyism. Oxford research encyclopedia of politics. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/ 9780190228637.013.74. Bornman, E. (2016). Information society and digital divide in South Africa: Results of longitudinal surveys. Information, Communication and Society, 19(2), 264–278. Brownlee, J. (2007). Authoritarianism in an age of democratisation. Cambridge University Press. Carson, J. (2013). The Obama administration’s Africa policy: The first four years, 2009-2013. American Foreign Policy Interests, 35(6), 317–324. Clapham, C. (2007). Democratisation in Africa: Obstacles and prospects. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), 423–438. Decalo, S. (1998). Psychoses of power: African personal dictatorships. Florida Academic Press. Edroma, E. (Ed.). (2013). Rethinking the role of law and justice in Africa’s development: An edited volume of discussion papers. UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa. Ellis, S., & Haar, G.-T. (2004). Worlds of power: Religious thought and political practice in Africa. Oxford University Press. Emoruwa, A. (2019). Africa needs traditional, independent media to hold the powerful to account. The Mail and Guardian, 5 September. Accessed January 03, 2020, from https://mg.co.za/article/ 2019-09-05-00-africa-needs-traditional-independent-media-to-hold-the-powerful-to-account/ Evrensel, A. (Ed.). (2010). Voter registration in Africa: A comparative analysis. Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa. Ferim, V. (2012). Dictatorships in Africa. Conflict Trends, 4, 28–35. Garman, A., & Malila, V. (2016). How South Africa’s media deny the country’s youth a voice. The Conversation, 24 February. Accessed December 12, 2019, from https://theconversation.com/ how-south-africas-media-deny-the-countrys-youth-a-voice-54853 Halperin, M. H., Siegle, J. T., & Weinstein, M. M. (2010). The democracy advantage: How democracies promote prosperity and peace. Routledge. Hazan, R. Y., & Rahat, G. (2010). Democracy within parties: Candidate selection methods and their political consequences. Oxford University Press. Hope, K. R. (2000). Corruption and development in Africa. In K. R. Hope & B. C. Chikulo (Eds.), Corruption and development in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. Human Rights Watch. (2005). Chad: The victims of Hissène Habré still awaiting justice. Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. (2016). Enabling a dictator: The United States and Chad’s Hissène Habré 1982–1990. Human Rights Watch. Hyden, G. (2013). African politics in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. Jinadu, A. L. (1997). Matters arising: African elections and the problem of electoral administration. African Journal of Political Science, 2(1), 1–11. Kieghe, D. (2016). National ambition: Reconstructing Nigeria. New Generation Publishing. Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (2007). Patrons, clients and policies: patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge University Press. Lotshwao, K. (2009). The lack of internal party democracy in the African national congress: A threat to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 35(4), 901–914. Lotshwao, K. (2011). The weakness of opposition parties in Botswana: A Justification for more internal-party democracy in the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 5(2), 103–111. Mba, N. E. (1982). Nigerian women mobilized: Women’s political activity in Southern Nigeria, 1900–1965. University of California Press. Menocal, A. R. (2015). Ghana’s democracy is driving great progress in health and education. The Guardian, 18 March. Accessed October 19, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2015/mar/18/ghana-democracy-progress-health-education Mulinge, M., & Lesetedi, G. (1998). Interrogating our past: Colonialism and corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. African Journal of Political Science, 3(2), 15–28.

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Ngalame, E. N. (2018). 20 Parties firmly behind Biya. Eden Newspaper. Accessed November 18, 2019, from https://www.edennewspaper.net/20-parties-firmly-behind-biya/ Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-colonialism: The last stage of imperialism. Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd.. Nolte, I., Danjibo, N., & Oladeji, A. (2009). Religion, politics and governance in Nigeria. University of Birmingham. Ojukwu, C. C., & Olaifa, T. (2011). Challenges of internal democracy in Nigeria’s Political parties: The bane of intra-party conflicts in the peoples democratic party of Nigeria. Global Journal of Human Social Science, 11(3), 25–34. Oladipo, T. (2011). Nigeria: Where religion is big business. The British Broadcasting Corporation, 22 August. Accessed November 16, 2019, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-14573660 Olawoyin, O. (2019). Nigeria: 13 factors that ‘triggered’ Saraki’s Fall in Kwara. Premium Times, 1 March. Accessed January 10, 2019, from https://allafrica.com/stories/201903010621.html Omodia, S. M. (2009). Elections and democratic survival in the fourth Republic of Nigeria. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 3(3), 35–42. Omotola, J. S. (2010). Elections and democratic transition in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic. African Affairs, 109(437), 535–553. Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (2002). Financing politics: A global view. Journal of Democracy, 13(4), 69–86. Pring, C., & Vrushi, J. (2019). Global corruption barometer Africa 2019: Citizens’ views and experiences of corruption. Transparency International. Reno, W. (1998). Warlord politics and African States. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Tangri, R., & Mwenda, A. M. (2013). The politics of elite corruption in Africa. Routledge. Van Allen, J. (1976). Aba Riots’ or Igbo ‘women’s war’? Ideology, stratification and the invisibility of women. In N. J. Hafkin & E. G. Bay (Eds.), Women in Africa. Stanford University Press. Wasserman, H. (Ed.). (2013). Press freedom in Africa: Comparative perspectives. Routledge. Williams, C. (1974). The destruction of black civilisation. Third World Press. Zanker, F., Simons, C., & Mehler, A. (2015). Power, peace, and space in Africa: Revisiting territorial power sharing. African Affairs, 114(454), 72–91.

Chapter 4

Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African Millennials

4.1

Social Revolutions: A Diagnosis

Although social revolutions have been experienced through ancient and modern human history (Skocpol, 1994), there is no clear-cut definition of the concept. This is partly due to their historical and contemporary features as well as the variability in the underlying reasons for their occurrences. Karl Marx is recognised as one of the foremost socialist thinkers, and his description of the concept of social revolution often receives significant attention from academics and practitioners. In a document entitled A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx wrote as follows: “At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations, a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophical—in short, ideological—forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out” (Feuer, 1959, pp. 43–44). Several revolutionary leaders have been armed with Marxist ideas (Donham, 1999). The whole point of these ideas was to illustrate that human culture is produced and reproduced socially in response to human needs. While Marx believed that culture is organised to meet needs more holistically, he did not consider that individuals and their needs exist for the sake of society. Some people misconstrue political revolutions for social revolutions. A political revolution is the forcible removal of a power structure by a group of people and the implementation of a new power structure (Grosser, 2020). By “power structure,” we © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Ojo, Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88546-5_4

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4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

are referring to a system of government. Political revolutions generally lead to the replacement of old regimes with new ones. However, in social revolutions, both political and economic systems of the old order are dismantled and replaced (Lachapelle et al., 2020). African countries have witnessed some revolutions since the beginning of the twentieth century, the most prominent probably being the Arab Spring which started in Tunisia as a response to oppressive regimes and a low standard of living (Dabashi, 2012). Similarly, some authoritarian African leaders were forced out of politics— Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the 82-year-old president of Algeria, who had ruled since 1999, and Omar al-Bashir, 75, in power in Sudan since 1989. Both political strongmen fell victim to mass movements spearheaded by millennials, though in each case, the once-powerful rulers were left vulnerable when armed forces withdrew their support. Table 4.1 shows a cross-section of prominent movements, rallies, and mass actions recently spearheaded by young Africans. There may be no straightforward way to summarise the impetus for these unrests. In some parts of Africa, the push by young protesters seems to be for better governance, while in other places, there seems to be an emphasis on the demand for regime change. The current political situation in multiple African countries indicates that social, cultural, technological, environmental, political, and women-led movements are making gains in the struggle against authoritarianism (Fallon, 2008). Although millennials are actively involved in these movements, the determinants of the propensity for social revolutions among African millennials are not well documented. To investigate the underlying drivers of the inclination for social revolutions, we draw upon the hypothesis of Tiruneh (2017), which suggests that the three most important factors that explain the onset of social revolutions are economic development, regime type, and state ineffectiveness.

4.2

Data Preparation and Methodological Approach

The main data used for the study presented in this chapter was obtained from the Afrobarometer study, which focuses on public attitudes, democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related social issues in multiple African countries (Bratton, 2013). The analysis is based upon data collected from 2014 to 2016 for people aged 18–35 years across 36 African nations shown in Fig. 4.1. Table 4.2 shows the number of millennials included in this study at continental and sub-regional levels. The aim of the study was to ascertain the predictors of the propensity for social revolution among the cohort. We now turn to a description of our dependent and predictor variables.

4.2 Data Preparation and Methodological Approach

55

Table 4.1 Prominent socio-political unrests recently spearheaded by young Africans Sociopolitical unrest Revolution of smiles

Country Algeria

Timeline 2019–2021

Benin

2011

Electoral fraud protests

Burkina Faso

2014–2015

Revolution 2.0

Egypt

2011

Arab Spring

Ethiopia

2015–2016

Oromo people protests

Libya

2011

The 17 February Revolution

Morocco

2011–2012

Moroccan protests

Nigeria

2012

Occupy Nigeria

Reasons for unrest Students fed up with a stagnant and corrupt government triggered nationwide protests when President Abdelaziz Bouteflika indicated he wanted to contest for a fifth term in office The Independent Electoral Commission of Benin organised a new electronic voting system that would have disenfranchised millions of eligible voters Corruption, nepotism, and the violent quelling of a student and military rebellion Protesters demanded the resignation of the autocratic president, Hosni Mubarak, the dissolution of the national assembly and the release of political detainees Yearnings by young people and others for political change The Libyan revolution started in Benghazi as a response to 42 years of oppression under Muammar Gaddafi Demands for political reform, action against police brutality, electoral fraud, political censorship and high unemployment Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan abruptly removed the fuel subsidy provided to citizens by the government

Outcome Toppled an entrenched and corrupt elite

The Constitutional Court of Benin ruled in favour of the protesters and delayed the election allowing more people to register Overthrow of long-time strongman Blaise Compaoré Egyptians brought down the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak

Emergence of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018 Overthrow of dictator Muammar Gaddafi

King Mohammed VI announced comprehensive constitutional reforms

The Nigerian government restored fuel subsidy to quell nationwide protests

(continued)

4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

56

Table 4.1 (continued) Sociopolitical unrest End SARS

Country Nigeria

Timeline 2020

Senegal

2011–2012

Do not touch my constitution

South Africa

2017

Zuma must fall campaign

Sudan

2018–2021

Sudanese revolution

Tunisia

2010–2011

Jasmine Revolution

4.2.1

Reasons for unrest Series of mass protests against police brutality particularly targeted at young people in Nigeria President Abdoulaye Wade proposed constitution change that would have allowed his son Karim to succeed him Demand President Jacob Zuma’s resignation due to a cabinet shuffle and allegations of corruption Demands for urgent economic reforms and for President Omar al-Bashir to step down High unemployment, food inflation, corruption, and absence of political freedoms

Outcome Dissolution of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) by President Buhari’s government The president cancelled the proposed change to the constitution

The president resigned on eve of no-confidence vote in 2018 Overthrow of dictator Omar al-Bashir

Ousting of long-time president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and democratisation of the country. Also culminated in the Arab Spring.

Dependent Variable

The revolutionary propensity of an individual is the theoretical probability that the person will become an active participant in anti-government protests that could lead to the establishment of new power and economic structures (Wolfenstein, 1967). The measurement of individual and group level propensities to participate in social revolutions in Africa is somewhat consequential given the rapidly growing number of young people who have so far failed to derive tangible benefits from Africa’s demographic dividend (Eastwood & Lipton, 2010), its estimation remains challenging. For this study, the propensity for millennials to participate in social revolutions is synthesised by lessons learnt from previous literature that has examined the plausibility of groups of people to take part in anti-government protests (Skocpol, 1994). The dependent variable here is the likelihood for a young person to attend a demonstration or protest march as a result of legitimate grievances held against a ruling government.

Fig. 4.1 Map of the 36 study countries by regime types (2014–2016)

4.2 Data Preparation and Methodological Approach 57

4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

58

Table 4.2 Continental and sub-regional distribution of sample sizes

Sub-region Central Africa East Africa North Africa Southern Africa West Africa Africa (Total)

Sample size (n) 2267 4530 3027 9500 9769 29,093

In the Afrobarometer study, participants were provided with a list of actions that people take as citizens when they are dissatisfied with government performance. For each of these actions, the study participants indicated whether they have undertaken the activity in the past or whether they would undertake the activity if they had the chance to do so. The specific anti-government action that was used to construct the dependent variable is participation in demonstration or protest march. A dichotomous variable indicating whether a millennial has the propensity for social revolutions or not (PSR) was constructed as follows:  PSR ¼

Yes, if millennial has participated or would participate in a protest march No, if otherwise

Basically, a millennial is deemed to have the propensity for social revolutions if the individual has ever participated in a demonstration or protest or if they would participate in such anti-government activities should the opportunity present itself.

4.2.2

Predictor Variables

The predictor variables used for this study are sensitised by the published literatures and arranged under three themes, namely economic development, regime type and state effectiveness. Economic Development People believe that economic development represents a country’s wealth, education, urbanisation, and industrialisation. Economic development transforms societies by injecting momentum into the production of goods, increasing consumption, triggering investment in public services, and lowering unemployment (Hague et al., 2011). The way African millennials feel about economic development in their countries was captured from the sentiments expressed about various issues related to the performance of the economy. Dichotomous variables denoting the mood of millennials towards the handling of various aspects of the economy by their respective governments are described in Table 4.3.

4.2 Data Preparation and Methodological Approach

59

Table 4.3 Description of economic development variables Code ED1

Variable Management of the economy

ED2

Living standards of the poor

ED3

Job creation

ED4

Keeping prices down

ED5

Narrowing income gaps

ED6

Reducing crime

ED7

Basic health services

ED8

Handling of educational needs

ED9

Water and sanitation services

ED10

Handling of food needs

ED11

Handling of corruption

ED12

Maintenance of roads and bridges Electricity supply

ED13

Dichotomous re-coding and description of variable Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise Good, if respondent specified very well or fairly well Poor, if otherwise

Regime Type Social revolutions, radical changes and mass spontaneity have often been triggered or aggravated by tyrannical regimes (Skocpol, 1994). Authoritarian regimes do not exist because people want dictatorship. It is generally believed that once democracies are consolidated, they tend to lean toward a political culture that promotes negotiation, compromise, redistribution mechanisms and systems for handling group demands (Cheibub et al., 2010). However, there are exceptions to this world view. Although a large number of African countries presently operate some form of the democratic system of governance, this does not make them invulnerable to internal revolutionary tensions (examples from Tunisia, Egypt and Mali). Some African democracies are characterised by controversial electoral practices and elections (Bratton, 2013). These warped practices and outcomes tend to delegitimise electoral outcomes and diminish the confidence of citizens. It would therefore be erroneous to assume that democracy is the antidote for social revolutions. In order to test the effect of regime type on the propensity for social revolutions, seven dichotomous variables representing the system of government practiced in the 36 African countries contained in the Afrobarometer dataset were generated. These

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4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

Table 4.4 Description of regime type variables Code RT1

Variable Absolute monarchy

RT2

Constitutional monarchy

RT3

Constitutional parliamentary monarchy

RT4

Parliamentary republic with a ceremonial presidency

RT5

Presidential republic

RT6

Republic with an executive presidency nominated by or elected by the legislature

RT7

Semi-presidential republic

Dichotomous re-coding and description of variable Yes, if all authority vested in an absolute monarch No, if otherwise Yes, if the head of state is executive; Monarch personally exercises power in concert with other institutions No, if otherwise Yes, if head of state is ceremonial monarch; ministry is subject to parliamentary confidence No, if otherwise Yes, if head of state is ceremonial; ministry is subject to parliamentary confidence No, if otherwise Yes, if head of state is executive; presidency is independent of legislature; ministry is independent of legislature No, if otherwise Yes, if president is both head of state and government; ministry, including the president, may or may not be subject to parliamentary confidence No, if otherwise Yes, if head of state is executive; presidency is independent of legislature; ministry is subject to parliamentary confidence No, if otherwise

regime type variables are shown in Table 4.4. In Fig. 4.1, we show the geographical divisions of regime types for the 36 African countries included in the study. State Ineffectiveness State ineffectiveness presents a serious impediment to social and economic development. It can be understood as stemming both from state institutions’ lack of capacity and/or political will to provide the basic functions and conditions for citizenship (OECD, 2007), and arising from and experienced at the local and everyday level through the intersection of social norms, cultural expectations, poverty, gender insecurity, and other factors (Hammett & Marhsall, 2017). In order to determine how young Africans perceive the effectiveness of their states, the approval ratings given to elected and non-elected leaders and representatives were considered. Four dichotomous variables listed in Table 4.5 were generated to measure perceptions on state effectiveness at different levels of governance. Demographic Characteristics Three demographic characteristics of respondents shown in Table 4.6 were also introduced as part of the predictor variables based on evidence from published research. The demographic predictor variables include age, gender, and educational attainment.

4.2 Data Preparation and Methodological Approach

61

Table 4.5 Description of state ineffectiveness variables Code SI1

Variable Performance of head of state

SI2

Performance of parliamentarians

SI3

Performance of elected local government councillors

SI4

Performance of traditional leaders

Dichotomous re-coding and description of variable Approve, if millennial specified approve or strongly approve Disapprove, if otherwise Approve, if millennial specified approve or strongly approve Disapprove, if otherwise Approve, if millennial specified approve or strongly approve Disapprove, if otherwise Approve, if millennial specified approve or strongly approve Disapprove, if otherwise

Table 4.6 Description of demographic variables Code D1

Variable Age

D2

Gender

D3

Educational attainment

Dichotomous re-coding and description of variable Younger Millennial, if respondent’s age is 18–25 years Older Millennial, if respondent’s age is 26–35 years Male Female Formal education, if respondent has received formal education at any level No education, if otherwise

Evidence from the literature suggests that younger adults are more likely to participate in anti-government protests (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012). Similarly, there is evidence that formal education can have a strong impact on demands for regime change, especially where there is an education-employment mismatch (Schaefer, 2018). However, the relationship between gender and participation in social revolutions is not clear-cut.

4.2.3

Statistical Analysis

Frequency tabulation was used to summarise basic information of respondents, as well as their response to questions about the dependent and predictor variables. Descriptive statistics about the dependent and predictor variables were generated for all respondents in the study. Binary logistic regression (Harrell, 2015) was used to identify predictor variables influencing the propensity for social revolutions among African millennials by categorising the dependent variable into two categories, i.e. PSR ¼ “yes” and “no,” which would provide a clearer idea about how intensely different factors are influencing the outcome. Logistic regression generates the

4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

62

coefficients (and its standard errors and significance levels) of a formula to predict a logit transformation of the probability of the presence of the characteristic of interest: logit ðPÞ ¼ b0 þ b1 X 1 þ b2 X 2 þ . . . þ bk X k

ð4:1Þ

Where P is the probability of the presence of the characteristics of interest. The logit transformation was defined as the logged odds: Odds ¼

P Probability of presence of characteristic ¼ 1  P Probability of absence of characteristic

ð4:2Þ

And logit ðPÞ ¼ loglog



 P 1P

ð4:3Þ

Rather than choosing parameters that minimise the sum of squared errors (like in ordinary regression), estimation in logistic regression accepts parameters that maximise the likelihood of observing the sample values.

4.3

Continental Predictors of Social Revolution

This section covers the presentation of the results generated from the analysis. First, a set of sample characteristics are presented for the 29,093 millennials included in the study. Frequency distributions are used to disaggregate the data. The disaggregation of the characteristics of study participants is followed by the presentation of results from the logistic regression model.

4.3.1

Descriptive Characteristics of Study Participants

Table 4.7 shows the descriptive information of the dependent and predictor variables of the millennials involved in this study. Results show that 47.6% of African millennials have the propensity to take part in social revolutions. Further scrutiny of the data revealed that there are sub-regional variations in the propensity for millennials to take part in social revolutions. North African millennials (54.1%) have the highest propensity for social revolutions, while the counterparts from East Africa (34.2%) expressed the least propensity for taking part in revolutions. Others include Central Africa (52.7%), West Africa (51.1%) and Southern Africa (47%). The data shown in Table 4.7 also shows that more than half of the millennials included in the study are females (52.8%). Similarly, just over half (55.3%) of the study participants are older millennials aged 26–35 years. In terms of the educational

4.3 Continental Predictors of Social Revolution

63

Table 4.7 Frequency table for dependent and predictor variables Variables Propensity for social revolution No Yes Management of the economy Poor Good Living standards of the poor Poor Good Job creation Poor Good Keeping prices down Poor Good Narrowing income gaps Poor Good Reducing crime Poor Good Basic health services Poor Good Handling of educational needs Poor Good Water and sanitation services Poor Good Handling of food needs Poor Good Handling of corruption Poor Good Maintenance of roads and bridges Poor Good Electricity supply Poor Good

Frequency

Percent

15,257 13,836

52.4 47.6

18,299 10,794

62.9 37.1

20,958 8135

72 28

21,407 7686

73.6 26.4

21,637 7456

74.4 25.6

23,050 6043

79.2 20.8

16,054 13,039

55.2 44.8

14,134 14,959

48.6 51.4

14,100 14,993

48.5 51.5

17,051 12,042

58.6 41.4

19,932 9161

68.5 31.5

20,640 8453

70.9 29.1

15,846 13,247

54.5 45.5

17,583 11,510

60.4 39.6 (continued)

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4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

Table 4.7 (continued) Variables Frequency Percent Absolute monarchy No 28,391 97.6 Yes 702 2.4 Constitutional monarchy No 28,427 97.7 Yes 666 2.3 Constitutional parliamentary monarchy No 28,599 98.3 Yes 494 1.7 Parliamentary republic with a ceremonial presidency No 28,623 98.4 Yes 470 1.6 Presidential republic No 12,006 41.3 Yes 17,087 58.7 Republic with an executive presidency nominated by or elected by the legislature No 27,322 93.9 Yes 1771 6.1 Semi-presidential republic No 21,190 72.8 Yes 7903 27.2 Performance of head of state Disapprove 12,930 44.4 Approve 16,163 55.6 Performance of parliamentarians Disapprove 17,882 61.5 Approve 11,211 38.5 Performance of elected local government councillors Disapprove 18,179 62.5 Approve 10,914 37.5 Performance of traditional leaders Disapprove 13,303 45.7 Approve 15,790 54.3 Age Younger Millennial 13,003 44.7 Older Millennial 16,090 55.3 Gender Male 13,742 47.2 Female 15,351 52.8 Educational attainment No education 3616 12.4 Formal education 25,477 87.6

4.3 Continental Predictors of Social Revolution

65

Table 4.8 Contingency table of demographic variables and PSR Variables Age Younger Millennial Older Millennial Gender Male Female Educational attainment No education Formal education

Propensity for social revolution No (Percent) Yes (Percent)

Total (Percent)

50.8 53.7

49.2 46.3

100 100

48.5 55.9

51.5 44.1

100 100

58.4 51.6

41.6 48.4

100 100

attainment of the study participants, over 8 in 10 indicated that they had received some form of formal education at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. Although the vast majority of African millennials feel that the handling of various issues related to the economy has been poor, two exceptions buck this trend. More African millennials rated their governments in the good category in the handling of basic health services (51.4%) and educational needs (51.5%). From the analysis shown in Table 4.7, one finds that the largest share of millennials included in this study live in countries where the regime type is a presidential republic (58.7%). The least represented type of regime is the parliamentary republic with a ceremonial presidency (1.6%). Perceptions of state ineffectiveness are considered by looking at leadership in a hierarchical way. More than half of the millennials approve of the performance of their heads of states (55.6%) and traditional leaders (54.3%). On the contrary, there is a much lower approval rating for parliamentarians (38.5%) and local government councillors (37.5%). In Table 4.8, the demographic variables are cross-tabulated with the propensity for social revolution. The results are quite striking. Younger millennials (49.2%) aged 18 to 25 have a greater propensity for joining social revolutions. When gender is examined, one discovers that males (51.5%) are more likely to revolt, while formally educated millennials (48.5%) have a greater propensity for revolutions than those who do not have any formal education.

4.3.2

Logistic Regression Analysis Results

The interpretation of the logistic coefficient can be more challenging than in the case of multiple linear regression, and, as a result, instead of the conventional Beta coefficient, the logistic model is rewritten in terms of the odds of an event occurring. This is defined as the ratio of the probability that an event will occur to the probability that it will not. Factors with values greater than one indicate that the odds are increased, and those with values less than one indicate that the odds are decreased (Harrell, 2015).

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4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

Table 4.9 Logistic regression results for economic development variables Variables Management of the economy Living standards of the poor Job creation Keeping prices down Narrowing income gaps Reducing crime Basic health services Handling of educational needs Water and sanitation services Handling of food needs Handling of corruption Maintenance of roads and bridges Electricity supply

B 0.095 0.073 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.121 0.038 0.113 0.035 0.064 0.155 0.076 0.066

Wald 8.442 4.005 0.405 0.546 0.409 17.097 1.337 11.984 1.31 3.803 22.315 6.569 4.55

P 0.004 0.045 0.524 0.46 0.522 0 0.248 0.001 0.252 0.051 0 0.01 0.033

Exp(B) 0.91 1.075 1.023 0.975 1.025 0.886 1.039 0.893 0.965 1.066 1.168 0.926 1.069

95% C.I. for Exp(B) Lower Upper 0.853 0.97 1.001 1.154 0.954 1.097 0.911 1.043 0.951 1.104 0.836 0.938 0.974 1.107 0.838 0.952 0.909 1.025 1 1.136 1.095 1.246 0.874 0.982 1.005 1.136

Results of the logistic regression analysis for economic development variables are presented in Table 4.9. Among the thirteen independent variables available to the regression solution, only eight bear a statistically significant relationship to the prediction of participation in social revolutions. Priority attention is given to those variables bearing a significant statistical relationship. The results indicate that the more African millennials perceive that the overall management of the economy is good, the less they are likely to partake in social revolutions. If a millennial is happy with the overall management of the economy, the odds of refusing to take part in social revolutions is 1.09. The way millennials perceive the reduction of crime contributes to the prediction of their participation in social revolutions. Basically, if a millennial has the feeling that crime is reducing, the odds of refusing to join a social revolution increases by a factor of 1.13. Similarly, a millennial 1.12 times less likely to join social revolutions if they feel that the government’s handling of educational needs has been good. Furthermore, if a millennial feels that physical projects such as the maintenance of roads and bridges have been handled well, they are unlikely to join a social revolution. Millennials’ perception of the handling of living standards of the poor also contributes to the prediction of their possible participation in social revolutions. However, for this variable, one finds that even if a millennial feels that the living standards of poor people are good, they can still choose to take part in a social revolution—their odds of participation being a factor of 1.08. Our results also show that a millennial is still likely to join a revolution even if they feel that the government’s handling of food needs, corruption, and electricity supply has been good. Results of the logistic regression analysis for the six regime-type variables are presented in Table 4.10. Four of the variables bear a statistically significant relationship to the prediction of participation in social revolutions. Constitutional monarchies contribute to the prediction of the propensity for social revolution. The odds that a millennial living within a constitutional monarchy will join a social revolution

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Table 4.10 Logistic regression results for regime type variables

Variables Absolute monarchy Constitutional monarchy Constitutional parliamentary monarchy Parliamentary republic with a ceremonial presidency Presidential republic Republic with an executive presidency nominated by or elected by the legislature

95% C.I. for Exp(B) Lower Upper 0.342 0.474 1.376 1.962 0.966 1.415 0.426 0.63

B 0.91 0.497 0.156 0.657

Wald 118.198 30.119 2.579 43.387

P 0 0 0.108 0

Exp (B) 0.403 1.643 1.169 0.518

0.634 0.025

483.054 0.199

0 0.655

0.531 0.976

0.502 0.876

95% C.I. for Exp(B) Lower Upper 0.731 0.819 1.053 1.193 0.914 1.03 0.867

0.562 1.087

Table 4.11 Logistic regression results for state ineffectiveness variables

Variables Performance of head of state Performance of parliamentarians Performance of elected local government councillors Performance of traditional leaders

B 0.257 0.114 0.03

Wald 77.611 12.966 0.982

P 0 0 0.322

Exp (B) 0.774 1.121 0.97

0.089

10.902

0.001

0.914

0.964

is 1.64. The analysis shows that millennials residing in three other regime types (absolute monarchy, presidential republic and parliamentary republic with a ceremonial presidency) are less likely to take part in social revolutions. For these three regime types, the odds of millennials refusing to take part in social revolutions are 2.48, 1.99 and 1.93, respectively. Three variables in Table 4.11 bear a statistically significant relationship to the prediction of participation in social revolutions. As the approval of the performance of heads of states and traditional leaders increases, the likelihood of social revolutions diminishes. However, the results further indicate that millennials will be prepared to revolt against the state even if they approve of the performance of their parliamentarians. One means of evaluating how well the logistic model performs is to compare the predictions made by the model to observed outcomes in the data. The classification table for the calibration and validation samples of millennials displayed in Table 4.12 provides a measure of the discriminative efficiency of the logistic regression model. The results presented in Table 4.12 indicate that the logistic regression model containing the various significant variables successfully classifies the majority of millennials in both samples. Overall, the logistic model correctly classifies 59.2% of millennials in the calibration sample and 52.4% in the validation sample. Relative to the validation sample, cases are somewhat better classified in the calibration sample.

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4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

Table 4.12 Classification table of predicted vs. observed outcomes of the logistic regression model Observed outcome Calibration sample No propensity for social revolution Propensity for social revolution Overall percentage Validation sample No propensity for social revolution Propensity for social revolution Overall percentage

4.4

No propensity for social revolution

Propensity for social revolution

% Correct

10,664

4593

69.9

7263

6573

47.5 59.2

15,257

0

100

13,836

0

0 52.4

General Discussion and Implications

As we move into the third decade of the present millennium, activists, and leaders in Africa continue to follow the unfolding agitations and youth restiveness, pondering their implications for the continent’s future. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the growing pressure from protesters does not extend beyond regime change and better governance. Some observers, however, point out that, despite the conditions, the underlying problems are not too different from those that contributed to recent revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East (Harsch, 2011; Iwuoha, 2016; Wilmot, 2019). Although there have been broad suggestions that there is a growing propensity for social revolutions among African millennials, there is no published empirical evidence about the underlying drivers for these agitations. In this chapter, logistic regression was used to formulate an empirical model describing the predictors of social revolution propensities of African millennials. Among the significant predictor variables, we find that regime type is an important contributor to the model. Specifically, absolute monarchy was the single most important contributor to the model. African millennials living under regimes where all authority is vested in an absolute monarch are highly unlikely to take part in social revolutions. Although absolute monarchies are notorious for not involving democratic processes, involve leaders not chosen by people and encourages an excess of fame, our finding that African millennials under this regime types are highly unlikely to revolt is not surprising. Under absolute monarchies, it is often more difficult to build the critical mass required to stage anti-government demonstrations (Motsamai, 2011). It is difficult to build critical mass under absolute monarchies because no one has any guaranteed rights. Furthermore, it is possible that some millennials under this regime type choose not to revolt because they are comfortable with the speed with which decisions are made. Absolute monarchies help to ensure that things in a country get done quickly and efficiently.

4.4 General Discussion and Implications

69

Unlike absolute monarchies, our results show that a millennial living within a constitutional monarchy is 1.64 times more likely to join a social revolution. Constitutional monarchies are regimes where the head of state is executive, and the monarch personally exercises power in concert with other institutions (Sklar, 2003). Unlike their counterparts in absolute monarchies, millennials living under constitutional monarchies have guaranteed rights because such regimes embrace a system of equality, neutrality which allows for a change in the government. This probably emboldens millennials under these types of regimes. The level of educational attainment of millennials was also a significant predictor of participation in social revolutions. Our results agree with some previous studies, which suggest that as young people acquire formal education, the better enlightened they are and the more likely they are to join anti-government protests (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012; Schaefer, 2018). As more African millennials have accessed formal education, they have become better emboldened to challenge their leaders for their rights. Similar advances in higher education preceded the revolutions of the latetwentieth century and the Arab revolts of the early twenty-first century. In many Asian and African colonial states and dictatorships, it was new university graduates, mostly educated abroad and then returning home to find small outlets for their aspirations, who led revolutionary movements (James, 2012). In terms of state ineffectiveness, the way millennials perceive the effectiveness of their head of state matters. If the head of state has a negative approval rating, then millennials are much more likely to revolt. Our finding suggests that the public anger over state ineffectiveness in Africa is often directed at the country’s leader irrespective of the arm of government that is complicit. For instance, where the judiciary has been found to be ineffective, members of the public have still chosen to direct their anger at their disapproval at the presidency. It therefore seems that African millennials believe that their heads of state should bear responsibility for all forms of state ineffectiveness. There are two other important findings to mention in relation to state ineffectiveness. In general, it does appear that millennials are fed up with their parliamentarians, which should work closely with people at the grassroots. Our study reveals that whether a millennial approves or disapproves of the work of their parliamentarian, they can still choose to join a social revolution. For millennials, the vast majority of African parliaments are enclaves of corruption where scrutiny and probity are absent (Davies, 2009). For instance, Nigerian parliamentarians are some of the highest paid in the world (Oxfam, 2017), which is a sharp contrast to the scale of poverty endured by Nigerian citizens. These parliamentarians receive state funding for all manners of constituency projects which are rarely implemented, and despite this, there is almost zero accountability. Crime reduction has a significant impact on the propensity of a millennial to join a social revolution. Our results show that if a millennial feel that the handling of public safety matters has been poor, they will likely join a social revolution against the state. In 2016, a paper published by the Institute for Security Studies revealed that civil protests and strike actions due to increasing insecurity have become increasingly commonplace (Lancaster, 2016). Similarly, Ojo and Ojewale (2019) disclosed that

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4 Determinants of the Propensity for Social Revolutions Among African. . .

for urban millennials, rising levels of urban crime are generating at least two outcomes for young people. There is now a standard narrative of “join them if you can’t beat them.” Secondly, some millennials are pulling together to form local civilian joint task forces and joint patrol systems aimed at combating crime in their communities. Recently in South Africa and Nigeria, young protesters have defied coronavirus lockdown restrictions to voice their anger over the recent wave of violent crimes, particularly violent sexual crimes against women (Egwu, 2020). From the analysis, it is clear that education is paramount in the minds of millennials and the way that governments handle educational needs impacts the propensity to join social revolutions. If millennials feel that the government is meeting their educational needs, they are 1.12 times less likely to join social revolutions. Across sub-Saharan Africa, education is defined as one vital sector for development. There is a call for access to education to be improved for poorer millennials. Second, there is a need for increased investment in teacher training. Expanding and enhancing vocational training, better preparing learners for a competitive labour market and giving them entrepreneurial, linguistic and soft skills to forge their own career destinies are a significant third priority (Ezepue & Ojo, 2012). The analysis further reveals that the provision and maintenance of physical infrastructures such as power, roads, and bridges have knock-on effects on the propensity of millennials to participate in social revolutions. Results show that the refusal of national governments to provide and maintain basic infrastructure will heighten agitations for civil unrest among millennials. Our results offer partial support to the results of Ojo et al. (2018), who have found that discontent and the accumulation of the risk of public protests grow quickly within cities with dilapidated urban infrastructure.

4.5

Conclusion

Following the Arab Spring, a second wave of global demonstrations is taking millennials to the streets to vent their grievances. These millennials, united across time zones and societies, respond to the common problems of political and economic exclusion. Yet demonstrators are using new means of organising to question political monopolies and increase civic participation, not settling for a shift of leadership anymore. The data analysed in this chapter indicate that the predictors of the propensity for social revolutions among African millennials can be identified. The prediction of the propensity for social revolution is of considerable importance. Predicting the potential drivers of social revolutions among millennials allows stakeholders to think ahead and ask questions actively. It allows leaders at all levels to make connections between the event and devise necessary interventions to forestall state failure. The results of the investigation suggest that millennials do not trust the desire and capacity of the state to find solutions to their problems anymore. Centred on large, decentralised, horizontal, and consensus-based approaches to socio-political mobilisation, these millennials are prepared to

References

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constitute organic voluntary alliances of individual people, activists, public communicators and community organisers seeking to build new modes of political involvement.

References Bratton, M. (Ed.). (2013). Voting and democratic citizenship in Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143, 67–101. Dabashi, H. (2012). The Arab spring: The end of postcolonialism. Zed Books. Davies, J. (2009). Parliamentarians and corruption in Africa: The challenge of leadership and the practice of politics. Accra. Donham, D. L. (1999). Marxist modern: An ethnographic history of the ethiopian revolution. University of California Press. Eastwood, R., & Lipton, M. (2010). Demographic transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: how big will the economic dividend be? Population Studies, 65(1), 9–35. Egwu, P. (2020). After lockdown, Femicide Rises in South Africa. 30 July. Accessed September 24, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/30/coronavirus-lockdown-femicide-risessouth-africa/ Ezepue, P. O., & Ojo, A. (2012). Addressing economic development goals through innovative teaching of university statistics: A case study of statistical modelling in Nigeria. International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology, 43(8), 1013–1032. Fallon, K. M. (2008). Democracy and the rise of women’s movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Feuer, L. S. (Ed.). (1959). Marx and Engels: Basic writings on politics and philosophy. Anchor. Grosser, F. (2020). Political revolution. The internet encyclopaedia of philosophy. Accessed June 27, 2020, from https://iep.utm.edu/pol-rev/ Hague, C., Hague, E., & Breitbach, C. (2011). Regional and local economic development. Palgrave Macmillan. Hammett, D., & Marhsall, D. (2017). Building peaceful citizens? Nation-building in divided societies. Space and Polity, 21(2), 129–143. Harrell, F. E. (2015). Regression modeling strategies. Springer. Harsch, E. (2011). ‘Arab Spring’ Stirs African hopes and anxieties. Africa renewal. August. Accessed June 12, 2020, from https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2011/% E2%80%98arab-spring%E2%80%99-stirs-african-hopes-and-anxieties Hoffman, M., & Jamal, A. (2012). The youth and the Arab spring: Cohort differences and similarities. Middle East Law and Governance, 4(1), 168–188. Iwuoha, P. (2016). The 3 most powerful revolutions shaking up Africa right now. Smallstarter Africa, 12 September. Accessed June 18, 2020, from https://www.smallstarter.com/get-inspired/ the-3-most-powerful-revolutions-shaking-up-africa-right-now/ James, C. L. R. (2012). A history of pan-African revolt. PM Press. Lachapelle, J., Levitsky, S., Way, L. A., & Casey, A. E. (2020). Social revolution and authoritarian durability. World Politics, 72(4), 557–600. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000106 Lancaster, L. (2016). At the heart of discontent: measuring public violence in South Africa. Institute for Security Studies. Motsamai, D. (2011). Swaziland: Can Southern Africa’s last absolute monarchy democratise? African Security Review, 20(2), 42–50. OECD. (2007). Principles for good international engagement with Fragile States. OECD. Ojo, A., & Ojewale, O. (2019). Urbanisation and crime in Nigeria. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Ojo, A., Papachristodoulou, N., & Ibeh, S. C. (2018). The development of an infrastructure quality index for Nigerian Metropolitan Areas using multivariate geo-statistical data fusion. Urban Science, 2, 59. Oxfam. (2017). Inequality in Nigeria: Exploring the drivers. In London: Oxfam. Schaefer, I. (2018). Political Revolt and youth unemployment in Tunisia: Exploring the educationemployment mismatch. Palgrave Macmillan. Sklar, R. L. (2003). The premise of mixed government in African political studies. In O. Vaughan (Ed.), Indigenous political structures and governance in Africa (pp. 3–25). Sefer Books Ltd. Skocpol, T. (1994). Social revolutions in the modern world. Cambridge University Press. Tiruneh, G. (2017). Is social revolution a passing phenomenon? Sociology International Journal, 1 (2), 36–41. Wilmot, P. (2019). Prospects for revolution in Africa’s 55 countries. Waging Nonviolence, 20 March. Accessed September 23, 2020, from https://wagingnonviolence.org/2019/03/ prospects-for-revolution-in-africas-54-countries/ Wolfenstein, E. V. (1967). The revolutionary personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi. Princeton University Press.

Chapter 5

Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance Aspirations of Millennials

5.1

A New Approach for Evaluating Governance Aspirations of Young People

None of the governance metrics reviewed in Chap. 2 explicitly focuses on young people in Africa. None of the indices incorporates the direct opinions of young people across the continent therefore there is no voice for them in present day governance measures. Due to their lack of focus on young Africans, these metrics do not give a sense of the likely configuration of the political geography of Africa in the future. It is contested here that it may be possible to infer what the future political geography of Africa may look like by examining the present aspirations of young people and using a rigorous numerical approach to classify African nations based on these aspirations. The methodology is also different from the approaches used to construct the previous metrics. The techniques used to construct the other metrics seek to rank African nations in ascending or descending order of governance performance (for the purpose and good of peer comparisons and learning). However, the interest is in grouping these nations based on the similarity of the aspirational orientations of their young citizens. There is some contestation about how to describe the term young person (Hofmeyr, 2012; Abdullahi et al., 2014). Perhaps one way to understand the concept is to view it as a transitional period between childhood and adulthood. Essentially, it is the period that individuals learn how to become less dependent upon their parents or guardians. Due to the subjective nature of this transitional phase of life, the youth concept tends to be more fluid than other age brackets. Age remains the most widely accepted approach for identifying young people. Different global organisations define young people with different age brackets. The United Nations Secretariat, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) all refer to young people as persons aged 15–24 years (ILO, 2006). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Ojo, Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88546-5_5

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The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) uses the age bracket of 15–32 years to describe young people (UN-Habitat, 2012). Other agencies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) have used connotations such as adolescents (persons aged 10–19 years); young people (persons aged 10–24 years); and youths (persons aged 15–24 years) (Schmidt et al., 2014). Different African countries also have varying age brackets (AU, 2006). In order to avoid confusion and for the purpose of convergence, the age bracket proposed by the African Youth Charter is adopted for the analysis in this chapter. The African Youth Charter was published by the African Union Commission (AU Commission) during the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of States and Government held in July 2006 in Banjul, The Gambia. The Charter defines youths as persons aged 15–35 years (AU, 2006). This characterisation resonates more broadly with the connotation of young people in the minds of Africans and captures the millennial demographic group in the dataset available for the analysis.

5.1.1

Data

One of the possible reasons for the paucity of governance metrics focused on young people is the difficulty of accessing data from consultations garnered directly for young people. Many governance-related consultations in Africa often tend to be directed at people who are outside the age bracket of youths. This makes it challenging to capture the voices of young people in the debate about governance. The datasets used in this study were derived from two sources. These include: • The UN World Population Prospects. • The Afrobarometer Study. The UN World Population Prospects are reports published by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA). Since 1946, the Population Division of the UN-DESA has been amalgamating official and projected demographic statistics for several countries. This includes regular studies of population size and characteristics and of all three components of population change (fertility, mortality, and migration) (UN-DESA, 2017). These statistics help to provide a comprehensive review of global demographic trends and prospects for the future. The information is believed to serve as essential components for guiding policies aimed at achieving some of the SDGs. The UN-DESA utilises the cohort-component projection method for producing population projections for individual countries. The Afrobarometer study focuses on public attitudes, democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related social issues in nearly 40 countries in Africa. The study is a face-to-face consultation conducted by a coalition of independent non-partisan academics and international organisations. The core project partners include The Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), Institute for

5.2 Governance Aspiration Themes

75

Table 5.1 Study countries and regions Region Central Africa

Eastern Africa

Northern Africa

Country Cameroon Gabon São Tomé and Príncipe Burundi Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Algeria Egypt Morocco Sudan Tunisia

Region Southern Africa

Western Africa

Country Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland Benin Burkina Faso Cape Verde Cote d’Ivoire Ghana Guinea Liberia Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo

Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP), Institute for Development Studies (IDS), The University of Nairobi, and Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa (IJR). Project support units also include Michigan State University (MSU) and the Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU), Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. The Afrobarometer study yields the bulk of governance-specific variables for young people in Africa (Bratton, 2013). It is noteworthy to mention that the minimum age of respondents included in the study is 18 years. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter subsumes Afrobarometer data for young persons aged 18 to 35 years for thirty-six African nations shown in Table 5.1.

5.2

Governance Aspiration Themes

In order to determine the set of independent variables that could be included in the modelling process, it was important to consider the thematic areas that reflect the objective of the analysis. A total of eleven themes were identified after broad literature consultation, as shown in Fig. 5.1. These themes are discussed briefly in this section. Shared identity is integral to sustainable governance because people see themselves as stakeholders in the overall business of governing their nation. Young Africans draw on a multiplicity of identities to give meaning to their lives and determine the way they interact with other people. Citizenship and identity variables

5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

Fig. 5.1 Data themes

76

5.2 Governance Aspiration Themes

77

help to unmask how young Africans perceive themselves relative to language, ethnic, religious, and other forms of social identities and how these identities define their governance aspirations. Civic engagement involves the creation of avenues and mechanisms that link young people with one another so that they can work for the collective good of society. Civic engagement also accounts for the need to link young people with other demographics and established institutions in order to maximise their impact. The range of variables included within the civic engagement theme gives us an insight into whether young African’s care about their local communities and if their passion can spur them on to make their societies more positive places to live, work, and socialise. Democracy and politics are under stress in virtually every region of the world. In some African countries, democracy seems to have given some leaders a systematic opportunity to cling to power, manipulate elections and ignore institutions that should hold them accountable (Cheeseman, 2015). Given these outcomes, it is important to include variables that test if young Africans still prefer democracy as the dominant system of governance or if they are likely to try some other hybrid systems. Demographic variables are indicators that facilitate the understanding of the size, structure, territorial distribution and composition of the population of young people. African nations have peculiar reservoirs of youthful and productive age population; therefore static and dynamic aspects of this age cohort have the potential to shape the future of governance on the continent. When it comes to the participation of women in governance and decision-making, widespread evidence shows that a lot of African countries still experience multifaceted roadblocks (Paxton and Hughes, 2015). Deep inequalities and entrenched discriminatory views about the role of females amongst their male peers often relegate women and girls to inferior positions in African societies, and this has knock-on effects on governance. The equality and gender variables give us a clue if young Africans are more likely to reject or encourage these unequal power relations in the future. Leadership and institutions are central to the aspirations of young Africans for good governance. Getting leadership tenets right has a significant bearing on social and economic growth and performance. The inclusion of leadership variables yields insight into the perceptions of young Africans about what they think leadership is; their understanding of the scale, dimensions, and drivers of the leadership challenge; and the specific steps they are prepared to take to ensure that governance in the future is not undermined by large-scale leadership deficit. Institutions refer to the types of departments, ministries, groups, and agencies that will be needed to drive the ambitious economic, social and environmental agenda of young Africans in the future in order to deliver the dividends of good governance. It is essential to comprehend the views of young Africans about existing formal and informal institutions and to understand further how they may seek to build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels in the future.

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5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

Policy performance is about evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of government policies and procedures. Governance policies should be based on sound available evidence as evidence remains the sole lifeline of the workability of policies. Variables within the policy performance theme help to gauge how young Africans perceive current conventional policies. Furthermore, these variables help us to detect whether young Africans prioritise principles and convictions over evidence when pushing forward policy positions. In April 2018, Mo Ibrahim, Chair of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, declared that the “. . .public service is the pillar of governance. Without strong public services and committed public servants, there will be no efficient delivery of expected public goods and services, nor implementation of any commitment, however strongly voiced” (MIF, 2018, p. 5). Public services are those routine provisions delivered by governments to citizens living within their legitimate jurisdictions. Such services can be delivered directly through public sector institutions and organisations or by financing private and third sector organisations to provide services. Beyond traditional public services demands, evidence shows that young Africans are increasingly demanding new forms of services like solidarity, business-enabling environments and climate change mitigation (MIF, 2018). Social capital has been described as the “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (OECD, 2001, p. 41). For young Africans, strong social capital assets represent integral governance apparatus for stretching beyond territories of shared identity. Socio-economic variables are factors of social and economic nature which indicate the status of young people in their communities and help to place them in the context of the wider population. The socio-economic status of young people can serve as critical supply side inputs for achieving good governance. The concept of world view can be interpreted through multiple lenses—religious, economic, geographic and indeed political. It is therefore hard to reach consensus in academic and policy literature on the generic components of world view. For the purpose of this chapter, the world view is interpreted through the lens of governance and the willingness to relate beyond cultures and national boundaries. In a general sense, the world view theme subsumes two interlinked concepts—Cosmopolitanism and Afropolitanism, with the former often viewed through a Eurocentric lens and the latter considered to be its non-Eurocentric equivalent. Cosmopolitanism has been defined as “reaching out across cultural differences through dialogue, aesthetic enjoyment, and respect: of living together with difference” (Werbner, 2008, p. 2). Afropolitanism can be described as a form of cosmopolitanism with African roots (Gehrmann, 2016). Therefore, Cosmopolitan believes everyone is the same and that there are moral obligations to all human beings based solely on humanity alone, while Afropolitan believes in the idea that everyone is the same in their own unique way. The variables within this theme provide some perspective on whether the governance inclinations of young Africans may prioritise either Cosmopolitan or Afropolitan notions in the future.

5.3 Analytics for Mapping and Profiling Governance Aspiration People

5.3

79

Analytics for Mapping and Profiling Governance Aspiration People

Following the detailed scrutiny and preparation of data from the two key data sources, an initial set of 157 variables was selected as potential candidates for inclusion in the analysis. It was important to de-select those variables that would not be appropriate for inclusion in the analysis based on their theoretical relevance as well as their statistical suitability. Initial descriptive exploratory statistics were generated to check underlying assumptions for each variable. Table 5.2 shows a range of statistics indicating the spread of the variable “citizens should vote.” Those variables with larger standard deviations, for instance, are preferred (Ojo et al., 2012) to those with lower values because they help to present better distinctions between different countries. Normality tests were also conducted to examine the shape of each variable. Normally distributed variables are preferred but are rare to come by in social scientific data analysis such as this. In order to evaluate the scale of non-normality across the dataset, graphical normal Q-Q plots were generated for each variable. These are preferred to histograms due to the sample size of 36 countries. Figure 5.2 shows the normal Q-Q plots for the variable “no external interference.” As can be seen, the scatter lies close to the line, with no obvious pattern coming away from the line. This variable can be considered normally distributed. In conjunction with the Q-Q plots, Shapiro–Wilk’s W test and measures of skewness and kurtosis were also used to determine whether the underlying distribution of each variable is normal. Multicollinearity is a state of very high inter-associations among the independent variables, and where present, statistical inferences made from such dataset may be unreliable. A large correlation matrix of all initial variables was generated, and those variables with very high positive and negative associations were weeded out. However, it is noteworthy to mention that a few correlated variables were chosen

Table 5.2 Exploratory statistics generated for the variable—citizens should vote

Statistic Mean 5% Trimmed mean Median Variance Std. deviation Minimum Maximum Range Interquartile range Shapiro–Wilk W Skewness Kurtosis

Value 78.0 79.1 81.0 193.9 13.9 40.5 95.4 54.9 16.5 0.9
1.3 1.6

Std. Error 2.3

0.4 0.8

5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

80

3

Expected Normal

2

1

0

–1

–2

–3 30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Observed Value

Fig. 5.2 Normal Q-Q plot of variable—no external interference

due to their predictive power and due to some important dimensions of governance aspirations which they help to reinforce. After the data reduction procedures, the pool of variables was reduced to a final list of 130 variables shown in Table 5.3. Prior to grouping the thirty-six African countries listed in Table 5.1 on the basis of the governance aspirations of their young citizens, the selected variables were transformed using a logarithmic transformation technique to curtail the possible effects of skew. In addition, the variables were standardised using a range standardisation technique in order to bring them to a common scale. The notation for the range standardisation is given in Eq. (5.1). xi
xmin xmax
xmin Where, xi is the value of the variable to be standardised xmin is the minimum value of the distribution xmax is the maximum value of the distribution

ð5:1Þ

5.3 Analytics for Mapping and Profiling Governance Aspiration People

81

Table 5.3 Final list of variables Theme Citizenship and Identity

Variable Citizens should vote Do not criticise govt. Complain over pub. Serv. Pay taxes Agree with majority Ethnic identity National identity

Civic Engagement

Radio news Tabloid news Social media news Public affairs interest Discusses politics Religious group Voluntary association Community meeting Voter apathy Election rally Works for pol. Party Queries local councillor Queries traditional leaders Queries religious leaders

Year 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15

Theme Leadership and institutions

Policy priorities

Variable Corruption—traditional leaders Corruption—religious leaders Corruption—business executives Corruption resp.— cannot fight it Corruption resp.—do not pay bribes Corruption resp.— report Corruption resp.— speak out Corruption resp.— contact fam and frnds Corruption resp.— join anti-corr org. Corruption resp.— protest Priority—economy Priority—wages and income Priority—credit facilities Priority—agriculture and food shortage Priority— transportation Priority— communications Priority—infrastructure and roads Priority—education Priority—housing Priority—electricity Priority—water supply

Year 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15

(continued)

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5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

Table 5.3 (continued) Theme Democracy and Politics

Variable Rejects one-party rule Rejects military rule Democracy—civil liberties Democracy—popular rule Democracy— multiparty competition Democracy—peace Democracy—socioeconomic dev. Democracy—equality and justice Democracy—majority rule Democracy—mutual respect Democracy—working together Democracy—corruption and abuse of power Democracy—economic hardship Non-democracy preferred Democracy preferred

14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15

Theme

Variable Priority—health Priority—security Priority—corruption

Public services

Priority—political violence and instability Priority—gender, inequality and rights Priority—marketing agric. Produce Difficult school serv. Difficult medical serv. Difficult identity serv. Difficult household serv. Difficult policing serv. Difficult legal serv.

Density 15–19

14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 15

Density 20–24

15

No trust in army

Density 25–29

15

Density 30–34

15

Density 15–34

15

No trust in traditional leaders No trust in religious leaders Nation’s economy is bad

Approves non-electoral methods President—2 terms Demographics

Year 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15

Social capital

No trust in president No trust in parliament No trust in electoral commission No trust in tax department No trust in local council No trust in police

Socioeconomics

Year 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15

(continued)

5.3 Analytics for Mapping and Profiling Governance Aspiration People

83

Table 5.3 (continued) Theme

Variable Sex Ratio

Year 15

Male Life Expectancy

10 to 15 10 to 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15

Female Life Expectancy Freedom, Equality & Gender

Freedom of speech Freedom of association Freedom of choice

Leadership & Institutions

Females—equal leadership chance Unequal treatment of citizens Country—wrong direction Govt.—needs citizens influence President—parliament checks Govt.—media checks Courts make decisions Obey the law Must pay taxes Corruption— presidency Corruption—MPs Corruption—govt. officials Corruption—LG. officials Corruption—police Corruption—tax officials Corruption—judges and magistrates

Theme

Variable Food deprivation Fuel deprivation

Vehicle ownership

14/ 15

Unemployed

14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15 14/ 15

Part-time employment Full-time employment Private sector employment NGO employment Public sector employment No formal schooling Informal schooling Formal schooling World View

Year 14/ 15 14/ 15

Pro free movt. Anti-free movt. Accepts external interference No external interference Regional orgs. Help Continental orgs. Help Future model—USA Future model—China Future model—colonial power Future model—own country model

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5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

Following this standardisation, the value of each variable ranged from a minimum value 0 to a maximum value of 1. This helps to ensure that all variables are measured on the same numeric scale. Following standardisation, the standardisation, the countries were grouped using an iterative allocation-reallocation algorithm popularly known as K-means. This algorithm first creates groups of similar nations by imperfectly arranging them into the final number of predefined cluster and rearranging the assignments iteratively in order to generate a better fit as shown in Eq. (5.2). This method of cluster reassignment helps to reduce the variability within groups and increase the variability between them (Ojo, 2020). V¼

y
1 X x¼1 X i¼1  X k

v

zyxi
μxy



ð5:2Þ

nk

Where, V is the sum of squared distances of all variables from cluster means for all clusters zyxi is the standardised variable for country i, variable x and cluster y μxy is the mean for variable x in cluster y k is the number of clusters v is the number of variables nkis the number of countries in cluster When deploying the k-means algorithm, there are no set criteria for determining the optimum number of cluster solution. Two tests were used to select the optimum solution. First, the elbow test was conducted. This works by running the algorithm multiple times and subsequently examining the variation in the distances between cluster centres (Ojo, 2020). Following this, the compactness of possible solutions was evaluated by examining the balance of number of objects in each cluster. The five-cluster solution was identified as the most compact solution.

5.4

Emerging Geographical Patterns

This section shows what the future political geography of Africa might look like assuming young Africans are able to pursue their aspirations. The map in Fig. 5.3 shows the geographical distribution of the five clusters generated from the analysis. Some of the principal features of each cluster are summarised and displayed by radar plots in Figs. 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. The plots focus on just three (Social Capital, Socio-economics and World View) of the eleven data themes discussed in Sect. 5.3. The plots represent final cluster centres computed as the mean for each range standardised variable within each cluster. These reflect how each variable makes the clusters distinctive. The distinct governance aspiration characteristics and

Fig. 5.3 Governance aspiration clusters of young Africans

5.4 Emerging Geographical Patterns 85

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Unemployed

Vehicle ownership

Fuel deprivation

Fig. 5.4 Anti-democratic nationalists (social capital, socio-economics and world view)

Anti-Democratic Nationalists

Food deprivation

Nations economy is bad

No trust in religious leaders

No trust in traditional leaders

No trust in army

No trust in police

Continental Average

Public sector employment Part-time employment Full-time employment NGO employment Private sector employment

No formal schooling

Informal schooling

Formal schooling

Pro free movt.

Anti free movt.

Accepts external interference

No external interference

Regional orgs. help

Continental orgs. help

No trust in president No trust in parliamnet Future model - own country model 1 No trust in electoral commission Future model - colonial power 0.9 No trust in tax department Future model - China 0.8 Future model - USA No trust in local council 0.7

86 5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

Unemployed

Vehicle ownership

Fuel deprivation

Fig. 5.5 Afropolitan melting pot (social capital, socio-economics and world view)

Afropolitan Melting Pot

Continental Average

Food deprivation

Nations economy is bad

No trust in religious leaders

No trust in traditional leaders

No trust in army

No trust in police

No trust in local council

No trust in president No trust in parliamnet 0.9 No trust in electoral commission 0.8 No trust in tax department

Public sector employment Part-time employment NGO employment Full-time employment Private sector employment

No formal schooling

Informal schooling

Formal schooling

Pro free movt.

Anti free movt.

Accepts external interference

No external interference

Regional orgs. help

Continental orgs. help

Future model - USA

Future model - China

Future model - own country model Future model - colonial power

5.4 Emerging Geographical Patterns 87

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Unemployed

Vehicle ownership

Fig. 5.6 Pro-democratic nationalists (social capital, socio-economics and world view)

Pro-Democratic Nationalists

Fuel deprivation

Food deprivation

Nations economy is bad

No trust in religious leaders

No trust in traditional leaders

No trust in army

No trust in police

No trust in president No trust in parliamnet 1 No trust in electoral commission 0.9 No trust in tax department 0.8 No trust in local council 0.7

Continental Average

Public sector employment Part-time employment Full-time employment NGO employment Private sector employment

No formal schooling

Informal schooling

Formal schooling

Pro free movt.

Anti free movt.

Accepts external interference

No external interference

Regional orgs. help

Continental orgs. help

Future model - USA

Future model - China

Future model - own country model Future model - colonial power

88 5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Unemployed

Vehicle ownership

Fuel deprivation

Fig. 5.7 Hybrid anti-military polities (social capital, socio-economics and world view)

Hybrid Anti-Military Polities

Food deprivation

Nations economy is bad

No trust in religious leaders

No trust in traditional leaders

No trust in army

No trust in police

No trust in president No trust in parliamnet 1 No trust in electoral commission 0.9 No trust in tax department 0.8 No trust in local council 0.7

Continental Average

Public sector employment Part-time employment NGO employment Full-time employment Private sector employment

No formal schooling

Informal schooling

Formal schooling

Pro free movt.

Anti free movt.

Accepts external interference

No external interference

Regional orgs. help

Continental orgs. help

Future model - USA

Future model - China

Future model - own country model Future model - colonial power

5.4 Emerging Geographical Patterns 89

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

Unemployed

Vehicle ownership

Fuel deprivation

Fig. 5.8 Colonial cravings (social capital, socio-economics and world view)

Colonial Cravings

Continental Average

Food deprivation

Nations economy is bad

No trust in religious leaders

No trust in traditional leaders

No trust in army

No trust in police

No trust in local council

No trust in tax department

No trust in president No trust in parliamnet 0.9 No trust in electoral commission

Public sector employment Part-time employment NGO employment Full-time employment Private sector employment

No formal schooling

Informal schooling

Formal schooling

Pro free movt.

Anti free movt.

Accepts external interference

No external interference

Regional orgs. help

Continental orgs. help

Future model - USA

Future model - China

Future model - own country model Future model - colonial power

90 5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

5.6 Afropolitan Melting Pot

91

related descriptions of each cluster have been described in detail below. It is acknowledged that, in reality, these descriptions will show some degree of variability and applicability.

5.5

Anti-Democratic Nationalists

The four countries within this cluster are all located in Northern Africa. They include Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan. Together, they combine an average youth population density of 7.1 young persons per square kilometre. Youth population density ranges from 2.4 (Algeria) to 12.8 (Egypt) young persons per square kilometre. Social media remains their predominant medium for securing news and information. However, these young people have not been engaging effectively in politics. Many do not vote, or they have lacked time to vote in recent elections. Although these youngsters believe that democracy helps to breed equality and justice, they sometimes prefer non-democratic governance. For young people in these countries, life expectancy at age 15 years is significantly higher than their peers from other parts of the continent. In terms of leadership and institutions, these young people believe that local government officials, councillors, and traditional leaders are mostly or fully involved in corruption. Their general view is that the most effective approach for combating corruption is to avoid paying bribes. The most important policy priorities for this generation of young people are to improve the wages and income of citizens and to address the problem of corruption. Young people within these nations also find it very difficult to obtain public medical services. Similarly, they struggle to secure important identity documents from relevant agencies. Their distrust for traditional leaders is way above the continental average. For these young people, formal education rates, as well as public sector employment, are comparatively high. Vehicular (car and motorcycle) ownership is also dominant among these youths. Two features dominant their world view. First, these youngsters believe that their own country’s model is the best for future development. Secondly, young people in these nations strongly believe that governments should protect their own citizens and limit the cross-border movement of foreigners and goods.

5.6

Afropolitan Melting Pot

This is the largest cluster comprising sixteen of the thirty-six countries evaluated. This group is made up of the following nations: Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Together, they combine an average youth population density of 11.06 young persons per square kilometre. Youth population density ranges from 1.0 (Gabon) to 26 (Nigeria) young persons per square kilometre. While

92

5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

these young people believe that good citizens should regularly complain to their governments about poor public services, they also strongly believe that good citizens should vote in elections. Furthermore, there is an overrepresentation of young people who also believe that good citizens should always avoid criticising the government, indicating un-revolutionary inclinations. In terms of their citizenship and identities, evidence shows that those young people who affiliate themselves only with their ethnic identity are equally as dominant as those who identify only with their national identity. The major mechanisms used for civic engagements by young people in these countries are religious organisations. Many of them are leaders or active members of religious groups. Young people in these countries overwhelmingly approve of the adoption of other non-electoral methods for choosing these political leaders. There is also strong evidence of freedom of association, with many young people accepting that they are completely or somewhat free to join any political organisations of their choice. There is an overwhelmingly high expression of negativity towards key public institutions. A lot of young people in these nations strongly believe that the presidency, members of parliament, members of the judiciary, local government officials and traditional leaders are mostly or fully involved in corruption. Social capital is particularly weak on three fronts—traditional leaders, parliament, and national electoral commissions. Many of the young people in these nations have experienced some form of formal schooling. However, in socio-economic terms, many grapple with food deprivation. These young people express a world view that embraces the free movement of people and goods across international borders. Furthermore, many of them feel that regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, and IGAD are still helpful and influential.

5.7

Pro-Democratic Nationalists

This cluster comprises five countries scattered across four regions on the African continent. The nations in this cluster include Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, and Tunisia. Together, they combine an average youth population density of 6.7 young persons per square kilometre. Youth population density ranges from 0.2 (Mauritius) to 20.7 (Cape Verde) young persons per square kilometre. Young people in these countries strongly believe that good citizens should regularly complain to the government over the state of public services. Social media platforms remain their dominant channel for circulating news. In these nations, young people strongly prefer democracy as their system of governance. Their interpretation of democracy is that it should allow for multiparty competition therefore there is an overwhelming rejection of military rule and one-party rule by these young persons. However, it is noteworthy to mention that they also embrace the use of non-electoral methods for choosing leaders. In general, many of these young persons are of the opinion that they are completely or somewhat free to say what they think, join any political organisations and free to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured.

5.8 Hybrid Anti-military Polities

93

The overwhelming feeling is that local government officials and councillors are mostly or fully involved in corruption. In the future, the top policy priorities for young people in these nations would be addressing security and corruption. Many young people are formally educated, and employment in the private sector is equally as significant as employment in the public sector. Although there is an overrepresentation of young people who believe that regional organisations are beneficial, their predominant world view is that African countries should not try to interfere in the internal affairs of each other. Furthermore, many of the young people in these nations are against the free movement of people and goods across borders.

5.8

Hybrid Anti-military Polities

This cluster comprises six countries from four regions excluding Northern Africa. The nations in this cluster include Cote d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Madagascar, São Tomé and Príncipe, Swaziland and Tanzania. Together, they combine an average youth population density of 12.4 young persons per square kilometre. Youth population density ranges from 5.7 (Madagascar) to 27.4 (São Tomé and Príncipe) young persons per square kilometre. These youngsters express a very strong affiliation with their national identity. Many of them believe that good citizens should vote, and there is overwhelming agreement that good citizens should avoid criticising their government. However, these young persons are prepared to complain to the government over the poor state of public services. In general, civic engagement appears to be on the high side amongst young people. They contact their local councillors and religious leaders often to query important governance problems. They are actively involved in religious, civic engagements. They also attend community meetings regularly. However, these young people exhibit high levels of voter apathy as many deliberately decided not to vote or did not create the time to vote in some recent elections. There is an overwhelming rejection of military rule even though many of these young people would be prepared to choose their leaders using non-electoral methods. Furthermore, there is some evidence of rejection of democracy in these nations. Many of them feel that they are completely or somewhat free to join any political organisations and to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured. Amongst all institutions, the judiciary is particularly loathed by these young people as many of them believe that Judges and Magistrates are mostly or fully involved in corruption. Their top policy priority in the future is likely to focus on infrastructure, including the construction of roads. Social capital is generally weak in three institutional domains—the army, national electoral commissions and parliament. Although the young people in these nations believe that regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are helpful, they are prepared to model the future development of their nations in similar patterns with their previous colonial powers.

94

5.9

5 Mapping Africa’s Possible Future Political Geography Based on Governance. . .

Colonial Cravings

This cluster comprises seven countries, five of which are situated within Western Africa, with the other two located in Eastern Africa. The nations in this cluster include Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger, and Senegal. Together, they combine an average youth population density of 14.5 young persons per square kilometre. Youth population density ranges from 1.8 (Mali and Niger) to 50.7 (Burundi) young persons per square kilometre. These young people strongly believe that good citizens should always vote, avoid criticising the government, pay their taxes and agree with most people in their communities on political issues. Their civic engagements are mainly channelled via community meetings. For them, democracy is the preferred system of governance. They also overwhelmingly believe that they are free to say what they think, to join any political organisations and to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured. There is strong agreement among young people in these nations that citizens must obey the law. However, they have reservations about corrupt practices within the presidency and the judiciary. There is an overwhelming belief that the presidency and judiciary are mostly or fully involved in corruption. In the future, their chief policy priority will focus on addressing agriculture and food shortages. Many young people within these nations have no formal education, and they are disproportionately deprived of food. This perhaps explains why agriculture will feature at the top of their policy priority list in the future. Even though they believe that regional organisations have their national interest, the young people in these nations are prepared to model the future development of their nations in line with the models being operated by their previous colonial powers.

5.10

Conclusion

The discussions subsumed in this chapter represent the first attempt to utilise an empirical technique based on rigorous theoretical and conceptual foundations to group young African citizens according to their governance aspirations. The discussion unmasks some valuable data mining approaches that help to generate new insights about the disparities in young people’s governance aspirations. Not only do the techniques and results provide useful points of reference for students and scholars interested in politics and governance in the Global South, but they also offer public policy stakeholders an opportunity to get a sense of what the future might look like in terms of the political geography of the continent. Furthermore, the results of the study support the robust qualitative arguments put forward by Allen (1995) that African countries exhibit distinct forms of politics and political systems. Similarly, young Africans are currently threading on differentiated governance trajectories. It may therefore be erroneous or misguided to treat African

References

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youths who are on a particular governance trajectory as being representative of all other young Africans.

References Abdullahi, A. A., Adekeye, D. S., & Balogun, O. S. (2014). A ‘Nation’ in wilderness: Youth and insurgency in Nigeria. South African Review of Sociology, 45(2), 78–96. Allen, C. (1995). Understanding African politics. Review of African Political Economy, 22(65), 301–320. AU. (2006). African youth charter. African Union Commission. Bratton, M. (Ed.). (2013). Voting and democratic citizenship in Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cheeseman, N. (2015). Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform. Cambridge University Press. Gehrmann, S. (2016). Cosmopolitanism with African roots. Journal of African Cultural Studies, 28 (1), 61–72. Hofmeyr, J. H. (Ed.). (2012). The youth dividend: Unlocking the potential of young South Africans. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. ILO. (2006). Global employment trends for youth. International Labour Organisation. MIF. (2018). Public service in Africa. Mo Ibrahim Foundation. OECD. (2001). The well-being of nations: The role of human and social capital. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Ojo, A. (2020). GIS and machine learning for small area classifications in developing countries. CRC Press. Ojo, A., Vickers, D., & Ballas, D. (2012). The segmentation of local government areas: Creating a new geography of Nigeria. Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy, 5(1), 25–49. Paxton, P., & Hughes, M. M. (2015). Women, politics and power: A global perspective. CQ Press. Schmidt, L., Ramu, T., Conley, K., & Pfeifer, L. (2014). United Nations children fund background guide: National model United Nations. National Collegiate Conference Association. UN-DESA. (2017). World population prospects: The 2017 revision, methodology of the United Nations population estimates and projections, Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.250. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. UN-Habitat. (2012). Building an architecture for youth engagement in the UN system. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme. New York, 22 March–02 April. Werbner, P. (2008). Anthropology and the new cosmopolitanism. Berg Publishers.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1

Recognising the Power of Millennials

The accounts contained in this book feed directly into the mission of development stakeholders to stimulate new narratives about leadership and development in Africa. African millennials now have the audacity to imagine and talk about a better Africa. How to achieve a better Africa is a matter of ongoing commentary and changing perspectives. Observers within and outside Africa believe that weak political leadership and governance are responsible for Africa’s challenges (Afegbua and Adejuwon, 2012). A better approach to engaging leadership and governance challenges in Africa is to ask, why the deficits? Interrogating Africa’s leadership and governance challenges opens our minds to explore the contexts and facts about Africa. It initiates a more rigorous and robust process that is diagnostic of the problems and systematic to proffering solutions. Young people all over the world are becoming connected due to near-real-time information accessibility (Sindhuja and Akhilesh, 2020). Young Africans see the quality of life being experienced by those in the northern hemisphere. They also desire to have the same comforts. Rising aspirations are good, and when met with opportunities, they can lead to an explosion of dynamism among young people. This in turn helps to engender inclusive and sustainable growth. However, if aspirations are met with frustration, this can trigger and possibly exacerbate fragility, extremism, and migration. Rather than recognising the transformational power and potential of a new generation of visionary young leaders, Africa’s current political elite have systematically mounted roadblocks to frustrate the emergence of a new political class. Strongmen across Africa have established obstacles like politics of patronage, godfatherism, absence of internal democracy within existing political parties, illegal use of state resources, erosion of public confidence in elections, control, and corruption of the judiciary, exploitation of the power of incumbency, control of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Ojo, Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88546-5_6

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6 Conclusion

media and publicity spaces, divide-and-rule politics, and the smearing of the next generation of young Africans with the corruption label. The goal of these political strongmen is to force African millennials into a culture of low expectations, disunity, and ideological poverty. African millennials must reject mediocrity as a standard. In order not to risk alienating their generation from African leadership spaces, millennial movements and progressive development stakeholders must together to help young people break the cycle of hopelessness towards politics and governance. Despite the importance of African millennials to the future sustainability of the region, there are no specific governance metrics that explicitly focus on them. Current global governance measures do not incorporate direct opinions of young people across Africa therefore their voices are missing. A lack of focus on young Africans means that the future configuration of the political geography of Africa is hard to forecast. These knowledge gaps make this book timely and important. In addition to rigorously engaging widely held views about Africa’s current political elite, the book informs new narratives about Africa’s prospective future political geography. In terms of substantive findings, the majority of African millennials wish to push for closer integration and better cooperation between African nations. In the main, the youths in such nations described in this book as Afropolitan Melting Pot embrace and cherish their African identities, but they also express a world view that is not confined to a singular culture or experience. There is a sense that these nations may be homes to some of the least revolutionary young African citizens despite overwhelmingly low social capital in virtually all institutions. These nations, which include economic giants like Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya, are scattered across all the regions of Africa, excluding Northern Africa. The results from this work also reveal that some young Africans do exhibit nationalistic predilections that may see their countries reduce their engagement in regional and/or continental partnerships. These groups of countries are of two classes. There are those nationalists who do not fancy democracy. These are countries predominantly situated in Northern Africa. Conversely, those nationalists who embrace democracy are situated in Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, and Tunisia. Tunisia is a particularly interesting case as it is surrounded by nations whose young people overwhelmingly reject western democracy. Furthermore, we discovered that some millennials have no real preferences, and they are willing to mix and match different governance approaches, including non-electoral methods. However, these young people do not want to experience a return to the military. Finally, there are some young people who will push for their countries to model future development according to prototypes used by their previous colonial powers. The vast majority of these countries are concentrated in Western Africa. Their policy priorities will focus on addressing agriculture and food shortages.

6.2 Organising the Power of Millennials

6.2

99

Organising the Power of Millennials

In May 2020, Professor PLO Lumumba (Professor of Public Law and anticorruption advocate) shared a thought-provoking tweet on his Twitter handle. The text reads as follows “If young Africans should have one duty, it should be to irritate those in Power in such an organised manner that they have no choice but to do what is right” (Lumumba, 2020). The first insight that can be deduced from Lumumba’s tweet is the recognition of the power, energy intellect and potential of African millennials. This tweet acknowledges the role of African millennials as the likely agents of transformational change. Secondly, Lumumba’s tweet agrees with a central argument in this book—the unwillingness of the majority of African leaders to do the right thing. Africa is suffering a leadership deficit that is compounded by a general lack of urgency and desire for human and social development among the current ruling elite (Timamy, 2005). Lumumba’s argument is that millennials can compel African leaders to do the right thing. However, he also points out that millennials cannot accomplish much if their power remains disorganised. He proposes a much more cohesive approach as a panacea. Organising the power of African millennials requires millennials to build meaningful relationships. This in turn will strengthen their cause and allow them to attract solidarities among the general population. For millennials to be able to diminish existing elite power, they need to expand their bases. Without organised movements, millennials will struggle to expand their bases (International IDEA, 2018). Millennial movements can attract solidarity and build important relations through activities like door knocking, phone banking and one-to-one meetings. It is also worrying that some African millennial movements do not have action plans designed to achieve their long-term goals (De Hann et al., 2020). This explains why it is challenging for such groups to organise themselves properly. Without proper strategies, millennial groups cannot effectively organise themselves to mount formidable challenges against political strongmen. Millennial movements need to learn to identify issues that affect different demographics in their nations and find ways to bring those people together to address the issues collectively. Among electorates, there are always undecideds—those persons who is are not a firm supporters of any political party, and whose vote in an election is difficult to predict. Clear organisational strategies can help millennials bring unconvinced electorates into their movements in order to expand their base. Better organising will also yield transformational capabilities among millennials. Millennials involved in organising inadvertently develop a sense of personal agency that they previously lacked (International IDEA, 2018). They harness new leadership qualities and build confidence that enables them to make a difference in their communities (De Hann et al., 2020). Millennial movements that embrace a sense of agency are able to push in directions they might not have conceived.

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Another advantage of organising millennial movements is that groups are better able to distribute tasks through larger networks of leaders (De Hann et al., 2020). Organised movements cultivate a sense of division of labour, and all members of such movements perceive themselves as stakeholders in the movement. Leaders of millennial movements need to learn to engage young people for action that brings them into contact with each other and presents them room to deploy their strategic autonomy.

6.3

Concluding Thoughts: Young Africans Must Avoid Familiar Mistakes

It is immensely challenging for young Africans to sidestep the obstacles (discussed in Chap. 3) put in place by political strongmen because established politicians have either been in the corridors of power or held unto power for too long while also accumulating vast volumes of wealth. Although the challenge of rising out of the political shadows of strongmen is enormous, African millennials must also avoid committing familiar errors and making false starts. These mistakes which are discussed below, make the task of unseating established corrupt politicians difficult and further damages prospects for good governance.

6.3.1

Culture of Low Expectations

Africa has been depicted as a continent with a lot of promise and potential (Olopade, 2014). However, it appears that the current political class has succeeded in nearly aborting this promise. In doing this, the political class has managed to create polities where large sections of the citizenry rationalise, defend and excuse the mediocrity and underperformance of the political class. Tragically, it appears that sections of young Africans have become accustomed to this culture of low expectations. They have learned to tolerate the crises bedevilling their nations because it has always been that way. Young Africans who accept mediocrity as a standard and adopt a disinterested and hopeless approach towards politics and governance risk alienating their generation from African leadership spaces.

6.3.2

Absence of Compromises and Alliances

Some of the political movements set up by young visionary Africans have been inflicted by a clash of egos (Business Day, 2019), resulting in their wreckage. A recent example can be drawn from Nigeria’s 2019 presidential election. Around

6.3 Concluding Thoughts: Young Africans Must Avoid Familiar Mistakes

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18 presidential aspirants were aged between the ages of 33 and 46 years. This pool of contestants comprised people based locally and some from the diasporas. They expressed distrust in the Buhari leadership and promised to edge him out of power in 2019. With limited resources, some of these young people traversed much of the country. Closer to the elections, this group of younger contestants realised that if they all contested, they would split the youth vote; therefore a number of conferences were held to see if the group could form a united front. Two of them, Fela Durotoye and Omoyele Sowore, were front-runners. However, after several attempts, the group failed to forge a united front. Most of them contested the election, and they all lost, hence maintaining the old entrenched system.

6.3.3

Lopsided Ethno-Religious Perceptions

Ethnicity and religion are salient social identities and institutions that are deeply ingrained within African societies. Ethnicity and religion generally inculcate moral principles and values (Ebstyne and Furrow, 2008). However, the diversity of ethnoreligious identities is also repeatedly exploited for political gains (Ojo et al., 2019). Unfortunately, in recent years, a disturbing trend seems to be emerging among African millennials, particularly on social media. Constructive debates or discussions that should focus on progressive governance and politics tend to degenerate into the hurling of depressing ethnic and religious slurs rapidly. Much of the use of biased language among young Africans is directly linked to the stories (true or false) that many of them have heard from their parents or guardians. Young Africans seem to have inherited a baggage of ethno-religious and patriarchal bigotry from preceding generations, and this baggage is making it difficult for the younger generation to build the necessary bridges and form the cross-cultural alliances that can help them unseat political strongmen.

6.3.4

Ideological Poverty

Ideologies are the sets of basic beliefs about the political, economic, social, and cultural affairs held by the majority of people who form a political movement (Seliger, 2019). Effective political movements are identified by their political ideologies. A cross-section of mainstream ideologies is described in Table 6.1. In their recent working paper, Conroy-Krutz and Lewis (2011) used statistical methods to investigate the ideological orientation of contemporary African political parties. They discovered that there is a general absence of elite-generated ideological discourse across the continent. An excerpt from their paper reads as follows: “Given a lack of emphasis on ideological cues in elite-mass communications, top-down approaches to the emergence and salience of ideology would suggest that Africans will not organise their political opinions according to identifiable value structures. In

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Table 6.1 A cross-section of political ideologies Ideology Absolutism Anarchism Aristocracy Autocracy Capitalism Communism Conservatism Democracy Dictatorship Egalitarianism Fascism Imperialism Liberalism Marxism Maoism Monarchy Nationalism Oligarchy Populism Socialism Theocracy Totalitarianism Trotskyism

Description System where the rulers have unlimited control. Society without government, laws, police, or other authority. System of selfcontrol. The privilege of social class whose members possess disproportionately large percentage of society’s wealth, prestige, and political influence. Supreme political power is in the hands of one person whose decisions are unregulated. Right-wing political system where the principle means of production and distribution are in private hands. Extreme left-wing ideology. Collective ownership and a planned economy. Each should work to their capability and receive according to their needs. Governmental system where the existing institution is maintained, emphasising free enterprise and minimal governmental intervention. Government by the people usually through elected representatives. Government by a single person with absolute control over the resources of the state. Belief where all citizens have equal rights and privileges. Extreme right-wing ideology where the existing social order is protected by the forcible suppression of the working class. The extension of power and rule beyond established geographical boundaries. Representative government, free speech, abolition of class privilege and state protection of the individual. It proposes that all is subject to change and resistance to change necessitates the overthrow of the system through class struggle. Interpretation of Marxist communism emphasising the development of agriculture. A form of rule in which the head of state is a King or Queen. The unification of the state and release from foreign rule. A system of government in which virtually all power is held a small number of wealthy people who shape policy to benefit themselves. Collective noun for the ideologies, which demand the redistribution of political power and economic leadership to the “common people.” Left-wing political system where the principle means of production, distribution, and exchange are in common ownership. A form of government in which God or a deity of some type is recognised as the supreme ruling authority. Government control of all activities. Form of Marxism incorporating the concept of permanent revolution

country after country, and in subgroup after subgroup, we find little evidence of structures that inform individuals’ opinions on multiple political issues. In short, most Africans do not seem to adhere to ideologies, or belief structures, that inform their attitudes on specific political issues” (Conroy-Krutz and Lewis, 2011, p. 27). Sadly, the problem of ideological barrenness persists within political movements set up by young Africans (Igue, 2010). Some African countries have multiple youth

References

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movements, the vast majority of them lacking any form of political or electoral sway or significance. The danger of ideological poverty is that political participation can quickly become a way of life or a profession where switching from one political party to another becomes the norm. When the chips are down, young people without a clear ideological focus may end up using politics as a means for economic survival. For them, politics may become a career devoid of a sense of dedication or sacrifice for the common good or their respective countries’ development.

References Afegbua, S. I., & Adejuwon, K. D. (2012). The challenges of leadership and governance in Africa. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 2(9), 141–157. Business Day. (2019). Old African leaders can be unseated if younger ones unite, olusegun obasanjo says. Business Day, 28 March. Accessed January 12, 2020, from https://www. businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2019-03-28-old-african-leaders-can-be-unseated-if-youn ger-ones-unite-olusegun-obasanjo-says/ Conroy-Krutz, J., & Lewis, D. (2011). Mapping ideologies in African landscapes. Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 129. Accessed January 10, 2020, from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/ 128199/AfropaperNo129_2.pdf De Haan, L., Barrail, H. S., Burdett, E., Ciasnocha, M., Dangote, C., Dannomau, A.A., Nzuki, S., Ouadah, Z., Peprah-Agyemang, B., Sanzarello, L., & Stuurman, P. (2020). What makes a successful protest? Chatham House, 15 December. Accessed July 20, 2020, from https:// www.chathamhouse.org/2020/12/what-makes-successful-protest Ebstyne, K. P., & Furrow, J. L. (2008). Religion as a resource for positive youth development: Religion, social capital, and moral outcomes. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, S(1), 34–49. Igue, J. O. (2010). A new generation of leaders in Africa: What issues do they face? International Development Policy, 1, 115–133. International IDEA. (2018). Collaboration between citizen: Movements and political parties. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Lumumba, P. L. O. (2020). If young Africans should have one duty. [Twitter]. 6 May. Accessed July 23, 2021, from https://twitter.com/ProfPLOLumumba/status/1258047896856952835 Ojo, A., Ibeh, S. C., & Kieghe, D. (2019). How Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election outcome was forecasted with geodemographics and public sentiment analytics. African Geographical Review, 38(4), 343–360. Olopade, D. (2014). The bright continent: Breaking rules and making change in modern Africa. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Seliger, M. (2019). Ideology and politics. Routledge. Sindhuja, C. V., & Akhilesh, K. B. (2020). Millennials at Industry 4.0 - Opportunities and Challenges. In K. Akhilesh & D. Möller (Eds.), Smart technologies. Springer. Timamy, M. H. K. (2005). Debate: African leaders and corruption. Review of African Political Economy, 32(104–105), 383–393.

Index

A Absolute monarchies, 60, 64, 67–69 Accountability, 19, 23, 24, 27, 69 Africa, 1–4, 6, 7, 11, 13–21, 27, 28, 33–38, 41, 44, 46–50, 54, 56, 58, 62, 68–70, 73–94, 97–100 African, 1–7, 11–28, 33–50, 53–71, 73–75, 77, 78, 80, 84, 85, 92–94, 97–102 African citizens, 21, 35, 49, 94, 98 African continent, 1, 2, 5, 11, 14, 17, 20, 28, 44, 92 African Governance, 13, 16, 19, 24, 46 African leaders, 4, 16, 17, 20, 23, 28, 47, 48, 54, 99 African leadership spaces, 33–35, 98, 100 African millennial movements, 99 African millennials, 2–4, 6, 7, 14, 15, 27–28, 36, 53–71, 97–101 African monarchs, 18, 34 African political class, 1 African political parties, 101 African politicians, 49 African stakeholders, 2 African traditional rulers, 19 African Union Commission, 74 Afrobarometer study, 6, 54, 58, 74, 75 Afropolitanism, 78 Age, 1–3, 6, 14, 15, 18, 19, 27, 60, 61, 64, 65, 73–75, 77, 91 Ageing population, 3 Agile state building, 19 Agitations, 7, 20, 68, 70 Agricultures, 14, 81, 94, 98, 102 Algeria, 18, 54, 55, 75, 91 America, 16, 33, 37

Annual growth rate, 1 Anti-democratic norms, 3 Anti-government protests, 56, 61, 69 Arab Spring, 28, 54–56, 70 Aspirations, 2, 6, 7, 11–16, 21, 27, 28, 69, 73, 77, 84, 97 Authoritarian regimes, 59

B Basic human rights, 13 Basic needs, 12, 13 Benin, 6, 55, 75, 91 British, 34 Burkina Faso, 55 Burundi, 46, 75, 94 Business, 23, 26, 27, 35, 75, 78, 81, 100

C Cameroon, 39, 45, 46, 75, 91 Cape Verde, 75, 92, 98 Citizens, 5, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 55, 58, 59, 69, 78, 79, 81, 83, 91–94, 102 Civic engagements, 77, 81, 92–94 Civil liberties, 37, 39, 40, 82 Civil-society representatives, 1 Closer integration, 98 Coalitions, 43–45, 74 Cohort, 4, 54, 77 Collective national ambition, 20 Colonial Africa, 49 Colonialists, 35, 39, 45 Colonial leaders, 36 Colonial period, 34

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Ojo, Social Revolutions and Governance Aspirations of African Millennials, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88546-5

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106 Colonial powers, 35, 45, 83, 93, 94, 98 Colonial regimes, 34, 45 Communitarianism, 18 Communities, 18, 42, 45, 70, 71, 77, 78, 81, 93, 94, 99 Composite indices, 24, 26 Comprehensive social science, 5 Conflicts, 1, 5, 17, 19, 28, 33, 35, 53 Consensus, 1, 11, 15, 18, 19, 78 Constitutional monarchies, 7, 60, 64, 66, 67, 69 Continental European traditions, 16 Continents, 1, 2, 4, 7, 14, 15, 20, 27, 28, 33, 46, 50, 68, 73, 77, 91, 94, 100, 101 Cooperation, 14, 98 Core traditions, 16 Correlation, 24, 26, 27, 79 Corrupt, 7, 16, 33, 43, 49, 55, 100 Corruption, 1, 3, 12, 21, 24, 26–28, 35, 38, 40, 49–50, 55, 56, 59, 63, 66, 69, 81–83, 91–94, 97 Corruption label, 98 Corrupt leaders, 33 Cosmopolitan, 78 Cosmopolitanism, 78 Councillors, 61, 64, 65, 67, 81, 91, 93 Countervailing powers, 19 Crime, 7, 27, 40, 59, 63, 66, 70 Crime reduction, 69 Critical mass, 68 Cult personality, 44 Cultural differences, 78 Cultural divides, 14

D Data collection processes, 5 Decaying infrastructure, 3 Decentralised decision making, 19 Deciles, 24, 25 Decision-making, 2, 19, 36, 37, 47, 77 Decision-making process, 45 Democracies, 6, 16, 17, 28, 33, 34, 37, 39, 45, 48, 54, 59, 74, 75, 77, 82, 91–94, 98, 102 Democratic development, 5, 6, 18, 74 Democratic systems, 34, 59 Demographic dividend, 2, 56 Demographic structure, 14 Demographic variables, 61, 65, 77 Denis Sassou Nguesso, 37, 46 Development goals, 12, 20 Development stakeholders, 97, 98 Development studies, 4, 6, 75

Index Dictatorships, 39, 55, 59, 69, 102 Digital learning technologies, 2 Disciplines, 4, 17 Diversity, 43, 101 Donor agencies, 11, 12 Duplication, 19

E Eastern Africa, 75, 94 Economic conditions, 6, 53, 54, 74 Economic development, 7, 21, 54, 58–60, 66 Economics, 2–5, 14, 16–18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 37, 42, 45, 53, 54, 56, 70, 77, 78, 82, 93, 98, 101–103 Economic significance, 1, 2 Economic structures, 56 Economies, 2, 6, 7, 15, 53, 58, 59, 63, 65, 66, 75, 81, 82, 102 Education, 2, 13, 23, 58, 61, 64, 65, 69, 70, 81 Educational attainment, 60–62, 64, 65, 69 Educational needs, 7, 59, 63, 65, 66, 70 Education gap, 3 Education system, 3 Effective governance, 5 Egypt, 38, 55, 59, 75, 91 Elections, 17, 19, 36, 37, 45, 47, 48, 55, 59, 77, 81, 91–93, 97, 99, 101 Electoral competition, 45 Electoral institutions, 45, 46 Electoral processes, 48 Electorates, 26, 44, 48, 49, 99 Elites, 33–36, 39, 55, 97–99 Empirical scientific projects, 5 Employment, 2, 13, 14, 27, 83, 91, 93 Energy, 7, 27, 28, 50, 99 Entrepreneurs, 28 Environmental agenda, 77 Equality, 69, 77, 82, 83, 91 Ethnicity, 18, 101 Ethno-religious identities, 101 Ethno-religious patronages, 42 European, 16, 34, 35, 49 Evidence, 1, 2, 12, 14, 15, 20, 27, 34, 42, 48, 49, 60, 61, 68, 77, 78, 92, 93, 102

F Fairness, 19, 24, 48 Faith-based movements, 42 Fears, 6, 13–16, 42 Fertility rate, 6 Financial safety net, 15

Index Formal education, 13, 61, 64, 65, 69, 91, 94 Formal institutions, 19 Fragile nations, 24 Fragile States Index (FSI), 5, 21–24 Fragility, 21, 26, 28, 97 Freedom, 13, 20, 28, 37, 56, 83, 92 Frequency distributions, 62 Functional existence, 13 Fund for Peace (FFP), 5, 21–23 Future political geography, 73–94, 98

G Gabon, 75, 91 Geography, 4, 21 Gerontocracy, 18, 19 Ghana, 6, 18, 33, 75, 91 Global demographic estimates, 6 Global governance, 21, 98 Goals, 12, 13, 45, 98, 99 Godfathers, 47, 50 Governance, 1–7, 11, 13–21, 23–27, 33–35, 37, 40, 41, 44, 50, 54, 59, 60, 68, 73–94, 97, 98, 100, 101 Governance aspirations, 2, 20, 73–94 Governance dividends, 14 Governance metrics, 26, 73, 74, 98 Governance orientation, 7 Governance strategies, 20 Government, 5, 7, 12, 15–17, 19–21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 35–38, 40, 42, 44, 54–56, 58–61, 64–70, 74, 78, 91–94, 102 Government parastatals, 44 Government policies, 78 Guinea, 37, 39, 40, 46, 75, 94

H Higher educational institutions, 4 Higher-order skills, 15 History, 4, 18, 36, 42 Human culture, 53 Humanism, 18 Humanistic psychology, 12 Human Rights Watch, 44, 45

I Ibrahim Foundation, 5, 24, 25, 78 Ibrahim Index, 5, 21, 23–25 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), 5, 21, 23–25 Ideological orientation, 101

107 Ideologies, 101, 102 Idriss Deby, 46 Igbo, 34 IIAG data, 5 Ill-informed electorates, 49 Impending demographic dividend, 1, 14 Inclusion, 77, 79 Inclusive institutions, 77 Inclusiveness, 19 Incumbency, 44, 48, 97 Incumbents, 45, 48 Independence, 35, 45 Index scores, 5 Indicators, 6, 21, 23, 24, 77 Indigenous system laws, 19 Industrial settings, 4 Infrastructures, 1, 7, 15, 23, 35, 70, 81, 93 Institutional structures, 42 Institutions, 6, 13, 15–21, 23, 24, 33–37, 60, 69, 77, 81, 83, 91, 93, 98, 101, 102 Insubordination, 19 Integral governance apparatus, 78 Integrated analysis, 7 Integrated continent, 14 Integration, 17, 19, 20 Intergenerational members, 15 Internal democracy, 45, 47, 97 Internal displacement, 21 Internal party democracy, 45, 47 Internal social structures, 5 International agencies, 21 International Labour Organisation (ILO), 73 Investment, 3, 26, 58, 70

J Journalists, 44 Justice, 1, 6, 13, 18, 48, 75, 82, 91

K Karl Marx, 53 K-means algorithm, 84 Kurtosis, 79

L Labour markets, 3, 13–15, 70 Law, 17, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 40, 48, 83, 94, 99 Leadership, 2–4, 6, 7, 15, 17–20, 28, 34, 42, 47, 50, 65, 70, 77, 81, 83, 91, 97, 99, 101, 102 Leadership failure, 27, 28 Living standards, 59, 63, 66

108 Logistic model, 65, 67 Logistic regression analysis, 7, 65–67 Logistic regression model, 62, 67, 68 Logit transformation, 62 Long-term engagement, 11 Long-term incumbents, 46 Loyalists, 39, 43 Loyalty, 20, 43

M Madagascar, 75, 93 Mainstream media, 49 Malawi, 37, 75, 94 Mali, 59, 75, 94 Management, 7, 21, 23, 59, 63, 66 Mass actions, 54 Mauritius, 23, 75, 92, 98 Media, 27, 36–38, 40, 43, 44, 49, 83, 91, 97 Media outlets, 44 Metrics, 6, 7, 21, 24, 26, 73 Military rule, 82, 92, 93 Millennial movements, 98–100 Millennials, 2–4, 6, 7, 13–15, 27, 28, 44, 54, 56, 58, 61, 62, 64–70, 73–95, 97–100 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 11, 12, 20 Minority ethnic groups, 19 Mobilisation, 7, 70 Modern human history, 53 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF), 5, 11, 23–25, 27, 78 Monarch, 19, 34, 60, 68, 69 Morocco, 55, 75, 91 Multicollinearity, 79 Multi-lateral partnership, 11 Multiple linear regression, 65

N National electoral institutions, 45 Nationalism, 20, 102 Nationalists, 86, 88, 91–93, 98 Natural science, 53 Neo-colonialism, 35, 36 Nepotism, 3, 55 Niger, 75, 94 Nigeria, 18, 34, 39, 45, 46, 55, 56, 70, 75, 91, 98, 100 Nkrumah, K., 36 Non-governmental organisations, 42 Northern Africa, 75, 91, 93, 98 Nyerere, 35

Index O Opposition, 37, 39–41, 43–46 Opposition parties, 45 Oppression, 34, 35, 39, 55 Outsiders, 19

P Parliament, 33, 46, 69, 82, 83, 92, 93 Parliamentarians, 7, 61, 64, 65, 67, 69 Partisan loyalty, 47 Partnership working, 19 Party procedures, 45 Party structures, 45, 47 Patronage, 35, 42, 47, 97 Performance index, 24 Polarisation, 3 Policy, 1, 2, 4, 11, 14, 16, 17, 23, 24, 27, 38, 43, 47, 74, 78, 81, 91, 93, 94, 98, 102 Policy performance, 78 Policy priorities, 81, 91, 93, 94, 98 Political accountability, 48 Political campaigns, 47 Political class, 3, 15, 46, 49, 50, 97, 100 Political geography, 73, 94, 98 Political ideologies, 101, 102 Political leadership, 3–5, 42, 49, 97 Political movements, 50, 100–102 Political organisations, 17, 92–94 Political participation, 103 Political party structures, 45, 47 Political platform, 35 Political power, 36, 40, 41, 46, 102 Political situation, 36, 54 Political strongholds, 49 Politicians, 37, 45, 47–49, 100 Politics, 1, 2, 34, 37, 38, 45, 47, 49, 50, 54, 77, 81, 82, 91, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103 Polities, 19, 47, 89, 93, 100 Poor leadership, 11–28 Poor political leadership, 6 Population cohort, 2 Population Prospects, 74 Poverty, 1, 15, 17, 21, 28, 35, 37, 49, 60, 69, 98, 101–103 Power, 4, 13, 15, 17–19, 33–48, 50, 53, 54, 56, 60, 69, 70, 77, 80, 82, 97–102 Power base, 6, 35, 36 Practitioners, 4, 53 Pre-colonial Africa, 18 Pre-colonial African administrations, 18 Pre-colonial African states, 18 Pre-colonial era, 18

Index Pre-colonial governance systems, 34 Predictions, 66, 67, 70 Predictor variables, 54, 58–63, 68 Presidency, 60, 64, 65, 67, 69, 83, 92, 94 President Barack Obama, 33 Presidential aspirants, 101 Presidential election, 45, 100 Primary datasets, 6 Privileges, 19, 36, 102 Problematic behaviours, 15 Professor PLO Lumumba, 99 Propensities, 7, 15, 53–71 Protégés, 47 Protests, 55, 56, 58, 69, 70, 81 Public attitudes, 6, 21, 54, 74 Public confidence, 48, 97 Public institutions, 27, 92 Publicity spaces, 49, 98 Public offices, 41, 47, 48, 50 Public officials, 27 Public participation, 19 Public perception, 24, 26, 45 Public perception data, 24, 26 Public policymaking, 19 Public safety, 6, 69 Public sector institutions, 78 Public services, 58, 78, 82, 92, 93

Q Qualitative expert analysis, 5, 21

R Radicalisation, 28 Recognition, 1, 2, 13, 19, 20, 42, 99 Recognition needs map, 13 Regime, 7, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42, 45, 54, 57–61, 65–69 Regime change, 41, 54, 61, 68 Regime types, 7, 54, 57–60, 65–68 Religion, 35, 101 Religious organisations, 92 Resolution, 19, 33 Responsibilities, 5, 19, 20, 36, 69 Retrogressive governance, 21 Revolts, 65, 67–69 Revolutionary leaders, 53 Revolutions, 53–56, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 102 Rural areas, 3, 14 Rural millennials, 14, 15

S São Tomé, 75, 93 Skewness, 79 Skills, 14–16, 50

109 Social Affairs, 5 Social control, 39, 40 Social integrity, 5 Socialisation, 2 Social media, 2, 7, 15, 49, 91, 92, 101 Social Policy, 4 Social revolutions, 7, 53–71 Societies, 1, 2, 14, 15, 18, 38, 39, 42, 43, 53, 58, 70, 77, 101, 102 Socio-economic variables, 78 Soft skills, 70 Spiritual powers, 19 Stakeholder groups, 4, 6 Stakeholders, 19, 45, 70, 75, 94, 100 State effectiveness, 7, 58, 60 State funds, 47, 49 State institutions, 21, 34, 60 State resources, 42, 43, 47, 48, 50, 97 Statistical systems, 5 Statistics, 5, 61, 74, 79 Strongmen, 6, 33–50, 54, 55, 97–101 Students, 4, 7, 16, 55, 94 Sub-Saharan Africa, 68, 70 Suburban areas, 2 Sudan, 37, 39, 43, 49, 54, 56, 75, 91 Support base, 45 Surveillance, 38, 40, 44 Surveys, 23, 24 Survival mindset, 42 Survival needs, 13

T Taxpayers, 20 Teachers, 3, 15, 70 Technologies, 3, 15 Totalitarian regimes, 33, 34 Traditional African culture, 18 Traditional leaders, 19, 61, 64, 65, 67, 81, 82, 91, 92 Traditions, 16–21, 34, 35 Trust, 18, 44, 70, 82 Tunisia, 40, 54, 56, 59, 75, 92, 98 Twitter, 15, 99

U UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), 1, 4, 6, 74 Unemployed citizens, 15 Unemployment, 3, 14, 15, 27, 55, 56, 58 Unemployment benefits, 15 UN-Habitat, 74 United Nations, 5, 6, 73, 74 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 73 United Nations Secretariat, 5, 73

110 United Nations Statistics, 5 United States, 33, 44, 45 Urban, 1, 3, 14, 15, 70 Urban cultures, xi, 1

V Vibrant political party, 45 Violent, 7, 33, 35, 55, 70 Violent agitations, 7 Violent sexual crimes, 70 Vulnerability, 5

W Warrant chiefs, 34, 35 Weakening societal structures, 14

Index West Africa, 28, 33, 58, 62 Western Africa, 75, 94, 98 Women leaders, 34 World Population Prospects (WPP), 5, 74 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 5, 21, 24–27

Y Young Africans, 1–6, 11–28, 46–50, 54, 55, 60, 73, 75, 77, 78, 84, 85, 94, 95, 97–103 Young aspiring leaders, 49 Young citizens, 73, 80 Youth, 1, 2, 4, 7, 14, 19, 28, 50, 68, 73, 74, 91–94, 98, 101, 102 Youth bulge, 2 Youth movements, 1, 102